The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala 3030212327, 9783030212322

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The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala Alex Roberto Hybel

with Zander Weisman Mintz and Elise Hope Dunn

The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas

Alex Roberto Hybel

The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala

With Zander Weisman Mintz and Elise Hope Dunn

Alex Roberto Hybel Marina del Rey, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-21232-2    ISBN 978-3-030-21233-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Marina Lohrbach / shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my wife Jan and my mother-in-law Barbara

Preface

This book may be my last one. The approach of my 74th birthday, accompanied by the invasion of an unexpected and often destructive disease, engendered a new awareness about my mortality. Regardless of whether I will have the energy and drive to initiate and complete a book that I have been planning for several years, I consider myself a very fortunate individual. My move to the United States in 1965 opened doors to a future I could never have imagined. After spending 19 turbulent years in Argentina, a long stint in Vietnam in the late 1960s as an Army reporter and photographer, and the attainment of US citizenship, I finally found my passion. My mother said it best in 1983 when she stated, “Who would have dreamed that you, who barely made it through high school, cared about little but swimming in the Rio de la Plata, and skipped classes regularly to go to the movies, would eventually get a Ph.D. from Stanford University.” I don’t have a clue as to what made that transformation possible, but I am very grateful that it happened. This project would have never been completed without the hard work and tremendous patience of two of my Connecticut College students. Zander Weisman Mintz spent months collecting data and writing about Venezuela’s and Colombia’s distinct political experiences. Elise Hope Dunn carried out the same task in her analysis of Mexico. Zander also contributed to the analysis of the Mexican case at a later stage. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criticisms and suggestions. I am also thankful to Connecticut College for granting me multiple sabbaticals and providing the necessary financial support via my endowed chair. vii

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As in the past, I am indebted to my mother-in-law, Barbara Peurifoy, for her willingness to edit countless drafts and in the process teach me how to write in English. Her kindness, thoughtfulness, and intelligence continue to motivate me. But when all is said and done, nothing that I have written for the past 30-plus years would have been published had I not had Jan’s constant support and love. Final responsibility for the structure and content of every chapter in this book and for whatever errors may remain is mine alone. Marina del Rey, California 2019

Alex Roberto Hybel

Contents

1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem  1 Alex Roberto Hybel 2 Theories of State Creation and Democratization 17 Alex Roberto Hybel 3 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in the United States 55 Alex Roberto Hybel 4 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in Mexico 91 Alex Roberto Hybel, Elise Hope Dunn and Zander Weisman Mintz 5 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in Colombia and Venezuela137 Zander Weisman Mintz and Alex Roberto Hybel

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6 State Creation and Democratization in Costa Rica and Guatemala209 Alex Roberto Hybel 7 An Exploratory Theory of State Creation and Democratization: The United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala247 Alex Roberto Hybel Index261

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

Introduction This book’s principal objectives are threefold. The initial goal is to identify the key challenges encountered by six political entities in the Americas as each one tried to create its own state and form its own political regime. The second objective is to postulate a set of time-related hypotheses that capture the evolutionary processes of state creation and political-regime formation. The third objective, which is closely related to the first two, is to explain why some states in the Americas have been more effective than others at creating a democratic regime. Since the arguments presented here are built on the contention that past developments can affect the state-creation and political-regime-formation processes, the analysis begins with the identification of the main conditions each newly freed entity inherited from the colonial period. An examination of the challenges each group encountered as it sought to create a state and form a political regime is followed by an evaluation of its effectiveness in addressing those tasks. The six cases investigated in this book are the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.

Rationale Democracy is in peril. Just a few decades ago, most Western political scientists would not have voiced such a concern. They would have agreed with the contention that democracy was the “only game in town.”1 They © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_1

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would have added that in places where democracy had been consolidated, the return to authoritarianism had become an unacceptable alternative.2 Today, such a bold assertion would be questioned, and with very good reasons. In the 1920s, only a very small number of sovereign states had political regimes that would have qualified as democratic. By 1990, that number had increased to 69, and by 2012 to 117. Between the years 2005 and 2013, however, more countries experienced a decline in political rights and civil liberties than an increase.3 Equally disturbing are the figures representing the percentage of millennials in developed democracies who actually support democracy. In the United States, the number of millennials who believe it is “essential to live in a democracy” is only 30 percent. In Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand the percentage is at 40 percent or lower. Ironically, the last four states are among the 16 most developed democracies in the world. The numbers remain troubling as the analysis focuses on those who believe that it is preferable to have a “strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” As could be expected, the percentage in places such as Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey oscillates between the high 50s and the high 70s. But sadly, though the percentages are much lower, they have increased in the United States and Germany, as well as in Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, four South American countries that seemed to have finally embraced democracy some two to three decades ago.4 Is the world beginning to witness the steady downfall of democracy? Will a modified form of authoritarianism arise, one in which autocratic leaders limit the access to multiple sources of information in order to mold the preferences of the public? The two questions beg another question: Should democracy be desired? Any serious attempt to answer the questions forces analysts to recognize that despite democracy’s present allure among many people in various corners of the world, for much of history political leaders and philosophers did not view it favorably. Plato posited that oligarchies turned into democracies when elites overindulged, became idle and wasteful, and developed interests separate from those they ruled. Democracies did not fare much better. Democracies became tyrannies when mob passion overtook political reason and autocrats became the darling of the masses. Machiavelli was no less critical. He argued that democracies catered to the whims of the people, who too often accepted false ideas, misused their resources, and failed to take into consideration potential threats until it

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was too late. The founders of the United States also feared democracy. John Adams warned that democracies never lasted long. Every democracy throughout history self-destructed. James Madison was equally troubled. But then Winston Churchill told us to keep in mind that no one “pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”5 Churchill’s implicit warning should not be taken lightly. Democracies have not always enabled the wisest to lead, and too often, they have become victims of the whims of uninformed populists. But it should not be forgotten that though open and competitive political systems have not always shielded democracies from grave errors, they have enhanced the chances to correct those mistakes before they became unbearably costly. Other political systems lack such safety measures. Moreover, no other single type of political system has empowered the voices of those who, forced to remain quiet throughout history, can finally be heard and counted. The study of the conditions that either facilitate or obstruct the formation of democratic regimes is an old enterprise. Some investigators have focused on single cases; others have conducted comparative studies in different regions. Based on their works, analysts have derived multiple arguments, often in the form of theories. Because democracies have emerged in every region of the world, and at different times in history, it would be futile to attempt to develop a theoretical argument applicable to states worldwide without first acquiring a clear understanding of the struggles that states in particular regions endured at different point in time as they strove to consolidate and legitimize their power and establish democratic regimes. Hence the rationale for focusing solely on a few states in the Americas.6

Methodology Process-tracing procedure is an analytical tool utilized to draw “descriptive and causal pieces from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena.”7 As David Collier explains, process-tracing helps to: (a) identify and describe political and social phenomena, (b) evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses, discover new ones, and assess the new causal claims, (c) gain insights into causal mechanisms, and (d) provide alternative ways of addressing challenging problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias.8

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Stated differently, the investigator tries to identify the intervening steps or cause-and-effect links that might exist between the dependent, intervening, and independent variables within a particular case, conduct the same analyses in other related cases, and then compare the cause-and-effect links across cases.9 In cases where a similar sequence does not emerge, the investigator attempts to find out what might have caused the discrepancy.

Case Selection The decision to study the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela demands answers to two questions: Why compare the state-creation and political-regime-formation processes of the United States with those of Spanish American states when their histories and cultures are so different? Why include in the analyses the experiences of Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia and not of other Spanish American states? The analysis presented here rejects the contention that the inclusion of the United States in the comparison would elicit arguments of limited theoretical value. The United States’ pathway to democracy was neither predetermined nor intentional. Much of its evolution was defined by a combination of domestic and external factors that compelled the US leaders to steadily transform the nature of the state and of their political system. As demonstrated in this study, though differences existed between the ways the United States and the Spanish American colonies evolved into states and formed their respective political regimes, many similarities were also present. The identification of the differences and similarities helps develop a better understanding of the types of obstacles and opportunities newly independent entities in the Americas encountered as they created their respective states and political regimes and, as a result, helps determine what enabled or prevented the development of democratic regimes. In short, despite the fact that the founders of the United States feared democracy, unintentionally they helped set up its foundation, which in turn served in a number of cases as a model for the Spanish American leaders who were determined to create their own sovereign states and distinct political regimes after they gained independence from Spain. With regard to the second question, it is evident that the comparison of cases other than Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia would help elicit valuable explanatory hypotheses.10 In a separate book, the state-creation and political-regime-formation experiences of the

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United States are compared with those of Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Needless to say, there are many other Spanish American cases that could also be studied, and this analyst hopes that other investigators will assume such responsibility and compare their conclusions with those arrived at in this volume and its companion. There are several distinct rationales for selecting Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Mexico is one of Spanish America’s most idiosyncratic states. Because of its richness and vastness, and its significance to Spain for much of its colonial period, Mexico stood singularly apart from the other Spanish American colonies. For much of the nineteenth century, the same type of domestic political turmoil that afflicted other Latin American entities plagued Mexico. However, despite this similarity, none of the other Spanish American states was forced to surrender large parcels of its territory to the United States, had its own capital threatened by the US military forces, or was governed for a brief period by a European political figure who assumed the title of emperor.11 In addition, Mexico, from the late 1920s until 2000, was the only Spanish American state that did not experience a military coup; was ruled by a single political party despite having relatively open elections; and ultimately managed to partially overcome its past and give rise to a regime that, notwithstanding its multiple deficiencies, is democratic. To explain these differences, it is important to examine what made Mexico’s political history so unique. What was it about Mexico that led it to undergo such a distinctive transformation? Why did a state that experienced many of the same conditions generated by colonialism in other colonies throughout Spanish America, and that suffered many of the same problems the other newly freed states encountered during the nineteenth century, ultimately moved along a different political path in the twentieth century? The comparative analysis of Colombia and Venezuela builds on the conclusions arrived at in the Mexican study. The investigation is guided by this question: Why would Colombia ultimately be markedly more successful than Venezuela at creating the state and forming a quasi-democratic regime, when the two shared common borders, achieved independence at almost the same time, and were members of the same confederation during their immediate years after independence? The question becomes substantially more intriguing when one considers that for some three decades after 1959, Venezuela was viewed by many researchers as one of the few Spanish American states that had succeeded at creating a stable democracy, while during the same period Colombia’s political regime was being ­challenged

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by the rise of four major drug-trafficking cartels and several revolutionary movements. And yet, as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, a dramatic turnaround took place. Venezuela’s democracy was assailed by a set of leaders determined to transform its economic system and to gain and retain full political control, while Colombia moved steadily to eliminate the conditions that had given rise to the drug cartels and revolutionary movements during the previous decades. Though Colombia is still afflicted by many of its earlier problems and remains a flawed democracy, its political system is substantially more open and more competitive than Venezuela’s. The argument repeats itself when their respective levels of corruption are assessed. Venezuela today is one of the most corrupt states in the world, while Colombia, though not a model of integrity, is markedly less corrupt than its regional counterpart. Moreover, Venezuela was recently ranked as one of the world’s most violent countries, while Colombia has of late managed to reduce the violence that plagued it in decades past. In sum, stepby-step historical analyses of the emergence of both states and of their political regimes reveal the causal conditions that engendered critical changes at different points in time, and help explain why Colombia, despite its troubled past in the later part of the twentieth century, today has a more open and competitive political regime than Venezuela. At first light, the inclusion of Guatemala and Costa Rica may seem unjustified. The territorial and population sizes of each country are measurably smaller than those already mentioned. There are at least three reasons why both states should be included in the analysis. First, it is important to ascertain whether the challenges of creating states and political regimes encountered by Central American states differed substantially from those encountered by the other states. Second, though Guatemala and Costa Rica do not share common borders, geographically they are not far from one another, and from 1823 until 1840, both were part of the Federal Republic of Central America. And third, today Costa Rica is considered to be the second most developed democracy in Spanish America—after Uruguay, while Guatemala is ranked markedly lower than the other political regimes investigated here, but ahead of Venezuela. Hence, the questions: Why did two states that were colonized by the Spaniards, attained independence at nearly the same time and were part of the same confederation after independence, evolve so differently? Or more to the point, why did Costa Rica’s inhabitants (Ticos) manage to create one of Spanish America’s most developed democracies, while Guatemalans e­ stablished one of Spanish America’s most undemocratic and corrupt political regimes?

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A few final points about the selection of cases: Brazil is Latin America’s biggest country, has the largest population, economy, and military force, and houses one of the most populated  democracies in the world. Those characteristics alone would justify its inclusion in the analysis. Two reasons dictate its exclusion. First, this analyst does not possess the knowledge about Brazil needed to conduct a meaningful study. Second, the intent throughout the book is to conduct a comparative analysis of the United States and Spanish American states, not of the United States and Latin American states. This analyst recognizes that the comparison of Brazil’s state-creation and political-regime-formation experiences with a number of Spanish American states, and possibly the United States, would bring to light some valuable arguments, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study. To sum up, the six cases investigated throughout this book share both similarities and differences in the creation of their respective states and political regimes. The analysis of how each state and its political regime evolved through time helps reveal possible causal relationships between the conditions that either facilitated or obstructed the construction of stable states and democratic political regimes. It is imperative to keep in mind that the relationships between state creation and regime formation, though distinct, are generally dependent on one another. As the study shows, many states that initially were assumed to have attained stability, in fact, had not; and political regimes that early on were deemed to be democratic often became nondemocratic. To understand what brought such changes, it is essential to study the interconnections between the creation of the state and the formation of its political regime. Stated differently, because setbacks in attaining state stability and achieving democracy were not uncommon, investigators are compelled to expose the conditions that brought about changes in one or the other process, or in both, at specific points in time, and determine how those conditions differed when some of those same entities were finally able to create stable states and form lasting democratic regimes.

Structure of the Book Chapter 2 is both conceptual and theoretical. An investigation of democratization and the conditions that facilitate, delay, or obstruct the process of liberalization has to be built on a set of well-defined concepts. Since part of the argument presented here is constructed on the contention that today’s democracies cannot emerge in failed states, the first task is to

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determine what constitutes a state, and then to discuss alternative theories of state creation and their possible applicability to the state-building process in the Americas. Disagreements regarding the definition of democracy persist. Charles Tilly notes that analysts choose among four types of definitions: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented.12 Tilly’s analysis presents a rationale for combining the procedural and process-oriented methods in the definition. Because there are multiple theories of democratization, the first chapter ends with a summary and analysis of the most important ones. The empirical cases are built on axioms generally accepted by students of democracy. They are: Axiom 1: Democracies do not emerge in stateless territories or in states that have failed to consolidate and legitimize their power. Axiom 2: States that have existed for extended periods, and whose power and legitimacy may seem to have been consolidated, may lose some or all of both conditions. Axiom 3: Though the consolidation and legitimization of a state’s power is a necessary condition for the creation of a stable democracy, it is not a sufficient one; other factors can derail the democratization process. Axiom 4: None of today’s well-established Western democracies that began to create representative governments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did so with the intent of forming democratic regimes. Axiom 5: Conditions in the international arena can either weaken or strengthen the drive to create democratic regimes. The study of each country’s processes of state creation and political-­ regime formation is conducted from the same vantage point. Initially, the focus is on each colony’s pre-colonial conditions. Each colony’s topography and natural resources are described, along with the political, economic, and social systems in which its native inhabitants lived. Consideration is given to the size of the native population, how extensively various native groups interacted, and whether any of the existing societies had a hierarchical structure. In addition, attention is paid to the region’s abundance or lack of minerals such as gold and silver, and the kinds of crops grown or that could be grown. Also discussed are the colonizers’ general values, beliefs, and ideas; the way they tried to transform the human and natural conditions they encountered in the colonies; and the level of opposition

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they faced. This portion of the analysis is completed with a description of each colony’s political, economic, and social structure, and with an evaluation of the types of tensions that afflicted each colony as the drive for independence was about to begin. Independence arrived differently in the various colonies. The third section identifies the core conditions that prompted the drive for independence and the obstacles each colony encountered. Since commitment to independence within each colony was not universal, the reasons for such divisions are discussed, along with the types of tensions the internal struggles generated. The hardships each colony confronted as it became independent affected the early stages of its state-creation process. Because the newly independent entities inherited different sets of problems from their colonial past, some were more effective than others at setting up the foundation of a new state. During this portion of the analysis, an attempt is made to identify the most cumbersome obstacles each prospective state encountered, explain how effective its leaders were at addressing those obstacles, and examine why some states consolidated their power and gained legitimacy sooner than others. The processes of state creation and regime formation did not evolve separately. As the political elites in each newly freed state sought to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state, they also tried to create a political regime. The problems they faced varied. This part of the empirical analysis identifies and discusses the main factors that affected the state-­ creation and regime-formation processes, and examines the types of positive and negative effects that developments in one process had on the other. Specifically, the intent of this section is to: 1. Describe the processes of state creation and of regime formation for each state after it had attained independence. 2. Identify the elements that generated either positive or negative changes in the processes of state creation and regime formation within each state. 3. Discuss the tensions such changes engendered. 4. Isolate the conditions that facilitated the initial development of quasi-democratic regimes and, in certain instances, the circumstances that provoked their downfall. 5. Explain why some of today’s states have been more effective at creating stable democracies than others.

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Each empirical case closes with a two-part examination. In the first part, the factors that either served democratization well or impeded its development are identified. The contents of the analyses can vary substantially from case to case. Because this study uses cases as building blocks and as a way of assessing the explanatory value of earlier conclusions, some analyses are more detailed and more complex than others. The second part examines the obstacles to further democratization and compares those conclusions with the ones derived in the previous cases. The empirical cases are arrayed in a specific order. Chapter 3 explains the creation of the United States as a state actor and the development of its political regime. Mexico is a unique case, and thus also merits its own separate chapter. Its analysis is conducted in Chap. 4. Chapter 5 focuses on Colombia and Venezuela’s distinct experiences and presents several hypotheses. Chapter 6 focuses on the state-creation and political-regime-­ formation processes of Guatemala and Costa Rica, and also posits a small set of hypotheses designed to explain their distinct experiences. Chapter 7 brings the various arguments together in the form of revised hypotheses. To fulfill the objectives identified at the start of the Introduction, it is necessary to address a set of questions: . What compelled the colonizers to colonize? 1 2. What led the new inhabitants of the colonies to seek independence? 3. Why were the leaders of some colonies more inclined to seek independence than those of the other colonies? 4. What conditions helped or mired the consolidation and legitimization of the power of the state? 5. What conditions helped or mired the formation of stable democratic regimes? This is not the place to bring to the fore the multiple hypotheses postulated in the conclusion, but the presentation of a summary version of the arguments derived from them is justified. First, the empirical examinations establish that the values, beliefs, and ideas the British and Spanish colonizers brought to the Americas influenced greatly their approaches to colonization—approaches that after independence affected significantly their processes of state creation and political regime formation. Second, the analyses demonstrate that a region’s topography, natural resources, and characteristics of the indigenous population also played a

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critical role in shaping the colonization processes of the Americas by the Spaniards and the British. Notwithstanding the similar values, beliefs, and ideas the settlers of the 13 North American colonies brought with them, they encountered various natural and human environments, and as they adapted to them, they started to generate different economies. The different economies, in turn, helped shape their political and social structures. By the time the leaders of colonies agreed to seek independence, the northern and southern colonies had developed different economies and social norms that would generate deeper roots as each sought to construct a state and a political regime. The same type of argument applies to the Spanish colonization of the Americas. Though the Spaniards were also guided by their own common set of values, beliefs, and ideas during the early stages of colonization, the type of terrain, the kind and scope of the natural resources, and the size and attributes of the indigenous population they encountered had profound effects on how they went about colonizing a region. In both the British and the Spanish American cases, a region’s economic significance helped determine the size of the military—the greater a region’s economic importance, the greater the size of the military deployed by the colonial power. However, it is at this juncture that the processes began to differ markedly, not only between the British and the Spanish colonizers but also among members of the latter group. Though a great number of the British colonizers were deeply religious and developed strict rules of social behavior, the structures of control they imposed on themselves were markedly less hierarchical than those created by the Catholic Church. In Spanish America the relationship between the two sets of factors was relatively simple—the greater a region’s wealth and size of its indigenous population, the larger the size of the armed forces deployed by the Spanish monarchy and the number of clerics posted by the Catholic Church. Third, this study concurs with analysts who have noted that though both the British and Spanish colonizers traversed the Atlantic in search of a more prosperous material life, the role religion played in their lives differed measurably. A vast number of British colonizers emigrated in order to be able to practice their own faith freely. Though anti-Catholicism was predominant among the various Protestant sects that settled in the North American colonies, and though many of them demanded the strict enforcement of their religious doctrine, its practice was not controlled by an all-­ powerful centralized church. The lives of the Spaniards and their

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progenitors in the Americas were bounded by a religious construct that was as severe and hierarchical as the one they had left behind in their homeland. This difference between the Spanish American and the British American colonies are reflected, in part, in their state-creation and political-­ regime-­formation processes. The fourth finding is related to Stein Rokkan’s and Charles Tilly’s separate analyses of state creation in Europe. Both analysts stress that the first step in the state-construction process entails generating an agreement between competing elites. In Spanish America, a small number of factors determined the likelihood that rival elites would agree on how to structure the new state. Typically, the challenge they faced was determining whether to create a federal or a unitary state. Leaders of a state where regional divisions had been substantial had a much harder time agreeing on whether to create a federal or a unitary state than leaders of a state where regional divisions had been minor or nonexistent. The Catholic Church compounded the problem in cases in which critical divisions existed between those who aspired to create a unitary state and those who advocated forming a federal one. In those situations, advocates of a unitary form invariably wanted the Catholic Church to continue the vital role it had played during the colonial period, while supporters of a federalist arrangement argued that it should not. The presence or absence of such reinforcing cleavages explains why some Spanish American entities found the task of creating the state and its political regime less or more cumbersome than others.13 The fifth finding is closely related to the fourth one. As other scholars have noted, military force has been one of the most commonly used and effective means for creating a state and forming its regime. Its constant use, however, also had a negative effect—the longer political leaders relied on martial means to address critical domestic political problems, the longer it took them to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state. For much of the nineteenth century, newly empowered Spanish American political leaders used their own militias to address political, social, and economic differences. The stronger the reinforcing cleavages, the longer they relied on martial means. During that period, political rivals advocated economic growth and created their own distinct political parties. Economic growth and the emergence of rival political parties did not bring a reduction in violence; rivals continued to use force in an attempt to impose their will and vision on others. The sixth argument explains the connections between economic growth, the rise of non-status quo parties, and military activity. Every

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newly created state in the Americas underwent an economic transformation. Differences on how to generate economic growth and development divided political leaders. Economic growth was accompanied by demands that voting restrictions be reduced or eliminated, by the emergence of political parties with distinct political, economic, and social agendas, and by the increase in actual political participation. As those changes ensued, the military evolved; but it evolved differently depending on the state. In the United States, the military did not seek to dictate the country’s political path. Its involvement during the Civil War was the exception. On the other hand, throughout much of the twentieth century, the armed forces continued to intervene in the political affairs of Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia either to prevent the political participation of unacceptable political leaders and/or parties or to remove those who upon assuming power generated too much uncertainty or threatened to challenge the status quo. The behavior of Mexico’s military was different from Costa Rica’s. In the case of Mexico, the military agreed to diminish measurably its political role after the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had incorporated it into one of its political branches. In the case of Costa Rica, the winner of the 1948 Civil War put an end to the role of the military. This decision helped transform Costa Rica into a democracy. The seventh inference brings to light the critical but very different effects the Second World War, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the end of the Cold War had on the United States and a substantial number of Spanish American states. Participation by African Americans in the Second World War and the Korean War helped strengthen their argument that they merited equal rights. Though other factors also contributed, the wars enhanced the status of African Americans and reduced, but did not ­eliminate, the racism that had permeated the American political system since its conception. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were reaffirmations of the equal status deserved by African Americans and people in general, regardless of gender, race, or religion. In their introduction to their edited volume, Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz initially state that studies have provided little support for the view that the source of Latin America’s political turmoil and democratic failures was primarily external. Subsequently, however, they acknowledge that throughout history, international factors have had an impact, sometimes crucial, on the development of Spanish American democratic regimes. Their argument needs to be placed in a time framework. The end of the Second World War brought to the fore the Cold War. The net impact of the Cold War on Spanish American states was negative. The

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fear of communist takeovers emboldened the military throughout Spanish America, often with the backing of the United States, to intervene if they suspected that a communist takeover was likely. Thus, between the early 1960s and middle 1980s, military regimes became the norm in several Spanish American states and prevented or delayed the creation of democratic regimes. Two more arguments must be considered. Military regimes throughout Spanish America failed to cure their countries’ economic ills. With the end of the Cold War and communism no longer being perceived as a critical threat, attempts to create democratic regimes throughout Spanish America gained momentum. The so-called third wave of democratization, however, was not caused primarily by deep public commitments to creating political systems governed by democratic norms and rules. Rather, it was born largely out of discontent with the failure by military regimes to solve the grave economic problems of the Spanish American states. No longer able to justify their domestic political involvement, military regimes gave in to domestic and international pressures to authorize the establishment of democratic governance. The reduction in the domestic political role played by military regimes, however, did not always give way to the creation of effective democratic systems. Failures by a few embryonic democracies to resolve the economic problems that had afflicted earlier military regimes led to the rise of authoritarian populist regimes. The Hugo Chávez phenomenon in Venezuela spread rapidly into Nicaragua, Bolivia, and temporarily Ecuador and Argentina. In every instance, the common claim by the emerging authoritarian leaders and their closest allies was that they possessed the capacity and knowledge to build ­equitable and just socioeconomic systems. In order to strengthen the power and authority of the executive power, such leaders and their closest allies typically relied on democratic instruments to diminish the capabilities of potential adversaries to pose viable political challenges. The end result has been the creation of populist authoritarian regimes.

Notes 1. Juan J.  Linz and Alfred C.  Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, Number 2, April 1996: 14–33. 2. See Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2017): 5–16.

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3. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014, https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014. 4. Foa and Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation.” See also, “Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the ‘deplorables’,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 25, 2017. 5. Winston Churchill, Churchill by Himself, edited by Richard Langworth (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 574. Churchill did not originate the comment, according to Langworth, he was quoting someone else. 6. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Argentina, Chile and Peru. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 7. David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” in Political Science and Politics, 44 (No. 4), 2011: 823–830. 8. Ibid, 823–830. 9. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), 18. See also Hybel’s endnote 57, 23. 10. See Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas. 11. In late 1903, Panama proclaimed its independence from Colombia and granted rights to the United States “as if it were sovereign” to a zone where the United States built a canal, administered it, fortified it, and defended it until the late 1970s. Other states did lose territory, but the United States was not the actor that provoked their loss. Puerto Rico was appropriate by the United States during the Spanish American war in the late nineteenth century, but prior to that time Puerto Rico had not existed as an independent state. 12. Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7–11. 13. See Chaps. 2 and 5 in Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina, and Peru.

Bibliography Collier, Simon. 1967. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence: 1808–1833. Cambridge University Press. Print. Diamond, Jared. 1997. Guns, Germs, and Steel. New  York: W.  W. Norton and Company. Print. Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan J. Linz. 1999. Introduction: Politics Society, and Democracy in Latin America. In Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

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Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. 2017. The Signs of Deconsolidation. Journal of Democracy 28 (1): 5–15. Print. Freedom House. 2017. Freedom in the World, 2014. Web. January 24. Hybel, Alex Roberto. 1986. The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company. Print. ———. 2019. The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas  – the United States. Chile, Argentina; Peru, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Print. Langworth, Richard. 2008. Churchill by Himself. New York: Public Affairs. Print. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Toward Consolidated Democracy. Journal of Democracy 7 (2). Print.

CHAPTER 2

Theories of State Creation and Democratization

Introduction This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses and evaluates alternative definitions of the state and theories of state creation. The second one examines and assesses different conceptualizations of democracy and theories of democratization.

The State Charles Tilly proposes that an organization that controls the population occupying a defined territory is a state insofar as it is characterized by the following conditions:1 . It is differentiated from other organizations in the same territory. 1 2. It is autonomous. 3. It is centralized. 4. Its divisions are formally coordinated with one another. Jorge Dominguez’s version of the state differs somewhat from Tilly’s. Dominguez defines the state as “a set of institutions with claim to legitimate monopoly of force over a certain territory and an ability to exercise it.”2 By asserting that a state is a set of institutions with claim to the legitimate monopoly of force, Dominguez concurs with Tilly that such institutions are different from other organizations in the same territory, are © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_2

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autonomous, and are either centralized or divided but formally coordinated. Tilly, however, does not specify the way the state controls the population, while Dominguez emphasizes that such control is a function of the state’s claim to the monopoly of force.3 Both Tilly and Dominguez stipulate that for an entity to be a state, it must be sovereign. Eric Nordlinger challenges the tendency to define the state in the context of institutions. Institutions, he contends, do not engage in authoritative action; only individuals do. Nordlinger’s alternative is to define the state as “all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all parts of a territorially circumscribed population. The state is made up of, and limited to, those individuals who are endowed with society-wide decision-making powers.”4 Nordlinger’s challenge and proposed alternative have limited value. First, his definition does not escape the problem he attributes to those who place the emphasis on the legitimate monopoly of power. States differ and change in terms of how much authority their representatives have to make decisions, and how binding their decisions are. Second, the concept of legitimacy, which is closely linked to sovereignty, pertains to a system of relations, and some states are not more sovereign or legitimate than others; an entity is not a state if it is not legitimate or sovereign. Third, although Nordlinger is correct in stipulating that individuals, not institutions, engage in authoritative actions, the authority of such actions resides not with the individuals but with the institutions. The authority of the decision-maker, in other words, is a function of the authority of the institution in which she or he works. And finally, by placing the emphasis on individuals rather than institutions, Nordlinger is unintentionally contending that every time a new group replaces a core group of individuals, the state changes. Obviously, that would not always be the case. In 1758, Eric Vattel contended that sovereignty helps maintain the relationship between the “international community and the preservation of the separate existence of its parts.” It does so by legitimizing the right of only one actor to claim possession and control over a certain territory and its population, and by setting up a system of relations among the entities that make up the international system.5 Internally, the state must be able to claim supremacy over all other institutions within a particular territory and population. Externally, it must be able to assert its independence from outside authorities.6 In short, the state refers to an organization, or set of institutions, that is guided by specialized personnel who control

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a consolidated territory and its population, and that is recognized as the ultimate sovereign authority by other organizations operating in the same territory and by the agents of other states.7 Students of states in the developing world have proposed the inclusion of two additional categories: failed and collapsed states. A failed state is one that is “deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions.” The state cannot control its borders—it lacks authority over sections of its territory.8 A collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state. A collapsed state displays a vacuum of authority in which security is equated with the rule of the strong, and political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means.9 It has been argued that the modern state is not an entirely autonomous actor and that its strength is not static. Timothy Mitchell writes that the “boundary between the state and society is elusive, porous, and mobile.”10 Theodore Lowi emphasizes that “there is no single dimension of strength, and there is no single dimension of autonomy.”11 Theda Skocpol reminds analysts that state autonomy “is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go.”12 This study is attentive to the above warnings.

Theories of State Creation Few analysts have paid more attention to the issue of state formation than Tilly and Stein Rokkan. Their initial focus was the process of state creation throughout Europe. Their general argument has been that entities north and west of the city belt in the middle of Europe were markedly more successful at forging centralized states earlier than the territories in the center of Europe, which remained fragmented until the nineteenth century. Their capacity to create centralized states depended on relative ethnic, religious, and language homogeneity, as well as access to extractable resources. Control over resources could not be attained without the presence of a powerful army. According to Tilly, the ability of a European entity to form a state was determined by whether it possessed the following advantages:13 . Access to extractable resources; 1 2. Relative invulnerability to military attacks or conquests for significant periods; 3. Competent political leaders;

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. Powerful army and success in wars; 4 5. Homogeneous population; 6. Capacity to design a strong coalition with the major segments of the landed elites; and 7. Advantageous position within the international system Tilly presents two arguments. A culturally divided society will be less willing to accept the authority of the state than a culturally homogeneous one. European actors that took firm steps to homogenize the population by imposing a state religion, expelling minorities, institutionalizing a national language, and standardizing education, were more successful at creating stable and unified states than those that tolerated diversity.14 He also notes that the continuous, aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing European states of unequal size made war a driving force. To fight a war, a political entity had to build an effective political machine. If the political actor was militarily successful, it would have political institutions capable of delivering revenues for other purposes and would possess an army with the power to enforce the government’s will over stiff resistance.15 The centralized state apparatus typically started in one or more fairly well-populated cities. Urban ruling classes relied on capital to “extend their influence through the urban hinterland and across far-flung trading networks.”16 Rokkan’s argument parallels Tilly’s. State-building, explains Rokkan, can be divided into four phases. The first step entails “a period of political, economic, and cultural unification at the elite level: a series of bargains are struck and a variety of cultural bonds are established across networks of local power-holders and a number of institutions are built for the extraction of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of internal order and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established rights and privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity.”17 During the second phase, the center ­creates new channels of contact with the peripheries in order to induce the population to identify more closely with the political system. In the third phase, the level of participation of the masses increases through the establishment of privileges of opposition, the creation of political parties, and the extension of the electorate. In the final phase, the state experiences growth in the agencies of redistribution.18 Rokkan then isolates the conditions that affected the ability of European actors to create the state. First, the only efforts of aggressive state-building

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took place on the fringes of economic Europe. “In the smaller of these peripheral nation-states, the typical sequence was one of gradual build-up at the ethnic center, rapid imperial expansion, [and] consolidation within a more homogeneous territory.”19 Second, democracy in Europe began to take form only after political, economic, and cultural unification at the elite level had been attained and channels of contact between the center and the periphery had been established. The drive to form a nation requires building a national identity, unifying administrations, and roping in territories that were accustomed to high levels of autonomy and had resisted centralization.20 Before the era of mass politics, the transition from state-building to nation-building, and then to the development of unified cultures, depended greatly on three factors. States that underwent the Protestant Reformation were markedly more successful than states that did not experience such change. States that were not deeply divided along linguistic and ethnic lines were also more effective.21 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan address questions similar to those just articulated. They first differentiate the state from the nation. The nation lacks autonomy, agents, or rule. Its only resources are derived from the psychological identity developed by leaders and the people within a state.22 Based on this differentiation, they ask: “Under what empirical conditions are the logics of state policies aimed at nation-building congruent with those aimed at crafting democracy?” Conflicts, they explain, are reduced “when almost all of the residents of a state identify with one subjective idea of the nation, and when that nation is virtually coextensive with the state. These conditions are met only if there is no significant irredenta outside the state’s boundaries, if there is only one nation existing (or awakened) in the state, and if there is little cultural diversity within the state.”23 When such conditions are present, governmental leaders can pursue democratization and nation-state policies at the same time. The United States did not become a state overnight. In Saskia Sassen’s words, a powerful and legitimate state “evolved out of a loose confederation—eventually a federation—with extensive decentralized powers residing at local levels, with a culture of local self-government, and with strong participatory democracy.”24 An examination of existing studies of the United States’ state-creation experience, however, reveals that the common shortcomings they all share are failures to explain the actual evolution of the United States as a state and the reasons it evolved in the manner it did.

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Samuel Huntington proposes that there are three patterns of political modernizations: Continental, British, and American. There is no need at this stage to discuss the differences and similarities between the three. For the moment, all that is required is to explicate the way the American pattern differed from the other two, but principally from the British. In the seventeenth century, notes Huntington, the state replaced fundamental law as the source of political authority, and within each state, a single authority replaced the many sources of authority that had existed during the feudal era. In the newly independent American states, its people continued to adhere to fundamental law as the source of authority for human actions and as an authoritative restraint on human behavior. Sovereignty was never concentrated in a single institution or individual. Instead, it was dispersed throughout society and among many political bodies.25 The distinctions identified by Huntington are helpful as one tries to understand the initial stages of the state-creation process in the United States. But as he also notes, it was not the intent of his discourse to explain the transitions the United States experienced as a state, and the types of effects such transitions had on the US polity. According to Stephen Skowronek, American leaders tried to create a state with a structure that would differ measurably from the type of framework the arising European entities were designing. Skowronek concurs with Alexis de Tocqueville, Marx, and Hegel, all of whom, in their own distinct ways, argued that the United States was the great anomaly among Western states.26 Hans Daalder does not necessarily challenge the conclusions arrived at by the aforementioned scholars, but emphasizes that though the United States sought to create a different type of state system, ultimately it is an offshoot “of English political traditions, whittling down the royal powers of colonial days in favor of elected chief executives at federal and state levels, giving greater weight to representative principles, creating institutional checks and balances both in central institutions and in the federal makeup of the new polity, and providing a greater role for popular control and election.”27 Though Skowronek’s work is not designed to explain the evolution of the United States as a state, his work merits careful consideration.28 The sovereignty of the United States, he writes, was embodied in 13 separate state legislatures. This kind of power distribution left government “at the mercy of fast-changing popular sentiments.” Aware of the destabilizing effects of such a loose arrangement, those who met in Philadelphia in 1787 tried to create a state organization that would enable a central

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government to control the territory and would distribute power between three branches that would share it equally at the national level. “Constitutional federalism,” he writes, “inhibited the penetration of central power throughout the nation by ensuring the integrity of these states, each with its own institutional organization, legal code, and law enforcement apparatus.”29 By the start of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, political and economic leaders, along with members of the intellectual elite, recognized that they had to readjust the organization of the state. They concluded that in order to deal with the forces of industrialization, Washington had to expand the administrative capacities of the central state. The modernization of the state did not involve making it more efficient—instead, it entailed “building a qualitatively different state.”30 A number of students have sought to explain the conditions that facilitated and obstructed the process of state creation throughout Latin America. According to Frank Safford, the literature on state-building in Spanish America can be divided into three categories. One category stresses the significance of Spanish American culture, the second contends that structural economic problems were the principal influences, and a third emphasizes the conflicting ideologies and the fear of the potential power of the lower classes.31 As an alternative, Safford proposes a more complex argument. He contends that a combination of seven factors enabled or inhibited state development in Spanish America during the nineteenth century. Independently, they are: (i) economic geography, including topography, resources, and relative economic integration; (ii) political geography, including geographic and transportation conditions affecting political integration; (iii) relative economic and fiscal strength; (iv) relative public acceptance of the political systems, regardless of whether it was framed in the constitution or not; (v) the extent to which the civilian authorities control the military; (vi) the role of the Catholic Church; and (vii) the relative vulnerability of the evolving state to external pressure or attack.32 The significance of those factors, adds Safford, varied from state to state, as did the way they were combined. In a comparative analysis of five Latin American states, Fernando López-Alves postulates several additional arguments. He proposes that state formation throughout Latin America has been defined as a process whereby elites committed to creating states overcame deeply seated opposition from their populations and vanquished regional political leaders.33 The feudal characteristics of rural life in Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia, he adds, are poor predictors of state-making, and

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mode-of-productions arguments regarding state creation in Latin America are not particularly relevant. Though he acknowledges the significance of domestic structural elements, he stresses that the inclusion of war and conflict-resolution factors enhances measurably the predictive quality of a theory of state creation. “Conflict and concomitant collective action,” he explains, “determined access to the means of production, altered property relations, created new classes, and displaced old monopolies and land and trade.” He adds that the ability of the state to recruit members of the nobility and secure their support during wars affected the timing and character of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies. Based on the above generalizations, López-Alves advances several hypotheses that can be summarized as follows: 1. Failure on the part of a rebellious upper class to coalesce against the central power accelerated power centralization. 2. When the landed gentry were defeated in their own domains, the process of centralizing power took place faster. 3. When wars ensued within the area controlled by the central government and territory nearby, the process of power centralization proceeded at a slow pace. If battles were fought far away, political leaders were able to invest more resources in the construction of a central army, which in turn strengthened the elites’ capacity to consolidate the power and authority of the state.34 The Resource Curse or Paradox of Plenty Theory has been designed to explain the process of state creation in states with extensive mineral wealth. According to the theory, states rich in minerals and fuel are predisposed to generate high levels of corruption, ineffective governance, and violence.35 Terry Karl uses elements of the theory to explain the type of impact Venezuela’s dependence on oil revenues had on its state capacity. Venezuela’s heavy reliance on petrodollars, she notes, expanded the state’s jurisdiction and weakened its authority as other extractive capabilities withered. As a result, when faced with competing pressures, state officials, accustomed to relying on the progressive use of public spending as a substitute for statecraft, weakened the state’s capacity to address problems.36 The first thing that becomes evident from the brief discussion is that analysts are not in agreement as to which are the leading factors that help explicate the state-creation processes throughout Latin America. For Safford, the most important ones for each country are: political and

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economic geography; economic and fiscal strength; public acceptance of the political systems; extent to which the civilian authorities control the military; the role played by the Catholic Church; and vulnerability to external pressure or attack. For López-Alves, the leading causes are conflict and concomitant collective action. Together they determined access to the means of production, altered property relations, created new classes, and displaced old land and trade monopolies. Related to the issue of conflict was whether those striving to create the state and consolidate its power were able to recruit members of the nobility and secure their support during wars. Their level of success affected the timing and character of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies. In related arguments, López-Alves proposes that the process of centralizing the power of the state was less cumbersome when the members of the rebellious upper class were unable to unite against the elites at the center, when the landed gentry were defeated in their own domains, and when battles took place in distant regions not controlled by the central government. Karl does not posit a theory of state creation. Instead, she applies elements of the Resource Curse Theory to explain the effects oil has had on the capability of the Venezuelan state. She does not suggest that all resource-rich states are destined to experience Venezuela’s fate.37 For present purposes, it is not necessary to engage in a critical analysis of the various theoretical alternatives. Such an analysis will evolve from the empirical cases.

Democracy According to Robert Dahl, a contemporary democracy is a political system that is “completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.” A political system will remain responsive to the preferences of its citizens only if they have unimpaired opportunities to: . Formulate their preferences; 1 2. Manifest their preferences to one another and to the government by individual and collective action; and 3. Have their preferences weighted equally, with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference. For the aforementioned opportunities to exist, the regime must provide its citizens the following guarantees:

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. Freedom to form and join organizations; 1 2. Freedom of expression; 3. Right to vote; 4. Eligibility for public office; 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6. Access to alternative sources of information; 7. Free and fair elections; and 8. Institutions for making government policies that depend on votes and other expressions of preference38 The extent to which the eight conditions are present in a contemporary political regime can be represented along two dimensions: liberalization (public contestation) and inclusiveness (participation). Throughout history, political systems have varied in terms of which, or whose, political preferences were accounted for when policies were made. At one extreme, the government responded to the political preferences of only one person; at the other extreme, it weighted equally the political preferences of all the citizens and formulated its policies based on the preferences of the greater number. Political systems, however, have also varied in terms of the barriers or opportunities they extended for “the expression, organization, and representation of political preferences and thus in the opportunities available to potential oppositions.” The fact that all the eligible adult citizens in a political system had the right to vote did not mean that such a regime respected their votes. For such votes to be meaningful, the voters had to have open access to political institutions that they could employ openly to challenge the government.39 By positioning public contestation on the vertical axis and participation on the horizontal one, Dahl creates a theoretical space in which he can place at least four types of regimes. Where public contestation and participation are nonexistent, Dahl situates closed hegemonic regimes. These regimes ban completely the expression, organization, and representation of political preferences, and prohibit any form of organized dissent and opposition.40 In the second space are polyarchies, that is, regimes that “impose the fewest restraints on the expression, organization, and representation of political preferences and on the opportunities available to opponents of government.”41 Competitive oligarchies occupy the third space. These are regimes that authorize an increase in public contestation but limit extensively the number of participants. Though opportunities to oppose the government exist, only a small number of individuals are

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authorized to participate in the political process. And finally, in the fourth space are the inclusive hegemonies. In these regimes, there are no major constraints on participation, but the participants lack access to organizations with the authority and power to project dissent and oppose the government.42 According to Wolfgang Merkel, each liberal democracy consists of five partial regimes with these requirements: . It must have an electoral regime that is competitive and transparent; 1 2. Elections and the pursuit of collective interests must be allowed by granting citizens the right to freedom of speech, of opinion, of association, and of demonstration; 3. Civil rights that contain and limit the exercise of power by the state must exist; 4. Power between the executive, legislative, and judiciary bodies must be divided, and each must be accountable; and 5. The government must be able to govern without the threat of being vetoed, overruled, or overthrown by a nonelected group.43 Merkel proposes that for a political regime to be considered a democracy, certain partial conditions must support the performance of other partial conditions. The division into partial regimes serves several analytical purposes. First, it enables the analyst to identify defects within a democracy. Second, by aggregating the defects within a democracy, the analyst can compare them with the defects of other democracies. And third, it enables the analyst to conduct a systematic and comparative analysis of the way in which defects in a partial condition affect other partial conditions.44 Merkel completes his analysis with the identification of four types of defective democracies. In an exclusive democracy, one or more segments of all adult citizens are “excluded from the civil right of universal suffrage.” In an illiberal democracy, “constitutional norms have little binding impact on government actions and individual rights are either partially suspended or not yet established.” In a delegative democracy, the division of power is not well rooted and the power of the executive branch is not kept fully in check by the legislative and judiciary branches. And finally, in a domain democracy, the effective conditions that prevent the illegal intervention by unelected officials, such as the military, are absent.45 Merkel’s types of democracy are built on the idea that certain defects are qualitatively worse than others. Defects present in an exclusive democracy are considered to be

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the worst, while defects found in either a delegative or a domain democracy are thought to be the least troublesome.46 Giovanni Sartori reminds us that the standard way of delimiting a concept is by establishing its opposite. Thus, in order to determine what a democracy is, one must also establish what it is not. He also prompts us to keep in mind that when discussing democracy, it is critical to differentiate between two questions: “What is democracy?” and “How much democracy?” These two questions complement one another, but in order to answer the second question, one must first establish what a democracy is, and what it is not. Sartori contends that the tendency to overlook the critical difference between both questions is a result of our general tendency to place tremendous emphasis on quantitative analysis. He does not suggest that such focus is misplaced; instead, he proposes that sometimes it compels us to overlook the value of differentiating between regimes that are democratic and those that are not. Failure to attend to this distinction could easily lead one to infer that all political regimes are to a lesser or greater degree a democracy.47 Dahl’s and Merkel’s alternative conceptualizations of democracy do not address the problem identified by Sartori. Neither framework enables the analyst to determine when a political regime is no longer a democracy. The problem can be best identified in the form of distinct but related q ­ uestions: When does a polyarchy become a competitive oligarchy? Is a competitive oligarchy a defective democracy? When does a defective democracy become a non-democracy? A partial analysis of the political conditions in the United States during the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century helps illustrate the problem. During that period, the level of political competition between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party was intense, but not every adult was allowed to participate. White women who had been born in the United States, or who had been naturalized and were in “good moral standing,” were legal citizens; members of neither group, however, had the right to vote until 1920. African American men were recognized as citizens in 1867 but were denied the right to vote for two more years. Then, between 1896 and 1900, several Southern states adopted “grandfather clauses” in order to prevent former slaves and their descendants from voting. Many of these clauses remained in place until the mid-1960s. Native Americans were not considered citizens until 1924, and in many states, they were denied the right to vote until 1957. Thus, were one to adhere to Merkel’s criteria that a democracy protects the civil rights of adults to participate in elections,

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speak freely, voice their opinions, and associate, one could claim that in the year 1900 the United States was both an exclusive democracy and an illiberal democracy, but still some kind of democracy. The above argument begs the question: How do we justify categorizing the United States as a defective democracy in 1900 when more than half of its citizens did not possess the legal right to vote? More directly, why even label the United States a democracy? Were one to rely on Dahl’s alternative classification, in 1900 the United States was a competitive oligarchy, not a polyarchy. Or if one were to use Guillermo O’Donnell’s terminology, it was a democratic oligarchy, as less than half of the adult population who were born in the United States or who were naturalized citizens and over the age of 21 possessed the right to vote. Though other states throughout the globe that were permitting only a portion of its population to participate in the electoral process did not have to cope with a racial divide, they would also be depicted as a competitive oligarchy or a democratic oligarchy rather than a polyarchy. Based on Sartori’s argument and the example just presented, it is clear that one must first differentiate democratic regimes from nondemocratic ones. A competitive oligarchy is not a democracy, not even a defective democracy. This distinction does not preclude determining which ­democratic regimes are more or less democratic. In short, a minimum standard must be designed to determine when a regime begins being, or stops being, a democracy. The modern demos is a vast, atomized, and depersonalized mass society, incapable of functioning as a collective decision-making body. This condition forces the members of the demos to rely on representatives to design policies. In such a world, free elections become the protectors of the people’s power. Representatives make policies, but free elections force policymakers to account for the preferences of the demos during the policymaking process. Without open access to information, however, free elections would express nothing. To the extent that free elections protect the power of the people, open access to information ensures that the representatives do not undermine such power. In addition to representation, elections, and access to competing sources of information, the contemporary democratic state is characterized by the presence of political parties. As Dahl notes, “elections cannot be contested in a large system without organization. To forbid political parties would make it impossible for citizens to coordinate their efforts in order to nominate and elect their preferred candidates.”48

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A regime is nondemocratic when contested elections are not permitted. The absence of public contestation can take at least two forms. In its first form, the state has only one party, which is a duplicate of the state. A party-state system is a “system of unitarism.”49 Communist, Nazi, and fascist regimes fit in this category. In its second form, the state has one party and permits the presence of secondary minor parties. This system is noncompetitive, because the state does not authorize the peripheral parties to compete with the hegemonic party on an equal footing. A hegemonic party system remains undemocratic even if competition were to ensue solely among leaders of the party. It is not the case, as Maurice Duverger argues, that to the extent that competition within a party ensues freely, the system can be categorized as being democratic. Competition within a party between leaders who do not have to consider the voters’ preferences is very different from competition when such preferences must be taken into account. Competition in the first case lacks the elements that make a system democratic: electoral competition and free elections.50 To the extent that public contestation focuses on the degree of opposition permitted, participation focuses on whose preferences the system considers. As already explained, constitutions have differed throughout history partly by dictating who possessed the legal right to participate in the electoral process. Thus, if by democracy one means the rule or power of the people, then one must first determine who the people are. The analysis must begin with this question: “What persons have a rightful claim to be included in the demos?”51 According to Dahl, the Strong Principle of Equality provides the ground needed for the criteria of inclusion. In line with this principle, all members of an association “are adequately qualified to participate on an equal footing with the others in the process of governing the association.”52 Dahl then uses the principle to infer that the “demos should include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the association.”53 Dahl’s rule rejects Joseph Schumpeter’s claim that it is “not relevant whether we the observers admit the validity of those reasons or of the practical rules by which they are made to exclude portions of the population; all that matters is that the society in question admits it.”54 To agree with Schumpeter’s justification, notes Dahl, is to accept the argument that if a group of people within an association were not considered to be “people” by another group also in the same association, the system could not be considered to be undemocratic.

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Dahl is cognizant of how difficult it is to rely on logical criteria to determine who the people are. But he questions the idea of relying on the principle of competence to decide who should be part of the demos. This principle has been used repeatedly to prevent women, artisans, laborers, those without property, and racial minorities from acting on behalf of their own interests. Moreover, whenever such constraints existed, those who were part of the demos did not necessarily protect the interests of those who were excluded from the political process. Dahl emphasizes that the rule has always been applied to ensure that children were not considered part of the demos, and argues that such a stand is justified.55 He accepts its application to children by siding with John Locke, who argues that though children are denied certain rights, they receive them as they mature, while for excluded adults “the bonds of … subjection” never “quite drop off.”56 Dahl concludes that though it is necessary to rely on a judgment of competence, it is imperative to use a standard that helps reduce the arbitrariness of such a judgment. O’Donnell concurs, adding the very important clarification that in a democracy the “attribution of rights and obligations is assigned by the legal system to most adults in the territory of a state.”57 This brings us back to one of the original questions. When does a political regime stop being democratic? Neither O’Donnell nor Merkel provides clear guidelines. Throughout his analysis, O’Donnell refers to an “inclusive democracy,” to a “non-inclusive democracy” and to an “oligarchic democracy.” These three references generate confusion. By classifying one type of government as an inclusive democracy, O’Donnell is proposing that if a regime enables political competition between parties but not every adult citizen is authorized to vote, it can also be referred to as a democracy, albeit an oligarchic democracy or a non-inclusive democracy or, as Merkel would call it, an exclusive democracy. Based on this unclear differentiation, it is difficult to determine when a democracy ceases to be a democracy. The boundary between a democratic and a nondemocratic regime is delineated along the public contestation axis, which indicates whether free competition between at least two political parties is permitted, and along the participation axis, which specifies the extent to which a state’s adult citizens can participate in the electoral process. Accordingly, a political regime is democratic if all adult citizens are empowered to participate in contested free elections between at least two political parties. It is nondemocratic if political competition between at least two political parties is

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not permitted, or if the criterion of inclusion provided by the Strong Principle of Equality is not applied. Adherence to the proposed rule would indicate that the United States did not become a democracy until after 1965. At that time, of more than five million African Americans of voting age living in 11 Southern states, only 1.4 million were registered to vote. Moreover, during debates in the Senate, 18 southern Democratic senators and 1 Republican senator launched a filibuster designed to prevent the passage of the Civil Rights Act. No single senator explained his intent to deny racial equality, and consequently his opposition to the idea of creating a democracy, more unmistakably than Richard Russell (D-GA) when he stated: “We will resist to the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our Southern states.”58 As already noted, to argue that there must be a well-defined boundary between a democratic regime and a nondemocratic one is not to propose that all democratic regimes are equally democratic. Because preferences within a state can vary notably, no single political party can represent all of them at all times; hence, there is competition between political parties. The level of competition is dictated by constitutional design.59 Certain constitutions decree that elections use proportional representation and multimember electoral districts, while others rule that elections be bounded by a plurality system and single-member districts. Of the two, the first one is more “democratic.”60 As Sartori, an ardent defender of the “elite” theory of democracy, notes, if democracy is rooted in the concept of the people’s power, then logic dictates that “true representation is, and can only be, proportional representation.”61 Proportional representation is more democratic in the sense that it facilitates the formation of a multiparty system, while plurality elections promote the construction of twoparty systems. One of the critical differences between these two types of systems is that in a proportional-representation type of system the political parties are responsive, in the aggregate, to a broader set of preferences than in a plurality-type system.62 Stated in Dahl’s terms, public contestation is greater in the first system than in the second one.63 It can be proposed, thus, that a democracy’s degree of democracy is in part determined by its level of public contestation—the broader the range of preferences the political parties can respond to, the more democratic the regime. A democratic regime’s capacity to address a wide range of preferences is not the only determinant of its level of democracy. Elections alone do

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not guarantee that the elected officials will be permitted to perform their assigned roles. Throughout history, there have been many cases in which elected officials were prevented from assuming office, Congress or the Judiciary was dismissed, or the holder of the executive office was either toppled or forced to resign by a group or organization insulated from the electoral process.64 Those actions engender an analytical problem. Let us imagine a regime in which there is political competition between the parties, information flows relatively unhindered, civil rights are fairly well protected, and public participation is not restricted in any of the forms identified earlier. At the same time, however, the voters’ level of dissatisfaction and the tension between the competing parties have grown measurably. Then, after repeated failed attempts on the part of the elected political leaders to resolve their differences, the military intervenes, topples the government, dismisses the Congress, and decides who should rule or appoint some of their own as the new rulers. Is the regime that was toppled a nondemocratic regime? Or is it a democratic regime that was not solid enough to protect itself by resolving the existing tensions, and thus unintentionally empowered the military to take over the reins of government? It is not possible to draw a precise line that separates one category from the other. However, it is feasible to differentiate between two types of regimes: one is structured according to democracy’s basic tenets and exists uninterruptedly for an extended period, but at some point, is toppled by the military; the other is a regime that, despite its one or many attempts to adhere to democracy’s basic tenets, is toppled by the military shortly after its creation. The crucial factor in this comparison is the longevity of the political regime. The regime in the first case can be characterized as a defective democracy; the regime in the second case never managed to achieve the status of democracy. In other words, durability matters.

Theories of Democracy What are the conditions that enable certain countries, but not others, to develop stable polyarchies? According to Dahl, a country’s chance to develop a polyarchy is dependent on whether the following conditions are present:65 1. Means of violent coercion are dispersed and controlled by the civilian government;

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2. Those who control the means of coercion are subject to the democratic process; and 3. Power, influence, authority, and control are dispersed from a single center toward a variety of entities; 4. Society is marked by a “relatively high level of income and wealth per capita, long-run growth in per capita income and wealth, a high level of urbanization, rapidly declining or relatively small agricultural population, great occupational diversity, extensive literacy, a comparatively large number of persons who have attended institutions of higher education; an economic order in which production is mainly carried on by relatively autonomous firms whose decisions are strongly oriented toward national and international markets, and relatively high levels of conventional indicators of well-being, such as physicians and hospital beds per thousand persons, life expectancy, infant mortality, percentage of families with various consumer durables, and so on;”66 5. People are culturally homogeneous or are at least not segmented into strong and distinctive subcultures; 6. People are supportive of democratic institutions, particularly in their political activities and 7. Government is free of threats by foreign powers hostile to democracy.67 Linz and Stepan identify a similar set of factors. The creation of the state, they note, is a necessary condition for a regime to become a consolidated democracy, but not a sufficient one. Five other mutually reinforcing conditions must also be present. They are:68 . A free and lively society; 1 2. A relatively autonomous political society; 3. Laws that regulate the actions of all the political actors and the government, and that protect individual freedoms and associational rights; 4. A functional state bureaucracy; and 5. An institutionalized economic society Linz and Stepan then postulate that a state that has a plurality of national, linguistic, religious, or cultural societies will have great difficulty creating and maintaining a stable democracy.69

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For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the extent to which different factors contributed to the creation of democratic regimes and their consolidation in Latin America, it is helpful to rely on, and when appropriate combine, the conclusions derived by Jeff Haynes, and by Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz. Haynes reviews the effects three distinct conditions have had on the consolidation, or the failure to consolidate, democracy in Latin America. They are:70 political culture and the legitimacy of the post-authoritarian regime; political participation and institutions; and economic and international factors. Based on the analysis of the aforementioned factors, Haynes proposes that in the consideration of cultural conditions, what matters is whether a political regime is backed by a civic culture “characterized by high levels of mutual trust, tolerance of diversity and a propensity for accommodation and compromise.” The development of such a culture is the by-product of democratic institutions and structures working jointly over time. More to the point, institutions help engender and disseminate democratic values and beliefs among the people of the state.71 Political leaders, adds Haynes, particularly in developing states, are rarely willing to relinquish power. Power-holders in developing countries typically rely on the military to either retain power or topple those in power. Or as he notes, in many cases the military intervenes to help “defend members of the political and economic elite from the rigors of democracy.” To obstruct this process, continues Haynes, a strong civil society must be present. The last issues Haynes addresses are whether economic and international factors affect the democratization process. He takes as his starting point a question posited by Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Chibub, and Fernando Limongi. The four scholars ask: What conditions should be present in any country for it to have a democratic regime the following year? They contend that for a country to have a democracy in the following year, it must already have a democracy in place, be affluent, experience economic growth but with no-more-thanmoderate inflation, undergo a decline in inequality, face a favorable international climate, and have parliamentary institutions.72 Last, Haynes points out that despite an initial, multipronged drive by developed countries and institutions in the Western world to nondemocratic regimes to transform themselves into democracies, the outcomes have been disappointing. Though initially, efforts by members of the international community seemed to compel some developing countries to hold their first

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free elections, as time went by the intensity of the external appeals and pressures weakened.73 Diamond and his co-authors present and assess the relevance of a large number of potential “causal” variables. Within those variables, they sometimes identify conditions that impact them. They are the following:74 . Historical legacies, paths, and sequences; 1 2. State structure and strength:

a. The crisis of state expansion and economic intervention, b. Centralization and decentralization, and c. The military; 3. Political institutions:



a. Parties and party systems, b. Constitutional structure; 4. Political leadership:



a. Founding of democratic leadership, b. Political adaptation and reform, c. Response to economic crisis, d. Response to generalized political crisis; 5. Political culture:



a. Sources of political culture, b. Effects; 6. Socioeconomic development and economic performance:



a. Economic performance; . Inequality, class, and other cleavages; 7 8. Civil society and associational life:



a. The mass media; 9. International factors:



a. US Policy.

The three authors’ first contention is that colonial rule throughout Spanish America did not leave behind a homogeneous legacy. They add

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that though it is very likely that the dissimilar experiences and obstacles encountered by the colonies affected differently the newly created states’ efforts to democratize, equally significant were the disparate circumstances surrounding the achievement of independence. They emphasize that in order to understand the roots of authoritarianism that were quite prevalent throughout Spanish America, one must also focus on the political, social, and economic developments for the period between 1825 and 1900.75 Such an argument is essentially true, but it is important to recognize that each territory’s unique colonial experience had important effects on its leaders’ efforts to shape the state during the decades immediately after independence. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz acknowledge the importance of this factor when they affirm that the constant conflicts between the centers and the peripheries in the emerging republics complicated the process of state-building for decades. What they do not emphasize is that such struggles did not always ensue equally in each of the emerging republics. For instance, the challenges faced by Peru’s center during the early stages of state creation were markedly greater than those encountered by Chile’s center. In Peru, though Lima occupied the center during the colonial period, it had to tackle the competing interests and demands of many peripheries. In Chile, most of the power during the colonial period resided in Santiago. The differences in the intensity of the challenges encountered by Peru’s and Chile’s centers did not disappear with independence, and those differences affected directly the leaders’ respective capacities to form the state.76 An important point Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz make is that democracy is threatened by both the absence of an authoritative state and the presence of very dominant state institutions. One of the common problems during much of the nineteenth century was that most Latin American leaders had great difficulty creating effective state institutions, and that during parts of the twentieth century the common tendency of leaders was to establish domineering states.77 When one compares the powers of states across the two centuries, it is unquestionable that their powers were much greater in the latter century. But this generalization disregards two important facts. First, not all Latin American states in the nineteenth century were equally ineffective. And second, not all of them were equally oppressive in the twentieth century. This observation brings us back to the earlier claim that in order to understand the initial differences among the newly independent states, it is imperative to delineate the types of regional, polit-

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ical, economic, and social structures they inherited from their respective colonial eras, and to describe the way such structures evolved as time went by. It is via the analysis of such processes that one can begin to understand why states and their respective democratic regimes developed differently. With regard to what role the military played and should play throughout Latin America, analysts are almost of one mind. Democracy can emerge and can be sustained only when the military accepts the supremacy of civilian authorities elected freely by the people. As self-evident as this last contention may seem, it has limited theoretical utility. The following questions must also be answered: 1. How long did it take for the military to become a well-organized institution? 2. What made it possible for the military to transform itself into a well-­ organized institution? 3. What led the military to decide in a great number of cases that it was the only institution capable of resolving the political, economic, and social issues afflicting their respective states? 4. What compelled the military to start accepting that it had to acquiesce to the dictates of freely elected civilian political leaders? Answers to those questions should help analysts understand why the processes of state creation and democratization were more cumbersome in some instances than in others. A related, but different, argument could be made with regard to the role of political institutions in the fostering of a stable democracy. Democracy will not emerge—and if it emerges, it will falter—unless it is built on a constitution that advocates the rule of law, representative institutions, elections, legal systems, and political freedom. Latin American countries encountered great difficulties as they tried to create the aforementioned institutional organizations and structures. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz emphasize these two points. But once again, they do not discuss at any length the fact that some states had to overcome greater obstacles than others as their respective political leaders went about designing their political regimes. In short, it is important to explain why some states designed more constitutions than others, and why some states were afflicted by a greater number of military coups than others. Can political leadership have a positive or a negative effect on the creation and protection of democratic regimes? Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz

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propose that it can. Various empirical studies support that argument. The claim is that a “flexible, accommodative, consensual leadership style is more successful in developing and maintaining democracy than a militant, uncompromising, confrontational one.”78 This study neither supports, nor objects to, such an argument; instead, it contends that as presented it generally faces two crucial methodological problems. First, to avoid postulating a circular argument, the analyst must design a priori measures of political leadership styles. Second, the causal significance of political leadership cannot be ascertained until it is tested under specific structural conditions. Contingent choices must be placed in the context of the structural constraints that shape them.79 To prove that political leadership played a significant role in the formation and protection of a democratic regime, the investigator must select at least two states in which the domestic and international political, economic, and social obstacles and opportunities were quite similar, and in which one group of leaders succeeded at developing and maintaining democracy while the other did not.80 This objection is not designed to question the significance of leadership styles but to contend that the extent to which they matter cannot be ascertained unless the analyses are conducted with independent measures of leadership styles and under controlled conditions. Students of Latin American politics are not of one mind with regard to the role of political culture. Some analysts view political culture as a secondary phenomenon that accompanies another and is caused by it. Others propose that the nature of culture is too plastic and too malleable to have a decisive effect on whether a state will become democratic or not. To analyze the significance of political culture, this study adopts a social constructivist approach. Social constructivism has three foundations. First, it asserts that material structures do not exist independently of the identities of the social actors interpreting them. Second, it states that the identities of social actors shape their interests, preferences, and actions. And third, it emphasizes that social actors and normative structures are reciprocally formed.81 A legitimized structure of meaning helps define the social identities of actors, and these definitions in turn help shape their interests and actions. Thus, the relationship between a domestic system’s structure of meaning and the identities, interests, and actions of social actors is not unidirectional. Just as the domestic system’s structure affects the identities, interests, and actions of social actors, they, in turn, mold the international system’s structure of meaning. Or in Diamond, Hartlyn,

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Linz’s own words, their empirical cases “strongly suggest a reciprocal relationship between the political culture and the political system.”82 The three noted scholars add two important qualifiers to the last declaration. First, they assert that in most cases the choice of democratic values by political elites preceded the presence of democratic values among members of the general population. Then they propose that, in a great number of cases, the decision on the part of conservative elites to create a democratic regime was a pragmatic, calculated strategy. Their general conclusion is partly correct but not nuanced enough. Among the Latin American political leaders who advocated the formation of representative systems after their colonies had attained independence from Spain, none sponsored universal participation. Those leaders were influenced by many of the ideas and values being promoted both in the United States and throughout various Western European countries, which for a prolonged period refused to extend such a right to every adult male member of the population. In Latin America two reinforcing, but distinct, beliefs obstructed attempts to revise the law. During the early decades after the declaration of independence, leaders of Latin American states argued that men who did not own property, did not pay taxes, or could not read and write were not sufficiently responsible to cast their votes. Such an argument gained greater intensity in states with vast indigenous populations. The common sentiment of the elites was that they would undercut their own political, economic, and social privileges were they to extend voting rights to the original inhabitants of the Americas. In short, students of Latin American politics acknowledge that states with substantial ethnic cleavages typically have greater difficulty democratizing. From this generalization, however, it should not be inferred that states without ethnic cleavages always found the path toward democracy less cumbersome. Regional cleavages have also acted as barriers to the building of democratic regimes.83 As economic development gained momentum, and as the well-being of those who remained disenfranchised improved and they started to demand the right to vote, political elites recognized that it would be in their interests to widen the size of their electorate. Such a right did not apply immediately to the indigenous peoples of all Latin American countries. Indigenous people were first allowed to vote in Guatemala in 1945, in Bolivia in 1952, in Peru in 1978, in Ecuador in 1979, and in Colombia in 1991.84 Since then, their capacity to have their voices and demands

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addressed has increased measurably, but it has not reached a level proportional to their numbers. A culture of democracy did not start gaining roots until the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Elected civilian officials failed to engage in constructive dialogues in order to formulate solutions to the multiple political and economic ills their countries encountered. Their failure empowered military leaders to declare that they were the only ones able to protect the national interest and bring about political stability in concert with economic development and growth. For a while, civilian leaders and members of the general public either accepted or had no choice but to accept the argument postulated by the military. Most military governments, however, did not succeed in bringing about the positive results they had promised. As it became evident that military rule was not the solution, the clamor for democratic rule intensified. But did the demand for change increase because democratic values still lingered in the minds of many members of the political elites and the public in general? Or was the upsurge prompted by a rational process, one in which political leaders and the public finally recognized that adherence to democratic government was the only real alternative to military rule? According to Arturo Valenzuela, the decision to opt for a democratic regime was a calculated strategy conducted by Conservative forces.85 Valenzuela’s conclusion, however, begs the question: Why advocate a democratic regime instead of another type of regime? As Robert Merton reminds us, politics is always about interests but interests are always rooted in values, beliefs, and ideas.86 Earlier it was noted that a common argument advanced by scholars is that political elites began to adopt values and beliefs associated with democracy before the general public did. And yet, toward the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first century, political leaders in several Latin American states initiated anti-democratic structural changes. The leaders of Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua imposed constitutional changes that led many to question the claim that the changes were designed to promote the values associated with democracy. Their leaders’ actions, however, did  not seem to have undercut the Argentinians’ and Venezuelans’ commitment to democracy. In both cases, though the people had been highly critical of their respective governments, the majority continued to believe that democracy was  the only viable form of government. Did  their commitment suggest that, despite the anti-democratic measures initiated by their leaders, the values

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and beliefs generally associated with democracy had  actually developed deep roots among the people? This question is revisited shortly. It is argued that every democracy needs a pluralistic, autonomously organized civil society in order to check the power of the state and give expression to popular interests via the democratic process.87 According to Diamond, a civil society refers to the “realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self generating, at least partially self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” A civil society is distinct from ‘society’ in general. It must exist in a democracy in order to express collectively the public’s “interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.”88 A civil society is not a political society, because a political society encompasses organized actors whose central goal is to gain access to the state or to gain control of the state. Moreover, a civil society excludes individual and family life; groups that are organized for recreational, entertainment, or religious purposes; and individual business firms. How is a “pluralistic, autonomously organized civil society” formed? 89 To develop a better understanding of the relationship between civil society and democracy, one must once again refer to the state-creation process. During the first phase of building a state, a territory’s preeminent elites engage in a series of bargains and establish a variety of networks to create bonds with local power-holders. Jointly they start creating institutions designed to extract resources for common defense, maintain internal order and adjudicate disputes, protect established rights and privileges, and create the elementary economic and political infrastructure. During the second phase, the center creates new channels of contact with the peripheries in order to induce their populations to identify more closely with the political system. Democratization begins in the third phase. At this stage, there is an increase in the level of participation of the masses. The increase takes place through the establishment of privileges of opposition, the creation of political parties, and the extension of the electorate. In the fourth stage, the state experiences a growth in the agencies of redistribution.90 According to this differentiation, thus, civil society begins to shape itself during the second phase. It begins to gain importance as the people within the state start to develop norms and values that transcend their own narrow interests, and as they start to organize themselves with the intent of demanding changes to the existing structures.

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Diamond contends that civil society can affect democratization in three distinct, but not entirely independent, ways. It can: 1. Aid political elites in consolidating democracy and strengthening its foundations; 2. Control the power of the state by holding [it] accountable to the law and public expectations; and 3. Generate the transition from authoritarian rule to, at least, an electoral democracy. A civil society’s role with regard to the third condition can vary depending on circumstances. A fissure within an authoritarian regime, such as an internal cleavage within the regime between its hard-liners and its soft-­ liners, has in some instances compelled civil society to initiate a public upsurge strong enough to force the regime to relinquish control. In other cases, the transition has ensued even without the existence of a division within the authoritarian regime. In such instances, typically the driving entities were one or more non-governmental organizations that succeeded in convincing hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets to demand changes, and also succeeded in enlisting the backing of international actors.91 Before the discussion of the role of civil society, it was stated that though most Argentinians and Venezuelans were  highly critical of their ‘democratic governments,’ they remained committed to democracy. It seems quite evident, therefore, that a civil society that is committed to acting “collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable” is a society that is defined by a culture of democracy. It is a society with this type of culture that can have a positive effect on democratization. Conversely, a society that has a civil society that lacks a culture of democracy, or has a very weak one, will not affect the process of democratization in any significant way. We can now turn to the next set of factors identified by Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz—the nature of the international environment and the actions initiated by powerful international actors. They note that the authors of the various empirical cases in their edited volume concur on two points. First, they propose that the political structures Latin American leaders created were borrowed from abroad, particularly the democratic

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models adopted by some European states and the United States. At the same time, they contend that external actors were not the leading source of political turmoil and democratic failures throughout Latin America.92 Analyses conducted in this book qualify the last argument. Specifically, those analysts demonstrate that though for extended periods blame for failing to consolidate democracy can be placed principally on the shoulders of Spanish Americans themselves, the United States also played a substantial, negative role. The actions by the Eisenhower administration against the democratically elected Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 were not inconsequential. The US intelligence documents reveal that for more than 30  years the United States was involved in equipping and training Guatemalan security forces that murdered thousands of civilians in the country’s civil war. Moreover, one cannot dismiss the impact of Operation Condor, a campaign of political repression and terror designed by the dictatorships of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to eliminate Soviet or communist influence and ideas throughout Latin America. Although the United States was not a member of the organization, it provided financial and technical assistance to the operation. It is difficult to measure the effects that US involvement had on democratization in the six aforementioned Latin American states, but it is fair to assert that any time a foreign actor contributes to the promotion of repression and terror, democracy is not well served. The last contention must be balanced, at least partially, with the acknowledgment that after the end of the Cold War, the United States launched a doctrine designed to persuade many of its Latin American counterparts to rebuild their democratic regimes and open their markets. It is difficult to ascertain whether Washington’s efforts actually contributed to the reestablishment of democratic regimes in the states in which they reemerged. It is unquestionable, however, that the political leaders of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina steadily imposed, or tried to impose, constitutional structural changes that actually undercut their respective original democratic structures and, consequently, directly challenged Washington’s post-Cold War pro-democracy doctrine. In short, it would be a grave mistake to dismiss outright the positive or negative effects international actors have had on the process of democratization in Latin America, for two reasons. First, though in most cases the actions by international actors have not been the leading determinant of whether a regime has become a democracy, in a few situations, they have hindered the process. Second, international actors have not attempted to

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affect the political regimes of each Spanish American entity equally. Therefore, in those cases in which international actors sought to transform a state’s political regime, it is incumbent on analysts to ascertain whether the interferers’ actions, when compared to non-international factors, affected the process.

Conclusion This study is built on the argument that to understand why some states in the Americas have been more effective at creating democratic regimes than others, it is necessary to analyze the evolution of their respective states and political regimes, identify the factors that either aided or obstructed the processes at different points in time, and isolate potential causal relationships. This study concurs with the contention that stable democracies are built in states that have consolidated and legitimized their power. It also agrees with the proposition that democracy is threatened by the presence of very dominant state institutions. These two declarations make it clear that the state-creation and democratization tasks, though distinct, are interconnected. Thus, it is the task of investigators to isolate the principal contradictory tensions that arose at different points in time in different entities, beginning with the end of the colonial period. As analysts examine the immediate post-independence period—the remaining nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the first decade of the twenty-first century— they must isolate those tensions that were or were not resolved at different stages, and the new ones that might have emerged. In addition, investigators must identify changes in the nature and structure of the various states and their respective regimes. The analyses of multiple cases facilitate the design of multiple interconnected hypotheses.

Notes 1. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 70. See also Albert Yee, “State-Society Complexes and State Autonomy in Political Analysis.” Unpublished paper (1993), 1. See also Bob Jessop, The State: Past, Present, Future (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2015). 2. Jorge Dominguez, “Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean,” in  Myron Weiner, Samuel Huntington, eds.,

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Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 66. 3. See Gianfranco Poggi, The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 21. 4. See Eric A.  Nordlinger, “Taking the State Seriously,” in Myron Weiner, Samuel Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 362 and 363. 5. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” 278. 6. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 8. 7. This definition borrows directly from the definitions posited by Finer and Tilly. See Tilly, 1975: 70. 8. Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 5. 9. Ibid., 9. 10. Timothy Mitchell, “Go Beyond the States Response,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 4 (December 1992): 1017. 11. See Theodore Lowi, 1988. “The Return of the State: Critiques,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (September 1988): 891. 12. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14. 13. Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 40–44, and 632–633. Tilly does not include the last condition as part of his initial set, but it is evident that he believes accounting for the structure of the international system in the study of state formation is critically important. He acknowledges, however, that the last condition may have played a more important role among political entities that sought to become states after the major European powers and the United States had given form to the contemporary international structure. Tilly borrows this argument from Immanuel Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 14. The problem of state-building, as Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell contend, entails the problem of penetration and integration, while the problem of nation-building involves the problem of loyalty and commitment. See Gabriel A.  Almond and G.  Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 35. Having a culturally homogeneous population is more important for nation-­building than it is of state-building. At the same time, however,

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one must consider that a culturally divided state that seeks to become a nation-state is more likely to become an unstable state than is a culturally homogeneous nation that seeks to become a state. 15. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 41–42. 16. Charles Tilly, “The Formation of European States, AD 990–1990,” in Stephen K. Sanderson, ed., Sociological Worlds: Comparative and Historical Readings on Society (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000), 234. 17. Stein Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe,” in Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 1975, 563. It is not this study’s intent to contend that Rokkan’s theory is applicable to Latin American politics. However, his theory is constructed on an analytical framework that could be used in the analysis of state-building in Latin America. 18. Ibid., 571–572. 19. Ibid., 577. 20. Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building, 577. 21. Ibid., 581–582. 22. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1997): 22. 23. Ibid. 24. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 121. 25. See Samuel Huntington, “Political Modernization America Versus Europe,” World Politics, vol. 18, no. 03 (1966), 379–382. 26. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 6–7. 27. Hans Daalder, State formation, parties and democracy (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011), 40. 28. Skowronek, Building a New American State. 29. Ibid., 20–22. 30. Ibid., 4. 31. Fernando  López-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 35. 32. Frank Safford, “The Construction of National States in Latin America, 1820–1890,” in Miguel Centeno and Agustin E.  Ferrero, State Nation Making in Latin America and Spain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25–26, and 55. 33. López-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 15. 34. López-Alves, State Formation …” 19, and 22–23. C. G. Thies contends that throughout Latin America the rivalry between states had a positive effect on the capacity of the state to extract resources while the rivalry

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between internal had a negative effect on state-building. See C. G. Thies, “War, rivalry, and state building in Latin America,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005): 451–456. 35. Jonathan Di John, “The ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Evidence,” Real Institute Elcano, December 15, 2010. http://www.realinstitutoelcano. org/wps/por tal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/sub-saharan+africa/ari1722010. 36. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 16. 37. For a review of alternative recommendations, see Meaza Zerihun Demissie, “The Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transparency and International Initiatives. (University of Southern Mississippi, 2014). https://eiti.org/files/The%20Natural%20Resource%20Curse%20in%20 Sub-Saharan%20Africa.pdf. 38. Robert Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 2. 39. Ibid., 1–2. 40. Giovanni Sartori considers these regimes to be autocratic. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One (Chatham House Publishers, 1987), 203–207. 41. Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions, 3. 42. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 7. 43. See Wolfang  Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 5 (2004): 33–58. 44. Ibid., 43. 45. Ibid., 49–50. See also David Bosold and Christian Achrainer, “Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the PostSoviet States,” 14. https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/20148. 46. See Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “Post-communist regime types: Hierarchies across attributes and space,” in Communist and Post-­ Communist Studies, 2010, Vol. 1: 51–71. 47. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers 1987), 31–32. 48. Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 36. 49. Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), 288. 50. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 49–50. 51. See Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 119.

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52. Ibid., 31. 53. Ibid., 120. 54. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 243–245. 55. Dahl also points out the arbitrariness of imposing a child/adult dichotomy “on a process of development that is not only continuous but varies between different persons.” See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 127. 56. Ibid., Note 10, 354. 57. Guillermo  O’Donnell, “Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 2000): 22. 58. Quoted in Carolyn Maull McKinstry, While the World Watched (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2011), 193. The contention that the United States did not become a democracy until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not a new one. See O’Donnell, “Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics,” 24, footnote 29. 59. For a comparative analysis of the relationships between constitutional designs and political performances, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 60. It is not important to address at the moment whether a system that relies on proportional representation with multimember electoral districts is more stable and more efficient than one that relies on plurality elections and single-­member districts. 61. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Vol. One, 54. 62. This study acknowledges that there is significant variance within multiparty systems. 63. This study does not suggest that in a proportional-representation-type system the government per se will be responsive to the preferences of more people than in a plurality-type system. It merely contends that in the first system, because there are more parties covering a wider ideological spectrum, a broader set of preferences can be represented at election time than in the second system. 64. See O’Donnell, “Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics,” 16. Merkel’s argument was discussed earlier in the chapter. 65. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 241. 66. Ibid., 251. 67. Ibid., Chapters 17–18. 68. Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 17. 69. Ibid., 24. 70. Jeff Haynes, Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 198. 71. Ibid., 199.

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72. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Chibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F.  Plattner, eds., The Global Divergence of Democracies (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University, 2001), 168. 73. Haynes, “Democracy in the Developing World,” 205. 74. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” in Larry  Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publisher, 1999), 9. 75. Ibid., 7–60. 76. See Alex Roberto  Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina and Peru (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), Chapter three. 77. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” 15. 78. Ibid., 33. 79. Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, (October 1990), 1. 80. A similar type of analysis could be conducted within a state but at different points in time if and when the domestic and international structural conditions faced by the leaders were quite similar. 81. A.  Wendt and R.  Duvall, “Institutions and International Order,” in E. Otto-Czempiel and J. Rosenau (eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics in the 1990s, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989, p. 60. 82. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” 39. 83. Ibid., 53. 84. In the United States Native Americans were denied the right to vote until the late 1920s. 85. Ibid., 59. 86. Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 120. 87. For a discussion of the evolution of the modern conceptualization of civil society see John W. Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa,” in John W.  Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1994), 1–32. 88. Larry Diamond, Development and Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221. 89. For an analysis and critique of the concept civil society, see Bakry M. El Medini, “Civil Society and Democratic Transformation in Contemporary

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Egypt: Premise and Promises,” in International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2013): 14–26. 90. See Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe,” 571–572. 91. Diamond, Development and Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 240–262. 92. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” 57.

Bibliography Almond, Gabriel A., and G.  Bingham Powell. 1966. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Print. Barker, Ernest. 1942. Reflections on Government. Oxford: University Press. Print. Bosold, David, and Christian Achrainer. 2012. Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States, 9–22. Web. January 24, 2019. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. New  York: Colombia University Press. Print. Daalder, Hans. 2011. State Formation, Parties, and Democracy: Studies in Comparative European Politics. Colchester: ECPR Press. Print. Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Print. ———. 1974. Regimes and Oppositions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Print. ———. 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven: Yale University Press. Print. ———. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Print. Demissie, Meaza Zerihun. 2014. The Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transparency and International Initiatives. University of Southern Mississippi, Print. Di John, Jonathan. 2010. The ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Evidence.” Real Instituto Elcano. Real Instituto Elcano. Web. July 03, 2017. Diamond, Larry J., ed. 1993. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries: Conference: Papers. Boulder, CO: L. Reinner, U.S.. Print. ———. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Print. Diamond, Larry Jay, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan J.  Linz. 1999. Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America. In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, ed. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Print. Dominguez, Jorge I. 1987. Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. In Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Print.

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El Medini, Bakry M. 2013. Civil Society and Democratic Transformation in Contemporary Egypt: Premise and Promises. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3 (2): 39–49. Web. January 24, 2019. Harbeson, John W. 1994. Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa. In Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Print. Haynes, Jeff. 2004. Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Cambridge: Polity. Print. Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Huntington, Samuel. 1966. Political Modernization: America vs. Europe. World Politics 18 (03). Print. Jessop, Bob. 2015. The State: Past, Present, Future. Cambridge: John Wiley and Sons. Print. Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics 23 (1): 1–21. Web. 24 January 2019. ———. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Print. Katzenstein, Peter. 1978. Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy. In Between Power and Plenty, ed. Peter Katzenstein. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Print. Krasner, Stephen. 1978. Defending the National Interest. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C.  Stepan. 1997. Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy 7 (2): 14–33. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. López-Alves, Fernando. 2000. State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Print. Lowi, Theodore J. 1988. The Return to the State: Critiques. The American Political Science Review 82 (3): 695. Print. McKinstry, Carolyn Maull. 2011. While the World Watched: A Birmingham Bombing Survivor Comes of Age during the Civil Rights Movement. Cambridge: Tyndale House. Print. Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. Embedded and Defective Democracies. Democratization 11 (5): 33–58. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Merton, Robert K. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Print. Mitchell, Timothy. 1992. Go Beyond the States Response. American Political Science Review 86 (4). Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2010. Post-Communist Regime Types: Hierarchies Across Attributes and Space. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43 (1): 51–71. Web. 24 Jan. 2019.

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Nordlinger, Eric A. 1987. Taking the State Seriously. In Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P.  Huntington. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Print. Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Print. Powell, G.  Bingham. 1982. Contemporary Democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Print. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E.  Alvarez, José Antonio Chibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2001. What Makes Democracies Endure. In The Global Divergence of Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F.  Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Print. Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. In When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Safford, Frank. 1987. Politics, Ideology, and Society. In The Cambridge History of Latin America. From Independence to C. 1870, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. ———. 2014. The Construction of National States in Latin America, 1820–1890. In State and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Agustin E.  Ferraro. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Print. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Print. ———. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers. Print. Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1947. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers. Print. Skocpol, Theda. 1985. Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In Bringing the State Back In, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter B. Evans, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Thies, Cameron G. 2005. War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America. American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 451–465. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Tilly, Charles. 1975. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. ———. 2000. The Formation of European States, AD 990–1990. In Sociological Worlds: Comparative and Historical Readings on Society, ed. Stephen K. Sanderson. London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. Print.

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Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System. New  York: Academic Press. Print. Wendt, Alexander, and R. Duvall. 1989. Institutions and International Order. In Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics in the 1990s, ed. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau. Lexington: Lexington Books. Print. Yee, Albert. 1993. State-Society Complexes and State Autonomy in Political Analysis. Unpublished Paper, Print.

CHAPTER 3

The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in the United States

Introduction The designers of the US constitution never intended to create a democracy, and yet a minimalist democracy emerged 187 years after the enactment of the 1787 constitution. What brought about the transformation?

Colonial Period The New England settlers created colonies significantly different from those established by Virginia’s immigrants. Unlike those who settled in Virginia, colonists in Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, and Rhode Island generally came in family groups who had owned small parcels of land in England. Upon their arrival in New England, they tended to replicate their home environments, creating towns made up of independent landholders. The New England climate and soil prevented the development of large-scale plantation agriculture, which discouraged the formation of a system of extensive landholdings that required large numbers of slaves or indentured servants to grow labor-intensive crops. Disease aided the new settlers in their relations with Native Americans. By the time the Puritans arrived, French and Portuguese fishermen, who had been fishing along the New England shores since the early sixteenth century, had transmitted a lethal pandemic of smallpox to New England’s Native American population that killed as many as 90 percent of them. Moreover, because of the colder weather they encountered, the New © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_3

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England colonists were not afflicted by the death rate experienced by the Virginia colonists. A relatively healthier environment, coupled with political stability and the substantial presence of family groups among the early immigrants, enabled the New England population to grow from 21,000 to 91,000 people by 1700, while of the 120,000 English who arrived in the Chesapeake area, only 85,000 white colonists remained in 1700.1 Like the colonists in Virginia, those who moved to New England sought to interact with the Native American groups they encountered. In the early years, both parties benefited from the interaction. But as was in Virginia, the relatively peaceful arrangement did not last long. Initially, the New England colonists viewed America’s natives as members of an uneducated society who deserved external assistance in order to realize their potential. Many Puritans were guided by the belief that it was “not the nature of men, which makes them barbarous and uncivil.” The colonists believed that with a change in education, the nature of the Native Americans would be “greatly rectified and corrected.”2 Determined not to replicate Castile’s cruel treatment of Native Americans, the New England colonists assumed they could rely on kind actions instead. While the Spaniards had conquered the West Indies “with rapiers point and musket shot, murdering so many millions of naked Indians,” the English would use “fair and loving means, suiting to our English natures.”3 Gentle actions, moreover, would help convince Native Americans to embrace Christianity, and conversion would lead to a successful colonial enterprise. Though the colonists’ initial attempts to colonize varied by region, in the long run they all took similar steps. When it became evident that Native Americans would not acquiesce peacefully, most of the colonists, including those who had originally advocated humane treatment, began to advocate the use of force, savagery, and harsh reprisals to achieve their ends.4 By 1690, wars and diseases brought by immigrants had destroyed much of the Native American population living along the eastern parts of the United States, while the new American population had risen to a quarter of a million. In New England, with its stony terrain and harsh winters, the new settlers had difficulty building sizable farms. Typically, they resided in villages and towns near the harbors, and each village had its own church, school, and town hall. Farmers in the surrounding areas worked small tracts of land and provided sustenance for residents in the immediate region. By the end of the colonial period, New England was the most ethnically homogeneous region in North America, and though it had the highest

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rate of family immigration, and thus a high birth rate, it also had the fewest immigrants coming from continental Europe. By 1776, 26 percent of the colonialists lived in the New England region; of those, 97 percent were white and 3 percent were black.5 The Middle Colonies included Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. In the eighteenth century, the Scots-Irish made Philadelphia their leading gateway into America and settled in the backcountry. Quakers dominated Philadelphia. Not far north, the Dutch became the predominant presence in New York, and their merchants played a critical role in establishing Manhattan as an important center of commerce. Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, English, Scots, Irish, Germans, Poles, Bohemians, and Portuguese soon joined them. By the end of the colonial period, of the 24 percent of the colonists who lived in the Middle region, 94 percent were white, and 6 percent were black.6 The southern colonies—Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia—were mostly rural settlements. Because of the heavy dependence on farming large tracts of land, the composition of the population in the southern colonies differed greatly from those in New England and Middle colonies. Not counting the indigenous population, the southern colonies served as the home for 48 percent of the colonies’ inhabitants. Moreover, because of the large presence of black slaves, the southern colonies were the most ethnically diverse. In that region, the black population was only 1.5 times smaller than the white one, while in the Middle colonies it was nearly 16 times smaller, and in the New England colonies 32 times. The variance in the regional ratio of the black and white populations would eventually become “a social question of major political importance.”7 What is more, because initially most of its newly arrived people were single men seeking fortunes, the South had a lower birth rate. Its lower birth rate was compounded by very high death rates produced by malaria, yellow fever, and physical violence. It was not long before Britain’s colonies became almost self-governing, with London too far away to rule. The 13 colonies lacked a common center and showed little desire to attain a modicum of unity. When problems of governance emerged, they sought solutions within their own political capitals. Few engaged in intercontinental trade; each producer sold his products either overseas or within his own colony, most likely in the local markets.8 Though each colony was highly protective of its own independence, they all developed a standard culture, one that remained connected to

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England. Each one relied on the English model to structure its political system of governance, and each government and most churches adopted English as the official language. They were united by a commitment to frugality, virtue, and industry, and by an innate aversion toward corruption, idle public officials, and arrogant governments. These values had arisen in England, and they defined the core of Whig ideology, which linked “liberty to balanced government, and despotism to the over-mighty executive and to moral corruption.”9 The creation and solidification of the United States as a state and the transformation of its political regime went through six stages.

First Transformation None of the governments established in the colonies was democratic. The governor of each colony served as its chief enforcement officer and was appointed, with few exceptions, by the king—not by the common people of the colonies nor by elected members of the colonial assemblies. Moreover, prior to the 1700s, the level of religious tolerance varied from region to region; it was high in the Middle Colonies, very low in the New England regions, and moderate in the South. Servants, paupers, women (except widows in New England), Native Americans, and African Americans were barred from participating in the political process in each of the colonies. Of the remaining population, made up of white males, those who did not own a minimum amount of property, or did not pay taxes, as was the case in South Carolina, were also excluded from political engagement. It was believed that property ownership demonstrated that the individual had a stake in society, was competent, and was independent from others. During the first transformation after independence, the 13 colonies became a confederation. Congress was established to act as the g ­ overnment of the newly established free states, but with limited power and authority. Each state had its own government and viewed itself as a sovereign entity. The resulting overall state structure reflected the common set of values that united the representatives, and the commitment of each colony to protect its independence. The relationship between liberty and an individual’s control over his own property helped build the rationale for independence. Borrowing from John Locke, Americans viewed property as the means to define their freedom and differentiate themselves from slaves. A slave, argued Locke,

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had no “political rights because he has no property.” Freedom, in turn, stood for the right of an individual to decide how to use his property. A man could decide to separate himself from his property and his labor, but only if he consented to do so.10 This vision affected the decision on the part of Americans to free themselves from Britain’s dictates, and to determine the type of structure the newly freed “states” wanted to assume. The relationship between property and liberty extended to suffrage. Property, as already noted, demonstrated that the individual had a stake in society, was competent, and was independent from others. But property or taxation was not the only condition that dictated who could vote and who could not vote. Religion, gender, race, and ethnicity were also used as impediments to full political participation.

Second Transformation It was not long before Americans lost confidence in the weak constitutional structure they had created while seeking independence. During the early days of the revolution, its central figures shared the conviction that most Americans were people who “valued frugality, despised luxury, hated corruption, and preferred moderation and balance to extremes of any sort.” They also believed that the gravest danger the people faced was the emergence of a tyrannical ruler. To avoid the creation of such a condition, they had recommended that government hold very limited powers.11 Opinions had changed by the 1870s. The desire for greater private gains had steadily become the norm, making it difficult for a Congress without adequate powers to resolve the differences between the states and govern effectively. Moreover, since independence, each of the state legislatures had increased the number of its members and the number of those eligible to vote. This increase made it harder to promote a “unitary public interest distinguishable from the private and parochial interests of ­individuals.”12 Political leaders worried that the people were becoming the new source of tyranny.13 By the middle of the 1780s, the political regimes in the new states had also changed. The debate between those who argued in favor of keeping the franchise narrow and those who proposed that it be widened had gained momentum. Planters, merchants, and prosperous farmers advocated keeping the franchise narrow.14 They generally argued that the franchise was a privilege, not a right. Since a state’s central priority was to protect itself, it should be able to determine who could and could not

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vote. Extending the right to people who did not own property would undermine stability, because those without property did not have a will of their own and could be easily manipulated by a demagogue. Furthermore, there was the danger that if people without property were to vote, they would actually threaten the interests of property owners.15 However, it was generally agreed that those who served in the military should be enfranchised. The notion that voting was a natural right stood in direct opposition to the argument just articulated. If voting was a natural right, did it mean that in addition to the white men without property, women, African Americans, children, and recently arrived immigrants also should be permitted to vote? Most advocates of the natural-right proposition rejected that idea. Instead, they proposed that property qualifications be replaced by taxpaying requirements. Their justification was that since taxpayers, not just property owners, contributed to the government and were affected by its policies, they should also be granted the franchise. Taxing an individual without his consent, they argued, would be unfair and unjust. Moreover, it would be an invitation to disorder, anarchy, and tax evasion. Another group who was to be enfranchised consisted of those who had served or were serving in the military.16 Responses to the query varied from state to state. Vermont opposed linking the right to vote to a man’s financial standing. Massachusetts stiffened the requirements. Rhode Island, Delaware, Connecticut, South Carolina, and Virginia kept most of the prerequisites that had been in place during the colonial period. The remaining states moderated the conditions to different degrees. “The overall result was a mixed bag of substantial changes, cosmetic alterations, and preservation of the status quo.”17 Mindful that they had to address a wide range of issues and that if not restructured the Confederation could collapse, delegates of the various states met in Philadelphia in May 1787. All 57 men were white property owners. Some were farmers, others were lawyers and merchants, and 19 were slave owners. From early on, they recognized that they needed to increase the power and authority of the central government. After three days of deliberation, the committee assigned to draft a plan agreed on a compromise, which came to be known as the “Connecticut Compromise.” The competing camps concurred that they would create an upper house composed of two representatives per state, regardless of the size of each state’s population; and a lower house where each state would have one representative for every 40,000 inhabitants.

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The inclusion of slaves as inhabitants became a contentious suffrage issue during deliberations. Bondage was almost nonexistent in the Northeastern states but was widespread in the South. Abolitionists wanted slavery to be made illegal; delegates from the South insisted that each slave be counted as three-fifths of a person. The North acquiesced but demanded a ban on international slave trade and a government census every ten years to reflect changes in the size of the population. The South insisted that the ban be delayed for 20 years. The North agreed but demanded that the South accept taxation of slave trades in the international market. The South assented. The process of selecting a president generated concern. Granting Congress responsibility for choosing the president was rejected almost immediately, because it was believed that the procedure would upset the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches. Awarding state legislatures the authority to select the president was also discarded. Such an arrangement would undercut the authority of the federal government and extend state legislatures too much power. Election of the president by popular vote was abandoned on three accounts. First, delegates feared that if no single candidate won a substantial popular majority, he would have difficulty governing the entire country. Second, granting the decision directly to the people nearly ensured that the election would be decided by the most populous states. And third, because of the size of the country and the absence of good means of communication and transportation, people within each state would have very little information about candidates from outside the state and would tend to vote for someone within their own state or nearby region. A committee finally recommended the indirect election of the president through a College of Electors. Article II, Section 1, of the 1788 Constitution stipulated that each state was allocated a number of electors to be determined by each state’s number of senators, which in every case would be two, plus the number of ­representatives in the lower chamber. The number of electors for each state could change depending on variations in its number of inhabitants, which would be reassessed every ten years after the completion of a census. The method of choosing electors was left to the individual state legislatures. In each of the imaginable scenarios, the candidate with the second-highest number of votes would be named vice-president. One critical issue remained unresolved—a national conception of voting rights. The constitution was promulgated in the name of “We, the people of the United States ….” Members attending the convention,

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however, could not agree on the definition of “we.” Unable to reach an agreement, convention delegates concurred that each state retained the right to decide who “the people” were and, thus, the right to decide who was a citizen and who could, or could not, express his opinion at the ballot box.18 By the beginning of the 1790s, the United States had become a state but its political regime was not democratic. Each state remained a competitive oligarchy. Only white males could vote for the lower houses of both state and federal governments. In neither the election of senators nor the election of the president were those who voted granted equal voting rights. In both instances, inhabitants of the less-populated states played a greater role.19

Third Transformation The federal republic designed in the late 1780s was far from perfect. Its imperfection spawned a major flare-up in 1861. Though multiple issues divided the Southern and Northern states, several were connected, and their linkage helped deepen the discord. Slavery was at the heart of the Southern states’ economy. In South Carolina and Mississippi, slaves made up more than half of the population. In Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana, they represented more than 40 percent of the population. In the remaining Southern states, the percentage was not as high, but in each case, it ranged between 20 and 30 percent. Though Northern states had slaves, their economy did not depend heavily on them. Moreover, people in Northern states increasingly opposed slavery on moral grounds. That the economy of Northern states depended less on slavery than the economy of Southern states did not mean that the former were more receptive than the latter to political participation by free African Americans. In Northern and Southern states, most people adhered to the belief that there were inherent racial differences. This belief “ensured that African Americans, even when free, would increasingly be considered unworthy of citizenship,” and thus would experience disfranchisement.20 The 1860 presidential elections set the groundwork that would lead to the transformation of the US political landscape. By the 1850s, the Whig Party capitulated to the sectionalizing effects of the slavery issue and stopped operating as a national party. During its existence, it had supported the supremacy of Congress over the presidency and had favored a

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program of modernization and economic protectionism. Meanwhile, though the Democratic Party had remained intact throughout that decade, slavery had weakened the bonds between the southern wing, which was the dominant faction, and the smaller northern contingent. The Republican Party was composed of former Whigs, a few ex-Democrats, and prior members of other parties, including some who had previously supported anti-slavery parties. The Republican Party took positions on a wide range issues, but its defining one was its stand on slavery. It opposed the expansion of slavery and called upon Congress to act accordingly. As explained in its political platform, carrying “slavery into any or all of the territories of the United States, is a dangerous political heresy … and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country.”21 In its eighth declaration, the Republican Party stated that the normal condition “of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom: That, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that ‘no persons should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,’ it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it.”22 Not all Republicans were abolitionists. Abraham Lincoln and a significant minority upheld the constitutional sanctity of slavery in the South. In his inaugural speech, the president stated that he “had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.” He added, “I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.”23 The November election did not give Lincoln a resounding victory. He garnered 180 electoral votes out of 303 but received only 39.65 percent of the popular vote. Convinced that the newly elected president would reject the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which had been reinforced by the Supreme Court ruling of March 6, 1860, 11 Southern states chose almost immediately to secede, the last one in June 1861.24 By then, Confederate soldiers had already attacked Union soldiers stationed at Fort Sumner, South Carolina. In sum, during the third transformation Southern states pressed Washington to increase the US territorial reach and demanded that it authorize the practice of slavery in the newly acquired territories. Originally, opposition to this demand came primarily from the North, but with limited effect, largely because Southern planters and Western farmers had joined forces. However, the Industrial Revolution and the flow of millions of immigrants to the Eastern cities enabled the North to develop

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faster than the South and to recruit support from several Western states. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the issue of slavery had become the leading divisive force. Southern leaders, convinced that the abolition of slavery would destroy their region’s economy, made it clear that if Abraham Lincoln were to be elected president, the states in their region would secede. It took the Union states four years to win the war. The victory, though not predetermined, was highly probable. Twenty-two million people inhabited the North; only nine million lived in the South. The Union army outnumbered the Confederate forces by nearly two to one. The industrial capacity of the Union was nine-tenths greater than that of the Confederacy. The railroads of the Union states covered twice as much territory as those covered by the Confederate states. The superior naval strength of the Union states prevented attempts by the Confederacy to overcome its inferior materiel capacity by trading with Europe. Also, of great significance was Lincoln’s January 1, 1863, Emancipation Proclamation. The decree freed slaves in rebellious states and stipulated that African American men would be permitted to serve in the Union Army or Navy. By the end of the war, some 200,000 African American men had served as either soldiers or sailors. As noted by Richard Current, “in view of the disparity of resources, it would have taken a miracle … to enable the South to win.”25 Victory by the Union during the Civil War helped retain the union. In addition, it set up the groundwork for the changes that would start taking place after 1877.

Fourth Transformation In January 1865, Congress, with Lincoln’s backing, approved the 13th Amendment. It abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime. In March, shortly before his assassination, Lincoln ordered the creation of The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands in order to provide economic, legal, and social assistance to African Americans and poor whites, and to help plantation owners rebuild their estates. However, his successor, Andrew Johnson, clashed with Congress almost immediately over the Civil Rights Act, which was the first federal law that defined US citizenship and affirmed equal protection for all citizens. Johnson vetoed the act, but Congress overrode it. The power of the Republicans increased further near the end of 1866, when voters gave the

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party a two-thirds majority in both chambers. By 1870, with Ulysses Grant as the new president, members of Congress had approved the 14th and 15th Amendments. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment stipulated that all “persons born or naturalized in the United States … are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside” and that no state had the right to “make or enforce any law” that abridged “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” The 15th Amendment dictated that neither the United States nor any state could deny a US citizen the right to vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” To attract broad support, the amendment did not include alternative measures that states could use to block voting, such as poll taxes and literacy tests. The measures approved by Congress instigated resentment among many white Southerners, principally because, depending on the state, blacks constituted absolute majorities; were equal in numbers to whites, or represented more than 40 percent of the population. Determined to protect their lifestyle and interests, white supremacist paramilitary groups that were allied with Southern Democrats relied on violence and general intimidation to prevent blacks from exercising their political rights. During the second half of the 1870s, Southern states began to pass laws designed to make it very difficult for blacks and poor whites to register to vote. They imposed property and lengthy residence requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, and cumbersome registration procedures to disqualify African Americans from voting. By 1908, all Southern states had approved new constitutions designed to limit voting by blacks. Reconstruction was, as noted by Ron Chernow, a doomed experiment. “Once Reconstruction collapsed, it left southern blacks for eighty years at the mercy of Jim Crow segregation, lynching, poll taxes, literacy tests, and other tactics designed to segregate them from whites and deny them the vote.”26 As the United States continued its expansion, those who traversed the newly conquered lands encountered resistance from Native Americans. In 1830, the US Congress approved the Indian Removal Act. It authorized the government to carry out the large-scale resettlement of indigenous people, moving them from east of the Mississippi River to the western frontier. Starting after the end of the Civil War, President Ulysses Grant sought to protect Native Americans. He appointed General Ely Parker, a Seneca, to be commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and asked Congress to form a ten-man Board of Indian Commissioners. Grant’s attempt to provide protection for Native Americans conflicted with the

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development of millions of acres of federal public lands and with the private acquisition of land by pioneers, and railroad and mining companies. These expansionist measures required the actual removal of Native Americans from desirable territory. White settlers continued to push Native Americans off their land and relied on the Army to prevent retaliation. Despite Grant’s initial intention, his strategy to contain Native Americans on reservations involved aggressive military pursuits that led to horrific killings. Two years into his presidency, Grant signed the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871. The act ended the government’s treaty-making process and the practice of recognizing tribes as sovereign nations. It also signaled the official start of policies designed to assimilate Native Americans. Grant’s policy placed Native Americans on reservations in order to convince them to repudiate their nomadic past and mimic the ways of the white people. Ultimately, this program led to a form of cultural genocide.27 In short, the Civil War and the Reconstruction Era that followed did not engender a political system in which those who had been excluded from the political process were finally able to become free and full participants. Moreover, all that the Peace Policy and the drive to culturally assimilate Native Americans accomplished was to further isolate them and impede their rate of growth.

Fifth Transformation Despite the changes that had taken place since the declaration of independence, it is generally agreed that the major effort to build a stronger, central US government did not begin until 1877.28 As explained by Stephen Skowronek, the ability of the US system to function during the early years depended on the rules of behavior provided by the political parties and the courts. Local political organizations designed electoral alliances that removed the chaos that too often had dominated politics. Party organizations connected the national government to each locale. They set up a horizontal network between the many discrete units of government that operated across the territory. They “brought a measure of cohesion to national politics and a measure of standardization to governmental forms and processes throughout the federal system.”29 By the end of the nineteenth century, the political parties had become one of the critical obstacles to the formulation of reasonable responses to the challenges faced by the United States. Instead of acting on behalf of

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the state as a whole, the leaders of the parties used their power to serve their own self-interests and those of their supporters.30 As the power of the party machines increased, so did the power of the federal courts. Aware of the competing demands generated by the country’s participatory system and mindful of the ill-defined boundaries that existed between the private and public spheres, the courts intervened as the only rational entity capable of dictating standards for state action and of demarcating the rights of property owners. Their reach, however, was limited. Though they could observe and dictate which actions were lawful and which were not, they could not supervise the rapid growth of the country’s economy.31 By the start of the twentieth century, populists, socialists, and corporate liberals had grown so dissatisfied that they demanded a change in the foundation on which the American economy and polity were built. They chastised the despotic role played by the political parties and the professional politicians who ran them and advocated the creation of administrative bureaucracies that would rely on rational approaches to problem-solving to guide the development of the economy.32 The drive to reform the system repeatedly encountered barriers erected by those who had been benefiting from pre-existing political and institutional arrangements. Their opposition, however, did not prevent changes in the country’s administrative structure. Administrative reformers steadily gained political power and managed to build coalitions among ­bureaucratic institutions. In time, however, as the various bureaucracies tried to address problems generated by the rapid industrialization of the American economy, the rivalry between them became acute, which in turn led to internal governmental confusion. As Skowronek explains, though the newly restructures national administrative apparatus freed the United States from the clutches of party domination, direct court supervision, and localistic orientations, it found itself engulfed by institutional politics. Saskia Sassen concurs.33 Lawmaking through the judiciary, she argues, played a large, positive role in the construction of the American state. The judiciary downplayed the stress placed by the forefathers on states’ rights and authority and emphasized the prerogatives of the federal government and the need to strengthen the union. The legitimacy of the original decentralized polity was derived from law; in the new system, the national centralized state became the source of law. From the 1870s on, “federal constitutional law displaced common law as the pre-eminent law.”34 What convinced the United States to rely on laws to make the national state the core of the federal system? By the early twentieth century, eco-

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nomic rivalry in the world arena with and between the leading European states had intensified. The internationalization of capital became a process whereby a state had to enlarge its domestic power structure in order to have access to the international market. International expansion also necessitated alliances and interstate coordination, neither of which could be achieved without active state participation. During the rapid expansion of industrialization, working classes in the major states, including the United States, strove to acquire social legislation that would address some of their concerns. The new forms of capitalism, imperialism, undercut the growing power of labor unions. Emphasis was now placed on the international greatness of the state. “The national idea,” writes Sassen, “becomes the driving force of politics. Class antagonisms disappear and are transcended in the service of the collectivity. The common action of the nation, united by a common goal of national greatness, replaces class struggle.”35 Nationalism became the norm, as did the conviction that as members of a “superior race” the citizens of a state had the moral obligation to unite in order to transform the world. The arguments posited by Skowronek and Sassen capture the process of strengthening the national state and its rationale. Imperialism, built on a capitalist foundation, had become the motto of many European powers as they extended their dominance throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The United States decided to follow a similar path. With the ­question of cessation no longer dividing the country and with the industrial revolution gaining momentum throughout parts of the United States, it became evident to some of its leading political, economic, and intellectual figures that in order to elevate its standing in a world arena and increase its economic capacity, many of the administrative functions executed by the separate states would have to be assumed by organizations within the national government. The payoffs became evident soon. By the start of the twentieth century, the United States had already revealed its intention to access Asia’s economic riches by forcing Japan to open its ports to American ships, purchasing Alaska from Russia, pressuring Korea and China to accept an open trade policy, annexing Hawaii and parts of the Samoan islands, and becoming the Philippines’ overlord. In addition, the United States became the principal military and economic actor in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America. None of this could have been accomplished without the existence of a strong state bureaucratic system. Woodrow Wilson’s decision to enter the First World War (WWI), and the rapid termination of the conflict

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shortly thereafter, informed the world that the United States had become a state with substantial organizational capabilities. Emboldened by the US contribution to bringing the war to an end, Wilson traveled to Europe determined to persuade his allies to accept his vision of a League of Nations. Aware that they could not outright reject his idea, Europe’s leaders accepted aspects of his proposal. Many in the United States questioned his attempt to transform an international system that for centuries had been afflicted by wars.

The Fifth Transformation and the Slow Opening of the Political System By 1920, a different type of political momentum had come to fruition within the United States. On August 18, 1920, the United States ratified the 19th Amendment, which stated the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.” One of the leading obstacles to granting women the right to vote had been the cult of true womanhood. The cult premise assumed a prevailing role among white Protestants. It fostered the notion that the ideal woman served as the center of the family—she ran the household, reared the ­children, and took care of the husband. The cult was defined by cardinal virtues. Piety kept the woman within the confines of the house and controlled her longings. Purity was a woman’s greatest treasure, to be protected until marriage. Submission and obedience to the male head of the household was God’s appointment. And domesticity enabled her to perform her role as a wife and to create a refuge for her husband and children.36 The image that was promoted during religious services, in religious texts, and in women’s magazines was that “true women” were delicate, soft, and weak.37 The extension of rights to African American men after the Civil War engendered a major division among women seeking the right to vote, and between abolitionists and some women’s-rights activists. During consideration of the 14th amendment, many female activists, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Stanton, opposed it, because they believed priority should be given to women. Abolitionists, led by Frederick Douglass, argued that recently liberated African American men should be extended the right to vote before women. White women, Douglass contended, were

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already indirectly empowered by their fathers, husbands, and brothers; and African American women would also be empowered once African American men were granted the vote. Consideration of the 15th Amendment also generated discord. This time the division was between women who refused to support it because it did not include the term sex, and women who championed it in exchange for future support of women’s suffrage by black men. The two groups remained at odds with one another until 1890, when they joined forces and formed the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). As the United States transitioned into a more developed industrial society and women began to have greater access to education and to factory and office jobs previously reserved for men, the cult of true womanhood started to lose its relevance and support. By 1917, demonstrations and parades led by women demanding the right to vote had grown measurably. The First World War helped tilt the balance. Because factories and businesses in general could not remain idle as men left to fight, greater numbers of women were recruited to enter the workforce. Tired of Wilson’s failure to act, women intensified their demonstrations. In 1918, ten months after the referendum to enfranchise women was approved by a substantial margin in New  York, the country’s most populous state, Wilson went before the Senate and called for the approval of the suffrage amendment. On September 30, 1918, he stated: “We have made partners of the women in this war; shall we admit them only to a partnership of suffering and sacrifice and toil and not to a partnership of privilege and right?”38 After having rejected the 19th Amendment multiple times, the House passed it in May 1919, with 304 votes in favor and 89 against. By March 1919, 35 states had ratified the Amendment. Seven former members of the Confederate States of America—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia—opposed it. Tennessee was the former Confederate state that tilted the balance in favor of women’s suffrage. It took the US Congress four more years to approve the Indian Citizenship Act, which accorded Native Americans the right to be a citizen of the United States. The act did not automatically grant them the right to vote. Several states found ways to prevent them from formally expressing their choices.39 During this period, Chinese Americans also faced discrimination. In 1882, the US Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act,

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which ended immigration from China and other Asian states. The act remained into effect until 1943.

The Sixth Transformation and the Expansion of Political Rights The Great Depression crushed the hopes of millions of Americans and set the groundwork for the sixth transformation. Upon assuming the presidency, the Franklin Roosevelt administration enlarged drastically the role of the federal government. The attack on Pearl Harbor further alerted Americans that their safety and well-being depended on the presence of a government with the power and authority necessary to put together a massive military force. By the end of the war, for a brief while some members of Congress demanded that Washington curtail its involvement in world affairs. This sentiment lost much of its appeal when the White House warned that if the United States reduced its international commitment, the Soviet Union would exploit the power vacuum and enlarge its domination throughout Europe and other regions of the world. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and Washington’s decision to involve the United States in the Korean and Vietnam Wars consolidated the sentiment that it was imperative for the United States to have a state with the capacity to address multiple domestic and international challenges simultaneously. Along with the enlargement of the role of the state came another transformation of the political regime, particularly with regard to the rights of African Americans. In 1890, the state of Louisiana passed the Separate Car Act. The law required that all railroads operating in the state provide equal but separate accommodations for whites and African Americans. Homer Plessy, a one-eighth African American, purchased a train ticket, sat in a car reserved for White people, refused to move when asked, was arrested, and was charged with violating the Separate Car Act. In the Plessy v Ferguson case, the US District Court and the state Supreme Court rejected Plessy’s contention that the law was unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court concurred. During the Second World War (WWII), large numbers of Blacks migrated from the rural South and West Virginia into Ohio to take part in the booming wartime economy. Racism and discrimination continued to dictate the policies of many companies. Instead of being given semiskilled

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or skilled jobs, African Americans were relegated to menial jobs. As the war efforts increased and more workers were needed, companies began to alter their practices. By the end of the war, 8 percent of Ohio’s skilled workforce was African American. WWII enabled African Americans to gain greater political rights in another important way. Fewer than 4000 blacks were serving in the military in 1941. It was not uncommon for Blacks to be passed over by the all-White draft boards. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) demanded that Roosevelt order that African Americans be enlisted in proportion to their percentage throughout the population. Though that goal was never achieved, by the war’s end more than 1.2  million African Americans were serving in the European and Pacific fronts. Their enlarged military presence did not eliminate discrimination. Initially, most African Americans were assigned to non-combat units, but by 1945, troop losses forced the military to place them directly in harm’s way. The irony was not lost on African American servicemen. While they were fighting for “freedom and democracy” thousands of miles away from their homeland, they were still experiencing discrimination in the United States. After the war ended, African Americans and White women who had been working in industries in the northeast were pressured by company executives, unions, soldiers, and society in general to relinquish their ­wartime jobs to the returning white soldiers. Blacks refused to remain quiet, and from then on, they increased the pressure on the US government to become a proactive promoter of greater political, economic, and social equality, regardless of race. A new major step was taken in the early 1950s. The Topeka Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People organized a class-action suit on behalf of 13 Black families. At that time, the children in those families were forced to walk or ride buses more than a mile to attend segregated schools, though there were white schools near their homes. After the US District Court ruled against them, the plaintiffs, together with four similar NAACP-sponsored cases from three other states and Washington, DC, appealed to the Supreme Court. The court, in a unanimous decision known as the case of Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, ruled that the “separate but equal” doctrine did not have a place in public education, and that it deprived citizens of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.

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The move to improve the rights of Blacks continued to intensify. The 1960 Civil Rights Act granted the federal government the authority to inspect local voter registration records and impose penalties on anyone who obstructed someone’s attempt to vote. The 1962 US Supreme Court decision in Bailey v. Patterson ruled that segregation in transportation facilities was unconstitutional. These changes had no great effects before John F. Kennedy decided to play an active role. Initially, Kennedy did little. He finally chose to act after civil rights activists, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., Dorothy Height, Roy Wilkins, and John Lewis, intensified the pressure, and boycotts and protests that often turned violent began to erupt. In a speech to the nation in June 1963, the president stated:40 We are confronted primarily with a moral issue…. One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet their heirs … are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice… this Nation … will not be fully free until all its citizens are free … Now the time has come for this Nation to fulfill its promise. The pressure on Washington to address the demands voiced by Blacks and their supporters was deepened by the August march on Washington, where Martin Luther King delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech; by the killing of four young African American girls with a bomb at a Baptist church in Alabama in September; and by the murdering of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. Less than a week after Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson asked Congress for the passage of the civil rights bill. With the 1964 presidential election over, civil rights organizations demanded that new legislation be enacted to safeguard the voting rights of minorities. Civil rights activities throughout Alabama sparked violent responses from state troopers and county posses that resulted in the deaths of two activists and the injuring of hundreds of demonstrators. Between July 1964 and August 1965, the US Congress enacted two Civil Rights Acts, despite intense opposition from senators and House of Representatives members from Southern states. The first act was designed to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, public facilities, public education, employment, and federally assisted programs. The second one was devised to outlaw discriminatory voting practices throughout the entire United States.

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In the theory chapter, it was proposed that the boundary between a democratic and a nondemocratic regime is demarcated along the public contestation and the participation axes. Accordingly, a political regime is democratic if all adult citizens are empowered to participate in contested free elections between at least two political parties. It is nondemocratic if political competition between at least two political parties is not permitted, or if the criterion of inclusion provided by the Strong Principle of Equality is not applied. It was also contended that for a regime to be democratic, its elected officials must not be prevented from assuming office, Congress or the Judiciary must not be dismissed, and the holder of the executive office must be neither toppled nor forced to resign by a group of organizations insulated from the electoral process. Using those conditions as the reference points, it can be argued that it took the people of the United States 182 years to create a democratic regime.41 They did not create the world’s most democratic regime, but they did create a democracy.

Analysis State- and Regime-Creation Processes: From 1776 Until 1865 From the analysis postulated so far, it is possible to generate several interrelated arguments. The colonizers were led to strive for independence by their strong aversion toward corruption, idle public officials, and arrogant governments, and by a refusal to accept Britain’s attempts to use any portion of the colonizers’ property or levy taxes on them without their prior approval, either directly or through their representatives. As they fought to gain independence, widespread regional economic and administrative autonomy during the colonial period compelled them to create a confederacy composed of multiple states in which each one would preserve substantial self-rule. Not long after the war for independence had come to an end and the United States had been recognized in Paris as a sovereign state, US leaders concluded that their original framework could not address some of the emerging domestic and international challenges. Cognizant that each state would still have to retain substantial sovereignty, the leaders of the confederacy agreed to replace it with a federal system. Because they believed that certain individuals—women, nonWhite persons, non-Protestants, and White individuals who did not own property or did not pay taxes—could not think rationally and temper their

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actions, and because they were committed to the limiting of political rivalries and factions, leaders of the new federal system chose to create a political structure that prevented those individuals from voting, prioritized the state over the individual voter, and devised a winner-take-all style of electoral system. After 1789, with steady economic growth that was punctuated by periods of economic downturns, and with a continuous increase in the size of the population and the number of states, various states began to remove voting restrictions on members of the white male population. At the same time, during the first half of the nineteenth century, two different types of economy arose. One economy was based on plantation agriculture and was heavily dependent on slave labor, while the other, though it was just beginning to industrialize, relied on market labor provided chiefly by immigrants. Tension between both groups grew steadily. Members of the slave-labor-dependent economy attempted to expand it into the new states before and after the Mexican-American War, while their counterparts opposed the growth of slave labor. These differences, along with the election of Lincoln as president, intensely aggravated the strain between the two economies and brought about the Civil War. After four years of fighting, during which both sides lost hundreds of thousands of lives, the leaders of the Confederacy accepted their inability to overcome the vastly superior economic and military power of the Union. The Enlargement and Solidification of the Power of the State: From 1865 Until the Present Victory by the Union forces in 1865 consolidated the power of the state. It empowered the US Congress to pass amendments that abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, declared that all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens, and prohibited any state from depriving a citizen his right to vote because of his color, race, or previous condition of servitude. However, the ability of members of the Black population to enjoy the fruits of their newly gained freedom was severely undercut for nearly nine decades by the actions of officials in Southern states and extremist members of their white population. As the industrial revolution gained momentum within the United States, analysts and political and economic leaders started to argue that the continued growth of the economy depended greatly on whether it could become an effective competitor in the rapidly changing global

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system. They added that though the future performance of the US economy would not be contingent solely on the administrative power of the federal government, the presence of a stronger and more coherent set of administrative bodies would enhance demonstrably the US fortunes. The great depression and the eruption of WWII pressured political leaders to overcome their reluctance to further widen and strengthen the power of the central government. By the end of WWII, with only the Soviet Union standing as its principal rival, the US leaders accepted, reluctantly initially, that its newly won status could be protected and preserved only by maintaining the power of the state at the federal level. The end of the Cold War did not bring about a reduction in the power of the state. In sum, a number of contradictory forces dictated the US process of state creation. European immigrants sought a new future in North America. They aspired to live in an environment that was free of poverty, corruption, and religious oppression, that valued frugality and hard work, and that equated freedom with a person’s right to determine how he would use his own property. That same aspiration led them to free themselves from Britain’s rule, and to create a constitutional structure that recognized and protected each former colony’s sovereignty. Realizing that granting too much sovereignty to each state was unproductive, leaders established a federal system that, while continuing to respect aspects of each state’s sovereignty, also extended additional authority to a central government in which power and functions were distributed between three institutions. Eventually, each state’s commitment to its sovereignty reinforced the division generated by the development of two substantially different economies—one that relied heavily on servitude, and one that did not.42 Compromise between the competing sets of interests and needs was sought but not found. The civil war ensued, and ultimately the regions with the superior economic and military power dictated the shape of the new state structure. The post-Civil War leaders, though not always in agreement, steadily transformed the national bureaucratic structure of the United States. They created a federal structure that made it possible for the United States to be an effective participant in multiple domestic and international political and economic scenarios. Without a federal state that had consolidated, legitimized, and strengthened its power, it is unlikely that the second half of the twentieth century would have ever been referred to as Pax-Americana.

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Culture, Changes in Attitudes, and the Emergence of an Imperfect Democracy: From 1865 to the Present The passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments formally legislated the termination of slavery and involuntary servitude, the recognition that blacks born or naturalized in the United States were citizens, and the requirement that no male citizen of the United States could be denied the right to vote because of his race, color, or religion. However, it would take nearly a century for blacks to be able to practice their political rights. Blacks were not the only ones insisting that they be accepted as political equals. Demands by women that they be granted the same set of rights as men had been evolving steadily throughout the nineteenth century and had gained tremendous momentum during the first 19 years of the twentieth century. By then, 11 other countries had already provided women the right to vote. Earlier it was argued that values, beliefs, and myths help define a culture’s change through time, that culture constantly interacts with the material environment within which it exists, and that the two continuously affect one another. Almost invariably, within an existing culture, two competing views struggle for dominance. One group typically advocates altering the culture, some more aggressively than others, while the counter-group strives to prevent its transformation. The industrial revolution and the increasing involvement of women in the workforce steadily altered the perception of the role they should play in the public sphere. Despite strong opposition from powerful political figures, the continual change in perception among a growing number of women and men weakened the dominant patriarchal culture. WWI helped tilt the balance in favor of those who demanded that women be granted the right to vote. Because factories and businesses in general could not remain idle as men went to fight, greater numbers of women were recruited to enter the workforce. By the war’s end, demands that women be extended the right to vote had the intended effect. In sum, though advocates of greater gender equality did not win straightaway, they were destined to succeed eventually, largely because for many inhabitants in certain parts of the United States the patriarchal culture contradicted the essence of the country’s political and economic system. The presence of liberty and equality in an economic market system that increasingly demanded the expansion of the labor force—a demand that could be resolved principally by increasing the number of women

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workers, eventually undercut the rationale that had sustained the patriarchal culture. Weakening the racist culture that had defined much of the history of the United States proved to be markedly harder than moderating the patriarchal culture. The Civil War did not make it possible for all Black males, regardless of the state they resided in, to cast their votes immediately. Similar to the forces that helped women gain the vote, it would take a major war, intense public demands, and extensive intervention by the US courts and government for African Americans to start practicing the political rights the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments had granted them. The effects of changing conditions and laws on attitudes are difficult to measure. However, it may be possible to infer some useful conclusions by looking at the way attitudes toward electing a woman or a Black person as president and toward interracial marriages changed through time. In 1937 and 1945, only 33 percent of those polled noted that they would vote for a woman. Four years after WWII had ended, the percentage had jumped to 48 percent, and to 55 percent in 1963. In 1978, 78 percent declared they would be willing to vote for a woman. When Americans were asked whether they would elect an African American as president, their attitudes underwent greater changes. It started at a low 33 percent in 1958, but it steadily increased as new civil right acts were enacted—it reached 59 percent in 1965. By 1978, the percentage of Americans who stated they would elect a Black person as president had jumped to 77 percent, which nearly equaled the percentage who claimed that they would vote for a qualified woman. Americans, however, had a much harder time accepting marriage between Blacks and Whites. In 1959, only 4 percent stated that they would accept marriage between the two. By 1968, after the enactments of several civil rights acts, the percentage had only increased to 20 percent. It would take 30 more years for the percentage to rise above the halfway mark.43 The increase in positive attitudes toward women and blacks indicates that as both groups became more involved in the public workforce and assumed greater responsibilities, attitudes toward their perceived competence improved. The patriarchal and racist cultures were not eradicated the moment the civil rights statutes were enacted, but their enactment left those who had vehemently opposed them little choice but to adapt. In short, though those who had been the most negatively affected were the ones who initially demanded change, change was greatly facilitated by the intervention of the courts, the US Congress, and the president. Thus, it

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seems reasonable to contend that had the central bodies of the federal state not played strong roles, passages of amendments and civil rights acts would have been rejected or, at minimum, delayed.44 This conclusion adds credence to the contention that without a strong state a stable democracy will not evolve. But it also brings to the fore the question: At what point does the strength of the state transform a democratic regime into an authoritarian one?

How Democratic Is the US Democracy? At the beginning of the analysis, it was stated that the architects of the US Constitution did not seek to create a democratic political regime. The commitment to preventing the creation of a highly democratic democracy remains quite firm among many of today’s political leaders, and it is reflected in their determination to retain several of the original measures. Though the citizens of the United States are able to elect their president, their votes are not weighted equally. First, the Electoral College continues to dictate who is elected president, and on five different occasions—two in the last two decades—the declared winner did not win the popular vote. Second, the composition of the Senate is undemocratic. Small states get the same number of senators as large states. When the constitution was first adopted, the ratio between the largest and smallest states was about 12 to 1. Now, as in the case of California and Wyoming, the ratio is 68 to 1. Stated in starker terms, in the US Senate, the voices of the people of California is 68 times weaker than the voices of the people of Wyoming. The House of Representatives is supposed to act as the equalizer. In a sense it does. The number of voting seats in the House is currently set at 435, with each one representing approximately 711,000 people. Thus, California today has 53 representatives, while Wyoming has only 1. The number increases as the size of the population increases. But such a “balanced” presence is undermined by other critical factors. The percentage of House members who sought reelection since 1963 has oscillated between approximately 82 and 94 percent, and the percentage of those who were reelected never dropped below 84 and sometimes reached into the high 90s.45 Historically, the reelection rate for senators has been lower than for House members, but its percentage has also been quite high. Since 1982, the percentage of senators being reelected dropped slightly below the 80 percent mark only in 1986, in 2000, and in 2010.

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It could be tempting to argue that the above high numbers indicate that the general public has been satisfied with the way Congress has performed its political functions. Data measuring Congressional approval rating trends, however, does not back such a conclusion. The average percentage of approval rates since 1974 typically was in the 20s and 30s. During the years immediately after September 11, 2001, it climbed to the 50s and higher, but never above 84 percent. Since October 2005, with the exception of a few months, the average percentage has been between the mid-20s and low 30s. The lowest trend ensued between May 2011 and the end of 2014. During that period, the percentage never topped the high teens, and it dropped into the single digits in November 2013.46 The numbers compel the analyst to ask: If Americans have been scorning Congress for so long, why do they keep reelecting so many of its members? There is no one single explanation. It has been suggested that gerrymandering—the practice of trying to gain a political advantage for a particular party or group by manipulating district boundaries to create partisan advantaged districts—plays a critical role. The common claim is that partisan redistricting is responsible for declining electoral competition.47 This argument has been challenged.48 In an analysis of the effects of the 2000 gerrymandering cycle, Seth Masket, Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald Wright contend that the manipulation of the boundaries of an electoral constituency has not weakened competition. The three analysts also note that in states that relied on nonpartisan methods to redistrict, legislatures became more polarized, while states that employed partisan methods experienced, on average, slight depolarization. However, one could ask: If partisan redistricting does not reduce competition, then why have both parties applied it when the opportunity arose? Partisan gerrymandering might not have reduced competition, but the intent of its endorsers, from either party, has always been to achieve such an end. It is agreed that a democracy becomes less viable if voters are disinclined to participate. In the United States, primary elections are the most important ones, for at that event voters have the biggest choice of candidates. The Bipartisan Policy Center established that between 1972 and 2016, no more than 30.6 percent of age-eligible citizens cast their votes in statewide primaries for president, governor, or senator. In 2012, the number reached its lowest mark at 17.3 percent. The numbers oscillated substantially between Republicans and Democrats from one election period to another. The party of the incumbent president generally determined the fluctuation. If the president was a Republican and was running for

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reelection, turnout among Republicans was substantially lower than among Democrats, and vice versa.49 Ignorance and general lack of interest seem to best explain the low level of participation. The percentage of people who know the names of their two senators is below the 30 percent mark. Moreover, “barely a third of the citizenry can recall the name of their representative, and even fewer can remember anything he or she has done for the district. Only one in ten people can remember how their representatives voted.”50 As most voters know little about their political leaders, in all likelihood they will know even less about their leaders’ political rivals in the primaries; hence, they see little reason to participate. During mid-term elections—that is, when voters are electing House Representatives and senators who have completed their six-year term, but voters are not choosing a president—voter participation in the United States is abysmal. When compared with other developed states where voting is not mandatory, the United States ranks last. In Denmark, Sweden, and Norway the percentage is twice as large as in the United States. The percentage in the United States improves substantially during presidential elections, but it is still lower than in the aforementioned countries. In France, where presidential elections are held every five years and voters elect their next president directly, voter turnout in the 2012 election was 80.35 percent, while in the United States it was 54.87 percent. Voter turnout in the 2016 presidential election in the United States was 59.7 percent, while in the 2017 French presidential election it was 65.4 percent. It is no coincidence that in developed countries where voting is not mandatory the number of registered voters casting their votes is typically higher than in the United States. For the most part, those countries have adopted proportional representation as their electoral system. Though there are different types of proportional representation in electoral systems, they are all designed to help represent the “wishes” of the voters at the ballot box much better than a “winner-takes-all” system. Stated differently, because fewer votes are “wasted,” greater participation typically results, and minority parties have a much greater chance of being represented in government. Voters, moreover, are provided with a greater choice of candidates who will be attentive to the needs of their constituents. As Henry Milner has noted, “a proportional system of elections promotes a politically knowledgeable population, and thus informed political participation.”51

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If representation in the US House of Representatives and Senate were to be weighed according to gender, race, or ethnicity, the numbers would reflect a very poor distribution. There are more women than men in the United States, but in 2019 only 23.4 percent of the representatives in the House were women. Among developed countries, only in Japan was the percentage of women serving as representatives lower than in the United States. In Sweden, women held 43.6 percent of the seats, while in Norway the percentage is above 39.52 African Americans fare somewhat better than women in the US House but not in the Senate. With 13.2 percent of the US population identified as African American, their number in the House stands at 10 percent. In the Senate, the percentage drops to .132 percent. Hispanic American representation in the US Congress has been increasing but it remains woefully low. With 17 percent of individuals of Hispanic/ Latino descent comprising the US population, their percentage in the US House stands at a very low 6.66 percent, while in the Senate it drops to 3 percent. For some time, it has been argued that the United States is not a democracy but an oligarchy. A multivariate analysis conducted by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page included the reviews of answers to 1779 survey questions asked between 1981 and 2002 on public policy issues. The authors found that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have much greater influence on the development of US government policies than do average citizens and mass-based interest groups.53 The authors concluded that a proposed policy change that had low support among members of the economic elite (one out of five in favor) was adopted only about 18 percent of the time, while a proposed change that had high support (four out of five in favor) was adopted about 45 percent of the time. They also established that when a majority of citizens disagreed with economic elites and/or with organized interests, the former lost. Their conclusion is straightforward. Though large business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans do not always get what they want, their influence over the policymaking process is much greater than that of the average citizen.54 A condition that is related to the last point has caused concern among certain political leaders, analysts, and the public in general: the excessive influence of money in politics. At different points in the twentieth century, Congress took steps to constrain the impact of money in federal elections. In 1990, the Supreme Court concluded in the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce case that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act that prohib-

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ited corporations from using treasury money to support or oppose candidates in elections did not violate the 1st and 14th Amendments. In 2002, Congress approved the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which amended the Federal Campaign Act of 1971. The 2002 Reform Act prohibited national political party committees from raising or spending funds not subject to federal limits, and barred profit and non-profit corporations and unions from broadcasting ads within 30 days of a primary or caucus, or 60 days of a general election. Other proposals and challenges were submitted through the first decade of the twenty-first century, but the most significant rulings came in 2010 and 2014. In a case filed by Citizens United, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling by the US District Court for the District of Columbia that proscribed the group from advertising and showing a film critical of Hillary Clinton 30  days before the 2008 Democratic primaries. In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations and labor unions “may spend their own money to support or oppose political candidates through independent communications like television advertisements.” The decision, however, did not “alter prohibitions on corporate contributions to candidates, and it did not address whether the government could regulate contributions to groups that make independent expenditures.”55 Four years later, the Supreme Court took a major step designed to undercut restrictions on independent spending. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court plurality. He stated: “The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption.” He added that Congress may target only “quid pro quo” corruption. “Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” he explained, “does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties.” Based on this argument, Roberts concluded that the aggregate limits on contributions “intrude without justification on a citizen’s ability to exercise ‘the most fundamental First Amendment activities.’” Though the Court’s decision removed the overall cap on individual contributions, it did not affect the existing base limits on individual contributions to federal candidate campaigns, Political Action Committees (PACs), or party committees.56

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Interpretations with regard to the possible consequences generated by the Supreme Court’s rulings vary, but the one advanced by Gerken gets to the core of the problem. As she points out, corporations had found multiple loopholes to spending long before the Citizens United suit sought to reverse the ruling; besides, the share of corporate spending has not changed measurably. The overruling of the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce case in 2014 mattered because it reduced the reasons Congress could regulate. Specifically, “it substantially narrowed the definition of corruption, which is regularly invoked whenever Congress wants to pass reforms.” Before Citizens United got involved, “ingratiation and access” entailed corruption, which was easy to identify; with the new ruling, it is markedly harder.57

Conclusion In 2026, the United States will celebrate its 250th anniversary. For the first 100 years of its existence, it struggled to solidify and legitimize the power of the state. During that period, with the exception of eliminating voting restrictions for its white male population, its various states did little to create a political regime that adhered to one of democracy’s most basic tenets—the right to vote. After the end of the Civil War, the federal government steadily consolidated and legitimized its power and adopted laws designed to enable male African Americans to participate in electing political leaders. In many states, however, such laws were offset by a series of conditions that dictated who could vote and who could not. The ­enactment of the 19th Amendment in 1920 proved to be a major step toward the formation of a democratic regime, but nearly half a century elapsed before gender, race, and ethnicity would no longer be used as means to limit voting rights. Different sets of electoral rules continue to limit the extent to which the average citizen of the United States can affect its political, social, and economic future course. Despite the repeated claims by many Americans that the United States has created “the greatest democracy on earth,” the quality of its democracy has been experiencing a downward trend, and today it is viewed not as a democracy but as a “flawed democracy.” It ranks 25th in the world, behind nearly every developed Western European country58 and New Zealand, Canada, and Australia. Of no less importance, for the first time since Spanish American states gained indepen-

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dence from Spain, two of them, Uruguay and Costa Rica, rank higher than the United States.

Notes 1. Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York: Penguin, 2001), 170. 2. Quoted in Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America 1585–1685 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 44. 3. Quoted in Ibid., 17, 18, 34, and 52. 4. See Taylor, American Colonies, 135; and Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America 1585–1685, 76. 5. James T.  Lemon, “Colonial America in the Eighteenth Century.” See Table 6.2: Comparison of White and Black Population by Region, 1700 and 1785, 126. http://www.asdk12.org/staff/bivins_rick/HOMEWORK/ 230028_ColonialLife.pdf. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-­ 1789 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 30–31. 9. Ibid., 32, 35, 36, 51 (quote), and 52. 10. Ibid., 122–123. 11. See Gordon S.  Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7. 12. Ibid., 17. 13. See Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 622–655. 14. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote. The Contested History of Democracy in the United States, (Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books, 2000), 7. 15. Ibid., 9. 16. Ibid., 11 and 12. 17. Ibid., 16. 18. Ibid., 20. 19. See Donald Ratcliffe, “The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787-1828,” Journal of the Early Republic, 33 (Summer 2013), 232–233. 20. Ibid., 247. 21. See “Republican Party Platform of 1860,” in Civil War Era: Teaching American History teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/republican-party-platform-1860. 22. Ibid.

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23. See “First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln,” (March 4, 1861), in “Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: from George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989.” The Avalon Project—Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV; October 18, 1907, Yale Law School, 2008). avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp. 24. The act allowed people in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska to decide for themselves whether or not to allow slavery within their borders. 25. Quoted in James M. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 116. 26. See Ron Chernow, Grant. (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 857–858. 27. Ibid., 658–659. 28. See Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 122–123. 29. See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 25. 30. Quoted in Ibid., 40. 31. Ibid., 41–42. 32. Ibid., 41–42. 33. See Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, 123. 34. Ibid., 130. 35. Ibid., 139. 36. See Barbara Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” American Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1966, 152. 37. See Linda Brannon, Gender: Psychological Perspectives (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2005), 154–155. 38. Quoted in “Woodrow Wilson and the Women’s Suffrage Movement: A Reflection,” Woodrow Wilson Center, (June 4, 2013). http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/woodrow-wilson-and-the-womens-suffrage-movement-reflection. 39. See Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson, Native Vote (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19. 40. Quoted in Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-­1963 (Boston: Little Brown, 2003), 604–606. 41. The reference point used here is not 1776, when the United States declared its interdependence, but 1783, when it was recognized as an independent state by The Treaty of Paris. 42. As noted earlier, there were more than two economies, but the two just identified were the ones that generated the greatest tension. 43. See Frank Newport, “In U.S., 87% Approve of Black, White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958.” www.gallup.com/poll/16397-approve-blacks-whites.aspx; and Frank Newport, “Americans Today Much More Accepting of a

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Woman, Black, Catholic, or Jew as President.” www.gallup.com/ poll/3979/americans-today-much-more-accepting-woman-black-catholic.aspx. 44. By no means, it is being suggested that presently men and women are treated equally, and that blacks have achieved parity with whites in the workforce. The two groups that have not experienced major improvements in the workforce since the 1980s are African Americans and Hispanics. Their earning capacity remains markedly lower than that of whites. On the other hand, Asian men earn 117 percent as much as white men. See Eileen Patten, “Racial, gender wage gaps persist in U.S. despite some progress.” Pew Research Center, (Pew Research Center, July 1, 2016). www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-genderwage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/. 45. See Charts 2-K and 2-L in “Reelection Rates of Incumbents in the House,” (December 7, 2006), http://www.thirty-thousand.org/documents/ QHA-08.pdf. 46. “Congress and the Public,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx. 47. Norm Ornstein, “The Pernicious Effects of Gerrymandering,” National Journal, (December 4, 2014). http://www.nationaljournal.com/washington-inside-out/the-pernicious-effects-of-gerrymandering-20141203. 48. See Seth E.  Masket, Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald C.  Wright, “The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It.” American Political Science Association, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (January 2012), 39–43. 49. See “National Primary Turnout Hits New Record Low,” (October 10, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/national-primary-turnouthits-new-record-low/ 50. Quoted in Philip Kotler, Democracy in Decline (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), 41. 51. Henry Milner, “Does Proportional Representation Boost Turnout? A Political Knowledge-based Explanation.” Presented at the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Toronto, Canada (September 6, 2009). 52. U.N.  Women in Politics: 2017 http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/ headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/femmesenpolitique_2017_english_web.pdf? la. 53. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I.  Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, Issue 3, (September 2014): 564–581. See also “Study: US is an oligarchy, not a democracy?” BBC News, (April 17, 2014). http:// www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746. 54. See Gilens and Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” 564–581.

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55. Adam Liptak, “Courts Take on Campaign Finance Decision,” in The New  York Times, (March 26, 2010). http://www.nytimes. com/2010/03/27/us/politics/27campaign.html. 56. “McCutcheson, et. al. v. FEC” (Case Summary), Federal Election Commission http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/McCutcheon.shtml. 57. See Heather K. Gerken, “Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, in Marquette Law Review.”  https://law.marquette/edu/assets/ marquette-lawyers/2014-summer-p10.pdf. 58. See World Audit Political Rights, http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm. Italy, Belgium, France, Portugal, and Spain ranked below the United States in 2017.

Bibliography Brannon, Linda. 2005. Gender: Psychological Perspectives. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Print. Chernow, Ron. 2017. Grant. New York: Penguin. Print. Dallek, Robert. 2003. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963. Boston: Little Brown. Print. “First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln,” (March 4, 1861), in “Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: from George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989.” The Avalon Project  – Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV; October 18, 1907, Yale Law School, 2008). Web. 20 Jan. 2017. Gerken, Heather. 2014. Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties. Marquette Law Review. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics 12 (3): 564–581. Print. Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. Basic. Print. Kotler, Philip. 2016. Democracy in Decline. London: SAGE Publications. Print. Lemon, James. Colonial America in the Eighteenth Century. Web. 20 January 2018. Liptak, Adam. 2010, March 26. Courts Take on Campaign Finance Decision, In The New York Times. Web. 23 February 2016. Masket Seth, E., Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald C.  Wright. 2012. The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It. American Political Science Association 45 (1): 39–43. Print. McCool, Daniel, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson. 2007. Native Vote. New York: Cambridge University Press. Print.

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McPherson, James M. 1996. Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. Print. Middlekauff, Robert. 2005. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Print. Milner, Henry. 2009, September 6. Does Proportional Representation Boost Turnout? A Political Knowledge-based Explanation. Presented at the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Toronto, Canada. Print. “National Primary Turnout Hits New Record Low,” 2012, October 10. Web. 13 December 2017. Newport, Frank. 1999, March 29. Americans Today Much More Accepting of a Woman, Black Catholic, or Jew as President. Gallup.com. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. ———. 2013, July 25. In U.S., 87% Approve of Black, White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958. Gallup.com. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Oberg, Michael Leroy. 2004. Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585–1683. New York: Cornell University Press. Print. Ornstein, Norm. 2014, December 4. The Pernicious Effects of Gerrymandering, National Journal. Print. Patten, Eileen. Racial Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S.  Despite Progress, Pew Research Center. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Ratcliffe, Donald. 2013. The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828. Journal of the Early Republic 33 (2): 219–254. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. “Reelection Rates of Incumbents in the House,” 2006, December 7. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1860, May 17, 1860. The American Presidency Project. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. “U.N. Women in Politics: 2017.” Web. 23 October 2018. Welter, Barbara. 1955. The Cult of Womanhood: 1820–1860. American Quarterly 18 (2): 151–174. Print. Wood, Gordon. 2009. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic 1789–1815. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Print. Woodrow Wilson and the Women’s Suffrage Movement: A Reflection. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2013, June. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. World Audit of Political Rights. 2017. Web. 10 Nov. 2018.

CHAPTER 4

The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in Mexico

Introduction1 In the annals of Spanish American history, Mexico’s is unique. Though during the nineteenth century Mexico was afflicted by many of the challenges that tormented its counterparts throughout Central and South America, during the twentieth century it experienced a political transformation unlike that of any other Spanish American state. This chapter explains why Mexico’s political experience was so distinctive. Specifically, this chapter: 1. Isolates the conditions that affected Mexico’s state-creation and political-regime-formation processes since 1824 to the present; 2. Explains what enabled one political party to govern uninterruptedly from the late 1920s until 2000 without experiencing a single military coup; 3. Identifies the conditions that forced the hegemonic political party to open the political system; and 4. Explicates why the political system has been faltering since it became democratic in 2000

Pre-Colonial Period Nomadic and semi-nomadic groups inhabited what is presently referred to as Aridoamerica, a region that encompasses the northern parts of Mexico, along with sections that include present-day areas of New Mexico, Arizona, © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_4

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Colorado, and Utah. Bordering the south of Aridoamerica is Mesoamerica, a territory that extends all the way to Costa Rica near the southern tip of Central America. Some 16 different indigenous groups inhabited the region around present-day Mexico City. By the time the Spaniards arrived, the Aztecs had absorbed many of them and had created a vast empire, with the Mexica emerging as their most important group. One of the last indigenous groups to move to the central region of Mexico, the Mexica found much of the land already occupied, and were thus forced to settle on a small island in a lake in the valley. Such obstacles did not deter the Mexica. They drained the swampy area, constructed artificial islands on which they planted gardens, and in 1325 A.D. set up their capital city, Tenochtitlán. The Aztecs developed a highly structured society defined by an authoritarian class system, with nobles at the top and serfs, indentured servants and slaves at the bottom. By the early sixteenth century, the Aztecs were ruling up to 500 small states, which collectively contained some five-to-six million people.2

Colonial Period In March 1519, Hernán Cortés landed on the southeastern coast of present-­day Mexico, where he built the city of Veracruz. Upon learning about Tenochtitlán, Cortés, backed by some 400 soldiers, marched toward the city. They arrived in November of that same year and were received by the city’s leader, Montezuma, and his people. The cordial relationship came to a rapid end. Cortés imprisoned Montezuma and his closest nobles, and massacred thousands of Aztec dignitaries. Soon after Montezuma’s death, his nephew, Cuauhtémoc, took over as emperor and managed to force the Spaniards out of the city but not for long. Assisted by many of the Aztecs’ native rivals, Cortés launched a counteroffensive and soon regained control of Tenochtitlán. To reassert his and Spain’s power, he demolished Tenochtitlán and built Mexico City.3 After Cortés’s arrival, the Spanish monarchy imposed a political, economic, and social structure on the regions its representatives were colonizing. At the top of the political structure stood the viceroy, who served as the King’s representative in the colony (or, as has been stated, the “King’s alter ego”).4 The viceroy was more than a civilian and political leader—he was also the “vice-patron of the Catholic Church.”5 Jointly, the Spanish monarchs and the Catholic Church established a contractual relationship whereby the two became integrated—Catholicism became the official reli-

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gion, and individuals who practiced a different religion were not allowed to enter the colonies. In addition, the monarchs granted the clergy fueros—special privileges—just as they did for members of the military.6 Though the power of the viceroy within a colony was not unlimited, he faced very few restrictions. There was a quasi-legislative body responsible for addressing grievances against the viceroy, but it did not exist as a fully independent institution.7 Moreover, because the Spanish crown allowed very little trade between the colonies and other countries, and because there was a monopolistic relationship between Spain and the colonies, the latter were not able to develop their own domestic economies. Thus, throughout the entire colonial period, the state, in the form of the authority of the Spanish monarch and his appointed viceroy in one of the viceroyalties, was always the leading entity. During that period, the idea of equating private property with freedom was a concept that did not take root in Spanish America. The state was the dispenser of rights, and the power to challenge its dictates was almost nonexistent. As explained by Carlos Fuentes, the Spanish monarchs and the Catholic Church replaced the vertical power structure originally created by the Aztecs with the equally vertical power structure of the Spanish Hapsburgs.8 The absence of independent powers on the part of the colonizers did not signify that orders and rules were always executed. The tendency “to observe but not obey” became a very common practice throughout Spanish America.9 The oligarchies of the Indies achieved “a kind of autonomy within the wider framework of a centralized government run from Madrid.” The system fell far short of the aspirations of the monarch, but it “also left the Indies heavily dependent on the Spanish crown.”10 In sum, several principles defined the relationship between the Crown and its American viceroyalties. First, the viceroyalties belonged exclusively to the Crown, not to Spain. The Crown possessed full sovereignty over them and had complete rights over all their offices and properties. Second, the Crown’s rights over the viceroyalties were a consequence of its obligation to evangelize the Native Americans, as dictated by Pope Alexander VI’s bull.11 To facilitate evangelization, the Crown and the Church established the clerical estate, a fully designed ecclesiastical organization with the same status as the clergy of metropolitan Spain.12 The two agreed on the subordination of the Church to the Crown except on matters of dogma and the maintenance of religious discipline.13 Third, in order to mobilize indigenous labor, the Crown authorized the creation of the encomienda, an arrangement under which the Crown granted a person

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or corporation the right to collect dues and services from the inhabitants of towns, villages, and other populated places in a particular region for a specified period.14 People are creatures of geography.15 Mexico has five distinct regions. Central Mexico is encased in high volcanic terrain. During the colonial period, this region was the richest, had the most diverse economy, and contained the largest and most varied population.16 The northern region stretched from the Sierra Madre Occidental to the Gulf of Mexico. Twenty percent of Mexico’s population occupied that area. Its inhabitants relied principally on mining and stock-raising to make a living. It was dominated by the city of Guadalajara, which saw itself as Mexico City’s main political and economic rival. The Spaniards went to great lengths to control this region and to protect themselves from the indigenous population.17 The North Pacific area was mostly barren, and it had a very small population. The Gulf Coast section to the south included what eventually would become the states of Yucatan, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Tabasco. The territory was more rural, had larger indigenous populations, and was less dependent on mineral resources than central Mexico. The comparative absence of large amounts of mineral wealth in the Gulf Coast expanse contributed to the Spaniards’ inclination to overlook the area, and their lack of interest helped to foster a strong sense of autonomy on the part of its people.18 The fifth region, the South Pacific, was mainly rural and resembled parts of Central America.19 The structure imposed by the Spanish monarchy in the early days was relatively simple. The Spaniards were at the top of the system, with indigenous people in the middle and blacks at the bottom. Miscegenation transformed the arrangement. Mexico’s racial composition during the colonial period, unlike that of the United States, included a mixed component. In Mexico, because of the initial absence of Spanish women, the first group of Spanish conquerors interacted with female members of the indigenous population and either married them or took them as mistresses.20 By the eighteenth century, four ethnic mixtures had been added to the original order: mestizos (Euro-Indigenous Mexicans), mulattos (EuroAfricans), zambos (Afro-Indigenous Mexicans), and chinos (Asians of various mixtures). Initially, New Spain’s leaders relied on two criteria to dictate social rank. The first criterion required that it be established whether a person was black, for invariably blacks were placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy.21 The second norm focused on the “purity” of an individual’s

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blood. Purity determined whether an individual would have access to the university, the Church, the professions, the craft guilds, bureaucratic employment, and other major, elite positions.22 Economic growth altered the second norm, for eventually it became possible for a black person, or one of “mixed” blood, to purchase a “patent of whiteness.” With the royal order of gracias al sacar (grateful for deliverance), institutionalized in 1795 but practiced since at least 1773, the Crown developed standards to regulate the number of persons with different levels of “purity” and how much they had to pay in order to become “white.”23 New Spain’s established elite opposed the enactment of the royal order.24

The Struggle for Independence Upon learning in 1808 that Napoleon had chosen his own brother to replace Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII as rulers of Spain, the leaders of New Spain had to make a decision. They could embrace the Council of Regency established in Spain to govern in the King’s absence, and hence accept Spain as an entity superior to the colonies; or they could reject its authority by claiming that since New Spain was the monarch’s property, it was on the same hierarchical footing as Spain, and thus had the right to appoint its own ruling junta. The issue did not elicit a unified response from New Spain’s upper class. The peninsulares (those born in Spain) advocated either the recognition of one of the new juntas just formed in Spain or the delay of any immediate action. Many criollos (those born in New Spain but of Spanish descent) favored autonomy. They asked the viceroy to assume control of the government in New Spain and govern in the name of the king. Advocates of autonomy argued that since New Spain was not a colony of Spain but one of the kingdoms of the monarchy, the superior tribunals that governed it and administered justice during the monarch’s reign were the parties responsible for ruling it while the monarch was being held prisoner. The autonomy advocates were the first to gain the upper hand. New Spain’s viceroy, with the backing of prominent criollos, formed a junta and issued the following manifesto: “[I]n the absence or during the impediments [of the king], sovereignty lies represented in all the kingdom and classes that form it; and more particularly in those superior tribunals that govern it and administer justice, and in those corporations that represent the public.”25 The group did not retain power long. In September 1808, Conservatives, some of whom were criollos, overthrew the viceroy, arrested

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the leaders of the autonomy movement, and ruled New Spain for two years, at which time a new revolt erupted.26 The new uprising started northwest of Mexico City. Because of its high wages and overall economic potential, the area had attracted large numbers of Europeans, indigenous people, mestizos, mulattos, and blacks. The region had prospered for much of the eighteenth century, but toward the end of that period, it began to experience acute economic problems. Querétaro’s textile industry was severely weakened by the increase in the cost of wool production and by competition from Britain. Guanajuato’s mining industry was debilitated by the rise in production and supply costs.27 The region’s farmers were the most affected by the economic downturn. Discontent reached its peak in 1810, at which time Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, a criollo parish priest in the town of Dolores, exhorted the people of his town to rebel.28 Initially, he was backed by successful criollos who had suffered financial reverses during the Consolidation, and by the rural poor who felt that they had absorbed the brunt of the region’s economic collapse. Hidalgo’s support from the middle and upper classes disintegrated as the rural peasants resorted to violence to vent their anger against both classes. The rebellion suffered a major setback in March 1811, when Hidalgo and other leaders were captured and killed. Father José Maria Morelos tried to continue the struggle, but his effort came to naught in 1815 when he was captured and executed. By 1818, the insurrection had been contained. The rebels failed, “principally because they threatened the status and safety of the Spanish and criollo elites and had the aura of being uprisings of the oppressed Indian and mestizo masses.”29 The end of the rebellion did not mark the end of New Spain’s drive for independence. In early 1809, after members of the Royal crown had been imprisoned, Spain’s newly created Junta Central decreed that Spain and America had equal standings and invited the Spanish American provinces to elect representatives to the Junta Central. Three years later, the Junta enacted the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy. The new constitution severely limited the authority of the king, integrated Spain and America as one state, stipulated that both regions would be ruled by the same set of laws, and granted the Junta greater powers. Many criollos in New Spain objected. They claimed that though the new laws might be designed to ensure equality between Spain and America, those in the upper strata in the Spanish colonies would remain at a disadvantage. Their leading objective was to gain autonomy but not to erase

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inequalities between ethnic groups. A compromise was reached whereby the various parties agreed on the introduction of provincial deputies while keeping strong ties with Spain.30 The agreement generated concern among New Spain’s conservative peninsulares, who feared that most of the elected deputies would be criollos advocating autonomy. Their fear was justified. At elections held in 1814, the autonomists won all the seats to the Cabildo, the provincial deputation, and the Junta Central. Their triumph was short-­ lived. In a year’s time, Ferdinand VII had returned to the throne and abolished the Junta Central and the 1812 constitution. Liberals in both Spain and New Spain were persecuted, and by 1815, the latter had lost its semi-autonomy. Liberals did not give up. In 1820, Liberals in Spain rebelled against Ferdinand VII, restored the 1812 constitution, and reestablished the junta. The new regime prohibited religious orders from setting up new convents, accepting and ordaining new members, and acquiring real estate. The junta also confiscated the real estate controlled by the Church and abolished entailments on real estate.31 The junta did not stop with the Church. It deprived militiamen of the right to trial by military courts for nonmilitary offenses and proposed a law that denied military jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.32 Mindful that developments in Spain provided New Spain with a new opportunity to regain its autonomy, Colonel Augustin de Iturbide, a criollo and the commander of the royalist forces in Southern Mexico, and General Vincente Guerrero, an indigenous Mexican and the chief of the guerrillas who had been battling the royalist forces, signed the Plan of Iguala.33 The most important articles of the plan stipulated that New Spain would become an independent state and its political regime would be a constitutional monarchy; Roman Catholicism would be the only religion practiced in New Spain; all its inhabitants, regardless of ethnic background, would be considered citizens of the state; private property would be respected; and an army would be formed to protect the state and its citizens.34 The plan was a political compromise that brought “together liberals and conservatives, rebels and royalists, criollos and Spaniards.”35 Rebels accepted the plan because it called for independence and equality of all citizens. Criollos, who wanted separation from Spain but feared the radicalism of the indigenous and castes, viewed it as a moderate alternative. Conservatives who opposed autonomy regarded it as a wise compromise, because it advocated the protection of their rights and property. Moreover,

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the clerics supported it because they were convinced that without self-­ government their interests in New Spain would be undermined.36 Mexico’s state-creation and regime-formation processes went through six transformations.

The First Transformation: 1824–1865 Mexican leaders signed the Act of Independence in September 1821 and proclaimed Iturbide, Emperor Augustine I. Iturbide’s tenure lasted only until the third month of 1823. Three factors contributed to his downfall. They were: an upper class that yearned for a European prince who would free them from their fiscal burdens; a territory led by regional leaders who had conflicting interests and were unwilling to relinquish their power to a central government; and a hierarchically structured population divided along ethnic lines.37 A brief period of tranquility followed the demise of Iturbide’s regime. In the interim, a group of Mexican leaders, mindful that their newly born state could not survive as a sovereign entity unless it first took care of its economic ills, granted Britain access to Mexico’s mineral resources. In a short time, well over 20 million pesos were injected into Mexico’s ailing economy. At the same time, with the monarchy no longer viewed as an acceptable political form, Mexico’s leaders began to write its first federal constitution. By then, leaders in the various regions throughout Mexico were demanding that their rights be protected. As a result, members of the Mexican Congress concluded that in order to adapt to the country’s new realities they would have to adhere to the ideals of republicanism and federalism and would have to replace the monarch with a president. In 1824, the new Mexican constitution created a federal republic. It divided the country into 19 states, with each state regulating the election of its own governors, and it distributed governmental power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In addition, the constitution established Catholicism as the state’s religion, prohibited the practice of any other religion, and stipulated that citizens could not be classified by racial origins in governmental documents.38 The 1824 charter remained silent on the subject of citizenship and voting rights. It left the decision up to each state because, as explained by one member of the Mexican Congress, it was most “convenient that every legislature enacts its own regulation in accordance to its own climate and circumstances.”39

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With extensive powers, including the power of state governments to elect the president, federalists believed they had claimed a victory for provincial state authority. By late 1823, however, the federal government had begun to send military forces against state governments with the intent of abolishing their militias.40 Because the provincial elites were not unified and their militias lacked the might to resist the advancing military forces, the Mexican government was able to slowly consolidate its power. General Guadalupe Victoria was elected president in 1824. During his administration, what began as political tension between federalists and centralists, soon led to the emergence of rivaling ideologies that began to underpin and define two distinct political camps. The federalists gradually embraced liberalism, which in the context of nineteenth-century Mexico meant limited government, a capitalist economy, a low level of government regulation—especially of foreign trade—and the curtailment of the power of the Church, the military, and peninsulares.41 Centralists, or Conservatives, advocated the establishment of a strong military, the protection of Church privileges, and the consolidation of authority within a centralized governing apparatus.42 Though Liberals and Conservatives stood on opposite ends of the political spectrum, they were similar in more ways than they were different. Leaders from both groups came from the urban middle and upper classes, held the common citizen in low regard, and agreed on the need to maintain the institution of the hacienda. Sharing these basic commonalities allowed individuals to move from one political camp to another without losing credibility.43 As a result, alliances formed by elites were not necessarily rooted in ideological cohesion. Rather, they were based on personal networks of power, village, or locality affiliation, corporate or peer group participation, or profession.44 Mexico’s period of tranquility was short-lived. It ended in 1828, with a revolt intended to overturn the election of General Manuel Gómez Pedraza as president and replace him with General Vincent Guerrero. Though the upheaval succeeded, Guerrero was soon forced out of power by Catholics and Conservatives, who remained determined to strengthen the economy, curb the power of the states, safeguard property rights, restrict the rights of the indigenous population, and protect the privileges of the Church.45 The Conservative group that had ousted Guerrero experienced a similar fate three years later. By then Mexico seemed ready to accept that the country could not afford to function as a federalist institution. In late

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1835, the Mexican Congress altered the organizational structure of the republic. It replaced the states with centralized departments, authorized the president to appoint governors and legislators, and established at the federal level a Congress of Deputies and Senators.46 It also stipulated that male members of the population who could read and had an annual income of 100 pesos were qualified to be citizens and to vote. Domestic workers were not granted the right to vote. Shortly thereafter, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna and his forces marched north to prevent the province of Texas from challenging Mexico City’s drive to transform Mexico into a centralized state. Santa Anna’s expedition came to an end in April of 1836, when his soldiers were defeated and he was taken prisoner. Santa Anna was compelled to accept the independence of Texas, with the Rio Grande as the boundary separating the two countries. The Texas fiasco was followed by a French blockade and the capture of a fortress in Veracruz in November 1838. Though the dispute was resolved rapidly, it provided Liberals the impetus they needed to obstruct attempts by the Conservatives to further augment the power of the state. The fight between Conservatives and Liberals continued, without either side gaining the upper hand. The Conservatives remained convinced that the only path to modernity was via the formation of a powerful centralized government, while the Liberals continued to advocate the idea that Mexico had to break its autocratic dependency and extend greater freedom to its provinces and citizens. Caught in between were members of the indigenous population, who had very little use for the government and the institutions Mexico’s new leaders were attempting to shape.47 Thus, after more than 20 years of independence, the creation of a stable Mexican state continued to be obstructed by the battle between regional leaders determined to challenge the dictates of an all-powerful central government, and by ethnic and racial divisions.48 Violence between competing strongmen and their followers came to be accepted as the legitimate means of promoting change, thus cementing the interventionist role of the caudillo in Mexican politics.49 A country deeply split along regional, economic, and ethnic lines must sometimes face a costly crisis before its people understand that unless they unite and act with a common purpose, powerful foreign actors could exploit the divisions to advance their own interests. In February 1845, when the US Congress approved the annexation of Texas, Mexican leaders found themselves in another quandary. Prior to the annexation, General

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Santa Anna had announced that the appropriation of Texas by the United States would be tantamount to a declaration of war. After Washington announced its decision, General Mariano Paredes Arrillaga demanded that President Jose Joaquín Herrera resign and that a new constitution be drafted. The army consented, and by January of the New Year, General Paredes had become president.50 With Paredes as president, Mexico went to war against its northern neighbor to reclaim Texas. The United States exploited Mexico’s internal discord. In 1848, aware that it could defeat its northern neighbor, Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Washington forced Mexico to accept the Rio Grande as the boundary for Texas, and forfeit California, half of New Mexico, most of Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. In return, the United States recognized Mexico’s claim over Lower California. The Mexican Congress had no choice but to ratify the accord.51 By then, during a 25-year span, Mexico’s leaders had managed to select and topple a total of 48 heads of state. The outcome stunned Mexican leaders. Of great concern to many was the recognition that few Mexicans had risen to defend their homeland. Mariano Otero, a major opponent of the treaty, argued that Mexicans did not fight for their country because in Mexico, “there is not, nor there has ever been able to be, anything called national spirit because there is no nation.” He added that the absence of a national spirit could be attributed to Mexico’s division into three classes: the people in general, the productive class, and the unproductive class. For the first group, the native Mexicans, defending their exploiters against the United States would have made no sense. The productive people, added Otero, were also rational in their unwillingness to defend Mexico, because it would have meant supporting a corrupt regime that had burdened them with taxes and tariffs. And finally, the unproductive class did not defend Mexico because its members were degenerate and corrupt.52 The US-Mexican war signaled Liberals and Conservatives alike that Mexico could not afford to remain internally divided. They understood that the absence of unity created a power vacuum, which in turn enticed foreign powers to exploit the situation. This acknowledgment, however, did not help the competing parties to agree on how they would attain unity. In fact, the war with the United States intensified the ideological struggle. Liberals continued to argue that it was imperative to remove all vestiges of colonial forms and create a federal democratic republic, governed by representative institutions that did not have to respond to the

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demands and needs of the Church, and based socially on a mixture of small proprietors, yeoman farmers, and master craftsmen.53 Conservatives, in turn, called for the revival of the colonial heritage, with the Church acting as the unifying bond, and for the eradication of excessive regionalism.54 Five years after the Mexican-American war had ended, the Conservatives, led by Santa Anna and Lucas Alemán, regained the upper hand. The intent of the new regime was to abolish the federal system, popular elections, and the congress; establish a strong central government; reorganize the army; and reaffirm Catholicism as Mexico’s sole religion. But as in the past, the increase in power of those who favored the creation of a strong central government forced those who opposed its formation to unite. In March 1854, advocates of a federal system withdrew recognition of the Santa Anna government and proposed the Plan of Ayutla. The plan called for the reaffirmation of federalism, recommended that each province draw up its own code of laws, and advocated turning the country into a popular, representative nation. Other regional leaders soon supported the proposal. Eighteen months later, the federalists were back in power, this time led by General Juan Alvarez, the caudillo who had helped draft the Plan of Ayutla.55 Alvarez created a cabinet composed mainly of Liberals. From the moment it was conceived, the cabinet sought to curtail the power of the Church and the military. In November 1855 the minister of justice, Benito Juárez, announced that he would recommend that the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts be restricted, thus abolishing clerical immunities. Moreover, he proposed that the military be divested of some of its privileges. Groups of laymen, army officers, and priests rebelled, demanding protection for both institutions. But their action did not stop the government. In June 1856, the minister of finance, under the presidency of Ignacio Comonfort, proposed the enactment of the disentitlement law. The edict, known as the Lerdo Law, stipulated that the Church would have to sell all its urban and rural estates to the respective tenants and lessees at a low price. Less than a year later, the new minister of justice sought to prohibit the collection of parochial fees from the poor.56 As the anti-Church and anti-military laws were being proposed, the Congress, composed primarily of Liberals, framed a new constitution. The constitution, approved in early 1857, reflected the belief that the creation of a federalist system without a strong center could lead to the disintegration of Mexico. In addition, the constitution dropped the assertion that Mexico was a Roman Catholic nation, included the anti-clerical rules pro-

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posed earlier, abolished the judicial privileges of the military, and extended the rights to vote and be elected to every male citizen, regardless of race or economic status.57 The 1857 constitution did not alter the cycle of struggle between Conservatives and Liberals. From the moment it was enacted, the Conservatives, with the support of several dissatisfied Liberals, began to plot its annulment. In December 1857, General Felix Zuloaga took control of the city, dissolved the Congress, and arrested a large group of Liberal leaders. The struggle between the two factions, dubbed The War of Reform, lasted three years, with Zuloaga leading the Conservatives, and Benito Juárez, who had named himself president, heading the Liberals. The Church and the military supported the Conservatives. State governors, businessmen, miners, merchants, teachers, cattlemen, professionals, and many more who believed they would gain a political voice—especially those in north-­central Mexico—backed Liberals.58 Liberals defeated the Conservative forces protecting Mexico City in 1860. Soon after, the Congress declared Juárez president of Mexico. The three-year struggle had created a power vacuum that did not go unnoticed abroad. Political infighting, protracted violence between disgruntled generals—both Conservatives and Liberals—and their soldiers, deteriorating infrastructures, and a stagnant economy had crippled the Juárez administration and hindered its ability to repay foreign debts to Spain, Britain, and France. With Mexico’s reserves nearly empty, the Juárez government refused to settle its debts. On October 31, 1861, Spain, Great Britain, and France agreed to intervene militarily. The Spanish government hoped to regain some control over what used to be one of its richest colonies. Britain’s government was interested only in collecting its claims. France’s monarch had a weightier design: to augment his country’s power. With this goal in mind, Napoleon III sought to establish a French dominion in America. Shortly after Spanish and French troops landed in Mexico, with the British providing naval protection, France’s representative in Mexico requested full payment of the French claim. Aware that Mexico lacked the means to meet the demand and had received only a portion of the proceeds of the loan, the British and Spanish representatives refused to support the French and withdrew their forces.59 This decision favored Mexico. Although many Conservatives viewed the French invasion as a way to rid Mexico of Liberals, others put their rancor aside and joined Liberals in the struggle against the assailants. For them the issue was no longer Conserva­

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tives against Liberals but “Mexican independence against conquest by a foreign power.”60 Determined to establish an empire in Mexico, Napoleon III appointed Maximilian of Hapsburg, the brother of Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, as emperor of Mexico.61 Upon becoming Mexico’s emperor in April 1864, Maximilian realized that to rule the country effectively he would need, in addition to the support provided by the French army, the backing of the country’s Liberals. He sought to gain their favor by forming a cabinet made up almost entirely of Liberals, proclaiming equality under the law to all inhabitants of the empire, granting freedom of worship, prohibiting debt peonage, and restoring to indigenous Mexicans the right to own property. None of these steps lessened the determination of Mexicans to regain their country’s freedom. Juárez’s Liberal government responded by enlarging the powers given to the executive by the 1857 constitution. The Mexican Congress supported him by stating that the president should govern “with no other restriction than the salvation of the independence and integrity of the Nation, the constitutional form of government, and the Reform Laws.”62 To remain sovereign, however, Mexicans needed more than determination and a president with nearly dictatorial powers. By the end of 1865, with his army no longer able to withstand the French onslaught, Juárez sought assistance from Washington. But just as it seemed that Maximilian was about to consolidate his power, Napoleon III, afraid of Prussia’s expansionist intent in Europe, recalled his troops from Mexico. This action forced Maximilian to rely on an army composed primarily of Mexicans. Nineteen months later, Juárez returned triumphantly to Mexico City and restored the Liberal Republic.63 In sum, between 1824 and 1866, Mexico’s history was defined by coups, assassinations, regional wars, intervention by two foreign powers, and struggles between those who wanted to create a secular federal state and those who favored the establishment of a centralized state with the Catholic Church still playing a central role. It took the intervention by two foreign powers to persuade Mexico City and the competing regional leaders to acknowledge that the creation of a relatively stable sovereign state would not be possible unless they could find ways to moderate some of their differences. Unsurprisingly, differences between the competing sides did not come about via compromise. Military force; the use of autocratic power; and the rapid enlargement of the Mexican economy, aided

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by extensive involvement from international corporations, became the principal instruments of change.

The Second Transformation: 1865–1911 Between 1861 and 1867, President Juarez, with nearly omnipotent powers, strove to expunge internal opposition and unite Mexicans to battle the foreign invaders. Most Mexicans believed that they could not hope to repel the foreign invaders so long as they remained divided, and that the only way to achieve unity was by extending extraordinary powers to the president.64 Accustomed to ruling with little opposition, Juárez and his advisers searched for ways to further increase the power of the executive branch in order to curtail the authority of regional leaders and the Mexican Congress. Juárez’s design became so encompassing that by 1871 his government had become “a perfect police state, one in which the president had the power to pursue order at the expense of liberty.”65 With the help of his treasury secretary, Matias Romero, Juárez implemented an economic program that advocated the development of mineral resources by foreign capital, made improvements in transportation facilities, and organized an efficient bureaucracy.66 Part of this plan centered around the institution of a federal taxation system that increased the government’s control over tax revenues generated outside Mexico City. However, impoverished regional governments frequently failed to make the legally mandated transfer of tax receipts to the federal government. Between 1867 and 1877, the federal government repeatedly intervened to quell insurrections mounted by villages and districts to assert local sovereignty. Juárez policies had the effect he intended. By the end of his administration, power had shifted to the federal government from the Church, local caudillos, the military establishment, and most notably from the states, confirming the president as the ultimate authority within the political system.67 Juárez’s death in 1872 did not alter Mexico’s political system. Juárez’s successor, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, persuaded the Mexican Congress to ratify the creation of a Senate. The effect of this action was to divide legislative authority and, as a result, to further strengthen the power of the executive. Structuring power and exercising power are two different processes.68 Lerdo succeeded in completing the job initiated by Juárez by creating a presidency powerful enough to unite a nation divided along regional, class, and ethnic lines. However, Lerdo was not strong enough

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to remain in office and exercise its newly gained authority. Such a task fell on the shoulders of Porfirio Díaz. Like his predecessors, Díaz endeavored to solidify his power from the moment he became president. During his tenure, Díaz created a political apparatus over which he kept tight personal control. Power at the regional level was divided among governors, military commanders, and 300 district chiefs, known as jefes politicos—all of whom owed their positions to Díaz.69 He accepted both Liberals and Conservatives into his ruling coalition, drawing a confluence of support from previously adverse factions including military leaders, landowners, foreign investors, and intellectuals. With a tight grasp over the political system, which was labeled the “Porfiriato,” the arrangement deprived Mexicans of the few constitutional guarantees they had won since the end of the colonial era, while establishing the appearance of a politically inclusive and representative regime.70 In addition, Díaz muzzled Mexico’s press and prevented the election of his opponents to Congress. He reduced the overall size of the military and relied on paramilitary forces, who answered directly to him, to engage in repressive activities. Aware that any attempt to further undermine the authority of the Church would generate hostility from Conservatives, he allowed it to recover some of its lost political, economic, and social relevance. Determined to prevent his own allies from appropriating his power, he rejected the formation of a political party. At the provincial level, he selected around 70 percent of the governors. To increase the likelihood that they would remain loyal to him, he chose individuals who, despite lacking political, economic, or social roots in the provinces they were assigned to govern, would be able to amass substantial personal wealth.71 Although a political Liberal, Díaz set criteria and qualifications for voting at the federal level. The criteria included making an honest living, possessing a minimum level of financial or material wealth, being able to read and write, and demonstrating a level of patriotism by having served in the ­military. By limiting the qualifications for voting at the federal level of government, Díaz created what was essentially an autocracy. By the 1900s, the Díaz regime had balanced the budget, reformed the treasury, abolished internal tariffs, overhauled the banking institutions, placed Mexico on the international gold standard (thus eliminating fluctuations in the value of the peso), and accumulated substantial reserves.72 With a population increasing at the rate of 1.4 percent per year, an economy growing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, and exports growing at an

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annual pace of 6.1 percent, Mexico under Díaz had attained a modicum of political and economic stability.73 These changes could not have taken place without extensive foreign involvement. To lure foreign stakeholders, Díaz initiated in 1877 the construction of a modern rail network to stimulate Mexico’s internal commerce, agriculture, industry, and mineral production, and to empower “the nation to develop its rich natural resources for export, which, in turn, would generate foreign exchange needed for internal investment and government revenue.”74 By the start of the twentieth century, foreign investors controlled one-seventh of Mexico’s land surface and two-thirds of Mexico’s accumulated investment (outside of handicraft and agriculture). Assets owned by US investors were larger than all other foreign holdings combined. Approximately 98 percent of Mexico’s arable land consisted of haciendas, and 90 percent of Mexico’s peasants, most of whom were illiterate, were landless.75 Mexico’s economic growth did not engender equal benefits. In the north, the railroad facilitated a major increase in exports, which spurred widescale population growth. Between 1877 and 1910, the population of the border states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas swelled by 227 percent.76 Their proximity to the United States led to large-scale investments by American companies in the railroads, lumbering, mining, and ranching industries. Central Mexico became the center of wealth generated by the influx of foreign capital. Access to electricity, street cars, paved streets, street lamps, telephones, sewage treatment plants, and drinking water systems steadily became the norm in major cities.77 As Northern and Central Mexico were experiencing substantial changes, tradition continued to have a strong grip on the people in rural Central and Southern Mexico. In 1910, 71 percent of Mexico’s inhabitants still lived in communities with a population below 2500, and most of those who lived in rural areas rarely saw a mine, a railroad, a foreigner, a Mexico City resident, or a politician.78 Means of communication also remained slow, and the primary economic activity relied on the exportation of agriculture. With much foreign investment concentrated primarily in the North and in the Center, many states were left with little benefit from Porfirian economic development. In 1910 Mexico was “less a nation than a geographic expression, a mosaic of regions and communities, introverted and jealous, ethnically and physically fragmented, and lacking common national sentiments.”79

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Foreign investment led to a sharp rise in prices, which had risen after Díaz’s decision to give up the silver standard and adopt the gold standard. Jointly, these developments facilitated a sharp drop in real wages. Conditions deteriorated further when the economic downturn experienced by the United States in 1907–1908 led to massive layoffs and reductions in wages. The economic decline was compounded by the increase in the price of food after floods and drought had decimated Mexico’s food production. Although social classes were affected differently, jointly they placed the blame on Díaz and his regime.80 By the start of the new century both rural and urban working people were angered, some by the exclusivity of the new order, and others by their worsening economic status, which had been generated by their increased exposure to foreign trade and investment. Their discontent led to the creation of large numbers of opposition groups—in the form of local, regional, and national workers’ associations, as well as clubs. They were united by their demands for greater participation and representation of their interests in the political system.81 Matters between the government and the public came to a head near the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. Conscious of the challenges he faced, Díaz declared in 1908 that he would not run for reelection. His statement immediately led to the emergence of several Liberal political parties. Members of his core political group began to distance themselves from each other to gain a political advantage during the subsequent presidential elections. In 1909, Díaz had a “change of heart,” and announced that he would run for reelection. His decision did not deter his adversaries. That same year, Francisco I. Madero, the son of a wealthy landowner, created the Anti-Reelection Party and traveled the country advocating the revival of the Mexican public spirit and promoting himself as the alternative presidential candidate. He lost the election. Nevertheless, in early November 1910, he denounced Díaz, named himself Mexico’s provisional president, and set November 20 as the date when the revolt against the government would be launched.82 His daring stand had the intended effect. Díaz resigned and left the country on May 25, 1911. In sum, the second transformation is defined by two interconnected changes. The consolidation of the power of the state began under Juárez. To bring together Mexico’s various factions, he assumed autocratic power. His firm stand against Maximilian and his French supporters enabled him to use extraordinary means to offset the power of those who challenged his authority, and to initiate the process of state creation after the foreign

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intruders had left the country. Juárez did not complete the process of state creation. Porfirio Díaz further strengthened the power of the state, but it would take a revolution, the design of a new constitution, and the establishment of a hegemonic political party to finally consolidate the power of the state. After a period of time, the willingness to back an autocratic regime is bound to contract if the financial benefits start to diminish and those who have gained little from the system conclude that its continued presence will never address their economic needs. Thus, throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, Mexicans from various political, economic, and social strata increasingly demanded that the system be changed.

The Third Transformation: 1911–1929 Less than five months after Díaz’s resignation, Madero was elected president by almost 90 percent of the vote. Despite his considerable popularity, Madero soon encountered opposition from more radical revolutionaries, as well as from members of the former regime. In February 1913, General Victoriano Huerta, the military commander of Mexico City, mounted a coup that resulted in the arrest and killing of Madero and his Vice-­ President, José María Pino Suárez. Shortly thereafter, armed forces organized by Venustiano Carranza launched an attack on the newly created Huerta regime, and toppled it in mid-1914. Carranza’s tenure as Mexico’s new leader came to an end in 1919 when he was murdered. Though the Carranza administration had a short tenure, some of the measures it implemented helped generate some stability. The regime restored business and commerce by promoting Mexican businesses, regularizing railroad services, raising taxes on foreign companies, and establishing a central bank. In addition, it reduced the size of the military and gained greater control over it. One of the Carranza administration’s most important accomplishments, however, was the enactment of a new legal charter. The constitution of 1917 incorporated the major features of the 1824 and 1857 charters regarding territorial organization, civil liberties, democratic forms, and anti-clerical and anti-monopoly clauses. Moreover, it postulated that the national government had an obligation to take an active role in promoting the social, economic, and cultural well-being of its citizens. Article 3 outlined a plan of secular, free, compulsory, public education. Article 14 reaffirmed the sanctity of private property and con-

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tracts. Article 27 interpolated concepts of social utility and national benefit by limiting the unrestricted use of private property. Moreover, the same article reasserted national ownership of subsoil resources, and outlined alternative land-reform and agrarian programs. Article 123 guaranteed minimum wages and the right to organize and strike. It gave labor social status and rejected the notion that labor was an economic commodity to be bought at the lowest rates to maximize profits. Article 123 also outlined a comprehensive system of social security that included public health and welfare programs.83 During the 1920s, a group of political leaders sought to transform Mexico into a modern nation-state via the establishment of a strong nationalist-capitalist economy. They moved rapidly to control the army, restrain the power of the leaders from the various regions, give education a national character, and allow workers to properly organize. Moreover, although Díaz’s immediate successors were reluctant to break Mexico’s dependence on the external world—a step that would potentially inflict large domestic costs—they steadily sought to reduce it. Despite significant domestic political differences, strong nationalist sentiments made attacks on foreign investors a reliable source of popular support. The foreign-dominated oil industry became one of the core targets. The Mexican government raised the special oil tax from 20 cents to 70 cents per ton in 1913. Two years later, a different Mexican government ordered state approval on all transfers of ownership in the oil zone, imposed new taxes, and stopped additional exploration and development until new legislation had been enacted. In 1918, a new petroleum law imposed higher tariffs. For the next ten years, Mexico and the United States negotiated their differences until they reached a major accord in 1928. A steep drop in the production of oil in Mexico, with a resulting decline in the petroleum sector’s contribution to Mexico’s GNP, helped the two countries reach an agreement.84 In the pact, Mexico a­ cknowledged the ownership of concessions held by foreign companies before 1917, while the foreign companies recognized Mexico’s ownership of subsoil rights.85 The accord did not mark the end of Mexico’s anti-foreign sentiment. At the end of his term, Plutarco Elías Calles, a member of the Mexican Labor Party who had served as president between 1924 and 1928, persuaded Mexico’s power-holders to put their quarreling to rest to create an all-powerful political party. They named the new party the National

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Revolutionary Party. Though Elías Calles took the first critical step, it was left to Lázaro Cárdenas to fully restructure Mexico’s party system. In sum, the third transformation started a few years after Díaz had been forced to relinquish control of the executive office. As to be expected from a political system that for decades had endured regional and ideological rivalries and competing visions as to the type of form the state should assume, the transition did not proceed smoothly. Assassinations and military actions became the norm for several years. Nevertheless, despite the initial presence of chaotic conditions, by 1917 Mexico’s leaders had managed to create a constitution that sought to protect the sovereignty of the Mexican state; limit regional rivalries; and address the economic, political, and social needs of those who for much of the country’s history had been disregarded. The enactment of the constitution was a necessary step but not a sufficient one. To actually bring the transformations Mexico’s leaders hoped for, they needed to gain greater control over the actions of foreign investors and redesign their country’s political system. Both actions were initiated under the leadership of Elías Calles, but it would take the presence of a new leader to further generate the intended results.

The Fourth Transformation: 1929–1945 During his presidency, Lázaro Cárdenas moved in two fronts. To signal that he was determined to prevent external actors from defining Mexico’s economic development, he nationalized most railroads, which had been mostly under foreign control. His coup de grâce came in 1938, when the state took over the oil industry.86 Mindful of the strong nationalist sentiment generated by the questionable behavior of the foreign oil companies, Cárdenas noted in a speech that for the 1911 revolution to continue, Mexicans had to be “prepared at all times to resist, even at a cost of serious sacrifice, attacks by those who do not understand the justice of the Mexican cause and those who seek to bring about its failure by creating a situation of uncertainty and alarm.”87 Jean Meyer, summarized it best when he said that during this “phase of state building and national capitalist development, there was a basic understanding between the ’revolutionary family,’ industrialists, bankers and business men, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), capitalist rural interests, and even foreign capital.”88 The measures just described could have not been enacted had Cárdenas not been backed by a united political organization. From the moment he

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assumed the presidency in 1935, Cárdenas sought to reform the party created in 1929, changing it from an organization composed mainly of generals to a mass political organization structured along state corporatist lines.89 He divided the party into four branches, each representing a different section of society—peasants, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and the military. To underscore their commitment to the restructuring of politics in Mexico, Cárdenas and his associates renamed their party the Mexican Revolutionary Party. The name would be changed again in early 1946, when it became the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).90 Peasants were incorporated into the party system through the National Peasant Confederation (CNC). The first pillar was established to balance the political power of large landowners, small landowners, and landless peasants. The intent was to offset the power of landowners and curtail the capacity of peasants to mount coup d’états.91 Ultimately, however, the structure of the confederation became hierarchical, which meant that its leaders, instead of being elected through a democratic process, were appointed by party and regional political leaders. This arrangement, along with the fact that financial support came from the top, helped bureaucratize the organization and compel its leaders to be more attuned to the demands of those who appointed them, rather than to those of their constituents. Thus, by 1940 the CNC had become a tool used by the party to control agrarian actors, rather than an instrument designed to balance the interests and power of landowners and landless peasants, as initially intended.92 By the end of the nineteenth century, labor had become a critical political force throughout parts of Europe and Latin America. In Mexico too, the new party needed labor’s support to gain legitimacy. To draw this support, the PRI helped organize the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM).93 One of Cárdenas’s major triumphs in the mid-1930s was to bring into the party 13,000 oil workers (out of 19,000). As the second pillar of the PRI, members of the CTM abandoned the rhetoric of class struggle in favor of an ideology that championed greater collaboration with industry for the good of national development and unity. This step led to the decrease of workers’ bargaining power, and to an increase in the party’s capacity to control them.94 The name the PRI assigned to the third pillar was a misnomer. Under the heading of National Confederation of Popular Organizations,95 the PRI brought together white-collar professionals, small entrepreneurs, and government bureaucrats. This “popular” pillar enjoyed the greatest share

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of governmental benefits and in time emerged as the organization that would have the greatest capacity to represent the interests of its constituents.96 The fourth pillar was established to represent the military. Mindful of the military’s history of mounting coups against earlier leaders it did not favor, Cárdenas chose to keep himself and the party in their good favor. He institutionalized greater professionalism, extended its officers and troops substantial pay raises, and gave them educational opportunities and other benefits. At the same time, he cut the military’s share of the federal budget from 25 percent in 1934 to 19 percent in 1938 and he removed some of its top officers from positions of power, posting them in less influential public offices. These steps had their intended effect. Eventually the military lost much of its influence within the party, and in 1940, when the PRI broke up the organization, its members did not revolt. The decision vis-à-vis the military placed Mexico in a highly unusual position. It became one of the very few Spanish American states that would not be entangled in the intermittent coups and military dictatorships that would plague the others in the 1960s and 1970s.97 To help bring about radical change in a state’s political system, leaders need the backing of a comprehensive dogma. The central missions of Cárdenas’s ideology, which he called “rational socialism,” were to teach people how to increase productivity, foster cultural cohesion, and generate national integration. The nurturing of a doctrine, however, typically engenders a counter-ideology. Toward the end of the 1930s, several groups were no longer willing to acquiesce to a credo that they considered extremist. Saturnino Cedillo, a veteran of the revolution who was serving as governor of San Luis Obispo and minister of agriculture, mounted a half-hearted revolt. In earlier days, Cedillo had sponsored a popular agrarian reform, but with the passage of time, he began to tolerate landlords and businessmen who opposed Cárdenas’s policies. Cedillo’s revolt garnered little support, and soon he and a few of his collaborators were hunted down and killed. Nevertheless, Cedillo’s stand compelled the government to curtail reform and soften its radical rhetoric. More importantly, his action marked the end of military rebellion in the country’s “long revolutionary cycle.”98 In the meantime, with the 1940 presidential elections approaching, conditions in the world arena began to affect Mexico. A study commissioned by the government noted that although the war in Europe would engender substantial economic damage to Mexico, it would also provide

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the nation with an opportunity to industrialize. The study concluded that closer association with the United States was unavoidable and that the greater interconnection would help Mexico accelerate development in the areas of steel, mining, and livestock. By this time, Avila Camacho had started to emerge as the PRI candidate best suited to move the party away from Cardenas’s earlier radical reforms. During the campaigning period, he moved rapidly to repair his earlier differences with Mexico’s leading counterrevolutionary forces on the right, and to unify those at the center and the left within the PRI. His rise as the moderate alternative was aided greatly by Juan Andreu Almazán’s decision to declare his candidacy for the presidency, and the announcement on the part of representatives of the far right that they would form a party to support him. With the rise of these ideologically disparate candidates, the result of the 1940 election had the potential to either reaffirm or alter the course of the Mexican revolution. Since the beginning of the revolution, the United States had watched Mexico rather closely. While Washington had objected to the policies carried out by the Cárdenas administration and its predecessors and was apprehensive about the path Camacho would adopt were he to be elected, it feared more Almazán’s presumed pro-Nazi and fascist tendencies.99 Campaigning prior to the 1940 elections was clouded by violent clashes between members of the opposing camps, and for a while, speculations arose that the government intended to either cancel or delay them. The official announcement that the PRI candidate had received 2,476,641 votes, and that Almazán had only received some 151,000 votes, immediately incited accusations of fraud. For the next several months Almazán, who left Mexico shortly after the elections, tried unsuccessfully to garner support from the United States by promoting himself as the “betrayed challenger.”100 In September, the Mexican Congress declared Camacho the official winner. Shortly thereafter, Washington announced that it would officially recognize Camacho as the newly elected president. During the fourth transformation, the major changes were brought about by the creation of a political party with a very wide umbrella and by the restructuring of Mexico’s economy—an undertaking initiated by the nationalization of some of its key industries. The 1940 elections could have weakened the PRI when intense ideological differences between its leaders led to the formation of an alternative party determined to support its own candidate. But by that time, the power of the PRI had been sufficiently solidified to ensure that its political primacy would not be undercut.

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The Fifth Transformation: 1945–1990 For the first two decades after the end of the Second World War, the PRI sought to further consolidate its power.101 To avert challenges to its political authority, the PRI tried to revitalize the Mexican economy by investing heavily in education; placing high tariffs on imported goods to protect nascent industries; and allocating new resources to agriculture, energy, and transportation infrastructure. However, not everyone was prepared to accept the PRI as the country’s sole political authority. In 1958, labor leader Demetrio Vallejo tried to organize independent railroad unions. The government of Adolfo López Mateos arrested Vallejo, alleging that he was a communist; fired some 10,000 workers; and imprisoned thousands. Dissatisfaction within Mexico, however, continued to mount. The Cuban revolution and the Vietnam War helped delineate and strengthen the divide between those who wanted to protect the existing status quo and those who called for the creation of new social structures. The two sides would clash before the end of the decade. Throughout Spanish America, but especially in Mexico, 1968 was expected to be a special year. For the first time in the history of the Olympics, the games would be staged in a Spanish-speaking county in the Americas. In the view of the PRI’s leadership, the successful conduct of the games would aid Mexico’s economy and help highlight its political, social, and economic achievements. Thus, under the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Mexico invested some $150 million (roughly $7.5 billion in today’s terms) to prepare for the games. Moreover, because he was determined to present his country in a positive light and without protests, his administration suppressed movements by independent labor unions and farmers who had been demanding that the state address their needs instead of squandering money on buildings that would benefit very few. Conditions worsened in July 1968, when the Mexican police used force to enter a vocational school. Their use of violence against several students and teachers was viewed by many in the academic world as a major infringement on student autonomy. Thereafter, students throughout the country, backed by many other members of society, formed the National Strike Council (CNH).102 In a short time, small groups began to coalesce with the intent of exposing and speaking against the government’s corruption and repression. The CNH called on workers, farmers, teachers, students, and the general public to participate in a national silent march at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)103 on September 13.

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The government ordered the army to occupy UNAM. Other educational institutions throughout the country mounted demonstrations against the Díaz Ordaz regime. Less than a month later, thousands of university and high school students gathered in a plaza to protest the government’s actions. Violence erupted, and many were either killed or wounded.104 At first, media reports claimed that the students had incited the violence. In time, it became evident that an Olympic Brigade made up of the presidential guard provoked the massacre when it opened fire from the buildings that surrounded the plaza. The event did not bring the PRI down, but it did reduce measurably the public’s trust in its capacity to govern effectively. José Lopez Portillo was elected president in 1976. Three months after his election, the value of the peso dropped by half. The event shattered the myth of the “Mexican miracle” among those who viewed the currency as a sign of economic strength and stability. Minimal violent acts of rebellion that followed helped spread a sense of malaise throughout the country and gave rise to the rumor that the military was planning a coup. Cognizant that a major source of the widespread apprehension could be attributed to the obstacles the opposition parties faced in attempting to have their representatives elected, the new president introduced electoral reforms. The measures, approved in 1977, entailed liberalizing the party registration procedures; expanding the Chamber of Deputies to 400 members, with 300 of them elected by simple majority, single-member districts, and the rest by proportional representation; and granting the opposition parties greater access to the media. Minority parties immediately became involved in the system and began to demand additional changes.105 Changes in Mexico’s political system were accompanied by transformations in its economic milieu. Mexico’s economy in the mid-1970s did poorly. Unemployment had increased rapidly, import substitution industrialization had lost its vigor, and inflation was on the rise. But not all news was bad. After expropriating the foreign-owned companies, the Mexican government started to produce enough oil to supply the domestic market at relatively low prices. The energy scenario began to change in the 1970s. The discovery of new oil reserves convinced Mexico’s political leaders that its national oil company had the capacity to fulfill domestic requirements for the foreseeable future. Three years later, they learned that their country possessed about 5 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 3 percent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves.106

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The new information engendered intense debates. Some feared that greater reliance on oil revenues could generate a costly dependence on foreign buyers. Others advocated the development of a policy that would accelerate the process of oil extraction to pay for Mexico’s foreign debt and would acquire reserves for foreign exchange. López Portillo sought to satisfy both sides. He authorized the production of enough oil to both satisfy domestic needs and reach the export goal of 1.25 million barrels per day. Subsequently, he increased the daily ceiling export to 1.50 million barrels a day. By 1981, the export of oil accounted for nearly three-­quarters of Mexican exports, which helped generate nearly a million new jobs.107 The president’s gamble proved to be costly. Based on estimates of future earnings, the Mexican government launched expensive initiatives that forced it to borrow funds from abroad. Between 1977–1978 and 1982, the country’s national debt rose from $30 billion to $80 billion. During this period, inflation rose, and by 1982, it had climbed almost 100 percent, thus reducing the purchasing power of workers. Mexico’s economic woes were further aggravated by a sharp decrease in the price of oil generated by a worldwide glut. By 1982, the value of the peso had dropped from 26 pesos per dollar to 45 pesos per dollar. López Portillo sought to address the financial crisis with the expropriation of domestic, privately owned banks. Shortly afterward, his successor, Miguel de la Madrid, criticized the decision but acknowledged that he could not reverse it. Nonetheless, he agreed with the IMF’s plan to reduce Mexico’s budget deficit from 18 percent of the GDP in 1982 to 3.5 percent in 1985, in exchange for a renegotiation of the debt. In addition, he lifted price controls and floated the peso. These actions led to a major decrease in the real purchasing power of the working class. Mexico’s political, economic, and social milieus were further worsened by a series of problems: accusations of corruption spawned by drug trafficking; two large earthquakes; and a steep decline in the international price of oil. President de la Madrid and his associates attempted to remedy the situation by embarking on an ambitious market-oriented reform program. His administration sought several remedies: opening Mexico’s economy to international competition; privatizing and deregulating Mexico’s economy; establishing a stabilization program centered around a pre-­ determined nominal exchange rate and supported by fiscal and monetary policies; and designing broad social and economic agreements between the government, the private sector, and labor unions.108

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Governmental mismanagement of the privatization process enabled the newly privatized banks to take excessive risks, underreport non-­performing loans, and engage in large-scale borrowing in dollars to finance expansion.109 Moreover, in 1989, the government created a system based on a preannounced rate of devaluation. In November of 1991, the rate of devaluation was set to a narrow exchange rate band with a sliding ceiling. This attempt to reduce inflation using the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor led to the protracted real appreciation of the Mexican peso.110 As explained by Harvard economist Rudi Dornbusch in 1992, “[t]he current problem of the Mexican economy is the overvalued exchange rate.”111 A decline in the magnitude of capital flows would, conversely, lead to a reversal of the real exchange rate appreciation. The way the reversal was carried out during large-scale capital flight and in the middle of a credit boom engendered a severe economic crisis by the end of 1994. Against the backdrop of the country’s economic crisis, a series of events in 1994 changed investors’ expectations about Mexico and triggered massive capital flight. On January 1, 1994, a relatively unknown guerrilla movement, named the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN),112 seized control of three cities in the southern state of Chiapas.113 The Zapatistas called for social justice, the implementation of a democratic government, and the resignation of President Carlos Salinas. They also demanded redress for 500 years of violence, discrimination, and abandonment. Their challenge directly questioned the idea, which had been promoted for decades by the PRI, that all Mexicans were integrated into a single national project.114 Failure on the part of the negotiators to reach an agreement led the military to force the EZLN out of the cities, and into the surrounding jungles. Despite being forced out of the cities, the Zapatista movement became a political focal point both domestically and internationally. The new PRI presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, acknowledged that the regime had systematically failed a section of the population, and saw the events as a means to carry out political reform within the PRI. In a speech delivered on March 6, 1994, he claimed that increasing democracy and distancing the PRI from the government’s policy would be the first steps in the resolution of Mexico’s problems.115 Shortly after this speech, on March 23rd, he was assassinated in Tijuana.116 Later that year, the Senate majority leader Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, another advocate for democratic reforms within the PRI, was also assassinated. Almost immediately,

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allegations that the PRI was connected to both murders began to gain attention both nationally and internationally.117 The political assassinations of high-profile figures, a protracted increase in the US and European interest rates, and the continued violence in Chiapas led investors to start moving their capital out of the country. As capital outflows of foreign investment depleted Mexico’s reserves of foreign exchange, the government began to borrow more to accumulate foreign reserves, strengthen the peso, and maintain the exchange rate. The intent behind the action was to entice investors to keep their money in Mexico.118 These measures helped bring about short-term stability. However, the continued increase in the foreign deficit due to borrowing, the ensuing credit boom, and the escalation in the rate of inflation resulted in the further appreciation of the peso.119 Amid the political and economic troubles, Ernesto Zedillo, the PRI candidate, won the 1994 presidential election, promising “immediate improvement” in family incomes, as well as stability.120 Early on, the Zedillo administration discussed plans to gradually depreciate the peso, and it tried to do so by widening the band in which the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate. The depreciation led to panic among investors. As the panic spread in the financial markets, the magnitude of the capital outflow became too large, leading the government to float the peso. In a matter of weeks, the peso underwent a devaluation of 75 percent, which then dropped to 100 percent, and 140 percent in 1998.121 A recession and sizable banking crises followed, causing further economic destabilization and depreciation into 1995. As noted by Jorge Basurto, the “crisis that enveloped Mexico in early 1995 practically paralyzed the economy… The new president could not count on PRI to provide clout, because the party was deeply divided by internal conflicts. Even Zedillo began to distance himself from the PRI.”122 As one Mexican administration after another strove to address the country’s economic crisis, its political regime was experiencing its own set of transformations. The effects of the political revisions enacted in 1977 became evident in 1988. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI candidate, emerged as the winner with 50.4 percent of the vote, while Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a defector from the PRI and son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas, received 31.1 percent of the vote as the candidate of a coalition of leftist parties. Cárdenas and his allies accused the government-controlled electoral commission of fraud, but their actions did not alter the results. Nevertheless, mounting

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discontent forced the PRI to establish two years later the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)123 to enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the elections. For the first four years, however, the IFE did not exist as an entirely independent organization, because the secretary of the interior served as its secretary general, and most of the councilors were PRI members. The widespread political and social instability engendered by the Zapatista movement prior to the 1994 presidential elections compelled the PRI to acquiesce to the demand by an eight-party opposition coalition in Congress to change the composition of the IFE’s General Council. In its new form, the 11-member board would have 6 nonpartisan “citizen” councilors, thus offsetting the power of the PRI appointees. The change had its intended effect. Many viewed the 1994 presidential election as the first relatively free election in modern Mexican history. An additional change in 1996, which dictated that thereafter a nonpartisan “citizen” would always serve as president of the General Council, freed the IFE fully from the executive branch.124 The true test as to whether the PRI was prepared to actually open Mexico’s political system would come six years later. By the 2000 elections, few sectors of the Mexican population had responded favorably to Zedillo’s economic recovery program, which continued to draw inspiration from the neoliberal doctrine that had led to the economic meltdown of 1994–1995.125 This time around, the leaders of the PRI had decided that the party would hold a primary election to select the party’s presidential candidate in 2000. This decision broke practice with the PRI’s tradition of authorizing the outgoing president to personally select his replacement. The intent on the part of the PRI leaders was to persuade voters that the party adhered to and respected the tenets of democracy.126 The PRI held its primary on November 7, 1999. Francisco Labastida sailed to an easy victory over his main competitor, Roberto Madrazo. Because of his experience as both an elected official and a cabinet appointee, Labastida had close associations with foreign-trained neoliberal ­economists, as well as with old guard politicians who believed neoliberal policies had resulted in a drop in the standard of living and were therefore the primary reason for the waning support of the PRI.127 As the PRIendorsed presidential candidate, Labastida faced opposition from Vicente Fox, a relatively obscure, Jesuit-educated, former corporate official from Coca-­Cola de Mexico who had been governor of Guanajuato.128 Fox had announced his presidential bid in 1997, as the representative of the

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National Action Party (PAN). To enhance his presidential prospects, PAN and the Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM) created the Alliance for Change.129 Also entering the race was Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, the veteran Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate who had enjoyed political prominence since his 1988 presidential candidacy. Fox became the first non-PRI candidate to win a presidential race since the establishment of the PRI in 1929.130 The Alliance for Change gained the largest number of votes in the Chamber of Deputies, while the PRI remained the largest faction in the Senate.131 Fox’s victory signaled two very important changes within the Mexican political system. First, nearly 64 percent of the registered voters cast ballots on July 2nd. With around 59 million people voting in the election, observers noted that the balloting and counting resulted in the one of the fairest elections in Mexico’s history.132 In addition, the election “marked the first orderly and relatively peaceful change of political regime in its history as an independent country.”133 The emergence of electoral democracy was significantly aided by an independent media and the influence of IFE, the nonpartisan Civic Alliance—a group of NGOs involved with observing elections and the electoral process.134 The political fortunes of the PRI experienced another tumble six years later, when its presidential candidate polled only 22.3 percent of the vote and came in third. The PRI, however, remained the dominant political force at the state level. In 2012, the PRI regained control of the executive office under the leadership of Enrique Peña Nieto. Possibly the strongest signal that Mexico has transitioned into a democracy has been the election in July 2018 of Andrés Manuel López Obrador to the presidency. His election marked the first time in nearly 90 years that the Mexican president had not been elected from either the PRI or the PAN.

Analysis Immediately after independence, the Mexican state and its political regime were defined by the refusal on the part of regional leaders to surrender the power and authority they inherited from the colonial period to a central government. Their actions resulted in the emergence of regional militias. The presence of regional leaders backed by militias led to violent and highly polarizing civil wars. A weak central government, intense regionalism, deep contradictory views as to the role the Catholic Church should play, and strong differences as to whether the power of the state should be centralized brought about the formation of a highly divided and unstable

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political system. The absence of a stable and strong national military enabled competing factions with relatively equal powers to act intermittently as the state. Mexico’s internal discord made it vulnerable to the power aspirations of the United States and France. The high costs generated by the aggressive actions initiated by the United States and France compelled Mexico’s leaders to try to curb their domestic political differences to protect their state’s sovereignty. Benito Juárez set the foundation for the creation of a strong state, but it was Porfirio Díaz who started the process of undercutting the power of regional leaders, brought about a modicum of stability, and helped generate economic growth. His rule had two contradictory effects on Mexico’s political development. By attracting foreign investments, he helped energize the Mexican economy and strengthened his control over the state. However, his refusal to limit the drive by foreign investors to dominate the Mexican economy, inability to prevent major economic downturns, and unwillingness to relinquish the presidency after being in power for more than three decades, propelled Mexicans of all classes to demand his resignation and support efforts to topple him. The demise of Porfirio Díaz’s autocratic regime generated a power vacuum that was followed by the eruption of violence between different factions of the revolution. The politicization of the Mexican society in the closing years of the Revolution posed a major challenge. Political leaders needed to find a way to pacify a strong and mobilized labor and peasant sectors that showed signs of organizational potential, while at the same time protecting the interests and extensive freedom of the country’s political-­economic elite. The leaders took two critical steps. They ratified a constitution in 1917 designed to address a broad range of political, economic, and social issues. It included concepts such as federalism, division of powers, separation of state and church, control over natural resources, recognition of the rights of labor to organize and to strike, universal male suffrage, and a bill of rights. To aid the consolidation process, Mexico’s leaders had to integrate into the state structure the various political, economic, and social interests that populated the country’s political arena. Such an end was achieved through the creation of the PRI, an all-encompassing political party. The administration of Lázaro Cárdenas set up the foundation that enabled the PRI to solidify its power and protect its standing within the political system for a long, uninterrupted period. His administration formally created the institutional underpinnings from which the party machine would launch its clientelistic practices, and it established the precedence for ideological

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plurality.135 Most importantly, the Cardenas administration ensured that the leader of each institution within the PRI would owe his future political standing solely to the PRI leadership.136 The corporatist state created by the PRI enabled representatives of different interest groups to bargain within the confines of state-sponsored associations, and it limited the inclination on the part of any one group to seek outside assistance to either protect or advance its own interests. Also, of great significance were the decisions by the PRI leadership to isolate the military from politics and to reduce measurably its power.137 These actions lessened the capacity of the military to mount a coup and, as a result, reduced the urge on any rival interest group to advocate the mounting of one. Eventually, the PRI lost its hegemonic control over Mexico’s political arena. Several factors undermined the capacity of the PRI to retain complete command of Mexico’s political arena. First, the measures the PRI utilized in the early years to stimulate Mexico’s economy lost their effectiveness as the economy became more complex. The PRI’s dependence on large foreign loans to keep the country from defaulting strengthened the perception that its leaders lacked the capacity to resolve the country’s evolving economic challenges. Second, as corruption increased, so did the public’s belief that the PRI’s leaders were the main culprits. Third, for the first 50 years of its existence, the PRI owed its longevity to its capacity to recruit new members, assimilate them into the system, and produce new leadership. Starting in the 1980s, the PRI began to recruit a well-educated and tightly knit political-technical elite whose members were receptive to the political and economic strategies used abroad. This new class of recruits lacked the political bargaining skills used in the traditional corporatist structure of the PRI.138 And fourth, the demise of the Soviet Union, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the substantial financial assistance extended by the United States and other Western powers granted them the ability to pressure the PRI to engage in democratic practices. Despite its disinclination to relinquish political control, these developments forced the PRI to acquiesce and open Mexico’s political system.

Conclusion The opening of Mexico’s political system was the by-product of lengthy and costly transformations. The arrival of democracy, however, did not lead to an improvement of Mexico’s political, economic, and social environments. This lack of improvement was to be expected.

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An examination of the Mexican state during the post-1930 period until the 1980s could lead investigators to contend that its power and legitimacy increased measurably. During that period, the Mexican government played a central role in restructuring the country’s economy. The problem with that assertion is that it fails to differentiate between the structure of the state and the structure of the political party system. Mexico formally became a federal state in 1917. The designers of the 1917 constitution sought to transform Mexico’s political, economic, and social arenas. For a little over a decade, its creators battled one another. By the late 1920s, cognizant of Mexico’s chaotic and divisive history, several political leaders envisioned the formation of a party that would house every major interest group within Mexico. To keep them inside the same abode, the emerging party committed itself to addressing some of the basic demands of the various interest groups. Mindful that fulfilling such a goal without encountering extraordinary challenges was impossible, the PRI created a structure that compelled the leaders of the various interest groups to become more dependent on the power and authority of the party’s core leaders than on the members of the groups they had been chosen to represent. For an extended period of time the strategy worked. The party became the state—it controlled the officials that headed the governments and bureaucracies that governed and administered the various regions. As Viridiana Rios Contreras notes, although the country had a “de jure decentralized regime” during the period the PRI ruled Mexico, “it was de facto centralized due to a lack of outside options for politicians within the system.”139 Those who led Mexico’s government had a monopoly on authority and made decisions as a single body. Local political leaders who dared to opt for a different course faced political extinction. An important measure of a state’s capacity is its ability to limit corruption. According to Rios Contreras, corruption under Mexico’s centralized system was a single-bribe game. Decentralization changed the nature of the game. It dispersed the state’s decision-making power across multiple organizations and across different levels of government, thus turning corruption into a multiple-bribe game. Federal control declined after the PRI lost control of the presidency in 2000. Governors who in the past might have been expelled from office by PRI’s leaders for being too bold in their misconduct, realized that Mexico City no longer had as much power and authority to constrain their actions. The democratic transition helped generate two equally significant but contradictory outcomes. On the one

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hand, it helped generate greater popular participation. On the other hand, it “opened the door to a lot of corrupt practices, especially on the local level.”140 Thus, it is not surprising that in the year 2000, Mexico was ranked 59th in the world by the Transparency International Corruption Index (a 1st rank denotes the lowest possible level of corruption), while in 2016 its rank had dropped to 123rd in the world.141 Mexico’s inability to contain the resurgence of corruption and violence strengthens the argument that effective democracies do not emerge in states that have failed to consolidate and legitimize their power. For some seven decades, the PRI tried to consolidate and legitimize its power and promote the image that it was the state. The PRI’s failure to resolve critical political, economic, and social issues steadily undercut its power and image. Thus, by the late 1970 and early 1980s, a vast number of Mexicans had lost faith in the PRI. This loss of faith signaled that Mexicans were no longer willing to accept the notion that the PRI and the state were one and the same. Without the support it had garnered through the years, the PRI had no choice but to level the political playing field. The leveling of the playing field led to the emergence of a form of democracy in which the government lacked many of the means it needed to rule effectively.

Notes 1. Whenever possible, the  names of  Mexican organizations are written in English throughout the main body of the manuscript and presented in Spanish on the endnotes. 2. See Frances F. Berdan, “Mesoamerica: Mexica.” In Michael S. Werner, ed., Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society & Culture. (Routledge, 1998). 3. See Charles Gibson, The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519–1810 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). 4. See J.  H. Elliot, “Spain and America in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 294. 5. Ibid., 28. 6. See Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico: Democratic Consolidation or Decline? (New York: Oxford University Press), 27. 7. Ibid., 29. 8. Fuentes adds: “Today’s Spanish Americans are descendants of both verticalities.” That generalization is incorrect, because not all Spanish

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Americans were impacted by the Aztecs’ verticality. One can assume he intended to write “Today’s Mexicans …” See Carlos Fuentes, The Buried Mirror: Reflections on Spain and the New World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 129. 9. Elliot, “Spain and America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” 303. 10. Ibid., 339. 11. See Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C.1500–C.1800 (Verlag Nicht Ermittelbar, 2010), 47–48. 12. Pagden, Lords of all the World, 59. 13. Hostility within Spain toward the pope’s relentless drive to centralize the Church’s power reached its peak around the start of the fifteenth century. Though attempts to change the ways of the Church had been initiated in the late fourteenth century, it was not until after Ferdinand  II and Isabelle  I had married that the Church’s authority in Spain started to diminish. In 1474 and 1475, the king and queen sought to restrict and control papal tax collectors and to prevent the pope from appointing anyone to the archbishoprics, bishoprics, or military orders, unless the application came from them. Despite his initial unwillingness to acquiesce to the monarchs’ challenge, the pope agreed to compromise in 1482, when Isabella I and Ferdinand II requested that a major portion of the taxes collected from the clergy be used to finance the war against the Moors in Granada. See J.N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516 (Princeton University Press, 2000), 395–398. 14. See Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492–1700 (University of Minnesota, 1984), 78–79, 157–160, 194. 15. Colin M. MacLachlan and Jaime Rodriguez O., The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 7. 16. Stanley C.  Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823–1832 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 17–18. 17. Ibid., 19–21. 18. Ibid., 15. 19. Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 10. 20. See Camp, Politics in Mexico, 24. 21. Indigenous people were ranked above blacks but were treated legally as minors. See Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 40.

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22. See Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire, 34. 23. Ibid., 37. 24. As Dominguez notes: “The goal of the elite was the restoration of rights of ethnic superiority and exclusiveness.” Ibid., 37. 25. Quoted in MacLachlan and Rodriguez O., The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico, 303. See also, David Bushnell and Neil Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15; and John A.  Crow, The Epic of Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 501. 26. By the time Spain learned that New Spain had recognized the Seville junta, the Junta Suprema Central, had been formed. Ibid., 308. 27. Ibid., 312. 28. See MacLachlan and Rodriguez O., The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico, 313. 29. Timothy E.  Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide (Lincoln: Lincoln University Press, 1990), 3. 30. See MacLachlan and Rodriguez O., The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico, 327. 31. See Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire, 228–229. 32. Ibid., 229. 33. Also known as the Plan of the Three Guarantees. 34. See Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide, 4. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 8. 37. Although independence made native Mexicans legally free and equal, it did not alter social mores. As already explained, social structures were discussed in terms of blood lines, with blacks at the bottom, followed by indigenous Mexicans, then by mestizos, and finally, at the top, by whites. See Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823–1832, 53. Moreover, from 1808 to 1822 the national debt had increased from 20 million pesos to 45 million pesos. See Jan Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 4. 38. Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” 130–131; Burton Kirkwood, The History of Mexico (Greenwood, 2010), 92; and Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823–1832, 45–48. 39. José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, “Beyond the Restrictive Consensus: Elections in Mexico (1809–1847),” Revista de Sociologia e Politica, Vol.

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20, No. 42 (June 2012). http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S010444782012000200005&script=sci_arttext#top11. 40. See Philip L.  Russell, History of Mexico: From Pre-Conquest to Present (Routledge 2010), 156. 41. Ibid., 160. 42. Ibid., 160. 43. Ibid., 160. 44. Ibid., 160. 45. Though federalists were also inclined to perceive the indigenous Mexicans as degenerate creatures, the attitude was significantly more predominant among Conservatives. Lucas Alaman, who was the force behind the Conservative attempt to reinvigorate Mexico’s economy and curb the power of the provinces, considered indigenous Mexicans to be “inclined to thievery and drunkenness.” See Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823–1832, 63. 46. See Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 137. 47. Richard N. Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas Press, 1979), 23. 48. Ibid., 23. 49. See Kirkwood, History of Mexico, 94. A caudillo needed supporters to fight for him and his supporters needed him to provide for them. This relationship of “mutual dependence” ensured that the caudillo could maintain his seat of power as long as he operated in a manner that ensured the advancement of his supporters’ political and economic interests. See Frank Safford, “Politics, Ideology and Society,” in Bethell, ed., Spanish America after Independence, c. 1820–1870, 72–76. 50. See Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 141–142. 51. Ibid., 143–144. 52. See Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-­ Building, 24–25. 53. Ibid., 25. 54. Ibid., 25–27. 55. Federalists, however, faced a paradox. Although they emphasized that it was imperative to end federal intervention in local affairs, they also advocated instituting an executive with nearly omnipotent powers. Such an executive had to have sufficient power to protect the state and help bring about prosperity in Mexico. A solution to this paradox would not be found for many years. See Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A

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Study in Liberal Nation-Building, 75–76. See also Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” 152. 56. See Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” 154–156. 57. Ibid., 157–159. 58. See Russell, History of Mexico, 222. 59. Ibid., 364. 60. See Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” 166. 61. Dana G. Munro, The Latin American Republics: A History (New York: Appleton Century, Inc., 1960), 363. 62. Quoted in Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building, 84. 63. See Bazant, “From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821–1867,” 167–169. Also see Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building, 81. 64. See Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876. A Study in Liberal Nation-­ Building, 85. 65. Ibid., 90. 66. Jaime Suchlicki, Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, and Beyond (Transaction Publishers 2000), 96. 67. See Russell, History of Mexico, 229. 68. Ibid., 91. 69. See Russell, History of Mexico, 232. 70. See Brian R. Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 194. 71. See Friedrich Katz, “The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 81–88. See also Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 15–36. 72. See Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 23. 73. Díaz ruled between 1876 and 1880, and then again from 1884 until 1911. 74. Lorena M.  Parlee, “Porfirio Díaz, Railroads and Development in Northern Mexico: A Study of Government Policy Toward the Central and National Railroads, 1876–1910” (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1981). 75. One hacienda was larger than Belgium and the Netherlands combined. See Fuentes, The Buried Mirror, 299–300. See also Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and

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U.S.  Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 158. 76. See Russell, History of Mexico, 240. 77. Ibid., 240. 78. Ibid., 240. Between 1875 and 1910, Mexico’s population increased from 8.3 million to 15.1 million people. 79. See Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 55–77. 80. See Katz, “The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato, 1876–1910,” 109–111. 81. See Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico, 215. 82. See Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 55–77. 83. See Ernst C. Griffin, Gordon R. Willey, Henry Bamford Parkes, Michael C.  Meyer, Angel Palerm, and Marvin David Bernstein “Mexico,” Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/379167/Mexico/27367/The-consititution-of-1917. 84. See Alan Knight, “The Politics of Expropriation,” in Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight, eds., The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 90. 85. See Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy, 160–178. 86. Ibid., 180–181. 87. Ibid., 102. 88. Jean Meyer, “Mexico in the 1920s,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 238. 89. Daniel C.  Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, “Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule and the Question of Democracy,” in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder: Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1999), 526–527. 90. Partido Revolucionario Institucional. 91. Judith A.  Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978), 41. 92. Ibid., 45–46. 93. Confederación de Trabajadores de México. 94. Ibid., 42. 95. Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares. 96. Ibid., 49. 97. Ibid., 43. See also Anthony Gill, “Mexico,” in Jeffrey Kopstein, Mark Lichbach and Stephen E.  Hanson, eds., Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 310.

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98. See Alan Knight, “The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo, c. 1930–c.1946,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 293–295. 99. See Friedrich Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lazaro Cardenas, 1934–1940 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 179–182. 100. Ibid. 101. During this period, women were granted for the first time the right to vote in national elections. 102. Consejo Nacional de Huelga. 103. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 104. The numbers of people killed or injured are still contested. 105. Peter H.  Smith, “Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 373–376. 106. See Smith, “Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an authoritarian regime,” in Bethell, ed., Mexico Since Independence, 376–377. 107. Ibid., 377–378. 108. See Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano. “The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis.” (The National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), 4. www.nber.org/ papers/w6516.pg. 4. 109. See Aldo Musacchio, “Mexico’s Financial Crisis of 1994–1995.” (Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–101, May 2012), 14. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9056792/12-101. pdf?sequence=1. 110. Edwards and Savastano. “The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis,” 7. 111. See Rudiger Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner. “Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1994, (Brookings Institute, 1994), www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/ mexico-stabilization-reform-and-no-growth/. 112. Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional. 113. Kirkwood, History of Mexico, 199. 114. See Jo Tuckman, Mexico Democracy Interrupted (Yale University Press, 2012), 15. 115. Kirkwood, History of Mexico, 200. 116. See Jorge Castañeda, The Mexican Shock: Its Meaning for the United States (The New Press, 1996), 101. 117. See Jorge Basurto, “Populism in Mexico.” in Michael L.  Conniff ed., Populism in Latin America. Second Edition (University of Alabama Press, 2012), 92. 118. Musacchio, “Mexico’s Financial Crisis of 1994–1995,” 22. 119. Ibid., 22.

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120. Basurto, “Populism in Mexico.” in Michael L. Conniff ed., Populism in Latin America: Second Edition, 92. 121. Ibid., 93. 122. Ibid., 93. 123. Instituto Nacional Electoral. 124. Dylan McNally, “Mexico’s National Electoral Institute: Ensuring Fair Elections at the Local Level,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/3af21328/ BI-Brief-063014-Mexico_Elections.pdf. 125. Basurto, “Populism in Mexico.” in Michael L. Conniff ed., Populism in Latin America: Second Edition, 94. 126. Russell, History of Mexico, 580. 127. Ibid., 580. 128. See Kirkwood, History of Mexico, 206. 129. Partido Acción Nacional; Partido Verde Ecologista de México; and Alianza por el Cambio. 130. Ibid., 207. 131. PAN and PVEM broke their alliance in 2001. 132. Ibid., 207. 133. See Lorenzo Meyer, “La institucionalización del nuevo regimen,” 823– 879 and “De la estabilidad al cambio,” 881–943, in Historia general de México: Version 2000 (Mexico City: Colegio de México). 134. See Russell, History of Mexico, 588. 135. The term clientelism refers to a political or social system based on the relation client to patron with the client giving political or financial support to a patron (as in the form of votes) in exchange for some social privilege or benefits. 136. See, Levy and Székely. Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change, 124. 137. The PRI’s reduction of the military’s budget has been so substantial that today it receives the smallest percent of the federal allocation of any military force in Latin America. See “Country Comparison: Military Expenditures–percent of GDP,” Index Mundi at Indexmundi.com/g/r. aspx?v=132. See also Susan Eva Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 34. 138. Ibid., 34. 139. Viridiana Rios Contreras, “How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The Cause of Mexico’s Drug War.” Dissertation. (Cambridge, MA: The Department of Government, Harvard University, 2012). http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf. 140. See David Iaconangelo, “How governors’ offices became ground zero for corruption in Mexico,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 25, 2017.

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Quote appears in same article. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/ Americas/2017/0425/How-governors-offices-became-ground-zerofor-corruption-in-Mexico. See also Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. http://www.ey.com/Publication/ vwLUAssets/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-PerceptionsIndex-2016/$FILE/EY-Transparency-International-CorruptionPerceptions-Index-2016.pdf. 141. Ibid.

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Eckstein, Susan. 1977. The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Edwards, Sebastian, and Miguel A.  Savastano. 1998. The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis. The National Bureau of Economic Research, The National Bureau of Economic Research. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Elliot, J.H. 1984. Spain and America in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. In The Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Fuentes, Carlos. 1992. The Buried Mirror: Reflections on Spain and the New World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Print. Gibson, Charles. 1964. The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519–1810. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Print. Gill, Anthony. 2014. Mexico. In Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order, ed. Jeffrey Kopstein, Mark Irving Lichbach, and Stephen E.  Hanson. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Print. Green, Stanley C. 1987. The Mexican Republic: The First Decade, 1823–1832. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. Print. Griffin, Ernst C., Gordon R. Willey, Henry Bamford Parkes, Michael C. Meyer, Angel Palerm, and Marvin David Bernstein. 2017, September 20. Mexico. Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Hamnett, Brian R. 2018. A Concise History of Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Hellman, Judith Adler. 1978. Mexico in Crisis. New York: Holmes and Meier. Print. Hillgarth, J.N. 1976. The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516. New York: Clarendon Press. Print. Iaconangelo, David. 2017, April 25. How Governors’ Offices Became Ground Zero for Corruption in Mexico. The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Katz, Friedrich. 1991. The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato. In Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Kirkwood, Burton. 2010. The History of Mexico. Oxford: Greenwood. Print. Knight, Alan. 1986. The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1. Lincoln: University of Nebraska. Print. ———. 1992. The Politics of Expropriation. In The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jonathan C.  Brown and Alan Knight. Austin: University of Texas. Print. ———. 1991. The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo, C. 1930–c.1946. In Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print.

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Levy, Daniel C., and Gabriel Szekely. 1987. Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change. Boulder: Westview. Print. Levy, Daniel C., and Kathleen Bruhn. 1999. Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule and the Question of Democracy. In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, ed. Larry Jay Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Juan J. Linz, and Jonathan Hartlyn. Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner. Print. MacLachlan, Colin M., E.  Jaime, and O.  Rodriguez. 1990. The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico. Berkeley: University of California. Print. McAlister, Lyle N. 1984. Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492–1700. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Print. McNally, Dylan. 2014. Mexico’s National Electoral Institute: Ensuring Fair Elections at the Local Level. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Print. Meyer, Jean. 1991. Mexico in the 1920s. In Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Meyer, Lorenzo. “La institucionalización del nuevo regimen.” Historia general de Mexico: Version 2000. Mexico City: Colegio de México. ———. “De la estabilidad al cambio.” Historia general de Mexico. Version 2000. Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico. Munro, Dana Gardner. 1960. The Latin American Republics: A History. New York: Appleton Century, Inc.. Print. Musacchio, Aldo. 2012, May. Mexico’s Financial Crisis of 1994–1995. Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–101. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Pagden, Anthony. 2010. Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C.1500–C.1800. Verlag Nicht Ermittelbar. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Parlee, Lorena M. 1981. Porfirio Díaz, Railroads and Development in Northern Mexico: A Study of Government Policy Toward the Central and National Railroads, 1876–1910. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International. Russell, Philip L. 2010. The History of Mexico: from Pre-Conquest to Present. New York: Routledge. Print. Safford, Frank. 1987. Politics, Ideology, and Society. In The Cambridge History of Latin America. From Independence to C.1870, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Schuler, Friedrich. 1998. Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lazaro Cardenas, 1934–1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico. Print. Sinkin, Richard N. 1979. The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building. Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin. Print.

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Smith, Peter H. 1991. Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime. In Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Suchlicki, Jaime. 2000. Mexico: from Montezuma to NAFTA, and Beyond. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Print. Transparency International. 2016. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Tuckman, Jo. 2012. Mexico Democracy Interrupted. New Haven: Yale University Press. Print.

CHAPTER 5

The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in Colombia and Venezuela

Introduction Venezuela and Colombia achieved independence from Spain simultaneously and remained members of the same federal system for the first decade. Thereafter, they underwent dissimilar state-creation and democratization experiences. Their distinct histories are reflected in the nature of their political, economic, and social systems today. Though neither country has a solid democracy, Colombia’s standing in the 2018 Democracy Index was 51st while Venezuela’s was far behind at 134th.1 Hence the question: Why has Colombia been much more effective than Venezuela at creating an open and competitive political system although both were colonized by the Spaniards at approximately the same time, jointly gained independence from their colonizers, and for a ten-year period were members of the same federation?

Colombia Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times Located in the northwest corner of South America, Colombia shares its borders with Venezuela and Brazil to the east, Ecuador to the south, and the Panamanian isthmus to the northwest. As the fourth largest country in Latin America, covering approximately 440,829 square miles in area, Colombia can be separated into three distinct regions. In the © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_5

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mountainous region of the west, the western, eastern, and central ranges of the Andean Mountains divide the country and provide for its climatic variations.2 The Andean region covers approximately 30 percent of the country’s surface area but is home to more than 75 percent of the population. The eastern region constitutes approximately 58 percent of the territory, but only 5.5 percent of the population lives there. The Caribbean coast, which makes up around 12 percent of the territory, holds close to 20 percent of the population.3 Various indigenous groups were dispersed throughout Colombia during the pre-colonial period. The largest and most developed groups were the Muisca, the Tairona, and the Cenu. They lived in the Cordillera Oriental, east of the upper Magdalena River in east-central Colombia, as well as in parts of northern Colombia.4 The larger and more complex societies developed an economic system based on agriculture and supplemented by hunting and fishing. Though cultural and linguistic differences caused fierce antagonisms and chronic conflict between some of the chiefdoms, commerce flourished. Most of the developed chiefdoms of the west, specifically in the Cauca region and the lowlands of northern Colombia, were divided into territorial or state-like political organizations. Each was under the jurisdiction of a local chief, albeit federated under a paramount chieftain. The aristocratic class within these states included warrior leaders, chiefs, and other prominent members of society who received tribute from commoners and enjoyed the privilege of polygyny.5 The first Europeans arrived in present-day Colombia at the very end of the fifteenth century and soon began to establish trade relations with local indigenous groups. In 1508, the Crown authorized the creation of two permanent settlements. By 1524, after fighting and enslaving several members of the native population, the colonizers had abandoned the settlements because of increasing indigenous hostilities.6 As they moved westward, the colonizers settled near the Gulf of Urabá, in the Darien region. The settlement became the foundation of the Spanish colony of Castilla del Oro on the Isthmus of Panama. In 1526, they constructed another settlement—Santa Marta—on the eastern end of the Caribbean coast. Seven years later, they founded the town of Cartagena de Indias, also on the Caribbean coast. The town covered a large swath of land located between the Gulf of Urabá and the Magdalena River. Gold discovered in the tombs of the Cenu further compelled the Spaniards to plunder the area at the expense of indigenous populations. Santa Marta

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and Cartagena both served as permanent bases from which the Spaniards would conquer and colonize the Colombian interior.7 Native tombs discovered not far inland revealed gold almost on a scale found in Peru or Mexico. Within a year’s time, the newcomers had conquered most of the Muisca territory.8 Not long afterward, they bestowed the title of “New Kingdom of Granada” on the new territory and founded the present capital of Colombia, Santafe de Bogotá.9 The establishment of Bogotá enabled the Spaniards to consolidate their control over the eastern highlands and use the settlement as a base for further conquest and colonization. Fanning out into neighboring territories, they ventured to the north and to the west, and down the slopes of the Andes to the edge of vast grassy plains.10 By the end of the sixteenth century, the Spaniards had concluded that the nascent cities from which they sought to dominate the surrounding countryside did not constitute a coherent colonial dominion.11 The two chief regional centers of Spanish control in the interior were the eastern highlands and the upper Cauca region. The Central Cordillera physically separated both regions, creating a considerable barrier to transportation and communication that in turn resulted in the area’s relative isolation. Physically and administratively separated, each region had become economically self-sufficient by the start of the seventeenth century.12 The principal economic activities in the eastern highlands were the production of grains and the weaving of textiles, while gold dominated the economy of the western region. Cartagena, the third major region of Spanish settlement along the Caribbean coast, developed nearly a monopoly on all external commerce—namely the legal imports of European luxury products and African slaves. It sent most of its imported luxury goods to Bogotá, the chief consumption and distribution center in the eastern highlands; and imported slaves to the mining towns of the west. In return, the Caribbean coastal region received agricultural and manufactured ­consumer goods from the east and gold from the west. In short, because of its ideal location Cartagena became the Kingdom of New Granada’s leading port. Over time, the regions in New Granada developed distinct ethnic features. In the agrarian eastern highlands, the dense indigenous population did not decline as rapidly as it did in the mining regions. By the eighteenth century, miscegenation in the eastern highlands between Spaniards and the indigenous peoples had become a common occurrence, imbuing the region with a largely mestizo population. In the west and on the Caribbean

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coast, members of the indigenous population died at a much higher rate, leading to the introduction of African slaves as a way of replenishing a declining indigenous labor force. Soon thereafter, African slaves came to provide much of the demographic base in both regions. Differing population profiles, compounded by distinctive regional economic roles, led to the development of a variety of institutions designed to enforce colonial socioeconomic hierarchies and organize indigenous labor. In the eastern highlands, the Spaniards established a system of encomiendas.13 According to the arrangement dictated by the Spanish monarchy, indigenous peoples would provide the encomenderos with goods and labor, and in return they would receive spiritual guidance, protection, and stability. As their wealth increased, the encomenderos started to disregard the Crown’s dictates and exploit their indigenous workers.14 Between 1590 and 1620, Spain established reservations called resguardos in order to strengthen its political control over the encomenderos, improve the religious acculturation of the indigenous populations, and deal with their decline.15 By creating collective communities, Spain effectively removed the indigenous peoples from the lands that they had previously occupied and opened large areas of fertile land for Spaniards. In their newly gained dominions, the Spaniards began to grow European crops and raise livestock for sale in city markets and mining zones. Soon thereafter, the new landholdings began to replace the encomienda as a major source of wealth.16 The policy implemented in the eastern part of the Cordillera was soon replicated in the western section. During the same period, the production of gold remained the dominant economic activity of the Colombian region. As the original population declined, African slaves became the core labor force in the mines. In the Pacific lowland mining zones, ownership was concentrated amongst just a few individuals. Conversely, in Antioquia, ownership was less concentrated, and although slaves constituted a large portion of the labor force, the free labor provided by mazamorreros, or free prospectors, played an essential role in gold production.17 In the Caribbean region, African slaves were used primarily to cultivate beans, cassava, maize, and plantains.18 The fragmentation of political authority within the territory did much to exacerbate an incipient sense of regional autonomy. From 1546 until 1717, the authority of the Audiencia of Bogotá over New Granada was generally weak. Bogotá’s capacity to assert its authority was further restricted by the territory’s distinct topographical features, which created transportation and communication difficulties. As a result, provincial

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governors remained independent of Bogota’s authority. Internecine conflict between the Church and the Audiencia further inhibited the governing capacity of the colonial state.19 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Spanish monarchy acknowledged that its colonies were being governed inefficiently and that their leaders lacked formal authoritative powers. To address the problem, Spain created the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and designated Bogotá as its capital. The new Viceroyalty encompassed present-day Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, much of Venezuela, and the islands of Trinidad and Margarita. The Viceroyalty was disbanded in 1723 but was reinstituted in 1738 to protect Cartagena from increases in English hostilities within the region. New Granada’s colonial society became highly complex and stratified. On top of the social hierarchy were the original conquistadores, who for the most part were members of Spain’s manual trades or lower professions. Their elevated social status in the colonies was closely intertwined with their ability to extract and amass large quantities of wealth at the expense of the existing indigenous population. Post-conquest settlers— the primeros pobladores—also enjoyed a high socioeconomic status, as many of them became encomenderos. In the vice royal government, they dominated the highest administrative positions in society. American-born Spaniards were normally relegated to the middle or lower levels of the colonial administration. Typically, they served as provincial administrators, lieutenant governors, or lawyers practicing before the Audiencia. Occupying the lower rungs of Spanish colonial society in descending socioeconomic order were mestizos—the progeny of Spanish and native miscegenation; other racial intermixtures, including zambos; the indigenous population; and lastly, black slaves. Fluidity rather than rigidity, within certain limits, was the essence of the mestizo’s social and economic standing in New Granada’s colonial society.20 By the eighteenth century, with its population growing and changing, New Granada had become mostly a mestizo society. According to the 1778–1780 censuses, people of mixed race made up 46 percent of New Granada’s population; whites, 26 percent; indigenous people, 20 percent; and black slaves, 8 percent.21 The process of miscegenation that drew natives into mestizo society was the driving force behind the growth of the population. The growth in the white population, on the other hand, stemmed from a natural increase amongst American-born Spaniards, who constituted an emerging social class.22

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The substantial increase in the size of the mestizo population posed a potential threat to the socioeconomic dominance of the white ruling class. Claims to “cleanliness of blood”23 were fiercely contested during the eighteenth century as whites fought to distinguish themselves from the expanding mestizo and mulatto groups in order to reinforce the existing colonial socioeconomic hierarchies. Notwithstanding these developments, as the number of mestizos increased, they assumed a wider array of roles in colonial society.24 Despite the socially divisive measures implemented by members of the white class, colonial society became less rigid in New Granada than in areas with large numbers of indigenous populations, such as the southern Andean regions of Peru, or southern New Spain.25 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that New Granada’s society had achieved greater integration than other colonial regions of the Spanish empire, or that the colonial elites had attained greater control over those below them. Rather, without a strong sense of ethnic identity, the mestizo and poor white populations tended to identify with their localities. Thus, as white and mestizo villages grew, they generally cultivated local rights and privileges and sought official recognition as autonomous municipalities. Of the many concerns that preoccupied those who governed the Viceroyalty of New Granada, the two most important ones were the need to produce more gold and the maintenance of Cartagena’s defenses. The continuous need to extract and export gold and silver undercut the capacity to diversify other exports. Moreover, though the Spanish Crown was able to fortify Cartagena, it was unable to finance basic development projects and improve overland transportation. Because for much of the eighteenth century other foreign powers, especially England, often encroached on legal trade routes, most cities in New Granada had no alternative but to engage in illegal trading to export their crops and animal products. The challenges faced by those cities were compounded by Spain’s decision to extend important benefits—neutral trade and the elimination of export taxes—to Cuba and Venezuela while denying the same advantages to New Granada. The unfair conditions of trade became a significant source of irritation to New Granada’s creole elites. From around 1790 onward, educated creoles began to point out the ineptitudes of the Spanish regime. They primarily focused their criticisms on the lack of efficient means of internal communication and the obstruction of unrestricted external trade.26

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Although tackling the dilemma of smuggling and fostering economic development were two primary objectives of the Spanish reforms, the Crown’s chief preoccupation was to increase revenue.27 In the 1750s, viceregal administrators began to advocate for more efficient revenue collection methods, which included the monopolization of tobacco and cane liquor, a rise in the prices of goods, and an increase in the sales tax. While those measures increased revenues and decreased its dependency on the wealthier viceroyalties for military expenditures, the New Granada Viceroyalty was unable to support fully the costs of its own administration and defense.28 By the late eighteenth century, patterns of various types of war-induced tax exactions, accompanied by riots and protests, had become common occurrences in New Granada. This cycle was exacerbated by the diffusion of the North American and French revolutionary ideals among the creole elites.29 The most striking manifestation of discontent in New Granada was the Comunero movement of 1780–1781, brought about by the imposition of new taxes on tobacco and cane liquor. The decision provoked riots in the province of Socorro. The Comuneros demanded that in all future administrative appointments, creoles, instead of Spaniards, be extended preferential treatment. Although the rebellion subsided, the public display of anger toward Spanish administrators, as well as the overwhelming desire for local governance on the part of the masses, indicated a growing resentment toward the continuation of foreign colonial domination.30 In sum, the patterns of conquest that originally divided the territory into three relatively disconnected regions, the communication and transportation problems caused by harsh topographical conditions, and the initial fragmentation of authority gradually led to the development of a sense of regional autonomy. Additionally, while a large, compliant indigenous population, located primarily in the eastern highlands, allowed for the rapid transformation of numerous Spanish settlements into commercial hubs, much of the western region, although imbued with gold deposits, generally lacked consistent access to workers. The importation and transportation of African slaves to the mining towns in the western areas gradually yielded an increase in the regional population, which in turn helped generate an overall surge in the production of gold.31 Colombia’s Struggle for Independence Shortly after Napoleon forced the Spanish monarchs to abdicate the throne, leaders loyal to the Crown quickly established in Spain a Central

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Junta tasked with the unification of the provinces and the colonies under a central authority. Over time, it became clear that the Central Junta would be unable to both organize resistance efforts against the French and maintain the unity of the provinces and colonies. As the legitimacy of the Central Junta waned, distrust between Spaniards and the creole elites in the Viceroyalty arose. A major conflict between the two factions gripped Quito in 1809 when its creole elites deposed the president of the Audiencia and established an autonomous Junta that declared loyalty to Ferdinand VII. The new Junta denounced peninsular officials as the creatures of a corrupt, pro-French regime, and urged other cities within the Viceroyalty to follow Quito’s example. Upon receiving word of the coup, the viceroy in Bogotá assembled a cohort of government officials, members of the Bogotá Cabildo, representatives of the upper echelons of the clergy and military, as well as leading citizens, to counter the apparent threat to his authority and the existing political order. Because the action did not lead to a formal resolution, the viceroy sent a diplomat to negotiate with the Quito Junta, and dispatched troops to restore royal authority should conciliation fail. Far from drawing the elites together, the meetings simply exacerbated the mistrust that existed between Spanish governors and creole notables. The clear political division that had been established within the first decade of the nineteenth century between creoles and peninsulares in Spanish America was further intensified by the collapse of the last remnants of monarchical authority in Spain. In February 1810, a newly formed Council of Regency, which governed little more than the port of Cadiz, issued a proclamation designed to both stabilize the Spanish empire and sway the creole elites to not break away from Spain. The new edict stated:32 From this moment, American Spaniards, you see yourselves elevated to the dignity of free men; you are no longer the same men bent under a yoke made…heavier by being…distant from the center of power; looked upon with indifference, harassed by greed, and destroyed by ignorance…[Y]our destinies now depend neither upon ministers nor viceroys, nor governors; they are in your hands.

Instead of bolstering the Regency’s authority in Spanish America by conceding political rights to colonial subjects, the explicit repudiation of the old regime, with the overt recognition of colonial claims to self-government, gave the viceroy’s adversaries the opportunity to mobilize against the colonial government.

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Starting in June 14, 1810, local notables began to exercise their newly ratified right to political autonomy by ejecting royal governors throughout New Granada. Caracas’s creole elites blocked the captain-general of Venezuela from entering the city council, established a Junta, and proclaimed it to be the political authority within the region.33 Developments in Cartagena unfolded in a similar fashion. In November 1811, creoles removed Cartagena’s governor, and they established a Supreme Junta and declared its complete independence from Spain.34 As news spread regarding the establishment of autonomous juntas in both Caracas and Cartagena, creoles in other towns within New Granada began to take similar steps. In most cases, the creole elites influenced the masses to revolt against the vice-regal government in order to establish an autonomous junta that is free of peninsular influence. Once they had erected a new governing apparatus, the creole elites planned to pledge their allegiance to Ferdinand VII. However, a faction of creole agitators rallied the masses in Bogotá and demanded a definitive break with the past. Under public pressure, the Bogotá Junta disavowed the authority of the Spanish Regency and broke with the colonial government entirely. Unlike the Comunero rebellion of 1781, the movement toward rebellion in New Granada was engineered by a faction of the creole elite, not by the masses. At its first session in July 1810, the newly established Junta in Bogotá declared itself the provisional supreme government of New Granada and called for cabildos throughout the territory to send delegates to the capital to form a federal government “on the bases of the freedom and respective independence” of the provinces.35 Many provincial capitals were reluctant to cooperate with the Bogotá Junta. Wherever a junta in a provincial ­capital thrust aside colonial authorities, it proclaimed its province to be a sovereign state and unwilling to forfeit its absolute sovereignty. Cartagena espoused the most vehement opposition to Bogotá’s scheme to organize a new central government in the vice-regal capital. As the territory succumbed to regional and local fragmentation, it became apparent that there was no central entity powerful enough to unify the existing factions and that there was a profound division among regional elites as to the system of governance they should adopt. Moreover, the leaders of the provinces, preoccupied with local and regional affairs, neglected to organize to defend themselves against royalist forces. Those who chose to remain loyal to the Crown still controlled substantial parts of the country and posed a significant threat to the nascent independent regions.

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During the 1810–1816 period, two dominant regional confederations emerged, each attempting to consolidate its own authority and subjugate the other. Cundinamarca struggled against the provincial coalition of Cartagena, Antioquia, Tunja, Pamplona, and Neiva. By 1811, Bogotá had formed the new state of Cundinamarca and had sought to reassert the city’s authority over much of the former Viceroyalty. Convinced that a federal system would be too weak, Antonio Nariño, the first leader of Cundinamarca, began to consolidate his power in order to establish a centralist government.36 As royalist forces began to threaten the nascent confederations, the government of Cundinamarca declared absolute independence from Ferdinand VII in July 1813. Antioquia took the same steps in August, but Popayan, Panama, and Santa Marta did not. Napoleon’s abdication in April 1814 increased the likelihood that Ferdinand VII would return to power and that Spain would deploy its forces to suppress the creole governments. Apprehensive of this impending threat, the Congress of New Granada, which formerly had been committed to a weak federalist structure, gradually began to exert more centralized authority, particularly over its finances and military operations. The Congress of Granada also sought to incorporate Cundinamarca into a more united system in order to present a cohesive military front against the royalist forces. However, the governor of Cundinamarca refused to cooperate. In December 1814, the forces of the Congress of Granada, under the command of Simon Bolivar, forced Bogotá to accept a general union. Soon after Bolivar’s victory, Spanish forces arrived in Santa Marta from Venezuela, and by July 1815, Cartagena was under siege. After Cartagena had succumbed, Spain’s army regained control of the remaining sovereign territories in New Granada quite rapidly. Spain’s re-conquest was short-lived. In August 1819, Bolivar and his army crossed the Andes and defeated the Spanish forces. Bolivar’s victory changed the course of the independence struggle. After their defeat, Spanish authorities panicked and fled from the vice-regal capital. Using New Granada as his base of operations, Bolivar proceeded to defeat royalist forces in Venezuela, Ecuador and, ultimately, Peru and Bolivia. The First Transformation of the Colombian State and Its Political Regime: 1820–1831 Though significant contingencies of royalist forces remained on the Caribbean coast through 1821, and in southwestern Colombia until 1825, the creole elite, who had constituted the leadership of the rebel forces,

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began the task of constructing an independent republic.37 The Confederation of Gran Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1821. It consisted of the territories of Venezuela and New Granada. Ecuador was incorporated after it was liberated from Spanish control in 1822. In May 1821, delegates from Venezuela and New Granada convened in the town of Rosario de Cucuta to determine the form of government the republic would adopt. At the Congress of Cucuta, they promulgated a charter. The new constitution provided for the strict separation of powers, with a president and vice president each serving four-year terms. The president was granted the power to appoint intendants, as well as the right to retain legal jurisdiction over extensive regions and their subordinate provincial governors. The constitution also stipulated that legislative authority would be held by a bicameral congress and that a judiciary, whose members were to be selected jointly by the executive and the legislature, and would be charged with enforcing the law. Participation in the political process was limited to males who were either married or 21 years of age or older, either owned property worth a 100 pesos or independently exercised a craft or profession, and were literate. Those conditions limited political participation to 10 percent of the free adult male population.38 Notwithstanding the political restrictions, the Congress adopted several broad-minded measures. It enforced a nationwide free-birth principle designed to abolish slavery gradually, and it passed a provision that relieved the remaining indigenous population of any obligation to pay tribute or provide involuntary labor. The intent of these laws was to end the colonial period’s legal distinctions among racial castas through the gradual incorporation of historically marginalized factions of society into the general body of citizens. Despite the adopted measures, the dominant class remained unwilling to consider blacks and natives as their equals.39 Among some of the first legislative acts produced by the Congress of Cucuta were mandates designed to bolster economic growth and development. Many of New Granada’s elites believed that direct access to foreign markets and capital, state involvement in the economy, and participation by local entrepreneurs in external commerce would help generate economic growth and lay the foundation for future prosperity.40 The Congress of Cucuta made Bogotá the capital of the republic, partly because of its central location and partly because of its previous role as the vice-regal capital. The Congress elected Bolivar as president and General Francisco de Paula Santander as vice-president, but it did not decide whether it would tolerate religious diversity.

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Because the constitution proposed by the Congress of Cucuta increased civilian participation in governance, political leaders from relatively highstatus families, often with university education, began to contest the authority that the military held in government. To the emerging civilian elite, it was important to bring the military under the rule of law, as Bolivar’s army constituted a centralizing force that conflicted with their respective localized and regional ambitions.41 The military, on the other hand, asserted that it had claims to authority by virtue of having liberated the country. By 1827, Gran Colombia had been pushed to its breaking point by tensions between various groups: Venezuelans versus New Granadans, the military versus civilian elites, and those who sided with Santander versus those who backed Bolivar. Of no less significance, the collapse of the British bond market imposed on the federation an external debt that was approximately five times its annual revenues. Gran Colombia’s debt had been caused primarily by its heavy borrowing to finance the prolonged wars of independence, by the bankrolling of large governmental and military apparatuses, and by its nearly moribund foreign trade. As a result of the financial crisis of 1825–1826, Gran Colombia’s fiscal problems intensified, subsequently resulting in a crisis of authority. In an attempt to preserve the fragile union and consolidate his authority, Bolivar used the military in 1828 to impose an authoritarian constitution, with himself at the helm. However, shortly after his death two years later, the authoritarian regime was dismantled and the power of the military—the apparatus that had been most loyal to Bolivar—was drastically reduced. By 1831, Santander’s faction had eclipsed the power of Bolivar’s backers, and two rival parties began to form. In the meantime, Venezuela and Ecuador broke away from Gran Colombia and established their own sovereign states. The Second Transformation: 1831–1885 Santander gave the new Republic of New Granada its own constitution. His 1832–1837 tenure as president was defined by conflict between two factions that had opposed Bolivar’s authoritarian rule. One group, typically referred to as the exaltados, opted for permanently excluding from public office those who had sided with Bolivar, whereas moderates advocated their reincorporation into the political arena in order to curtail political tension. Although conflict between the two nascent political groups intensified as time went by,

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ideologically they differed little. The issue that created major tension between the two groups was the role of the Catholic Church in society. Exaltados were determined to break the political power held by the Catholic Church; moderates did not want to address the issue, because they believed that the Church could help maintain social order. The divide between the two groups led to a civil war.42 The war, which lasted from 1840 until 1842, brought about economic devastation and substantial loss of lives.43 Conservatives dominated the political arena until 1849; Liberals ostensibly controlled the political system from the middle of the nineteenth century until the 1880s. During their rule, Liberals reduced the authority of the central government and passed it on to the provincial governments, curtailed the power of the military as well as that of the Catholic Church, and authorized the people of the various regions to elect their own governors.44 This process of decentralization was bolstered by the promulgation of the constitutional reform of 1853, which extended suffrage to all adult males and removed all property and literacy restrictions. Additional constitutional reforms instituted in 1858 and 1863 focused on resolving the question of state sovereignty and transformed New Granada into one of the most federalized systems in the world. The 1863 constitution ambiguously stipulated that the duty of the national executive was to “watch over,” “guard,” or “protect” the general order of the sovereign federated states.45 However, it did not specify ­conditions under which the national government would have the right to intervene in the affairs of the states. Moreover, the nearly absolute sovereignty extended to the states enabled them to establish their own armies. Such measures spawned an era defined by rampant civil wars and violence. Between 1863 and 1885, the country was afflicted by more than 50 insurrections, as well as 42 constitutions, in the 9 states.46 In addition, Liberals implemented economic policies designed to enhance free trade. They based their decisions on the assumptions that an increase in foreign trade and greater external economic integration would yield substantial growth. Federalism and free trade, however, helped bring the country to the brink of economic ruin, destroying its incipient industrial base and impeding national integration.47 National economic stability and integration were partly achieved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries solely because of the coffee boom. Prior to the coffee boom, the first commodity the new leaders focused on was tobacco. Next was Cinchona bark, also a significant export from the 1850s until its decline in the 1880s.48 It was not until 1870, when coffee

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became one of Colombia’s primary export commodities, that the country’s elites began to generate substantial profits.49 Those earnings enhanced the ability of the state to consolidate its power and allowed the government to meet its debt obligations, maintain a large standing army, and claim credit for the country’s economic revival.50 Extreme federalism was abandoned in 1885 after Conservative forces defeated the Liberals’ troops in one of Colombia’s many nineteenth century civil wars that resulted from regional conflicts. In the wake of that war, Conservatives and independent Liberals formed a coalition to promote the creation of a new constitution. The coalition, known as La Regeneracion, 51 led to the formation of a new political organization called the National Party. The promulgation of the Constitution of 1886 marked the end of a quarter century of Liberal party leadership and set the stage for an era of Conservative rule lasting until 1930. The Third Transformation: 1883–1899 The new constitution gave way to a centralized structure in which the president appointed the governors of the departments and elected legislative assemblies replaced sovereign states. The president and senators were elected indirectly for six-year terms, representatives were picked for fouryear terms, and civil rights were subject to restriction. Suffrage for e­ lections of national scope was limited to all literate men over the age of 21. Under the new charter, the government possessed the sole right to import, manufacture, and obtain arms and munitions of war; designated Catholicism as Colombia’s official religion; and empowered civil authorities to enforce respect for the Catholic Church.52 A concordat with the Vatican in 1887 further consolidated the role of the Church. In short, the 1886 alliance led to the promulgation of a constitution that symbolized the triumph of a clear set of principles—centralism, strong institutional authority, and close church-state cooperation.53 The new constitution would remain in place until 1991. In summary, the period from immediately after independence until the end of the nineteenth century was characterized by regional fragmentation, political instability, pervasive violence, economic stagnation, intense partisan socialization of the masses, and institutionalized decentralization. By 1849, the Liberal and Conservative parties had become organized and had advanced different programs. The Liberals were federalists, who advocated free trade, universal suffrage, and religious tolerance. The Conservatives,

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on the other hand, favored a unitary government, protectionist policies, a strong Catholic Church, and limited suffrage.54 Plagued by a multitude of violent civil wars and inter-regional conflicts throughout most of the nineteenth century, the ratification of the 1886 Constitution effectively enabled the Colombian state to consolidate its power and provide relative peace and stability for a significant period. The Fourth Transformation: 1902–1930 The War of the Thousand Days, fought between 1899 and 1902, pitted the Conservatives against the Liberals, and resulted in the loss of Panama. After the conflict, a spirit of interparty collaboration came to characterize political life until the mid-1940s. Under the purview of the Conservative administration, Liberals were permitted some representation in government at the national level. A new system of voting for Congress was introduced, in which two-thirds of the seats within an electoral district were allotted to the party receiving the most votes, while the other third of the seats would go to the losing party. With those electoral reforms, Conservatives hoped to reduce the intensity of Liberal opposition and bring about peace.55 Liberals, for the most part, also rejected violence as a means of promoting their aims or seeking political office. As a result, consociational practices were employed in an attempt to prevent renewed violence. Coalition ­ governments steeped in bipartisan consensus and political demobilization characterized the political landscape between 1910 and 1949.56 A sustained coffee boom that had started in 1870 and lasted until the mid-twentieth century helped engender political constancy. Despite the loss of Panama at the turn of the century, the expansion of the coffee export sector gave life to Colombia’s struggling economy. By the mid1920s, earnings from coffee exports facilitated Colombia’s economic modernization.57 The sustained rise of banana exports, the promising takeoff of oil, and a payment of US$25 million by the United States as an indemnity for the seizure of Panama, also helped attract the interest of lenders in New York.58 By 1929, US investments in Colombia had tripled and reached 6 percent of the Latin American total. Although foreign investment and the US indemnity contributed to Colombia’s economic growth in the 1920s, the income generated by coffee exports was three times higher than the amount of the indemnity and the loans put together.59 As a result, the larger producers, and those who

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processed as well as exported coffee, came to constitute the most dynamic and powerful economic group in Colombia. This group consisted of factions of both Liberals and Conservatives involved in the export trade. Throughout this period, coffee producers in the latifundia—primarily Liberal landowners—competed with the small, predominantly Conservative, family-owned farms established in the western highlands.60 Although the two factions competed with one another, no major conflicts ensued between them, simply because both groups owned land and controlled the means of production. The principal goal of each was to consolidate its political power in order to preserve its economic dominance. With the export income generated from coffee and the sizable presence of foreign loans, the Colombian government developed its transportation industry and established a market for the trade of other consumer goods, and in 1923 it founded a national bank. The creation of the bank made possible the organization of Colombia’s monetary system through the development of a single monetary unit and credit regulation. Improvements in road and rail transportation facilitated coffee exports and strengthened Colombia’s connection with the global economy.61 As income derived from coffee exports grew, wages, profits, and rents also increased, leading to a corresponding rise in disposable income. Increase in consumption followed, generating markets for other goods and services.62 During the first three decades of the twentieth century, there was an exponential expansion of industries associated with the production of nontraditional exports, and an increase in the mining and production of coal, nickel, and oil.63 Nevertheless, while the state had been strengthened during this period of economic change, it remained fragile and underresourced. From very early on, the coffee bourgeoisie controlled its own affairs, remained autonomous from the state apparatus, and invested primarily in regional or local development. Adhering to the economic liberalist theory enforced by prominent capitalist economies—principally the United States, to which Colombia was significantly indebted—the Colombian elites utilized the two-party system to protect their power in their respective regions and keep the state weak.64 The Great Depression slowed the period of industrialization and urbanization, and it forced Colombians to question the free-market policies and political liberalism of the early decades. The election of a moderate Liberal to the presidency in 1930 marked the definitive end to almost 45 years of Conservative hegemony.

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The Fifth Transformation: 1930–1949 The election of Enrique Olaya Herrera engendered the emergence of a “Liberal Republic” that would last until 1946. All four Liberal administrations active during the 1930–1946 period tended to enforce policies that heavily favored unionization, systems of financial controls, deficit spending, and greater executive power within the government. The peaceful constitutional transfer of power between political parties was unprecedented in the history of the nation, and it was made possible by several conditions. First, the political faction called National Concentration 65 included moderates from both parties. Second, internal divisions within the Conservative sphere allowed for a degree of bipartisan support for a moderate president. Third, the Catholic Church also accepted the election result. And fourth, the military, despite its Conservative roots, had acted as the country’s electoral police since 1910.66 With the Liberals now at the head of the government, bringing about significant changes regarding the relations between the state and workers became their primary political objective. Determined to capture the support of a growing urban working class, the government formulated legislation that recognized labor unions and their right to unionize, established the 8-hour workday and the 48-hour working week, and outlined the legal responsibilities of employers. Those measures helped Liberals capture popular support. During the Liberals’ time in power, the state was given a constitutionally guaranteed role in economic development and diversification of exports.67 Legal measures were enacted to protect domestic industry, strengthen credit institutions, and levy a graduated income tax as well as impose taxes on excess profits and patrimony. Tax reforms enabled the state to break away from its exclusive dependence on external trade as the primary source of income, although the powerful coffee elites limited the scope of governmental intervention in economic and social life. In short, though the economic reforms initiated by the state were not designed to actively promote industrialization, they provided conditions under which entrepreneurs could take initiatives.68 Between 1933 and 1938, industry in Colombia grew at an average annual rate of 10.8 percent. Industrialization was accompanied by urbanization and together they gave rise to a cheap and cooperative labor force. Although the government was limited in its ability to participate in the affairs of the industrialized sectors of society, it viewed labor as a “social obligation” and sought to protect it. During this period the number of

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unions, union members, and labor demands increased. Suffrage was extended to all adult males aged 21 years or over by eliminating the literacy requirement established by the 1886 constitution. In 1936, the Liberal, Socialist, and Communist parties dominated an important segment of the unions through the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC).69 With this arrangement, the CTC ostensibly came under the purview of the Liberal party, whose main base of support was the workforce that depended directly or indirectly on the state.70 As a result, union organization, labor rights, and Liberal electoral support became intertwined. Instead of augmenting the strength and autonomy of the unions, the government’s enactment of its labor program had a devastating impact on the workers’ movement. Workers increasingly relied on state intervention to resolve their disputes, and this dependency resulted in the virtual subservience of the unions to the state.71 Issues regarding the peasantry and their access to land also formed part of the Liberal-left platform. Being culturally diverse, geographically dispersed, and employed within various agrarian labor systems, the peasantry, although discontented, were unable to mobilize. In addition, agrarian reforms that guaranteed the provision of public land to individuals working on it went largely unenforced. Eventually, these reforms were altered in a way that strengthened the juridical position of large landowners at the expense of the peasantry. By the second half of the 1930s, the policies implemented by the Liberal governments had engendered factional divisions within the party. Landowners, merchants, industrialists, the Catholic Church, and leaders from both parties openly criticized the policies the government had been implementing. More importantly, by then, powerful private associations of landowners and businessmen had formed guilds 72 that had begun to insert themselves into the political sphere. The guilds augmented the private sector’s ability to monitor and direct state intervention. The proliferation of the associations effectively restricted the autonomy of the state and ensured its commitment to economic liberalism. The 1946 elections represented the second transfer of power between the two parties in the twentieth century. Because of the profound split within the Liberal party between two candidates, the Conservative candidate won the presidential election.73 Politicization, polarization, and violence between Liberals and Conservatives accelerated after the elections. Local violence led to the deaths of some 14,000 people in 1947 alone.74 Moreover, the social and economic changes of the previous two decades had facilitated the emergence of more economically integrated

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and politically mobilized groups. As a result, control over the state became critical for each party, not only for advantages of patronage and regional favoritism but also for economic and political security to procure favorable administrative and judicial decisions.75 From 1946 until 1948, Jorge Elicier Gaitan headed a popular movement that focused on urban growth and inflation. He condemned the Liberal Republic and the oligarchy for “betraying” the nation and called for their demise and the empowerment of historically marginalized groups. His message resonated with a substantial portion of the Colombian electorate and with elements of the middle classes. The assassination of Gaitan in Bogotá in April 9, 1948, led to a massive urban insurrection, dubbed the Bogotazo, that resulted in the destruction of commercial and governmental buildings and churches. Riots spread to other cities.76 By 1949, the Conservative government was on the verge of collapse, as its leaders and members of the Liberal party refused to negotiate in good faith. Following the failure to reach a bipartisan accord, the Liberals withdrew entirely from the upcoming presidential election, which had been moved in an attempt to restore political order, and began impeachment proceedings against President Mariano Ospina. The result was the breakdown of the regime. As a response to the challenge to his authority, Ospina declared a state of siege, closed Congress, banned public meetings, and censored the press. Running unopposed, Laureano Gomez, a Conservative committed to erecting a corporatist state in Colombia along the lines of Franco’s Spain, was elected president in 1949. The Sixth Transformation: 1949–1953 Gomez’s tenure in office is referred to as La Violencia. Primarily a rural phenomenon, La Violencia, which lasted from 1949 until 1953, was characterized first by terror and then by resistance. Under the Gomez regime, the government resorted to overt terrorist acts, primarily organized by local political bosses and landowners. Those groups supported the government and its crusade against communism and liberalism in the wake of the destruction caused by the Bogotazo.77 In addition, the government tightened censorship, increased repression against labor, and intensified violence against Liberals and Protestants—sometimes with the cooperation of the local clergy. Though Gomez’s repressive policies claimed the lives of an estimated 145,000 people, the country also experienced healthy economic growth as export crops reached the ports and urban industrial areas were relatively unaffected.78

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As the reign of terror against the Liberal peasantry progressed, many guerrilla groups formed to resist the state-sponsored persecution. Openly confronting government forces, the guerrilla groups were primarily composed of a militarized peasant class and communists. Clashes between the guerrillas and the military significantly augmented the level of violence in the countryside. By 1953, virtually all factions of both parties supported Gomez’s removal. Opting to find a way to facilitate an end to the violence, leaders from both parties supported a military coup and installed the commander in chief of the army, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, as president. The Seventh Transformation: 1953–1974 Rule by the military was expected to be a transitional phase, until the rule of law could be restored. It soon became clear that Rojas intended to prolong his stay at the helm of the government. By 1957, Rojas had built his own popularly based political movement.79 Aware of Rojas’s power play, many prominent Liberal and Conservative leaders negotiated an agreement. The pact called for the establishment of a consociational arrangement in which the two traditional parties would alternate power every four years for a minimum period of 16 years.80 A “civic front” was also formed to oppose Rojas and his administration. The front included the Church, trade associations, labor unions, banks, and other institutions that actively pressured Rojas to resign in favor of a military junta. Finally, in 1958, the junta held a plebiscite that resulted in the ratification of the party pact and the establishment of the National Front. Founded on the tenets of parity of power and presidential alternation, the National Front attempted to synthesize the ideas of Liberals and neoconservatives to bring an end to resurgent, party-based violence. The National Front was a political arrangement steeped in the concept of consociationalism, in which national power was to be divided equally between the two parties in order to foster a period of political stability.81 Because both sides feared that members of the left would jeopardize the alternation of political power from Liberals to Conservatives, they agreed to exclude third parties from direct participation in the political system. The pact allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism as the primary method of interaction between elected officials and civilians.82 The arrangement also made it easier for private-sector interests to block reforms that could have given the state the opportunity to broaden social welfare services. As a result, the state limited the creation and implementation of policies

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designed to reduce inequality.83 Of no less significance, between 1958 and 1972, the National Front increased substantially the authority of the president.84 From the 1960s until the 1980s, Colombia underwent massive economic, social, and demographic changes. During that period, the size of the population increased by approximately 13.5 million and became concentrated mostly in Bogotá, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla.85 Between 1973 and 1985, younger workers, who had finally had greater access to educational facilities previously accessible only to workers in the formal sector of the economy, entered the labor market in large numbers. By 1988, 72 out of every 100 people looking for work in the four aforementioned cities were under 30 years of age. Of that group, 70 percent had at least some secondary education. The growth of the informal sector, which covered a wide range of both legal and illegal activities, occurred primarily within the peripheries of cities. This development led to record levels of migration from rural to urban centers.86 By 1980, 64 percent of Colombia’s total population was urban, whereas in 1960 only 48 percent of the population had lived in cities. Because of this drastic population shift toward urban centers, Colombia rapidly became “a nation of cities,” and agriculture ceased to be the principal source of economic growth. As the urban labor force expanded, the demand for food to sustain its members, as well as the need to generate export earnings for industrial expansion, facilitated the proliferation of large-scale commercial farms. During the 1960s and 1970s, the traditional latifundia were transformed into highly mechanized modern enterprises. This transformation significantly disadvantaged the rural peasantry. Pushed off the land to accommodate the commercial farms, the rural peasantry responded with demonstrations, which in turn prompted extensive debates regarding agrarian reform and rural modernization. In an attempt to address the unrest, the first two National Front administrations enacted agrarian reforms. Led by the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), the reforms were designed, among other guarantees, to eliminate and prevent the inequitable concentration of land, give small tenants and sharecroppers greater guarantees of security of tenure and ownership, and elevate the standard of living of the rural population. This program was in part financed by the Alliance for Progress program of the United States.87 In conjunction with the growing pains associated with industrialization, coffee exports stagnated from around 1940 to 1975, and economic growth that had been largely dependent on coffee earnings slowed down

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significantly. The slowdown was caused by these factors: the fluctuation of world prices in a period of free, or only partly regulated, markets (1948– 1963); competition from emerging producers in Africa; restrictions imposed by international coffee accords; and the deterioration and destruction of coffee farms during La Violencia in key production areas.88 The reduction in coffee exports led to a fall in real wages, which in turn generated a wave of labor agitation between 1957 and 1966. Attempting to address the drop in real wages as well as the decline in the power of the labor movement, the government enacted Decree-Law 444 in 1967. The enactment of the decree marked the start of a growth strategy based on dependent development, with an emphasis on export diversification. Instead of promoting either coffee exports or import-substitution industrialization, which had reached its limits due to the stagnation of intermediary goods and capital-goods sectors, Colombia decided to rely on export diversification to generate development.89 Minor exports, such as bananas, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and gold grew rapidly, and by 1974, the totality of those goods had become more important than coffee. The new set of exports, along with coffee earnings, brought about higher levels of foreign exchange and allowed for the purchase of consumer, capital, and intermediate goods.90 Moreover, Decree-Law 444 established a “crawling peg” exchange rate that sharply reduced political conflicts over devaluation and provided the means for a partial reorientation of the economy from an import-substitution model to one of export promotion.91 Although the new reforms helped the overall state of Colombia’s economy, they did little to rectify real wages or decrease economic inequality. During this period, a number of factors—the physical expansion of cities, the proliferation of regionally based labor actions, a growing division between elite interests and popular interests, and self-censorship within the media—reduced the urban population’s exposure to, and the interest in, the troubles emerging in the rural areas. As the government increasingly ignored the demands of the various labor movements, discontent intensified. Close to the end of the 1960s, General Rojas created the Popular National Alliance (ANAPO)92 and ran for president on a platform of “socialism on Christian bases in the Colombian manner.” It called for free education, free medical and dental service for the poor, bank credit for small entrepreneurs, the unification of the labor federations, a new plan for housing for the poor, and an exchange-rate system that pegged the peso to the dollar. Supported by urban and rural workers, as well as by politicians who

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had become disenchanted with the National Front, ANAPO’s rapid growth signified the erosion of the consociational coalition’s popular support.93 In sum, the National Front  was a political and economic system designed to protect the interests of the elites at the expense of the rest of the country. By limiting political participation, bolstering the powers of the executive at the expense of the judicial and legislative bodies, allowing unfair and predetermined elections, and advancing economic inequality, the National Front substantially inhibited the development of a democratic regime. According to Harvey F. Kline, 16 years of coalition government generated a wide range of negative effects. They: 1. Narrowed the political space available for individuals unaffiliated with either the Liberal or the Conservative parties; 2. Failed to resolve many of the economic problems associated with underdevelopment; 3. Enabled the continuation of violence in the countryside; 4. Made it harder for the poor to earn decent wages by limiting their access to resources; 5. Empowered a relatively small group of political and economic leaders to live lavishly in the cities; 6. Established a government that was less able than before to enforce laws; and 7. Engendered, indirectly, the development of a weak and politically divided labor movement, in which a majority of the urban and rural poor were not well organized94 During the National Front period, voter participation in national elections steadily decreased, popular confidence in the ability of the government to provide for the Colombian people waned, the central role played by the parties in the country’s political life declined, and a new generation of provincial politicians started to emerge. The result was the proliferation of non-electoral opposition—namely civil protest movements and labor confederations independent of the two parties.95 The Eighth Transformation: 1974–1990 The end of the National Front era in 1974 generated a sense of optimism, as an administration dedicated to “Closing the Gap”—a phrase alluding to an agenda that prioritized addressing poverty and attacking inequality—was

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elected into office. However, an unanticipated influx of foreign currencies, generated by a boom in coffee prices and the rapid expansion of illegal drug exports, subjected the economy to intense inflationary pressure and made monetary control the primary concern of economic policy. Consequently, plans to “close the gap” were delayed or cancelled.96 Leftist guerilla revolutionary movements such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) intensified their activities.97 With roots in the labor movements of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the guerilla movements drew on the support of an increasingly disgruntled peasantry, marginalized lower classes, and disenchanted middle-class groups, all of whom perceived the political elites to be corrupt and unfit to govern. In the late 1970s, the government expanded greatly the power and authority of the military. Soon afterward, accusations of human rights violations by the armed forces proliferated. Right-wing death squads appeared, many with military ties, and in some rural areas large landowners resorted to violence to acquire land from the peasantry.98 After ­contending with decades of fighting, lack of oversight, and the existence of weak state institutions, the military gradually disassociated itself from the two parties and became a more coherent institutional force.99 In addition, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the expanding influence of drug cartels challenged the regime further through violent confrontations, bribery, and corruption. Both the cartels and the military were charged with colluding with right-wing paramilitary groups, whose primary targets were leftist guerilla organizations such as the M-19, FARC, and the ELN. In the 1980s, the government launched a series of policies aimed to reduce government inefficiency, bolster production and economic growth, augment the competitiveness of domestic industries, and reduce poverty and inequality through the establishment of free markets. This period, which is often referred to as the “lost decade,” was also a time in which much of the developing world, and especially Latin America, endured major debt crises that led to a global recession. President Belisario Betancur, who was elected in 1982, tried to eliminate the government deficit via reductions in public expenditures and the gradual devaluation of its then-overvalued peso. The end result was that the poor disproportionately bore the burden of stabilization, as state employees were dismissed and state funding for social programs was significantly curtailed. The Betancur administration also changed its anti-guerrilla tactics. Instead of supporting a campaign of unconditional eradication, the government

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favored political accommodation and negotiated peace with the country’s major guerilla groups. The peace process achieved some early successes with the passing of an amnesty law in 1982 and agreements with the FARC, M-19, and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). However, by the end of the Betancur administration in 1986, most of the guerrilla groups remained active.100 Although during his presidency Betancur accomplished little with regard to political reform, he reached an agreement with the Colombian Congress to amend the constitution so that beginning in 1988 mayors would be chosen by popular elections. This reform was supplemented by various fiscal measures aimed at increasing the flow of resources to the departmental and municipal sectors. The enactments led to an increase in political participation. The Ninth Transformation: 1990–Present The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by two efforts of the political elites: ending the tradition of coalition government and establishing a single-party government with the presence of opposition parties. The government-opposition scheme proved to be problematic, since a legitimate opposition party did not exist. Aside from the Liberal and Conservative parties, which after decades of coalition rule were ideologically and politically similar and sought power by means of broker clientelism, the Patriotic Union (UP)101 was the only other major alternative. The UP, composed of former members of the FARC, the Communist Party, and other leftist activists, advocated social change through participation in the political process. However, many critics perceived the UP to be a political extension of the FARC.102 Thus, in the eyes of a substantial portion of the Colombian electorate, the political system remained devoid of a legitimate opposition party. Factionalization and personalistic tensions left both traditional political parties disorganized and in disarray. The absence of more-disciplined and better-organized political parties with distinct programs, as well as the lack of protection for opposition politicians, greatly undermined the legitimacy of the political system. Moreover, the proposition to establish a government-opposition regime was ultimately rejected by Congress. To make matters worse, the expansion of drug trafficking and the rapid growth of drug cartels drastically increased violence throughout the nation. Several prominent Colombian political figures were assassinated, prompting a massive state crackdown of the cartels. The Medellin cartel issued its own

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declaration of war and initiated a campaign of terror designed to destabilize the Colombian state and intimidate the regime.103 Intense internal conflict, combined with the profound reluctance on the part of both political parties to transform the political regime, gave rise to a broad-based student movement that demanded constitutional reform by means of a popularly elected National Constituent Assembly outside the bounds of Congress.104 The National Constituent Assembly, supported by a plebiscite, took place in 1990 as a new administration took office. The composition of this assembly varied, with the two traditional parties controlling less than half its seats. Analysts have attributed the surprisingly low voter turnout to the fact that most legislators chose not to run for a seat in the assembly and thus did not activate their broker clientele networks. Nevertheless, with the traditional two parties together holding a minority stake in the constituent assembly, the coalition that came to dominate was composed of Liberals close to the president, members of the National Salvation Movement (MSN)105, and the representatives of the Democratic Alliance M-19 (AD M-19).106 The new constitution removed all remnants of coalition governance and instituted electoral, participatory, and institutional reforms. In the electoral sphere, the constitution implemented popular elections of departmental governors and the vice-president, established a runoff system for presidential elections, called for the official distribution of electoral ballots, and enforced the provision of special seats for the election of indigenous and black representatives. To bolster participation, the new constitution called for the implementation of a recall vote for governors and mayors, a mechanism for “popular consultation” at all levels of government, referendums to repeal national laws or amend the constitution, and the right to organize and participate in political parties and movements. In addition, the constitution reduced presidential power; weakened veto power; placed limits on “extraordinary powers” to issue legal norms; curtailed state-of-siege emergency powers; significantly transformed the judicial branch to counter chronic problems of weakness, corruption and lack of resources; introduced an extensive bill of citizen rights, as well as a variety of judicial mechanisms that citizens can employ to protect these rights; and strengthened political and legislative powers of Congress.107 Despite the promulgation of a markedly liberal constitution, the state remained unable to end the political violence ravaging the nation throughout the 1990s. At the same time, criminal violence became almost uncontrollable, and bribery and corruption continued to characterize Colombian politics as politicians at all levels were forced to either confront or acquiesce to narco-traffickers.108 The presumed collusion with the Cali cartel

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severely undermined the legitimacy of the Ernesto Samper regime (1994– 1998). The de-legitimization of the president’s authority, in turn, complicated efforts to consolidate the country’s democratic transformation.109 Under mounting pressure from Washington to crack down on the drug trade, which by the late 1980s had become a major domestic industry, the Samper administration strengthened penalties for drug trafficking and reformed the 1991 constitution to allow for the extradition of Colombian citizens to stand trial abroad. Nevertheless, the alleged association with the Cali cartel and the accompanying loss of credibility hindered Samper’s capacity to address the internal armed conflict. By then, both left-wing guerrilla movements and right-wing paramilitary organizations had expanded significantly, mostly because of their increased financial dependency on the drug trade.110 The Colombian and US governments initiated the Plan Colombia in 2000  in an attempt to eradicate illicit crops bilaterally; negotiate settlements with the guerilla movements; revive the stagnant Colombian economy; and provide aid for judicial institutions, human rights, and alternative development.111 Once adopted, Plan Colombia became a means for the United States to supply the Colombian government with military and police assistance. Between 2000 and 2010, Washington provided $7.3 billion in aid to Colombia, making it the largest recipient of US aid outside the Middle East and Afghanistan.112 Under this plan, the Alvaro Uribe Administration (2002–2010) strengthened the state security forces and deployed them aggressively against the FARC and ELN guerillas. By 2010, Uribe’s aggressive tactics had produced significant results. Most indicators of violence, including kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and massacres, showed considerable decline. While in recent years the number of paramilitary groups operating within Colombia has surged, lengthy negotiations with the FARC produced a historic ceasefire in 2016. This ceasefire marked the end of 50  years of internal armed conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government. In late November 2016, the Colombian Congress approved a revised peace accord. Analysis of the Transformations Experienced by the Colombian State and Its Political Regime Access to great riches throughout a fairly large territory with a rugged topography induced New Granada’s colonial economic elites to protect their power and authority within the regions they controlled after the attainment

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of independence. Cognizant that it would be nearly impossible to convince regional leaders to relinquish much of their power in order to create a state in which power and authority would be heavily concentrated, the leaders of the independence movement agreed to form a confederation. Regional divisions brought about the dissolution of the confederation in 1830, followed by a substantial reduction in the size of Colombia’s national armed forces. This reduction, along with the refusal of regional leaders to surrender to a central government the power and authority they inherited from the colonial period, led to the formation of regional militias. The presence of regional leaders backed by militias provoked violent and highly polarizing civil wars.113 The materialization of highly polarizing civil wars delayed the development of a national consciousness and political consensus.114 A weak Colombian military, intense regionalism, deep contradictory views as to the role the Catholic Church should play in the newly created state, and differences as to whether or not the power of the state should be centralized, led to the formation of a highly divided two-party system. The absence of stable military rule for extended periods enabled the Liberal and Conservative parties to intermittently act as the state. Economic stagnation and institutional decentralization worsened the divide between the political parties. The coffee boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the corresponding infusion of foreign capital helped Colombia’s elites establish a national bank, enlarge the transportation industry, and assist in the development of domestic industries for consumer goods. Economic progress did not prevent the eruption of a highly destructive civil war between the two competing political parties toward the end of the nineteenth century. The decision as to whether or not Catholicism would be Colombia’s single religion induced deep animosity between political leaders and extensive polarization among the masses. The religious conflict, along with disagreements over the structure and capacities of the state, were the main causes of Colombia’s major civil wars. Though the Thousand Days’ War did not resolve the differences between the two conflicting parties, it strengthened the power of the armed forces and the Catholic Church, and helped the oligarchy consolidate its own economic and political power. The evolution of Colombia’s state and political system after the Thousand Days’ War can be encapsulated as follows. The economic growth of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s gave rise to new economic and social classes but did not spawn new political parties. The assimilation of the emerging economic and social classes into the ranks of the two competing

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political parties intensified the tension between them. The increase in tension led to a lengthy period of violence. The agreement between leaders of the two political parties—to alternate the presidency, share other governmental positions equally, and exclude members of fringe parties—lessened the violence and helped them retain their power. The accord provoked internal disorder within each party, strengthened clientelism, and activated the rapid growth of anti-government guerrilla movements. The rapid growth of guerrilla movements led to an increase in the power and authority of the armed forces and to the creation of p ­ aramilitary forces. The growth in the number of rival martial entities and the advent of drug cartels led to a major increase in the level of violence. The incessant intense violence and deep public dissatisfaction with the two-party arrangement compelled the leaders to establish a more open political structure in order to create a democratic system. In sum, Colombia’s unsteady democratic political system is the product of a slow evolutionary process that began during the colonial period. After the wars of independence had come to an end, the creation of the state during the nineteenth century was obstructed by two political groups that differed on whether the power of the state should be centralized or diversified and on whether the Catholic Church should play a central role within the state. The creation of the state was also obstructed by the presence of a weak national armed force and by the emergence of rival regional militias. The same two parties engaged in a very costly war at the turn of the century—a conflict that neither resolved their differences nor defused the political tensions that had divided the nation. After the war, both parties continued to behave for a significant portion of the twentieth century as if they were the state. The war, however, helped solidify the power of the oligarchy, the national armed forces, and the Catholic Church. The sheer dominance of the two political parties and their determination to prevent the development of a political system in which multiple parties would be allowed to compete, even after new economic and social classes had emerged, helped instigate the rise of guerrilla movements. Their rapid spread compelled the government to strengthen further the power of the military and authorize the creation of paramilitary forces. Eventually, the resulting intense violence and corruption forced the two parties to replace their party system with a democratic one. Whether Colombia’s political system will remain democratic depends greatly on the state’s ability to ensure the rule of law and protect civil rights and liberties, strengthen and widen the political party system, diminish corruption

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swiftly and measurably, provide a voice to those who have traditionally been excluded from the political process, and share the economic pie more widely.

Venezuela Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times Though smaller than Colombia, Venezuela also has distinctive physiography, climate, culture, populations, and economies.115 Venezuela’s landscape is dominated by the Andean mountain ranges in the west and Lake Maracaibo in the northwest; highlands in the east that give way to another mountain range that runs parallel to the coast until it is broken up by the Orinoco Delta in the northeast; large expanses of plains located east and south of the Andes and south of the Central Coastal Range; and the Guyana highlands—an area defined by low mountains, rich grasslands, and extensive tropical forests.116 Before the colonial period, the indigenous peoples of Venezuela had created political, economic, and social systems that differed significantly from the empires of the Incas or the Aztecs. Instead of forming hierarchical and centralized empires, the native inhabitants of Venezuela grouped themselves in the form of chiefdoms and resided primarily in the northern part of the Orinoco River. Most of the larger groups had an elaborate political structure, with a primary chieftain and lesser chieftains presiding over a class of nobles, distinguished warriors, and wealthy men whose status seems to have been hereditary. Occupying the lowest socioeconomic status were slaves, who consisted of captive children.117 Enclaves of tropical-forest farmers occupied some of the lowlands adjoining Lake Maracaibo, while nomadic hunters and gatherers lived along the Orinoco River, on the southern borders of the chiefdoms.118 In western Venezuela, members of the chiefdoms cultivated manioc, maize, and sweet potatoes, while in the east they grew almost exclusively bitter manioc. When harvests were poor, they relied on their rich game resources. Trade was considerable. They bartered gold for pearls obtained from the distant coastal region. The Spaniards arrived in present-day Venezuela around 1500. They first attempted to extract wealth by forcing its natives to dive and retrieve pearls from the waters near the Island of Margarita off the northeastern coast. Once the pearl beds had been exhausted, the absence of large min-

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eral deposits compelled many settlers to move westward. Upon discovering gold in Yaracuy—located in Venezuela’s northwestern region—the Spaniards attempted to use the indigenous population as a cheap source of labor. However, as in other colonial regions, most of the native population declined rapidly, being victims of foreign diseases and mistreatment. Those who survived were enslaved or entrusted by the Crown to the missionaries.119 To augment their dwindling labor force, the colonizers started to import African slaves.120 However, because imported slave labor was costly, Venezuela quickly lapsed into the periphery of the Spanish Empire.121 Viewed as a quiet and unimportant backwater of the empire, the Spanish Crown rented Venezuela to the German commercial banking firm of Welser in 1521. Twenty-five years later, the commercial banking firm deemed Venezuela unprofitable. Those who did not leave engaged in agriculture or in ranching. In Venezuela’s northern region, they cultivated tobacco, indigo, cotton, coffee, wheat, and sugar cane. In the southwestern llanos, they raised cattle. Cattle ranchers sold the meat from the herds to the local market, and the hides to both domestic and international markets.122 Labor for the ranches and agricultural activities was supported through the use of the encomienda system, and later through the use of imported slaves. Since encomiendas typically occupied large swaths of land, wealth was highly concentrated in the hands of a few encomenderos. Cacao became the colony’s most important crop and principle export. By the end of the eighteenth century, its production dominated the domestic economy and accounted for almost all of the colony’s export earnings. Its effects on Venezuela’s colonial society were substantial. Because it generated sizable profits, it attracted significant numbers of Spaniards, including relatively poor Canarians. Moreover, because there was little indigenous labor available, the crop’s cultivation stimulated an increase in demand for African slaves during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In time, those who owned the means of production came to constitute the ruling class, and to occupy the highest stratum of colonial society. The members of this group were subsequently divided into two factions—the peninsulares, who were associated with Spanish colonial rule, and the mantuanos, who were the American-born progeny of the Spanish colonizers. White Canarians, who typically worked as wage laborers, followed them in status. Next came a large group of racially mixed pardos. As white Canarians, African slaves, and the natives worked closely with one another, either on plantations or small landholdings, miscegenation ensued. By the start of

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the nineteenth century, pardos constituted more than half of Venezuela’s total population, African slaves represented about 20 percent, while Amerindians had been reduced to less than 10 percent.123 The last two groups were relegated to the lowest position in Venezuela’s colonial society. By the mid-seventeenth century, Venezuela had been incorporated into New Granada. Because it occupied a rather marginal position in the empire, its people retained considerable political autonomy.124 Communication and commerce flowed relatively freely between Venezuela’s three primary regions. The northern region, with its access to the Caribbean Sea, became an important hub of commerce for most of Venezuela’s imports and exports, such as cacao, wheat, and tobacco. The southern and eastern regions, albeit not as important, supplied crucial linkages to the rest of New Granada and access to both the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. Those regions, because they relied primarily on the breeding of cattle and production of related commodities such as hides and other livestock items, generally augmented the flow of trade.125 Moreover, the profits obtained from the triangular trade— African slaves for Venezuelan cacao, which was then shipped across the Caribbean and sold primarily in Veracruz for consumption in New Spain—made the Venezuelan coast a frequent port of call for Dutch and British merchants.126 In the eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown, determined to crack down on the contraband flowing through the Caribbean and to increase its own profits, implemented a series of measures. From 1728 to 1793, these statutes were used to not only suppress contraband trade but also defend the Venezuelan coast, stimulate the regional production of cacao, provide slaves to the colony, and gradually centralize fiscal and administrative authority under an Audiencia based in Caracas.127 Despite the implementation of the aforementioned measures, Venezuela’s society remained divided along the self-reinforcing cleavages of wealth, ethnicity, and locality. In the top rank were members of the white elites. They included high-ranking Spanish officials, landowners and ranchers, and a few wealthy merchants and professionals, most of whom resided in Caracas. Pardo agriculturalists, day laborers, artisans, and slaves, all of whom lived predominantly in the surrounding provinces, jointly constituted the lower strata of Venezuelan society. Members of the latter groups enjoyed relative political autonomy, controlled their respective channels of commerce, and were disinclined to submit to the dictates of Caracas’s emergent elites.128

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Venezuela’s Struggle for Independence When Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII were forced to surrender the throne to Napoleon, Spanish authority throughout Venezuela came under intense scrutiny. The Caracas Cabildo, which was composed primarily of creole leaders, pledged its allegiance to the royal Spanish Junta. This decision, however, did not deter some creoles from questioning the political legitimacy of the hastily formulated Spanish Junta. In April 1810, the Caracas Cabildo ousted its governor, the intendant, several Audiencia justices, and members of the military. Shortly thereafter, a group of creole leaders formed their own Junta, repudiated the authority of the Council of Regency in Spain, and governed in the name of the deposed Ferdinand VII. The Cabildos of Coro, Maracaibo, and Guayana refused to join the rebellious group in Caracas and vowed to remain loyal to Spain.129 On July 5, 1811, a Congress convoked by the Junta in Caracas declared Venezuela’s independence from Spain. Despite the absence of a unified central authority, the Congress drafted a constitution near the end of the same year. Though the action marked the official beginning of Venezuela’s First Republic, the new state lasted barely six months. By July 1812, royalist forces had defeated the national forces led by Simon Bolivar, captured the leader of the new republic, Francisco Miranda, and reinstituted the colonial government. Once in power, the royalist government instituted an oppressive military regime that rekindled creole resentment toward the centralized, colonial system of authority.130 Determined not to repeat their earlier mistakes, the rebels launched from the periphery a new strategy of military campaigns in order to regain control over Caracas. With the support of an eastern front as well as aid from a second front from New Granada, Bolivar re-captured the city a year later. As a member of the caraqueño creole elites, Bolivar had hoped to preserve the original class system. In 1813, after the initial Royalist triumph over the forces of the nascent Republic, Bolivar wrote that a “revolution of blacks, free and slave, broke out in the eastern coastal valleys, provoked, supplied, and supported by agents of Monteverde. These inhuman and vile people, feeding upon the blood and property of the patriots … committed the most horrible assassinations, thefts, assaults and devastation.”131 A year later, he supported a policy that ordered the capture of escaped slaves to safeguard the supply of labor. By publicly voicing his intention to keep blacks politically, economically, and socially subjugated, Bolivar compelled them, regardless of whether they were freedmen, slaves, or fugitive slaves, to offer their

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services to royalist forces. The royalists, with a force of 10,000 to 12,000 troops, only 160 of whom were Spaniards, began to terrorize those in the plains and eventually marched into Caracas in July 1814, where they defeated Bolivar’s forces and restored Venezuela to the Spanish Crown.132 After he was forced to leave Caracas, Bolivar recognized that if he hoped to defeat the royalist forces and free Venezuela, he would have to revert his earlier decision to restrict blacks to the lower strata of society. Moreover, the initial loss informed Bolivar that while control of Venezuela’s political and economic center was critical, dominance over the hinterland was also very important.133 Upon his return to Venezuela in 1816, Bolivar secured support from the llaneros—namely Jose Antonio Paez, and promised to abolish slavery if newly freed slaves aided in the effort for independence from Spanish Colonial rule.134 By 1819, the Venezuelan army had gained substantial momentum. That same year, the Congress of Angostura established the Third Republic and appointed Bolivar as its first president. Bolivar and his army then quickly marched across the llanos and into the Andes and liberated Caracas in June 1821. The First Transformation of the Venezuelan State and Its Political Regime: 1821–1830 Two months later, delegates from Venezuela and Colombia met to sign the Constitution of the Republic of Gran Colombia, name Bolivar as provisional president of Gran Colombia and Francisco de Paula Santander as vice-president and place the capital of the republic in Bogotá.135 The Republic of Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1819. It consisted of the territories of Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador, which was incorporated only after it was liberated from Spanish control in 1822. In addition, the Congress adopted a centralized system of government. While Bolivar continued the fight for the liberation of Spanish America, tensions between various factions of the new republic intensified. Members of the caraqueño military and civilian elites came to resent being governed by Bogota’s leaders. In 1826, the tensions culminated in a separatist movement led by Antonio Paez, who called for the creation of an independent Venezuela. Unable to defuse the separatist movement and quell the strains that had developed between rivaling factions, Gran Colombia disintegrated. Paez took advantage of the existing discontent to seize power in 1830, break away from Gran Colombia, and declare Venezuela’s independence.136

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The Second Transformation: 1830–1858 For the next several years, Paez presided over a prosperous Venezuelan economy that was sustained by its principal source of revenue—coffee, which was in high demand throughout Europe.137 Despite the initial rapid economic growth, the possibility of continuous economic development was undermined by several problems: the staggering external debt Venezuela had accumulated during the wars of independence, the uncertainty as to whether properties would remain in the hands of those who had controlled them prior to independence, and the competition from cheap manufactured imports.138 The increase in public expenditure from five million bolivars to 18 million bolivars, along with the inherited debts and lack of an effective tax system, undercut the fiscal viability of the central government. By 1839, the external debt had grown to ten times the value of exports, while servicing it absorbed 40 percent of public expenditures. Matters were not made easier by Paez’s decision to use 50 percent of the state budget to build a strong central army in order to prevent attempts by local caudillos to usurp his power. Venezuela’s economic elites were reluctant to become less dependent on revenues generated by coffee exports. Their resistance made the country’s economy highly vulnerable to the volatility of commodity markets. When foreign demands for Venezuelan goods contracted in the 1840s, peasants and landowners were driven further into debt. Merchants and financiers in the cities, in turn, moved aggressively to recover the balance of the loans by forcing the affected parties to sell the assets they had used as collateral.139 As a result, a lasting political division amongst two elite factions began to emerge.140 In one camp were the Conservatives, composed primarily of merchants, creditors, and agents of foreign commerce. Opposing them were the Liberals—a group of largely indebted coffee planters and rival caudillos who feared the economic power of the established commercial and financial elites, and who advocated a more decentralized state, the expansion of suffrage, freedom of the press, and limits on the power of the Church. In 1847, Paez selected Jose Tadeo Monagas to become Venezuela’s next president. After assuming the presidency, Monagas gravitated toward the Liberal party. After Monagas had approved a series of debt-relief laws and granted protection against foreclosures to shield landowners, Paez tried to overthrow him. But by then, Paez had lost much of his political power, and Monagas exiled him. Determined to solidify his power, Monagas and his brother, Jose Gregorio, enacted a series of land and labor

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reforms. Such measures did not protect them and Venezuela from the 1857–1858 global economic crisis. As prices fell—leather by 30 percent, coffee by 20 percent, and cacao by 50 percent—Conservative and Liberal caudillos used the growing discontent in the countryside to drive the ruling Monagas family from power.141 The Third Transformation: 1858–1899 The period between 1858 and 1863 is referred to as the Federal Wars. The wars, generated by an intense ideological division between those who advocated the creation of a federalist system and those who called for the establishment of a unitary order, claimed the lives of approximately 5 percent of the population.142 The wars ended in 1863 when General Juan C.  Falcon and his adviser, Antonio Guzman Blanco, gained control of Caracas.143 Guzman replaced Falcon in 1868. Determined to achieve “eternal peace,” strengthen the Venezuelan economy, and build the country’s essential infrastructure, Guzman expanded coffee production, augmented the availability of foreign loans, established new contracts with foreign companies, and amassed a large federal army to address potential sources of dissent.144 In addition, his administration rebuilt Caracas, developed a modern governmental bureaucracy with the capacity for inter-regional communication and transportation, and pushed for the approval of a constitution that reduced the number of states from 20 to 9 in 1881.145 The last measure reduced the number of caudillos involved in government, thus making it substantially easier to exercise total control over the territory. Despite 18  years of expensive foreign-financed projects, the income derived from export earnings did not increase, while the country’s foreign and domestic debt did.146 In 1899 Cipriano Castro, with the backing of his protégé, Juan Vicente Gomez, exploited the crisis to assume the presidency. Castro remained in power until 1908, when Gomez, with US support, mounted a military coup and replaced him. The Third Transformation: 1899–1930 Gomez organized the first national army, built up a highly centralized bureaucracy, and established a government monopoly in the fiscal arena.147 In power for 27 years—not always as president but always as the leading figure—he deployed his well-trained and well-armed troops to defeat

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regional caudillos and establish himself as the nation’s single, dominant strongman.148 Oil production and its export greatly aided his efforts to solidify his power and recreate the Venezuelan state. By 1909, Gomez had granted concessions to foreign companies for the right to explore large swaths of territory for oil. He awarded a representative of a British company control over 27  million hectares—a little less than one-third of the national territory.149 After the end of the First World War, US corporations moved to compete for oil concessions. Aware of the potential profits to be made, the Venezuelan government drafted in 1918 an oil law that raised royalties to 15 percent and reduced the number of new concessions. Warned by the US companies that they would not invest under such terms, Gomez acquiesced. Four years later, the Venezuelan Congress gave Gomez sole legal authority to extend concessions, set royalties at 10 percent, confer titles for forty years, and grant customs exemptions for industry-related imports.150 Later that same year, Shell’s oil drillers struck the country’s first enormous gusher.151 The petroleum industry transformed the Venezuelan state.152 From 1922 to 1945, Venezuela became the world’s first great exporter of petroleum and the world’s second producer, after the United States.153 Between 1921 and 1925, Venezuela’s petroleum exports rose from a value of 5.26 million bolivars to 259.15 million bolivars, and by 1936 oil earnings reached 676.77 million bolivars, more than 21 times greater than coffee earnings.154 With the country’s petroleum revenues Gomez paid off the national debt by 1930, financed the construction of an extensive new highway system and other public works, provided subsidies to Venezuela’s constituent states during the economic depression, supported the expansion of the armed forces, and enlarged the benefits extended to himself, governmental employees, and political allies.155 Oil expansion, however, crippled Venezuela’s agriculture as workers abandoned their jobs to become part of the nascent petroleum industry. As peasants left the countryside for new opportunities in oil camps and cities, and as rural elites sold their valuable land to oil companies, a new working class and a small mercantile middle class emerged.156 With the agrarian portion of the export sector nearly destroyed, the new socioeconomic classes became increasingly dependent on the investment decisions of the foreign oil companies. The rise in imports and the appreciation of the value of the bolivar against the dollar led to an overvalued exchange rate, which increased imports and inflation further and resulted in a decline in real wages. What is more, since oil production is a capital-intensive

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industry and does not require a large labor force, the initial expansion of the industry did not necessarily lead to an increase in employment. As noted by Alberto Adriani, a Venezuelan politician who served in the cabinet of Gomez’s successor, the oil industry is, “a foreign, provincial enclave within the national economy… [that] exercises a relatively insignificant influence over the prosperity of our people.”157 In sum, for Venezuela to become a modern state it had to fulfill three conditions. First, the state’s territorial divisions had to be formally coordinated through a centralized administrative apparatus. Second, the state apparatus had to be autonomous and able to enforce its authority throughout its territory. And third, the state had to mobilize and integrate the polity into a national political life.158 By the third decade of the twentieth century, Venezuela had fulfilled the first condition and part of the second, but not the third. The Fourth Transformation: 1930–1948 The new social groups and forces created by the rise of the petroleum industry had little connection to older elites or to past social and political structures. As such, these new groups were effectively marginalized by the oligarchic political system created by Gomez, and therefore could not find legitimate avenues of organizational expression and reliable allies within the regime to represent their interests. In addition, since agrarian elites had lost their base of support because of extensive rural-urban migration, it was extremely difficult for them to establish powerful political organizations able to dominate the political arena, as could elites in neighboring Colombia. In the meantime, the peasantry who had migrated to the cities had become particularly receptive to the calls of politically charged university students disenchanted with the Gomez regime. Those groups saw little hope for their own socioeconomic advancement under the current system.159 After a series of protests in 1928, in which university students were arrested and exiled, Romulo Betancourt, a member of the “generation of 1928,” developed a plan to replace Gomez with a government broadly representative of Venezuelan society.160 His strategy was eventually incorporated into the doctrine of the Democratic Action Party (AD)161—as it was called upon its legalization in 1941. It demanded that the foreign oil companies provide a “just share” of their accrued profits to modernize and diversify the economy and to provide

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essential state-funded services such as healthcare, public education, and housing subsidies. It also called for universal suffrage and the election of the president through direct vote.162 After Gomez’s death in 1935, exiles eager to help transform Venezuela’s political system began to return to their homeland. Gomez’s successor, General Eleazar Lopez Contreras, tried to both keep in place Gomez’s political structure and contain the revolutionary zeal stimulated by his death. After the enactment in 1936 of a law that formally sanctioned the right of workers to create unions, the Venezuelan Organization Movement163, which had been established by Betancourt, organized the petroleum workers. This movement, together with members of the Communist Party, the National Democratic Party Partido (the precursor to AD)164, and Caracas’s middle classes, launched a national strike.165 In response to the strike, Lopez Contreras banned political parties, limited suffrage to adult, literate males, and established indirect elections. Those measures enabled members of the oligarchy to retain their dominance over local and state politics.166 Lopez Contreras also prohibited activities involving open masses of people, and he banned incipient trade unions. To further strengthen his control, the president retained many of Gomez’s generals in the top ranks of the military. A large number of the professionally trained officers criticized the last measure.167 General Isaias Medina Angarita succeeded Lopez Contreras in 1941. Once in office, Medina began a process of liberalization. Seeking his own base of political support, Medina gradually re-authorized the creation of political organizations and unions.168 In addition to legalizing AD, he forced the foreign oil companies to revise their contracts and accept the right of the government to raise their taxes. Venezuela’s share of oil profits increased from about one-eighth to over one-half. Medina also pushed through an agrarian reform law designed to address economic and social discontent in Venezuela’s rural areas.169 During this period, the AD created a vigorous, effective, and close-knit political organization. Its party organizers mobilized and established both industrial and peasant unions, and by 1945 they had grown larger than their political competitor—namely the Communist Party.170 Although AD had grown exponentially, power continued to be firmly in the hands of the military and the state elites. Mass organization yielded no real power, elections remained indirect, and suffrage continued to be limited. At the end of his term in 1945, Medina reached an agreement with AD for a gradual transition to full democracy and chose as his successor a civilian.171

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Unbeknownst to Medina, during his negotiations with AD, a group of young military officers had approached party officials with a proposal for a coup. Influenced by the professionalism and modernization of some of their Latin American counterparts, many young Venezuelan officers had been eager to cleanse the institution of the old, unprofessional Gomez hierarchy represented by both General Lopez and General Medina. The reformist officers came to believe that the military was the only domestic organization with the integrity and capability to protect the national interest. By then, this sentiment had become widely accepted among military personnel in a number of Latin American states.172 The Venezuelan officers who shared the described sentiment formed the Military Patriotic Union (UPM)173 and entered into an agreement with the AD. If successful, they would hand over control of the government to AD, with the understanding that free elections would be held, the military would be depoliticized, and professional criteria would be used in promotions, assignments, and other military affairs.174 After Medina had named his successor and AD members had accepted the offer, the military conspirators ousted the president and transferred power to a provisional junta headed by Rómulo Betancourt and three other members from AD, two officers, and one independent civilian. The three years that followed, known in Venezuela as the trienio, marked the introduction of mass politics into national life.175 During that period, the provisional government passed laws that lowered barriers to participation and guaranteed universal suffrage to all citizens over 18. In addition, it initiated limited land reforms, restructured the educational system, helped create labor and peasant organizations, and advanced housing construction and public investment.176 During the December 1947 elections, Rómulo Gallegos won the ­presidency and AD gained control of the new Congress. Free, direct elections  prevailed at all levels, from municipal councils and state legislatures to  the  national Congress and the president. AD captured most votes, but  new  parties, such as the Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee (COPEI), but typically known as the Social Christian Party, the Democratic Republic Union (URD), and the Communist Party, were also able to gain representation in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. Like previous governmental leaders, AD leaders utilized the profits accrued by the oil bonanza to finance education, health care, water, and communication to poor and peripheral groups and regions. They also sought to increase significantly the state’s royalties derived from petroleum, promulgate labor laws favorable to unions, and institutionalize

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secular education.177 While the new policies garnered massive popular support, they also alienated the Catholic Church; new political parties such as COPEI; Conservative elements in the military, domestic, and international businesses; and the US embassy. Business interests—the oil industry in particular—contested policies that favored labor and restricted company profits. Rural elites resisted land reform and objected to measures that bolstered the involvement of peasant unions in the implementation of rural policy. The Catholic Church challenged education reforms that promoted public schools and restricted the autonomy of Church-run institutions. And the same military leaders who had orchestrated the coup against General Medina resented attempts by the civilian leaders to relegate them to subordinate, apolitical roles. Confident of its vast electoral majorities and of its presumed alliance with the military, the AD largely ignored the opposition coalition. On November 24th, 1948, the AD government fell to a military coup. Venezuela’s first major experiment with democracy lasted less than a year.178 The Fifth Transformation: 1948–1958 After the coup, a military junta composed of three colonels—Marcos Perez Jimenez, Carolos Delgado Chalbaud, and Felipe Llovera Paez— established a provisional government. By 1952, Perez Jimenez had declared himself provisional president. On November 30th of that year, he manipulated the National Constituent Assembly to declare him the constitutionally elected president for the period 1953—1958.179 During his rule, educational, labor, and agrarian reforms were rescinded, the press was censored, and the labor syndicates and peasant unions that had formed the base of AD support were replaced by nonpartisan unions.180 To prevent public unrest, Perez Jimenez launched a state initiative that directed large amounts of money to the creation of major urban centers and massive housing projects. His government also allocated funds to help improve the country’s transportation and communication infrastructure, and to accelerate the development of basic industries, such as iron and steel.181 By 1957, several factors had converged to undermine Perez Jimenez’s military rule. The Catholic Church, which had openly endorsed military rule in 1948, turned against the government. This action helped legitimize opposition to the military. The combination of a general economic downturn and extensive corruption, especially in public works, stimulated public criticism by members of professional societies.182 The business community, moreover, had

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started to voice its intense dissatisfaction with the regime’s tendency to renege on its debts and contracts.183 Exiled party elites from AD, COPEI, URD, and the Communists, formed an opposition bloc, the Patriotic Junta.184 Finally, although many military officers had benefited from the regime’s lavish spending and rampant corruption, others had become concerned about the longterm viability and integrity of the institution. In late 1957, a group of officers staged a coup against Perez Jimenez. Though the coup failed, the insurrection erased the façade of unity that had been enforced by the military regime. Determined to remain in power, Perez Jimenez unleashed a wave of repression that resulted in the further alienation of the armed forces. 185 As the weakness of the regime became obvious, underground political forces, now united under the Patriotic Junta, orchestrated massive public demonstrations. Unable to control the masses, the government collapsed, and Perez Jimenez fled the country in January 1958.186 The Sixth Transformation: 1958–1998 A junta composed of two military and three civilian men assumed control of the government. The power transition did not calm the public. Demonstrations continued until the junta announced that new elections would be held prior to the end of the year. Mindful of the various challenges Venezuela faced, the leaders of the three main political parties— AD, URD, and COPEI—signed a series of pacts that culminated in the promulgation of the Punto Fijo Pact.187 Leaders of the three parties agreed to defend constitutional government against coup d’états and to form a coalition government of national unity in which no party would dominate the president’s cabinet. They also agreed to exclude the revolutionary left (viz. the Communist Party), implement a minimal common program regardless of which party won office, provide financial subsidies and legal autonomy to the Church, enforce civilian oversight over the military, and not prosecute military officers for their past actions.188 The power-sharing pact was signed just before the 1958 December elections. Betancourt won the presidency. With voter participation reaching above 92 percent, his party, AD, won 73 of the 132 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 32 of the 51 seats in the Senate. The agreement was designed to ensure that the vital interests of all major social interest groups would be represented through the establishment of implicit, concurrent, majority rule. In the short run, the “pacted

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democracy” significantly enhanced governability in Venezuela and lowered political tensions through the deliberate toning down lessening of partisan discourse. Citizens and social actors not affiliated with either party recognized the elections as legitimate and accepted the results.189 Five key points characterized the new political arrangement. The first one entailed respecting elections whatever the outcome, and forming coalitions with the losing parties via the selection of members through proportional representation. The second key point involved setting aside potentially volatile issues and focusing on manageable ones. The third one called for a development model that would have as its foundation foreign and local capital, subsidies to the private sector, compensations for land reforms, and a conservative approach to economic and social reforms. The fourth point called for the encouragement of political participation, but in a controlled and properly channeled way. The last one delineated who would not be part of the coalitions, which issues would not be tackled, and which components would be included in the development program by specifically excluding the revolutionary ones.190 Though stability and governability were achieved in the post-1958 period through the institutionalization of Venezuela’s party system, the consociational or quasi-consociational experiment that emerged also imposed considerable constraints on the decision-making process. Because the most important sectors were given almost complete veto power on matters affecting their respective fundamental interests, policymaking was lengthy and generated slow advances in terms of redistributive legislation.191 Moreover, until the 1980s, associational life was encapsulated and dominated by the major political parties—namely AD and COPEI; URD had left the coalition two years after it was formed. Consequently, voter choice and participation in elections were constrained by both electoral and legal systems. This situation in turn afforded leaders of the remaining two parties significant influence over all stages of the electoral process.192 It was not long before those who had been excluded from the agreement started to question its legitimacy. The Communist Party and other leftist factions began to engage in armed opposition. Their tactics did not produce the results they had intended. By the late 1960s the insurgents had been defeated, and many of them accepted amnesty and became members of political parties of the left—most notably the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR).193 From 1958 until 1973, doctrinal disputes, generational rivalries, and conflicting personal ambitions led to the steady decline of AD and the

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growth of COPEI. Nevertheless, by 1973, the political system had been consolidated into a two-party arrangement as AD and COPEI successfully pushed their rivals to the fringes. A growing number of distinct groups sought official representation in government—3 candidates competed for the presidency in 1958 and 23 in 1988, and 8 parties presented legislative slates in the first election, compared to 78 approximately 30 years later. AD and COPEI, however, were the only parties that were in power for a substantial period.194 In his study of the characteristics of party maturation in Venezuela from 1973 to 1983, John D.  Martz posits eight reasons for the unwavering political dominance of those two parties:195 1. The costs of campaign competition hindered the potential success of minor or personalistic challenges. 2. Major parties were able to control internal conflict without leading to outright division. 3. The centrist proclivities of public opinion forced the two dominant parties toward the middle of the political spectrum, crowding out all competitors. 4. The catch-all methods relied on by AD and COPEI diminished the appeal generated by the radical parties on either the right or the left. 5. The solidification of the democratic system that underlined the commitments of the Punto Fijo made AD and COPEI the main beneficiaries. 6. Party loyalties took precedence over nonparty personalities. 7. Centralized party organizations functioned in a democratic manner. 8. There was hegemonic turnover of governments between the two main parties. On an economic front, the 1973 Middle East oil embargo and the resulting high prices for oil in the international markets greatly augmented the revenues of the Venezuelan government. The impressive increase in revenue led the government to raise the minimum wage, reduce unemployment, create vast steel and aluminum industries, subsidize industries and agriculture, and expand social benefits. Inflation was controlled with a fixed exchange rate of 4.3 bolivars to the dollar, which made it easy to obtain dollars as well as imported goods. Although the sustained petroleum boom from 1973 until the early 1980s earned Venezuela over $150  billion, which was augmented by the nationalization of the oil

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industry in 1976, by 1978 the positive balance of payments had been overtaken by the export of capital abroad, and by imports for consumption and the expansion of basic industries. To continue industrial expansion projects and cover the balance-of-payments deficit, the government had contracted several large, short-term loans, which came due just as the price for petroleum on international markets dropped measurably.196 General overproduction, a reduction in demand induced by a recession that lasted from 1981 until 1982, and widespread conservation efforts led to a significant decrease in petroleum prices. The convergence of those factors affected the economies of all the oil-exporting states, including Venezuela.197 As the price of oil fell, revenue from the export of petroleum dropped from slightly below $20 billion in 1981 to $11 billion in 1983. Petroleum accounted for over 90 percent of export earnings, and the government depended heavily on that revenue to fund social programs, public works, construction, and the subsidization of nascent domestic industries. The drop in the price of oil led to the stagnation of wages and salaries in both public and private sectors, the decline in real income, and the reduction in quality and accessibility of governmental services.198 As real income from wages and salaries plummeted, the proportion of households in poverty and extreme poverty grew significantly.199 Moreover, inflation skyrocketed over the course of a few years.200 In 1989 alone, inflation reached 81 percent, unemployment touched 50 percent, and foreign reserves were severely depleted.201 Of nearly equal significance, the massive amounts of revenue that the Venezuelan government had acquired during the oil bonanza led to waste and corruption. By the late 1980s, corruption was endemic as generals, senators, ministers, and business elites siphoned millions of dollars into their pockets and sent them abroad. The rich were not the only ones engaged in corrupt activities. Petty corruption became a way of life at the grassroots level.202 To make matters worse, by 1985, Venezuela’s total private and foreign debt had reached an estimated $35 billion.203 As Venezuela’s leaders were dealing with the country’s economic crisis, a new one began to surface. For the first three decades after the establishment of the 1958 Punto Fijo Pact, national elections garnered unprecedentedly high rates of voter turnout. Initially, parties and party leaders were able to implement policies that to some extent reflected the desires of a large majority of the population. However, despite the introduction of electoral reforms in 1978 that established separate municipal and state elections to diversify choice and spur voter interest, voter abstention increased to over 18 percent by 1988

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and to almost 49 percent by the 1993 presidential elections.204 Abstention in regional races stood at slightly over 25 percent in 1979, but increased to more than 50 percent in 1989.205 With mandatory voting and the presence of a ballot that discouraged ticket splitting, such behavior on the part of the electorate was indicative of discontent with the party system.206 Moreover, with less of the electorate performing its civic duty, the capacity of parties and leaders to channel conflict, control organizations, and mobilize votes suffered. Ultimately, party coherence decayed and new organizations emerged to challenge the dominant parties’ “hitherto unquestioned role as the only legitimate vehicle for public voice and representation.”207 In 1988, President Carlos Andres Perez, who had campaigned as a populist, announced the implementation of an austerity program and a structural-adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund, to satisfy the requirements for receiving a $4.5 billion loan.208 The implementation of neoliberal reforms provoked public unrest, especially inasmuch as the economic crisis in the 1980s, coupled with the end of the Cold War, had left the government with no other choice but to embrace orthodox macroeconomic policies and dismantle the protectionist structures that had previously been in place.209 The confluence of both economic and political crises led to an outbreak of violence on late February 1989 when a rise in gasoline prices was to be accompanied by an increase in bus fares and the cost of basic goods.210 Widespread demonstrations, rioting, and looting gripped Venezuela. By the end of the day, 22 cities had experienced some sort of public demonstration. Unable to contain the protests with the traditional mechanisms of social control, such as party or trade-union networks, Perez sent in the military. The situation took a turn for the worse. It has been estimated that almost a thousand Venezuelans, mostly civilians, perished.211 Following the incident, public support for the government decreased substantially, while demonstrations and protests continued on a daily basis. In light of the government’s use of force during the uprising, a growing cadre of young military officials attempted to overthrow President Perez in 1992. Their failure was followed by massive demonstrations that helped propel one of the leaders of the military insurrection, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez, to national fame. In November of the same year, there was another failed coup attempt, this time led by military leaders who had formed an alliance with a collection of small leftist groups.212 In 1993, the Venezuelan Congress found Perez guilty of a relatively minor misuse of public funds and removed him from office. By then, AD and COPEI had

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lost much of their political power, and the system they had created was being portrayed as corrupt and fraudulent.213 The hostility toward the political system, specifically AD and COPEI’s hegemonic governance, enabled the independent candidate, Rafael Caldera, to win the presidency in 1993. Relying on an anti-neoliberal and anti-party discourse, Caldera promised to return to the days of consultative consensus-building and to create an interventionist state. However, from the very beginning his administration faced a financial crisis of enormous proportions. Constrained by Venezuela’s economic challenges, Caldera sought the backing of AD to implement a second structuraladjustment package based upon neoliberal policies, effectively reneging on his campaign promises.214 In 1998, a sudden drop in oil prices in the international market provoked another economic and fiscal crisis. The new economic downturn further undermined the willingness of the general public to continue supporting the traditional elites and the political parties. The Seventh Transformation: 1998–Present The opportunity to make dramatic changes in what most citizens considered to be an unresponsive political regime presented itself during the 1998 national elections. Hugo Chavez, who had had been jailed for mounting a military coup in 1992 but had been pardoned two years later by the Caldera administration, surged to national prominence with an electoral movement called the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR).215 With massive support from members of Venezuela’s dissatisfied factions of society, Chavez proposed a radical anti-neoliberal approach in order to eliminate corruption and incompetence and bring about profound social and political change.216 Chavez won 56 percent of the vote and assumed the presidency in 1999. During his first two years in office, Chavez broke down the old institutions that supported the continued hegemony of the traditional parties. Convoking a Constituent Assembly legitimized by a national referendum, Chavez and his supporters worked to neutralize the most important institutional checks on the president’s power. Their intent, they claimed, was to construct a more robust “democratic regime.” The new constitution was ratified in 1999. The new constitution fundamentally transformed Venezuela’s political, economic, and social environments. First, it significantly augmented the power of the executive. The president was given complete authority over

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the armed forces, as well as the right to appoint and remove the vicepresident and any of the 25 ministers who comprised his cabinet. In addition, the president could stand for reelection for a second six-year term. Second, the constitution substituted a unicameral National Assembly for the bicameral Congress that had been mandated by the 1961 constitution. Third, it curtailed the autonomy and power of the National Assembly and granted the president the power to dissolve it and call for new elections if it proved recalcitrant. Fourth, the constitution sought to shield the entire judiciary from the influence of political parties by mandating an election term of 12 years without the possibility of reelection, and by forbidding justices to engage in partisan political activity during time in office.217 In 2004, the National Assembly expanded the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 members.218 Fifth, the new charter added two new branches of government, the Citizen Power and the Electoral Power, in order to promote greater direct and semi-direct participation by the people. The suggested rationale was that such change would enhance the efficacy of the decisionmaking process and the management of public policies. Sixth, it incorporated four types of popular referenda and provided for legislative initiatives, assemblies, and other participatory measures.219 Political parties were not specifically mentioned as vehicles for political organization and public financing of parties was prohibited. And seventh, the constitution reaffirmed the centrality of the state, the validity of the universal principle of social rights, and the inherent duty of the state to create the conditions to guarantee such rights.220 State ownership of oil resources was to be enforced, which in fact reversed the tendency toward privatization that had occurred under the Caldera administration. The new constitution dictated that new elections be held in order to legitimize the government and president. Chavez and members of his party won handily, and the new government was established in January 2001. Chavez’s policies and programs were directed primarily to address the needs of Venezuela’s marginalized population, which was his almost exclusive base of support.221 As a result, the political changes introduced by the new constitution, along with the redistributive policies enshrined within the Bolivarian Revolution, generated significant resistance from economic, political, media, religious, and trade union interests that were reluctant to lose their privileged positions in society. In prioritizing the interests of the poor over those of previously privileged groups, Chavez created a “zero-sum” framework for governing, whereby one group’s losses were the other’s gains. This divide between social groups, in which

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the middle and upper classes were pitted against the lower classes, greatly reduced the possibility of negotiation and compromise.222 The result was intense social polarization and political conflict that divided the country between supporters and opponents of the democratically elected government. Between 2001 and 2003, the opposition attempted to force the ouster of Chavez. The first attempt manifested itself in a coup in April 2002. The coup took place after hundreds of thousands of disgruntled citizens marched in Caracas. A group of military officers used the incident to justify its decision to remove Chavez from office and replace him with Pedro Carmona Estanga, a prominent businessman. After a short-lived administration in which the new president abolished the National Assembly and attempted to establish a rightwing dictatorship, Chavez was reinstituted. In December of that same year, a general strike orchestrated by Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA)223, an organization that produced around 80 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues, attempted to force Chavez to resign. Chavez responded by firing the disgruntled workers and replacing them with non-union employees loyal to the regime, and with foreign laborers supplied by several OPEC (Organization of the  Petroleum Exporting Countries)  countries.224 A final effort to remove Chavez from power was initiated by the main anti-Chavez organization, the Democratic Coordinator (CD).225 It included members from both traditional parties, many smaller leftist parties of the Punto Fijo era, leaders of the Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) and other less-influential middle-class parties and civic organizations. Jointly, they called for a recall referendum in 2004.226 Their attempt did not engender their intended objective, and two years later Chavez was reelected to a third presidential term.227 Dynamic and sustained economic growth that began in 2004 helped Chavez win reelection. After almost two decades of economic stagnation, an increase in international prices of oil and the instigation of domestic oil reforms greatly augmented the state’s fiscal resources. Greater oil rents allowed for increased public expenditure in social programs that contributed to the overall decline in poverty, extreme poverty, and unemployment.228 By this time, the Bolivarian movement led by Chavez had consolidated itself as the nation’s most important political force, supported by a broad-based consensus driven by society’s lower-income and working-class members.229 Determined to further consolidate his power, in 2007 Chavez proposed a Project for Constitutional Reform. The reform called for the extension of the presidential term from six to seven years and for the indefinite

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reelection of the president. The proposal was rejected by a slight margin in a national referendum held in December; 50.65 percent of the votes were “No,” and 49.34 percent were “Yes.” The abstention rate was around 44 percent. Chavez did not concede. In a referendum held in February 2009, Venezuelans approved a revised constitutional amendment that removed the legal obstacles to the continuous reelection of the president and all other elected positions.230 Over the years, Chavez and his party utilized their control over the state, including the state media, to reward friends, quell dissent, and promote the government during campaigns.231 Chavez’s drive to move away from participatory democracy was not overlooked.232 Margarita Lopez Maya wrote: Until 2006 the government was guided—not without contradictions—by ideas of participatory democracy, which involved a mixed economic model. It was redistributive in the social sphere and combined liberal institutions of representation with mechanisms of direct democracy… [A]fter 2006 the government initiated a new phase, emphasizing its statist tendencies in the economy and maintaining its redistributive orientation. Politically, there was a turn toward the construction of a highly centralized state apparatus, which concentrated power in the hands of Chavez and was characterized by growing authoritarian features.233

Simply put, the general weakening of liberal institutions accompanied the steady centralization of political and economic power in the executive branch. There also ceased to be separation of powers, fully competitive elections, and boundaries dividing state, government, party, and participatory social organizations.234 The various channels of participation that characterized Chavez’s early years as president were repealed and replaced by communal councils. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and its impact on international oil prices generated a significant blow to the viability of Chavez’s socialist project. Once again, the Venezuelan economy suffered from the typical boom-and-bust cycle characteristic of mono-export oil economies.235 As oil rent decreased, the state was not able to redirect the wealth derived from oil toward the poor. Surveys soon demonstrated social discontent and the declining popularity of the president.236 As with previous governments, the global crisis revealed the institutional weaknesses of Chavez’s political agenda and the state’s redistributive mechanisms.

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Although ill and uncertain that he would be reelected, Chavez ran again in 2012 and won his fourth consecutive presidential term. He died shortly thereafter from cancer. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, was elected by a small margin in April 2013. As international oil prices declined further and Venezuela’s economy suffered, Maduro’s popularity deteriorated rapidly. National Assembly elections held in early December 2015 saw a high voter turnout, which helped the centrist-Conservative opposition to overtake Maduro’s party for the first time in 16 years. In April 2016, the Supreme Court ratified a constitutional amendment proposed by Maduro’s opponents that would reduce the presidential term from seven to four years. However, the court noted that since the amendment was ratified after Maduro’s election, it could not be applied retroactively to his administration. Despite the caveat, the National Electoral Commission authorized Maduro’s opponents to initiate the paperwork required to begin his recall. In response to these actions, Maduro decreed a state of emergency, claiming that right-wing elements working jointly with foreign powers were threatening the security of the state. The National Assembly rejected Maduro’s decree. The president in turn declared the Assembly illegitimate and disregarded its vote. In 2015, both the World Bank and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated that oil revenues accounted for almost all export earnings and nearly half of the Venezuelan government’s revenue.237 Because of the collapse in international oil prices in 2014, Venezuela once again faced major domestic restrictions, with a fiscal deficit estimated at 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of 2015 and external financing needs estimated to be between US$25 billion and US$35 billion.238 In addition, a combination of price controls, limitations on access to foreign currency, and the collapse of the private sector in the provision of basic goods, led to drastic increases in inflation that skyrocketed to 121.7 percent by the end of 2015. Venezuela’s economic conditions did not improve with time. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that in 2017 inflation reached over 1000 percent, and by the end of 2018 was near one million percent. The initial inflationary pressure prompted the Venezuelan government to transition in March 2016 from a multiple-exchange-rate system to a dual system. The  DIPRO exchange-rate system was made available to pay for vital imports such as food, medicine, raw materials for production, and pensions for Venezuelans living abroad. It was also to be used to cover payments in the state sectors of healthcare, culture, sports, scientific investigations, and in other cases of special urgency. The new official rate was

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devalued by 37 percent, from 6.3 bolivars per US dollar to 10 bolivars per US dollar. The other rate, DICOM, was left floating. In 2016, the bolivar opened at 206.92 bolivars per dollar. By March 2017, the value of the bolivar in the DICOM exchange rate system was an estimated 710 bolivars per dollar; however, on the black market the dollar reached 3000 bolivars. Because of this devaluation, in 2017 Venezuela faced major stagflation, and importers were increasingly unable to obtain sufficient dollars to purchase goods.239 In sum, the overall effects of Venezuela’s overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues— effects amplified by misguided macroeconomic stabilization policies— have been rampant inflation; widespread shortages of basic consumer goods, medicine, and medical supplies; violent crime; high unemployment; and political instability. Analysis of the Transformations Experienced by the Venezuelan State and Its Political Regime The development of the Venezuelan state and its political regime went through multiple transformations. Initially, the leaders of Venezuela did not strive to create a completely independent state. For nearly a decade, Venezuela was part of a confederation dominated by Bogotá. Dissatisfied with the existing structural arrangement, Caracas’s political leaders broke away and started the process of building their own sovereign entity. The rapid increase in the production and exportation of coffee convinced Venezuela’s regional leaders and Caracas’s financiers to put their differences aside and work together. The decline in the international demand for coffee brought to the fore the divisions between Conservatives, who advocated the centralization of state power, and Liberals, who called for the distribution of power between the center and the regions. Near the end of the 1850s, unable to resolve their differences, the two camps sought to resolve their differences on the battlefield. Despite the reduction in the number of regional caudillos brought about by the Liberals’ victory during the 1859–1863 Federal Wars, and despite the substantial enlargement of the state administration and economy, by the start of the twentieth century the Venezuelan state was still weak. It remained unable to enforce its authority throughout its territory and had yet to garner the capacity to mobilize and integrate an intensely divided citizenry.

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The discovery and production of vast amounts of oil within its territorial boundaries enabled the Venezuelan government in power to use oil proceeds to defeat its regional enemies, organize the first national army, provide high salaries and benefits to the caudillos who sided with the government, strengthen further its bureaucracy, establish a monopoly in the fiscal arena,240 pay off the foreign debt, and stabilize the currency. In short, the production and exportation of oil empowered consecutive governments in Caracas to solidify the power of the Venezuelan state. Continuous economic growth, accompanied by substantial development, led to the further strengthening of the state’s armed forces and the rise of new social classes. The advent of new social classes led to the emergence of new political parties ready to protect and promote their own interests. Demands from emerging political groups to open the political system forced Venezuela’s military rulers to acquiesce in 1945. This development in turn facilitated the election in 1947 of a government that sought to alter the socioeconomic environment substantially. Troubled by the substantial changes, leaders of the Venezuelan armed forces replaced the new government with an authoritarian regime in 1948. Public dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy led the ­government to resign in 1957. Fearful of being toppled again by Venezuela’s armed forces, the new political leaders created a quasi-open political regime that did not challenge the existing status quo and limited competition by rotating control of the government solely between two moderate parties. Control over oil production and revenue services by the two ruling political parties had two critical, negative effects on Venezuela. Easy access to great wealth, initially almost unrestricted, generated a culture of dependency. The economic and political dominance of oil corroded the state’s efficacy as well as its political culture. The “get rich quick” mentality—a characteristic of the Venezuelan political elites following the rapid influx of petrodollars—normalized and expanded clientelistic behavior, and also augmented the level of governmental corruption that had dominated politics during the nineteenth century. In addition, Venezuela’s heavy dependence on oil revenues to generate economic growth exposed the state to the volatility of the global market. The abundant revenue from oil extraction discouraged the long-term investment in infrastructure that would have facilitated the creation of a more diverse economy. This lack of investment exacerbated the negative effects of sudden drops in the resource’s price. Moreover, while the oil sector produced large financial revenues, it added few jobs to the economy

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and tended to operate as an area with few connections to the rest of the economy. A lengthy drop in oil prices led to a decrease in state revenues, a deceleration of the economy, and an increase in unemployment. These developments forced Venezuela’s political parties in power to acquiesce to demands from international financial entities to carry out austerity programs and make major structural adjustments in order to receive financial assistance. The continued failure to address Venezuela’s economic ills despite its access to vast oil reserves, and the implementation of austerity programs that affected principally those with fewer means, weakened the ruling political parties’ ability to justify the preservation of the system they had created in the late 1950s. Growing public discontent with the ruling regime led to the election in 1998 of a political leader who promised to address the needs of those who had received little attention from previous governments. Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, came to power committed to the restructuring of Venezuela’s political and economic system. They succeeded, but in the process they transformed Venezuela’s flawed democracy into a nondemocratic regime and wrecked the economy. By the end of 2018, Venezuelans had experienced the largest recorded refugee crisis in the Americas. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Intergovernmental International Organization for Migration estimated that since 1999, when Hugo Chavez assumed the presidency, some three million people—that is, 10 percent of the population—had fled Venezuela. Those who stayed behind will continue to be ruled by Maduro, who was reelected in May 2018 for a six-year term, and they will have to cope with the country’s exorbitant inflation rate, which in 2018 went over the 800,000 percent mark.

Conclusion The intent of this chapter has been to describe the processes of state creation and political-regime formation of Colombia and Venezuela in order to isolate the principal factors that affected their respective developments. To design a set of informative conclusions regarding those processes, from the end of the colonial period to the present, a series of hypotheses are postulated in the following pages. Some of the hypotheses apply to both cases; others are relevant to only one case or the other. The initial transformation can be depicted as follows:

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Hypothesis CV (Colombia-Venezuela)1: Widespread regional economic and administrative autonomy within a colonial territory propelled regional leaders to try to preserve their autonomy after independence.241 Hypotheses CV2: The greater the involvement on the part of the Catholic Church in the settlement of colonies, the greater the inclination on the part of certain leaders to try to continue its role after independence. Hypothesis CV3: Attempts by regional leaders to protect their autonomy resulted in the formation of two competing political and economic groups— one that advocated the creation of a state in which political power was centralized, and one that favored the decentralization of the power of the state. Hypotheses CV4: In instances in which the Catholic Church sought to play a major role in the newly created state, the division between the two groups was intensified by conflicting demands—one group’s insistence on centralizing the power of the state and granting the Catholic Church a prominent societal role, and the rival group’s refusal to do so. Hypothesis CV5: Rivalry between the two earlier-mentioned groups resulted in the creation of militias that resorted to violence to protect and advance their interests. Hypothesis CV6: Rivalry between the two groups lessened when the economy grew and both groups benefited. It intensified when the economy weakened and one group experienced greater costs than the other. During the latter instances, the likelihood of military conflict increased. Hypothesis CV7: The greater the material wealth a political leader was able to access, the greater the size of the military he was able to create, and thus the greater his capability to defeat his regional adversaries. Hypothesis CV8: The defeat of regional militias led to the consolidation of the power of the state and to the professionalization and strengthening of the armed forces.

At the start of the twentieth century, Colombia and Venezuela started to move in different directions. Colombia’s War of a Thousand Days and the discovery of oil in Venezuela had two distinct effects.

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Hypothesis (Colombia)C1: The high human and material costs generated by the War of a Thousand Days convinced Colombia’s leaders to limit their differences and rule jointly. Hypothesis (Venezuela)V1: Access to vast oil reserves enabled Venezuela’s political leaders to solidify the power of the state and enhanced the power of the leader controlling the presidency.

For the first four or five decades of the twentieth century, the political systems of Colombia and Venezuela were dominated by two groups, both of which sought to protect their political power. During that period, however, the economies of both states grew. Hence: Hypothesis CV9: Steady economic growth engendered two conflicting effects. On the one hand, it led to the rise of new socioeconomic groups who demanded greater involvement in the political process and greater benefits from the growing economy. On the other hand, it propelled those who controlled the political system to protect their power and obstruct the implementation of critical political and economic changes. The protection and obstruction process took one of three forms: direct military intervention, drives to assimilate the new socioeconomic groups into the existing political arena, and/or suppression of radical parties. Hypothesis CV10: Failure on the part of traditional political leaders to address the demands of emerging socioeconomic groups led to the development of alternative political parties or revolutionary groups.

In 1957, Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia negotiated a consociational pact, whereby two traditional parties would alternate power every four years for a minimum period of 16 years.242 A year later, they established the National Front. Founded on the tenets of parity of power and presidential alternation, the National Front attempted to synthesize the ideas of Liberals and Neoconservatives to bring an end to resurgent party-based violence. Because both sides feared that members of the left would jeopardize the alternation of political power, they agreed to exclude third parties from direct participation in the political system. The pact allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism as the primary method of interaction between elected officials and civilians.243 The arrangement also made it easier for private-sector interests to block reforms that could have given the state the opportunity to broaden social welfare services. As a result, the state limited the creation and imple-

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mentation of policies designed to reduce inequality.244 In 1958, a similar pact was reached by Venezuela’s three dominant political parties. The intent was the same—to alternate political power between the leading parties and facilitate the design of policies that benefited them. Shortly thereafter, one of the three parties pulled out of the agreement. A question that has been posed by analysts is whether “pacted transitions” result in the formation of stable democratic regimes. Though a number of scholars have referred to the positive effects this type of transition has generated, others have warned that the results may not be longlasting. Adam Przeworski argues that “the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders. Democracy would then turn into a private project of leaders of some political parties and corporatist associations, an oligopoly in which leaders of some organizations collude to prevent outsiders from entering.”245 Frances Hagopian adds that “comparative evidence supports the contention that democratization is often slowed or stopped in regimes spawned by political pacts negotiated with traditional and authoritarian elites.”246 The present analysis of Colombia and Venezuela supports Przeworski’s and Hagopian’s conclusions. After an initial period of stability, the pacted agreements reached by Colombia’s and Venezuela’s leading political entities began to lose their political value and effectiveness, principally because those who had been excluded from the political process started to demand that the system be opened and their distinct needs be addressed. Hypothesis CV11: A pacted transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one may initially lead to the attainment of the intended objective, but it is highly unlikely that the newly created regime will survive in its original form. The parties involved in its formation will be compelled to open it. Failure to do so will result in the establishment of a regime that will exclude them from the political process.

Venezuela faced an additional problem. Hypothesis V2: The ability of Venezuela’s two ruling political parties to retain control of the political system depended on their ability to satisfy the economic needs of the population. In turn, their ability to satisfy the economic needs of the population depended greatly on the stability of oil revenues. Fluctuations in the price of oil in the world market, along with

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the continuous failure on the part of the two ruling political parties to seek alternative sources of revenue, engendered political instability and an increase in the unwillingness on the part of the electors to continue supporting the status quo.

The one problem that has always been at the core of both Colombia and Venezuela is corruption. Hypothesis CV12: Corruption has been present since the colonial period. As the political and economic stakes grew, so did corruption. Hypothesis CV13: The heavy dependence of a state on revenues derived principally from a single natural source fostered greater corruption than did the acquisition of revenues from various sources. Hypothesis CV14: Political and economic corruption delayed the processes of state creation and democratization.

As this point, it is important to try to explain why Colombia managed to avert the political trauma experienced by Venezuela during the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The reasons are not simple. Colombia was successful in preventing the destruction of its own quasi-­ democratic regime for three reasons. First, its leaders learned from its civil war at the start of the twentieth century that to create a stable state and generate economic growth they had to work with one another. Ultimately, they relied upon a well-institutionalized party system to consolidate their power. By doing so, political parties, beginning with the mid-1800s, became integral entities that monopolized power at the expense of existing state institutions, hindering specifically the power of the executive. The relatively well-institutionalized party system in Colombia undercut the power of the branch of government typically susceptible to populist manipulation—the executive. Second, as implied in Hypothesis CV11, Colombia’s leaders realized that if they hoped to avert the toppling of the existing political order, they had to open the political system, allow greater political participation, and address some of the needs of those who had been marginalized for too long. Despite the opening of the political system, the party system remained too exclusive, as dominant parties have become either personalistic vehicles for members of the political elite, or offshoots of the two traditional parties. Though a greater portion of the electorate participates

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in the political process, and though the number of parties operating in Colombia has grown, the most successful political parties have been those advocating traditional Conservative or Liberal policies consistent with the values of the political elites. The dominance of those political parties led to the historical exclusion and persecution of populist groups and figures advancing views inconsistent with theirs. Finally, Colombia’s leaders and the population never developed an intense dependency on oil revenues to generate economic growth and development. Instead, they sought to diversify the economy to ensure that its performance would never become dependent on a single factor. On the other hand, from its inception until the mid-1940s, Venezuela was ruled by caudillos who used military force to consolidate their power and thereafter molded state institutions to their liking. As a result, the Venezuelan state was constructed to support a strong executive—the branch of government most susceptible to populist manipulation. Moreover, Venezuela’s leaders developed a culture of nearly total dependency on oil revenues to generate economic growth. Such dependency exposed the country’s economy—and as a result the welfare of the population—to the vagaries of the world market. Suffering from repeated failures by the governments to attenuate the ill effects of the global oil market, the Venezuelan people voted for a political figure who promised to improve their fortunes. His mistake and that of his successor was to assume that they could rely on high oil revenues almost indefinitely to bring about the social and economic changes they had promised.

Notes 1. “Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?” The Economist Intelligence Unit (8 January 2019). http://www.eiu.com/home/aspx. 2. Jenny Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin American Bureau, January 1, 1990), vii. 3. Harvey F.  Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press October 12, 1995), 5. 4. Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19. 5. Julian Steward and Louis C.  Faron, Native Peoples of South America (McGraw-Hill, 1959), 217. 6. Anthony McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

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7. Ibid., 8. 8. Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present (Wiley, 2004), 103. 9. Ibid. 10. Plains in Spanish means llanos. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 9. 11. Ibid., 10. 12. Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 39. 13. Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 201. 14. Ibid. 15. Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 41. 16. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 20. 17. Ibid., 73. 18. Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 49. 19. Ibid., 55. 20. Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 173. 21. Ibid., 34. 22. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 35. 23. Limpieza de Sangre. 24. Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 174. 25. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 38. 26. Ibid., 59. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., 64. 29. Rex A.  Hudson, Area Handbook Colombia: A Country Study, Fifth Edition. (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 5, 2010), 107. See also John R. Fisher, and Allan J. Kuethe, Reform and insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, Ed. Anthony McFarlane (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 292. 30. Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 68. 31. John C.  Dugas, “Colombia”, in Harry E.  Vanden, and Gary Prevost, eds., The Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 510. 32. J. D. Monsalve, Antonio de Villavicencio (el Protomártir) y la Revolución de la Independencia, Vol. 1, (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1920), 70. See also Anthony McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 338. 33. Bakewell, A History of Latin America: c. 1450 to the Present, 389.

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34. Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, and Divided Society, 86. 35. Manuel José Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución de la república de Colombia, Vol. 1, (Paris: Liberia Americana, 1827), 134. See also in McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 345. 36. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 90. 37. Ibid., 89. 38. David Bushnell, “The Society and the Environment” in Rex A. Hudson, ed, Area Handbook Colombia: A Country Study, 114. 39. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 180. 40. McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule, 348. 41. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 16. 42. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 31. 43. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 150. 44. Ibid., 215. 45. “…velar por la conservación del orden general”, segment of the 1863 Colombian Constitution found in Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 36. 46. Francisco Leal Buitrago, Social Classes, International Trade, and Foreign Capital in Colombia: An Attempt at Historical Interpretations of the Formation of the State, 1819–1935, (Thesis (Ph.D.)—University of Wisconsin, 1974), 112. 47. Jonathan Hartlyn and John Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J.  Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset,  eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Second Edition. (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, October 1999), 256. 48. See Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 230. See also Jose Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economia mundial 1830–1910, (Bogota: Universidad de los Andes Press, 1984). 49. Dugas, “Colombia”, 511. 50. James William Park, Rafael Nuñez and the Politics of Colombian Regionalism, 1863-1886, (Louisiana State University Print, 1985), 273. 51. “La Regeneracion” translates to “the Regeneration”. 52. Park, Rafael Nuñez and the Politics of Colombian Regionalism, 1863– 1886, 265. 53. Ibid., 269. 54. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 32. 55. Ibid., 37. 56. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 257.

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57. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 274. 58. Ibid., 274. 59. Ibid. 60. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 257. 61. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 273. 62. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 29. 63. Dugas, “Colombia”, 435. 64. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 33. 65. “Concentración Nacional.” 66. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 292. 67. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 42. 68. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 37. 69. “Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia” (CTC). 70. Ibid. 71. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 42. 72. “gremios.” 73. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 43. 74. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 318. 75. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 261. 76. Ibid. 77. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 52. 78. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 262. 79. John A.  Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, Third Edition, (Boulder, Colorado: Reinner, 2009), 57. 80. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 61. 81. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 48. 82. Dugas, “Colombia”, 443. 83. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 72. 84. A similar type of arrangement was arrived at by Venezuela’s dominant parties at approximately the same time. 85. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 302. 86. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 73. 87. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 98. 88. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 277. 89. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 99. 90. Carlos F.  Diaz-Alejandro, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976), 37. See also Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 99.

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91. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 270. 92. Alianza Nacional Popular. 93. Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 57. 94. Kline, Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 52–53. 95. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 323. 96. Kline Colombia: Democracy under Assault, 102. 97. Safford and Palacios, Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 332. 98. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 276. 99. Ibid., 273. 100. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 277. 101. Union Patriotica. 102. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 278. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid., 280. 105. “Movimiento de Salvación Nacional.” 106. Alianza Democrática. Hartlyn and Dugas, “The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation,” 281 107. Ibid., 282. 108. Frequently, Colombian police officers, soldiers, judges, and elected officials were faced with the choice of plata or plomo—this signified an offer to accept money, in the form of a bribe to look the other way, or a bullet if one did not consent to bribery. 109. Hartlyn and Dugas, ‘The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’, 284. 110. Harry E. Vanden, and Gary Prevost, eds., Politics of Latin America: The Power Game (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 526. 111. Ibid., 527. 112. Ibid., 528. 113. Eduardo Posada-Carbo, “Elections and Civil Wars in Nineteenth-­Century Colombia: The 1875 Presidential Campaign.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1994), 621–649. 114. Judith Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change (Stanford University Press, 1984), 1. 115. Ibid.,14. 116. John V.  Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream for Progress (Oxford University Press, 1982), 10–11. 117. Ibid., 242–243. 118. Steward and Faron, Native Peoples of South America, 239.

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119. Daniel C.  Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy (Westview Press, 1991), 16. 120. Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream for Progress, 10–11. 121. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 16. 122. Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream for Progress, 33. 123. “Spanish Colonial Life,” U.S.  Library of Congress, accessed online at http://countrystudies.us/venezuela/3.htm. 124. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 17. 125. Richard A.  Haggerty and Howard I.  Blutstein, Venezuela: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993), 41. 126. Ibid. 127. “Caracas Company”, in the Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture. http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-and-maps/caracas-company. 128. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 5. 129. Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 149–152. 130. Ibid., 19. 131. Ibid.,177. 132. Ibid., 177–199. 133. Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream for Progress, 142. 134. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 5. 135. Haggerty et al., Venezuela: A Country Study, 10–11. 136. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 19. 137. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 7. 138. Ibid., 24. 139. Ibid., 24. 140. Ibid., 7. 141. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 25. 142. Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search for Order, The Dream for Progress, 187. 143. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 25. 144. Haggerty et al., Venezuela: A Country Study, 49. 145. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 21. 146. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 28. 147. Terry Lynn Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, (Stanford University, 1982), 76. 148. Daniel C. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, in Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, eds., Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, 488. 149. Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, 78.

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150. David Eugene Blank, Politics in Venezuela (Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 15. 151. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 488. 152. Miriam Kornblith, and Daniel H.  Levine, “Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford University, 1996), 40. 153. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 63. 154. See Table 2.4 in Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 38. 155. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 488. 156. Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, 81. See also Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 488. 157. Alberto Adriani, Labor Venezolanista (Caracas: Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas, 1984), 187–297. See also Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 43. 158. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making”, in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70. See also Blank, Politics in Venezuela, 4–5. 159. Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, 85–86. 160. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 488. 161. Accion Democrática. 162. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 488. 163. Movimiento de Organización Venezolana. 164. Partido Democratico Nacional. 165. Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, 86–87. 166. Ibid., 47. 167. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 47. 168. Daniel H. Levine and Brian F. Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, in Larry Jay Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J.  Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1999), 376. 169. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 489. 170. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 376. 171. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 59. See also Kornblith and Levine, “Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System”, 42. Also Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 376.

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172. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 59. 173. Union Patriotica Militar. 174. Ibid., 60. 175. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 376. 176. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 499. For a more in depth understanding of the trienio policies see Diego Abente, “Politics and Policies: The Limits of the Venezuelan Consociational Regime” in Donald L.  Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin American: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger, 1988), 135. 177. Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 58. 178. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 377. 179. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 85. 180. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 107. 181. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 489. Iron and Steel industries are deemed “basic” for they retain forward and backward linkages that lead to the development of other domestic industries. 182. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 378. 183. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 489. 184. Junta Patriótica. See Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 58. 185. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 92. 186. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 378. 187. John D.  Martz, “The Malaise of the Venezuelan Political System: Is Democracy Endangered?”, in Donald L.  Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger, 1988), 158. 188. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 490. See also Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 58. And Martz, “The Malaise of the Venezuelan Political System: Is Democracy Endangered?”, 158. Also see Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 379–380. 189. Abente, “Politics and Policies: The Limits of the Venezuelan Consociational Regime”, 137–138. Also see Michael Coppedge, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of Partyarchy,” in Jorge I. Dominguez and Abraham F.  Lowenthal, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance— South America in the 1990s (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4. 190. Ibid. 191. Abente, “Politics and Policies: The Limits of the Venezuelan Consociational Regime”, 138.

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192. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 382. 193. Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 59. 194. Martz, “The Malaise of the Venezuelan Political System: Is Democracy Endangered?”, 159–160. See also Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 382–383. 195. Martz. “The Malaise of the Venezuelan Political System: Is Democracy Endangered?”, 163. 196. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 126. 197. Robert J.  Alexander, “Venedemocracia and the Vagaries of the Energy Crisis” in Donald L.  Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin America: Colombian and Venezuela (New York: Praeger, 1988), 184. 198. Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 197. 199. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 387. 200. Alexander, “Venedemocracia and the Vagaries of the Energy Crisis”, 184. 201. Ramón Espinasa, “El Destino de la Renta Petrolera, 1974-1986”, Revista SIC 50 (1987): 53–54. Latin America Weekly Report (London: March 22, 1990). See also Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 126. 202. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 492. 203. Alexander, “Venedemocracia and the Vagaries of the Energy Crisis”, 185. 204. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 388. 205. Ibid., 389. 206. Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy, 160. 207. Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 389. 208. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 493. 209. Moises Naim, “Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” Foreign Policy Issue 118 (2000), 92. 210. Hellenger, “Venezuela”, 493. 211. Ibid. 212. Ibid. See also Levine and Crisp, “Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy”, 391. 213. Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America, 207. 214. Margarita Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., The Resurgence of the Latin American Left (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 219. 215. Movimiento Quinta República. 216. Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 219.

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217. David J.  Myers, “Venezuela: Delegative Democracy or Electoral Autocracy?” in Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 312–314. 218. Ibid., 315. 219. Ibid., 220. 220. Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 220. 221. Julia Buxton, “Venezuela’s Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context” Bulletin of Latin American Research 24.3 (2005), 328–347. See also Roberta Rice “Venezuela: Pacts, Populism, and Poverty” in Katherine Isbester, ed., The Paradox of Democracy in Latin America: Ten Country Studies of Division and Resilience (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011), 238 222. Rice, “Venezuela: Pacts, Populism, and Poverty”, 239. 223. Petróleos de Venezuela. 224. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 505. 225. Coordinadora Democrática. 226. Ibid., 499–500. 227. According to Chavez and his supporters his first presidential term should not count as part of the two-consecutive six-terms authorized by the 1999 constitution, because during the first two of years of his first presidency he was serving under the rules of the old constitution. 228. Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 225. 229. Ibid. 230. Ibid., 228–237. 231. Hellinger, “Venezuela”, 504. 232. Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 230. See also Valia Pereira Almao and Carmen Perez Baralt, “Venezuela: The Impact of Recent Electoral Processes” in Daniel H.  Levine and Jose E. Molina, eds., The Quality of Democracy in Latin America (Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 2011), 222. Also see David Smilde, “Participation, Politics, and Culture—Emerging Fragments of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy” in David Smilde and Daniel Hellinger, eds., Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: Participation, Politics, and Culture under Chavez (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2011), 11. 233. Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 236. 234. Smilde, “Participation, Politics, and Culture—Emerging Fragments of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy”, 11. See also Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 236. 235. Kurt Weyland, “The Left: Destroyer or Savior of the Market Model?” in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M.  Roberts, The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 77.

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236. Lopez Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left”, 236. 237. Ibid. 238. See “Venezuela Overview” http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ venezuela/overview. 239. Lucas Koerner, “Venezuela Revamps Currency Exchange Rate System,”. https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11883. 240. Karl, The Political Economy of Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, Volumes I and II, 76. 241. CV refers to Colombia and Venezuela. 242. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 61. 243. Dugas, “Colombia”, 443. 244. Pearce, Colombia inside the Labyrinth, 72. 245. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 90–91. 246. Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22.

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Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Print. Restrepo, José Manuel. 1827. Historia De La Revolución De La República De Colombia. Vol. 1. Paris: Liberia Americana. Print. Rice, Roberta. 2011. Venezuela: Pacts, Populism, and Poverty. In The Paradox of Democracy in Latin America: Ten Country Studies of Division and Resilience, ed. Katherine Isbester, 229–251. Toronto: University of Toronto. Print. Safford, Frank, and Marco Palacios. 2002. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. New York: Oxford University Press. Print. Se Gobierna Para El Bien De Todo El Pueblo. 2016. Latinobarometro 2016. Latinbarometro.org. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Smilde, David. 2011. Participation, Politics, and Culture – Emerging Fragments of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy. In Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: Participation, Politics, and Culture under Chavez, ed. David Smilde and Daniel Hellinger. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Print. Steward, Julian Haynes, and Louis C.  Faron. 2000a. Native Peoples of South America. Woburn, MA: Booktech. Print. ———. 2000b. Theocratic Chiefdoms of Venezuela and the Greater Antilles. In Native Peoples of South America. Woburn, MA: Booktech. Print. The Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy. 2018. Democracy Ranking. Democracyranking.org, 2018. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Tilly, Charles. 1975. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly, 3–84. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. 2016. Transparency International (2016). Transparency International. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. 2018. Politics of Latin America the Power Game. New York: Oxford University Press. Print. Venezuela  – Spanish Colonial Life. 2019. U.S.  Library of Congress. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Venezuela Overview. 2019. The World Bank Working for a World Free of Poverty. The World Bank. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Weyland, Kurt. 2013. The Left: Destroyer or Savior of the Market Model? In The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Print. World Audit Political Rights. Worldaudit.org. Web. 24 Jan. 2019.

CHAPTER 6

State Creation and Democratization in Costa Rica and Guatemala

Introduction This chapter strives to answer the following question: Why was Costa Rica markedly more successful than Guatemala at creating a legitimate state and forming a democratic regime even though the two states are near neighbors in the Central American isthmus, the Spaniards began to colonize each region during the first half of the sixteenth century, and both colonies gained their independence at approximately the same time? To answer the question, this chapter identifies the challenges each state encountered, from the beginning of independence to the present, as each one sought to consolidate the power of the state and form its own political regime.

Costa Rica Colonial Period Christopher Columbus reached the eastern coast of Costa Rica in 1502. It has been estimated that at the time of his arrival, Costa Rica had about 400,000 native inhabitants. The Spanish initially attempted to settle near the present city of Limón on the Mexican Gulf coast and conduct inland explorations, but their efforts did not generate significant results. The early explorer soon concluded that there was very little gold to be found in the region. In 1519, Hernán Ponce de Leon and Juan de Castañeda © The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_6

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sailed from Panama along the Pacific coast up to the Gulf of Nicoya. Follow-up expeditions sought to gain control over the territory surrounding the gulf but were not successful. The diseases brought by the Spanish colonizers period decimated much of Costa Rica’s original population. In 1524, five years after Hernán Cortes had marched triumphantly into Mexico City, the Spaniards mounted three expeditions. One group left from Panama City and traveled north to develop the gold deposits in the interior of Nicaragua. The other two groups departed from Mexico City and plodded south, with one exploring the Pacific side of Guatemala and the other prospecting in the northern Caribbean coast of Honduras. The Spaniards soon lost much of their initial interest in Central America. Some sought their fortunes in the Peruvian region, where Francisco Pizarro had gained control by 1532–1533, while others turned to Yucatan and the silver mines in northern Mexico.1 In 1543, Spain divided Central America into two regions. It placed the area from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to Costa Rica under the jurisdiction of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, which was, in turn, under the authority of the Viceroy of New Spain. The new inhabitants of the region were for the most part left to their own devices. The absence of strict control from New Spain freed them to pursue their independent interests. In the meantime, Panama, which was part of New Granada, was placed under the control of the Viceroy of Peru.2 In 1561, a Spanish expedition led by Juan de Cavallón left Nicaragua, entered Costa Rica’s central valley, and established the small settlement of Garcimuñoz. A year later Juan Vásquez de Coronado arrived from Nicaragua with supplies and men, and founded the town of Cartago, some 17 miles southeast of San José, Costa Rica’s present-day capital. The Spaniards found Costa Rica much less appealing than other areas within the isthmus. Three factors made Costa Rica less attractive. First, it was the most isolated area of the territories that were part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala. Second, it lacked mineral wealth. And third, it did not have a large, tractable, indigenous population. In short, Spaniards considered the region “the poorest and most miserable Spanish colony in all America.”3 Those who stayed settled in Costa Rica’s central area engaged in subsistence agriculture and conducted much of the labor themselves.4 They grew corn, beans, and plantains for sustenance, and produced sugar, cacao, and tobacco for sale. As a result of their physical isolation, the colonizers developed very few bonds with their Central American counterparts, and because of the absence of a large indigenous force they did not establish

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encomiendas—the quasi-feudalistic hacienda systems their counterparts developed in other regions. Despite their limited economic worth, the settlers’ communities each had an upper social class. Social mobility existed, but the absence of substantial resources and the presence of cultural conservatism hindered the process. Because labor was in short supply, non-whites managed to make a living on the edge of the colonial economy; and yet they were denied legal status. The presence of few European women led rapidly to miscegenation. By the end of the eighteenth century, the region was inhabited by only some 50,000 people, 8000 of whom were Amerindians. In short, lacking strategic significance or exploitable riches, Costa Rica became a minor provincial outpost.5 The State-Creation Process in Costa Rica  Liberation came to Costa Rica unobtrusively and was unsought. After Mexico had freed itself from Spain, the Central American colonies followed their example. The same year that Agustin de Iturbide proclaimed New Spain’s independence from Spain and became Mexico’s emperor, Central America’s landed criollo elite announced their region’s annexation to the new empire.6 The marriage of convenience did not last long. In 1823, after Iturbide’s abdication, the territory from Guatemala to Costa Rica became the independent United Provinces of Central America.7 This action was soon followed by an armed conflict between the Conservative centralists, who were based in Guatemala City and hoped to increase their authority over the provinces, and the Liberals, who controlled the outlying provinces. The Liberals won the initial struggle and declared San Salvador the capital of the new federation. In a short time, the same Liberals who had opposed granting the center greater powers sought to achieve the same end. The leaders of the provinces refused to acquiesce and decided that being part of the federation was not in their best interests. By 1839, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica had seceded from the federation.8 Of the four provinces, Costa Rica experienced the least amount of conflict.9 During the colonial period, because of the absence of effective means of transportation and Spain’s refusal to permit export, most of the coffee produced in Costa Rica had been consumed locally. With independence, the notion emerged among Costa Rica’s economic elites that the export of coffee would help enlarge their wealth.10 The Meseta Central, which is

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where most Costa Ricans lived, offered the “ideal combination, altitude, temperature, rainfall and volcanic soil for producing prime coffee.”11 Braulio Carrillo, who ruled Costa Rica from 1835 to 1837, and then from 1838 until 1842, was the leading force behind the drive to create an export-oriented coffee market. To increase production, Carrillo subdivided the common lands among people willing to plant coffee.12 The change in Costa Rica’s economy ensued amid a fairly turbulent political environment. Following independence, Costa Rica’s economic elites established a representative system led by a weak executive body. The system was subverted almost immediately by the rivalry between Conservatives and Liberals. Several issues divided the two groups, but as in other newly formed Spanish American states, the most significant one was the role the Catholic Church should play in society. Liberals argued that the Catholic Church should not have any economic or political power, while Conservatives viewed it as a defender of their privileges and as a vital institution for controlling the masses and securing their support.13 These two groups relied on coups and assassinations against one another to gain control of the state. In 1844, Costa Rica’s leading political figures approved a new federal constitution that divided the government into the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches, and called for the direct election of the president. This action did not signify that Liberals and Conservatives were ready to open their political system. Although the electoral process was expanded in 1847, literacy and property ownership requirements, along with the exclusion of women from the political process, ensured that only a very small percentage of Costa Rica’s inhabitants would be able to vote. According to one estimate, the number of Ticos who were authorized to vote did not reach 10 percent of the adult population.14 In a separate analysis, it was estimated that less than 3 percent voted in the first election under the 1844 constitution. Regardless of whose figures one considers, the number of eligible voters was very small.15 A significant change took place in Costa Rica toward the midpoint of the nineteenth century. The presence of a very small indigenous population during the colonial period made it feasible for Ticos to exist without the protection of a powerful army. However, with coffee producing the first real wealth known by the new republic, the need arose for an army strong enough to protect its leading producers. In 1849, after numerous years of violent confrontations, Juan Rafael Mora, a Conservative who was head of one of Costa Rica’s most prominent families, assumed the

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­ residency and remained in power for ten years. By this time, Costa Rica’s p leaders were beginning to acknowledge that their country, which had adopted a federalist system in 1844, needed a more powerful executive if they hoped to generate economic growth. This change was precisely the intent of the 1847 constitution. A year later Costa Rica abolished the army and replaced it with a national guard. This reorganization gave the president greater leverage over the use of violence. During his tenure as president, Mora and other Central American leaders moved against Nicaragua, which had come under the temporary control of William Walker, a citizen of the United States acting on behalf of Nicaragua’s Liberals. Mora’s ability to hold the presidency for a decade and his success against Walker in 1856 were not overlooked by Costa Rica’s economic leaders. Many of them concluded that they needed to increase their political power to protect and promote their own economic interests, and they reasoned that the most effective way to achieve such a goal was by creating a strong military.16 Thus, they abolished the National Guard and reinstated the Army. The increased dependence on the military had a major unintended effect, but one also experienced by other Spanish American countries. In 1870, Colonel Tomas Guardia, an army officer who had become convinced that the army was the only institution capable of lifting Costa Rica out of its factional strife, mounted a military coup, exiled the leaders who had dominated Costa Rica’s political system, and created the first government in Costa Rica’s post-independence period that did not include representatives of the country’s most prominent families. Guardia dominated Costa Rica’s political affairs until his death in 1882, when his friend, Prospero Fernandez, replaced him. Fernandez was in turn succeeded in 1885 by Braulio Carrillo’s son-in-law, Bernardo Soto.17 Soto governed until 1889. Thereafter, Costa Rica experienced a long period of political stability that lasted virtually unbroken until 1948. Though some analysts have argued that during this period democratic rule was present in Costa Rica, such a contention is unjustified. Universal male suffrage was not instituted until the general elections of December 1913, and women were not extended the right to vote until 1949.18 Notwithstanding the political shortcomings, Tomas Guardia and his immediate successors brought about measurable changes. Guardia helped design a constitution that established the supremacy of civil authority over the military, and he replaced the bicameral congress with a single legislative assembly.19 He also levied higher taxes, used tax revenues to pay for

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education, public health, and transportation, and he backed the building of the railroad connecting the Meseta Central with Limon. For the Guardia government, the construction of the railroad signified more than helping export larger quantities of coffee. It also meant facilitating the state’s ability to increase its power and legitimacy by reaching the people in the regions surrounding the central area. Costa Rica’s economic elites began to finance the construction of the railroad in 1871. The decision to build the San Jose-Limon railroad had a major unintended effect. To pay for the construction of the railroad, the coffee planters took foreign loans. Because of a temporary major drop in demand for Costa Rica’s coffee in the foreign market, they were unable to repay the loans prior to the completion of the railroad. To subsidize its completion, they persuaded the government to grant the rights to plant bananas in the Caribbean tropical lowlands to the company that had contracted to build the railroad. The railroad was completed in 1890, and bananas became Costa Rica’s second most important export.20 A second railroad was started in 1897, connecting San Jose with Puntarenas, on the Pacific coast. Fernandez, who was backed by Costa Rica’s emerging salaried middle class, followed in Guardia’s steps by instituting additional educational reforms and bringing about the full separation of church and state. Soto, who assumed the presidency after Fernandez’s death and married the deceased president’s daughter, expanded the original educational reforms by establishing free compulsory education in Costa Rica’s principal towns and villages.21 Coffee production and the regime of Tomas Guardia and his immediate successors had three noticeable effects. First, as Costa Rica’s principal engine of economic growth, coffee helped forge a relationship of interdependence between different economic sectors.22 To satisfy demands by European markets and to ensure high quality, coffee planters and producers of large-, middle-, and small-sized coffee enterprises created an environment of interdependence. Moreover, because of Costa Rica’s small and relatively homogeneous population, the planters sought to strengthen their political, economic, and social ties with the labor force.23 The workforce of the coffee estates “was not made up of a conquered race or of imported slaves held in inferior status by the institutionalized tyranny of a ruling class, but consisted of persons accustomed to being free and who had the same cultural heritage as the emerging coffee baron.”24 Second, the export of coffee served as an incentive for people to move to the agricultural frontier in order to grow coffee. It spread the

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“population ­outward from the urban centers of the Meseta Central.”25 And third, as the export of coffee became more important, those associated with its production recognized that to remain competitive in the international market, Costa Rica needed better roads and railways.26 In short, coffee transformed Costa Rica into Central America’s first “liberal oligarchic state.”27 The argument offered so far can be contrasted with Chile’s experience during the nineteenth century. Analysis of Chile shows that the greater the similarity in preferences between a territory’s principal economic elites during the early days of independence, the fewer the obstacles to state formation. The argument is built on two propositions. The first proposition contends that the differences in preferences between a territory’s economic elites are likely to be less intense if the elites control a small area and are not heavily dependent on the exploitation of the indigenous population for cheap labor than if the elites face diametrically opposite conditions. The second proposition suggests that after independence the interaction between the Chile’s economic elites was reinforced either negatively or positively by their attitudes concerning whether or not to open their markets to foreign competitors. When economic elites agreed that it would be in their best interests to open their markets to foreign competitors, the agreement facilitated the creation of the state; when some opposed the unlocking of markets, the disagreement delayed the formation of the state.28 The above arguments, with a few modifications, apply to Costa Rica. Because the colony consisted of a small territory that lacked great mineral wealth and access to a sizable indigenous population, Costa Rica’s settlers were compelled to cooperate with one another and create an economic and social system that was not rigidly stratified. The absence of a large indigenous population and the presence of small peasant holdings during the colonial period reduced the need on the part of Costa Rica’s ruling classes to create a powerful and permanent military apparatus.29 The difference between Chile’s political leadership and Costa Rica’s proved to be significant. Chile’s leaders were profoundly more effective at forming the state than Costa Rica’s leaders. The success on the part of Chile’s political leaders can be largely attributed to the army’s early involvement in the political process. Though Costa Rica’s economic elites, like Chile’s, had become fairly interdependent during the colonial period, in neither case were they able to extend their relationship to the post-­independence period. With independence came domestic political

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strife in both cases. Though leaders shared several economic interests, these i­nterests were undermined by the presence of political differences. But Chile had an advantage over Costa Rica. With the Spaniards mostly out of the picture, the Chilean army became the only institution with the strength to tilt one way or the other the dispute between rival political factions. When independence arrived in Costa Rica, its leaders did not have a military force that could be relied on to end the strife that had begun to dominate the political arena. This situation began to change as the export of coffee enabled certain Costa Ricans to gather sufficient wealth to create an army that could be used to protect their economic and political interests. And yet, this step did not bring about the immediate alleviation of strife; on the contrary, it encouraged its intensification. Political strife started to recede only after Costa Rican military officers began to perceive their institution as the only independent entity capable of standing above the insular interests dividing the civilian leaders. The Democratization Process in Costa Rica In 1889 the Catholic Unity Party, which had been organized under the auspices of the Catholic Church to combat the Liberals’ anti-clerical policies, succeeded at garnering more votes than its opponent during the presidential elections. Initially, Costa Rica’s pro-Liberal military prevented the elected president from assuming his post, but demonstrations instigated by the Catholic Church compelled the organizers of the subversion to allow the process to proceed. Though the Catholic Unity Party lost control of the executive branch during the next presidential election, and the party was soon thereafter suppressed, from then on Ticos began to witness the splintering of the Liberals and the creation of new parties. In the meantime, between 1905 and 1914, Costa Rica’s Liberal presidents instituted a constitutional amendment that established the direct popular election of public officials. They also extended the franchise, encouraged political participation, and provided greater access to public office to non-­ members of the aristocracy. As explained by Booth, Costa Rica’s increasingly complex class structure “widened the distribution of power resources throughout society and produced new class and political forces.”30 The further opening of the political regime did not ensue smoothly. The economic crisis provoked by the First World War led Costa Rica’s president to impose major economic reforms, new taxes, and an austerity program. Costa Rica’s elites did not welcome those measures. Near the

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end of January 1917, José Federico Tinoco and his brother, José Joaquín, mounted a coup and established a military dictatorship. The action did not remain unanswered. Popular sentiment against the two brothers mounted steadily until early August 1919, when José Joaquín was assassinated. Shortly thereafter, his brother stepped down and went into exile in Europe. The response to the coup and to the establishment of a military dictatorship revealed something very important about the Ticos: The only political system they would accept was civilian constitutional rule.31 For the next 30 years, Ticos continued to alter their electoral system, expand suffrage, and create organizations designed to address a wide range of issues. The onset of the 1929 Great Depression added impetus to the process and led to the emergence of a Communist party as well as a workers’ confederation. Jointly, they became a major political force in the 1940s. Ironically, in time they formed an alliance with Costa Rica’s Republican Party. Together, the Republican Party and the party created by communists, which they named the Vanguard Party, compelled the legislature to approve a social security system, provide equal pay for equal work to men and women, allow labor the right to form unions, and institute an eight-hour workday. Troubled by the political power generated by the new alliance, representatives of the coffee aristocracy joined forces with the anticommunist middle class to establish the National Unity Party. At this stage, it is necessary to insert into the analysis the roles played by three international actors: Guatemala, the United States, and Nicaragua. In 1947 Costa Rica was home to the largest and most powerful middle class in all of Latin America. At the same time, the presence of United Fruit, with its extraordinary economic and political power, unintentionally spurred the Vanguard Party to gain enough support from the plantation workers to become one of the most powerful leftist parties in the entire Western Hemisphere. The tension generated by the existence of both political forces, along with the Republican Party’s drive to retain control of the government, attracted the attention of the three aforementioned international actors. On February 8, 1948, Costa Rica held general elections. Otilio Ulate Blanco, the presidential candidate of the newly formed National Unity Party, won 55 percent of the votes. The Republicans, which with the Vanguard Party dominated the legislature, claimed that the elections were fraudulent and demanded that they be annulled. Their demands carried the day, but not for long. By then, José Figueres, a Costa Rican businessman who had been forced by President Rafael Angel Calderón into exile

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in Mexico in 1942, was convinced that Calderón would never allow fair elections and began to build a “National Liberation Army.” The legislature’s attempt to invalidate the electoral outcome incited protests. On March 12, Figueres, using the protests as justification, ordered his army to attack the governmental forces stationed in San Jose. Nicaragua’s leader, Anastasia Somoza, who had held dictatorial power over his country since the second half of the 1930s, offered to send military equipment to Costa Rica’s government so that it could protect itself from Figueres’s army. Washington did not welcome Somoza’s initiative. It condemned the dictator’s abrasive behavior and failure to address his country’s own economic and social problems. But the United States also feared that the Vanguard Party, because of its political alliance with the Republicans, would be the entity that would benefit the most from Nicaragua’s military assistance. Hoping to prevent the expansion of conflict, Washington persuaded the Nicaraguan leader to retract his offer. In the meantime, Guatemala’s president, Juan José Arévalo, who was determined to eradicate the presence of dictatorships throughout Central America, provided military assistance to Figueres’s army. On April 24, some six weeks after the start of the civil war, Figueres’s National Liberation Army entered San José. By then his political adversary had already acquiesced.32 Figueres ruled for the next 19 months as the head of a provisional junta named Founding Council. During its tenure, the Council replaced the army with a 7500-member national police, directed the writing of a new constitution, outlawed the Vanguard Party, granted women and illiterates the right to vote, gave citizenship to the children of black immigrants, put into effect basic welfare legislation, established civil service to eliminate the patronage system in government, and nationalized banks. When Figueres and the Council stepped down in 1949, he said: “The health of democracy in Latin America demands that men who have seized power by force go home when normalcy is restored.”33 Since Figueres stepped down voluntarily, elections in Costa Rica have been held regularly, and the country continues to be Latin America’s second most developed democracy. Analysis of Costa Rica’s State-Creation and Political-Regime Processes After independence, as the leaders of Costa Rica and Chile strove to create their respective regimes, they were aided by three conditions: the initial occupation of a relatively small area, the absence of great mineral wealth,

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and the minimal dependence on the exploitation of an indigenous population for cheap labor. Those three conditions were necessary, but not sufficient, to bring about the rapid development of the state. In each case, the armed forces had to intervene to control the discord that had arisen between the country’s principal civilian leaders.34 Chile was able to consolidate the power of the state in the 1830s, nearly 40 years before Costa Rica, because it had formed an army during the colonial period. Costa Rica managed to consolidate the power of the state only after the army, formed with the intent of protecting the interests of the country’s coffee elites, established itself as an independent entity. In each case, moreover, those who relied on the military to gain control of the government ruled for an extended period with nearly dictatorial power and sought, in the process, to diminish the authority of the military. Based on the last declaration, one could postulate that interdependent economic elites who could rely on the backing of a strong military were faster at consolidating the power of the state than interdependent economic elites who interacted in a political environment that lacked the presence of a strong military. The production and exportation of coffee that began to evolve rapidly after 1900 gave rise to an economic aristocracy in Costa Rica and stimulated economic inequality. However, the absence of a large indigenous population forced landowners to depend heavily on scarce rural workers. This dependency prevented the emergence of deep socioeconomic cleavages.35 Like several other Spanish American states, Costa Rica relied on the military to consolidate the power of the state. Its dependence on the military, however, was never as strong as it was in the other Spanish American states. Such a condition facilitated the early establishment of civilian rule and the steady growth of a culture that favored it. Egalitarian traits inherited from earlier periods prevailed, as did the general belief that uncontrolled capitalism provoked undesirable socioeconomic dislocations and inequalities. These attitudes facilitated the expansion of the state’s role in a wide range of areas, including banking, insurance, telephone and electrical service, railroads, ports, and refineries, and these attitudes helped to promote the subsidizing of health care, higher education, and housing.36 The presence of a homogeneous society does not guarantee the development of a stable democratic regime.37 However, all other things being equal, the task of creating a democratic regime is markedly easier in a homogeneous society than in one divided by reinforcing ethnic, economic, and social cleavages. It was estimated that by 1925 about 80 percent of Costa Rica’s population was white, 14 percent mestizo, and 4

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percent black.38 The actual size of the indigenous population remains unclear. In the 1920s, it was estimated to be smaller than 1 percent of the entire population, but the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs has estimated that in 2016, indigenous people accounted for 2.5 percent of Costa Rica’s entire population.39 Regardless of which estimate is correct, it could be argued that Ticos were aided in the creation of Spanish America’s second-most-developed democracy by a relatively small territory that lacked deep regional economic divides, did not possess vast mineral resources, and was inhabited by a very small indigenous population. And yet, not all is well in Costa Rica today. In the early 1980s, conditions began to worsen, and public support for democracy started to diminish. Between 2000 and 2016, the number of Ticos who believed that democracy was preferable to another form of government dropped measurably. In 2000, Latinobarómetro analysts noted that 83 percent of Ticos favored democracy, 5.6 percent believed that in certain instances it would be better to have an authoritarian regime, and 6.2 percent indicated that they did not care what type of political regime Costa Rica had. Sixteen years later, the percentage of the Ticos who favored democracy over any other regime had dropped to 60 percent.40 The substantial change in attitude followed a shock to Costa Rica’s domestic economic environment in the early 1980s. Its wide-ranging social commitment compelled Costa Rica to borrow so extensively that by 1983 its foreign debt had reached 147 percent of its GDP. The US and European governments, along with the  International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), expressed their willingness to assist, but only if Costa Rica engaged in major structural readjustments that required its government to liberalize the economy, open new markets for its exports, and reduce its budget and workforce. In the years that followed, the Costa Rican government adopted several of the recommended measures. The state divested itself of most of its ventures and initiated free trade agreements with many countries throughout Latin America, and with the United States, Canada, China, Singapore, and the European Union. As a result of these changes, the value of Costa Rica’s exports as a percentage of GDP rose from 27 percent in 1985 to 49 percent in 2007. The liberalization of the market helped the economy grow at an average of 4.7 per year since 1987, one of the fastest rates in Latin America.41 The benefits generated by the opening of the market, however, were unequally distributed throughout Costa Rica. Between 1980 and 1989, the public workforce declined one-seventh, spending on education came

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down 35 percent, and spending on health fell nearly 50 percent. In two years, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased by more than 20 percentage points to 54 percent. Despite the fact that the ratio of families living below the poverty line fell in the early 1990s to 20 percent, it has remained at about the same level since then, and inequality has increased.42 This increase has been accompanied by a reduction in the size of the country’s middle class.43 Ticos took to the streets to demand protection as the changes ensued. The government listened, and it doubled social assistance programs and increased spending on housing.44 These measures were not enough to lessen the level of discontent. In April 2014, Luis Guillermo Solís, the candidate for the Citizens Action Party, won the presidential contest. His election broke the monopoly that the National Liberation Front and the Social Christian Unity Party had held on the presidency. During his campaign, Solís promised to fight Costa Rica’s poverty rate and eradicate corruption—issues that had troubled the administration of his predecessor, President Laura Chinchilla. Specifically, Solís stated that he intended to “recover that sense of solidarity, of social inclusion, and commitment to the neediest Costa Ricans that has been lost.”45 Solís’s election did not manage to convince Ticos that they should develop a more favorable attitude toward democracy. A public opinion poll conducted by the Investigative Center of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica in 2015 noted that 70 percent of voters in the country believed that the economy was in shambles, and only 37.1 percent had confidence in the president. Those who were dissatisfied voiced concern about the growing rate of unemployment, which in 2015 surpassed 10 percent.46 Moreover, though the 2015 Household Survey reported that the overall rate of poverty had decreased to 21.7 percent from 22.4 percent in 2014, extreme poverty had risen from 5.8 percent in 2010 to 7.2 percent in 2015.47 The growing fear that corruption is deeply embedded in Costa Rica’s political system seems to have also undercut the Ticos’ earlier positive sentiments toward democracy.48 The overall picture is not entirely negative. Although in 2016 only 60 percent of Ticos favored democracy over other types of political regimes, and only 11 percent claimed that the government served different social classes within the population well, when asked whether they were satisfied with their lives, 87 percent said yes, and when asked whether they had the freedom to speak openly and criticize the government, 69 percent stated that they did. Those last two figures are telling, because when compared

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with the way the citizens of other Latin American states responded, in both cases Ticos ranked second in positive answers.49 In a comparative analysis of multiple countries, Chunlon Lu demonstrates that a country with a large and strong middle class is more likely to have a stable democracy than one in which the middle class is small and weak.50 It is unclear at this time whether poverty and income inequality will be reduced in Costa Rica, and whether corruption will be contained. In the past, the failure to restrain the rise of those conditions, concurrent with the inability to prevent the decline in the size of the middle class, gave populist leaders the platform they needed to weaken the structure of their state’s democratic system. Based on Chunlon Lu’s argument, one could wonder whether a further reduction in the size of Costa Rica’s middle class will imperil the future of its democratic regime. If the trend remains unaltered, the future that awaits Ticos will depend greatly on the strength of their democratic institutions and on whether the culture of democracy is deeply embedded in their minds. Whether Costa Rica’s new president, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, will be able to alter the trend is unknown. It should be noted, however, that Costa Rica’s standing in the Democracy Index has improved in the past two years. In 2016, Costa Rica ranked 26th in the world, but by 2018 it had jumped to 20th in the world and was no longer considered a flawed democracy.

Guatemala The Pre-Colonial and Colonial Periods Upon their arrival in 1524 to the territory known today as Guatemala, the Spaniards encountered a decaying Mayan empire. The empire’s population occupied the countries of modern-day Guatemala, Belize, the western portions of Honduras and El Salvador, and the five Mexican states of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Campeche, and Chiapas. The inhabitants of the empire developed an agricultural based society that depended on maize, beans, and root crops, supplemented by wild game and fish caught in rivers, lakes, and oceans. Their cities, which were densely populated, had created far-reaching production and trade networks. Though unified by a common belief system, its members were divided into some 28 political groups, spoke different languages, and were constantly fighting one another.51 The Spanish interlopers initially had difficulty imposing their authority, but by 1548 they had overcome the resistance of the various indigenous groups and had created an audiencia.52 During subsequent decades,

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the colonizers enlarged the size of their dominion, and by 1570 the audiencia known as the Captaincy General of Guatemala had assumed control over a region that stretched from the southern part of Mexico to Costa Rica. Although the Captaincy General was part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, it had its own ruler—a captain general—who governed with little supervision from his superiors, primarily because during the early years the region produced little that was considered valuable. Left largely to their own devices, the Spaniards forced the original inhabitants to adopt Western customs and values, and to work the land controlled by a small number of families who were Spanish or of Spanish descent. As in other regions throughout Spanish America, the new inhabitants brought about the destruction of a vast number of indigenous people, mostly through disease epidemics. In the eighteenth century, the Spanish monarchy introduced policies designed to stimulate exports. Those measures enhanced the value of various regions under Guatemala’s management, and this situation in turn led to the establishment of new, independent provinces. By the end of the century, the Spanish monarchy had created Chiapas, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and had designated them as separate units. These changes would help define the boundaries of the latter three areas following their eventual independence and establishment as states. The State and Regime Creation Processes of Guatemala As noted in the discussion of Mexico and Costa Rica, very few of the Central American leaders played pivotal role during the fight for independence. During much of the struggle, Captain General Jose de Bustamante ruled the Captaincy General of Guatemala with an iron fist and repressed all moves toward independence. After Mexico’s breakup from Spain, a council in Guatemala City also declared its independence and established its own government, with the captain general serving as the chief executive. The leaders of several municipalities throughout the region did not accept the council’s decision and took it upon themselves to declare their own independence from Spain, Mexico, and Guatemala. The government in Guatemala counteracted by incorporating the kingdom into the Mexican Empire. The leaders of the provinces, determined to retain the independence they had possessed during the colonial period, did not acquiesce peacefully, and soon a civil war erupted. It was a short one. When the anointed emperor of Mexico stepped down in

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1823, the leaders of the various Central American regions gathered in Guatemala City and founded the United Provinces of Central America. The attendees agreed to form a federation composed of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. They also decided that the newly established entity would be ruled from Guatemala City, and that local governors would govern each of the five states that made up the federation. Peace did not follow. Dissent came from two sources. First, other states begrudged the power Guatemala’s commercial and bureaucratic elites had held over them during the colonial era. Moreover, as in the other newly freed former colonies in Spanish America, ideological differences immediately divided the elite members of the new republic. The elite class was divided into Conservative and Liberal factions—that fought over government power, economic policies, and the role of the Catholic Church in society. Conservatives, like those everywhere throughout Spanish America, advocated granting the Catholic Church a prominent role, establishing a central government with extensive authority, and limiting voting rights. They viewed the state as a social organization that assigned “roles and places to individuals as members of groups.” Liberals, in turn, called for the creation of a central government with limited powers, and for the separation of state and church. Liberals repudiated Spanish influence and sought to emulate Great Britain and the United States, but they had no intention of surrendering their privileges to the masses.53 It did not take long for the opposing factions to face one another on the battlefield. After a brief civil war in 1827, Guatemalan Conservatives gained control of Guatemala. Two years later, Liberal forces led by General Francisco Morazán, a Honduran, retaliated and took over Guatemala City. Shortly after he became president, Morazán moved the capital to San Salvador and initiated a series of liberal reforms. He abolished slavery, established habeas corpus and trial by jury, and curtailed the power of the clergy. Guatemala’s governor, Mariano Galvez, implemented similar measures. He confiscated Church property; wrested control of schooling from the Church; introduced educational policies designed to bring about a major cultural change; promoted the immigration of Europeans, particularly British; launched public health initiatives; established far-reaching new judicial codes; and lowered tariffs. In his eagerness to modernize ­agriculture and privatize land ownership, he passed a law that stripped Amerindian villages and families of any lands for which they lacked titles.54

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Conservatives objected to the new programs, but no one took a more aggressive stand than Rafael Carrera, a mestizo. Supported by the Church and by the indigenous groups of southern and eastern Guatemala, and aided by the spontaneous revolts engendered by a cholera epidemic that spread misery throughout Guatemala in 1837, Carrera mounted an attack on the liberal regime and soon became the country’s de facto ruler. By then, the breakup of the confederation had started. Nicaragua left it in 1838, and Costa Rica and Honduras followed suit shortly thereafter.55 Carrera was elected president in 1844, was forced into exile for a brief period in 1848, returned, assumed the presidency in 1851 with the support of the military and the indigenous communities from the heavily populated western highlands, and remained in power until his death in 1865. During his tenure as head of state, Carrera consolidated his power; formally declared Guatemala a sovereign republic; reinstated much of the Catholic clergy’s lost power; imposed voting restrictions based on ownership of property, profession, and literacy; became the sole person responsible for appointing regional governors; reduced foreign influence; started to develop the country’s roads and infrastructure; and managed to energize the economy. Though Conservatives disliked him, mainly because of his reliance on the indigenous population for support, they came to acknowledge that his policies served them well.56 Vicente Cerna y Cerna succeeded Carrera, but not for long. Liberals revolted, toppled the Cerna government, and assumed power in 1871. Two years later, Justo Rufino Barrios, a Liberal who had played a critical role in the revolt as the military commander of the western regions, was elected president. Barrios’s political style was authoritarian, like Carreras’s, but his ideology differed. Like his predecessors, he was determined to further unify and strengthen the authority of the state, but in a different way. Like the Liberals of the earlier decades, Barrios approved a constitution in 1879 that curtailed the power of the Church and seized its properties; guaranteed the free practice of religion; and established a public-school system that was laical, free, and compulsory. To promote rapid economic growth, he encouraged coffee cultivation and granted land at moderate or no cost. Voting rights, however, were restricted to men 21 years or older who could read and write or had a profession that provided them with substantial monetary resources. With the exception of two Conservatives who ruled for no more than six years in the 1920s, Liberal caudillos succeeded Barrios. Like their Liberal predecessors, each sought to exert authoritarian power. Jose Ubico, one of

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Guatemala’s last two Liberal leaders, assumed the presidency in 1931 and ruled for the next 14 years. Ubico rapidly moved to strengthen his power. He established a close association with coffee planters and United Fruit, reinforced the army, compelled members of the Supreme Court to relinquish their posts to supplant them with his own political associates, and replaced elected mayors with town managers answerable to himself.57 Constrained by the constitution to serve only two consecutive terms, Ubico convened a Constitutional Assembly in 1935 and ordered its members to determine whether he could retain the presidency until 1943. They acquiesced. Freed of electoral limits, he continued to adopt measures designed to solidify his authority and his relationship with Guatemala’s domestic and foreign landowners. He pressured Congress to pass a Vagrancy Law that required all landless peasants to work for an employer for at least 150 days a year. This measure provided a steady supply of cheap labor to plantation owners and United Fruit. Moreover, in 1936 he granted the American company a 99-year contract for a Pacific coast plantation that exempted it from taxation and import duties. To prevent the demand for higher wages elsewhere in the economy, he put an upper limit of 50 cents a day on wages. By the start of the 1940s, however, the call for change had intensified exponentially. Labor unions, backed by a relatively large middle class, initiated a series of strikes and protests. In 1944, with his power deteriorating rapidly, Ubico suspended constitutional guarantees, arrested opponents, and placed his own supporters in high university positions. His opponents called for a general strike, the creation of a democratic structure, and the institutionalization of universal rights. Aware that he would not be able to remain in office much longer, Ubico resigned, but not without first selecting his successor, Juan Federico Ponce Vaides. Ubico’s decision did not appease the opposition, and new general strikes ensued immediately. Following the overthrow of Ubico’s designated leader, a Provisional Junta took over and called for new elections. José Arévalo was elected president on December 19.58 In his March 1945 inaugural speech, Arévalo announced that he intended to free Guatemala from Washington’s control. He proposed a new program based on the idea of “spiritual socialism.” The plan was predicated on the assumption that the government had to create c­ onditions that would facilitate each individual’s psychological development and moral liberation. Arévalo disavowed both Marxism and individualistic capitalism. He contended that by viewing the individual as an economic

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animal and by prescribing class struggle, Marxism undermined the individual’s spiritual foundation. He also claimed that individualistic capitalism, with its emphasis on the individual over collective interests, weakened the structure of society.59 That same year Arévalo signed a new constitution that granted men and women 18 years or older the right to vote and to seek public office. However, it imposed two clauses. It stipulated that it was obligatory for men who could write and read to vote, but for women it was optional. In either case, they would use the secret ballot. Illiterates were not required to vote; but if they did, they had to express their choice publicly. Afraid that Moscow might decide to initiate aggressive measures throughout Latin America, Washington took Arévalo’s ascent to power seriously. However, upon evaluating Guatemala’s new constitution, the Department of State initially concluded that it was free of communist dogma. Officials at the Department of State wrote: Like other recent constitutions in Latin America and elsewhere, the Guatemala charter heavily emphasized the responsibility of the state with respect to economic and social matters and asserted its concern for the welfare of the underprivileged. It formulated ambitious economic goals; it spelled out extensive social reforms; it called for a more equitable distribution of the national income. It specifically provided the basis for the emergence of a protected labor force and for land reform legislation.60

Despite the analysis, US foreign policy decision-makers became concerned that communists were beginning to play an important role in the design of Arévalo’s policies. They questioned his 1945 support of the Caribbean Legion—a Latin American organization committed to ousting dictatorships, by force if necessary—and were troubled by his decisions to institute social security and Labor code laws that threatened United Fruit’s investments.61 Convinced that he needed a representative in Guatemala who would speak bluntly about US concerns and interests, President Harry Truman appointed Richard Patterson as US ambassador to Guatemala in 1948. Patterson wasted little time in expressing his country’s discontent. In January 1949, the new US ambassador warned the Guatemalan president that he was there to promote US interests and that the relations between both countries would suffer if the host country did not stop undermining

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them. A year later, Patterson demanded that Arévalo fire 17 government officials, all of whom Washington claimed to be communists. By 1950, the Truman administration had concluded that the communists in Guatemala were taking advantage of the country’s free processes and institutions to expand their own power and destroy freedom. Reluctant to take a major stand against the Guatemalan government, the US president acquiesced to Arévalo’s demand that Patterson be removed from his post for having insisted that Guatemalan officials be dismissed.62 Jacobo Arbenz was sworn in as Guatemala’s new president in March 1951. Though in his inaugural speech, Arbenz stated that he intended to transform his country’s predominantly feudal system into a modern capitalist state, not everyone in Washington believed him. Distrust about the new president’s intentions increased when Guatemala’s Labor Court ordered United Fruit to rehire 4500 Guatemalan employees who had been laid off for three years and pay them $650,000 in back wages. Doubts were also aroused when the Arbenz administration instituted an agrarian reform bill that called for the division and redistribution of idle land exceeding 223 acres per owner, including land owned by foreign corporations.63 In 1954, convinced that communists would take over the reins of government in Guatemala unless the Arbenz regime was toppled, President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to launch a covert operation that it had been working on for some time. The operation fulfilled its intended objective, but it also marked a turning point in Guatemala’s history and pushed the country onto a treacherous path. Immediately after the overthrow of Arbenz, all organizations associated with his government and all political parties were declared illegal. Land reforms were reversed, and in a short time, 2 percent of the population, among them top military officials, had gained control of 67 percent of the country’s arable land. Between 1954 and 1986, 14 different governments ruled Guatemala, 12 of which were military juntas. Though Guatemala’s agricultural economy, like those of other Central American states, continued to grow and diversify during that period, the change was not accompanied by an increase in economic and social equity. Because the various military regimes were unwilling to address the needs of the poor or the indigenous people during the post-1954 period, the afflicted population began to exert pressure on the state. The state, in turn, relied on its military superiority to exercise a level of repression almost unmatched anywhere else throughout Latin America.64

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The state’s measures did not stop Guatemala’s marginalized citizens from rebelling. Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, Guatemala became a highly polarized and violent society. In the 1960s an insurgency, led by Ladino65 groups named Fuerzas Rebeldes Armadas, failed to induce Guatemala’s core leaders to transform the political, economic, and social system. Their failure can be largely attributed to the extensive role played by US military advisors, who helped convert Guatemala’s army into a highly efficient counterinsurgency apparatus. Conditions began to change in the 1970s. Compelled by economic conditions to migrate to the southern coast as seasonal laborers, and also forced to migrate to Guatemala City, Mayans began to join forces with Ladino groups. Between 1976 and 1978, peasants and agricultural workers, both Mayans and poor Ladinos established the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC). In February 1980, the CUC organized strikes against sugar and cotton plantations on Guatemala’s southern coast. During that same period, emboldened by the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador, both in 1979, the Ladino revolutionary leaders of the 1960s joined forces with the Mayans, and together they launched a major offensive against government troops. Guatemala’s military responded with a counteroffensive that led to the destruction of 440 villages, the killing of some 150,000 civilians, and the displacement of over one million people.66 Military success on the battlefield did not help those in power. Following fraudulent elections in 1974, 1978, and 1982, the military embarked on the most brutal counterinsurgency campaign it had ever launched. However, after being denied access to financial assistance by international actors that repudiated its behavior, the military opted for a face-changing strategy. It authorized the creation of an assembly to draft a new constitution and allowed the election of a new president. The 1985 election did not concur with the norms typically associated with a democratic process, for only right and center parties were permitted to participate. Though a civilian leader was elected for the first time in 15 years, the change signified little. The army continued to control the state, and the economic and social issues that had been plaguing the country since the middle 1950s remained unaddressed. The economic growth experienced in earlier years had stopped, and the implementation of austerity programs became the norm. By the late 1980s, close to 90 percent of Guatemala’s population lived below the country’s official poverty line. The people voiced their strong dissatisfaction with the new political system when only 30 percent of eligible voters participated in the 1990 presidential elections.

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During the first six years of the 1990s, the opposing parties underwent considerable pressure from external and internal actors to design a workable solution. With the Soviets no longer posing a threat to its interests in the Americas, Washington pressured the Guatemalan military to alter its behavior. In turn, the Guatemalan revolutionary forces were aware that their resources from sympathetic foreign actors had been in decline for quite some time. Realizing that they would fail to change their political system without the continued support of these resources, the revolutionary forces decided to alter their strategy. After engaging in extensive negotiations, Guatemala’s rival parties signed several accords. In March 1994, they gave the green light to a Human Rights Accord that established an international verification mechanism to monitor human rights. In June of that same year, they signed the Resettling of Displaced Populations Accord and agreed to form a Truth and Reconciliation Committee that would investigate human rights abuses. In May 1996, they signed the Accord on Socio-Economic Issues. The last agreement did not resolve the problems generated by widespread poverty, high levels of unemployment, income inequality, and imbalanced land ownership. However, it committed the government to the implementation of a tax reform that would make it possible to increase spending on health and education. Possibly of greater long-term significance was the signing of the Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. The agreement called for a reduction in the size and budget of the armed forces, mandated constitutional reforms that placed the military under civilian rule, and limited the military’s role to the protection of the country from external threats. Thereafter, responsibility for internal security matters would be handled by a new civilian police force.67 Analysis of the State-Creation and Political-Regime Processes of Guatemala Except for the year when Guatemala existed as part of the Mexican Empire, and the years between 1823 and 1838 when Guatemala was a member of the United Provinces of Central America, the development of its state and political regime can be divided into six episodes. The first one, which was dominated by Liberals, started in 1839 and lasted until December 1844. The second period began when Carrera ousted the Liberal government and assumed power. Conservative regimes dominated Guatemala’s political system until June 1871. The third episode was the lengthiest. For some

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73 years, Liberals dominated the country’s political arena almost continuously. Though between 1839 and 1944 Guatemala experienced great moments of turmoil, they were not that dissimilar in number or intensity from the clashes other Latin American countries endured. During that time, the struggle was mainly between Liberals and Conservatives, each advocating its distinct preferred state structure. The fourth episode started at the end of 1944, when an alliance of business and military leaders, as well as a coalition of intellectuals and students, demanded the resignation of President Ubico and the creation of representative government. Shortly after becoming the leader of Guatemala’s first authentic democratic government, Arévalo announced that he intended to transform Guatemala’s economic and social structure. His policies generated apprehension in Washington. Such concern intensified when the people of Guatemala elected Arbenz as their new president five years later. Convinced that Arbenz’s policies were being advocated and backed by Guatemalan communists and supported by Moscow, and that jointly the two intended to transform Guatemala into a Soviet puppet, President Eisenhower ordered the CIA to overthrow the Arbenz regime. The fifth episode began with Castro’s rise to power in Cuba. Troubled by its failure to prevent Cuba from moving into the Soviet camp, Washington launched a series of initiatives designed to avert the establishment of a “second Cuba” in the Western Hemisphere. Guatemala became one of Washington’s first projects among the initiatives.68 For the next 30 years, Guatemala was plagued by a civil war that led to the deaths or disappearances of hundreds of thousands of people. The rivalries were between whichever government was in power and various rebel groups composed of ethnic Mayan indigenous people and Ladino peasants. The start of the sixth episode is marked by the series of accords that ended the civil war. From the moment Guatemala became an independent state until 1945, Liberal and Conservative leaders had taken turns at dominating the political regime. Though the two groups differed on the amount of power they were willing to grant the central government and the role the Catholic Church should play, both sides were determined to protect their political, economic, and social status. For both factions, ­protecting their status and limiting voting rights meant ensuring that the very large indigenous population, which comprised 40 percent of the population, would have limited access to the political process. The lengthy civil war forced the elites to recognize that the struggle had severely damaged Guatemala’s economic, political, and social system, and to accept that if

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they hoped to improve conditions and receive foreign assistance they would have to extend the indigenous population and members of the lower socioeconomic strata greater rights and services. The enactment of Article 66 of the 1985 Constitution, recognized Mayan groups, granted them the right to use their indigenous languages, permitted them to form social organizations, and paved the road for future agreements.69 Ten years later, the government and the guerrillas signed an agreement that defined Guatemala as a “multi-ethnic, pluri-cultural and multilingual” state. The accord was included in the constitution and promised the introduction of anti-discriminatory legislation and the congressional approval of the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, commonly knows as the ILO-convention 169. It was also agreed that the state would promote bilingual education at all levels of the state’s educational system; that the use of indigenous languages within the legal system would be permitted through indigenous legal aid organizations; that bilingual judges and interpreters would be trained; and that legal defense services for indigenous women would be provided. Despite these positive developments, when a national referendum was held in 1999 on whether or not to advance cultural and linguistic plurality, only 43 percent of those who voted voiced their approval. This percentage represented barely 19 percent of the total electorate.70 In sum, from independence until 1945, small groups of elites, despite their conflicting ideas as to how to structure the state, together obstructed the state creation and democratization processes in Guatemala. Jointly they undermined the potential capacity of the country’s very large indigenous population to alter the existing balance of power. In the 1944–1945 period, intense dissatisfaction with the deeply rooted status quo compelled a vast number of Guatemalans to demand that democracy be introduced. Afraid that a communist-style regime would overtake the Guatemalan state, in 1954 Washington initiated a covert operation designed to overthrow the Guatemalan government. After the overthrow, and with Washington’s tacit approval, Guatemala’s military and established elites decided to recreate the political, economic, and social system they had lost during the experiment with democracy. Their actions engendered intense opposition from rural Ladinos and Mayans, and the resulting conflict morphed into a long-lasting and highly destructive civil war. After a very lengthy period, the Guatemalan elites were forced to recognize that the civil war had severely damaged Guatemala’s economic, political, and social system. That awareness, along with intense demands from foreign actors that Guatemala change its political system, compelled the elites to end the

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civil war and extend greater rights and services to the indigenous population and members of the lower socioeconomic strata. Certain conditions in Guatemala have improved. According to the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index, life expectancy at birth increased from 57.2 years in 1980 to 72.1 in 2013, and during the same period Guatemala’s ranking in the Development Index has gone up 41.1 percent. However, as reported by the World Bank, though Guatemala’s poverty rate dropped from 56 percent to 51 percent between 2000 and 2006, it increased to 59.3 percent in 2014. Of critical significance is the identity of those living in poverty—52 percent are indigenous people.71 To this day, the country’s indigenous population remains largely disenfranchised, and its members are by far the poorest and least educated. Guatemala also does poorly in the Corruption Perception Index. In 2016, it was considered to be the fourth-most corrupt state in the Western Hemisphere, surpassed by Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela. But not all news is bad news. When compared to others in Spanish America, Guatemala’s democracy seems to have improved slightly. In 2014, Guatemala’s democracy ranked below that of every other Spanish American government, with the exceptions of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba; in 2018, it continued to stand above that of Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba.72 A Comparative Analysis: Costa Rica and Guatemala If one takes into consideration that neither Costa Rica nor Guatemala possessed substantial mineral wealth; that though the two countries do not have common borders they are part of the same isthmus; and that people who shared a common culture colonized both territories at approximately the same time, it is worth repeating the question posed earlier: Why were Costa Rica’s leaders distinctly more successful than Guatemala’s in consolidating and legitimizing the power of the state and in helping establish a fairly well-developed democracy? From the moment they moved into today’s Costa Rica and Guatemala, the colonizers, and subsequently their progenies, sought to rule vastly different territories. In Costa Rica, the colonizers took over a territory that was sparsely populated by indigenous people, whereas in Guatemala the conquerors invaded an area that had been inhabited for more than two millenniums by people who viewed the land as theirs. Until the 1990s, Guatemala’s white population—Spaniards or immigrants who arrived

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from other parts of Europe principally during the mid-nineteenth century—opposed the creation of a state structure that included the participation of Guatemala’s large indigenous population and poor Ladinos. The process was also subverted by the disinclination on the part of an indigenous population to conform to the social practices advocated by the leaders of the state. As already noted, the indigenous population in Guatemala makes up around 41 percent of the population and is composed of communities that speak some 28 languages, but not always the country’s official language. This observation is not to suggest that the indigenous community should have acted differently. But as has been noted, the “extreme polarization of Guatemala’s social structure stems largely from the compounding of class divisions and exploitation with ethnic divisions and discrimination, which during some periods reached genocidal proportions.”73 This polarization helped impede the creation of a legitimate Guatemalan state. Fearing that the struggle between the competing parties would create a power vacuum that would enable communists to establish their own regime, Washington intervened. US covert action in Guatemala in 1954 brought down the regime the Eisenhower administration believed was enabling communists to strengthen their political power. At the same time, however, Washington’s action helped foster a greater divide between those in power and the various under-represented groups that were demanding that their needs be addressed. Convinced that those demanding a change in the structure of the political system would help reenergize communism in Guatemala, Washington took extraordinary measures to ensure that they would not succeed. As noted by an independent United Nations’ Truth  Commission, the United States, particularly under the Reagan administration, engaged in extensive advising, training, arming, and financing of the troops, even teaching torture, as part of its campaign against communism. Christian Tomuschat, the German jurist who headed the panel, adds that the “United States Government, through its constituent structures, including the Central Intelligence Agency, lent direct and indirect support to illegal state operations,” which in turn “had a significant bearing on human rights violations during the armed confrontation.”74 During this period, Costa Rica tried to distance itself from the troubles ensuing in neighboring states. However, Washington, under the Reagan administration, demanded that Costa Rica aid the United States in its struggle against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Costa Rica refused. Determined to play its own independent role, Costa Rica, under the presi-

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dency of Oscar Arias and with the support of Central American presidents, brokered a peace accord designed to bring to an end the military conflicts that had afflicted Central America for years. On August 7, 1987, the five Central American presidents signed in Guatemala City the Equipales II Accord. They agreed to engage in economic cooperation and created a framework for peaceful conflict resolution.75 An important note needs to be added at this stage. It has been established that the state creation process was slowed by the battle between two adamant adversaries: one group that advocated the creation of a state in which its power was centralized, with the Catholic Church playing a leading actor, versus a second group that favored a state in which its power was decentralized, with the Catholic Church playing a less influential role.76 Such a division existed in both Costa Rica and Guatemala, and although for a period of time it delayed the process of state creation in both states, ultimately it did not prove to be the principal cause. Several factors helped make the Ticos markedly more effective than Guatemalans at creating their state and forming their democratic regime. First, Costa Rica inherited from the colonial period an economic system in which its principal actors were substantially more interdependent on one another than their counterparts in Guatemala. Second, the size of Costa Rica’s territory was noticeably smaller than Guatemala’s. Third, Costa Rica’s population was smaller than Guatemala’s. Fourth, Costa Rica’s ethnic population was significantly more homogeneous than Guatemala’s. And fifth, during the Cold War, Washington was markedly less intrusive in Costa Rica’s domestic affairs than in Guatemala’s. The first four conditions help explain why the socioeconomic cleavages Costa Rica developed were never as deep or intense as those developed by Guatemala. The egalitarian traits Ticos inherited from earlier periods helped engender a political culture in which elites, rather than holding firmly to initial principles and positions, favored compromise and consensus.77 Moreover, from 1948 until 1982, Ticos in general believed that uncontrolled capitalism provoked undesirable socioeconomic dislocations and inequalities. This mindset facilitated the expansion of the state’s economic role in a wide range of areas, including banking, insurance, telephone and electrical service, railroads, ports, and refineries. In addition, the state subsidized health care, higher education, and housing, and it regulated imports, exports, agricultural production, and the environment.78 The above arguments can be summarized in the form of a hypothesis,

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Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of economic interdependence among members of a state’s elite, and the smaller the size of its territory, indigenous populations and level of US intervention in its domestic affairs, the easier it was for its leaders to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state and create a stable democratic regime.

The one condition that does not seem to have an equal effect throughout Central America is the size of a state’s indigenous populations. Based on the size of its indigenous population, Honduras should rank second behind Costa Rica in the Democracy Index, but it ranks next to last, just ahead of Nicaragua. In other words, the absence of a large indigenous population does not seem to have made it easier for Honduras to transition into a democracy. Moreover, for a number of years Honduras has been afflicted by a very high crime rate. At the same time, El Salvador, which has the third smallest indigenous population in Central America, ranks second in the Democracy Index, but it has a crime rate higher than Honduras’s. Possibly, the counterbalancing case is Nicaragua. Nicaragua has the second largest indigenous population and the least democratic system, and yet its crime rate is markedly lower than in the other states, even lower than Costa Rica’s. The one factor that differentiates Nicaragua from the other Central American states is that its president, Daniel Ortega, has been in office since 2007; and with the assistance of his wife Rosario Maurillo, who also serves as vice-president, he has sought to gain nearly complete control over the country’s political system. Ortega and Maurillo’s drive to retain power has engendered intensive domestic political resistance, but as of mid-2018 the two leaders have been successful in averting their own downfall. To find a reasonable answer for the uncovered inconsistencies it may be helpful to revisit the role of the United States and some American corporations. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, have been vulnerable to the actions initiated by the US government and extremely powerful fruit companies. Following Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in 1959, attempts by non-status groups to transform the political, economic, and social conditions of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala regained strength. However, it was not until 1979, when the Sandinistas had brought to an end the Somoza dynasty, that counter-governmental movements managed to make significant inroads. Fearful that a second “Nicaragua” would emerge throughout Central America, Washington

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established a center of military operations in Honduras in order to undercut the power of the Sandinista government and help the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador to offset the rebel movement that had sprung up in their midst. The only state that was spared the presence of US forces was Costa Rica. It is impossible to gauge the precise effects that intervention by American companies and the US government have had on the capacity of Central American states to create stable democracies. But one cannot dismiss the fact that Costa Rica—the one state that was the least affected by, first American companies, and subsequently by the US government—has developed the most advanced democracy in all of Central America. Thus, it is reasonable to propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of American companies’ control of the economies of Central American states since the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the greater the level of US intervention in the domestic affairs of Central American states designed to prevent the spread of communism within their midst, the harder it was for Central American states to create stable democratic regimes.

What future awaits Costa Rica and Guatemala? As already noted, during the past two decades, conditions in Costa Rica have worsened, and public support for democracy has diminished. Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings the country’s political system faces, Ticos have not lost hope, and it is unlikely that its political system will lose its democratic structure. A good measure of a people’s level of satisfaction toward their country is its level of emigration. With fewer than 3 percent of its citizens residing abroad, Costa Rica has the lowest rate of emigration in Central America and one of the lowest in all of Latin America. This figure stands in sharp contrast to the overall level of Spanish American emigration around the world, which makes up 13 percent of the global diaspora. A number of important changes, some of them contradictory, have taken place in Guatemala since it began to experiment with democracy. Between 2003 and 2013, the percentage of Guatemalans who favored democracy over any other form of political regime increased from 33 percent to 41 percent. At the same time, the percentage of Guatemalans who noted that in certain instances they would favor an authoritarian regime over a democratic regime increased from 10 to 19 percent.79 Another

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important factor is Guatemala’s Human Development Index (HDI). Guatemala’s HDI value for 2013 was 0.628. This value indicates that Guatemala stood at 125 out of 187 countries and territories. When compared with 20 other Spanish American countries, Guatemala ranked 17th. Between 1980 and 2013, Guatemala’s HDI value grew from 0.445 to 0.628, an increase of 41.1 percent or an average annual increase of about 1.05 percent. Between 1980 and 2013, Guatemala’s life expectancy at birth increased by 14.9 years, mean years of schooling went up by 3.2 years, expected years of schooling rose by 4.7  years, and Gross National Income  (GNI) per capita improved some 11.2 percent. These averages, however, do not tell the full story. Like averages, the HDI hides inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level. The Inequality-­ Adjusted HDI (IHDI) discounts each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. “The ‘loss’ in human development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI and can be expressed as a percentage. As the inequality in a country increases, the loss in human development also increases.” When inequality is accounted for, the HDI for Guatemala falls 32.8 percent, from 0.628 to 0.422. The average loss due to inequality for Latin America and the Caribbean countries is 24.5 percent.80 To be specific, more than half of Guatemala’s population is below the national poverty line, with 13 percent of them surviving in extreme poverty. But no one group is more aggrieved by poverty than Guatemala’s indigenous population, which comprises more than 40 percent of the country’s inhabitants. Some 73 percent of them live in poverty, and 22 percent in extreme poverty.81 Moreover, as pointed out earlier, Guatemala remains one of the most violent countries in Latin America and has the fifth-highest crime rate in the world. As reported by Freedom House, “violence related to the shipment of drugs from South America to the United States has spilled over the border from Mexico, with rival Mexican and Guatemalan drug gangs battling for territory. These groups have operated with impunity in the northern jungles, which serve as a storage and transit hub for cocaine en route to the United States.”82 On December 12, 2006, the United Nations and Guatemala agreed to form an independent international organization designed to investigate and prosecute serious crimes in Guatemala. An additional goal of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was to help strengthen the capacity of Guatemala’s national judicial institutions, including its Public Prosecutor’s Office and the National Civilian

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Police, to confront illegal groups and organized crime in the future. Initially, the decision had an important immediate effect. Since its creation, the organization has investigated the questionable actions of a number of high-level officials, including those by former Vice-President Roxana Baldetti and former President Otto Pérez Molina. The two were accused of customs fraud, racketeering, and bribery, and both were compelled to resign their respective posts. The future of these politicians is yet to be determined. However, on January 7, 2019, President Jimmy Morales announced that he was forcing members of the CICIG to leave the country. Canada and Western European governments immediately criticized the decision. The administration of President Donald Trump, on the other hand, said little, despite requests from 47 members of Congress that the United States impose sanctions on Guatemala.

Notes 1. Harold Blakemore and Clifford Smith, Latin America: Geographical Perspectives (London: Metheun and Company, 1971), 131–132. 2. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 309. 3. Quoted in D.  Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: how sectors shape the developmental prospects of states (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 185. 4. See Harold D.  Nelson, ed., Costa Rica: A Country Study (Washington, DC: American University, 1983), 12. 5. It is estimated that by 1800, 67 percent of Costa Rica’s population was Spanish and Mestizo, 16 percent was Indian, and 17 percent was Black. Most Blacks, however, resided along Costa Rica’s Caribbean coast. See Mitchell Seligson, “Costa Rica,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., Latin American Politics and Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 457. See also John A.  Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1989), 388. 6. That same year, Costa Ricans passed the Pacto de la Concordia. The pact formalized Costa Rica’s independence from Spain and set up the provisional government of the Province of Costa Rica. 7. In 1825, Costa Ricans passed the Fundamental Law of the Free Nation. The law described Costa Rica as an independent state within the United Provinces of Central America.

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8. See David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 273. 9. Between 1824 and 1842, only 5 battles took place in Costa Rica, while a total of 51 were fought in Guatemalan territory. 10. It was around this time that coffee became a modish drink in Europe. See Richard Biesanz, Karen Z.  Biesanz, and Marvin H.  Biesanz, The Costa Ricans (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 19. 11. It is estimated that coffee cultivation in Costa Rica started in 1779. See Nelson, Costa Rica: A Country Study, 12. 12. Ibid, 19. See also Seligson, “Costa Rica,” 459; Dana G. Munro, The Latin American Republics (New York: Appleton-Century, Inc., 1960), 412; and Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 389. 13. See R.  L. Woodward, “Central America,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., Spanish America After Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 180. 14. Tico (feminine tica, plural ticos, ticas) is the term typically used for a native of Costa Rica, in place of the formal Costarricense. 15. According to Booth, the number by 1847 did not amount to more than 10 percent. See Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 389. Seligson estimates that less than 3 percent voted in the first election under the 1844 constitution. Seligson, “Costa Rica,” 461. 16. Between 1835 and 1899, Costa Rica was ruled by the military over half of the time, and the generals in the presidency were almost always wealthy coffee planters. See Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 389–390. The number would increase markedly if the period considered were to begin with Mora's presidency in 1849. 17. Munro, The Latin American Republics, 415. 18. Seligson, “Costa Rica,” 461. See also Leslie Bethell, Latin America: Politics and Society Since 1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 41. 19. The same type of assembly exists today. 20. See Seligson, “Costa Rica,” 459; and Carolyn Hall, Costa Rica: A Geographical Interpretation in Historical Perspective. (Westview Press, 1985). Print. 21. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 390. 22. See Seligson, “Costa Rica,” 459; and Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 389. 23. Samuel Z. Stone, The Heritage of the Conquistadors (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 113. 24. Charles D.  Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica (New York: Praeger, 1982), 3. 25. Nelson, Costa Rica: A Country Study, 147.

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26. Hall, A Geographical Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 125. 27. D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 186. 28. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina and Peru (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), Chapters 3 and 4. 29. See Alan Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 189. 30. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 435–436. 31. Ibid., 436. 32. Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), 100–107. 33. Ibid., 106. 34. Such strife never reached the level of intensity experienced by countries in which the leaders controlled large territories, had access to an abundance of mineral resources, or could rely on the cheap labor of large indigenous Indian populations, but it was sufficiently high to require the involvement of the army. See Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas, Chapter five. 35. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 460. 36. Ibid., 448. A figure that helps capture the role of the state in the economy is the size of its workforce, which increased from 6.1 percent in 1950 to 19.1 percent in 1985. 37. Argentina is a good case in point. 38. Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, Modern Latin America Eight Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 108. 39. Indigenous People of Costa Rica. http://www.iwgia.org/regions/latin-america/costa-rica. 40. “Apoyo a la democracia,” Latinobarómetro 2015. http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp. 41. Juan Carlos Hidalgo, “Growth Without Poverty: The Case of Costa Rica,” in CATO Institute, Economic Development Bulletin No. 18 (January 23, 2014). http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/growth-without-poverty-reduction-case-costa-rica. 42. Ibid. 43. Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Latin America’s Emerging Middle Class (New York: Palgrave, 2015). 44. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability,” 449. See also Hidalgo, “Growth without Poverty Reduction: The Case of Costa Rica.” 45. Alexandra Alper, “Costa Rica leftist easily wins presidential run—off,” Reuters, April 7, 2014. http://news.trust.org/item/20140406183401werw4/.

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46. Jaime Lopez, “Public Opinion of President Solis worsens in Costa Rica,” The Costa Rica Star, (September 26, 2015). https://news.co.cr/publicopinion-of-president-solis-worsens-in-costa-rica/41771. 47. Zach Oyer, “More than 1.1 million Costa Ricans live in poverty,” The Tico Times (October 23, 2015). http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/10/23/11-million-costa-ricans-live-poverty. 48. Ronaldo Alfaro Redondo, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Cultura politica en Costa Rica: El declive de largo plazo de las actitudes que favorecen una democracia estable continua,” in Perpectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas: 2015, Número 11. http://www.vanderbilt. edu/lapop/insights/IO911es_V2.pdf. 49. “Latinobarómetro, 2016.” http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=lati nobarometro+2016&id=D42C4B2F66981FD3515923850239597418C B7DA&FORM=IQFRBA. 50. Chunlong Lu, “Middle Class and Democracy: Structural Linkage,” International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Autumn 2005): 173. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41421642.pdf?seq=1#page_ scan_tab_contents. 51. Susanne Jonas, “Guatemala,” in Harry Vanden and Gary Prevost, eds., Politics of Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 305. 52. “Audiencias were established in the various administrative districts (viceroyalties, captaincies general) of Spanish America. They were empowered to hear complaints against viceroys and captains general (executive officers) and to take appropriate actions to curb abuses of power. Their primary function of the audiencias was judicial. The Crown ordered them to safeguard the rights of the indigenous inhabitants. Audiencias had both civil and criminal jurisdiction and appeals in major cases could be made from their ­decisions to the Council of the Indies in Madrid. See “Audiencia,” Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/42536/audiencia. 53. Frederick Stirton Weaver, “Reform and (Counter) Revolution in Post-­ Independence Guatemala: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Postmodern Controversies,” in Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1999: 132–133. 54. Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Rafael Carrera and the Emergence of the Republic of Guatemala, 1821–1871 (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia, 1993). 55. Ibid. 56. Weaver, “Reform and (Counter) Revolution in Post-Independence Guatemala: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Postmodern Controversies,”139–140.

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57. Richard H.  Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983). 58. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason—US Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 57. 59. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 48; and Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 53. 60. US Department of State, “A Case History of Communist Penetration: Guatemala.” (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957), 17. https://www.worldcatorg/title/case-history-of-communist-penetration-guatemala/oclc/2604404. 61. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 68–79. 62. See Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 57. 63. Ibid., 58–59. 64. Jonas, “Guatemala,” 310–311. 65. The Ladino is as a heterogeneous population that uses Spanish as its maternal language, possesses specific cultural traits of Hispanic origin mixed with indigenous cultural elements, and dresses in a style commonly considered as western. 66. Jonas, “Guatemala,” 312–315. 67. Ibid., 321–323. 68. Washington also targeted the Dominican Republic and Chile as countries that had to be protected from communist takeovers. 69. “Guatemala—Maya,” Minority Rights—World Directory of Minority and Indigenous Peoples, minorityrights.org/minorities/maya-2/. 70. Ibid. 71. “The World Bank in Guatemala,” http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview. 72. “Democracy Index 2014—Democracy and its discontents.” http://www. sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b242504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf. See also “Democracy Index 2016—Revenge of the ‘deplorables’.” The Economist—The Intelligence Unit. http://pages.eiu.com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Democracy_ Index_2018.pdf. 73. Jonas, “Guatemala,” 281. 74. Mireya Navarro, “Guatemalan Army Waged ‘Genocide,’ New Report Finds,” The New  York Times, February 26, 1999. http://www.nytimes. com/1999/02/26/world/guatemalan-army-waged-genocide-newreport-finds.html?pagewanted=all. 75. “Central America, 1981–1993,” in Department of State  - Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/centralamerica. 76. See Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas, Chapter 4.

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77. Booth, “Costa Rica: The Roots of Economic Stability,” 442 and 447. 78. Ibid., 448. A figure that helps capture the role of the state in the economy is the size of its workforce, which increased from 6.1 percent in 1950 to 19.1 percent in 1985. 79. As the reader might remember, during a similar period the percentage of Ticos favoring democracy decreased from 78 to 53 percent, while the percentage who stated that an authoritarian regime would be preferable over a democratic one in certain instances went down from 18 to 15 percent. 80. “Guatemala: HDI Values and rank changes in the 2014 Human Development Report,” Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/GTM.pdf. 81. “Guatemala Economy Profile 2014,” http://www.indexmundi.com/guatemala/economy_profile.html. 82. “Guatemala,” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/guatemala.

Bibliography Alper, Alexandra. 2014. Costa Rica Leftist Easily Wins Presidential Run  – Off. Reuters. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Ameringer, Charles D. 1982. Democracy in Costa Rica. New York: Praeger. Print. Apoyo a la Democracia. 2015. Latinobarómetro Database. Latinobarometro.org. Web. 24 Jan 2019. Audiencia. 2011, September 27. Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Bethell, Leslie. 1998. Latin America: Politics and Society Since 1930. New York: Cambridge University Press. Print. Biesanz, Richard, Karen Z.  Biesanz, and Marvin H.  Biesanz. 1982. The Costa Ricans. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Print. Blakemore, Harold, and Clifford T.  Smith. 1970. Latin America: Geographical Perspectives. London and New York: Methuen. Print. Booth, John A. 1989. Costa Rica: The Roots of Democratic Stability. In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Print. Bushnell, David, and Neill Macaulay. 1988. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Print. Central America, 1981–1993. 2019. United States. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Dayton-Johnson, Jeffrey. 2015. Latin America’s Emerging Middle Classes: Economic Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Print.

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“Democracy Index 2018 – Me Too?” The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019. Web. 20 Feb. 2019. “Democracy Index 2014  – Democracy and its Discontents.” The Economist Intelligence Unit 2015. Web. 20 March 2016. Guatemala. 2014. Country Report – Freedom in the World, 2014. Freedom House. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Guatemala Economy Profile 2017. 2017, July 9. Index Mundi. Index Mundi. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Guatemala: HDI Values and Rank Changes in the 2014 Human Development Report. 2016. Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. United Nations Development Programme. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Guatemala – Maya. 2018, July. Minority Rights – World Directory of Minority and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group International. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Hall, Carolyn. 1985. Costa Rica: A Geographical Interpretation in Historical Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press. Print. Hidalgo, Juan Carlos. 2014, January 23. Growth Without Poverty Reduction: The Case of Costa Rica. CATO Institute, Economic Development Bulletin No.18, Cato Institute. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Hybel, Alex Roberto. 2019. The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina and Peru. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Print. ———. 1990. How Leaders Reason-US Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Oxford: Blackwell. Print. Immerman, Richard H. 1982. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin: University of Texas. Print. Indigenous People of Costa Rica. Web. 20 Nov. 2018. Jonas, Susanne. 2012. Guatemala. In Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, ed. Harry E.  Vanden and Gary Prevost. New  York: Oxford University Press. Print. LaFeber, Walter. 1983. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Print. Latinobarómetro. Opinión Pública Latianoamericana, 2016. Web. 14 Oct. 2018. López, Jaime. 2015, September 26. Public Opinion of President Solis Worsens in Costa Rica. The Costa Rica Star. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Lu, Chunlong. 2005. Middle Class and Democracy: Structural Linkage. International Review of Modern Sociology 31 (2): 157–178. JSTOR. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Munro, Dana Gardner. 1960. The Latin American Republics: A History. New York: Appleton Century, Inc. Print. Navarro, Mireya. 1999, February 26. Guatemalan Army Waged ‘Genocide,’ New Report Finds. The New York Times. Print.

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Nelson, Harold D., ed. 1983. Costa Rica: A Country Study. Washington, DC: American University. Print. Oyer, Zach. 2015, October 23. More Than 1.1 Million Costa Ricans Live in Poverty. The Tico Times. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Redondo, Ronaldo Alfaro, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2015. Cultura Política En Costa Rica: El Declive De Largo Plazo De Las Actitudes Que Favorecen Una Democracia Estable Continua. Perspectivas Desde El Barómetro De Las Américas: 2015, Numero 11. Vanderbilt University. Print. Rouquie, Alan. 1987. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Print. Seligson, Mitchell. 1990. Costa Rica. In Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Harvey F. Kline and Howard J. Wiarda. Boulder, CO: Westview. Print. Shafer, D. Michael. 1994. Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Print. Skidmore, Thomas E., and Peter H.  Smith. 1992. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press. Print. Skidmore, Thomas E., Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. 2014. Modern Latin America. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Print. Stone, Samuel Z. 1990. The Heritage of the Conquistadors: Ruling Classes in Central America from the Conquest to the Sandinistas. Lincoln: University of Nebraska. Print. The World Bank in Guatemala. 2017, April 7. The World Bank Working for a World Free of Poverty. The World Bank. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. United States. 1957. Department of State. Public Services Division. A Case History of Communist Penetration: Guatemala. U.S. G.P.O. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. Weaver, Frederick Stirton. 1999, February 26. Reform and (Counter) Revolution in Post-Independence Guatemala. Latin American Perspectives. Print. Woodward, Ralph L. Rafael Carrera and the Emergence of the Republic of Guatemala, 1821–1871. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia. Print. ———. 1987. Central America. In Spanish America after Independence: C. 1820– C. 1870, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print.

CHAPTER 7

An Exploratory Theory of State Creation and Democratization: The United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala Introduction The final chapter consolidates the analyses derived from the empirical examinations of the six cases. It presents 22 time-related hypotheses that explain the evolution of the state-creation and regime-formation processes of the United States and five Spanish American entities from the colonial period, through independence, to the present. The six cases studied throughout this book share at least four characteristics. First, none of their original inhabitants had a say on how the emerging states and their respective political regimes in the two continents should be structured. However, the magnitude of the number of the remaining progenies in the Americas would play a pivotal role in the formation of the political regimes generated after independence. Second, none of the original leaders of the states initially created intended to create a democratic regime. In those states in which democracies took form, each democracy evolved in an unplanned and piecemeal way. Third, the political, economic, and social environments developed during the colonial period affected the extent to which the established elites within a colony would be committed to the attainment of independence. Those conditions also shaped the types of states and political regimes the original leaders initially tried to create after they had freed themselves from their colonial powers.

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And fourth, with the passage of time each state and its political regime encountered additional sets of conditions engendered by developments in the domestic and international arenas. These new conditions, in turn, determined whether a democratic regime would evolve.

From Colony, to Independence, to State Creation, to Political-Regime Formation There is consensus among scholars with regard to the relationship between the state and democracy. Their basic argument is that without the presence of a state that has consolidated and legitimized its power, a stable democracy cannot emerge.1 This study concurs but adds that in order to understand the challenges encountered by various entities in the Americas who were determined to create their respective states, the analyses must account for the conditions they inherited from the colonial period. The first hypothesis addresses the effect(s) the structure of a colony’s economy had on the state-creation process after the colony’s attainment of independence. Hypothesis Americas (A)1: The greater the number of economically developed regions within a colony, the greater the commitment on the part of their respective leaders to decentralize the power of the new state.

Religion played distinct roles throughout the Americas during and after the colonial period.2 What has not been properly established is the reinforcing effect religion had among those who advocated the formation of a centralized state. Moreover, the absence of a hierarchically structured church placed the United States at an advantage over Spanish American states as both struggled to consolidate the power of the state. H A2: The greater the role a hierarchically structured church played during the colonial period, the greater the divide between those who advocated the creation of a centralized non-secular state and those who favored the establishment of a decentralized secular state.

The impact of the division identified in H A2 can be postulated as follows:

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H A3: The greater the divide between leaders who advocated the creation of a centralized non-secular state and those who supported the formation of a decentralized secular state, the harder it became to reach agreements, establish cultural bonds across networks of local power-holders, and create institutions for the extraction of resources required for the performance of a wide range of a state’s functions.

During the early decades after the attainment of independence, Spanish American leaders were prone to rely on militias to protect and promote their own regional political and economic interests; resolve whether to create a centralized or decentralized state; settle whether to establish a secular or a non-secular state; and, when the opportunity arose, take over the reins of government and design a new constitution. The leaders of the United States never relied on militias to address their political and economic differences except during the Civil War. Hence, H A4: The greater the discord between leaders who favored the creation of a centralized, non-secular state and those who opposed it, the greater their tendency to rely on military force to resolve their differences.

H A2, H A3, and H A4 not only help explain why the United States encountered fewer problems during the earlier stages of the state-creation process than Spanish American states in general, but also reveal differences among Spanish American states. Newly created Spanish American states were burdened by the division identified in H A4, but some states were affected more than the others. Costa Rica was more successful than Mexico and Colombia in consolidating the power of the state, because the division in the former was much less intense than in the latter two states. The United States, in turn, was comparatively more effective in forming its own state than were its southern counterparts. At this stage the critical question is: What enabled states that were intensely divided and consistently resorted to military force to address their differences, to finally reach agreements and establish cultural bonds across networks of local power-holders? Ultimately, the consolidation of the power of the state depended on which interest group or region was able to create the strongest militia and overpower its rivals. Moreover, one of the first steps the victorious party typically took after defeating its adversaries was to transform its military into the state’s armed forces. This argument also applies to the United States.

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H A5: Where deep divisions existed between those who favored the creation of a secular federal state and those who advocated the formation of a non-­ secular centralized state, the power of the state was not consolidated until one of the regional leaders had gathered sufficient military might to defeat his adversaries.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, economic growth started to transform the political regimes of the various American states. As economies grew and the size of the workforce increased, so did the demand that voter restrictions on white men be either eliminated or reduced. The initial general effect, though experienced at different times, was generally the same: H A6: Economic growth led to an increase in the workforce, which in turn generated, initially, an increase in the demand that voting restrictions on white men be removed. The increase in the demand led to the elimination of voting restrictions and a steady growth in voter participation.

Economic growth accompanied by an increase in voter participation created the potential for the emergence of non-status quo political parties. Political systems responded differently to the increase of such potential. In Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and the United States the status quo parties tried to broaden their political appeal in order to curtail the capacity of non-status quo political parties to rise and disrupt the system. In the case of Mexico, its political leaders sought to control political fragmentation by incorporating under a single large umbrella all the relevant competing interests. The immediate effects of such actions varied. H A7: Economic growth, increase in voter participation, and the initial inability or unwillingness on the part of established political parties to address the economic problems faced by the rapidly growing working class heightened the potential for the emergence of non-status quo political parties. H A8: The involvement of non-status quo political parties in the political process increased the likelihood that they would be voted into power. This increase led to an increase in the likelihood that the military would intervene, either to prevent non-status quo political parties from assuming power or to remove them from power were they to gain control of the government and implement radical political, economic, and social reforms.

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The last hypothesis can be rephrased as follows: H A9: The likelihood that the military would intervene, either to prevent a political party from assuming power or to topple a government, was greater in states where non-status quo political parties participated in the political process than in states where status quo political parties broadened their political appeal in order to prevent the emergence of non-status quo political parties.

The last hypothesis calls for a brief discussion. The decision by status quo political parties to broaden their political appeal in order to prevent the emergence of non-status quo political parties ultimately did not generate viable solutions. The argument applies to cases in which either one or two parties strove to reduce tensions generated by political, economic, and social cleavages. In Colombia, the continuous domination of the political system by two political parties resulted in the emergence of revolutionary movements that resorted to violence. In Venezuela, the agreement reached by its two status quo political parties in the late 1950s, which also involved the exclusion of non-status quo political parties, eventually facilitated the rise of Hugo Chavez and the demise of the country’s flawed democracy. In Guatemala in 1945, an alternative political party overtook the two-political  party system that had dominated its political regime since independence. The change gave hope that democracy would begin to take root. But it was not to be. The decision to eliminate the non-­status quo political parties in 1954 resulted in a civil war that lasted more than three decades and brought about the death of hundreds of thousands of people. At first light, the inclusion of Mexico and the United States in the same group may seem unjustified. Though during the first three decades of the twentieth century Mexico experienced a major revolution and intense moments of violence, after 1929 the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was able to eradicate the level of violence that had plagued the state through much of the nineteenth century. In turn, the United States never faced the radical challenges and the level of discord and internal violence experienced by the other five states. But notwithstanding such variance, the attempt of the PRI to house the state’s multitude of political interests under one single, large roof did not lead to the development of a viable political solution or to the creation of a stable political system. Though Mexico’s political system today is more open than it was three decades ago, it is markedly more violent and more corrupt. With regard to the United States, it is

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evident that the challenges it faces are significantly smaller than the problems faced by the other states, with the possible exception of Costa Rica. And yet, the continued exclusion from the political arena of political parties than can actually represent the interests, values, and beliefs of those to the extreme left and extreme right of the Democratic and Republican parties have done little to prevent the escalation of tensions within and between each political  party. The continued attempt on the part of both political parties to represent and retain control over a multitude of conflicting voices will further increase and intensify the divide that has afflicted for decades the US political, economic, and social environment. Hence:

H A10: Representation of a wide range of conflicting political, economic, and social interests by one or two political parties may be effective in the short run, but not in the long run. In the long run, such political parties fail to eliminate the intense divides and help engender greater political discord.

It is generally agreed that democracy can emerge and be sustained only when the military accepts the supremacy of civilian authorities elected freely by the people. The two questions that must be addressed at this point, and that lie at the core of what makes a political system democratic, are these: How did the United States, though it experienced a civil war, avoid being plagued by military coups and being ruled by a military government? What enabled the freely elected civilian authorities of some Spanish American states to gain full supremacy over the military despite having experienced military coups and civil wars? Since the inception of the United States, its leaders have agreed that they would respect the rights of each state, including the right to decide which inhabitants within each state would be authorized to vote. This agreement was respected until 1861, when Southern states used military force against the newly elected president for fear that he would abrogate their rights. Despite this serious breakdown, throughout most of the history of the United States its various leaders, regardless of their ideological or political affiliation, accepted the rule that no civilian or military official would ever use martial means to affect the internal nature of the state’s political regime. This canon was also adopted and protected by members of the US military. On the other hand, from the moment they attained independence from Spain, the leaders of the new Spanish American states relied on military means to decide whether to centralize or decentralize the power of the state, determine whether to create a secular or a non-secular state, protect their regional interests, and choose who would rule. The extent to which

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they relied on martial means was determined by the intensity of the discord. The dependency on the use of military force did not vanish when leaders agreed what form the state would assume and whether to accept the Catholic Church as a central component of the state. The military used the increase in voter participation and the emergence of non-status quo political leaders and parties to justify its continued intervention and, eventually, its decision to govern not just as a provisional government but also as a legitimate one. Stated differently, the sustained use of martial means—first by militias and then by an established and well-organized armed force—validated the role of the military as an essential actor in the domestic political affairs of Spanish American states. The armed forces did not lose their political legitimacy until it was revealed that they had repeatedly engaged in major human rights violations and lacked the means and knowledge to resolve entrenched domestic political, economic, and social problems. It was only then that the door to democracy was opened to Spanish American states. Answers to the last two questions can be postulated in the form of interconnected hypotheses: H A11: The greater the level of discord in a Spanish American state between domestic political actors with conflicting agendas during the nineteenth century, the greater their willingness to use military means to resolve their political differences. H A12: The longer competing domestic political actors in a Spanish American state used military means during the nineteenth century to resolve their political differences, the greater the value placed on the military as an independent domestic political actor. H A13: The greater the value placed on the military as an independent domestic political actor in a Spanish American state during the nineteenth century, the greater the commitment on the part of the military to prevent political parties or political leaders from participating in the political process or overthrowing a government during the twentieth century. H A14: The longer the military in a Spanish American state intervened to address domestic political issues during the twentieth century, the longer it took for civilian political leaders to resume control of the political system and for political parties to renew their roles as legitimate political actors. H A15: The longer it took for civilian political leaders in an Spanish American state to resume control of the political system and for political parties to renew their roles as legitimate political actors, the longer it took for a culture of democracy to develop deep roots.

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As already explained, the Second World War (WWII), the Korean War, and the US rivalry with the Soviet Union had various effects in the Americas. Clearly, without the involvement of civil right activists and political leaders the Second World War and the Korean War alone would have not transformed the political system, but both events provided one of the leading arguments as to why African Americans and women merited equal rights. If African Americans were expected to risk their lives for their country, and women were expected to work while men were fighting in foreign lands, then both had the right to demand and be extended equal political and social rights.3 H A16: The Second World War and the Korean War enhanced the standing of African Americans and women in the United States and, as a result, eased the approval of the 1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Voting Rights Acts. The approval of both acts helped transform the United States into a democracy.

The above hypothesis clearly does not apply to Spanish American states. The worldwide “cold” conflict that ensued between liberalism and communism affected Washington’s view of its southern counterparts in the Americas. Washington’s fear that Spanish American states would be ­overtaken by communists intensified after Fidel Castro and his revolutionary forces took over the reins of government in Cuba and developed close political, military, economic, and social ties with the Soviet Union. WWII and the Korean War had a positive effect on the US political system, while the Cold War and the emergence of Fidel Castro in Cuba had a negative effect on the political system of Spanish American states. Of the five Spanish American states considered in this book, no state was more affected by the actions of the United States than Guatemala. H A17: The greater the perceived likelihood that a leftist-radical political party or a revolutionary group would assume power in a Spanish American state either through the democratic process or through force during the Cold War, but especially after the rise of the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba, the greater the likelihood that the military in the affected state, with Washington’s explicit or tacit support, would prevent such a development, sought to gain control of the government, curb political liberties, and prohibit competition between political parties.

Lastly, it is necessary to address Venezuela’s and Mexico’s distinct e­ xperiences during the twentieth century and the conditions that generated them. Discussions about the relationship between oil dependence

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and democracy have been viewed from two different perspectives. The first perspective postulates that heavy dependence on oil revenues strengthens the power of authoritarian regimes; while the second view suggests that heavy reliance on oil makes the transition to democracy harder. It has been contended that of the two arguments only the first one has been substantiated.4 Though a case does not make a theory, it is reasonable to argue that both trends were applicable to the Venezuelan case. During the first 58 years of the twentieth century, with the exception of a brief period in the late 1940s, corruption facilitated by the abundance of oil revenues permeated the autocratic political system. After 1958, for a period of some three decades Venezuelans went to the polls regularly, but their choices were limited to two parties that had agreed to alternative control of the government, and corruption continued to afflict the political system. When Hugo Chavez came to power, he could have diminished his government’s heavy dependence oil resources, but he did not. Not only did his administration continue to rely heavily on oil revenues but, like the previous administrations, he misused the state’s oil revenues and continued to engage in corruptive practices. In addition, the Chavez and Maduro regimes removed many of the political elements that would have made. Put simply, every Venezuelan administration has used its access to oil revenues to undercut the state’s democratic process. Hence: H A18: All other conditions being equal, a nondemocratic regime that is housed in a state that has yet to develop a properly structured bureaucratic system and is heavily dependent on oil to sustain and develop its economy, is less likely to transition into a solid democracy than any nondemocratic regime that is housed in a state that has yet to develop a properly structured bureaucratic system but relies on multiple sources of revenue to develop and sustain its economy.

Mexico faced challenges significantly different from some of its southern counterparts. The argument can be postulated as follows: H A19: The intense regional divisions that afflicted Mexico during long stretches of the nineteenth century, the concentrated effort by foreign corporations to dominate Mexico’s economy, and the threat posed by the United States, convinced Mexico’s political leaders that they could not tolerate the political and economic uncertainties that the establishment of a democratic

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regime would generate. Determined to avert zero-sum competition and eliminate military coups and military juntas, they created a hegemonic party that placed Mexico’s various interest groups under a single authority.

Lastly, it is important to bring to the fore the role of culture. A people’s willingness to accept a culture of democracy depends on whether the material needs of the majority are served well. Hence: H A20: The longer the economic needs of the majority of the people are well served under a democratic regime, the greater their willingness to embrace a culture of democracy. The longer the majority of the people embrace the culture of democracy, the stronger their opposition to authoritarianism and the greater the likelihood that the regime will remain democratic.

Conclusion With the end of the Cold War and communism no longer perceived as posing a critical threat, attempts to create democratic regimes throughout Spanish America gained momentum. The so-called third wave of democratization, however, was born more out of discontent with the failure by military regimes to solve the grave economic problems that afflicted Spanish American states than by deep public commitments to creating political systems governed by democratic norms and rules. No longer able to justify their domestic political involvement, military regimes gave in to domestic and international pressures to authorize the establishment of democratic governance. The reduction in the domestic political role played by military regimes, however, did not always give way to the creation of effective democratic systems. Failures by a few embryonic democracies to resolve the economic problems that had afflicted the military regimes of earlier years led to the rise of authoritarian populist regimes. The Hugo Chávez phenomenon spread rapidly into Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, and temporarily to Argentina. In every instance, the common claim by the emerging authoritarian leader, and her or his closest allies, was that they possessed the ability and judgment that would enable them to build equitable and just socioeconomic systems. In order to strengthen the power and authority of the executive power, such leaders and their closest allies typically relied on democratic instruments to diminish the capabilities of potential adversaries to pose viable political challenges. The end result has been the creation of populist authoritarian regimes.5

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The preceding statement sets the path for the voicing of one final conjecture. This book sought to describe the processes of state creation and regime formation of six  states in the two American continents with the intent of postulating a general argument that explains why certain regimes became democratic while others did not and why—among those states that are democratic—some are more democratic than the others. Whether such a goal has been achieved is for the reader to decide. More significant at the moment is the vision that drove the analysis carried out throughout the book. This book is built on the conviction that creating democracies is a worthy endeavor. Such a belief remains firm, but this study has reaffirmed the initial view that the survival of well-established democratic regimes is not assured, and that there is no guarantee that new ones will arise and become members of the community of democracies. Every democratic system carries within itself the seeds of its own decline and possible demise. Every democratic system is built on the assumption that if given a chance, every political leader has the potential to be corrupted by power. The intent of every political leader in either a democratic or a nondemocratic system is to protect her or his own power and diminish the capacity of her or his adversaries to increase their own power. The decisive difference among democratic systems, and between democratic and nondemocratic systems, is the degree to which political leaders can exploit the existing norms and rules designed to prevent the abuse of power. The stricter the rules and the longer they have been enforced, the greater the capacity of a democratic regime to survive and prosper. It is no coincidence that in each of the Spanish American cases that have been transformed into authoritarian populist regimes, their political leaders’ first step was to rely on democratic means to challenge the existing norms and rules in order to increase their own power. And there is the United States. As recently as 2016, the suggestion that the United States was moving closer to creating a populist authoritarian regime would have seemed unfounded. But by 2019, such concern seemed less farfetched. The Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit notes that between 2008 and 2017 the number of “full democracies” had decreased from 30 to 21, while the number of “flawed democracies” for that same period had increased from 39 to 61. Among those regimes that have descended to the category of “flawed democracy” is the one that inhabits the United States. Donald Trump’s election to the presidency has reinforced the belief among political analysts that though

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the constitutional obstacles present in the United States are too powerful to enable any one leader to transform its political regime into an authoritarian one, during the first two years of his presidency he has borrowed the playbook utilized by authoritarian leaders who used populism to undermine the structures of their own democratic regimes. The 2020 elections will reveal whether such fear is justified.

Notes 1. See Charles Tilly, “The Formation of European States, AD 990–1990,” in Stephen K. Sanderson, ed., Sociological Worlds: Comparative and Historical Readings on Society (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000), 234. Stein Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 563. Juan José Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1997): 22. Fernando López-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 15. 2. Frank Safford, “The Construction of National States in Latin America, 1820–1890,” in Miguel Centeno and Agustin E. Ferrero, eds., State Nation Making in Latin America and Spain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 55. 3. Obviously, other factors also contributed to the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts. 4. See Michael L. Ross, “What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of Political Science, 18 (2013): 239–259. 5. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Mexico. (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

Bibliography Hybel, Alex Roberto. 2019. The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina and Peru. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Print. Linz, Juan José, and Alfred C. Stepan. 1997. Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy 7 (2): 22. Print. López-Alves, Fernando. 2000. State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Print.

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Rokkan, Stain. 1975. Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe. In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Print. Ross, Michael L. 2013. What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of Political Science, 18. Print. Safford, Frank. 2013. The Construction of National States in Latin America, 1820–1890. In State Nation Making in Latin America and Spain, ed. Miguel A.  Centeno and Agustin E.  Ferrero. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Print. Tilly, Charles. 2000. The Formation of European States, AD 990–1990. In Sociological Worlds: Comparative and Historical Readings on Society, ed. Stephen K. Sanderson. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. Print.

Index1

A Adams, John, 3 on democracy, 3 Africans Americans (Blacks), 58, 60, 62, 64, 65, 69–73, 78, 82, 84, 87n44 and the 1788 Constitution, 61 and slavery, 62, 64 Almazán, Juan Andreu, 114 Anthony, Susan, 69 Aridoamerica, 91, 92 Authoritarian populism, 256, 257 Axioms, 8 Aztecs, 92, 93, 126n8 B Bailey v. Patterson rule of 1962, 73 Brazil, 7 British colonizers beliefs, values, and ideas, 10 religion, 11

Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 72 and “separate but equal,” 72 C Camacho, Avila (President), 114 Cárdenas, Lázaro (President), 111–114, 119, 122, 123 Carranza, Venustiano, 109 Catholic Church, 92, 93, 104, 121 and the military, 11 and the unitary state, 12 Caudillo, 100, 102, 105, 128n49 Centralists (conservatives), 99 Cessation of territory, 68 Chavez, Hugo, 251, 255, 256 Christianity, 56 Churchill, Winston, 3, 15n5 on democracy, 3 Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 73 of 1964, 73 of 1965, 73

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9

261

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INDEX

Civil War, 64–66, 69, 75, 76, 78, 84 and African American men, 69 Colombia, 1, 4–6, 10, 13 and colonial period; and African slaves, 140; and Antioquia, 140; and arrival of Spaniards, 166; and Cartagena, 139; and cleanliness of blood, 142; and composition of population, 162; and Comunero movement, 143; and creoles, 142; and economic activities, 139; and encomiendas, 167; and establishment of Santafe de Bogotá, 139; and gold, 140; and Kingdom of New Granada, 139; and mestizo population, 139, 142; and regions, 137, 139, 152, 163, 167; and resguardos, 140; and settlements, 138; and Spanish monarchy, 140, 141; and structure of society, 138, 141, 142, 167, 168; and taxes, 143; and topography, 163; and trade, 138, 148, 152; and Viceroyalty of New Granada, 141, 142 and independence period; and Bogotá, 139, 144; and Bolivar, Simón, 146; and Cádiz, 144; and Cartagena, 142; and Castas, 147; and Central Junta, 143, 144; and Congress of Cucuta, 147, 148; and Council of Regency, 169; and Cundinamarca, 146; and Ferdinand VII, 144, 146; and New Granada, 139–142; and Quito, 144 and post-independence period; and Alliance for Progress, 157; and

Betancur, Belisario, 160; and Bogotazo, 157; and Bolivar, Simón, 146–148, 169, 170; and Cali cartel, 163; and Catholic Church, 164; and civil war, 150, 164, 194; and clientelism, 161; and Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), 157; and Communists, 154; and Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC), 154; and conservatives, 150, 152, 192; and consociationalism, 156; and Constitution of 1886, 150; and corruption, 162, 177, 178, 194; and debt, 148; and Decree-Law 444, 158; and Democratic Alliance M-19 (AD m-19), 162; and exaltados, 148, 149; and federalism (federal system), 149, 150; and foreign markets, 147; and free trade, and bananas, 158; and free trade, and Cinchona bark, 149; and free trade, and coffee, 171; and free trade, and tobacco, 143, 149, 158, 167, 168; and Gaitan, Jorge Elicier, 155; and Gran Colombia, 147, 148, 170; and Great Depression, 152; and gremios, 198n72; and guerrilla movements, 163, 165; and hypothesis, 194; and industrialization, 152, 153; and La Regeneración, 150; and La Violencia, 155; and Latifundia, 152, 157; and Liberal Republic, 155; and liberals, 150, 152, 192; and “lost decade,” 160; and Medellin cartel, 161; and

 INDEX 

National Constituent Assembly, 177; and National Front, 157, 192; and National Liberation Army (ELN), 160; and National Party, 150; and National Salvation Movement (MSN), 162; and “nation of cities,” 157; and 19th of April Movement (M-19), 160; and Olaya Herrera, Enrique, 153; and pacted transition, 193; and Panama, 141, 151; and Patriotic Unit (UP), 161; and Plan Colombia, 163; and political participation, 147, 194; and Popular National Alliance (ANAPO), 158; and regional divisions, 164; and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 160; and right-wing death squads, 160; and Rojas Pinilla, General Gustavo, 156; and role of military, 144, 164; and Samper, Ernesto, 163; and Santander, Francisco de Paula, 147, 148, 170; and social obligation, 153; and suffrage, 150; and transportation, 152, 164; and urbanization, 152, 153; and Uribe, Alvaro, 163; and US investments, 151; and War of the Thousand Days, 151 and pre-colonial period, 138 Colombia-Venezuela, 191 and hypotheses, 191 Colonial period, 1, 5, 12 pre-, 8 Colonization by British, 55–58, 92–95, 209–211 and effects of regions economic wealth, 248

263

by Spaniards, 247, 248 Colonizers, 8, 10, 11 values, beliefs, and ideas, 8 Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 118 Competitive oligarchy, 62 Confederation, 58, 60 Congress, 58, 59, 61–65, 70, 71, 73–75, 78, 80, 82–84, 102, 103, 106, 120 and 14th and 15th Amendments, 65 Connecticut Compromise, 60 Constitution of 1917 and 123, 110 and article 3, 109 and article 14, 109 and article 27, 110 Cortés, Hernán, 92 Costa Rica, 1, 4–6, 10, 13, 209–239 Colonial period; and absence of encomiendas, 211; and Captaincy General of Guatemala, 223; and colonization, 209, 233; and gold, 209, 210; and indigenous population, 210, 212; and isolation, 210; and Pacific coast, 210; and poverty, 221; and size of population, 220, 222, 236; and social mobility, 211 Post-Independence period; and annexation to Mexican empire, 223; and Arévalo, Juan José, 218, 231; and bananas export, 214; and Calderon, Rafael Angel, 217, 218; and Carrillo, Braulio, 212; and Catholic Church, 212, 216; and Catholic Unity Party, 216; and Chinchilla, Laura, 221; and Citizens Actions Party, 221; and cleavages, and coffee export, 215; and comparison

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INDEX

Costa Rica (cont.) with Chile, 215; and conservatives, 212; and coup, 213; and Democratic Party, 213; and democratization, 209–239; and egalitarian traits, 219; and federalist system, 213; and Fernandez, Prospero, 213, 214; and Figueres, José, 217; and Founding Council, 218; and Great Depression, 217; and Guardia, Tomas, 213, 214; and Guatemala, 211; and homogenous population, 214; and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 220; and Latinobarómetro, 220; and liberal oligarchic state, 215; and liberals, 216; and liberation, 211; and Meseta Central, 211; and middle-class, 222; and military (army), 213, 216, 219; and mineral wealth (gold), 215, 233; and Mora, Juan Rafael, 212; and National Liberation army, 218; and National Liberation Front, 221; and National Unity Party, 217; and Nicaragua, 210, 224, 225, 234, 236; and political strife, 216; and representative system, 212; and Republican Party, 217; and San José-Limón railroad, 214; and Social Christian Unity Party, 221; and Solís, Luis Guillermo, 221; and Somoza, Anastasio, 218; and Soto, Bernardo, 213; and support for democracy, 220, 237; and Ticos, 212; and Tinoco, José Federico, 217; and Tinoco, José Joaquin, 217; and Ulate

Blanco, Otilio, 217; and uncontrolled capitalism, 235; and United Provinces of Central America, 239n7; and United States, and Vanguard Party (communists), 218; and voting restrictions, 225 Costa Rica and Guatemala, 209–239 and hypotheses; about the consolidation of the power of the state, 236; about the creation of a stable democracy, 236, 237 Council of Regency, 95 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, 119, 121 D Dahl, Robert, 25, 26, 28–33 closed hegemonic regimes, 26 competitive oligarchies, 26, 28, 29 conditions necessary to develop a polyarchy, 33 definition of democracy, 28, 32, 33 inclusive hegemonies, 27 Declaration of Independence, 66 De la Madrid, Miguel (President), 117 Democracy contradictions, 2, 3, 6, 13 culture of, 41, 43 and Democracy Index, 257 and the Electoral College, 79 and flawed democracy, 251, 257 and the House of Representatives, 79 impact of economic growth on, 35, 39, 41 impact of ethnic cleavages on, 40 impact of regional cleavages on, 40 and ranking of US, 84, 85 and seeds of its own destruction, 3, 257

 INDEX 

theories of, 17–45 in the United States, 55–85 Democratic regime creation (formation) of, 1, 3, 7, 8, 14 stability of, 5, 7, 8, 10 Democratization international effects on, 10 theory of, 8 third wave of, 14 Demos, 29–31 the nature of the, 29 Diamond, Larry, 35–39, 42, 43 civil society and democracy, 42 conditions necessary to generate a democracy, 35, 37–39, 42 control over the military in a democracy, 27 Díaz, Porfirio (President), 106–111, 122, 129n73 Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo (President), 115, 116 Dominguez, Jorge, 17, 18 definition of state, 17 Douglass, Frederick, 69 and African American men, 69, 70 and rights of women to vote, 69 Drug trafficking, 117 Duverger, Maurice, 30 competition within a party, 30 E Economic growth, 12, 13 impact of economic growth, 12 on voting, 13 Elías Calles, Plutarco (President), 110, 111 Encomienda, 93 Ethnic groups and gracias al sacar, 95

265

and purity, 94, 95 and social rank, 94 F Failed and collapsed states, 19 Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), 120, 121 Federalists (Liberals), 99, 102, 128n45, 128n55 Federal republic, 98 Federal system, 12 First World War and the 19th Amendment, 70 and the role of women, 70 Fox, Vicente (President), 120, 121 G Grant, Ulysses, 65, 66 and Native Americans, 65, 66 and Peace Policy, 66 Great Depression, 71, 76 Guatemala, 1, 4–6, 10, 13 Independence and Post-­ independence; and Accord on Socio-Economic Issues, and Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, 230; and Arbenz, Jacobo, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 228, 231; and Arbenz, Jacobo, and Eisenhower, President Dwight, 228; and Arbenz, Jacobo, and Labor Court, 228; and Arbenz, Jacobo, and United Fruit, 228; and Arévalo, José, and capitalism, 226; and Arévalo, José, and Caribbean

266 

INDEX

Guatemala (cont.) Legion, 227; and Arévalo, José, and labor Code, 227; and Arévalo, José, and Marxism (communism), 226, 227; and Arévalo, José, and Patterson, Richard, 228; and Arévalo, José, and spiritual socialism, 226; and Arévalo, José, and Truman, President Harry, 227; and Arévalo, José, and Washington, 226, 227; and Baldetti, Roxana, 239; and Barrios, Rufino, 225; and Bustamante, Captain General José de, 223; and Carrera, Rafael, 225; and Castro, Fidel, 236; and Catholic Church, 231; and Cerna y Cerna, Vicente, 225; and Committee for Peasant Unity(CUC), 229; and conservatives, 224, 230; and corruption, 233; and coups, 225; and economic growth, 225; and Fuerzas Rebeldes Armadas, 229; and Guatemala City, 211; and Honduras, and Human Development Index (HDI), 210, 233, 238; and Human Rights Accord, 230; and independence, 223; and indigenous people (communities), 228, 233; and Inequality-Adjusted HDI, 238; and International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), 238; and Ladinos, 234; and liberals, 226, 231; and Mayans, 222, 229; and Mexican Empire, 230; and military, and Morales, Jimmy, 228–230, 232, 239; and

Morazán, General Francisco, 224; and Nicaragua, 217, 236; and Pérez Molina, Otto, 239; and Ponce Vaides, Juan Federico, 226; and Resettling of Displaced Populations Accord, 230; and Sandinistas, 229; and Truth and Reconciliation Committee, 230; and Ubico, Jorge, and Vagrancy Law, 225, 226, 231; and United Fruit, 217, 226, 228; and United Provinces of Central America, 211, 224, 230; and US military advisors, and violence, 229, 238; and voting rights, 225, 231; Galvez, Mariano, 224 Pre-colonial and colonial period; and agricultural-based society, and audiencia, 222, 223, 228; and Captaincy General of Guatemala, and empire, 210, 223; covert operation, 228; and languages, 222; and population, 222, 229, 232–234, 238 H Haynes, Jeff, 35 conditions necessary to develop a democracy in Latin America, 35 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 96 Huntington, Samuel, 22 patterns of political modernization, 22 Hypotheses and African Americans, 254 and civil rights, 254 and Cold War, 254 and corruption, 255 and cultural bonds, 249

 INDEX 

and development of a properly structured bureaucracy, 255 and economic growth, 250 and Fidel Castro, 254 and increase in non-status quo political parties, 250, 253 and increase in voter participation, 250, 253 and increase in workforce, 250 on Mexico, 249–251, 254–256 and relationship of military with civilian leaders, 252, 253 and role of Catholic Church, 253 and role of military force, 249, 252, 253 and Second World War, 254 and secular federal state vs. non-­ secular unitary state, 250 and voting rights, 254 on Venezuela, 250, 251, 254 I Independence, 4–6, 9–11, 15n11 Indian Citizenship Act, 70 Indigenous populations characteristics of, 10 size of, 11 structure of, 11 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and ideological differences, 114 and National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP), 112 and National Peasant Confederation (CNC), 112 and Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), 111

267

J Johnson, Andrew, 64 and 1866 Civil Rights Act, 64 and 14th and 15th Amendments, 65 Juarez, Benito (President), 102–105, 108, 109, 122 Junta Central, 96, 97 and Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, 96 K Kansas-Nebraska Act, 63 Karl, Terry, 24, 25 Resource Curse (Paradox of Plenty Theory), 24, 25 Venezuela’s oil dependence, 24 Kennedy, John F., 73 and 1963 civil rights speech, 73 King, Martin Luther, 73 and “I have a dream,” speech, 73 L Liberals, 97, 99–104, 106, 108 Lincoln, Abraham, 63, 64, 73, 75 and Abandoned Lands, 64 and The Bureau of Refugees, 64 and 1860 elections, 63 and emancipation and sanctity of slavery in the South, 63 Freedmen, 64 Linz, Juan, 21, 34 conditions necessary to develop a democracy, 21 difference between state and nation, 21 Locke, John, 58 and freedom, 58 and slavery, 58

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INDEX

López-Alves, Fernando, 23, 24 process of state formation in Latin America, 23 state creation hypotheses, 23, 24 López de Santa Anna, Antonio (General), 100 López Mateos, Adolfo (President), 115 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel (President), 121 López Portillo, José (President), 116, 117 Lowi, Theodore, 19 dimensions of state strength, 19 M Machiavelli, 2 on democracy, 2 Madero, Francisco (President), 108, 109 Madison, James, 3 on democracy, 3 Maximilian (Emperor), 104, 108 Merkel, Wolfgang, 27, 28, 31 conceptualization of democracy, 28 delegative democracy, 27, 28 domain democracy, 27, 28 exclusive democracy, 27, 29, 31 illiberal democracy, 27, 29 Mesoamerica, 92 Mestizo, 94, 96, 127n37 Methodology process tracing, 3 sequential relationships, 3 theoretical argument, 3 Mexica, 92 Mexican miracle, 116 Mexico, 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13 Military and communism, 14 coups, 5

force, 5, 7, 12 impact on democratization, 14 impact on state creation, 12, 13 Miscegenation, 94 Mitchell, Timothy, 19 boundary between state and society, 19 Montezuma, 92 Morelos, José Maria, 96 N National Action Party (PAN) and Alliance for Change, 121, 132n131 and Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM), 121, 132n131 National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), 70 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 72 National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 115, 116 National debt and exchange rate, 117 and GDP, 117 and IMF, 117 and inflation, 117 National Strike Council (CNH), 115 Native Americans, 93 Natural resources, 8, 10, 11 New Jersey Plan, 57 New Spain, 94–98, 127n26 Nineteenth Amendment, 69, 70, 84 and passage of, 70 Nondemocratic, conditions, 29–33, 35 Non-secular state, 248, 249, 252 Northern states, and industrialization, 62

 INDEX 

O O’Donnell, Guillermo, 29, 31 democratic oligarchy, 29 Oil industry and nationalization of, 111 and oil reserves, 116 and the United States, 110 Olympic games, 115 P Paredes Arrillaga, Mariano (General), 101 Pax-Americana, 76 Peña Nieto, Enrique (President), 121 Peninsulares, 95, 97, 99 Plan of Ayutla, 102 Plan of Iguala, 97 Plato, 2 on democracy, 2 Political participation, 13 Political parties, 5, 12, 13 Democratic Party, 63 emergence of, 12, 13 Republican Party, 63 Whig Party, 62 Political regime, 58, 59, 62, 71, 74, 79, 84 Property and liberty, 58, 59, 63 and suffrage, 59 Q Qualifications to vote, 60 and white men, 60 R Racial differences, 62 and cultural beliefs, 62

269

Reconstruction era, 66 and responses by Southern states, 66 Region divisions, 12 economic significance, 11 Rokkan, Stein, 19, 20, 47n17 stages of state creation, 19 theory of state creation, 20 Roosevelt, Franklin, 71, 72 S Safford, Frank, 23, 24 state building in Latin America, 23 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos (President), 119 Sartori, Giovanni, 28, 29, 32 definition of democracy, 28 elite theory of democracy, 28 majority rule, 30, 32 Sassen, Saskia, 21, 67, 68 evolution of United States as a State, 21 and lawmaking though judiciary, 67 and new form of capitalism (Imperialism), 68 and world economic rivalry, 68 Schumpeter, Joseph, 30 exclusion of participants, 30 Second World War (WWII), 71 and impact on African Americans, 72 Secular state, 248–250, 252 Separate Car Act of 1890, 71 and Plessy v Ferguson case, 71 Skocpol, Theda, 19, 46n12 state autonomy, 19 Skowronek, Stephen, 22, 66–68 and changes in the American economy, 66 constitutional federalism, 23 and creation of administrative bureaucracies, 67

270 

INDEX

Skowronek, Stephen (cont.) creation of US state structure, 22 impact of forces of industrialization on state creation, 23 and political parties and courts, 66 and post-Civil War era, 63 Social constructivism, 39 Southern colonies, 57 Southern states and differences with Northern states, 62 and slavery and right to vote, 65 Spanish American colonies, 4, 5, 12 leaders, 4 states, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14 Spanish colonizers, 10, 11 values, beliefs, and ideas, 10 Spanish monarchy, 92, 94 Stamp Act, 124 State consolidation of power of, 8, 10, 12 creation and political regime formation, 9, 10 failed, 7, 8 legitimate, 3, 8–10, 12 obstacles to state creation (formation), 9 State creation, 17–45 theories, 17–45 State legislatures, 59, 61 Stepan, Alfred, 21, 34 conditions necessary to develop a democracy, 21 difference between state and nation, 21 Strong Principle of Equality, 30, 32, 74 and democracy, 74

T Tenochtitlán, 92 Territorial expansion and protectionism, 63 and sectionalism, 62 and slavery, 63 and state rights, 63 Third wave of democratization, 256 Tilly, Charles, 17–20 definition of state, 17 theory of state creation, 17, 19 Transformations fifth, 115–121 first, 98–105 fourth, 111–114 second, 105–109 third, 109–111 Transparency International Corruption Index, 125 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 101 Truman, Harry, 71 and Marshall Plan, 71 and Truman Doctrine, 71 U Unitary and non-secular state vs. federal and secular state, 121, 191, 248–250 Unitary (centralized) system, 12 United States Civil and Voting Rights, 13 cult of true womanhood, 69 economic cleavages, 12 and the ideal women, 69 independence, 10 northern colonies, 11 political regime, 1, 4, 6, 10 settlers, 11 southern colonies, 11 thirteen colonies, 57, 58 US-Mexican war, 101

 INDEX 

V Vattel, Eric, 18 sovereignty, 18 Venezuela, 1, 4–6, 10, 13, 14 and colonial period; and African slaves, 167, 168; and Audiencia, 169; and cattle ranchers, 167; and cleavages, 168; and commerce, 168, 171; and contraband, 168; and encomiendas, 140; and German commercial banking, 167; and gold, 166; and hypothesis, 192; and indigenous population, 167; and mantuanos, 167; and pardos, 167, 168; and peninsulares, 144, 167; and regional divisions, 164; and trade, 166, 168 and independence; and Bolivar, Simón, 148, 170; and Caracas, 145, 169, 170, 172, 175, 185, 188, 189; and Caracas Cabildo, 169; and caraqueño, 169, 170; and Ferdinand VII, 169; and First Republic, 169; and Paez, José Antonio, 170, 171; and Spanish Junta, 169; and Third Republic, 170 and post-independence; and Betancourt, Romulo, 174–176, 178; and Bolivarian Revolution, 184; and bureaucracy, 172, 189; and Caldera, Rafel, 183, 184; and Castro, Cipriano, 172; and Catholic Church, 177; and caudillos, 189, 195; and Chavez, Hugo, 185–187, 190; and Citizen Power, 184; and clientelism, 165 (see also under Colombia); and Cold War, 182; and Communist

271

Party, 161, 175, 176, 179; and conservatives, 188; and consociational democracy, 179; and Democratic Action (AD), 174; and Democratic Coordinator (CD), 185; and Democratic Republic Union, 176; and economic growth, 171, 189; and Electoral Power, 184; and exports, 168, 171, 173, 181, 185; and external debt, 148; and Falcon, Juan C, 172; and Federal Wars, 172, 188; and Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), 183; and Gallegos, Rómulo, 176; and Gomez, Juan Vicente, 172–175; and Guzman Blanco, Antonio, 172; hypotheses, 190; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 182; and inter-­ regional communication and transportation, 172; and labor reforms, 171–172; and liberals, 171, 188; and Lopez Contreras, Eleazar, 175; and Maduro, Nicolas, 187, 190; and Maduro, Nicolas, and inflation, 173, 180, 181, 187, 188, 190; and Maduro, Nicolas, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 182; and Maduro, Nicolas, and Medina Angarita, Isaias, 175; and Maduro, Nicolas, and National Electoral Commission, 187; and Maduro, Nicolas, International Organization for Migration, 190; and Maduro, Nicolas, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 187; and Maduro, Nicolas, and

272 

INDEX

Venezuela (cont.) DICOM exchange rate system, 188; and Maduro, Nicolas, and DIPRO exchange-rate system, 187; and Maduro, Nicolas, and UN Commissioner for Refugees, 190; and Maduro, Nicolas, and World Bank, 187; and military coup, 177, 183; and military, and military coup, 156, 172, 177, 183; and Patriotic Military Union (UPM), 176, 202n173; and Monagas, Tadeo, 171, 172; and Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), 179; and National Assembly, 184, 185, 187; and National Constituent Assembly, 162, 177; and oil, and agriculture, 167, 173, 180; and oil, and corruption, 177, 181, 183, 194; and oil, and export earnings, 187; and oil, and imports, 167; and oil, and inflation, 180, 187, 188, 190; and oil, and Middle East oil embargo, 180; and oil, and poverty, 185; and oil, and subsidization of nascent domestic industries, 181; and oil, and wages, 173; and oil, as capital-intensive industry, 173; and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 185; and pacted transition, 193; and Paez, Antonio, 170, 171; and Patriotic Junta, 178; and Perez Jimenez, Marcos, 177, 178; and Petroleum of Venezuela(PDVSA) Venezuela; and Petroleum of

Venezuela(PDVSA), 185; and Project for Constitutional Reform, 185; and Punto Fijo Pact, 178, 181; and Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), 179; and rural elites, 173, 177; and Social Christian Party (COPEI), 176; and suffrage, 171, 175, 176; and Supreme Court, 184, 187; and trienio, 176; and Venezuelan Organization Movement (ORVE), 175; and Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV), 185 and pre-colonial period, 166–168 Viceroy, 92, 93, 95 powers of, 93 Voting and anarchy, 60 as a natural right, 60 and taxation, 59 and voting rights, 61, 62, 73, 84 W War of Reform, 103 Wars their impact on democratization, 13 their impact on state formation, 13 Washington, George, 71 Wilson, Woodrow, 68–70 and First World War, 68 and women’s rights, 70 Z Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), 118 Zedillo, Ernesto (President), 119, 120