The Bergsonian Heritage

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THE BERGSONIAN HERITAGE

The Bergsonian Heritage

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

Thomas Hanna

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK AND LONDON 1962

o ,

COPYRIGHT

©

&

H 2> 3

PRESS 1962 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

card number: 62-16690 library of congress catalog

MANUFACTURED

IN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Preface

The essays which form Part One of uct of the

this

book are a prod-

Bergson Centennial, which took place October 16,

1959, on the campus of Hollins College. In addition desire to

commemorate

the life

century’s notable philosophers,

to the

and works of one of it

this

was the special concern

of the Centennial to take a long retrospective glance at

Henri Bergson, taking stock of the more enduring contributions

made by him

to

present patterns of thought.

Bergson was anything but a closet philosopher, and his philosophizing was destined to affect a broad range of

human

thought.

The essays of

sive influence of

this

Bergson not only

book in

reflect the exten-

philosophy but as

well in the rambling bailiwicks of theology and literature.

M. Edouard Morot-Sir, whose essay appraises sophical legacy of Bergson,

French Embassy

in the

is

the philo-

Cultural Counselor of the

United States and

is

the

Embassy

representative in the United States of the French universities.

An

agrege in philosophy, M. Morot-Sir was, during

the forties, professor in the Faculty of Letters at the uni-

PREFACE

VI

versities of Lille

and Bordeaux, and for two years was

professor at the University of Cairo, before returning to Lille. In addition to a host of articles of

cosmopolitan range

philosophy, he has published two full-length works in

in

France, Philosophy and Mysticism and Negative Thought:

A

Logical Study of

Its

Structure and Processes.

He

holds

honorary degrees from Middlebury College and Lafayette College.

The consideration of Bergson from the point of view of his effects on theology is made by Jaroslav Pelikan, one of the outstanding

younger historians of theology

in the

United

States. Dr. Pelikan was, at the time, professor of Historical

Theology

in the

Federated Theological Faculty of the Uni-

versity of Chicago,

and

is

presently Titus Street Professor

of Ecclesiastical History, at Yale University.

author of several works in theology,

is

He

is

the

an editor of the

Works and in 1959 published Luther the Expositor. Also in 1959 Dr. Pelikan received the 812,000 Abingdon Award for his The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. series Luther s

,

Enid Starkie’s contribution raphy of French literature

member the

of the Irish

is

Academy

to

at

and biog-

enormous. Dr. Starkie, a of Letters

Royal Society of Literature,

French Literature

the criticism

is

and a Fellow of

presently Reader in

Oxford University. Her sixteen pub-

lications include studies of

Rimbaud, Gide, and Verhaeren,

and her great work on Baudelaire

is

accepted as a definitive

study. During the time of the Centennial, Dr. Starkie visiting professor of

Modern Languages

at

was

Hollins Col-

• •

PREFACE

Vll

lege; her presence at the College

was

a colorful explosion

of Irish wit and enthusiasm.

The seven papers

in the latter portion of the

book are a

product of the Bergson Centennial which took place in

May

Paris,

19, 1959,

and was sponsored by the French

Philosophical Society and the French Language Society.

The theme of

these

homages was “Bergson

et

Nous,” and the

speakers evoked Bergson’s past influence on several centers of French intellectual life and his continuing influence into the present time.

Jean Hyppolite, formerly professor of philosophy

Sorbonne and now director of the

life

there as a student.

At the College de France, spoke

Normale Superilittle known facts of

ficole

eure, spoke at the Lcole, recalling

Bergson’s

at the

its

director Marcel Bataillon

at the unveiling of a bas-relief

Salle 8, the classroom

plaque of Bergson in

made famous by

Bergson. Mr. Batail-

lon reviews in his paper the influence of Bergson on the

College and the remarkable enthusiasm with which his tures were received during Bergson’s occupancy

chairs of Ancient Philosophy and, later, of

lec-

of the

Modern

Phi-

losophy.

The four remaining papers were presented by four of France’s most eminent philosophers, in the Grand Amphitheatre of the Sorbonne. Gaston Berger, a Institut

de France, was

at the

member

time president of the French

Philosophical Society. Gabriel Marcel, also a the Institut,

of the

member

of

was vice-president of the Association des Amis

PREFACE

Vlll

de Bergson. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, of the College de France, occupied the chair of held by Bergson. Jean

Wahl

Modern Philosophy formerly is

professor at the Sorbonne,

and Vladimir Jankelevitch, also professor

was

a friend

at the

Sorbonne,

and student of Bergson.

These papers, presented during the American and French

Bergson Centennial celebrations, are accompanied by

own remarks about Bergson, which

my

serve not only as an

introduction to Bergson and his works but also as a

more

general appraisal of the Bergsonian heritage. I

feel exceedingly grateful to

Suzanne Delorme, general

secretary of the Societe Franchise de Philosophic, for her

unfailingly

patient

and friendly aid

in

expediting the

also, to

John R. Everett,

French portion of the book.

My gratitude at the

must be expressed,

time president of Hollins College and

of the Colleges of the City of

support which express

my

made

New

now chancellor

York, for the interest and

the Centennial possible.

And

appreciation to Dean John P. Wheeler,

I

must

Jr.,

who

thoughtfully and helpfully laid the groundwork for the

Bergson program

at Hollins College.

THOMAS HANNA Hollins College

1960

Contents

Thomas hanna: The Bergsonian Heritage Part

One

The Bergson Centennial

at Hollins

College

edouard morot-sir: What Bergson Means

Us Today 35 jaroslav pelikan: Bergson among the Theologians 54 enid starkie: Bergson and Literature 74 Part

to

Two

The Bergson Centennial

at Paris

JEAN HYPPOLITE (AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE) 103 MARCEL BATAILLON (AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE) 107 119 GASTON BERGER (AT THE SORBONNE) 124 GABRIEL MARCEL (AT THE SORBONNE) MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY (AT THE SORBONNE) 133 150 JEAN WAHL (AT THE SORBONNE) 155 vladimir jankelevitch: With the Whole Soul BIBLIOGRAPHY

167

/

by Thomas

Hanna THE BERGSONIAN HERITAGE

From

his earliest writings to the present time,

Henri Berg-

son has shown himself to be one of the most tantalizing of

modern philosophers. “Tantalizing”

just the

is

word

for

Bergson: for over seventy years his philosophizings have

been enormously attractive

to a

motley variety of persons;

however, as soon as one reaches out thought

it

seems

to

grasp his body of

to

disappear within a teasing ambiguity.

In the world of academic philosophy there

and honest conviction

ations to the degree that he

and of succeeding gener-

makes

it

clear exactly what he

saying and exactly where he stands. Bergson

ing,

the simple

that a great philosopher influences

the thought of his contemporaries

is

is

inasmuch as the continuing influence of

goes hand in hand with the fact that he

is

tantaliz-

his thought

never systemati-

cally and finally clear in what he says, nor

down where he stands. There may be a sly wisdom in

is

is it

always pos-

sible to pin

tractiveness of Bergson’s

hound up with

a

this.

The continuing

works seems

charming ambiguity.

If

to

he very

at-

much

Bergson were

less

THOMAS HANNA

2

ambiguous and more severely systematic,

fear that his

I

philosophy might already have been dressed and laid out within the quiet

mausoleum

Bergson was not

less

of philosophical history. But

ambiguous, and he has continued

to

appeal to a surprisingly varied number of minds. His ambiguity

in this: that

is

he shows

marks of a mystic,

all the

drawing away from the natural world

into the surging flux

of a non-natural and, perhaps, anti-natural reality; hut his other face

is

that of the avid, open-eyed student of the sci-

and physical

ences, insatiably curious about the biological

structures of the natural world. Either of these Janus faces is

profoundly typical of Bergson. Those who have no doc-

trinal or

may

emotional patience with the mystic visage

omnivorous

find themselves utterly taken with Bergson’s

absorption of the materials of both experimental and theoretical science.

And

those

who

are sick to death of the

half-founded pretentiousness of the contemporary scientific

world

may

leap with heels up into the

warm

rush of his

mysticism. Like the Catholic church, Bergson has been

capable of receiving

all into his

bosom.

But no one any longer believes in Janus; our tendency is to

deny the existence of such creatures and

one face

to the

exclusion of the other.

And

to settle

upon

this is acutely

true for twentieth-century philosophy, most particularly in its

Anglo-American segment. Janus has been cloven

in two,

and the visage of subjectivity and mysticism seems decisively separated from part.

its

be

rational-empirical counter-

But whether he has been destroyed

speculation, and, accordingly,

to

is still

we should keep

a matter of

in

mind

that

THOMAS HANNA

3

Henri Bergson, himself, was acutely aware of his Janus image: with care and deliberation he constructed pleted

it,

and affirmed

it.

It

is

is

a fact

we must

com-

this difficult construction

which bears the stamp of “Bergsonism,*' and ambiguity

it,

accept

if

we

essential

its

intend any under-

standing of Bergson’s thought. So, then,

can be laid

much

of the interest in Bergson’s philosophy

to a philosophical

ambiguity which

step with the doctrines of the times. But another,

out of

is

and more

searching reason for the sustained interest in this Janus

Bergson constructed his thought

philosophy

is

sponse

problem which blossomed

to a

that

the nineteenth century

and now,

in re-

in the latter part of

in the twentieth, has be-

come, perhaps, the only problem worth solving. The question raised in the last century in the present

century

is this:

and not yet clearly answered

How

can we understand the

human creature, and world? From his first to

and

nature of the

his place

cance in the

his last work,

signifi-

Bergson

focussed his remarkable talents upon this question, and

Bergson continues is

because

this

to

have something

problem which was

to

say to us today,

his is also ours,

philosophy represents one of the great efforts tury to spin out an understanding of

which does

full justice to

each of them

In the nineteenth century, the critical

if it

and his

in this cen-

man and

his

world

in their

own

right.

unavoidable course of

thought and scientific research was to move full

circle in fixing

one area after the other of the physical and

biological worlds under the laws of invariable processes until, finally, the

human

individual himself became fixed

THOMAS HANNA

4

under these laws, his nature spelled out and exhausted by these laws.

The powerful Marxist delineation

ternal determinants of

completed

human

of the ex-

thought and conduct was

by psychoanalysis and

psychological

deter-

minism, which saw the human creature as a complex

ganism operated,

like all other organisms,

or-

by invariable

natural processes. The

wave of Darwinism was merely the confirmation of what was already evident: that the human individual differed from other natural objects or organisms only by degrees of complexity, and thus any notion of

human

difference in terms of quality, or freedom, or

was a

nobility

novel conception of

moment when

now exposed. The moment

fiction,

man became

operative was like the

away from the shores of and moral wisdom of the

a small skiff pushes

a continent: the cultural insights entire past

that this

were denied and abandoned, and the bearers of

a “final” understanding of

man

launched out loudly and

bravely into a weird and tortured era, hardly conscious of the enormity of what they

these beginnings,

had

lost.

Bergson was a child of

and the task he chose was the

difficult

one

of reconciling a triumphant but blind understanding of hu-

man

reality with the past’s imperfect but irreplaceable un-

derstanding of

human

reality.

That Bergson was not en-

tirely successful in this task is of small

philosopher worth his

dream tant, as

of I

more than have said,

is

salt

importance

—no

should ever allow himself to

a noble failure

—

but what

that his philosophy

is

is

impor-

one of the

first

great efforts to effect a reconciliation which has not yet

been effected, and which remains the most anxiously and

THOMAS HANNA

5

hotly debated of questions in the mid-twentieth century.

Although partially unsuccessful, Bergson's works

main

a treasure house of insights

tion,

and an appraisal of

and analyses of

still

re-

this ques-

his contribution to present think-

ing must rest on the great value

still to

be found in these

works, as well as on the more recent philosophical move-

ments which are continuing his at the central insights

task.

We

should look

developed by Bergson during his

long writing career, and then compare these with the sights of

which,

I

first

in-

two highly interesting philosophical movements think, are the special inheritors of Bergson’s task:

Process Philosophy and Existentialism.

Like that of

many

another philosopher, Bergson’s philo-

sophical career unfolded itself according to the time-hon-

ored plan of theme and variations.

From

the outset he

was

a thinker with one theme, one conceptual insight which he

applied with persistence and enormous imagination to one area after another.

It

found

mology and psychology, then

its

in

first

variations in episte-

metaphysics, then in bio-

logical history, then, finally, in morality

and

history.

The

theme was unchanging, and no matter which of Bergson’s works one picks up the same passacaglia sounds base of

theme

it.

Stated as generally as possible this Bergsonian

affirms that all experience reveals two categorically

distinct realms: that of the organic

ganic.

at the

And

this

general affirmation

is

and

that of the inor-

rooted in a clear-cut

metaphysical dualism which makes an absolute distinction

between two reality

realities: the reality of life or spirit

of matter.

and the

That a clearly dualistic metaphysics

THOMAS HANNA

6

should be at the base of a highly appealing and presumably “scientifically oriented” philosophy

is

an extraordi-

nary happening, and the ambiguity of Bergson

enormously resourceful manner

in

in

on the

which he has held

gether this dualism within an argument that

and persuasive. As

rests

is

to-

ingenious

most metaphysical dualisms, Berg-

son makes what can be termed a male-female distinction:

one reality

is

active, the other passive. Life or spirit is

an

aggressive reality which has bullied and molded the static

and novel realm:

reality of matter in creating a distinct

that of the organic. Thus, the off-spring of this

sion

is

organic

life,

and

it

is,

male

ingres-

perhaps, an obscure echo of

Bergson’s Jewish patriarchalism that the active spirit

alone sanctioned as the parent of organic

life.

Put in

is

dif-

ferent terms, spirit seeks to express itself by incarnation

within matter, but this incarnation

is

not a synthesis,

it

is

not a union of two equal realities; rather, organic life

is

a victory over static matter, spirit’s triumphant use of matter to

express and realize

itself.

This basic metaphysical dualism and of organic

and inorganic

is

the

Bergson’s works. As a theme,

son as baldly as we see present,

With

it

its

modus vivendi

theme sounding throughout

it is

never expressed by Berg-

here, but as a

theme

it is

always

implied and suggested with undoubted clarity.

the lines of this basic conception so clearly drawn,

one might wonder how anything so obvious could be developed into a persuasive philosophical position. This

proper puzzle

to

wonder

derstanding this puzzle

at,

and

I

would

we encounter

is

a

insist that in un-

in full the genius of

THOMAS HANNA

7

Henri Bergson. The genius of Bergson in his basic presuppositions;

it

is

not to he found

be found in the man-

is to

ner in which he has argued these basic ideas and organized

them

in

an almost audaciously unique manner. As men-

tioned already,

if

Bergson’s system of thought

unsuccessful, this matters

—

little

this

is

finally

unsuccess hinges pri-

marily on his basic presuppositions. But the success of

Bergson and the true measure of his genius

way

in

which he has argued these

difficult

is

found

in the

presuppositions,

and the wealth of insights and analyses he has embedded in these

arguments.

Authentic Bergsonism

he has taken

is

encountered when we see how

this organic-inorganic

dualism and argued

it

within a broad historical-biological context. Within this context the separation of living beings from static matter

appears

to

be not just a presupposition but has historical

and biological support which makes

it

a compelling view-

point: Bergson mobilizes theoretical and experimental sci-

ence to his aid. Organic

ary history,

is

life,

viewed

an obvious testimony

the aggressing spirit has relentlessly ter to its designs. life,

in

terms of evolution-

to the

way

in

which

molded inorganic mat-

There are evolutionary grades of organic

clearly indicating the stages of achievement in the

The stage of torpor more advanced stage

creative evolution of life within matter. is

that achieved within plant life; the

of instinct

is

that

found in the forms of

life

crowned by the

hymenoptera; and an equally advanced stage telligence, developed through the vertebrates

is

that of in-

and perfected

with man. Beneath each of these phases of organic

life is

e

THOMAS HANNA

8 the

ever-present,

managed

impulse of

ever-active

life

which has

in these three evolutionary grades to bully the

intractable stuff of matter into a partially successful, partially

incomplete incarnation of

ual must be understood, of

and second,

life,

what

strictly for

first,

itself.

individ-

as rooted in the vital impulse

must be understood

his intelligence

it is:

The human

a limited instrument for encounter-

ing a limited aspect of the whole of reality. It is,

then, necessary to note the basic

theme of meta-

physical dualism, and the basic historical-biological ar-

gument of special

this

way

theme, before one

which human reality

in

son’s philosophy. All of Bergson’s

ture of

human

able to pin

is

is

down

the

understood in Berg-

works focus on the na-

reality in the attempt to vindicate the unique-

ness and freedom of this reality, but this attempt always takes place against the backdrop of these two basic argu-

ments.

Bergson’s

when de

first effort in this

vindication appeared in

his doctoral thesis, Essai sur les

la conscience

under the

title

donnees immediates

was published. Later published

Time and Free

the prevalent attitudes of

which he saw ical world, et

Memoir

all

and (

scientific

to a large extent, a

Matter and

work which appeared

in

English

initial shot

mechanism and positivism

about him in the

it is,

in

Will, this work, which re-

mains one of Bergson’s most ingenious, was an at

1889

Memory ),

and philosoph-

preface to Matiere

his next book-length

1896. Together, these two works

provided an ample exposition of Bergson’s thinking

in the

areas of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics, all

THOMAS HANNA

9

three of these areas finding their focus of interpretation in

perceptive experience, which Bergson describes as being

based constitutionally on an enduring, non-material proclinked with the material world but not explained by

ess, as

or dependent upon the material world. In Will,

qualitative

“facts"

(

differences were

Time and Free

depicted as intensive

donnees ), distinct from extensive

ture of this intensive realm

facts.

The

na-

was then described as a “dura-

tion" of one's states of consciousness, a fusing together of these states, which

is

not only an explanation of the inner

way of explaining the nature of number, of time, and of movement in space. Finally, Bergson opposed his position of dynamism and freedom to that of mechanism and determinism, dynamism nature of experience but also

is

the sole

recognizing the existence both of free forces and natural laws,

mechanism recognizing

the existence only of natural

laws.

Time and Free Will, a product of Bergson’s thirtieth year, is marked by youthful fervor as much as it is by brilliant argumentation. The fervor is evident in Bergson’s overenthusiastic peroration on

human freedom and

tinction between the inner “true self" cial self.'’ In this

his facile dis-

and the external “so-

work, as later in others, Bergson was

barely able to rein in his strong evangelical instinct. this

dom

From

beginning he gave notice that the uniqueness and freeof

human

reality

were

at stake in the philosophical

arena, and he, at the precarious age of thirty, challenged the mechanistic systems of thought which were developing

apace in the academic halls and

in

experimental labs. The

THOMAS HANNA

10

and

distinctive biological

historical

themes which were

be developed in his famous later works are implicit in Bergson's

first

movement

major

effort.

of duration

is

The contention

to

this,

that the inner

becomes

the very stuff of reality

not only a key for an understanding of the nature of time

and of memory but, inevitably, becomes the interpretive basis for understanding the evolving character of

mankind

as well as of organic life in general. All of organic life

is

linked together in time by an enduring reality which relentlessly preserves the past, as this living past

way

gnaws

its

further into the present.

Within a space of seven years, Matter and

Memory

fol-

lowed Bergson’s precocious doctoral thesis somewhat as a sequel.

Whereas

experiences

the earlier

made up

work

lists

the

many

specific

of intensive, qualitative factors as

well as of extensive, quantitative factors, this sequel addresses itself to the

more general problem of

the nature

of perception with the attendant problems of the nature of

memory and ory

is

of matter. In

many

respects Matter

Bergson’s most interesting work;

most tightly argued of

all his

the philosophical worth of the

it

is,

and Mem-

certainly, the

works. But, unfortunately,

book

is

somewhat

vitiated

by the presence of a large number of turn-of-the-century findings in clinical and experimental psychology which

now have been

either

improved upon and superseded

or,

The widespread influence of Bergson's works was stimulated in large measure by his

in

some

cases, contradicted.

constant use of the latest data of the experimental sciences,

but the inherent risk of such philosophizing

is

that to the

THOMAS HANNA

11

degree that one's argumentation

upon recent experimental

is

dependent

partially

data, later experimentation

very well weaken this argumentation so that

it

may

becomes

archaic or simply irrelevant. Later psychology and psychiatry has chipped

and Memory

ter

that

away

much

of the argument of Mat-

so that, for example, Bergson’s contention

“pure memory'’

brain cells

at

is

not dependent

upon or stored

in the

exploded when a neuro-surgeon brushes a

is

small charged brush across the surface of the cerebral cortex

and the patient simultaneously experiences a complex

series of vivid

Bergson’s

memories. But, again,

contentions

have been

in those areas

further

where

validated

the

soundness of his exploratory insights becomes ever more apparent.

Bergson’s term “duration” in

Matter and

plication

Even

and

Memory is

it

is

metaphysical in intent, but

becomes epistemological

identified with the function of

as the flowing reality of duration

guished by Bergson from the

static

in ap-

memory.

was sharply

distin-

reality of extended

space, so here does he attempt to show that perception qua

perception

is

from mem-

a function categorically distinct

ory qua memory.

When

he speaks of pure memory, Bergson

does not refer to the motor activities and conditioned sponses which

—

make up

the habitual functions of our bodies

these functions are not

but, rather, they are

re-

“memories" referring

to the past,

always in the present, unchangingly

fixed to action in the present.

of the images of perception

Pure memory

is

when perception

taking place. Perception, says Bergson,

is

the survival is

no longer

an immediate

THOMAS HANNA

12 confrontation with matter, into the

it is

consciousness projected out

world of matter. The meaning of the temporal term

“present”

quite simply this: the presence of matter be-

is

fore consciousness in the act of perception.

“present”

The temporal

identified with the perceptual “presentation”

is

of matter to consciousness. Bergson views perception as an active function;

nature

it

is

By

not a passive observation.

it is

its

very

a searching, selective outreach of organisms,

appraising the field of matter in terms of action. This prag-

matic description of perception ture of living organisms

whose

fits

in with the larger pic-

sole function

is to

develop

bodily functions which can adapt to and contend with the material world. Like other bodily functions, perception

designed for action, and, specifically,

body which scans and assesses

the

But

is

not

memory

it

is

the outreach of

the field of action.

also a perception? a

weak perception

which was once strong hut has now faded and the brain? Bergson reasons that

memory why is it

if

than a “weak perception,” then

is

seem

not

to

stored in

is

nothing more

we do not memory? or

that

confuse a weak sound, for example, with a

why do our memories

is

be weak perceptions of

sounds or colors? The answer, he says,

is

obvious:

memory

has nothing to do with the bodily apparatus of perception, it is

not in any

way

world;

has

in the

ter

it

a confrontation with what to

ent:

it

to perception, is

from the

“present”

do neither with the presence of mat-

nor with the functions of the body.

an aid

is

but

its

source

is

Memory

obviously

categorically differ-

part of the enduring reality which reality of matter.

is

is

separate

So then, not only does memory

THOMAS HANNA

13

qua memory point away from matter, but we must understand that perception qua perception points directly to matter.

The

that

it

significance of Bergson's theory of perception

is

denies the Cartesian dichotomy of extended and non-

extended substances, and thus avoids the otherwise unavoidable (and indefensible) idealism. In perception one

alternatives of realism is

as matter

is

what

in the presence of

“really” there in the world of matter.

What we

perceive

not simply a report of bodily sensations in

generally by idealism), nor

is

matter a mysterious thing-

which remains ever different from the sensual im-

in-itself

age we believe we have of

it

(as materialism generally

claims). No, perception of matter

is

an unbreakable

cuit of brain, nerve-channels, sense-organs, object.

parts

to is,

break

by analyzing

this circuit

as Bergson sees

data of perception.

it,

When

there before the object: this the

image of matter

is

an attempt

to

it

cir-

The

deny the given

one perceives an object, one is

because perception

selective function

—

is

a unified experience in which

what the matter

is

at-

into separate

is.

And

if

our image

of a material object does not exhaust all of that object, is

is

from the “outside” realm of matter (as claimed

isolation

tempt

and

as already

mentioned

which appraises the

— an

field of

it

active,

matter for

possibilities of bodily actions.

This to

is

Bergson’s theory of pure perception. As an effort

break through the logical absurdities of realism and

idealism and as an attempt to be strictly faithful to the

given experience of perception, this theory son’s

most significant contributions

is

to recent

one of Bergphilosophical

THOMAS HANNA

14 thinking

— although

he has received

little

credit for this,

the attention being primarily focussed on later Existential

thinkers

who have continued

But, of course, perception

to is

Memory

“pure.” Matter and

make

not “pure/’ nor

is

memory

analyzes them in terms of

pure and indigenous functions

their

use of this theory.

in

order to

make

former with matter and the real

the real linkage of the

separation of the latter from the material and realms. There is

is

clear

bodily

memory and there perception. The memory

no perception without

no memory except

support of

in

of the past crowds up into present perception, guiding

it

memory

in

appraising possible courses of action. Indeed,

so

crowds and dominates perception that Bergson suggests

that

we never perceive

the present, but only the past. These

two functions, separate as

to source but unified in their

active adaptation of bodily needs to material conditions,

are the central elements in Bergson’s epistemology. If the function of

memory

is

described as independent of the

structure of the brain, this

is

in

no wise a sign of Bergson’s

naivete or his contempt for neurology; he that

memory cannot

that without a living

as he puts

mean be, or

it,

that the

if

body there would be no memory. But, is

hanging on a peg,

peg accounts for the

the functions of

quite aware

function without a nervous system,

a hat

can be used

is

to

does not

hat, or causes the hat to

describe the hat.

memory

this

As Bergson

sees

it,

are enormously broader than the

functions of the nervous system: the latter does no

more

than trace the bare outlines of the former. The skeletal tracings of the nervous system are indisputably related to

e

THOMAS HANNA the functions of

15

memory, but

these tracings are not and

should never be asserted as identical with and exhaustive of

memory’s functions. The middle

Memory tions

involve

which arise

sections of Matter

and

some clever discussions of the contradicwhen one tries to treat memory as a purely

physiological fact. With examples of various types of oral

and auditory aphasia, Bergson notes the impossibility of claiming that memories are located in any specific

group

in the brain;

Some

cell

one cannot say “where” memories are.

types of aphasia

may

suggest that

if

there are lesions

memories are automatically destroyed, but

of the brain,

Bergson takes pains

show

to

that

it

is

not the memories

themselves which are destroyed but, rather, the ability to use, recognize, or

communicate these memories for

cal bodily activities. If

and understand f,

and

not

if his

all

trary, that

it is

sound which

is

an aphasiac, for example, can hear

words except those beginning with an

hearing

mean he has

itself is

not impaired, then this does

forgotten the letter

but, quite the con-

f,

automatically recognized and selected as a not to be responded

to.

This

example of what Jean-Paul Sartre was faith,”

and

it

practi-

is

is

an excellent

later to call

“bad

worthwhile noting that Sartre was not the

originator of the reasoning behind this famous term. If

Les Donnees immediates and Matter e

et

Memoir

were the enunciators of Bergson’s basic theme, the great variation on this theme was the extraordinary

first

U Evo-

lution Creatrice, which, in one of his letters to Bergson,

evoked from William James the judgment

was a “marvel,” “a

real

wonder

that the

hook

in the history of philoso-

THOMAS HANNA

16 phy.

.

.

There

.

is

much

so

Creative Evolution, with

biological evolution and

appeared like a rocket

its

in

academy

the walls of the

absolutely

is

your contemporaries

will take a long time for it.”

that

new

that

to assimilate

vitalistic interpretation of

its

catch phrases and analogies,

1907 and soared cleanly over

into the

ken of a general public.

This, the third of Bergson’s major works, quickly

became

one of the rarities of philosophical literature, a smash. not actually read by everyone,

by everyone and quoted by

it

it

all.

was, like the Bible,

Before

If

known

appearance, the

its

only published work to come from Bergson following Matter

and Memory was the

Le

Rire. This essay with

little

essay on laughter, entitled

its

ingenious interpretation of

laughter and the comic and with

its

brief,

en passant

closure of Bergson’s theory of esthetics, was the

dis-

first

in-

stance of Bergson’s adaptation of his basic theme to the

areas of biology and anthropology.

It

also an instance

is

of Bergson’s troubling ambiguity. Bergson sees the essentials of the

comic

in

whatever smacks of automism and me-

chanical inelasticity in in

what

is

life.

The comic

habitual and blindly unadaptable to

tions; as such, society,

human

human

and laughter

unadaptability is

is

a

is

inherent

new

condi-

minor threat

to

the involuntary social response

which restrains and corrects such eccentricities. This

is

an interesting and even persuasive theory of the

comic. As to

its

truth, there is

simply no way of telling;

this is the

kind of theory which can never be more than “in-

teresting”

—

this

it is

in

no way subject

to validation.

would not count against Bergson’s theory of

Even the

so,

comic

THOMAS HANNA if

17

were consistent with the entirety of his philos-

his theory

ophy. Unfortunately,

Two Sources

not.

is

it

—

a parallel in

later, in his

and Religion Bergson contends

of Morality

,

that the primitive social instinct

habit

Considerably

human

is

that of conformity

and

society to the inelastic hive

tendency instinctive in the highly developed hymenoptera. Thus, in

this later

work, social morality

seen to be a

is

protective reaction which pressures each individual in society into habitual,

society tism,

is

and

unvarying actions. So then,

in

Laughter

described as constitutionally fearful of automain

The Two Sources society

is

described as consti-

tutionally fearful of any threat to automatism within the

further deepened

when Bergson

intellectual in nature

and devoid of

group. This inconsistency

contends that laughter

is

is

emotional content; but in The as such,

is

Two Sources

seen to be a threat to the social group

— and

protection as suggested by Laughter itself

intelligence,

it

is to

—

not a

defend

against the innovations of intelligence, says Bergson,

that primitive societies

instinctively create

myths which

confound the straight-line movement of intelligence which otherwise would destroy the closed circle of society. the face of

resolved

it,

it,

On

simple contradiction; Bergson never

this is a

nor, indeed, did he ever

seem aware of

it.

In

somewhat complex and arbitrary manner, Bergson may have felt there was not at all a contradiction here: there are a

varying nuances given by Bergson stinct,

and he

to the

meaning of

in-

residual instinct, intelligence, social self, inner self,

“life,” so that in a

may have found

a

complex juggling of these meanings

way

of justifying this apparent con-

THOMAS HANNA

18 tradiction.

Whether or not he could have unknotted

problem matters

little;

what does matter, unfortunately,

whole of Bergson’s philosophy all its

is

above the

that these large areas of inconsistency hover

For

this

like a pall.

acclaim and despite

its

obvious intention to

transform the general lines of biological theory, Creative Evolution succeeded in creating perhaps one generation of vitalists in biology, a

generation which

now has

all

but

vanished. Viewed from a distance of half a century what

was important about Creative Evolution was the way

in

which great and hopeful prospects were suddenly opened

up for a meaningful, nontheological conception of history and for a wholesome respect between the proponents of scientific intelligence

and those of

intuitive understanding.

For a long moment, the universe seemed large enough for both science and poetry and not only that, but in need of

them both. This

was a

is to

say that although Creative Evolution

brilliant failure in biological theory,

in another

way by loosening up

it

succeeded

and philo-

the scientific

sophical thinking of the 1900s and offering serious thinkers a broad perspective in which humanitarian concerns

were

not swallowed up by dispassionate objectivity. If Bergson’s

own viewpoint seems no longer

tenable,

still

itarian implications of Creative Evolution

the

human-

have survived

and, in ways impossible to calculate, have directly and directly

tinue to

in-

spawned new philosophical viewpoints which conevaluate the modern world with the same broad

perspective that was characteristic of Bergson.

Only two major works followed Creative Evolution. One

THOMAS HANNA Duree

of these,

tempt

et

19 Simultaneity (1922), was Bergson’s

to relate his

at-

theory of time as an inner duration to

Einstein’s relativity theory

—

son's cosmopolitan interests

again, an example of Berg-

and

his concern to

fit

his basic

themes into the broadest possible theoretical framework. His

de

last

major work was Les deux Sources de which appeared

la Religion ,

in

1932.

la

Two

Morale

other vol-

umes, L'Energie spirituelle (1909) and La Pensee

Mouvant (1934), were cles,

and

et

et

le

collections of varied essays, arti-

lectures.

The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) is a product of Bergson’s old age; he was seventy-three when it

appeared. In

it,

Bergson's lasting concern

to

effect a

modus vivendi between two competitive viewpoints becomes once again apparent. This to

is

his

most elaborate attempt

provide a conceptual scheme which preserves the good

of past culture and the novel insights of an emerging

sci-

and proper place. The

dis-

entific culture,

tinction

each in

its

just

between closed and opening

societies, social

and

absolute morality, and static and dynamic religion provides just such a scheme. With his conception of closed societies with their instinctive social

able to

make

mechanisms, Bergson

full use of sociological

is

and anthropological

mechanisms

insights

which have discovered such

society.

But the discovery of recurrent processes does not

static

in

exhaust what one can say about social groupings, nor does it

enable one

to

account for the emergence of novel proc-

esses in the evolution of social groupings.

velopments which break through the

Such novel de-

static circle of social

THOMAS HANNA

20

habit are not a product of society as such; rather, they are

products of individuals within that society who, abandoning the instinctive imperative of social conformity, aspire to a universality

which bursts out of the

tight circle of

group habit and group self-preservation. The source of aspiration

is

not in social “instinct”;

it

is

in “feeling,” a

feeling of the vital impulse of life itself which

expansive, and liberating.

this

is

universal,

As Bergson describes

morality evolves in ever expanding circles.

it,

social

From time

to

time, a prophetic leader leads his society in the direction

own expansive

of his

aspiration: the old circle of habits

is

broken and expanded into a more universal social morality,

and the “opened” society

broadened but again

ossifies

static morality.

once more with

its

The next expansion

waits upon the next prophet. Thus, social changes are not

due

to a revolt against the past, but rather to

from

a continuous line of expansion

it,

an evolution

from the narrow

toward the universal. Like Jesus of Nazareth, prophets do not

come

to destroy the

law but

to fulfill

it.

way Bergson applies his concerns to social hisand in The Two Sources he links this theory to his

In this tory,

biological theories with the notion that species evolution

has reached

its

ultimate in the static society, and that evolu-

tion, henceforth, als.

The

matter its

vital

can take place only by means of individu-

impulse of

life,

which has driven and bullied

to its final possibilities of

organic

life, will

continue

mission through the moral prophet and the religious

mystic. These mystic heroes gain their expansive visions

not through intelligence but through absorption in the di-

THOMAS HANNA

21

vine creativity that surges through all living beings. Intelligent insight tant,

it

is

and rational organization are not unimpor-

simply that they are not primary: they are tools

for implementing

and carrying out the expansive visions

of mysticism. In this, his final major work, Bergson asserted once again the priority of spirit over matter, of the

organic over the inorganic, of feeling over intelligence: in

each pair both are real, both are necessary, but because of the driving, relentless creativity of life there will never

be a balance between the two, never an equilibrium that lasting.

The

is

creative evolution of life goes forward in a

never-ending expansion and aspiration.

It

was suggested

that the genius of

Henri Bergson was

displayed not in any originality of his basic presuppositions but rather in the wealth of ideas

and insights which

develop these presuppositions. To the ex-

he employed

to

tent that his

works continue

to

be a stimulant

gadfly) both to philosophy and the sciences, this

(if not a is

largely

testimony to the fact that sections of his works have a more

enduring worth and attraction than do the works considered as a whole, so that

many

philosophical elements in

his literature survive even though the broader theses in

which they were encased have fallen

into disrepute.

The

kind of analysis typical of Bergson and the concerns characteristic of

him have now taken

their place in different

systems of thought which perpetuate the Bergsonian tradition frequently without

happening.

it

being noticed that

this is

what

is

THOMAS HANNA

22 If,

of for example, the notion of a creative evolution

organic

life is

of nature

who

is

the

passe, the notion of a creative process

now

not at all passe, and Alfred North Whitehead, most influential spokesman for Process Philoso-

is

considerable phy, has provided a philosophical system of that of attractiveness to both the world of philosophy and science. In truth, Whitehead’s thought

own concerns and

with Bergson’s

is

is

weighted heavily

studded with insights

and arguments directly traceable to Bergson. Speaking broadly, Whiteheadeanism is an expansion of the relatively simple conception of creative evolution, an expansion which goes beyond biology into the realms of physics and mathematics. Bergson

s

tions of duration

limitation

was

and evolution

that he lestiicted the noto

organic

life

an idea

increasingly intolerable to physical scientists in the twentieth century.

Whitehead,

in a

more complex way, has

in-

of inorganic nature within his conception of process and by this lias rehabilitated the Bergsonian ideas of duration, memory, creative process, and teleology.

cluded

all

Whitehead has made persuasive use of these ideas for the simple reason that as a metaphysician, he succeeded where Bergson

fell short.

look, Bergson,

With

his expansive philosophical out-

from the beginning, strained toward a

sys-

tematic metaphysical position, but this he never achieved.

Bergson succeeded in arriving at scientific hypotheses instead of metaphysical statements. As mentioned already, this

was Bergson’s

attractiveness as well as his ultimate

limitation as a philosopher. In his epistemology, in his evolutionary doctrines, and in his social-historical doc-

THOMAS HANNA Bergson

trines

23 took

persistently

which were intended

to

hypothetical

transform

ification or rejection

by the

experimenta-

scientific

and which, by nature, were subject

tion

to

an ultimate ver-

sciences. Bergson’s fate as a

philosopher has largely been determined by

by other philosophers. His strong having found a kindred

in his

same

positions

scientists, not

interest in Einstein lay

spirit

who was making

the

theoretical innovations in the inorganic sciences as

Bergson was in the organic sciences. Unfortunately, Einstein's theories gradually received increasingly dramatic verification, while Bergson’s theories wilted

The

best explanation for Bergson’s impressive failure as

a scientific theoretician to

on the vine.

is

the

same

as that for his failure

succeed as a metaphysician: he was not sufficiently con-

versant with the outlook and problems of mathematics and physics.

ways

The

field of

will be the

icists.

This

is

metaphysics always has and likely

al-

playground of mathematicians and phys-

manifestly the case with Whitehead: he has

achieved a more systematic metaphysical framework for Bergson’s concerns chiefly because his training and outlook inevitably pointed

him toward

the elemental nature

and

structure of reality. It

is

Henri

a remarkable event in philosophical history that

Bergson constructed

such

impressive

conceptual

schemes, inasmuch as he not only was focussed away from the mathematical-physical sciences, but, in truth,

was con-

cerned with the organic and social sciences primarily as a means of arguing his convictions about human existence.

The

focal point of Bergson’s philosophy

is

the nature of

THOMAS HANNA

24

of man. man, the consciousness of man, and the freedom Bergsoman respect, the authentic inheritors of the

In this

but the Existentradition are not the Process Philosophers tial thinkers.

A

perplexing question for

Bergson

is

an Existentialist or

proto-Existentialist.

would make

little

many

persons

whether

perhaps some kind of

is

For a host of reasons,

sense to identify

is

I

him with

believe that

it

the Existential

movement, certainly the prime reason being Bergson’s characteristic desire to validate his ideas

through empirical

same and rational means. The concerns are basically the human existence, consciousness, and freedom but Beigwithin a son always makes the effort to treat these areas the Bergsonnaturalistic framework, nature understood in stuff of matian sense as being the conjunction of the real The attitude of ter with the equally real stuff of duration. Existential philosophers

is

much more

that of a stiict at-

described in tention to the nature of individual existence categorical differences from its own terms and in its own that

which

justify

this

is

extra-individual, without being concerned to

description

in

either

empirical or rational

a final terms. Even as Whiteheadeanism gives Bergsonism so impersonal and universal focus which it did not possess,

and does Existentialism give Bergsonism a final personal s in individual focus which it did not possess. Beigson than survive incorporated within viewpoints other sights his

in

own and more sharply drawn than

his

own.

For example, Bergson’s theory of perception, developed Matter and Memory has become an important element ,

THOMAS HANNA

25 Existential thinkers have, for the

in Existential thought.

most part, reacted strongly

to the

main tendencies

in West-

ern philosophy and theology.

One

particular tendency they

(and Whitehead)

the

“mind-body” dichotomy

reject

is

of Cartesian thought, a basic split which

is

still

stuck in

craw of contemporary philosophy and psychology. The

the

Existential position

is

that sense perception of an object

in fact, of that object;

mediately taken

perception

is

exactly what

it is

is,

im-

an encounter of a real perceiver

to be:

with a real object within a unitary reality called percep-

The Cartesian tendency, which applies simple-minded surgery to the reality of perception, leaving an unmend-

tion.

able and inexplicable separation between something called

“mind” and something separation

called

“matter”

—

this

erroneous

seen by Existentialists to be the product not

is

of an analysis of perception qua perception but rather to

be a logical analysis of the physical processes presumed to

be the corollary of the reality of perception. Therefore

an observer, following blindly psychology, will perception but, rather,

is

make

in the Cartesian tradition of

the inevitable statement that visual

not of the “real” material object “out there”

is

a

product of one’s retinal sensations and

is

not to be confused with the independent objective reality that is

is

prior to and distinct from retinal impressions. Thus,

“mind”

seems sis.

to

split ofT

many

from “matter” as the

result of

what

persons to be an indisputable fact of analy-

But Existential thought has succeeded

in

making

point that the reality of any man’s sense perception

its is

completely devoid of any data of a “split”: when one views

THOMAS HANNA

26 a painting, one

one hears a sound, one

it

is

there in the sound.

is

ture of sense perception tion:

“on” the painting; when

there visually

is

is

that there

And

a unified reality.

is

no

The very

split,

na-

no separa-

who

the psychologist

sits

viewing the physical and physiological corollaries of another man’s act of perception

is

serenely forgetful of the

given fact that in his perception of this

mate confrontation with the no awareness of a

split or

man

he

is

in inti-

facts there in the world, with

mediation between himself and

these facts. Cartesianism has produced this easy-going heb-

etude in both epistemology and psychology, and because it is obvious as well as easy, the “positive” way of viewing perception tialist

is

hard in dying

refutation will,

I

But

out.

this incisive Existen-

suspect, eventually

overcome many

of the absurdities in the Cartesian heritage; this

very

much

the case with philosophy

is

already

and behavioral

sci-

ence on die Continent and will gradually be the case in the

slower-moving Anglo-American world where neatness, caution, and a hath every day are still the rules for philosophy

and science.

With rare exceptions istential tradition do, in

the varied thinkers within the Ex-

varying degrees, espouse

this un-

derstanding of sense perception: individual consciousness is

there-in-the-world, and, for

good or for

existence takes place in a world which

inescapable; there

is

thought, and

it

individual

fearfully real and

no convenient “split” for the

creature to hide behind. This tial

is

ill,

is

a central

theme

human

in Existen-

goes hand in hand with the notion that

the only real perception

is

my

perception, and, therefore,

THOMAS HANNA

27

any analysis of perception must begin with the

reality of

perception and not with an analytical corollation of plied to the problem of perception, this

is

it.

Ap-

only one instance

of the typical Existential viewpoint that reality

is

never

my conscious reality in the world; anything to my conscious reality may be interesting but

anything but extraneous it is

not “serious," nor

Bergson shared

fully real.

is it

view of the unified reality of per-

this

ception, understanding perceptive experience to be a real

contact with the reality of matter, and he defends this view

extensively in Matter and

Memory. But

view of per-

this

ception should not be confused with Bergson’s peculiar

conception of “intuition,” developed later in Creative Evo-

Metaphysics and

lution, Introduction to

essays.

When

other of his

still

he speaks of “intuition” Bergson

is

not speak-

ing of the perceptual unity of the observer and his object

but rather of a special act of consciousness which

is

a

way

of knowledge and not a sense perception. In intuition one has,

by withdrawing

into oneself, attained a sympathetic

relationship with an object: one has a living “feeling” of the object, not a “representation.” Intuition

different order than perception;

is,

then, of a

Bergson developed his

notion of intuition to the deficit of his earlier understand-

was

ing of perception. This

a parallel

development of his

biological philosophy, wherein “intuition”

is

the

human

manifestation of that internal sympathy of relationships

which, in other organic

life, is

called “instinct.” Unfortu-

nately, Bergson leaves us confused as to the exact nature

of intuition;

we know

that

it

involves a conscious relaxa-

,

THOMAS HANNA

28

we become confused

tion into the inner flow of life, but

specifying whether this involves a knowledge of other

in

liv-

ing beings (the notion of instinct in Creative Evolution ), the

knowledge of

all

inorganic as well as organic beings

(the notion of metaphysics in Introduction to Metaphysics )

or simply the knowledge of the vital impulse of life which

underlies all things (the notion of mysticism in The

Two

Sources of Morality and Religion). Whatever the prob-

lems with Bergson's conception of intuition,

should

this

not blind us to the worth of his theory of perception, which

continues to

make

itself

felt

contemporary philo-

in the

sophical world.

But

man

in

carrying on Bergson’s special attitude toward hu-

consciousness, Existentialism has not only developed

his theory of perception, but has, interestingly

enough, de-

veloped his pragmatic theory of perception. Bergson understood perception to be founded in the needs of action rather than of knowledge; perception activity that surveys the environing

sible actions of the

threats tical

from

it.

world

in

terms of pos-

Hence, perception, motivated by the prac-

needs for action,

is

a natural organic

organism on that world or possible

is

world: what one perceives

what

is

selective in is

its

a function of

appraisal of the

what one needs;

not of practical importance to the organism

is

edited

out of perception. Taking together Bergson's two theories of perception, tion

is

we have

the following position:

if

percep-

of the real world (and not just a distorted, sensual

echo) and

if

human

perception

is

inescapably governed

by the needs of one's nature (which thus orders and

selects

THOMAS IIANNA

29

the reality of the world), then “reality'’ can only he defined as that which

“real"

is

us in the promises and threats of

to

the world. This notion that the nature of the real world

partially contingent istence

a

is

upon

human

the specific needs of

prominent theme

is

ex-

in the philosophies of Hei-

degger, Jaspers, Sartre, Buber, and

is

implicit in all of

Existential thought. Heidegger’s Dasein discloses a world

which

is

what

sein. Sartre's

it is,

because

has been disclosed

to the

Da-

Pour-Soi discovers the reality of negation

the world, a nothingness utes to

it

which the Pour-Soi

in

itself contrib-

relationship with the world.

its

So, then, Bergson’s special concerns for the nature of

human

consciousness have been continued within later sys-

tems of thought. The attitudes toward

human freedom

human

nature and

are also present in Existentialism, but they

have undergone much more extensive transformation. The uniqueness of

human

nature was seen by Bergson to be

predicated on two points: the distinction of organic nature

from inorganic matter, and the privileged position of the

human

creature in respect to

all

other stages of evolution-

ary development. Existentialism, of course, makes a radical reduction of

human uniqueness

to the

uniqueness of

each individual existence. In his earlier psychological and epistemological works, Bergson had the possibility of moving toward this kind of individualistic position, but

drowned

in the flood of

new ideas developed

it

was

in Creative

Evolution.

Bergson’s conception of flected

somewhat more

human freedom

has been

re-

directly in Existentialist literature.

THOMAS HANNA

30

we

If

divest the notion of duration

overtones,

human

of

we have

the

is

its

evolutionary

a conception of the free, inner reality

consciousness which

of the Existentialists.

ophy

from

is

largely the

The main theme

that one exists in the

same

of Existential philos-

world and

is

part of

same time one cannot be completely defined by

of the world or exhausted

dividual as a spectator to his

it.

is

it,

but at

in terms

Existentialism sees the

in-

own inescapable involvement

in the natural processes of the world,

“spectatorship,” there

as that

and

in this fact of

revealed the unique detachment

and freedom characteristic of one’s consciousness of oneself

and one’s world. Bergson’s theory of the real

self as

an inner duration (rather than a spatialized object) taken in

bare sense, a basic theme of Existential philos-

its

ophy, and

is

especially amenable to the attitudes of theo-

logical Existentialists

an eternal

As

who

see this duration

embedded

in

life principle.

summary

would be

it (

a

is,

statement about the Bergsonian heritage,

fair to say, then, that Bergson's early

Time and Free

IV ill

cial psychological

works

and Matter and Memory) have

spe-

and epistemological themes which Exis-

tentialism continues to develop, and that Bergson’s later,

more expansive works have metaphysical implications

that

have been most successfully realized in the Process Philos-

ophy of Alfred North Whitehead and

his followers.

The interest in “Bergsonism,” already curtailed to a minimum, is destined to fade away entirely. And even though his insights and arguments will continue

to effect

their presence in philosophy, Bergson’s characteristic bio-

THOMAS HANNA logical

31

and historical systems will come

to

he only en-

gagingly interesting failures. Bergson’s philosophy had a rocket-like beginning,

more expansive

and

it

blazed up, opening new and

we could have hoped

we have seen the rocket exhaust itself and follow downward on a sad and ageless trajectory, it should not be too much of a disappointment. The contribution of Bergson is that he made a whole generation look up and see the possibility vistas than

for; if

of a world large enough and tolerant enough to include the

goods of varied viewpoints, varied endeavors, and varied types of men.

A

man’s aspirations must always be counted

more important than his achievements, otherwise no man is worth more than his tomb. If the traditions of philosophy remain largely unaffected by “Bergsonism,” they do I

believe,

for the

remain impervious

man Bergson

brought

Henri Bergson himself,

to to

not,

philosophy an eloquence,

an imagination, an expansiveness, and a concern for the value and uniqueness of placeable. If this

much

men

that

is

as rare as

of the Bergsonian heritage

worth carrying on, then, surely, philosophy worth carrying on.

it

is

irre-

is

not

itself is

not

PART ONE

The Bergson Centennial at Hollins College

by Edouard Morot-Sir

VVHAT BERGSON MEANS TO US TODAY

In 1912 John

Dewey

wrote:

“No

philosophic problem will

ever exhibit just the same face and aspect that

before Professor Bergson invited us

to

look at

it it

presented in its con-

nections with duration as a real and fundamental fact.” In

1913 Edouard Le Roy, ciples,

the most devoted of Bergson’s dis-

exclaimed enthusiastically: “Beyond any doubt, and

by common consent, Mr. Henri Bergson’s work to future

eyes

among

glorious of our era. in history.”

A

little

sophical revolution

will

appear

the most characteristic, fertile

and

marks a never-to-be-forgotten date further, Le Roy asserts that this philoIt

is

equal in importance

to that effected

by Kant, or even, by Socrates. It

was over half

a century ago that these appreciations,

and many other similar ones coming from the greatest

minds of

that period, greeted the publication of the philos-

Can we today ratify these opinions? Or, at how should we formulate them, in the name of a not-

opher’s works. least,

so-distant posterity?

Let us turn to the professional philosophers for an opin-

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

36

They are unanimous

ion.

in recognizing in

the greatest philosophers of our century.

Bergson one of

Such was the opin-

May, 1959, by the French Philosophical ceremony at the Sorbonne commemorating the

ion expressed in

Society in a

hundredth anniversary of the birth of the author of Crea-

Such a

tive Evolution. is

tribute,

however,

too general.

is

It

true that philosophy students read the works of Bergson

and

that professors explain the different aspects of his doc-

trine.

may

What

is

interpret

then the significance of this recognition? it

this

way: Bergson belongs

to

We

our past; he

has become for us a classic of the history of philosophy;

one must be acquainted with his thought, as one must quaint oneself with Kant or Rousseau.

On

ac-

reading the

speeches in praise of Bergson given in Paris a few months ago,

I

was struck by the

identical:

The

fact that their

is

almost

influence exerted by Bergson in his lifetime

has been decisive and profound. As fect is felt “in all

own

judgment

it

has been said, his

ef-

avenues of thought today." Moreover, his

authentic personal greatness

is

recognized, and thus

he assumes an exemplary value. For generations to come,

he will be an ideal model for philosophers; he has given the

example of

a life entirely

and truly devoted

to

meta-

physical research.

Such eulogies, however, can imply severe criticism. Bergson is thus relegated to the past, irrevocably separated from present-day life. Some have gone so far as to say that he belongs

to the

we be embalmed,

nineteenth century. In short, should

consider that Bergson’s thought deserves to or on the contrary should

we consider him

as one of us,

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR as a direct ancestor

37

who

has something

still

say to us

to

and can be our guide?

Such

is,

in

my

opinion, the real problem

we have

to deal

with today, a problem concerning the present and the future,

not a problem of determining what rank Bergson

should have in the Pantheon of philosophers. This I

should like you

to forget the

is

a

mere

the

I

am

well

convinced however that

words indicates a change of

same problem

You may

substitution of words, the real

problem remaining the same. the change of

why

very ambiguous notion of

influence and substitute that of presence.

think that this

is

attitude towards

of the survival of a philosopher’s thought.

But how can we measure history the presence, and

moment

at a given

we might

of

human

say, the weight of pres-

human being and of his work? It seems to me that simultaneously we can use two means, two measures, one

ence of a

objective,

and the other subjective.

to the other

historian

without realizing

who proceeds

it.

We

The

often pass

first

one

is

from one

that of the

like a detective, picking

up

clues,

finding here and there a person’s actual presence, and thus

determining a certain historical dimension peculiar to an individual. different to

ing in

it

The second one is that of the philosopher, inthe historical background of a work, but seek-

whatever assistance

it

may

provide for our present-

day thinking and whatever solution

it

may

offer to our

present-day problems. Thus, in this perspective, one

may

speak of the enduring character of the work which has

es-

caped the dialogue of the dead imposed by the historian

in

order to enter another dialogue, a dialogue with the living.

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

38 I

apologize for this long preamble on a question of meth-

odology.

thought

I

it

was necessary

if

we wish

study of influences, always of doubtful value.

avoid a

to I

shall

now

take the point of view of the historian and then the point of

view of the philosopher as they have just been defined.

An

may

historian

verify objectively the following facts.

First of all, today there is

no visible Bergsonian movement,

or Bergsonian school, as there have been for example a

Cartesian

movement

in the

second part of the seventeenth

century, a post-Kantian and an Hegelian

nineteenth century.

Then everybody

movement

will

in the

agree that the

philosophical thought of the last fifteen years can be di-

vided into three main trends: Logical Positivism, which

through

its

many

manifestations tries to give to science,

as the only source of truth, a logical

Marxism, with tentialism.

its

Who

and legal

orthodoxy and revisionists;

would be so bold as

status;

finally, Exis-

to detect

some Berg-

sonian element in the various expressions of the three tendencies

now dominating

the scene?

The answer may be

definite in the case of Existentialism, still

less

which has had and

has important representatives in France; and

it

would

be tempting to suppose that philosophers such as Sartre

and Gabriel Marcel and even Heidegger are descendants of Bergson, who opened the way for them. However, a first look at the main Existentialist themes reveals an opposition to

Bergsonism.

We

might even believe that Sartre, for ex-

ample, has dreamed of being an anti-Bergson.

As

a reaction against a psychology of empiricist origin,

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

39

against an atomistic psychology claiming to be scientific,

and also against the beginnings of psycho-physics, Bergson emphasized the dynamism of mental temporal

omy

life, its

opposed

reality, as duration

originality as

to space, its auton-

power and freedom, its profound unity and its continuity which does not allow any gaps and cannot he reduced to atoms such as sensations and images. Hence the as creative

meaning of the famous and now banal comparisons which Bergson used from the start in his Time and Free Will

—

mental

an inner

life is

life

flowing like a stream,

stream of consciousness,

it

covered with dead leaves,

it is

sion and then released. serl,

With

a flame,

it

is

a spring which the

a

a deep pool is

under

ten-

phenomenology of Hus-

on the contrary, appears the idea of a consciousness

whose unity the

is

is

it

consists in

now famous remark,

consciousness

is

its

relation-to-something. Hence,

inherited from absolute idealism:

always the consciousness of something. In

short, for Husserl

and

his followers, consciousness

is

at

once the consciousness of the world of objects and of other

human

means nothing except in its relation to this world and to others. With Sartre, this philosophy of consciousness, first dramatized by Heidegger, becomes a beings.

theory of

man

sorbed by the

It

human being cast into the world, abworld, who can assert his freedom only in as a

the revolt of a negation. Sartre wishes to introduce after

Heidegger and against the entire classical philosophy of

which Bergson would be the

last representative, a

new

tology which would be in fact a “meontology,” that say, a theory of existence

is

onto

founded on the idea of nothing-

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

40 ness and no longer on that of Being.

It

may

be recalled that

Bergson, in his Creative Evolution had tried to prove that ,

the idea of non-Being

was second and the product of an

artificial dialectic of the intelligence as a fabricator of an-

tinomies. Moreover, with his well-known distinction of the “in-itself”

and the

ness as an

empty power, tension towards negation, which

“for-itself,” Sartre considers consciousis

revealed in a series of breaks, but which hardens and freezes in

its

inevitable

and inescapable relation with the

world of objects and the others.

There

is

no need

two attitudes seem

to

is

an attempt

continue this analysis further: the

be diametrically opposed. Basically,

to

this is a conflict of

there

to

philosophical methods. With Bergson, to

go beyond intellectual analysis and

recapture by an act of intuitive sympathy the being and

the existence in their original quality.

most subtle attempt of intelligence

With

Sartre,

it is

the

to describe the infinitely

complex interplay of continuous relationships which occur at every moment between men and the world and which constitute the real life of the mind.

But

this is not

only a matter of opposition between two

philosophical temperaments. Is

it

not also a conflict of

generations and of metaphysical sensibility?

appears

to

be anti-Bergsonian.

It is

in its

wake

full of violent

political, social, cul-

Marxism advocates

a revolution which

will bring about the birth of a

Everywhere,

in all countries,

religious ideals

and dra-

—

matic contrasts, torn by antinomies tural antinomies.

Our epoch

may

new type of man.

whatever their moral and

be, society exerts

its

pressure on the

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

41

means of pubSartre when he

individual, attracting his attention by all the licity at its

disposal; and

denounces

this

which he

seems

it

to justify

kind of constant bleeding of the psyche

identifies with the very life of the

mind.

Inti-

macy, which for Bergson was the very quality of the psyche, disappears. Moreover, as

condemns

said before, Bergson

I

the antinomies as artificial productions of an in-

telligence turned towards the external world

and seems

escape into easy optimism when he invites us

to rise

to

above

these contradictions to find the serene unity of the spirit. It is difficult

lic

then for a

picture. All of us

man

have been insidiously influenced by

Hegel’s dialectics. Finally,

velopments of

of our time to accept this idyl-

scientific

could be added that the de-

it

psychology in the

hardly justify Bergson.

Is there a

last fifty

psychologist

ever followed the advice of the author of

L

Essai

years

who has when he

underscored the irreducible opposition between spiritual quality and the spatial quantity?

and Gestalt theories owe nothing choanalysis

is

recent developments

and has come closer is,

you

to

Bergson. Freud’s psy-

undoubtedly much nearer, but

it

to

it

originated

known that in its most has moved away from Bergsonism phenomenology and Existentialism.

about the same time, and

Here

The famous behaviorist

it

is

well

will say, a negative balance sheet

which

is

a condemnation. Is Bergson’s presence today only felt in contrasts?

I

do not think

so,

and now

that the preceding oppositions

than In

is

claimed by

my

many

may

I

shall try to prove

be more superficial

present-day philosophers.

opinion, Bergson

is still

among

us. First,

he

is

so

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

42 indirectly

by certain themes which have become so familiar

to us that

we have

ond, he

so in a direct way, in our conception of certain

is

forgotten their Bergsonian origin. Sec-

we cannot avoid posing

philosophical problems that

terms defined by Bergson

at the

in

beginning of this century.

Since Descartes, the problem of mind as consciousness

has been at the heart of tentialism

is

all

European philosophies. Exis-

but the last metamorphosis to date of the

extraordinary history of the Western culture in search of spiritual vocation

its

mind. Now, today,

it

and

its

has become impossible to approach

problem without adopting certain

this

attitudes

which we

have inherited from Bergson and which appear as a in

human

mission in defining

filigree

our philosophical thinking. It

is

true that

came

Existentialism

into

being when

Kierkegaard revolted against the Hegelian system, thus causing the framework of traditional psychology to burst

modern aspect. HowKierkegaard after 1930 in Europe was

and giving the romantic revolution ever, the rebirth of

its

possible oidy because already Bergsonism had borne first

fruits.

minds for

Bergson’s role was to purify.

existential dialectics.

It

may

its

He prepared

be banal to say that

he restored the sense of quality in philosophical thought,

and also

that he called

our attention

to those aspects of

consciousness which escape a purely intellectual analysis.

By emphasizing tity,

the oppositions between quality

mathematical time and concrete duration, continuity

and discontinuity, the social son

and quan-

made

self

and the inner

possible existential descriptions.

self,

Berg-

The opposition

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

43

established by Sartre between the “in-itself” and the “for-

between the consciousness

itself,"

jects

and pure consciousness,

oppositions that

we have

is

lost in the

not so

removed from

mentioned.

just

world of ob-

It

seems

the

to fol-

low directly from them, and thus Bergson, as seen today, appears

to us

very familiar and perhaps better understood

than he was in his lifetime. His thought

still

continues with

themes which sometimes we do not recognize as Bergsonian because they have chosen attire.

appear

to

in a different linguistic

In short, Bergson provided European Existentialism

with a background of ideas and feelings which tected

in

Sartre or Gabriel Marcel, in

may

Max

be de-

Scheler or

Heidegger.

But Bergson’s presence

even more directly

is

felt if, in-

stead of paying attention to the analysis of themes,

come aware our time.

be-

of the philosophical problems which disturb

am aware

I

we

of the fact that man’s great philo-

sophical problems are eternal or at least belong to the cycles of civilizations. However, they have a certain historical color

and appear formulated

We

the great philosophers. fact that each

gives

first

rank

must also take

epoch spontaneously

problems according to

in terms

to their

imposed by

into account the

classifies

traditional

degree of urgency, or even

questions which, before, appeared of

secondary importance: such

is

the

problem of judgment

and concept after Socrates, or the mechanistic problem after Descartes.

Now

the problems facing

I

man

am

convinced that our problems,

in the

second part of the twentieth

century, have been keenly defined by Bergson.

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

44 there

First,

knowledge. Today

scientific

physics in the

make

problem of the existence of

the

is

manner

of Aristotle or even Descartes and to

the foundation of the sciences. There remains the

it

proud attitude of the

The Bergsonian approach

to the

most alive today. Science

physics;

own

problem,

—

i.e.,

universe which

to a

it

I

seems

itself, to

to

me,

is

give itself

its

its

truths in relation to a

it

explores in two direc-

the direction of the infinitely small

infinitely great.

the others?

not the extension of meta-

principles and to establish

reality,

tions

is

What about

tends to be sufficient unto

it

who

Positivists, for those, at least,

can be satisfied with Positivism.

the

consider meta-

is difficult to

it

extra-

and that of the

do not claim that we should accept the

famous theory of

a scientific intelligence turned towards

space, conceiving

more and more

tems. But

we must, along with Bergson,

lowing fact: there bilities,

subtle geometric sys-

and

is

a science with

its

start

truths

from the and

its

fol-

capa-

has an autonomous existence. Moreover,

it

and by virtue of

this attitude

towards science, the problem

of the existence of metaphysics can he formulated in Berg-

sonian terms. The philosopher of the Mind-Energy invites us to seek a knowledge which

is

parallel to science, as posi-

but which

is

of a different kind and

tive as science

is,

is

turned towards another reality, which we shall call the

mind, with

its

known doctrine

own resources

it

is

the well-

of intuition, so poorly understood in Berg-

son’s lifetime, takes on a clearer tive:

And

of energy.

meaning

the awareness of a reality

in this

which

is

perspec-

not spatial

and yet can be explored and described. Following Bergson,

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

Max

45

Scheler and Rene Le Senne have recently introduced

the notion of

Value

to give a

new

the meta-physical intuition of

Value which inspires our

thoughts and motivates our actions intuition of the elan vital in

But

life to spiritualism.

is

a consequence of the

and of the inner

self.

Heidegger,

developing his metaphysics of Being, also found on his

way

same sympathy with an “authentic” existence which does not allow itself to be bound by the necessities of the

a life governed is

by science and

its

Today

techniques.

there

a whole literature which boasts of denouncing the evils

of scientific organization when, as a matter of fact,

nothing but give

and awkwardly,

common

to this

it

does

expression, often incompletely

anguish and kind of questioning, to

which Bergson gave form in a way unknown before his time.

Moreover, Bergson did not limit himself the it

to just stating

problem of original metaphysical experience. For him,

is

an experimentation.

It is

no longer simply a question

The philosopher must, himself, promote the metaphysical life. I do not know if such a task can be truly realized, but I know that the possibility must of language, but of action.

be entertained.

If there is a

world today,

may

after

it

be because too

becoming aware of

sponsibilities

crisis of

philosophy in the

many

this possibility,

and accept a method which

philosophers,

avoid their is

a

re-

compromise

between reflection and description. Bergson showed that there

was no metaphysical knowledge without

cal life, just as there can be

mentation. Such

is

a metaphysi-

no science without experi-

the starting point of the contemporary

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

46

problem of the coexistence and relationship between ence and philosophy. This

is

a pressing problem, because

conditions our moral and religious

dramatic problem, because

sci-

it

life,

and

it

is

it

our most

should be at the root of any

philosophy of education.

There

come

is

yet another present-day

to us in

aware of the

problem which has

Bergsonian terms: the problem of fact that

most biologists refuse

to

life. I

am

acknowl-

edge Bergson as a master and claim that they owe nothing to

the philosopher of Creative Evolution.

doubtedly right when

it

comes

They are un-

to their techniques

and hy-

potheses. Their true ancestor remains Claude Bernard. Yet it is

well

known

that

Bergson considered himself a disciple

of Claude Bernard and that he wrote a penetrating essay

on the author of Introduction to Experimental Medicine.

Bergson gave a metaphysical dimension

to the

theme of

“the vital principle'’ governing living organisms. Thanks to

him, our epoch has become aware of the problem of

life as

an original, autonomous problem. Here also, as before, he

we cannot fail to take into account. Once more I do not claim that we must all follow Bergson. Yet Bergson taught us that we must go beyond the classical dualism and conflict between mechanism and introduced new elements which

finalism. Studies like those of Alexis Carrel

dinger seemingly owe nothing

to

Bergson.

I

and Schro-

do not believe,

however, that they could have been written before Creative Evolution.

When tithesis

he denounced the artificial character of an an-

which opposed Lamarck and Darwin, as well as

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR their disciples,

47

Bergson reinjected

on

into reflection

life a

new freedom and boldness which has benefited even those who seek to define a more subtle biological mechanism or a vital dynamism endowed with organizing power. Also, it is

true that there

is

no

common measure between

and the present hypothesis of

vital

theories

move on

the elan

the transformists: these

different planes of thought.

But here

again, however, Bergson’s role was a purifying one in that it

lifted the

weight of a crushing past off from philosophi-

cal imagination. Finally, for professional philosophy, the fate of Creative Evolution took a curious turn. first

appeared and for some 30 years

after,

many

When

it

philoso-

phers looked upon Creative Evolution as a metaphysical novel consisting of poetic flights and very vague ideas.

remember one

still

of

my

his class in 1930, “This

philosophy professors saying

I

to

book by M. Bergson cannot be

taken seriously. The philosophical method should be more rigorous and less fanciful.” Such, indeed,

book

strikes us:

it is

brilliant

and

glib.

is

the

way

the

However, today we

have penetrated under the surface and discovered a rigorous analysis of the fundamental ideas of biological instinct

and

intelligence, of life

and matter

in relation to the prin-

ciple of the degradation of energy (law of entropy) which

Bergson then called the most metaphysical principle in nature. In

making

life the

necessary starting point of any

philosophical reflection on man, Bergson, at the beginning of this century, gave a solemn warning, too often misinter-

preted at present: of

man who

we must consider

the striking

paradox

has his roots in the animal kingdom and yet

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

48 can rise above

we prefer

to

the physical

man

it.

Too

make

often, for the sake of convenience,

a distinction between the two planes of

and the

human

biology and a

we

spiritual;

build separately a hu-

sociology, and as an extension

of them, a medicine and a political philosophy. This attitude of the Positivists as well as of the Marxists;

part of the legacy of the 19th century, of of history and culture. This

Bergson

is

not only a

man

is

why

I

an

it

is

philosophies

its

am

is

convinced that

of the 20th century, but that his

message has not yet been fully interpreted. This report of the historian, whose role

summed up

I

have momen-

Our thinking has become impregnated with Bergsonian themes which we tarily

assumed, can be

briefly.

translate into a different language: idealism, existential-

ism, or sometimes even materialism.

When we

urgent problems of metaphysics and

life,

consider the

we spontaneously

turn to Bergson in order to define their essential aspects.

we choose solutions when our thinking runs

This remark remains true even when different in

from

his

and especially

opposition to his.

However, in any historian of philosophy, there lurks philosopher, and thus a

moment

is

bound

to

come when

the historian ceases to be an impartial observer.

no longer interests himself

in

dimensions of his masters.

He

what

I

a

He

then

called the historical

seeks in them, he

demands

of them a guiding principle or an inspiration, and historical barriers break

down. This other aspect of Bergson

personal, subjective; in his

it

is

own way. However,

for each one of us to discover this

is it

dialogue of the minds can

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR rise to the universal

49

and can be identically formulated

in

our secret meditations.

A

short while ago,

philosophical thinking reaching.

No

I

spoke of a

—

a crisis

modern-day

crisis in

which

is

acute and far

one can deny that for the past ten years,

philosophy has followed an uncertain path. Existentialism has fallen more and more into disregard, there

is

a grow-

ing tendency to proclaim that Positivism has reached an

impasse, in Marxist thought there

capable of evolution, and

nothing original or

is

finally, all philosophies

be powerless when they try

to

seem

to

evolve into some kind of

vague humanism.

The w orld 7

of today

is

looking forward to a new philoso-

phy which will take it out of this state of uncertainty and lead it beyond its contradictions and turmoils towards the beginnings of a new wisdom. With respect to Bergson, the question which arises can be formulated quite simply: can

he be for us an intellectual and spiritual guide? Rather than a visionary poet and apostle, can he be for us a

master? I

am

convinced that through Bergson

metaphysics of energy. Energy

—

there

we can

is

a

find a

new

word which

to-

day should cause a reconciliation among philosophers,

American

as well as European. For

we have been reminded and organization have

more than 30

years,

that the notions of existence, labor, real value. But there

is

a principle

which underlies these ideas and gives them a deeper meaning than they have by themselves.

I

mean

a principle of

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

50

creation and consequently a principle of energy, which

man

allows one to place invites

him

To help value,

to rise

above

man

ters of reflection.

thought insofar as

The

first

is

finds himself

A

meaning of our body

we have

tool.

Such,

to return in

Bergson's importance in this

as an I

order

technique. In short,

an energy

physical

inertia.

immediate and direct

believe, to

action,

have so fully grasped

first to

is

the source to

in-

which

avoid easy romantic notions

about existence, as well as the notion of its

cen-

French philosopher,

constantly struggling against

strument and

main

an obscure energy which makes

Bergson undoubtedly was the the

than

on the plane of biological

body an unlimited source of potential is

a living

seeks to go beyond the findings of

it

Raymond Ruyer, has shown

which

it

at present

of today, there are three

science after assimilating them.

Man

same time

it.

us understand this principle and give

Bergson. For the

his

at the

do not know of any better guide

I

respect.

and

in nature

human work and

we must rediscover

the significance

and natural impulse of our body, and Bergson can help us do

it.

The second center of

reflection, in

my

opinion, lies on

the social plane. Undoubtedly, the political philosophy of the eighteenth century gave us the principles of personal

freedom and free exchange; but the increase population and, parallel to

it,

the

in

human

development of

in-

dustrial techniques since then, requires a reinterpretation

of society as a storehouse of potential energies.

once more, we feel the presence of Bergson.

I

Here,

do not need

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR to give

example

as

51

the sociology suggested

in the

Two

Sources of Morality and Religion but Bergson does offer ,

us there a

new element

of reflection as a point of departure,

hand which

that of a social inertia on the one

ized

by a necessary equilibrium, and, on the

is

character-

other, a revo-

lutionary creation which has nothing to do with a deterministic and historical dialectic but which relates rather

mystery of human creativity and consequently

to the

those

whom

Bergson chose

not believe that

to call

we should keep

heroes and saints.

the

famous

tween “closed" and “open" societies; but to solve the

I

to

do

distinction be-

it is

not possible

problem of the relationship between the

indi-

vidual and society without thinking over social inertia and the creative spirit.

It is

not enough to champion the cause

of an elite or to defend the rights of an aristocracy of intellectuals

and

artists.

Once more,

it

is

necessary to return

source of our difficulties and try to understand the

to the

exact meaning of social energy. Finally, the third center of reflection itself.

Today

there

is

is

that of the

a tendency to say that the

man

mind

chiefly

responsible for the reorientation of European thought was

Sigmund Freud. It is a fact that contemporary psychology has been more markedly influenced by Freud and

still is

than by Bergson. But Freud has been the explorer of the

dark recesses of the human mind. Unquestionably, his

work has been

a liberating force,

and

yet, in

my

opinion,

it

remains negative. Bergson, on the contrary, opened the

way

to

another kind of exploration

—

the exploration of the

energy of our personal mind. Such could be the point of

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR

52

departure for a revolutionary psychology and pedagogy.

And I

such will be,

am

hope, the task of tomorrow. This

I

is

why

convinced Bergson’s future will be richer than his

past.

I

do not wish

My

convictions.

to

my

elaborate any longer on

main

objective

was

to try

and prove the

inexhaustible vitality of Bergson's thought. us;

beckons us towards new progress.

it

I

personal

surrounds

It

have not men-

tioned the impact of his thought in fields other than phi-

losophy because his influence

is

At any time, a philosopher’s influence

to grasp.

municated

in

Thus people have pointed out

sonism of Marcel Proust who,

movement, born

a greater debt to

But one

may

ask

if

and unique love

is

Freudian.

I

com-

the Berg-

source of

in his turn, is the

contemporary novel as a whole. In Europe, the

realist

owe

is

an indirect way through channels which are

difficult to identify.

the

always diffuse and hard

after the First

sur-

World War, seems

Rimbaud and Freud than

to

Bergson.

to

the surrealist call to automatic writing

not essentially

more Bergsonian than

shall leave to others the task of solving these

historical questions which, in order to be resolved, require

a perspective

losophy

still

still

lacking today. All

I

know

is

needs Bergson today. His genius

this: pi.ilies essen-

tially in his

metaphysical sensibility and his quiet

tual daring.

Without trying

that he

is

to

be paradoxical,

intellec-

we can say

perhaps more alive today than he was yesterday.

Separated from his past and from his own epoch, he nearer

As

to us

than

many

is

living philosophers.

a conclusion, allow

me

to

remind you

that Bergson,

EDOUARD MOROT-SIR of all

53

European philosophers,

is

the one who, without

doubt, has best sensed the great and permanent values of

and

the United States,

that he

is

a

man whose

thinking

is

closest to the

American. He bridges spiritualism and prag-

matism and

rises

above the national barriers which too

often give a touch of provincialism to

many

philosophies

of the nineteenth century and of the present.

should like

I

quote a passage from a speech he gave

to

June of 1913 before the members of the France- Ame-

in

rique Committee, in which Bergson tried to analyze the

American ideal and expressed universities

his admiration

and colleges springing up

in this country, as

brought forth by some volcanic eruption. In

if

for those

this

simple

and moving passage, he writes: “The main feature of the

American soul

a certain idealism:

is

by idealism

an ensemble of tendencies which are hard

which hardly need

to

I

mean

to define

but

be defined. First, curiosity for things

of the mind, then the habit of placing the matters of the

mind above

all others.

Finally and especially,

idealism the habit of considering that

be lived but that .

.

.

it

life is

mean by

I

not simply to

has an objective and a ‘raison d’etre’:

something must be achieved which does not yet

and when

this

‘something’

richer and will give

This idealism

is

it

a

is

new

achieved

it

will

exist,

make

life

significance.”

also very Bergsonian;

purest part of Bergson’s philosophy which

it

is

expresses die essentially a

philosophy of intimate freedom resulting from personal effort

man,

and creation. Here in the final

is

triumph of

a

deep faith in the destiny of light over darkness.

no other meaning for Bergsonian “intuition.”

There

is

by Jaroslav Pelikan

BERGSON AMONG THE THEOLOGIANS

In the history of theology, the philosopher has been cast in the dual role of

Don Juan and Simon

Bolivar.

He

has ap-

peared as a seducer and as a liberator. Ever since the

Testament warning, “See

to

it

that

New

no one makes a prey of

you by philosophy and empty deceit” (Col. 2:8), philosophy has been seen as the seducer of theologians, enticing them

into thoughts

and actions

Less publicized perhaps, but

to the Christian revelation.

no is

less

that violate their fidelity

thoroughly documented in the history of theology,

the role of the philosopher as liberator, delivering the

theologians

from the onerous responsibility of making

their theologies

conform

to

philosophical systems that are

passe and enabling the theologians to recognize issues and implications in the Bible and in the traditions of the

Church

that

might have eluded them

alerted by the philosophers.

may may be

Of

if

they had not been

course, what one genera-

tion of theologians

regard as a liberation effected by

the philosophers

interpreted by another generation

of theologians, or even

by other theologians

in their

own

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

55

generation, as a seduction. Yet the history of theology does 1

provide

many

philosophers.

illustrations of the liberating influence of the It

was Middle Stoicism

that helped Tertul-

lian to clarify the Christian notion of conscience, which

New

treated seminally but scantily in the

was the Aristotelian sible for the

both

Roman

Testament

distinction of causes that

is It

.

was respon-

deepening of the doctrine of creation among Catholic and Protestant theologians,

alike indebted to Aristotle."

And

was thanks

it

who were to

Hegel

that the Protestant theologians of the nineteenth century

launched an era of historical study

by previous centuries

in theology

unmatched

3 .

These and dozens of other instances

in the history of

theology are quite separable from the equally interesting question of

how

have helped

to

the history of religion

and of theology may

shape philosophy, from the Orphic elements

in Plato to the

Lutheran elements

in

Hegel. Thus there

have been a few studies of the relation of Henri Bergson to the

two religious traditions, Judaism and

Roman

Cathol-

icism, that play their contrapuntal themes in his life

and

The study of Bergson and Judaism by Aime

Pal-

thought.

liere, brief

though

it is,

suggests the complexity of his

atti-

1

Cf. J. H. Waszink, ed., Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De Anima (Amsterdam, 1947), for a detailed commentary upon the Greek and Christian

elements in Tertullian’s view of the soul. 2 See James A. McWilliams, S.J., Physics and Philosophy. A study of Saint Thomas’ Commentary on the Eight Books of Aristotle’s Physics (Washington, 1945), pp. 106-9; Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard (St. Louis, 1950), pp. 67, 74. 3 Karl Barth, Protestant Thought:

From Rousseau

to Ritschl , introduction

by Jaroslav Pelikan (New York, 1959), pp. 298-305.

56

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

tude toward the faith of his fathers.

On

more detailed examination

man

the other hand, the

of his ambivalence toward Ro-

Catholicism, published in 1941 by the philosopher-

theologian Antonin Sertillanges, augmented by some material in the

Etudes bergsoniennes, provides background for

consideration of the apparent leanings toward the Church evident in Bergson's later years.

4

Neither of these books

as satisfying as their important subjects

made

but they have at least

a beginning.

is

would demand,

From them we can

see that in Bergson too the history of religion has

had a

part in the development of the history of philosophy.

This paper, however,

is

intended to show that in Berg-

son too the history of philosophy has had a part in the history of religion, and specifically in the history of theology.

Clearly this part has not been as important as was the prestige of, let us say,

Kierkegaard

Kant or Hegel

a century ago, or of

in recent decades. Nevertheless,

Bergson has

Don

been heard in the halls of the theologians, both as

Juan and as Simon Bolivar. As could be expected, The

Two Sources

of Morality

and Religion has received

the

most explicit consideration, but Creative Evolution has not been entirely overlooked for

its

possible contribution to

the restatement of the Christian doctrine of to

cosmogony. One of the most

from Bergson

is

chapters of The

that indicated

Two

influential

God

in relation

themes

to

come

by the second and third

Sources, “static religion" and “dy-

*

Antonin Sertillanges, Bergson et le catholicisme (Paris, 1941); Aime Palliere, Bergson et l e judaisme (Paris, 1933) Lydie Adolphe, La philosophic religieuse de Bergson (Paris, 1946). ;

>

JAROSLAV PELIKAN namic religion.” For

57

the sake of formulating the issues as

they have appeared in the history of theology, of institution and intelligence as two

to terms.

shall speak

phenomena

in the re-

which theologians have been obliged

ligious life with

come

I

to

Both the idea of institution and the problem

of intelligence have figured prominently in the history of

Christian thought, but theologians have been embarrassed

with each in turn

for they

;

know

that theology cannot avoid

dealing with the problems of institution and intelligence, hut that to deal with them adequately other resources than

and

own

its

to look

two problems have often

beyond the theologian for

the presence of the philosopher, cast as

Simon Bolivar

My

or as both.

must draw upon

special materials of Scripture

tradition. Therefore these

been an obvious place

it

Don Juan

or as

examination of Bergson’s

significance for the theological evaluation of institutions will be

based upon the work of our contemporary, Profes-

sor H. Richard Niebuhr of Yale.

My

study of Bergson’s

significance for the theological understanding of intelli-

gence will make use of the work of Bergson’s contemporary, Alfred Loisy

(1857-1940). he p roblem of institution from did not, and indeed could not, take

Christianity in heri ted

Judaism; but because

it

t

over the institutions of Judaism,

it

repetition of Old Testament answers possible. Ironically, because tional patterns of

its

tion,

be almost cavalier in

it

—

to the

problem im-

Judaism regarded the

communal

of the special will of God,

has found the mere MW—

life as the direct

eotrld, in the

its

institu-

products

prophetic tradi-

treatment of these patterns.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

58 Christianity, on the other hand, attribute

may and sometimes

institutional structure to the explicit

its

does

warrant

of Jesus Christ himself; but even those theologians

make such an

who

attribution recognize that the details of this

institutional structure are not part of the original warrant,

development of

as they are in Judaism, but belong to the history, even

though

this

problem of

evitable

may

be viewed as a

Thus Christian theology has found

special activity of God. the

development

institution

as embarrassing

as

it

is

in-

5 .

Both the embarrassment and the inevitability became special problems

for

Protestant theology.

Reformers could speak as though

Although the

institutions

were

ex-

pendable, they found themselves forced to create, adapt,

and rationalize various their reformatory work. institutions

was

institutions in order to carry out

When

was combined with

this

embarrassment about

historical relativism, as

it

end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the

at the

twentieth century, the result

was a virtual

the institutional forms of the

identification of

Church with Antichrist. For

the cultivation of true Christian inwardness, the institution

was a hindrance. Thus

in the thought of

Rudolph Solim,

the

Church becomes a purely spiritual phenomenon; and the difference between Protestantism and

Roman

Catholicism

defined on the basis of their fundamental cleavage at

is

this point 6

0 .

The creation of

institutionalized Christianity,

Anders Nygren, Christ and His Church, translated by Alan Carlsten

(Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 97-100. “Rudolph Solim, IV eltliches und geistliches Recht 1914), pp. 43-69.

(Munich and

Leipzig,

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

rg

with hierarchy and canon law,

was

the fall of the Church;

development of a Protestant hierarchy and a Protestant canon law was thus a relapse into Catholic institutionalism, and to this extent was a betrayal of the Reformation. About the problem of institution in religion Bergson had much to say. The most memorable metaphor he employed was the definition of religion as the

“the

crystallization,

ought about by a scientific process of cooling, of what mysticism had poured, while hot, into the 7 bi

^

soul of

ith this

man.”

metaphor Bergson acknowledges the correct

ele-

ment

in the notion of the fall of the

trast

between “static religion” and “dynamic religion”

rests

upon

the recognition that

institution,

however sacred

its

Church. His whole con-

membership

in a religious

may

historical origin

cannot be equated with being religious; for by istence such an institution symbolizes the

its

be,

very ex-

partial betrayal

of the enthusiasm in which the religion originated. Bergson compared Christianity with Judaism at this point and identified nationalism,

the confinement of religion to the confines of a single historical institution, as the reason for the replacement of Judaism by Christianity. He penetiated as few thinkers have into the conservatism i.e.,

of a

ligious institution: it

is

unable

to

to its

own

past that

that is

more

loyal to the true past of the

than the hierarchs are themselves. With the

story of the

R Ashley K.

can be so devoted

recognize and to accept in the present a dy-

namic movement institution

it

re-

Grand

Inquisitor,

Bergson shares the realiza-

T U Sources of Morality and Religion , ? Audra andIl7 Cloudeslcy Brereton (Garden City, 1956),

translated by p. 238.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

60 tion that Christ

was not lynched by

a ruffian

mob, but

fied at the behest of institutionalized religion,

Him

be willing to crucify

again.

Where

ing, religion degenerates into that

ulations and

little

cruci-

which would

this insight is lack-

observance of petty reg-

which Bergson describes with

pieties

such sharpness in his observations of conventional,

institu-

tional religion.

Bergson knows that saying

Still

this is irresponsible.

this

and no more than

may

Religious institutions

trayal of high religion, but they are also

its

presupposition.

In the chapter on “static religion,” building the insights of

Durkheim, he describes

utility of religion as a

survival.

s

To

upon some of

the necessity

reject the institutions of religion out of

many

with as

much

are able to bear of genuine religious enthusiasm. cessions and compromises that mysticism

make

order

in

to

and

defensive reaction aimed at social

forget that they provide

is to

be a be-

is

hand

as they

The con-

obliged to

gain acceptance are a high price, some-

times indeed too high a price. Yet the acceptance of an institution

may

mysticism,

or

way

something

effect, !>

nitely.”

tional]

like

and continue

For

religion,

Ibid., pp.

Two

may happen

102

Sources,

{I.;

on one another

reason “mysticism

this

finds waiting for

0

mysticism,

to interact

against the day

enriched by his mysticism.”

8

guard the possibility that

to

Thus “mysticism and religion are mutually cause

again.

and

be the

him ...

on Durkheim

p. 239.

10

is

cf.

a

is

when

indefi-

served by [institureligion

becomes

Indeed, “what the mystic

humanity which has been

pp. 104, 134, 184. 10 Ibid.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN prepared

61

message by other mystics invisible

to listen to his

and present

in the religion

which

For “religious dynamism needs pression and diffusion.”

is

actually taught.”

n

static religion lor its ex-

1J

Both his historical observations and his philosophical consideration led Bergson to a sophisticated recognition of the needs and the limits of religious institutions.

The

reader should not be thrown off by Bergson’s effort to

term “religion”

strict the

The term

sion.

is

to its static, institutional expres-

not simply a pejorative for him, for

can mean “the adoration of the gods In this sense religion to

re-

which mysticism,

is

it

whom men

a representation of that

i.e.,

leads and from which

to

pray.”

it

13

continuum

genuine and ultimate religion,

also proceeds. Neither the identifi-

cation of this ultimate with the rules of an institution nor a

radical separation between the institution and the ultimate

represents Bergson’s mature judgment about the role of the institution in the history of religion. If

I

may

be per-

mitted to paraphrase this judgment in the language of traditional theology, Bergson seems to be saying that what

Kingdom of God might appear, if only briefly; but that while we are praying and waiting, we have to have the Church. This does not mean that the

we pray

I

ogy

is

that the

the

not; but

it

does have a role

have chosen these particular terms of traditional theolto

paraphrase Bergson because H. Richard Niebuhr

explicitly 11

is

Kingdom, for it is coming of the Kingdom.

Church in the

for

Ibid.

draws upon 12

Two

this

very insight of Bergson in his

Sources,

p. 179.

13

Ibid., p. 175.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

62

Kingdom

God

America and then implicitly in his more recent books on The Meaning 14 and on The Purpose of the Church and Its of Revelation important book on The

Ministry.

I

cannot presume

buhr,

who

hut

does seem to

it

to

of

in

,

speak for Professor Nie-

usually manages to speak very well for himself;

me

that the

problem of the relation

tween the Church and the Kingdom of God, that

bebe-

is,

tween institutionalized religion on the one hand, and what

Bergson

calls

“mysticism,” on the other hand,

one of the

is

continuing issues to which Niebuhr has addressed himself in his thought

and research. Having learned from Ernst

Troeltsch to discern the social motives behind theological

Niebuhr devoted

rationalizations, cial

his

Sources of Denominationalism

tion of

how

volume on The So-

to a careful

social-political issues like slavery

more responsible for the denominational American Protestantism than the ideological have provided the pretext for these divisions.

When Kingdom

examina-

have been

divisions issues 1

in

which

'

he came, therefore, to the description of The of

God

in

America Niebuhr needed an analysis ,

of the relation between religious faith and ecclesiastical stitution that

would do

in-

justice to his insight into the social

sources of denominationalism, but would at the same time interpret the relation

more

dialectically than a one-sided

sociological interpretation could. This he found in Bergson. 14

tion 15

Quoting the very metaphor about crystallization and

Cf. the prefatory

(New York,

remarks

in

H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revela-

1941).

H. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism York, 1957).

(New

JAROSLAV PE LI KAN cooling to which servation: since

it

63

referred earlier, Niebuhr

I

“The statement

may

many

subject to

is

makes

criticisms,

be objected that the term ‘religion’

plicable to the

dynamic process

the ob-

is

as ap-

the crystallized

as

it

is to

product, that the process of cooling

is

not always scientific,

that

prophetism more than mysticism represents the dy-

namic element poured

into

in Christianity,

the

social

rather than

life

scribed a process which had

men when

it

was

into

is

individual

life.

The occasional

zation of the evitable.”

become

unintelligible to

set forth in the traditional

gospel and law, but which gious

that the molten fluid

Nevertheless the philosopher of vitalism has de-

souls.

ern

and

kingdom

of

is

mod-

terms of

a very real part of all reli-

crystallization or institutionali-

God movement

is

apparently

in-

16

Although Niebuhr does not quote Bergson often

in this

book, he cites his authority at two crucial points: several times in the introductory chapter, which sets the terms

and the

limits for his consideration

Kingdom

of

of institutionalism and

God; and then again

in the

concluding

chapter, which contains his evaluation of the patterns of institutionalization that have characterized

estantism.

American

Prot-

Thus the extent of Bergson’s significance for Nie-

buhr could not be measured by a catalogue of the number of times he quotes

lem of

institution

The Two Sources. For the crucial proband dynamis Bergson provides Niebuhr ,

with an apparatus that 10

H. Richard Niebuhr, The pp. 165-66.

is

both critical and realistic. Just

Kingdom

of

God

in

America (New York, 1959),

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

64 combination of the

this

critical

and the

what

realistic is

Niebuhr needed when, after surveying theological education in the United States

and Canada, he proceeded

to de-

The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry. “We need,’' he wrote, “to define Church further by use of the fine

polar terms ‘community’ and ‘institution.’

A

social reality

such as the Church cannot be described by means of one of these categories only and

Church

much misconception

from such exclusive

results

use.

Popularly and

may

even among churchmen the institutional Church

emphasized that there that does not .

.

to

tional forms.”

Now this

is

in organizations

also possible; a

vaguely defined by reference

vaguely described,

is

be so

appreciation for the Church

appearance

But the opposite error

.

life,

come

is little

of the

to a

common

and

rites

common

spirit also

exalted at the expense of institu-

17

H. Richard Niebuhr was not the

first to

discover

about the Church, nor was Henri Bergson. Nor, for

that matter,

was Bergson Niebuhr’s only mentor on

this

question. Indeed, the impressive intellectual genealogy of

Niebuhr’s thought compiled by his student and colleague,

Hans

Frei, restricts itself almost entirely to the

backgrounds of

his theology

18 .

In

any case,

it is

German

essential to

note that the propositions and affirmations of the

Testament by themselves would not

suffice

for the con-

17

H. Richard Niebuhr, The Purpose of the Church and York, 1956), pp. 21-22. ls

New

Its

Ministry

(New

Hans W. Frei, “Niebuhr’s Theological Background” in Paul Ramsey, ed., Faith and Ethics. The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr (New York, 1957), pp. 9-64.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

65

struction of such a doctrine of the Church.

about the Church and

to

To discover

this

be freed from the necessity of

choosing between form and matter or between institution

and dynamis a theologian needs a working theory about ,

the validity

and the

needs

such a theory from those whose special calling

it is

to get

to reflect

upon

limits of institutionalization;

this

Bergson has been cast

and he

problem. For Niebuhr, then, Henri in the role of

Simon

Bolivar, de-

him both from the tyranny of a positivistic institutionalism and from the anarchy of a vacuous idealism. livering

Bergson has helped him inadequate as

to realize that static religion is as

inevitable.

it is

Bergson’s interpretation of “dynamic religion” has like-

wise been significant in the history of modern theology, for it

has enabled some modern theologians to come

to

terms

with a problem as perennial and as perplexing as the prob-

lem of

institution,

namely, the problem of intelligence. The

reconsideration of this problem in relation to myth,

lit-

urgy, science, and history was an assignment taken up by

movement

the

in

Roman

ernism, whose outstanding French representative fred Loisy.

Denounced by Pope Pius

thesis of all heresies,” left

its

logians.

methods 19

ed.. J

mark It

also

19

Modwas Al-

Catholic theology labeled

the

X

in

1907

movement has

as “the syn-

nevertheless

upon orthodox Roman Catholic

theo-

agitated for the acceptance of historical-critical

in the

study of Scripture and dogma, but behind

Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, September 8, 1907, in Henry Denzinjier, The Sources of Catholic Dogma translated by Roy J. Deferrari (St.

ouis, 1957), p. 539, no. 2105.

,

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

66 this lay

an image of the role of the intelligence

from the

that differed

came

fair to say that Bergson’s insight into the

is

it

relation between instinct, intuition, ligion ranks

among

his

and intelligence

means with

effort “to co-ordinate to

undertake what

carrying out,”

20

it

its

essence as the

a view to a remote end,

its

base religion could not

be simply a matter of the intelligence, but preceded

its

reflection.

tuitions

and

intelligence

it

mean

still

intelligence a fringe of instinct, instinct there still survive

was a

for, in

Bergson’s epi-

hangs around the edge of

and ...

in the

depths of

gleams of intelligence.”

J1

an interpretation ascribed simultaneously too

much

little

Such

and too

to religion.

Bergson pointed primitive religion. shall say

phize

On

distortion of religion to interpret

as primarily an ideological system or a theology.

it

in-

and the practice of the

were mutually exclusive;

grammatic formula, “there

fundamental

that the

instincts of religion

it

intelli-

with some of the raw material for

This did not

the other hand,

to

does not feel absolutely sure of

he saw that at

gence and provided

in re-

most important contributions

theology. Defining the intelligence in

and

Catholic image and

closer to Bergson’s understanding.

think

I

Roman

classical

in religion

it

this out It

most clearly

amounted

to

an axiom for him:

over and over again: before

man must

live;

it

is

from a

in his analysis of

man

“We

can philoso-

vital necessity that the

primeval tendencies and convictions must have originated.

To connect

religion with a system of ideas, with a logic or a

‘pre-logic,’ is to turn

M Two Sources, '

p. 139.

our remote ancestors into 21

Ibid., p. 118.

intellec-

JAROSLAV PELIKAN tuals,

67

and intellectuals such as we ought

be in greatest

to

numbers ourselves, for we often see the finest theories succumbing to passion and interest and holding good only in our hours of speculative thought, whereas ancient religions

pervaded the whole of

life."

22

This protest against the

tellectualization of religion, so familiar to us

in-

from S0ren

Kierkegaard and Rudolf Otto, defended the essentials of religion against the reductionism so often urged

Among

telligence.

by the

in-

those essentials were two that are im-

portant for our purposes here

— myth and

treatment of the myth-making function

descension with which so

much

is

ritual.

Bergson’s

free of the con-

of Western thought since

the Enlightenment has discussed the early sagas of the

world religions; Professor Manuel’s recent study of Enlightenment arguments about myth reveals this contrast

very sharply.

unaware of

23

All this does not

the deficiency in

mean

that

Bergson was

myth-making; he saw

that

it

did not “clearly distinguish between the physical order and

moral or social order, between intentional orderliness

the

due

to the

manifested

obedience of in the

all to

a law and the orderliness

course of nature.”

24

Still

he was able to

myth with genuine and profound understanding as one of man’s cardinal efforts to give meaning to life. Less prominent than myth in Bergson’s interpretation, treat

but present nonetheless, was ritual.

Modern study

of the

history of religion, including and especially the history of Israel 22 23

and of primitive Christianity, has stressed

Ibid., p. 176.

Frank

E.

Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cam-

bridge, Mass., 1959). 24

the close

Two

Sources,

p.

124.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

68

connection between myth and ritual as basic components of religion.

-2

"

Bergson’s study of the history of religion had

provided him with examples of the prominence of

and he stressed

this against the intellectualization of the

would be an error,” he

relation behind ritual action. “It

argues, “to regard as an abstract idea

—

mean an

I

extracted from things by an intellectual effort sentation of the act and of

its

continuation

not too often repeat that the action

and he

first

self-sufficient.”

“no religion without representation acts.

it

all

and strengthen

‘

.

.

the repre-

.

We

can-

may

be forthcoming

is,”

he summarized,

“There

an occasion for these religious

it:

if

their worship; hut since there

he gods/'

—

idea

and ceremonies. The religious

rites

above

is

“6

They doubtless emanate from

react on

ritual,

belief, but they at

gods

is

exist,

once

they must have

worship, then there must

Therefore Bergson insisted that

it

is

wrong

to

assign to the intelligence functions that actually belong to the

myths and

provide

rituals

men and

by which primitive religion seeks

societies with protection

against the imminent prospect of their

Nor

is it

and reassurance dissolution.

only in primitive religion that intelligence has

a limited function. is

own

to

The

history of so-called “high religion*’

also unintelligible without a realistic assessment of what

ideas can and cannot do."

s

A

comparison of Stoic and

Christian proclamations about universal brotherhood re28

Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, introduction by Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York, 1958), pp. 97-120. M Two Sources, 27 180. Ibid., p. 201.

p.

28

A Study in the Samuel McComb (New

Cf. Friedrich Heiler, Prayer.

Religion,

translated

by

History and Psychology of

York, 1958), pp. xv-xvi.

.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN vealed

to

69

Bergson, for example, that “the words were

al-

most the same; but they did not find the same echo, because they were not spoken with the same accent. The

some very fine examples. If they did not drawing humanity after them, it is because essentially a philosophy. The philosopher who

Stoics provided

succeed in Stoicism

enamoured

so

is

is

wrapped up

in

it

of

this

noble doctrine as to become

doubtless vitalizes

it

by translating

it

into

practice; just so did Pygmalion's love breathe life into the statue once

it

was carven. But

the enthusiasm

it

is

a far cry

which spreads from soul

ingly, like a conflagration.

develop into ideas which

from

that to

to soul, unceas-

Such an emotion may indeed

make up

a doctrine, or even sev-

eral different doctrines having no other resemblance be-

tween them than a kinship of the

spirit; but

idea instead of following

have quoted

it.”

able passage at length because son's

programme

I it

so well

it

precedes the this

remark-

summarizes Berg-

for religion, as well as the interpretation

of the role of intelligence that Loisy and his colleagues

sought to establish (or, as they claimed, re-establish) in the Church.

Although Loisy was primarily an historian of Christianity

obliged,

and an exegete of the

New

upon the publication of Bergson’s

Sources, to write a full-length reply

argumentation 20

30

ed.

;

Testament, he

Two

in

this

little-known

30 .

A

The

felt

Two

study of Loisy’s

work

discloses

that

Sources, pp. 60-61. Alfred Loisy, Y a-t-il deux sources de la religion et de la morale? (2nd Paris, 1934)

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

70

much

squared with his own interpre-

in Bergson’s position

tations of religion

and morality, but

that at several decisive

points he found the position unsatisfactory. Perhaps the

most decisive of these unsatisfactory points was Bergson’s designation of Christ and the apostles as mystics. Accord-

we

ing to Bergson, “if the great mystics are indeed such as

have described them, they are the imitators, and original but incomplete continuators, of what the Christ of the Gos-

was completely/’

pels

31

To

grounds that a study of the

this

New

Loisy objects on the

Testament does not subnor an

stantiate such a picture of the religion of Jesus,

interpretation of St. Paul that

would put him so unequivo-

cally into the succession of the “true mystics.”

fore accuses Bergson of imposing his

Nevertheless,

basic

this

there-

own conception

upon the picture of Christ

the “true mystic”

He

disagreement

of

in the Gospels.

with

Bergson,

which occupies a major part of Loisy’s book, must not be permitted to obscure their even more basic agreement at the very points

I

have stressed. Speaking from his study of

the history of non-Christian religions

as a

New

and from

his

work

Testament scholar, Loisy finds himself obliged

to

agree with

much

of what Bergson says about the role of

myth and

ritual

in

ligion

is

about

life,

not in the

religion,

first

son

is

31

Re-

expressed in the form of myth and ritual; in

Loisy and Bergson concur.

32

33 .

place a set of ideas, but an intuition

this

a

also in Christianity

What Loisy adds

somewhat more ample consideration of

Bergson, Tivo Sources, p. 240. Loisy, Y a-t-il deux sources?, pp. 43, 144

33 fT.

to Berg-

the place

Ibid., pp.

136

IT.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

71

that ritual occupies alongside ligion.'*

myth

in the evolution of re-

This applies both to the sacrifices of the world

religions, especially of the primitive religions,

and

to the

sacraments of Christianity. Therefore, theology must he liturgical theology.

permits him

to

Here Loisy’s empirical

amplify Bergson. But

this

historical study

merely reinforces

agreement that doctrines do not build religion,

their basic

but religion (understood as the myth and ritual of a society) builds doctrines.

upon

and thus,

this

The

role of intelligence

relation to

in

is to reflect

the destruction

that

threatens nature, “to set up intelligence against intelli-

The

gence.

intellectual representation

the balance to nature's advantage

is

which thus restores

of a religious order.”

3o

Theology and dogma do not generate the substance, but preserve the form of devotion; this they do by their abstract teachings.

Bergson

willing to raise the question “if

is

these abstract teachings are not at the root of mysticism,

and of

if

the latter has ever done

dogma,

in order to retrace

more than go over it

the letter

in characters of flame.”

But finally both Bergson and Loisy assign

to

dogma

3t>

a sub-

sidiary role in the true life of the spirit. In Loisy’s case as

“influence” to

is

much

as in Niebuhr’s, loose talk about

undoubtedly out of place. But

it

is

in place

point out that this insight into the relatively subsidiary

role of intelligence,

ligious life has

i.e.,

become

of

dogma and

theology, in the re-

a self-evident presupposition for

historians of Christianity as well as for historians of the

non-Christian religions. Lex orandi lex credendi 3*

Ibid,.,

pp. 73

85 ff.

Bergson,

Two

Sources,

p. 129.

30

is

now

a

Ibid., p. 36.

JAROSLAV PELIKAN

72

basic axiom of theological research. Bergson was certainly

only one of the thinkers and scholars of the past century

who came

to this insight

and transmitted

it

to the theo-

The importance of Bergson was partly his effort to combine this insight with his concept of emergence an

logians.

—

effort with which,

come

it

seems

to

me, theologians have not yet

But he did help the theologians

to terms.

terms with the materials of their own

field

to

come

to

more adequately

than they had before, as the examples of both H. Richard

Niebuhr and Alfred Loisy It

illustrate.

was, then, as Simon Bolivar that Henri Bergson acted

in the thought of both these Christian theologians.

meaning of

the theological

significance

of

the

Neither

the institution nor the religious

intelligence

can be evaded by the

thoughtful theologian, and neither of these problems can

be handled by means of theological sources alone. theologian cannot avoid them and

if

If the

he cannot handle them

purely as a theologian, he must go elsewhere for help.

must turn

to a

Simon Bolivar

he always runs the danger that for the fun of

it.

The

He

for liberation, even though

Don Juan

will

come along

significance of Bergson for these two

theologians thus provides a useful case-study for consideration of the

problem of theology and philosophy. Although

Paul Tillich says that philosophy raises questions and ology gives answers, reversed.

the-

in these cases at least the situation is

The questions are raised by

the history of theol-

ogy within the context of the history of the Church, and the answers cannot come from theology

itself

but must be pro-

vided by a more generalized reflection about the nature of

JAROSLAV PELIKAN institution

and of

73

intelligence.

Thus philosophy helps

theologians to be better theologians. this

has always been the case, but

phy

lias

hearing.

performed I

this role often

do not believe that

do believe that philoso-

enough

to

make

it

worth

believe further that theology has not yet heard

the last of Henri Bergson. at least for

I

I

the

He

deserves to be heard again,

another hundred years.

by Enid Starkie

BERGSON AND LITERATURE

I

what follows deserves an apology.

feel that

trained philosopher, and

work very

well.

I

as to claim that

am

1

I

understand

him

would even go

I

whom

one

is

discussing.

moved by some

so far

know

that

I

as a philosopher, but

it is,

I

all his ideas. I

as well to understand the philosophy of

feel,

not a

do not even know Bergson’s

do not think that

not here talking about

am

I

When

I

of his writings

was young

—

I

an author

was much

especially by Creative

Evolution and the treatise on laughter; and later by Morality

and Religion

— but

I

think that

it

was probably

his style,

his

form of imagery, which moved me, and

my

experience was a literary rather than an intellectual

I

believe that

pleasure. Bergson wrote one of the most melodious and

harmonious

styles of his time

which was a joy

to read,

and

there are passages concerning literature in Laughter which

are amongst the most perceptive that

was

in tune with the spiritual

which was I felt

that

my I

I

have ever read.

He

and Symbolist literature

favourite reading then

could see with his eyes.

— and even now — and

ENID STARKIE

75

was not unique

I

those

who thronged

in this;

was the experience of

it

all

de France

his lectures at the College

between 1900 and 1921, when he retired. This was before

my

time, and

to die in

was

never heard him personally, though he was

I

1941

at the

age of eighty-two. But, later when

I

knew many who had gone earlier and who all described the wonder and the

a student in Paris,

to his courses,

I

magic of the experience.

To understand Bergson's

significance he should not be

He was

considered only as a philosopher.

same philosophic family

the

Descartes or Kant.

It is

as

—

certainly not of

for instance

—

Aristotle,

indeed fashionable today amongst

philosophers to denigrate his contribution to philosophy,

and

to

deny him the name of philosopher

at all.

One must

also take into account the period in which he flourished in

and the feeling of

the history of thought in France,

many people, the feeling of hope in a thought. He gave that hope with authority

which he gave

tion

libera-

better world of

to

because he was a trained philosopher, and not merely an aesthete waffling sentimentally.

were not philosophers self

who used

his

just

He gave hope

to those

who

because he was a thinker him-

mind. And, by making up the quarrel

between the idealists and

realists,

he

set spiritual

values

again on the map, on a firm basis of intellectual experience.

He

considered

intuition

that, in the

had been

academic teaching of

sacrificed to the intellect,

his youth,

and yet he

believed that intuition alone could reveal the unity of that if a unity existed,

must be wider than the

it

must be

intellect

life,

a spiritual one, that life

and the materiality which

ENID ST ARK

76 binds us. Bergson’s ideas

in a wilderness.

One must remember what was the state of studies in the university when Bergson began full justice.

ries

intellectual to teach, in

appreciate the force of his message, and to give

to

it

This was the time when Hyppolite Taine’s the-

were the staple

a passionate

E

up the path for many other

lit

minds which had been wandering

order

I

intellectual diet. Their

and intolerant

main feature was

cult of positive science, so that

metaphysics was considered only a deception or an empty fantasy.

The dream of thinkers was

the discovery of a uni-

versal science, a mathematics which thing,

and

this

was expected

Everything was subjected

to

would explain every-

to fulfill all the it

needs of man.

and explained by

in the introduction to his history of

it.

Taine,

English literature, de-

clared that vice and virtue did not exist as moral factors but were only two products like vitriol and sugar, neither of which

was better than the

He even

considered that the whole of art and literature

other, only dissimilar to

it.

could be explained rationally, by scientific investigation,

through the principle of Race, Environment and Historical

Moment. That

is

to

say that

it

and inevitably, what kind of given people at a given

would he

would be produced by any

art

moment

environment. This theory

left

stated scientifically,

of history, and in a given

completely out of account

personal genius, and, like psychoanalysis,

it

could not be

concerned with aesthetic or spiritual values. But, after the Franco-Prussian

eighteen-eighties onwards, there tion with rationalism

War, especially from the was growing dissatisfac-

and positivism, with the amoral and

ENID STARKIE

77

unspiritual attitude of Taine’s teaching, and this

clearly in the novel by Paul Bourget, The Disciple

taken to heart the

num

opus, The

human

all

pub-

,

young man who has always teaching of his Master, who, in his mag-

The hero

lished in 1889.

seen

is

Anatomy

is

a

of Will expressed the theory that ,

desires follow certain inevitable laws; and that

crime and virtue only exist from the social point of view but that, for the philosopher, they are meaningless.

The young man seduces

a

young

girl

who

is

engaged

to

another man, and then promises her that they will commit suicide together, but he backs out of the pact and she dies alone.

He

writes to his Master, in despair, for help and

comfort, saying: I

write to you de profundis.

Answer me, dear Master,

you, direct me, guide me! Strengthen

was, and

still

is,

mine;

universe. Tell sters;

and

—

me

that you'll

implore

which

in the doctrine

in the conviction of universal necessity,

which means that our worst actions the suicide pact

me

I

—

this cold plan of seduction,

are part of the natural laws of the

immense

that I’m not a monster, that there are

no mon-

all

still

that you'll accept

The old professor

be there,

me

if

I

escape this terrible ordeal,

again as a disciple.

is filled

with horror when he discovers

the results of his teaching. After the girl’s fiance kills the

young man, and when he himself watches beside where

his

young follower

lies

the bed

ready for burial, he

come with horror and remorse

at the

outcome of

is

over-

his life’s

work. During the night which followed of

The Anatomy

of

this tragic scene, the

Will would have been

astonished

admirers if

they

ENID STARKIE

78

could have read what was going on in the mind of their venerable

man

Master. At the foot of the bed where the dead

lay, the

mother

knelt praying and, seated on a chair, the great “negator"

watching the

woman pray

and, for the

enough

his thought not strong

was almost inhuman through

to

first

time in his

uphold him;

this analyst,

The words

from

who

of the only prayer

his far-distant childhood, rose art in

Heaven!" He did

felt

who

was humbling himself and

logic,

prostrating himself before the impenetrable mystery of destiny.

life,

was

which he to

his

not, in fact,

still

human

remembered

mind: “Our Father

pronounce them, and

perhaps would never do so again, but they were the only words

which occurred

to

him

In the Symbolist

to

meet the situation.

movement

in

French literature there

had also been a reaction against positivism and materialism.

The writers had found

laire,

who had

their theories largely in

Baude-

been, during the Second Empire, the only

poet in France to have spiritual aspirations and not to be

wedded

to positivism, but

preciated in his

own

he was not understood or ap-

day.

Baudelaire had seen art as an essentially spiritual activity,

its

main function being

to get into

touch with the

beyond, with the ideal. For him there was a unity in

and he dreamed of one perfect rest,

and appealing

art

encompassing

to all the senses in one.

art,

all the

This could not,

however, be achieved through the efforts of reason alone.

Indeed the only way

to

reach

it

was

to

break down the

tyranny of the mind by any possible means. Later Rim-

baud was

to

say that the poet could reach the ultimate only

through the ‘"dereglement de tous

les sens,”

by becoming a

ENID STARKIE

79 which impressions could be written with-

sensitive plate on

The poet was

out his volition or effort.

to

become an

in-

spired prophet or seer, through which the eternal voice

found expression. Later on, in 1934, Daniel-Rops was

to

declare that any

action which tended to ruin the primacy of reason, to hu-

miliate

it

for the part

him worthy

it

of interest.

who was in movement began,

Bergson, bolist

dares to play on earth, seemed to

his is

middle twenties when the Sym-

nearer in thought to these writers

than to the academic philosophers of his time, and he was either influenced

by them, or

else the products of his

mind

sprang up from the same roots and needs, in the same

He became

for

soil.

them the heaven-sent thinker, who carried

their theories further,

who had

the authority of a trained

mind, and who was not merely a sentimental and emotional aesthetician, such as Villiers de LTsle

de Wyzewa.

He became

Adam

the link between the

of the literary coteries and the

men

and Theodore

men

of letters

of scholarship of the

learned academies.

Many

of the younger students at the Sorbonne at this

time were disillusioned and dissatisfied with the tual fare which they

and they

intellec-

were being offered by their teachers,

felt that the spiritual side

of their nature was

being starved. The University was then so hermetically sealed within itself that any hope of change, any chance of resurrection

or

renaissance,

seemed impossible. Young

Jacques Maritain and Ra’fssa,

whom

he had just married,

were students

at the

beginning of the new

at the

Sorbonne

ENID STARKIE

80

century. She tells us in her autobiography, written after

she escaped from France, during the late war,

We

have

Been Young Together (published in New York in 1942), of their despair and hopelessness at the aridity of their lives and beliefs. She describes what she calls their “un-

happy and cruel universe, wherein the sole philosophy of skepticism and relativism.”

light

was the

Finally, in despair at the vanity of their present and future,

the

young couple decided

that,

for a

little

longer they would bear with existence, treating

experiment, in the hope that

life

would reveal

it

while

like an

itself, that

some new values would stand forth so clearly as to enlist their total allegiance, and deliver them from the nightmare of a sinister and useless world. Then,

if

the experiment

should prove unsuccessful, they would envisage their only solution in suicide, in a deliberate and reasonable suicide,

before the years had accumulated their dust, before their

youthful strength was completely spent. Then they would die of their

own

free will, of their

not possible to live according to the

own

free choice,

some

if it

was

spiritual truth.

At

Sorbonne they had been given nothing but dust and

ashes by their teachers, the pseudoscientific skepticism and relativeness which did violence to that idea of truth of

which Pascal speaks. They wanted something

else.

Their disillusionment had been complete when, suddenly, one day, they went to the College de France to hear

one of Bergson's lectures. Raissa Maritain declared that

was God’s band

infinite

to find

it

mercy which caused her and her hus-

Henri Bergson

in their great spiritual distress.

ENID STAR KIE

81

At that time Bergson had France, whose buildings

lie

from the Sorbonne, but

it

just arrived at the College

de

across the rue Saint Jacques

was much further than

that

was an adventurous step which the Maintains took when they crossed it. A mounstretch of street in thought,

and

it

tain of prejudice separated the two institutions

larly on the side of the Sorbonne, for

whom

—

particu-

Bergson was

anathema. The feeling was so strong, says Ra’fssa Maritain, that

it

was

as hard to go

from the Sorbonne

de France, as from the Sorbonne Etienne du Mont

The straight

Church of Saint

to the

across

that

dangerous

was Charles Peguy, the declared enemy of

Sorbonne, who had the la

College

at the top of the street.

who guided them

pilot

to the

offices of his

Quinzaine across the ,

street

the

paper, Les Cahiers de

from the Sorbonne,

in the

rue de la Sorbonne.

There had been

in

Jacques and Raissa Maritain, since

childhood, an overpowering feeling for truth, as

door ajar on the road of

day when they this

first

it

were a

life, but, until

the unforgettable

heard Bergson speak,

this idea of truth,

hope of suspected discoveries had been explicitly and

implicitly frustrated by all those

hoped

to

gain

light.

from

whom

they had

Then they heard Bergson and im-

mediately were transported into another world and, thanks to

him, their minds were cleansed of the

stitions

on which they had been nourished

The great

scientific superat the

hall at the College de France in

lectured was too small to hold all those

him speak, and were eager

Sorbonne.

which Bergson

who wanted

to receive his

to

hear

message. The larg-

ENID STARKIE

82 est

number

of them were not philosophers,

Tancrede de Visan said February, 1914 to

in

an article

— fashionable

ladies

many were

in Excelsior

who

sent their

—

as

on 14

grooms

keep places for them, and they asked for a larger hall

so as to be

more comfortably

seated.

Amongst

the auditors

was Ernest Psichari, the grandson of the notorious freethinker, Renan; this was the Ernest Psichari whose Voyage

du Centurion marks one

of the

revival in France. There

first

steps in the Catholic

were also the future

art critic,

Henri Focillon, the poet Anna de Noailles, the future Catholic writers, tain,

Charles Peguy, and Jacques and Rai’ssa Main-

and the future Existentialist philosopher, Jean Wahl.

Peguy and Psichari were both to be killed in the 1914 war. Maintain was later to talk of his passionate devotion to Bergson

in his youth, to

the idols of materialism.

Maintain was the one of

whom

he owed his delivery from

And Bergson was to declare that his students who had best under-

stood and interpreted his thought. In a sense

philosopher

who

led Maintain,

and many

it

others,

was the back

to

consummate art views, and his inspired

the faith. Rai’ssa Maintain says that the

with which Bergson expounded his sincerity,

seemed

to

carry them along in the development

of his discoveries, but in no

way diminished

the subtlety

or technical perfection of his teaching.

To

unhappy young people who were lost in a wilderness of doubt and rationalism, to Peguy, Psichari, those

Jacques and Ra'fssa Maintain,

to all of

them, through Berg-

son’s inspiration, spiritual perspectives of intellectual certainty

were again beginning

to

open up. As Rai’ssa says,

ENID STARKIE she

felt as if

83

she had “rediscovered the light-heartedness

of childhood through his teaching."

They had gone

to the

College de France, with an overwhelming anxiety and a sincere expectation, but they had returned, as she describes it,

“carrying our

bouquets of truth and promises, as

little

though vitalised by healthful air

and

— prolonging

to greater

greater lengths our conversations on the Master's

still

teaching.

W

inter

was passing and spring was coming.”

All of them arrived nearly an hour ahead of time to be

sure of getting

for

in,

many were

turned away each day at

the door.

Bergson's teaching, in

its

positive aspects, supplied his

hearers with the possibility of metaphysical work, and un-

masked

the sophisms on

alistic theories of the

which the mechanistic and materi-

day were founded, sweeping from

the philosophical terrain a great

number

of pseudo prob-

lems or false solutions.

The teachers

at the

Sorbonne had made

light of

moral

problems; they had scorned religious experience, denied

freedom and made idealism impossible. What the soul

was reduced

to the

called

is

body; psychology was replaced

by physiology; while evolutionary doctrine had been turned into a heartless assertion of natural selection, the struggle

for life, this,

and the survival of the

fittest.

Bergson reversed

and brought back poetry and mystic

intuition.

all

He

vindicated freedom and idealism, and freed the stream of consciousness.

He

challenged the materialists, and

the vital force a spiritual impulse, a freeing of the

from matter and

insisting

on

its

creative powers.

made mind

He saw

ENID STARKIE

84

spiritual energy existing as a concrete force of the soul.

At

this

time when these young people were attending

Bergson's lectures, he was composing his Creative Evolu-

and they got the theories from him, red-hot from the

tion,

had had time

anvil, before they

This was the

to solidify.

science of spiritual impulse and impetus, to lay the foun-

dations of mysticism.

He

considered that our civilization,

our science, our intellect were

all

too materialistic and

they must return to spirituality, though the task would not

be an easy one. Humanity, he declared, cannot live by

machinery, for

needs metaphysics.

it

make an appeal to the whole low his own inspiration, and his

complete

self.

Andre Gide. All

It

was important

of man, to allow for

him

to act

man

to fol-

according to

That was part also of the teaching of

this

could only be achieved, he thought,

through intuition. Intuition was, as he said, “a lamp

most extinguished, which only glimmers wherever a interest is at stake.

place it

we occupy

to

On our

al-

vital

personality, our liberty, on the

whole of nature, on our destiny,

in the

throws only a feeble and vacillating

light,

but which,

nevertheless, pierces the darkness of the night in which

our

intellect leaves us.”

The young people physics to that they tion they

what It

its

felt that

Bergson had restored meta-

proper place, and he was able

would be able

to

would be able

know

reality, that

to attain the

to

assure them

through

absolute and

intui-

“know

is.”

was natural

that

Bergson should be attracted by the

mystical theories of Symbolism,

away from

the French ra-

ENID STARKIE

85

tionalism of the day, for he had not a drop of French blood

and the Symbolist Movement was one of

in his veins,

ternational feeling. specifically

French

Its

—

in-

most advanced literature was not

indeed,

many

of the writers were for-

eigners, like Jean Moreas, Stuart Merril and Viele-Griffin.

His father came from a Polish-Jewish family, while his

mother was tually,

He was educated

Irish.

became

a naturalized

in

France and, even-

Frenchman. Like most of

French contemporaries, he started by being a but, while teaching at Clermont-Ferrand, the cal,

his

rationalist,

home

of Pas-

he turned against materialism. At that time he also

came under the influence troux, who had started as

of the philosopher Fmile Boua Kantian, but then discovered

that his reason did not get

probably the

first

him very

far.

Boutroux was

philosopher to question scientific ration-

alism, and he followed Pascal in believing that the heart

has

its

reasons which reason does not know. “Le coeur a

ses raisons

que

la raison

ne connait pas.” In his book on

Pascal, which Bergson was to read with great interest, he

turned towards metaphysics, and fought against the theory of the world as pure reason.

Bergson, in his doctoral thesis entitled Time and FreeWill published in 1889 ,

Disciple

— already

experimental daring

the

same year

as Bourget’s

asserted the freedom of the

fact, to

at the time.

—

mind

The

as an

be realized by intuition. This was very

He wanted, he

the bridge between metaphysics

said, to build

up again

and science, which had

been demolished since Kant. In his next book, Matter and

Memory Bergson showed ,

E

ENID STARK

86 that he believed that the

mind could have some

matter in a mysterious way.

knowledge does not give

He

I

on

effect

thought that intellectual

reality as

it

but transmutes

is,

it

symbols which are useful for the guidance of

into a set of

which have no metaphysical significance. By

action, but

symbols here he does not mean the symbols of the Symonly such symbols as telegraphic signs.

bolists, but

lieved that it

to

become

The mind must place

object;

its

that of intui-

itself into a living relation

then will

grasp

many

must, for the time being, become the object

it

it

be able

to

movement and

follow the creative

living wholeness, instead of seeing

its

it

as so

separate things and states.

and Religion he writes:

In Morality

A work

of genius

unique of to

its

most cases the outcome of an emotion,

in

is

kind, which seemed to baffle expression, and yet

express

itself.

But

is

not this so of

imperfect, into which there enters

Anyone engaged

in

burns with the

work, however

all

some degree

of creativeness?

writing has been in a position to feel the

difference between an intelligence fire of

left

to

and

itself

that

of intuition. In the

first

case the

mind cold-hammers

combining together ideas long since

cast into

society supplies in a solid form. In the second

the solid materials supplied by intelligence

then solidify into fresh ideas .

.

.

But

it is

in

which

an original and unique emotion, born of

the identification of the author with his subject, that

itself

with

through the exercise of intellectual sympathy. Only

itself,

had

be-

a true metaphysics

must relinquish the method of analysis for

tion.

to

philosophy was

if

He

to say

the materials,

words and which it

would seem

first

now shaped by

is

that

melt and mix,

the creative

such a case only that the mind

mind

feels itself,

ENID STARKIE or believes plicity of It

87 be creative.

It

ready-made elements

to

itself, to

no longer

from a multi-

starts

arrive at a composite unity.

has been transported at a bound to something which seems

both one and unique in the soul of a poet

from

this

.

.

Unique of

.

its

kind,

and there alone, before

emotion the work has sprung,

it

has sprung up

own; and

stirring our

to this

emotion the author

was continually harking back throughout the composition of the work.

It

was no more than a creative exigency, but

now

specific one,

satisfied

once the work

is

finished,

it

was

a

which would

not have been satisfied by any other work.

In the Introduction to Metaphysics he said that the ab-

and expressed through

solute can only be reached tion,

and by

this

intui-

he meant the spiritual sympathy by which

one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what

unique

is

in

and consequently inexpressible.

it,

Analysis, on the contrary, it

to

elements

common

to

is

it

which reduces

the operation

and

to other objects.

He

there-

fore considered that there were two types of knowledge: intellectual

and

intuitive

—

the intellectual being directed

towards the already known, and the intuitive attaching self to the

unknown, the being-made. The

ing to him,

and

life,

is

intellect, accord-

totally incapable of grasping time, motion,

while these are the unique objects of intuition.

Philosophers

who

are in disagreement with Bergson be-

lieve that if the intuitive

adopted instead of their

method which he advocated were critical

method of

philosophy would be condemned

and inarticulate; or it

it-

if

to

reflection, then

remain forever

philosophy sought

to

express

could do so only through Symbolism, which

is

silent itself

literature

ENID STARKIE

88

and not philosophy. This was, however, the belief of Baudelaire and the Symbolists, that the deep reality, the abso-

which we perceive

lute,

can never be

in a state of vision,

expressed directly in logical words, but can only be com-

municated through symbols. In Laughter Bergson has written a passage which expresses this very clearly:

What

is

the object of art? Could reality

tact with sense

come

into direct con-

and consciousness, could we enter into immediate

communion with

things and with ourselves, probably art would

be useless, or rather we should

would continually vibrate

be

all

in perfect

for then our soul

artists,

accord with nature. Our eyes,

aided by memory, would carve out in space and

most inimitable pictures. Deep strains of our inner life’s

in

fix in

time the

our souls we should hear the

unbroken melody

—

a

music that

is

oft-

times gay, but more frequently plaintive and always original. All this is

around us and within

and yet no whit of

us,

it

do we

perceive distinctly. Between nature and ourselves, nay between ourselves and our that

is

own consciousness

dense and opaque for the

transparent, for the artist and the

a veil

is

interposed; a veil

—

common herd, thin, almost poet ... So art, whether it

be painting or sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils re-

order to bring us face to face with reality

ality

from

us, in

It is

from

a misunderstanding on this point that the dispute be-

tween realism and idealism say, without in

that realism is

in

art

has

arisen

.

.

.

We

itself.

might

any way playing upon the meaning of words,

is in

the

work when idealism

only through ideality that

is

we can resume

in the soul, that

it

contact with reality.

E

ENID STARK That

is

felt

also the

volume of

the last I

89

I

method of Proust, which he expounds

in

The Past Recaptured:

his work,

there might be underneath these signs something quite dif-

which

ferent

ought

I

transcribed after the

to

try to discover, a thought

manner

which they

of those hieroglyphics

which one

might think represented only material objects. Most assuredly deciphering was

difficult

but

this

alone offered some truth to be

it

For the truths that the intelligence grasps directly and

read.

openly in the

full

lighted world are

indispensable than those which

life

somehow

profound,

less

less

has communicated to us with-

out our knowledge through the form of impressions, material be-

cause they have come through our senses, hut the inner meaning

we can

of which

discern

...

I

must try

to interpret the sensa-

tions as indications of corresponding laws to think, that is to say,

and convert seemed

work

to

it

me

and ideas;

I

bring out of the obscurity what

Now

into a spiritual equivalent.

the only one,

what was

this

I

must had

try felt,

method which

other than to create a

it

of art.

This

is

what Andre Gide writes,

also

in his “Traite

du

Narcisse” (The “Treatise of Narcissus”), which contains

one of the best definitions of the ideals of Symbolism: Appearances are imperfect, they only half reveal the truth which they conceal; the poet must be able, at a hint, to understand these truths,

he

is

him is

and then

to reveal

them

.

.

.

The poet who knows

creating, divines behind each object

—symbols,

to reveal its archetype;

—and

common

piously

leaning over them,

there.

and beyond which

The poet contemplates

that

is

it,

herd does not penetrate, hut which

dicates

it

suffices

he knows that appearance

only a pretext, a garment which hides

the gaze of the

one only

and then,

that

silently,

these

in-

symbols,

penetrates

into

ENID STARKIE

90 And when, harmonious Number of

the heart of the matter.

visionary, he has perceived

the Idea, the

his being,

which sustains the

then, regardless

of the transitory

imperfect form, he seizes

shape which clothed shape,

its

it,

in time,

it

true form, final

he knows

and

how

to give

it

and

inevitable, heavenly

eternal

its

crystal-

clear.

Bergson considered that his predecessors, when they had not despised intuition, had elevated

world, had isolated it

a scientific basis.

intellect

ative

and

from everything. He wanted

it

He saw man

is

as being

and practical idea of

power

in

of both

objects.

itself.

But intuition enables

Within

all

of us

is

a spir-

which we can take refuge and meditate.

It

there that are found the deep roots of our personality,

communicating with

all nature.

Like his inspirer Pascal,

he believed in truth directly revealed intuition, he says, is

made up

to give

intuition. Intellect could give only a very rel-

us to enter into the object itual

too far above the

it

“by a kind of

able to feel the throbbing of

the absolute. That

is

its

to the heart.

True

intellectual auscultation

soul";

it is

able to attain

mysticism. In Morality and Religion,

he writes of mystic experience: True mystics simply open of themselves,

their souls to the

because they

feel

within them something better

than themselves, they prove to be greater surprise of those for

whom

raptures, and ecstasies. That

them

is

a stream flowing

their fellowmen;

have received

oncoming wave. Sure

mysticism

is

men

nothing but visions, and

which they have allowed

to flow into

down and seeking through them

the necessity to spread about

affects

of action, to the

them

like the

to

reach

them what they

onslaught of love.

A

love which

ENID STAR KIE

91

each one of them stamps with his own personality. is in

A

love which

each of them an entirely new emotion, capable of transposing

human

life

into another tone.

Bergson thought that the divorce between science and metaphysics was the greatest evil from which modern philosophy suffers. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, he declared that ‘‘concepts are only symbols”

hieroglyphics

—

“substituted

for

the

—meaning

only

images which they

symbolise, and which are incapable of giving more than

an

artificial reconstruction of the subject;

shadow of

reality."

in the universe

calculate,

He

believed that there was something

which science cannot weigh, measure, or

and which

it

will never be able to calculate.

a true intuitive philosophy

much

they present the

would be able

But

to realize the

desired union between science and metaphysics.

Bergson's spiritual attitude to philosophy influenced the Catholic revival in the twentieth century, such writers as

l’Abbe Bremond, Charles du Bos, Charles Peguy, Paul Claudel, Julien Green

—and many

others. Raissa Maritain

says that Bergson had created in them all an enthusiasm

and a joyous gratitude, which was

to last

them for many

years, even through grave philosophical differences and

despite necessary and sustained criticism.

As he grew

older, Bergson

to Christianity. In

was moving closer

to religion,

1920, in his Spiritual Energy, he began

to consider the possibility of the

human

soul.

The consid-

eration received fuller expression in his Morality ligion,

and Re-

published in 1932. This effected the fusion of

Christianity and philosophy, though he never

became a

ENID STARKIE

92

—he did not wish

do so while his peoMaritain ple, the Jews, were being persecuted. As Raissa said: “Bergson travelled uncertainly towards God, still far Catholic himself

off,

but the light of

No

already reached him, and us

whom had

through him.”

to

—with must be century — was

the exception of Des-

philosopher in France

cartes, perhaps,

studied in order

who

stand the seventeenth

Bergson

to

be studied, amongst the

integral part of the literature.

losophers, but by all

men

He was

o under-

entitled

better

men

f

than

of letters, as an

read not only by phi-

of letters, and he spoke the kind

of language which all understood. His lectures at the College de France were a social event.

with people from nity.

all sections

With philosophers,

They were thronged

and classes of the commu-

scientists,

men

of letters, students,

clergymen, rabbis, and fashionable women, holding their finger tips together, high up before him, to show that they were clapping silently, since applause at lectures

priests,

was not the custom. It was very “snob” to go to hear him lecture, and he harmonized well with the literary and artistic

trends of the day.

His approach than intellectual ent

from

to his

work was

—he must have

his father

literary

and

artistic

more

inherited this creative

who had been something

tal-

of a musician.

Bergson saw the clearest evidence of intuition in the work of the artist. It is the same conception which we find in Baudelaire’s poem, Les Phcires, where each artist

is

seen

as a beacon shining in the surrounding darkness to light

up, and also to show

God

that

man

is

there.

it

ENID STARKIE They are

An

on by a thousand

a cry passed

sentinels,

order re-echoed through a thousand megaphones;

They are

A

93

call

a beacon lighted on a thousand citadels,

from hunters

lost

deep in the woods.

Genius, Bergson believed, was the power the artist possessed of seeing

more than ordinary people

can, of ena-

bling him, by his superior experience and intuition, to

penetrate further into reality. Writing about the philoso-

pher Ravaisson, he said that from the contemplation of a

work of

art could arise

more concentrated

truth than can

He himself was first and many of his most telling

be found in a philosophic treatise.

foremost an efforts

artist,

came from

and a great

the beauty

a poet, ideas did not

seem

crystallized in an image.

and harmony of

to exist for

He was

him

As they had

his style.

until

a poet in language

—we

see that in his use of metaphor. In his Introduction to Meta-

physics, he says: “Is

it

astonishing that, like children try-

smoke by closing their hands, philosophers so often see the object they would grasp fly away before them?” This is a literary image rather than a philosophic ing to catch

concept.

He was

Those with

a poet with a beautifully

this gift of the

tongue have always given the

impression of visionary powers.

larme

at his

modulated voice.

Tuesday evening

It

was thus also with Mal-

literary sessions at the rue

de Rome. Bergson’s lectures awakened in his hearers a sense of mystery through the imagination, and to

reach

to the

it

seemed

core of their being, where the springs of

consciousness well up. Like the Symbolist poets he man-

aged

to suggest a spiritual reality

which he had perceived

ENID STARKIE

94

himself. People listened to the beauty of the style and not all

paused

to think

ing contained in

whether there was any profound mean-

The passage which ends Laughter

it.

—

very typical of such speaking Such

is

is

or writing:

also the truceless warfare of the

waves on the surface of

the sea, whilst profound peace reigns in the depths below.

The

billows clash and collide with each other, as they strive to find their level.

A

fringe of snow-white foam, feathery and frolicsome,

follows their changing outlines.

wave

leaves behind a

child

who

ment,

is

From

remnant of foam on the sandy beach. The

plays hard by, picks up a handful, and, the next mo-

astonished to find that nothing remains in his grasp but

a few drops of water, water that bitter,

is

far

more

than that of the waves which brought

being in the self-same fashion. surface of social the disturbance. it

time to time the receding

sparkles.

It is

handful to taste

It

life. It,

It

may

Laughter comes into

instantly adopts the

itself.

more

indicates a slight revolt on the

also, is a froth

gaiety

it.

brackish, far

changing forms of

with a saline base. Like froth

But the philosopher who gathers a

find that the substance

scanty,

is

and the

after-taste bitter.

Bergson’s eloquent and precise language held his audi-

ence enthralled, so that no distraction was possible. The attention of his listeners did not

wander

moment,

for a

nothing could break the precious thread of the discourse. It

was

like perfect

and beautiful music, captivating the

mind, just as music’s richness does, allowing

The absence

of heavy technical vocabulary

it

no escape.

made

it

all a

joy to hear, and he was the least Germanic of philosophers.

His words slipped out as

if

on

silk,

and the rhythm lulled

the senses of his hearers so that they felt that they

saw with

ENID STARKIE

95

his eyes, with the eyes of a poet. Indeed, in his Introduc-

tion to Metaphysics

And

pher and the poet. language, that

is

frequently compares the philoso-

lie

had

yet he

logical language,

a

profound distrust of

which he

felt to

be too

were

abstract. Like the Symbolists he believed that there

thoughts so profound that words were powerless to express

them, that abstraction created a veil which hides reality

from

Music he

us.

factory art, as the activity

it

felt

was more capable of being a

was dynamic, the very manifestation of

which pushes the world forward,

laden with our emotions which enable us tact

with

life.

feel,

else but

while

from action

but

we

listen, as

many

humanity,

is

though we could not desire anything suggesting to us, and that that

to listen. Let the

we not

music express joy or

are what

expresses.

it

others, nay, all the others, too. all

recover con-

to

naturally and necessarily act did

moment we

love, every

vibrations

said:

what the music

we should

as

its

Talking of musical experience, in Morality

and Religion, he

We

satis-

nature, weeps with

introduce these feelings into us,

it.

it

just

is

refrain

grief, pity or

Not only

ourselves,

When music

In point of fact

weeps,

it

does not

introduces us into them, as

passers-by are forced into a street dance.

Thus do pioneers

morality proceed. Life holds for them unsuspected tones of

new symphony, and

ing like those of some into this

music that we

may

express

it

they

to

draw

Anyone who has attempted

draw us

after

and the notes

all

feel-

them

illustrations

artistic creation,

from

it.

literary composition,

He

knows

says: that

the subject has been studied at length, the materials are lected,

in

in action.

Bergson had a clear understanding of

and he was able

all

made, something more

is

when

all

col-

needed in order

ENID STARKIE

96 about the work of composition

to set

itself,

and that

is

an often

very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject,

and

to seek, as deeply as possible,

we need only

Hence

let

an impulse, after which

ourselves go.

follows that the highest art will always be the

it

most individual, the most unique. As he says

What

the artist fixes on his canvas

is

in

Laughter:

something he has seen

at

a certain spot, on a certain day, at a certain hour, with a colouring

What

that will never be seen again.

the poet sings of

mood which was his, and his alone, and which will We may indeed, give general names to these .

.

.

is

a certain

never return feelings, but

they cannot be the same thing in another soul. They are individualised. Thereby,

and thereby only, do they belong

form the current coin of our

generalities, symbols, or even types

daily perception.

How

to art; for

then does misunderstanding on this point

arise?

Proust writes in a similar vein in The Past Recaptured. Only the subjective impression, however inferior the material may

seem

be and however improbable the outline,

to

truth and for that reason

the mind, for lead the joy.

tion

The is

mind

alone to a

is able, if

mind can

the

extract this truth, to

greater perfection and impart to is

for the writer

we

it

a pure

what experimenta-

for the scientist, but with this difference, that with the

work

of the intelligence precedes,

and with the writer

comes afterwards. Anything we have not had

clarify

a criterion of

alone merits being apprehended by

subjective impression

scientist the it

it

it

is

by our own personal

intervened,

posing of

life,

is

effort,

not our own.

to decipher

and

anything that was clear before

And

since art

is

a faithful recom-

around these truths that one had attained within

ENID STARKIE

97

oneself there floats an atmosphere of poetry, the sweetness of a

mystery, which

merely the semi-darkness through which we

is

have come.

Bergson had the same conception of nature, which he shared with Baudelaire and the Symbolists, and that was

had no beauty

that nature

Nature was beautiful only by what the

or line.

brought

artist

her of himself. In Time and Free-Will Bergson

to

,

“We

says:

had no colour

in herself, that she

might ask ourselves whether Nature

is

beautiful

otherwise than through the meeting by chance of certain processes of

art,

and whether

art is not prior to nature.”

Proust says:

Thus

I

had already come

to the conclusion that

free in the presence of the

do not do us,

it

as

us to

make

it is

r

forever

piness I

all

we

please, but that

existed prior to

it

we would do a natural both necessary and hidden. But when art enabled

to hold

unknown

so different

are not at

of art to be created, that

to discover

this discovery,

w hat we ought

it?

we ourselves

and we should seek

law because

work

we

to us,

was

it

it

as

not disclosing to us, after

all,

most precious but what usually remains our true

life,

from what we think that we are

when chance brings back

we have

reality as filled

to us the true

felt

it,

with great hap-

remembrance

of

convinced myself of this by the falseness of even the art

that calls itself “realist,”

we had not formed

which would not be so untruthful

in life the habit of giving to

if

our sensations

an outward expression so different from them, which, after a short while,

we take

for reality

itself.

Bergson led the writers of his age into the regions

to

which they naturally aspired, where they could breathe

ENID STARKIE

98 freely,

where they began

itual reality.

to realize that there exists a spir-

Most of Proust’s work

is

an exposition of

Bergson's philosophy. Proust also forced his readers to

memory resembles

accept the inexpressible. His theory of that of Bergson,

in

seeing the difference between habit

—

memory and pure memory the second psychological

Matter and

Memory,

distinct

spiritual.

physiological and

Bergson says in

from the material, protects and preserves the and puts

the images of the dream,

it

When

dispersion of the present.

it is

and

first is

Memory:

real part of the past,

value,

the

it

is

out of the it

way

of the utilitarian

it,

as sleep liberates

liberates

transfigured.

It

has the whole of

its

integrated into eternity.

Bergson’s doctrine

may

not have altered the course of

philosophical reflection, but he did affect literary thought,

and what writers

call philosophy, with the result that the

focus of personality was no longer intelligence, but intuition

and feeling; and

that the

most precious intimation of

experience, the immediate data of consciousness, was considered, at best, half conscious, and capable only of being

revealed

probing.

to the artist's

Bergson’s views of the problems which confront modern civilization are as true today as thirty years ago. itual

when he expressed them

He understood how,

without further spir-

development, the world could not continue

The words which end

his last

to

live.

work, published in 1932,

Morality and Religion are tragically apposite for the sixth ,

decade of the twentieth century,

in

an atomic age. Those

99

ENID STAR KIE

who today read Baudelaire ills,

in a desire to find

kind out of

its rut,

in search for a

remedy

something new which will

to

lift

our

man-

will find similar spiritual food in Berg-

son: But whether we go bail for small measures or great, a decision imperative. of

its

is in

all

own their

Mankind

progress.

Men do

whether they want

make

groaning, half-crushed beneath the weight not sufficiently realise that their future

own hands. Theirs

sibility, then, for

to

lies

to

is

the task of determining

go on living or

deciding

if

first

they want merely to

just the extra effort required for fulfilling,

machine for the making of gods.

of

not. Theirs the responlive,

or intend

even on their

refractory planet, the essential function of the universe, which a

is

is

PART TWO

The Bergson Centennial at Paris

by Jean Hyppolite (at the ecole nor male superieure)

A

tribute to Bergson should not ignore the formative years

of the philosopher, which

may have been

decisive in the

orientation of his thought. Bergson had at

first

dreamed

of becoming a mathematician. Instead of staying in the

philosophy class a second year and preparing for NormaleLettres , he

began elementary mathematics; he took a con-

cours general prize in mathematics in 1876 and proposed

an elegant solution

to a

letter

from Pascal

gifts

Bergson preferred

pared for

to

geometrical question found in a

Fermat. But in spite of his remarkable to return to

N ormales-Lettres,

1878. Such a dual vocation

philosophy and pre-

where he took third place is

not unusual here, where

ence and literature coexist, where even in

this

in

sci-

very year a

first-ranking science candidate has turned to philosophy

and

a philosophy student to mathematical research.

The leading candidate of 1878 was Jaures. We have some memories of the youthful relationship between Jaures and Bergson, whose careers were the

first

there

to differ so greatly.

was a great contrast between

From

the two, between

JEAN H YPPOLITE

104

and the subtlety, the medi-

the expansive eloquence of one

They went together to the Louvre. Their schoolmates sometimes amused themselves by setting

tative spirit, of the other.

them against one another. There is a story that one of their professors, Desjardins, proposed that they reenact Cicero’s oration defending Fonteius against a charge of lying. Jau-

vigorously: ‘‘Fonteius could have been ac-

res attacked

quitted in an era

when

was declining, but you

the republic

who judge him at the beginning of demn him.” Their classmates were

the republic will con-

away

at first carried

by Jaures’ eloquence, but Bergson was able to persuade them with elegance, distinction, and a splendidly solid argument. The result of

imagine today

—was

this

a draw.

give the decision could

demno” but “non

liquet.”

also

to

“absolvo”

neither

We

scarcely

The classmates who were

award victory neither

Bergson. They uttered

to

—which we can

debate

know

that

to

Jaures nor

nor

“con-

Bergson took

fencing lessons and that his teacher one day told him,

“You

are subtle, Mr. Bergson.” I

have not time

at the

Fcole

—

licentiate, the

the

to recreate the three first

second

to

years Bergson passed

year was devoted

to

acquiring a diploma

time as a definitif, the third, at

last, to

obtaining the

known

at that

the agregation.

question was: would Jaures or Bergson take

first

The

place in

the agregation? Jaures possibly antagonized the examiners

by the large audience which came excessive eloquence. Lesbazeilles, fore the examiners, took

Jaures third.

first

to

hear him and by his

who appeared alone

place, Bergson second,

be-

and

JEAN IIYPPOLITE At

105

time students of the £cole enjoyed less freedom

this

than today; they might go out only on Thursdays and Sundays.

We may

imagine long conversations among the

stu-

dents, in the monastic corridors of the £cole, or in the

courtyard, around the

pond. Lucien Levy-Bruhl was a

when Bergson was an undergraduate;

third-year student

he

fish

who became Monseigneur Baudrillard

was, as well as

Jaures, a fellow student of Bergson's. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this house

is

the diversity of

which meet here and the mutual education that

is

minds

a result.

There has always been a love of freedom, discussion, and even paradox. Bergson was a student librarian, and therefore

had free access

library,

the

to

where he studied

Spencer and read Lachelier. His masters were Durkheim, Olle-Laprune, Boutroux.

way more

We know

that he then sought his

philosophy of Spencer than in the Kant-

in the

ian critique.

Before

professorship

his

Bergson returned

1898 (shortly

at

to the ficole

the

College

Normale

de

France

as a lecturer. In

after the publication of Matter

and Memory )

he gave at the iScole some notable lectures on ancient philosophy.

He

did not always have a large audience, because

he was accused of not preparing his students specifically for the agregation.

When

he was Professor for Advanced

Students at the Henry IV School, he had as a student

Thibaudet, who,

it

seems

to

me, has written one of the best ficole

he met

who was

to give

and most suggestive books on him. At the Charles Peguy, author of Jeanne d' Arc,

Bergsonism

its

great existential dimensions.

JEAN HYPPOLITE

106 I

have tried

to

evoke only a few associations and the

place and atmosphere of these associations. But these are, I

think, very important in the construction of

an intellectual

biography. The iScole Normale must congratulate for having the opportunity of paying to

one of

its

greatest philosophers,

homage,

in

its

itself

home,

whose thought, whether

recognized or not, dominates our era.

by Marcel Bataillon (at the college de France)

men

If to the

of

my

generation

it

seems so natural that

Bergson represents, by himself and very largely, the College,

it

because when we began our philosophical studies

is

the College

make

was for us the house of Bergson. Allow me

a short detour into

schoolboy

in

my

1911-12, coming

personal experiences as a to Paris, to the

boarding school, the Lycee Louis-le-Grand. ions and

I,

fresh

from the baccalaureat

knew

that the

those

who were “good

to

neighboring

My

compan-

in philosophy, all

house beside us was that of Bergson. Even at philosophy,’" as

we

called

it,

and

who, for example, had read L’Automatisme psychologique

may

not have

known

that Pierre Janet

de France. Bergson, yes; we glory of the College.

I

all

knew

was

that

at the

,

College

Bergson was the

admit frankly that the names of

Sylvain Levi, of Pelliot, of Meillet, of Louis Havet meant

we classmates who were know the name of Langevin. But

nothing to us; moreover, that

studying science did not

who could be

ignorant of the fact that the College de France

was the house of Bergson?

MARCEL BATAILLON

108

The year 1911-12

to

which

was evidently a peak (I Bergson’s career. It was

refer

I

do not say the peak, but a peak)

in

when he had

the time, for one thing,

just given the lectures

Oxford on “The Perception of Change’' and, for another thing, had presented, at the Bologna convention, the famous at

paper on “Philosophical Intuition.” one by saying that something of the classrooms of the

courses.

to think that

on Friday or Saturday and

Many

found

all that

way

its

into

Lycee Louis-le-Grand, although no

one among us had the audacity his classes

shall surprise no

I

reasons prevented us.

he could “'cut"

slip into

must

I

Bergson's

state that

our

professor of philosophy that year had never been counted

among

the Bergsonians. This

before him students

was Marcel Bernes. He had

who had been

initiated into

by Bergsonian professors; such was

my

case.

I

philosophy

had had

my

Dijon a strongly convinced one, Albert Sauvage;

at

good

friend Frangois Saleilles had had at Stanislas a teacher

who

since has taught in this house, Jean Baruzi.

He was

a

fervent Bergsonian. Certainly Bernes tried neither to “Berg-

sonize” nor to “de-Bergsonize” us, but

it

was apparent

some of Bergson’s preoccupations and something of

his

that

way

of approaching problems were present in his teaching.

I

never suspected this more strongly than recently, when

I

went over the yearbooks of the College de France for that period

to see

what Bergson had said

years preceding 1911.

I

course of the

in the

remembered then

the

way

in

which

Bernes always spoke of “the posing of the question,” how he taught us that

it

was more important

than to produce some acceptable solution.

to

pose questions

And

I

can better

MARCEL BATAILLON explain to myself, too,

109

why he gave

us a whole year’s course

on Berkeley. For two years Bergson had studied,

in that

classroom, the writings of Berkeley, and when Bernes came to the

end of his course he offered us as dessert, so

the paper of the Bologna Convention. inflection with

I

can

still

to speak,

hear the

which he toned down the irony of the pas-

sage on the hodgepodge one can

make

with pieces, con-

veniently adapted, of what the historians of philosophy are

able to find in Berkeley’s work.

And

then

I

should recall a

memory Sunday

rather moving; on a fine April

which, for, me, in that

year

I

is

was

taken to the hall of the Societe de Geographic by another friend of mine, £lie Gounelle, estant minister.

“Foi

et

He was

who was

the son of a Prot-

involved with the organization

Vie” which arranged lectures, and therefore

I

had

the greatly envied privilege of hearing Bergson’s lecture,

“Soul and Body.” attentive

We

were, Gounelle and

readers, very

I,

young readers, of Matter and Memory; we were

surprised to find the fundamental themes of the book ap-

new way. I shall speak not of Bergson’s voice, very great charm which emanated from that voice, the perfection with which everything was set forth

proached of the

but of

in a

and the value given

to

images. There

now famous, concerning

the

I

heard comparisons

relationship

of brain

and

thought: that of the peg from which a garment hangs, which will fall if this support falls, although there

is

no analo-

gous relationship between one and the other; also the image of the orchestra leader’s baton. lecture

must have struck young

Many

listeners.

things in that

The man’s com-

MARCEL plete lack of

severity

B ATAILLON

bib complacency about wliat he was saving, style, took a austerity, in spite of the brilliant

and

strong hold on us.

Allow me,

in

ending

this

detour into

my

youthful

mem-

impression of great soberness with chance to observe which Bergson struck me when I had a of a mission to several years later. It was at the time ories,

recall the

to

him

—he undertook, with

1916

Spain, in

several of his Institute

then at war. I had colleagues, a good-will tour for France, conscripted, of living the opportunity, since I was not yet of some on a scholarship, and I was able to be me with them to service to the academicians, who took remain with Granada. Two pictures of Bergson in Spain him at dinner, I me. One evening in Seville, seated near in Seville

saw him, while joining tesy required, abstain

in the

conversation as far as cour-

from that collective devouring of a

number of dishes that ner was a bun and a glass of

certain

is

called a banquet; his din-

milk.

A

picture of sobiiety,

me. Another picfortuitous perhaps, but one that struck can vouch for, is that of ture, the authenticity of which I by moonlight, the Court of the

Bergson silently admiring, Myrtles

at

take us to it

to us

to the

Granada. Someone had been kind enough to shown see the Alhambra at night, after having This silent Bergson, his eyes opened wide

by day.

nocturnal scene, has remained for

me

a

symbol of

and the capacity for silence in a man so elosapiens and his fashion. He opposed to homo

the restraint

quent in

homo

faber,

homo

loquax, which seemed to him to contrast

MARCEL BATAILLON as

111

awkwardly with one

spoke so well, exactly the opposite of

Now

let

He was, he who homo loquax.

as with the other.

us turn again to the subject of his teaching. That

lecture on the soul and the body, which gave

me

experience of an incomparable art of persuasion subject

I

then, but

now ask myself which

is

a question

which

I

a direct

—on

this

did not ask

incumbent on one whose duty

it

is to

chronicle Bergson’s teaching at the College de France, even

though he did not take any of his courses. in the hall of the Societe

Was what

heard

I

de Geographic like a lecture in

one of Bergson’s courses?

reply with considerable as-

I

surance: No, after having talked to some of his students.

We

heard there, evidently, a synthesis of

In a note to

La Pensee

et le

many

lectures.

Mouvant Bergson,

discuss-

ing his views on what he calls “the choreography of dis-

course”

(another

way

of expressing the relationship of

thought and bodily activity),

densed a lecture given

tells

at the

us that he has there con-

College de France on the

rhythm of philosophical discourse. He

tells

how, reading

aloud certain passages of Descartes, he had shown that

rhythm was essential

to the

communication of the thought

expressed in those passages. Well, this

it

certain that if in

is

page Bergson summed up a whole lecture given within

these walls, the lecture entitled “Soul and

many

others, within a

new form. All

I

Body” condensed

have heard on the

subject of Bergson’s courses has convinced the course to be a unity, that

me

from beginning

that to

he

felt

end he

closely related each lesson to the preceding one, repeating

MARCEL BATAILLON

112 at the

beginning of each one the essential point he

had established

preceding lecture.

in the

wholly different from the one he used lecture. This leads us to ask

felt

he

was a technique

It

“Foi

in the

Vie”

et

what connection Bergson’s

courses had with the written expression of his thought: the

books he has I

left us.

think the question

not without value,

is

us on guard against a

commonplace

that

if

only to put

we hear

enough: for a professor of the College de France, a course

is to

to give

prepare a book; the book will be molded by

the outlines of the course.

It is

true in a certain

cases, but not so often as people think,

was rarely

often

the case.

I

number

and for Bergson

of it

should simply note that when Berg-

son came to the College de France he had already published

Time and Free Will but also Matter and Memory, and if we look for a connection between his teaching here (as far as we can tell what it was by the resumes in our yearbooks) and the books which followed, we are struck

not only

by the

fact that the only subject revealing a close connec-

tion

that of the course of

is

1904—1905, on

the evolution

of the problem of freedom, a course which shows an obvi-

ous relationship, by

which was

to

its

subject, with Creative Evolution,

appear soon thereafter.

A summary

of the courses taught at the College de

France in the following years, losophy

in the chair of

Modern

Phi-

(I shall refer later to this title) offers us, in turn,

will, effort,

general ideas and the posing of problems

find again “the posing of the question”! wit, personality.

A

—

—we

the nature of

course which came just after the Oxford

,

MARCEL BATAILLON

113

lectures entailed a probing of the idea of evolution

and

the proposal of a sort of

program

for reforming the under-

Then there was “Spirituality and Freedom.” “Philosophic Method" was the last course taught hy Berg-

standing.

son at the College de France, in 1913-14. that in all the lectures given

1914 one

I

must point out

hy Bergson between 1900 and

however

sees nothing that leads,

indirectly, to

The Two Sources of Morality and Religion the hook of his old age. It would not seem a betrayal of the spirit of the oral teaching he did, here to say that he devoted himself

above

all to

going more deeply into the problems he had

already broached in Matter and Memory,

if

not even ear-

Time and Free Will, or, later, in Creative Evolution. He was very demanding of himself in the written expression of that which he wanted to set down as a more or less lier in

definitive statement of his thought.

He

forbade anyone to

take possession of provisional statements, which might have

we should consider College de France were for him and

been obtained during a lecture. that the years at the his disciples

cause of the

way

in

—

for he

way

to

—extremely fecund

in several

be-

which he explored problems, and the

seems

to

new questions views he had

to

me

that this

is

al-

what the College

Bergson: the possibility of communicating, of

ting forth orally

I

It

think

had disciples

which he applied

ready presented.

meant

in

I

set-

what he had already basically formulated

main books.

apologize for not giving the College de France a hand-

—

somer role

I

would be afraid of falsifying

the real sig-

nificance of Bergson’s oral exposition; in returning

it

to

MARCEL

114 its

we are

true value

not underrating

accomplishment in

son's

this lecture

it.

I

B ATAILLON

think that Berg-

room, by word, was

immense.

to

It is

necessary now, since the role of chronicler has fallen

me,

to give

you some indications of what Bergson’s pro-

fessorial career at the College de France was, details that

you already are not

acquainted with and that others

ill

could easily learn, as

myself have done, by spending a

I

few hours with the archives of the College de France and its

collection of yearbooks. I

have said that Bergson lectured

He

Philosophy."

in the chair of

did not begin there, and this

is

“Modern the role

played by accident in some professorial careers. In 1897-

98 he

substituted for Charles Leveque, professor of

and Latin philosophy. the chair of

When

the death of Nourisson left

Modern Philosophy

fessors of the

would become

Greek

vacant, most of the pro-

College de France thought that Bergson its

occupant. The report which Ribot pre-

sented to the Assembly expressed at length the importance

he attributed to Bergson: cian, but one

who

lie

defined

among

already

that turn.

it

counted

the young." This

the College

made

as “a metaphysi-

links all his speculations to positive

research," emphasizing that this

namic"

him

its

mind “both

“many

was

in

subtle and dy-

enthusiastic

disciples

1899. Three days before

recommendation for

filling the

had earmarked for Bergson, Leveque died

chair in his

Those who had supported the cause of Gabriel de

Tarde against

the

candidacy of Bergson had the opportu-

MARCEL BATAILLON nity to say:

115

“Bergson will have his turn; Tarde can only

hold the chair of

Modern Philosophy,

Bergson for the one

so let us reserve

Greek and Latin philosophy." And

in

how Gabriel de Tarde was named, in fact, professor of Modern Philosophy, and Bergson, for several years, taught Ancient Philosophy. In the autumn of 1904 the this is

death of Tarde allowed Bergson, thanks to a procedure

we followed

rare in the College but one which

not long ago

for the chair of Medicine, to be transferred to the chair

which suited him

best.

and the Ministry soon of

The Assembly made

ratified his

the proposal

nomination as professor

Modern Philosophy. Bergson had enthusiastic disciples; he had ardent hear-

ers,

and

ing,

I

cannot refrain from mentioning, at least in pass-

a picturesque aspect of his success in his courses.

Those who know nothing else about Bergson’s lectures the College de France

know

this, at least.

The

lecture

was invaded well ahead of time. This audience, said,

it

is

at

room often

was composed of society people, people having no

profound

interest in philosophy.

But who can judge? The

matter reached a critical point in 1914, at the beginning of the year;

it

was probably the election of Bergson

Academie Frangaise

that

precipitated

this

to the

phenomenon,

the rush to his philosophy course. Progressively

the

room

became more inadequate. Means of transmitting sound from one room to another had not yet been invented; in short, a solution had to be found to reserve a certain number of places for students

in the

classroom;

it

was divided

MARCEL BATAILLON

116 so as to reserve a part of

exposition which

we

it

for them.

will soon visit ,

1

You

will see, at the

a petition to this ef-

some of whom have since become more or less well known. The Administrator then received violent protests against this measure which, in effect, excluded some of the public from the room. fect,

signed by

many young

people,

Bergson must have been troubled, for certainly the tradition of the College

de France,

if

not

its

rule, has

been that

mind which by attending them. It was

courses should be public, open to every

its

claims, or hopes, to enrich itself

perhaps a people.”

little

rash to say that Bergson attracted “society

We must agree that this spiritual revolution spoken

of by fitienne Gilson the

first

paths,

—

the restoration of metaphysics to

generations of the twentieth century

and

that not all of these

sional philosophers.

We

—took many

were the paths of profes-

understand, then, that Bergson

must have been perturbed by a success which, as we say today, “dazzled” the public, but in unfortunate circumstances which excluded part of the audience that wished

hear him.

to

During

his career in the chair of

Modern Philosophy

Bergson twice had a substitute. There was arrangement, which remains

in

at that

time an

present-day regulations,

but has fallen into disuse, which permitted a professor to furnish his replacement; the substitute he chose was then

proposed

to

the minister

by the Assembly, a procedure

which excluded arbitrary designations. The professor

re-

ceived half of the year’s salary and the substitute the other 1

Bergson exposition organized

at the

Bihliotheque Nationale.

MARCEL BATAILLON

117

This custom justified

half.

in that there

itself for

many

were almost no retirements

France: Bergson's

substitute

first

years, notably

College de

at the

was Couturat,

in

1905-6,

when he was preparing Creative Evolution for publication. In 1909-10 he had as substitute Rene Worms. Finally, his permanent substitute from 1914 until 192021 was £douard Le Roy, who was to become his successor. The regulation provided that substitution for a professor should not continue for more than five consecutive years, and the immense respect that Bergson inspired in his col-

the year

leagues slightly extended the limit in his favor. But he

himself had too

much

respect for the house in which he

taught to agree to this stretching of the regulations, and

be retired in 1921.

he asked

to

(certain

dictionaries)

totally

We

find in certain

erroneous information on

Bergson stopped teaching

this matter.

College de

at the

France early, when he was sixty-one years old. others, at this period, taught until they

and even older.

I

works

Many

were seventy-five

think this retirement must be explained

by the high conception

that

He

Bergson had of teaching.

considered that his lectures demanded a great deal of meditation

years self

and a serious attempt

when he taught

at the

most scrupulously

number enough

required

of

perfection.

During the

College de France he held him-

to the

common

courses,

but

it

rule of a is

this

more reason

wanted

burden which weighed upon him.

for us to respect his

set for

minimum

understandable

that at a certain point in his career he

be freed of

Bergson

at

memory

It is

to

one

in this house.

himself a very high conception of teaching

MARCEL BATAILLON

118 at the College

that the

de France.

Assembly of

It

was during

his time, in 1910,

the College discussed at length the

subject of reforming course regulations, which led to a

number of Bergson, who was, I

great reduction in the

lectures required of the

professors.

repeat, very scrupulous

concerning observation of the regulations, was one of the

most ardent proponents of a reduction in the number of courses. Excessive numerical

demands were

the fault of this house. Paradoxical? No.

position thus: “It

is

his eyes

justified his

number

of courses which

What people

expect of the Col-

too great a

today menaces the College.

He

in

lege,” he explained, “are original lectures.” For the satis-

faction of posterity as well as for those generations

were able

to

who

hear him here, Bergson gave of his best in

fulfillment of this task, this ideal of the Twentieth Century

College de France, which he formulated one day in the heat of discussion on regulation reform.

by Gaston Berger (at the sorbonne)

Mr. Gouhier,

in a

very

paper he has

fine

just presented to

Academie des Science Morales et Politiques, has said that the philosophy of Bergson was a philosophy of na-

the

ture. If

it is

so

— and

for

my

part

I

and

tion on Bergsonian thought

themes and theses ought not

think that

to consist in

preoccupations.

If

made by

—

a reflec-

a critique of Bergson’s

losophy from points of view alien with the statements

it is

to

judging

this phi-

or comparing

it,

philosophers

who have

Bergson describes nature, then

it

other

isn’t the

best procedure that of going to the things themselves to see

what they look

like,

and

to

model which has inspired able one here, perhaps

compare

it? If this

we should

the portrait with the

procedure

doubt, to understand a philosophy thus

we may

of the thought, because

pher

is

use

to

it.

we must place

Without it

in its

better lay hold on the connections

we know what

opposing and what

come. However,

the suit-

take note that Bergson’s

contemporaries were not well placed

own epoch:

is

difficulties

this retrospective

theses the philoso-

he

is

method

trying to overis not,

perhaps

GASTON BERGER

120 the one tion,

which should be applied

and of novelty.

we

If

to a

philosophy of crea-

think of the world of 1880,

of 1900, of 1910, to which Bergson addressed himself, see

it

marked by weariness and

respond merely of an epoch.

to the

lassitude.

end of a century.

It

It

we

does not cor-

marks

The great enthusiasm which created

the end

the Ren-

aissance has cooled off; the heavy tedium which crushes

Baudelaire weighs on

everyone’s

shoulders.

Doubtless,

people speak of evolution, but a cooled-off evolution, an

may

evolution of the past, an evolution which

once have

created things but for a long time has created nothing and contents itself with developing, then progressively water-

down its earlier creations. Man himself, who seems to mark the end of this evolution, moves no further and can ing

no longer change. Doubtless people speak a great deal of progress, but by this

word they understand

a sort of auto-

matic transformation, in short, mechanism. The biologists,

on their

side,

apply themselves

anism of evolution, not

On

the contrary, the

its

to rediscovering the

creative surge.

men

of today,

who

live in this

plicated, changeable, surprising, disturbing world is

mech-

com-

which

ours, are in a better position than Bergson’s contempo-

raries to understand his message.

men met

to

Two

years ago certain

share their knowledge, especially their per-

sonal experiences, and to reflect together on the problem of the future.

The

fruit of their meditations

of the world, particularly the

of a Bergsonian universe.

A

human

was a description

world, which was that

philosophy of mobility yester-

day could surprise and disappoint those who placed

their

GASTON BERGER hopes in the

from the

static

121

and who sought

Today

static.

to

explain movement

a philosophy of mobility expresses

only the most evident and constant of experiences.

We

are

well aware today that everything changes, that everything

changes rapidly, that everything changes more and more

we

rapidly;

are well aware that each

new discovery

at

once

we are well aware that each difficulty solved gives birth to ten new difficulties, no less serious than the one over which we have just triumphed, but which generally oblige us to modify our attitude and invent new methods of solution. The surging forth of which Bergson raises

up

ten others;

speaks in his books is

is

no longer

the direct translation of an

know

that the rigid

and

just a

metaphor for

it

We

immediate experience.

inert products of this surge fall

back and the creative elan ceaselessly makes through

us:

this matter, these

its

way

mechanisms, these habits which

constantly threaten to crush us.

Now

this, too,

a daily experience for us: as there are too

has become

many

cars in

much specialized knowledge in our curricula, there are too many books in our libraries, too many documents in our card indexes, too many rules made our

to

streets, there is too

support us, which only serve to paralyze us.

this

It is

through

whole mass of increasingly heavy and dense creations

of yesterday, thoroughly cooled

our way.

Man

is

encumbered by

off,

that

we must

threatened by his works; he

his works.

The surge which

is first

trace

of all

creates things

and the decline of things which disintegrate are no longer arbitrary images for us, but are the very description of

what we

see.

What

the simplest reflection

shows us

is

the

GASTON BERGER

122

We

unforeseeability of the future.

an ambiguity, which

lence,

meet here an ambiva-

not a weakness of Bergson-

is

ism, hut which was, quite rightly, denounced by Bergson.

The future

unforeseeable, and

is

if

we

believe that ma-

chines will think for us and automatically predict for us the shape that the world will take tomorrow,

we

shall be

seriously deceived. But meanwhile, in evoking this unfore-

we are well aware that we cannot rely on a sort of easygoing intuition. One is often tempted to confuse intuition with a free gift or with a more or less vague seeable future,

presentiment. future

Now

— we have

aspects of

it

here

to

is

the paradox: this unforeseeable

apply ourselves

with all the care, all the attention, and all the

strictness possible, while

knowing only

while indispensable, will remain as with the concepts which

Bergson wished he claimed

to

to

it

that our forecasts,

insufficient. It is the

same

has sometimes been said

do without, but which, on the contrary,

have a certain value

We

them than they can

give.

chines, to construct

human

ficient: the

to forecasting certain

if

we do

not ask

must use forecasts,

more of like

ma-

happiness. Necessary and insuf-

two things are linked;

this is

perhaps one of

Bergson's greatest discoveries. Intuition never dispenses with work. The concept take

it

find in

as an absolute, it

is

at

once what hinders us

and what aids us

if

if

we are able

we to

a means.

The philosophy of surging

forth also has an amazing,

even paradoxical consequence: that creation, in

its

it is

activity, far

comes richer and stronger.

Its

that life does not age;

from exhausting

itself, be-

elan never stops increasing.

GASTON BERGER

123

Bodies age; the elan

seems

vital

to rejuvenate itself.

The

philosophy of Bergson, which must he judged as a description, not as a system, is for

does not place

tion. It

itself,

in opposition to traditional

one day, referring I

to the

wrote to Bergson

modern man

a faithful descrip-

however, as one might think, metaphysics.

I

remember

that

terms of one of our conversations,

to point out that there

must be a pro-

found difference between the mystique of Life and the mystique of Being. Bergson replied that

undoubtedly existed, but that extent that

we were

it

tended

to

this

diminish

to the

able to increase our mastery of Nature.

Thus, also, the conquest of the spiritual

life itself,

access

—

of this

discovery of profound joy

to plenitude, the

difference

all

supposes, implies, demands work. The philosophy of Bergson, far itself,

from saying

far

from putting us

us with illusions, restoring

that everything goes well

men

is

to sleep

and goes of

with a melody that lulls

a call to laborious creation. Thus, while

to the great

philosophical view which per-

mits them to attain joy and which gives hope back to them, it

recalls the place

which men must give

work. The mystique but

its

utilization.

is

to suffering

and

no longer the scorn of technique,

by Gabriel Marcel (at the sorbonne)

Bergson

—

pronounce

I

awaken from

strive to

this

name;

is

As always

so distant

present.

I

is

see

Leroi-Beaulieu

at the

where we submitted

—submitted,

I

released around I

note that what

close,

immediate,

to the

course of Mr.

rather than listened

And

which he exercised on us

all.

spell

in myself;

College de France, entering

be there when he arrived.

from the

name

same time quite

him again

it

magic powers which

such circumstances,

in

at the

the amphitheater

hold

a long sleep the

formerly, half a century ago, this itself.

I

again

I

—

so as to

sense the

charm

Nothing could be further

produced by certain orators. Bergson was

no orator, thank God, for an orator creates around him a zone of passivity, in which the hearers gather as though

to

merge with each other by a strange and, on the whole, disquieting phenomenon of agglutination. Listening to Bergson, on the contrary, everyone felt himself

attached to himself and at the

overflowing uplifted

—

fulfilled

[exhausse ]

.

[

same time

exauce ] and

more

fulfilled,

at the

closely

even

to

same moment

This sort of half-pun, with which

I

GABRIEL MARCEL have often tried I

am

tempted

to

125 express the melody crowning a poem,

to repeat to

express the feeling of inner ex-

pansion that Bergson awoke in

all

of us.

man

Bergson the professor, not of the

speak here of

I

visited first in the

I

Rue

Vital and later in the Boulevard Beausejour.

tion

which these

visits

aroused

in

me was

not of the

it

seemed

to

order. At the College de France

never present the

at

hope that

say

little

him repeat ingly

clarity;

it

if I

may

when

my

eagerness was so great that

I re-

at the

it,

that

we were,

beginning of the class

— and,

patiently, meticulously

—what

that

would be given me, without the

would welcome

by side;

so, side

belled a

I

me

same I was

one of his classes without being stirred by

a revelation

assurance that

The emo-

I

heard

for me, unavail-

he had told us a week earlier with perfect

seemed

to

me

that these minutes

were

proper deductions from the time of the revelation.

like im-

We

can

never regret sufficiently that at that time there were no

phonograph records or tapes of his speech.

press

it,

the

When

first

I

to preserve the

unique quality

grope for a word with which

one that occurs

to

me

is

to ex-

the doubtless un-

usual one “felicity.’' With Frederic Rauh, for example, or even with Leon Brunschvicg, the speech was, at least a little

stumbling; with Victor Delbos

if it

not weak,

had some-

thing almost too deliberate or magisterial; with Bergson

it

was permeated by the pleasant tremor that vibrates in the voice of an explorer when he tries to evoke the ineffable peace of some inviolate shore or perhaps a sojourn midst of a fabulous correspond,

it

seems

The words of charm and magic me, in some manner to this experi-

tribe. to

in the

GABRIEL MARCEL

126

ence, so difficult to bring back to life, of the process that

was accomplished before not the act by which a

What was

us.

man

it,

this process, if

of genius exerted on the inner

world which he evoked, which he described, a power of effective transformation?

historical collapse

When,

which has manifested

itself in the

us and even, alas!

of this half-century, outside us,

after the unprecedented

course within

try to revive this presence mysteriously preserved

I

my

in the depths of

being,

wish

if I

what was unique

as possible

in

to translate as exactly

must say

I

it,

that,

at

the time, Bergson’s face and, above all, the inflections of his voice disclosed tion.

what seemed

to

be a contained jubila-

Nothing would have been more precious than

derstand what

was.

it

It

was,

seems

it

to

hunter, but rather that of a naturalist

by surprise, after having followed, by to

which he has dedicated

by surprise, look

that

means above

enjoys looking and which

Charles de Bos, far as to say a

just taken

spoor, the animal

his passionate pursuit. all to

is

To

a look

it is

which

closely akin to contemplation.

who always had

a gratitude,

I

would go so

piety, for Bergson's thought, in a

filial

take

look sharply, but this

not that of an ordinary observer,

is

me, not that of a

who has

its

to un-

page

of his Journal sketches a revealing relationship between

him and Corot. Perhaps

it

would not be absurd,

say that Bergson was in some

meer which at

way

in fact, to

the Corot or the Ver-

of the interior universe: the mystery of transparency is

first

in

them

is

also at the heart of his thought.

It

may

seem very paradoxical and almost ridiculous

speak of these great

artists in this

connection;

if

to

we adopt

GABRIEL MARCEL

127

we he tempted to place elan vital among the Dionysian

the language of Nietzsche mightn't the philosopher of the spirits? But

we could

not do so,

think, except

1

by virtue of

a misunderstanding that must be avoided. Like the Ariane of Maeterlinck clarity.

It

and of Dukas, Bergson had the passion of

would not be absurd, despite appearances,

say that for him

life

remains

in a certain

way

—

demand careful shading of meaning in a idea. What is extremely novel in Bergson

—

this

to

would

certain way, is

the tender

precaution he takes in approaching his subject, as though

he were delicately brushing aside vines sleeping infant. The

more

to

bend over a

absorb myself in the evoca-

I

more

tion of those hours at the College de France, the I

assure myself that they were in truth traversed by the cur-

rent of an unrestrainable hope. ily

than “optimism.”

timism seems

to

On

use this word more read-

I

the metaphysical plane all op-

lead either to Leibnitz or to the Minores,

whose names have hardly survived

into the present time,

but the spirit of Leibnitz did not preside over Bergson's courses. Leaving out of account, be

it

understood, Taine,

Spencer, and some contemporaries, his references, explicit or not, were neo-Platonic or Berkeleian.

I

am

thinking

here, of course, of the Berkeley of Siris, not that of the

Dialogues. This

may seem

strange today.

How

could a

philosophy of pure duration claim kinship with Plotinus?

And yet, nevertheless, name of Plotinus with moreover,

it

was

a sort of

in passing, that if

Bergson pronounced the

so.

shy dilection.

my

And

I

note

lamented colleague, the

noble and profound historian Lmile Brehier, was able to

GABRIEL MARCEL

128

give his adherence to Bergson’s thought, this

may have

been because of his Alexandrian attachments. At any

rate,

we may be

certain that the future historians of philosophy

will place

Henri Bergson in a metaphysical context

more

finitely

vast than could have been believed

of his contemporaries relation to such

who were

by those

content to place

him

I

am

thinking

especially of one of his detractors whose pamphlets

hour of fame and who so strangely failed

nize the essential

say

that,

joins

at

had

to recog-

rhythm of a doctrine of which we must

by ways hitherto untrodden, despite the

in

and such a philosopher of the nineteenth

century or the beginning of the twentieth.

their

in-

peak certain

of the

intuitions

all,

it

re-

Philosophia

perennis.

What

nonetheless surprised us

1908 and 1909

—was

—us

who heard him

in

the confidence of the tone with which

he spoke of those who would come after him, those who

would

toil in their

he thought he had laid the to

our mind, when we

affirm,

was

far

new science for which stones. One question comes

turn to build the

from

first

reflect

on his assurance, which,

I

presumptuousness. The intuition,

all

singular and creative, without which he did not conceive

philosophy, or at least metaphysics, to be worthy of the

name,

this intuition

which was the root of his work, what

sort of relationship could

it

have with the new science or

with the scientific metaphysics of which he thought himself

only one of the

swer

first

this question.

I

fashioners?

am

It is

not very easy to an-

inclined to believe that in his eyes

the nature of this science

was able

to

display

itself

only by

GABRIEL MARCEL

129

such intuitions as could, alone, give access to

genuinely creative

sidered

without reason,

we were

if

invite us to distinguish tutes itself in teriori

to

among

its

which

in

to

growth.

its

own dynamism, and

it is,

—

But they,

it.

run the risk of falsifying

at least

—

to

overcome

to

I

would gladly enough adopt

admit

in

what we wrongly

call

reducible dualism, and here there tion between la pensee pensante I

insist

on appealing

to,

What must be

we have

disciples.

—

I

him

to

it

it

a hypothesis

is

would be advisable

is

and

la

pensee pensee that if

one

but so

this obliquity, the late,

—

now,

is

—

hope

that the

in a large

meas-

had, certainly, in every country,

many

until

at least

But can we say that these disciples were his

shall

add

that

we

are all

an artisan, placing the

of a pyramid.

I

little

first

It

seems

to

inclined to

would he tempted

and the true nature of

me

not,

compare

stones of a cathedral or to

ask myself here

whether Henri Bergson was not often deluded as self,

ir-

a Blondelian distinc-

recognized, nonetheless,

He

in its in-

Bergsonism a certain

successors in the sense he expected?

and

—

it

to

between the closed and the open.

of Bergson has been

ure frustrated.

consti-

to tell the

asking myself, moreover,

would not touch upon, by fruitful distinction

it

progress and

its

to think of

ventive movement. Perhaps, moreover

which

as

would

the accounts a pos-

of proposing a schematic representation that shatter or

it

can and must inevitably give place

it

those entrusted with teaching

truth, too often

Perhaps, not

ask such a question,

between science as

con-

life

his contribution,

by

to

him-

his care

not only to maintain the closest contact with positive

sci-

GABRIEL MARCEL

130

ence but to seek for himself the sort of consecration that

many

attaches itself to scientific research. In this, like

whom we

contemporaries

his

known,

have

Brunschvicg, for example, he remains,

man

of the nineteenth century.

And

it

yet, as

I

Leon

like

seems

of

me, a

to

have said, be-

cause of the demands revealed in his style and even be-

cause of the analogies to which he so often appeals, rather

among

their age, that

him. But

I

among

the artists,

many

must add

of us today

that

it is

who transcend

would he inclined

to

place

this in

my

eyes suffices to show

only partially valid. Henri Bergson believed pro-

foundly in truth, and

him

is

an assertion would certainly

that such

have distressed him, and

the artists

it

that the

it

is

because he did not understand

minor opponent

him such great

injustice.

to

What

is

whom

I

have alluded did

true in this realm

is

only

am

that his theory of intelligence, the interest of

which

far from disregarding, no

more illuminates

the truth to

which he dedicated his

than the poetics of Valery

life

minates his poetry. There that

comes

to

my

mind.

If,

is,

I

illu-

besides, another connection

in Bergson, the

man

of the nine-

teenth century remains passionately attached to a certain

concept of science, hut

if

he himself

is

actually engaged in

a certain process which goes far beyond this concept, and for which the concept does not offer an explanation, can

we

not evoke here a contradiction, or at least a tension com-

parable to that which hovers in Nietzschean thought, especially as he has, at one

and the same time, seemed

to

assume

and yet so evidently surpass an evolutionism of the Dar-

GABRIEL MARCEL

131

winian type? But such tensions, far from weakening the range of the works tribute towards to the

in the

midst of which we find them, con-

making them more

same degree

that such

selves. In this perspective

Bergson

in

my

I

eyes consists

richly educational for us,

works already transcend themwill say that the greatness of

much

less in

what one might

otherwise unwisely call his system than in the fact that he

was and

is

a fountainhead.

Two

of the greatest works of

our time, without a doubt, could not have existed without

him: that of Peguy, on one hand, that of Proust, on the other. But the prodigious

gap between these two careers

re-

veals in a certain paradoxical fashion the unequaled driving

power which was

whom we

spirer to I

should like

enough,

it

the

endowment

of the brilliant in-

are paying homage.

to close

with a brief remark. Paradoxically

was the fashion,

in certain philosophical circles,

not long ago, in circles where engagement was preached,

what was called ‘Tesprit de serieux.”

to

hold up

I

fear there has been

may

be,

to ridicule

if,

as

some confusion

here.

Whatever

think, the true spirit of the serious

I

attention to reality, that

is

not only

is

demanding but

it

an in-

corruptible, Bergson has given us one of the highest examples of

it

in the history of thought.

for the sake of the

This

I

say particularly

young philosophers who

in their turn

will set forth on the paths of speculative adventure. they,

beyond

all

May

divergences, all possible objections, not

only greet with gratitude and humility this conspicuous virtue, but find

it

an incentive

to their

own

quest.

For

if,

GABRIEL MARCEL

132 after so

many

pear closed

checks and failures,

to us,

it

is

not so,

experience; authentic, that

is

to

I

am

many ways today

ap-

certain, for authentic

say revitalized by not only

an attentive but by a reverent feeling for fundamental issues.

.

by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (at the sorbonne)

There

is

more than one paradox

in the fortunes of Berg-

sonism. This philosopher of freedom, said Peguy in 1913,

had against him the Radical party and the University;

enemy

of

gaise; this

this

Kant had against him the party Action Franfriend of the spirit had against him the party of

the devout: not only, then, his natural enemies, but the

enemies of his enemies. In the years when he seems a predilection for nonconformists like

to

have

Peguy and Georges

we could almost regard Bergson as a philosopher under a curse if we forgot that at the same time he had Sorel

—

been followed passionately, for thirteen years, by his audience of the College de France, that he had been for twelve years a

member

of an academy, and later of the

The generation

to

which

I

Academic

belong knew only the second

Bergson, already retired from teaching and nearly silent

during the long preparation of the

Two Sources already ,

considered by Catholicism as a light rather than a danger,

already taught in classes by rationalist professors.

our elders,

whom

he had formed

— although

Among

there

had

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

134

never been a Bergsonian school

mous.

It

was not

—

his reputation

more recent times

until

was enor-

that there ap-

peared a shadowy post-Bergsonism, exclusive, as

if

one

did not better honor Bergson by admitting that he belongs

everybody.

to

How

who had

could the one

radically transformed phi-

losophy and literature become thor?

Had

We

he changed?

almost canonical au-

this

shall see that he

changed

little.

Or had he changed his public, winning it over to his own audacity? The truth is that there are two Bergsonisms: that of audacity, when the philosophy of Bergson fought and, says Peguy, fought well; and that which came after the victory, persuaded in advance of what Bergson had spent a long time in finding, already supplied with concepts which Bergson the

had made for himself. Identified with

vague cause of spiritualism, or of some other

entity,

the Bergsonian intuitions lose their bite; they are generalized,

minimized. This

Bergsonism.

It

found

is

its

only a retrospective or exterior

formula when Father Sertillanges

wrote that the Church today no longer placed Bergson on the Index, not because

because

it

now knew

it

revoked

its

judgment of 1914, hut

the final direction of his works. Berg-

son himself did not wait to find out where his road led

before he took

it

or, rather,

made

it.

Two Sources before permitting Memory or Creative Evolution. Yet the

He

himself Matter and if

compensated for the condemned works,

had

its

meaning without them,

famous without them. Take

it

it

did not wait for

the it

Two Sources

would not have

would not have been so

or leave

it,

we cannot have

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY truth without danger.

of the conclusions.

It isn't

135

philosophy

The philosopher does

one thinks

if

first

not look for short

cuts; he goes the

whole route, and a definitive Bergsonism

distorts Bergson.

Bergson disturbed;

was

Bergsonism defends,

conquest;

a

reassures. Bergson

it

justifies

Bergson was a contact with things; Bergsonism

The

tion of accepted opinions. tions should not

make

is

Bergson. a collec-

conciliations, the celebra-

us forget the pathway that Bergson

traced alone and that he never renounced: this direct, sober, immediate,

and unusual manner of remaking philoso-

phy, of seeking the profound in the apparent and the absolute

under our very eyes

—

sense, the spirit of discovery

in short,

which

is

in

its

most proper

the fountainhead of

Bergsonism.

He ended

his course in

1911 by these words, which the

review Les Etudes preserved: “If the researcher, the

artist,

the philosopher attach themselves to the pursuit of fame, it

is

because they lack the absolute security of having

created something capable of living. Give them this assurance, and that is

you

made

the end

was

will at once see

is

light of the fuss

over them.” The only thing that he wanted in to

have written hooks that would

to that testimony,

present he

them make

we can

in our labors,

live.

Now

give

it

only by indicating

how

in

some pages

we, with our preferences and our partialities,

as

how

of his work, feel, as

did

his hearers of 1900, that he is at the heart of the matter.

He

is

a philosopher first of all

by the manner

he discovered the whole of philosophy, as

if

in

which

for the

first

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

136

time, through the examination of one of the mechanical

principles which Spencer used without strictness. that he perceived that it,

we do

between measuring

necessary, on the contrary,

it

ceive

to let

birth

it,

is

it

we

if

lines,

are to con-

go along with the continual

act freely, to

which makes

thus

not approach time by grasping

as though between pincers,

but that

It is

always new and, because always new,

it

always the same. His philosopher’s view found something he had sought. For

if

that

see from the outside.

an outline of thrust.

it, I

is

From

time,

is

more than

not something that

the outside

would not be

Time, then,

it is

else,

I

would have only

I

in the face of the generating

myself;

am

I

grasp; the duration that grasps itself

the duration that

me.

is in

And

I

already

we are in the absolute. Strange absolute knowledge, since we know neither all our memories nor even the whole density of

my

our present; and

coincidence”

—

a

contact with myself

absolute, 1

know

that

I

it

it

is

it is

because the contact

because

I

am engaged

as an individual,

it

have an experience of

is

is

a great novelty in 1889,

more

flight,

and for

principle to philosophy, not an

is

it

is

partial that

my it

it

is

duration that

inundates

me

I

intimate. Absolute

it is

inherency. This

the future, gives as a

think and

its

immanent

thoughts, but a Being-itself, the cohesion of which

an uprooting.

a ques-

which could not be con-

it

not an observation

in

when

because

is

ceived of as being any closer or

knowledge

“partial

word which Bergson often used and which,

indeed, poses a problem. At all events, tion of myself,

is

is

also

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY Since

is

it

here that

the experience

137

coincide with a noncoincidence,

I

capable of being extended beyond the

is

particular being that

my

am. The intuition of

I

duration

is

an apprenticeship in a general manner of seeing, the principle of a sort of Bergsonian “reduction'’ which reconsiders all things sub specie durationis

what we

ject,

we already which

is

call object,

the world

and even what we

form

see taking

—what we

call sub-

call space: for

a space within, an extension,

where Achilles walks. There are beings,

structures, like a melodic line (Bergson says: “organiza-

tions"), which are only a certain tion

is

of enduring. Dura-

not only change, growth, mobility,

the living

now

it

is

being

—

in

and active sense of the word. Time has not taken

the place of being; it is

way

it

is

understood as nascent being, and

the entire being that

must be approached from the

side of time.

This was apparent when Matter and or at least

it

it

appeared obscure;

even today, the

it is,

read of Bergson’s great books. Nevertheless,

that the scope of duration

expanded

in a decisive

manner. Forgetting, as he

making contact with

Bergson was led back that different

it

is

here

and the method of intuition are

previous book, following for facts,

appeared,

should have been apparent. But the book

evoked surprise; least

Memory

the

said, his

own sake another line of compound of soul and body,

its

to duration.

But duration took on in

approach new dimensions, and we would be

ignoring the law of a philosophy that claims to be not a

system but a full reflection and that wishes speak,

if

we here reproach Bergson with

to

make being

the charge of a

— MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

138

when this is the quest itself. Hencemedium in which soul and body are

veering of direction, forth, duration is the

connected, because the present and the body, the past and the spirit, different in nature, nevertheless pass into each other. Intuition

than fusion:

it

is

decidedly no more simple coincidence

extends

itself to ‘'limits,’' like

and pure memory, and also

tion

being

that,

Bergson says, opens

to their interstice, to a

itself to the

space in the exact measure that

it

poses of a past. There

— Maurice

say a “hybridization’'

is

—

a life

pure percep-

aims

present and to

at a future

and

dis-

Blondel would

of the intuitions, a “dual release”

towards matter and towards memory.

It

is

by taking the

opposites in their great difference that intuition sees them rejoin.

For example,

it

would greatly

distort

Bergson

to

mini-

mize the amazing description of perceived being given in Matter and Memory. in

He

does not at

say that things are,

all

the restrictive sense, images, mental or otherwise,

my

he says that their fullness under it is

as

if

my

self, as if to

vision took place in

is

such that

them rather than

in

my-

be seen were only a degradation of their emi-

nent being, as says, in the

regard

if

being “represented'’

“camera obscura” of

—

to

appear, Bergson

the subject

—

far

from

being their definition, resulted from their natural profuseness!

Never before had anyone established

this circuit be-

tween being and myself, which has the result that being

is

“for me,” the spectator, but that in return the spectator

is

“for being.” Never before had anyone thus described the brute being of the perceived world. In unveiling

it

along

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

139

with nascent duration, Bergson rediscovers in the heart of

man

a pre-Socratic

and ‘"prehuman” sense of the world.

Duration and Simultaneity which ,

book of philosophy,

is

is,

Bergson repeats, a

placed yet more firmly in the per-

ceived world. Today, as thirty-five years ago, physicists

reproach Bergson for introducing the observer into relativistic physics,

make time

which, they say, can

relative

only with instruments of measurement or a system of reference. But what Bergson wishes to there

is

dividuals.

is

precisely that

is

no simultaneity between things in themselves,

which, no matter

same

show

how contiguous

may

they

be,

remain

Only perceived things can participate

line of the present

perception there

is

— and,

in return, as

in

in-

the

soon as there

immediately, and with no other meas-

urement, simultaneity of a single view, not only between

two events in the same fields, all

field

but even between all perceptive

observers, all durations. If one took all the ob-

servers at once, not as they are seen by one of them but as

they are for themselves and in the absolute of their lives, these solitary durations, no longer able to be applied to

each other, measured by each other, would offer no further displacement and thus would cease verse of time.

Now

gether, which

is

to

fragmentize the uni-

this restoration of all the durations to-

not possible at their interior source, since

each of us coincides only with his own, occurs, Bergson said,

when

when

embodied subjects interperceive one another,

their perceptive

fields

intersect

and envelop each

when they see each other in the act of perceiving same world. Perception poses in its own order a uni-

other,

the

the

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

140

versal duration, and the formulas which permit passage

from one system of reference

another are, like

phys-

all

secondary objectifications which cannot determine what

ics, is

to

meaningful

in

our experience either of embodied subThis was the outline of a

jects or of the totality of being.

philosophy which bases the universal on the mystery of perception and proposes, as Bergson has justly said, not to fly

above perception but

to penetrate

Perception to Bergson

is

it.

the totality of these “comple-

mentary powers of understanding” which alone are the

measure of being and which, opening us

work

selves at

know how to

to

to

it,

in the operations of nature.”

perceive

life,

the being of life will

“see themIf

only we

show

itself

be of the same type as these simple and indivisible beings

for which the things under our eyes, older than any

manu-

factured thing, offer us the model, and the operation of life will

appear

to us as a sort of perception.

When we

note

that life, after long preparations, assembles a visual appa-

paratus on divergent lines of evolution,

same apwe think we see a

my own

hand, behind the

ratus on a line of evolution and, sometimes, the

single

movement,

like that of

convergent details; and the “march toward vision” in the species hangs on the total act of perception as Matter and

Memory pressly.

has described It is this,

it.

There Bergson refers

he says, which descends more or

organisms. That does not

mean

that the

world of

human

representation, nor, moreover, that

tion

a cosmic product:

is

ception that

we

it

means

find in ourselves

human

to

it

ex-

less into life is a

percep-

that the original per-

and the one which shows

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY through in evolution as twined,

its

141

interior principle are

and overlap or are bound each

Whether we

to

life,

always there

same tension

the

is

other.

world or lay

find in ourselves the entry to the

hold on the interior

the

inter-

between one duration and another duration which borders it

from without.

We

see well enough in the Bergson of 1907, the intuition

of intuitions, the central intuition, and

it is

far

from being,

as has mistakenly been said, a “je ne sais quoi,” an act

of uncontrollable genius.

from which it

The source

his philosophy takes

its

which he goes and

to

meaning

—why would

not be simply the architectonics of his interior landscape,

the

manner

in

which his gaze encounters things or

bond with himself, nature, and

living beings, his contact

with being in us and outside of us? tible

intuition,

was not the

and existing world

visible

scribed

it?

And

for this inexhaus-

best “mediating

itself,

life, his

as Matter

image” the

and Memory

Even when he passed upwards toward

de-

the tran-

scendent, Bergson did not think himself able to attain

it

except by a sort of “perception.” Life, at any rate, which,

below

we

us,

always solves problems

do, resembles the

human

in a

way

spirit less

different than

than

it

does

imminent or eminent vision that Bergson glimpsed

this in

things. Perceived being is that spontaneous or natural be-

ing that the Cartesians did not see because they sought

being against a background of non-being, and, Bergson says, because they lacked the being necessary to

nonexistence.” felt to

He

“conquer

describes a preconstituted being, always

be on the edge of our reflections, always already

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

142

there to disarm the agony and lostness that are on the verge

of birth.

indeed hard to know

It is

why he never thought

of his-

why

tory from within, as he thought of life from within,

he never

set

himself there, too, to the study of the simple

and indivisible

each period and each event,

acts which, for

establish the order of partial facts. In positing that each

period

is all it

can be, an entire event,

that preromanticism, for sion,

Bergson seems

example,

is

one action, and

all

a postromantic illu-

once and for

to refuse

notion

all the

of historical depth. Peguy, however, tried to describe the

emergence of the event spond

— and

—when some begin and

others re-

also historical completion, the response of one

He saw

generation to what was begun by another.

the es-

sence of history in this meeting of individuals and time,

which

is

difficult,

since the deed, the work, the past are

inaccessible in their simplicity to those

who

see

them from

outside, since years are needed to create the history of this

revolution which was

made

mentary does not exhaust

in

this

a

day; an

infinite

com-

page which was written

in

an hour. The chances of error, of deviation, of failure, are great.

or

But

who

bodied

it is

live in public spirits

—

—

who

who

act,

that is to say, finally, of all

em-

the cruel law for those

to expect,

write,

from others or from successors,

another carrying out of what they are doing; another and the same, says

men, because

Peguy profoundly, because in this substitution, they

selves similar to the originator.

There

these also are

have made themis

a sort of scandal, but “a justified scandal”

in this,

he says,

and consequently

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

143

something “mysterious.” Meaning refashions risk of destroying itself;

formed

to the

it

a fluid

is

itself at the

meaning, well con-

Bergsonian definition of meaning, which

“less a thing thought than the

movement than

movement

is

of thought, less a

a direction.'' In this network of challenges

and responses, where the beginning metamorphoses and completes

itself,

one and

everyone, a “public duration," the “rhythm and

to

there

is

a duration

real speed of the world event,”

which belongs

which would

the subjects of a true sociology.

be, said

He had shown, by

a Bergsonian intuition of history

is

no

to

Peguy,

this, that

possible.

But Bergson, who said of Peguy in 1915 that he knew his “essential thought," nevertheless did not follow

on

this point.

For Bergson, precious

little

him

credit can be

given to the notion of the “historical record'’ nor of challenging generations and responding generations: there

is

only the heroic call of individual to individual, a mystique without a “mystical body.” For him, there

is

no single

fabric where good and evil dwell together; there are natural societies

breached by irruptions of the mystical. Dur-

ing the long years

when he was preparing

the

Two Sources

he seems not to have been saturated in history as he was saturated in life; he did not find at

once in in

life,

work

in history, as

“complementary powers of understanding"

close touch with

our own duration.

He remains

too

optimistic in regard to that which concerns the individual

and

his ability to rediscover the source of things, too pes-

simistic in regard to

what touches the

social life, to admit,

as in the above definition of history, a “justified scandal.”

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

144

And perhaps

holding on

this

of the whole doctrine; the fact

Mouvant,

at

much

opposites

to

same period

the

La Pensee

that

is

Two

as the

rectifies in the sense of a

clean delimitation

“overlappings,”

—

true

is

it

reflective

is

—

et

le

Sources,

not without

the relationships of implica-

tion that the Introduction to Metaphysics

had established

between philosophy and science, intuition and intelligence, spirit

and matter.

tery of history,

If

is

for Bergson no mys-

he does not, like Peguy, see

if

with each other,

decidedly there

if

he

is

men

involved

not aware of the prevenient pres-

ence of symbols around us and of the profound changes of

which they are the vehicles

—

if,

the origins of democracy, only

for example, he finds, in its

“evangelical essence”

and the Christianity of Kant and Rousseau

—

way he

this

has of cutting short certain possibilities and arresting the

work must express a basic preferphilosophy and we ought to try to

final implications of his

ence;

it

part of his

is

understand

That

in

it.

him which

diation and of history

is is

opposed

to

any philosophy of me-

one of the earliest elements of his

thought, the certainty of a “half-divine” state in which

knows neither

lostness

nor anguish. Meditation on

tory modified this conviction without lessening

it.

man his-

At the

time of Creative Evolution the philosophical intuition of the natural being sufficed to get rid of the false

non-being. In the

Two Sources

“inaccessible,” but

puts

human

it

is

“divine

always he against

history in perspective.

being, joy, peace

man”

problems of has become

whom

Bergson

The natural contact with

—quietism— remain

essential with Berg-

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

145

son; they are only transferred from the de jure generalizable experience of the philosopher to the exceptional ex-

perience of the mystic, which opens on another nature, and

on a second

which are boundless.

positivity,

It

is

the di-

vision of nature into unreconciled natura naturans and

natura naturata which in the

God and

the distinction between left implicit in the

not say

cause

Deus

God

Two

Sources, brings about

his action

on the world,

previous works. Bergson certainly does

sive Natura, but if he does not say

another nature. At the

is

its

fi-

“earthly

again the word of nature which comes

is

it

be-

moment when he

nally separates the “transcendent cause’' from

delegation"

it it is

under his pen. In God

and creative

concentrated all that was truly

is

which

is

only

“arrest" or “created thing.” But the relationship of

man

active

in this world,

finally,

with this Super-Nature remains the direct relationship that the previous books found between intuition

being. There

is

the simple act

cies; there is the

mystique; there

which made the human spe-

simple and simplifying act of God in the is

no simple act which founds the domain

of history and of evil. That truly It is

better to say that

than to say he

is

and natural

man

is

made

is

only an interspace.

of two simple principles,

double. History, oscillating between natura

naturata and natura naturans, has no true substance. Certainly for

it is

not accursed, the universe remains a “machine

making gods,” and

natura naturata has

one day the machine

always failed

to

do

that

its

to it

is

not after all impossible, since

source in natura naturans. But

make gods succeeds

in

what

it

if

has

will be as though arrested creation

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

146

movement. Nothing announces

be^an again

its

Springtime.

We

this

Great

read nowhere, not even in riddles, of a

would reunite our two natures. Evil and frustration moves have no meaning. Creation is not a drama which down, toward a future. It is more an effort which has bogged sign that

and human history

is

a device to put the mass back in

motion.

Thence comes an extraordinary religious philosophy, Mystical very personal and in some respects pre-Christian. experience is what remains of the primordial unity, which was shattered when the created thing appeared by a “simple arrest” of the creative force.

behind us which

is

How

our origin, how

to

leap over this wall

to rediscover the

the naturans? Intelligence will not do

one cannot

it:

creation with what has been cieated.

make

path of le-

Even the imme-

the fission diate experience of our duration cannot annul

which

is its

origin, to rejoin the naturans itself. This

is

why

Bergson says that mystical experience need not ask itself whether the principle in contact with which it places us is

God

himself or his delegate on earth.

It

experiences this

consented-to invasion of a being which “is enormously more puissant than itself.” Let us not even speak of an

omnipotent being: the idea of the

all,

says Bergson,

is

as

and for him the possible remains the shadow of the real. 1 he Cod of Bergson is immense rather than infinite, or, rather, he is an infinite of

empty as

quality.

that of the nothing,

He

is

the element of joy or the element of love in

the sense that water

beings and

human

and

fire

beings, he

are elements. Like sentient is

a radiance

and not an

es-

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

147

The metaphysical attributes which seem to determine him are, Bergson says, like all determinants, negations. Even if against all possibility they became visible, no religious man would recognize in them the God to whom he prays. The God of Bergson is a being as unique sence.

immense

as the universe, an

this,

and Bergson has extended

even into theology his promise of a philosophy actual being, and which applies only to inative terms

it.

If

compares the actual with the

made

for

one in imag-

ideal,

must

it

be admitted, he says, that “the whole of things could have

been much superior the

to

what

death of someone

is

it

No one can have

is.”

is

it

tions of classical theodicy that are false,

himself, which

is

that

an element in the making of

the best of all possible worlds. But

which have no meaning

it

not only the soluit

is its

problems

where Bergson places

in the order

that of the radical contingency.

There

is

no question here of the conceived world or of a conceived God, but of the existing world and of existing God; and that in us

which knows

this

order

is

their life, miserable as

judgment retrieves as

ing

from

life

justifications.

it

beneath

it

might he. This

vital

and God from accusations as well

And

if

one

how natura naturans has been

naturata in which

less

No one can keep men

our opinions and our statements.

from loving

more or

lias

insists

on understand-

able to produce natura

not truly realized itself; why, at

least provisionally, the creative force has arrested itself;

what obstacle mountable for

it

has met and

it;

how an

obstacle can be insur-

Bergson would admit

as to other planets

where perhaps

life

—with

reservations

has succeeded better

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

148

—

that his philosophy does not

answer such questions, but

it

not a cosdoes not have to ask them, being ultimately mogony not even (as it almost became) the integration

—

and differentiation of one system tial,

—but

the deliberately par-

discontinuous, almost empirical groping for

many

centers of being.

On

the whole,

Peguy

losophy has “for the

what being

itself

had

is

first

right

time

in its

when he says .

own

.

.

that this phi-

attracted attention to

right

and

to the articula-

from which no reprethe sentation separates me, which contains in advance that we views, however conflicting, however incompatible, can take of it, which stands before us, younger and older

tion of the present.” Nascent being,

born, than the possible and the necessary, and which, once the can never cease to exist and will continue to exist in

depths of other presents: the century the books

being and

its

that at the beginning of

which rediscovered

this

forgotten

powers were experienced as a renaissance, a

liberation of philosophy, intact. It

we know

and

would have been

their value in this respect

fine if the

same view

is

of origins

had then been focused on passions, events, techniques, law, language, literature, ing them as

to find their

spiritual nature, tak-

monuments and prophecies

cryptograms of a questioning verification

own

and

in invention;

spirit.

of hieratic man, as

Bergson believed

in

he did not believe in inter-

rogative thought. But, even in this restriction of his scope, he is exemplary in his fidelity to what he has seen. In the religious conversations of the last years,

when

his philoso-

— MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY phy found

itself, in

149

terms of experimental contribution and

benevolent aid, included, by some, in the Thomist frame-

work

—

as

if

it

were not clear

when one adds

to

it

—what

that

strikes

something essential

me

is

is lost

the tranquility with

which Bergson, in the very moment when he gives

to

Ca-

tholicism a personal assent and a moral adherence, main-

method

tains his

to his direction

in philosophy. After

having held

through the storms, he held

to

it

strictly

during the

His efforts and his works, which

re-

stored philosophy to the present and showed what can

to-

final reconciliations.

day he an approach

to being, also teach us

how

a

man

of

an earlier moment remained indomitable. They showed that

one must not claim anything which cannot he “shown,”

that one

must know how

to displease

and

that,

and even

to

wait and to keep others waiting,

to please, to

moreover, among men,

he oneself, to he true

this firmness is not in the

least despised, since, in seeking the truth,

birth to Bergsonism.

it

moreover, gave

by Jean Wahl (at the sorbonne)

In a kind of silence arise

I

see the visage of Henri Bergson

from the past; a zone of silence surrounded him,

whether one visited him or went

College de France

hear him speak of Spencer, Berkeley, Plotinus, or Spi-

to

noza, to I

to the

whom

have had

at first

this joy, this privilege, of contact

philosopher. those

he was perhaps closer than

Today

who were

I

would not want

his friends;

I

to

appeared.

with a great

separate

him from

should like to mention Wil-

liam James, the great American philosopher; Le Roy;

should like also referred

to

especially

to

mention

— Peguy,

recall

a

— but they my

spoken by Whitehead during that of Gilson, I

whom

good,

in

first

I

visit, that

of Bergson and

he cherished also.

belong or have belonged very much:

and

when two names were

to

many groups which may

he considered hostile to Bergson, and all

have already been

Thibaudet, and Whitehead, conversation

I

the £cole

1907 or 1908

(I

I

Normale;

have liked them it

was not very

hesitate to recall that far-off

year), to write an article in favor of Bergson.

To

class one-

JEAN WAHL among

151

was very had. Today we are happy, at the Sorbonne, to celebrate Bergson's memory, in this magnificent amphitheater. The Sorbonne was not always friendly to Bergson, and Bergson remembered it. Reself

the Bergsonians

cently a journal echoed these memories. In literary groups, the Nouvelle

Revue Frangaise, on

the first generation but the second,

aside from Thibaudet a very fine

the whole, certainly not

was

who admired him

hostile to Bergson,

greatly and wrote

book on him, which stands beside that of Jan-

And I am allied with the philosophers of existence. Two of the most illustrious philosophers of existence are among us, and perhaps the public has noticed all kelevitch.

on the philosophy of Bergson, which

their reservations

at

same time they admire. I remember some conversations with Bergson on science, on philosophy; I admired the multiplicity of approaches in his thought. It would be necessary, if we were to study the

him

—we hardly

possess sufficient time to do so

—

it

would

be necessary to distinguish his critical methods, his

cri-

tiques of ideas, his dissociations of ideas, and also his

hypotheses, and, too, his

way

of following facts and lines

of facts, of establishing provisional certainties, of

pseudo-problems disappear by pointing out lates in doctrines

study a whole vocabulary:

His

first

common

postu-

apparently opposed, of also establishing,

afterward, definite certainties.

sant.

making

le

It

would be necessary

mouvant

,

le

vecu

book, Les Donnees immediates,

toward immediate

facts,

because dialectically,

,

to

le se fai-

is

an

if

one

effort

may

use this term for him, he thinks that the immediate should

JEAN WAIIL

152

he conquered. But this conquered immediate lute,

and, in opposition to the agonosticism of most of his

contemporaries, Bergson wanted to show that

many ways, it

the abso-

is

in touch with the absolute.

We

we

are, in

are in touch with

even in science, which places us before an absolute that

matter, in the perception that places us in the object at point 0, as

he says, of the object. And, beyond

are absolutes of the spirit. So that,

the

if

is

itself,

there

this,

word were not

used for other forms of doctrine, one would willingly say that there

was a gnosticism

Bergson, an affirmation of

in

He always wanted

the knowability of the absolute. the pure

and the

through

to the limit;

full: the pure,

cepts will never

he presents

fill

to us a

and the this

by

his

methods of carrying he thinks that con-

full, for

plenitude of intuition; and so

multiple world, with images such as he

painted at the beginning of Matter and ing beyond realism and idealism.

heard of

at that

to find

moment

It

Memory

,

thus go-

was something un-

in philosophy,

an effort

to

yond the two opposed doctrines. Above, there are projects, tensions of the intellect,

elan , the elan

vital.

Many

all the

and below, there

difficulties arise

from

go be-

is

the

the con-

Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory where

frontation between the theory of the theory of pure a

new dimension,

like “action”

memory

in

in depth,

,

of the past appears.

and “life” successively take on different

pects, often opposed. In the social dimension, to

begin with,

Words

we

disparaged

see born later, with the support of pro-

ductive intuition, sublime forms. son’s article on

as-

And

I

remember Berg-

“Philosophical Intuition,” which

is

for

JEAN WAHL

153

every historian of philosophy a lesson, that he should not stop with the structures of systems, or contradictions, or the use of

enabled say

—

I

words

meanings, so that he will he

in multiple

to see the

unity of vision; and

I

believe one might

have already used the word “dialectic”

one might say that Bergson had a destructive

—

I

believe

dialectic, a

descending dialectic, an ascending dialectic, and finally a destruction of dialectic

ment which

Few

is at

by the vision of the single move-

the depths of the whole universe.

thinkers

have been so daring as Bergson,

for

he gave us a description of the whole universe, as he

viewed

each time taking his departure from certain pre-

it,

cise facts,

which he attempted

but criticizing scientists precisely as possible.

had

to

name

the scientists, to

establish as

have once thought that

if

one

the four great philosophers one could say:

Socrates, Plato

and Bergson;

I

when

— following necessary —

—taking them

that

is to

together,

—

Descartes, Kant,

say, the philosophers

toward ourselves, who, each

in his

who turned

own way,

said,

us

“Know

same time we have seen that he places absolute; we are not separated from the world, universe. Perhaps he goes beyond the ontologies

thyself.” But at the

us in the

from the

which have succeeded him, founded on the pseudo-ideas of non-being and being, and he takes his place great philosophers.

He

among

reunites two of the

first

the very

philoso-

phers: Heraclitus and Parmenides, Heraclitus by motion

and the affirmation of motion, Parmenides by the affirmation of the fullness of being.

But there

is

No

disquietude

in

always the danger of a set-back or a

Bergson? total en-

JEAN WAHL

154 gulfment of the elan less succession of

dual frenzies.

Confidence in the

human elan?

Bergson always preserves disquietude about this

And

at the

danger of the end-

vital: there is the

in himself,

life

same time he

Yes, without doubt; but

—even

mastered, a profound

a certain misanthropy.

sees that, beyond, he can have

something; he questions himself in spite of I

on

all;

his table

Madame Guyon’s Les Torrents, for it is Madame Guyon that he was led to the understand-

always saw

through

ing he acquired of mystical experience. It

seems

to

me

as a purification. is

the

theme of

that meditation on It

Bergson can serve us

can exorcise. ‘"Bergson

this gathering, but

I

et Nous,’' that

would prefer

to stress

we should question him, question ourselves before him; and in questioning myself on him and before him I see in evidence two of the kinds of profound memory that he distinguished: the memory of Bergson before me, in the past, and then what he is in my own the accent on Bergson;

duration. There

he was, he

is

is

Bergson as he was, and he

here at this moment.

the durations of us it is

simply

this that

all, I

And

is

thus, he

is

we philosophers who are

wished

to

present as

say this evening.

a part of

here,

and

by Vladimir Jankelevitch

WITH THE WHOLE SOUL

You know

return to simplicity.

doing

this

end of his

that at the

evening

We may

is

life

Bergson preached the

ask ourselves

very Bergsonian.

selves whether in general

it is

if

what we are

We may

Bergsonian

to

ask our-

commemorate

Bergson. There are two ways not to be Bergsonian: the first is to

be so only on the day of his anniversary, as

if

that

gave us a dispensation from being so on the other days, as

if

we could

then be quits once and for all; in truth, as

far as that goes,

it

would be

better to be anti-Bergsonian.

This anniversary should not resemble All Souls’

Day,

which the living have invented so as

dead

to think of their

only once a year and never have to think of them again homage

Henri Bergson, Professor Jankelevitch addressed the following introductory remarks to Mile. Jeanne Bergson, who was a guest of honor at the Sorbonne proceedings:

As

a preface to his

to

“Mademoiselle:

am

moved

be speaking before the daughter of Bergson. If, despite my disinclination to place myself on platforms, I have agreed to take part in this evening, it is because of my veneration for your father and also because of the warm insistence of M. Gaston Berger, whose respect I cherish and whose confidence has greatly touched me.” “I

especially

to

VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH

156 thereafter.

hope therefore

I

that

it

is

a question of a re-

newal of Bergsonian thought, and that we shall not wait another century to speak of not being Bergsonian

specimen,

again.

it

Bergson like a historical

to treat

is

The second way of

resay what he has said instead of doing as he

to

has done; or

to “place’'

Bergsonism, instead of rethinking

Bergson as Bergson wanted

be rethought. These two

to

pseudo-Bergsonisms, that of the anniversary-Bergsonians

and

that of historians, suggest to us the

two principal points

of this short speech.

And

first

of

all,

manner, as we believe

the Bergsonian

Bergsonism

do.

mands

the necessity of thinking of Bergson in

the total adherence of the heart

For Bergson there are only utter ties;

no vacuum comes

which we

It is

to

and of the

spirit.

organic

totali-

totalities,

to deplete the positive fullness in

live; all that exists is

cient to itself.

wished us

maximalist philosophy, which de-

a

is

that he

complete, viable,

all-suffi-

necessary, however, that these totalities

be equal in dignity; their moral weight, their value, their quality, their density,

their profundity

equalities give the totalization its

at

The

scope.

each instant

itself.

son,

The

man

totalization

may

free act

is

is

its

in-

possible although each being is

this totalization

the act into which, according to Bergit is

the decision in

wholeness of his person figures; on its

these

reason for existence and

he total! Freedom

puts his whole self:

presses, with all

differ;

weight and

then, be understood that

all

it

its

which the

the personal past

richness.

freedom moves

in the

rection as life, which tends continually to

fill

It

must,

same out,

di-

con-

VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCII

157

stantly to regenerate in utter totality, so that the parts

themselves become not the

monad,

monads:

like the Leibnitzian

total,

Man

like the person, sufficient unto itself?

can figure partially in what he decides;

who

can be mean,

and act only with the

superficial, wicked, lying, bit of will, like those

man

is

slightest

think only with the slightest bit

of thought; there are acts which are like lapses of will

in-

stead of being genuine free acts. In the third chapter of

Time and Free Will Bergson

clares, citing Plato, that the free act

with the whole soul: £vv oXrj

appear twice

Book

\ II,

in the

tt\ ijjvxy-

These famous words

Republic, in Book IV and especially in

“With

things: in the

same

must be accomplished

which concerns the conversion of the prisoners

in the cave.

light not

first

the

whole souP’ really means three

place, that one

must turn toward the

only the head but the whole body; and,

time, that one must not turn toward truth a

And

in the

second place, what

one must not turn a few degrees, acute angle, but must

make an

is

or, in other

por-

whole

the same,

words, at an

about-turn or an about-face

and turn entirely: for conversion

is

a diametric inversion,

eVtcrrpo^rJ or TrepujTpocfirj. Third, to is

somewhat

at the

little

tion of the soul, or a piece of this portion, but the soul.

de-

become converted

it

not enough, then, to remain planted like a post, while

crying bravo to those

forward oneself; then

it is

who go forward, but one must go not enough to turn around, one must

move onward. And

because

it is

first

of all the conversion

accomplished with the whole soul,

tially serious act.

Does not

Aristotle, in his

is

itself,

an essen-

Nichomachean

VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH

158 Ethics

who

define the cnrovSalos, the serious

,

man, as the one

desires with his whole soul, Kara Tracrav Trjv ipvxw-

This expression

is

not only Aristotelian and Platonic: the

Old and New Testaments also use it. It is in Deuteronomy, for the first time, and then in the Book of Isaiah, that God

demands

that he be loved with the

whole soul; and

the apostles, varying the formula, say that

God “with

love

“with “with

all

all one's

mind,” kv

whom man

the one to

necessary to

one’s strength,” ef 6X179 T179 uxxuo9,

one’s understanding,”

all

it is

later

is

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