The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand

Citation preview

THE

BUREAUCRATIC

ELITE

OF

THAILAND:

A STUDY OF THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES, EDUCATIONAL

BACKGROUNDS

AND

CAREER

ADVANCEMENT PATTERN.

by

LIKHIT DHIRAVEGIN

•G

. u .h nbii.,

1-

PM

PrintjpgAS'L A

>'

LCopyright. ■ 19783 I « \ 0 G/zj.

«•>«•;/* .

-'GJA . ..

' Oh; 1

UI ’

y

tt ’

n ’ - ' ''■■ '

j

Published by r .. '7AE '■ : "" Thai ’Khadf Research Institute Thammasat University, Bangkok

Printed at Wacharin Press 350—352 Prasumain Road, Bangkok., T. Wacharindrananda Printer. B.E. 2521

Foreword

Thai Khadi Research Institute was established eight years ago as an institute of Thai Studies. For a number of years it has concentrated its efforts on the humanities arid historical -researches.

However, since the

year 1977, it has been developed into a broader institution Which serves as the center for all research activities of Thammasat University. Responding to this institutional development, it has expanded the scope of -its activities to cover researches in the social science and development studies. It has also begun to publish reports of researches done by staff of the institute, and faculty members of Thammasat University. This work on “The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand’’’ by Dr. Likhit Dhiravegin is the first monograph in English language published by the Institute. It contains a wealth of data on the sociological attributes, educational background, and career advancement pattern of the Thai elites. The primary data alone will be most useful for further analysis and reference. “ Akin Rabibhadana Director Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University Bangkok' 12, 1978 ' r

Acknowledgement

There are many books on the Thai bureaucracy but so far there is not one dealing with the bureaucrats’ sociological attributes, educational backgrounds and their career advancement pattern. There is thus.,a gap in the literature and this study is an attempt to bridge this gap. The impetus for such a study occurred while I was writing my Ph. D. dissertation on the Thai bureaucratic elite’s political attitudes which touched upon the subject of the elite’s social backgrounds. In the process of data collection, I discovered studies focusing on this particular aspect of the bureaucrats of other countries. Examples are Muneer Ahmad, The Civil Servant in Pakistan : A Study of the Background and Attitudes of Public Servants in Lahore (London : 1964), and

Akira Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan Their Social Origins, Educational Backgrounds and Career Patterns (Princeton, New Jersey : 1969). Upon_

probing further, I discovered that, no such study has been done,on the Thai bureaucrats. II

While teaching at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, I received' a research grant from the Ford Foundation for the -subject. With recommendation from Dr. Larry Stifel, the Rockefeller Foundation Representative in Thailand, and the assistance of the officers of the Ford Foundation, especially Dr. David Szanton and Dr. David Pfanner, and the Ford Foundation Regional' Fellowship Committee, I was given a grant to conduct research on the subject in 1973.

The process of data collection, data processing

and analysis took about two years.

However other

duties and the political change of October 14, 1973, delayed the writing up of a report of my findings. Nevertheless, certain portions of the data have already been used for articles published in scholarly journals -both in Thailand and abroad. In order to disengage myself from my teaching work load and to devote fulltime for writing up the report, I applied for- a grant from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore for the purpose. A period of three months Was approved by the -Instituted .Selection Committee. However, unforeseen -Circumstances made it necessary for 'me to turn down -the -offer. This finished report was. then written -under III

considerable strain to my f amily and students, both of whom were supportive and understanding. It is hoped that this study will lead to a better understanding of the Thai bureaucracy, a subject of great interest to scholars on Thai politics. I hope also that this study would stimulate more research on this •artea and that the study would in some way contribute toward the growth of social science in general. A number of people and institutions have in one way or another helped in this study. First of all, this study would not have been possible had- it not been for I would like to the grant from the Ford Foundation, express my sincere thanks to the ‘Foundation and its officers Dr. David Szanton (presently with the Social Science Research Council in New York) and' Dr. David Pfanner for their understanding and kind assistance My thanks are extended to relating to the project. Dr. Larry Stif el for his help in regard to this project and to his constant support. To Mr. Praveen na Nakorn, the Deputy SecretaryGeneral of the Civil Service Commission, I am very grateful to him for allowing me to collect necessary I would also like to data on the officials* records. thank Mr. Putsup Maneesri of the Personnel Record IV

Division, the Civil Service Commission Jfor'hisl valuable advice. Thanks are due -to. the officialsnof the .agencies -concerned who did the transcribing ;of* 4he■ /I ' n Data- processing and data analysis' 'were -under the supervision of Dr. Suchart Prasif— Rathasm of Mahidol' University. I would like to:.express/Here my thanks to him and his-staff who assisted wi'thcthei.coSiputer work. Another person who- has-hevptedjadofriof energy-and time for- this project was my formenntudent and research assistant, Mr. Thanin idVijayangkura.u,iJ?I would like to express here my appreciation and thanks to him3.6 Fathers Occupations -of the First Grade Officials by Ministry 3 7 Places

of

*

-

Origin

of

the

75 Special

Grade Officials -

79-

3.8 Places of Origin of the First Grade Officials

79

3.9 Places of Origin of the- Special Grade Officials by Region

t

81

?

3.10 Places of Origin of the First Grade Officials .v

by Region

•

»

82

3.11 Place's of Origin of. the ..Special Grade. 11

Officials by Ministry

.

84

3.12 Places of Origin of the First- Grade Officials by Ministry 3.13 Age

-Distribution-

Grade Officials

O

)

85

'of ** the- > Special 1

t

91

-’3.14 Age Distribution of the. First Grade Officials

91

3.15 Sex . Distribution of

of

Grade Officials

the

Special. •’

1

t 95

IX

Page 3.16 Sex Distribution of the First Grade Officials

96

3.17 Sex Distribution of the Special Grade 98

Officials by Ministry 3.18 Sex Distribution of the First Grade

: 100

Officials by Ministry 3.19 Religious Denomination of .the Special

102

Grade Officials 3.20 Religious

First

Denomination of the

103

Grade Officials 4.1 Educational

of

Levels

the

Special 110

Grade Officials of

4.2 Educational 'Levels

the

First 111

Grade Officials 4.3 Frequency of Further Training After the

Entering Service of First.

Grade

Special

and

Officials

115

4.4 Educational Level of the Special Grade 116

Officials by Ministry

X

Page 4.5 Educational Level of the First Grade Officials by Ministry

119

4.6 Location of Foreign Training of the Special Grade and First Grade Officials 4.7* Educational Institutes

of

124

the Locally-

trained Elite „

126

4.8 Location of Training of the Grade Officials by Ministry

Special

""

L

128

4.9 Location of Training of the First Grade Officials by Ministry

129

5.1 Transfer of the Special Grade Civil Servants

156

5.2 Transfer of the First

Grade

Civil

Servants

157

5.3 Pattern of Promotion of the -Special Grade Officials 5.4 .Pattern

of

160 Promotion of the First

Grade Officials.

' XI

161

Page 5.5 Relationship between Promotion and. f

Educational Level of the Special Grade Officials (from 1st Grade to Special Grade) 164

5.6 Relationship between Promotion and Location of Training (Quality), of the Special Grade Officials ’(from 1st Grade to Special Grade)

165

5:7 Relationship between Promotion and " Educational Level of ther (Special Grade. R

Officials (from 1st Grade to Special, Grade) 166

5.8 Relationship between Promotion and

5.9 ( Educational Level of Judges, Public Prosecutors and Police Grade

Officers

(special

or Equivalent)

5.10 Location of

Training

171 of the

Judges, Public Prosecutors and Police '

:

Officers (special Grade or Equivaferit)

172

5.11 Educatiohal Level of Judges,- Puplic Prosecutors * and Police Officers (First Grade or Equivalent)172 XII

Page Judges,

the

.51,12 Location of Training of

Public Prosecutors and Police.. Officers, , 173

( First Grade or Equivalent), • ,, 5.13 Relationship between Promotion and

Educational Level of the First Grade Officials (from 2nd to 1st Grade)

174

5.14 Relationship between Promotion and

i1i 1'0. Ralph Braibanti1, 2 The Higher' Bureaucracy of Pakistan ” in Braibanti, ed., op. cit| p. -269'> and • ' Table. II. 11. Guyot, op. cit., p. 425, Table 6.' i t.

7 „ *

Other aspects,of the elite s sociological)attributes

such' as age; sex distribution?:and religiousnwoijshipjcan also give US' a.picture of the composition of thejbureau; cracy. ilf ’Will give us an idea of whetheij most o£.£h§ bureaucrats are of advanced age which/furtHei’ suggests 12 whether they are likely to. be conservative jpr -liberal. Sex distribution will show, 'whether thfereoisjsex d.is-; crimination in the recruitment of personnel;J n J he’ 12. It is a well-known, hypothesis that the older people ■A become,> the more conservativ.e‘ ? attit,ude.i Samuel Stouffer has discovered that there is an " inverse 1relationship between age and the degrdedf c "tolerance. Older people.ar’e' less .'tolerant . toward, . non-conformists and other related issues. Psycho" logists Have" discovered that as individuals‘ become* advanced.in age,ithere-is. am increasing degree of dogmatism and rigidity. See Samuel Stouffer,

Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A' Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind (New York : Doubleday & Company:,Jiicfyi J955)? passim, andj>. 94; fames, E.. Birren, The .Psychology'of Aging (New fersey; Prentice- Nall, Inc., * d96 )plp\ 1'89. ' ' < ) f .)

8 bureaucracy. It also reflects the social values of a particular country.

Religious worship will tell us

whether there is a proportionate representation of people with different religions in the organization. Also, one can infen whether religious' prejudice plays.a part in the recruitment .of officials in the bureaucracy. The list of the sociological attributes and their analysis can be extended. It is thus obvious that a study of the Thai > * bureaucratic elite s sociological attributes, their educat

tional backgrounds and their career pattern will be of great value to the field of social science.. 'It will help us understand the Thai bureaucracy better, by looking at a more completes picture of both the macro and micro levels.,

iii

.

i

■„

o'

Scope and Method of the Study •

;

«

’ The bureaucratic elite in. 'this 1study includes: f • "

•

’’

4

’

v

ci

(1) The total population (.N=216o) of the

9 Officials. the study covered every

That is,

member of the highest

government officials of all ministries except the Minis14 try of Defence. (2) Twenty percent sample (N=2394)of the First Grade (c 5,6 Officials of all ministries except the Ministry of Defence. * , ■ / 13. Formerly the civil servants .of Thailand were divided into five grades: Special Grade; First Grade; Second Grade; Third Grade; Fourth Grade. In 1975, a new Civil Service Act was enacted and the civil service system of Thailand was changed to what is known as the Position Classification (P.C.) System. The civil servants are now divided into eleven levels or C's as follows; C 1 equivalent to the' former fourth grade C 2,3 C 3,4 C 5,6

„ „

„ „ „

thir degrade second grade first grade

C 7 and above, „ ,, special grade 14. Our main focus of study is on the civil .servants. ■ We therefore' did not include the military bureaucrats in our research project-

ID ,1/ si Thec.Minist’ries and ’agencies covered dn the


•

*

\

#

j
personal records at the National Teachers 'Council were outdated, so the transcribing was done from personal record books of the officials at the various departments of the Ministry. The total length of time ! for the transcribing took four months, After that the data were fed -into the computer for marginals and * * cross-tabulation, Occasionally, computations were done

13

by hand.* The

whole project took about a year -and a

half.

The Subject To Be Discussed This study will have altogether eight chapters. Following the introduction, a discussion of the development of the Thai bureaucracy will be made. This will provide a brief historical background of the Thai bureaucratic structure serving as a foundation for understanding the *

discussions of

.*

*

the

subsequent ?

chapters. The third chapter will deal with sociological

attributes of

the

bureaucratic

the elite.-

The discussion will cover the general characteristics f ‘ ;T of the bureaucrats such as age, sex, father s occupation, place of origin, The finding will shed light on the composition of the bureaucratic elite’ Chapter IV focuses on the- educational backgrounds' of* the bureau-' crats. It covers -such aspects as the level of educational achievements, location of training.

.Mobility' patterns

14 .of the elite -or .promotion or career

advancement is

discussed in Chapter V. An attempt will be made to discuss favoritism and the merit system in the Thai * bureaucracy. Chapter VI investigates the role of the « t bureaucrats in politics by looking at the Cabinet members of various governments since 1958 when Field

Marshal Sarit Thanarat seized power,

i

•*

in

>

order to see how many civil bureaucrats were in the Cabinet or the Executive Branch of government. An examination of the number of the bureaucrats in the legislative assemblies is also to be made. This is to find out if the bureaucrats play an important role in the ' 1

i '

fi

Lagislative Branch of government. It must be pointed out, however

that this chapter is the result of a

separate, research, endeavor. Therefore, the data used in #this chapter are not what we’ have gathered from this project. Chapter VII will discuss briefly the bureaucrats

retirement;

The

discussion will be

15 •qualitative. The .information used 'in this chapter is from; ihte'r views with retired bureaucrats. ! The1 'last chapter is the concluding chapter’"pulling' the scattered ■information into, a coherent whole upon pwhichj certain patterns;, are -discerned. Policy implications .derived from, the (findings are also to be presented.

’jjj

>.

r-y/-

. i

'r

L

»• r

C

4 . capital, while the neighboring territories: were under the feudal princes who were succeeded by their own sons.

.a

These princes -'held lands as fiefs 'and %

governed them almost as independent states. Im tact,

23 the provinces under the feudal princes, had functioned much in the same way as the great fiefs of mediaeval France and Germany.

12

In order to bring the peripheral territories under the control of the central government, King Paramatrailoknatha (1448-1488, hereafter referred to as Trailok) had first sought to undermine the power 13 of the feudal princes and then reorganized the ----------- . 12 Hall, op. cit., p. 179. 13 King Trailok did this by changing the feudal system from a territorial base to that of a personal- base. In other words, it was changed from a system which resembled the Frankish seniorat to a system, like • that of the Roman patrocinium. According to the patrocinimn, the vassal was allowed to choose his lord. Two significant consequences followed from this new system. First, by allowing the freemen or client io choose his lord or patron, the power of ” lord or patron was weakened because "instead of drawing Jiis men from one well-defined area of land which was his fief, they were, within the limits of the territories immediately -surrounding the capital, widely scattered and were also permitted

24 . system of administration.

In reorganizing the admi-

nistrative systen, he did it by first dividing-the populate change their habitat." Second, with the. change to the patrocinium the land factor, which had formerly served to consolidate the power of the lord lost its political significance. See Wales, op. cit., pp. 46-47. The attempt to bring the feudal lords under the control of the central government was not a unique phenomenon for Ayudhaya. In traditional Japan a similar situation existed. Japan before 1871 was a feudal state. The country was divided into hans (fiefs) under the daimyo (lords) who acknowledged the authority of the shogun. To ensure that the daimyo accepted the central authority, the shogun, during the Tokugawa epoch, just as Louis XIV compelled his nobles to reside at Versailles, had adopted a system of political control called sankinkotai by which the daimyo were forced to spend a certain time in the capital each year and' were also required to leave their families in the capital as hostages when they returned. See G.B. Sansom, Japan A Short Cultural History ('New York'. ■Appleton-Century -Crofts, Inc., 1962), p. 444; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 234.

25

tion into two divisions—military and’ civil

and by

establishing a number of government departments with a theoretical separation between military and civil structures and functions. The new structure had two 15 essential ; partst headquarters and provinces. 14 This is a broad division. In fact there Were many categories of people in the society. There were -the royal family, the officials, the freemen, the monks, the Brahmans, the slaves and the foreigners. See JKales, op. eit., Chap. III. The freemen were subject to the corvee system. They had to work for the government for a certain period of time. During King Narai ( 1656-1688) the period for the royal corvee was six months. This was reduced to four months,in, the Thonburi period and three months in the Bangkok period until it was abolished by King Chulalongkorn. See ibid., pp. 53—56. 15 In addition to the provinces, there were also varying groups of vassal states or tributaries. The remnants of these tributaries were not fully incorporated into * the kingdom, until .the modernizing efforts of .the late nineteenth century.

w

26

The Headquarters: The headquarters organization included two great ministers or bodi,

argamahasena-

the heads of the civil and military divisions of

the populace. The civilian side of the headquarters 16 had four major ministries or krom headed by minister or senabodi. They were the councilors of the King. Less

was known

about the military but

presumably a parallel structure existed. The four civilian ministries were the Krom Wang (pal;lace Ministry), Krom Phra Klang (Treasury), Krom Muang (Ministry of the Capital) and Krom Na (Ministry of Lands)

7

This was based on the system of jatusdom

mentioned earlier. The Provinces: Under the

new system, the

Kingdom was divided into two main areas. The wang 16 Some scholars used the word “department" instead y

. of "ministry.”' 17 For a discussion of the duties and functions of these ministries, see Siffin, op. cit., pp. 20—21.

27 rajadhani

which*' was the central territory

with

provinces or districts in the outer area, supervised by one senabodi and the area outside the wang rajadhani which was also arranged into provinces. To increase the governing power of the central .government, a step was taken to expand the territory of the wang. rajadhani. This was done by bringing Jour .outlying provinces which had formerly been under the feudal princes under the wang rajadhani. These provinces were then administered directly as the wang rajadhani by officials who were responsible '

18

to the. central government.

As a result, the; central

government had now controlled a more extensive territory. However, the provinces farther away were • 1c still under the governing power of the feudal princes ‘ ’18 -Wales,' op. dt, pp. 105—106. 79 Ibid.

\

,

28 owed allegiance to the King.

7

The Khmerized administrative system of King Trailok (see Chart 2.1) and

the new system of

provincial administration developed later by King Naresvara (1590-1605) who replaced the feudal princes with governors appointed by the central government had consolidated the power of the King and the central government. However, owing to poor communications and a high degree of autonomy of the provincial governors, control over the provincial administration 20 This new system of King Trailok had probably continued for more than a century until the Burmese defeated Ayudhaya in A.D. 1569 and dominated it for fifteen years. King Naresvara the Great (1590-1605) who liberated the Thai from Burmese domination undertook a further stage of centralizing the administration. A reorganization of provinces was made at the same time that the feudal princes or their lineage who ruled over the provinces outside of the wang rajadhani were superseded by high officials appointed .by the. King. These governors 'were responsible- to, the' central government. See ibid., pp. 108—109; Siffin, op. cit., pp. 21—23.

Chart 2,1

Provincial

_ _ _Brahmans* Department

- _ Wardrobes Department

Scribes Department

Chief ( Staff'

__ "Uw on>??r.—

Village. Leader's or ’Headman

1

• Fourth-class provinces

military, etc.

.land, treasury. religious,

Great minister" of tho Military Division

(various military — departments. Including elephants, military registration, etc.)

Religious Affairs Departments

Minister

-Other staff —

(First-, second-, and third»cia$s province's)

Ministry of Land

Palace Minister

Adaptcd.from WRIfam Siflin, Tht Thai Bureaucracy Tnstifutlonarchanffg and Development (Honolulu : East-West Centre,Press, 1965), p, 22.

Minister acquired control over some provincial territory.)

and later the Treasury

(As the system evolved control over provinces was divided among the twd J groat ministers,

Port or "Landing Stage'* Department

[------

Minister of Treasury-

— (departmental staff, and registration department)

Great Minister of Civil Division

An Idealized-.Sketch of Governmental Organization Under the Khmcrizcd System of King Trailok of Jtyudhya

30

*

------

*

21'

was a persistent problem for Thai Kings- . The basic structure of this ‘system was in use until the 1’892 .

Chakkri Reformation.

22

Institutionalization of the Rank and Status of the Bureaucrats

,

Concomitant to the establishing of the new system

of administration,

the-' rank,

duties and

privileges of every official were institutionalized by the Laws of the Civil,

Military

and

Provincial

Hierarchies of A.D. 14547- According to these laws, each official was classified according to four methods of- distinguishing sakdi or power mnd hence dignity . These four methods which were closely related were * -a as follows:

/ u

Sakdi na or

literally

V. J * J* the farming ofrsdues, '.feudal 'privileges-especially in • i ' /St • V ' S* ; ~ rt f »v **' 25 'In. the first twenty years,of his. eign, before f.892, ' King .Chulalongkorn -tnade various reforms in such •»A 'areas as administifltia cdmm.iihicati'ons'f education and fiscal reform. See Siffih bp. cit., '52—58.

35

the ;matter of .forced labor- and general inefficiency. The abuses .of, local justice were also, from a European >>26 point of view, flagrant. , 5 'The problem of the inability of the central government to exert its control over provincial governors

was aptly

summarized by Walter Vella as

f

. follows : The problem of provincial control was a real one.

The ideal was to centralize control as

much as possible, but poor transportation and A

>

communication facilities made a large degree of ■w decentralization of power inevitable. Thus the t < ' rr » principal problems of the central government -------—--------— i " vji-d 26 Hall, op. cit., p. 673. 27 The inability of the King lo' exert Ins control"over; th e provincial governors;:as already ■ rmentioned,"hadbeen a problem since Ayudhayai This was attested by th'e considerable number and frequency of royal orders orderingTthe- governors‘.r.not' to be disloyal not to be dishonest f not to oppressPhe people See Sif fin, op; 'cit., ppi 29-30. C 3 ’ *

36

with regard to provincial administration was to give provincial officials enough power to administer the provinces effectively but not enough to permit the creation of independent provinces. In general, the degree of control maintained by the central government over . the provinces tended to decrease as the distance from the capital increased. For many distant provinces the government adopted the practical policy of allowing the position of governor to hereditary,

become

(emphasis supplied)28

Another weakness of the provincial admimstrai t* tion before the 1892 reformation was the tug of war between the two great ministers—the chiefs of civil and military affairs. Despite a theoretical division of power and jurisdiction between the two great ministers, there arose in practice a continual struggle of 28 Walter Vella The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand (Berkeley and Los Angeles'. University of California Press, 1955), p. 327.

37 power and duplication of jurisdiction

There was also

a scramble for power in the administration of provinces. Some provinces were under the great minister of civil affairs while others were under the great minister of 29 military affairs. The Chakkri Reformation of 1892 or * silent revolution

was launched by King Chulalongkorn for

one main reason- to have a strong and effective centralized state in which modernization programs could 30 be launched in order to remain an independent state. This was expounded by King Chulalongkorn s remarks: ....if’ the administration could not be modified arid developed into a modern system the country would be 29 Prachoom Chomchai, Chulalongkorn the Great (Tokyo; The Centre for East Asia Cultural Studies, 1965), p, 28. 30 Meiji Japan undertook1 a similar attempt in the face of Western imperialism. The two major, tasks facing the oligarchy were how to achieve a modern centralized state and a modern industrial economy. See Moore, op. cit., p. 246.t

38 in -danger- or worse, we might lose our independence >>31 • and freedom. 4 " The .central objective of the 1892 radical .administrative reformation was to, put an end .to the quasi32 autonomous, quasi-feudal Ayudhayan pattern. > Thereby, the ‘power of the central government would genuinely

be

consolidated. The crucial aspect of the

reformation was the transformation of the administrative

system

of

King

Trailqk to a

mor e

modern system. The two great ministers were abolished.

New

.established.

33

ministries along All

the

government employees.

Western- .lines, .were

officials became .salaried The key provincial adminis

tjrative reform lay in the. Ministry pf'Jthe Interior. * Under Prince Damrong, King Chulalongkorns •

I

half-brother, the Ministry of the. Interior undertook 31 Quoted in Siffin, op. cit, P- 59- ' • 52 Vella, bp. eit, p. 341; Cf. Siffin, op cit, p. 69; 4 Hall, bp. cit., pp. 67 3-674. 33 See Siffin, op. cit, pp. 58-61.

;39

the task of bringing about a- centralized -governmental system in which the administration of the-,provinces , were, subject to complete control of the central government. The new system of administration launched in the , reform was the development of a hierarchy of B.elow

-regional; provincial and district jurisdictions.

the district were tambol (communes) and the -villages. ■» The provincial towns were mostly governmental -> centers; they were also the centers in which regional n

"

and provincial headquarters situafed.

*'■ ’tn 1'”

The key of the new network of control was the monthon or region. .into a

It was developed from 1892

network of general government blanketing Che

entire ' nation, responsible for peace and justice,' ‘arid > serving alsckas 'skeleton ‘to which a growing number of functionally specialized activities could be attached

34

69 ‘

7

- .,34

.r

in an orderly fashion. 41

Vt

The monthons were the '* ' .

-*

f

id.

40

power centers at key points across the nation. were under the monthon

They

commissioners'

by the central government) under whom the provincial governors were subordinated.

In 1898, with the

enactment of the Provincial Administration Act, the new salaried governor was also flanked by two provincial boards. These two boards were to advise and assist in the conduct of the governor s duties.

This

had made the governor to function as a responsible governmental official rather than the formerly semi36 autonomous lord of the ’province. Another epochal development was the change in governmental philosophy. The old concept of public administration, in Prince Damrongs words, was that the country should be

free from danger,

such as

the danger of robberies. The main duty of the gover35 The significance of the monthons lay in their contribution to a new system of territorial (or local) government known as tesapiban. See ibid., p. 71 ff. 36 Ibid., p. 74.

41 nor was to maintain order and peace. If he was able to do this, he would be regarded as purpose.

If, on the other hand,

disorder, Royal

achieving his there was much

Commissioners would be sent

to

suppress the evils, or the minister himself might even go if conditions were sufficiently serious.

There had

thus been no inspection in peace times.

The new

concept, said Prince Damrong, was that

the purpose

of public administration is the maintenance of the peace and contentment of the people,

The country,

he stressed, must be improved even in time of ”37 peace. This new governmental philosophy had significant policy implications.

It meant that instead

of preserving the status quo and being satisfied with the existing condition, there would be attempts for constant- improvements. 37 Prince Damrong, “Conditions Existing During the Establishment of the Ministry of the Interior," (Sixtieth Anniversary Volume, Part 4); quotedin ibid., £ 68.

42 J

1

1

Along i with the administrative reforms,- King

Chulalongkorn had also sought to launch a series of other' reforms, : such as the emancipation ‘of slaves and the abolition of the corvee system and ’the outdated customs/1 More railroads* were built. Map surveys and the telegraph were introduced. Legal reform was 38

undertaken. Education was promoted.’ In the course Jj

*

of 'these reforms, a national bureaucracy with elaborate differentiated structures and specialized functions"was brought about. Instead of King Trailok s four ministries, there were

now several

ministries

along

Western lines, such as, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Education. The division of labor of each ministry was now more distinct.

Most important of all, the central govern-

ment .could, now exert its control over the provincial I? * administration and made the salaried governor subject 38 See Hall, op. cit., pp. 671-678.

f

43 to-xentral control.. This meant that the bureaucratization .of the- .administrative system had now become nation-wide.

The recruitment of personnel had also

.extended outside of the elite circle and was based also on. the achievement criteria (tor be discussed below). The new administrative system of King Chulalongkorn has become the. foundation of the present Thai bureaucratic system.. The Recruitment of Personnel t

The -recruitment of personnel in the Thai bureaucracy before the Chakkri Reformation of 1892 was based mainly on the ascriptive criteria and by personal favor of the King.

Top positions were held

by princes or other members of the royal family. Besides members of the royal family were sons or j >i ’ -J dependents of officials who had the advantage of learning the art of government

and skill .in. the

language of the court from the Mahatlek, or corps of

44 royal pages servants.

39

who served as

the King s

personal

In due time, these people would be

appointed to fill the vacant .positions. In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the recruitment of personnel had expanded in response to

need for more competent people to

fill the expanding bureaucracy.

As in the traditional

practice, top positions were filled by members of the royal family.

This was made possible through the

practice of polygamy among Thai Kings. King Mongkut 40

for example, had ninety—four children.

Many of

King Chulalongkorn s officials were his half-brothers. Under colonial threat, an effort to modernize the country had led to the employment of foreign advisors to help in the administrative work and the modernization programs. A study has revealed that there were 549 foreigners who served in the Thai 39 Wales, op. cit., p. 40. 40 Siffin, op. cit., p. 94.

45

government during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. In the year 1909, there were 319 foreign officials 42 working for the Thai government These foreign officials had helped lay down the groundwork and policy for the modernization process. The expansion of bureaucracy, especially after the 1892 reformation led to personnel needs which had to be met by recruits from the population other than the members of the royal family or sons or dependents of the officials.

Formal institutions were

founded for the training of civil servants. This began with the founding of the Royal Pages School which bacame the Civil Service School in 1911.

The needs

for new personnel in various fields to fill government positions had led to the creation of Chulalongkorn Lniversity, and, after the 1932 Revolution, Thammasat 41 Ibid., p. 96. 42 Ibid., p. 97.

46

University. In order to f Have well— trained Thai to, replace, foreign officials, competent young; 'Thai abroad on the Kings scholarship.

were sent,

Many-.of these

students were sent to England and Western European countries and the United States. At first France was ! avoided because of its political atmosphere of radica'lism. Being a republic with the history of the 1789 Revolution, it was thought of as an unsuitable place for Thai students. However, this practice was later f ’j «4 dropped and by the reign of King Rama VII, quite a ■■e c large number of Thai students were educated in "5 f France. These young students were enchanted by the ‘ ’ V If, * " J, political ideology of constitutionalism, democracy and '» < • ’ ______"_____• _____x V "t ’ ■» * ,4,9 or a discussion of higher education in, Thailand,, see Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Higher Education‘and * Political Development in Thailand? (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, the Fletcher School of Law—and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, I 'Mass-;, 1968), Chap. Il, III.

47 ' egalitarianism students

:It was a* group of returned.

-Paris

who initiated the overthrow of, the absolute,

monarchy in 1932

?

'

' The Bureaucracy After the 1 9 3 2 Revolution.

• >

t

The >1932 Revolution brought an end to the

absolute monarchy. Since there is no political culture and historical background upon which a democratic form of government can flourish, the country has been plagued by coups d etat 44

military.

and power seizures, by the

This phenomenon stems logically from the

fact that the overthrow of the absolute monarchy f > has created a power vacuum which has not been filled

by

other political institutions. The ■ i ? military in alliance with the senior civil bureaucrats 44 All of these coups or power seizures, either successfill or rabortive were undertaken by or- witli'the aid gffhe military! fhe militgry has taken- the offen-, sive to change the political situation on nine occasions, namely,'June 1932, June '1933 November( /1947, November 1951, September 1957,- October 1958, November 1971, October 1976 and October 1977.

However, in the absence of mature

extrabureaucratic political institutions, Thailand has turned into a

-OCOCOOOOO • » « « »*»*•••♦• CO 1 - 1 CO r B CO c o b ' CO CO 1 0 i n COCO'SCWNCO'CCQCOCONCOCO

z

t

1

CQ

COCONDO IrHO

”■* f-O

. LO

r-i c i

H

o • • I>0 H (N

H

, L>~ 1 *—1

- CO CM 0 0 c q CM r S r d CM CM’ 1 - 4 “

N M LO O i—I LO O ■'tf CO O • • • * > • • * 'S’ CM t - CO -c* -TJ1 O C O - L p 'd*"'3! '3* 'S’

(D ' a

■

Ministry

Table 3.5

Fathers Occupations of the Special Grade Officials by Ministry

.

to

.2«8

._ Pi

,o ,

g

H.2

3

.2

rs a>

o • -s

°

oS u co

8-g

g-M

°C

o’B

73 and the Ministry of Public Health are technical—oriented organization.. The training of these two ministries are very technical and. the recruitment are by necessity based on merit. There cannot be an under-drained judge or physician.

Thus, bias in the recruitment is

probably relatively less than other organizations. One does not need, although it may help, to come from a family of bureaucrat in order to become a- successful judge or doctor.

Since most of the businessmen are

Chinese, they are also economically better off, a factor * which makes them able to afford to send their children’ to -medical schools. Also, as members of the minority, legal knowledge and -beingfiri a legal -profession could serve as a protection for their legal right? and as ‘a* - O O r-H CH O

IO CM o CM CD CM

| CO

m LQ j

c o

|

g’lOO O O N

H

< N CO CO

R S £SS§S8

86 ’ thing to be noted is that the number of the Special Grade Officials in the Ministries of (Interior, Education and Justice when compared to -other ministries and bureaus had -fewer -number of officials whose places of origin were in the central region (Interior .64,99%, Education 63.95%, Justice 60.32%). And this is also true for the First Grade Officials (Interior 63.67%, Education 56.6'4%, Justice 64.89%) which; !with 'the exception i of the Ministry of Industry (56.00%; very likely a result of the small total number, N=25) are lower than other ministries and bureaus (see Table 3.1'2). This is probably due to what we have noted earlier. The. Ministry of * ’I* 'i Interior has a lot of activities dealing.with the administration of the provinces.including the Department of Local Administration and the Police Department. Many "1 r"’. of -these officials are- recruited. locally.- The Ministry of Education has a lot of schools throughout the country. The positions of these teachers are filled by.. the local «I If residents who either entered the teaching job-after they had- finished high school and then improved their educational qualifications by taking further training ‘courses I ’ L.

kf' or they could undergo training in the region’s teacher’s ' training college. In the case of Ministry of Justice, the nature of' its activities is very technical and it is the L * * fastest .channel for a "provincial'’ boy to be elevated onto the elite status. The cost of training is relatively cheaper when compared to medical school, and the time required is shorter.

After high school, one spends

only Jour years in a law school and probably another year preparing for the Bar Examination. Then one. can sit for a competitive examination Tor judgeship. Thus, the .’system is very open.

'Not surprisingly, a few

numbers of "provincial” boys are recruited into this ministry. Age, Sex and. Religion of the Elite From a-'S.tudy of .the age distribution of the elite, one -can make- the following inferences. * -'ll the ’elite consists mainly of people of advance'd age' many jimplications will follow.

First,, the system is geronto-

craticalLy— oriented,, which -means that seniority plays a more- important role in ’promotion than achievement or skill. -Second,., the incumbents may be conservative becaiise.it is-,generally argued, that the older m person

88 gets, -the more -he tends to become conservative— intolerant toward differences of ideas, preferring the maintenance of the status quo, .stability and security,21 Thus, in a geron tocra tically- oriented system, there is a tendency for the incumbents to be unresponsive to innovative ideas, and this will retard the process of modernization.

There is also a likelihood of tensions

and' frustration among the younger members of. the elite whose mobility and innovations are blocked by convention maintained by the older group at the top. 22 21 Anthony Downs' hypothesized that a bureaucrat tends to become a cohserver as he gets older. .See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1961), Chapter 9 and pp. 267—268. Samuel Stouffer discovered* an inverse relationship between age and tolerance — the higher the age, the lower 'the degree of tolerance and vice versa. See S.A Stouffer, Communism, Comformity and Civil Liberties : A Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind ( New York : Doubleday &

Company, Inc., 1955), passim. 22 Cf. Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Illinois : The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 25-29. Frustration can potentially become d significant motivating force that drived- the young elite to seek a.-radical'.change of the. system,. The 1932' Revolts

89 Data on the elite’s religious denomihatidmwould'ifidicate whether -social mobility is proportionate to the number of believers of different religions. If there is ari’ inibalance in the number-, it could have many- implies-, tions but the most important one is the existence of, religious prejudice. Therefore this, information is.very important. Sex distribution of the elite would be indicative of tradition and values of the social .system. For,, example/ if most or -all- of the bureaucratic1 pelite- are male, it would mean that there is sex discrimination in ' the recruitment process. This might also reflect’ the social values and the society’s attitudes toward malefemale equality in such’ areas as’ civil law; political rights, etc. ■ • ■ & •---------------’---------t lion in Thailand is a case in point. Brian,.Crozier maintained that one element common to all rebels is- frustration, definedpas "the inability to do something one badly wants io do, through Circumstances beyond one's control." See Brian jjfbzief,‘ The Rebels : A

Study of

Post-War Insurrections

(London : Chaito and Windus, I960}, p'pf 1'5-16. See also Ted Robert Gurr, Why 'Men Rebei (Princeton,. N.J.-. Princeton University Press, 1970)t i To the extent that the "Young Turks" are successfully

Age:, Distribution

! t n - o oo w t o tn. '«•« t o iFn2 c o r-i o w w

ci o WN

|

25

1

r

‘ ‘• Female ■■

O O TT LO O

. CM c o | CO CM.

O> CM

O

CO O in

. rH |

C7>

‘-'GY

. G> i co

.00 I

.CO | O

. CD I L0

h

CM

I TH

|

O lO

t_6

LO

oq

] rH,

, |

2;

7—1 -! O 0 0 CM O CT> C2>’CM LO M O H N O LO 0 ' 0 • • • .CTiOocoooo t-o G> O i n O O c n O CTl 7—1 t—i i—i '

iw

I

' '■ L H 1 S r a N CO O H i n S -OT OT » ■

.

t

members in .the University Bureau is impressive, many have’ rioted thatjth£jehching profession for many Thai

O O O O 0 0 o o O o o o o

have discovered, contrary to the previous' findings? that the number of Special Grade Officials''who ; are' from the business families are predominant, in the Ministry of Justice and Public Health while .among -the. First Grade Officials, the same situation is true .tor thej Ministry of Justice and a few other ministriessbut sincethe number is too small, it is statistically insignificant The elites places of origin are concentrated -in Bangkok and the provinces in the central part. In terms , f. . of the elite and population ratio, the central' and the

,

'.

. * .4

'.’“nr?",

southern regions have an impressive ratio but the north

and (he northeast did not fare very well. The' ndrtli- 4 east region obviously has the lowest elite 'and popUla-'' tion ratio.

"

-

When the data are broken down’ by ministry' it is found that

'the

number

of "Sp'ecia| - aridP

First. Grade Officials in the Ministry•- f-'-jnteriorf11

106 Ministry of Education and Ministry of Justice when compared to other ministries and bureaus have fewer number of officials whose places of origin are in the central region. Among the Special Grade Officials, almost -60# of the -elite are between the ages of 50-60 years which is 'of an advanced age. But among the First Grade, the elite are relatively younger; almost 77$ are under 50 and 35,55$ are .40 years and under. The number of female Special Grade Officials is 10.84$; the First Grade is 22.64$. Although these figures are low when compared to the male members, they are impressively high when compared to other, countries such as . Japan.

Among the Special Grade

Officials, the- number of female bureaucratic elite is high in the Ministry of Education and the University Bureau and among the First Grade? the number is high in-£,-the 'University Bureau (higher than the , male ;

107 members),. Ministry of Education and Ministry of Public Health. In terms of religious denomination, the majority of the elite are Buddhists (Special Grade 92.73#, First Grade 86.01#).

This is not surprising because over

90# of the Thai call themselves Buddhists.

1

O .

v

‘

*' rr

' '

'

£

’

1

r *

.

"

if'

i

J *■

f

>■-' I

:

Chapter IV

Educational Background of the Bureaucratic Elite

Educational Level

Lipset and Beridix argued that there is a close j., ■ „k ; relationship between educational achievement arid occupational achievement- in a bureaucratized industrial society.

This argument, in fact, holds true even for

a society as old as Imperial China. education

In Thailand,

(especially Western education)

plays a

significant role in determining one s mobility. Once a higher academic degree is obtained, the future elite status of the individual is almost assured.

There are

I Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 227 . See also Bruce K. Eckland, "Academic Ability, Higher Education, and Occupational Mobility,” American Sociological Review {October 1965}, pp. 735—746. Cf. Robert M Marsh, "Values, Demand and Social Mobility," American Sociological Review, (August 1963), pp. 565 575. 2 Evers and Silcock, op. cit., pp. 84-104,

109 two reasons for this. One is the simple law bf supply and demand. The percentage of the, population having a graduate degree is quite small. College enrolment is „

•

-

—

-------

'

"■

small dn proportion'to thetdfal population. The second reason is concerned with 'the. survival of the politicals, *

“

- V

r

#

I

>

system; If the system is to survive, it has to, engage’’ _

J

the best qualified 'and: competent people in the J affairs of thejstate. With" their expertise,- these well—educated* ’

■

_

- ’ -

•

1 - V „

young .officials will be elevated eventually; to the >elite* status.-

'

5

"

Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the current’ educational levels .of the Special Gradeand First Grade Officials in comparison to their educational levels when ahey. first entered civil service. It jean b& seeg ’= 3 ‘ J ’ i 2« that among the Special Grade Officials, 32?27X did not < k i * ’* . ■ have a college degree and "among the jFirst 'GradiS J:

S' i " ,

1/

Officials 45.61# did n o t . have a college degree when; 3 The total enrolment, colle'g-fisfand Uriiversiiies less than 2% of ilievlotal . population. . u i

? b: ■

*

TJ W

t>O O to w

* ,i Lower than B.A. . . » B.A. M.A. Ph. D. Military Academy* No Information _______ | ■ 2,160 . . | Total

> iSn

£/

»•*> *3

H

-j

|

!

, 1

t - r 4 oO CO co. co N H i n oq oo’co c

r

Ph.D. degrees among the Special Grade Officials about 3’2%) an'd among the First Grade Officials (about 20%) is high. All in all, the number of officials who have obtained advanced degrees is impressive. This might stem from the fact that, to earn an advanced degree (especially a doctorate) is not just considered, on the basis of its functional value but it-is'also equated with .prestige. In Thailand, a doctorate has now become a status symbol 'as the title of the Sakdi Na 'system. Although e

The number of Thai‘‘officials 'who' are degree holders is impressive, this situation is not unique. A similar situation is repeated in other,developing: cpuntries. For instance, the post-war generation civil servants- of the selection

-

114 grade level (top and middle-level elite) in Burma “

4

(

,

consisted of 95.80/ college graduates. In a developed country like Japan, 98.80/ of the' civil servants of Levels I, II and III' (top and middle-level, elite) from 5

1949—1959 were college graduates.

That a large number of officials having their educational level raised after they have entered '‘civil * service suggests that the civil service system must have L allowed them the opportunity to continue their educa„

tion or to have in-service training.

i

The figures in

Table 4.3 support our argument. Table 4.3 shows that among, the Special' Grade Officials 46.93% have furthered their studies and among the First Grade Officials 38.93% have furthered their studies after entering civil service. The figures,indicated that the civil service system provided' the -officials with chances of further training to improve their .qualifications. Not surprisingly, the educational level of the bureaucratic elite is impressively high. 4 Guyot op. cit., p. 425, Table VI. 5 Kubota, op. cit.,*/)'; '68, Table XX.> "-K'*

1

|

Number

|

Number

to t ® o i cd T? M t— t i-l LO i q M H r-i H 6 co rt

o co o . o- o o- od i n oo co oi> eq

2,394

|

Percentage.,

First 1Grade

O LO i-H LD cn i—i O H

2,160

Percentage

LQ

100.00

7—i

|

j1 Never 1 2 3 4 No Information Total

Number of time ' of further trailing

1

Special Gr ade

°. LQ CO LO

5

I

o o jo c j M j-H '

CO 'oo CO t-~ !c

>i

1

1 >

j.

so £ d. i

as 8 ' ”T o c

s

Zas

H CO I N L O eo r—I O - OO CO CO c c CO '03 0 4 LO

0.98 0.71

H

to

03

CO o CO o

£ -q

Z

|

I

as

04 O LO

O

I Is

CD

|

rH

|

00 O LO L 0 0 3 XF

I '

1 1 1

LO

1

|

CO

CO t > [ H to

CQrHrHO Z

t-i

Q

CO LD 0 3 O LO CO CO 0 3 L - 0 3 CO 0 3 r—i i—1 03

£

O

|

O o

|

1

|

|

"|

|

CO r-d 0 0 r-i

i—< o I H

|

-sf.iH

03

vH

OQ t>- o LO CO H O

•» »status attached to such a degree has encouraged many young people to further their education abroad.

A

foreign degree also helps one’s career advancement Hi the bureaucratic system. To start with, a foreign degree usually qualifies a person to .start with a higher level of salary and grade. Also, it is believed that 'a foreign— trained individual is cultured, and 'undejstajnds » the “high civilization”, of the-West. _ IJe is .different from others, in terms of nutlopk„ value

nd . tastes,

etc. So,' he could command respect ..from his boss. GiVeri this situation, it is not surprising that' jmfeiny. 'Thai students go abroad every year for further studies. •The countries selected range from India, .(the Philippines, Japan, to France, England,' Germany and the .United stages, depending on one’s .economic status or the ability to .compete for scholarships,. . . .■

122 £ r*

As for those who are locally—trained, it is

important to take note of how many are from Chulalongkorn University and.how many are from Thammasat University. Until among five,

recently • two major universities,

were Chulalongkorn and Thammasat.

While Chulalongkorn was famous for the sciences, Thammasat. was known for the social science, notably law. Most -senior judges, public prosecutors, practising lawyers, district officers, provincial governors are ■graduates of Thammasat University while in the field of -science and applied science, most graduates are ■from Chulalongkorn University. The present situation is' lbf 'course different. There are now a number of 'Other good state' universities such as Mahidol Univer-

Besides Chulalongkorn and Thammasat, there were ; three,other universities-. Silpakorn (traditionally well-known for arts), Kasetsart (traditionally 'well-known ' for agriculture), and Siriraj (tradi'■■tiohally well-known for medical science). Siriraj is now partrof .Mahidol University. . ■

123 sity, Khonkaen University and Ramkhamhaeng University, -in addition to Thammasat University, Chulalong.

korh University and the other two well-established universities, Silpakorn and Kasetsart.

w

When we look .at the location of training of the Special Grade Officials who were foreign- trained (which' comprised 33.10X of the total number) and the location of training of the First Grade Officials who were foreign— trained (-which comprised 19.36/ of thej total number), we can see from Table 4.6 'that among | the Special Grade Officials 71.10/ were trained in the United States; 11.40/ were trained in ’and between Thailand and the United' States after World ‘War’ll.

A 1 large numbeF-df

Thai

Students wer-e'-sent to'thes'e two countries for further !»?' » sJ

'

t,

7

i *

Wable '4.6 vtocatidn of Foreign Training of the Special z i

" .v

'*

and 4 h e First Grade Officials

« •' i >j

; -

•Country -

.

Special Grade First Grade 1 J ' Number Percentage Number Percentage

77.81 71.10. . 400 U.S.A. , 1 **r .596 ,’2 J 95' ll'.4O England' 5 ' 8.95 " 46 45 ' ’ 5.40 > n c e „. 3.90 20. 9 1.56 1.00 Gerniariy 8 .Australia-.’S-z-r- * 20.96 ' 6 ■. • .'1.1'7.: Other - European *lr56'o:84* ' :

•

l> tn

•

• ■

l£> H - i t in ow

•

CO W

CO

< .

O o

•

-O t>- cz> z—i < o

•

•

•

•

CD IT1 ISj O i> m 1?

r

t

Locally-trdined

Location of Training

’ oo

•

0

a.

SNcotsNcrmcvcocooDO H O t> CD CO CO L Q CD L O CO T—I

si

■

• S’

COOCOHLO CO i-l

lOlOCDWt't| r-l -tr t o t f

tD

CO

M

q

CNtNOqoqWH

,

M

Cl

>—i - ’ o i c l -qi CD CO ’CD CO ~d*

ifCOa)lOOMO C > C l L O C-l O o j u d c i co" i o t>- LSD CO L O 0 5

f

co CO L

‘ ' ’

'

k

«

H O r t O CO r - i. O O q c O D N O C C O W -COC'COTH’ cOjHN L Q 0 4 CO

H

H

|

£

Ministry-

Tablet 4.8 Location of Training ofs the Special Grade Officials by Ministry *■ •

s?

H

Q.

£

?

'S e J?

OT ” 3

**M

5pO.S

S

.

-2

«

• 8

-COOOOOOO 0 CM* CM CM* t > 0 0 6 LO CM 7 CM H

0

L-

o-r-H LQ I N

Nt-tOaiOCONOOHmO-TfiH c

■ Ministry

d

Location of Training

Table 4.9 Location of Training of the First Grade Officials -by Ministry

OOOOOOOOOOOOO OO ♦ O «O O•O O• O O O O O■O 4 OOOOOOOOOOOOO

"f-r -2

S

c

5

.2

“

,.himself , f s , ,his|l ss’s favorite may be promoted to a Certain rank 1

*

*

* ■ * ■ * .. i

i

and position. But his boss also has to have some other -

*

i »*


\

J *

some record- of performance, otherswise he himself ’•

' ’

'

could be in trouble.

?r> > n - , j ■. A h j

;

ii : i '

.J

.• ‘ j i s u u . l

Thus, willy nilly he has to g i •'!> 'jdi

T34

a

promote someone with suitable qualifications for' a position which requires special knowledge. But a very capable man who is insubordinate and holds steadfastly to his idea or goes against the tides will very likely find himself stagnate- with no hope of seeing the- chance for smooth advancement in the system. While- studies on other aspects of Thai bureau, cracy; such as its structural •development, are many, those oh promotion and career advancement, with quantitative data are few,. Examinations of the promo, .tipn .pattern and career advancement in the Thai bureaucracy are of great interest- to not only scholars but also to the bureaucrats themselyes. Also a study •* • --i of such nature which covers both favoritism and the 1V merit system would give a balanced view on the Thai bureaucratic system. This is because the general belief is that < e Thai bureaucratic system is* plagued 'with favoritism.

Personalism and the patron-client system

are taken for granted. This assumption, as we shall seek to show later, is not totally accurate.

While

favoritism in the Thai bureaucracy is a fact of 'life, the merit system cannot be totally ruled out.

• 155 ■There -are. two main focuses in this chapter : favoritism and 'the merit system.

Favoritism will be

discussed' mainly qualitatively "since systematic quantita tive empririciai data are- not yet available.

The merit

system will be ‘discussed and substantiated by empirical data.- It is ‘hoped that our findings will shed some light on another aspect of the Thai bureaucracy.

Favoritism in the Thai Bureaucracy

When one talks about favoritism, it should be made clear that favoritism will have weight in the following cases.

If there are two or more equally

competent men vying for a special promotion, be it the annual “double step” salary raise as opposed to the regular single-step promotion ; or the jumping,” i.e., promotion from a lower rank to a higher rank which , follows with several steps 'in salary increase, chances..are that the “favorite” of the boss will be promoted.

t

In

some cases, a person with unimpressive record or ability may be promoted just because he is favored by k ** ■his boss. This- is especially true if he happens to have

‘

•

J

M36 In this case, it becomes nepotism.'-

.’family connection.

Nepotism can also occur in a case in which,his and boss’s families are very close.

.Favoritism may also result

from old school ties..

In the .Ministry of Interior

■which is staffed mainly by graduates from two majors universities — Thammasat and Chulalongkorn — it is usual for promotion1 to be given to those who graduated from the same alma mater. 2 As a bureaucrat’s- advancement in the system tends to depend largely on favoritism, the.art.of currying. favor with one’s boss has been developed over the .years.

When a person is promoted rather rapidly in

the. bureaucracy, the comment one;‘normally hears is *■

*

'

*

“lia keng” which literally means '"good at licking” a

Thai analogy to. domestic pet which lear-ns how to please its master by licking.

A generous comment

iu

would bd ‘kliao chao khao nai kerig” [He knows hoiy * to smoothly approach his lord and master.]

Another

, 2 .This practice exists in other countries also. The Tokyo Imperial University clique in the Japanese t bureaucracy and the present Berkeley Mafia tn the’. - tl ■Ihdonesiaii Gob6rhwent"are caset'in'‘point I

137

comment with a tint of resignation would-be “duang dee” [His horoscope is on the rise].

From ,the above,

one gets the feeling that the ability to gain favor from one's superordinate is quite important for one’s promo■tion in the bureaucracy. The art of making oneself the favorite of 'one's boss involves the following : the bureaucrat himself, his wife, his superodinate’s wife, gifts, etc. We will elaborate on this later. ‘ An official who is likely to sjicceed in the bureaucratic game has to be willing to do things which my be 'against his principle ;he has to know which direction the wind blows, to understand human nature, to have perfect timing, etc. Seasoned bureaucrats, upon close and long observation of the successes and failures of men in the system, come out with - a list ‘of ‘■'practical knowledge” of how to be a successful bureaucrat. Below are interesting observations written in the form of rhymes which are usually taken seriously. V * w To be a successful bureaucrat, one must Hear i in mind the followings: Gifts : Phrabooeha, Nampueng Duan Ha, Poom1 • ’ " niaka, Nga—chang, Hang. Nokyoong, Taem.TponggoIf.

138 1

Actions ; Sanoenaf Ha Rongraem, Taem Ea—fua. 3

Tua Rongraem, Taem Khongfaak. f

t

Meanings : Phraboocha— Buddha statue for worshipping.

This is considered a gift of high value.

It

• is. usually presented to those whom one respects. < Nampueng Duan Ha— the fifth month honey. The

fifth month honey is considered the best honey; it is sweetest, rare and expensive, an ideal gift. Poommaka . is a kind of rare and expensive wood for furniture— * making. It is usually available only in the provinces. This is also a present of high value. Ngachang—ivory. The value of ivory, as a home .decoration, needs no -eleboration. Hang Nokyoong— peacock .s tails. X is another ‘beautiful ’gift' for

home

This

decoration.

3 Anant Changkleep, "Karn Pen Looknong Tee Dee, [How io be d good subordinate] Botkwam Tang Wichakarn Kliong Kromkarnpokkrong {Scholarly articles ’ J 1 *of the Department « of Local Administration) published for the funeral of Mrs. Sanguan- ' .■R- ,.-sarfi Pariyanont, B.E. 2514, p.-L12.

139 Taem ,Toonggolf-a golfbag as a souvenir.

Playing

golf, has become a popular game among the

upper

class. It is an expensive game in Thailand, somewhat ■ of a status symbol. ‘Many high-ranking bureaucrats play golf as a hobby. The golfbag is thus a gift that would please one s boss. Sanoena-to be always around for service..

In

order to gain favor from .one s boss, one has to stay around so that one can be readily available to render service that will please one s superior. Ha Rongraem finding hotel accommodation when the boss comes to pay a visit. It is a common phenomenon for an official stationing in the province to receive his superior from Bangkok who comes for an official tour by finding for 't ’ him hotel accomodation, transportation, etc. This is ■* ' *.-■ t usually followed by a dinner party at? an expehsive restaurant. Taem Ee-tua— getting the boss a prostitute. It is not uncommon that when a high-ranking -official goes -

his'

to'

the

subordinate

provinces

on ’an - official tour,

in the province -would try '-to

140 'please him .by procuring for him a sleeping mate. Tua ♦ » Rongraem-paying the hotel bill. This is a natural sequence from what has. been discussed. Taem Khongfaak-gifts as-souvenirs. It is a customary practice. ~r

for an ‘Official* to -seek rare, exotic and expensive gifts . > for his boss. This will be imprinted in his boss s t

x

*membry’and it! may have some impact upon-his career. The kind of .gifts that- should be given have' already

’"been discussed above. ",

v

“ The significance of these observations lies in

that it lists a number of gifts and certain services the bureaucrat must prepare in meeting, his boss when he comes for an official tour.

What is expected of a

bureaucrat when his boss comes to the area under his ■ ■

■

,

'

responsibility ranges from providing hotelxaccommodation, finding him a sleeping-mate and offering gifts as . souvenirs*. u There is reason to believe that these are not jjust empty , words but they do reflect practices tua mai -rod [Despite his

abundant knowledge stuffed in his head until it overflows, he cannot save himself, (because he is deficient in some other ways.)]

Another ;point that should be_

noted is that .to have a lot of money is important for

f 7 Cf. Ibid., pp. 31-36. u .

*

149 -of the -system.

Thus, promotion and career advance-

-ment-also depend on the clique' that happens to be in ■power, j The person f in .power -tends to promote his •followers so- that .he will ihe able to create a base of ‘support, ‘i If this tenure .is long and unchallehged, he will be able' to build up his ‘empire in .the bureaucracy ■by winning -more supporters .from other, cliques.. Favoritism, therefore,’-cannot 'be viewed as a 'one’-way system. It is a 'patronl-cTieht -system' of .you scratch, my back and I scratch yours1/* -which involves three levels of relationships, superiors, subordinates and -equals. one writer put it; " ’ - --

’•

’C*.‘ -1

- -

As

*’• - ... -cc-C

tr.Tl

Working in a bureaucracy, you. must try to gain - -

'■'?

eq i- ’‘•Au-.u

experience, -.10- understand , human£ .-relations *

1

~8 Cf. Ibid., yp. '215—36;' 'bhbop—karhjandirdkdrK "Rabob' Oop-pa-tum [TheJPatron-Giient'Sy ibWi]” in Amara Raksasataya and 'Sofoa'ch 'Soot jar itkoon; ed'S. Karn Boriham Ngarnbodkkon Nai Pratfesthai in''f'hatband]' :(,'Bangkok-. ''' B.E 2514ypp; '111-128. '

150

and to be able to catch up with all the tricks. You must also learn the art. of administration, and. the art of command...

You cannot .just depend

on work efficiency but you must also use your knowledge * to understand the nature of the environment. That is, to be able to succeed in a bureaucracy, you must be pulled by your superiors, pushed by your subordinates and supported

by

your equals [pooyai dueng,

It could be seen that the art of gaining favor from the boss is not easy to practice as it involves a \ z , number of people, techniques and sacrifice in terms of principleswid self-respect.* 'AboifeVaJ]; all'these have" to be done in competition with many others who are practicing' the same things. Competition is keen, and 5 ZOw (Pseudonym) “Cha Pen Hwma, [To Be •' a Boss]” in Warasam Ratehakam [Civil Servant Journal], Vol. IX, No. 2>, (B.E. 2507), pp. 21-23.

151 u only the fittest survives. Most important of all, to be succeseful in the bureaucratic, system, it is necessary to have support from subordinates and colleagues of equal rank. A bureaucrat who does not realize this fact is likely to drop out of -the race in due time. The Merit System in the Thai Bureaucracy ■

As- said earlier, promotion in a- bureaucracy is also based on the merit system.

That is, whether a

bureaucrat will achieve fast promotion (beyond the .normal annual single-step salary- increase), depends on his- ability or talent. One way to examine this issue is to see whether there is a direct association between the educational level of the bureaucrats and their promofion. We can also look at the quality of education. In the- case of Thailand, a foreign, (notably western) training is considered o£ better quality/ it w6uld also' be •. —. ... df/ihterest *fo see if there is any relationship between promotion and the location of training.,10 10 From one previous study,'the writer has found that there is an association between the educational level and mobility of the bureaucratic elite. A large

t

*

*■

'•

*

.♦

The “empirical data we are using are part of the findings from this research project which includes £ * Special Grade Officials of all Ministries except the }

e

.1 ,

\

.

-•*

Ministry of Defence (N=2,160 the total population), a* 20% sample of the First Grade Officials of all Ministries except >. the Ministry of Defence (N=2,3,94). • Although ’the Grade System (Special, First, Second, etc.) has? now been replaced by-the Position’' Classification System .(P.C.), equivalents can be given.11 Interestingly, the Grade System still ’lingers on as- a' number of' the younger member's of the elite are hdldeifs of 'higher degrees (ALA. 'dr PhD.). See Likhit Dhiravegin, "The Power Elite in Thailand;' A General Survey with a . Focus on the Civil -iL ’ Bureaucrat s'," Southeast Asian journal of Social ? -Science,' 'Vol. 3, Nb.T, -J97&. see also I hit .Elite. and Modernization in .Thailand {Bangkok.

That Watana Panich Co., Ltd., 1972), p. 28. 11 C-l is equivalent io the 4y th "grade . C 2 - 3 are equivalent to t he ‘3rd gfdde$ , , ; -P3-4 , 2ndpgracle v C 5 - & ‘ •,«.»- Jjj , l 0 /t grade .i JV* * * * '* r C 1 and above „ Special grade tt

.

*0*

1E53' fixation in the minds of the civil servant!, and the uniforms worn' by the civil servants still remain unchanged, i.e., following the pattern designed for use with the Grade System.. r t

Promotion under the Merit System

To achieve rapid promotion in the bureaucracy, qualifications alone are hot enough. Granted that he has no problem in his relation with his boss, aVqualified bureaucrat has to know where to start, to change from one agency to another,’ etc., in order to gain quick promotions. A few examples will clarify this point. ( . .

For. a. person whose aim .is to work at the Depart-

ment, of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, after earning his B.A. degree in Political .Science from A*-*--"

q

a local university, preferably Thammasat.University. or ’ Chulalongkorn University he should go to ‘the United States for his M.A. Upon graduation, lie would come back and work as an instructor in the Faculty of Political, Science for a while. This, would brihg tvzb ’positive .results.

p First,

to start with an M.A. normally would

give him a second grade (Cl)

status instead of the

. 154 ...third, grade,.as .in the case of the holder of a local B.A. Secondly, as a lecturer, his promotion will not be .blocked by the limitation of functional positions, for all lecturers have the same position and function -tea. ching. After a few years, he will either be spotted by a high ranking bureaucrat from the Department of Local. Administration who was invited to teach part„ -time- at the university or he himself would try to build - a good relationship with a high-ranking, bureaucrat. He would then ask for a- transfer to work under the high-ranking bureaucrat. Thus his salary scale would give him a start far ahead of his classmates. For this reason some people use university teaching as a stepping stone for -their career in the bureaucracy. It should be noted, however, that this is only one .example of how a person makes a good' start.

There are also other

channels a person ran ’exploit. .

Another way to achieve rapid promotion is to

keep the eyes open for vacancies in a new government agency. Normally, wheri a new division or departmentis set up, there is need to recruit personnel and often there are high-ranking positions to be filled. Also, in *

*

•' ■

/

155

i

a new division or department, promotion -can be rapid because competition is not very keen. * This is especially true when a new agency is established outside the. capital,city. An obvious case is the University of -Chiangmai in the north of Thailand.

A number r'

-

of

4

professors in Bangkok asked for a transfer' there and immediately assumed' high—ranking administrative positions-dean or department head. After a few ‘years, through politicking and good connections, they asked to be transfered back to Bangkok, thus jumping'several steps in salary and position promotion.12 A look at the number of civil servants who were transfered from one department to another or from one ministry to another may give us some idea onJ thi's point. 12 There is another way one can -rise rapidly in the bureaucracy. That is io try to create a new agency, such as a new division or a new department in the ministryT This-isf usually done by recruiting enough personnel who specialized in certain1' area and having enough activities to justify- the creation of a new agency. Once the new agency is created, the number— one man who initiated the- creation will usually become "acting head and subsequently the head of the new agency.

CD CQ

o bJ3 Ctf ■4~» a : co CO

06

Table . 5.1 Transfer of Special Grade ( C 7 and above} Officials

J CD PH

CD s

CO s

CD 4—»

CD > O

S' rt 2

w •s H o •S-I 'CD 'S a

h 'S ’s 4 o

r-t C\) co TP

60

s

r. C\Jco

t

: 5 and over Total

•

o 4? O N QO.t H CO

i

co o

*• OC