The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy 9780773595248

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Introduction
PART I: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL
1: Canada in the World
2: Canadian External Policies Since 1945
3: Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?
4: Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy
5: The Public and Foreign Policy
PART II: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
1: International Co-operation - The Hard Way
2: Peacekeeping and the Security Function of the United Nations
3: The Politics of Independence
PART III: THE COMMONWEALTH
1: The Commonwealth and the United Nations
2: The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: A Mood of Exasperation
3: The Future of the Commonwealth
PART IV: THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
1: The Atlantic Community: Unity and Reality
2: Alliance and Independence
PART V: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
1: The Relationship in Alliance and World Affairs
2: Growing Independence in Canadian-American Relations
3: The American Problem
PART VI: THE PACIFIC AREA
1: Canada's Involvement in the Pacific Area
2: Canada and China
3: Canada's Task in Indochina
PART VII: THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
1: Canada and Pan America
Note On The Author

Citation preview

THE BETTER

PART OF VALOUR:

ESSAYS ON CANADIAN DIPLOMACY

THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR:

Essays on Canadian Diplomacy

JOHN W. HOLMES

The Carleton Library No. 49 McClelland and Stewart Limited Toronto / Montreal

© McC lelland and Stewart Limited, 1970 AT,L RIGHTS RESERVED

The Canadian Publishers McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 374

Printed and bound in Canada by T. H. Best Printing Company Limited

THE CARLETON LIBRARY A seri es of Canadian reprints and new collections of source material relating to Canada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute of Canadian Studies of Carleton University, Ottawa. DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE

Pauline Jewett GENERAL EDITOR

Robert L. McDougall EDITORIAL BOARD

Carman Bickerton (History) Michae l S. Whi ttington (Politica l Science)

H. Edward English (Economics) Gordon C. Merrill (Geography) Bruce A. McFarlane (Soci%gy) Wilfrid Eggleston (Journalism) Robin S. Harris (Education)

Contents INTRODUCTION, PART I:

I: 2: 3: 4: 5:

vii

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL

Canada in the World Canadian External Policies Since 1945 5 Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship? Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy 28 The Public and Foreign Policy 44

16

PART II: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION I : International Co-operation - The Hard Way 58 2: Peacekeeping and the Securi ty Function of the United Nations 65 3: The Politics of Independence 79

PART III: THE COMMONWEALTH

I: The Commonwealth and the United Nations 2: The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis:

A Mood of Exasperation 103 3: The F uture of the Commonwealth

89

113

PART IV: THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY I: The Atlantic Community : Unity and Reality 2: Alliance and Independence 132

123

PART V: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

I: The Relationship in Alliance and World Affairs 2: Growing Independence in Canadian-American Relations 166 3: The American Problem 180 PART VI: THE PACIFIC AREA

I: Canada's Involvement in the Pacific Area

2: Canada and China 201 3: Canada's Task in Indochina

218

PART VII: THE W ESTERN HEMISPHERE

1: Canada and Pan America NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

227

241

190

143

Introduction

"The better part of valour is discretion" - I realize that I invite calumny in citing Falstaff as a patron of Canadian diplomacy. To many critics Don Quixote would, no doubt, be more appropriate. The lusty English knight did, however, possess certain capacities essential to diplomats: to charm and to COD. There was a credibility gap between bis bold words and his discreet performance, whereas Canadian diplomatists are usually condemned for the quietness of their words as well as of their performance . Falstaff did, however, know enough to avoid getting killed when the fight was not worth it, and this unheroic preoccupation of good diplomats in the age of megamurder deserves more praise than it gets. We need heroic ideas and heroic deeds in both domestic and foreign policy, but they are best left to engineers and politicians. The diplomat's primary responsibility is to "cool it." It is not to preserve the status quo; if he thinks so, be will be soon blasted. His function is to negotiate the adjustment and ease the pain of it. I am well aware that the pain and the blood of revolution seem essential for the purgation of saciety to many well-intentioned young people, but I think they are dead wrong. Discretion in diplomacy is not incompatible with boldness of initiative in foreign policy or even with dramatic moves in international politics. The discretion is in the calculation of the issues at stake and the forces which can be mustered. Above all it lies in the recognition of contradiction and the acceptance of paradox. George Kennan said in 1944, of Americans and Russians, "The American mind will not apprehend Russia until it is prepared philosophically to accept the validity of contradiction. It must accept the possi bility that just because a proposition is true, the opposite of the proposition is not false." This is a wisdom which Canadians might well ponder when tbey contemplate the foreign policies of their country. A sound fore ign policy must be based on an acceptance of paradox. This is true for great powers, but it is especially true for a middle power whose reach ought not to exceed its grasp. However exasperating and however irksome, there is no escaping considerations on the one hand and considerations on the other, even when they are not reconcilable. The CODstant contemplation of paradox can produce hyp-

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THE BETTER PART

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VALOUR

oasis. The besetting sin of diplom ats, a nd ex-diplomats, is creeping paralysis. According to Canada's most brilliant critic of diplomacy, Professo r James Eayrs, "The foreign service officer is a nay-sayer in statecraft, th e abom inable no-man of diplomacy." The besetling si n of professors is exagge ration, but I have learned that it is wise to look for a valid point at the basis of th ei r overstated cases, especially Professo r Eayrs's. The views contained in th is volume are those of a so metime foreign service officer and a part-tim e professor, a nd the discretion is no doubt exaggerated. I would insist nevert heless that although it is the responsibility of the diplomat to think constructi vely, it is his duty to warn his governmen t of the consequences of whatever actions they propose. The opposite of a nay-sayer is a yes-man. The most baffling paradox in Canadian foreign policy is that, gi ven the international commu nit y in which it operates, it is more likely to be effective if it is carefull y calculated, but a carefull y calc ulated approach to foreign policy strikes no spark in a zealous and imagi native people. The difficulties in the way of bold initiatives raised by the professionals may be attributed to th eir ine rtial conservatism, and sometimes should be. However, when one gets down to cases, to the art and craft of the possible, it is usuall y less easy to wa ive their objections merely on principle. It would help enormo usly if diplomats a nd citizens would learn to respect each other's legitimate functions in the making of foreign policy, because they are distinct. There is an essential place in the making of foreign policy for loud adyocacy,loud praise, or loud in vecti ve; and there is a place for quiet diplomacy. The public has a ri ght to know, and the government has an obli gation to keep intern ational confidences. There are few tenable absolutes. In approaching fore ign policy my own disposition is to favour Raymond Aron's doctrine of "prudence," but I realize that the word, in E nglish, is enough to damn it. Th e first duty - political but also moral- is to see international relations lor what th ey are, so that each state, legitimately preoccupied with its own inlerests, will not be entirely blind to the interests of others . ... In this uncertain battle, in which the qualifications of the participants are not eqtdvafent, but in which it is rare that One of them has done absolu tely no wrong, the best conduct is that dictated by prudence. To be prudent is to act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data, and not in accordance with some system or out 01 passive obedience to a norm or pseudo-norm; it is to prefer the limitation of

lNTRODUCTION -

ix

violence to the pUllishmem 0/ the presumably guilty party or to a so-called absolute justice; it is to establish concrete accessible objectives cOllforming to the secular Jaw of illlefllational relations and 1I0t to limitless alld perhaps m eaningless objectives, such as "a world safe for democracy" or "a world from which power politics will have disappeared."l

It is not a philosop hy to stir the blood, although it seems to me more exciting than reading the works of Chairman Mao all day, wh ich is what the world's most revolutionary revolutionaries do to work themselves up. There are too many mass hysterias building up , and perhaps it is one of the obligations of a middle power to induce its citizens to remain at middle temperature. It may be ingenuous, of course, for those of my generation who see k to be prudent pragmatists to claim that we are not act ing "in accordance with some system. " T he charge against us is that, consciously or unconsciously, we are uph olding the system. It is an accusat ion we should not ignore, although I confess that it is difficult for anyone who has been involved in the crosscurrents of policy-making to believe that the system is much of a sys tem. It might be advisable for the young and impatient to regard tpese essays on various aspects of Canadian foreig~ policy as historical - as period pieces, perhaps; evidences of corruption. They were written during the past decade and they reflect attitudes accumulated largel y during the period after the Second \\forld War when Canada emerged from self-imposed isolation into a gidd y experience of world diplomacy. The Canadian approach to an international role was exceedingly pragmatic. Both sc holars and diplomats have been groping their way to genera li zat ions about the nature and scope of Canadian foreign policy, based inevitably on what it has been. The foreign policy of a state needs continuous re-examination, but, if tested principles are to be discarded, it should be on the ground that they no longer are or never were valid, rather than just that they are tiresome. There is nothing so insistently tiresome and persiste ntly wise as the injunction not to drive if you drink. This is an assembly of occasional pieces, not a rounded dissertation on Ca nadi an foreign policy. It has gaps. Some of its inconsistencies may be attributed to changes of perspective over the years and so me to the varying audiences confronted. The style shifts in accordance with the age, nationality, and the degree of sophistication or inebriation of the audience. One does 1

Raymond Aron, Peace and War; A Theory o/ International Relations (Garden City, 1966), pp. 584-5.

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THE. BETTER PART OF VALOUR

not use the same language in a learned journal as one does to resuscitate an audience after port. Anyone who reads the book from cover to cover will be pained by the repetition of themes, but the assump tion bas been that this kind of dogged readi ng wou ld be exceptional, and that each piece should stand on its owo. There has been so me editing and abbreviation of the original text but, as ide from the addition of occasional footnotes, there was no attempt to upd ate the perspective. We need vehement tracts about Canadian fore ign policy, but th is is not intended to be one. The purpose is largely description rat her than presc ription. It is intended as an analysis rather th an a jus tification of Ca nadian policy. To state, for example, that consideration is norma lly give n by ou r governments to the repercussions of our external policies on the economic policies of Washington is not to argue that this is r ight or wrong. Some justification of the analytical method unfortunately seems necessary at a time when objectivity is misunderstood. This is not to deny, of course, that analysis is abandoned from time to time in these pages in favour of prescription. Beneath the skin of every Canadia n there lurks a missionary. I am grateful to Professor Robert McDougall and Carleton University for encouraging me to pull these pieces togeth er, and, in particular, to R. A. MacKay, Peyton Lyon, and Mrs. Wendy Jones for critical comment. The initial editing was done by Mrs. Jane Schoeffel; the final editing was done by Mrs. Sally Wismer and Mrs. Marion Magee; and the manuscript was prepared by M iss Gayle F raser - a triumph of fou r meticulous young lad ies over a disorderl y author. F inall y, I wo ul d like to ded icate th is book to the memo ry of my mentors in diplomacy, HUME WRONG (1 894- 1954) and NORMAN ROBERTSON (1904-1968) , who, by their wisdom a nd human ity, inspired the finest traditions in Canadian dip lomacy. w . HOLMES Toronto, April, 1970

JOHN

Part One: Canadian Foreign Policy - General

1: Canada in the World Voltaire said several things about Canada, none of them very Battering. His most interesting comment on what he obv iously considered a distasteful subject was, in my opinion, "J'aime rnieux la paix que Ie 'Ca na da." It is a phrase that haunts me because Voltaire was obviously right. Although I would defend Canadian nationalism - and the existence of Canada - as healthy forces in internat ional relations, I too would say that peace is more important than Ca nada. I think 1110St Canadians would agree that the preservation and promotion of a peaceful and prosperous world has for them a higher priority than the defence of Canadian sovereignty. We Canadians - most of us, at leastplace a high va lue on the continuing existence of a country to which we are emotionally attached, which assures us of a standard of li ving second only to that of the United States and a higher standard of personal freedom than is enjoyed by citizens of the United States or most other countries. Its mere existence is not, however, the ultimate value. And that is why it is hard to define the aims of Canadian foreign policy in conventional terms. The traditional first priority of a country's foreign policy has been to defend to the death its sovereignty and its territory. Canadians would , as in the past, die to preserve their liberties; but we are not likely to see this action as standing on guard over our borders in the classic sense. In diplomacy - both political and economic - we must and we do advocate and defend the interests of our population and ou r sovereignty, but we know that we cannot flourish or even survive as an autarky. We are more dependent on foreign trade than almost any other country. In all aspects of our economy, from the value of our currency to the \vages of our workers, international factors, and not just continental factors, predominate. We have never fou ght a war on Our own, and we think of ourselves rather as participants in alliances or international operations. Our debates have been over whom, if anybody, we should be allied with. The truth, I think, is that Canadians do not think of their country as being SOURCE : First delivered in French at a colloqlle at Ccrisy-la-Salle, Normandy. July. 1968, "Canada in the World" has now appeared in Le Canada au seuil du siec/e de I'abondance (Montreal: Editions HMH, 1969) under the title "Le Canada et Ie monde."

2 -

THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR

exposed or vulnerable and. r ightl y or wrongly. find it hard to believe anybody wou ld a ttack Canada as a primary target. Such interests and attitudes do not make fo r a stron gly nationalist foreign policy. The predominant instinct is internationalist; but the situation also enco urages both isolationism and neutralism. We have, at prese nt, a strongl y independe ntist school of thought among the young and those left-of-centre. Even this attitude, however, is essentially internationalist. It is concerned with loosening existing ties of alliance, parti cularly with the Uni ted States. Its aim. however. is not to isolate Ca nada but to have Ca nada playa more active part on a wider world scene - especially in relation to the Third World. All th is may sound very obvious and not pa rticularly distinctive. All countries increa si ngl y feel their interdependence. Canada, however, is uniquely an international country - in its lack of a strong and single-minded national ism ; in its specific bi-nationalism (I am not afraid of the term because I think the nation-state is more likely to be a reactiona ry form); in the composition of its population ; and io the assortment of its internationa l ties and associations. Our national identity is to be found in our internationalism. We glory in our di vers ity and in what we like to think of as our rejection of an American-style ideal of the all-Canadian type with a nationalist emphasis on conformity. In stressing the strong internationalist nature of our foreign policy. I want to avoid sou nding unbearab ly self-righteous. We have always considered the United Nations our first priority, and for very good reasons. There we can playa role of our own · and try. not without frustrations. of course. to achieve the international agreements which for tify the world struct ure in which we flourish best. There also we ca n, througb flexible and shifting alliances witb other powers. pursue our aims by international collaboration while avoiding restricting ali gnments. It is only fair also to add that. unlike some otber count ries, Canadians have not suffered rebuke or interference by th e United Nat ions. There is nothing particularly high-minded or unselfish about a strongly internationalist policy on the part of a country that so obviously cannot protect its people and its interests except in collaboration with others. It is inevitable that a country such as Canada. relatively new on the world scene, uneasy about its identity. neither homogeneous nor ripe as a state, should seek a role in world affaifs. One notes a preoccupation with the word "role" in the brief bibliography on Canadian foreign policy. Older and larger states

3 might be somewhat more understanding than they have been of this instinct towards a sense of responsibility on the part of middle·sized powe rs. In order to make some impac t as ourselves, we have elaborated the role of a middle power. Our interest is in a hierarchical world order, in volving all nations, rather than in a duopoly or a triumvira te or an absolute rule by five great powers. The case for a hierarchical international syste m has been put force ful y by an Ame rican of French ed ucation, Stanley Hoffman, in a book about the problems of American foreign policy. aptly enti tled Gulliver's Troubles. He rebukes his fe llow- . citizens fo r complaining about their associates' withdrawal from " world responsibility." He says, PART ONE: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL -

But it is our very involvement that provides th em with a perfect excuse for turning inward, and elbows th em out 0/ playing any role other th an that of our junior partners or satellites. Th e role th ey ought to play should be theirs, not ours; and our role should be to let them play it.

H e argues that middle powers should act not just as powers concerned only with their o wn secu rity, expansion, and development, but as partial trustees of world order . ... This m eans encouraging their diplomatic initiatives for peacekeeping or peaceful change, helping them to defend the area or to initiate schemes jor economic co·operation, so that th ey will have the psychologicai boost of leadership and contribute to international m oderation at the same time . ... We must understand that our distaste, however justified, for strengthening what we see as "parochial" national ambitions, and our preference for collective solutions, only prevent the emergence 0/ the latter and re·enforce national pettiness by frus trating the designs 0/ states to which th e only real alternative is not a collective solution but a foreign- often an American - one.l

This seems to me a legitimate criticism, but it could be applied as well to the attitudes of other great powers, although their arrogance is naturall y diminished by their lesser power. It excellently summarizes the Canadian grievance. This preoccup ation with a role can, however, go too far; and in recent years Canadians have become a bi t neurot ic on the subject. They have often been more concerned with putting a lStanley Hoffman, Gulliver's TrollbleJ (New York : McGraw·Hill. 1968) . pp. 371-2.

4 - THE DETTER PART OF VALOUR maple leaf on a proposal than with making sure it was a good and a necessary proposal. (In some cases a fig leaf would have been more appropriate.) Some have become more concerned with Canada's having an independent foreign policy than with our having an effective policy - as if independence were an end in itself. There has been an inordinate emphasis on influence as the sole purpose of foreign policy. Our foreign policy is too often discussed as if it consisted of nothing except the craft of making the Americans do what we want. The possibility of any country's making the Americans do what it wants them to do by simple unil ateral pressure is extremely limited, a nd this limitation aggrava tes its se nse of frustration. It has also diverted us from the much more profitable uses of our influence in all kinds of intern ational organizations in which we can help create the kind of situations wi th wh ich the super-powers have to live. When this Canadian compulsion to playa role is combined with a certain natural instin ct of self-ri ghteousness, it can destroy the rather more favourable image we had earlier acqu ired; it has done a good deal, for example, to reduce in recent years the effectiveness of Canadian diplomacy, especiaUy, perhaps, in Europe. It is difficult to speak at this moment about Canadian foreign policy, because it may be in the process of change. There are new men in charge. There is a more insistent demand for cbange in the country and, of course, there are increas ing uncertainties about so me of the principal institutions around wh ich our policy has bee n dev ised - the United Nat ions, the North At lant ic Treaty Organization, and the Commonwealth. How much room for drastic change there is for a middle power is difficult to say. A hard fact to be reckoned with is th at, however sou nd the principles evolved over the past quarter-centu ry, the Canad ian public bas become bo red witb them. They would appreciate even a change of style, but style and policy in diplomacy are inseparable, like the medium and the message. This is the persisting dilemma of those who are elected to conduct Canada's international relations.

PART ONE: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL -

5

2: Canadian External Policies Since 1945 Until the Second World War, Canada's external relations were tentative and circumscribed, limited in later years not so much by colonial status as by a lingering colonial mentality - a mentality even more characteristic of Liberal nationalists like Mackenzie King than of the traditionally imperialist Conservative Party. Mr. King, having secured with disconcerting ease recognition of Canada's right to an independent role in the world, was left with undeveloped convictions about what to do next. He cherished the view th at Canada was a remote and uniquely peace-loving area, too much burdened with domest ic problems to be drawn into the struggles of an obstreperous world. Because his primary impulse was to keep out of trouble, he preferred Canada's role in the world to be a modest one. To sati sfy a modest sense of mission, he nourished the illusion that Canada was a linchpin that kept the United States and Britain in harmony, and, without pain or cost, Canadians lectured the League of Nations on the virtuous example of North America. This att itude was swept away at the end of the war. Selfdoubt, an innate suspicion of great powers, and a quality of selfrighteo usness lingered. Nevert heless, Canada went through a remarkably swift transition from the status of a wartime junior partner in 1945 to that of a sure-footed middle power with an acknowledged and applauded role in world affairs ten years later. The change was accentuated by the passing from the political scene of Mr. King in 1948 and his replacement by Mr. Louis St. Laurent, a prime minister less inhibited by the phobias that had prevented both nationalists and imperialists in the past from seeing Canada's place in the world clearly and confide ntly. Mr. St. Laurent, furthermore, worked in close harmony with his new secrelary of state for .external affa irs, Mr. Pearso n, who had been trained as a professional diplomat. Mr. Pearson became a major architect of the United Nat ions and of N.A.T.O., and the rapid growth of Canada's stature was inextricably associated with his position as one of the most respected foreign ministers of the post-war era. The new approach was enco uraged also by the national pride of a country in the course of unparalleled This article is a slightly amended version of a p3per read before a joint session of the Canadian Historical Association and the American Historical Association, Chicago, December 28, 1962. Published in Illternational ]oumaJ, vol. XVll[ (spring, 1963). SOURCE:

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THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR

economic expansio n, capable even of assisting tbe ruined great powers of the pre-war world. The ri se of the United Nations, which acknowledged the formal equality of states regardless of size, se L the stage for accomplishmen ts by lesser powers with will and skill to play the new kind of diplo matic game. It ca n be said of Canadians as of Americans, however, that their new imernationai activit y was th e result more of respo nding to a need th an of thrusting themselves forward as world salvationists in accordance with preco nceived notions of national miss ion. The precarious stale of the world after 1945 required the forceful intervention in far corners of a benevo lent great power like the United States. It turned out also that the preservation of order often enough requi red the services of middle powers whose principal value was their very incapaci ty to threat en or command. Ca nada was no longer relucta nt to be useful. Canadians coveted responsibilities, and Canadian diplom atic missions multiplied from seven in 19 39 to sixty-five in 1962. At the conclusion of tbe war, Canada was faced with the pro blem of finding for itself, along with Australi a, Sweden, Brazil, and other countries of middle stature, a place in international councils appropriate to its position as something less tban a major and something more than a rninor power. In the case of Ca nada and Australia, thi s was a continuation of the frustrated struggle to acquire some influence on the direction of the a llied war effort. It was not surprising, therefore, that at San Francisco in 1945 it was directed most often towards reducing the pretensions of the great powers and presc ribing as mucb international "democracy" as poss ible in the United Nations. Canadia n demands we re, however, tempered by so me understandi ng of the relation between function and power, and the more rabid campaign against the great powers was left to the Australians and New Zealanders. Ca nada did accept the special positio n of the great powers and the inevitability of the veto, ~ven whi le seeking to place restraints o n it. Contrary to habit, Canadian officials even evolved a theory that determined their attitude on the composition of the new international bodies being established in the late 1940s. They called it tbe "functional theory," and although th e term has dropped out of usc, it is perhaps worth rnentioning to illustrate the nature of Canadian pragmatisrn in fore ign policy - a characteristic endeavour to find tbeories to fit the facts of international life and at the same time to justify a Canadian role rather tban impose moral abstractions on a n untidy world. The essence of

PART ONE: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL -

7

th e functional th eory was th at each nation should have respons ibility appropriate to its pa rticu lar capacit ies. Great powers, by reason of their ext raordinary military capacit y, were entitl ed to special pos itio ns in mallers of security. For the non-perman ent seats of the Security Cou ncil, however, prefe rence wou ld be given to middle powe rs able to make so me milita ry con tribution, over smaller powers that mig ht act irrespo nsibly beca use they had no forces of their own . Important trad ing nalions would be accorded speci al influence in intern ational commercia l organ izations whether o r not they happened to be grl.!a t military powers. Th ose conce rned with colonial questions wo uld ha ve places on the Trusteeship Council, and the privileged places in bodies de aling with hea lth or communications or immigra tion wou ld go to those co untri es that had special interes ts or special qua lifications in those specific subjects. To each according to hi s capacities seemed to be the best rule of thumb to encourage a maximum se nse of responsibility in world co uncils, and a lso to avoid a permanent hegemon y of the great powers on all subjects and see th at middle and lesser powers had reasonable parts to pla y. On the whole, this conception of function and responsibility in international organization was subdued by the pressure of regional and group represe ntation, although it still conditions the attitudes of member states, especiall y middle powers, o n such matters as disarmament negotiations and the directio n of U .N. operatio ns in the Middle East or the Congo. The theory was, of course, neve r intended to be applied ri gidly - rigid theories are very un-Canadian. Its appl ication did at the beginning provide one triumph for Canada when. as one of the tbree powers that bad worked to harness nuclear energy, it became a perma nent member, along with the great powers, of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. This priority position for Canada on an important sec urity organ was maintained in successor bodies dealing with di sarmament until 1957, and contributed considerably to Canada's prestige as a middle power that kept influential company. Canada's concern to limit the functions and privileges of great powers was replaced by a conception of special functions for great powers and special functi ons for midd le powers - and even for small powers. Each nation was seen as un ique, its history and geography as well as its size giving it some special part to play ad hoc in world affairs. The world did not consist merely of great powers on the one hand and small powe rs on the other. Nor should it be divided arbitrarily into blocs - Western, Communist, and Uncommitted. Or into

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good guys and bad guys, black and white. The international scene would be more manageable if relationships rema ined flexible, if countries were not driven into rigid blocs and reg ions. Canada became the persistent advocate of flexibility in international associations, constantly worried ' about what seemed too categorical an approach in \Vashington . Having staked out a claim for the powers of middle strength, Canada worked throughout the 1950s to put meaning into the concept - along witQ othe r comparable countries, nations of the Commonwealth and Scandinavia in particular. If the San Francisco concept of world order controlled by the great powers in unit y had been maintained, the middle powers would probably have continued to see their mission as banding together to mitigate the rule of the great. When the great powers fell apart, however, their smaller associates sobe rly recognized that the first priority was to maintain the strength of their large friends. The polarization of the blocs produced a si tu at ion in which middle powers found themselves with functions unlike those they had conceived for themselves in 1945. When crises developed in the Middle East, Indochina, or the Congo, for instance, middle powers were required to fill diplomatic and even param ilitary roles from which the grea t powers excluded each other. Whereas Ca nad a in the past had kept free of entanglements in Asia because it had no direct interests there, DOW it found that its very lack of interests was the reason it was involved. For this reason, and because Ca nad ians had developed a reputation for objectivity and independence, if not neutrality, in international affairs, Canada was chosen in 1954, along with India and Poland, to man the Internatio nal Supervisory Commissions to pat rol the truces in Indochina. In 1956 Canada took the lead in proposing and also in staffi ng the first United Nat ions Emergency Force. Canadians participated in simi lar operations in Kashm ir and Palestine, Lebanon, and the Congo. The performanc.e of these essential tasks gave a certain style to Canadian d iplomacy. The reputation for independence and objectivity had to be reflected in endeavours to establish bridges between the blocs, to find compromise solutions. Because this independence was more natu ral in colon ial quest ions than in cold-war questions, the mediatory role was, of cou rse, more assiduously .cultivated in relat ions with the uncommitted than with the communists. There were those in Canada who began to argue th at Canada would be a more useful force in the world if it could move to a position of neutrality in the cold war and concentrate on

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mediatory fUDctions . This was not necessarily a rejection of nuclear diplomacy for the great powers but rather a pushing to extremes of the theory of a functional distinction between the roles in the world of great and middle powers. For Canada, however, it was not possible because Canadians felt too directly committed in the struggle against communism. Canada played an active and strategic part in the creation of N.A.T.O. in 1949. Canadian spokesmen were, in fact, among the first to enunciate the North Atlantic idea. In doing so they were moved by fear of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and also by the opportunity perceived to end their historic schizophrenia. For a generation Canadian external policy had been racked by a conflict between the advocates of continental and transatlantic attachments. Now leaders of all parties, having cast off the tradition of Canadian helplessness, saw in the military alliance of Britain and France with the United States the opportunity to be part of a team in which Canada's international interests and its domestic emotions could both be satisfied. Although differences between the major allies were by no means extinguished in N.A.T.O., Canada's mutua l alliance with them all did ha ve a soothing effect on the considerations that determine external relations. The Canadian hand in diplomacy was strengthened by an unprecedented consensus with in the country on the basic directions of fore ign policy. Within N.A.T.O., however, Canada found itself aligned not with one large friend aga inst another so much as with the other smaller members against the domination of the great powers. A persistent but not very successful campaign was waged to persuade the larger powers to consult their allies. Another Canadian prejudice, a traditional uneasiness about the morality of military alliances, was reflected in the continuing effort to emphasize the economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects of the association. Whatever success this worthy endeavour achieved was largely rhetorical. Canada contributed forces to N.A.T.O. in Europe and never doubted the need to resist the Soviet Un ion with military power, but Canada usually joined the Scandinavians iIi N.A.T.O. to oppose the rigidit ies of the great powers in their attitudes to both the communist states and the neutralists. This approach was attributable not to neutralism or to softness on communism but, rightly or wrongly, to a somewhat less ideological concept of the forces in conflict. It frequently brought Canadians into conflict with the Americans and the French, but less often with tbe British with whose intellectual traditions of foreign policy they bad more in common.

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One way in which Canada maintained its independence was by keeping its feet in two camps. Balancing its close continental and Atlantic associations with the ' major Western powers were its unique associations through the Commonwealth with the leading states of As ia and Africa. The footwork was tricky: Washington often thought Ca nadian policy too much swayed by Mr. Nehru; and Paris and Lisbon we re offended by Canadian association with th e ant i-colonialists. These ambiva lent loyalties d id, however, encourage the Canadian inclination for compromise and trouble-shooting and fortify its diplomatic strength for this purpose. The Commonwealth played a significant role in shaping Canadian external policy after 1945. Although tbe impact of the Commonwealth on Ca nadians was more diffuse than in imperial days, the institution roused a new and in some ways more positive kind of enthusiasm, an enthusiasm that reflected the new self-confidence of a nation that saw in the ancient ti es not a limitation upon, but an instrument for Canadian pol icy. As it was transformed from an unfashionable empire into a more fashionable association among peoples of different races. the Commonwealth caught the imagination of young and progressive elements in the country, the very elemen ts th at traditional1 y bad looked askance at the imperial tie as nostalg ic, reactionary, and racist. Canadian nationalists, no longer afraid the British were restricting their freedom. saw in the Commonwealth a counter-force to the threat to Canadian independence posed by the increasing dominance of the United States in world affairs. The Commonwealth, furthermore, was bein g reshaped in the Canadian image. The British and the Australians, until the late 1940s, had hankered after a more unified Commonwealth, speaking in unison in international councils. Canada had insisted that the effort to impose a rigid framework on scattered peoples would induce friction rather th an harmony. India, Pakistan, and the ot her ne~ countries were disposed to continue membersh ip only if the Canadian concept prevailed. and Canada's obvious preference for the new over the old Commonwealth inspired a special bond with the non.European members. In the United Nations especially, Canada found that the Commonwealth association, including as it did the major nations of Asia and Africa, extended its own diplomatic resources. Canada was canny, nevertheless, about sharing Britain's responsibilities for dependent territories. It did participate wholeheartedly, although with restrained generosity. in the Colombo Plan, a scheme for mutual economic aid of Commonwealth origin . The British

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proceeded to transform their empire into the kind of Commonwealth Canada preferred, and the end product, not surprisingly, now seems to appeal more to Canada than to Britain itself. Canada strove after 1945 to play an active role in the United Nations fo r sound and conscientious reasons. In the foreign policies of democracies, however, there is always an element of calcu lation as well as conscience, and neither the cynic nor the idealist is ever right in an absolute judgement on motives. Trust in the possibilities of the United Nations is more necessary to a weak power than to a strong power. The United Nations, furthermore, provides a middle power with a stage on which to perform, and an arena in which skill counts for more than muscle. Thanks to its racial homogeneity and brief history, Canada escaped censure in the United Nations and was inevitably di sposed, therefore, to look upon its activities with more enthusiasm than were, say, France or South Africa. The Commonwealth, N.A.T.O., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T . ), and dozens of other international associations likewise gave Canada scope to exercise its national capability. The i eal with which a distinct and forceful foreign policy was pursued was related to the constant compulsion Canadians felt to preserve and assert their identity. It is significant that the inlernational associations that Canada favoured were trans-oceanic rather than regional. The very existence of Canada is a defjance of regionalism, and Canadians instinctively have clung to overseas associations for balance. An international association for which they were presumably eligible but which they did not espouse was the Organization of American States. The practical reason for this aloofness was that a country one-tenth the size of the United States had limited diplomatic resources for playing a responsible hand in international bodies .. This was compounded by wariness about extending the areas of trouble in which to become involved. The "western hemisphere," furthermore, is not a geographical reality but a historical tradition. Canadians, never having shared the Washington-Bolivar mystique and the revolutionary republican tradition, have not taken very seriously the idea that they have special links with peoples of vastly different political traditions merely because they happen to be linked by an almost untraversible neck of land. History has bound Canada across trave rsible ocea ns to the northern hemisphere. In recent years, however, there has been increasing interest in the O. A.S. The continuous brainwashing from the United States to which Canadians are subjected has led many to accept

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the assumption that the western hemisphere is a region. More significant perhaps has been the escalation of Latin America from the status of backwater to that of crisis zone, and some Canadians have sniffed another usefu l role to play in the world. They have been brainwashed also by the new dogma of regionalism inspired by the western Europeans. Goaded by economists crying doorn, many Canadians, against all their political instincts, have been troub led that they too will have to find a region to cling to. The fear that their traditional associates across the Atlantic will draw in on themselves, taking Britain along, threatens - although it has by no means triumphed overthe deep historical instinct to brace against a southward pull. In any regiona l reorientation that might take place, however, the continent is likely to be taken more seriously than the "hemisphere. " Relations with the United States since 1945 illustrated the validity of the statement in 1950 of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, that the da ys of easy and automatic relations were over. Relations we re more complex and more irritable, not because the two nations were dr ifting apart but because they were impinging more. Bilateral disputes - tbe problems of water power and canals and tariffs - continued as they presumably always will continue between ne ighbours. Althougb they inspire regional passions, they have corne to be taken for granted, and in the past decade and a half they disturbed official harmony Jess than in earlier years when there were fewer world iss ues to think about. However, since the United States and Canada moved actively into the international arena, their policies on international issues clashed more frequently. Harmonious relations were threatened more by differences over defence or disarmament, over Cuba or trade with China, than over the S1. Lawrence Seaway or the Columbia. River. The distinct identities of the two countries have been more readi ly di sce rnible in th eir approaches to international problems than their common social and economic hab its would suggest - differences reflecting diverse political institutions, histories, overseas associations, temperament, and the inevitable differences of approach between a nation of dec isive power and a nation of modest influence in the world. Canada was, in fact, less docile th an more distant allies - Australia and Turkey, for example. These differences reflected on the Canadian side honest convictions, tempered with a strain of perversity perhaps and the assurance of a country that was never dependent on economic aid from the United States and that, unlike overseas

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friends and clients, knew the United States could not disinterest itself in its defence. In its defence pOlicy.. however, Canada was stimulated at all times by the sober recognition that Canadian defences must not fall below a certain minimum lest the United States be tempted to intervene to guarantee its own defences. These strains, however, should not obscure the profound change that took place in the formal relationship between the two countries in the period under consideration. The Un ited States and Canada became peacetime mi litary allies, a fact that later became taken for gran ted that its revolutionary nature is perhaps grasped only by historians. Contrary to the view once stated, by President Kennedy, history did not make the United States and Canada friend s; it made them natural antagonists and they remai ned a ntagonists from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. It took the Germans and then the Russians to make them all ies. And even at that, Canada was prepared in 1949 to enter into such an alliance only in partnership with others, including its two mothercountries. Having grown accustomed to this association, and having grown more conscious of present perils than past anx iet ies, Canada was ready in 1957 to enter into a more specific bilateral commitment in the North Atlantic Air Defence Command (N.O.R.A.D.) . The surrender of independent action involved in this agreement continued to disturb many people in Canada, even though few doubted the practicality of integrated continental defence. Canadians have shown an inclination, therefore, to see N.O.R.A.D. not as an isolated bi lateral arrangement but as a regional but integral part of the N.A.T.O. alliance - thereby, as is their custom, seeki ng to bring in the old world to redress the overwhelming imbalance of the new. The process of rise and decline which affects good and evil slates alike is normally spread over centuries, or at least generations. Canada, however, experienced a cycle of unnatural expansion and subsequent diminu tion of its international influe nce in considerably less than one generation. The phenomenon bas been disconcerting. At the end of the Second World War, Canada emerged as the third strongest of the Western powers and assumed in international organizations a position of influence not far behind that of the m inor great powers. During the decade and a half since that time, Canada's population and resources continued to grow, but its relative position in the world fell off considerably. The reasons were natural and not discreditable. Canada's position in 1945 had been temporarily inflated because of the ex haustion of countries such as France, Germany, and Japa n. Then, the appearance of new independent

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states and the multiplication of the membership of the United Nations gradua ll y reduced the relative importance of the foundin g members. Canada, for instance, had two acti ve terms on the Security Council in the first fifteen yea rs, but is unlikel y to have another for decades.:! Canada in no time at all became one of the older nations of the world, but the appeal of youth a nd chastity whicb a new country enjoys is a waning asset. As it lurches through a decade of active dip lomacy, even a lesser power steps on toes and injures feel in gs. Many people arc inclined to attribute the decline of the Canadian position in the world to the end of the long period of Liberal govern ment in the election of 1957. There was, however, little detectab le difference in the basic ex ternal policies of the Liberal and Co nserva tive regimes. 11 was inevitable, of coursc. that a new government whose members had had little experience of diplomacy would find difficulty sustaining a position of influence that, in the case of middle powers, is peculiarly dependent up on the authorit y of personality and expe rience. The change of govern ment did, however, tend to obscu re certain inexorable factors. Olhers would say that the influence of all powers other than th e two larges t decli ned because th e role of nu clear weapons throughou t the J 950s became more and marc decisive. There is force in this argument. Paradoxically, however, it was th e nuclear stalemate Ihat paralysed th e initiati ves of grea t powers in fear of each other's in tervention and enabled militaril y weak but diplomaticall y influential lesser states to act effect ively, particularly in those areas where th ere was no direct confronta ti on of the major powers. During thi s period of rapid change, the theory of Canadian foreign policy never ca ught up with the reality. By the time theorists had begun to define a middle-power role for Canada, based on a record of diplomatic honest broke ra ge culminating in a lead ing role in the Suez Crisis of 1956, the continu ing effectiveness of this role was already bei ng chall enged by new ali gnments of the powers and shifting patterns in the United Nations. The patterns of midd le-power diplomacy can never be se t for long periods if it is to retai n its vitality and its relevance. Findi ng them selves a role appropriate to the circum stances of the 1960s is the preoccupatio n of Canad ians, and it is complex. 2This prediction proved shortsighted because Canada was elected again for 1967-8, but membership in the Secu rity Council had lost a good deal of its attraction, and Canada was pressed into service by the reructant Weste rn European states.

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The foreign policies of middl e powers are inevitably directed not only at the substance of a n issue but also at the means by which they can affect the resolution of that issue. The machinery of world pOlitics is their specia l concern. The more responsible of them wa nt to be of some serious co nsequen ce in the world. Since Canada first recognized its power to influence events, Canadians have been groping [or a justification of their existence. What might have been a sordid pursuit of international recognition was redeemed by a puritan conscience. It was not enough to possess sovereignty; Canada must justify its independence by being somehow good for humanity. In the record since 1945 there a rc some grounds at least for sati sfaction and encouragement for those who believe that powers of middle size have the capacity. jf they wish to use it wisely. to contribute to the international community as sovereign entities.

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3: Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship? My purpose is to ask questions, and my text is taken from the words of that great Australian poet, Adam Lindsay Gordon. Mr. Gordon's mortal lines on the subject of questions were as follows: Question not, but live and labour Till yon goal be won, Helping every feeble neighbour, Seeking help from none: Life is mostly froth and bubble, Two things stand like stone, Kindness in another's trouble, Courage in your own .

That seems to summarize Canadian foreign policy very well - at least if one accepts as gospel the persistent themes of luncheon speakers, parliamentarians, and Canadian representatives on, say, the Social Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.It combines the moral uplift, respect for authority, prideful independence, belief in the virtue of toil, and conviction of responsibility towards the less blessed which are at the same time the silliest and noblest of Canadian characteristics. It is easy to laugh at these qualities, but one should not laugh them off. In a nasty world, of which Canada is a somewhat less nasty and a great deal luckier part than most, Canadians need a chi valrous theme for thei r international relations - somethi ng to live and labour by until peace and prosperity, or something more like it than the present state of affairs, emerges. Somebody, however, does have to ask questions. My purpose is not to provide satisfaction but to induce scepticism - a health y mood. But scepticism and cynicism are, as I shall argue later, quite differen t things. One should try to find what Canadian fo reign policy should not be, but also what it should be. The status of second-rank powers was a preocc upation of the League of Nations in its time, but the term "middle power," SOURCE: This chapter is a slightly revised version of a paper presen led at the Third Annual Conference on World Development, Banff, 1965. The papers from this conference were published in 1965 by the C.t.I.A. as a book entitled Canada's Role as a Middle Power and edited by 1. King Gordon.

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in its present connotation. grew out of a functional concept of the role of nations in world organizations. a concept which was developed at the end of tbe last war. Canada was a particularly strong advocate of the functional principle. According to thls way of thinking. the world ought not to be divided simply into great powers and Jesser powers; each sbould have status and influence commensurate with its special interests or special competence. Specifically. countries like Sweden, India. Brazil. Holland, Australia, or Canada. which did not claim great-power status but were far from negligible in military and economic resources. ought to be accorded more influential positions in international organizations and a greater share in the ordering of the world than should impotent smaller states. It cannot be said that the United Nations or other organizations full y accepted this principle in practice. although it is enshrined in article 23 of the Charter. Nevertheless. most of these middle states. fo r the si mple reason that they had greater resources - including diplomatic resources - did corne to play a part in world affairs more eff.ective th.an that of lesser slates. In the United Nations in particular there has been no strict hierarchy of power and influence. The five recognized great powers have their special veto privileges in the Security Council; but. otherwise. for the purpose of voting, all members are considered equal. There is. however, much more to the exercise of power and influence in the United Nations than voting. The capacity for u.N.manship makes some of these equal countries much more equal than others. When the stalemate of cold war set in, the middle powers found themselves frequently cast in mediatory positions in disputes. Because they were weak, and because the ir interests were localized. they were often detached from disputes in a way great powers could not be. Canada. for example, in the late 1940, was already active in the middle of the Arab-Israeli and the Dutch-Indonesian disputes. Having achieved some success, it thereby got started in a pattern of diplomacy which determined its posture in world affairs. There developed an ambiguity in the term "middle power." It origi nally implied a power of medium strength but it began to develop also the connotation of a midd le or mediatory position in conflicts. When U .N. peacekeeping forces, after 1956, came to be stocked largely by middle-sized powers, this double connotation was confirmed. It is hard ( 0 say now precisely what a middle power is; the emphasis shifts. Some of the most effective mediatory powers are relatively small - for example, Norway, Ireland, T unisia -

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but tbey are often embraced as middle powers in certain contexts. It is advisable to accept this ambiguity rather than insist on a logical clarification which would serve only to raise hornets, large; m iddle, aod small. The term bas no meaning in international law; it is an expression of conven ience. If one attempts to list those countries which have earned the designation of middle powers by performance beyond mere existence with intermediate-class statistics, one realizes how fleeting and intangible the status is. Some countries play their middling parts on occasion or never at all; some -like Canada, India, or Sweden - develop the habit. Each country is unique, and its capacity to intervene, to mediate, to influence depends on factors of race , geography, tradition, or alignment. Its aptness for the role is ad hoc. Those least fixed in their orbits have on the whole been more influenti al midd le powers than those wh ich are group-conformists. States whose votes can be influenced attract more attention and therefore exert more influence than do those whose position as members of a bloc is certain in advance. They and their citizens are more likel y to prove acceptable also as members of committees, commiss ions, or truce teams, or for important roles in international organizations because some compromise may be expected of them. Yugoslavia, for example, has played a part on the world scene out of all proportion to its size and resources because of its relative independence of view. Among N.A.T.O. countries, Norway, Denmark, and Canada have achieved reputations for flexibil i.ty and non-conformity. (It might be remarked parenthetically that sometimes such a reputation outJives the prescribed kind of performance, as nations change their policies and their leaders. On the other hand, countries like Australia and New Zealand have beeD considered ineligible for some of the duties and opportunities of middlepowermanship because of reputations for excessive partisanship achieved in the past but not necessarily relevant to all situations today.) There are many combinations of factors and qualities which make a nation effective. Ireland, exploiting constructively its position as a Catholic and European-but-anti-colonial country, has given leadership in seeking compromise on colonial issues and in proposing, for example, the highly significant Irish Resolution on the dissemination of nuclear weapons. (The fact that the Irish were considered one of the few European peoples fit for United Nations' duty in the Congo may have had something to do with Sir Roger Casement.) Ireland has been effective also because it produced able and attractive international

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politicians who calculated we ll how their country's peculiar tradition could be capitalized upon for the general good. Mr. Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia did the same in an Arab country that had uniquely retained the confidence of Europeans. In the 1950s Mr. Nazrollah Entezam of Iran was one of the most effective though discreet international-peace manipulators. It is the combination of remarkable men with appropriate national backgrounds and opportu ne circumstances tbat has made for effective middlepowermanship. Mr. Pearson is a pre-eminent example. The eminence of Mr. Nehru, the ghost of Mahatma Gandhi, and the cantankerous brilliance of Mr. Krishna Menon combined to make India in the 1950s a middle power of such influence that in all things except military and economic strength and a permanent seat in the Security Council it was a great power. This sort of influence is fleeting and fluctuating and often specialized or regional in its application. Japan was an active promoter of compromise among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Ethiopia plays an important part in holding the African states together. Mexico seeks to use its peculiar geographical status ~o hold open the doors between the United States and Cuba; and the new West Indian nations are beginning to perceive the advantage they can find in their mixed African and European heritage (Afro-Saxons they have been called). At the other end of the scale, Britain and France, not often thought of as middle powers, manceuvre to seek a settlement in Vietnam. As the two superpowers draw away from the field in military capacity. there is an increasing tendency to refer to Britain and France as middle powers - not, of course, in front of the General. It is perhaps more easily seen as a term of historical assessment than as a prescription for the foreign policy of a state. The more one tries to define middle-powermansbip. the more difficult and perhaps pretentious it appears to do so at all. Often it seems like describing the obvious. Definition spoils the special quality. Canada was perhaps more effective as a middle power before it started everlastingly classifying itself as such. There is nothing more fa tal for a country with a sense of pacificatory mission tban to proclaim itself as a professional mediator. Paradoxically, bowever. without some such definition of its status, both to discip1ine itself within its limitations and to be aware of its opportunities, a state and its citizens are likely to flounder ineffectually or turn nasty and neurotic. Whether or

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not Canadians like the term mediator, it bas stuck to them, and they have to -try to understand what it means. The role of the middle power, as one has come to think of it in the past decade or two, has been particularly dependent on two elements, not usually recognized as compatible. One is the un formalized institution of maintaining peace by nuclear deterrence. The other is the formalized institution of the United Nations. Nuclear weapons have exaggerated the gap between great powers (or at least two of tbem) and lesser powers, but tbey have not, as is too often assumed, extinguished the political and diplomatic influence of non-nuclear states. The assumption that power and influence in the world are solely de termined by the number of battalions a state produces is as distorted as the contrary assumption that all states are as equal as the U.N. Charter says they are. The dec isiveness of the super powers in determining the shape of the world is obvious. This influence, however, is limited by their own awareness of the fact that they cannot deploy their full strength without risking self-destruction. The nuclear stalemate does provide a kind of precarious stability that gives lesser powers enough feeling of security to raise their voices and pursue their interests. It allows them to do so in a way that wo uld be impossible if the world were polarized by fear into two or even three hostile blocs, or if one or more great powers were able to run roughshod over weaker countries without fear of retribution from other great powers. Because of the awful power of the largest states and the global character of their interests, middle powers can often act more safely and even more effectively to reduce or solve contagious conflicts. At the risk of making this pictu re of the great and middle powers performing their allotted functions under a nuclear umbrel1a tidier than it is in a very untidy world, the point can be made that these functions are or can be looked upon as complementary. But it must always be remembered that it is the reserve power and pressure of the stronger nations that ultimately induces the disputants to corne to terms, however useful the middle power may be in the negotiations and supervision of the terms. It is hard to conceive, nevertheless, how this function of the middle powers could be performed if the Un ited Nations did Dot exist. It provides in the first place an arena where they can manreuvre and combine their forces and have an impact out of proportion to their size. It can provide instruments for their will - comm issions and subcommittees, truce teams and arbitrators and a hall in wh ich to be heard. Quite apart from its institu-

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tional apparat us, the U.N. Charter has, by proclaim ing the equality of states, established certain assumptions about international relations that the world has come to take for granted. It would be absurd, of course, to pretend that the institution works perfectly or that the high principles of the Charter determi ne internationa l cond uct. Even lip service, however, is of some consequence. There is at least the expectation of conduct more favourab le to the m iddle powers than wou ld exist if the United Nations had not been created or if it were to break up or di ssolve into ineffectuality. The great question s about the future of midd lepowe rmanship, therefo re , scem to revolve around the future of these two institutions. The system - one might almost call it that - of nuclear deterre nce between the Un ited States a nd the Soviet Union has been developing encouraging ly to the point where there is cause to hope that institu tionali zing it might well be the first step towards disa rm ame nt and a new kind of international order, conceived real isticall y. Even though neither Washington nor Moscow seems to want to arrest this transit ion, it may be shattered by the crisis in Vi etnam. The danger is' not merely that there may be a mil itary clash between the United States a nd the U.S.S.R., it is also th at the United States experience in V ietnam may prove the inabilit y of a great nuclear power to achieve ends by deterrence and thereby destroy an assumption on wh ich mutual respect because of mutua l deterre nce is based. Just as American deterrence of the Soviet move to set up miss iles in Cuba reinforced the system, Am erican fai lure in Vietnam could be expected to have a highly des tabili zing effect on a world where stabili ty is precarious. T he system is, of course, also threatened by the ri se of an increasing ly independent nuclear power, Ch ina , cast willingly o r unwill ingly in the role of an outlaw state. China decla res itself opposed to the kind of balance that it is the function of middle powers to promote. Whereas in 1954 China was prepared to subscribe at Geneva to an ag reement for Sout heast Asia based on neutral ity. now it seems unshakably confident of the inevitable triumph of its cause and unwilling to stop sho rt of unconditional communist victory in Indoch ina. A decade ago it hoped to triumph by o ther means, by subscribing to a truce in the conflict whic h wou ld enable it to push on to a polit ical victory. Those other means, however. provided middle powers with the opportunity within a nuclear statemate to frustrate the extreme intentions of all parties. They could seek to create stability out of stalemate in the ultimate interests of, although perhaps not

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in accordance with, the original intentions of the parties and their great-power sponsors. There is no point here in reviewing the present crisis of the United Natio ns, but its relevan ce to the future of middle powers must be noted. Jf the financial issue is resolved, the effect on the role of middle powers may be paradoxical. In theory, the affirmation of the primary position of the Security Council and denial of the right of the Assembly to raise levies for U.N. forces is a blow to the lesser powers and the chamber in which they nourish. The middle powers have not, however, striven as a united corpus to assert the power of the Assemb ly. For the most part they turned thei r wrath on the great powers for their intransigence, and ha ve some reason therefore to look upon themselves as the victors in a compromise solution. They a re not likely to consider themse lves hamstrung by th is solution if and when a substantial bod y of m idd le powers, aligned or nonaligned, are in a future crisis determined to secure U .N. intervention. I may seem here to be confusing the role of the middle powers with the role of the influential company of non-aligned, which includes middle and small powers alike. As I have ta lked of midd le powe rs, I have conceived of them as individual states, not as a bloc. Nevertheless, the heightened det ermination of the non-aligned to resist the pretensions of the great powers is a factor in keeping the world safe for middle-power diplomacy. At the same time, the growth of a solid and intran sigent AfricanAsian bloc could diminish the scope of tradit ional midd le powers like the Scandinavians or Canadians. Over and above a ll these calculations, however, is the fact that a reaffirmation of the United Nations after the disastrous Assembl y of 1964 will strengthen the structure in which midd le powers fl ourish best. Having looked at the position of the midd le powers in general in the period up to the mid- 1960s, I would now like to look more specifically at the posi tion of Ca nada. It may be usefu l to try to list those factors which, it seems, have enabled Ca nada in the past to play, both successfu ll y and unsuccessfully, the role of a middle power - a concept tbat [ have recognized as nebulous but nevertheless useful when see n in its context. First of alI, I would place; Canada's relative security. I say relative securi ty because if Canad ians continued to think they lived in "a fire-proof house," they would not have been spurred to action and initiative. They know that they have a stake in an orderly world. Even those Canadians who argue for neutralism do so not because they believe Canada could thereby escape involvement in war but because they think such a status would

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make preventi ve diplomacy more effective. Canada owes its feeling of se~ u r it y to N.A.T.O., to the overwhelming power of its neighbour, and to the precarious safety provided by nuclear deterrence. Canadian soil is protected nO l by Ame ri ca n generosit y but by American self-in terest, which is more dependable. Canada is fortunate, however, that its powerful protector recogni zes Ca nada's right to a co nsiderable latitude of indepe ndence in foreign relati ons. The A merica ns need not fear Canadian hostility, bu t they would not tol era te conn ivance with their ant agoni sts. On thei r own, Ca nadians arc too weak to th reate n. Know ing on which side of the cold war their interests lie, th ey are not disposed to press indepe nd ence fart her th an wo uld be allowed. They ca n tell their neighbour when they think he is wrong, but they know that in the end they a re li kely. in their own interests, to side with th at neighbour right or wrong. Because of thi s security, Canadians are able to play their own ga me more confi dentl y than the ir more distant allies who must be more cardful not to offend a nd who, unlike Canadians, lack the assurance of American mi litary or economic support whether or not the United States is pleased with what they do. There are, of course, li mits 10 Canada's free-wheeling. In th eir own interests, Canad ians do not want to take action that might adversely affect the power and prestige of the country whose strength is of decisive consequence for tbem. T hei r concern is more economic th an st rategic. The y want to keep the United States sweetl y disposed towards Canadian commercial and financial affairs. They do also, of course, out of co ncern for their sovereignty, wa nt to avoi d Americans' being tempte d to move in and take over Canadian defences to protect themselves. The question fo r the fu ture, howeve r, is whether the critical nature of the worldwide co nfrontation in which the U nited States is involved will not reduce American tolerance and also affect Canada's own calculation of how far out of ste p it wants to get. Furthermore, the supercess ion of aircraft by miss iles is reducing the military importa nce to the U nited States of Canadian soil and of Canadian coll aboration in continental defence. Americans may feel freer in the future to ignore Canada. Will . this trend give Canada more freedom of ac tion within a looser mi litary alliance, or me rely reduce its influence and bargaining position, small though it may be, vis-ii-vis Washington? The second factor has· been Canada's capacity to produce the goods. Canada is one of the best equipped military powers among those of secondary rank. Without such an establishment it could not respond to requests fo r military training from

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Ghana and Tanzania. Expertise, experience, and diversity have been major factors in qualifying Canadians for international peacekeepi ng - even when th eir alignment and the colour of their skins might have disqualified them. Participation in peacekeeping operations is by no means the on ly outlet for midd le powers, but it has become a bact,gc of middlepowermanship, and the willingness to contribute and pay has given Canada a valuable reputation for responsibility. It has also, as in Cyprus or Indochina, given Canadians a right and also the first-hand knowledge to playa part in the dip lomacy of the area and to have their voice heard. The extent of that influence cannot be measured by the obvious fact that it has not been deci sive. Who do Canadians think they are, even at their best? Their record in economic aid and development is not as good; but, especially in such large projects as the Canada-India reactor or the Warsak Dam in Pakistan, it has been of sufficient co nsequence to be noted. There see ms no serious difficulty in Canada's continuing to produce the goods, and the policy adumbrated in the Defence White Paper of 1964 suggests increased attention to the capacity for peacekeeping. This, however, is not the issue. The questions about peacekeeping are whether there will continue to be conflicts for which this technique is applicable and whether Canadians wi ll be wanted. No one knows whether the United Nations will be able to mount new operations. Canada's alignment with the United States ma y disqualify it for any further assignment in Indochina and damage its reputatio n for independent thinking. This kind of work may be taken over by regiona l bodies such as the O.A.S. or the O.A.U. or the Arab League to which Canada does not belong. On the other hand, si nce the Congo operation, when Canadians first began wondering whether they would ~ve r be wanted again, they have been asked to serve in Yemen, West Jrian, and Cyprus - in fact in every United Nations' operation that has been set up. These obligations and opportunities never have been predictable and never will be, but the law of averages may be commencing to work, and that law suggests Canadians should count on getting furthe r work. Canada's alignment has been a factor of strength and also, of course a handicap. Membership in N.A.T.O. has rarely in fact bou nd Canadians to support the ca uses of their colonialist allies. Because it is complemented by Commonwealth ties to the anticolonialists, Canadians have bee n induced to work for compromise and settlement. The positions they have taken on South Africa, Rhodesia, or the Portuguese colonies, issues that could

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make or break their middle reputation. have been determined not so much by their alliance as by their mi xed pragma tic and idealistic approach to such questions. These posi tions reflect recognition. from Canadian experience. that colonialism and s elf~g ove rnrnent are complex issues. Embarrassment in colonial issues affec ting their allies has also persuaded Canadians to keep their mouths shut. to avoid denouncing either side. and this kind of discretion has been one of th eir qualifications fo r an intermediary ro le. Alliance with the great Western powers has given Canada influence where powers can command. There is reason to believe that the non~aligned have taken Canada more seriously because it is a country wh ich they think has the ea r of Washington and London. On the other hand. there is no doubt that Canada had to fight against suspicion of its independence over Suez and the Congo, and it must constantly prove itself by giving evidence of independent thought and action . Possession of nuclear weapons, regardless of fanc y arrangements about keys. does affect Canada's reputation in middle power diplomacy. On the other hand, there is no evidence that it has been decisive. The fac tor of alignment ought not to be regarded too categoricall y. Canada's N .A.T.O. alliance has always been counterbalanced by its other associations. especiall y the Commonwealth. Canadians have never considered themselves at the United Nations as fixed members of any bloc and have tried to pay due regard to their loyalties to both N.A.T.O. and Commonwealth associations. This has been a dangerous game for a country th at needs to make friends to influence events, but it has done reasonably well and honed its diplomacy in the process. Its role in the transform ation and maintenance of the new Commonwealth has abetted Canada's reputation, provided it with close and influential friends. and given it intimate rel ationships with the major nations of Asia and Africa. Its special role is nowhere better illustrated than by the military training missions sent to G hana and Tanzania. This association with differe nt camps can continue so long as the camps maintai n their liberality of outlook. It wou ld be threatened on the one hand by an increasingly formalized Atlantic community or on the other hand. a more likely prospect, by the intensification of racial antagonism over Rhodesia and South Africa. a split in the Commonwealth. or the replacement of the present African leaders by fanatical racialists or communist stooges. There are many other factors in middIepowermansbip of

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course. I have mentioned in detail those which seem basic and are too often ignored. Canadians concentrate a little too much on the purity of their souls, their freedom from the blight of imperialism-whatever that is-and their genius for compromise. I do not want to be cynical. There is something in all these claims. At the very least Canadians' hyprocisy sets them standards of conduct at which to aim. They ~hou ld not fo rget , however, that they and their reputation are getting a bit tarnished after twenty years of the kind of active diplomacy that has rarely satisfied anyone. They are no longer looked upon as a fresh young force come out of the north. They have left a lot of people with grudges against them, and they dare not act as if they are still universally lovable. Tbey bave passed the test of not being old-fashioned imperialists, but they may not be as free of the test of neoimperialism, as their financial and industria l enterprises spread throughout the globe and Canadians come to be tangible figures instead of fair.y princes in faraway places. As for the genius for compromise, I have no doubt" that Canada's existence as a bi-tribal state has not only tempered its international political awareness; it has also been a source of inspiration to new tountries struggling against much greater odds to establish multi-tribal states. I have no doubt also that a stronger assertion of the French fact in Canada wou ld strengthen Canada's diplomatic hand. However, Canadians must avoid getting a reputation abroad for intolerance rather than compromise, and internal tensions may inhibit the vigour of their foreign policy. Canadians must look at the future of their foreign policy with hard realism but without cynicism . They cannot live by old slogans. Every nation's foreign policy must undergo constant re-examination in the light of changing world circumstances. If the old ways no longer fit the circumstances they must be cast off. However. something must be fou nd to take their place. It is easy to be ironical about the phrases Canadians have clung to - like the term " middle power" itself; it is so contradictory, it provokes sarcasm. Its ach ievements have inevitably been so far short of its pretensions that it can be made to sound flatulent. I recognize, furthermore. that it prescribes a sophisticated and perhaps too professional approach to be generally understa ndable or acceptable. An impatient public has frequently demanded more tangible proof of success. Canada's young idealists are frustr:tted by what seems to them moral deviousness. But Canada cannot avo id forming a conception of its role in the world if it is to be an indepe ndent state at all. Even an acceptance of satellite status is a logical conception,

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however unattractive. If the conception is to be rea lislic, adapted to the size of the country and the shape it is in, it is bound to be complex in nature, sensitive to equilibrium and opportunity, and for the most part discreet. At the same time it must be wrapped in an acceptable formula, oversimplified of course but honest, to give Canadians some kind of guide and an idea of which they can be proud. The danger of delusions of grandeur is, on the whole, to be feared less than the danger of paralyzing abnegation.

J

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4: Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy Nationalism is best regarded as neither a blessing nor a curse but as a hist orica l fact. The reasons for viewing the phenomenon with scepti cism need no reiteration. However, the present prejudice against nationalism is largely a respo['1se to recent European experience. It is assoc iated with a special linguistic and tribaJistic concept of nationa lism only pa rtl y relevant to the Western Hemisphere or Africa. States in these areas - most of which are not, in the European sense, nat ional states at all - are products of the vagaries of imperial administration rather than the ethnic assert ion of tribes and clans. Nigeria, Colombia, or Ca nada differ from the conventional nation-states of Europe in th at they are ei ther multi-tribal or a subd ivision of a larger tribe. They are quite capable of exhibiting the malevolent nationalism of the Europe,an tradition, but they have special qualities and functions to be taken in to consideration when one estimates the appropriate role of nationalism in a viable design for the globe. Canada is a very special case. It is a bi-national state where the term "nationalism" is used ambivalently. Rather than pursue definitions, I propose to treat both uses as valid. For the most part I am concerned with the nationa lism of the entity Ca nada, which one might call "Canada-ism" or less aptly but more fluently "Canadianism," begging the question whether a binational state is a nation. (One virtue of its nationalism can, of course, be pride in its bi-nationa lism.) I shall also touch upon the impact of French-Canadian "nationalism" on our foreig n policy. As for English-Canadian nationalism, it is doubtful if it exists at all apart from Canadian nationalism. One ought not, however, to ignore the triba lism of Anglo-Saxon Canadians associated either with an imperi al clan or now, more often, with the idea of the natural superiority of English-speaking peoples. Either in identification with the empire or with the United States this tribalism has usualy been a counter-national or counterCanadian force. That fact does not necessarily make it disc red itable. In its considerab le influence on Canada's foreign relations, however, it has always had more of the sectarian characteristics of f'national ism" than has strictly Canadian nationalism which, This chapter was originally an essay prepared for a seminar of the University League for Social Reform and appears in a book entitled Nat ionalism in Canada edited by Peter RusseU, copyright C 1966, McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited. SOURCE:

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whether it is constructive or merely competitive, is normally harmless. The central problem of pan-Canadian nationalism has .been the need to find a reason for the country's existence. The disadvantage of the synthetic state such as Canada is that it lacks a visceral drive to achievement. Its advantage is that it is more likely, althougb not predestined, to find a rational justification for its existence. Canada was the product of a resistance movement. From 1791 to 1871 the evolution of the Canadian state was a sheltering together of those northerly North Americans who. for varying reasons. did not want to be absorbed into the United States. Some. like the Quebeckers, wanted to preserve their culture; others, like the British Columbians, wanted to stay in the British empire. The idea of Canada was to come later. Resistance to the active and passive pressures of the United States was a rational enough foreign policy for the first century or two. However. it has not alone been sufficient since the transformation of the United States from an ogre into a benign ally and since the identification, in the past half century, of distant devils who are less well known and feared more. 1 The n~tional­ ism of Canadians is not now stimulated by the threat of military aggression. Their anxiety about national survival is attributable to fear of their own fa ilure of will. In an earlier age, Canadians would have needed no more justification fo r being a state than that they lived on the lands their forefathers had conquered or cultivated, and that they proposed to go on doing so. Canadians come of Messianic stock, however; the spirits of John Knox and Jean de Brebeuf haunt them. Their neighbours have indoctrinated them with the assumption that a nation must be ordained for a benevolent political purpose. Canada came to nationalism late, after the Europeans had discredited it. In the pseudo-sophistication of this late adolescence, many Canadians would rather let the country fall apart than be accused of nationalism, a "weakness" not only "malign" but also "corny." Some find pride in Canadians having conceived the immaculate nOD-nation. A majority recognize with satisfaction, but without erpotion. the blessings of a country that demands little of them - in the way of service or conformity. Perhaps it is in the external policies of the past two decades, however, that Canadians have done more to satisfy themselves and others that existen,ce as an independent state is 1

I think this statement is still valid for the great majority oC Canadians, althaugh for a very articulate group the United States has been restored as a malign ogre.

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fortunate and th at disappearance would be unfortun ate- thou gh hard ly trag ic. The instinct wi thin Canadians for constructi ve natio nalism is perverted by the irrascibility of their defensive nationalism. T he latter is, in their case, the special peevishness of a lesse r power which has required a minimum of heroism in its struggle with aU too reasonable great powers. Canada bas been un healthily preoccupied all its nati onal life with two powerful states; its nationalism was nourished on resista nce to bot h the United States and Btitaio. Whil e it resisted .the encroachment of the Americans 0 0 the frontier, the attentio n of Ca nad ia n governments was directed to securing by manreuvre and negot iation independe nce fro m Britain - not too much independence, however, because Britain had to be a counter-weight to pressures fro m the South. But when the British showed reluctance to stand up to the Yankees on Ca nada's behalf, the Ca nadian government was moved to take the direction of foreig n policy more and more into its own hands. Ca nada was less a lin chpin tha n a nui sance in Anglo-American re lations. Canadian nationalisfll learned early to seek security by playing off one great power against another, and the technique still comes naturally though less successfully. It took a longer time for Canadian nationalists to learn that Canada wo uld have to break out of this isosceles triangle if it were ever to take a respectab le place in the international commu ni ty. Two' world wars, N.A .T.O., and the U nited Nations sent Canada looking for allies its own size although Canadians still suffer from a myopic concentrat io n on North Atlantic affairs. It is hard to und erstand why it was half a century after Confederatio n and the establishment of the Canadian Idea before co ntrol over exte rn al relati ons was se riously sought. Control over things that mattered to a pioneer communi ty, such as commerce and border problems, was assumed , a nd Canada had ne ither the resources nor the will to seek a role in world politics. The hallucinat ions of Jubilee imperialism distracted those few Canadians with enough imagination to not ice the world beyond the tri angle.2 Co ncern for external relations was largely directed to questions of status with in the empire. The nati onalism wh ich followed the F irst World War was ambivalent about whet her the Ca nadian destiny, of wh ich all Ca nadians 'This kind of schizoid nation alism is well illustrated by the Nova Scotian bard who wrote: " Hail our great Queen in her regalia; One fool in Canada, the other in Australia."

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were more consciolls, sho uld be primaril y imperia l or national. Mackenz ie Ki ng, who dom in ated the era, rejected the fo rmer, and in so doing absentmindedl y created the Com monwea lth of Nat ions, with himse lf as its prophet. H e was not, however, genu inely interested in his crea tion. Fortunately he left the scene in time fo r his successors to recognize in the Commonwealth a useful instru ment of Canadian national policy. Unfortunate ly, the legacy of the long arg umcnt betwcen unsound but imag inative imperia lists and sound but unimag inat ive nati o nalists has been a public opinion whi ch, confused by old shi bboleths, has Jagged beh ind its government (Liberal o r Conservative) in appreciat ing the Commonwea lt h as a Ca nadian sphere of interest. U p to 1945, Engl ish Canadia ns, when they thought about it, fo un d the ir justifi catio n for ex istence in a conscio usness of moral superiority ove r the·corrupt and (as in 1914 and 1939) cowardly Ya nkees, in the rad iance from Westm inster, and in the fact that Canada was a coveted have n for the poor and oppressed of E urope. French Ca nadians saw the ir m ission in fa survi vance. In the Second World War the fr ustrations of being the third stro ngest all y - but with little influence - encouraged a new idea of the Canad ian miss ion. Instead of a country that could see itself only in a mirror, Canada would stand on its own as a "middle power." Being, as it was for a time after the wa r, the strongest of th is newly conceived category of states, Canada fanc ied itself, along wit h Australia and a few ot hers, as a spokesman and champion of the midd le powers. It was a new front, which crystalized in 1945 at San Francisco. T he idea of a united Commonwealth front had been finally rejected in 1944 at the prime min isters' meeting in London. The Commonwealth was soon to begin turn ing out new middle powers in a pattern which strengthened the new Canadian concept of a hierarc hical com mun ity of states and Canada's role therein . The U nited Nat ions accorded to all powers an equa li ty which, however unreal in terms of power, tempered the sign ificance in diplomacy of the mili tary might of great powers. The front of the great powers was itself dissolved in cold war. Ca nada's position in the world was st rengt hened, furthermo re, by internal fac tors. The old schizoph reni c pull between th e imperialists and the con tinentalists was tranqu ill ized by the new pa rtnersh ip of Brita in, France, and the Un ited States in N.A.T.O. lsolat ionalism was dead in North America. As a result, domestic te nsions over Canada's external associations subsided. When Ca nadians next went overseas to fight - in Korea - there we re more volunteers from Quebec th an from th e other prov-

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inces. A strongly entrenched government had for a decade an unprecedented consensus behind it in support of a vigorous Canadian foreign po'licy. From the perspective of 1965 , the consensus may seem more apparent than real because of the quiescence of French Canada. Yet this foreign policy was designed by English and French Canadians who together nourished a policy positive enough to_appeal to most varieties of Canadian nationalism without offending unduly the susceptibilities and prejudices of ei ther of the major elements in the country. Only fanatical mi norities - from the British, French, and Slavic communities - were at odds with a policy in which a new Canadian nationalism found its outlet in active internationalism. The United Nations has been a boon to Canadian nationalists. As an in ternational rather than a supranational organization, it satisfies the Canadian predilection for a cautious mixture of pragmatism and idealism, and it avoids the principle of collective securit y of which they have always been sceptical." It has also provided a stage on wh ich Canada could emerge from the shadow of the great powers, which gives it complexes, and could establish an unm istakable identity. It has given Canada the chance to prove itself, to gain a reputat ion in the world . In the past decade it has offered also a congenial military role which has given the country a sense of purpose for its armed forces not so readily felt for the more subordin ate role of lesse r military allies - important and essential though that role may be. Pride in the mediatory role has given a certain style to Canadian diplomacy. The reputation for objectivity is sought. Comment on world events is muted, and emphasis is placed on maintaining contact even'with international malefactors. This style has differed considerably from that of the Uo ited States, either because of Mr. Dulles's intolerance of grey positions or because of the imperatives of American leadership, a factor wh icq. has made the style particularly coogenial to Canadian nationalism. There is no escape - and for the most part no strong will to escape - from the obligation to solidarity on basic things with the United States, The difference in category, the variation in the role, is all the more to be welcomed, therefore, 'It has been fashionable since the last war to deride Canadians' hostility to the collective-security provisions of the League and in par-

ticular their volfe-lace on oil sanctions against Italy, Their hostility was attributable partly to a neurotic fear of getting involved in a wicked world but also to a shrewd realization that a League which did not embrace aU the major natioll3 ought not to pretend that it would enforce collective security,

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by the nationalist. Restlessness over the United States' foreign policies is a constant element in Canadian fore ign atlitudes, both public and official. The expression of such sentiments is rationalized as the obligation of the most loyal of friends to be candid. The rationalization is well justified, but tbe need to dissent is essential to Canadian mental health. This concept of the distinct vocation of states was at the root of the so-called "functional theory," which Canadians advocated at the end of the Second World War. It was a rationalizat ion of the new nationalist approach, an atlempt to find a sensible and possible occupation for Canada in a world in which, Canadians full y recognized, the mo~t important thing was that the great powers should combine to keep the peace. As Mr. K ing defined the theory on July 9, 1943, it was a recognit ion that in international institutions effective represe ntation could not be restricted to the great powers or extended to all states. It must be determined on a functional basis, according membership to "those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question." Although Canada got the principle written into one article of the United Nations Charter,4 it cannot be said to have dominated world organization ever since. Canada, as one of the three original atom ic partners, did become the only non-great power to sit on the United Nat ions' Energy Commission, by inheritance, on subsequent bodies seeking disarmament. This role as the leading middle power on disarmament quest ions did much to establish the Canadian position in world affairs and satisfy Canadian narionalism. At the same time it created exaggerated notions of Canada's permanent place in the galaxy. This illusion has led to frustration and, at times, to a self-defeating concern for status rather than function (since Canada's position among midd le powers suffered a relative and natural decline because of postwar readjustments) . Nevertheless, functional ism has provided Canadian nationalism with a frame of reference that encourages it to seek an impact proportionate to its energy and resources, without exhausting its zeal in futile effort and making itself ridiculous by universalist fantasies. The functionali st habit of mind can also lead Canada through the menace of contemporary rhetoric from those who would tear up the country's roots in the name of abstractions such. as I.

Article 23, which says that in ejecting the six non-permanent members of the Security Council due regard should be pn id in the first instance to the con tribut ion of members to the mnintenance of international pence and security.

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Atlantic unity, the West, the hemisphere, regionalism, or world federalism . The need to find expression for the uniquely Canadian role and to avoid losi ng national identity encourages the Canadian instinct for practical and suitably unsy mmetrical international institutions. Canadians prefer a world organization, like the United Nations, which does not pretend to act like a govern ment but is rathe r a congeries of councils and agencies, each with its function and a constitution and membership sui ted to" that function - dominated but not run by the great powers. For Canadians it is better, even regionall y, to have N.A.T.O. for defence and O.E.C .D., with a differe nt set of members, for economic development than a rigid Atlantic federation which we know would not work. Above all, Canada has been encouraged to strengthen its independence by maintaining overlapping memberships in various clubs: N.A.T.O., the Commonwealth, and the shifting alignments of what the Economist called the "Sanitavian bloc" in the Un ited Nations' Assembly.Ci The acquisition of membership in the Organization of American States would' seem to be in aco rd ance with this aspect of the nationalist impetus. It has been in co nflict, however, with another nationalist instinct, that of avoiding a situation which might subvert Ca nada 's independence by too close an alignment with the United States, and the canny fear of provoking qu arrels with the Americans on remote issues that might jeopardize Canada's immediate economic interests. This caution looks like the old defensive nationalism, but in the changed circumstances it may reflect Canadians' new confidence in their ability to playa part in the hemisphere without tying their hands. The shift in the external posture of Canadian nationalism from Mr. King to Mr. S1. Laurent was revolutionary. In 1939, Mr. King complained, not without justification, that it was madness to expect Canadians every twenty years to rescue a continent which could not run itself. When Canada was elected to the Unite.d Nations' Security Council in 1947, Mr. St. Laurent said that questions having their origins far away from our shores were, in so far as they were factors of world security, "of first importance to the future of th is country." Mr. King had ac· quired for us the right to a national foreign policy and built up the resources to exercise it, but he was more concerned with defending the right than using it. He seemed to think we were too weak and too virtuous to be let loose in a wicked world. 'That is, the Scandinavian states, Canada, Ireland, and a few others who constantly pursued compromise solutions or resolutions to reconcile the blocs.

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His defensive mentality has not been exorcised from the land. Nevertheless, the idea that sovereignty may be extended as well as limited by combination and alliance superseded the old nervousness about commitments. The paradoxes of an alli ance role are not always comprehended. There lingers an assumption that we can reject commitments to an allia nce like N .A.T.O. or a brotherhood such as the Commonwealth and at the sa me time play a decisive role in determining their policies. On the whole, however, Canadians have accepted the proposition that our nationalism is better served by e nl arging our influence through group activity th an by standing guard over a sove reignty which leaves up impotent. We have learned what Mr. Kin g didn't seem to sense, that chastity may be noble, but it isn't very creative. The concept of the middle power as a constructi ve force in world politics is one for the recognition of which Canada can claim some credit. Whether it was essentiall y a rationalization of the needs of Ca nadian nationalism or a response to the requirements of intern ational politics may be argued. Probably it was both. That it can be the basis of our continuing foreign policy is, howe ve r, a question that should be consta ntly under review. The dan ger is that Canadians will be impelled to seek tbis kind of fulfilment whether or not it is required; that an agg ressive determination to middlepowermanship will offend or amuse the international community, thereby dissipating th e reputation for se nse and judgement on which the success of the role depends. Relations among powers shift, and the middle-power concept could be a passing phase. It has represented, in fact, a deviation f rom the tradition al attitude to lesser powers. Walter Lippmann, in his statement of American war aims during the last war, said: "We must not, as many do, identify the rights of sman nations with their right to have an 'independent' foreign policy, that is to say one which manipulates the balance of power among great st.ates."o Before the new day of United Nations' diplomacy the conventional role of lesser powers was exemplified in most minds by Sarajevo not, as at a later stage, by Suez. Now, however, Canada is urged by influential Americans to preserve its national independence for mediatory purposes.7 At 'Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims (Boston, 1944), p. 84. ""An address prepared for delivery by Harlan Cleveland, United States Assistant Secretary of Stale for International Affairs, at the Annual Meeting of the United Nations' Association in C anada, June 6, 1965: Member of the Pa rish," esp. p. 3 or Final Report ot the Twenty-fifth American Assembly, Th e United Stales and Canada (New York, April 23-26, 1964), esp. p. 5.

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the same time lesser-power nationalism as aD abstraction is under increasing assault. Amalgamation is in the air. Supranationalism is regarded as a hi gher principle than nationalism, and regional ism is looked upo n as the wave of the future . Alt hough th e fede ral world state is regarded by few as an imminent solu tion, many seem driven by the assumption that salvation is to be sought by moving towards the central switchboard, the single global computer. The iro n law of eco nomics is believed to be mass production , ama lgamation, centralization. National bo undaries are regarded as anachronistic a nd artificial. It is fo rgotte n that they resulted not merely from tribal passion but also from the groping of diverse peoples to establish governable uni ts on an uneven and irregular planet. As populations grow and the fu nctions of governme nt mult ipl y, this planet's political and administrative requ irement may be for smaller states and decentra lized government. National ism and internationalism are confused by these paradoxes. Canada may be caught between political arguments for nationalism and economic and strategic argumen ts for supranationalism. (The argument for internationalism, the co-operation of natio ns in the common inte rest, is not questioned. ) The obvious political requirement for a stronger Canadian ism to enable the confederation to work more effectively runs counter to the anti-nationalism or rather a-nationalism of tbe business community. There are valid arguments on both sides, but Canadi ans may get the worst of both worlds - the perpetuation of a political state rendered anremic by the disco uragement of any nat ional fee ling. The antago nism to Ca nadian economic nationalism is abetted by the fashio nable prejudice against political nationalis m as well as by premature ex trapolat ions from the early successes of the European common market. Canadians are co nfronted also by well-intentioned but dubious arguments for supranationalism by Ameri cans a nd Europeans seeking a way out of the paradoxes of an un equal alliance. In their anxiety' to share the military burdens of the N.A .T.O. alliance and to offer at least the appearance of sharing policy decisions, spokesmen of the Wash ington ad ministration and noble-voiced citizens pour scorn on petty nationalism - other people's nationalism, of course - and proclaim the need to find unity in Atlant ic institutions in which all would sacrifice their nationalism and sove reignty in a common will . That that common wil1 is bound to be Washington's should be obvious. The result of this mutua l sacrifice would be that in exchange for a nominal share in policy-making the other countries would give

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up their moral ri ght to differ with the United States. While they possess the decisive power, and are committed all ove r the wo rld, the Americans cannot be asked to surrender the right to decide thei r foreign policy, although they can be expected to pay more attention to the views and interests of their allies. Other countries, howeve r, will be cau tious about allowing the United States, more ingenuously than by design, to rob them of th at independence they possess in the name of supranational institutions. For Canada the siren song is particularly strong because its own natio nalism can be made to seem perverse and helpless. The term "community" is easily bor rowed from the entirely different circumstances of a multinational Europe to disguise annexation. There is, of co urse, a sta ndi ng argument for a nnexation, and it is not a fale worse than death. Nevertheless, if it is to be chosen, the choice should be calculated. If Canada wants to remain an entity, it must have a nat ional foreign policy. To surrende r its sovereign ty to a genuinely international institution might in the ri ght circumstances be a contribution to wo rld order. To hand it over to the United States might bring so me advantages to Canadians or Americans, but it is not likely to make the world a better place for anyone else. It would mere ly encourage the dangerous world trend towards bipolarization. Nor is it likely to reduce the level of global nat ionalism. The final achievement by the United States of its manifest destiny on this continent might well be followed by an in tensification of America n nationalism - of wh ich its new northern citize ns would no doubt be the most extravagant advocates, after having been liberated from a na tionalism which had perforce to worship good sense and moderation. One cannot be sure, of course; a united conti nent, confident of its power, might turn benign and serene. The kind of Canadian nationalism th at finds its outlet in effective middle-power diplomacy may wi ther because it does not appeal to a restless public. Many people are impat ient of its moderation and sobriety and, above all, of its "quietness." They want to fi ght real devils, nucle ar weapons, and segregationists, with whi ch there can be no comprom ise. Although English- or French-speaking youth are to some extent united by such sentiments, th ey are separated by the preoccupation of French Canadians with their own problems and the preoccupation of English Canadians with other people's. POlitically-conscious English Canadians are often obsessed by a humanitarianism which, almost as a matter of principle, removes th eir attention

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from the issue which threatens to tear their own country aparl; it is as if such concern would be evidence of nationalism and, therefore, less virtuous than intervention in other countries' problems. Those who demand a strongly nationalist Canadian foreign policy - of resistance to the United States over Vietnam or the Caribbean - arc not always nati onall y conscious enough to rea li ze that they are foreigners in Alabama. To suggest to them that priority might be given to their own coun try's prob· lems is rejected as offensive to the brOlherhood of man. One is tempted to ask, however, whether involvement in the Canadian issue is less attractive because it requires ratiocination, and possibly sacrifice and commitment, in place of heady emotion and adventure from which withdrawal is easy. One is reminded of what Daniel Webster desc ribed as "that wanderi ng and vagrant philanthropy" which healed "the imagination on sub· jects distant, remote, and un cert ai n." It is the kind of comfort· able internationalism that saves Canadians from the noiso me and intractable issues that confront them , and warms their hearts with noble sentiments and apocalyp tic visions. 11 is not in the better trad ition of Canadian foreign policy, which has sought to exploit the peculiar advantages of the Canadian position in the general interest. Nevertheless, th is restlessness cannot and should not be di smissed by those who see Canada's role in coolly professional terms. If Canada's foreign policy is to be maintained it must be popular, a little less immaculate, and a little more vulgar than the "mandarins" prefer,s It must provide some occasions for shouting and for standing up fo be counted. Defying the Yankees in order to prove Canadians' viri lity is chi ldish. but when there is good cause Canadian independence must be made manifest. As one young Canadian put it: "Our present, actions may have solid worth in themselves, but they appear grey and oh so solid." There is a re lationship between nat ionalism and independeoce. One of the requ isites for Canada's playing any disti nct ive role, other than that of satellite, is the maintenance of a considerablc degree of independence. The strength and vitality of its ration alism is an important eleme nt of its independe nce. Without a sense of identity, pride, attachment to his own group, the citizen becomes too suscep tible to external influences to sustain a national fore ign policy. Nationalism itself is a function in parI of what a nat ion accomplishes in international society. So the foreig n policy of Canada must be des igned to bolster 'See two articles on Canada's rale as a middle power by Lloyd Axworthy in the Winnipeg Fru Press (September 8 and 9, 1965) .

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Ca nadi an nationa lism and, in so doing, to bolster Ca nadian independence. Otherwise, Ca nadia ns perish, o r at least are diminished. H owever misg uided the public restlessness may seem, for th e most part it represents fru strated idea lism that needs a n ou tl et. It is infinitel y preferable to th e cy nicism abo ut the Canadi a n role in th e world whi ch is a ll too com mon. If it is too ofte n directed towards telling Washington what to do , that may be because it bas not fe lt able to communicate with Ottawa. Ca nada's national foreig n policy is threatened by supranatio nalism and also by bi-nationa lism. An urgent ques tion to be faced is whe ther the polic y 1 have been desc rib ing is compatible with the bi-nationalis t approach of th e new voices in Quebec. (The sepa ratist argument can be disrega rded. not because it is illogical or un atta inable but beca use it is irrelevant to a discussion of the foreign policy of Ca nada whi ch, however organized internall y, is considered a n ent it y in the world community.) It seems to me that Ca nada 's trad itiona l midd le-power policy is no t incompatible with the French-Canadian conse nsus on what the country's national foreign poli cy should be, altho ugh th ey wou ld interpret it o therwise. If a nyt hing, F rench Canad ia ns wou ld propel Ca nada further in the direction it has been moving. They wo uld urge it to greater independence, in particula r less categorical identifica tion with the United States and the A nglo-Saxo n comm un ity, closer association with Latin America n a nd the French-speaking wo rld , a more sympathetic relationsh ip with F rance - but not partnership in Gaullist fo reign policy. It is a difference of emphasis rather th an ali gnment, and there is room fo r compromise. There need be no direct confrontation between French and English views of Ca nada's place in the worJd, provided th at ex tre mists on both sides do not fo rce the cou ntry into rigid alignme nts. There is already some adjustment tak ing place in Canada's alignments. There has been the effo r~ of the Pearson government to breach the fo rmi dab le gap in world ou tl ook wh ich has kept Ottawa and Paris apart since the war. Th is has bee n an act of deliberate policy, an acknowledgment as a basic fact of Canada's international orientati on th at there mu st be a special relationsh ip with F rance. It has always been recognized, of course, th at alth ough French Canada wou ld not insist on being a n all y of F rance, Canada cou ld never ha ve France as an enemy. (Even Vichy France had to be treated wit h circum specti on.) Nothing fund amental has cha nged, but the requ irement 'for mo re posi tive relat io ns with France is acknowledged a nd the

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image of Canada as a member of the Anglo-Saxon fraternity dilUled.'

This adjustment of relations with one mothercountry may be easier because of the change that has come over relations with the mothercounlrY with which the association had been closer. The decline of British power aod prestige has reduced the place of Britain in the Canadian scheme of things. Impa~ tienee of old forms and symbols bas encouraged some Cana~ dians to assert their nationalism against the relics of British suzerainty - to some extent perhaps as compensation for impotence against the realities of American domination. A souring of the old relationship has also come on the British side where good will has often given way to irritation, hostility, or boredom as a result of the Suez crisis, the imbalance of trade, dislike of North America in general, and the malevolence towards the Commonwealth which has accompanied the frustrated infatuation with Europe. The gbost of British domination has, however, almost certainly been laid. Free of the inhibitions of the past, the two countries may come to recognize morc easily that, as the two middle powers with the most vital stake in the American alliance and close and complementary national interests, they have much to gain from a partnership that will have to be closer to equality than it was in the past. Britain has always played an important part in the dogma of Canadian nationalism, and this changing relationship bas considerably altered tbe nature of the phenomenon. The prospect of the engulfment of Britain in a European union, removing as it would the traditional counterpoise, has affected the Canadian will to resist what it is fashionable to consider our regional destiny. The pattern of Canadian nationalist foreign policy is more easily mai ntained if Britain remains a maritime rather than a narrowly European power, and if the Atlantic community is a flexible fraternity of fifteen or twenty countries rather than a rigid stalemate on the dumbell pattern. It is inadvisable for Canada to oppose the development of the European Economic Comm unity, or Britain's entry into it. Canada is not required, however, to share the illusion of Washington that the transformation of six nationalisms into one subcontinental nationalism is necessarily going to make the world a healthier place. Here we must beware of contradiction. Canada's sense of national mission in this world has been encouraged by Lord 'The most unfortunate consequence of the de Gaulle visit of 1967 was that this rapprochemelJt was frustrated or at least interrupted.

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Acton's famous declarat ion: "The combinations of different nations in one state is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in society." He was, of course, thinking more of the Austro-Hungarian empire than of Canada. Canada can hope for a better fate than the Hapsburgs', although it will do well if it has as long a run as they had. Can one be sceptical of the virtues of a multi-national state in Europe and proclaim that our own bi-national state is a higher form of political organism than the nation-state? Lord Acton was perhaps too absolute in his principle. The objection to a western European political union is not that it is offensive in principle but that Europe is not ripe for it, and in federations ripeness is al l. A union too tight for the circumstances increases tensions dangerously. It is forced to nourish a common external danger and may turn mean, nasty, and aggressive rather than benign, tolerant, and generous. A western European federat ion might be in Canada's interest, of course, if Canadians were reasonably confident that it wou ld provide expanding markets or th at it would reduce the danger of conflict in Europe - rather than divide it permanently down the middle. Neither can be taken for granted. In the meantime Canada might remain neutral, viewing scepticall y the apocalyptic vision of a world which, it is proclaimed, would be redeemed if only it would follow the " antinationa list" example of a partially united Europe. On the other hand, the one-nation state is an inadequate model for a world proliferating new states at a dizzy rate. The failure of one of the oldest and most sophisticated multi-nat ional states. Canada, would be discourag ing to all the new countries striving to find viable formulae of government to encompass diverse nations and languages. Canadian nationalism must be bi-nationalist. Canadian foreign policy will be effective if Can~ ada succeeds internally. Even if the creation of vast and inef~ fectual regional federations is an uncertain panacea, there is not much to be said for splintering unions that have been in operation for two centuries. Federation is in itself neither good nor bad. The strength and fl exibility of Canadian foreign policy could. however. be unfortunately affected by certain interpretations of bi-nationalism. In such fields as human rights Canada's voice in international circles has always been muffled by the limitations of the federal system, the fact that the federal government, which must speak for Canada abroad. cannot commit the provinces on subjects reserved for them. Canada could probably go quite a long way in allowing provinces the

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right to deal with foreign governments on subjects within their jurisdiction inc1qding, of course, cultural mallers. O n political, economic, or security matters national forei gn policies should rest on a consensus of all Ca nad ians, and French Canadians have a case to argue that the ir views have had less weight than they merited. They will, of course, inevitably carry more we ight if and when French Canada turns its attention from domestic to international problems. Proposals, however, which imply that tbere is or sho uld be a separate French-Canadian co nsensus and that Canadian policies should somehow or ot her be the product of negotiation between Quebec and Ottawa threaten Canada with paralysis. There neve r has been any such thing as an English-Canadian or a French-Canadian view of foreign relations, although there are, as I have said, ide ntifiable differences in emphasis. There has been no consequential issue of fore ign policy since the last war on which the division of opinion within tbe country bas been specifically between English and French. It is not in tbe national interest to create the machinery or encourage the assumptions that could lead to separate foreign policies. It is not in the interest of French Canada to do so, for the inevitable result wou ld be the surrender of the dete rmination of federal foreign policy, the one th at counts, to the sole con trol of English Canadians. An effective foreign policy cannot be evolved in a provincial capital because it is divorced from the international life of diplomacy, conference, negotiation, secrets, and confidences. French Canada has a significant role to play in the world, one which could be pursued in an independent state of five million people; but it is more likely to be effective through a state of twenty million - only if French Canada sees its role as a partner in a national policy, rather than as an indigestible lump pi opposition. For Canada, unlike the heroic nation-state of old, national survival is not the higbest priority of foreign policy. The survival of the world, or at least a congenial kind of civilization, comes first. There are many thin gs more important for Ca nada than resisting its absorption, as a minor but influential en tity, into an Atlantic state or even national extinction by annexation with the United States. If either of these acts was essential to save Canada and others from nuclear an nihilation or totalitarian enslavement, Canadians would undoubtedly accept them. Short of that, they would even give up their nat ional identity, I presume, if it were essential to save them from an unacceptably low standard of Jiving. For the time being at least, none of these reasons has persuaded them to forego the satisfactions and the

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sec urit y they find in th eir own national life. Canadians rarely say so, but they seem to recognize the tranquil advantage of not being a grea t power. They are saved by their weakness and their diversity from the temptations of aggress ive nationalism. They are not devoid of the pettiness of nega ti ve nationalism. but their society is so free, thei r ethnic origins so varied, and the influences upon them so diverse that they cannot avoid being one of the most in ternati onal of countries. They have found, therefore, satisfaction for thei r ego in the construction of intern ational organisms that allow them to keep their identity and help build a world order at the same time. Because their it.lentity is political rath er than cultural, Canadians must, if they are to exist at all, guard their se parate constitutional framework more jealously than the nation-states of Eu rope or Asia. Canadians are dedicated to maintaining a strong United Nations because it is the kind of intern ational rather than supranational organization which suits th em, and permits them to flouri sh. They can assume with reasonable assurance, furthermore, th at their independent existence is good for the United Nat ions and that they should preserve Canada in the general interest. A threat to the United Nations is a serious th rea t to their national existence because they are cowed more easil y in the alternative world of clashing alliances and the unchallengeable rule of tbe superpowers. Let me say, in conclusion, th at I am aware that my definition of a Canad ian foreign policy and my comments on other powers and international bodies are less an analysis of facts than the imposition of a framework and a justification for Canadian nati onalism. How otherwise does one devise a fo reign policy?· Canadia ns cannot argue th at they have a divine or racial mission, that they were created for a predestined purpose. They exist; therefore they think. If what tbey think up for themselves to do is good for them and serves their ultimate interest in a peaceful and prosperous world, let them rejoice in it. Eve n the gloomiest denouncers of nationalism claim tbat the " phenomenon" of "nationalism" is not dead. In Canada, however, it can be tamed and civilized.

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5: The Public and Foreign Policy Canadians have no reason for complacency abou t the state of public opinion on international questions, its shallow approach to the deeply-rooted problems of the age. It serves no purpose, however, to denounce the public or to look for villains - Parliament, the press, or the Department of External Affairs. It would be easy to blame Parliame nt alone for the simplicity of many debates in the House on Canada's foreign policy. the feeble grasp of the issues or even of the facts of crises in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, and the neurotic preoccupation with the Canadian role rather than the health of the world. There is no use blaming the media, for they offer both salvation and damnation. Ca na dians live by their good reporting and could die from their bad reporting. It is just a question of their contriving to have more of the former and less of the latter - and by and large I think that is being done. The media will never please those who complain, like children, that the press does not tell the truth. There is no doubt that too often they don 't try, but the truth, adults must realize, is many-faceted. What, for goodness sake, is the simple truth about Vietnam? The members of the press, however, if I might insert a peevish note, are better at expressing their own opinions than recording the views of the laity. Those humble citizens who would like to contribute to the debate in Ca nada are wary of do ing so after a few experiences in which thei r subordinate clauses or whimsical addenda have been torn out of context to make fools of them from coast to coast. If to o man y "spokesme n" insist aD speaking "off the record," wast ing their wisdom in a deserted ball, the fault is not their timidity. A society's health depends on the competence and res ponsibili ty of reporters as much as on the similar qualities of teachers and preachers. 1 The most depressing excuse for public ignorance I hear is that the government does not tell people what is happeping; that the Department of External Affairs doesn't try to educate the public. I recognize a legitimate argument as to the extent SOURCE :

This chapter was originally an address to the annual meet·

ing of The United Nations Association, Montreal, June, 1967. 1

The danger to which one is subjected came home to me forcefully when a wildly erroneous report of what I said in a panel discussioD in New York gained foe me peaise in the Chicago Tribune. That is gomg too fae.

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to which the government takes the public into its confidence, but that is only a minor element in the problem of public awareness. The job of the Department of External Affairs is to advise the government not to educate the public. Since when has it been an admissible tenet of democracy that the bureaucracy should tell the public what to believe? The sources of information are everywhere, in the press, on the air, in books in fabulous quantities. This is where people learn about the world around them, if they want to. Of course, it is a lot less work to sit and gnaw a fe w strong prejudices and read only pamphlets put out by those we know we shall agree with. Seeing all sides of a question multiplies the amount of energy required. I should like to look at the paradoxes of this question, think a few unthinkable thoughts one would not dare venture in front of a reporter, ask questio ns rather than answer them. To ask quest ions honestly, it is necessa ry to predicate some unattractive ideas one is by no means convi nced of oneself. Herein lies the persistent danger of being quoted out of context. There are two themes, and they are going to get mixed up with each other. The first is what one can do, if anything, to create a more intelligent public opinion on foreign policy. The second is what part, if any, the general public should play in foreign policy. First of all, let us not dodge the fundamental question . Is there really anything that you or r or that faceless Canadian citizen, lean-Louis McGregorchuk, can do about Vietnam or anti-ball istic missiles or the National City Bank? Is democ ratic control of foreign policy possible in the age of the incomprehensible - fission and fusion, second·strike capabilities, and the computer that will beat us at checkers? Even with the new math, how m~lOy people could grasp all that bargaining at the Ken· nedy round of tarif! talks? What is most di sco ncerting is that just when a person thinks he has a grip on one aspect of policy, he is told that everything he ever knew has been rendered obsolete by the sage of St. Michael's Col1ege. I do not know whether I dare speak at all, for the fashionable social scientist thinks it is only one's motivation that matters. I have a vested interest in the propagation of international affairsmanship and anything I say about the relation between public opinion and foreign policy is to be regarded not for its substance but merely as evidence of the bias of one kind of "Establishment" or another. Having classified me as a white, Anglo-Saxon ex.-bureaucrat, what I have to say would be disposed of. The categorization is the message. We suffer,

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as Jacob Viner used lO say, fro m hardening of th e ca tegories. It is, I know, old-fashioned lO take a stand for any of the eternal ve rit ies. Even mo th erhood is o ut of fashion because of its mi schievous effect o n the population exp losio n. I have been a bit cy nica l a lready a bout freedom of speec h and the press. Now J propose to take an eve n mo re cynical look at the shibbo leth of foreign policy for the peo ple and by the people. Most of us have, I suppose, handled the question from school ch ildren or thei r middle -aged eq ui va lents of whether or not the publ ic should be interested in foreign policy. The reply was probably a sound talk o n the benefits a nd the responsibilities of democ rac y, encouraging the yo ung to learn as much as poss ible about V.N.C.T .A. D. and U.N.F. 1. C.Y .P. and the problems of Mrs. Gand hi ; th e differences be tween Ghana, Guinea, and Gu yana - offering a few si mple illustrations of the belief th at knowledge heals all interna tiona l ills and that the truth shall make us free. But how ca n o ne now take for granted that the better educated a people are the wiser the ir governments will be? Nazi Germany ended easy opt imi sm on that sco re. Mary McCarth y, in her recent reports fro m Vietnam , ha s some frightening if jaund iced co mm ent s to make o n the applicat ion of the most refined and scient ific intelli gence of the new political economists to the age-old problems of Sout heast As ia.

It is peculiar that the academic experts who have been studying guerilla techniques, Communism , "wars oj liberation" jar nearly two decades ha ve been una ble to jace the question oj intention in this kind oj warjare, where com batants and noncombatants are all but inseparable, while reaching a point close 10 perjection. 2 As for knowledge being th e key to intern ational understanding, one sometimes wonders whether Canad ians are not better off baving tbe good will of their American neighbours ratber than their und erstanding? It is nice to trust th at if Americans know Canadians thoro ugh ly th ey are bound to see what lo vable people we are, but I suspect Amer icans would , if the y paid more attent io n to us, be less tolerant. I am terr ified by the thought of those computerized American graduate schools taki ng up Canada as a scientific study, the way they analyze Afghanistan , churn ing out hundreds of specialists, masters of every Canadian statisti c, who with the best will in the world would want to come North to re-stru cture us. Faced with the .IMary McCarthy, Vie/flam (New York , 1967), p. 86.

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stolidity of the many Canadia n "Establishm ents," 1 am sure they co uld turn to counter-insurgency. Then, of course, o nce we had a little bo nesH o-God insurgency pro and can in this country VIe co uld ge t headlines fro m Bango r to Bonanza. It is a vicious circle, and there are times whe n I think 1 li ke my neighbours wrapped in the benevo lent cocoon of ignorance. A lot of k nowledge is a dan gero us thing. ]n my cynical moments, I wonder if we are not more in danger now from the quick acceptance of cliches abo ut international affa irs by the half-educated th an we are from mass ignorance. Th is is especiall y true when we are so manipulable by the media and do no t eve n know whell we are being massaged. We shift from one fa shi o nable idea to another. A few comm ent ators can set the whole Western world babbling a theory about Mao o r McNamara wh icb is repeated as gospel for a fortnight un til another clever o ne takes its place. In June, 1967, whe n th e Americans sent ground troops for the first time into th e de-militarized zo ne of Vie tnam and U Thant reca lled the United Na tio ns E mergency Force (V ,N.E.F.) from Gaza, a chorus of Canadian comme ntators, who assume that pronouncing obiter dicta and ass uming cynical postures give them the appeara nce of profundity, wrapped this all up in thunderous phrases about the colJ apse of Ca nad ian foreign pol icy - and that was the thing to say for ;t week. Neither even t was cheerful, but the fac ts and implications of eac h were different and they filted into no neat one-minute-and-forty-five-seco nd form ul a. It was not good news for Canad ians, but th e effect was made worse by this act of dramatization in place of calculation. Scepticism is usually a virtue, but not cynicism, and a healthy scepticism has always been, I th in k, a Canadian virtue. There are too ma ny half-baked truths tha t pass for wisdom and confuse issues. Nothing gets in the way of constructive thougbt more stu bbornly than the utterly inane idea, fo r example, that tbe world would have peace if only the desire for peace of the common man were not frustrated .by politicians, or diplomats, or the Kremlin and the Pentagon! It is the natu ral bell icos ity and greed of the common man that is at the root of the trouble. Then there are the two equall y silly convictions : on the Ri ght, that you cannot trust the Ru ssians to keep any agreement; or on the Left, th at there are no differences of interest with the Russians that cannot be settl ed by a good face-to-face talk. There are eas il y identifiable patterns into which well-mea ning people allow their prejudices to drive them, substituting a set of preconceived no tio ns for a body of opi ni ons. They have

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instant convictions on all current issues. Right or Left, they are remarkably similar in pbilosophy even tbough they seem diametrically opposed. It all depends on whether the consumer has swallowed the anti-communist or the anti-American powder - sometimes with all new, 100 per cent pure, Maple Leaf additives. Like Pavlov's dog, they drool out their little formulae at the sounds of words like C .I. A., Nasser, Cuba, or de Gaulle. Instead of probing for the complex. realities, they regurgitate familiar bits of pablum. Foreign aid all goes into the pockets of local politicians. The Sino-Soviet dispute is a communist bluff. Tbe United States government is tbe tool of the United Fruit Company and supports aU Latin American dictators. The trouble in Rhodesia is all caused by disgruntled Africans. Canada would be the leader of the non-aligned if it got out of N .O.R.A.D. The Chinese communists are just a bunch of overenthusiastic boy scouts who would be nice to Canada if it were nice to them. Sometimes there is a sad, irrelevant echo of past prejudices. There are still, for instance, a few aging Canadian nationalists left over from the thirties who want to blame the British for Canada's mistakes. They provide some comic or campy relief from current patterns of thought or non-thought. Wbat we need most of all today is tbe will and the energy to be sceptical of all glib answers, to look ruthlessly at all accepted formulae. I am almost inclined to say that if one has any clear view of anything in the world, any simple conviction of the rightness or wrongness of tbis man or that country or cause, it is better discarded. But that would be carrying things too far and ignoring the role of the visionary, the prophet, and the crusader in history. The only caution I would add is that these crusader chaps may still be necessary, but they are a lot more dangerous in a nuclear age. They always did set off a lot of killing, aod the world is equipped to do that much more, ultimately, now than in the days of Oliver Cromwell or William Lyon Mackenzie. It is hard to know what to do about the menace of the balfbaked. One way to keep the bees out of people's bonnets is to lock up the bees. These cliche-mongers would not be so tiresome or so dangerous if they knew nothing at all. A Httle knowledge is such a dangerous thing. (That classical quotation becomes even more cynical in the light of my having just said that a lot of knowledge is dangerous.) People who have just discovered that the world is round have to learn that it is also very irregular. But there is no solution to be found in keeping the facts of life from children or the masses. However discouraging this effort

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to build a new world of und erstand ing based on more knowledge and better edu cation, there is no alternative. There is no need to assume. however, that the essential requisite for the brave new world is one billion people with bonour deg rees in intern atio nal politics. So me people have to conce ntrate on driving tractors. The conduct of diplomacy and the discussion of intern ational affairs always have bee n the preoccupation of an elite. As education has spread, the elite has grown larger, but it st ill is a small minority. (I do not use the word elite in a pejorative se nse. It need not refer onl y to a coterie of the high-born and fas hionable. Because it includes all shades of opinio n it cannot be dismi ssed by using that ti resome and dated term, "Establishment. ") It is wise to recognize this role of the elite in foreign affairs if o nly to avoid that common iUusion of the aged - that is, about everyone over twenty~nine that in the late golden age the public was mu ch better informed about world affairs than are the hedonistic masses of today. There is no val id comparison. We ought not to com pare the vast masses of the literate, or even the college graduates, of today with the chosen few who were educated in the past. We would be confusing the very limited elite who used to determ ine OUf foreign policies, whether or no t they were members of government, with the vastly mult iplied circles of those who concern themselves with international affa irs today. It may well be that the small group of highly educated and broadly experienced men who did all the writing and thinking about fore ign policy until recently were informed in greater depth than are those concerned today, but they were not the general public. Nevertheless, as it was not found necessary in the past to have a general public well-informed on international affairs, is there a sound reason why this should be essential from now on? There is plenty of evidence that intervention of the general public has had bad effects on policy. The advantage of leaving things to a well informed elite was that they could un derstand issues with more perception, assess the facts with Jess passion, and act more subtly. I am aware, of course, of the view that it was th is kind of elite control of fo reign policy that caused wars, that allowed selfish interests to prevail over the people's will to peace. Since the time of Woodrow Wilson people have been susp icious of secret diplomacy. sinister and cabalistic, and the faith grew that if only the public could be allowed to take over there would be no more wars. This is a kind of th inking of which one has to be very careful. The old diplomacy bad a good many appalling sins to answer for - the totally unnecessary

50 - TIlE DETTER PART OF VALOUR outbreak of the First World War being the foremost. On tbe other hand, the new humanitarian trends in international morality set in during this same period. The beginnings of international law, the groping towards a league of nations, the abandonment of slavery, and the acceptance by imperial nations of a sense of responsibility to their non-European subjects were all in train while the general public slumbered. They can be attributed, I think, more to the influence of enlightened members of the elite than to the pressure of an informed public opinion. The most immediate result, in fact, of the effort for the first time of the editors of mass circulation journals in Britain and the United States to inform their readers on international affai rs was the creation of a jingoistic nationalism - a phenomenon that has done as much in this century to disturb the peace as the machinations of munitions-manufacturers or power-hungry dictators. . I am not arguing the counter-thesis. I am not trying to prove that diplomacy got worse when the public started to get mixed up in it and that rule by the informed elite was in all ways preferable. I am really just wondering whether this factor of an informed public means anything at all. There are so many varying factors involved in the course of international relations that it is rash to attribute good and evil to any simple factor such as the extent of an informed public opinion. This discussion as to whether or not the old diplomacy in the hands of an elite was good or bad may well be academic. The world has changed in so many ways that we cannot go back to old habits. Radio and television, swift travel, and mass circulation newspapers would seem to have made it impossibleeven in communist countries - to return to a situation in which an apathetic or docile public allows an elite to make decisions of foreign policy for it. And yet, for reasons we did not foresee, this may be exactly what is happening. It is not the old, rather aristocratic elite but a new elite of those in the know - scientists and generals and I.B .M. machines. We may have to accept the unattractive proposition that international affairs are now too difficult, too complex, and too technical for the average man and have to be left to the experts. The fate of the planet depends on our making intelligent decisions about nuclear weapons. It is hard to see how such decisions can be intelligent, however, unless those who make them understand certain fundamental things. Among these are . such recondite matters as the tactical capacity of nuclear weapons, the prospects for weapons development, the basic

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tenets of Soviet a nd Chinese policy. Policy thinkers must also have possession of top-secret intelligence information on the development of comm unist and N.A.T.O. military power. This is all for highly professional planning staffs rather than the general public, I am afraid. 11 is a fac t to be coped with ; it cannot be deplored away. International affa irs always have been complex. A knowledge of geography a nd histo ry, a sympathetic imagination, a capacity to see and to judge issues through the eyes of other peoples has been essential since ma n first isolated himself into comm unities with conflicting interests. A member of the general public has never had anything like the requisite know ledge to make decisions on such difficult questions. Today, however, he is in a much worse position, even though he is better educated than ever. The world has grown larger, and science has become more directly involved in internation al relations. The whole world is in a state of fermen t, and the sense of international responsibility fostered by the United Nations is such that if people are to make intelligent decisions on critical international questions, they have to be aware of the geography of the Mekong between Laos and Tha iland, the possibilities of detecting und erground nuclear tests, or the mystical reasons for the price of go ld. These are not questions for amateurs and dabblers. Internationa l affairs are not just something it would be so nice to know more abou t, exotic, and ever so fascinating. Nor is it a proper subject for the large proportion of neurotics in our society who infuse into it "frustrated ambitions, substitute moral indignation for ratiocination, or inject into international relations their questionable superiority over foreigners or those of the non-pink races. Walter Lippmann, when asked seve ral yea rs ago how he felt about American resumption of atmospheric tests, said firmly this was a matter on which no layman was entitled to an opi nion. If Hans Bethe, a scientist of great distinction, in whom he had grea t trust, believed that testing should be resumed, Lippman would accept it; but he would not accept such a verdict from a politician. Then there is the question of the secrecy and confidentiality of government actions in foreign policy, complicating factors too often dealt with emoti onally rather than reasonably. A great lather has been worked up in Canada over the merits of "quiet diplomacy." Diplomacy is by nature qui et and cannot very well be anything else. Canada would find itself im po tent if it insisted on conducting all its diplomacy in th e open, when no other country would think of doing so - or of even talking to people

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who could not keep a confidence. A wise country adjusts the tone of its voice to suit the e nd it wants to achieve. Those who want the Canadian government to criticize the United States publicl y over Vietnam should say specificall y th at. They should base their argument on what they consider a moral comp ul sion or on the results they expect wo ul d be achieved in this particular case, bearing in mind, of course, the consequences in other spheres on other issues. They spoil the ir cause by denouncing " qu iet diplomacy" in general terms as if it were so me form of immoral behaviour. Surely they want Canada's man in H anoi to have private talks with the North Vietnamese or the Canadian Ambassador in Wash ington to find out from Mr. Rusk in advance what the United States proposes to do about matters of interest to Canadians? Is it too much to ask rational members of the elite to recognize that on this as on all issues of foreign policy there are co nsiderations of various ki nds to be weighed. Foreign policy is the art of the possible. It is dangerous to think of it as a simple crusade. The choice is usually among unattractive alternatives, and the clashes which threaten the world are as often between conflicting rights as between right and wrong. One cannot cope with the Middle East, for example, without recognizing that the Arabs and Israelis both have right on their sides. There is certainly a time and place for government leaders to speak out loud and clear. There are other times when silence, even waffling, is li kely to be more helpful. Which course it is wise for the Canadian government to take over Vietnam is too important a matter to raise here as a side issue. I see no argument of general principle for or aga inst either. I wish peaceloving Canadians, however, would curb their prejudices aga inst qu iet diplomacy in principle, because it is much Jess belligerent than the loud-mouthed kind. Much of diplomacy must remain confidential if the world is to be something better than a screaming bedlam. It is, of course, frustrating for the citizen not to know what is going on and not to know, either, whether or not his government is in fact vigorously trying to achieve quietly the results he wants. Life is full of such paradoxes, and it is a sign of maturity to recognize and cope with them. It is quite true that governments can dece ive their public by not revealing what they are up to privately in their dealings with other governments. The revelations long after the Suez Crisis in London proved that even the most decent of democratic governments can be deceitful. Parliament and public must be vig ilant against this abuse of power. On the other hand, the Canadian government would have no chance whatsoever of affecting plans for nuclear dis-

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armament, Uni ted Na tions' peacekeeping, negotiations in Vietnam, or any of the other causes dear to Canadians if it were not prepared to enter on a basis of mutual confidence in preliminary discussions with other foreign offices or with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, or Ho Chi-minh, or the Pope. And that means that the public should not wreck the government's chance to further the cause of peace by insisting that they make full statements twice a week about what they are up to. The argument that much of diplomacy must remain "confidential" seems to me incontrovertible jf the world is to be peace-loving. The classification "secret" is, of course, something quite different. So long as there is a military factor in international relations some things are bound to reman on the "secret" list. The fact th at the classification is abused and that the passion for secrecy becomes at times ludicrous does not make a total case against secrecy. It is the so-caIled "people's revolutionary" powers who make a particular fetish of secrecy. I recognize, nevertheless, that this element of privacy, however inevitable, is a factor that militates against the maintenance of a public opinion well enough informed to make the right decisions. The dilemma is becoming greater because the facts are becoming more sensitive and infinitely more complex. Because the facts of international life are so incomprehensible and so bard to corne by, there is a real danger, as I suggested earlier, of the control of policy faIling into the hands of cliques and pressure groups. President Eisenhower, on the eve of his retirement, issued a warning against the assumption of a determining role in important questions of policy in the United States by a "military-industrial complex" with strong vested interests : In the councils 0/ Government, we must guard against the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise 0/ misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of the combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for grail ted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

One reason these people are in a dominant position is that they are among the very few who know the essential facts of weapons

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development and military capability on which American foreign policy to a large extent must be based. This knowledge is no guarantee against their being ignorant and simple-minded in their comprehension of tbe historical, economic, and social factors that make Russians or Cubans or even Americans behave as they do. There arc other and less sinister elites who play an influential role in determining fore ign policies simply because they are among the few with the IQ and training to grapple wi th the complexities. The strategic and political factors have become tbe special discipline of many dedicated people: scientists, political scientists, economists, or mathematicians in graduate schools, research institutions, government departments, and the kind of intellectual pressure cookers which flourish in California and to a lesser extent elsew here. They now form a highly influential international coterie. In Europe there are the bureaucrats and economists with their centre in Brussels who determine and shape the progress of western Europe, remote from general public opinion because they alone can grasp the patterns of tariffs and production and currency which get farther and farther beyond the comprehension of the general public. These are Dot sinister cabals. Most of these people are well-meaning and high-minded, and it is a good rather than a bad thing that they are indefatigably studying these terribly difficult problems. The question is how the general public can understand enough of what they are up to to prevent them from manipUlating foreign policy and losing touch with the citizenry. What do we make also of that Dew kind of pressure group, the New Left? It would not like to be called an elite, and yet it is self-selected, if Dot self-ordained. In its conviction that it has the answers, it is no less arrogant than the military- industrial clique. In the name of democracy, it despises accepted democratic methods of determining foreign policy. Its claim to speak for the inarticulate masses must be regarded with skepticism. Nevertheless, one is on ticklish ground if one argues with those who want to impose their views with banners and boycotts that the conventional way foreign policy is determined in even the most democratic democracies li ke Canada is impeccably democratic. It is" the product of an elite - but not a single-minded elite. None of us who are heirs of the Western traditions of freedom can forget what we owe to those revolut ionaries in the past who rose up and violently insisted upon reform. We must listen to the protesters and decide on the strength of their message whether or not we march with them . What we must resist, however, is

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tbeir claim to messianic certainty. Even if we accept the validity of righteous indignmion demonstrated, mobs in the street are not the best way to make foreign policy - or se t the price of milk. We shou ld beware also of demands for tbe total rejection of what th ey call "tbe system," because the so-called system is a complex structure, the produ ct of some milennia of trial and error, always in need of reform and of preservation. The language of total rejection is beguiling, theatrical, and juvenile. One of the grave dangers is that tbe public, feeling incapable of comprehending the issues, is running away from the issues. They should look more sensibly at the role of the people at large in an ideal conception of democratic foreign policy. It never has bee n the job of tbe average citizen to reach complex decisions. Williams James said that the purpose of an education is to enable one to tell a good man from a bad man. David Riesman has commented on James's words : "Half a cent ury later, it should also enable one to tell a good expert from a bad or unreli able expert and to know the limitations of the expertise." That is what Lippmann was doing when he 1istened to Hans Bethe. The job of the public is to choose delegates, trust them to make wise decisions, and keep an eye on them. The responsibility of the voter in a democracy is to choose between good men and bad men - not to decide what should be included in the first stage of a di sarmament program or whether to send forces to Cyprus. Choosing between good men and bad men does, however, require some knowledge of public affairs. There must also be a continuing dialogue between the delegate, that is, the M .P., and those he represents, about matters of policy. He must reflect to some extent their views, and they must approve or disapprove what he does. Even the M .P . is not likel y to be fully expe rt in international affairs himself. He and the government in general must depend to a considerable extent on the professionals in the foreign service. It is the job of the professionals to collect the facts and recomme nd policies. The government and Parliament must have enough knowledge and intelligence to decide among the policies recommended, and it is the responsib ility of the public in general to know enough to keep in power those whose policies are good and throw out those who make mistakes. A good government both leads and follows public opinion. Because it has access to more information and has the advice of a body of experts, it must offer guidance, state the alternatives, outline the facts to be faced. Sometimes a governmen t must even, because of its greater knowledge and responsibility, take

56 - THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR decisions that would probably be rejected by the public if put to plebiscites. On the other hand, a democratic government must act within limits prescribed by the wishes of the public. its understanding, and its prejudices - and by the extent of sacrifice the public will accept or can be persuaded to accept. Seen in th is perspective, it may be somewhat easier to define the value of a public well-i nformed in international affairs. A country is more likely, I think, to get a wise foreign policy if it is fo rmulated by a government in the climate provided by a wellinformed pUblic. An ignorant public is a panicky public, inclined to rash decisions. H alf-ignorant people prefer simple solutions. They tend to the conspiratorial theory of international affairs. Instead of recognizing the infinite complexity of historical and economic factors in all things, they attribute their tro ubles to the conspiracies of communist agents, international bankers, Jews, Americ3.Q.s, Anglo-Saxons, the Elysee Palace, Yippies, or some spectre called the "Establishment." They are guided by emotion without reason ; they favour drastic action in an age when the facts of nuclear power make drastic actions appallingly dangerous. Because they are selfish and narrow, they conceive of their country's role in the world in terms of its commercial or nuisance value and encourage tbeir leaders to scream at the Russians or make the Yankees sore - rather than use Canada's influence to heal breaches and grope towards a better world order. Worst of all, perhaps, they fail to understand the need for a generous Canadian attitude to less prosperous countries and put a brake on lhe government's role in this increasingly important aspect of international relations. What Canada needs is not so much a well-informed public as a rational public. One must recognize, however. th at the most irrational people are often the half-educated. Our illiterate ancestors and the illi terate inhabitants of some newly selfgoverning states today have displayed at times a quite rational ability to choose good leaders. A public which knows of international affairs only what it is told by the vicious and biased oversimplifications of irresponsible columnists and fl ip young men on radio stations is more dangerous than one wh ich can neither read nor write. It is in this climate th at Knownothingism flourishes and governments are driven or elected to pursue a narrow nationalism and breed the hate and distrust on which wars flo urish. I think we must recognize that in foreign policy - as in financi al policy and certain other aspects of government - there is an informal hierarchy of public opinion. Outside government

PART ONE: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL - 57 itself there must be a considerable body of people capable of comprehending the issues at stake and arguing over them. The government is more li ke ly to be swayed by the view of the info rm ed few than the uni nformed multitude. It is healthy that the num ber of the intelligentsia should continue to grow, but until physiologists have bee n able to perfec t the brain structure of the species it is not li ke ly to be enormous. The general public must kn ow enough of the broad issues at stake to keep an eye on bo th the governmen t and their expert elite. T hey have to know enough a bout the st rategic and economic facts of life to decide which kind of leaders they want to make the ir decisions for them. They also have to make sure th at the experts are not losing co ntac t with their interests. In part icular, they must make sure th at special groups do not in fac t make decisions over which they, the people, have no control. The responsibility of the in tellectu al elite is twofold. They sta nd to some extent between the government and th e general public. On the one hand they have to ass ist the government in finding th e answers and to criticize it responsibly - an exe rcise not to be confused with scori ng debating poi nts. On the other hand they have to spread knowledge and create a cli mate of opinion which sustains wise policy with approva l and , when requ ired, sacrifice.

Part Two: International Organization

1: International Co-operation The Hard Way A community is not so much a set 0/ institurions as a state oj mind. Even th e most ingeniously designed political inslitution.J are likely to be unworkable in the absence oj an aclive, cor· parale will 10 make them work; and conversely, when a society or nation or gro up 0/ nations is united by a spirit 0/ kinship or co-operation, the chances aTe good that even de/eclive legal arrangements can be made to function with tolerable efficiency. II. then. as 1 believe, the problem of international com· munity is essefllially psychological rather than organizational, having to do with the cultivation oj a spirit 01 shared values, mutual sympathy, and broad common objectives, then the eOort to build a co-operative world order must consist not in the dralting 0/ blueprints and grand designs but rather in th e advancement 0/ a great many projects 0/ practical co-operation, projects which, taken by themselves, may be Of lillie importance, but which, taken together, may have the effect Of shaping revolutionary new attitudes in the world.l Senator Fulbright's words go to the heart of the problem of International Co-operation Year. It is not just a pious invocation to international goodwill; it is a prescription for hard work, dedication, and commitment for all the citizenry, not just the overworked governments. The besetting sin of good people who want peace is that they are too easily beguiled by simple formulae. They are inclined to fall victim to certain heresies which are the aberrations of decent people not the errors of the wicked . One such heresy is the belief that we would have a peaceful world if everyone wanted peace, if all countries were peaceloving rather than war-loving. But since the collapse of Nazi Germany and the explosion at Hiroshima, virtually all governments are peace-loving. I do not believe that Mao Tse-tung, Brez.hnev. Nasser, de Gaulle, the generals in the Pentagon, or SOURCE: T his chapter was originally an address to the London

Council of Women, London, Ontario, April 20, 1965, at a luncheon honou ring International Co--operation Year. lFulbrigbt, "Approaches to International Community," an addre$.'l delivered at Pennsylvania State University, March, 1965.

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Paul H ellyer want war or believe in its vi rtue. They are all trying desperately to avoid it, a nd the chief hope of the world at the moment is the common recognition in \Vash ington and Moscow that nuclear war is self-destructi ve and that they must therefore never provoke eac h other too far. That is a powerful incentive to keep the peace. Those who want to rid not just Canada but the world of nuclear arms must recognize, as they co ntinue to pu rsue their end, that peace is at present ma intained by this balance of nuclear forces . Of coU[se, everyo ne wants a better arrangement, but he must be confident that it is going to work better th an the prese nt device before pushing on. I realize, of co urse , that all these people 1 spoke of as peaceloving do still carryon war - except Mr. Hellyer, who only tries to make sure that Canada can do so if it must. The communists have publicly renounced war as a means of achieving their ends, but they make an exception for what they call wars of nat ional liberation. The Americans, and also the British, believe that war is Dot a rational mea ns of securing their interests, but they feel the need of fighting, as in Vietn am or Ma lays ia, to pre~ent people from being liberated agai nst their will. All of these countri es, however, including even the Peking Chinese, do try hard to keep the li d on these wa rs, to prevent them from escalating into nuclear combat. Ma ny people believe that th e Americans or the Chinese are deliberately trying to escalate the war in Vietnam. It is necessary, however, to pe rceive that, if peace is to be preserved by mutual deterrence, it is part of the game th at each side seek to ach ieve its ends not by waging nu clear war but by threatening to do so if necessary. There still are wa rs, but there is at any rate a more conscious and concen trated effort to limi~ a nd co ntrol them than there has been in the past. that , you may say, is no way to run a world. I ag ree. One must face without flinching, however, tbe very hard question as to what other way this intensely disorderly world can be run in this year of grace. Nuclear deterrence has kept the world free of a major war for fifteen years. That is something. One must be cautious about undoing that achievement. It is not facing up to the problem to say airily that there must be an all-powerful U .N. police force to settle everything. That is simply running away from the real world governments have to cope with. Th is mayor may not be an answer to the problems of the twent y-fi rst centu ry. It is not a feas ible mechanism for dealing wi th the crises this year in Vietnam or Malaysia, next year in Rhodesia or heaven knows where. And if prescriptions are not found for this year's crises

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with the international apparatus now available, there will be progress backwards to imernational anarchy rather tban a great leap forward into a self-disci plined world. To finish with this facile belief that war is caused by warmongers, I should like to quote Senator Fulbright again: " It is not simply a question of learning to value peace over war. Virtually everybody wa nts peace, but most nations want someth ing else even rnore, be it conquest or glory or prestige or some objective or other th at is taken to be essential for its honour." The motives often appear even higher than that. In Vietnam, both sides think they are fight ing for peace and freedorn against aggression. Only too often, as in the case of Arabs and Israelis, there is a clash nol between right and wrong but between two incompatible rights that are the product of hi story. The world is by nature chaotic, and th ere are bound to be conflicts of interest between states, conflicts that are not just the product of aggressors or warmonge rs. And it is wise to avoid another one of these easy cliches, the now fashionable myth that it is all the fault of the nation-state and nationalism, and that there would be perfect peace if cou ntries would only give up their sovereignty. It is nol nationalism but rather neurotic nationalism that causes wars. Nationalism is an essential and constructi ve force in a world that is best govern ed in comfortablesized units which require a decent loyalty fro m their citizens. Some countries, like Canada for instance, would be better governed and mo re effective internationa ll y if they had a 1ittle more nation alism. You do not get rid of conflicts between peop les by wiping out the ir national boundaries and locking them all up in one state; you are more li kely to exace rbate them. Has the creat ion of the Canadian state ended conflict of interest in thi s country? Vietnamese fight Vietnamese, as Koreans fought Korea ns and Irish fought lrish. It is the clash of real interests rat her th an national sovereignty and the love of war th at causes fights to break out. Conflicts cannot be federalized out of existence, alth ough federation in certai n situations does provide a workable framework for some peoples and tribes to live together. It is a good form of government, but not the universal answer. Men are goin g to go on forever clashing and fighting for the ir in terests or their rights as they see them. What the y have to do is persuade themselves to fight in the courts or in internationa l bodies rather th an with deadly weapons. And thi s selfpersuasion is not going to be easy. One dare not ignore the fact that th e most powerful pers u ad~r to peaceful settlement, as I said before, has been the

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nuclear bomb. It has served its purpose during what one hopes will be a transition from a world which took war for granted to a world in which war will become unthinkable. I am not suggesting that you should stop worrying and love the bomb. It is a hideous fact of cOl'ltemporary life, but it is a fact which will not be eliminated by marching and chanting. The major quclear powers are beginning to establish more control over the bomb than they have ever been able to establish over less terrifying weapons. This could prove to be the break-through to a pattern for further international understandings and a forward step in man's groping for some kind of stability and equilibrium in world affairs. I say equilibrium deliberately because one cannot hope for peace, perfect peace in this world; the world has too much vitality. Stability and a less warlike world may, however, be the product of horror. It is more likely to be achieved by grappling with the fact of the bomb than by simply abhorring it. Another heresy is the belief that we can simply call on the United Nations to move in, settle all disputes and make everyone behave as we would like. What do we think the U.N. is? An agency from Outer Space with electronic pacifying devices out of a comic strip? It is not. It is "we the United Nations," as the preamble to the Charter says, the brawling nations who cause all the trouble - minus, of course, the effective government of China, which may be the most troublesome of all. The U .N. can do ooly what its members agree to do, with the resources they are prepared to put at its disposal. In a world of super powers and nuclear weapons it is ludicrous to talk as if the U.N. could muster a police army to enforce its will. The U .N. is not and never was intended to be a world government that passes legislation to be enforced. Its "one-nation, one vote" composition is all wrong for that, and there is no hope of altering th e voting pattern. It is an instrument of diplomacy; its purpose is conciljation, not enforcement. It is not true to say that its founders planned it otherwise and have been betrayed by wicked politicians and even more wicked diplomats. It was set up at San Francisco as a concert of the great powers in the hope that together they would maintain the peace. The founders were too wise to imagine that the U.N . could enforce the peace against a great power, and that is why the great powers have their vetoes in the Security Counci1. The best hope for peace is the growing realization of the Soviet Union and the United States, unde r the pressure of the bomb, that, in spite of their rivalries, they have one fundamental interest in common: the need to preserve a peaceful world in which

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they can flourish according to their own predilections. Although between them they have nearly wrecked the U.N. from time to time, it is clear that both the Russians and Americans were reluctant to do so because of that common realization. This gives us a hope that we can eventuall y get the U.N . back to the basis of great-power unity on which it was fo unded. 1 am not being cynical or trying to undermine tbe authority of the U.N. Quite the contrary. l want to keep it from strangling itself. 1 was involved in the U.N. from the days when the Charter was being drafted until it bad passed its fifteenth birthday, and, in spite of all the frustrations that entailed, I remain a true believer. I cannot see any hope in a world without the U .N . What I have learned, however, is that it has had to cope not only with its enemies but also with addled friends. Its enemies want it to do too little; some of its friends want it to do too much. Those who insist that the U.N. move in and enforce settlement of all disputes may think they are devoted to its interests, but if they had their way it would collapse quickly. Over the past two decades the U.N. has been developing capacities to deal with as many 'disputes as possible and increasing its resources for this purpose. It remains, howe ver, an association of sovereign states, and its purpose is not to govern them but to help them reconcile their interests. There is not a chance in the world tbat the great powers - or most of the smaller powers, for that matter - would agree to its being anything else. Within that framework there is an enormous amount it can do. So I return to Senator Fulbright's warning against those who think they can save tbe world by drawing up blue-prints and grand designs. The United Nations is not going to be saved by altering its Charter, although it might be improved in a few ways. It is exceedingly difficult to get any cbanges in the Charter approved; that is a great big fact of life. Members can, however, build a sounder body on the basis of tbe present Charter by dealing energetically and imaginatively with the actual problems tbat confront them. The U.N . has grow n in strength not by revising its constitution but by interpreting the Charter to enable it to cope with such crises as Suez or the Congo. The Charter should grow, like the British Constitution, from precedent to precedent. In my view one of the most lamentable forms of escapism to-day is the construction of schemes for world federation. It is especially lamentable because it preoccupies good people who should be concentrat ing on real issues - the present turmoil in Africa or the present negotiations on disarmament. I am not even prepared to accept world federation as the ultimate goal.

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The assumption that this is the only way ahead can lead the United Nations into calami tous mistakes. World federation may be the answer, but it is too sean to decide. One must work with the world we have and make progress from here to there, not from th ere to here. As government becomes more complex and a ll-embracing, the argument for decentralization of authority rather th an centralization becomes stronger. World government could prove to be a monstrous leviathan, the most totalitarian of all systems. What is needed is a more imaginative and experimental attitude toward new forms of international co-operation. There is a good example in the way in which the European Economic Community has been feeling its way towards practical and nonfederal schemes of collaboration. There is much to be said for the functionalist approach, strengthening and multiplying international organizations for specific purposes: to co-ordinate and raise standards in the fields of health and labour, science and the arts. There is still, unfortun ately, a need for special functional organizations for defence like N .A.T.O. There is a place for quite different organizations, the Commonwealth or Francophonie or tbe Organization of African Unity, to strengthen understanding among peoples of different races. Non-governmental bodies are needed as well as governmental- the World Council of Churches or Rotary International, women's institutes, and the Interna~ tional Federation of Chess Players. I am even prepared to approve, with reservations, the Ol ympic Games. Tid y-minded people, of course, are always wanting to control this proliferation, co-ordinate the life out of it, driven by an almost biological urge towards unity. Unity is one of the most overworked words in the language. Harmony, yes; but unity is not an end in itself. Tidy-minded people are a menace in world affairs, because the world is untidy. Thank God it is so. It is much easier to keep it peaceful that way, and it is its diversity that makes it such an enchanting place in which to live in freedom. This functionalist route is not the easy way to international co-operation; it is the hard way. It requires energy and sacrifice and commitment on the part of all, rather than lea ving problems to governments and systems. For some it may mean participation in assistance programs overseas, raising money at borne for U.N.I.C .E.P., or trying to save some worthy unofficial international organization from the pressures of national policies. For all it means the brain-splitting intellectual effort of trying to comprehend the complexities of the world we live in . Only in so doing can we create in Canada a climate of rational and in-

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formed opinion which makes it possible for the government to follow an enlightened rather than a parochial policy during and after International Co-operation Year. If I have confused you, that was partly my purpose. It is better to feel honestly confused by the state of the world than to seek shelter from it in slogans or to imagine that the world's ills can be cured by concocting a perfect constitution or by exposing a conspiracy. In spite of my scepticism about proposals for an earthly paradise, I am an optimist. Like C. S. Lewis, I am an optimist because I believe in the fall of man. I do not believe the world is populated by happy, loving people who are prevented from living peacefully by nasty warmongers. 1 believe that nature is indeed red in tooth and claw. Men are by nature quarrelsome savages who are slowly disciplining themselves to live together. It is a long, bard struggle, but more progress has been made in the last generation than in the history of man. It follows that we are nearer the abyss at the same time.

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2: Peacekeeping and the Security Function of the United Nations In a ny assessment of U .N. peacekeeping forces, one is faced, at the beginn ing, with a problem of definition. The principal interest is in the Gaza and Congo forces, but the product of U.N. experience has been not a single kind of international fo rce but rather a vari ety of supervisory armies, observer corps, and border patrols, ranging from small groups of officers to military units numberi ng thousands. Much of thei r virtue lies in their diversity. It is hard to identi fy what they have in common, excep t they 'are all "forces" that acco mplish their missio ns not really by force at all but by the persuas io n of their presence. As is known from the Congo experience, there is still need to limit the use of force to accord with varying situations. This kind of intervention is most effec ti ve when the military force is associated with a U.N. med iatory presence. It is more closely related in kind to the non-military mediati on of the United Nations between Cambodia and Tha iland , for example, than to the United Nations' single effort at COll ective-security act io n in Korea. This is Dot collective-security ac tion in the proper se nse of the term. T he force, as an instrument of the United Nations, armed or unarmed. interposes rather thaD enforces, develops the U .N . role as neither a policeman no r an avenging fury but as an objective entity. The United Nat ions accepts as inevitable the q uarrelsomeness of its members and seeks in this way only to ge t them to agree. The pure objectivity of the fo rce, howeve r, is far from a bsolute. The United Nation s often does not pretend to be neutral in these disputes. It may provide a force, as it did in Yemen, wi th out any commitment on the merits of the case, and it may seek to be uncommitted in intern al di sp utes, as it did in Lebanon or the Congo. However, over Congo or Suez, U.N. bodies adopted moral positions o n aspects of the issues at stake. In the light of U.N. oppositio n to certain parties in th e Suez and Congo cases, some elemen t of enforcement \\'as im pli cit in the ve ry U.N. prese nce, eve n if the military power was by no mea ns adequate to impose a U . N . will. This chapter is an abbreviated version of a paper delivered to a conference on United Nations' Security Forces, Oslo, February 20, 1964, with the title "The Political and Philosophical Aspects of U.N. Security Forces," and was published in Oslo. SOURCE:

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There is no generalization that acc urately fits all these thin gs. The function of these bodies is adapted and adjusted to accord wi th the moral and military st rength th e United Nat ions musters in th e particular situation and in the certainty of its convict ions about th e rights and wrongs of th e case. The certainty of its co nvictions, needless to say, is determined not just by the val idity of the respective arg uments of the di sputa nts but also by the weight that their partisan can throw about in U.N. councils. The power and authority are affected by the degree of unanimity th at exists in the United Nations-and particularl y amo ng the leading powers. A perceptive explanation of the func ti on of U.N. peacekeeping fo rces as now developed is given by Inis Claude in his Power and International Relations: Th is . .. is not a device jar dejeating aggressors - and certainly not for coercing great powers determined to expand the sphere of their control- but jar assisting the major powers in avoiding the expansion and sharpening oj their conflicts and the consequent degeneration oj whatever stability they may have been able to achieve ill their mutual relationships. The best hope jar the United Nations is not that it may be able to develop a military establishment which will enable it to exercise coercive control over great powers, but thac it Inay be able to con tinue the development oj its capability to serve the interests oj the great powers - and oj the rest of the world - by helping them to contain their conflicts, to limit their competition, and to stabilize their relationships. The greatest political COlllrib lllion oj the Un ited Nations in our tim e to the management of international power relationships lies not ill imp lemellfillg collective security or instituting world government , but in helping to improve and stabilize the working of th e balance oj power system, which is. for better or jor worse, the operative mechanism oj contemporary international politics. Th e immediate task , in short, is to make the world safe jor the balance oj power system, and the balance system saje jor the world. l

Professo r Claude's definition sets out U.N. securi ty forces in their place in the history of international relations. One might at this poin t look at the accumulated U.N. peacekeeping experience in relation to two concepts of international forces : first, the persistent anticipation of an " internationa l police force" capable of enforcing world law or agreed international dec isions anywhere in the world; and secondly, th e San Francisco plan emlInis L. Claude, Jr. , Power and Intemar;onal Relations (New York, 1962) . p. 28S.

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bodied in the U.N. Charter for a security force composed of nationa l contingents placed at the disposal of the United Nations and acting on the basis of great~powe r COnsensus. With the concept of an "international police force" U.N. peacekeeping has little in common. It is generically different because it is based on a quite different view of the relations among peoples. The "intern ationa l police force" assumes a delegation of supreme auth ority to a world federal government or at least to some authority with supreme security functions. Such a force, to exercise unquestioned power, would have to operate in a virtually disarmed world. The United Nations' kind of peacekeeping assumes the necessit y of acting in a world in which military power is controlled by states, although the states may on occasion delega te military force for international ass ignmenls.Jhat this is the kind of world people are going to live in for a long time to come - unless they expire in it - is the most prudent ass umption. T he difference between these two concepts - U.N. peacekeeping and the international police fo rce - seems to me so clear I hesitate to labour the obvious. The only real question is whe th er or not one should see in the Gaza and Co ngo forces the nucleus of an "international police fo rce." One can be misled by seeing too much sign ificance in what have been reaso na bly successful experiments with polyglot military units. It is not, however, the composition of the international force but the control of it which is cruci al. The world is not within sight of an international authority capable of mounting and directing an international police. It is, in fact, too earl y to say whether th e "international police force" should be the goal at al l. In the meantime, the assumption th at it is could lead into experiments which are bound to fail and destroy with them the sound prece~ dents whi ch have been established . Although it is customary to decry the illusio ns of the constitution-makers at Yalta, Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco, they were closer to earth than are those who dream of the "international police fo rce." If the world wants to make progress from where it stands, it might Detter set as its target the kind of force envisaged in Article 43, approaching it. however, enriched by the variety of experi ence in U .N. peacekeeping by means never envisaged in 1945 . The kind of peacekeeping wh ich was developed did not, of course, have its roots in Article 43; it developed when the effort by the Mililary Staff Committee to im plement Article 43 failed. The essence of the San Francisco pri nciple of security was the del egation by member states, especially the great powers. of forces to serve the purposes of the U.N. Those

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purposes would be enforceab le because they would be supported by the great powers - or if not supported by all of them, at least not act ively opposed by any great powe r. T he principle broke down, Dot because it was intrinsicall y unsound, but because the great powers moved rapidly away from consensus. The kind of peacekeeping functio ns the United Nat ions bas developed did not come as a co nscious alternati ve to Art icle 43; they evolved out of necessity. The experiment started before, and was resumed after, the Korean experience convinced most people that, although the Korean effort was by no mea ns a failure" it was Slli geller is and did not provide a precedent for U .N . collecti ve-security action which could be followed again. The early experience of U .N. interve ntion in Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, a nd Palestine were steps on the way to the much bolder expe riment of U.N.E.F., and the remarkable success of U .N . E.F. set a pattern for the plunge into the Congo. These achieve ments \. . ere pragmatic. I do not believe anyo ne, scholar or bureaucrat, had arti culated in advance thi s particul ar kind of middle-power operation, although Mr. T rygve Lie certainly deserves credi t for adumbrating, in his ea rl y proposals for a U.N. G uard Force, the co ncept of a limited U.N . body of a military ki nd, capable of maintaining in troubl ed areas the agen ts of U.N. mediation. Now, of co urse, a great deal of theo ry is being expounded abou t this kind of peacekeeping, but it is a codification of what has taken place and a projection of past experience into the future. There was never a deliberate intention in se tting up U.N . fo rces, as they are known, to start the United Nations off on a different course from that which had been contemplated in the Charter. It was an effort to cope as well as possible with the dangerous situati ons tha t flared all over the world du ring a period of great power di sunity. It was in fact the United Nations grop ing, with lesser powers as its agents, to take advantage of the elemental but tac it conse nsus which did exist among the great powers, th e co nsensus of fear of uncon troll able co nflict. That consensus was neither strong nor explicit enough for the great powers to ac t direct ly by combination of their own forces. but they were prepared to let others ac t. Some of the great powers viewed th ese events with , to say the least, very little enthusiasm, but their fea r of conflict and their deference to a U.N. majority have held them back from bold e nough opposi tion to wreck the operations. The kind of U .N . security forces in wh ich lesser rather than great powers make personnel avai lable for U.N. pu rposes is a great deal closer to the San Francisco concept than to the idea of

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an "international police force." The di ffere nce, wh ich is adm ittedly great, li es in the scope of action wh ich can be envisaged without great-power participati on. One must be extremely wary of assuming that the rudimentary peacekeeping which has been develo ped could, in th e abse nce of a far larger degree of greatpower consensus than now exist, be pushed to fu lfi l the collective-security funct ion that the framers of the Charter had in mind. It should not be forgotten, however, th at it was not the intention of the grea t powers wbo drafted the essential principles of the Charter that the U.N . security provisions sho uld be implemented aga inst any of them; that denial was implicit in the provision fo r the veto on which they all insisted. Jt is the extent of great-power co nsensus rather than any fundamenta l difference between th e principle of Articl es 42 and 43 o n the one ha nd and the principle of U .N.E.F. or O.N.U.C . on the other that determines wbether o r not U.N. security forces can expand the area of their competence. There is much reason for grat ifica ti on with the results so fa r achieved. F ighting was stopped in Greece, Ind onesia, and Kashmir. Relative stabilit y was established in the Middle East. The Congo has a chance. The fact that all this has been achieved to a considerable extent by diplom atic pressures of the great powers outside the United Nations is no reason for despo ndency about the U.N. role. The United Natio ns is esse ntially a broad framework. ·It is a pu rpose of U.N . peacekeeping to be associated with o r to be an agent of Ihe direct negotiation between disputants or their intermediari es. (What activit ies, o ne might ask , sho uld be regarded as beyond the compass of the U.N. Charter if they contribute to reasonable and acceptable se ttlements of dispu tes?) In add ition to these specific achievements there has been the experience of internationa l collaboration. Brian Urquhart, who should know, put it th is way :

The thousands of soldiers from some twenty cou ntries who accepted the challenge ill th e COllgo have begun to learn to apply the arts of war to th e infinitely subtle and difficult problems of maintaining the peace - this may be a development of more lasting importance than what eventually does or does not happen in the Congo its eIJ.~ 2

Brian E. Urquhart, "United Nat ions Peace Fo rces and the Changing United Nations: An International Perspective," Inlemational Organizatio" XVII 2 (Spring, 1963), p. 347. Urquhart is Principal Officer in the office of the Under-Secretary for Special Politica l Affairs of the United Nations, and formerly Representative of the United Nations in Elizabethville.

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The accompl ishments of U.N. peacekeeping should not be underestimated; and yet they raise ce rtain diiHcult questions not only about the future of U.N. peacekeeping but about the record. The basic thesis of these enterp rises is that the object is to SlOp the fi gh tin g LO provide an opportunity for negotiated se tll emenl. A sett lement was achieved in Indonesia, although it may have se t a precedent for a later U .N. role in West I rian that was more a face-saving than a peacekeeping operation. There is no settleme nt after fifteen years in Kashmir or Palest ine. The U .N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (V .N.M.O. G.I.P.) and U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (V.N.T.S.O.) loo k like bei ng permanent establishments. U.N .E . F. has provided a framework for a temporary peace, but lasting peace seems DO nea rer. The U .N. Observer G rollp in Lebanon (U.N .O.G. I. L.) d id help to make possible a transition of political power in Lebanon, a lthougb some might argue th at this was achieved by the intervention of the American Marines. A final verdict on the accomp lishment of O.N.V.C . ca nnot yet be given with assurance. It is said, of course, that the cost of maintaining these establishments is relatively small in an armed world and well worthwhile. F igh ting has been contained, although the aim of promoting settlement has all too seldom been achi eved. A more disturbin g question is whether the intervention of the Un ited Nations made a lasting settlement more difficult. The world is in the throes of violent change, of old disco ntents, new and unstable governments, empires in fission, a nd drastic inequalities. Is the achievement of a new stabilit y dependent on the completion of vio lent solut ions whether they are in the abstract good or bad? Would the sub-continent, for instance, be more or less lranquiUf the situation had been frozen after rat her than before the Pakistanis secured a solution by force? \Vould there be less ferment in the Middle East if the Israelis had been ab le to consol id ate their positions on the old borders of Palestin e; or in Central Africa if some strongman had had a chance to establ ish hi s authority by fo rce over the whole of Congo before the United Nations arrived o n the scene in 1960? Or consider the obverse argument: how happy would the world be if the United Nations, in accordance with peacekeeping precedents, had established a U.N. presence with force to promote a peaceful settlement in Goa before the Indians took direct action? Without the U.N. intervention in Palest ine or Co ngo there would of course have been bitterness and cont inuing tension ; but would the rough arbitrament of the violent solution have provided a better base for progress in the area th an the perpetuation

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of uncertainty and the immobility imposed by the U.N. presence? And the cost of this is thut Ule United Nations is involved indefinitely in financial drains which th reaten its health and have led its major members into an impasse that could wreck the organization. Should not the con tinuing presence of a costly U.N. force at least have been tied to a commitment of the di sputants to serious negotiation? Of course, I think the answer to these questions is no. It seems to me that although the second and major half of the United Nalions' aim has not been accomplished. it was still worthwhile to stop the lighting. The fighting may not have spread, and the great powers may not have become involved as had been feared, but the ri sk of these things happening was too great to be taken. History is long; and fifteen years is not an excessive period in which to wait for peace to come when the grudge is ancient. The ,,·/Orld ought to show the same pat ience with small cold wars as it is learning to show over the big one. This is how it appears to me but 1 have been too much involved in these thi ngs ever to see them objectively. Nor has my country ever been tranquillized or paralysed by V. N . peacekeeping. One can Dever know what might have happened, and one dares not assume tbat the way history worked itself out was the right way. These hypothetical but nasty questions must be kept in mind if for no other reason than to recognize the need for discrimina· tion in applying this kind of U.N. force. There is no generally valid answer. The intervention of U.N. forces may have been wrong in some past cases and right in others. There is a tendency to accept as categorical the distinctions between di sp utes in which the great powers are and those in which they are not directly involved. Similarly. the Korean crisis of 1950 is often dismissed by explaining that it has nothing to do with the United Nations' kind of peacekeeping. Well. it may not belong to this "chapler of the book." but it was a very real crisis. There is no guarantee that there will not be more like it, and the United Nations will not be able simply to declare it out of bounds. On the other hand, would it have been·better to try in Korea the more conventional kind of U.N. peacekeeping? Would it have been better for the United Nations to remain uncommitted as a belligerent and keep itself available for good offices in the settlement? If the United Nations had left the fighting to the immediate parties and th eir great- and smallpower friends, might it have had a better chance to be the deus ex mac/zina when the truce was in sight? Would tbe world thereby have avoided the Chinese argument that the United

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Nations, as a belligerent, had forfeited any right to an arbitral role in th e reunification of Korea? As ODe who was present at Lake Success in the summer of 1950, I do not see how the United Nations co uld have acted otherwise. The world was still perhaps beguiled by the collective-sec urit y co ncept of th e United Nations' function , and this looked like a challenge to U .N. authority before whi ch it wou ld be [atalto fail. The implications of the balance of terror had not yet been absorbed. Nevertheless, the hypothetical questions abo ut Korea must be asked in retrospect so tbat the next crisis will be calculated wisely. A final and quite unrelated question is whether the world may now be in danger of letting the United Nations become a mere service agency, hiring ou t pol icemen to maintain agreements in which it plays no par t. In West Irian and Yemen the United Nations had no real say at all in the truces or sett lements agreed on by the parties with the good offices or pressu re of great powers; and yet it organized the supervision. As I have suggested earli er, one must not under present circumsta nces reject reasonable settlemen ts reached off the U.N. premises. However, th e United Na tio ns must be sure they are reasonable before it accepts responsibility for maintaining them. While avoiding the pretension to sett le all disputes by its captious majorities, the U nited Nat ions must at the same time avoid the humiliation of being used by powers, great or small, for their priva te purposes. Each of these questio ns could be exhaustively argued, and there is no final answer to them. Howeve r, one ought not to let enthusiasm for accomplishments push th ese doubts into the background.

The problem now, and particularly since Jul y 1960, is a conflict between political and practical realities. The Unit ed Nations has been conducting military operations that defy every ru le of good soldiering. The world political situati on, however, is such th at another U.N. force is likel y to be required at any time, but a direct attack on th e military problems seems impossible. The argument for a nucleus of a permane nt force, at the very least a considerable military establishment in the Secretari at, the training of standby forces, perhaps even U .N. bases and a U.N. intelligence network, seems to this layman incontrovertible. It is clear, however, that for international political reasons a standing U.N. force is out of the question. The conse nsus does not exist wh ich would authorize one to go very far beyond Dag Hammarskjold's recommendation of a force formed ad hoc from standby forces in contributing countries,

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and it is politically unwise for a Westerner to push. The political advantages of spont aneous improvisation are great, and it is tempting for statesmen, diplomats, and theorists to be complacent, to say that it always has bee n worked out somehow and will the next time. But the history of C.N.U.C. provides too much proof of what a near thing it was - so much luck, so much depending on heroic improvisation and the availability of remarkable men. All must press hard and with as sou nd a diplomatic base as possible to achieve at least minimal improvements: extension of Secretariat functions, estabHshment of precedents and procedure, reliable financ ial provisions, training of experts - if not undertake n by the United Nations itself, possibly by some unofficial international institutioo. Aside from improving the machinery I is there any way to extend the applicability of present procedures? The formal definition of bolder theories of peacekeeping by any U.N. subcommittee would be as futile as the attempt to define aggression. Every step forward has been taken in the press ure of necessity when the consensus enlarges. Still, ooe can in private think about the direction in which progress might move. All plans for the future must be based on a recognition of the slender reso urces avai lable - personnel and material, as well as fin ancial resources. One shudders at the prospect of another crisis, because those in which the United Nations is still involved absorb all the people it can get. How could the Secretariat cope with another operation like O.N.U.C.? I hasten to recognize that I would have asked the sa me question before Congo, a challenge that revealed extraordinary resources from African sta tes. Diplomats should not assume the Un ited Nations cannot cope with another such challenge, but they should not forget that U.N. forces do not spring fully armed out of thin air. Need one accept as permanently desirable that only middle and small powers - preferably uncommitted - should participate in U.N. security forces? The arguments for doing so are strong. Not only has this practice been good for the United Nations, it has been good for the middle powers. The midd le powers have all felt that their contri butions to U.N. forces have given them a purpose in the world that justified their existence. They have even been tempted into sm ugness vis-a-vis the quarrelsome and predatory great powers. It has been good, practical U . N. politics to emphasize the objectivity of the U.N. forces and attribute it to the virtue of the weak powers which manned them, forgetting that lesser powers can have even more vigorous special interests in di sp utes than remoter great powers. The part the great powers

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have actually played in the operations has also been conveniently forgotten. The American role in U .N .E.F . and a .N.U.C. may have been confined to transport and general servicing, but it has been indispensable. Britain and the Soviet Union also made facilities and transport available. I recogni ze, of 'course, that the part the Soviet Union played may not be considered a contribution, and that it can be argued that th e United States and Britain have pursued special interests. So have many of the lesser powers involved in the U.N. Force. Great powers can be neutral enough in some controversies. The staffing of international forces might be less absolutely conceived. New situations will almost certainly require anOlher call on the Americans for help. If the trouble should come in the Western Hemisphere, it would be better to ask the British and French. It would be much belter, of course, if Soviet services could also be used . Despite the obvious disadvantages, the advantages of including the Russians could be much greater than merely helping with the logistics. It could assist in winning them from an attitude of mist rustful toleration of exercises in which DO members of their camp participate to positive collaboration in U.N. peacekeeping. The extending American-Soviet dialogue could conceivably make this possible. The inclusion of Soviet or Eastern European personnel in U.N. forces would be primarily a reflection of rather th an a cause of changing great-power relations. One should recognize, however, that the broadening of the composi tion of U.N . forces is something to be anticipated rather than avoided, even though the United Nations cannot safely move too far ahead of the great powers in a policy based on detente. Only if there is collaboration among the great powers in peacekeeping can there ever be hope of applying this U.N. function to the great issues of the time. I am not suggesting that the principles of collective secu rity could then be enforced on all powers. I am thinking only of peacekeeping roles extended, for instance, to Berlin. It would not be wise for the United Nations to venture in its councils to impose a settlement on Berlin. even if it were not prevented from doing so by Article 107. Nevertheless, if the great powers concerned were to reach an agreement that required neutral supervision, it is conceivable that the United Nations could fulfil that function. There are strong cases for a nd against the occupying powers doing any such thing, or the United Nations accepting an assignment not of its own making. One must, however, contemplate the possibility that such a role for the United Nations might be found helpful. I do

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not wa nt to a rgue here the case for and against zones of di sengagement or nuclea r disarmament in Europe or elsewhere, but these, too, are possibilities for U.N. service, possibilities tb at would be useful experiments in testing U .N . supervision of disarmament provisions. They would almost certainly requi re participation not only of unco mmitted forces but also of fo rces committed to both East and West. ]t should be borne in mind also, that U .N. supervision was part of the formula on which President Kennedy and Premier Kh rushchev found a way out of the impasse in Cuba, even though this was not carried Ollt, for reaso ns th at did not seem to involve the va lidity of U .N. supervision in principle. It is not as certain as commonly stated that U.N. security forces as th ey are known have no rol e to play in controversies between the great powers. It is usuall y forgo tten th at there has been for a decade in Indochina a reasonably successful example of a peacekeeping operation comparable to U .N. missio ns, estab lished by the great powers and operating in an area where thei r interests clash dangero usly. This precedent is largely ignored by writers on this subject, pres um ab ly because it is outside th e Un·ited Nat ions. Here is an example of the great powers, faced in 1954 with the imminent catastrop he of uncontrollable connict, negotiating a truce eve n thougb two of the great powers were not speaking to each other. Supervisory commissions fo r Vietn am, Laos, and Cambodia were authori zed on the troika principle of one Communist country, Poland; one Western country. Canada; with a neutra l chairman, India. These comm issions were surprisingly effective in the disengagement of troops and p"opulations in the first year or so of the truce and si nce then in serving as a reminder of international concern in its maintenance. It goes without saying that the troika arrangement often produced deadlock and has seemed more int ractab le than an ent irely neutral body would have been. However, it does rep resent the real facts of power in the area in a way a neut ral commission wou ld not have done. It is fatuous to hanker after a supervisory commission homoge neous enough to reach agreemen t if such a comm ission has no influence on the disputants. The truces have been roug hl y mainta ined by th e equil ibriu m of those external pressures which were represented in the commissions. It is un~ fortunate that the deterioration of the truces 3 has dive rted atten'The deterioration into war in Vietnam should not obscure th e fact that the I.C.C. was an essential part of the 1954 armistice and something li ke it is like ly to be required if there is anothe r arm istice. It was, of cou rse, never the funclion of an unarmed commission of a few hund red men to prevent infiltration or fi ghting.

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lion from a peacekeeping experiment which would be a pilot project for the United Nations - a pilot project which provides warni ngs as well as precedents. It was at least one step forward from the form ula of two Comm unist states and two neutral states which the United Nations established to supervise the truce in Korea and which res ulted in total dead lock. Whether it would have been more effective as a U.N. project rather th an remaining responsible to a confe rence of powers is an a rgument with much significa nce for discussion. Certainly the parti cipants would have welco med U.N . accepta nce of th e burden of logistics and adm inistrati on. The lack too of an objective intern ational entity like the U.N. Secretariat mea nt th at the commissions were less coherent or si ngle·minded . On the other hand, this inchoate intern ation al mechanism aptly refl ected th e minimal consensus among the powers. Jt reflected also the unwillingness of the great powers, even with their veto rights, to concede to a U.N. body the righ t to interfere in a n area of such crucial importa nce to their vital interests. It was not merely the need to include tbe Peking government in the a rran gements that kept this operation outside the United Nations. Even if the great powers in future are disposed to leave supervision of their settlements to tbe United Nations, they are likely to keep the United Nations as far removed as possible from th e politics of the settlement. For the time being th e U.N. peacekeeping forces will have to be im proved on the accepted basis - wi th the Secretariat and the middle powers in the foreg round and the great powers in the background. There are limita tions, however, to what can be accomp lished unless participation becomes more nearly u.niversal and all the great powers are com mitted. Even if the fifth great power, silting sullenly outside, shows no inclination to participate, and one of the lesser great powers holds such activities in con tempt, conC).lrrence of the other three would greatly extend the area of operation. I do not think the kind of peacekeepin g developed in Gaza and the Congo is incompatible with the basis of security envisaged at San Francisco. If the world is working its way towards great-power unanim ity, at least on fundamental attitudes to war and peace, th en I think it should try to work its way back - or forward - to the basis of Article 43. If this is done, the effort to implement the Chaner could be resumed, all being a great deal wiser, on the one hand, from the Un ited Nations' experience with collect ive sec urit y over Korea and, on the other hand, from its success with procedures of truce-keeping, tranquillization, and prevention adapted to the rudimentary state of international

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organization. It is to be hoped also that ~e great powers would have acquired a broader appreciation than they had in 1946 of the role lesser powers can play in the maintenance of peace. It is only by this path tbat the world could ever find its way to the international force which is expected to operate while the world disarms. How this international force would work I do not yet comprehend. That disarmament is not possible without some kind of international force is a dogma now accepted by the two super·powers and most other people. The United States in its disarmament proposals of April 1963 envisaged by the end of the disarming process a U.N . force wi th "sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it." Most students of international security measures discourage belief in the foreseeable possibility of such a force based on a monopoly of military powers under the control of a world auth ority responsible to the peoples of the world. Nevertheless, this utopian vision appears in the fo rm al proposals of a hard-headed government. (The cynic could say that this is the American way of making sure th at there will never be a state of total disarmament, but the cynic is never marc than partly right when he talks about American policy.) On such a conception I remain agnostic. I cannot believe in it as a foreseeable goal, any more than I can believe that a federal state could ever be fitted safely to the jagged geography of this universe. At the same time I recognize th at one cannot rule t mt the possibility of some day coming to these answers. In a recent report on "Disarmament and European Security," prepared for tbe Institute for Strategic Studies, appears the following comment on the world authority required for a disarmed world: In the end, it is possible ,hat such an authority might be created through the commitment of national forces 'to a unified command in the manner foreseen by paragraph 8 of the Nassau Agreement, for th e more limited purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This system allows countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom to take part in a unified system while remaining secure in the knowledge they have in the hands of their own officers weapons which can, if necessary, be used under th e orders of their own chiefs of staff. To rely on a peacekeeping authority constituted on this basis (a system much closer to what the Russians are propOSing than what the West appears to be proposing) is to give the appearance of disarmament without for many years abandoning the reality of national

78 - THe BETTER PART OF VALOUR power. But with this security natiollal military systems would erode away, like the methods of persollal and local self-protection ill tile old American West. The political framework of a disarmed world could be created and could through cllstom and acceptance be relied 011 increasingly to carry the burdeIJ oj security.

This kind of thinking seems to me more profitable than the concoction of constitutions for international armies rooted to no feasible political institution. It is closer to the U.N. experience and it is closer to the intentions of the Charter on which there was great-power agreement in 1945. Apocalyptic pronouncements that a world moving fast to destruction requires drastic measures are hard to deny, but they do not lead up the steps to Utopia. One must rather focus on the world as it ex-ists and the progress that has been made, hoping that the moderation of international relations because of the dread facts of power and growing habits of collaboration will enable the peace to be kept more effectively and more reliably.

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3: The Politics of Independence "The first of earthly blessings, independence." This sublime reflection was a product not of the hot oratory of colonial debate in the United Nations but of an earlier student of imperialism, Edward Gibbon. The trouble about independence is that everyone pr,,:.ises and covets it but everyone is thinking of different things. Gibbon was thinking of his person and was hardly on the same wave-length as his contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, who established the reputation of independence as a good thing for countries. Ever since 1776, it has become increasingly necessary in politics to pay lip service to independence - although there has been less agreement, of course, on the specific application of the principle to Ulster or Kashmir, the Confederate States of America, or the suburbs of Toronto. The trend of bistory is now set so strongly towards multiplying national independence in tbe world tbat there are sound reasons for making a virtue of necessity and welcoming the inevitable. The glorification of independence is one of the accepted idealisms of the times. I do not wish to imply that tbis is a bad thing. Independence is a wanton principle on which false hopes are often fastened. Nevertheless, the independence of peoples and nations has proved a great force for liberating their energies and fulfilling their needs. This idealization of independence conflicts with other idealisms of tbe times and induces a great international neurosis. Although independence manages to keep its good reputation among idealists, sovereignty is getting a bad name. The confusion may be traced to the fact that the world is steadily increasing the number of independent states addicted to sovereignty while it grows more and more concerned with the Deed for international collaboration and the extension of world order. Good people press for the independence of dependent peoples, but in the second half of their speeches they demand that all surrender their sovereignty, like their worldJy goods, to speed the way to the kingdom. We suffer from the abstractions of poIitical philosophers and political moralists. Independence and sovereignty are in themselves neither good nor bad, and it is not necessarily good to SOURCE: An address to the 30th Annual Couchicbing Conference in July 1961 and published in Diplomacy in Evolution by the University of Toronto Press, 1961.

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achieve ODe aDd surrender the other. It all depends on the use to which independence is put and the purpose for which sovereignty is surrendered. The world has reached a stage when simple incantations about freedom an d independence are - as Edith Cavell said about patriotism - not enough. The problem lies in the application of these principles to the contradictions of real life. The politics of indepe ndence in the age of interdependence should be concerned more with practice and less with preaching - but I doubt if they will be. This is a good time, in fact, for a nation of political pragmatists, like the Canadians, to assert themselves. Because they have produced no Jefferson, no Burke, no Montesquieu, they think they have no genius fo r political philosophy. Neverth eless, they have played a leading part in fo rmulat ing some of the most fruitful and original political ideas of our times - the peaceful transformation of empire, the co ncept of commonwealth, and the non-violent co-existence of two nations within the bosom of a single state. All of these concepts, I am happy to note, played havoc with conventional postulates of independence and sovereignty. They were products of the restless and inventive politics of a young nation trying to establish its independence and reconcile in feasible ways internal and external contradictions. Although my subjec t fo r disc ussion, "The politics of independence," may conjure up in most minds the politics of continents newly experiencing independence, it is advisable, I think, first to scrutinize with due hu mility the politics of countries great and small which have long since known independence and exercised sovereignty - not least of all our own. Canadians achievep independence gradual Iv and painlessly and have acquired some maturity in the exercis~ of sovereignty. We are, nevertheless, sensitive ana touchy, and the preservation of our independence is a theme still dear to voters and politicians alike. It is a preoccupation that too often diverts us from constructing.the substance of a healthy national life - economic, political, and cultural. It encourages dark suspicions and the tendency to blame our incapacities on the interference of others. Self-examination is healthy for countries as well as people, but in Canada today an almost obsessive introspection robs Canadians of the easy confidence necessary to play the roles for which they are fitted in the worlds of art, commerce, and diplomacy. People do not become great by deliberately pursuing the unique rather than the universal. By pursuing universal truth and universal peace with the benefit of a unique heritage and unique opportunities Canadians shall more readily establish

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tbeir identity in art and foreign policy al ike. In spite of our considerable contributions to world politics, Canadians constantl y succumb to the temptation to emphasize their status and neglect thei r fu nction, to insist upon the fo rms of equality, on the right to be consulted rather th an on being worth y of consult ation. It has been th e.ir weakness si nce they sallied out into the world half a century ago, and they ought not to be surprised if it afflicts nations younger than Canada. The neurosis of independence is attri butab le partl y to the frustration of striving for the unattainable. For a small or middle power, the enj oyment of absolute sovereignlY, if it ever was possible, is certainly out of the question now because of the exige ncies of nuclear defence and commercial interdependence. The recognition in Canad a of this very obvious fact of life is too often obscured by a preoccupation with the everweening influence of one large neighbour. Canada's internatio nal life is, however, no more circumscribed than that of Australia or Italy or Japan. The Canadi an neurosis is also compounded, I think, by the conflict of idealisms I mentioned above. Canadians feel guilty for caring about their sovereignty. We feel the need of a constructi ve nation alism, but the books tell us that nationalism is wrong. (The books, of course, are written by the Americans or the English, whose national character and institutions would dominate rather than be submerged in any agglomeration of states, or by Europeans who feel guilty about the excesses of their nationalism.) But th e surrender of sovereignty mayor may not be in the interest of world peace. The case for surrendering sovereignty is arguable when it is a question of handing it over to a world organization - although the pervasive assumption that the world would be peaceful if nations would pool their sovereignty instead of clinging to it seems to me cart-before-thehorse thinkin g. There is a more obvious case for states in such defi nable regions as Western Europe, West Africa. or Latin America voluntari ly turning themselves into federal states although it is too unquestioningly taken for granted th at unity in federation is beneficent in itself regardless of the purpose to whi ch it is put. But sovereignty is not a general vice of which cou ntries should p urge themselves. It is not necessarily a n act of merit for count ries to renounce their sove reignty purposelessly rather than to exercise it vigorously ih th e cause of righteousness. I have no doubt at all that it has been a good thing for all concerned, and for the world in general, that the manifest desti ny of the United States on this continent was resisted, that

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Mexico and Canada survived. The political and cultural life of the planet has been diversified thereby, and - in the contemporary infatuation with uni ty - one ought not to forget th at diversity !=an also be a vi rtue. Whi le praying daily, as all must, for the increasing strength and prosperity of the United States, Mexicans and Canadians ca n, wi thout presumption, recognize that they have their own miss ions to fulfil. The cause of wo rld order req uires one or more large and strong free nations. It also requires varie ty in states, heterogeneity and dissent, room for manreuvre, a supple relationship among independent governments of all kinds and sizes, rather than the perilous rigidity of bipolarization. It is no contribution to world order or the strengtheni ng of the United Natio ns to sacrifice national sovereignty if the onl y result is to make a great power still greater. Altho ugh admittedl y the politics of independence do tend to increase world tension, independence can be an instrument of internati onalism rather than nationalism. Independence for Canada is not good when it induces in Canadians a jealous regard for status, a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude towards our British and French partners, and a carping irresponsibility in our criticism of the United States. The exercise of our independence is, however, good when it is used effective ly to do those thin gs we can uniquely do - to create an international force in the Middle East, strengthen the United Nations in the Congo, or prevent the Commonwealth from dividing on rac ial lines over South Africa. The cure for the Canadian neurosis about independence is not to abjure it but to make good use of it. The smaller and newer cou ntries have, of course, no monopoly of the shoddier political aspects of independence. The neurosis in its most aggravated form is to be found in great powers. The Chinese befog their dedication to Chinese sovereignty in the mystifications of Marxist internationalism, but it is fierce, arrogant, and quarrelsome nonetheless. (It is only fair, of co urse, to recognize that Western powers have aggravated this Chinese bloody-minded ness by humiliat ing them for a century, and then seeking to isolate them.) France brooks no interfe rence from the Un ited Nations. Even in French support of a European Community, the concession of independence may be more apparent than real. The French people may sincerely yearn for European unity, but the attitude of their leaders from this distance looks like "l'Europe, c'esl moi." The British, however insular the ir emotions, have done more than any other great power to di lute tradit ional notions of sovereignty and independence in the worl d at large. Nonetheless, it is quite

83 obvious that British independence in defence and trade remains a poignant theme of British politics. The Russians, in accordance with the principle of Leninism, take a strictly ad hoc view - all sovereignty to-the soviets and those countries whose causes they are for the moment espousing, and a minimum to others. The Russian is a pragmatic approach, but hardly one that encourages a sane attitude towards independence on the part of new countries. It might be said for the Russians that although they exploit the politics of independence, they do not get involved in the particular Western kind of double-talk. They cling to the idea of a world order imposea by the great powers without even paying lip-service to notions of world government, with equal rights for unequal powers. The tears they shed for the ravaged independence of little states arc not necessarily those of the crocodile. The recurring conviction of great powers that people of lesser countries wanl to be liberated is not always bypocrisy. Often it is just delusion. Even benevolent great powers have aberrations of this kind, but the Russians, bewitched by their false prophets. are the most dangerously deluded. The Americans are racked by conflicting good impulses. Having invented independence in 1776, and federation shortly thereafter, they tend to see both these principles as instant cures for other peoples' needs. While their congressmen fiercely guard their own sovereignty, they have a weakness for grandiose plans for the internationalization of sovereignty in Europe or Africa. The old-school Europeans have a habit of blaming the Americans for converting contented Africans and Asians to the independence racket - which is, of course, a gross distortion. The United States played an important role in popularizing the idea of independence, but Europeans too often forget that the United States has accepted the consequences of its miss ionary zeal in the support it gives to new countries. Althougb the United States can be ruthless towards the sovereignty of smaller states when its eyes have seen the glory and it has convinced itself that a moral issue is at stake, its record for respecting the sovereignty of others is on the whole remarkable for so great a power. One of its problems is in fact tbat of reconciling in its own turbulent cons.cience tbe principles of a democratic world order of states to which Americans are earnestly dedicated with the practical necessity of grasping the reins as one of the two great powers in the worJd. Having recognized that the aberrations of independence politics are not restricted to those who have only recently experienced this heady wine, one might now have a look at some PART TWO: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION -

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of the manifestations characteristic of the new countries of Asia and Africa. These states arc bedevilled by their own kind of paradox in attitudes to independence and sovereignty. They arc foremost in demanding strong international act ion to defend them fro m imperialists and to give them economic aid without any interference in their economic policies. They are at the sa me time warily jealous in preserving their sove reignty so recent ly attained. They do not even seem to recognize and trust the power they have acqu ired in the United Nations. So accustomed have th ey been to the capacity of th e imperial powers to impose their will that they are slow to recognize in the United Nations an international authority that is something more than an instrument for perpetu at ing Western domination. When they have come to realize th e extent of their powe r in the United Nations, the West may have to urge them to use th at power with discrimination. If they do not, of course, they wiH dri ve tbe Western powers into resistance, choke off the United Nations as a source of eco nomi c aid, and become more dependent on the Russians than they have any wish to be. The United Nations is for them the major opportunity and outlet for diplomacy, and th ey shou ld not reduce its credibility. The prospects are encouraging because the politics of indepe ndence are fortunate ly conditioned by the calculat ions of responsibility. One must recognize th at the politics of independence require a certain panache. We Northerners are impatient of this sort of thing in Africa, or we look upon it as unseemly for the young and too expensive for the recipie nts of charity. Its gaudier manifestati ons disturb us - perhaps beca use these involve the wearing on state occasions of bizarre plumage or top hats with unsuit ab le ra iment rather tha n somethi ng sensible like a busby. The fact that the politics of new states throw up leaders wi th a tendency to strut on the international stage in a manner out of keeping with their age and wea lt h is also a source of irritation. Europea ns forge t easil y that they have produced the most absurd and the most barbarous strutters in the history of man. Northerners a re impatient likewise of the fac t that Africa has broken up in small pieces, and that the Africans arc di latory in putting them together. There are some good reasons for the trend towards petty states with declamatory leaders. The areas th at have been transformed into independent states in Africa. and to some extent in As ia as well, have little natural unity. In such circum stances, and wi th only rudimentary experience in government, the pOlitics of independence are bound to be sim ple

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and direct. These fledgling countries need strong government and adminis tration as uncomplicated as poss ible so that they may create nations out of what may still be littl e more than artificial jurisdictions of tribes. Fo r such sit uations the balance of federa l and provincial governments, wh ich even Canadians in their late ado lescence find barely manageable, may be undul y sophistic ated. Messy as this leaves the map, it may be better that states now learn the. arts of government on a small and local scale first. If this endeavour ca n be accompanied by arrangements fo r collaboratio n with other states in foreign re lat ions, currency. postage, o r other admini strative matte rs, so mu ch the beller. A redu ction of the excess indepe ndence flourishing in Africa could, of course, be achieved by"'old-fashioned No rthern methods - the gobbling up of neighbo urs known as L ebensraum, Manifest Destiny, or Peoples' D emocracy. Such methods, howeve r, are frowned on by the United Nations. Fulherm ore, they are dangerous to world peace because of the incorrigible habit of the great powers of taking sides. And the great powers have a habit of taking sides not by calculating the interest of the inhab itants but by qui ck decisions as to which parties are "pro-Western" o r " Moscow-tra ined" or "imperialist lackeys." On these grounds, they decide in which cases anschluss is or is not accept able in Afri ca. Press ure from the Western powers o n Africa ns to unite is likely to be suspect even when it is disinterested . For a va ri ety of reasons, therefore, the West should leave the question of African unio n to the Africans and limit its role to two functio ns: the Wes t can adjust its collective economic pOlicies to assist African experiments, and it can work through the United Nat ions to preve nt aggressors inside and outs ide Africa fro m playing fast and loose with the independence of Africans. The habits of the great powers have, not surprisingly, encou raged the enthusiasm of newl y independent countri es for neutralism. (Even countries in the time of their hundredth birthday are affected by this yearni ng.) The Western powers tended at first to consider neutralism immoral - the most recent convert from neutralism having been the most rabid on the subject. The inevi tability of neutralism, however, bas induced more tolerance of this attitude, and the United States has come to recogn ize that there are advan tages in leaving a large mass of peoples in a no n-cold-war sta te. Th is change of heart has led to healthier international understanding and a reduction of frustration.

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SO far, so good - provided one does not proceed to sentimentalize neutralism into a positive virtue aki n to innocence and chast ity. Neutralism, which is an exaggerated fo rm of independence, is, .Iike sovereignty, to be judged on its results. Mr. Nehru saw no positive virtue in neutralism and rejected the term for his country. Neutrality is a sensi ble, practical policy for most new and powerless states. There is a danger, nevertheless, that neutralism can become a dogma just as contrary to the spread of law and order as the fanaticism of ex treme cold warriors. It is one thing for a country too weak to follow a policy based on power to find a place outside the co ntest between East and West and eve n to use its influence as an objective peace-maker. That kind of neutralism is an amel iorating factor in the international situation . It is another matter, however, when the touchstone of a country's policy is the avoidan ce of a stand on any issue on which th e great powers are divided. For example, the African states th at resisted the introduction of cold-war attitudes into the Congo were right, I believe. On the other hand, states that withheld support from the Secretary-General, not because they disagreed with him but because his person was a subject of dispute between th e Western powers and the Russians, were, I believe, wrong. In the latter case, neutralism becomes nihi lism, the rejection of choice and and the rejection of progress. Independence means freedom of choice. It was reported in 1960 that some Congolese interpreted independence as the right to drive on the wrong side of the road . There is bound to be an element of perversity in the policies of newly independent countries. For reaso ns that are not merely perverse. furthermore, they are bound to be eclectic in th eir economic and political pol icies. It is not surpri sing that the Asia ns a nd Africans or Latin Americans are not dedica ted to the belief that only Western models are good models. The practices of capital formation or party-politi cal formation appropriate to Bay Street or the Ottawa Coliseum may be quite irrelevant for an illiterate country on a subsistence econo my. New countries will pick and choose their models accord ing to prejUdice and also according to their own judgement as to what suits them best. The result in thlZ more successful countries is unlikely to resemble capitalism or communism in purer form. As we in th e West long since abandoned capitalism in its purer fo rm and the Russians and Chinese do not pretend to have entered as yet into a state of pure communism, we need not get too exci ted. As a wise Australian, Mr. Hedley BuB, has written, "No one way of life is specially

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favoured by God, history, or nature; and in the long run , all are bound to be superseded.'" We need not be too upset if the leadership principle is practised more vigorously and more fa ntastically in new countri es than seems to us compatible with democracy. At the sa me time, the \\'estern powers should insist, more by exa mp le than by prediction, that the principles of political freedom have been hard-won over 1housands of yea rs, that they are all too easily extinguished and very hard to recapture. The point will be made more effectively if there is less talk about the free principles of " the West" and more recognition of the fact th at the doctrines of freedom arc today just as much the heritage of the people of India or the Ivory Coast. Freedom is not something that was gra nted to Asians and Afr ica ns by the wise men of the West. It was fought and nego tiated fo r. Africa ns and Asians did learn about democracy from Western books and from Western example, but in thei r revolutions of independence they have added a new dimension to the COj11mon heri tage. By undermining the discriminatory natu re of Western practice and preaching, they have broadened the base of freedom. The politics of independence in the Dew continents are likely to be turbul ent for many years to come. They can be undisciplined and dangerous to world order. They are also a liberating and creative force, precarious and suspicious like all revolutionary movemen ts. There is danger, not only in the moonstruck behaviour of new nat ions but also in the tendency of the older nations to pa ni c in the face of these un se ttl ing forces. Nostalgia for the stability th at seemed to reign when these forces were bottled up still drives north ern countries into anachronislic atti tudes. Gran ted, a United Nations of over one hundred members is not the ideal instrument we co uld have wished fo r. We must, however, make the best of it, and, in order to do so, look tor its adva ntages. Every nati on is uniqu e a nd each one has a con tribution to make, not only to the cultural life of the planet but to the diplomacy of the United Nations. In the ve ry diversity of U nited Nati ons membership, there is the kind of vitality that resists petrification. If the world is to avoid anarchy, of course, we shall all have to accept limitations on the absolute exercise of our sovereignty. This we do every time we sign a treaty or enter into a multilateral agreement. It is by co mbination and agreement for specific purposes that the rule of law is extended - whether it is 1

Hedley BuIJ , The Control 01 th t! Arm! Ract! (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1961 ), p. 21.

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an agreement to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court or to limit the number of seals caught in the North Pacific. The best way to Utopia is to speetl up this process of limiting sovereignty by contract and by the extension of international regulatory institutions in the fields of commerce and production and the control of arms. To imagine, however, th at one would exorcise the conflicts endemic to this wildly un symmetrical planet by surrendering sovereign ty to an internat ional governing body is one of the unfortunate heresies of good people. But good people must give up their habit of ignoring nasty realities like force aod violence and conflict and the passions of independence aod wishing them away in pious formulas - or (hey will be more like pharisees than prophets. If we are to make progress, we must begin with the world as it is. The independence and sovereignty of states, and the ungovernable politics that attend them, are a part of that world. Some of the sting can be removed from these politics if Canadians and other junior breeds relax their fear of being pushed around and think of independence as opportunity . rather than as something to be everlastingly protected against interference.

Part Three: The Commonwealth

1: The Commonwealth and the United Nations The United Nat ions and the Commonwealth are two institutions that have profoundly affected the history of the world since 1945. The Commonwealth has played a significant part in the evolution of the United Nat ions. Individually its members have been from the beginning active and constructive workers. As an institution, the Commonwealth set the pattern for the United Nations coocept of colonial development, aDd a model, imperfect but tangible, of inter-racial community. Paradoxically. however, the Un ited Nations has deprived the Commonwealth of certain reasons for its existence. By internationalizi ng the mission of the Commonwealth, the United Nat ions provides the framework within which the Commonwealth may eventually be subli mated. The Early Years 0/ the United Nations When the United Nations' Charter was being drafted at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, members of the Commonwealth were among the most influential of the allies who had formed themselves into the "United Nations." Britain participated in the drafting on a footing of equality with the United States, and th e British hab it of consulting other Commonwealth members was at th at lime more serious than it became after the Commonwealth had expanded into a less cohesive body. Before San Francisco, in April, 1945, ~. ministerial meeting took place in Down ing Street during which Commonwealth representatives discussed all issues arising out of the Charter. The influence exerted by the Commonwealth derived partly from Britain's interest at that time in preserving Commonwealth solidarity as one of its waning assets in the struggle to remain a great power. It was based also on the international prestige and strong will of remarkable men: Field Marshal Smuts, whose rhetoric is embodied in the Charter, and those obstreperous and dynamic Labour Party representatives from Australia and New Zealand, SOURCB: This paper was presented at a conference at Bellagio, Italy, in June, 1964. The papers of this conrerence were later published as a book entitled A Decade 0/ tile Commonwealtll (Duke University Press, 1966).

90 - THE BEITER PART OF VALOUR H. Y. Evatt and Peter Fraser. At San Francisco the influence of Evatt and Fraser was even stronger than at the London session. They were the principal spokesmen of the Jesser powers, struggling valiantly, often rudely, bUl largel y in vain, to mitigate the principle of great-power unanimity preordained by the great powers themselves. They were supported ardently but less stridently by the Canadians and Indians in a middle-power bloc that was almost a Commonwealth bloc-a pattern for diplomacy within the United Nations that was to become habitual. Both at the London meeting and at San Francisco the aim was a meeting of minds rather than a united front. There was a remarkable degree of unanimity, nevertheless, among members other than Britain, a feature of the Commonwealth that persisted so long as the independent-minded Labour government remained in Canberra and Wellington. The Commonwealth as a group remained an acti ve force dudng the first decade of the United Nations. One reason was that the focus of crisis was the Far East, on the problems of which there was a rough consensus among Commonwealth countries. There were variations in the positions of Britain, India, Canada, Australia, aod others 00 the subject of Korea or relations with China, but the consensus, such as it was, arose from a shared concern not only over China but also over the Asian policy of the United States. The role of India was crucial because it was one of the few channels of communication with Peking. Mr. Nehru's influence was strong in Commonwealth capitals, and the concept of partnership with the Asians attracted new support in the "Old" countries to the Commonwealth idea. The other Commonwealth countries by no means accepted fully De:lhi's estimate of China's policies, and most of them joined the United States in United Nations' military operations in Korea. Nev~rthele ss , they grew alarmed over what they considered the rigidity of American attitudes. In such issues as the "Oil-shore I ~ lands" and the attempt to achieve a Korean settlement, which dominated United Nations high politics for a number of years, there was, in addition to a harmony of views, considerable agreement among Commonwealth countries at the United Nations on ways of restraining the principal antagonists. India, Britain, and Canada were particularly active in this diplomacy, which extended also to the truce settlements in Indochina outside the United Nations in which all three were assigned responsibilities to maintain agreements that the United States had declined to sign. The Commonwealth consensus was most notable when the Prime Ministers met in London in February,

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1955, at the time of ratification of th e defence treaty between Washington a nd Ta ipei. T he ir com munique we nt unusually fa r in say in g on thi s issue th at they were "united in their conviction th at it was necessary th at incide nts should be avoided while means were sought fo r a peaceful outco me" and "confident th at the intimate and perso nal discussions wh ich they had held . . . woul d be a valuable fou ndation fo r future co nsultations with one another and with other countri es direct ly co ncerned." Wha t amoun ted to combi ned represe ntations were made to Washington and, through India, to Pek ing. At a stage when th e Co mmonwca lth cou ntries, as new pe rfo rmers in th e worl d of diplo macy, were acquiring a sense of power and in fl uence, thi s consensus was fo rtui tous. It dim inishcd later when the spotli ght shi fted to the Middle East, where British rathe r tha n American policy was under fire. Neve rtheless, the Far Eastern crises of the early fi fties did estab lish a hab it of com mon action, a feelin g, not altogeth er unju stified, th at th ere mi ght be a Commonwealth way o f looki ng at world issues; an'd th at the cross-fer tili zati on of As ian and European perspectives was u niqu ely valu able. To call this an anti-American front woul d be a di stortion; it was no n-American rather tha n anti -America n. I t is Com monwealth doc trine that its good wo rk must be compl ementary to th at of the Un ited States a nd, in fact, the institu tion could not fl ouri sh on any other bas is. Neverth eless, its ca pacity at va rious stages of its history eitheli by acc ident or design to set itself apart from the Un ited States has stre ngt hened the agglu tinative process. It is a fac tor th at is wisely not ment io ned by statesmen and should be reserved for confession to the psych iat rist-historian. D ecline of th e Consensus This co nse nsus was somewhat ephemeral. It left a tradition and a justifi ca tion of the Com mon wea lth tie in matters of diplomacy, parti cularly in Ottawa, where th e need was felt for associates and accomplices in worl d diplomacy and also for an orientat ion not anti-American but independe nt of the Un ited States. It helped to set Ca nada, and to a lesser extent A ustrali a and New Zealand, in the habits of middl e-power diplom acy, although their associates we re quite as often the Scandinavi ans and other independent-minded states as members of the Commonwealth fratern ity. India, however, whi ch had played a central role in the earlier conce nsus, by the mid-fifties was emerging u nd er the forceful if choleric leadership of Kri shna Menon as a great power in the United Nations, tacitly if reluctantly recognized as such

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in the Assembly if not formally in the Security Council. Its role was primarily that of a leader of the Asians and Africans, although it continued LO be a force also with in the councils of the Commonwealth, largely because of the inclination of Mr. Neh ru. Curiously enough, Krishna Menon, however much he deli ghted in scourgi ng the British, Australians, and, of course, th e South Africans, remained Commonwealth-minded, perhaps because, his pOlitical formation being British, he felt more at horne battling with other people of si mil ar hackground. Much of Commonwealth diplomas:y in the United Nations was among the lesser powers. It is Dot true, as is often stated by the British, that there is little direct associat ion of Commonwealth members and that all contacts run through London. A good deal takes place behind their backs. In the United Nations, close personal relations, team-work, those inta ngible ties said to distinguish the Commonwealth relationship, have been more Dotable among Canadians, Indians, New Zealanders, or Nigeri ans than with the British themselves, embarrassed as they inevitably are by their motherhood. For the British the Commonwea lt h was often a millstone, whereas for othe r members it provided opportunities to be taken advantage of or ignored as they wished. The Suez Crisis of 1956 divided the Commonwealth but proved its strength. ]t did not break uP. and in spite of bitterness the tradition of Commonwealth co nsultation persisted. Rega rdless of the differences in public positions, Co mmonwealt h represe ntatives in New York worked earnestly together, and the messages exchanged among Londo n, Delhi, Karachi, Ottawa, and elsewhere proved a st rong justification of the existence of the Commonwealth. While 'Washington virtually broke oft' relations with London, Mr. Nehru, Mr. Suhrawardy, and Mr. St. Lau rent worked hard to get the British out of their mess and save the Commonwealth, an endeavour in which they were conscious of. the encouragement of powerful forces in Britain and anguished members of th e British foreign service who, whi le loyal to their government, recognized what their Commonwealth associates were trying to do. The disruptive effect of the Suez Crisis was mitigated by the fact that differences on the subject among the peoples of the Commo nwealth were not strictl y along national lines. Even without Britain it was Commonwealth members which formed the core of the United Nations operation, fortunately including "Old" Commonwealth a nd "New" Commonwealth members. Although Canada took the initiative in proposing a solution by the establishment of U.N.E.F., it could

93 not have rallied support from the sceptical Arabs and Asians if it had no t been for team-work with India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, after 1956, the Commonwealth was never quite the same at the United Nations. The causes were by no means only the division over Suez. The British lost their confidence and never recovered the leading role they bad had in the United Nations up to that time. The Africans began to pour iota the United Nations, and the Asian-African "bloc" was more and more the focus of interest of the "New" Commonwealth members. Whereas in the earlier stages Britain's enlightened policy of liberation bad given the Commonwealth as an institution prestige in the world community, the last stages of decolonization raised hard core issues: Central Africa, South Africa, Angola, British Guiana, and the bitterest aspects of "colonialism." It became no Jonger just a queston of the colonialists seeking to propel tbe willing British towards a goal they had already chosen. Both sides were running into stubborn resistance and disagreed vehemently on the way to dissolve it. The United Nations itself became a cause of division between the British, whose Conservative Government displ~yed an obvious lack of enthusiasm for the institution, and other members, both white and non-white, whose dedication to the United Nations was intense if not entirely consistent. At the same time, what seemed to the British a lack of consideration for their problems in the United Nations on the part o~ their Commonwealth colleagues encouraged hostility in Britain to the Commonwealth itself as well as to the United Nations. PART THREE: THE COMMONWEALTH -

The Commonwealth and "Colonialism" The fact that the Commonwealth has been embroiled over questions of colonialism has obscured the fact that its greatest contribution to the United Nations is its existence. The most important function of the United Nations has been to provide a framework witbin which could take place tbe transition from an imperial world to one in which over a hundred countries stand on their own feet. The transition has been accompanied by such turmoil and anger that one forgets how much more bloody and violent it would otherwise have been. The United Nations' Charter, however, went no furtber than to insist that dependent territories must become independent. What was needed in practical politics was a formula fo r the peaceful process from dependence to independence. This formula was provided by the Commonwealth. The idea of a colony being aided by the colonial power to

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establish institutions of government and proceed by stages to govern itself in fruitful collaboration with its former master is now widely accepted as a natural progression, but a generation ago it did not seem at all natural or obvious. It was not only Marxists who assumed that independence could come only in a violent break accompanied by hostility. The British Commonwealth bad, long before the Second World War, set a different pattern for white countries, but it was the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947, and their unexpected preference for remaining within the Commonwealth, that was decisive. Even if membership within the Commonwealth was regarded as no more than a face-saving formula (which would be to underrate it), it established the revolutionary idea that the path was open for non-European peoples in the Empire to achieve freedom by orderly evolution and agreed stages rather than by precipitate "liberation." This philosophy of the Commonwealth became the philosophy of the United Nations, accepted in the Trusteeship Council and in Assembly debates even by those who denounced the British for nol acting in accorda nce with the pauern they themselves bad established . The acceptance of lbe Commonwealth as the norm was neither acknowledged nor conscious, of course. The other imperial powers, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Portugal, were expected to follow this pattern even thougb they had quite different ideas of their own. The application to other powers, and the pressure for speed, did not necessarily have happy results in all cases. It is often argued that the tragedy of the Congo was due to the insistence of the United Nations and the Congolese that Belgium pursue the Commonwealth pattern in too great haste, and it is feared that the enforced application of the principle to the Portuguese territories would lead the United Nations into the most dangerous responsibility of its history. Nevertheless if colonial rule is doomed by history, it was better that the United Nations should be able to place its confidence in a tried pattern of partnership between the governors and the governed than to have indiscriminately encoumged "liberatioD." The greatest contribution of the Commonwealth to international society was to prove in practice that this formula would work, a contribution that justifies its ~xistence for all time, even after it will have faded from the scene as an institutional entity. The Commonwealth as a "Caucus" To what extent is the Commonwealth, or has it been, a "bloc" in the United Nations? Thomas Hovet. in his study Bloc

95 Politics in the United Nations,l describes is as a "caucusing group," and his analysis of its voting record suggests to him that it is a "loose coalition," wi th "a very low degree of either identical or solidarity votes." He found it most likel y to vote together on matters involving economic, social, and hu manitarian co-operation and least likely to vo te toge th er on questions of self-determ ination. Not surprisingly, he also noted that it tended to divide into "Old" and "New" Commonwealth groups, although this has by no means been a fixed division. The pattern of voting since th is survey was made has not changed greatly, although it has become more complex with the increase of Commonwealth members, which now include countries aligned neither with the aligned nor the non-aligned ... Such statistics present the facts about the "group," but conclusions are misleading if they place too much emphasis on unanimity, a concept foreign to the Commonwealth si nce 1945. Having decisively rejected proposals that it have a common foreign policy, the post-war Commonwealth made almost a fetish of rejecting the united front. Its object is to promote understanding, to encour~ age tolerance, and to reduce but not eliminate differences. On many occasions Commonwealth members have altered their votes in order not to offend another member. Canada would not vote in favour of a resolution that condemned British actions over Suez. although it obviously deplored them. Britain's volle-face in its voting on South Africa after the latter withdrew from the Commonwealth proved bow much its earlier votes had been conditioned by the obligations of fraternity. The new members have felt less constrained to "loyalty" in their voting. but their positions have been conditioned by a sense of Commonwealth Obligation. India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and smaller states as well have often so ught to moderate anti-colonialist resolutions, partly in order to attract a majority to the middle of the road but also out of regard for the feelings of the "Old" Commonwealth members. Some countries, or rather some spokesmen, have recognized no inhibition and perhaps been more than usually spleenful towards Britain, but this does not invalidate the general conclusions. They have reserved their worst fire for the French, the Belgians, and especially the Portuguese. The "Old" members, except South Africa in its time, have consistently bridled their feelings in public statement about other members. Nevertheless, although the "Old" members cbarge' the "New" members with failure to recognize a decent PART THREE: THE COMMONWEALTH -

lThomas Hovet. J r., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1960), pp. 69-73.

96 - THE BEITER PART OF VALOUR obligation to the Commonwealth in the United Nations, the latter have a strong case that the "Old" members, in spite of their soft language, have given a priority to solidarity with their European allies on colonial issues about which the Commonwealth brethren feel strongly. It is hard for the "anti-colonialists" to accept that the cautious attitude of the older members over these issues stems not only from alliance obligations but also from a more cautious concept of the function of the United Nations and of the best way of effecting change. In spite of common political and judicial traditions, there is a real difference among Commonwealth members over the question of interference in the domestic affairs of a state, and this difference has been as much at the root of their conflicts in the United Nations as their varying views on colonialism. So strong are the feeli ngs of the African members on th is issue now and so intractable the argument over "intervention" that the Commonwealth is seriously thre ate ned by the bitterness of the debate in the Assembly. The position of the "Old" members has stiffened, but not even the "white Commonwealth" is always solid on colonial votes. When Britain remains intransigent, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand sometimes abstain or accept a compromise. This flexibility in the middle alleviates somewhat the sharp division. The fact that all members of the Commonwealth have regional or other associations to consider, and have in most cases given priority to their racial, regional, or defence associations, does Dot necessarily imply the failure of the Commonwealth idea in the United Nations. The Commonwealth is designated as a bridge by which there can be communication and some meeting of minds among the continents and peoples of the world. It is essentially a "bloc" of a very different sort from the others. It cannot be denied that the single-minded attachment of countries like Ghana or Ceyloo2 to the AsianAfricans casts doubt on the theory of a Commonwealth of understanding. Ghana and Ceylon are, however, not entirely tYP,ical. For most of the members, European and non-European, the Commonwealth association has at least introduced a healthy ambivalence into their orientation, which is all to the good of the United Nations. It is doubtful whether the Commonwealth should be described as a "caucusing group" at al l. D uring the General • It is worthy of note that changes of government since 1964 in both Ghana and Ceylon have considerably modified this single-mindedn ....

97 Assembly and on other occasions there have been weekly. fortnightly, or ad hoc meetings of Commonwealth delegations to di sc uss the agenda. The purpose has been to exchange information and explore possibi lities of agreement rather than negotiate agreed positions. In lhe ea rl y days of the United Nations, when hab its of Commonwealth consultation were taken for granted and members were more dependent on the British diplom at ic se rvice for information, these meetings were taken seriously. They declined in importance largely because of a tend ency to avoid issues on which there were differences and to concentrate instead on procedural questions. For many years they we re chaired by the bead of the British delegation, a tactical error th at was onl y in the last few years correc ted by a system of allern ating chairmen . However, senior members of delega tions gave up the habit of attending. and the custom, which with more imagination could have been useful, has been hard to salvage. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the failure of this formal system means a failure of consultation altogether. There is a constant exchange of views on United Nations' matters through diplomatic channels and in ad hoc meeting'), which are franker and more fruitful. The representative of the Commonwealth Relations Office norm ally on the staff of the British Mission has acted as a channel and co-ordinator of information, although any suggestion that he is an ali gner of votes has to be scrupulously avoided. Consultation is bilateral or multilateral but rarely in sessions of the whole. Inevitabl y, some members are more addicted to Commonwealth consultation than others, but the prevalence of the habit nee'd not be judged by the practi ces of the least interested. PART THREE: THE COMMONWEALTH -

The Diplomatic Advantages One of the reasons "New" members have chosen to remain within the Co mmonwealth is th at they recognize the value of dipl omat ic ass istance when they are pushed out into the cold world. Naturally they will see a good deal of their regional breth ren, and be more inclined to al ign th emselves in that direction, but they find the need of help also from sophisticated relations with well established communications and a storehouse of information and experience. It is Britain which is, of course. most forthcoming with assistance of all kinds, but the other countries have been increasingly helpful. Before Kenya, Uganda, or Jamaica, for example. joined the United Natio ns, their officers had been training as members of not only the British but also the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand delega-

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tions. thereby establishing personal links and att itudes that reinforce the Commonwealth tie. With rudimentary foreign services, it is impossible for most of these countries to cope with the hundreds of issues in United Nations organs or even to be represented at all mee tin gs. They find themselves more fortunatc than unattached new members by having the assistance of countries with established missions that arc among the most effective in the United Nations.

Group Representation The Commonwealth has been officially and unofficially recognized as an cntity by the United Nations. According to the unofficial "Gentleman's Agree-ment" reached among the great powers at San Francisco, one of the six non-perman ent sea ts in the Security Council was to go to a member of the Commonwealth other than Britain. The Commonwealth was accorded a sca t because it included five countries wh ich were then influential United Nations' members - India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand - but which at that time did not fit neatl y into any existing regional group. In the first two elections, Co mmonwealth countries competed against each other. India was reluctant to be labeled the Commonwealth "sitter," but came to real ize that it had a privileged position, Thereafter Commonwealth members clung loyally to the "Gentlem en's Agreement," even at the risk of harming good relations with the United States. The Un ited States had abandoned the agreement on the grounds that it was intended to apply only to the first election, and refused to vote for an Eastern European member, but the Commonwealth members more or less consistently respected this agreement because the Soviet bloc abided by the commitment to a Commonwealth representative. In 1957, official recognition was accorded to the Commonwealth when th e General Assembly adopted a resolution on the composition of its General Committee, which provided that at least one of the vice-presidents in the Asian-African category or the " western Europe and other states" category would be from a Commonwealth country. It was a so mewhat more appropriate way of recognizing the Commonwealth, not as a bloc itself but as an association significant enough to be represented above and beyond the regional groups. This was not a situation which could last indefinitel y. The original categories set out in San Francisco did not fit the United Nations of today, with its expanded membership of Asians and Afric ans. Both the Commonwealth seat on the Security Council

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and' the provISIon for a Commonwealth vice-president were cballenged at the 1963 Assembly. Older members of the Commonwealth, who did not fall easil y into a geographical gro up, fo ught hard to preserve these positions, seeing in them not only opportunit y of election to office but also a recognition of the Commonwealth as an entity. However, th ey were not supported by the newer members, most of whom preferred to take their chances with regiona l groups. T he special proviso for a Commonwealth vice-president was lost. The Assembly also passed a resolution calli ng fo r an enl arged Securi ty Council with represe ntatives from four specified areas, with no mention of th e Commonwealth.l\ The conven tion of Commonwealth representati on on the Council is, neverth eless, dead. No Commonwealth cou ntry was elected in 1964 as a non-permanent me mber. althougb Malaysia split th e term wi th Czechoslovakia and took a one-year seat in 1965. With over a hundred members in the United States, no member of the Commonwealth, except of course Brita in, ca n expect to be on the Security Counc il more than once in a generati on, and the chances for Can ada, Australia, and New Zealand arc probably best as compromise candidates:' In other United Nations organs and in the specialized agcncies there has been :1 less explicit acknowledgement of the Commonwealth as a gro up dese rving recognitio n. One of the older members has normall y bee n elected to the Economic and Social Council (E.C.O.S.o.c.) and usually one of the newe r ones as well. T he Commonwealth seat on E.C.O.S .O.C. has been maintai ned after the revisions of the 1963 Assembly. Resolution 199 1 called for an expansion of E.C.O.S .O.C . by nine members to be distri buted along geographical lines, but this was explicitly "without prej udice to the present distribution of se at s ~ " The recognition of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as a special group is common in most bodies, and in a rough way their represe ntatives are rota ted in office. They and the newer members have had more th an their share of seats and offices, but they have deserved this recognit ion because they have been more responsible th an most nations in the United Nations. Their record of contribution, both of money for the regular budget and special causes. and of men for Korea and the U nited Nations' peacekeeping operations, has been unusuall y good. A "Commonwealth Division" was provided fo r the United Nations • This has come into effect. 'Canada became a member for the 1967-8 term at the urging of Western European members, none of whom wanted the seat.

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forces in Korea. India and Canada have been involved as major contri butors in almost every United Nations' peacekeeping body established, and Austra lia took part in Indonesia a nd G reece before it lost, after Sir Robert Me nzies came to power in laic 1949, its reputation fo r "independence." It is perhaps in the contri bution of rema rkable men th at the Commonwealth has been outstanding. Out of twenty presidents of the General Assembly, five have been from the Commonwealth, a reflect ion perhaps of the parliamentary tradition and the instinct for compromise which are part of the inherit ance. Intra-Commonwealth Disputes The most dis tress ing problems for the Commonwealth in the United Nations have bee n th ose situations in which members of the Comm onwealth we re direc t an tagonists. The most important has been the persistent argument between India and Paki stan over Kashmir. Other members have consistently tried to ma inta in an objective posi tion, avo id stron g advocacy of one side or the ot her, and take an active part in prompting reconci liation . In the effort to find ao accom modation, Britain has worked closely with the U ni ted States, and Australians and Canadians have been likewise involved. In spite of thes'e strenuous efforts to avoid commitment, neither of the parties has appreciated the impartiality of its Co mmonwealth associates. The ]ndia ns, who prefer th e status quo, have not li ked the efforts of Britain and others to propose new means of se ttlement and have assumed that Pakistan had th e favour of its S.E.A.T.O. allies - Brita in, Australia. and New Zealand. Pakistan. on the other hand, has complained bitterly that its brothers and allies have not given tbe support that was its due. On the other major intra-Commonwealth iss ues. the treatment of Indians in South Africa, there was likewise an effort on the part of other Commonwealtb members to fi nd compromise solutions and avoid denunciation. There is no doubt tbat the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth has been a relief to the white Commonwealth coun tries in the Un ited Nations. Since th at day they have given up the struggle to be neu tral on South African issues, although their actions are still restrained by their reluctance to commit the Un ited Nations to intervention th at it could not carry through or tha t is more likely to stiffen resistance in South Afri ca than to induce compliance. In earlier stages of the United Nat ions many Commonwealth supporte rs we re atTe nded th at an argument between members should come before an international bod y at all, as they han-

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kered after a Commonwealth court and Commonwealth machinery for se ttling disputes. 5 The ferocit y of the Kashmir d ispute did more Ihan anything else to remove that noble idea from the realm of practical politics. The United Nat ions relieved the Com monwealth of an intol erable problem that could have torn it apart. It wou ld have been a matter of prest ige for the Commonwealth to muster the resources of diplomacy and persuasion to promote an equi table se ttlement. However, the chance of agreement on any terms between India and Pakistan, or between India and South Africa, were small, and it has probably been bettcr for the Commonwealth that the blame which the parties attach to all those who have tried to help and 10 the organs of mediation themselves should have been diffused among many members of the United Nations and heaped upon the Security Council rather than a ny Commonwealth body. An Appraisal

One's assessment of the record of the Commonwealth within the United Nations depends on one's approach to the institution itself. If the Commonwealth is regarded as a constitutional organization corporate in intent, the judgement is Jikcly to be that it has been ineffectual and its very existence a chimera. It has rare ly presented a common fro nt; it has been divided on major and minor issues; and its record of infighting is far from fraternal. The coherence that it had at San Francisco and afterward has dissipated. In so far as there has been coherence, this has largely been the traditional collaboration among the white members on the one hand, and among the Asian and African members on the other, in neither case exclusive. But if one thinks of it as an organism, a heritage, a historical phenomenon, rather than a club or bloc, the picture is different. The Commonwealth does not pretend (0 be a tigh tl y-knit group of like-minded countries with obvious common interests which might naturally aspire to unanimity a nd common action . Although its conventional rhetoric may sound as if this was its aim, no contemporary 'The judgement of a British expert on this question is as follows: "The experience to be drawn from Commonwealth practice appears to be that Commonwealth countries do not regard intra-Commonwealth disputes as sui gerreris, and outside the purview of the United Nations, and that while certain disputcs which might be justiciable by the Court, :lre excluded from its compulsory jurisdiction, no provision has been made for their regular settlement elsewhere, and which are by treaty within the jurisdiction of the Court." J. E. S. Fawcett, "The Commonwealth in the United Nations," Journal 01 Commonwealth Political Studies I (May. 1962). p. 133.

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Commonwealth polit ician or diplomat has been able to think of th is as feasible. The accomp lishment is less apparent th an in the case of most regional blocs, but the ambit io n should be recogni 7.ed as hi gher. It is an ambition well-nigh impossible to ac hieve, a nd success is bound to be limited . Looked upon as a collection of active, devoted, and, accord ing to somewhat varying lights, respo nsible me mber states, it has had an impact out of a ll propor tion to its members. It is diffic ult to esti mate how much if any of that success can without strain be atlributed to Commonwealth membership, and it is important not to indulge in the kind of illusions that have for too long prevented the Commonwealth from seeing itself realisticall y. Suffice it to say that it has been more than appears to the public eye. The political tradition , the sense of belonging from birth as a nation to a worldwide com mun ity, the flow of information. and the cont inuous di alogue mad e easier by the sharin g, at least partially, of a political language are considerable elements. It is better judged by the personal relations it has stimulated than by the institutions it has spawned, none of which has been very effective. It is a presence within the United Nations working for good. If its accomplishments as a bridge among the races a nd continents have been limited, these must be set against the difficulties in what is the major task of the times. One of the difficulti es in trying to estimate the function of the Commonwealth in the United Nat ions is that it is by its nature non-exclusive ; it marches in step wit h other members moving in the same direction. Jts miss ion is sha red to such an extent by the United States in p3rticular that it is hard to isolate the significance of the Commonwealth as an en tity. Its raison d'etre is that it has certain historic, familial features that can be exploited to hold th e wo rl d closer together. There wou ld be no sense in creating it in this day a nd age for that purpose, bu t it was not cre(lted; it grew and it exists, and, as it exists, advan tages can be taken of it to do what the world needs most. The Un ited Nations cannot progress fur ther, either in the creation of more effective institutions or in the solving of disputes, unless the consensus on major issues is widened. The United Nations has not yet divided itself into fixed racial groups warring against each other, and there is reaso n to hope it never will. If the conse nsus widens and the United Nations is thereby strengthened, the existence of the Commonwealth will have been a factor of sign ificance in promoting the sense of com munity.

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2: The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: A Mood of Exasperation Two countries closely associated for centuries, Britain and Canada, are drifting apart, and it is a pity. Few states in the world have so much in common; few states need eac h other more. Their histories are entwined. The institutions of the younger grew from those of th e older, and in partnership they created the Commonwealth. Alt hough they grow ethn ically dissimilar, they share one common language and a rich heritage. What has gone wrong? Some of the trouble is attributable to facts, in particular, economic facts. Much of it, however, is psychological and requires analysis. The two peoples need, most of aU, new images of eac h otber. They are caught in a web of the past from which they ca nnot break free to see themselves as natural partners across th e North Atlantic. ] mprovement of Anglo-Canadian re lat ions is not helped by the fact that Britons and Canadians at this moment in history find each other dull. Or it may be more true to say that those more imperially minded people in each country who especially nourished the association are losing interest. The yo ung and the way-out in Canada are fasci nated by mod Britain, which the Anglophiles of the previous ge neration find di sillusioning. Business-minded young Englishme n and restless Scots may like the comfort and modernity o f Toronto; but the old-fashioned English view of Canada as a place which, although American in speech, was cleaner and decenter because of its Brit ishncss has given way to the compla int that Canada has gone off whoring with the Yankees. Canada now seem less attractive tha n th e United States because it is American without the strong wild taste of the real thin g. Anglophobia is a n old phenomenon in Canada - along, of course, with an equall y irrational Anglophilia. It is muted now for the simple reason that the object of irrit ation is less evident. Canadians grow increasingly awa re, however, of the resentment against them in Brita in which has replaced the old irritati ng but comfortable condescension and patient pride. Suez seems to be a main cause, acce ntuated by a feeling in some quarters that Canada kept Britai n out of Europe, unfairly disSOURCE:

Abbreviated ve rsion of an article in

(July, 1966) .

Th~

ROll1ld Table 223

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criminates aga inst British produce, acts mischievously in the Commonwealth, maltreats the Queen, postures like a bighminded nuisance on the world scene, and is a vulgar, nouveau riel,e second-cousin. The view has turned from sweet to SOUf, but what the Canadian resents most is the almost total lack of interest in the vitali ty of his co untry in a period of unprecedented economic and cultural escalation. It seems that if Canada is not to be a jewel in the imperial diadem, then to hell with it. Some of the difficulty between Britain and Canada is the unforeseen problem of the normal child. Both cou ntries have taken pride in the fact that Canada did not grow up in rebellion. It evolved sensibly, step by step, to self-government, setting a pattern for the rest of the Commonwealth and other empires as we ll. Relations were not troubled by the bitterness that lingered in the United States or Commonwealth countries whose leaders had their training in prison. In Canada, self-government came easily - a phenomenon that left its patriotism fr ustrated. The continuing Commonwealth relationship has been regarded as a guarantee of comradeship. This is to a large extent true. Evolution has advantages over revolution, and the way in which the Commonwealth idea has effected the largest amount of peaceful change in history more than justifies the Canadian-British relationship as it was. But in the perfect family there is the neurotic element. It is the very idea of Britain as the mother country and Canada as the eldest daughter that prevents a proper understanding of the contemporary rel ationship between two mature middle powers, neighbours across the Atlantic, senior partners of the United States, allies in N .A.T.O. and the Commonwealth. collaborators in many world endeavours, and with no serious reason for conflict. But neither people can take each other seriously as partners because they cannot rise above the historical paltern. Economic Opportullities Economically, the two countries were made for each other. A vast and underpopulated country, rich in natural resources, should be complementary to a small, densely populated country maki ng its living by its wits and its industry. The population gap is closing, and the gap in gross national product is still closer. Canada, of course, long since burst from the colon ial pattern by establishing its industry, but it remains a producer of raw material for industrialized countries. Here are an underd eveloped and an overdeveloped country. Tn spite of the involvement of both in other parts of the world, in spite of the fact that neither

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is likely to be the other's best customer, there remains enormo us opportunity for the exchnoge of goods. I do not propose to exnminc the economic facts but to suggest that these have been complicated by psychological factors. There is a mood of mutual exasperation which prohibits sensible examination of reciprocal interests. For the British, the disadvaillage in the balance of trade is proof of injustice. They consider it un fair of Canadians not to buy in a market that serves them well. They accuse Canada of discrimination and unfair practiccs. Ca nad ians are exasperated by what th ey consider the whining of British traders. They deny discrimination - although the Canadian government adm iltcd some by removing the principal grounds of complaint. To them the trouble is that the st ubborn British will not produce for the Ca nad ian market, will not provide reliable de liveries and service, but expect them to buy British for sent imental reasons. In culture, as distinct from economics, Britain and Canada are Jess equal. The Canadia n soil is fertile, but the brains are drained off too fas t as the world becomes more and more metropolitan. Canadian cultural resources are expandingj and in the performing arts a prevalence of Illusic and painting, museums and galleries is closing the gap. In university resources, Canada bas done more than that. There is no doubt, however, that in original product it lags behind Britain - and perhaps Australia as wel l. lt suffers also in that its artists abroad are often identified as American or French and Canada gets no credit. Canadians feel that Britons ignore the exciting things that are happening in their country, not only in English Canada but also in French Canada, where the cultural explosion is far more important than the odd act of violence which is noted in the British press. They cannot, however, blame others entirely for their failure to pique the curiosity of other countries. A notable change si nce the war has been the shift of focus on the part of the Canadian scholar. The impact on Canadian public administration, the universities, and cultural life of Canadians who studied at British universities was once important. They usually rcturned more nationalist than imperialist in outlook; but their habits of thought, intellectual ties, and style were affected by British traditions, and there were strong personal bonds which survived. Now British universities are crowded; the number of Canadian gradua.te students has multiplied; and they swarm into the graduate schools of the Un ited States, where large fellowships and comfortable research opportunities are available. Britain is a stranger land to them th an it was to the

106 - THE BETTER PART OF VALoun previous genera tion, and their admiration for the efficiency of American universities is such that th ey often look with co ndescension on the conditions and faci lities of British universities. That they are being well educated in good American graduate ,chools there can be no doubt. They bring back American perspectives and techniques, and increasi ng num bers of American scholars are joi ning the staffs of the rapidly expanding universities of Canada. This is all to the good. What is lost, however, is the perspective that Canadians gained on their own country and their own cont inent by the sea-change. It was not only the habits of mind of Oxfo rd, Edinburgh, or London that they acquired but also the civilizing influence of the European summers. It was the cross-fertilization th at did so rnuch to give Canada its own point of view. Canada still absorbs rnore British scholars and rnore of British culture than it gives back in return. Nevertheless, in adtlition to their controve rsial contribution to newspaper publishing, Canadians have had sorne considerable irnpaat on British television. Many ·of the best producers and actors have gone off to London and Manchester, whe re they have contributed to the vitality of th e British product. On the other hand, the C.D.C. bas depended heavily on British imrnigrants, as has the native Canadian theatre. The new theatre at Chichester was, of course, inspired by a Canad ian mOdel, and thereby hangs a lesson. A phenomenon to conternplate is the emergence of the Canadian Stratford Festival as the most professional, artistic, and the most phe nomenally successful (at the box office) of all cultu ral enterprises in Canada - if not in the whole continent. Although it started some fifteen years ago producing Shakespeare in a great tent, the Festival now encompasses two theatres, and its productions range from plays by Shakespeare, Moliere, Chekhov, and Strindberg to Mozart operas, chamber music, and assorted entertainrnents beyond the fringe . Stratford was successful because, instead of hirin g a circus performer some dozen years ago, the local entrepreneurs imported Tyrone Guthrie and Tanya Moiseiwitch from Britain, with Alec Gui nness as first attraction. These British (and Irish) so rcerers saw an opportunity to carry out experiments in a far country im possible at home. Then they set out to encourage a self-sustaining Canadian operation. The end product has been unique, something impossible without British experience, talent, and genius, which has flowered in its own style and raised a crop of native-born Canadians and British-born Canadians who have revitalized

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the Canadian theatre and th ereby made high standards of television possible. Its impact abroad is felt from Chichester to Minneapolis. T he R eversal oj Empire Canadi ans, however, are reluctant to acknowledge how much Stratford, as one example, owes to the British. In their uneasy nat ionalism they forge t that all culture is derivative. Britons, on the other hand, seem to prefer their vision of Canada as a vast field of wavi ng grai n. Many Canadia ns would ra ther perform or exhibit in foreign capitals, where they may be judged on their merits rather than being pre-judged in accordance wi th the critic's views on the Commonwealth. For many years, of course, the English wcre expected 'to be nice to people fro m the Emp ire, to pour tea and whisky into boring co usins-in-law from Moose Jaw and Melbourne, to make ge nerous allowances for th e colonials' pai ntings and their musical antics. T he Empire hav ing become unpopular, the critics' prej udice now is to be not benevolent but savage. It is a pity, because Canadi an culture co uld do with the clean edge of British cri ticism. The dean of American literary critics, Edm und Wilson, has just written a whole book, first published seriall y in T he N ew Y orker, about Canadian culture, mainly French, in which he fo und much to praise and to blame but enough of substan ce to write a book about. It is hard to conceive of an Englishman even considering such a project - except, of co urse, as part of a survey of the expansion of British genius in the Commo nwealth. Strange as it may seem, it is in fo reign policy that the two countries have most in co mmon. This fact may be evident only to the professionals who play the game behin d the sce ne, although even they suffe r from ancicn t irritati ons and by no means always see thei r mutua l interests plain. The pict ure of Canada-United Kingdom rel ati ons since the war is distorted by the spectre of Suez, but this was notable as one of the few occasions on which the two countries diffe red over a major issue. The Canadian Government, moreover, never conside red its Suez policy anti-British; its aim was to rescue the old lady from an unfortu na te and uncharacteristic aberration. On most inte rn at ional questio ns, particul arly in Europe and the Far East, Canadia n and British official thinking has been closer together than has that of eit her coun try to the Americans. On Vietnam, Britain as a co-chai rm an of th e Geneva Conference and Canada as a member of the tri partite Control Commission had similar perspectives from the begi nni ng. Both have had

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considerable reservations about United States policy. Similarly with China. Although Caoada has not recognized the Peking Government, its approach to the China problem has always been closer to that of London than to that of Washington. On Germa ny, N.A.T.O., and disarmament, British and Canadian delegations have seen eye to eye. falling out from time to time on tactics but rarely on policy, annoying each other with their respec tive assumptions but confident of eac h other's intentions. This harmony in international policy has not been calculated. It has not been based on the principle of Com monwealth solidarity, although alignment has been promoted by the routines of Commonwealth consultat ion. The two policies have coincided because interests and habits of mind coincided. That is largely because both are Atlant ic middle powers. They are the closest allies of the United States and, regardless of what it is fash ionable to say these days, they both have what can be called a special relationship with that country - a relationship based upon language, historical experie nce, and mutual confidence not extended to other countries. (1 am arguing not that the special relationship is a good thing, but that it is endemic.) Canada and Britain are in their actions and judgements less ruthless th an the Americans - partly because they are weaker. They have been more pragmatic and more cautious. They both have a deep sense of responsibility for world order and for international organizations, a qual ity th at associates them more closely than all but a few other powers with the Americans.

The Second Division That one of these countries is a ci-devant great power and the other has in a generation risen from the ranks ought not, in logic, to make much difference in their respective capacities for international gamesmanship. Nevertheless, it does. There is a difference in their auras. an d au ras matter in world politics. Britain is a permanent member of the Security Council, a nuclear power of sorts, and is saddled with direct responsibilities in many parts of the world. It is a country of unquestionably greater consequence, if not of much greater power, than Canada in international politi~s . The gap closes between those who are second-class first-class powers and those who are first-class second-class powers, but they are still not in the sa me division. The relationship between a team that fears it may be relegated to the second division and one that has acquired some assurance in the second division is delicate. It is not inclined to promote the amiable acceptance of each other's position. It encourages

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deflation of each other's pretensions. a considerable barrier to both Canadians and Britons in perceiving the vast range of their mutual interests. Although many Britons speak of their country as a "middle power," the Foreign Office would find distasteful any suggestion that it operated on the same level as any Department of External Affairs. This sensitivity - or insensitivity - is aggravated by the lamentable divorce of tbe Foreign Office from any direct interest in Commonwealth countries. Never having been stationed in Canada, the F.O. man is likely to take Turkey or Argentina more seriously.1 It is a question whether the Commonwealth tie has been a bond or an irritant. It is probably both. It has brought the two governments together in many enterprises and has not only provided the opportunity for consultation, but bas forced consultation, which would not have taken place otherwise. However much they may prefer old-worldly Portuguese or all-powerful Americans, British diplomats are forced by the Commonwealth mechanism to consort with brash fellows from the Commonwealth, an experience tbat may account for their Europeanist bias. H would be overdramatic to suggest that Britain and Canada are rivals for leadership of the Commonwealth, but there is a kernel of truth in the statement. The Canadian conception of the Commonwealth prevailed over the British conception. Old British impedal thinkers have been frustrated in their vision of a united Commonwealth maintaining Britain as a first-class power. (The idea that Commonwealth unity would mean in practice general acceptance of British foreign policy was as persistent and pathetic as the contemporary belief in the possibility of a single and at the same time strong foreign policy for Europe.) When Canada got the kind of Commonwealth it wanted, it found it a useful instrument of Canadian diplomacy. Support from the African and Asian members buttressed Canadian influence. Canadian sympathy for anti-colonialists on the other band annoyed British Conservative administrations. The Canadian contribution to the Commonwealth has been constructive, perhaps indispensable, in the transformation of an empire into an association which still exists for good. None of this diplomacy has cost Canada much. Britain has had to pay the bills and suffer the' headaches. Canada can afford to lose all its trade with Rhodesia - or South Africa for that matter. Britain cannot. Canada has diverted the largest part of its economic aid 1 Although

the Foreign and Commonwealth services bave now been amalgamated, it will take some time for the results to be felt.

lID -

THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR

to the Commonwealth, but Britain must see that the final ac~ count is settled. Canadian policy has not been irresponsible on colonial matters. Allhough Canadians were often impatient of the stuffiness of Bri tish official presentations, they were loyal in support of Britain th rough ma ny difficu lt years in the United Nations. Viewed from \Vhitehall, however, where things are felt most acutely, Canada's position may sometimes have seemed mischievous. The Queen of Canada Traditionally the monarchy has been a bond between Canada and Britain. 11 still is, but in some ways it clouds the modern relationship. When the Queen last visited Canada a prominent French-Canadian entertainer refused to appear in a royal variety show in Charlottetown, explain ing that she wou ld be delighted to sing before the Queen of England but not before the Queen of Canada. This incident is representative of much opinion in English-speaking as well as French-speaking Canada. Although officially Her Majesty has been for many years "Queen of Canada," neither Canadians nor British have taken popularly to this concept. She is thought of as an English woman who comes to Canada from time to time to do her ritual duties. The Queen has been not only scrupulous but also imaginative in the attempt to project her role as Queen of Canada. It is not her fa ult that the effort has been unsuccessful. Not only do Canadians look upon her as a representative of Britain; so do citizens of the United Kingdom. The British complaint to Canadians when the Queen visited Quebec was, "What are you doing to our Queen?" The divisibility of the monarch was a good constitutional idea, but it bas not caught on. Even when British civil servants were seeking more enthusiasticalIy than they are now to establish the imperial idea, they were never prepared to relinquish their sole right to the appellation, H.M.G.; it never occurred to them to do so. Although their government has long si nce accep ted the Dew Commonwealth, for many Canadians the Commonwealth still means an antique tie to Britain and the monarchy, and their views on the institution are governed accordingly. It is associated with Anglo-Saxonry; and as the Canadian population becomes less and less Rritish in origin, resistance grows. When the glory of the Commonwealth is that it is multiracial, and AngloSaxons and Celts are a small minority among its millions, it seems absurd to cling to the idea that it and the monarchy are something for those of British breed. However irrational, the idea persists. It could be argued, therefore, that the establish-

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ment of a Canadian republic would remove an important barrier to better relations between Britain and Canada and to more enthusiastic Canadian popular acceptance of the Commonwealth. As usual, however, one cannot look at (his matter in pure logic. The cutting of the ties with the monarchy would be interpreted bo th in Canada and abroad as another step in the divorce between Canada and its one-time mother country and a further step in its assimilation to American political institutions. This would be a misinterpretation. If the republican preference grows in Canada, it would be attributable not so much to the changing ethnic composition of the country or the power of American example as to the growing nationalism of Canadians of all varieties. Although this nationalism is primarily directed to the assertion of separate identity from the United States, it is unduly suspicious of all traditions that it finds un-native. It is usually easier to uproot a British irritant than an American. If the monarch were unpopUlar, change might be rapid. It is held in check by two factors - the universal respect for the Queen as a person and admiration for her performance; and the fact tbat the monarcby matters so little in Canadians' daily lives. The revolution lranquille in Quebec is less important in this question of Anglo-Canadian rel ations than Britons may think, although it has led many English Canadians from the primary assertion of the "British connection" to a more nationalist Canadian ism, a willingness to save the union at all costs. French-Canadian nationalism is not anti-British. The demonstrations \n Quebec against the Queen were not directed against Britain as a country or the Queen as a p erson but what is seen as the "Anglo-Saxon establishment" of this country and this continent. Britain and British governments have more often been looked upon as protecto rs than as enemies by French Canadians. Their quarrel has been with the English Canadi~ns who, they assume, want to perpetuate a colonial status for Canada - an assumption long out of date. Their argument now is largely that English Canadians assert Canadian independence. too little against the Americans. They feel, however. that in general Canada's ties are too Anglo-Saxon. They themselves are reasserting a cultural lin" with France and would like Canada to be more Latin in its choice of friends. On the other hand. the new assertion of a close r relationship with France removes one of the traditional French-Canadian arguments against a closer Canadian affinity with Britain. French-Canadian scepticism of the Commonwealth tie is appeased by the policy of the Government

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in recognizing French-speaking Africa and Asia as an area of Canadian special interest equivalent to that of the Commonwealth. The argument in Canada for a closer association with both France and Britain is strong because of intense thinking just now about relations with the United States. The internal debate has on the whole strengthened rather than weakened the attachment of Canadians to the Canadian fact. The present search for a wider international life is not the expression of a sordid antagonism to the United States or a rejection of continental realities but the desire to cast off a prolonged national adolescence for a more mature experience. Canadians would like to have the two countries they once called "mother" as allies and partners in the endeavour, recognizing, of course, with native modesty that in an equal partnership some are more equal than others and deference must be paid to age and experience. A considerable period of adjustment will be required on all sides. It should be worthwhile, however, if we can agree with Claude Julien of Le Monde: "Sans doute 1e Canada a besoin de l'Europe, mais l'Europe a aussi grand besoin du Canada."2 tClaude Julien, U Canada: Grasset, 1965) .

Dern;~Te

Chance de L'EuTope (Paris:

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3: The Future of the Commonwealth The Commonwealth is one of the most extraordinary examples of wishful thinking among contemporary political phenomena. On this judgement its deprecators wou ld agree. So also may its supporters. Its future is not predestined. It is an institution with or without another chapter, depending on whether its members and its citizens will it to continue. If it is worthwhile, hopeful thinking must be deliberatel y stimulated, because confidence in the future of its mission is required if the Commonwealth is to be taken seriously. It can die of disparagement. From an Empire of British breed it progressed to a pink-cheeked Commonwealth and then to a fraternity rejoici ng in its breedlessness; it is no wonder most people's image of it got lost on the way. There is oot even agreement as to whether the thing exists at all. The co urse of history is clear enough, but the direc tion is disputed. Has this been decl ine and fall, or ful filment? Betrayal or sublimation? The sunset or the fi nest hour? Logical argume nts can be filed for either case. Reality is in the eye of the beholder. Only if one believes in it is it there. What one thinks of the present state of the Commonwealth and its chance for a future depends on what one thin ks it is supposed to be. Advocates and critics seem to be talking about different institutions. What is it, and what should one expect of it? First of all, one must forget a good deal, although by no means all, of the past. The Commonwealth ought not to be regarded as primarily a matter of ant ique ceremony reserved for those of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic ancestry. The trad itions of the Palaces of Westminster and Buckingham are woven deep into its fabr ic and remain important for many. They have provided stability and romance in the national lives of the "Old" Commonwealth and deserve continuing respect. But they are not central. They do not appeal in the same way to the hundreds of millions of citizens of a "New" Commonwealth which is multiracial, republican as well as monarchical- or to the millions of new and younger citizens of the "Old" Commonwealth . Essentially, the Commonwealth must be looked upon, in the 19605, as an informal aod largely de-institutionalized association among SOURCE: An article in Optima, September, 1966, a Quarterly journal published by The Anglo-American Corporation, De Beers Consolidated, and Charter Consolidated groups of companies.

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countries of various races and con tinents. As a result of a common historical experience, a nd in spite of wide dHIerences of political practice and imernational orientation, they have some vital things in common. They share certain constitu tional and legal altitudes, governmental and business practices, and habits of working together. It is neither an empire nor .a power bloc. H is neither a diplomatic nor a military nor an economic unit although it is not devoid of diplomatic, military, a nd economic significance. Because the usual political terminology is inept, the nature of the Commonwealth has been encrusted with cliches - many of which are nauseatingly mystical. It is in the nature of a family, but this is a stale metaphor, and the comparison with a family went out of fashion since it was used by those who overemphasized blood. Now that the Commonwealth has come to glory in its multi-racial quality, it has been bad form to call it a family. Yet there are mu lti-racial families. The essential thing about a family is that it has a common origin, and the Commonwealth has significance only because its members sha red, for a time at least, a common institution. It is not a thing one joins; it is a thing one stays in. The "family" metaphor suggests a unity closer than in fact exists, if one has a kiddies-round-the-hearth image of the family presided over by a mother figure looking like Queen Victoria. What I have in mind is the modern grownup family. each member of which spend s most of his time in other circles, but in whose life the family remains a unique if not predominant association. The Commonwealth ought no longer to be looked upon primarily as an economic organization. The commercial and financial advantages of membership have been of less importa nce to Canada than to olher members, and for thi s reason Ca nadians may underestimate the economic factor and overstress the political. The sensitivity of Canadian governments to Britain's flirtation with the European Common Market indicated that Commonwealth commercial advantage, allhough not of first importance, meant more to Canadians than they had recognized. This crisis revealed also the dependence of other parts of the Commonwealth on the British market and on British finance, even though the United States and other countries were increasing in relative importance for them . If one analyses the reasons why Asian and African members have decided to remain within the Commonwealth. one is impressed - and worried - by the extcnt to which this is justificd by the expectation of favourable economic terms. This is not their only reason, of

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course, but if the expectations of newer members, which extend not only to Bri'tain but also to Canada and Australia and include capital as well as technical assistance, are disappointed, they may be more easily tempted to resign the first time they are irritated. Obviously, their expectations cannot be fully satisfied from Commonwealth resources. Whether membership can continue to seem economically worthwhile is -a major question. As an economic entity the Commonwealth is bound to be of declining significance. What still exists in the way of preferences and the sterling area cannot be abandoned on principle or sur~ rendered without compensation. Preferences might be regarded as vestigial, as arrangements to be incorporated into broader international systems of commerce and currency, if these can be achieved: If they cannot, then protective systems of all kinds will become important again - although regional systems may infringe on the old Commonwealth network. What the Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958 proved was that although consultation on economic problems among countries of such diverse interests was well worthwhile, that was not because the Commonwealth as an entity provided the means or resources to solve these problems. One should accept as progress that many of the economic and political functions of the Commonwealth have merged into broader international organ izations, just as the Colombo Plan, a Commonwealth initiative, was extended to include foreign peoples moving in the same direction . The Commonwealth can still be useful for some complementary purposes. It is of growing importance, for instance, as a framework for technical (especially educational) assistance programs, because these are personal in appl ication, and the element of familiarity in a historical association is important. It is noteworthy that Canada has devoted almost its entire assistance program to Commonwealth countries. The exchange throughout the Commonwealtb of students, volunteers, engineers, teachers, and civil servants, strengthen the fabric of an association in which peoples on the whole get along better than governments. None of this work, however, can be exclusive, because other countries, and especially the United States, pJay an indispensable part in all those things that the Commonwealth is about. In recent years, the Commonwealth and Europe have been set up unnecessarily as antithetic choices for Britain, although the European Community is a regional association with economic functions quite different from anything the Commonwealth could provide. Responsibility for this misconception

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rests on botb sides in the debate. It must be recognized that the European a~s ociat i on is intended to have political sign ificance. As an independent At lantic state, Britain is more likely to give priorit y to Co mmonwealth interests than it would as a tightlyknit associate of a European Community. Other members of the Commonwealth, however, must recogn ize that Britain cannot be prevented from this association if she is convinced that her prosperity lies in that direction. To protest is only to make certain that Britain's affiliat ion with Europe, if it comes, would be accompanied by an a ngry renunc iation of Commonwealth ties and responsibilities. One can only hope that the British, with their worldwide vision, wi ll not, in whatever relations with wester n Europe they contrive, become victims of a narrow and isolationist continentalism, which it is the funct ion of the Commonwea lth to counter. The role of Britain in the Commonwealth is gradually being reduced to someth ing more like equal status, but in many very practical ways it is still the sine qua non. I have said that the Commonwealth is not an economic un it. That it is neit her a power bloc nor a diplomatic unit is also obvious. It is not a military unit either, although its importance for defence, at least regionally, was highlighted by the crisis over Malays ia. The idea that it should face the world with a single foreign policy persisted until the end of the Second World War, but it was never a possibili ty. The "New" Commonwealth wou ld not have come into being if India, Ghana, or Malaya, on achieving independence, had felt unable to exercise the ir independence in foreign policy. Not even for the older members was a tight framework possible when regional attractions were becoming stronger. So, making a virtue of necessity in accordance with its gen ius, the Commonwealth proceeded to glorify its. diversity. It found its justification not in unity of policy but in a common search for understanding, for the sharing of viewpoints, consta nt consultation. Critics say that the Commonwealth is meaningless because its members differ publicly, but it ought not to be judged by a criterion of unanimity, which it does not postulate. This search for understanding remains the primary justification of the Commonwealth. One can assert the virtue of such a way of international life, without ignor ing that the practice falls short of pretensions. The denunciations of India's actions in Goa, of Uganda's attitude on the Congo, or of Britain's actions in Cent ral Afr ica mayor ma y not be justifiable, but they are too often shrill, unctuous, and unresponsive to the victim's explana-

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tions. The Commonwealth never will be a happy band of total concord. but there must exist enough good will, candour, and recognition of common interests to justify its existence. The quota of hypocrisy must be kept to an acceptable level. The stress on independence of action and the absence of commitment co uld, of course, land the Commonwealth in a hollow shell. Consultation has to be frequent and serio.us enough to be worthwhile. The Commonwealth has suffered more from failure to face up to difficult issues than from public quarrelling. At the United Nations the regular meetings of Commonwealth representatives became a farce because only minor items were discussed. It was not worthwhile for senior officers to attend; so they growled at each other in public sessions. The Suez Crisis in one way strengthened the Commonwealth. It split membership (though not on racia l lines) , but for the first time in a long while Messrs. Eden, Nehru, St. Laurent, Me nzies, and others were talking to each other about serious questions without blinking, expressing their disagreement frankly though respectfully and then trying to find some way out. Over South Africa and Rhodesia they have also been forced to face up to vital issues, but it has seemed to take an unavoidable crisis to induce the Prime Ministers to put anything controversial on their agenda. It has also taken an expanded membership. Many people, inspired by nostalgia rather than know ledge, say that with all these upstarts around a big table at Marlborough House there can never be the intimacy and confidence experienced by the old-guard European and Asian gentlemen in the Cabinet room at IO Downing Street. May I give evidence as one who witnessed some of those ancient r.ituals - as a bag.carrier in the back row. The intimacy was such that there was a common will to omit from the agenda anyth ing that might interfere with the friendly relationship of which the communique was obliged to speak. Recent sessions of the Prime Ministers have been more vital. The Africans have shown signs of taking the Commonwealth seriously - and that has come as a shock in Whitehall . The Africans have also produced a healthy th ird force to broaden the white and brown Commonwealth which emerged after 1947. The Commonwealth is confronted with grave issues in South Asia, Central Africa, the Caribbean, and the English Midlands. Immigration questions, which affect not only Britain but also Austra lia, Canada, Ceylon, and East Africa, have been exacerbated by a Commonwealth relationship that makes restrictions particularly unacceptable. Nevertheless, there are

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paradoxes in this final stage of colonialism to be resolved, and if this multi-racial fraternal society has any reason for existence it is to help resolve them. The responsibility for initiative does not rest alone on those most deeply involved or passionately concerned; as a Canadian I feel bound to say that it rests also on those elder members who have long boasted of the magnanimity of spirit and purity of conscience with which a history unsullied by imperialism has endowed us. One enco uraging feature has been the greater di sposition of members other than Britain to use the Commonwealth. The Lagos Conference of 1966, which temporarily at least reduced the divi sion between white and black co untrics over the Rhodesia issuc, was called at the initiative of Nigeria. The Conference of Commonwealth countries in the western Hemisphere held 00 a prime ministerial level in Ottawa in July, 1966, is sigoificant.lt marks a new attitude of responsibility in Canada's relations with its Caribbean partners - with the British attending as observers. Corning to grips thus with serious problems is dangerous , and the Commonwealth hovers close r to the brink than ever before. The increasing use of the consultative function means that the Commonwealth is less likel y to have a future at all, but if it has one, it should be more rather than less worthwhile. Recent Commonweahh Prime Ministers' meetings have been reassuring and encouraging. Members have shown a statesmanlike concern to avoid confrontation and seek constructive agreement. They we nt beyond merely avoiding disruption to establish a common institution, a secretariat, to promote the exchange of information. It shou ld not be assumed, however, that there has been a reversal of tbe old deci sion against the Commonwealth as a centralized unity. This is a me asure to make consultation more effective. One motive was to wrest control of Com monwealth machinery from the British and persuade them to join the Commonwealth as partners. The new att itude is revealed in Julius Nyerere's comment on his qu arrel with Mr. Wilson over the Lagos meeting: "We shall not leave the Commonwealth that is a multi-national organization, not a British one, and is therefore, for the moment at any rate, unaffected by our decision." With a zealous and imaginative secretary-general, the new institution has already proved its value. The secretariat, as I see it, is intended as a "static conference machinery" rather than a "dynamic instrument of governments" - if I might borrow Dag Hammarskjold's definitions for another purpose. Nevertheless, if the secretary-general is dynamic, and discreet enough to rec-

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ognize the limitati o ns imposed on the instrument by the loose nature of the assoc iation, he can make concili at ion a by-product of communi cati o n. Anoth er rea li ty one ca nnot ignore is the fate of those f ree constitutional principles claimed to be the heritage th at binds the CommonwealLh together. Here it is hardest to be objective. On the part of the olde r members th ere has bee n a soul-searching effo rt to be fair about gove rnm ental trends in Pakista n, Ghana, or Zanzibar. Rac ial equality is now as basic a Commonwealth principle as Parl iame nt and the law, and the older members know that their own practice is far short of the ideal. They are co nscious of the sins they have committed in their time in th e name of effective governm ent. They know that they must not expect con for mit y to the tradit io ns of Westminster in countries where unit y is fra il, illiteracy high , and the economy baffling. They c,lin g to the beli ef tha t, in spite of restrictions o n oppositio n and interference with the courts, the sp irit of a free Co mmonwealth is in some measure preserved. Free principles of governm ent may, however, have a harder time from ant icolonialists than Ihey had from colo nialists. It is hard to say how far th e Comm onweallh ca n go in tolerating governments that deny the few but fundamental principles that di stinguish the Commonwealth system . On the other h and , th e older members have to ask themselves whethe r expulsion from a freedomloving commun ity would help them through the terrible testingtime that faces govern ments in all new states. Recent events in G hana provide an argument for patience. Realpolitik, one knows un comfortabl y, forces members to be more pati ent with G hana than with South Afri ca or Rhod es ia. A problem for the Commonwealth is that it is unfashionabl e - in Lo nd on more than a nywhere. Regional solutions - the E uropea n Community, Pan Africanism, the Western H emisphere, the At lanti c community - are in style, although as the world gets smaller and regions less mean ingfu l an intercontinental organ izati on shou ld be more rat her than less significan t. For th e Africans there is a stro nge r emotional attachment to African ism than to the Co mm onwealth . For Britons Europe is attract ive, a nd for Ca nadians the continental pull is strong. Asian members are Asian first. Austra lia ns and New Zealanders ad just to their P acific commu nit y. Tf one regards these regional affiliati ons as irreconcilable wi th th e interests of the Commonwealth, the cause is lost. The Commo nwealth ca nnot force people o ut of a natural framework, set Ma laysia apart' fro m Asia, Trin idad from South America, or Ca na da from the United States. It can

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recog nize, however, th at natio ns need not be total in their orientations, that they may with profit vary their cultural, political, and commercial affil iations. It profits no one that the peoples of the world be isolated in regions. The Commonwealth is not exclusive. It is a force for good working within the United Nations. It is counter-regional; its role is not to rival regional blocs but to link them. One obstacle to a recognition of the function of the Commonwealth is the persiste nce of a belief in the evol ution of national and international society towards a Utopia which will provide a final solution, a government of the world, somehow federalistic in structure. This bias prevents appreciation for the value of amorphous international bodies that funct ion usefully for a time and are transformed. The Holy Roman Empire or the Hapsburg monarchy, th e Grreco-Roman world, med iaeval Islam or Chris tendom p layed their part and left their mark. The Commonwealth is such a phenomenon , better grasped by n historian than a pO litical scientist because it happened; it was not invented. It has already pla yed its part in one way or another for over half of the twentieth century. It may break up in dissension tomorrow or it may persist as an active force, but it has already just ified its existence. Its function has bee n and remains that of a bulwark against th e crowding forces of anarchy. Its major achievement has been in ass isting the grea test of world empires to be tra nsformed with minimum bloodshed and di sruption and, in the process, strengthening rather than weakening the international fabric. Those who hanker for the apparent sec urity of the imperial era avoid rea li ty. The Empire had to be tr.ansformed not because it was immoral but because it had stimu lated self-government. To attribute this tran sformation to unscrupulous American pressure, as is so often done, is not only to indulge in silly mali ce, it is also to tran sfer the cred it from Britons to Americans. To argue that the pace of change was too rapid is another and more substa ntial matter, although one must avoid the ill usion that history can be co nt rolled more st ri ct ly than the forces let loose allow. The alternative to the new Commonwenlth was not a happy, prosperous, and benevolent empi re but the tragic hi story of V ietnam and lndol1 csia repeated on eve n larger playing fields. (The other alternative, a two tiered Commonwealth with white chaps loyal to the Queen on top and a lower level graciously reserved for lesser breeds, is hopeless.) The West would have destroyed itself in the contest. To talk thus about the inevitable transformation of the old

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Empire may seem like underlining the obvious or se tting up a straw man to punch . Most sane people accept reality in these terms, bu t too ofte n they kick against the prese nt as if its horrid problems wou ld have been avo ided if only - if on ly precisely what? That is the question. There were certainly errors in judgement and liming in the Middle East, in India, and in Central Africa, but these do not prove the pattern wrong. And the pattern was the Commonwealt h, a Commo nwea lt h which was not a sc heme of the Colonial Office but a formula worked out in Ottawa and Pretoria as well as in \Vestminster. The formu la now seems commonplace, but it was until lately revolutionary. Pamdox icaIly, it was the idea that independence could be achieved by peaceful evolu tion rather than by violent revolution whi ch was revolut ionary. There a re those who accept the Co mmo nwealth as harmless. OtHers find it posi tively harmfu l. Has it perhaps bred ill usions of pOlitical equality not grounded on equal political capacity? Is it advisable to encourage Sierra Leone or Barbados to expect the same infl uence as Australia - or Pakistan? Should Afri ca n count ries new ly come to th e responsibil ities of self-gove rn ment be allowed through Commonwealt h institut io ns to interfere in the internal affairs of Rh odesia? H as not the Commonwealth, in the name of mult i-racialism, come u nder the majority rul e of those who are rac ialist in their hostility to whites and act as if black me n ca n do no wrong? Do DOL the Asian and African members show litt le disposition to support thei r white brothers di plo mat ically or eve n to ref ra in from using abusive la nguage about them in public? T he cha rges cannot be dismissed. Commonwealth discussio ns are not feasts of pure reason, and the non-wh ite me mbe rs are often intolerant and unreasonable. It is, of course, unw ise of Britain, Canada, or Australia to com plai n about th e regio nal loyal ties of Africa ns and As ia ns, in view of the priorities they ass ign to their N.A.T .O. and S.E.A.T.O. commitments. T hey are more inclined by habit to keep a leash on their public utterances about fellow members, an old-fashioned custom not much appreciated by th e spokesmen of new cou ntries who insist that they judge govern ments by deeds, not words. Olde r members do have to be prepared to take more abuse than they give. On the other hand, deci sions are by comp romise and consensus, and the voti ng st rength of the newer members is less significan t th an it seems because there is no voting. Like most wo rldly institutions, the ach ievements of the Commonwealth are less than its aspi rations, but there remains an argu ment for the asp irat ions.

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It is important not to blame the problem on the spokesman. Unjustifiable and mischievous a nti-colonialism - as well as justified anti-colon ialism - are reflected in the deliberations of the Commonwealth as of the United Nations. There are those who believe that both these institutions have stimul ated and aggravated irresponsible attitudes. It is hard to argue with anyone who sees it that way. It is my own conviction, based on two decades of involvement in bo th Commonwealth and United Nations' diplomacy, that both institutions have imposed restraint and di scipline in the process of liquidating or transforming the im perial system. By exorcising Africa and Asia from the international institutions which bind countries together in a common framewo rk , one could not cause th eir terribl e problems to vanish or to be of less co ncern any more than the proscription of China from international society has caused the giant to go away and stop bothering th e rest of the world. Coping with turbulent forces in a world without these international links, without some recognition of common interest, even the shari ng of myths and aspirat ions, would be fighting blind. The Commonwealth, in its post-imperial phase, st ill has some of the qualities of an imperium - a defence of the law against the barbari ans of any race or creed who th reaten it. It is by no means alone in the struggle, but it is unique and it embraces many of the most influential states in world politics. It is hard then to say whether the Commonwealth has a future. Its future may be no more than the fruit of its past, the persistence without form of a special relationship which cannot be uprooted. It may expire in anger. It may on the other hand become of increasing, though probably never primary, importance in the life of its members. If it fails to survive, howe ve r, it will be because the concept is too far ahead of rather than too far behind the times.

Part Four: The Atlantic Community

1: The Atlantic Community: Unity and Reality [ fee l under so me obli ga tio n to offer the Ca nadian posit ion on th e prese nt slate o f North At lanti ca . There is, however, no such th ing as the Ca nad ian positi o n - except a consensus on the overwhe lm ing import a nce of ha rmonio us re la tions a mong the A tlan tic peoples. Bu t ritual incan tatio:ls a bo ut the swee t blessedness o f A tl antic un it y do not p reve nt a ny of th e me mbers o f N .A.T .O. from ta king a hard look a t the realit ies behi nd the phrases th at ro ll flu ent ly. Wh at I have to say may be typi ca ll y C anadi an in its mi xture of p rag ma tis m, scep ti cism, heres y, an d what J m ight ca ll the d isci plined irrespo nsibi lity tha t is the privi lege a nd the ob ligation o f lesser powers in an all iance. Jt is, never theless, a pe rsonal statem ent , and I a m a nxious to reli eve the Ca nad ia n Go vernme nt a nd my fell ow citizens fro m a ny responsibi lit y whatsoe ver fo r the views I sh all ven ture . T hese arc Ca nad ian views in th at they loo k a t the all iance fro m a northwest a ngle, a point I would li ke to stress beca use I shall no t pre te nd to express the vie ws or lhe int erests of E uropea ns o r o f o ther spec ies of North America ns. T bcir di lemm as about the great stra tegic proble ms of the mome nt a re well known and loudl y d ebated . The Canadia n perspect ive is admittedly of lesser sign ificance, but it is a compleme nta ry eleme nt in the p icture. Th e alli a nce is in a period when th e natu re of rela tions amo ng its members, a nd wi th the ir antago nists and the rest of the wo rld , is in flux, a nd one must grop e fo r new o r, a t least, adj usted co ncep ts. F irst o f all, may T, as a Ca nadia n, ex press sa tisfact ion over one cha nge in a tt itude - the decline an d , I tru st, discard o f " the dum b-be ll." I co nfess th a t it had always seemed to me a d a ngero us fantasy, th is concept o f a happ y A tla nt ic world in w h ich E urope (o r a t least the so uth-west-ce ntral p a ri s ~ f it, wi th or wi tho ut offsho re isla nd s), united in th e Spirit of '76, would work ha nd in equ al ha nd - or glove - wit h a Un ited Sla tes o f A merica c ut dow n to ma tc h ing nu clear size. Such perve rse scep ti cism , I recogn ize, may have a n ele me nt o f sour gra pes in SOURCE: This chapter is a slightly revised version of the text of a speech given to the Assembly of the Atlantic TrealY Associa tion in Ottawa in September, 1964. Th is paper later ap peared in T ile A tlantic Commllll it)' Qllarterl), vol. 2, no. 4.

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it, as the whole dumb-bell concept was highly offensive to Canada. Perhaps it put Canada in its place, because the advocates of "The Grandiose Design" gave the impression that they bad either misplaced or quite forgotten Canadians. Dumbbellists On both sides of the Atlantic, if queried about the Canadian role, had a habit of suggesting that Canadians should run off and find happ iness in their regional bundle. Sometimes this meant simple "union" - with a nation ten times Canada's size; sometimes, on a grander scale, it wrapped Canadians up with their neighbours in Paraguay in accordance with prevalent myths about the "naturalness" of hemispheric ties. Canada was clearly a nuisa nce to these designers with a passion for an UDterrestrial symmetry, and it is fortunate for all that their fanaticism has abated in the light of, among other things, Gaullist realism . I do not wan t to be pa roc hi al. If thi s design were the bes t for the Atla ntic community, then Canadians should recogni ze their relative unimportance and submit. It seems to me, however, to be a rigid pattern not only unrealistic but also contrary to the ultimate interests of a comm un ity that must be bo th united against present dangers and elastic enough to survive. Regionalism can be a us'eful and modern approach applied ad hoc to situations in which it is histo ri call y, geograph ically, or economically applicable. Of this the European Economic Community is a shining example. As a universal panacea it is often irrelevant and anachronistic in an age in which the economic and polit ical ti es which bind togeth er a sbrinking world defy the logic of geography. The Trea ty of Rome has been a progressive force in Europe; it is not a formula applicable to the political configuration of North America or the so-called \Vestern Hemisphere. There is a considerable difference, I might remind you, between union and annexation. Annexation by the Uni ted States could not be considered by any civilized people a fate worse than death, and it is almost a cent ury si nce Canad ians have had to contemplate dy ing to prevent it. Nevertheless, it is undesired by both countries and undesirable for the commu nity of nations, because that com munity profits more from the existence of indepe ndent middle as well as large powers than it wou ld from an accretion to the resources of a benevolent superpower already possessed of a more than adequate capacity for overkill. From the perspective of my national prejudice, I would prefer an Atlantic Community in wh ich the Atlantic had less significance as a divider. I do not believe in looking upon N.A.T.O. as composed of a European wing with a fixed point of view and a North Am erican wing wi th another point of view.

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One might as easily perceive a Northern and a Southern align~ ment. As I see it, N .A.T.O. is composed of fifteen highly indj~ vidual countries scattered from the eastern Mediterranean to the eastern Pacific, among whom there are th e shifting combioa~ tions that make an alliance healthy. Contrary to th e prejudices of the North American continent I should like to see a little less regional and a little more class distinction. In the community there are great powers and lesser powers, each with its own historical and geograph ical associations and its distinct function in the promotion of world order, and. I cannot think that the prospects of peace .or the triumph of the values all believe in would be abetted if all were welded into one or even two indigestible masses. Would the world be better off today. for instance, if the Scandinavians or the Irish had been bound so tightly to a united Europe or Atlantica that they would not have been accep table as secretaries-general of the United Nat ions or as intermediary agents in the Congo or on Cyprus? Each country is unique, and there are uniqu e ways they can serve. In the case of Jesser powers, the variety of service is often, although oat always, more important than the modest military power or the diplomatic subservience they would contribute. It is hard to think of a country as useful as Switzerland, the unique provider of neutral services and territory in peacetime as well as wartime. Yet there are those with such an unreasoning prejudice aga inst neutrality and for uniformity in the abstract that they would penalize Switzerland within the European community. Countries like Switzerland and Sweden are surel y more useful neutral than armed in N.A.T.O. Even wit hin the alliance, there is room for diversity short of neutrality. Norwegians, Danes, and Canadians have been able to serve the cause by participating in various international military exercises while contributing to N.A .T.O., remaining aligned on basic N.A.T.O. issues but maintai ning adeq uate independence to qualify as objective on other issues. It is not suggested th at the United Nat ions or other international forces are a substitute in the foreseeable future for N .A.T.O. forces, but they playa complementary and indispensable part in the con tinuin g struggle against anarch y - and it is anarchy that may prove to be a greater danger than communism. Is this somewhat nonconformist view of the Atlantic association compatible with the need for unity in the face of the present communist threat? I think it is, because I believe that unity. oddly enough, can be achieved only by reaching agreement. It cannot be imposed or legislated. This is a truth all ought to have held dear without waiting for the communists to

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prove it by their own painful experience. My argument, 1 should like to emphasize, is not based on naive assumptions about the presen t state of derente. It is based rather on deductions from experiences in the years when there was no talk of delente. Nevertheless, in order to take advantage of the shifting forces in the world, now is the time when N.A.T.O. needs unity witho ut rigidity. Unity is necessary, but th ere are no absolute form ulae for achieving it. There are, in N.A .T.O., contradictions between military and diplomatic requirements, for instance. Unity of command and co-ordination a ll down the line certainly make for an effect ive fighting posture, and this would be easier to achieve if N .A.T.O. forces were directed by federal government of which they were all citizens - provided, of course, an instrument so unwie ldy as a N.A.T.O. government could have a forthright policy on anything. Most members recognize the necessity of surrendering more control over military than over political or economic policy. The federal solu tion being out of the question, however, they are sensible enough to steer clear of a solution based on the illusion of federal ism. While insisting on as much inter-allied co-ordinat ion and consultation as possible, they shy away from the paralysis inherent in proposals for plac ing all bands on the trigger. Knowing that ultimately it is the stren gth and determination of the country or countries that have the decisive weapons rather than the unit y of the all iance which acts as a deterrent, they accept, tacitly for the most part, the decisive role of the United States. Dissenters prefer to develop their "independent" nuclear power rath er than hold out for multiple control. Whether or not this is wise and effective, it may be better that dissent take thi s form than lead N .A.T.O. into schemes for tripartite or even multipartite direction of policy which would break down in a crisis. In diplomacy, the interests of the N.A.T.O. members are diversified, and a common foreign policy has proved impossible to achieve. It is persistently ass umed, nevertheless, that it would be a good thi:1g if it could be achieved. One cannot, of course, argue aga inst perfection, and if all could think in' unison on issues from Cyprus to Sarawak, that would be a heavenly situation. On thi s earth such will not happen, however, and it is not just rationalization to argue that N.A.T.O. members can be stro nger as a team because of their diversity. To accept this fact is better for their morale. Its members are driven mad by abstractions, searching for symmetry and unity, making ends out of means, ignoring the virtue of untidiness in an untidy

a

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world, seeking to defi ne the undefinable, and evoking a mood of despair about the fortunes of the Atlantic world when they might better feel the reasonable confidence which is justified by decisions as they work out in practice. The differences are admittedly serious, but it is better to look at the practical results of these differences than to judge them in accordance with the hysterical belief that every difference is fatal to the organization and a boon to its antagonists. It is better for allies to agree than disagree, provided that the policy they agree on is a good one. It was better to be divided over Suez, the Congo, or the Bay of Pigs than to present a common front in support of the unwise poJicies of one or more members. Orators tend to assume against all evidence that unity means being united behind policies which, because they are collective, are wise. There are times, however, when members should remain disengaged to do what they can to bail out thei~ foolish partners and avoid the opprobrium they have brought on "the West." There are other times, on such issues of crucial military importance as the protection of Berlin or, even outside the N.A .T.O. area, the placing of missiles in Cuba, when a united front is hi ghly desirable if not absolutely essential. It is true, of course, that the morale of the alliance is sapped by persistent differences, but on the other hand damage can be done to the spirit of fraternity by resentment of members against the compulsion to alignment against their own judgement. It is by no means certain that General de Gaulle's differences with the United States over European affairs and his intervention in Latin America bring cheer to the Kremlin. As a third element in the neurotic atmosphere of Pan America, Gaullism, if it has anything behind it, should be more of a threat to Castroism than to any real interests of the United States. As for General de Gaulle's attitude to China, there is reason to conclude tbat on balance it has been a good rather than a bad thing that Britain and other N.A.T.O. countries have had relations of some kind with Peking when the United States has not. There is a good deal to be said at present for contact between a major Western leader and the outlaws in Peking, although, because nothing is clear-cut in alliance diplomacy, this advantage does have to be weighed against the effect that French deviation bas on the prospects of success of the uncompromising policy that the United States, in its unilateral wisdom, pursues in Vietnam. The worst thing is to st raddle a policy. My argument is not that diversity and disunity, rather than unity, should be ends in themselves; it is that there are things worse than disunity, and

128 - THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR sometimes diversity strengthens the diplomatic arm of the West. The passion for uniformity is usually expressed in a credulous predilection for federalistic institutions, associated no doubt with the widespread assumption that progress in the international community must inevitably proceed through regional agglomerations to the monstrous leviathan of world federation . Present trouble comes because the enthusiasts plan as if the unity they devoutly wish does in fact exist. When there is not a consensus of peoples, then a common policy can be only the lowest common denominator and much weaker than the separate but more forthright policies of the component states. If western Europe has not an adequate consensus to permit even E.E.C. members to submit to common decisions on foreign policy, how much more unreal would it be to act on the assumption that there is a conse nsus from Ankara to Anchorage? To assume that it exists because it ought to exist or that a council of ministers could compel it to exist is to court disaster. Ancient nations and new nations alike need room to breathe. Agreement is induced more readily when they are tied loosely rather than tightly. Canadians, after two centuri es of experiment, arc realizing that if two of the great peoples of Europe are to li ve within a single political framework without unbea rable fr iction, the corset must have a two-way stretch. The search for agreement is not helped by pious denunciations of nationalism and sovereignty in the abstract. The smaller countries arc well aware that they have limited their sovereignty by their commitments. Exorcising national sovereignty is not going to remOve the problems of jurisd iction or conflict of interests endemic in a world disorderly by nature. The bloodiest war of the nineteenth century was caused not by the assertion of national sovereignty but by the problem of jurisdiction within the sovereign state. Nor is the cause aided by unctuous pleas to rise above petty national ism coming from large states that have cultivated more intense national feeling and maintain more jealous regard for their sovereign ty than do their docile partners. The largest powers, furthermore, far from submerging their identity or their national will in a broader political organism, can confidently expect to do mi nate it po li ti~ cally and culturally. There is an element of self-deception in all count!"ies, and it would be grossly unfair to accuse the United States in particular of calculating aggrandizement, or even of hypocrisy, when Americans call upon their allies to su rrender their national controls to common institutions. Yet lesser countries cannot fail to foresee that such institutions would in prac-

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tice lead to an extension of American control and domination over their policies. It is not a quest ion of American arrogance but of an incompatibility of power. Congress, it must be recognized, while generous and internationalist and prepared to offer American aid and protection, is not at all di sposed to surrender its right to decide American foreign policy - and for quite sound reasons! Neith er the United States nor any other ally cou ld accept North Atl antic institutions in which decisio ns were made by a simple or even a weighted majority, because the United States, which has a ncar mo nopo ly of the crucial weapons, could not permit a vew o n its freedom of mo veme nt , and its all ies could not, in such a n unequal situation, give up their right to d issent and contract out. In practice, of course, and that is what matters, the United States is unlikel y to act in ruthless disregard of the views of its allies; and the latter are unlikely to be so reckless as to put them selves beyond the bounds of alliance. This is a relationship that can be tacit ly recognized but not formally instituted, and there is much to be sa id for leav ing well enough alone. The tacit relationship, furthermore, will be easier to adjust to fit th e changes of positio n of the grea t powers wi thin the alliance, changes that are almost certain to take place. It must be admitted that fa ilure to create new deci sion-maki ng instruments leaves th e great powers free to make unilatera l decisions. Th ey are going to do so anyway, and it may be be Iter no t to comp lic ate crises with the bitterness of broken prom ises. When Britain, France, and the United States. failed to consult their allies over their poli cies on Suez and C uba, they also fai led to consult their own senior officials. How can they be expected to consult foreigners? This is a fact of life abo ut great decisions. It does not mean, of course, that members cannot and should not consult constantly about the continuing policies which , in fact, shape the world and determ ine whether or not these cri ses will erupt. None is witho ut influence if he uses it wisely and well. The argument for undev iating alignment within the alliance rests too often on an oversimplified view of the forces loose in the world. It assum es that the world is divided into two camps, or even three. The need to ma intain 'Vestern strength against the communist threat may often be the determining factor in policy, but to ass ume that any single frame of reference could guide all the decisions of a modern country in foreign policy is too much like Marxism for free peoples. The upheaval involved in the transition from an imperial world to a world of universal self-government makes the factors much more complex. Nor

130 - THE BEITER PART OF VALOUR can one dissociate from political diplomacy the struggle for trade which divides the nations. The bipolarization into which the world has been forced is a dangerous and undesirable state of affairs from which a break should be sought as soon as possible. The crack ing of the monolithic structure of the communist realm presen ts opportunities - not for triumph but for pacification . Recent assertions of indepe ndent thinking within the alliance may be seen simply as dangerous threats of disruption. Treated with imaginat io n, however, they could represe nt a n effort to break through the framework in which members have been congealed for too many years, to loosen international society. and, by permitting greater freedom of national expression, 10 reduce the danger of ca tast rophe. Close ali gnm ent and the unity of the west cannot be lightly abandoned as principles, but the world will be better off whe n Atlantic nati ons can afford to merge themselves more easily in the wider international community. What members should seck to ach ieve by the idea of the Atlantic Community is somet hing deeper than the concoction of a new political entity: it is the strengthening and preservation of a civilization which, although it has its roots in the Mediterranean-North Atlantic area, is universally pervasive. Because that civilization is still threatened by the military power of a bloc th at only partially shares ils tene ts and by the danger of ana rchy in the wo rld at large, and because the vast preponderance of military power outside the communist bloc is to be found in thi s area, the countries of the North Atlantic have to collaborate closely in military affairs. This is the persisting reaSO D for N.A.T.O. , which is on the whole a satisfactory functional agency for the purpose. To maintain understanding and a sense of common purpose, the N.A.T.O. Council and bodies like the Atlantic Treaty Association and the N.A.T.O . Parliamentarians are also needed. Valuable, too , is O.E.C.D., a body devoted to stimulat ing the wealth of Europe a nd America for the be nefit of itself and the world at.iarge. It is encouraging, however, that O.E.C.D. has recognized, by inviting Japan to membersh ip, that its function cannot be geographicaJly or racially circumscribed. These function al bodies for varying purposes and of varying membership are, I suggest, all N .A.T.O. needs for its esse nti al purposesexcept, of course, for the will to understanding, without which no cou ncils are of any use at all . The trouble with defining the Atlantic Commun it y is that it bas no bounds. Its pOli tical anel cultural ideas are more deeply rooted in Delhi or Dakar than in some regions washed by the

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waters of the North Atlantic, and its own political theory is increasingly affected by the views of Asian and African philosophers and statesmen - Gandhi, Se nghor, or Nyerere. When one tries to draw up a membership list one reali zes the futility of seeing this institution in geographical and constitutional terms. How can ODe draw a frontier around the Atlantic spir it without destroying it? The act of definition wou ld seem a separation of sheep and goats. The creation of unity on a selective basis stimulates disunity on a broader basis. It is often argued that the North Atlantic races must form their own bloc to defend themselves against the blocs being formed in Africa. Asia, and Latin America, and against the combination of them all in the United Nations. But how can one compare the laudable but tentative endeavours of the weak and divided peoples of these continents, groping towards mutual collaboration, with the creation of a close federation of power and wealth in the North At lantic? As for the so-called "Afro-Asian bloc," there are undoubtedly r~al problems presented by the united front of non-Europeans from time to time in what seem dubious causes, and others have the right to combine against them when circumstances warrant. This far-from-coherent "bloc," however, is often a bogey emphasized by those who want to shake free from a universal United Nations and create a pure white substitute in the guise of a North At lantic Community. It could quickly turn from a bogey into a terrifying reality if the Atlantic ranks closed against it. The Atlantic Community is a spiritual idea, but it has a function. That function is to use its enormous wealth and power and skill to protect the weak and stimul ate prosperity. Its function is initiative, to save the world, not itself alone. It can be the breeder of racial iso lation ism or of a new internationalism. Its primary duty is to promote its mission, not its unity.

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THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR

2: Alliance and Independence The central question about Canada's existence in the second half of the twentieth century is whether Canadians can exercise enough independence in the world community to justify their seeking to play an independent role at al l. In an era dominated, and likely to be dominated for some time to come, by the nuclear super-powers, is Canada's foreign policy bound to be determin ed by the fact that it shares a continent with one of them? I was asked to express my own views and the view of English Ca nada. You will have my own, but I do not pretend to be speaki ng for English Canada because, happily for the health of the country, there is no m'onolithic corpus called English Canada, and views on this subject cut across ethnic div isions in any case. If I ignore the domestic issues that preoccupy Canada at present, it is not because I think them unimportant, but because they do not seem especially relevant to the question of the military dependence or independence of Canada. That question does, however, enter into the argument as to whether Canada should or could be two political entities rather than one. It is bard to predict, but I am inclined to think that the proximity of American military power would operate on two northern states as it does on one. I do not think the Un ited States would consider there were mi litary reaso ns to persuade it to intervene to prevent the division of Canada - although they would probably regret the consequent weakening of an indepe ndent-minded but reliable all y. The Americans have become sophisticated eno ugh to accept a more neutrally inclined country on their borders. Their equanimity might not stretch to accommodate a regime they chose to consider Castroite. One cannot escape the fact that tbe most powerful nation in the world likes friendly states on its periphery, and I suggest that two Canadas would find themselves with about the same freedom of movement as one Canada. That freedom, however, is just about as wide as is possible for any power less than super wherever it is situated. I am sceptical of almost every absolute generalization about the independence of states. It is, of course, ridiculous for any SOURCE: Th is article has been taken from the Actes du IV- Congre.s Affairs canadiennes (l964), later published as La dualire carmdienn. l'hellre des Etats-Unis (Quebec: Les Presses de l'universit6 Laval, 1965).

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country to expect uninhibited so vereignty and untrammeled freedom of action. But it is just as ridiculous fo r the high-m inded to argue that all national sovereignty ought to be ab