The British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638-1653 1783272295, 9781783272297

Table of contents :
Frontcover
Contents
List of Illustrations
Preface and Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1. Warfare at Sea in the Early Modern Period
2. The Outbreak of War, 1638–1642
3. The War at Sea, 1642–1646
4. Parliament’s Navy, 1642–1646
5. Royalist, Confederate, and Scottish Naval Efforts, 1642–1653
6. Revolution, 1647–1649
7. Conquest, 1649–1653
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Timeline of the Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653
Appendix 2: Parliamentarian Fleets, 1642–1649
Bibliography
General Index
Index of Ships

Citation preview

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RICHARD J. BLAKEMORE is a Lecturer in the History of the Atlantic World at the University of Reading. ELAINE MURPHY is a Lecturer in Maritime/Naval History at the University of Plymouth and author of Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653 (Boydell Press, 2012). Front cover: detail from Cornelis Claesz van Wieringen, A Dutch Merchantman Attacked by an English Privateer, off La Rochelle, 1616 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

An imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620--2731 (US)

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156mm

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The civil wars in England, Scotland and Ireland in the period 1638– 1653 are usually viewed from the perspective of land warfare. This book, on the other hand, presents a comprehensive overview of the wars from a maritime perspective. It considers the structure, organisation and manning of the parliamentarian, royalist, and Irish confederate navies, discussing how these changed over the course of the wars. It also traces the development of the wars at sea, showing that the initial opting for parliament by seamen and officers in 1642 was a crucial development, as was the mutiny and defection of part of the parliamentarian navy in 1648. Moving beyond this it examines the nature of maritime warfare, including coastal sieges, the securing of major ports for parliament, the attempts by royalists to ship arms and other supplies from continental Europe, commerce raiding, and the transportation of armies and their supporters in the invasions of Scotland and Ireland. Overall the book demonstrates that the war at sea was an integral and important part of these dramatic conflicts.

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The British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653

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The British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653 Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy

THE BOYDELL PRESS

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© Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy 2018 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

First published 2018 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge

ISBN 978 1 78327 229 7

The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620–2731, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate This publication is printed on acid-free paper

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To Dr David Smith, from whom we have learned so much.

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Contents

List of Illustrations

viii

Preface and Acknowledgements

ix

List of Abbreviations

xi

Introduction

1

1. Warfare at Sea in the Early Modern Period

12

2. The Outbreak of War, 1638–1642

35

3. The War at Sea, 1642–1646

58

4. Parliament’s Navy, 1642–1646

84

5. Royalist, Confederate, and Scottish Naval Efforts, 1642–1653

108

6. Revolution, 1647–1649

129

7. Conquest, 1649–1653

154

Conclusion

173

Appendix 1: Timeline of the Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653

179

Appendix 2: Parliamentarian Fleets, 1642–1649

186

Bibliography

190

General Index

214

Index of Ships

223

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Illustrations

Plates 1. Willem van de Velde the Elder, The Battle of the Downs, 1659 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) 2. Salomon Savery, after Abraham der Verwer, The Battle of Scheveningen (Zeeslag bij Terheide), 1653 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) 3. Willem van de Velde the Elder, Portrait of a Dutch Frigate, 1665? (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London) 4. Studio of Daniel Mytens the Elder, Robert Rich, 1587–1658, Second Earl of Warwick, c. 1632 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London) 5. Willem van de Velde the Elder, Portrait of the Constant Reformation, 1648 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London) 6. Copy after Van Dyck, Prince Rupert (1619–1682), Count Palatine of the Rhine, 1630–1699 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)

2 5 23 49 139 155

Maps 1. Principal ports in the British Isles, 1638–53 2. British Isles and principal continental ports, 1638–53 3. Principal British Atlantic colonies and ports, 1638–53

xii xiii xiv

Table 1. Pressing by parliament, 1642–46

101

The authors and publishers are grateful to all the institutions and individuals listed for permission to reproduce the materials in which they hold copyright. Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders; apologies are offered for any omission, and the publishers will be pleased to add any necessary acknowledgement in subsequent editions.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This book started out as a conversation on a train journey from Cambridge (where we both then lived) to The National Archives at Kew. The conversations that have continued ever since – usually over copious amounts of tea, beer, wine, and Plymouth gin – have been the most enjoyable aspect of working on the book. From the beginning we both agreed that there is a need for a maritime history of the civil wars of the 1640s, to provide students and scholars with an overview of this topic and to introduce it to a wider audience. We also agreed that any such history must take into account both the significance of the conflict at sea to the outcome of the wars and its place in long-term naval and maritime developments in Britain and Ireland. These have been the guiding principles we have followed in writing this book. Readers will decide for themselves whether we have succeeded. Many other people have joined us in the conversations behind the book, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge them here. Our first and most important debt is to Dr David Smith, to whom this book is dedicated. David has mentored both of us, as Ph.D. supervisor to Richard and as a colleague of Elaine’s on the New Edition of the Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell project, and he has given endless and unstinting advice and encouragement. He commented on our first proposal for the book and read the full draft once it was complete. Our second major debt is to Peter Sowden, our editor at Boydell and Brewer, who responded enthusiastically to our initial idea and has continued to support us with the same enthusiasm and with no less patience. Without him this book would not have happened. We are also grateful to Dr J. D. Davies, Professor John Morrill, Professor Steve Murdoch, Dr Annaleigh Margey, and Dr Ismini Pells, who also read drafts and offered valuable comments; to Rachael Blakemore, whose copy-editing greatly improved the text, especially in harmonising two authorial styles; and to Cath D’Alton for preparing the maps. Both of us have benefited greatly from our many colleagues and friends at the universities of Cambridge, Exeter, Oxford, Plymouth, and Reading. We would also like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council; the European Research Council; the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences; Merton College, Oxford; Plymouth University; and the Royal Historical Society for supporting the research that has gone into this book. Elements of

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x

preface and acknowledgements

this research have been presented at numerous conferences and seminars, and we are grateful to the organisers and audiences of all of them. We also thank the staff of the archives and libraries we visited in the course of this research: the British Library, the Bodleian Library, the Caird Library at the National Maritime Museum, the London Metropolitan Archives, the Parliamentary Archives, The National Archives, the National Library of Ireland, the Stadsarchief Amsterdam and Stadsarchief Rotterdam, and the university libraries of Cambridge, Exeter, Plymouth, Reading, and Trinity College Dublin. We are also grateful to the National Maritime Museum and the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, for their permission to reproduce images. Our final thanks go to our families, who have listened to, put up with, and even – to their own cost – encouraged our interest in and obsession with naval warfare and the 1640s for many years.

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Abbreviations

BL Bodl. CJ CSPD CSPI CSPV HCA HJ HMC IJMH LJ MM NLI NMM ODNB P&P TCD TNA

British Library Bodleian Library, Oxford Journals of the House of Commons Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Calendar of State Papers, Ireland Calendar of State Papers, Venetian High Court of Admiralty Historical Journal Historic Manuscripts Commission International Journal of Maritime History Journals of the House of Lords Mariner’s Mirror National Library of Ireland National Maritime Museum Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Past & Present Trinity College Dublin The National Archives

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Map 1. Principal ports in the British Isles, 1638–53

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Map 2. British Isles and principal continental ports, 1638–53

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Map 3. Principal British Atlantic colonies and ports, 1638–53

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Introduction

On 11 October 1639 the royal navy was humiliated. In the Downs, Britain’s most important anchorage, a large Dutch fleet attacked and scattered a Spanish force, in so doing defying British neutrality and claims to maritime sovereignty, while a small English squadron was powerless to intervene.1 This marked the end of a month’s anxious watching for the English commander, Sir John Pennington, and his fellows. This Spanish fleet had been sighted near Plymouth at the start of September, carrying 12,000 soldiers for their army in Flanders (some 2,000 of them aboard English merchant ships hired by the Spanish).2 They soon met the Dutch in the channel, under Admiral Maarten Tromp, and in a running fight sailed eastwards until 9 September, when they sought the security of the Downs.3 The Dutch ships followed them, and Pennington’s squadron found themselves in the middle of a tense situation. On the night of 11 September fifteen Spanish ships escaped northwards, which provoked protests from the Dutch, as Pennington had previously forbidden them to position their ships against just such an eventuality.4 About a fortnight later a Dutch ‘Frigat’ sailed into Margate harbour, flying English colours, and there seized upon two small vessels ­carrying Spanish soldiers: complaints to Tromp were met on his part by claims A similar, but much smaller, incident occurred in Aberdeen in 1623: see Steve Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513–1713 (Leiden, 2010), pp. 158–9. On claims to sovereignty, see Chapter 1, pp. 24–6. 2 TNA SP 16/428, fos 62r–65r, 178r–178v; Peter White, A Memorable Sea-Fight Penned and Preserved by Peter VVhite (1649), pp. 13–14; C. R. Boxer, trans. and ed., The Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 1–19, 85, 90, 97–8, 106, 111, 116–21, 123, 127, 130. 3 TNA SP 16/428, fos 93r, 114r–114v, 136r–1367v; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 3–8; W. P. Guthrie, ‘Naval Actions of the Thirty Years War’, MM, 87 (2001), pp. 268–70; Boxer, trans. and ed., Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, pp. 35–47, 207–19. For a concise account of Tromp’s naval career, see C. R. Boxer, ‘M. H. Tromp, 1598–1653’, MM, 40 (1954), pp. 33–54, 162–5; Ronald Prud’homme van Reine, Schittering en Schandaal: Biografie van Maerten en Cornelis Tromp (Amsterdam, 2001), chs 1–5. 4 TNA SP 16/428, fos 178r, 179v, 182r–183r; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 10–11, 13, 16; Boxer, trans. and ed., Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, pp. 167, 169, 172; Prud’homme van Reine, Schittering en Schandaal, p. 81. 1

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Plate 1. Willem van de Velde the Elder, The Battle of the Downs, 1659 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) of innocence and ignorance.5 Indeed, the Dutch admiral repeatedly insisted that he would inform Pennington before he moved against the Spanish and would do nothing to offend the British crown.6 However, following the direct orders he had received from the Dutch government, he eventually attacked in the midst of a heavy fog, later maintaining that the Spanish had opened fire first.7 Throughout these weeks Charles I’s naval administration were unprepared and indecisive, perhaps because they had just supported a wholly unsuccessful military campaign in Scotland.8 Pennington’s repeated requests for clear instructions about how to proceed elicited only prevarication.9 Algernon Percy, TNA SP 16/429, fos 51r, 136r–136v; SP 16/430, fo. 78r; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 23–4, 38. For another, similar incident, see TNA SP 16/429, fos 125r, 127r, 132r; Boxer, trans. and ed., Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, pp. 182–3; White, Memorable SeaFight, p. 25. 6 White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 20, 26–7, 32–3; Prud’homme van Reine, Schittering en Schandaal, pp. 81–2. 7 TNA SP 16/430, fos 138r, 142r, 146r, 154r–154v, 165r–165v; SP 16/431, fos 7r, 9r–10v, 17r–17v, 19r, 33r, 39r–40r, 42r–43v, 54r–54v, 56r–56v, 78r–79r, 142r–143r; White, Memorable SeaFight, pp. 42–9; Boxer, trans. and ed., Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, pp. 51, 60–8, 171, 184, 188, 195–200, 222; Guthrie, ‘Naval Actions’, pp. 271–3; Prud’homme van Reine, Schittering en Schandaal, pp. 82, 84–6. 8 See Chapter 2, pp. 37–41. 9 TNA SP 16/429, fo. 137r; SP 16/430, fos 78r–78v, 98r–98v, 117r–117v. 5

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introduction 3 tenth earl of Northumberland, the lord high admiral, wrote to Pennington on 10 September that he was ‘confident the Hollanders will bee so respective to the King Our Master as not to offer any violence to the Spaniards whilest they are under his Majesties protection’, and again two days later that the king was ‘well satisfied … with the Hollanders civility at this time, and doubts not, but that they will continue their faire respects to his Majestie’.10 This opinion was shared, to his cost, by the Spanish commander Don Antonio de Oquendo, who refused to set sail early in October because ‘in the King of Englands road he thought himself secure’, although Northumberland had changed his mind by that time, writing ‘I do much doubt this businesse will have an untoward end’.11 Though Northumberland and his subordinates organised reinforcements from Chatham and Portsmouth, these ships only arrived in the Downs days after the battle.12 Pennington was also authorised to commandeer armed English merchant vessels in the anchorage, whether outward or homeward bound, but was then periodically ordered to discharge them so they could continue with their commercial voyages.13 The shore defences were similarly unprepared: Sir John Manwood wrote from Dover Castle on 19 September that they had ‘but Eleven Barrels of Powder, & for the other Castles I beleeve they have scarce one Barrelle apeice, but to bee a suitor for powder before the Cannon be mounted & the Castles repaired … is to noe purpose’.14 This compares quite drastically with the Dutch commanders, who, eager for the Spanish to put to sea and continue the campaign – and perhaps resenting the mounting cost of keeping their fleet in the Downs for so long – not only arranged to transport replacement masts from Dover for the Spanish ships, but also offered the Spanish some of their spare gunpowder.15 It is therefore hardly surprising that Pennington could do so little. Thomas Smith, Northumberland’s secretary, wrote to Pennington that he ‘should seeme to make a shew of assaulting [the Dutch] but not running yourselfe nor his Majesties ships in danger where there is no hope of victory’.16 Even when two Dutch ships surrendered to Pennington after he fired upon them during the battle, he was forced to release them, fearing that the rest of the Dutch fleet would return and ‘by force take them from us … [which] would be a greater

TNA SP 16/428, fos 129r, 137r. White, Memorable Sea-Fight, p. 40; TNA SP 16/429, fo. 137r; cf. SP 16/430, fos 15r, 160r. On Oquendo’s career, see Guthrie, ‘Naval Actions’, p. 265. 12 TNA SP 16/428, fos 179v, 214v, 216r–216v; SP 16/431, fos 18v, 39v, 54v; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp 15, 48, 51. 13 TNA SP 16/428, fos 179r, 180r–180v, 188r, 214r; SP 16/429, fos 27r, 62r; SP 16/430, fos 14v, 78v; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 15–17, 21, 23, 34–5, 40. 14 TNA SP 16/428, fo. 208r; cf. SP 16/429, fo. 125r; SP 16/430, fo. 69r. 15 TNA SP 16/429, fo. 38v; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 21, 24–5, 34, 37; Boxer, trans. and ed., Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, pp. 176, 191–2; Prud’homme van Reine, Schittering en Schandaal, p. 83. 16 TNA SP 16/429, fo. 139r. 10 11

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affront unto his Majesty, and disgrace unto us’.17 It may have been an extra frustration that, contrary to recent royal proclamations forbidding them from doing so, British subjects fought aboard both the Spanish and Dutch fleets.18 English and Scottish sailors serving in the Dutch navy received prize money for their part in the action.19 Nor were they the only ones who took advantage of Spanish misfortune: ships that ran ashore on the English coast were pillaged by local residents, who apparently expressed ‘a generall hatred of the Spaniards … [and] much good will to the Hollanders’.20 It was reported on 18 October that ‘seafaringe men … from most partes of the kingdome as well as hereabouts have come with their vessells & boates to committ theise robberies’, suggesting that Charles’s own subjects had as little regard for his claims to maritime sovereignty as did the Dutch.21 On 31 July 1653 the Commonwealth navy was triumphant. This time off the coast of Holland near Scheveningen, the English once again faced a Dutch fleet led by Admiral Tromp (who had been knighted in 1642 by Charles I – rather ironically, using Sir John Pennington’s sword).22 During skirmishes the previous day the English had been outmanoeuvred, allowing Tromp to combine two squadrons and so match the English in strength. However, Tromp was killed early in the battle, and after several hours of fierce fighting the Dutch retreated, in disarray, behind the sandbanks along their shoreline.23 This was the final battle of the first Anglo-Dutch war, which had begun in 1652, and although peace was not formally declared until April 1654 this defeat put much greater pressure on the Dutch to negotiate a treaty.24 Scheveningen also marked the end of a highly successful campaign for the Commonwealth White, Memorable Sea-Fight, pp. 45–6; TNA SP 16/430, fo. 154v. Andrew Thrush, ‘The Navy Under Charles I, 1625–40’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1990), pp. 207–12. 19 Stadsarchief Rotterdam, 18 (Oude Notariaal Archief), inv.nr. 199, pp. 330, 395, 397, 403; inv.nr. 200, pp. 28, 60, 93, 137, 140, 180, 302. White also mentioned ‘the English men which were amongst the Spanyards’: Memorable Sea-Fight, p. 8. The Spanish ambassador, meanwhile, complained that Spanish mariners had abandoned their ships for ‘English Bottomes’: TNA SP 16/430, fo. 14r. 20 TNA SP 16/431, fos 17r–17v, 29r, 145r. 21 TNA SP 16/431, fo. 74r; cf. fo. 79r; White, Memorable Sea-Fight, p. 52. 22 Boxer, ‘M. H. Tromp’, pp. 44–5; Prud’homme, Schittering en Schandaal, p. 110. 23 Documents from both British and Dutch archives were printed in Samuel R. Gardiner and C. T. Atkinson, eds, Letters and Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, 1652–1654 (6 vols, London, 1899–1931); vol. v deals with 1653, and for the battle of Scheveningen, see pp. 161–79, 340–86, 419–21, 426–8; anon., The Nevves, or, the Ful Particulars of the Last Fight (1653); George Monck, A True Relation of the Last Great Fight at Sea (1653); John Poortmans, A True Relation of the Last Great Fight (1653); Jacob Smith, The Full Particulars of the Last Great and Terrible Sea-Fight Between the Two Great Fleets of England and Holland (1653). 24 For accounts of these campaigns and their political impact, see Bernard Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648–1660 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 80–6; J. R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (London, 1996), pp. 128–44. 17

18

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Plate 2. Salomon Savery, after Abraham der Verwer, The Battle of Scheveningen (Zeeslag bij Terheide), 1653 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)

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navy. In the first days of June 1653 they had won another significant victory at the battle of the Gabbard, which took place near the Suffolk coast and has been described as ‘the decisive battle of the war’.25 Many witnesses noted that English firepower far outmatched Dutch gunnery, with even a hostile reporter writing from The Hague that the English were ‘always battering’ their enemies.26 The same writer noted, as did others, that a number of the Dutch ships ‘stole away in the night’ and ‘showed very great fear’, principally smaller hired merchant vessels whose owner-captains were reluctant to endanger their own possessions in the heat of battle.27 After the Gabbard a number of Dutch commanders were court-martialled, and following Scheveningen the vice-admiral, Witte de With, again complained about captains who ‘behaved in a very villainous way’ and ‘wilfully left the battle … in their confusion and disobedience’.28 The English had faced a similar problem at the battle of Dungeness in 1652, but had embarked on substantial naval reforms as a result.29 Following the fighting in June 1653, the Dutch fleet retreated to their harbours at Texel and in Zeeland, where they began desperately to repair their navy. The Dutch States General looked to all available sources: they commanded part of their Mediterranean fleet to return, put pressure on the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie to contribute some of their large and well-armed vessels, and even contemplated approaching Denmark to loan them some ships.30 The situation was all the more urgent because the English navy established a blockade along the Dutch coast.31 This campaign was not without its problems for the English administration. Food supplies were frequently delayed and of terrible quality, which contributed to repeated outbreaks of sickness in the fleet.32 Because of this sickness, and desertion, the naval administration were forced to press more men, showing ‘no consideration of them that have wives and five and six

Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, p. 128; cf. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 82; Gardiner and Atkinson, Letters and Papers, v, p. 8, and for contemporary accounts see pp. 21–4, 66–102, 109–11, 116–18, 137–8, 143–5; anon., A Bloudy Fight Between the Two Potent Fleets of England and Holland (1653); anon., A Declaration of the Further Proceedings of the English Fleet upon the Coast of Holland (1653); anon., A Letter from the Fleet, with a Divrnal Account (1653); Robert Blake and George Monck, A True Relation of the Late Great Sea Fight (1653); George Monck and Robert Blake, The Particulars of all the Late Bloody Fight at Sea (1653); George Monck and John Bourn, Two Letters from the Fleet at Sea Touching the Late Fight (1653). 26 Gardiner and Atkinson, Letters and Papers, v, p. 100. 27 Ibid., pp. 100–1. 28 Ibid., pp. 153–4, 191–2, 204–5, 239–44, 351, 355–6. 29 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 79–80; Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, pp. 121–3. 30 Gardiner and Atkinson, Letters and Papers, v, pp. 107–8, 109–11; Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, p. 131. 31 Gardiner and Atkinson, Letters and Papers, v, pp. 147–60, 194, 233, 263–4; anon., A Letter from the Fleet, pp. 4–6. 32 Gardiner and Atkinson, Letters and Papers, v, pp. 215–16, 249, 256, 257, 260, 268, 274, 276–7, 295, 310, 313–14, 330–3, 333–4, 339–40. 25

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introduction 7 c­ hildren apiece’.33 Nevertheless, the blockade was largely successful. On 16 June it was reported that the English fleet doth hinder all manner of trade and navigation for East and North, and especially the herring fishing … the commonalty who thereby get their livelihoods and subsistence are much discontented and it hath been the occasion of a tumult at Enchuysen, where the house of one of the Admiralty hath been plundered.34

Early in July it was similarly noted that ‘the English fleet lie so all along our coast  that we can get no ships out nor very few in … we are fain to eat old pickled herring instead of new, for which the English are cursed by the commons with bell, book, and candle’.35 The Dutch navy also faced problems in recruiting men, despite offering considerable wages.36 When Tromp finally put to sea again, aiming to strike at the English blockade concentrated around Texel, it proved futile. Though one English participant in the battle of Scheveningen wrote that the Dutch ‘fought like so many Alexanders, Cæsars, and Pompey’s for many hours together’, once again superior English firepower and the reluctance of Dutch merchant commanders resulted in a victory for the Commonwealth.37 As these two episodes show, the fourteen years between the battles of the Downs and Scheveningen witnessed a transformation in British naval activity: in 1639 the Stuart government could barely keep an effective fleet at sea, while in 1653 the Commonwealth was able to undertake a successful campaign against the foremost maritime empire of the day.38 This has long been recognised by historians, and forms part of a conventional narrative in which glory under Elizabeth I was followed by Stuart corruption and disgrace, and then revival during the Interregnum; a narrative which took root in the Stuart period itself, when commentators hostile to James VI and I and his son evoked memories of an already-mythical Elizabethan period.39 It was later reiterated by historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, for whom English naval power Ibid., pp. 236, 291. Ibid., p. 194. 35 Ibid., pp. 263–4. 36 Ibid., pp. 201, 223, 234. 37 Smith, Full Particulars, p. 6. 38 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806 (Oxford, 1998), especially chs 29–30. 39 N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea-Power in English History’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 14 (2004), pp. 153–74; Mark Netzloff, ‘Sir Francis Drake’s Ghost: Piracy, Cultural Memory, and Spectral Nationhood’, in Claire Jowitt, ed., Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550–1650 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 137–50; Claire Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy, 1580–1630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime (Farnham, 2010), pp. 30, 39, 67–72. 33 34

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was a matter of both national character and national destiny (and who treated anything falling below the expected standard as an aberration).40 The assumptions held by such nationalist scholars, not least their Anglocentrism, and many details of the narrative they put forward, have been widely challenged. On the one hand, the Commonwealth navy suffered major defeats in 1652, while Elizabethan naval might has probably been overestimated; on the other, scholars have reinterpreted early Stuart naval policy in a more positive light.41 Rather than portraying the development of British sea-power in terms of momentous swings between success and failure, or as an inexorable but sometimes interrupted progress towards a nineteenth-century apogee, it makes more sense to acknowledge the limits of what any early modern government could achieve, and therefore to interpret this process as a series of hesitant and intermittent, but cumulatively powerful, steps. Nevertheless, the broad shape and chronology of the original narrative have survived, particularly in general overviews of the royal navy.42 This narrative also fits with the general consensus among naval historians that the mid-seventeenth century witnessed the culmination of long and dramatic changes in the technology, organisation, purpose, and capabilities of European navies, Britain’s among them.43 Within this chronology the 1640s are crucial, as they marked a sea change for the English navy and empire, including the greater interaction and integration of military and naval forces around Britain and Ireland. If the events of 1639 owe more to the political crisis then gripping the three Stuart kingdoms (and its consequences for the royal coffers) than to any peculiarly maritime factors, they nevertheless reveal just how fragile the naval establishment was.44 By 1653, however, foundations had been laid which – though they did not always guarantee military success, as demonstrated in the second and third Anglo-Dutch wars later in the century – did have profound consequences.45 It is no coincidence that the early 1650s also witnessed the Commonwealth’s conquest of Scotland and Ireland, the first Navigation Act, the first major naval expedition to the Caribbean (which, though it failed in its original objectives, seized Jamaica, later one of Britain’s most economically important colonies), and growing British involvement in the transatlantic slave trade.46 M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy from MDIX to MDCLX (London, 1896); Thomas W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (London, 1911); C. D. Penn, The Navy Under the Early Stuarts and its Influence on English History (Leighton Buzzard, 1913). 41 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 78–80; Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, pp. 114–21; on the Elizabethan and early Stuart navy, see Chapter 1, pp. 26–30. 42 Richard Harding, The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509–1815 (Basingstoke, 1995), ch. 2; N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (London, 2004), chs 24–5. 43 See Chapter 1, pp. 21–4. 44 On this crisis, see Chapter 2, pp. 37–41. 45 On the later Dutch wars, see Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, chs 7–8. 46 J. E. Farnell, ‘The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community’, Economic History Review, 16 (1963–4), pp. 439–54; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, 40

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introduction 9 Nor is it a coincidence that these changes occurred during a period of civil war. It was precisely the demands of internecine strife that spurred on efforts to expand and improve naval forces in Britain and Ireland. Yet, notwithstanding the enormous scholarly efforts to understand the causes and course of the British civil wars, their maritime dimension has been routinely overlooked.47 In general accounts of these wars the importance of the navy is acknowledged, but usually treated briefly, and often only when it intruded directly upon events ashore; by contrast, some military historians have argued that the strategic impact of the navy was ‘strictly limited’.48 This has not come about through lack of detailed research, as there have been several theses and articles about certain aspects of the British civil wars at sea.49 It might rather result from a lack of circulation, pp. 87–90; David Loades, England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690 (London, 2000), pp. 249–50; Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (London, 2004); Richard J. Blakemore, ‘West Africa in the British Atlantic: Trade, Violence, and Empire in the 1640s’, Itinerario, 39 (2015), pp. 299–327. 47 For overviews of civil war historiography, see R. C. Richardson, The Debate on the English Revolution Revisited (London, 1988); and John Adamson, ‘Introduction: High Roads and Blind Allies – the English Civil War and Its Historiography’, in John Adamson, ed., The English Civil War: Conflict and Contexts, 1640–1649 (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 1–35. 48 Quoting Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War (London, 2005), p. 12; see also Peter Edwards, Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638–52 (Stroud, 2000), pp. 212, 218. For general accounts, see J. P. Kenyon, The Civil Wars of England (London, 1988); Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford, 2004); Ian Gentles, The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652 (London, 2007); Michael J. Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars (London, 2008). 49 R. C. Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1648’, MM, 9 (1923), pp. 34–46; A. C. Dewar, ‘The Naval Administration of the Interregnum, 1641–59’, MM, 12 (1926), pp. 406–30; Donald Kennedy, ‘Parliament and the Navy, 1642–1648: A Political History of the Navy during the Civil War’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1959); Donald Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains at the Outbreak of the English Civil War’, MM, 46 (1960), pp. 181–98; Donald Kennedy, ‘The Establishment and Settlement of Parliament’s Admiralty, 1642–1648’, MM, 48 (1962), pp. 276–91; Donald Kennedy, ‘The English Naval Revolt of 1648’, English Historical Review, 77 (1962), pp. 247–56; M. L. Baumber, ‘The Navy during the Civil Wars and Commonwealth’ (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manchester, 1967); M. L. Baumber, ‘The Navy and the Civil War in Ireland, 1641–1643’, MM, 57 (1971), pp. 385–97; Charles Thomas Maples, ‘Parliament’s Admiral: The Parliamentary and Naval Career of Robert Rich, Second Earl of Warwick, during the Reign of Charles I’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1975); R.  McCaughey, ‘The English Navy: Politics and Administration, 1640–1649’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ulster, 1983); M. L. Baumber, ‘The Navy and the Civil War in Ireland, 1643–1646’, MM, 75 (1989), pp. 255–68; M. L. Baumber, ‘Parliamentary and Naval Politics, 1641–1649’, MM, 82 (1996), pp. 398–408; Michael LeaO’Mahoney, ‘The Navy in the English Civil War’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2011); Richard J. Blakemore, ‘The London and Thames Maritime Community during the British Civil Wars, 1640–1649’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of

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as many of these theses remain unpublished and a number of the articles have appeared in specialist maritime journals; the only book-length general study of this topic is now out of print and, in any case, left a lot to be desired.50 Several chapters in more general works have dealt with this subject, but these are by their nature relatively brief.51 There are two further factors which have probably influenced the direction of scholarship. First, naval and military history have traditionally focused upon large-scale battles such as the Downs and Scheveningen, and there were few such encounters between major fleets during the civil wars, which has created the misleading impression that fighting at sea was limited.52 Second, much of the research in this area has focused on England and on the royal navy, which sided with parliament in 1642 and was the most coordinated naval force involved in the civil wars, and also left behind the most copious and coherent body of evidence.53 Yet the parliamentarian navy was only one of many seaborne actors, and not always the most powerful: indeed, the growth in naval power and imperial ambition under first the parliamentarian leadership and then the Commonwealth was, at least in part, a direct response to the very real threat represented by Irish confederate and royalist forces.54 Moreover, this scholarly focus has obscured one of the most significant aspects of maritime activity during the civil wars, the way in which it linked together the different theatres of war across the three Stuart kingdoms, and entangled these wars in contemporary conflicts Cambridge, 2013); Richard J. Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck: Maritime History, the Royal Navy and the Outbreak of British Civil War, 1625–1642’, Historical Research, 87 (2014), pp. 251–74. 50 John R. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War (London, 1962); see also John R. Powell and E. J. Timings, eds, Documents Relating to the English Civil War, 1642–1648 (1963). 51 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 240–3, 248–50, 264, 293–5, 302–71; Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, ch. 10; Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge, 1991), ch. 8; Bernard Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, in J. P. Kenyon and J. H. Ohlmeyer, eds, The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 156–91; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, ch. 28; J. D. Davies, Pepys’s Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649–1689 (Barnsley, 2008), chs 1–2. 52 E.g. Charles Carlton, Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651 (London, 1992), p. 3. 53 See Chapters 2 and 4. 54 See Chapters 5 and 7; J. H. Ohlmeyer, ‘“The Dunkirk of Ireland”: Wexford Privateers during the 1640s’, Journal of the Wexford Historical Society, 12 (1988–9), pp. 23–49; J.  H.  Ohlmeyer, ‘Irish Privateers during the Civil War, 1642–1650’, MM, 76 (1990), pp. 119–33; Elaine Murphy, ‘Atrocities at Sea and the Treatment of Prisoners of War by the Parliamentary Navy in Ireland, 1641–1649’, HJ, 53 (2010), pp. 21–37; Elaine Murphy, ed., A Calendar of Material Relating to Ireland from the High Court of Admiralty, 1641–1660 (Dublin, 2011); Elaine Murphy, ‘The Navy and the Cromwellian Conquest of Ireland, 1649–53’, Journal for Maritime Research, 14 (2012), pp. 1–13; Elaine Murphy, Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641–1653 (Woodbridge, 2012); see also Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, ch. 5, on Scottish naval activity.

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introduction 11 in Europe, as well as spreading them to Britain’s trading and colonial interests around the Atlantic.55 We have three objectives in this book. The first is, simply, to provide an overview of the British civil wars at sea, filling this scholarly gap and introducing students and scholars to the topic. In doing so, we pursue our two other objectives: to assess the influence of maritime activity on the course of the civil wars; and to understand the consequences of the civil wars for British naval and imperial history. They are, in effect, two sides of the same coin. It was the prosecution of the civil wars at sea (both in widespread commerce-raiding and privateering, and the strategic use of naval forces to support land campaigns) which shaped the development of maritime resources. It was the control and deployment of those resources which proved crucial to the outcome of the civil wars – and this in turn produced a government not only intent on aggressive policies within and outside Britain, but with the capability to carry out these policies. In Chapter 1, we describe the nature of warfare at sea during the early modern period, encompassing questions of prize law and piracy, technological and tactical developments, political disputes over maritime sovereignty, and the expansion of state navies in western Europe. We then take up the story of the British civil wars at sea, beginning in Chapter 2 with the outbreak of warfare from 1638 onwards in Scotland, Ireland, and England, and continuing in Chapter 3 with a narrative account of naval campaigns around the British Isles and Ireland during the first civil war of 1642–46. Chapter 4 discusses the parliamentarian navy in terms of strategic aims, organisation, personnel, and auxiliary forces, and Chapter 5 offers a comparative analysis of the royalist, Irish, and Scottish maritime efforts, both throughout the first civil war and in the years thereafter. Our final two chapters take us through the end of the civil wars and into the Commonwealth: Chapter 6 examines post-war politics, the mutiny in parliament’s fleet in 1648, and the naval actions of the second civil war, which culminated in the execution of Charles I and abolition of the monarchy; Chapter 7 studies the actions of the royalist fleet from 1649 onwards, and the role of the navy in the Commonwealth’s conquest of Ireland and Scotland.

Simon Groenveld, ‘The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640–1652’, Historical Journal, 30 (1987), pp. 541–66; Pestana, English Atlantic; Richard J. Blakemore, ‘The Politics of Piracy in the British Atlantic, c. 1640–1649’, IJMH, 25 (2013), pp. 159–72; Blakemore, ‘West Africa’.

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1 Warfare at Sea in the Early Modern Period

When the civil wars broke out in Britain, the realities of early modern war came as a shock to most of the population.1 It is true that the British military establishments were not entirely moribund, as historians once thought. Many Scottish, Irish, English, and Welsh soldiers served in continental armies throughout the early seventeenth century, and in the late 1630s and early 1640s returned to the Stuart kingdoms to lend their experience to the armies on all sides.2 Nevertheless, the majority of people living in the British Isles and Ireland had not seen warfare at first hand before it tore those islands apart. Seafarers are an exception. The early modern sea was a dangerous place, and not just because of the natural perils that were proverbial.3 Seafaring was also a distinctly violent undertaking. Contemporary English ballads celebrated seamen’s bravery not just because they faced storm and shipwreck, but because they could expect (and often experienced) attack by hostile ships, or indeed participated in such attacks themselves.4 Conflict was an ordinary and regular feature of maritime commerce, and often the two occurred concurrently: as N. A. M. Rodger has written, ‘Robbery under arms was a normal aspect of seaborne trade’ during medieval times, and in the early modern period too ‘there

Carlton, Going to the Wars; Martyn Bennett, The Civil Wars Experienced: Britain and Ireland, 1638–1661 (London, 2000); Barbara Donagan, War in England, 1642–1649 (Oxford, 2010), especially chs 4, 5, and 6. 2 Carlton, Going to the Wars, ch. 1; Roger B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford, 2003); Donagan, War in England, ch. 3; Ismini Pells, ‘The Legacy of the Fighting Veres in the English Civil War’, in Ismini Pells, ed., New Approaches to the Military History of the English Civil War (Solihull, 2016), pp. 77–100. 3 David Cressy, ‘The Vast and Furious Ocean: The Passage to Puritan New England’, New England Quarterly, 57 (1984), pp. 511–32; Sarah Mary Parsons, ‘Religion and the Sea in Early Modern England, c. 1580–1640’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2010), ch. 2; Richard J. Blakemore, ‘The Ship, the River, and the Ocean Sea: Concepts of Space in the Seventeenth-Century London Maritime Community’, in Duncan Redford, ed., Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World (London, 2014), pp. 99–103. 4 E.g. Martin Parker, Saylors For my Money (1630?); cf. anon., A Dainty New Ditty of a Saylor and his Love (1684–6).

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warfare at sea in the early modern period 13

were few non-combatants at sea’.5 The maritime side of the British civil wars, therefore, has to be understood within this broader context of European seaborne warfare – warfare which, throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, underwent substantial and far-reaching changes. This chapter will introduce that context, looking first at the question of privateering and piracy, then the technological changes which occurred during this period and the contemporary debates over maritime sovereignty, before examining the growth in state navies which resulted from these interrelated factors.

Privateers and pirates The most important point to begin with is that maritime warfare was not only, or even primarily, carried out by state-owned navies during the early modern period. Indeed, Louis Sicking has argued that in any analysis of sea-power before 1650 a study of ‘naval force’ by itself is insufficient; drawing upon the Dutch term scheepsmacht, Sicking proposes instead the idea of ‘maritime potential’, representing the combination of naval and commercial shipping upon which a state could call.6 Britain’s maritime potential, then, continually increased throughout the period with the expansion of its merchant fleet as much as with the development of the navy.7 British merchant ships, like those of other nations, carried their own armaments – one example from 1543, the Elizabeth of Newcastle, reportedly carried seventy-two guns, of which six were ‘brasen peces’ (brass pieces), though the remainder may have been handguns.8 The merchant ships recruited by Sir John Pennington in the Downs during the crisis of 1639 all carried between fifteen and thirty-two guns, ranging in burthen from 180 up to 400 tons.9 In 1652 the Fellowship, of 160 tons, carried ten guns, and six years later the Invention of Newcastle had twelve iron guns.10 These N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare’, MM, 100 (2014), p. 6; cf. Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe (London, 2000), pp. 40–2. 6 Louis Sicking, ‘Naval Power in the Netherlands before the Dutch Revolt’, in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 199; see also Jaap R. Bruijn, ‘States and Their Navies from the Late Sixteenth to the End of the Eighteenth Centuries’, in Philippe Contamine, ed., War and Competition between States (Oxford, 2000), pp. 73–83. 7 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Newton Abbot, 1972); David B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, 1550–1642 (London, 1983); Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630 (Cambridge, 1984); Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 1. 8 G. V. Scammell, ‘War at Sea under the Early Tudors: Some Newcastle upon Tyne Evidence’, in G. V. Scammell, ed., Seafaring, Sailors and Trade, 1450–1750 (Aldershot, 2003), p. 187; cf. Oppenheim, History of the Administration, p. 171. 9 TNA SP 16/428, fo. 188r; see Introduction, p. 3. 10 Stadsarchief Amsterdam 5075 (Oude Notariaal Archief), inv.nr. 849, fo. 432r; inv.nr. 1539, p. 263. On the armament of privateers and merchant ships with letters of marque, 5

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weapons were not just intended for defence, as privately owned vessels were regularly hired or commandeered to participate in naval operations, or acted independently as privateers.11 As we might expect, violence was particularly common during periods of warfare. From the 1520s to the 1550s, England and Scotland went to war against France and the Habsburg-ruled Holy Roman Empire on a number of occasions, and England then pursued a long war against Spain in 1585–1604, during which most of the fighting took place at sea.12 Before the unification of the two crowns of Scotland and England under James VI and I in 1603, English and Scottish ships regularly came to blows, usually as opposing allies of France or the Empire during times of war; even in the long peace between them after 1560, Scottish and English pirates continued to prey upon their neighbours.13 Both English and Scottish vessels again participated in warfare against Spain and France during the later 1620s.14 Yet in times of diplomatic peace the seas were rarely peaceful either, and this was complicated by the disputed status of maritime violence. Throughout the medieval period, aggressive acts by privately owned ships had been regulated and legitimated in two ways. On the one hand, it was generally accepted that a ruler’s subjects could attack their enemies during times of war. On the other hand, there were letters of marque (also called letters of reprisal), issued by a ruler to a seafarer or merchant who had suffered losses at sea, and who could not seek redress through court, or where such redress had failed. These commissions authorised the bearer to make good their losses by attacking ships of the same port or nation as the original aggressor, and were technically only relevant during times of peace.15 During the early modern period, however, letters of marque or reprisal were increasingly used to license both types of activity, and the terms became confused and imprecise, although a clearer distinction was preserved in Scotland see John C. Appleby, ‘English Privateering during the Spanish and French Wars, 1625–1630’ (2 vols, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1983), i, pp. 223–7. 11 The term ‘privateer’ did not emerge until the late seventeenth century, but is used here and throughout to mean specifically a ship sailing with a commission: see Rodger, ‘Law and Language’, p. 12. 12 David Loades, The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political, and Military History (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 57–70, chs 5–6; Cheryl A. Fury, Tides in the Affairs of Men: The Social History of Elizabethan Seamen, 1580–1603 (London, 2002), pp. 258–64; David Loades, The Making of the Elizabethan Navy, 1540–1590: From the Solent to the Armada (Woodbridge, 2009), ch. 1. 13 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 95, 179; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 174, 179, 184–5; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 36–70, 113–20. 14 See below, pp. 15, 29–30. 15 Bryan D. Dick, ‘“Framing Piracy”: Restitution at Sea in the Later Middle Ages’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2009), chs 2 and 3; Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York, 2009), ch. 8; David J. Starkey, ‘Voluntaries and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering, Corsairing, Buccaneering and Piracy’, MM, 97 (2011), pp. 128–35; Rodger, ‘Law and Language’, pp. 6–7.

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than in England.16 Henry VIII published a proclamation in 1544 which allowed his subjects to undertake unrestrained private warfare, unsurprisingly leading to attacks on neutral shipping and provoking diplomatic tensions thereafter.17 In the wars of both 1585–1603 and 1625–30 England issued no public declarations of war, but instead authorised large numbers of privateers against the Spanish, and in 1627–29 against the French; during these wars even ships on commercial voyages routinely acquired letters of marque, in case prize-taking opportunities arose.18 There is considerable evidence of privateers exceeding or ignoring the terms of their commissions, especially in seizing neutral shipping, and the English government’s commitment to punishing such practices was variable to say the least – which is unsurprising, given the strategic and financial benefits they reaped from privateers.19 Elizabeth’s admiral, Lord Howard, even issued retrospective letters of reprisal, allowing ships to effectively purchase a cover of legality for prizes they had already seized.20 Therefore, while there were some seafarers who committed violent acts at sea without any authorisation, and were strictly speaking pirates, many others did hold a commission from a government, and it was the contested legitimacy of that government or its commission – not the violence itself – which made them a ‘pirate’ in the eyes of the law.21 Besides the commissions that Scottish or English monarchs issued, British ships received letters of marque from other rulers during the sixteenth century, including the Huguenot leader Henry of Navarre, later Henry IV of France; the prince of Orange, leader of the Dutch revolt against the Spanish that began in 1568; and Dom Antonio, pretender to the Portuguese throne after it had been assimilated to the Spanish crown by Philip II in 1580.22 Scottish vessels also participated in what Steve Murdoch has called ‘reprisal wars’ in Scandinavia and the Baltic, and in the seventeenth century British ships were hired by other states, such as Venice and Portugal, which brought them into war zones in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.23 Kenneth Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish War, 1585–1603 (Cambridge, 1964), ch. 2; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, pp. 5–10; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, ch. 2, especially p. 107; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 199; Rodger, ‘Law and Language’, pp. 9–10. 17 Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 130–6; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 182; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, p. 42; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 20–1. 18 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, ch. 3; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, pp. 8–9, 194. 19 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, pp. 22–3; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, pp.  10–20, 31–5, 46–59, 75–80, 111–12, 121–33, 138–57; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 224–37; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 137–42. 20 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 345. 21 Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’, pp. 165–6. 22 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, pp. 16–18; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 202, 245. Huguenot ships also took out English letters of marque in the 1620s: Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, p. 19. 23 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 92–8; Blakemore, ‘The Ship, the River’, pp. 101–2; Maria Fusaro, ‘Public Service and Private Trade: Northern Seamen in Seventeenth Century Venetian Courts of Justice’, IJMH, 27 (2015), pp. 3–25. 16

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In Scotland, additionally, letters of reprisal were heritable property and could remain legitimate for decades or even longer.24 This situation began to shift in the early seventeenth century, however, with British ships becoming more and more likely to be targets rather than captors (although sailors from all over Britain continued to be both). This was largely due to James VI and I’s pacific policy, which meant peace with Spain from 1603 to 1625, and which left many former English privateers out of employment. At the same time, the navy entered a period of relative inactivity, making it harder to crack down on illicit activities like piracy and smuggling.25 John Appleby has shown that the English government lacked the resources to suppress not just pirates, but also the communal networks of families and traders who handled and benefited from the loot.26 The two main areas of piratical activity which attracted most attention at the time, and have continued to occupy historians since, were Ireland and the Maghreb, principally the semi-independent Ottoman regency of Algiers and the kingdom of Morocco. A number of Irish ports supported large communities of seaborne raiders and became notorious as ‘pirate havens’, in particular during the years 1605–15, when fleets of ten or more ships gathered on the southwest coast of Ireland.27 In 1614 Sir William Monson, admiral of the narrow seas, led an expedition to suppress these pirates, at the request of some of the king’s Scottish subjects, although he pardoned many of the sailors aboard the ships he captured.28 In contrast, relations between Britain and the Islamic world had not always been openly hostile. Elizabeth I corresponded with the Ottoman sultan, and also entered into an alliance with the sultan of Morocco, united by their shared hostility towards Spain.29 Indeed, Ah·mad al-Mans·ūr, who had ruled Morocco since 1578, wrote to Elizabeth I in 1603 proposing a joint Anglo-Moroccan assault upon Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, to be funded by al-Mans·ūr, but this never materialised.30 After James made peace with Spain this alliance fell apart, and British ships became the targets of the formidable Magharibi corsairs. Algiers alone had 100 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 81–5; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 200. C. M. Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in Its Heyday (Newton Abbot, 1976); John C. Appleby, ‘Jacobean Piracy: English Maritime Depredation in Transition, 1603–1625’, in Cheryl A. Fury, ed., The Social History of English Seamen, 1485–1649 (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 277–99; John C. Appleby, Women and English Piracy, 1540–1720: Partners and Victims of Crime (Woodbridge, 2013), ch. 1. 26 Appleby, Women and English Piracy, ch. 2. 27 John C. Appleby, ‘A Nursery of Pirates: The English Pirate Community in Ireland in the Early Seventeenth Century’, IJMH, 2 (1990), pp.  1–27; John C. Appleby, ‘The Problem of Piracy in Ireland, 1570–1630’, in Jowitt, ed., Pirates?, pp. 165–6. 28 William Monson, Sir William Monson’s Naval Tracts, ed. M. Oppenheim (5 vols, London, 1902–14), iii, pp. 56–69. 29 Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery (New York, 1999); Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689 (Gainsville, FL, 2005). 30 James A. O. C. Brown, ‘Morocco and Atlantic History’, in D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, and William O’Reilly, eds, The Atlantic World (London, 2015), p. 187. 24

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ships, and between 1613 and 1621 they seized almost 900 European vessels.31 A number of British sailors who had been captured were recruited into the corsairing fleet, some of whom converted to Islam; indeed, many Europeans joined these corsairs from the late sixteenth century onwards.32 One report in 1611 suggested that there were 2,000 English sailors in North Africa, operating forty ships – about half of them also maintaining ties to southwest Munster.33 The most famous was Captain John Ward, who, with his Flemish fellow Simon Dansekar, was vilified in both pamphlets and theatre.34 An even greater number of the British sailors who were captured by the Magharibi corsairs were either ransomed or enslaved. David Hebb estimated that some 400 ships and 8,000 men were seized in the period 1616–42, of whom probably less than a third were ever ransomed.35 According to a complaint made in parliament in August 1625, in the space of two months fifty English ships and 1,000 men were taken, and corsairs even attacked Baltimore in Ireland, and Lundy in the Bristol Channel.36 To combat this threat, an English naval expedition of eighteen ships was sent against Algiers in 1620, led by the admiral of the fleet Sir Robert Mansell; despite orders to coordinate with the Spanish and the Dutch, this met with little success.37 Charles I secured a brief peace with Morocco later in the 1620s, but hostilities were soon renewed, and another expedition was sent in 1637 against Salé, on the Atlantic coast, under William Rainborowe. This squadron destroyed seventeen of Salé’s ships, seized two more, and managed to free 340 English prisoners, and Rainborowe’s return to England was celebrated with parades in London. However, it did not end the threat from corsairs, and Rainborowe proposed a similar blockade of Algiers the following year, but

Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 350. Salvatore Bono, I Corsari Barbareschi (Torino, 1964); David Delison Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642 (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 13–15; Michel Fontenay, La Méditerranée entre la Croix et la Croissant: Navigation, Commerce, Course et Piraterie (XVIe–XIXe siècle) (Paris, 2010); Joel H. Baer, ‘Introduction to Volume 1’, in Joel H. Baer, ed., British Piracy in the Golden Age: History and Interpretation, 1660–1730 (4 vols, London, 2007), i, pp. xxvi–xxvii; Faitha Loualich, ‘In the Regency of Algiers: The Human Side of the Algerine Corso’, trans. Anissa Daoudi, in Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri, eds, Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel’s Maritime Legacy (London, 2010), pp. 69–96. 33 Appleby, ‘Nursery of Pirates’, p. 7. 34 Baer, ‘Introduction to Volume 1’, p. xxvii; Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580–1615, trans. Janet and Brian Pullan (London, 1967), pp. 76–9; see also Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy. 35 Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 137–42. 36 H. Barnby, ‘The Algerian Attack on Baltimore in 1631’, MM, 56 (1970), pp. 27–31; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, p. 35; Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 149–50; CSPD 1625–6, p. 89. 37 Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, chs 5 and 6; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 352–3. 31

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this was never undertaken.38 Nabil Matar has called this situation a ‘crisis of captivity’ which, he argues, undermined people’s faith in the Stuart monarchs and their government.39 Such widespread violence does not mean that the seas were lawless. In fact, this was a period when international and maritime law was a lively topic of debate (discussed below). Rather, as Lauren Benton has written, the sea was ‘a legal space constructed by inter-imperial tensions’: maritime law was unevenly applied, and influenced by the prejudiced attitudes and interests of both governments and seafarers.40 The term ‘pirate’ and its legal meaning were used to define whose violent acts were legitimate, and whose were not; in English, it had acquired a criminal connotation in the fourteenth century.41 It was an applied label and a matter of perspective, and there is little evidence that anybody actually thought of themselves as a pirate.42 When an English merchant called Algerians ‘a dissolute and resolute company of Sea-farers and Pirates’, or an English admiral wrote of them as ‘a sort of outlaws … in enmity with all the world’, they ignored the fact that these corsairs were authorised by the Maghreb states, and were therefore technically not pirates at all.43 Moreover, many ships and sailors crossed these boundaries – without necessarily noticing, or believing, that they did so. Armed merchantmen might seize prizes, if the right opportunity arose, and it seems that many sailors moved between commercial and ‘piratical’ employment with relative ease.44 Even pirate leaders might redeem themselves, as in the case of Sir Henry Mainwaring, who had commanded a substantial corsair fleet based at Marmora but later became an admiral and advisor to King James.45 This issue also became more complex as the legal geography of empire expanded, and as most of the rest of the world was excluded from Europe’s Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 7; Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, chs 9 and 11; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 384–5; Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, p. 260. 39 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 78–80; this thesis is critiqued in more detail in Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 259–62. 40 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400– 1900 (Cambridge, 2009), p. 34. 41 Dick, ‘“Framing Piracy”’, pp. 15–16; Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (New York, 1998), ch. 1; Christopher Harding, ‘“Hostis Humani Generis” – the Pirate as Outlaw in the Early Modern Law of the Sea’, in Jowitt, ed., Pirates?, pp. 20–38; Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, ch. 8; Michael Kempe, ‘“Even in the Remotest Corners of the World”: Globalized Piracy and International Law, 1500–1900’, Journal of Global History, 5 (2010), pp. 353–72. 42 Lauren Benton, ‘Towards a New Legal History of Piracy: Maritime Legalities and the Myth of Universal Jurisdiction’, IJMH, 23 (2011), p. 239; Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’, pp. 164–5. 43 Both quoted in Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’, p. 166; cf. Rubin, Law of Piracy, p. 30; Rodger, ‘Law and Language’, p. 7. 44 Senior, Nation of Pirates, p. 36; Fury, Tides in the Affairs of Men, pp. 22–7; Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’, pp. 164–5. 45 G. E. Mainwaring, ed., The Life and Works of Henry Mainwaring (2 vols, London, 1920–2). 38

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‘zone of law’ by the principle of ‘no peace beyond the line’.46 This concept originated with Spain’s and Portugal’s forceful attempts to prevent competitors from entering their imperial possessions, which provoked a similarly aggressive response.47 Violent acts that might have been prosecuted as piracy in European waters were therefore permitted in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and both individual ships and the great trading companies, such as the English East India Company and the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie and West Indische Compagnie, made war in the pursuit of their colonial and commercial ambitions. These companies not only commanded large and heavily armed fleets, they built up their own imperial networks of fortified trading posts and colonies, and they practised their own military policies.48 Between 1623 and 1637, for example, the West Indische Compagnie’s privateers seized 609 enemy ships, most dramatically when Piet Hein captured the Spanish silver fleet in 1628.49 Jan Glete has described the conflict between the combined Portuguese and Spanish empire on the one hand and the Dutch on the other, which began in Lauren Benton, ‘Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Global Regionalism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 47 (2005), pp. 700–24; Eliga H. Gould, ‘Lines of Plunder or Crucible of Modernity? The Legal Geography of the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1660–1825’, in Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen, eds, Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges (Honolulu, 2007), pp. 105–20; Benton, Search for Sovereignty; Benton, ‘Towards a New Legal History’; Starkey, ‘Voluntaries and Sea Robbers’, pp. 137–9, 140–1, 145. 47 Garrett Mattingly, ‘No Peace beyond What Line?’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 13 (1963), pp. 145–62; Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, pp. 11–15 and chs 8–10; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Revolution and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 103–14; Glete, Warfare at Sea, chs 5 and 9; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The New Atlantic: Warfare in the Sixteenth Century’, in Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea, p. 242. 48 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 (Oxford, 1957); C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800 (London, 1965), pp. 24–7, 48–50, 85–90; Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 168–77; C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825 (London, 1977), pp. 106–27; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic in the Hispanic World, 1606–1661 (Oxford, 1982), pp. 79–80, 117–21, 123–7, 130–1, 196–200, 277–8, 330–6; Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra, ‘The Dutch East India Company’s Shipping, 1602–1795, in a Comparative Perspective’, in Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra, eds, Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries (Amsterdam, 1993), pp. 49–80; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 325–7, 401–2, 753–8, 934–6, 939, 942–7, 951–2; P. J. Marshall, ‘The English in Asia to 1700’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 1: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 276–82; Femme S. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline (Zuphen, 2003), pp. 37–56; Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundation of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011); Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (2nd edn, St John’s, Newfoundland, 2011), pp. 15, 17; Henk der Heijer, Geschiedenis van de West Indische Compagnie (4th edn, Zutphen, 2013), chs 2–4. 49 Heijer, Geschiedenis, pp. 59–62. 46

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the late sixteenth century but intensified in the early seventeenth, as ‘the first global war at sea’.50 British ships were also engaged in this conflict. Many of the privateers set forth during England’s war with Spain at the end of the sixteenth century sailed to the Caribbean to raid Spanish colonies and shipping.51 In the early seventeenth century, too, British colonists and investors in the Caribbean, among them future leaders of the parliamentarian cause like Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, set out privateering expeditions. Warwick had been rumoured as an alternative appointment as admiral to the unpopular George Villiers, duke of Buckingham, in 1628, and he received a commission directly from the crown on the basis of which he set out privateering voyages against Spain in 1627, and to the Spanish Caribbean throughout the 1630s and into the 1640s.52 In the Indian Ocean, similarly, the British and Dutch sometimes allied together against the Portuguese, but also fought one other.53 At the start of the 1640s, then, maritime warfare was still carried out by a mixture of state and private agencies, and the boundaries between the two were blurred.54 Seafarers could expect to engage in violent actions not just if they served aboard naval vessels, but also when they sailed on merchant voyages, in privateers, in private ships hired to serve the crown or another European state, or as pirates. Yet this was also a period of considerable change. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries witnessed important developments in naval technology and organisation which had begun to transform warfare at sea by the time of the British civil wars.

Glete, Warfare at Sea, ch. 10. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, ch. 8; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 164–5. 52 Vincent T. Harlow, ed., ‘The Voyages of Captain William Jackson (1642–1645)’, in Camden Miscellany, vol. xiii (London, 1924), pp. 1–39; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, pp. 81, 91, 114–15, 196–7, 207; Nelson P. Bard, ed., ‘The Earl of Warwick’s Voyage in 1627’, in N. A. M. Rodger, ed., The Naval Miscellany, V (1984), pp. 15–93; Karen Kupperman, Providence Island 1630–1641: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge, 1993); Hilary McD. Beckles, ‘The “Hub of Empire”: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century’, in Canny, ed., Oxford History, pp. 218–40; Sean Kelsey, ‘Rich, Robert, Second Earl of Warwick (1587–1658)’, ODNB. On Buckingham, see below, pp. 29–31. 53 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 151–2, 157–62, 185–9; K. N. Chaudhuri, ‘The English East India Company’s Shipping (c.1600–1760)’, in Bruijn and Gaastra, eds, Ships, Sailors and Spices, pp. 49–80; Marshall, ‘English in Asia’, pp. 270–1, 274, 276–7, 279–81; K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early JointStock Company, 1600–1640 (London, 1999); Femme S. Gaastra, ‘War, Competition, and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Companies in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in H. V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby, eds, The Worlds of the East India Company (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 49–68. 54 Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860 (2 vols, Stockholm, 1993), i, p. 51; Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1994); Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 43. 50 51

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Ships, guns, and tactics A number of historians have argued that the changing nature of ships, seafaring, and armament was a key, but often overlooked, part of the ‘military revolution’ – a term coined to describe the development of more complex military organisations, technology, and tactics, which had profound implications for the financial structure and the power of European state governments.55 Others have been more critical of this idea, suggesting that the long and slow nature of the process, and the many continuities between medieval and early modern shipping, make the use of the word ‘revolution’ rather inaccurate.56 Whatever they choose to call it, historians generally do agree that ‘war at sea underwent a fundamental transformation’ during the century and a half after 1500.57 In general terms a greater variety of ship types emerged across this period, and in particular more differentiation occurred between merchant ships and warships, with three important strands.58 First, although ships had carried guns throughout the medieval period, during the sixteenth century ever heavier ordnance was carried in ever greater numbers, first on galleys in the Mediterranean and then on sailing vessels.59 This was reflected in the rise in the number of gunners serving aboard both naval and merchant ships.60 Second, states built larger warships, to carry these greater armaments, to undertake long-distance travel (pioneered by the Portuguese nau, and then the smaller caravel and galleon), and in a drive for prestige in which different rulers vied to own the most

Parker, Military Revolution, p. 83; M. A. J. Palmer, ‘The “Military Revolution” Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea’, War in History, 4 (1997), pp. 123–49; Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 9–14; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The Military Revolution at Sea’, in N. A. M. Rodger, ed., Essays in Naval History: Medieval to Modern (Farnham, 2009), pp. 59–76; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘From the “Military Revolution” to the “Fiscal-Naval State”’, Journal for Maritime Research, 13 (2011), pp. 119–28; John F. Guilmartin, ‘The Military Revolution in Warfare at Sea during the Early Modern Era: Technological Origins, Operational Outcomes and Strategic Consequences’, Journal for Maritime Research, 13 (2011), pp. 129–37; Gijs A. Rommelse, ‘An Early Modern Naval Revolution? The Relationship between “Economic Reason of State” and Maritime Warfare’, Journal for Maritime Research, 13 (2011), pp. 138–50. 56 Jeremy Black, Naval Power: A History of Warfare and the Sea from 1500 (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 42–8; Louis Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare in Europe, c. 1330–c. 1680’, in Frank Tallet and D. J. B. Trim, eds, European Warfare 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 2010), p. 263. 57 Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, p. 236; cf. Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 1. 58 For a general overview, see Glete, Navies and Nations, i, pp. 22–65; Glete, Warfare at Sea,  ch. 2; Black, Naval Power, pp. 10–13, 19–22; Guilmartin, ‘Military Revolution’, pp. 130–4. 59 John Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1974), ch. 4; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650’, MM, 82 (1996), pp. 301–24; Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 21–32; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, pp. 241–4, 248–52. 60 Scammell, ‘War at Sea’, p. 195. 55

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impressive ship.61 In the first few decades of the sixteenth century the Scottish Michael, the Danish Engelen and Maria, the Swedish Stora Kravelen, the English Henry Grace à Dieu, the French Grande Françoise, and the Portuguese Sao João all exemplify this trend. Most of them were between 1,000 and 2,000 tons and carried several hundred guns; the Grande Françoise also had a chapel, a tennis court, and a windmill.62 A hundred years later the same pattern continued, for example with the Swedish Vasa (although this ship sank almost immediately after launch), the French La Couronne, and the English Sovereign of the Seas.63 Third, and slightly later, there was the development of fast, manoeuvrable fighting vessels, as a hybrid of Mediterranean and northern European shipbuilding techniques, in general referred to as ‘frigates’. These probably first appeared in Flanders and especially Dunkirk, and it seems that Britain was quite slow to catch up.64 Navigational knowledge also made considerable progress in this period, linked to developments in mathematics.65 In practice these changes were haphazard and slow to take hold, and they do not seem to have prompted a significant change in tactics until the middle of the seventeenth century.66 In the 1630s, for example, English admirals’ instructions still envisioned fleet actions in which ships lined up to an opposing vessel, in order of rank from the admiral downwards, in what were effectively individual duels.67 Hired merchant ships also remained a significant part of most fighting On Portuguese ships, see Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 31; Francisco Contente Domingues, ‘The State of Portuguese Naval Forces in the Sixteenth Century’, in Hattendorf and Unger, eds, War at Sea, pp. 193–5. 62 Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 23, 26–9; Jan Glete, ‘Naval Power and Control of the Sea in the Baltic in the Sixteenth Century’, in Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea, pp. 221, 223; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, pp. 250–1. 63 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, p. 237; Brian W. Quintrell, ‘Charles I and His Navy in the 1630s’, The Seventeenth Century, 3 (1988), pp. 159–79; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 387–9; Bruijn, ‘States and Their Navies’, p. 83; Alan James, The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572–1661 (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 113, 116–17; Guilmartin, ‘Military Revolution’, p. 134; See also below, p. 31. 64 G. Robinson, ‘The Seventeenth Century Frigate’, MM, 15 (1929), pp. 271–81; R. Baetens, ‘The Organization and Effects of Flemish Privateering in the Seventeenth Century’, Acta Historiae Neerlandica, 9 (1977), pp. 54–62; Andrew Thrush, ‘In Pursuit of the Frigate, 1603–40’, Historical Research, 64 (1991), pp. 29–45; R. A. Stradling, The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568–1668 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 33, 164–73; Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 26; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, pp. 253–4. See also Chapter 5, pp. 122–4. 65 David W. Waters, The Art of Navigation in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times (Greenwich, 1978); Katherine Neal, ‘Mathematics and Empire, Navigation and Exploration: Henry Briggs and the Northwest Passage Voyages of 1631’, Isis, 93 (2002), pp. 435–54; Richard J. Blakemore, ‘Navigating Culture: Navigational Instruments as Cultural Artefacts, c. 1550–1650’, Journal for Maritime Research, 14 (2012), pp. 31–44. 66 Rodger, ‘Development of Broadside Gunnery’, pp. 315–17; Palmer, ‘“Military Revolution” Afloat’; Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 32–9; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, pp. 258–60. 67 NMM JOD/1/1, fos 70v–73r; NMM LEC/5, fos 2r–8v; cf. TNA PRO SP 16/157, fos 140v–145v. 61

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Plate 3. Willem van de Velde the Elder, Portrait of a Dutch Frigate, 1665? (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

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fleets until after the middle of the seventeenth century, and across Europe navies made slow progress in establishing ­permanent naval officer corps, and usually recruited sailors from the merchant marine rather than trying to create a distinct naval profession.68 As we have already seen, private and state activities continued to coexist and overlap in maritime warfare. Nevertheless, the cumulative impact of these changes must not be underestimated. Perhaps most importantly, they made navies much more complicated to organise and much more expensive to maintain, therefore requiring more state involvement in order to achieve fully effective maritime forces. This coincided with shifts not just in tactical thinking but also in political attitudes about maritime sovereignty, especially during the early seventeenth century.

Sovereigns of the sea At the same time as technological changes were taking place, there was a shift in the way monarchs, lawyers, and scholars thought about the extent and nature of the maritime sovereignty that any ruler could exercise. Throughout this period, as mentioned previously, the Spanish and Portuguese empires claimed exclusive rights to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, claims which were increasingly challenged by other European seafaring states.69 In the sixteenth century, the Habsburg emperors were also proclaimed ‘masters of the sea’ by their subjects in the Netherlands – although after the Dutch revolt, the new republic’s government established its own maritime courts.70 From the middle of that century, French kings also strove to bring local maritime jurisdictions more fully under royal control, which was further encouraged by the policies of Cardinal Richelieu from the 1620s onwards, although these met with considerable local resistance.71 English monarchs had asserted a sovereign right to territorial waters around England since medieval times, but even under Elizabeth this meant exercising jurisdiction without necessarily excluding others’ use of the seas. Scottish monarchs had also claimed sovereignty over the seas off their coasts, and in this tradition claimed more exclusive rights, particularly over fisheries; James VI brought these ideas to England when he ascended the throne in 1603.72 Shortly Bruijn, ‘States and Their Navies’, pp. 73–83; Glete, Warfare at Sea, ch. 3; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’, pp. 255–8. 69 Elizabeth Mancke, ‘European Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic Space’, Geographic Review, 89 (1999), pp. 225–36; Elizabeth Mancke, ‘Oceanic Space and the Creation of a Global International System, 1450–1800’, in Daniel Finamore, ed., Maritime History as World History: New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology (Gainsville, FL, 2004), pp. 155–6. 70 Sicking, ‘Naval Power’, p. 208; Bruijn, Dutch Navy, pp. 6–8. 71 James, Navy and Government, chs 2–3. 72 David Armitage, ‘The Empire of the Seas, 1576–1689’, in David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 105–8; Mancke, ‘Oceanic Space’, pp. 157–8; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 20–5. 68

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afterwards, a new international debate was triggered by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius, whose Mare Liberum, published in 1609, argued that seas could not be owned, and that free access for travel and resources, like fisheries, was a natural right.73 This argument arose from a particular context: Grotius wrote on behalf of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, to defend the actions of a Dutch privateer against the Portuguese claims to sovereignty over the Indian Ocean. The arguments in the published version of Mare Liberum were also moderated out of consideration for ongoing peace negotiations between the Dutch States General and the Spanish-Portuguese crown.74 However, Mare Liberum was part of a much larger work on the international laws of war, De Iure Pradae, and Grotius argued elsewhere that the freedoms he proclaimed were not limited to the Indian Ocean but extended to other seas.75 These general principles espoused by Grotius provoked a loud response, including from the Portuguese writer Serafim de Freitas, but also from a series of British authors eager to defend their monarch’s rights.76 The first was William Welwood, a Scottish juror who published an anthology of sea law, and to whom Grotius personally responded, as they were both particularly concerned with negotiations over rights and access to North Sea fisheries.77 John Burough, the keeper of the records in the Tower of London, then compiled a treatise at Charles I’s direct request.78 Finally, and most famously, the lawyer and MP John Selden wrote the weighty Mare Clausum, originally begun under James but only published in 1635.79 All three of these writers summoned classical and medieval precedents to argue that the sea could be possessed, just like the land, and that the seas around Britain belonged to the British crown. [Hugo Grotius], Mare Liberum (Leiden, 1609); Helen Thornton, ‘Hugo Grotius and the Freedom of the Seas’, IJMH, 16 (2004), pp. 17–38; Heller-Roazen, Enemy of All, ch. 11. 74 Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘Preparing Mare Liberum for the Press: Hugo Grotius’ Rewriting of Chapter 12 of De Iure Pradae in November-December 1608’, Grotiana, 28 (2007), pp. 246–80. 75 Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘Mare Liberum in the West Indies? Hugo Grotius and the Case of the Swimming Lion, a Dutch Pirate in the Caribbean at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century’, Itinerario, 31 (2007), pp. 59–94. 76 Monica Brito Vieira, ‘Mare Liberum vs Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on Dominion over the Seas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 64 (2003), pp. 361–77. 77 William Welwood, An Abridgement of All Sea-Lavves (London, 1613); William Welwood, De dominio Maris (London, 1615); J. D. Alsop, ‘William Welwood, Anne of Denmark and the Sovereignty of the Sea’, Scottish History Review, 59 (1980), pp. 171–4; Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘Mare Liberum versus the Propriety of the Seas? The Debate between Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and William Welwood (1552–1624) and its Impact on AngloScotto-Dutch Fishery Disputes in the Second Decade of the Seventeenth Century’, Edinburgh Law Review, 10 (2006), pp. 239–76. 78 NMM CAD/D/18, and for Charles’s involvement, see NMM REC/3, fo. 268v. 79 John Selden, Mare Clausum (London, 1635). For commentary on these texts, see Fulton, Sovereignty of the Sea; Helen Thornton, ‘John Selden’s Response to Hugo Grotius: The Argument for Closed Seas’, IJMH, 18 (2006), pp. 105–28. 73

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The timing of Selden’s publication is significant, as it coincided with an expansion of naval activity, and was part of a deliberate shift in policy.80 Where Elizabeth and James had taken a relatively relaxed approach to maritime affairs, Charles wanted more influence and stricter conformity. In 1634 the government published a new ‘Reglement for the narrow seas’ (although the exact extent of these territorial waters may have been left deliberately vague), as part of a wider attempt to bring naval and maritime activity under more direct control.81 Such policies may well have caused friction for sailors strongly attached to a professional culture and customary law.82 Charles I also made claims to the fishing grounds off Britain’s north coast, and tried to enforce a system of licences on the Dutch fishing fleet, although this seems to have achieved little except to antagonise the Dutch.83 These practical measures were therefore not necessarily enforced evenly or effectively, but they represented a substantial change of direction for the British government, and one with significant consequences in subsequent years. Together with the changing technological context of maritime warfare, they placed greater emphasis on the role of the royal navy.

The growth of state navies While, as we have seen, private warfare continued to be an important part of seafaring life and maritime strategy, the growth of centralised state navies was one of the most significant changes to maritime warfare across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, spurred by, and driving on, changes in technology and competing claims about maritime sovereignty.84 In England, Henry VIII built up an impressive fleet, though this was usually more successful in a defensive capacity than in any offensive strategies; and at the very end of his reign the king established the basis of what became a permanent naval administration.85 Ships from Newcastle, most of them merchant ships commissioned for naval service or as privateers, were used during his reign to interrupt communication and reinforcements between France and Scotland, and to counter Scottish privateering.86 Under the rule of Edward VI and Mary I, the navy was maintained at a relatively steady level, with a considerable amount of continuity in the See below, pp. 30–3. Quintrell, ‘Charles I’, p. 165; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, pp. 135–7; Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 262–4. 82 On customary law, see Richard J. Blakemore, ‘The Legal World of English Sailors’ c.1575–1729, in Maria Fusaro, Bernard Allaire, Richard J. Blakemore, and Tijl Vanneste, eds, Law, Labour, and Empire: Comparative Perspectives on Seafarers, c. 1500–1800 (Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 100–20. 83 Quintrell, ‘Charles I’, pp. 164, 171–2; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, pp. 155–6; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 383–4. 84 The best overviews are Glete, Navies and Nations; Glete, Warfare at Sea; Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare’. 85 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 45–99; Loades, Tudor Navy, ch. 4; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 176, 221; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 38–43. 86 Scammell, ‘War at Sea’, pp. 73–97. 80 81

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administration and personnel despite the political and religious upheavals of those years.87 By contrast, the Scottish crown boasted a large naval fleet at the beginning of the sixteenth century, with some thirty-eight ships in 1513, but this was soon reduced; the prestige ship Great Michael was sold to France in 1515.88 Thereafter the Scottish government kept only a small number of state-owned ships, largely for defence of the coast, and relied on privateers during times of war, and Steve Murdoch has argued that this was an effective approach considering Scotland’s geography and strategic aims.89 Additionally, Scottish ships participated in Caribbean raiding from the 1540s onwards, before the English followed the same path.90 England and Scotland were responding to, and participating in, a major European trend. Throughout the sixteenth century, Portugal and Spain depended on substantial fleets to protect and connect their global empires, which were kept largely under state control, unlike the northern European merchant companies that increasingly challenged these empires.91 At the same time, the Mediterranean became a theatre of war between the old might of Venice and the growing power of the Ottoman and Spanish empires, all of them developing large galley fleets which met at the famous battle of Lepanto in 1571; however, by the 1580s these galley fleets were no longer dominant, and private warfare was once again on the rise in this sea.92 The French monarchy, too, established a substantial Mediterranean galley fleet, as well as mobilising a large invasion force against England in 1545.93 As well as their Mediterranean galleys, the Spanish monarchs briefly established a navy in the Netherlands during the 1550s, but the ships were sold off in 1561, and, like the Scottish government, they resumed their reliance on hired or commandeered merchant ships.94 The Armada of Flanders, established towards the end of the sixteenth century to defend the Spanish Netherlands, was a combination of royal and private frigates which began to inflict considerable Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 100–14; Loades, Tudor Navy, ch. 6; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 71–3, 82–4; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, chs 3–4; C. S. Knighton and David Loades, eds, The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I (Farnham, 2011). 88 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 25–32. 89 Ibid., pp. 77, 320, 326–7. 90 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 172–4; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 239. 91 Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, pp. 39–64; Parker, Military Revolution, pp. 103–7; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History (London, 1993); Philip Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 1589–1665: Reconstruction and Defeat (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 3–4; Glete, Warfare at Sea, ch. 5, p. 149; Domingues, ‘Portuguese Naval Forces’; Kenneth J. Andrien, ‘The Spanish Atlantic System’, in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds, Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford, 2009), pp. 61–2; Black, Naval Power, pp. 13–19. 92 Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, chs 5–6; Glete, Warfare at Sea, ch. 6; Black, Naval Power, pp. 22–30; Guilmartin, ‘Military Revolution’, pp. 132–3. 93 Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 140–3. 94 Sicking, ‘Naval Power’. 87

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damage on the Dutch and on Spain’s other enemies, and also preyed on neutral British shipping.95 More lasting changes took place in the Baltic, where, from the first decades of the sixteenth century, rivalry between Sweden and DenmarkNorway led both states to establish permanent and centralised navies, among the largest in Europe, culminating in the major fleet engagements of the Nordic Seven Years’ War of 1563–70.96 Even European states with relatively small territories, such as Florence, sought to increase naval resources: these were often used more as a form of political influence – being loaned to Spain and to Venice in their imperial wars – rather than as an independent force.97 After Elizabeth I came to the throne in 1559, the English navy again played a primarily defensive role, for example against a French intervention in Scotland in 1560, although in 1562–63 the English supported Huguenot forces in Le Havre.98 The navy was also developed by long-term planning from the very beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, building upon the official administration established by her father, though the queen continued to rely on cooperation with private parties.99 After 1585, during war with Spain, this defensive role intensified, most famously against the Invincible Armada in 1588, but this period also witnessed a number of offensive operations, both in Europe and elsewhere around the world, usually carried out as a partnership between the crown’s small fleet and private ships.100 Most famous amongst these are Sir Francis Drake’s global circumnavigation in 1577, his attacks on Spain’s Caribbean possessions in 1585–86 and on Cadiz in 1587, and a second campaign against Cadiz in 1596, led by Robert Devereux, the second earl of Essex.101 The traditional narrative of British naval history has been one of decline under the Stuarts following these heights of Elizabethan glory, and there is some accuracy to this.102 There evidently was a lower level of naval activity, and considerable corruption in the administration, under James VI and I, prompting Stradling, Armada of Flanders, pp. 6–15. Glete, Warfare at Sea, ch. 7; Jan Glete, ‘Naval Power and Control of the Sea in the Baltic in the Sixteenth Century’, in Hattendorf and Unger, eds, War at Sea, pp. 217–32. 97 Marco Gemignani, ‘The Navies of the Medici: The Florentine Navy and the Navy of the Sacred Order of St Stephen, 1547–1648’, in Hattendorf and Unger, eds, War at Sea, pp. 169–85. 98 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 115–83; Loades, Tudor Navy, chs 7–8; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, ch. 5; C. S. Knighton and David Loades, eds, Elizabethan Naval Administration (Farnham, 2013). 99 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 57–63, 69; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 178–82; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 226, 229–30, 327. 100 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 247–53; Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 157–64; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 87–97, 122–5; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 179, 193–200. 101 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 27–43; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 222–4, 233–7, 239–42, 263–6; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 244–5, 249–53, 284–6; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 113–16; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 166–71, 174–8, 186–90, 214–17. 102 See Introduction, pp. 7–8. 95 96

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the king to authorise enquiries into these problems in 1608 and 1618. The first resulted in only limited reform, but the second passed the naval administration to a commission headed by the king’s favourite, the duke of Buckingham, who soon became lord high admiral.103 When Charles I came to the throne, and quickly went to war first with Spain and then France in the 1620s, he launched large naval expeditions against Cadiz in 1625 (involving 100 ships, of which thirteen belonged to the navy, while twenty were Dutch), and to the Ile de Ré in 1627. These were considerably less successful than the Elizabethan ventures they self-consciously sought to emulate, or than propaganda at the time would have had the English public believe.104 Both these expeditions, and two smaller but equally ineffective efforts in 1626 and 1628, suffered from enormous administrative difficulties, with horrific and often fatal consequences for the men employed aboard the ships, and they achieved little in strategic terms.105 However, this narrative of decline has undergone a considerable amount of revision. For one thing, naval administration, like much of Elizabeth’s government, had already run into difficulties and accusations of corruption and mismanagement in the 1590s.106 Nor were all Elizabethan endeavours unqualified successes: the 1589 campaign against the Spanish coast, the 1595 Caribbean expedition in which Sir Francis Drake died, and the ‘Islands voyage’ of 1597 all failed to achieve their main objectives.107 As we have seen, much of the success that did occur was due to private activity rather than naval strength, but this occasionally created tensions between the priorities of the crown and those of its plunder-hungry subjects.108 Moreover, during the 1620s both England Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 184–215; Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, chs 1–3; A. P. McGowan, ed., The Jacobean Commissions of Enquiry, 1608 and 1618 (London, 1971); Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 211–17, 220–5; Elizabeth Milford, ‘The Navy at Peace: The Activities of the Early Jacobean Navy: 1603–1618’, MM, 76 (1990), pp. 23–36. 104 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 219–22, 227–34, 251; Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, chs 6–8; Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 226–33; Thomas Cogswell, ‘Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La Rochelle, 1625–1626’, English Historical Review, 99 (1984), pp. 241–67; Thomas Cogswell, ‘Prelude to Ré: The AngloFrench Struggle over La Rochelle, 1624–1627’, History, 62 (1986), pp. 1–21; Thomas Cogswell, ‘“Published by Authoritie”: Newsbooks and the Duke of Buckingham’s Expedition to the Île de Ré’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 67 (2004), pp. 1–15; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 357–61. 105 Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 248–52, 273–4, 294–8, 303–7, 336–41; Richard W. Stewart, ‘Arms and Expeditions: The Ordnance Office and the Assaults on Cadiz (1625) and the Isle of Rhé (1627)’, in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 112–32. 106 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 332–3, 337–8. 107 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 109–13, 116–19, 121; Loades, Tudor Navy, pp.  255–9, 262–3, 266–7; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 273, 282–3, 287–8; Loades, Making of the Elizabethan Navy, pp. 207–10, 213–14. 108 Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 79–90, 96–101; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 120–2, 128. 103

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and Scotland again set out considerable numbers of privateers, at least 522 ships and 141 pinnaces, mostly from London and the southwest.109 This was not as effective a tactic as it had been in the sixteenth century, but it was still significant; at least 737 vessels were adjudged lawful prizes by the admiralty court between 1625 and 1630, and as the legal evidence is incomplete, and does not account for ships which were seized but never brought to court, the real total is likely to be closer to 1,000.110 These prizes were worth an annual average of at least £110,000, and possibly £160,000, compared with an estimated level of £100,000–200,000 per year for 1585–1603.111 The later activity may not have given the same boost to English shipping as Elizabethan privateering had done, but it suggests that the contrast between Elizabethan and Stuart sea-power may be exaggerated. Furthermore, the admiralty of the duke of Buckingham during 1623–28 has been described as ‘competent until it was faced with the almost impossible task of preparing large scale expeditions on a meagre budget’, and finance was the major issue that the navy continually struggled to overcome, and the cause of most of its problems.112 Proposals to resolve this issue, and to undertake even more ambitious naval operations, were never carried out; but this period has been credited with some improvements.113 In particular, the provision of medicine for the naval fleet was increased (though in other regards the treatment of naval seamen was callously negligent), and there were experiments with innovative shipbuilding, such as the ten Whelps, intended to provide small and fast ships to counter the threat from Dunkirk and elsewhere.114 Besides these, the shipwright William Burrell built ten large warships for the navy in 1619–23, all of which lasted until at least the 1650s; two were still in service in the late 1680s.115 Additionally, the wages of naval seamen were raised in 1626, although these were still less than they could earn in merchant ships.116 Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, ch. 3; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, ch. 4. Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, p. 260. 111 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, pp. 124–8, 230; Appleby, ‘English Privateering’, i, p. 270; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 294, 361. 112 Quoting Alan McGowan, ‘The Royal Navy under the First Duke of Buckingham, Lord High Admiral 1618–1628’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967), p. 2; on naval finances, see Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, chs 3–4 and pp. 368–9. 113 Thomas Cogswell, ‘“The Warre of the Commons for the Honour of King Charles”: The Parliament-Men and the Reformation of the Lord Admiral in 1626’, Historical Research, 84 (2011), pp. 618–36. 114 McGowan, ‘Royal Navy’, pp. 168–88, 222–4, 270–2; Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 344–5. 115 McGowan, ‘Royal Navy’, appendix 3, p. 304. For a full list of ships built in Charles I’s reign, see Rif Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail 1603–1714: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates (Barnsley, 2009), pp. 5, 23–6, 43, 87, 147–8. 116 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 225–6; Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 212–13; on merchant wages see Richard J. Blakemore, ‘Pieces of Eight, Pieces of Eight: Seamen’s Earnings and the Venture Economy of Early Modern Seafaring’, Economic History Review, 70 (2017), pp. 1153–84. 109

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After Buckingham’s assassination in 1628, Charles sought to continue and expand naval activity, although from 1630 Britain was at peace and there were no more large offensive expeditions.117 During the same period he pursued a wider defence policy, continuing reforms to the local militia which had begun during the 1620s.118 It was to fund his navy specifically, however, that Charles introduced the Ship Money levy, a controversial (but not entirely novel) tax that has often been described as a major cause of the civil wars.119 In the short term, this measure solved the navy’s financial problems, raising £800,000 between 1634 and 1640, with over 80 per cent of Ship Money assessments being paid.120 The money allowed Charles to embark on a greater level of regular naval activity. A fleet of nineteen ships was set out in 1635, and twenty-seven ships the next summer, which achieved some measures of security along Britain’s coast, although Charles also indulged in some expensive magnificence with the Sovereign of the Seas.121 Indeed, Charles was so impatient to launch his new prestige ship that he ignored the advice of the shipwright who built the Sovereign, Peter Pett, leading to an embarrassing anti-climax during ‘a very poor tide’; the ship was later floated ‘without ceremony and at night’.122 If the constitutional basis of Ship Money and Charles’s spending choices were questionable, the need for it was not. Besides threats such as corsairs from the Maghreb, most European states continued to build up their naval resources as they had during the sixteenth century, due to the regular outbreaks of war in Europe.123 From the beginning of the revolt against Spain in the 1570s, the Dutch United Provinces had depended on both private and state-organised warfare, and they quickly established the most powerful navy in Europe, which Quinn and Ryan, England’s Sea Empire, pp. 234–8; Quintrell, ‘Charles I’; Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, 1992), pp. 97–104; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, ch. 26; Loades, England’s Maritime Empire, pp. 155–7. On Buckingham’s assassination see Thomas Cogswell, ‘John Felton, Popular Political Culture, and the Assassination of the Duke of Buckingham’, HJ, 49 (2006), pp. 357–85. 118 Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp. 487–500; Henrik Langelüddecke, ‘“The Chiefest Strength and Glory of this Kingdom”: Arming and Training the “Perfect Militia” in the 1630s’, English Historical Review, 118 (2003), pp. 1264–303. 119 Robin J. W. Swales, ‘The Ship Money Levy of 1628’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 50 (1977), pp. 164–76; Quintrell, ‘Charles I’, pp. 165–7; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 6; Andrew Thrush, ‘Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money’, in Fissel, ed., War and Government, pp. 133–62; Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 222–36; See also Chapter 2, pp. 35–7. 120 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 382. 121 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 236–9, 260–2; Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, ch. 9; Glete, Navies and Nations, i, pp. 129–33; Quintrell, ‘Charles I’, pp. 162–5, 168–73; Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 24, 36, 178–9, 190; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 382–3, 386–94. 122 Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, p. 38. 123 On the relationship between Ship Money and Magharibi corsairs, see Thrush, ‘Naval Finance’, pp. 137–40; Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 230–6; Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 260–2. 117

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they used for both military campaigns and trade protection, both in a largely defensive capacity.124 The Dutch fleet consisted of 50 ships in 1615–16, and 125 in 1631, though this declined to 62 by 1650.125 A decentralised establishment with five separate admiralties, each of which managed its own finances, created some problems but did not prevent the effective operation of the navy, and nor did a continued reliance on hired merchant vessels.126 Britain was nominally allied to the Dutch, but there were mounting tensions over the theoretical arguments of Grotius, trade (especially in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans), and access to fisheries. While the Dutch in some ways eclipsed their great enemy, Spain, the Spanish government also sought to preserve and expand their navy, maintaining four galley squadrons in the Mediterranean and establishing a new Armada del Mar Océano in 1594, as well as employing large numbers of privateers.127 Spain faced a series of defeats by the Dutch and the French during the 1630s, and internal rebellions erupted in the following decade, but up to this point it still preserved some effective naval forces. The Armada of Flanders, in particular, grew in size and activity up until the later 1630s, seizing large numbers of prizes, although there were differences of opinion over strategic priorities between the Spanish government and the privateers themselves.128 At the same time, French naval ambitions were on the rise, largely due to the influence of Cardinal Richelieu, who in 1626 became grand-maître de la navigation. Richelieu’s interest in a strong naval fleet was partially to counter Huguenot forces, partially to encourage French imperial endeavours, and partially to increase royal authority. Though Richelieu did not restructure French naval authority entirely, and though there was friction as areas like Brittany strove to retain their autonomy, the cardinal’s efforts produced clear results.129 The French fleet expanded from seventeen ships in 1625 to fifty-seven ships by the start of the next decade, and maintained that high level until the mid-1640s; many of these ships were Dutch-built, and they included vessels modelled on Flemish frigates.130 The French were also allied with the Dutch against Spain, and this combination of forces provided the main source of British anxieties about maritime sovereignty and national security during the 1630s.131 Charles I’s naval policy of the 1630s is therefore not extraordinary for the time, even if the approach he took to fund it proved destabilising. Indeed, the fact that Bruijn, ‘States and Their Navies’, pp. 77–81; Bruijn, Dutch Navy, especially part 1. Glete, Navies and Nations, i, pp. 152–8. 126 Bruijn, Dutch Navy, pp. 4–8, 23, 25–34, 55–6. 127 Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, pp. 8–9, 11–14; Bruijn, ‘States and Their Navies’, pp. 73–7. 128 Stradling, Armada of Flanders, pp. 39–88; R. A. Stradling, ‘The Spanish Dunkirkers, 1621–48: A Record of Plunder and Destruction’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 93 (1980), pp. 541–58. 129 James, Navy and Government, especially ch. 3. 130 Glete, Navies and Nations, i, pp. 125–9; James, Navy and Government, pp. 111–14. 131 Quintrell, ‘Charles I’, pp. 164–5, 169–70; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 137. 124

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the Dutch and French avoided confrontation with the Ship Money fleets, and in 1637 sought British assistance in their campaigns against Dunkirk, suggests that Charles’s navy was more impressive to other European rulers than it was to his own subjects, or has been to many historians.132 Nevertheless, the humiliation of the Downs in 1639 shows how impermanent this progress had been, and how vulnerable the naval establishment still was, despite the attention Charles had lavished on it.133 To a degree, all naval administrations struggled with these same problems – bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption; inconsistencies in the experience and training of officers and commanders; difficulties in recruitment; above all, inadequate finances, for even Spain with its revenues from American silver mines had money problems.134 European rulers also, as we have seen, continued to rely on private activity, whether privateers, hired merchant ships, or contractors. These problems may well have been structurally inherent in early modern states, and, as Alan James has pointed out, ‘The nature of an arms race … is that no-one feels satisfied with the material potential of their forces’.135 None of the European navies of this time afforded total maritime control to their rulers, and perhaps the most significant evidence of this is the continued activities of North African corsairs described earlier. Even so, it is clear that significant changes were under way throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that some states – most notably the Dutch United Provinces – were achieving more success at resolving these inherent problems in order to wield naval power. Britain, like other European states, had increased both its naval forces and its broader maritime potential, but could not yet harness this in a consistent and sustained way. This set the scene for the British civil wars at sea.

Conclusion The early modern period witnessed practically continuous maritime warfare, in Europe and throughout the expanding commercial and imperial networks acquired by European states. Private enterprise – whether supporting naval fleets, or acting independently – continued to be a crucial part of this warfare. Even in times of peace, ships might be threatened by corsairs or pirates, or engage in violence themselves, especially in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. At the same time, rulers built up larger navies, with more established administrations, and more technologically advanced ships (and the need to pay for these drove financial policies which, in England, proved highly provocative). In Britain, this was partnered by more strident claims to maritime sovereignty, inspired in part by ongoing theoretical and legal debates in Europe. The maritime dimension of the British civil wars emerged from these circumstances, and in many ways the Stradling, Armada of Flanders, pp. 100, 134. See Introduction, pp. 1–4. 134 Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, pp. 39–40, 50–3; cf. Stradling, Armada of Flanders, pp. 186–93; James, Navy and Government, pp. 68–73, 124–38, 146. 135 James, Navy and Government, p. 122. 132 133

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nature of warfare at sea would have been much more familiar to seafarers than campaigning on land was to their shore-bound compatriots. Yet, as we shall see, the civil wars also had a crucial impact, accelerating many of the trends outlined in this chapter.

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2 The Outbreak of War, 1638–1642

Historians now largely agree that the events of the mid-seventeenth century were a truly ‘British’ crisis: that, in Conrad Russell’s evocative phrase, the three Stuart kingdoms had a ‘billiard ball effect’ upon one another.1 Although each kingdom experienced a distinctive path to war that was contingent upon local as well as national circumstances, the collision of these circumstances resulted in conflict engulfing the whole of the British Isles and Ireland. In broad terms, Charles I’s policies provoked resistance and then rebellion in Scotland and Ireland, which altered the political situation in England, sparking off issues there that were already potentially divisive. The role and importance of naval warfare in this period of conflict is complex. In 1638, Charles I could set out a substantial fleet of state-owned men-of-war and hired merchantmen to deal with his disorderly Scottish subjects; yet by the time the king raised his standard at Nottingham in August 1642 the naval situation had altered radically. Parliament had taken control of most of the navy in which Charles had so lovingly invested during the 1630s, and the king was reduced to relying on his supporters to put ships into his service, while the rebels in Ireland had begun to acquire a force of privateers that threatened England’s overseas trade. This chapter therefore seeks to examine how the opening stages of the civil wars developed from a maritime perspective. After briefly describing the tensions which emerged in Charles’s reign, it will explore the navy’s actions during the Bishops’ Wars in Scotland and rebellion in Ireland, how the king lost and parliament won the support of the main royal fleet, and how privateering came to be a major part of the naval strategies for all the protagonists.

The road to rebellion, 1625–38 Both political and religious problems emerged from policies undertaken by Charles’s government during the 1620s and 1630s, although there has been a lively debate about just how unpopular royal governance was, provoked by a more sympathetic rendering of Charles by Kevin Sharpe and Mark Kishlansky.2 1

Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990), p. 27. Sharpe, Personal Rule; Mark Kishlansky, ‘Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity’, P&P, 189 (2005), pp. 41–80; see also Clive Holmes, Julian Goodacre, Richard Cust,

2

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Few scholars have accepted their arguments entirely, and certainly some policies proved contentious, in particular financial ones. Ruling without parliament in England, Charles turned to questionable methods for raising money. The naval expansion discussed in Chapter 1 was financed by the Ship Money levy, notorious at the time and for historians because it was collected across the whole country, rather than just coastal areas, and, although initially justified as an extraordinary measure, it was levied repeatedly.3 Charles’s use of prerogative courts, such as Star Chamber, to suppress those who criticised his reign was also evidently resented. David Cressy has argued that Charles’s style of governing was generally intrusive, authoritarian, and uncompromising, and even if Charles had never set out to rule without parliament, the king’s actions probably made it look like that was increasingly the direction in which English politics was moving.4 Some of those in England who opposed these policies, fearful of a ruling style reminiscent of ‘absolute’ monarchies like France and Spain (seen in England as tyrannical and intrinsically linked with Catholicism), felt threatened and became more radical in response. The king’s uncompromising political style also alienated him from his subjects in his other kingdoms. As an absentee monarch with little understanding of Scottish affairs, Charles was always going to face difficulties in his northern kingdom. Throughout the 1620s and 1630s he managed to estrange most sections of society with his ill-thought-out policies. Fiscal expedients such as the ‘revocation scheme’ – which threatened landholding – and tariff and monopoly reform, and the imposition of new men and bishops as office-holders at the expense of the traditional great nobles, all served to cause disaffection in Scotland.5 In Ireland, attempts to strengthen royal authority and make the kingdom pay for itself by Sir Thomas Wentworth, appointed as lord deputy in 1632, also met with resistance. As in Scotland, threats to undermine the landholdings of both Protestants and Catholics in conjunction with other financial and political reforms proved to be unpopular. Wentworth’s ‘brusque uncompromising’ governmental style helped to persuade previously hostile groups to work together to oppose his rule.6 and Mark  Kishlansky, ‘Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity’, P&P, 205 (2009), pp. 175–237. 3 See Chapter 1, pp. 31–3; Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642 (3rd edn, Oxford, 1995), pp. 7–14; Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (2nd edn, Oxford, 2004), pp. 67–9; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 68–70. 4 David Cressy, ‘Conflict, Consensus, and the Willingness to Wink: The Erosion of Community in Charles I’s England’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 61 (1998), pp. 131–49; see also David Cressy, ‘Revolutionary England, 1640–1642’, P&P, 181 (2003), pp. 35–71; David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution 1640–1642 (Oxford, 2006). 5 Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 22–8; David Scott, Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637–49 (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 12–14; Allan Macinnes, The British Revolution, 1629–1660 (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 74–93; Allan Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement in Scotland, 1625–1641 (Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 49–123. 6 Scott, Politics and War, pp. 13–14; John Adamson, The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (London, 2007), pp. 9–10; Ronald G. Asch, ‘Wentworth, Thomas, first earl

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From the 1620s, Charles also sponsored a new direction for the Church of England; whether this was indeed Arminianism, following the teachings of the Dutch scholar Jacobus Arminius, is another topic that has split historians, usually focused on theological interpretations.7 Nevertheless, the changes imposed by Charles and his archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, altered the style and appearance of worship in English churches, although this was not necessarily resented everywhere in England. Probably just as inflammatory as the policies themselves was the forceful way in which they were imposed, and their opponents punished, the most famous victims being William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Burton, who were branded, disfigured, and pilloried (a fate they may have courted by publicly criticising bishops and Queen Henrietta Maria).8 In Ireland, Wentworth also sought to impose the king’s ecclesiastical policies. Divesting church land from laymen affected many leading men of both religions, while imposing uniformity of worship annoyed the Presbyterian Scots in Ulster, and Catholics found themselves debarred from holding important state offices.9 It was when Charles tried to roll out his religious changes in Scotland, however, that the king’s subjects could take no more. Hostility to the king’s attempts to impose a British uniformity of worship on the Presbyterian Scots, with bishops and a new English-style prayer book, boiled over in July 1637. The first use of the new prayer book in Edinburgh led to rioting and helped to coalesce opposition against Charles. Over the next few months the king and his Scottish subjects failed in their attempts to negotiate a settlement.10 As the events of the 1640s show, this collection of religious and political developments had created divisions in the societies of Scotland, Ireland, and England, fault lines which cracked open as events played out across each of the three Stuart kingdoms.

Rebellion in Scotland, January 1638–October 1640 In February 1638, the divisions between Charles I and his Scottish subjects came to a head with the signing in Scotland of the National Covenant. Charles was determined to bring the ‘covenanters’ to heel: he wrote in June 1638 that ‘I intend not to yield to the demands of those traitors the Covenanters’.11 Both sides began of Strafford (1593–1641)’, ODNB; Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580–1650 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 275–300; Aidan Clarke, The Old English in Ireland (Dublin, 2000), pp. 75–152. 7 For a summary of this debate, see Michael Questier, ‘Arminianism, Catholicism and Puritanism in England during the 1630s’, HJ, 49 (2006), pp. 55–6; Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 14–17; Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, pp. 37–40, 49–50, 75–83. 8 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 81; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 77–8. 9 Canny, Making Ireland British, pp. 275–87. 10 Laura A. M. Stewart, Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651 (Oxford, 2016), pp. 1–84; Scott, Politics and War, pp. 13–18. 11 Cressy, England on Edge, pp. 69–70; Charles I, The Letters, Speeches and Proclamations of King Charles I, ed. Charles Petrie (1968), p. 109.

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to make preparations for war.12 From a naval perspective, the king initially appeared to be in a stronger position than the covenanters.13 The use of Ship Money during the 1630s to build up the royal navy and set out regular summer fleets meant that Charles could draw on a substantial number of men-of-war and experienced captains to support his northern campaign.14 By the spring of 1639 a summer flotilla of twelve ships was preparing for sea, although not all of these were available for service in the northern campaign. The navy required vessels to patrol elsewhere and to provide escorts for merchantmen and state business; the Greyhound and Dreadnought went to the Irish Sea, and Captain Carteret in the Leopard received instructions to ply near Dover.15 Nevertheless, a strong summer guard gave the royal navy the potential to disrupt Scottish overseas trade, and in particular to intercept shipments of munitions and Scottish veterans returning from Europe to join the covenanting army. From the spring of 1639 onwards a number of Scottish ships, and those suspected of going to assist the covenanters, were seized in English and Irish ports, and at sea. For example John Allen, master of the Fortune of Queensferry, found himself arrested in Dover in April 1639 on suspicion of trading with a covenanter-held port.16 In noting the detention of twenty Scottish ships on the Thames, a report (rather optimistically) suggested that the king ‘has in his custody most of the ships which belong to Scotland’, and that ‘all their traffic by sea is already cut off’.17 In reality numerous ships carrying soldiers and arms safely reached Scottish ports.18 English negotiations in 1639 for an alliance with Christian IV of Denmark-Norway also offered the possibility of interrupting the flow of supplies to the Scots, and the Danes stopped some ships from sailing to Scotland; but they colluded in others getting through, such as the vessel carrying the Scottish veteran Colonel Robert Monro.19 At the same time the covenanters also sought to prepare a naval force, but they lacked the resources available to Charles I. In late May, Sir Francis Windebank, the English secretary of state, received reports that some Scots had fitted out twenty to thirty ships at Flushing to be manned with ‘discontented Scots and Hollanders’, to put to sea as soon as war was declared and seize English merchant shipping.20 For an in-depth analysis of the military preparations and campaign, see Mark Charles Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars: Charles I’s Campaigns Against Scotland, 1638–1640 (Cambridge, 1994). 13 For a discussion on terminology (and not viewing the crisis in Scotland as a national conflict) see Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years War (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 100, 119–29. 14 See Chapter 1, pp. 31–3. 15 CSPD, 1638–9, p. 566; CSPD, 1639, pp. 14, 214–15. 16 John Appleby, ed., A Calendar of Material Relating to Ireland from the High Court of Admiralty Examinations, 1536–1641 (Dublin, 1992), nos. 1099–105. 17 CSPD, 1639, p. 71. 18 Ibid., pp. 198–9. 19 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 194–5. 20 CSPD, 1639, p. 234. 12

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A strong maritime element underpinned the plan devised by Charles I and his advisors to defeat his Scottish adversaries. A three-pronged attack would see the bulk of the largely English army march north overland, while an amphibious force from Ireland would land in the west, and James, third marquis of Hamilton, would sail with 5,000 men from England to land in the Firth of Forth, either to attack the covenanters or link up with Scottish royalists. Sir John Pennington, in the Rainbow, received command of the naval escorts and colliers employed to ship the army under Hamilton. It was also hoped that Scottish royalists in the northeast would rise up. The Irish contingent would consist of two elements – an army raised by Wentworth, to be shipped from Carrickfergus, and a body of clansmen that Randal MacDonnell, the second earl of Antrim, promised to recruit and transport to Scotland from Ulster. However, this ambitious plan quickly ran into problems. Poor leadership, financial and logistical difficulties, and complications with recruitment hampered the raising of forces in England. Political issues, a shortage of money, and the complex nature of organising an amphibious operation of this scale meant no soldiers crossed the Irish Sea.21 Hamilton found himself delayed, as some of the men assigned to sail with him refused to board their ships, but despite these issues the fleet put to sea and approximately thirty vessels arrived in the Forth by the end of April 1639. Initial reports suggested that the arrival of this force put the covenanters into some disorder.22 Aside from issuing the king’s proclamations for the Scots to submit, Hamilton made no actual moves to land his army. Himself a Scottish noble and landholder, he may have been reluctant to go on the offensive. Some suspected that the arrival of his mother, Anna Cunningham, at the head of a troop of horse at Leith to oppose him did not exactly help the situation. She reputedly carried a set of pistols specially loaded with silver bullets to be used against her son if he put ashore. On balance, the superior covenanter forces he faced, combined with the inexperience of his own men and the spread of sickness in the fleet, persuaded the marquis not to risk a tricky contested landing. The untrained English soldiers were instead landed on two uninhabited islands in the Forth, Inchcolm and Inchkeith, to practise with their weapons.23 The naval squadron on the Scottish coast achieved some successes in intercepting Scottish ships: the Third Whelp, operating from Aberdeen, seized a number of vessels near the port.24 When the Scott, Politics and War, pp. 20–1; Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie, ch. 5; Mark Charles Fissel, ‘English Amphibious Operations, 1587–1656: Galleons, Galleys, Longboats and Cots’, in Mark Charles Fissel and D. J. B. Trim, eds, Amphibious Warfare, 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion (Leiden, 2006), pp. 245–7; Fissel, Bishops’ Wars, pp. 10–33; J. P. Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘The Background to the Civil Wars in the Stuart Kingdoms’, in J. P. Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, The Civil Wars, pp. 16–21. 22 CSPD, 1639, p. 140. 23 CSPD, 1639, pp. 127, 144–6; John Scally, ‘Hamilton, James, first duke of Hamilton (1606–1649)’, ODNB; Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie, ch. 5. 24 CSPD, 1639, pp. 278–9. 21

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king’s army arrived at Berwick at the end of May, the soldiers embarked upon the ships once more, and Pennington wrote that he expected orders for action. None came, and after a series of humiliating minor engagements, Charles was forced to sign the Treaty of Berwick on 18 June 1639. In late June, Pennington received orders to sail for home, and he arrived in the Downs on 8 July.25 Scotland was not the navy’s only concern in 1639, as an escalation of the wider European maritime conflict took place off the English south coast.26 In the summer of 1639, with the fleet scattered to various outposts and with naval finances in a bad state, the ships that remained stationed in the Downs could do little more than report the insolences committed by Dutch ships against English merchantmen. Captain Povey informed Pennington that between thirty and sixty Dutch men-of-war lay between Plymouth and the Isle of Wight.27 The Dutch stopped and searched English vessels, which they suspected of transporting Spanish soldiers and silver to Flanders, and they seized at least two vessels carrying Spanish men. Pennington informed Secretary Windebank that the Dutch removed the Spaniards from the ships and treated the English sailors with civility, but this was still a clear disregard of Charles’s claim to sovereignty in the seas surrounding Britain.28 After the fiasco of the Scottish campaign, the king lacked the resources to prevent these affronts. Of the nineteen warships in service in July 1639, only four (the Unicorn, the Henrietta Maria, the Vanguard, and the Antelope) could be made ready to sail, with another three to follow later (the Expedition, the Mary Rose, and the Second Whelp). The rest of the fleet were on distant stations, low on victuals, or in need of repairs. Captain Pennington’s ship, the Rainbow, became so unserviceable that he transferred his command to the Unicorn.29 The situation came to a head in the autumn of 1639 when the Dutch chased a Spanish fleet into the Downs, and Pennington was unable to prevent a battle occurring.30 Nor was this the end of the king’s troubles. The Treaty of Berwick did not lead to peace between Charles I and his Scottish subjects, and over the winter of 1639–40 both sides prepared for a renewal of the conflict. The king’s strategy for defeating the covenanters in 1640 largely mirrored that of 1639, but a lack of funds hindered mobilisation in England and Ireland.31 Therefore, in April 1640, Charles summoned the English parliament to seek the money that he needed to conquer the Scots. The unwillingness of MPs to grant revenue to the king without redress of their grievances led to this parliament, known as the Short Parliament, being dissolved on 5 May; Charles instead hoped to borrow from Philip IV of Spain. Ibid., pp. 210, 376–8. Guthrie, ‘Naval Actions’, pp. 266–73. 27 CSPD, 1639, pp. 273–4. 28 CSPD, 1639, p. 390; Stradling, Armada of Flanders, p. 105; on sovereignty see Chapter 1, pp. 24–6. 29 CSPD 1639, pp. 398–9. 30 See Introduction, pp. 1–4. 31 Fissel, Bishops’ Wars, pp. 39–53, 287–95; Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, ‘Background to the Civil Wars’, pp. 21–4. 25 26

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The promised financial aid never arrived.32 These monetary problems and poor leadership bedevilled the military preparations in 1640. Thomas Wentworth, now earl of Strafford, promised that an Irish army of 9,000 would be ready at Carrickfergus in May, but the men did not assemble there until July.33 As in the previous year, the navy attempted to cut off the overseas trade of covenanter harbours, and Scottish ships were detained at sea and in English and Irish ports. The Lion of Fairlie, for example, was stayed at Portsmouth in April.34 A substantial fleet was authorised for the summer campaign in 1640.35 Naval vessels were again needed for other duties as well as dealing with the Scots: in particular, privateers operating from Dunkirk regularly attacked English merchantmen and fishing vessels. In March 1640, for instance, Dunkirkers in the Irish Sea seized the William and Thomas of Liverpool en route to France.36 William Herman, a shipmaster from Rye, described a number of attacks by Dunkirkers, including one on his own vessel, and claimed that more lay ‘ready to rob any ship putting to sea that they can overcome’.37 Captain Robert Slingesby in the Happy Entrance received orders with three other ships, the Leopard, the Mary Rose, and the First Whelp, to provide convoys to protect merchantmen.38 Nevertheless most of the fleet, seventeen ships, went north to the Firth of Forth by September. According to the Scottish royalist Sir Patrick Drummond (who was deprived by the covenanters of his position as conservator of privileges of the Scottish royal burghs in the Low Countries, because he reported to the king about arms shipments arriving in Scotland), the king’s navy proved to be quite ineffective at intercepting covenanter vessels. In October, another source noted ‘the King’s ships do little good upon the coast of Scotland’ and that ‘it will be more credit to his Majesty to recall his ships than suffer them to remain there to be laughed at, as they are’.39 The navy could therefore do nothing to prevent the disaster that befell the king’s forces, as the covenanters defeated Charles’s army at Newburn and occupied Newcastle in August 1640. In the Treaty of Ripon, which ended the hostilities, the Scottish leadership sought the restitution of all their vessels seized by the English during the war.40

Cressy, England on Edge, pp. 71–2, 110–12; Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 50–1. Fissel, ‘English Amphibious Operations’, pp. 248–50; Fissel, Bishops’ Wars, pp. 170–1; Clarke, Old English, pp. 131–2. 34 CSPD, 1640, p. 12; Appleby, High Court of Admiralty, no. 1137. 35 Anon., A List of the Colonels as also of the Severall Counties out of which they are to Raise their Men as also the Names of Ships, Captaines, and Lieutenants that are now Set Forth under the Command of the Right Honourable Algernoun Percey Earle of Northumberland (1640), p. 1. 36 Appleby, High Court of Admiralty, no. 1153. 37 CSPD, 1640, pp. 124–5. 38 Ibid., p. 372. 39 CSPD, 1640, pp. 52–3, 135–6; Stewart, Rethinking the Scottish Revolution, p. 185. 40 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, p. 200. 32 33

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Protest in England, May 1640–October 1641 In May 1640, after Charles had dissolved the Short Parliament, seamen joined apprentices and labourers in a riot at Lambeth Palace, seat of the deeply unpopular Archbishop Laud.41 The Privy Council wrote afterwards to both Watermen’s Hall and the Trinity House of Deptford, complaining that ‘there were divers idle & lewd persons transported to & from Ratcliff, Blackwall, [Rotherhithe], wapping & other parts thereabouts, whereby the said disorderly & rebellious assemblies were much increased’, and ordering that no ‘idle or suspected persons’ should be given passage on boats at night.42 The mention of these specific riverside hamlets, mostly in the parish of Stepney and home to large numbers of seamen and their families, and the inclusion of Trinity House, a corporation of ship-owners and shipmasters, strongly suggests a significant involvement in the riot by seafarers, which apparently unnerved the government.43 This incident shows the direct and early engagement of mariners in the furore unleashed by the Bishops’ Wars and their political consequences in England, which continued to escalate throughout 1640. Following his defeat at Newburn in August, Charles was forced to call a second parliament: while the covenanters and the English government negotiated, the crown was made to pay for the upkeep of the Scottish army that had crossed the border, and parliament in England was the only source of money. This parliament would sit throughout the civil wars, becoming known as the Long Parliament, and from the summer of 1640 onwards Charles’s opponents, including Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex, and the earl of Warwick, and lawyers like Oliver St John and John Pym, used this new leverage to dismantle what they saw as the more objectionable elements of Charles’s regime. This was not a simple or straightforward process, however. Some things, like Ship Money and Star Chamber, were swiftly removed, but there were disagreements elsewhere. The show-trial of Charles’s unpopular advisor, the earl of Strafford, was long and ultimately unsuccessful; only by an act of attainder was Strafford eventually declared guilty of treason, and executed in front of massive crowds. As the parliamentary debates continued, some MPs became uncomfortable with the radical group’s aims and methods, especially their desire for ‘root and branch’ reform of the church, and their appeal to a broader public audience. Moderates and conservatives, anxious about where all this was heading, began to show more support for the king.44 While Charles no doubt welcomed this support, he also seems to have contemplated more confrontational options, and he was convinced that his For this riot and similar actions in this period, see Keith Lindley, Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 4, 8; Cressy, England on Edge, pp. 110–26. 42 TNA SP 16/453, fo. 192r. 43 See G. G. Harris, The Trinity House of Deptford, 1514–1660 (London, 1969); Blakemore, ‘Legal World’. 44 Detailed accounts of this period are given in Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, chs 7–9; Adamson, Noble Revolt, chs 8–12. 41

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enemies were part of a committed conspiracy against him. The radicals in parliament similarly saw their actions as part of a struggle against the machinations of Catholics or their sympathisers, who they suspected of exercising a malevolent influence over the king.45 This was apparently confirmed by two failed attempts to seize military resources in May and June 1641, known as the ‘Army Plots’, which were carried out by Charles’s supporters, if not necessarily on his orders.46 In the autumn and winter of that year, Londoners took to the streets, protesting about the place of bishops in the House of Lords, while Charles’s moves to fortify Whitehall and put his own men in command of key positions like the Tower of London also raised alarm. The radicals reiterated their perspective, and their demands, in the published Grand Remonstrance in December 1641.47 Seafarers continued to participate in popular protest, particularly in and around London. In May 1641, in response to a closure of ports across Britain – although perhaps relating to May Day as a traditional moment of misrule – a large crowd of sailors protested outside the Tower of London.48 They reportedly ‘got the Flag of a ship’ before they marched on the Tower, implying an element of deliberate political theatre, and this incident ended in violence: the sailors pulled down some houses before the Trained Bands, London’s militia, fired upon them and drove them off, killing three.49 There were other, more isolated incidents, too, as ‘insolencies and misdemeanours’ were reported on a naval ship in July 1641, probably over a lack of ready money to pay the sailors.50 In the charged days of the winter of 1641–42 seamen and watermen ‘came by water before Whitehall’ in barges, at the same time as large crowds of apprentices gathered outside Westminster, demanding political and religious reform.51 These tensions reached fever pitch when news came to England of the rebellion that erupted in Ireland during October 1641.

On the impact of popular belief in ‘popish plots’, see Keith J. Lindley, ‘The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641–5’, Irish Historical Studies, 18 (1972), pp. 143–76; Robert von Friedeburg, ‘The Continental Counter-Reformation and the Plausibility of the Popish Plots, 1638–1642’, in Charles W. A. Prior and Glenn Burgess, eds, England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited (Farnham, 2011), pp. 49–73. 46 Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 291–5, 350–4; Adamson, Noble Revolt, pp. 278–91, 332–8. 47 Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 424–9; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 169–71. 48 On May Day see Keith J. Lindley, ‘Riot Prevention and Control in Early Stuart London’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 33 (1983), pp. 109–26. 49 Quoting CJ, ii, p. 143; see also LJ, iv, pp. 244–5; BL Harl. MS 164, fos 207v, 209r; Harl. MS 6,424, fo. 65v. Lindley, Popular Politics and Religion, p. 25, describes these as ‘bawdy houses’, but there is no mention of this in the parliamentary journals or diaries. 50 TNA SP 16/482, fo. 21r. 51 John Bramston, The Autobiography of Sir John Bramston, K.B., ed. Thomas William Bramston (1845), p. 82; cited in Cressy, England on Edge, p. 386. 45

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Rebellion in Ireland, October 1641–February 1642 The king’s inability to subdue his troublesome Scottish subjects helped to provide the impetus for rebellion in Ireland. A small group of disaffected Ulster gentry and landowners planned a limited uprising, aimed at seizing key strategic fortifications in the province, and Dublin Castle, and from this hoped to negotiate ‘a resolution of their grievances from a position of strength’.52 In many respects they sought to emulate the way the Scots had dealt with Charles. Sir Phelim O’Neill, the leader of the Ulster rebels, explained his intentions by stating that ‘they would obtaine the secureing of theire Religion & Estates in as ample manner as the Scotts had obtained theires in Scotland’.53 However, the outbreak of rebellion in Ulster in October caught the government in Dublin and London by surprise. The Irish rebels quickly, and ­bloodily, seized control of much of the country, including a number of major ports such as Wexford, Waterford, and New Ross. Other important coastal towns and fortifications, including Drogheda, the fort at Duncannon, Limerick, and Galway, were besieged, or came under pressure to join the rebellion. The insurgents, however, lacked the military capabilities to capture a number of key harbours, including Dublin, the Munster towns of Cork, Youghal, and Kinsale, and the Ulster towns of Carrickfergus, Belfast, Londonderry, and Coleraine.54 Refugees fleeing the rebellion brought news of its spread, and the atrocities they had witnessed or heard about on land and at sea. John Archer, a Wexford man who lost his home and goods in the rebellion, was ‘credibly informed’ of an atrocity, in which sixty Protestants fleeing on a ship from Wexford to England were wilfully cast away by the Irish owners or seamen for their wealthes sake & as the said passengers did swimm to shoare they were thrust back into the sea again & drownd by the saylers & rebells on shore none escapeing but the sea faring men & one papist woman.55

The initial government response in London to news of the rebellion was to promise prompt military and naval action, and in mid-November 1641 four ships were selected to guard the seas around Ireland: the Bonaventure, the Happy Entrance, the Leopard, and the Providence.56 However, it took time to set out these vessels, and none arrived on the Irish coast until 1642. Canny, Making Ireland British, p. 469. TCD MS 836, fo. 83r. 54 For the outbreak and spread of the 1641 rising, see Clarke, Old English, pp. 153–70; Canny, Making Ireland British, pp. 469–72; M. Perceval-Maxwell, The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641 (Montreal, 1994), pp. 192–212; Aidan Clarke, ‘The “1641 Massacres”’, in Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds, Ireland 1641: Contexts and Reactions (Manchester, 2013), pp. 37–51. 55 TCD MS 818, fo. 42v. 56 Thomas Carte, The Life of James, Duke of Ormond (2nd edn, Oxford, 1851), ii, p. 168. 52 53

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Like their counterparts in Scotland, the Irish rebels sought to acquire military supplies from the continent, and encouraged Irish soldiers serving in European armies to return home. In January 1642 the lord justices in Dublin wrote to the earl of Northumberland, who had been lord high admiral since 1636, to warn of the likelihood that the rebels were receiving arms from abroad. They reiterated this warning in February, and suggested deploying men-of-war at Wexford, Waterford, and Kinsale, and between Galway and Killybegs. Reports from English officials and sailors on the continent also highlighted this threat.57 For example, around Christmas 1641 Englishmen residing in Nantes described having seen Irish gentlemen there purchasing muskets, pikes, swords, and bandoliers.58 As in the previous years of war against the Scots, the government ordered the stay of any vessels in English or Welsh harbours suspected of going, or belonging, to ports under rebel control. In January 1642 contrary winds forced the Unity of Cork, on a voyage from St Malo to Cork, into Salcombe in Devon. There the crew and passengers, Irish officers returning from service in the French army, found themselves imprisoned by the town’s officials. The Elizabeth of Limerick was detained at Falmouth in a similar manner, on a voyage from Dunkirk to Limerick. The owners of some ships, including the Elizabeth, managed to get their property restored if their vessel set sail on its intended voyage before the Irish uprising began.59 Faced with a crisis that rapidly engulfed the country, the English administration in Dublin took a proactive approach to the military and naval situation. Protestant refugees arriving in the city formed the core of the first military forces recruited to fight the rebels. These men bolstered Dublin’s defences and those of beleaguered nearby towns. John Crosse, for example, who escaped from Fermanagh with his wife after being robbed and stripped by the rebels there, enlisted and marched to join the garrison at Drogheda.60 As well as raising soldiers, the lord justices set out shipping to guard the coast and relieve coastal towns. They brought the royal frigate the Swan, commanded by Captain John Bartlett, into service and hired two pinnaces, the Confidence and the Phoenix, along with six other small unnamed vessels.61 By the start of 1642 the siege of Drogheda was the most immediate military concern for the government in Dublin. Ulster rebels, led by Sir Phelim O’Neill, maintained a loose blockade of the town which prevented overland aid getting through. In November the Ulstermen defeated a relief army at Julianstown, and this left the sea as the only way to get supplies into Drogheda to enable it to hold out. Military inexperience told against the rebels as the boom they constructed proved to be ineffective at keeping out seaborne relief: on 12 January 1642 Captain HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Duke of Ormonde, ns (London, 1902–20), ii, pp. 58–9, 68–9; CSPD, 1641–3, pp. 236, 245. 58 TNA HCA 13/58, fos 86r–87r. 59 TNA HCA 13/248, fos 1v–2r, 4r–5v; TNA HCA 13/248, fos 20r–21r; TNA HCA 13/246, examination of David Kelly, 10 June 1644. 60 TCD MS 835, fo. 98r. 61 HMC, Ormonde, ii, pp. 58–9, 68–9. 57

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Bartlett and Captain Stutfield got through with their ships, bringing victuals to the town.62 The rebels learned from these initial failures and strengthened the boom by adding ship masts and a strong chain, as well as acquiring two cannon from a merchantman, which they placed to fire on ships in the channel. Despite such efforts, further seaborne relief got through to Drogheda as the boom was dislodged by a storm and the artillery was ineffective at preventing ships from sailing up to the town.63 The inability of the Ulstermen to prevent seaborne supplies reaching Drogheda eventually led to the siege petering out in March, but the Dublin-based naval force paid a considerable price for these successes. The Phoenix was sunk off the coast of Wales, and some of the shallops employed to bring supplies to Drogheda became unserviceable because of damage that they sustained during the siege.64 Supporting besieged garrisons became an important function for naval forces in the civil wars, and, as one of the first major sieges of the conflict, Drogheda demonstrated some of the potential advantages and dangers that ships faced when operating in this role.

Turmoil in England, January–June 1642 The Irish rebellion was reported throughout England in a multitude of voyeuristic pamphlets as a wholesale slaughter of Protestants, and seemed to confirm the fears of those who saw Charles’s policies as linked to Catholic plots against England. Throughout the winter of 1641–42 political tensions mounted until, in a desperate response to the actions of his opponents in parliament, Charles came to Westminster on 4 January 1642, accompanied by soldiers, to arrest the radical leaders (known during and after this incident as the Five Members). He found them forewarned and in hiding, and was forced to withdraw. In the face of resulting riots, and afraid for the safety of his family, Charles left London on 10 January, and on the following day those whom the king had sought to arrest returned to parliament in triumph.65 During this crisis, seafarers in London expressed their political and religious anxieties through a series of petitions and pamphlets.66 One petition, submitted to the Commons by ‘the marriners and sea-men’ of London on 8 January, Carte, Ormond, ii, pp. 165–6; TCD MS 840, fos 7r–7v. Carte, Ormond, ii, 168–9; Brian Smith, The Victorious Proceedings of the Protestants in Ireland; from the Beginning of March to this Present (1642), p. 1; Pádraig Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War, 1641–49 (Cork, 2001), p. 171. 64 HMC, Ormonde, ii, pp. 68–9, 77–8. 65 Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, pp. 446–53; Adamson, Noble Revolt, ch. 16; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 177–81. 66 Discussed more fully in Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 251–74. On the political culture of petitioning during these years, see David Zaret, ‘Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution’, American Journal of Sociology, 101 (1996), pp. 1497–555; Valerie Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625–43 (Oxford, 1961), pp. 228–35; John Walter, ‘Confessional Politics in Pre-Civil War Essex: Prayer Books, Profanations, and Petitions’, HJ, 44 (2001), pp. 677–701. 62 63

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bemoaned ‘the decay of Trade, and lying still of Ships’, and blamed ‘the Popish Lords and Bishops in the House of Peeres … [and] the destructive plots of the Papists and their adherents’. The petitioners requested that ‘those abominable and bloudy Rebels in Ireland’ should be defeated.67 When, three days later, the Five Members returned to Westminster, some 2,000 sailors accompanied them in the procession, and their participation was explained in the anonymous The Seamans Protestation Concerning their Ebbing and Flowing to … Westminster.68 The pamphlet maintained that the sailors had not been summoned, but came ‘of our own free voluntarie disposition … as well to protect White-hall, had his Majestie been there, as the Parliament house’ (perhaps offering a snide criticism of Charles’s decision to leave the capital).69 This publication, too, blamed ‘Papists’ as the enemy, and concluded with an oath supposedly sworn by the mariners, closely modelled on parliament’s Protestation oath.70 On 26 January, another petition was submitted to the House of Lords ‘by young Men, Apprentices and Seamen’, again complaining that ‘Trading is extraordinarily decayed’ due to ‘that abominable Rebellion of the bloody Papists’ in Ireland. The petitioners requested that ‘the Kingdome at home may be speedily put into such a posture of Warre and defence, as may enable them against all forreigne Invasion, and domestique plots, and conspiracies of Papists, and their adherents’.71 Just twelve days earlier the Commons had themselves appointed a committee to consider ‘putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence’, and the earl of Warwick introduced the petition to the Lords, so there may well have been cooperation between the petitioners and the parliamentarian leadership.72 Similarly, an anonymous Generall Remonstrance or Declaration of the Sea-Men, dated 31 January, requested letters of marque in order to seize Irish shipping.73 By August 1642, the Commons’ journal records that ‘Mariners upon the River Thames’ were lending money ‘for the Affairs of Ireland’.74 This evidence suggests a serious degree of mobilisation amongst sectors of the London maritime Anon., To the Honourable, the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the Commons, now Assembled in Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Marriners and Sea-Men, Inhabitants in, and about the Ports of London, and the River of Thames (1642); cf. Diurnall Occurrences in Parliament (2–10 January 1641[/2]), p. 5. 68 Anon., The Seamans Protestation Concerning their Ebbing and Flowing to and from the Parliament House at Westminster: Upon Tuesday the 11 Day of January, 1642 (London and Edinburgh, 1642); CJ, ii, p. 370; TNA SP 16/488, fo. 88r; CPSD 1641–3, p. 252. This is discussed in Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 268–9. 69 Anon., The Seamans Protestation, sig. A2r. 70 Ibid., sig. A2v–3v; John Walter, Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution (Cambridge, 1999), p. 317. On the Protestation oath, see below, p. 48. 71 Anon., To the Right Honourable the House of Lords now Assembled in Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Young Men, Apprentices and Sea-Men, in and about the Citie of London (1642); LJ, iv, pp. 544, 549. 72 CJ, ii, p. 379; LJ, iv, p. 544. 73 Anon., The Generall Remonstrance or Declaration of the Sea-Men, which Inhabit in London and Thereabouts (1641[/2]). 74 CJ, ii, p. 709. 67

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community in support of the parliamentarian programme, with a particular consensus around the need for action in Ireland. These anxieties in London were probably exacerbated by local problems in Stepney, home to many seafarers and a deeply divided parish. During January 1642 some of the parishioners complained to parliament about the menacing behaviour of Richard Cray, a constable of Stepney and newly appointed warder of the Tower, while the vicar William Stampe was also a controversial figure because of his Laudian leanings.75 These petitioners also requested permission to put themselves into ‘a Posture of defence’, and the organisers were probably linked to, or even the same people as, those who prepared the sailors’ petitions.76 In February and March 1642, parliament’s supporters administered the Protestation oath in Stepney, with 1,688 men swearing it and only 66 refusing it, while a further 510 were ‘at sea’.77 This oath had first been proposed by parliament in May 1641, was subscribed widely throughout London, and was increasingly a tool for parliamentarian mobilisation, especially when its ‘relatively anodyne phrases … gathered extra valency in the crisis of 1642’.78 The Protestation was therefore part of the propaganda contest between the king and his opponents in parliament which took place across the spring and summer as they began to raise forces, still ostensibly for service in Ireland. Parliament passed the Militia Ordinance in March, claiming the power to appoint commanders over local defence forces. The king, for his part, issued ‘commissions of array’ to individual nobles and gentlemen, commanding them to raise troops on his behalf. All across the country, this contest was played out in local situations as people were made to obey one of the two competing authorities, although many sought to satisfy both for as long as they could.79 Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 269–71. Anon., To the Honourable the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses of the House of Commons in Parliament Assembled. The Humble Petition of the Inhabitants, of the Parishes of Stepney, Shoreditch, VVhitechappell, and Algate, the Chappelry of Wapping, the Precinct of St Katherins, and the Parish of St Peter Advincula, Adjacent to the Tower, and without the Liberties of London (1642). Its topical reference to ‘Mr. Pym, and the other foure’, i.e. the ‘Five Members’, suggests publication in January. This petition was printed by a radical printer connected with the parliamentarian leadership: see Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, p. 270. 77 PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/99, fos 208r–219r, 238r–244r, 249r–260r. 78 Quoting David Cressy, ‘The Protestation Protested, 1641 and 1642’, HJ, 45 (2002), pp.  251–79, at p. 268; Walter, Understanding Popular Violence, pp. 292–6; Edward Vallance, ‘Preaching to the Converted: Religious Justifications for the English Civil War’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 65 (2002), pp. 395–416, at pp. 402–3; Edward Vallance, Revolutionary England and The National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism and the Political Nation, 1533–1682 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 512–13; Michael J. Braddick, ‘Prayer Book and Protestation: Anti-Popery, Anti-Puritanism and the Outbreak of the English Civil War’, in Prior and Burgess, eds, England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited, pp. 125–45. 79 Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, chs 12–13; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, chs 6–7. 75 76

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Plate 4. Studio of Daniel Mytens the Elder, Robert Rich, 1587–1658, Second Earl of Warwick, c. 1632 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

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One of the first serious confrontations occurred over the navy, which after all was one of the country’s major military institutions. Northumberland was a moderate and elderly peer, but on 15 March 1642, by order of parliament, he appointed the earl of Warwick as his deputy (disregarding Charles’s nominee, Sir John Pennington).80 Warwick was one of the leaders of parliamentary opposition to the king, and also had close links to the mercantile and maritime community, having previously financed and commanded privateering expeditions against Spain, as well as investing in the Providence Island colony alongside other leading puritan figures.81 He was apparently very popular among the sailors, which, considering the petitions submitted in January 1642 and the religious disputes in Stepney, may have been related to his religious credentials as well as his maritime experience. By March, Warwick was in de facto command at sea, which must have disturbed Charles – and with good reason. In April, when the king attempted to seize the armoury at Hull, he was refused entry to the city, and soon afterwards parliament ordered Warwick to send two ships to transport the magazine to London: on 23 May, ‘understanding that there is a Design of surprising and taking the Ships that are laded at Hull’, Warwick set sail to see the convoy safely to the capital.82 At the end of June, the king wrote to Northumberland discharging him from his post as lord admiral, but this was – according to the memoirs of the royalist Edward Hyde, later earl of Clarendon – a calculated move to undermine Warwick, and was prompted by a ship under Warwick’s command almost seizing a vessel carrying ammunition to the king.83 Charles also wrote to Warwick to tell him that his appointment was rendered void by Northumberland’s dismissal, and letters were sent to the dockyards at Chatham and the fleet in the Downs, ordering them to obey Pennington.84 Parliament did not give in, however. Northumberland presented his letter from the king to the House of Lords on 1 July, and later that day both Houses confirmed the earl of Warwick to ‘command in chief the Ships of the Fleet now at Sea’.85 Pennington, meanwhile, travelled to the Downs carrying the letters from the king, and arrived on 2 July, but instead of going out to the fleet himself he sent Sir Henry Palmer, a retired naval officer.86 Alerted to LJ, iv, p. 645; CJ, ii, pp. 474, 478. See Chapter 1, p. 20; a detailed account of Warwick’s role in 1640–2 is given in Adamson, Noble Revolt. 82 LJ, v, pp. 20–1, 70–2, 80, 85, 91. 83 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 1641, ed. W. Dunn Macray (6 vols, Oxford, 1888, reprinted 1992), ii, pp. 209–16. 84 LJ, iv, pp. 665, 695, 676, 697; LJ, v, pp. 178–80, 223; CJ, ii, pp. 495, 499–500, 509–10; Parliament, A Message from both Hovses of Parliament … that the Earle of Warwick Might Command this Summers Fleet (1642); A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 11 (21–28 March 1642), pp. 6–7. On Pennington, see Andrew Thrush, ‘Pennington, Sir John (bap. 1584?, d. 1646)’, ODNB. 85 LJ, v, pp. 169, 174; CJ, ii, pp. 647, 650. 86 On Palmer, see Roy McCaughey, ‘Palmer, Sir Henry (bap. 1582, d. 1644)’, ODNB. 80 81

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this danger, Warwick called a council of war at which seventeen captains and masters pledged their support for him and for parliament. Five captains – all active in the navy during the 1630s – wrote to Warwick explaining that they could not disobey the king.87 One subsequently submitted to Warwick, who surrounded the four other ships and ‘sent to them by Boat’, ordering them to surrender, which two did. According to Warwick’s account, the response of the last two captains was ‘so peremptory’ and ‘my Masters and sailors grew so impatient on them’ that, despite being unarmed, they boarded and seized both ships.88 These five captains were promptly declared ‘delinquents’, and on 7 July parliament ordered all ‘Ships that are in the Service of the State’ to obey Warwick.89 The actions of the fleet’s sailors in supporting Warwick have been described as materially orientated and opportunistic, expecting better treatment from parliament than they had received from the king.90 This, however, underestimates the political engagement of ‘common seamen’.91 We have already seen how some seafarers and their families in London were vocal supporters of both parliament and the king even at the earliest stages of political conflict, and the same was true in the fleet. Thomas Cooke, a boatswain from Chatham, was accused of saying on 25 April 1641, that King Charles was a Tyrant in demanding ship-monies, & that in England kings had beene deposed and murdered for lesse matters alleadging further, for iustifing of his speeches, the deposing of King Richard the second of England, & Jehu’s killing of Jehoram, & the Netherlanders falling off from the king of Spaine.

This is a remarkable statement, combining criticism of controversial royal policies with historical, biblical, and contemporary European examples of rebellion. The corporal of the Garland, William Toomes, was likewise charged with saying, in the captain’s cabin on 20 August 1641, that ‘the Spanish & French kings were forbidden by the Pope to aide the Scotts, because now there were great hopes that king Charles would prove a Romane Catholicke’. For the earlier careers of these officers, see Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, pp. 181–98. These events are described in Warwick’s letters in LJ, v, pp. 178–80, 185, which were published in Robert Rich, earl of Warwick, A Letter Sent from the Right Honorable Robert Earle of Warwik [sic] (1642), printed in two separate editions; Parliament, Another Declaration of the Lords and Commons … and a Letter from the Earle of Warwick (1642), sig. A1v; and Robert Rich, earl of Warwick, The Earl of VVarwicks Letter from Aboard his Majesties Ship, Called the James (1642); another, shorter, parliamentarian account was published in Anon., The Kings Majesties Resolvtion Concerning, Robert Earl of Warwicke (1642). 89 LJ, v, pp. 188–90, 195, 218–19; CJ, ii, pp. 654, 657. 90 Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 240–1; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 19–22; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, pp. 184–6; Stephen J. Greenberg, ‘Seizing the Fleet in 1642: Parliament, the Navy, and the Printing Press’, MM, 77 (1991), pp. 227–34. 91 This argument is developed more fully in Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’. 87

88

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Both had apparently stated, aboard a different ship on 15 June, that the king ought to settle peace with the Scots, because a number of counties ‘would withstand pressing of souldiers’. Their accusers, three surgeons and a clerk from Rochester, claimed that The continual discourse of theise two men [is] … even publickly, before common  seamen, still censuring what is done by his Majestie & the State; & speaking most athistically against Bishops, & all church-men, & church-­ discipline, & Ecclesiasticall Courts … [when one of them] heares of any thing disastrous to the king or state … he relates it againe in a gesture of reioycing.92

The surgeons also complained that they ‘have been threatened to be throwne over-board, least they call theise … in question & have beene discourteously used by the Captain, for this very cause, & … Cooke would still boldly say, that the Captain would beare him out in all things’.93 Both Captain Fogge and the gunner of the Garland were accused of attempting to keep the ­accusers quiet ‘by promises & threatninges’, stating that Cooke and Toomes ‘had spoken noething but what became honest men to speak’.94 Also intriguing is the m ­ ention of ‘those pamphletts scattered abroad against the king by the Scots, & printed beyond sea’, the contents of which Toomes endorsed, ‘adding thereuntoe  that the Scotts rebelled, because the king intended to bring in Arminianisme & Popery amongst them’. 95 Toomes, Cooke, and the gunner all claimed they ‘never thought or said such thinge or thinges’, though that is not a surprising response to a treason charge.96 This is certainly not evidence of unanimous parliamentarian sympathies in the fleet – especially because, during the summer of 1641 when these statements were supposedly made, no unified ‘parliamentarian’ position had emerged even within parliament. Equally, we cannot draw a straightforward line from these accusations to the events of July 1642, because there is no later evidence of such outspoken debate. Even so, this evidence accords with the examples of petitioning and other popular politics in London, suggesting that some in the fleet and the wider maritime community were deeply committed to specific political and religious viewpoints on the extreme ends of a spectrum of public opinion that, under the pressure of events first in Scotland, then Ireland, and finally in England, was coalescing into two opposing sides. This perspective helps to explain the actions of the naval seamen in supporting Warwick; both Warwick and Robert Coytmore, who was Warwick’s secretary and also present in the Downs in July 1642, placed great emphasis on the active involvement of the sailors, although they did so with an obvious polemical purpose.97 The TNA HCA 1/7, fos 25r–25v; see also the depositions in HCA 1/50, fos 92r–98v. TNA HCA 1/7, fo. 25v. 94 TNA HCA 1/50, fo. 96v. 95 TNA HCA 1/7, fo. 25v. 96 Quoting TNA HCA 1/50, fo. 93v; cf. fos 92r–93v, 97v–98v. 97 See the sources cited in n. 88 above, and the letter from Robert Coytmore printed in The Earl of VVarwicks Letter, pp. 5–7. 92 93

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decision of these sailors to support Warwick secured the control of most of the royal fleet for parliament, even before the civil war in England had begun in earnest.

War in Ireland, March–September 1642 While tensions flared into confrontation in England, this long-drawn-out political wrangling between king and parliament impacted on the English naval response to the crisis in Ireland. The selection of Sir Henry Stradling, a well-known royalist supporter, to command the Bonaventure, one of the ships allocated to the Irish guard, proved to be contentious. His appointment was only approved by nine votes in parliament, and may have been successful only because he had already sailed for Ireland.98 Instead of the four ships promised in November 1641, only two men-of-war, the Bonaventure and the Swallow commanded by Captain Thomas Kettleby, arrived on the Irish coast in the spring of 1642.99 As well as these two warships, parliament approved the selection of eight armed merchantmen to strengthen the Irish guard.100 Stradling and Kettleby based their vessels in the Munster port of Kinsale, and their presence helped to ensure that the town did not join the rebellion. Brian Smith, a minister on the Bonaventure, warned that the Irish rebels ‘expected to surprize every houre, if the Kings Ships (which keepe them in awe) leave them in harbour’.101 The hired merchant ships began to arrive on the Irish coast from late February onwards, and also quickly made their presence felt by supporting besieged Protestant garrisons and intercepting ships sailing to rebel ports. Captain Powell, in the Fellowship of Bristol, arrived at Duncannon fort in early March 1642, which was commanded by Laurence, Lord Esmond, and besieged by up to 1,000 rebels.102 Powell tried to alleviate pressure on the garrison by attacking nearby rebel-held positions; he used his ordnance to batter Ballyhack castle, and burned the town.103 The Fellowship also seized a number of prizes including the John of Le Croisic, laden with wheat, and the Francis of Rotterdam, which was carrying arms to Limerick.104 As the insurgency moved south, attacks began on Protestants in Limerick Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, p. 181. HMC, Ormonde, ii, pp. 58–9; CSPI, 1633–47, p. 357. 100 Anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall, and Merchant Ships (1642), p. 1. The eight merchant ships were listed as the Discovery, Ruth, Employment, Peter, Pennington, Fellowship, Mary, and John. 101 Smith, The Victorious Proceedings of the Protestants in Ireland, p. 4. 102 Lazarus Haward, A Continuation of the Diurnal Occurrences and Proceedings of the English Arms against the Rebels in Ireland from the First of Aprill (1642), p. 1; Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War, p. 178. 103 Thomas Aston, Newes from the West of Ireland Relating what Hapned to Captain Weldon and Captain Aston after their Passage from Bristol to the Fort of Duncannon (1642), pp. 5–6; David Edwards, ed., ‘The Ship’s Journal of Captain Thomas Powell, 1642’, Analecta Hibernica, 37 (1998), p. 260. 104 TNA, HCA 30/854, fos 263r–264v; Edwards, ‘Ship’s Journal’, pp. 262–6. 98 99

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city in late 1641. The weakness of the forces at the disposal of Captain George Courtney, constable of King John’s Castle in the city, emboldened the more rebellious citizens. By February 1642 most of the local Protestant community, between 600 and 800, had fled to the castle for protection.105 The situation came to a head in the middle of May, after the rebel Munster army failed to capture Cork city. Led by Colonel Garret Barry, a veteran of the Spanish army in Flanders and an expert in siege warfare, the Irish moved on to Limerick and were admitted to the city, where they began to besiege the castle. With only 300 able-bodied men, arms for only 200, and a limited supply of powder and provisions, the defenders needed external assistance in order to hold out.106 Unlike at Drogheda, attempts to get relief through to the garrison by sea were spectacularly unsuccessful. A combination of poor weather, difficult operating conditions on a tidal river, effective Irish defences, and naval incompetence or cowardice meant no aid reached the castle.107 One officer witnessing the inaction of Captain Constable in the Ruth described how ‘Constable never fired a shot against Limerick & was deservedly beaten and proved a coward’.108 As supplies ran out and Barry’s men undermined the castle walls, the defenders surrendered on 23 June 1642, and boarded ships to go to England.109 The soldiers stationed in St Augustine’s fort, outside Galway, also found themselves facing a hostile local populace in 1642. Relations broke down in March after a ship arrived from France with arms for the town. Captain Willoughby, the governor of the fort, attempted unsuccessfully to seize the ship: this enraged the citizens of Galway, who erected artillery batteries against the fort.110 The Irish cannon failed to prevent the Employment from bringing supplies to Willoughby in April.111 Ulick Burke, the earl of Clanricarde, a prominent local noble, then brokered an uneasy peace between the fort and town that lasted into the summer.112 Defeating the Irish rebels required a major investment of manpower and resources, and, in London, parliament turned to private enterprise to meet some of these costs. In March 1642 parliament passed ‘An act for the speedy and effectual reducing of the rebels in his Majesty’s Kingdom of Ireland’ (generally referred to as the Adventurers’ Act), which allowed parliamentary supporters BL Sloane MS 1008, fos 123v–124. BL Sloane MS 1008, fos 123v–124v; M. J. M’Enery, ‘A Diary of the Siege of Limerick Castle, 1642’, Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquities in Ireland, 34 (1904), pp. 163–87; anon., Good and Bad Newes from Ireland (1642), pp. 1–2; TCD MS 840, fos 91r–93v. 107 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 21–5. 108 CSPI, 1647–60, pp. 260–1. 109 BL Sloane MS 1008, fos 129r–129v. 110 J. T. Gilbert, ed., History of the Irish Confederation and War in Ireland, 1641–53 (Dublin, 1882), i, pp. 97–103; TCD MS 830, fos 146r–147v, 197r–198v, 209–210v. 111 HMC, Ormonde, ii, p. 113. 112 James Hardiman, The History of the Town and County of the Town of Galway from the  Earliest  Period to the Present Time (repr. Galway, 1975), pp. 113–15; James Hogan, ed.,  Letters and Papers Relating to the Irish Rebellion between 1642–46 (Dublin, 1936), pp. 103–4. 105 106

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to contribute money towards raising an army to re-conquer Ireland. The investment would be repaid in confiscated land. In mid-April a group of London merchants proposed a similar scheme to set out between five and seven ships and 500 soldiers, to ‘further the conquest of Ireland, and the relief of their brethren there’; in return for their investment they also sought confiscated Irish land. On 30 April 1642 the Commons approved the scheme to raise £40,000 for this ‘Sea Adventure’.113 Roughly 180 subscribers contributed just over £43,400.114 This paid for a fleet of eighteen ships, which set sail for Ireland on 29 June 1642.115 Alexander, Lord Forbes commanded the soldiers and Captain Benjamin Peters in the Speedwell acted as admiral for the squadron.116 From the outset a lack of clear objectives hampered the ‘Sea Adventure’. After putting to sea with no planned destination, the ships delayed at the Lizard while the commanders decided on a course of action. They eventually decided to sail for Munster and the bulk of the fleet arrived at Kinsale on 11 July.117 There Forbes landed a mixed party of soldiers and sailors, and marched to relieve Bandonbridge, while the ships put to sea in search of prizes. By using false colours, Captain Clark in the Pennington captured a number of rebels at Baltimore. However, the ‘Sea Adventure’ did not stay long in Munster: after returning from Bandonbridge, Forbes re-boarded his men onto their ships and left Kinsale on 24 July.118 The expedition did little to bolster the military or naval position of the Protestants in Cork, and Lord Inchiquin, the military commander of Munster, complained to parliament about the waste of supplies and lack of concerted action which occurred during the short time Lord Forbes had spent in the province.119 After departing from Kinsale, a council of war decided that the ‘Sea Adventure’ should go to assist the soldiers at St Augustine’s fort in Galway. On 9 August 1642 the fleet anchored in Galway bay. Forbes landed part of his force and artillery against the town, but failed to persuade Clanricarde to assist him.120 Unsuccessful in the siege, the Sea Adventurers’ ships sailed from Galway on 3 September. Some of the ships stayed on the west coast for a few weeks

HMC, Fifth Report: Appendix (1878), p. 18; LJ, v, pp. 3–5; CJ, ii, pp. 549–52; Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (Princeton, 1993), pp. 402–3. 114 Karl Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land: The ‘Adventurers’ in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland (Oxford, 1971); John Prendergast, The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland (2nd edn, Dublin, 1875), pp. 443–8. 115 LJ, v, pp. 144–5; Hugh Peters, A True Relation of the Passages of Gods Providence in a Voyage for Ireland (1642), p. 4. 116 Peters, A True Relation, p. 4. 117 Peters, A True Relation, pp. 3–4; G. Goring, A Relation of the Sundry Occurrences in Ireland from the Fleet of Ships Set Out by the Adventurers of the Additionall Forces by Sea (1642), p. 1. 118 Goring, A Relation, pp. 1–2; I. P., The Truest Intelligence from the Province of Munster in the Kingdome of Ireland (1642), pp. 2–4. 119 Bodl. Carte MS 4, fos 415r–415v. 120 Gilbert, Irish Confederation, i, pp. 140–2; Peters, A True Relation, p. 11; Hogan, Letters and Papers, pp. 103–10. 113

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raiding Irish-held castles along the Shannon.121 Most of the ships returned to England, but nine of the larger ships remained at sea as part of the navy’s winter guard.122 On balance, the ‘Sea Adventure’ achieved little of significance. Aside from the capture of a number of prize ships, the actions of Lord Forbes did little to improve, and may have actually worsened, the military situation in Munster and Connacht.123 As the rebellion continued, the Irish leaders found they needed to develop a naval strategy to counteract English sea power. Like the Scots in 1639, who intended to fit out privateers in Flushing, the Irish also looked to the continent for warships and mariners. Irish clerics based in Europe were heavily involved in shipping munitions and weapons to Ireland in the first months of 1642.124 By April some of these priests moved on to recruiting men with experience in Dunkirk frigates to go to Ireland. Father Hugh Bourke found one captain whom he described as ‘a very bold seaman and dexterous and adventurous: with such a frigate and mariners of our nation, such as there are, very good in Dunkerque, he might do great service’.125 Father Mathew O’Hartegan, in Paris, tried to persuade John O’Daniel, an experienced Limerick seaman and captain, to return home and join the rebels.126 The work of these clerics began to bear fruit in the summer, as the ships and sailors they recruited started to arrive in Ireland. The political and military organisation of the rebels into the confederate Catholic association in the summer helped their cause. The new confederate government could issue letters of marque to license any ships that came to their aid. In July 1642 two frigates from Dunkirk, the St Francis and the St Peter, landed a party of Irish veterans from the Spanish army in Flanders at Doe Castle in County Donegal, led by Owen Roe O’Neill.127 After landing the soldiers, the ships sailed south to base themselves at Wexford. On the voyage they captured eight English and Scottish vessels and Irish sources noted ‘it is incredible how much terror and ruin have been spread by the two frigates that bore Don Eugenio, for the English quake for dread of them’.128 Confederate naval developments in the seas around Ireland came at the worst moment for the English navy. As relations broke down between the king and the parliament, Stradling and Kettleby remained loyal to Charles I. In June, having lost control of the main royal fleet, the king tried to take advantage of this loyalty when he ordered Stradling to sail Hogan, Letters and Papers, p. 110; Hardiman, Galway, pp. 116–18; Owen Cox, The Latest and Truest Intelligence from Ireland (1642), p. 3; Peters, A True Relation, pp. 12–21. 122 LJ, v, p. 408; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 197. 123 Peters, A True Relation, p. 21; Tristram Whetcombe, A Most Exact Relation of a Great Victory Obtained by the Poor Protestants in Ireland (1642), p. 10; Cox, The Latest and Truest Intelligence, p. 5; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 197. 124 HMC, Report on the Franciscan Manuscripts Preserved at the Convent, Merchants Quay, Dublin (Dublin, 1906), p. 132. 125 Ibid., p. 132. 126 Ibid., pp. 183–4. 127 Ohlmeyer, ‘The Dunkirk of Ireland’, p. 39; HMC, Franciscan Manuscripts, p. 202. 128 HMC, Franciscan Manuscripts, pp. 186, 202, 208. 121

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for Scotland.129 It was reported in London during August that the two captains had ‘lately deserted [their] Charge’, but the Bonaventure and Swallow remained on the Irish coast through the summer until September, when they sailed to join the king’s forces at Newcastle.130 This conflict between royalists and parliamentarians hamstrung the navy during the late summer and autumn of 1642, effectively leaving the Irish coast largely unguarded by English warships, at a time when further ships came from Europe to serve as confederate privateers. In September the lord justices warned that the confederates possessed at least one strong frigate at Wexford, and they believed another seven or eight operated out of that port. Tristram Whetcombe, the mayor of Kinsale, wrote in the same month that five or six men-of-war, one with 18 guns, sailed from Wexford.131

Conclusion By the autumn of 1642 the overall shape of how the civil wars would play out at sea over the next ten years had become clear, although the outcome was by no means predetermined. Private enterprise had already become an important component of the naval strategy for each of the major antagonists, and as most of the royal navy’s fleet had sided with parliament, it was also likely that largescale set-piece battles between fleets of warships were not going to be a feature of this war. Instead, the fighting at sea would largely mean commerce raiding: efforts to seize enemy shipping, especially merchantmen, became the hallmark of engagements that took place at sea. However, the opening years of the war also demonstrated that fighting at sea was not the only, or the most important, function of a naval force. Navies could also play a major role in military campaigning, and seaborne support could mean the difference between a coastal garrison holding out or surrendering when besieged. In the early stages of the war this was demonstrated in Ireland at places like Drogheda and Limerick, and it would soon become apparent in England. If control of the navy looked to be a major advantage for parliament, the gathering of forces by confederates, and the support for the king amongst some naval captains and sailors, showed that parliament’s victory, at sea or on land, was far from certain.

Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 12. CJ, ii, pp. 24–31; LJ, v, p. 299; LJ, vii, p. 284; An Exact and Trve Divrnall (22–29 August 1642), p. 1; A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament, 13 (5–12 September 1642), sig. O1v; A Paerfect [sic] Diurnall of the Proceedigns [sic] in Parliament (5–12 September 1642), pp. 1, 5; England’s Memorable Accidents (12–19 September 1642), p. 11; A Continvation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from both Houses of Parliament, 8 (16–21 September 1642), p. 3. 131 Hogan, Letters and Papers, pp. 140–1; Whetcombe, A Most Exact Relation, p. 3. 129 130

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3 The War at Sea, 1642–1646

As they had in the first four years of conflict, private naval enterprise and siege operations came to characterise naval warfare between 1642 and 1646. Just as on land, the conflict at sea was largely regionalised, with the fortunes of each side ebbing and flowing as the war progressed. Each of the combatants made extensive use of ships with letters of marque and hired merchantmen to aid their cause at sea: even parliament, with their control of the navy, still relied on large numbers of privately owned vessels each year to bolster their maritime forces.1 Siege warfare, rather than large set-piece battles, dominated much of the military campaigning each year. Writing in the 1670s, but drawing heavily on his experiences during the 1640s, Roger Boyle, the earl of Orrery, wrote that ‘we make war more like foxes than lions and you will have twenty sieges for every battle’.2 Most of the key sieges that took place in these four years occurred along the coast, and the support that garrisons received by sea, or the prevention of seaborne relief from getting through, often determined the fate of beleaguered coastal outposts. In order to assess the conduct and wider significance of the war at sea between 1642 and 1646, this chapter will focus on the activities of privateers and the naval dimension of the key sieges that took place in this period.

Opening moves, September 1642–September 1643 The navy proved its worth and loyalty to parliament in the early months of fighting, by helping to ensure that key coastal outposts did not fall under royalist control. Important ports such as Bristol, Milford Haven, and Plymouth supported parliament at the outbreak of the war. The presence of men-of-war and the actions of energetic officers prevented the king’s supporters from gaining footholds in a number of regions: for example, the ships sent to Sir John Hotham at Hull helped to drive royalist forces away from the town, and the naval blockade of Portsmouth proved to be effective, with the garrison surrendering to parliament in early September 1642. One daring officer even used some longboats at night to steal the Henrietta Maria pinnace from its anchorage 1

See Chapter 4, pp. 91–2, 96, 104–7. Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery, A Treatise of the Art of War (1677), p. 15.

2

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under the guns of the city.3 When royalist forces marched on London in November, parliament deployed ‘his Majesties shallops & other Boates’ on the Thames, to support their land forces; William Beck, a mariner from the Roebuck, was awarded compensation for ‘a hurt he received at [Brentford] in one of the Kings shallops’.4 Captain Richard Swanley’s aggressive warning to the corporation of Southampton, that ‘ruin and destruction’ would befall them if they held out, helped to persuade the town to surrender in December.5 However, even with the best efforts of the fleet not every major harbour could be secured for parliament: in the north, Newcastle remained under the command of the royalists. This greatly aided the king’s cause, because it denied important coal supplies to London, on which the capital’s economy and population relied.6 In the autumn of 1642 the most pressing maritime concerns for parliament came from the transports that brought overseas military aid to their enemies in England and Ireland. There were considerable fears that an invasion by one of Charles I’s potential European allies, such as France or Spain, might be imminent.7 The scattered warships that remained loyal to the king also posed a threat. In October 1642 the Swallow and the Bonaventure under Captain Stradling arrived at Newcastle to join the royalist cause, having abandoned their station on the Irish coast. The danger was short-lived, as the crews and ships quickly surrendered to parliament’s vice-admiral, William Batten (though Stradling managed to escape, and rejoined the king’s forces).8 Other ships also abandoned the royalist cause. Robert Bramble, commander of ‘a Spanish Friggott called the Rotterdam … under the Command of Captain Kettleby’, took his ship to the Thames, showing his ‘faithful service to the Kinge & Parliament’.9 Parliament thus seemed to be consolidating their control of the fleet, and the winter guard they set out in October 1642 assigned twelve ships to ­protect

John Hotham, More Joyfull Newes from Hull being the Happiest Tydings that Ever Came to London (1642), np; H. Blunden, Some Speciall and Considerable Passages from London, Westminster, Portsmouth, Warwicke, Coventry, and Other Places (1642), p. 8. 4 TNA ADM 18/1, fos 22v, 23v; anon., The Ualiant Resolution of the Sea-Men, Listed under the Command of the Earle of Warwicke, who upon Munday last Most Valiantly Slew Many of the Cavaliers (1642); for seafarers in the defence of London that autumn more generally, see A Continvation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages, 16 (24–28 October 1642), p. 2; England’s Memorable Accidents (24–31 October 1642), p. 61; England’s Memorable Accidents (31 October–7 November 1642), p. 70; England’s Memorable Accidents (7–14 November 1642), pp. 75, 79. 5 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 39–40, 47. 6 LJ, v, pp. 554–5; Ben Coates, The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642–50 (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 17, 110, 139; William M. Cavert, The Smoke of London: Energy and Environment in the Early Modern City (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 116–19. 7 See Chapter 4, pp. 85–6. 8 Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, p. 181; CJ, ii, pp. 723, 735, 791; Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 12; Hogan, Letters and Papers, pp. 65–7, 87–8, 140–1. 9 TNA SP 16/494, fo. 20r. 3

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the English coast and a further eighteen vessels for Ireland.10 These ships ­concentrated on patrolling the seas to intercept supplies for the rebels in Ireland and the king in England. They met with some success, and seized a number of ships: on 16 October two parliamentarian ships detained two vessels carrying officers and arms to Ireland, and in January 1643 Captain Dankes seized the Abraham, sailing from Dunkirk to Limerick or Wexford.11 An account of an engagement between two parliamentarian warships and five Spanish ships carrying supplies to Ireland describes how, they ‘being very hot in Batteile immediately did sinke two of their [the Spanish] best ships, but one of ours … being mightily pestred and brused, was (not long after) sunk’.12 However, supplies and reinforcements sometimes got through.13 In September 1642 five vessels landed Thomas Preston and other Irish veterans from the Spanish army at Wexford.14 In February 1643 Henrietta Maria managed to evade a pursuing fleet of parliamentarian ships to unload arms and ammunition at Bridlington near Newcastle. The queen had left England the previous February, and spent the summer and autumn of 1642 raising money and purchasing arms in Holland for the royalist armies. The queen’s travels by sea were hampered by poor weather. On her voyage to Holland in 1642 one of the ships carrying plate and clothing sank.15 Stormy conditions also thwarted her plans to return later that year.16 In October, Henrietta Maria wrote to Charles about how much she feared the prospect of the voyage: ‘I dread the sea so much, that the very thought of it frightens me, not on account of the fleet of the rebels, through that is a beast that I hate, but I fear it not.’17 The queen’s anxiety about the crossing A number of ships set out as part of the winter guard never reached their station. The Charles, under Richard Swanley, named as the vice-admiral for Ireland, instead went to Southampton. LJ, v, pp. 379, 408; Baumber, ‘The Navy and Civil War in Ireland 1641–3’, p. 391. 11 John Hunt, Most Joyfull Newes by Sea and Land (1642), np.; Murphy, War at Sea, p. 182. 12 Anon., Ioyfull Nevves from Sea: or Good Tidings from my Lord of Warwicke, of his Encounter with Some Spanish ships (1642), sig. A2v. 13 For the importance of imported military supplies, see Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 175–211. 14 Hogan, Letters and Papers, pp. 147–8; J. T. Gilbert, ed., A Contemporary History of Affairs in Ireland from 1641 to 1652 (Dublin, 1879–80), i, p. 42. 15 Nadine Akkerman, ed., The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, vol. 2: 1632–1642 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 1031–2. In 2016 a wreck was found off the island of Texel, containing a dress and a book-cover bearing the Stuart coat of arms, and was initially linked to Henrietta Maria’s expedition in 1642 (see http://www.uva.nl/en/news-events/ news/uva-news/content/press-releases/2016/04/texel-gown-belonged-to-member-ofroyal-court-of-queen-henrietta-maria.html (accessed 19 September 2015)). This theory has since been dismissed, but the wreck certainly dates from the mid-seventeenth century, and may still be connected with the queen’s embassy; research is ongoing. We are grateful to De Helmer Helmers for communication on this topic. 16 Caroline M. Hibbard, ‘Henrietta Maria (1609–1669)’, ODNB. 17 Henrietta Maria, Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria: Including her Private Correspondence with Charles the First, ed. M. A. E. Green (1857), p. 131. 10

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was justified, as the parliamentarians sought to capture her and storms forced her back twice, with the loss of a boat carrying some of her supplies. On landing at Bridlington her parliamentarian pursuers opened fire on the house she was staying in. Henrietta Maria described how, ‘before I could get out of bed, the balls were whistling on me in such style that you may easily believe I loved not such music’.18 The queen escaped unscathed, and the munitions were safely landed and helped to reinforce the earl of Newcastle’s army in Yorkshire. This buttressing of the royalist position in the region played a role in the defection of Sir Hugh Cholmeley and Scarborough’s garrison from the parliamentarians.19 The royalists and confederates were not the only enemies that parliamentarian ships faced at sea. The perennial problem of attacks by North African corsairs continued throughout the war. In 1642 a pamphlet, supposedly written by an anonymous member of the parliamentarian fleet, described an encounter between two ships commanded by Sir John Mennes and two ‘Turks men of war’, at times in a jocular fashion. ‘Captaine Millar … gave their Admirall a salute, that spoiled part of his haste … the Assurance also out of her Fore-castle shooting her great Guns at her, tore her without mercy’. The ‘Turks’ responded with muskets, and threw ‘fire-pots over into the Merchant-man with great fury and agility’, until Mennes in the Assurance ‘laid their Vice-admirall aboard’, and the ‘Turks’ surrendered.20 This pamphlet indicates how, from the beginning of the war, maritime fighting was embedded in the broader context of contemporary European conflicts. By the end of 1642 private enterprise was also firmly entrenched in the approach taken by all sides. Hired merchantmen made up around half of the parliamentarian summer guard, and over half of the winter guard.21 Parliament offered further encouragement for individuals to provide ships for its service when, on 19 October, they authorised their supporters to set out privateers to seize shipping going to and from rebel-held ports in Ireland.22 Shipmasters and owners, such as Nicholas Polhill, owner of the Spy, began to apply for these commissions and to put ships to sea in parliament’s service. The masters of two London ships, the Ann and the Solomon, sought letters of marque from parliament in case they encountered Irish shipping on their own merchant voyages.23 Parliamentarian privateers and merchantmen can be identified in Henrietta Maria, Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria, p. 167; anon., A True Relation of the Queens Majesties Return out of Holland and, of Gods Merciful Preservation of her from those Great Dangers, wherein Her Royall Person was Engaged Both by Sea and Land (York, 1643), pp. 15–17. 19 Anon., A True Relation of the Queens Majesties Return out of Holland, pp. 7–9; John Hotham, A True and Exact Relation of all the Proceedings of Sir Hugh Cholmleys Revolt, Deserting the Parliament, and Going to the Queen, with the Regaining of Scarborough Castle (1643), pp. 1–5. 20 Anon., True Newes from our Navie, Now at Sea: Shewing the Most Remarkable Passages from There (1642), pp. 1, 4–7. 21 See Appendix 2, pp. 187–9. 22 On parliamentarian privateers, see Chapter 4, pp. 89, 92–3, 104–7. 23 LJ, v, pp. 408–9; TNA HCA 30/854, fos 275r, 282r, 284r. 18

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admiralty records, seizing ships that traded with royalist- or rebel-held ports in England and Ireland throughout 1643. In May a privateer, the John of Plymouth, captured the Fortune of Dunkirk, which was carrying soldiers, tobacco, and other goods to Ireland.24 The Irish rebels and royalists found themselves in a much more difficult position than the parliamentarians.25 The creation of the confederate Catholic association in June 1642 brought political and military organisation to the rebels’ affairs. They continued to issue letters of marque to captains willing to serve the Irish cause, as had begun in the spring. In December, Father Shee, the confederate agent in France, received eight blank letters of marque. The confederate supreme council also formalised earlier commissions issued independently by clerics, such as that given to Captain Francis Olivier in the St Michael the Archangel.26 Reports from late 1642 onwards indicate a steady increase in the number of English prizes being seized by private men-of-war operating from confederate ports. The St Patrick of Wexford seized six vessels in July 1643, and John Seller, a sailor on the Marygould of Shoreham sailing from Chester to Bilbao, related details of his capture and losses in April 1643, after he ‘was chased by a frigot of Dunkirke (then Imployed by the rebelles of the Towne of dungarvan for pyracy)’.27 The strategic importance of controlling the navy, and their luck in seizing that control, became ever more apparent to the parliamentarian cause in 1643. The earl of Warwick needed a sizeable fleet of ships at sea to deal with this range of threats. The summer guard list of at least sixty ships in April, considerably larger than the previous year or any English naval fleet since the 1620s, showed how seriously parliament viewed these dangers.28 Supporting isolated outposts to keep a foothold in royalist territory continued to be a naval priority, as towns such as Bristol, Hull, Pembroke, and Plymouth gave parliament bases from which to strike into enemy heartlands. They also kept the king’s armies tied down in these regions, and prevented them from moving against London; from a royalist perspective capturing these enclaves was a military imperative for precisely the same reasons. Henry Howard, Lord Mowbray and Maltravers, advised his father that if Plymouth could be captured, ‘then those Western forces may be drawn towards London’.29 In particular, the navy played a major role in enabling parliament to maintain an interest in the northeast. William Cavendish, the earl of Newcastle, defeated the parliamentarians at Adwalton Moor in June 1643 and ensured royalist domi TNA HCA 13/246, examinations of John Lambert, William Vase and Francis White, 12 May 1643. 25 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, pp. 14–20. 26 Gilbert, Irish Confederation, ii, p. 125; CSPI, 1633–47, p. 376. 27 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 31–2, 201–2; Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 81; TCD MS 820, fos 298r–298v. On the language of ‘piracy’, see Chapter 1, pp. 00–00. 28 See Appendix 2, pp. 186–9. 29 Martyn Bennett, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland, 1638–1651 (Oxford, 1997), p. 167; CSPD, 1641–3, p. 502. 24

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nance in this area. Nevertheless, the earl refused to move south on London until he had secured Hull.30 In June, Captain Moyer in the Hercules discovered a plot by Sir John Hotham, the governor, to surrender Hull to the king: sailors from the Hercules went ashore to hold military strong points, and prevented the royalist stratagem.31 In October the navy again proved its worth when the Lion arrived to relieve Hull, by then besieged by the earl of Newcastle’s army. Captain Thomas Rainborowe led mariners from the Lion in an attack that drove the royalists from their entrenchments. One source praised how ‘the Sea-men went on with such a courage and so hot, that they beate the Earles forces from their great Guns’.32 In the southwest Sir Ralph Hopton led incursions by royalist forces from Cornwall into Devon, and assaulted Exeter and Plymouth.33 Here, parliamentarian shipping did not always succeed in getting aid through to beleaguered garrisons. In July, Warwick brought a relief force of 2,000 soldiers by sea to Exeter and initially succeeded in capturing a number of royalist fortifications along the river Exe. However, counterattacks by royalist land forces prevented the parliamentarians from getting ashore and forced the earl to retreat with the loss of two ships.34 The failure of the ships to get through to the city largely determined its fate, and the defenders surrendered on 5 September 1643.35 Elsewhere in Devon the navy met with more success: in September, the arrival by sea of Colonel Gould and 400 men at Plymouth helped bolster the town’s defences. The royalists set up artillery batteries to prevent shipping from bringing supplies through to the town, but they proved to be ineffective, with one account of the siege reporting that ‘they have done no harme to any Ship or boat that hath passed in or out’.36 In the sieges of Hull, Exeter, and Plymouth, the control of sea access to these towns proved decisive in the outcome of each campaign. The royalists also made gains along the west coast. Many in the maritime community in Bristol favoured Charles I, and their opportunity to aid the king’s cause came about in July 1643. Military disasters elsewhere, especially the defeat of Sir William Waller at Roundway Down, allowed a royalist army commanded by Prince Rupert to move against Bristol with little opposition. A number of Lynn Hulse, ‘Cavendish, William, First Duke of Newcastle upon Tyne (bap. 1593, d. 1676)’, ODNB. 31 Henry Overton, More Plots Found Out, and Plotters Apprehended (1643), pp. 3–5. 32 Anon., Good and True Newes from Bedford (1643), np. 33 Ronald Hutton, ‘Hopton, Ralph, Baron Hopton (bap. 1596, d. 1652)’, ODNB; R. N. Worth, History of Plymouth (Plymouth, 1871), pp. 62–70; CJ, iii, p. 22; Mark Stoyle, From Deliverance to Destruction: Rebellion and Civil War in an English City (Exeter, 1996), pp. 67–74. 34 Stoyle, Deliverance to Destruction, pp. 74–82; Robert Rich, earl of Warwick, A Letter from the Earl of Warwick Relating the Taking of all the Forts, and 16 Pieces of Ordnance, from the Malignant Cornishmen (1643), pp. 1–2; Joseph Bampfield, Colonel Joseph Bamfield’s Apologie (The Hague, 1685), p. 6. 35 Stoyle, Deliverance to Destruction, pp. 82–5. 197–8. 36 L. N., A True Narration of the Most Observable Passages, in and at the Late Siege of Plymouth (1644), pp. 1–22; Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 91, 100, 103; CJ, iii, pp. 238, 304; see also BL Add. MS 35,297, fos 2r–13v. 30

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merchant ship-owners and seamen in the city helped the prince take control, by seizing ships in the harbour. Parliamentarian men-of-war could therefore do little to prevent Prince Rupert from storming the city on 26 July.37 The fall of Bristol changed the dynamic of the naval war, as the capture of the port and the acquisition of ships enhanced the king’s naval strength, although his fleet never matched parliament’s in size. By mid-August Sir John Pennington reportedly commanded eighteen ‘tall stout ships’ at Bristol, and a number of parliamentarian ships, such as the armed merchantmen the Fellowship and the Hart, and one of the Whelps, surrendered and came into royalist service.38 The king also issued a proclamation to encourage sailors to join his navy, although only a few officers deserted parliament.39 An attempt by Captain Brooks of the Providence to defect came undone when his sailors intercepted a letter to Pennington and ‘clapped their captain under deck’.40 Following on from their successes in the southwest, the royalists went on the offensive in Wales. Robert Vaughan, earl of Carberry and the king’s lieutenant general in Wales, led an army into south Pembrokeshire in the summer of 1643. The royalists attempted to utilise their newly acquired naval strength to move against parliamentarian strongholds there. In August the Fellowship and the Hart sailed to Milford Haven, on a mission to persuade the gentry of the area to come over to Charles. The arrival of Captain William Smith, the vice-admiral of the parliamentarian Irish squadron, thwarted these plans, and he re-captured both the royalist ships. More significant to parliament than the ships were the skilled sailors; Smith wrote that ‘I was resolved not to part with any one man of them, for I valued them more than I did the ship’. He persuaded the master and crew of the Fellowship to join the parliamentarian navy.41 The outbreak of civil war in England created a complex situation in Ireland. For royalist and parliamentarian supporters alike, fighting against the Irish rebels, rather than against each other, remained the military imperative. The two small state-owned warships operating from Dublin, the Swan and the Confidence, remained under royalist control, but despite their presence Irish confederate privateers grew bold and entered the harbour to seize shipping, such as a bark bound for Milford Haven in March.42 James Butler, earl of Ormond, the lord lieutenant of Ireland who remained loyal to the king, continued to depend on CJ, iii, p. 61; John Lynch, Bristol and the Civil War: For King and Parliament (Stroud, 1999), ch. 5; John Lynch, ‘Bristol Shipping and Royalist Naval Power’, MM, 84 (1988), p. 261; Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 84–5. 38 Some accounts suggest the royalists took up to thirty ships there. Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 84–5; Lynch, ‘Bristol Shipping’, pp. 261–2. 39 Charles I, By the King, a Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Grace to the Mariners and Sea-Men (Oxford, 1643); see Chapter 5, pp. 115–17. 40 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 91–2. 41 William Smith, Severall Letters of Great Importance, and Good Successe Lately Obtained against the Fellowship of Bristow, by Captain William Smith, Captain of His Majesties Ship Called the Swallow (1643), pp. 1–4. 42 Bodl. Carte MS 4, fo. 559r; HMC, Ormonde, ii, p. 280. 37

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the sporadic naval aid he received from parliament. Ships from the summer guard in 1643 patrolled the seas around Ireland, and assisted the besieged garrison at St Augustine’s fort in Galway until it surrendered in June. Parliament also continued to pay for the armed merchantmen which Ormond hired to defend Dublin from confederate privateers.43 In March 1643 Ormond employed the ships at his disposal to go on the offensive against the confederate port of New Ross: as he marched over land, the Constance of Yarmouth and the Love’s Increase of Bristol conveyed supplies for the army. The ships also attempted to bombard the town into submission, but they were unsuccessful, and the crew of the Love’s Increase abandoned their vessel after they found themselves in difficulties with the tide and under accurate artillery fire from the defenders of New Ross.44 This cooperation came to an end after the military and naval situation changed completely in Ireland in September 1643 with the agreement of the Cessation, a ceasefire between Charles and the confederates.45 In the longer term the king’s willingness to deal with Catholic rebels in Ireland lost him the support of many Protestants, but the most immediate impact of the ceasefire was that he no longer needed to deploy warships against the confederates, and his armies could be shipped to fight in England and Wales. From a parliamentarian perspective the loss of access to the ports of Cork, Youghal, and Kinsale, all of which adhered to the Cessation, was a major blow.

Balance of power, October 1643–December 1644 Going into the winter of 1643–44 parliament needed to deal with pressing naval and military issues on a number of fronts. Leading parliamentarians realised the need for re-organisation in order to secure a victory against the king: an alliance was agreed with the Scottish parliament, the Solemn League and Covenant, and a new committee, the Committee of Both Kingdoms, was formed to manage the war.46 In October, parliament approved a winter guard of nineteen stateowned warships and twenty-three merchantmen. Warwick warned of the need for more shipping to stem the royalist and confederate resurgence at sea. He promised that ‘I shall ever endeavour to my uttermost to do; but … there may be more expected from me than I am able to perform with the Handful of Ships in respect of the Work under my Command.’47 For his faithful service, parliament

Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 31–2. The ship, renamed the St Patrick of Ross, was retaken by parliament in 1647. Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 30, 190; Bodl. Carte MS 4, fo. 494r; HMC, Ormonde, i, p. 259; TNA HCA 30/849, fo. 651r. 45 Robert Armstrong, Protestant War: The British of Ireland and the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (Manchester, 2005), pp. 92–9. 46 The Solemn League and Covenant was agreed on by parliament on 25 September and signed on 29 November 1643, and the Committee of Both Kingdoms was formed in February 1644: Stewart, Rethinking the Scottish Revolution, pp. 194–5. 47 LJ, vi, pp. 311, 313, 332, 419–20. 43 44

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appointed Warwick to the position of lord high admiral on 7 December 1643.48 In January 1644 parliament again began preparations for the summer fleet with plans for pressing seamen – which they had done since 1642 – and assigned an excise tax on meat and salt to fund the navy.49 There was indeed plenty of work for parliament’s fleet, as the confederates and royalists made the most of the opportunity provided by the Cessation in Ireland. Confederate merchantmen and privateers operated with greater freedom due to the removal of parliamentarian shipping from Irish ports, and overseas trade to and from towns such as Waterford boomed as ships now found themselves able to pass safely by the formerly hostile Duncannon fort.50 In Dublin Ormond immediately took advantage of the truce to ship soldiers across the Irish Sea: the lord lieutenant even contracted with the confederates for transports to carry 1,930 soldiers, and frigates to escort them.51 Within a few weeks men began to cross from Ireland, and the first troops landed in Minehead late in October.52 Captain Baldwin Wake’s royalist fleet arrived at Dublin in November, and Ormond estimated that they could carry 3,000 men over.53 Between October 1643 and February 1644 approximately 7,740 soldiers from Ireland joined the royalist armies in England and Wales. This influx of manpower had an immediate impact on the war in the west, as five regiments from Dublin joined Sir John Byron’s royalist forces in Cheshire. By the end of December 1643 Byron had pushed Sir William Brereton’s army out of the entire county, except for Nantwich.54 The king’s supporters also gained the upper hand in the Channel Islands. In November 1643 Captain George Carteret expelled the parliamentarians from Jersey. Carteret was an experienced naval officer who had become heavily involved in shipping arms from St Malo to the royalists in the west of England in the early years of the war. After securing control of Jersey, he received a commission from the king as vice-admiral of the island and set out a number of privateers to attack parliamentarian shipping. Charles rewarded Carteret’s loyal service with a knighthood and baronetcy in 1645.55 During the later stages of 1643 the parliamentarian Irish Sea squadron could do little to hinder these troop movements, as the winter guard had still not put LJ, vi, p. 330. Ibid., pp. 372–3. On pressing, see Chapter 4, pp. 99–102. 50 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 35–6; Bodl. Carte MS 6, fos 505v–507v. 51 Bodl. Carte MS 7, fos 66r, 226r, 267r–267v. 52 Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, p. 49. 53 Bodl. Carte MS 7, fo. 414r; Baumber, ‘The Navy and Civil War in Ireland, 1643–6’, pp. 255–6. 54 J. L. Malcolm, ‘All the King’s Men: The Impact of the Crown’s Irish Soldiers on the English Civil War’, Irish Historical Studies, 21 (1979), pp. 251–5; Mark Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers, an Ethnic History of the English Civil War (New Haven, 2005), pp. 53–62, 209–10; J. S. Wheeler, The Irish and British Wars, 1637–1654: Triumph, Tragedy and Failure (London, 2002), pp. 97–8; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 49–51. 55 C. H. Firth, ‘Carteret, Sir George, First Baronet (1610?–1680)’, rev. C. S. Knighton, ODNB; Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, p. 188. 48 49

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to sea by November.56 The situation began to improve in January, however, when Captain Richard Swanley and a flotilla of five ships arrived at Milford Haven. There he found the earl of Carberry besieging Pembroke. The royalists had erected a fortification, called the Pill fort, to try to dominate Milford Haven and therefore to deny seaborne relief to the town, but this did not keep the parliamentarian navy out.57 Over the next two months Swanley’s ships and sailors played a major part in assisting Major General Laugharne to clear the royalists from the region. Guns from the fleet battered royalist fortifications, supplies of arms carried by the navy allowed the parliamentarian army to go on the offensive, and mariners from the Crescent and Swallow led the successful assault on the town of Tenby in March 1644.58 Despite these advances, the parliamentarian position in Wales remained far from secure. The king replaced Carberry with Colonel Charles Gerard, a more energetic professional soldier, who advanced into south Wales and rapidly retook most of the places lost to the parliamentarians earlier in the year. This left Pembroke and Milford Haven as the only places of significance still held by parliament.59 Yet royalist setbacks elsewhere, especially the defeat at Marston Moor in July, helped to alleviate the pressure in Wales: Charles recalled Gerard’s army from Wales to deal with the threat posed by advancing parliamentarian and Scottish forces.60 As well as helping their forces to hold out in Wales, by the spring of 1644 the presence of parliamentarian men-of-war in the Irish Sea began to affect the shipping of soldiers from Ireland to England. Parliamentarian warships intercepted transport vessels, and in April Captain Swanley even went so far as to execute seventy Irish men he found on one captured bark.61 The loss of shipping and Swanley’s ruthless actions made it increasingly difficult for Ormond to send men to England and Wales throughout 1644. Financial pressures also began to hamper royalist naval efforts, and in March Captain Baldwin Wake’s

CSPD, 1641–3, p. 498. Swanley’s fleet consisted of the Leopard, Swallow, Crescent, and two merchantmen, the Leopard and Providence. William Smith, An Exact Relation of that Famous and Notable Victorie Obtained at Milford-Haven (1644), pp. 1–3. 58 Smith, An Exact Relation, pp. 1–9; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 58–61; Geraint Jenkins, The Foundations of Modern Wales: Wales, 1642–1700 (Oxford, 1987), pp.  12–13. See also Anon., A True Relation of the Routing his Majesties Forces in the County of Pembroke (1644); Richard Swanley, A True Relation of the Proceedings of Colonell Langharne, and Others, in the County of Pembrooke (1644); Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 44 (14–20 February 1644), p. 344; The Military Scribe, 1 (20–27 February 1644), p. 8; The Military Scribe, 2 (27 February–5 March 1644), p. 15; The Military Scribe, 5 (19–26 March 1644), p. 36; The Military Scribe, 6 (26 March–2 April 1644), p. 43; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 53 (30 April–7 May 1644), pp. 428–9. 59 Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 71–2; Jenkins, Foundations of Modern Wales, p. 13. 60 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 429; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 71–2; CSPD, 1644–5, p. 444. 61 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 39–40; Murphy, ‘Atrocities at Sea’. 56 57

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squadron mutinied due to a lack of pay, and refused to sail.62 In Dublin a shortage of money and provisions made the crews of the two ships based there, the Swan and the Confidence, equally mutinous and unwilling to put to sea.63 Parliamentarian warships took advantage of this weakness to anchor in Dublin bay and illicitly trade with the city.64 In April parliament rewarded Richard Swanley and William Smith, his second-in-command, with gold chains for their service in the Irish Sea.65 In the first six months of 1644, then, parliament’s navy ensured that Pembrokeshire remained under parliamentary control, stemmed the tide of soldiers crossing from Ireland to England and Wales, and blockaded the royalists in Dublin. From July onwards the situation in Ireland improved even further for parliament after the defection of Lord Inchiquin, the royalist commander in Munster, due to his dissatisfaction at his treatment by the king and at the conduct of the war. Lord Esmond at Duncannon fort followed in September, with his soldiers swearing the National Covenant.66 Naval officers in the parliamentarian Irish guard understood the importance of these harbours, and quickly set about aiding them. Captain Robert Moulton ordered relief vessels to Munster, while Swanley, on his return to Milford Haven having been reappointed as vice-admiral, directed the Great Lewis to ride at anchor below Duncannon.67 Elsewhere the fortunes of war also fluctuated, and naval forces were often directly involved, though not always with the same impact. In April 1644 Prince Maurice led his army against the relatively unimportant but staunchly parliamentarian port of Lyme. A combination of strong defensive works, a resolute garrison led by Colonel Robert Blake, and the ability of warships to get aid into the town enabled it to withstand a three-month siege.68 Warwick’s fleet intercepted royalist shipping, carried munitions and provisions into the town, and sent sailors ashore to help the defenders. The mariners in the squadron gave up their own spare clothing and part of their rations to aid the town as well.69 In Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 126, 141. Bodl. Carte MS 11, fo. 178r, 462r. 64 Murphy, War at Sea, p. 40. 65 CJ, iii, pp. 516–18. 66 Carte, Ormond, vi, p. 75; J. A. Murphy, ‘The Expulsion of the Irish from Cork in 1644’, Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society, 69 (1964), pp. 123–6; Gilbert, Irish Confederation, iv, pp. 211, 215. On the National Covenant, see Chapter 4, pp. 86–7. 67 Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 173; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 429; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 71–2; CSPD, 1644–5, p. 444. 68 For Warwick’s letters concerning the siege, see TNA SP 16/504, fos 56r–59r, 61r, 63–65r, 77–78r, 81r, 83r; SP 21/16, pp. 1–2, 12–13, 16, 34–5, 44–6, 61–2, 90–1, 92, 95–6, 119–20, 127–9, 155–6, 163–4, 202–3; CJ, iii, pp. 208, 215, 228, 236, 485–6, 489, 522, 564, 711; LJ, vi, pp. 551, 556, 588, 595, 617, 630. 69 Ronald Hutton and Wylie Reeves, ‘Sieges and Fortifications’, in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, The Civil Wars, p. 217; anon., An Exact and True Relation in Relieving the Resolute Garrison of Lyme in Dorset-Shire, by the Right Honourable, Robert Earle of Warwicke (1644), pp. 1–6; Robert Rich, earl of Warwick, A Letter Sent from the Right Honorable Robert Earl of Warwick to the Right Honorable the Speaker to the House of Peers (1644), pp. 3–8. 62 63

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June the earl of Essex’s army marched into the south, relieved Lyme, and compelled Maurice to retreat. Essex and Warwick joined forces to pursue the fleeing royalists into Somerset and Devon, and Essex’s advance also forced the royalists to abandon their siege of Plymouth.70 For a few weeks the combined operations worked well, with the MP Bulstrode Whitelocke writing how ‘the Earl of Warwick with his fleet sailed along the coast as the Lord General marched, and carried his ammunition, and sent ships to keep off the enemy’.71 This was soon to change. After his defeat at Marston Moor in July, Charles moved south to deal with Essex, because the earl’s advance trapped the queen in Cornwall. The parliamentarians found themselves hemmed in by royalist forces, and poor weather prevented Warwick’s fleet from supporting the army or taking it to safety. After defeat at Lostwithiel in August, Essex escaped in a boat to Plymouth and left his troops, commanded by General Philip Skippon, to surrender in September.72 The submission of Essex’s army was a major blow to parliamentarian prestige, and from a naval standpoint it left Plymouth in a vulnerable position. Few of the soldiers that Essex had drawn out of the garrison during his campaign returned, and the royalists resumed their siege with the king in attendance. With supplies running low Warwick sailed for the Downs, leaving William Batten to assist Plymouth in withstanding the attack.73 Meanwhile, parliament also found the need to send ships to Scotland. Signing the Solemn League and Covenant with the Scottish covenanters had brought parliament military aid in the north, as a Scottish army marched into England to campaign in January 1644, but the covenanters did not possess any significant naval strength. This meant that parliamentarian naval resources became stretched even further, as they now had to provide seaborne support to their Scottish allies. For example, the parliamentarian Captain Tracie Cater, commanding the Mary of London, sailed to Aberdeen in April 1644. There he sent two of his mariners ashore uppon pretence to gett some ballast there but in truth to see howe the Towne stood affected & to understand the Condition of the Countrey thereabout (haveing by a barque which hee mett in the night before hee came to Aberdine receaved intelligence that Marquess Huntley with others were upp in Armes in those partes for the King against the Parliament of England).74

The ‘pretence’ failed, and Huntly imprisoned the two sailors for ‘three dayes not allowing them meate drincke or money’, hoping to entice Cater into the port, and Worth, History of Plymouth, pp. 111–18. John Morrill, ‘Devereux, Robert, Third Earl of Essex (1591–1646)’, ODNB; Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs (1682), p. 88. 72 Anon., A True Relation of the Sad Passages between the Two Armies in the West (1644), pp. 1–7. 73 CSPD, 1644, p. 559; CSPD, 1644–5, pp. 12, 36, 222. 74 TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of Tracie Cater, John Shut and Erasmus Wills, 29 April 1644; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 222, fos 28v–29r. 70 71

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threatned sometymes to hange them … & other tymes dealt with them fair meanes … to gett them to write to the Captain to bringe the shipp in & told [John Shut, one of the mariners] that … they should have a Letter of Marque under his hand … & within tenn dayes after they should have a letter of Marque under his Majestys hand to the same effecte.75

The parliamentarians refused, and while they were imprisoned, the wife of William Walkey, whose ship was expected to arrive shortly, visited them  and  ‘gave [Shut] a Cup of Ale … & desired [him] to bee good to her husband  yf hee mett him at sea’.76 The two sailors were released after Cater ­captured  some Aberdeen fishermen, and ‘their wives & children went cryeing to Marquis Huntly’; a few days later the Mary captured two Scottish ships, including Walkey’s vessel.77 The civil wars cost Aberdeen dearly, for in the 1650s the town estimated that they had suffered shipping losses worth £200,000–300,000.78 Besides the aid of parliamentarian privateers, the earl of Leven’s covenanter army received munitions and provisions sent by sea from London, while a flotilla of six vessels, including some commanded by Scottish officers, also patrolled the North Sea. Newcastle, and the coal trade based in that city, became the main priority for Leven’s forces. They quickly captured Sunderland in March, but could not take Newcastle. Only after their victory at Marston Moor could the covenanters and parliamentarians turn their full attention to this city. The navy blockaded the harbour, and Leven’s army stormed the town on 19 October.79 The covenanters also required naval support along their western seaboard, and so parliament assigned three ships, the Fellowship, the Jocelyn, and the Eighth Whelp, to patrol the Irish Sea between Ulster and Scotland. They captured vessels such as the Alice of Londonderry, which was carrying soldiers to the royalist port of Chester when seized in May.80 However, the small squadron failed to prevent the landing of a confederate expeditionary force in Scotland in July. Randal MacDonnell, the earl of Antrim, had originally reached an agreement with Charles I to raise soldiers in Ireland, to serve the king in Scotland, in January 1644. Political and logistical problems meant the men did not sail from Ireland until June, and parliamentarian warships intercepted the transports – but only after they had landed the Irish soldiers.81 These TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of John Shut and Erasmus Wills, 29 April 1644. TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of John Shut, 11 June 1644. 77 TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of John Shut and Erasmus Wills, 29 April 1644. 78 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, p. 231. 79 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 204–5; anon., An Exact Relation of the Last Newes from the Quarters of His Excellency, the Lord Generall of the Scottish Army (1644), pp. 1–6; Anon., A Full Relation of the Scots Martch from Barwicke to Newcastle (1644), np. 80 TNA HCA 13/61, fos 176r–177v. 81 Bodl. Carte MS 11, fo. 332r; J. H. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim (Dublin, 2001), p. 145; David Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates: Scottish-Irish 75 76

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men formed the core of the royalist army that fought under James Graham, marquis of Montrose, in Scotland, which won a series of victories over the next twelve months. Although this campaign ultimately ended with Lieutenant General David Leslie’s total destruction of the Montrosian force at Philiphaugh in September 1645, with no quarter being given to soldiers or camp-followers alike, it nevertheless drew Scottish covenanter forces away from England to deal with the crisis.82 In the southwest of England and in the North Sea and Scotland, as in the Irish Sea, maritime forces participated in major campaigns, and were particularly important in providing strategic connections between the different coalitions of the first civil war.

Parliamentarian ascendancy at sea, January 1645–December 1645 Despite the royalist resurgence in Scotland, parliament and their covenanter allies began 1645 in a reasonably strong position, especially in the north. In February Sir John Meldrum captured the town of Scarborough. Privateers operating from the harbour, described as a ‘den of thieves’, had been a major problem for English and Scottish merchant and fishing fleets in the area; moreover, Scarborough’s loss meant the royalists no longer controlled any significant ports in the northeast.83 Things fared better for the king in the southwest, where his supporters continued to hold important harbours such as Dartmouth, Falmouth, and Weymouth, from which Sir Nicholas Crispe and other royalist supporters sent out substantial numbers of privateers.84 These men-of-war and their confederate counterparts, and their comrades based in Europe, intercepted considerable numbers of Scottish and English ships. In a two-week period in May the True Informer reported the loss of twenty-two vessels to Dunkirkers.85 Meanwhile, helping beleaguered outposts to hold out still remained a key naval priority for parliament in the first half of the year. In January sailors from the Warwick and other ships helped repulse a royalist assault on Plymouth, though Captain Thomas warned of the need to send more shipping and supplies to prevent the loss of the town.86 Similarly, controlling Duncannon fort allowed parliament to hinder confederate trade and privateers operating from Waterford and New Ross. Captain Samuel Howett in the Duncannon frigate anchored below the fort, and intercepted vessels as they tried to sail past, such as the North Holland in December 1644.87 Relations in the Mid-Seventeenth Century (Belfast, 2004), pp. 165–75; see Chapter 5, pp. 126–7. 82 Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie, pp. 138–40. 83 Scarborough Castle did not surrender until July 1645. CJ, iv, p. 59; CSPD, 1644–5, pp. 323–4. 84 See Chapter 5, pp. 110–13. 85 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 213–20; Murphy, War at Sea, p. 204; True Informer, 4 (17 May 1645), p. 27. 86 CSPD, 1625–49, pp. 672–3. 87 TNA HCA 13/60, examination of Samuel Howett, 22 November 1645.

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The confederates realised the dangers of leaving Duncannon under parliamentarian control and mounted a siege of the fort in January 1645.88 For the next two months the navy tried to relieve the fort, and as at other sieges, a number of English sailors went ashore to help man the defences. However, the military situation in Wales, with the reappearance of a royalist army led by Colonel Gerard, hampered Swanley’s ability to send supplies to the defenders in Duncannon, and the vulnerability of naval vessels when facing strong shore-based forces also became apparent during the siege.89 Well-sited confederate artillery batteries hit and sank the Great Lewis, and this accurate firepower forced later re-enforcements to anchor out of range of the Irish guns, and made getting supplies into the fort more difficult.90 By early March the situation had become desperate, and the seamen on shore wrote to Captain William Smith to remind him of his promise not to leave without them.91 With his ships dangerously low on provisions, Smith advised the commander, Lord Esmond, to open negotiations with General Thomas Preston, the confederate leader. Smith then sailed away from the fort, abandoning his mariners to their fate: on 19 March 1645, with the walls breached and no prospect of relief, Esmond surrendered.92 The siege of Duncannon highlights the limitations of sea power to support isolated outposts under certain conditions. The weakness of the defenders, combined with a resolute and well organised enemy, meant there was little the navy could do to enable the fort to hold out for any length of time. Its loss gave confederate privateers and merchants free rein to sail from Waterford and New Ross, with the townsmen reportedly being ‘verie glad for this service’.93 Meanwhile, events in London during the spring of 1645 led to a major shift in the command and organisation of the parliamentarian navy. On 3 April the Lords and Commons passed the Self-Denying Ordinance, which obliged peers to step down from their military and naval appointments. Warwick therefore resigned as lord high admiral, and William Batten took over operational command of the navy. Batten, unlike his predecessor, depended on parliamentary committees for his authority and lacked the independence that Warwick had possessed. The earl remained an active member of a number of key committees

Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War, pp. 178–89; J. R. Powell, ‘Operations of the Parliamentary Squadron at the Siege of Duncannon, 1645’, Irish Sword, 2 (1954–6), pp. 17–21; Gilbert, Contemporary History, i/1, pp. 102–4. 89 Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 85–7; Gilbert, Irish Confederation, iv, p. 145. 90 Connie Kelleher, Results of the Archaeological Surveys and Investigations into Two Shipwrecks (a 16th Century and 17th Century Wreck) on Duncannon Bar in Waterford Harbour, 2000– 2006 (Dublin, 2007); Powell, ‘Duncannon’, pp. 17–19; Gilbert, Contemporary History, i/1, p. 103. 91 TCD MS 818, fo. 155r; Gilbert, Irish Confederation, iv, p. 177. 92 Gilbert, Irish Confederation, iv, pp. 178–9, 212–23; TCD MS 818, fo. 150r; Powell, ‘Duncannon’, pp. 19–21. 93 Gilbert, Contemporary History, i, p. 104. 88

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responsible for administering naval affairs.94 Parliament again approved a substantial summer guard for 1645, with a large number of ships being assigned to the seas around Ireland.95 New naval officers, who were making their reputation in parliament’s service, also began to come to the fore. In May the death of Captain William Smith led to the promotion of William Penn as vice-admiral of the Irish squadron.96 Ireland and Wales remained the most pressing concerns for the navy. In the spring of 1645 the confederates overran most of the Protestant strongholds in Munster, and by June, they approached the port of Youghal.97 The royalist resurgence led by Colonel Gerard in Wales in March and April, combined with internal parliamentarian dissensions in Pembroke, put the navy on the back foot in the principality. A series of accusations against Swanley by the local gentry led to his temporary recall to London.98 However, he was soon back at sea, and the defeat of the king’s army at Naseby on 14 June relieved the pressure elsewhere and allowed the navy to focus its efforts on southern Ireland and Wales. During that same month, Swanley and Penn elected to leave the Globe, the Magdalene, and the Anne and Joyce at Tenby to protect the town against the royalists. They chose the Duncannon frigate and the Happy Entrance to sail for Munster.99 Penn, in the Happy Entrance, arrived at Cork on 2 July and began to organise relief for Youghal.100 He sent gunners and munitions from his squadron to bolster the town’s defences, but, as at Duncannon earlier in the year, the vulnerability of warships anchored near besieged towns to shore-based artillery fire caused problems for the parliamentarian navy at Youghal. Confederate commanders had clearly realised how to deal with naval reinforcements. One salvo from confederate batteries caused the Duncannon frigate to explode, and the Nicholas also received several direct hits before Captain Bray moved his vessel out of range.101 Unlike at Duncannon, however, the resolute actions of parliamentarian naval officers, combined with a lack of determination on the part of the confederates, ensured that Youghal held out. In William Penn the parliamentarians had found a steadfast naval officer willing to do whatever was necessary to defend the town: at one point Penn threatened to tie the master of a bark to the mast as it C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, eds, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660 (1911), pp. 664–5; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 420; Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’, pp. 402–3. See Chapter 4, pp. 87–9. 95 CSPD, 1644–5, p. 629; anon., A List of such of the Navy Royall, as also of the Merchants Ships as are Set Forth to Sea for this Summers Expedition 1645 (1645); Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 156–7. 96 William Penn, Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, ed. G. Penn (2 vols, 1883), i, p. 112. 97 James Tuchet, earl of Castlehaven, The Earl of Castlehaven’s Review: Or his Memoirs of his Engagement and Carriage in the Irish Wars (1684), pp. 56–68. 98 Murphy, War at Sea, p. 46. See Chapter 4, pp. 96–7. 99 Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 115–18. 100 Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 119–33; J. R. Powell, ‘Penn’s Attempt to Relieve Youghal, 1645’, Irish Sword, 2 (1954–6), pp. 83–7. 101 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 44–6; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 19–20.  94

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sailed past the Irish guns, after this master refused to risk his vessel in carrying provisions into the garrison.102 While the situation in Ireland still hung in the balance, the king’s maritime position, like his overall military fortunes, went into freefall following his defeat at Naseby. Parliamentarian naval and land forces combined to reduce the royalists in the west, and in late July mariners from Batten’s ship joined with Major General Laugharne’s soldiers to clear Pembrokeshire.103 Naval vessels blockaded Prince Rupert’s forces in Bristol, and seized shipping on the Severn, before the city finally yielded in September.104 In October Sir Thomas Fairfax began the recapture of Somerset and Devon, while the winter guard set out in September continued to support beleaguered garrisons such as Plymouth, and put pressure on royalist-held coastal towns like Dartmouth and Dublin.105 Meanwhile, parliamentarian warships and privateers went on the offensive against the royalists and confederates: privateers such as the Discovery of London, commanded by Captain Thomas Plunkett and set out by a syndicate of prominent parliamentarian supporters, intercepted numerous prizes at sea.106 In October Plunkett nearly captured the frigate transporting Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, the papal nuncio, to Ireland.107 Other officers, such as Captain Robert Clarke in the Jocelyn, seized the initiative against the royalists. In November 1645 Clarke took advantage of disaffection among the crew of the Swan, anchored in Dublin bay, to peacefully seize control of the ship.108

Royalist collapse at sea, January–December 1646 The king’s military position continued to deteriorate in the early months of 1646. In January, Chester surrendered, and Fairfax relieved Plymouth and captured Dartmouth, while Exeter was besieged from October 1645 and finally yielded to parliament in April 1646. Through the spring and summer the parliamentarians advanced into Cornwall and captured the remaining royalist outposts, including Penzance and Falmouth. The navy played a vital role in these operations, carrying supplies and munitions, blocking up hostile ports, and helping to storm recalcitrant garrisons. At Dartmouth, Batten’s squadron prevented royalist ships Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 44–6; Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War, pp. 188–9; HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont, ed. S. Lomas (1905–9), i, p. 264; Gilbert, Contemporary History, i, pp. 94–7; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 124–30. 103 Rowland Laugharne, A True Relation of the Late Successe of the Kings and Parliaments Forces in Pembroke-Shire wherein the Great Victory against the Kings Forces in Wales by Major Generall Laughorne is Fully Related (1645), pp. 4–5. 104 Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 208; anon., Two Letters Sent to the Honorable William Lenthall Esq (1645), pp. 2–5. 105 LJ, vii, pp. 594–5; Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 206–8; CSPD, 1645–7, pp. 150, 153. 106 See Chapter 4, p. 106. 107 See Murphy, War at Sea, p. 47. 108 TNA HCA 13/63, fos 267r–269v; HMC, Ormonde, i, pp. 101–4 102

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in the harbour from escaping, and sent 200 men ashore to participate in the assault. In March a parliamentarian frigate braved royalist fire at Falmouth to sail into the harbour, boarding and seizing a Dunkirk frigate that was harassing the attacking army.109 The king’s surrender to the Scots in May, though it brought a pause to fighting ashore in England and Scotland, did not mark the end of the war at sea. The parliamentarian army and navy continued to work together to capture garrisons that held out, and to combat privateers. In March the prince of Wales escaped from Falmouth to the staunchly royalist Scilly Isles. Soon afterwards Batten persuaded the garrison of Portland Castle to surrender, before sailing to Scilly in pursuit of the prince. A storm dispersed Batten’s fleet before he could intercept the prince there, and, rather than flee to France or Ireland, the prince of Wales sailed to royalist-controlled Jersey, where he was welcomed and entertained by Sir George Carteret. In September, Batten sent Sir George Ayscue in the Expedition to the Scilly Isles. Ayscue’s ‘endeavours to ingratiate’ himself with the islanders proved successful, and they surrendered in the same month. Captain Crowther also persuaded the royalists on the island of Lundy to join the parliamentarian cause.110 The efforts of parliamentarian naval officers to persuade leading royalists to surrender did not always work out, however. Robert Moulton’s flotilla at Dublin blockaded the harbour, and intercepted ships carrying supplies and correspondence bound for Ormond. Moulton advised the lord lieutenant to join parliament, writing that ‘it is now high time to begin to make way for your peace’, but Ormond refused to consider yielding Dublin in the summer of 1646.111 His position changed a few months later when peace negotiations with the confederates collapsed and an Irish army advanced on the city. Ormond turned to the parliamentarian commanders of the Globe and the Samuel for assistance to fight the confederates, and requested safe passage for delegates to go to London. In November the Irish advance faltered, Ormond broke off talks, and the parliamentarian ships resumed their blockade.112 Even with a large summer guard sent out in April, the parliamentarian dominance at sea was far from complete.113 Confederate privateers remained active and increased in numbers after Dunkirk fell to the French in October.114 Displaced frigate captains moved to Irish harbours such as Wexford and Waterford: a report in November 1646 claimed that these two ports swarmed with former Dunkirkers.115 Dealing with privateers and aiding parliament’s supporters in Stoyle, Deliverance to Destruction, pp. 109–35; Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 229; John Rushworth, Two Letters Sent to the Honorable William Lenthal Esquire (1646), p. 5. 110 LJ, viii, pp. 268, 496; Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 254–5; John Haslock, A True and Perfect Relation of the Surrender of the Strong and Impregnable Garrison the Island of Scillie to Captain Batten (1646), np. 111 Bodl. Carte MS 17, fos 416r–417v. 112 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 54–5. 113 See Appendix 2, pp. 186–9. 114 See Stradling, Armada of Flanders, ch. 7. 115 HMC, Egmont, i, p. 328. 109

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Ireland thus continued to require large-scale naval resources. In January the leading military commanders in Munster persuaded Robert Moulton and William Penn to undertake an ambitious amphibious diversionary operation, at Bunratty Castle on the River Shannon. Prior to this, the isolated castle had largely been ignored by the confederates, as it was of little strategic importance. The arrival of 700 reinforcing soldiers and a small flotilla commanded by Penn forced the confederates to move against Bunratty, to prevent the overseas trade of Limerick from being cut off. From the outset the isolation of Bunratty and the lack of soldiers and supplies made the expedition unlikely to succeed; Moulton predicted that to hold the castle a further 1,500 men, and a supporting campaign over land from Cork, would be needed.116 Nevertheless, the parliamentarian fleet arrived at Bunratty in early March. Sailors and gunners from the ships helped to prepare the defences by constructing artillery platforms, and Penn positioned his ships on the river to help protect the castle. The complexities of the expedition quickly became apparent to the defenders. The tidal nature of the Shannon meant only the smaller ships in the squadron could safely ply the river, and added to this a shortage of provisions meant that Penn placed the sailors on half rations only a few weeks after arriving, in order to prolong his stay in the Shannon. As the confederates pressed their siege, raids by the ships along the coast to seize Irish livestock, and the arrival of occasional supply vessels, enabled the soldiers to hold out until July. Following the death of Colonel McAdam, however, the remaining army officers began negotiations to surrender to the confederates on 11 July. Penn’s fleet brought the survivors back to Kinsale on 26 July.117 The expedition failed to hold Bunratty, but it did succeed in its original aim of keeping the confederates tied up in the summer of 1646. Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, reported the success, describing how ‘the progress of our designes in the River of Lymerick hath not only diverted a supply of six thousand from going to the King, and ready to be shipped at Waterford, but also ruined their projects upon us’.118 At the same time Bunratty also demonstrated the problems faced by the navy when trying to support isolated positions. Without regular reinforcements and fresh supplies, naval vessels on their own lacked the capacity to ensure that these outposts held out. The parliamentarian position at sea also began to improve in late 1646 as the first vessels from a new frigate-building programme came off the stocks, and quickly proved their worth.119 In October the admiralty appointed William Penn to the Assurance, Thomas Bedell to the Adventure, and William Thomas Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 159–62; C. McNeill, ed., The Tanner Letters: Original Documents and Notices of Irish Affairs in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Dublin, 1943), pp. 215–16; CSPD, 1645–7, pp. 510–11; CSPI, 1633–47, pp. 434–5; J. R. Powell, ‘Penn’s Expedition to Bonratty in 1646’, MM, 40 (1954), pp. 4–20; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 48–51. 117 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 48–51; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 168–203. 118 Gilbert, Irish Confederation, v, pp. 324–5; anon., The Treaty with the Earle of Southampton, the Earle of Lindsey and Other Commissioners from Oxford (1646), pp. 5–6. 119 See Chapter 4, pp. 89–90. 116

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to the Nonsuch. Penn and Thomas received orders to go into the Irish Sea and ply near Wexford and Waterford to intercept confederate shipping. Four more frigates – the Tiger, the Elizabeth, the Phoenix, and the Dragon – followed in 1647.120 These new ships were designed to challenge the fast frigates used by the confederates and royalists.121 The navy also proved its value in helping to discredit the king, when Captain Robert Moulton and Captain Robert Clarke both seized papers relating to the secret peace negotiations between the royalist Edward Somerset, earl of Glamorgan, and the confederates.122 As well as these successes, however, the navy faced problems on a number of fronts in 1646. Accusations of corruption were laid against leading admiralty officials and naval officers.123 Underlying tensions between naval officials concerning the administration of the navy and the settlement of the kingdoms, and a parliament increasingly under army domination, were also becoming apparent by the end of the year.124

Widening conflict, January 1643–December 1646 The coastal waters of the British Isles and Ireland were not the only arenas of conflict during the first civil war. Many of Charles’s privateers were based in Europe, especially in Flanders and France, and the diplomatic correspondence between European governments and both parliament and the king contains many complaints, on all sides, of depredations at sea.125 William Boswell, the king’s agent in the Netherlands, wrote of Charles’s ‘extreme displeasure and resentment’ at the ‘violence and pillage’ committed by London ships and, in March 1644, demanded the arrest of parliamentarian privateer captains.126 Both parliamentarians and royalists complained of ships and captains seized by European ships or arrested in continental ports, while the French and Dutch replied with condemnation of the ‘Pirateries made upon them by the English nation’.127 Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 222–3; Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 257–8; HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix, Part I: The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, preserved at Welbeck Abbey (9 vols, London, 1891–1923), i, p. 65. 121 See Chapter 5, pp. 110–1, 122–4. 122 Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 231; CSPD, 1645–7, p. 346. 123 See Chapter 4, pp. 92–3, 96–7. 124 Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’, pp. 403–4; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 421–4. See Chapter 6, pp. 134–7. 125 On royalist privateers, see Chapter 5, pp. 109–15. For these diplomatic exchanges, see the Trumbull papers, BL Add. MS 72,434–8; and the Netherlands diplomatic transcripts, Add. MS 17,677 Q-T. 126 BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 77r–78v, ‘extreme desplaisure et resentiment’, ‘violences et pillages’, cf. fos 85r–85v, 229r–229v, 240r, 324r–324v; see also Add. MS 72,438, fos 5r–6v. 127 Quoting BL Add. MS 4,200, fo. 15r; see also fos 35r, 37r; Add. MS 72,434, fos 28r, 30r, 34v–35r, 37r, 59r, 61r, 103r, 117r; Add. MS 72,435, fos 23r, 53r, 99r, 111r; Add. MS 72,437, fo. 88v; Add. MS 4,155, fos 212r–213v, 225r, 236r, 266r–268r; Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 77r–78v, 85r–85v, 92r–96r, 118r–120r, 203r–203v, 332r–332v, 233r–233v, 340r, 357r–357v, 364r–364v, 370r, 383r–384r, 385r–385v, 393r–393v, 454r–455v. 120

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A particular furore was kicked up in 1644 by the actions of Captain Zachary and Captain Whetstone, two parliamentarians who were arrested by the Dutch for seizing prizes within the territorial waters of the United Provinces.128 Intriguingly, Zachary was described by William Boswell as ‘ordinarily reputed for a Renegado, and circumcised in the law of Mohammed’, while Mercurius Aulicus, in December 1644, accused him of being ‘a Native Turke, who having been a Pyrate … [is] to this day unchristened’, though Mercurius Britanicus denied this.129 London ships were also attacked by French and Spanish vessels, and attitudes in Europe seem to have hardened against parliament.130 Captain John Hall, in the Ann, flying parliament’s colours, met ‘a Bisquay Shallopp’ and bade the master come aboard, who responded ‘Come aboard you Parliament dogs … shee is but a Parliament ketch Ile fight with her’.131 These attitudes may have been a consequence of parliament’s own forces seizing European ships trading with royalist ports: throughout June 1644, the Dutch ambassadors in London reported that ‘Daily come to us many complaints, about manifold damages at sea … by the ships under the earl of Warwick or [sailing with] his Excellency’s Commission’.132 The conflict also expanded further outwards. In February 1644, Miles Cawson, a London shipmaster who had been briefly imprisoned in Dartmouth, reported ‘divers men-of-war ready for sea and others preparing’, including some from Bristol, intending to capture ‘English shipping’ at the Canary Islands, Madeira, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, the Caribbean and North America, and fishermen at Newfoundland: effectively, the whole North Atlantic.133 This probably referred to the expedition led by James Ley, earl of Marlborough, which sailed to the Caribbean, although three London ships also reported being attacked by privateers under Marlborough’s command in the Mediterranean in May 1644.134 Cawson may have exaggerated, but there certainly was fighting BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 195r–195v, 214r–215v, 240r, 263r–265v, 274r–276r, 277r–279r, 278r–279r, 288r, 289r, 304r–304v, 311r–314r, 416r–418v, 424r–428v; TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Hugh Peters, 12 March 1643[/4]; SP 21/7, fo. 27v; CJ, iii, pp. 333, 407, 436; LJ, vi, pp. 633–4; CSPD, 1644, p. 68. See also SAA 5075, inv.nr. 848, pp. 509, 545. 129 BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fo. 230r–v, ‘ordinairement reputé pour Renegado, et circoncis dans le loy de Mahomet’; Mercurius Aulicus (29 December 1644–5 January 1644[/5]), p. 1321; Mercurius Britanicus, 67 (20–27 January 1645), p. 529. 130 E.g. TNA HCA 13/58, deposition of William Hodges, 9 September 1643; HCA 13/59, deposition of Christopher Michell, 14 June 1644. 131 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of William Sindenby, 13 August 1644. 132 BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 312r–313r, ‘Dagelijck comen tot ons vele clachten, over meenichvuldige beschadicheden ter zee … bij de schepen onder den heere grave van Warwijck ofte sijner Excellentie Commissie’; cf. fos 326v–327v. 133 HMC, Portland, i, p. 168; on Cawson, see Blakemore, ‘West Africa’. 134 J. H. Bennett, ‘The English Caribbees in the Period of the Civil War, 1642–1646’, William and Mary Quarterly, 24 (1967), pp. 359–77; CJ, iii, p. 524; LJ, vi, pp. 419–21; TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Nicholas Colwell, 25 August 1645, Laurence Thompson, 26 August 1645, Philip Scobble, 11 September 1645, and John Shawe, 7 February 1645[/6]; BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fos 330r–331v; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 48 (13–21 March 128

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in the Atlantic. The John of London, at the Canary Islands in March 1644, was captured by ‘two shipps pretended to bee imployed by the King againste the Parliament’, and carried to Galway in Ireland, where the master and six others seized another ship to escape.135 In May 1644 Captain Taylor, commander of the parliamentarian privateer Nicholas, was imprisoned in Barbados at the request of two Bristol shipmasters, who feared he might attack them as they unloaded; when he was released he promptly sailed to ‘Spike’s bay’, where the Bristol ships lay, fired upon them, and forced a Plymouth ship also there to submit to him.136 Other engagements occurred off the coast of Newfoundland, in the Cape Verde Islands, and in the harbours of New England.137 As the war at sea escalated, and merchant ships were caught up in the fighting, subterfuge became a particularly common feature. Men-of-war on all sides made use of false flags to lure in unsuspecting prey, while merchant captains regularly carried falsified papers and passes to try to avoid seizure if stopped by hostile vessels. An unusually detailed account of a fight between the parliamentarian Captain William Thomas and the royalist Captain George Polhill, off the coast of France, was published in June 1643.138 Thomas related how he was convoying vessels along the south coast of England when he met three shipmasters whose ships had been taken, who told him that the royalists’ ‘accustomed manner was to set out their Scouts … to give them notice when they should discry any English colours … which they could do six or seven Leagues off, presently to … go out, and by craft, and deceit, seize on them’. Thomas himself then took down my Foretop-Gallant-Mast, and put English Vanes, in all my top Mast Heads, and took in all other Colours, with a resolution to … surprize [the royalists] … [appearing] like a Merchant man, having covered my painting with old Canvas, took in all my Ordnance, kept close my men.

When Thomas encountered Polhill, they informed Polhill’s lieutenant (who was himself disguised ‘in French habite’ when he came aboard Thomas’s ship)

1644), pp. 385–7; Mercurius Britanicus, 28 (18–25 March 1644), p. 222; Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 34 (18–25 March 1643[/4]), p. 267; James Kendall Hosmer, ed., Winthrop’s Journal ‘History of New England’, 1630–1649 (2 vols, New York, 1908), ii, pp. 196–7; on the Mediterranean, see TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Nicholas Colwell, 25 August 1645, and Phillip Scobble, 11 September 1645. 135 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Lewis Boulden, 25 January 1644[/5]. 136 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Acon Ruddocke, 5 May 1645, Thomas Hasting, 5 May 1645, Samuel Leigh, 8 May 1645, and James Small, 10 May 1645. 137 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Nicholas Browne, 13 November 1645, Peter King, 17 February 1645[/6], and John Shawe, 7 February 1645[/6]; Hosmer, ed., Winthrop’s Journal, ii, pp. 167–8, 183–4. See also Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’. 138 Also mentioned in TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of William Thomas, 6 June 1644.

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that they came from London, whereupon Polhill attacked.139 Thomas, however, ­managed to overpower the royalist vessel.140 Such tactics were common on all sides and were well known in the maritime world: George Cheatham deposed in 1640 that ‘it is an ordinary thing with the Turcks to make use of the Colours of any Country to serve their present occasions’.141 The Magdalen and the Lorne, under Captain Hosier and Captain Hodges, encountered four ships off the coast of France; initially the two parliamentarians had out colours which they call the Bristoll Jacke, but soe soone as they drew within sight of the colours of those fower shipps, and perceiving thereby that they were Scotchmen, the Magdalen tooke in the Bristoll Jacke, & put forth the Parliament Jacke.142

Intriguingly, though the four Scottish ships were sailing as a group, one of their masters stated that ‘the John & the Jennett … were for the kinge, & hee & the other shipp for the Parliament’, and the parliamentarians did indeed dismiss two of the ships, after receiving proof of their intended destinations.143 Captain Thomas Plunkett in the Discovery used a similar deception when he met the Thomas, commanded by John Todd, in February 1645. Though the Discovery was apparently flying parliament’s colours, Plunkett told Todd that he came from Bristol, to which Todd replied ‘hee was frend then to the said Plunckett and that hee had taken the Covenaunt for the King to serve live and die with him’. Plunkett refused to believe Todd until ‘a bible being delivered to him … [Todd] tooke itt into his hand and kist itt, and swore uppon his conscience and soule that hee had spoken nothinge but the verety’, after which Plunkett insisted this be put down in writing. Only after this did Todd finally realise that Plunkett was a wily parliamentarian, and he resorted, unsuccessfully, to bribery.144 Hosier and Hodges employed similar deceits when they interviewed the master of the Jennett. Hodges offered to release the ship if the master could prove he was for the king. At this point, the Master of the Jennett said his Merchant had the Marquis of Ormonds passe … the Merchant beeing called in pulld that passe out of his sleeve [and] threw yt downe uppon the table, & then said, yf you bee Parliament shipps, I have lost my shipp & goods.145

William Thomas, Good Newes from Sea, being a True Relation of the Late Sea-Fight, betweene Captaine William Thomas … Against Captaine Polhill (1643), pp. 1–3. 140 Ibid., p. 4. 141 TNA HCA 13/56, deposition of George Cheatham, 28 May 1640. 142 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Thomas Browne, 17 May 1644. 143 Ibid., depositions of Richard Warde, 16 May 1644, and Thomas Browne, 17 May 1644. 144 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of William Smart, 2 May 1645, and Thomas Ashbye, 9 May 1645. 145 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of William Cock, 16 May 1644. 139

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Documents such as this pass were intended to demonstrate the legality of a specific voyage but, because they established with whom a ship was trading and, in theory at least, where the crew’s or owners’ loyalty lay, they became potentially dangerous items during the 1640s. Consequently, some masters hid or destroyed their papers when captured, though this too could be interpreted as a sign of guilt. George Jacobson, master of the Hunter, threw all of his papers overboard when captured by the Constant Warwick, and when the Hector seized the Phenix, they saw papers ‘swiming in the sea neare her’; ‘a little boy one of the Company of the Phenix’ later admitted that ‘uppon the coast of Norway [they] shott a Scott in the Bow & suncke her’.146 The crew of the Postillian of St Malo, sailing from Galway in December 1646, disagreed about where their ship’s papers were cast overboard. Anthony Lynch claimed ‘he threwe over Boarde one letter to a Marchant in London, and three other letters, but where hee threwe them over Boarde nor why he cannot tell’, while James Cordieu remembered this occurring ‘aboute the Lands Ende being chased by a Dunkirker’. John Eales denied that they had met any other vessels, and thought that the letters had been thrown overboard just before their destination, suggesting that the Dunkirker was a convenient invention.147 Rather than casting documents overboard, others were inventive in their hiding places; when Captain Coppin seized the Margaret of Milton, ‘in the Cabon of the said ketch they founde a Cade of herrings, & turning them out of the Cade, they founde [a royalist pass] stickinge in a herrings mouth’.148 Still others hedged their bets. The Charity sailed from London for Milford Haven and Liverpool, but en route put into Dublin bay, where she was seized by parliamentarians.149 One of her part-owners, Gabriel Pears, reported meeting Robert Smith, the freighting merchant, before the voyage and ‘discoursing and telling [him] … [of] the danger and difficulty of that voyadg in case they should meete with any men of warr belonging to the Parliament’; Smith replied that he had a pass from the earl of Warwick. Pears pointed out ‘that the danger would bee as greate in case they should bee mett withall by any of the Kings men of warr’, whereupon Smith ‘made answer that hee then had in his Custody a Comission from his Maiesty with his Maiestys hand to it’.150 During the voyage, one of her crew, Richard Pacy, came across the master’s mate, Thomas Ashkettle, ‘reading of a great writinge in parchment, to which was affixed a great seale … who told [Pacy] yt was a Commission from the Kinge from Oxford, & wissed [sic] [Pacy] not to say any thinge of yt’; according to another deposition they carried a pass from the marquis of Ormond.151 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Walter Hide, 9 November 1645, and Peter Whit, 14 May 1646. 147 TNA HCA 15/2, depositions of Anthony Lynch, 19 January 1646[/7], James Cordieu, 19 January 1646[/7], and John Eales, 19 January 1646[/7]. 148 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Thomas Squary, 8 February 1643[/4]. 149 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Henry Parry, 10 February 1645[/6], William Haile, 10 February 1645[/6], and Edward Clement, 21 April 1646. 150 Ibid., deposition of Gabriel Pears, 18 May 1646. 151 Ibid., depositions of Henry Parry, 10 February 1645[/6], and Richard Pacy, 2 May 1646. 146

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Similar deceptions were necessary in Denmark, where a number of masters were advised by James Roberts, ‘an Englishman Shipcarpenter ymployed to build shipps there for the Kinge of Denmarcke … not to enter their shippes for London or any other place under the Parliament’.152 Henry Sheeres, master of the Elsabeth, along with John Eldred of the Jeremy, consulted together & drew upp a Commission from their factor, requiring them to saile … for Bristoll or Fraunce, or to that effect, & that Commission they shewed at Elsanore … & by noe other meanes they gott the said shipps freed at Elsanore after some few dayes stay there … And [Sheeres] denieth that hee had any passe Royall Conduct or speciall Intimacion from Oxford.153

It was not only parliamentarian ships who made use of such ruses to target ships at sea. Confederate privateers flew false flags and made use of other ploys to get close to merchant vessels before they attacked. In 1644 Master Taylor, on board a London merchantman, saw what he believed to be a parliamentarian warship and sailed close by. He hailed the ship and received a friendly answer, before he realised it was an Irish man-of-war and came under attack.154 A failure to hide incriminating documents could just as easily lead to detention for parliamentarian vessels as it could for royalist ships. In 1645 the mayor of Wexford ordered the search of an unnamed merchantman that put into the port, after he became suspicious of the paperwork provided by the master. The ship was seized after the examination found hidden passes signed by Richard Swanley.155 These examples show how the impact of maritime warfare during the 1640s was not confined to the conduct of military campaigns ashore, but also disrupted the networks of trade and shipping around the British Isles and Ireland, and even further afield.

Conclusion Between the autumn of 1642 and the end of 1646, as Ian Gentles put it, the ‘fortunes of war had swung this way and that’, and the outcome was uncertain until very late in the war.156 In many respects the fluctuations in the naval war were even less predictable in 1642 than those on land, and remained so throughout subsequent years. With control of the navy and the resources of London at its disposal, parliament should have dominated the conflict at sea, but instead the TNA HCA 13/58, deposition of John Eldred, 28 October 1643. For diplomatic negotiations between parliament and Denmark, see BL Add. MS 72,436, especially fos 53r–62v, 105r–106v, 128r–130r, 131r, 137r–138v; Bodl. Tanner MS 62, fos 397r–80r, 648r; Tanner MS 61, fos 3r–3v, 132r–134r. 153 TNA HCA 13/58, deposition of Henry Sheeres, 28 October 1643. 154 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 84 (3–10 December 1644), pp. 671–2. 155 HMC, Ormonde, i, pp. 93–4. 156 Ian Gentles, ‘The Civil Wars in England’, in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, The Civil Wars, p. 135. 152

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parliamentarian navy found itself in a difficult struggle against resourceful and energetic enemies who at times challenged their control of the waters around the British Isles and Ireland. Patrolling against privateers and taking part in siege operations were vital activities, but they required a large-scale commitment of naval resources for what often seemed like limited strategic gains. Nevertheless, they paid off, and, by the end of 1646, the royalist naval threat had largely been eliminated in England and Wales. But the war was far from over: confederate privateers were growing in numbers and boldness, cracks were beginning to show in parliament’s unity, and as 1647 began, the war at sea moved into a different phase.

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4 Parliament’s Navy, 1642–1646

Parliament’s maritime forces have attracted considerable attention from historians, with particular interest in political and administrative developments within the navy, overall strategy, and military impact.1 For the most part these scholars have concluded that, although there were no major seaborne engagements on the same scale as the battles on land, the navy played an important role in protecting trade (and therefore customs revenues), interrupting the shipping of arms to royalists, and preventing foreign intervention, as well as supporting coastal garrisons. The impression of overwhelming parliamentarian strength at sea has been corrected by research into the activities of royalist and Irish privateers, but nevertheless control of the navy contributed to parliament’s eventual victory in the first civil war.2 As Bernard Capp noted, had Charles I possessed the naval strength to blockade London, the war could have ended considerably sooner as parliament’s war machine would probably have ground to a halt.3 Indeed, the navy’s main significance for parliament may well have been in defending London, the Thames, and maritime trade to the capital. At the same time, the Thames and Medway were the site of England’s major naval bases, and – as discussed in Chapter 2 – parliament’s success in taking control of the navy depended upon mobilising support amongst the capital’s seafarers.4 Parliament relied upon the navy to protect London, while at the same time they relied upon London to support the navy. In a similar way to their land forces, parliament Oppenheim, History of the Administration, pp. 240–50; Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, ch. 10; Dewar, ‘Naval Administration’; Kennedy, ‘Parliament and the Navy’; Kennedy, ‘Establishment and Settlement’; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War; Baumber, ‘The Navy during the Civil Wars and Commonwealth’; Baumber, ‘The Navy and Civil War in Ireland, 1641–3’; Maples, ‘Parliament’s Admiral’; McCaughey, ‘The English Navy’; Baumber, ‘The Navy and Civil War in Ireland, 1644–6’; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 8; Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’, pp. 398–408; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, ch. 28; Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, pp. 156–91; Lea-O’Mahoney, ‘The Navy in the English Civil War’. 2 See Chapter 5, pp. 113, 119–22. 3 Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, p. 176. A few royalist privateers did seize shipping in the Thames: see Bodl. Rawl. MS A 221, p. 138. 4 See Chapter 2, pp. 49–52.

1

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­ tilised existing military structures, but expanded and (to some extent) reformed u them for the demands of civil war. This chapter will first examine the purposes for which parliament used the navy, before turning to naval administration and politics, and then the various ranks of naval personnel. Finally, we will look at the considerable auxiliary maritime forces mobilised by parliament.

Defence and authority At times, as discussed in the previous chapter, the fleet was pivotally important to the course of the land war. In 1643, the navy supplied both Plymouth and Hull by sea while these towns resisted a royalist siege; in 1644 the earl of Warwick commanded naval forces supporting the besieged port of Lyme, and in the same year the Irish squadron under Richard Swanley was instrumental in rescuing parliamentarian fortunes in Pembrokeshire. Throughout the war parliamentarian ships in the Irish Sea were vital to supporting English garrisons in Ireland, and in linking together campaigns in the three kingdoms. In these instances, it is clear that parliament’s ability to bring naval force to bear at specific points, and to supply its garrisons from the sea, significantly altered the strategic balance of these campaigns.5 However, parliament rarely mentioned land warfare to explain the purpose of naval activity, but rather laid great emphasis on maritime and national security, which were presented as intimately linked. According to Warwick’s instructions to captains, the navy was ‘for the safe guarding of his Majesties kingdoms & Parliament [and] the preventing of forraigne Invasions, and securing of the Trade of his Majesties good subjects’, and very similar phrases appear in published ordinances authorising impressment.6 There were serious concerns that French or Danish help might reach the king, that the Spanish might interfere in Ireland, and that ammunition was being shipped from continental ports. One pamphlet from September 1642 warned of the ‘malicious intentions of forraigne Nations, who daily strive to foot themselves in the heart of this Kingdome’, singling out the Spanish who ‘egge and encourage on a Civill dissencion’.7 A declaration by parliament published on 14 March 1643 warned of ‘the great inconveniences, Distractions, and Troubles … by the Approaching of foraigne forces now in preparation’, and this was a perennial anxiety in the popular London press, who dutifully reported whenever the navy captured a European ship carrying supplies to the king or the Irish confederates.8 See Chapter 3, pp. 58–60, 62–4, 67–9, 71–2, 73–4, 76. TNA SP 16/509, fo. 28r; Parliament, An Ordinance for the Bettter [sic] Raysing and Levying of Mariners, Saylers and Others (1643); Parliament, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament; For the Better Raising, Leavying, and Impressing of Mariners, Saylers, and Others (1644). 7 Anon., Ioyfull Nevves from Sea, sig. A2r–A2v. 8 Parliament, A Declaration by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, for the Speedy Setting Forth of a Fleet of Ships to Sea, for the Defence of the Kingdome (1643). For discussion and citation of newsbooks dealing with these issues, see Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 138–9. 5 6

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Parliament positioned itself not just as the defender of the realm from foreign invasion, but from all maritime threats. The same declaration condemning ‘foraigne forces’ also mentioned ‘Sea Rovers’ and royalist ‘pirates’, and in 1644 parliament levied a tax on herring to pay for convoys for the fishery.9 These interventions represented more than just practical responses to the circumstances: parliament began to claim the role of authority in the maritime sphere traditionally held by the crown. Warwick commanded his captains to ‘apprehend’ any ‘Strangers shipps (being men of warre) … any Pyratt, Sea Rover or other Delinquents at sea’ and ‘any Shipp … waringe the Kinges Colours, or any other Colours being men of warre and not haveinge authoritie from the Parliament’.10 The implication was that parliament alone had the right to grant ‘authoritie’ to warships, and thus to distinguish between piracy and legitimate acts of maritime warfare.11 This was expressed in the familiar language of maritime sovereignty.12 One royal proclamation accused Warwick of ‘traiterously presum[ing] to usurpe to himself the Soveraignty of the Seas’, although in Warwick’s instructions to his captains the concern for ‘his Majesties Soveraigntie’ is very similar to naval orders from the 1630s, except that it was now to be protected by parliament on the king’s behalf.13 William Batten, when commanding the fleet in 1645, was ordered to ‘maintaine this kingdomes Soveraigntie and Regalitie in the Seas’ – which included protecting ‘Vessells trading under the Parliaments obedience’ from ‘ships set forth under the pretext and colour of Commissions from the King’.14 Parliament also performed this role by continuing to support the High Court of Admiralty in London, and in 1643 parliament administered its oath of loyalty, the National Covenant, to the naval fleet and to seafarers in London’s eastern parishes.15 The importance of this oath can be seen in the prize lawsuit concerning the Angell, seized by the parliamentarian Constant Good Hope. The crew of the Angell claimed they had fled only because they mistook their pursuer for a royalist ship; in a bid to prove their loyalty, Thomas Grad, one of the crew, mentioned in his deposition that ‘hee this examinate hath taken the nationall Covenant & soe hath Baker the Master’, and two other sailors also claimed to have sworn the oath.16 Ambrose Pomeroy, another of the crew, CJ, iii, pp. 604–5; CJ, iv, pp. 85, 245; LJ, vi, pp. 686–7. BL Add. MS 4,106, fo. 201v; cf. fo. 203r. 11 Blakemore, ‘Politics of Piracy’, pp. 159–72. 12 On the crown’s claims to maritime sovereignty, see Chapter 1, pp. 24–6. 13 Charles I, By the King. A Proclamation for the Safety of his Majesties Navy (Oxford, 1642[/3]); cf. Mercurius Aulicus, 7th week (12–18 February 1642[/3]), sig. N4r–v; Mercurius Aulicus, 2nd week (7–13 January 1643[/4]), p. 780; BL Add. MS 4,106, fos 199r–205r, quoting fo. 201r; other examples survive in TNA HCA 30/865 (unfoliated), and Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 51r–53r. For earlier instructions, see NMM JOD/1/1, fos 70v–73r; NMM LEC/5, fos 2r–8v; cf. TNA SP 16/157, fos 140v–145v. 14 Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 25v–26r. 15 CJ, iii, pp. 254, 262; Certaine Informations, 25 (3–10 July 1643), p. 194; Vallance, Revolutionary England, ch. 3. 16 TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Thomas Grad, 2 November 1644; cf. depositions of Robert Peckett, 4 November 1644, and Edmund Brightman, 6 November 1644. 9

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admitted that he ‘hath not taken the nationall covenant’, but he maintained that the merchants who freighted the Angell were ‘men verye well affected to the Kinge and Parliament’.17 Seafarers continued to petition parliament throughout the 1640s, usually requesting protection for trade, or other forms of aid (such as the ransoming of captives in North Africa).18 As well as requests for protection, these began to include a variety of issues relating to maritime employment. A petition from ‘divers Masters and others’ was submitted on 10 February 1645, complaining that ‘divers worldlyminded [sic] Persons’ were exporting goods in foreign ships, ‘to the great Discouragement of the Owners, Shipwrights, and Mariners, weakening of the Kingdom (rendering it less able for Defence), diminishing of the Customs … [and] disheartening both the building of Ships and breeding of native Mariners’, and requesting parliament to take some course ‘for the remedying thereof’.19 In May that year, a petition ‘from some Seamen, and Masters of Ships … concerning free Trade’ was submitted to parliament.20 The consequences of parliament’s control of the navy, therefore, must be seen not just in its strategic influence, but also in the way it enabled parliament to claim legitimacy in the maritime sphere.

Politics and administration Having taken control of the navy, parliament managed it through a mixture of overlapping organisations.21 In 1642 parliament created a navy committee to direct the day-to-day running of their naval forces, and the earl of Warwick was appointed as lord high admiral in December 1643, but was then removed from this position by the Self-Denying Ordinance in April 1645, to be briefly reinstated during the crisis of 1648–49.22 In 1645, therefore, parliament set up the admiralty committee, to carry out the functions of the vacant office of admiral. Important London merchants staffed both committees, including Giles Grene, Samuel Vassall, Alexander and Squire Bence, and Maurice Thomson.23 Warwick, Grene, TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of Ambrose Pomeroy, 29 October 1644 and 2 November 1644. 18 LJ, v, p. 605; LJ, vi, pp. 19, 440, 501, 686–7; CJ, iii, pp. 55–6; CJ, iv, p. 54; To the Honourable the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the House of Commons assembled in the High Court of Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Marriners and Seafaring-Men and Other Inhabitants of Stepny, and Some Other Adjacent Parts (1643). 19 LJ, vii, pp. 185–6. 20 CJ, iv, p. 145; LJ, vii, p. 372. 21 Dewar, ‘Naval Administration’; Kennedy, ‘Establishment and Settlement’; Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’. 22 For Warwick’s commission, see Bodl. Rawl. MS A 221, fo. 1r. On 1648–9, see Chapter 6, pp. 140–52. 23 Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’; Robert Brenner, ‘The Civil War Politics of London’s Merchant Community’, P&P, 58 (1973), pp. 53–107; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, part 3. 17

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and Vassall were also important on other committees, such as those for foreign affairs and for American colonies.24 To carry out the practical administration, parliament retained the pre-existing posts but augmented them with new appointments. Charles forbade the principal officers of the navy to obey parliament in July 1642, but William Batten, the surveyor and Warwick’s second-in-command, ignored this order. The MP Sir Henry Vane junior became navy treasurer, and parliament nominated navy commissioners to carry out routine tasks, some of them salaried, some of them MPs sitting on the navy committee. These men, too, were amongst the most substantial members of London’s shipping establishment: the salaried commissioners included Richard Cranley, sometime master of Trinity House, John Morris and Roger Tweedy, elder brethren of that corporation, and Peter Pett, member of a shipbuilding dynasty that was involved in naval activity throughout the seventeenth century.25 Cranley, Tweedy, Morris, and Squire Bence were all listed as masters in a survey of London’s shipping from 1629, all in command of ships of 200 tons or more and carrying ordnance.26 At that time, Tweedy and Morris were also part-owners of their vessels: these men were experienced shipmasters, some of whom had moved into trade as they prospered. Cranley, Tweedy, and Bence appear as younger brethren of Trinity House in another survey of the same year.27 Since its formation in 1514 this corporation, whose members were mainly masters but also master’s mates and other officers, had served as an advisory body to the crown in naval and maritime matters, as well as lobbying on behalf of the maritime community, and Charles’s admiralty had regularly consulted them.28 Yet this was the first time that members of the corporation had effectively taken control of the navy. Only Batten and Thomas Smith, secretary to the admiralty, had previously been involved in naval administration; Smith was secretary to the earl of Northumberland while he was admiral during the 1630s, and had business dealings with some of the Trinity House clique.29 Charles M. Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 1622–1675 (Baltimore, 1908), p. 21. 25 For the Petts, see Phineas Pett, The Autobiography of Phineas Pett, ed. W. G. Perrin (1918), pp. xlii–civ; Stuart Rankin, ‘Pett, Peter (d. 1589)’, ODNB; Roy McCaughey, ‘Pett, Phineas (1570–1647)’, ODNB; J. K. Laughton, ‘Pett, Peter (b. 1610, d. in or before 1672)’, rev. J. D. Davies, ODNB. 26 TNA SP 16/137. 27 TNA SP 16/135, fos 108r–109v. 28 Harris, Trinity House of Deptford, pp. 66–7, 219; G. G. Harris, ed., Trinity House of Deptford Transactions, 1609–1635 (1983), pp. xx, 2, 67, 89–90, 93–4, 125, 129, 157–9; McGowan, ‘Royal Navy’, pp. 14, 19, 26, 70, 112, 268; Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 82, 291, 294. For ships requesting ordnance through Trinity House during Charles’s reign, see TNA SP 16/228, fos 16r, 30r, 36v, 50v, 58r, 72r, 74r, 82v, 85r, 90v, 129v; SP 16/264, fos 4v, 19r, 28v, 29v, 31r, 35r, 37r, 38r, 60r, 65v, 80v, 111v, 116v, 118v, 133v, 136v, 141v, 157v, 159r, 161r, 165r, 166r; SP 16/353, fos 20r, 24v, 31v, 32v–33r, 37v, 43v, 44r, 50r, 54r, 62v, 69r, 72v–73r, 76v, 77r, 78v, 91v, 98r. 29 Roy McCaughey, ‘Smith, Thomas (d. 1658)’, ODNB. 24

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Parliament also benefited from the pre-existing vice-admiralty system in those ports that remained loyal to it. The local vice-admiral, who was often also the mayor, could stay suspicious ships, take examinations and inventories concerning prizes, and see to the disposal of perishable prize goods. In 1643 Philip Francis, mayor of Plymouth, oversaw the necessary administration and examinations after the Fortune of Dunkirk was brought into his town as a prize. The crew of the captured vessel were examined on 12 May and an inventory was taken the following day: such a speedy prosecution was essential to ensure the value of the prize was not lost, as much of the cargo of tobacco was wet and in danger of spoiling.30 The local adjudication of prizes could be very advantageous to parliament’s war efforts, and in Munster the operations of the vice-admiralty court helped to ensure that the province held out against the confederates. Under the direction of Lord Broghill, the vice-admiral, the court’s judgments on prize cases and sale of prize cargoes provided essential funds for Lord Inchiquin’s army. In 1645 the disposal of goods from the St Peter allowed Inchiquin to pay his soldiers and provide victuals, at a time when he was besieged by the confederates and in danger of being overrun.31 However, being far from the oversight of the main admiralty court in London may also have enabled corrupt practices to flourish in regional vice-admiralties such as Munster. During the war a number of mariners and merchants made complaints about how they were treated there. Thomas Boyd, the master of the Thomas of Ely, spent years seeking restitution for the sale of his lading of wine, which was sold in Munster even after it was deemed not to be a prize in London.32 The navy’s administrators similarly relied upon maritime tradesmen to supply the navy with its enormous material requirements, and the recorded expenses indicate the vast array of material required to keep naval ships operational.33 Throughout the 1640s the navy purchased huge quantities of necessary supplies, some of them sourced from those involved in the naval establishment (particularly Peter Pett), and regularly sent ships into the Thames dockyards, and to Chatham, for repairs and resupply.34 In 1646 parliament ordered the building of four new frigates at Chatham, Deptford, and Woolwich, which proved busy work. Daniell Larkin, a shipwright from Deptford, was ‘daiely employed in his

TNA HCA 13/246, examinations and orders concerning the Fortune, 12 May 1643. For the jurisdiction and operation of the admiralty court in Ireland, see Kevin Costello, The Court of Admiralty in Ireland, 1575–1893 (Dublin, 2011), pp. 1–47; TNA HCA 13/60, deposition of Richard Gething, 10 March 1646; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 100–1. 32 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of William Smart, Richard Collett, Hugo Fulham, and Thomas Barnett, 2, 3, 5, and 9 May 1645; CJ, x, p. 453. 33 See especially TNA ADM 18/1, 18/2, 18/3, and 18/5; and E 351/2284, fos 6r–8v; E 351/2285, fos 5v–15r; E 351/2286, fos 3r–9v; E 351/2287, fos 2v–11v; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 220. 34 TNA SP 16/494, fo. 57r; SP 16/504, fo. 90r; ADM 18/1, fos 37v, 44v, 48r, 76r, 84v, 88v, 96r; ADM 18/2, fos 5r, 43r, 76v, 82v, 89r, 107Ar–107Av, 110r, 114v; BL Add. MS 9,297, fos 389r–394v; see also the Ordnance Office records, NMM CAD/C/5. 30 31

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Majestys yard … hee cannot possibly bee spared to attend any parish duties’.35 This, again, reveals the close relationship between Trinity House and the naval administration, as ‘3 or 4 of the ablest shippwrights’ of Shipwrights’ Hall, and ‘3 or 4 of the ablest Elder Brethren [of Trinity House]’, were ordered to ‘Report unto us their opinions’ concerning the shipbuilding.36 Parliament also saw the benefit of developing and expanding dockyard and victualling facilities in other key harbours, to ensure ships could remain on their stations for longer. Portsmouth dockyard received a large amount of state investment during the war, and began to undertake building works in the 1650s.37 Kinsale became the base for the Irish guard, with the establishment of a victualling office, repair and ship-cleaning facilities, and the appointment of skilled craftsmen to staff them.38 This industry included not only the supply of raw materials, but also carefully manufactured items, such as the compasses and other navigational instruments sold to the navy by Dennis Liddall.39 It also involved some women, often participating in the professions of their husbands and male relatives but sometimes on their own account, who were responsible for considerable enterprises. Elizabeth Davies, a widow, supplied the stores at Deptford with large quantities of ‘hamaccoes’, and some flags.40 Hester Leatherland delivered ‘Grometts & Nayles’ throughout the 1640s, presumably manufactured by her husband Ambres Leatherland (who also appears in the records). In 1646, ‘now widdowe[d]’, she was contracted by Warwick to continue making ‘Nailes Lockes hinges and other smale Ironworkes’, possibly because she ‘gave credit when others would not to considerable summes of mony’.41 Elizabeth Hill, another widow, also delivered compasses and navigational equipment to Deptford.42 During these years, Shipwrights’ Hall, officially incorporated by James I but still struggling to enforce its authority over maritime tradesmen, became dependent on parliament’s support.43 In April 1644 Edward Keeling, clerk of the corporation, wrote to Robert Coytmore, Warwick’s secretary and a navy commissioner, that ‘for the publicke service (which I accompt this Corporacion of shipwrights to relate to) there is need enough to cherish this Infant Government’.44 In March 1646 Keeling petitioned parliament, complaining that the corporation had not paid him, and it was later reported that one Mr Brograve refused to pay BL Add. MS 9,306, fo. 89v; on the frigates, see fos 89r, 101v, 110v; LJ, viii, pp. 646–7. LJ, viii, p. 646; BL Add. MS 9306, fos 89r, 101r. 37 Davies, Pepys’s Navy, p. 181. 38 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 84–5 39 TNA ADM 18/2, fo. 86v; ADM 18/5, pp. 20, 53, 73, 143, 188, 206, 226, 245, 270, 288. 40 TNA ADM 18/1, fos 26v, 35r, 49r, 53v. 41 TNA ADM 18/2, fos 18v, 19r–21r, 39v; BL Add. MS 9,306, fo. 98v. For other widows, see ADM 18/5, pp. 21, 92. 42 TNA ADM 18/1, fo. 66r; ADM 18/2, fo. 53v. 43 For the early stages of the shipwrights company, see Pett, Autobiography, pp. xv–xli. The 1605 and 1612 charters are printed in ibid., appendices III and IV, pp. 176–206. On disputes, see ibid., pp. xxxiv–xxxvi; TNA SP 16/264, fo. 145r; SP 16/353, fos 19v, 41v–42r, 87r–87v; LJ, viii, p. 286; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fo. 34v. 44 TNA SP 16/501, fo. 159r. 35 36

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the corporation’s ‘Assessment’, probably the Andrewe Brograve who owned a dock in Deptford, was an overseer for the parish, and built ships for the East India Company, as well as being part-owner of a parliamentarian privateer.45 This dispute indicates how politically important the regulation of maritime industry was. This administration and industry supported a higher level of naval activity than had been seen in Britain throughout the early seventeenth century. Parliament set out both summer and winter guards, and maintained a squadron in the Irish Sea, as well as sending ships to the northeast coast and to Scotland.46 The various sources which list parliament’s fleets give conflicting numbers of ships, but there are two clear trends.47 First, even if we take the minimum number of ships, parliament’s fleet rose from forty-one vessels in 1642 to fifty-six by 1647. Second, and more importantly, the number of state-owned ships doubled (from eighteen to forty-three, minimum) while the number of hired merchant ships almost halved (from twenty-three or twenty-four to thirteen), although this does not include the substantial number of auxiliaries employed outside of the naval fleet.48 This was a clear operational expansion from the Ship Money fleets of the 1630s, and the navy purchased or otherwise added thirty-two vessels between 1642 and 1645 alone.49 Such an expansion incurred massive expenditure and repeated problems with finance, and Warwick regularly complained to parliament about the lack of funding and cash-flow difficulties, though this was somewhat ameliorated by appropriating to the navy the income from excise taxes on meat, salt, and tobacco pipes in November 1643.50 To some extent, then, the sheer size of parliament’s naval mobilisation had a transformative effect, as a new financial system, which dwarfed Charles’s controversial Ship Money, developed to cope with it.51 LJ, viii, pp. 232, 286; TNA HCA 13/58, deposition of Thomas Page, 19 December 1643; HCA 13/60, deposition of Jonas Shish, 10 September 1646; HCA 24/141, fos 311r–315v; ADM 7/6723, pp. 101, 119, 130; LMA P78/NIC/44, pp. 52–3, 55, 58. 46 See Chapter 3, pp. 59, 62, 65, 67, 71, 73–7. 47 See Appendix 2, pp. 186–9. 48 On auxiliaries, see below, pp. 104–7. 49 Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223, pp. 35–6; for the Ship Money fleets, see Chapter 1, pp. 00–00. 50 TNA SP 16/500, fos 112r–113r; CJ, iii, pp. 228, 236; LJ, v, p. 206; LJ, vi, pp. 332, 419–21, 617; BL Stowe MS 184, fo. 120v; Bodl. Tanner MS 62, fo. 464r. Other complaints: SP 16/494, fo. 74r; Bodl. Rawl. MS 62, fos 549r–549v, 614r. For the excise, CJ, iii, p. 312; see also CJ, iv, pp. 76, 107. For estimates of the cost of the fleets, see BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 62r; Add. MS 17,503, fos 3v–4r; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223; Giles Grene, A Declaration in Vindication of the Honour of the Parliament, and of the Committee of the Navy and Customes, against All Traducers (1647), pp. 9–10. 51 On parliamentarian war finances, see John Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War, 1630–1648 (2nd edn, Harlow, 1999), pp. 77–122; Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 105–8; for the development of taxation throughout the seventeenth century, and the significance of the 1640s to this, see Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558–1714 (Manchester, 1996). 45

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This resulted, in 1646, in accusations of corruption against the administration, made by the shipwright Andrewes Burrell; he complained in particular that the navy commissioners hired large, slow ships to the state’s service and kept better ships for privateering ventures.52 Whether or not the allegations were true (they were, unsurprisingly, fiercely denied), Burrell’s ire was most likely provoked because his own earlier suggestions had apparently gone unanswered. In his Humble Remonstrance he complained that he had submitted proposals for naval improvement to Warwick, and to Viscount Saye, but these were ‘sent … to be disputed by the Officers of the Navy, with whom it died’.53 He maintained that he meant no disrespect to Warwick, but targeted ‘the Officers of the Navie, and the Brethren of the Trinitie [House]’.54 On the other hand, the navy commissioners responded with an accusation that Burrell had rejected the post of prize commissioner because it was unsalaried.55 Moreover, the uselessness of large ships was an axe Burrell continued to grind after the first civil war, and it is not entirely surprising that the naval administrators used their own ships, or that they provided larger ships to supplement the main battle fleet, and kept smaller vessels for privateering.56 More generally, Burrell criticised the navy’s conduct in the war, alleging that ‘it was verie rare if once in a week, there came not a report of one, or more ships taken from the Merchants of London, by the Kings evill partie, of the landing of Irish, of invasion by the Turks’.57 The navy commissioners in their turn claimed that ‘[the corsairs] landed in his Majesties Quarters and not in the Parliaments; and if Posts and Intelligence might have gone along that Coast, they might have been prevented, the Parliament Ships being at the seige of Plymouth’.58 Burrell also argued that ‘Those Captaines that are most valiant, have been discouraged, These accusations were published in Andrewes Burrell, The Humble Remonstrance of Andrewes Burrell, Gent. For a Reformation of Englands Navie (1646), and the naval administration published two responses: Navy Commissioners, The Answer of the Commissioners of the Navie, to a Scandalous Pamphlet (1646); Grene, Declaration in Vindication. For a summary and analysis, see Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, pp. 190–4. 53 Burrell, Humble Remonstrance, sig. Ar–Av. 54 Ibid., p. 3. 55 Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, p. 9. Burrell appears in the 1644–9 prize accounts, TNA PRO E 351/2213; see also the ordinance authorising the prize commissioners in HCA 4/4. 56 Andrewes Burrell, A Cordiall for the Calenture and those Other Diseases which Distempers the Seamen (1648[/9]); White, Memorable Sea-Fight. 57 Burrell, Humble Remonstrance, pp. 1–2. For reports in newsbooks, see Certaine Informations, 14 (17–24 April 1643), p. 110; Certaine Informations, 15 (24 April–1 May 1643), p. 115; Certaine Informations, 16 (1–8 May 1643), pp. 123–4, 128; Certaine Informations, 36 (18–25 September 1643), pp. 291–2; Certaine Informations, 45 (20–27 November 1643), p. 353; Certaine Informations, 46 (27 November–4 December 1643), pp. 358–9; The Covrt Mercurie, 4 (20–27 July 1644), sig. DD4v–5r; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer 84 (3–10 December 1644), pp. 671–2; A Diary, or an Exact Iovrnall, 39 (6–12 February 1644[/5]), sig. Mmmv. 58 Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, p. 15. 52

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and those that have deserved punishment, have been preferred to places of trust’.59 It is difficult to tell whether there is any truth in this accusation either, but parliament evidently did face some difficulties in their naval command, to which we will now turn.

Commanders and captains The central role of London’s maritime elite in naval mobilisation extended to operational commands as well as administration: apart from Warwick, the flag officers were all London seafarers linked to Trinity House.60 William Batten was appointed vice-admiral in 1642; he had been a privateer during the 1620s, and commanded a hired merchant ship in the naval fleet of 1638, in which year he purchased the position of surveyor of the navy.61 He was listed as a younger brother of the corporation in 1629 and might have been the ‘William Battinge’ who was master and part-owner of the Sallutation in that year, and he was also involved in the network of navigational practitioners centred on John Tapp’s bookshop by London Bridge.62 Richard Swanley, another younger brother of Trinity House in 1629, served as vice-admiral of the Irish squadron from 1642 until 1645.63 He had commanded ships for the East India Company during the 1630s, and also seems to have held deep religious, and especially anti-Catholic, convictions.64 He became notorious for executing captured Irish sailors, which parliamentarian newsbooks justified because of the ‘death of the Protestants’ for which the Irish were allegedly guilty.65 Swanley’s brother William commanded a hired merchantman in 1642–43 and a naval ship in 1646, and the George Swanley who commanded the Bonaventure in 1642 may have been a relative.66 Another important figure was Robert Moulton,

Burrell, Humble Remonstrance, p. 12. For lists of naval captains during the 1640s, see LJ, v, pp. 178–80; LJ, vii, pp. 594–5; LJ, viii, pp. 157–8; see also Appendix 2, pp. 186–9. 61 See C. S. Knighton, ‘Batten, Sir William (1600/01–1667)’, ODNB; TNA HCA 13/59, deposition of Thomas Crafte, 15 April 1644. 62 TNA SP 16/135, fo. 109v; SP/137; W[illiam] B[atten], and J[ohn] T[app], A Most Plaine and Easie Way for the Finding of the Sunnes Amplitude and Azimuth, and thereby the Variation of the Compasse (1630); on Tapp, see Henry R. Plomer, ‘The Church of St Magnus and the Booksellers of London Bridge’, The Library, 3 (1911), pp. 384–95; and Blakemore, ‘Navigating Culture’, pp. 31–44. 63 TNA SP 16/135, fo. 110r. 64 M. L. Baumber, ‘An East India Captain: The Early Career of Richard Swanley’, MM, 53 (1967), pp. 265–79; M. L. Baumber, ‘Swanley, Richard (1594/5–1650)’, ODNB. 65 Quoting Mercurius Britanicus, 36 (13–20 May 1644), p. 282; cf. Mercurius Britanicus, 39 (10–17 June 1644), p. 308; and also Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 161 (11–18 August 1646), p. 205; for the accusations, see Mercurius Aulicus, 18th week (28 April–4 May 1644), p. 966; Mercurius Aulicus, 29th week (14–20 July 1644), p. 1091; and see also Murphy, ‘Atrocities at Sea’, pp. 21–37. 66 William is mentioned in Richard Swanley’s will, TNA PROB 11/213 (11 September 1650). 59 60

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who in 1629 had been master of the George, a ship of 300 tons.67 During the 1630s he was involved in a shipyard in Massachusetts, and commanded a vessel on an interloping voyage to the Indian Ocean; by the next decade he was a ship-­owning partner of Thomas Smith and Warwick.68 Moulton commanded volunteers from Rotherhithe in 1642, captained the Swiftsure in 1643, and was Swanley’s replacement as vice-admiral in the Irish Sea in 1645.69 His son, who was also Peter Pett’s son-in-law, served as a parliamentarian captain in 1646.70 There were other family connections: Richard Cranley’s brother Benjamin, and Peter Pett’s son Phineas, commanded parliamentarian warships during the 1640s.71 John Crowther, vice-admiral of the Irish squadron from 1646, had also commanded a substantial merchant ship in 1629, and Elias Jordaine, an influential member of Trinity House, named Crowther as executor to his will in 1654.72 The final important naval commander was Thomas Trenchfield, who had been an elder brother of Trinity House since the 1620s, and in 1629 had commanded the 340-ton William and Ralph.73 In 1637–38 he captained the Mary Rose in the navy, and in 1637 he commanded a ship in William Rainborowe’s expedition against Salé.74 In his highly individualistic will, he described himself as ‘not of Eminent yet of honest and Religious Parents’, claimed a Protestant martyr for a grandmother, and outlined a successful maritime career, which he attributed to divine providence and which ended with him as a landowner in Kent.75 Trenchfield commanded the Sovereign in 1642 and was rewarded in January 1643 for his ‘extaordinarie care and paines taken in managing the service at Chatham … his Charges was farr greater then any other of the Commanders by reason of his Command in Cheife’.76 Trenchfield later commanded ships on the northeast coast, and was promoted to rear-admiral before his death in 1646.77 Some of those appointed to captaincies came from this same group. Brian Harrison, another younger brother of Trinity House from 1629 and also a shipmaster in the Salé expedition, commanded the Vanguard in 1642 and became an elder brother of Trinity House at some point during the 1640s.78 George Hatch, TNA SP 16/137. Bernard Capp, ‘Moulton, Robert (c. 1591–1652)’, ODNB; TNA HCA 3/231, fos 231r, 233r–235r, 237v, 238v, 251r; TNA HCA 34/1, fo. 590r. 69 CJ, ii, p. 831; CJ, iii, p. 26. 70 CJ, iv, pp. 450–1; TNA PRO PROB 11/224 (18 August 1652). 71 For family ties, see the wills of Beniamin Crandley, TNA PROB 11/233 (25 September 1654); and Peter Pett, PROB 11/224 (18 August 1652). 72 TNA SP 16/137; PROB 11/253 (13 February 1645[/6]). On Jordaine, see Chapter 6, pp. 145, 148, 151. 73 TNA SP 16/135, fo. 106r; W. R. Chaplin, ‘William Rainsborough (1587–1642) and His Associates of Trinity House’, MM, 31 (1945), pp. 190–1. 74 On this expedition, see Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 7; see also Chapter 1, pp. 17–18. 75 TNA PROB 11/197/441. 76 Quoting TNA SP 16/494, fo. 52r. See also BL Add. MS 22,546, fo. 1r; LJ, v, p. 438. 77 LJ, v, pp. 313–14; CJ, iv, pp. 450–1. 78 TNA SP 16/135, fo. 109r; Chaplin, ‘Rainsborough and His Associates’, p. 189. 67

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a parliamentarian captain in 1642, and Richard Blythe, who served from 1642 to 1645, both appear as elder brethren and commanders of substantial ships in 1629, Blythe in the service of the East India Company.79 Nathaniel Goodlad, a shipmaster from Leigh in Essex and younger brother from 1629, and who had also commanded a ship of 300 tons that year, served as captain of the Victory in 1643, and in March 1645 was appointed for an unspecified special service by Warwick, along with Peter Andrews, who also commanded a naval ship in 1642–43, and whom Warwick asked Trinity House to admit to the corporation at some point during the 1640s.80 Goodlad pleaded sickness and the execution of his father-in-law’s will as reasons why he could not accept the mission.81 Both Goodlad and Andrews were again selected for the 1646 fleet, though Goodlad was then released once more ‘in regard of his own special Occasions’.82 Only a few of these men had served in the royal navy during the 1630s, and none were gentlemen, which led Donald Kennedy to argue that the outbreak of civil war ‘changed at once the professional and social character’ of the naval command, and it does appear that parliament’s control of the navy relied upon an influx of new commanders at the beginning of the war.83 It seems likely that these men had been active in popular politics in London even before the confrontation over the fleet in July 1642, and also that many of them were driven especially by religious convictions; Batten, Swanley, and Trenchfield are examples of this.84 Maurice Thomson, a key naval administrator, and Solomon Smith, the marshal of the admiralty court, both participated in parliament’s reform of church government during 1645, again suggesting involvement in the radical religious movement.85 However, Kennedy focused very much on this group, and while they were undoubtedly important they were only a small proportion of the officers employed by parliament. In the records of parliament’s votes concerning ship captains, and in the fleet lists they published, there were 203 commanders of naval or hired merchant ships during 1642–46; in some lists ships were noted without named commanders, suggesting there were probably more.86 Even discounting the fifty-five officers who were listed in command of auxiliary vessels or privateers, and the many others who commanded privateers on parliament’s behalf, almost 150 captains at some point served in parliament’s naval fleets.87 To maintain the vastly TNA SP 16/135, fos 106r–106v; SP 16/137. TNA SP 16/135, fo. 108v; SP 16/137; SP 16/509, fo. 39r; BL Stowe MS 184, fo. 127v. 81 TNA SP 16/509, fo. 41r. 82 CJ, iv, pp. 450–1, 475–6. 83 Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, p. 182. 84 See Chapter 2, pp. 46–8. 85 CJ, iv, p. 307. 86 BL Add. MS 17,503, fos 3v–12r; TNA PRO SP 16/494, fo. 5r; SP 16/504, fo. 73r; SP 16/509, fo. 4r; SP 16/512, fos 31r–32r; ADM 18/1, fo. 62r; LJ, v, p. 379; LJ, viii, p. 459; CJ, iv, p. 648; for the published lists see Appendix 2, p. 186–9. 87 On auxiliary vessels and privateers, see below, pp. 104–7. 79

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increased naval activity upon which parliament had embarked, it was necessary to recruit a far larger officer corps, and, significantly, few of these men served in the naval fleets throughout the entire war. Of all the 203 commanders, 136 (67 per cent) were listed in only one year of the war, although William Brook in 1643 and William Brookes in 1645 could be the same person. These were for the most part captains of hired merchant ships, while some commanded small frigates. Of the remainder, over half served for just two years, which again included a substantial number of merchant ships. Only sixteen men held commands for three years, nine men for four years, and four men commanded ships for all five years of the first civil war. However, the larger naval warships were placed under the command of those men – mostly members of Trinity House – who remained in parliamentarian service, including the flag commanders. Moulton, William Swanley, Benjamin Cranley, and Peter Andrews all served for at least three years; Richard Swanley and Richard Blythe senior served for four, William Batten for five. The lack of Trinity House records for the 1640s makes it difficult to establish whether other long-serving captains (for example John Stansby, Robert Constable, and John Bowen, all of whom were listed in all five years) had any connection with the corporation, but it is likely. Some of those who commanded naval ships for three years or more, such as Joseph Jordan and William Thomas, were also residents of London.88 Parliament therefore relied upon a small, but consistent, core of Trinity House men while also employing a much wider range of temporary captains. It is also possible that Kennedy drew too cohesive a picture of men united in parliamentarian endeavour, as disputes arose among the captains of the navy. These do not appear to have occurred in the first two years of war, but in April 1644 Batten was charged with an unrecorded offence by Richard Blythe junior, who had commanded the Mary Rose the previous year.89 In 1645 Richard Swanley was accused of trading with the enemy and keeping too familiar company with women aboard his ship; it was noted that ‘songs were frequently sunge upp & downe the Country of … Captain Swanley & … Bellendia Steele’.90 Batten and Swanley were acquitted, and Swanley was loudly vindicated in the parliamentarian press.91 By contrast, some less senior captains were dismissed, including Abraham Wheeler, who was accused in June 1644 of acting without orders and of too much ‘continuance on shore’, and Matthew Coachman, who was simply ‘discharged from [his] Employment’, with no recorded reason.92 Christopher

TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of William Thomas, 6 June 1644, and Joseph Jordan, 24 April 1645. 89 CJ, iii, pp. 444–5. 90 Quoting TNA HCA 13/60, deposition of George Hayward, 3 October 1645; see also depositions of William Ayliffe, 18 September 1645, James Henly, 9 November 1645, Samuell Hawett, 12 November 1645; LJ, vii, p. 517; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 41v, 61r, 84r, 91r. The ‘Country’ may refer specifically to Wales, where Swanley was stationed. 91 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 143 (24–31 March 1646), pp. 57–61. 92 CJ, iii, pp. 447, 517; TNA PRO SP 16/504, fo. 59r; LJ, viii, pp. 210, 529–30. 88

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Ellison was suspended after an extended dispute with his chaplain and crew.93 Only one naval officer, Ralph Danske, was specifically recorded as being suspected of intending to join the king (which Danske himself denied), although there may have been more, as Mercurius Britanicus reported in mid-September 1643 that Captain Brooks of the Providence had attempted to defect but was foiled by his own crew, while in December 1645 it was reported ‘some Persons are now in Custody that have betrayed their Trust at Sea’.94 Thomas Plunkett was arrested in 1644 and accused of ‘ill affections’, but was released after ‘expressing his Sorrow for his Refractoriness’; he then became one of parliament’s most active privateers, although he later joined the royalists in 1649.95 With a few exceptions, therefore, these disputes do not necessarily indicate any considerable dissension within the navy. Rather, they reflect internal tensions between personalities and between, on the one hand, loyalty to those who had sided with parliament from the beginning and, on the other, the constant need for capable and active commanders. Warwick, in ordering Wheeler’s dismissal, stated that I doe not love to out men of theire employments, desiring rather by a[n] affectionate and respectfull carriage to engage them to doe what becomes them But this neglect … considering how much it concernes men to bee active, especially in these tymes, when the services required are above the proporcion of abilities to performe them … I canot passe it over.96

Similarly, in March 1644, parliament told Warwick that his captains should ‘be enjoined to be more active and vigilant than hitherto they have been’.97 After 1644 parliament took more interest in naval appointments. Though some commissions had been voted upon in 1642, fewer were officially approved in 1643, while in 1644 the choice of officers was generally left to the discretion of Warwick as lord high admiral.98 In 1645, voting about the appointment of officers occurred more frequently, probably as a result of the admiralty passing to a committee after Warwick resigned his commission following the SelfDenying Ordinance.99 This does not seem to have been simply a consequence of political restructuring, though. Early in 1646, parliament ordered Trinity House to ‘certify and BL Add. MS 35,297, fos 53v–57v; SP 16/509, fo. 70r; SP 16/512, fo. 45r; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 29r, 31r, 36v–37r, 44r, 58r, 60r; see also Amos C. Miller, ‘John Syms, Puritan Naval Chaplain’, MM, 60 (1974), pp. 153–63. 94 Mercurius Britanicus, 4 (12–19 September 1643), p. 32; CJ, iii, p. 447; TNA SP 16/509, fo. 73r; LJ, viii, p. 20. 95 Bodl. Rawl. MS A 221, p. 65; TNA SP 16/504, fo. 37r; CJ, iii, pp. 492, 517. On his privateering see below, pp. 106, 116–7. 96 TNA SP 16/504, fo. 59r. 97 CJ, iii, p. 412. 98 CJ, ii, p. 818; CJ, iii, pp. 331–2, 447; LJ, vi, p. 330. 99 CJ, iv, pp. 84, 107, 183, 247, 322–3; LJ, vii, pp. 312–13. 93

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­ resent the Names of such able, religious, and faithful Seamen, as they shall p think fit to be employed for Sea-Captains, for this Summer’s Expedition’, before a full list was voted on in February.100 This suggests that as the war went on, presumably because of the disputes over the sufficiency of officers, and perhaps also because many naval captains served for only a short time, parliament felt the need for increasingly direct control over their naval command. As this order was directed to Trinity House, however, it appears that even as parliament intervened more deliberately, they still relied upon the same group of masters and ship-owners to mobilise other seafarers and to provide naval personnel.

Officers, mariners, and impressment While there was a ‘social revolution’ of sorts among captains, there is little evidence of any corresponding shift among the officers who managed the daily life of a ship – boatswains, gunners, surgeons, cooks, carpenters, pursers – although there are fewer surviving records concerning their appointment. It does not appear that any of these men were removed or replaced in July 1642. When appointments were made later that year and early in 1643, frequently of men described as ‘well recommended’ or possessing ‘sufficiency and abilitie’, or already holding some position in the navy, it was usually when a place was vacated by the death, promotion, or resignation of the previous incumbent, or when a new ship was being prepared.101 This pattern of filling open places but rarely removing officers continued throughout the war, although officers were sometimes appointed by commanders at sea, and then confirmed by Warwick or the admiralty committee.102 Some of these men had served in the navy before 1640, such as Henry Kyme, who described himself as ‘long a servitor to the Navy’, or William Clarke, who had ‘beene a painefull [i.e. painstaking] Servant in severall of his Majesties shipps for manie yeares together’.103 In 1645 John Attawell attested that he had been a purser in various ships for twenty-seven years, while William Cooke had ‘served the state for above 40 yeares past in most of his Majesties ships’, and had been one of the navy’s four principal masters for two decades.104 When promoting the boatswain of the Convertine, a ‘Civill, well governed man’, Warwick reminded Richard Cranley that ‘those men that have long secured the State ought to be prefer’d before strangers’.105 CJ, iv, pp. 416, 450–1. TNA SP 16/494, fos 61r, 63r, 66r, 68r, 86r, 103r–107r, 115r, 119r, 121r, 125r, 127r, 129r, 132r–142r, 175r. 102 TNA SP 16/504, fos 1r, 4r, 8r, 9r, 11r–12r, 15r, 29r, 34r, 38r, 109r, 121r, 124r, 130r, 136r–137r, 139r, 142r, 144r–145r; SP 16/509, fos 11r–12r, 15r–16r, 27r, 31r, 33r, 38r, 54r, 57r, 58r–59r, 60r, 61–62r, 67r, 70r–71r; SP 16/512, fo. 30r; BL Add. 63,788 B, fo. 24r; LJ, vii, pp. 449, 468, 489–90, 501; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 46v, 58r–58v, 61v; LJ, viii, p. 562. 103 TNA SP 16/494, fo. 103r, SP 16/504, fo. 33r; see also SP 16/509, fo. 14r. 104 TNA ADM 18/3, fo. 19v; SP 16/509, fos 53r, 72r. 105 TNA SP 16/504, fo. 45r. 100 101

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When men of these ranks were dismissed, as a few were, it was usually discussed in terms of individual negligence. There were frequent accusations of corruption, particularly against pursers and gunners, and other officers responsible for stores, but relatively few of these officers were actually ousted because of these charges.106 Some officers were accused of selling alcohol to their crewmates, presumably without permission.107 Thomas Cooke was ordered to be dismissed on 8 May 1644 because he ‘doth not use that authoritie, and Comand … as is fitting for a Boatswaine in his place to doe’, and ‘loves his bed to[o] well’, though he was apparently still in place in February 1645, when he was granted a post ashore after he was injured aboard ship.108 The master of the Warwick hoy was accused of being ‘a notorious knave & lewd fellow’ and of ‘leud and wicked carriage and behaviour’.109 Other accusations were rather vague. Boatswain Thomas Rocknell was removed on 9 November 1642 ‘for some misdimeanours testified against him by Captain Richard Swanly’, and purser Francis Austen was suspended on 18 March 1643 ‘untill such time as he hath quitted himselfe of the charge laid against him’.110 The imprecise language referring to Rocknell and Austen might conceal accusations of royalist sympathies, but it seems unlikely, as elsewhere such concerns were discussed explicitly. This suggests that there was less concern within the administration over the commitment of these officers, perhaps because there is some evidence for enthusiasm amongst these ranks to remain in naval service. Occasionally, dismissed officers petitioned successfully for reinstatement, such as Charles Bennyon, when the charge against him was ‘proved scandalous and false’.111 Others were praised for their commitment. Thomas Arkinstall, boatswain of the Unicorn and then the Dreadnought, was described by Warwick in April 1644 as ‘a man that is always ready to serve the State on all occasions’, and in March 1645 was given a post at Chatham; similarly John Fortescue, gunner of the Prince, was ‘a Cordiall man in the action & service of the Parliament’.112 Again, the impression emerges that a small, committed group were instrumental in maintaining the navy, and that through them parliament controlled the naval administration and the ships at sea, which made it considerably easier to mobilise a large number of seafarers. Lacking detailed evidence, it is much more difficult to be entirely certain whether the vastly more numerous ‘common seamen’ of the fleet were TNA SP 16/504, fos 31r–32r, 37r, 113r, 128r, 135r; SP 16/512, fo. 26r; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 221, p. 11; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fo. 41r. These accusations were nothing new: see Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 114–21. 107 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Richard Cox, 18 September 1645, and Edward Munchman, 14 October 1645. 108 TNA SP 16/504, fo. 38r; SP 16/509, fo. 20r. 109 TNA SP 16/504, fos 19r, 37r, 45r. 110 TNA SP 16/494, fos 37r, 173r. For other examples see SP 16/497, fo. 96r; SP 16/504, fos 2r, 139r; SP 16/512, fo. 49r. 111 TNA SP 16/504, fos 14r, 28r. 112 TNA SP 16/504, fo. 27r; SP 16/509, fos 63r, 72r; LJ, v, pp. 313–14; see also SP 16/512, fo. 5r; LJ, viii, p. 497. 106

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­ olunteers or had to be recruited in a forceful manner. Parliament attempted to v encourage seafarers to serve in the navy through increased wages and a ‘bounty’ of one month’s extra pay for those who had served eight months, originally enacted in September 1642 to reward the mariners’ ‘Cheerefullness & fidelitie’, as well as one-third of all prizes shared amongst the crew.113 In January 1644 Warwick ordered ‘drume to be beaten in the Citty of London & the suburbs’ to gather volunteers for privateers, and a similar ritual was repeated in Chatham throughout the 1640s to warn naval sailors to board ship.114 However, these measures were not entirely successful, and from 1642 onwards parliament repeatedly passed laws to press sailors as well as gunners, surgeons, and carpenters.115 In January 1643 the navy commissioners acknowledged that ‘they have not bin able to prevaile’ with the ‘Caulkers Carpenters Seamen &c’ necessary to prepare that year’s fleet, and the principal officers of the navy were therefore authorised to call before them all such inferior Officers and other Seamen whatsoever, as are necessary to attend the present service of the Fleet shortly to go forth, and with the help of the Master & Wardens, and assistance of the Trinitie House.116

Those who did not appear for service after they were pressed and paid ‘Conduct money’ were to be imprisoned ‘without Baile or Mainprize’, and innkeepers were forbidden from harbouring pressed seamen, though mariners and watermen who had served an apprenticeship were exempted from land service.117 Impressment was certainly no innovation, and large numbers of men had been pressed into naval service in the 1620s and 1630s.118 Yet parliament’s activities represented a significant legal innovation, as impressment had previously been authorised solely by royal prerogative; here too parliament were appropriating the king’s political and maritime role.119 Moreover, parliament’s activities were more sustained and systematic, perhaps because of active cooperation from BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 66r; TNA SP 16/494, fos 25r, 113r; CJ, ii, pp. 776, 993; cf. SP 16/494, fo. 155r. 114 TNA SP 16/500, fo. 75r; ADM 18/3, fos 7r, 21v; E 351/2286, fos 11v–12v, 16v. 115 TNA SP 16/509, fo. 28r; SP 16/512, fo. 17r; CJ, ii, pp. 378, 411, 951; CJ, iv, pp. 57, 431; LJ, iv, pp. 516, 561; LJ, v, pp. 585–6; LJ, vi, p. 373; LJ, vii, pp. 180, 222; LJ, viii, pp. 95, 637. These were printed: Parliament, An Act for the Better Raising and Levying of Mariners (1641[/2]); Parliament, An Ordinance for the Bettter [sic] Raysing and Levying of Mariners; Parliament, An Ordinance … for the Better Raising, Leavying, and Impresting of Mariners (1644). 116 TNA SP 16/494, fo. 72r. 117 TNA SP 16/509, fo. 30r; CJ, iii, p. 27; LJ, v, p. 693; Parliament, Two Declarations of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament … that no Alehouse-Keeper or Other Person … Shall Harbor any Marriner or Seaman Belonging to the Fleet (1643); Parliament, A Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: Straightly Charging and Forbidding all In-keepers, Victuallers, Alehouse-Keepers, or Other Persons Whatsoever, to Harbour or Entertain any Marriners, Sea-Men, Water-Men &c Prest into any of his Majesties or Merchants Ships Employed in this Service (1643). 118 For pressing in the 1620s–30s, see Thrush, ‘Navy Under Charles I’, pp. 202–6, 215–47. 119 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 140–1. 113

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parliament’s navy, 1642–1646 101 Table 1. Pressing by parliament, 1642–46 Year

1642

Navy commissioners’ No. Pressed financial estimates Fleet total Total pressed Average fleet total Percentage pressed

1207 5053   24

1643

1644

1645

1646

5330 6330

3000 4000

2300 3166

3200 4500

3136 6485   48

3643 4307   85

 193 4200    5

2219 5005   44

Sources: see notes 122, 123, and 124.

within the maritime community. The complaints from earlier decades that the press-masters had no familiarity with seafarers, and pressed ‘a Rabble of poor Rogues’, are conspicuously absent from the 1640s.120 Although no direct records of impressment have survived, it is possible to analyse the level of pressing through the navy’s financial records. This may represent only money paid to sailors, not that they served on any ship, but it does permit a calculated estimate of the pressing undertaken by parliament’s navy.121 These figures must be compared to an average total, as recorded fleet totals vary considerably in different sources, and the numbers presented here include only the larger summer fleets, as the turnover of men between summer and winter service is uncertain (Table 1).122 The navy commissioners provided for around 70–80 per cent of sailors to be pressed in their financial estimates, but the recorded payments suggest that, except in 1644, actual pressing fell quite far below this level.123 The amount of small-scale pressing directly into ships was probably higher than appears here: commanding officers of naval ships were issued with press warrants, and many of the recorded payments were relatively small sums to ships’ officers.124 It is also impossible to assess how many men were ‘turned over’ from one ship to another each year. In 1642 Brian Harrison was appointed to place ‘the severall Companyes of those shipps [come in from sea] into such other of the shipps … as that they may bee best secured from danger’, and 200 men were ‘turned over’ by boatswain Andrew Mitchell in 1644.125 This may go some way to explaining the discrepancy between the commissioners’ estimates NMM JOD/1/1, fos 86v–87r. For a detailed discussion of these sources see Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 153–5. 122 See the printed lists in Appendix 2, pp. 186–9; BL Add. MS 17,503; Grene, Declaration in Vindication, pp. 8–10. These numbers exclude the crews of auxiliaries in the published lists, both because this brings the numbers given in the lists closer to the other sources, and because officers for these ships were rarely granted press warrants. 123 Taken from Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223, pp. 3, 9, 25, 45–8. 124 TNA SP 16/504, fo. 76r; BL Add. MS 4,106, fo. 199r; Add. MS 9,305, fos 17r, 40r, 59r, 63v; Add. MS 9,307, fo. 6r; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 14v, 36v, 42r, 51r–53r, 76v. 125 TNA SP 16/494, fo. 21r; ADM 18/3, fo. 13r. 120 121

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and the recorded figures, which probably underestimate the number of men compelled into parliament’s navy; the very low number for 1645 is almost certainly incorrect. This evidence suggests a considerably higher level of pressing than the navy required in later periods, though that remains a topic of ongoing debate.126 Nevertheless, this evidence suggests both that the need for coercion fluctuated considerably throughout the war, and that a significant proportion of mariners in parliament’s navy were volunteers. These records also show that pressing took place primarily in London, and along the east coast (the latter, according to the navy commissioners, deliberately intended to ease the pressure upon London’s merchant shipping).127 The continued need for impressment shows that there was no consistent, unanimous loyalty to parliament: the royalist newsbook Mercurius Aulicus gleefully reported financial difficulties for the navy, and ‘disaffections’ amongst seafarers, and on 26 April 1643 Robert Coytmore complained about seamen who ‘come in a tumultuous waie rayling at our office dore’, demanding unpaid wages.128 In 1645 there was another protest by ‘unruly Mariners’ aboard a naval ship, and Warwick wrote in March that martial law was ‘absolutely necessary for preventing of mutinies, plunderings, and disorders amongst the Sea-men’.129 Andrewes Burrell, in his criticism of the naval administration, also argued that ‘It was the dutie of the Trinity House, to have taken care of the common Seamen, and not (through their neglect) to suffer thousands of them, in discontent, to run out of the Kingdome.’130 The navy commissioners defended themselves by alleging that ‘for the many thousands of Sea-men that have left the Kingdom … we could never learn of any that deserted the Parliament, but such as have always lived as Pirats and Robbers at Sea formerly’.131 This debate has concentrated on the eighteenth century, and the most significant recent works are Nicholas Rogers, The Press Gang: Naval Impressment and Its Opponents in Georgian Britain (London, 2007); Denver Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Charlottesville, VA, 2013); Nicholas Rogers, Manning the Royal Navy in Bristol: Liberty, Impressment, and the State, 1739–1815 (Bristol, 2014); J. Ross Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang: Volunteers, Impressment, and the Naval Manpower Problem in the Late Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2015). 127 Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, pp. 7–8; Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, p. 156. 128 Mercurius Aulicus, 8th week (19–25 February 1643), p. 63; Mercurius Aulicus, 13th week (26 March–2 April 1643), p. 161; Mercurius Aulicus, 14th week (2–9 April 1643), p. 177; Mercurius Aulicus, 18th week (30 April–6 May 1643), p. 223; Mercurius Aulicus, 34th week (20–26 August 1643), pp. 457–8; Mercurius Aulicus, 35th week (26 August–2 September 1643), p. 479; Mercurius Aulicus, 36th week (3–10 September 1643), p. 493; Mercurius Aulicus, 37th week (10–16 September 1643), p. 511; Mercurius Aulicus, 13th week (24–30 March 1644), p. 904; Mercurius Aulicus, 16th week (14–20 April 1644), pp. 945–6; Bodl. Tanner MS 62, fo. 82v; cf. fo. 311r. 129 Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 73r, 88r–88v; Bodl. Tanner MS 60, fo. 31r. 130 Burrell, Humble Remonstrance, p. 4. 131 Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, p. 23; see also Grene, Declaration in Vindication. 126

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There is no clear surviving evidence on how many seafarers were forced to leave Britain, or faced other professional difficulties, due to the civil wars. It was reported to the House of Lords on 20 September 1645 that ‘the Number of hurt and maimed Seamen hath so much increased of late, by reason of their more than ordinary Action at Sea’, and this is borne out by payments from the Chatham Chest to seafarers wounded in parliament’s service.132 There were complaints from the churchwardens of Stepney in April 1646 and again in 1647 that ‘by reason of the casualtyes of the Seas Warres & Turkish Tyrrany the number of poore doth dayly encrease in the said parish so that the Inhabitants are not able to releive or maintayne the poore from perishinge’.133 Similarly, a merchant’s correspondence in 1646 referred to ‘these soe daingerous tymes’, one letter in particular complaining of ‘our men of warr being very Faulty for lokeing out to cleare the coast’.134 There is also plentiful evidence of sailors’ careers being interrupted mid-voyage by the seizure of their ship, sometimes forcing them into service with the captors.135 In the most extreme cases Irish sailors were summarily executed, and some Irish commanders threatened retaliations, which forced parliament to adopt instead a policy of prisoner exchange.136 However, the parish registers of Stepney and other London parishes – home to the largest maritime community in Britain – show no major decline in the number of seafarers resident there, and in 1645 the navy committee issued 663 warrants for ships leaving London, showing that trade did not halt entirely.137 It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that while the civil wars endangered seafarers’ lives and livelihoods, they did not result in a total exodus from Britain. Indeed, a number of seafarers apparently chose to serve parliament in these wars, even if many others were forced to do so. The navy commissioners claimed, in 1647, that on one occasion during the first civil war ‘such was the willingnesse of the Sea-men and Water-men’ that they were able to release men who had been pressed in Essex, Suffolk, and LJ, vii, pp. 588–9; NMM SOC/15, the records of the Chest for 1637–44. LMA MJ/SB/B0005, book 58, p. 20; MJ/SB/B/0006, book 66, pp. 13–14, and book 68, pp. 13–14. 134 TNA C 110/151, [John Turner?] to Rowland Willson and Martin Bradgate, 1 May 1646; same to same, 10 June 1646. 135 Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 183–6. 136 Murphy, ‘Atrocities at Sea’; TCD MS 820, fos 298r–298v; PA PO/JO/10/1/220, fos 120r, 122r, 123r; LJ, viii, p. 637; CSPD, 1644, p. 557. 137 For parish registers, see Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp.  207–12. For passes, see Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 3r–3v, 6v–7r, 8r–8v, 10v, 12r, 13r–13v, 15v–16v, 18r, 20v, 21v, 23r, 24v–25r, 26r, 27r, 29v–30r, 31r, 32r–32v, 36v–37r, 38v, 41r–41v, 42v, 45r–45v, 47r–47v, 50v, 54v, 56r–56v, 58v, 59v, 60v, 62r–62v, 65v, 68v–70r, 73r, 74r–74v, 75v, 76v–77v, 78v, 80r, 81r–81v, 83r–83v, 84v, 87v, 90v. For the economic impact of the war on London in particular, see Stephen Porter, ‘The Economic and Social Impact of the Civil War upon London’, in Stephen Porter, ed., London and the Civil War (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 175–204; Coates, Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 175–204; Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, ch. 4. 132 133

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Norfolk, although as this was also part of their response to Burrell it may be an exaggerated statement.138 The raised wages, the promise of prize money, and the f­amiliarity of the navy as a recognised source of employment were likely influential, and perhaps the disruption of merchant shipping encouraged seafarers to seek work where they could, but an ideological commitment was probably behind the presence of at least some of these men aboard the navy’s ships.

Auxiliaries and privateers The same pattern discussed so far in this chapter, a base of support ­particularly in London centred on Trinity House, but a larger mobilisation around that base, can be seen in the auxiliary forces parliament deployed. These have largely been overlooked in studies of the navy, except for ­merchant ships hired to supplement the main naval fleet. This was only one form of ­auxiliary ­mobilisation; there were also privateers, licensed by an ordinance of November 1642, reissued in 1643, 1644, and 1646.139 Amongst these were two sorts, those explicitly set out in ‘the service of the Parliament’, and deliberately intended for warfare, sometimes as part of practically autonomous squadrons, such as the ‘Sea Adventurers’ for Ireland; and those whose petitions for letters of marque described them as simply ‘bound out on a voyage’, implying that privateering was a secondary, opportunistic objective.140 These three kinds of auxiliary were not always distinct, and some ships and seafarers moved between these different functions. In parliament’s published fleet lists of 1642 and 1643 the ‘Adventurers’ were included, while the 1644 list mentioned 25 ships ‘set forth by way of Reprisall’, and the 1646 list recorded, in addition to 22 merchant ships with the main fleet, 33 ‘to be Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, pp. 7–8. CJ, iii pp. 287–8, 324–5, 368 ; CJ, iv, pp. 390–1; LJ, v, p. 467; LJ, vi, pp. 690–1; LJ, viii, pp. 88–9, 130–1. 140 For ships in ‘the service of the Parliament’, see TNA HCA 13/56, depositions of Robert Paule, 22 April 1643, John Wilkins, 12 September 1643, George Lawly, 18 October 1643, William Cooke, 18 November 1643, and Thomas Ashley, 25 November 1643; HCA 13/59, depositions of Thomas Ewin, 22 March 1643[/4], John Bennett, 19 April 1644, Tracie Cater, 29 April 1644, William Foote, 10 May 1644, Richard Warde, 16 May 1644, Thomas Plunckett, 29 May 1644, John Gillson, 24 June 1644, Thomas Middleton, 19 October 1644, James Rowland, 9 November 1644, Thomas Ashley, 7 December 1644, Walter Heath, 4 April 1645, William Oliffe, 19 April 1645, and Joseph Jordan, 24 April 1645; HCA 13/60, depositions of Acon Ruddocke, 5 May 1645, Reynard Ulricke, 26 June 1645, Nicholas Browne, 13 November 1645, John Marshall, 7 February 1645[/6], William Phelps, 6 March 1645[/6], Mathew Grant, 26 March 1646, Richard Boway, 4 April 1646, Jeremy Cornellis, 16 April 1646, William Pepper, 13 May 1646, Richard Cranley, 11 June 1646, Phillipp Evans, 26 September 1646, and John Smith, 28 September 1646; for ships ‘bound upon a voyage’, see the petitions in HCA 30/854, fos 275r, 289r, 301r; HCA 30/862, George Richardson (1 January 1644), Robert Page (9 May 1644). On the Sea Adventurers for Ireland, see Chapter 2, pp. 54–5. 138 139

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graved and fitted for sea, for the better defence of the Kingdome upon any emergent occasion’.141 As with impressment, there is no complete documentation for these auxiliary vessels, but we can get some impression of the size of these forces by collating three sources: the fleet lists published by parliament, petitions submitted and obligations issued for letters of marque, and payments to ship-owners recorded in the navy board’s bill books and exchequer accounts.142 Since there was a high frequency of common ship names, a tendency to record only one owner or commander where a ship may have had several, and a lack of detail in some entries, ships have only been matched where there was sufficient similarity of details (port, tonnage, commanders, or owners), or where external evidence demonstrated a definite link between the named owners or commanders, and there is therefore some margin of error. Even so, these sources show that parliament employed 79 merchant ships in the main naval squadrons; 48 additional ships mentioned in the published lists, but not as part of the fleet; 156 ships not mentioned in those lists, for which letters of marque were issued, plus three others named as privateers in admiralty court depositions but not in other sources; and 70 vessels appearing neither in the lists nor letters of marque, whose owners were paid by the navy administration for some service in 1642–46, with a further 24 which might be duplicates but cannot be positively matched.143 In total, then, parliament employed somewhere between 370 and 394 privately owned ships either as part of the naval fleet, as privateers, or in other duties. This is a much larger mobilisation than just the navy itself, and again it is evident that parliament drew on a wide range of resources from around Britain, but that London provided the lion’s share, and did so consistently throughout the first civil war.144 The number of ships mobilised by parliament is smaller than the auxiliary forces that Britain deployed against France and Spain during the 1620s, either as hired merchant ships in large expeditions, or as privateers.145 The total number of prizes seized by parliament’s supporters was also lower than the number taken by English privateers during the 1620s; during the first civil war, 353 prizes were listed in the admiralty court’s records and those of the commissioners for prize goods.146 This could be a consequence of the civil war Anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1642); anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1643); anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1644); anon., A List of Svch Ships and Friggotts of the Navy Royall (1646). Similarly, the Greene and Charles frigates were included in anon., A List of Such of the Navy Royall (1645); and anon., A List of Svch Ships and Friggotts (1646). 142 These sources are discussed in detail in Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 160–4. 143 For the privateers mentioned in the admiralty court but not elsewhere, see TNA HCA 13/58, depositions of Robert Paule, 22 April 1643, and George Lawley, 18 October 1643; HCA 13/59, depositions of Walter Heath, 4 April 1645, and William Oliffe, 19 April 1645. 144 Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, p. 164. 145 On the 1620s expeditions and privateers, see Chapter 1, pp. 14–15, 30. 146 TNA HCA 34/1; E 351/2513–14. 141

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splitting Britain’s maritime resources – during the 1620s a substantial number of privateers were set out from the southwest, a region largely under royalist control during the 1640s – or the fact that the navy itself had expanded considerably, and was more active. Nevertheless, the scale of the auxiliary activity is much larger than is revealed by a focus solely on the navy, and it testifies to the willingness of many ship-owners and seafarers to participate in maritime warfare for parliament. The petitions for letters of marque, in particular, offer some indication of why seafarers chose to set out privateers. Parliament declared in March 1643 that one-third of a prize would go to the privateer’s owners, and another third to the crew, so there was a clear profit motive, and this could be pursued more deliberately and opportunistically in a privateer than it could be as part of the duties of the naval fleet.147 A large number of the letters of marque were probably issued for vessels ‘bound out upon a voyage’ and therefore involved in warfare only when the chance arose, rather than regularly active in parliament’s war effort: the navy commissioners’ financial estimates listed only forty-nine privateers which received direct payment from parliament.148 Amongst that minority, however, some were very active. Thomas Plunkett reportedly captured twenty-six prizes in 1643–44, and nineteen in 1645–46; he appears to have been exceptional, but he was certainly not alone.149 William Thomas and Joseph Jordan captured the Esperanze jointly with Plunkett, as well as four more vessels while sailing ‘all of a squadron’, and at least another four and five prizes each, respectively, in 1643–44.150 Besides profit, some petitions express an ideological commitment, such as Richard Boller’s desire ‘to doe the best service hee can for the good of the State’, shared by other petitioners.151 Many of these particularly related to Ireland, for example Thomas Horsman and company, who expressed ‘the fellow feelinge they have of the great miseries of theire distressed [Protestant] brethren CJ, ii, p. 993. Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223, pp. 82–3; for the ordinance, see CJ, iii, pp. 287–8; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 221, p. 261; Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fo. 33r. 149 TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of Thomas Plunkett, 29 May 1644, and William Thomas, 6 June 1644; HCA 13/60, depositions of William Smart, 2 May 1645, Thomas Ashbye, 9 May 1645, Robert Row, 15 May 1645, Robert Thomas, 15 May 1645 and 16 May 1645, Allen Lantren, 4 June 1645, Thomas Grigg, 13 June 1645, Richard Poole, 13 June 1645, Allen Lagny, 14 June 1645, James Askew, 28 February 1645[/6], John Witchurch, 2 March 1645[/6], and Richard Denby, 23 March 1645[/6]. Following his discharge from the navy, Plunkett became captain of the privateer Discovery, whose owners included Warwick, Moulton, and Thomas Smith: see TNA, HCA 13/120, answer of Gregory Clements, 30 January 1647[/8]; HCA 13/126, answer of Gregory Clements, 9 February 1653[/4]; HCA 13/62, deposition of Thomas Plunkett, 9 October 1647; HCA 13/62, depositions of William Farr and Thomas Vincent, 15 January 1647[/8]. 150 TNA HCA 13/59, depositions of William Gray, 3 June 1644, William Thomas, 4 June 1644, and Joseph Jordan, 24 April 1645. For an account of Jordan’s and Thomas’s expedition, see Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 48 (13–21 March 1644), pp. 385–7. 151 TNA HCA 30/851, fo. 377r; HCA 30/854, fo. 301r; HCA 30/862, John Hayes (1 January 1644). 147

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in Ireland’, or John Harris of Ardart, Kerry, who wished to recover £2,000 lost to ‘those cursed cruell and barbarous Rebells’.152 On the other hand, a small number of parliamentarian privateers changed allegiance to the king, especially during the early stages of the war.153

Conclusion Having seized control of the naval fleet in the summer of 1642, and with London as a consistent power base, parliament was able to mobilise substantial maritime forces throughout the course of the first civil war. This mobilisation was led and facilitated by a group of shipmasters, ship-owners, and merchants who were connected by family ties and professional activities, and through their involvement in Trinity House. They took over the naval administration and operational commands at sea, as well as employing their own ships to supplement the fleet and as privateers. Beyond this core of support, the parliamentarian navy drew in a wide range of seafarers and maritime workers, in the dockyards on the Thames and on naval and auxiliary ships at sea, some coerced into service, but a substantial proportion of them serving voluntarily. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that while parliament always struggled to recruit enough seafarers, they did not face much political dissension or any large-scale hostility amongst seafarers. Some may have served parliament only for a short time, or as part of their own maritime enterprises; others, especially skilled officers, may have simply continued naval careers they had begun in previous decades. Despite these problems, however, parliament was able to sustain a higher and more regular level of naval activity than either Charles I or his father had previously done, and took advantage of a large auxiliary mobilisation as well. The primary purpose of these forces was not just to intervene directly in the civil wars on land, but also to prevent any invasion in support of the king, and to protect shipping and trade (and therefore customs revenues) in those ports which parliament controlled, while inhibiting the same for royalist bases. In this sense parliament’s use of the navy had a significant but largely structural role in the course of the first civil war, by denying naval resources which might have strengthened the royalists, by discouraging foreign intervention in favour of Charles I, by protecting London, and by linking parliamentarian campaigns in England, Scotland, and Ireland. This does not mean that parliament enjoyed undisputed power at sea: far from it, as we will see in the next chapter.

Quoting TNA HCA 30/854, fo. 286r, 290r; see also fos 276r, 277r, 281r, 284r, 285r, 292r, 294v, 295r. 153 See Chapter 5, pp. 115–17. 152

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5 Royalist, Confederate, and Scottish Naval Efforts, 1642–1653 Naval warfare during the civil wars mirrored the complex military situation on land in many respects. The activities of multiple naval forces, and shifting alliances between them, can make it difficult to follow the course of the conflict at sea. As we saw in the previous chapter, parliament controlled the largest navy in the three Stuart kingdoms, but its dominance at sea did not go unchallenged. The king and his supporters set out shipping in England, Ireland, and Scotland, while both the Irish confederates and the Scottish covenanters authorised privateers to sail in support of their causes. The ad hoc nature of the creation and operation of these forces meant that they all faced similar problems. These included fluctuations in strength, an overreliance on merchantmen or privately-owned warships, shortage of facilities ashore, and a lack of centralised control and administration. Historians trying to reconstruct their activities must also take into account the limitations of the surviving archival records: in particular, much of what we know of the naval activities of the royalists and confederates during the 1640s and 1650s comes from hostile parliamentarian sources. This chapter seeks to unravel these sources, to outline the activities of these naval forces, and to assess how they overcame the problems they faced in order to mount a challenge to parliamentarian naval power. It is worth noting that confederate and royalist naval efforts were larger and more sustained throughout the war than those in Scotland. The ‘limited naval policy’ adopted by the covenanters for much of the conflict, combined with the poor survival of admiralty records, makes assessing maritime activity in seas around Scotland less straightforward than it is for other regions.1

Royalists Edward Hyde, first earl of Clarendon, in the famous History of the Great Rebellion, described the desertion of the navy to parliament in 1642 as an ‘unspeakable ill consequence to the King’s affairs’.2 On a number of levels the loss of the fleet impacted on the royalist war effort. Without men-of-war at his disposal, Charles I lacked the ability to contest parliamentarian control of important ports and 1

Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, p. 236. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, ii, p. 224.

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shipping routes; this meant his overseas trade and communications became vulnerable to interception, while at the same time the king could do little to hinder parliamentarian shipping. This was especially significant because the royalist armies needed to import large quantities of military equipment from the continent, since parliament controlled London (the domestic centre for arms manufacture) and other armouries, including Hull. The presence of parliamentarian warships patrolling the coast made it difficult for these shipments to get through to the king’s supporters. In November 1642, for example, parliament seized a French vessel taking munitions to Sir Ralph Hopton in Cornwall.3 Charles also struggled to secure communication with his followers by sea: parliament captured his correspondence and commissioners on a number of occasions. The publication of his secret, and at times questionable, negotiations, especially with the confederates in Ireland, ultimately damaged the king’s reputation.4 Despite these problems, however, the king and his supporters adapted and developed certain strategies to compete with parliament at sea. In order to organise any maritime forces, Charles found himself compelled to create a ‘substitute navy’.5 The king and his supporters managed to set out menof-war by adopting a variety of measures, but assessing and quantifying the strength of this royalist naval effort is far from straightforward. The forces at the king’s disposal fluctuated considerably throughout the war. At times he or his supporters commanded substantial numbers of warships, such as after the 1648 mutiny discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, but at other times royalist naval strength was much more illusory.6 In 1643, for example, after the capture of Dartmouth and the acquisition of forty vessels, Gerolamo Agostini, the Venetian secretary, reported that the royalist fleet ‘is now more numerous than that of Warwick’. In reality the comparison was flawed, as most of the captured ships were merchantmen, and so not comparable to parliamentarian warships.7 Despite the loss of the bulk of the regular naval fleet in the summer of 1642, the king and his supporters did gradually accumulate a sizeable number of ships for his service. Not all the navy’s captains went over to parliament and a few warships remained loyal, such as the Swan and the Confidence based in Dublin.8 Charles also hired shipping to patrol the coast and help keep his lines Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 71–9, 173–211; anon., True Newes from our Navie, Now at Sea (1642), pp. 3–4; see also Chapter 4, pp. 85–6. 4 Elaine Murphy, ‘Intelligence, the English Navy and Ireland during the 1640s’, in Eunan O’Halpin, Robert Armstrong, and J. H. Ohlmeyer, eds, Intelligence, Statecraft and International Power (Dublin, 2006), pp. 35–47; Edward Husband, The Earl of Glamorgans Negotiations and Colourable Commitment in Ireland Demonstrated (1646), p. 30; CSPD, 1645–7, p. 346; Gilbert, Irish Confederation, v, pp 318–19. 5 Edwards, Dealing in Death, p. 213. 6 Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1648’, pp. 34–8. See pp. 113, 137–52. 7 CSPV, 1643–7, p. 34. 8 Until the Cessation of September 1643, the position of these ships in Dublin was somewhat ambiguous and parliament continued to pay for them. Bodl. Rawl. MS A221 fo. 93r; Bodl. Carte MS 8, fos 555r–555v. See pp. 52–3, 59, 64–5. 3

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of communication open: in 1643 he employed Captain Morris in a 300-ton vessel to guard St George’s Channel.9 From the summer of 1643 onwards, military victories in the southwest combined with the Cessation in Ireland allowed the king to increase his naval strength. As Agostini noted, large numbers of vessels were taken or joined the royalists at Dartmouth, Falmouth, and Bristol. In August 1643 the citizens of Bristol resolved to fit out fifty ships to join the eighteen that already sailed from the port with Sir John Pennington.10 Preparations to furnish the ships at Dartmouth for action against parliament were underway by December of that year, when the king ordered the governor to raise £1,000 for the earl of Marlborough, the admiral, to victual his vessels. In February 1644 Warwick warned, ‘as our Dangers are great at Home, so are they not contemptible at a Distance’, because Marlborough sailed with two ships of force to attack parliamentarian interests in the Americas.11 In late 1643 and early 1644 Captain Baldwin Wake commanded a small flotilla of royalist ships that helped to transport soldiers from Dublin to Wales.12 The royalists also supplemented their naval strength by purchasing or hiring frigates on the continent. Letters from Walter Strickland, parliament’s agent at The Hague, refer to various European privateers who possessed Charles’s commission and were raising maritime forces.13 In 1643, Strickland requested help from the Dutch States General against 24 ‘Dunquerquois’, two of which had already left Dunkirk flying ‘the colours or ensigns of the king of England’.14 William Boswell, the king’s agent, denied this as a ‘dirisible reported falsehood’, but in November 1645 parliament protested again, this time to the Spanish ambassador, about ‘the many Depredations done by the fregatts at Dunkirke’, listing twelve ships carrying the king’s warrant, some commanded by Englishmen, five of them ‘now at Falmouth’, and another ‘taken and now at Amsterdam’.15 Earlier that year, in May, it was complained in parliament that Bodl. Carte MS 8, fo. 561r. Mercurius Aulicus, 5 August 1643 (Oxford), p. 417; cf. BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 111r–113v. Some of Pennington’s orders to his captains survive, e.g. TNA HCA 30/855, fo. 559r; cf. CSPD, 1644, p. 16. 11 Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 107; LJ, vi, p. 420. See Chapter 3, pp. 78–9. 12 Bodl. Carte MS 7, fo. 414r; Baumber, ‘The Navy and the Civil War in Ireland, 1643–6’, pp. 255–6. 13 BL Add. MS 72,435, fos 25r–26v, 53r–54v, 72r–73v, 97r, 99r–100v, 108r, 111r. 14 BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 32r–32v, ‘les couleurs ou enseignes du roy d’Angleterre’, cf. 38r–40v, 67r–68v; reports of this appeared in Certaine Informations from Severall Parts of the Kingdome, 12 (3–10 April 1643), pp. 94, 96; Certaine Informations from Severall Parts of the Kingdome, 14 (17–24 April 1643), p. 110; Certaine Informations from Severall Parts of the Kingdome, 16 (1–8 May 1643), pp. 123–4; anon., Some Speciall and Considerable Passages, 35 (4–11 April 1643), p. 290; for later complaints of Dunkirk ships with royal commissions, see The Military Scribe, 3 (5–12 March 1644), p. 24; Mercurius Britanicus, 29 (25 March–1 April 1644), E.40[7], p. 230; Mercurius Britanicus, 82 (5–12 May 1645), p. 752; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 123 (21–28 October 1645), p. 988. 15 BL Add. MS 17,677 R, fos 50r–50v, ‘une fausseté signalée dirisible’, cf. 48r–49r; Add. MS 4,191, fos 6r–7v. 9

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royalist, confederate, and scottish naval efforts, 1642–1653 111 many ill-affected Persons of this Nation, in actual Rebellion, do shelter themselves, with their Ships and Vessels, in the Parts and Harbours of the Provinces under the Obedience of the King of Spaine, and … set Sail to Sea from thence … to commit many Spoils and Depredations upon the Ships and Goods of the well-affected Subjects of this Kingdom.16

Strickland noted in the same month that ‘commissions are given out to the subjects of all princes’, and a merchant’s letter in January 1646 described ‘dunkerk Frigotts … full of men of all nations for the king’.17 London seafarers reported attacks by ‘Dunkirkers’, sometimes in concert with Irish privateers or with royalist forces.18 In 1644 negotiations had indeed begun to construct twelve frigates for the king in Dunkirk, and the following year John Webster, an English merchant in Amsterdam, made enquiries to buy or hire ships for the royalists in that city. He reported that four to six vessels could be acquired there for approximately £20,000, but financial issues and the reluctance of the agents involved meant little came of these initiatives.19 In February 1644, the earl of Warwick advised the House of Lords of the need for resources for parliament’s navy as ‘the Enemy is able to make at least Two Hundred and Sixty Sail’.20 A factor behind this increase in royalist naval strength was the king’s willingness to contract with his supporters, at home and abroad, to set out independent men-of-war for his cause. In November 1643 he made terms with Jeronimo Cæsar de Caverle to serve as vice-admiral under Marlborough at Dartmouth, and to ‘furnish five able ships and 500 men with arms and victual at his own charge, and employ them against our rebels’. In return Charles promised him £2,000 per month from any prizes he brought into royalist-held ports in England.21 Other ship-owners and entrepreneurs also negotiated for their ships to receive royalist commissions. In 1645 Sir Nicholas Crispe and John van Haesdonck agreed to provide Charles with six weeks’ service per year with their ships, operating from Dartmouth and Falmouth, in

LJ, vii, p. 361; see also LJ, viii, pp. 303–4; Bodl. Tanner MS 60, fos 158r–158v. BL Add. MS 72,435, fos 72r–73v; TNA C 110/151, Richard Best to John Turner, 10 January 1645[/6]. 18 TNA HCA 13/58, depositions of John Prowse, 30 August 1642, Henry Trewing, 19 October 1642, John Prowce, 19 October 1642, William Older, 3 November 1642, John Coppinbergh, 26 November 1642, William Bernett, 9 March 1642[/3], Abraham Porrye, 28 July 1643, Paul Dod, 2 August 1643, and James Felsor, 15 September 1643; HCA 13/59, depositions of Samuel Chamlett, 30 May 1644, and George Archer, 11 October 1644; HCA 13/60, depositions of Jefferey Winnhurst, 17 June 1646, Edmund Groue, 19 June 1646, William Steele, 8 July 1646, and John Perlen, 14 August 1646; BL Add. MS 4,191, fos 6r–7v. See also Stradling, Armada of Flanders; Stradling, ‘Spanish Dunkirkers’. 19 HMC, Report on the Pepys Manuscripts Preserved at Magdalene College, Cambridge, ed. E. K. Purnell (1911), pp. 200–1, 204. 20 Warwick probably counted ships set out by the confederates in Ireland within this total. LJ, vi, p. 419. 21 CSPD, 1641–3, p. 499. 16 17

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return for privateering licences.22 These two men put a large number of ships to sea for the king: Crispe, a prominent English merchant, owned, held interest in, or set out between ten and twenty-five ships at different points in the war.23 A further eleven vessels served under van Haesdonck, a Flemish merchant based in England, such as the Neptune of sixty tons, with fourteen guns, commanded by Captain Barthen, or the much smaller Salvator frigate with just two brass guns. Details of these ships’ activities, however, are sketchy. Surviving information about the ships that belonged to Crispe indicates that a number of them clearly functioned as men-of-war, such as Captain Bowden’s twenty-two-gun frigate. Others, like a vessel lost in Weymouth carrying Canary wine, seem more likely to have served in the capacity of armed merchantmen rather than as men-of-war.24 The royalists continued to use contracts of this type throughout the war in order to get ships to sea to aid their cause. Personal connections and the promise of pay helped to persuade some privateer captains to put their frigates under the command of the king’s officers. Ormond, for example, engaged ‘some pirate friends’, Captain Antonio Nicholas Vanderkipp and his frigates, to convoy the transport vessels carrying the men recruited by the earl of Antrim to serve the king in Scotland.25 In 1649 the Amsterdam merchant Theodore Dommer offered to place six men-of-war, each with thirty-six guns, in the service of Charles II, and in exchange he expected to receive a sum of money (to be agreed upon), and to be allowed to use his other ships to transport 10,000 soldiers from Ireland to Spain or Venice.26 Bringing captured prizes into service also helped to augment royalist naval forces. Sir Nicholas Crispe converted a number of captured ships into warships for the king.27 After taking command of the royalist fleet in 1649, Prince Rupert made extensive use of prizes to increase and supply his forces.28 Persuading parliamentarian ships and their crews to change their allegiance bolstered royalist naval forces on occasion. In July 1643 Charles issued a proclamation which promised a pardon and full arrears of pay to any sailors who brought their ships to join the royalists at Falmouth, although this does not seem to have provoked much of an immediate response.29 Over the course of the war very few major warships abandoned parliament, and those that did defect tended to be armed merchantmen, or small warships like the Tenth Whelp

CSPD, 1644–5, pp. 617–18; some of Crispe’s correspondence about privateers survives: Bodl. Clarendon MS 25, no. 1913, fos 9r–9v; Clarendon MS 26, nos. 2070, fos 134r–135v, 2070.i, fo. 136r, 2070.ii, fos 137r–138v, and 2070.vii, fo. 147r. 23 On Crispe, see R. Porter, ‘The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century’, Journal of African History, 9 (1968), pp. 57–77; Blakemore, ‘West Africa’. 24 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 214–20. 25 Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, pp. 142–4; Carte, Ormond, vi, p. 122. 26 HMC, Pepys, p. 263. 27 Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 218. 28 NMM AND 45, pp. 1–14; see pp. 151–2, 154–8, 161–3. 29 Charles I, Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Grace. 22

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that joined the royalists after the fall of Bristol in 1643.30 Only after the mutiny in the Downs in 1648 did a large-scale desertion of ships from parliament take place. Nine ships – the Constant Reformation, the Antelope, the Hind, the Swallow, the Roebuck, the Crescent, the Convertine, the Satisfaction, and the Pelican – sailed to Holland to fight for the king. The Constant Warwick joined them in August.31 These ships represented a major addition to the king’s fighting strength as they consisted of men-of-war rather than the mixed shipping of earlier royalist forces; but, coming so late in the civil wars, they did not enable the royalists to change their naval tactics very much.32 The transitory nature of royalist naval service makes it difficult to provide a definite account of the strength of the king’s forces at sea for much of the war. The ships set out by contractors, given only limited obligations by the royalist command, acted more like privateers than as a proper navy. Some men-of-war did remain in the king’s service for long periods. The Swan, based in Dublin harbour, came into service before Christmas 1641, and was not taken by parliament until November 1645.33 These, however, were an exception: others only spent very short periods, of a few weeks or months, under royalist command. The Fellowship of Bristol and the Hart served the king for less than a month before being taken by parliament in August 1643.34 After 1648, Prince Rupert regularly sold or abandoned vessels from his fleet if he could not supply or man them.35 Nevertheless, the king’s forces clearly had successful episodes. In 1645, for example, the Elsabeth and Ann of London under Captain Robert Sparks was acting as ‘a Convoy to the North sea Fishermen’, but met with three royalist frigates, led by the Spread Eagle, who had already captured Scottish ships and proceeded to take the Elsabeth and Ann.36 In May 1645, the Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer reported twenty English ships taken ‘within this Fourteen dayes’, as well as seven Scottish ships recently seized, and in 1646 merchants and ship-owners in the west complained that they had lost £8,000 worth of shipping in just two or three months.37 The situation with royalist commanders resembles the king’s approach to securing naval resources. At the outbreak of the war a small number of naval officers chose the king over parliament: many of these men already possessed considerable naval experience, going back to the 1620s and 1630s. Sir John Pennington, for example, began his naval career in 1621 and received a Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 84–5; Lynch, ‘Bristol Shipping’, pp. 261–2; Winfield, British Warships, p. 148. 31 Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1648’, pp. 34–8. 32 See Chapter 6, pp. 137–52. 33 HMC, Ormonde, ii, pp. 58, 68–9; HMC, Ormonde, i, pp. 101–4. 34 William Smith, Severall Letters of Great Importance, and Good Successe (1643), pp. 1–4. 35 NMM AND 45, pp. 5, 8; see pp. 154–7, 161–3. 36 TNA HCA 13/60, depositions of Henry Sloame, John Jenkins, and Giles Sparks, 23 May 1645. 37 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 101 (20–27 May 1645), pp. 813–14; BL Add. MS 9,306, fo. 98v. 30

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­ nighthood in 1634. Sir John Mennes similarly served on a variety of royal ships k in the 1620s and 1630s.38 Parliament sought to remove these men, whose loyalty they suspected, from command in the fleet in the spring of 1642. They rejected Pennington as admiral of the fleet, as well as other captains including Sir David Murray and Captain Price. Nevertheless, some well-known royalist officers such as Sir Henry Stradling and Thomas Kettleby retained their commands, possibly as they had already sailed for Ireland.39 Most of the officers who remained loyal to the king in 1642, such as Captain Baldwin Wake, continued to support his cause throughout the war, and many received promotions for their faithfulness. Wake, for example, later became an admiral and governor of Castle Cornet in Guernsey.40 John Bartlett commanded royal warships throughout the conflict, initially the Swan from 1641 until parliament captured it in 1645. Within a few months he returned to sea in a new frigate called the Falcon, and he remained active at sea into the 1650s, with complaints reaching parliament about the ‘piracies of Bartlet’.41 Certain captains found themselves imprisoned by parliament for their refusal to abandon the king’s cause, though for some this was only brief. The earl of Warwick mediated to procure the release of Robert Slingesby and Wake in December 1642, when both men agreed ‘not to receive any Employment against the Parliament’, but they reneged on this promise and rejoined the royalist cause at sea.42 Others had a long sojourn in custody: Thomas Kettleby, jailed after his surrender in October 1642, remained a prisoner throughout the war – indeed at one point he escaped a retaliatory execution, after royalists killed a number of parliamentarian officers, only because Dartmouth’s governor insisted that ‘it will not rest here’ but would lead to further bloodshed.43 In November 1643 the Commons agreed to exchange him for Colonel Thomas Rainborowe, but in 1646 a Captain Kettleby petitioned the Lords to be released on bail in London, to which they acquiesced.44 This treatment did not discourage some of these captains in their royalism: Mennes and Kettleby both captained ships under Prince Rupert in 1649, and Charles II recommended that Kettleby be restored

Andrew Thrush, ‘Pennington, Sir John (bap. 1584?, d. 1646)’, ODNB; C. S. Knighton, ‘Mennes, Sir John (1599–1671)’, ODNB. 39 Baumber, ‘Parliamentary Naval Politics’, p. 399; Kennedy, ‘Naval Captains’, p. 181; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 414. See Chapter 2, pp. 52–3. 40 LJ, v, p.179; Bodl. Carte MS 9, fo. 96r; John Rushworth, Historical Collections of Private Passages of State (1721), vii, p. 1248. 41 HMC, Ormonde, ii, pp. 58, 68–9; Bodl. Carte MS 17, fo. 387r; Bodl. Carte MS 27, fo. 342r; CSPD, 1650, p. 423. 42 LJ, v, p. 510. 43 CJ, ii, pp. 723, 735, 790, 791, 803; CJ, iv, pp. 100, 258; LJ, vi, p. 482; LJ, vii, p. 604; LJ, viii, pp.  382, 588; England’s Memorable Accidents (26 September–3 October 1642), p. 29; England’s Memorable Accidents (3–10 October 1642), p. 34; Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 12; Hogan, Letters and Papers, pp. 65–7, 87–8, 140–1; for the threat of execution, see BL Stowe MS 184, fos 134r–134v. The letters are undated. 44 CJ, iii, p. 302; LJ, viii, p. 382. 38

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to command of Castle Park fort in Kinsale, a post he formerly held in 1637.45 As the king’s military position became hopeless, however, some of his staunchest naval supporters sought to come to terms with parliament. Sir Nicholas Crispe’s ‘militant royalism’ did not prevent him from petitioning for and receiving permission from parliament to compound on the terms of the Exeter articles in 1648.46 As well as British supporters, a number of men from the continent became involved in royalist naval affairs. Some, such as Jacques Vander Walle, a shipwright at Dunkirk, were willing to contract with the royalists to provide shipping. As mentioned previously, Theodore Dommer of Amsterdam put his ships under the king’s command in return for payment.47 Similarly the Flemish gunrunner John van Haesdonck, as well as investing in frigates for the king, supplied arms and raised soldiers. He was clearly living in London by the 1640s, and in 1652 he petitioned parliament to compound on the Jersey articles of surrender. He later struggled in the 1660s to get payments from Charles II for debts owed to him from the war.48 The names of royalist officers in ship lists also suggest foreign origins – for instance Captain Adrian van Dieman commanded the Star, and Captain Jacques Carol received a royalist commission in a French frigate.49 Francis de Wolfe, ‘whoe spocke a little brocken English’, recruited English sailors in the taverns of Nieuwport, Flanders, telling them he intended ‘to take the Parliament Roagues for I have your Kings Commission to that effect’.50 The navy commissioners claimed that ‘in the Kings Men of Warre, there are three strangers for [each] English man’, though this sounds very much like propaganda.51 Allegiance during the civil war was often very fluid and many people took a pragmatic approach to changing sides, so that a number of royalist recruits came from the parliamentarian forces.52 When Ralph Danske requested letters of marque in March 1645 it was feared that he and his officers were ‘resolved as soone as they are out, to goe into the Kings service, though hee deepely swears the contrary’.53 Perhaps prompted by this incident, in May of that year Trinity House was ordered ‘to give seasonable notice … of all ships bound out of the Bodl. Carte MS 23, fo. 207r. Robert Ashton, ‘Crisp, Sir Nicholas (c. 1599–1666)’, ODNB; Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding, 1643–1660, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (5 vols, 1889–92), iii, p. 1651. 47 HMC, Pepys, pp. 200–1. 48 Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 187, 202–3; CSPD, 1641–3, pp. 418–19, 511; Calendar of the Committee for Compounding, iv, p. 3036; CSPD, 1661–2, p. 226; CSPD, 1663–4, pp. 261, 283, 396. 49 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 217–20. 50 TNA HCA 13/60, deposition of Robert Bristowe, 5 March 1646[/7]. 51 Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, p. 27. 52 Andrew Hopper, Turncoats and Renegadoes: Changing Sides during the English Civil Wars (Oxford, 2012), pp. 1–3. 53 CJ, iii, p. 447; TNA SP 16/509, fo. 73r; cf. Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 17r, 20v, 21v, referring to ‘Danx’ or ‘Daux’, probably the same captain; see Chapter 4, p. 97. 45 46

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River of Thames of whose Commanders … good affection to the Parliament they shall Conceive any just cause of suspition’.54 Nor were these suspicions baseless. In March 1643, Mercurius Aulicus claimed that Bristol seafarers were defecting to the king, and on 9 August of the same year it reported that the Charles had sailed into Falmouth, though the naval ship Charles remained in parliamentarian service and there is no mention of this defection in the navy’s papers.55 Browne Bushell (who operated out of Amsterdam for a while) and Nicholas  de Witt were two royalist captains who had previously served parliament, and in May 1645 de Witt was captured but escaped; another was William Ayre, commander of the Hopewell, initially a parliamentarian who took a royalist commission when he came to Falmouth in 1643, and was also captured in 1645.56 Bushell paid the ultimate price for changing sides when he was executed in 1651 by parliament for his role in the surrender of Scarborough to the royalists earlier in the war. On the scaffold he lamented initially fighting for parliament and not joining the king sooner.57 In a rather more spectacular case, John Mucknell, master of the John of London, set out by the East India Company in 1644, led a mutiny against the captain and ­merchants of the ship when they neared Madagascar, declaring to the crew that ‘hee was for the Kinge and would carrye the said shippe to the Kinge’; he brutally punished those of the crew who objected, and sailed the John to Bristol.58 The distance of the journey before the mutiny perhaps suggests that this was opportunistic royalism, but Mucknell later fought in at least one engagement against parliamentarian ships, although not long after this the John was ‘cast away’.59 For much of the war, Thomas Plunkett commanded parliamentarian privateers and was known as the ‘scourge of the Irish sea’, but even his loyalty was questioned, and indeed in 1649 he defected and Quoting Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fo. 18v; for others taking the king’s commission, see Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1642–1656, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (3 vols, 1888), i, p. 42. 55 Mercurius Aulicus, 11th week (12–18 March 1643), p. 133; Mercurius Aulicus, 32nd week (6–12 August 1643), p. 429. 56 On Bushell, see Jack Binns, ‘Bushell, Browne (bap. 1609, d. 1651)’, ODNB; also Stadsarchief Amsterdam 5075 (Oude Notariaal Archief), inv.nr. 848, pp. 407, 727, 749, 1042; on de Witt, Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 14r, 17v, 39v; on Ayre, see HMC, Portland MSS, i, pp. 321–2. 57 Browne Bushell, The Speech and Confession of Capt. Brown-Bushel (1651), pp. 3–4. 58 Quoting TNA HCA 13/60, deposition of Thomas Heath, 2 September 1645; see also depositions of William Claye, 4 September 1645, William Porter, 4 September 1645, William Glover, 27 September 1645, and Richard Cartwright, 29 September 1645; HCA 13/119, answer of Bartholomew Hayward, 5 July 1645; CJ, iv, p. 34; LJ, vii, p. 158; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 89 (21–28 January 1645), p. 717; Mercurius Aulicus (26 January–2 February 1644[/5]), p. 1358. 59 Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 9v, 37v; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 98 (29 April–6 May 1645), p. 786; Burrell, Humble Remonstrance, p.18; Navy Commissioners, Answer of the Commissioners, p. 21. 54

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served as rear-admiral in a royalist squadron, leading attacks on parliamentarian shipping.60 Other mariners proved unreliable for the royalists, and a number of seamen abandoned their allegiance to the king when the opportunity arose. On 21 August 1645 it was reported to parliament that ‘divers Mariners employed in the service of the Enimy, and now in or about Flanders, are willing to come under the Parliaments obedience if they may be accepted and pardoned’, suggesting that the royalists’ European-based mobilisation was difficult to sustain.61 Many of the sailors who went over to the royalist cause in 1648 quickly became alienated from it and returned to parliament.62 Poor conditions, including shortages of provisions and delayed wages, lay at the heart of some incidents of seamen changing sides. The crew of the Fellowship of Bristol quickly abandoned the king and surrendered their ship in 1643, after the parliamentarian Captain William Smith promised them their arrears of pay. These issues also help to explain how a boatload of a dozen men from the Jocelyn, a parliamentarian man-of-war, persuaded the crew of the Swan to yield their ship without a fight in November 1645.63 Money alone, however, does not explain why all the sailors who abandoned the king’s ships did so. For example, records from Prince Rupert’s fleet anchored at Kinsale in 1649 show that the seamen received regular wages, and large sums of money were spent on food and other supplies.64 Nevertheless, so many mariners tried to slip away to join the blockading parliamentarian fleet that the prince executed some deserters, ‘which somewhat startled the rest & kept them in better order’.65 A variety of factors, such as their previous service in the parliamentarian navy, or a practical acknowledgement of the precarious nature of royalist maritime fortunes, may have persuaded these men to risk their lives and desert the prince’s squadron.

Confederates The confederates in Ireland also needed to start from scratch in order to deploy naval forces in the 1640s, but, unlike the royalists in England, they did not possess any individuals with experience of running a navy. They therefore opted to rely on private enterprise to attack their enemies at sea, and this reliance on privateers by the confederates did much to shape the nature of maritime warfare during the civil wars. Commerce raiding and fast frigates came to characterise the conflict. The confederates did establish a naval organisation modelled on the Gilbert, Irish Confederation, iv, pp. 7–8; anon., A Great Victory Obtained by Prince Charles (1649), p. 6. See Chapter 4, p. 106. 61 Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fo. 76r; LJ, vii, p. 551. 62 Hopper, Turncoats and Renegadoes, pp. 97–8. 63 Smith, Severall Letters of Great Importance, pp. 3–4; Bodl. Carte MS 11, fo. 462r; Bodl. Carte MS 14, fo. 304r; HMC, Ormonde, i, pp. 101–4. 64 NMM AND 27; see pp. 154–8. 65 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 62–3; NMM AND 45, p. 9; A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 307 (11–18 June 1649), pp. 250–1; NLI MS 17,851, fo. 8r. 60

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English system: they created an admiralty and appointed a lord high admiral, Donough MacCarthy, Viscount Muskerry, to manage their maritime affairs.66 However, rather than exercise any command at sea, this admiralty mainly issued letters of marque, took security from ship-owners, and adjudicated in prize matters. Very few of this Irish admiralty’s records survive, making it difficult to reconstruct the activities of the privateers commissioned by them. Nevertheless, from the available sources it is possible to assess at least some of the confederate war effort at sea.67 The strength of the confederate privateering fleet during the 1640s is practically impossible to quantify with any precision. At least eighty-four men-of-war with Irish letters of marque can be identified at sea between 1642 and 1652: this represented a considerable naval force, but in reality most of the privateers were not all active at the same time. In some years, such as 1648 or 1649, a large number of privateers can be distinguished, whereas in others only a few vessels can be found in the records. In 1644, for example, only the St Francis of Dunkirk and Hare of Wexford can be definitely shown to have been active at sea.68 Other evidence suggests, however, that in most years of the conflict more ships sailed with confederate commissions than those that can be definitely identified by name. Some sources, such as the correspondence of the Venetian ambassador, probably exaggerate the strength of the Irish at sea. His claim in December 1642 that the rebels kept ‘30 well armed ships at sea’ conflated frigates with the merchantmen bringing arms to Irish ports. Even so, other more informed reporters confirm higher levels of active privateers. In 1643 only seven Irish men-of-war can be identified by name, but a captured sailor from Wexford gave evidence in the same year that twelve privateers as well as his own frigate, the St Patrick, operated from that port.69 The fleet reached its probable peak of forty-four active ships in 1649, after the second ‘Ormond peace’, and from this point on the confederate and royalist naval war effort effectively merged in Ireland.70 Ormond, the royalist lord lieutenant, issued letters of marque for ships, such as the Cornelius of Wexford, to sail from confederate harbours and attack parliamentarian shipping.71 Only a fleeting glimpse of the naval careers of most Irish privateers survives. Some remained active over a number of years, like the Mary and John of Wexford, which first put to sea in 1646 and remained active taking English prizes until 1649. During that time it seized at least six prizes, such as the William and Thomas of Dover with a lading of sack.72 The Mary of Antrim gave even longer service J. H. Ohlmeyer, ‘MacCarthy, Donough, First Earl of Clancarty (1594–1665), ODNB. Costello, Court of Admiralty, pp. 13–18; Murphy, Calendar of High Court of Admiralty, 1641–1660. 68 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 106–8, 172. 69 Murphy, War at Sea, p. 172; Powell and Timings, Documents, p. 81. 70 See Chapter 6, p. 131, and Chapter 7, pp. 155–7. 71 Murphy, War at Sea, p. 108; TNA HCA 13/250, part i, letter of marque for Clement Van De Ryder, 9 July 1649. 72 TCD MS 819, fos 200v, 203r–203v; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 204–9. 66 67

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to the confederates, from 1645 until February 1649, in which period it intercepted six known prizes, including three ships in the first five weeks of 1649, before being captured by the Tiger.73 However, not all the known confederate frigates had such long or successful service at sea. The Mary Magdalen and the Clement, both of Wexford, were listed as privateers in a 1643 account, but neither appears in the records again, nor is either ship known to have taken any prizes.74 Like other ships, they may have found their cruising for prizes cut short by parliamentarian warships. The St Clara of Waterford sailed from that town with a letter of marque on 29 December 1648, but Captain Anthony Young and the Dragon took the St Clara a few days later on 3 January 1649.75 Others probably alternated between or combined privateering voyages and merchant voyages as the opportunity arose. For example, Laurence Baron received a commission from the confederate supreme council in February 1648 for the John Baptist of Waterford, and in November of the same year the ship was intercepted by the Hart, by which time the John Baptist was on a merchant voyage from Ostend carrying munitions and tobacco.76 This pattern, a mixture of long and short service, and probably a combination of ideological and commercial motivations, is broadly similar to the privateers set out on parliament’s behalf.77 Over the course of the war the parliamentarian navy seized nearly one-third of the known confederate privateers. The Adventure, one of the parliamentarian frigates launched in 1646, proved to be very successful as a privateer hunter.78 It captured the Patrick of Waterford, the Angel Keeper of Waterford, and two other unnamed confederate warships between 1647 and 1649.79 The advance of parliamentarian military and naval forces in Ireland from 1649 also led to the loss of privateers. Oliver Cromwell seized the Mary Conception of Wexford, Mary of the Isles, and four partially built frigates in Wexford harbour when his army stormed the town in October 1649. The Mirror of Dunkirk was seized a month later in Waterford harbour.80 Despite parliament’s efforts to crack down on the confederates and to protect trade, privateers operating from Irish ports proved to be very successful at seizing enemy ships – 468 prizes can be identified from the surviving historical Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, pp. 161–2; Ohlmeyer, ‘The Dunkirk of Ireland’, pp. 30–2; TNA HCA 13/250, part i, examination of Antonio Vamdermarche, 5 February 1649; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 204–10. 74 Bodl. Carte MS 7, fo. 267r–267v; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 172, 201–19. 75 TNA HCA 23/15, no. 239. 76 TNA HCA 30/855, fo. 378r; TNA HCA 13/61, fos 209v–210v. 77 See Chapter 4, pp. 104–7. 78 On these frigates see Chapter 4, pp. 88–9. 79 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 179–200; TNA HCA 15/2, examination of Francis Oliver, 24 July 1647, and William Hoville, 21 March 1648; HMC, Report of the Manuscripts of F.W. Leyborne-Popham, Esq., of Littlecote, Co. Wilts., ed. S. C. Lomas (1899), p. 304. 80 Murphy, War at Sea, p. 109; Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, pp. 4–5; anon., A Great Fight in Ireland between the Lord Lieut. Cromwels Forces and the Lord Inchequeens army (1649), p. 6. 73

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records.81 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the figure was probably much higher. Dr Walter Enos, a confederate theologian, claimed that frigates from Wexford seized 1,900 prizes in a six-year period, but this figure is generally regarded as unrealistic.82 Nevertheless, confederate men-of-war clearly captured large numbers of English and other ships. Irish and parliamentarian sources commented on the value of goods brought into towns such as Wexford and Waterford: James Dalton, an inhabitant of Wexford, reported that ‘much plunder was brought into Wexford taken from the english’.83 John Pine from Weymouth noted in 1649 that ‘the cellars and storehouses of Waterford are full of Englishmen’s goods, and the Irish there come and trade for them familiarly’; after taking Wexford, in addition to the four frigates, Cromwell wrote that his soldiers took ‘a very good booty in this place’.84 As confederate towns reaped the benefit of this trade in prize goods, coastal communities in England suffered from the loss of their ships and commerce. In August 1649 the Moderate Intelligencer described how at Ipswich ‘there is great lamentation in this Town, for the loss of many Ships taken by those pilfering vessels call’d Irish Frigots’, and how at Yarmouth they prayed the fishing fleet would ‘not be disturb’d, by the Irish rovers’.85 Confederate privateering activity peaked between 1647 and 1649, with 191 prizes seized in 1649 alone.86 This success can largely be attributed to the peace between the royalists and confederates in Ireland, and parliamentarian naval problems in 1648.87 A number of Irish frigates made the most of the opportunity to intercept large numbers of English ships – in 1648 and 1649 the St Peter of Waterford seized thirty-six ships on its first voyage, and a further fifteen or sixteen ‘mostly English’ vessels on a second cruise. Captain Patrick Wadding in the St John of Wexford seized six ships between March and May 1649.88 Newsbooks also reported large losses to Irish privateers. In December 1648 the Moderate Intelligencer told of the loss of fourteen English vessels to an unidentified ‘Irish pirate’.89 Confederate warships ranged around the British Isles in search of prey. In March 1649 the Angel Keeper of Waterford cruised off the northeast coast of England, capturing vessels from Newcastle, Scarborough, and Yarmouth, while over Christmas 1648 it had sailed near Plymouth and Cornwall in search of

Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 201–18. B. O’Ferrall, and D. O’Connell, Commentarius Rinuccinianus, de sedis Apostolicae Legatione ad Foederatos Hiberniae Catholicios per Annos 1645–9, ed. S. Kavanagh (6 vols, Dublin, 1932–49), i/7, pp. 519–20; Ohlmeyer, ‘Irish Privateers during the Civil War’, p. 126. 83 TCD MS 819, fo. 7v. 84 HMC, Portland, i, p. 510; Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, pp. 6–7. 85 Moderate Intelligencer, 233 (30 August–6 September 1649), pp. 2239–40. 86 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 201–18. 87 See Chapter 6, passim, and Chapter 7, pp. 156–8. 88 TNA HCA 15/2, examinations of Joseph Content, 11 July 1649, and Patrick Wallding, 7 May 1649; Bodl. Carte MS 155, fo. 68r. 89 Moderate Intelligencer, 196 (14–21 December 1648), p. 2042. 81

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prizes.90 The majority of confederate prizes belonged to English ports, such as the Jonathan of Southampton, taken in November 1648 on a return voyage from Barbados laden with tobacco, sugar, cotton, and ginger.91 However, a substantial number of prizes also belonged to Scottish ports, and Irish towns in opposition to the confederates. Prior to the ceasefire with the royalists, Irish privateers regularly attacked ships from Dublin. In July 1643 Daniel Hutchinson, a Dublin merchant, was stopped at sea by the ‘pyrats of Wexford’ and robbed of his goods, which he claimed were worth £50.92 As well as detaining vessels from the three Stuart kingdoms, the confederates regularly apprehended prizes from other countries trading with parliament. A large number of these ships belonged to Dutch ports, such as the Three Blackmores of Flushing, captured in August 1648 after sailing from Flushing to La Rochelle, and there loading a cargo of salt. The St Michael of Wexford seized the Three Blackmores near the Lizard as they made for Plymouth with their lading.93 In May of the same year Captain John Rossitor, commanding the Mary and John of Wexford and lying off Lundy, managed to intercept two Dutch ships within days of each other, the Hope of Amsterdam and the Peter of Rotterdam, both en route to Bristol.94 The lack of Irish admiralty papers makes it virtually impossible to assess the value of these prizes and their cargoes to the confederate cause, and very few of the extant records give any financial details about captured ships or cargoes. Prizes captured by Irish men-of-war ranged from small fishing boats to large merchantmen carrying valuable ladings of tobacco, wine, munitions, and other luxuries. Some of these prizes cannot have been worth much to the crews who captured them, such as the two barks carrying only ballast detained by the Dolphin of Wexford in the summer of 1647. Even so, the values attributed to the cargoes of a few ships indicate that the confederates gained substantial economic benefits from their maritime activities. The crew of the St Francis struck it lucky in 1643 when they captured the Adventure of London, carrying a cargo of sugar and other luxuries valued at £14,000–15,000. The sale of the prize ships themselves also realised large sums for investors in privateering. Michael Teeling, a Wexford merchant, acquired the Hopewell of London after it was condemned as a legitimate prize in 1647, and managed to sell it on for 2,400 livres tournois. Even the value of relatively small prizes could add up for the crew of an active frigate. Between February 1648 and February 1649 the Mary of Antrim reputedly seized shipping worth £8,000.95 As well as benefiting the sailors and TNA HCA 15/2, examination of William Hoville, 21 March 1648. Sheila Thompson, ed., The Book of Examinations and Depositions before the Mayor and Justices of Southampton 1648–1663 (Southampton, 1994), pp. 2–3; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 112–13. 92 TCD MS 810, fo. 238r; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 112–13. 93 TNA HCA 13/249, examination of Peter Arneson, 7 August 1648. 94 TNA HCA 13/61, fos 109v–110r. 95 TNA HCA 13/58, fos 603r–604v; TNA HCA 15/2, certificate by the confederate commissioners of the admiralty, 30 April 1647, and certificate by Michael Teeling, 24 April 1647; Ohlmeyer, ‘Irish Privateers during the Civil War’, p. 126. 90 91

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the privateer’s owners, the disposal of prizes generated considerable revenue for the confederate authorities, who collected a tenth share of the value of each prize. If they were indeed paid, the tenth shares of the prizes brought in by the Mary of Antrim in 1648–49 would equate to two-thirds of the taxation raised in County Carlow throughout the whole of 1645.96 Not all captured vessels generated such wealth for the confederate cause, and corruption was clearly a problem, with some captains ignoring the terms of their commissions by selling prize goods abroad rather than bringing them into Irish ports for adjudication. Letters of marque such as those issued to Joseph Content for the St Peter of Waterford in April 1649 directed that ‘you are not but in cases of inevitable necessity to expose to sale any prize to be taken by you in any other place then in the portes of this Kingdome, under his Majesties obedience’.97 However, privateers often found it more convenient to ransom small ships back to their owners. In 1649 John Page of Yarmouth paid Daniel van Vooren, commander of the St John of Wexford, £135 for the immediate release of his fishing boat, and van Vooren similarly managed to extort 1,400 guilders from the proprietors of two colliers for the return of their vessels.98 Privateer captains also flouted the rules and denied the confederate authorities an important source of revenue by sending their prizes into continental ports, especially Dunkirk and Ostend. Van Vooren continued to display contempt for his letter of marque by sending prizes into Ostend in April and May 1649. Captain Clement Ryder of the Cornelius of Wexford followed suit by directing three ships into that port in 1649. In that one year, confederate privateers disposed of nearly 30 per cent of the vessels they captured by sale in Dunkirk or Ostend. After his capture in July 1649, van Vooren boasted that he never sent prizes to Ireland but ‘made his owne benefit thereof for himselfe and his company although by his commission he was bound to carry in his prizes thither’.99 Parliamentarian naval patrols also ensured that many prizes did not reach Ireland. In May 1649 an Irish man-of-war captured the John of Hamburg en route to Yarmouth, and Captain Roch, the commander of the confederate frigate, placed six men and a boy aboard the prize to sail it to an Irish port. The parliamentarian ship the Greyhound retook the John before it reached safety. The Francis of Wexford lost out on a substantial payday in May 1644 after taking the Mary and Dorothy, which was carrying gold pieces of eight; Captain Middleton in the Paramour retook the ship for parliament less then twenty-four hours later.100 One of the factors behind the success of privateers operating from Ireland was the type of ships to whom the supreme council issued letters of marque. Lenihan, Confederate Catholics at War, p. 177. TNA HCA 30/855, fo. 202r. 98 TNA HCA 13/123, answer of Thomas Bayly, 17 May 1650; TNA HCA 13/250, part ii, examination of Daniel van Vooren, 25 July 1649. 99 Bodl. Carte MS 29, fos 110r–111v; TNA HCA 13/250, part i, commission for the Cornelius of Wexford, 9 July 1649; TNA HCA 13/250, part ii, examination of Daniel van Vooren, 25 July 1649. 100 TNA HCA 13/61, fos 502r–502v; TNA HCA 13/59, fos 300r–300v, 304r–305v. 96 97

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In order to overawe merchant shipping and quickly force them to yield, they tended to be heavily armed and well manned. The Mary of Antrim carried 109 men and boys along with thirteen mounted pieces of ordnance. The Mary Virgin of Wexford was similarly well supplied with over 100 men and eighteen cannon on board.101 When the St Michael of Wexford seized the Three Blackmores of Flushing, as mentioned above, the Three Blackmores was armed with five guns and stood little chance of fighting off the St Michael, which carried sixteen cannon.102 A number of these confederate warships were described as frigates, and some may be classed as ‘Dunkirk frigates’, which were noted as amongst the most technologically advanced fighting vessels of the mid-seventeenth century, because they rode low in the water and were very fast sailors.103 Perfect Occurrences of Every Daies Journal in Parliament, for example, complained about the actions of ‘Irish frigates’ in 1648, and Robert Hutchins, a mariner on the Adventure, described how his ship spotted and chased an ‘Irish frigate’ off the coast of Brittany but could not catch it.104 The St Peter of Dunkirk, one of the first continental frigates to arrive in Ireland in 1642, corresponds to the type, being described as ‘built in the style of a frigate, being sharp below and broad above after the Spanish fashion’.105 Some confederate supporters, such as the marquis of Antrim, also purchased custom-built frigates from Dunkirk.106 The demand for warships meant that shipyards in Ireland also built frigates; as noted above, Cromwell found a number of such vessels nearly completed on the stocks at Wexford when he stormed the town in 1649.107 However, some caution needs to be used in assessing whether or not most confederate vessels can be classified as ‘Dunkirk frigates’. Parliamentarian and Irish sources regularly used the term ‘frigate’ in relation to privateers, on all sides, regardless of the actual construction of the ship; we have seen that a number of royalist privateers were also referred to as ‘frigates’. The precise classification of confederate privateers as ‘Dunkirk frigates’ is, therefore, difficult to make from surviving descriptions, and certainly not all confederate mariners went to sea in such cutting-edge craft.108 Many Irish privateers set out in quite small ships, like the Mary Consolation of Waterford, which carried twenty-five men, two cannon, and two ‘murderers’ (a smaller kind of cannon) on its cruises. The poorly armed TNA HCA 13/250, part i, examination of Antonio Vamdermarche, 5 February 1649; TNA HCA 13/250, part ii, examinations of Peter Bowry and Patrick Rooth, 8 January 1649. 102 TNA HCA 13/249, examination of Harmen Bruen, 10 August 1648. 103 R. C. Anderson, ‘The Ancestry of the Eighteenth-Century Frigate’, MM, 27 (1941), pp. 158–65; Stradling, Armada of Flanders, 166–8; Robinson, ‘The Seventeenth Century Frigate’, pp. 271–81; Baetens, ‘The Organization and Effects of Flemish Privateering’, pp. 54–62; Thrush, ‘In Pursuit of the Frigate’. See Chapter 1, p. 22. 104 Perfect Occurrences, 73 (19–26 May 1648), p. 528; TNA HCA 13/61, fos 149v–150v. 105 TNA HCA 13/58, fos 299r–300v. 106 Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration, pp. 161–2. 107 Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, p. 7. 108 For a full discussion on this issue see Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 115–19. 101

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Patrick of Ross sailed with twenty-four sailors and just two iron guns in June 1649.109 These smaller men-of-war may have been converted merchantmen or captured prizes, rather than warships. Such small ships stood little chance when they encountered much more heavily armed parliamentarian naval vessels. Captain Francis Oliver in the Patrick of Waterford, with six guns, miscalculated badly in 1647 when he chased the Adventure, a thirty-two-gun parliamentarian frigate. Oliver realised his error when he came within range of the Adventure, and surrendered immediately after Captain Bedell fired some warning shots.110 Even well-armed confederate frigates struggled when they came up against parliamentarian men-of-war. In February 1649 the Mary of Antrim surrendered to the Tiger. Only fifteen of the original crew of 109 remained aboard, as the rest had sailed as prize crews or died in action. Therefore the Mary could not repel or escape the parliamentarians.111 Setting out private men-of-war was expensive and risky, but also potentially very profitable for investors in confederate privateering ventures. Many similarities can be seen in the type of men who supported the confederate and royalist causes at sea. A range of backers from Ireland and the continent, including nobles, clergymen, and merchants, sought letters of marque and equipped privateers for sea. Some men acquired a number of these vessels, for example Randal MacDonnell, the second earl and first marquis of Antrim, who operated a successful fleet of warships. During the 1640s he owned at least four frigates: the Mary of Antrim, the Mary of the Isles, the St Peter of Waterford, and the Bonaventure. Numerous parliamentarian complaints referred to encounters with ‘Antrim’s frigates’ during the war. In 1648 Captain Robert Dare described a twenty-two-gun ship as being ‘one of the best frigates that the earl of Antrim hath’.112 Antonio Vanderkipp, a merchant from Flanders, also invested heavily in confederate maritime and military affairs. He supplied munitions to the Irish rebels, and took up the early letters of marque sent by the agents of the supreme council to Europe. Only two of his ships can be identified by name, the St Francis and the St Joseph, but English prisoners held captive in Wexford reported that he sent out a number of frigates from that port.113 He remained active in confederate naval affairs until late in the war; after the fall of Wexford he moved his operations to safer harbours, and in May 1650 he arrived in Galway in a frigate laden with munitions.114 TNA HCA 13/62, examinations of John Herne and William Barrett, 27 September 1647, and Robert Sansum and John Nager, 22 November 1649; TNA HCA 23/30, commission for the Mary Consolation, 27 September 1647. 110 TNA HCA 15/2, examinations of Master Randle and Francis Oliver, 24 July 1647. 111 HMC, Portland, i, p. 510; TNA HCA 13/250, part i, examination of Antonio Undermarche, 5 February 1649. 112 TNA HCA 13/255, part i, examinations of James Miller and John Lamport, 4 February 1651; anon., A Great Victory at Sea against the Irish Rebels by Captaine Robert Dare (1648), pp. 2–3. 113 Bodl. Carte MS 27, fo. 267r; Ohlmeyer, ‘The Dunkirk of Ireland’, p. 39; TNA HCA 30/863, examinations of Richard Hill, Thomas Webb, and Gabriel Hughes, 13 November 1643. 114 Bodl. Carte MS 27, fo. 530r. 109

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The papal nuncio to Ireland, Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, also got in on the act. He possessed four frigates, two of which are known by name, the San Pietro and the St Ursula.115 With the exception of the marquis of Antrim, however, no leading confederate politician can be identified as a privateer owner. A lack of knowledge or interest in maritime affairs, combined with other concerns, may help explain why men such as Viscount Muskerry, the lord high admiral, did not become directly involved in private naval enterprise.116 In contrast, many of the leading parliamentarians and royalists in Ireland invested in men-of-war, as their fellows did in England.117 Ormond, the royalist lord lieutenant, leased out a ship called the Falcon, and in Munster Lord Inchiquin and Lord Broghill both set out frigates.118 Like their parliamentarian counterparts, a number of syndicates, usually made up of merchants and members of the local gentry, owned a large number of confederate privateers. Groups of likeminded men in Wexford and Waterford joined together to spread the risks and reap the rewards associated with prize taking. John Stafford, a Wexford gentleman, held shares in the Harp, which ‘was Imployed as a man of warre at Sea and brought in prisses and pilladge into wexford’.119 A group of five men including John Rooth, a Wexford merchant, owned part of the Mary and John of Wexford: Rooth’s two brothers went to sea on the frigate, and the plundered prizes’ goods were delivered to his house in the town. Ship captains often also owned a share in the vessel they commanded, such as John Rossitor, captain of the Mary and John.120 Prominent members of the local community were also directly or indirectly involved in the business. William Keating held positions as an alderman and mayor of Wexford, as well as being a partner in a privateer. Two of the sons of Patrick French, a Wexford alderman, served in confederate frigates and were killed in a fight at sea.121 The fragmentary nature of the evidence concerning confederate mariners provides snapshots of the crews, rather than detailed information about the men. Ages and places of residence can be ascertained from admiralty examinations, and from these a large number of foreign sailors can be seen spread among Irish frigates. Antonio Vandermarche, the captain of the Mary of Antrim, came from Flanders, and the 109 seamen on his ship included a mix from Ireland, Dunkirk, Holland, and England. Most of the sixty-five mariners on board the Cornelius of Wexford were Irish or Dutch, along with one Englishman.122 Daniel van Vooren, Ohlmeyer, ‘The Dunkirk of Ireland’, p. 37; Commentarius Rinuccinianus, iii, p. 56. J. H. Ohlmeyer, ‘MacCarthy, Donough, First Earl of Clancarty (1594–1665), ODNB. 117 See Chapter 4, pp. 88–9, 92–3, 104–7. 118 TNA HCA 13/62, examination of Robert Thorp, 17 October 1647; TNA HCA 15/2, examination of John Boon, 25 February 1647; TNA ADM 18/4, payments for the Charles and Green frigates, 1645–6. 119 TCD MS 819, fos 105r–105v. 120 Ibid., fos 20r–20v, 204r–204v. 121 TCD MS 818, fo. 291v; TCD MS 819, fos 7r–8v. 122 TNA HCA 13/250, part i, examinations of Antonio Vandermarche and Peter Toland, 5 February and 3 November 1649. 115 116

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the captain, and Derrick Hendes, the master, of the St John of Waterford both came from Dunkirk.123 Most of the identifiable Irish sailors listed towns like Wexford or Waterford as their home port. Giving evidence in the 1650s about the war, John Hay deposed that James Welsh, who went privateering in the Francis, ‘lived & had his Residence in Wexford the whole time of the warre’. Richard Keating from Fethard was noted as ‘being a pyrate & goeing to sea, spoyling & plundering the english’.124 As well as signing up to sail on privateers, many people in Irish port towns interacted with and benefited from the business. John Nevill, a merchant in Wexford, enriched himself by dealing in plundered merchandise, and regularly entertained a Dutch sailor called Capras in his home. Workmen also profited from new employment opportunities, such as Patricke ô Quouny, a carpenter who found work building the frigate Mary and John of Wexford.125

Scottish naval efforts Clan rivalries within Scotland led to a considerable amount of maritime activity throughout the war. Traditional enemies such as the MacDonalds and Campbells launched seaborne raids on each other’s territories, especially in the islands. In June 1639 a Campbell force attacked the island of Colonsay and captured a minor MacDonald chieftain, Coll Ciotach, and some of his family. In retaliation Alasdair MacColla, one of Coll Ciotach’s sons who had escaped, led an incursion force of eighty men to Islay in November 1640.126 Three years later, in November 1643, MacColla commanded another foray against Islay. MacColla’s men were defeated by Campbell forces and driven back to Ireland.127 However, in June 1644 he successfully led an invasion force of approximately 2,000 royalist soldiers from Ireland into Scotland. As early as April the Scottish covenanters’ commissioners to the English parliament had warned the Committee of Both Kingdoms of ‘those seas being without any guard, to the great prejudice of both kingdoms and particularly of the Scottish army in England; and that preparations are making in Ireland to invade Scotland’.128 Prince Rupert’s capture of Liverpool in the same month disrupted parliamentarian naval efforts and the Irish expeditionary force landed safely. MacColla’s men went on to form the core of the marquis of Montrose’s victorious army in 1644 and 1645. The ships that carried MacColla’s men even managed to capture a ship carrying two Scottish ministers home from Ulster.129 TNA HCA 13/250, part ii, examinations of Daniel van Vooren and Derrick Hendes, 25 July 1649. 124 TCD MS 819, fo. 66r; TCD MS 818, fos 300r–300v; TNA HCA 13/250, part i, examination of James Gott, 5 February 1649. 125 TCD MS 819, fos 149r–149v, 203r–203v. 126 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp. 34–8; Barry Robertson, Royalists at War in Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1650 (Farnham, 2014), p. 65. 127 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp. 165–7. 128 CSPD, 1644, pp. 110–11. 129 Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters, pp. 170–4. 123

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The ability of the royalist navy to intercept Scottish vessels persuaded many covenanters of the need to acquire shipping, and to develop a maritime strategy in their war with the king. From 1639 they began to issue letters of marque.130 After allying with parliament in 1644 the Scots came to rely on a combination of their own privateers and English men-of-war, referred to as the ‘Scotch guard’, to protect the coast. Some Scottish captains, such as the commander of the Deliverance, applied to the English admiralty for letters of marque.131 Despite these efforts, the confederates still managed to score a number of victories at sea, such as the landing of MacColla’s expeditionary force in 1644, and Irishbased privateers ‘posed the largest threat to the Covenanters at sea’.132 They intercepted a number of merchantmen and fishing vessels going to and from Scottish harbours. Some ‘Dunkirk frigates’ intercepted the Blessing of Leith in May 1645 as it sailed to the Dutch Republic, while in 1647 an Irish frigate intercepted the Orange Tree carrying a cargo between Norway and Ayr.133 Late 1646 and 1647, however, saw an improvement in the covenanter strength at sea with the addition of extra ships.134 The Scottish naval situation became more complex after the regicide in 1649, when King Charles II opened negotiations with the covenanters. On the royalist side the marquis of Montrose set out five well-armed vessels in 1649 to aid the new king. As lord high admiral of Scotland, Montrose added other ships to this fleet, but failed to achieve any major successes at sea, and the squadron was lost to the royalist cause following his defeat in 1650.135 By that year, when Charles finally reached an agreement with the covenanters, they had ‘no effective maritime force’ at their disposal.136 A small number of Scottish privateers can be identified at sea in 1650 and 1651, but the prizes they brought in did not offset the Scottish losses to English men-of-war and privateers.137

Conclusion Parliament’s ultimate victory, at sea as on land, should not detract from the efforts and impact of other naval forces during the 1640s. The confederates and royalists displayed great determination to set out large and, on occasion, successful fleets, even if these were never as coordinated as the parliamentarian navy, and the covenanters also maintained some maritime forces. Many s­ imilarities Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 202–3, 379–80. See Chapter 2, pp. 37–40 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 203–11; CSPD, 1644, p. 115; Memorials, i, pp. 105–9. See Chapter 3. pp. 69–70. 132 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, p. 235. 133 TNA HCA 13/60, examinations of Gregory Bell and John Trotter, 11 June 1645; TNA, HCA 13/62, examination of John Nelson, 18 September 1647; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 381–4. 134 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 210–11. 135 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 218–26, 385; Robertson, Royalists at War, pp. 181–3. 136 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, p. 227. 137 Ibid., pp. 227–36. 130

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can be seen in the way they organised their naval war efforts, largely due to the problems they faced. These included their reliance on private individuals, the importance of continental supporters, fluctuating strength, and a lack of direct control over their forces at sea. In the long run they lacked the capabilities to pose a serious threat to parliamentarian domination of the seas around the British Isles, but for much of the war they inflicted considerable damage on their enemies, and forced these enemies to develop and deploy substantial resources in order to eliminate the danger they posed.

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6 Revolution, 1647–1649

When the first civil war ended after Charles I’s surrender to a Scottish covenanter army in May 1646, it left the three British kingdoms in an unresolved crisis. Parliament remained divided about what victory should bring, and communities throughout the British Isles suffered from war’s economic and social scars.1 The majority in England appear to have desired a return to government by both king and parliament, and some kind of established church, though the form either of these should take was widely disputed. Presbyterians in Scotland and Catholics in Ireland continued to push (and in Ireland, fight) for their own religious settlement. During the following two years, as efforts towards a political compromise between parliament and the king foundered, and peace brought no relief from heavy taxes and harvest failure, dissatisfaction with the parliamentarian regime in England grew.2 This eventually broke into fresh conflict in 1648, in a series of uprisings and the invasion of England by the Scottish Engager army, led by the royalist marquis of Hamilton. One of the most significant of these uprisings took place within the naval fleet stationed in the Downs. In May 1648 a substantial proportion of the fleet’s sailors rejected their commander and expressed support for some kind of political accommodation with the king. This soon escalated into open warfare, as parliament prepared a new fleet to counter this threat, and the mutineers were pushed from forceful petitioning into outright royalism, accepting the leadership of the prince of Wales. This chapter will discuss these developments and their consequences during the second civil war, which resulted in victory for the more radical faction in parliament, leading to the execution of Charles I and the establishment of the Commonwealth.

The fullest general account of the period between the first and second civil wars is Robert Ashton, Counter-Revolution: The Second Civil War and Its Origins, 1646-1648 (New Haven, 1994); see also Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces, pp. 169–76; Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 291–322; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 465–506. 2 Steve Hindle, ‘Dearth and the English Revolution: The Harvest Crisis of 1647–50’, Economic History Review, 61 (2008), pp. 64–98. 1

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Loyalty and sovereignty, January–April 1647 Although the conclusion of the first civil war brought an end to fighting on land in England and Scotland, warfare continued in Ireland and at sea. The navy achieved some success in their efforts to protect merchant shipping, providing convoys on major trade routes, and capturing a number of privateers.3 However, parliament’s enemies continued to be very active: in January 1647, the parliamentarian agent in France, René Augier, reported that ‘The Prince of Wales doth daily deliver severall Commissions against the Parliamenteers’, because ‘the King his Father caused, (saith [the prince]) all acts of hostility to cesse by Sea [in May 1646], the Parliament not doing the like on their side’.4 Irish confederates and European privateers also continued to operate, and there were repeated complaints to parliament throughout 1647 and 1648 from merchants and the maritime community.5 Indeed, the confederate privateers stepped up their efforts at sea early in 1647 and placed considerable pressure on parliamentarian naval resources.6 Irishbased men-of-war increasingly operated in packs to attack English shipping. For example, in February 1647 the Mary of Antrim and Mary of the Isles captured the Hopewell of London en route from its home port to France.7 One complaint to the Commons lamented that ‘the Irish Coasts are infested with Pirates, in small Frigates’.8 In January a confederate privateer even managed to overpower a parliamentarian warship, the Sampson, after a storm forced it into Galway bay.9 However, parliament set out a sizeable summer guard for the Irish seaboard in March, and the gradual arrival of these ships meant that the confederate threat began to be curtailed. William Penn claimed that his squadron of six vessels patrolled the coast between Wexford and Waterford so successfully that the confederates sent their prizes elsewhere, rather than risk them being retaken by his flotilla.10 Ships with parliamentarian letters of marque such as the four vessels set out by Captain Reeve Williams – the Cat, the Mermaid, the Warspite, and the Cambria galley – also added to the English naval strength in the Convoys: BL Add. MS 9,305, fos 6v, 16v; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 100, 124, 163, 175, 251–3, 306, 322, 353, 438. Successes against privateers: ADM 7/673, pp. 118, 180–1; Moderate Intelligencer, 121 (1–7 July 1647), p. 1163. 4 BL Add. MS 4,200, fos 37r–38r. On the prince of Wales’s role from 1646 to 1649, see Sean Kelsey, ‘“King of the Sea”: The Prince of Wales and the Stuart Monarchy, 1648–1649’, History, 92 (2007), pp. 428–48. 5 CJ, v, pp. 130, 131, 247, 505; LJ, ix, p. 337; Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 192 (29 March–5 April 1647), pp. 1539–40; BL Add. MS 9,305, fos 17r–18r, 26r, 50r; Add. MS 9,306, fo. 98v; TNA ADM 7/673, p. 127. 6 See Chapter 5, pp. 119–21; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 172–5, 204–6. 7 TNA HCA 15/2, commissioners of the court of admiralty of the confederate Catholics at Wexford, 30 April 1647. 8 CJ, v, p. 247. 9 TNA HCA 13/62, deposition of Robert Plunkett, 2 September 1647. 10 Anon., A List of Such Ships and Frigots Belonging to the Parliament (1647), p. 1; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 245–6. 3

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seas around Ireland.11 Confederate frigates were therefore forced to sail further afield in search of prizes: in October the committee of the admiralty directed the Nonsuch and Adventure to go to the coast of France to deal with three Irish frigates plying there.12 The effectiveness of the Irish summer guard in 1647 can also be seen in the way the navy disrupted confederate plans to transport soldiers to the continent, and captured three Irish privateers.13 This contributed to the ongoing deterioration of the royalist position in Ireland during 1647. In January the parliamentarian Captain Willoughby in the Globe intercepted the Falcon, one of the few remaining royalist warships, as it sailed from Dublin.14 The following month the confederate general assembly rejected the first ‘Ormond peace’, which they had originally negotiated with Ormond in March 1646. The marquis reopened talks with parliament, and English soldiers and a new governor, Colonel Michael Jones, arrived to take charge of Dublin. Ormond formally surrendered the city in June and sailed for England in July.15 This particular attention given by parliament’s naval command to the Irish coast may have drawn attention away from other areas.16 For example, there were complaints about St Malo in France, but only when a naval officer and his crew were imprisoned there in retaliation for attacks committed upon St Malo’s ships did parliament make direct addresses to the French king, though they had been in relatively unsuccessful negotiations with French, Spanish, and Dutch authorities throughout the 1640s.17 A ‘briefe Memoriall’ concerning English ships captured and taken into Dunkirk, Mardijk, Calais, and Boulogne, undated but probably later than 1647, mentioned some ships which had been released, but others were still held, one seized as far back as 1643.18 Therefore, although TNA HCA 30/849, fo. 577r, commission to Reeve Williams and others by the ­committee  of the Lords and Commons for the admiralty and Cinque ports, 8 April 1647. 12 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 292–3. 13 TNA HCA 13/248, deposition of Derrick Ramson, 22 May 1647; HCA 15/2, deposition of  William Powline, 31 May 1647; CSPI, 1633–47, p. 695; Murphy, War at Sea, p. 109. 14 The ship had been sold by Ormond to the French agent to the confederates who was sending it to Wexford: TNA HCA 13/62, deposition of Robert Thorp, 17 October 1647; HCA 15/2, deposition of John Boon, 25 February 1646[/7]; Carte, Ormond, vi, pp. 487–8. 15 Patrick Corish, ‘Ormond, Rinuccini and the Confederates, 1645–9’, in T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne, eds, A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691 (9 vols, Oxford, 1976), iii, pp. 322–3. 16 CJ, v, pp. 191, 329, 513; LJ, ix, pp. 210, 409, 466; BL Add. MS 9,305, fos 46r, 65r; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 94–5, 161, 185–6, 277, 492, 527. See also Murphy, War at Sea, p. 187. 17 LJ, x, p. 115; BL Add. MS 9,305, fo. 5r; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 351, 418; reported in Moderate Intelligencer, 131 (16–23 September 1647), pp. 1275–7. For negotiations throughout the 1640s, see BL Add. MS 4,155, fos 212r–214r, 233r; Add. MS 4,191, fos 2r–4r, 6r–7r, 9r; Add. MS 4,200, fos 15r–16r, 24r–25r, 35r–36r; Add. MSS 72,434–8. 18 BL Add. MS 4,155, fos 266r–268r. 11

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­ arliament continued to send large fleets to sea as they had throughout the first p civil war, they were unable to protect shipping completely.19 Parliament also still needed to resort to coercion in order to man the fleets they set out. The previously enacted ordinance to press mariners for naval service was re-issued in January 1647 and again a year later, and press warrants were given to most naval captains, indicating that force remained necessary to find crews for the naval ships.20 Payments are recorded for the impressing of some 3,055 men during 1647–48.21 Although certain ships were awarded exemptions by the admiralty committee, these were relatively few and generally limited to longer voyages, to India or the Caribbean; one was the Guift, sent ‘for the redemption of the English Captives in South Barbary’.22 Failure to settle the jurisdiction and personnel of the admiralty court, despite repeated debates in parliament, also meant that judgments in maritime cases were continually delayed, provoking objections from ship-owners and mariners alike.23 The naval command was still confident enough to release imprisoned royalist officers and privateers, so long as they agreed to take the National Covenant and swore not to serve against parliament again.24 These included Thomas Kettleby and Peter White, who had served in the navy during the 1630s and had been imprisoned at the start of the first civil war for fear they might have ‘evill influence’ on other seafarers.25 However, there was some disquiet within the naval administration, provoked by ‘intelligence that theire are severall persons entertain’d into some of the ships of the Irish [squadron] that have not only not taken the Nacionall Covenant but have also heretofore served against the Parliament’.26 In April 1647 an inquiry was ordered into who had and who had not taken the Covenant, both in the Irish squadron and at Chatham dockyard.27 For fleet sizes, see BL Add. MS 17,503, fos 13v–14r; Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223, pp. 78–80, 86–6, 96–7; Grene, Declaration in Vindication, p. 10. 20 CJ, v, pp. 36, 454; LJ, viii, pp. 643, 663; LJ, x, p. 6; BL Add. MS 9,305, fo. 17r; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 213, 222–3, 235. 21 TNA ADM 18/3, fos 30v, 33r, 34r; ADM 18/5, pp. 21, 23, 30, 111, 119, 122, 136, 141, 150, 157, 164, 229, 237, 241, 256, 269; E 351/2286, fos 15r–15v; E 351/2287, fo. 31v. See Chapter 4, pp. 99–102. 22 Quoting TNA ADM 7/673, p. 264, cf. pp. 188, 200–1, 244; BL Add. MS 9305, fo. 6r. On the captivity of British mariners in North Africa during the 1640s, see Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’, pp. 259–62. 23 CJ, v, pp. 98, 256, 395, 523, 528; LJ, viii, p. 640; LJ, ix, pp. 39, 150, 292, 303; LJ, x, pp. 188–9; Bodl. Tanner MS 59, fo. 757r; see also George F. Steckley, ‘Merchants and the Admiralty Court during the English Revolution’, The American Journal of Legal History, 22 (1978), pp. 137–75; Blakemore, ‘The Legal World of English Sailors’, pp. 110–11. 24 TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 105, 337, 370. On the National Covenant, see Chapter 4, pp. 86–7. 25 LJ, ix, p. 121; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 283–4. Peter White served as master to Sir John Pennington throughout the 1620 and 1630s: see NMM JOD/1/1, fos 4v, 29r, 64r; White, Memorable Sea-Fight. For Kettleby, see Chapter 2, pp. 52–3, Chapter 3, p. 59, and Chapter 5, pp. 114–15. 26 TNA ADM 7/673, p. 260. 27 Ibid., pp. 260, 264. 19

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It seems that the navy struggled to resolve the continued need for skilled seafarers with the ambiguous and conflicted loyalties of a divided nation. Even so, as they had throughout the 1640s, parliament continued to enforce English claims to the ‘sovereignty of the seas’ at least as aggressively as Charles I had during the 1630s.28 This is shown by a diplomatic dispute in May 1647, when three Swedish ships convoying merchant vessels refused to strike their flags to two English naval ships, stating that they had been ordered not to submit to any other flag by their queen. A short battle followed, and the naval ships called on the assistance of English merchant vessels, but the Swedish squadron escaped at nightfall. The next day William Batten, commander-in-chief at sea since 1645, learnt of this incident and set out with four ships, meeting the Swedes at Boulogne.29 Batten seized the Swedish commander’s ship and brought it into the Downs, and the other Swedish ships, who ‘durst not goe home without her’, followed.30 Although parliament ordered Batten to release the ship, both Houses approved of his actions, and resolved to write a letter to Queen Christina ‘To set forth the Right of this Crown to the Sovereignty of the Narrow Seas’.31 René Augier reported from France that ‘The incounter with the Swedish Ships … doth bruit here, & shew to these folk that the Parliament stands up[on] the honour of the Crowne, & thinks to be in posture not to suffer any injury of whomsoever’.32

Post-war politics, May 1647–March 1648 The navy was not alone in facing difficulties after the first civil war: victory on the battlefield had only exposed the cracks in the unity of parliament and its forces. The parliamentarian cause was a very complex configuration of individual interests, but in broad terms the two factions vying for control were the Presbyterians, who generally favoured some settlement with the king and a church based on the Scottish model, and the Independents, who were more radical and wanted greater toleration of religious diversity.33 In the summer of 1647 the Presbyterians made a bid for power by seizing London, and they received support from a large proportion of the city’s seafarers, probably motivated by hostility to the financial burden and radical religious agenda associated with the See Chapter 1, pp. 24–6. On parliament’s naval command, see Chapter 4, pp. 87–8, 93–4. 30 Quoting HMC, Portland, i, p. 437; see also CJ, v, p. 170; LJ, ix, pp. 178, 186; reported in Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 197 (3–10 May 1647), p. 5679; Moderate Intelligencer, 113 (6–13 May 1647), pp. 1057–8; R. B., A Trve and Fvll Relation of the Late Sea Fight, Betwixt a Squadron of Ships Belonging to the Parliament of England, and the Queene of Swethlands Fleet (1647); Alexia Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden, 1569–1654 (Leiden, 2003), p. 239. 31 CJ, v, p. 170. 32 BL Add. MS 4,200, fos 46r–47r. 33 These labels were used in both religious and political contexts. For accounts of the political situation see Ashton, Counter-Revolution, chs 7–8; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, ch. 16. 28 29

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New Model Army.34 However, this move was short-lived, as the army and their political allies swiftly marched on the city and retook control. The army’s ascendancy after its occupation of the capital had significant consequences for the naval command. These essentially revolved around William Batten, who has generally been described as a Presbyterian, and who was definitely hostile to religious radicalism, and to the army.35 In October 1646, Batten had accused Captain Edward Hall of saying ‘certaine words … ­concerning the king and his issue’, presumably meaning that Hall had spoken against the monarchy and Batten had taken umbrage at this; however, the admiralty committee dropped the charge against Hall because there was ‘noe sufficient profe’.36 Batten’s political and religious sympathies became an issue in early August 1647 when five of the Presbyterian MPs who had led the attempt to seize London, and then been impeached for it, tried to go abroad.37 They took ship for France, but were chased and stopped by Roger Lamming and Thomas Pacy, both commanders of small naval vessels.38 Pacy and Lamming brought the MPs to Batten. Because they possessed passes from the Speaker of the Commons and orders from the admiralty committee, Batten allowed them to depart.39 A curious occurrence is recorded in one anonymous pamphlet recounting these events, apparently written by some naval officers, which added that Samuel Kem – a former parliamentarian army officer and Batten’s chaplain – told Lamming that ‘were he [Kem] in the Army or the Councell of Warre, he would Vote [Lamming] to be hanged’, because ‘he knew [Lamming] had a Commission in his pocket, signed by some of the Members to raise a Company of Sea-men, to oppose the Army’.40 If Lamming did indeed have this commission, which is also mentioned in Batten’s account and would probably have come from the Presbyterian leadership, his behaviour in recapturing the impeached MPs is somewhat incongruous: it may represent an attempt to reconcile himself to the newly dominant army and their allies. Kem was no sympathiser with the army, This is discussed in detail in Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 261–7. 35 Gardiner thought Batten was a Presbyterian: Samuel Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (4 vols, London, 1894), iv, p. 314; also Robert Ashton, The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution 1603–1649 (London, 1978), p. 325; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 81. 36 TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 2, 40. 37 For accounts of these events see Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 312–15; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 498–500. 38 Batten’s own account of this is William Batten, The True Relation of Capt: William Batten … Touching the Manner of the Transportation of the Six Members (1647); see also anon., A Declaration of the Representations of the Officers of the Navy. Concerning the Impeached Members of Parliament, Transported Beyond Seas (1647). Pacy appears in the 1646 and 1647 ship lists, a ‘Lanning’ only in the 1647 list: anon., A List of Svch Ships and Frigotts (1646); anon., A List of Such Ships and Frigots (1647). 39 TNA ADM 7/673, p. 361. 40 Anon., Declaration of the Representations, pp. 4–5. On Kem, see Barbara Donagan, ‘Kem, Samuel (1604–1670)’, ODNB. 34

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and went on to play a role in the mutiny of 1648, so he was unlikely to upbraid Lamming for possessing such a commission – his words look more like an ironic threat about the dangers of switching sides to the army.41 This rather cryptic piece of evidence does at least suggest that loyalties were confused and tempers running high in the navy. Bernard Capp argued that Batten releasing the MPs was the ‘affront’ which prompted the Independents to review control of the navy, but the maritime community’s support for the Presbyterians in July may also have raised concerns, and Batten himself later claimed that the mutual hostility ran deeper, writing ‘I was dismissed by a Committee … because I was not of the temper of the Army’.42 Batten does seem to have had some suspicions regarding the army’s dealings with the king. On 10 September 1647 Andrew Gosfright, a Justice of the Peace in Sandwich, reported second-hand that a minister from one of the naval ships had heard Batten claim that the army ‘would in the Conclusion take off [the king’s] Head’. The minister, John Springham, protested that he had only heard Batten say that ‘the Army would not deal fairly with the King’, but either was a pretty serious aspersion at this time.43 Whether in response to one of these factors or all of them, Batten was called before the admiralty committee on 17 September, which had been expanded to include Independent members such as Colonel Thomas Rainborowe and Henry Marten, and resigned his commission rather than be dismissed.44 The royalist press made much of this, claiming that it was ‘for feare he was tainted with Presbytery’, and that he was ‘cast over-board by a Committee of land-pirates’, although this is probably exaggerated; at the committee meeting, Batten professed his continued loyalty to parliament, and he retained his place as surveyor of the navy.45 Batten was not the only one out of sorts with the naval command. In October 1647, twenty-three of the company of the Bonaventure, the ship of John Crowther, vice-admiral of the Irish squadron, petitioned the admiralty for their pay, ‘the same being on theire former peticion to Captain Crowther denied & theire persons sent onshore’ because (according to Crowther) they ‘did in a very disorderly and mutinous way demand theire pay from the said Captain Crowther and contrary to theire dutie desert the said ship’.46 The admiralty committee Batten, The True Relation, p. 5. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 16; William Batten, A Declaration of Sir William Batten, Late Vice-Admiral for the Parliament, Concerning his Departure from London, to his Highnesse the Prince of Wales (1648), p. 2. 43 Quoting LJ, ix, p. 433. 44 Expansion of the committee: CJ, v, p. 297; LJ, ix, p. 430. Batten’s examination and resignation: TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 377–8, 381. 45 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 2 (21–28 September 1647), sig. B2v; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 5 (12–19 October 1647), p. 37; cf. Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 228 (21–28 September 1647), pp. 679–80; BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 89r; Add. MS 9,305, fo. 40v; TNA PRO ADM 7/673, pp. 381, 408. 46 TNA ADM 7/673, p. 401. 41

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condemned the ‘principall Formentor’ and two others to forfeit their wages, and docked the others the 4s bounty that parliament had added to naval pay.47 The dockworkers at Chatham also petitioned in March 1648, and again in October that year, for pay which had been in arrears since 1646, as well as for an increase in their salaries, but were apparently ignored.48 After Batten’s resignation, and though he remained in the administration, the navy came increasingly under the influence of men associated with the army. Rainborowe was appointed as vice-admiral, and although he was ostensibly a reasonable choice as the son of an important London shipmaster, and had served as captain of the Lion in 1643, he was controversial because of his radical affiliations.49 The royalist newsbook Mercurius Pragmaticvs, an admittedly hostile source, called him ‘one of the Princes of the LEVELLERS’, and this is the reputation he has held among historians, being famous for his outspoken role in the Putney debates of 1647.50 There was disagreement in parliament concerning his suitability, and he was not fully accepted until April 1648.51 However, the king’s escape from army custody in November 1647 lent new urgency to proceedings: on hearing of Charles’s escape, parliament closed all the ports of the kingdom, and even after the king was quickly incarcerated in Carisbrooke castle ‘strange’ rumours circulated, that he had escaped, or that the prince of Orange meant to save him, the latter caused by the arrival at Portsmouth of Dutch West Indische Compagnie ships.52 These rumours justified the necessity of even a disputed choice such as Rainborowe, who was sent to sea in January, to join ships stationed off the Isle of Wight.53 Rainborowe was not the only army officer given a naval appointment, and he himself recommended a number of men both for command of ships and for other positions.54 This seems to have been part of a wider move to build closer connections between the navy and army: late in October 1647, the navy TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 407, 497; LJ, ix, p. 482. BL Add. MS 9,305, fo. 8r; TNA ADM 18/3, fo. 38r–38v. 49 On Thomas Rainborowe’s father William, see Brian Quintrell, ‘Rainborow, William (bap. 1587, d. 1642)’, ODNB; W. R. Chaplin, ‘William Rainsborough (1587–1642) and His Associates of the Trinity House’, MM, 31 (1945), pp. 178–97; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, ch. 7. For Rainborowe in 1643 see Chapter 3, p. 63. 50 For a brief account of these debates, see Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 315–19; for Rainborowe, Ian Gentles, ‘Rainborowe [Rainborow], Thomas (d. 1648)’, ODNB. For more detailed discussions of the debates, see Michael J. Mendle, The Putney Debates of 1647: The Army, the Levellers, and the English State (Cambridge, 2001). 51 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 13 (14–21 December 1647), sig. O3r; CJ, v, pp. 378, 406, 413; LJ, ix, pp. 459, 606, 615–16; LJ, x, p. 115. 52 CJ, v, pp. 356, 359; TNA ADM 7/673, pp. 440, 478–9; Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 230 (20–27 December 1647), p. 1853. 53 Moderate Intelligencer, 147 (6–13 January 1647[/8]), p. 1124; Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 232 (10–17 January 1647[/8]), p. 1678; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 19 (18–25 January 1647[/8]), sig. T3r–v. 54 CJ, v, p. 528; BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 123r; Add. MS 9,305, fos 4v, 27v, 31r, 42r, 43v, 47v, 55r. 47

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and army committees were ordered to consider together the ‘Habilments and Materials of War’ belonging to the state.55 Thus, by the end of 1647 the navy had come under the influence of the army and Independent faction, although Warwick and others from the first war continued to sit on the admiralty committee.56 By contrast, many seafarers were increasingly disenchanted with parliament’s post-war regime, and particularly the political role of the army and its association with radical religion, as well as the failure to suppress conflict at sea. This disenchantment fuelled, amongst the maritime community as elsewhere, what Robert Ashton has termed a ‘groundswell of enthusiasm for the king’, intensifying especially in early 1648, after parliament’s ‘vote of no addresses’ in January ended negotiations with Charles.57 This groundswell was to erupt in the spring and summer of 1648, first in popular petitions and then in mutiny and war.

Mutiny in the Downs, April–June 1648 The papers of the admiralty and navy committees from the early months of 1648 show little inkling of disaffection in the navy, though royalist reports in April mention discontent, and there were rumours of mutinies early in May.58 This may be because parliament’s commanders were concerned with events elsewhere. Resentments over delays in pay, and the proposed disbandment of soldiers in south Wales, led Colonels John Poyer and Rowland Laugharne to defect from parliament in the spring. They secured the key garrisons in the region and had removed Milford Haven from parliamentarian control by April.59 In Ireland, meanwhile, a number of coastal outposts also went over to the king’s cause. Robert Monro and his Scottish army in Ulster supported the Engagement, and as a result the parliamentarian navy lost the use of Carrickfergus as a port.60 The situation worsened when Inchiquin also acted on his disillusionment with the political and religious settlement in London: in April he declared for the king, and the following month he agreed to a ceasefire with the confederates.61 This resulted in the navy losing access to the key havens of Cork, Youghal, and Kinsale, and they could do little to prevent these defections, although Crowther, CJ, v, p. 339. For the membership of the admiralty committee through late 1647 and early 1648, see BL Add. MS 9,305, passim. 57 Ashton, Counter-Revolution, pp. 205ff. 58 BL Add. MS 9,305, fos 4v–70v; BL Add. MS 9,307, fos 5r–11v; Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, pp. 152–3; Dorothy Gardiner, ed., The Oxinden and Peyton Letters, 1642–1670 (1937), p. 138. 59 Robert Ashton, ‘John Poyer’, ODNB; J. D. Davies, Britannia’s Dragon: A Naval History of Wales (Stroud, 2013), p. 41. 60 The Engagement was an alliance between the king and the Scots, agreed in December 1647, in which Charles agreed to recognise the Solemn League and Covenant in return for Scottish military support against parliament. 61 Armstrong, Protestant War, pp. 200–22; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 218–19. 55 56

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still in command on the Irish coast, received orders to prevent supplies reaching Inchiquin, and to bring artillery to Wales.62 Similar dissatisfaction with parliament prompted a group of gentlemen in Kent to circulate a petition to parliament calling for a personal treaty with the king.63 The main fears of the admiralty committee were that naval stores might be seized, or that the mouth of the Thames would be blockaded by artillery; they did not envision anything more serious.64 These fears were soon realised when parliament’s harsh response forced the petitioners into revolt, and they quickly joined with royalists, as well as finding sympathisers in the navy. On 23 May, Peter Pett ‘mustered the ordinary men of the Navy’ (the dockworkers at Chatham), but ‘found as well divers officers of the ships missing which were joined in that horrid engagement … as also many ordinary shipkeepers’. Pett ordered that ‘if any of them would lay downe their armes, and come in to do their duty within two daies they should have their full allowance. But never an officer appeared nor above two ordinary men.’ Over the next few days the Kent petitioners sent repeated envoys to Pett in attempts to get hold of the stores, and while Pett kept them out of the dockyards, some ships lying in the Medway were seized.65 At the same time parliament’s leaders wrote to the navy commissioners, being ‘informed That some people are now at Deptford, seizing upon & plundering the Stores there’, and ordering the commissioners to ‘take the best course you can for the preservation & security of the stores’ and the Tilbury blockhouse.66 Towards the end of May, Mercurius Pragmaticvs reported that ‘since their securing Rochester, and the Magazines at Chattam and other places, they have collected themselves, by the assistance of Sea-men, Watermen, &c into such a posture, that they have secured the Country’.67 This ‘posture’ of strength might well be exaggerated, but the revolt was causing concern, and on 27 May Rainborowe went ashore to inspect important coastal castles.68 Samuel Kem, now parson of Deal and cooperating with the petitioners, took this opportunity to go out to the fleet, to circulate the petition and encourage support from the sailors.69 According J. Crowther, Papers Presented to the Parliament against Lord Inchequin (1648), pp. 1–5; LJ, x, p. 201; Perfect Occurrences, 68 (14–21 April 1648), p. 478. 63 Ashton, Counter-Revolution, pp. 144–8; anon., To the Right Honourable the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, at VVestminster. The Humble Petition of the Knights, Gentry, Clergy and Commonalty of the County of Kent (1648); M[atthew] C[arter], A Most True and Exact Relation of that as Honourable as Unfortunate Expedition of Kent, Essex and Colchester (1650). 64 BL Add. MS 9,305, fos 71r–74r. 65 HMC, Portland, i, pp. 459–62; for more detail see Richard J. Blakemore, ‘Parliament, Royal Dockyards and the London Maritime Community: The Aftermath of the 1648 Naval Revolt’, Transactions of the Naval Dockyard Society, 8 (2012), pp. 31–44. 66 BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 83r; Add. MS 9,305, fo. 71r. 67 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 9 (23–30 May 1648), sig. I2r. 68 Rainborowe’s own account of these events is given in his letters to parliament: Bodl. Tanner MS 57, fos 91r, 115r–115v, 117r–117v. 69 Anon., The Declaration and Propositions of the Navie with the Oath which they have Taken (1648), p. 1. 62

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Plate 5. Willem van de Velde the Elder, Portrait of the Constant Reformation, 1648 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London) to an anonymous pamphlet describing these events, when Rainborowe returned to the Constant Reformation he was told by the crew that ‘they would obey him no longer, but would have the King brought to London’, and that coming aboard would be ‘at his perill’.70 A more detailed account of the mutiny survives in two depositions in the admiralty court given by William Hudson and Thomas Spencer, both gentlemen employed aboard the Reformation, although the fact that these were not recorded until 6 April 1649 may bring their authenticity into question. Spencer was ‘walking with one of the Masters mates by name Mr Peper’ when ‘on a suddine he heard a great noise and lumbring betweene decks … the seamen came runninge upp the Portall and hatches with great fervency and activity of body’. Spencer and Peper ‘fell into a disputing and reasoning with them for this manner of carriage and mutinous combineing themselves into a warlike posture’, and would have persuaded them to lay aside their weapons, but ‘upp came one Lendall Boatswaines mate in a very great fury and madnesse of spirit’, who shouted ‘Gentlemen if you doe not stand with mee wee are all dead men and shallbee hanged’.71 Both Spencer and Hudson reported that Lendall locked up the master and ‘some gentlemen of the Colonells retinew’ in the great cabin, then searched Anon., Declaration and Propositions of the Navie, p. 2; see also Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 262 (23–30 May 1648), p. 960. 71 TNA HCA 13/61, deposition of Thomas Spencer, 6 April 1649. 70

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Hudson’s chest for money.72 Further attempts to reason with Lendall were futile because hee was in such an extasie of spiritt … sayeing that hee had served the Parliament this seaven yeares & they had donne noethinge but nowe hee would serve them noe longer but cryed out wee will bee for God and Kinge Charles … [with] generall acclamation and shouteing throughout the whole shippe.

Spencer claimed that they tried again to calm the sailors, whose ‘generall answer was that they did not knowe what they did and they were Comanded by their officers to whome wee could not addresse ourselves because most of them did slinke away into their Cabins and the underdecks’.73 Despite Spencer’s condescending comments about the ‘common’ seamen, as in the mobilisation in the navy during the early years of the first civil war, political attitudes are evident at all levels within the navy, and particularly lower-ranking officers emerge as very influential figures.74 This is supported too by a later list presented to parliament of officers involved in the mutiny, and consisting mainly of boatswains, gunners, and pursers, although the navy also subsequently made payments to two captains and eight officers for their ‘fidelity’, and towards ‘losse susteyned in deserting the revolted shipps’.75 Following their mutiny, the sailors of the Reformation called a council, to which officers of other ships came.76 Captain Francis Penrose objected and, when armed men came to summon him in the name of the mutineers’ vice-admiral, he asked who this person was; upon being told ‘his name was Lendall’, Penrose replied ‘he knew such a man to be a Bostons [i.e. boatswain’s] Mate, but no otherwise’. Despite his reluctance, Penrose attended the council, apparently forced by his own crew, but refused to sign the petition or accept Lendall, suggesting that they ‘make choice of some honourable person, that is true to both [i.e. king and parliament]’; at which, reportedly by unanimous consent, Warwick was selected.77 Penrose was dispatched with letters to Warwick and to the navy commissioners, printed soon afterwards as The Declaration of the Navie, signed by nine officers of the Reformation and the Swallow.78 Lendall’s name is absent from these signatories, throwing into doubt the actual significance of the role he Ibid., deposition of William Hudson, 6 April 1649. Ibid., deposition of Thomas Spencer, 6 April 1649. 74 See Chapter 2, pp. 42–3, 46–8; Blakemore, ‘Thinking Outside the Gundeck’. 75 CJ, v, p. 606; TNA E 351/2287, fos 14r–16v. 76 Moderate Intelligencer, 167 (25 May–1 June 1648), p. 1371, reported five ships involved in the mutiny; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 9 (23–30 May 1648), sig. I4v, mentioned ‘a whole Squadron of ships’; Warwick reported six: LJ, x, p. 300. A later deposition reported eight: TNA HCA 13/61, deposition of Richard Cranley, 12 April 1649. 77 Anon., Declaration and Propositions of the Navie, pp. 3–4. 78 Anon., The Declaration of the Navie, being the True Copie of a Letter from the Officers of the Navie (1648); another version was printed: anon., The Declaration of the Navie: VVith the Oath Taken by All the Officers and Common-Men of the Same (1648). 72 73

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played, and it is possible that he was simply a scapegoat, although a ‘Lindall’ appears as a lieutenant in the royalist fleet later in 1648.79 The Declaration proclaimed its signatories ‘unanimously joyned with the Kentish gentlemen’, and called for a treaty with Charles, along with the paying and disbanding of the army, and that ‘the known Laws of the Kingdome may be Established and continued … [and] the Priviledges of Parliament and the Liberty of the Subject may be preserved’. These demands show that the mariners did not consider themselves irrevocably separated from parliament, although they reveal dissatisfaction with its rule, and are similar to demands in other contemporary petitions.80 The Declaration also described Rainborowe as ‘a man not wel-affected to the King, Parliament and Kingdome’, and they ‘resolved to take in no Commander whatsoever, but such as shall agree and correspond with us in this Petition’.81 This undermines the prominence some historians have accorded to Rainborowe’s personality in causing the mutiny.82 It appears that the decision to petition resulted in his removal because it was known he would not ‘agree and correspond’, rather than being a reaction against Rainborowe himself, and this was the interpretation presented by one of the Kent royalists in his account of the mutiny.83 Rainborowe’s ‘Ignorance and insolency’, mentioned in one anonymous manuscript note, may have provoked feeling against him, but this note probably represents rumours prevalent in London rather than the actual opinions of the mutineers.84 The Declaration itself deployed respectful language, and aimed to persuade, not overthrow, the government; but the escalating situation, and the hostile reaction it engendered in parliament, doomed this persuasion to failure. One reason for this hostility by parliament was fear that the disaffection would spread swiftly. One report declared that ‘The falling off of those ships … makes other Sea-men tumultuous, and if some course be not taken to reduce them, I feare no commander will bee safe in any ship’.85 Reports early in June of an encounter between Lord General Fairfax’s soldiers and some of the petitioners at Blackheath, and the capture of Maidstone from the royalists, mention seamen fighting against the parliamentary forces, while a petition from London’s common council to parliament requested that Batten be reinstated, suggesting Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, no. 2879, fos 243r–243v; cf. Moderate Intelligencer, 179 (17–24 August 1648), p. 1507; Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 264 (14–21 August 1648), p. 2124. 80 For 1648 petitions see Ashton, Counter-Revolution, pp. 139–58. 81 Anon., The Declaration of the Navie. 82 Donald Kennedy, ‘The English Naval Revolt of 1648’, English Historical Review, 77 (1962), p. 253; Powell, Navy in the English Civil Wars, pp. 156–7; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 26, though cf. p. 23; for more general accounts which focus on Rainborowe, see Ashton, English Civil War, pp. 323–4; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, p. 540. 83 C[arter], A Most True and Exact Relation, p. 52. 84 Anon., ‘The Reasons [th]e Navy Give for Theire Resolution’, dated 17 June 1648, BL Thomason Tracts E.448[3]. 85 Anon., A Fight at Sea Between the Parliament Ships & those that Revolted (1648), p. 3. 79

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little sympathy for Rainborowe.86 Perhaps because of this, parliament did not respond with immediate force, and Warwick was named admiral and sent to take command, but things did not go to plan. When Warwick would endorse neither the Declaration nor the Kent petition, the sailors of the fleet refused to acknowledge his authority, again indicating that this was not simply a question of charismatic commanders, but of political objectives.87 This was a step towards open revolt, and at about the same time the sailors began to take violent action, capturing an East India Company vessel carrying substantial sums of money, and boarding other ships to search for ammunition.88 Warwick hurried to Portsmouth, where he reported that the crews ‘severally engaged themselves to live, and dye with mee’.89 However, two navy commissioners who were with him, Batten and Richard Cranley, reported that ‘we find the Seamen disaffected and poisoned … Merchantmen concur with them … there is not a possibility of quieting the seamen unless some suddaine addresses be made to the king’.90 This probably represents another attempt to persuade parliament, undermining Batten’s later claim that he had transferred his loyalty to the prince of Wales by this point.91 Indeed, it suggests that for Batten, loyalty to both parliament and king was still not incompatible, and that he used his position within the naval administration to further the cause of a peaceful resolution and a personal treaty. There was in fact some substance to Batten’s and Cranley’s claims, as the sailors of the Antelope rejected their officers and sailed to join the disaffected fleet.92 Even so, the Kent uprising was swiftly defeated by Fairfax: by mid-June the last of the royalist army were besieged in Colchester, although they did not surrender until August.93 Similarly, the parliamentarian men-of-war assigned to the west were too far removed to be caught up in the mutiny, and suspicions about the loyalties of some captains, such as William Penn and Richard Swanley, proved to be unfounded: no ships from the Irish coast deserted to the royalists.94 Naval vessels also supported Cromwell when he retook south Wales and besieged Pembroke in June; the Expedition and Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 253 (29 May–6 June 1648), p. 2039; Moderate Intelligencer, 168 (1–7 June 1648), p. 1375; LJ, x, pp. 295–6; BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fos 117r–123v. 87 LJ, x, pp. 297–300. 88 Mercurius Elencticus, 29 (7–14 June 1648), p. 226; Mercurius Melancholicus, 43 (12–19 June 1648), pp. 258–9; anon., A Fight at Sea Between the Parliament Ships & those that Revolted, pp. 1–2. 89 BL Add. MS 19,367, fo. 3v; cf. Add. MS 17,677 T, fos 123r–123v; anon., Sir Thomas Payton Lieutenant Generall for the King with Divers Others, Taken Prisoner … [and] a Letter from the Navy (1648), p. 1. 90 TNA ADM 18/3, fo. 37v. The letter is undated but must have been written early in June, as Warwick wrote to Batten and Cranley on 9 June, announcing that he was leaving Portsmouth: BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 89r. 91 Batten, Declaration of Sir William Batten, p. 3. 92 Mercurius Elencticus, 29 (7–14 June 1648), pp. 225–6. 93 On the siege, see Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 545–8. 94 CJ, v, pp. 530, 533; BL, Add. MS 9,305, fo. 58r; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 24–5. 86

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Bonaventure blockaded Tenby, while cannons from the Lion were landed and planted against the town, which surrendered in July.95 Nevertheless, the crews in the Downs refused offers of indemnity made by parliament and Fairfax, either because of their serious commitment to the position they had taken up, or perhaps mistrusting their former masters.96 Lacking support on land, and no longer merely petitioners applying military leverage, the fleet sailed for Holland on 12 June to meet the duke of York, who was nominally the royalist admiral, although Prince Charles quickly took command himself.97

Blockading the Thames, June–August 1648 Parliament’s efforts to raise a new fleet did not begin smoothly. Warwick wrote to Trinity House on 17 June requesting their assistance, but at a meeting of the corporation on 21 June the majority resolved to petition parliament in favour of a personal treaty with the king, which they duly did, followed by further petitions published early in July.98 However, twelve of those present at the meeting had already promised their ‘best Aid and Assistance’ to Warwick, and soon submitted their own counter-petition calling for the ‘reduction’ of the royalist fleet by force.99 This petition gathered only fifty-two signatures, compared with over 500 on the combined petitions from the majority in Trinity House, and the main figures of the counter-petition were ridiculed in the royalist press as insignificant and untrustworthy, but they show that some seafarers still supported Warwick and parliament, and were prepared to serve in their new fleet.100 On 8 July, on the same day the Scottish Engager army led by the marquis of Hamilton marched into England, A Declaration of the Officers and Company of Sea-Men aboard the royalist fleet was published in London, having originally Robert Matthews, ‘A Storme Out of Wales’: The Second Civil War in South Wales, 1648 (Newcastle, 2012), pp. 120, 136–8. 96 Moderate Intelligencer, 16 (8–15 June 1648), p. 1396; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 22. 97 Anon., A Fight at Sea Between the Parliament Ships & those that Revolted, p. 2; Kelsey, ‘“King of the Sea”’, pp. 437–9. Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, p. 165, gives 10 June as the date of departure, but has some confusion concerning dates in June and July. 98 CJ, v, p. 603; anon., ‘Marriners & Seamen of [th]e Trinitie-House Theire Resolution’, dated 21 June 1648, BL Thomason Tracts 669.f.12[51–2]; anon., The Humble Tender and Declaration of Many Well-Affected Mariners and Sea-Men, Commanders of Ships, Members of Trinity-House, to the Commissioners of the Navy (1648); anon., The Humble Petition and Desires of the Commanders, Masters, Mariners, Younger Brothers and Sea-Men of the Shipping Belonging to the River of Thames (1648); the originals survive in the Lords papers, PA PO/ JO/10/1/264, fos 172r–173r; PO/JO/10/3/181/16. The only surviving account of the 21 June meeting is in Richard Badiley, The Sea-Men Undeceived (1648). 99 LJ, x, pp. 339–40; anon., The Humble Declaration, Tender, and Petition of Divers Cordiall and Wel-Affected Marriners, whose Names are Subscribed, to the Right Honourable the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament (1648), p. 4; CJ, v, p. 624; the original survives in PA PO/JO/10/1/264, fo. 60r. 100 This is discussed in more detail in Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 277–82. 95

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been printed in Holland, and translated into Dutch, suggesting an international maritime audience.101 In this publication the officers went much further than their previous statements, claiming that ‘the Independent party’ was treating England ‘as if it were a Conquered Nation’, and explicitly criticising parliament’s religious policies; the oath they had sworn to Charles I was likewise circulated in print.102 Parliament responded with their own proclamation on 14 July, also translated into Dutch, giving the royalist ships twenty days to submit, otherwise Warwick would ‘proceed to the reducing of them by Force’.103 Despite this threat, the royalist fleet returned to the English coast: in mid-July they bombarded the parliamentarian forces besieging Deal, and throughout July and August the fleet remained at the mouth of the Thames, capturing London shipping, so that the navy board were reluctant to send stores to Portsmouth by sea.104 Prince Charles wrote to London merchants offering to release their ships if they would loan him £20,000, which presumably did not gain him much popularity in the city.105 Despite the triumphant boasting of the royalist newsbooks about what the fleet would achieve, this blockade justified parliament’s militant response.106 A number of depositions in the English admiralty court about the ships taken by the prince’s fleet survive, the most detailed concerning the Love.107 According to Robert Warde, who sailed as surgeon, the master Gregory Milner had been informed ‘about 18 July’ that ‘the Revolted shipps were gonne for Holland’. When the Love approached the Downs, however, they found the prince’s fleet Anon., A Declaration of the Officers and Company of Sea-Men Aboard his Majfsties [sic] Ships … Lately Rescued for his Majesties Service (1648); anon., Een Verclaringe vande Officieren ende Compagnie van het Zee-Volck, oft Matrosen op Sijne Majesteys Shepen (1648). On Hamilton’s army, see Scott, Politics and War, pp. 177–8. 102 Anon., The Oath taken by the Sea-Men of the Revolted Ships (1648). 103 Parliament, A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Concerning the Reducing of the Late Revolted Ships (1648); Parliament, Declaratie van de Lords ende Commons, Vergadert in ’t Parliament, om de Gerevolteerde Schepen Wederom te Brenghen Onder de Gehoorsaemheyt van het Parliament (1648). 104 R. G., The True Relation of the Arrivall of Thirty Flemish Ships, and Six of Those that Revolted, Before the Town and Castle of Deale (1648); BL Add. MS 9,306, fo. 116r. 105 For an account of ships taken, see BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fos 171r–171v; Perfect Weekly Account, 21 (2–9 August 1648), sig. W2r; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 21 (15–22 August 1648), sig. B2r–B2v; Mercurius Aquaticus (4–11 August 1648), p. 6. This is the only surviving issue of Aquaticus: see Carolyn Nelson and Matthew Seccombe, British Newspapers and Periodicals 1641–1700: A Short-Title Catalogue of Serials Printed in England, Scotland, Ireland, and British America (New York, 1987), p. 203. 106 E.g. Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 17 (18–25 July 1648), sig. R4v; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 19 (1–8 August 1648), sig. Xr; Samuel Sheppard, ed., Parliament Kite, 12 (3–10 August 1648), p. 67. 107 TNA HCA 13/61, depositions of Robert Warde, 15 January 1648[/9], William Drake, 17 January 1648[/9], Thomas Denman, 20 January 1648[/9], Francis Busher, 20 January 1648[/9], Thomas Hendra, 22 January 1648[/9], George Butcher, 15 February 1648[/9], John Warenne, 15 February 1648[/9], Nicholas Trerice, 12 March 1648[/9], William Sinckler, 12 March 1648[/9], Edward Farmer, 22 March 1648[/9], Richard Haddock, 5 April 1649, Richard Kennedy, 19 April 1649, and Nicholas Lucas, 1 May 1649. 101

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returned, and upon advice that the fleet watched all entrances to the anchorage, they sailed in ‘hoping either to goe cleere by them, or at least to obtaine leave from them to bringe up his said shipp for London’. Despite firing a salute to the prince, they were seized, and made to serve with the fleet, with ‘diverse officers and gentlemen by commaund of the Prince or his Counsell put aboard her to secure and more strictly detaine her’.108 Another of the Love’s crew, Thomas Denman, ‘heard diverse of the seamen that were in the Revolted shipps in their passing to and fro saye that if shee was cleared they would serve the Prince noe longer’, and royalist accounts also noted the sailors’ dissatisfaction that more ships were not detained either as prizes or reinforcements.109 These actions presumably did not inspire royalist support amongst the wider maritime community either. There was a particular blow to the prince’s reputation when on 28 July one of his frigates was captured bearing a commission to ‘take, apprehend, sink and fire, or otherwise to impair and destroy the Ships, Vessells and men’ of those who supported parliament.110 Also found in the frigate were papers confirming that a ship captured by a royalist privateer, in March 1648, was declared legal prize on the grounds that the master had sworn the National Covenant (in that month the prince had established his own admiralty court in Jersey).111 Considering that many seafarers living in London and indeed elsewhere would have taken the Covenant, this revelation may also have discouraged further royalist mobilisation. It might explain the publication, only a few days later, of The Declaration of the Sea Commanders and Marriners in the Royal Navie, again justifying the actions of the royalist fleet and stating that mariners had been fooled by ‘the subtile malice, & many hypocritical pretentions’ of parliament, and that ‘many families in our profession, are almost, or altogether impoverished, by the decay of forraign Traffique, and Trade’.112 In order to explain increasingly extreme measures, the king’s seafaring supporters denied their earlier protestations of loyalty to both king and parliament, and reinterpreted the actions they had taken during the first civil war. Yet in spite of the depredations of the royal fleet, there was no immediate swing in favour of parliament. At least two important shipmasters joined the royalist fleet in July, William Batten and Elias Jordaine, and though Jordaine later claimed to have been ‘a passenger and noe otherwise’ in the fleet, he was reported by numerous witnesses to have been vice-admiral and a member of the Ibid., deposition of Robert Warde, 15 January 1648[/9]. TNA HCA 13/61, deposition of Thomas Denman, 20 January 1648[/9]; Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, nos. 2878, fos 241r–241v, 2879, fos 242r–243v. 110 The commission was printed in Moderate Intelligencer, 177 (3–10 August 1648), pp. 1476– 7; see also Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 18 (25 July–1 August 1648), sig. S6v. 111 Perfect Weekly Account, 21 (2–9 August 1648), sig. W1v–2r; Moderate Intelligencer, 176 (27 July–3 August 1648), p. 1471; on the admiralty court see Kelsey, ‘“King of the Sea”’, p. 441. 112 Anon., The Declaration of the Sea Commanders and Marriners in the Royal Navie and Fleet, Now with his Highnesse Prince Charles, Riding on the Downes (1648). 108 109

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prince’s council.113 The Dutch ambassador noted how influential they were, as Batten was ‘greatly loved by the seamen’, and ‘both greatly valued amongst the seamen’; a royalist narrative of the fleet described ‘hardly a shipp coming in [to the Downs] but was a kinne to one of them’.114 In his will Jordaine bequeathed a gold ring to each ‘of the Elder brothers of the Trinity House in the yeare one thousand sixe hundred Fourty and eight’, suggesting both a wide acquaintance in the corporation and that the events of that year left a lasting impression.115 It was also reported from Portsmouth that ‘The sailors in the ships here … doe not cry out for King and Parliament but for King and the ships’, and there were rumours of fighting in the city.116 According to royalist reports, Warwick had to recruit Newcastle collier ships to supplement his numbers, and still by the beginning of August had no more than ‘six inconsiderable ships’, as well as encountering problems when trying to recruit sailors.117 Mercurius Pragmaticvs reported that in early July, Warwick caused Drum to be beaten for Sea-men for the service of the STATE. But when the Sea men … would none of them stirre … [Warwick] noised it abroad by sound of Trumpet, that all which would come and list themselves, should immediately receive Conduct money … Yet with all this adoe, he was not able to raise 100 men.118

Though this is an obviously partisan source, even a relatively impartial writer acknowledged that, because of the prince’s ships, ‘Parliament [is] in a very low credit’, and the Dutch ambassador wrote on 3 August that ‘Warwick is still not gone out, through lack of men’.119 Warwick requested the right to execute martial law in the fleet, as one newsbook put it, ‘in regard of the odnesse of the Saylors’.120 This was provoked, Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, no. 2878, fos 241r–241v; Mercurius Elencticus, 35 (19–26 July 1648), p. 273; Mercurius Elencticus, 38 (9–16 August 1648), p. 311; TNA HCA 13/61, depositions of Nicholas Trerice, 12 March 1648[/9], William Sinckler, 12 March 1648[/9], John Rawlins, 30 March 1649, and Edward Farmer, 22 March 1648[/9]; HCA 13/121, answer of Elias Jordaine, 5 February 1648[/9]. 114 BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fo. 148v, ‘Batten, seer bemint is van de zeelieden’, 166r, ‘capeteijn Batten en capiteijn Jordan … beide veel vermogen onder het zeevolck’; Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, no. 2879, fo. 242v. 115 TNA PROB 11/253, will of Elias Jordaine, proved 13 February 1655[/6]. 116 Quoting Moderate Intelligencer, 175 (20–27 July 1648), p. 1458; see also Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 269 (18–25 July 1648), p. 1030; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 270 (25 July–1 August 1648), p. 1026; BL Add. MS 17,6777 T, fos 156v–157v. 117 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 17 (18–25 July 1648), sig. R4v; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 18 (25 July–1 August 1648), sig. S6v; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 19 (1–8 August 1648), sig. Xr; cf. BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fos 147v–149r; Add. MS 9,300, fo. 95r. 118 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 14 (4–11 July 1648), sig. P3v. 119 Moderate Intelligencer, 174 (13–20 July 1648), p. 1445; BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fo. 156v, ‘Warwijck is noch niet uijtgeloopen, door gebreck van volck’. 120 Moderate Intelligencer, 176 (27 July–3 August 1648), p. 1480. 113

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Mercurius Pragmaticvs reported, by one sailor telling Warwick that their consciences forbade them from fighting against the prince.121 Warwick himself wrote, on 1 August, that he had ‘discovered one or two ill affected persons’ amongst his crew, and that ‘The spreading, and acting of daungerous principles, amongst the Marriners, will not be easily prevented’ without ‘some knowne rules … and punishments’.122 The imposition of martial law proved even more unpopular; Mercurius Pragmaticvs went on to claim the following week that the mariners were ‘mutinying against his Martiall Law, as contrary to the custome of the Sea, crying out, one and all, &c., and telling him to his face, that this was not the way to make them fight’.123 ‘One and all’ was the traditional cry of mutineers in merchant ships, so the report implies that these seafarers, no longer accepting parliament’s right to exert authority, were falling back upon conventional methods of resistance.124 These difficulties for parliament perhaps reflect the desire of the majority for a peaceful resolution, as well as continued loyalty to the crown, and it is not surprising that, for most of July and August, Warwick was reluctant to venture forth to confront the prince, earning him ‘the glorious new title of L[ord] high Admirall of the Thames’.125 The print debate rumbled on: William Batten published two pamphlets, on 17 and 21 August, justifying his own decision to join Prince Charles and exhorting others to follow him, while Richard Badiley wrote in support of parliament.126 An ordinance confirming Warwick’s right to execute martial law, because of a ‘want of strict and severe Discipline to have been observed in the Navy’, was approved on 21 August, but the very next day Warwick appealed to parliament ‘for additionall power to the Ordinance’, and this too was passed, on 23 August.127 There were subsequent rumours of problems among Warwick’s crews, royalist writers claiming that ‘the Sea-men are more stubborn since his Commission for Martiall-Law’, and that ‘all the world knowes the Seamen hate it worse then hell, to bee tide [sic] to the manners and Discipline of Land Souldiers’; meanwhile, more ships had joined the prince.128 The Dutch ­ambassador wrote on 21 August Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 19 (1–8 August 1648), sig. Xr. Bodl. Tanner MS 57, fo. 164r. 123 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 20 (8–15 August 1648), sig. Y5r. 124 Blakemore, ‘Orality and Mutiny’; Blakemore, ‘The Legal World of English Sailors’, p. 112. 125 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 20 (8–15 August 1648), sig. Y5r. 126 W[illiam] B[atten], The Sea-Mans Diall, or, the Mariners Card: Directing unto the Safe Port of Christian Obedience (1648); Batten, Declaration of Sir William Batten; Badiley, The SeaMen Undeceived. These pamphlets are discussed in more detail in Blakemore, ‘London and Thames Maritime Community’, pp. 288–91. 127 LJ, x, pp. 449, 452; CJ, v, pp. 675, 678; Parliament, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Authorizing Robert Earl of Warwick Lord High Admiral of England, to Execute Marshal-Law (1648); Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 265 (21–28 August 1648), p. 2134. 128 Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 22 (22–29 August 1648), sig. Cc3v; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 24 (5–12 September 1648), sig. F4v; Mercurius Melancholicus, 54 (28 August–4 September 1648), p. 328. 121

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that Warwick was at Tilbury ‘with not more than four or five ships, so was said to me for certain, although at Westminster it is published that he has 15 or 16 ships with him’.129 One desperate parliamentarian attempt to sway opinion was a printed letter supposedly written by the royalist Anthony St Leger, imputing that the prince distrusted his ‘turn-coate mariners’, although the royalist press alleged that this was forged.130 On the other hand, royalist prospects were damaged when news reached London of a victory for parliamentary forces in Kent.131

From the Thames to Hellevoetsluis, August–December 1648 For most of August neither fleet made any aggressive movements, while rumours circulated that the prince was injured, or had gone to Holland, or that Warwick had been attacked and had suffered losses.132 In general, royalist fortunes faltered: on 25 August, after defeat at Preston, the Scottish Engager army surrendered, as did the soldiers besieged in Colchester two days later.133 Eventually, on 30 August, the prince (supposedly forced by the impetuosity of his own sailors) advanced up the Thames.134 Warwick moved to meet him but held back from fighting, waiting for reinforcements from Portsmouth; when Prince Charles summoned Warwick to acknowledge his authority and surrender, Warwick unsurprisingly refused.135 After a few days of manoeuvring, just as Jordaine began to attack one of Warwick’s ships, the fleets were separated by BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fo. 176r, ‘Sijne Excellentie light noch omtient Tilbury met niet meer dan vier ofte vijf schepen, soo mij voor seeckers is gesegt, howel te Westminster uijtgegeven werd dat hij 15 of 16 schepen bij hem heeft’. 130 Anon., A Prospective Glasse for the Revolters at Sea, and New Malignants at Land: Being a Letter sent from Sir Anthony St Leger, an Attendant on the Prince, to a Person of Quality in Colchester (1648), quoting p. 2; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 22 (22–29 August 1648), sig. A4r–A4v. This version of this issue does not appear in the Thomason collection, but is present in the Burney newspaper collection. 131 Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 264 (14–21 August 1648), p. 2124; Moderate Intelligencer, 179 (17–24 August 1648), p. 1507. 132 Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 264 (14–21 August 1648), p. 2124; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 21 (15–22 August 1648), sig. B2v; Mercurius Elencticus, 39 (16–23 August 1648), p. 8 318; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 23 (29 August–5 September 1648), sig. Ec2r; Mercurius Melancholicus, 54 (28 August–4 September 1648), p. 328. 133 Scott, Politics and War, pp. 179–80; Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 339–49. 134 This is asserted by [William Batten], A True Relation of What Past Betweene the Fleet of his Highnes the Prince of Wales, and That Under the Command of the Earle of Warwick (1649), sig. pp. 2, 5; anon., The Copie of a Letter from a Commander in the Fleet with his Highnesse the Prince of Wales (1648); Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, nos. 2878, fos 241r–241v, and 2879, fos 243r–244v; it was accepted by Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, iv, p. 210; and Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, p. 170. 135 See anon., Prince Charles his Summons Sent to the Lord Admiral, to Take Down his Standard,  and Come Under his Highnesse Obedience. And the Earl of Warwicks Answer (1648), pp. 2–3. 129

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a storm, and Prince Charles then withdrew to Holland, on the way trading shots with Warwick’s incoming reinforcements.136 Both sides criticised the other for not seizing the initiative, but parliament reaped the benefits. London had been protected, and soon after Prince Charles’s departure Warwick was reported to be ‘clearing the seas for Trade’.137 This did not prevent shipmasters from complaining in a petition submitted on 11 September that ‘the Seas are worse guarded than ever’, and also that some merchants ‘refuse to employ us because we have been active in supporting your Interest in the Navy … we receive many reproaches, nay, assaults and affronts, not only to the detriment of our names, but the hazard of our lives’.138 Significantly, however, this petition did not discuss the royalist fleet or a personal treaty, though by then parliament were again negotiating with the king; the petitioners only requested convoys for their ships. On 17 September, Warwick, having gathered all the forces he could, pursued Prince Charles to Hellevoetsluis, a major naval anchorage in Holland. Another stalemate occurred, lasting through September and October. Warwick was prevented from attacking by the presence of an officially neutral Dutch fleet, from whom the royalists sought protection.139 The Moderate Intelligencer felt ‘four or five resolute ships would spoyle [the royal fleet] in an instant’, and Mercurius Militaris concluded ‘it puts me in mind of two London cheats that must pretend to fight, yet are glad that any will interpose’.140 Certainly, the royalists’ situation did not look hopeful; the prince was in bad health, and in September it was the turn of the parliamentarian newsbooks to report ‘insolence and deboystnesse’ among the prince’s sailors, accusing them of causing trouble ashore, though Mercurius Elencticus protested, rather unconvincingly, that ‘all is well there’.141 Warwick’s account of these events, as written to parliament, is in LJ, x, pp. 488–90; it was printed in Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament, 267 (4–11 September 1648), p. 2147; a royalist account was published shortly after: anon., Copie of a Letter from a Commander in the Fleet; and manuscript accounts also survive: Bodl. Clarendon MS 31, nos. 2878, fos 241r–241v, and 2879, fos 242r–243v; shorter accounts were related in Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 23 (29 August–5 September 1648), sig. Ef2v; Moderate Intelligencer, 181 (31 August–7 September 1648), pp. 1518–19; Perfect Occurrences, 88 (1–8 September 1648), p. 438. On Charles’s arrival in Holland, see BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fo. 201r. 137 Quoting Perfect Occurrences, 88 (1–8 September 1648), p. 440. For criticisms, see anon., Copie of a Letter from a Commander in the Fleet, p. 2. 138 CJ, vi, pp. 18–19; anon., To the Right Honourable the Commons Assembled in Parliament: The Humble Petition and Representation of Divers Well-Affected Masters and Commanders of Ships (1648). 139 BL Add. MS 17,677 T, fo. 213r; Bodl. Tanner MS 57, fos 308r–308v, 326r–326v. 140 Moderate Intelligencer, 183 (14–21 September 1648), p. 1544; anon., Mercurius Militaris, 1 (19–17 October 1648), p. 4. 141 Moderate Intelligencer, 183 (14–21 September 1648), p. 1544; anon., A Bloudy Fight at Sea Disputed and Maintained by the Royall Navy (1648); BL Add. MS 72,435, fos 141r–142v; Mercurius Elencticus, 46 (4–10 October 1648), p. 383; see also Moderate Intelligencer, 187 (12–19 October 1648), p. 1692. 136

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The royalist fleet printed yet another defence of their actions, while a published letter from Prince Charles protested that ‘our only aym and end is ... to protect the Ships, Vessels and Goods’ of his father’s subjects, but these publications probably reflect the prince’s desperate circumstances following the general collapse of the royalist cause in the second civil war.142 A similar desperation is evident in two pamphlets, published in late October and early November, which purported to be printed at Warwick’s command but were clearly royalist propaganda. They accused parliament of causing ‘the totall ruine and downfall of all religion’, and the Independents of having ‘a Jesuiticall spirit … that Army abounds with Preists and Jesuits’.143 Warwick issued a personal disavowal, claiming that ‘the Honour of the Parliament by sea is cleared … [and] The affections of the Sea-men setled’.144 This may be a rather positive gloss on a dangerous situation: confederate privateers had taken full advantage of the political and military chaos in England, and newsbooks and officials complained about the depredations of men-of-war sailing from Ireland.145 Colonel James Heane wrote to the Derby House committee that a fleet of thirty Irish ships pestered the seas near Weymouth, while eleven confederate frigates reportedly came together to form three squadrons to seek out prizes in the Channel, and in December the Mary Virgin of Wexford, the Patrick of Waterford, and an unnamed Waterford frigate intercepted two merchant ships between the Lizard and Land’s End.146 Parliament did its best to protect shipping, for example ordering the Samuel, bound to Hamburg with a lading worth £50,000, not to sail until a convoy was available.147 Warwick sought to keep up the Irish guard, and the Assurance, the Dragon, and the Elizabeth remained on station in St George’s Channel through the summer and captured or retook eight prizes in August, although the Bonaventure had become so ‘very foul and unserviceable’ while blockading Kinsale that it returned to Portsmouth.148 In November, Warwick ordered the Tiger, the Phoenix, the Nonsuch, and the Providence to sail west, but the Nonsuch required extensive repairs, and by December the other three ships still remained at Portsmouth re-victualling.149 The parliamentarian forces achieved some success in Ireland: Anon., The Sea-Mens Answer to the Motives Lately Alledged, to Draw Them from their Duty and Service to the Prince of Wales (1648), in answer to anon., Motives to Engage the Sea-Men in this Honourable Cause (1648); anon., Charles P. A Letter sent from his Highness the Prince of Wales, to his Majesties Loyall and Faithfull Subjects within the Realm of England (1648), p. 2. 143 Anon., The Declaration and Resolution of Robert Earle of Warwick (1648), sig. A2v–A3r; anon., A Declaration of his Excellency Robert E. of Warwick (1648). 144 Robert Rich, earl of Warwick, A Declaration of the Earle of Warwick, Lord High Admiral of England: In Answer to a Scandalous Pamphlet, Falsly Reflecting upon his Lordships Honour and Proceedings (1648), sig. A3r. 145 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 61–2; see Chapter 5, pp. 118–20. 146 HMC, Portland, i, p. 499; McNeill, Tanner Letters, p. 287; TNA HCA 13/250, part ii, deposition of Patrick Rooth, 6 January 1648[/9]; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 190–2. 147 BL Add. MS 9,305, fo. 6v. 148 McNeill, Tanner Letters, p. 292; CSPD, 1648–9, p. 364. 149 Powell and Timings, Documents, pp. 399–400; LJ, x, pp. 625–7. 142

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Scottish officers in Ulster overthrew Monro, returning Belfast, Carrickfergus, and Coleraine to parliamentarian control, but elsewhere circumstances turned against them. In late September, Ormond returned to Ireland and began negotiations for a peace treaty with the confederates, which was finally agreed upon in January 1649, and opened up the prospect of royalist-confederate cooperation at sea.150 Nevertheless, by November Warwick had some reason to be confident. Reports of mutiny among the royalists had intensified, including that the mariners in Hellevoetsluis had seized Batten and threatened to hang another captain, though again royalist newsbooks denied these rumours.151 A parliamentarian report claimed that the sailors were ‘high in discontents and break[ing] out into factions … much discontented at the Prince for leaving them’, while parliament’s agent at The Hague wrote, ‘Here our Argonauts rebel one against another’.152 On 9 November, the Dutch fleet left the harbour, and on the same day the Constant Warwick submitted to the parliamentarian fleet, soon to be followed by other ships.153 This was due at least in part to infighting among the royalist leadership, for it was Batten and Jordaine who took the Warwick back to parliament, after Prince Charles named his cousin Prince Rupert as the new admiral.154 This appointment, it was reported, ‘bred such a rankor in the hearts of both Seamen and others … & indeed when Batten & Jorden (by reason of discontent) left his Highness, the greatest part of the Navy, there went off with them, or staggred in their affections’.155 The crew of the Love, which had been taken with the prince’s fleet to Hellevoetsluis, deliberately ran her aground so that Warwick’s ships could seize her, though when the master subsequently went ashore he ‘was there mett withall and taken by some of the Mariners and others belonging to the Revolted shipps and by them staid and imprisoned’.156 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 38–40; Micheál Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, 1642–1649: A Constitutional and Political Analysis (Dublin, 1999), pp. 185–96; Kelsey, ‘“King of the Sea”’, pp. 444–6. 151 Moderate Intelligencer, 190 (2–9 November 1648), p. 1735; for royalist denials, Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 32 & 33 (31 October–14 November 1648), sig. Yy2v; Mercurius Elencticus, 51 (8–15 November 1648), p. 500. 152 Anon., A Fight at Sea two Ships taken by Prince Charles his Officers (1648), pp. 1–2; BL Add. MS 72,435, fo. 145r, ‘Icy nos Argonautes se revoltent l’un contre l’autre’. 153 BL Add. MS 72,435, fos 146r–146v; anon., Two Letters Containing all the Proceedings Betwixt the Prince, and the E. of Warwick: A Fight at Sea, and a Fleet upon the Downs (1648), pp. 1–4 (the pamphlet bears no date, but the latest letter is dated 18 November); anon., A Message sent from his Highnesse the Prince of Wales, to the Citizens of London, on Thursday Novemb. 23 (1648); anon., A Letter from the Navy vvith the Earle of Warwick, Lord Admiral, from Hellevoyt Sluice, Novemb. 24 (1648); Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 34 (14–21 November 1648), sig. Bb3r–Bb3v; ME, 52 (15–22 November 1648), p. 507; Moderate Intelligencer, 192 (16–23 November 1648), p. 1742. 154 Perfect Occurrences, 98 (10–17 November 1648), pp. 711–12; Bodl. Tanner MS 57, fo. 409r; Kelsey, ‘“King of the Sea”’, pp. 443–4. 155 Anon., Two Letters Containing all the Proceedings, p. 4; cf. BL Add. MS 9,300, fo. 106r. 156 TNA PRO HCA 13/61, deposition of Robert Warde, 15 January 1648[/9]. 150

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Even Mercurius Pragmaticvs now admitted ‘in how low an Ebb the Prince’s Navy is, the Marriners in those ships, which yet remaine behind, being but few, and those discontented’.157 On 21 November, low on supplies and considering Rupert’s unrigged ships to be no threat, Warwick sailed for England.158 Rupert promptly prepared his ships and was at sea again by January.159 Reports of success, or imminent success, by the royalist fleet continued into 1649 but were just rumours, and parliamentarian writers responded with their own.160 Warwick lost some reputation for not having destroyed or regained the entire fleet and, disenchanted, retired from public life; but the naval mutiny, and indeed the second civil war, ended once again in military victory for the New Model Army and their allies, who on 6 December famously purged parliament.161

Conclusion Historians have tended to discount the impact of the 1648 naval mutiny on the course of the second civil war.162 Certainly it would appear that Prince Charles missed his chance, although this may have been due to the uncoordinated nature of the royalist war effort. Nevertheless, there were profound consequences: indeed, the mutiny culminated in practically the exact opposite of its original intentions, hardening attitudes against Charles I, making a personal treaty less likely and contributing to his reputation as a ‘man of blood’, which led ultimately to his execution in January 1649. More specifically, the new fleet created by Warwick, building upon the naval resources which parliament had developed throughout the first civil war, gave control of the navy to those who had supported parliament, and who shared the aims and principles of the army, an association expressed explicitly in a printed declaration in December, and again in a petition in February 1649.163 Under the Rump parliament – the Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 35 (21–28 November 1648), sig. Bbb3r. Anon., A Perfect Remonstrance and Narrative of all the Proceedings of the Right Honourable Robert, Earl of Warwick … from the 29. of August, to the 25. of December, 1648 (1649). 159 See Chapter 7, pp. 154–7. 160 Anon., Gallant Newes from the Seas. Being a Relation of Certain Speeches made by Prince Charles, the Duke of Yorke, the Lord Montroße, Sea-men and Land-men (1649); anon., A Great Victory Obtained by Prince Charles his Ships (1649); for parliamentarian propaganda, often under the guise of royalist titles, see anon., Joyfull Nevves from the Princes Fleet at Sea (1649); anon., A Declaration of the Princes Navie, Concerning the Parliament of England and the Army (1649); anon., Joyfull Nevves for the Citizens of London, from the Princes Fleet at Sea (1649). 161 Mercurius Elencticus, 53 (22–29 November 1648), p. 517; Mercurius Pragmaticvs, 38 (12–19 December 1648), sig. Dddd3v–Dddd4v. On ‘Pride’s purge’, see David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1971). 162 Ashton, Counter-Revolution, pp. 438–48; Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, p. 184; Scott, Politics and War, pp. 176–7; Gentles, The English Revolution, p. 333; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, p. 542. 163 Anon., The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers, and Seamen in the Shippes, under the Command of the Right Honourable the Earle of Warwicke (1648); 157

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remnant of those MPs who had not been purged, and now ruled England – the navy and other important institutions, such as Trinity House and the royal dockyards at Deptford and Chatham, were also purged of men whose support for the new regime was suspect.164 During the 1650s this new administration would continue to expand the naval force of the British state, and deploy it in a more aggressive and ambitious foreign policy; in immediate terms, this meant supporting Cromwell’s campaigns in Scotland and Ireland, as we will see in the next chapter.

anon., The Resolution and Remonstrance of the Navie, to the Supream Power of England, the Commons Assembled in Parliament (1649), also printed in anon., A Proclamation or Act by the Parliament of Scotland, for the Proclaiming of Charles Prince of Wales, King of Great Brittain, France, and Ireland … also the Remonstrance of the Navy (Edinburgh, 1648[/9]). 164 Bodl. Rawl. MS A 224, fos 9r, 12v, 24r, 26v, 32v–33r; Parliament, Act Touching the Regulating of the Officers of the Navy and Customs (1649); Harris, Trinity House of Deptford, p. 39l; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 42–60.

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7 Conquest, 1649–1653

The execution of Charles I left parliament facing enemies at home and abroad in 1649. European monarchs, repulsed by the killing of the king, initially refused to recognise the new regime and some, such as the Tsar of Russia, broke off trade relations.1 Royalist forces opposed the Commonwealth in Ireland, Scotland, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and in British colonies in the Americas such as Virginia and Barbados. This opposition posed a significant danger to the Commonwealth because of the considerable naval strength commanded by the late king’s supporters, who now gave their allegiance to the prince of Wales, whom they proclaimed Charles II. Between 1649 and 1653 the navy became parliament’s first line of defence in dealing with these overseas threats. As N. A. M. Rodger argued, it was ‘the fear and insecurity of a military dictatorship surrounded by enemies real and imagined which made England a first class naval power’.2 In order to understand how this came about, this chapter will examine the final years of the civil wars from a maritime perspective. In particular it will focus on the activities and pursuit of Prince Rupert’s squadron, and the vital role the Commonwealth’s navy played in supporting military campaigning in Ireland, Scotland, and further afield. The navy expanded and developed in this period because of the need to deal with the variety of threats faced by the Commonwealth. Its success ensured that as the civil wars ended the state possessed a substantial and capable naval force that could see off other maritime challenges.

Royalist resurgence at sea, February–December 1649 In 1649 the most pressing danger came from the royalist coalition in Ireland (the confederates had also chosen to support Charles II), which possessed substantial military and naval resources. During the first and second civil wars, confederate privateers had lacked the strength to successfully take on English men-of-war, but the arrival of Prince Rupert’s fleet at Kinsale on 21 January added a new dimension to the naval war. The royalists now possessed a large S. N., A Declaration, of His Imperiall Majestie, the Most High and Mighty Potentate Alexea, Emperor of Russia (1650), pp. 1–5. 2 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 32. 1

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Plate 6. Copy after Van Dyck, Prince Rupert (1619–1682), Count Palatine of the Rhine, 1630–1699 (© Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)

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squadron of men-of-war and privateers who could undertake operations against the English navy, but in order to achieve success at sea the royalist leadership in Ireland needed to devise a strategy to make best use of their newly acquired naval strength. Their position was bolstered by the financial, administrative, and leadership problems which continued to afflict the parliamentarian navy in the early months of 1649, as the Rump parliament struggled to maintain control of England.3 Despite these advantages, however, the royalists failed to seize the opportunity to take decisive action at sea. A combination of practical problems and political divisions scuppered the opportunity to develop a coherent naval strategy. A shortage of skilled mariners, for example, made it difficult for Rupert’s ships to put to sea.4 The prince also wanted the Irish privateers placed under his direct command; he advised the earl of Ormond that he desired an expedient ‘for the uniting of the Irish frigates to this fleete’, but the peace terms agreed between the lord lieutenant and the confederates in 1648 prevented the amalgamation of the two forces.5 More damagingly, the royalist leadership were unable to agree on how best to deploy the fleet, as Rupert initially favoured mounting an expedition to Guernsey to aid their fellow royalists there.6 The pressing need to raise funds, to maintain his vessels and pay the sailors, meant Rupert came to prefer using his ships to attack English merchantmen: the prince’s warships seized a number of ­high-value prizes, such as a ship worth £40,000.7 Ormond, on the other hand, wanted to use the squadron to blockade the parliamentarian garrison at Dublin, who were low on provisions and likely to surrender if their supply lines were cut.8 In March, Ormond advised Rupert of the weakness of the two parliamentarian warships protecting the city and suggested that ‘they might be surprised with little ­difficultie’, but royalist naval forces made no attempt to do so.9 Irish privateers did take advantage of the weakened state of the parliamentarian navy to continue to wreak havoc on English overseas trade.10 In February the English council of state lamented that ‘the seas here and upon the Irish coast are much infested with pirates’.11 Robert Coytmore recounted the loss of twenty merchantmen and colliers near Newcastle to privateers, while the Moderate Intelligencer, commenting on the capture of eight ships from Ipswich, noted that ‘there is great lamentation in this Town, for the loss of many Ships taken by those pilfering vessels call’d Irish Frigots’.12 News reached London from the Canary Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 42–66; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 1–3, 33–4. Bodl. Carte MS 23, fos 437r–437v. 5 Ibid., fos 436r–437v. 6 Ibid. 7 NMM AND 45, fos 5r–6v. 8 Bodl. Carte MS 24, fo. 647r. 9 Ibid., fos 90r–90v. 10 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 63–4, 71. 11 CSPD, 1649–50, p. 18. 12 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 23; Moderate Intelligencer, 233 (30 August–6 September 1649), pp. 2239–40. 3 4

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Islands about the damage done to the wine trade there by an Irish privateer, and there were also reports of an ‘Irish pirate’ who plied the Mediterranean in search of English merchantmen.13 Some privateers became emboldened enough to attack small parliamentarian warships and post-carrying barks.14 Aggressive action by the royalist naval forces operating from Ireland in the early months of 1649 therefore damaged English trade, but did not threaten to undermine the parliamentarian economy. The presence of the royalist squadron at Kinsale combined with the losses to Irish privateers did, however, convince the council of state of the need to reorganise the navy and prioritise Ireland. In March they advised that, ‘there is no affair before us of greater concern than expediting our fleet to sea, for want whereof the shipping of this nation is daily taken by those pirates and rebels which abound in this and the Irish seas’.15 Parliament began to deal with the naval problems that they faced in February 1649. The earl of Warwick’s failure to seize the royalist fleet in the autumn of the previous year cost him his position as lord high admiral.16 The council of state took over many of his responsibilities, and command at sea was delegated to three politically reliable army colonels, Robert Blake, Richard Deane, and Edward Popham, styled the generals-at-sea. On 27 February they received ­commissions to take charge of the fleet.17 In conjunction with ­resolving the ­leadership issue, parliament needed to restore the navy’s credit, and they achieved this through the sale of church lands and improvements in the collection of customs revenues.18 The generals immediately began to reorganise the fleet, and ships were put to sea by the end of April, most of them sailing for Kinsale to seek out Rupert. In May the generals directed Sir George Ayscue to Dublin with a small flotilla. While their focus lay on Ireland, the generals could spare few resources for elsewhere, and Blake acknowledged that prioritising one area left others vulnerable, noting ‘how impossible it is to give satisfaction unto all clamours’.19 Nevertheless, the generals’ organisational efforts proved to be successful, and on 21 May 1649 a flotilla of ten warships arrived at Kinsale.20 There they found the royalist ships at anchor. The formidable nature of Kinsale’s seaward fortifications, to which Rupert had added, combined with the similar strengths of the opposing fleets, meant the generals-at-sea could not risk assaulting the royalists in the harbour.21 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 48; Perfect Occurrences, 145 (5–12 October 1649), p. 1343. CSPD, 1649–50, pp. 20, 23, 138, 143. 15 Ibid., p. 38. 16 See Chapter 6, pp. 148–52. 17 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 43–6; CSPD, 1649–50, p. 23. 18 J. S. Wheeler, ‘Prelude to Power: The Crisis of 1649 and the Foundation of English Naval Power’, MM, 81 (1995), pp. 150–3. 19 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 21. 20 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 12; R. C. Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1649’, MM, 14 (1928), pp. 218–30. 21 Gerard Boate, Irelands Naturall History (1657), p. 34; Paul Kerrigan, Castles and Fortifications in Ireland, 1485–1945 (Cork, 1995), pp. 55, 61, 63–4; Bodl. Carte MS 24, fo. 334v. 13 14

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Equally, Rupert dared not risk an engagement with the blockading ships, as his men-of-war were undermanned and some of his crews were in a mutinous state.22 In June the prince failed to seize his chance to break out when a storm forced the parliamentarians back to Milford Haven.23 Individual royalist vessels did attempt to evade the cordon, but met with little success. In the same month the Adventure intercepted the St Teresa as it tried to slip out of Kinsale at night.24 Keeping Rupert bottled up in Kinsale did not represent a long-term solution for the Commonwealth, however, and the council of state, conscious of the high cost of setting out the fleet and the failures of the year before, pressed the generals for action. They warned that some extraordinary improvement should be made of this extraordinary preparation, this summer, for breaking the head and pulling up the route [sic] of the enemies’ marine strength in the fleet with Rupert; also for lopping off the loose branches and gathering up those pickeroons that infest the seas. If Rupert continue whole until winter when the chief of our strength will be come in, the return of our [merchant] ships home from France, Spain and the Straits will be of very great danger.25

The council’s fears proved correct: as the summer wore on, maintaining the blockade became increasingly difficult, and in June Deane returned to Plymouth to seek fresh supplies for the fleet. Defeating the royalist coalition in Ireland required more than just putting the summer guard to sea. In the spring and summer of 1649, the Rump parliament also made plans to send an expeditionary force to conquer Ireland, and on 30 March Oliver Cromwell received command of the army for this campaign. Intelligence from England and Wales kept the royalists informed of the preparations for the invasion: in August, for example, two Irish prisoners returning to Wexford reported seeing 15,000 soldiers and forty-six ships in and around Milford Haven.26 The key question was not when Cromwell would sail, but where he would land. The royalist defeat at the battle of Rathmines on 2 August secured control of Dublin for parliament, and made the city a logical choice for Cromwell’s army.27 Yet other options, such as a landing in the southern Munster ports, also remained feasible.28 In the end, Cromwell decided to split his force. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 62–3; NMM AND 45, fo. 8r; Perfect Diurnall, 307 (11–18 June 1649), pp. 250–1; NLI MS 17,851, fo. 8r. 23 McNeill, Tanner Letters, p. 309; HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 18. 24 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 21; TNA HCA 15/2, commission for the St Teresa, 4 July 1649, and examination of Richard Teague, 20 July 1649. 25 CSPD, 1649–50, p. 202. 26 Bodl. Carte MS 25, fos 165r–165v. 27 Micheál Ó Siochrú, God’s Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland (London, 2008), pp. 71–8; Moderate Intelligencer, 228 (26 July–2 August 1649), p. 2179; Michael Jones, Lieut: General Jones’s Letter to the Councel of State, of a Great Victory (1649), pp. 3–8. 28 For Cromwell’s options see J. S. Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland (Dublin, 1999), pp. 71–5. 22

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He sailed on 13 August with the bulk of the fleet for Dublin, and on the stormy crossing one witness described him as ‘sea sick as ever I saw any man’.29 A second wave put to sea for Munster, but bad weather prevented their landing there; they and a third force arrived at Dublin in late August.30 Over the next two months Cromwell’s army achieved a series of stunning victories against the royalist coalition, and naval support was a key element in this campaign. As Rodger noted, ‘only the support of the navy allowed Cromwell to campaign in an impoverished country’.31 In particular, attacking garrisons along the coast allowed Cromwell to take advantage of his naval superiority, and sending artillery and supplies by sea enabled the army to march quickly northwards to Drogheda in early September. He also utilised the manpower resources available on naval vessels, as shown by his account of the storming of Drogheda on 11 September, in which Cromwell praised Captain Brandley, probably the captain of the Satisfaction, who led a party of forty sailors during the assault on the town.32 Cromwell returned to Dublin after the capture of Drogheda, and sent Colonel Robert Venables with a small force northwards to capture a number of important towns, to secure his northern flank. Parliamentarian menof-war again proved their worth, with Captain Nathaniel Ferns in the President ­mounting a joint land and sea operation with Venables to seize Carlingford.33 Cromwell next turned his attentions to the confederate privateering bases on the southeast coast. On 23 September the army left Dublin and began their march to Wexford, while twenty-nine ships commanded by Richard Deane carried provisions, munitions, and artillery. The army arrived before the town on 1 October.34 In order to land their supplies, the parliamentarians needed to capture Rosslare fort, an artillery fortress which controlled access to the harbour.35 On 2 October Colonel Michael Jones led an assault on the position, and many of the garrison chose to flee to a nearby frigate rather than fight. As the defenders fled, one of the English warships saw an opportunity to assist the army and sailed up to the fort, then opened fire on the Irish frigate and forced Perfect Diurnall, 318 (27 August–3 September 1649), p. 2376. Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 71–3; HMC, Leyborne-Popham, pp. 26, 34, 36, 38, 40–1; Oliver Cromwell, The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. W. C. Abbott (4 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1937–47; repr. Oxford, 1988), ii, p. 104; Whitelocke, Memorials, pp. 606–8. 31 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 3; see also Murphy, ‘The Navy and the Cromwellian Conquest’, pp. 1–13. 32 Oliver Cromwell, Letters from Ireland, Relating the Several Great Successes it hath Pleased God to give unto the Parliaments Forces (1649), pp. 5–11, 13; Ó Siochrú, God’s Executioner, pp. 77–95. 33 Cromwell, Letters from Ireland, p. 15. 34 Cromwell, Writings and Speeches, ii, p. 125; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 90–2; HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 47. 35 Oliver Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, to the Honourable William Lenthal Esq; Speaker of the Parliament of England (1649), p. 4; [John Lodge], ed., Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica: Or a Select Collection of State Papers; Consisting of Royal Instructions, Directions, Dispatches, and Letters (2 vols, Dublin, 1772), ii, p. 159. 29 30

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it, and another small vessel, to surrender. The capture of Rosslare fort allowed Deane’s ships into the harbour to land their supplies.36 One contemporary account summed up the importance of this naval support to the land operations at Wexford, describing how ‘for neither had we canon to batter, nor provisions to subsist without our Navy’.37 On 11 October the army stormed the town, after attempts to negotiate its surrender had stalled.38 From a maritime perspective, the loss of such an important port was a major blow to the royalist cause. One English officer noted the seizure of forty ships in the harbour, while Cromwell referred to four captured Irish men-of-war, including a thirty-four-gun frigate, a twenty-gun frigate, a twenty-gun ship on the stocks (which he ordered finished), and the frigate that had been taken at Rosslare fort.39 This naval setback was greater than just the loss of so many ships. Since 1642, Wexford had operated as the pre-eminent privateering base in Ireland, and some privateer owners, fearful of the advancing Cromwellian army and the fate of Wexford, had already begun to move their frigates abroad in search of safer havens. Others, such as Antonio Nicholas Vanderkipp, shifted their vessels to other royalist-held ports in Ireland like Waterford. The loss or surrender of coastal towns, including Wexford, New Ross, Belfast, Coleraine, Carrickfergus, and Drogheda, had greatly weakened the royalist maritime position by the autumn of 1649.40 Regardless of the military victories on land, however, the Commonwealth naval position remained vulnerable while Rupert lay at Kinsale. Keeping such a large squadron off the Irish coast placed great pressure on Commonwealth naval resources. After spending the summer being battered by the Atlantic seas, a number of men-of-war needed to return home for refitting, and in September Blake sent the Paradox, the Triumph, and the Victory to England for repairs, leaving him with only five ships before Kinsale.41 At the same time, Rupert’s position in the port became increasingly precarious. The prince was considering leading his flotilla to Portugal as early as March 1649.42 By October he realised that he could no longer remain in Ireland as Cromwell advanced south, and the loyalty of the Munster garrisons to the royalist cause was becoming increasingly questionable. In late October Rupert seized the opportunity to escape when a storm Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, pp. 4–7; HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 47. 37 Anon., A Brief Relation of Some Affaires and Transactions, Civill and Military, both Forraigne and Domestique (1649), p. 51. 38 Ó Siochrú, God’s Executioner, pp. 95–7; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 94–9; anon., A History or Brief Chronicle of the Chief Matters of the Irish Warres (1650), p. 4; Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, pp. 4–7. 39 R. L., The Taking of Wexford (1649), p. 5; Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, pp. 6–8; Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 71–2. See Chapter 5, p. 119. 40 Oliver Cromwell, A Letter from the Right Honorable the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Concerning the Surrender of the Town of Ross (1649), pp. 3–5; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 100–2; anon., A History or Brief Chronicle, pp. 4–5. 41 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, pp. 39, 42; Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1649’, p. 334. 42 Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1649’, p. 331. 36

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forced Blake’s ships back to Milford Haven: he sailed for Portugal with seven ships, leaving two vessels behind at Kinsale.43 On Blake’s return to Munster he found the royalist fleet gone.44 The garrisons of Cork, Youghal, and Kinsale surrendered to Cromwell’s forces soon afterwards.45 These towns provided the English army with winter quarters, and a vital harbour on the south coast to serve as a base of operations for the navy. In November 1649 Cromwell moved against the important port of Waterford. As the second most active privateering harbour in Ireland, Cromwell was keen to capture it, but a combination of resolute defence, bad weather, and sickness among his army forced him to withdraw from the city into winter quarters in early December.46 In spite of this setback, by the end of 1649 the Commonwealth’s military and naval position had improved considerably from the crisis at the start of the year. The royalist naval cause was greatly and irreversibly weakened by the loss of privateering harbours in Ireland. Prince Rupert remained at large with a fleet of warships, but the threat he posed had now diminished because he lacked a base of operations in the British Isles.

The pursuit of Prince Rupert, 1650 Even with the improved maritime situation at the start of 1650, the Commonwealth still needed to resolve a number of issues. The game of cat-and-mouse between Rupert’s squadron and the parliamentarian fleet continued, and at the same time suppressing royalist supporters in the British Isles also required considerable naval resources. Scotland, in particular, remained as a potential naval danger zone. Montrose’s fleet and other royalist ships continued to pose a threat and there was always a chance that Charles II might direct Rupert’s ships northwards.47 Coupled with these campaigns, the reorganisation of the navy, begun in 1649, continued to change the nature of the Commonwealth’s forces. After an eventful journey, the royalist fleet reached the coast of Portugal in mid-November 1649. Along the way they seized a number of English ships which the prince added to his squadron, to give him a flotilla of at least eleven warships. The presence of these vessels in the River Tagus posed a major political problem for King João IV of Portugal, and the Portuguese government opposed Rupert using Lisbon as a base. They feared it would alienate other European powers, because of the royalists’ lack of scruples regarding their choice of prizes. In January 1650 the Portuguese government received complaints about Rupert’s ships attacking Dutch vessels, and the secretary of state advised Rupert to ‘reembarke all into The Constant Reformation, Convertine, Swallow, Mary, Blackmoor Lady, Scott, and Black Knight left with Rupert. The James and Roebuck remained at Kinsale. Bodl. Carte MS 25, fo. 774r; Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1649’, pp. 335–6. 44 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 49. 45 For the disloyalty and defection of the Munster garrisons, see Denis Murphy, Cromwell in Ireland: A History of Cromwell’s Irish Campaign (Dublin, 1883), pp. 192–213. 46 HMC, Portland, i, p. 510; Ó Siochrú, God’s Executioner, pp. 103–5, 115–16. 47 Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 220–30. 43

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your shippes and with all brevity hasten your departure’.48 Regardless of this pressure, Rupert made no major effort to leave the Tagus. The generals-at-sea were initially unsure as to where Rupert went after his departure from Kinsale, and Deane reported to Popham that ‘Which way he is gone we know not’, but he suspected that he sailed ‘in all probability for the Straits to meet the vintage [i.e. merchant ships carrying wine] coming home’.49 Reports to London in late 1649 alerted parliament to royalist depredations against English shipping on the Portuguese coast.50 As in the previous year, fitting out a fleet to go after the royalists became parliament’s naval priority. Blake received command of the force in January, with orders ‘to pursue, seize, scatter, fight with, or destroy, all the ships of the revolted fleet’.51 He put to sea with fifteen ships at the beginning of March. On reaching Lisbon on 10 March, Blake found Rupert’s ships still at anchor, and in contrast to the stalemate at Kinsale the previous year, the parliamentarians actively sought to engage the prince’s fleet on a number of occasions. The previous failures in Holland and Ireland may have helped to persuade Blake of the need for decisive action. On his initial arrival at Lisbon, Blake suspected that the royalists planned to put to sea, and after holding a council of war he decided to attack Rupert’s ships in the harbour to prevent their escape. The plan came undone when Portuguese coastal defences opened fire on the English ships, and forced them to anchor outside the port. Blake next turned to diplomacy, and opened negotiations with the Portuguese to allow his ships into the bay as the weather deteriorated, on the condition that they would not attack Rupert’s ships.52 Other attempts to agree a resolution to the standoff proved unsuccessful, as, despite his reservations, João IV remained more inclined to support Rupert.53 Little was achieved, and tensions began to escalate. In April, Blake seized two royalist ships that mistakenly anchored beside his fleet, and sailors from the two squadrons also fought with each other while ashore, as they had in Hellevoetsluis two years before.54 Reinforcements arrived from Plymouth in May with instructions for Blake to act decisively against Rupert, and they also authorised him to attack any Portuguese ships that tried to intervene, and to seize French ships as well.55 Further attempts to negotiate with João IV achieved little, and the parliamentarians began to seize Portuguese ships and fishing S. R. Gardiner, ed., ‘Prince Rupert at Lisbon’, Camden Miscellany, 10 (Camden 3rd series, 1902), pp. 12–13, 15. 49 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 50. 50 CSPD, 1659–50, pp. 412, 417. 51 Ibid., pp. 420, 483. 52 John Haslock, A Letter from Lysbone Directed to Captain Thomas Harrison (1650), pp. 4–5, 8; Prince Rupert, Prince Ruperts Declaration to the King of Portugall (1650), pp. 10–11. 53 Rupert, Prince Ruperts Declaration to the King of Portugall, p. 13. 54 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 60; John Thurloe, A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, ed. Thomas Birch (7 vols, 1742), i, p. 145. See Chapter 6, pp. 149–52. 55 Popham reinforced Blake with the Resolution, Andrew, Phoenix, Satisfaction, Great Lewis, Merchant, Hercules, and James and Hercules of Plymouth (victualler). HMC, LeybornePopham, p. 64; CSPD, 1650, pp. 102–3, 142. 48

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boats. These acts of hostility led the Portuguese to prepare ships and men for action against the parliamentarian fleet.56 Over the next three months a series of skirmishes took place, as the prince’s fleet tried unsuccessfully to break out of Lisbon. The Constant Reformation lost its foremast in one of these engagements, while Blake seized seven Portuguese ships and burnt a number of others.57 Maintaining a naval force so far from home waters gradually took its toll on the English flotilla, as it had done in the two previous years. A shortage of water threatened to undermine the whole operation, but putting the men on short allowance, and sending out some of the squadron to replenish the supplies, helped to alleviate the situation and ensured that the fleet did not have to withdraw.58 Nevertheless, on 12 October a royalist flotilla of six vessels slipped past the blockade and sailed for the Mediterranean. Blake seemed initially unaware of Rupert’s escape, writing in a dispatch to London on 14 October that he intended to remain in the Tagus ‘yet a month or longer’.59 Within a few days, however, he realised his error and sailed in pursuit of the royalists. He quickly caught up with some of the prince’s ships and on 19 October captured the Jules.60 In late October the remaining royalist ships entered the Mediterranean, where they attempted to seize English merchantmen anchored in Spanish harbours. Not long afterwards Rupert and his brother Prince Maurice, in the Constant Reformation and Swallow, became separated from the rest of the flotilla as they split up to chase prizes. Disaster befell most of the fleet shortly afterwards. On 4 November, four royalist ships put into Cartagena for safety, but Blake continued his pursuit of them and sought permission from the Spanish to attack. Rather than wait for the Spanish answer, the royalist vessels tried to flee and ran aground.61 The loss of these ships represented a major blow to the royalist naval cause, but Rupert and Maurice, in two of the largest warships, remained at large and attacked English merchant shipping. In mid-December the Constant Reformation and Swallow put into Toulon, and Blake’s dogged pursuit of the royalists came to an end in the same month, when orders from London caught up with him. He received instructions to return home, while William Penn took over command in the Mediterranean.62 In conjunction with pursuing the royalist fleet to Portugal, supporting the military campaign in Ireland remained a naval commitment throughout 1650. A large number of warships were allocated to the Irish coast for the summer and

HMC, Leyborne-Popham, p. 66. R. C. Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1650’, MM, 17 (1931), pp. 146–6. 58 HMC, Leyborne-Popham, pp. 67–8. 59 HMC, Portland, i, pp. 536–7. 60 Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1650’, pp. 157–9. 61 Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1650’, pp. 163–7; anon., A Bloudy Fight at Sea (1650), pp. 1–5; HMC, Portland, i, pp. 539–42, 547–50; Michael Baumber, General-at-Sea: Robert Blake and the Seventeenth Century Revolution in Naval Warfare (London, 1989), pp. 89–92. 62 Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1650’, pp. 166–7; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 309–20. 56 57

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winter guards.63 The army relied on the navy to ensure that convoys bringing fresh soldiers and supplies reached Ireland safely. This logistical assistance enabled Cromwell to go on the offensive, and his armies captured numerous towns including Fethard, Cahir, Kilkenny, Clonmel, Carlow, and Athy.64 In order to cut off the overseas trade of the principal ports that remained in royalist hands, William Penn assigned men-of-war to blockade Waterford and Limerick, and to patrol near Galway. Their efforts at Waterford bore fruit; the city was described as being ‘wholly stopped up’. Waterford and Duncannon finally surrendered in August 1650 to General Henry Ireton, since Cromwell had by that time returned to England.65 The naval blockade of the Shannon proved equally effective at stopping maritime traffic getting through to Limerick. A contemporary report described Limerick as ‘being 60 miles distant from the Sea, and so easily guarded with a few ships of ours’. Parliamentarian men-of-war, such as the Dragon, sank or captured ships trying to get into Limerick.66 However, the good work undertaken by the navy at Limerick came to nothing in 1650, as Ireton failed to capitalise on this opportunity to effectively besiege the city.67 From a naval perspective, privateers operating from Irish ports still remained a threat for much of the year, and a number are recorded attacking English shipping. Captain Antonio brought a frigate to Galway in May 1650, while in April Ormond received word that ships with his letters of marque brought ‘divers prizes’ into Galway.68 Nevertheless, privateering activity on the Irish seaboard declined as the year progressed. The strong parliamentarian naval presence, combined with the loss of ports such as Waterford, and the spread of the plague to Galway and other towns, made Ireland an increasingly unattractive base for privateers.69 Some ship-owners moved their vessels abroad in search of safer bases: the St Michael of Waterford, an eighteen-gun frigate, transferred to Brest in France.70 Moreover, privateering activity that can be identified tended to occur away from the Irish coast. Reports noted Irish frigates operating along the northeast coast of England.71 The relocation of these frigates did little to help the Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 166–7. Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 75–80; CSPD, 1650, p. 91; Perfect Diurnall, 26 (3–10 June 1650), p. 286; Ó Siochrú, God’s Executioner, pp. 116–28, Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 116–58. 65 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 79–80; Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 306–8; Whitelock, Memorials, p. 430; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 172–5. 66 Perfect Diurnall, 46 (14–21 October 1650), p. 479; 1 October 1650, Perfect Diurnall, 81 (23–30 June 1651), p. 1126. 67 Pádraig Lenihan, ‘Ballaí Luimnigh: The Sieges of Limerick’, in Liam Irwin and G. Ó Tuathaigh, eds, Limerick History and Society: Interdisciplinary Essays on the History of an Irish County (Dublin, 2009), pp. 130–2; James Burke, ‘The New Model Army and the Problems of Siege Warfare, 1648–1651’, Irish Historical Studies, 27 (1990), pp. 19–27. 68 Bodl. Carte MS 26, fo. 401r; Carte MS 27, fo. 530r; Carte MS 142, fo. 184r. 69 Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 80–3. 70 TNA HCA 13/251, part i, examinations of Edward Artane and Patrick Landy, 15 June 1650. 71 Severall Proceedings in Parliament, 20 (7–14 February 1650), p. 270; Perfect Diurnall, 10 (4–11 February 1650), p. 493. 63 64

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royalist cause in Ireland, as most of the prizes they intercepted were not sent there.72 By the end of 1650 the parliamentarian naval ascendancy on the coast of Ireland was virtually complete, and Ormond finally abandoned the country in December, after his relations with the Catholic clergy broke down.73 By the spring of 1650 it became apparent that various contesting groups of Scots intended to fight for Charles II, and that Sir Thomas Fairfax was unwilling to lead a pre-emptive strike north of the border. As well as long-term Scottish royalists and supporters of Montrose, the fledgling royal army also included covenanters and other former parliamentarians whom parliament in London now found too radical or ungodly to ally with.74 The Rump recalled Cromwell to command this invasion force instead, and he left Ireland in May 1650. Two months later Cromwell led the English army overland into Scotland, while a small naval squadron commanded by Captain Hall sailed to support them. In late July, at Leith, the Liberty, the Hart, the Garland, and the Dolphin joined the army in bombarding the town.75 As in Ireland, naval vessels played a key role in supporting the logistical effort, because the scarcity of provisions available in the country made the army dependent on supplies brought by sea in order to campaign.76 Cromwell’s great victory of September 1650 at the Battle of Dunbar largely came about because the English army marched to the coast to get relief, and the Scots tried to block their route on land.77 The navy provided escorts for ships carrying provisions, munitions, and money by sea to ensure they arrived safely. In October the captain of the Recovery received orders to convoy seven ships with supplies for the army from the Thames to Leith, and the council of state issued orders for the President frigate to carry £35,000 for the army to Leith.78

Royalist reversals, 1651 Royalist maritime fortunes had suffered a number of blows in 1650, and consequently going into 1651 the Commonwealth’s navy found itself in a position of increasing strength. New men-of-war from the 1649 and 1650 shipbuilding programmes came into service, and soon proved their worth. The Fairfax, the Murphy, War at Sea, pp. 114–15; Bodl. Carte MS 29, fos 110r–111v; CSPI, 1647–60, p. 377. Toby Barnard, ‘Butler, James, First Duke of Ormond (1610–1688)’, ODNB; Wheeler, Cromwell in Ireland, pp. 175–7; Patrick Corish, ‘The Cromwellian Conquest, 1649–53’, in T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne, eds, A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691 (9 vols, Oxford, 1976), iii, pp. 348–9; Perfect Diurnall, 46 (14–21 October 1650), p. 479; Perfect Diurnall, 81 (23–30 June 1651), p. 1126. 74 For a fuller discussion of the differing groups in Scotland and their allegiances to Charles II, see Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 224–30; Andrew Hopper, ‘Black Tom’: Sir Thomas Fairfax and the English Revolution (Manchester, 2013), p. 114. 75 James Lardner, A Large Relation of the Fight at Leith neere Edenburgh (1650), np. 76 J. S. Wheeler, ‘The Logistics of the Cromwellian Conquest of Scotland 1650–1651’, War and Society, 10 (1992), pp. 1–18. 77 Bodl. Nalson MS 8, fos 37r–38v. 78 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 67; CSPD, 1650, pp. 562, 566. 72 73

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Speaker, and the President were all launched in 1650 and began active service in 1651. The names, badges, and emblems of these ships represented the new regime, its victories, and its concerns (though an attempt to rename the Sovereign of the Seas as the Commonwealth did not succeed; it became known as simply the Sovereign).79 Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than with the Worcester, ordered in 1649; when launched in 1651, the ship was named after Cromwell’s great victory, his ‘Crowning mercy’, over the largely Scottish royalist army at the battle of Worcester, in September of that year. The navy continued to expand as parliament ordered additional frigates and took other ships into their service.80 With such a strong fleet at their disposal, the Rump parliament could begin to deal with the royalist threat at sea once and for all. By 1651 Rupert’s depleted squadron had become ‘more of a nuisance’ than a threat at sea.81 Nevertheless the prince’s ships remained capable of inflicting damage on English interests, and over the winter of 1650–51 he refitted his ships, and bolstered his squadron with the addition of some small prizes at Toulon.82 After Blake’s recall in late 1650, William Penn in the Fairfax took over in the Mediterranean, though his ships did not arrive at Cadiz until February 1651. Penn lacked the strength to blockade Toulon, and therefore set his ships cruising nearby, hoping to intercept the royalists if they put to sea. They intercepted a number of prizes that came their way, but fortune again favoured Rupert, and he managed to slip past the parliamentarian ships in May.83 The royalists left the Mediterranean and reached Madeira in June, from where the prince intended to sail south to the Canary Islands as the first stage to crossing the Atlantic to the West Indies. The strong royalist sympathies of Barbados made this a logical move for the royalist fleet.84 Unaware of Rupert’s intentions, the parliamentarian squadron spent the summer cruising in the Mediterranean, seeking prizes and news of the royalist ships. False rumours in August put the prince and his flotilla off the Lizard, and neither the Rump nor its naval officers knew where to find the royalists. In September Penn admitted his failure, informing the council of state that As to our missing the grand end of our design, viz the uppression [sic] of that arch-enemy Rupert, I know not how it may be judged of; but this I certainly know, that the all-seeing Judge above, and the all-witnessing witness within, On the Sovereign of the Seas, see Chapter 1, pp. 22, 31. Winfield, British Warships, p. 45; Michael Seymour, ‘Warships’ Names of the English Republic, 1649–1659’, MM, 76 (1990), pp. 319–20; CJ, vi, pp. 580–1; Bodl. Tanner MS 55, fo. 29v. 81 Baumber, General-at-Sea, pp. 92–3. 82 R. C. Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1651–1653’, MM, 21 (1935), pp. 63–4. 83 Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 317–35. 84 Sarah Barber, ‘Power in the English Caribbean: The Proprietorship of Lord Willoughby of Parham’, in Louis H. Roper and Bertrand Van Ruymbeke, eds, Constructing Early Modern Empires: Proprietary Ventures in the Atlantic World, 1500–1750 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 192–5; Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1651–1653’, pp. 64–9. 79

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conquest, 1649–1653 167 will clearly pass it on my side, that my endeavours and diligence have been to the utmost employed for the finding him85

The need for fresh supplies and to undertake repairs to the royalist ships persuaded Rupert’s council of war to sail for the Azores, which the fleet reached at the end of July. A gale in late September damaged the fleet, and sank the Constant Reformation with the loss of 340 men. The royalists remained in the Azores throughout October, and sailed to the Canary Islands in November in the hope of finding some prizes.86 Late in that month Penn learned of the loss of the Constant Reformation, and a few days later sent three of his ships, the Nonsuch, the Pelican, and the Foresight, in pursuit of the last remaining royalist man-of-war, the Swallow. The rest of Penn’s squadron remained in and around the Mediterranean, until they finally returned to England in the middle of March 1652.87 While the futile pursuit of Rupert continued in the Mediterranean, the navy played a more direct role in subduing the remaining royalist outposts in the British Isles throughout 1651. There was an upsurge in privateer activity, especially from ships operating from royalist-held islands. Newsbooks reported these activities, such as the four Flemish frigates that lay off the Lizard in January, or the cruise of the ‘notorious pirate’, Captain Bradshaw, during which he seized ships in the Irish Sea until his capture by Captain Sherwin in May. In July a French privateer intercepted an English ship carrying oatmeal to Carrickfergus, and in August the press complained that merchantmen could not risk sailing from Chester, because of ‘pickeroon rogues’ operating from the Isle of Man.88 The navy set out patrols to try to limit losses to privateers, and though they remained a nuisance, the damage they caused never became large enough to undermine the logistical war effort in Ireland or Scotland. Subduing these two kingdoms remained a military and naval priority. Everything from hay to surgeons for the army was shipped by sea, and the admiralty made good use of convoys to ensure most transports arrived safely: for example, in March the masters of three London merchantmen bound for Leith with provisions for the army received orders to wait for General Deane to escort them northwards.89 A Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 335–67. Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1651–1653’, pp. 69–76; Eliot Warburton, ed., Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers (3 vols, 1849), iii, pp. 540–1. 87 Penn, Memorials, i, pp. 367–93. 88 Perfect Diurnall, 60 (27 January–3 February 1651), p. 803; Perfect Diurnall, 66 (10–17 March 1651), pp. 888–9; Severall Proceedings in Parliament, 86 (15–22 May 1651), p. 1323; Perfect Diurnall, 84 (14–21 July 1651), p. 1166; Severall Proceedings in Parliament, 95 (17–24 July 1651), p. 1463; Perfect Diurnall, 86 (28 July–4 August 1651), p. 1209; Perfect Diurnall, 94 (22–29 September 1651), p. 1340. 89 For the logistical effort of the military campaigns in Ireland and Scotland, see J. S. Wheeler, ‘Logistics and Supply in Cromwell’s Conquest of Ireland’, in Mark C. Fissel, ed., War and Government in Britain 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 38–56; Wheeler, ‘Logistics of the Cromwellian Conquest of Scotland’, pp. 1–18. For examples of naval convoys and supplies in 1651, see CSPD, 1651, pp. 517–35. 85 86

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strong naval presence in the seas around the British Isles also made it difficult for foreign powers to intervene to aid the royalist cause, or to send large-scale military relief to the garrisons that held out. Small amounts of munitions did get through. In February 1651, for example, Abbott Stephen de Henin arrived in Galway with arms from Charles IV, duke of Lorraine, to support the Irish royalists. However, more ambitious plans to undertake military or naval enterprises to aid the king’s cause, such as the negotiations for Lorraine to bring an army and fleet of ships to Ireland, came to nothing, at least partially because of the high number of warships that parliament deployed.90 In Ireland the capture of Limerick remained a naval objective for 1651, after General Ireton’s failure to take the city in the autumn of 1650, despite divisions among the defenders. With Limerick lying so far from the sea, parliamentarian shipping could effectively cut off sea access. The five vessels assigned to patrol near the River Shannon as part of the summer guard, the Portsmouth frigate, the Swiftsure, the Concord, the Fellowship, and the Hector, intercepted vessels trying to relieve the city.91 Ireton still failed to capitalise on his military and naval superiority to storm the city, and the siege dragged on until October 1651, when the general deployed artillery from the fleet and his army to batter a breach in the city’s walls, which forced the beleaguered garrison to surrender.92 In Scotland the navy similarly supported the parliamentarian armies as they campaigned along the coast. Naval ships and boats enabled Cromwell’s forces to cross the Firth of Forth in July in order to campaign in Fife. In September the military cause of the Scottish royalists collapsed with the defeat of their main army by Cromwell at Worcester, and in the same month they lost their two principal remaining ports. General George Monck stormed Dundee and took forty to fifty vessels in the harbour, and Aberdeen surrendered on 7 September.93 The Commonwealth navy also played a major role in eliminating the threat posed by royalist-held islands in 1651, both near Britain and further afield. Negotiations with Lorraine went back to 1650 although a treaty was not agreed until July 1651. J. H. Ohlmeyer, ‘Ireland Independent: Confederate Foreign Policy and International Relations during the Mid-Seventeenth Century’, in J. H. Ohlmeyer, ed., Ireland from Independence to Occupation (Cambridge, 1995), p. 106; Micheál Ó Siochrú, ‘The Duke of Lorraine and the International Struggle for Ireland’, HJ, 48 (2005), pp. 905–32; Mark R. F. Williams, The King’s Irishmen: The Irish in the Exiled Court of Charles II (Woodbridge, 2014), pp. 64–74; Perfect Diurnall, 72 (21–28 April 1651), p. 968. 91 CSPD, 1651, p. 86. 92 Henry Ireton, Sad Newes from Ireland (1651), pp. 1–6; Henry Ireton, A Letter from the Lord Deputy General of Ireland (1651), pp. 1–24; Lenihan, ‘Ballaí Luimnigh’, pp. 130–2; Burke, ‘New Model Army’, pp. 19–23; Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645–1653 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 377–8. 93 Anon., A Great Victory God hath Vouchsafed by the Lord Generall Cromwels Forces against the Scots (1651), pp. 1–6; Murdoch, Terror of the Seas, pp. 229–3; T. L., A Letter to the Right Honourable William Lenthall, Esq., Speaker of the Parliament of England Giving a True Relation of a Late Great Victory Obtained by the Parliaments Forces against the Scots Neere Dundee (1651), pp. 3–4. 90

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In March the council of state assigned Blake twelve ships to deal with the Isle of Man, and Sir George Ayscue also received command of a squadron of seven ships to suppress the royalists in Barbados.94 Events elsewhere prevented these operations from taking place. In late March a Dutch fleet commanded by Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp moved against the royalist privateers based in the Scilly Isles due to their attacks on Dutch shipping. Parliament responded by sending Blake’s and Ayscue’s ships to Scilly to force Tromp to desist in his plans.95 The Dutch fleet backed off, and on 17 April Blake’s fleet landed soldiers reinforced with seamen. The garrisons surrendered to Blake at the end of May.96 The crossing of the royalist army into England from Scotland in the summer of 1651, which culminated in their defeat at Worcester, also served to further delay the planned naval expeditions. On 9 August Ayscue’s small fleet finally managed to sail from Plymouth for Barbados.97 After Cromwell’s victory at Worcester, the navy was again free to concentrate on the islands that remained loyal to Charles II. In October a parliamentarian fleet of thirty or forty ships transported 3,000 men to the Isle of Man, which succumbed with little resistance as the inhabitants deserted the royalist cause. A Perfect Diurnall reported how ‘the islanders sent out their Boats to bring our men ashore, and have secured Bartlett the pirate’; the remaining royalists surrendered there on 31 October.98 Meanwhile, Blake had received orders to reduce the Channel Islands, and on 17 October he sailed from Weymouth with eighty ships carrying infantry and cavalry for the invasion. At Jersey Blake again demonstrated his skill in amphibious operations – by cruising along the coast he exhausted the royalist defenders as they followed him to prevent a landing. The eventual assault took place at night, and met limited resistance. From this foothold the parliamentarians went on the offensive; royalist resistance collapsed, and Jersey surrendered on 12 December, followed by Guernsey five days later.99 Meanwhile, Ayscue’s expeditionary forces had arrived off Barbados in October. Lord Willoughby, the royalist governor of the island, remained defiant and refused to surrender, but in December the arrival of a Virginia-bound fleet of merchantmen added to Ayscue’s strength. The parliamentarians staged a number of raids against The ships were Phœnix, Providence, Fox, Tenth Whelp, Mayflower, Hind, Truelove, Convertine, Little President, Constant Warwick, Convert, and Galliot hoy. CSPD, 1651, p. 86; J. R. Powell, ‘Sir George Ayscue’s Capture of Barbados in 1651’, MM, 59 (1973), p. 281. 95 CSPD, 1651, pp. 123–4. 96 CSPD, 1651, pp. 213–17; Joseph Leveck, A True Accompt of the Late Reducement of the Isles of Scilly (1651), pp. 3–14; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 6. 97 Powell, ‘Capture of Barbados’. 98 Perfect Diurnall, 98 (20–27 October 1651), p. 1397; Perfect Diurnall, 100 (3–10 November 1651), p. 1421. 99 CSPD, 1651, p. 441; CSPD, 1651–2, p. 31 Perfect Diurnall, 100 (27 October–3 November 1651), pp. 1416–17; Michael Baumber, ‘Blake, Robert (bap. 1598, d. 1657)’, ODNB; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 4–6; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 67; J. R. Powell, ‘Blake’s Reduction of Jersey in 1651’, MM, 17 (1932), pp. 64–86. 94

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the island, and on 7 December a night assault by sailors and Scottish prisoners, who were offered a gratuity to fight, routed a larger royalist force. One account described ‘the seamen running in upon the enemy with hallowing and whooping, in such fierce disorder’. Despite the success of these attacks, however, Ayscue lacked the strength to undertake a major landing on the island as had been done at Scilly or Jersey. Therefore he began negotiations in secret with discontented royalists on the island. Realising that the cause was hopeless, and losing the support of his soldiers, Willoughby surrendered on 11 January 1652.100 The loss of these island outposts marked the end of royalist privateering as a serious maritime threat to parliament, and in this and in supporting land campaigns the navy played a major role in subduing the royalists during 1651. The year was not without losses for parliament, as Edward Popham, one of the generals-at-sea, died in August: his importance, and the significance of the navy, can be seen in his state funeral and burial in Westminster Abbey in late September.101

Endgame, 1652–53 By the beginning of 1652 the royalist cause was all but lost, at sea and on land. In the West Indies, Ayscue followed up his success at Barbados by mopping up resistance in the remaining royalist islands. He remained in the region until May 1652, when his fleet sailed for Plymouth.102 Virginia submitted on 12 March 1652, and Maryland and Bermuda followed around the end of that month. Rupert was still at large: after refitting in the Canaries his small squadron sailed for Cape Blanco, on the coast of Africa, and then on to Cape Verde, where, in February, he learned of Ayscue’s presence in the West Indies. The royalists remained on the coast of West Africa for a number of months, mostly chasing prizes, before they finally crossed the Atlantic and arrived in the Caribbean in May. The prince arrived too late to win the inhabitants back to the doomed royalist cause, but his ships cruised the region in search of prizes, and occasionally put into French colonial islands such as Monserrat and Guadeloupe. In September disaster struck when a hurricane led to the loss of Prince Maurice and his ship. Rupert remained in the West Indies until December, when he decided to return to Europe with his remaining ships; but by then the political situation had shifted. Portugal had recognised the Commonwealth, and opened diplomatic relations with the regime in London, and so on arrival at the Portuguese Azores in January 1653 Rupert did not receive the friendly reception that he expected. Instead, the governor opened fire on the royalist ships. The fleet sailed on to France, and ‘after many storms and tempest’ reached the Loire in March.103 For parliament, this marked the end of the royalist naval danger at sea. Powell, ‘Capture of Barbados’, pp. 283–90; Michael A. LaCombe, ‘Willoughby, Francis, Fifth Baron Willoughby of Parham (bap. 1614, d. 1666)’, ODNB. 101 Michael Baumber, ‘Popham, Edward (c. 1610–1651)’, ODNB. 102 CSPD 1651–2, pp. 265–6. 103 Anderson, ‘Royalists at Sea in 1651–1653’, pp. 76–9; Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert, iii, pp. 342–88, 541–6; Ian Roy, ‘Maurice, Prince Palatine of the Rhine (1621–1652)’, ODNB. 100

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As Rupert’s naval campaign petered out, the war in Ireland also entered its final stages. By the start of 1652, only Galway remained as the last significant royalist port in the former Stuart kingdoms. A strong winter guard assigned to the west coast of Ireland from late 1652 onwards helped to prevent seaborne relief getting into the city. Reports from captured ships suggested that the garrison lacked food, and that merchants dared not risk sending supplies by sea, ‘they beinge not able to goe into Galloway because of the Parliaments Friggats that lye before itt’.104 With an ever-tightening siege and no prospect of relief, Galway yielded on 12 April 1652. Inishboffin Island, off the coast of Galway, held out as a royalist harbour until February 1653, but by then it was little more than ‘an itche in the enemie arme’ to parliament.105 The removal of Rupert and of the privateers based in Irish harbours did not completely eradicate the dangers to parliamentary shipping at sea. Pirates and privateers operating from continental ports continued to seek out English prizes, and officials complained to London about the activities of pirates in the seas around the British Isles. A letter from Chester complained that ‘Our channel is so infested with Pirates’, while Captain William Kendall of the Success described fighting with Irish and Dunkirk privateers on a voyage to Scotland.106 However, the navy sent out patrols to keep the sea lanes open, and met with some success. The council of state reported on the capture of Captain Gardner, whom they condemned as a pirate, in July 1652.107 Commonwealth naval expansion continued, with newly-built frigates coming into service, and orders being placed for additional vessels to deal with these issues and other potential enemies at sea.108 Despite the best efforts of the navy, however, the problem of pirates on the coast was never fully eradicated; dispatches from Ayr in Scotland in June 1653 referred to the coast there being ‘infested with pickeroons’.109 As the royalist threat receded in 1652 and 1653, the Commonwealth faced a different enemy at sea. Relations with the Dutch had been difficult throughout the 1640s, and deteriorated from 1651 onwards.110 The Navigation Act passed by the Commons in October 1651 effectively barred Dutch ships from transporting goods to England or its colonies.111 The first clash occurred in May 1652, and war was declared in July. Fighting the Dutch became the navy’s major task CJ, vii, pp. 31–3; TNA HCA 13/252, part i, examination of James Ballan, 17 February 1652; TNA HCA 13/65, examination of Peter Seddon, 15 April 1652; Murphy, War at Sea, p. 170. 105 Gilbert, Contemporary History, ii, pp. 142–3; Sheila Mulloy, ‘Inishbofin – the Ultimate Stronghold’, Irish Sword, 17 (1987–8), pp. 105–16. 106 Perfect Diurnall, 125 (3–10 May 1652), p. 1870; Perfect Diurnall, 146 (20–27 September 1652), p. 2189; CSPD, 1651–2, p. 526; CSPD, 1652–3, pp. 40–1. 107 CSPD, 1651–2, pp. 273, 286, 306, 324. 108 Winfield, British Warships, p. 102; CSPD, 1651–2, pp. 146, 196. 109 CSPD, 1652–3, p. 600. 110 Groenveld, ‘The English Civil Wars’. 111 C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, eds, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660 (1911), pp. 559–62. 104

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between 1652 and 1654, and this conflict differed greatly from that which took place during the 1640s, as opposing fleets faced each other in large-scale battles at sea.112 Nevertheless, the success of the Commonwealth navy in this war owed much to the maritime dimension of the civil wars, which ended with a radical and aggressive English government in command of a larger and more effective navy than Britain had ever seen.

Conclusion The outcome of the civil wars from a maritime perspective was settled long before Inishboffin surrendered or Rupert landed in France in the spring of 1653. By the end of 1651, royalist defeat at sea was inevitable following reverses in Scotland, Ireland, and various British and Caribbean islands, and with the prince’s squadron on the run. The promise of a royalist resurgence at sea in 1649 had come to nothing, as Rupert and other commanders failed to capitalise on the naval resources, both a coordinated squadron and privateers, at their disposal. Instead they squandered the opportunity to challenge the parliamentarians at sea. Ill-thought-out strategies saw the strength of the prince’s fleet gradually diminish and waste away, without ever running the risk of a large-scale engagement with the parliamentarians, while privateering harbours fell to Cromwell’s armies. The Commonwealth’s navy, on the other hand, was able to regroup and move on from its problems and failures in 1648. From this reorganisation a more effective and efficient naval force emerged that helped to ensure victory at sea and on land: the Commonwealth’s armies could not have conquered Ireland and Scotland without the logistical support of the navy. Ironically, it was only in civil war against Charles I that the English government built up the resources to achieve what he had tried and failed to do: defeat Scottish and Irish armies, and send out a fleet that overpowered its European rivals. Even before the final shots were fired in the civil wars, the navy was at the forefront of the Commonwealth’s military priorities, as war broke out with the Dutch at sea in 1652. Going forward it would be the navy, as much as the army, that symbolised, showcased, and secured the power of the new regime.

112

See Introduction, pp. 4–7.

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Conclusion

In April 1655 a ship that bore the name of one of the most important battles of the civil wars, the Naseby, was launched. Lorrenzo Paulucci, the Venetian Secretary to England, described the event: Only yesterday His Highness’s galleon was launched in the presence of his entire household and his chief councillor. It has been built regardless of cost, of marvellously rich construction, carrying 120 guns great and small and costing 150,000l. sterling …

He continued: England now claims to be more powerful at sea than any other power, and more abundant in war ships, as the Protector fully realises that great strength at sea may support him on land also, and bring him friendship and repute in every part of the world as it actually is doing.1

The diarist John Evelyn also viewed the newly launched Naseby, and wrote a well-known account of what he saw and thought of the ship, and what it stood for: I went to see the great ship newly built by the usurper, Oliver, carrying ninety-six brass guns, and 1,000 tons burden. In the prow was Oliver on horseback, trampling six nations under foot, a Scot, Irishman, Dutchman, Frenchman, Spaniard, and English, as was easily made out by their several habits. A Fame held a laurel over his insulting head; the word, God with us.2

There is considerable irony in how much the size, ceremonial launching, and iconography of the Naseby resemble Charles I’s Sovereign of the Seas: the figurehead of the later ship may even have been deliberately modelled on that of the Sovereign, which featured King Edgar trampling seven kings.3 It is also rather CSPV, 1655–6, pp. 38–52. John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn (London, 1901), i, p. 304. 3 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 388. 1

2

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174 conclusion appropriate that, where Charles I harked back to a medieval predecessor, the Protector proclaimed himself. In 1639, despite a decade of governmental support and royal attention, Charles I’s navy could not enforce the king’s claim to sovereignty over his territorial waters, and the English fleet was a bystander as the Dutch and Spanish fought each other at the battle of the Downs.4 Yet in the space of fourteen war-torn years, between 1639 and 1653, the English navy had become the pre-eminent naval force in Europe, and a key pillar of the Commonwealth. By 1655 it was the strength and successes of the navy that kept the Dutch, French, and Spanish at bay. It is highly significant that the figurehead of Cromwell on horseback was shown not just crushing his domestic enemies within the British Isles, but also overseas powers who threatened the regime.5 In writing this book we set out with three objectives: to provide an overview of the war at sea that takes into account the wider nature of the conflict within the British Isles; to assess the impact of maritime activity on the course of the wars; and to understand the consequences of the civil wars for wider British naval and imperial history. In this conclusion we return, in particular, to the last two. The fighting at sea between 1639 and 1653 was unusual in a number of respects. Much of the character of the struggle was shaped by the fact that one side controlled nearly all of the available naval resources at the outbreak of the war, which in effect meant that there was little chance of any decisive engagements taking place at sea. At first glance, this lack of naval battles suggests that the conflict was relatively insignificant, where little of note occurred. In reality, however, the mariners who fought at sea were involved in a fast-paced and technologically advanced theatre of the war. Encounters between hostile vessels were often intense and brutal, while setting out to interdict enemy shipping, sometimes in the depths of winter, was a never-ending grind that exhausted crews and ships on all sides. Sailors also regularly took part in complex military operations: parliamentarian seamen, in particular, saw considerable action in coastal sieges and amphibious operations at places such as Bunratty, Duncannon, Exeter, Hull, Pembroke, and Plymouth. The demands of war and the limitations they faced compelled each side to innovate at sea. The confederates and parliamentarians readily adopted new technologies, such as ‘Dunkirk frigates’, and adapted their tactics to make the best use of this style of warship. Each side developed sophisticated bureaucracies and infrastructure to organise and run their undertakings at sea more efficiently, even if the records of some of these efforts do not survive. The confederates, for example, established an admiralty from scratch that quickly managed to recruit men-of-war to sail under its colours. In other ways, the war at sea was more conventional in the way it was conducted. The reliance on private enterprise is unsurprising, considering that in the early modern maritime world commerce raiding and ‘reprisal wars’ were already the norm.6 Parliament hired, or issued See Introduction, p. 1–4. For depictions of Cromwell see Laura Lunger Knoppers, Constructing Cromwell: Ceremony, Portrait and Print, 1645–1661 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 31–106. 6 See Chapter 1, pp. 13–20. 4

5

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conclusion 175 letters of marque to, nearly 400 privately-owned vessels; approximately eighty confederate privateers can be identified, and at least thirty men-of-war set out with royalist colours during the 1640s.7 The confederate and royalist privateers were very successful, suggesting either that there were many more than are recorded, or perhaps that they were mostly warships, while parliament’s mobilisation may have included more merchant ships, some of which would not have focused solely on combat. These ships seized hundreds of prizes, and thousands of mariners found themselves as prisoners of war. The scale of this activity harked back to the ‘glory days’ of Elizabethan privateering, with its reliance on privately-owned men-of-war taking the fight to the Spanish.8 A very high proportion of Britain and Ireland’s seafaring population must have served aboard a naval ship or privateer, or fallen victim to them.9 Assessing the impact of this maritime activity on the course of the war is far from straightforward, and it is easy for historians to either overstate or dismiss the importance of the naval contribution to the civil wars. The significance of privateering, amphibious operations, and the logistical support provided by navies should certainly not be over-emphasised. Ultimately battles on land, and not at sea, decided the fate of the confederate, covenanter, parliamentarian, and royalist causes. Most historians would agree with the earl of Clarendon’s opinion that the battle of Naseby was a key turning point in the first civil war, and the moment ‘when the King and the kingdom were lost’.10 However, the fighting that took place at sea should not be viewed as a peripheral campaign of little consequence to the outcome of the wars.11 Navies were not simply useless ornaments, and the naval conflict was more than just a ‘strictly limited’ sideshow to the war on land.12 Victory could not be totally secured on land, for, as Barbara Donagan has argued, ‘parliament’s ultimate victory owed much to its superiority off the battlefield’.13 Command of the navy and the ability to impose control on the seas around the British Isles was therefore one of the most important elements in parliament’s ability to defeat the confederates and royalists. In many respects this ‘undramatic work’ may seem of secondary importance to the outcome of the war, but naval support helped many coastal garrisons to survive, or hold out for longer than they might otherwise have done.14 Without this aid parliament would have See Chapter 4, pp. 104–7, and Chapter 5, pp. 109–20. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, pp. 124–49, 222–73; see Chapter 1, pp. 13–15, 28–30. 9 Charles Carlton estimated that one in four adult males served ‘at some time in some capacity in the armed forces’, but this estimate did not include the navy or privateers: Carlton, Going to the Wars, p. 340. 10 Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, iv, p. 46; Gentles, The English Revolution, pp. 267–71; Bennett, The Civil Wars, pp. 226–7. 11 Powell, Navy in the English Civil War, p. xii; Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 202. 12 J. P. Kenyon, Stuart England (London, 1978), pp. 147–8; Wanklyn and Jones, Military History, pp. 11–12. 13 Donagan, War in England, p. 3. 14 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 2–3. 7

8

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176 conclusion lost footholds in a number of regions including Ireland, southwest England, and south Wales. A number of these enclaves, such as Plymouth and Bunratty, acted as thorns in the side of the confederates and royalists, and prevented them from moving armies against more important parliamentarian targets. The fact that the majority of recorded confederate prizes were taken during 1647–49 also suggests that parliament’s navy was reasonably successful at protecting commerce until political divisions split the fleet during the second civil war.15 At the same time, it should be stressed that the naval activities of confederate and royalist supporters clearly helped their cause on many levels. Prize ships and their cargoes generated substantial revenues which helped fund the war. Confederate ports such as Wexford and Waterford, and royalist harbours such as Falmouth, reaped massive economic rewards through the sale of captured vessels in their towns, though it is difficult to gauge how much of this windfall went to funding the wider confederate and royalist war efforts. Shipments of arms and munitions from overseas also helped to strengthen their armies, while ships with letters of marque from their admiralties damaged parliamentarian and covenanter overseas trade and fishing, and tied up men-of-war on convoy and patrol duties. In the longer term, however, the reliance on private enterprise that characterised the confederate and royalist efforts at sea meant they were never able to tip the balance of maritime warfare in their own favour. In particular, the failure to challenge parliamentarian naval dominance following the mutiny of the fleet in 1648 and 1649 was a missed opportunity. Though confederate and royalist privateers captured large numbers of prizes, the parliamentarian navy, through the use of convoys and patrols, ensured that the losses never became large enough to undermine the economy of London. The importance of London and its economic might to the overall victory achieved by parliament is widely recognised by historians, but it was parliamentarian sea power that protected the trade of the city and allowed it to flourish throughout the 1640s.16 Thereafter, the navy made it possible for the Commonwealth to subdue royalist resistance and prevent a Stuart revival in Ireland, Scotland, and the royalist-held islands. Secure sea lanes protected the supply lines on which Cromwell’s armies depended, and ensured that the massive logistical requirements of these forces were met. On balance, then, maritime affairs had a major bearing on the outcome of the war and should not be overlooked. The longer-term consequences of the civil wars for wider British naval and imperial history are also important. The significance of parliament’s navy, in contrast to the reliance on private activity by their opponents, underlines the importance of the ‘military revolution at sea’ and the contemporary trend towards complex, state-controlled naval forces.17 However, the conflict in the 1640s was more than a reflection of this trend: it also forced an acceleration of it, laying the groundwork for many later naval advances. The victorious See Chapter 5, p. 120. Coates, Impact of the English Civil War, pp. 109–38; John Morrill, ‘Introduction’, in John Morrill, ed., Reactions to the English Civil War, 1642–1649 (London, 1982), p. 18. 17 See Chapter 1, pp. 21–4, 26–33. 15 16

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conclusion 177 Commonwealth navy that emerged from fourteen years of warfare in 1653 was an experienced and increasingly professionalised fighting force at all levels. Officers and men rose through the ranks during the 1640s, and by the time of the first Anglo-Dutch War there were many veteran naval sailors. Some of these mariners brought their skills and knowledge into the service of King Charles II after the Restoration.18 In a sense, then, the civil wars were the proving ground for the naval officers, both parliamentarian and royalist, who would serve in the navy against the Dutch Republic, Spain, and North African corsairs in the later seventeenth century. For example, six of the ‘Flagmen of Lowestoft’, painted by Peter Lely after the battle of Lowestoft in 1665, had served during the civil wars.19 The navy became a force to be reckoned with, and other European powers recognised this: in 1651 Tromp and the Dutch navy backed off rather than challenge Blake at the Scilly Isles.20 Wartime necessity also helped the navy to develop on an administrative level, and the underpinning for what N. A. M. Rodger terms the ‘fiscal naval state’ was laid during the civil wars. New infrastructure, such as dockyards and victualling offices, and new shipbuilding programmes all came into being between 1638 and 1653, and naval capabilities in these areas continued to expand and develop after the war.21 During the course of the war the navy also became an increasingly global force, which sought to extend the power and authority of the state away from the British Isles. English men-of-war undertook extended operations in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, and during the Interregnum the commanders of the navy felt able to place pressure on foreign powers such as the Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese in a way that would not have been possible in the 1630s. While these foundations of naval developments can be seen during the civil wars, it is important not to slip into a triumphant narrative, in the manner of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.22 Progress was not always straightforward, and setbacks occurred; there were very real limits to what an early modern state could achieve, and by the Restoration the navy can best be described as ‘dilapidated and virtually bankrupt’, though that state of affairs did not last.23 The navy under Cromwell expanded out of necessity in order to For the debate about ‘gentlemen versus tarpaulin’ officers in the navy of Charles II, see J. D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy (Oxford, 1991); Davies, Pepys’s Navy, pp. 94–9. 19 Sir Thomas Allin (R), Sir George Ayscue (P), Joseph Jordan (P), Sir John Lawson (P), William Penn (P) and Prince Rupert (R) all fought at sea during the civil wars. A number of the other flagmen fought in the first Anglo-Dutch War or served in the Protectoral navy. R. C. Anderson, List of English Naval Captains, 1642–1660 (London, 1964). 20 See Chapter 7, p. 168. 21 The new infrastructure still faced problems during the 1650s, particularly in areas such as recruiting and victualling. Rodger, ‘Military Revolution’, pp. 119–28; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 33–49; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 258–92; Davies, Pepys’s Navy, pp. 37–64, 177–202. 22 See Introduction, pp. 7–8. 23 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 65. 18

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178 conclusion s­ ustain a military dictatorship, but unlike the Stuart monarchs the Lord Protector himself was relatively uninterested in naval affairs, though he did attend the launch of a number of warships, including the Swiftsure in 1653 and the Richard (named in honour of his son) in May 1658.24 The civil wars did not lead to any innovations in tactics at sea; these came later in the Dutch wars, with the introduction of new fighting instructions in 1653.25 In other areas, the civil wars were a blind alley in terms of naval advances. The new frigates built to counter confederate privateers proved unsuitable for the large-scale actions of the Dutch wars, although later modifications and the addition of extra ordnance helped to keep them in service well into the late seventeenth century. The Adventure, launched as part of the 1646 programme, was rebuilt at Chatham in 1691.26 This was only one episode in a much longer trajectory, but it is nevertheless a vitally important one. For naval officers, officials, and sailors, the civil wars at sea were an affair of much ‘greater concern’ than they have since been to historians.27 In the final assessment, the course of this maritime conflict was an integral element of the wider war, and of the history of early modern Britain and Ireland, and needs to be considered as part of this story.

Richard received minor injuries while attending the launch when the horses of his coach ran away. The Lord Protector, who also travelled in the coach, was unhurt. John Morrill, ‘Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)’, ODNB; The Faithful Scout, 131 (23–30 September 1653), p. 2071; CSPD, 1658–9, p. 403; Robert Vaughan, ed., The Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell (2 vols, 1838), ii, pp. 468–9. 25 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 16–19. 26 Davies, Pepys’s Navy, pp. 51–2; Winfield, British Warships, pp. 88–93. 27 CSPD, 1639–40, p. 38. 24

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Appendix 1

Timeline of the Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653

Year

Date

Event

1638

February

1639

March–June 18 June September

Solemn League and Covenant signed in Scotland First Bishops’ War Treaty of Berwick Spanish fleet pursued into the Downs by the Dutch Battle of the Downs ‘Short Parliament’ in England Second Bishops’ War Battle of Newburn Covenanters take Newcastle Treaty of Ripon ‘Long Parliament’ called by Charles I Earl of Strafford impeached Archbishop Laud impeached Trial of Strafford begins Strafford executed ‘Army Plots’ Irish rebellion begins Four ships assigned by parliament to guard the Irish coast Siege of Drogheda

1640

1641

1642

11 October 13 April–5 May May–October 28 August 30 August 26 October 3 November 11 November 18 December 22 March 12 May May–June 22 October November 21 November–March 1642 1 December 4 January 10 January January 23 February 15 March

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Grand Remonstrance presented to Charles I Charles I attempts to arrest five MPs in the Commons Charles I leaves London Petitions to the House of Commons by the seamen of London Queen Henrietta Maria sails for Dutch Republic Earl of Northumberland appoints earl of Warwick as his deputy

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180 Year

appendix 1 Date

Event

19 March

1643

‘Adventurers’ Act for Ireland Charles I establishes his court at Oxford 23 April Charles I fails to seize the armoury in Hull 30 April Parliament approves the ‘Sea Adventure’ for Ireland 1 June 19 Propositions presented to Charles I 2–3 June Fleet in the Downs declares for Warwick 18 June Charles I rejects the 19 Propositions 23 June King John’s Castle in Limerick surrenders to the Irish rebels (besieged from February) 29 June ‘Sea Adventure’ with 18 ships sails for Ireland June Confederate Oath of Association drawn up; supreme council nominated 1 July Parliament confirms Warwick as commander of the navy 11–24 July ‘Sea Adventure’ soldiers campaign in Munster; sail from Kinsale on 24 July July Two frigates from Dunkirk carrying Irish veterans including Owen Roe O’Neill arrive in Ireland August Captains Stradling and Kettleby desert Irish guard with Bonaventure and Swallow to serve Charles I 9 August–3 September ‘Sea Adventure’ fleet arrives in Galway bay; campaigns in Connacht; sails for England on 3 September 22 August Charles I raises his standard at Nottingham September Thomas Preston and other Irish veterans land in Wexford September Portsmouth surrenders to parliament October Swallow and Bonaventure arrive at Newcastle – crews surrender to parliament 19 October Parliament authorises issuing of letters of marque to its supporters 23 October Battle of Edgehill 13 November Royalist march on London halted at Turnham Green December Southampton surrenders to parliament December Confederates appoint representatives in Europe with power to issue letters of marque February Henrietta Maria lands with arms at Bridlington 18 March Ormond fails to take New Ross 23 April Charles I orders Ormond to treat with the confederates

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Year

appendix 1 181 Date

Event

June

Navy helps foil plot by Sir John Hotham to surrender Hull Battle of Adwalton Moor Royalists take Bristol Attempts by Warwick to relieve Exeter fail Earl of Carbery secures Pembrokeshire for king Royalist siege of Hull

30 June 26 July July August–October 2 September–12 October 5 September 15 September 25 September

1644

Late October– February 1644 November 7 December 19 January January 3 February February–March 24 March April–June May–September June–September 2 July c. 14 July 17 July August–2 September 28 July 1 September–15 August 1645 September

1645

19 October January January

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Royalists take Exeter One-year ceasefire agreed between confederates and royalists in Ireland Solemn League and Covenant between Scottish covenanters and English parliament Royalists in Ireland begin to ship soldiers to England Royalists gain control of Jersey Warwick appointed lord high admiral Scottish army invades England Earl of Antrim makes agreement with Charles I to raise soldiers for Scotland Scottish army arrives at Newcastle Parliament retakes Pembrokeshire Confederate agents arrive at Oxford to negotiate with king Royalist siege of Lyme Charles Gerard pushes back parliamentarians in south Wales Earl of Essex marches into southwest; relieves Plymouth Battle of Marston Moor Henrietta Maria sails from Falmouth for France Inchiquin and Munster protestants declare for parliament Lostwithiel campaign – parliamentarian army trapped in Cornwall and surrenders Covenanter siege of Newcastle begins Series of victories by Montrose over covenanters in Scotland Lord Esmond and garrison at Duncannon fort defect to parliament Newcastle surrenders to covenanters Parliament appoints Inchiquin as Lord President of Munster Parliament captures Scarborough

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182 Year

appendix 1 Date

Event

19 January–19 March March–July

Confederate siege of Duncannon fort Charles Gerard leads royalist into south Wales and threatens Pembroke Formation of New Model Army ‘Self-Denying Ordinance’ passed by parliament Warwick lays down commission as lord high admiral under ‘Self-Denying Ordinance’; William Batten takes command of the navy Montrose victorious at Auldearn Confederate army besieges Youghal Battle of Naseby Secret treaty between earl of Glamorgan and confederates signed Parliament takes Bristol Montrose defeated at Philiphaugh Papal nuncio, Rinuccini, arrives in Ireland Parliamentarian siege of Exeter begins Chester surrenders to parliament; Fairfax relieves Plymouth and captures Dartmouth Parliament begins siege of Pendennis Castle in Cornwall Parliamentarian fleet arrives at Bunratty Castle to bolster garrison; castle besieged by confederates Exeter taken by parliament Parliament begins siege of Oxford Charles I surrenders to Scots near Newark Battle of Benburb Oxford surrenders Bunratty Castle surrenders to confederates Montrose’s forces disband Proclamation of ‘First Ormond Peace’ in Dublin Scilly Isles surrender to parliament Ormond begins to negotiate with parliament to surrender Dublin Two new parliamentarian frigates, Assurance and Nonsuch, come into service Scots hand Charles I to parliament Army seize Charles I Parliamentarian army under Michael Jones lands near Dublin Declaration of the army published Ormond surrenders Dublin to parliament Ormond leaves for England

April 3 April 10 April 9 May June 14 June 25 August

1646

11 September 13 September 12 October 28 October January 17 March March 9 April 3 May 5 May 5 June 25 June 14 July 30 July 30 July September October–November October

1647

30 January 4 June 7 June 14 June 19 June 28 July

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Year

1648

appendix 1 183 Date

Event

6 August 8 August 17 September Late October–early November 28 October 11 November 26 December

New Model Army occupies Westminster Jones defeats Preston at Dungan’s Hill William Batten lays down his commission Putney Debates

1 January February March–May 3 April May 20 May May–11 July 27 May 29 May 10–11 June 17 July 17 August 29–31 August 19 September

1649

8–10 November 21 November 2 December 6 December 20 January 21 January 30 January Late January 5 February 6 February 7 February 13 February

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Agreement of the People King escapes from the army King and Scots sign an ‘Engagement’ on the Isle of Wight Rainborowe ordered to take command of the navy Inchiquin begins negotiation with the confederates Royalist revolt in south Wales Inchiquin declares for the king Revolt against parliament in Kent Truce between Inchiquin and confederates Parliamentarians besiege Pembroke Mutiny in the Downs – Rainborowe expelled Rainborowe dismissed by parliament; Warwick reinstated Royalist fleet sails for Holland Royalist fleet, commanded by prince of Wales, returns to the Downs Cromwell defeats Scots at Preston Confrontation between revolted fleet and Warwick’s fleet at the mouth of the Thames; royalists retire to Hellevoetsluis Warwick’s fleet arrives to blockade royalists at Hellevoetsluis Several royalist ships surrender to parliament Warwick’s fleet returns to England Army occupies Westminster Pride’s Purge of parliament Trial of Charles I begins Prince Rupert puts to sea with royalist fleet from Hellevoetsluis King Charles I executed Rupert and fleet arrive at Kinsale Charles II proclaimed king by Scots Abolition of the House of Lords Abolition of the monarchy Council of state appointed

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184 Year

appendix 1 Date

Event

23–24 February

Warwick dismissed; Blake, Deane, and Popham appointed as generals-at-sea Cromwell appointed to command army in Ireland Leveller mutineers at Burford defeated England declared a ‘Commonwealth’ Cromwell leaves London for Ireland Jones defeats royalists at battle of Rathmines Cromwell lands at Dublin Cromwell storms Drogheda Cromwell storms Wexford New Ross surrenders to Cromwell Rupert and fleet escape from Kinsale Cork, Youghal, and Kinsale surrender to parliament Rupert and the royalist fleet arrive at the Tagus in Lisbon Scots surrender Carrickfergus to parliament Waterford besieged Siege of Waterford lifted; Cromwellian army enters winter quarters Fethard surrenders to Cromwell Blake and the Commonwealth navy blockade the royalist fleet off Lisbon Montrose executed Cromwell leaves Ireland; replaced by Henry Ireton Cromwell leads army into Scotland Waterford surrenders Duncannon fort surrenders Battle of Dunbar Rupert’s fleet escapes from the Tagus and sails into the Mediterranean Most of Rupert’s fleet lost at Cartagena Ormond leaves Ireland for France Edinburgh surrenders Rupert’s remaining ships shelter at Toulon Charles II crowned at Scone Robert Blake defeats royalists in Scilly Isles Rupert’s ships at sea mainly on west coast of Africa seeking prizes Limerick besieged Galway besieged Scots invade England

30 March 14 May 19 May 10 June 2 August 15 August 11 September 11 October 19 October 20 October October November 2 November 24 November 2 December 1650

3 February March 21 May 26 May 22 July 6 August 17 August 3 September 12 October

1651

4 November 11 December 24 December December–May 1652 1 January April–May June–April 1652 4 June August 5 August

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Year

1652

appendix 1 185 Date

Event

3 September 9 October 13 October 27 October 31 October 26 November 12 December 11 January 12 March 12 April May

Battle of Worcester First Navigation Act Charles II escapes to France Limerick surrenders Royalists in Channel Islands surrender Henry Ireton dies Blake captures Jersey for the Commonwealth Barbados submits to the Commonwealth Virginia submits to the Commonwealth Galway surrenders First Anglo-Dutch War – clashes in the Channel between Blake and Tromp Rupert’s fleet arrives in the Caribbean Edward Popham dies; buried in Westminster Prince Maurice killed when his ship sinks in hurricane near the Virgin Islands Battle of Dungeness Rupert and remaining ships sail for Europe Battle of Portland Rupert arrives back in France Inishboffin Island, last royalist maritime outpost in British Isles, surrenders Battle of Scheveningen; death of Admiral Tromp

May August 1652 September

1653

30 November December 18 February March May 31 July

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Appendix 2

Parliamentarian Fleets, 1642–1649

Exact figures for the size of parliament’s naval fleets are problematic, because there are a number of surviving sources which record the ships set out by parliament, and these do not always agree. The purpose of this appendix, therefore, is to summarise these sources and indicate the likely (but not definite) numbers of ships set forth by parliament during the period up to 1649. Where auxiliaries are mentioned here, this is because they are included in these sources – as discussed in Chapter 4, parliament mobilised many more auxiliaries than are listed here.1 Table 1 presents the minimum and maximum ranges indicated by the available sources for the summer guards, which were the largest concentration of ships. ‘Total’, in this table, is not the addition of the maximum or minimum for each category, but the range of totals indicated by the various sources. The printed lists (see Table 4, below) are also incorporated into this table, although they do not distinguish between summer and winter guards and therefore may, in some cases, represent the latter. Table 2 presents the numbers recorded in two manuscripts held at the British Library. The first, Add. MS 17,503, is entitled ‘A list of such Shipps and Frigotts of the Navy Royall as Also of such Marchant Shipps as were sett forth in the service of the King & Parliament in the Yeares 1642: 1643: 1644: 1645: 1646: and 1647’. This document distinguishes between summer and winter guards, and besides merchant ships serving with the fleet it specifies colliers’ ships and fire ships in 1643, as well as merchant ships ‘taken upp … for the Irish Coast’ in 1645, and merchant ships that ‘Capt[ain] Lewis Dick set out for Scotland’ in 1647. It further notes eight pinnaces employed for eight months, in 1642, which are included here, and the ‘Hire and fraight of Ten Packet Boates and Ketches’ in 1644, which are excluded. Finally, it records, for the winter guard in 1643, 1645, and 1646, ‘divers of the Marchant ships’, manned with 1,808, 840, and 456 men respectively. For each of these years the average number of men per merchant ship in the summer guard has been calculated from the available figures, resulting in estimates of eighteen, thirteen, and six ships, respectively (rounding down) for the winter guards. The other manuscript, Add. MS 9,300, is a volume of seventeenth-century naval papers, which records (among other things) fleet numbers for 1648 and 1649; this 1

See pp. 104–7.

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appendix 2 187 Table 1. Collated ranges for parliamentarian fleets, 1642–49 Year

1642

1643

1644

1645

1646

1647

1648

1649

Naval ships

18–27

26–36

31–36

32–34

43–45

43–49

–

–

Merchant ships

23–26

20–26

19–23

19–25

18–20

13

–

–

Total

42–50

46–61

50–59

34–63

61–65

49–56

37

46

Auxiliaries

0–10

8–18

0–25

6–65

0–33

3–27

–

–

Sources: see tables below.

Table 2. Fleet numbers in the British Library lists, 1642–49 Year Summer guard Winter guard

1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 Naval ships

27

36

36

34

45

43

–

–

Merchant ships

23

24

23

25

20

13

–

–

Total

50

60

59

59

65

56

37

46

Naval ships

19

20

18

29

26

29

–

–

Merchant ships

23

18

13

13

 6

–

–

–

Total

42

38

31

42

32

29

–

26/32

–

 8

–

 7

–

 3

–

–

Auxiliaries

Sources: BL Add. MS 17,503; BL Add. MS 9,300, fos 79r, 116r, 122r, 137r, and 147r.

document does not distinguish between naval and merchant ships. The 1648 list includes six ships ‘upon comeing in’, which are excluded here, and the summer guard for 1649 mentions two ketches, which are included. The 1649 winter guard is listed twice – both numbers are given in the table. Table 3 presents the numbers recorded in the Journal of the House of Lords. These are not systematic lists but appear each time the Lords voted upon the fleet or captains (the House of Commons does not include many comparable lists, though it mentions a winter guard of just six naval and five merchant ships in 1646).2 There are no numbers in the Lords’ Journal for 1644. The 1642 list notes twelve ships in total for the English coast and eighteen for the Irish coast; the 1643 list notes eight ‘to the West’, sixteen ‘for Ireland and the Seavern’, eight to the Downs, eight for Scotland, and six for the north coast of Ireland. The 1645 list is a report on 14 May of ‘the State of the Fleet now at Sea’, and does not distinguish between naval and merchant ships, but does note nine ships ‘for the Guard of the Irish Seas’, seven ‘for the Scottch Guard’, seven ‘to the blocking-up of Bristoll’, three at Guernsey, five at the Downs for convoy, and five estimated for convoying prizes or for revictualling or repair. The 1647 list includes six naval ships ‘ordered to be graved and fit to be set forth upon any Emergency’, which have been excluded here. The 1648 numbers appear in letters from the earl of 2

CJ, iv, p. 648.

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188

appendix 2 Table 3. Fleet numbers in the Journal of the House of Lords, 1642–48

Year Summer guard Winter guard

1642

1643

1644

1645

1646

1647

1648

Naval ships

–

26

–

–

43

43

–

Merchant ships

–

20

–

–

18

13

–

Total

–

46

–

36

61

56

–

Naval ships

12

–

–

22

36

–

27

Merchant ships

18

–

–

12

5

–

Total

30

–

–

34

41

–

27

10

–

–

–

–

–

–

Auxiliaries

Sources: LJ, v, pp. 379, 406; vi, p. 333; vii, pp. 373–4, 594–5; viii, pp. 157–8, 459, 717; ix, p. 76; x, pp. 495, 625–6.

Table 4. Fleet numbers in printed lists, 1642–46 Year Fleet Irish squadron

1642

1643

1644

1645

1646

1647

Naval ships

16

27

36

32

44

43

Merchant ships

16

23

22

19

20

13

Naval ships

 2

 8

–

–

–

–

Merchant ships

 8

 3

–

–

–

–

Total

42

61

58

51

64

56

Auxiliaries

–

18

25

 6

33

27

Sources: anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1642); anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1643); anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1644); anon., A List of Such of the Navy Royall, as also of the Merchants Ships as are Set Forth to Sea for this Summers Expedition 1645 (1645); anon., A List of Svch Ships and Frigotts of the Navy Royall (1646); anon., A List of Such Ships and Frigots Belonging to the Parliament (1647).

Warwick, on 8 September and 12 December, and mention six ships in the Downs, four at the Isle of Wight, ten at Land’s End, two on the north coast, and five in the Thames or at Portsmouth preparing for sea. Table 4 presents the numbers recorded in published lists, including both naval and merchant ships, with a separate section for the ‘Irish guard’ in the years 1642 and 1643. Besides the hired merchant ships in the main squadrons, several additional kinds of auxiliaries are noted: colliers’ ships, fire ships, and ‘Irish adventurers’ (i.e. those in the Sea Adventure) in 1643; merchant ships ‘set forth by way of reprisall’ in 1644; ‘additionall’ merchant ships in 1645; and merchant ships ‘ordered to be graved and fitted for sea’ in 1646 and 1647.3 The 1643 list mentions ‘two small vessells, and the foure Ketches [which] are to attend the Fleet’ – these are probably the Fortune Pynk, the Rottordam, and the 3

On the ‘Sea Adventure’, see pp. 54–5.

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appendix 2 189 Table 5. Fleet numbers in the navy commissioners’ financial estimates, 1643–46 Year Naval ships Summer guard

Winter guard

1643

1644

1645

1646

30

31

34

–

Merchant ships

20

19

20

–

Total

50

50

54

–

Naval ships

21

17

27

21/42

Merchant ships

24

13

12

14/15

Total

45

30

39

35/57

–

–

65

–

Auxiliaries

Sources: Bodl. Rawl. MS A 223, pp. 45–8, 68–71, 75–8.

Revenge, all with fewer than twenty men, and the Prosperous, Anne, and Hopewell, for which no crew numbers are listed. These are included here, but the ‘Loads boat at Dover’, also mentioned, is not included. The 1644 list mentions ‘Six small Pinnaces with sixe Guns apeece, to attend the Fleet’, which are not individually named, and which have been included here. The 1647 list, as in the Lords’ Journal, mentions ‘Six second rate Ships ordered to be graved, and fit to set forth upon any Emergency’, which have been excluded here. Table 5 presents the numbers from the financial estimates of the navy commissioners for the years 1643–46, which are recorded in a volume of their papers held at the Bodleian Library (Rawl. MS A 223). These estimates contain numerous payments to ships serving for specific periods, without explaining how these relate to the overall totals, so these have not been accounted for here. There are also contradictory figures for the winter guard of 1646, which are indicated in the table. In addition to merchant ships listed for the winter guard of 1645, there are seventeen extra merchant ships and forty-eight ships for reprisal listed in that year. Finally, there are two additional lists surviving in the papers of the navy and admiralty committees, but only for the years 1642 and 1645. The navy committee’s records, in the State Papers, list six naval and six merchant ships for the winter guard of 1642, and a further six naval ships and twelve merchant ships for the Irish coast, as well as a total summer guard of thirty-four ships in 1645.4 For 1645, the admiralty committee records ten ships and two small vessels for the vice-admiral’s squadron; seven ships and one small vessel for the rear-admiral’s squadron, and the same for the North Sea squadron; sixteen ships and two small vessels for the Irish Sea squadron; seven ships and two small vessels for the Scottish squadron; and three ships for the Guernsey squadron – a total of fifty-five ships and eight small vessels.5

TNA SP 16/494, fo. 5r; SP 15/609, fo. 4r. Bodl. Rawl. MS C 416, fos 40v–41r.

4

5

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London, British Library MS Add. 4,106 MS Add. 4,155 MS Add. 4,191 MS Add. 4,200 MS Add. 9,297 MS Add. 9,300 MS Add. 9,304 MS Add. 9,305 MS Add. 9,306 MS Add. 9,307 MS Add. 17,503 MS Add. 17,677 Q-T MS Add. 19,367 MS Add. 22,546 MS Add. 35,297 MS Add. 63,788 B MS Add. 70,100 MS Add. 72,434–8 MS Harl. 164 MS Harl. 6,424 MS Sloane 1008 MS Stowe 184 London, Metropolitan Archive MJ/SB/B0005, book 58 MJ/SB/B/0006, book 66 and book 68 P78/NIC/44 London, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich AND 27 AND 45 CAD/D/18 JOD/1/1

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Dublin, National Library of Ireland MS 17,851 Dublin, Trinity College MS 809–840 1641 Depositions

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Amsterdam, Stadsarchief 5075 (Oude Notariaal Archief), inv.nr. 848–9 Rotterdam, Stadsarchief 18 (Oude Notariaal Archief), inv.nr. 199–200

Published printed sources [all published in London unless otherwise noted] Akkerman, Nadine, ed., The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, vol. 2: 1632–1642 (Oxford, 2011) Anon., A List of the Colonels as also of the Severall Counties out of which they are to Raise their Men as also the Names of Ships, Captaines, and Lieutenants that are Now Set Forth under the Command of the Right Honourable Algernoun Percey Earle of Northumberland (1640) Anon., The Generall Remonstrance or Declaration of the Sea-Men, which Inhabit in London and Thereabouts (1641[/2]) Anon., The Seamans Protestation Concerning their Ebbing and Flowing to and from the Parliament House at Westminster: Upon Tuesday the 11 Day of January, 1642 (London and Edinburgh, 1642) Anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall, and Merchant Ships (1642) Anon., Good and Bad Newes from Ireland (1642) Anon., To the Honourable, the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the Commons, Now Assembled in Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Marriners and Sea-Men, Inhabitants in, and About the Ports of London, and the River of Thames (1642) Anon., To the Right Honourable the House of Lords Now Assembled in Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Young Men, Apprentices and Sea-Men, in and About the Citie of London (1642) Anon., To the Honourable the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses of the House of Commons in Parliament Assembled. The Humble Petition of the Inhabitants, of the Parishes of Stepney, Shoreditch, VVhitechappell, and Algate, the Chappelry of Wapping, the Precinct of St Katherins, and the Parish of St Peter Advincula, Adjacent to the Tower, and Without the Liberties of London (1642) Anon., The Kings Majesties Resolvtion Concerning, Robert Earl of Warwicke (1642) Anon., The Ualiant Resolution of the Sea-Men, Listed under the Command of the Earle of Warwicke, who upon Munday last Most Valiantly Slew Many of the Cavaliers (1642) Anon., Ioyfull Nevves from Sea: or Good Tidings from my Lord of Warwicke, of his Encounter with Some Spanish ships (1642) Anon., True Newes from our Navie, Now at Sea: Shewing the Most Remarkable Passages from there (1642) Anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1642) Anon., A True Relation of the Queens Majesties Return out of Holland and, of Gods Merciful Preservation of her from those Great Dangers, wherein Her Royall Person was Engaged Both by Sea and Land (York, 1643) Anon., Good and True Newes from Bedford (1643) Anon., A List of his Majesties Navie Royall (1643) Anon., To the Honourable the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the House of Commons Assembled in the High Court of Parliament. The Humble Petition of the Marriners and Seafaring-Men and Other Inhabitants of Stepny, and Some Other Adjacent Parts (1643) Anon., A True Relation of the Routing his Majesties Forces in the County of Pembroke (1644) Anon., An Exact and True Relation in Relieving the Resolute Garrison of Lyme in Dorset-shire, by the Right Honourable, Robert Earle of Warwicke, Lord High Admirall of England (1644)

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194 bibliography Anon., The Declaration of the Sea Commanders and Marriners in the Royal Navie and Fleet, now with his Highnesse Prince Charles, Riding on the Downes (1648) Anon., A Prospective Glasse for the Revolters at Sea, and New Malignants at Land: Being a Letter sent from Sir Anthony St Leger, an Attendant on the Prince, to a person of Quality in Colchester (1648) Anon., The Copie of a Letter from a Commander in the Fleet with his Highnesse the Prince of Wales (1648) Anon., To the Right Honourable the Commons Assembled in Parliament: The Humble Petition and Representation of Divers Well-Affected Masters and Commanders of Ships (1648) Anon., A Bloudy Fight at Sea Disputed and Maintained by the Royall Navy (1648) Anon., The Sea-Mens Answer to the Motives Lately Alledged, to Draw Them from their Duty and Service to the Prince of Wales (1648) Anon., Motives to Engage the Sea-Men in this Honourable Cause (1648) Anon., Charles P. A Letter Sent from his Highness the Prince of Wales, to his Majesties Loyall and Faithfull Subjects Within the Realm of England (1648) Anon., The Declaration and Resolution of Robert Earle of Warwick (1648) Anon., A Declaration of his Excellency Robert E. of Warwick (1648) Anon., A Fight at Sea Two Ships Taken by Prince Charles his Officers (1648) Anon., Two Letters Containing all the Proceedings betwixt the Prince, and the E. of Warwick: a Fight at Sea, and a Fleet upon the Downs (1648) Anon., A Message Sent from his Highnesse the Prince of Wales, to the Citizens of London, on Thursday Novemb. 23 (1648) Anon., A Letter from the Navy vvith the Earle of Warwick, Lord Admiral, from Hellevoyt Sluice, Novemb. 24 (1648) Anon., The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers, and Seamen in the Shippes, Under the Command of the Right Honourable the Earle of Warwicke (1648) Anon., A Proclamation or Act by the Parliament of Scotland, for the Proclaiming of Charles Prince of Wales, King of Great Brittain, France, and Ireland … also the Remonstrance of the Navy (Edinburgh, 1648[/9]) Anon., The Resolution and Remonstrance of the Navie, to the Supream Power of England, the Commons Assembled in Parliament (1649) Anon., A Perfect Remonstrance and Narrative of all the Proceedings of the Right Honourable Robert, earl of Warwick … from the 29. of August, to the 25. of December, 1648 (1649) Anon., A Brief Relation of Some Affaires and Transactions, Civill and Military, both Forraigne and Domestique (1649) Anon., Gallant Newes from the Seas. Being a Relation of Certain Speeches made by Prince Charles, the Duke of Yorke, the Lord Montroße, Sea-men and Land-men (1649) Anon., A Great Victory Obtained by Prince Charles his Ships (1649) Anon., Joyfull Nevves from the Princes Fleet at Sea (1649) Anon., A Declaration of the Princes Navie, Concerning the Parliament of England and the Army (1649) Anon., Joyfull Nevves for the Citizens of London, from the Princes Fleet at Sea (1649) Anon., A Great Victory Obtained by Prince Charles (1649) Anon., A Great Fight in Ireland Between the Lord Lieut. Cromwels Forces and the Lord Inchequeens army (1649) Anon., A Bloudy Fight at Sea between the Parliament of England’s Fleet, Commanded by General Blague, and Prince Ruperts navie, neer Carthaginia Road, upon the Coast of Spain (1650) Anon., A History or Brief Chronicle of the Chief Matters of the Irish Warres (1650) Anon., A Great Victory God hath Vouchsafed by the Lord Generall Cromwels Forces Against the Scots (1651)

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bibliography 197 Haslock, John, A True and Perfect Relation of the Surrender of the Strong and Impregnable Garrison the Island of Scillie to Captain Batten Vice-Admirall of the Parliaments Navie at Sea (1646) Haslock, John, A Letter from Lysbone Directed to Captain Thomas Harrison (1650) Haward, L., A Continuation of the Diurnal Occurrences and Proceedings of the English Arms against the Rebels in Ireland from the First of Aprill (1642) Henrietta Maria, Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria: Including her Private Correspondence with Charles the First: Collected from the Public Archives and Private Libraries of France and England, ed. M. A. E. Green (1857) HMC, Fifth Report: Appendix, ed. J. Romilly and others (1878) HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix, Part I: The Manuscripts of his Grace the Duke of Portland, Preserved at Welbeck abbey, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell and others (9 vols, 1891–1923) HMC, Report of the Manuscripts of F.W. Leyborne-Popham, Esq., of Littlecote, Co. Wilts., ed. S. C. Lomas (1899) HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Duke of Ormonde, ed. F. Elrington Ball and C. Litton Falkiner (new series, 1902–20) HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont, ed. S. Lomas (1905–9) HMC, Report on the Franciscan Manuscripts Preserved at the Convent, Merchants Quay, Dublin, ed. G. D. Burtchaell and J. M. Rigg (1906) HMC, Report on the Pepys Manuscripts Preserved at Magdalene College, Cambridge, ed. E. K. Purnell (1911) Hogan, J., ed., Letters and Papers Relating to the Irish Rebellion between 1642–46 (Dublin, 1936) Hosmer, James Kendall, ed., Winthrop’s Journal ‘History of New England’, 1630–1649 (2 vols, New York, 1908) Hotham, John, More Joyfull Newes from Hull being the Happiest Tydings that Ever Came to London (1642) Hotham, John, A True and Exact Relation of all the Proceedings of Sir Hugh Cholmleys Revolt, Deserting the Parliament, and Going to the Queen, with the Regaining of Scarborough Castle (1643) Hunt, John, Most Joyfull Newes by Sea and Land (1642) Hyde, Edward, earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 1641, ed. W. Dunn Macray (6 vols, Oxford, 1888, repr. 1992) I. P., The Truest Intelligence from the Province of Munster in the Kingdome of Ireland (1642) Ireton, Henry, Sad Newes from Ireland (1651) Ireton, Henry, A Letter from the Lord Deputy General of Ireland (1651) Jones, Michael, Lieut: General Jones’s Letter to the Councel of State, of a Great Victory (1649) Journals of the House of Commons, 1547–1714 (1742) Journals of the House of Lords, 1578–1714 (1767) Knighton, C. S. and Loades, David, eds, The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I (Farnham, 2011) Knighton, C. S. and Loades, David, eds, Elizabethan Naval Administration (Farnham, 2013) Lardner, James, A Large Relation of the Fight at Leith Neere Edenburgh (1650) Laugharne, Rowland, A True Relation of the Late Successe of the Kings and Parliaments Forces in Pembroke-Shire Wherein the Great Victory against the Kings Forces in Wales by Major Generall Laughorne is Fully Related (1645) Leveck, Joseph, A True Accompt of the Late Reducement of the Isles of Scilly (1651) L. N., A True Narration of the Most Observable Passages, in and at the Late Siege of Plymouth (1644) [Lodge, John], ed., Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica: or a Select Collection of State Papers; Consisting of Royal Instructions, Directions, Dispatches, and Letters (2 vols, Dublin, 1772)

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198 bibliography Mainwaring, G. E., ed., The Life and Works of Henry Mainwaring (2 vols, 1920–2) McGowan, A. P., ed., The Jacobean Commissions of Enquiry, 1608 and 1618 (1971) McNeill, C., ed., The Tanner Letters: Original Documents and Notices of Irish Affairs in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Dublin, 1943) M’Enery, M. J., ‘A Diary of the Siege of Limerick Castle, 1642’, Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquities in Ireland, 34 (1904), pp. 163–87 Monck, George, A True Relation of the Last Great Fight at Sea (1653) Monck, George, and John Bourn, Two Letters from the Fleet at Sea Touching the Late Fight (1653) Monson, William, Sir William Monson’s Naval Tracts, ed. M. Oppenheim (5 vols, 1902–14) Murphy, Elaine, ed., A Calendar of Material Relating to Ireland from the High Court of Admiralty, 1641–1660 (Dublin, 2011) Navy Commissioners, The Answer of the Commissioners of the Navie, to a Scandalous Pamphlet (1646) O’Ferrall, B. and O’Connell, D., Commentarius Rinuccinianus, de Sedis Apostolicae Legatione ad Foederatos Hiberniae Catholicios per Annos 1645–9, ed. S. Kavanagh (6 vols, Dublin, 1932–49) Overton, Henry, More Plots Found Out, and Plotters Apprehended (1643) Parker, Martin, Saylors for my Money (1630?) Parliament, An Act for the Better Raising and Levying of Mariners (1641[/2]) Parliament, A Message from Both Hovses of Parliament … that the Earle of Warwick Might Command this Summers Fleet (1642) Parliament, Another Declaration of the Lords and Commons … and a Letter from the Earle of Warwick (1642) Parliament, An Ordinance for the Bettter [sic] Raysing and Levying of Marinors (1643) Parliament, Two Declarations of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament … that no Alehouse-Keeper or Other Person after the Beat of a Drum, Shall Harbor any Marriner or Seaman Belonging to the Fleet (1643) Parliament, A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament: Straightly Charging and Forbidding all In-Keepers, Victuallers, Alehouse-Keepers, or Other Persons Whatsoever, to Harbour or Entertain any Marriners, Sea-Men, Water-Men &c Prest into any of his Majesties or Merchants Ships Employed in this Service (1643) Parliament, A Declaration by the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, for the Speedy Setting Forth of a Fleet of Ships to Sea, for the Defence of the Kingdome (1643) Parliament, An Ordinance for the Bettter [sic] Raysing and Levying of Mariners, Saylers and Others (1643) Parliament, An Ordinance … for the Better Raising, Leavying, and Impresting of Mariners (1644) Parliament, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament; for the Better Raising, Leavying, and Impressing of Mariners, Saylers, and Others (1644) Parliament, A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Concerning the Reducing of the Late Revolted Ships (1648) Parliament, Declaratie van de Lords ende Commons, Vergadert in ’t Parliament, om de Gerevolteerde Schepen Wederom te Brenghen Onder de Gehoorsaemheyt van het Parliament (1648) Parliament, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Authorizing Robert Earl of Warwick Lord High Admiral of England, to Execute Marshal-Law (1648) Parliament, Act Touching the Regulating of the Officers of the navy and Customs (1649)

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212 bibliography Thrush, Andrew, ‘Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money’, in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 133–62 Underdown, David, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1971) Vallance, Edward, ‘Preaching to the Converted: Religious Justifications for the English Civil War’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 65 (2002), pp. 395–416 Vallance, Edward, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism and the Political Nation, 1533–1682 (Woodbridge, 2005) Van Ittersum, Martine Julia, ‘Mare Liberum versus the Propriety of the Seas? The Debate between Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and William Welwood (1552–1624) and its Impact on Anglo-Scotto-Dutch Fishery Disputes in the Second Decade of the Seventeenth Century’, Edinburgh Law Review, 10 (2006), pp. 239–76 Van Ittersum, Martine Julia, ‘Mare Liberum in the West Indies? Hugo Grotius and the Case of the Swimming Lion, a Dutch Pirate in the Caribbean at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century’, Itinerario, 31 (2007), pp. 59–94 Van Ittersum, Martine Julia, ‘Preparing Mare Liberum for the Press: Hugo Grotius’ Rewriting of Chapter 12 of De Iure Pradae in November–December 1608’, Grotiana, 28 (2007), pp. 246–80 Vieira, Monica Brito, ‘Mare Liberum vs Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on Dominion over the Seas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 64 (2003), pp. 361–77 Von Friedeburg, Robert, ‘The Continental Counter-Reformation and the Plausibility of the Popish Plots, 1638–1642’, in Charles W. A. Prior and Glenn Burgess, eds, England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited (Farnham, 2011), pp. 49–73 Walter, John, Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution (Cambridge, 1999) Walter, John, ‘Confessional Politics in Pre-Civil War Essex: Prayer Books, Profanations, and Petitions’, HJ, 44 (2001), pp. 677–701 Wanklyn, Malcolm, and Frank Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War (London, 2005) Waters, David W., The Art of Navigation in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times (Greenwich, 1978) Wheeler, J. S., ‘Logistics and Supply in Cromwell’s Conquest of Ireland’, in Mark Charles Fissel, ed., War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 38–56 Wheeler, J. S., ‘The Logistics of the Cromwellian Conquest of Scotland 1650–1651’, War and Society, 10 (1992), pp. 1–18 Wheeler, J. S., ‘Prelude to Power: The Crisis of 1649 and the Foundation of English Naval Power’, MM, 81 (1995), pp. 148–55 Wheeler, J. S., ‘Navy Finance, 1649–1660’, HJ, 39 (1996), pp. 457–66 Wheeler, J. S., Cromwell in Ireland (Dublin, 1999) Wheeler, J. S., ‘The Logistics of Conquest’, in Pádraig Lenihan, ed., Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland (Leiden, 2001), pp. 177–209 Wheeler, J. S., The Irish and British Wars, 1637–1654: Triumph, Tragedy and Failure (London, 2002) Williams, Mark R. F., The King’s Irishmen: The Irish in the Exiled Court of Charles II (Woodbridge, 2014) Winfield, Rif, British Warships in the Age of Sail 1603–1714: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates (Barnsley, 2009) Woolrych, Austin, Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660 (2nd edn, Oxford, 2004) Worth, R. N., History of Plymouth (Plymouth, 1871) Zaret, David, ‘Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution’, American Journal of Sociology, 101 (1996), pp. 1497–555

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bibliography 213 Unpublished Ph.D. theses Appleby, J. C., ‘English Privateering during the Spanish and French Wars, 1625–1630’ (2 vols, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1983) Blakemore, Richard J., ‘The London and Thames Maritime Community during the British Civil Wars, 1640–1649’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013) Dick, Bryan D., ‘“Framing Piracy”: Restitution at Sea in the Later Middle Ages’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2009) Kennedy, Donald, ‘Parliament and the Navy, 1642–1648: A Political History of the Navy during the Civil War’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1959) Lea-O’Mahoney, Michael, ‘The Navy in the English Civil War’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2011) Maples, Charles Thomas, ‘Parliament’s Admiral: The Parliamentary and Naval Career of Robert Rich, Second Earl of Warwick, during the Reign of Charles I’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Alabama, 1975) McCaughey, R., ‘The English Navy: Politics and Administration, 1640–1649’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ulster, 1983) McGowan, Alan, ‘The Royal Navy under the First Duke of Buckingham, Lord High Admiral 1618–1628’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967) Parsons, Sarah Mary, ‘Religion and the Sea in Early Modern England, c. 1580–1640’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2010) Thrush, Andrew, ‘The Navy Under Charles I, 1625–40’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1990)

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General Index

Aberdeen, 1 n.1, 40, 69–70, 168 Adventurers’ Act (1642), 42, 54 admiralty, 7, 30, 88, 108, 145 confederate, 89 n.31, 118–21, 174 parliamentarian, 62, 76–7, 82, 87–98, 105, 108 125, 127, 131–9, 144, 167, 189 see also letters of marque; privateers Adwalton Moor, battle of (1643), 62 Africa, 17, 87, 170 see also corsairs Agostini, Gerolamo (Venetian Ambassador), 109–10, 118 Alexis, Tsar of Russia, 154 Algiers, 16–18 allegiance, 96–7, 112–17 Allen, John, 38 Allin, Sir Thomas, 177n Amsterdam, 110, 111–112, 115–16 Andrews, Peter, 95–6 Anglo-Dutch War, First (1652–4), 4, 6–7, 171, 177 Anglo-Dutch War, Second (1665–7), 8, 177 Anglo-Dutch War, Third (1672–4), 8 Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604), 14–17, 19–20, 27–9 Anglo-Spanish War (1625–30), 15, 29 Antonio, Captain, 164 Antonio, Dom, Pretender to the Portuguese throne, 15 Antrim, Earl of see MacDonnell, Randal Archer, John, 44 Ardart (Kerry), 107 Arkinstall, Thomas, 99 Armada, Spanish (1588), 28 Arminius, Jacobus, 37 Army Plots (1641), 43 Athy (Kildare), 164

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Atlantic Ocean, 11, 15, 17, 19, 24, 32–3, 78–9, 160, 166, 170 Attawell, John, 98 Augier, René, 130, 133 Austen, Francis, 99 Ayr, 127, 171 Ayre, William, 116 Ayscue, Sir George, 75, 157, 169–70 Azores, 78, 167, 170 Ballyhack (Wexford), 53 Baltic, 15, 28 Baltimore (Cork), 17, 55 Bandonbridge (Cork), 55 Barbados, 79, 121, 154, 166, 169–70 Barbary, 132, See also corsairs Baron, Laurence, 119 Barry, Garret, 54 Barthen, Captain, 112 Bartlett, John, 45–6, 114 Bartlett, the pirate, 169 Bastwick, John, 37 Batten, William, 59, 69, 72, 74–5, 86, 88, 93, 95–6, 133–6 mutiny in the Downs (1648), 141–2, 145–7, 151 Beck, William, 59 Bedell, Thomas, 76, 124 Belfast, 44, 151, 160 Bence, Alexander, 87 Bence, Squire, 87–8 Bennyon, Charles, 99 Bermuda, 170 Berwick, 40 Berwick, Treaty of (1639), 40 Bilbao, 62 Bishops’ Wars (1638–40), 37–41

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Blackheath, 141 Blackwall, 42 Blake, Robert, 68, 157, 162–3, 166, 168 Blythe, Richard, junior, 96 Blythe, Richard, senior, 95–6 Boller, Richard, 106 Boswell, William, 77–8, 110 Boulogne, 131, 133 Bourke, Hugh, 56 Boyd, Thomas, 89 Boyle, Roger, 1st Baron Broghill and 1st Earl of Orrery, 58, 76, 89, 125 Bowden, Captain, 112 Bowen, John, 96 Bradshaw, Captain, 166 Bramble, Robert, 59 Brandley, Captain, 159 Bray, Captain, 73 Brentford, 59 Brereton, Sir William, 66 Brest, 164 Bridlington (Yorkshire), 60–1 Bristol, 58, 62–4, 74, 78, 79–82, 110, 113, 116, 121, 187 Bristol Channel, 17 Brittany, 32, 123 Broghill, Lord see Boyle, Roger Brograve, Andrew, 91 Brooks, Captain, 63, 96–7 Brookes, William, 96, see also Captain Brooks Buckingham, Duke of see Villiers, George Bunratty Castle, 76, 174, 176 Burke, Ulick, 5th Earl of Clanricarde, 54–5 Burrell, Andrewes, 92–3, 102, 104 Burrell, William, 30 Burough, John, 25 Burton, Henry, 37 Bushell, Browne, 116 Butler, James, 1st Marquis of Ormond and 1st Duke of Ormond, 75, 80–1, 112, 118, 125, 151, 156, 165 royalist commander in Dublin, 64–7, 131 see also Ormond Peace Byron, Sir John, 66 Cadiz, 28, 166 Cadiz, expedition to (1625), 29 Cadiz, raid (1587), 28 Cadiz, raid (1596), 28

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Cahir (Tipperary), 164 Calais, 131 Campbell, clan, 126–7 Canary Islands, 78–9, 156–7, 166, 170 Cape Blanco, 170 Cape Verde Islands, 78–9, 170 Capras (Dutch sailor), 126 Carberry, Earl of see Vaughan, Robert Cárdenas, Alonso de (Spanish Ambassador), 4 n.19 Caribbean, 8, 16, 20, 27–29, 78, 132, 170, 172, 177 Carisbrooke castle, 136 Carlingford (Louth), 159 Carlow, County, 122 Carlow town, 164 Carol, Jacques, 115 Carrickfergus, 39, 41, 44, 137, 151, 160, 166 Carteret, George, 38, 66, 75 Castle Cornet, Guernsey, 114 Castle Park fort, Kinsale, 115 Cater, Tracie, 69–70 Cavendish, William, Earl of Newcstlele, 61–3 Caverle, Jeronimo Cæsar de, 111 Cawson, Miles, 78–9 Cessation (1643), 65–6, 109 n.8, 110 Channel, Bristol, 17 Channel, English, 1 Channel Islands, 66, 154, 169 Channel, St George’s, 110, 150 Charles I, King, 2–4, 11, 62–71, 73–7, 79–81, 84–8, 91–2, 97, 100, 149, 172–5 execution of (1649), 152, 154 outbreak of the civil wars, 35–44, 46–60 naval affairs before 1642, 17, 25–6, 29, 30 n.115, 31–33 naval war effort, 108–17 Second Civil War, 129–30, 133–43, 146 see also privateers; Downs, mutiny in the Charles II, King, 75, 112, 114, 115, 127, 129–30, 154, 161, 165, 169, 177 commander of the revolted fleet (1648), 142–52 see also Downs, mutiny in the Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, 168 Chatham, 3, 50, 51, 89, 94, 99–100, 132, 136, 138, 153, 178 Chatham Chest, 103

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general index

Cheatham, George, 80 Cheshire, 66 Chester, 62, 70, 74, 167, 171 Cholmeley, Sir Hugh, 61 Christian IV, King of Denmark-Norway, 38, 82 Christina, Queen of Sweden, 133 Clarke, Robert, 74, 77 Clarke, William, 98 Clanricarde, Earl of see Burke, Ulick Clarendon, Earl of see Hyde, Edward Clonmel (Tipperary), 164 Coachman, Matthew, 96 Cordieu, James, 81 Colchester, 142, 148 Coleraine, 44, 151, 160 Connacht, 55 Constable, Captain, 54, 96 Constable, Robert, 96 Content, Joseph, 122 convoys, 41, 49, 79, 86, 112–13, 130, 133, 149–50, 163, 165, 167, 176, 187 Cooke, Thomas, 51–2, 99 Cooke, William, 98 Coppin, Captain, 81 Cork City, 44–5, 54, 55, 65, 73, 76, 137, 161 Cornwall, 63, 69, 74, 109, 120 corsairs, North African (Magharibi), 17–18, 31, 33, 61, 92, 177 Courtney, George, 54 Coytmore, Robert, 52, 90, 102, 156 Cranley, Benjamin, 96 Cranley, Richard, 88, 94, 98, 142 Cray, Richard, 48 Crispe, Sir Nicholas, 71, 111–12, 115 Cromwell, Oliver, 119–20, 123, 142, 153, 158–61, 164–5, 169, 172, 173- 8 Cromwell, Richard, 178 Crosse, John, 45 Crowther, John, 75, 94, 135, 137 Cunningham, Anna, marchioness of Hamilton, 39 Dalton, James, 120 Dankes, Captain, 60 Dansekar, Simon, 17 Danske, Ralph, 97, 115 Dare, Robert, 124 Dartmouth, 71, 74, 78, 109–11, 114 Davies, Elizabeth, 90

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Deal, 138, 144 Deane, Richard, 157, 158–60, 162, 167 deception (false flags), 79–82 Denman, Thomas, 145 Denmark, 6, 28, 38, 82 Deptford, 42, 89, 90–1, 138, 153 Devereux, Robert, 2nd Earl of Essex, 28 Devereux, Robert, 3rd Earl of Essex, 42, 69 Devon, 45, 63, 69, 74 Dieman, Adrian van, 115 Dick, Lewis, 186 Doe Castle (Donegal), 56 Dommer, Theodore, 112, 115 Dover, 3, 38, 118, 189 Dover Castle, 3 Downs, 1, 3, 7, 13, 40, 50, 52, 69, 113, 129, 133, 143–4, 146 battle of (1639), 1–3, 7, 13, 33, 174 mutiny in the (1648), 113, 129, 137–46 Drake, Sir Francis, 28–9 Drogheda, 44–6, 54, 57, 159, 160 Drummond, Sir Patrick, 41 Dublin, 44–6, 64–6, 68, 74–5, 81, 109–10, 113, 121, 131, 156–9 Dublin Castle, 44 Dunbar, battle of (1650), 165 Duncannon fort, 44, 53, 66, 68, 71–3, 164, 174 Dundee, 168 Dungeness, battle of (1652), 6 Dunkirk, 22, 30, 33, 41, 45, 56, 60, 62, 75, 110–11, 115, 122, 125–6, 131, 171 see also frigates Dutch Revolt (1568–1648), 15, 24, 31–2 Eales, John, 81 East India Company, 19, 91, 93, 95, 116, 142 Edinburgh, 37 Edward VI, King, 26 Eldred, John, 82 Elizabeth I, Queen, 7, 15–16, 24, 26, 28–9 see also Anglo-Spanish War Ellison, Christopher, 97 England, 24, 59–60, 64–9, 71, 75, 83, 110–12, 114, 120, 125–6, 129–31, 143–4, 150, 152–5, 158, 160, 163–4, 166, 168, 171, 173, 176 outbreak of the civil wars, 35–54 navy before 1642, 26–31 see also Anglo-Spanish War

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general index 217

Enos, Dr Walter, 120 Esmond, Thomas, Lord Esmond, 53, 68, 72 Essex, 95, 104 Essex, Earl of see Devereux, Robert Evelyn, John, 173 Exeter, 63, 74, 115, 174 Falmouth, 45, 71, 74–5, 110–12, 116, 176 false flags, see deception Fairfax, Sir Thomas, 74, 141–3, 165 Ferns, Nathaniel, 159 Fethard (Wexford), 164 Fiennes, William, 1st Viscount Saye and Sele, 92 Five Members, attempted arrest of (1642), 46–8 Flanders, 1, 22, 40, 54, 56, 77, 115, 117, 124–5 Flanders, Armada of, 27, 32 Florence, 28 Flushing (Vlissingen, Netherlands), 38, 55, 121, 123 Fogge, Captain, 52 Forbes, Alexander, Lord Forbes, 55 Fortescue, John, 99 Forth, firth of, 39, 41, 168 France, 14, 15, 26, 27, 29, 41, 54, 62, 77, 79, 80, 130–1, 133, 164, 170–172 Francis, Philip, 89 Freitas, Serafim de, 25 French, Patrick, 125 frigates, 27, 45, 66 Dunkirk, 22, 32, 56, 71, 81, 110–5, 117–27, 130–1, 150, 155, 159, 164, 166, 174 parliamentarian, 30, 76–7, 89–90, 124–5, 165, 171, 178 Gabbard, battle of (1653), 6 Galway city, 44–5, 54–5, 65, 79, 81, 124, 130, 164, 168, 171 Gardner, Captain, 171 Gerard, Charles, 67, 72–3 Glamorgan, Earl of see Somerset, Edward Gordon, George, 2nd Marquis of Huntly, 69–70 Goodlad, Nathaniel, 95 Gosfright, Andrew, 135 Grad, Thomas, 86 Graham, James, 1st Marquis of Montrose, 71, 126–7, 161, 165 Grand Remonstrance (1641), 43

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Grene, Giles, 87 Grotius, Hugo, 25, 32 Guadeloupe, 170 Guernsey, 114, 155, 169, 187, 189 Haesdonck, John van, 111–12, 115 Hague, the, 6, 110, 151 Hall, Edward, 134 Hall, John, 78, 165 Hamburg, 150 Hamilton, James, 3rd Marquis and 1st Duke of Hamilton, 39, 129, 143 Harrison, Brian, 94, 101 Harris, John, 107 Hatch, George, 94 Hay, John, 126 Heane, James, 150 Hein, Piet, 19 Hellevoetsluis, 148–51, 162 Hendes, Derrick, 126 Henin, Stephen de, 168 Henrietta Maria, Queen, 37, 60–1, 69, 133 Henry IV (of Navarre), King, 15 Henry VIII, King, 15, 26 Herman, William, 41 Hill, Elizabeth, 90 Hodges, Captain, 80 Holland, 4, 60, 113, 125, 143–4, 148–9, 161 Holy Roman Empire, 14 Hotham, Sir John, 58, 63 Hopton, Sir Ralph, 63, 109 Horsman, Thomas, 106 Hosier, Captain, 80 House of Commons, 46–7, 54, 114, 130, 134, 171 House of Lords, 43, 47, 72, 50, 103, 111, 114 Howard, Charles, 2nd Baron Howard of Effingham and 1st Earl of Nottingham, 15 Howard, Henry, Lord Mowbray and Maltravers, 62 Howett, Samuel, 71 Hudson, William, 139–40 Huguenots, 15, 28, 32 Hull, 50, 58, 62–3, 85, 109, 174 Huntly, Marquis of see Gordon, George Hutchins, Robert, 123 Hutchinson, Daniel, 121 Hyde, Edward, 1st Earl of Clarendon, 50, 108, 175

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218

general index

Ile de Ré, expedition to (1627), 29 impressment, 6, 66, 85, 100–2, 104, 132 Inchcolm, 39 Inchiquin, Baron of see O’Brien, Murrough Inchkeith, 39 Indian Ocean, 19, 20, 24, 25, 32, 33, 94 Inishboffin Island, 171 Ipswich, 120, 156 Ireland, 8–9, 16–17, 59–68, 70, 73–7, 79, 85, 104, 106–12, 114, 117–26, 129–31, 137, 150–1 Cromwellian conquest of (1649–53), 8, 11, 153–61, 163–4, 167, 170–2 outbreak of the civil wars in (1641–2), 36–7, 39–40, 43–8, 52–7 Ireton, Henry, 164, 168 Islands Voyage (1597), 29 Islay, 126 Isle of Man, 154, 169 Isle of Wight, 40, 136, 188 Jacobson, George, 81 Jamaica, 8 James, Duke of York, 143 James VI and I, King, 7, 14, 16, 24, 28–9, 90 João IV, King of Portugal, 161–2 Jersey, 66, 75, 115, 145, 170 Joachimi, Albert (Dutch Ambassador), 78, 146–8 Jones, Michael, 131, 159 Jordaine, Elias, 94, 145–8, 151 Jordan, Joseph, 96, 106 Julianstown, battle of (1641), 45 Keating, Richard, 126 Keating, William, 125 Keeling, Edward, 90–1 Kem, Samuel, 134–5, 138 Kendall, William, 171 Kent, 94, 138, 141–2, 148 Kent, uprising (1648), 138–42, see also Downs, mutiny in the Kettleby, Thomas, 53, 56, 59, 114, 132 Kilkenny city, 164 Killybegs, 45 King John’s Castle (Limerick), 54 Kinsale, 44–5, 53, 55, 57, 65, 76, 90, 115, 117, 137, 150 Prince Rupert at (1649), 154–8, 160–1 Kyme, Henry, 98

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Lamming, Roger, 134–5 Lands End, 81, 150, 188 Larkin, Daniell, 89 La Rochelle, 121 Laud, Archbishop William, 37, 42 Laugharne, Rowland, 67, 74, 137 law, maritime, 24–26, see also Hugo Grotius; sovereignty Lawson, Sir John, 177 n.19 Leatherland, Hester, 90 Le Havre, 28 Leigh (Essex), 95 Leith, 39, 165, 167 Lendall, Boatswain’s Mate, 139–40 Lenthall, William, 134 Lepanto, battle of (1571), 27 Leslie, Alexander, 1st Earl of Leven, 70 Leslie, David, 71 letter of marque (reprisal), 13–16, 70, 127, 164, 175, 176 confederate, 56, 62, 118–19, 122–4, 130, 175–6 parliamentarian, 47, 61–2, 104–6, 115, 175–6 see also privateers Leven, Earl of see Leslie, Alexander Ley, James, Earl of Marlborough, 78, 110–11 Liddall, Dennis, 90 Limerick city, 44–5, 53–4, 56–7, 60, 76, 164, 168 Lisbon, 161–3 Liverpool, 81, 126 Lizard, the, 55, 121, 150, 166 London, 17, 57, 59, 62–3, 72–3, 75–8, 109, 111, 114, 115, 133–4, 139, 141, 156, 162–4, 167, 176 blockade of (1648), 143–5, 148–9 naval administration, 84–9, 92–107, 136 outbreak of the civil wars, 43, 44, 46–54 shipping, 30, 61, 77, 80–2 London Bridge, 93 Londonderry, 44 Lostwithiel, battle of (1644), 69 Low Countries, 41, 46–52, 54, 56, 69 see also Netherlands; United Provinces Lowestoft, battle of (1665), 177 Lundy, 17, 75, 121 Lyme, 68–9, 85 Lynch, Anthony, 81

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general index 219

MacCarthy, Donough, Viscount Muskerry, 118 MacColla, Alasdair, 126–7 MacDonald, clan, 126–7 MacDonald, Coll Ciotach, 126 MacDonnell, Randal, 2nd Earl and 1st Marquis of Antrim, 39, 70, 112, 123–5 Madeira, 78, 166 Maghreb, 16–18, 31, see also Algiers; Morocco Maidstone, 141 Mainwaring, Sir Henry, 18 Mansell, Sir Robert, 17 Mansūr, Ahmad al, 16 Margate, 1 Mardijk, 131 Marlborough, Earl of see Ley, James Marmora, 18 Marston Moor, battle of (1644), 67, 69–70 Marten, Henry, 135 Mary I, Queen, 26 Maryland, 170 Massachusetts, 94 Maurice, Prince, 68–9, 162–3, 170 McAdam, Colonel, 76 Mehmed III, Ottoman sultan, 16 Mediterranean, 6, 15, 21, 22, 27, 32, 78, 157 pursuit of Prince Rupert, 162–3, 165–7, 177 Medway, 84, 138 Meldrum, Sir John71 Mennes, Sir John, 61, 114 Middleton, Captain, 122 Milford Haven, 58, 64, 67–8, 81, 137, 158, 160 Millar, Captain, 61 Milner, Gregory, 144 Mitchell, Andrew, 101 Monck, George, 168 Monro, Robert, 38, 137, 151 Monserrat, 170 Monson, Sir William, 16 Montrose, Marquis of see Graham, James Morocco, 16–17 Morris, Captain, 110 Morris, John, 88 Moulton, Robert, 68, 75–7, 93–4, 96

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Moyer, Captain, 63 Mucknell, John, 116 Munster, 17, 44, 53, 55, 68, 73, 76, 89, 125, 159–61 Murray, Sir David, 114 Muskerry, Viscount see MacCarthy, Donough Nantes, 45 Nantwich, 66 Naseby, battle of (1645), 73–4, 175 Navigation Act (1651), 8, 171 National Covenant (1638), 37–42 Netherlands, 24, 27, 77 see also Low Countries; United Provinces Netherlands, Spanish, 27 Nevill, John, 126 Newburn, battle of (1640), 41, 42 Newcastle, 26, 41, 56, 59–60, 70, 120, 146, 156 Newcastle, Earl of see Cavendish, William New England, 79 Newfoundland, 78–9 New Model Army, 134, 152 New Ross, 44, 65, 71–2, 160 Nieuwport, 115 Norfolk, 104 North Atlantic, see Atlantic Ocean North Sea, 25, 70, 71, 113, 189 Northumberland, Earl of see Percy, Algernon Norway, 28, 81, 127 Nottingham, 35 Nottingham, Earl of see Howard, Charles O’Brien, Murrough, 6th Baron of Inchiquin, 55, 68, 89, 125, 137–8 O’Daniel, John, 56 O’Hartegan, Mathew, 56 Oliver, Francis, 124 O’Neill, Owen Roe, 56 O’Neill, Sir Phelim, 44–5 ô Quouny, Patricke, 126 Ormond, Marquis of see Butler, James Ormond Peace, First (1646), 131 Ormond Peace, Second (1649), 118, 120 Ostend, 119, 122 Oquendo, Don Antonio de, 3 Oxford, 81, 82

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general index

Pacy, Richard, 81 Pacy, Thomas, 134 Palmer, Sir Henry, 50 Page, John, 122 Paulucci, Lorrenzo (Venetian Ambassador), 173 Parliament, Short (1640), 41–2 Pears, Gabriel, 81 Pembroke, 62, 67, 73, 142, 174 Pembrokeshire, 64, 68, 74, 85 Pennington, Sir John, 39, 40, 50, 64, 110, 113–14, 132n battle of the Downs (1639), 1–4, 13 Penn,William, 73, 76–7, 130, 142, 163, 166, 177 Penrose, Francis, 140 Penzance, 74 Peper, Mr, 139 Percy, Algernon, 10th Earl of Northumberland, 2–3, 45, 50, 88 Peters, Benjamin, 55 petitions, 46–9, 52, 87, 90, 99, 114–15, 129, 135–8, 140–3, 149, 152 Pett, Peter, 31, 88, 89, 94, 138 Pett, Phineas, 94 Philiphaugh, battle of (1645) 71 Philip II, King of Spain, 15 Philip IV, King of Spain, 41 Pill fort, Milford Haven, 67 Pine, John, 120 piracy, 13–20 Plunkett, Thomas, 74, 80, 97, 106, 116 Plymouth, 1, 40, 58, 79, 89, 120–1, 158, 162, 169–70, 174, 176 siege of (1643–6), 62–3, 69, 71, 74, 85, 92 Polhill, George, 79–80 Polhill, Nicholas, 61 Popham, Edward, 157, 162, 170 Portland Castle, 75 Portsmouth, 3, 41, 58–9, 90, 136, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 188 Portugal, 15, 19, 27, 160–3, 170 Povey, Captain, 40 Powell, Captain, 53 Poyer, John, 137 Preston, battle of (1648), 148 Preston, Thomas, 60, 72, 148 Price, Captain, 114 prisoners, 67–8, 158, 175 confederate, 103

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North Africa, 17, 87, 132 parliamentarian, 124 royalist, 114, 169 privateers, 11, 13–20, 25–6, 28, 30, 32–3, 35, 41, 49, 175 confederate, 55–6, 64–6, 71–2, 75, 82–4, 117–26, 130–1, 150, 154–6, 159–60, 164, 175–6, 178 parliamentarian, 61–2, 70, 74, 91–3, 95, 97, 100, 104–7, 130 royalist, 71, 77–9, 84 n.3, 110–16, 132, 145, 166, 168–9, 170–1 Scottish, 126–7 Providence Island colony, 50 Prynne, William, 37 Pym, John, 42, 48n Rainborowe, Thomas, 63, 114, 135–42 Rainborowe, William, 17, 94 Ratcliff, 42 Rathmines, 158 Rich, Robert, 2nd Earl of Warwick, 49, 62–3, 68–9, 72, 78, 81, 109–111, 114, 137, 156, 188 outbreak of the civil war, 42, 47, 50–53 naval administration, 65–6, 85–88, 90–102 privateering ventures, 20, 50, 106 n.149 Second Civil War (1648), 140, 142–52 Richelieu, Cardinal, 24, 32 Rinuccini, Giovanni Battista, 74, 125 Ripon, treaty of (1640), 41 Roberts, James, 82 Roch, Captain, 122 Rochester, 52, 138 Rocknell, Thomas, 99 Rooth, John, 125 Rossitor, John, 121, 125 Rosslare fort (Wexford), 159–60 Rotherhithe, 42, 94 Roundway Down, battle of (1643), 63 Rupert, Prince, 112–14, 126, 151–2, 155, 170–2, 177 n.19 at Kinsale (1649), 117, 154–8, 161 at Lisbon (1649–50), 161–3 captures Bristol (1643), 63–4, 74 in the Mediterranean (1651), 165–6 Ryder, Clement, 122 Rye, 41

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general index 221

St Augustine’s fort (Galway), 54–5, 65 St Leger, Anthony, 148 St Malo, 45, 66, 131 St John, Oliver, 42 Salcombe (Devon), 45 Salé, 17 Salé, expedition to (1637), 17, 94 Sandwich, 135 Scandinavia, 15 Scarborough, 61, 71, 116, 120 Scarborough Castle, 71 n.83 Scheveningen, battle of (1653), 4, 5, 6–7, 10, 155 Scilly Isles, 75, 169–70, 177 Scotland, 30, 56, 75, 91, 108, 112, 126–7, 154, 171–2 Cromwellian conquest of, 8, 11, 161, 165, 167–8, 176 navy (before 1603), 14–16, 26–8 outbreak of the civil wars, 2, 11, 35–41, 44–5, 52 parliamentarian alliance, 69–71, 75, 130 see also privateers ‘Sea Adventure’ (1642), 54–6, 104 Selden, John, 25–6 Self-Denying Ordinance (1645), 72, 87, 97 Seven Years’ War (1563–70), 28 Severn, River, 74, 187 Shannon, River, 56, 76, 164, 168 Shee, Father, 62 Sheeres, Henry, 82 Sherwin, Captain, 166 Ship Money, 31, 33, 36, 38, 42, 91 Shipwrights’ Hall, 90 Smith, Brian, 53 Smith, Robert, 81 Smith, Solomon, 95 Smith, Thomas, 3, 88, 94 Smith, William, 64, 68, 72–3, 117 Slingesby, Robert, 41, 114 Skippon, Philip, 69 Solemn League and Covenant (1643), 65, 68–71, 86–7, 108, 126–7, 132, 137 n.60, 145, 164, 175–6 Somerset, 69, 74 Somerset, Edward, Earl of Glamorgan, 77 sovereignty, maritime, 1, 4, 11, 13, 24–6, 32–3, 40, 86, 133, 174 see also maritime law

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Spain, 33, 49, 51, 59, 105, 111, 112, 157, 177 naval forces, 27–32 see also Anglo-Spanish War Sparks, Robert, 113 Spencer, Thomas, 139–40 Springham, John, 135 Stafford, John, 125 Stampe, William, 48 Stansby, John, 96 Star Chamber, 36, 42 States General, Dutch, 6, 25, 110 Steele, Bellendia, 96 Stepney, 42, 48–50, 103 Stradling, Sir Henry, 53, 56, 59, 114 Strafford, Earl of see Wentworth, Thomas Straits, the, 157, 161 Strickland, Walter, 110–11 Stutfield, Captain, 46, 48–9, 103 Suffolk, 6, 104 Sunderland, 70 Swanley, George, 93 Swanley, Richard, 59, 60 n.10, 67–8, 72–3, 82, 85, 93–6, 99, 142 Swanley, William, 93, 96 Sweden, 28 Tagus, River, 162–3 Taylor, Captain (Nicholas), 79 Taylor, Master, 82 Teeling, Michael, 121 Tenby, 67, 73, 143 Texel, 6–7, 60n Thames, River, 38, 47, 59, 89, 107, 116, 165, 188 blockade of (1648), 138, 143–8 Thomas, Captain, 71 Thomas, William, 76–7, 79, 96, 106 Thomson, Maurice, 87, 95 Tilbury, 138, 148 Todd, John, 70 Toomes, William, 51–2 Toulon, 163, 166 Tower of London, 25, 43 Tapp, John, 93 Trenchfield, Thomas, 94–5 Trinity House, Deptford, 42, 88, 90–8, 100, 102, 104, 107, 143, 146, 153 Tromp, Maarten Harpertszoon, 1–4, 7, 169, 177 Tweedy, Roger, 88

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general index

Ulster, 37, 39, 44–6, 70, 126, 137, 151 United Provinces, 31, 33, 78 see also Netherlands; Low Countries Vanderkipp, Antonio Nicholas, 112, 124, 159–60 Vandermarche, Antonio, 125 Vane, Sir Henry, junior, 88 Vassall, Samuel, 87–8 Vaughan, Robert, Earl of Carberry, 64, 67 Venables, Robert, 159 Venice, 15, 27, 28, 112 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 6, 19, 25 Villiers, George, Duke of Buckingham, 20, 29–31 Virginia, 154, 170 Vooren, Daniel van, 122, 125–6 Wake, Sir Baldwin, 66–7, 110, 114 Wales, 46, 96 n.90, 110, 158, 176 royalist advances (1643–5), 64–8, 72–5, 83 Second Civil War (1648), 137–8, 142–3 Walkey, WIlliam, 70 Walle, Jacques Vander, 115 Waller, Sir William, 63 Ward, John, 17 Warwick, Earl of see Rich, Robert Waterford, 66, 76–7, 150, 160, 164, 176 1641 Rebellion, 44–5 privateer base, 71–2, 75, 119–26, 130 see also privateers Watermen’s Hall, London, 42 Webster, John, 110 Welwood, William, 25 Welsh, John, 126

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Wentworth, Thomas, 1st Earl of Strafford, 36–37, 39, 41–2 West Indische Compagnie (Dutch), 19, 136 Westminster, 46–7, 148 Abbey, 170 Wexford, 60, 77, 82 1641 Rebellion, 44–5 privateer base, 56–7, 75, 118–26, 130, 158–60, 176 see also privateers Weymouth, 71, 112, 120, 150, 169 Wheeler, Abraham, 96–7 Whetcombe, Tristram, 57 Whetstone, Captain, 78 White, Peter, 132 Whitehall, 43 Whitelocke, Bulstrode, 69 Windebank, Sir Francis, 38, 40 William I, Prince of Orange, 15 Williams, Reeve, 130 Willoughby, Captain, 54, 131 Willoughby, Francis, 5th Baron Willoughby, 170 With, de Witte, 6 Witt, Nicholas de, 116 Wolfe, Francis de, 115 Woolwich, 89 Worcester, battle of (1651), 166, 169 Yarmouth, 120, 122 Yorkshire, 61 Youghal, 44, 65, 73, 137, 161 Young, Anthony, 119 Zachary, Captain, 78 Zeeland, 6

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Index of Ships

Abraham, 60 Adventure (1646), 76, 119, 123–4, 131, 158, 178 Adventure of London, 121 Alice of Londonderry, 70 Andrew, 162n Angel Keeper of Waterford, 119–20 Angell, 86, 87 Ann (1644), 78 Ann (Letter of marque), 61 Anne, 189 Anne and Joyce, 73 Antelope, 40, 113, 142 Assurance (1642), 61 Assurance (1646), 76, 150, 182 Blackmoor Lady, 160 n.43 Blessing of Leith, 127 Bonaventure, 44, 53, 57, 59, 93, 135, 143, 150–180 Bonaventure (Rinuccini), 124 Cambria galley, 130 Cat, 130 Charity, 81 Charles, 60n, 116 Clement of Wexford, 119 Commonwealth, see Sovereign of the Seas Concord, 168 Confidence, 45, 64, 68, 109 Constance of Yarmouth, 65 Constant Good Hope, 86 Constant Reformation, 49, 113, 139–40, 160 n.43, 163, 167 Constant Warwick, 81, 113, 151, 168 n.94

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Convert, 168 n.94 Convertine, 113, 160 n43, 168 n.94 Cornelius of Wexford, 118, 122, 125 Couronne, La, 22 Crescent, 67, 67 n.57, 113 Discovery of London, 74, 80, 106 n.149 Discovery (merchant), 53 n.100 Dolphin, 165 Dolphin of Wexford, 121 Dragon, 77, 119, 150, 164 Dreadnought, 38, 99 Duncannon frigate, 71, 73 Eighth Whelp, 70 Elizabeth (1647), 77, 150 Elizabeth of Newcastle, 13 Elizabeth of Limerick, 45 Elsabeth, 82 Elsabeth and Ann of London, 113 Employment, 53 n.100, 54 Engelen, 22 Esperanze, 106 Expedition, 40, 75, 142 Fairfax, 166 Falcon, 114, 125, 131 Fellowship, 13, 64, 70, 168 Fellowship of Bristol, 53, 113, 117 First Whelp, 41 Foresight, 167 Fortune of Dunkirk, 62, 89 Fortune of Queensferry, 38 Fortune Pynk, 188 Fox, 168 n.94 Francis of Rotterdam, 53 Francis of Wexford, 122

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index of ships

Galliot hoy, 168 n.94 Garland, 52, 165 George, 94 Globe, 73, 75, 131 Grande Françoise, 22 Great Lewis (1645), 68, 72, 162 n.55 Great Lewis (1649), 162 n.55 Great Michael, 27 Greyhound, 38, 122 Guift, 132 Happy Entrance, 41, 44, 73 Hare of Wexford, 118 Harp, 125 Hart, 64, 113, 119, 165 Hector, 81, 168 Henrietta Maria, 40, 58 Henry Grace à Dieu, 22 Hercules, 63, 162 n.55 Hind, 113, 168 n.94 Hope of Amsterdam, 121 Hopewell (royalist), 116 Hopewell (parliamentarian), 189 Hopewell of London, 121, 130 Hunter, 81, 168 n94 James and Hercules of Plymouth, 162 n.55 Jennett, 80 Jeremy, 82 Jocelyn, 70, 74, 117 John, 80 John (merchant), 53 n.100 John Baptist of Waterford, 119 John of Hamburg, 122 John of Le Croisic, 53 John of London, 79, 116 John of Plymouth, 62 Jonathan of Southampton, 121 Jules, 163 Leopard, 38, 41, 44, 67 n.57 Leopard (merchant), 67 n.57 Liberty, 165 Lion, 63, 136, 143 Lion of Fairlie, 41 Little President, 168 n.94 Lorne, 80 Love, 144–5 Love’s Increase, 65 see also St Patrick of Ross

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Magdalen, 80 Magdalene, 73 Margaret of Milton, 81 Maria, 22 Mary, 40, 53n, 70, 160 n.43 Mary and Dorothy, 122 Mary and John of Wexford, 118, 121, 125, 126 Mary Conception of Wexford, 119 Mary Consolation of Waterford, 123 Marygould of Shoreham, 62 Mary Magdalen, 119 Mary of Antrim, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 130 Mary of London, 69–70 Mary of the Isles, 119, 124, 130 Mary Rose, 40, 41, 94, 96 Mary Virgin of Wexford, 123, 150 Mayflower, 168 n.94 Merchant, 162 n.55 Mermaid, 130 Michael, 22 Mirror of Dunkirk, 119 Naseby, 173 Neptune, 112 Nicholas (Captain Bray), 73 Nicholas (Captain Taylor), 79 Nonsuch, 77, 131, 150, 167, 182 North Holland, 71 Orange Tree, 127 Paradox, 160 Paramour, 122 Patrick of Waterford, 119, 124, 150 Patrick of Ross, 124 Pennington, 55 Pelican, 113, 167 Peter, 53 n.100 Peter of Rotterdam, 121 Phenix, 81 Phoenix, 77, 150, 162, 168 n.94 Phoenix (pinnace), 45, 46 Postillian of St Malo, 81 Portsmouth frigate, 168 President, 159, 166 Prince, 99 Prosperous, 189 Providence, 44, 64, 97, 150, 168 n.94 Providence (merchant), 44n, 67 n57

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Rainbow, 39, 40 Recovery, 165 Resolution, 162 n.55 Revenge, 189 Ruth, 53 n.100, 54 Rotterdam, 59 Rottordam, 188 St Clara of Waterford, 119 St Francis (Vanderkipp), 124 St Francis of Dunkirk, 56, 118, 121 St John of Waterford, 126 St John of Wexford, 120, 122 St Joseph, 124 St Michael of Waterford, 164 St Michael of Wexford, 121, 123 St Michael the Archangel, 62 St Patrick of Ross, 65 n.44 St Patrick of Wexford, 62, 118 St Peter (1645 prize), 89 St Peter of Dunkirk, 56, 123 St Peter of Waterford, 120, 122, 124 St Teresa, 158 St Ursula, 125 Sallutation, 91 Salvator, 112 Sampson, 130 Samuel, 75 Samuel (merchant), 150 Sao João, 22 San Pietro, 125 Satisfaction, 113, 159, 162 n.55 Second Whelp, 40

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index of ships 225 Solomon, 61 Sovereign of the Seas, 22, 31, 94, 166, 173 Speaker, 166 Spy, 61 Star, 115 Stora Kravelen, 22 Success, 171 Swallow, 53, 57, 59, 67, 113, 140, 160, 163, 166 Swan, 45, 64, 68, 74, 109, 113–14, 117 Swiftsure, 94, 168, 178 Tenth Whelp, 112, 168 n.94 Third Whelp, 39 Thomas of Ely, 89 Three Blackmores of Flushing, 121, 123 Tiger, 77, 119, 124, 150 Triumph, 160 Truelove, 168 n.94 Unicorn, 40, 99 Unity of Cork, 45 Vanguard, 40, 94 Vasa, 22 Victory, 95, 160 Warspite, 130 Warwick, 71 Warwick hoy, 99 William and Ralph, 94 William and Thomas of Dover, 118 William and Thomas of Liverpool, 41 Worcester, 165

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CMYK

156mm

RICHARD J. BLAKEMORE is a Lecturer in the History of the Atlantic World at the University of Reading. ELAINE MURPHY is a Lecturer in Maritime/Naval History at the University of Plymouth and author of Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653 (Boydell Press, 2012). Front cover: detail from Cornelis Claesz van Wieringen, A Dutch Merchantman Attacked by an English Privateer, off La Rochelle, 1616 (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

An imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620--2731 (US)

20mm

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156mm

234+6mm

The civil wars in England, Scotland and Ireland in the period 1638– 1653 are usually viewed from the perspective of land warfare. This book, on the other hand, presents a comprehensive overview of the wars from a maritime perspective. It considers the structure, organisation and manning of the parliamentarian, royalist, and Irish confederate navies, discussing how these changed over the course of the wars. It also traces the development of the wars at sea, showing that the initial opting for parliament by seamen and officers in 1642 was a crucial development, as was the mutiny and defection of part of the parliamentarian navy in 1648. Moving beyond this it examines the nature of maritime warfare, including coastal sieges, the securing of major ports for parliament, the attempts by royalists to ship arms and other supplies from continental Europe, commerce raiding, and the transportation of armies and their supporters in the invasions of Scotland and Ireland. Overall the book demonstrates that the war at sea was an integral and important part of these dramatic conflicts.

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