The Battle For U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress, Parties, And Factions In The 21st Century 3030301702, 9783030301705, 9783030301712

Table of contents :
Preface and Acknowledgments......Page 5
References......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
List of Tables......Page 9
Chapter 1: Introduction: Congress, Factions, and the Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy......Page 10
Congress Matters: Representation and Policy Influence......Page 12
Party Majorities, Minorities, and Factions......Page 14
Finding Factionalism......Page 16
Theories of Factionalism......Page 20
Factions and Foreign Policy......Page 23
Theoretical and Empirical Preview......Page 25
Bibliography......Page 28
Chapter 2: Factionalism and Foreign Policy: A Model of Minority Influence......Page 37
The Social Psychology of Minority Influence......Page 39
Attributes of Factions......Page 43
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 48
Issue Framing......Page 50
Consistency of Opposition......Page 53
Research Design......Page 54
Bibliography......Page 58
Chapter 3: “We the People?” Historical Foundations of Factionalism......Page 65
Historical Foundations......Page 66
Factions and the Democratic Party......Page 69
History of Democratic Factions......Page 70
Democratic Factions Today: The Rise of the Progressives......Page 73
Factions and the Republican Party......Page 77
History of Republican Factions......Page 79
Modern Republican Factions......Page 81
Factions and Foreign Policy......Page 88
Bibliography......Page 91
Chapter 4: The Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and the Obama Administration......Page 96
The Tea Party and Comprehensive Immigration Reform......Page 97
Factional Attributes......Page 98
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 100
Issue Framing......Page 103
Consistency of Opposition......Page 107
Outcome......Page 109
The Freedom Caucus and the Export-Import Bank......Page 110
Factional Attributes......Page 111
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 113
Issue Framing......Page 117
Consistency......Page 119
Outcome......Page 122
Bibliography......Page 123
Chapter 5: Progressive Caucus Activism During the Obama Administration......Page 127
Chemical Weapons: Crossing the “Red Line” in Syria......Page 128
Factionalism and the Progressive Caucus......Page 129
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 131
Issue Framing......Page 135
Consistency of Opposition......Page 137
Outcome......Page 139
The Progressives and Trade Policy Authority for the TPP......Page 141
Factional Attributes......Page 142
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 144
Issue Framing......Page 148
Consistency of Opposition......Page 150
Outcome......Page 152
Bibliography......Page 153
Chapter 6: The Freedom Caucus and Factionalism in the Trump Era......Page 157
Reproductive Health Care Rights and Foreign Assistance in the Trump Era......Page 158
Factional Attributes......Page 159
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 162
Legislative Debates in the Trump Era......Page 165
Issue Framing......Page 168
Consistency of Opposition......Page 170
Outcome......Page 173
Challenging the Iran Nuclear Deal......Page 174
Factional Attributes......Page 175
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 177
Issue Framing......Page 182
Consistency of Opposition......Page 186
Outcome......Page 187
Bibliography......Page 189
Chapter 7: Progressives and Foreign Policy in the Trump Era......Page 193
Factional Attributes......Page 194
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 197
Issue Framing......Page 200
Consistency......Page 203
Outcome......Page 205
Progressives, Trump, and DACA Reforms......Page 206
Factional Attributes......Page 207
Traditional Legislative Strategies......Page 208
Issue Framing......Page 213
Consistency......Page 215
Outcome......Page 218
Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Battle Continues......Page 220
Factions Today......Page 222
Summary of Findings......Page 225
Assessing Impact: How Powerful Are Factions?......Page 229
Theoretical Implications......Page 231
Avenues for Further Investigation......Page 235
Bibliography......Page 240
Bibliography......Page 244
Congressional Resolutions......Page 250
Index......Page 251

Citation preview

The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy Congress, Parties, and Factions in the 21st Century Patrick Homan Jeffrey S. Lantis

The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy

Patrick Homan • Jeffrey S. Lantis

The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy Congress, Parties, and Factions in the 21st Century

Patrick Homan Department of Political Science Dominican University River Forest, IL, USA

Jeffrey S. Lantis Department of Political Science The College of Wooster Wooster, OH, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-30170-5    ISBN 978-3-030-30171-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface and Acknowledgments

America is divided. Parties are polarized in modern politics, voters seem dug-in, and battles are raging among lawmakers over control of the policy process. While concerned individuals and groups with strong opinions have always tried to influence the policy process, most members of Congress have traditionally acted with comity. Today, though, these ideological and political divisions seem laid bare. Major party leaders have tried to maintain unity but are facing deep rifts among the groups in their caucus that can influence the policy process. The rise of Donald Trump as an outsider presidential candidate who eventually won over moderates to secure the Republican Party nomination is evidence of these divisions. So, too, is the activism of representatives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) on the left who are pushing redistributive policies, challenging the establishment, and keeping an active social media presence. Even as moderate party leaders attempt to corral their membership, political scientists have charted dramatic fluctuations in party unity voting scores over the past two decades (Miller, February 28, 2019; Noel 2016). We argue that these developments have created space for the emergence of strong dissident voices who seek to shape the political agenda, block major initiatives, and advance policy innovations. Party factions and factionalism appear to have become powerful dynamics in U.S. politics today. Dissidents and innovators in political parties in Congress are challenging authority, pushing new ideas, and changing the foreign policy-­ making environment. They employ traditional and nontraditional means, including persuasion, legislation, and issue framing—and they are making v

vi 

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

a difference in the choices of the U.S. government at key crossroads in the foreign policy process. Research questions for this study include: What strategies have members of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus and the Congressional Progressive Caucus developed to influence their party’s positions on foreign and national security policy from the outside-in? Are factions more likely to employ traditional legislative maneuvers such as proposing legislation, or nontraditional instruments such as issue framing and problem definition? What are the implications of factionalism for foreign policy consistency? And can groups that seem “too small to win” actually influence foreign affairs? This book is the product of three years of research collaboration, and we are indebted to a number of institutions and individuals for their support. Our ideas emerged from fieldwork for past research projects, where we were both confronted with the rising tide of insurgency politics in Washington, DC. Frank discussions with congressional staffers, in particular, helped solidify our understanding of the dilemmas that were emerging for both parties. Our work for this study has included primary and secondary research, along with conversations with other experts about our ideas. We are very grateful for suggestions and encouragement for this project from Ralph Carter, Jim Scott, Danielle Lupton, Juliet Kaarbo, James Curry, Jordan Tama, Jeffrey Peake, Michael Snarr, Jose Aguto, Matt Krain, Kent Kille, and Kevin Marsh. Patrick Homan would like to thank Dominican University and all those on his campus who helped support this project, especially the unwavering encouragement from his Department Chair David M. Dolence as well as financial backing from the Faculty Development Committee for research stipends to work on this book over the past few summers. He was aided in his research and writing by two wonderful students—Andrea Tellez and Kassey Franco—both of whom provided invaluable assistance and energy for this project. He would also like to extend his gratitude to his co-author Jeff for his incredible stewardship of this project as well his mentorship and friendship over the years. Lastly, Homan is most grateful to his wife, Vimla, whose patience and support makes everything possible. Jeffrey Lantis would like to thank The College of Wooster and the Henry Luce III Fund for Distinguished Scholarship, which supported interviews and archival research in Washington, DC. He has had valuable research assistance on this project from Wooster students Ghita Chiboub and Matt Mayes, whose curiosity and interest in the project have helped to propel this work forward. Lantis is also grateful for the support and

  PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

vii

­ nderstanding of his family as he worked intensively on this project and u watched way too much cable television news. Finally, we thank the editors and staff members at Palgrave Macmillan, including Michelle Chen, who have been supportive of the project throughout its development. Helpful comments from anonymous reviewers also were critical in refining the arguments of the book, and their keen eyes and suggestions helped us to sharpen the focus of the project. Needless to say, any errors in the manuscript remain our own.

References Miller, J. (2019, February 28). Party Unity on Congressional Votes Takes a Dive. CQ Vote Studies. RollCall.com. https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/ party-unity-congressional-votes Noel, H. (2016, September). Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties. Annals, AAPSS 66

Contents

1 Introduction: Congress, Factions, and the Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy  1 2 Factionalism and Foreign Policy: A Model of Minority Influence 29 3 “We the People?” Historical Foundations of Factionalism 57 4 The Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and the Obama Administration 89 5 Progressive Caucus Activism During the Obama Administration121 6 The Freedom Caucus and Factionalism in the Trump Era151 7 Progressives and Foreign Policy in the Trump Era187 8 Conclusion: The Battle Continues215 Bibliography239 Index247 ix

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Case studies of insurgency and innovation Table 8.1 Findings

49 221

xi

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Congress, Factions, and the Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy

This nation is never beyond remedy, it is never beyond hope, it is never too broken to fix. We will be here, and we are going to rock the world. —Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (2018) You cannot compound a successful government out of antagonisms. —Woodrow Wilson (1908)

U.S. foreign policy is at a crossroads today. Around the world, the nation faces numerous challenges, from immigration pressures and the rise of China to Russian meddling in democratic elections, rogue state nuclear ambitions, and global trade imbalances. At home, bipartisan consensus on foreign policy priorities has collapsed, and President Trump and members of Congress seem to disagree on even basic questions regarding international commitments. Studies of these dynamics often focus on explanations such as partisan polarization in Congress (Stonecash et  al. 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or a failure by presidents to carefully consider grand strategy (Dueck 2015; Beinart 2018). This book contends that one of the most important and under-studied factors that shapes contemporary U.S. foreign policy is the splintering of political parties into ideological groups, or factions. Just as the gulf between Republicans and Democrats widened, so, too, have the differences within parties (Caldwell et al. 2018). Party unity voting scores have fluctuated dramatically in the past two decades, for example, and cleavages are presenting challenges to © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_1

1

2 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

the leaderships of both parties (Miller, February 28, 2019; Noel 2016). This has created space for the emergence of strong dissident voices who seek to shape the political agenda, block major initiatives, and advance policy innovations. Factions and factionalism represent some of the most interesting, yet under-studied, dynamics in U.S. politics today. Dissidents and innovators in political parties in Congress are challenging authority, pushing new ideas, and changing the foreign policy-making environment. They employ traditional and nontraditional means, including persuasion, legislation, and issue framing. By working alongside other groups, tapping into civil society and public attitudes, and confronting the establishment, they are fostering policy changes. In the Republican Party, for example, two conservative intraparty factions, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus, have emerged as more visible and influential forces over the past decade. Their members have steadily moved the GOP to the right through a combination of strategic dissent and policy innovation. The Tea Party and Freedom Caucus helped block comprehensive immigration reform during the Obama administration, and Freedom Caucus members allied with President Trump to end U.S. engagement in the Iran nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Democrats are also divided. These differences were clearly illustrated in the 2016 presidential primary contest between Progressive Bernie Sanders and Centrist Hillary Clinton, as well as the rise of other candidates on the far-left. The number of Democratic voters who describe themselves as liberal grew from 30% in 2001 to 50% in 2018 (Edsall, October 18, 2018), and Progressives gained the largest number of seats in history in the 2018 midterm elections. Newly elected representatives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) demanded seats on powerful committees as well as access to Democratic fundraising programs (Carter, November 15, 2018), while Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) promised to end America’s longest war in Afghanistan and cut the military budget. At this writing in 2019, far-left and far-right factions in Congress have become active and energized, while moderates and establishment party leaders seem increasingly defensive. The stakes of this battle among factions are quite high for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, at the very time when the president and congressional leaders might need to present a unified front on critical matters in foreign affairs, the country is exhibiting more incongruence than certainty. Divisions seem rife. Beinart (2018) describes the situation today as “a crisis of foreign policy solvency,” where there are more questions than answers about international commitments (Lippmann 1943). Studies also show a signifi-

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

3

cant rise in affective polarization and “negative partisanship” in Washington politics that has made it harder for members of Congress and concerned citizens to find room for compromise (Campbell 2018; Iyengar et  al. 2012; Schultz 2018; Sitaraman, April 15, 2019). It is in this environment, perhaps best characterized as disequilibrium, that radically different lawmakers are offering radically different solutions to the solvency crisis. And in certain circumstances, these voices have greatly influenced foreign policy development. Cast in this light, attempts by some scholars to dismiss factionalism as a temporary distraction from politics-as-usual, or as a “dysfunctional aberration,” seem especially shortsighted (Belloni and Beller 1978: 2; Lasswell 1951; Miller and Schofield 2008). This book presents the story of the contemporary battle over foreign policy. It focuses on factions and the sophisticated strategies they have developed for “minority” influence, and it charts their impact on the policy process and outcomes. Our new model draws on insights from social psychology and studies of political parties. We explore propositions for the significance of factional strategies of influence, including the importance of direct legislation, issue framing, and persuasion. This study conducts a plausibility probe of the model through a structured, focused comparison of eight critical instances of activism by the Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and Progressives Democrats over the past decade. We find that factions that are persistent in issue framing, consistent in support of minority positions, and employ entrepreneurial legislative and non-legislative challenges can influence the scope and direction of foreign policy commitments. In short, groups in U.S. politics that some have dismissed as “too small to win” may sometimes have a profound impact on its engagement with the world.

Congress Matters: Representation and Policy Influence Presidents often promote their own foreign policy agendas in a separation of powers system, and they work with members of Congress to achieve their policy objectives (Dewan and Squintani 2016; Howell and Pevehouse 2007a, b). Indeed, presidents are typically described as dominating the foreign policy process by asserting their authority, especially their power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Rudalevige 2008; Weissman 1995). Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests the president with power to establish the executive branch of the federal government to carry out and enforce federal laws. The president commands the armed forces, while

4 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

at the same time controls diplomatic means such as treaty negotiation and bilateral engagements through appointed ambassadors. Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky’s “two presidencies” thesis argued that even when domestic political debates are fraught, presidents often enjoy significant, bipartisan support for major initiatives in Congress for foreign policy initiatives (1966). A corollary to this can be seen in Arthur Schlesinger’s early 1970s model of the “imperial presidency,” which catalogued the dominance of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policy-making during the Cold War. Facing a series of challenges to national security, Schlesinger claimed, presidents have pursued an “unconstitutional executive usurpation of authority” through “the appropriation…of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress” (1973: viii). Subsequent works have linked the imperial presidency to dominance of security and trade policies, as well as the potential for overstretch (Wolfensberger 2002; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008). Even in cases where presidents do not try to exert dominance, critics charge that Congress has abdicated its own authority in foreign affairs (Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Goldwin and Licht 1990). For example, Stephen Weissman has condemned the congressional “culture of deference” to the White House—an “acquiescence in foreign affairs [that] is the product of a powerful set of internal norms and attitudes, customs and institutions” (1995: 3). Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann have suggested the demise of congressional influence could be traced to a “loss of institutional identity among its members, an abdication of institutional responsibility vis-à-vis the executive…and the consequent deterioration of the deliberative process” (2009: 215). They argued congressional oversight in foreign and national security policy “virtually collapsed” in the first six years of the George W. Bush presidency, for example. One critic said Congress, had “voluntarily removed itself” from foreign policy debates after 9/11 “and went up into the cheap seats with the reporters and the pundits” (Lindsay, qtd. in Fessenden and Cochran 2003: 677). Many others have echoed these concerns, lamenting the loss of legislative constraints on presidential foreign policy power and latitude (Marshall and Prins 2011; Ornstein and Mann 2008). Yet, Congress can and does push back, and the reality is that the foreign policy decision-making process is far from orderly. Political scientist Edward Corwin’s characterization of the Constitution as an “invitation to struggle” over foreign affairs (1957: 171) captured these tensions

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

5

well. A substantial body of literature has examined this struggle, with studies offering a counterweight to the imperial presidency model by arguing that Congress can and does influence U.S. foreign policy development. Lawmakers may pass legislation using the blunt force of governing majorities, as well as through appropriations and treaty ratification (Kriner 2018; Lindsay 1994; Campbell et al. 2003; LeLoup 1993; Dodd and Schraufnagel 2013). The Constitution provided them with rulemaking authority to run the deliberative body (Wolfensberger 2018). David Auerswald and Colton Campbell contended that “two factors most determine the extent of Congressional influence over national security policy: whether Congress possesses the will and the capability to affect policy” (2012: 189). Some of the direct powers of Congress to shape foreign policy are vested in the Constitution, including authority under Article I to legislate and tax and spend for the common welfare, a broad mandate for members of Congress to help shape day-to-day management of domestic policies, the power of ratification of international treaties, the regulation of commerce, and the power to declare war (Kriner 2018). Political scientists William Howell and Jon Pevehouse advanced a simple formula for congressional assertiveness: “When the opposition party holds a large number of seats or controls one or both chambers of Congress, members routinely challenge the president and step up oversight of foreign conflicts; when the legislative branch is dominated by the president’s party, it generally goes along with the White House” (2007b: 96). In sum, a critical mass of studies assert the importance of Congress as an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process.

Party Majorities, Minorities, and Factions Other important players in the policy process include political parties that are represented in Congress, as well as the intraparty organizations within them (Rubin 2017). While the Constitution did not mention parties—and the framers did not expect them to emerge so quickly after the founding of the nation—they became well established in U.S. politics in the 1800s. Consequently, studies of party systems in the United States have proliferated (Mayhew 1986, 2002; Schattschneider 1942, 1960; Key 1942). Many treatments have focused on their organizational power and influence, and in turn, how these factors have played out in e­ xecutive-­legislative relations

6 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

(Crabb and Holt 1992; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Dodd and Oppenheimer 2013). Parties have been characterized as critical institutions that help organize, shape, and convey the political will of voters through the policy process. Hofstadter (1969) detailed how parties served as especially useful institutions with the expansion of suffrage over time, allowing more voters to work with organized identity structures and platforms. U.S. electoral laws favor the emergence of a two-party system, and historically, party affiliation has been the single best predictor of congressional voting behavior (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008). National party organizations try to foster unity of purpose on both ideological and utilitarian grounds in modern U.S. politics, and voters favor candidates from their parties by a wide margin (Azari 2016). Indeed, partisanship has remained a strong predictor of voting behavior. The traditional wisdom in the parties literature is that the majority party controls and dominates procedures and sets the legislative agenda (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, b; Dewan and Squintani 2016). According to Cox and McCubbins’ “cartel agenda model” (2002, 2005), for example, majority party leaders can exercise a great deal of negative agenda control. That is, they can advance their own interests while preventing the development or advancement of legislation that would harm a majority of their co-partisans. This is an expressly party-centered perspective on congressional activity, which sees parties as deeply committed to winning elections and confirming party majority status by establishing a record of legislative accomplishments. Majorities try to usurp the procedural rulemaking and committee assignment powers to produce outcomes favorable to majority members. Party leaders can act as effective gatekeepers of the legislative process, insisting upon procedural control to achieve their objectives (Jenkins and Monroe 2012). Among their tools are information (Curry 2015), control over chamber rules (Straus and Glassman 2017), party processes, funding (McGee 2017), and control over agendas in both the House and Senate (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). Scholars have also studied the significance of interparty competition in the policy process. Over time, Downs (1957: 82) claimed, parties in the United States came to operate much like athletic teams in a competition— a dynamic that helped “sustain democracy by offering citizens a choice between them.” DiSalvo has characterized interparty competition as the life-blood of the democratic system, arguing, “The parties adjust, adapt, and adopt new techniques in their efforts to win votes” (DiSalvo 2012: xiii). Schattschneider also famously weighed in on this dynamic, saying,

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

7

“Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties” (1942: 60). Even though important asymmetries remain between the Republican and Democratic party organizations, they remain significant players in political discourse who have proven essential for successful democratic consolidation (Grossman and Hopkins 2015, 2016; Fiorina and Mayhew 1996; Smyth 2006) (for more on this, see Chap. 3). Meanwhile, another compelling counter-narrative that has begun to emerge in the parties literature challenges the majority party dominance thesis by recognizing conditions in which minority parties and actors can and do influence the policy process. The spirit of this work reflects calls for more democratic processes, such as in Madison’s writings in the Federalist Papers. Madison advocated for a fair and just process, in contrast to an “unstable” process in which “the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” ([1787]1961: 7). Political scientist Charles O. Jones advanced this concept in his classic book The Minority Party in Congress (1970), which elevated the importance of opposition parties in shaping rules, procedures, and decisions. Later, Dion argued that there are select conditions in which minorities may be more successful at innovation and obstruction, including when the majority party is large and less cohesive (1997). Political scientist Matthew Green took up this research in his persuasive contemporary study, Underdog Politics (2015). He described how minority party strategies and tactics have adapted in the face of increasing polarization. Green rejected the premise that majority-rule is the ultimate determinant of policy outcomes and instead systematically studied the tactics of minority parties in Congress over decades. By examining decades of legislative assertiveness and activism in the Congressional Record, he identified ways that minority parties can advance their causes, including blocking legislation, protests, and obstruction. Ultimately, the study provided a convincing record of minority party activism in the U.S. House of Representatives in recent decades. Finding Factionalism Intraparty factions can also play important roles in the domestic and foreign policy process. They represent ideological subdivisions of major parties—the minorities within the majority and minority parties who

8 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

demonstrate their own levels of activism and assertiveness. Factional disputes regularly arise inside American parties, in part because they are mass catch-all organizations that include within them diverse ideological perspectives. Karol highlights that parties are made up of coalitions with disparate interests (Karol 2009), and these coalitions are constantly evolving. Noel also argued that there has been a sharpening of ideological coalitions over time in party structures, describing them as “coherent divides” that shape the policy process (2013, 2016). “What splits parties,” he argued, “are rifts between ideologically pure, less compromising members, and more pragmatic, moderate ones” (2016: 167). The result is that pressures for policy innovation or change tend to originate as much from within parties as across the political aisle. Scholars have recognized the significance of factions over time, but a majority of studies have focused on centrist factions because of the potential “pivotal significance of the median voter in legislative affairs” (Clarke 2017: 2; Goldman 1990; Roback and James 1978). Examples include works on the New Democrat Coalition (Medvic 2007), the Republican Main Street Partnership (Lucas and Deutchman 2007), and the Blue Dog Democrats (Yoshinaka 2015). At the same time, however, there is a puzzling dearth of scholarly works on more extremist factions, at the very time that these groups are more energized and active in U.S. politics (McGee 2017). Possible explanations for this might be found in political culture, in traditional scholarship, and in the policy discourse. For example, factionalism has always seemed to carry a certain political stigma in the United States, with many preferring to see it as the pursuit of private gain over public goods and more as an aberration than a norm (Lasswell 1951; Miller and Schofield 2008; Thomsen 2017). Critics contend that the national political character should be so strong in democracies that any partisan or ideological differences pale in comparison to universal commitment to the liberal ideal (Gerring 1998: 40). This bias was a centerpiece of writings by David Hume, who argued in 1742, “factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation.” In the Federalist Paper No. 10 (1787), Madison warned against the “mischiefs of faction” and said the proposed Constitution would help “guard against” factional discord. Both of these classic perspectives on “factions” actually referred to the emergence of political parties, but a broader point was that they distrusted subsets of individuals that might seek to undermine public will. In this

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

9

sense, parties and factions were characterized as forces of chaos. This frame took root in political culture, despite the clearly emerging realization that factional and ideological differences were producing policy innovations and enhanced policy legitimacy. Centuries after Madison and Hume, Belloni and Beller asserted that factions are still regarded as “interesting curiosities or as dysfunctional aberrations that appear in times of controversy” (1978: 2). Factions have been characterized as challenging party structures and threatening good governance (Koger et  al. 2010; Gerring 1998). Traditionally, factionalism has been treated as deviation from party norms—and acts of defiance have been met with punishment from leaders in the major U.S. political parties. For example, Green and Bee (2017) describe regular instances of leadership response to straying legislators or “general disloyalty” that has included voting against party policy priorities on the floor of the House of Representatives, challenging rules, and voting against policy initiatives launched by the Speaker of the House. Traditional scholarship outlines the power of the leadership to take these decisions against perceived “defections and disruptions from rank-and-file members” (McGee 2017: 2). Punishments have included removal of members from coveted committee and leadership postings and redirection of campaign finance funding to other candidates. The parties’ literature also operates on the base assumption that party organizations are strong, yet this, too, is debated more frequently today. Traditional theories focus on the importance of their functions of integrating mass participants into the institutional structure and transforming democracy into mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness to public demands (Aldrich 1995; Schattschneider 1942; Stokes 1999). Mass-­ based theories of partisanship rest on strong assumptions about the nature of their organizations and their capacity to act in government. Theorists assume unity and purpose in party organizations—that members march in lock-step to achieve their legislative objectives. However, contemporary trends in U.S. national politics tell a different story: Party unity has fluctuated significantly over the past 20 years. While there is an overall trend of rising rates of party unity on legislation since the 1950s, year-by-year analyses suggest surprising changes. Party unity votes in the House of Representatives dropped by 17% from 2017 to 2018, for example, one of the largest fluctuations since the 1950s. And some years in recent memory that one associates with the rise of factionalism—such as the emergence of the Tea Party in 2010—were years in

10 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

which there was dramatically lower party unity voting. The year 2018 demonstrated a significant decline once again, with party unity scores in the Senate dropping by 20% to their second-lowest rate since 2002 (Miller, February 28, 2019). Meanwhile, scholars have scrambled to account for these changes, with some ascribing this to a temporary blip (Caldwell et al. 2018) or the “Trump effect” (Keller, January 15, 2019). For example, Samuel Issacharoff (2016) has argued that the ability of American parties to coordinate political action has been undermined by reforms and legal restrictions including the decline in patronage, the increased reliance on primary elections, and campaign finance reform that disproportionately targets highly visible fundraising by parties. Whatever the cause, Issacharoff argued, the result is a political system led by “hollowed out institutions that are vulnerable to hostile takeover” (2016). Julia Azari argued that it is imperative we better understand a “defining characteristic” of our political moment: why parties are weak but partisanship remains strong (2016). This conforms to a broader scholarly interest in increasing party system volatility across democracies around the world (Liddiard 2018; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017). At a deeper level, some equate problems of U.S. partisan divisions with a dangerous culture war playing out in ideology, political messages, and elections (Mead 2017; Milner and Tingley 2015). One sociological treatment suggested that political antagonisms have played out “not just on the surface of social life (that is, in its cultural politics) but at the deepest and most profound levels; not just at the level of ideology, but in its public symbols, its myths, its discourse, and through the institutional structures that generate and sustain public culture” (Hunter 1991: 4). These dynamics have been visible in recent years, including through the 2016 and 2018 election cycles. Conservatives labeled proposals by Progressives like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, including a platform of “Medicare for all” and “tuition-free” college, as extremist. Meanwhile, liberals charged that presidential candidate Donald Trump, himself a fringe player in the Republican Party at one time, espoused dangerous nationalist rhetoric that bordered on racism and xenophobia. These and many other examples demonstrate how factionalism has become increasingly salient in U.S. politics today. Nevertheless, the phenomenon remains somewhat “invisible” in academic studies. Many assume that major parties will eventually corral their dissidents and foster a unity of purpose. Factionalism is also sometimes difficult to measure—deviant positions like obstruction can sometimes result in non-events (i.e., no legislation comes up for a roll-­

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

11

call vote in Congress to mark these episodes), making it harder for political scientists to capture this phenomenon in data. Coding of the U.S. political system as factionalized in the Polity IV dataset, for example, may tell us more about interparty competition than intraparty differences (Cole 2018). Nevertheless, these critically important forces seem to bubble just below the political surface, and we charge they can have distinct effects on foreign policy decision-making. Finally, even works that do recognize factions must overcome biases in explaining their potential significance for the policy process (Gervais and Morris 2015; Ragusa and Gaspar 2016; Clarke 2017). For example, Gerring (1998: 24) contends, “when viewed in a broad, cross-national context, factionalism does not appear to be a salient characteristic of the American party system.” The United States, he argues, represents “no analogue to the faction-ridden parties of Japan, Italy, and France.” Indeed, political scientist Howard Reiter has called factionalism, “one of the most widely discussed but under-theorized aspects of party politics” (2004: 251). Theories of Factionalism Despite the biases outlined above, we identify ready foundations for our study of factionalism in the comparative politics literature, as well as studies of U.S. state politics. A number of scholars have recognized the complexity of party organizations and their very nature as catch-all organizations comprised of coalitions of different actors. Françoise Boucek has emphasized, for example, that, “political parties are not monolithic structures but collective entities in which competition, divided opinions and dissent create internal pressure” (2009: 455, 2012). Yet, while this dynamic is well recognized in today’s advanced industrial democracies, factionalism itself seems to defy the common logic of organization that party unity is essential to electoral success. Comparative approaches capture some of the complexity of parties. Studies have examined specific typologies of intraparty groups with different attributes, including organization, stability, function, and role (Bettcher 2005; Hine 1982; Janda 1979). Many of these works also discuss projected impacts on political outcomes. For example, Frank Belloni and Dennis Beller’s classic Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (1978) explored factions as agents in a diverse range of political systems, from India and the Philippines to Israel and Bolivia. Other studies identify fascinating links between fac-

12 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

tionalism and party government, as well as Cabinet durability in parliamentary regimes (Köllner and Basedau 2005; Leonardi and Wertman 1989; Kohno 1992). Meanwhile, Boucek (2009, 2012) suggested that the organization of factions is not static, but rather fluid in relation to different political issues. Studies of political parties also adopt different approaches to analyze the organization and activity of factions. For example, some works identify factionalism as a dependent variable, versus an emphasis on its agency (Zariski 1960; Epstein 1980). Others focus on aggregate measures of party unity (Cox and McCubbins 2005) and the power of majorities in gatekeeping proposals. Party unity scores have traditionally provided insights into how the organizations achieve their objectives, but such approaches may also bias how one measures the power of various factions. Some scholars point out analytical distinctions between party cohesion, party discipline, and party unity (Hazan 2006; Rice 1928; Carey 2009). Christian Stecker (2013) asserted that measuring unity through vote aggregation misses key variance in the institutional effects of party structures. Additional studies show that simply relying on high-profile votes may not capture individual entrepreneurship involved in non-legislative resolutions (Heidar and Koole 2000; Laver and Schofield 1998; Hazan 2003). More recently, specific types of political parties have garnered more attention in comparative politics, including the rise of the populist radical right (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Mudde 2007, 2013; Schori Liang 2007; Chryssogelos 2010) and its potential influence on policy issue areas such as migration policy and European integration. In summary, comparative political studies of these dynamics demonstrate the importance of factions in select democratic systems, as both agents and products of distinctive political systems. Scholars also have studied factionalism in U.S. state politics (Key 1949; Sindler 1955; DiSalvo 2012). For example, Howard Reiter (2001, 2004) adopted a functionalist approach, describing factions as the product of exogenous factors, primarily discussing the history of challenges of factions within political parties. These symbolize intraparty divisions from the fully institutionalized and disciplined blocs found in other countries. Factions may be organized, cohesive, and disciplined, and these dynamics can produce bifurcated cleavage structures within parties. Reiter also explored the development of factions and twentieth-century history of U.S. political parties, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Edmund Muskie to William Proxmire, using a dominant-minority balance to dis-

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

13

cuss the ebb and flow of factions. Sin (2015: 11) also explored the implications of factions for national politics. These “clusters of individuals within a party who share an ideology and a set of core policy preferences” can be more influential in select circumstances, she argues. In more recent work, Gregory Koger, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel have used social network methods to characterize the place of factions within larger information-­ sharing clusters, or “expanded party networks,” that also include interest groups, consultants, and segments of the media (2010). Subsequent work began to examine the shifting balance of power between factions in parties (Budge et al. 2010; Dewan and Squintani 2016). Ruth Bloch Rubin (2017) offers a valuable theory of intraparty organization at the national level, designed to call attention to the value of party groupings and sub-groupings to help “resolve serious collective action and coordination problems that would otherwise prevent them from effectively challenging congressional leaders for legislative control” (2017: 4). She describes intraparty organizations as capturing more contemporary demands and pace “of an electorate whose increasingly diverse membership the framers could scarcely have imagined.” These organizations are “smaller and more agile than majority-seeking party coalitions” and serve to “give voice to constituencies with views and interests that would otherwise be subsumed by demands of coalition-building in a two-party system.” Deeper cleavages have become manifest within the parties, as well as across them (Cole 2018: 186). Rubin concluded, “intraparty organizations often exacerbate partisan tensions and forestall legislative compromise by amplifying the voices of legislative minorities” (2017: 5). In summary, scholars have recognized the importance of Congress and parties in the U.S. political system, but specific roles and strategies of factions in the foreign policy process remain under-studied. The development of distinctive ideological groups, including far-left and far-right clusters of politicians, raises important questions about how minority groups make their voices heard. There is also a healthy debate underway today about whether factions may be more or less influential in a polarized political environment. Party polarization and fragmentation also have impacted contemporary interbranch struggles in the United States, though scholars disagree on its potential impact for foreign policy (Sin 2015; Carter and Scott 2017; Theriault 2008; Rohde 1991; Bond and Fleisher 2000). Some argue that polarization and divided government are conditions that hinder the ability of the executive to secure their preferred p ­ olicy

14 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

outcomes (Binder 2003; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). Other works (Jeong and Quirk 2019; Mayhew 1994; Marsh and Lantis 2018) have asserted that polarization may not prohibit foreign policy entrepreneurship. Slightly more nuanced studies have suggested that other factors, such as institutional preferences and intra-branch friction (Binder 1999) and the goals of pivotal players in the process (Krehbiel 1998), may account more fully for the policy record than partisanship.

Factions and Foreign Policy This study builds upon previous work on factions as agents of change in shaping domestic and foreign policies. We argue factions can play important roles as insurgents in the policy process—more often as obstructionists than innovators. Political scientist Daniel DiSalvo defined factions as (2009: 31): “a party subunit that has enough ideological consistency, organizational capacity, and temporal durability to influence policy making, the party’s image, and the congressional balance of power.” He added, “Factions exist when some party members share a common identity, are conscious of differences that separate them from other party members, and vote collectively on a range of issues” (2009: 32). They represent important units of analysis between the “responsible party” and the lone legislator, and serve as “agents of preference formation, agenda setting, and coalition building” (2008: 27). They are also considered “ideological cohorts that are smaller and more agile than the party as a whole” (DiSalvo 2009: 27). Seen in this light, factions may be engines of political change that react to initiatives, help mold them into workable policies or to defeat them, and monitor them through the policy process. Factions “help decide which measure make it onto the agenda and whether they are voted up or down,” DiSalvo contended. And often, their activism helps define the very nature of the political party and its effectiveness. He added, “The battle among competing factions or between factions or other groups within the party might be characterized as the struggle for the ‘soul’ of the party” (2010: 272). While they seek to organize and focus their energies, they also operate “informally by altering folkways and norms under the existing procedural rules.” Factions thus become vehicles for members to pursue their own electoral interests by shifting the party’s ideological positioning and image to the right or to the left. The coordination functions factions perform can also help members realize what they deem good public policy (McAllister 1991).

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

15

Arguments about the agency of factions in U.S. national politics relate well to studies of broader congressional agency and activism in the foreign policy process. For example, according to the theory of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship developed by Carter and Scott (2009, 2010, 2013, 2017), entrepreneurs are, “legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas” (Carter et  al. 2004: 280; Kernell 1997; Sinclair 1997). Carter and Scott’s policy entrepreneurs are innovators, characterized as “an actor who advocates and seeks to change policy by exploiting opportunities and employing entrepreneurial strategies” (Kingdon 2003: 21). Carter and Scott suggested that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs exhibit several common characteristics. First, these individuals aspire to be policy leaders (2009: 25; Schneider and Teske 1992; Riker 1986; Bianco and Bates 1990). They are individuals or groups “sufficiently dissatisfied with the administration’s existing policy (or lack of a policy) to push for their own initiatives” (Carter and Scott 2009: 19). They often have unique perspectives as problem-solvers—the potential to engage their creative imagination in deliberating potential solutions, as well as the authority to allocate government resources to achieve their goals (Marsh and Lantis 2018; Malnes 1995). Individual entrepreneurs may also demonstrate “social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example” (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 649; Kingdon 2003). As alert individuals, they are able to identify and seize windows of opportunity for policy change. It is also important to recognize that factions do not necessarily work alone. Members of factions may generate greater momentum when they work together in coalitions to shape the policy process. Members of factions may find supporters among civil society groups and ally with interest groups and lobbies who share their values. In select circumstances, factions on the far-left and far-right of the major political parties may even find common ground in their challenges to administration initiatives. This is certainly consistent with a pluralist approach to the study of U.S. politics, which recognizes potential links between governmental authority and nongovernmental organizations who use resources to attempt to influence the political process (Dahl 1961). Factional members may reach out to other actors, and find support for broader initiatives in select circumstances. Modern examples include Progressive caucus support from nongovernmental organizations like Moveon.org and NetrootsNation, as well as strong links between the House Freedom Caucus and President Donald Trump. In various forms, these coalitions may help players attain short-­ term and long-term objectives.

16 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Finally, to date, a limited number of studies have begun to link factionalism and foreign policy (Hazan 2000; Mead 2011; Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Dueck 2010). Informed by counter-intuitive approaches such as Mayhew’s Divided We Govern (1991), Peake (2002) challenged conventional wisdom that divisions necessarily lead to legislative gridlock. Specifically, he explored conditions that contribute to foreign policy challenges, as well as factors that might lead to greater opportunity for creative coalition-building and advancement of foreign policy agendas. An empirical investigation of patterns from 1947 to 1998 found support for his thesis that factionalism does not always yield gridlock, and in some cases actually may foster vibrant political discourse (Peake 2002; Peake et  al. 2012). Rathbun (2013) offered an extension of these ideas in his study of the Tea Party as an influential subunit in U.S. foreign policy deliberations. Rathbun (2013) argued that the Tea Party values are more reflective of the Jacksonian tradition in American political thought regarding foreign affairs, not the more isolationist Jeffersonian values. This raises the potential for compromise with establishment Republicans and even some Democrats on foreign policy issues. In 2019, Sitaraman argued, the division between conservatives and Progressives is “perhaps the most interesting—and most misunderstood—development” in foreign policy debates (April 15, 2019).

Theoretical and Empirical Preview In an era of increased polarization and partisanship, it is imperative that we better understand how minority factions in political parties influence the development of U.S. foreign policy. Among the questions we address are the following: What strategies do minority factions employ, and why? Under what conditions are they more or less successful? How can dissent both stop establishment initiatives and foster innovation in foreign policy? This book advances a novel framework to examine the impact of factions on foreign policy development in the Obama and Trump administrations. Drawing on insights from social psychology, foreign policy analysis, and comparative politics, we present a multidimensional model of factions as agents in the foreign policy process. We identify three points of leverage for these insurgents and innovators: motivations, strategies, and instruments of influence. This helps cut across biases in the scholarship on ­democratic systems that disregard factions as more as a “dysfunctional aberration” than a norm (Belloni and Beller 1978: 2). We conduct

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

17

a plausibility probe of the minority influence model through process tracing and a structured, focused comparison of eight original case studies. Evidence suggests that factions that demonstrate persistence and consistency in support of minority positions do appear to influence the scope and direction of foreign policy commitments, votes on major legislation, and non-votes over time. It appears that dismissing minority positions on foreign policy and national security may be both politically and analytically shortsighted. This study also offers suggestions for future study of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship and the rise of factions and populism for foreign policy development. Case studies offer insights including: • From 2013 to the present, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus have played a profound role in debates over comprehensive immigration policy, limiting efforts by centrists in both political parties to find a compromise. Led by activists including Representatives Steve King (R-IA) and Michele Bachmann (R-MN), the faction employed a range of strategies to block reforms during the Obama administration. Freedom Caucus members also cheered on President Trump when he orchestrated the longest shutdown of the federal government in U.S. history in his fight for a border wall in 2018–2019. • U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement collapsed under the weight of opposition from anti-globalists, including Progressive Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT). Their challenges to the TPP emboldened opponents on the left and right. When Donald Trump became president in 2017, one of his first acts in office was to withdraw the United States from the trade pact. • When Bashar al-Assad’s regime used Sarin nerve gas in an attack on a suburb of Damascus in 2013, killing more than 1400 people, President Obama appeared to hesitate to follow up his pledge that such an action would cross a dangerous “red line.” The White House knew that establishment Democrats and Republicans in Congress might support military retaliation, but factions in both parties were opposed. In a surprise move, the president reversed course on military action and instead sought a face-saving diplomatic route for negotiations with Russia to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal.

18 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

• President Trump faced serious political challenges from Progressives and Democrats in response to his executive orders creating travel bans during his first year in office. When Trump tried to block citizens from specific countries from entering the United States in 2017, Progressives countered that the president was instituting an unconstitutional “Muslim ban.” They led the charge in decrying the executive action, advanced legislative challenges to executive excesses, and supported court challenges to block the action. • Another highly contested dimension of U.S. foreign assistance policy has been the question of whether the United States should fund aid organizations that provide reproductive healthcare, family planning information, and population control measures in developing countries. With the support of the Freedom Caucus, the Trump administration has attacked all forms of federal funding associated with reproductive healthcare, cutting funds, and seeking legislation to block future appropriations. In summary, this study offers a policy-relevant and timely account of how the United States develops responses to international challenges of the twenty-first century as well as ongoing debates about foreign and security policy. It speaks to political debates within the hyper-partisan environments of the Obama and Trump administration and highlights the role of key foreign policy actors in a liberal democracy. This book is organized as follows: Chap. 2 develops our minority influence model of foreign policy. It surveys the social psychology literature as a foundation for the development of research propositions focused on the attributes of factions and traditional and nontraditional strategies of influence. It then links this model to broader debates about U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. Chapter 3 provides a rich look at the evolution of the political party system in the United States over time. It explores the history of political party formulation in the United States and the rise of centripetal political forces that threatened the “Cold War consensus” model of bipartisan foreign policy development. This sets the stage for an examination of liberal and conservative factionalism that have emerged as powerful dynamics in recent decades: the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus inside the Republican Party and the Progressive Caucus in the Democratic Party. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present a series of original case studies of the activism of factions in both major parties. Chapter 4 examines Tea Party

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

19

and Freedom Caucus factions during the Obama administration, including immigration policy reforms and the funding of trade credit agencies including the Export-Import Bank. Chapter 5 presents original case studies of Progressive Caucus activism inside the Democratic Party and Congress during the Obama administration, including opposition to the military strike on Syria in 2013 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Chapter 6 examines ways that conservatives with deeply held civil liberties positions challenged family planning provisions in foreign aid legislation and U.S. engagement in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal). Chapter 7 presents case studies of Progressive activism during the first years of the Trump administration, including debates over international travel bans and reforms of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and related immigration legislation. Finally, Chap. 8 analyzes evidence from across the case studies and considers important lessons for theory and the practice of U.S. foreign policy development in the twenty-first century.

Bibliography Aldrich, J.  H. (1995). Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Aldrich, J. H., & Rohde, D. W. (2000a). The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government. In J. R. Bond & R. Fleisher (Eds.), Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era (pp. 31–72). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Aldrich, J.  H., & Rohde, D.  W. (2000b). The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee. Journal of Politics, 62, 1–33. Auerswald, D. P., & Campbell, C. C. (Eds.). (2012). Congress and the Politics of National Security. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Azari, J. (2016, May 19). A for Effort? Republican Elites Tried to Coordinate but Never Quite Got There. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/5/19/11712612/republican-elites-coordination Beinart, P. (2018, September 16). America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic. com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreignpolicy-for-the-trump-age/570010/ Belloni, F. P., & Beller, D. C. (Eds.). (1978). Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio. Bettcher, K. E. (2005). Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism. Party Politics, 11(1), 339–358.

20 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Bianco, W.  T., & Bates, R.  H. (1990). Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas. American Political Science Review, 84(1), 133–147. Binder, S.  A. (1999). Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–1996. American Political Science Review, 93, 519–533. Binder, S. A. (2003). Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Bond, J.  R., & Fleisher, R. (Eds.). (2000). Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in the Partisan Era. Washington, DC: CQ Press College. Boucek, F. (2009). Rethinking Factionalism Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism. Party Politics, 15(4), 455–485. Boucek, F. (2012). Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Budge, I., Ezrow, L., & McDonald, M. D. (2010). Ideology, Party Factionalism, and Party Change: An Integrated Dynamic Theory. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 781–804. Caldwell, C. C., Karol, D., Kazin, M., & Lee, F. (2018). Are the Parties Dying? Democracy Journal 48. Spring. https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/48/ are-the-parties-dying/ Campbell, J. E. (2018). Making Sense of a Divided America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Campbell, C. C., Rae, N. C., & Stack, J. F., Jr. (2003). Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River. Canes-Wrone, B., Howell, W. G., & Lewis, D. E. (2008). Executive Influence in Foreign Versus Domestic Policy Making: Toward A Broader Understanding of Presidential Power. Journal of Politics, 1, 1–16. Carey, J. M. (2009). Competing Principles, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 1. Carter, Z. (2018, November 15). These House Committees Could Make or Break a Progressive Agenda. Huffington Post. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/house-committees-incoming-progressive-democrats_us_5bee096 4e4b0510a1f2f25ee Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. Durham: Duke University Press. Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2010). Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Innovators: Mapping Entrepreneurs and Their Strategies. The Social Science Journal, 47(2), 418–438. Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2013). Hitting the Reset Button: Why Is Cooperation So Hard? In R.  G. Carter (Ed.), Contemporary Cases in U.S.  Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade (pp. 167–199). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Carter, R.  G., & Scott, J.  M. (2017). Choosing to Lead in a Shrinking Space: Partisanship, Polarization, and Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association.

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

21

Carter, R. G., Scott, J. M., & Rowling, C. (2004). Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in Post-World War II U.S.  Foreign Policy. International Studies Perspectives, 5(3), 280. Chiaramonte, A., & Emanuele, V. (2017). Party System Volatility, Regeneration and De-institutionalization in Western Europe (1945–2015). Party Politics, 23(4), 376–388. Chryssogelos, A.  S. (2010). Undermining the West From Within: European Populists, the US and Russia. European View, 2, 267–277. Clarke, A. J. (2017). The House Freedom Caucus: Extreme Faction Influence in the U.S. Congress (PDF file). Retrieved from http://www.democratic-anxieties.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Clarke_Berlin2017.pdf Cole, B. R. (2018). Democratization and the Mischief of Faction. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Corwin, E.  S. (1957). The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1957. New  York: New York University Press. Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2002). Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986. In D.  Brady & M.  D. McCubbins (Eds.), Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crabb, C., & Holt, P. (1992). Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Curry, J. M. (2015). Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. Dahl, R. A. (1961). Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dewan, T., & Squintani, F. (2016). In Defense of Factions. American Journal of Political Science, 4, 860–881. Dion, D. (1997). Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. DiSalvo, D. (2009). Party Factions in Congress. Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies, 36(1), 27–57. DiSalvo, D. (2010). The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal-Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948–1972. The Journal of Policy History, 22(3), 269–299. DiSalvo, D. (2012). Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-­ 2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dodd, L. C., & Oppenheimer, B. I. (2013). Congress Reconsidered. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

22 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Dodd, L. C., & Schraufnagel, S. (2013). Party Polarization and Policy Productivity in Congress: From Harding to Obama. In L. C. Dodd & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress Reconsidered (10th ed.). Washington, DC: Sage/Congressional Quarterly Press. Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Dueck, C. (2010). Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edsall, T. B. (2018, October 18). The Democrats’ Left Turn Is Not an Illusion. The New York Times. Epstein, L. (1980). What Happened to the British Party Model? American Science Review, 74, 9–22. Fessenden, H., & Cochran, J. (2003, March 22). Congress Seeks to Find Its Voice as Iraq War Rages. CQ Weekly, 676–677. Finocchiaro, C. J., & Rohde, D. W. (2008). War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the US House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33(1), 35–61. Fiorina, M. P., & Mayhew, D. R. (1996). Divided Government (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Gailmard, S., & Jenkins, J. A. (2007). Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of Majority Party Power. Journal of Politics, 3, 689–700. Gerring, J. (1998). Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gervais, B., & I. L. Morris. (2015, December 4). Tea and Coffee: The Ideological Implications of the Tea Party Movement in the House of Representatives. Paper Presented at the American Politics Workshop. Giannetti, D., & Benoit, K. (Eds.). (2009). Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments. Abingdon: Routledge. Goldman, L. (1990). Qualitative Assessment. The Counseling Psychologist, 18(2), 205–213. Goldwin, R.  A., & Licht, R.  A. (1990). Foreign Policy and the Constitution. Washington DC: AEI Press. Green, M. N. (2015). Underdog Politics: The Minority Party in the U.S. House of Representatives. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Green, M., & Bee, B. (2017). Keeping the Team Together: Explaining Party Discipline and Dissent in the U.S. Congress. In J. R. Straus & M. E. Glassman (Eds.), Party and Procedure in the United States Congress (2nd ed., pp. 41–62). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Grossman, M., & Hopkins, D.  A. (2015). Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 1, 119–139. Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D.  A. (2016). Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats. New York: Oxford University Press.

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

23

Hazan, R. Y. (2000). Intraparty Politics and Peacemaking in Democratic Societies: Israel’s Labor Party and the Middle East Peace Process 1992–1996. Journal of Peace Research, 37(3), 363–378. Hazan, R.  Y. (2003). Does Cohesion Equal Discipline. Journal of Legislative Studies, 4, 1–11. Hazan, R. Y. (2006). Israel’s ‘Big Bang’: The Parliamentary Elections of 2006. Representations, 42(3), 243–252. Heidar, K., & Koole, R.  A. (2000). Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties Behind Closed Doors. London: Routledge. Hine, D. (1982). Factionalism in West European Parties: A Framework for Analysis. West European Politics, 5(1), 36–53. Hofstadter, R. (1969). A Constitution Against Parties: Madisonian Pluralism and the Anti-Party Tradition. Government and Opposition, 3, 345–366. Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2007a). While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2007b). When Congress Stops Wars. Foreign Affairs, 4, 95–107. Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books. Issacharoff, S. (2016). Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our Hollowed Out Political Parties. Houston Law Review, 54:4, NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper, 16–52. Available as SSRN:  https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2888064 Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S.  J. (2015). Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690–707. Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431. Janda, K. (1979). Comparative Political Parties Data 1950–1962. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Jenkins, J. A., & Monroe, N. W. (2012). Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House. American Journal of Political Science, 4, 897–912. Jeong, G.-H., & Quirk, P. (2019). Division at the Water’s Edge: The Polarization of Foreign Policy. American Politics Research, 47(1), 58–87. Jones, C. O. (1970). The Minority Party in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown. Karol, D. (2009). Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Keller, J. (2019, January 15). Research Suggests Trump’s Election Has Been Detrimental to Many Americans’ Mental Health. Pacific Standard. https:// psmag.com/news/research-suggests-trumps-election-has-been-detrimentalto-many-americans-mental-health Kernell, S. (1997). Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

24 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Key, V. O., Jr. (1942). Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. Key, V. O., Jr. (1949). Southern Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Kingdon, J.  W. (2003). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy. New  York: Longman. Koger, G., Masket, S., & Noel, H. (2010). Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics. American Politics Research, 38(1), 33–53. Kohno, M. (1992). Rational Foundations for the Organisation of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. World Politics, 44(1), 369–397. Köllner, P., & Basedau, M. (2005, December). Factionalism in Political Parties: An Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies. German Overseas Institute Research Program on Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems no. 12. Retrieved from www.duei.de/workingpapers Krehbiel, K. (1998). Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S.  Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kriner, D. L. (2018). Congress, Public Opinion, and an Informal Constraint on the Commander-in-Chief. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(1), 52–68. Kupchan, C. A., & Trubowitz, P. L. (2007). Grand Strategy for a Divided America. Foreign Affairs, 4, 71–83. Lasswell, H. D. (1951). The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science. American Political Science Review, 45(1), 133–142. Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1998). Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. LeLoup, L. T. (1993). Congress and the President: The Policy Connection. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Leonardi, R., & Wertman, D. A. (1989). Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Liang, C. S. (2007). Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right. New York: Routledge. Liddiard, P. (2018, December). Are Political Parties in Trouble? Woodrow Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ publication/are-political-parties-trouble Lindsay, J. M. (1994). Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore/ London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lindsay, J. M., & Ripley, R. B. (1992). Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 3, 417–449. Lippmann, W. (1943). U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little Brown and Company. Lucas, D. L., & Deutchman, I. E. (2007). The Ideology of Moderate Republicans in the House. The Forum, 5.

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

25

Madison, J. (1787). Federalist Paper No.10: The Same Subject Continued: The Unions as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. New York Daily Advertiser. Malnes, R. (1995). ‘Leader’ and ‘Entrepreneur’ in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis. European Journal of International Relations, 1(1), 87–112. Marsh, K., & Lantis, J.  S. (2018). Are All Foreign Policy Innovators Created Equal? The New Generation of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12(2), 116–141. Marshall, B. W., & Prins, B. C. (2011). Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S.  Presidential Decisions to Use Force. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 3, 521–545. Mayhew, D.  R. (1986). Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mayhew, D.  R. (1991). Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mayhew, D. R. (1994). US Policy Wanes in Comparative Context. In L. C. Dodd & C.  Jillson (Eds.), New Perspectives on American Politics (pp.  325–340). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Mayhew, D. R. (2002). Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. New Haven: Yale University Press. McAllister, I. (1991). Party Adaptation and Factionalism Within the Australian Party System. American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 206–227. McGee, Z. A. (2017). Keeping Your Friends Close: How the House Freedom Caucus Organized for Survival. M.A. Thesis. The University of Texas at Austin: Austin (Author’s copy). Mead, W. R. (2011). The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 28–44. Mead, W. R. (2017, January 20). The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order. ForeignAffairs.com Medvic, S. K. (2007). Old Democrats in New Clothing? An Ideological Analysis of a Democratic Party Faction. Party Politics, 5, 587–609. Miller, J. (2019, February 28). Party Unity on Congressional Votes Takes a Dive. CQ Vote Studies. RollCall.com. https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/ party-unity-congressional-votes Miller, G., & Schofield, N. (2008). The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the US. Perspectives on Politics, 6(3), 433–450. Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2015). Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mintrom, M., & Norman, P. (2009). Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change. Policy Studies Journal, 4, 649–667.

26 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2013). Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What? European Journal of Political Research, 1, 1–19. Noel, H. (2013). Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America. New York: Cambridge University Press. Noel, H. (2016, September). Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties. Annals, AAPSS 667. Ornstein, N.  J., & Mann, T.  E. (2008). The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Ornstein, N. J., & Mann, T. E. (2009). It’s Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books. Peake, J. S. (2002). Coalition Building and Overcoming Legislative Gridlock in Foreign Policy, 1947–98. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41(4), 67–83. Peake, J. S., Krutz, G. S., & Hughes, T. (2012). President Obama, the Senate, and the Polarized Politics of Treaty Making. Social Science Quarterly, 93(5), 1295–1315. Ragusa, J. M., & Gaspar, A. (2016). Where’s the Tea Party? An Examination of the Tea Party’s Voting Behavior in the House of Representative. Political Research Quarterly, 2, 361–372. Rathbun, B. (2013). Steeped in International Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1), 21–37. Reiter, H. L. (2001). The Building of a Bifactional Structure: The Democrats in the 1940s. Political Science Quarterly, 116(1), 107–129. Reiter, H.  L. (2004). Factional Persistence Within Parties in the United States. Party Politics, 10(3), 251–271. Rice, S. A. (1928). Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York: Knopf. Riker, W.  H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Roback, T. H., & James, J. L. (1978). Party Factions in the United States. In F. P. Belloni & D. C. Beller (Eds.), Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (pp. 329–355). Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. Rohde, D.  W. (1991). Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rubin, R.  B. (2017). Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rudalevige, A. (2008). The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party Government. London: Transaction Publishers. Schattschneider, E.  E. (1960). The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Boston: Wadsworth.

1  INTRODUCTION: CONGRESS, FACTIONS, AND THE BATTLE… 

27

Schlesinger, A. M. (1973). The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Schneider, M., & Teske, P. (1992). Toward A Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government. The American Political Science Review, 86(3), 737–747. Schultz, K. A. (2018). Perils of Polarization for U.S. Foreign Policy. The Washington Quarterly, 40(4), 7–28. Sin, G. (2015). Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Sinclair, B. (1997). Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Sindler, A.  P. (1955). Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana. American Political Science Review, 49(3), 641–662. Sitaraman, G. (2019, April 15). The Emergence of Progressive Foreign Policy. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-emergence-ofprogressive-foreign-policy/ Smyth, R. (2006). Strong Partisans, Weak Parties? Party Organizations and the Development of Mass Partisanship in Russia. Comparative Politics, 2, 209–228. Stecker, C. (2013). How Effects on Party Unity Vary Across Votes. Party Politics, 21(5), 791–802. Stokes, S. C. (1999). Political Parties and Democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 243–267. Stonecash, J.  M., et  al. (2018). Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization. New York: Routledge. Straus, J. R., & Glassman, M. E. (Eds.). (2017). Party and Procedure in the United States Congress (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Theriault, S. M. (2008). Party Polarization in Congress. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomsen, D.  M. (2017). Joining Patterns Across Party Factions in the US Congress. The Forum, 15(4), 741–751. Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2015). The Impact of Populist Radical Parties on Foreign Policy: The Northern League as a Junior Coalition Partner in the Berlusconi Governments. European Political Science Review, 4, 525–546. Weissman, S. R. (1995). A Culture of Deference. New York: Longman. Wildavsky, A. (1966). The Two Presidencies. Trans-Action, 2, 162–173. Wolfensberger, D.  R. (2002). The Return of the Imperial Presidency? Wilson Quarterly, 26, 36–41. Wolfensberger, D. R. (2018). Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays. New York: Columbia University Press. Yoshinaka, A. (2015). Crossing the Aisle: Party Switching by U.S. Legislators in the Postwar Era. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zariski, R. (1960). Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4(1), 27–51.

CHAPTER 2

Factionalism and Foreign Policy: A Model of Minority Influence

The dissenting spirit stands with the party of things-as-they-mightbecome….Dissent is what rescues democracy from a quiet death behind closed doors. —Lewis H. Lapham (2005) The time is long overdue for a vigorous discussion about our foreign policy, and how it needs to change in this new era. —Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) (October 9, 2018)

Factions in Congress and political parties can be powerful actors in the battle over domestic and foreign policy. Dissenters on the ideological margins have jumped into the policy process, even when their efforts have undermined their own party’s agenda. Some of these acts of insurgency and innovation have been consequential. Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives know this all too well, especially when they themselves have become the targets of dissent. The 1910 overthrow of powerful Republican Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL), who had maintained strict control of his caucus for a decade, came at the hands of a small group of “willful men” inside his party who were committed to reform (Bloch Rubin 2017: 2). A century later, Speaker John Boehner faced similar challenges from conservatives in his own party who contributed to his overthrow, and he resigned from office immediately after hosting the Pope on a visit to Capitol Hill. When House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) announced © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_2

29

30 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

in 2018 that he would not seek reelection to office, a leadership struggle erupted between establishment Republicans and Freedom Caucus members that effectively deadlocked the party at a time when it faced serious intraparty divisions on critical policy issues. Simply by threatening to withhold votes for Ryan’s hand-picked successor, the far-right Freedom Caucus gained unprecedented leverage. These lawmakers also exerted their influence in controversial showdowns over immigration policy reform and agricultural policy in the summer of 2018. The Democratic Party has faced its fair share of factionalism, as well. From splits in the party during the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century to the fracture between establishment Democrats and the “Dixiecrats” in the party during the desegregation era, the party’s history has included eras of division (see Chap. 3). New fissures erupted among Democrats again during the pitched battles over the presidential nomination in 2016 and debates about policy priorities. The rise of a wave of Progressivism in the party through the 2018 midterm elections challenged the leadership of the presumptive Speaker, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and led to serious debates about domestic and foreign policy directions. These events underscore how factionalism and the emboldened exchange of views between minorities and majorities matter. Today, the two major U.S. parties are ideologically further apart than ever, deeply polarized and fractured. Party organizations have faltered, experiencing leadership turnovers and uneven patterns of funding (Azari 2016). Parties often appear to be playing catch-up behind dynamic leaders who challenge conventions, from Michele Bachmann and Bernie Sanders, to Donald Trump and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Parties have also been plagued by a raft of legal restrictions and campaign finance reforms (Issacharoff 2016). At the very time that the United States is facing “a crisis of foreign policy solvency” (Beinart 2018), we are witnessing some of the deepest fractures and the highest turnover rates in Congress in decades. In the 2018 midterm elections, for example, more than 50 members of the House and Senate chose not to run for reelection, and another 7% of incumbents lost their seats (McCammond, November 8, 2018). These conditions are all contributing to a shifting environment in which foreign policy is being made within the United States. Given these recent developments, the research questions that drive our study include the following: How have factions in the Republican and Democratic parties evolved in recent decades? How have factions become significant players in the battle over U.S. foreign policy? What strategies have members of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus and the Congressional

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

31

Progressive Caucus developed to influence their party’s positions on ­foreign and national security policy from the outside-in? Are factions more likely to employ traditional legislative maneuvers such as proposing legislation, or nontraditional instruments such as issue framing and problem definition? What are the implications of factionalism for foreign policy consistency? And, can the United States maintain primacy in global affairs, or do internal struggles portend fundamental transformations in foreign policy and grand strategy? To examine these questions, this chapter presents our minority influence model of the foreign policy decision-making process. It also outlines our propositions and the plausibility probe to trace processes of direct and indirect involvement by minority actors in U.S. political parties on foreign policy, as well as discussing case selection criteria for the study.

The Social Psychology of Minority Influence How do players that are seemingly on the margins of politics influence the development of U.S. foreign policy? This study turns to research in social psychology for some promising insights on these dynamics. Generally speaking, social psychologists examine, “how individuals think and feel about, interact with, and influence one another, individually and in groups” (Bordens and Horowitz 2002: 3). Explorations of group interactions, including attempts at persuasion and influence, offer a potentially rich foundation to examine minority-majority relationships. For much of the twentieth century, the traditional “conformity thesis” in social psychology held that dissident voices in groups tend to yield to the majority position even when incorrect (Allen 1965; Maass and Clark 1984). Solomon Asch (1955, 1956) demonstrated that individuals will even dismiss their own sensory information in favor of the position espoused by the majority. Stanley Milgram’s famous studies (1963, 1965) reinforced these ideas about majority positions and obedience to authority. Research in the 1950s and 1960s focused on conformity, where group pressure was thought to foster consensus along with consideration of fewer alternatives (Nemeth 1986). This view is also supported by some contemporary studies, such as social psychological treatments of how factors such as praise, sanctions, and status influence social relationships and unit behavior (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Jones 1984; Bernheim 1994). Research demonstrates group biases toward conformity and support for the status quo, even when

32 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

it might not favor all members. For example, John Jost, Mahzarin Banaji, and Brian Nosek (2004) showed how groups tend to serve their own interests, develop ideological strategies to justify those interests, demonstrate homophily (a strong preference for members of their own kind), and act prejudicial toward outsiders. People may be driven by ethnocentric motives to build in-group solidarity and to defend and justify the interests and identities of fellow in-group members against out-groups (Allen and Wilder 1975; Brewer 1979). Related studies have examined how cost-­ benefit calculations and preference structures influenced behavior. Social rewards for conformance include back-patting, while shaming or exclusion are used as penalties. Scholars also have studied how members of dominant groups try to impose their hegemonic will on members of subordinated groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), as well as justify and rationalize the status quo. However, an alternative school of social psychology offered a fresh take on these dynamics. Serge Moscovici, Elizabeth Lage, and Martine Naffrechoux (1969) challenged the traditional wisdom by showing how group members may exhibit deviance or nonconformity by attempting to persuade others to endorse alternative decisions. Theorists who shifted their perspectives to focus on social change rather than social control reached “an inescapable conclusion that minorities do influence majorities, that originally deviant views can come to prevail” (Nemeth and Staw 1989: 186). Serge Moscovici and colleagues identified a two-step model of minority influence, involving the inducement of conflict with the majority by challenging the majority ideal or norm and providing a consistent alternative perspective. Numerous studies have reinforced the central premise of minority influence theory: consistent behavior by minorities can exert influence, whereas inconsistent behavior is likely to fail to bring about any change of the majority’s attitudes and perceptions (Tanford and Penrod 1984; Moscovici and Personnaz 1980). Notably, these studies tended to focus less on the actual size of the minority than how deviant positions might affect cooperation dynamics and the attainment of goals. Key characteristics of minority influence such as consistency of purpose may help produce attitude changes through member attribution of certainty and competence. Moscovici argued, “minorities can be especially effective when they remain adamant, refuse to compromise or negotiate, and provide a clear alternative view for the majority to adopt” (1980: 201). According to his model, “the process of social influence was qualitatively distinct depending on the target (majority or minority) and the

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

33

source (majority or minority).” When “majorities influence minorities, the conflict is social and minorities comply, changing their position publicly, but not privately. When minorities influence majorities, by way of contrast, the conflict is cognitive—it makes the majorities think and the majority convert (actually change their position), although the conversion is private and delayed, as aligning with a ‘deviant’ minority in public is not desirable” (Kaarbo 2008: 65). Over time, studies have reinforced a central premise of minority influence theory: consistent behavior by minorities will exert influence, whereas inconsistent behavior is likely to fail to bring about any change of the majority’s attitudes and perceptions (Maass and Clark 1984). This work opened a new research program focused on how the activation of minority opinions creates opportunities for innovation. If majority dominance fosters “convergence of attention,” Charlan Nemeth argues, minority views are just as important, “not because they tend to prevail but because they stimulate divergent attention and thought.” Their presentation of views may stimulate consideration of policy alternatives “that, on balance, are qualitatively better” (Nemeth 1986: 25). These positions are echoed by Wendy Wood et al. (1994: 324), who emphasized the degree to which minority pressure can foster innovation and the generation of new, unique views. Gabriel Mugny and Juan Antonio Pérez (1991: 81) added, “the constructive activity induced by the revelation of a minority viewpoint involves a cognitive activity affecting at least three levels: the (re)construction of categorizations, the (re-)definition of attributes, and the (re)analysis and (re)working of the actual content of the minority’s message.” According to Nemeth, deviant viewpoints “stimulate a greater consideration of other alternatives, ones that were not proposed but would not have been considered without the influence of the minority.” When someone is exposed to opposing minority views in a group setting, Nemeth argued, they “exert more cognitive effort…stimulated to attend to more aspects of the situation and think in more divergent ways…and they are more likely to detect novel solutions to come to new decisions” (1986: 27). It is worth noting that these theories of social psychology are not mutually exclusive. There can be both measures of cohesion and unity in groups, as well as divergent opinions or factional challenges. Ruth Bloch Rubin (2017) recognizes that intraparty organizations can share their own measures of unity, bolstering their ability to coordinate policy beliefs and achieve desired outcomes. She characterizes this as developing within the

34 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

broader context of the “push and pull of party power” (2017: 5) and argues that “when serving as a forum for debate,” the work of intraparty organizations is likely to be shaped by many of the same dynamics that “govern the pace and content of legislative activity on the House and Senate floors” (2017: 15). These dynamics, she contends, are a double-­ edged sword: “on the one hand, provoking partisan conflict while, on the other, offering the tantalizing possibility of mitigating partisan discord” (2017: 306). Ultimately, social psychologists contend, there are several possible outcomes from group efforts to influence others. Persuasion can result from genuine transformation of preferences (Rublee 2008: 422). Social conformity can result from the desire to maximize social benefits and minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences. And identification represents a third possible outcome—behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other (Johnston 2001). The processes involved in attempts of persuasion often include offering incentives for cooperation or threats of sanctions for noncompliance. The social psychology literature further demonstrates the need to appear to be consistent in persuasion. This need is often engaged through making commitments; once made, people tend to behave in ways that are consistent with them. Maria Rost Rublee (2008: 427) argues “commitments that are active, effortful, public, and viewed as internally motivated are most likely to generate consistent future behavior.” Additional research in social psychology identified scope conditions associated with greater minority influence. For example, studies found that alternative voices tend to be most effective if they have enough time to present their position (Wachtler 1977), argue in a firm but flexible manner (Mugny 1975), and share the same social category as the majority (Maass et al. 1982). Gabriel Mugny and Juan Pérez (1991: 2) explored how minority groups “firmly uphold their own deviant or marginal standpoint can have an impact on the belief systems and behavior patterns of other individuals.” By inducing social conflict, minorities are capable of creating change—which they can further try to instigate and manage. Mugny and Pérez concluded, “an illusion of immobility is maintained by the fact that, in all innovation processes, conformity with the dominant norm takes place first, and all the more so when it must be displayed publicly. The reality of change, on the other hand, is underground, and is always nearly invisible because of resistance to that change” (1991: 3).

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

35

Notably, political scientists have begun to draw on the social psychology literature to illustrate potential links between social group dynamics and foreign policy decision-making (Levy 2003; Hymans 2006; Kaarbo 2006; Rost Rublee 2008). For example, Joe Hagan et  al. (2001) have argued that the interactions between minority and majority positions, or between government and opposition, can produce alternative outcomes including deadlock, compromise, and more serious policy inconsistencies. Juliet Kaarbo (1996: 501) suggested social psychology provides “a lens to examine junior party strategies of influence in governing coalitions and the locus of decision-making authority”—to study underlying mechanisms linking institutional context to policy-making and policy choices. Beyond a power-based view of junior party influence is a position-based view (i.e., influence can be explained by characteristics of the minority’s position that indicate the commitment, legitimacy, and credibility of the position). Ultimately, Kaarbo (2008: 57) asserted, “The psychological processes involved in group polarization, persuasion, and other influence strategies” can play critical roles in shaping outcomes.

A Minority Influence Model of Factionalism and Foreign Policy Building off this previous work, this book explores how members of the Progressive Caucus in the Democratic Party and the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus in the Republican Party can influence foreign and national security policy. In an era of declining strength of party organizations, we recognize the importance of factional actors in debates about foreign policy solvency. Our study advances four propositions on factionalism for study. Attributes of Factions Counter to the limited literature on factionalism in U.S. politics that treats it as; an outcome of structural conditions, more significant in state and local politics, or as an anomaly (Key 1949; Reiter 1998, 1980; Sindler 1955), this study focuses on attributes of factions as effective agents in policy processes. We adopt DiSalvo’s definition of faction as a party subunit with ideological consistency and temporal durability that undertakes significant actions to shift policy preferences. They are “agenda-setting

36 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

vehicles and engines of political change that develop new ideas, refine them into workable policies, and promote them on Capitol Hill” (2009: 28). Because the United States’ big-tent parties are “cumbersome instruments, factions help account for changes in public policy, modes of electoral mobilization, and the parties’ ideological positions.” Thus, factions provide a valuable social function, helping party members with common identities define and innovate policy positions. They can also help set the policy agenda by challenging dominant ideas and operating “informally by altering folkways and norms under the existing procedural rules” (DiSalvo 2009: 31). While factions technically may be majority or minority actors within their parties, this study focuses on minority faction influence. These groups may be more or less cohesive and disciplined, and their interactions with majorities often produce bifurcated cleavage structures within parties. As DiSalvo argued, At the micro level, a mixture of electoral, ideological, and power-base considerations drive faction members. Members of Congress belong to a faction because they believe that their adherence helps them achieve certain goals. Factions thus become vehicles for members to pursue their own electoral interests by shifting the party’s ideological positioning and image to the right or to the left. The coordination functions factions perform can also help members realize what they deem good public policy. (2009: 30)

These characteristics also relate to scholarly debate about the complex relationship between traditional parties and social movements in democratic systems. Comparative political studies of party movements have identified factions variously as insurgency parties (Schwartz 2010), or social movements that form within parties (sometimes referred to as a “party in the street”; Heaney and Rojas 2015). In that spirit, scholars have continued to disagree about how best to characterize the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus (Skocpol and Williamson 2011; Van Dyke and Meyer 2014; Libby 2014). Mildred Schwartz suggested, “the Tea Party movement fits comfortably into the category of party movement, occurring in the form of an insurgency within an established party that can affect political outcomes” (2010: 4). Meanwhile, among contemporary Democrats, moderates have sought to cast Progressives as a noisy but powerless force. In an attempt to distinguish the difference between Progressive movements and the challenge of party politics, some within Washington have

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

37

adopted “Twitter is not real life” as a rallying cry. The implication of this charge is that people such as Representative Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) or Senator Sanders (I-VT) have exerted undue influence on the party’s direction (Herndon, May 31, 2019). Yet, there is also a distinctive appeal of factions in today’s party system. Clarke (2017) finds that factions can offer attractive “party sub-brands” that may help them appeal to voters, as well as the media and potential campaign donors. Members of factions that are effective communicators can help to reframe political conversations and create traction for their ideas regarding possible answers to the policy process. As such, factions like the New Democrats, the Progressives, or the Freedom Caucus can gain power and influence by establishing cohesive policy approaches to distinctive issues. And in the process, they gain energy and momentum, while the traditional establishment or moderate middle of party organizations becomes defensive and embattled (Thomsen 2017; Clarke 2017). One way to identify the makeup of factions is to examine party support scores. For example, DeWayne Lucas and Iva Deutchman (2009) explored how party members of factional groups differ in voting from their fellow party members who are not members of their respective factions. They measured partisan and ideological voting behavior by the percentage of times members voted with a majority of their party and against a majority of the other party. Party support scores measure the extent of agreement within a party and against the other party and thus assess the extent of party conformity among individual members’ voting decisions. Such scores provide an assessment of unity of party organization on voting behavior of legislators and have been calculated using Congressional Quarterly records (Hager and Talbert 2000; Patterson and Caldeira 1988; Rohde 1991). In addition, recent studies have examined potential links between factionalism and foreign policy (Peake et  al. 2012; Mead 2011, 2017). In contrast to the theory of foreign policy entrepreneurship (Carter and Scott 2009; Marsh and Lantis 2016), which examines direct and indirect, legislative and non-legislative pathways of influence, new attention to factionalism identifies group actors, their ideological foundations, and then extrapolates to potential impact on political party dynamics (Rathbun 2013; Dueck 2010). Notably, these works tend to focus less on the relative “size” of the factions than on their ideological impact. So long as they are ideologically cohesive and temporally durable, they are significant. In Chap. 3, for example, we describe the Jacksonian foundations of Tea Party

38 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

ideology within the Republican Party (Mead 2017), as well as suggestions that it is linked to militant nationalist orientation with regards to foreign affairs (Rathbun 2013). A richer historical accounting of the development of factions in U.S. political parties also contributes to the first proposition of study: Proposition 1  If a cohesive faction emerges that challenges the establishment on significant votes, majority progress on passing their preferred foreign policy initiatives is likely to be prevented or delayed. To explore this proposition, we examine two different measurements of factional cohesiveness. First, we survey the ideological alignments of the members within each faction in comparison to its broader party affiliation (e.g., Tea Party members vs. Republicans). For purposes of this study, levels of ideological polarization will be measured using first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (Hare et  al. 2014; Hare and Poole 2014). DW-NOMINATE scores can be used to show the ideological distance between fellow party members as they rate politicians on a scale from negative 1.000 (most liberal) to positive 1.000 (most conservative) using voting behavior. At the same time, we recognize that some recent studies have challenged the value of DW-NOMINATE and other vote-scaling techniques, believing that they cannot differentiate between government-­ opposition partisanship and voting driven by ideology. Lee (2016) and others believe that under conditions of government-opposition partisanship, scores such as DW-NOMINATE measure party discipline, instead of members’ positions on a left-right continuum (Godbout and Hoyland 2011; Hix and Noury 2016; Spirling and McLean 2007; Zucco 2009; Zucco and Lauderdale 2011). However, as McCarty (2016) argues, these shortcoming and ambiguities related to DW-NOMINATE are not as significant as they are sometimes portrayed and that its scores largely reflect an “ideology-like substance” that is in fact very successful in capturing intraparty divisions. Thus, we consider DW-NOMINATE an ideal starting point for our measurement of congressional ideology and factional ideological cohesion within each caucus membership. DW-NOMINATE offers another way of examining factions and their attributes besides ideology, which is just one component of the fissures among American political parties today (Enten and Azari 2017). The second dimension of DW scores, seldom used in comparison to the first dimension, has historically been viewed as capturing differences within the

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

39

parties over issues such as currency, nativism, and civil rights, thus primarily capturing regional differences within the parties (e.g., between ­northern and southern Democrats) (Voteview). However, more recently, the creators of NOMINATE themselves have begun to argue that the second dimension captures intraparty divisions or insiders versus outsiders cleavages (Poole Rosenthal 2015). Hans Noel (2016) turned this new interpretation into a compromise dimension, arguing that the second dimension captures the degree to which members of congress favor their ideology over the procedural demands of their party. Lauren Johnson, Deon McCrary, and Jordan Ragusa (2018) also use second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores to try and capture the establishment versus antiestablishment divide in the Republican Party. One example they provide is that while Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Rand Paul (R-KY) were ideologically distant in the first dimension (0.38 vs. 0.90), they ranked among the most anti-establishment lawmakers in the second dimension (−0.62 and −0.43) (Johnson et  al. 2018: 5). In his use of the second dimension to examine partisan warfare, Sean Theriault (2013) found that negative scores seem to indicate members who are more anti-establishment and less willing to compromise. Given the increasingly popular use of second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, we add an examination of it in our measurement of the level of anti-establishment cohesiveness in each faction during the Congress in which the policy debate occurred. Specifically, we will employ both first dimension and second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores as follows: First, a simple descriptive analysis will be done to show the differences between the factions and the broader political party it is affiliated with. For both first and second dimension scores, the overall mean score for the entire party will be compared to the average score for faction members (e.g., Republican vs. the Tea Party). The average faction members’ score will be compared to the mean non-­ faction members’ score (e.g., Tea Party vs. non-Tea Party) to determine the specific differences across the party. This will allow us to establish the ideological and anti-establishment differences among those who identify as members of the faction being examined. Next, we determine a threshold for what is defined as the party extreme for all members of the broader political party (i.e., Democrat and Republican). For this, we use Green’s (2019) definition of scores that were at or above the 70th percentile for the party. Once the 70th percentile is established, then we determine how many members of the faction have scores that fall within the extreme. Third, we determine if a majority of the faction have ideological scores

40 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

that put them in the “extreme” (e.g., 30 of 70 Tea Party members). For coding purposes, levels of cohesiveness within a faction is demonstrated using both first and second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. A more cohesive faction is illustrated when a majority of the faction members are found to be extreme in both their ideology and anti-establishment tendencies in relation to the broader party it is affiliated with. A less cohesive faction is illustrated when a minority of the faction members are found to be extreme in either their ideology or anti-establishment tendencies in comparison to their broader political party. Traditional Legislative Strategies Members of Congress can dissent from their parties in many different ways (Green and Bee 2017). In theory, members of minority factions in Congress have equal access to the levers of power and can attempt to shape policy through traditional legislative means. Article I of the U.S.  Constitution grants Congress several important powers related to foreign policy: First and foremost, the legislative process requires a majority in both houses of Congress to vote in favor of bills to be signed into law by the president. Committees review and approve legislation before consideration by the full House or Senate. Legislation also must go through an appropriations stage for funding. Second, Congress has the power to raise funds (through taxes and tariffs) and disperse them for the “common defense and welfare.” The executive branch proposes expenditures, but congressional appropriations shape all federal spending, with large portions of the budget going each year to domestic entitlement programs. Third, the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war (Crabb and Holt 1980), to “raise and support armies” and a navy, and to “make rules for the government and regulation” of the armed forces. Fourth, Congress has the power to offer its advice and consent in treaty-­ making. Ratification represents the confirmation of a signatory power to support  an international treaty or convention (Lantis 2009). Fifth, Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” Historically, this has been a core foreign policy issue that impacts both federal government relations with states and executive-legislative relations. It is also highly politicized, in that many different players have a vested

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

41

interest in how the benefits of trade are managed and accrued (Delahunty 2001). These powers enumerated for Congress in the Constitution demonstrate an implicit bias in favor of majorities or groups who dominate the legislative process. For example, legislation requires majority support in both houses of Congress before submission to the president, and draft bills typically work their way through committee processes that are dominated by the party in the majority. Scholars contend that party leaders have a number of advantages in terms of resources and knowledge of procedures (Strauss and Glassman 2017). James Curry (2015: 2) argued, “information is a key source of power for legislative leaders, shaping the tactics and strategies by which they exercise leadership…leaders can shape how their followers view policy proposals and preferences they develop.” Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins recognized the importance of legislative leaders in the policy process and that “positive agenda control is ever present.” But they also acknowledged, “the frequency with which the party uses this power varies with the degree to which party membership agrees on what the party’s collective reputation should be, hence on what should be done” (2002: 109). While majorities and leaders might have some advantages, this does not prevent members in the minority from developing direct and indirect approaches to attempt to influence policy. Some of the most common direct legislative approaches for expression of deviant opinions include proposing alternative legislation on issues of concern. Direct non-­ legislative instruments include activism through committee hearings or providing advice to the executive branch through consultations (Lindsay 1994; Carter and Scott 2009). Douglas Kriner (2010: 12) argued that Congress can affect foreign policy decisions “through a variety of formal and informal actions taken on the chamber floors [and] in the committee rooms.” And in these settings, groups with deviant or nonconformist positions may induce conflict and seek to persuade others of the legitimacy of their cause. Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (2015: 1) have asserted that the foreign policy-making process is neither distinctly parochial nor internationally focused; rather, groups in Congress must work both with and against the executive to advance their policy goals. These perspectives support our second proposition for study:

42 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Proposition 2  If a faction challenges establishment positions using traditional legislative instruments, it is likely to prevent or delay majority progress on policy passage. This book examines the use of traditional legislative maneuvers by factions that attempt to influence the achievement of preferred foreign policy outcomes (or non-outcomes) by the establishment majority of the party. We address the scope and timing of legislation proposed by members of factions who seek to challenge establishment initiatives. This assumes agency for minority positions in broader political debates and emphasizes the vibrancy of political discourse. They may sometimes try to “veto” majority positions in an institutional sense, but they also have larger potential to influence party cohesion or unity and shape the foreign policy agenda through multiple pathways or means. In terms of coding, high levels of legislative activism are demonstrated by factional members’ introduction of multiple draft bills and the use of amendments to modify legislation in their preferred directions. We expect factional members to sponsor or co-sponsor two or more bills, as well as one or more amendments to existing legislation in attempts to achieve their objectives. They are also likely to speak out and challenge establishment initiatives through committee hearings. Medium levels of legislative activism are demonstrated by the introduction of either legislation or the use of amendments. Low levels of legislative activism are demonstrated by limited engagement in the legislative process, often denoted by the absence of sponsorship or co-sponsorship of bills related to the issue in the period of study. Issue Framing Consistent with Moscovici’s description of a two-step model of minority influence, this study posits that factions may use nontraditional means such as issue framing to induce conflict with the establishment by challenging the majority position or preferred policy outcome. Because minorities often lack the power, status, and size to drive affairs, Serge Moscovici found that “the organization of behaviors and opinions, and the timing and intensity of their expression” are critical to their successful influence (1976: 110). This approach assumes that social influence inherently involves conflict between minority and majority preferences. Moscovici recognized that social influence could be qualitatively distinctive, depending on its source and target. Specifically, when majorities influence

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

43

­ inorities, the conflict is social and minorities comply, changing their m position publicly, but not privately. When minorities influence majorities, by way of contrast, the conflict takes the form of cognitive dissonance, with the potential to force consideration and even conversion by the majority (Kaarbo 2008: 65). As Nanne De Vries and De Dreu (2001: 3) have explained: a minority expresses a deviant view using a behavioral style that expresses confidence and consistent, the majority group member wants to understand why they (dare) do this. In trying to understand what the minority apparently understands, a cognitive conflict is brought about and the group member, in trying to comprehend the deviant position, validates it….The process of reconsidering one’s own views, results in changing the (cognitive) basis of the original opinion: “real” change, not contingent upon the power of the group and its presence, but based on new ideas and cognition. This ‘real’ influence will be indirect rather than direct.

Issue framing offers a powerful tool to help create dissonance and foster conversion. Junior partners may be able to avoid a clash with the senior partner over policy choices if they can successfully frame, or more accurately, reframe, the way a problem is represented. Problem representation represents the mental image of an understanding of the problem and involves a definition of the situation (Sylvan and Voss 1998), and framing theories suggest that frames can be especially powerful through selective descriptions and even omission, in some cases. Studies of political decision-­ making suggest that the ways in which individuals and groups represent a problem is key to understanding the policy choices that are considered and eventually chosen. Scholars who have examined the role of problem representation in the group setting (e.g., Sylvan and Thorson 1992; Beasley 1998) have noted that much of the group process revolves around negotiation among competing problem representations rather than among competing policy choices. If junior parties are instrumental in the framing process, they are likely to influence the policy from the outset. Although there have been few studies examining framing in the group process, some have proposed that what frame is accepted by the group significantly influences group information processing and choice (e.g., Haas 2001). Particularly important is whether the issue is framed in terms of losses or gains, as the former tends to push groups to be more risk-prone, while the latter tends to lead them to be

44 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

more risk-averse. Individual group members or factions can influence the group frame. “[I]f one favors a bold and risky alternative, the framing tactic requires a definition of the decision problem as a choice between risky prospects. And if one wants to play it safe, the tactic requires that the problem be defined as a choice between gains” (Maoz 1990: 89). In this way, Charles O. Jones (1982) and others have recognized that factions can be “agenda-setting vehicles and engines of political change that develop new ideas, refine them into workable policies, and promote them on Capitol Hill.” This contributes to the third proposition of study: Proposition 3  If a vocal faction challenges and redefines the frame of the problem in a foreign policy issue area, it is likely to prevent or delay majority progress on policy passage. Minority factions may employ issue framing fairly often, with the goal of defining the challenge in a way that conforms to their preferred solution. Because the goal is persuasion for policy change, and we expect minority and majority frames to differ, it is important to recognize these perspectives may be deviant or nonconformists. As Robert Entman (1993: 53) argued, frames may be metaphors or symbols raised in political discourse to “help receivers of information define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.” Framing allows factions an opportunity to shape the discourse on controversial issues and effectively shape the meaning-in-use or popular understanding of certain issues (Mugny and Pérez 1991). And notably, Entman recognized that redefinition can be a confrontational process: “Elites wage a war of frames because they know that if their frame becomes the dominant way of thinking about a particular problem, then the battle for public opinion has been won” (1993: 58). For purposes of this study, we examine both the use of framing and its scope and nature. Strong positive framing would be demonstrated by distinctive interpretations of the problem by members of a faction meant to seek constructive solutions. Strong negative framing is present when factions employ vocal, regular challenges to obstruct progress by establishment leaders. These are alternative frames or narratives that come through clearly in discourse, which distinctively characterize the issue and proposed solutions. Medium levels of issue framing are demonstrated by limited attempts to reframe or define a problem by members of a faction, in either

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

45

direction (positive or negative). These would be demonstrated in less distinctive or prominent alternative interpretations. Low levels of framing are demonstrated by the absence of evidence of framing and problem definition by members of a faction. Given the nature of the discourse among committed actors in the policy process, this would seem to be a less likely outcome. Consistency of Opposition Another nontraditional strategy that party factions may employ to persuade the establishment of deviant positions is consistency. According to Moscovici, consistency indicates a “strong conviction, commitment. It shows that the minority believes in what it says and that its belief is fixed,” and it can manifest in repeated expressions of similar ideas or demonstrations of similar behavior—a clear extension of convictions. Moscovici added, “such singleness of purpose, such confidence, never fails to make an impression or indeed to attract others. Everyone recognizes that a consistent individual or group knows what it wants, is willing to pay the price of its actions, will reject any concession to the majority, and will in no case give in to pressures” (1985: 28–29). In other words, scholars see demonstrations of repeated behavior as an overt sign of belief and support. Ultimately, the goal of such efforts is persuasion, or what Maria Rost Rublee defines as “behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences” (2008: 421). When minorities are consistent in their efforts to challenge majority opinions, they may be engaged in persuasion, obstruction, or innovation. Persuasion suggests the ability to influence or shape the development of policy initiatives. It typically requires both clarity of purpose and persistence. For example, following years of steady pressure from far-right conservatives in the Republican Party, Speaker Paul Ryan worked through the House Republican Conference in 2015 to effect changes to the panel that assigned seats for plum committees on Capitol Hill. Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members repeatedly called for the addition of at large appointments to the Republican Steering Committee, and this reconfiguration allowed a shift in control of the party from establishment Republicans to include more conservatives (Straus and Glassman 2017: 5–6). Policy obstruction or innovation effectively involves constructive substitution of alternative policy frames or preferred solutions. Building on issue framing, minority groups may offer alternative policy goals or out-

46 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

comes that are more attainable (Johnston 2001). Through persistence, Nemeth maintained, “even when they are wrong [minority challenges] contribute to the detection of novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better. The implications of this are considerable for creativity, problem solving, and decision making, both at the individual and group levels” (1986: 25). This work informs the next proposition of study: Proposition 4  If a vocal faction is consistent in their policy opposition, it is likely to prevent or delay majority progress on policy passage. Persistence of opposition or persuasion are, themselves, a means to shape the policy process. The social psychology literature is clear that resistance and provision of a stable alternative norm may produce successful outcomes. High levels of consistency are demonstrated by often-repeated occurrences of public advocacy for a particular foreign policy concern by members of a faction throughout the period of its consideration on the policy agenda (Papastamou and Mugny 1985). Evidence of this level of engagement should be seen in the Congressional Record and in the public record—in that members will reappear regularly in the policy process debates and through a variety of outlets to reassert their position. Medium levels of consistency and persuasion are demonstrated by the introduction of periodic assertions of minority concerns during the policy debate. This may be illustrated most clearly when members of factions engage in policy debates, but then shift their attention to other pressing matters. They are committed, but appear not to remain engaged over time. Low levels of consistency are coded when there are few or no public records of instances of alternative policy advocacy by members of factions.

Research Design This study explores the role of factions as catalysts for political change. We conduct a plausibility probe of the model of minority influence to account for select episodes of factional challenges to establishment positions on U.S. foreign policy. Once again, the factors that we believe shape minority influence for this study are: (1) Attributes of Factions: this study examines the relative size and cohesion of factions within larger party organizations; (2) Traditional Legislative Instruments: examining the extent of legislative action undertaken by members of the faction; (3) Issue Framing: the

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

47

minority inducement of conflict with the majority by challenging the majority position, ideal, or norm; and (4) Consistency: the provision of consistent, stable alternative positions. These strategies may allow factions to amplify their voices and influence in the policy process. They also often work together with other groups, from dissenters in the major party across the political aisle to civil society groups, to help achieve their objectives. To examine factional attributes, we review both the historical development of the party factions (see Chap. 3) and the contemporary ideological links and affiliations among members of Congress with factions inside larger party organizations. Factions are seen as vehicles for both identity and agency—they help to define and innovate policy, as well as act as agents to challenge dominant ideas and reset policy agendas. Again, we employ DW-NOMINATE data to determine the cohesiveness of the factions at the time of the policy dispute in question. We also seek to broaden our measurements of factional attributes by including primary and secondary works on intraparty groups in Congress. We look for self-reporting of ideological alignments through policy-makers’ public affiliations or membership in caucuses or groups on Capitol Hill, or secondary accounts of the membership and relative influence of factions. We examine three strategies of influence in the foreign policy process. Traditional legislative instruments can be determined by tracing the process of factional engagement in the foreign policy process. We measure the number of bills introduced by factional leaders, as well as attempts to add amendments as riders to existing legislation. We also examine instances of challenges through committee hearings. This behavior should be manifest in the public record. We code multiple attempts by factions to interject themselves into the foreign policy decision-making process as significant, while few attempts represented a limited role. For issue framing and consistency, we examine the discursive record for presentation of alternatives by prominent factional voices, as well as regular engagement in the policy process to a determined outcome. Regular rhetorical efforts to reframe issues in line with factional interests are coded as significant, while less engagement or efforts constructive substitution of alternative issue frames and policy solutions are characterized as limited. Outcomes, or the dependent variable of this study, are focused on the relative “success” of the factions in blocking establishment initiatives. Consistent with Matthew Green’s (2019) study of factionalism, we recognize differences between “policy wins” and “political wins.” Policy wins focus on the enactment of desired legislation or the successful blockade or

48 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

defeat of undesired legislation (i.e., negative agenda-setting power), contrary to the preferences of party leaders. To Green, political wins represent a higher bar of achievement—successful efforts by the Caucus to exercise positive agenda-setting power by forcing floor votes on desired proposals. Our study focuses primarily on policy wins, which it defines as preventions or delays of passage of establishment policies, or, in some cases, the successful implementation of alternative policies supported by the factions. We measure these outcomes on a nominal scale from prevention/delay to successful passage of alternative legislation. We mark the beginning of a period of policy consideration through high-profile statements by party leaders and the introduction of related legislation in one chamber of Congress. We then examine the duration of deliberations from the initiation of intent to pass legislation to the ultimate outcome or non-outcome. If factions are successful in proposing alternative legislation or executive actions that are subsequently enacted, this denotes a “highly successful” level of influence. If factions are unable to significantly influence establishment proposals but are effective at blocking the passage of establishment legislation for an entire session of Congress, this activity is coded as “successful.” When administration proposals are delayed by factional opposition but ultimately enacted within a session of Congress, we code the outcome as “partially successful.” Finally, if establishment initiatives are advanced, move quickly through the legislative process, and emerge relatively “unscathed” by the input of opponents in party factions, this outcome is coded as “unsuccessful.” This nominal scale is designed to recognize the power of dissent as a strategy in minority-majority relations vis-à-vis policy development. This study conducts a plausibility probe of these propositions to help refine theory regarding the role of factions as minority actors in foreign policy decision-making processes (Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2004). Plausibility probes “allow the researcher to sharpen a hypothesis or theory,” or “to refine the operationalization or measurement of key variables” (Levy 2008: 6). The goal of the study is to highlight new insights into how partisanship and politics can influence decisions involving critical areas of foreign policy. Case studies attempt to trace the mechanisms and processes of policy development, with a special focus on congressional entrepreneurship strategies and outcomes (Ragin 2014; George and Bennett 2004). Theoretically relevant, standard questions regarding p ­ olicy engagement and activism are applied to the cases in order to standardize data collection (George and McKeown 1985; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999).

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

49

Table 2.1  Case studies of insurgency and innovation

Tea Party/Freedom Caucus (Republican Party) Progressives (Democratic Party)

Obama administration (2009–2017)

Trump administration (2017–present)

Immigration policy reform Export-Import Bank funding Military strike on Syria Trade policy and TPP

Iran nuclear deal Family planning and foreign aid Travel bans Immigration reform (DACA)

While this subject area presents an exciting potential universe of cases that could be applied to study propositions, including comparisons of relations between majority and minority factions within U.S. political parties over time, or comparisons of factionalism in democratic regimes around the world, this study delimits the focus to factionalism during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The value of these cases is that they provide a contemporary perspective on a (potentially) persistent challenge, and they allow us to “convert descriptive explanations of particular outcomes to analytic explanations based on variables” (Levy 2008: 2). Case studies selected for this project focus on foreign policy debates from 2009 to the present (2019) (see Table 2.1). Finally, we employ several criteria for selection of the case studies in this project. First, these cases offer tests of the plausibility model of factionalism. Consistent with the logic of the comparative case studies method, Gerring and Cojocaru (2016: 3) have argued, the exploration of several in-depth case studies, integrating diverse styles of (observational) evidence, can potentially “shed light on a broader population, which it represents in an imperfect manner.” Case selection criteria included reflecting on variation in the research design, selecting cases with enough data to address the question of interest, cases that help draw significant comparisons, and representativeness (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Cases chosen for this study also highlight significant contemporary foreign policy and national security policy debates that generated substantial political crosswinds, media attention, and public interest.

50 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Bibliography Allen, V.  L. (1965). Situational Factors in Conformity. In L.  Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press. Allen, V.  L., & Wilder, D.  A. (1975). Categorization, Belief Similarity, and Intergroup Discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 971–977. Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American, 5, 31–35. Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(9), 1–70. Azari, J. (2016, May 19). A for Effort? Republican Elites Tried to Coordinate but Never Quite Got There. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/5/19/11712612/republican-elites-coordination Beasley, R. (1998). Collective Interpretations: How Problem Representations Aggregate in Foreign Policy Groups. In D. Sylvan & J. Voss (Eds.), Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beinart, P. (2018, September 16). America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic. com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreignpolicy-for-the-trump-age/570010/ Bernheim, B. D. (1994). A Theory of Conformity. Journal of Political Economy, 5, 841–877. Bordens, K., & Horowitz, I.  A. (2002). Social Psychology. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Brewer, M.  B. (1979). In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 2, 307–324. Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. Durham: Duke University Press. Cialdini, R.  B., & Goldstein, N.  J. (2004). Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity. Annual Review Psychology, 55, 591–621. Clarke, A. J. (2017). The House Freedom Caucus: Extreme Faction Influence in the U.S. Congress (PDF file). Retrieved from http://www.democratic-anxieties.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Clarke_Berlin2017.pdf Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2002). Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986. In D.  Brady & M.  D. McCubbins (Eds.), Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Crabb, C., & Holt, P. M. (1980). Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

51

Curry, J. M. (2015). Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. Delahunty, R. J. (2001). Federalism Beyond the Water’s Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs. Stanford Journal of International Law, 37(1), 1–73. De Vries, N.  K., & De Dreu, C.  K. (2001). Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation. London: Blackwell Publishing. DiSalvo, D. (2009). Party Factions in Congress. Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies, 36(1), 27–57. Dueck, C. (2010). Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Eckstein, H. (1975). Case Studies and Theory in Political Science. In F. Greenstein & N.  Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science (Vol. 7, pp.  79–139). Reading: Addison-Wesley. Enten, H., & Azari, J. (2017, March 26). The Two Cracks in the Republican Party. FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-two-cracksin-the-republican-party/ Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication, 4, 51–58. George, A., & Bennett, S. (2004). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Boston: MIT Press. George, A., & McKeown, T. J. (1985). Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decisionmaking. Advances in Information Processing in Organization, 2(1), 21–58. Gerring, J., & Cojocaru, L. (2016). Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods. Sociological Methods and Research, 45, 392–423. Godbout, J.-F., & Hoyland, B. (2011). Legislative Voting in the Canadian Parliament. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 367–388. Green, M.  N. (2019). Legislative Hardball: The House Freedom Caucus and the Power of Threat-Making in Congress (Elements in American Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Green, M., & Bee, B. (2017). Keeping the Team Together: Explaining Party Discipline and Dissent in the U.S. Congress. In J. R. Straus & M. E. Glassman (Eds.), Party and Procedure in the United States Congress (2nd ed., pp. 41–62). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Haas, P. M. (2001). Policy Knowledge: Epistemic Communities. In N. J. Smelser & B.  Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (pp. 11578–11586). Oxford: Pergamon. Hagan, J. D., Everts, P. P., Fukui, H., & Stempel, J. D. (2001). Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy. International Studies Review, 3, 169–216.

52 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Hager, G. L., & Talbert, J. C. (2000). Look at the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25, 75–99. Hare, C., & Poole, K.  T. (2014). The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics. Polity, 46(3), 411–429. Hare, C., Poole, K.  T., & Rosenthal, H. (2014). Polarization in Congress Has Risen Sharply: Where Is It Going Next? Washington Post, 13. Heaney, M. T., & Rojas, F. (2015). Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and the Democratic Party after 9/11. New York: Cambridge University Press. Herndon, A. W. (2019, May 31). Biden’s Appeal to Political Center Tests Power of Democrats’ Left Wing. The New York Times. A11. Hix, S., & Noury, A. (2016). Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures. Political Science Research and Methods, 4(2), 249–273. Hymans, J. E. C. (2006). The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Issacharoff, S. (2016). Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our Hollowed Out Political Parties. Houston Law Review, 54:4, NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper, 16–52. Available as SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2888064 Johnson, L.  R., McCray, D., & Ragusa, J.  M. (2018). #NeverTrump: Why Republican Members of Congress Refused to Support Their Party’s Nominee in the 2016 Presidential Election. Research and Politics, 5(1), 1–10. Johnston, A. I. (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 487–515. Jones, C.  O. (1982). The United States Congress: People, Place, and Policy. Homewood: Dorsey Press. Jones, E.  E. (1984). Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships. New York: W.H. Freeman. Jost, J., Banaji, M., & Nosek, B. (2004). A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo. Political Psychology, 25(6), 881–919. Kaarbo, J. (1996). Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 501–530. Kaarbo, J. (2006, April 12). Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy: Project Overview. Invited research presentation, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Kaarbo, J. (2008). Coalition Cabinet Decision Making: Institutional and Psychological Factors. International Studies Review, 10(1), 57–86. Kaarbo, J., & Beasley, R. K. (1999). A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 20, 369–391. Key, V. O., Jr. (1949). Southern Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

53

Kriner, D.  L. (2010). After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lantis, J. S. (2009). The Life and Death of International Treaties: Double-Edged Diplomacy and the Politics of Ratification in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. Lapham, L. H. (2005). On the Suppression of Dissent and the Stifling of Democracy. New York: Penguin Books. Lee, F.  E. (2016). Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levy, J.  S. (2003). Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. In D.  O. Sears, L.  Huddy, & R.  Jervis (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (pp. 253–284). New York: Oxford University Press. Levy, J. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25(1), 1–18. Libby, R.  T. (2014). Purging the Republican Party: Tea Party Campaigns and Elections. Lanham: Lexington Books. Lindsay, J. M. (1994). Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore/ London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lucas, D.  L., & Deutchman, I.  E. (2009). Five Factions, Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994–2002. Congress & The Presidency, 36(1), 58–79. Maass, A., & Clark, R. D. (1984). Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Years of Minority Influence Research. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 428–453. Maass, A., Clark, R.  D., & Haberkorn, G. (1982). The Effects of Differential Ascribed Category Membership and Norms on Minority Influence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 12(1), 89–104. Maoz, Z. (1990). Framing the National Interest. World Politics, 43, 77–110. Marsh, K., & Lantis, J.  S. (2016). Are All Foreign Policy Innovators Created Equal? The New Generation of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12(2), 116–141. McCarty, N. (2016). In Defense of DW-NOMINATE. Studies in American Political Development, 30, 172–184. McCammond, A. (2018, November 8). The Incumbents Who Lost in 2018. Axios. https://www.axios.com/incumbents-who-lost-reelection-2018-midtermelections-f4cc0c57-77c3-4952-baa1-7a2e7128568c.html Mead, W. R. (2011). The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 28–44. Mead, W. R. (2017, January 20). The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order. ForeignAffairs.com Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(4), 371.

54 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Milgram, S. (1965). Liberating Effects of Group Pressure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1(2), 127–134. Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2015). Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Moscovici, S. (1976). Social Influence and Social Change. New  York: Academic Press. Moscovici, S. (1980). Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 13, pp.  209–239). New York: Academic Press. Moscovici, S. (1985). The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moscovici, S., & Personnaz, A. B. (1980). Studies in Social Influence V: Minority Influence and Conversion Behavior in a Perceptual Task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16(3), 270–282. Moscovici, S., Lage, E., & Naffrechoux, M. (1969). Influence of a Consistent Minority on the Response of a Majority in a Color-Perception Task. Sociometry, 32, 365–380. Mugny, G. (1975). Negotiations, Image of the Other and the Process of Minority Influence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5(2), 209–228. Mugny, G., & Pérez, J.  A. (1991). The Social Psychology of Minority Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nemeth, C. J. (1986). The Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence. Psychological Review, 93, 23–32. Nemeth, C., & Staw, B.  M. (1989). The Trade Offs of Social Control and Innovation Within Groups and Organizations. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 175–210). New York: Academic Press. Noel, H. (2016, September). Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties. Annals, AAPSS 667. Papastamou, S., & Mugny, G. (1985). Rigidity and Minority Influence of the Social in Social Influence. In S.  Moscovici, G.  Mugny, & E.  Van Avermaet (Eds.), Perspectives on Minority Influence (pp.  113–136). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patterson, S. C., & Caldeira, G. A. (1988). Contours of Friendship and Respect in the Legislature. American Politics Research, 16(4), 466–485. Peake, J. S., Krutz, G. S., & Hughes, T. (2012). President Obama, the Senate, and the Polarized Politics of Treaty Making. Social Science Quarterly, 93(5), 1295–1315. Poole, K.  T., & Rosenthal, H. (2015). The Polarization of the Congressional Parties. Voteview.com. Updated March 21, 2015. Ragin, C.  C. (2014). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Oakland: University of California Press.

2  FACTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: A MODEL OF MINORITY INFLUENCE 

55

Rathbun, B. (2013). Steeped in International Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1), 21–37. Reiter, H. L. (1980). Party Factionalism National Conventions in the New Era. American Politics Quarterly, 8(3), 303–318. Reiter, H. L. (1998). The Bases of Progressivism Within the Major Parties. Social Science History, 22(1), 83–116. Rohde, D.  W. (1991). Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rubin, R.  B. (2017). Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rublee, M.  R. (2008). Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 10(3), 420–450. Sanders, B. (2018, October 9). Sanders Speech at SAIS: Building A Global Democratic Movement to Counter Authoritarianism. School for Advanced International Studies. Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University. https:// www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-speech-at-saisbuilding-a-global-democratic-movement-to-counter-authoritarianism Schwartz, M. A. (2010). Interactions Between Social Movements and US Political Parties. Party Politics, 16(5), 587–607. Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case-Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(3), 294–308. Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sindler, A.  P. (1955). Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana. American Political Science Review, 49(3), 641–662. Skocpol, T., & Williamson, V. (2011). The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press. Spirling, A., & McLean, I. (2007). UK OC OK? Interpreting Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of Commons. Political Analysis, 15(1), 85–96. Straus, J. R., & Glassman, M. E. (Eds.). (2017). Party and Procedure in the United States Congress (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Sylvan, D. A., & Thorson, S. J. (1992). Ontologies, Problem Representation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(4), 709–732. Sylvan, D.  A., & Voss, J.  F. (1998). Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1984). Social Influence Model: A Formal Integration of Research on Majority and Minority Influence Processes. Psychology Bulletin, 95(2), 189–225. Theriault, S. M. (2013). The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress. New York: Oxford University Press.

56 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Thomsen, D.  M. (2017). Joining Patterns Across Party Factions in the US Congress. The Forum, 15(4), 741–751. Van Dyke, N., & Meyer, D. S. (2014). Understanding the Tea Party Movement. Surrey: Ashgate. Wachtler, J.  B. (1977). The Effect of Conformity Versus Minority Influence Settings on the Individual’s Ability to Locate Non-obvious Solutions in a Hidden Figures Test. Doctoral Dissertation, ProQuest Information & Learning. Wood, W., Lundgren, S., Ouellette, J.  A., Busceme, S., et  al. (1994). Minority Influence: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Influence Processes. Psychological Bulletin, 115(3), 323–345. Zucco, C., Jr. (2009). Ideology or What? Legislative Behavior in Multiparty Presidential Settings. Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1076–1092. Zucco, C., Jr., & Lauderdale, B. E. (2011). Distinguishing Between Influences on Brazilian Legislative Behavior. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36(3), 363–396.

CHAPTER 3

“We the People?” Historical Foundations of Factionalism

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. —James Madison (1787) The internal divisions within our political parties are deeper than they’ve been in at least two decades. The Democrats are divided between the Hillary types and the Bernie camp. The Republicans between Trump and Never Trump. This is beginning to harken back to the old days, when our parties were amalgams of factions that were sometimes harshly at odds with each other. —Caldwell et al. (2018)

The political climate in the United States today is polarized and fractured. In many ways, the tumultuous politics of the Trump era seem emblematic of divisions—featuring rifts between the president and Congress, between political parties, among factions within parties, and among the American people (Caldwell et al. 2018; Noel 2016). As a candidate for president in the 2016 elections, Donald Trump courted supporters using strong populist rhetoric that appealed to the far-right and marginalized members of society. As president, Trump has variously aligned himself with the positions of the far-right Freedom Caucus and with establishment Republican leaders. In what is clearly a transactional relationship, the president has abandoned some initiatives at the urging of conservatives, while ­embracing © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_3

57

58 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

others. Meanwhile, Democrats remain deeply divided over principles that could shape their political agenda. The 2016 primary showdown between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders for the party’s nomination for the presidency revealed deep schisms over issues and strategies within the Democratic Party. These became even more visible following the arrival of a new wave of Progressives in Congress in the 116th Congress. The division among Democrats is also evident with the beginning of the 2020 presidential primary campaign with questions about whether candidates such as former Vice President Joe Biden are “Progressive enough” to lead today’s Democratic Party. These ideological and political divisions have been salient for the development of all forms of policy—and they have intensified at the very time when the United States faces an incredible range of challenges around the world. The collapse of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy in the Cold War has given way to serious debates about U.S. engagement in the world, and we have witnessed shifting cycles of global engagement and retrenchment. With no clear agreement on future pathways, the country may indeed be facing “a crisis of foreign policy solvency.” U.S. purposes and means for engagement in global politics have fallen out of alignment, and today there is little agreement on U.S. grand strategy. Facing a significant rise in polarization and “negative partisanship” in Washington politics (Campbell 2018; Iyengar et al. 2012), different lawmakers have advanced very different solutions for the solvency dilemma. How did we get to this place where consensus on U.S. foreign policy priorities appears to have broken down? How have minority factions gained such sway over U.S. politics? Who are these groups, and what do they stand for? And, what strategies do these groups employ to try to shape foreign policy development? This chapter examines historical patterns in the rise of factionalism and identifies pathways of influence over time.

Historical Foundations America’s Founders were distrustful of political parties. When devising their revolutionary new system of government, they hoped to create a “polity without parties.” There were a number of reasons for this disdain. Many of the framers had studied classical political philosophy and the works of European political theorists who warned how divisions could unsettle the polity. Their personal experiences with party-like groupings of

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

59

delegates within colonial and state governments also impacted their negative views (Wolfensberger 2018). Some saw parties as potential drivers of class conflict and clashes of interests as well as opportunities for corruption and demagoguery (Reichley 2000: 17). More importantly, many of the Founders rejected parties because they believed that those divisions could undermine their fledgling republican form of government. Even before the Revolutionary War ended, John Adams lamented, “There is nothing I dread so much as a division of the Republic into two great parties, each arranged under its leader and converting measures in opposition to each other” (qtd. in White and Kerbel 2011: 34). Parties, and their efforts to cater to special interests, would undermine the republican ideal of compromising for the common good. Nevertheless, political parties began to emerge within a few short years of the founding of the country. Some of the Founders were members of the Old Whig party in Great Britain, and their affiliations carried over to debates in the New World. Factions and ideological divisions that had emerged within the colonies were further inflamed during the debates over drafting of the Constitution. The two distinct groupings in this period, the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, and Anti-Federalists (or Republicans), led by Thomas Jefferson, represented the early foundations of the two-party system that the United States has today (Gerring 1998). Following President Washington’s retirement, the elections of 1796 and 1800 saw the breakout of party warfare in national politics. The fervor of the ideological debates at the time, mostly about who a democratic government really serves, led some of the Founders to reconsider both the potential benefits and the inevitability of the emergence of the party system (Shefter 1993). Jefferson’s election in 1800 brought along with it a period of Republican dominance, while the Federalists faded. The resulting “Era of Good Feelings,” created the illusion that parties or factions could still yet be avoided in the fledgling government. Jeffersonian Republicans dominated the White House without much opposition for the better part of two decades (Goodman 1977). This period of “politics without parties” came to an end in 1824 when the Republicans shattered over the question of who would succeed James Monroe after his second term. While John Quincy Adams would eventually defeat Andrew Jackson, it was clear that formidable coalitions and political organizations were departing from the previous singular Jeffersonian lineage. As such, Adams and others soon began to call themselves National Republicans, with Jacksonians i­ dentifying

60 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

as Democratic-Republicans. The renewal of competition between and within parties revealed that distinctive American traditions were embedded within the national political culture and that a two-party system was useful, and perhaps even essential to American democracy (Reichley 2000: 51). As such, the period from the 1830s to the 1890s is often described as America’s “true party period” (White and Kerbel 2011: 48). The return of major party struggle in the 1830s coincided with the emergence of the Whig Party. This diverse group coalesced in opposition to the Jackson presidency and the populist party organization created by Jacksonite Martin van Buren (whose members simply called themselves “Democrats”).1 Besides opposing Jackson’s expansive use of presidential power, the Whigs attacked the major changes in the structure and behavior of parties occurring during Jackson’s political hegemony (Gerring 1998). They believed in a nonconformist position at the time—that party partiality and discipline, mass voter mobilization, strong state machines, and the spoils systems was a danger to the republic. These views led some to call the Whigs the first anti-party (Azari 2016). Yet, the Whigs and their moral conservativism remained one of the two major national parties for two decades, successfully electing two presidents—William Henry Harrison in 1840 and Zachary Taylor in 1848—as well as House majorities in 1840 and 1846. Unfortunately, both Harrison and Taylor died in office, hampering the party from establishing a more lasting coalition. In the end, the Whigs ended up as the only conservative party in American history to become a truly national party (before the Republicans of the 1970s), electing governors in 20 states including most of the South (Reichley 2000: 79). The ideological battles between the Democrats and Whigs were fought out on the national stage, and as a result they emerged as national political institutions of a kind that had never been seen before (Holt 2003). Election turnouts soared, and the parties responded to popular interest by formalizing and centralizing their structures, including holding national conventions for the first time. However, the momentum of the Democrats and Whigs would be abruptly halted by the social and moral disputes of the 1850s. Nativism and anti-Catholicism plagued American politics at the time, creating a vacuum for a deviant anti-immigration faction, the Know-­ Nothings, to emerge and break away from the Whigs forming the 1  At the party’s 1840 national convention, the name was formally changed to the Democratic Party.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

61

“American Party” (Gerring 1998). The issue of slavery also divided both major parties, eventually leading to the extinction of the Whigs and the fracturing of the Democrats. Opposition to slavery laws in the North in the 1850s led to the creation of the modern-day Republican Party. With the other parties in disarray, Republicans quickly attained major party status, winning control of the House in 1858. Two years later, Republicans nominated Abraham Lincoln for president, and he won office in a contested, four-way race. The election of Ulysses S. Grant in 1868 is considered to mark the moment when the two-party system as we know it today, dominated by Republicans and Democrats, fully took hold. By the 1890s, a new set of rules came to define processes by which governing majorities could advance legislation (dubbed the “Reed Rules” for the House Speaker at the time, Thomas Brackett Reed [D-ME]). While both parties enjoyed national prominence and procedures appeared to favor majorities, the Democrats and Republicans would nevertheless continue to face challenges to their unity from factions throughout history (Wolfensberger 2018; Holt 1983).

Factions and the Democratic Party The history of the Democratic Party in the United States can be traced back to the framers. Thomas Jefferson was elected the first Democratic-­ Republican president in 1800, elevating the party to power and prominence that was carried on by Jacksonian Democrats. The Democratic National Committee was created in 1848 to help institutionalize the party. However, the party was on the wrong side of the slavery issue: Democrats defended its practice in the South and promoted its expansion to new Western states. The rise of the anti-slavery Republican Party and the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 gave Democrats their longtime partisan rival. For most of the next century, the legacy of slavery would leave Democrats as the party of the South and Republicans the party of the North (Holt 1983). Yet, even the broadest outlines of the history of the U.S. political party system also hint at divisions. In some ways, parties might always be seen as manifestations of factionalism—that is, they are often composed of (sometimes) disparate factions trying to work together in a big tent. This was the case during the first century of the history of the party, and those dynamics continued to evolve in the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, for example, Democrats were divided between progressive and more

62 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

conservative factions. William Jennings Bryan’s call for an expansion of government support for social welfare foreshadowed causes that the party would later take up in earnest. President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) and a dominant coalition of Democrats helped define an agenda for the party that favored liberal internationalism. Wilson called for active engagement in global politics, for the end of imperial conquest, and the establishment of international organizations. Later, Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initiatives (1933–1945) helped define the modern party as a champion of a strong social welfare state, liberalized immigration policies, support for agriculture, government assistance to those in need, strong separation between church and state, and challenges to the wealthy aristocracy. President Truman (1945–1953) grafted elements of Wilson’s commitment to liberal internationalization to reinforce America’s commitment to democracy and order after World War II (Milkis 1993). In contemporary politics, the Democratic Party garners support from a diverse range of groups in modern politics. Democrats tend to be backed by labor unions, white working-class voters, secular groups and the Christian left, middle-class educated women, and minorities (Frymer 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001). Support for Democrats is strongest among voters in urban areas as well as elites concentrated on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. Yet, it is also an amalgam of very different groups and perspectives, including those who favor nonconformity and are deeply committed to causes. The party has gained support over time from the expanding minority populations active in American politics, including initiatives and outreach to African-American and Latinx voters. It also receives support from identity groups such as Jewish voters and the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGBTQ) community (Miller and Schofield 2008). The modern Democratic Party is, thus, full of potential factional groupings. History of Democratic Factions While the Democratic Party is the oldest continuous party organization in the United States and has played an important role in U.S. national politics, it also has faced challenges from within. During the Civil War, for example, Democrats in the North became deeply divided. One faction of the party supported President Lincoln’s military policies in the prosecution of the war (the so-called War Democrats), while others strongly opposed them (the Copperheads). The Copperheads made a number of

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

63

attempts to end the Civil War in the early 1860s. Even though the party garnered support from the South during the Reconstruction era, this served to further fracture the party along regional lines (Gerring 1994). As a result, the Democrats suffered losses in Congress and a string of failures in presidential elections; no Democratic President was elected from 1861 until 1884 (Grover Cleveland). Yet, even then, there was substantial division in the party: Cleveland represented a nonconformist faction known as the Bourbon Democrats, who challenged U.S. expansion overseas and the annexation of Hawaii. These and other divisions further diminished the party’s voice in Congress (Milkis 1993). Populist Democrats represented a particularly strong faction within the party, active during the Progressive Era from 1896 to 1924. Led by Bryan, the Populists filled the Democratic Party’s programmatic void during the first two decades of the twentieth century with its focus on promoting and protecting the economic interests of farmers. Emerging largely in response to the social and economic impacts of industrialization, the Populists appealed to the agricultural areas of the Midwest and South, wrestling the party away from Northern hard-money men and Southern states-rights conservatives (DiSalvo 2012: 13; Gerring 1998). In order to check corporate excesses and readjust sectional economic imbalances, Populists believed in expanding the power of the federal government. This would help regulate the marketplace, such as the railroads and banking industries, and offered the potential to promote the redistribution of wealth. The Populists were considered relatively successful at driving change within their party, with Bryan securing the Democratic presidential nomination three times. Even though Bryan never won the presidency, Populism helped to refashion the Democratic Party agenda, and supporters became important players in the passage of legislation such as Wilson’s New Freedom programs (Gerring 1998: 192). Internal divisions in the party continued into the 1930s and 1940s, even after the influence of the Populists had waned. The passage of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies in the 1930s awakened the long-­ standing Southern fear of an all-powerful federal government that would transform their way of life. By 1938, a faction of Southern Democrats began to defect and cooperate with conservative congressional Republicans in their attempt to defend states’ rights and look after their region’s well-­ being (DiSalvo 2012: 49). They championed policies and framed issues that were very different from the party majority, including supporting segregation and government support for economic modernization in the

64 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

South. When Democrats adopted a civil rights plank at their 1948 ­convention, Southern delegations walked out and formed a “Dixiecrat” ticket led by Strom Thurmond. The Southern Democrats would linger for decades as a somewhat successful faction aimed at maintaining the status quo within the party. Presidents from Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson would often be forced to adjust their policies to placate the wishes of their Southern colleagues (Bibby and Maisel 2003). Another faction of the Democratic Party, the Liberal-Labor Democrats, emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s. Its members hoped to significantly expand the role of government to address economic and social problems. Liberal-Labor Democrats “preached policies built on pragmatism, moderation, and pluralism that differed not only from Southern Democrats’ parochialism but also the idealism and moralism of the earlier Populist Democrats” (DiSalvo 2012: 52). They adopted nonconformist positions that challenged government support for big business and centralized economic management. The deviant policy positions that emerged from the Liberal-Labor faction would impact the political agendas and major legislative accomplishments of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy. Division again rocked the Democratic Party in the 1960s and 1970s, when a group of New Politics Democrats rose out of middle-class suburbs to challenge the party on issues of multiculturalism, identity, and U.S. engagement in the world. One of the central issues that they coalesced around was their opposition to the Vietnam War. Moreover, New Politics Democrats became an influential faction in Congress in the 1970s as members championed minority rights, the environment, and consumer protection (DiSalvo 2012). The faction became so vocal in its support for left-liberal policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s that it actually drove the Democratic Party to nominate far-left Senator George McGovern (D-MN) for the presidency in 1972. McGovern was a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, and Democrats believed they might have found a cause that could unite the party. They also thought they had a potential advantage with the recent passage of the 26th Amendment to the Constitution, which lowered the national voting age to 18 from 21 years of age. This ultimately proved a strategic overreach for the Democrats, though, when McGovern suffered one of the worst defeats in the history of presidential elections (Karabenick et al. 1973).2 Nixon carried the youth vote, and he drew broad support from across the country. Meanwhile, the Democratic  McGovern won votes in the Electoral College from only one state, Massachusetts.

2

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

65

Party reeled from this experience, and the New Politics faction quickly faded from the national political scene. In the 1980s, a new faction in the Democratic Party emerged that called themselves “New Democrats.” This group materialized after the defeat of Walter Mondale in the 1984 election (and following a string of other presidential defeats in 1968 and 1972) when some Democrats determined that only a move to the political center could revive the party’s prospects (Medvic 2007). They formed the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), a group dedicated to the development of pragmatic, more moderate policies, in an effort to try to widen the political tent. Looking back to this time, former Democratic Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) said, “We knew that we wanted the DLC to be an idea factory—an idea generator”. Members of the DLC became prominent players in the party as well as representing New Democrats. They found support largely in new areas, such as the suburban South and West, rather than the traditional sources of Democratic voters in the Northeast and Midwest. A son of the South, Bill Clinton, ran successfully as a New Democrat in 1992 by advocating middle-of-the-road policies such as free trade and deficit reduction. Clinton won the White House, but he failed to govern consistently enough to help solidify the New Democrats’ control of the agenda in the party (Zelizer 2010). Democratic Factions Today: The Rise of the Progressives Today’s Democratic Party is divided between Centrists (including vestiges of the New Democrat faction) who reflect the establishment positions, the more conservative Democrats or “Blue Dogs,” and the Progressives on the left. The rise of these factions reflects cleavages among the party’s major constituencies, very different frames of reference, and shifting patterns of policy interests and popular support. As one observer noted, the schism between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders had actually been “knit into the DNA of the modern Democratic Party, in two interrelated ways. The first [was] ideological: the battle of left versus right….the second [was] sociological” (Perlstein, June 14, 2016). The roots of contemporary differences began nearly a century ago when the party was divided between an urban and more progressive wing and its conservative opponents. Under new President Franklin Roosevelt, “the party’s urban, modernist wing established what would become a long hegemony over its reactionary, Southern one” (ibid.). But even those dynamics were contested, including

66 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

challenges within the party from both the political left and right, over questions like the size and responsibilities of government and individual rights and liberties. Modern Centrists reflect the establishment majority in the party, but this was not always the case. Centrists tend to support a balanced economic agenda, along with fights for civil liberties. Their foreign policy agenda supports active, if measured, engagement in global politics, reflecting the spirit of Wilsonian idealism. Centrists tend to back the use of military force in select circumstances, and in some cases, have been willing to support reductions in social welfare programs. Prominent Centrists in the 2010s included House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) (a former Progressive, herself) and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY). Former Presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, also reflected these values. The Blue Dog Caucus, first formed in 1995, includes Democrats disproportionately from the South, and they express views that tend to be more fiscally conservative and socially moderate than the larger party membership. Conservative Democrats have frequently entered into coalitions of support with Republicans on critical issues. These members tend to support initiatives more popular in the Republican Party, from defense of the Second Amendment to fiscal conservatism. Blue Dog Democrats have experienced varying levels of influence in recent decades. After its initial activity in the 1990s, the group underwent some decline in the 2000s until more recently (Yoshinaka 2015). Seen as once on the verge of extinction, the Blue Dog Coalition nearly tripled their membership after the 2018 elections, when Democrats were recruiting and supporting moderate, centrist candidates as part of its strategy to take back control of the House. As a result, the Blue Dogs now have 27 members in the House and are proving themselves to be a force in challenging the establishment and progressives within the party (Ferris 2019). The Progressive wing represents a vibrant, newer faction of the Democratic Party that challenges conformity on policies and rules structures. Progressive influence rose dramatically in the 2000s and 2010s, and its members tend to advocate a relatively social democratic agenda. While the ideological split in the party might be seen as linked back to differences in the 1960s and the fallout from the collapse of McGovern’s “New Left” movement, Progressives in the late 2010s also champion some distinct issues. Progressives support populist resistance to economic liberalism in the form of free trade, as well as a push for universal health care and revitaliza-

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

67

tion of the national infrastructure. They also advocate for a strong social welfare net and restrictions on the power of banks and major corporations to impact the lives of citizens. In the 1990s, prominent members of the Progressive movement included Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), and presidential candidate Howard Dean. In the 2000s, Progressives included Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Representative John Lewis (D-GA). In the 2010s, the Progressive movement was led by Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT). And following the 2018 midterm elections, a new group of prominent voices have emerged among the Progressives, including Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI). Progressives represent the most committed modern faction of the Democratic Party to overhaul its agenda, with distinct definitions of policy problems and seemingly steadfast commitments to key issues. In a struggle that some have termed a “battle for the soul of the party,” Progressive challenges to Centrists in the 2010s were designed to draw the party to the left on a number of issues. Policies supported by Progressives have included recognition of the intermestic nature of foreign economic policies, challenges to centralized power and “crony capitalism,” respect for alliances with countries that share American values, skepticism regarding military interventions in other countries, and redistribution of the federal budget to support social welfare over military spending (Sitaraman, April 15, 2019). Progressives have also attempted to expand their support among highly educated voters, women, and young people through online outreach. Modeled on the success of early online campaigning by Democratic candidates for the presidency, such as Barack Obama and Howard Dean, Progressives like Warren and Sanders seem to be going “all-in” on networked advertising and promotion. They seek to link into powerful grassroots organizing and draw support from active online communities such as Daily Kos, MoveOn.org, and Talking Points Memo to help repel challenges from moderates (Cillizza and Murray, August 5, 2007). The contest between Progressives and Centrists has played out in other interesting ways, too. In 1992, for example, President Clinton promised to champion a New Democrat agenda that would satisfy all sides (Perlstein, January 16, 2016). President Barack Obama also struggled to hold together the party factions. In particular, the rift within the party emerged quite strongly during Obama’s second term, and it became more evident during the combative Democratic Party primary race between Clinton

68 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

and Sanders for the 2016 presidential nomination. Sanders championed a social democratic agenda with a populist edge, appealing to Democratic voter groups including millennials and labor supporters. Meanwhile, Clinton had to fend off repeated challenges that she was simply “too establishment.” Following the surprise victory by Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential elections, analysts suggested that the Democratic Party was much more deeply divided than it appeared on the surface. One columnist wrote, “The Democratic Party exploded Tuesday night [in the presidential election]. There will be months of finger-pointing and internal reprisals over exactly what Democrats should have done differently. But the shocking thoroughness of the defeat is plain” (Carter, November 11, 2016). In reality, these divisions would continue to impact the Democratic Party and U.S. politics for years. The election of Republican President Donald Trump served as a catalyst for the dramatic expansion of Progressive influence in the Democratic Party. According to one analysis, liberals in the party began to displace moderates at a rapid pace. The share of Democratic voters who describe themselves as liberal has grown from 30% to 50% from 2001 to 2018, according to Gallup data. At the same time, the percentage of Democrats who identified as moderate fell from 44% to 35% (Edsall, October 18, 2018). This dramatic lurch to the left was “more pronounced on social issues involving race, gender and sexual identity than it is on economic matters.” Progressives espoused different, nonconformist positions and appeared committed to fighting for them through the policy process. According to data from American National Election Studies, strong progressive and liberal views were on the rise in the 2010s. For example, progressive activists were much more likely to say that they were “ashamed to be an American” and identified themselves as “feminists”. These shifting sentiments played out through the 2018 midterm election cycle, which saw the emergence of an outspoken new group of Progressive candidates. These liberal Democrats advocated for a number of issues, including challenges to establishment candidates and corporate power, championing universal health care, and fighting wage inequalities. Some Progressive candidates challenged the traditional leaders of the party, including House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and called for a new spirit of change. The election outcome brought dozens of new Democrats to Washington, and more than 20 would join the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC). In fact, the size of the CPC in the 116th session in Congress would be the largest in history.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

69

Not only would Progressives have greater numbers, they also gained visibility and sought positions of power and influence in the House of Representatives. Progressives intended to parlay their victories into influence in governance and the policy process. Leaders of the CPC demanded, for example, that Progressives gain key leadership positions in the party caucus and that their members would be represented proportionally on some of the most powerful committees. These include seats on the House Committees on Appropriations, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Financial Services. These seats at the table would empower Progressives to influence both party decisions and the policy agenda, giving them a voice in bill writing, amendments, and voting. Progressives are also working with policy advocacy coalitions to leverage more of a voice in the policy process, including key consumer groups and labor unions (Carter, November 21, 2018). At this writing [in July 2019], the record shows that factionalism has affected Democratic Party initiatives. There are deep cleavages inside the party on a wide range of issues, including income redistribution, immigration policy, campaign strategies, challenges to President Trump, environmental protection, immigration policy, drug policy, and education policy (Cole 2018). In early April 2019, for example, Democratic Party leaders in the House were unable to muster support for a major federal funding initiative that would have opened negotiations with Republicans on new provisions for a spending bill (DeBonis and Bade, April 10, 2019). When the caucus gathered for a 3-day retreat to celebrate its first 100 days in power in the House, leaders focused on how to keep the party together. While House Speaker Nancy Pelosi maintained, “Our diversity is our strength,” Representative Mark Pocan (D-WI), co-chair of the CPC argued, “Hopefully there’s a good lesson to be learned…that when 40 percent of the caucus has a position, it may be a good position to listen to.” CPC lawmaker Pramila Jayapal (D-WA) spoke directly to the leadership, saying, “Please come and talk to us; we have to be a part of the process” (qtd. in DeBonis and Bade, April 10, 2019).

Factions and the Republican Party The modern Republican Party is descended from the conservative Federalists and Whigs, with strong roots in Jeffersonian individualism. From its very inception in the mid-1850s, the Republican Party has been a catch-all mass party, or a “Grand Old Party” (GOP). Although it emerged through opposition to slavery, it was far from being a single-issue

70 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

party (Reichley 2000: 93). The early Republican Party was committed to an extensive program and ideology that championed, among many other issues, liberty, moral puritanism, order, and industrial capitalism. While its stance on slavery meant that Republicans would have little to no support in the South and in the slave-owning border states for nearly a century, the party has also always been a firm advocate of political nationalism dating back to Lincoln’s preservation of the union (Richardson 2014). Since the 1930s, the Republican Party has developed a clearer platform devoted to curtailing the size and scope of the federal government as well as its potential threats to personal liberty. Republicans have instead preferred to restore the powers of state and local governments (reflecting Jeffersonian localism), while limiting the federal government to only those responsibilities reserved to it in the U.S. Constitution. This “small government” approach by the GOP serves as a foundation for a platform focused on lowering taxes, entitlement reform, limited government regulation, free trade, and open markets, as well as its views on gun rights. This brand of economic conservativism within the Republican Party was later joined by a religious component in the 1970s and 1980s. The religious right or “Christian right” coalesced into a political movement just in time to court Ronald Reagan for the 1980 election. Reagan’s victory brought the “Moral Majority” of evangelicals more directly into American politics. This remains an extremely influential pillar of the GOP today, especially its views on policies such as abortion, gay marriage, and other social issues (Richardson 2014). The Republican Party has also been associated with a focus on national security and the promotion of U.S. values abroad. In the Eisenhower era, this took the form of global engagement in the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. During the Nixon presidency (1969–1974), Republicans supported continued U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, and the president claimed that a broad “silent majority” of Americans supported conservative values. The Ronald Reagan era saw a profound shift in the U.S. commitment to fight the Cold War, including dramatic defense spending increases (the largest peacetime increases in history) and harsh rhetoric threatening the Soviet Union with a limited nuclear war. Later, President George W. Bush (2001–2009) enjoyed unified government—Republican control of the White House and both houses of Congress—that firmly linked the party with his new global War on Terror and associated increases in military spending.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

71

The Republican Party of the 2010s garnered support from a range of social and economic groups including small business owners, the wealthy, and large corporations, as well as the agriculture sector. Republicans typically receive strong backing from white voters who also identify as older, less-educated, male, and religious. The Republican emphasis on moral values garners support among many religious groups from Mormons to white evangelical Protestants. Geographically, Republican constituents have been concentrated in suburban and rural areas throughout the United States, giving them large majorities in the South and the Central (or “Plains”) regions of America. Republicans’ more conservative stance on immigration, civil rights, and social issues has often meant less or little support among African-Americans, Latinx, some groups of women, as well as the LGBTQ community (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). History of Republican Factions Republicans have their own history with factionalism and disagreements within the party. These factions reflect deep-seated ideological tensions among groups within the catch-all party. Many Republican politicians, activists, and voters view their party as existing to advance the conservative cause and its goals of reducing the scope of government and reversing cultural change. At the same time, some party leaders have espoused the expansion of the national security state and compromised with Democrats on social welfare issues. Thus, Republican politicians and party leaders have faced periodic accusations that they have failed to uphold the party’s conservative principles, and they have been challenged from both within and from civil society actors (Grossman and Hopkins 2018). Republican factions first emerged in the late 1860s when the two-party system dominated by Republicans and Democrats began to coalesce. It was during this time period that the GOP split into groups such as the Stalwart Republicans, the Liberal (or Mugwump) Republicans, and later, the Half-Breed Republicans. Each of these factions reflected different, nonconformist perspectives on key issues. Stalwart Republicans, mostly within industrial states and in the South, emerged in resistance to the end of Reconstruction and the patronage system that had developed along with it (DiSalvo 2012: 36). Liberal Republicans, on the other hand, opposed the continuation of the military occupation of the South, seeking to remake the GOP into a party ruled by well-bred Northeastern Protestant elite that stood for free markets and efficient government. Half-Breed

72 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Republicans, from the Northeast and West, sought to navigate a course between Liberals and Stalwarts that occupied the center of the party, one that stood for moderation, pragmatism, and effective government (DiSalvo 2012: 37). However, because these factions were relatively small and geographically concentrated, it was difficult for any group to truly recast their party. Instead, they attempted to use their influence to try to impact the Republican presidential nomination process throughout the late 1800s. The divided character of the GOP in the Gilded Age continued into the early 1900s with the rise of the Conservative (or Old Guard) Republicans and Progressive Republicans, who often found themselves on opposite sides on many issues. Conservative Republicans included legislators from the industrial regions of the Northeast and Midwest who, alongside their allies in big business, wanted to reassert control over the party’s image and platform (Richardson 2014). Conservatives used their power in Congress to block populist reforms emanating from the Western and Southern agricultural states and veto Teddy Roosevelt’s progressive policies, especially federal regulatory expansion. Progressive Republicans, emerging as a challenge to Old Guard dominance, focused on reducing tariffs, railroad regulation, and breaking up trusts. President Roosevelt was a major catalyst for Progressives as was opposition to his successor, William Howard Taft, who conservatives had backed for president in 1908. As the 1912 election loomed, the Progressive faction became a splinter third party or anti-party, effectively splitting Republicans and allowing for the victory of Woodrow Wilson. The election of 1912, to a large extent, spelled the end of progressivism in the Republican Party and the long-term victory of a conservative party image. During the 1930s and 1940s when the party was out of power, a new faction emerged that aimed to move the party toward the political center: Liberal or “Modern” Republicans found a political opening in supporting the publicly popular New Deal, while the rest of their party opposed FDR and his policies (Zelizer 2010). Between 1940 and 1956, Liberal Republicans were able to successfully dominate the GOP’s presidential selection process with the central appeal of candidates such as Wendell Willkie, Thomas Dewey, and Dwight Eisenhower. While Liberal Republicans were effective in elevating their candidates, they failed to draw their party’s ideology away from conservativism. In the 1960s, a New Right Republican faction emerged that was far more successful at transforming the GOP over time. This group had bri-

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

73

dled under President Johnson’s Great Society policies as well as the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and by the late 1970s they began to take over the Republican Party with an ideology distinct from older conservatism. The New Right espoused a stronger strain of libertarianism and anti-statism, while at the same time not shying away from support of evangelical Christian principles. This faction challenged social welfare spending and instead favored stronger commitments to national security. The movement culminated in the election of one of their own in Ronald Reagan in 1980, and presaged Newt Gingrich’s takeover and transformation of Congress through the “Contract with America” in 1994. Modern Republican Factions The Republican Party is divided into several prominent factions in the 2010s. At the core of the party stand establishment Republicans, who tend to be fiscally and socially conservative and have made politics their profession. Establishment politicians also enjoy broader support from a coalition of lobbyists and donors. This “governing wing” of the Republican Party is perhaps best represented by the Bush family (including Presidents George H.W.  Bush and George W.  Bush, along with Florida Governor and presidential candidate Jeb Bush) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY). Establishment Republicans became the target of frustrated voters and other factions of the GOP in the 2010s who believed that the “Washington cartel” had failed to stand up to “politics as usual” or President Obama in defense of conservative values (Stevenson 2016). Political strategists characterized 2016 as the most anti-establishment race they had witnessed in modern politics, with Donald Trump campaigning on the pledge to “drain the swamp.” U.S. politics in the years that followed have seemed to bear this out. Another faction within the GOP is the Moderate Republicans, who are more middle-of-the-road ideologically and more likely to embrace pragmatism and bipartisanship. The moderates were represented by members of Congress like Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), as well as others concerned about particular issues. Moderates in the Republican Party could trace their roots back to the aftermath of the 1964 election when a number of leading voices called for a more inclusive GOP.  They criticized the campaign of Barry Goldwater and sought to modernize their party on social issues. However, the moderates never fully

74 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

coalesced into a movement with a coherent program or ideology, nor the kind of grassroots fundraising network that could fuel candidates for office (Kabaservice 2011). This lack of coherence and absence of a rigid ideology depressed support for Moderate Republicans over time, as residents of larger cities and suburban areas have shifted their support to the Democratic Party. Members of a smaller Libertarian branch of the Republican Party in the 2010s believe in stronger commitments to personal and economic liberty, above all else. These views are deeply held and manifest through issue framing and nonconformity. A popular Libertarian slogan is “Minimum Government, Maximum Liberty.” This movement appeared to make a recent comeback with the popularity of Representative Ron Paul (R-TX), who criticized the failures of the Iraq War and government responses to the 2008 Global Recession. One study in 2017 found that around one in six Republicans identified as liberty-minded conservatives or people who strongly favored smaller government and lowers taxes. The heirs of Barry Goldwater seemed to be on the rise again during the 2016 election with presidential candidates including Senators Rand Paul (R-KY)  and Ted Cruz (R-TX), but they were soundly defeated in the primaries by President Trump. Trump’s own approach was somewhat incoherent early in the presidential race, but he also appeared to co-opt libertarianism with his own “America First” strategy (Tyson and Maniam, November 9, 2016). Perhaps the most determined factions in the Republican Party in the 2010s were the Tea Party movement, and later, the Freedom Caucus. In fact, Green (2019) believes that no intraparty group truly compares to the Freedom Caucus in modern congressional history. These collections of arch-conservative lawmakers represent an extension of a cycle of insurgencies or “rejectionist wings” of the Republican right that has shaken the GOP since the 1950s. Even the name of the Tea Party movement was a throwback to the “T Parties” of the early 1960s that was part of the right-­ wing, anti-tax crusade of that era. During the Nixon administration, disagreement over policy and legislative strategy between conservative Republicans and the overall party leadership led to the eventual creation of the Republican Study Committee (RSC) in 1973. The RSC served as an “ideological rallying point” for conservatives in the House who had both substantive and tactical differences with the overall Republican Conference.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

75

The RSC and its agenda-setting and coalition-building activities continue to exist today, but it was not until the Tea Party faction brought far-right ideas, which, in previous decades had been marginalized by some conservatives, into the Republican mainstream. They found more currency in the polarized political environment of the 2010s for many reasons, not the least of which included the rise of the media nexus of Fox News, conservative talk radio, online outlets such as Breitbart, and for-­ profit groups that acted as an echo chamber for the factions (Bailey et al. 2012). As a result, many GOP politicians were unable to keep the Tea Party movement at arm’s length or resist the rightward pressures from their base in the late 2000s and early 2010s. The Tea Party movement emerged in the aftermath of Barack Obama’s 2008 election as part of a wave of frustration with the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Manifestations of the movement included populist rallies across the United States and challenges to government elites. The consequent rise of the Tea Party faction in Congress, boasting about five dozen members at its height, helped fuel the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm elections. Tea Party members in the House represented nonconformists who regularly defied leadership attempts by Speaker John Boehner (R-OH). Their differences with establishment Republicans over fiscal and social issues became emblematic of a period of extreme partisanship and polarization in Washington politics (Martin 2013; Chaddock 2011). They took on the establishment on issues ranging from deficit reduction and health care to immigration policy and the right to life (Karpowitz et al. 2011; Williamson et al. 2011). The Tea Party seemed to quickly find success by pressuring the establishment wing of the Republicans Party to the right on issues for fear that moderate members might be “primaried” by a right-wing opponent or lambasted in the media (Richardson 2014; Mead 2011; Rathbun 2013). Support for the Tea Party was strongest in the South, but most of its members make up a demographic—white, middle to low income, older, married, Christian—that spans the whole country (Hochschild 2016: 15). They also feared that “their country” was being taken away from them by mass immigration and new extensions to social welfare programs for minorities (Williamson et al. 2011). Tea Party adherents seemed to arrive at their dislike of the federal government via three routes—through their religious faith, through hatred of taxes, and through its impact on their loss of honor (Hochschild 2016: 35). Overall, the Tea Party movement reflected a popular dissatisfaction with cultural change, of which President

76 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Obama’s election and the ACA were powerful symbols (Grossman and Hopkins 2018). While it was often believed that fiscal conservativism was the top priority of the Tea Party faction, research proved that to be inaccurate, as many members of the group were themselves collecting from government welfare programs. Instead, crackdowns on immigration, fierce opposition to Democrats, and cuts in spending for the young were found to be the overriding policy priorities for Tea Partiers. The movement was able to tap into a number of populist foundations. In a survey conducted in 2014, for example, 72% of white respondents without college degrees said they believed that “the U.S. economic system generally favors the wealthy” (Edsall, November 11, 2014). Like the Old Right of decades ago, the Tea Party conceived the United States as divided between those who work hard and play by the rules and those who game the system (Skocpol and Williamson 2011). During its rise to prominence, influential leaders within the Tea Party movement included former Governor of Alaska and Vice Presidential nominee Sarah Palin, former House Majority Leader and chairman of the conservative non-profit Freedomworks Dick Armey, and Representative Michele Bachmann (R-MN), who founded the Congressional Tea Party Caucus faction. While activists of the Tea Party movement were leery of embracing the caucus, Bachmann’s group eventually included nearly 50 members of the House of Representatives. She also launched a failed attempt to run for president in 2012. At around the same time, the Tea Party Caucus started to lose its luster despite the fact that one of its members, Steve Scalise (R-LA), was elected as House Minority Whip. While the Tea Party as a group fell into decline, intraparty discontent would remain prevalent in the Republican Party. The Freedom Caucus is a conservative intraparty faction that arose in 2015 as the Tea Party was fading. There are some similarities between these groups. Indeed, six members of the Freedom Caucus in 2015 had also been members of the Tea Party faction in the House, and two of these were founders of the new caucus: Mick Mulvaney (R-SC) and John Fleming (R-LA). These and other founders, including Tim Huelskamp (R-KS) and Jim Jordan (R-OH), were disgruntled Republican lawmakers who were motivated principally to try to shape a new political agenda for conservatives. In particular, Freedom Caucus members felt they were not being heard, and so they focused much of their energy on internal ­influence within the GOP and trying to change its existing procedures and policy, as opposed to developing alternative policy proposals, which

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

77

had been the objective of the Republican Study Committee. “Our guys have always been more about the process than the policy,” said one Caucus member (Green 2019: 10, 13). But there are also differences between this new faction and the Tea Party. While they sought to tap into some of the energy and ideas of the earlier movement, Freedom Caucus leaders were determined to develop a more organized and focused approach to policy development. The purpose of the new caucus was expressly: “to advance an agenda of limited, constitutional government in Congress” (Press Release, Congressman Jim Jordan, January 26, 2015). Members of the Freedom Caucus believe that they should keep a tightly organized movement that is devoted to conservative principles in order to achieve selective goals (Eaton, February 11, 2015). As Clarke (2017: 11) argued, the faction is “selective, ideologically homogenous, and rigid in their commitment to serve as the ‘tip of the spear’ for the activist, conservative wing of the Republican Party.” The caucus is led by a nine-member board of officers that are annually elected, and it is expressly organized as an invitation-only group that deliberately capped its size to about 40 Republicans and kept its membership roll private. Another significant difference between the House Freedom Caucus (HFC) and other, previous factions was that its bylaws included a formal binding mechanism that required the full membership to vote in favor of a position if 80% of its members were in agreement (Green 2019: 10). The Freedom Caucus also founded two political action committees, the House Freedom Action Fund and the House Freedom Fund, to help fund its members’ reelection campaigns and recruit new members (Clarke 2017; McGee 2017; Center for Responsive Politics 2019). One of their goals is to create independent sources of campaign funds so that caucus members would not have to fear cuts as potential punishments from the Republican Party leadership if they went their own way in the policy process. Without fear of punishment, the Freedom Caucus was uniquely designed to move the Republican Party to the right through threat-making and other aggressive bargaining tactics against their party leadership—eventually earning it the name of the “Caucus of [Hell] No” (Green 2019). The rise of conservative intraparty factions within the Republican Party was not without controversy. Representative Charlie Dent (R-PA), a moderate, called the Freedom Caucus the “veto caucus” and criticized the group as a “bunch of rejectionists” (qtd. in Sherman, October 15, 2015). He made it clear that he saw the Freedom Caucus as bent on obstruction-

78 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

ism, not as an engine for policy innovation. Representative Tom McClintock (R-CA), who was once a member of the Freedom Caucus, but later resigned, claimed that by carving off from the main party agenda, the caucus had “unwittingly become Nancy Pelosi’s ally” in Democrats’ efforts to challenge the Republican agenda (Press Release, Congressman McClintock, September 16, 2015). Caucus members shot back with responses like that from Representative Dave Brat (R-VA), who said, “People call us obstructionist [but] we are obstructionists to bad policy” only. The result has been retribution for challenges to the Establishment for Caucus members, including removal from key committee seats, loss of subcommittee chairmanships, and even ousters from the Republican Party’s leadership team. In fact, the treatment of conservatives by the Establishment was one of the triggering events for the creation of the HFC, when Mick Mulvaney lost the election for chair of the RSC in November 2014 amid allegations of interference by the GOP leadership (Green 2019: 9). Donald Trump’s presidential campaign breathed new life into factions in the Republican Party—and the relationship between the Freedom Caucus and Trump blossomed. Trump’s candidacy effectively challenged establishment Republicans, and he attempted in 2016 to tap into the concerns of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus bases in order to cobble together a coalition backing his presidential run. Trump also endorsed some of the libertarian principles of the faction. Despite his past politics, Trump attempted to woo the most conservative of Republican supporters in the process. He called for fewer government regulations, as well as a pullback from widespread U.S. government engagement in global politics. Trump’s base also reflected the demographics of backers of the Freedom Caucus. Trump voters tended to be white males without a college degree. While his base was predominantly male, Trump also drew a notable percentage of support from college-educated females. Older voters also preferred Trump over Clinton by a wide margin. Despite efforts by the Republican Party to try to broaden its “tent” of supporters to include greater diversity, Trump seemed all too ready to try to tap into traditional Republican voters’ frustrations with social issues, challenges to Christian values, frustration with Obamacare, and general a sense of victimhood (Tyson and Maniam, November 9, 2016). Divisions inside the Republican Party continued during the first years of the Trump presidency. In some cases, the Freedom Caucus and its obstructionist positions were buoyed by Trump’s confrontational

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

79

approach. When their interests aligned, the president and far-right conservatives were able to block substantial initiatives. In other cases, Trump appeared to cajole and encourage faction members to get behind compromise policy initiatives. One of the issues on which they found great harmony was immigration, for example. Conservative Republicans were deeply concerned about immigration policies and the potential of immigration to fundamentally undermine demographic and social support for the party. The Freedom Caucus applauded the president’s tough rhetoric on immigration reforms, including the White House travel bans and showdowns over “caravans” of asylum seekers moving to the U.S.-Mexico border. In turn, the president quietly encouraged Republicans to continue to challenge establishment principles. This synergistic relationship thus continued to sow seeds of dissent within the Republican Party, seemingly regardless of long-term potential costs. In summary, the history of factionalism in U.S. political parties has been characterized by powerful twists and turns, and some evidence suggests that factionalism has again intensified in the past two decades. Today, more and more Democrats identify as ideologically “liberal” and more Republicans identify as “conservative,” and membership in the Congressional Progressive Caucus has grown in recent years. This appears to echo major intraparty divisions in the Democratic Party between highly conservative Southern Democrats and northern liberals in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the serious split between the Democrats in the 1990s. More broadly, we are witnessing a period of division that periodically comes to the fore in American politics—an important crossroads in which debate and contestation can help shape the paths we will choose. Polarization and partisanship have become so severe that the United States was recently coded factional in the Polity IV dataset. These dynamics can be linked to factors including “increasing levels of income inequality, an increase in the proportion of noncitizen immigrants in the US population, and changes to campaign finance rules” (Cole 2018: 185). These differences can be seen in challenges within the Democratic Party, where members have debated a redistributive agenda and focused on social identity issues; they can also be seen in rifts among Republicans over the very definition of “conservative” in the Trump era. By whatever measure, though, Cole (2018: 186) argues, the “erosion of wealth redistribution policies and programs since the Ronald Reagan administration has contributed to increased income inequality and exacerbated political polarization.” The result, Cole argues, is that “Cleavages

80 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

in American politics seem to be increasingly parallel and reinforcing among social identity (e.g., race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender), economic class, and urban/rural geographic lines, and they now align with issue based cleavages that use to be cross-cutting such as environmental protection, immigration policy, drug policy, and education policy” (2018: 186).

Factions and Foreign Policy While the histories of political parties in the United States are rife with attention to factionalism, fewer scholars have studied its implications for foreign policy development.3 Treatments of factions in the media and political science often tend to relate these dynamics to social issues and values debates. Nevertheless, factional struggles over foreign policy abound, and politics have rarely stopped “at the water’s edge.” During the Cold War, for example, some members of Congress on the Democratic Party’s left flank encouraged the government to find common ground with the Soviet Union. Later, New Politics Democrats rose in feverish opposition to the Vietnam War, and members of both parties raised questions about how the United States should use its power in the world. Foreign policy has become a more serious area of disagreement between Centrist Democrats and Progressives over the past decade, for example. Indeed, some of the most outspoken members of the Progressive movement in the party have called for an end to U.S. military interventions in the war on terror and a return to a more parochial focus on concerns at home. Progressives gained ground politically during the George W. Bush administration, a period in which they helped lead the charge against ­ continued U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Progressives also challenged Bush administration policies such as national security surveillance through the PATRIOT Act and raised important moral and ethical questions about drone strikes. Meanwhile, Centrist Democrats tended to support more military interventions and challenges to U.S. adversaries around the world. Debates in 2018–2019 regarding the continued U.S. military presence in Syria nicely illustrated these divisions, for example. 3  Notably, one reason for the dearth of scholarship in this subject area this might be professional: The study of factions effectively straddles the division between the subfields of American/Comparative Politics and International Relations/Foreign Policy Analysis.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

81

Liberal Republicans first started to buck their party on foreign policy during the Cold War. In fact, the biggest issue dividing Liberals from their intraparty rivals was their belief about the role of the United States in the world, as the majority of the party favored strains of “isolationism” while the Liberal faction championed “internationalism” and America’s global responsibilities (DiSalvo 2012: 44). Following their predecessors’ lead, the New Right faction of the 1980s and 1990s pushed the GOP on foreign policy concerns, specifically calling for the United States to adopt a more vigorous promotion of its interests after years of timidity in the wake of Vietnam. They argued for a major defense buildup and a revived Cold War posture that needed to challenge Soviet aggressiveness. The collapse of the bipartisan Cold War consensus, coupled with foreign policy arguments championed by the New Right in the Republican Party and disputes between New Democrats and liberal Democrats, signaled a new chapter of factional politics in the United States (Johnson 2006; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007, 2010). In the post-Cold War era’s increasingly polarized environment, issues that had been previously treated as settled were reopened, fueling the fire of partisanship. For example, in the 1990s, New Party Democrats bucked the establishment by promoting free trade agreements as well as criticizing the larger Democratic Party for supporting pacifist, isolationism. However, these themes were largely rhetorical devices used by Clinton and others and were not issues of intense scrutiny by New Democratic thinkers. In reality, the New Democrats were slow to develop coherent, broadly agreed upon positions on foreign policy issues, especially a clear strategy in response to the rise of Islamic terrorism, and this was one of the factors leading to the factions’ demise (DiSalvo 2012: 58). To their credit, today’s factions have tried to learn valuable lessons from the past, and they have become more distinct in their domestic and foreign policy platforms. They have also come to recognize foreign affairs as a more fertile battleground for challenging their party’s agenda in a more partisan and polarized political environment. Indeed, one could argue that the modern Progressive faction in the Democratic Party was founded on foreign policy, specifically the opposition to the Iraq War by groups such as MoveOn (Friedman 2017). While President Obama offered a type of progressive foreign policy vision by further downplaying the efficacy of military intervention, he was not immune to challenges from the left. During the 2016 election, in the wake of the Sanders campaign, polls showed that Democrats were more progressive on foreign policy issues

82 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

than at any time in recent history, despite some observers arguing that parts of its agenda skewed to the right given some of Hillary Clinton’s hawkish views (Zunes 2016). In the wake of President Trump’s election, and the reexamination of the Democratic Party as a whole, progressives have become a growing source of resistance on foreign policy issues. At the same time, from the Republican takeover of the House in 2010 through the 2018 midterms, the GOP has been experiencing its own sort of “civil war” over control of the party’s foreign policy agenda (Drezner 2014a, b; Miller 2013). Libertarian Republicans have advocated a more anti-globalist, non-aggressive approach to foreign policy where the United States does not act as the word’s police force. Yet, it has been the farright’s foreign policy views that have had more of an impact. The Tea Party’s foreign policy views are less Jeffersonian and more Jacksonian in their support for militant internationalism and opposition to cooperative internationalism (Rathbun 2013: 22). For far-fight factions, battles over foreign policy issues, such as immigration reform, are about taking a stance on their party’s ideology and redefining what it means to be a conservative, not about the stability of institutions like the GOP or Congress itself. Another defining characteristic of modern politics is the extent to which the far-right and far-left have “gone public” in their calls for changing foreign and national security policy. For instance, Progressive Democrats were extremely vocal in their opposition to Obama’s strikes in Syria and Trump’s immigration travel ban. Today’s more radical factions have also effectively challenged their party’s leadership by attempting to “rule out” certain foreign policy options and constrain executive authority through substantive and procedural legislation and amendments. For example, the Freedom Caucus opposed a bill on trade promotion authority, despite its support for free trade because it believed it was ceding too much congressional power to the President (Lizza 2015). At the same time, Progressives challenged Centrist Democratic leaders, including launching efforts to unseat presumptive House Speaker Pelosi. Newly elected Progressive Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez blasted “corporate Democrats who seem to find the cash to fund a 1.1 trillion fighter jet program and are refighting the Cold War with a new arms race nobody can win” (qtd. in Beinart, September 16, 2018). She and other Progressives said they would pursue a dramatic retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy when they took over the House. Notably, resentments and divisions within the parties seem mutual— that is, centrists and establishment members appear to be extremely frus-

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

83

trated with factions. Harsh critics in the mainstream Republican Conference have described the Freedom Caucus as composed of “bomb throwing ideologues,” intent on scoring political points (Sherman, October 15, 2015). One senior GOP aide claimed that the group represented the “the craziest of the crazy” and cared more about obstructionism than accomplishing real goals. “They’re not legislators, they’re just assholes,” said the aide. “These guys have such a minority mindset that the prospect of getting something done just scares them away, or pisses them off” (qtd. in Fuller, February 4, 2015; Boguhn, December 17, 2015). The result, they charged, was that ideologues have fostered a “civil war” in the party for control of the policy agenda. In summary, the history of factionalism in U.S. politics has been filled with twists and turns that have had a profound impact on elections and policy-making. The chapters that follow present case studies of contemporary foreign policy decision-making that extend on  these historical patterns. They highlight connections between factionalism and U.S. foreign policy development on a range of issues, including trade policy, immigration policy reforms, and responses to the civil war in Syria.

Bibliography Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2005). Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America. The Forum, 2, 1–24. Azari, J. (2016, May 19). A for Effort? Republican Elites Tried to Coordinate but Never Quite Got There. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/5/19/11712612/republican-elites-coordination Azari, J. (2018, January 19). Politics Is More Partisan Now, But It’s Not More Divisive. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/politics-is-more-partisan-nowbut-its-not-more-divisive Bailey, M. A., Mummolo, J., & Noel, H. (2012). Tea Party Influence: A Story of Activists and Elites. American Politics Research, 5, 769–804. Beinart, P. (2018, September 16). America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic. com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreignpolicy-for-the-trump-age/570010/ Bibby, J. F., & Maisel, L. S. (2003). Two Parties – Or More? The American Party System. Boulder: Westview Press. Boguhn, A. (2015, December 17). Meet the Anti-Choice Radicals Behind the House Freedom Caucus. Rewire News.

84 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Brewer, M.  D., & Stonecash, J.  M. (2001). Class, Race Issues, and Declining White Support for the Democratic Party in the South. Political Behavior, 2, 131–155. Caldwell, C. C., Karol, D., Kazin, M., & Lee, F. (2018). Are the Parties Dying? Democracy Journal 48. Spring. https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/48/ are-the-parties-dying/ Campbell, J. E. (2018). Making Sense of a Divided America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Carter, Z. (2016, November 11). The Democratic Party Has Exploded. Huffington Post. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democratic-partyfuture_us_5824caf6e4b0c56101d5ec05 Carter, Z. (2018, November 15). These House Committees Could Make or Break a Progressive Agenda. Huffington Post. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/house-committees-incoming-progressive-democrats_us_5bee096 4e4b0510a1f2f25ee Chaddock, G. R. (2011). Libya Intervention: Tea Party and Liberal Democrats Make Unusual Allies. The Christian Science Monitor. Cillizza, C., & Murray, S. (2007, August 5). The Net Roots’ Moment in the Sun. The Washington Post. Clarke, A. J. (2017). The House Freedom Caucus: Extreme Faction Influence in the U.S. Congress (PDF file). Retrieved from http://www.democratic-anxieties.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Clarke_Berlin2017.pdf Cole, B. R. (2018). Democratization and the Mischief of Faction. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. DeBonis, M., & Bade, R. (2019, April 10). House Democrats Confront Party Divisions at Unity-Building Retreat. Washington Post. https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/house-democrats-confront-party-divisionsat-start-of-unity-building-retreat/2019/04/10/f4f0cf5a-5b09-11e9-962501d48d50ef75_story.html?utm_term=.02d928bda9a1 DiSalvo, D. (2012). Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-­ 2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Drezner, D. W. (2014a). Rebooting Republican Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Drezner, D. W. (2014b, October 15). Two Thoughts on the GOP’s Brewing Civil War on Foreign Policy. The Washington Post. Eaton, S. (2015, February 11). It’s Official: Rep. Jim Jordan Now Chairs the House Freedom Caucus. Cleveland.com Edsall, T. B. (2014, November 11). The Demise of the White Democratic Voter. The New York Times. Edsall, T. B. (2018, October 18). The Democrats’ Left Turn Is Not an Illusion. The New York Times.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

85

Ferris, S. (2019, May 7). The ‘Velvet Hammer’ Leads Resurgent Blue Dogs. Politico. https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/07/stephanie-murphydemocrats-blue-dogs-moderates-1305398 Friedman, U. (2017, March 15). Do Liberals Have an Answer to Trump on Foreign Policy? The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2017/03/chris-murphy-donald-trump-progressive-foreign-policy/518820/ Frymer, P. (2008). Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fuller, M. (2015, February 11). House Freedom Caucus Looks to Be a Force—In Leadership and Lawmaking. Roll Call. Retrieved from https://www.rollcall. com/news/policy/house-freedom-caucus-looks-to-be-force-in-leadershipand-lawmaking Gerring, J. (1994). A Chapter in the History of American Party Ideology: The Nineteenth-Century Democratic Party (1828–1892). Polity, 4, 729–768. Gerring, J. (1998). Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goodman, P. (1977). The Federalists vs. The Jeffersonian Republicans. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Green, M.  N. (2019). Legislative Hardball: The House Freedom Caucus and the Power of Threat-Making in Congress (Elements in American Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grossman, M., & Hopkins, D. A. (2018, April 17). Why There Is No ‘Liberal Tea Party.’ The New York Times. Hochschild, A. R. (2016). Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. New York: The New Press. Holt, M.  F. (1983). The Political Crisis of the 1850s. New  York: W.W.  Norton & Company. Holt, M.  F. (2003). The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. House Freedom Fund: Outside Spending Summary 2018. (2019). Center for Responsive Politics. Retrieved from https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00552851&cycle=2018 Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431. Kabaservice, G. (2011). Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party. New York: Oxford University Press. Karabenick, S., Lerner, R.  M., & Beecher, M.  D. (1973). Relation of Political Affiliation to Helping Behavior on Election Day, November 7, 1972. The Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 223–227.

86 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Karpowitz, C. F., et al. (2011). Tea Time in America? The Impact of the Tea Party Movement on the 2010 Midterm Elections. PS, 2, 303–309. Kupchan, C. A., & Trubowitz, P. L. (2007). Grand Strategy for a Divided America. Foreign Affairs, 4, 71–83. Kupchan, C.  A., & Trubowitz, P.  L. (2010). The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism’s Revival. International Security, 1, 95–109. Lizza, R. (2015, December 14). A House Divided. The New Yorker. Madison, J. (1787). Federalist Paper No.10: The Same Subject Continued: The Unions as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. New York Daily Advertiser. Martin, S. F. (2013, April). Immigration Reform: A System for the 21st Century. Rice University Baker Institute Paper. Retrieved from http://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/684/ McGee, Z. A. (2017). Keeping Your Friends Close: How the House Freedom Caucus Organized for Survival. M.A. Thesis. The University of Texas at Austin: Austin (Author’s copy). Mead, W. R. (2011). The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 28–44. Medvic, S. K. (2007). Old Democrats in New Clothing? An Ideological Analysis of a Democratic Party Faction. Party Politics, 5, 587–609. Milkis, S.  M. (1993). The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal. New York: Oxford University Press. Miller, Z. J. (2013, July 27). GOP Goes Public with Long-Brewing Foreign Policy Civil War. Time. Miller, G., & Schofield, N. (2008). The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the US. Perspectives on Politics, 6(3), 433–450. Noel, H. (2016, September). Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties. Annals, AAPSS 667. Perlstein, R. (2016, June 14). The Split: 19 Reasons the Democrats Will Remain Divided – And What It Means for the Party’s Future. The New Republic.  Press Release. Congressman Jim Jordan. (2015, January 26). House Republicans Form Freedom Caucus. https://jordan.house.gov/news/documentsingle. aspx?DocumentID=397889 Press Release. Congressman McClintock. (2015, September 16). Congressman McClintock Today Announced His Resignation from the House Freedom Caucus. https://mcclintock.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/congressmanmcclintock-today-announced-his-resignation-from-the-house Rathbun, B. (2013). Steeped in International Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1), 21–37. Reichley, A. J. (2000). The Life of the Parties. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. Richardson, H. C. (2014). To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party. New York: Basic Books.

3  “WE THE PEOPLE?” HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM 

87

Shefter, M. (1993). Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sherman, J. (2015, October 15). The Obsession of the House Freedom Caucus. Politico. Sitaraman, G. (2019, April 15). The Emergence of Progressive Foreign Policy. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-emergence-ofprogressive-foreign-policy/ Skocpol, T., & Williamson, V. (2011). The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press. Stevenson, P. W. (2016, April 14). Who Exactly Is in the ‘GOP Establishment.’ The Washington Post. Tyson, A., & Maniam, S. (2016, November 9). Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education. Pew Research Center. White, J. K., & Kerbel, M. R. (2011). Party On! Political Parties from Hamilton and Jefferson to Today’s Networked Age. New York: Oxford University Press. Williamson, V., Skocpol, T., & Coggin, J. (2011). The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. Perspectives on Politics, 9(1), 25–43. Wolfensberger, D. R. (2018). Changing Cultures in Congress: From Fair Play to Power Plays. New York: Columbia University Press. Yoshinaka, A. (2015). Crossing the Aisle: Party Switching by U.S. Legislators in the Postwar Era. New York: Cambridge University Press. Zelizer, J. E. (2010). Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Zunes, S. (2016, July 27). Most Progressive Dem Platform in History Hawkish on Foreign Policy. The Progressive.

CHAPTER 4

The Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and the Obama Administration

I think the master plan of the ruling class that runs Washington, DC, is to ram this [immigration reform] bill through before the American people know what has hit them. —Representative Michele Bachmann (R-MN) (qtd. in Greenley 2013) [Republicans] are bending to the hard right. [The Export-Import Bank] is the one thing that unites business and labor, unites Democrats…and independents, and they are bending to the will of a small but very, very determined few. —Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) (2015)

The Tea Party faction was established during the 2010 midterm election cycle by far-right conservative lawmakers who held nonconformist views toward policy problems and potential solutions. The Freedom Caucus was formed in 2015 by conservatives who sought a more focused approach to principled resistance. This chapter applies the minority theory of factional influence in two case studies of foreign policy solvency debates during the Obama administration. First, we examine Tea Party strategies in opposition to comprehensive immigration reform. Second, we analyze the activism of conservatives in the Freedom Caucus in delaying and challenging the Obama administration’s funding of trade credit agencies including the Export-Import Bank. Through persistence, these case studies illustrate the power of factions as insurgents and innovators in the foreign policy process.

© The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_4

89

90 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

The Tea Party and Comprehensive Immigration Reform U.S. immigration policies have a long and complex history, and government attempts at reforms have generated substantial political controversy. During George W. Bush’s second term, for example, a bipartisan immigration policy reform plan failed due to opposition from the right wing of the Republican Party. One of the most serious clashes over immigration reform during the Obama administration followed a tough loss in the 2012 presidential race, when the Republican National Committee (RNC) recommended that its party organization try to improve its outreach to America’s growing Hispanic population and embrace immigration policy reform. GOP leaders quickly joined this effort, some of whom had supported past initiatives. Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) called immigration reform “an important issue that I think ought to be dealt with,” and said that he was confident of a deal with the White House (qtd. in Steinhauer 2012). President Obama also promised a vigorous push for immigration policy changes in his 2013 State of the Union address. Some believed that bipartisan progress on immigration reform might be possible after decades of divide. In June 2013, the Senate advanced an immigration reform bill that would establish a pathway to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants, increase security along the border, require a mandatory workplace verification system for employers, and develop a new visa program for lesser-skilled workers. Yet, while the bill had bipartisan support and was lauded by the White House, it stalled in the deeply divided House of Representatives. Far-right Republican opponents employed traditional and nontraditional tactics to block its progress. While some sought routes for quiet persuasion, others threatened that Boehner would lose the speakership if he brought an immigration bill to the floor with insufficient party support. The Speaker subsequently refused to take up the Senate legislation or any immigration bill that lacked support from a majority of the House GOP. These developments seemed to further empower far-right conservative faction members who were staunchly opposed to immigration reform. In the fall of 2015, they played a role in successfully pressuring Boehner to resign from office, closing off chances for immigration reform for the foreseeable future (Cillizza 2015).

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

91

Factional Attributes As noted in Chap. 3, the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party rose to the national stage in 2010 as part of a wave of popular frustration and “big government.” The faction was made up both of a grassroots social movement and candidates for high political office who campaigned on Tea Party principles, including fiscal and social conservatism and a libertarian goal of a leaner government (Richardson 2014; Williamson et al. 2011). Tea Party challenges reflected a fairly ideologically cohesive approach during the immigration policy debates, and members championed the principles they held dear. Indeed, some observers characterized the struggle over control of the party’s foreign policy agenda following the Republican takeover over the House in 2010 as a civil war (Drezner 2014a, b; Miller 2013). The Tea Party Caucus (TPC) was officially founded in 2010  in the House of Representatives, and Michele Bachmann (R-MN) was named its first chair. The Tea Party movement clearly reflected deep schisms in the ideological unity of the Republican Party, including differences between the far-right and establishment Republicans over issues like immigration reform and other “core American values” (Weiner, January 20, 2013). At the same time, opponents saw the movement as a “racist, reactionary, and ultimately futile protest against the emerging reality of a multicultural, multiracial United States and a new era of government activism” (Mead 2011:27). When it came to foreign affairs, the movement reflected strains of both Jacksonian populist energy and foreign policy engagement and Jeffersonian isolationism (Parker and Barreto 2014; Rathbun 2013; Mead 2011). There were 48 members of the Tea Party Caucus during the immigration policy debates in the 113th Congress (2013–2015), constituting 21% of all Republicans in the House. The faction thus had opportunities to pursue both formal and informal decentralization strategies—to promote a policy shift to the right within the Republican Party and to seek new opportunities for leadership through committee structure and rules changes. Given the significant size of the faction, it also had the potential to veto establishment initiatives. When it comes to its ideological makeup, Tea Party members averaged a first dimension DW-NOMINATE score of 0.554 for the 113th Congress, which was more conservative than the average House Republican (0.484) and Republicans who were not part of the faction (0.459). While the faction was more conservative, the vast

92 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

ideological makeup of the Tea Party can be seen in its broad range of first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. At one end of the spectrum, some Tea Party members were very conservative, such as Representative Paul Broun (R-GA) who scored a 0.913, while some were much more moderate, including Congressman David McKinley (R-WV), with a score of 0.292. However, while Tea Party caucus members were more conservative ideologically than the rest of the Republican caucus, second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores show that they were not as much of an anti-­ establishment group as they might have seemed. In fact, the average second dimension score for Tea Party members was 0.072, suggesting a more establishment-leaning or cooperative score than differences between the mean non-Tea Party member (0.035) or the average Republican in the House (0.043). Surprisingly, the establishment Republican of the time, Speaker John Boehner, even had a lower score (0.040) than the average Tea Party member (Martin 2013). DW-NOMINATE data also provide a mixed picture of the Tea Party when it comes to factional cohesiveness. Ideologically, using first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, only 19 of the 48 members of the Tea Party exhibited an extreme conservative voting record. Thus, the faction does not seem to have been as far-right as many believed. Furthermore, most Tea Party members were not in the extreme in their willingness to challenge the establishment. In fact, only 9 of the 48 members scored in the 70th percentile in their second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, signifying more of a penchant for compromise than anticipated. Given that a majority of Tea Party faction members were not extreme in their ideology and anti-establishment behavior, we would label them as being less cohesive. Statements and policy proposals by members of the Tea Party demonstrated their convictions to challenge the establishment (Parker and Barreto 2014; Williamson et al. 2011). One of the issues that separated Tea Party members from mainstream Republicans was immigration policy. Far-right conservatives had seen their party drift toward support for a bipartisan immigration reform plan during the George W.  Bush presidency, and they were intent on driving their party as far away from this as possible. Most conservative members adopted an anti-establishment perspective on immigration, opposing any form of “amnesty” for undocumented immigrants and proposing harsh crackdowns on those that challenged U.S. laws. Tea Party members were seemingly much more unified in their opposition than mainstream Republicans: Indeed, nearly 40%

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

93

of lawmakers affiliated with the Tea Party said they favored a policy that would identify and deport all immigrants who were in the United States illegally (Cox, June 12, 2014). Members of the Tea Party also held negative views regarding the potential contribution by immigrants to the U.S. economy, and they were more likely to describe immigrants as a “burden” on the United States that took away jobs and drove down wages (Ehrenfreund, February 3, 2016; Parker and Barreto 2014). Their rhetoric reflected a clear commitment to a set of principles, which, in turn, helped buoy the movement in its challenges to the White House and establishment lawmakers. Traditional Legislative Strategies The history of U.S. immigration policy has been marked by alternating periods of more restrictive government moves and liberalization. Congress passed its first laws on immigration in 1875, which barred entry by migrants from certain countries based on race and ethnicity. In the 1920s, a discriminatory national origins quota system was established for immigrants. Congress later passed a comprehensive immigration reform program in 1965 that liberalized policies, creating new systems for migrants from many different countries to legally enter the country and seek citizenship (Orrenius and Zavodny 2010). During the Reagan administration, the Immigration Reform and Control Act tightened standards on legal immigration and proposed more enforcement to deter undocumented immigrants from entering the country (Martin 2011). President George W. Bush took office in 2001 with a pledge to address immigration reform, and he called for bipartisan cooperation (Tichenor 2002). In August 2001, a bipartisan group of Senators sponsored the DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act), designed to offer protections for children of undocumented parents. However, these initial initiatives to liberalize immigration policy lost momentum following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Rosenblum 2011). Eventually, in 2007, President Bush and Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, worked together to create a comprehensive immigration bill. Still, the push for bipartisan immigration reform under Bush was overwhelmed by the new, polarized politics of the day, and eventually defeated by a conservative revolt against amnesty for undocumented immigrants. The defeat in 2007

94 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

s­ignaled a turning point for Republicans and the level of partisanship surrounding immigration reform. President Obama promoted new reforms during his administration, but his efforts again ran into political headwinds. In the Senate, his allies reintroduced the DREAM Act, and it gained co-sponsors from a broad coalition of Republicans and Democrats (Hudson, December 1, 2010). However, the Republican takeover of the House in January 2011 and rising right-wing opposition to immigration reforms stalled hopes for further legislative progress. President Obama took a new tack on the issue in 2012 by announcing an executive action for the Department of Homeland Security to stop deporting young undocumented individuals who matched certain criteria outlined in DREAM Act draft legislation. He also ordered a new plan to begin accepting applications for the new Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program (Alcindor and Stolberg, September 5, 2017).1 In 2013, the White House worked with a new bipartisan group of senators, including Marco Rubio (R-FL), John McCain (R-AZ), and Chuck Schumer (D-NY), to negotiate the outlines of comprehensive immigration reform. This group became known as the “Gang of Eight.” The bill proposed a pathway to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants, increased security along the border, a mandatory workplace verification system for employers, and it advanced a new visa program for lesser-skilled workers (Kim, June 27, 2013). The bill quickly gathered momentum: it generated several weeks of floor debates and committee re-writes, and it was passed by a strong majority of 68–32 (with 14 Republicans joining all 54 Democrats). Conservative Tea Party faction members adopted a sharply divergent policy position, and they sought to induce conflict in order to try to change the political agenda. They emerged as some of the most powerful voices against immigration reform. Tea Party leaders became highly engaged in legislative action—both introducing and amending multiple bills—along with committee activity to oppose new initiatives. Michele Bachmann and other members of the Tea Party faction were concerned  about the changes that the Obama administration was trying to orchestrate, with support from many Democrats (Parker and Barreto 1  The objective would be to provide some protections for up to 1.5 million young undocumented individuals who had been brought to the United States by their families as children (under the age of 16). DACA would grant them deferred status for immigration enforcement, along with work authorizations, and other benefits.

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

95

2014). They were especially alarmed by what appeared to be a changing stance on immigration within their own party. While nearly 60% of establishment Republicans surveyed expressed support for immigration policy reforms that might allow a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, only about one-third (34%) of Tea Party Republicans favored such a policy. Many more Tea Party members endorsed plans for rounding up and deporting immigrants and said in surveys that immigrants “threaten American customs and values.” A 2014 survey also showed that Republicans who are part of the Tea Party movement were more likely to perceive an economic threat from immigrants (PRRI/Brookings, June 2014; Ehrenfreund, February 2, 2016). President Obama announced more executive actions in 2014 to implement components of the DREAM Act. Executive orders would focus on border security and would prioritize deporting felons versus law-abiding immigrants who encountered the policy. The administration also championed a new system whereby undocumented immigrants who passed a criminal background check and paid taxes might be able to temporarily remain in the United States. The president also used an executive order to expand the population eligible for the DACA program to migrants who entered the United States before the age of 16 and lived in the United States continuously since 2010. DACA work authorizations would be extended from two to three years (Alcindor and Stolberg, September 5, 2017). The president was determined to move forward on reforms, despite opposition in the House. He even dared opponents to respond, stating, “To those members of Congress who question my authority to make our immigration system work better, I have one answer: Pass a bill” (qtd. in Sink, November 20, 2014: 1). Executive actions and taunts did not have the desired effect on Capitol Hill, however. To the contrary, Tea Party lawmakers were even more committed to challenge the president, bipartisan initiatives, and establishment Republicans who favored those positions. The Tea Party effectively took up legislative arms against the president and tried to counter moves by the White House and the Senate. They set out to block any new legislation that might be proposed to enact parts of the Obama agenda. Conservatives successfully challenged proposed reforms through the direct legislative process, including introducing draft legislation to counter establishment plans and trying to add poison pill amendments (also known as “killer” amendments) to draft legislation to render bills impassable (Costa, April 15, 2013). One prominent opposition group, who dubbed themselves the

96 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

“Gang of Six,” focused their concern on preventing the establishment of any “path to citizenship” for the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. They instead favored heightened border security and enforcement of existing laws. Representatives Bachman and Steve King (R-IA), challenged implementation of executive actions through various means, including threats of funding cuts. Bachmann co-sponsored a number of bills in this spirit, including H.R. 5160, a bill entitled “To Prevent Expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program.” That bill was designed to cut off funding for implementation of the executive order and institute new layers of congressional oversight. In early December 2014, the House approved 219–197 a resolution of disapproval of Obama’s executive orders. One of the most vocal members of the wave of Tea Party Republicans from 2010, Representative Raul Labrador (R-ID), called for President Obama to be censured, a symbolic act that Congress has only used on one other president in history (Berman, December 1, 2014). Later, House conservatives pushed the GOP leadership to try to use its legislative “power of the purse” to attempt to force changes in Obama’s immigration policies. Tea Party members attached amendments to funding bills for the Department of Homeland Security that would reverse Obama’s immigration executive actions and cut funding to the department for enforcement actions (Shabad and Marcos, January 14, 2015). For example, in June 2013, King authored an amendment to the Homeland Security Appropriations bill that would have prohibited implementation of DACA. It also called on the Obama administration to resume deportation of the DREAMers who were apprehended by law enforcement. Democrats in the House were furious with the legislation, and they booed and shouted “shame” during the vote. But King was determined, “If this position holds, no amnesty will reach the president’s desk,” said King, celebrating after the vote (Dumain, June 6, 2013). Despite their efforts to create a showdown over immigration through spending bills, though, Senate Democrats were able to block bills with poison pill amendments through the conference process. The Homeland Security funding bill eventually passed free of immigration riders. Issue Framing Issue framing has played a very important role in policy debates over immigration reform. This study expects that factions may use ­nontraditional means such as issue framing to induce conflict with the establishment by

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

97

challenging the majority position or preferred policy outcome. Framing allows factions an opportunity to try to shape the discourse on controversial issues to their advantage. Frames are especially helpful to certain groups, including minorities, who might normally lack the power or status to drive affairs (Moscovici 1976). Supporters sought to frame comprehensive immigration reform as a reasonable and fair response to a real-world problem. Studies showed that more than 11 million undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America were living in the United States; more than 1 million of them were brought to the country by their families when they were children. Many of those young people were gainfully employed or enrolled in schools. They had paid taxes and contributed to society. Indeed, many corporations and trade associations supported protections for DREAMers and other skilled immigrants. Mark Zuckerberg, the billionaire CEO of Facebook called immigration reform “one of the biggest civil rights issues of our time.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported liberal immigration reforms, as did unions, faith groups, and human rights advocates. Grassroots organizations rallied to the cause, meeting with politicians and organizing rallies across the nation in favor of reforms. Civil society actors grew more optimistic during the Obama era. “What’s different about this moment is that we have the moral, the economic and the political imperatives for why we need immigration reform fully in line,” said Clarissa Martinez, director of immigration and civic engagement at the pro-reform National Council of La Raza (qtd. in Weiner, January 20, 2013). Tea Party conservatives had to practice strong, negative counter-­ framing measures in order to try to stem the tide of reform. This was designed to persuade Republicans who favored bipartisanship not to advance legislation, but also to shift the framing of the entire issue toward a more legalistic one. In this, they enjoyed a relative advantage: The conservative stance of opposition represented support for enforcement of the law, and they could associate their frame with concrete actions, like building a wall and rounding up and deporting “illegals.” Border security was critical, they argued, and the flow of “illegal” immigrants crossing the Mexican border could hurt American prosperity and security (Parker and Barreto 2014). For example, Congressman Dave Brat (R-VA), one of the most conservative members of the House, said that the Tea Party was in the right

98 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

for upholding laws. Democrats, in contrast, were “weak” on immigration. He said they favored an open border, which he called “both a national security threat and an economic threat that our country cannot ignore.” He added, “I reject any proposal that grants amnesty and undermines the fundamental rule of law” (2014 VA-7 House campaign website, DaveBratForCongress.com, June 15, 2014). Later, he asserted, “The DACA problem is the immigration problem. And once you put up a green light, it’s a green light….[And] once you put up that green light, whoosh, right? Surges come every time”. Such frames helped the Tea Party to pursue a nonconformist campaign to challenge the momentum of the Obama era. Critically, conservatives opposed to immigration reform also targeted Speaker Boehner for his seeming willingness to consider bipartisan initiatives. Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC) sought to project a message of “no confidence” in the House majority leadership. In July 2015, he sponsored a resolution (H.R. 385) that began: “Declaring the office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives vacant,” and continued, “Whereas the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 114th Congress has endeavored to consolidate power and centralize decision making…[causing] the power of Congress to atrophy.” Meadows’ resolution was less a legislative maneuver, however, than a frame. In an interview, Meadows admitted that he did not expect the resolution to be considered. Instead, “It’s really more about trying to have a conversation on making this place work, where everybody’s voice matters, where there’s not a punitive culture” (qtd. in DeBonis 2015a). Fox and Newhauser (2015) argue that this and related maneuvers actually contributed to the downfall of Boehner and the stifling of legislative progress. While Green (2019) suggests that the Freedom Caucus’ role in removing Boehner was not as potent as widely believed, the challenge itself was extremely rare and exemplified the power of party extremists to effectively employ threats to topple their own party’s leaders. Once again, conservatives seemed to enjoy an advantage in the “war of frames” on immigration: Groups that continued to promote immigration policy reforms often felt the need to complicate their message with supporting evidence, including descriptions of the underlying causes of undocumented immigration, conservatives argued simply that the law should be enforced. This contrast in messaging was perhaps seen most starkly several years later, during the 2016 elections: While Hillary Clinton called for nuanced attention to legal changes that could provide protec-

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

99

tion for the DREAMers, Trump and his supporters chanted simply “Build that Wall!” Tea Party opponents in 2013 and 2014 repeatedly challenged initiatives by the White House and any conciliatory moves by Speaker Boehner. Their use of the terms “amnesty” and “open borders” as synonyms for flawed immigration reforms represented their primary framing tactics. For example, during a speech to the Conservative Political Action Conference, Bachmann warned, “The last thing conservatives should do is help the president pass his number-one goal, and that’s amnesty” (Costa 2014a). Tea Party conservatives also focused much of their opposition framing arguments on what they called the extensive social cost of Obama’s immigration policies. This represented a tactic to shift the debate around immigration reform. Bachmann said that amnesty would mean “millions of unskilled, illiterate, foreign nationals coming into the United States who can’t speak the English language” (ibid.). Conservatives also regularly criticized establishment Republicans for conspiring with Democrats and the Obama administration to pass a “dangerous” bill. For example, in June 2013, facing imminent Senate passage of their own version of comprehensive immigration reform, Bachmann called for a grassroots rally against amnesty on Capitol Hill. She warned that an “amnesty bill” could be approved by Congress within weeks and that she employed hyperbole to encourage conservatives to rise up. “The Senate is going to pass a very bad bill,” she said, “The House will pass what will sound like a pretty good bill. But I’m just here to tell you, it’s a Trojan horse.” Her goal was to rally public support for a House move to block the possibility that the legislation would go to a conference committee. If that happened, she warned, “It’ll be Nancy Pelosi leading all the House Democrats to vote for it, and just enough Republicans will vote for the bill and you’ll have amnesty” (qtd. in Greenley, June 14, 2013). The only thing that could stop what Bachmann referred to as a master plan by the ruling cabal in Washington was a massive outpouring of populist opposition. Bachmann argued, “if you sit this one out and you don’t start hitting the phone lines and email, calling and visiting your representatives now and saying, ‘No amnesty now, no amnesty ever’, we’re going to have perpetual amnesty for illegal immigration” (ibid.). Finally, in addition to their strong negative framing of reform proposals, Tea Party leaders also painted the debate as further evidence that the Obama administration was overstepping its constitutional authority. The White House, they said, was a player that could not be trusted. They

100 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

were angered by the administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that stopped the deportation of hundreds of thousands of undocumented young adults. They continued to challenge a series of other executive actions designed to shield up to five million immigrants from deportation who were the parents or children of either U.S. citizens or legal residents. Conservative lawmakers were furious with the president and questioned his willingness to obey laws that would secure the border. Consistency of Opposition Tea Party opponents of immigration reform had to remain consistent, assertive, and nimble in their legislative challenges. They were clearly committed to stand their ground against proposed changes: Representative King (R-IA) confided to a reporter at the time that their strategy was to remain vigilant, and when pressed, to not let anything get to the floor (Berman, July 3, 2013: 1). They were also strategic in their responses to establishment initiatives. For example, when the Speaker and Republican Party leaders faced challenges to their comprehensive immigration reform package, establishment leaders shifted their tactic to try to adopt a piecemeal approach to immigration reform through individual proposals rather than taking up any single bill like the Senate. But even then, the establishment leadership stumbled in the face of conservative persistence and commitment to their cause. For example, when Speaker Boehner advanced a bill in July 2014 that called for $659 million in emergency funds to strengthen border security and speed up the processing of new arrivals, Tea Party members refused to support the plan because it failed to limit the president from acting on his own on immigration issues. Bachmann said that she and others would not “vote for a bill that is going to look good but do nothing” (Costa, August 1, 2014b). Conservatives were adamant in their opposition to reforms. Not only did they viscerally reject amnesty or a “pathway to citizenship” for individuals who had arrived in the United States illegally, they were convinced that the president and moderates were taking the wrong path. Tea Party members argued vociferously against the executive overreach of the Obama administration. During the 2014 midterm election campaigns, for example, far-right conservatives challenged the president on nearly every one of his major policy initiatives. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) argued that the president’s 2014 State of the Union address epitomized his vision of

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

101

an imperial presidency. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) called the Affordable Care Act delays are “a shameless power grab that is designed to help the president and his political party achieve a particular outcome in a partisan election.” And conservatives authored a number of acts of legislation that they termed “STOP Acts” that were aimed to “‘Stop this Overreaching Presidency’ by rescinding certain executive actions” (Bump, February 7, 2014). One of the main tactics House conservatives repeatedly employed on immigration reform was to try to convince establishment leaders that progress was impossible. This required a great deal of persistence and resolve from the opposition. For example, when the Gang of Eight proposed broad protections for DREAMers, far-right conservatives tried to flood the House floor with speeches denouncing the plan. Any proposal for pathway to citizenship for those that the Tea Party believed had acted illegally generated strong objections (Lantis 2019). Conservatives also remained steadfast in their challenges to Boehner’s majoritarianism. In the face of continued opposition, the Speaker and GOP leadership had to abruptly pull one border bill from the House floor in the summer of 2014, just hours before a scheduled recess. Tea Party conservatives threatened to hold back their support unless Congress allocated even more funds to enforcement. This would include more money for the National Guard and provisions making it easier to deport children back to Central America (Bash et al. 2014). This forced Boehner to take the unusual step of delaying the congressional summer recess and forced separation of different initiatives into bills that could be passed. In exchange for Tea Party support for a modest border funding bill, the Tea Party won the opportunity for a high-profile floor debate on immigration and even received establishment backing for a new bill to end DACA. It passed the House in August 2014 by a vote of 216–192. In sum, conservative members of Congress who were opposed to immigration reform were quite persistent in their presentation of minority positions. Bachmann and King were often the most important voices of dissent, but their leadership encouraged other lawmakers to challenge the majority and the party leadership. Representatives Labrador (R-ID), Gohmert (R-TX), Yoho (R-FL), and Brooks (R-AL) also made their voices heard during floor debates as well as in the media. They opposed any Republican or Democratic plan to provide what they called amnesty, and they refused to compromise on a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

102 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Outcome Strong and consistent opposition from the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party helped stymie efforts by bipartisan groups to achieve any comprehensive immigration policy reforms in 2013 and 2014. We code the outcome of this case as “successful” because the far-right faction blocked passage of establishment compromise initiatives for immigration reform throughout the 113th Congress (and beyond). Opponents of reforms were effective through persuasion in delaying and prolonging debates, and they even seized the advantage when Speaker Boehner attempted to take a piecemeal approach to reforms. Tea Party members threatened to unify in opposition to any form of legislation. Legislators who challenged immigration reform, such as Representatives Bachmann and King, were highly consistent in their messages, and the Tea Party advanced amendments that would curtail any significant liberalization of policy or “amnesty” for undocumented immigrants. In this case, the minority faction appeared to effectively persuade the establishment Republican leadership that aligning interests with a bipartisan coalition (i.e., joining with the Democrats to pass legislation) would be against the interests of the party and the country. With dogged persistence, then, they effectively blocked any major change in immigration policy. This showdown also set the stage for further wrangling on immigration policy reforms. When supporters tried to raise those issues from 2015 to early 2019 (at this writing), they were always brushed back by the farright. The volume of these challenges grew significantly in this period, as well. In 2015, Republicans like Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) were openly supporting mass deportation for the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. He argued that these migrants should be sent back to their home countries whether or not they had legitimate claims for asylum. While his program for “mandatory repatriation” stalled in the Senate, it drew an especially strong measure of support from Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members in the House. Donald Trump soon picked up on these themes and made them a central part of his presidential campaign for 2016. Once in office, Trump seemed to echo the Tea Party campaign from five years earlier, calling on the United States to deport immigrants and create much stricter enforcement methods. Trump’s agenda included building a high-security border wall the entire length of the Mexico-U.S. border, travel bans for citizens of select countries, dismantling DACA, and ending Temporary Protected Status for refugees

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

103

from countries like the Sudan, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. These efforts would soon create controversies of their own, and force clashes between the Freedom Caucus, Progressives, and establishment lawmakers.

The Freedom Caucus and the Export-Import Bank In early 2015, debates over the future of the Export-Import Bank, a relatively obscure but far-reaching federal agency, exposed serious divisions within the Republican Party foreign policy platform. The charter of the Bank, which helps underwrite loans for American products sold abroad, was set to expire that June, and members of the far-right faction of the GOP saw this as another opportunity to push a hard-line conservative agenda. They targeted the Bank’s reauthorization as part of their efforts to push for smaller government, including the closure of federal agencies and budget cuts. The ensuing policy debate that took place throughout most of 2015 would ensnare much of the Republican Party and its Congressional leadership, as well as those running for the GOP’s presidential nomination. The Export-Import Bank was first established in 1934 as part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal. Lawmakers felt the need to step in during the Great Depression to become the financier of last resort and help businesses in the United States increase their exports (to a world that was also nearly bankrupt). Subsequently, the Bank enjoyed a long history of bipartisan support in Washington. Democrats backed the program across the decades as a reflection of their commitment to subsidy and protection programs. Establishment Republicans traditionally favored it given their party’s close ties with the business community and trade groups. In the 2010s alone, the Bank provided billions of dollars annually in loan guarantees and other financial support for American businesses selling goods abroad. However, in the 2010s, bipartisan support for the Bank began to crumble. Far-right conservatives raised questions about the need for the institution, at the very time that their voices were gaining influence and leverage in the political process. Not only were there more hard-line conservatives in Congress, but Freedom Caucus-aligned groups, donors, and political networks also were expanding. As such, opposition to the Export-Import Bank in 2015 became a de facto litmus test for many Republicans who had to choose sides between the GOP’s traditional pro-business platform and the emerging far-right agenda.

104 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Factional Attributes The debate over the Export-Import Bank took place during a changing of the guard among far-right members of Congress. By 2014, the Tea Party Caucus had become largely inactive. The House Freedom Caucus (HFC) was founded in 2015 with the expressed aim to be a more focused and organized faction that would push the party’s leadership to the right on certain social and fiscal issues. Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) served as chairman of the Freedom Caucus and its 40 members who claimed to give a voice to “countless Americans who feel that Washington does not represent them” (Quinn, April 29, 2015).2 Freedom Caucus members saw their role as a sort of conscience for the GOP leadership, forcing them to stay true to conservative beliefs in the face of opposition from President Obama. Conservatives were also more comfortable expressing deviant and nonconformist opinions and using extreme tactics, like a government shutdown, to defend those beliefs (Lee, October 9, 2015a, b). Reports in 2015 acknowledged that the typical member of the House Freedom Caucus was far more conservative than other House GOP members, relatively new to Congress having been first elected in 2010 or later, and likely to come from the southern or western parts of the United States. The new caucus was also mostly made up of white males who tended to be a bit younger than their colleagues (DeSilver, October 20, 2015). The House Freedom Caucus was certainly more ideologically conservative than the rest of the Republicans in the House.3 According to first dimension DW-NOMINATE data, the average for all Republicans who served in the 114th Congress (2015–2016), including the House Freedom Caucus was 0.483. However, isolating the confirmed 40 Freedom Caucus members shows that they had a much more conservative average score of 0.660, whereas the rest of the party came in at 0.453. While the average Freedom Caucus member is more conservative than most of their fellow Republicans, there is also quite a range within the Caucus itself. The most conservative Freedom Caucus member, Representative David Brat (R-VA), scored a 0.825, while Congressman Steve Pearce’s (R-NM) ideological 2  The House Freedom Caucus does not disclose the names of its members. The number comes from the Pew Research Center’s work to confirm factional affiliations (http://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/20/house-freedom-caucus-what-is-it-and-whos-init/). Other accounts estimate membership at 40. 3  All data for ideological measurements comes from Poole and Rosenthal (www.voteview. com).

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

105

score was 0.470, or much closer to the GOP norm. Such a range reflects the fact that the House Freedom Caucus has taken on a wider range of topics than its Tea Party predecessor, including foreign policy issues, where there is more diversity of perspective. The ideological range of the faction is also reflected in the geography of its representatives, with members who mostly come from traditionally conservative regions of the United States or red pockets of voters in swing states and even a few more liberal states. Some of the states that had the most House Freedom Caucus members in the 2010s included Florida (4), Arizona (4), and South Carolina (3). This development coincided with the broader geographic shift within the Republican Party’s base to the south and west—a region of the country with more distrust of corporate America and Wall Street, two traditional sources of support for the establishment wing of the GOP (Calmes, July 30, 2015b). Ideology and geography are not the only characteristics that brought the Freedom Caucus together. Members quickly made their mark by challenging the GOP leadership in the policy realm, expressing deviant views from the establishment and striving to change the political agenda. The House Freedom Caucus’ willingness to challenge the Republican establishment is evident in their second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. As a group, Freedom Caucus members had an average score of −0.271, which was much lower than non-members (0.100) as well as all Republicans (0.041). Such a negative score provides further evidence of the growing establishment/anti-establishment divide within the GOP at the time. The House Freedom Caucus was also founded to be a more disciplined bloc than the Tea Party. Among its many qualities, one strength of the Caucus came from its members’ ability to stick together as a cohesive voting bloc and impact debates despite their relatively small numbers. In 2015, for example, Republicans had 247 seats in the House (to 188 for the Democrats), meaning that without the support of the Freedom Caucus, the GOP’s strength would fall below a simple governing majority (218) that is needed to pass bills, elect a new speaker, and conduct most other business (DeSilver, October 20, 2015). A deeper analysis of Freedom Caucus DW-NOMINATE scores also points to its cohesiveness. Ideologically, 34 of the 40 Freedom Caucus members had extreme ­conservative views (scoring at or above the 70th percentile) in comparison to their party as a whole. Moreover, 33 of the 40 members demonstrated extreme anti-establishment views. These extreme similarities within the Freedom Caucus lead us to conclude that it was a more cohesive faction.

106 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

The extreme views and factional cohesiveness of the Freedom Caucus would be especially evident throughout the Export-Import Bank debate, as well as the broader legislative agenda of 2015. Traditional Legislative Strategies Opponents of the Export-Import Bank employed several legislative strategies, including trying to eliminate the reauthorization of the Bank outright or to delay its funding long enough to obstruct its effectiveness. They were able to use legislative maneuvers to pursue their policy goals fairly effectively in this case. For example, far-right members of Congress introduced a bill that directly attacked the Export-Import Bank in March 2015. Justin Amash (R-MI), a member of the House Freedom Caucus, introduced H.R. 1605 the “Export-Import Termination Act” with the support of nine other Caucus members of Congress as original co-­ sponsors (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114hr1605ih/content-detail.html). The bill called for a reduction of the Bank’s authorities over three years before its eventual abolishment. While Amash and others knew that this bill had no hope of getting passed at the time, they saw it as a means to a larger end. Introducing the bill was more of a symbolic gesture or signal rather than a concerted effort. In fact, Amash did not even make a speech in support of the bill on the House floor, and it never progressed beyond its introduction in the House Committee on Financial Services. The far-right adopted different, indirect, and nontraditional tactics in Congress. For example, with another round of the Bank’s periodic authorizations due to expire at the end of June 2015, far-right members of Congress knew that time was on their side given their strength in numbers and the relative ease required to delay the passage of a bill. As Jim Jordan, the chairman of the Freedom Caucus, said confidently at the time, “Our job is real simple. All we have to do is nothing, something Congress is usually pretty good at doing. All we have to do is not reauthorize this bank…” (114 Cong. Rec. H2454, 2015). In reality, though, opponents did a lot more than nothing: They utilized a variety of legislative tools in executing their delay strategy including sponsoring bills that took up time on the House floor, offering amendments to legislation in order to block passage or water down its effect, using committee deliberations and hearings to bottle up bills and prevent anything from getting to a vote, and even challenging their party’s leadership and its legislative desires.

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

107

In their efforts to delay or keep a reauthorization bill for the Bank from getting to the floor, far-right opponents found that they had an important ally on their side, Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. Hensarling had no direct affiliation with the House Freedom Caucus, but he had always been closely aligned with the Tea Party due to his economic views and his important position in the House. Hensarling personally believed that the fight over the Bank was important, calling it “a debate about what type of economy we are going to have: an economy based on fairness…or is it dependent on who you know in Washington?” (114 Cong. Rec. H7220, 2015). Hensarling and his staff regularly posted to social media on the “Egregious Ex-Im Deal of the Day,” such as one aiding mining projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a county with a record of human rights violations (Weisman, March 10, 2015). Knowing that simple inaction would shutter the Bank, Hensarling defied Speaker John Boehner’s demands to produce a bill to either reform the bank or wind it down. Instead, Hensarling bottled up any efforts to reauthorize the Bank, even preventing the committee’s panels from producing legislation to overhaul its perceived flaws. Hensarling’s defiance of Speaker Boehner’s wishes exemplified another important aspect of the Export-Import Bank debate and the strategy employed by its opponents: forcing a leadership challenge to Speaker Boehner. The year 2015 was an especially difficult year for establishment Republican efforts to pass legislation because they were continually thwarted by discord within their own party. The far-right and the Freedom Caucus intentionally tried to make Boehner’s job as Speaker very difficult, and the debate over the Export-Import Bank was a perfect illustration of the struggle playing out within the Republican Party. In fact, one of the leaders of the Freedom Caucus, Mark Meadows (R-NC), led a surprise effort to unseat Boehner that July in the midst of the Bank debate. Believing that he and his far-right colleagues were being too often excluded, Meadows introduced a motion to vacate the chair, an extraordinarily rare procedural move that could have stripped Boehner of his position. While the motion was never brought to a vote, it helped set the course for events that eventually led Boehner to announce his retirement in late September. Some believe that pushing Boehner out was perhaps the HFC’s greatest political win (Green 2019). Ironically, though, what would have normally seemed like a victory for the far-right ended up triggering a series of events that thwarted their efforts to try to stop the Bank.

108 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

With the House Republican Conference seemingly in turmoil in the wake of Boehner’s resignation announcement, House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) emerged as the strong favorite to become Speaker and hopefully bring some stability to the party. However, one of the final steps that McCarthy needed to take was winning over the votes of the House Freedom Caucus membership. The Caucus members decided to condition their backing on gaining McCarthy’s support for several of their cherished issues, including killing the Export-Import Bank. Members of the House Freedom Caucus wanted assurance that McCarthy was on their side (Wong and Cirilli, July 7, 2015). While McCarthy personally opposed renewing the Bank’s charter, he could not guarantee victory in Congress on the question. Eventually, when House Republicans gathered to select their candidate for Speaker, the Freedom Caucus sought to exploit the impression that it had brought down Boehner, and members made demands to further include their views in the conference in exchange for support. While the ability of the caucus to serve as king-­ maker proved limited, most members eventually pledged to vote for Rep. Daniel Webster (R-FL) instead of McCarthy (Green 2019; DeBonis et al. 2015). In an effort to promote party unity, McCarthy would pull out of the race for Speaker, and the leadership debate would drag on throughout October. Perhaps ironically, though, the internal politicking of the far-right over who would be Speaker actually ended up backfiring on their efforts to shut down the Export-Import Bank. Republican supporters of the Bank saw the leadership mess as a byproduct of a group of conservatives who were pushing unrealistic demands. As such, more moderate Republicans became energized and decided to take matters into their own hands and advance their agenda including issues such as the Bank, even if it meant allying themselves with Democrats (Marcos, October 28, 2015). “If the Freedom Caucus and their 40 members can run this place, we’ll show them that 40 centrists can run this place too,” said Representative Denny Heck (D-WA) (Ho and Snell, October 9, 2015). Just one day after McCarthy’s announcement, supporters of the Bank from both parties moved to force legislative action in the House and to get around Hensarling by executing a discharge petition, a rare procedural motion that only needs the support of a majority of the House and would trigger a vote by the end of the month. A discharge petition had not been used since 2002, and only 27 such maneuvers had ever been employed before in the history of the House. Democrats voted for the discharge petition along with 42 Republicans,

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

109

triggering outrage from the far-right as well as the Republican leadership. “At a time when our conference is divided, this will divide it even further,” said Rep. Hensarling. “Signing a discharge petition—regardless of the issue—gives the Democrats control over our agenda” (Hulse, October 10, 2015). Nevertheless, the debate over the Bank was not yet settled, and the House Freedom Caucus would still have a few last chances to use legislative tactics in opposition to reauthorization. On October 27, the Export-­ Import Bank Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 597) was passed in the House by a vote of 313–118, with 127 Republicans (including eight Freedom Caucus defectors) joining 186 Democrats in support. Yet, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell had no plans of holding a vote on a stand-alone bill, despite support for the Bank in his chamber. Instead, he signaled that he would accept the legislation if it were attached to another bill. Thus, the reauthorization of the Bank was attached to a “must pass” bill—a highway authorization, and then sent back to the House (as H.R. 22). Once again, however, Freedom Caucus members proposed a series of amendments to the legislation. Mick Mulvaney (R-SC), a previous member of the Tea Party movement and a founding father of the House Freedom Caucus proposed five amendments (H.Amdts. 807–811), in an effort to reform the Bank rather than kill the reauthorization process altogether. For example, in an effort to address the claim that the Bank was needed in order to help confront foreign competition and that without it the United States would be at a disadvantage, one of Mulvaney’s amendments proposed that if a company wanted to use the Bank it would have to be able to establish that it was actually competing with a foreign export credit facility. As Mulvaney said on the floor, “until we get a chance to enforce the law and actually get other countries to disarm, let’s go ahead and not unilaterally disarm, and let’s make sure, in order to use the Export-­ Import Bank, you have to be meeting specific and identifiable competition” (114 Cong. Rec. H7694, 2015). Opponents of the amendment pointed out that the Bank was already required to do this, in which Mulvaney responded that his amendment gave the existing law more teeth in its considerations. Mulvaney and some of his conservative colleagues subsequently advanced and defended additional amendments to ­legislation, but all were defeated. In short, it seemed that the far-right’s active legislative tactics, including bills and amendments, had finally run their course. The Export-Import Bank would get a reauthorization vote.

110 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Issue Framing Issue framing was a widely used tactic used throughout the debate over the future of the Export-Import Bank. Supporters from both sides of the aisle tried to paint the Bank as an uncontroversial institution that was helping American jobs and businesses. However, far-right opponents were seemingly much more successful in framing the Bank and its activities in a negative light. The Freedom Caucus and its active members received support in these efforts by a variety of voices from the before mentioned far-­ right conservative political groups, as well as presidential candidates and much of their party leadership. The primary frame used by far-right opponents against the Bank was labeling it as an example of “corporate welfare.” They cited the fact that some of the corporations that benefitted from the Bank’s programs included major players like Boeing and General Electric. This corporate welfare frame fit within the original Tea Party platform of decreasing spending on federal agencies that they deemed unnecessary, which they believe distorted the marketplace and stole from taxpayers. In an opinion piece published in USA Today, Representative Jordan said that “taxpayers should not be forced to support welfare for some of the world’s largest companies” (Kucinich and Jordan, July 12, 2015). Another popular criticism was that the Export-Import Bank served as an institution that redistributed wealth from taxpayers to big businesses. “The Ex-Im Bank puts billions of taxpayer dollars at risk to subsidize some of the world’s largest, most well-connected companies at the expense of hard-working American taxpayers,” said Marc Short, the president of Freedom Partners (qtd. in Confessore, March 23, 2015). Critics charged that corporate welfare and redistribution of wealth were incompatible with conservative economic ideology and a reliance on free markets. In a statement, the House Freedom Caucus said the Bank’s “daily operations and its core mission do not align with free market principles,” calling it the “bridge to nowhere” of corporate welfare (Quinn, April 29, 2015). Conservative groups campaigning against the Bank reiterated this frame by labeling it as the “epitome of big government” and “a slush fund for corporate welfare.” They claimed that “true supporters of free enterprise must oppose corporate welfare of any kind” (Gold and Hamburger, March 29, 2015). A related, strong negative framing tactic that opponents employed was arguing that reauthorization of the Bank would represent “crony capitalism.” From this perspective, most of the benefits of the Bank’s actions go

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

111

to a few, very large politically connected corporations, earning it the derisive nickname, “the Bank of Boeing.” The House Freedom Caucus called the Bank a “classic example of crony capitalism” that “supports mega-­ corporations at the expense of small businesses—literally picking winners and losers among American workers” (Quinn, April 29, 2015). Appealing to their base, far-right opponents often harped on the Bank as ignoring small business, while instead supporting large exporting corporations that could finance their own sales to foreigners without commercial credit. “It’s big business cozying up to big government,” said Jordan. The claim that the Bank could be manipulated for political purposes was also part of the “crony capitalism” narrative. Opponents frequently highlighted multiple examples of corruption and illegal activity at the Bank as well as its failure to reform according to previous Congressional authorizations. At the time, the Bank had 31 open fraud investigations leveled against it and one former loan officer at the agency pled guilty to accepting bribes on 19 different occasions between 2006 and 2013 (Quinn, April 29, 2015). Supporters of the Export-Import Bank, including moderates from both parties, pushed back on this claim by pointing out that other countries provide the same or even more generous financing to their exporters. They argued that scores of other countries had export-finance agencies to promote export sales, with the largest and most powerful of these operated by the government of China (Calmes, June 30, 2015a). Furthermore, they argued that even if the Bank was a benign form of corporate welfare, it was a job creator at no cost to the taxpayer. In 2014, the Bank returned $675 million to the U.S.  Treasury, mostly from the fees and interest it charges on loans, while having a default rate of less than 1%. Moreover, the deals underwritten by the Bank helped to create more than 160,000 jobs (Hunt, July 6, 2015) and helped expand domestic productivity. “I’m putting jobs over ideology,” said Representative Stephen Fincher (R-TN), who helped to support the Bank throughout the debates in the House (Hulse, October 10, 2015). Yet, supporters had a harder time rebutting the claims of their critics, who argued that the Bank served big corporations at the expense of small businesses. According to the Bank’s annual report, the majority of the Bank’s transactions supported small businesses. However, the vast share of the total financing that the Bank provided boosted large businesses. The year before, in 2014, more than $15 billion, or 75% of the money authorized by the Bank, went to support exports by companies such as Boeing, Caterpillar, and General Electric (Gold and Hamburger, March 29, 2015).

112 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

While there was some truth to opponents’ claims about the Bank’s favoritism toward large businesses, supporters countered that this line of criticism failed to take into account the supply chains of these large corporations that also benefitted small- and medium-sized companies. As one businessman put it, “if G.E. does less exporting, the whole supply chain will get less work” (Nocera, December 21, 2015). In the end, these more technical arguments in favor of the Bank were mostly drowned out by the simple and repeated criticisms employed by the far-right. Consistency The far-right and the House Freedom Caucus were very consistent in their resistance to the Export-Import Bank during the reauthorization debate. Their opposition stance had developed for years. In 2012, Eric Cantor (R-VA), then Majority Leader in the House, teamed up with Democratic House Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD) to prevent the Bank’s authorization from lapsing by shepherding it through Congress. This was the last time the full House voted on a stand-alone Export-Import Bank measure, and Cantor effectively rebuffed far-right critics in pushing it forward despite a large minority of House Republicans (93) voting against it. Opponents of the Bank never forgot Cantor’s betrayal, and he was subsequently “primaried” and defeated by a far-right challenger and Tea Party and Freedom Caucus member David Brat. The GOP leadership took note of the far-­ right’s level of engagement and determination in opposing the Bank and challenging its supporters, and Kevin McCarthy and others shifted their views against reauthorization for the next Congressional debate as the dynamics within their party changed. The strong level of engagement by the far-right in opposing the Export-­ Import Bank began in the early months of 2015 as Congress faced mounting bipartisan pressure to pass its reauthorization. In April, a wide swath of Bank supporters, including 11 Republican governors and a group of businesses calling themselves the “Exports for Ex-Im Coalition,” intensified their campaign in support of renewing the institution’s charter via radio and digital ads in states around the country (Cirilli, April 14, 2015c). These proponents of the Bank were met with an equally committed opposition that demonstrated resolve throughout the year as the debate dragged on into the fall. Unable to directly kill the Bank through legislation, they employed a strategy of delay to prevent reauthorization before the Bank’s charter expired at the end of June. However, even after accomplishing this

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

113

goal, the House Freedom Caucus would have to maintain its pressure on its party if it wanted to keep the Bank from reopening. As the reauthorization deadline approached, opponents in both the House and Senate succeeded in keeping any bill with renewal from coming up for a vote. The far-right in Congress created an exceptional level of “legislative muddle” and their efforts were strengthened by the populist energy of conservative groups and those Republicans running for president, all who railed against the Bank and helped create a defensive blockade against its passage (Calmes, June 18, 2015a). Time actually did run out on the Bank’s charter that summer, and it was technically no longer able to make any new loans or financing commitments. However, the Bank itself did not close, nor were there any layoffs because it was fully funded through the end of September. This gave both supporters and opponents more time to struggle over its fate. The Freedom Caucus also had support in this struggle from a legion of conservative political groups, including the Club for Growth, Heritage Action, Americans for Prosperity, and FreedomWorks. Some of these groups had been campaigning against the Bank for years, but this deviant position did not yet influence mainstream debates until a more concentrated lobbying effort emerged in 2015 that was funded by Freedom Partners, a project of billionaire financiers Charles and David Koch. Their “Break the Bank” campaign included showering voters with mailers and phone calls, sending activists to Washington, and online ad campaigns (Gold and Hamburger, March 29, 2015). The power of these groups to support the resolve of the opposition could be seen in their influence over the large field of would-be GOP presidential nominees at the time. Only one candidate, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), supported the Bank, while the rest—Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Rand Paul (R-KY) and former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker—all lined up in opposition. The Export-Import Bank would become a significant point of disagreement as intraparty strife amongst Republicans led to high drama throughout the summer. As Senator McCain (R-AZ) wisely observed at the time, “There is no doubt that presidential ambitions have some impact around here” (Schroeder, July 25, 2015). Supporters returned to the fight in July 2015. This time, it seemed likely that lawmakers would reach a deal before the end of the month. Champions of the Export-Import Bank in the Senate attached an amendment reauthorizing it to a long-term highway bill, and supporters were

114 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

gaining momentum in Congress. The House leadership also crafted a transportation bill that was expected to include reauthorization for the Bank, and a House-Senate conference committee would follow. However, continued pressure from the far-right delayed progress on these bills. Leaders of the Freedom Caucus openly proclaimed their stubborn opposition to any reauthorization, especially with Boehner, but the Speaker signaled he would allow a vote later in July. In response, members of the Freedom Caucus redoubled their commitment, stating clearly and loudly that they would employ all available legislative tactics to ensure that the Bank was not passed within the highway bill. “I think we’re gonna use every procedural way of trying to separate both issues. They shouldn’t be in the same bill anyway. The highway bill has nothing to do with Ex-Im,” said Raul Labrador (R-ID) a co-founder of the Freedom Caucus (Cirilli and Wong, July 9, 2015). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) also came under heavy pressure from the far-right to stand firm in not giving the Bank and the highway bill any consideration. Of those who were lobbying McConnell to resist, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), one of the few far-right senators and who was running for president at the time, emerged as the strongest voice. “Majority Leader McConnell has publicly promised not to bring Ex-Im reauthorization to the Senate floor. If he keeps that promise, then this cronyism will remain dead, and Leader McConnell will deserve all the credit,” said Cruz (Needham and Carney, October 29, 2015). The Bank debate would become a political headache for McConnell due to the consistent pressure put on him by the far-right. “He has to pick his poison – a stand-alone [bill] would enrage the Tea Party. But trying to put it on the highway bill may cause him to get rolled by his Senate colleagues,” said one report at the time (Cirilli, October 22, 2015b). In the end, the efforts of the far-right worked, and Congress adjourned for the August recess without reauthorizing the Bank (much to the dismay of its supporters). As prospects that the Bank would eventually be reauthorized increased, though, members of the Freedom Caucus identified a new line of attack on the institution: blocking President Obama from filling vacancies on the institution’s board of directors. According to the Bank’s charter, three seats on the five-member board must be filled in order for it to approve transactions exceeding $10 million. Conservatives realized that as of late July, the three members of the board could soon drop to two if the Senate did not confirm President Obama’s reappointment of Patricia Loui, whose term had already expired in March (Cirilli, July 7, 2015a). Blocking nomi-

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

115

nations was another clear example of the far-right’s persistence. Meanwhile, Bank supporters, perhaps showing their frustration, called this tactic “pretty desperate from opponents who know they are ultimately going to lose this misguided fight” (Cirilli, July 7, 2015a). Pressure mounted for action following the August recess. Major corporations intensified their call to renew the Export-Import Bank. The Business Roundtable, a top business and trade consortium, argued in a letter to House and Senate leaders that U.S. companies were losing international sales and hundreds of thousands of jobs were at risk because they failed to reauthorize the Bank’s charter (Needham, September 15, 2015). Yet, conservatives maintained that they would fight to stop any reauthorization. This showdown, coupled by the intraparty drama over replacing Speaker Boehner, created a situation in which the far-right’s opposition finally got the best of them. Energized by the Freedom Caucus and its stubborn obstructionism, moderate Republicans and Democrats used the discharge petition strategy that eventually led to the end of the reauthorization debate in late October. Outcome On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed a highway bill that included reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank. Its programs would reopen, and the federal government would continue to support trade and commerce by U.S. corporations. Supporters celebrated their victory. However, conservatives also seemed mollified in that their efforts had been successful in delaying the Bank’s reauthorization for nearly an entire year. In this instance, the Freedom Caucus was able to effectively leverage support form well-placed allies in Congress, such as Hensarling and other conservative leaders, to have a significant impact on the policy debate (Green 2019). Thus, we code this case as “partially successful” because administration proposals were delayed, but ultimately enacted during the congressional session. Their goals to block or stall the Bank, and short of that to interfere with its functioning by preventing nominations for key posts, were attained in limited ways. Supporters could not rest on their laurels in this case, however, as the ultimate fate of the Bank was far from settled. Congress could agree only to a reauthorization through September 2019. When President Trump took office, he found himself pulled in both directions on the issue. Trump indicated his support for the Bank, and the White House worked with the

116 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

pro-business Republican establishment to get a number of nominees approved for filling out the Bank’s board. However, at the same time Trump made a move to please the Freedom Caucus by nominating former Representative Scott Garrett (R-NJ), a critic, to become its next president. Garrett’s nomination process did not go smoothly however. He failed to win sufficient support in the Senate Banking Committee because of his past record of statements strongly opposed to the Bank (Warmbrodt 2017). Trump would later nominate Kimberly Reed, the Bank’s acting vice president and a friend of the business community, to take over. Reed was confirmed by the Senate, but the nominations other board members were processed very slowly in 2018, as the politicking over the Bank and the far-right continued.

Bibliography Alcindor, Y., & Stolberg, S.  G. (2017, September 5). After 16 Futile Years, Congress Will Try Again to Legalize ‘Dreamers.’ The New York Times. Bash, D., et al. (2014, August 1). House GOP Passes Border Bill – Likely to No Effect. CNN. Berman, R. (2013, July 3). No Pressure on House Republicans to Tackle Immigration Reform. The Hill. Berman, R. (2014, December 1). How Will Republicans Rebuke Obama on Immigration. The Atlantic. Bump, P. (2014, February 7). Republicans Take Their Tea Party Frame to the Logical Conclusion: Fight King Obama I. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/republicans-take-their-tea-partyframe-logical-conclusion-fight-king-obama-i/358175/ Calmes, J. (2015a, June 18). Export-Import Bank Divides Once-Supportive Republicans. The New York Times. Calmes, J. (2015b, June 30). Its Charter Expired, Export-Import Bank Will Keep the Doors Open. The New York Times. Cillizza, C. (2015, December 8). How to Negotiate, According to the House Freedom Caucus. The Washington Post. Cirilli, K. (2015a, July 7). Ex-Im Opponents Adopt New Tactic in Battle Over Bank. The Hill. Cirilli, K. (2015b, October 22). Export Import Brawl Enters Upper Chamber. The Hill. Cirilli, K. (2015c, April 14). Governors Rally Behind Ex-Im. The Hill. Cirilli, K., & Wong, S. (2015, July 9). Conservatives Prepare for Showdown on Ex-Im Bank. The Hill.

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

117

Confessore, N. (2015, March 23). Koch-Backed Group Bolsters Effort to Shut Down Export-Import Bank. The New York Times. Costa, R. (2013, April 15). A Gang of Six Plots a Revolt. National Review. Costa, R. (2014a, March 8). As CPAC Ends, Republican Factions Remain Adamant in Disagreements. The Washington Post. Costa, R. (2014b, August 1). Senate Cracks Conservative Whip to Stop the Speaker. The Washington Post. Cox, D. (2014, June 12). On Immigration, the Tea Party Remains an Important Outlier. The Huffington Post. DeBonis, M. (2015a, July 28). GOP Congressman Launches Bid to Oust John Boehner as House Speaker. The Washington Post. DeBonis, M. (2015b, December 2). House Freedom Caucus Looking to Flex Its New Muscle in 2016 Races. The Washington Post. DeBonis, M., Costa, R., & Helderman, R. S. (2015, October 8). House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy Drops Out of Race for House Speaker. Washington Post. DeSilver, D. (2015, October 20). House Freedom Caucus: What Is It, and Who’s in It? Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/10/20/house-freedom-caucus-what-is-it-and-whos-in-it/ Drezner, D. W. (2014a). Rebooting Republican Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Drezner, D. W. (2014b, October 15). Two Thoughts on the GOP’s Brewing Civil War on Foreign Policy. The Washington Post. Dumain, E. (2013, June 6). GOP Backs Amendment to Deport DREAMers. Roll Call. Ehrenfreund, M. (2016, February 3). What’s Incredible About Republicans’ Views on Immigration Is How Much They’ve Changed. The Washington Post. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication, 4, 51–58. Fox, L., & Newhauser, D. (2015, July 29). John Boehner’s Not Giving Mark Meadows the Chance to Oust Him. National Journal. Gold, M., & Hamburger, T. (2015, March 29). Export-Import Dividing GOP. The Washington Post. Green, M.  N. (2019). Legislative Hardball: The House Freedom Caucus and the Power of Threat-Making in Congress (Elements in American Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greenley, L. (2013, June 14). Rep. Bachmann: Don’t Count on House to Stop Amnest. The Jackson Press. Ho, C., & Snell, K. (2015, October 9). Export-Import Bank Supporters Move to Force House Vote. The Washington Post. Hudson, J. (2010, December 1). The Conservative Case Against the DREAM Act. The Atlantic. Hulse, C. (2015, October 9). Bipartisan Coalition Forces New Vote on Ex-Im Bank. The New York Times.

118 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Hunt, A. (2015, July 6). U.S. Import Bank Teetering on Edge. The New York Times. Kim, S. M. (2013, June 27). Senate Passes Immigration Bill. Politico. Kucinich, D., & Jordan, J. (2015, July 12). Pull the Plug on the Ex-Im Bank: Opposing View. USA Today. Lantis, J.  S. (2019). Foreign Policy Advocacy and Entrepreneurship: How a New Generation in Congress Is Shaping U.S. Engagement with the World. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Lee, T.  B. (2015a, October 9). The House Freedom Caucus, Explained. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2015/10/9/9488835/house-freedom-caucus-explained Lee, F. E. (2015b). How Party Polarization Affects Governance. Annual Review of Political Science, 18(1), 261–282. Marcos, C. (2015, October 28). In Surprise, Most House GOP members Back Ex-Im. The Hill. Martin, S.  F. (2011). A Nation of Immigrants. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Martin, S. F. (2013, April). Immigration Reform: A System for the 21st Century. Rice University Baker Institute Paper. Retrieved from http://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/684/ Mead, W. R. (2011). The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 28–44. Miller, Z. J. (2013, July 27). GOP Goes Public with Long-Brewing Foreign Policy Civil War. Time. Moscovici, S. (1976). Social Influence and Social Change. New  York: Academic Press. Needham, V. (2015, September 15). Business Push Back to Renew Ex-Im. The Hill. Needham, N., & Carney, J. (2015, October 29). Ex-Im Fight Shifts to McConnell. The Hill. Nocera, J. (2015, July 31). Revenge of the Ideologues: Killing the Export-Import Bank. The New York Times. Orrenius, P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2010). Beside the Golden Door: U.S. Immigration Reform in a New Era of Globalization. Washington, DC: AEI Press. Parker, C. S., & Barreto, M. A. (2014). Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. PRRI/Brookings. (2014, June 10). What Americans Want from Immigration Reform in 2014. Policy Brief. https://www.brookings.edu/research/whatamericans-want-from-immigration-reform-in-2014/ Quinn, M. (2015, April 29). Conservative House Freedom Caucus Comes Out Against Export-Import Bank. Daily Signal (PDF file). Retrieved from https:// www.dailysignal.com/2015/04/29/conservative-house-freedom-caucuscomes-out-against-export-import-bank/ Rathbun, B. (2013). Steeped in International Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1), 21–37.

4  THE TEA PARTY, THE FREEDOM CAUCUS, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

119

Richardson, H. C. (2014). To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party. New York: Basic Books. Rosenblum, M. (2011, August). Immigration Policy Since 9/11: Understanding the Stalemate Over Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Migration Policy Institute Study. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (PDF file). Retrieved from www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-post-9-11policy.pdf Schroeder, P. (2015, July 25). Republicans Make Peace After Days of High Drama. The Hill. Shahab, R., & Marcos, C. (2015, January 14). House Passes Bill to Defund Obama’s Immigration Orders. The Hill. Sink, J. (2014, November 20). Obama to Congress: ‘Pass a Bill.’ The Hill. Steinhauer, J. (2012, November 8). Speaker ‘Confident’ of Deal with White House on Immigration. The New York Times. Tichenor, D.  J. (2002). Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Warmbrodt, Z. (2017, December 19). GOP Defectors Block Trump Nominee to Head Ex-Im Bank. Politico. Weiner, R. (2013, 20 January). How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over. Washington Post. Weisman, J. (2015, March 9). Tea Party Divided by Export-Import Bank. The New York Times. Williamson, V., Skocpol, T., & Coggin, J. (2011). The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. Perspectives on Politics, 9(1), 25–43. Wong, S., & Cirilli, K. (2015, July 7). Ex-Im Vote Holds Peril for No.2 House Republican McCarthy. Southcarolinaliberty.com.

CHAPTER 5

Progressive Caucus Activism During the Obama Administration

The Assad regime’s actions in Syria are reprehensible, but it is critical that we recognize the complexity of the conflict [and] consider the potential for unintended consequences of U.S. intervention, no matter how good our intentions. —Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) (2013) The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a disastrous trade agreement designed to protect the interests of the largest multi-national corporations at the expense of workers, consumers, the environment and the foundations of American democracy. —Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) (2014)

Progressive Caucus activism inside the Democratic Party shaped the relationship between Congress and the Obama administration in the development of contemporary foreign policy. This chapter applies our model of minority influence to two original case studies. First, it examines Progressive opposition to President Obama’s plan to conduct a military strike on Syria in 2013, a case in which left-liberals, along with other factions in Congress, appeared to help influence White House decision-making. Second, this chapter explores how active opposition from outspoken Progressives, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Representative Rose DeLauro (D-CT), influenced the development of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Liberals challenged the free trade deal as a threat to

© The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_5

121

122 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

U.S. jobs and labor and environmental standards, and as a “Trojan Horse” that would give corporations greater power over individuals. Both cases provide illustrations of the power of factions as insurgents and innovators in foreign policy decision-making.

Chemical Weapons: Crossing the “Red Line” in Syria In August 2013, the Syrian military launched a chemical weapons attack on a rebel-held neighborhood that killed more than 1400 people, including many civilians. The attack, and the international news media coverage of victim suffering, became a catalyst for debate in Western countries over whether to punish the Bashar al-Assad regime for its violation of an international norm. This represented a watershed moment for the  Obama administration’s foreign policy development, as the president mulled the idea of conducting a military strike to retaliate for the chemical attack. In Washington, lawmakers, human rights groups, and concerned citizens coalesced on both sides of the debate, mounting a substantial pushback on a national security matter that some considered primarily the purview of the White House. In many ways, the subsequent decision by the U.S. government not to intervene militarily in Syria had profound consequences. It was interpreted at home as a function of both Obama’s pragmatism in foreign policy and his sensitivity to minority opposition to intervention in a distant civil war. Around the world, this pullback was seen as a signal that the United States would not fully commit to any intervention in distant conflicts, even in the face of serious human rights abuses. In the end, U.S. inaction opened the door for other countries to take on a greater role in deciding the fate of Syria (Charap 2013).1 The Syria debate was emblematic of U.S. foreign policy challenges surrounding the revolutions of the Arab Spring. In 2011, popular protests began in Tunisia and quickly spread to states throughout North Africa and the Middle East. Within months, revolutions had brought down regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, and leaders in a number of countries offered substantial political concessions to reformers. Uprisings in Syria began in February 2011, but citizens who took to the streets in that country were met with violent reprisals by government security forces under direct orders from authoritarian President Bashar al-Assad. The violence escalated, and the struggle soon metastasized into full-scale civil war between the Assad regime and rebels (Jenkins 2014). Syrian government  The authors acknowledge valuable insights for this case study from Dr. Kevin Marsh.

1

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

123

forces battled the rebels throughout the country; fighting was particularly intense in urban areas. Civilian casualties ran into tens of thousands. As the international outcry against the Assad regime increased in 2011 and 2012, U.S. policy-makers grew especially concerned about Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. In August 2012, President Obama issued what became known as the “red line” declaration. He stated that Syrian government use of chemical weapons would change his calculus and could lead to a potential U.S. military intervention (“Remarks by the President,” August 20, 2012). Sadly, the conflict in Syria continued to escalate, and the Assad regime seemed undeterred by threats and warnings from the international community. Military forces unleashed a Sarin nerve gas attack against rebel-­ held areas in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013, that killed more than 1400 civilians (Warrick, August 30, 2013). Video images of injured and suffering victims, including many children, circulated on social media in the days that followed. Obama administration officials publicly condemned the attack and held crisis meetings to discuss various options for a response such as a possible military strike (Shanker et  al., August 27, 2013). Initially, the president mulled military action without seeking congressional authorization, and he seemed determined to strike back. However, in a surprise address on August 31, 2013, Obama announced that he would seek authorization for the use of force from Congress (August 31, 2013). What ensued was a complex struggle over U.S. foreign policy goals and the means to achieve them in Syria and beyond. Factionalism and the Progressive Caucus The debate over the authorization of the use of force against Syria highlighted divisions in both major political parties. Republicans certainly disagreed over whether a retaliatory strike would be in the national interest, and public opinion seemed opposed to such an action. There were also deep rifts in the Democratic Party that pitted President Obama and moderate lawmakers who represented the establishment against lawmakers in the Progressive left-wing. The Progressives were determined to pursue their own objectives, including refocusing attention on domestic politics and social issues. Progressives championed causes including the widening disparities of income, wealth, and power in American society and called for social movements to address economic and social injustices. Liberals such as Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Representatives Keith Ellison (D-MN) and

124 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Barbara Lee (D-CA), co-chairs of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), worked hard to advance alternative perspectives in support of their preferred positions. They were willing to stand up for those issues and induce conflict with establishment Democrats, when necessary, to try to achieve their goals. Liberal opposition to presidential initiatives in 2013 came primarily from members of the CPC, which was formed in 1991 by members of the House of Representatives, including Maxine Waters (D-CA), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Ron Dellums (D-CA), Thomas Andrews (D-ME), and Peter DeFazio (D-OR). The group expanded its membership over time and became the largest Democratic congressional caucus in the 2010s. Progressives chaired a number of standing committees when Democrats controlled the House in the 2000s, and they remained active as ranking members. Members supported four core principles of the Progressive Promise, including “fighting for economic justice and security for all; protecting and preserving our civil rights and civil liberties; promoting global peace and security; and advancing environmental protection and energy independence” (https://cpc-grijalva.house.gov/ the-progressive-promise/). In 2013, the president knew that few Progressives would be willing to work with moderates to support military action. For years, members of the far-left faction had expressed concerns about the limits of foreign policy obligations in the Middle East. Senator Sanders and his Progressive allies in the House of Representatives favored a more restrained foreign and security policy profile, including withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. And in the face of an immediate crisis, the absence of core support within the party likely influenced President Obama’s calculus not to move forward on military action and instead seek a negotiated deal with Syria and Russia to eliminate its chemical weapons arsenal. Public opinion was also against taking action, and Republicans were divided, with hawkish lawmakers in support of a military strike, while others were concerned about overstretch. The formal membership of the CPC during the 113th Congress (2013–2015) included 79 members in the House of Representatives and one senator, Bernie Sanders. This number declined slightly to 68 House members in the 114th Congress, along with Sanders. On average, Progressives constituted nearly 40% of Democrats in the House, again making the Progressive Caucus the largest belief-based caucus within the party. The average first dimension DW-NOMINATE score for Progressive

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

125

members in the 113th Congress was −0.462. The average for all 204 Democrats who served in the congress was −0.384, with non-caucus members having a mean score of −0.335. Ideologically, the Progressive Caucus was more like-minded than its Tea Party counterpart, with its scores ranging from −0.276 to −0.683. In addition, public statements by members of the Progressive Caucus clearly articulated strong convictions for liberal principles. These views often clashed with Democratic establishment policies, which can be seen in second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. The average for Progressive Caucus members was −0.203, showing increasing signs of partisan warfare when compared to non-­Progressives (0.013), as well as all Democrats in the House (−0.071). Interestingly enough, however, the average Progressive had a similar score to Nancy Pelosi (−0.206) who many might consider to be the Democratic establishment at the time. An in-depth analysis of the first and second DW-NOMINATE scores provides further attributes on the Progressive Caucus. A majority of Progressives scored in the extreme in comparison to the broader Democratic Party in both ideology (47 of 79) and its views toward the establishment (42 of 79). Given its members shared liberal and anti-establishment views, we consider the Progressive Caucus to be a more cohesive faction during the 113th Congress. Traditional Legislative Strategies The Assad regime’s Sarin nerve gas attack against rebel-held areas in August 2013 ignited an intense debate over possible responses, both at home and abroad. President Obama publicly condemned Syrian actions and considered authorizing a punitive military strike. This would be designed to send a powerful message that Western countries would not abide by the use of weapons of mass destruction and could degrade Syrian military capability. However, the president chose not to act unilaterally on the issue. On August 31, 2013, the president announced that while he personally favored a military strike, he would seek congressional authorization for any action. Obama chose to defer to congressional consideration on the issue to honor what he described as the best tradition of the “world’s oldest constitutional democracy” (“Statement by the President on Syria,” August 31, 2013). However, support was not foreordained, and it soon became clear that the move was a risky gamble to gain congressional buy-in. Representative Tom Cole (R-OK), a leading Republican, summed up Obama’s situation at the time: “Obama hasn’t

126 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

got a chance to win [a congressional authorization vote] if he can’t win the majority of his own party, and I doubt he can. Democrats have been conspicuously silent. Just about his only support is coming from Republicans. He is a war president without a war party” (qtd. in Baker and Weisman, August 31, 2013). The ensuing debate over the authorization of the use of force in Congress highlighted pronounced divisions within the government, within both parties over foreign policy, and among the public. Democratic Party leaders who supported the White House tried to move forward with resolve. On September 6, 2013, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid formally submitted S.J. Res #21, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons (S.J. Res 21). The resolution would authorize the president to use the U.S. military to intervene in Syria for up to 60 days, with a possible 30-day extension. In a nod to potential opposition, the bill also expressly prohibited the use of ground troops and included detailed reporting requirements. Senate leaders who supported action scheduled committee hearings to begin soon and set a deadline for a floor vote on an authorization to be held “no later” than the week of September 9 (Solomon and Hook, September 2, 2013). However, there was no guarantee that this legislation could move forward quickly. Congress was in recess for the Labor Day holiday, and members touring their home districts found little public appetite for escalation of involvement in Syria. For example, Democratic Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) said that based on what he had heard at home it would be hard to generate public support for action. He predicted, “I’d be very surprised if the position of going forward with the strike would reach 50 percent in our state. I don’t think it would get to 50.” Representative Mick Mulvaney (R-SC) said that no other issue had generated as passionate a response from the public, and voters made it known that they strongly opposed military action. He reported that only three voters from the more than a thousand calls to his offices on the issue actually supported an action (Harwood and Weisman, September 6, 2013). The polity was also deeply divided over other issues at the time, including immigration reform and raising the debt ceiling to expand federal spending. By delaying a decision and taking the issue “public,” the president might have unintentionally generated stronger opposition. Limited support from moderate Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill created a window of opportunity for Progressives to argue against

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

127

military action. They did not propose alternative legislation or ­amendments to existing bills, however. Rather, their preferred alternative to military action was no action, and so they argued publicly against the idea of a congressional authorization for the use of force. They did state their appreciation that the president had engaged with Congress, even if this simply created an opening for the expression of deviant minority viewpoints. Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) said that Obama did the right thing in seeking the backing of Congress. He said, “If [the president fires] rockets in Syria, you’ll see a lot of people saying this is an absolute mistake, they should not have done it, I do not support it” (qtd. in Epstein and Kim, August 28, 2013). Without support from Congress, he added, a “storm [would] follow.” A prominent critic, Barbara Lee (D-CA), a former chairperson of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, also backed the idea of congressional debate, even if she opposed a military strike. Representative Tim Walz (D-MN) said a unified position from Congress was imperative, arguing, “I think there is a high bar to be passed here, and I think there needs to be a strong voice” (qtd. in Epstein and Kim, August 28, 2013). Other liberal lawmakers took more forceful stands, arguing that Congress should not be complicit in an executive action that was opposed by other great powers and appeared to have only weak public support. Some charged that any authorization might enable the Obama administration to become emboldened to support an open-ended military commitment to Syria—a quagmire that might rival the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan (Fahrenthold and Kane, September 6, 2013). Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) argued that while he intended to keep an open mind, he had serious reservations. He stated, “I think we all understand that Assad is a ruthless dictator and that his use of chemical weapons is abhorrent and a violation of international law.” However, he said he was “concerned that the United States would be going into a war almost unilaterally without the support of the United Nations or NATO. If we are concerned about international stability, this sets a very dangerous precedent that other countries could use in the future” (September 4, 2013). Party leaders began to whip votes in the first week of September. The administration attempted to remain confident through this process— indeed, Secretary of State Kerry said on a Sunday morning news program, “We’re not going to lose this vote.” But the terrain of support in Congress belied this position. According to an exhaustive accounting of

128 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

potential supporters and opponents of a Syria strike bill conducted by reporters at TheHill.com, more moderate Democrats than Republicans favored a Syria strike in the Senate. Among those Democrats who either publicly endorsed action or indicated they would vote in support were Senators Cardin (D-MD), Coons (D-DE), Kaine (D-VA), and Menendez (D-NJ). Some moderate Democrats in the House spoke out in favor of the president’s plans, but many Progressives challenged the call for a strike. Opponents who went on the record against the strike included Representatives Castor (D-FL), Cleaver (D-MO), Courtney (D-CT), Duckworth (D-IL), Gabbard (D-HI), Lee (D-CA), Peterson (D-CA), and Yarmouth (D-KY). However, by far, the largest group of lawmakers was undecided on the issue, keeping close counsel on the question of intervention (Hill Staff, September 9, 2013). In an interesting twist, Progressive Representative Alan Grayson (D-FL) actually teamed with GOP colleagues to organize a vote-whipping operation to oppose the president’s call for authorization of the use of force (SeitzWald, September 13, 2013). Grayson argued, “what you’re hitting on is this general consensus—across the political spectrum—that we just need to mind our own business. And that’s not a liberal or conservative concept. It’s just a universal law of life” (qtd. in Fahrenthold and Kane 2013). In the face of determined opposition, inside and outside the government, Senate Majority Leader Reid pulled his authorization bill from the floor of the Senate. Nonconformists seemed to have won the day with their case that no action would be better than a flawed operation with uncertain long-term consequences. Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) agreed to halt consideration of the measure in the House. This occurred just days after Obama administration officials had testified in congressional hearings in both chambers. But with this move, lawmakers signaled that any renewed effort in the upper chamber would likely necessitate another direct ask from Obama. One Senate Democratic staffer said at the time, “We’re ready to bring it to the floor at a moment’s notice. But for the moment, we’re letting the diplomatic process play out” (Everett, September 14, 2013). Instead, both the House and Senate turned their attention to different matters, including an energy efficiency bill, while a group of senators worked behind closed doors to draft an alternate Syria resolution that would instead support diplomacy before military action.

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

129

Issue Framing Issue framing became a prominent tool in the debate over Syria in 2013. The Obama administration attempted to frame the issue of military intervention as a moral imperative following the horrific chemical attack. They argued that the United States and its Western allies had a responsibility to act out against the blatant violation of international norms. And they pressed their framing case hard: Secretary of State John Kerry said that the use of chemical attacks on civilians in Syria was “undeniable, and that the Obama administration would hold the Syrian government accountable for a moral obscenity that has shocked the world’s conscience.” Kerry accused the Syrian government of the “indiscriminate slaughter of civilians” and of cynical efforts to cover up its responsibility as a “cowardly crime” (“Remarks on Syria,” August 26, 2013). The White House also held a series of closed briefings on Capitol Hill. Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee were shown classified signals, intelligence of radio intercepts, and telephone calls between Syrian military commanders as proof of their culpability. Members also saw a video compilation of recorded evidence of victims of the nerve gas attack (Gordon and Landler, August 26, 2013; Hunt, September 5, 2013). Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that the evidence had convinced her, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Assad was responsible. But she also noted that there was more work to do to convince other members of Congress and the general public to support action. She said, “this is what other members of Congress need to see if they’re to be persuaded to vote to authorize strikes designed to punish Assad and deter him from using chemical weapons again.” Meanwhile, opponents attempted to persuade moderates against authorizing action. They employed several framing devices, or negative counter-narratives, of their own to challenge the call for immediate action. First, many skeptics wondered aloud whether the missile strikes that the president proposed would yield anything productive. Senator Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), who had been a target of Obama administration lobbying through extensive briefings, said that she was still unconvinced. “After all these meetings, I still have serious concerns. I cannot support the current Senate resolution to authorize force at this time,” she said. “After doing my due diligence, I believe we need an alternative path forward in dealing with the Assad regime. We must balance the legitimate concerns that Americans have about the use of military force with our

130 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

strategic interests” (qtd. in Kane and O’Keefe, September 9, 2013). Opponents also argued that U.S. allies like Great Britain and France had not determined that action was necessary, and that their citizens clearly saw potential limits to Western action. Second, some critics argued that it was not appropriate to match the violation of one norm—in Syria’s use of weapons of mass destruction— with the violation of other norms such as state sovereignty and standards for discriminate and just uses of military force (Price 2013). This argument came primarily from the liberal left, especially nongovernmental organizations and academics, who lobbied Congress against a rush to action. They said that in the modern era of global politics, there was limited rationale for military interventions in foreign countries and that few actions would rise to the standard of legitimizing violence. Even the argument for intervention to protect the norm against chemical weapons use was countered by concerns about unintended consequences. Critics charged that a military strike would actually damage changes for a diplomatic settlement of the complex conflict (Packer, August 26, 2013). Key voices opposed to a strike included liberal academics and prominent voices from the Council on Foreign Relations, including CFR President Richard Haass, Steven Cook, and Micah Zenko (Cook, August 30, 2013). In addition, the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental panel of experts, argued that the Obama administration’s proposed strikes would be “largely divorced from the interests of the Syrian people” and could damage prospects for a diplomatic settlement (Klein, September 2, 2013). Third, some opponents saw the Syrian authorization as a Trojan Horse—a policy change that might inadvertently make Congress complicit in deepening military engagement. After spending trillions of dollars and losing thousands of lives of U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was little appetite for military operations in another Middle Eastern country. The Syrian civil war had already raged for two years by 2013 and caused major challenges for citizens of that country and its immediate neighbors. An estimated 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict so far (“Syria Death Toll”). But when the administration argued there was a “clear and compelling” case that had proven Bashar al-Assad was a “thug and murderer,” Progressives responded that they found such claims eerily familiar. They countered that the rhetoric was quite similar to the claims the George W. Bush administration had made for the costly invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Indeed, Progressives charged that the quagmire of Iraq represented a clear and

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

131

compelling reason not to intervene in Syria. They were especially mindful of opposition from war-weary constituents at home and remained generally wary of being pulled into another foreign conflict (Thomas, September 7, 2013). “We’ve been to this dance before and we saw what happened in Iraq,” said Progressive Representative Bruce Braley (D-IA), “And I have a solemn responsibility to understand what the risks are before I vote to authorize the use of force” (qtd. in Thomas, September 7, 2013). Progressives charged that U.S. national security interests were not threatened in this case, and that any action would represent a dangerous, slippery slope of commitments of blood and treasure (Bierman and Viser 2013). This generalized opposition to expanding military operations reflected a populist anti-war sentiment that crossed party boundaries, from the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus to the progressive left. One commentator observed at the time: …We may finally be seeing the mythical populist coalition between anti-­ interventionist libertarians on the right and antiwar civil libertarians on the left that former Rep. Ron Paul and Ralph Nader have dreamed about for years….Indeed, Syria has tilted the political landscape 90 degrees, turning the familiar partisan divide into a vertical split between the leadership in both parties, which favors military intervention, and the parties’ anti-­ interventionist grassroots bases. And it comes on the heels of a revival of “libertarian populism” on the right, alarm over civil liberties on the left, and a general war weariness among Americans of all ages. (Seitz-Wald 2013)

Clearly, these and related dynamics were playing out in important ways during the Syria vote showdown. Consistency of Opposition The Progressive case against intervention in Syria represented a fairly consistent and strong message against action that was actually shaped before the chemical weapons attacks of 2013. They followed the two-step approach outlined by Moscovici et al. (1969) by inducing conflict on the question and following through with expressions of opposition to a strike. Indeed, an earlier, smaller chemical weapons attack in Syria that June provided an opportunity for some lawmakers to consider contingencies and stake out their positions. The administration was aware that it could not

132 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

count on sufficient congressional support to authorize wider military actions in Syria—despite the fact that it had backing from establishment Republicans and Democrats. In fact, the White House might have guessed congressional sentiments even before the “red line” declaration. Many lawmakers had been deeply frustrated by President Obama’s decision in 2011 to intervene in Libya’s civil war without seeking a congressional authorization for the use of military force. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle believed that presidents were required by the Constitution to secure congressional authorization for the use of force except in times of imminent security threat or invasion. Yet, in 2011, the White House had effectively gone around Congress in its consideration of participation in NATO military strikes on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in the civil war that followed Arab Spring revolutions. The proposed vote on authorization of the use of force in Syria presented frustrated members of Congress with an actual opportunity to say “no,” and they relished the chance to cast their votes. The consistency of the opposition was fueled, in part, by steady populist pressure against intervention. To the extent that the American public was attentive to issues in Syria, a large majority opposed engagement in “another” distant war. Progressives trumpeted those numbers repeatedly in debates in Washington, calling for constraints on military operations. For example, when it came time to debate a resolution authorizing the Obama administration to use force in Syria, opponents arose in both the Senate and the House. Three Democratic members of the Senate who were particularly outspoken against a military strike were Chris Murphy (D-CT), Tom Udall (D-NM), and Ed Markey (D-MA). Other opponents included Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), and Joe Manchin (D-WV) (“Where Lawmakers Stand”), each of whom voiced their opposition, described a reluctant public, and issued a steady barrage of questions for the administration to address. Other Democrats said they were “undecided” in early September, including prominent voices such as Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Mark Begich (D-ME), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Edward Markey (D-­ MA), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), Mark Udall (D-UT), and Ron Wyden (D-OR). Opposition to action in Syria was more vocal and consistent in the House of Representatives. Barbara Lee led the charge for Progressives, arguing that the United States should vigorously pursue all alternatives to the use of military force. She was the only member of Congress who had

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

133

voted against the broad authorization of the use of force for President George W.  Bush after 9/11, and she remained an outspoken critic of action. Lee was joined in issuing challenges by other House colleagues, including liberal Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA), who argued, “There is ferment out there [against a military strike]—you just haven’t seen it yet.” He added, “If they fire rockets in there, you’ll see a lot of people saying this is an absolute mistake, they should not have done it, I do not support it. The storm will follow if [Obama] goes without having the backing of the Congress.” Similarly, Alan Grayson (D-FL) said it was hard to criticize a president from your own party, but that he was committed first to upholding the Constitution. In early September 2013, Lee authored a letter of opposition to a strike on Syria that drew signatures from a total of 60 Democratic members of the House. The goal of Progressives, Lee said, was simple: “We want a debate” (Epstein and Kim, August 28, 2013). The opposition message in the House and in civil society was pervasive. For example, the views of far-left liberals were advertised by the non-profit group the Progressive Democrats of America, who paid for full-page advertisements in prominent publications that read: “Forceful diplomacy is the alternative to force without a diplomatic solution” (Epstein and Kim, August 28, 2013). There were no similar public information campaigns in favor of military action at the time. This hesitation also reflected the fact that lawmakers were monitoring public opinion polls that showed strong public resistance to action. For example, a CNN/ORC International poll published on September 9, 2013, found that more than 70% of Americans did not want Congress to authorize a military strike against the Assad government (Fahrenthold and Kane, September 6, 2013). Representatives also got an earful on the matter during their visits with constituents over the Labor Day recess, with many reporting that voters were extremely concerned about stepping into the Syrian civil war. Opponents on Capitol Hill echoed these public concerns, arguing they did not see how a military strike would achieve U.S. national interests (Harwood and Weisman, September 6, 2013). Outcome The Obama administration tried to make a case for military action on Capitol Hill, but by the second week of September 2013, the message was clear: a large number of Democrats and Republicans were either unde-

134 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

cided or outright opposed to a strike. Progressives signaled that dozens of their members would vote against any use of force resolution. Public opinion remained opposed to a strike, as voters expressed doubts about the long-term implications of escalation of U.S. involvement in Syria. The political discourse was further complicated by news of a vote in the British House of Commons rejecting the authority of their government to conduct a retaliatory strike. As a result of many factors, Senate Majority Leader Reed and House Speaker Boehner announced they would postpone the vote on an authorization resolution. The opposition celebrated a “successful” level of influence at blocking the initiative, but the administration quickly suggested that the issue would be resolved another way. In the end, the White House was saved from embarrassment by a diplomatic maneuver: Secretary Kerry was asked in a news conference on September 9 whether there was anything the Syrian regime could do to avoid an attack. In an off-hand manner, Kerry said that he did believe the situation could be resolved if President Assad would admit that he had chemical weapons and give them all up peacefully. This was a far-­ reaching proposal that Kerry knew at the time had little chance of success. But in a surprise move, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seized on this new “initiative” and helped broker talks with the Syrian government to do just that (Chollet, July 19, 2016). Within 24 hours, President Obama announced that the new diplomatic initiative was moving forward, and he requested that Congress not vote on the action. While he again restated his case for a possible military attack, the president acknowledged that there were many questions from Congress and lingering doubts in the public on whether that would be the best policy choice moving forward (Landler and Weisman, September 10, 2013). The outcome of this showdown was a decision not to proceed with plans for military strikes in 2013 while a multilateral consortium helped negotiate the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. United Nations inspectors working with experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reported that they had identified more than 70,000 metric tons of Syria’s declared stockpile and began to remove the weapons. The chemical agents were diluted and loaded onto ships in a Syrian port, then transported to a U.S.  Navy vessel specially equipped to neutralize and destroy chemical agents. In his State of the Union address in January 2014, President Barack Obama celebrated the outcome, announcing, “American diplomacy, backed by the threat of force, is why Syria’s chemical weapons are being eliminated” (qtd. in

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

135

Shane, April 7, 2017). However, the war itself continued, and in 2017 and 2018, the Syrian army used alternative chemical agents including chlorine and phosgene for even more attacks against rebel groups. The challenge presented by horrific violence in the Syrian civil war and the Assad regime’s willingness to use weapons of mass destruction continued to pose difficult questions for Western governments about their responsibility to protect citizens caught up in violence around the world.

The Progressives and Trade Policy Authority for the TPP Free trade agreements (FTAs) were a very important focus of the Obama administration’s foreign policy agenda. The completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 helped set the stage for the advancement of subsequent deals to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and promote economic growth. In the 2000s, the Bush administration negotiated bilateral FTAs with Australia (2004) and Morocco (2006). Later, Obama officials began to focus on two, larger multilateral trade agreements—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—along with bilateral deals with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. TTIP was a proposed comprehensive trade and investment program between the United States and the European Union; it was considered highly specialized and complicated (Akhtar et al. 2016). TPP negotiations were already underway among a dozen countries located around the Pacific Rim when President Obama authorized U.S. diplomats to join the talks starting in 2009. The president saw TPP as an exciting opportunity to promote commerce and believed it could serve as a centerpiece for the administration’s “pivot” toward Asia. Such an agreement could also help counterbalance China’s growing hegemony in the region (Petri et al. 2012). The Obama administration’s first legal step to completion of any of these agreements was renewing congressional approval of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). TPA, also known as “fast-track” legislation, was a system first established in the 1974 Trade Act to expedite consideration of trade deals by preventing Congress from amending or filibustering them. Past U.S. presidents had secured this authority to negotiate deals like NAFTA and support negotiations in round of global trade talks sponsored by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization. However, TPA renewal was not a foregone conclusion in the 2010s, and

136 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

the Obama administration faced a complicated political landscape. Mainstream Republicans traditionally supported trade agreements given their economic benefits for corporations; some moderate Democrats were also willing to follow the lead of the president on such deals. Yet, the prospect of TPA renewal in 2015 faced strong opposition from the far-left and the far-right of the political spectrum. Progressive Democrats challenged such agreements on the grounds that they increased economic inequalities and empowered corporations. Far-right conservatives also opposed free trade deals that promoted supranational authority and diminished sovereignty. As a result, the Obama administration had to court supporters on both ends of the political spectrum to pass TPA and pave the way for TPP. That process required nearly two years of political wrangling, and the final bill included unprecedented restrictive language. The residual effects of the bitter battle over TPA would continue throughout the 2016 presidential election campaign, and beyond. Factional Attributes The debate over Trade Promotion Authority again illustrated divisions in the Democratic Party, especially between the Progressive left-wing and more moderate establishment Democrats. The split reflected decades of differences between factions in the party over domestic and foreign affairs. On domestic issues, Progressives were committed to advance principles of equity and fairness. They supported the Affordable Care Act and expansion of social welfare benefits, and they were willing to advance deviant and nonconformist positions that challenged moderates. In the realm of foreign affairs, Progressives espoused a mixed bag of positions. Generally speaking, Progressives were more averse to foreign military operations and favored redistribution of federal spending to promote interests at home. Many Progressives were highly sensitive to the effects of intermestic issues on the polity such as trade and immigration. They favored protections for American workers, and thus adopted insurgent positions on debates about free trade agreements. Key figures in the Progressive movement in the Senate in the 2010s included Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT). Warren, a former law professor and head of a consumer protection agency, won a U.S. Senate seat in Massachusetts in 2012. Once in office, Warren fought for issues that were at the core of the Progressive agenda of the new left of the Democratic Party, including consumer protection from banks and cor-

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

137

porations and opposition to the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement (Scheiber, November 10, 2013). Warren led Progressives on the TPA-TPP fight, calling the deal a Trojan Horse for big corporations and a product of a “rigged system” that “benefits corporations over American workers” (Casella 2016; Lantis 2019). Bernie Sanders was also a strong opponent of free trade, placing a higher priority on protecting jobs for Americans. He argued that the TPP, like other trade deals, would allow corporations to exploit cheap labor; unfettered free trade, he said, would be “a disaster for the American people” (qtd. in Prokop, October 12, 2015). The challenges raised by Progressives regarding the TPA and TPP reflect their broader sentiments that free trade deals have been disastrous. Lower tariff barriers to trade, they believe, have led to factory closings and shrinking wages for workers. Thus, agreements like NAFTA and the proposed TPP could serve as the death-knell for already fragile industrial bases across the United States. Progressives also held strong views about the wealth gap, arguing that free trade deals mostly benefitted the wealthy, such as factory owners, and cost workers dearly. Not only could more corporations move their production lines offshore, costing American jobs, but they might also operate in countries with poor labor standards. Lower environmental standards and consumer protections also pose potential threats to workers and even indigenous populations in areas of new factories. Another modern challenge with free trade is the potential for theft of intellectual property through shared production processes that do not adequately protect patents and inventions. The formal membership of the CPC during the 114th session of Congress (2015–2017) included 68 members in the House of Representatives. Progressives constituted roughly 36% of Democrats in the House at the time, again making them the largest belief-based caucus within the party. At the same time, the group exhibited a slightly more ideologically liberal bend: the average first dimension DW-NOMINATE score for Progressive members in the 114th Congress was −0.477. Democrats as a whole, scored an average of −0.395, with non-caucus members having a mean of −0.349. The ideological makeup of the Progressive Caucus did not change much from the last Congress, with its range of scores still largely between more liberal (−0.683) and more moderate (−0.276) members. In addition, public statements by members of the Progressive Caucus clearly articulated strong convictions behind liberal principles and increased willingness to challenge the establishment.

138 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Progressives in the 114th congress averaged a −0.211 second dimension DW-NOMINATE score, indicating that their members were much more anti-establishment and less willing to compromise than non-Progressives (−0.003) and the average Democrat (−0.077). When comparing their ideology and anti-establishment views to the broader party, Progressives in the 114th Congress were still rather extreme. In fact, 42 of the 68 members had extreme liberal views, and 36 of the 68 were extreme in their willingness to challenge the establishment. Thus, we code the Progressive Caucus at the time as a more cohesive faction. Traditional Legislative Strategies One of President Barack Obama’s goals in passing Trade Promotion Authority was to secure the fast-track review process for negotiation of the TPP. The proposed agreement was extremely ambitious: It would create a trade zone similar to NAFTA by joining with a dozen or more countries on the Pacific rim, including Vietnam, Japan, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Peru, and Chile. The goal was to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade throughout the region by 2030 (Lim et al. 2012; Petri et al. 2012). As TPP talks gathered momentum, the administration stepped up its quest to secure TPA. While the president had the Constitutional authority to negotiate treaties, Congress retained the formal right of “advice and consent” on them. If the Obama administration followed a traditional treaty ratification process for an agreement like a Pacific trade deal, it would require a super-majority of support in the Senate (two-thirds, or 67 votes) for passage. TPA was a much more attractive option: it provided a system for expedited review of a trade deal by Congress. The president could negotiate a deal that they consider in the best interests of the nation, and then submit it to Congress for an up-or-­down vote, with no amendments (Sherman 2002; Destler 1992; Bailey et al. 1997). However, this authority was not automatic: The Trade Act legislation required that TPA be reauthorized periodically, and over time, members of Congress added elements to the legislation such as requiring consultation mechanisms and reporting requirements. In this case, the Obama administration saw TPA as essential for progress in negotiations on the TPP, TTIP, and even U.S. engagement in other multilateral ­negotiations like another Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade talks (Fergusson 2015).

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

139

President Obama issued a formal request in July 2013 for Congress to reauthorize TPA, and he drew support from establishment lawmakers for the initiative. For example, House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Paul Ryan (R-WI) supported fast track. Bills with duplicate language were advanced in both chambers: In the House, Representative Dave Camp (R-MI), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Relations Act (H.R. 3830). Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT) and ranking member Orrin Hatch (R-UT) introduced an identical measure in the Senate. However, 2014 was a midterm election year, and the White House faced opposition to fast-track authority from key Democrats in the Senate. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and others opposed TPA amid pressure from organized labor groups and other lobbies. The president could not find sufficient support for the legislation throughout 2014, and it stalled in the Senate until the midterm elections brought Republicans to power in that chamber (Lantis 2019). The controversy over TPA intensified in 2015. The White House again attempted to advance legislation, but Progressives and other opponents in Congress delayed its progress (Palmer, April 17, 2015). While they did not propose alternative legislation or seek many amendments to existing bills, Progressives again adopted a two-step approach to challenging the TPA and TPP.  They induced conflict on the TPA itself and adopted a vocal, nonconformist posture regarding the trade deal. They expressed a number of reservations about the deal, ranging from threats to the American economy to lower standards for the environment. Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) warned, “I opposed NAFTA, CAFTA, KORUS, MFN for China, and a host of other trade deals we have adopted over the last two decades. These trade deals were sold on the premise that they would expand U.S. job growth and boost American exports; instead we’ve seen massive trade deficits and enormous job losses.” He added, “If our previous free trade deals are any indication of what we can expect from the TPP, American workers are in serious trouble.” Other Progressives called out challenges to food safety and intellectual property rights. Progressives also challenged the negotiation and review process for the TPP.  They pressed for language in the renewal that would allow more members of Congress and their staffs to see the text of treaties under negotiation as much in advance as possible. They proposed public access to the text and scrutiny for at least 60 days before the president signed

140 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

them (Watson, April 20, 2015). In fact, this secrecy had long been a bone of contention between presidential administrations and Congress. Past trade promotion authority essentially allowed administrations to keep the text of the agreement sealed until the very last moments of the negotiation and ratification process. The hundreds of “cleared advisors” who had the license to review the TPP draft and make suggestions along the way were mostly corporate lobbyists and lawyers who consulted with the federal government (Harris and Bradsher, November 19, 2016). In June 2015, the story took an interesting turn: two draft chapters of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and other materials were posted on the Internet by WikiLeaks. The chapters covered sensitive issues including environmental regulation agreements and intellectual property rights. The draft text included enough specifics to generate a firestorm of criticism by concerned civil society actors at the time. For example, the TPP would require signatories to adopt criminal sanctions for those found guilty of copyright infringement. The agreement would also put new demands on Internet service providers (ISPs), requiring them to enforce copyright law. The chapter on environmental regulations seemed especially weak to many critics, with the language requiring only that signatories “affirm [their] commitment to uphold environmental regulations,” and it created a weak arbitration system for punishing violations (qtd. in Lantis 2019). Progressives seized on this news to once again challenge the nature of the agreement itself, as well as to criticize the integrity and transparency of the negotiation process. They believed the leak provided an opportunity to persuade the public against TPP—a look inside the development of a deal that would hurt the environment and disadvantage American workers. They also argued that plans to move forward on FTA legislation without transparency represented an untenable legislative strategy. The leaked sections of the agreement, critics argued, proved that TPP would not significantly advance international standards established decades earlier (wikileaks.org/tpp-soe-minister/, July 19, 2015). Progressives were also concerned about the proposed new investor-­ state dispute settlement arbitration system (ISDS) for the agreement, which appeared to give foreign companies significant rights in disputed cases. This system had been implemented in other international trade agreements, and it was designed to allow a corporation invested in a ­foreign country to appeal to arbitration panels, often consisting of corporate lawyers, if that country enacted a law or regulation that violates a

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

141

trade agreement or discriminated against the company. Additional provisions allowed greater autonomy for multinational corporations to operate in less developed countries (Dayen and Grimm, September 7, 2016). From their first appearance in multilateral trade arrangements in the 2000s, dispute settlement arrangements in treaties had grown in popularity (UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016). Nevertheless, critics argued that it was inherently unfair to governments and consumers. One challenger to the Obama administration’s negotiation strategies on TPP, Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR), said, “The ramifications of these ISDS provisions, including erosion of U.S. sovereignty and potential costs passed on to the American public, are extremely troubling—and they become even more so when hedge fund investors are actively working to exploit this system and pocket profits at the expense of taxpayers around the world” (Dayen and Grimm, September 7, 2016). Nevertheless, congressional allies of the administration introduced parallel measures in both chambers to authorize TPA in 2015, entitled the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1890/S. 995). In the House, this proposal was joined with legislation extending Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), a bill that would help workers displaced by international trade accords. Supporters believed that TAA was an attractive piece of legislation that would draw Progressive support for the TPP.  However, the opposition remained intense. That June, President Obama appealed directly to House Democrats in a speech that was reportedly forceful and even angry (Panda, June 15, 2015). Trying to push the issue, the president implored House Democrats to “play it straight” and divert their opposition to specific legislative changes. However, rather than agree to change course, Progressives were incensed. If anything, they believed, it was the White House that failed to “play it straight” by wedding TPA with TAA and by not allowing more transparent review of controversial terms of the TPP. Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) said the president had not helped his cause, describing the meeting as, “basically, the president tried to both guilt people and then impugn their integrity.” When it became clear to the leadership that Obama’s efforts had backfired, the leadership moved to separate the two pieces of legislation (Brodey, July 21, 2015). The TPP itself was finalized in October 2015, and the Obama administration submitted a formal copy of the agreement to Congress for review in 2016. However, political support for the deal seemed to have fallen apart by that time, and House leaders saw little chance for a successful up-­

142 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

or-­down vote. Progressives were energized in their opposition and sought to exploit divisions across the chambers. Meanwhile, some Republicans who had agreed to support TPA in 2015 back-pedaled in 2016 in the face of changing political tides. The TPP became a political football during the presidential election campaign, and both major party candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump stated that they were opposed to the deal in its current form. Issue Framing Issue framing also played an important role in trade policy debates. Supporters of fast-track authority saw it as an important step toward comprehensive trade agreements with partners in Europe and Asia. The White House and its allies claimed that the United States should be a part of TPP given its sheer scope and potential. “When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy,” President Obama said in a statement, “We should write those rules, opening new markets to American products while setting high standards for protecting workers and preserving our environment” (qtd. in Calmes, October 5, 2015). The participants in a future trade agreement, supporters noted, would include Australia, Japan, Chile, Singapore, Peru, and other countries, together responsible for about 40% of the world’s GDP. Many of them were already significant trading partners with the United States and Canada, and there was a great deal of potential for advancement of common interests by lowering additional tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In addition, the administration made the case that the TPP would extend U.S. economic and political interests in its strategic “pivot” to Asia and help rally other countries against emerging Chinese hegemony (Lim et al. 2012). The Obama administration also argued that the TPA and TPP would help advance economic and fiscal policies and better align key U.S. and regional economies in an era of globalization. TPP would help promote growth by providing the legal and technical foundations for job gains, enhance innovation, and improve economic conditions for all. New opportunities for market access, including in emerging sectors like telecommunications, would enhance prosperity and cyber-security. The Obama administration would attempt to make a strong case to Congress framing the TPP as a “win-win” for the United States and the region. The case made by the White House was even more important in this instance

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

143

because the president needed to drum up broad support to win Congressional approval. Essentially, Obama would have to assemble a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers focused largely around the political center in order to marginalize resistance on the left and right. Meanwhile, opponents fought back with strong negative issue framing. In the short-term, they hoped to derail TPA legislation; in the longer-­term, they set their sights on preventing passage of the TPP. Issue framing became a vehicle for them to challenge establishment positions and induce policy conflict. In May 2015, for example, the Congressional Progressive Caucus released a document that responded to the Obama administration’s support for TPP, called “Progressive Principles for Trade.” This alternative program outlined trade principles that opponents believed would directly benefit working people. It stated, “America’s current trade policy fails working families while increasing profits for the world’s largest corporations. Trade agreements should create a net increase of good American jobs, spur more balanced trade between partners, and improve governance, public health, and environmental protections around the world.” Some of the principles in the agreement include creating robust labor protections, prohibiting currency manipulation, implementing strong environmental standards, prohibiting special corporate courts, and insuring the health and safety of consumers, among others. Citing problems like the loss of millions of jobs since the implementation of NAFTA, Progressives argued that trade agreements contributed to wage stagnation and declining living standards at home. Abroad, they argued, trade policy had negative effects for factory workers and environmental standards (CPC, May 14, 2015). Another critical frame for opponents was the argument that TPP would “kill jobs” and “hurt” working families. The treaty was really a vehicle for corporate interests and lobbyists, they argued, and the ISDS system would give too much leeway to corporations in challenging a government’s trade laws (Mimms, May 26, 2015). In the House, Progressive Caucus leaders including Representatives Raúl M. Grijalva (D-AZ) and Keith Ellison (D-MN) argued that Trade Promotion Authority should be stopped. They argued it would effectively circumvent Congressional authority and prevent “oversight that is vital to protecting working families from bad trade deals.” They said, “Both Republicans and Democrats know the TPP is a threat to our constituents, our economy, and the checks and balances that make our democracy work, which is why TPA

144 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

faces such steep bipartisan opposition in Congress.” Instead of the unfair treaty under development, they argued, “Trade deals should be balanced, improve environmental protections and put workers first. The TPP will likely send more American jobs overseas, threaten our food and water safety, and increase the price of prescription medicines. Congress should not provide blanket authority to approve a deal that puts corporate profits over working families”. Together, factional leaders used these frames to help challenge the veracity of the administration’s claims about TPA and TPP and stall progress. For example, they were able to block the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Relations Act (H.R. 3830/S. 1900), a legislative package that included TPA, throughout 2014. Senator Warren and her allies were highly concerned about the growing influence of corporations and lobbying organizations on the TPP negotiations, and they sought to redress the imbalance of power between Congress and the executive branch. Notably, these criticisms also meshed well with challenges from Tea Party Republicans, who consistently railed against President Obama’s exercise of his executive authority. Consistency of Opposition Many Progressives maintained consistent opposition to the TPA and TPP as part of their broader strategy to derail the bipartisan free trade movement. Progressives knew that if they continued to oppose passage of TPA, they could effectively block the advancement of the TPP. They also knew that time was in their favor: if they could delay TPP to the time around the 2016 presidential election, it would likely become too controversial and politicized for lawmakers to try to negotiate or pass. Opponents issued a number of challenges to TPA to persuade Congress to delay or halt legislative progress. For example, they argued that while trade agreements could boost growth, this would come with costs for key components of the U.S. economy. Patterns of past deals showed that U.S. manufacturing often experienced losses in the wake of trade liberalization, and workers in the manufacturing sector were especially vulnerable. Federal subsidies for key sectors like agriculture would also be in peril under the terms of any new agreement. Representative Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH) publicly raised concerns about the potential effects of TPP on

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

145

New Hampshire’s textile industry as well as the fate of a government fisheries program funded by trade duties. She also signed another letter expressing concern that the trade deal would “weaken” U.S. environmental standards (National Cotton Council of America, June 14, 2013, http://www.cotton.org/issues/2013/tpplett.cfm). Lawmakers also consistently argued that they would like to have more of a voice in the process of developing trade deals. They challenged the “secret” negotiations of TPP, and they were concerned that resulting trade agreements would not fully reflect American values. Instead, opponents believed that any free trade agreement with Pacific nations would institutionalize an inherently unfair system that would let “multinational corporations rig the rules—on everything from patent protection to food safety standards—all to benefit themselves” (qtd. in Roberts et al., May 17, 2016). Proof of this, Senator Warren argued, was in its development: The first clue about who the TPP helps is who wrote it. Twenty-eight trade advisory committees were formed to whisper in the ear of our trade negotiators—to urge them to move this way or that in the negotiations. Who are the special, privileged whisperers? 85% are senior corporate executives or industry lobbyists. Many of the committees—including those on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, aerospace equipment, textiles and clothing, and financial services—are 100% industry representatives.

As a result, she concluded, “A rigged process produces a rigged outcome…in favor of corporate interests” (Warren, “Floor Speech”). Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and other colleagues in the House sent a series of open letters to President Obama, citing concerns about the details of TPP that were leaked to the media. DeLauro said that she and other members of the Progressive Caucus would, therefore, “oppose ‘Fast Track’ Trade Promotion Authority or any other mechanism delegating Congress’ constitutional authority over trade policy that continues to exclude us from having a meaningful role in the formative stages of trade agreements and throughout negotiating and approval processes” (“153 House Democrats,” May 29, 2014). Challengers in both the House and Senate were resolved to stand against TPP ratification. Critically, they also knew that time was on their side: The longer that the agreement remained in limbo, the more it became a political punching bag in the presidential election campaign of 2016. Democrats and Independents were actually able to raise the volume

146 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

on their opposition through Sanders’ run for the party’s presidential nomination, and Progressives effectively tried to box in Hillary Clinton as well (Washington Post Editorial Board, August 20, 2016). With Donald Trump also opposed to the treaty, prospects for its ratification seemed dim. Outcome Following several failed efforts, TPA was introduced again as a stand-alone bill in 2015. It passed by an incredibly narrow margin in the House of Representatives, 219–209, with moderate Democrats joining Republicans to pass it. TPA passed by a 60–37 vote margin in the Senate, resolving lingering uncertainty about its fate (Kim, June 23, 2015). Once again, Democratic senators including Ron Wyden of Oregon and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire had to cross the aisle to vote with Republicans to advance the bill to the White House. We code this as a case of “partial success” for the Progressives. The president signed TPA into law on June 29, 2015. Nevertheless, the significant delay in its passage, coupled with strong opposition from the political margins, continued to cloud the prospects for successful TPP negotiations. The final wording of TPA legislation was also strikingly restrained. Members of Congress managed to insert significant restrictions in the language that would require further reporting and deference to checks and balances between the branches of government. Ultimately, President Obama’s efforts to pass TPP would not be realized during his tenure in office. In January 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the TPP.  In response, leaders of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, including Representatives Raúl M.  Grijalva (D-AZ), Keith Ellison (D-MN), and Mark Pocan (D-WI) issued a celebratory press release, stating: Today was the final nail in the coffin for the TPP. The activists, advocates, and American workers who have spent the past five years fighting this trade deal deserve the credit for bringing about the end of the TPP – not President Trump. Together with its partners, the CPC has consistently opposed the TPP and laid out a vision for fair trade that must be incorporated into any future multilateral or bilateral trade agreement to receive progressive support. U.S. trade policy must create good-paying jobs, stop currency manipulation, and protect the environment and public health. We cannot enter

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

147

into trade agreements with countries that violate fundamental human rights. We cannot allow trade deals to ship jobs to countries that pay their workers next to nothing, and put hard-working Americans and small businesses at a disadvantage. The TPP failed to meet these basic principles and was met with opposition from people across the political spectrum for years. This has always been a bipartisan issue. It is up to President Trump to stand up to his billionaire cabinet and corporate boardrooms to create trade policies that benefit American workers, instead of increasing the profits and power of big corporations. (Congressional Progressive Caucus Responds to TPP Withdrawal, January 23, 2017)

Progressives touted their success in maintaining steady opposition to TPA and the TPP, and they believed that the move by President Trump represented a just and fitting outcome to the controversy.

Bibliography 153 House Democrats to USTR Froman: Protect Workers’ Rights in TPP Negotiations. (2014, May 29). Rep. Rosa DeLauro Office (Press Release). https://delauro.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/153-house-democrats-ustr-froman-protect-workers-rights-tpp-negotiations Akhtar, S.  I., Jones, V.  C., & Johnson, R. (2016). Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations. CRS Reports. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Bailey, M.  A., et  al. (1997). The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions and International Trade. World Politics, 49, 309–338. Baker, P., & Weisman, J. (2013, August 31). Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria. The New York Times. Bierman, N., & Viser, M. (2013, September 3). Obama Faces Support, Skepticism in Congress: Boehner, Pelosi Aboard on Syria; Kerry Pressed. Boston Globe. Brodey, S. (2015, July 21). How Keith Ellison Made the Congressional Progressive Caucus into a Political Force that Matters. MinnPost. Calmes, J. (2015, October 5). Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress. The New York Times. Casella, M. (2016, July 7). Warren Calls on Progressives to Help Fight the TPP. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/elizabethwarren-trade-tpp-225214 Charap, S. (2013). Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention. Global Politics and Strategy, 55(1), 35–41. Chollet, D. (2016, July 19). Obama’s Red Line, Revisited. Politico.

148 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Cook, S. A. (2013, August 30). In Trying to Help Syria, an Intervention Would Destroy It. The Washington Post. Dayen, D., & Grimm, R. (2016, September 7). There’s A New Front in The Battle Over the Trans-Pacific Partnership. U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley for Oregon. Retrieved from https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/in-the-news/theresa-new-front-in-the-battle-over-the-trans-pacific-partnership Destler, I.  M. (1992). American Trade Politics. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and the Twentieth Century Fund. Ellison, K., Grijalva, R.  M., & Pocan, M. (2017). Congressional Progressive Caucus Responds to TPP Withdrawal (Press Release). Retrieved from https:// cpc-grijalva.house.gov/press-releases/congressional-progressive-caucusresponds-to-tpp-withdrawal/ Epstein, R. J., & Kim, S. M. (2013, August 28). Anti-War Democrats Speak on Syria. Politico. Everett, B. (2013, September 14). Tough Hill Vote on Syria Fades. Politico. Fahrenthold, D. A., & Kane, P. (2013, September 6). Opposition to Syria Strike Brings Together Liberal Democrats, Libertarian Republicans. The Washington Post. Fergusson, I.  F. (2015). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress. CRS Report R42694. Gordon, M. R., & Landler, M. (2013, August 26). Kerry Cites Clear Evidence of Chemical Use in Syria. The New York Times. Harris, G., & Bradsher, K. (2016, November 19). China’s Influence Grows in Ashes of Trans-Pacific Trade Pact. The New York Times. Harwood, J., & Weisman, J. (2013, September 6). House Republicans Say Voters Oppose Intervention. The New York Times. Hill Staff. (2013, September 9). The Hill’s Syria Whip List: Obama Seeks to Turn Tide with House, Public. The Hill. Hunt, K. (2013, September 5). Lawmakers Shown ‘Horrendous’ Video of Alleged Chemical Attack in Syria. NBC News. Retrieved from http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/05/20343868-lawmakers-shown-horrendousvideo-of-alleged-chemical-attack-in-syria? Jenkins, S. (2014, December 2). Britain and the US Must Help Mend the Syrian Refugee Crisis They Helped Create. The Guardian. Kane, P., & O’Keefe, E. (2013, September 9). Obama’s Push for Syria Actions Runs Into Growing Opposition. The Washington Post. Kim, S. M. (2015, June 23). 13 Senate Dems Vote with GOP to Advance Trade Bill. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/ tpa-trade-bill-democrat-vote-tally-119331 Klein, E. (2013, September 2). Obama’s Proposed Syria Strikes Are ‘Largely Divorced from the Interests of the Syrian People. The Washington Post.

5  PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS ACTIVISM DURING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

149

Landler, M., & Weisman, J. (2013, September 10). Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan. The New York Times. Lantis, J.  S. (2019). Foreign Policy Advocacy and Entrepreneurship: How a New Generation in Congress Is Shaping U.S. Engagement with the World. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Lim, C.  L., Elms, D.  K., & Low, P. (2012). The Trans-Pacific Partnership. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mimms, S. (2015, May 26). Is Elizabeth Warren an Effective Senator? The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/iselizabeth-warren-an-effective-senator/449349/ Moscovici, S., Lage, E., & Naffrechoux, M. (1969). Influence of a Consistent Minority on the Response of a Majority in a Color-Perception Task. Sociometry, 32, 365–380. Packer, G. (2013, August 26). Two Minds on Syria. The New Yorker. Palmer, D. (2015, April 17). Lawmakers Strike Deal On Fast Track Trade Bill. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/ trade-promotion-authority-bill-orrin-hatch-ron-wyden-117043 Panda, A. (2015, June 15). TPP Update: What Happened in the House. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/ tpp-update-what-happened-in-the-house/ Petri, P. A., Plummer, M. G., & Zhai, F. (2012). The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Price, R. (2013, September). No Strike, No Problem: The Right Way to Nurture a Norm. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139903/richard-price/no-strike-no-problem?cid=090613 Principles for Trade. (2015, May 14). Congressional Progressive Caucus Website. Retrieved from https://cpc-grijalva.house.gov/principles-for-trade/ Prokop, A. (2015, October 12). Bernie Sanders 2016: A Primer. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2015/7/28/18093566/bernie-sanders-issues-policies Roberts, J., Bromund, T., & Dasgupta, R. (2016, May 17). Straight Talk on the ISDS Provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/ straight-talk-the-isds-provisions-the-trans-pacific-partnership Sanders, B. (2013, September 4). Sanders Statement on Syria. Sen. Bernie Sanders Office. Press Release. https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/sanders-statement-on-syria-9-4-13 Scheiber, N. (2013, November 10). Hillary’s Nightmare? A Democratic Party It Realizes Its Soul Lies with Elizabeth Warren. The New Republic. Retrieved from https://newrepublic.com/article/115509/hillarys-nightmare-democraticparty-realizes-soul-lies-elizabeth-warren

150 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Seitz-Wald, A. (2013, September 13). Libertarian Republicans and Liberal Democrats: Marriage or 1-Night Stand? The Atlantic. Shane, S. (2017, April 7). Weren’t Syria’s Chemical Weapons Destroyed? It’s Complicated. The New York Times. Shanker, T., et al. (2013, August 27). Obama Weights ‘Limited’ Strikes Against Syrian Forces. The New York Times. Sherman, R. (2002). Delegation, Ratification, and U.S. Trade Policy: Why Divided Government Causes Lower Tariffs. Comparative Political Studies, 35(10), 1171–1197. Solomon, J., & Hook, J. (2013, September 2). White House Girds for Battle with Congress on Syria. The Wall Street Journal. Statement by the President on Syria. (2013, August 31) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. www.whitehouse.gov/the-pres-office/2013/08/31/ statement-president-syria Thomas, K. (2013, September 7). Democrats Face Divide Over a Strike on Syria. Associated Press. Retrieved from http://www.sbsun.com/generalnews/20130907/democrats-face-divide-over-a-strike-on-syria Warrick, J. (2013, August 30). More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says. The Washington Post. Watson, W.  K. (2015, April 20). What’s Really in the New Trade Promotion Authority Bill? Cato Institute. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/blog/ whats-really-new-trade-promotion-authority-bill

CHAPTER 6

The Freedom Caucus and Factionalism in the Trump Era

I believe innocent human life is sacred from conception. This informs all that I do in Congress. I call on Republican leadership to keep their commitment to the American people and defund Planned Parenthood through reconciliation. —Freedom Caucus Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) (April 25, 2017) The Iran Deal was nothing short of a foreign policy debacle. President Trump is absolutely right to reinstate sanctions and withdraw from the agreement. The United States can do better—and we will. This is a victory for a safer and more secure America. —Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC) (May 8, 2018)

The Freedom Caucus was formed in 2015 by conservatives who sought a more focused approach to principled resistance. This chapter applies the minority theory of factional influence in two contemporary case studies. First, we examine ways that conservatives with deeply held social values challenged family planning provisions in foreign aid legislation. This included calls for cuts in foreign aid and enforcement of executive orders to achieve the goal of limiting access to reproductive health care in developing countries. Second, we explore conservative resistance to engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal). While the Republican Party was more unified toward these issues, far-right conservatives took especially strong © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_6

151

152 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

stands. Cases show the dynamics of minority challenges to establishment positions and their committed efforts to change the status quo. Through persuasion and persistence, conservatives were able to dismantle an agreement that had taken years to negotiate and had gone fully into effect, with Iranian compliance.

Reproductive Health Care Rights and Foreign Assistance in the Trump Era U.S. foreign assistance represents a tiny portion of the annual federal budget, but foreign aid has sometimes generated outsized controversy. Policy-­ makers have debated how much money the government allocates each year for foreign assistance, which countries and organizations receive these funds, and their intended purpose. In many ways, these issues go to the heart of America’s values and strategic goals. Foreign assistance programs have been designed as much to help with economic, political, and social development as to promote U.S. interests abroad. They also reflect the state of U.S. relations with other countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). One controversial question for foreign assistance policy is whether the United States should help fund the activities of intergovernmental and nongovernmental aid organizations that provide reproductive health care and family planning measures in developing countries. Such initiatives began as part of a broader effort to promote economic development abroad in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson championed these programs, calling on the U.S. government to advance progressive legislation for economic development and global cooperation. He said the United States should “find new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources” (“State of the Union Address,” January 4, 1965). It would become U.S. policy to help combat overpopulation and solve natural resource scarcities in the developing world. Johnson directed the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) to launch its first population and family planning program in 1965. By the 1980s, the federal government was allocating hundreds of millions of federal dollars a year to family planning projects led by government agencies, NGOs, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (Cincotta and Crane 2001).

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

153

However, not everyone supported these efforts. Some policy-makers and civil society groups argued that providing support for reproductive health care, including abortions, ran counter to American values and interests. They cited political, moral, and religious reservations to challenge these initiatives both at home and abroad. The debate took on new urgency following the Supreme Court’s controversial Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, which ruled that a woman’s right to make her own medical decisions, including the choice to have an abortion, was protected under the 14th Amendment. While some members of Congress celebrated the outcome, others condemned it and sought legislation that would outlaw the practice of abortion (Blanchfield, April 5, 2018). Starting in the 1980s, many Republicans channeled these concerns by trying to eliminate federal funding for reproductive health assistance through U.S. foreign aid programs. They charged that federal funding should be withheld from countries or organizations that sanctioned abortions or engaged in coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization activities (Cook et  al. 2003). This case study examines how the rise of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus in Congress in the 2010s intensified this debate and how the Trump administration appeared to take actions to address conservative positions. Factional Attributes While reproductive health care policies have been controversial for decades, the period of contestation examined in this case study began in January 2015 with the swearing-in of the 114th Congress and continued into the 115th Congress (2017–2019). This included the Republican takeover of the Senate in 2015 and new policies in the Trump administration. While Republican opposition to this funding area was fairly consistent since the 1980s, this period saw the rise of a new faction of conservative lawmakers, the House Freedom Caucus (HFC). Consistent with the party politics literature, this faction was formed by members of Congress who believed that their interests had not been met through establishment control. They were dissatisfied with the Republican Party leadership and expressed deviant policy positions that challenged the status quo (Hammond 1998). The founders of the Freedom Caucus believed that they were “true conservatives” who could operate more effectively as a group in the legislative process by remaining small and well organized. Membership in the Freedom Caucus was invitation-­only, and the group began to meet regularly to try to coordinate their policy positions. The caucus was organized

154 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

to be more focused and nimble than the Tea Party, as well as the much larger Republican Study Committee. Conservative Republican Jim Jordan (R-OH) said at the time of its formation that the Freedom Caucus would “advance an agenda of limited, constitutional government in Congress” by employing “a smaller, more cohesive, more agile and more active organization” (Press Release, January 26, 2015). All members of the caucus had to demonstrate their commitment to conservative ideologies and to work intentionally and closely with the group. They also sought independent means of funding. Representative Mick Mulvaney (R-SC), one of the founders of the caucus, said, “We fully expect to start our own separate fundraising, our own separate vetting for candidates, and you’ll see us trying to get good conservatives elected in open races.” He added, “We recognize the fact that we have a brand, and we’re going to try to use that to further our mission” (qtd. in DeBonis, December 2, 2015). The Freedom Caucus was as much a faction in the modern era as it was a social values movement in Congress. Freedom Caucus members championed fiscal conservatism and a leaner government (Richardson 2014; Pramuk, March 24, 2017). They were also deeply committed to conservative social values. A core group of Freedom Caucus members in the 2010s were evangelical Christians, and the caucus worked closely with evangelical groups like the Faith and Freedom Coalition, which claimed 400,000 members across scores of states. That group regularly shared voter guides in churches nationwide and conducted outreach to tens of millions of evangelical voters. Ralph Reed, its founder, claimed that close coordination between government officials and organizations like his offered potential for  having an incredible impact on politics. The goal was to induce conflict, to persuade others of the correctness of their position, and to change the political agenda. Reed said in one interview, “Conservative people of faith are playing a larger role in shaping the contours and affecting the trajectory of the Republican presidential nomination contest than at any time since they began pouring out of the pews and into the precincts in the late 1970’s” (qtd. in Hirschkorn and Pinto March 15, 2012). This helped to foster a symbiotic relationship between Freedom Caucus lawmakers and their constituencies. However, the creation of a new, empowered conservative movement was not uniformly welcomed within the Republican Party. While Freedom Caucus lawmakers saw themselves as an important conservative ideological organization with a focused mission, others believed it was a group

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

155

bent on obstructionism. They saw far-right conservatives as too eager for a fight, and willing to brazenly use their political leverage to block progressive legislation. Critics in the mainstream Republican Conference described it as nothing more than a “veto group” (Wallis, October 16, 2016) composed of “bomb throwing ideologues,” intent on scoring political points (Sherman, October 15, 2015). To moderates, the Freedom Caucus was not simply a deviant group of nonconformists; one senior GOP aide claimed the group represented the “the craziest of the crazy.” “They’re not legislators, they’re just assholes,” said the aide. “These guys have such a minority mindset that the prospect of getting something done just scares them away, or pisses them off” (qtd. in Fuller, February 4, 2015; Boguhn, December 17, 2015). Some academics, who viewed the Freedom Caucus in less colorful terms, nevertheless acknowledged that the Republican Party was facing a serious civil war over control of the policy agenda (Drezner 2014a, b; Miller 2013). The modern controversy over family planning and foreign aid spanned two sessions of Congress. In the 114th Congress, there were 40 members of the Freedom Caucus in the House of Representatives. They were well organized and exhibited a great deal of cohesion in their support of increased conservative principles and challenges to establishment positions. First dimension DW-NOMINATE data show that Freedom Caucus members exhibited a conservative average voter score of 0.660  in this period, significantly higher than other House GOP members who had a mean score of 0.483. Meanwhile, the overall size of the faction represented around 16% of Republicans in the House (with 40 of the 247 seats in 2015). This gave it veto power in the Party. That is, when the group agreed to vote as a cohesive bloc against establishment Republican wishes, it could effectively eliminate the Republican’s majority—or the number of votes needed to elect a new speaker, pass bills, and conduct related business (at least 218). The policy record and discourse of members of the Freedom Caucus reinforce both their presence as agents in the policy process, as well as their activism (Clarke et al. 2018). The complexion of the Freedom Caucus and Republican Parties changed slightly in the 115th Congress. Several members of the caucus either left or were not reelected to office. In 2017, 35 members of the House were confirmed to be caucus members. This represented about 14–15% of the overall Republican membership in the House, and the group continued to remain ideologically cohesive. It was also more

156 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

c­onservative in the 115th Congress, with an average first dimension DW-NOMINATE voter score of 0.669, compared to the whole party, which averaged 0.490. Non-caucus members averaged an ideological score of 0.461, considerably less conservative than the far-right faction. The range of Freedom Caucus scores, from Representative Steve Pearce (R-NM) at 0.472 to Tom Garrett Jr. at 0.931, shows the increasing rightward shift from the days of the Tea Party movement. Freedom Caucus leaders, including Representatives Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows, also appeared empowered by the election of President Trump. A discursive analysis of policy debates and affiliations shows that the Freedom Caucus seemed to find its footing in the 115th Congress, asserting itself in debates on domestic and foreign policy in 2017 and 2018. They also posed a formidable challenge to House Speaker Paul Ryan’s chosen successor Representative Kevin McCarthy (Clarke et  al. 2018; Fox, March 24, 2017). In fact, the HFC’s average second dimension DW-NOMINATE score showed a continued willingness to challenge the party establishment and engage in intraparty fighting. Freedom Caucus members averaged −0.295 compared to 0.101 for non-Caucus members and 0.045 for the Republican Party. The Freedom Caucus continued to maintain its cohesiveness as exhibited in the extremeness of their first and second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores compared to the broader Republican Party. In fact, 29 of its 35 members can be categorized as extreme ideologically, with an inclination to buck the establishment. Thus, we would continue to label the Freedom Caucus as a more cohesive faction in the 115th Congress. Traditional Legislative Strategies Congress began to wade into the family planning and abortion debate in foreign assistance policies in the 1980s. Some lawmakers attempted to support and extend U.S. engagement in reproductive health assistance through foreign aid programs. They believed in promoting health and wellness in developing countries, and in the inherent rights of women to make choices related to their own bodies. Others sought to place restrictions on federal funding that would bar many family planning practices. This study argues that members of minority factions can attempt to shape policy through traditional legislative means, as well as nontraditional means such as issue framing and consistency.

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

157

Members of Congress began to confront these issues directly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s controversial Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, which upheld the legality of family planning measures in the United States, including abortion, for any reason (Cook et al. 2003). Far from settling the matter in the public sphere, Roe actually generated more controversy among lawmakers and grassroots activists. The issue was incredibly sensitive because it was rooted in fundamental political and social values about freedom and women’s rights to control their own bodies. Many Republican opponents of abortion became vocal “pro-life” advocates, and those who supported the legality of family planning measures including abortion became known as the “pro-choice” movement. Hundreds of civil society organizations, including both secular and religious organizations, joined the fight before, during, and after the Supreme Court ruling. Members of Congress also waded into the controversy through legislative initiatives and debates about federal policies for education and family planning. Policy-makers and the courts first took on the issue of providing reproductive health care through foreign policy assistance during the Reagan administration. In 1984, President Reagan signed an executive order that required foreign NGOs receiving funds from the USAID to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds (Cincotta and Crane 2001). Conservatives backed the goal to place new restrictions on family planning and abortion providers through foreign assistance authorizations and appropriations. The Reagan administration announced its new guidelines during the UN International Conference on Population in Mexico City, and the order became known thereafter as the “Mexico City policy” (Saletan 2003). Sympathetic Republicans in Congress also sought to advance legislation to eliminate all funding for reproductive health care in foreign assistance. Some also introduced legislation aiming to make the Mexico City policy permanent law (Blanchfield, April 5, 2018). These efforts were buoyed by federal court rulings, including DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. A.I.D. (1989) and Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. A.I.D. (1990) (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed/11648399). The resulting interpretation imposed restrictions primarily on foreign NGOs versus U.S.-based charities. Lawmakers on both sides of the debate engaged in a high degree of legislative activism. They employed two main legislative tools in the fight over family planning assistance in foreign aid. The first was appropriations legislation related to specific provisions and funds for reproductive health

158 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

care. Republicans targeted funding for reproductive health assistance in the United Nations Population Fund and through bilateral foreign aid programs. These initiatives saw considerable pushback, though, from concerned Democrats in the 1990s. President Clinton rescinded the Mexico City policy, and an emboldened Democratic majority in Congress actually increased funding for reproductive health care by hundreds of millions of dollars (Cook et al. 2003). Congress passed appropriations to restore contributions to the UNFPA in 1993 and pushed overall health care assistance over $400 million for the first time. By 1995, Congress was funding nearly $600 million per year for reproductive health care assistance. However, these levels of funding once again came under pressure from the right following the Republican takeover of both houses of Congress after the 1994 midterm election. Second, conservatives also attached rider amendments to larger appropriations bills in an attempt to derail funding. For example, in 1973, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) passed a rider into law, stating “no foreign assistance funds may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions” (USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/cross-cutting-areas/ legislative-policy-requirements). In addition, the “Helms amendment” overturned previous rulings that stated that the unborn child was not yet a “person” and therefore did not have constitutional rights. In 1985, Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) and Senator Bob Kasten (R-WI) co-authored an amendment to an appropriations bill that prohibited foreign aid to any organization that the administration deemed to be involved in coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization (Hwang and Stewart 2004). Using a broad interpretation of the amendment, the George H.W. Bush administration determined that the UNFPA presence in China could be violating the global gag rule, for example. In 1998, Representative Todd Tiahrt (R-KS), used an amendment to advance a position that deviated from the establishment, imposing standards for voluntary family planning service delivery projects to protect family planning “acceptors” (i.e., the individual clients receiving services). The Tiahrt amendment prevented organizations from being subject to numerical targets or quotas of total number of births, number of family planning acceptors, or acceptors of a particular family planning method (Curtis 2007). While this series of challenges placed new limits and legal requirements on reproductive service providers, it is important to note that they had only modest impacts on actual levels of federal funding in the United

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

159

States and abroad from the 1980s to the 2000s. Defenders in Congress were able to maintain fairly high funding levels for family planning and reproductive health care in foreign assistance—providing hundreds of millions of dollars per annum throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In fiscal year 2011, for example, the United States provided over $600 million per year in foreign aid for reproductive health care assistance. The arrival of a new generation of far-right conservatives on Capitol Hill in the 2010s reignited political controversy on the issue. Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members immediately began to experiment with legislative initiatives to chip away at these programs. For example, they tried to challenge an Obama-era program, the Global Health Initiative (GHI). Launched by the president in 2009, this was a six-year, $63 billion initiative to develop a comprehensive government strategy to promote global health (Pramuk, March 24, 2017). The intent was to create a superstructure for management of various development initiatives and critical health concerns—an integrated program that would increase the efficiency of global health initiatives including HIV/AIDS programs, family planning, maternal and child health, and the fight against tropical diseases like tuberculosis and malaria (Staats, November 3, 2010). Supporters believed the GHI provided an omnibus package and mechanism to help redistribute funds across different programs, and as a result, provide more consistent funding for reproductive health care programs in developing countries (Sedgh et al. 2016). At the same time, however, Tea Party members tried unsuccessfully to add rider amendments that would cut funding for the GHI in the fiscal year budgets for 2013, 2014, and 2015. Conservatives also sought to leverage funding cuts to legislatively impose the global gag rule and eliminate funding for the UNFPA. House appropriations bills proposed hundreds of millions of dollars in cuts to funding and the end of the UNFPA. In most cases, though, champions on the Senate and House Appropriations Committee were able to beat back some challenges and redirect funds to other programs. The fiscal year 2016 omnibus spending bill designated more than $600 million for reproductive health rights, including more than $30 million for the UNFPA. Legislative Debates in the Trump Era The reproductive health care debate took a new turn during the Trump administration. On January 23, 2017, President Trump again reinstated the Mexico City policy, and directed the Secretary of State to implement

160 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

an even broader plan to extend the guidelines to “global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies.” The modified plan, called “Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance,” took direct aim at Obama administration policies. With the backing of conservatives on Capitol Hill, the new plan would cut funding to the GHI and hold NGOs that receive U.S. funding for global health assistance to stringent new standards. New guidelines against family planning assistance would also target health programs under the GHI umbrella, including funding and implementation guidelines for HIV/AIDS research and treatment, maternal and child health, malaria, global health security, and family planning and reproductive health. The new standards would apply not only to NGOs receiving direct assistance but also to foreign NGOs who were working for U.S.based organizations. Humanitarian and refugee assistance would be exempt, but otherwise the policy would apply to all new funding agreements (grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts) for global health assistance, as well as to existing agreements when amended to add funding (PAI.org 2017). Conservative Republicans sought dramatic cuts in funding to support this new direction. In its first budget proposal in March 2017, the Trump administration requested a 26% reduction in global health care assistance spending, decreasing it from about $8.7 billion in the 2016 fiscal year budget to less than $6.5 billion (Pramuk, March 24, 2017). This included the complete elimination of more than $600 billion per year to support women in poor countries with birth control and reproductive healthcare in an effort to “achieve further savings” to the federal budget (Aizenman, May 25, 2017). Not only would most of Obama’s GHI be gutted under new legislative proposals, U.S. aid for international family planning would be eliminated; programs to combat HIV/AIDS in the world’s poorest countries would be cut by 17%; funding for the malaria fight would also be cut by 11% (Leoudaki, May 12, 2017). Freedom Caucus members worked behind-the-scenes with the administration to overhaul the federal funding plan in a way that would be consistent with their alternative perspectives. Lawmakers applauded the State Department announcement of its intention to dramatically reduce federal spending on reproductive health care assistance. Far-right conservatives saw it as a vehicle to help them achieve their goals of ending support for family planning policies, including the elimination of funding for domestic organizations like Planned Parenthood. Meanwhile, opponents cried foul. Defenders of reproductive health rights quickly recognized

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

161

that global health spending for family planning was being targeted. They claimed that U.S. restrictions might affect up to $10 billion in global health assistance, including the flow of funds for programs to combat HIV/AIDS, to promote maternal and child health, and to prevent childhood diseases (ibid.). That news sent shockwaves across the community of concerned actors, however. Opponents said it would have a chilling effect on women’s health. “It means,” said a spokesperson from Human Rights Watch, “that when a doctor sits down with a woman, if she has a health complication and she’s entitled under her local law to access a safe abortion, that doctor cannot give her a referral, or provide her information she needs to take care of herself” (https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/24/qa-humanrights-law-and-access-abortion; July 24, 2017). This program could most directly impact health care assistance in rural areas of developing countries, where a physician often takes care of a variety of medical needs, including providing information about reproductive health. Such medical practices would be proscribed from receiving any U.S. assistance. Advocates cite research that has shown family planning services result in fewer unplanned pregnancies, fewer maternal deaths, and fewer abortions. Some sympathetic members of Congress fought back. During an especially contentious debate in the House Committee on Appropriations in July 2017, for example, Democrats challenged a U.S. foreign affairs budget bill that would cut funding for these and other international programs by $10 billion. In a prolonged markup debate, representatives tried to propose and debate amendments to the State and Foreign Operations budget bill. They took issue with cuts to U.S. foreign assistance programs and U.S. contributions to international organizations that this bill would require. They also argued against the expansion of the Mexico City policy. Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), the ranking Democrat on the committee, said, “It is unconscionable to tie up $8.8 billion in global health assistance by inserting abortion politics,” while offering an amendment to remove what she called the “particularly egregious” language. The expanded “global gag rule” would prevent U.S. global health funding to any organization that failed to produce an anti-abortion policy, even those working on unrelated issues. “What does child blindness have to do with reproductive health? Nothing,” she said. A number of Democrats introduced other amendments that would restore funding to agencies and organizations shouldering a large share of cuts under the House budget proposal.

162 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Ultimately, conservatives in the House controlled the majority in appropriations, and they were able to advance their interests. Committee Chairman Hal Rogers (R-KY) said they were serious about these changes, and warned, “All multilateral organizations need to be put on notice that we have to examine, line by line, their allocations.” Conservatives were able to achieve cuts for funding for family planning by $146 million for financial year 2018. This represented a significant reduction, though it did not zero-out the budget as the White House had hoped. Freedom Caucus members also reiterated their support for Trump administration prohibitions on international organization activity in reproductive health care, including the elimination of U.S. support for the UN Population Fund. Issue Framing Issue framing has played a central role in the congressional debate over reproductive health care and government funding for decades. This study posits that factions may use nontraditional means such as issue framing to induce conflict with the establishment by challenging the majority position or preferred policy outcome. If frames “help receivers of information define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies” (Entman 1993: 53), then minority actors may employ these tools to try to shape the discourse on controversial issues to their advantage. Fiscal conservativism was obviously an important theme for the Freedom Caucus in its struggle against reproductive health care funding, but morality was the dominant contested frame in this case. In the 1960s, many Democrats (and some Republicans) celebrated Johnson’s original policy development as reflecting a progressive stance on reproductive health rights. Democratic lawmakers tended to support a woman’s right to use contraception and the choice of whether to terminate a pregnancy for any reason. They saw the development of family planning policies and reproductive health care initiatives in foreign aid as an inherently “moral” answer to the challenges of overpopulation in developing countries. Providing improved health care and educational programs for family planning seemed the right thing to do if the world was to combat overpopulation. Western governments and nongovernmental organizations were well positioned to provide the needed support for the global South (Saletan 2003). In contrast, many Republican legislators supported the pro-life stance that any involvement in reproductive health care that included abortion,

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

163

or abortion counseling, was morally wrong. Drawing on their religious beliefs, supporters argued that abortion was tantamount to murder, and that any health care assistance program that encouraged the active use of contraception or abortions as a means of family planning would be immoral (Leoudaki, May 12, 2017). They adopted a two-step approach to the question: inducing conflict with the establishment and Democrats and then adamantly championing and defending their own policies. Far-right conservatives resisted funding for related domestic and foreign programs, and consistently argued that the U.S. government had no right to engage in this type of activity. Opponents of abortion saw the Mexico City policy and related actions as ways to redefine what would be considered appropriate foreign assistance policies. Freedom Caucus members drew support for their attempts to frame the debate from other groups with similar interest. For example, the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus included dozens of conservative members who were committed to defend the rights of unborn children. In the 2010s, the group’s membership overlapped significantly with many representatives of the Freedom Caucus. Those members were especially outspoken, for example, in taking on family planning assistance. The Heritage Foundation was particularly strong on the issue, arguing its position that “The guiding principle for our policy really needs to be rooted in the respect for the most important fundamental human right of all, and that’s the right to life” (qtd. in Blanchfield, April 5, 2018, p. 14). Members of the Freedom Caucus were strong defenders of conservative values. The right to life, some members argued, represented a new version of a civil rights movement. Several of them began drafting a “Contract with America II,” which would be a set of legislative priorities for the new Congress in 2016. Their goals included a vote on repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act, tax reforms designed not to penalize the wealthy (such as repeal of the estate tax), and an overhaul of entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. They also pledged a vote to end federal funding for Planned Parenthood. Representative Paul Gosar (R-FL), who was a self-described “active member and leader of the House Freedom Caucus,” was also a staunch defender of unborn children. He touted a “100 percent pro-life voting record on all right-to-life issues that have reached the House floor” and a rating from the National Right to Life Committee. Gosar proudly proclaimed that protecting fetuses would be “our country’s next big battle for civil rights”.

164 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Following substantial pushback from Democrats in 2017 and the restoration of some family planning assistance within President Trump’s first federal budget, Freedom Caucus members renewed their attack on reproductive health care assistance in the spring 2018 debate over the FY 2019 budget. Conservatives in Congress and the administration proposed that international family planning and reproductive health spending should be cut from its 2017 level by 50% (Crossette, March 25, 2018; Pramuk, March 24, 2017). Conservatives in the Freedom Caucus maintained their support to reduce or even eliminate funding, and they regularly brought up their values and beliefs in reference to the budget fight. Fueled by the ideology of conservative anti-abortion lobbies, they believed that dramatic cuts would help meet the interests of the “Republican base.” Freedom Caucus members even brought up the Reagan legacy when defending the global gag rule, and they charged that the UNFPA was supporting forced abortions in China. Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) was one of the toughest advocates for conservative challenges to federal budget spending on family planning. A veteran on Capitol Hill, Smith was a longtime member of the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus and a shadow member of the Freedom Caucus. He also held a powerful leadership position as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Smith regularly employed framing in his attacks on liberal policies. A devout Catholic who was known to quote scripture to explain his political philosophy, Smith struggled against any federal program that he believed could be linked to reproductive health care. He regularly voted against U.S. federal funding for HIV/AIDS care and prevention, and he even sought to redefine rape to prevent rape-­ related abortions in debates in the 2000s. In 2013, he voted against the Violence Against Women Act (Dao, December 4, 1997). When President Trump signed the Mexico City policy back into law, Smith offered his praise: “By directing taxpayer dollars away from the international abortion industry, President Trump has reinstituted life-affirming protections for unborn children and their mothers”. Consistency of Opposition The Freedom Caucus was highly consistent in its challenges to federal funding for reproductive health care. Building on a tradition of congressional opposition that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, members saw

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

165

issues like this through both moral and fiscal lenses. Freedom Caucus members consistently argued that pro-life positions reflected American values. Abortion, and federal government support for any programs associated with it, represented a challenge that should not be sanctioned, they argued. Their approach to the question seems to reflect Moscovici’s characterization of advocacy—where groups that exhibit “strong conviction” and a “singleness of purpose” can make substantial progress in influencing policy (1985: 28–29; Nemeth 1986). The Freedom Caucus undertook repeated efforts to shape these policies. There was certainly no shortage of resolve to challenge the legality of abortion and the ethics of family planning in debates over Roe v. Wade in the 1970s. In many ways, President Reagan’s new guidelines on the use of U.S. foreign aid funds for family planning represented a symbolic response to Roe. If abortion was to be allowed in the United States by law, conservatives argued, at least they could attempt to limit education and its practice through foreign policy, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. Conservatives backed broad executive orders designed to place restrictions on family planning and abortion providers in foreign assistance authorizations and appropriations. This debate extended to the perennial question of U.S. support for the UNFPA. Conservatives also offered a fairly consistent string of challenges over time, including the Helms amendment, the KempKasten amendment, and the Tiahrt amendment (Saletan 2003; Cincotta and Crane 2001). This tradition continued in the 2010s, when Freedom Caucus leaders Jordan and Meadows (R-NC) threatened to oppose federal funding legislation that included support for Planned Parenthood, at home, and for reproductive health care assistance in foreign aid (Lizza, New  Yorker, December 14, 2015). Conservatives sought to promote the steadfast message that conservatives would oppose government policies that they believed were inherently immoral. Freedom Caucus members’ commitments to fiscal and social conservatism, along with deep roots in evangelical Christian values, drove their steadfast opposition. They challenged continued funding for USAID programs, and regularly returned to the questions of UNFPA funding (Cook et al. 2003). Freedom Caucus members were especially outspoken and persistent in this fight against abortion funding. For example, the pro-life National Right to Life Committee, a civil society actor dedicated to lobbying Congress on legislation, gave Representative Jordan a very

166 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

strong rating for his votes in favor of their cause. Jordan proudly proclaimed that he was, “the only legislator in state history to win both the Defender of Life award from Ohio Right to Life and the Pro-Life Legislator of the Year award from the United Conservatives of Ohio.” Jordan sponsored a series of (failed) legislative initiatives that underscored his commitment to pro-­life causes, including the 2013 “Life at Conception Act.” That bill was described as a “personhood” bill that “would have granted embryos, eggs, fetuses, and clones constitutional rights. The extreme legislation could have banned all abortions without exception, as well as many forms of birth control such as IUDs, the pill, and emergency contraception.” In 2014, Jordan sponsored the (failed) Ultrasound Informed Consent Act, a bill that would have required all doctors to perform ultrasounds on pregnant women seeking abortions and “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting” in graphic detail. Similarly, Representative Ted Yoho (R-FL), supported the “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act” that would have banned abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy. In a creative twist, Yoho compared unborn fetuses to endangered species. He questioned colleagues on the House floor in a speech, asking, “How can we as a nation have laws that protect the sea turtle or bald eagle, but yet refuse to protect the same of our own species?” (“Press Release,” May 13, 2015). The consistency of opposition on Capitol Hill also was fueled by interest group support. The Freedom Caucus drew energy for its challenges to the Obama administration’s GHI and related initiatives from a mix of pro-­life groups. These included secular organizations like the Heritage Foundation and the National Right to Life, which bills itself as the “flagship” pro-life organization and the nation’s “oldest and largest grassroots pro-life organization.” The March for Life Education and Defense Fund was also a highly mobilized organization. Beyond general education and pro-life policy advocacy, one of the group’s primary missions was to organize annual marches in Washington held every year on January 22 to mark the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade ruling. Key evangelical organizations became involved in the struggle, including Operation Save America and the American Family Association. Catholic organizations were also highly engaged in attempting to persuade lawmakers on policies. These included the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute and CatholicVote.org.

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

167

Outcome The outcomes of Freedom Caucus members’ efforts to shape U.S. family planning and foreign assistance policies were mixed. They engaged in regular legislative challenges to federal funding and were somewhat successful in passing spending bills in the House that were laced with conservative positions on family planning. However, even though there was persistent opposition from many Republicans, the Senate adopted a more bipartisan approach to annual appropriations and successfully restored some areas of funding that far-right conservatives opposed. We code this as a case of “partial success.” The overall result in legislative terms was that Congress maintained funding levels for family planning and reproductive health care in the hundreds of millions of dollars per  annum from the 1990s to the 2010s. However, this debate was not over: Far-right conservatives stepped up their opposition in the 2010s, and Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members employed new strategies to try to chip away at these programs. The election of a Republican House majority in 2010 saw moves by conservatives to leverage funding cuts to legislatively impose the global gag rule and eliminate funding for the UNFPA. House appropriations bills proposed hundreds of millions of dollars in cuts to funding and the end of the UNFPA. Conservatives also directly targeted an Obama-era program, the GHI, and successfully passed cuts in funding for initiatives like HIV/ AIDS prevention and family, disease research, and family planning. And in many ways, the Trump presidency appeared to further empower the Freedom Caucus. Members continued to try to reduce or even eliminate funding, and they sought out a variety of means to achieve their goals. Not only were new limits imposed on funding and policy implementation, the Freedom Caucus was able to effectively change the political climate on reproductive health care through persuasion and consistency. Conservatives were very effective in framing the question as one of morality, and they sought to generate sufficient public resistance to federal dollars for reproductive health care that would complicate the policy process. They clearly played a long game in the contest and used key issues to generate support—including trotting out the question of U.S. support for the UN Population Fund and renewing efforts to defund Planned Parenthood on a regular basis. Regarding Planned Parenthood, for example, some conservatives appeared highly effective in obfuscating the truth about government support: Critics charged that U.S. taxpayer dollars

168 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

were funding the organization and its implementation of abortion. In reality, federal funds were only directed by the government to reimburse Planned Parenthood for reproductive health care it provided to poor women in the United States through the Medicaid program. The result was a political environment in which health care providers felt embattled, and some foreign aid organizations had to cease operations due to inconsistencies in funding and political support from major donors like the U.S. government. By playing the long game, conservatives were able to secure incremental gains in their broader struggle.

Challenging the Iran Nuclear Deal On July 14, 2015, Iran and six world powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany, or the “P5+1”) finalized a Joint Comprehension Plan of Action (JCPOA). The diplomatic agreement was designed to impose significant limits on Iran’s nuclear program, with the goal of ensuring that it remains focused on peaceful purposes for a decade or more. In exchange for Iran’s commitment to shut down enrichment facilities and transfer significant quantities of enriched uranium out of the country, the international community would lift a battery of economic sanctions. For the P5+1, the primary goal was to promote international security by reducing the threat of an Iranian nuclear breakout. Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran saw this as their best opportunity in decades to escape sanctions and potentially normalize relations with foreign countries. The JCPOA was a landmark agreement in terms of its ambition to roll-­ back a country’s progress toward nuclear weapons. It effectively provided an off-ramp for a government that was clearly on the road to developing nuclear weapons. The JCPOA included rigorous inspections and verification procedures, and world leaders celebrated its completion in 2015. Yet, it was surprisingly controversial in the United States. The Obama administration negotiated the deal in the form of an executive agreement, but concerned members of Congress countered that it should really be a treaty that would require Senate approval (Baker, April 16, 2015). Most Republicans opposed it, and far-right conservatives induced conflict with the executive and challenged the terms of the agreement as seriously flawed. Allowing Iran to continue uranium enrichment was dangerous, conservative critics argued, and removing many restrictions after ten years was no better than “kicking the can down the road.”

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

169

In the face of these challenges at home, the president reluctantly agreed to sign a new law, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). This gave Congress a role in the final review process on the deal and offered short-term relief from the political pressure that had been building in Washington related to the agreement. However, it also included provisions for periodic certification of Iranian compliance. This system would later come back to haunt the Obama administration, and, ultimately, provided President Trump with leverage to dismantle the deal. The case of the rise and fall of the JCPOA offers important object lessons in the study of factional influence in the foreign policy process. Factional Attributes Conservative lawmakers began to challenge the negotiation process for the Iran nuclear deal in 2013 and 2014, warning that they were given too little input on what would be a critical development in international security. The controversy took on real urgency, though, after it was finalized in 2015. The period of political struggle examined in this case began with the swearing-in of the 114th Congress in January 2015 and continued into the 115th Congress (2017–2019). Initially, this time period was marked by the takeover of the Senate by a new Republican majority in 2015, and later, the inauguration of President Donald Trump, and the Trump administration’s foreign policy decisions. Concurrently, conservatives voiced serious concerns about whether Obama officials had achieved the best terms of a deal, whether hard-line Iranian leaders could be trusted to comply with it, and what role Congress should play in the agreement. There were several notable characteristics of conservative factionalism in this case. First, Republicans secured a new majority in the Senate in 2015, giving them control of both houses of Congress at a time when the Obama administration was undertaking major new foreign policy initiatives, including the Iran deal. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, Republicans enjoyed their largest majority since 1928, with 249 seats compared to Democrats’ 190 seats. With a 54–45 seat advantage in the Senate, the new Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell (R-KY) would assume a powerful role in determining the agenda in the chamber. He and his close associates wasted little time in attacking presidential initiatives including the Affordable Care Act, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arab Spring. Conservatives also began to zero-in on the Iran nuclear deal as a major point of contention.

170 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Second, even though most Republicans opposed the Iran deal, the party itself was factionalized in this period. Members of the Republican Study Committee raised a string of conservative challenges to leadership preferences, for example. In the House, the Tea Party had faded from the scene, while the Freedom Caucus gained prominence on the far-right. It represented a broader social movement that espoused conservative principles at home and abroad. At the same time, Freedom Caucus founders knew that the Tea Party faction had suffered from some divisions in ideological foundations and policy priorities and was limited by scatter-shot leadership (Rathbun 2013; Dueck 2010). This new, smaller group of hard-line conservatives were ready to challenge the Republican establishment and the leadership of Speaker John Boehner (R-OH). They questioned the Speaker’s commitment to conservative principles and plans, including ending the Affordable Care Act, reducing financial regulations, and cutting big government. In January 2015, 25 conservative Republicans openly opposed Boehner’s bid for the House Speakership (Lizza 2015). Members of the House Freedom Caucus were among the most ideologically conservative House Republicans. As noted earlier, this was a more focused insurgency than the Tea Party, in part because it was better organized as a cohesive voting bloc. Its members were deeply committed to fiscal conservativism as well as strict constitutional interpretations (Lizza 2015). In the realm of foreign policy, however, the faction continued to be plagued by some of the same debates that divided the Tea Party (e.g., whether Jeffersonian or Jacksonian principles should guide U.S. involvement in the world) (Rathbun 2013). The controversy over the Iran nuclear agreement spanned two sessions of Congress. During the 114th Congress, there were at most 40 members of the Freedom Caucus in the House of Representatives. DW-NOMINATE data shows that Freedom Caucus members exhibited an average voter score of 0.660 in this period, significantly higher than other House GOP members (DeSilver, October 20, 2015). Meanwhile, the overall size of the faction represented around 16% of Republicans in the House (with 40 of the 247 seats in 2015). This gave it veto power in the Party. That is, when the group agreed to vote as a cohesive bloc against establishment Republican wishes, it could effectively eliminate the Republican’s ­majority—or the number of votes needed to elect a new speaker, pass bills, and conduct related business (at least 218). The policy record and discourse of members of the Freedom Caucus reinforce both their presence as agents in the policy process, as well as their activism (Clarke et al. 2018).

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

171

The makeup of the Republican Party and the Freedom Caucus changed somewhat during the Iran policy debates from 2017 to 2018. Several members of the caucus either left or were not reelected to office. In 2017, 35 members of the House confirmed that they were caucus members, and the group continued to remain ideologically cohesive. Thirty-five of 236 members were in the Freedom Caucus, representing 14–15% of the overall Republican membership in the House. The group appears to have become even more conservative in the 115th Congress, with an average DW-NOMINATE voter score of 0.669 (Clarke 2017). This group of Freedom Caucus members were much more conservative ideologically than the House GOP as a whole (0.490)—in fact, all but one member had a higher score than the average Republican. Members’ policies and statements clearly reflected commitments to deeply conservative principles and an inclination to challenge the establishment within their party. Second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores show that Freedom Caucus members were much more anti-establishment than the rest of their party. Meanwhile, its leaders, including Representatives Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows, seemed to be empowered by the election of President Trump, and the Freedom Caucus found a valuable ally in debates on domestic and foreign policy (Bacon, July 31, 2018). Traditional Legislative Strategies Factional challenges to establishment policies on Iran began slowly, but gathered momentum between 2015 and 2018. Western countries initiated talks with Iran over its nuclear program in the early 2000s, following reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the country was violating terms of its comprehensive safeguards agreements and ramping up its weapons research program (Bowen and Kidd 2004). The IAEA identified new, secret nuclear facilities at Arak and Natanz, which were part of a network that could advance Iran’s nuclear weapons program (Raas and Long 2007). While European powers were willing to negotiate with Iran during this period, the United States under the George W. Bush administration at first kept a wary distance and maintained sanctions on Iran. Republicans were generally opposed to negotiating any ­concessions with a regime they viewed as a sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East. In 2006, the P5+1 group was established, and they initiated a new round of talks to limit operations at Iran’s key nuclear facilities and implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities (UN Security Council, July 31, 2006).

172 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

The Obama administration pursued multiple tracks of engagement with Iran. While ostensibly supporting international diplomacy coupled with economic sanctions, the president also secretly ordered an expansion of a sophisticated cyber-attack plan against the computer systems that ran Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities (Sanger, June 1, 2012). After mixed success, however, the White House changed directions in the early 2010s. In 2013, the Obama administration and its P5+1 partners devoted new energy to negotiating a deal with Iran that would end its nuclear weapons ambitions and promote international security. This came partly in response to the election of a more moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. However, from the start of this new initiative in 2013, some legislators denounced the executive branch negotiations with Iran and questioned the viability of any diplomatic settlement. Moreover, the Obama administration’s pursuit of a diplomatic deal with Iran faced new challenges at home following the election of Republican majorities in both houses of Congress in the 2014 midterms. Many members of Congress expressed concerns about the Obama administration’s negotiations with Iran during the first year of negotiations. Republicans were reluctant to support any agreement, but members of the party also displayed some different perspectives. For example, moderate Republicans were hesitant to embrace any agreement without knowing the details of what the White House might be including in it. They tried to walk the line between support for the possibility of a deal and expressions of concern over its details. The new Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Bob Corker (R-TN), preached caution in early 2015, preferring to wait out the emergence of details from the proposed agreement rather than take a strong stand early on. Corker endorsed a diplomatic approach, but said he would not sign off on the deal until it was finalized. Meanwhile, Democratic Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Ben Cardin (D-MD) said they supported the spirit of a diplomatic settlement of a dangerous situation, but desired a stronger understanding of details of any proposed agreement. At the same time, Freedom Caucus members in the House decried the development of the Iran nuclear deal and challenged its legitimacy. Representatives Meadows and Jordan presented a united front in statements meant to question the legitimacy of the Obama administration’s negotiations, and they increased their opposition as details of the deal began to leak out in early 2015. While they stopped short of proposing actual counter-legislation, members of the House Freedom Caucus cer-

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

173

tainly threatened to introduce bills that would give Congress the authority to review and potentially reject a nuclear deal with Iran (French and Sherman, May 13, 2015a). Tea Party leaders like Representative Steve King (R-IA) were highly vocal in their challenges to the Iran deal. They warned that if the White House would not include Congress in finalizing the terms of the agreement, they would move to defund any new programs and dismantle the deal after the fact (Carden, July 31, 2015). Some congressional inquiries on the agreement were more high profile than others. For example, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the deal in 2015 offered public forum showdowns over the issue before the deal was even finalized. Both Republicans and Democrats raised questions. Ranking minority leader and former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Robert Menendez (D-NJ) challenged administration claims of Iran’s willingness to offer concessions. He said the administration was hailing a possible breakthrough in the negotiations using “talking points straight out of Tehran,” implying that the administration had been co-opted by Iranian positions (Chumley, January 21, 2015). Senators argued that the agreement should take the form of a treaty and that negotiations should include a much wider set of themes including Iranian support for terrorism and its ballistic missile program. The House Foreign Affairs Committee also held four hearings on the issue in the first half of 2015, where members argued that Iran was using the United States and would not comply. Representatives Peter Roskam (R-IL) and Lee Zeldin (R-NY) suggested creative ways to try to undermine negotiations, even advancing legislation that would block diplomats’ expenditures for hotel stays and foreign travel. Facing direct pressure from far-right conservatives, Senator Corker and moderate allies decided to call for new legislation that would allow Congress to take an up-down vote on any agreement with Iran. At issue was the interpretation of Congressional power relative to international agreements like the pending Iran deal. The “treaty clause” in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides the Senate an opportunity for advice and consent on international treaties, and ratification requires two-­ thirds majorities of support (Homan 2015). Corker and other Republicans believed that if the Iran deal was to have any hope of legitimacy and effectiveness, the White House must allow some role for congressional review. The Iran deal was simply “too important” not to allow a voice for Congress, they argued. Republicans demanded an opportunity for consid-

174 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

eration of the agreement on both principled grounds and in the spirit of advancement and reform (Lindsay, December 20, 2017). The White House resisted such a move as U.S. diplomats were putting final touches on the JCPOA, but eventually they gave in to congressional pressure. The administration tried to defend the legitimacy of the deal as an executive agreement and warned that spring that any new legislative action might provoke “Iran to walk away from the negotiating table” (Richter and Memoli, April 14, 2015). However, as Congress persisted the White House recognized that it simply did not have the votes to prevent Congress from issuing follow-on legislation that might block implementation of an Iran deal. Senators Corker and Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) proposed a bipartisan solution in The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). This legislation would give Congress the opportunity to review the Iran nuclear deal for up to 60 days after its completion, as well as the possibility of a vote to reject the plan. The bill was structured to provide Congress with the right to disapprove of its terms, a procedural maneuver that had been employed on controversial votes in the past, such as raising the debt ceiling. In effect, it would allow individual lawmakers to vote their conscience against a bill without endangering the outcome of the legislation itself. The INARA also included stipulations for a periodic review of the effectiveness of the agreement and reports to Congress certifying Iranian compliance. It held the threat of snap-back sanctions as the “stick” to encourage Iran to work with the United States and its partners in ensuring compliance. The compromise legislation moved easily through the Senate (passing by a vote of 98–1), but it ran head-on into conservative resistance in the House. The Freedom Caucus saw a real opportunity to try to influence the outcome of the Iran deal. They began warning that they would insert a series of “killer” amendments to the Iran nuclear review bill (French and Sherman, May 8, 2015b). This would represent not only a challenge to the Obama administration, but offered a residual opportunity to further challenge the leadership of Speaker Boehner. Representative Meadows led the charge, arguing, “the Corker deal gives the illusion of government oversight while actually just providing political cover. A number of conservative House members want to encourage our leadership to allow ­meaningful amendments.” Freedom Caucus members threatened other legislative actions, as well. For example, Representatives Ron DeSantis (R-FL), Jeff Duncan (R-SC), and Matt Salmon (R-AZ) circled an idea first advanced by Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) to pass an amendment requir-

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

175

ing that Iran recognize Israel as a Jewish state as a condition of any nuclear deal. They believed many legislators would have to support the initiative to demonstrate their backing of Israel. Members also considered adding amendments that would target Iran’s broader behavior outside of its nuclear program, including a proposal to “certify Iran has ceased all support and funding of terrorism and terrorist activities,” as well as sharply curtailing its ballistic missile program (French and Sherman, May 8, 2015b). In the end, however, moderate Republicans were able to beat back most Freedom Caucus challenges on the legislation through procedural moves, aware that the bill also had strong support from the Democrats. They defended their actions by arguing that passing the bill was imperative. Republican leader Kevin McCarthy said, “It is essential that we do everything we can to prevent the President from providing across-the-­ board sanctions relief during the mandated congressional review period, after which Congress would have the opportunity to offer a strong vote of disapproval in the event that a bad deal is reached.” By acting with resolve, Republican leaders in the House and Senate were able to successfully build a near veto-proof majority for passage of the legislation (Berman, April 10, 2015). They forwarded the bill to the White House, and President Obama reluctantly signed it into law on May 23, 2015. The passage of the INARA may have forestalled some controversy, but in hindsight, it represented a pyrrhic victory. It certainly did not erase the polarization and partisanship that was pervasive in Congress (Weisman and Baker, April 14, 2015). And it did not prevent Freedom Caucus conservatives from launching more challenges. They began a second phase of legislative attacks during  the late summer and early fall of 2015. Conservatives were adamant that Iran was not to be trusted and that relief of sanctions against Iran would provide its leaders with a flood of new money to support terrorism and unrest around the world. This time, they attempted to exploit the very mechanism of the INARA to try to bring down the Iran deal. At a confrontational Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on July 29, 2015, for example, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), an ally of the far-right, grilled Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on the deal. Framing this as his “last opportunity” to hear directly from the administration before the summer recess and an impending vote on the Iran deal, Cotton pressed cabinet officials on questions such as whether U.S. airstrikes could disrupt the Iranian program

176 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

without an agreement in place. Conservatives also demanded more information related to news of a set of secret side deals with the IAEA. Freedom Caucus members raised stronger challenges to the terms of the Iran deal in the buildup to a possible congressional vote in September 2015. House Freedom Caucus members began to employ several different legislative maneuvers to try to force the hand of establishment Republicans. For example, Representative Meadows called for the leadership to delay a vote on an Iran disapproval resolution until the White House had revealed all side deals with Iran. If the disapproval vote was not delayed, Freedom Caucus members hinted they might try to block other procedures in order to force their hand. Meadows said that the proper procedure on the INARA “hasn’t been followed [and] we can’t ignore it.” They claimed that the administration’s completion of diplomatic side letters with Iran violated the spirit of the original compromise. Any such action might be grounds to reject the Iran deal—it would be “erroneous and really usurp the authority of Congress,” Meadows said. Conservatives also criticized the plan by the leadership to hold a final vote on the Iran deal on Friday, September 11, 2015, the 14th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks (qtd. in Slavin, May 7, 2018). However, this round of conservative challenges did not produce the desired effect: The Freedom Caucus was in a bind because the Iran deal had strong bipartisan support. For example, even if conservatives in the House banded together to try to bring a resolution of disapproval of administration actions to the floor, Democrats could bail out establishment Republicans by voting against it. Conservatives were especially frustrated because they knew that time was not on their side: If Congress did nothing, Democrats and establishment Republicans would see the Iran deal take effect. They threatened a number of actions, from the resolution of disapproval to strategic voting to take down procedural motions and force a debate on the House floor. But once the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives recognized they might face a rebellion in their ranks, they decided to suspend floor debates and call a recess. Issue Framing Critics of the JCPOA employed strong negative framing in an effort to derail the Iran deal before it was completed, and they continued their challenges through the INARA vote debate, and beyond. Policy-makers tried to persuade the administration not to proceed by calling out Iran as an

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

177

unreliable partner, especially given revelations of its advancements in its secret nuclear program and newly discovered facilities at Arak and Natanz. In the 2000s, many conservatives were content with a two-track approach advanced by President George W. Bush, and later maintained by Barack Obama: the United States would ostensibly cooperate with its international partners in negotiations with the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program while at the same time maintaining sanctions and using covert methods to try to disable Iran’s advancements. Conservatives certainly quietly applauded the achievements of Operation Olympic Games, the sophisticated cyber-attack plan on Iranian centrifuges that included the highly effective Stuxnet virus (Sanger, June 1, 2012). Lawmakers ramped up their opposition to the Obama administration’s about-face and diplomatic engagement with Iran starting in 2013. Their expressions of deviant positions became even louder following the election of Republican majorities in both houses of Congress in the 2014 midterms. Conservative members of Congress began challenging the very idea of a framework agreement with Iran as early as 2013. A headline in the Washington Post at the time, “GOP Flatly Opposes Iran Deal, Sight Unseen,” captured the spirit of their opposition. Congresswoman Bachmann (R-MN) said any agreement with Iran would effectively represent a “total surrender by the Obama administration” (qtd. in Milbank, November 26, 2013, p. 1). Tea Party Representative Ron DeSantis (R-FL) said the plan that emerged was, “less a deal that it is a list of concessions to the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.” “[T]here is a reason why you see smiles on the faces of the ayatollahs in Tehran,” he said (qtd. in Beinart, July 14, 2015). Conservatives had additional complaints beyond the terms of the agreement, including the fact that the Obama administration did not also demand constraints on Iran’s missile program or support for insurgent groups in the Middle East (Congressional Record H5971, September 11, 2015). Members of the Freedom Caucus offered more direct challenges to the viability of any agreement with Iran in 2015. For example, they criticized the technical details of the agreement as soon as they emerged publicly. They were especially concerned by the terms that allowed Iran to retain some of its uranium enrichment technology and return to large-scale operations after a ten-year period. The absence of terms in the agreement related to Iran’s ballistic missile program and its backing of radical groups in the Middle East also raised hackles for Washington lawmakers. And when the Obama administration shared details of the JCPOA first with the

178 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

United Nations Security Council versus Congress, lawmakers had had enough. One Tea Party member, Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX), said, “The President has announced that he is going to the United Nations to get their approval before he would even ask for a vote in Congress. That struck a chord. That rang a bell” (Congressional Record, H5231, July 15, 2015). One of the central frames that Freedom Caucus members employed to challenge the agreement was questioning whether the Obama administration could be trusted to deliver the best deal or verify its terms. Far-right lawmakers were especially concerned about the number of apparent “side deals” that Iran had made with the IAEA, and perhaps even directly with the United States. Republicans claimed that because they were not informed of the nature of any associated deals, they should not even begin to review the Iran deal in line with the INARA. Representative John Fleming (R-LA), one of the co-founders of the Freedom Caucus, worried that secret negotiations could have produced “something so hideous and so egregious that even Democrats wouldn’t dare go along with this deal.” Congressman Ted Poe (R-TX) warned, “It seems the Iranians are not the only ones we can’t trust. Apparently, there are some secret side deals with Iran concerning inspections of their nukes. The administration conveniently withheld from Congress…what else are they hiding?…we can’t trust the administration to let us know what is in the deal” (“Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” April 22, 2015). They sought to undermine confidence in the administration and persuade the electorate that it was on the wrong path. Another central concern raised by critics on the right was sanctions relief. Many Republicans argued that the JCPOA effectively “gave away” hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief with little but promises in return. They argued that the $100 billion in sanction relief that Iran was going to receive immediately was a dangerous move, especially given its history of supporting terrorism throughout the Middle East. With an inspection regime in the deal that would not be tough enough, they feared that Iran could funnel this money directly back into its clandestine nuclear program. While far-right factions utilized these arguments in its opposition to the deal, it worked to shape the understanding of the issue in a number of different ways as well. Allowing Iran to escape sanctions and normalize its economic and diplomatic relations with other countries represented a serious concern, they warned.

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

179

Freedom Caucus members also tried to frame the Iran agreement as “anti-Israel.” This redefinition of the deal as a capitulation by the Obama administration to an untrustworthy Iran was a common talking point. Conservatives argued that Iran was an adversary that regularly threatened the legitimacy of the Israeli state, and that U.S. and Iranian interests did not align. As one neoconservative columnist wrote at the time, “There was something grotesque about the chumminess, the jolly camaraderie, of the American negotiators and the Iranian negotiators. These negotiations represent a twisted moment in American foreign policy.” Instead of trying to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Iranians, he argued, “we need to despise the regime loudly and regularly, and damage its international position as fiercely and imaginatively as we can, for its desire to exterminate Israel” (Wieseltier, July 27, 2015). Indeed, the defense of Israel and other Middle East allies was a major talking point of those on the far-right throughout the debate over the accord. Not only did the deal have no acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist, but according to conservative Representative Brian Babin (R-TX), Iran “declared just last week, with certainty, that Israel, whom they call the Little Satan, will be wiped off the map in less than 25 years. This plan allows Iran to build a nuclear bomb in no less than 15 years. You do the math” (Congressional Record H5971, September 11, 2015). Finally, conservatives clearly sought to frame the Iran deal as something that required congressional engagement and approval. One example of this framing was an open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the spring of 2015 that was drafted by Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) and signed by 46 Republicans in the Senate. That letter stated: “It has come to our attention while observing your nuclear negotiations with our government that you may not fully understand our constitutional system. Thus, we are writing to bring your attention to two features of our Constitution—the power to make binding international agreements and the different character of federal offices—which you should seriously consider as negotiations progress.” Republicans set out to clarify the terms of the agreement and ratification process, and made clear that conservatives in Congress could sink the deal. Based on constitutional provisions, ­conservatives argued, Congress had the power to “consider any agreement regarding your nuclear-weapons program that is not approved by [us] as nothing more than an executive agreement between President Obama and Ayatollah Khameini. The next president could revoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and

180 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any time” (Cotton 2015) qtd. in March 11. As part of their effort to persuade the public against the deal, conservatives also participated in public protests. For example, on September 9, 2015, at the height of the controversy, Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members held a rally at the Capitol. The high-profile event featured dozens of speakers, including opponents from Congress and even reality television stars like Duck Dynasty’s Phil Robertson and Sarah Palin (Booker, September 9, 2015). The keynote address was delivered by presidential candidate Donald Trump, who argued, “If Senate Democrats decide that party loyalty matters more than national security, and if Republican leadership decides that a show vote is more important than stopping this deal, then the single most important issue in 2016 will be stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon” (Jacobs, September 9, 2015). Consistency of Opposition Policy-makers tried to offer consistent messages on the Iran deal as a way to block-out its chances of success. However, they found it difficult to slow the momentum of the administration and mainstream Republicans and Democrats. Conservative calls on the president to halt the talks from 2013 to 2015 largely went unanswered, and conservatives had to reframe their message as the deal was finalized. Opponents regularly claimed that a “better deal” with Iran was possible—and by this, they meant an agreement that included must broader restrictions on Iranian activities in the Middle East and limitations on its ballistic missile program. Later, conservatives sought to attach amendments on the INARA, to little avail, and they tried to delay a vote on the final agreement until they had more information. But this appeared to be an uphill battle, and a series of retrenchments may have undermined the consistency of their efforts and limited their effectiveness. One of the challenges in mounting a persuasive and consistent alternative to the Iran deal was that there really was no substantive alternative. Republicans opposed concessions over the long term, but never outlined realistic policy substitutes (Beutler, August 15, 2015). Republicans flirted with possible alternatives, including increasing sanctions in the hopes of forcing Tehran to make further concessions or even going to war, but ultimately deemed them unpalatable (Beinart, April 6, 2016). By default, mainstream Republicans like House Majority Leader Boehner were left

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

181

saying things like, “No deal is better than a bad deal.” When President Obama eventually prevailed over Congress on the Iran deal, it was said that two things broke in the White House’s favor: an absence of outrage from lawmakers’ constituents and the absence of a credible alternative policy program (Hylse and Herszenhorn, September 3, 2015). House consideration of the Corker-Cardin compromise and a final vote on the INARA in 2015 offered perhaps the best opportunities for conservatives to hold the line. For example, when it came time to pass a routine procedural vote to bring the Iran disapproval vote to the House floor for debate, the hard-line Freedom Caucus threatened to block it. But their demands that the Obama administration make public the terms of side deals to the agreement rang hollow, given that moderate Republicans knew that the Iran deal had the support of Democrats. Consequently, after hearing an earful from rank-and-file members during a conference meeting, House Republican leaders did not decide to give in to conservative demands. Rather, the leadership canceled the procedural votes and moved to recess the House for Labor Day break. The consistency of the far-right conservative message was also muddled by other pressing issues, including the struggle for House leadership. For example, in late July 2015 when the House should have been focused on the Iran deal, Representative Meadows introduced a rare procedural tactic to depose Speaker John Boehner. Meadows’ resolution had the support of a handful of other hard-line conservatives such as Representatives Ted Yoho (R-FL), Walter Jones (R-NC), and Thomas Massie (R-KY). While the measure was ignored by Boehner and his leadership team, it later became a significant development in the struggle for control of the House agenda. What some saw as an unnecessary distraction at the time (Representative Tom McClintock, a fellow Freedom Caucus member, publicly called the move by Meadows “about the dumbest idea I’ve seen here” [qtd. in Wong and Marcos, July 30, 2015]) ultimately was a harbinger of things to come. Outcome Freedom Caucus opponents of the Iran nuclear deal were “partially successful” in this case: They were able to achieve short-term goals by gaining a say in the fate of the Iran nuclear agreement (through the INARA), but they were unsuccessful in stopping it. From the 2013 announcement by the Obama administration of its intent to negotiate an agreement to the

182 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

July 2015 presentation of the deal to Congress, conservatives repeatedly questioned the administration’s intent and purview to negotiate the agreement. They tried to pressure diplomats to pursue the most stringent terms for a deal, such as a complete elimination of Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and the maintenance of sanctions, through floor statements and committee hearings. They also sought to widen the agreement to include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for insurgencies in the Middle East. Yet, while the HFC was not able to stop the Iran deal from going into effect, their increasing influence and effective threat-making was felt within the GOP’s opposition strategy in the House. Republicans had long considered legislative maneuvers, including in this case bringing a disapproval resolution on the Iran deal to the floor. Instead, in the face of conservative arguments, they changed course and embraced a plan devised by the House Freedom Caucus that would bring up several other Iran-related measures to provide position-taking opportunities, forcing Democrats to go on the record, and preserving their ability to take President Obama to court over the Iran deal (Green 2019). Boehner gave in to the insurgent wing of his party, giving the HFC a symbolic victory in an otherwise losing battle (Fuller 2015). While Freedom Caucus efforts to follow through on the plan and vote down the Iran deal in September 2015 fizzled, they maintained their attacks on the JCPOA in the years that followed. In a twist of fate, Freedom Caucus conservatives actually found a new ally. Donald Trump campaigned for the presidency in 2016 on a platform that challenged Obama-­ era multilateral initiatives. He targeted the JCPOA specifically, pledging to “rip up” what he called the “worst deal ever” if elected to office. While the Trump administration did remain a party to the agreement for 17 months, the president consulted regularly with its opponents, including Tom Cotton, and tried to build a coalition against it. In May 2018, President Trump declared that the United States would withdraw from the agreement. He described the JCPOA as a “disastrous deal” negotiated by the Obama administration that had wrongly returned billions to the Iranian regime. This was, he said, “a great embarrassment to me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States” that was based “on a giant fiction: that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program. Today, we have definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie” (“Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” May 8, 2018).

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

183

Bibliography Aizenman, N. (2017, May 25). Trump’s Proposed Budget Would Cut $2.2 Billion From Global Health Spending. NPR. Retrieved from https:// www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/25/529873431/ trumps-proposed-budget-would-cut-2-2-billion-from-global-health-spending Bacon, P., Jr. (2018, July 31). How the Freedom Caucus Learned to Love Trump, or at Least to Work with Him. FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-freedom-caucus-learned-to-love-trump/ Baker, P. (2015, April 16). Congress’s Role in Iran Nuclear Deal Shows Limits of Obama’s Power. The New York Times. Beinart, P. (2015, July 14). Why the Iran Deal Makes Obama’s Critics So Angry. The Atlantic. Beinart, P. (2016, April 6). What’s the Alternative to Obama’s Iran Deal. The Atlantic. Berman, R. (2015, April 10). Why Congress Can’t Be Silenced on Iran. The Atlantic. Beutler, B. (2015, August 11). Republicans Who Oppose the Iran Deal Are Making Promises They Can’t Keep. The New Republic. Blanchfield, L. (2018, April 5). Abortion and Family Planning-Related Provisions in U.S. Foreign Assistance Law and Policy. Congressional Research Service. Boguhn, A. (2015, December 17). Meet the Anti-Choice Radicals Behind the House Freedom Caucus. Rewire News. Booker, B. (2015, September 9). Trump, Cruz Headline Tea Party Rally Against Iran Nuclear Deal. NPR. Bowen, W. Q., & Kidd, J. (2004). The Iranian Nuclear Challenge. International Affairs, 80(2), 257–276. Carden, J. (2015, July 31). Inside the Effort to Kill the Iran Deal. The Nation. Chumley, C. K. (2015, January 21). Democrat Sen. Menenedez: Obama’s Points on Iran Come ‘Straight Out of Tehran.’ The Washington Times. Cincotta, R. P., & Crane, B. B. (2001, October 19). The Mexico City Policy and U.S.  Family Planning Assistance. Science. Retrieved from http://science.sciencemag.org/content/294/5542/525/tab-article-info Clarke, A. J. (2017). The House Freedom Caucus: Extreme Faction Influence in the U.S. Congress (PDF file). Retrieved from http://www.democratic-anxieties.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Clarke_Berlin2017.pdf Clarke, A., Gray, T., & Lowande, K. (2018). Causal Inference from Pivotal Politics Theories. The Journal of Politics, 80(3), 1082–1087. Cook, R. J., Dickens, B. M., & Fathalla, M. F. (2003). Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating Medicine, Ethics, and Law. Clarendon Press.

184 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Cotton, T. (2015). An Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Office of Senator Tom Cotton. Press Release. https://www.cotton.senate. gov/?p=press_release&id=120 Crossette, B. (2018, April 3). US Congress Strikes Back at Trump’s Goals to Curtail Family Planning. PassBlue. Retrieved from https://www.passblue. com/2018/03/25/us-congress-strikes-back-at-trumps-goals-to-curtail-familyplanning/ Curtis, C. (2007). Meeting Health Care Needs of Women Experiencing Complications of Miscarriage and Unsafe Abortion: USAID’s Postabortion Care Program. Journal of Midwifery & Women’s Health, 52(4), 368–375. Dao, J. (1997, December 4). Crusader and Pragmatist: The Two Chris Smiths. The New York Times. DeBonis, M. (2015, December 2). House Freedom Caucus Looking to Flex Its New Muscle in 2016 Races. The Washington Post. DeSilver, D. (2015, October 20). House Freedom Caucus: What Is It, and Who’s in It? Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/10/20/house-freedom-caucus-what-is-it-and-whos-in-it/ Drezner, D. W. (2014a). Rebooting Republican Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Drezner, D. W. (2014b, October 15). Two Thoughts on the GOP’s Brewing Civil War on Foreign Policy. The Washington Post. Dueck, C. (2010). Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication, 4, 51–58. Fox, L. (2017, March 24). Why (Almost) Everyone Hates the House Freedom Caucus. CNN. French, L., & Sherman, J. (2015a, May 13). GOP Expected to Buck Conservatives on Iran. Politico. French, L., & Sherman, J. (2015b, May 8). House Conservatives Target Iran Nuclear Bill. Politico. Fuller, M. (2015, February 11). House Freedom Caucus Looks to Be a Force—In Leadership and Lawmaking. Roll Call. Retrieved from https://www.rollcall. com/news/policy/house-freedom-caucus-looks-to-be-force-in-leadership-andlawmaking Green, M.  N. (2019). Legislative Hardball: The House Freedom Caucus and the Power of Threat-Making in Congress (Elements in American Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hammond, S.  W. (1998). Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Hirschkorn, P., & Pinto, J. (2012, March 15). White Evangelicals Are Half of GOP Primary Voters. CBS News. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/ news/white-evangelicals-are-half-of-gop-primary-voters/

6  THE FREEDOM CAUCUS AND FACTIONALISM IN THE TRUMP ERA 

185

Homan, P. (2015). Getting to 67: The Post-Cold War Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification. New York: Routledge. Hwang, A. C., & Stewart, F. H. (2004). Family Planning in the Balance. American Journal of Public Health, 94(1), 15–18. Hylse, C., & Herszenhorn, D. M. (2015, September 3). A Coordinated Strategy Brings Victory to Obama on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The New York Times. Jacobs, B. (2015, September 9). At Rally Against Iran Deal, Tea Party Finds Itself Trumped by Trump. The Guardian. Johnson, L. (1965, January 4). State of the Union Address. https://millercenter. org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-4-1965-state-union Leoudaki, Z. (2017, May 13). Ideological Divide Over Abortion Again Affects US Foreign Aid. Voa News. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/us-cutin-foreign-aid-for-abortion-advice-could-hit-hard/3850371.html Lindsay, J. (2017, December 20). The Iran Deal Saga Continues. Council on Foreign Relations. Lizza, R. (2015, December 14). A House Divided. The New Yorker. Milbank, D. (2013, November 26). Republicans Mindlessly Oppose Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. Miller, Z. J. (2013, July 27). GOP Goes Public with Long-Brewing Foreign Policy Civil War. Time. Moscovici, S. (1985). The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nemeth, C. J. (1986). The Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence. Psychological Review, 93, 23–32. Pramuk, J. (2017, March 24). Trump Presses Freedom Caucus on Health Care: A No Vote Helps Planned Parenthood. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www. cnbc.com/2017/03/24/trump-to-freedom-caucus-a-no-vote-on-healthcare-helps-planned-parenthood.html Press Release. (2015, May 13). Found Quote Cited Here Too. https://thehill. com/blogs/floor-action/house/230338-men-dominate-gop-floor-speecheson-abortion-bill Press Release. Congressman Jim Jordan. (2015, January 26). House Republicans Form Freedom Caucus. https://jordan.house.gov/news/documentsingle. aspx?DocumentID=397889 Raas, W., & Long, A. (2007). Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities. International Security, 31(4), 7–33. Rathbun, B. (2013). Steeped in International Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1), 21–37. Richardson, H. C. (2014). To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party. New York: Basic Books. Richter, P., & Memoli, M. A. (2015, April 14). Senate Panel OKs Compromise Bill on Iran. Los Angeles Times.

186 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Saletan, W. (2003). Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sanger, D.  E. (2012, June 1). Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran. The New York Times. Sedgh, G., et  al. (2016, June). Unmet Need for Contraception in Developing Countries: Examining Women’s Reasons for Not Using a Method. Guttmacher Institute. Sherman, J. (2015, October 15). The Obsession of the House Freedom Caucus. Politico. Slavin, B. (2018, 7 May). The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ the-dangerous-consequences-of-us-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal Staats, S.  J. (2010, November 3). Republican Victory, the Tea Party and U.S.  Development Policy. Center for Global Development. Retrieved from https://www.cgdev.org/blog/republican-victor y-tea-par ty-and-usdevelopment-policy Sullivan, S. (2015, March 11). With Iran Letter, Tom Cotton Emerges as Leading GOP National Security Hawk. The Washington Post. United Nations Security Council. Security Council Resolution 1696. (2006, July 31). SC/8792. Wallis, J. (2016, October 16). The Republican House Wreckers Trying to Veto Democracy. The Huffington Post. Weisman, J., & Baker, P. (2015, April 14). Obama Yields, Allowing Congress Say on Iran Nuclear Deal. The New York Times. Wieseltier, L. (2015, July 27). The Iran Deal and the Rut of History. The Atlantic. Wong, S., & Marcos, C. (2015, July 30). Effort to Oust Boehner Falls Flat. The Hill.

CHAPTER 7

Progressives and Foreign Policy in the Trump Era

President Trump’s ban on Muslim refugees betrays American values while undermining national security and economic prosperity. —Representative Joaquin Castro (D-TX) (2017) There are two types of Democrats. There are killers, and there are whiners. Unfortunately, we have too many of the latter and not enough of the former. —David Krone, Former Democratic Senate Aide (2017)

As noted earlier, members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) have asserted their positions on a range of issues in domestic and foreign policy, often serving as a megaphone for liberal ideological perspectives. Along with many of their colleagues in the Democratic Party, Progressives have championed liberalizing immigration laws and have spoken out against conservative policy initiatives. This chapter develops two case studies of Progressive/Liberal activism during the first years of the Trump administration. First, it examines the political challenges of Progressives Democrats in response to the international travel bans that were announced by the White House in January 2017. Next, it analyzes the Progressive challenges to the Trump administration’s approach to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and related immigration legislation. These cases show that with dedication and persistence, Progressives have amplified liberal challenges to the White House and influenced the foreign policy process. © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_7

187

188 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Progressives Challenge the Trump Travel Bans On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order #13769, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Entry into the United States.” This order, which came just 7 days into his presidency, suspended the entry of all refugees into the United States for 120 days and directed officials to determine additional screening protocols. White House officials called this a plan for “extreme vetting” and argued that it would help guarantee “the security and welfare of the United States.” The executive order also halted the admission of refugees from Syria indefinitely and barred entry into the United States for 90 days for individuals from seven predominantly Muslim countries linked to concerns about terrorism. As part of Trump’s plan to keep out “radical Islamic terrorists,” the order effectively established a religious test for refugees from Muslim countries while at the same time giving priority to Christians and other minority religions. Defending his position, the president claimed, “We only want to admit those into our country who will support our country, and love deeply our people” (qtd. in Shear and Cooper, January 27, 2017). The travel ban was incredibly controversial, though, and White House actions were met with fierce opposition from Progressives and other groups. Liberal members of the Democratic Party emerged as some of the leading voices on Capitol Hill against the policy, and they were on the front lines in protests in the streets and at major airports. Progressives also supported court challenges designed to stay or reverse administration actions. Debates over the travel ban would continue throughout most of 2017, defining this as one of the most divisive foreign policy issues during President Trump’s first year in office. Factional Attributes The Democratic Party was deeply divided at the time of the announcement of the travel ban. Democrats, who were already accustomed to factionalism and rivalries in their own ranks between groups like the New Democrats, the Black Caucus, the Hispanic Caucus, Progressives, and the conservative Blue Dogs, saw these rifts intensify after the 2016 presidential election. The Democratic primary had been bitterly fought. Internal emails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) that were hacked by Russia and leaked by WikiLeaks in the summer of 2016 suggested that the party leadership had shown clear favoritism to Hillary Clinton. Hard feelings between

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

189

the far-left and the Democratic Party establishment were compounded when Clinton lost the general election to Donald Trump. The shock of her defeat—along with a failure to pick up the needed seats in the Senate and House—left the party in disarray. In practical terms, Democrats would face a unified Republican government with its fewest number of elected officeholders in almost a century (Draper, November 1, 2017). Voices on the far-left became louder and more persuasive during the period of Democratic Party soul-searching that followed the 2016 election. Progressives criticized Clinton and the party establishment as being too focused on courting the ideological “center,” with moderates conducting high-minded campaigning and legislating. In the process, they argued, working and middle-class Democrats who were suffering through an uneven economic recovery became disillusioned and many felt disenfranchised. Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ), chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), argued in an open letter to the party that “Middle-of-the-road thinking” had “overstayed its welcome” (November 11, 2016). Progressives saw their influence rise, as they and others began to pay more attention to ideological issues that the establishment had seemingly let atrophy over the previous eight years under President Obama. Looking back, one Democratic Congressman opined, “We got a bit lazy and found ourselves relying on Barack Obama’s charisma, and it left us in bad shape” (Pollman, September 11, 2018). The Progressive caucus had been the home of a number of influential far-left members of Congress over the years, including Barney Frank (D-MA) and Dennis Kucinich (D-OH). Even a young Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) had found friends and supporters in the CPC before adopting more moderate positions as she rose in the party leadership ranks. While direct legislative victories were rare, members of the CPC became adept at gaining attention for causes like economic fairness. During the presidency of George W. Bush, the CPC adopted its anti-war foreign policy platform, and this position caught on as the wars in the Middle East became increasingly unpopular. The far-left also emerged as a strong voice in support of immigration and the protection of civil rights and liberties. Progressivism was also on the rise in the 2010s. In the 2016 House elections, for example, every single Progressive running for reelection (62 in total) won their races and another 14 won open seats (Wallach and Zeppos, November 9, 2016). This constituted more than one-third of all Democrats who won election to House seats that year, or 77 of the 193 Democrats (Congressional Progressive Caucus “What is CPC”).

190 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

The race for the chair of the DNC just weeks after the 2016 election epitomized the factionalism within the party. The Progressive candidate for this position was Representative Keith Ellison (D-MN), co-chairman of the CPC. Ellison faced off against the establishment’s candidate, former Labor Secretary Thomas Perez. Bernie Sanders waded into the fight, making his support for Ellison clear: “We need a Democratic National Committee led by a Progressive who understands the dire need to listen to working families, not the political establishment or the billionaire class” (qtd. in Fears, November 11, 2016). In the end, after two rounds of voting, Perez defeated Ellison in a narrow win. Well aware of the divisions in his caucus, Perez immediately reached out to the Progressives by appointing Ellison deputy chair and welcoming a broader dialogue on the future of the party (Bradner, February 26, 2017). With the Democratic Party in turmoil, Progressives found themselves at the vanguard of many challenges to President Trump’s agenda in 2017–2018. Liberal lawmakers promised to fight the president and his policies with renewed vigor at the grassroots level even before his inauguration. The Women’s March on January 21, 2017, and the subsequent protests surrounding topics from immigration to climate change, built off of the populism of the Sanders campaign and were seemingly more ideologically consistent with the left wing of the Democratic Party and Progressives than the establishment. Those protests helped energize a new wave of activism that was uniting against White House policies. Before Trump’s election, liberal groups had focused on a range of issues from promoting a $15 minimum wage, combating climate change, protecting the Affordable Care Act, and ending police violence, but they did so in relative isolation. Now, galvanized by Trump’s victory and his policy agenda, Progressive lawmakers began collaborating with groups like Indivisible, MoveOn.org, and the Working Families Party against a common foe. Grassroots activists exchanged civil disobedience tactics, pooled financial resources, showed up at town hall meetings, and created organizational partnerships to demonstrate together on issues of concern. As one columnist noted at the time, “Trump has done more to spur progressive political organizing than Bernie Sanders, George Soros, and Saul Alinsky combined” (Goldberg, December 18, 2017). By the numbers, Progressives serving in the House during the early part of the 115th Congress were significantly more liberal than their Democratic counterparts. The average first dimension DW-NOMINATE

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

191

score for the 76 CPC members who were able to vote1 during the early months of 2017 was −0.467. Other Democrats from the same time period averaged a score of −0.344, showing the difference between the far-left and the other wings of the party. The combined score for all 193 Democrats, including Progressives, was −0.392. The ideological makeup of the CPC included a range of members from Pramila Jayapal (D-WA) at one end of the spectrum (−0.706) to David Loebsack (D-IO) on the other (−0.276). Besides ideology, Progressives also showed dramatic differences in their willingness to challenge the party establishment. According to second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, Progressives at the time (−0.178) were on average much more anti-establishment or less willing to compromise than those who were not in the caucus (0.021) or Democrats all together (−0.055). In fact, a majority of CPC members scored in the 70th percentile or higher for both their first and second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores in relation to the entire Democratic Party. Ideologically, 44 of the 76 members were extremely liberal, while 39 of 76 would be considered extreme in their willingness to challenge the party establishment. Thus, we code the Progressive Caucus in this period as a more cohesive faction. Traditional Legislative Strategies President Trump’s executive order in January 2017 represented his first formal act to curtail travel and immigration to the United States. The order suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions program and banned the intake of Syrian refugees. It also blocked travel to the United States by citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries and dramatically reduced the number of refugees that would be accepted in 2017 (from the 110,000 limit per year set by President Obama to 50,000). Tens of thousands of travelers and immigrants were immediately affected; many found themselves stuck at U.S. airports in a legal limbo. While the White House defended the action as protecting national security, protests erupted across the country in opposition to the harsh measure. Former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon later admitted that he personally orchestrated the plan for the president to sign the first travel ban on a Friday afternoon when it would cause the most chaos at airports (Mark, January 3, 2018). 1  The House member from the District of Columbia cannot vote, so we do not employ their scores to calculate average DW-NOMINATE rankings.

192 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Progressive opponents to the travel ban quickly rose to the challenge, employing direct and indirect legislative instruments at their disposal to fight the ban and pressure the president to reconsider. CPC members introduced a series of bills in the House in an attempt to block Trump’s executive order from going into effect, as well as deal with the problems and confusion sparked by the ban. Left-wing senators also proposed legislation in opposition to the travel ban. Other legislative instruments that Progressives used to their advantage during the travel ban debate included blocking executive appointments, as well as writing letters to the executive branch and meeting with Trump administration officials. Progressives also supported a series of legal challenges in the federal courts in attempts to strike down the executive order. Just days after Trump’s executive order, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), a member of the Progressive Caucus and the top Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee’s immigration panel, introduced legislation (H.R. 724) to rescind and defund the travel ban. Calling it the “Statue of Liberty Values (or SOLVE) Act of 2017,” Lofgren took direct aim at the ban attempting to make it “null and void, shall have no force and effect, and may not be implemented, administered, enforced, or carried out” (H.R. 724, 115th Cong. 2017). The proposed legislation also attempted to bar federal agencies from using any funds to enforce the ban. While Lofgren’s bill had the support of 179 House Democrats, the Republican leadership refused to bring the bill to the floor for a vote. Afterward, Lofgren issued a press release stating, “In July last year, House Speaker Paul Ryan said that a religious test for entering our country is not reflective of America’s values. Today, House Republicans had an opportunity to put those values to the test, but they failed” (Press Release, January 30, 2017). A similar bill blocking implementation and funding of Trump’s travel ban was advanced by Progressive Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) and had the support of Bernie Sanders, Kristen Gillibrand (D-NY), Cory Booker (D-NJ), and Patty Murray (D-WA). However, like its counterpart in the House, the Republican leadership was unwilling to let S. 248 advance through the Senate. As showdowns in airports and in Washington intensified, other Progressive Caucus members in the House advanced legislation to contest the travel ban. On January 30, Representatives Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) and Jamie Raskin (D-MD), vice chairs of the Progressive Caucus, ­introduced the USA Values Act of 2017 (H.R. 735). This bill was designed to prohibit the enforcement of the travel ban (or any executive order)

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

193

because of its violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act. Another proposed piece of legislation in the House (H.R. 722), aimed at prohibiting any federal agency fees toward the travel ban, also received broad support from many Progressive Caucus members. Lawmakers also tried to help immigrants who were traveling and stuck in limbo. For instance, Progressive Caucus member Yvette Clarke (D-NY) introduced the FREE Act (H.R. 1075) on February 15 that both echoed the SOLVE Act as well as called on the Department of Homeland Security to release any alien in custody and reissue visas or documentation revoked under the authority of the travel ban (https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1075). Progressives continued to pursue legislative means to stop the president’s orders, even as the White House formulated new iterations of their plan. In November 2017, after the release of the third travel ban, Senator Murphy again introduced legislation (S. 2145), entitled “The No Ban on Refugees Act,” which attempted to prohibit any government agency from preventing a refugee from entering the country based on their origin. While these efforts provided some assurance to immigrant advocates, numerous attempts to legislate the matter failed; Democrat-sponsored bills never made it past the introductory stage or referral to a committee in both chambers, where no further action was then taken. Liberals also attempted to use other legislative means in order to attack the travel ban, including threats not to confirm presidential appointees. For example, President Trump announced his Supreme Court nominee, Neil Gorsuch, just a few days after his first travel ban was ordered. Democrats and Progressives were emboldened in their opposition by the growing backlash against Trump’s immigration orders. Gorsuch drew even more Democratic ire after he privately called Trump’s criticism of a judge that ruled against the travel ban “disheartening,” but declined to speak out publicly (Carney, March 14, 2017). The resulting confirmation debates and votes were fractious, laying bare the deep divisions among the parties at the outset of the Trump presidency (Lichtblau and Flegenheimer, February 8, 2017). Progressives and other Democratic lawmakers tried to exhaust every procedural mechanism at their disposal in attempts to stymie the president’s efforts (O’Keefe, Sullivan, Snell, February 1, 2017; Weigel and O’Keefe, January 29, 2017). For example, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) threatened to jam the Senate calendar if Trump did not revoke his order or if Republicans did not allow a vote on legislation that

194 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

would rescind it. Democrats called for a delay or postponement of committee confirmation votes on a number of Trump nominees, including Rex Tillerson for the position of Secretary of State. They saw these maneuvers as creating more opportunities to ask questions and clarify their position on the travel ban. Progressive theatrics included a boycott of Senate committee meetings, effectively denying Republicans the necessary quorum and forcing them to reschedule votes. Democrats ended one hearing by using the obscure “two-hour” rule that permits either party to stop committees from meeting beyond the first two hours of the Senate’s official day—something Republicans used against Obama’s Cabinet nominees. They even invoked an arcane rule to temporarily block the Senate Judiciary Committee from holding a roll-call vote on Trump’s choice for Attorney General, former Senator Jeff Sessions. Republicans complained that Democrats at the time were committing a “completely unprecedented level of obstruction” (Senator Patrick Toomey [R-PA] qtd. in O’Keefe et al., February 1, 2017). Issue Framing Progressive opponents of Trump’s travel ban became personally involved on the front lines of the travel ban battle. They induced conflict with the White House and vocally championed alternative solutions to the crisis. Progressives employed several different negative frames to try to draw attention toward the policy. First and foremost, opponents said that the travel ban was a form of religious discrimination. They called it a “Muslim ban” that was both undemocratic and contrary to American values. Critics also challenged Trump’s argument that the ban made America safer, believing instead that it made the United States less safe. Furthermore, opponents on the left tried to humanize the impact of Trump’s policy by sharing stories of individuals and families who were impacted by the ban (Chang et al., January 29, 2017). Progressives in Congress were some of the “first responders” and loudest voices on the front lines of the protests. In the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the ban, many lawmakers went to their local airports to attend the protests and help those stuck in immigration limbo. Senator Warren gave a speech at Boston’s Logan Airport in the early days of the crisis, for example, in which she labeled the ban as turning away people because of their religion who want to try and help Americans, not hurt them. She led chants with protestors saying, “we will not turn away chil-

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

195

dren” and “we will not turn away families” (Schroeder and Sacchetti, January 29, 2017). A few days later Warren would reiterate that the ban was targeting people who are not threats or criminals but rather students, families, and veterans. Representative Dwight Evans (D-PA), another Progressive Caucus member, went to the Philadelphia Airport to join in the protests along with a number of other Democratic officials (Chang et al., January 29, 2017). Progressive Caucus members Representatives Jerry Nadler (D-NY) and Nydia Velasquez (D-NY) also personally worked hard to get refugees out of detention at New York’s JFK International Airport, including an Iraqi refugee who had served as a translator for American troops. At a hastily called press conference at JFK, Nadler offered strong negative framing. He called Trump’s order “discriminatory…and frankly quite disgusting” (Stanglin and Gomez, January 28, 2017). Representative Karen Bass (D-CA) publicly shared the stories of individuals stuck at her constituent’s airport in Los Angeles, including a Stanford student, as a result of the executive order which she called “nothing less than a religious ban.” Bass labeled Trump’s action “a travesty that has resulted in innocent people, students, grandparents, mothers, fathers, and children being unable to travel and enter the United States” (163 Cong. Rec. H726, 2017). Progressive members of Congress also used speeches on the House floor to try to negatively frame the narrative surrounding the travel ban. Members such as Adriano Espaillat (D-NY) railed against what they believed was making America into a “nonsensical, anti-refugee nation” and expressed solidarity with those hurt by the executive order. “I rise today in opposition to President Trump’s Muslim ban because that is exactly what it is…a mean spirited ban against members of a religious faith,” said Espaillat. Representative Andre Carson (D-IN), a Progressive, and one of only two Muslim members of Congress at the time, argued that the action made America less secure: “Just as I worked at the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,” he said, “there are thousands of Muslims likely working to keep America safe” (Weigel, January 30, 2017). Hank Johnson (D-GA) and many others used speeches to share how their constituents were affected by the travel ban, personalizing stories about immigrants and refugees. Other Progressives, including Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), railed against the travel ban as “unconstitutional” and “discriminatory.” The u ­ nconstitutional frame would be used consistently throughout the struggle over the travel ban with opponents often using it interchangeably with the phrase “un-

196 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

American” in trying to make the argument that President Trump was not living up to his oath by favoring one religion over another. Progressives also worked to humanize the impact that the ban was having on individuals and families who were looking for freedom or safety in the United States. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), the first vice chair of the CPC and the first Indian-American woman ever elected to the House, spoke about volunteering in Seattle to try and help a man from Somalia who was turned away without any due process instead of being reunited with his wife. She also shared a personal narrative, stating, “I, myself, immigrated when I was 16 years old, and it took me 19 years to become a citizen. I am intimately familiar with the barriers that people face in our immigration system, and I hope that all of the Member of this Chamber will welcome immigrants the way we have” (Marcos, The Hill, October 31, 2017).2 Representative Chellie Pingree (D-ME) told the story of a young woman in her district from Djibouti who had immigrated to the United States after serving as an interpreter for the U.S. military. She told the Congresswoman that she was now questioning whether she would be welcome in the country that she had fought to serve. Pingree reminded her colleagues in Congress of the importance of immigrants for American economic prosperity. Of the many Democrats and Progressive Caucus members who spoke out against the travel ban, Senators Warren and Sanders were perhaps the loudest. A few days after the travel ban was announced, Democratic members of Congress held a rally outside the Supreme Court. While most leaders of the Democratic Party were in attendance, reports suggested that it was Warren and Sanders who drew the strongest recognition from the crowd. The sight of Sanders’ “white hair sparked some of the evening’s loudest cheers” (Weigel). Sanders said, “we do not hate the Muslim people and we want them to know that.” Sanders accused President Trump and the ban of “fostering hatred and intolerance” as well as playing “into the hands of fanatics wishing to harm America” (Greenwood, January 28, 2017). Warren took her case to the Senate floor only a few days after Trump issued his executive order and laid out many impassioned critiques as well as personal stories for those caught in limbo by the ban. Warren 2  Sadly, a far-right member of Congress later lashed out during a House Judiciary Committee meeting, telling Jayapal on the House floor that the Trump travel ban was not a “Muslim ban” and that she should “learn how to read” (Marcos, The Hill, October 31, 2017).

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

197

said that the radical ban on Muslims and its religious tests were illegal, unconstitutional, and immoral, and they struck at the heart of American values. The president, she said, was banning the entry of people and skills into the United States that were “part of what makes America great” (163 Cong. Rec. S474, 2017). The protest framing of the executive order also became a centerpiece of court challenges. In February 2017, attorneys representing the state of Hawaii filed a lawsuit against the federal government claiming the ban was discriminatory against Muslims, and the use of the term “travel ban” by President Trump in his tweets was a significant argument made by opponents. Legal cases proceeded through the circuit and appeals court system, eventually making it to Supreme Court in June 2017. Throughout their filings, U.S. government lawyers went out of their way to not use the term “travel ban” in court as they sought to convince the judges that the policy was rooted in evidence-based national security concerns and not religious animus (Fabian, The Hill, June 6, 2017). While Trump’s top aides continued to insist that the order was not a travel ban, the president made clear his intention by Twitter, stating: “People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” (qtd. in Fabian, June 5, 2017). Consistency The debate over President Trump’s travel ban, and its subsequent iterations, dragged on for more than two years. Versions of immigration controls were challenged on Capitol Hill, in public discourse, and in the courts. When opponents successfully challenged parts of the travel bans, the White House then maneuvered to repackage limits and attempted to implement them. Throughout this period, Progressives in Congress maintained their opposition by repeatedly offering legislative challenges to the travel ban and exploring direct and indirect means to limit their effects. The far-left and Progressive Democrats consistently matched the White House in their refusal to compromise, despite the success that opponents were having in the courts. In the end, the steady signal of resolve put forth by Progressives and their repeated opposition maneuvers successfully delayed the actions—and greatly annoyed the president. The legal fight over the travel bans demonstrated the depth of opponents’ commitment. On February 3, 2017, a U.S. District Court judge blocked the implementation of Trump’s first travel ban nationwide. The

198 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

ruling stated that those who filed the lawsuit “have met their burden of demonstrating that they face immediate and irreparable injury as a result of the signing and implementation of the executive order” (Gerstein and Stokols, February 3, 2017). Instead of appealing early court decisions, the White House adopted new measures that were more “tailored” to address concerns of judges. On March 6, 2017, Trump signed a revised executive order that included changes meant to blunt legal and political opposition (Thrush, March 6, 2017). Progressives remained in the fray, offering consistent opposition to Trump’s second iteration of his executive order. Despite their shortfall of votes or support, Progressives again took aim at the travel ban through legislative means. Representative Lofgren and more than 170 original co-sponsors introduced the SOLVE Act 2.0  in the House (H.R. 1503), which had the same objectives as its predecessor as well as an identical result—dying in committee. Undaunted, Progressive senators followed suit with similar pieces of legislation. Senator Murphy submitted another bill (S. 549) to block the implementation of the new ban by prohibiting any federal funds, and he was joined by many of the same left-leaning colleagues from his previous legislation, including Bernie Sanders. However, this time a competing bill aimed at rescinding the provisions of Trump’s executive order (S. 608) was also introduced by another Democrat, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). The second travel ban was also challenged immediately in the courts. On March 15, a district court judge issued a nationwide halt on the travel ban. Other federal courts across the country also ruled against the ban, forcing the Trump administration to petition the Court of Appeals. In May, the Fourth Circuit of Appeals voted to block the travel restriction for Muslim countries but left in place the 120-day refugee ban. After yet another setback, the White House asked the Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter. In June, the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case in full in October, and in the meantime, overruled the lower courts by allowing a limited travel ban to go into effect. While the debate continued, the second travel ban actually expired that September. The expiration of the second executive order banning travel led the Trump administration to issue a new program, also referred to as the third travel ban (“Presidential Proclamation Enhancing…” September 24, 2017). The new order was more far-reaching than the previous versions. It imposed permanent restriction on travel, rather than a 90-day suspension and added some non-Muslim countries, such as North Korea and government officials from Venezuela, in hopes of avoiding the earlier

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

199

claims of discrimination (Shear, September 24, 2017). Progressives once again leaped into the fray. Senator Chris Murphy introduced another bill (S. 1979) attempting to prohibit federal agency funds, resources, or fees from being used to implement the new ban. This time around, however, Murphy had the support of 30 original co-sponsors, including all of the Progressive flag bearers in the Senate. Finally, in early November, Representative Judy Chu (D-CA), a Progressive caucus member, introduced a bill (H.R. 4271) to block the implementation of the third travel ban (“Press Release,” November 21, 2017). Even though none of the bills introduced by Democrats were ever brought to a vote, Progressives showed high levels of consistency in their opposition. Outcome The struggle over the Trump administration’s travel ban was a polarizing issue throughout his first year in office (and beyond). Progressives in Congress opposed the travel ban and its many iterations at every turn. They introduced bill after bill in an effort to thwart the administration using the powers of the legislature. Progressives also were some of the leading voices in trying to dominate the narrative and paint the travel ban in a negative light. Moreover, the consistency of Progressive opposition constantly kept the White House on its heels. While the bills put forward in Congress seemed to have little direct effect because of Republican obstructionism, the criticism from the far-left did not go unnoticed by Trump. The president repeatedly defended his policy, often saying that it was not a “Muslim ban,” and he blamed the media for falsely reporting that framing. Factional challenges to executive orders took many forms in this case. We code this case as “partially successful,” though there is mixed evidence that complicates this designation. For example, executive orders were issued and implemented rather quickly in early 2017, and the lives of visitors and immigrants to the United States were immediately affected. Yet, factional pushback did help to foster both vocal challenges in Congress and court cases designed to stymie administration efforts. Those actions did prevent full implementation and maintenance of Trump’s “first” and “second” versions of the travel bans. However, in December of 2017, the Supreme Court allowed the third version of the travel ban to go forward in its entirety. While the Trump administration hailed the court’s decision as a win, the debate was far from over. The Supreme Court announced

200 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

that it would hear oral arguments in April 2018 on whether the ban violated immigration law as well as the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Ultimately, in late June of 2018, the Court made its final ruling and upheld President Trump’s travel ban. In a 5–4 vote, the court’s conservatives endorsed the president’s power to control immigration and secure the country’s borders. The majority ruling said that the president had ample statutory authority to make national security judgments in the realm of immigration, which had been delegated by Congress over decades of immigration lawmaking (Liptak and Shear, June 26, 2018). In a statement released after the decision, President Trump seemingly alluded to the fight put up by the far left, saying, “This ruling is also a moment of profound vindication following months of hysterical commentary from the media and Democratic politicians who refuse to do what it takes to secure our border and our country” (Liptak and Shear, June 26, 2018).

Progressives, Trump, and DACA Reforms Immigration reform continued to generate intense political debates in the United States during the Trump administration. On September 5, 2017, the White House ordered an end to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program and urged Congress to pass replacement legislation before the program would be phased out. DACA had been created by the Obama administration in 2012 as a way to shield nearly 800,000 young undocumented immigrants from deportation. In particular, the program allowed for immigrants who were brought to the United States illegally as children (often called “DREAMers”) to remain in the country and legally go to school or work without fear of immediate removal (see Chap. 4). Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ announcement that DACA would end set off another round of contentious politics over immigration policy in the United States. In Congress, the debate led to a government shutdown and further deepened the divide inside (and between) both political parties. President Trump had long railed against DACA, but the process of actually engineering policy change would be more complicated. Trump argued that ending the Obama-era program and illegal immigration was essential to reestablishing the rule of law and helping native-born Americans to ensure employment over immigrants. Conservatives ­overwhelmingly supported the move and pressured the administration to rescind DACA. Democrats, especially Progressives on the far-left, saw Trump’s plan as another example of his agenda to divide the country.

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

201

They quickly took up arms in an effort to amplify the Democrats’ message, opposing White House plans and saving the DREAMers. Once in office, though, Trump stalled, and he showed signs of having conflicted feelings on the issue. From time to time, Trump acknowledged the emotional charge and public sympathy that many Americans held for the DREAMers. The president decided to place the onus on Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration plan that would not just fix DACA but also strengthen the border and protect American jobs. Factional Attributes The Congressional Progressive Caucus led the charge to both oppose Trump’s decision to end DACA and try to save the DREAMers. The CPC was able to exert its influence during the DACA debate in large part due to its size. During the 115th Congress, the CPC was the largest Democratic caucus in the House, making up nearly 40% of the 194 Democrats. Not only did the caucus enjoy a deep roster it also drew support from across the United States. The members of the CPC hailed from 34 different states as well as the District of Columbia. The largest clusters of members came from states on the West Coast and New England, such as California (16), New York (7), and Massachusetts (4). Smaller pockets of Progressive members represented districts in states throughout parts of the South and the Midwest. As noted earlier, the debate over DACA took place at a time when Democrats were engaged in serious internal deliberations about the party’s overall policy platform and strategy. The party was struggling in the wake of the 2016 elections and was searching for the best way to fight President Trump and the Republican agenda. Progressive leaders and lawmakers wanted the Democratic Party to rethink its policies and not just be an anti-Trump party. Establishment leaders within the Democratic Party, including Senator Schumer (D-NY) and Representative Pelosi (D-CA), tried to corral the debate, saying the party was undergoing a “presentation correction” not a “course correction.” However, broader changes in this period suggested that the writing was on the wall—that the party would move further to the left to distinguish itself from moderate and conservative policies (O’Keefe and Weigel, July 22, 2017). In the late summer of 2017, not long before President Trump would make his announcement ending DACA, the Democrats released a plan they called “A Better Deal,” which showed just how prominent Progressive

202 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

voices in the party were becoming. Lawmakers hoped they could revive the party’s message to voters by calling for attacking consolidated corporate power, cracking down on prescription drug pricing, and creating jobs through infrastructure spending and tax credits (Stein, July 24, 2017). Moderates also signaled that they might embrace the idea of a $15 minimum wage and a more balanced trade agenda, both causes long championed by the left. The influence that Progressives had on this rebranding effort within the Democratic Party showed the growing importance of far-left voices in Congress, which would only be reinforced during the struggle over DACA in late 2017 and early 2018. The Progressive faction and the Democratic Party also experienced a few minor changes in leadership and membership in 2017. In July, for example, Congressman Jimmy Gomez (D-CA) replaced Xavier Becerra, who had resigned to become Attorney General of California. Gomez’s addition increased the number of Progressives in the House to 78 members (of the total 194 Democrats). The ideological leanings of Progressives compared to the larger Democratic caucus during the DACA debate were thus marginally different than the travel ban. The average DW-NOMINATE score for the 77 CPC members who were able to vote was −0.468, slightly more liberal than before Gomez’s arrival. However, the other Democrats from the same time continued to average a score of −0.344. For all Democrats, with Progressives included, the score was −0.392, showing the little difference that Gomez’s addition made to the overall party. Progressives were still much more likely to challenge the establishment, according to second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, with an average score of −0.175, much lower than their average non-Progressive colleagues (0.021) and the Democratic Party as a whole (−0.055). The CPC continued to include a majority of members with extreme first and second dimension scores in terms of their ideology (44 of 77) and anti-­ establishment views (39 of 77) in comparison to the broader Democratic Party. Thus, the CPC still exhibited traits of a more cohesive faction. Traditional Legislative Strategies Many Democrats were opposed to  the Trump administration’s plans for DACA, but the legislative strategies employed by the far-left during the debate were somewhat different from those in the 2017 struggle over the travel ban. Progressives in Congress believed they had a far larger cause. During the travel ban debate, far-left members of Congress had been mostly

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

203

focused on trying to kill or delay the White House efforts. In the instance of DACA, they recognized the need to pass a replacement bill quickly. This legislative goal, and the time constraints to achieve it, was a daunting challenge. This was made all the more difficult by the fact that Democrats did not control either the House or the Senate. As such, the far-left would try to employ a variety of legislative tactics in trying to replace DACA and save the DREAMers. The simplest legislative approach to fixing the DACA problem was to pass a permanent solution for undocumented individuals already living in the United States. The primary piece of legislation that the far-left would push during the DACA debate was the DREAM Act, a bill that they had been trying to get through Congress for many years. In 2007, a version of the Dream Act won the support of a majority of senators but fell victim to a bipartisan filibuster. Three years later, in December of 2010, the House passed the DREAM Act with support from all Democrats alongside a handful of Republicans. However, the bill was blocked again in the Senate where only 55 votes were cast for cloture, short of the 60 needed to overcome a filibuster (Alcindor and Kaplan, December 8, 2017). The leader of that Republican filibuster was Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL), who would later become President Trump’s Attorney General. With the Dream Act effectively stuck in Congress, President Obama created DACA via an executive order in 2012. In July 2017, a few months before the Trump administration’s announcement to end DACA, the Dream Act was once again introduced in both the House and Senate. The Senate legislative attempt was a bipartisan effort put forth by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Dick Durbin (D-IL), but it was the far-left who led the charge in the House. Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA), a Congressional Progressive Caucus member, introduced the House version of the Dream Act (H.R. 344), saying at the time, “This bipartisan, bicameral DREAM Act is the most progressive yet, and moves the ball forward for protecting DREAMers—individuals who have built their lives here and call no other country home” (Press Release, July 26, 2015). However, despite the fact that the House version had 203 co-sponsors, neither bill was advanced to the chamber floors for a full debate or vote. The White House’s announcement to end DACA became a catalyst for legislative activity. Progressives tried to employ a variety of tactics in order to bring the DREAM Act forward. In late September, only a few weeks after the president’s decision to rescind DACA, Representative Roybal-­

204 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Allard and other Democrats attempted a rare procedural tactic that, if it had succeeded, would have given them the power to control the House floor schedule and bring the Dream Act forward. While debating H.Res. 538, an unrelated resolution specifying the rules for debate of a different bill, Roybal-Allard tried to defeat the previous question, giving Democrats control of the House floor (Press Release, September 27, 2015).3 This type of maneuver, established by precedent in the House, is one of the only available tools for those who oppose the majority’s agenda to offer legislative alternatives. However, despite Roybal-Allard’s urging, a majority of House members voted yes on the previous question, keeping the Dream Act bottled up and off the floor. The DREAM Act was not the only piece of legislation that the far-left championed in trying to find a solution to the DACA dilemma. Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-IL), a member of the CPC and a strong advocate for immigrants in Congress, introduced “The American Hope Act of 2017” (H.R. 3591) in the summer of 2017. Gutierrez’s legislation required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to cancel the removal and adjust the status of certain residents who entered the United States as children prior to 2017. The bill, which had 157 co-sponsors, would have awarded conditional permanent-resident status for a period of eight years. After not receiving any attention for a few months, the American Hope Act and Roybal-Allard’s Dream Act were referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security the day after Trump’s announcement. While these were promising signs of life from the far-left in the aftermath of the controversial decision by the White House, ultimately the bills received little support. Meanwhile, Progressives in the Senate were able to impact the legislative agenda because Republicans lacked the 60 votes needed to overcome a Democratic filibuster. With the far-left’s attempts to pass their own legislation facing a roadblock, their strategy shifted toward opposition to immigration bills introduced by Republicans that did not pass their ideological muster. In particular, Progressives in the Senate started to signal that they would not be settling for anything less than full citizenship for

3  To defeat the previous question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the subject before the House. “The refusal of the House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes the control of the resolution to the opposition” (Congressional Record, September 27, 2017). See 115 Cong. Rec. H7547, 2017.

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

205

DREAMers and were willing to go to great lengths to achieve this goal given their legislative leverage. In early December, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced the Security, Enforcement, and Compassion United in Reform Efforts Act of 2017 (or SECURE Act), which he believed would be fair to all parties since it contained provisions from previous immigration proposals from both sides of the aisle. Borrowing from Durbin’s BRIDGE Act (S. 128), the bill would have extended DACA for three years. In exchange, conservatives would receive a number of their policy goals that were from Senator John Cornyn’s (R-TX) “Building America’s Trust Act” (S. 1757), such as allowing President Trump to build a “tactical and technological infrastructure” along the U.S.-Mexico border, targeting sanctuary cities, bolstering the e-verify verification program, and cracking down on “chain migration” (Carney, December 5, 2017). This plan was immediately panned in the Senate by Progressives since it did not include a path to citizenship for DREAMers. In fact, Durbin and others attacked Grassley’s plan, claiming that it was not actually made in good faith but was rather an attempt to delay and stop any serious bipartisan efforts. House Republicans undertook a similar legislative effort in the early months of 2018. Representative Bob Goodlatte’s (R-VA) immigration bill (H.R. 4760), the “Securing America’s Future Act of 2018” (SAFA), also included a collection of conservative hard-line provisions for immigration and border reform in exchange for a potentially renewable three-year reprieve from deportation for DACA recipients. Democrats had a hard time seeing Goodlatte’s bill in an objective fashion given his previous stance on immigration-related issues, including the “No Sanctuary for Criminals Act” that he had introduced in the summer of 2017. In fact, many of Goodlatte’s positions were in step with or were supported by President Trump. Not surprisingly, the SAFA faced strong opposition from the Congressional Progressive Caucus, with some of their loudest voices taking to the chamber floor and showing their fierce disapproval. “This legislation is nothing more than a wish list of the far-right anti-­immigrant fringe….It is almost impressive how many bad ideas have been crammed into one comprehensive package,” said Representative Nadler (R-NY) (115 Cong. Rec. H5424, 2017). Adding to the chorus of opposition, Representative Lofgren (D-CA) said, “Why are we debating a bill that nearly everyone, even many in the Republican Party, think is a terrible idea?” (115 Cong. Rec. H5425, 2017). Not surprisingly, the Goodlatte bill did not emerge for a vote for another six months, when it failed (193–231).

206 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Progressives were successful in opposing bills in both chambers of Congress that did not include their demands for DREAMers. However, the DACA issue became intertwined in the Senate with the ongoing efforts to pass legislation for funding the government. As President Trump’s first year in office came to an end, the federal government was operating on a series of stopgap spending bills, which kept the government open for only short periods of time rather than a year-long budget. During consideration of these spending measures, far-left Democrats in the Senate demanded a solution for DREAMers and DACA in exchange for their votes. Progressives threatened to kill any spending bill that did not solve the DACA crisis, which was sometimes at odds with the position of other more moderate Democrats and the party leadership. Notably, the Progressive opposition in the Senate was led by a group of Democrats who had their eye on running for president in 2020, and therefore wanted to appeal to the newly mobilized base of their party (Pullen, December 7, 2017). In late December 2017, both parties agreed to a budget extension, with Democrats securing a promise from Republican leaders that immigration legislation would be considered if a bipartisan compromise was reached after the first of the year. On January 11, 2018, a bipartisan group of senators announced a deal that would legalize DREAMers in return for more border security, ending the diversity visa lottery, and addressing Temporary Protected Status for Haitians and others in the United States because of natural disasters. However, this bipartisan legislation quickly lost steam in the fallout from President Trump’s comments about stemming immigration from “shithole countries” (qtd. in Scott, January 12, 2018). This fizzled plan fueled deeper mistrust between the parties as well as between the White House and Democrats, including Senator Durbin. On January 20, 2018, the Senate took up a House bill for a one-month stopgap measure that excluded a deal on DACA, but Progressives led the way in Democratic opposition. The result was a government shutdown, its first since 2013. The shutdown only further fueled divisions and partisanship over DACA and immigration. Republicans, led by President Trump, accused Senate Democrats of holding the entire government hostage over their demands for an immigration bill. Democrats, on the other hand, blamed Trump and Republicans for a basic failure to govern and pointed to the president’s repeated backing out of agreements. In the end, though, the shutdown was rather short-lived. After only three days, the Senate, with many Democrats in support, voted 81–18 to end the shutdown in return for a commitment from the Republican leadership to consider

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

207

DACA-related legislation. Most of the Senate Democrats who voted against ending the shutdown were far-left Progressives living up to their hard-line stance on DACA who did not trust in the promises made by Republicans. Disappointed Progressive lawmakers and activists believed that it was “foolhardy” to believe the promises of Senate Majority Leader McConnell. Progressives in the House responded similarly calling the deal struck as meaningless since Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) had not even matched McConnell’s commitment to advance DACA-related legislation. “This shows me that when it comes to immigrants, Latinos and their families, Democrats are still not willing to go to the mat,” said Representative Gutierrez (Goldberg, January 22, 2018). Liberal and immigration activists were furious about the Democrats “caving” on the shutdown and “selling out” progressive policy priorities. However, in the end, Democrats on the far-left were hampered by a lack of unity within their party as only the hardcore base was ready to hold out. They could not convince Democrats who were running in red states in the 2018 midterms to join them in their brinkmanship. Furthermore, there was a legitimate fear among Democrats, especially the party leadership, that if the shutdown dragged on, they would lose ground and the public might turn against DREAMers (Goldberg, January 22, 2018). Issue Framing Much like their efforts against the Trump administration’s controversial travel bans, those on the far-left were able to be effective in their efforts to negatively frame the political debate over DACA. Progressives employed both positive and negative framing devices in their effort to persuade voters of their position. They highlighted the constructive role of DACA as a way of improving lives, providing opportunities, and as a source of optimism or protection for young immigrants across America. “DACA has provided more than a million young immigrants safety, security, dignity, respect, and opportunity. These are young people who play, study, work, and live next door to us each and every day,” said Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). Moreover, Progressives such as Representative Gutierrez talked about how DREAMers were innocent of any crimes claiming they did nothing wrong or had no choice when they were brought to America as young children by their parents. Not only is America the only country that these DREAMers have ever known, as many pointed out, but they “have been playing by the rules, doing everything

208 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

their government has asked them to do, and have been living productive lives in communities in every state,” said Gutierrez (115 Cong. Rec. H9847, 2017). Similar to their framing of opposition to the travel ban, liberal members of Congress also drove their messages home by telling the personal stories of DREAMers living in their states or districts. Some lawmakers even introduced young people with DACA status to their audiences at public events or news conferences. These stories often mentioned DREAMers that served in the armed forces, further reiterating the frame that these individuals were “Americans too.” Progressives also tried to paint the White House’s decision to rescind DACA as heartless, and they highlighted potentially adverse outcomes that would result in the end of the program. Concerned lawmakers argued that the decision to end DACA was not living up to American values or such an act was “not who America is” and that “we are a nation of immigrants” or a “melting pot.” Progressives such as Senator Warren, and many others, made the claim that the United States had made a promise to DREAMers about coming out of the shadows and that Trump was breaking that agreement by turning our backs and threatening to deport them to countries they barely know (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). Warren also pointed out that the act of ending DACA kept in line with other political decisions by the Trump White House that had racial undertones, such as the Muslim ban, supporting white supremacist groups during the rally in Charlottesville, and pardoning Sheriff Joe Arpaio. According to Warren, ending DACA was part of President Trump’s campaign to turn Americans against each other in a broader effort to “build a hateful and frightened America.” Other Progressives employed economic frames, highlighting the negative impact that ending DACA would have on the American economy. Lawmakers described Trump’s decision as “bad news for the economy,” pointing out that many immigrants were productive members of the economic community. They cited statistics about DREAMers that had started their own businesses and the fact that 95% of DREAMers had either found gainful employment or were in school (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). In addition, many Progressives pointed out that some of America’s largest corporations and business leaders favored liberalization of immigration laws. Over 400 American business leaders and CEOs, including those from major companies like Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, Google, and General Motors, and hundreds of academic leaders and university presidents all signed a letter sharing their displeasure

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

209

with ending DACA and stated how it was bad for their companies and the country as a whole. Progressives also worked hard to frame the decision to end DACA as a moral mistake that a majority of Americans opposed. In their speeches on the floors of Congress and in their media appearances, progressives used language to shame the Trump White House such as “cruel,” “evil,” “unjust,” “heartless,” and “ripping families apart” to describe what they believed was the unnecessary pain and suffering that ending DACA was causing for countless young people whose futures were now suddenly uncertain. In this effort, they effectively employed tactics of nonconformity to suggest that the establishment position was the deviant one. Senator Sanders said that the “decision to end the DACA program is the cruelest and most ugly Presidential act in the modern history of this country. I cannot think of one single act which is uglier and more cruel” (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). Another lawmaker argued that by crushing the dreams of young men and women, the United States was not only hurting itself economically but also paying a “price morally as our standing in the world as a beacon of hope and opportunity is tarnished” (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). This moral argument certainly matched public sentiment at the time: Polls showed that 76% of Americans agreed that deportation was wrong and supported passing legislation such as the DREAM Act. One data point in particular heartened Progressives: they pointed out that even 73% of Trump supporters believed that DREAMers should be allowed to stay. Bernie Sanders gave a series of public addresses in which he spoke directly to the DREAMers, saying, “you are not being deserted by the people of this country, you are being attacked by the president.” (115 Cong. Rec. S4899, 2017). Progressives also drew support for their plans from many religious leaders, including many within the Catholic Church, who came out against ending DACA. Consistency Throughout the debate over replacing DACA, the Progressive far-left showed a consistent level of engagement in pushing for their preferred solution. They also continually opposed Republican efforts that did not include a permanent fix and called for delays in policy changes. Progressives presented a steady signal of resolve through their efforts to dominate or frame the narrative surrounding DACA as well as their pursuit of a legislative resolution. In particular, the far-left’s unwillingness to back down or

210 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

refusal to compromise during the government shutdown exemplified its commitment to DACA. The consistency of the far-left’s efforts over DACA can be seen in their refusal to compromise throughout the length of the debate in Congress. When President Trump announced that he was rescinding DACA, he gave Congress six months to pass a replacement. Thus, the faction had to keep up its maneuvering and hold its minority position over a relatively long period of time. In fact, at times, even the Democratic leadership underestimated the resolve of the far-left. In early December, Senate Democratic Leader Schumer, despite being in a tricky situation trying to keep his caucus unified, downplayed the likelihood that Progressives would cause a shutdown, telling reporters, “We don’t think we’re going to get to that” (Bolton, December 6, 2017). As another Democratic senator said, “The Democratic leaders who are negotiating aren’t talking about shutdown” (Bolton, December 7, 2017). Nancy Pelosi, the House Democratic Leader, was also in a delicate position as her caucus pressed her to take a firm line. Showing how she was being torn in different directions, Pelosi told reporters that, “Democrats are not willing to shut the government down.” Yet, she also maintained, “We will not leave here without a DACA fix” (Alcindor and Kaplan, December 8, 2017). The far-left would continue to hold back their support despite the leadership’s belief that they were willing to deal. The tightrope that the Democratic leadership had to walk was also influenced by the actions of a group of Progressive senators who were angling to run for president in 2020. Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and others were adamant that they would not vote for any spending bill that did not include a permanent fix for DACA. They believed that taking a principled stand would not hurt Democrats in tough races because there was strong bipartisan support for DREAMers (Bolton and Parnes, January 17, 2018). Other Democrats were not so sure and urged the far-left to compromise and avoid a shutdown. Those Democrats facing a tough reelection in 2018, including Senators Jon Tester (D-MT), Joe Manchin (D-WV), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), Joe Donnelly (D-IN), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and others were in no mood to take chances. They warned their leadership not to draw a line in the sand over immigration. “We’ve got people running for president all trying to find their base, and then you’ve got people from Trump states that are trying to continue to legislate the way we always have—by negotiation,” said Senator McCaskill (Bolton and Parnes, January 17, 2018). The far-left resisted

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

211

these calls and continued its hard line, and, despite the wishes of the broader Democratic Party, eventually forced the government shutdown in an attempt to leverage the DACA debate. Progressives kept up their commitment to DACA even after they felt they had been betrayed by the Democratic leadership when it agreed to cut the 2017 government shutdown short. However, as time wore on, the resolve of the far-left appeared to be affected by decisions made in the federal courts. While Democrats and Republicans were fighting it out in Congress, supporters of DACA turned to the courts in hopes of finding another way to resurrect it. Several states and organizations sued the White House, saying that shutting down the program was arbitrary and done without following the proper legal procedures. In January 2018, while the fight in Congress was coming to a boil, a federal judge in California ruled that DACA could remain in place while legal challenges over the program were resolved in court. The judge, saying that the White House’s decision to kill DACA was improper, issued a nationwide injunction ordering the Trump administration to start the program up again. That February, a second federal judge in New York issued a nationwide injunction blocking the Trump administration from ending DACA. The judge’s ruling allowed existing DREAMers to re-apply for a new two-year extension but the administration did not have to accept new applications. While these decisions were seen as big wins for DACA and its supporters, others expressed concern that these legal efforts undermined the efforts in Congress for a more permanent deal (Sheer, January 9, 2018). By the spring of 2018, Progressives seemed to come to the conclusion that while they had the support of the courts, Republicans and President Trump still held advantages in the DACA legislation chess game. The President appeared to bait the far-left through his continued demands for an immigration bill that would include funding for a U.S.-Mexico border wall. Progressives seemed to lose faith in any short-term prospects for solution, believing their counterparts in the administration were disingenuous. There appeared to be limited prospects for any deal that would, at the same time, please immigration hawks and the far-right in the House and get 60 votes in the Senate. The result was stalemate. “Unfortunately, the DREAMers have become pawns in this whole process,” concluded Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ), the chair of the Progressive Caucus (Mascaro, February 9, 2018). While other legislative progress was achieved in 2018, the fate of DACA remained unresolved.

212 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Outcome DACA did not end on March 5, 2018, as President Trump had originally ordered. Instead, the status of the DREAMers remained in limbo as the issue wound its way through the court system. Some Progressives seemed quietly satisfied that the administration did not get its way immediately, but the challenge was far from resolved. Political haggling between members of Congress and President Trump in the year that followed went nowhere amid bitter recriminations. Meanwhile, court rulings on the question were equally unsatisfying to many. On April 24, 2018, for example, the Trump administration faced its biggest setback when a third federal judge for the District of Columbia ruled that the protections of DACA must stay in place and that the government must resume accepting new application. The judge said that the White House’s decision to terminate the program was based on the “virtually unexplained” grounds that the program was “unlawful” and gave the government 90 days to better explain its reasoning or the cancellation of the program would be rescinded. In May 2018, a federal judge in Texas heard arguments against DACA brought by Texas and eight other states seeking to declare the program illegal (Yee, August 9, 2018). The judge ruled in favor of DACA, comparing the idea of ending DACA to an attempt to “unscramble” an egg (Shear, August 31, 2018). We code this as a case of “successful” influence because Progressives and their allies in the Democratic Party (along with a few moderates in the Republican Party) were successful in defending DACA. They remained effective at blocking the passage of establishment legislation for an entire session of Congress, and they helped sustain the debate over legislation for the DREAMers into the 116th Congress. Indeed, the DACA debate continued in 2019. The Democrats took control of the House of Representatives for the first time in eight years, and Progressive lawmakers worked with their fellow lawmakers to advance new legislation on immigration. While the DACA program and its participants continued to live in a state of legal limbo, with cases wending their way through the court system, House Democrats nevertheless advanced new legislation. Several important developments occurred in June 2019. First, the Supreme Court denied the Trump administration’s request to fast-track a court decision on DACA. This meant that legal challenges would continue. Days later, the House passed a new version of the Dream Act (H.R. 2820). This bill drew support from seven Republicans, along with the Democratic majority. It

7  PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TRUMP ERA 

213

was designed to provide DREAMers a pathway to citizenship—a way to attain permanent lawful status if they meet certain requirements. The bill also created pathways for hundreds of thousands of individuals in the United States with Temporary Protected Status to gain permanent residency (Montoya-Galvez, June 5, 2019). However, Progressives knew that so long as Republicans controlled the Senate, there was little room for optimism that the legislation could pass. At this writing (July 2019), the political and legal struggle over DACA continues.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: The Battle Continues

Dogmatic ideological parties tend to splinter the political and social fabric of a nation. Parties with fixed ideological programs lead to governmental crises and deadlocks, and stymie the compromises so often necessary to preserve freedom and achieve progress. —Governor George Romney (R-MI) (1964) Let me tell you that the delight of political life is altogether in opposition. Why, it is freedom against slavery, fire against clay, movement against stagnation! —Joshua Monk, Phineas Finn (1867)

This study has explored the interests and strategies of factions within political parties, as well as their impact on the U.S. foreign policy decision-­ making process during the Obama and Trump administrations. Far from abnormalities or exceptions in the political sphere, the influence of minority factions was pervasive in the cases examined here. Lawmakers in the Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and the Progressive Caucus sought to influence the political agenda and shape U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, they played willful roles in the policy process, leaning in to engage with the administration and party leaders. Though the factions studied here represented very different ideological positions, they employed some of the same techniques in their efforts to bend the will of the establishment majority. In many cases, they were successful at blocking or delaying legislation, or achieving a “political victory” (Green 2019), and they were © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_8

215

216 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

sometimes able to advance their preferred solutions to foreign policy problems. Today’s active factions would likely have stunned early Western political philosophers and the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Hume’s warning in 1742 that “factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation” clearly influenced the framers. Many of them saw any organized political groupings of any kind, including parties or subdivisions thereof, as fostering division. James Madison warned against the “mischiefs of faction” in Federalist Paper No. 10 (1787). Factions would not represent the will of the people, they argued, instead they would be agents of dissent that seek to undermine the traditional order. Thus, Madison called on any “friend of popular government” to try to “provide a proper cure” for the factional condition, ideally while retaining respect for liberty and diversity (Madison 1787: 10; Cole 2018: 2). This negative framing took root in political culture, despite the reality that factions with ideological differences were also directing policy innovations and widening political tents. In the process, whether they acknowledged so or not, they were also enhancing the policy legitimacy of the state. Both parties and factions have persisted over time. In fact, Wallner (2017: 275) argues, “while legislative parties and intraparty caucuses are in competition with one another, this competition is not zero-sum…. Rather, intraparty caucuses serve as pressure valves.” Thus, factions have not only added color to the American political landscape and served as agents of change, they have also created opportunities for malleability in the system over time. The splintering of the Democratic-Republican Party in the 1820s into factions including the Jacksonian Republicans, Nationalist Republicans, and the Anti-Masonic Party helped pave the way for the emergence of the Whig Party. It also set in motion the creation of the Free Soil Party, which actively opposed the expansion of slavery into new Western territories. Developments in the twentieth century saw the rise and fall of the Progressive Republicans and Populist Democrats, along with other factions (DiSalvo 2010). The power of factions in modern politics calls into question some prevailing assumptions about how parties serve as custodians of the U.S. democratic system. Theories of party organizations tend to focus on how institutional structure promotes integration of diverse ideas and, in turn, how parties provide accountability and responsiveness to public demands (Aldrich 1995; Schattschneider 1942; Stokes 1999). James Sundquist

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

217

argued parties are “the indispensable instrument that [bring] cohesion and unity, and hence effectiveness, to the government as a whole by linking the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common interest”. Yet, more scholars have recognized that fundamental assumptions about party structures appear outmoded in a new era of politics. For instance, factions were to be expected when parties were more ideologically heterogeneous in the 1970s, but they have persisted despite the ideological homogenization of some aspects of parties today, especially the GOP (Wallner 2017). Moreover, Political scientist Julia Azari asserted that in the twenty-first century, U.S. party organizations are surprisingly weak, even if partisan voter identification remains strong. Through legal restrictions and campaign finance reforms, as well as the primary election process, the ability of parties to coordinate political action has been undermined (Issacharoff 2016: 41). The result is a political system characterized by “hollowed out institutions that are vulnerable to hostile takeover” (ibid.).

Factions Today Intraparty factions and congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs have stepped into this void to serve as important “engines for change” in the larger political process in the United States. This study shows they have been actively engaged in persuasion and nonconformity to try to shape domestic and foreign policy agendas. Indeed, the Republican and Democratic Parties have both experienced “hostile takeovers” in the 2010s. Minority segments of major parties have increasingly stepped out on their own, defying establishment leaders and focusing their energies on specialized issues or concerns. They have challenged traditional norms and demanded a larger say in the running of committees, agenda-setting, and financing. They have also placed demands on establishment and moderate factions within larger party organizations, sometimes putting party leaders on the defensive as they guard their political flanks. Factional influence on major party agendas in the 2010s has been punctuated by watershed elections and contentious policy processes. The arrival of the Tea Party wave in Congress in 2010, the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, and the rise of the Progressive Democrats in the 2018 midterms all reflect these trends at work. The Tea Party effectively blocked comprehensive immigration reform and tried to roll-back government programs like the Affordable Care Act for years. Donald Trump’s

218 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

fast rise to the Republican nomination in 2015–2016 was fueled, in part, by his willingness to tap into the populist pressures of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus and challenge the establishment.1 As president, Trump’s ability to drive the political agenda using social media and leveraging divisions within the GOP has made the traditional party apparatus seem increasingly outmoded and slow. The 2018 elections brought a new wave of change to Washington, highlighting factional divides in the Democratic Party. The new 116th Congress would be the most diverse in U.S. history, with record numbers of women lawmakers and greater diversity in terms of race and class. Progressive Democrats, and their 98 newly elected members, helped their party regain control of the House of Representatives, but they also arrived with their own agendas for domestic and foreign policy. They have tended to place greater emphasis on how global affairs impacts the United States at home, for example, economic issues, free trade, and alliances have all been viewed from the inside-out, as liberals recalculated policy priorities (Sitaraman, April 15, 2019). Elected officials like Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) have called for fundamental reforms, including proposals for “tuition-free” college and a “Medicare for all” health care system. Progressives also tried to exert their influence in the race for Speaker of the House in the winter of 2018–2019, and they demanded concessions from the establishment including seats on powerful committees and access to fundraising. Some Progressive leaders sought to change U.S. foreign policy positions on questions as disparate as immigration reform, military intervention in Syria, and the trade war with China. This study also shows how far-right and far-left factions have been engaged in both foreign policy innovation and obstruction over the past decade. For example, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus were highly active in debates about foreign policy solvency during the Obama administration (2009–2017), including through their opposition to comprehensive immigration reform and funding of trade credit agencies, including the Export-Import Bank. In the Trump era, conservatives with deeply held social values challenged family planning provisions in foreign aid legislation, while the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus challenged U.S. engagement in the Iran nuclear deal. They induced conflict with establishment 1  Presidential candidate Donald Trump, a fringe player in the Republican Party in 2015, also espoused dangerous nationalist rhetoric that bordered on racism and xenophobia.

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

219

majorities and sought to persuade others to reject programs they opposed. Meanwhile, Progressives in the Democratic Party opposed President Obama’s plan to conduct military strikes on Syria (along with many Republicans), and their opposition effectively helped bring down the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal. Progressives also strove to challenge the Trump administration’s approach to reform of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and related immigration legislation. Time and again, vocal groups employed strategies in a high-stakes battle over U.S. foreign policy to support outcomes more favorable to their own ideologies or priorities. They practiced nonconformity and sought pathways of influence through creative problem-solving and pursuit of alternative objectives (Rubin 2017). Conservatives on the far-right challenged funding for family planning programs in foreign assistance by threatening to bring down the federal budget process. Progressives on the far-left undermined broader support for free trade agreements. In these and other cases, minorities stood up to the establishment and brokered alternative outcomes that were more in line with their ideologies and policy preferences. And throughout these battles, factions have confronted the solvency debate in United States foreign policy, offering their own preferred solutions to important challenges. Finally, this study underscores that factions do not typically work “alone.” Instead, members on the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum have sought support for their initiatives from other groups inside government (such as the executive branch) as well as from civil society actors and interest groups to help them achieve policy success. This study even revealed instances in which there were opportunities for cooperation between the factions at the two ideological extremes. Tea Party and Progressive members of Congress both opposed a military strike in Syria in 2013, for example, as well as held reservations regarding free trade. As noted in Chap. 1, broad foundations for understanding an advocacy model of foreign policy entrepreneurship lay in studies of pluralism in American politics (Dahl 1961). Factions work with a variety of players in coalitions where they can find potential leverage for change. The Freedom Caucus benefitted from policy alignments with the Trump administration, for example. Progressives sought out supporters for their positions from civil society groups and sympathetic fellow lawmakers. Members of Congress stood alongside immigrants’ rights organizations during protest rallies against the Trump travel ban at airports in 2017, for example, just as

220 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

conservative lawmakers had joined with reality television stars to protest the Iran nuclear deal two years earlier. While these dynamics were not a central focus of this study, they suggest interesting avenues for further exploration.

Summary of Findings Evidence from this study helps us to identify alignments between factional orientations and outcomes. Case study data illustrate ways in which policy-­ makers have approached critical phases of policy development. In the process, these data also demonstrate the contours of strategies employed by factions in support for their causes. As illustrated in Table 8.1, these results suggest support for propositions regarding avenues of influence of minority factions. Evidence shows that factionalism can influence the ability of establishment positions in both parties to achieve their goals in terms of foreign policy outcomes (or non-outcomes). In seven of the eight case studies where factional agents employed strategies of influence, they appear to have been successful or partially successful in shaping foreign policy outcomes. The first proposition for this study focused on factionalism. We posited that the existence of cohesive and well-defined blocs with distinct views on policy could impact the timing and scope of legislation favored by the establishment. Evidence from the case studies demonstrated the power of the presence of factions, with Tea Party/Freedom Caucus and Progressive legislators directly impacting policy processes. Factions in these cases clearly represented distinct blocs with common ideologies that simply could not be ignored. However, in terms of their attributes, not all of the factions were alike. Both the Freedom Caucus and Progressives exhibited characteristics at the ideological extremes of their respective parties, and DW-NOMINATE scores show both factions to be more cohesive ideologically and in their willingness to challenge the establishment. Average DW-NOMINATE scores in these cases were regularly extreme—illustrating the ideological bend of groups like Progressives who opposed the missile strike against Syria in 2013 and the Freedom Caucus challenges to the Iran nuclear deal in the Obama administration. However, the Tea Party demonstrated less ideological distinctiveness and a lower level of anti-­ establishment fervor than the Freedom Caucus. In fact, the Tea Party case examined here is the only faction which exhibited less cohesiveness in our analysis of its members’ DW-NOMINATE scores.

Highly conservative, more cohesive: DW-­ NOMINATE 1 = 0.660 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.271

Highly conservative, less cohesive: DW-­ NOMINATE 1 = 0.554 DWNOMINATE 2 = 0.072

High

Strongly negative

Highly consistent

Successful

Factional attributes: Ideological cohesiveness

Legislative activism

Issue framing

Consistency of challenge

Outcome

Partially successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

High

Obama

Presidential Obama administrations

Case studies

Table 8.1 Findings

Successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

Medium

Highly liberal, more cohesive: DWNOMINATE 1 = −0.462 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.203

Obama

Partially successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

Medium

Highly liberal, more cohesive: DW-­ NOMINATE 1 = −0.477 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.211

Obama

Partially successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

High

Highly conservative, more cohesive: DW­NOMINATE 1 = 0.669 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.295

Trump

Unsuccessful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

Medium

Highly conservative, more cohesive: DW-­ NOMINATE 1 = 0.669 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.295

Trump

Partially successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

High

Highly liberal, more cohesive: DW-­ NOMINATE 1 = −0.467 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.178

Trump

Partially successful

Highly consistent

Strongly negative

High

Highly liberal, more cohesive: DWNOMINATE 1 = −0.468 DWNOMINATE 2 = −0.175

Trump

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

221

222 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Factions were present and active in debates in all of the issue areas in this study, from “high politics” questions such as whether to conduct a military strike on an adversary to seemingly quieter issues such as support for the Export-Import Bank or reproductive health care policies. The Tea Party represented a strident group of conservatives who were committed to obstruction on initiatives including comprehensive immigration reform. Michele Bachman, Steve King, and other leaders of the movement employed a range of strategies to block changes that were championed by the Obama administration, Democrats, and even some moderate Republicans. Similarly, Progressives challenged policy initiatives during both the Obama and Trump administrations, and at this writing (July 2019), it appears that left-liberal activist members of the CPC are prepared to go to extremes to fight the Trump agenda. The Freedom Caucus represented another active faction in contemporary politics, and its members have been committed to coordination of their policy initiatives. Their highly cohesive approach, which is included in their by-laws, to both opposition and policy innovations has yielded results. The second proposition in this study examined legislative activism, primarily focusing on traditional routes of influence. As illustrated in Table 8.1, factions implemented mixed levels of engagement on legislative challenges. These patterns actually reflect acknowledgment of the separation of powers, with members of Congress less directly engaged in legislative activism on issues where the executive had more exclusive authority. For example, in two of the four cases of engagement by the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus, members employed a high degree of direct and indirect legislative activism. They introduced bills and sought to amend other legislation to address their concerns in the case of blocking comprehensive immigration reform in 2013 and opposing funding for family planning in foreign aid during the Trump administration. They induced conflict and sought to advance alternative agendas. But in the other two cases, Freedom Caucus members pursued only amendments designed to block legislation supported by a larger number of lawmakers. They offered “killer” amendments to try to deconstruct the Export-Import Bank during the Obama administration, and they forced language into legislation in a failed attempt to block the Iran nuclear deal. Broadly speaking, Progressives appeared equally likely to pursue direct and indirect challenges. In the case of the Trump travel bans in 2017 and the DACA challenge, for example, Progressives pursued both their own legislation and amendments to Republican-sponsored bills to try to

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

223

achieve their goals. However, Progressive opposition to Obama administration policies—including the Syria military strike in 2013 and Trade Promotion Authority/Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPA/TPP) in 2015— focused less on legislation than issue framing and lobbying. Perhaps unsurprisingly, members of factions who opposed White House initiatives appeared to be more active on issues that clearly required legislation and regularized congressional oversight, and they were somewhat less active on traditional “high politics” issues that were often ascribed to the commander-in-chief. The third proposition of the study focused on minority issue framing and problem definition. Consistent with social psychological theories of minority influence, this study shows that factions were much more fully engaged in indirect, non-legislative strategies to try to shift establishment views. Drawing on the literature, we posited that conflict with the establishment by challenging the majority position could impact foreign policy decisions. All eight case studies show that members of factions were quite active in issue framing. Factional leaders regularly attempted to redefine the frames of problems and prevent or delay majority progress on legislation. In the Syria case, for example, Progressive opponents of White House plans for a military strike against the Assad regime in 2013 were able to successfully characterize the issue as the equivalent of the misguided invasion of Iraq a decade earlier, and they highlighted problematic aspects of the case such as the violation of some norms (sovereignty and indiscriminate use of force) to protect others (such as the norm against chemical weapons). Progressives in this and other cases warned that ceding authority to the executive was a very slippery slope. Progressives kept up these framing challenges in their attacks on the travel ban and DACA protections, arguing that the Republican Party was choosing a cold and confrontational path that violated legal processes for immigration, including the right of refugees to apply for political asylum. Progressives were equally confrontational in the TPA debate, arguing that executive overreach by the Obama administration would create a program that would cost American jobs. In all case studies, factions appear to have been successful at persuasion, influencing foreign policy and shaping the procedures by which these issues were addressed. Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members also actively employed issue framing, characterizing establishment initiatives in strongly negative terms. For example, in the case of comprehensive immigration reform, Tea Party and Freedom Caucus challengers launched attacks against the

224 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

administration claiming that it was trying to provide “amnesty” for undocumented workers and that it preferred an “open borders” arrangement with Mexico. The Freedom Caucus worked hard to try to characterize the Export-Import Bank as a “big government” program that provided unnecessary protections and subsidies. They were equally disdainful of federal funding of family planning programs through foreign assistance, challenging the morality of such programs and asserting that the government was effectively helping to subsidize abortion around the world. President Trump and the Freedom Caucus also attacked the Iran nuclear deal. Caucus leader Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC) said, “From its very inception, the Iran Deal was nothing short of a foreign policy debacle.” He joined dozens of other far-right conservatives in arguing that the agreement had made the United States less safe and secure (qtd. in “WTAS: Support for President Donald J. Trump’s Decision to End United States’ Participation in the Iran Deal,” May 9, 2018). The fourth proposition in the study helped to flesh out the tools employed by minority actors by looking for consistency of positions. All eight cases demonstrated that factions were highly consistent in working to oppose establishment positions. While sometimes less active in terms of legislative challenges, they were highly and actively engaged in negative issue framing and presenting consistent stands. Conservative opposition leaders regularly opposed comprehensive immigration reform, for example, and used (and threatened to use) all means at their disposal to block changes. The Syria case also illustrated strong resolve on the part of the opposition to concerted action—enabled when President Obama made a surprise decision to give Congress a say in the intervention decision. In the showdowns over the Trump travel bans and DACA, Progressives were very vocal and consistent in their messages. Protests at major airports and debates on the airwaves demonstrated clear denunciations of the new president’s agenda. Meanwhile, at the other ends of the ideological spectrum, Freedom Caucus members were equally vocal in denouncing federal funding for family planning and the legitimacy of the Iran nuclear deal. These represented profound challenges to foreign policy development. Assessing Impact: How Powerful Are Factions? Factions employed a mix of techniques to attempt to change the political agenda and shape the course of the policy process. Their overall record of “success” is impressive, though it includes mixed outcomes. As illustrated

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

225

in Table 8.1, factions successfully, fully blocked legislative progress in two of the cases in this study, Tea Party opposition to comprehensive immigration reform and Progressive resistance to Obama administration plans for a military strike in Syria in 2013. In four additional cases, factions were partially successful in blocking policy changes: Freedom Caucus challenges to funding for the Export-Import Bank; Progressive opposition to TPA/ TPP; Freedom Caucus challenges to family planning funding; and the Progressive defense of DACA. In the two remaining cases, where the Freedom Caucus tried to block the Iran nuclear deal and Progressives attempted to end Trump’s travel bans, the factions failed to achieve their objectives. The pattern of evidence suggests that in cases of successful influence (Tea Party-Immigration Reform and Progressives-Syria Policy), factions were generally ideologically cohesive, employed strong negative issue framing, and were highly consistent in their activism. The level of employment of direct legislative challenges varied, though, with one case of high legislative activism and one case of medium. This suggests that high degrees of direct legislative activism (e.g., alternative bill sponsorship) are not necessary conditions to facilitate factional influence. Looking across the four cases of partial success (Freedom Caucus-Export-Import Bank, Progressives-TPA/TPP, Freedom Caucus-Family Planning, and Progressives-DACA Defense), there again appears to be a mix of employment of direct legislative challenges. In two of the cases, lawmakers tried to oppose the establishment or offer amendments to existing legislation; in the other two, factional lawmakers employed higher degrees of legislative challenge. This once again underscores that direct legislative challenges may be useful, but not necessary, to achieve objectives. The two remaining cases of failure again demonstrate variance on legislative activism measures. The effectiveness of factions seems to reflect the patterns predicted by theories of social psychology. Factions have been willing to stand up for issues that they believe are important. They have induced conflict and advanced alternative positions. For example, Progressives have challenged the veracity and the morality of the Trump travel ban and DACA limitations. At the same time, Tea Party and Freedom Caucus lawmakers contested comprehensive immigration reform proposals and sought to limit federal funding for reproductive health care rights. Factions have cited fiscal, legal, moral, ethical, religious, and political foundations for their positions, and they have not shied away from confrontation. Opponents

226 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

on both ends of the ideological spectrum have taken on administration and establishment positions and demonstrated their effectiveness in shaping the political agenda. In summary, a structured, focused comparison of case studies suggests interesting patterns of relationships between instruments and outcomes. The evidence shows that the most successful factions are those that employ a range of instruments. They must be ideologically cohesive as a bloc, promoting affiliation and communication among their members. They are more effective if they are active in the legislative process, though they need not sponsor alternative bills to achieve their objectives. They often employ strong negative issue framing, challenging establishment initiatives as wrong-headed and even dangerous for American national security. And they are often quite persistent—providing doggedly determined stands on issues that are controversial in nature. The voices of factions should be loud, clear, and consistent in their opposition to establishment presence. By playing the long game, it seems, even minority voices that are deeply committed to their causes can help sway the policy process.

Theoretical Implications This project demonstrates how factions are increasingly engaged in today’s foreign policy processes and employ similar strategies to help steer debates within their parties. They employ direct and indirect tools such as issue framing and consistency of minority influence in presentation of opposing views. Whereas conventional wisdom assumes that divisions between and within parties may lead to legislative gridlock, this study has shown that factions can shift their weight to shape the policy process in both the short and long term. These results suggest important implications for theories of minority influence. Broadly speaking, the study reinforces arguments that foreign policy is shaped by a variety of forces. Factional leaders appear to play especially important roles in influencing foreign policy, and coalition-­ building was demonstrated as essential to build support for implementation and monitoring of policy goals. This study clearly has underscored the need to fill a gap in the literature on factionalism and U.S. foreign policy, both historically and in the present context. It reinforces the observation by Bell and Shaw that, “Modern political theory has not caught up with the fragmented nature of political parties…Party actions cannot be understood if these internal conflicts are ignored and the nature of i­ nternal

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

227

alliances and coalitions has to be understood to make any sense of party behavior” (1994: 1). Further study can help deepen our understanding of increasingly complex and growing partisan foreign policy-making processes (Rubin 2017). Evidence from the case studies in this project also strongly support examinations of the impact of majority-minority differences on political processes in the social psychology literature. This study successfully challenges the traditional “conformity thesis” in social psychology, which holds that dissident voices in groups tend to yield to the majority position (Maass and Clark 1984; Milgram 1963). It shows that minority groups may employ innovation, “deviance,” or nonconformity to persuade others to endorse alternative decisions (Moscovici and Nemeth 1974). Case evidence also confirms the arguments in the literature that factions are more effective in producing attitude changes if their alternative voices are consistent, have enough time to present their position, and argue in a firm but flexible manner to demonstrate “an illusion of immobility” (Mugny and Pérez 1991: 3). Minority views may also gain traction in policy development through persuasion to promote policy alternatives or innovation. In many ways, studies of minority influence through challenge, deviance, and nonconformity seem especially well suited to inform the broader struggle underway in the U.S. foreign policy process today. Insurgent challenges to foreign policy development are often informed by these approaches, learning both the theoretical perspectives and experiences from implementation. For example, this study clearly showed that one of the most important tools for minority influence was issue framing. Factions often employed issue framing and problem definition in order to oppose or challenge the establishment party’s majority position, ideal, or norm (Lantis 2016; Beasley 1998). This refers broadly to a process of recalculating values and commitments attached to what normally would be a traditional interpretation of policy meanings.2 Attempts to frame issues in these cases included the use of metaphors or symbols. Entman’s assertion that “elites wage a war of frames” certainly rings true when surveying the case studies for this project (1993: 58). Time and again, “adamant” minorities who refused to compromise were successful in shaping policies (Moscovici 1980, 1985). 2  This contestation process may be the most transparent in democratic states, where accountability and power-sharing necessitates the open and constructive exchange of ideas among leaders.

228 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

In addition, this study offers more focused insights on prevailing models of minority influence. For example, counter to Moscovici et al., minority factions do not always follow a two-step approach involving the inducement of conflict with the majority by challenging the majority ideal or norm and providing a consistent alternative perspective (Tanford and Penrod 1984; Moscovici and Personnaz 1980; Moscovici 1985). The case evidence from this study shows that factional leaders often issue challenges before, during, and after considerations of alternatives in policy processes. They may communicate with their fellow caucus members and consider whether or not to advance direct legislative challenges like alternative bills or indirect legislative challenges through amendments, as well as work to frame establishment policies in a negative light. Moscovici’s model thus represents a simplification of what is often a complex and nuanced process. Nevertheless, by whichever means they choose, factions have shown to be critical “engines of change” (DiSalvo 2012), in that they provide steady counter-narratives that can also be the seeds of policy innovation. Time and again in this study, we see that factional advancement of new initiatives helps shape the policy debate. Outspoken minority leaders help “stimulate a greater consideration of other alternatives, ones that were not proposed but would not have been considered without the influence of the minority” (Nemeth 1986: 25). Freedom Caucus positions on family planning in foreign assistance legislation posed obstacles to the development of policy that establishment politicians had not regarded as significant, while Progressive challenges to the travel ban pushed the issue of inclusivity and fairness. De Vries and De Dreu described this process of innovation as follows: In trying to understand what the minority apparently understands, the cognitive conflict is brought about and the group member, in trying to comprehend the deviant position, validates it….The process of reconsidering one’s own point of view, and the thoughtful consideration of alternative views, results in changing the (cognitive) basis of the original opinion: ‘real’ change, not contingent upon the power of the group and its presence, but based on new ideas and cognitions. This ‘real’ influence will be indirect rather than direct. (De Vries and De Dreu 2001: 3)

This study also highlights the degree to which factions can be successful obstructionists in the policy process. This approach helps to round out the majority of scholarship on congressional entrepreneurship, which favors innovation over obstruction. For example, Carter and Scott’s theory of

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

229

congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship (2009) focused on entrepreneurs as “legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas” (Carter et al. 2004: 280; Kernell 1997; Sinclair 1997). Wawro’s (2010: 4) theory of legislative entrepreneurship characterized them as an individual “who coordinates the actions and resources of other individuals so that they can realize gains that would not be possible without such coordination.” Their goal is expressly passing legislation: “Legislative entrepreneurship clearly helps members accomplish the goal of enacting their conception of good public policy” (2010: 15). Our approach accepts many of the assumptions about entrepreneurship in the literature but recognizes that this form of policy engagement is toward a different end. Members of factions can be savvy and aspire to be policy leaders (Carter and Scott 2009: 25). They are “sufficiently dissatisfied with the administration’s existing policy (or lack of a policy) to push for their own initiatives” (Carter and Scott 2009: 19). They also have unique perspectives that they may engage in policy deliberations (Marsh and Lantis 2016). However, their goals in this study were quite different from initiation and implementation. This book highlights ways that factions sought to block administration initiatives through persuasion and persistence. They employed similar skills as legislative entrepreneurs, but their goals were often the prevention of administration or establishment initiatives from implementation or development. Factions represented what DiSalvo called “engines of change,” but these alterations or changes were directed toward very different ends. Finally, lessons for factions themselves might be derived from this study. For example, while issue redefinition and consistency appear to empower minority actors, Tea Party and Freedom Caucus members sometimes have failed to offer constructive alternatives to major policy initiatives put forward by the Obama administration and Democrat leaders. And when factions stand up to authority, such as in recent challenges by the Freedom Caucus to the Trump administration, there is a political price to pay. These dynamics perpetuate an image of factions as disruptors rather than strategic or constructive actors. In sum, through further study, it may be possible to both construct more sophisticated models of how multidimensional ideological divisions impact foreign policy and draw practical lessons for greater effectiveness in the political process. In sum, social psychology may offer another valuable window for exploring how congressional factions can shape foreign policies through opposition and resistance. This is especially the case because factions usually do not have the numbers or votes to make direct legislative policy.

230 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Conclusions This study shows just how prominent and influential factions can be in the modern political process. The period from 2015 to 2019 (at this writing) saw an especially dramatic swell of support for factions at both ends of the ideological spectrum. For example, Progressives in the Democratic Party launched a formidable challenge to the presidential nomination bid by establishment leader Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. The fallout from Clinton’s loss, coupled with the dramatic Trump agenda in domestic and foreign policies, served to energize the liberal left. In the lead-up to the 2018 midterm elections, many voters were disaffected with traditional Democratic politics and seemed to shift their support to Progressive voices. The 2018 midterms led to the largest gain by Progressives in modern history, as scores of new members prepared to take over the majority in the House in 2019. Those members brought with them many diverse opinions about foreign policy priorities, free trade, and immigration reform that were destined to foster intense debates in Washington, DC, and beyond. Meanwhile, Freedom Caucus lawmakers also showed that they had internalized valuable lessons about minority influence. By 2018, several dozen conservative members of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives had secured valuable ideological real estate on the right and essentially refused to budge on key issues. Their voices were further magnified by the fact that they found themselves frequently in line with the views of President Donald Trump. The power of the caucus was on full display when House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) announced that he would not seek reelection and would retire at the end of the 116th Congress. Debates rose immediately regarding who would be Ryan’s successor as Minority Leader of the House Republicans, and Freedom Caucus members voiced strong reservations about establishment traditions. Their populist rhetoric and ideological opposition to mainstream initiatives offered them significant leverage when operating as a voting bloc. They parlayed this into influence on issues such as the government shutdown of the winter of 2018–2019 and also served as a narrow base to back President Trump’s announced pullout from Syria in December 2018. Avenues for Further Investigation This study identifies additional interesting questions and avenues for exploration in future research. For example, what are the most productive and “efficient” ways for minority factions to oppose the establishment? Is

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

231

obstruction by factions in itself sufficient to demonstrate influence in the foreign policy process? Or should factions also demonstrate that they, too, can offer persuasive foreign policy alternatives? This seems especially timely given debates about foreign policy solvency in the twenty-first century. For example, columnist Uri Friedman wondered aloud early in the Trump presidency whether liberals had an answer to his agenda on foreign policy (March 15, 2017). Trump and other far-right Republicans were all too willing to open big debates on issues ranging from immigration to trade to terrorism, but Democrats like Chris Murphy (D-CT) warned that Progressives were basically “adrift on foreign policy.” He charged that the modern Progressive movement lacked a clear alternative to the conservative agenda. The only way to improve the situation, Murphy said, was for Democrats to “get their act together” before the 2020 presidential campaign. This would require a clear vision, as well as some measure of liberal consensus regarding the highest priorities for the political agenda. These could prove to be elusive. Another critical question after the 2018 midterm elections was how Progressives could convert their momentum from the polls into a functioning political agenda with clear priorities. Here, there are lessons to be gained from comparative analyses of factional influence, as well as necessary adjustments to adapt the movement to the legislative process. As one observer opined, It is, all things considered, a pretty good time to be a Progressive in the Democratic Party. Progressive ideas about inequality, health care and corporate power have taken hold in the ideological mainstream, and after a decisive midterm election, at least 36 fresh Democrats will arrive in Washington—at least 22 of them new members of what will be the most expansive Congressional Progressive Caucus in history….But there’s more to exercising power in American politics than winning elections….In the past, progressive lawmakers have ceded battles over some of the most powerful committees in Congress to more conservative Democrats. This time around, according to Lawson and other activists roaming the halls of Capitol Hill in the days since the Nov. 6 election, Progressives are getting more serious about the mechanics of power. (Zach Carter, November 15, 2018)

This process of adaptation and adjustment of newly empowered factions to the institutions and levers of power in Congress is instructive in itself. Further longitudinal, comparative analyses of how groups like the Gingrich Republicans in 1994, or the Tea Party in 2010, or the Progressives in

232 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

2018 took office and began to push their factional agendas should yield very interesting insights about the processes and mechanisms at work. The activities of lawmakers who identified foreign policy priorities during their campaigns, and then adopted diverse strategies of influence once in office, may be illustrative of broader patterns. In theory, these comparisons should function effectively across the political spectrum, regardless of ideology, and provide lessons for scholarship. A third avenue for further investigation is what combinations of strategies employed by minority factions could be most effective in achieving foreign policy influence. That is, this study has revealed steady patterns of engagement of negative issue framing coupled with highly consistent challenges. Legislative activism appears less directly correlated with successful foreign policy influence. Moscovici’s articulation of the process of minority influence as a two-step engagement suggests that groups need only state their opposition and remain firm that they will not accept alternatives to gain influence. But this study shows that factions that are more nimble and adept at engagement of a variety of strategies appear more influential over the long term. Factions need to be willing to remain committed to issues and to play the long game to drive foreign policy in their desired directions. However, one of the ironies revealed in these case studies, though, is that even factions that are more short-lived may be highly focused on innovation or obstruction—and can be effective in shaping the political agenda. Here, factors like intensity of opposition or willingness to engage with the media may play interesting roles as intervening variables. Tea Party opposition to comprehensive immigration reform was extremely intense from 2013 to 2015, for example, and this created enough momentum and populist opposition to prevent what appeared to be a promising grand compromise among establishment Democrats and Republicans. Progressive challenges to the Trump travel bans were equally as intense in 2017, and protests demonstrated the power of groups to effect the political process. In this case, however, the issue that catalyzed major political challenges shifted to the courts, where the White House eventually gained the upper hand through rulings. A fourth area for further refinement in the literature relates to the measurement of factionalism itself and whether factionalism and divisions are on the rise in the parties. As noted in Chap. 1, scholars have adopted a range of different approaches to this question. Some studies look at actors and conditions that can foster factionalism, viewing it as a dependent vari-

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

233

able (Zariski 1960; Epstein 1980). Other valuable approaches focus on aggregate measures of party unity (Cox and McCubbins 2005) such as the power of majorities in gatekeeping proposals. Party unity scores provide insights, though there are additional potential lenses for studying divisions such as measurements of party cohesion and discipline (Carey 2009; Hazan 2006). Other approaches focus more directly on ideological differences, including analyses of how specific groups shape the broader political discourse (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Mudde 2007, 2013; Chryssogelos 2010). We found that the study of factionalism could also be complicated by a scholarly preoccupation with polarization—and by the confounding relationship between polarization and policy entrepreneurship. Scholars continue to debate the effects of polarization and fragmentation on foreign policy development (Sin 2015; Carter and Scott 2017; Theriault 2008; Bond and Fleisher 2000). Some maintain that polarization hinders the ability of entrepreneurs and innovators, even the president, to secure their preferred policy outcomes (Binder 2003; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). Green (2019) adds another layer to this debate by asserting that a combination of divided government and polarization and partisanship may be the most powerful explanation for factional influence. In divided government, moderates in both parties attempt to pass compromise legislation to avoid presidential vetoes or Senate filibusters, upsetting members on the ideological fringes of the parties. Meanwhile, other works (Lantis 2019; Jeong and Quirk 2019) maintain that polarization may not prohibit foreign policy entrepreneurship. This study adopts a two-tier analysis of factions: We examine both the ideological differentiations between members of factions and their moderate counterparts, as well as the ideological cohesiveness of the factions themselves. This offers added dimensionality to the study that helps us gauge to what degree the fissures in party organizations represent profound differences in orientation and outlook. This spirit of our approach is more akin to studies by Koger et  al. (2010), Dewan and Squintani (2016), and Rubin (2017). Indeed, Rubin’s work on intraparty organizations advances our understanding of factions as representative of deeper cleavages that have become manifest within the parties. Finally, this study also reveals interesting patterns for further investigation related to interparty factional coalitions, or “strange bedfellows” coalitions. Our cases illustrated intraparty conflicts between factions and establishment wings of the major parties and their impact on foreign pol-

234 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

icy, but we did not fully explore instances where party factions sought close alignments with two other groups of actors in attempts to shape the policy process: factional-administration alignments and faction-faction alignments. Factions have, in select circumstances, found allies for their cause in the White House, and the rich relationship between the Freedom Caucus and President Trump suggests potential value in additional explication and study of these ties. For example, reports showed that President Trump sometimes talked with the co-leader of the Freedom Caucus, Representative Mark Meadows, more often in 2018 than he did with the Speaker of the House Paul Ryan or with senior aides at the White House. In fact, Meadows and Trump spoke as much as an hour per day on the phone, vaulting the Freedom Caucus into the inner circle of Trump’s kitchen cabinet (in company with media figures Sean Hannity and Rush Limbaugh). According to Orr, the “result is that a three-term congressman little known outside the Beltway has earned an outsized influence on shaping the direction of the Trump administration and the country…on any number of topics, from immigration and border security to criminal justice and international affairs”. While we did not set out to identify issues where members on the far-­ left or far-right of the political spectrum might find common ground, these nevertheless emerged in the study. Tea Party and Freedom Caucus Republicans have joined with Progressives to challenge military intervention in Syria and free trade agreements, for example, and questions of civil liberties and the war on terror have created further synergy. To some degree, intraparty foreign policy heterogeneity may represent an under-­ examined aspect of executive-legislative interbranch foreign policy conflict. Both the right and left flanks of the major parties have been emboldened to challenge leadership—and they sometimes see potential allies as they look far across the political aisle. In conclusion, we argue that factionalism has become increasingly salient in U.S. politics and deserves greater attention in the political science scholarship. Traditional assumptions about institutions—for example, that a strong U.S. presidential system fosters a measure of loyalty within the two major parties, or that national party organizations strive every day to reinforce a unity of purpose on both ideological and utilitarian grounds—seem outmoded. Factions are alive and well, and they are serving as important innovators and obstructionists in the political ­process. Their fingerprints are on major pieces of legislation related to domestic

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

235

and foreign policy. And in other cases where factions actively influence decision-making, their pressures can result in non-events (i.e., no legislation comes up for a roll-call vote in Congress to mark these episodes). It is high time for us to overcome traditional characterizations of party dissension and factionalism as “a frightful despotism” (George Washington) and to recognize the power of innovation and change that factional voices represent in today’s politics. No group in this dynamic system should be characterized as “too small to win.”

Bibliography Aldrich, J.  H. (1995). Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Beasley, R. (1998). Collective Interpretations: How Problem Representations Aggregate in Foreign Policy Groups. In D. Sylvan & J. Voss (Eds.), Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bell, D.  S., & Shaw, E. (1994). Introduction. In D.  S. Bell & E.  Shaw (Eds.), Conflict in Western European Social Democratic Parties (pp.  1–9). London: Pinter. Binder, S. A. (2003). Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Bond, J.  R., & Fleisher, R. (Eds.). (2000). Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in the Partisan Era. Washington, DC: CQ Press College. Carey, J. M. (2009). Competing Principles, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 1. Carter, Z. (2018, November 15). These House Committees Could Make or Break a Progressive Agenda. Huffington Post. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/house-committees-incoming-progressive-democrats_us_5bee096 4e4b0510a1f2f25ee Carter, R. G., & Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. Durham: Duke University Press. Carter, R.  G., & Scott, J.  M. (2017). Choosing to Lead in a Shrinking Space: Partisanship, Polarization, and Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Carter, R. G., Scott, J. M., & Rowling, C. (2004). Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in Post-World War II U.S.  Foreign Policy. International Studies Perspectives, 5(3), 280. Chryssogelos, A.  S. (2010). Undermining the West From Within: European Populists, the US and Russia. European View, 2, 267–277.

236 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Cole, B. R. (2018). Democratization and the Mischief of Faction. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005). Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dahl, R. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press. De Vries, N.  K., & De Dreu, C.  K. (2001). Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation. London: Blackwell Publishing. Dewan, T., & Squintani, F. (2016). In Defense of Factions. American Journal of Political Science, 4, 860–881. DiSalvo, D. (2010). The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal-Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948–1972. The Journal of Policy History, 22(3), 269–299. DiSalvo, D. (2012). Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-­ 2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication, 4, 51–58. Epstein, L. (1980). What Happened to the British Party Model? American Science Review, 74, 9–22. Green, M.  N. (2019). Legislative Hardball: The House Freedom Caucus and the Power of Threat-Making in Congress (Elements in American Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hazan, R. Y. (2006). Israel’s ‘Big Bang’: The Parliamentary Elections of 2006. Representations, 42(3), 243–252. Issacharoff, S. (2016). Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our Hollowed Out Political Parties. Houston Law Review, 54:4, NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper, 16–52. Available as SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2888064 Jeong, G.-H., & Quirk, P. (2019). Division at the Water’s Edge: The Polarization of Foreign Policy. American Politics Research, 47(1), 58–87. Kernell, S. (1997). Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Koger, G., Masket, S., & Noel, H. (2010). Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics. American Politics Research, 38(1), 33–53. Kupchan, C. A., & Trubowitz, P. L. (2007). Grand Strategy for a Divided America. Foreign Affairs, 4, 71–83. Lantis, J.  S. (2016). Arms and Influence: US Technology Innovations and the Evolution of International Security Norms. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lantis, J.  S. (2019). Foreign Policy Advocacy and Entrepreneurship: How a New Generation in Congress Is Shaping U.S. Engagement with the World. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

8  CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE CONTINUES 

237

Maass, A., & Clark, R. D. (1984). Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Years of Minority Influence Research. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 428–453. Madison, J. (1787). Federalist Paper No.10: The Same Subject Continued: The Unions as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. New York Daily Advertiser. Marsh, K., & Lantis, J.  S. (2016). Are All Foreign Policy Innovators Created Equal? The New Generation of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12(2), 116–141. Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(4), 371. Moscovici, S. (1980). Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 13, pp.  209–239). New York: Academic Press. Moscovici, S. (1985). The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moscovici, S., & Nemeth, C. (1974). Social Influence II: Minority Influence. In C.  Nemeth (Ed.), Social Psychology: Classic and Contemporary Integrations. Chicago: Rand McNally. Moscovici, S., & Personnaz, A. B. (1980). Studies in Social Influence V: Minority Influence and Conversion Behavior in a Perceptual Task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16(3), 270–282. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2013). Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What? European Journal of Political Research, 1, 1–19. Mugny, G., & Pérez, J.  A. (1991). The Social Psychology of Minority Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nemeth, C. J. (1986). The Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence. Psychological Review, 93, 23–32. Rubin, R.  B. (2017). Building the Bloc: Intraparty Organization in the U.S. Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party Government. London: Transaction Publishers. Sin, G. (2015). Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Sinclair, B. (1997). Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Sitaraman, G. (2019, April 15). The Emergence of Progressive Foreign Policy. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-emergenceof-progressive-foreign-policy/ Stokes, S. C. (1999). Political Parties and Democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 243–267.

238 

P. HOMAN AND J. S. LANTIS

Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1984). Social Influence Model: A Formal Integration of Research on Majority and Minority Influence Processes. Psychology Bulletin, 95(2), 189–225. Theriault, S. M. (2008). Party Polarization in Congress. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2015). The Impact of Populist Radical Parties on Foreign Policy: The Northern League as a Junior Coalition Partner in the Berlusconi Governments. European Political Science Review, 4, 525–546. Wallner, J. (2017). Intraparty Caucus Formation in the U.S. Congress. In J. R. Straus & M.  E. Glassman (Eds.), Party and Procedure in the United States Congress (2nd ed., pp. 261–278). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Wawro, G. (2010). Legislative Entrepreneurship in the US House of Representatives. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. WTAS: Support for President Donald J. Trump’s Decision to End United States Participation in the Iran Deal. (2018, May 9). Retrieved from https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/wtas-support-president-donald-jtrumps-decision-end-united-states-participation-iran-deal/ Zariski, R. (1960). Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4(1), 27–51.

Bibliography

Abramowitz, A. (2011, September 1–4). Partisan Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement. Paper Prepared for Delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Seattle. Alcindor, Y. (2017, February 14). Liberal Activists Join Forces Against a Common Foe: Trump. The New York Times. Allen, D., Perlstein, R., & Schlotzman, D. (2016, May 5). Is the American Party System About to Crack Up? The Nation. Ashford, E., & Thrall, A. T. (2018, December 12). The Battle Inside the Political Parties for the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy. CATO Institute. Retrieved from https:// www.cato.org/publications/commentary/battle-inside-political-partiesfuture-us-foreign-policy Auerswald, D. P., & Campbell, C. C. (Eds.). (2012). Congress and the Politics of National Security. New York: Cambridge University Press. Author’s Interview. (2017, March 9). Confidential Interview with Jeffrey S. Lantis. Washington, DC. Beinart, P. (2018, December 2018). Will the Left Go Too Far? The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/ democratic-party-moves-left/573946/ Beinart, P. (2019, February 21). It’s Foreign Policy that Distinguishes Bernie This Time. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/foreign-policy-distinguishes-berniesanders-2020/583279/ Board, E. (2016, August 20). If Not the Trans-Pacific Partnership, then What? The Washington Post. Boles, C., & Lee, C. E. (2013, August 27). White House Aims to Make Case to War-Weary Public. The Wall Street Journal. © The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2

239

240 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Buchanan, J. M., & Roback, J. (2015). The Incidence and Effects of Public Debt in the Absence of Fiscal Illusion. Sage Journals, 15(1), 5–25. Budge, I., Ezrow, L., & McDonald, M. D. (2010). Ideology, Party Factionalism, and Party Change: An Integrated Dynamic Theory. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 781–804. Canes-Wrone, B., Howell, W. G., & Lewis, D. E. (2008). Executive Influence in Foreign Versus Domestic Policy Making: Toward A Broader Understanding of Presidential Power. Journal of Politics, 1, 1–16. Carney, J. (2017c, September 6). Sanders: Ending DACA ‘Cruelest’ Presidential Act in Modern History. The Hill. Carney, J. (2017d, December 5). Schumer Downplays Shutdown Chances over DACA Fight. The Hill. Carney, J., & Needham, V. (2015, August 4). Export-Import Fight Shifts to McConnell. The Hill. Carroll, R., et  al. (2015, September 17). DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. Retrieved from https://legacy.voteview.com/ dwnomin.htm Caucus Members. (2017). Congressional Progressive Caucus Website. https:// cpc-grijalva.house.gov/caucus-members/ CBS News. (2019, June 5). House Passes Latest DREAM Act. https://www. cbsnews.com/news/dream-and-promise-act-2019-passes-house-approvesbill-that-would-place-millions-of-immigrants-on-path-to-citizenship/ Dave Brat for Congress. (2014, June 15). VA-7 House Campaign Website. DaveBratForCongress.com. Davis, J. H. D., Stolberg, S. G., & Kaplan, T. (2018, January 11). Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging Words for Haiti and Africa. The New York Times. DeBonis, M., & Ho, C. (2015, June 29). Conservatives Claim Big Win on Export-­ Import Bank. But Will It Last? The Washington Post. Dickinson, T. (2018, June 25). Meet the Right-Wing Rebels Who Overthrew John Boehner. Rolling Stone. Retrieved from https://www. rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/meet-the-right-wing-rebelswho-overthrew-john-boehner-73320/ Dunn, S. (2010). Roosevelt’s Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Easley, J. (2018, January 13). Trump Allies See ‘s—hole’ Controversy as Overblown. The Hill. Executive Order Protesting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. (2017, January 27). The White House. French, L., & Sherman, J. (2015, July 28). House Conservative Seeks Boehner’s Ouster. Politico.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

241

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action. In R. G. Braungart & M. M. Braungart (Eds.), Research in Political Sociology (pp. 137–177). Greenwich: JAI Press. Gerring, J., & Cojocaru, L. (2016). Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods. Sociological Methods & Research, 3, 392–423. Gervais, B., & Morris, I. L. (2015a, December 4). Tea and Coffee: The Ideological Implications of the Tea Party Movement in the House of Representatives. Paper Presented at the American Politics Workshop. Gervais, B. T., & Morris, I. L. (2015b). Reading the Tea Leaves: Understanding Tea Party Caucus Membership in the US House of Representatives. PS: Political Science and Politics, 2, 245–250. Giannetti, D., & Benoit, K. (Eds.). (2008). Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments. Abingdon: Routledge. Global Health Legislative & Policy Requirements. (2018, December 10). USAID. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/crosscutting-areas/legislative-policy-requirements Grijalva, R.  M., Sellers, B.  T., Teachout, Z., Taylor, S., & Sheyman, I. (2016, November 11). We Were Dealt a Body Blow: Democratic Leaders on the Future of Their Party. The Guardian. Guida, V. (2015, October 26). Ex-Im Supporters Win First Round in House Showdown. Politico. Haar, R. N. (2017). Insurgency and American Foreign Policy: The Case of George McGovern. World Affairs, 180(2), 32–61. Hamilton, A., Madison, J., & Jay, J. (1961). The Federalist Papers (Vol. 10). New York: Mentor Books. Himelfarb, J. (2015, March 20). Lawmakers on Both Sides Push to Cut Funding for Iran Nuclear Deal. https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/pete-roskamlee-zeldin-obama-iran/2015/03/20/id/631644/ House Republicans Block Lofgren Effort to Rescind Trump’s Muslim Travel and Refugee Ban. (2017, January 30). United States Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren Representing California’s 19th District. Retrieved from https://lofgren.house. gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398131 Hudson, J. (2010, October 10). The Conservative Case Against the DREAM Act. The New York Times. Hume, D. (1742). Essays Moral, Political, Literary [1777]. E.  F. Miller (Ed.). Retrieved from https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-essaysmoral-political-literary-lf-ed Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on U.S. Interests and the Military Balance in the Middle East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 114th Cong. (2015). Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). Partisanship as Social Identity; Implications for the Study of Party Polarization. The Forum, 16(1), 23–45.

242 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kaarbo, J., & Beasley, R. K. (1998). A Political Perspective on Minority Influence and Strategic Group Composition. In M.  A. Neale, E.  A. Mannix, & D.  H. Gruenfeld (Eds.), Research on Groups and Teams (Vol. 1). Stamford: JAI Press. Kane, P. (2015, May 23). Senate Gives Obama a Victory on Trade. The Washington Post. Kurtzleben, D. (2016). The Most ‘Unprecedented’ Election Ever? 65 Ways It Has Been. NPR. July 3. http://www.npr.org/2016/07/03/484214413/ the-most-unprecedented-election-ever-65-ways-it-has-been Lewis, J. B., Poole, K., Rosenthal, H., Boche, A., Rudkin, A., & Sonnet, L. (2019). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/data Lissner, R.  F., & Rapp-Hooper, M. (2018). The Day After Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order. Washington Quarterly, 1, 7–25. Lizza, R. (2017, June 19). The War Inside the Republican Party. The New  Yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 2015/12/14/a-house-divided Marcos, C. (2017, October 31). Rep. Pramila Jayapal Takes Sexist Arrows and Fights Back. The Hill. Martin, J., & Burns, A. (2018, June 30). As Trump Consolidates Power, Democrats Confront a Rebellion in Their Ranks. The New  York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/midterm-elections-democraticparty.html Milbank, D. (2013, July 25). A Fruitless Attempt. The Washington Post. Nagourney, A. (2016, November 5). Don’t Gloat, Democrats. The New York Times. Neustadt, R. E. (1991). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press. Nilsen, E. (2018, February 13). Immigration Is Becoming a 2020 Litmus Test for Democrats. Vox. Retrieved from: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/13/16902454/daca-democrats-2020-immigration-shutdown Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Can’t Trust, Can We Verify? (2015). Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House, 114th Cong. Perez, E., & Diamond, J. (2017, January 31). Trump Fires Acting AG After She Declines to Defend Travel Ban. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn. com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigration-order-departmentof-justice/index.html Peterson, K. (2017, December 7). Congress Passes Two-Week Spending Bill to Avoid Government Shutdown. The Wall Street Journal. Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. (2017, September 24). The White House. https://www. whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-enhancingvetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-terrorists-public-safety-threats/

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

243

Progressive Caucus Co-Chairs Oppose Trade Promotion Authority Bill that Hurts Working Families. (2016, April 16). Congressional Progressive Caucus (Press Release). Retrieved from https://cpc-grijalva.house.gov/press-releases/ progressive-caucus-cochairs-oppose-trade-promotion-authority-bill-thathurts-working-families/ Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2012). American Grace How Religion Divides and Unites Us. New York: Simon & Schuster. Q&A: Human Rights Law and Access to Abortion. (2018, May 14). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/24/ qa-human-rights-law-and-access-abortion Rothfeder, J. (2017, June 19). Why Obama Is Still Trying to Pass the T.P.P. The New  Yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-obama-is-still-trying-to-pass-the-t-p-p Saletan, W. (2009, August 3). The Pro-Life Movement’s Contraception Problem. Slate. Retrieved from https://slate.com/technology/2009/08/the-pro-lifemovement-s-contraception-problem.html Schroeder, P. (2015, November 5). Banks Score Win as House Kills Fed Dividend Offset in Highway Bill. The Hill. Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) Treaty: State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Issues for Ministerial Guidance. (2015, July 29). WikiLeaks. Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/tpp-soe-minister/ Senate Floor. (2016, February 2). Senator Warren Urges Congress to Reject TPP Agreement (Press Release). Retrieved from https://www. warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-urgescongress-to-reject-tpp-agreement Senate Joint Resolution 21. (2013). Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to the Use of Chemical Weapons. 113th Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/ senate-joint-resolution/21 Sherman, J., & Palmer, A. (2019, April 5). How Trump Conspired with the Freedom Caucus to Shut Down the Government. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/05/jake-sherman-a... naid-trump-paul-ryan-mark-meadows-freedom-caucus-shutdown-226569 Soskin, B. (2017a, September 27). Rep. Roybal-Allard Speech on Effort to Bring Her Dream Act to House Floor. Office of Rep. Roybal-Allard (Press Release). Retrieved from https://roybal-allard.house.gov/news/documentsingle. aspx?DocumentID=398343 Soskin, B. (2017b, July 26). Reps. Roybal-Allard & Ros-Lehtinen Introduce DREAM Act of 2017. Office of Rep. Roybal-Allard (Press Release). Retrieved from https://roybal-allard.house.gov/news/documentsingle. aspx?DocumentID=398310

244 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stolberg, S. G. (2018, January 17). Senate Democrats Make Hard Turn Left in Warming Up for 2020 Race. The New York Times. Stonecash, J.  M., Brewer, M.  D., & Mariani, M.  D. (2003). Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization. New York: Routledge. Sundquist, J. L. (1983). Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. The Progressive Promise. https://cpc-grijalva.house.gov/the-progressivepromise/ Trubowitz, P. (2011). Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tucker, T. (2015, October 6). The TPP Has a Provision Many Will Love to Hate: ISDS. What Is It, and Why Does It Matter? The Washington Post. United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2016). World Investment Report 2016. UN (PDF file). Retrieved from https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf United States Congressman Jim Jordan. (2015, January 26). House Republicans form House Freedom Caucus (Press Release). Retrieved from https://jordan. house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397889 Valverde, M. (2017, September 15). Rep. Dave Brat Claims DACA Leads to Chain Migration of up to 4 Million. That’s False. PolitiFact. Wagner, J., & DeBonis, M. (2018, March 23). Trump Signs $1.3 Trillion Spending Bill Despite Veto Threat on Twitter. The Washington Post. Warren, E. (2015, February 25). The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose. The Washington Post. What Is CPC? The Congressional Progressive Caucus. (2019). https://cpc-grijalva. house.gov/what-is-cpc/ Where Lawmakers Stand on Military Action in Syria. (2013, September 5). New York Times. http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/politics/syria-vote-tracker.html Wood, W., et  al. (1994). Minority Influence: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Influence Processes. Psychological Bulletin, 115(3), 323. Wright, T. (2018, September 12). The Return to Great Power Rivalry Was Inevitable. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https:// w w w. t h e a t l a n t i c . c o m / i n t e r n a t i o n a l / a r c h i v e / 2 0 1 8 / 0 9 / liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/ Zald, M. N. (1996). Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing. In D. McAdam, J.  D. McCarthy, & M.  M. Zald (Eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (pp. 261–274). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Congressional Resolutions 114 Cong. Res. H2454, 2015 114 Cong. Res. H7220, 2015 114 Cong. Res. H7694, 2015 115 Cong. Res. H5424, 2017 115 Cong. Res. H5425, 2017 115 Cong. Res. H9847, 2017 115 Cong. Res. S4899, 2017 115 Cong. Res. H724, 2014 141 Cong. Res. H4339, 1995 161 Cong. Res. 5231, 2015. (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert) 161 Cong. Res. 5971, 2015 163 Cong. Res. H726, 2017 163 Cong. Res. S474, 2017 163 Congressional Record. H727, 2017. (statement of Rep. Dwight Evans)

245

Index1

A ACA, see Affordable Care Act Adams, J. Q., 59 Affordable Care Act (ACA), 75, 76, 101, 136, 163, 169, 170, 190, 217 Agenda-setting, 14, 35, 48, 75, 217 Aguto, J., vi Alinsky, S., 190 Amash, J., 106 Amendments (to legislation), 42, 47, 66, 106, 109, 153, 158, 159, 161, 165, 174, 175, 180, 193, 222, 225, 228 American Hope Act, 204 American Party, 61 Americans for Prosperity, 113 Andrews, T., 124 Anti-Catholicism, 60 Anti-establishment, 39, 40 Anti-Federalists, 59 Anti-Masonic Party, 216 Arab Spring, 122 Arpaio, S.J., 208

Al-Assad, B., 17, 122, 125, 127, 129, 130 Asch, S., 31 Auerswald, D., 5 Azari, J., 10, 217 B Babin, B., 179 Bachmann, M., 17, 30, 76, 91, 94, 96, 99–102, 177, 222 Baldwin, T., 132 Banaji, M., 32 Bannon, S., 191 Bass, K., 195 Baucus, M., 139 Becerra, X., 202 Bee, B., 9 Begich, M., 132 Beinart, P., 2 Bell, D.S., 226–227 Beller, D., 9, 11 Belloni, F., 9, 11

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2

247

248 

INDEX

Biden, J., 58 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, 139, 141, 144 Bipartisanship, 58, 73, 81 Blue Dog Caucus, 66 Blue Dog Coalition, 66 Blue Dog Democrats, 8, 65, 66 Boehner, J., 29, 75, 90, 92, 98–102, 107, 108, 114, 115, 128, 134, 139, 170, 174, 180–182 Booker, C., 192 Boucek, F., 11 Bourbon Democrats, 63 Braley, B., 131 Brat, D., 78, 97, 104, 112 Breitbart, 75 Brooks, 101 Broun, P., 92 Brown, S., 67, 132 Bryan, W. J., 62, 63 Building America’s Trust Act, 205 Bush, G. H. W., 158 Bush, G. W., 4, 70, 80, 90, 92, 93, 133, 171, 177, 189 Bush, J., 73, 113 Business Roundtable, The, 115 C Camp, D., 139 Campbell, C., 5 Cannon, J., 29 Cantor, E., 112 Cantwell, M., 132 Capitol Hill, 29, 36, 44, 45, 47, 159, 160, 164, 166, 188, 197, 231 Cardin, B., 128, 172, 174 Carson, A., 195 Carter, R., vi, 15, 228 Casey, B., 126 Castor, K., 128 Centrists, 66, 67, 80

Chemical weapons, Progressive Caucus activism and, 122–135 consistency of opposition, 131–133 factionalization, 123–125 issue framing, 129–131 outcome, 133–135 traditional legislative strategies, 125–128 Chen, M., vii Chiboub, G., vi Christians, 154 Chu, J., 199 Civil society organizations, 157 Civil War, 62, 63 Clarke, Y., 37, 77, 193 Cleaver, E., 128 Cleveland, G., 63 Clinton, B., 65, 66 Clinton, H., 2, 58, 65–68, 81, 82, 98, 142, 146, 158, 188, 189, 230 Club for Growth, 113 Cohesion/cohesive, 7, 12, 33, 36–40, 42, 46, 47, 91, 92, 105, 106, 154–156, 170, 171, 191, 202, 217, 220, 222, 225, 226, 233 Cojocaru, L., 49 Cold War, 4, 58, 70, 80–82 Cole, T., 79, 125 College of Wooster, vi Collins, S., 73 Comprehensive immigration reform, Tea Party and, 90–103 consistency of position, 100–101 factional attributes, 91–93 issue framing, 96–100 traditional legislative strategies, 93–96 outcome, 102–103 Congress, v, 1–19, 29, 30, 39–41, 47, 48, 57, 58, 63, 64, 68, 70, 72, 73, 77, 80, 82, 91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101–104, 106, 108, 112–115, 121, 123, 129, 133, 138–140, 153–182, 189, 190,

 INDEX 

194–196, 196n2, 199–204, 206, 208–212, 217–219, 222, 224, 230, 231, 235 representation and policy influence of, 3–5 Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship theory, 15 Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), vi, 30–31, 68, 69, 79, 124, 137, 146, 187, 189, 191, 192, 196, 201, 202, 222 Congressional Pro-Life Caucus, 163 Congressional Quarterly, 37 Congressional Record, 7, 46 Conservative Republicans, 72 Conservatives, 2, 10, 16, 18, 19, 29, 38, 45, 57, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 70–79, 82, 89–101, 103–105, 108–110, 113–115, 151–182, 187, 188, 200, 201, 205, 218–220, 222, 224, 230, 231 Conservativism, 60 Consistency (of issue position), 14, 17, 31, 32, 35, 45–47, 100–101, 156, 164–166, 180, 181, 197–199, 209–211, 224, 226, 229 Consistency of opposition Freedom Caucus and Export-­ Import Bank, 112–115 Progressive Caucus and chemical weapons, 131–133 Progressive Caucus and TPP trade policy analysis, 144–146 Contract with America II, 163 Cook, S., 130 Coons, C., 128 Copperheads, 62–63 Corker, B., 172–174 Cornyn, J., 205 Corwin, E., 4 Cotton, T., 175, 179, 182 Courtney, J., 128 Cox, G., 6, 41

249

CPC, see Congressional Progressive Caucus Crony capitalism, 110 Cruz, T., 74, 100, 113, 114 Curry, J., vi, 41 D DACA, see Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Daily Kos, 67 De Dreu, C. K., 228 Dean, H., 67 DeFazio, P., 124, 141 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 19, 94–96, 94n1, 98, 100–102, 187, 200–213, 219, 222–225 DeLauro, Rosa, 121, 145 Dellums, R., 124 Democratic fundraising programs, 2 Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), 65 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 61, 188, 190 Democratic Party, 30, 35, 58, 60n1, 121, 188–191, 196, 202, 230 factions and, 61–69; history, 62–65; today, 65–69 Democratic-Republicans, 60 Democratic voters, 2 Democrats, 60–64, 68, 71 Blue Dog, 65, 66 Bourbon, 63 Conservative, 66 Jacksonian, 61 liberal, 68 Liberal-Labor, 64 New Politics, 64, 65, 80 Populist, 63, 64 Progressive, 82 Southern, 64 War, 62

250 

INDEX

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 94, 96, 193, 204 DeSantis, R., 174, 177 Deutchman, I., 37 De Vries, N. K., 228 Dewan, T., 233 DHS, see Department of Homeland Security Dion, D., 7 Direct legislative approaches, 41 Direct non-legislative instruments, 41 DiSalvo, D., 6, 14, 35, 36, 229 District of Columbia, 191n1 “Dixiecrats,” 30 “Dixiecrat” ticket, 64 DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. A.I.D., 157 DLC, see Democratic Leadership Council DNC, see Democratic National Committee Dolence, D.M., vi Donnelly, J., 210 Downs, A., 6 DREAM Act, 93–95, 203, 204, 209, 212 Duckworth, T., 128 Duncan, J., 174 Durbin, D., 203, 205, 206 DW-NOMINATE database, 38–40, 47, 91, 92, 104, 105, 124, 125, 155, 156, 170, 171, 190, 191, 191n1, 202, 220 E Eisenhower, D. D., 70 Ellison, K., 123, 143, 146, 190 Entman, R., 44, 227 Espaillat, A., 195 Establishment Clause of the Constitution, 200 Establishment Republicans, 78

Evans, D., 195 Export-Import Bank, 19, 89, 218, 222, 224, 225 Freedom Caucus and, 103–116; consistency (of issue position), 112–115; factional attributes, 104–106; issue framing, 110–112; outcome, 115–116 F Factional attributes, 35–40 Factions/factionalism, 1–19, 29–49, 151–182, 188, 190, 191, 202, 210, 215–235 attributes of comprehensive immigration reform, 91–93 Democratic Party, 61–69 and foreign policy, 80–83 Freedom Caucus and Export-­ Import Bank, 104–106 historical foundations of, 57–83 minority influence model of, 35–46 Progressive Caucus and, 123–125; TPP trade policy analysis, 136–138 Republican Party, 69–80 Faculty Development Committee, vi Family planning, 18, 19, 151, 152, 155–167, 218, 219, 222, 224, 225, 228 Far-left factions, 2 Far-right conservatives, 163 Far-right factions, 2 Federalist Papers, 7 Feinstein, D., 198 Fiscal conservativism, 162 Fleming, J., 76, 178 Foreign aid, 19, 151, 152, 155–159, 162, 165, 168, 218, 222 Foreign policy decision-making process, vi, 2, 31

 INDEX 

development, 3 factions and, 80–83 Fourth Circuit of Appeals, 198 Fox, L., 98 Fox News, 75 Franco, K., vi Frank, B., vi, 189 Freedom Caucus, vi, 2, 3, 17–19, 30, 35–37, 45, 57, 74, 76–79, 82, 83, 151–182, 215, 218–220, 222–225, 228–230, 234 and Export-Import Bank, 103–116; consistency (of issue position), 112–115; factional attributes, 104–106; issue framing, 110–112; outcome, 115–116; traditional legislative strategies, 106–109 FreedomWorks, 113 Free Soil Party, 216 Free trade agreements (FTAs), 135 Friedman, U., 231 FTAs, see Free trade agreements G Gabbard, T., 128 Gaddafi, M., 132 Gang of Eight, 94, 101 Gang of Six, 96 Garrett, S., 116 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 135 Gephardt, R., 65 Gerring, J., 11, 49 GHI, see Global Health Initiative Gillibrand, K., 132, 192 Gingrich, N., 73 Global gag rule, 161 Global Health and Human Rights, 164 Global Health Initiative (GHI), 159, 160, 166, 167

251

Gohmert, L., 101, 178 Goldwater, B., 73, 74 Gomez, J., 202 Goodlatte, B., 205 GOP, see Grand Old Party Gorsuch, N., 193 Gosar, P., 163 Government-opposition partisanship, 38 Graham, L., 203 Grand Old Party (GOP), 2, 69–76, 78, 81–83, 90, 96, 101, 103–105, 112, 113, 182, 217, 218 Grant, U. S., 61 Grassley, C., 205 Grayson, A., 128, 133 Great Britain, 59 Green, M., 7, 9, 39, 47, 48, 98 Grijalva, R. M., 143, 146, 189, 211 Gutierrez, L., 204, 207, 208 H Haass, R., 130 Hagan, J., 35 Half-Breed Republicans, 71 Hamilton, A., 59 Harrison, W. H., 60 Hatch, O., 139 Hawaii, 63 Heck, D., 108 Heitkamp, H., 129, 132, 210 Helms, J., 158 Helms amendment, 158, 165 Hensarling, J., 107–109, 115 Heritage Action, 113 Heritage Foundation, 163 HFC, see House Freedom Caucus Hill, The, 197 Hofstadter, R., 6 Homan, P., vi House Committee on Appropriations, 161

252 

INDEX

House Committee on Financial Services, 106 House Democratic Leader, 210 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 164, 173 House Freedom Action Fund, 77 House Freedom Caucus (HFC), 15, 77, 78, 104, 104n2, 105, 107–113, 153, 182 House Freedom Fund, 77 House of Representatives, 9, 155, 169, 218, 230 Howell, W., 5 Hoyer, S., 112 Huelskamp, T., 76 Human Rights Watch, 161 Hume, D., 8, 9, 216 I IAEA, see International Atomic Energy Agency Immigration and Nationality Act, 193 Immigration policy/reform, 17, 19, 30, 62, 69, 75, 79, 82, 83, 90–103, 200 INARA, see Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 171, 176, 178 International Crisis Group, 130 Internet service providers (ISPs), 140 Intraparty factions, 7 Investor-state dispute settlement arbitration system (ISDS), 140, 141 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), 169, 174–176, 178, 180, 181 Iran (nuclear deal), 2, 19, 151, 168–182, 218, 220, 222, 224, 225 ISDS, see Investor-state dispute settlement arbitration system

ISPs, see Internet service providers Issacharoff, S., 10 Issue framing, 2, 3, 31, 42–47, 74, 156, 162–164, 194–197, 207–209, 223–227, 232 comprehensive immigration reform, 96–100 Freedom Caucus and Export-­ Import Bank, 110–112 Progressive Caucus and; chemical weapons, 129–131; TPP trade policy analysis, 142–144 J Jackson, A., 59, 60 Jacksonian Democrats, 61 Jayapal, P., 69, 191, 196 JCPOA, see Joint Comprehension Plan of Action Jefferson, T., 59, 61 Jeffersonian Republicans, 59 JFK International Airport, 195 Johnson, H., 195 Johnson, L., 39, 64, 73, 152 Joint Comprehension Plan of Action (JCPOA), 19, 151, 168, 169, 174, 176–178, 182 Jones, C.O., 7, 44 Jones, W., 181 Jordan, J., 76, 104, 106, 154, 156, 165, 166, 171, 172 Jost, J., 32 K Kaarbo, J., vi, 35 Kaine, T., 128, 172 Karol, D., 8 Kasten, B., 158 Kemp, J., 158 Kemp-Kasten amendment, 165

 INDEX 

253

Kennedy, J. F., 64 Kennedy, T., 67 Kerry, J., 127, 129, 134 Khameini, A., 179 Kille, K. J., vi King, S., 17, 96, 100, 173, 222 Koch, D., 113 Koger, G., 13, 233 Krain, M., vi Kriner, D., 41 Kucinich, D., 67, 189

Liberals, 2, 8, 10, 18, 38, 68, 72, 79, 81, 97, 123, 164, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 202, 207, 208, 218, 230, 231 Life at Conception Act, 166 Lincoln, A., 61 Loebsack, D., 191 Lofgren, Z., 192, 198, 205 Lowey, N., 161 Lucas, D. W., 37 Lupton, D., vi

L Labrador, R., 96, 101, 114 Lage, E., 32 Lantis, J., vi Lavrov, S., 134 Leahy, P., 132 Lee, B., 124, 128, 132, 133 Lee, C. E., 38 Lee, M., 101 Lee, S. J., 192, 195 Legislation/laws, 2, 3, 5–10, 17–19, 31, 40–42, 47, 48, 63, 82, 90, 93–97, 99, 101, 102, 106, 107, 109, 112, 151–153, 155, 157, 158, 161, 164–166, 169, 173–175, 187, 192, 193, 198, 200, 203–207, 209, 211–213, 215, 216, 218–220, 222, 223, 225, 228, 229, 233–235 Freedom Caucus and Export-­ Import Bank, 106–109 Progressive Caucus and; chemical weapons, 125–128; TPP trade policy analysis, 138–142 Legislative process, 40 Lewis, J., 67 Liberal-Labor Democrats, 64 Liberal (or Mugwump) Republicans, 71, 81

M Madison, J., 7–9, 216 Manchin, J., 132, 210 Mann, T., 4 March for Life Education and Defense Fund, 166 Markey, E., 132, 207 Marsh, K., vi Martinez, C., 97 Masket, S., 13 Massie, T., 181 Mayes, M., vi Mayhew, D. R., 16 McCain, J., 39, 94, 113 McCarthy, K., 108, 112, 156, 175 McCarty, N., 38 McCaskill, C., 132, 210 McClintock, T., 78 McConnell, M., 73, 109, 114, 169, 207 McCrary, D., 39 McCubbins, M., 6, 41 McDermott, J., 127, 133 McGovern, G., 64, 64n2, 66 McKinley, D., 92 Meadows, M., 98, 107, 156, 165, 171, 172, 174, 176, 181, 224, 234 Members of Congress, 36, 40, 157, 172 Menendez, R., 128, 173 Merkley, J., 141

254 

INDEX

Mexico City policy, 157–159, 161, 163, 164 Milgram, S., 31 Milner, H., 41 Minority influence/minority influence theory, 17, 18, 29–49, 89, 223, 226–228, 230, 232 of factionalism, 35–46 research design of, 46–49 social psychology of, 29–49 Moderate Republicans, 73, 74 Mondale, W., 65 Monroe, J., 59 Moscovici, S., 32, 42, 45, 131, 165, 228, 232 MoveOn.org, 15, 67, 81 Mugny, G., 33, 34 Mulvaney, M., 76, 78, 109, 126, 154 Murkowski, L., 73 Murphy, C., 132, 192, 193, 198, 199, 231 Murray, P., 192 Muskie, E., 12 Muslim ban, 194 N Nadler, J., 195, 205 Naffrechoux, M., 32 NAFTA, see North American Free Trade Agreement National Republicans, 59 National Right to Life Committee, 163 Nativism, 60 Negative partisanship, 3 Nemeth, C., 33 NetrootsNation, 15 New Deal, 63, 72, 103 New Democrat Coalition, 8 Newhauser, D., 98 New Politics Democrats, 64, 65, 80 NGOs, see Nongovernmental organizations

Nixon, R., 64, 70, 74 No Ban on Refugees Act, 193 Noel, H., 8, 13, 39 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 152, 157, 160 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 135, 137, 138, 143 No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, 205 Nosek, B., 32 O Obama, B., 16–19, 49, 66, 67, 73, 75, 76, 177, 179, 181, 182, 189, 191, 215, 218, 219, 222–224, 229 administration, 2, 89–116, 160, 172, 174, 178, 179, 181, 182 Progressive Caucus activism and, 121–147 Ocasio-Cortez, A., v, 2, 10, 30, 37, 67, 82, 218 Omar, I., 67 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 134 Ornstein, N., 4 P Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act, 166 Palin, S., 76, 180 Partisanship, 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 38, 48, 75, 79, 81, 94, 175, 206, 233 bipartisanship, 58, 73, 81, 97 negative, 58 PATRIOT Act, 80 Paul, Rand, 39, 74, 113 Paul, Ron, 74 Peake, J., vi, 16 Pearce, S., 104, 156 Pelosi, N., 30, 66, 68, 69, 78, 99, 128, 189, 201, 210 Pérez, J. A., 33, 34

 INDEX 

Perez, T., 190 Persuasion, 2, 3, 31, 34, 35, 44–46, 90, 102, 152, 167, 217, 223, 227, 229 Peterson, B., 128 Pevehouse, J., 5 Pingree, C., 196 Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. A.I.D., 157 Pocan, M., 69, 146 Poe, T., 178 Polarization, 1, 3, 7, 13, 14, 16, 35, 38, 57, 58, 75, 79, 81, 93, 175, 233 Political parties, 1–3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14–18, 31, 37–40, 49, 57–59, 61, 79, 80, 101, 200, 215, 226 Politics without parties, 58, 59 Populism, 63 Populist Democrats, 63, 64 Progressive Caucus, during Obama administration, 19, 35, 121–147 chemical weapons, 122–135; consistency of opposition, 131–133; factionalization, 123–125; issue framing, 129–131; outcome, 133–135; traditional legislative strategies, 125–128 Trans-Pacific Partnership, trade policy analysis for, 135–147; consistency of opposition, 144–146; factional attributes, 136–138; issue framing, 142–144; outcome, 146–147; traditional legislative strategies, 138–142 Progressive Democrats, 82 Progressive Era, 30, 63 Progressive Principles for Trade, 143 Progressive Republicans, 72 Progressives, 2, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 36, 37, 58, 72, 80–82, 103, 152,

255

155, 162, 187–213, 218–220, 222–225, 228, 230–232 rise of, 65–69 Progressivism, 72 Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance, 160 Proxmire, W., 12 Public opinion/support, 44, 99 R Radical Islamic terrorists, 188 Ragusa, J., 39 Rathbun, B., 16 Ratification, 40 Reagan, R., 70, 79, 93, 157, 164, 165 administration, 157 Reconstruction era, 63 Reed, K., 116 Reed, R., 134, 154 Reed, T. B., 61 Reed Rules, 61 Reid, H., 126, 128, 139 Reiter, H., 11, 12 Reproductive healthcare, 18, 151–168, 222, 225 Republican Conference, 155 Republican Main Street Partnership, 8 Republican National Committee (RNC), 90 Republican Party, 2, 10, 18, 30, 35, 38, 39, 45, 61, 66, 72–74, 76–79, 81, 90, 91, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 151, 153–156, 171, 205, 212, 218n1, 223, 230 factions and, 69–80; history, 71–73; modern factions, 73–80 Republicans, 59–61, 71 Conservative, 72 Democratic-Republicans, 60 establishment, 78 Half-Breed, 71

256 

INDEX

Republicans (cont.) Jeffersonian, 59 Liberal, 81 Liberal (or Mugwump), 71, 81 Moderate, 73, 74 National, 59 Progressive, 72 Stalwart, 71, 72 Republican Study Committee (RSC), 74, 75, 154, 170 Revolutionary War, 59 RNC, see Republican National Committee Robertson, P., 180 Roe v. Wade, 153, 157, 165, 166 Rogers, H., 162 Roosevelt, F. D., 12, 62–65, 72, 103 Roosevelt, T., 72 Roskam, P., 173 Rouhani, H., 172 Roybal-Allard, L., 203–204 RSC, see Republican Study Committee Rubin, R. B., 13, 33, 233 Rubio, M., 94, 113, 174 Rublee, M. R., 34, 45 Ryan, P., 29, 30, 45, 139, 156, 192, 207, 230, 234 S SAFA, see Securing America’s Future Act Salmon, M., 174 Sanders, B., 2, 10, 30, 37, 58, 65, 67, 68, 81, 123, 124, 127, 136, 137, 146, 190, 192, 196, 198, 209 Scalise, S., 76 Schattschneider, E. E., 6 Schlesinger, A., 4 Schumer, C., 66, 94, 193, 201, 210 Schwartz, M., 36 Scott, J., vi, 15, 228

Securing America’s Future Act (SAFA), 205 Security, Enforcement, and Compassion United in Reform Efforts Act (SECURE Act), 205 Sessions, J., 102, 194, 200, 203 Shaheen, Jeanne, 146 Shaw, E., 226–227 Shea-Porter, C., 144 Sherman, B., 139 Sin, 13 Slavery, 61 Smith, C., 164 Snarr, M., vi Social psychology, 3, 16, 18, 46, 225, 227, 229 of minority influence, 31–35 Social Security and Medicare, 163 SOLVE Act, 193, 198 Soros, G., 190 Southern Democrats, 64 Squintani, F., 233 Stalwart Republicans, 71, 72 State Department, 160 Statue of Liberty Values (or SOLVE) Act, 192 Stecker, C., 12 STOP Acts, 101 Syria Civil War, 83 T TAA, see Trade Adjustment Assistance Taft, W. H., 72 Talking Points Memo, 67 Tama, J., vi Taylor, Z., 60 Tea Party, vi, 2, 3, 9, 16–18, 30, 35, 36, 38–40, 45, 74–78, 82, 153, 154, 156, 159, 167, 170, 173, 178, 180, 215, 217–220, 222, 223, 225, 229, 231, 232, 234

 INDEX 

and comprehensive immigration reforms, 90–103; consistency of position, 100–101; factional attributes, 91–93; issue framing, 96–100; outcome, 102–103; traditional legislative strategies, 93–96 Jacksonian foundations of, 37 Tea Party Caucus (TPC), 91 Tellez, A., vi Temporary Protected Status, 213 Tester, J., 210 Theriault, S., 39 Thurmond, S., 64 Tiahrt, T., 158, 165 Tillerson, R., 194 Tingley, D., 41 Tlaib, R., v, 67, 218 To Prevent Expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program, 96 TPA, see Trade Promotion Authority TPC, see Tea Party Caucus TPP, see Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Act, 138 Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), 141 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 135, 136, 223 Trade/trade policy, 1, 4, 17, 19, 41, 83, 169, 202, 218, 219, 230, 231, 234 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 135 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 17, 19, 169, 219, 223, 225 trade policy analysis for, Progressive Caucus and, 135–147; consistency of opposition, 144–146; factional attributes, 136–138; issue framing, 142–144; outcome, 146–147; traditional legislative strategies, 138–142

257

Travel ban/s, 18, 19, 79, 82, 102, 187–200, 196n2, 202, 207, 208, 219, 222–225, 228, 232 Truman, Harry S., 62 Trump, Donald, v, 1, 2, 10, 15–19, 30, 49, 57, 68, 69, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 102, 116, 142, 151–182, 187–213, 215, 217–219, 218n1, 222, 224, 225, 229–232, 234 TTIP, see Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 26th Amendment to the Constitution, 64 U Udall, Mark, 132 Udall, Tom, 132 Ultrasound Informed Consent Act, 166 Underdog Politics (Green, M.), 7 UN International Conference on Population, 157 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 158, 159, 162, 164, 165, 167 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 152, 157, 158, 165 USA Values Act, 192 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 97 U.S. Constitution, 3, 40, 216 Article I, 5 Article II, 3 Establishment Clause, 200 26th Amendment, 64 U.S. democratic system, 216 U.S. District Court, 197 U.S. electoral laws, 6 U.S. family planning, 167 U.S. foreign affairs, 161 U.S. foreign aid programs, 153 U.S. foreign assistance in Trump Era, 152–168 U.S. House of Representatives, 7, 29

258 

INDEX

U.S. national politics, 15 U.S. parties, 30 U.S. party organizations, 217 U.S. policy, 152 U.S. politics, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 35, 234 U.S. presidential system, 234 U.S. Refugee Admissions program, 191 U.S. state politics, 12 V Van Buren, Martin, 60 Velasquez, N., 195 Vietnam War, 64, 70 W Walker, Scott, 113 Wallner, J., 216 Walz, Tim, 127 War Democrats, 62 War on Terror, 70 Warren, E., 2, 17, 67, 121, 136, 137, 144, 145, 194–196, 208, 210 Washington politics, 3

Waters, Maxine, 124 Webster, Daniel, 108 Weissman, S., 4 Whig Party, 59–61, 69, 216 White House, 4, 5, 17, 172, 173, 187, 188, 191, 193, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 206, 208, 211, 212, 223, 232 Wildavsky, A., 4 Wilson, Woodrow, 62, 63, 72 Working Families Party, 190 World Trade Organization, 135 World War II, 62 Wyden, Ron, 132, 146 Y Yarmouth, 128 Yoho, T., 101, 166, 181 Z Zeldin, L., 173 Zenko, Micah, 130 Zuckerberg, Mark, 97