The Cappadocian Reshaping of Metaphysics: Relational Being 100941206X, 9781009412063
In this volume, Giulio Maspero explores both the ontology and the epistemology of the Cappadocians from historical and s
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Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title page
Imprints page
Contents
1 Introduction: The Depth of Being
1.1 Greek Life and Tragedy
1.2 Metaphysics and Scripture
1.3 Systematic Approach: Trinitarian Ontology
1.4 Historical Approach: Patristic Philosophy
1.5 A Look Ahead: The Road Map
2 Rational Logos
2.1 Greek Life and Cosmology
2.2 The History of the Logos
2.3 The One and the Many
2.4 Conclusion: Logos ut ratio
3 Relational Logos
3.1 The Personal Logos
3.2 The Logos and the Trinity
3.3 From Eros to Christ
3.4 Filiation and Relation
3.5 The New Ontology
3.5.1 The Logos and Immanence
3.5.2 Relational Being
3.5.3 The Will in God
3.5.4 The Spirit of the Father and of the Son
3.6 Conclusion: Logos ut relatio
4 Life from Life
4.1 A Fundamental Question
4.2 Divine Attributes and Sacred Scripture
4.3 The Fourth Century and Arianism
4.4 The Contra Eunomium III
4.5 Divine Attributes and Relation
4.6 Theologizing the Divine Attributes
4.7 The Interpretation from Nicaea
4.8 Conclusion: Being and Relation
5 Philosophical Relation in History
5.1 The Beginnings
5.2 The Philosophical Understanding
5.2.1 The Different Schools of Thought
5.2.2 Alexander of Aphrodisia
5.2.3 Plotinus
5.2.4 Porphyry
5.3 Conclusion: Relation and Neo-Platonism
6 The Cappadocian Reshaping
6.1 The School of Alexandria
6.1.1 Clement
6.1.2 Origen
6.2 The Shift in the Fourth Century
6.2.1 Eusebius
6.2.2 The Homeousians
6.2.3 Epiphanius
6.3 Basil of Caesarea
6.4 Gregory of Nyssa
6.4.1 The Dispute with Eunomius
6.4.2 Relation and Freedom
6.4.3 Reciprocal Relation
6.4.4 Relation and p.. e..a.
6.5 Gregory of Nazianzus
6.6 Conclusion: Relation Within
7 Knowledge and Relation
7.1 Relation and Silence
7.2 God's Name Is Wonder
7.3 Trinitarian Knowledge
7.4 Ontology and Knowledge
7.5 Latreutic Theology
7.6 Conclusion: The Icon of the Trinity
8 Epistemology and Openness
8.1 An Ancient Tension
8.2 Science and Relation
8.3 Relational Causality
8.4 Basil: Time and the Trinity
8.5 The Gregories: Epistemological Paradox
8.6 Logical Openness
8.7 Conclusion: The Open Approach
9 Conclusions: The Third Navigation
Bibliography
Index
Citation preview
The Cappadocian Reshaping of Metaphysics
In this volume, Giulio Maspero explores both the ontology and the epistemology of the Cappadocians from historical and speculative points of view. He shows how the Cappadocians developed a real Trinitarian ontology through their reshaping of the Aristotelian category of relation, which they rescued from the accidental dimension and inserted into the immanence of the one divine and eternal substance. This perspective made possible a new conception of individuation. No longer exclusively linked to substantial difference, as in classical Greek philosophy, the concept was instead founded on the mutual relation of the divine Persons. The Cappadocians’ metaphysical reshaping was also closely linked to a new epistemological conception based on apophaticism, which shattered the logical closure of their opponents and anticipated results that modern research has subsequently highlighted. Bridging late antique philosophy with Patristics, Maspero’s study allows us to find the relational traces within the Trinity in the world and in history. Giulio Maspero is Professor in the Faculty of Theology at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome.
The Cappadocian Reshaping of Metaphysics Relational Being
GIULIO MASPERO Pontifical University of the Holy Cross
Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge , United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, th Floor, New York, , USA Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, , Australia –, rd Floor, Plot , Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – , India Penang Road, #-/, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/ : ./ © Giulio Maspero This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data : Maspero, Giulio, author. : The Cappadocian reshaping of metaphysics : relational being / Giulio Maspero. : Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, . | Includes bibliographical references. : (print) | (ebook) | (hardback) | (paperback) | (epub) : : Christian philosophy–History–Early church, ca. -. | Metaphysics. | Cappadocian Fathers. : . (print) | (ebook) | .–dc/eng/ LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/ LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/ ---- Hardback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Introduction: The Depth of Being . Greek Life and Tragedy . Metaphysics and Scripture . Systematic Approach: Trinitarian Ontology . Historical Approach: Patristic Philosophy . A Look Ahead: The Road Map
Rational Logos Greek Life and Cosmology The History of the Logos The One and the Many Conclusion: Logos ut ratio Relational Logos . The Personal Logos . The Logos and the Trinity . From Eros to Christ . Filiation and Relation . The New Ontology
. . . .
.. .. .. ..
The Logos and Immanence Relational Being The Will in God The Spirit of the Father and of the Son
. Conclusion: Logos ut relatio
Life from Life . A Fundamental Question . Divine Attributes and Sacred Scripture . The Fourth Century and Arianism
v
Contents
vi . . . . .
The Contra Eunomium III Divine Attributes and Relation Theologizing the Divine Attributes The Interpretation from Nicaea Conclusion: Being and Relation
Philosophical Relation in History . The Beginnings . The Philosophical Understanding .. .. .. ..
The Different Schools of Thought Alexander of Aphrodisia Plotinus Porphyry
. Conclusion: Relation and Neo-Platonism
The Cappadocian Reshaping . The School of Alexandria .. Clement .. Origen
. The Shift in the Fourth Century .. Eusebius .. The Homeousians .. Epiphanius
. Basil of Caesarea . Gregory of Nyssa .. .. .. ..
The Dispute with Eunomius Relation and Freedom Reciprocal Relation Relation and πῶς εἶναι
. Gregory of Nazianzus . Conclusion: Relation Within
Knowledge and Relation Relation and Silence God’s Name Is Wonder Trinitarian Knowledge Ontology and Knowledge Latreutic Theology Conclusion: The Icon of the Trinity Epistemology and Openness . An Ancient Tension . Science and Relation . Relational Causality . Basil: Time and the Trinity . . . . . .
Contents
vii
. The Gregories: Epistemological Paradox . Logical Openness . Conclusion: The Open Approach
Conclusions: The Third Navigation
Bibliography Index
Introduction The Depth of Being
. In turning toward the mystery of God from the perspective of Being and relation, we can immediately see how precious of a guide the attribute of divine life can be. It has the merit of covering all terrain, embracing the spheres of religious history, philosophy and theology. In fact, from the most ancient of times, the human being has always taken the fullness of being to be life, and religious thought indeed has emerged precisely as a yearning toward the source and origin of this Life, urged onward by the perception of one’s own finitude. Man places himself before God, for he acknowledges his relation with God to be an essential relation from which springs the life that constitutes his own being. Since the dawn of history, even the most primitive of myths manifest this intertwining of Life, being and relation. Paternity and filiation, the transmission of life, death and the conditions surrounding the subsistence of any community are all essential elements of the religious conception and the literature of all the most ancient civilizations. All this can be illustrated with an example taken from Greek tragedy. The sequence in the life of Oedipus shows how the collapse of all distinction between being father, mother and son indeed bears with it the ruin of the city, as without any distinction based on relation, life is not possible. A particularly beautiful and meaningful example of this is given in
In this volume relation and relationship are respectively used in reference to the metaphysical and the phenomenological dimensions of the state of being related. The content of the book will show the necessity of this distinction. So we speak of relationship in logical and personal terms, whereas its ontological root is denoted by relation.
Introduction
Antigone, whom Sophocles seems to have sculpted to be the very namesake of tragedy. Oepdipus’ daughter lives in Thebes with one of her brothers under the protection of her uncle, Creon. As is recounted in Seven Against Thebes, another of her brothers turns on the city and is subsequently delivered death in the duel with the brother who stands in defense of Thebes. They kill each other. Thus, the curse of Oedipus continues to plague his posterity. Creon decrees that the corpse of this nephew who attacked the city would not be buried, a fate that, according to popular belief of the time, meant the soul would forever be deprived of the peace of the netherworld. Here emerges the crux of the tragedy that weighs so heavily on Antigone, who is torn between her duty of obedience to the law of the community (polis) to which she belongs and a precept of higher law, which is tied to her relation with her brother and family (genos). In the context of this, an important dialogue occurs between Creon and his son, Haimon, who is involved in the affair insofar as he is engaged to Antigone. As his son approaches, Creon asks him whether he is angry at him for having condemned Antigone. Haimon immediately places himself in submission to the sovereign, acknowledging that he belongs to Creon. The latter responds by stating an incontrovertible principle, that the son must always place himself under the judgment of the father (γνώμης πατρῴας πάντ΄ ὄπισθεν ἑστάναι). Only in this way can the polis continue to subsist, for if Creon’s own sons did not obey him much less would the citizens and soldiers in battle do so. Here the tragedy that is crushing Antigone is translated in terms of the relationship between father and son. Haimon appeals to the voice of the people and natural law, which prohibits killing the innocent, but does not succeed. In the end Creon condemns Antigone. Tragedy is, then, born of the struggle between the demands of the whole and those of the individual: Creon defends the city, whereas Antigone considers her brother; the father lays down the law for all, yet the son would save the woman he loves. A fateful aut-aut emerges between the life of the city and the life of the self, that is, between the universal and the particular. This tragic dimension of life, which characterizes the whole of Greek tragedy, claims metaphysical roots as we shall see, for identity cannot be attributed if not through the category of substance. As Haimon is only
Cf. Sophocles, Antigone, vv. –.
. Greek Life and Tragedy
himself insofar as he remains in submission to the paternal archetype, so is ontological primacy always assigned to the prototype rather than the individual. The absolute value of the person has not yet been constituted. The death of Socrates is a further example of this. This leads to a full-on metaphysical analysis, one that pursues the ontological foundation that lies beyond appearances and all that which could be other than what it is. The sought-after principle must be outside the realm of physical reality (μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ) and indeed provide the very basis for this reality. Hence, the fundamental question of being: what is it that renders this reality concrete as opposed to some other reality? What is the essence of this reality (ousia)? What “lies beneath,” sustaining this phenomenal, or external, appearance? Haimon and Antigone can only live, then, can only be, if they willingly submit to the universal, a universal that stands in marked contrast to their individuality and their relationships. The greatness of Greece does not only consist of having developed metaphysical thought but in furthermore realizing and declaring that its solution is not completely satisfying. The honor of sympathy granted to Antigone together with the declaration of the limit of the paternal answer as received in Haimon’s words constitute the true and proper apex of the Greek literature imbued with a deep humanism. Tragedies could be compared to magnificent tombstones that at the same time are border stones laid on the very limits of Greek world. In a way, tragedy itself reveals how Greek metaphysical thought aspires to go beyond what it knows in search not only of the principle of that which lies outside of all physical reality but also of that which is the basis of the reality that is properly human and hence the very sense of
One might say that the very philosophical reflection is none other than the extreme answer of reason to this problem, if it is true, as Soloviev claims, that Platonic philosophy is born of the existential drama caused in Plato by the death of Socrates: “The tragedy was not personal, not subjective, not in the parting of student and teacher, son from father; in any case, there remained for Socrates but a short time to live. The tragedy was in the fact that the best public community in all humankind of that time-Athens-could not endure the simple, naked principle of truth; that public life turned out to be incompatible with personal conscience.” V. Soloviev, “Plato’s Life-Drama,” in Politics, Law and Morality: Essays by V.S. Soloviev (New Haven: Yale University Press, ), . The term “sub-stance” conveys this “being underneath.” This is a mold of the Greek hypostasis that is exactly what makes this substance-dimension possible at least until the end of the fourth century, at which point the term ceases to be considered synonymous with ousia and instead becomes used to indicate person. More on this can be found in Section ...
Introduction
the mystery of freedom. Yet the history of thought demonstrates how it is only through Revelation that this avenue of new exploration is opened.
. A personal encounter with God lays out for the human being the means by which to fulfill this undertaking. The Fathers of the Church were able to wield Greek thought as an instrument, particularly in the Middle- and Neo-Platonic periods, for it did not dismiss nor overlook metaphysics. Rather, they used it to consider the truth of being as was presented to human thought by the encounter with God. In a certain sense, the Fathers came to accomplish the very dynamic of Greek thought, one that is invoked through tragedy’s deep cry of despair. But what is the content of this innovation so introduced? Largely through an analysis of the work of the Cappadocians, the present study proposes that this ontological innovation lies in the fact of having recognized relation to be an original co-principle together with substance. As opposed to other authors who deal with relational ontology, also in reference to Cappadocian theology, the idea advanced here is that relation has not supplanted substance: if one were to analyze the ontology of the Fathers, one would instead see the first placed next to the second, without any superiority of one over the other. Indeed, it could not have been otherwise if it is true that theology must always be based on real and salvific events. Metaphysics is not some arcane science reserved for a few elect, rather it is an essential facet to any and all thought that aims to explore what is real. The necessity of metaphysics and its field of investigation are illustrated by a consideration
This ability to use in a non-manipulative way is essential in the Fathers’ method and is called chrêsis, as Christian Gnilka pointed out: see Ch. Gnilka, Chrêsis: Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur: Der Begriff des “rechten Gebrauchs” (Basel: Schwabe, ). See also the works of . . Zizioulas, in particular Being and Communion: Studies in the Personhood of the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, ); and Communion & Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: T&T Clark, ). See also Ch. Yannaras, Relational Ontology (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, ) The influence of this approach can be read in . LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (New York: Harper, ); . Volf Trinität und Gemeinschaft. Eine ökumenische Ekklesiologie (Mainz; Neukirchen-Vlyn: Grünewald; Neukirchener Verlag, ); . Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, ) and Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press ).
. Metaphysics and Scripture
that might be called a child’s favorite question. It is also a kind of translation of the most fundamental metaphysical question there is: What is it? Why? It is not without cause that wonderment is the underlying attitude that moves both children and philosophers. To wonder of a certain thing, what is it, means precisely to inquire after its essence. This is an ordinary and even daily problem, as is for instance knowing whether or not what one ordered at the restaurant will in fact be brought to the table and not something else. Likewise in Scripture this same question continually emerges. When manna is discovered in the desert, the Israelites wonder what is it? Hence, the phrase man hu (Ex :), from which derives the very name of this substance given them from heaven. In various encounters with God, they must continually revisit this same question. “This thing that speaks to us, places itself in our midst, what is it?” Is it simply one of the local divinities or does it belong to that single category that claims one and only one representative, inasmuch as it is the One on high and therefore the only God? Little by little the Israelites come to understand that God is the Creator, the One who made all things from nothing, that He is substance in a way superior to all else, as He is the living God and origin of all being. The human being as well as all other things need Him in order to subsist, whereas He identifies Himself with Being and Life itself. The innovation here is that this God is the Absolute and yet has a name, that He enters into relation, that He is a person. Joseph Ratzinger pointed out that the essential difference between polytheism and monotheism is not expressed in the fact that the former worships a plethora of deities, whereas the latter recognizes but one. For even in various forms of polytheism, the Absolute is considered to be singular, precisely as it is in monotheism. The essential element of polytheism is, rather, that this same Absolute, often identified with the god of heaven, apex of the divine hierarchy, is not addressable (ansprechbar), as It does not enter into relation with the human being. In such a context as this, the human being can only address the finite reflections of the Absolute or those gods that represent the intermediate ontological degrees
This wonder approaches philosophy to poetry, as María Zambrano showed. At the same time philosophy is limited by the necessity to renounce to the very source of this wonder in search for real being. From this perspective metaphysics should always be open to new answers. See M. Zambrano, Filosofía y poesía (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, ).
Introduction
that in a determined manner connect the Absolute and the world. It was once inconceivable that the supreme God be a concrete who, a someone, one who likewise enters into dialogue as a thou with respect to the I of the individual human being. Personal being was understood to be necessarily limited. One can hereby grasp in what way the ontological innovation introduced by the thought born out of Revelation resides precisely in the personal and relational dimension. A perfect example of this is the theophany on Mount Sinai (Ex ). Finding himself before the burning bush, Moses takes steps toward it to understand what it might be. Yet emanating from this burning bush is a voice that calls out to him, addresses him and intimates to him that he should remove his sandals because the ground he treads upon is holy. There is already a startling notion in all of this: in sacred space, there where God abodes, man can only enter as naked and stripped from anything that might act as a barrier, that might protect him. God does not tell Moses to distance himself, rather to approach in his bare feet. Hence, the question what is it is transformed into the question who is it, and indeed into an earnest request for a name. In Exodus :, it is exactly substance and person that are closely united: God says of Himself I am, He Who is. He is the One who is more, greater than all else, for He is the beginning and end of all beings. He is truly an I who speaks, who creates, who loves. God is a Person and has relations, desiring to enter into relation with his people. His very distinctiveness must assume as an image not a stone or totem, rather communion and unity of the people, of a people who on their own are weak and without a homeland. God reveals Himself, therefore, precisely in His relation with the human being. Hence, in the New Testament, God not only discloses His personal being but also reveals Himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet again, the questions what and who emerge side by side. Indeed, the crucifixion itself is a sort of ultimate metaphysical judgment and demonstration of how the High Priest knew very well that Jesus claimed to be God, essentially offering a precise answer to the first question: “I and the Father are one” (Jn :). What is Jesus? God. His substance is the substance of God, one, absolute, infinite and eternal. Yet Jesus simultaneously offers a different answer to the question of who: He is not the Father but the Son. Christianity thereby implies keeping together the two
Cf. . Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis (Trier: Paulinus, ).
. Systematic Approach
levels of what and who in concomitance, without confusing them with each other or placing one before the other. This is not something derived out of the cultural milieu in which the Greek Fathers found themselves, nor any specific moment of history, for the very sense of Scripture depends on this twofold question. It is only by making oneself a child (Mt :) that one grasps the sense found herein. Hence, it is asking exactly those questions that arise out of the wonder of both children and philosophers. It is in traversing this path of development that Christian thought has in stages come to acknowledge that the one and only God in three Persons not only has relations but is also three eternal Relations. Greek metaphysics has thus been extended through this sense of who, that is, in the personal sense, becoming a relational and Trinitarian ontology and a relational ontology precisely because it is a Trinitarian one.
. : The scope of the present volume is to offer an outline of the Cappadocians’ elaboration on this new ontology, in particular of Gregory of Nyssa’s work on the category of relation. He was the younger brother of Basil and the most speculative of the Cappadocian Fathers. He is noted for the vital role he played in the preparation and unfolding of events at the First Council of Constantinople in . The Cappadocian thought cannot be considered merely a proposed theory, nor simply as one voice among an ocean of other opinions. Rather, it constitutes an essential element in the formulation of Trinitarian dogma, one might even say an objective point of departure, as the Cappadocian thought, having been developed in relation with the definitions of the Council, may be
Cf. G. Maspero, The Mystery of Communion. Encountering the Trinity (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, ). For an introduction to the Cappadocian Fathers, see A. Meredith, The Cappadocians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ); C. Moreschini, I Padri Cappadoci (Rome: Città Nuova, ). More concretely, on Gregory of Nyssa, see M. Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (Post)modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ); S. Coakley (ed.), Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, ); S. Taranto, Gregory di Nyssa. Un contributo alla storia dell’interpretazione (Brescia: Morcelliana, ); and L. F. MateoSeco and G. Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory di Nyssa (Leiden; Boston: Brill, ). For the best introduction so far available to the dogmatic writings of Gregory of Nyssa, see A. Radde-Gallwitz, Gregory of Nyssa’s Doctrinal Works: A Literary Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
Introduction
considered to belong to the dimension of data. We are dealing with normative thought that takes precedence and claims a place on a plane distinct even from that of Augustine, who would be immensely influential in the West, though subsequent to the formulation of Trinitarian dogma as this is instead fixed in the Greek area. In a certain sense, Cappadocian thought belongs to a category that is properly systematic and is not solely situated in the sphere of theological reflection. Joseph Ratzinger emphasized in his theological writings the revolutionary breadth of Trinitarian theology from the point of view of metaphysics and in particular underlined the new ontological status it recognizes in relation. He reached such a conclusion upon a reflection of Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine. This has led Piero Coda to write that it is precisely in Patristic thought where one recognizes in nuce an initial, authentic Trinitarian ontology, even if the expression Trinitarian ontology in and of itself is of rather recent origin. In speaking of this, one primarily begins with the Thesen of Klaus Hemmerle, in the form of philosophical letters written to Hans Urs von Balthasar, who in turn deals with this question in his Theodramatik. Likewise, the tendency toward a close conception
It seems that this is something passed over by a few systematic theologians who risk treating Cappadocian thought as an opinion of contemporary theology, expressing judgments as to the value of the coherence of their thought. Examples of this include T. F. Torrance when he claims, “It would have been better if the Cappadocians had paid less attention to the concept of causality in God,” in The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ), –. Or when he laments the fact that the Cappadocians have “[introduced] the ambiguity into the doctrine of the Trinity,” in The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ), . Other examples of this include: G. Lafont, Peut-on connaître Dieu en Jésus-Christ? (Paris: Cerf, ), –; and L. Scheffczyk and A. Ziegenaus (eds.), Katholische Dogmatik II (Aachen: MM Verlag, ), –. Cf. . Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, ), –. Cf. . Coda, “Ontologia trinitaria,” in J. Y. Lacoste (ed.), Dizionario critico della teologia (Rome: Borla-Città Nuova, ), –, here . See also, G. Greshake, Der dreieine Gott (Freidburg: Herder, ), . The use of language and grammar of the first six ecumenical councils can be traced back to Trinitarian ontology. On this, see G. Uribarri Bilbao, “La gramática de los seis primeros concilios ecuménicos. Implicaciones de la ontología trinitaria y cristológica para la antropología y la soteriología,” Gregorianum (): –. Cf. K. Hemmerle, Thesen zu einer trinitarischen Ontologie (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, ), –. See also L. Oeing-Hanhoff, “Trinitarische Ontologie und Metaphysik der Person,” in W. Breuning (ed.), Trinität: Aktuelle Perspektiven der Theologie (Freidburg: Herder, ), –. H.U. von Balthasar, “Welt aus Trinität,” in Theodramatik IV (Einsiedeln: JohannesVerlag, ), –.
. Systematic Approach
of the relationship between philosophy and theology, common in Orthodox thought, is linked to Trinitarian ontology, particularly in the work of Pavel Florenskij and Sergej Bulgakov. The same can be said of certain areas of research in contemporary philosophy, such as the work by Antonio Rosmini, the phenomenology of Edith Stein or the discussions on onto-theology. In this context, the categories of person, relation and communion play a fundamental role. In the present work, what is meant by the expression Trinitarian ontology is precisely the ontology of relation as it is conceived through Trinitarian revelation. Indeed, an analysis of the Greek tradition shows that the dogmatic development of the fourth century could actually be reread as the history of the birth of a new ontology of relation, one that surpasses classical Greek metaphysics. This, then, would be a kind of contribution to a “neo-patristic synthesis” as desired by John Zizioulas in his well-known Being as Communion, in the hope that this work might encourage and advance dialogue among the many different Christian denominations. Currently, a reflection on the ontology of the person and relation is front and center in many interesting studies that attempt to analyze the reflection of the Trinity in the structure of created being, and in particular
Cf. L. Zák, “Premessa: Verso un’ontologia trinitaria,” in P. Coda and L. Zák (eds.), Abitando la Trinità (Rome: Città Nuova, ), –. E. Iezzoni, “Ontologia trinitaria: dal mistero della rivelazione una sfida per la filosofia contemporanea,” Nuova Umanità (): –. M. Krienke and N. Salato, “A proposito di ontologia trinitaria. Il contributo di Antonio Rosmini Serbati ed Edith Stein, per una fondazione in chiave teosofica e fenomenologica della filosofia cristiana,” Rassegna di Teologia (): –. Cf. J. Milbank, “Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics,” New Blackfriars (): –; J. Milbank, “The Second Difference: For a Trinitarianism Without Reserve,” Modern Theology (): –; J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, ). See also, W. J. Hankey, “Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, JeanLuc Marion and John Zizioulas,” Modern Theology (): –. See the contributions on this point made by L. Ayres, A. Cordovilla Pérez, and K. Tanner in R. Wozniak and G. Maspero (eds.), Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology (London: T&T Clark, ). Cf. Zizioulas, Being and Communion, . The ecumenical value of a reflection on Trinitarian ontology is highlighted, for example, in J.-Y. Lacoste, “Being,” in Encyclopedia of Christian Theology I (New York: Routledge, ), .
Introduction
in anthropology. For example, there is the work of John Zizioulas, Colin Gunton and Christoph Schwöbel. Clearly, this type of analysis must place itself in direct contact with the early Church Fathers and with the doctrinal advancement made in the fourth century, whose metaphysical innovations are highlighted in these approaches. Studying the work that has emerged in the last thirty years of this past century, one can schematically identify, at least in a historical-dogmatic analysis, two principle lines of development: one that is more prevalent in the West, which moves along the Augustinian tradition and focuses on the concept of relation, building upon its relationship to substance; then there is the development more prevalent in the East, which, beginning with the impressive theology of the Greek Fathers, focuses mainly on the concept of person, demonstrating its precedence with respect to philosophical substance. The former perspective, largely on account of Joseph Ratzinger, emerges from a background of Augustinian thought, successfully echoing in a Thomistic-inspired philosophy as well with the work of Norris Clark and his notion of being as substance-in-relation. The latter perspective is mainly represented by the above-mentioned author John Zizioulas, Metropolitan of Pergamon. In his Being as Communion, first published in , he expands a reformulation of metaphysics from the perspective of the history of dogma and the personal principle of the monarchy of the Father. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century constitutes a fundamental moment in the development of ontology inasmuch as they position the Person of the Father as the source of all Being, both on an intra-divine level as well as
For a noteworthy synthesis of this, see Cordovilla Pérez, “The Trinitarian Concept of Person,” in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology, –. See the works of J. D. Zizioulas cited in note . C. E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ). Ch. Schwöbel, Gott in Beziehung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, ). Cf. Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, . Cf. W. N. Clark, Explorations in Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, ); Person and Being (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, ); The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, ); and The Philosophical Approach to God: A New Thomistic Perspective (New York: Fordham University Press, ). In the field of Thomistic studies, see also G. Ventimiglia, Differenza e contradizione. Il problema dell’essere in Tommaso d’Aquino: esse, diversum, contradictio (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, ).
. Historical Approach
on the level of economical participation. This exhibits the personal dimension as fundamental to the level of metaphysics. The two perspectives seem to employ two different tones, as Matthew Levering points out. The first deals with the substance-relation pairing, and within a context that tries to harmonize classical philosophy and theology through the simple fact of having recourse to metaphysical categories, whereas the second is based on a purely theological category of monarchy, thus maintaining the priority of the Person of the Father over substance and greatly emphasizing the rift between Greek philosophical reflection and patristic thought. The intention of the present study is to provide evidence of the possible convergence between both readings through a reconstruction of the historical-dogmatic development of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century. In particular, together with the reflections of Basil the Great, here there is recourse to the thought of his younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa, and the latter’s insistence on the economical-immanent distinction and the co-relativity of the divine Persons. It is precisely this notion of co-relativity, as it is found in divinis, that is the element that facilitates a reconciliation of the two readings, inasmuch as it strongly expresses personal communion in terms of relation and hence in terms of a relationship to substance. With respect to Zizioulas’ deep analysis, we in particular try to show how relation and substance can never be dialectically opposed if one means to remain faithful to Cappadocian thought.
. : But there is another perspective that provides particularly interesting elements in the present context and that the previous section requires to
“Thus God as a Person-as hypostasis of the Father-makes the one divine substance to be that which it is: the one God. This point is absolutely crucial.” Zizioulas, Being as Communion, . Cf. M. Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, ), –. Some claims reveal a kind of dialectical opposition between substance and person that seems not to give proper attention to Patristic thought: cf. J. D. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, . See the citations in note . In this sense, here one is not claiming the primacy of relation over substance. For this, there is total agreement with the criticism offered by Lewis Ayres of relational ontology, if this is characterized by such an approach. Cf. L. Ayres, “(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontologies,” in J. Polkinghorne (ed.), The Trinity and an Entangled World (Cambridge: Eerdmans, ), –.
Introduction
be examined: the historical-philosophical one. Indeed, the epistemology that has characterized modernity has led to an unnatural and anachronistic separation between the properly philosophical and religious dimensions in the analyses of Classical and Late Antique philosophy. The connection with salvation, which has been essential in metaphysical research since its beginnings, has thus remained totally in the shadows. This led to a radical separation between philosophy and theology, a separation that made it inexplicable why theologia was the first name for metaphysics in the fourth century BC and why Christian life has been identified, eight centuries later, with the term philosophia. This is why a recent book by Johannes Zachhuber is of great interest. He deals with the subject of Patristic philosophy, covering, with speculative vigor and scientific courage, the period from the fourth century to John Damascene. The volume seeks to overcome the stark dichotomy between Patristic thought and the study of ancient philosophy. The thesis of the book, in a nutshell, is that the real metaphysical novelty in the Patristic field did not occur in the fourth century, as some important authors have argued, for example, Zizioulas and Losski, but only in the following centuries in the context of the discussions about Christology. Zachhuber’s analysis has a pars destruens and a pars contruens. The latter consists of drawing attention to the philosophical value of the Christological debates of the first millennium. This is a truly valuable service for both philosophical and Patristic research, which opens up a very promising field of investigation. The historical fact that the metaphysical discussions and reformulations to describe the unity of Christ’s two natures in his one hypostasis represent a genuine metaphysical novelty is apparent and extremely important. The pars destruens consists of deconstructing the identification of Cappadocian theology with a metaphysical revolution, which for the first time recognizes the value of the individual in relation to the universal. The question is extremely important for the research perspective on the following centuries, since the theology of Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus became a sort of Scholastic ante litteram for the
J. Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Mark Edwards’ approach is really valuable in this respect. See, in particular, M. J. Edwards, Aristotle and Early Christian Thought (London; New York: Routledge, ).
. Historical Approach
later Patristic thought. The author has the merit of highlighting the development of the thought of the three Cappadocians, pointing out the transition between a theory of the triunity of God in Basil, later shared by Gregory od Nazianzus, according to an approach that is defined in the text as “abstract,” and a more “concrete” version characteristic of Gregory of Nyssa, in his reinterpretation (and defense) of his brother’s thought. Zachhuber rightly corrects an exclusively linguistic (and logical) reading of Basil’s Trinitarian theology, which would lead to a merely social conception of divine unity, highlighting the originality of Cappadocian philosophy. While the pars contruens of Zachhuber’s proposal is absolutely acceptable, the pars destruens is less convincing. In fact, the approach to the Cappadocians’ theology seems flawed from the outset by the decision not to consider apophaticism as a fundamental element of their epistemology. This prevents the reader from grasping the great novelty of the relation, which in the ontology of Basil and the two Gregories becomes a true principle of individuation for the divine Persons. As the following pages will attempt to demonstrate, the perspective of the relation (schesis) makes it difficult to agree with the claim that the Cappadocians do not depart from the Greek philosophical tradition in their supposed prioritization of unity over the particular or that for them the uniqueness of the existent was as irrelevant as in Hellenistic thought. Zachhuber writes: Yet it is hard to see how the individual, let alone the person, is more important to the Cappadocians than it had been to earlier representatives of ancient philosophy. Human individuals in the Cappadocians’ view are only hypostases of the “one man”; they represent universal being insofar as it necessarily exists in a multitude. Individuals, therefore, are only of interest in their plurality; they matter, one might say, as particulars, but not each of them in their particularity or individuality. In their systematic lack of interest for particularity, these Christian thinkers followed a main tendency of ancient philosophy more generally.
On this key element, see S. Douglass, Theology of the Gap: Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy (New York: Peter Lang, ). “The Cappadocians developed an ontology of being as one; thus far, they did not diverge from the long-standing emphasis on ontological unity in Greek philosophical thought.” (Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics, ) “[T]he world consists of individual existents, but their distinctiveness and uniqueness is as unimportant as it had been in the previous Hellenistic tradition” (Ibid., ). Ibid., .
Introduction
If this were the case, then it would be incomprehensible that Gregory of Nyssa was the first person in history to condemn slavery in an absolute and theologically founded manner, as previous research has made clear. Similarly, it would be incomprehensible to understand how the Cappadocian concept of pronoia concerns both universal history and the individual at the same time, unlike the philosophical perspective, including the Hellenistic one, for which pronoia never touched the material and personal level. For the same reason, the novelty in the conception of historia, which becomes the narration of a concrete life, of a personal history, would not be understandable either. But also from a theological point of view, the perspective chosen by Zachhuber carries within itself a principle of opposition between Trinitarian doctrine and Christology, because, in the absence of a correct consideration of the apophatic dimension, it projects the concept of hypostasis developed by Gregory of Nyssa at the cosmological level onto the ontology of the three divine Persons. This movement of thought from the bottom to the top seems to contradict precisely Cappadocian epistemology, because it does not sufficiently distinguish the nature of the Creator from creatures. Thus, Zachhuber cannot fully appreciate that the characteristics that identify the three divine Persons in the Cappadocian theology are the Father’s being without beginning, the Son’s being through generation and the Holy Spirit’s being through procession. But these characteristics are based on the act from which the processions emerge, founding hypostatic distinction on the different relations (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις) of origin of the divine Persons, as we will try to show. And it is precisely the resemantization of schesis that makes it difficult to accept Zachhuber’s assertion that Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of hypostasis is close to that of Porphyry. The following chapters will be devoted precisely to showing the novelty of the relational conception of
Cf. I. Ramelli, Social Justice and the Legitimacy of Slavery: The Role of Philosophical Asceticism from Ancient Judaism to Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Cf. V. Limone, Origene e la filosofia greca. Scienze, testi, lessico (Brescia: Morcelliana, ). Cf. G. Maspero, “Teologia biblica ed esegesi cristologico-trinitaria alla luce del rapporto tra historia ed oikonomia in Gregorio di Nissa,” Annales theologici (): –. Cf. Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology, . See, for example, Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio , , –: SCh , . Cf. Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology, .
. A Look Ahead
the Cappadocians with respect to the Neo-Platonists, with the consequences that follow at the level of the principle of individuation. This revision of Aristotelian categories opens up possibilities of thought that can be judged valid even independently of the faith that inspired them. This is why the Cappadocians’ reshaping of classical metaphysics can be considered a crucial element of Patristic philosophy.
. : The present study is inspired by a tremendous claim made by Jean Daniélou, who in wrote of the Mystery of the One and Triune God: We thus touch upon the depths of Christian Trinitarian ontology. One of the ways that the Trinitarian mystery better illuminates the human situation [is that] it indicates to us that the very depth of existence, the basis of reality, the form of everything in that it is the origin of all things, is love – that is, it is love in the sense of interpersonal community. The foundation of being is the community of persons. Those who say that the basis of being is material, those who say it is the spirit, those who say it is the one: they are all wrong. The basis of being is communion.
Jean Daniélou is one of the preeminent scholars of Gregory of Nyssa, thus it seems helpful to re-read Gregory’s thought from the perspective of Trinitarian ontology, combining philosophy and freedom. But in order to do this, it is likewise necessary to briefly review the history of logos and the cosmological conception that characterized the Greek world (Chapter ). Doing so will reveal how the Greek logos was linked to the concept of necessary relation (logos ut ratio) and why Trinitarian reflection had to re-elaborate it according to the notions of freedom and mutual gift (Chapter ). The central nucleus of Gregory of Nyssa’s theology is the divine Filiation: the process of purification of the concept of filiation in creation, which is the only way to avoid contradicting the content of Revelation, urged to overcome the reading of the Logos as a figure of ontological mediation so as to make the insertion of the Logos into the divine immanence possible (Logos ut relatio). Yet this undertaking marks a change in the very makeup of ontology. Classical metaphysics is hereby extended in a relational sense. This is evident in any elaboration of the divine attributes, and in particular of the attributes of Life (Chapter ), that is re-read through a Trinitarian lens and is thus inseparably connected to eternal generation (Life from Life).
J. Daniélou, La Trinité et le mystère de l’existence (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, ), .
Introduction
This conclusion, which here can only be partial, is verified through a review of the history of the term schesis (relation) from its debut in the philosophical thought (Chapter ) until the emergence of the thought of the three Cappadocian Fathers (Chapter ). Both the originality of their elaboration and the explicit ontological orientation of their doctrine are themes that go hand-in-hand according to this very same historical review. This Cappadocian reshaping of metaphysics has extremely relevant consequences at the level of knowledge theory and epistemology. They will first be explored from the point of view of apophaticism and how, in the Christian conception, it points precisely to the role of relation in the cognitive act, founding the philosophical value of both faith and worship (Chapter ). Then, secondly, it will be shown how the Cappadocian solution responds to an aporia present in the Greek conception of epistêmê, the root of which goes back to the metaphysical tension between the one and the many, hence to the discussion between Parmenides and Plato. From this comes an open conception of logic that, surprisingly, is also in tune with contemporary research in this field (Chapter ). Lastly, the conclusion (Chapter ) aims to present Trinitarian ontology as appearing out of an exploration of the Cappadocian thought as a true and proper third navigation, which, beginning with the divine Word, rips open classical metaphysics to acknowledge the sense of relation and a personal dimension. This set course, which places the quite unfashionable term ontology in conjunction with the adjective Trinitarian, might seem daunting or, even in the best of scenarios, a worthless venture in our own day. Yet it seems necessary to answer the post-Nietzchian relativism that threatens the foundations of contemporary existence. In such an age of crisis, it is all the more urgent to return to the sources, as indeed any authentic renaissance in the history of thought has always been accompanied by a return to origins and by overcoming a dependence on their respective commentaries. Here we are dealing with an attempt to show, through a historical perspective, how the concept of person, relation and freedom, that is, a real Patristic Trinitarian ontology, has emerged through theological
The reference is to the second navigation in Plato’s Phaedo (.d–.a). Cf. W. Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, ), –.
. A Look Ahead
reflection, these very elements that today are gravely endangered by Western relativism and individualism. Clearly, this work is a kind of proposal and nothing more. Yet the decomposition of a communitarian fabric along with the multiplication of pathologies that accompany it render such a project necessary. In this endeavor, various threads of an investigation converge, giving rise little by little to a true and proper hope for a rebirth of human thought in postmodern times.
Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, . Many contributed to the realization of this present volume. I would like to thank in particular Riccardo Chiaradonna of RomaTre University, whose indispensable feedback was essential to the philosophical part of this research. I would also like to thank Paul O’Callaghan of the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross. The works of Mark Edwards and Johannes Zachhuber have been an occasion to deepen many points of this volume, which has been inspired by dialogue with them too. The simultaneous approach to philosophy and theology is typical of the Patristic thought but is also extremely relevant for present time, as John Milbank and Piero Coda have shown. The present work could be considered a contribution to the research on Trinitarian Ontology, whose importance is all the more apparent in the present time, as also the recent conference New Trinitarian Ontologies, held in Cambridge in September , has shown. The present volume is part of the research project that was brought to that event, co-organized by the author.
Rational Logos
. “Most ancient philosophers think of nature (φύσις), that is, heaven and earth, in relation with life, indeed the cosmos itself seems like a living thing.” Being has from the earliest of times been perceived to be in relation to life, and this life is explained mainly in terms of logos. This is due to the fact that there is an organic quality attributed to the world precisely through a logos that rules all things insofar as it is the relationship between its various parts and elements. We see an example of this in Heraclitus, who, even with the difficulties in interpretation on account of the scarcity of available testimonies, seems to make the claim that people, notwithstanding the fact that everything occurs according to this measure (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), do not actually know it. The transformations of the eternal flux obey this logos of necessary proportion. It seems that all the cosmos is a living thing held together by an internal logos that serves as a kind of breath that animates it and conducts it through all of its continual mutations. This very correspondence between being and life can be read in Plato as well. In his attempt at a rational purification of religious tradition, he explains that the cause and origin of the world are the Good and the goodness of the Demiurge, who desired that the visible world be beautiful:
M. Sánchez Sorondo, La vita. Storia e teoresi (Rome: Mursia, ), ix. Cf. Heraclitus, Fragment, DK . In DK , he uses the equivalent expression: ᾧ λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι. Cf. Heraclitus, Fragment, DK .
. Greek Life and Cosmology
He made the universe by infusing the intellect in the soul and the soul in the body, in such a way that his work would be as beautiful and as good as possible. Therefore, according to the most probable line of reasoning, we must say that this world is a living thing, truly endowed with a soul and intellect by God’s providence.
Hence, being takes movement, life, soul and intelligence as its characteristics. The cosmos has to be singular inasmuch as it is constituted according to what is exemplary, which in turn has as its one and only material image (μονογενής) a perfect living being (τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ). The series of images transmits being together with its goodness, yet it is marked by a perfection of descending degree stemming, or departing, from its prototype. Plato has a conception of ontology as by degree, constituted by a further scale of degrees of being that together unite the divine world to the world of mankind. Eros plays a fundamental role in this, who, as if he himself were the intermediate level of metaphysics, effectively acts to keep the universe united: [Diotima] I said: therefore, what is Eros? Is he mortal? Absolutely not. And what then? As I already said, he is between the mortal and immortal (μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ θανάτου). [Socrates] What do you mean, Diotima? [Diotima] He is a great spirit (δαίμων μέγας), Socrates. In fact, each spirit is an intermediate being between (μεταξύ) god and mortals. [Socrates] I asked: and what type of power does he have? [Diotima] That of interpreting and bringing (διαπορθμεῦον) prayers and sacrifices from human beings to the gods, and replies and orders from the gods to human beings. He, who is the middle-road between them, completes (συμπληροῖ) both, in such a way that he brings the entire universe to unity in himself (τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι). It is thanks to him that every mantic and priestly art (ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη) takes place, and that every divinization and magic is connected with sacrifices and initiations. Gods do not mingle with human beings (θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται), but it is thanks to him that the gods have every relation and communication with human beings, both in dreams and while awake. And whoever is learned in these things is a spiritual [i.e., daemonic] man.
It is clear that Eros is an ontologically intermediate being, as Diotima herself also indicates in this description of his being born of Penia, or Misery, and the god of expediency and excess, Poros. This mixed nature
Plato, Timaeus, .b.–.c.. English translations of Platonic works cited herein are taken from John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, ). Plato, Sophista, .e.–.a.. Plato, Timaeus, .b.–. Plato, Symposium, .d.–.a.. Cf. Plato, .a–e.
Rational Logos
makes him, who is the personification of desire, look like one of the links of the chain that, from friend to friend (φίλος), according to Plato, leads to the First Friend (πρῶτον φίλον), from whom flows all friendship and attraction. This intermediate nature attributed to Eros allows him to carry out a relational function. The gods do not communicate directly with mankind, rather everything passes through him, who as the essence of tension of being keeps the universe united in himself, thus assuming a cosmological dimension. An anthropological reflection of this metaphysical concept reveals the apollinism of desire, that is, the reduction of the will to the dimension of intellect as described by Plato: Socrates’ victory at the end of the struggle to praise Eros, which is the argument of the dialogue, implies an admission of the superiority of the god of philosophy (who is Apollo) over all the frustrated desire of Dionysian tendencies. It is necessary to place the will and desire in submission to the standards of reason. The intellectual bent of Socratic ethics is an immediate consequence of this, where sin is reduced to simple error. Eros is, then, the figure who is referred to as life on account of his direct anthropological and religious relevance. Indeed, in the Symposium he is hailed as authentic life and unhindered thought, for he is defined as the very tendency to generate what is beautiful so as to achieve eternity. The relationship between ontology and life is hence inherent to a metaphysical conception of what is real. Generation and a tendency toward fullness, or completeness, of life are placed within the graduated structure of being. Here one might ask whether the connection between being and life holds true even at the vertex of the ontological scale. Clearly the generative dimension cannot be extended to the perfect world of the Ideas, wherein there is no such thing as becoming. Yet, interestingly, in the later works of Plato, there is the reference to life even at the level of the world of Ideas. Therefore, in The Laws, one reads a magnificent line of reasoning that concludes with the preexistence of the soul and its primacy over the body. Taking up a thread of logic analogous to the one hinted
From the verb φιλέω, with the twofold meaning of both being dear to and loving, therefore both as object as well as subject of attraction. Cf. Plato, Lysis, .d. Cf. G. Reale, Eros dèmone mediatore (Milan: Rizzoli, ), –. Cf. Plato, Symposium, .; .a–b. Cf. Plato, Leges, .e.
. Greek Life and Cosmology
upon in the Lysis, in classifying the various movements, Plato shows how the chain of those realities that move and are moved must claim a beginning in some thing that moves itself, some thing that is not on the receiving end of any motion from external sources. This is precisely what is identified as Life and the Soul. This doctrine implies a true and proper evolution in Plato’s theological thought, whereas in the Phaedo he presents the world of the Ideas in a static way, in the Sophist, one of his last works immediately prior to The Laws, this vision of the world of the Ideas is modified, and he attributes to the Ideas movement, life, soul and intelligence (κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν). The dynamic of which he speaks is obviously that of thought, in that the Ideas are subjects that know and are known. In this way, the maturity of Platonic thought presents an intimate connection between the foundation of ontology and life. It likewise reveals a notion of life that vindicates relation, calls relation to the fore, although here it is still understood as a necessary and intelligible relationship between the different Ideas. Such a conception has to do with the entirety of being, from the cosmos to the Hyperuranion. It is Aristotle who later perfects this construction and through the metaphysical conception of act goes so far as to identify God with the act of life and thought. In an analysis similar to that of Plato, Aristotle, starting from the circular and constant motion of the first heaven, revives the necessity of a reality that might be the cause of this movement. Yet the reality that moves because it is moved from without is only acknowledged as an intermediary (μέσον), one that necessarily requires a further reality that moves even without being moved (ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ) inasmuch as it is eternal and yet at the same time substance and act (ΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα). The Prime Mover must be the final cause, the cause beyond which there is for no thing another cause, and which identifies itself with Being and the Beautiful. It is utterly desirable in that it is pure act and pure thought. Hence, it does not communicate movement as something moved, as is true of all other realities, rather, it draws and turns other things because it is both loved and desired (κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον͵ κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα
Cf. Ibid., .c–e. Cf. Plato, Sophista, .e–.a. On Plato and relation, see Th. Scaltas, “Relations as Plural Predications in Plato,” in A. Marmodoro and D. Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –. Aristotle, Metaphysica, XII, ; .a.–.
Rational Logos
κινεῖ). It is quite significant that Aristotle has recourse to the verb ἐράω, for in doing so, he calls to mind even in the very terminology the Platonic reflection on Eros. Aristotle arrives at the apex of his reflection exactly in his presentation of the First Mover as life, similar to that which for the human being is, albeit for but a brief moment, the highest kind of life: And this elicits even more wonder if God is eternally in that state of beatitude which for us is only momentary. And if God’s state of beatitude is greater, then the wonder is also greater. God, however, is in such a state. And he subsists as life (καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει): in fact, the act of the intellect is life (γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή), and God is act. Therefore, his act is essentially: supreme and eternal life (ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ΄ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ΐδιος). We then say that God is a supreme and eternal living being (φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ΐδιον ἄριστον), and thus that a continuous and eternal life subsists in him. This, indeed, is God (ὁ θεός).
Enrico Berti’s words are quite beautiful, for he rightly emphasizes that only at the end of Aristotle’s reasoning is the name of God (ὁ θεός) introduced. The way in which the philosopher attempts to trace contemplation back to the act that can be called divine life deserves another look. This theological claim is of enormous breadth, indeed enough to perhaps establish the extreme limit that marks how far one might elevate human reason in absence of Revelation. The beatitude of intellectual contemplation allows the human person to find her way back to God, who is alive inasmuch as He is thinking, and identifies Himself with thought itself. In this way, Aristotelian ontology turns out to be an ontology of life that is an ontology of thought. This vertex likewise represents a limit, for the fullness of life here is identified with the necessary dimension, one that explicitly excludes reciprocal relation and will. The God of Aristotle is pure act and hence can
Ibid., .b.–. Ibid., .b.–. Cf. E. Berti, “Per i viventi l’essere è il vivere (Aristotele, De anima .b.),” in M. Sánchez Sorondo (ed.), La vita (Rome: Lateran University Press, ), . Cf. ibid., . Enrico Berti maintains that Aristotle’s First Mover is a person, understood in the sense of being a subject bearing will and intention as delineated in Roman law. This attribution of will would be demonstrated by the fact that, for the first principle, act is pleasure (ἡδονή), from which one deduces the presence of will (cf. E. Berti, “Attualità dell’eredità di Aristotele,” PATH []: –). But in this theological context, it is important to underline the difference between a merely juridical conception of person and what we understand as person today through Christian thought. Even on a philosophical level, this seems not to be a totally rigorous identification of intellectual pleasure with will, through the application to the first principle of the category of ὄρεξις, which Aristotle only uses in
. Greek Life and Cosmology
desire nothing and have relation with nothing. Simply put, as God is absolute He does not concern Himself with any concrete individual. Necessity is precisely the dynamic that colors any perspective of life. Yet the fact that one also identifies the first principle with life and thought is said to be the basis for any further metaphysical reflection on what is real. We can hereby give a summary of the various outcomes of the Greek reflection on God, the cosmos and life: . Both Plato and Aristotle begin with a metaphysical conception of God, one constituted by a continuous ontological scale that unites the world and the first principle in a singular ordering. . Aristotle perfects the work undertaken by Plato: the latter in fact, at the end of his work, introduces life and thought into the world of Ideas, and the former goes so far as to identify the First Mover with the act of life and thought. . Both enter into the same conceptual space when they identify with thought the ultimate metaphysical dimension of the life of the first principle. Greek metaphysics, then, makes the connection between life and being at the level of the first principle, identifying the fullness of life with thought. What is intelligible, then, never passes away and survives in comparison to the transience of the material and phenomenal dimension. Yet here thought is relative to the necessary, causal links that guide the cosmos and extend to the one, single ontological ordering that includes the first principle and the world. This is the cosmological background of the Greek world wherein the logos, as we will soon see, is understood as
the anthropological realm. As Adriano Bausola shows, Aristotle’s psychological theory represents enormous progress with respect to Plato (cf. A. Bausola, La libertà [Brescia: La Scuola, ], –). Nevertheless, the application of the analysis of pleasure and desire to the first principle was not something developed by Aristotle and it seems impossible in the identification of this first principle as pure act. It seems likewise improper to attribute personality to the Aristotelian first principle starting from the identification of the traditional Greek deities with the various movers (see, E. Berti, Struttura e significato della Meatafisica di Aristotele [Rome: Edusc, ], –). The gods themselves in fact are none other than mythological personifications of natural forces that belong to the domain of necessity. It would seem anachronistic to read Aristotle along the lines of an ontological conception of person and will. The same can be said for the Platonic Demiurge and all other ancient, mythical personifications of the divine. See also the claims made by Giovanni Reale in G. Reale (ed.), Metafisica di Aristotele (Milan: Bompiani, ), cxxiv.
Rational Logos
the necessary relationship that binds together all the different levels of the scale of being.
. The term logos has throughout the course of history been considered very nearly a definition of Greek thought. The word derives from the verb λέγειν, which in its most original sense means “to gather.” From this one derives “to count” and “to give an account,” that is, “to tell,” which in the end is the meaning most commonly ascribed to the verb. Four fundamental meanings of the term logos can be reconnected to these mentioned tendencies: . Calculation, understood as the act of counting; . The account or expressed account (story), and hence the word, inasmuch as it is the result of this action; . The necessary relationship or proportion, the objective foundation for the action; . Reason as mankind’s capacity to grasp all of the above, and hence the subjective and potential foundation of the act itself. It is important to note that the account that makes reference to the logos does not stay within the bounds of opinion and myth. Rather, it touches upon the very being of things. We are dealing with, then, the foundation of scientific thought, as one reads in the discussion of Plato’s Theaetetus, where the term logos is explained through an ascending scale of meanings in relation to true science: (a) articulated thought that manifests a correct opinion, (b) analytical description and (c) distinction of specific difference. Plato in The Laws clarifies his thought regarding myth when he compares the human being to a puppet built by the gods for fun or for some other more serious reason: the passions are likened to the cables moving it between virtue and vice. Philosophy aims to show the fittingness of letting oneself be guided always by only one of these forces, that is, by the sacred golden cable of reason (τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ γωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν), which is actually the most flexible in that it is made of gold. This thread must be defended, for reason is by nature always peaceful and opposed to
Cf. G. Kittel (ed.), Theologische Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. IV (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, ), –. Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, d–a.
. The History of the Logos
violence. Hence, it is the state, recognizing this thread on account of the revelations of the gods and philosophy, that must protect reason by way of the law. From a philosophical point of view, it is the logos as necessary relationship that bears the most fundamental meaning. Indeed, as is also seen in the example of the puppet mentioned above, the relationship between the divine and the world is conceived of in terms of determination, or being determined. For Plato, the logos is the fixed proportionality wherein the basic physical elements interact in generating the body of the world, which all takes place according to analogy. And this analogy, which here means necessary proportion, covers all things. Later, the conception of Plotinus will be an extreme offshoot of this, when he writes that the universe is an animated being (ζῴου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς) in which all opposites are held together by a providence of which only God is capable, and which furthermore connects the celestial and terrestrial worlds together by analogy. This makes knowing future events possible through observing the movements of the heavens, for these heavenly realities act on or influence earthly events according to the analogy of how the various mechanisms of an animal interact with each other, where no single part generates another part, rather all are generated together. This, according to Plotinus, all demonstrates that reason is one (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λόγος εἷς). The Greek logos is, then, essentially different from the word understood in a personal sense, as we are inclined to think of it today after many centuries of Christian civilization and culture. The term means just the intelligible and necessary structure of reality discovered by Greek thought through the use of reason. It was this discovery that made it possible for the philosopher to recognize the place of the human being in the cosmos, always perceived as finite in the Greek world, and to act accordingly. It was a geometrical conception of existence, framed within a vision of history as an eternal repetition and a pursuit of the most fundamental metaphysical principle that might reveal the necessary relation of each part to the whole. It is precisely from the perspective of this logos that life is developed as an interpretative key to the entire universe. So if one were to study the history of this concept and its development, it would become clear that it first emerges in Heraclitus, whom we already mentioned, and his conception of logos as the profound law of the
Cf. Plato, Leges, d–b. Cf. Plotinus, Enneades, III, , .
Cf. Plato, Timaeus, b–c.
Rational Logos
continual transformations that characterize the world, a law that mankind is called to grasp so as to understand what his place is in the cosmos. The word logos, then, is as a notion very close to that of law, and more specifically the law of movement. Hence, the term furthermore indicates mediation, and in the broadest sense of the term: among the different components of the enormous organism that is the universe, between mankind and the world and, lastly, between mankind and the divine. In light of the particular manner in which the present study is developing, the Sophists’ critique is very interesting. They separated the meaning of logos as necessary law from that of word, as they were deft with words and denied any predetermined foundation of the world. In doing so, they claimed only the interests of the most dominant in the conversation. Socrates and Plato reacted against this individualistic notion of the logos, providing the essential depth for a further development of human thought. Plato in fact warns his disciples to not lose faith in their own reasoning, for distrust in reasoning is born in the same way as distrust in mankind, as disillusion or disappointment in the face of the betrayal of those whom one thought to be friends should not lead one to the confusion that all men are bad, so it is with one’s reasoning. Instead, philosophy is possible because the law that governs the relationship of the one and the many is always the same, in the present as in the past and in such a way that that which gives value to reason is always present. In his Sophista, through the concept of the logos as universal mediator, Plato answers the criticism that naturally emerges from the claim that what is true must be characterized as movement, life, soul and intelligence, which is already hinted at in the previous section: movement and eternity seem not to link themselves, whereas reasoning is born out of the overlapping of the forms (διὰ γὰρ τὴν λλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν). Yet the Sophists separate everything from everything and thereby destroy the λόγος by claiming that there is no mixing whatsoever of nothing with nothing (συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν). The λόγος, then, is born out of a relationship of the forms that are recognized in their reciprocal relationships. And so thought (διάνοια) and the logos are identical, even though the former is internal, as the dialogue the soul has with itself. The latter, however, is expressed. In any case, their
Cf. Plato, Phaedo, d–e. Cf. Plato, Philebus, d. Cf. Plato, Sophista, .e.–.a.. Cf. Ibid., e–b.
. The History of the Logos
value or importance is grasped after first correctly understanding the relationships of the object known through the Forms. One can thus speak of a true logos and false logos, according to which one speaks of how entities are or are not. In summary, for Plato the capacity mankind has for reason is based on the metaphysical role of the logos understood as that relationship that unites the one and the many, reflecting the relationships among the Forms in the harmony of the world. It can thus be said of the world that it is alive and true life consists of following reason, even if it costs one his or her earthly life, as seen in the example of Socrates. Aristotle’s contribution to the history of the term logos can be broken down into two main aspects that further develop, and in part advance criticism of, the Platonic inheritance: (a) the logos is the distinctive mark of mankind in the world of animals and (b) the logos is the basis of aretê and therefore of the entirety of mankind’s moral enterprise, which has as its end the perfect happiness proper to the Unmoved Mover, thought of thought. Aristotle’s metaphysical construct is quite solid inasmuch as it presents the relationship between the divine and the world from the point of view of act. This will lead to a unified vision that bestows enormous importance to the visible world and will facilitate subsequent philosophical developments. Stoicism was in fact an essential moment in the advancement of the doctrine of logos. Here the term was taken to be something evermore immanent with respect to the world. The cosmos itself is directed by the logos in its providence, according to an expression of Chrysippus borrowed by Diogenes Laërtius. On the level of popular religion, the logos is even identified with Zeus, as read in the hymn of Cleanthes. For the Stoics, the logos is the immanent power that renders the cosmos a living thing, like the body of a single organism that develops as if from a seed, an immanent force that is identified with the λόγος σπερματικός. Man himself is made a part of this whole by way of his reason, and he reaches perfection when he lives according to his nature, as happens in the lives of the wise. The distinction articulated in this context between thought immanent to the human being and its expression, which begins to emerge and be identified through the phrases λόγος ἐνδιάθετος
Cf. Ibid., e–b. Plato, Cratylus, b.–. Aristotle, Politica, a.–. Chrysippus, Fragmenta logica et physica, .. Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum, VII, , . Cf. Cleanthes, Fragmenta, , .
Rational Logos
and λόγος προφορικός, will prove to be very important in the development of Christian theology. These run throughout the writings of the early Church Fathers as they attempt to explain the relationship of the Son with creation. It is worth noting that Chrysippus describes the function of the logos in the cosmos with an expression that harkens back to Plato’s Symposium and the role of Eros. Indeed, according to the citation reproduced by Philo in De fuga et inventione, Chrysippus claims: The logos of Being, which is the bond (δεσμός) of the Universe, conserves every part of it and unites them, preventing them from being dissolved and dispersed.
With respect to the Platonic conception, here one is no longer dealing with a mediator between an ideal world, that which is considered authentic, and the material world, which is marked by appearances and contingency. Rather, the world is conceived of as one singular divine organism endowed with a body and the logos is its measure and scope as well as its dynamic force.
. Thus far, one can see how the issue at stake is an articulation of the relationship, on the one hand, between transcendence and immanence and, on the other hand, between the one and the many. Philo’s contribution to this development of philosophical thought deserves to be revisited. He returns to the role of the δεσμός of the logos, yet in a metaphysical context that is totally diverse. His doctrine is particularly important from the perspective of the Christian Logos. He attributes to the Logos a function analogous to that of the Platonic Eros, identifying it with an archangel through Semitic categories: And the Father who has generated everything has given the most ancient archangel Logos an excellent gift: to stand on the border (μεθόριος) to separate creation from the Creator. He always intercedes with Him who is incorruptible in favor of the mortal race, which is bound to affliction and misery. And he is also the ambassador sent by Him who is Lord over the lower nature. And the Logos exults in the gift and announces it saying: I was standing between the LORD and you (Dt :), without being uncreated like God, or created like us, but intermediate (μέσος) between the extremes and concordant with both.
Philo, De fuga et inventione, , –. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit? .–..
. The One and the Many
With respect to a pagan philosophical tradition, there is evidence that the logos takes on personal traits that are real and not simply literary. This happens, for example, in the case of Plato’s Demiurge: the cosmological conception is juxtaposed to freedom. On the contrary, in Philo faith in the Creator is expressed through the exultation of the gift that the Logos is aware he has received, with his status as ontological mediator. Though in this context marked by the doctrine of creation, there yet remains an ambiguity, for the logos continues to play the role of ontological intermediary. This cosmic role is also highlighted in the De plantatione, where one reads: Nothing that belongs to the material world is able to bear the weight of the cosmos. But the eternal Logos of the eternal God is the most resistant and the most solid support of the universe. He, in fact, extends from the center to the extremities and from the extremities to the center, invisibly running through all of nature, bringing every part of it together and securing them. He is the one whom the Creator Father has made the intangible bond (δεσμόν) of the universe.
As in the case of the Stoic Chrysippus, and analogous to the Platonic Eros, the Logos serves as the bond (δεσμός) that keeps all things together. It is μέσος in the way Eros was μεταξύ. The capacity to unite is tied to co-naturality with both elements connected, in such a way that the connection between the one and the many is traced back to some metaphysical mediation and ontological structure of gradation. In subsequent stages of thought after Middle Platonism, both Philo and Neo-Pythagoreanism will be fundamental, possessing between them a reciprocated bond. Here one calls to mind, in particular, the work of Eudoros who seems to have been the first to place the One as an absolute principle above the Monad-Dyad pair. He thereby initiates an authentic monism that passes over an opposition between the One and the Dyad, which is something that characterizes Platonism.
Philo, De Plantatione, , –, . Cf. D. T. Runia, “Why Does Clement of Alexandria Call Philo ‘The Pythagorean’?” Vigiliae Christianae (): –. Cf. C. H. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History (Indianapolis: Hackett, ), –. See Eudoros’ text reproduced by Simplicius in his In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria (Berlin, , IX, , –). Even Aristotelianism seems to be unable to overcome the opposition between the one and the many, which is translated into terms of the pairing potency and act. Here one thinks of eternal matter with respect to its form.
Rational Logos
Certainly, Philo cannot accept the notion of an ontological scale that, and necessarily so, unites God and the world. Yet it is precisely upon this infinite distance between the two that he bases the claim of the goodness of the world, which comes to be according to the will of the Creator. The influence of Philo facilitates the passage to monism, which, in the absence of the revealed doctrine of creation nevertheless has to resolve the dialectic between the one and the many and does it by giving matter a negative connotation so as to differentiate it from the first principle. This comes to fruition with Moderatus who explicates this negativity of matter, something only implicit in Eudoros. Here a conception of a hierarchical system of gradual degeneration emerges and will be later picked up by Plotinus. Even the three Neo-Platonic hypostases seem to be “anticipated” by the doctrine of the three gods, cited in fragment of Numenius, which was part of Plotinus’ pedagogy. Numenius seems particularly interesting when read from a perspective that considers the relationship between the metaphysics of the logos and Trinitarian doctrine. Speaking of how the second cause comes to being beginning with the first, he writes in fragment : Everything that is given passes from the giver, whom it leaves, to the one recipient – servants, properties, wrought silver or coins. But these are mortal and human realities. Divine realities, rather, are such that in being communicated, passing from one to the other, they have not stopped being with the giver and have benefited the recipient with no detriment to the giver, indeed, giving him the added benefit of remembering what he knew. Now, this excellent good is the good knowledge, which benefits the one who receives it without leaving the one who confers it. This is like a lamp that shines with a light of which the first is not deprived, since the matter of the second lamp was lit by contact with the flame of the first.
This passage is particularly important from a point of view of the doctrine of the logos and the use Christian theologians will make of it.
On the complex interpretation of the Dyad within Philonian thought, which is presented more as a philosophical exegesis rather than a coherent system, see M. Bonazzi, “Towards Transcendence: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age,” in F. Alesse (ed.), Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelianism Philosophy (Leuven: Brill, ), –; and C. Lévy, “La question de la dyade chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” in M. Bonazzi, C. Lévy and C. Steel (eds.), A Platonic Pythagoras. Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Imperial Age (Turnhout: Brepols, ), –. Cf. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, –. Numenius, Fragment , in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XI, , –: SCh , p. .
. The One and the Many
The claim here, in fact, is that the second cause follows the first by way of intellectual procession and without there being any loss whatsoever on the part of the source. And what is more, Numenius has recourse to an image of the communication of fire, which will later be common when speaking of the Trinity. The transmission of life and forms from the first god to human beings follows this same principle, for in the following of the fragment Numenius writes that the nature and being that possesses knowledge is the same in the god who gives and we who receive. In perfect consonance with the image of the lamp, he traces this doctrine back to the Platonic interpretation of Prometheus’ theft of the fire. It is precisely here that one meets with the insurmountable difficulty that any thought must face when dealing with the relationship between the divine and the world, or between the one and the many. The notion advanced by Numenius postulates a transmission of what is intelligible, which is so perfect that human souls must be thought of as parts of the divine Being, that is to say, parts of the God on high. For Plato, however, souls are divine but not part of god. For this reason, Numenius is pressed to emphasize, with a force that almost sounds Gnostic, the negative connotation of matter so as to preserve the distinction between the world and the divine and to furthermore speak of an evil soul of the world. Here one sees how the passage from dualism to monism requires that the derivation of an inferior cause from a superior cause be stamped with a lesser ontological status, which would then intrinsically characterize multiplicity and that which is countable. With Neo-Platonism, this difficulty will give way to the formalization of the degenerative aspect of the emanations as well as their hierarchy, which through the doctrine of the three hypostases will be something of a necessary element of confrontation in Trinitarian doctrine. Porphyry is an example of this, as he says: Every generator generates a reality inferior to his essence; and everything that is generated is by nature oriented toward its generator. Some generated ones do not turn toward their generators at all, others turn toward them sometimes, and others still turn only toward the generators and not toward themselves.
In a different ontological context, Gregory of Nyssa extends the image to the three divine Persons. See, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –, . Porphyry, Sententiae ad inteligibilia, n. (Bompiani: Milan, ), .
Rational Logos
In this context, procession implies degeneration. The influence that such a notion will have on subordination seems obvious, where the Son, the Logos, is considered to be necessarily inferior to the Father inasmuch as the Son is generated. All of this reverberates on the level of relations, for again according to Porphyry: [God] is always without relations (ἀσχέτου) with what comes after Him, and those who had been generated by Him who have become dissimilar from Him and strive to return to Him; and they believe that the relations (σχέσεις) toward Him are reciprocal (ἀντιστρέφειν), when they relate to Him.
The relation between the generated and the one who generates must necessarily be asymmetrical. Plotinus expresses this in terms of logos. It is, in fact, like a ray of light that emanates from Intelligence (νοῦς) as itself and from pure soul (ψυχή): Intellect and soul – and the soul that conforms to the Intellect – generate this Reason that is life which secretly possesses reason.
Reason (λόγος) here, then, proceeds from the one Intelligence and the one Life, both of which are perfect, but Reason is not in and of itself a one Life nor a one Intelligence, and it is certainly not perfect, for it does not give the whole of itself when it gives itself to other realities. Rather, it sets parts in opposition to one another, thus creating them as having defects and producing a reason for war and struggle. The unity that results from reason is here that of music and drama, where harmony is reached through pairing opposites. Harmony is hereby understood as “a greater relationship” (λόγον μείζονα), which is found repeatedly in the universe, a universe that although containing within itself warring parts is a single, living organism. In this sense, Plotinus writes: This unity of Reason must derive from opposites, insofar as their being contrary gives the Reason its coherence, and therefore its being. If it were not manifold it would neither be a whole nor Reason. Insofar as it is Reason it is differentiated in itself, and the maximum difference is, indeed, being opposed.
Thus, all of nature is logos, and all that which is contained in it is logos, as it was for the Stoics, but the origin of this logos is centered in the
Porphyry, In Platinus Parmenidem commentaria, III, –IV, (Vita e Pensiero: Milan, ), . Plotinus, Enneades, ...–. A. H. Armstrong (trans.) Plotinus: Ennead III (London: Harvard University Press, ), . Cf. Armstrong, Plotinus: Ennead III, –. Plotinus, Enneades, ...–.
. The One and the Many
intelligible world. This passage to the intelligible world is of great importance and will significantly influence Christian theology, largely through the Neo-Platonic culture that characterized the period of the early Church Fathers in the fourth century. Indeed, Plotinus writes: reason proceeds from the Intellect, and it always proceeds, as long as the Intellect is present in beings.
This perfect, primitive unity breaks downs into the multiplicity of the material world, as from a seed is born a composite body in which the different parts obstruct one another. Indeed, “this All of ours is not Intellect and rational principle, like the All There, but participates in Intellect and rational principle,” inasmuch as Intelligence is intermingled with necessity, and this leads the world toward evil, toward irrationality. Rather, the intelligible world is pure reason (λόγος) and another one that is reason (λόγος) alone could not arise from it. If another were to arise from it, it would inevitably be inferior, and would not be reason (μὴ λόγον). And it would not even be matter, because it would be without order. It would instead be a mixture of both.
This text reveals all the depth and limits of the Neo-Platonic conception: the logos is fully introduced into the intelligible world, certainly a significant development for the perspective of Christian Trinitarian doctrine, yet at the same time the multiplicity of the material world is explained through the process of degeneration. This was what compelled the Neo-Platonic philosophers to search not for a salvation of the world, as in the Gospels, but for a salvation from the world. Stoicism had a more positive conception of the world, yet unlike Plotinus it was not able to connect the logos to the intelligible world. Plotinus had introduced the idea that the logos proceeds from the nous, according to a notion that will be later transformed by Christianity and reformulated in terms of freedom, perfection of the gift and filiation. The comparison of the Neo-Platonist’s claim, relative to the world, that “the beginning is logos and everything is logos” (ἀρχὴ οὖν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος) and the “in the beginning was the Logos” (ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος) of the incipit of the prologue of the fourth Gospel serves as proof of the significance of Plotinus. What Aristotle had initiated, Plotinus hereby completes, as Aristotle’s Metaphysics reads “thought is the beginning”
Ibid., ...–. Ibid., ...–.
Ibid., ...–.
Ibid., ...–.
Rational Logos
(ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις). Yet only John will be able to perfectly distinguish the eternal and the personal Logos, whom he knew in the flesh, from the created world, and thus trace all things to this first principle without introducing any necessary and corruptive derivation.
. : The Greek cosmological conception, as presented in the first section of the present chapter, has ultimately led to a study of the history of the logos, which, notwithstanding different approaches, is always connected to some necessary relationship and ontological mediation. This progression of examination is concluded by the final section that has demonstrated in what way, in the passage from Platonism to Neo-Platonism, this essential development in the ontological conception has taken place. The opposition between the one and the many that characterizes Platonic dualism is hereby resolved on account of Philonian and Neo-Pythagorean mediation through the oneness of the Neo-Platonic first principle. The condition for such a development was the tracing back of multiplicity to the decomposition of various ontological degrees that, in a continually decreasing scale, necessarily united the One and the world. In this vision, borrowing inspiration as well from Aristotelian metaphysics and its chain of movers, the logos was conceived of as a fixed law of proportion that regulated this decomposition, or descent, from the One to the many. We are talking about, then, a logos that is both necessary and necessitating. From the relational perspective, this logos was marked by imperfection according to the Platonic conception of the inferiority of the image with respect to the prototype and according to categorization on the accidental level of the Aristotelian pros ti, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter . In conclusion, a common approach of classic antiquity upheld a system of scalar theology that recognizes an ontological continuum between the various degrees of being. The entire cosmos is alive and the logos is the foundation for its unity. Here the clarity of the distinction between transcendence and immanence is blurred, for there exists a necessary connection between the first principle and the world. The basis of the
Aristotle, Metaphysica, a.. On this topic, see M. Fattal, Du Logos de Plotin au Logos de saint Jean. Vers la solution d”un problème métaphysique? (Paris: Cerf, ). Cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, b. Cf. G. Sfameni Gasparro, “Monoteismo pagano nella Antichità tardiva? Una questione di tipologia storico-religioso,” Annali di Scienze Religiose (): –.
. Conclusion
Absolute’s being beyond all things is thus built upon the absence of relations, whereas the various intermediate degrees serve a relational function with respect to mankind and are all the more accessible the further removed they are from the first principle. Being par excellence is life as pure thought but life deprived of authentic relations. Within this being there is only room for fixed relations among what is intelligible, that is, for the rationes. In this vision, everything is directed according to necessity and the logos, which apart from the different philosophical perspectives, represents the fixed relationship that unites the various degrees of being, the ratio between the different heavens and different movers in the PlatonicAristotelian vision. Here ratio is understood in the accepted meaning from which numerous rationalizations emerge in such a way that the conception of the logos superimposes itself onto the meaning taken as necessary law. In a Neo-Platonic sphere, a contest particularly interesting to Trinitarian doctrine in that Neo-Platonism was the cultural milieu in which this doctrine was developed, the ontological scale was reinterpreted in terms of emanation and decadence from the One and in such a way that the logos was conceived of as the law of fixed proportion that ruled or coordinated this decline from the One to the many. Here, the logos is, then, the necessary and necessitating projecting imperfection on any relation connected to it. This philosophical background will have noteworthy consequences for Christian theology, which is born out of the unsettling encounter with the “Logos who became flesh” (John :).
Relational Logos
. The Jewish conception of the logos presents characteristics that are distinct from those of the Greeks inasmuch as the Jewish logos is directly linked to the Word of God who entered into authentic relation with the chosen people. The Lord speaks, chooses, is angered and saves. The very being of the people, the identity of the people, is constituted by the relation with this God who has reunited the different nomadic tribes and has made a great nation of them. The doctrine of creation is crucial to this notion. Whereas for the Greek world everything is eternal and necessary, for the Jewish world everything has been created by God, and this has been done freely. There is, then, an infinite metaphysical chasm between the creature and the Creator, something only the will of God can overcome. The logos of the Greek-speaking Hellenist Judaism was therefore tied to the will of God, the God who entered into relation with the people as a person. God speaks to mankind. God enters into relation with mankind, revealing Himself as a person and not only as power or life or unmoved Mover. The continuous ontological scale is ruptured and in such a way that the Jews now discover that no one can get to know God if God does not reveal Himself, if He does not desire to be known. In this way, the logos that is necessary and corresponds to ontological necessity is enlightened by the personal logos of a God Who is Person and Who desires to reveal Himself and enter into relation, in creating and saving. The Jewish logos, then, is bound to God’s action: it represents mediation but no longer simply an intermediate ontological level. Rather, it is a free and downward reaching relation, for the God of Israel is Person and has relations.
. The Personal Logos
The next step can be taken on account of the revelation of the New Testament, in an encounter with the intimacy of a God who is not only personal but who is three Persons. Hence, the logos will move from the role of divine activity that reveals the Lord’s personhood to being the Person of the Son, whose identity is based on the reciprocal relation with the Person of the Father. From this perspective, one sees for the first time that not only does God have relation but that He is Relation. This, however, will require further innovation to the ontological understanding. This innovation consists of the discovery of God’s immanent dimension, the God whose being identifies itself with the singular, uncreated and eternal nature. This dimension is hereby clearly distinguished from the dimension of economy, that is, it is distinct from His action in creation and the redemption of that which is external to Himself. Indeed, if there no longer exists an intermediate degree or status between God and the world, through Christ it is the very Logos, who is God, and thus within the archê, who enters into history out of love. One thus admits a strict distinction between what is interior and exterior to God. Yet, simultaneously, divinity and humanity are and will ever be united in Christ: not by nature but by grace. The source of unity of the whole is always the Logos, who nevertheless now with respect to the world comes from the outside, comes from an uncreated dimension proper only to the Trinity. The ultimate depth of being is therefore only knowable through the Revelation of God. An encounter with Neo-Platonism is inevitable inasmuch as it was the philosophical koiné of the fourth century. Arianism itself can be considered but a reduced version of the novelty of revelation to the earlier notion of ontology as descending from the logos understood as necessary relationship. Its theological translation cannot be anything but Trinitarian subordination, as it is in the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine of the three gods or as in that of the three hypostases mentioned in Chapter . The orthodox solution, from Athanasius up until the Cappadocians, was thus forced to move on a metaphysical level with the creation of a new ontology that would permit a formulation of the Trinitarian Mystery, making worship possible without undermining its unspeakable depths. As Zizioulas rightly observes, an essential step forward in this process was tracing the divinity to the hypostasis of the Father, such that the archê was no longer just a nameless and necessary substance of Greek philosophy but the infinite mystery of the first Person of the Trinity.
Cf. J. D. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: T&T Clark, ), .
Relational Logos
The notion of relation hereby comes into play and is elevated, according to Trinitarian terms, which emerged from the sequence of arduous discussions following the Council of Nicaea and which led to the Council of Constantinople, to a metaphysical principle that is not accidental but on the same level as essence. In this way, logos as necessary proportion makes way for logos understood as relation. Yet on this path many steps are required in order to arrive at this point.
. In order to understand how the theology of Gregory of Nyssa can be credited as bearing the beginnings of Trinitarian ontology, one must start by attesting that at the center of his thought is a relation: Filiation. In grasping this, contextualizing the claim and, above all, considering that Christ was crucified precisely because He defined Himself as Son of God in a new and exclusive sense with respect to the Hebrew people’s concept of filiation in the Old Testament will be of great help. From the Jewish perspective, Jesus’ words seem to negate monotheism. Thus, on a theological level, the scandal that led to his death on the Cross is not unrelated to the difficulty of embracing the unity and triune reality of God. Thought pertaining to the content of Revelation has from the beginning been exposed to a twofold temptation. On the one hand, there is the risk of reducing the Trinity to a sort of mere unity by claiming that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are only appearances, or masks, of one singular God (Sabellianism). On the other hand, there is the tendency to dissolve any unity in the Trinity by subordinating the three divine Persons (Arianism) according to a model taken from Neo-Platonism. As was elaborated in Chapter , Arianism acknowledges a Trinity that is a hierarchy of subordinated principles, and which is simply the vertex of the ontological scale that necessarily connected the world and the divine. The price of the shift to monism was precisely the connection between the distinction of the hypostases, that is, of relation and ontological degeneration. When Christ, standing before the High Priest, refers to Daniel’s prophecy that the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of God
Rowan Williams writes “Arius is seeking, so it appears, for a way of making it clear that the doctrine of creation allows no aspect of the created order to enter into the definition of God; he thus requires a metaphysic both monist (in the sense of deriving the being of everything from primal unity) and absolutist (placing the essence of this primal unity beyond all relation).” (R. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, ], ).
. The Logos and the Trinity
(Mt :), the scorn and death sentence are unleashed, as He who was merely a man here makes himself out to be God. The question is indeed metaphysical in that it turns on the inquiry into what is Jesus? The answer is unequivocal: Jesus, a man, claims to be God. The condemnation is issued precisely because the question of what is addressed while ignoring the dimension of who. It is meaningful that Jesus, in responding to the initial inquiry into the possibility that he might be Christ (who), speaks of his being at the right hand of God even while possessing his human nature. Jesus has two natures, as He is both God and man; and in order to understand who He is, one must start with what He is. This man is God, He is one with the Father though as a Person also distinct from Him. And yet this man is a man who truly has a human nature, so much so that he is subject to death. What is revealed here is the breadth of the ontological revelation of the Cross: precisely because it is simultaneously a negation on the part of the man and affirmation on the part of Jesus of the Trinitarian dimension of God, it reveals that the metaphysical depth of what is real cannot be grasped if not through a personal, profound and authentic relation with Christ Himself. Access to this depth of reality is in passing through the Heart and the Person of Jesus, for only in Him can one think of being as triune: He Who is is one and triune. The possibility of arriving through thought at this innovation was, of course, slowed by the philosophers who pressed forward with their interpretations according to the category of necessity of the Son, who John in his prologue identifies as the logos. The question emerges in full force in the fourth century when, in particular, Arius and his followers’ interpretation of Christ’s obedience in the Gospel is cited as proof of Christ’s inferiority with respect to the Father. For Arians, God was not always Father but rather began to be Father after the creation of the Son as first, or preeminent, creature and through whom all other things are created. Creation was accomplished via the obedience of the Son. The Son, the logos, had to be placed in a gray, intermediate area that continuously connected the sphere of the divine with that which is human. The second Person of the Trinity is, for Arians, hereby made divine but is not God. Essentially, the Trinitarian disputes of the fourth century can be seen as a confrontation between opposite ways of interpreting John’s prologue.
For example, Mt :–; Phil : ; Jn :. Cf. P. Coda, Per una lettura trinitaria del prologo di Giovanni (Milan: Bompiani, ), –.
Relational Logos
This new theology of Filiation, which begins with the claim that God is eternally Father and hence Christ is the eternal incarnate Son, undermines the subordinationism that reads the Johannine text through a Neo-Platonic philosophical lens. Arius interpreted eternal generation beginning from creation: he did not accept that the Logos could have been God, for the highest principle must necessarily be unchangeable and therefore ungenerated, as in not having been created. The Fathers of the Church in the fourth century, from Athanasius up until the Cappadocians, showed how filiation and generation had to be purified in order to be made attributes of God. In particular, all temporal mutation or passage from potency to act had to be eliminated. Thus, the Father is and always was the Father and the Son is and always was the Son. But this implies that God, Who is Father and Son, must be understood as an eternal relation and is utterly distinct from creation. The logos can no longer be between Creator and creation, as an intermediate degree, but must literally be placed in God and thereby understood as relatio, or relation with the first Person, inasmuch as logos is the thought and knowledge of Him. The logos is so not only divine, but is God, for in the Jewish-Christian notion, as opposed to that of the Greek world, the condition of being divine does necessarily coincide with being God, as there is no continuous scale that on a metaphysical level connects the world and the first principle. The appearance of an ontology that is authentically Trinitarian can be identified precisely in this shift from the logos as necessary proportion to the logos as relation. Starting from the Person of Christ, then, all of reality is transformed and viewed in its authentic profundity, the veil of necessity falls and the freedom in Christ’s gaze that leads to the Father is revealed. Indeed, in this way thought abandons the notion of an intermediate ontological degree, similar to the Platonic Eros or to the Aristotelian movers, which by its proper nature might unite Heaven and earth and grasps how all of reality is desired by God in His free act of donation, which in turn is the foundation of the goodness of that which exists. With respect to the hesitations prior to the fourth century, this progress is indeed radical. Before, history and the world were considered merely a phase to be overcome, as matter itself was marked by evil and the fulfillment of reality was effectively identified only in the sphere of the intelligible. Now, however, the strict distinction between God and the world leads to the notion that the latter must be considered good, for all things are created by God from nothing. The freedom and will of God makes possible the awareness of the metaphysical role of human will and freedom.
. The Logos and the Trinity
Early theological reflection had recognized a way to enter into dialogue with pagan thought and forge authentic Christian thought, one capable of answering man’s striving for the truth present in every age, in the shared reference to the logos on the part of both philosophy and revelation. Hence, Justin in his Apologia I says that Christ is the Word in which all mankind is a participant and so much so that those who lived according to the Word, even men like Socrates or Heraclitus, are Christians despite not having faith. The logos serves as a kind of junction uniting pagan and Christian history. Yet this likewise introduces a difficulty because from Justin’s perspective the logos is conceived of within a relationship to history and the dimension of creation and therefore to limitation and multiplicity. All truth is Christian, even that which is found in pagan thought, for it is the voice of the Logos who speaks in every age. But the Logos himself is none other than the thought of creation that the Father conceives eternally. The Logos is eternal because the Logos is God, but it is in the function of creation and bound to the latter. The immanence and acting of God thus remain connected in a necessary way. This is effectively the price one pays in a recourse to the categories of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός, developed in a different metaphysical context. This point emerges upon a simple review of the history of the development of the theology of the Logos. The early apologist Church Fathers did not succeed in freeing the second Person from a kind of subordinationism, one tied to his being an intermediary between the Father and the created world. His personal dimension is therefore taken to be a limitation, so much so that, according to Justin, the Father could not be said to be a Person, whereas the Son is. Indeed, the latter is incarnate in history, has a face, a name, a delimitation (περιγραφή), all of which render the role of mediation possible, albeit according to the previous philosophical vision. The logos of the Father is thus still marked by a form of decline, something that can be traced back to his being in relation both with God and the world. We see the same problem come up again in Clement of Alexandria. So, too, can the uncertainty expressed by Origen in his theology of the Son be traced back to the theology of the logos. According to Origen,
Cf. Justin, I Apologia, , ,–,: Goodspeed, p. . See Section .. Cf. J. Daniélou, “La notion de personne chez les Pères grecs,” Bulletin des Amis du Card. Danièlou (): –. Cf. Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone ; PTS (Marcovich), p. . Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto , : SCh , p. .
Relational Logos
a role of mediation with respect to the created world must be attributed to the Son qua Son and not to the Son inasmuch as He is incarnate. Hence, the tension between, on the one hand, the claim of the second Person’s eternity (by which the Father has never been without the Son) and, on the other hand, the fact that the Son is named δεύτερος θεός (whereas only the Father is named true God, or ἀληθινὸς θεός) remains unresolved. The notion of the logos of the Father remains marked by necessity and the necessitating proportion of a hierarchical ontology. Only in the following century will the relationship between the first two Persons of the Trinity begin to be understood in a properly relational sense and from the perspective of gift. This was all the result of the shift in perspective in the architectonic conception of theology: in the fourth century, the relationship between God and the world begins to be formulated no longer in terms of the theology of the logos, rather in terms of the theology of the φύσις. Athanasius and the Cappadocians made a strict distinction between the nature of God and the nature of creation. The ontological abyss between the Creator and the world permits the introduction of the logos in Trinitarian immanence, affirming the fully divine nature of the Trinity. In this way, the ontological step was taken that facilitates an abandonment of the logos as conceived of only in light of necessity and instead takes up the logos understood from the perspective of gift and relation. For Athanasius and the Cappadocians, the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that is, He is God, eternal as is He from Whom the Son proceeds. Yet this means that the Father is always the Father precisely because he eternally generates the Son. Father and Son cannot be if not in reciprocal relation: the Father is God in His eternally giving of Himself to the Son. The revolution here is critical as the giving of oneself, the self-gift, becomes a divine prerogative. The Absolute must now therefore be read from the point of view of relation. Furthermore, as seen from the Son’s perspective, one observes that being from, the fact of proceeding from someone, is no longer necessarily connected to the dimension of creation, rather it is recognized as divine.
Cf. J. Daniélou, Origène (Paris: Ed. de la Table Ronde, ), . Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum , , : SCh , p. . Cf. Origen, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis II, , , : SCh , p. . The following pages clarify this claim, which is essentially based on an understanding of eternity and perfection of divine generation wherein the Father does not give the Son a part of his divinity, rather “all” of himself.
. From Eros to Christ
In other words, the discovery of a dimension that is utterly personal and relational of the logos is tied to a distinction between immanence and divine economy, that is, between the being of God in his eternal interiority and his acting outside of Himself. From an Arian perspective, the Son can only belong to a dimension of economy, whereas the Church Fathers, in dealing with revealed content, must overcome the philosophical conception of the logos by inserting the latter into the divine immanence. It is a move from the outside to the inside, from God’s acting to God’s being. From a metaphysical point of view, this distinction between economy and immanence is equivalent to the discovery of a new ontology, one that with respect to that which guides and reigns over creation is utterly distinct. This new ontology, rather, pertains exclusively to the sphere of the intra-divine. It is an ontology knowable only in part and solely through Revelation.
. The arrival of this new ontology is particularly evident in the work of Gregory of Nyssa. He is clearly conscious of the metaphysical role of the logos, so much so that he enthusiastically takes up Plato’s expressions used in the Symposium and likewise of Chrysippus and Philo. Yet he reinterprets these in light of Christology, placing them in a new cosmological context wherein the relationship between God and the world is understood in light of freedom. It is true that an educated Christian of the fourth century when faced with the figure and mediation of Eros as recounted in the Symposium did in fact think of the Priesthood and Person of Christ. This parallel called for a clear response on the level of metaphysics. Hence, in the Oratio Catechetica, Gregory explains why God freely chose to die on the Cross when he might have accomplished his Father’s work through other means: In the Gospel, everything is said or occurs with a supreme and divine meaning, and one does not come across anything that does not reveal itself as true union of the divine and mankind (ὃ οὐχὶ πάντως μίξις τις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ θείου πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), because the expression and the facts are told in a human way, but the hidden meaning reveals the divine element . . .. We learn this through the cross, whose figure is divided into four, so that there are four arms that come from the middle (μέσου) which keeps them united together (ὁ τὸ πᾶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συνδέων)
See Section ..
Relational Logos
and harmonizes everything, leading the different natures of beings to a single cospiration and harmony (σύμπνοιάν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν).
The four dimensions of the Cross represent, then, the four cardinal points and express the fact that divine power touches every dimension of creation. The Cross thus reveals the glory and the power of Christ as Son of God. For this reason, Gregory says that the Cross is the true theologian. The historical fact of the death on the Cross for Gregory reveals that only in Christ is it possible to return to unity, only in Christ is it possible to truly reach being. But the text explicitly alludes to Plato’s Symposium, to the dialogue in which the priestess Diotima of Mantinea reveals to Socrates that Eros is not a god, rather a daemon, since his parents are of two different natures: Poros is the god of abundance and Penia the daimon of poverty. An examination of the Platonic text (see Section .) allows one to observe the radical difference between the Christian and Platonic conceptions (see Table .): . The “He Who unites all things to Himself” (ὁ τὸ πᾶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συνδέων) in Gregory of Nyssa (, ) is literally parallel with the expression “binds fast the all to the all” (τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι) read in Plato (.e.–). For Gregory, it is Christ Who is, in his Humanity and in His Person, the sole Mediator between God and mankind, the one who unites the universe. The very word συνδέω is utilized in its active form so as to underline the personal dimension: the daemonic mediation of the philosophical Eros, to be the intermediate between the good and the bad, between gods and mortals, is substituted by the mediation of Christ, perfect God and perfect man. . Gregory’s expression (ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μέσου͵ καθ΄ ὃ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συνάπτεται) (, –) calls to mind Plato’s “he who is in between mortal and immortal” and who unites both (ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὂν μφοτέρων συμπληροῖ) (e). Plato’s μέσος is an intermediate ontological level, whereas Gregory’s μέσος is not a μεταξύ, rather a concrete place in the universe and in history. It is a μέσος with a καιρός. The very recourse to the verbal form συμπληροῖ makes reference in Plato to a void that
Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica magna, ,–.– (GNO III/, –). See also in Gregory of Nyssa, De tridui inter mortem et resurrectionem domini nostri Iesu Christi spatio (GNO IX, , –), quoted in Section ..
. From Eros to Christ
.. Comparison between Plato and Gregory of Nyssa: The texts Plato Round out the whole and bind fast the all to the all (.e.–) He who is in between mortal and immortal unites them, one to the other (.e.) Gods do not mix with men (.a.–)
Gregory of Nyssa He who draws all things together in himself (, ) Starting from the center in Himself, he keeps the whole together (, –) One does not come across anything that does not reveal itself as true union of the divine and mankind (, )
is filled, whereas συνάπτεται is absolutely physical and horizontal. Yet at the same time, Gregory’s μέσος is immediately identified with Christ, perfect man, who is also perfect God, that is, who is of the same divine essence as God. . One further expression reveals the essential point of this parallel: in a– Plato claims that “a god does not mix with man” (θεὸς δὲ νθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται), whereas Gregory in , –, opens his discussion of the sense of the mystery of the Cross with the affirmation that in the Gospel “one does not come across anything that does not reveal itself as true union of the divine and mankind” (ὃ οὐχὶ πάντως μίξις τις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ θείου πρὸς τὸ νθρώπινον). Gregory’s term μίξις corresponds to the Platonic μείγνυται and functions as the absolute negation of the Platonic notion that is tied to the terminological background of the text. Gregory implicitly alludes to the Symposium in order to demonstrate the radical difference between the mediation of Christ and the philosophical vision in Plato. He nevertheless intentionally includes various citations that implies he relies on those deep intuitions that characterized the
With a sense of indissoluble union: see J. R. Bouchet, “Le vocabulaire de l’union et du rapport des natures chez S. Grégoire de Nysse,” Revue thomiste (): –; L. F. Mateo-Seco, “Notas sobre el lenguaje cristológico de Gregorio de Nisa,” Scripta Theologica (): – and L. F. Mateo-Seco, “Cristologia e Linguaggio in Gregorio di Nissa,” in C. Moreschini and G. Menestrina (eds.), Lingua e teologia nel cristianesimo greco (Brescia: Morcelliana, ), –; G. Maspero, “Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa’s Christology in the Light of Its Use (chrêsis) in the Second Council of Constantinople,’ in M. Brugarolas (ed.), Fourth-Century Christology in Context: A Reconsideration, Studia Patristica (Leuven: Peeters, ), –.
Relational Logos
.. Comparison between Plato and Gregory of Nyssa: The texts Plato The Greek μέσος is a μεταξύ; it is an intermediate ontological level. Συμπληροῖ is vertical; it refers to a void that must be filled. Συνδέω is used in the passive voice. Beauty and harmony are necessarily present.
Gregory of Nyssa The Nyssen’s μέσος is historical and possesses a καιρός. συνάπτεται is absolutely physical and horizontal. Συνδέω is used in the active voice. Harmony and beauty are gifts from God.
Platonic tradition and that Gregory recognizes to be aspirations for the fullness of things to be revealed. The essential difference (see Table . for a summarized outline) consists in the cosmological vision, for the distinction of the two ontological levels between mortals and immortals, which characterizes the Symposium and is reunified by the intermediary figure of Eros, is substituted by the intra-worldly distinction of that which is above and that which is below, together with the horizontal dimensions, immediately described as celestial regions, hades and boundaries of the world (, –), so as to demonstrate their belonging to one and the same order of creation. It is precisely this preservation of the distinct ontological orders of Platonic thought in the singular order of creation that allows Gregory to present the unity of the cosmos as a sign of the presence of the Divine, truly to be found in the world but coming to the world from the outside as the foundation of the world. Thus unity and harmony reveal the divine power of Christ who restores the unity to the cosmos that was lost through sin. God’s coming down to us permits one to pass over the multiplicity of cosmological levels, acknowledging them as one whole in light of the divine power down from on high. Creation is presented in all its radical dependence on divine nature as it is one single ontological ordering, one that includes the beings of heaven, earth and even hell. What is hereby revealed is the profound unity of the theology of creation and soteriology: it is precisely the description of the Cross and the Humanity of Christ as σύνδεσμος of the world that advances the freedom of the Son as the foundation of the very being of the universe as well as of the act of creation.
The term is in fact a derivative of συνδέω and Gregory uses it in reference to the Cross and the Crucified in the De Tridui, GNO IX, , .
. From Eros to Christ
As is seen, in fact, the effective response issued to the Arians was based on the claim that the obedience of Christ to the Father was free and utterly voluntary. Obedience thus understood is no longer proof of the inferiority of the second Person, rather, and to the contrary, it manifests the equality of nature between the second Person and the Father Himself in revealing the Son as one who likewise gives of Himself as perfect Image of the Father who gives Himself. The radical difference between the orthodox and the Arian positions consists in the acknowledgment of the pure capacity of gift as the distinct sign of divinity. Hence, a comparison of the texts of the Symposium and the Oratio catechetica magna shows how the activity of the love of God who embraces all things replaces the passivity of the attraction of the Platonic Eros. From passive love, that is, the attraction toward that which is beautiful and good, one moves to active love, which gives and renders that to which it gives itself good and beautiful. Filiation and Revelation of the Cross are reread in an ontological light and placed at the center of the universe and the relationship between time and eternity. The Crucified is the link or bond (σύνδεσμος) of all that which exists, for it is the Son incarnate, the Creator, who dies for love of his creation. Unity is the gift that comes from on high, a gift of the Father who desires to make Christ the center of the world and the very sense of history. This new content is expressed by Gregory of Nyssa by way of classical language, with Platonic resonances and a method that is in and of itself relational. Indeed, he utilizes philosophical intuitions that predate Christianity, to which the theology of the Logos aimed to attribute value, though without paying the price of falling into subordinationism that was necessary in the approach taken by classical ontology. Theology of natures, and hence the distinction between immanence and divine economy, permits Gregory to access the elements of truth present in the history of human thought, yet without subjecting himself to the limits implied by the metaphysical framework that characterized these. God and the world, then, are not necessarily united by a continuous ontological scale, rather they are united by Christ, the Son of God made man who died so as to bring all of creation to the Father.
Cf. G. Maspero, Trinity and Man (Leuven: Brill, ), –. This method is typical in the Fathers’ approach, as Christian Gnilka has pointed out in his analysis of chrêsis: see n. in the Introduction. Here we can see the Trinitarian foundation of this method.
Relational Logos
. For Gregory, then, there is no intermediate degree or level between God and the world, but in Christ the Logos itself, who is God, enters into history out of love. In this way, divinity and humanity are forever united in Christ and not by nature but through grace. The source of unity of the whole is always the Logos, though who now comes from beyond the world to the world, from the uncreated dimension proper only to the Trinity. This stands in contrast to the position of Arius and Eunomius: neither of them was able to admit the identical substance of the Father and the Son: the first two divine Persons were not believed to have been one and the same thing in that the first is ungenerated whereas the second is generated. This impossibility was tied to a philosophical presupposition of Neo-Platonic origin, which excluded a relational distinction that did not imply degeneration. Relation was necessarily linked to inferiority with respect to the ontological perfection of a prototype. The orthodox response, from Athanasius up until the Cappadocians, was thus compelled to move to the level of metaphysics with the creation of a new ontology, and one that facilitated the formulation of the Trinitarian mystery, offering it for adoration without undermining its unspeakable profundity. Two different ontologies were thus distinguished: one created, by which classical metaphysics was developed, and one uncreated, that is, the Being and immanence of the Trinity, which is known solely through Revelation. The concept of relation was key in this ontological development and was elevated to a metaphysical principle of equal grade as essence in the Trinitarian grammar that emerged out of the arduous discussions that followed from the Council of Nicaea and led to the Council of Constantinople. In the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, this passage is in continuity with the theology of Athanasius and Gregory’s brother, Basil. Its particular characteristic, as we shall see, is the extension of the co-relative interpretation of the Father and the Son, something his predecessors already illustrated, to the relationship with the Holy Spirit. The Logos is grasped in full in His dimension of perfect relation, eternal and reciprocal only when He is considered together with the Holy Spirit, giver of Life.
See Porphyry’s text in Section ..
. Filiation and Relation
The Father is Father only because He has always and always will generate the Son, and the Son is the Son only because He has always and always will be generated by the Father. Hence, also the first two divine Persons are each Himself only in relationship to the third and vice versa. Relation in the Trinitarian immanence is always understood to be co-relation. Athanasius succeeded in recovering the notion of the logos as fixed proportion and purified it through his Physis-theology, that is, through the expression of the absolute distinction between the triune Creator and creation in terms of a difference in nature. Justin, Clement of Alexandria and Origen had recourse to the philosophical conception of the logos so as to present the history of salvation in unity with the history of mankind and the search for God. But as we have seen, this endeavor remained vulnerable to subordinationism, for the existence of the divine Logos, inasmuch as He is thought of as eternal, could not be considered as independent from creation. For this reason, Athanasius, ever faithful to the inspiration of the first verse of the Johanine prologue, rephrases the relationship between God and the world in terms of nature, identifying the Trinity with the one and only eternal and uncreated nature, whereas all other being is creation and is of a different nature. In this way, the Logos and the Pneuma cease to be figures of mediation and are instead both placed within the immanence of the single first principle, and this means within God. Proportion is no longer applied to the relationship between God and the world, as Arians had a tendency to do, rather it characterized the very essence of God inasmuch as the eternal Logos is the image of the Father just as the Spirit is image of the Son, that is, the Son remains in the Father, as the Spirit remains in the Son. Here Athanasius’ intention is to express the identity of nature and not to distinguish the personal proprium: being image does not express the distinctive characteristic of the second Person. This was, then, the proportional ratio that maintained the unity of the Trinity itself, the eternal relationship, that in Greek it is precisely the term logos, between the first and third Persons. Being an image no longer meant being in a lesser degree, rather perfection in relation and this includes the Son and the Spirit in the heart of the First Principle, that is, of the archê. The reading of this was already relational: the Father is the Father only
See more on this topic in G. Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, ). See Section . for an elaboration of this. Cf. Athanasius, Letter to Serapion, I, , ; , .
Relational Logos
because he has the Son, and the Son is the Son because he has the Father. This initial construction had one weak spot: there was not enough of a distinction between the first and second procession. This left the doors wide open to the criticism advanced by the Tropikoi who claimed that the Father grandfathered the Spirit. If the third Person was likewise an image, then He, too, had to be generated as the Son is generated and actually generated by the Son in that He is the image of the Son. The proportionality was yet too heavily marked by the physical notion: relation here is eternal, but it is still excessively vertical and not perfectly integrated with the personal dimension. The correlativity of the third Person was in need of serious development. In order to overcome this difficulty, Gregory of Nyssa developed his reflection on the relationship between the Logos and the Spirit in their respective origins in the Father. He thus elaborated the relationship between the two processions, re-reading both the relationship between the Father and the Son and that of the Holy Spirit and the first two Persons from correlativity. It was his specific contribution to include the Spirit in his understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Logos, showing how the insurmountable difficulties that emerge in NeoPythagorean and Neo-Platonic thought can only be overcome by moving from a conception of the Logos as ratio to a conception of the Logos as relatio. This was possible when attributing to the procession a sense of authentic, reciprocal donation and thereby expounding on the role of the Spirit in the eternal generation of the Son. The line of argument adopted by Gregory of Nyssa can be summarized by four key passages, which will be the focus of Section .. In the first place, the Logos is introduced in the divine immanence (Section ..). But this requires its reinterpretation in a relational sense. Ontology is hereby modified by way of flanking substance and relation as fundamental co-principles, which in turn allows for personal distinction within the Trinity (Section ..). This ontological innovation means rethinking the role of the will, in such a way that the procession of the Son is understood as a total gift of self on the part of the Father and not as a necessary effect (Section ..). Lastly, in the field of pneumatology, Gregory recalls the biblical categories of the Kingdom and Glory, both now reinterpreted in view of relation. The Kingdom is taken to be the reason for which the Son is King, that is, perfect image of the Father without any deficit as in
Cf. ibid., I, , – and IV, , . See more details in Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, –.
. The New Ontology
Neo-Platonism; Glory is conceived of as the perfect and eternal honor exchanged between the Father and the Son (Section ..). It is precisely this reinterpretation in view of the eternal relation of the third Person that allows a new reading of the relationship between the Father and his Logos, one in the other, one through the other, as gift. The Trinitarian notion becomes evermore dynamic and the Logos Himself is interpreted in a purely relational sense, as Son of the Father’s Love (cf. Col :).
. .. The Logos and Immanence The first fundamental move Gregory makes is to insert the Son in the first principle, having recourse to Athanasius’ Physis-theology: The beginning of all things is the Father (ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ πατήρ). But it is proclaimed that the Son is also in this beginning (ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ) since He is by nature (κατὰ τὴν φύσιν) that which is the principle. In fact, God is the principle (θεὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή), and the Word that is in the beginning is God (ὁ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὢν λόγος θεός ἐστιν).
This text is quite rich and can be articulated in two movements. Firstly, the monarchy is mentioned: the principle, the archê, sought after by philosophers of every age, is not some anonymous unmoved mover or the unattainable One that is beyond all things. Rather, He is the Father, the first Person of the Most Holy Trinity. His Person is the origin of all things. The archê, then, is not merely substance but a substance that is the Person of the Father. The second step immediately follows: within this principle there is the Son who is by nature identical to the Father. One notes how Gregory simultaneously utilizes both the personal dimension and the dimension pertaining to nature and this corresponds to the twofold question of who and what found in Scripture. The ontological innovation to which he is trying to grant expression is the necessity to keep these two aspects together. The result is that God has an interior and this is the principle, that substance that is the archê of all things and is a Person and has a bosom wherein there has always been the Son. Classical philosophy could only think of God from the outside, for it did not have
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, , –.
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received Revelation. Now, instead, the immanence of God can be distinguished from economy and acting. From this perspective, Gregory of Nyssa, in loyalty to the theology of the Johannine prologue, can introduce the Logos in the beginningprinciple, identifying the Logos Himself on the level of nature with the beginning-principle itself. But that means that the Logos can no longer be considered a figure of ontological mediation, an intermediary between God and the world. The shift form ratio to relatio is necessary. Identifying the Logos as the Son urges a reflection along the lines of perfect relation, one that is reciprocal and not subordinating: This Logos is distinct from the One of whom He is Logos: in a certain way He also belongs in the relational sphere (τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων), since it is absolutely necessary to understand the Father of the Logos along with the Logos: He would not, in fact, be the Logos, if He were not the Logos of someone.
The Logos is reinterpreted in light of relation, and here relation is understood as a new plane of being, namely, one that is not accidental but inseparable with respect to substance and to the singular nature of the archê. The reflection on nature and the reflection on relation are thus presented as inseparable from one another. To grasp this innovation, it is worth briefly explaining the connection between divine filiation and the theology of the image. Gregory in fact treats the being of the Son in the Father in the following manner: The Son is in the Father like the beauty of the image is in the form of the model (ἐν τῇ ἀρχετύπῳ μορφῇ), and the Father is in the Son, as the exemplar beauty (τὸ πρωτότυπον κάλλος) is in the image itself. However, unlike with images made by the human hand, in which there is always a temporal distance between the communicated image and the model, in this case, one cannot be separated from the other.
Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Cathechetica Magna, , –: Srawley, p. , –. The approach taken by J. D. Zizioulas rightly emphasizes the value of this shift, which makes the Person of the Father to be the first principle but seems to place the personal dimension in opposition with that of substance: “If otherness is to be ontologically primary, the one in God has to be a person and not a substance, for substance is a monistic category by definition (there can only be one substance and no other in God), while a person, such as the Father, is inconceivable without relationship to other persons.” (Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, –). Instead, each person is also substance, albeit never primary substance, as the Metropolitan of Pergamon seems to read in Augustine and Latin theology. Every who is also a what and this holds true for Christ and the Father as well. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, GNO I, , –.
. The New Ontology
The text clearly makes reference to a mode of being an image that is essentially different from the Platonic conception. The latter was at the heart of subordinationism, for it identified the image with material decay and corruption of the ideal prototype. Jean Daniélou describes the new notion of image present in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theology in the following way: It [the term εἰκών] designates a true commonality of nature. However, it implies a certain number of distinctions that the non-Christian uses of the term did not offer. Applied to λόγος, as in St. Paul (Col : , Wis : ), the term εἰκών does not designate a deficient participation, but the pure relation of origin in the perfect equality of nature: this is a new meaning, linked to the Trinitarian dogma.
One thus arrives at the startling claim that the Son not only possesses that which the Father possesses, but the Son possesses the Father Himself. The name of the Father actually points to two Persons, because the idea of the Son spontaneously follows from the idea of the Father such that on hearing “Father” our faith pushes us to think of the Father with the Son. The re-reading of the Logos in view of relation is likewise translated into a re-reading of the Father Himself in light of relation. Everything is approached from the category of relation, in an effort to purify the notion of filiation, which ceases to be subject to the temporal limits and material characteristics of human generation.
.. Relational Being The ontological innovation introduced in the fourth century can be traced back to the impossibility of expressing the unity and trinity in God with philosophical means developed in the sphere of classical thought. The question became a problem of individuation: one is dealing with the distinction between the first two divine Persons and doing so without attributing a difference of substance in each. In the sphere of classical
J. Daniélou, Platonisme et théologie mystique (Paris: Aubier, ), . For a vision of the whole of this concept in Gregory of Nyssa’s thought, see G. Maspero, “Image,” in L. F. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa (Leuven: Brill, ), –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I , –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, , – and Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, , –. J. D. Zizioulas writes that Father is a relational term and that it is “impossible to make the Father ontologically ultimate without, at the same time, making communion primordial” (cf. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, ).
Relational Logos
thought, individuation could be traced back to matter or the dimension of potency, even though in all cases the first principle could not be bound to this in that individuation immediately denotes multiplicity and limitation. Nevertheless, Trinitarian revelation calls for the individuation and personhood of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who regardless identify themselves each with the same nature. Arianism resolved this issue by preaching substance to be different in each, thus undermining unity, whereas Sabellianism eliminated the triune reality altogether, thus reducing the Persons to mere appearances. The Cappadocians’ answer was the introduction of a new and original ontological plane, similar to essence yet distinct from it, that is, the how a thing is, in Greek the πῶς εἶναι. This level coincides with that of relation, indicated in the classical context by πρός τι, though until this moment this was considered to be accidental. The response offered to Arianism will thus consist of the claim that there is in the divine immanence a relational dimension that is not accidental. Once again, the Johannine prologue offers the key insight. The root of the theological and dogmatic reflection in the Cappadocian Fathers is Scripture. Hence, in the first verse of the fourth Gospel, two terms appear, terms that are quite meaningful on a philosophical level. They are the archê and the Logos, which we have already discussed. It is worthy of note how these two terms played a fundamental role in the Jewish tradition as well, for the former refers to the in the beginning (be reshit) that constitutes the incipit of Genesis, whereas the second corresponds to the fundamental category of the Word (debar) of the Lord, who draws reality out of nothing, reveals and saves. Here the thesis advanced is that even the relational dimension might be hinted at in the beginning of the prologue: Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος͵ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν͵ καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. The untranslatable πρὸς τὸν θεόν seems to call to mind the ultimate philosophical category of the Greek πρός τι, which here loses the accidental dimension and is reinterpreted on the level of immanence as personal relation. Certainly, from the point of view of classical metaphysics, prepositions like pros could not point to anything other than accidents, for without the substantives connected by them they do not make any sense. But here, from the relationship between things and substances, there is a shift to the relation between persons in the divine immanence: from πρός τι one moves to πρὸς τόν. Within the one and only divine nature, the Father, Son and Spirit are distinguished among themselves only through reciprocal relation. And once again this category is fundamental in the Jewish tradition as well, where the very
. The New Ontology
identity of the people rises out of relation with God and in remaining in relation with Him, turned toward Him and staying close to Him through the covenant. Hence, in Gregory’s thought, it seems that inserting the logos into the archê requires the passage of the logos Himself to the relational dimension, which is signified by the πρὸς τὸν θεόν. As one will see later on, it is interesting to note that the new solution to the problem of distinction in God also influences the anthropological sphere with the question, previously unheard of and unthinkable, of how it is possible that three men, Peter, James and John, for example, could be three different persons yet are called three men and not simply one, whereas the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three Persons but one, singular God. The relationship between the universal and the concrete is resolved through recourse to relation. In other words, a Trinitarian ontology emerges that can be defined by adding prepositions to being, for these signify individuation in reciprocal relation. One must keep in mind that the theological discussions of the fourth century are deeply connected to the hermeneutics of the Nicaean “God from God” and “Light from Light.” Indeed, from a perspective that inspired Arius, the preposition from in and of itself indicates subordination and difference of substance. The root of the question was ontological in that, as has been mentioned and as will be further elaborated in Chapter , metaphysics from Aristotle to Neo-Platonism identifies relation with accident. The only instrument that permitted the individuation of the subject was the substance, in such a way that the personal distinction of the Father and the Son required the affirmation of a substantial distinction as well. In order to interpret “Light from Light” as meaning perfect substantial identity, what was needed was an extension of the ontology known at that time. Basil had already embarked on that path when he underlined the difference between God and that which is found in nature, reinterpreting the names Father and Son in such a way as to negate that these might imply or implicate the passions. According to the Bishop of Cesarea, in the Trinity the name Father and the name Son are not marked by the limits that would be observed in the sphere of creation. Rather, “they only express reciprocal relation” (τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν ἐνδείκνυται μόνην). The innovation regarding metaphysics is thus situated on the level of relation.
Basil, Contra Eunomium, II, , (SCh , ).
Relational Logos
The instrument of reciprocal relation (ἡ σχέσις πρὸς ἄλληλα) appears several times in Gregory’s writings against Eunomius. In Chapter , we will see in what manner the latter has recourse to this expression to indicate the necessary relationship that according to his view would distinguish the second and third substance from the supreme substance in the ontological hierarchy. Gregory of Nyssa’s response is an ontological reinterpretation of schesis in the work of Basil, reconnecting reciprocal relation that unites the Father and the Son to the names of the divine Persons as revealed by Scripture. This implies that they are of an identical nature. The three divine Persons do not have quantitative and necessary relationships among themselves, for they are not like larger and smaller containers, one placed in the other. Thus, reciprocal relation, when understood according to the names of the first two divine Persons revealed in Scripture, simultaneously indicates unity of nature even in the distinction of the two subjects (ἐν δύο τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς φύσεως). This individuation, which is not based on the distinction of substance, calls for the move to a new and original ontological plane like essence and yet distinct from essence: the πῶς εἶναι. In the Contra Eunomium III Gregory writes: Existing in an uncreated (ἀγεννήτως) way is one attribute of He who is, but the definition of Being is one thing and the definition of the mode of being (πῶς εἶναι) is another.
Joining the adverb to εἶναι is parallel to the use of the prepositions with the same verb in explicit or implicit form, as occurs in the Nicaean ἐκ. It indicates the plane of hypostatic distinction, something that must be clearly differentiated with respect to the contrast between what is created and uncreated. We find the uncreated through means of contrasting it (πρός) with the created; the incorruptible is known if it is juxtaposed with (πρός) the corruptible, and substance is seen in its difference with respect to (πρός) the insubstantial . . ..
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, , (GNO I, p. ,), , (GNO I, p. ,–), , (GNO I, p. ,–), , . (GNO I, p. , and –) Cf. ibidem, (GNO I, p. ,–). See Section ... Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,– (GNO I, p. ,–). The topic reappears in the first book of the Contra Eunomium III, , , (GNO II, p. ,–); , (GNO II, p. ,–) and , (GNO II, p. ,). Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, ,,–: GNO II, ,–. One can read this powerful text in ibid., , ,–,: GNO II, ,–,.
. The New Ontology
Therefore, substance is understood as such in being something (ἐν τῷ εἶναί τι), while the corruptible or the incorruptible is understood as being of a certain nature (ἐν τῷ ποδαπὸν εἶναι), and the created and uncreated are understood in being in a certain mode (ἐν τῷ πῶς εἶναι).
So, for Gregory there are three different ontological levels, to which correspond as many distinctions: (a) the immanent one between the ungenerated Father and the generated Son; (b) the ontological gap that separates the Creator from the creatures, that is, the only incorruptible nature that is the Trinity and the world marked by corruptibility; and (c) within this, the classic distinction between substance and accident. One could say that the first level is horizontal in the sphere of divine ontology, that is, of the only eternal and uncreated substance that is the Trinity, while the second distinction is vertical. The third, finally, is still horizontal and exclusively characterizes creation. To each of these levels do correspond different questions: to the question on what that concerns the substance at the creatural level, one must add the question on the difference of nature in vertical, to conclude with the formulation of the question regarding the immanent distinction between the divine Persons, which is expressed through how it is (πῶς εἶναι). It is not a question of quality, which would remain in the accidental sphere, but the switch to a real relational level. The definition of the relation by Aristotle and then by the Stoics through the πρός τί πως ἔχειν is reformulated in terms of being, to highlight the ontological stability of the divine Person. The how it is thus becomes an expression of the difference of origin that characterizes the Divine Persons. The progression of the analysis in Gregory is quite clear: substantial identity, which touches all levels of being, must accompany relational distinction, a characteristic of the ungenerated Father and the generated Son. This distinction is on another ontological plane than that which holds between the created and the uncreated, as well as between corruptible and incorruptible nature. The πρός that distinguishes the generated and the ungenerated, the Son and the Father, does not belong to substantial distinction, rather to the how of being. That is to say, it belongs on the original ontological level of the πῶς εἶναι. Gregory boldly discusses this dimension by introducing the concept of cause in immanence. He is here dealing with a new concept of relational
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, , , –.–: GNO I, , –; , –.
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causality, something distinct from necessary and necessitating cause that characterizes the created order: And when we say “cause” (αἴτιον) and “from the cause” (ἐξ αἰτίου), we are not describing a nature (οὐχὶ φύσιν) – in fact, we could not give the same explanation for a cause and for a nature – but we are explaining the difference according to the mode of being (τὴν κατὰ τὸ πὼς εἶναι διαφοράν). In fact, in saying that one is socaused, while the other is without cause, we are not dividing the nature because of the cause, but we are only demonstrating that the Son is not without begetting, nor is the Father by begetting. It is necessary that we first believe that something is (εἶναί τι), and (only) then do we investigate how it is (πῶς ἐστι) what we believed in. It is therefore different to say “what it is” (τί ἐστι) by saying “how it is” (πῶς ἐστι). Now, saying that something is without begetting reveals “how it is,” but it does not explain “what it is.” Moreover, if you asked a farmer whether a tree was planted or whether it grew on its own, and he responded either that the tree was not planted or that it is derived from a plantation, would the response have explained the nature of it?
Once again, one reads how Gregory’s ontological discourse simultaneously has recourse to the dimension of substance and that of relation. The final question of the text makes reference to the impossibility of defining not only the nature of God but of a tree as well. As we will see in Chapter , the gnoseological level is clearly distinct from the ontological, which always remains abundantly more than the capacity of human language can express. But this ineffability does not mean that substance and nature are simply substituted by person and relation. Indeed, the Father and Son are one and the same thing, one single substance and one single nature, something that is not broken off from relational distinction, for this distinction moves along the level of how one is and not what one is. The reference is to the relation of origin, which, within the one and only substance, is made out to be the heart of individuality of the divine Person Himself. The Father and the Son distinguish themselves only because the former is origin whereas the other is from the origin. Yet again, it is the preposition that indicates relation in this new ontological plane introduced by Gregory.
.. The Will in God This ontological innovation implies a radical shift in the notion of divine Filiation. The Father is Father because He has the Son and the Son is not
Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–,.
. The New Ontology
merely an effect, but He is the perfect and active image of the Father. Thus, the obedience of the Son to the Father, cited by Eunomians as proof of the Son’s inferiority, instead becomes a sign of love and the authentic gift of self of the second Person to the first Person, an eternal response to the love and gift of self of the Father to the Son: a sign of being entirely from the Father and entirely for the Father. This is exactly what Filiation is. Gregory in fact emphasizes that the Son is not passive in his relationship with the Father. Instead, his very ontology is constituted by freely willing that which the Father wills: The Father willed something and the Son, who is in the Father, had the same will as the Father, or better yet, He made Himself the Will of the Father.
This freely taking up the will of the Father is precisely what it means to be the Son, His personal characteristic. Gregory in his reflection connects the Son, and thereby also the logos, not only to thought, as is natural, but also to the will, the basis of the gift of self. The commentary of Christoph Schönborn seems to illuminate this point: “what, to the eyes of the Arians, is proof of the Son’s subordination to the Father, that is, His acting in obedience to the Father and His instrumental role in relation to Him, actually turns out to be the very mystery of the communion of divine Persons.” Humility itself, which in pagan ethics was not considered a virtue, now comes to the fore as a distinctive characteristic of God in His immanence. But all this is comprehensible only because the doctrine of creation and redemption have broken up the necessary ontological connection that united the world and the divine according to Greek thought. Here there is a metaphysical abyss dividing mankind and God, that is, between time and eternity, and there is no intermediary (μέσον, μεταξύ): it is exactly this claim of infinite distance that leads one to perceive divine action as gift and, therefore, to distinguish the three divine Persons from creation, overcoming all risk of subordinationism. In this way, the will can be recognized in all its ontological depth. The god of Aristotle was pure νόησις, thought thinking upon itself, desired by all yet itself void of all desire and relation precisely as god. Revelation instead gives testimony to the desire of the God who creates, pursues and saves the people. It is a desire not born out of some deficiency, rather of the God willing to give Himself, of communicating his own goodness. Hence, this desire expresses the very being of God as gift
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, : GNO I, , –. Ch. Schönborn, L’icône du Christ: Fondements théologiques (Paris: Cerf, ), .
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and source of all good. The God whom the Hebrews and Christians meet desires to give and give of Himself. This transfiguration of the Platonic inheritance is exactly based in the new role assigned to love and the will. Proof of this is the relationship of Gregory’s thought with Plotinus’ reflection on the will of the One. Here one sees a situation analogous to that of Gregory’s re-reading of the philosophical tradition tied to the figure of Eros, since the closeness to the form facilitates a radical innovation of content. Indeed, for Gregory of Nyssa knowledge is called upon to transform itself into love, for Being itself is love: The life of the divine nature is love (ἀγάπη), since beauty is absolutely lovely for those who know it. Now the divine is known, and knowledge is transformed into love (ἡ δὲ γνῶσις ἀγάπη γίνεται).
This last phrase wonderfully expresses the primacy of love over merely intellectual knowledge. It has as its deepest root the Son’s giving Himself to the Father, in the making the Father’s will His own. For Gregory, the Logos takes up the will (θέλημα) of the Father: it is the opposite of the Apollinization of Eros in Plato’s Symposium, that is, contrary to the Socratic reduction of the volitive faculty to a mere intellective function,48 for He who unites the universe now is the Logos who loves, the Logos who is the Son. Instead, in the Ennead VI, , Plotinus, when speaking of the contemplative intelligence of the One, reproduces the classical formula, tracing the will back to thought: Will is thought (ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις), which is called will since it is conformed to the intellect. In fact, we say that the will imitates what is in accordance with intellect.
In truth, the βούλησις is actually νόησις: they are not two distinct faculties. Yet the Christian God wills and loves because He is Father and He is Son. The will is no longer linked to some absence, but in its re-reading in light of relation developed in the disputes with the Arians, the relationship between the divine Persons must be grasped in the dynamic terms of gift.
A re-reading of the term ἀπάθεια is likewise an example, which in Gregory is now understood as faithfulness to love and unchangeableness in benevolence notwithstanding sin in mankind; prior to this, it was a philosophical term denoting impassability. Cf. L. F. Mateo-Seco, “Apatheia,” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, –. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurrectione, PG , C See Section .. Plotinus, Enneades VI, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ), .
. The New Ontology
It is significant that, notwithstanding this radical difference, Gregory of Nyssa has recourse to expressions very close to those that Plotinus employs. For example, in Contra Eunomium III Gregory writes: God always wills (βούλεται) what is, and it is absolutely what He wills.
One is dealing with a formula that by expression likens it to that of Plotinus: He [the One] is as He willed (ἐβούλετο). Thus, to say that He wills and acts according to His nature is the same as saying that His being corresponds to His will and His action.
We are not dealing with isolated cases, for the parallelism is repeated. In De anima et resurrectione Gregory writes: Therefore, since the divine nature is above and beyond every good and the good is absolutely friend of the good, then looking at itself, it both wills (θέλει) what it has and has what it wills.
The sense of this claim can be approximated to what Plotinus says of the One: He is consistent (σύνδρομος) with himself, insofar as He wills what He is, and is what He wills (θέλων), and His being and His will are a single thing.
The term σύνδρομον is important to Gregory as well, who once again has recourse to a formulation similar to that of Plotinus, even though it is to explain that the identical will (προαίρεσις) between the Father and the Son implies being identical by nature. With respect to Neo-Platonism, the context is quite different in that Neo-Platonism cannot admit any relation in the One. This context seems almost to have as its background the discussions of the divinity of the Logos. In the Ennead IV, one in fact reads: And then, how could that which is from something else, and has become what it is from that other thing, depend on itself?
This is another example of chrêsis, as presented in Christian Gnilka’s works. See n. in the Introduction. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, , , –: GNO II, , –. Plotinus, Enneades, VI, , , –. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurrectione, PG , A–B. Plotinus, Enneades, VI, , , –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, , , : GNO I, , . Plotinus, Enneades, VI, , , –.
Relational Logos
From Plotinus’ perspective, there is no space given to the notion of the relationship between the Father and the Son in terms that would not violate the substantial identity of the divine Persons. Arianism was anchored to this structure, which in turn had to be cast aside in order to speak of God as love. This is accomplished by Gregory of Nyssa through a development of the ontology of the will, as an expansion of the ontology of thought that characterized the classical reflection. Only in this way is it possible to read the intra-Trinitarian relationships in terms of love and gift: relation (σχέσις) comes to the fore in the articulation of the mystery of God. One notes that Gregory is quite careful to never project anthropomorphic categories onto the being of God. His Greek theological rigor is expressed in his acute attention in distinguishing the realm of creation and economy from the eternal immanence. The term “gift” literally never appears in his theological formulations, also for the ambivalence that this category has always had in human culture. Nevertheless, the current value of this category of gift, fruit of two millennia of Christian thought, seems to authorize the use of this term to express the fact that the Father not only gives something to the Son, rather gives all of Himself. This total gift of self identifies itself as love. The category of substance is fundamental in expressing the gift of one’s person in the divine immanence because, if the Son is not numerically the same substance as the Father, relation between them cannot be interpreted in terms of identity of physis. Indeed, the Father does not give the whole of Himself by force, obeying some natural necessity, as in the case of a vase that pours itself out. Yet the first Person is Himself precisely in giving of Himself completely and for love in the generation of the second Person.
One might recall the Greek context of the Trojan war and Virgil’s words: Time Danaos et dona ferentis (Virgil, Aeneid, II, ). René Girard notes that the ancient Saxon roots manifests this ambivalence in the current modern English term gift, which means “present,” and likewise the modern German word Gift, which means “poison”: R. Girard, The One by Whom Scandal Comes (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, ), . See also the important analysis of gift undertaken by Marcel Mauss in , found in M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, ). Gregory of Nazianzus, in Oratio , (SCh , p. ), underlines the difference of Trinitarian procession with respect to the illustration used by Plotinus in the Enneades V, , , where emanation of the second cause starting from the first is compared to an overflowing krater.
. The New Ontology
This role of gift and the will could be expressed in terms of freedom but this would lead to a risk of reductionism on a categorical level and work against the most fundamental principles of Gregory’s theology. In the Trinity, opposition between freedom and necessity comes to naught, since the Father generates the Son always, and always will, in an absolute manner and with no room for contingency. Yet on a level of creation, this is instead always accompanied by freedom. For this reason, as we have already seen, one cannot speak of free procession in the sense that it could be otherwise, as is the case of freedom in creation, because this is something that is always associated with the dimension of accidents. And neither can one say that God is necessary on account of a conception of necessity opposed to real freedom that is observed in nature. The reference to gift allows one to comprehend how this freedom in divinis is not marked by the reference to the contingency that on a categorical level is always implied. Generation here is eternal and therefore necessary: the Father cannot not generate the Son, and not because He is imperfect, but precisely because He is under any circumstance perfect. This is, then, a free and eternal act that cannot be understood through the lens of necessity as is predicated in nature and as happens in Neo-Platonic emanations: it is not as if the Son is water that pours out from a glass that is the Father, thus deriving from the Father in this necessary way. In order to overcome the subordinationism of the second Person, it is essential to think of generation as an act of freedom, to which eternally corresponds the free response of the Son. To characterize the intended meaning of freedom that is referenced in the divine immanence, it seems opportune to speak of the “freedom of the gift and love,” showing how the category has been purified to be predicated of God. And an analogous operation is required in order to speak of necessity in God inasmuch as this category must also be deprived of any reference to physical determination, or contingency, that characterizes Greek thought and created nature. The immanence of God is identical to the one, single and uncreated nature, in such a way that it simply and absolutely is. Recourse to the terminology of gift seems to be the most efficacious way, in the realm of the limits of human language, to express the reciprocal relationship of the Father and the Son. The very depth of being is constituted by this eternal
Cf. J. D. Zizioulas, “Trinitarian Freedom: Is God Free in Trinitarian Life?,” in G. Maspero and R. Wozniak (eds.), Re-Thinking Trinitarian Theology (London: T&T Clark: ), –.
Relational Logos
dialogue of love that in mutual gift constitutes the Person of the Father and the Person of the Son. One might say that in the eternal generation exists the freedom of Love and Gift, applied according to eminence to the eternal and absolute divine substance. Yet to expound on this dimension one needs to follow the last step in Gregory’s reasoning, his conception of the procession of the Holy Spirit and His role in the relationship between the first two Persons. .. The Spirit of the Father and of the Son The possibility of no longer reading generation as necessary degeneration, or degradation of being, but instead as gift of self is based in fact on a noteworthy development and elaboration of the relationship between the Logos and the Spirit. In the first place, Gregory interprets the name of Christ as a direct reference to the Holy Spirit inasmuch as the Anointed One cannot be such without the chrism: How will one who does not recognize the Chrism along with the Anointed One confess Christ? God “anointed this man,” he says, “in the Holy Spirit.” (Acts :)
To think of Christ, then, necessarily means to think of the Holy Spirit, as thinking of the Father means to think of the Son. Yet this relational characteristic of Christ is not bound to the dimension of economy, rather it is rooted in His eternal being, as one reads in the following text: So if the Son is king by nature, and the chrism is a symbol of his kingship, then what does the logic of the reasoning mean to you? That the chrism is not something foreign to the natural king, and we do not classify the Spirit with the Holy Trinity as a stranger and someone with a different nature. Indeed the Son is king. But the Holy Spirit is the living, substantial and subsistent kingship (ζῶσα καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος). Since He has been annointed with his kingship, the Only-begotten Christ is also king of all existing things. So if the Father is king and the Only-begotten is king and the Holy Spirit is kingship, the reason for kingship in the case of the Trinity is absolutely the same.
See more on this in Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, –. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –. One must remember that for Gregory Christ is a title of honor and one equivalent to Lord, hence the term is used in immanence as well without meaning that human nature could have existed prior in God. On this, see the following excerpts: Contra Eunomium III ,– (GNO II ,–,); Contra Eunomium III , –; – (GNO II ,–,; ,–,). Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –.
. The New Ontology
The reason behind the fact that the Son is the perfect image of the Father, and in a way radically new with respect to all of Greek thought, is based precisely in the Spirit. He is in fact the eternal Kingdom on account of whom the Son is King as the Father is King. One notes a juxtaposition in the text of the qualifiers substantial and personally subsisting (οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος), and this calls to mind once more the necessity of thinking of Revelation having recourse both to the dimension of substance as well as the personal dimension. The personal characteristic of the Third Person is re-read in terms of co-relation, with respect to the Father and the Son. Here we are dealing with an innovation exegetically founded on the connection between the invocation “May your Kingdom come” of Mt : and a variant of Lk :, “Thy Spirit come upon us and purify us.” Gregory is one of two witnesses to this variant of the Our Father prayer typical of the Syriac tradition and probably linked to a liturgical invocation that accompanied pre-baptismal anointing as evidenced in the Acts of Thomas. The equivalence of these two verses allows Gregory of Nyssa to identify the Spirit as the Kingdom, by identifying the third person’s own personal proprium in joining the first two. This urges a re-reading of their relationship in terms of gift, namely, understood as gift of self. The Father eternally generates the Son giving the Son His Spirit and thereby His Kingdom. The Logos is born of Love and not of necessity, and for this Gregory writes: There is no difference in any way between calling the Only-begotten God the Son of God or the Son of his Love. (υἱὸν τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ: Col :)
One notes that the expression taken from Col : in the Pauline text refers to the fact that the Father introduces Christians into the kingdom (βασιλείαν) of His beloved Son. Here love is situated at the very heart of being and is presented in a manner utterly ontological and not merely
Here one notes definite progress with respect to Basil, who was limited to claiming participation of the Spirit in the Kingdom: cf. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, , , –: SCh bis, pp. –. Gregory of Nyssa, De oratione dominica, GNO VII/, , –. See M. Alexandre, “La variante de Lc , dans la Troisème Homélie sur l’Oraison Dominicale de Grégoire de Nysse et la controverse avec les pneumatomaques,” in M. Cassin et al. (eds.), Grégoire de Nysse: La Bible dans la construction de son discours. Actes du colloque de Paris, – février , Études augustiniennes (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, ), –. Cf. ibid., –. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum canticorum, GNO VI, , –
Relational Logos
psychological. Absolute gift is in fact approachable only from this new ontological perspective that does not allow for any μέσον that might put itself between (μεταξύ) the Father and the Son, just as the conjunction of the first two Persons is immediate (ἀδιάστατος): Reason recognizes nothing intermediary (μέσον), so that some special border (ἐν μεθορίῳ) nature be thought to exist between (μεταξύ) the created and the uncreated, in such a way it partakes of both and is neither perfectly.
The language used is evidently ontological and directly rejects the tenets of Platonic metaphysics, which the very same terminology calls to mind. One might compare this text with that of Philo reproduced above, as well as with the figure of Eros sketched in Plato’s Symposium. They are simultaneously evidence both of the closeness of the language as well as the difference in ontology. The objective clearly is to reiterate the operation undertaken for the Logos and declare that the Spirit is not an intermediary being between God and the world. Rather, the Spirit is He Who unites the Father and the Son in the Trinity. Without inverting the order of the Trinity and without violating the monarchy, Gregory holds that the intermediary between the Father and the Son must be of their same nature. This is the final step in the theological effort to overcome the NeoPlatonic and Gnostic conception of an ontological scale that connects God and the world. The first step in this movement was to modify the philosophical conception of the logos understood as the mediator between Heaven and earth. The Johannine prologue urged the insertion of logos into divinity, that is, into the archê. The showdown with the Arians touched exactly upon this capital point. The subsequent shift radically excluded any possibility that the Spirit could occupy the position of mediator between Creator and creation. To place the πνεῦμα in the very same divine archê meant re-reading both the mediation of the Son as well as that of the Spirit in terms that were purely immanent. Gregory is moved to expound on the reciprocal relations of the two processions through the pressure placed on him by the Pneumatomachians, who denied the divinity of the third Person even though they accepted the divinity of the Son.
Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –. See Sections . and .. For more on this topic, see P. Meinhold, “Pneumatomachoi,” Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft / (): –; and M. A. G. Haykin, The Spirit of God: The Exegesis of and Corinthians in the Pneumatomachian Controversy of the Fourth Century (Leiden: Brill, ).
. The New Ontology
This outcome is the fruit of the course taken in Gregory’s thought, as is demonstrated in a diachronic study of his interpretation of the passage in Jn : (“And now, Father, glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had with you before the world existed”) and the concept of glory applied to the third Person. Indeed, in his commentary on the Johannine passage, Gregory gives evidence as to how it is precisely the Spirit Who glorifies the Father and the Son, and at the same time the Father gives glory to the Son as the Son likewise gives glory to the Father. One sees that the third Person unites the Father and the Son inasmuch as the third Person is Glory, according to a dynamic analogous to that of the Kingdom. In Ad Eustathium, the themes Kingdom and Glory were already placed in the vicinity of one another by Gregory in order to explain that the chrism harkens back to the dignity of the third Person. The text echoes Basil’s De Spiritu Sancto: The Holy Spirit shares (κοινωνεῖ) the glory and kingship of the Only-begotten Son of God.
Later in the Adversos Macedonianos, the relationship between the Spirit and the Kingdom becomes one of sameness, even if doxa appears without its article, in that it asserts consubstantiality. And yet an exegesis of Jn : points directly to an identification of the Spirit as Glory. All this is evident in the Antirrheticus adversos Apolinarium: And the glory that is contemplated before the world and all creation and all the ages, in which the Only-begotten God is glorifed, is nothing other than the glory of the Spirit, according to our thought. In fact, the doctrine of piety teaches that only the Holy Trinity is eternal. “He who exists from before the ages” (Ps :) gives the prophecy of the Father; and the Apostle says in reference to the Son: “Through Him were made the ages” (Heb :). The glory before the ages, contemplated in the Only-begotten God, is the Holy Spirit.
With the In Canticum canticorum, and in the maturity of his thought, Gregory presents the Spirit as precisely the Glory that the Father and the Son eternally exchange:
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –. Cf. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, , , : SCh bis, p. . Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium, GNO III/, , –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, , –, . Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus adversos Apolinarium, GNO III/, , –. This theme already appears in In illud: Tunc et ipse, GNO III/, , –, .
Relational Logos
It is better to quote textually the divine words of the Gospel: “So that all be one. As you Father, are in me and I in You, that they be also one in Us” (Jn :). And the bond of this unity is the glory (τὸ δὲ συνδετικὸν τῆς ἑνότητος ταύτης ἡ δόξα ἐστίν). But no prudent person could oppose the fact that the Spirit is called “glory,” if the words of the Lord are considered. For He says: “The glory that You gave me I gave to them” (Jn :). He gave, in fact, that glory to the disciples, saying to them, “Receive the Holy Spirit” (Jn :). Having embraced human nature, He received this glory that He already possessed forever, from before the world was made (cf. Jn :). And, since this human nature was glorified by the Spirit, the communication of the glory of the Spirit happens to all who belong to the same nature (ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συγγενὲς), starting with the disciples. For this he says: “And the glory that You gave me, I gave to them, so that they be one like Us. I in them and You in Me, so that they be perfect in unity.” (Jn :–)
In order that the disciples might be one, as the Father and the Son are one, it is necessary that they receive the Spirit, who is the bond in this union. He is no longer the vertical and necessary δεσμός, rather συνδετικόν in His being the Person-relation. Glory and, thus, the Spirit are recognizable as the intra-Trinitarian bond wherein the unity that is communicated outside of the Trinity is based. Here the theology of Glory illuminates the theology of the Kingdom, showing the extent to which Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of the immanent relationships might be deepened and developed. The basis of unity is placed in the Trinity itself, in the eternal, free and reciprocal gift that constitutes the relation between the Father and the Son. It was on account of the expansion of the personal characteristic of the Spirit that the relationship between the Father and the Son was able to be read in terms of mutual gift and thereby as relation and as opposed to necessary relationship. The act of generating is perfect precisely through the Spirit, Kingdom and Glory of the Father eternally given to the Son as is constitutive of His being Son, namely, of His being perfect image of the Father.
. : John D. Zizioulas is correct, then, when he says that for the Cappadocians the Father does not generate by simply giving his essence to the Son: in immanence all is substantial and all is personhood. The gift that is
Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum canticorum, GNO VI, , –. See on the intra-Trinitarian mutual glorification, K. Anatolios, Deification through the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, ).
. Conclusion
eternally exchanged between the Father and the Son is not some abstract essence and something prior to hypostasis (unhypostatized), rather it is the Holy Spirit, Who is God. Their eternal relationship can thus be expressed with a concise formula: the re-giving of the gift. The Father is Himself in the giving completely and eternally of Himself in the generation of the Son and the Son is Himself, that is, infinitely perfect and actual image of the Father, re-giving to the Father that which the Father gives to Him, which is the Kingdom and the Glory. To reign is to serve in the Most Holy Trinity, in the very depths of Being itself, the furthest reaches of truth. The humility of being in the gift given to the other is identical to true and absolute being. It should be noted that the formulation advanced by Gregory of Nyssa at the same time affirms the monarchy of the Father, for the gift has its beginning in Him, and an active dimension of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit, who gives of Himself precisely in this twofold movement of ebb and flow of the gift that from the Father moves to the Son so as to then be re-given to the first Person from the second Person. It seems that this formulation vindicates a pointed demand advanced by Sarah Coakley to those who deal with Trinitarian ontology, that is, that the triadic and necessary dimension and role of the third Person be expounded. In the Trinitarian theology of Gregory of Nyssa, the Spirit is presented in a certain sense as Person-relation. The personal characteristic of the Spirit is precisely being what, better said, who unites the first two Persons in an eternal and mutual self-giving. In this way, the course taken by the logos conceived of as necessary relationship that keeps the universe united, on account of its ontological status of being the intermediate parallel to the Platonic Eros (logos ut ratio), has led to the Logos understood as eternal relation of reciprocal gift, which is the very heart of Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of the Trinity (Logos ut relatio). Unity is no longer implicit in nature, rather it is founded on person and communion. Substantial unity ceases to be
It is worth looking at the beautiful text of the Ad Ablabium, cited above (cf. Section ..) where Gregory emphasizes how the Spirit is through (διὰ) the Son. The second and third Persons are both “from the cause” (ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου) but are differentiated one from the other precisely because the Son is immediately from the Father whereas the Spirit is through the Son: Ad Ablabium, GNO III/ , –, . Cf. S. Coakley, “Afterword: Relational Ontology, Trinity, and Science,” in J. Polkinghorne, The Trinity and an Entangled World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, ), –. In particular, see the last section, which bears the meaningful title “Why Three in Relation?”.
Relational Logos
measured according to archetype of the natural and inanimate world to instead be re-thought of in light of relation. The most profound unity is not that which implies solitude, rather that which is identified with the absolute, perfect and eternal love of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is clear that Gregory not only does not reject the inheritance of classical philosophy and Greek metaphysics but that he relies on it and significantly re-elaborates its categories in order to express the radical newness represented in the Trinity. Substance is neither denied nor passed over, rather it is presented from the inside beginning with the relational and personal dimension that characterizes divine immanence. The relationship between philosophy and theology is not expressed in dialectic terms inasmuch as the very category of gift can only be expressed where one strictly draws the boundary between that which is natural and necessary and that which is not. In order to grasp the disproportion of the Christian Logos who has all the passion of a true lover, one must never forget the proportion and measure of the Greek logos. What is natural and what is supernatural can never be separated and certainly not confused. The boundary between them must remain clear-cut, as are the distinctions between Creator and creation or immanence and economy in Cappadocian thought. The articulation of theological thought through philosophy is a fundamental aspect of Gregory’s doctrine, as is made evident by the question of attributes, something familiar to both fields. Chapter is dedicated to this point and will facilitate a further expansion of both a historical perspective as well as on the Trinitarian ontology of Gregory of Nyssa. The analysis of Life as attribute and its Trinitarian dimension expressed by the formula “Life from Life,” parallel to “God from God” and “Light from Light” as given by Nicaea, will shed more light on the essential elements that have allowed this shift from the logos ut ratio to the Logos ut relatio.
Life from Life
. In any re-reading of the doctrine of the one and triune God from a perspective that is also philosophically careful, the question of the divine attributes is fundamental. For example, if the first principle is the Absolute then it cannot but be unique inasmuch as if there were two different principles with such an attribute they would contradict the very definition of what it means to be absolute, the one thereby restricting the other and vice versa. Hence, singularity and unity are presented as fundamental attributes of the first principle from both a philosophical and theological perspective. Thinking of the one and triune God, then, necessarily calls to the fore a discussion of unity itself, which must be reframed from the perspective of Christian Revelation. Yet how is it possible that the Trinity does not contradict unity? The question at hand, generally speaking, is that of the relationship between nature and the supernatural and, more specifically, of the relationship between faith and reason. It is clear in fact that reason can only grasp the unity of God, and the Trinity belongs to the realm of faith. Yet if we assert that God is one and nevertheless triune, we literally deny the possibility of finding any reason in faith, reason that might be shared by the non-believer. Is there, instead, a way of conveying unity and trinity in God that might claim philosophical value in addition to that which is theological? Might one draw some authentic profit for human thought in general from the reflection on the Trinity? The doctrine of the Church Fathers of the fourth century seems to offer a response through its treatment of the divine attributes, and it is the
Life from Life
intention here to map out this development in its key moments. In this there must be specific attention given to Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian ontology and its impact on this question and particularly his doctrine elaborated in the Contra Eunomium III. We will hereby see how the extension of the classical ontology elaborated by Gregory about relations permits him to claim that God is one precisely because He is triune. This new understanding of being and relation constitutes something of worth for all human beings, even independent of one’s faith.
. It is not possible to approach any aspect of the fourth century without confronting the work of Origen, whose influence is a fundamental component in all subsequent Greek thought. His reflections make it particularly evident that the notion of the attributes is directly tied to biblical exegesis and the interpretation of the content of Revelation. In the Old Testament, the Jewish people must narrate and pass down how it is that their identity indeed revolves around the encounter with the one God, the Creator. Here the question of the divine attributes rises spontaneously: how does one recognize this God when he or she meets Him? Furthermore, along the progression of the Jewish reflection various attributes continue to lose their anthropomorphic character and are subject to a process of purification and spiritualization. Thus, Origen, in his reading of Sacred Scripture, must explain how it is that God exhibits properties that seem to be in opposition, for example justice and mercy. In order to demonstrate the sameness of various attributes, he places the Goodness of God at the front and center of his reflection and maintains that in God Being and Goodness are identical. All that which exists has its origin in the Creator and participates in His Goodness, which is the source of all things. But God is Spirit, and thus the expression used in Sacred Scripture for the relationship between Creator and creation, together with His salvific action in history, must be stripped of all corporeal resonance with those images that are used only so that mankind might understand. God does not identify Himself
For an overview of Origen’s position and his predecessors, see P. Him Ip, Origen and the Emergence of Divine Simplicity Before Nicaea (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, ). This is a central point in Origen’s theology; Cf. M. Simonetti’s “Spirito Santo,” in A. Monaci Castagno (ed.), Dizionario Origene (Città Nuova: Roma, ), .
. Divine Attributes and Sacred Scripture
with images of any kind and is furthermore invisible and incomprehensible. For this reason, omnipotence does not mean that God might enact evil if He wanted: as that which is sweet cannot produce what is bitter, and as light does not yield shadow, so, too, is God faithful to His being, which is identified as Goodness. In a certain sense, one might say that Origen is saying something analogous to what was already accomplished by Socrates and Plato with respect to myth: beneath the literal narrative appearance, the truth transmitted consists of making Being identical to the Good. Nonetheless, herein lies an essential difference. Myths do not allude to any authentic history, whereas Scripture does. Myths recall the necessary dominion of nature whose forces are in turn personified. Scripture, however, tells of God’s voluntary and free intervention in history, with all the nuances of mankind’s free response. The Good that Origen makes out to be the very sense of the text is that which is revealed throughout the history of salvation by God the Creator and Redeemer: the Good gives of Himself; and on account of this, everything is founded in love and freedom. It is precisely for this reason that Origen further develops the relation between the divine attributes and freedom. Evil is traced back to the bad use of free will on the part of mankind, whereas all things are marked by the goodness of the act of creation. Divine omniscience and omnipotence do not suppress the freedom of mankind, who is not obligated to undertake what God has prescribed, as if one were still moving along the lines of a pagan notion characterized by the domination of the Fates. Thus, the prophecies read in Scripture are not fulfilled simply because they have been spoken. On the contrary, they have been spoken in the past precisely because in the future they would be fulfilled. The causal arrow is opposite to the temporal arrow: it is not that something will happen because it was said, but it was said because it will happen. A confrontation with Celsus compels Origen to re-read divine eternity not as a mere prolongation of time, a quantitative extrapolation of mankind’s finitude, but rather as presence and possibility of relation with every moment of history. Hence, the clock can be inverted with respect to temporal direction: the prophet, through his own relation with God sees that which for the eternal God is simply happening; but for mankind, it is within the bounds of time and thus will only occur in the future.
Origen, Contra Celsum, , : SCh , . Cf. ibid., , : SCh , .
Cf. ibid., , : SCh , –.
Life from Life
One therefore is guided to a new understanding of the philosophical attributes of God starting from a personal and historical vision that characterizes biblical thought. This operation lies at the heart of theological development and signals the way for all thought that follows. Of course, in Origen all this is still in its initial stages and marked by various limits of expression, as was mentioned in Chapter . Nevertheless, his work clearly manifests an effort, or impulse, to elaborate on a thought that takes into consideration the unity of God in a way that is consonant with Trinitarian Revelation. The difficulty in this becomes evident the moment one tries to apply the divine attributes to the Trinity, as witnessed in several passages in Origen. For example, in his theological thought only the Father is perfectly identified by the attributes, whereas the Son is the image of these in a sense that is still colored by Platonic degradation: In the same way, I think that it will rightly be said that Lord is the image of the goodness of God (cf. Wis : ), but not that He is the Good in itself. And perhaps the Son is also good, but not merely good alone. And just as He is the image of the invisible God (Col : ), which is why He is God, without being the One of whom Christ Himself says: “that they should know you, the only true God” (Jn :), so too is He the image of His goodness. However, He is not identical to the Good, as is the Father.
Precisely because He is the image of Goodness, the second Person of the Trinity cannot perfectly be identified with Goodness itself. The metaphysics behind this is still of a Platonic blend: the multiplicity in the bosom of the First Principle cannot yet be expressed without leading one into a kind of subordinationism, at least verbally. This phenomenon is likewise evident with respect to the third Person: As only the Only-begotten is by His very nature Son from the beginning, so it seems that the Holy Spirit needs His mediation in order to subsist: not just to be (τὸ εἶναι), but also to be wise, intelligent, just, and everything that we must say about Him, due to the participation in the already enumerated attributes of Christ.
Here one reaches the limit of Origen’s conception of the Trinity: the being (τὸ εἶναι) of the third Person is not identical with being wise or with
Origen, Justinian’s Fragment (Ep. ad Menam): SCh , n. , pp. –. Origen, In Joannem, , , , –: SCh , . Cf. D. L. Balás, “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in Origeniana. Premier colloque international des études origéniennes (Montserrat, – Septembre ), Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum (Bari: Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di Bari,
. The Fourth Century and Arianism
being intelligent and just (τὸ εἶναι σοφὸν, λογικὸν, δίκαιον). The divine attributes of the Son and Spirit are only participatory and do not possess fullness. Thus emerges a tension between the philosophical notion and the demands imposed by the interpretation of biblical texts. Even though Origen succeeds in purifying the attributes and bringing the understanding of them closer to the full sphere of freedom, spirituality and the personal dimension, with the metaphysical tools at his disposal he is unable to reach a better formula of God as one and therefore triune. We must wait for the fourth century and the new conceptual instruments that it will bring.
. The divine attributes occupy the center of theological reflection in the fourth century, fueled by Arius’ work to show the eternity and immutability of God by denying the divinity of the Son. Generation necessarily implied a beginning in the Son and thus excluded that the Word could be eternal and immutable. Athanasius responded by likewise beginning from the divine attributes, yet through a more soteriological perspective: if the Life that Christ communicates to the human being is not the Life of God, the only life that is truly eternal, then there is no such thing as Christian salvation. He thus asserts that God is simple, infinite, without composition, immaterial and incorporeal, eternal, immense and transcendent with respect to creation. At the same time, however, Athanasius claims that this God took on the form of flesh and draws near to each and every human being. What is at stake here is the theological reinterpretation of philosophical attributes for God: if eternity and omnipotence exclude relation, it will not be possible to articulate the Christian mystery. The one and triune God is in fact so great as to send the Son into the world and there make Himself man, without in any way denying Himself. Entering into relation does not contradict the being of God, for in Himself He is relation.
), –. The shortcomings in Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine do not signify any subordinationism in a proper sense. See also I. Ramelli, “Origen’s Antisubordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –. Subordinationism in Origen is just linguistical, for it shows all the limitations of the philosophical tools at his disposal. Cf. Athanasius, De decretis Nicaenae synodi, : Athanasius Werke, II, p. . Cf. ibid., p. .
Life from Life
A fundamental point in all of this, as we have seen, is the shift from Logos-theology, one that saw in the second Person of the Trinity only a figure of ontological mediation between God and the world, to Physistheology. Origen was unable to fully and authentically express the divinity of the Word precisely on account of the conceptual tool that he used: the Logos was linguistically marked by a kind of subordination with respect to the first Principle. This is later corrected by Athanasius by way of the identification of the Trinity as the one, single, ungenerated and eternal divine nature: The Trinity was not made, but is eternal. And in the Trinity the divinity is one, like the glory of the Holy Trinity is one. And you dare to divide the Trinity into different natures. And you say that, while the Father is eternal, there was a time in which the Word that is with Him did not exist.
Now the distinction between the world and the Creator is well-defined. God is the one, eternal nature, whereas all else that exists has a created nature. In this way, Christian salvation is expressed by the fact that the Son not only has but is the eternal life of the Father – that is, He identifies Himself with the single, uncreated nature that is the Trinity. The Father has never been without the Son. Thus, the theological re-reading of the divine attributes is on equal footing with a purification of the concept of generation. Generation, then, as opposed to what philosophy was able to formalize of it on the basis of what is observed in the cosmos, in what pertains to the one and triune God, must be understood as eternal. The Father is Father only because He generates the Son, in such a way that the divine Persons are presented as co-relative. And all this is required according to the need of keeping all the divine attributes together, for if generation were not eternal, God would have undergone a mutation in His becoming the Father. The divine immutability according to the Arians would hereby be eradicated. In Athanasius, we see the process of theologizing the divine attributes at work as the attributes begin to be reinterpreted in light of relation. This dynamic does not contradict philosophical requirements but rather, starting from Revelation, shows a fuller realization of the identical nature
Domenico Pazzini shows how Origen goes beyond the Logos-theology of the apologists, putting the Son and Wisdom before the Logos itself in his analysis of the epinoiai: D. Pazzini, In principio era il Logos: Origene e il prologo del Vangelo di Giovanni (Brescia: Paideia, ). Athanasius, Contra arianos, , : Athanasius Werke, I, p. . Ibid., , : Athanasius Werke, I, p. –.
. The Fourth Century and Arianism
of the different attributes with respect to what classical thought had attained. This was accomplished by introducing Physis-theology as the new instrument and by bringing it up to the level of the personal dimension. This is all the more evident through the encounter with Arius’ heirs. Eunomius held, like Plato, that there was a connection between names and things, as read in his claim to which Gregory of Nyssa refers: “the intimate bond between names and things is unalterable” (ἀμετάθετος ἡ προσφυὴς τῶν ὀνομάτων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσις). To each name corresponds a distinct reality based on the necessary connection that binds the world of Ideas to material reality. Hence, the Father’s attribute ungenerated (ἀγέννητος) would for this exclude His being identical in substance to the generated (γεννητός) Son. The point here is that Eunomius does not succeed in distinguishing two different meanings of the attribute ungenerated. The first is synonymous with not created and pertains to the relationship between God and the world. The second meaning, however, is a characteristic only of the divine immanence in reference to the Father inasmuch as the Father is the Principle of the other two Persons, though without making them out to be His creations, or effects. And we can deal with an analogous distinction for the attribute generated: we get a new notion, made possible by Revelation, besides the former identification of this term as being created, a new notion that makes the Son eternally generated by the Father without ever having a beginning as such. This new meaning is purely relational and exclusive to divine immanence. Eunomius’ position instead undervalues human knowledge and the weight of the divine attributes: only ungenerated would express divine substance, whereas all other terms such as justice, beauty and mercy would only be subjective artifacts and say nothing of God. The value of human knowledge would thus seem totally deflated. But for the Cappadocians, it is precisely because no name expresses essence that one needs to have recourse to multiple names. Each of these individual names through ontological participation reflects a certain aspect of the divine essence. In all its limitations, human reason must deconstruct and dissect what is unity and identity in God. Once again, this is something derived
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, ,,–: GNO II, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,: GNO II, ,–. Cf. Basil, Adversus Eunomium, , : SCh , –.
Life from Life
directly from Scripture, where there are various attributes explicitly named. The point is that the essence of God is simple, but also infinite, and as such a plethora of concepts is the only way to arrive at a certain idea of it. Basil introduces a classification of the names of God, distinguishing them as positive or negative. The former group speak of what God is and the latter of that which He is not. The name ungenerated is obviously a negative one, as are infinite, invisible, etc. Yet this way of speaking alone is not enough. In attempting to say something of God’s infinite value, Basil says one must rely on all kinds of attributes even those that are considered positive, such as good, just, true and so on. Yet the most significant of Basil’s metaphysical jumps is his distinction between absolute and relative names, which emerges from a distinction between substance and hypostasis. Absolute names touch upon all of the essence and are thus applied to the three divine Persons, whereas relative names can only be used in reference to a singular Person. Gregory of Nanzianzus clearly demonstrates how ungenerated might be understood both as an absolute name synonymous with not created as well as a relative name solely in reference to the Father, who is not generated and is not the fruit of a procession. In a parallel manner, the Son is generated yet not created. Of course, positive names cannot ever fully express God, even though they are the aptest and most meaningful, for God remains out of the reach of human cognition. The relationship between being and language can never be inverted: first comes the entity and only after comes its name. This form of reasoning is especially developed by Gregory of Nyssa, who with respect to Eunomius moves along a gnoseology that is of an Aristotelian variety, which is why in his view names are of human and not divine origin, assigned by reason on the basis of analogy of proportion. For Gregory, then, names are but reflections of beings: Perhaps we have not learned clearly that the names which signify what comes into being come after the things themselves and that, like the shadows of things (σκιαὶ
Cf. ibid., , : SCh , –. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio , : SCh , –. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio , : SCh , –. Cf. Basil, Adversus Eunomium, , : SCh , –. See also Gregory of Nanzianzus’ Oratio . Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, II, GNO I, , –.
. The Contra Eunomium III
τῶν πραγμάτων), are themselves the nominal voices, which get their form according to the movements of what subsists in a hypostasis (τῶν ὑφεστώτων)?
The necessary connection between names and things as held by Eunomius theoretically allowed an ascent in knowledge from the world to God, climbing the different levels of the ontological scale. This is precisely the perspective discarded by Gregory, who accuses his interlocutor of projecting the lesser onto the greater and thereby violating the mystery of theology (θεολογίας μυστήριον) in applying the names and reasoning appropriate for created nature and thus for all things that are in the sphere of what is necessary, to God. For Gregory, knowledge of God can only proceed from on high to all below. It is, then, only according to gift. We know God on account of His acting in history and there is no a priori idea of Him. The common notions and natural knowledge of God are based on the creative act, that is, the fruit of freedom and love. Hence, the only name that can express the divine nature is the amazement that rises toward it in our souls. Simply put, God is known only in wonder. Here the distinction between divine immanence and economy comes into play, a distinction that proved fundamental in the orthodox response to Arianism. The mystery of theology that Eunomius violates has to do exactly with the knowledge of the divine substance, which in and of itself is both unknowable and ineffable. This advancement in theological epistemology and gnoseology is reflected on the level of the comprehension of the divine attributes, as read in the Contra Eunomium III, one of Gregory of Nyssa’s most dogmatically mature works.
. The composition of this work is usually dated between and , immediately after the Council of Constantinople and only a little removed from the first two works issued against Eunomius, both in . The structure of this work is centered around the question of the divine attributes, as, again, this was a central point in the debate with Arius’
Ibid., , –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, III, ,: GNO II, ,–,. Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. J. I. Ruiz Aldaz, “Contra Eunomium III,” in The Brill Dictionary on Gregory of Nyssa (Leiden: Brill, ), –.
Life from Life
heirs. The first chapter shows how the response to Eunomius’ identification of being generated as being created can be overcome only by theologizing the divine attributes and demonstrating their connection to the generation of the Logos. Chapters through are an analysis of Christ’s attributes and show how He who is generated by the Father is Lord. Thus, in the first place, Gregory rules out that eternal generation is marked by passion, something that is true for creation (ch. ). The claim “God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified” (Acts :) is analyzed in an effort to show in what sense Jesus was constituted Christ and Lord after the Passion, distinguishing created nature from uncreated nature (ch. ). Lastly, after having made this distinction, Gregory defends himself against the accusation that he thereby introduces two Christs and efficaciously deepens the question of the communicatio idiomatum (ch. ). The second part of the work looks in depth at the attributes of the Son, studying generation directly as it is in divinis. In the fifth chapter, Gregory once again takes up the title Lord attributed to Christ and, in general, the various names attributed to God (ch. ). In chapter , he denies that the Son might have been generated by an act of the will of the Father, passing from not-being into being. The eternal and indivisible unity between Father and Son is founded precisely upon the singularity of generation, something radically different from any form of generation on the level of creation (ch. ). The last four chapters of the Contra Eunomius III can be read as an explicit representation of the relationship between eternal generation and the divine attributes. The items Eternity, Life and Goodness are now approached from a soteriological perspective. In the seventh chapter, Gregory denies that “before” and “after” can be relevant attributes in the relationship between the Father and the Son. There does not exist any pause or interval between the first two Persons of the Trinity, nothing that would show the attribute Eternity to be incompatible with generation itself (ch. ). What is presented in this chapter is applied to chapter , especially in what pertains to the eternity of the divine attribute Life. True Life must be eternal life, as Christ saves because He communicates eternal life. And He communicates this because He himself is eternal life. This is a significant step, for here the relationship between the divine attributes and generation is elaborated. It is precisely in this moment that this relationship is best represented, for Life and “to generate” are directly linked. Among the attributes Eternity, Life and Goodness, the second naturally calls to
. Divine Attributes and Relation
mind generation as well as the names of the Father and the Son in their relation to one another (ch. ). In chapter , the conversation turns to the attribute Goodness. This cannot be considered as solely of the Father, for it is an attribute of the Son as well. Christ, Who is eternal life, has given this life for us, in His economy revealing that He, too, possesses the divine attribute of Goodness in its fullness. The main content of the Incarnation is precisely the gift of Self that God renders to mankind. Christ’s death is not a sign of inferiority and subordination. Rather, it is the revelation of Jesus’ divinity, for the eternal life communicated and the absolute goodness that this communication likewise manifests are the splendor of the divine attributes (ch. ). This work is concluded in a final chapter that shows how the Onlybegotten is in possession of all human attributes in His human nature and of all divine attributes in His divine nature. In this sense, any offense to the Son is an offense to the Father inasmuch as the two Persons are one and the same thing, two Persons of the same, singular divine nature. The Christological doctrine is, then, presented as inseparable from the reflection on the Trinity (ch. ). The aim of the next movement of this study is to show how, on the basis of the direct link between the divine attributes and the generation of the Son, there is a new ontology of relation drawn from Chapter insofar as the First Principle is no longer approached from an Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic perspective (as a being that is solitary and void of relations), but the Father and the Son are one in the other and each one through the other. The divine attributes are only and exclusively true in relation and therefore so are true Unity and true Life.
. This interpretation seems to have confirmation in the frequency in which the divine attributes and generation appear as linked in Gregory’s argument throughout the course of the Contra Eunomium III. Indeed, from very early on in the first chapter, Gregory highlights the bond between the attributes, procession and relation. The nucleus of his reasoning, which is developed throughout the work, is founded upon the words of John : that place the Son in the bosom of the Father:
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, III,,–: GNO II, ,–,.
Life from Life
. God is fullness and contains in Himself, in His bosom, the power, the wisdom, light, word, life and truth. . But the Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, renders this bosom ever full, for never could the Father be thought of as empty of good things. . The Son is these goods things, that is, the power, the life, truth, light and wisdom. Gregory advances this reasoning as the interpretive key to the Nicene expression “true God from true God” (θεὸν ἀληθινὸν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ). For Eunomius, generation implies difference of substance and in such a way that the generated substance cannot numerically be the same as the ungenerated substance. From this perspective, procession is taken to be proof of subordination. To this Gregory responds on the basis of the relationship of mutual immanence of the Father and the Son, according to which the names given to the Son are incomprehensible apart from the relation between the first two divine Persons: Son, Right Hand, Only-begotten, Logos, Wisdom, and Power are all similar titles that describe a relation (πρός τι); they are all surely used with simultaneous reference to a certain relational bond (συζυγίᾳ τινὶ σχετικῇ) with the Father.
Starting from the attributes predicated of the Father, the line of argumentation arrives at the very same attributes predicated of the Son through the derivative preposition ἐκ. The reference to the bosom of the Father serves to reinforce the reading of this derivation in light of mutual immanence and this in the sense of relation, which in turn becomes the key to interpreting generation. Instead, for Eunomius, generated and ungenerated must correspond to different substances. This renders it impossible to read the Nicene “Light from Light” in the sense of the homoousios, for the derivative formulas mean, in Eunomius’ philosophy of language, that the distance between the two Lights is the same as that between the generated and the ungenerated. His conception of metaphysics, anchored in a continuous series of descending ontological degrees from the First Principle down to the
The Nicene construction in the Contra Eunomium III appears explicitly in ,, (GNO II, ,) and in ,,– (GNO II, ,–), in this case accompanied by light from light: φῶς ἐκ φωτός͵ θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ. Cf. ibid., ,: GNO II, ,–,. Ibid., ,,-,: GNO II, ,–. Ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–.
. Divine Attributes and Relation
world, is directly translated into a gnoseology that is practically indistinguishable and inseparable from ontology. Yet for the Cappadocians, the source of knowledge of the divine attributes is only economy, the salvific acting of God, inasmuch as there is no necessary connection between creation and Creator. This leads Gregory of Nyssa to write: But I, instructed by divinely inspired Scripture, firmly declare that He who is beyond any name takes on many names for us, with titles that correspond to His various acts and benevolence: Light when He casts out the darkness of ignorance; Life when He grants immortality, Way when He guides us from error to truth; so too we say Tower of strength, Fortified city, Font, Rock, Vine, Physician, Resurrection, and all such names that are given to Him in relation to us, due to His sharing Himself, and His benefits, in various ways for us.
The names Light and Life emerge from this text. They are not proper names of the essence, but they are only divine attributes. That is to say, they are qualities that characterize the divine nature per se and the human being only knows of them through the action of God Himself. It is important to emphasize that these attributes constitute an authentic knowledge of God because they are effects that can only characterize His nature. They are proper effects, founded upon an operation that can only be undertaken by the divine nature, such as the act of creating. Likewise, the distinction between Creator and creation is well defined. Hence, Gregory writes to Eunomius in reference to the Johannine prologue: Creation was neither in the beginning, with God, nor was God; it was not Life, Light, Resurrection, or any other of the names belonging to God.
The radical nature of this distinction urges forward the reflection on the relationship between the divine attributes and relation. Indeed, the Gospels show the Son to be God, Life, Light, the Resurrection, etc. In this way, he or she who might inquire after the sense of Scripture through a narration of economy encounters not only the Light and Life of God but also He who is Light from Light and Life from Life. And this is a fact that is compelling, because Christ rises and saves, communicating eternal Life.
For more on this point, see Chapter . Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, ,,–,: GNO II, ,–. Cf. M. R. Barnes, The Power of God (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, ), –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, ,,–: GNO II, ,–.
Life from Life
From here follow the scathing words against Eunomius in chapter of the Contra Eunomius III: The wretch did not notice that the Gospel teaches us to see eternal life in the same way in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit: the text says that knowing the Father is eternal life (Jn :); that whoever believes in the Son has eternal life (Jn :); and that for those who have received the grace of the Holy Spirit, He will be the source of living water for eternal life (Jn :). Therefore, whoever desires eternal life, when he finds the Son – meaning the true Son, and not that which has a false name – finds everything he desired in Him, because the Son is also life in himself and has life in himself.
The identification of Life as the Trinity is extremely important to Gregory. It is founded in the recognition that Life is one of the characteristics proper to God, who is source of all Good. Thus, the Only Begotten must be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the Father, for: God is essentially Life (αὐτοζωή), and the Only-begotten God is God, Life, Truth and every conceivable thing that is sublime and proper to God.
All other realities only participate in Life yet are not identical to it. Then, it is absurd in the eyes of Gregory to deny the Son full divinity. For Eunomius, derivation implies a diversity of substance and a lower ontological status. In this sense, his exegesis is dictated by Aristotelian and Platonic presuppositions that envisage an ontological scale. If some reality derives from another and so has relations, it must necessarily be inferior and cannot be the First Principle. Whereas for Gregory there is an unbridgeable distance between Creator and creation, according to Eunomius there are intermediate degrees of being. Thus, in the final chapter of the Contra Eunomium III, the latter is accused of adhering to an Egyptian religion characterized by daemonic beings, ontologically halfway between Heaven and earth, as was the Platonic Eros. In this way, the distinction between immanence and economy, together with the strict separation between divine and created nature, urges Gregory toward the formulation of the connection between the divine attributes and relation. Eunomius, in fact, maintains that the One “seated at the right hand of the Father” is created, in that He is of a different substance than that the Father. To this Gregory writes:
Ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,: GNO II, ,–.
Ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–
. Theologizing the Divine Attributes
Whoever has eyes to see the truth will see that what is the Most High, the same will also be seen to be the Right Hand of the Most High: uncreated from uncreated, good from good, eternal from eternal (ἄκτιστον ἀκτίστου͵ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθήν͵ ἀϊδίου ἀΐδιον), and not compromised at all in His eternity by the fact of being in the Father by begetting.
It is possible to see here how the relation is expressed through the repetition of the attributes in their genitive form: ἄκτιστον ἀκτίστου͵ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθήν͵ ἀϊδίου ἀΐδιον. The very name “seated at the right hand of God” is a relative one, as is the name Son because it is a term that speaks of the Father and indicates relation with Him (ἡ σχετικὴ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ σημασία).
. Relation becomes a key element in the understanding of the relationship between economy and immanence. In fact, there are names known through economy that do not indicate the divine nature but specifically refer to the divine Hypostases and are identified by way of mutual relation. The name Son thus points to the Father. It is essential to note that these names, which can only be accessed through Revelation and the history of salvation, do not remain on the level of the mere action of God, rather they speak of immanence itself. Yet in speaking of immanence, they nevertheless do not offer a definition of the divine substance. Hence, though being clearly distinct, immanence and economy are not separated, for the relational dimension makes the access possible to the interpersonal dynamic of the one and triune God. That the names of the Father and the Son refer to immanence can be seen in the identification of the relational dimension as the one being in the other: even if these two terms are not used together, even if one is omitted, it is nevertheless implied by the use of the other. Thus, one is in the other and corresponds to the other (τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον), and both are considered one, in such a way that neither of them can be thought of without the other.
The affirmation that each Person has being in the other is aptly translated by Gregory as the being one in the other of the divine attributes. So, if the Son is in the Father who is eternity, he cannot but be eternal:
Ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–. Ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–.
Life from Life
being in the Father, He is not in Him in only one respect, but He is in all that the Father is acknowledged to be, the Son is likewise in the Father in every respect. Thus, He is incorruptible because He is in the incorruptibility of the Father, good because He is in His Goodness, powerful because He is in His power, and since He is in all those attributes of special excellence that are preached of the Father, He is also eternal in His eternity.
And this holds for both directions, as the immanence of the two divine Persons is reciprocal, expressed by the words “I am in the Father and the Father is in me” (Jn :). In this way, the attribute is real precisely because it is relational: One single goodness, wisdom, justice, prudence, power, incorruptibility, and everything about the other that is of the highest meanings, is all said of both. And in a certain way each has His strength in the other (ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον): the Father does everything through the Son, and the Only-begotten, who is the Power of the Father, carries out everything.
Here one is confronted with a shift in metaphysical perspective, for that which is read (through an Aristotelian lens) as accident and mark of ontological inferiority, namely, relation, now becomes sign of the reality and absoluteness of the attribute. Translated in terms of unity, one could say that for Gregory God is one precisely because He is triune, just as God is life precisely because He generates and is generated. Once again, what has entered into play is a further level of ontological analysis, which Trinitarian Revelation has made accessible: the level that is truly personal and relational. Thus, for Gregory, the divine essence remains unknowable, and yet the human being can know something of immanence. The wall of apophaticism impedes the passage to possessing the divine substance, yet it opens the way to personal knowledge, that is, relational knowledge, that touches on the depths of being without stripping the mystery of God of its radical incomprehensibility. This level is indicated, as already noted, by the expression πῶς εἶναι. The name not generated is one that pertains to essence, yet to say that the Son is generated does not undermine His identity of nature with the Father, for it expresses his way of existing as God. In this sense πῶς εἶναι identifies itself as πρός τι, that is, as relation (σχέσις). This argument is the very nucleus of Contra Eunomium III, , which means to demonstrate how being in a way that is absolute, and thus being
Ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,– Cf. ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–,. Ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,,–: GNO II, ,–.
. Theologizing the Divine Attributes
in a proper sense, does not exclude being in relation. If it were so, not even the Father would be in an absolute way. The line of reasoning is as follows: . In the first place, Gregory accepts the possibility that only being without relation (ἄσχετον) is absolute. . Yet John not only says that the Son is the Logos of the Father and is in the bosom of the Father, but also that He is God, without adding anything further. He thus says that He is both Light and Life in an absolute way (cf. Jn :–). . What is more, if it were true that being in relation means not being absolute, not even the Father would be absolute being, for Jn : says that the Father is in the Son. The text is quite clear and marks the starting point of Gregory’s response, which ultimately reduces Eunomius’ arguments to absurdity. John the Evangelist says, in fact: that the Word was God, and was Light, and was Life (see Jn :–), and not only that He was in the beginning and with God and in the bosom of the Father. This is in such a way as to ensure to the Lord the being, in the proper sense. Saying that He was God, He cut off the road to those who run toward wickedness and, more importantly, He tests the evil intention of our opponents. Since, if they argue that to be in something (ἔν τινι εἶναι) is a sign of not being in the proper sense, they surely at least agree that the Father is in the proper sense. In fact, they learn from the Gospel that just as the Son is in the Father, so too the Father is in the Son, according to what the Lord says (Jn :). Affirming that the Father is in the Son and that the Son is in the bosom of the Father is, in fact, the same.
One notes that the expression “being in something” (τὸ ἔν τινι εἶναι) is of fundamental importance in classical metaphysics because it signifies accidental being that must inhere in a substance and cannot subsist on its own. Hence, even the name of the Father indicates the concrete way of His existing as God as the first Person of the Trinity. It is a name that expresses relation with the Son. The two divine Persons are co-relative: their nature is Being itself and it is absolute. Yet at the same time each exists in relation with the other. The πῶς εἶναι is given by the πρός τι in such a way that if someone were to hypothetically say that the Son did not
Cf. ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–. Ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–,.
Life from Life
exist, it would necessarily follow that the Father also did not exist (ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνυπαρξία).
. The perspective of the divine attributes and the study of the Nicene “Life from Life” has the advantage of directly emphasizing how the new Trinitarian ontology introduced by Gregory of Nyssa structures itself according to the dispute over a concrete hermeneutics of the Nicene “God from God.” Indeed, the Arian tradition might have accepted the expression “Life from Life” if it had admitted a different ontological degree in the two divine Persons. What Gregory and his orthodox contemporaries set out to demonstrate is that it is precisely through the perfection of procession that the attribute is bestowed in an absolute way on the Son as well. In this context, the expression “Life from Life” is of particular significance, for “to generate” is directly linked to communicating life. The name of the divine Persons, the name of procession and the name of the divine attributes are all connected, for the Son proceeds from the Father inasmuch as He is eternally generated by the Father and receives Life from Him in a way that is both proper and absolute. It has already been mentioned that for Aristotle God is identified as the very sum of all life that is thought thinking upon itself. As the centuries pass, and parallel to Plotinus’ incorporation of the will in the description of the highest principle, even the expression “Life from Life” (ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς) appears in the latter’s writings: The first part of the soul is on high, close to the summit, eternally satisfied and illuminated, and it remains there; the second part, which participates in the first, insofar as it participates in it eternally proceeds (πρόεισι) as life from life (ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς); it is, in fact, action (ἐνέργεια) that spreads to every place and is present everywhere.
It is evident in the text how procession, expressed by the derivative formula “Light from Light” means participation and therefore inferiority. This philosophical precedent leads to a confused footing and theologically ambiguous interpretation of the formula.
Cf. ibid., ,,–,: GNO II, ,–. Plotinus, Enneades III, ,,– (P. Henry, H. R. Schwyzer). The text recalls the aporia of the non-descended soul, as will be seen in Section ., cf. p. and the volume by Riccardo Chiaradonna cited there.
. The Interpretation From Nicaea
There are certain studies that trace Eunomius’ doctrine back to Plotinus and others that exclude this possibility claiming that he denied Emanationism. Nevertheless, one cannot deny the presence of Plotinian language in both Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa. Perhaps the substantial difference between these two authors might be said to be located in the use each makes of Platonic philosophy. Eunomius seeks an exact doctrinal formulation in the development of his thought, which in turn permits him access to the knowledge of God’s essence. Gregory, however, acknowledges the limits of reason and accepts that only Christ, not human reason, saves. He thus lets faith open his mind to a new ontology. In the end, both authors employ the same expressions but with very different meanings. A confirmation of this is found in the fact that the formula “Life from Life” appears elsewhere in the Alexandrian tradition. In reference to Baptism and the Pneumatic human beings, one reads in one of Origen’s fragments: As we arise from the Savior, wisdom from Wisdom, truth from Truth, “life from life”, which is the beginning of each thing and the only begetting, so too the pneumatic human being is born holy of the Holy Spirit.
It could be noted that the reading of “life from life” is connected to the couple “wise from Wisdom” and “true from the Truth,” where the two terms of the formula are adjectives derived from the abstract substantive. Its meaning is clearly very different than the use that Gregory makes of this in the Contra Eunomius III, for the formula connects two different levels of ontology, as it occurs in Plotinus as well. The explicit reference to generation is still meaningful and runs parallel to Plotinus’ reference to procession. So, since its first appearance, the formula “life from life” has been bound to a reflection on the divine attributes and generation. These developments account for the interpretative ambiguity that is reflected in the history of the formula, which will all reappear in an important way at the Council of Nicaea. We can see this in the letter written by Eusebius of Caesarea in June of to the faithful of his community. Here Eusebius professes to believe:
P. Papageorgiou, “Plotinus and Eunomius: A Parallel Theology of the Three Hypostases,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review (): –. R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ), –. Origen, Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis, bis: E. Preuschen, GCS . Cf. H. von Campenhausen, “Das Bekenntnis Eusebs von Caesarea (Nicea ),” Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche (): –.
Life from Life
in one Lord Jesus Christ the Word of God, God from God, Light from Light, Life from Life (ζωὴν ἐκ ζωῆς), Only-begotten Son, “firstborn of all creation” (Col : ), begotten of the Father before all ages, through whom “all things came to be.” (Jn : )
This formula “Life from Life” follows the double Nicene formula. It seems that this expression is typical in Eusebius’ theology, as the De ecclesiastica theologia shows: God from God, Light from Light, and Life from Life, with reasons that are indescribable, ineffable, inscrutable, and absolutely unknown to us, begotten of the Father for the salvation of the universe.
The fact that Eusebius uses the expression αὐτοζωή for the Son in the same context might clarify the sense of this text. His intention is to emphasize the radical difference in the life of the Son, and thus in His generation, with respect to all of creation. The Son likewise appears to be generated for the salvation of the world, even if in a manner that is unfathomable. In fact, Athanasius holds Eusebius’ letter to be unorthodox, and so much so that he accuses him of Arianism through the term ἀρειανόφρονος, in the title that introduces the letter in the De decretis Nicanenae synodi. The bishop of Caesarea’s expression “He [the Son] did not exist prior to generation” (πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν) at the end of the letter reinforces Athanasius’ judgment. The difficulty of interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the same letter is transmitted by Socrates as well, albeit in a different form. This conflicts with the version known by Athanasius in a good forty-two of its points. The text includes the formula “Life from Life,” while the reference to nonexistence prior to generation is nowhere to be found. Socrates’ direct source might have been the Macedonian Bishop, Sabinus of Heraclea.
Eusebius, Epistula ad Cesarienses : H. G. Opitz, Athanasius Werke, vol. ., p. , – and vol. ., p. , –. Eusebius , De ecclesiastica theologia, I, , : GCS , p. , –. Cf. ibid., I, , and I, , : p. , and . Cf. H. G. Opitz, Athanasius Werke, vol. ., p. . Eusebius , Epistula ad Cesarienses : H. G. Opitz, Athanasius Werke, vol. ., p. , and vol. ., p. , . Cf. SCh , pp. –, n. . Cf. Socrates, Historia Ecclesistica, I, , : SCh , p. . Cf. W. D. Hauschild, “Die Antinizänische Sammlung des Sabinus von Heraclea,” Vigiliae Christinae (): –, here .
. The Interpretation From Nicaea
The ambiguity is reflected in the Arians’ claim that ascribes Dionysius of Alexandria their own part for his recourse to the formula ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς. Athanasius demolishes this claim, showing that this Arian affirmation would imply that the Word was created from nothing: [Dionysius] destroys this affirmation by saying that the Word was like a river [that flows] from a source, like a bud on a vine, like a child form a parent, and Light from Light and Life from Life. And he defeats their exclusion and separation of the Word from God by saying that the Triad is, without division and without diminution, united (συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι) in the Monad.
Certainly, the risk in Dionysius’ formulation is that procession might be understood in an emanationist sense or as mere participation, and the examples employed only reinforce this interpretation. Hence the intervention of Athanasius and, perhaps, the explanation of why “Life from Life” does not appear in the Nicene Creed alongside “Light from Light”: the derivative formulas of the type “x from x” required an interpretation which at Nicaea was attempted through the inclusion of the expression regarding light between “God from God” and the “true God from true God.” To multiply the derivative material formulas, adding an additional “Life from Life,” would have only weakened the expression. Thus, both the orthodox theologians as well as the Arians have recourse to derivative language. The Creed from the Synod of Antioch in shows clearly this. It is the Eastern equivalent of the Council of Rome of the same year, which also rehabilitated Athanasius. Eusebius of Caesarea was already deceased, and the person of greatest influence was Eusebius of Nicomedia. The profession of faith here was: In one Lord Jesus Christ, His Only-begotten Son, God, through whom all things were made, begotten of the Father before all ages, God from God, everything from everything, one from one, perfect from perfect, King from King, Lord from Lord (Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ͵ ὅλον ἐξ ὅλου͵ μόνον ἐκ μόνου͵ τέλειον ἐκ τελείου͵ βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως͵ κύριον ἀπὸ κυρίου), living Word, Wisdom, Life, true Light, way of truth, Resurrection, Shepherd, Door, immutable and inalterable, perfect image of the divinity, the substance, the power, the will, and glory of the Father.
The formula ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς does not appear in the text. Instead, one finds the expressions βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως and κύριον ἀπὸ κυρίου, to which
Athanasius, De sententia Dionysii ..–.: H. G. Opitz, Athanasius Werke, ., p. , –. This pertains to a commentary on Dionysius’ work in .. (p , ). Cf. M. Simonetti, Il Cristo, vol. II, Fond. Lorenzo Valla (Milano: Mondadori, ), –. Socrates, Historia Ecclesiastica, II, , –: SCh , p. .
Life from Life
Gregory of Nyssa has recourse. It should be stressed how daring Gregory’s choice of these expressions was, for at Sirmium in , the subordinationist interpretation of the expression was recognized as anathema. This formula was labeled heretical when used to say that the Father and Son are two gods. The same discourse can be applied to βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως, which appears only after the Arian synod at Antioch. The sequence of expressions used in the Antiochian profession of faith is therefore the closest text to that of Gregory. The explanation advanced in the Contra Eunomium III concerning the relationship between the attributes, generation and relation seems precisely to aim for a resolution surrounding the ambiguity in the derivative formulas “x from x” and thus to establish the interpretation of Nicaea. In light of what has been said in Section ., we can understand why Gregory accepts the formulas ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς, βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως and κύριον ἀπὸ κυρίου but cannot agree to the coupled ὅλον ἐξ ὅλου, μόνον ἐκ μόνου. The latter in fact leads the reader to believe that not only is the Son a distinct hypostasis from the Father but that He is distinct from Him in substance as well. Gregory already uses the formula ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς at the end of the Contra Eunomium I and, as always, within the boundaries of the conversation of the divine attributes and their relational interpretation: But if the Son is always thought of in the sphere of existence, since He is manifested along with the notion of the Father, what fear do we have of confessing the eternity of the Only-begotten, who neither has a beginning of days nor an end of life? In fact, as He is Light from Light and Life from Life and Good from Good, as well as wise, just, powerful, and in the same way such from such (ἐκ τοιούτου τοιοῦτος) for all other divine attributes, so He is also absolutely eternal from eternal.
In a certain sense, Gregory hereby articulates a model for all derivative formulas with the ἐκ τοιούτου τοιοῦτος. The Contra Eunomium III might be considered, then, a treatise that plays an historical and fundamental role in the hermeneutics of Nicene doctrine. From this perspective, the occurrence of the formula ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς in Pseudo-Didymus the Blind’s De Trinitate is of interest. In his commentary on Jn : (“As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever feeds on me, he also will live because of me”) he says:
Again, see chapter of the Contra Eunomium III: ἐκ κυρίου κύριος͵ βασιλεὺς ἐκ βασιλέως͵ (GNO II, , –). Cf. ibid., II, , : SCh , p. . Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,,–: GNO I, ,–,).
. Conclusion
the Savior speaks this way to adapt to the expressive form of the economy, or because He is Life from paternal Life, and Light from Light and God from God.
This is a sophisticated text, which seems to presuppose Gregory’s reflection because it allows for the twofold possibility that the formula “Life from Life” might be taken as a reference to the Christ. Here it is understood, then, according to economy and in reference to the human nature of the Lord as well. Otherwise, it might refer to the immanence and thus to eternal generation. There is a twofold possibility of interpretation: the case where derivation implies ontological inferiority (as occurs in the incarnation and created nature of the Christ) or else the case where derivation implies perfect equality and identical nature (as it is in the eternal procession of the Son from the Father). The original pneumatological use of “Truth from Truth,” another derivative formula present in Pseudo-Didymus’ De Trinitate and also in Gregory’s Contra Eunomium III, , is also sophisticated. In the former’s commentary on Psalms : (“Send your truth and your light”), the passage is read starting from the two processions of the Son and the Spirit. The “Light from Light” would be thus attributed to the second Person and the “Truth from Truth” to the third. This is clearly a text written in a dogmatic context, and one that is certainly less polemic than that found in Gregory. Gregory’s theological effort seems to have yielded fruit in the form of a Trinitarian theology that established the orthodox interpretation of the Nicene Creed.
. : One can very well read Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium III and its doctrine as the point of arrival of the work begun by Origen of theologizing the divine attributes, so as to grasp the sense of Sacred Scripture. This work was then carried forward by Athanasius and the other two Cappadocian Fathers. The Trinitarian thought and the reflection on the divine attributes progress hand in hand.
Pseudo-Didymus, De Trinitate, PG , AB. Ibid., PG , B. One finds the reference to the Spirit in a derivative formula in a beautiful piece by Epiphanius in the Ancoratus. He always places “Light from Light” and “Life from Life” together, yet this time both applied to the Son, to the phrase “Spirit from Spirit” (πνεῦμα ἐκ πνεύματος) applied to the third Person. Cf. Epiphanius, Ancoratus, ..–.: K. Holl, GCS .
Life from Life
In light of the discovery of relational names, which are applied on the level of the hypostases, even the absolute names of God must be revisited in light of relation, such that the unity of God is no longer read and measured according to a natural and creational paradigm that implies solitude. We come to see in fact that unity based on personal communion and relation is more fundamental and more original than any form of unity understood in classical philosophy. What was before only accidental and derived is now identified as the Absolute. This inversion required a new ontological development that instead of destroying the content of classical Greek metaphysics, completes and fulfills it. The divine attributes are reinterpreted in a manner that is authentically theological, that is, in their properly relational dimension. It emerges that God is not one despite the fact that He is triune, rather that He is one precisely because He is triune, just as true Life is that which consists in the eternal generation of the Son on the part of the Father and the true Goodness is this same Life, infinite and eternal Gift that pours out of the bosom of the Father. All the attributes are thus identified as belonging to the personal dimension, that is, the dimension of relation, of the one and triune God. Yet the discovery of this specifically theological dimension regards each and every human person precisely because it touches upon the very basis and origin of being, thus something independent of faith. The absolute value of the person and the centrality of relation represent an enormous acquisition for all of human thought. Hence, analogously to how one cannot speak of God without purifying human language drawn from natural experience, so too even on the level of anthropology, the transcendence of the person requires that the language of the individual, based on his or her particular experience, is purified through relation with another. An analogous personal, relational and revealed dimension of mankind corresponds, through creation in likeness, to the personal, relational and revealed dimension of being and knowledge of God. The former will be more closely examined in the next chapters. So, in what pertains to the divine attributes, we might say that their theologization opens the way to a subsequent and new philosophizing of these very attributes. The theological progress of the fourth century could serve as a model by which to appreciate the dialogical dimension even in anthropological terms, of which mankind of the present day are particular in need. For now more than ever we risk forgetting that God is one because He is triune.
Philosophical Relation in History
. In order to fully grasp the innovation presented in the ontological concept developed in the Trinitarian thought of Gregory of Nyssa, a concise review of the history of the category of relation as well as the threads of the Greek term σχέσις are important. This term derives from the Indo-European root segh, from which comes the Greek verb ἔχω. The fundamental meaning is that of a thing’s possessed condition. From here stem the position and relation of a thing in every sense, grammatically, physically and even ontologically. From a perspective of philosophical evolution, this connection with the verb to have reveals a fundamental importance. The most ancient recorded occurrences of the term are in the composite ἐπίσχεσις read in Homeric literature, where the prefix draws the meaning of being late and of reluctance out of the basic sense of “to keep.” The term σχέσις appears in Aeschylus’ Septem contra Thebas as indicating equipment and armor, or a warrior’s being equipped. In Plato, the term is found thrice: in Respublica (.c.), with a meaning similar to that of Aeschylus, where the Greek ὅπλων σχέσις of Aeschylus is reproduced in the reference to the training in arms; in the Timaeus (.b.), once more in relation to armor; and in the sense of holding back when σχέσις appears in the Cratylus (.a.). The manner in which ἕξις was placed next to the definition of φιλανθρωπία is an interesting hint of its use in the Academy: the condition
Homer, Odyssey, , .
Aeschylus, Septem contra Thebas, .
Philosophical Relation in History
of acting to the advantage of mankind and the disposition toward goodness (ἕξις εὐεργετικὴ ἀνθρώπων· χάριτος σχέσις). In Plato, there is a clear distinction made between the two terms: ἕξις denotes a stable condition and a permanent state, whereas schesis refers to a changeable and accidental disposition. This difference is made quite evident in the composite including μετά: μέθεξις appears in the Parmenides and in the Sophista in reference to a stable form of participation; μετάσχεσις is a Platonic innovation, introduced in the Phaedo where it indicates the participation in the Dyad as origin of the number two. Here the expression is used in a sense that is for the most part synonymous with μετάληψις, which will later successfully indicate ontological participation. This conceptual connection will reveal itself to be of great importance in the Neo-Platonic reworking of schesis and the Trinitarian discussions tied to it in the fourth century. In Aristotle’s Historia animalium (b.), one finds schesis used in reference to the late onset of menstruation. The term likewise appears in the fragments, therein bearing the sense of familial relation, such as that between husband and wife (σχέσιν ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα). Yet the terminology might here be greatly influenced by those authors who reproduce Aristotle’s thought, and its presence does not necessarily mean that the philosopher used this vocabulary to denote relation on the level of metaphysics. In Book VII of the Categoriae, there is recourse taken to pros ti to denote the relationship, exemplified as double, half or greater, in the listing of the ten categories. He gives this initial definition in his treatise dedicated to relation: We call a reality relative (πρός τι) if it is said to come from another reality (ἑτέρων), or else, if it refers (πρὸς ἕτερον) to another.
Habit (ἕξις) reemerges in this category, as well as disposition (διάθεσις) and science (ἐπιστήμη). The context and the examples clarify that the term for relation is expressed both by the genitive as well as by the
Pseudo-Plato, Definitiones, e . Plato, Parmenides, d ; d ; e . Plato, Sophista, b and a . Plato uses the expression τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν (Plato, Phaedus, c ). Cf. Ch. Mugler, “ΕΞΙΣ, ΣΧΕΣΙΣ et ΣΧΗΜΑ chez Platon,” Revue des études grecques (): –, especially –. Aristotle, Fragmenta varia IV, , .... Cf. M. Mignucci, “Aristotle’s Definitions of Relatives in Cat. ,” Phronesis (): –. Aristotle, Categoriae, b –a (Harvard University Press, Cooke, trans.) Ibid., a –. Cf. ibid., b –.
. The Philosophical Understanding
preposition πρὸς. Placing pros ti and πως ἔχει together suggests another etymological connection with schesis, as happens in a second definition: Relational realities (τὰ πρός τι) are those whose being is identified with being in a certain relation to something (πρός τί πως ἔχειν).
Aristotle’s reasoning thus concludes in favor of this second definition, where he says that no substance can be counted among the relative realities (οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν). This is restated in the Metaphysica where he maintains that relational realities are minimal (ἥκιστα) with respect to other realities from a perspective of ontological density. Another noteworthy use of the term comes to us from Euclid in his Elementa where he sets down the following definition: A ratio (λόγος) is a type of relation (σχέσις) with respect to the measure of two magnitudes of the same kind.
Looking at the history of the term, the occurrence of logos together with schesis is significant, as both are here linked to the sphere of necessary relationships. The text continues by defining the reciprocal relationship (λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα) between the two magnitudes. This renders this occurrence all the more interesting to the study of the theological evolution of the expression inasmuch as the Arian dispute of the fourth century hinges exactly on the subordination of the divine Logos based, as we shall see, on His reciprocal relation with the Father (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις). Before analyzing the properly theological use of the term, it is necessary that we acknowledge its evolution in the realm of philosophy, particularly in what pertains to the history of Aristotelian interpretation and its rereading within the context of Neo-Platonism.
. .. The Different Schools of Thought The Stoics bear an essential contribution to the reflection on relation. More than simply categories, the Stoics speak of a subdivision into four genera,
Ibid., a –. Ibid., b . Euclid, Elementa, V, ,. Heath, trans.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, a –.
Philosophical Relation in History
traditionally attributed to the authority of Chryssipus. According to Plotinus’ statements, these genera are: subjects (ὑποκείμενa), qualities (ποιά), being in a certain condition (πὼς ἔχοντα) and being in a certain condition in relation to something else (πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα). This last subdivision turns out to be particularly relevant on both a philosophical and theological level. Here one might recall that there is not abundant direct knowledge of the Stoics on relation. Apart from various indirect sources, one of the most significant texts is found in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (,–,). The theory he presents is especially pertinent to the conversation regarding what is relative, even if it seems one cannot link it directly to Chryssipus. All one can say is that it traces back to some previous Stoic who was a contemporary of Boethius. Without entering into more technical detail, what interests us here is only the fact that according to Simplicius relation can be subdivided by the Stoics he references in two types: the πρός τι and the πρός τί πως ἔχουσιν. The former group stands in contrast to that which one can conceive of in and of itself and that which can be understood only in reference to something else. The realities in the second group, which could not yet be defined except with respect to another reality, lack with respect to the pros ti a distinctive property intrinsic to them (διαφορά), which distinguishes them by specifying their nature and are characterized by their dependence on a schesis. Examples of the first category are habit, science, sweet, sour, etc. Examples of the second category are right and left, and certainly the pairing of father and son, which theologically is the most significant. Here one is dealing with accidents that may or may not inhere in a substance without producing any change in it. The only change that occurs is in the direction in which the substance itself is oriented. One notes that, as we have already seen, the expression πρός τί πως ἔχειν is
For a summary and a more recent bibliography, see R. W. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy, BC to AD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), –. Cf. Plotinus, Enneades, VI, , . Cf. M. Mignucci, “The Stoic Notion of Relatives,” in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Pontignano, August –, ) (Napoli: Bibliopolis, ), –, here . Cf. ibid., . Cf. M. Isnardi Parente, “Simplicio, gli Stoici e le categorie,” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia (): –, in particular p. . See also, D. C. Baltzly, “Porphyry and Plotinus on the Reality of Relations,” Journal of Neoplatonic Studies (): –, here .
. The Philosophical Understanding
present in the Aristotelian definition of relation, which would have been later reworked by the Stoics, who provoked the reactions of Aristotle’s commentators. It is important to highlight how Sextus Empiricus in the Adversus Mathematicos states that according to the Stoics the realities that are in relation (τὰ πρός τι) are only thought and therefore have no existence (ὑπάρχει) in the proper sense. Hence, even demonstrations unfold on a conceptual level (ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ) and are not a part of reality. The Stoics, he says, thus seem to deny any existence to relation, confining it to a plane of logic, even if it is connected to the physical world and cannot be separated from it, through the very concept of the categories and the Stoic vision of the cosmos. This reading is functional to the Skeptical program, which confronts the so-called dogmatists, that is, the other philosophical schools, particularly of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic origin, with a radical critique that is extremely relevant in the contemporary context. Starting from the opposition between the relative and the substantial realities that exist κατὰ διαφοράν, the Skeptics deny the very possibility of expressing truth through signs. Thus, Diogenes Laërtius writes of the school of Pyrrhus: [They claim] that there is no sign. For, they say, if there is sign, it must be sensible or intelligible. But it is not sensible, because what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas the sign is particular. Moreover, what is sensible belongs to the realities that exist by difference (κατὰ διαφοράν), whereas the sign belongs to the relative (πρός τι).
The demonstration is developed in Sextus Empiricus, who like Diogenes was in Alexandria probably at the same time as Origen: We can conclude in particular that everything is relative (πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι) in the following way: do the relative differ or not from the realities that are by difference (τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν)? If they do not differ, then they are purely relative. But if they do differ, then, since everything that differs is relative – in fact it is said with reference to that from which it differs – then the realities that are by difference are relative (πρός τι ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν).
On this identification and the semantic relativity of the Stoic notion, see Mignucci, “The Stoic Notion of Relatives,” –. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VIII, ,–,. Cf. A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics: A Preliminary Study (Leuven: Brill, ), . Cf. M. L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. I (Leuven: Brill, ), –. Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum, IX, (H. S. Long). Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes I, ,–,, ed. H. Mutschmann.
Philosophical Relation in History
This aporia, the importance of which will be emphasised in Chapter , in extreme synthesis shows how a conception that identifies being with the intelligible falls under a binary opposition whereby everything is relative, because if there is something that is not such, then it will be different on a substantial level, but the difference itself will make it relative to that with respect to which it is different. The Skeptical position is so radical: The true must be either by difference and nature or relative. But it is none of these, as we shall show, so the true does not exist.
The detailed explanation of Sextus Empiricus’ binary categorization can help reconstruct the path of these Alexandrians: According to the Skeptics of existing things some have an existence by difference (τὰ μέν κατὰ διαφοράν), others a relative one (τὰ δὲ πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα). Those that exist by difference are all the realities that are perceived with a subsistence of their own and absolute (κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως), such as white, black, sweet, bitter and all that is of the same type. For we know them simply in themselves and by distinction (κατὰ περιγραφὴν), without the concurrence of another perception. But relative are those realities that are perceived to be in a certain relation to another reality (τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν) and are not known absolutely (ἀπολελυμένως), i.e. in themselves (κατ’ ἰδίαν), such as whiter and blacker, or sweeter and more bitter, and any other characteristic of the same kind. Indeed, the whiter and the blacker are not perceived separately in the same way (κατ’ ἰδίαν περιγραφήν) as the white and the black, but to know one you must also know the reality of which is whiter or blacker. And the same applies to sweeter and more bitter. So there are two distinct classes, that of absolute realities (κατὰ διαφοράν) and that of relative realities (τῶν πρός τι πὼς ἐχόντων) and the sign must belong to either one or the other, because there is no third class besides these two.
Here the schesis makes its appearance, in the formula κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν, which seems equivalent to πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα in its categorical opposition to what is κατὰ διαφοράν. As with the Stoics, the relative appears only at the logical level. The difference between what is κατὰ διαφοράν would only be the comparative dimension, as between white and whiter. The focus on signs and the refutation of the possibility of proving the true keeps the whole discourse at the level of adjectives and perception. However, quite different is the approach of the Neo-Pythagoreans, again according to the testimony of Sextus Empiricus: They say that of the existing realities some are conceived absolutely (κατὰ διαφοράν), some as antonyms (κατ΄ ἐναντίωσιν) and others according to relation
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, VIII, ,–, ed. H. Mutschmann. Ibid., VIII, ,–,, ed. H. Mutschmann.
. The Philosophical Understanding
(τὰ δὲ πρός τι). The absolute ones are those realities that subsist in themselves in complete independence, such as man, horse, plant, earth, water, air, fire, because each of them is considered absolutely and not in relation to something else (κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν). And contraries are all those realities that are considered with respect to mutual contrariety, such as good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, holy and unholy, being in motion and at rest, and all other realities similar to these. And the relative are the realities conceived as in relation to something else (τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα), such as the right and the left, the above and the below, the double and the half, because the right is conceived as in relation to the left and the left as in relation to the right, and the below is conceived as in relation to the above and the above to the below, and similarly in the other cases.
Here we have moved from the binary Skeptical conception to a ternary one. The issue is not merely linguistic, because logical reductionism traps in the antinomy between identity and dialectical opposition. Instead, the reference to a surplus of the real completely changes the framework, distinguishing the gnoseological dimension from the properly ontological one. The examples reveal this: from the black and white, as distinguished from the blacker and whiter, of a Skeptical matrix, we move on to man and horse, as representatives of realities conceived κατὰ διαφοράν, and good and evil, in the case of the antonyms, that is, what is κατ΄ ἐναντίωσιν, and finally to the right and left for the κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν, that is, the relative. In the exemplification referred to the Pythagoreans, the first two categories deal with substantial realities (man and the good), while only that of the relative deals with tags, that is, attributions such as right to left, which need a reality to which to be inherent. This may explain why two main tendencies intersect within the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. On the one hand, the Platonic tradition considers relation to be an overarching category that embraces the entirety of what is not substantial. On the other hand, it places relation on the lowest level of the accidental. The first approach attempts to bring Aristotle’s categorical analysis to a convergence with Platonic thought, tracing all non-substantial categories to pros ti and leading the fundamental distinction once again to that between the Absolute and the relative, something that had characterized the Old Academy.
Ibid., X ,–,, ed. H. Mutschmann. The examples are of Aristotelian origin, see Aristotle, Metaphysica .– and a.–. Cf. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Bristol: Duckworth, ), .
Philosophical Relation in History
Alcinous-Albinus stated that the Ideas could not be relational realities (τῶν πρός τι), as he places the distinction between the Ideas and the cosmos parallel to the distinction between the Absolute and what is relational. From this perspective, everything that can be sensed, that is concrete and individual, seems to be identified as relational. According to his doctrine, then, theology has as its object the first causes, whereas physics seeks the nature of all things, mankind’s place in the universe, the providence of God, the subordination of the various deities and the relation of mankind to these same deities (τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς σχέσις). This last object of study is evidence of the role of mediation and dependence assigned to schesis. The Peripatetic tradition embarked along a different road, placing as did Andronicus of Rhodes (first century BC) the category of relation on the lowest rung of the scale of being. It is defined as a kind of offshoot of being (σχέσις ἐστὶν καὶ παραφυάδι ἔοικεν), according Simplicius, directly dependent on Aristotle. Whereas other categories like quality and quantity are present in some being, relation seems to always be external, something added from without, insofar as it refers to some other being. Another question normally dealt with in the context of Aristotle’s doctrine on relation is the presumed circularity of the second definition of relation in the Categoriae (a–), with the troublesome insertion of pros ti in both components of the same definition. Hence, Andronicus proposes a modification in this regard by way of substituting pros ti with πρὸς ἕτερόν, as read in Porphyry and Simplicius. Boethius, a contemporary and disciple of Andronicus in fact dedicates an entire study to what is relative, although it has been since lost. It bore as a title περὶ τοῦ πρός τι καὶ πρός τὶ πως ἔχοντος and engaged in the
Alcinous-Albinus, Epitome doctrinae Platonicae (Didaskalikos), IX, , (p. ). Ibid., VII, ,–, (p. ). Andronicus seems to likewise admit relation is an overarching category, distinguishing a broad meaning from one more specific. Cf. T. Reinhardt, “Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon on Aristotle’s Categories,” in R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy BC– AD, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplementary Volume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –, especially – . Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium ,. Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, a –. Cf. P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. I (Berlin: Gruyter, ), –. Cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium , and Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem, ,.
. The Philosophical Understanding
polemic with Stoic thought, accused of having subdivided the category of relation into two parts. What is enormously interesting is his claim that the origin of the Aristotelian conception of pros ti is actually Platonic, in the context of the discussion of the fifth fundamental genera in the Sophista: together with being, motion and stillness, there is also identical and different. This last item is defined as that which is always in reference to another (ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι), coming close to a notion of relational realities, as in the case of those beings that do not exist in and of themselves but are always spoken of in relation to other beings (τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ΄ αὑτά͵ τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι). One notes that, according to the Platonic text, the nature of being different must be spread (διεληλυθυῖαν) throughout all the forms, for each is one and distinct from the others inasmuch as each participates in the idea of the different (διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου). .. Alexander of Aphrodisia The relationship between the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of the pros ti, together with the possibility that the Idea of the relative might exist, seem to have become classic themes in the tradition of the commentaries on Aristotle’s thought. This is clear in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisia, a figure who lived in Athens sometime between the second and third centuries of the Christian era. He played a fundamental role in the development of the term schesis. Of all the authors prior to the fifth century, it is his work that presents the greatest number of occurrences of this term, which is used more than times. The reason behind this seems to be his work on the Aristotelian categories in an attempt to harmonize them with the Platonic tradition. Referring back to the deep relationship between Plato and the Pythagoreans, a relationship acknowledged by Aristotle himself, Alexander explains that in the Platonic notion sensible realities cannot be defined but that both the fact of their being and their definitions depend on supersensible Ideas. The plethora of sensible realities exist, then, through participation. Yet for Aristotle the Platonists
Cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium ,–. Plato, Sophista, d . Ibid., c –. Ibid., e –. It is interesting to note that Plato traces reasoning back to the entwining of Forms. Cf. ibid., e . The reciprocity in this process expressed by ἀλλήλων will play a fundamental role when dealing with the theory of mutual relation. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ,–.
Philosophical Relation in History
say that there are no Ideas of all the sensible entities. Indeed, they claimed that there were no Ideas of those entities among the relatives (ἐν τοῖς πρός τι) that are so by relation (κατὰ σχέσιν), neither of those against nature, nor in general of those that are evil.
The passage shows how the terminology of schesis begins to play a fundamental role in the analysis of the pros ti. The statement of the impossibility of Ideas existing for this latter term, already present in Alcinous-Albinus, is now connected directly to schesis. Alexander, in fact, commenting on the Aristotelian identification of accidents as realities that are spoken of in relation to substance (τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων), writes: And there are also realities that are, and are defined in relation to substances (πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν), that is the relatives (τὰ πρός τι). In fact, the relatives consist in the relation of substances (ἐν οὐσιῶν σχέσει).
The use of schesis might also be understood as a reference to disposition, in such a way that the last sentence could be rendered as “the relative realities consist of disposition of substances.” What counts here is that the relationship between the substances is what constitutes relation, which in turn is evidently only mere accident. To place relation among the accidents is essential, for otherwise one loses the dimension of truth, as happens in those who maintain that all things are both true and false, who make everything out to be something relative (πάντα ποιεῖν πρός τι), a statement that reveals awareness of the Skeptical criticism seen in Section ... With respect to substance, the distinction is evident in the fact that what is relational is by nature simultaneous (τὰ μὲν πρός τι ἅμα εἶναι τῇ φύσει), whereas the reality of beings that are objects of opinion are not less of themselves when deliberation on their behalf ceases. Alexander thus rejects that there can be an Idea of the relative realities and says, as we have seen, that not even the Platonists held this to be true, for: The Ideas subsist per se insofar as they are substances, while the relatives (τὰ δὲ πρός τι) have their being in mutual relation (ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει).
What comes into play here is a category that later will be essential in theological development, that is, the πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, which, in what
Ibid., ,–,. Cf. Aristotle, Metafisics, b . Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ,. The last phrase is repeated further on (,) and is considered something typical in his writings. Cf. ibid., ,. Cf. ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–.
. The Philosophical Understanding
we have seen thus far, is bound precisely to the accidental dimension of relation. This expression, already read in Euclid in reference to the reciprocal relationship, appears another twelve times in Alexander’s writings and is likewise present in Galen’s terminology. Alexander later on adds that relation is “like an offshoot of being” (τὸ πρός τι παραφυάδι ἔοικεν). He thus takes up again Aristotle’s line in the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle critiques Plato’s conception of the good, stating that substance is by nature prior to relation (ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι) inasmuch as the latter is like an outgrowth and is an accident of the entity to which is belongs (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ΄ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος). This expression, as has been seen, is attributed by Simplicius to Andronicus as well, even if schesis replaces pros ti.
.. Plotinus It is interesting to note that the pairing of pros ti with παραφυάς is present again in Plotinus’ treatment of the Aristotelian categories, which are proper only to the realm of the sensible: How can the relative reality (πρός τι), which is like an offshoot (παραφυάδι), be among the first genus? Indeed, the relation (σχέσις) is of one thing to another and not to itself; and therefore, with respect to a distinct entity.
In the Ennead VI, , , it is clearly stated that there cannot be a common genus that embraces both the dimension of what can be sensed as well as what is intelligible. The conversation surrounding pros ti then carefully shifts its attention to investigating whether in these one might grant a commonality of genera and whether or not relation is selfsubsisting (εἰ ὑπόστασίς τις ἡ σχέσις ἐστὶν αὕτη). Among the examples of this are the pairing of right and left, father and son, master and slave, together with positions as seated or standing.
Once again in In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria ,; and also in De mixtione ,; In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium , and ,; In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria ,; In librum de sensu commentarium ,; ,; ,...; In Aristotelis meteorologicorum libros commentaria ,. For an example pertaining to the parts in animals, see De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis IX, , ,; Institutio logica XIII ,; In Hippocratis librum de officina medici commentarii iii b, ,. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ,. Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, a –. Plotinus, Enneades VI, , ,– Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–.
Philosophical Relation in History
It is likewise worth noting in the Cappadocian perspective of thought, as it will be shown in Chapter , Plotinus’ claim that science (ἐπιστήμη), through its relation with knowledge (ἐπιστητὸν), can have actual existence (τινὰ κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν ὑπόστασιν) by way of the form of knowledge. The terminology in this is clearly relevant to the Trinitarian discussion, wherein ἐνέργεια and ὑπόστασις are key components. The same can be said of the claim that relations can only be said to be products of our judgment when we deal with aspects and positions, except for mutual relations (πρὸς ἄλληλα) that possess a particular ontological value. Plotinus hereby displays a distinction between schesis and pros ti, recognizing that it is the former that brings the second into being inasmuch as the latter is distinct from the nature of subjects (τὰ ὑποκείμενα) in which they come to be. In this way, one recognizes that schesis has hypostasis, that is, that it exists. Following this crucial passage, the inquiry focuses on the question of what there might be that is identical in all relational realities and whether this is a genus rather than an accident (εἰ ὡς γένος͵ ἀλλὰ μὴ συμβεβηκός). Plotinus poses the question of what its existence might be (ποίαν ὑπόστασιν). We need to speak of the relatives (πρός τι) not simply as an attribute of another (ἑτέρου), as the state (ἕξις) of the soul or body, or in the case of a soul that dwells in a body or in another, but only for those realities whose existence (ὑπόστασις) arises from the relation (ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως). And this does not mean the existence of substrates, but the existence of what is relative (πρός τι).
The development here with respect to previous philosophical doctrine is noteworthy. The analysis is refined and comes to identify the degree of ontological reality of schesis as the foundation of pros ti. Relation possesses, then, real existence, indicated here in a meaningful way by the term hypostasis. From this point of view, πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις plays a fundamental role inasmuch as the relatives come to being together (ἅμα ὑφίσταται) and in some cases remains in being even independently of the subsistence of its co-relative component, as occurs in the case of the son, who remains in being even upon the death of his father, or brothers, who remain as brothers in a similar case. On this point, Plotinus claims that the relative
Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–.
Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Ibid. VI, , ,– Cf. ibid. VI, , ,..
. The Philosophical Understanding
reality (πρός τι) can be part of a material substance, for example, in the case of a hand, when it is a relation of some substance (σχέσις οὐσίας). One of Plotinus’ subsequent questions is what this being is that consists of reciprocity (τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ παρ΄ ἀλλήλων) and what common existence (κοινὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν) it might possess. It cannot be something corporeal, rather it must be some incorporeal reality that is within the subject or outside of it (ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν). The answer seems to be of great interest for Trinitarian theology in regard to the Eunomian conflict, as Plotinus writes: Therefore, for the aforementioned cases (that is, the agent and knowledge), we must consider a relation that acts (ἐνεργῆ τὴν σχέσιν) according to the action (κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν) and the formal principle (λόγον) in the action, while in other cases the relation is a participation in the form and the formal principle (εἴδους καὶ λόγου).
Therefore, the relative realities are ontologically founded on schesis, which leads them back to formal principles and participation in the Forms. We should note how Plotinus cites just the father as an example of an agent. The conclusion of Plotinus’ treatment is that the relative realities cannot be traced back to one single genus in that they are too different and cannot be counted in the same category with their own respective opposites. It would be as if the living were united with the non-living. What emerges from Plotinus’ work is that schesis is now read from a perspective of participation and is brought close to logos as a formal principle. It is recognized as having existence (ὑπόστασις), especially in the case of reciprocal relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις), and this will be fundamental in theological reflection. This connection to a framework of participation, already present in nuce in the Platonic μετάσχεσις, will be the key to understanding the specific nature of the Cappadocian notion of schesis inasmuch as this connection to participation is precisely what must be overcome in order to apply relation to the Trinity. The claim that the One must transcend all thought is a clear counterevidence of the impossibility of applying Plotinus’ elaboration to the eternal and reciprocal relation of the Father and the Son, for their relation presupposes identity and otherness (ἑτερότητα καὶ ταὐτότητα), an alterity that is bound to the relation with that which is other (τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑτέρου σχέσει). Yet, as
Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–.
Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–.
Ibid. VI, , ,–.
Philosophical Relation in History
Plotinus states, the one who thinks of itself cannot be simple (οὐχ ἁπλοῦς γίνεται νοῶν ἑαυτόν). This noteworthy progress in the ontological understanding of the theory of relation in the Neo-Platonic commentaries on Aristotle is confirmed in the analysis undertaken by Alessandro Conti. In his view, whereas Aristotle knew only the notion of the relative realities (πρός τι), the Neo-Platonists develop the conceptual instrument of relation (σχέσις). For this reason, the ontological and not merely conceptual or logical value they assigned to the ten categories is essential, as is the fact that they considered the distinction between them to be real and not merely one of reason. The accidents were held to be forms inherent in substance and in such a way that the reality father was composed of substance and of a certain accidental form, namely, the relationship to a son. At the bottom of this development of Aristotelian tradition was also the fact that the seventh chapter of the Categoriae was considered to be the one least developed, a chapter that left many questions open-ended, such as the relationship between the two definitions seen above. It seems that the very ending of Aristotle’s treatment manifests the consciousness of not having presented a complete doctrine. Instead, the Neo-Platonic re-elaboration is successful in granting a significant coherency and completeness to the theory of relation. This formulation is founded upon a synthetic and harmonizing approach to the thought of Plato and Aristotle, which has its principle point of reference in Porphyry and sets its roots in Middle Platonism and its eclectic spirit.
.. Porphyry Alessandro Conti summarily identifies three major moments in the history of the relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine. In the first place, we see the New Academy accept Aristotelian concepts (), and this is followed by a phase of critical analysis and Plotinus’ refutation (). It finally reaches an organic synthesis accomplished building on Plotinus’ doctrine by Porphyry ().
Cf. ibid. VI, , ,–. Cf. A. Conti, “La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle Categorie di Aristotele,” Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia (): –, especially –. Cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, b –. Cf. Conti, “La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici,” .
. The Philosophical Understanding
The relationship between how the categories were approached on the part of the master and by his famous student is the subject of debate. Many authors emphasize the difference in the two positions, yet others have tried to show the opposite. One clear difference in the doctrine of Porphyry with respect to Plotinus is the claim that relation can never be considered to be substance, not even in the case of a part of a substance, as for a hand. According to Porphyry, neither can one speak of what is relational in the singular, rather always and only in the plural. This is due to the pros ti not being absolute but rather consisting of some relation to something else (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόλυτα τὰ πρός τι ἀλλ΄ ἐν σχέσει τινὸς πρὸς ἄλλο τι). Porphyry explains that the being of a relative reality (πρός τι) consists of its having relation, existing in relation (σχέσις) to some other entity that might be called its co-relative. The being of this co-relative, in turn, consists of its having relation, or existing in relation to the first. For example, citing the case of four and two, reciprocally in relation (ἐν λόγῳ) as double and half, Porphyry writes: Therefore, the relative subjects (πρός τι) consist in the mutual relation (σχέσις πρὸς ἄλληλα) of the subjects (ὑποκειμένων) and not in the subjects themselves, whose being is not the same as the mutual relation. But the mutual relation of the relatives consists in being arranged in a certain way in relation to another reality (τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν), in such a way that the relatives are those realities whose being consists in having a mutual relation (τῷ πως ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα).
We can note how in the text the various definitions found in the Aristotelian tradition converge and move in the direction of the concept of relation that bases itself on reciprocity. The πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις is hereby recognized to possess a real and quite precise ontological status, distinct with respect to that of subjects in whom relation inheres. There is, then, a strict distinction between the substantiality of subjects and the being of relation. The latter truly adds something to the subjects themselves; and as already occurs in Plotinus, this something identifies itself with the term logos. Indeed, four is something more when taken as the double of two, just as happens when two is considered as the half of four:
Cf. F. A. J. De Haas, “Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle’s Categories?,” Phronesis (): –. Cf. C. Evangeliou, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry (Leuven: Brill, ), . Cf. Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–,.
Philosophical Relation in History
They are relative (πρός τι) because they participate in the double and half relationship (λόγου). And the relationship (λόγος) is observed precisely in the case of the two realities in mutual relation (σχέσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα).
From a perspective of theological thought, the importance of linking logos and πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις is clear. In the background looms Euclid’s formula that is now revisited from a metaphysical perspective. Porphyry, in all his precision, emphasizes how the convergence of schesis and logos implies that these are joined by an intermediary term that ontologically connects two substances or two distinct entities. The term he uses, μέσον, is quite telling: The relation (σχέσις) is like an intermediate term (μέσον) between the subjects, for which the relative terms (τὰ πρός τι) subsist, taking on something more than the subjects, which is nothing other than the reference to a certain link (συνάφειαν) between them, by virtue of which they are called such [that is, relative].
Something likewise meaningful for the Trinitarian perspective is the use of συνάφεια. Relation, then, implies a kind of ontological acquisition, or gain. Yet it is something that remains external to the being in question and indeed by definition exists between two different entities. This real being in any event remains at a minimum, as the following passage affirms: [The relatives] are neither in the subjects, like complements of the substance, nor like any other accident, which arises in the subjects themselves, as passion or action (ἐνέργεια), but they are external (ἔξωθεν). That is why they appear and disappear without the subjects being affected.
In this sense, relations are accidents external to the subject and so faint that when not present nothing changes in the subject. This seems essential in preserving an asymmetry in the participatory structure as well. In the hierarchy of being, realities considered superior cannot be bound to those inferior, even despite there existing any relation between them. A clear example of this is the claim that the first principle is void of all relation (ἀσχέτος) even though all things that originate in Him, in the process of returning to Him, believe to have reciprocal relations with Him. All this is front and center while reading the texts wherein Prophyry has recourse to none other than schesis to indicate the relationship
Ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–. Cf. Porphyry, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria III, –IV, cited above. On the notion of non-reciprocal relation, see E. Samek Lodovici, Dio e mondo: relazione, causa, spazio in S. Agostino (Roma: Studium, ), –.
. Conclusion
between the body and the soul. In the Sentences, he states that what is incorporeal is not found in bodies spatially but rather through relation (τοπικῶς αὐτοῖς οὐ παρόντα͵ τῇ σχέσει πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς). The same is read in the Σύμμικτα ζητήματα fragments where the relational presence of the soul in the body is likened to the lover in the one who loves and God in us, placing schesis and energeia parallel to one another.
. : - The confrontation between the Stoics and the Skeptics highlighted an aporia that has at its core precisely the relation. In fact, as Sextus Empiricus showed, this category poses an ontological challenge that undermines the very possibility of the search for truth. For this reason, the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry mark a clear apex in the rethinking of the category of relation, as this is seen to have not a merely logical value, but an authentic ontological one, which certainly is only relevant in the dimension of what is tangible. When paired with logos, schesis is acknowledged to be the ontological foundation for pros ti and in such a way that reciprocity (πρὸς ἄλληλα) is taken on as an essential characteristic. The value of and reasons for this doctrine can be grasped in light of Iamblichus’ later re-elaboration, something we have received through Simplicius, as his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories was lost. Iamblichus concludes that schesis inheres in a distinct reality though being one, thus characterizing relation as such as the unifying and constitutive principle of pros ti. According to Simplicius, this development in the relationship between schesis and pros ti was a result of exposure to the Stoics who were the first to insert schesis into the category of pros ti. In the Neo-Platonic school of thought, schesis is an accidental form whose proper characteristic is putting two distinct realities in a relationship, which are then on account of this ascribed to the pros ti. The latter
Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, , Cf. Porphyry, Σύμμικτα ζητήματα, F,–. Cf. Baltzly, Porphyry and Plotinus on the Reality of Relations, . D. C. Baltzly’s assertion that Porphyry departs from Plotinus’ position seems to need to be nuanced: while the latter resorts to the language of comparison (παραβολλή), the original disciple prefers to speak of logos, in order to highlight that relations have an ontological and not only a logical reality. Cf. Baltzly, Porphyry and Plotinus on the Reality of Relations, . As has been seen, instead, the connection between schesis and logos is in Plotinus. Cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ,–,.
Philosophical Relation in History
can be in and of themselves substances or composed of substance and accidents. Yet they are considered pros ti only as terms of a relation. The schesis that unites them is thereby likened to the relationship between cause and caused, which explains its pairing to logos. Therefore, relations have real existence, albeit to a lesser degree than other categories of accidents such as quality and quantity. It is so because these inhere in a substance whereas relations inhere in two, having so to speak a greater need of ontological support to exist. In Neo-Platonic literature, relation has its own existence, proper existence, even if at a minimum. It must be added that relations, though being exclusively tied to the sensible realm, are always bodiless and do not possess their own respective matter. This means they can never be the object of perception, rather only of intellection. In the course we are currently taking, Iamblichus’ position seems to be of particular importance to the theological development that will follow. What comes after applies his allegorical technique to an exegesis of Aristotle’s Categoriae and treats them as a coherent description not only of the sensible world, according to what we have just spoken of in Plotinus and Porphyry, but also of the intelligible Neo-Platonic world. He especially underlines the transcendence of the Form of relation (σχέσις) with respect to the multiplicity that is observed on the level of the relative realities. This innovation will markedly influence all subsequent commentary. Recognizing the role of relation furthermore in the realm of the intelligible can be linked to the closeness to Pythagoreanism and the necessity to strongly accentuate the relationship between God and the world, as also expressed by theurgy. The following text moves along these lines: Therefore, it is best to trace the cause [of the effectiveness of sacrifices] to friendship and affinity, and likewise a unifying relation (σχέσιν συνδετικὴν) between creators and creations and between those who generate and those who are generated.
Cf. Conti, La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici, –. Cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ,–,. Cf. J. Dillon, “Iamblichus νοερὰ θεωρία of Aristotle’s Categories,” Syllecta Classica (): –. Cf. C. Luna, “La relation chez Simplicius,” in I. Hadot, Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, ), –, here . Cf. F. A. J. De Haas, “Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle’s Categories?,” . Iamblichus, De mysteriis, , ,–.
. Conclusion
Pairing schesis with the adjective syndetikos calls to the fore a particular context of ontological continuity that the Cappadocian Fathers will have to overcome in order to concretely distinguish Creator from creation and economy from immanence. Here one observes in action a relation that unites different ontological planes, placing them in contact with one another, but that also applies itself to the one who generates and the one who is generated. It seems this use might be the foundation for an unorthodox notion of the relationship between the Father and the Son as a union of two different natures, necessarily connected via schesis, where the second is subordinate to the first. This thread of metaphysical thought concludes with a recognition of the role of schesis that provides the basis for the existence of the pros ti, playing the role of mediation and ontological connection. Iamblichus recognizes this on a supra-material level as well. This creates a tension between the accidental dimension of the schesis and its role of ontological mediation, which is connected to participation. As we will see, a resolution in this tension will be offered by the Trinitarian thought and reworking the category of relation, particularly within the context of the debate that ensues between Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius. On this point, Alessandro Conti writes, “This rich conceptual legacy carried on by the Neo-Platonic commentators would historically be inconsequential. Indeed, it would not be passed on except to a rather small extent, and in a much more modest way through Boethius’s commentary on the Categories.” Perhaps one could add that the breadth of this tradition is revealed precisely on the theological front.
Cf. G. Maspero, “El Espíritu, la Cruz y la unidad: syndeô, syndesmos y syndetikos en Gregorio de Nisa,” Scripta Theologica (): –. Conti, La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici, .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
. .. Clement Alexandria possessed the necessary condition for this development to unfold, given the tremendous openness and deep dialogue between pagan thought and Christian Revelation that characterized the theological school of this city. As we have seen, the term schesis from the second century of the Christian era onward played an important role in the history of the interpretation of the category of relation in the StoicAristotelian tradition. We come to Clement of Alexandria, contemporary of both Alexander of Aphrodisia and Galen. The term appears sixteen times in his writings and is immediately a reference to an ontological analysis in the intra-Trinitarian discourse. The Paedagogus reads: The One who put “one at your right and the other at your left” (Mt :), when is thought as Father, being good, being called good is only called that which He is. But if we consider that His Logos, being His Son, is in (ἐν) the Father, then He is called just by virtue of the mutual relation of love (ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως ἀγάπης), since the name is based on the equality of power.
The backdrop to this claim is the response to the Gnostics who oppose the good god of the New Testament to a just and harsh god of the Old Testament. From the point of view of later theological development, the preciseness with which Clement says that the Logos is in the Father is essential. This seems to be already connected to the relational meaning of
Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus I, , , , –: SCh , p. .
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the names of the divine Persons. Thus, goodness and justice are precisely tied to relation, which is “mutual” and “of love.” We note that πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις had a necessary and geometric value of which Clement was aware and that he used. The specification “of love” corrects this element along the lines of goodness and one might even say freedom. Before Clement there was no pairing of schesis and ἀγάπη, and it only reemerges with Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nanzianzus, as we shall see. We are dealing with a fil rouge that ends up being essential in understanding the Trinitarian reworking of the category in question. A further occurrence of πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις appears in an apophatic context wherein Clement explains that one cannot give God a name and God cannot be known if not through the eternal Logos who reveals the unknown God. Therefore, such titles as One, Good and Being do not in and of themselves possess any value: But none [of these terms] taken individually can express God, only together can they describe the power of the One who is Omnipotent. Indeed, the things said are words that are formed from the properties that they possess or from their mutual relation (ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως). But none of this can be understood with regard to God.
It is interesting to note that the perception of distinction between what one says of God by way of properties or else through reciprocal relation appears even at this premature stage of Trinitarian reflection. The apophatic veil is clearly visible and acknowledged, for only Revelation can disclose Trinitarian immanence and one simply cannot comprehend God. Yet, at the same time, one can say something of God keeping in mind both the dimension of properties as well as that of reciprocal relations, which characterize language in general. Once again, the importance of pairing schesis and agapê comes up, and this eliminates any possible reading of the reciprocal relationship as through necessity. These two terms appear side by side in another passage of the Paedagogus and in a context quite similar to the one given above: In fact, before creation, He was God, He was good, and that is why He also wanted to be Creator and Father. And the disposition of that love (ἡ τῆς ἀγάπης ἐκείνης σχέσις) has become the principle of justice, of having lit His Sun, and of having sent His Son.
Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VI, X, ,,: SCh , p. . Ibid. V, XII, ,,-,: SCh , p. . Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus I, , , , –.
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In this passage, schesis refers to the very being of God inasmuch as He is of a benevolent disposition. One is thus dealing with a disposition toward gift, toward relation. Love and justice are bound together within divinity. Both creation and redemption and the Son’s sending originate in love. Appealing to categories that will be developed later, in this formula one reads the affirmation that the mission of the second Person is born out of the love that unites the Father and the Son on the intra-Trinitarian level. Clement’s formulations are still exposed to potential misunderstandings in absence of the categories of economy and immanence developed in the fourth century with the clear distinction that comes with them. But this very line of development will flourish and unfold in the theology of the Cappadocians. Ambiguity in this is linked to the fact that schesis in the philosophical framework was tied to participation: to be in relation implied inferiority with respect to full ontological autonomy. Therefore, in a theological framework, this category takes on a different value in immanence and in the economy, which must each be properly distinguished in order to avoid all possible hint of subordinationism. We have already seen that the combination of schesis with ἀγάπη to express the characteristic of the relationship between the Father and the Son and how love explains God’s action in history is specific to Clement. To cleanly distinguish immanent relation from that which is economic, Clement specifies that God is naturally good. But this does not mean He is in natural relation with us. So the pairing of schesis with the adjective φυσική is another important use specific to Clement: Man is inclined to communicate out of justice and passes on what he has received from God as a result of His natural benevolence and disposition (φυσικὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ σχέσιν), as well as the commandments that he follows. God, rather, does not have any natural relation (φυσικὴν σχέσιν) with us, as the founders of the heresies say.
Here the distinction between relation for the human being and relation in God is made quite clear. There is no ontological scale that would fluidly and uninterruptedly unite the world and the first principle. The last sentence directly denies the common doctrine that was taken as a given on a philosophical level, as seen from Alcinous-Albinus until Iamblichus,
See the interesting discussion in M. J. Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, XVI, ,,–,,: SCh , p. .
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where the first principle and the world were seen as extremes of a single ontological level. It is exactly this rejection that facilitates the recognition of schesis as disposition to gift, to free relation, with respect to mankind. Clement thus presents himself as one who has decisively re-elaborated the category of schesis, qualifying it with a reference to agapê and with the adjective φυσική, which will be taken up again by later theology. He has identified an essential element in the formulation of the ontology of the one and triune God in the πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις. Natural relation, that is, the conjunction of physikê and schesis, is a common formula in theology, though not to be found in the philosophical language of that day. It will later appear once in the writings of Eusebius and then eight times in the Trinitarian writings of Gregory of Nyssa. The latter seems to have been directly inspired by Clement, as is proved also by the presence in the Cappadocian’s writings of the connection between schesis and agapê. The originality of the ontological re-elaboration of the category of relation accomplished by the Christian thinkers, in their attempt to contemplate the Trinity, is quite evident. This was a properly philosophical work that unfolded in dialogue with the metaphysical thinkers of the day. The following text seems to demonstrate this, taken from chapter of the Stromata, where various types of causes are discussed. Apart from the doubt surrounding Clement’s authentic authorship of this book, whose content is largely philosophical and not theological like the rest of the work, it is in any case an interesting piece of evidence in the study of the interpretative tradition of schesis: Every cause as such includes a double concept, since it is considered starting from something (τινὸς) and in relation to something (πρός τιν): thus, it is of something, that is, of the effect, like the sword of the cut, and it is in relation to something, in
As we have seen, Plotinus and Porphyry deny that the first principle is in relation with what is lower than itself in the ontological ordering, but this ordering remains in its necessary structure and in such a way that the natural connection between the first principle and the world is always at the basis of Neo-Platonic emanationist thought. Cf. Eusebius, De ecclesiastica theologia I, , ,: CGS , p. . Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,; Contra Eunomium I, . (GNO, I, p. ,–); II, , and , (GNO, I, p. , and ,–); III, , , ; ,; ,; , (GNO, I, p. ,, ,, ,, ,). Marcelo Merino leans more toward an attribution to Clement: M. Merino, “El Stromata VIII de Clemente de Alejandría,” Scripta Theologica (): –. See also P. Nautin, “La Fin des Stromates et les Hypotyposes de Clément d’Alexandrie,” Vigilie Christianae (): –; and the commentary to the text in M. Havrda, The Socalled Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria: Early Christian Reception of Greek Scientific Methodology (Leuven: Brill, ).
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relation to what is disposed to it (τῷ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντι), like fire with respect to the wood. Indeed, fire does not burn diamond. The cause pertains to the relatives (τῶν πρός τι): indeed, it is thought of according to the relation (σχέσιν) of one thing to another, in such a way that we think about both in order to conceive of the cause as cause.
Among the examples are the Father and the Creator (τοῦ δημιουργοῦ). From a theological point of view, this is extremely significant because it affirms that God belongs to what is relational. Here, a real reconfiguration of the metaphysical conception of relation between God and the world is clearly at stake. This reshaped schesis enables a distinction to be made, but it does so without necessarily implying degradation. Two principles follow, which seem important. The first is: it is impossible that the same thing, considered in comparison to itself, acts and is acted upon at the same time: one cannot be father and son.
The theological interest of the example and doctrine herein is apparent. The same can be said of the second principle, directly connected to corelativity: “causes do not derive from each other, but are causes for each other” (Ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ αἴτια͵ ἀλλήλοις δὲ αἴτια). Perhaps the philosophical inspiration of this re-elaboration can be uncovered in Galen, who, when speaking of the hematopoietic faculty, connects causes and relation: every other faculty is thought of in the category of relation (πρός τι). Primarily, the faculty is the cause of activity (ἐνεργείας), but it is also accidentally the cause of what is produced. But if the cause is relative (πρός τι), since it is the cause only of what originates from it and it alone, then it is evident that the faculty also belongs to the relative (πρός τι).
Even if the term schesis does not appear, it is evidently important that cause, in the case of natural faculties, is inserted into the category of relation. The pairing is yet more interesting if one considers that Galen’s lost work De demostratione is likely the basis of chapter of Clement’s Stromata.
(Ps-)Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VIII, IX, ,,–,: GCS , p. . Ibid. VIII, IX, ,,–: GCS , p. . Ibid. VIII, IX, ,,: GCS , p. . Galen, De naturalibus facultatibus , ,–. Cf. M. Havrda, “Galenus Christianus? The Doctrine of Demonstration in Stromata VIII and the Question of its Source,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –. Regarding this same lost work, see also R. Chiaradonna, “Le traité de Galien Sur la démonstration et sa postérité tardo-antique,” in R. Chiaradonna and F. Trabattoni (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism (Leuven: Brill, ), –.
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Clement deals with the first cause, in which he introduces a purely relational distinction. He must therefore sustain the impossibility for one, single person to be simultaneously father and son within a single relation and has to try and overcome a derivative notion of the causes themselves, as the two principles cited indicate. The inclusion of causes in what is relative, with its parallel in Galen, demonstrates the importance that schesis takes on during this period and the necessity of its elaboration in a properly theological context.
.. Origen The fundamental elements of Clement’s contribution, with the latent tension between the immanent and the economic dimension, linger in Origen’s work, yet the latter seems not to follow the former in his terminological pairings. These pairings of schesis and agapê or physikê do not appear in the Greek writings that have survived, nor is πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις found in the Trinitarian context. Yet what can be seen is the same effort to distinguish the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son in divine immanence from an economical relation. Origen’s commentary on Jn :– reads: However, we need to pay attention to those two in’s and analyze their difference. The first is the Logos in the beginning, and the second is the Life in the Logos. But the Logos did not come into being in the beginning; nor was the Principle without the Logos. That is why John says: “In the beginning was the Word [Logos].” Life, rather, was not in the Logos, but Life came if the “Life was the Light of the human race” (Jn :). In fact, when there was no human race, there was not the light of human beings, since the light of human beings is conceived in relation (κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν) to human beings.
Clement hints that the Son is in the Father, and Origen then distinguishes the two uses of in that pertain to the Logos in the Johannine prologue. One of these could be called immanent, referring to the beginning, while the other could be linked to economy and the dawn of history and the world. This distinction is all the more clear in the first fragment of the Commentarii in evangelium Joannis where the expression κατ΄ οὐσίαν appears in opposition to the economical notion linked to schesis. Even if
Cf. I. Vigorelli, “Schesis in Origen,” in A-Ch. Jacobsen (ed.), Origen and Origenism in the History of Western Thought, Origeniana undecima (Leuven: Peeters, ), –. Origen, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis II, ,–: SCh , pp. –.
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the terminology could be subjected to some influence on the part of the compilator, the doctrine seems particularly relevant to the theme in question, as well as the fact of Origen’s influence on subsequent theology: The Son of God was also called Wisdom, created as the beginning of His doings, according the book of Proverbs (see Pro :), since the Wisdom of God existed alongside the One (πρὸς τὸν) of whom He is the Wisdom, without having any relation (σχέσιν) to another, but once the benevolence of God came to be, He decided that the creatures would exist. This Wisdom wants to take on a relation as Creator (σχέσιν δημιουργικὴν) with respect to the realities that would have started to exist, and this explains the meaning of His created being as beginning of the works of God.
Here one reads that the existence of the Son with the Father is expressed through a relational formula, something found within the prologue itself: pros ton calls to mind the pros ti albeit modifying it. Instead, in this text schesis is reserved exclusively to the relationship with creation. In a certain sense, the term here indicates the Logos in action, and the action is economical. This can be deduced from the following: Therefore, [some] say that the Logos is the beginning, not as different from this Wisdom according to substance (κατ΄ οὐσίαν), but according to conception (ἐπινοίᾳ) and relation (σχέσει), in such a way that there is only one existence (ὕπαρξις), which the Scriptures describe here according to substance (κατ΄ οὐσίαν), which as Wisdom is proper to God and bent, so to speak, as creator Logos over the creatures.
We are looking at a radical innovation with respect to the philosophical notion in that the Christian God, unlike the pagan deities, concerns himself with mankind and enters into relation with the human being as God Creator and Providence. The link between God and the world is not a necessary one, rather the fruit of love and divine condescension. In the above text, Origen’s position in favor of the eternal Logos is clearly laid out and it excludes any interpretation of his Trinitarian
Origen, Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis .–: GCS , p. , –. The same holds for the expression κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν in Origen, Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei, XIII, ,: GCS , p. , –. Origen, Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis , , –: GCS , p. , –. In the Contra Celsum, there is in fact the pairing of providence and relation between the human being and God (τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν σχέσιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοῦ θείου), both of which are denied by Aristotelians: cf. Origen, Contra Celsum III, ,–: SCh , p. . The cited passages parallel a text in the Expositio in Proverbia, where in a direct manner Wisdom is said to be eternal and in existence (ὑπάρχουσα) from the beginning substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) with God, whereas the acting of God belongs to the dimension of
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theology as subordinationist. As we have already stressed, if one can speak of a subordinationism, it is only at the verbal level, since the expressive form has not yet been refined enough to be able to express the mystery without obscuring it. The reformulation of metaphysical categories is still a work in progress. But it is clear that the critical point is precisely the need to separate the meaning of the Son’s relationship to creation from his relationship to the Father. Origen also seems to use schesis in a context that is properly immanent, in that he makes the reciprocal relation between the Father and Son identical to theologia itself, that is, with the affirmation of the Son’s divinity: Moreover, the prophetic witnesses probably do not announce only the coming of Christ, teaching us that and nothing more. Rather, it is possible to learn much theology (θεολογίαν), and the relation (σχέσιν) of the Father to (πρὸς) the Son and of the Son to (πρὸς) the Father, from the Prophets and what they have proclaimed in this regard, no less than from the apostles who told of the greatness of the Son of God.
We can observe here that, unlike Clement, Origen does not use the formula πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις but expresses the reciprocity of the relation of the Father and Son through the repetition of the names of the divine Persons in positions that have the form of a chiasmus. Theological effort is exerted to demonstrate the presence of the Logos in the Old Testament and thereby also the possibility of knowing the relation of the Logos with the Father by way of prophetic teachings. But a tension emerges here, because relativity also indicates a less than full degree of ontological subsistence, due to dependence on that which is other than the subject:
relation with creation (ἡ πρὸς τὰ γεννητὰ σχέσις): cf. Origen, Expositio in Proverbia, PG , A. Cf. I. Ramelli, “The Trinitarian Theology of Gregory of Nyssa in His In Illud: Tunc et ipse Filius: His Polemic against ‘Arian’ Subordinationism and the Apokatastasis,” in V. H. Drecoll and M. Berghaus (eds.), Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism, Proceedings of the th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Tübingen, – September ) (Brill: Leuven, ), –. Giovanni Hermanin de Reichenfeld speaks of “subordination” that is only logical and not ontological: G. Hermanin De Reichenfeld, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Gospel of John within Origen’s and Augustine’s Commentaries” (PhD diss., University of Exeter, ), . See also Giovanni Hermanin de Reichenfe, The Spirit, the World and the Trinity: Origen’s and Augustine’s Understanding of the Gospel of John (Turnhout: Brepols, ). Origen, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis II, , –: SCh , p. .
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If indeed religion, piety and justice are relative realities (τῶν πρός τι ἐστίν) in the sense that the same attitude can be either pious or impious depending on the difference in relations (σχέσεις) and laws, it follows that temperance too is relative (τῶν πρός τι), as are courage, prudence, science (ἐπιστήμη) and the other virtues. And nothing can be more absurd than this.
The point is extremely delicate, because the realities that belong to the pros ti must be dependent on schesis and thus change according to circumstances. This would be absurd for religion, piety, justice and the other virtues. It is noteworthy that Origen includes in the list science (epistêmê), which according to Aristotle, and all the commentators, belongs precisely to the relative, as already seen and as Chapter will explain in more detail. Thus, we see a clear divergence of the chrêsis elaborated by the Alexandrian from the Aristotelian tradition. This divergence emerges also in the Commentarii in Romanos (III.–V.) edited by J. Scherer, where Origen discusses Rm :: “Now we are well aware that whatever the Law says is said for those who are subject to the Law.” The question that guides his exegesis is what law Paul is talking about: is it the Law of Moses? Or what law is it about? The line of argumentation proves, relying on Scripture, that it is the natural law inscribed in the human hearts, precisely because the Apostle accuses every man of sin and because even before Moses there are examples of repentance in Scripture, as in the case of Cain, Joseph’s brothers and Job. So he concludes: Therefore, it seems to me sufficiently proven that the law the Apostle speaks of here is not the law of Moses. And if he is not thinking of it here, what other law can he teach us of but the natural one, the one that “is written in the hearts of men” (Rm :)? Who could be those who are under the law, if not all who have use of reason?
At this point, after a few gaps that can be reconstructed thanks to Rufinus’ translation, Origen introduces a distinction in the naming process that involves precisely the pros ti and the schesis associated with them: In some cases, names express a relationship (κατὰ τήν του πρός τι σχέσιν ὠνόμασται), as for father who is father of a son and son who is son of a father,
Origen, Contra Celsum V, ,–: SCh , p. . Here perhaps an influence of Clement can be found: see Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, , .–. (SCh , pp. –). Cf. Origen, Commentarii in Romanos (III.–V.), ed. J. Scherer, ,– (Cairo, L’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, ). Ibid., , –. Cf. ibid., n. .
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or for fellow citizen who is fellow citizen of a fellow citizen. Other times names express an absolute difference (κατὰ διαφοράν), like man and horse. Man is not man of something, nor horse is horse of something. Thus, we research with regard to the law we are to examine now, whether the term expresses an absolute difference (κατὰ διαφοράν) as man or a relation (κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν) as father.
The question is, therefore, to determine whether “law” is used by Paul in absolute or relative terms. The terminology is evidently philosophical and technical as the opposition between the relative dimension and κατὰ διαφοράν, already seen with Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius in Chapter , reveals. But first it is important here is to observe its theological value. For if the “law” is the natural law, then it cannot depend on circumstances and relationships. And this is exegetically grounded at the level of the Logos. Indeed, the Alexandrian affirms: “One could say again that, just as the only Son of God is the Word, Wisdom, Truth, He is also and in the same way the Law.” Returning to the initial texts in which the double valence of en in the Johannine prologue and the epinoetic reading of Wisdom was discussed, we see that Origen resorts to the technical distinction to show that Paul in the quoted passage from the letter to the Romans is addressing every human being. Hence, he concludes: For indeed it is men who live in the flesh and are in possession of reason who are precisely under the law. It is they who have their mouths shut (cf. Rm :), when, after the coming of the commandment, sin has come to life again. They form a sort of “world” and are liable to divine condemnation. But the saints whom God has known beforehand, predestined, called, justified and glorified (cf. Rm :), being the law, they are not under the law. Thus their mouth will not be closed and they will not be liable to divine condemnation, because they are not flesh. And so, if they are justified, it will not be because of the works of the law, for the law will not be justified because of the works of the law, being just in itself (αὐτόθεν), righteous and, if one must express it thus, possessing righteousness.
Origen’s conclusion, therefore, is that the law mentioned in the letter to the Romans must be understood in an absolute sense. But this is founded in the identity between Logos, Son, Wisdom and Law. So it would seem to be concluded that for the Alexandrian the Logos does not belong to the relative. Yet the distinction between the Father and the Son is expressed in terms of schesis. One can understand why later theological developments appealed to the authority of Origen, both on the part of the Eusebians and
Ibid., ,–.
Ibid., ,–.
Ibid., ,–,.
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Arians to deny the connection between the Logos and the relative and on the part of the Cappadocians to affirm it. A passage from Contra Celsum can best clarify this tension because it highlights the gnoseological dimension of the distinction. Faced with the criticism leveled at Christianity by the medioplatonic philosopher, according to whom Christ’s resurrection was witnessed by only one woman, while the crucifixion was seen by all, the Alexandrian says: While his human characteristics were visible to all, his properly divine ones – I do not mean those that related him to other beings (περὶ τῶν σχέσιν πρὸς ἕτερα ἐχόντων), but those that differentiated him (περὶ τῶν κατὰ διαφοράν) – were not intelligible to all.
The relational dimension is, therefore, interpreted in the line of what will later be called oikonomia, while Christ’s divinity radically differentiates Him from every creature precisely because, as the second divine Person, He is purely spiritual and Creator. But this requires moving beyond literal exegesis to spiritual exegesis. This is related to the value of pros ti when the expression takes on the value of “purpose,” “meaning,” for which a certain phrase or event appears in the biblical narrative. This is the exegetical principle of skopos whose theological foundation is, however, precisely what is stated in the Contra Celsum text just cited. The role of the distinction between absolute and relative sense is confirmed by Origen’s commentary on “Woe to the world for scandals!” in Mt :: The word “world” (κόσμος), in itself and in an absolute sense (καθ΄ αὑτὴν καὶ ἀπολελυμένως), is employed in the passage: “He was in the world, and the world was made through him, yet the world did not recognise him” (Jn :). On the other hand, in a relative sense (κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν), that is, in connection with that from which the order that makes the cosmos comes, the word is mentioned in the text: “So that when you lift up your eyes to heaven and see the sun and the moon and all the ornamentation (τὸν κόσμον) of heaven, you will not be deceived and prostrate yourself before these things and serve them.” (Dt :)
In a sense, the distinction introduced by Origen for “law” in his commentary on the letter to the Romans is applied here to “world,” with
See Sections ..–. and ... Origen, Contra Celsum II, ,–: SCh , pp. –. Seem e.g., Origen, In Jeremiam, X, ,: SCh , p. ; Homiliae in Lucam, XVII, ,: GCS , p. ; Commentarii in evangelium Joannis, XXXII, , ,: SCh , p. . Origen, Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei ,–: PG , C.
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its semantic multiplicity of cosmos and order. It should be noted that this is still a commentary on the prologue to John’s gospel, distinguishing between the use of the term in itself and its relative use. But here also emerges the possible positive value of the relative sense because the world refers back to its Creator, while the absolute sense refers back to an erroneous and idolatrous autonomy of creation with respect to its Creator and Redeemer. The passage is valuable because it allows us to grasp how it is not relativity in itself that is negative. In fact, the divine Persons are relative, and creation is relative, even if the technical formulae continue to maintain an ambivalence precisely because of their philosophical origin. So for this investigation, it could be extremely useful to try to identify the philosophical sources of Origen. To this end, a good starting point is the list of the elements that are significant in his chrêsis as seen in the texts of his Commentarii in Romanos: a. b. c. d. e.
One is the coupling of πρός τι and σχέσις, in the formula κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν, which appears together with κατὰ διαφοράν, with the examples father-son and fellow-citizen in the first case, and man or horse in the second case.
If one searches for those authors where the expressions are present together with the examples, focusing in particular on those where they appear simultaneously, the five elements identified in connection with the association of pros ti and schesis first of all reveal that the question of the relative was enriched by the development of the Platonic tradition, with the introduction of schesis into the Aristotelian categorisation of pros ti. The formula κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν is found in both Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias, particularly in reference to the theory of naming and sign. The former states that signs (σημεῖα) of diseases are neutral or morbid, “depending on what they are referred to” (κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν). In Alexander of Aphrodisia, the expression appears both in a similar context and in a directly metaphysical treatment.
The formula κατὰ τήν του πρός τι σχέσιν ὠνόμασται appears literally only in Origen, in the commentary on Romans cited above. Galen, Ars medica I, ,. See De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis VII, ,, for the naming reflection of the same relational dimension. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In librum de sensu commentarium (CAG /), ,. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria (CAG / ), ,.
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Yet in neither of these authors does the expression κατὰ διαφοράν appear. This makes its appearance in Stromata VIII, precisely in relation to the sign, and in the Stoic tradition and in Skepticism. On the contrary, the importance of Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius is apparent, as seen in Chapter . In fact, Origen, in the commentary on Romans cited above, gives as examples of realities conceived according to difference “man” and “horse”, similarly to Aristotle and the Pythagorean approach cited by Sextus Empiricus. The examples of relative are father and son, along with fellow citizen and fellow citizen. The first two are classical and found in practically all the commentators of the Categories, the second pair, on the other hand, is found only in a reference to the Stoic thought of Epictetus in Simplicius. The main difference is that, for Origen, relatives are substantial realities, like a father or a citizen, whose identity refers to another. This means that the κατὰ διαφορὰν and the κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν are not merely logical categories that are mutually exclusive because they are placed in a non-binary perspective. This also suggests an important role of the theological component, as shown by the operation of Clement, who links the correlation of faith and gnosis to that of the Father and the Son, with uncommon expressions present in Origen’s prose (πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατήρ), where the relationship is indicated by the terminology under consideration and is understood in a constitutive sense, because to believe in the Father one must believe in Him in relation to whom (πρὸς ὃν) He is such, that is, the Son. In summary, it does not seem possible to find a single philosophical source of the uses of pros ti and schesis in Origen. Clearly the Skeptical tradition seems to have played a mediating role, but the theoretical outcomes are diametrically opposed. Probably the confrontation in the Alexandrian intellectual milieu favored such exchanges. But it seems that the distinction between relative realities and κατὰ διαφοράν is an original one, enriched also by the contribution of the ontological reinterpretation in the Pythagorean, Peripatetic and Platonic tradition of the logical reductionism of the Stoics and Skeptics.
Cf. (Ps-)Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VIII, ,,,: GCS , p. . Cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. p. , ff. Kalbfleisch = SVF II, . For a comparison between the Stoic and the Skeptic understanding of the relatives, see M. Duncombe, Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Cf. Section ... Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridionm, ,–. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V,,–: SCh , p. .
. The Shift in the Fourth Century
Here we are before the spirit of the Alexandrian theology of the Logos that nevertheless manifests a limit that will be addressed in the fourth century, in that the Logos and Christ are superimposed, overshadowing the role of the incarnation. Athanasius’ Physis-Theology will require the reinterpretation of these claims in terms of the prophecy of the Incarnation.
. .. Eusebius The tension related to the need of a better distinction between economy and immanence comes up again in Eusebius’ writings, which employ the expression φυσικὴ σχέσις, though change the sense of it with respect to Clement. A possible ambiguity is emphasized, directly connected to the difficulties of interpretation of the Nicaean homoousious. Eusebius uses the category of schesis in fact in his arguments against Marcellus of Ancyra, who essentially dissolved the Logos in the substance of the Father. Instead, the distinction between the first two divine Persons is affirmed on the basis of the relationship between the nature of the Father and that of the Son. So, for Eusebius, relation is not taken to be in nature itself, rather it is found between two natures eternally united. He aims to show that the second Person of the Trinity is not created from nothing. He writes: [The Church] professes only Him and no other Only-begotten and Son of God, and He calls only Him the Wisdom and Logos and Life and Light, the “image of the invisible God” (Col : ) and the “reflection of eternal light” (Wis : ), and teaches that the myriad other created realities, which are sisters to each other, give glory to Him, in this way showing that the relation (σχέσιν) with the divinity of the Father belongs only to Him, as the Only-begotten Son.
The argument is an extremely simple one: if the Son were created, He would not be Only-begotten, rather a brother to all that which has been created. What is most important in this is the recourse taken to relation in order to sustain the divinity of the second Person. It is precisely because He is the Son that He must participate in the divinity of the Father. In the
For example, in the fourth century, Gregory of Nyssa interprets the episode of the burning bush of Ex : as a typological prefiguration of the virginal birth of Christ by Mary: cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Diem Natalem, GNO X/, ,–,. For an introductory account of the Council of Nicaea and the related Trinitarian discussions present therein, see B. Studer, Trinity and Incarnation. The Faith of the Early Church, ed. A. Louth (London-New York: T&T Clark, ), –. Eusebius, De ecclesiastica theologia I, , ,–,: GCS ,, –.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
same work, this relation to the Father is defined as natural relation (πρὸς τὸν πατέρα φυσικὴν σχέσιν). The fundamental theological point is that there be faithfulness to the significance of the names of the divine Persons as revealed in the New Testament: Father and Son indicate a common nature, and having one nature in common excludes the possibility of demoting the second Person to the level of creation. This approach is complementary to the one read in Clement, who denies that a natural relation could unite God and mankind. Here, instead, it seems that schesis can unite different natures, albeit similar, as in the case of the first two divine Persons. The claim places itself within the notion of the mediation of the Logos as developed in Eusebius. The second divine Person must be characterized by a twofold relation with the Father and creation in that He can only function as intermediary while participating in the natures of both extremes, which in Him are connected to one another. Hence, the Son cannot be a part of creation and instead must have a natural relation with the Father, and he furthermore cannot possess a nature that is identical to that of the first Person. This is clearly linked to a dependency on the Platonic philosophical matrices. All this seems to explain Eusebius’ careful precision in his commentary on “The Lord has been my support” (Ps :): Κύριος ἐγενήθη βοηθός μου. Here he explains that ἐγενήθη does not always refer to a substance (οὐσίωσιν), rather at times it also indicates a relation (πρός τινα σχέσιν), as in the case of the Savior. There is an absence of a full elaboration of the distinction between economy and immanence, as his recourse to the category of relation aims at connecting the two dimensions in a necessary way. It is clear that in Eusebius schesis is found outside the substance of the Father also in the case of the Son, even though the Son is necessarily and naturally tied to this substance. Relation thus remains tied to a preexisting philosophical notion. In light of this, a quote of Plotinus in Praeparatio Evangelica seems helpful. Eusebius cites it in his own discussion regarding the Stoic debate
Cf. ibid., I, , , : GCS , ,. Cf. J. M. Robertson, Christ as Mediator: A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and Athanasius of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –. Cf. H. Strutwolf, Die Trinitätstheologie und Christologie des Euseb von Caesarea: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung seiner Platonismusrezeption und Wirkungsgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ), –. Eusebius, Commentaria in Psalmos, PG , D.
. The Shift in the Fourth Century
on the immortality of the soul and the principle of life, namely the pneuma. This text that Eusebius cites was likely taken from Eustochius’ version and not from that of Porphyry. What we find is a discussion of the Stoic categories that argues the equivalence of πῶς ἔχον and schesis: But if [the stoics] argue that life and the soul are nothing more than breath (πνεῦμα), what becomes of that famous mode of being (πως ἔχον) in which they take refuge, as they are forced to pose another active nature in addition to the body? If, therefore, they do not say that each breath is soul, since there are many breaths that are inanimate, but that the soul is a certain mode of being (πως ἔχον) breath, then they would say that this mode of being and this relation (σχέσιν) of beings are either something or nothing. But if they are nothing, then only the breath would remain and the mode of being would only be a name. In this way, they would end up making the soul and God nothing but matter and everything just a name. And if the relation (σχέσις) of beings is something else with respect to the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) of the matter, but it is immaterial in the matter insofar as it is not comprised of matter, then there is a logos that is not body but is another nature.
The reference to being another nature, played on the parallel between the material and immaterial worlds and dictated by the comparison with the Stoics’ position on the pneuma and their identification between God and the world, seems to have an influence on the use of schesis for the second divine Person in Eusebius’ theology. In particular, we note the theological significance of placing schesis and logos together at the end of the citation given above. The background of the discussion between Marcellus and Eusebius is exquisitely metaphysical. In fact, according to Aristotle, God could not have faculties or virtues, because these are necessarily characterized by potentiality. This led the Bishop of Caesarea to criticize his opponent, who understood the divine Logos in the same sense as the human logos. The vocabulary refers to the terminology of the logos endiathetos and prophorikos, typical of the Apologists, which is rejected by Eusebius. The very potency that characterizes the human logos is the reason for the
Cf. E. des Places, in SCh , n. , pp. –; and P. Henry, Les états du texte de Plotin (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, ), –. Plotinus, Enneades IV, , ,–, in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XV, , ,–,: SCh , pp. –. Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, b.–. See on this, Maspero, Dio trino perché vivo, –. Cf. Eusebius, De ecclesiastica theologia I, , ,–: GCS , ,–. Cf. ibid., I, , ,–: GCS , ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
decisive negation of Marcellus’ position, since the Logos cannot just be in potency in the Father (δυνάμει ἐν τῷ πατρὶ εἶναι τὸν λόγος). The discussion concerns the prepositions in the first verse of John’s Prologue. It is written “the Logos was with God” instead of “the Logos was in God” to avoid any possibility of lowering the Logos itself to the human condition, that is, at an accidental level: In fact, if he had said: “And the Logos was in God,” as if admitting an accident in the substratum and an entity that is inherent to another, he would have presented God as a compound reality, assuming it as an essence without Logos or thinking of the Logos as an accident of the essence.
According to classical metaphysics, the use of in would have immediately referred to the relation of an accident to the substance. This brings Eusebius to explicitly exclude that the divine Logos could belong to the relative realities: He [the evangelist] says: do not think, in fact, that He [the Logos] belongs to the relative realities (τῶν πρός τι), like the logos in the soul or like the logos that is heard through the voice or like the logos that is found in the material seeds or exists in mathematical entities. Indeed, all of these, which are relative realities (τῶν πρός τι), are considered in another substance that exists before them. While the Logos that is God does not need anyone else pre-existing before Him to be subsisting in it, but He is by Himself, in that He lives and subsists as God.
This text is extremely important for interpreting the Cappadocians’ theology and grasping the novelty of their reshaping of Aristotelian categories, because the fact that the Logos belongs to the relative realities is explicitly denied.
.. The Homeousians The appearances of the term schesis in a theological context increase dramatically in the course of the fourth century. In Athanasius, the term is not so prominent, whereas in the writings of the Cappadocians the word is widely used. In Gregory of Nyssa, in particular, the term emerges nearly times. Prior to the fifth century, Gregory is the Greek author who cleanly and clearly most often has recourse to schesis after Alexander of Aphrodisia. This seems to be related to the debate that ensued with Eunomius where, as we shall see, the term becomes the object of
Cf. ibid., II, , ,–: GCS , ,–. Ibid., II, , ,–,: GCS , ,–. Ibid., II, , ,–,: GCS , ,–.
. The Shift in the Fourth Century
discussion on account of the reciprocal relationship between the three divine hypostases. It is worth noting that the category of relation was already present in Trinitarian disputes at the beginning of the century. Indeed, Arius in his letter to Alexander of Alexandria confesses his faith in the three divine hypostases but denies that the Son is eternal as the Father is eternal. He writes of the second Person: In fact, He is neither eternal, coeternal, unbegotten together with the Father, nor does He have His being with the Father, which some say to be relative (τὰ πρός τι), introducing two unbegotten principles (ἀρχὰς).
Athanasius repeatedly expresses the idea that the name of the Father implies the existence of the Son and vice versa, a notion inherited from Dionysius of Alexandria. Yet Athanasius never explicitly refers to the category of relation in the context of immanence. The term pros ti appears only once, in the commentary on Hebrews :–, where the “appointed” (ἐποίησε) refers to God as subject and Jesus as complementary object and is interpreted in the sense of “when and in relation” (πότε καὶ πρὸς τί). That is to say, it is interpreted in an economical sense. The latter Greek expression literally only appears in Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisia, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nanzianzus. In all of Athanasius’ works, the term schesis occurs in a generic sense, while the only meaningful occurrence from a Trinitarian perspective, once again, is used in reference to salvation history. Commenting on the
Cf. P. Arnou, “Arius et la doctrine des relations trinitaires,” Gregorianum (): –; G. C. Stead, “The Platonism of Arius,” Journal of Theological Studies (): –; and L. W. Barnard, “What Was Arius’ Philosophy?,” Theologische Zeitschrift (): –. Arius, Letter to Alexander of Alexandria, in Athanasius, De synodis, ,: Atanasius Werke, II/, p. ,. For a presentation of the category of relation in Athansius’ theology along with his predecessors, see the impressive summary of X. Morales, La théologie trinitaire d’Athanase d’Alexandrie (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, ), –. Cf. Athanasius, Orationes tres contra Arianos III, , : Athanasius Werke, II/, p. . Cf. Athanasius, De sententia Dionysii, ,–: Athanasius Werke, II/, p. . For an overview, see K. Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought (London: Routledge, ). Athanasius, Orationes tres contra Arianos, II, , : Athanasius Werke, II/, p. . Aristotle, Magna moralia ... e Topica b.. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, ,; , and ,. Gregory of Nyssa, De mortuis non esse dolendum, GNO IX, ,. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De Filio), , : SCh , p. .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
passage in Psalms : (“Let your hand be ready to help me”), schesis is employed to indicate the relation of God with those who are saved: It describes, not His [of the hand] begetting according to essence, but the relation (σχέσις) with what comes to be saved.
One catches a glimpse of the Arians’ exegetical background of the text who read it as an affirmation of the creaturely stature of the second Person. On a homeousian plane, the use of schesis seems to acquire a certain emphasis, most likely through an inheritance from Eusebius. The documents reproduced by Epiphanius in the Panarion give witness in fact to a debate that pivots precisely on this category. First, in one of Basil of Ancyra’s letters, he says that Paul learned from Scripture itself the notion (ἔννοιαν) of the Father and the relation of Wisdom with created realities (τὴν πρὸς τάδε τὰ γενόμενα σχέσιν). Here the term schesis refers to the relationship between the Son and the world. Reflecting on the creative role of the second Person seems to have been fundamental in treatises focused on the identical nature with the Father, for the Logos was seen to be the thought of the first Person who conceived of creation. In this way, the second Person makes himself distinct both from the first Person and creation, although he remains necessarily linked to creation inasmuch as the Logos was conceived of in function of creation. All this might explain the use of schesis in George of Laodicea in another letter reproduced in the Panarion, likely written together with Basil of Ancyra. Herein, the authors take up arguments already seen in Athanasius on the co-relativity of the names of the first two divine Persons: The name Father and the name Son signify the relation to something (τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν), so that even if we only name a father, we have also included the notion of the son in that name. In fact, a father is said to be the father of a son. Moreover, if we only name a son, we get the notion of the father, because a son is said to be son
Athanasius, Expositiones in Psalmos, PG , D. Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion, III, , ,: GCS , p. ,–. For a discussion regarding the possible author of the letter, see M. DelCogliano, “The Literary Corpus of George of Laodicea,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –. From the point of view of this present analysis, the question is not irrelevant because it has to do with the very same homeousian theological thread. See also L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –; M. DelCogliano, “The Influence of Athanasius and the Homoiousians on Basil of Caesarea’s Decentralization of ‘Unbegotten,’” Journal of Early Christian Studies (): – and D. A. Giulea, “Basil of Caesarea’s Authorship of Epistle and His Relationship with the Homoiousians Reconsidered,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –.
. The Shift in the Fourth Century
of a father. Indeed, they are linked together and the relation (σχέσις) is not broken, but each of them, named individually, implies the notion of the other, and not the name alone, but with the name also the proximity (οἰκειότητα) of the nature. In fact, thinking of God as a Father, we think of Him as Father of a God and, thinking that a Son of God is God, we consider God as the aforementioned Son and of a similar (ὅμοιον) nature to the One of whom He is considered the Son. But by unbegotten we do not mean unbegotten of a begotten one, nor are we using it to refer to one begotten of one who is unbegotten. Therefore, since the terms unbegotten and begotten neither have mutual relation (τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν) nor, at the same time, do they indicate nature, but rather unite the propriety (ἰδιότητα) of the Son to the rest of the created realities, we will not accept these names with wicked deceit, but we shall piously keep to that of Father and Son.
The text is quite dense and exhibits a clear reaction to the Arian argument based on applying an equivalence between being generated and created to the Son. The names Father and Son are read in a relational sense and introduce the technical term schesis into the classic arguments of Dionysius of Alexandria and Athanasius. Yet the expression emphasizes how the proposed idea is not the orthodox one because here the Son is said to be only of a similar nature to the Father. The expression “Father of a God” (θεοῦ πατέρα) is of particular significance, for it seems to distinguish the first two divine Persons on the substantial level. The terminology of reciprocal relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις) is employed to indicate an inseparability of nature in the two divine Persons, who are presented as mutually connected. The use of schesis in the citation seems to be based on a notion of the Son as divine being, hence of a nature similar to the Father and in reciprocal relation with Him. Yet the Son is not said to be part of creation as depicted by the Arians. The nature of the second Person can only be similar to the nature of the first Person, precisely through the relation of Wisdom with creation inasmuch as He is the thought of the Father. Then here schesis is seen as the relationship between different ontological degrees, according to an outline that still has traces of Pythagoreanism and the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. .. Epiphanius The difference with respect to the conception of schesis later developed in orthodox doctrine is evident if one reads how Epiphanius refutes Aëtius. The Anomeans maintained the impossibility that the Son, who is by
Epiphanius, Panarion, III, , ,–,: GCS , p. ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
definition generated, is also ungenerated. This was held on the basis of the principle that all nature is repelled by what is not of its own nature and moves toward what is connatural to it (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνοικείου ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτῆς οἰκεῖον ἐπεί γεται πᾶσα φύσις). The Bishop of Salamis brings into the picture just the sense of the schesis that unites the Father and the Son: If the Unbegotten created (ἐποίησε) the Begotten and did not beget him (ἐγέννησεν), given that the denomination is necessarily connected to the unique identity and neither of the two names can be extended to the other due to their real antimony, the meaning of the relation (ἡ δύναμις τῆς σχέσεως) consists in the distinction of each of the two, which have nothing in common with each other except the Authority and the Nature that is superior to all that has been created by It, insofar as It is its cause. However, since there is another name between “maker” and “made” and between “creator” and “creature” – a denomination that is close to unbegotten but very far from the name of creation – it is impossible, o Aëtius, for you to confuse all of this and eliminate the communion of the perfect denomination according to the true relation (κατὰ ἀληθινὴν σχέσιν) of the Son with the eternal and uncreated Father.
Epiphanius distinguishes two different theological uses of schesis. The first separates the nature of the Son from the nature of the Father, maintaining that the Son is like a creature and distinct from creation only in that He participates in the power of the Father. The second, situated on a different level than that of the distinction of “Creator” and “creation,” consists of a denomination according to true relation that distinguishes the Persons without separating the natures. It seems fitting to acknowledge the identity between this relational dimension and divine immanence, which is likened to the denomination of ungenerated and utterly beyond the status of being creation. Epiphanius has recourse to this very distinction between the meanings of schesis, one that subordinates the Persons and one that is immanent, in the area of theology of the image and in his opposition to Aëtius’ interpretation of the Son as image of the invisible God (Col :): We therefore mean that this relation (σχέσιν) is double and explain the different usage by taking an example from the expression in the human sphere. We speak of the image of a man: one that is similar to him and one that is dissimilar. The latter is portrayed with paint while the former is portrayed with the identity of his essence with his begetter’s, like the begotten son manifests the characteristics of his family, in such a way that the image is found in the identity and in having the same substance and the same effigy. And for us the Only-begotten Son of God is the
Ibid., III, , ,: GCS , p. ,–. Ibid., III, , ,–: GCS , pp. ,–,.
. Basil of Caesarea
same as the Father in divinity and honor and identical (ἴσος) to Him as His true image (διὰ τῆς ἀληθινῆς εἰκόνος) and because of the likeness which admits no variation but is immutable, as becomes a son who is truly begotten of a father, and with the same substance. This is also true for the Holy Spirit, insofar as He proceeds from the Father, even if He is not begotten, because the Son is the Onlybegotten.
The parallelism between true relation and the image is evident in the text. Both of these categories can be used according to a strong or a weak sense. The argument is assembled to confute Aëtius, who not only rejects the identification (ἴσος) but also any similarity (τὸ ὅμοιον) of the Father and Son in essence, something that instead was accepted by the homeousians. The doctrine of schesis in Epiphanius’ writings and theology illustrates the fundamental role played by this category in the Trinitarian discussions of the fourth century. The line of argumentation relies on the meaning of the revealed names of the Father and Son. These are names bound to a relation that implies identical nature. The reasoning clearly attempts to reduce the claims of his adversary to absurdity. To do this, it is enough to demonstrate that even the case of simple human generation rules out substantial diversity between the Father and Son. This implies, then, an ontological innovation with respect to Platonic categories that make images necessarily marked by degeneration and substantial difference. This innovation is particularly developed in Cappadocian theology.
. Basil’s relationship with the homeousians is worth noting: a closeness to Eustathius of Sebaste brings him into direct contact with the work of Basil of Ancyra and George of Laodicea, particularly in the common reaction to the reinvigorated Anomean position of Aëtius and Eunomius. George of Laodicea seems to have played the important role of point of agreement between Eusebian theology and the orthodox position later developed by Basil and the Cappadocians. From this perspective, the
Ibid., III, , ,–: GCS , p. ,–. Cf. Ph. Rousseau, Basil of Caesarea (Berkeley: University of California Press, ), –. For Basil of Ancyra, see also J. N. Steenson, Basil of Ancyra and the Course of Nicene Orthodoxy, PhD Thesis, Oxford ; J. N. Steenson, “Basil of Ancyra on the Meaning of Homoousios,” in R. C. Gregg (ed.), Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments (Cambridge: Wipf and Stock, ), –; and Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, –. Cf. M. DelCogliano, “The Significance of George of Laodicea in the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Debates,” Studia Patristica (): –.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
application of schesis to the relationship between the Father and the Son remains exposed to the danger that the relational distinction might be understood as a distinction of nature or substance as well, even though it would imply their similarity. In order to overcome this risk, an ontological reformulation was necessary, and it was Basil of Caesarea who initiated this. Basil refers to the term schesis around twenty-five times, half of which appear in a Trinitarian context, especially in the De Spiritu Sancto and his writings against Eunomius. What is immediately evident is the reformulation of the relational quality of the names of the divine Persons in terms of schesis, a shift missing in Athanasius: The term “Father” has the same meaning as “unbegotten,” to which it also adds the notion of “Son,” being united to it by relation (διὰ τῆς σχέσεως).
This principle is fundamental in that it expresses immanent relation in terms of schesis. Basil certainly uses the economic sense of the term as well. For example, he states that names given to Christ in Scripture are on the basis of the relation of benevolence that He has with us and particularly the good He accomplishes for us (τὴν πρὸς τὰ εὐεργετούμενα σχέσιν). Yet it is essential that the deepening of the relationship and distinction without separation between economy and immanence now makes it possible to develop a coherent doctrine that makes it possible to move from God’s acting to God’s being. This implies a re-elaboration of metaphysical categories. Therefore, Basil in the Adversus Eunomium makes the distinction between a natural and an artificial ordering. The relation between causes and their effects (ἡ τῶν αἰτίων πρὸς τὰ αἰτιατὰ σχέσις) falls into the former grouping. The second ordering characterizes human constructions, sciences and axioms. What is essential here is that whereas for Eunomius order is always inferior to the one who establishes it (ἡ τάξις δευτέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ τάττοντος), for Basil there exists a kind of order (τάξεως εἶδος) that mankind has not established. It follows from a connection in nature (τῇ
For a careful analysis of Basil’s Trinitarian theology and its development, see V. H. Drecoll, Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea: sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck Ruprecht, ). See also Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics, –. Basil, Adversus Eunomium, I, , –: SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., I, , : SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., I, , : SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., I, , : SCh , p. and passim.
. Basil of Caesarea
κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίᾳ), such as that between fire and the light it emits, without any possibility of separation between the two (οὐ διαστήματι χωρίζοντες ἀπ΄ ἀλλήλων ταῦτα). If the natural connection even on the level of creation presents a cause and effect united in a natural way, how much more can one say that in God there is an ordering that is not derived from the subordination of the substance of the Son to the substance of the Father: We say, rather, that the Father precedes the Son in order, according to the relation (σχέσιν) between the causes and what originates from them, and not according to the difference of nature or temporal antecedence. If so, we would exclude that God is Father, since the difference according to substance also excludes natural union.
The intra-Trinitarian ordering is traced exclusively to the relational distinction without allowing any difference in substance, which would violate the authentic sense of the names of the divine Persons. It is noticeable how the introduction of cause in the sphere of relation, something already present in Clement, plays an extremely important role. A reelaboration of ontology is clearly at work here, with the overcoming of certain categorical distinctions that are only valid on the level or creation. The reference to metaphysical terminology is evident in Basil’s argument, who shifts the focus from the difference of substance to the relation of origin, using an expression that will be taken up and developed by Gregory of Nyssa: And in reasoning, we conclude that the notion of unbegotten does not come to us from the analysis of the what it is (τί ἐστιν), but rather, I will say the word as forced, in the analysis of the how it is (ὅπως ἐστίν).
A new dimension now flanks the level of substance, and Basil must therefore find a term to indicate it. This is accomplished by modifying the formula that in Stoic philosophy indicated relation, that is, πως ἔχειν. Indeed, the bishop of Caesarea had no other way to express the immanent dimension of relation of origin. His younger brother later takes up the category of this ὅπως ἐστίν to insert the πως εἶναι into his treatise on intraTrinitarian schesis. Basil is compelled to recourse to πως ἔχειν in order to counter Eunomius’ conception of language for the different value that he assigns to names and their relationship to reality. Whereas for his opponent there is a one-to-one correspondence between the name “ungenerated” and the
Ibid., I, , –: SCh , p. . The same doctrine can be found in Basil, De spiritu sancto , : SCh bis, pp. –. Basil, Adversus Eunomium I, : SCh , p. .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
divine substance, for Basil the picture is a bit more complicated and the divine names must be distinguished as relative names or absolute ones: Because who does not know that, among names, those which are uttered in an absolute way and for themselves refer to the realities that are their substrates (ὑποκειμένων), while others, which are said in reference to something else (πρὸς ἕτερα), make known only the relation (σχέσιν) to that in respect of which they are called (πρὸς ἃ)? For example, man, horse, and ox each mean the realities that they describe; son, servant, and friend, rather, only describe union with the terms to which they are coupled. Therefore, hearing product (γεννήματος) the thought is not directed to a substance, but it is understood that it is united to another being, that is, the one who has done. In fact, the product is called someone’s product. But how can it not be so great a folly to establish that it is substance that does not introduce the notion of a hypostasis, but only means the relation to another (πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν)? And again, we have shown little above that among the names even those that are absolute even if they seem to show a certain substratum maximally, instead they do not describe the substance, but they define some of its properties.
Basil’s reasoning is quite straightforward: how can a name that only refers to relation indicate substance? And so much so that in his reworking of the theory of language even absolute names do not express the substance but only certain properties of the substance from which the names themselves are forged. It is interesting to note that the two triads cited as examples of absolute and relative names reveal in a very direct manner both the innovation of Cappadocian theology as well as the ideal interlocutor in a philosophical context. Indeed, the son-slave-friend sequence is only read in Gregory of Nyssa in a context parallel to the one cited above, whereas the three terms man-horse-ox are mentioned as an example in Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisia, Galen, and Porphryr in contexts linked to the discussion of substance and categories of being and later appear in a theological sense in the work of Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa.
Basil, II, , –: SCh , pp. –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, , ,: GNO II, ,. Cf. Aristotle, De generatione animalium, a . Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, ,. Cf. Galen, De temperamentis, I, ,; De totius morbi temporibus, , and De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus, ., and ,. Cf. Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem, ,. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, , (GNO I, ,) and Gregory of Nanzianzus, Oratio (De Theologia), ,: SCh , p. .
. Basil of Caesarea
As has been said, Basil revisits the doctrine of schesis in light of the distinction made between economy and immanence. On an intraTrinitarian level, relation must be understood differently with respect to what occurs in the sphere of creation and in such a way as to exclude subordination and causal necessity. Basil thus clarifies: And nobody thinks that the glory of the Only-begotten is damaged, due to the fact that the relation (σχέσεως) is common. In fact, the difference between the Son and the other beings does not consist in relation (πρός τί πως ἔχειν), but rather, it is in the properties of the substance that God’s transcendence over mortal beings is manifested.
It is clear, then, that the difference between the second Person of the Trinity and creation is substantial, yet the distinction between the Father and the Son is only relational. It is worth noting the use of the more technical expression πρός τί πως ἔχειν, which Basil borrows from the Stoics and the Neo-Platonic critique of this tradition, although the term itself originally comes from Aristotle. As we can see, the whole elaboration is dictated by exegetical reasons and the need to distinguish in the Gospel what was referred to each of the two natures of Christ. In the De Spiritu Sancto, for example, Basil explains “the right hand” referred to in Ps :; Heb :; Acts : ; and Rm :, not as a place but rather as a relation of equality between the Father and the Son that is expressed by the formula τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἴσον σχέσιν. All the doctrine outlined and the theological work carried out to develop a new ontological conception of relation that avoids subordinationism converge in a particularly important text, which takes up the first passage from Basil cited above. In Adversus Eunomium I, GNO I, , –, , Basil has expressed the property of co-relativity of the names of the first two divine Persons in terms of schesis. He repeats this now albeit with a small addition that nevertheless seems important for later discussions. Basil writes: In fact, it is clear through analysis that these names, namely those of the Father and the Son, do not aim to evoke precisely and primarily the idea of corporeal passions, but understood in themselves, indicate only the mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν).
The Greek πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις in this way moves to the front and center of the conversation with Eunomius, as will later be seen in an analysis of
Basil, Adversus Eunomium, II, ,–: SCh , p. . Cf. Basil, De spiritu sancto, , , .: SCh bis, pp. and . Basil, Adversus Eunomium, II, ,–: SCh , .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
what Gregory of Nyssa writes in opposition to Eunomius. With this formula, it seems that the concept of relation has been purified so as to now be introduced into the sphere of immanence. As is illustrated by his opponent’s reaction, this constitutes a clear innovation on the level of ontology. One might therefore hazard a guess that Basil came into contact with the theology of schesis in the homeousian circles he frequented. These were also marked by an inheritance from Eusebius who already and significantly used the terminology πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις. Nevertheless, Basil re-worked the term in a way that can be said to be original, synthesizing the philosophical inheritance of Stoic paradigms with the contributions of Neo-Platonic commentators of Aristotle and in doing so forged a new instrument that both Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa further perfect.
. .. The Dispute with Eunomius The Cappadocian doctrine on the Trinity is based on the distinction between ousia and hypostasis, which during the period of Athanasius and the Council of Nicaea were still considered to be one and the same thing. This must be confronted with the interpretation of Heb : where the Son is spoken of with respect to the Father, as “radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ):
David G. Robertson and Mark DelCogliano do well to highlight the importance of the contribution made by the rhetorical element in the development of the theory of Basil’s relational names: cf. D. G. Robertson, “Relatives in Basil of Caesarea,” Studia Patristica (): –; and M. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, –. These authors claim that Basil’s use of relational names focuses on the relational connection on a terminological level rather than one that is ontological, similar to what the grammarians did. It is nevertheless evident that the logic of the theological conversation presents the schesis of the names as a reflection of the schesis between the persons-hypostases, who are not substances and who cannot be distinct from the one divine substance. It seems that this focus on the linguistic aspect in the two authors cited here leaves the role that is properly ontological of relation in the shadows, whereas in Eunomius it is central. In particular, πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, with its role in the tradition of Neo-Platonic exegesis of Aristotle, seems not to be taken in its full breadth. Yet the reading here proposed confirms the connection identified by Mark DelCogliano between Basil and the heirs of Eusebius.
. Gregory of Nyssa
In fact, the speech of the Apostle does not seek to distinguish the hypostases from one another through means of the properties manifested, but to make it known the authentic union, without separation of relation (σχέσεως), of the Son to the Father.
This passage taken from Basil’s famous Epistula – although today it is recognized to have likely been written by Gregory of Nyssa – shows how schesis has now taken on an immanent value when it refers to the divine Persons, whose nature is eternal and infinite. Relation makes it possible precisely to express the distinction of the Father and the Son without breaking the substance, thus affirming unity without confusing the Persons. This is the fundamental axis around which Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrinal reflection and his use of the category in question revolves. Such a doctrine is in perfect continuity with his brother’s intuitions, which indeed are developed to the extent of giving rise to a true and proper ontological re-elaboration, as direct response to the tumultuous confrontation with Eunomius. Indeed, what strikes the reader immediately upon examination of the uses of schesis in Gregory of Nyssa, apart from the noteworthy frequency of the term, is the fact that of the appearances are found in works written against Eunomius. This seems to suggest right away that the category of relation was a key element of the discussion. The fact that reciprocal relation (ἡ σχέσις πρὸς ἄλληλα) appears no less than thirteen times, again, always in works countering Eunomius, only confirms this. And in six cases it is a literal citation of Eunomius that the bishop of Nyssa reproduces. It is evident that Basil’s use of the expression prompted Eunomius to reinterpret it in terms of a necessary relationship, which in the continuous ontological scale would distinguish the substances of the second and third Persons from that of the first One, the apex of the hierarchy of being. The difference in perspective is evident from the very first text of Eunomius containing schesis and quoted by Gregory:
Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Petrum fratrem de differentia essentiae et hypostaseos (known also as the Epistula of Basil), ,–: Y. Courtonne, I, . On the attribution of the work to Gregory, see G. Maspero – M. Degli Esposti – D. Benedetto, “Who Wrote Basil’s Epistula ? A Possible Answer Through Quantitative Analysis,” in J. Leemans and M. Cassin (eds.), Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium III, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Gregory of Nyssa Colloquium (Leuven, September –, ) (Leuven: Brill, ), –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, , (GNO I, p. ,), , (GNO I, p. ,–), , (GNO I, p. ,–), , . (GNO I, p. , – e –), III, , , (GNO II, p. ,–).
The Cappadocian Reshaping
Our entire doctrinal discussion moves from the substance which is supreme and par excellence; and from the substance that derives from it, and along with it, is above all things; and from the third substance that is not co-ordinated (συνταττομένης) to either of the first two, but is subordinate (ὑποταττομένης) to the first by its cause, and to the second by the action (ἐνέργειαν) through which it comes into being. It is clear that for the discourse to be complete, we must also consider the actions that correspond to the substances and the names that naturally follow form them.
The text gives a clear picture of the derivative nature of Eunomius’ ontology, who conceives of the divine Persons as three diverse substances. The Son is Son precisely because His cause is the Father, whereas the Spirit is distinct from both inasmuch as the Spirit is the fruit of an operation of the Son. The confusion between economy and immanence is apparent. The ending of this citation likewise demonstrates the linguistic implication of the question in that Eunomius maintains the necessary connection that binds actions, substances and names. The one-to-one correspondence of these three levels would mean that only the Father is the supreme substance inasmuch as the name “ungenerated” corresponds exclusively to Him. The Son and the Spirit, then, would be different substances on account of difference of name and operation. A difference in both ontological degree and time of operations would correspond to this substantial difference. The structure of derivation is expressed in terms of fixed and necessary relationships between the various ontological orders, according to a graduated scale as in classical metaphysics, relationships that correspond to the hierarchy of the first three substances. Eunomius defines these necessary relationships as “the immutable concatenation in the reciprocal relationship” (τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸν εἱρμὸν ἀπαράβατον). Here it can be plainly seen that the expression πρὸς
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, I, ,–,: GNO I, ,–,. It remains unclear if Eunomius had any emanationist notion of this graduated ontological structure. J. Daniélou places Eunomius’ system on a Neo-Platonic plane, and particularly in connection to Iamblichus, whose influence was already present in Julian’s court. Cf. J. Daniélou, “Eunome l’Arien et l’exégèse neó-platonicienne du Cratyle,” in Revue des Études Grecques (): –. John Rist forcefully denies this conclusion: Cf. J. M. Rist, “Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its Background and Nature,” in P. J. Fedwick (ed.), Basil of Caesarea, Christian, Humanist, Ascetic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, ), –, here –. He references L. R. Wickham, “The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean,” Journal of Theological Studies (): –, and , n. , yet in none of these authors any text by Eunomius is convincingly cited in support of said claims. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–: GNO I, p. ,–.
. Gregory of Nyssa
ἄλληλα σχέσις that Basil employs is inserted by Eunomius into a metaphysical context that is colored by Neo-Platonism, with its Neo-Pythagorean and Aristotelian components – and is read in the sense of necessary relationship and subordination. Thus, Gregory in his response defines Eunomius’ argumentation as “technology of blasphemy” (τεχνολογία τῆς βλασφημίας). In doing so, he alludes to the Aristotelian tradition while accusing Eunomius of purposefully neglecting to make any reference to the revealed names of the divine Persons, for these names are what necessarily indicate the identity of nature: all people, hearing the denominations father and son immediately recognize their mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν) of kinship (οἰκείαν) and nature (φυσικήν).
The theological gist of the matter depends precisely on the difference of interpretation of πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, as the cited text makes clear. On the one hand, Eunomius has recourse to mutual relation between the Persons, understood as different substances hierarchically ordered, to indicate their necessary relationship that is reflected in the connection between their names, operations and substances. On the other hand, Gregory relies on the connection of identity of nature and relation that joins any father and son. At the base of this decision is the theology of creation and the conviction that the human being is created in the image and likeness of God, and in such a way that the relationship between the Trinity and mankind is understood according to analogy. .. Relation and Freedom Obviously, the whole discussion will also have to clarify the difference between divine generation and generation in creation, where the nature of the father and son is not numerically the same, but only specifically. And yet, if God has revealed Himself through the names Father and Son, the communion of nature must always be maintained, even if in an infinitely more perfect way, to the point of absolute numerical identity. Thus, Gregory appeals to the simplicity of the divine substance and specifies:
See X. Batllo, Ontologie scalaire et polémique trinitaire: le subordinatianisme d’Eunome et la distinction ktiston/aktiston dans le Contre Eunome I de Grégoire de Nysse (Münster: Aschendorff, ). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, , : GNO I, p. ,. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, , ,: GNO II, p. ,. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–: GNO I, p. ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
But in those [substances] whose nature does not allow for (ἀνεπίδεκτός) anything worse, limits to goodness cannot be conceived: the infinite is not such in relation to something else (πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει), but, understood in itself and for itself, evades all limits.
The Greek term schesis is not understood as something external to substance. Divine infinity and simplicity imply that relation here is immanent. Indeed, schesis cannot in this context be understood as a relationship with another nature or substance. This alters the ontological status of relation itself. The essential point it that “more and less are not admitted in the Trinity” (ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται). This formula challenges the traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s Categoriae, from Alexander of Aphrodisia to Porphyry, who in his Isagogae associates accidents with the sphere wherein more or less are applied (τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεται). It is therefore evident that Gregory of Nyssa in both intention and argument is purposefully ontological. At the same time, this approach does not claim to be an alternative to the study of Scripture. It is born, rather, precisely out of an effort to adhere to the content of Revelation. Gregory is interpreting the titles given to the Messiah, “Son of Man” and “Son of God”: Just as [Christ] referred to His visible reality as “Son of man” in order to indicate His communion with human nature according to flesh, showing His commonality according to nature of His flesh with that from which He originated, so too the name “Son” manifests His true and authentic relation (ἀληθῆ καὶ γνησίαν σχέσιν) with the God of the universe, and indicates the affinity according to nature.
This text clearly demonstrates how schesis in a proper sense is understood to belong on the level of immanence. Christ in His perfect humanity is united to all men, but in His perfect divinity Christ is indissolubly united to the Father. And this relation is “true” where this adjective recalls the very same pairing as seen in the refutation of Aëtius in Epiphanius’ Panarion cited above.
Ibid., ,–: GNO I, ,–,. Ibid., ,–: GNO I, ,–,. In the Categoriae, expressions similar to ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον appear seven times: a ; b ; b ; a .; b .. In the Commentary on the Topici by Alexander, there are eleven occurrences of the same formula: ,; , .; , ..; , .; ,.; , . Porphyry, Isagogae, ,. The expression appears another eleven times in his commentary on the Categories: ,; ,.; ,–; ,.; ,–; ,. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–: GNO I, p. ,–. Epiphanius, Panarion, III, , . See Section ...
. Gregory of Nyssa
This must be reflected in worship, understood as a personal relation of love, in such a way that the duty of recognizing the divinity of Christ is implicit in the first Commandment: As the honor that human beings must render to God, properly understood, is none other than this: a relation of love (ἀγαπητικὴ σχέσις) and the confession of the goods present in Him. And it seems to me that the duty to honor the Son as the Father is honored was prescribed by the Logos as love (see Jn :). In fact, the commandment to wholeheartedly love God with all our might (Mk : and Lk :) orders that we give the honor that corresponds to Him, and here the Son who is God, commanding to love both in an equal way, says that it is necessary to honor the Son as the Father is honored.
Gregory once again seeks to remain in line with Scripture and its promptings, commenting on Jn :, “that all may honor the Son, just as they honor the Father. Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him.” The relational connection between the first two Persons of the Trinity is unmistakable. The profound notion of worship in Gregory is here observed in full as he states that God is in need of nothing and mankind possesses nothing that can come close to giving God honor, save love. That is, mankind has nothing for God save the freedom of entrusting oneself to Him, as is seen in the example of the widow and her offering (cf. Lk :–). God is identical to the Good and the relation between the divine Persons is a pure and total gift of Self, in such a way that the human being cannot give honor to God without recognizing this exchange of gifts, which implies the entrusting of oneself totally to the Father by means of the Son. There is nothing anyone can give the Creator, for everything already belongs to the Creator. But one can give himself or herself, choosing the relation with the Creator. One must keep in mind that Gregory introduces a definition of love in reference to the divinized soul and this soul’s union and likeness to the divine nature: “This is love: an intimate relationship (σχέσις) with what you desire.” A passage taken from the Refutatio emphasizes the fundamental importance that the relationship between the divine Persons be understood as love and reciprocal gift. In this work, the discussion surrounding relation seems to already be defined: schesis only appears thrice, starting with the fundamental principle already seen that the name “Father” does
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, p. ,–. Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et resurrectione, PG , C.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
not refer to divine substance but to relation with the Son (οὐκ οὐσίας ἐστὶ παραστατική͵ ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσιν), such that the Father cannot be thought of without necessarily calling to mind the second Person. Therefore, regarding Eunomius’ statement that the Holy Spirit must be inferior to the Father because the third Person is not the father of the Son, Gregory explains: If it were shown that the meaning of Father and tyrant were the same, then, once tyranny is attributed to the Father, one would consequently say that the Spirit is subjected to the Person who is superior to Him in power. But if with Father we only mean the relation to the Son (πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν σχέσις) and no concept of tyranny or dominion were introduced through it, how can the being subjected of the Spirit follow from not being the Father of the Son?
The claim is quite precise: in the Trinity there is no dominion or distinction of power among the divine Person. Thus, relation does not make for a distinction of dignity of substance or of ontological density. This implies an innovation in the comprehension of divine Fatherhood. This is not taken to be mere superiority of power, rather as the total gift of self. The Father generates the Son, giving the Son all of Himself, all of his power, and so the Spirit lacks nothing of the Divinity. The relationship among the three is marked by freedom of love and gift, not by necessity and submission. .. Reciprocal Relation What seems to be in play here is a shift not only in the vision of the cosmos but in the very notion of ontology. For here Being is understood as Love and not only as necessity; the Good is understood as gift and not simply as source of attraction. The content of Revelation completes the Greek conception. A broadening of classical metaphysics is particularly evident in the following passage, which marks the conclusion of a long rebuttal to Eunomius’ words that have been used as a point of departure in this study of Gregory of Nyssa’s thought: I think fools say such things or listen to those who say them without subjecting them to any critical examination: things like the fact that realities which are separated from each other by a difference in nature are governed by a certain sequence of their mutual relations (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως). In fact, they are either:
Gregory of Nyssa, Refutatio confessionis Eunomii , : GNO II, p. ,. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, ,: GNO II, p. ,. Ibid., ,–,: GNO II, p. ,–.
. Gregory of Nyssa
united in substance (διὰ τῆς οὐσίας), according to our reasoning, and so the sequence remains unalterable in the mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει); or they are separated from each other by the difference of nature, as he thinks. But can that relation in the sequence (καθ΄ εἱρμὸν σχέσις), a relation that remains immutable, be found in realities that are foreign to each other?
It is apparent how schesis is here understood differently with respect to its metaphysical reading in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Relation was the fundamental element in the derivative and scalar picture of classical ontology, inasmuch as it was seen as a necessary relationship that connected these various degrees of being. It thus implied a differentiation of substance. Here, however, Eunomius is cornered: the only way the Father, Son and Spirit are truly connected is actually through a natural relation. That is, the three Persons identify themselves with one and the same eternal and immutable substance, wherein distinction is facilitated only by relation itself. If instead the three divine Persons were of distinct natures, it would not be possible to explain how relation among them could remain unchanged, or eternal, when only the Father is “since always.” As we can see, the reflection on Trinitarian revelation requires a rethinking of the category of relation and a deepening of its ontological status. The term schesis is introduced within the divine substance, in the dimension that constitutes its immanence and not between the substances in that sphere that would be the economic dimension. One essential element in this ontological advancement is the Greek πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις. This for Eunomius is still tied to logos understood as necessary relationship, something analogous to the notion read in Plotinus and Porphyry, both discussed in previous sections. Their schesis is a meson, which binds two substances relative to one another as a proportion. Significantly, Gregory precedes the last quoted text with the affirmation that the three divine Persons do not just have a quantitative and necessary relationship with each other inasmuch as they are not like larger and smaller vases that are placed reciprocally (ἀλλήλοις) one in the other. The Father and the Son and the Spirit are instead without limit and boundaries (πέρατι καὶ ὅρῳ), such that relational distinction in them has only to do with hypostases and keeps the one, identical substance (κοινωνεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ διῃρῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως).
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–: GNO I, pp. ,–, . Cf. ibid., ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–: GNO I, p. ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
Here ontology is properly Trinitarian, being different from as much as can be observed in nature: in the case of the eternal and uncreated God, the specification of reciprocity implies identical nature, for only the first principle is eternal and uncreated. Relational distinction is traced back to a difference in origin, though without this necessarily implying a difference in substance, as in the case of Adam and Abel. The first man and his son did in fact come to possess their respective being in different ways (διαφόρως ἑκάτεροι τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντες), although according to species they were of the same nature. That is, they were not distinguished or divided among themselves by reason of substance (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπ΄ ἀλλήλων οὐ διασχίζονται), which instead was held in common (ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τῶν δύο κοινός). Gregory thus concludes: If, therefore, the idea of humanity in Adam and Abel does not change based on their difference in origin (γεννήσεως) or order (τάξεως), and their mode of coming into existence (τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως) makes no difference in their nature, and there is agreement on the fact that it is equal by the common consensus of all reasonable people and no one would say otherwise, then unless you are completely insane, what need would there be to argue this absurdity of thought for the divine nature? Hearing the One who is the Truth say “Father” and “Son,” we have learned of the unity of nature in the two subjects (ἐν δύο τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς φύσεως), the unity that is placed at the natural level by the names in mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως) and again by the very words of the Lord.
The final reference is to “I and the Father are one” in Jn :, which is cited immediately after in the full text. This shows how the magnificent formula “unity of nature in the two subjects” is intimately connected to the mutual relation expressed by the names of the divine Persons. Eunomius places the term ungenerated before the term Father precisely because the latter implies relation to the Son and speaks of identical nature, whereas Gregory exerts great energy in demonstrating the equivalence of the two names ungenerated and Father. Basil is the first proponent of this teaching, yet Gregory’s brother is cited by Eunomius in an incomplete manner. The bishop of Caesarea’s text called into question is the Adversus Eunomium I, ,– (SCh , pp. –): But I would also say that the name “unbegotten,” which seems to me perfectly compatible with our conceptions even though it is is not found in any passage in
Cf. ibid., ,–: GNO I, pp. ,–,. Ibid., ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Cf. those passages that correspond to the three following occurrences of the term schesis: ibid., ,; , and , (GNO I, p. ,; p. , and ).
. Gregory of Nyssa
Scripture and is the first element of their [some Eunomians] blasphemy, must be passed in silence. In fact, the term ‘Father’ has the same meaning as that of “unbegotten,” and moreover, it introduces the notion of Son, which is united to it by relation (σχέσεως).
Eunomius omits the last sentence, which is the first text cited earlier in this study when we examined Basil’s thought: it contains the reference to relation that implies the equivalence of the two names of the first Person. It is here made evident that Basil had already noted the centrality of schesis, which might have been inherited from his homeousian past. In any event, it was the bishop of Caesarea who re-elaborated this, so much so that it became an essential element in the exchange between Eunomius and Gregory. Indeed, it was the bishop of Nyssa who developed this intuition into a fully formulated doctrine. Gregory astutely reprimands his interlocutor noting that if he, Eunomius, were right, his own father could not also be a human being inasmuch as relation with his son would exclude any membership in human nature. He would have to either be Eunomius’ father or a man. Gregory thus picks up the distinction between absolute names and relative names, something introduced by Basil, and in doing so distinguishes two categories. On one side, there are those names that are without connection and relation to anything else (τὰ μὲν ἀπόλυτά τε καὶ ἄσχετα). On the other side, there are those that signify relation (τὰ δὲ πρός τινα σχέσιν). But these categories partially overlap in that some names can be used both in an absolute as well as relational sense. This is seen in Scripture, where God is said to be absolutely incorruptible and eternal and in other places defender or savior of mankind. But so, too, can absolute names be used in a relational sense, for example, when speaking of our God and thereby inserting a reference to ourselves in the term. This is true for the name Father as well, whom Jesus himself instructs us to call our Father (Mt :). As already seen, in the Oratio Catechetica, Gregory explicitly states that in a certain sense (τρόπον γάρ τινα) the notion Logos belongs to the relational dimension (πρός τι), for the pronunciation of the name Logos
Ibid., ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–,. See Section .. With respect to the homeousian position, we highlight the difference as the former denied the use of “ungenerated,” making it dialectically in opposition to “Father.” See the cited texts of George of Laodicea and Basil of Ancyra given earlier in Section ... Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I,,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–,.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
also makes a direct reference to the Father of the Logos Himself: the Logos is in fact always Logos of someone. This claim is particularly interesting when one examines this on the background of the already presented discussion of Eusebius with Marcellus together with Arius’ latter to Alexander of Alexandria, which are diametrically opposed to it. Claudio Moreschini notes how the distinction between absolute and relational names is derived from the grammarians and cites Dionysius Thrax, who separates relational terms (πρός τι ἔχον), such as father and son, from absolute terms (ἀπολελυμένον), such as God and word. It is clear that this ontological innovation would have to be reflected on the level of linguistics as well. It seems likewise important to observe that for Gregory it is exactly the Word, name of the second Person of the Trinity, that belongs among the relative terms instead of those that are absolute. This is a point that emerges from the discussion in the Contra Eunomium II. In this regard, it is said that even children know that hearing and speech (λόγος) have a natural (φυσικὴν) mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν) and that, as a hearing action is not possible while nobody is speaking, so neither is a speaking action possible if it is not addressed to a listener.
This text enters into the dispute over names. Eunomius maintains that there is a one-on-one correspondence between names and things, a correspondence that has its very origin in God’s own action through which each and every thing was given a name. He expresses this in terms of relation, operation and analogy (σχέσεως τε καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἀναλογίας). To prove his point, Eunomius adds scriptural passages that showcase the God who speaks. It is precisely in response to this that Gregory introduces the reference to mutual natural relation that unites the word and what is heard. His argument unfolds on two levels. In the first place, he affirms
Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica, GNO III/, ,–. C. Moreschini, Gregorio di Nissa. Teologia trinitaria (Milano: Rusconi, ), , n. . Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars grammatica, , (Grammatici Graeci, I., ,). Cf. ibid., , (,). Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, ,–: GNO I, p. ,–. See Daniélou, “Eunome l’Arien et l’exégèse neó-platonicienne du Cratyle,” –. For the philosophical sources and the later influence of the question, see Th. Kobusch, “Name und Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift ‘Contra Eunomium’ des Gregor von Nyssa,” in M. Brugarolas (ed.), Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium I. An English Translation with Supporting Studies (Leuven: Brill, ), –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, ,– and ,–: GNO I, p. ,– and –.
. Gregory of Nyssa
the spirituality and eternity of God and does so in such a way that he excludes any material intermediate (μὲσον) between the Father and the Son. This would happen instead, according to Eunomius, as the names of created realities in his view are spoken under the form of material words uttered by the first Person and addressed to the second Person. At the same time, Gregory distinguishes economy from immanence, thus placing schesis within one, single ontological ordering rather than making it a bridge or link between different levels. Once again we see the strict difference between all this and the Neo-Platonic thought. Both what is heard and the word, as well as father and son, are united by a πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις and are therefore relational. Yet this schesis must take on the traits of the nature wherein it finds itself and such that in the case of what is divine it cannot be material or accidental. Indeed, for the divine Persons there exists “the union and intimacy of the intelligible with the intelligible in the identity of the will” (τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τῆς ταὐτότητος τῶν θελημάτων ἕνωσίν τε καὶ ἀνάκρασιν). We note once again how the will is inserted into the absolute dimension of what is intelligible. The dispute over the names is thus directly connected to a differing ontological grasp of schesis and in a particular way the meaning of its reciprocity (πρὸς ἄλληλα) and its relationship to nature. In Book I of the Contra Eunomium III, it is precisely κατὰ φύσιν σχέσις that is argued in reference to the disagreement over the value of names. Gregory writes: Therefore, if [Eunomius] confesses that the Son has a natural relation (φυσικὴν σχέσιν) with the Father, let us, leaving aside the denominations, consider the meaning in the expressions, that is, whether in their connection we discern the diversity of substance or the connaturality and the properties of the same substance.
Obviously, here one excludes the possibility that there is a difference in substance between the two Persons, for the names themselves indicate connaturality. What seems pertinent is that here Gregory of Nyssa vindicates the ontological value of relation, denying that it can only be conceived of on an intellectual level. One understands from this perspective
Cf. ibid., ,–,: GNO I, pp. ,–,. Gregory has recourse to πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις likewise with the example of the relationship between a blacksmith and the material upon which he operates, denying that this might be true of the Father and Son inasmuch as this is not the effect of an operation, rather fully is in the proper sense: cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, ,–,: GNO I, p. ,–. Ibid., ,–: GNO I, p. ,–. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, , ,–,: GNO II, pp. ,–,. Ibid., ,–: GNO II, p. ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
how his conception of schesis is closer to a Neo-Platonic reading when compared to the Stoic reflection, which acknowledges categories only on the level of logic. The fundamental innovation is, however, witnessed in the insertion of relation into the divine immanence, not allowing any reading of the notion of relation in a merely accidental sense. The need for an extension of classical metaphysics as an attempt to adhere to the content of Revelation resounds in the effort made by Gregory to answer his adversaries: Therefore, if they find a conception of higher dignity than this, such that it seems unworthy to think of the Only-begotten Son as originating from the nature of the Father, let them say if in their ineffable wisdom they know something of higher elevation than the nature of the Father, so that, raising the Only-begotten Son who is God, they would place Him above His relation with the Father (πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως).
The text shows how the intratrinitarian relation is at the ontological level of the Father’s nature, that is, it is found within it, distinguishing in the one nature the divine Persons
.. Relation and πῶς εἶναι This individuation, which is not based on the distinction of substance, requires the shift to a new ontological plane as original as essence, but distinct from it, which Gregory of Nyssa calls the πῶς εἶναι. Hence, in the Contra Eunomium III, he distinguishes the personal trait of the Father as “to exist as ungenerated” (ἀγεννήτως), leading it back to the level of πῶς εἶναι instead of to a definition of substance. The combination of the adverb with einai is parallel to the combination of the preposition with again the verb to be, to indicate the origin and thus the relation, according to the logic of Nicea and the expressions “God from God” and “Light from Light”. This indicates the plane of the hypostatic distinction, which must be clearly differentiated from the opposition between created and uncreated, as already seen in Section .., and that here can be revealed in all its force: Therefore, “substance” is meant, as such, as being something (ἐν τῷ εἶναί τι), while “corruptible” or “incorruptible” are meant as being of a certain quality (ἐν τῷ
Ibid., ,–: GNO II, p. ,–. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, ,,–: GNO II, ,–.
. Gregory of Nyssa
ποδαπὸν εἶναι), and “begotten” and “unbegotten” are meant as being in a certain mode (ἐν τῷ πῶς εἶναι).
According to Gregory’s reasoning, the repeated use of πρός reveals the relational form of thought that gradually distinguishes the various ontological planes. Here, the level of substance of εἶναί τι is differentiated with respect to accident, and on the basis of ποδαπὸν εἶναι that of what is uncreated with respect to what is created, that is, what is incorruptible is distinguished from what is corruptible. In this way, one can identify a further distinction present in the divine immanence, something that has to do with the relation of origin, signified by πῶς εἶναι. So, relation allows Gregory both to distinguish the various levels of being as well as unite them on the inside of one, single level. A passage from Gregory’s more mature work illustrates this capacity of schesis in a more complete manner. In his Ad Ablabium, he introduces the distinction between the Father as absolute principle-cause (τὸ αἴτιον) and the Son and the Spirit as distinct insofar as they are “caused” (αἰτιατόν) in the intra-Trinitarian dimension. He thus proceeds in his ontological analysis: And in what is from the cause, we conceive yet another difference (διαφοράν): one thing, in fact, is the being that is immediately (προσεχῶς) from the first (ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου), and another being is by (διά) that which is immediately from the first cause, so that being Only-begotten remains incontestably in the Son, and it is not doubted that the Spirit is from the Father, since the mediation of the Son (τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ μεσιτείας) maintains in Him being Only-begotten, without excluding the Spirit from the natural relation with the Father (τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως).
The text places attention on the third Person, making His natural relation to the Father explicit. To be of the same nature means to be united through a relation that does not make any distinction in terms of
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, , ,–: GNO I, ,–. Cf. G. Maspero, “Ad Ablabium. Quod non sint tres dii,” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory di Nyssa (Leiden; Boston: Brill, ), –; and A. Radde-Gallwitz, Gregory of Nyssa’s Doctrinal Works: A Literary Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –. See also L. Karfíková, “Ad Ablabium, Quod non sint tres dii,” in V. H. Drecoll and M. Berghaus (eds.), Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism. Proceedings of the th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Tübingen, September –, ) (Brill: Leuven, ), –; A. Marmodoro, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Trinity (with focus on his Letter ad Ablabius),” in A. Marmodoro (ed.), Exploring Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical, Theological and Historical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
nature but instead identifies the two as having the same nature. Being identical in nature and yet distinct is not accomplished only through generation, which by definition unites subjects of the same nature, as is the case for the Son. This was the basis of the argument used repeatedly against Eunomius. But also the procession of the third Person is purely relational. Thus, the Son and the Spirit are distinct in the divine immanence on the basis of their respective origins, and this is expressed by the play on adverbs and prepositions. It can be said that Gregory’s Trinitarian ontology is equivalent to adding prepositions to being. The procession of one divine Person from another implies no difference of substance, for the distinction occurs on an exclusively relational level in the immanence of the one, single divine substance, which is likewise infinite and eternal. As already seen, the continuation of the text just quoted presents this distinction made by the σχέσις in terms of πὼς εἶναι, marking a point of arrival in the theological reinterpretation of the classical category of relation: It is necessary that we first believe that something is (εἶναί τι), and [only] then do we investigate how it is (πῶς ἐστι) that in whom we have believed. Saying “what is it” (τί ἐστι), therefore, is different than saying “how is it” (πῶς ἐστι). Now, saying that something is without begetting, “how it is” is revealed, but with such words, “what it is” is not explained.
This treatment of the divine Persons and their relational distinctions does not violate apophaticism, that is, the ontological cornerstone of the Cappadocian thought, which claims that being exceeds the capacity of language to express. Yet Revelation allows one to acknowledge intraTrinitarian relation by way of names and the differing origin of the divine Persons. The Aristotelian πρός τί πως ἔχειν, then, after having been reworked by the Stoics and subjected to Neo-Platonic critique, is substantially modified and translated into the Cappadocian πὼς εἶναι. Once it is inserted into the immanence of the one, divine substance, schesis – which is etymologically linked to ἔχειν – can no longer be interpreted in terms of having, rather it must be translated into terms of pure being. Basil’s intuition on this point that modified Stoic relation in the sense of ὅπως ἐστίν is later developed further by his brother into a more complete formula. The evolution enacted in the categories that hark back to Eusebius and the homeousians is quite relevant here, for these categories become the very object of dispute with Eunomius and are revisited and
See Section ...
Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–.
. Gregory of Nazianzus
refined according to a new ontological notion that avoids all danger of subordinationism. But what is likewise noteworthy is how the earliest origins of this terminology actually come from Clement. The heart of this discussion and central element of Gregory of Nyssa’s work seems to be the πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις and its reference to identical nature. It is precisely mutual relation that plays a key role in winning the battle and accomplishing the extension of classic ontology. An analysis of Gregory of Nazianzus reveals the same conclusion in that he relies in a consistent manner on πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, thereby illustrating a situation that had become both clear and defined.
. Gregory of Nazianzus’ theology confirms all that has been gathered thus far from the work of his friend, the Bishop of Nyssa. Elaborating on the inheritance from Basil seems to have already been undertaken and the doctrine well laid out. For this reason, there are little more than ten occurrences of schesis, of which around half are in a Trinitarian context. Gregory witnesses the ontological reworking of the category of πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, which makes a significant appearance on seven occasions. It seems fitting to begin with the Oratio on the Holy Spirit, where the ontological language is more explicit. Gregory of Nanzianzus declares from the outset that the object of his inquiry is the immanent dimension, namely the theologia. The backdrop of all this is always the intraTrinitarian interpretation of the Nicene “Light from Light” that must be applied to the Holy Spirit in order to answer the Pneumatomachians. Therefore, to the assertion that, if there was a time when there was no Son, then there was no Father either, typical of the Arian dispute, it
Gregory of Nazianzus’ Trinitarian passages where he speaks of schesis are found in his five Theological Treatises (Orationes –) and in the Oration (De pace), whose dates of composition generally are said to be during the second half of (cf. SCh , pp.– and SCh , p. ). Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium I and II were most likely taken down, at least in the form of notes (τὰ σχιδάρια) in , a little after the death of Basil at the end of . According to Pierre Maraval, this can be deduced from Gregory’s own statement in the Epistula (cf. SCh , p. , and p. , n. ). This is confirmed by the fact that they take on definitive form in after his return to Nyssa from a trip to Armenia in only seventeen days, as Gregory relates to his brother Peter in the same letter (cf. Gregory di Nyssa, Epistula , : SCh , p. ,). On this point see Raymond Winling in SCh , p. . Here one might consider the application of the term Light to the three divine Persons in Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De Spiritu Sancto), : SCh , p. .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
should be added that, if there was a time when the Spirit was not there, then neither was the Son. Here the logic of the Pneumatomachians is undermined by extending to the third Person the arguments accepted by these to define the divinity of the second Person. This happens as well with the soteriological claim that if the Spirit were simply creation He would not then be able to save the human nature by uniting it to God and thereby divinizing it. His argument is stunningly ontological, drawing a real Porphyrian tree. Gregory wonders whether the third Person should be placed among those beings that exist in and of themselves (τῶν καθ΄ ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκότων) or rather with those that exist as inherent to some other being (ἐν ἑτέρῳ), that is, if the third Person is substance (οὐσίαν) or accident (συμβεβηκός). If accident, the third Person would be a divine operation (ἐνέργεια), one of those realities pertaining to substance (τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν) although itself not being a substance. If, however, the Spirit is substance, there is no other possibility but to admit that the Spirit is either creation or God Himself, for it is impossible to conceive of an intermediate (μέσον) between them or a composite (σύνθετον) of created and uncreated being. After having clarified that the third Person is of divine substance, Gregory turns on the reasoning of the Pneumatomachians who claimed that in this case the Spirit would necessarily have to either be ungenerated or generated. In the former case, there would be two ungenerated, whereas if the latter were true there would be two possibilities and both absurd: either the origin of the Spirit comes directly from the Father, thereby rendering him brother or even twin of the Son, or the origin is in the Son thus giving rise to a grandchild God. According to Gregory, the point here is that we must heed the facts, without fearing the names (ἐδεξάμην ἂν τὰ πράγματα͵ οὐ φοβηθεὶς τὰ ὀνόματα) and without applying human categories and natural familial relationships (τῆς ἡμετέρας συγγενείας) to the Trinity. We must acknowledge that the Spirit is one and consubstantial with God (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ὁμοούσιον). Hence, it is necessary that the category of relation be purified and moved to a “more elevated conception” of relation (τινα σχέσιν ὑψηλοτέραν). After this analysis, the conclusion is drawn from Jn :, demonstrating the divinity of the Holy Spirit through his relational position between the Father and the Son:
Cf. ibid., ,–: SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., ,–: SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., ,–: SCh , pp. – Cf. ibid., ,–: SCh , pp. –. Cf. ibid., ,–: SCh , .
. Gregory of Nazianzus
Insofar as He proceeds (ἐκπορεύεται) from the Father, the Spirit is not a creature; insofar as He is not begotten, He is not the Son; insofar as He is in the middle (μέσον) between He who is unbegotten and He who is begotten, He is God.
The ontological reasoning that precedes this claim does not permit μέσον to be read in an economical sense, nor as an intermediate degree of substance between the created and the uncreated. This is, instead, the same solution introduced by Gregory of Nyssa, who identifies the third Person with the Glory that the Father and the Son eternally exchange or with the Royal Power with which the Father King makes the Son King. The Greek μέσον is, then, purely relational, bearing clear innovation with respect to Porphyry’s notion of it. This procession of the Spirit cannot be explained in cosmic terms, and so the apophatic veil remains. It would be folly, Gregory writes, to want to peek into the mystery of God (εἰς θεοῦ μυστήρια παρακύπτοντες), when, as it is written in Sir :, one cannot even count the drops of rain or grains of sand on the seashore. Yet Christian Revelation calls for the affirmation of the unity of nature and trinity of the Persons in their eternal mutual relations: What, then, is missing from the Spirit, they ask, that keeps Him from being Son? If, in fact, He did not lack anything, He would be the Son. We say that He is not missing anything: indeed, God is not incomplete. The difference consists in manifestation (ἐκφάνσεως), so to speak, and in mutual relation (τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως): the difference in their names also derives from this.
This text is a clear example of how the Spirit is identical to the one and only divine and uncreated substance, which nevertheless in this ontology in and of itself admits distinction according to reciprocal relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις). Within immanence, the plurality of divine Persons exists according to the differing relation of origin, expressed by the term
Ibid., ,–: SCh , p. . Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–; In illud: Tunc et ipse filius, GNO III/, ,–, and In canticum canticorum, GNO VI, ,–. See G. Maspero, “The Fire, the Kingdom and the Glory: The Creator Spirit and the Intra-Trinitarian Processions in the Adversus Macedonianos of Gregory of Nyssa,” in V. H. Drecoll and M. Berghaus (eds.), Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism. Proceedings of the th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Tübingen, September –, ) (Brill: Leuven, ), –; and Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, –. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De Spiritu Sancto), ,–: SCh , pp. –. Ibid., : SCh , ,–.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
manifestation (ἔκφανσις), which here certainly does not have economic value. The formula πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις is once again applied to the intraTrinitarian sphere in Oratio (De pace) where the ontological innovation emerges in a particular way. Indeed, Gregory argues that asserting that God has given rise to beings whose nature is identical to his own, attributes the most honor to God, more than saying that He is the origin of beings inferior to Himself, as his adversaries are inclined to do. We see here that the principle of “protection” of Divinity is overcome, that is, the idea that God must defend Himself, keeping His power to Himself in His autarchic solitude. This principle is countered by a new way of understanding being starting from the revelation of eternal and absolute gift. Thus, the metaphysical principle that characterizes Eunomius’ thought is laid out and then criticized: In fact, everything that exists because of something (τινος ἕνεκεν) is of a lower value than that for which it was made. I, instead, in admitting a principle of timeless, inseparable, and infinite Divinity, honor the Principle along with the beings that originate from the Principle: the first because He is the Principle of such things; and the latter because They are thus like the One from whom They proceed, without being differentiated from Him either in terms of time, nature, or worship. But they constitute a one reality in their distinction and are distinguished within the unity, even if it seems paradoxical to say so. Moreover, they are to be honoured in their mutual relation (τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως) no less than thought of and considered one by one.
The two ontological positions are directly opposed to one another. On the one hand, there is the metaphysical stance in Eunomius that considers what is caused to always be inferior to its cause, and in such a manner that schesis is read as linked to a necessary relationship and ontological inferiority. On the other hand, there is Gregory’s assertion of the status of the Trinity as highest ontological degree, wherein eternal relations have the same infinite value as the individual Persons. Gregory of Nazianzus’ formulation could not be more clear or more effective. Thus, the Greek πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις as an instrument is the center of this new ontological framework and undoubtedly moves beyond the conclusions of Greek metaphysics. In the same work, after having uttered his
Cf. G. Maspero, “The Spirit Manifested by the Son in Cappadocian Thought,” Studia Patristica (): –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, ,–,: GNO I, ,–. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De pace), ,–,: SCh , p. –.
. Gregory of Nazianzus
famous cry, “Brothers, the Trinity is truly the Trinity” (Τριὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡ Τριὰς͵ ἀδελφοί), Gregory denies that it is merely a matter of the sum of parts that can be taken apart in number (ἀριθμῷ) and claims: Knowledge of the mutual relation and the order (ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεώς τε καὶ τάξεως) of the Holy Trinity is reserved to the Trinity alone and to those purified souls to whom the Trinity itself reveals it now or in the future. But we know of the one nature of God, known to us in being without principle, in begetting, and in procession (ἀνάρχῳ͵ καὶ γεννήσει͵ καὶ προόδῳ); like the mind, thought, and spirit (ὡς νῷ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν͵ καὶ λόγῳ͵ καὶ πνεύματι) are in us, as far as intelligible realities can be surmised from sensory ones and great from small ones, since no image fully captures the truth.
The mystery of the eternal relations and personal distinction belongs to the apophatic dimension, which only divine revelation can make known. Only if one were himself united with the Trinity could (s)he know the Trinity in itself, in living the Life that is God, thus being divinized. It is only by conjecture, through analogy, that theology knows the divine reality, as is true also of the mind, thought and the human spirit. We would like to stress that there is a precise parallel between these three realities that constitute human immanence and the personal characteristics of the three divine Persons: the ingenerate being for the Father, the generated being for the Son and the being by procession for the Holy Spirit. Of course, Gregory immediately specifies that this analogy is no proof of the Trinity, as the Trinity is known only through revelation that proceeds from on high and moves to what is below. Yet at the same time it is worth noting that the possibility of making conjectures with respect to the Trinity is possible, albeit starting from below it, according to a common attitude among the Cappadocians who attribute a great value to created realities. This shows how the content of revelation is not absurd, for even in mankind is there an immanence in which the faculties make up an analogous kind of unity and trinity. Gregory uses other expressions similar to πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις another four times. In two cases, he has recourse to them to indicate love that
Ibid., ,: SCh , p. . Ibid., ,–: SCh , p. . Here one is dealing with a true and proper psychological analogy, which may have even inspired Augustine, as he knew the thought of Gregory of Nazianzus in Latin translation: cf. J. Chevalier, Saint Augustin et la pensée grecque. Les relations trinitaires (Fribourg: Librairie de l’Université, ), . See, on this point, G. Maspero, Dio trino perché vivo (Brescia: Morcelliana, ), –; and Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, . More on this, in Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, –.
The Cappadocian Reshaping
unites both parents and children, as well the parents among themselves. In another two cases, it refers to cosmic relationships, as, for example, the reciprocal positioning of the stars or the shared connections between the different parts of the earth. Gregory is well aware of the difference between the Trinity and mankind. His answer to the Arians is based precisely on the assertion of the difference between eternal and natural generation. He thus underlines the fact that only the Father and the Son are such in a proper sense (κυρίως), for in them one is not the other, whereas we can simultaneously be both fathers and sons (with respect to our children and our fathers respectively). Likewise, we come from two parents and we become men little by little and always running the risk of failure if we do not act according to the fullness of our humanity. This is read in terms of the relationship between paternal-filial relation and our being: we leave and we are left, in such a way that only the relations (σχέσεις) orphaned of the realities remain.
Instead, the divine Persons and the divine Persons alone are truly Father and Son, and eternally so, whereas in us relation and substance can be separated on account of our imperfections and finitude. In the cited text, it can be noted that for Gregory of Nazianzus relations seem to remain even in the absence of subjects to which these same relations might refer. As we shall see in the following analysis as well, the new ontology is clearly at work. It is parallel, though rendered in greater simplicity, to that which is already seen spoken of the Holy Spirit in Oratio . Gregory asks whether Father is the name of some substance or an action (οὐσίας͵ ἢ ἐνεργείας ὄνομα). This crossroads would lead to absurdity with the conclusion that the Son would have to have a different substance
In the Oratio , Gregory refers to the “natural inclination and mutual relation (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις) between those who generate and those who are generated, such that they are united in love”: Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De theologia), ,–: SCh , p. . In the Epistula (known also as Gregory of Nyssa’s Epistula n. ) one speaks of the τῶν πατέρων τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγαπητικὴν σχέσιν (Gregory of Nyssa, Epistula , ,–: P. Gallay, II, p. ). Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio (De moderatione in disputando), PG , C. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio (De pauperum amore), PG , B. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio (De Filio), ,–: SCh , p. . Ibid., ,: SCh , p. .
. Conclusion
(ἑτεροούσιον) than that of the first Person. Otherwise, it would be reduced to absurdity by the claim that the Son is created and not generated (ποίημα͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐ γέννημα), insofar as an operation must yield as fruit an act distinct from the agent. There is, then, a third solution offered: “Father” is neither the name of a substance – o wise ones – nor of an action, but of a relation (σχέσεως): of the Father’s mode of being with respect (πῶς ἔχει πρός) to the Son, and that of the Son with respect to the Father. In fact, as also occurs among us, these denominations make known the link of blood and kinship, thus they indicate the connaturality (ὁμοφυίαν) of the begotten with respect to the begetter. But let us concede to you that the Father is a substance; this would still include (συνεισάξει) the idea of Son, and it would not rule it out, based on the common notions and to the meaning of these names.
It is clearly seen that the way to link the new ontological conception of the relation with Greek metaphysics is to include the relation in the divine substance, in such a way that Father and Son are not two different substances but one, single substance with different πῶς ἔχει. The radical innovation consists in the fact that these relational modes cannot be accidents, and this is the opposite of what is seen in classical categories of being. Thus, the analysis of the doctrine of Gregory of Nazianzus confirms what has been said about his namesake from Nyssa, highlighting the explicitly ontological intention of their thought.
. : At the close of this long series of analyses it seems we are able to say that the theological elaboration of Trinitarian revelation has been led by Scripture toward this development of the category of relation. The names Father and Son in fact imply identical nature and relational distinction. Applying schesis to God required a purification and transformation of the ontological notion. Together with spirituality and eternity, divine perfection required that relation should not be put outside the divine substance, without, as a bond of union between Persons conceived as different natures, but that the schesis should be inserted in the substance, within immanence. This is why the role played by πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις ends up being so fundamental, after having been already something of great interest to
Ibid., ,–: SCh , .
The Cappadocian Reshaping
Alexander of Aphrodisia, Galen, Plotinus and Porphyry. Through the impetus of Clement of Alexandria, the Trinitarian reflection clearly entered into dialogue with the various exegeses surrounding the Categoriae developed in the Aristotelian tradition. Addressing this metaphysical reflection becomes central in the debate waged between Eunomius and the Cappadocians. In particular, the interpretation of reciprocal relation becomes essential to the orthodox formulation of the Trinitarian Creed. It is evident that all three Cappadocians have a clear ontological intention in their argumentation. Not only do they have recourse to technical terminology, but they elaborate it in an original way. The transformation of πὼς ἔχειν into πὼς εἶναι is proof of this. Yet this development of σχέσις clearly does not correspond to an abandonment of substance, since relation is placed within immanence. In this sense, one might say that the Cappadocians developed classical metaphysics into a new ontology, one that recognizes relation to have a value that is not merely accidental. This analysis also offers some insight into the question of Eunomius’ philosophical sources. The axis that unites Alexander of Aphrodisia, Galen, Plotinus and Porphyry throughout the discussion is striking. The language and occurrences of the expression πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις distinctly point in this direction. Basil likely took up this instrument during his time spent with the homeousians of the Eusebian tradition. We might perhaps also attribute some influence to Iamblichus inasmuch as he introduced schesis into the sphere of the intelligible. The notion of mutual relation in Eunomius seems in fact to call upon a Neo-Pythagorean
In this sense, John Zizioulas’ position would have to be nuanced: for example, Gregory of Nazianzus, as we have seen, in his ontological analysis of the Father and the Spirit clearly places both under the category of substance, numerically the same, without ever thinking of it as in opposition to being Person. Attention given to the relational category and the acknowledgment of the monarchy of the Father, personal principle of unity, cannot be to the detriment of substance. The same can be said of Augustine, who is accused of relying on a notion of relation of a Neo-Platonic variety – criticism of him ought to be revisited inasmuch as, and in what has been demonstrated, for Plotinus and Porphyry relation is simply an accident, and Augustine is quite distant from such a claim (see, as one example among many, Augustine’s De Trinitate, , ,). See on this, G. Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers, – and “Relazione e ontologia in Gregorio di Nissa e Agostino,” Scripta Theologica (): –. In descending order, authors prior to the fourth century who use the expression most often are: Gregory of Nyssa, Alexander of Aphrodisia, Porphryr, Gregory of Nazianzus, Plotinus and Galen. In the first three authors, there are more than ten occurrences.
. Conclusion
component that goes beyond any influence of Plotinus or Porphyry. An analysis of the theory of Eunomian language indeed points toward Iamblichus, as Jean Daniélou carefully demonstrates. On the one hand, the same French scholar acknowledges the influence of the Chaldean oracles, and, on the other hand, he has historically identified Julian’s court as the probable meeting point between the thought of Iamblichus and Eunomius. What this analysis suggests, then, is that in speaking of the unity of the one and triune God we cannot set the personal dimension in opposition to that of substance. This becomes particularly clear if we take on the perspective of relation as not just some other principle with respect to substance, rather as its immanent dimension. The Cappadocian Fathers, and in particular Gregory of Nyssa, have not only avoided any rejection of metaphysics but have actually developed it into a new ontology.
This might explain the accusation launched by Gregory of Nyssa at Eunomius to be a follower of Philo (cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, , ,–: GNO II, ,–,; and III, , ,–,: GNO II, p. ,–), which Clement of Alexandria defined as Neo-Pythagorean, as already seen (cf. n. in Chapter ). Cf. Daniélou, “Eunome l’Arien et l’exégèse neó-platonicienne du Cratyle,” –. Ilaria Ramelli highlights how Iamblichus’ Neo-Platonism developed the concept of revealed authority precisely through the tradition of the Caldaic Oracles: cf. I. Ramelli, “Apofatismo cristiano e relativismo pagano: un confronto tra filosofi platonici,” in A. M. Mazzanti (ed.), Verità e mistero (Bologna: ESD, ), –. From his perspective Iamblichus’ Neo-Platonism was more palatable as a conceptual context for thought of Christian inspiration, when compared to Plotinus and Porphyry. Mark DelCogliano recently criticized Jean Daniélou’s position, maintaining that Eunomius, more than by pagan philosophy, was influenced by theological developments that he observed in a strictly Christian environment, particularly in Athanasius: M. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names: Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy (Leiden: Brill, ), –. Yet the separation between the two spheres – that which is philosophical and that which is theological – cannot be considered so well-defined and the Eunomian theory of schesis points directly to a graduated ontological picture of a likely Neo-Pythagoric blend. Lewis Ayres sees the Aristotelian-Neo-Platonic tradition as an important element in the notion of relation in Basil: L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –. He particularly notes how the terminology of schesis was even present in Iamblichus and the writings of the emperor Julian (see n. ).
Knowledge and Relation
. After having recognized an extension of classical ontology in the thought developed by the Cappadocians from Trinitarian revelation, it is worth asking what reflection this had on the cognitive level in general. From a gnoseological point of view, in the fourth century both Christian thought and Neo-Platonic philosophy had come to affirm apophaticism. Indeed, some Neo-Platonic philosophers such as Temistius and Plotinus radicalize the isolation of the One to the extent of actually establishing an authentic relativism, somewhat convergent with Skeptical positions such as those of Sextus Empiricus, whereas other authors, such as Iamblichus and Proclus deny this relativistic outcome in the name of a revelation, which would be constituted by the ancient myths, mediated by the Chaldean tradition. Their position from this perspective parallels that of Christian authors who rely on historic revelation. The different outcome in terms of relation with truth depends precisely on the category of Revelation. If this were the case, the metaphysical novelty presented in the previous chapters would have no cognitive repercussions. It is therefore necessary to investigate the distinctive character of Christian apophaticism, specifically that of Gregory of Nyssa, with respect to Neo-Platonic apophaticism, regardless of the latter’s relativistic conclusions. Specifically, Gregory of Nyssa’s deepening of the apophatic dimension will be examined, verifying the connection between the
Cf. I. Ramelli, “Apofatismo cristiano e relativismo pagano: un confronto tra filosofi platonici,” in A. M. Mazzanti (ed.), Verità e mistero (Bologna: ESD, ),–.
. Relation and Silence
gnoseological level and that of the outlined new ontology, which the confrontation with the Arians had forced him to develop. At first glance, this connection is not always obvious, for apophaticism is born precisely out of the context of a graduated Greek theology in the sense that the first principle is placed at the apex of an ontological scale that descends by degree when moving away from this first principle. In this context, silence protects the absoluteness of the archê, which is what it is precisely because it has no relation with that which is inferior to itself, whereas the intermediate ontological degrees serve as mediators between it and the world. This absolute apophaticism is preserved in the NeoPlatonic reflection on the One and becomes a fundamental point also in the Christian context in the theological discussions of the fourth century. The reflection of the apologists had already revealed the difficulty of connecting the Word and the Silence of the Absolute: the latter, in fact, by essence must be infinite and inexpressible, while the Son, His Word, revealed Himself with a concrete face and name. Thus, according to Justin, only the Father is uncircumscribable (ἀπερίγραπτος), whereas the Word is such that He can take on flesh and reveal Himself. Ignatius of Antioch, then, identifies the Father with the Silence out of which the Word emerges, according to a form of phrasing that is also found in the Gnostic reflection on the Sigê. For Clement, the Son has his own subsistance, called perigraphê, that makes His “being called” possible. With respect to the Father, the difference would be substantial, as the possibility of “being called” would be related, in this first reflection, to the personal dimension, which it is not yet possible to purify from the concept of limitedness and which, therefore, cannot be applied to the Father. The very concept of Logos would thus necessarily imply the Son’s subordination to the Father. This is fully manifested in Neo-Platonism,
Cf. Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone ; PTS (Marcovich), . Ignatius of Antioch, Epistula ad Magnesios, , Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto , : SCh , p. . Cf. J. Daniélou, “La notion de personne chez les Pères grecs,” Bulletin des Amis du Card. Danièlou (): –. J. D. Zizioulas demonstrates the limitations in Origen and the role he plays in this field. The criticism of his Platonic notion of truth deserves to be seen in its nuances, even if it perfectly highlights the ambiguities in Origen’s understanding of relationship between truth and history. Cf. Zizioulas, Being and Communion: Studies in the Personhood of the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, ), –.
Knowledge and Relation
as Plotinus observes that one cannot speak of the One because to speak of something always presupposes distinction and multiplicity: In fact, if we consider [the One] as knowing and known, then we consider It manifold.
The Logos is thus necessarily linked to multiplicity. It is interesting to compare Plotinus’ text to Gregory of Nyssa’s thought and doctrine. As occurs with the concept of generation, so, too, is a purification necessary in the case of logos with respect to the material dimension in order to truly comprehend the sense of revelation in the New Testament. It is clear that Gregory of Nyssa likewise denies the possibility of there being multiplicity in the archê. For this reason, in his argument with Eunomius he rejects the physical word being in God inasmuch as a voice requires the material support of air. He adds that even human beings are able to communicate in silence, for example, through one’s gaze. The necessary conclusion is, then: But where distance cannot be thought of, conjunction is admitted without doubt, and what is in total union is not united by the mediation of voice or word (φωνῇ καὶ λόγῳ). But I call totally united what is completely without separation. In fact, the term ‘union’ does not mean a corporeal cohesion in the intellectual nature, but the union of it and the convergence of the intelligible with the intelligible in the identity of the wills.
This purification occurs along the lines of what is intelligible. A distinctive feature of Gregory’s position with respect to the philosophy of the time is his reference to the will, as we have already seen. Union of what is intelligible is accomplished in the identity of the spiritual will. In this way, it is possible to speak of an eternal Logos, different than the created logos, inasmuch as the Logos is a divine Person ever present in the archê and distinct from the Father at the level of relation, yet all within the one, single substance. Indeed, the Logos belongs to the “sphere of relation” (τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων). Therefore, as we have already seen, it is the shift to the relational dimension, combined with the reference made to the will, that allows Gregory to insert the Logos into the divine archê. Gregory of Nyssa
Plotinus, Enneades V, , , – See also ibid. III, , , –. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–,. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–,. See the text of the Oratio Cathechetica Magna cited in Section ... Even Plotinus in Enneades VI, deals with the will of the One that is, however, identified by its essence such that it excludes any relation. Yet for Gregory unity is tied to will inasmuch as unity is relational. See Section ...
. God’s Name Is Wonder
denies there could be logos understood as voice, as created word in God, whereas Plotinus denies that there could be any distinction between the knower and the known one. Yet Gregory can indeed speak of this distinction because here knowledge is transformed by the will and by the acknowledgment of union in terms of communion of love. Ontology is changed and relation is no longer considered to be accidental. The NeoPlatonic One and the One in Gregory are different. The former is based on a concept of philosophical unity, derived from observation of the created world. The latter is instead born out of Trinitarian revelation. Hence, Gregory can place the eternal Logos in the divine archê, with which He constitutes a single nature. The question thus becomes: does this change in the conception of the eternal Logos have a reflection on the conception of knowledge in general, that is, on human logos?
. ’ Gregory of Nyssa’s apophaticism is generally traced back to his deep understanding of the fact of God’s infinity. This is absolutely true, as read in the following text: In fact, we, believing that the divine nature is undefinable and incomprehensible, cannot conceive of any comprehension of it, but we say that in each way this nature is considered in its infinitude (ἐν ἀπειρίᾳ). What is absolutely infinite (ἄπειρον) is not limited by some things and not others; but infinitude (ἀπειρία) eludes all boundaries. Therefore, what is beyond the boundary is absolutely not limited, even by a name.
From this perspective, it would seem that the apophaticism in Gregory shares the same theoretical foundations as found in Neo-Platonism. And yet, surprisingly, Gregory of Nyssa extends his apophaticism to the sphere of creation as well, that is, to what is finite and material. He says in fact that one cannot even translate the human soul into terms and concepts, nor could one do this with man’s flesh. More than this, apophaticism is also applied to cosmic matter:
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, ,–. Cf. L. Karfíková, “Infinity,” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory di Nyssa (Leiden; Boston: Brill, ), –. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–,. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomiom II, GNO I, ,–,. Cf. ibid., GNO I, ,–.
Knowledge and Relation
Thus, observing the sky and making our own, in a certain way, through the visual faculties the beauty of the heavenly summit, we of course do not doubt that what is seen does exist, and yet if we are asked what it is, we cannot explain its nature in words, but we are filled with wonder in seeing the cyclical turning of the universe and the harmonious motion in the opposite direction of the planets and the cycle called the Zodiac, as engraved perpendicular to the pole, with which the learned men in these disciplines study the movement of those bodies that develop their course in the opposite direction.
The extension of apophaticism to the finite world is proof that Gregory is moving according to a different theory of knowledge, one that is an expression of a different ontology. Obviously, the claim that not even created realities can be understood and expressed by language harkens back to the Creator, source of their being. This is why Gregory of Nyssa uses the argument of the impossibility of “saying” or “speaking of” created things in order to a fortiori sustain the apophaticism pertaining to the infinite nature of God. Ironically, he replies to Eunomius that if he cannot understand the nature of an ant, how can he aspire to understand the nature of God? This is a central and reoccurring theme in his response to the Eunomians: If, therefore, inferior creation which is shown openly to our senses, is beyond the limits of human knowledge, how is it possible that He who with only His will gave subsistence to the universe is within reach of our understanding?
The ontological transcendence of what is real with respect to words is based on the foundational relation that unites creation to its Creator. In this regard it is worth noting a certain evolution in Gregory of Nyssa’s thought. In chapter of the De opificio hominis, dedicated to the incomprehensibility of the human mind, Gregory in his commentary on Rm : (“who has known the mind of the Lord”) rebukes those who claim comprehensibility of the divine nature that they cannot even claim to know themselves, because they do not even know the nature of their own intelligence. Apophaticism, on the level of creation, is here based on the doctrine of the image and thus limited to the human nature and indeed to its spiritual dimension. If the soul were comprehensible, it would still be
Ibid., GNO I, ,–. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, ,–. For a summarized account of the hierarchy of being in Gregory, see D. Balás, Metousia theou: Man’s Participation in God’s Perfection according to St. Gregory (Rome: Herder, ), –. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, II, GNO I, ,–.
. God’s Name Is Wonder
an imperfect image of its divine archetype, which in and of itself is incomprehensible. The reasoning behind this is based on an ontology that is still quite Platonic, although this will later be modified to the point of applying apophaticism to all of cosmic matter. Once again, it is the will that constitutes the root of this difference when compared to the philosophical position. Gregory explicitly states: “It is the thing, not the name, that springs forth by divine will.” This is why human knowledge must always be a posteriori, starting from history and all that which God has done. No human being comes to know anything by nature, that is, in a way that is both automatic and necessary, because knowing is always a gift. It is always so because being is always a gift, fruit of the will of God who creates not by necessity but out of love. Therefore, one only comes to know through wonder and adoration, as is written in the eleventh homily in the In Canticum canticorum: When [the soul] is elevated from the realities down here to the knowledge of higher realities, even if she understands the wonders of God’s activity, she does not immediately proceed further in the inquisitive search (διὰ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης) but admires and adores Him of whose existence she knows solely through what He accomplishes (μόνον δι’ ὧν ἐνεργεῖ γινωσκόμενον).
Divine action thus becomes the insurmountable limit of human knowledge, knowledge that can make its way toward the Creator only through history and from action, that is to say, by the free act of divine love. For this reason, action (ἐνέργεια) itself is identified in the In Canticum canticorum as the hand of the Bridegroom in Song : (“my Beloved puts his hand to the latch”). It is the limit of any possibility of knowledge, yet at the same time it is the way of accessing the personal relation of union with the Beloved. This union comes about in silence precisely because it is personal and out of love, something that comes about in the free gift of the will and not out of necessity. It is a union that emerges out of silence because it is a personal relation.
Ibid., GNO I, ,–. The topic resurfaces in Homily XII, where Gregory says the name of God is not known but only admired, commenting on Ps :: cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum, GNO VI, ,–. The Bridegroom’s search is linked to the transcendence of the divine Logos with respect to the cognitive capacity in mankind, a transcendence that renders knowledge possible only in the wonder within relation (cf. ibid., ,–,). Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum XI, GNO VI, ,–,. Cf. ibid. XI, ,–.
Knowledge and Relation
The shadow in which Moses meets God corresponds to the silence of the Canticum. Renunciation of mankind’s own method of coming to know and trust in the voice of God who is calling become the only way to get to know the personal God, beyond all human possibilities. Yet again, only in wonder is true knowledge possible, as the one and true name of God is wonder. Hence, paradoxically, apophaticism that seems to place an obstacle in the road to knowledge becomes the highest way to knowledge. Divine activity itself, which blocks all access to the Divine that does not start from history, becomes a way of knowledge of the immanence of the one and triune God. Indeed, God’s action is always personal and marked by the relational dimension of his being: But each activity (ἐνέργεια), which spreads to creation from God and is named according to the various conceptions, originates from (ἐκ) the Father, continues (πρόεισι) through (διά) the Son, and is accomplished in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit.
If Trinitarian ontology can be said to correspond to putting prepositions to being, trinitarian gnoseology would consist in recognizing prepositions in divine action in order to go back from knowledge to being. The prepositions correspond exactly to relations, which are reflected in the action of the Trinity. We can speak of God, of the one and triune God, because words can grasp the movement of hypostasis, as shadow follows the movement of a person illuminated by the sun. In this ability to grasp the relational dynamic is founded the necessity of language, for which Silence and Word are correlative and refer to each other. All this is clearly illustrated in the manifestations of apophaticism in the In Canticum canticorum, where the song of love unfolds in the spousal union and silence is the expression of the relation. In this context, Martin Laird perceptively inserts the category of λογόφασις to explain the apparent paradox emerging from the fact that “the encounter, however apophatic, does not, paradoxally, leave the bride speechless” but actually prompts to loudly praise the Bridegroom and call upon the other
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De Vita Moysis, SCh ter, II, –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, ,–. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–,. See the powerful text in Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–, quoted in Section .. Cf. M. Laird, “Apophasis and Logophasis in Gregory of Nyssa’s Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum,” Studia Patristica (): –. Ibid., .
. God’s Name Is Wonder
virgins. This is not only true of the Bride but of Paul and John as well. It is always “an encounter which begins as apophatic finishes as logophatic.” The relationship is fulfilled in silence and flourishes in singing. This coexistence of silence and chant reveals precisely the relational depth of Gregory of Nyssa’s apophaticism. It does not deny the possibility of knowing God but affirms that the only way to do so is through relationship. It is not a question of the intellectual capacity or purity of the knowing subject, as demonstrated by the impossibility of the angels themselves to know the Trinity: Thus the soul [i.e., the bride] went through the entire angelic order and since she did not see that which she sought among the goods that she found, she thought to herself: “Perhaps for them the one whom I love is comprehensible?” and says to them: “Have you seen him whom my heart loves?” (Song :). However, because they were silent before the question and with their silence they demonstrated that even for them that which she seeks is incomprehensible, as soon as she had gone in mental pursuit throughout the entire spiritual city and did not get to know what she was looking for even among intelligible and incorporeal beings, then renouncing everything she had found, she knew whom she sought, whose existence is known only in the impossibility of comprehending that which He is. In fact, every element that makes it known is an obstacle for those who seek Him come to find Him.
Gregory interprets the friends of the Bridegroom in the text of the Song of Songs as referring to the celestial creatures, who are also subject to apophaticism, even though they are purely spiritual and do not have the weight of the body. The dialogue with the bride is extremely effective, because the radicality of Gregory’s anti-idolatrous stance shines through. But the negative moment is not a point of arrival but rather a point of departure: And if it is not too bold to say, perhaps [the angelic powers] have marvelled seeing the beauty of the Bridegroom in the Bride, invisible and incomprehensible to all. In fact, He who “no one has ever seen” (Jn :), as John says, and who “no human being has seen or can see” ( Tim :), as Paul testifies, made the Church His Body and built in love through the addition of the saved, “until we all attain . . . mature manhood, to the extent of the full stature of Christ” (Eph :). Therefore, if the Church is the Body of Christ and the Head of the Body is Christ, Who forms the face of the Church with His own image, perhaps the friends of the Bridegroom are heartened watching her because in her they see the invisible more distinctly.
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum, GNO VI, ,–. Laird, “Apophasis and Logophasis,” . Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum, GNO VI, ,–,.
Cf. ibid., ,–.
Knowledge and Relation
Like those who do not manage to see the disk of the sun, they see it in splendor reflected in the water, so also [the angelic powers] in the pure mirror that is the Church they contemplate the Sun of Justice known through that which appears.
Gregorius’ text is very bold, because it not only applies apophaticism to the angels but also shows how angelic creatures know the Trinity only through the Church. The distance from Platonism and Neo-Platonism cannot be greater, because the theory of knowledge is here totally transfigured by Incarnation. If Christ is the only way to know the Trinity, then His ecclesial body is like a mirror in which it becomes possible to see the sun. The material veil reveals. And the relational dimension is here the ontological foundation of the cognitive act itself, as the following words of the Bride show: Therefore, ceasing to speak to the young girls, the bride returns to pray to the bridegroom, taking as name of the One whom she desired the intimate relationship (ἐνδιάθετον σχέσιν) to Him.
The only name and the only sign that can express God is, therefore, the relation immanent in the human heart, that is, the schesis born of grace that founds the Trinitarian indwelling in the soul. To know, then, means to be in a relation with the One who is in Himself Eternal Relation. For divine Goodness, the limit becomes a way of accessing the intimacy of the one and triune God, who is radically beyond the capacities of the human being, but who opens Himself to the latter out of love. Knowledge, therefore, is fulfilled for Gregory in adoration, because the very being of God is adoration, as reciprocal relations of love and praise, in the mutual being of one Person in and through the other of the Trinity. Christian apophaticism is thus essentially different from philosophical apophaticism inasmuch as it is a gnoseological translation of a new ontology, emerged from reflection on Trinitarian revelation. The Greek Logos is characterized by limitation, because it is a figure of ontological mediation that expresses the necessary proportion that unites the world to the Divine. The Trinitarian Logos, instead, reveals His specificity in the categories of will and relation. To being itself, which in the deepest intimacy of the triune God is relation, corresponds a relational and free
Ibid., GNO VI, ,–,. Ibid., GNO VI, ,–. See Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–. See also G. Maspero, Re-Thinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, ), –.
. Trinitarian Knowledge
knowledge, which can only be given in communion, that is, in union with the other. In this way, silence reveals that the Word is Relation. The truest knowledge of reality can only be gained through faith, that is, through the indwelling of the Trinity itself in the soul of the just (wo)man, in the human heart, there where “knowledge becomes love” (ἡ δὲ γνῶσις ἀγάπη γίνεται).
. So the progression of the thought on the very immanence of God together with the shift from the logos ut ratio to Logos ut relatio and the relational notion of life as being are quite naturally reflected in human knowing. Indeed, once being is revisited through the perspective of relation and freedom, it becomes clear how this new ontology is mirrored in the theory of knowledge. In this sense, we could say that through Revelation human language can grasp relation and even eternal relation. But this is only possible if man, as we have seen, recognizes the limits of his knowing on the level of nature and substance: But [the human mind] on one hand conjectures (ἐστοχάσατο) something of what she seeks through the contact (ἐπαφῆς) of reasoning, and on the other, she has knowledge of it in a certain way (κατενόησεν) due to the very fact of not being able to contemplate it (κατιδεῖν), forming in herself, so to speak, a clear knowledge (γνῶσιν) of the fact that what is sought is above and beyond all knowledge (γνῶσιν).
The condition for human reason to touch the divine nature is precisely the acceptance of apophaticism, that is, the rejection of the necessary connection between being and knowing. Instead, in the Platonic as well as the Aristotelian framework, the necessary connection between knowledge and ontology is rooted in the identity between essence and being intelligible. To know means to know the essence of a thing, inasmuch as it is an image of some Idea acquired through memory or an intelligible form obtained through a process of abstraction, a process that in and of itself is
Gregory of Nyssa, De Anima et resurrectione, GNO III/, ,–,. From a perspective of philosophy of language, the original quality of Gregory of Nyssa has been deeply highlighted by Marcello La Matina: cf. M. La Matina, “Philosophy of Language,” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory di Nyssa (Leiden; Boston: Brill, ), –. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–.
Knowledge and Relation
considered infallible. Yet because essences are connected in a necessary way, so, too, can thought reach the first principle in a necessary way. Hence, even if there are here two different paths – in Plato directly from the soul to the Ideas, in Aristotle by way of the mediation of the senses and the material world – these two approaches to knowledge lead to the same outcome. From a Trinitarian perspective, things are quite different, for in its depth and profundity being is relation and such that only in relation and freedom does it become knowable. The authentic distinction between ontology and knowledge is therefore the Cappadocian bastion of orthodoxy. It guarantees that the sphere of thought is not confused with that of essence, thus paving the way for relational thinking. The crucial question that the Christian thinker might put to the Greek is this: if essences are intelligible, by whom are they intelligible? By God or also by the intellect of a sufficiently wise human being? In the Trinitarian conception, in fact, only God can understand God, as only the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity, is the authentic knowledge of the Father. We have already seen how the question of the relationship between ontology and language was an essential part of the orthodox formulation of the Trinitarian dogma. The Cappadocian Fathers were provoked into a reflection on the value of the name through the Trinitarian dispute with Eunomius. The latter held that the divine essence was in fact something human reason could grasp. Inspired by Platonic influence, he maintained that the names had been revealed by God and that agennêtos, which means ungenerated, was a name that adequately expressed the substance of God the Father, the only Person who would have created everything. The same would hold for the name γεννητός – generated – that indicates the substance of the Son: the substance of the Father and that of the Son would not, then, coincide because they are indicated by distinct names. The Spirit in turn would not have any power to create and would only be the energy through which the Son produces the world. In a nutshell, Eunomius denied the consubstantiality of the three Persons, relying on a neo-Platonic logicist theory of names, which once again involves a logos understood as a necessary relationship. In this way, he claims that the
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, b–a and De anima , a.–b.. The substance of the Father would hereby coincide with not being generated, as read in Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–.
. Trinitarian Knowledge
planes of being and of knowledge are identical. Gregory responds to this by distinguishing being from being said: In fact, it is not the existing in an unbegotten way that derives from being called unbegotten, but it is being called such that derives from existing in an unbegotten way.
It should be noted that the discussion focuses precisely on the Aristotelian inheritance, mediated by the neo-Platonic tradition. Gregory in fact lashes out at Eunomius’ recourse to the logos of necessary proportion, calling him technologos (τεχνολόγος) inasmuch as he remains caught in Aristotle’s and Aëtius’ philosophical framework of bad technology (κακοτεχνία), which necessarily links ontology and knowledge. On the contrary, the ontological plane must have priority, just as immanence takes precedence over and establishes economy: names cannot always have been in existence because only God is eternal. The names, rather, belong to the created world, to διάστημα, and as such are human works. The capacity to bestow names is part of the divine image imprinted upon mankind inasmuch as names are not pure flatus vocis, but human inventions made possible by a divine gift, that is rational nature. This is capable of entering into an analogical relationship with reality and allows man to express his immanence and communicate: The Creator of our rational nature has given us discursive reason that is proportionate (ἀναλογοῦντα) to the measure of the nature, so that we were able to express the motions (κινήματα) of the soul with it.
God is not, therefore, knowable in himself automatically, that is, known without going through history and wonder before His acting. Access to being does not come through names but through ἐνέργεια. And this is not only true of God, but for every created being, inasmuch as apophaticism pertains precisely to the relationship between ontology and knowledge. Gregory’s philosophy of language is thus radically open. He emphasizes human freedom and creativity without overstepping the limits placed
For the argument between Eunomius and Gregory regarding the question of names, see M. S. Troiano, “I Cappadoci e la questione dell’origine dei nomi nella polemica contro Eunomio,” in Vetera Christianorum (): –. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomiom II, GNO I, ,. Ibid., ,– Cf. ibid., GNO I, ,. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, GNO I, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–. Cf. H. von Balthasar, Présence et pensée (Paris: Beauchesne, ), .
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upon creation, and he always stays solidly anchored in a healthy realism. Names are invented by human beings and always according to the nature of the thing named. The heart of the question touched upon here is precisely the relationship between being and language in an ontological context transfigured by Trinitarian revelation. Without opening up a detailed discussion regarding the differences between this notion in Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa, it is clear that, according to the former, names and being are bound together in a necessary relationship that unites the world and God in a sort of hierarchy, whereas for Gregory, thought cannot possess being, which always remains protected by the apophatic veil. A being is only truly intelligible for God. Yet the human being can obtain a certain grasp of the dynamics of relations by way of analogy and the personal dimension. Human knowledge can never be a priori, as Eunomius insinuates when he claims the possibility of coming to understand being through a name and the logos of necessary proportion. But the act of knowing is necessarily a posteriori, through the possibility of recognizing relations established in God’s utter freedom in the world and in history. Given that relation is the foundation of being, authentic knowing must be identical to grasping relation both with respect to God and to creation. Concepts do not provide the understanding of essences. Rather, knowledge is always possible through relation and thus by way of judgments. Thus, in the light of the proposed Trinitarian reading of Gregory of Nyssa’s ontology, apophaticism can be seen as a reflection of this relational dimension at the level of knowledge. This does not undermine the true possibility of cognitive acts because the proposed re-reading shows how Gregory’s apophaticism is simply an apophaticism of concept and not an apophaticism of judgment. The former is a denial of the possibility of translating the nature of God or creatures into concepts. Judgment, on the other hand, remains possible, precisely because of the relational structure of being that can be grasped by the human intellect. In fact, since the logos is read as a relation in God, the human logos is also understood in the light of this new conception, being identified with the capacity to recognize relations.
Regarding the value of sensible knowledge and its trustworthiness, see A. A. Weiswurm, The Nature of Human Knowledge according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, ), –. For the distinction between the two types of apophaticism, see M. Pérez de Laborda, “La preesistenza delle perfezioni in Dio. L’apofatismo di san Tommaso,” Annales Theologici (): –.
. Ontology and Knowledge
In other words, Gregory’s theory of knowledge is a reflection of a relational ontology, hence of a syntactic ontology, which differs markedly for the metaphysical gap from the Platonic-Aristotelian semantic ontology. Indeed, in the Cappadocian context, being can no longer be identified with the idea or intelligible form that the process of abstraction infallibly captures, as in Aristotle’s De anima. Thus, being does not necessarily correspond to a conceptual representation, barring the way to the cognitive ascent of the ontological hierarchical scale by the forces of reason alone. Thus, Gregory of Nyssa’s apophaticism is a semantic apophaticism, but not a syntactic apophaticism, because it is the relational dimension that becomes the path to the knowledge of truth, at the created level and in the relationship with the Creator. Precisely for this does Gregory say that theology must be ecclesial insofar as it is only in relation and communion that authentic human knowledge is made possible.
. The Trinitarian thought of Gregory of Nyssa is therefore presented as a Trinitarian ontology based on three main points: . the shift from logos as necessary proportion to logos as relation, with the corresponding ontological value assigned to prepositions (“God from God,” “Light from Light,” “Life from Life”); . recognition of the ontological role played by the will and corresponding affirmation of apophaticism; . the connection between God’s being and His action, accomplished through ἐνέργεια. This shows how, on an anthropological level, being is always perceived through another, as a gift from a person, founded on his or her free will. And this relational dimension of knowledge corresponds to the relational dimension of ontology, disclosed by Trinitarian revelation. Man thus discovers, starting from the knowledge of God, that his will is essential for knowledge itself, because the will is the basis of relation and union; at the same time, the human intellect shows all its strength not in possession though concepts, which is in itself impossible, but in the dynamic penetration of the relational fabric of reality, of which judgment is an expression. The specific nature of this Trinitarian ontology can be seen in the role assigned to the will, which stands irreducibly alongside the intellect, and in the centrality of filiation, that is the very meaning of all reality.
Knowledge and Relation
With respect to the solution offered by Greek philosophy in the resolution of the tension between Dionysius and Apollo in favor of the latter, Trinitarian revelation permits a re-reading of logos in light of the relationship of gift and love between the Father and Son. The logos is no longer an ontological intermediary between God and the world, which is the necessary proportion that keeps all things united and that can be grasped by the intellect. Rather, the Logos is in God and is a Person, indeed the beloved Son. There are important ontological and epistemological consequences that derive from this, all of which could be included in the contemporary discussions pertaining to the relationship between faith and reason. God has always had the Logos, who is God Himself and not merely some intermediary. God cannot, then, act against Himself and thus cannot act against the Logos. And this Logos is only accessible through the history of salvation and God’s gift of Himself to mankind. The Logos is given to us by an act of the Father’s free will, which in Gregory’s theology is expressed through the indispensable role assigned to activity (ἐνέργεια) in approaching God. It is impossible to approach Him on one’s own, exclusively with one’s own strength, but at the same time this infinite distance also marks the infinite value of human reason, which is marked by freedom and which allows for relationship, with God and between the human beings. Even on an anthropological level, if a word were exclusively mine it would do nothing to communicate anything. In order to create communion in an effective way, it must be simultaneously mine and yours. The true logos is, then, that which permits relation with reality and with persons. Hence, it is bound to love inasmuch as communication itself is an act of union in which one communicates something of himself or herself. Indeed, to speak meaningful words requires love, both received and given. The intellect is understood, then, as the capacity to recognize relations, since the gift has a radical anteriority. God, who is not reducible to a concept insofar as He is super-substantial, enters into relation with me and wants to have a word in common with me, a Word that cannot be other than Himself. Thus, man, too, created in the image and likeness of God discovers that he is capable of relation through his intellect and through his will. Precisely in this way does one come to recognize himself as capable of co-creating being, for the very foundation of being is relational and the human being has the possibility of creating relations. When a person
. Ontology and Knowledge
studies, when she cultivates relations, when she loves, in all these moments she is more and thus the world is more. When this does not happen, man suffers and the world suffers. This is due to the fact that even on a human level relations possess an ontological density that is not merely accidental: family and friendships have real consistency, which makes itself known precisely when these are thrown into crisis. The deficit of being experienced by the postmodern world not only pertains to the lack of something accidental but of a full and fundamental reality without which a human being cannot be a human being. From this perspective, psychology and sociology make a leap to the ontological level, and the ethical perspective can no longer be seen as a mere external imposition, to be recognized instead as an intrinsic dimension of being itself, which is now completely marked by freedom. In this way, the oscillation between existentialism and essentialism can be resolved, an oscillation that marks the history of human thought and that has as its fruits, on the one hand, relativism and subjectivism and, on the other, every form of totalitarianism and conservatism. The opposition between the reason of the individual and the necessary dependence on an extrinsic nature or law is resolved by the Trinitarian dimension, which unites essence and existence, in the connection of intellect and will through relation and person. The necessity of re-reading knowledge from the perspective of the theology of the image stems from this, emphasizing the dimension of the icon. Apophaticism prevents the mystery from being reduced to a level of concepts, yet this same mystery must nevertheless be communicated, that is, it requires there be some way of articulation in order for relation to be possible. We are dealing with precisely what occurs with icons, which do not replace Christ and the Trinity but rather are born out of a vital relation with Them and that direct all human persons to this relation. The victory of orthodoxy against iconoclasm, which concludes the series of the first seven ecumenical councils, thereby facilitates an essential leap forward in human thought – and in a universal sense. Indeed, an iconic conception of theology could be applied, or extended, to all science and to
This relational perspective can be very useful for transdisciplinarity, particularly with regard to the relationship of theology and philosophy with deeply humanistic disciplines. See in this regard: P. Donati - A. Malo - G. Maspero (eds.), Social Science, Philosophy and Theology in Dialogue: A Relational Perspective (London: Routledge, ); G. Maspero, “Remarks on the Relevance of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Doctrine for the Epistemological Perspective of th Century Psychoanalysis,” European Journal of Science and Theology (): –.
Knowledge and Relation
the very act of human cognition. In an extremely significant way, this council states that Gregory of Nyssa is considered by all to be the “Fathers of the Fathers.” In a natural way, the doctrine of the Fathers of the Church hereby provides a way to respond to the desperate contemporary relativism and all the pathologies that it induces. In order to cultivate hope when faced with this task, one must contemplate the figure of Mary. Her silent and adoring love might be the brightest icon of Trinitarian ontology, in the correspondence between the logical word (expression of her freely given obedience) and the ontological Word (welcomed into her very womb). All of this is perfectly accomplished when once again she embraces in her motherly arms Christ crucified at the foot of the Cross. Apophaticism is revealed in all of its splendor and depth in that silent yes that sustains the world over the abyss of nothing, in the transfiguration of life and person in pure relation of Mother and Son, which introduces all mankind into the mystery of the Father and the Son, to the depths of Being and Love.
. The link between theology and the Mother of God is wonderfully spoken of by Origen, where in one of his most beautiful works, at the beginning of his commentary on the fourth Gospel, he writes that no reader can grasp the sense of it if this person does not lay his or her head, as did John, in the bosom of Christ and receive Mary as Mother. In order to draw near to the mystery, the intellect must start from the Humanity of Christ and His Heart and move from that immanence to which one has access only through the yes of faith and a personal relationship. The adoration that permeates the whole of Mary’s life is, then, the fundamental attitude of being a theologian. This is an expression of the link between knowledge and relation, which emerges as a direct reflection on the notion of the Trinity in Gregory of Nyssa. One particular text elegantly illustrates how Trinitarian ontology might be defined as “attaching prepositions to being”: Do you see the circulation of glory through the same cyclical movements? The Son is glorified by the Spirit; the Father is glorified by (ὑπό) the Son. And likewise, the Son has His glory from (παρά) the Father, and the Only-begotten becomes the glory of the Spirit. In fact, in what would the Father be glorified if not the true
Second Council of Nicaea, Session VI: E. Lamberz, ACO II,/, ,–,. Cf. Origen, In Iohannis evangelium, I, : SCh , p. .
. Latreutic Theology
glory of the Only-begotten? And in turn, in what would the Father be glorified if not the greatness of the Spirit? So also thought (ὁ λόγος), entering into this circular motion, gives glory to the Son through (διά) the Spirit and to the Father through (διά) the Son.
Each Person is Himself in the other, becoming the glory of the other and preserving each One His own proper personal characteristic: the Father as the source of all glory and power, the Son who is the Son precisely because He receives the glory of the Father and the Spirit who, as we have seen, is the very Kingdom and Glory. It is precisely the prepositions, a grammatical reflection of the relational structure of the divine essence, that make knowledge of the divine immanence and liturgical praise possible. The end of the text cited above shows how for Gregory the basis of being is a mystery of adoration that facilitates a re-visiting of the cognitive act itself in a latreutic sense. The human logos is called to be part of the eternal movement of mutual praise of the three divine Persons. From here arises a profound link between ontology and theology of worship, which Gregory has in this way founded from the Trinitarian perspective. It is not, in fact, simply a matter of recognizing the omnipotence of a solitary god, extrapolated from human images, who, like idols or the powerful of the earth, requires submission and recognition of his supremacy: it is a question, instead, of the one and triune God. The notion of worship must, in fact, correspond to the revealed mystery. This is why both the word of man and his reason are called to be part of this movement, starting from the gift of the Spirit to reach the Son and arrive at the Father. If the three divine Persons are not acknowledged and honored, no true worship takes place. Human mind is called to elevation in a linear movement that plunges into the very mystery of the eternal exchange of glory within the Trinity, recognizing the depths of Being itself as an eternal dynamic of intratrinitarian relations of origin. This shift to relations allows for the foundation of a kind of worship that is properly Trinitarian, within the limits of apophaticism that, as we have seen, concerns nature and not personal relations. An example of this in a negative sense is the claim that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is projected onto the Son and from the Son to the Father, penetrating the divine immanence. The human word truly reaches divine immanence yet without any form of conceptual possession. Gregory is very clear in
Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–,.
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this: Revelation does not allow one to cognize the three eternal Persons but to re-cognize Them in the divine gift and action, yet the human being can in no way offer worthy worship to God. In the Adversos Macedonianos, Gregory, after having referred to Isaiah :, where the nations are compared to a drop in a bucket, poses an ironic question regarding what a drop could add to the glory of the divine nature. The same thing is said when dealing with Mt : when mankind is compared to grass: the human being cannot give honor that is worthy of God, as the light of a candle contributes nothing to the rays of the sun. Gregory categorically emphasizes the human impossibility of worshiping God in a worthy manner, for God has no need of man’s worship, as God’s very Being is the mystery of reciprocal adoration among the three divine Persons: the honor that is due, in the proper sense, to the divine nature is not carried out by our freedom, but subsists with the Divinity in a co-natural way.
Hence, the Holy Spirit being of divine nature is “worthy of honor and is glorious in his nature” (τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει τίμιον͵ ἔνδοξον). And again: Human nature has no gift worthy of God: in fact, our Creator has no need of our goods.
Worship worthy of the Creator must begin with an acknowledgment of the gift received and divine transcendence. Therefore, in parallel with theological language, it is necessary to purify liturgical expressions, which are taken from human custom but whose meaning changes substantially when they are addressed to the Trinity. The following text thus contains an argument similar to what is found in the Contra Eunomium II, wherein it reads that God can only be known in the same moment one acknowledges God to be unfathomable and utterly unknowable. In an analogous manner, one can only truly adore God when he understands that God is beyond all possible adoration and thereby cultivates in himself an attitude of humility. One thus comes to Gregory’s definition of adoration: adoration is this, the request of something that is desired, made with supplication and humility.
Cf. ibid., ,–. Cf. ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,– Cf. ibid., ,. Ibid., ,–. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, GNO I, ,–,. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–.
. Latreutic Theology
One must move from a logic of possession to the logic of gift and thus to the logic of the Trinity. Therefore, the answer to the question of how one ought to worship God takes as point of departure exactly these three Persons. God is to be adored as Trinity, and one must accept that only on account of God’s gift to mankind can human beings know God. This happens through the Son in the Spirit inasmuch as it is not possible to think of the Father without simultaneously addressing in thought the Son as well. Nor can one harbor the Son in mind without the Holy Spirit likewise being present. Thus, in an openness to the mystery of reciprocal correlation of the three divine Persons, authentic Christian worship is possible: So the true worshipper (Jn :), after having been purified from these corporeal and lowly notions concerning the One who commands and is Lord and has power and accomplishes every good in all creation, honors Him not in a way that is worthy of Him, but much more he can, like the widow who is presented as a model of generosity for her gift of two coins to the sacred treasury (Lk :–), not because the material merited admiration, but because she could not do more. One therefore concludes that everything from human beings that is designed to give honor and glory is far below the greatness of the Spirit and adds nothing to His glory, which remains the same, whether He is honored or not. Human nature only offers the gift of its freedom (τὴν προαίρεσιν) and only with its will does it carry out the gift that was proposed. Aside from the will, the initiative put in place and the movement has nothing else in its power.
The beauty of this passage is somewhat overwhelming and constitutes a noteworthy moment in the development of theological thought surrounding worship. Mankind is nothing and God’s glory does not depend on the will of the human being. Nevertheless, man can offer God his freedom. This is precisely the content of true worship. This is a new interpretation of the relationship between the Spirit and those who are worthy of him. This notion appears in Origen and is taken up by Basil: the Spirit brings gifts to those men and women who are worthy of sanctification. In the Adversos Macedonianos, this resurfaces where Gregory speaks of the sanctification that gushes out of the Father and through the Son is brought to fulfillment by the Spirit in those
Cf. ibid., ,–. Ibid., ,–. For example, in stating that one cannot speak of more or less in the Trinity, Origen says that starting from the Father as source the Word with His Spirit sanctifies all reality that is worthy of this (quae digna sunt): cf. Origen, De principiis, I, , ; P. Koetschau, GCS , p. . Cf., for example, Basil Adversus Eunomium, III, ,Z- (SCh , pp. – ) and the end of De Spiritu Sancto, XXX, (SChbis, pp. , ).
Knowledge and Relation
worthy of it (τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις). It also appears where Gregory states that the third Person is “with all those who are worthy of Him” (μετὰ πάντων ὂν τῶν ἀξίων) without the Spirit ever being separated from the Trinity. Yet the conclusion of the treatise, in the example of the widow’s offering, demonstrates that this being worthy consists precisely in recognizing oneself as unworthy, and this act is something achievable by anyone. Paradoxically, the condition to receive the Spirit is exactly comprehending that human beings can do nothing to deserve this. The initial condition, then, for true adoration is acknowledging the absolute transcendence and incomprehensibility of the divine nature: But that same [divine nature], precisely as it is the divine and blessed power, thus remains inaccessible and invisible to reason and leaves beneath it every agitation of the mind, strength of reason, movement of heart and momentum of desire, and all much more below that our bodies are separated by the stars.
Man thus perceiving the infinite height of God grasps the disproportion and humbles himself. Hence, perception of the impossibility of adoring the Trinity in a worthy manner does not bring the human person to give up, rather to his or her complete engagement. This dynamic is similar to the already mentioned logophasis proposed by Martin Laird, to indicate that the meeting of the bride with the bridegroom takes place in the apophatic dimension of the union but is transfigured in the overflowing of the words of praise.
. : Therefore, Gregory concludes, moving from the perception of the impossibility of praise worthy of nature to the salvation communicated by the three divine Persons: So willing, [the human being] dedicates his or her whole self to the service of the supreme nature. He or she does not honor it in some ways, refraining from others,
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–. Cf. ibid., ,. It seems that in this sense the observation by Wolf-Dieter Hauschild might be understood, that Gregory of Nyssa would have held a more rigorous position than Basil in what pertained to the spiritual dimension, and likewise in reference to the Messalians and to Simeon of Mesopotamia, with various elements harking back to a Syriac influence (cf. W.-D. Hauschild, Gottes Geist und der Mensch [Mϋnchen: Chr. Kaiser, ], –). Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–,. See Section ..
. Conclusion
but will dedicate to God, who is beyond all things, everything in his or her power that is great and superior, constantly directing all honor, glory, and adoration to the One who has the power to save him or her: in fact, the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit save.
Nothing short of everything would be enough for God. The very objective of theology is to bring human beings to grasp the infinite distance that separates them from God and lead persons to finally see the gift of salvation communicated by the Father, Son and Spirit. To acknowledge the Spirit as Creator and adore Him is, then, a condition upon which one comes to grasp the infinite transcendence of this God whose nature remains always and absolutely beyond human reach, yet who nonetheless calls mankind to participate in the life that constitutes the glorious eternal dynamic of intra-Trinitarian relations. Theology therefore fulfills itself by performing this latreutic function, which relates man to the one and triune God and leads him to recognize at the same time his unworthiness and the infinite depth of the mystery. According to Gregory of Nyssa, theology has an end of both praise and worship, which are given in the humble renunciation of every pretension before nature, in order to discover that the true foundation of Being is the relations of the Persons. True knowledge is realized not in the possession of concepts that express divine nature but in discovering the unknowability of God in order to open oneself to the relationship with the Trinity. We are talking of a personal knowledge that is born out of relation with the One who is in and of Himself the origin of all relations. For an example of Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of the task of theology, one might return once again to the icon: the person who bows his or her head before an icon acknowledges that the divine nature lies infinitely beyond the image, yet at the same time that it is possible to enter into relation with the mystery itself through the image as a personal mystery. Hence, Gregory claims that the Cross is θεολόγος in that by way of the form of its four arms it proclaims the absolute power of God and the divinity of the Son.
Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De tridui inter mortem et resurrectionem domini nostri Iesu Christi spatio, GNO IX, ,–.
Epistemology and Openness
. But how is it possible to speak of Christian philosophy in a gnoseological context such as that described in Chapter ? The theory of knowledge outlined by the Cappadocians, based on apophaticism and the ontological role of relation, seems to mark an absolute boundary between theology and philosophy, justifying modern criticism of the thought of the Fathers of the Church. It may be interesting, then, to take a brief look at the history of the definition of science according to Greek thought, in order to highlight an aporia that the relational dimension brings out and that the Cappadocian thought was able to address. This justifies the use of the expression “true philosophy” to refer to Christian life, particularly monastic life, which spread in the fourth century. So, if we look from the current perspective at the role and origin of epistêmê in Greek metaphysics, we are faced with a tension that can prove particularly fruitful even for the contemporary developments of thought. In fact, the etymology of the term itself (ἐπιστήμη from ἐπί + ἵστημι) refers to “standing by oneself,” that is, to a knowledge that needs no other or others, because the intellect has succeeded in reconstructing the chain of necessary connections that link the cause and the effect. Yet, in the Aristotelian Categoriae, the epistêmê, that is “science,” is placed among the relative realities. But how is it possible that a form of knowledge that
Cf. A.-M. Malingrey, “Philosophia”: Étude d’un groupe de mots dans la littérature grecque des présocratiques au IV e siècle après J. C. (Paris: Klincksiek, ).
. Science and Relation
is independent from doxa, therefore from the opinion of others, is classified within the realities that instead are essentially constituted by a relationship? We will see how this question is rooted in the central metaphysical issue of the relationship between the one and the many. This discussion has been taken up by the commentators of the Stagirite, who have recognized the tension, which the birth of theological thought has made, in a sense, to detonate. The Fathers had to ask themselves, in fact, in what sense can the doctrine on God be a science, as, in theology, thinking is based on the personal relationship of faith. Their response deserves to be rediscovered today, since it seems to have much to say to theology in postmodernity. The path sketched in this chapter will be divided into two steps. First the relational reinterpretation of the Greek metaphysical heritage by the Cappadocians will be shown to be linked to an epistemology capable of overcoming the aporia present in Platonic-Aristotelian thought. Then, in the light of the result obtained, the logical reflections of the Cappadocian discussion on time will be presented, in order to stress its topicality with respect to the incompleteness theorems highlighted by the advances in contemporary logic, which have shattered the modern positivist claims. In this way, it will be possible to show the relevance for current issues of the whole path of metaphysical revisitation proposed in the volume.
. Plato, in Phaedo, describes the teachings of Socrates awaiting the execution of his death penalty, which had been delayed because of the annual pilgrimage of Athenian ships to Delos to thank Apollo who had helped Theseus and saved the city from the Minotaur. Cebes and Simmias do not dare to continue questioning their teacher, who is about to die. But he himself encourages them, explaining that even swans raise their most beautiful song at the end of their lives not because of pain but because they are sacred to Apollo, like him, and therefore are clairvoyants. They sing because they prefigure the beauty of life after death. Socrates, who is a companion of the swans, is questioned, then, starting from the statement that thought cannot but critically examine the problems and that it is so necessarily faced with three possibilities: either learn science from a teacher, as Cebes and Simmias are doing, or find it for themselves, as
Plato, Phaedo, .b.
Epistemology and Openness
Socrates did but they cannot do, or follow the most likely opinion, to cross with it, as on a raft, the sea of existence. In addition to the doxa and the epistêmê based on the cause (αἰτία), however, there is a further path, which can be opened thanks to the arrival of a divine word. The text with the three possibilities is terrific in its force: either to learn from someone how things are, or to find it for yourself, or else, if that is impossible, to accept the best and most difficult to refute opinion of human beings and, grasping it like a raft (σχεδίας), venturing out to sail the sea of life, unless you have a firmer vessel (ὀχήματος) to make the crossing safer and less risky, that is, with the help of a divine logos (ἐπὶ λόγου θείου τινός).
This is one of the peaks of the superlative thought of Plato, in which the religious depth of the metaphysical act and the constant opening of intellectual research to the beyond are highlighted at the same time. So philosophy, in its constitutive origin, reveals the centrality of salvation as its goal and its ineludible openness. Aristotle resumes the opposition between doxa and epistêmê. In Ethica ad Nicomachum, he offers a definition of science that has marked every subsequent development. In VI,, in fact, he states that there are five dispositions through which the soul grasps the truth, both affirmatively and negatively (τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι): technology, science (ἐπιστήμη), knowledge, wisdom and intellect. Judgment and opinion (δόξῃ), however, are not counted in the number, because they may be wrong. So the Stagirite builds the definition (τί ἐστιν) of science starting from the statement that its object cannot be different from what really is, that is, from what necessarily exists and, therefore, is eternal (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν). But if it is eternal (ἀίδια) it is also ungenerated and incorruptible (ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα). The theological relevance of the issue is evident when, without falling into naive anachronisms, we reread the Aristotelian affirmation in the background of the Trinitarian discussion of the fourth century on the divinity of the Logos, that is, the eternal but generated Son, presented in the previous chapters.
See ibid., .b–c. On the relationship between them, see Meno, .c–.a, where it is said that epistêmê is based on knowledge of the cause, that is, reminiscence of ideas, and Theaetetus, .d– .c. Plato, Phaedo, .c–d. This corresponds to the aporetic, or rather apohatic, end of the Theaetetus itself (.c–d). See Aristotle, Ethica ad Nicomachum, b.–. See ibid., b.–.
. Science and Relation
Then Aristotle proceeds by observing that every science is teachable because the object of science can be learned (τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν). But every teaching comes from prior knowledge. This is obtained by two ways, one ascending and one descending, that is, the induction that leads back to the universals or the syllogism that, instead, starts from them. The conclusion is that science is a disposition to the demonstration (ἕξις ἀποδεικτική), in how much “there is science when one believes and one knows the principles of what one believes” (ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί͵ ἐπίσταται). From the theological perspective, the value of what has been said is evident and, at the same time, it is also manifest in the tension that can descend from it in an ontological context where the First Principle and the world are no longer connected in a necessary way within a single finite and eternal metaphysical order. As we have seen, in fact, in patristic reflection, the Trinity is identified with the only eternal and infinite nature, while the created world is understood as finite and temporal. It should be noted, however, that although the Aristotelian definition of science appears more closed than the Platonic one, even for the Stagirite the universals remain tied to the soul, as we see in De Anima, III, . This is important precisely because of the aforementioned tension, as the epistêmê is treated among the relative realities. In Chapter , the first definition of relation in Categoriae was presented in terms of a genitive or a pros, that is, as reference to something other. Consistently, this dimension is attributed to the habit (ἕξις), the disposition (διάθεσις) and the science (ἐπιστήμη), as we noted. The latter, in fact, is always the science of something (ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη). The analysis proceeds highlighting that the relative realities can have an opposite, as in the couple virtue-vice, even if not always, as it is the case of double or triple. Similarly, we can say for more and less or for similar and dissimilar but not for double. More interesting from the theological perspective is Aristotle’s demonstration that all the relatives admit a correlative but that they are not necessarily simultaneous. The first result is obtained by showing that in some cases a linguistic search is necessary. In fact, while for science it is evident that it corresponds to an object of knowledge and vice versa
See ibid., b.–. See ibid., b.–. Ibid., b.–. See Aristotle, De Anima, .b-.a. Aristotle, Categoriae, a.–. See Section .. See ibid., b.–. See ibid., b.. See ibid., b.–. See ibid., b.–.
Epistemology and Openness
(ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν), this is not evident for the relationship between the wing and the bird. Correlativity emerges, instead, if the latter is called “winged.” Similarly, for the rudder and the ship the relationality would be manifest if this were called “ruddered” through the creation of a new word. Thus, in the case of the relationship between slave and master, the correlativity will emerge as soon as being biped, man, etc. are eliminated from the concept of the latter. Even more interesting for the issue under examination is the discussion on the simultaneity of correlatives: it seems to be valid in general, except for some exceptions, such as just science and the object of knowledge (ἐπιστητόν), as the second is prior to the first. If the object disappears, science itself necessarily ceases to exist, while the opposite is not true. Aristotle mentions here, as an example, the quadrature of the circle, an extremely interesting case from the point of view of modern logic and incommensurability, as Section . will show. Finally, the discussion concludes with the demonstration that neither the first nor the second substances are part of the relatives (οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν). In this context, a second definition of relation appears, in term of πρός τί πως ἔχειν, as we have already seen. This statement is repeated in Metaphysica, where it is also explained that relational realities are minimal (ἥκιστα) compared to other realities from the point of view of ontological density. The question is particularly intriguing because in Book VI of Metaphysica Aristotle addresses the problem of the relationship between epistêmê and the causes of being: the distinctive criterion is precisely materiality and movement. For the Stagirite, all causes must be eternal as being, but they are divided into causes separated from matter and subject to movement, studied by physics, and causes not separated from matter, that is, derived from physical attributes, but not subject to movement, which are dealt with by mathematics. Finally, metaphysics studies what is separate from matter and immobile, that is, not subject to change or movement. And if all causes are eternal, then so are the causes of these realities, being the causes by which the divine realities manifest themselves (τῶν θείων). Aristotle concludes:
Ibid., b.–. See ibid., b.–a.. See ibid., a.–. Ibid., b.–. Ibid., b.–. Ibid., b.. Ibid., a.–. See Section .. See Aristotle, Metaphysica, a –.
. Science and Relation
So that there are three types of philosophy: mathematics, physics and theology (θεολογική) – in fact, it is clear that, if we can say that the Divinity exists, it exists in such a nature.
This is a fundamental text for Western thought, in that it recognizes theology, that is, metaphysics, as the highest science, because its object is at the summit. The classification is reaffirmed in Book XI, where this epistemological subdivision is resumed, after reaffirming that the divine principle is Being: It is clear, therefore, that there are three kinds of theoretical science (τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν): physics, mathematics and theology. The genus of the theoretical sciences is the highest and among them the most perfect science is the latter. In fact, it has as its object the supreme of beings and a science is called better or worse according to its own object.
The junction that lies at the heart of the tension inherent in the Greek epistêmê is that metaphysics, as a science, must belong to the relational realities, arousing an aporia, which the Stagirite faces in the book Lambda, after having defined the First Principle, that is, the God (ὁ θεός), as life that is thought of thought. The question is that both epistêmê and doxa, as well as reasoning and sensation, seem to have as their object something different from themselves, because one thing is the subject of the act of thinking, another one what is thought and the essence of the two does not coincide. Yet for the theoretical sciences: since there is no difference between thought and what is thought for immaterial realities, they will be the same, so that the thought (of God) will be one with its object.
Here the tension between the relational, and therefore open, conception of epistêmê, of a platonic matrix, and the metaphysical demand, which recognizes the autarchy and anorexia of the supreme cause, explodes in all its force. If a reality is God, it cannot be relational, but then the divine theôria itself, that is, the pure act of divine life that is joyful thought of thought, will not be based on an authentic otherness. Thus, there is a gap between the relationality of epistêmê in general and its metaphysical foundation in the first principle, as according to Aristotle “thought is not relative to what it is thought about” (οὐκ ἔστι δ΄ ἡ διάνοια
Ibid., .a.–. Ibid., b.–. See ibid., .b.–. See ibid., b.–a.. Ibid.,a.–.
Epistemology and Openness
πρὸς τοῦτο οὗ ἐστὶ διάνοια). In other words, the accidentality of the epistemic act outside of God will remain unrelated to its metaphysical foundation in the thought of thought which is the first principle. In a certain sense, Aristotle still fails to escape the criticism of Parmenides, who reduced the phenomenal dimension to not being, denying the very possibility of reasoning, since multiplicity is intrinsic to it. The Platonic eidetic solution recognizes and metaphysically founds the multiplicity of being, referring to the multiplicity of ideas and, ultimately, to the Dyad, if one accepts the interpretation in the line of the hidden doctrines. The Stagirite wants to recover the sensitive dimension, but its epistemic conception still finds itself facing the reductio ad unum of multiplicity, reflected in the question of the relationality of science and the knowledge of truth. This is where Skeptical criticism comes in, which reaches a particularly blunt formulation with Sextus Empiricus. In fact, the opposition between the relative and the substantial dimension is taken to the extreme and generalized, in such a way as to deny any possibility of semantic expression of the claim for truth. The gnoseological aporia induced by the irreducibility of the one and the many thus explodes in all its force. Neo-Pythagoreanism will try to find a solution to this aporia, recovering the Platonic inspiration and heritage, until it prepares the way for the synthesis with Aristotelianism attempted in various ways in NeoPlatonism. As we have already seen, Eudoros, Moderatus and Numenius will develop a real monism that, to the Dyad form-matter or act-power, will replace a process of generation of the multiple from the one, a process that, however, will imply an ontological degeneration that will reach its peak in Plotinus’ emanationism. The centrality of epistêmê in this development is demonstrated by Fragment of Numenius, already seen in Chapter , where he shows how the second cause came into existence from the first and explains that divine realities, being communicated, do not cease to be with the giver, as it happens in the case of human and material realities. The perfect example that he proposes is the good science (ἐπιστήμη ἡ καλη), which benefits those who receive it, without leaving the one who communicates
Ibid., a.–. On the topic, see H. J. Krämer and J. R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics: A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection of the Fundamental Documents (Albany: SUNY Press, ). Cf. Section ... See Section .. See C. H. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. A Brief History (Indianapolis: Hackett, ), –.
. Science and Relation
it. The text is meaningful for theology, as the image of the three lamps was taken up in the Christian context to show how the pure spirituality of the generation of the Son excludes that it is a degeneration. The statement that epistêmê being transmitted do not degenerate refers precisely to its relationality, already perceived by Aristotle. The novelty of the Neo-Pythagorean approach is that now this relationship can also be recognized in the divine sphere of the relationship between the One and the Second Cause. The price paid, however, is the clear separation between the sensitive and the intelligible world that will be formalized with mystical exactness by Plotinus. This, in Enneades VI,, clearly states that no common genus can embrace both the sensitive and the intelligible dimensions. The discussion on the relatives (πρός τι) explores the questions of whether they have a commonality of genus and whether relation has a subsistence of its own (εἰ ὑπόστασίς τις ἡ σχέσις ἐστὶν αὕτη). Among the examples, in addition to the right-left pairs, father-son, servant-manager, along with the positions, such as sitting or standing, there is also science. As we have seen, the relatives are, so, connected by Plotinus to σχέσις, a term that plays a fundamental role in the metaphysical formulation of the relation itself, a development of the πρός τί πως ἔχειν of the second Aristotelian definition, which had already been taken up in the stoic tradition. Relation is thus brought back to its ontological foundation at the level of formal principles and participation in Forms. However, the tension between the sensitive and the intelligible dimensions remains in all its strength, as demonstrated by Plotinus’ anthropology. The human soul in the world appears, in fact, ontologically divided, since its upper part would, according to Plotinus, always be directed to the Intellect and, therefore, would remain in the intelligible world, while the lower part would look at the material body. This aporia was highlighted by Riccardo Chiaradonna and seems to be a direct consequence of the passage in Neo-Pythagoreanism to an authentic monism, which implied the need to lower the value of the body and the material world in order to affirm that of the first principle.
Numenius, Fragment , in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XI, ,–: SCh , p. . See Section .. For the scope of this contribution, see just the example in Gregory of Nyssa, Adversos Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,–,. See Plotinus, Enneades, VI, , ,–. See ibid., VI, , ,–. See ibid., VI, , ,–. See ibid., IV, , ,–. See R. Chiaradonna, Plotino (Rome: Carocci, ), .
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Plotinus is part of this line of development and radicalizes the statements of his predecessors, arriving, however, at a contradiction that Iamblichus realized. This, perhaps for the cultural dialogue with Christians, tried to correct this tendency, without succeeding fully. But for the conception of the epistêmê and for the study of the tension inherent in it, the reinterpretation of the Aristotelian analysis by Porphyry is fundamental. In his commentary on Categoriae, in fact, he takes up the attribution of science to the relatives, following the same logical steps as the Stagirite, from which, however, he departs with regard to the statement of the simultaneity of the relative realities. At first, Porphyry repeats and developed the argument that led Aristotle to conclude that in some cases relative realities are not simultaneous, as is the case for science, which is subsequent to its object. But he closes his demonstration with the statement that in the case in which the object of science exists while it is not yet known in act, we can speak of knowledge in potency (δυνάμει): And perhaps even if there is not among the human beings the science (ἐπιστήμη) of a known object (ἐπιστητοῦ), nevertheless the science of all known objects (ἡ ἐπιστήμη πάντων τῶν ἐπιστητῶν) exists in nature by the eternal intellect which knows (ἐπισταμένου) the entities. So the science (ἐπιστήμη) of the multiple realities continuously descends on the human beings. In this way, if there is the object of sensation, there is also the sensation of the universal, and if there is the object of science, there is also the universal science. And so, the relatives are simultaneous.
Porphyry based the correlativity of science and its object on the universal intellect, as its metaphysical foundation. The monist and emanationist ontology of the Neo-Platonist allows, in fact, to link epistêmê to the Nous, leaving unchanged the One in its radical otherness. Aristotle obviously did not have this solution of the tension at his disposal. But this also shows the intensity of the tension itself. As in Plotinus, in fact, the world and the One remain separate and, even more radically, the upper epistêmê and the lower one remain alien to each other. The question will not find a solution in the philosophical later developments but rather will be exacerbated, as demonstrated by the example of Simplicius, in his commentary on the categories, where he takes up
See J. M. Dillon (ed.), Iamblichus Chalcidensis. De anima (Leuven: Brill, ), –; and Iamblicus, De mysteriis, II, ,; ,; ,; ,. See Iamblicus, De Anima VIII, . See G. Maspero, Dio trino perché vivo (Brescia: Morcelliana, ), . See Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem IV,,,–. See ibid., IV,,,–,. See ibid., IV,,,–. Ibid., IV,,,–,.
. Relational Causality
Plotinus’ affirmation that schesis has hypostasis, that is, that it really exists and cannot be reduced to a mere logical dimension. Mutual relations (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις) are so recognized as the ontological foundation of multiplicity: It would be absurd to eliminate what unites realities that differ from each other, it would be absurd to eliminate harmony, not only between sounds and numbers, but also between substances and between all that is in potency and all that is in act, harmony that, when present in beings, leads them to identity and at the same time produces their mutual relationship (σχέσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα). Thus, commensurability and equality and the object of science (ἐπιστητόν) would also be eliminated together with science itself (ἐπιστήμη). But if both geometry and music have to do with relations and these lack subsistence, it would be ridiculous for them to deal with realities which lack subsistence. But how can one say that God is desirable, if the one who desires has no relation (σχέσις) with (πρὸς) the desired (τὸ ἐφετόν)?
In the subsequent developments of Neo-Platonism, we see, therefore, how the Porphyrian solution is extended also to desire. According to Aristotle, the first motor moves everything as desired (κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον) because in the first principle the object of desire (τὸ ὀρεκτόν) and the object of thought (τὸ νοητόν) do coincide. The relation that founds the inseparability of epistêmê and its objects of knowledge, therefore, is at the basis of the relationship between act and potency, including thought and desire in the same ontological dynamic. In this way, epistêmê seems to be the bearer of an incurable tension that crosses all Greek metaphysical thought, from the Platonic response to Parmenides to the Neo-Platonic commentators of the Aristotelian Categories, through the Skeptic criticism. The ultimate root of all this is the relationship between the one and the many, which the Christians must necessarily place at the center of their reflection. The theological effort to elaborate a new epistemology cannot, then, be considered the “betrayal” of a scientific tradition to which the faith would ask to renounce but a response to an aporia that metaphysics itself struggled to overcome. This shows how an anachronistic narrative that dialectically opposes philosophy and theology is untenable.
. One of the possible ways to prove the point is to follow the thread of Cappadocian theology, dwelling in particular on the thought of Gregory
Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium VII, ,–. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, a.–b..
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of Nyssa, as we have seen in the previous chapters. Until now it has been shown that metaphysical epistêmê is the bearer of a tension that is ultimately linked to the relationship between the one and the many. Aristotle maintains the first but loses the connection between this and human scientific knowledge, because the first principle cannot be relational. The coincidence between subject and object in the thought of thought thus makes human science equivocal, marked by multiplicity as it is. For this reason, the upper part of the human intellect will be considered divine and, therefore, not human. Neo-Platonism will try to overcome this distance, founding epistêmê in the cognitive act of divine Nous, but will end up confirming the Aristotelian tension. Epistêmê will always be relational, as it is linked to the multiplicity inherent in the object-subject or act-potency pair, so much so that the logos, which necessarily refers to the multiplicity itself, will be separated from the One. The path here proposed aims at highlighting the strength of the epistemology developed in the theological and specifically Trinitarian discourse of the fourth century. The introduction of apophathism, the discussion on the term generated and its relationship with the divine substance in the context of the disputes with the Arians and their successors will gradually form a true theological epistemology in support of the identification of Christian life with true philosophy. The terminology was clearly and intentionally a continuation of Greek metaphysical tradition. The term theologia, which in Aristotle indicated the highest science directed to the causes separated from matter and immobile, becomes the name of Trinitarian doctrine. The epistêmê, read in the line of Aristotelian tradition as the knowledge of the principles for which one believes, is reread from the perspective of the Spirit and the Son who unite the human being to the one archê that is the Father. For only Christ allows true science, so that knowledge through the others loses all negative meaning. Being in its depth is an ontological mystery, in the sense that the veil that covers it is not linked to the limits of the knowing subject but to the perfection of the known object. That is why epistêmê relies on revelation. God does not unveil Himself, but re-veals Himself because He has an infinite depth that human thought never ceases to draw upon. All this is the cognitive reflection of the new ontological conception: while Aristotle conceived the world and the first principle united in a single graduated metaphysical order, which, from cause to cause, thought
See Aristotle, Ethica ad Nicomachum, a.–. See Plotinus, Enneades, III, , ,–.
. Relational Causality
could climb, now the Trinity constitutes a different metaphysical order with respect to creation. In fact, the latter is finite and has a definite origin in time, while the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are the only eternal and infinite substance. Thus, while the Greek epistêmê could follow the chain of necessary causes, significantly indicated by the term logos, Christian theology can only know the depth of the First Principle through the personal relationship and the self-giving of the divine Persons in history. Hence, the immense challenge to the thought of a knowledge that is still relational, like the Greek one, but that draws on Being now recognized as relational in its immanence. Whereas earlier the step from the world to God implied an epistemic rupture because the relationality of human knowledge could not be linked to divine being; in Christian theology, the knowledge of being is relational because Being itself is relational. This is the deepest reason for apophaticism, as Gregory of Nyssa’s thought can illustrate. His theology has been presented starting from the introduction of a new essential ontological distinction, which flanks the one between material and intelligible of platonic tradition, to re-semanticize it completely. In fact, the bishop of Nyssa recognizes as the most fundamental articulation of being the difference between created and uncreated. This distinction is biblically founded, as God creates by cutting: the verb barà ( )בראhas, in fact, precisely this etymological meaning. The world is the fruit of an act of God’s will that gives origin to being by creating a fundamental and insurmountable ontological difference between Himself and the cosmos. The very multiplicity of reality is the result of this act that multiplies the differences. But such action can be read as an expression of the immanent relationality of the Trinity itself, therefore as perfection. God, in fact, creates by placing precisely a relation through the difference constituted by the “cut,” as an expression of His own unity of substance in the hypostatic distinction. Thus, the principle of distinction and that of unity do coincide in the relation itself, in God as in the world and in the human being, for the creation of the latter in the image and likeness. The path to the fourth century had been prepared by Clement of Alexandria who, in the third century, took up in Stromata II, the Aristotelian definition of epistêmê, to apply it to Christian thought. Faith, in fact, can be based on an infallible criterion (ἀμεταπτώτῳ
See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, , ,–, (SCh , pp. –).
Epistemology and Openness
κριτηρίῳ) because the Logos identifies itself with the truth per se. There are four ways of knowledge highlighted by Clement: sensation, spirit, science and conjecture. The spirit is first by nature while sensation is first in relation to the human being, so that the substance of science (ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐσία) is made up of sensation and spirit. Here the discourse returns to Aristotle’s epistêmê, as seen in Ethica ad Nicomachum: But if anyone were to say that science is demonstrative (τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν) for the logos, let him know that the principles (αἱ ἀρχαὶ) are unprovable, because they cannot be known either by technique or by reflection. The latter, in fact, is possible for realities that may be otherwise, while the former concerns action, but not contemplation. Therefore, the principle of everything can only be achieved through faith. In fact, “every science can be taught and what is taught comes from previous knowledge.”
Here the relationality of science is invoked to demonstrate the epistemic foundation of a thought based on faith, that is, on the truths revealed by the incarnate Logos. Thanks to Him, the Christian knows that principle of the universe, also sought after by Greek philosophy from its inception. The Aristotelian definition of epistêmê as a disposition to demonstration (ἕξις ἀποδεικτική) is repeated here to show how faith itself allows us to go back to authentic unity, according to the aspiration of thought. As we have seen, Origen excludes that epistêmê can belong to the relative, thus separating himself from the Aristotelian tradition. Gregory of Nyssa, on the other hand, remains closer to the positions of the Stagirite, because he maintains the accidentality of the relative in the created realm, emphasizing the role of the ontological gap: Let no one force us to make the genealogy of this ignorance, saying where it comes from and from whom but let us understand it from the very meaning of the words that ignorance and knowledge indicate a relation (τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν) of the soul. In fact, nothing that is thought and expressed through the relationship (πρός τι) has essence, because one is the discourse of the relationship (πρός τι) and another one is that of the substance.
Ignorance is not a principle opposed to knowledge, similarly to how darkness is not something opposed to light but only its absence. In this categorical context, relation is presented as an accident, as the ontology of
See ibid., , (SCh , p. ). See ibid., ,– (SCh , pp. –). Ibid., ,–, (SCh , p. ). See Ibid., . (SCh , p. ). Cf. Section ... This is a clear reference to Aristotle, Categoriae, b. Gregory of Nyssa, De infantibus praemature abreptis, GNO III/, ,–.
. Relational Causality
the Trinity differs radically from that of creation. Yet the bishop of Nyssa overcomes the radical criticism of the possibility of expressing something true of Skeptical origin, linked precisely to the relativity of the sign. In fact, commenting on the title of Ps , he refers to the meaning of philosophizing according to a sublime doctrine (φιλοσοφεῖ ἐν ὑψηλοῖς δόγμασι), invoking the covenant of mercy (τῆς τοῦ ἐλέους συμμαχίας) as the only way to the truth for the human being, who is subject to the possibility of choosing evil. Then, referring to the shadow of God’s wings, an expression present in Ps :, he writes: In fact, what God is by nature remains inaccessible to human nature and is incomprehensible, in that it ineffably rises in flight beyond the reasoning of men. But a certain imprint of ineffable nature arises through the virtues like a shady sketch in those who turn their gaze to it. So all knowledge and wisdom and science (ἐπιστήμην) and approach to conceptual understanding are not the divine wings, but the shadow of the divine wings (τὴν τῶν θείων πτερύγων σκιάν). And this, while a shadow (σκιά), is a great benefit to us.
Evidently, the bishop of Nyssa emphasizes more clearly the excess of the thought fertilized by revelation with respect to Clement, since the ontological gap has now been formulated with extreme clarity in the context of the Arian dispute. This approach is also repeated, for example, in the In Canticum where the milk of the breast is connected to the wine that rejoices in Ps : in order to reaffirm that human wisdom, the science of reality, theoretical ability or direct apprehension are incapable of withstanding comparison with the divine teachings, because what is offered by the breast is milk and milk is the food of the children. The reformulation of the Platonic conception in terms of the shadow of the divine wings is noteworthy. Science here is truly human and divine at the same time, as a gift that thought can receive by following the shadow of wings. The approach is typical of Cappadocian theology, as the following text by Gregory of Nazianzus demonstrates: But by getting some idea (σκιαγραφοῦντες) of what concerns Him [God] (τὰ κατ αὐτὸν) from the realities surrounding Him (ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν), we piece together (συλλέγομεν) a dark and uncertain image from different things (ἄλλην ἀπ ἄλλου). In our opinion, the best theologian is not the one who has understood the whole, for the limit does not contain the whole, but he is the one who has been able to imagine more than others and more unite within himself (συναγάγῃ) the mental
See Gregory of Nyssa, Inscriptiones Psalmorum, GNO V, ,–. Ibid., ,–,. See Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum, I, GNO VI, ,–.
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image of truth or a shadow (ἀποσκίασμα) of it or whatever we would like to call it.
The first verb that occurs in the passage, σκιαγραφοῦντες, literally means “to write with shadows,” an expression to which ἀποσκίασμα corresponds at the end of the quoted passage. It is not possible to capture the Divine conceptually, which is why the best theologian is not the one who understands everything, which would be impossible. Instead, the dynamic of science is to “put together” the traces, as both the verb συλλέγομεν and συναγάγῃ in the text suggest. It is therefore a question of reconstructing the relations that reveal God’s being from His economic action. The inspiration for this dynamic seems biblical, as suggested by the parallelism of συλλέγω and συνάγω with Mary’s συμβάλλω in Lk :. On the contrary, the concepts are potentially idolatrous, as Gregory of Nyssa explains commenting on Ex :ff: In fact, the divine Word forbids in the last text that the human beings assimilate the Divinity to any of the created realities, since every concept, elaborated by the cognitive faculty in a sensitive image (περιληπτικὴν φαντασίαν) to know and reach the divine nature, makes an idol (εἴδωλον) of God, and does not give it to know.
In a way consistent with the ontological gap, Gregory of Nyssa affirms at the same time the radical difference between God and the categorical world, according to his apophaticism, but also a relational correspondence even if in the shadows. Thus he interprets the knowledge in parables and science (παραβολὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμην) of Eccl : in the sense of the understanding of the transcendent being that is obtained by analogy from known reality (τὴν ἐξ ἀναλογίας γινομένην τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου κατάληψιν διὰ τῆς παραθέσεως τῶν γινωσκομένων). The metaphysical language is applied to the exegesis of the parables of the Kingdom in Mt , in such a way that wisdom and ontological language converge in an original synthesis. As already seen, in fact, in the Cappadocians’ theology the confrontation with their adversaries had obliged them to exclude any possibility of an intermediate degree between the triune God and the world. Only the former is eternal and infinite, while every reality created, including angels, is finite and had a beginning in time. As seen, we can thus affirm that there is an ontological gap, an infinite metaphysical gulf between the Trinity and the cosmos. But this had an immediate and radical consequence at the
Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De Filio), ,–: SCh , . Gregory of Nyssa, De Vita Moysis, II, ,–: GNO VII/, ,–,. See Gregory of Nyssa, In Ecclesiasten, II, GNO V, ,–.
. Relational Causality
gnoseological level, because in this way the identification of being and intelligibility was blown away: from the Platonic-Aristotelian perspective, the foundation of every reality should be linked to the idea or to the form that in a Porphyrian re-reading is still guaranteed by the relationship with the Nous. On the contrary, as explained in Chapter , for the Cappadocians even the created being is not fully known to the human being inasmuch as it has its ultimate ontological reason not between God and the world, as in the Neo-Platonic conception, but within the Trinitarian immanence, beyond the infinite ontological hiatus constituted by the gap. Thus, for Eunomius, there was a necessary and unambiguous correspondence between the substances and their names, since every entity, as intelligible, was automatically translated into a concept. In the case of the Son, who by definition is generated, this implied the impossibility of accepting his divinity, based on the identification of the divine substance with not being generated (agennesia). Cappadocian apophaticism breaks this automatism, showing that there is no possibility for the human being to reduce substances to concepts, such as translating them according to an exact correspondence. Ontological excess makes both God and the world unknowable on a purely conceptual level, unless we follow the relational path, since the reason for everything is personal, that is, the Trinity, because the Father created through the Son in the Holy Spirit. This shows how the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians, characterized by the ontological gap and, therefore, by apophaticism, is founded on a relational understanding of causality, from which descends a new concept of epistêmê. This, compared to the Greek one, is more complete, so much so as to overcome the aporia of the relationality of science with respect to the absolute lack of relations of the metaphysical foundation, that is, of the ultimate cause. As we have seen, in fact, Gregory of Nyssa moved the Logos from the position of ontological intermediary between God and the world, almost as an intermediate motor of Aristotelian construction or Neo-Platonic Nous, to a new dimension within the immanence of the first principle. God turns out to have an inside, which is hypostatic and relational, as the Logos himself belongs to the relative dimension.
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, GNO II, ,–. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Cathechetica Magna, ,–: Srawley, p. ,–. See Section ...
Epistemology and Openness
The point was that the causal distinction between the Father and the Son could not be understood as a substantial distinction and, therefore, required the introduction of a new principle of individuation, unknown to Greek metaphysics. Relation, expressed by schesis and pros ti, thus underwent a radical re-interpretation, because it passed from the accidental dimension to the substantial one. Within God, the only perfect, infinite and eternal God, dwells the relation of the Father and the Son, who therefore is perfect, infinite and eternal, so as to make the first two divine Persons “relative.” Thus, the relation is one of the fundamental elements of the ontological structure of the world, a real co-principle of being together with substance. This corresponds to the πῶς εἶναι, that is multiplied by the πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσις, in the very immanence of the divine substance. But this implies that the first αἴτιον, that is the Father, is relational, together with the Logos and their Pneuma, as Ad Ablabium shows. Here the πῶς εἶναι is applied also to the cosmic dimension, through the example of the question about the origin of a plant asked to a farmer. This means that Gregory’s theological result has a philosophical value. In the Trinity the Father is presented as the Cause of the other two Divine Persons, who in turn are distinct in a relational way from one another, so that no distinction can be found except for the relations. This means that this causality cannot act at the level of substantial difference, as is normally the case with regard to proper effects, but must be fully and absolutely identified with relation itself. This is the discovery of relational causality, to which Jean Daniélou also refers. The new Trinitarian ontology developed by Gregory of Nyssa shows that in God the relation is both not accidental and an eternal and absolute cause, as it is identified with the first divine Person, who is the Father. And this relationality is also communicated to creation through the action of God. All oikonomia, in fact, is an expression of divine immanence, from which it is distinguished, but of which it bears the personal
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II, , ,–.–: GNO I, , –; ,–. See Section ... Cf. Ibid., I, ,–: GNO I, pp. ,–,. See Section ... Cf. Gregory of Nyssa , Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,– and ,–,, see Section ... See G. Maspero, “Ontologia e storia in Jean Daniélou,” in G. Maspero and J. Lynch (eds.), Storia e Mistero. Una chiave di accesso alla teologia di Joseph Ratzinger e Jean Daniélou, ROR Studies Series (Roma: EDUSC, ), –.
. Relational Causality
traces. The world, history, the life of man and his salvation, everything originates from (ἐκ) the Father, is realized through (διά) the Son and is brought to completion in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit. And these prepositions are nothing more than an expression of the distinct πῶς εἶναι of each divine Person. In this sense, relational causality shapes everything and also takes on a clear philosophical value, as the context of the passage from Ad Ablabium already quoted in Section . shows: On the other hand, regarding the divine nature, we have not learned that the Father accomplishes something by himself, in which the Son does not participate, or that the Son in his turn operates something without the Spirit. But every activity, which from God is propagated to creation and is called according to the various conceptions, has origin from (ἐκ) the Father, continues by means of (διά) the Son and is accomplished in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name of the activity is not divided in the multiplicity of those who act, since the care of something is not exclusive to each one in particular. But all that is realized, regarding either our providence or the history of salvation and the order of the universe, is realized in a certain manner by the Three, but they are not in fact three the things that are accomplished.
The very body of man, who is defined as the image of the Image (τῆς εἰκόνος εἰκόνα), that is, son in the Son, is also configured in its materiality by the relationality of the divine Logos. In fact, the upright position, expression of its identity, allows the forelimbs, which in animals are paws, to remain free to carry out those tasks that for the latter are carried out by the jaws of the mouth, so as to free this for the development of the ability to speak. Even the corporal dimension is thus conformed by relational ontology, which can be recognized as the deepest fabric of creation starting from the unity of the Creator. But then the discovery of relational causality can be recognized as the element that allows us to overcome the aporia of Aristotelian science, because human knowledge can access the immanent dimension of God not through necessary links, forbidden by the ontological gap, but through the relations with the divine Persons, who put (wo)man in contact with the very being of God. In the light of the tension highlighted in the reconstruction of the ideal path of Greek epistêmê, one can then see how the theological thought of the Fathers had to develop a true
See, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Macedonianos, GNO III/, ,– and Epistula , GNO VIII/, ,–. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium, GNO III/, ,–,. Gregory of Nyssa, De Perfectione Christiana, GNO VIII/, ,. See Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio, , PG , AB.
Epistemology and Openness
Trinitarian ontology, that is, a rethinking of being starting from the light offered by the revelation of the name of the Father, the Son and the Spirit. To this Trinitarian ontology, which has a philosophical value in its principles and results, irrespective of whether the former have been received through revelation, does naturally correspond a Trinitarian epistemology. The point is that this result, based on the recognition of the relational dimension of causality, also solves the aporia and tension inherent in Greek epistêmê. Thus, the act of knowledge based on faith no longer presents itself as an alternative to the Greek metaphysical path, almost as a relapse into the mere doxa but just as the fulfilment of the aspiration inherent in the Greek epistêmê itself, as traced by the Platonic opening to the gift of a divine logos. Thus, theological epistemology, the result of rethinking ontology in a relational perspective in the light of Trinitarian revelation, comes in response to a real cry, indeed a wound, that the history of metaphysical thought presents.
. : The thought of the Cappadocians can thus be considered an authentic form of Patristic philosophy, based on a revision of the Aristotelian Categories, particularly with regard to relation, from which a more coherent form of epistemology than the Platonic-Aristotelian one derives. The work of climbing back from cause to cause, in fact, now can go through the relational dimension that makes it possible to overcome the ontological gap between the Trinity and the created world, without violating apophaticism. But what consequences does this have for logic? Is it a fall into irrationalism? The question of the relationship between eternity and time in Cappadocian theology offers an extremely interesting perspective on this, because it is surprisingly consistent even with contemporary findings on logical incompleteness. The relationship between time and eternity in Cappadocian theology has been the object of various studies. However, the aim here is just to
See P. Coda, “L’ontologia trinitaria: che cos’è?” Sophia (): –. Cf., for example, B. Otis, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time,” Studia Patristica (): –; I. Escribano-Alberca, “Zum zyklischen Zeitbegriff der alexandrinischen und kappadokischen Theologie,” Studia Patristica (): –; D. Balás, “Eternity and Time in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium,” in Heinrich Dörrie, Margarete Altenburger and Uta Schram (eds.), Gregor von Nyssa und
. Basil
explore an aspect that seems to have remained in the shadows: the logical dimension of the argumentation of Basil and the two Gregories. Right from the beginning of Greek thought, in fact, this relationship was presented from the point of view of paradox. It is sufficient to give the example of two expressions of Thales recorded by Diogenes Laërtius. The first, which is also taken up by Clement of Alexandria, shows the connection between divinity and eternity: “What is the divine? That which has neither beginning nor end.” However, it is precisely this combination that throws into question human thought, characterized by the finite dimension: even when it tries to think of eternity in a cyclical sense, as was typical of the ancient world, it does not manage to escape the aporia. That is why it is said of Thales “When someone asked him which came first, the night or the day, he used to say: the night, because it comes one day earlier.” This view can be shown to be valuable for grasping how revelation comes to have a bearing on a question that Greek philosophy already regarded as a critical point for the claims of human reason in the double etymological sense of critical, that is, both difficult and implying a judgment. The relationship between time and eternity is central in Cappadocian theology insofar as it constitutes the very heart of their response to the Eunomians. As we have seen, in fact, the latter based their theological position on two principles: (a) generation implies temporality and, therefore, the inferiority of the one generated in relation to the eternal one generating; (b) the “logical” correspondence between being and names in such a way that the Father, as the only one who can be called “ungenerated,” is God, while the Son cannot be eternal because, by definition, generated. In the face of these positions, Basil takes up Athanasius’ distinction between the world and the one uncreated eternal nature that is identified with the Trinity. Between the Creator and the creatures there
die Philosophie, Zweites Internationales Kolloquium über Gregor von Nyssa, Freckenhorst bei Münster, – September (Leiden: Brill, ), –; M. Mees, “Mensch und Geschichte bei Gregor von Nyssa,” Augustinianum (): –; P. Plass, “Transcendent Time and Eternity in Gregory of Nyssa,” Vigiliae Christianae (): –; T. Špidlík, “L’eternità e il tempo, la zoé e il bios, problema dei Padri Cappadoci,” Augustinianum (): –. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, in Stromata V, ,, ,–: GCS , Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum I, , (H. S. Long). Cf. A. Spira, “Le temps d’un homme selon Aristote et Grégoire de Nyssa,” in Colloques internationaux du CNRS (París: CNRS, ), –. Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum I, ,– (H. S. Long)
Epistemology and Openness
exists an infinite metaphysical hiatus that removes the deity in its immanent dimension from the realm of human thought. The latter can know the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit only thanks to revelation and so through the history of salvation and personal relations, as Chapter has shown. This theological position required the overcoming of the graduated conception of metaphysics that was typical of Platonism. But this has serious consequences at the level of logic. The relationship between time and eternity becomes central in this perspective in that the Son cannot be distinguished from the Father through an ontological intermediary: The God of the universe is Father from eternity and has never begun to be. In fact, no defect of the will prevented Him from achieving what He wished. He did not have to wait for the cycles of the world to reach His capacity to generate, as is the case for the human beings and other animals, obtaining what He desired after the completion of a specific age. Indeed, one has to be mad to think and speak in this way. No, His paternity, to call it that, is coextensive with Hs eternity. Therefore, the Son too, who is before the ages and always is, has never begun to be, but, from when the Father is, thus is the Son in such a way that the notion of the Son appears immediately with that of the Father. Because it is evident that the Father is Father of the Son. Thus, the Father has no beginning and the beginning of the Son is the Father without there being anything between them (μέσον).
Between the first and second Persons of the Trinity, therefore, there cannot be inserted a meson, but the eternity of the Father must coincide with that of the Son in such a way that, not only nominally but also ontologically, the one is together with the other and vice versa. In this way, Basil establishes a two-way correspondence between coeternity and personal correlativity. In the light of the coextensive nature of the Paternity and eternity, Basil describes the Arian doctrine as sophism. He thoroughly excludes that there could be a διάστημα between the Father and the Son. This category was to become central in the ontological distinction between time and eternity:
Basil, Adversus Eunomium II, ,–: SCh , pp. –. Cf. ibid., II, ,: SCh , p. . Cf. ibid., II, ,: SCh , p. . Cf. T. P. Verghese, “διάστημα and διάστασις in Gregory of Nyssa. Introduction to a Concept and the Posing of a Problem,” in in Heinrich Dörrie, Margarete Altenburger and Uta Schram (eds.), Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie, Zweites Internationales Kolloquium über Gregor von Nyssa, Freckenhorst bei Münster, – September (Leiden: Brill, ), –; and L. G. Patterson, “The Conversion of Diastema in the Patristic View of Time,” in R. A. Norris (ed.), Lux in Lumine. Essays to Honor W. Norman Pittenger (New York: Seabury Press, ), –.
. The Gregories
If, then, the communion of the Son in relation to the One who is God and Father is revealed to be eternal in that our thought proceeds from the Son to the Father without crossing any void but joins the Son to the Father immediately (ἀδιαστάτως), there being no kind of intermediary (μέσῳ) separating them, what space still remains for the wicked blasphemy of those who say that [the Son] was brought from non-being to being?
As Ysabel de Andia has shown, in Basil, the koinônia of the Father and the Son takes on an ontological value, equivalent to identity of nature. Thus, the eternity of the generation is presented precisely as a consequence of this koinônia that excludes any participatory dimension. This response will mark the path taken by Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus. However, they do not fail to develop Basil’s argument in an original way. In particular, their theological proposal will deepen the logical dimension inherent in the ontological distinction between time and eternity.
. : Particularly evident in the work of Gregory of Nyssa is his continuity and fidelity in handling the anti-Eunomian theology of his brother. At the same time, the years and preparation for the Council of Constantinople enabled him to make an epistemological progress that is manifested especially in his emphasis on the apophatic dimension. Basil’s arguments are taken up in a logical, almost geometric form, elements dear to Gregory for his closeness to the medical tradition and his knowledge of Neo-Pythagoreanism mediated by Iamblichus: Whoever claims that the Father’s life is older than that of the Son is certainly causing the delay of an interval (διαστήματί τινι) between the Only Begotten and the God of the universe. And either it is supposed that this interval (τὸ διὰ μέσου διάστημα) is in some way infinite, or else it is limited with boundaries or points that are clearly identifiable. But the concept of an intermediate position (ὁ τῆς μεσότητος λόγος) will not allow us to say that it is infinite, otherwise we would be completely eliminating from our discourse the notion of the Father and the Son; and it will not even be thought to be intermediate as long as it is infinite, that is, not determined
Basil, Adversus Eunomium II, ,–: SCh , p. . Cf. Y. de Andia, “La koinônia du Saint Esprit dans le traité Sur le Saint Esprit de Saint Basile,” in Y. de Andia and P. Leander Hofrichter (eds.), Der heilige Geist im Leben der Kirche (Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia Verlag, ), –. For example, other than in Contra Eunomium I, cited in the following, the expression ὁ τῆς μεσότητος λόγος appears also in Iamblichus, In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem, , and , (Ed. U. Klein).
Epistemology and Openness
by one side or the other, in that the notion of the Father does not interrupt the proceeding of the infinite in an upward direction and that of the Son does not cut off infinity in a downward direction. In fact, the very idea of the infinite consists in its being extended through its own nature in every direction without being bounded by any limit or any border. Therefore, in order that the notion of being as regards the Father and the Son remain firm and immutable, it will not be possible to conceive the space between (διάστημα) as infinite; [it] will necessarily separate the Only Begotten from the Father with some kind of limit. Thus, I maintain that, according to this discourse, the God of the universe is not from eternity; rather, it postulates that He had his origin from a particular point.
The argument develops per absurdum, in the sense that if one takes seriously the statement that the life of the Father is prior to that of the Son, then it will be inevitable to introduce an interval between the two, involving the Father in the same dimension as the Son. In fact, both the mutually exclusive possibilities are absurd, that is, whether the interval between the two Persons is infinite or finite. The central point of the question is precisely the reflection on the relationship between adiastematic eternity and the diastematic time of the distinction into two ontological levels of the Trinity and the creation that, in Cappadocian theology, are separated by an infinite metaphysical hiatus. Apophaticism is the gnoseological reflection of this ontological structure, in that it removes all claim of projection from the dimension of the categories into the divine immanence, declaring, in fact, the impossibility of imprisoning the Trinity in concepts and in the necessary and necessitating logic that characterizes creaturely knowledge: That which truly exists is the true Life. And this is inaccessible to knowledge. If, then, the life-giving nature is beyond our knowledge, what can be comprehended is precisely not Life. But what is not Life cannot by its nature generate life. Thus, Moses is filled with what he desires precisely insofar as his desire remains unsatisfied. He learns from what was said that the divinity, by its very nature, is incomprehensible, since it is not circumscribed by any limit (πέρατι). In fact, if one were to think of the divinity as somehow limited (ἔν τινι πέρατι), it would be necessary and appropriate to consider together with this limit what lies beyond it (πέρατι).
As is clear from the text quoted, we find ourselves here at the very center of Gregory of Nyssa’s theology, which combines the ontological
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I, ,–,: GNO I, ,–. Cf. G. Maspero, “Relazione e Silenzio: Apofatismo ed ontologia trinitaria in Gregorio di Nissa,” Augustinianum , no. (): –. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita Moysis, II, ,–,: GNO VII/, .
. The Gregories
excess of the triune God with apophaticism and epektasis. Thus, Moses knows God only by recognizing in the encounter that He is unknowable. In this way, the human infinite desire becomes a guide to the true knowledge of the Creator, as seen in the previous chapters. We see that in this context too, which is not part of the polemical or dogmatic works of Gregory, there is a repetition of the principle present in the Contra Eunomium I: whatever limit is predicated of God would imply lowering Him to a single level together with the two sections that would mark this limit. That what we have here is a common strategy in Cappadocian theology is demonstrated also by the Oratio (De Filio) of the Nazianzen. The radical difference between generation within the divine immanence and that on the creaturely level is reaffirmed in order to deny the possibility of any kind of ontological participation on the part of the Son: But then [the Father] is supposed to have generated one who exists or who does not exist? These are ravings: this goes for you and for me since we were, in a certain sense, “in the loins of Abraham” (Heb :), like Levi, and we came to be. In a certain way, therefore, our mode of origin is partly from what is and partly from what is not, by contrast with the primordial matter which clearly exists from a state of non-being even if some describe it as unbegotten. Where God is concerned, however, being begotten coincides with being and with “from the beginning.”
This passage reveals Gregory of Nazianzus’ awareness of being faced with a question that is essentially metaphysical and so of coming up against the great classical tradition, as shown by his reference to the primordial matter. The point is the same as the one we have already seen in Basil and in Gregory of Nyssa: for the Son, being generated coincides ontologically with being itself, in such a way that having origin from another does not imply inferiority because it does not go out of the one divine nature, which is eternal. As the discussion continues, the debate takes on an extremely interesting logical dimension because, as already in the Contra Eunomium I of
On this subject, see E. Ferguson, “Progress in Perfection: Gregory of Nyssa’s Vita Moysis,” Studia Patristica (): –; Th. Alexopoulos, “Das unendliche Sichausstrecken (Epektasis) zum Guten bei Gregor von Nyssa und Plotin. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum (): –: and O. Sferlea, “On the Interpretation of the Theory of Perpetual Progress (epektasis). Taking into Account the Testimony of Eastern Monastic Tradition,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique (): –. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio (De Filio) ,–: SCh , pp. –.
Epistemology and Openness
Gregory of Nyssa, it proceeds per absurdum. But in the Nazianzen’s case, the paradoxical dimension emerges explicitly: I, however, do not accept either of the two possibilities and declare that the question is absurd while the response is not difficult. Yet, if it seems to you that one of the two must necessarily be true, according to the assumptions of your discourse, let me pose you a little question: is time in time or is it not in time? If it is in time, what time is that? And how is it different from other time? And how does it contain it? But if it is not in time, what is this strange wisdom that introduces an atemporal time? But now, with regard to “I am now lying”, admit the one or the other: either that it is simply true or that it is false. Indeed, we shall not admit both. But this is not possible: since by lying he is telling the truth, or else he is telling the truth with a lie. And this is inescapable. But then, why do you marvel that, as in that case the opposites agree, here, both the possibilities are false in such a way that your ingenuity is shown to be empty.
The force of the question as to whether time is within time or outside time is clear. It is actually a reformulation of the statement of the “adiamasticity” of the divine being or, in other terms, of the surpassing nature of the ontology of the Trinity with respect to the creation. The observation of the impossibility of both the outcomes of the syllogism, or, better, the sophism, according to Basil’s expression, is arrived at through the paradox of the liar.
. There is thus a convergence of philosophical study and the theological reflection that has developed on the basis of revelation. In fact, the Eunomian claim is confronted with a basic requirement of thought, which can be such only to the degree in which it remains open to the excess of the real and so to the possibility of the intervention of God in history. Thus, the logical argument reiterated by the Cappadocians in their response to Eunomius springs literally from Scripture and from that paradoxical dimension that characterizes the Gospel. The same paradox of the liar is found in Titus, where it says: “One of them, in fact one of their prophets, had already said: ‘The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, greedy bellies’. This testimony is true.”
Ibid., ,–: SCh , pp. –. On this theme, see J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy (eds.), The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Tit :–.
. Logical Openness
The prophet to whom Paul is referring is Epimenides, whose expression, according to Diogenes Laërtius, was to be taken up and formalized by Eubulides. In the words of Roy Sorensen, “Eubulides may have poked through the ashes of Epimenides’ remark and discovered a live ember; it would be odd if Epimenides’ ‘The Cretans always lie’ entails that some Cretan is not a liar. Sure, it is a historical fact that some Cretans sometimes tell the truth. But one should not be able to deduce this historical fact from logic alone.” It is precisely the opening of thought to the surpassing of the real and so the presence of the Logos in human life that is the point of contact with the Megarian philosophical reflection, which is later taken up in the Stoic sphere, through which it probably reached the Cappadocians. Eubulides operated simply in defense of the Parmenidean positions, using the paradox to cause the collapse of the distinction between premises and conclusions so as to bring about the emergence of an absolute identity. However, thanks to the revelation of the triune God, the Cappadocians succeed through their Trinitarian ontology in grasping the deeper message contained in that fire hidden under the ashes, formulating for the first time the distinction between the ontological and the logical-gnoseological levels. Such a form of thought, which reinterprets gnoseology from the relational ontology of the Trinity, is a genuine response to the Skeptical critique that relativistically denies all possible forms of thought, a critique with which metaphysical thought has not yet fully come to terms, as the postmodern context demonstrates. As Mark DelCogliano has observed, both Origen and Basil take up Ps :, which, in the LXX version proclaims “all men are liars” (πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης), developing a contextual exegesis to prove that David is not a human being, in such a way as to release the psalm verse from the grip of the paradox. However, the perspective illustrated on the basis
Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum II, (H. S. Long). R. Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox. Philosophy and the Labyrinths of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), . Cf. A. Rüstow, Der Lügner: Theorie, Geschichte und Auflösung (New York; London: Garland, ) and M. Mignucci, “The Liar Paradox and the Stoics,” in K. Lerodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), –. Cf. Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox, . Cf. Origen, Fragmenta in Epistulam ad Romanos ,,– (Hammond Bammel, , p. ); and Basil, Homilia in Psalmum CXV, PG , B. M. DelCogliano, “Origen and Basil of Caesarea on the Liar Paradox,” Augustinianum ( ): –.
Epistemology and Openness
of the relationship between time and eternity shows that, in the Cappadocian thought, the paradox reveals a deeper dimension. DelCogliano focuses on logical analysis so as to demonstrate the inconsistency in Basil’s reading, but he does not show that the theological solution to the philosophical paradox is the leap in the ontological level. But this point is fundamental in order to grasp the novelty of the theological proposal of the fourth century as is demonstrated by its convergence with the modern demonstrations of logical incompleteness. From Bertrand Russell to Kurt Gödel and later to Alan Turing, these proceed by reformulating the paradox of the liar as “This proposition is false” in order to translate it into “This proposition cannot be proved” and, then, in terms of information theory, as “It is incalculable/immeasurable.” The point of arrival is the same as for the Cappadocians in that thought cannot be closed to the real, but every formal system can be coherent only if open to the reality that it intends to formalize, just as theological thought can only be itself if it remains ever open to the ontological excess signaled by the apophatic dimension of which the distinction between time and eternity is the foundation.
. : Why are these considerations on the history of epistêmê and Cappadocian logic so relevant? The Enlightenment project clashed with certain results that were not external to science itself but internal to it. Thus Kurt Gödel demonstrated from within logic that any logical-formal system that contains at least arithmetic must necessarily be incomplete. This means that, once the starting axioms have been assigned, the theorems deduced from them cannot all be shown to be true or false, but there will be a point when it will be necessary to decide what the formal system is modeling by including some of the deduced theorems among the starting axioms. In physics, dynamical systems with classical and quantum chaos have led to a similar conclusion, demonstrating the existence of a cognitive limit intrinsic to the system itself. It is interesting to note that the Trinitarian doctrine requires, at a formal level, precisely the inclusion of natural numbers in any formal system that aspires to represent it. Moreover, Gödel’s theorem has as its
Cf. Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox, . Cf. G. J. Chaitin, The Unknowable (New York: Springer-Verlag, ).
. Conclusion
starting point precisely the paradox of the liar that the Cappadocians had taken as a starting point to show, by way of absurdity, that Eunomius’ logical system could not hold. The fundamental reason for this, according to Cappadocian thought, is in fact the relationship between the one and the many, which only Trinitarian theology manages to harmonize by resolving previous philosophical aporias. Greek thought was aware of its own logical limitations, which the tragedies represented through the pietas characteristic of the great Greek humanism. The quadrature of the circle, to which Aristotle often alludes, goes in the same direction, as does the discovery of irrational numbers. This is linked to the expulsion of Hippasus from the human community and his punishment by the gods because he was guilty of having revealed outside Pythagorean circles the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of the square, which undermined the identification between being and intelligible, and therefore between being and measure, on which Greek thought and society were founded. Everything called for a greater Logos, capable of recognizing an even greater value for the human being. Key to this new epistemological perspective is relation, which had been metaphysically reshaped by the Cappadocians. In fact, the fundamental aporia of the Greek world consisted in affirming the relationality of the epistêmê, which is the authentic path to truth insofar as it sought the metaphysical foundation of the world but in denying the relational dimension of the first principle. This left science itself suspended in the void, a path taken by the Sophists and the Skeptics, or introduced a separation between divine and human thought, which ended up making the human equivocal with respect to its divine foundation, as Plato, Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists did. In order to reach the fullness of truth, the human being had to renounce being human, as the path from Aristotelian nous to Plotinian mysticism illustrates. Thus, the analysis of the Cappadocian theory of knowledge with the stress on their research at the epistemological and logical level also shows the relevance and value that their Patristic philosophy can assume, particularly for postmodern thought. This has experienced the dramatic emergence of the tensions inherent in the modern project in the last century and is in search of new perspectives that make it possible for human beings to be fully themselves.
Iamblichus, De vita Pythagorica, –.
Cf. Plotinus, Enneades VI, ,.
Epistemology and Openness
In fact, despite the modern scientific denial of metaphysics, it can be seen that it always comes back just through epistemology, which, however, when it is closed, betrays itself and the human thought. This is why the epistemology and relational ontology of the Cappadocians can provide contemporary logic and scientific thought with the openness and depth they seek.
See J. Polkinghorne, The Trinity and an Entangled World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, ); M. Esfeld, “The Reality of Relations: The Case of Quantum Physics,” in A. Marmodoro and D. Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), –; and G. Maspero, “Theologia Ancilla Mysterii: epistemología relacional e interdisciplinariedad,” Scripta Theologica (): –.
Conclusions The Third Navigation
In the Phaedo, Plato compares his research to the second navigation, which is carried out by rowing when the wind has dropped: the PreSocratics had carried out a first navigation under sail, seeking the ultimate reasons for reality in first physical principles, which, however, once subjected to metaphysical analysis, turned out to be nothing more than concauses. That is why Plato presents the fruit of his arduous work, pointing to a first principle that belongs exclusively to the sphere of the intelligible. Aware of the difficulty, he compares his task to a perilous sea voyage, as we have seen, but at the same time he leaves the door open for help that may come from beyond his own investigative capabilities. The reference to this possibility of relying on a divine logos represents one of the pillars of Platonic thought. Trinitarian Revelation could be read precisely as this θεῖος λόγος that renders a third navigation possible. The final proposal of this research is the identification of this third navigation with the ontological extension developed by the Cappadocians and the Fathers of the Church from the fourth century onwards, in the attempt to think the real starting from the New Testament revelation. This voyage has proved to be neither easy nor without dangers and difficulties. The reconstruction of the historical scene proposed here demonstrates this quite well. The formulation of the perfectly identical nature of the Father and the Son, in fact, required serious effort from its Christological starting point. Jesus is not simply divine, as if He were
On this topic, see G. Reale, Toward a New Interpretation of Plato (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, ), –. Plato, Phaedo, .c–d.
Conclusions
merely a man who received certain extraordinary powers from God. Jesus truly is God, the Son of the Most High. Thus, God is the Father and God is the Son: the concept of the First Principle must thus undergo serious revision. Trinitarian revelation took four centuries to arrive at a complete definition that avoided the danger of reducing the mystery with undue simplifications. Baptismal faith was clear from the beginning, yet thought too had to be touched by the encounter with the one and triune God so as to be able to reach a formulation that did justice to this very faith and safeguarded against the danger of misunderstandings and lessening of the mystery. The main form of these simplifications was connected to the ancient metaphysical understanding, which was characterized by a continuous ontological scale that united God and the world. From this perspective, the first principle is necessarily relationless, precisely because it is absolute (ab-solutus, stripped of all ties) and has no need of anyone, turned solely to itself as in the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. Instead, the gods, dependent on this absolute, are considered the lower in the hierarchical scale of beings the more relations they have with mankind. Such an understanding suggested an interpretation of the Son as an intermediate being between God and the world and thus a kind of mediator between them: a divine and good being like Plato’s Demiurge but not one and the same with the Father. The first Principle had to be protected and could not be mingled with the world, hence should have no relations, which meant, in fact, imperfection. Moreover, the mediating function performed by the gods and made possible through relations was by nature necessary on account of their intermediate position in the scale of being. Relations, then, were asymmetric and not free. Thus, the first main result of this research is the concrete illustration of how one cannot reconstruct the historical and systematic course of theology in the first centuries without seriously taking into account metaphysics, with which the former has interacted profoundly. One may think that this is wrong, as Adolph von Harnack did, but it remains a historically inescapable fact.
Mark Edwards writes about Gregory of Nyssa: “Gregory’s theology blends the conceptual resources of Plotinus and Aristotle with consequences that are neither Aristotelian nor Platonic.” (Mark J. Edwards, Aristotle and Early Christian Thought [London; New York: Routledge, ], ). “Christian preaching and philosophy were things entirely different” (A. Harnack, History of Dogma, II [New York: Dover, ], )
Conclusions
In fact, the Hellenistic philosophical background – Medium- and NeoPlatonic – would inevitably influence the initial comprehension of the Christian Logos and thus the theology of the Son. This risked being interpreted as an intermediate degree between the Father and the world, along the lines of Platonic Eros. It was only in the fourth century that these difficulties were definitively overcome, in order to formulate the Trinitarian doctrine in complete terms. This required the recomprehension of the Logos, that is, of the Son, in relational terms and a real change in the ontological conception: from the logos ut ratio, to which the Christian θεῖος λόγος was first reduced, the Greek Father shifted to the Logos ut relatio. If earlier the supreme Cause had to be bereft of relations precisely as absolute, now, on the other hand, it is recognized that God is Father and Son and Spirit. The First Principle has an interior dimension, an immanence, in which are the three divine Persons, whose identity is founded on mutual relation and not on substantial distinction. And this is a radical metaphysical novelty. Each Person is the very one divine substance, and this substance, precisely because it is personal, has an immanence in which are the other two Persons, who are also the one perfect and eternal substance. So personal identity consists precisely in this mutual immanence of the divine Persons. The Son is in the Father, and the Father is Father only because He has within Himself the Son united to Him by perfect self-gift; and so the Son is such only in relation to the Father through perfect self-gift; and finally, the Holy Spirit, the very self-gift and συνδετικόν that unites the first two divine Persons, is God precisely because He is as hypostasis their mutual relation. Gregory of Nyssa for this reason identifies the Paraclete as the Glory or Kingdom that is eternally exchanged between the Father and the Son. He thereby fosters an essential development in showing the necessity of grasping the first procession in light of the second and vice versa. This opens the way to gradually identifying God with three perfect, reciprocal and eternal relations, as later in Middle Age Aquinas will do, thanks to the mediation of John of Damacus, who wrote about the difference between personal and essential attributes in God in the following terms: All these [essential] attributes are to be applied in a common manner to the entire Godhead and in an identical, simple, undivided and unitary manner, whereas the names “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit,” “Uncaused” and “Caused” (τὸ ἀναίτιον καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν), “Ungenerated,” “Generated” and “the One who proceeded in the manner of spiration” are to be applied in a distinct manner. They are
Conclusions
not revelatory of the essence, but of the mutual Trinitarian relations and the mode of subsistence of the Hypostases (τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως καὶ τοῦ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπου).
From the text it is apparent that in the eighth century the personal individuation within the Trinity does still coincide with the Cappadocian relational solution, as the three hypostases are characterized by the names of the Persons, the difference between Uncaused and Caused, as in Ad Ablabium, and the agennesia, generation and spiration, which signify the mutual relations. These are identified with the τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως of the three hypostases. And this is a second main result of the research from the historical perspective. The text, in fact, is very important for assessing Johannes Zahhuber’s position on Patristic philosophy, as it shows that the metaphysical reshaping of the Cappadocians is still present in John of Damascus’ intratrinitarian conception of schesis. Personal individuation in divine immanence is thus founded on the relational dimension, which derives from the processions that ground personal distinctiveness. Certainly, later the work in the Christological sphere brought great novelty, because of the need to illustrate the unity between the divine and human natures. In fact, for the latter, schesis continues to have an accidental dimension, as seen in Gregory, because each human person does not exhaust the divine nature, unlike the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit with regard to the divine nature. Yet the metaphysical novelty that allows the passage to a new form of individuation that truly recognizes the ontological plane of existence together with that of essence is already present, making it possible to speak of an authentic Patristic philosophy even at this moment. The very fact that the Cappadocians worked on Aristotelian categories, radically changing the value of the relation, demonstrates the scope of their metaphysical thinking. For this Patristic philosophy is a new relational ontology. Relation, in fact, is no longer seen as a mark of imperfection, and the very role of the Logos Incarnate must be re-read in terms of gift and love. Christ is not halfway between God and mankind. Rather, Christ is perfect God and perfect man. The Incarnation and the mediation of Christ do not imply inferiority for the relational dimension to mankind and the world that they entail, as initially one might have thought. In fact, Incarnation
John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa, ,–: Kotter, . Section ..
See Section ...
Conclusions
and mediation are not necessary but freely enacted, becoming the expression of God’s immanence that is in and of itself relation, gift and communion of love. Mediation thus becomes the expression of the perfection of relation: Christ is the mediator between God and mankind precisely because He is perfect God and perfect Man. Being the Son, He identifies Himself with the pure relation to the Father and becomes incarnate, uniting Himself with every human being, in order to attract everything and everyone to the very love of the Father. For the Father who loves the Son also loves the Son’s body with the same love, and we are that body, as Gregory of Nyssa says. This has also resulted in a truly theological understanding of the divine attributes, which from the historical-dogmatic point of view is significantly illustrated by the expression Life from Life, in its relation to the derivative formulas introduced into the Nicene symbol. The divine attributes are reinterpreted from a properly relational dimension, starting from divine unity. In this way, a third main result of this research at the systematic level is that God is not one despite being triune but is one precisely because He is triune, just as true Life is that which consists in the eternal generation of the Son by the Father and true Goodness is again this same Life as the infinite and eternal Gift that flows from the bosom of the Father. The third navigation is not, then, a negation of what the second one accomplished, that is, what is arrived at in classical metaphysics. Rather, the third navigation fulfills the second one by showing its potential as the point of departure for new thought that can now penetrate the immanence of the First Principle on account of Revelation. It is the reference to immanence that is essential for any grasp of the continuity even in the distinction of Trinitarian ontology with respect to Greek metaphysics. Relation is not just some other plane of being that is dialectically opposed to substance, stripping it down as Zizioulas seems at times to hint, neither something that is simply juxtaposed to it. Relation is located within the
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Illud: Tunc et ipse filius, GNO III/, ,–, John D. Zizioulas does not seem to cleanly distinguish the dimension of knowledge in apophaticism from ontological analysis. It is indeed evident that the Cappadocians identify God and each of the three divine Persons as substance. One might recall the analysis of Gregory of Nasianzus’ Oratio , cited above, where the theologian wonders whether the third Person is to be placed among those beings who exist in and of themselves (τῶν καθ ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκότων) or among those that exist by inhering in some other being (ἐν ἑτέρῳ) – that is, if it is substance (οὐσίαν) or accident (συμβεβηκός). He concludes, obviously, that the Spirit is divine substance: Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio , : SCh , , –, see
Conclusions
divine substance and constitutes its inside. In the theology of Gregory of Nyssa, the dimension of relation does not represent an intermediate level between substance and accidents, rather it is placed within the very immanence of the divine substance. Gregory of Nyssa’s intention, as in the other two Cappadocian Fathers, is explicitly ontological, as shown by the reconstruction of the history of the term schesis, with references to the philosophy of authors such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus. The analysis of relation in the Neo-Platonic background has confirmed Eunomius’ proximity to the latter philosopher, supporting Jean Daniélou’s thesis. At the same time, the analysis of the Patristic development allowed to highlight the clear difference between the conception of schesis in Gregory of Nyssa and Porphyry. The shift from πως ἔχειν to πως εἶναι, with the insertion of relation in the immanence of the divine substance, excludes, in fact, that the Cappadocian doctrine can be approached to that of the Porphyrian inseparable accidents. The extension of classical metaphysics developed in the search for an adequate formulation of the Trinitarian doctrine had, therefore, important implications in the ontological conception also at the creaturely level. The immanent Logos ut relatio also made possible a re-reading of the world in light of an analogous logos, now characterized by its reference to person, to freedom and to reciprocity. Knowledge itself had to be re-thought from the perspective of apophaticism so as to then come to an authentic distinction between ontology and knowledge. These had previously been practically indistinguishable in the identification of being and the intelligible that marked both the Platonic eidetic structure as well as Aristotelian abstraction. Trinitarian ontology implies, then, a Trinitarian epistemology, which is capable of rightly considering freedom and relation in the understanding of knowledge. Yet this new epistemology cannot be read in a dialectical sense with respect to the Greek one, because it is a response to an aporia that was previously present, as Sextus Empiricus’ criticism shows. If the
Section .. The point is that the position of Zizioulas, who seems to identify the Cappadocian affirmation of the impossibility of knowing divine substance with the negation of substance itself, prevents him from grasping the value of the immanence of substance as the ontological ubi of relations. On the inseparable accident, see Edwards, Aristotle and Early Christian Thought, –.
Conclusions
epistêmê is relational, in fact, while the First Cause is not, then there is an ambiguity between human and divine knowledge, which forces the human being to renounce her or his humanity in the search for identification with God. In fact, the tension between the one of Parmenides and the multiplicity of Platonic participation is still unresolved. On the other hand, the relational reinterpretation of the first principle made possible by Trinitarian revelation and achieved by the Cappadocians through their reshaping of schesis makes it possible to recognize the value of human knowledge and logic. The only condition is that these remain relationally open, through the recognition of apophaticism as a fundamental epistemological condition. Indeed, it is the cognitive reflection of the ontological gap, that is, of the difference between the one divine and eternal nature that is the Trinity and all other created natures. It is precisely this apophaticism, which seems to separate God and the human beings, that in truth brings them closer, because it marks the passage from a hierarchically graduated relationship of necessity to a possibility of an authentic free and personal relationship. The very contradiction between the astonishment before the world from which the philosophical act begins and the need to overcome precisely those realities that had attracted the thinker, as the myth of the cave teaches, demonstrates the philosophical scope of Cappadocian thought. This, on the contrary, recognizes the cave itself as the place where it is now possible to encounter the light, because the Sun became flesh and was born in Bethlehem in a grotto. From this perspective, Trinitarian doctrine might be defined as anaphysics, which is an extension of a metaphysics: the Greeks sought ontological foundation starting from physical and cosmic reality governed by necessity, whereas Christian thought describes an ontology that does not simply go beyond (meta) physical realities but actually stays over and above (ana-) them. Here the foundation is on high and paradoxically is found above and not below, fulfilling the Platonic suggestion that the human beings are like celestial trees rooted in heaven. It is precisely this anaphysics that allows an approach to Life in a way that pairs relation and freedom.
Cf. G. Maspero, “Cavern,” in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory di Nyssa (Leiden; Boston: Brill, ), –. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, .a–b. See also Aristotle, De anima, II,.
Conclusions
This new understanding of the divine also changes the way one reads the finite world: just because the ontology of creation subsists in relation with that of the Trinity, finitude can be understood as relation with the infinite Creator. The limits in created being become openness to the infinite. They are like paths to the relation with God who in creating gives of Himself, without losing anything of Himself or blurring Himself with His creation. It is precisely this relational ontology developed by the Cappadocian that allows for an understanding of how God has no need of “protecting himself” but can be absolutely transcendent though making himself truly present in the world. Thus, this theological achievement also has a profound philosophical value, because God’s relational unity is placed at the foundation of human unity and communion, just as the three divine Persons leave their personal and relational imprint in the act of creation. The human being is in fact the image and likeness of the Creator and his or her ontological makeup must bear the mark of those perfections that are uncovered by anaphysics. Clearly relation and being person do not exist in the same manner in God as they do in the human being, yet neither can they exist in an equivocal way. In conclusion, the ontology developed by the Cappadocians can be described as a metanthropics in that it seeks an ontological foundation without taking up cosmic necessity as a prototype but starting from freedom and relationality. It passes from the search for the foundation of what is μετὰ τὰ φυσικά to the foundation of what is μετὰ τὰ ἀνθρωπικά. This does not deny or supplant metaphysics, for the human being does not cease to be physical or stop obeying the necessary laws of the cosmos, nor does he or she stop being a substance by the fact of being a person. But this Patristic philosophy also explains the dynamic tension of human life toward the infinite, overcoming the “escape” in which, according to Plato, consists the assimilation with God obtained thanks
Ilaria Vigorelli has studied in a comprehensive and in-depth manner the anthropological reflections of the reshaping of schesis in the Trinitarian sphere in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa: I. Vigorelli, La relazione: Dio e l’uomo. Schesis e antropologia trinitaria in Gregorio di Nissa (Roma: Città Nuova, ). Another extremely interesting approach is that of Declan O’Byrne, who reconstructs an anthropology based on the theological grammar of the first seven ecumenical councils: D. O’Byrne, For Us and For Our Salvation: The “Christological” Councils and Trinitarian Anthropology (Roma: Urbaniana University Press, ).
Conclusions
to the intelligence that leads to be just and holy. This “escape” in Plotinus is “from solitary to solitary” but was later reshaped as “let oneself be transformed from glory to glory” (ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν μεταμορφοῦσθαι), by the relational reformulation of the Pauline theology of ὁμοίωσις in Gregory of Nyssa, which gives an answer to the tragic cry of Greek humanism and the age we live in.
Plato, Theaetus, .b.–. Plotinus, Enneades VI, ,,. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum canticorum , ,. See Cor :.
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Index
Abel Accidents –, , , –, , , –, , –, , , , –, , –, , , , , – Adam Aeschylus Aëtius –, , Agapê , , –, , Agennesia , Agennêtos , Aitia, aitiaton , , , , , , Alcinous-Albinus , , Alexander of Aphrodisia –, , , , , , , , Andronicus of Rhodes , Angels , –, Anomeans , , Antigone – Antioch, Synod of – Apollo , , Apophaticism –, , , , , , , –, –, –, –, , , , –, , –, , – Aporia , , , , –, –, , , –, , Archê , , , , –, –, , , –, , , Arianism –, , , , , –, , –, , , –, , –, , , , , , ,
Aristotle , , –, , –, –, , , , , , –, –, –, –, , , , –, , , , –, –, , , –, –, , –, –, , –, , , , – Arius –, , , , , , , Athanasius , , , –, , –, –, , , –, , , , Athens , Attributes, divine , , , , –, –, –, , , , Augustine , , , Basil of Ancyra , , Basil of Cesarea , –, , –, , , –, , –, –, –, –, –, –, – Beauty , , , , , , , Berti, Enrico – Body –, , –, , , , , –, , , Boethius , , Cain Categories , , –, , , , , , , , –, –, , –, –, –, , –, –, , , , ,
Index
–, –, , , , , , –, , , , Cause , , , –, –, , , , , –, , –, , , , , , –, , –, , , , Celsus Chiaradonna, Riccardo , , , Christ , –, –, , , , –, –, , –, , , –, , , –, –, –, , – Christology , , , , , , Chrysippus –, Clement of Alexandria , , , –, –, –, , , –, , –, Coakley, Sarah , Coda, Piero –, , , Constantinople, (First) Council of , , , , Conti, Alessandro , – Correlative , – Corruptibility Cosmos –, , , –, , , , , , –, , , , Creator , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , –, , , , , –, , , , –, , , , , , , , Creature , , , , , , , , , –, , , –, Creon Cross –, –, , , , Daniélou, Jean , –, , , , , , Degeneration , –, , , , , – DelCogliano, Mark , , , , – Demiurge , , , Desire , , , –, , , , – Desmos –, Diathesis , Diaphora , –, –, Diastêma , – Diogenes Laërtius , , ,
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