The Bangladesh Environmental Humanities Reader: Environmental Justice, Development Victimhood, and Resistance 1498599133, 9781498599139

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Foreword • Scott Slovic
Acknowledgments
Introduction • Samina Luthfa, Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, and Munasir Kamal
PART I: INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION, AND SPACE
PART IA: ENVIRONMENT AND NEW POLITICS OF SPACE
1 Growth and Disaster: A Tale of Environmental Disaster in the Time of High Growth in Bangladesh • Anu Muhammad
2 Co-management Approach for Nature/Forest Conservation, Corporate Interests, and the Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh • Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan
3 Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and Immigrants in the United Kingdom: The New Agent/Actors in Transnational Environmental Politics • Samina Luthfa
4 Pursuing Justice for All: Eviction and Environmental Injustice in Dhaka • Lutfun Nahar Lata
5 Rohingya Influx: Impacts on Environment and Local Host Communities in Bangladesh • Mrittika Kamal
PART IB: HAZARDOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT
6 Ironeaters: A Story of Scrapped Men • Fahmidul Haq
7 Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction in the Ready-Made Garments Industry in Bangladesh • Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury
8 Death of a Thousand Dreams: A Photo Essay on the Rana Plaza Collapse and the Aftermath • Taslima Akhter
PART II: WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND VICTIMHOOD
9 Chakaria Sundarbans: A Forest without Trees • Philip Gain
10 Critically Understanding Samta: A Tale of anArsenic-Affected Village • Fatema-Tuj-Juhra and Rubiat Afrose Raka
11 Kaptai Dam Bor-Porong: The Human Cost of Dam and Development—An Account of Forced Migration • Monzima Haque
12 Historicizing Kaptai Dam, Collective Trauma, and Political Awakening in the Chittagong Hill Tracts • Munasir Kamal and Mesbah Kamal
PART III: ECOCRITICISM AND CREATIVE SPACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
13 Ecocentrism and Bauls: Lalon’s and Radharaman’s Meditative Activism • Golam Rabbani
14 Rabindranath Tagore and Environmental Justice • Fakrul Alam
15 Marginalization of Minorities and the Environment: Bibhutibhushan Bandapadhyay’s Pather Panchali and Aranyak • Shehreen Ataur Khan
16 Reclaiming Voice: In Search of Space and Agency in Tarashankar Bandyopadhyay’s Hansuli Banker Upakatha • Sabrina Binte Masud
17 Riverine Communities: A Study of Adwaita Mallabarman’s Titas Ekti Nadir Naam and Manik Bandopadhyay’s Padma Nadir Majhi • Qazi Arka Rahman and Faria Alam
18 Unequal Justice: Ethnicity and Class in Mahasweta Devi’s Aranyer Adhikar and Selim Al Deen’s Bonopangshul • Soumya Sarker
PART IV: BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEM, AND POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY
19 Plant Biodiversity Management for Nutritional Food Security in Bangladesh • Lutfur Rahman
20 The UN Climate Change Conferences: Bangladesh’s Conundrum • Md. Rezwanul Haque Masud
Index
About the Contributors

Citation preview

The Bangladesh Environmental Humanities Reader

Environment and Society Series Editor: Douglas Vakoch As scholars examine the environmental challenges facing humanity, they increasingly recognize that solutions require a focus on the human causes and consequences of these threats, and not merely a focus on the scientific and technical issues. To meet this need, the Environment and Society series explores a broad range of topics in environmental studies from the perspectives of the social sciences and humanities. Books in this series help the reader understand contemporary environmental concerns, while offering concrete steps to address these problems. Books in this series include both monographs and edited volumes that are grounded in the realities of ecological issues identified by the natural sciences. Our authors and contributors come from disciplines including but not limited to anthropology, architecture, area studies, communication studies, economics, ethics, gender studies, geography, history, law, pedagogy, philosophy, political science, psychology, religious studies, sociology, and theology. To foster a constructive dialogue between these researchers and environmental scientists, the Environment and Society series publishes work that is relevant to those engaged in environmental studies, while also being of interest to scholars from the author’s primary discipline.

Recent Titles in the Series The Bangladesh Environmental Humanities Reader: Environmental Justice, Development Victimhood, and Resistance, by Samina Luthfa, Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, and Munasir Kamal Loren Eiseley’s Writing across the Nature and Culture Divide, by Qianqian Cheng The Saving Grace of America’s Green Jeremiad, by John Gatta Art and Nuclear Power: The Role of Culture in the Environmental Debate, by Anna Volkmar Contesting Extinctions: Decolonial and Regenerative Futures, edited by Luis I. Prádanos, Ilaria Tabusso Marcyan, Suzanne McCullagh, and Catherine Wagner Embodied Memories, Embedded Healing: New Ecological Perspectives from East Asia, edited by Xinmin Liu and Peter I-min Huang Ecomobilities: Driving the Anthropocene in Popular Cinema, by Michael W. Pesses Global Capitalism and Climate Change: The Need for an Alternative World System, Second Edition, by Hans A. Baer Ecological Solidarity and the Kurdish Freedom Movement: Thought, Practice, Challenges, and Opportunities, edited by Stephen E. Hunt Wetlands and Western Cultures: Denigration to Conservation, by Rod Giblett Sustainable Engineering for Life Tomorrow, edited by Jacqueline A. Stagner and David S. K. Ting Nuclear Weapons and the Environment: An Ecological Case for Nonproliferation, by John Perry Portland’s Good Life: Sustainability and Hope in an American City, by R. Bruce Stephenson

The Bangladesh Environmental Humanities Reader Environmental Justice, Development Victimhood, and Resistance

Edited by Samina Luthfa, Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, and Munasir Kamal

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ISBN 978-1-4985-9913-9 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4985-9914-6 (electronic) ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

ix

Forewordxi Scott Slovic Acknowledgmentsxv Introduction1 Samina Luthfa, Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, and Munasir Kamal PART I: INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION, AND SPACE 19 PART IA: ENVIRONMENT AND NEW POLITICS OF SPACE 1 Growth and Disaster: A Tale of Environmental Disaster in the Time of High Growth in Bangladesh Anu Muhammad

21 23

2 Co-management Approach for Nature/Forest Conservation, Corporate Interests, and the Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh 43 Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan 3 Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and Immigrants in the United Kingdom: The New Agent/Actors in Transnational Environmental Politics Samina Luthfa 4 Pursuing Justice for All: Eviction and Environmental Injustice in Dhaka Lutfun Nahar Lata v

59

73

vi

Contents

5 Rohingya Influx: Impacts on Environment and Local Host Communities in Bangladesh Mrittika Kamal PART IB: HAZARDOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT 6 Ironeaters: A Story of Scrapped Men Fahmidul Haq

87 105 107

7 Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction in the Ready-Made Garments Industry in Bangladesh Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

117

8 Death of a Thousand Dreams: A Photo Essay on the Rana Plaza Collapse and the Aftermath Taslima Akhter

135

PART II: WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND VICTIMHOOD 9 Chakaria Sundarbans: A Forest without Trees Philip Gain

145 147

10 Critically Understanding Samta: A Tale of an Arsenic-Affected Village 157 Fatema-Tuj-Juhra and Rubiat Afrose Raka 11 Kaptai Dam Bor-Porong: The Human Cost of Dam and Development—An Account of Forced Migration Monzima Haque

169

12 Historicizing Kaptai Dam, Collective Trauma, and Political Awakening in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Munasir Kamal and Mesbah Kamal

177

PART III: ECOCRITICISM AND CREATIVE SPACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

193

13 Ecocentrism and Bauls: Lalon’s and Radharaman’s Meditative Activism 195 Golam Rabbani 14 Rabindranath Tagore and Environmental Justice Fakrul Alam 15 Marginalization of Minorities and the Environment: Bibhutibhushan Bandapadhyay’s Pather Panchali and Aranyak Shehreen Ataur Khan

207

221

Contents

16 Reclaiming Voice: In Search of Space and Agency in Tarashankar Bandyopadhyay’s Hansuli Banker Upakatha Sabrina Binte Masud 17 Riverine Communities: A Study of Adwaita Mallabarman’s Titas Ekti Nadir Naam and Manik Bandopadhyay’s Padma Nadir Majhi Qazi Arka Rahman and Faria Alam 18 Unequal Justice: Ethnicity and Class in Mahasweta Devi’s Aranyer Adhikar and Selim Al Deen’s Bonopangshul Soumya Sarker PART IV: BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEM, AND POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY 19 Plant Biodiversity Management for Nutritional Food Security in Bangladesh Lutfur Rahman

vii

231

243

253

267 269

20 The UN Climate Change Conferences: Bangladesh’s Conundrum 281 Md. Rezwanul Haque Masud Index295 About the Contributors

301

List of Figures and Tables

FIGURES Figure 2.1 The Forest Areas under the Nishorgo Support Project (NSP) Figure 2.2 Prospective Natural Gas Reserves in Bangladesh Figure 3.1 Nested Pigeon and Extended Boomerang Model Figure 5.1 Rohingya Refugees Waiting at the Bangladesh border near Naf River Figure 5.2 Overcrowded Rohingya Camps, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh Figure 5.3 Hills Abandoned by Relocated Rohingyas near Kutupalong Camp, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh Figure 7.1 Predictive Margins of Work Satisfaction over “Feeling Safe” at Work with Factory Type (95% CI) Figure 7.2 Predictive Margins of Work Satisfaction over the “Extent to which Supervisors Listened to the Respondents” with Factory Type (95% CI) Figure 7.3 Predictive Margins of Work Satisfaction over the “Extent to which the Respondents Felt like Working in a Team” with Factory Type (95% CI) Figure 7.4 Predictive Margins of Work Satisfaction over the “Leisure Time” with “Factory Type” (95% CI) Figure 7.5 Predictive Margins of Work Satisfaction over the Training with “Factory Type” (95% CI) Figure 8.1 Rana Plaza Collapse Figure 8.2 Rana Plaza Collapse—The Last Embrace Figure 8.3 In the Rescue Figure 8.4 Rana Plaza Collapse—Parents ix

45 47 63 88 92 94 128 129 130 131 131 137 138 139 141

x

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 8.5 Figure 9.1 Figure 9.2 Figure 9.3 Figure 9.4

Rana Plaza Collapse—Death, Wait, and DNA Chakaria Sundarbans Today Satellite View of Chakaria Sundarbans, 1976 Satellite View of Chakaria Sundarbans, 1995 Shrimp Farms in the Middle of the Chakaria Sundarbans Today Figure 12.1 Kaptai Dam

142 148 152 153 154 180

TABLES Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics of “Work Satisfaction” and Its Covariates 124 Table 7.2 Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Dependent Variable “Work Satisfaction”) 127

Foreword Scott Slovic

In anticipation of my visit to Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2015, I began reading Willem van Schendel’s A History of Bangladesh (2009), an introduction to that complex region of the subcontinent. What struck me quickly were the paradoxical qualities of fierce local identity and mercurial fluidity of physical environment and political control. Stability and flux exist in constant tension in this part of the world, a society located immediately to the east of what is today the northeastern Indian state of West Bengal and immediately to the west of Myanmar. Flying toward Dhaka from Dubai, I realized we were approaching Bangladesh when I noticed a maze of water and land below. Indeed, Bangladesh is often described as the delta region for several major rivers— the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna—which flow and flood through Bangladesh and empty into the Bay of Bengal. Heavy rains regularly change the contours of these rivers and their numerous tributaries, water covering more than three-quarters of the country and frequently washing away subsistence farms. From a purely geophysical perspective, Bangladesh is a symbol of environmental uncertainty and human vulnerability. In the era of global climate change and hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees perched precariously in camps near the Myanmar border, this uncertainty is more intense than ever. This region is on the front lines of ecoprecarity, which Pramod K. Nayar defines, in his 2019 book on the subject, as both the precariousness of human lives during times of environmental disaster and the threats and changes human activities create for the non-human environment, especially during the Anthropocene. I had been to India several times before my visit to Dhaka, so I was somewhat familiar with intense human crowds and scenes of routine poverty. But nothing prepared me for the clots of traffic in Dhaka, the truly colossal traffic xi

xii

Foreword

jams, with strange agglomerations of rusty buses with riders dangling from the sides and clinging to the roofs, black SUVs signifying relative wealth, and pulses of wildly painted bicycle rickshaws, the latter often being the only moving vehicles amid the sea of stationery trucks, buses, and cars. The traffic of Dhaka struck me as strangely allegorical, a mechanical echo of the aquatic flow of this ever-shifting delta landscape, alternatingly still and stagnant and then rushing forward as a flood of movement. The only constant in a place like Bangladesh, it seemed to me, was uncertainty, the erratic pauses and gushes of traffic. Amid the hectic urban environment of the nation’s capital and a sprawling city of some nineteen million people, the editors of this book and their colleagues hosted the two-day International Interdisciplinary Conference on Ecocriticism, Environmental Justice, and Literature on August 7 and 8, 2015, on the campus of the University of Dhaka, a relatively peaceful oasis. Although this volume is not a conference proceedings, the contents of this elegant book reflect the topics of the conference itself in the combination of intellectual merit and social significance. Another essential aspect of both the conference and this book is the intrinsic and impressive interdisciplinarity revealed in the subject matter. Speakers at the conference included engineers, medical doctors, economists, historians, writers, literary scholars, and government officials—what is missing from the book itself, and I cannot think of a good way to remedy this, are the beautiful ecological song presented at the outset of the conference and the concluding theatrical performance. The contents of this book reflect the physical and cultural environment of Dhaka and Bangladesh itself in exploring powerful ideas within a socially relevant, even urgent, context. In his 2001 article “Toward an Environmental Justice Ecocriticism” (published in The Environmental Justice Reader), T.V. Reed asks a slate of probing questions that he feels are at the heart of an environmental justice approach to textual and cultural studies. Here are some of the questions that seem especially relevant to the present volume: “How can literature and criticism further the efforts of the environmental justice movement to bring attention to ways in which environmental degradation and hazards unequally affect poor people and people of color? How has racism domestically and internationally enabled greater environmental irresponsibility? What are the different traditions in nature written by the poor, by people of color in the United States and by cultures outside it? How can issues such as toxic waste, incinerators, lead poisoning, uranium mining and tailings, and other environmental health issues, be brought forth more fully in literature and criticism? How can issues of worker safety and environmental safety be brought together such that the history of labor movements and environmental movements can be seen as positively connected, not antagonistic? How can

Foreword

xiii

ecocriticism encourage justice and sustainable development in the so-called Third World?” (149) It is immediately clear that the contributions to this book explore various cutting-edge and socially urgent responses to precisely these questions, ranging from sustainable development to racism and refugeeism, issues of biodiversity and food security, the politics of water, and many others. At the same time, this book includes studies of alternative forms of environmental consciousness from the Bangladeshi point of view, including examinations of such authors as Rabindranath Tagore, Mahasweta Devi, and Selim Al Deen. When I attended the 2015 conference, I was particularly struck by the screening of Ironeaters, Shaheen Dill-Riaz’s 2008 documentary about poor farmers from northern Bangladesh whose fields are destroyed each year by river erosion, forcing the farmers to leave their homes and work for a pittance reducing the industrialized world’s oil tankers and container ships to scrap metal on the beaches near Chittagong. This is one of the world’s most dangerous jobs, and the people who perform the work do so because of economic hardship, much to both their own peril and the degradation of the environment. Those who watch this film experience indelible images of ecoprecarity in multiple manifestations. Ironeaters is an example of the kind of text presented and contextualized in this anthology of articles. Many years ago, the American environmental writer Rick Bass, a splendid storyteller and an ardent activist, wrote a brief essay for the Spring 1993 issue of The American Nature Writing Newsletter titled “20515 House 20510 Senate,” in which he said, “Suppose you are given a bucket of water. You’re standing there holding it. Your home’s on fire. Will you pour the cool water over the flames or will you sit there and write a poem about it?” (4) While Bass was at that time (and remains to this day) particularly concerned about endangered wildlife in the American West, his presentation of the predicament of socially and environmentally concerned artists and scholars is, I would say, equally trenchant in the context of environmental justice and just as relevant in Bangladesh as it is in Bass’s Montana. There is so much about Bangladeshi culture that is beautiful and elegant—even the brilliantly painted orange and blue rickshaws weaving through the streets, pedaled by spindly men (many of them displaced farmers), have an extraordinary aesthetic power. Yet it would be irresponsible to take in the colors and sounds of Bangladesh without also appreciating—and responding to—the worrisome and infuriating economic injustice and ecological danger. I carry with me two other experiences, in particular, from my visit to Dhaka that seem relevant to this volume. On the first day of the conference, I was attending a session when someone walked in the door and whispered in the ear of the moderator, who promptly halted the panel presentations and ushered the speakers and the audience to the main lecture hall. When we had

xiv

Foreword

all assembled, Professor Mesbah Kamal told us the somber news that Mr. Niloy Chatterjee, a critic of the country’s increasing religious extremism, had just been murdered at his home in Dhaka by a local al-Qaeda hit squad armed with machetes (see the Al Jazeera article “Fourth secular Bangladesh blogger hacked to death,” August 7, 2015). Mr. Chatterjee was expected to participate in the environmental justice conference. This brought home to me the bitter, brutal reality of identity politics in Bangladesh and the bitter, brutal reality of other social and environmental issues. Although we were discussing ecocriticism, environmental justice, and literature in the tranquil atmosphere of the university, the roiling, sweaty, desperate world was just beyond the campus gates. Readers of this book, too, should remember that such a world exists—it really exists—just beyond these pages. Finally, as if this shocking experience were not enough, just before taking me to the Dhaka airport to send me home to the United States, my hosts asked a student to accompany me to the Liberation War Museum, which educates visitors about the nine-month war in 1971, a conflict between East and West Pakistan that led to the creation of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, currently the world’s eighth most populous country. The museum brought back my distant childhood memories of the terrible human suffering that occurred during the war in Bangladesh—indeed, walking past photographs of shirtless men carrying machine guns and glass cases displaying neatly stacked skulls and femurs brought home the visceral reality of the violence on a level I had never before experienced. In one of the museum’s final exhibits, Allen Ginsberg’s poem “September on Jessore Road” hangs scroll-like, pleading “Ring O ye tongues of the world for their woe … Ring in the conscious of America brain.” Poets, photographers, filmmakers, and other artists—and the scholars who study this work—play a vital role in raising consciousness both at home and in distant parts of the world. The Bangladesh Environmental Humanities Reader is both informative and consciousness-raising. Whether we’re talking about the Liberation War of the early 1970s or the current culture war raging in Bangladesh (and elsewhere), the plight of Chittagong’s shipbreakers or the desperation of the Rohingya, Bangladesh is on the front line of the world’s struggles for just and sustainable development, human rights, and ecological health. Readers of this book will learn a lot about environmental justice and development victimhood—and about the potential of the environmental humanities to provide insights into and potential solutions to these concerns. Readers from beyond South Asia, including North America, may find these reports of human and environmental suffering to be shocking, almost unbelievable. But they are real—this is not “fake news.” It is our responsibility to pay attention.

Acknowledgments

We have taken a long time to complete this book amid the current global pandemic. Therefore, we thank our contributors for the chapters, waiting so long for publication, and doing the needful revisions on time, whenever we requested them. This edited volume is a culmination of a project that started by organizing an international interdisciplinary conference by the then-ASLE-Bangladesh Planning Committee and EMK Center titled “Ecocriticism, Environmental Justice and Literature” at the University of Dhaka in 2015. We are thankful to EMK Centre and ASLE-Bangladesh Planning Committee, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Dhaka, and all the presenters and volunteers of the conference. The conference kindled an interdisciplinary dialogue among literature and social science scholars of Bangladesh to collectively study the relationship of social justice, environment, and literature. The editors of this volume were among the organizers. We are grateful to Scott Slovic, the founder president of Association for the Study of Literature and Environment (ASLE), for writing the foreword to this volume and for attending the conference, guiding us through to submit the proposal and work on this book. We are thankful to our editorial assistants Nazifa Tasnim Khanam Tisha, and Samia Zaman for their wonderful job in finishing this volume. We are indebted to our series editor Douglas Vakoch, acquisition editors Michael Gibson, Kasey Beduhn, and Courtney Morales for their relentless efforts at the Lexington Books so that the book project could come to fruition. We would also like to thank Uzan Rahman, Terracotta Creatives, Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), Samari Chakma, Rupak Chakma Memorial Trust, Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, Sudipta Chakma Mikado, Quamrul Hassan, David Shook, and Bangla Academy, for granting us permission to reprint or use their works in the xv

xvi

Acknowledgments

volume. We also thank Dayan Hasan for doing mock cover designs to choose from the template sent by Lexington. Last but not the least, we thank our children Prakrito, Areeba, Souro, Roudro, and Samina and Tanzim’s spouses Mohammad Ali Haider and Afsana Binte Amin, respectively, for their endurance during the several years we kept working on the book. All three of us went through a great deal of physical and mental misfortunes and upheavals, and therefore, we are glad that we have finished this work.

Introduction Samina Luthfa, Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, and Munasir Kamal

Environmental Humanities (EH), in essence, synthesizes the relationship between the non-humans/nature and the humans/culture. To do so, it recognizes their interconnectedness/ inseparability from the academic, disciplinary, and ethical perspectives (Hubell and Ryan 2022, 6–10). In other words, EH crosses disciplinary boundaries of science, humanities, and social science to be identified either as cross-disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, or transdisciplinary (CMIT) (see ibid, 7 for details). In the process, it embodies certain ethics and values that call for greening the humanities with the growing environmental consciousness in academia (ibid, 10). The ethical frameworks and values of EH, founded on the indivisible human-environment nexus, guide this field of knowledge to focus on socioeconomic inequalities, injustices, cultural differences, and variations in historical context for exploring the reasons behind ecological crises and environmental degradation and proposing solutions on how to tackle them (Heise 2017, 2). This feature of the EH encourages scholars to base their work on some concepts without losing sight of the individual disciplines. They include Environmental Justice (EJ), Ecocriticism, Resistance Movements, the Environmentalism of the Poor, Development Victimhood, and Sustainability (see Heise 2017, 1–10; Hubell and Ryan 2022, 1). In other words, this academic approach helps us understand what “a good life” means to all living beings and the complex relationships involving people, places, animals, plants, mushrooms, water, soil, land, and air (Hubell and Ryan 2022, 5–6). These concepts also bind the scholars for an open-minded academic approach to integrating the scientific and technical disciplines with the humanities (Emmett and Nye 2017, 4–7). The objective for taking shelter in those concepts is to create an academic space across the disciplines for dialogues; and 1

2

Samina Luthfa et al.

communications and mutual learning to resolve or reflect on environmental problems and changes (Hubell and Ryan 2022, 4). Against the backdrop, this Bangladesh-specific EH reader documents how environmental and ecological issues have found expression in the academic disciplines across the social sciences, applied sciences, and humanities. Bangladeshi academics-cum-activists from anthropology, economics, geography, journalism, law, literary studies, philosophy, political science, sociology, agricultural science, and other fields have contributed to this volume. While employing the concepts mentioned above for writing the chapters on environmental humanities from the context of Bangladesh, the authors in this volume have not treated them in separate individual categories nor adopted any rigid framework. These concepts are rather perspicuous or implicitly guiding tools for the authors to use conveniently in their respective chapters. The primary motive for all the authors of this volume is to write chapters with social and environmental justice/injustice playing at the center of their analyses on any environmental or social concern in Bangladesh. Before we glimpse at the essays, we explore the concepts and justify their relevance in the context of Bangladesh in the following sections.

THE CONCEPTS Environmental Justice and Resistance Movement The concept of environmental justice (EJ) is inseparable from the resistance movements that have emerged in reaction to social injustices emanating from ecological degradation or concerns. The traditional academic lens of EJ offers us a value-laden framework to understand human-environment relations in terms of equitable and fair treatment of all living beings. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2018) has officially adopted this understanding of EJ. We also understand it as the ecological distribution conflicts referring to the continuing injustices “people of color” experience in the United States, for instance, evidenced in the uneven dumping of toxic waste in African American areas (Martinez-Allier et al. 2016, 732). This lens of EJ also helps scholars shed light on the low-income and minority populations who usually bear the major brunt of environmental injustice engendering from the development of industrial activities of states, or local, national, or multinational corporations. More so, since both academics and activists have contributed relatively equally to the emergence of the concept of EJ, the issue of resistance movements comes into interplay in tandem with the analysis of any environmental injustice (Herbert 2020, 341).

Introduction

3

Yet, according to the EJ movement, the environment does not mean just “wilderness” or “nature” separate from everyday life (Schlosberg and Collins 2014, 360). For EJ movements, the environment is where people “live, work, and play” (Novotny 2000, 3). According to Schlosberg and Collins, it is in the sense that environmental degradation puts the day-to-day lives of poor people at peril (2014, 360). Similarly, the EJ perspective reflects not only on the distributive unfairness, dispossession, marginalization, and exclusion but it also indicates the weakening of basic needs, capabilities, and functioning of individuals and communities (Schlosberg and Collins 2014, 361). If we accept this extended EJ perspective, the workplace environment of an industrial or any other production unit becomes an area of investigation on whether workers are victims of discrimination and unfairness. It can also be relevant to examine the delinking of a community from their traditional sources of natural resourcedependent livelihood caused by state-driven industrial or infrastructural development projects. However, many scholars, traditionally, trace the genesis of the term “environmental justice” in the environmentalism merged with the civil rights movements in the United States in the 1980s in particular and North America in general (Schlosberg and Collins 2014, 360). But some other scholars and activists claim that EJ is more than the fusion of these two movements, and it has a long history in the United States alone. One can also find the history of EJ in the anti-racism movement of the 1970s and the environmental concerns of the poor living in urban industrial areas (see Taylor 1997, 2009; Faber and McCarthy 2003 for details). But the environmentalism that emerged in the United States and Western Europe confronted heavy criticism from other scholars. Many scholars argued that it was a sign of post-industrial society and based on “postmaterialist” values (Guha 2000, 99). For instance, Ronald Inglehart claims that the post-industrial society, with the guarantee of physical sustenance and safety of citizens, tends to shift toward an environmental movement emphasizing the quality of life, among other issues such as selfexpression and belonging (1977, 52). In contrast to Inglehart, Guha offers an opposite view on environmentalism. He claims that environmentalism in the southern countries had its genesis more in “the material conflicts” for ensuring the rights of poor communities to natural resources for livelihood (2000, 122). This view is very much consistent with the term “environmentalism of the poor” coined by Martinez-Allier. He explains environmentalism for livelihood or alike in the southern countries (Dobson 2016, 22). His thesis elaborates: “[E]nvironmentalism of the poor” does not assert that as a rule poor people feel, think, and behave as environmentalists. This is not so. The thesis is that in the

4

Samina Luthfa et al.

many resource extraction and waste disposal conflicts in the past and present, the poor are often on the side of the preservation of nature against business firms and the state. This behavior is consistent with their interests and values (Martinez-Alier 2014, 240).

Such conflicts in the Global South become more relevant for analysis of environmental humanities with a recently identified shift of investment in the extractive industry from the Global North to the South in the last few decades (Bridge 2004, 407–409). The repercussions of this shift have been evident in the rise of local community-based resistance against mining ventures (Luthfa 2017, 128). This example points to the relevance of looking at “environmentalism of the poor” to set the volume’s scope on environmental humanities of a country from the Global South. Environmentalism of the Poor, Development Victimhood, and the Politics of Sustainability To delineate further, we argue that if any environmental movement involves resistance against the ecological degradation putting the natural resourcedependent livelihood of local communities living in the developing countries at risk, environmentalism of the poor becomes relevant. Development projects such as coal-fired power plants, flyovers, and metro rails that a development-aspirant state sometimes undertakes are the causes behind the degradation and the loss of livelihood of the local communities. The neoclassical growth-oriented economic development model politically motivates governments of the developing countries to undertake such harmful projects. The advantage of implementing a GDP-based development model is that it can represent economic development, numerically making it visible to the political constituents. This politically convenient development model can mask environmentally harmful impacts under the rubric of development performance calculated in GDP. Simon Kuznets, the original inventor of this tool and National Accounts System, became the staunchest critic of what he had brought to use. In his own words, the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a national income as defined (by the GDP). Goals for more growth should specify of what and what for (cited in Anielski and Soskolne 2002, 86). Chapters in this volume, critically engage with such development projects. For example, the chapter on arsenic-affected Samta village exposes the brunt of an ecological disaster brought to us by liberalization of irrigation and agricultural inputs, motivated by the excessive production of crops of the so-called green revolution. Bangladesh, being applauded for achieving selfsufficiency in food, has a story of ecological disaster hidden under the carpet

Introduction

5

of its “development” rhetoric which is brought to the fore in this chapter. The chapter on Kaptai Dam that translated the trauma of the people displaced is a text-book example of development-induced displacement and injustice to an already marginalized ethnic minority community in Bangladesh. With such a context, poorer and marginalized sections of the population voice their dissent in several forms. This book also looks at such resistances and infrapolitics of the marginalized. In a chapter on the slum dwellers who were to be displaced for gentrification of the neoliberal city, or in the one where immigrants mobilize resistance against an open pit coal mine in their homeland, or citizens protest against establishing power plants near Sundarbans, we examine such infrapolitics and resistance. This volume presents environmentalism of the poor from both social science and humanities perspectives. We also critically engage with such environmentalism represented through the literary works of our time to seek inspiration for resisting development victimhood through art. Still, to adopt the GDP-based development model, the developmental states now have the policy principle of sustainable development (SD), eventually institutionalized in the Rio Conference/Earth Summit in 1992. This policy principle, having its roots in the 1972’s United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), aims to strike a balance between the need for environmental protection and economic development by focusing on the three core elements: economic, social, and environmental (Lynch and Khan 2020, 58). This is when development victimhood occurs and attempts are made to mask such victimhood under the umbrella use of SD so that whenever victims of developmental aggressions protest, their voices are marginalized by the governments with the use of the SD trope. In such a narrative, governments claim to have taken steps to make development sustainable, which is an oxymoron, at best. Elkington termed such articulation of SD as “business strategies” through which “companies can turn the environment game into one in which they, their customers, and the environment are all winners” (cited in ibid; originally in Elkington 1994, 91). But this principle does not guarantee that this win-win-win situation for all is always possible in all cases when the issue of conservation of natural resources and development comes into play, in particular (Baird et al. 2018, 409). Conservation and development are, indeed, historically contradictory, and challenging (ibid). Given the contradictory relationship between natural resource conservation and SD, it becomes pertinent to ask how it can be addressed. The Biosphere Reserves (BR) management approach is relevant here to answer this question. The management approach helps transform BRs into “learning sites” for all the participating stakeholders—from local to international, state to non-state, and business to non-business—to gain knowledge on the implementation of

6

Samina Luthfa et al.

SD and understand a human-oriented approach to conservation (ibid, 410). As many as 669 BRs are now in existence in 120 countries (ibid, 409). In this connection, collaborative and adaptive co-management are now the most popular approaches that the development agencies and international financial institutions prefer for natural resource management. Adaptive Co-Management (ACM) is defined as “a dynamic and iterative process by which actors connect (linking horizontally and vertically) and engage in shared learningby-doing to address place specific issues of sustainability” (ibid, 410). On the other hand, co-management is referred to as “the joint management of the commons” based on a power-sharing arrangement between the state and a community of multiple resource users (Carlsson and Berkes 2005, 65). Multinational corporations (MNCs) take advantage of the “co-management” approaches to implement projects of natural resource conservation jointly with development-desperate governments, international financial institutions, and donor agencies that, in many cases, result in their desired outcomes. The community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) implemented in sub-Saharan Africa is an example in this regard (see Nelson and Agarwal 2008, for details). The Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh is also evidence of understanding how the co-management approach often offers “[a] strategy of accommodation, combining material and discursive efforts to preserve corporate legitimacy and autonomy in the face of growing public environmental concern” (cited in Khan 2010, 76; originally in Levy and Newell 2002, 93). Through the chapter critiquing this co-management, this volume addresses the politics of sustainability. In essence, our argument is that the policy principle of SD is an ideological cover for the policymakers to go ahead with a “business as usual” approach to development. Even more so, with one chapter on sustainable agricultural practices and another on how reducing workplace vulnerability can enhance job satisfaction in the apparel industry, this volume can show means to reduce development victimhood and establish sustainability. Similarly, the policymakers of the developing countries aim at further commodifying their natural resources. For doing so, they start with commodification of space by establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), mines, power plants and dams for enhancing GDP growth at the cost of the traditional sources of livelihood of the poor. The whole process of this commodification culminates into rapid urbanization, displacement of poorer sections from their ancestral lands, deforestation, and environmental hazards in the long run in lieu of profit for the national comprador class and local power elites. It finds its expression in depletion and pollution of the environment and unmanageable waste creation. Bangladesh is a prime example in this regard. For the last few years, the country

Introduction

7

has consistently been at the bottom in terms of the Air Quality Index (AQI) (Seema 2021). The desperation of a state for profit making on behalf of the national capitalists and the drive for economic growth leave the environment/nature, workers, and the local human and non-human communities simultaneously at the whims of these state and non-state actors. The politicians in power, in particular, sideline the lives and livelihood of the politically weak and economically underprivileged local communities and individuals in order to achieve and project high GDP growth across their constituents. In such cases, this group of people fall victim to environmentally degrading and livelihood threatening developmental sprees. As a result, development victimhood becomes the norm of the game, making capital accumulation more unhindered and the global guiding principle of sustainable development eventually becomes equally non-operative for all. Chapters on apparel industry’s work environment, ship-building yards, Rohingya camps, depleted forest patches of Chakaria, Kaptai dam, among others, present remarkable cases and stories of development victimhood from a country of Global South which has been globally highlighted as a role model of development.

THE BANGLADESH CONTEXT The poor communities in Bangladesh are experiencing the aforementioned phenomenon and becoming victims of development in many cases. For instance, under the impact of the traditional growth-based development projects, the ecology is in decline. Biodiversity loss, increasing carbon emission, and environmental pollution, or alike, are the regular companions of the high GDP growth in Bangladesh. Again Bangladesh—a poster figure of climate change—with its Power System Master Plan 2016 has targeted electricity production, mostly from coal, the dirtiest source of energy, ignoring its environmental/ecological and health cost. The bureaucrats and government leadership appear to be ready to sacrifice the Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest, in the world, for setting up a coal-driven power plant close to it (see chapter 1 by Anu Muhammad in this volume). Similarly, in most cases, the owners of apparel, shipbuilding and similar industries do not prioritize the workplace safety of their workers. The existing regulations for workplace safety are still far from being fully implemented (see chapters 6, 7, and 8 by Fahmidul, Zahid and Taslima in this volume). Therefore, given the extended idea of EJ or “environmentalism of the poor,” it is imperative to reflect on the human-nature relations, workplace

8

Samina Luthfa et al.

environment, and ecology-plus issues having implications for low-income workers living in Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the description and symbolic representation of depletion and pollution of natural resources and wastefulness of industrialization have been present in Bangla literature for decades, along with the representation of the human-nature relationship and symbiosis (See Part III of this volume). These literary works may not seem new in comparison with ecocritical analyses available in other languages, but for Bangla literature and culture, highlighting the environmental justice concerns through literature and songs has shown ways to achieve social justice in this region. In addition, agricultural technologies shaped by collaboration between local cultivators and scientists are evident as practices helpful for biodiversity conservation and achieving sustainability (see chapter 19 by Lutfur Rahman in this volume), notwithstanding those that are ruining ecology and livelihood since mechanization and privatization entered the agriculture sector of Bangladesh in the 1970s. Against the backdrop of climate change challenges, politics and technology meet in many cross-cutting pathways in Bangladesh society. This volume cannot escape focusing on such crossroads too.

LAYOUT OF THE VOLUME Against the conceptual discussion already done, we divide the chapters of this edited volume into following parts: i. Industrialization, Urbanization, and Space; ii. Water, Environment, and Victimhood; iii. Ecocriticism and Creative Space for Environmental Justice; and iv. Biodiversity, Ecosystem, and the Politics of Sustainability. The third section is, to an extent, different from the other three sections of this volume. It explores pieces of Bangla literature from the present day and from the colonial past to show how the ideas of environmental justice and development victimhood are applied and embedded in literary works of the region. More importantly, the English-speaking world is generally unaware of that facet of environmental justice literature in Bangladesh. Even if sometimes translations of the literature exist, non-Bangali scholars have focused mainly on other aspects of the respective writers’ creations. For instance, western scholarly circles applaud Lalon and Rabindranath Tagore for their mysticism, but not for their environmental justice concerns. This gap has been addressed in this volume by bringing new critical analysis of ecocriticism and environmental justice present in Bangla literature. The chapter contributors have translated relevant parts of works where an existing English translation was unavailable.

Introduction

9

CHAPTER SUMMARIES Part I: Industrialization, Urbanization, and Space Is development essentially harmful to the environment? Must we sacrifice the environment to achieve the much-needed economic growth at the national level by facilitating mining, urbanization, power-plant construction, displacement, and deforestation? Or should we accommodate the interests of a particular group of people to allow the destruction of the environment at the expense of other communities and nature? These are the foundational questions addressed in this part of the volume. Our policymakers and to a certain extent a larger part of the society, indeed, take industrialization and urbanization for granted to ensure development. While doing so, they ignore the importance of preserving nature. However, such development only serves the elite business groups, multinationals, and other politically and economically powerful classes. Therefore, such claims give rise to a relevant political question involving those who get the fruits of “development” and those whose dependence on the environment gets marginalized. As such, new types of politics of environmentalism of the poor emerge centering around the space where the so-called development is taking place. One such politics involves communities that lose access to resources due to industrialization, and the other is those who work inside such industrial and urban units. This section deals with both types of politics under two sub-sections: Environment and the Politics of Space, and Hazardous Work Environment. This section on “Industrialization, Urbanization, and Space” contains eight chapters with five chapters in the first subsection, “Environment and the Politics of Space.” In the first chapter titled “Growth and Disaster: A Tale of Environmental Disaster in the Time of High Growth in Bangladesh,” Anu Muhammad, with his bird’s-eye view, critically examines some well-campaigned beliefs and theories on development. For instance, theories claiming that economic growth—even if it causes harm to the environment—can preserve peoples’ interest, their employment, income, and future security, and environmental concern is a luxury for the people living in poverty. In this regard, the author reviews two prominent development projects in Bangladesh—the coal-fired Rampal Power Plant and the open-pit mining at Phulbari. He draws a connection between the aspiration of the Bangladesh state for high economic growth and declining environmental justice. The next four chapters explore different territorial spaces for analyzing the nature of environmental politics in Bangladesh. For example, Tanzimuddin Khan’s “Co-Management Approach for Nature/Forest Conservation, Corporate Interests and the Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh” provides

10

Samina Luthfa et al.

a critique of the co-management approach to nature/forest conservation that supposedly ensures the participation of all relevant stakeholders (i.e., state actors, local communities, NGOs, and business enterprises) in nature/forest conservation projects for sustainable development. He argues that the comanagement approach is an apolitical one, as it ignores the power relationship always existing at the grassroots among participating stakeholders. This power relationship gets exposed when its implementation, in many cases, depends on influential business actors like Chevron. As a result, the interests of the powerful actors prevail over nature/forest conservation. The sustainable development principle also becomes a mere pretext while the state and other non-state actors provide legitimacy to the whole project. While Khan addresses how, within Bangladesh, environmental politics opens up space for transnational actors like Chevron, the chapter by Samina Luthfa looks at how Bangladeshi immigrants in the United Kingdom resist a proposed coal mine in Bangladesh leading to transnationalizing the environmental politics. Her chapter titled “Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and Immigrants in the United Kingdom: The New Agent/Actors in Transnational Environmental Politics” shows that the Bangladeshi diaspora living in Britain maintained a transnational alliance against the mining project. They could translate between locals and western NGOs. She narrates how they resisted a company in a host country. They did so by waging a movement in their host country and becoming new agent/actors in the transnational coalition against environmental injustice. The chapter titled “Pursuing Justice for All: Eviction and Environmental Injustice in Dhaka” draws on field data collected from the Sattola slum in Dhaka. Lutfun Nahar Lata, the author of the chapter, applies the concept of the “right to the city” offered by Lefebvre in analyzing how the urban poor get marginalized and how the state denies their housing rights. She emphasizes that achieving environmental justice for citizens requires access to the spaces of a city. The existing literature on the issue confirms that planners in most cities of the Global South often ignore the need for housing of the urban poor, compelling them to opt for informal settlements. The dwellers of such informal settlements or slums often face eviction for cleaning public spaces and building infrastructure to serve the upper and middle classes. The final chapter under this subsection presents another analysis of territorial space concerning environmental justice. Mrittika Kamal, in her chapter, “Rohingya Influx: Impacts on Environment and Local Host Communities in Bangladesh,” narrates how host and refugee communities are competing against each other over scarce resources, putting pressure on the environment and rights of Bangladeshi citizens. The 2017 Rohingya influx from Myanmar to Bangladesh is the second largest new refugee arrival recorded in history. Bangladesh is currently hosting at least 1.2 million Rohingyas, which has

Introduction

11

affected the host communities—both Bangali and indigenous—of Cox’s Bazar. They have lost their land, businesses, and social forestry programs to meet the needs of refugee camps set up. Given this situation, the tension between the locals and the Rohingyas is also growing. This chapter assesses the environmental, economic, and socio-political impacts on host communities caused by the Rohingya influx. While in the industrial and urban centers of the Global South, destruction of and extraction from the environment through urban and industrial activities create new spaces for politics, inside such industrial units exist one of the world’s worst work environments. It is thematically significant to understand how Bangladesh is gradually replacing other developing nations by becoming a dumping ground for environmentally hazardous industries and work environments coming from the Global North. The chapters under the subsection “Hazardous Work Environment” exemplify the inhumane working conditions, but one chapter is on how satisfaction with work brings efficiency in apparel production. The first chapter under the subsection is Fahmidul Haq’s “Ironeaters: A Story of Scrapped Men.” It is a review of Shaheen Dill-Riaz’s documentary Lohakhor, translated as Ironeaters. Through this review, we bring one of the most hazardous working environments in the world to light. The film is about the ship-breaking industry producing scraps used for building factories, roads, and buildings. In Bangladesh, the steel from recycled ships is re-rolled to be used directly, for example, in urban construction. In these ship-breaking yards, health and safety standards are minimal, and the state is somewhat reluctant to enforce environmental policies and laws. Salaries of the workers are the lowest in the world, and still, the industry does not suffer from a shortage of workers because desperate job seekers are always around. Fahmidul reviews the film to capture the journey of Berlin-based Bangladeshi documentary filmmaker Shaheen Dill-Riaz’s efforts in portraying the lives and struggles of the laborers, called Lohakhor or Ironeaters. The film, as described by Huq, tells the story of poverty-stricken farmers from northern Bangladesh who while trying to escape the annual famine end up finding jobs in the ship-breaking yard in the south. Fahmidul portrays how the film recounts the happenings in the shipyards and people’s struggle in a hazardous yet low-paid working environment and how scrapping of the metallic ships, the workers themselves turn into scrapped men in the ship-breaking process in Bangladesh. The apparel industry is another industrial sector marred with unsafe work environments for workers, industrial accidents, and protests. But it accounts for the dominant share of our GDP and grabs international media attention for accidents and compliance issues. The workers are also low paid. As a case in point, we have two chapters that include a photo essay by Taslima

12

Samina Luthfa et al.

Akhter titled “Death of a Thousand Dreams: A Documentary Photo Essay on the Rana Plaza Collapse and the Aftermath.” The photo essay highlights the working condition and vulnerabilities of the female apparel workers in the aftermath of the notorious Rana Plaza collapse. The photo essay is a part of the exclusive work Taslima has been doing since 2008 as a witness of history, an activist, and a photographer documenting the lives and struggles of garment workers in Bangladesh. Taslima has captured in graphic detail how the families of the injured and dead workers are doing after the Rana Plaza collapse. The incident raises questions about national-international factory owners, brands, and the government—about their role in ensuring a safe working environment. It also raises questions about the responsibilities of citizens and consumers. With this documentary photo story, Taslima portrays the narrative of the death of a thousand dreams. The other chapter under this subsection is by Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury. “Work Environment and its Effect on Job Satisfaction in the Ready-made Garments Industry in Bangladesh” is based on a quantitative analysis of recent survey data that explores the relationship between work environment and job satisfaction in the RMG sector. Using a sample of 1,019 women workers in Dhaka City, Zahid, reveals that there is variation in the workers’ perceived state of vulnerability. The author adopts an ordered-logit model with a composite measure of work satisfaction as the dependent variable. He shows that work satisfaction depends on several indicators like work safety, worker-supervisor relationship, teamwork, satisfaction with training, and relative duration of leisure. Probing further, he discloses that the higher the perceived level of work safety and the safety in living places, the higher the level of work satisfaction. According to the author, these findings have some implications: first, all women workers are not equally vulnerable, and hence, they need differential solutions; second, safeguarding the work environment will increase job satisfaction. This chapter shows us the way forward out of the impasse called workplace vulnerabilities in the Bangladeshi apparel industry. Part II: Water, Environment, and Victimhood Part II starts with a discussion on the Chakaria Sundarbans, a unique mangrove patch of 21,000 acres in the coastal district of Cox’s Bazar in the southeast of Bangladesh that has lost everything other than the name. Philip Gain, in his analysis, shows how international financial institutions, consecutive governments, and local ruling elites have coalesced to destroy the Chakaria Sundarbans for their profit. It is a historical account of the merger of development policies. It resulted from the granting of international financial assistance, adoption of neoliberal policy agenda by the developing countries

Introduction

13

in the 1970s–1980s, and the local elites’ hunger for “development.” This policy merger opened up the remote Chakaria Sundarbans for “development” interventions, and, in the process, the forest eventually disappeared from the map. The second chapter of this part is a critical review of a Bangla book titled Samta: A Tale of an Arsenic-Affected Village written by Monjuara Parveen. The book narrates the sufferings of arsenicosis patients at Samta, a village under the Jashore District. A young village girl has authored this book based on her heart-touching day-to-day notes. She depicts the lives, the pain, and the social conditions of the ailing inhabitants of Samta who are unaware of what they suffer from and how to treat the disease. The third chapter is based on Samari Chakma’s book Kaptai Bandh: BorPorong (Kaptai Dam: The Great Exodus), which recounts the forced migration of the local Chakma community as a consequence of a hydroelectric dam constructed in the early 1960s on the Karnafuli River of Rangamati District under the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Monzima Haque selects and translates two case studies from the said book. The chapter offers an alternative account of the development project and seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature to put “people first” in development. The final chapter of the section by Munasir Kamal and Mesbah Kamal is also on the same dam. However, it reveals the transformation of the collective trauma caused by territorial and cultural dispossession into socio-political consciousness that serves as a cultural resource for the Adivasis of Chittagong Hill Tracts. Part III: Ecocriticism and Creative Space for Environmental Justice Our “Ecocriticism and Creative Space for Environmental Justice” section begins with Golam Rabbani’s discussion on Lalon Shah and Radharaman Dutta—two famous Bauls of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. Ecocriticism evolved as an academic pursuit in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s with many precursors throughout the world. Rabbani locates ecocentrism in the folkloric and musical practices of these Bauls and examines their meditative method in practicing dhora-bauliana—the ritual of bonding with mother earth, trees, and animals, which he regards as “meditative activism.” The Bauls have a long-standing reputation for opposing various forms of social injustice. Keeping this in mind, the chapter gives us a detailed account of their environment-friendly practices. Rabindranath Tagore, among his myriad identities, was an environmentalist with crusading zeal. The second chapter of this section examines Rabindranath’s eco-consciousness as articulated in many songs, lectures, essays, fiction, plays, and letters over three decades. Rabindranath was a pioneer

14

Samina Luthfa et al.

of the environmental movement in the Indian subcontinent, and the chapter reflects on his legacy and continuing relevance in our time as we endeavor to preserve earth’s resources and develop awareness about environmental justice. Fakrul Alam focuses on Rabindranath as a forerunner of ecocriticism, and a storehouse of wisdom about environmental problems besetting the region and ways of overcoming them. Next, Shehreen Ataur Khan contrasts the rural and the urban in two of Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay’s novels. While nature bestows its opulence on rural and forested areas in Bibhutibhushan’s works, selfish beings control natural resources and refuse to share, and are even ready to destroy them. As in some chapters in the earlier sections of this volume, Bibhutibhushan’s works put a question mark on the concept of development. He shows that urbanization and increased agricultural production are not necessarily synonymous with development, especially when—as in Aranyak (Of the Forest) “development” leads to the destruction of the forest and displacement of its indigenous inhabitants. Shehreen, in this chapter, asks whether such development is avoidable by any means. In the following chapter, Sabrina Binte Masud demonstrates an alternative development view voiced through the Kahars in Tarashankar Bandyopadhyay’s Hansuli Banker Upakatha (Tale of the Hansuli Turn). Tarashankar, in his novel, represents the struggle of the unheard subalterns since the Kahars—a marginalized community whose story he depicts—must struggle with a cultured narrator who attempts to tell their tale. Eventually, as Sabrina’s reading shows, it is the narrative of the Kahar that sustains. Despite the mistakes of certain community members and the destruction of their village, the Kahars envisage a future that would surmount the limits of their traditional way of life and a mechanized present uprooting them from their land and culture. Next, Qazi Arka Rahman and Faria Alam explore the lives of the people intertwined with rivers in Adwaita Mallabarman’s Titas Ekti Nadir Nam (A River Called Titas) and Manik Bandopadhyay’s Padma Nadir Majhi (Boatman of the River Padma). The chapter analyzes the relationship between the rivers and the people who depend on them, connecting the worsening condition of the communities depicted with the irresponsible and unethical handling of habitat. Arka and Faria also study the eco-cinemas adapted from the said novels and examine the evolving relationship between river, land, locality, and people in the original texts and their adaptations. In the final chapter of this part, Soumya Sarker reviews the condition of the indigenous peoples portrayed in Mahasweta Devi’s Oronner Odhikaar (The Right of/to the Forest) and Selim Aal Deen’s Bonopangshul (The Burnt Forest). The two Adivasi communities—Munda for Mahasweta, and Mandai for Selim—though located in different geographical regions and historical periods, face the same end: dislocation from the land they claim their own

Introduction

15

but have no “legal” ownership over. The indigenous peoples in both texts lose their ancestral land and forest which provided them with food and habitation, making their lives uncertain. Soumya discloses that the marginalized are getting further marginalized. The transition of the state from being colonized to becoming independent makes no difference in their lives and may even exacerbate their condition. Part IV: Biodiversity, Ecosystem, and Politics of Sustainability This part of the edited volume begins with Lutfur Rahman’s chapter titled “Plant Biodiversity Management for Nutritional Food Security in Bangladesh.” Here, the agricultural scientist sheds light on existing practices and also describes the experiments of in-situ and ex-situ plant biodiversity management in Bangladesh to ensure nutritional food security at household and state levels. For doing so, the author reflects on the Participatory Process for Alleviating Poverty and the Maintaining Biodiversity and the Integrated Agriculture Project of BARC. These two models link all the household actors with more emphasis on female headed-households, farmers, scientists, relevant NGOs, and government actors, taking the gender perspective of plant biodiversity management into account. Md. Rezwanul Haque Masud, in the final chapter, examines the shortcomings of the UN Climate Change Conferences. He does so by keeping the power and interests of the participating countries in perspective. His focus is on the Paris Agreement. To investigate the gap between expectations and outcomes involving the climate change negotiations, the author studies Bangladesh as a case. We must acknowledge that this volume is not exhaustive of all the cases and literature on environmental and ecological issues that have so far been evident in Bangladesh. Another shortcoming is that we have not selected the contributors to this volume by treating the Bengal Delta as a single biospheric region. It could have been a good idea to see how the two Bengals—Bangladesh and the West Bengal—compare in their thoughts and philosophical positions, inhaling and breathing the same air, living in the same area of South Asia. Scott Slovic in his Foreword to this volume also notes that this edited volume understandably misses the creative performances which were a part of the International Interdisciplinary Conference on Ecocriticism, Environmental Justice, and Literature held at the University of Dhaka in August 2015. Nonetheless, this volume presents the most crucial ideas, analyses, and questions about the human-nature relationship that Bangladesh confronts today. From theory and politics of space involving power plants, mines, forest conservation sites, dams, refugee camps, and urban slums to hazardous

16

Samina Luthfa et al.

work environments in the apparel and ship-breaking industry have been highlighted in this volume. This volume also looks at how water, forest and environment become victims of the so-called development spree without any concern for sustainability for livelihood and environment. To do so, it represents case studies on the erased forest patches at Chakaria Sundarbans, arsenic pollution, and the impact of a dam in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Moreover, we have presented agricultural practices by local farmers’ and scientists’ collaboration that can help maintain biodiversity as well as musical and literary exercises that rely on ecocriticism and creative space for environmental justice. This volume ends with underlining the politics of sustainability through the UN framework for climate justice.

REFERENCES Anielski, M., and C. L. Soskolne. 2002. “Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) Accounting.” In Just Ecological Integrity: The Ethics of Maintaining Planetary Life, edited by Peter Miller and Laura Westra, 83–97. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Baird, J., R. Plummer, L. Schultz, D. Armitage, and Ӧ Bodin. 2018. “Integrating Conservation and Sustainable Development through Adaptive Co-management in UNESCO Biosphere Reserves.” Conservation & Society 16, no. 4: 409–419. Bridge, Gavin. 2004. “Mapping the bonanza: geographies of mining investment in an era of neoliberal reform.” The Professional Geographer 56, no. 3 (2004): 406-421. Carlsson, Lars, and Fikret Berkes. 2005. “Co-management: Concepts and Methodological Implications.” Journal of Environmental Management 75, no. 1 (April): 65–76. Dobson, Andrew. 2016. Environmental Politics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elkington, J.1994. “Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win–win–win Business Strategies for Sustainable Development.” Californian Management Review 36: 90–100. Emmerett, S., and D. E. Nye. 2017. The Environmental Humanities: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: MIT Press. EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency). 2018. “Environmental Justice.” Accessed February 7, 2021. https://www​.epa​.gov​/env​iron​ment​aljustice. Faber, Daniel R., and Deborah McCarthy. 2003. “Neo-liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice.” In Just Sustainabilities: Development in an Unequal World, edited by Julian Ageyman, Robert Doyle Bullard, and Bob Evans, 38–65. London: Earthscan. Guha, Ramachandra. 2000. Environmentalism: A Global History. New York: Longman. Heise, U. K. 2017. “Introduction.” In The Routledge Companion to the Environmental Humanities, edited by U. K. Heise, J. Christensen, and M. Niemann, 1–11. London: Routledge.

Introduction

17

Herbert, Joe. 2020. “Environmental Justice.” In Social Geographies: An Introduction, edited by Newcastle Social Geographies Collective, 340–350. London: Rowman and Littlefield. Hubell, J. A., and J. C. Ryan. 2022. Introduction to the Environmental Humanities. London: Routledge. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. New Jersey: Princeton. Khan, M. T. 2010. “The Nishorgo Support Project, the Lawachara National Park, and the Chevron Seismic Survey: Forest Conservation or Energy Procurement in Bangladesh?” The Journal of Political Ecology 17, no. 1: 68–78. Levy, D. L., and P. J. Newell. 2002. “Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance: Toward a Neo-Gramscian Synthesis.” Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 4: 84–101. Luthfa, S. 2017. “Transnational Ties and Reciprocal Tenacity: Resisting Mining in Bangladesh with Transnational Coalition.” Sociology 51, no. 1: 127–145. Lynch, Tony, and M. T. Khan. 2020. “Understanding What Sustainability is Not— and What it is.” The Ecological Citizen, 3 (Suppl B): 55–65. Martinez-Alier, Joan. 2014. “The Environmentalism of the Poor.” Geoforum 54 (July): 239–241. Martinez-Alier, Joan, Leah Temper, and Arnim Scheidal. 2016. “Is There a Global Environmental Justice Movement.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 43, no. 3: 731–755. Nelson, Fred, and Arun Agrawal. 2008. “Patronage or participation? Community‐ based natural resource management reform in sub‐Saharan Africa.” Development and change 39, no. 4 (2008): 557-585. Novotny, Patrick. 2000. Where We Live, Work, and Play: The Environmental Justice Movement and the Struggle for a New Environmentalism. Westport: Praeger. Schlosberg, David, and Lisette B. Collins. 2014. “From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice.” WIREs Climate Change 5, no. 3 (May/June): 359–374. https://doi​.org​/10​.1002​/wcc​.275. Seema, Sabiha A. 2021. “Adverse Effect of Air Pollution in Bangladesh.” Centre for Governance Studies, June 3, 2021. https://cgs​-bd​.com​/article​/3358​/Adverse​ -Effects​-of​-Air​-Pollution​-in​-Bangladesh. Taylor, Dorceta E. 1997. “American Environmentalism: The Role of Race, Class, and Gender in Shaping Activism 1820–1995.” Race, Gender & Class 5, no. 1: 16–62.

Part I

INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION, AND SPACE

Part Ia

ENVIRONMENT AND NEW POLITICS OF SPACE

Chapter 1

Growth and Disaster A Tale of Environmental Disaster in the Time of High Growth in Bangladesh Anu Muhammad

Nobody would publicly support a mad race for GDP growth at the cost of losing rivers, forests, air, and health. Despite the continuous commitments from the ruling elites regarding preserving our environment and ecology, the question remains why all this destruction is still happening. To answer the question, I hold the alliance involving governments, big business houses, international financial institutions (IFIs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and corporate think-tanks, responsible. This alliance is behind the projects ruining the environment, lives, and livelihood. It is not country-specific, rather global, and has an ideological legacy endorsed by mainstream economics, neoclassical, in particular. While developed countries have to preserve the environment within their borders because of public pressure, they still patronize financial institutions and corporate groups that create havoc in peripheral countries for high profit. Capitalism is ruling our world as a single system and thus dominating our lives of the present and future. In our global ecological system, non-human lives are no different and remain captive in the hands of this order. The rules of capitalism touch us all. In terms of domestic policies, the function of the capitalist system varies from one country to another. The fundamentals of capital—hungry for private profit at any cost—have been the dominant language of development, from the United States to Bangladesh. However, present global capitalism makes some rules more prominent than others. The increasing militarization, surveillance, environmental degradation, and the encroachment of rivers-wetland-pastures accompany the tremendous growth of destructive elements. All these trends characterize capitalist Projects of Environmental Destruction (PED). 23

24

Anu Muhammad

While John B. Foster and Robert W. McChesney terms this phase “surveillance capitalism” (2014) and Naomi Klein as “disaster capitalism” (2007), Samir Amin defines historic capitalism by three fundamental contradictions: “economic alienation, global polarization, and destruction of the natural environment” (Amin 1998, 85). Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras offer an observation to understand the current form of global extractive capitalism (cited in Foster and McChesney 2014): “[A]ccumulation by dispossession” is taking the form of land grabbing, enclosure of what remains of the global commons, the privatization and commodification of land and water, the extraction and pillage of available natural resources, and the degradation of the habitats and ecosystems on which the communities affected by the operations of extractive capital depend for their livelihood and way of life. (Foster and McChesney 2014, 6)

The nature of capitalist development in Bangladesh confirms high GDP growth but increasing surveillance, widespread repression, and unprecedented environmental disaster. In this chapter, I investigate the status of capitalism and environmental degradation in Bangladesh beginning with a brief account of the historical struggle of ideas on development and environment on a global scale. STRUGGLES ON IDEAS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT During the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, capitalist development took its root. The classical liberal school treated the environment as “gift of nature” for economic development, exploitation, and capital accumulation. Both classical and neoclassical theorists agree that for resource allocation and rationale distribution in any capitalist economy, the invisible hand is the most efficient component of the market. They advocate that in a “free market economy,” disequilibrium, surplus, or deficit do not continue to exist in the long run. The market is naturally capable of solving any crisis. This ideology of economics faced stiff challenges during the great depression of the 1930s. The devastating human suffering and material loss prompted Keynesian economics to dominate academia and policymakers. But the Keynesian and post-Keynesian ideas recognized that a state must play an instrumental role in capitalist development (Muhammad 2006b, 77). But none of those treat the environment as an all-important variable for analysis. Global mapping of countries took a new shape after the Second World War when several countries emerged as independent one. Addressing the development problems of these post-colonial countries became a political necessity

Growth and Disaster

25

for the former colonial West. Therefore, theories of economic development that construct “development economics” were born. Many development theories, known as “modernization theories,” including “Harrod-Domar Model,” “Theory of Labor Surplus Economy,” “Theory of Dual Economy,” “Big Push Theory,” “Theory of Balanced Growth,” “Theory of Unbalanced Growth,” “Ranis-Fei Model of Economic Growth,” and “Surplus Labor Model” dealt with the realities of the post-colonial countries (Martinussen 1997, for details). While focusing on the agricultural and industrial economies, these theories prescribe the necessity of a close relationship between the developing countries and the Western financial centers. It helps the underdeveloped countries access foreign aid and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the keys for their development. The primary goal of underdeveloped countries is to increase their aggregate growth rate. Benefits from it would trickle down to the masses. However, by the early 1970s, it became clear that these promises did not come true. Poverty, inequality, savings-investment gap, trade gap, technology gap all increased along with new indebtedness to the developed countries or their financial institutions. Another economic crisis, on a global scale, in the same period, led to the re-emergence of neoclassical schools, with a new rigor in both academic and policy arenas. It was the “period of transition from the state-led capitalist development to a new world order of free-market capitalism and neoliberal globalization” (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014, 8). This model got momentum after its “successful implementation” in Chile in the early 1970s, with thousands killed and many more disappeared under the autocratic regime led by General Augusto Pinochet. Milton Friedman, the guru of neoliberal economics from the University of Chicago, served as a special adviser to Pinochet. Naomi Klein shows how this model in different parts of the world has created “disaster capitalism” (2007, 13–21). She reveals how disaster capitalism becomes a complex process with war, genocide, occupation, militarization, and privatization that go hand in hand to give the corporate world a big success (Klein 2007, 299). The transition of the 1970s was associated with the geopolitical project designed by the ideologues of a neoliberal thought collective the Mont Pelerin Society. The regimes of Thatcher, Reagan, and Ziaul implemented the project in their countries in the 1980s under the influence of neoconservative think-tanks and policy forums such as “the Heritage Society, …the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other such international financial institutions” (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014, 254). The neoliberal model became more pervasive as the World Bank and IMF adopted the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)-based lending policies for the countries mired in international debt. The objective was to eliminate

26

Anu Muhammad

all obstacles to the free movement of capital. The Bretton Woods Institutions recommended ten policy instruments under SAPs. Those include (1) fiscal discipline (controlling budget deficit), (2) reducing government subsidies, (3) broadening the tax base, (4) interest rate liberalization, (5) market-based exchange rate, (6) trade liberalization, (7) dismantling barriers for FDI, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) property rights (Waeyenberge 2006, 28). All these, in a package, eventually became known as the Washington Consensus. The Washington consensus, since then, has been the driving force for the so-called “donors” or “development partners” in shaping peripheral economies. Their policies of “getting prices right” and “getting policies right” to “getting institutions right” have been aimed at preserving corporate interest. After the near collapse of old socialist projects, this model created an irresistible global wave. This neoliberal model, an orthodox version of “free market” capitalism, has been a theoretical tool to rationalize an aggressive model of capital accumulation in the phase of “late capitalism,” as coined by Ernest Mandel (1976). But the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 has shaken confidence in the model and raised widespread discontent. Different strands of economic thought contribute to development economics. The neoliberal framework provides the basis for economic policies adopted by peripheral economies. Neoclassical economics and modernization theories are the forerunners of this neoliberal framework. The modernization school has always been unwilling or incompetent when it comes to addressing the structural causes of the environmental crisis. It is true that “environmental pressures, long an international concern, have acquired a new urgency. Both the content and the quality of environmental discourse have undergone a shift in the past 20 years” (Yusuf and Stiglitz 2001, 238). Despite worldwide concern about climate change, mainstream economics stubbornly keeps a distance from this “non-economic” issue, as an “externality.”1 Neoclassical economics, inherently, cannot take the issue of environmental degradation into account. It understands human development only through the standard economic metrics like GDP that it can only calculate. Therefore, the extinction of species or the destruction of whole ecosystems is irrelevant to this view while capitalist production expands, and the GDP experiences an upward trend. Economists designate “negative ecological impacts” as mere “externalities.” For them, nature is a “free gift to capital” and thus, there is “no direct feedback mechanism intrinsic to the capitalist system that prevents environmental degradation on a planetary scale” (Foster 2015, 1–13).

Growth and Disaster

27

Marx, accordingly, cautions that the unbridled exploitation of nature would affect the metabolism of the earth. He identifies the risks that Mother Nature confronts with capitalist expansion. It happens not only due to the robbery of labor, but also due to the pilfering of nature. He insists: Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as bonipatres families [good heads of the household]. (Marx 1981, 911)

Dependency theorists, a group of critical development theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, opposed the modernization school through their historical, holistic, and non-prescription approach. They primarily focused on the causes of dependence and underdevelopment of the peripheral economies. These theorists investigated the problems of underdevelopment as an effect of old colonial rule and later neocolonial dependency. They emphasized the global connection behind poverty, underdevelopment, and the environmental crisis of any country. They brought new insights into development discourse and highlighted the dominating power of the capitalist West in all aspects across the globe including military, economic, ideological, and political power (For more detail, see Muhammad 2006a). However, since the 1950s, the modern environmental movement had been evolving in reaction to increasing pressure on the environment. William Kapp (1950) and Barry Commoner (1971) then reached back to Marx’s idea of the metabolic rift in referring to ecological contradictions. In the 1980s, the eco-socialist idea was getting its ground with the growing recognition of “global ecology” as various problems related to the earth’s system grew in the Soviet Union (Foster 2015). John Foster, Brett Clark, and Richard York, by integrating Marxian “metabolic rift analysis” with “planetary-boundaries framework,” argued that today’s planetary emergency related to crossing boundaries created “the global ecological rift” (2011, 18). They referred to the “disruption and destabilization of the human relationship to nature on a planetary scale, arising from the process of capital accumulation without end” (Foster et al. 2011, 14–15). Not only does capitalist accumulation cause environmental degradation, it is also brushed under the carpet as “not-happening” by them. Environmental economists point out that conventional GDP measures are deficient in several respects. First, they measure only the value of goods and services that move through markets. Second, they do not allow for addressing natural resource depletion (Field 2012, 13). That is why global leaders enthusiastically accept GDP as a development measure since it is convenient for hiding many such internal hemorrhages.

28

Anu Muhammad

The UN Statistics Division introduces a System of National Accounts (SNA) for measuring economic activity, offering an effective alternative. It still has several drawbacks. They are: (1) it overlooks natural capital, (2) it does not take the degradation of environmental quality into account, and (3) it involves expenditure for the maintenance of environmental quality as income (Mondal 2014). Attempts have been made to arrive at a measure of environmentally adjusted Net National Product (NNP), but relevant shadow prices were not readily available (Sankar 2001, 14–15).

BANGLADESH: HIGH GROWTH WITH HIGH DISASTER Bangladesh is now a nearly 300 billion US dollar economy with 160 million people in a 148,000-square-km area. Recently, the country has entered the category of developing nation with a new per capita income of 1,700 US dollars per year (in 2010, it was 755 USD) (GOB 2011, 2018). In the last ten years or so, the national economy has experienced a steady and upward trend in GDP growth and crossed 7 percent. The remittance and earnings from the apparel industry are playing a crucial role in sustaining economic growth. There is a widely held belief that Bangladesh will be the 26th largest economy in the world by 2031. Evidence shows that this growth has conjoined twin syndrome, as environmental destruction is on a simultaneous rise in terms of air quality, water pollution, and deforestation. Poverty and inequality are also following the same path with an ever-rising regional and social marginalization. Even a World Bank study on Bangladesh admits: These recent and ongoing urban development trends are coming at the expense of the services and benefits that the city’s natural ecosystems (forests, mangroves, and wetlands) provide toward urban resilience. (The World Bank 2018, 50)

The U.S. Air Quality Index shows that the air quality of Dhaka is the worst of all other cities in the world (The Dhaka Tribune February 4, 2018).Thousands of brick kilns increase their production in and around Dhaka during the winter for the construction sector. These brick kilns are responsible for the degrading air quality of the city (Ahmed December 3, 2019). Even cities like Cox’s Bazar are not different. While pointing the finger at the environmental degradation of those cities, the same report identifies “loss and degradation of forests, increased landslide risk, reduced water retention capacity, increased siltation, and choked up drainage canals” (ibid 2019). It also reveals that “while air pollution is the leading environmental risk factor in all South Asian countries, the levels in Bangladesh are the highest in the region” (World Bank 2018, 8).

Growth and Disaster

29

Furthermore, Islam,Uddin, Tareq, Shammi, Kamal, Sugano, Kurasaki, Saito, Tanaka and Kuramitz show that Bangladesh now has only about 200 rivers (from more than 700), most of them are in dire conditions because of pollution and encroachment (2015, 280–294). The Buriganga, Shitalakhya, Turag, and Balu, the four major rivers in Dhaka and Narayanganj, receive 60,000 cubic meters of toxic waste every day from nine major industrial clusters2 (ibid, 281). Textile industries are responsible for an annual discharge of around 56 million tons of waste and 5 million tons of sludge, while Tannery accounts for 88 million tons of solid waste (ibid, 282). The situation has deteriorated faster in recent years. It clearly shows the price Bangladesh is internally paying for its so-called economic growth. Moreover, other global and regional factors such as global warming, dam, and barrage construction upstream on commonly shared rivers by India and China, and river linking projects by India are adding further woes to the already sorry state of the environment in Bangladesh (Islam 2016, 1). Forest cover depletion is another environmental price Bangladesh is paying dearly. Bangladesh’s forest cover has come down to 7 from 9 percent of the total land (instead of the required 25 percent coverage) because of deforestation for development projects and encroachment by powerful elites (Hussain, 2018). The latest Forestry Master Plan of Bangladesh (2017–2036) estimates that “only about 15% of the natural sal forests in the plains and 11% of natural hill forests are now left in the country and these too are under severe biotic pressure”(Bangladesh Forest Department 2016, X). Destructive commercialization, encroachment-friendly policies, and investment have led to deforestation in Bangladesh. The Ministry of Forest and Environment of Bangladesh confirms that this decade of high economic growth coincided with the highest deforestation rate. Only in Gazipur (a forest area near Dhaka), 79 percent of the forest disappeared in the same period (The Bonik Barta March 7, 2022 ). Despite the claims made by neoclassical economists that economic growth automatically reduces poverty, GDP growth does not match with poverty reduction in Bangladesh. According to government estimates, 24.3 percent of people were under the poverty line in 2014 compared to 31.5 percent in 2010 (GOB 2017). Even when the Bangladesh government estimated the national average of poverty to be around 24.3 percent in, regional data showed high regional disparity in regions where poverty is as high as 60 percent and more. In Kurigram, a northern district, poverty is as high as 71 percent (GOB 2017). So, higher growth is unable to reduce poverty in regional poverty pockets. Furthermore, Bangladesh is on the top of the list of fast growth of rich people (Wealth-X 2018). The country is, indeed, showing an alarming picture of social inequality too. In 2010, the lowest 5 percent (income group) earned 0.78 percent of the national income, which dropped in 2016 to 0.23 percent

30

Anu Muhammad

on a high growth year. On the other hand, the highest 5 percent earned 25 percent in 2010; that increased to 28 percent in 2016. In 2010, the income ratio between the bottom five and top five was 1:32, which reached 1:121 in 2016. Therefore, inequality increased by 400 percent in six years. It, however, does not include unaccounted wealth and the income of the rich and is, therefore, a conservative estimate (calculated from GOB 2017).

LUCRATIVE COMMISSION, CORRUPTION, AND CORPORATE PROFIT Since the 1980s, the neoliberal model of development has emerged as a theoretical tool to rationalize the aggressive mode of capital accumulation in Bangladesh. This model with Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) as its driver achieved privatization of education and health care, land grabbing projects, and privatization of common property including natural resources— dismantling of public services as a visible outcome of its roadmap. Privatization of the energy and power sector and bringing multinationals are a direct outcome of the neoliberal prescription. Neoliberal International Financial Institutions advocate deregulation, sectoral restructuring, and privatization of oil, gas, and mining sectors on the pretext that assists state-enterprises transition to the private sector—reducing the drain on the public sector, lowering costs of production, and providing a level playing field that encourages entrepreneurs to enter a competitive market. In reality, the opposite has happened since the prescribed policy shift increased public expenditure instead of reducing drainage of public resources. The government has allotted more subsidies to the companies. And for doing so, it has increased even the gas price for household users marred with the absence of an accountability mechanism. After giving several gas blocks to the multinationals, the country lost 550 bcf gas due to blow-outs in Magurchara (June 14, 1997) and Tengratila (January and June 2005) (Muhammad 2014, 59–67). The amount of gas burnt equals the gas that could have been used for power generation for nearly two years for the whole of Bangladesh (Muhammad 2014). These two blow-outs hit hard on the “efficiency of IOC” myth. But compensation due from the U.S. Company Chevron and Canadian company NIKO for these disasters remains unrealized. The import price of the gas lost in Magurchara and Tengratila amounts to more than US$5 billion, which is nearly eight times the average yearly budget allocation for the energy sector (Muhammad 2014). No government since 1997 has taken any step to realize the compensation. It is also worth mentioning that the World Bank, ADB, or other IFIs that are vocal advocates for International Oil and Gas Companies (IOCs) efficiency have remained silent for long about this compensation.

Growth and Disaster

31

Such a trend has not been limited only to the oil-gas deals. In recent years, it extended to multiple big projects that include, for example, Ruppur nuclear power plant being constructed without Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), several coal-based power plants threatening to destroy Sundarbans and coastal zones. When corruption and commission decide the course and nature of the deals, corporate interests dominate the development motive. When international development agencies and ministries turn into center of corporate lobbyists, the country becomes the worst victim of the “resource curse” syndrome. The reign of local-global profiteers and grabbers ensures that “development” is founded on neoliberal policy and becomes disastrous for present and future generations. The Rampal and Phulbari projects are two relevant examples in this regard.

THE COASTAL ZONE AND THE KILLING PROJECTS The health of the coastal zone is crucial not only for coastal people, but also for the ecological system essential for the people in the whole region. The coastal zone is a “mixture of very old settlements and the recently developed landmass” (Hussain 2013, 3). The newly accreted fragile land of more than fifty islands constitutes the “exposed coast,” while old and stable land mainly form the “interior coast.” The coastal region, covering an area of about 46,285 of the coastal region, constitutes 32 percent of the total land area of Bangladesh (ibid). It is also important to note that “the 149 coastal sub-districts in 19 districts accommodate nearly 38 million people in about 8.2 million households” (ibid, 6). As Amitav Ghosh elaborates on the danger of climate change for this coastal region, he argues that some of the world’s worst disasters have occurred in the Bengal Delta. In 1971 (actually the end of 1970), Bhola cyclone is thought to have killed 3,00,000 people . As recently as 1991, a cyclone in Bangladesh resulted in 1, 38,000 dead, of whom 90 percent were women. Rise of the sea level and the increasing intensity of storms will make large-scale inundations more likely all along the coastline” (Ghosh 2016, 84).

According to Ghosh, Bangladesh was hit by forty-eight severe cyclonic storms and forty-nine cyclonic storms between 1877 and 2016. Ghosh also showed that “rising sea levels could result in the migration of up to 50 million people in India and 75 million in Bangladesh” (ibid, 85). In this context, Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest, is regarded as the biggest protector for the coastal people against storms, cyclones, and inundations. It is

32

Anu Muhammad

extraordinarily rich in biodiversity3and unique because of its history, size, productivity, and significance in balancing the local ecosystem. UNESCO declared it as a world heritage site. About 200 years ago, the Sundarbans was much larger than its present state and was then measured to be about 16,700 square kilometers4. Nearly 70 percent of the present Sundarbans is in Bangladesh, and the rest is in India. It is now estimated to be about 6,000 sq km in Bangladesh, of which about 1,700 sq km is occupied by water bodies consisting of rivers, small streams, and canals.5 Despite its crucial importance, the Sundarbans has become a victim to many state-sponsored harmful projects of India and Bangladesh. The Farakka barrage in India caused salinity intrusion in Sundarbans, and irrigation and flood control projects in Bangladesh also created problems. Now the very existence of the forest is threatened by a 1320 MW coal-fired power plant at Rampal in the larger Sundarban area. This proposed power plant is a joint venture between the Indian state-owned National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Bangladesh state-owned Power Development Board (PDB). The Indian EIA guideline 2010 bars establishing similar projects within 25 kilometers of ecologically sensitive areas that include forests, rivers, and sanctuaries in India. But the site of Rampal coal-fired power plant is located in the north of the Sundarbans, only 14 kilometers away from its boundary and within 4 kilometers of the designated Ecologically Critical Area (ECA). This site is only 2 meters above sea level. It falls within a tidal delta region that has experienced a surge as high as 5 meters and witnessed sixteen cyclones in the past twenty-five years. From the very beginning, the project was developing with serious irregularities. The government had selected a natural wetland and fertile agricultural land for the project. The land acquisition process was also faulty and coercive. The signing of the contract also lacked transparency. The Indian company NTPC and the Bangladeshi PDB even signed the joint venture agreement on January 29, 2012 before getting approval for the EIA. A recent investigative report revealed that the government handed around two-thirds of the acquired land to the local leaders and ruling party men. One such leader proudly claimed that they had played a key role when the government acquired land for the plant by thwarting the local protestors and long marches against the power plant (Muhammad, 2018). The environmental devastation for the plant is going to be immense. The plant requires 4.72 million tons of coal annually, which will be transported to the project site through the waterways of the Sundarbans (nearly 13,000 tons per day) with serious risk of “coal spillage, ballast water, bilge water, oil spillage, lubricant, and garbage” (NCBD 2016). The current transportation system in the Sundarbans area itself is creating “severe sound and water pollution around the forest ecology, and deadly accidents with vessels sunk with pollutant items” (NCBD 2016). The management, precaution, and response of the government

Growth and Disaster

33

to tackle these accidents are currently so poor that the risks associated with the transportation of coal through the Sundarbans remain high. Zoologists have expressed their concern over the emission of toxic substances from the coal-fired power plant. They include arsenic, lead, mercury, nickel, vanadium, beryllium, barium, cadmium, chromium, selenium, and radium capable of contaminating the air and water to such an extent that it would affect the reproductive health system of the wildlife in the Sundarbans (NCSSBD 2017). Scientists are also concerned that coal-fired pollution will threaten the rare species of birds in the mangrove forest. The proposed Rampal power plant is “fraught with unacceptable risk, out of step with the times, and would set Bangladesh back”6. This project has become a center of attraction for other harmful businesses in and around the Sundarbans. In a large area of the Sundarbans, several corporate houses have already erected billboards declaring their new profitmaking ventures in the area. New shipyards, shipbreaking yards, five-star hotels, and aggressive tourism are in the making. Relevant authorities are also planning gas exploration and security installations in the area. The government is also planning a second nuclear power plant on the coastal belt. Independent experts from home and abroad have pointed out many aspects of the pressing threat of these projects for the Sundarbans. UNESCO, South Asians for Human Rights, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEFA), among others, have made their independent studies and reached the same conclusion that the project will be disastrous for the Sundarbans. Strong public protests have entered the eighth year to demand scrapping the project and saving the Sundarbans. In March 2016, the UNESCO World Heritage Center and International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) conducted “a reactive monitoring mission to assess the conservation of this iconic area” (UNESCO 2016). In October , 2016, the World Heritage Center and IUCN released the final report of the mission. The report concludes that the proposed Rampal power plant poses a serious threat to the Heritage site. They expressed their concerns over the pollution from coal ash by air, wastewater and waste ash, increased shipping and dredging, and the cumulative impact of industrial and related development infrastructure. The mission recommended, in clear terms, that the Rampal power plant project be canceled and relocated to a more suitable location. In 2017, in its final decision, UNESCO urged the Bangladesh government “to make constant efforts to fully implement all the other recommendations made by the 2016 Reactive Monitoring mission” (World Heritage Committee 2017). It also recommended: [T]he Committee requests the State Party not to proceed with the Rampal power plant project in its current location and to relocate it to a more suitable location where it would not negatively impact the OUV of the property. (ibid 2017)

34

Anu Muhammad

A recent study on financing the Rampal project shows an evil alliance among global capital actors. Despite India’s key role in developing Rampal, the project is being quietly backed by “some of the largest players in global finance,” who have poured hundreds of millions of dollars in capital into the companies developing it, according to an investigation conducted for this report (van Gelder et al. 2018). Many of these investors are profiting from the project despite having social and environmental guidelines that should preclude them from financing companies like NTPC, “these include development finance institutions whose mandate is to foster sustainable development and poverty alleviation” (ibid). For example, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank Group’s private sector arm, provided “half a billion dollars in loans to six Indian commercial banks, which have gone on to provide billions of dollars of financing to the project’s developers, NTPC, India Export-Import Bank, Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited and Coal India” (ibid). In October 2016, Roasa also revealed hidden support by IFC for Rampal and other harmful NTPC projects (2017, 1–14). In addition to the IFC, the UK’s development finance institution, the CDC, and the World Bank, which provides loans to governments, have similarly funded financial intermediaries helping to bankroll Rampal (ibid, 3–5). The World Bank also has an active loan on its books, worth $532 million, to finance the modernization of Coal India. Meanwhile, the private financial sector is backing and profiting from Rampal. U.S.-based BlackRock and Vanguard, the world’s largest asset managers, own tens of millions of dollars of equity and debt in NTPC, India Export-Import Bank, Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, and Coal India (ibid, 5–6). Some of Japan’s largest commercial banks, including Mizuho and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, have provided corporate loans, with few strings attached to the Indian companies developing Rampal (ibid, 6). Therefore, the global alliance of destruction is still moving forward, denying continuous public protests, strong public opinion, and global-national warnings by independent experts against the project. Profit at the cost of people and the environment remains the main guiding force of this evil alliance.

OPEN-PIT MINING AND THE PEOPLES’ RESISTANCE: PHULBARI Bangladesh has five coal mines with approximately three billion tons of coal reserves. Phulbari is one of them. People’s resistance in Phulbari has challenged the mining plan to destroy people’s livelihood and environment. Asia Energy, a newly formed company, incorporated in London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market, was trying to execute an open-pit mining

Growth and Disaster

35

project in a densely populated, water-rich, three cropped area against local community’s will. Moreover, with only 6 percent royalty for Bangladesh, 75–80 percent of the coal was planned for export through Sundarbans mangrove forest. An expert committee, formed by the then government in 2006, gave their opinion against the project and termed it legally flawed, environmentally disastrous, and economically harmful for the national interest. Its shareholders, among others, were Polo Resources USA, RAB Capital, UBS, Fidelity Group, Barclays, Credit Suisse, LR Global, Ospraie Management, Capital Group, and Argos Greater Europe Fund (Muhammad 2014, 59–67). This project faced strong resistance, first by the local community, then by the national organization for safeguarding national interests and the environment. The main reasons for opposing this project include eviction of many local inhabitants, dewatering and damage to the most potential and massive aquifer of northwestern Bangladesh, groundwater depletion, the risk of national environmental disaster, and the loss of food production. There was a strong demonstration of nearly 80,000 on August 26, 2006, demanding to scrap the project. Three people were killed and hundreds injured when paramilitary border guards opened fire. As the peoples’ uprising spread all over the country, it compelled the government to sign an agreement (known as Phulbari Agreement) with the local people7 on August 30, 2006. The agreement incorporated several demands. They included: scrapping the Phulbari coal project, ousting Asia Energy from the country, rejecting open-pit mining anywhere in the country, and consulting with the local people regarding the mining method and other steps for coal development and utilization, keeping national interests in focus (ibid). Asia Energy changed its name to Global Coal Management after the August 2006 uprising and bloodshed in Phulbari. However, the people’s resistance, the Phulbari agreement, and the expert committee’s recommendations could not stop lobbying for the project by vested local and foreign interest groups.8

CONCLUSION: THE WAY OUT Many global environmental initiatives are taking place with a view to facing the alarming level of climate change. Since 1992, United Nations negotiators have tried to reach an effective deal to fight climate change. In 1997, world leaders signed the Kyoto Protocol that assigned targets to the developed world, but the United States never ratified it. Other large polluters, including China and India, never joined the negotiation table, and therefore the deal remained meaningless. In 2009, 2014, 2015, and 2021 world leaders tried to reach unanimous consent required for legal enforcement of environmental regulation to force

36

Anu Muhammad

governments to reduce emission and pollution. In 2015, world leaders finalized the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the declaration to ensure a world where consumption and production patterns and use of natural resources— air to land, from rivers, lakes, and aquifers to oceans and seas— are sustainable9. Despite all these commitments, global development has been continuing in its “business as usual” path. Partha Dashgupta rightly points out, “contemporary models of economic growth and development regard nature to be a fixed, indestructible factor of production. It is wrong. Nature is a mosaic of degradable assets” (2013, 40). For Bangladesh, despite the endorsement of SDGs and active participation in climate change negotiations, the ruling class has been proceeding fast with unsustainable development (USD) projects. Such projects include flood control and irrigation projects; killing rivers; coal-fired power plants destroying Sundarbans and the coastal region; Ruppur nuclear power plant putting the country in unimaginable danger; the construction boom encroaching and grabbing agricultural lands, hills, rivers, wetland, canals, forest land, open space; and the privatization of common property. All these are contributing to both the high growth of GDP and the large-scale destruction of the environment. Nobody would deny that Bangladesh needs a substantial increase in power generation, but not at the cost of the survival of millions. Taking that demand as an opportunity, the Bangladesh government has opened the sector to big corporate groups for building massive coal-fired power plants and generating nuclear power. Given the geological and demographic conditions of Bangladesh, all these projects are threats to the environment and public health of the country. While consecutive governments of Bangladesh are pursuing corporate-controlled, private profit-centric, debt-dependent, and environmentally disastrous energy and power policy, the democratic peoples’ movement demands to scrap anti-people and anti-environment deals. It advances “the vision of equity, pro-environment energy security and pro-people technological advancement on the other” (NCBD 2017). For cherishing people’s aspirations, the National Committee has come up with an alternative energy and power plan, containing the vision of a progressive, egalitarian, democratic, pro-nature, and pro-human development model. With the two-decade-long experience of people’s movements in addition to research, investigation, and dialogue with concerned scientists, environmentalists, engineers, and renewable energy experts from all around the world, the National Committee introduced an alternative energy sector master plan for the people of Bangladesh on July 22, 2017. The aim is to meet energy and power demand in the future without harming people and the environment. This plan proposed by the National Committee has prioritized people’s ownership of natural resources, protection of the environment, development

Growth and Disaster

37

of national capability, and use of environment-friendly technology. The committee clearly shows that the Rampal, Phulbari, and Ruppur projects are not necessary for generating power keeping pace with its increasing demand in the country. There are many better alternatives (NCBD 2017). The government has shown little interest in this alternative because the alternative roadmap will not generate power for-profit and the government is serving to preserve neoliberal profiteering of the energy sector, expanding corporate plunder at the cost of people and the environment. Nearly three decades ago, the UN Commission on Environment and Development articulated the emergency of addressing environmental issues for sustainable development. The commission insisted that “it is impossible to separate economic development issues from environmental issues; many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon which they must be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic development. Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems. It is, therefore, futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality” (WCED 1987, 3). Therefore, development should aim at GDP growth without long-term irreversible destruction of nature and threat to human survival. We must not reduce economic development to “growth” and “construction.” We need to take ecological balance and quality of air and water into consideration for undertaking any project. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis must include a social and environmental cost. We cannot compromise fertile lands and the river flow. The ownership of people and participation should dominate the selection process of any project involving fertile land, water, and common property. At every phase, consultation with the public and their consent must be pre-conditions. We must ensure transparency and accountability and cannot privatize common property. Foster was right to point out that “in the not-too-distant future, an ‘environmental proletariat’—of which signs are already present—will almost inevitably emerge from the combination of ecological degradation and economic hardship, particularly at the bottom of society” (2015, 11). Bangladesh is already appearing as a clear case of creating an environmental proletariat, and the present growth model is undoubtedly going to increase that pressure immensely. I agree with Naomi Klein that “climate change could become a catalyzing force for positive change” (2014, 7). Klein proposed a list of the changes that require public action and reminded that we should reclaim people’s ownership and authority over their lives and the policymaking process. We put pressure on the government to invest in public infrastructures that include mass transit and affordable housing, essential services such as energy and water. We should also “reclaim our democracies from corrosive corporate influence” (ibid, 8).

38

Anu Muhammad

NOTES 1. “While the ecologists approach environmental problems from the viewpoint of all living organisms, economists, particularly those trained in the utilitarian framework, adopt an anthropocentric approach to the problem” (Sankar 2001, 2–3). 2. For extensive review of modernization and dependency theories, see Muhammad, 2006a. 3. These include Tongi, Hazaribagh, Tejgaon, Tarabo, Narayanganj, Savar, Gazipur, Dhaka Export Processing Zone, Ghorshal (Islam et al. 2015, 281). 4. The name Sundarbans is a combination of two Bangla words, Sundar and Bans. Sundar means beautiful and Bans means forests. So, in English, Sundarbans means the beautiful forests. 5. For details, see, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Banglapedia, National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, June 2012. http://en​.banglapedia​.org​/index​.php​/Sundarbans,​_The. Banglapedia published by Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. See: http://en​.banglapedia​ .org​/index​.php​?title​=Sundarbans download date: 12.1.2022. If we broaden the definition and include the lost area then the Sundarbans becomes much bigger. Annu Jalais, anthropologist researcher, estimated: “The total area of the Sundarbans—water, forested island, inhabited cultivated islands, and some parts of the Bengali mainland—is 40,000 sq​.k​m. Of this whole area, the total land area of the WB (India) Sundarbans is about 9630 sq​.k​m, of which the uninhabited portion is just under half”. 6. Risky and Over-Subsidised: A Financial Analysis of the Rampal Power Plant”, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2016, http://ieefa​.org​/wp​ -content​/uploads​/2016​/06​/Risky​-and​-Over​-Subsidised​-A​-Financial​-Analysis​-of​-the​ -Rampal​-Power​-Plant-​_June​-2016​.pdf. 7. The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, Bangladesh (NCBD) represented the people. 8. US and British administrations were also busy implementing the project. Wikileaks and British parliamentary proceedings carry some evidence. “Memorandum submitted by the World Development Movement”, www​.parliament​.uk, http:// www​.publications​.parliament​.uk​/pa​/jt200910​/jtselect​/jtrights​/5​/5we19​.htm. 9. “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, United Nations, https://sus​tain​able​deve​lopment​.un​.org​/post2015​/tra​nsfo​rmin​ gourworld.

REFERENCES Ahmed, Wasi. 2019. “Brick Kilns and Dhaka’s Air Quality.” The Financial Express, December 3, 2019. https://thefinancialexpress​.com​.bd​/public​/index​.php​/views​/ brick​-kilns​-and​-dhakas​-air​-quality​-1575389360. Accessed January 18, 2022. Amin, Samir. 1998. Spectres of Capitalism: A Critique of Current Intellectual Fashions. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Growth and Disaster

39

Bangladesh Forest Department, 2016. Bangladesh Forestry Master Plan 2017-2036. http://pubdocs​.worldbank​.org​/en​/848671521827530395​/FMP​-Full​-report​-final​.pdf Accessed January 18 2022. Commoner, Barry. 1971. The Closing Circle. New York: Knopf. Daily Bonik Barta. March 7 2022. “” Accessed: July 06 2022 https://bonikbarta​.net​/home​/news​_description​/292435/ Dasgupta, Partha. 2013. “The Nature of Economic Development and the Economic Development of Nature.” Economic & Political Weekly (EPW) 48, no. 51 (December): 38–51. http://dx​.doi​ .org​/10​.2139​/ssrn​.2352914. Field, Barry C. 2012. Natural Resource Economics. Illinois: Waveland. Foster, John Bellamy, and Brett Clark. 2018. “The Robbery of Nature, Capitalism and the Metabolic Rift.” Monthly Review 70, no. 3 (July): 1–20. https://doi​.org​/10​ .14452​/MR​-070​-03​-2018​-07​_1. Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York. 2011. The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review Press. Foster, John Bellamy, and Robert W. McChesney. 2014. “Surveillance Capitalism Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age.” Monthly Review 66, no. 3 (July): 1. https://doi​.org​/10​.14452​/MR​-066​-03​-2014​ -07​_1​.Ghosh, Amitav. 2016. The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. New York: Penguin India, pp. 84–95. Ghosh, Amitav. 2016. The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Government of Bangladesh (GOB). 2011. Bangladesh Economic Review. Dhaka: Finance Division, Ministry of Finance. Government of Bangladesh (GOB). 2017. Preliminary Report on Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016–2017. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). Government of Bangladesh (GOB). 2018. Bangladesh Economic Review. Dhaka: Finance Division, Ministry of Finance. Hussain, Anwar. 2018. “Experts: Bangladesh’s Forest Coverage Under 10%”, Dhaka Tribune, March 23, 2018, https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/environment​/2018​/03​/23​/experts​-bangladeshs​-forest​-coverage​-10 Accessed January 18, 2022. Hussain, S. G. 2013. “An Introduction to the Coasts and the Sundarbans.” In Shores of Tear, edited by Philip Gain, 1–19. Dhaka: Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD). Islam, Md. S, Uddin, M. K., Tareq, S. M., Shammi, M., Kamal, A. K. I., Sugano, T., Kurasaki, M., Saito, T., Tanaka, S., and Kuramitz, H. 2015. “Alteration of Water Pollution Level With the Seasonal Changes in Mean Daily Discharge in Three Main Rivers Around Dhaka City, Bangladesh.” Environments 2, no. 3: 280–294. Islam, Nazrul. 2016. Let the Delta Be a Delta. Dhaka: Eastern Academic. Jalais, Annu. 2010. Forest of Tigers. Oxford: Routledge. Kapp, William. 1950. The Social Costs of Private Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

40

Anu Muhammad

Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan. Klein, Naomi. 2014. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster. Mandel, E. 1976. Late Capitalism. Translated From the German by Joris De Bres. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc. Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development. London: Zed Books. Marx, Karl. 1981. Capital, Vol. 3. New York: Penguin. Mondal, Puja. 2014. “Green Accounting: Need, Objectives, Problems and Other Details.” Environmental Economics. https://www​.yourarticlelibrary​.com​/economics​/environmental​-economics​/green​-accounting​-need​-objectives​-problems​-and​ -other​-details​/39675. Muhammad, Anu. 2006a. Punjir Antarjatikikaran ebong Anunnata Biswa [Internationalization of Capital and the Underdeveloped World]. Dhaka: SrabanPrakashani. Muhammad, Anu. 2006b. “Ideology in Economics and Neoliberal Reforms.” Jahangirnagar Economic Review 17, no. 1 (June): 73–91. Muhammad, Anu. 2011. Development or Destruction. Dhaka: Sraban Prakashani. Muhammad, Anu. 2014. “Natural Resources and Energy Security: Challenging the ‘Resource-Curse’ Model in Bangladesh.” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 4 (January): 59–67. Muhammad, Anu. February 5 2018. Sundarbans, Rampal Coal-Power Plant, Peoples Movement. In: Shuddhaswar (Free Voice), Issue 6. Accessed 06.07.2022 https://shuddhashar​.com​/anu​-muhammad​-sundarbans​-rampal​-coal​-power​-plant​-and​ -peoples​-movement/ NCBD. 2016. “Scrap Rampal Power Plant Project, Save Sunderbans.” New Age, October 18, 2016. http://www​.newagebd​.net​/print​/article​/1039. NCBD. 2017. “The Alternative Power and Energy Plan for Bangladesh: Draft for Consultation Prepared by National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Ports, Bangladesh (NCBD).” July 22, 2017. http://ncbd​.org​/ wp​-content​/uploads​/2018​/01​/The​-Alternative​-Power​-and​-Energy​-Plan​-for​-Bangladesh​-by​-NCBD​.pdf. NCSSBD. 2017. “Expert Analysis on the Impact of Coal fired Power Plant on Sundarban.” http://ncssbd​.org​/all​-resources​/page​/2/. Roasa, D. 2017. Time to Come Clean. Inclusive Development International, BIC Europe, Centre for Financial Accountability, pp. 1–14. Sankar, Ulaganathan, ed. 2001. Environmental Economics. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. The Dhaka Tribune. 2018. “Dhaka Most Polluted City in the World.” The Dhaka Tribune, February 4, 2018. https://archive​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/environment​ /2018​/01​/30​/us​-aqi​-dhaka​-worst​-air. Accessed January 18, 2022. UNESCO. 2016. “Report of the Joint World Heritage Center/IUCN Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Sundarbans World Heritage Site (Bangladesh), 22–28 March 2016.” http://whc​.unesco​.org​/en​/documents​/148097.

Growth and Disaster

41

van Gelder, Jan Willem, and Joeri de Wilde. 2018. Financing of Rampal Coal-Fired Power Plant. Washington, DC: Bank Track. Veltmeyer, Henry, and James Petras. 2014. The New Extractivism: A Post-Neoliberal Model or Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century? New York: Zed Books. Waeyenberge, Elisa Van. 2006. “From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: Illusions of Development.” In The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus, edited by K. S. Jomo and Ben Fine, 17–32. New Delhi: Tulika. World Bank. 2018. Enhancing Opportunities for Clean and Resilient Growth in Urban Bangladesh: Country Environmental Analysis 2018. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Heritage Committee. 2017. State of Conservation: The Sundarbans (Bangladesh). World Heritage Committee, UNESCO. http://whc​.unesco​.org​/en​/soc​/3563. Accessed January 5, 2022. World Ultra Wealth Report. 2018. https://www​.wealthx​.com​/report​/world​-ultra​ -wealth​-report​-2018/. Accessed October 15, 2018. Yusuf, Shahid, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2001. “Development Issues: Settled and Open.” In Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective, edited by Gerald M. Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 227–268. New York: World Bank.

Chapter 2

Co-management Approach for Nature/Forest Conservation, Corporate Interests, and the Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

With the increasing environmental awareness and popularity of the environmental science/management discipline, the growing importance of environmental organizations like the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in environmental policymaking of countries like Bangladesh has become a common trend. Influential local, national, and international NGOs have now made their way into the state-level policymaking process. The emergence of the Co-Management Approach for the conservation of nature/forests in the twentieth century and the concept of sustainable development are the major contributing factors to this trend (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000). The organizations, donors, and financial agencies such as the IUCN, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, and the World Bank (WB) mainly played an instrumental role in making this theoretical framework a dominating one in nature/forest conservation scholarship. The co-management framework facilitates the institutional admission of non-state actors—from local communities, NGOs, foreign and international organizations to local and multinational business enterprises—in nature/ forest conservation projects. This framework sometimes functions in the form of much talked about public-private partnership (PPP) for nature/forest conservation. “Sustainable development,” “stakeholders’ democracy,” “Alternative Income Generation (AIG) for local communities,” and “learning by doing” concepts are the necessary intellectual foundation for advocating the co-management approach. Scholars define it as “a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define, and guarantee amongst themselves a 43

44

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements, and responsibilities for a given territory, area, or set of natural resources” (Borini-Fayerabend et al. 2000, 1). Given the feature of co-management model facilitating the participation of actors such as mining companies, environmental NGOs, local communities, and concerned ministries/departments with conflicting interests and values in conservation projects makes it necessary to raise a relevant question: how effective is such co-management approach in conserving natural/forest resources? Or is this approach making the common pool resources (CPR) exploitatively vulnerable to the business/financial interests of a handful of national and transnational companies, NGOs, and relevant organizations? Bangladesh is implementing a conservation project based on a co-management approach. The project, financed by USAID, officially started its operation in February 2004 as the Nishorgo (nature) Support Project (NSP). It took a different name in 2008 and became Integrated Protected Areas Conservation (IPAC). After four years of its operation, Climate Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods (CREL) came into existence in 2013 to conserve twenty-five forest areas and water bodies among the existing thirty-five areas. The CREL project eventually ended in 2018. At the planning stage, lasting from 2000 to 2003, Chemonics International, a Washington-based consulting firm, was responsible for making an eighteen-year-long blueprint for a conservation project in Bangladesh. But at the implementing stage, another Washington-based organization, International Resources Group (IRG), took over the project as the chief consulting and implementing agency in 2003. The IUCN Bangladesh (IUCNB) office and the Department of the Forest of the Government of Bangladesh were two other national partners in the project. Other NGOs and environmental organizations, Nature Conservation and Management (NACOM), Wildlife Trust of Bangladesh, Community Development Center (CODEC), Center for Natural Resource Studies (CNRS), and Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers’ Association (BELA), were also other actors taking part at least in the first two stages of the project in different capacities. More interestingly, almost all the environmental organizations that participated in the project had been members of the national committee of IUCN. In the Nishorgo phase, the concerned authorities brought five forests—the Lawachara National Park (LNP), the Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary, the Sathchari Reserve Forest, Chunati Wildlife Sanctuary, and the Teknaf Game Reserve—under the conservation project as pilot sites (see figure 2.1). All these sites fall in the Surma basin, and these sites are called Eastern Fold Belt. This Eastern Fold Belt broadly covers the Chittagong-Tripura fold defined in terms of its geological characteristics. Not to mention, Petro-Bangla and the U.S. Geological Survey did a collaborative survey and identified this area as

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

45

Figure 2.1  The Forest Areas under the Nishorgo Support Project (NSP). Adapted from Khan, 2010, p.69.

the most prosperous gas reserve zone in Bangladesh (see figure 2.2) (U.S.Geological Survey-Bangladesh Gas Assessment Team 2001, 2–9). When the Nishorgo project was in operation, the U.S.-based multinational mining and energy company—Chevron Bangladesh—conducted a seismic survey in 2008 in the LNP area. The survey was environmentally risky for the area that included a reserve forest. Thus, to do so, Chevron violated the existing laws of the country. It surveyed the gas reserve of block-14 of

46

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

Moulvibazar falling within the Lawachara forest area. On the other hand, Chemonics International, after the end of their engagement in the planning phase of the project, also signed a franchise agreement with the USAID to implement a PPP health project named Shurjer Hashi (smile of the sun) in Moulvibazar and Habiganj. Chevron, in collaboration with other multinationals—Cemex Cement, Grameen Phone, and British-America Tobacco Bangladesh—financed this project. Through this Shurjer Hashi project, Chemonics International’s business connection with Chevron came to light. It is also important to note here that a business relationship between the IUCNB and Chevron emerged in Bangladesh. It evolved in two stages: before and after the seismic survey. In the early stage of the project or before, the IUCNB did not engage in any direct business activity with Chevron Bangladesh. At this stage, IUCNB was responsible for evaluating the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the seismic survey at LNP. They had a subcontract agreement signed in 2007 with Australia-based consulting firm Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporations International Pty Ltd (SMEC)1, the original contractor of Chevron in Bangladesh. The purpose was to do the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE), EIA, and Economic, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) Study for the Lawachara seismic survey project. The success of the sub-consultancy services of the IUCNB in reviewing the EIA report on SMEC’s behalf led to the establishment of a direct business partnership with Chevron Bangladesh in the second stage. Chevron nominated IUCNB as the leading organization at this stage for the Biodiversity Monitoring Team that Chevron had formed to monitor the pre- and postseismic survey. They made the monitoring report public after completing the seismic survey (Khan 2013, 155). The monitoring role of the IUCNB originated from the site and environment clearance certificates issued by the DoE in August 2007 and in February 2008, respectively. These two certificates recommended drafting the IUCNB into the environmental monitoring team to be formed and financed by Chevron for its 3-D seismic survey project. This condition led to the IUCNB establishing a formal business relationship with Chevron and—at the same time—made it a “neutral third party” regarding the seismic survey at LNP (Khan 2013).​ Against this backdrop, the co-management–based conservation project invites a set of necessary queries. Is the joint participation of USAID and IUCN in the project for nature/forest conservation or is it for something else? Did Chevron, operating in gas blocs 13 and 14 located in Sylhet and Moulvibazar districts, have anything to do with the project? What role did the Department of Forest or Environment operating under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) play to save the environmentally threatened Lawachara forest?

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

47

Figure 2.2  Prospective Natural Gas Reserves in Bangladesh. Adapted from USGSBangladesh Gas Assessment Team, 2001, p.3.

To address the queries, I highlight several specific events and issues keeping the Nishorgo Support Project (NSP) (2003–2008) at the center. The exploration of the reasons for setting up the project, bringing a reserve forest area of LNP within the project, and the evolved business relationship between IUCNB and Chevron Bangladesh is perhaps relevant.

48

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

HOW THE CONSERVATION PROJECT GOT INTO OPERATION The NSP project did not come into operation based on any indigenous idea advocated by the forest department or any other concerned authority of the Bangladesh government. The forest conservation project came up during the official visit of U.S. president Bill Clinton to Bangladesh in 2000. During the visit, the president pledged to assist Bangladesh in the water and forest sectors and thus agreed to write off a portion of Bangladesh’s outstanding concessional loan by supporting the conservation of environmentally threatened tropical forest ecosystems (Chemonics 2002a, B-I, Annex: B). Bangladesh became the first country eligible for debt reduction worth USD 6 million by creating a Tropical Forest Conservation Fund under America’s Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) 1998 (Chemonics 2002a). To this end, USAID formulated a ten-year strategic plan named USAID/Bangladesh Strategy for FY 2000–2010. The open water and tropical forest management program came under this strategic objective (SO) (USAID 2000, 13, 25). With technical and financial support from the USAID and the “let us save nature for our future generation” slogan, the forest department (FD) opened the project in February 2004 at Bhawal National Park of Gazipur in February 2004. The Strategic Objective Grant Agreement (SOAG), signed by the finance secretary of Bangladesh and mission director of the USAID in February 2003, provided the necessary legitimacy for the conservation project (Khan 2013, 136–139). But the FD submitted the concept paper and project proposal to the planning commission only after the concerned officials had inaugurated the project (Khan 2013). More importantly, the site selection process for implementing the project was also very dubious. The official program design, prepared by the USAID’s Environmental Team, confirms that the USAID selected Lawachara National Park, Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary, Satchari Reserve Forest, and Teknaf Game Reserves as potential sites (Khan 2013, 138–139). Coincident or not, these sites fall in the areas identified as the most prospective gas reserve zone, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This Program Design advocates implementing co-management approach elsewhere in Bangladesh to conserve biodiversity with the long-term objective of an “improved capacity for self-help” of the local communities (USAID 2003, 13, 15). A team of Chemonics International initially selected the pilot sites. After rejecting ten other areas, they picked six that include Modhupur forest with the five sites already discussed. They preferred only those sites that already had management plans with demarcated core areas, buffer zones, and sustainable use zones because they could immediately put them to use (Chemonics 2002b, 8, 12–13). As a result, whatever their declared criteria2were, the

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

49

use-value—their tourism potential and marketable conservation possibilities—was more pivotal in targeting those sites. For those sites, the FD prepared five-year management plans in 2000 under the ADB-funded Forestry Sector Project (1998–2002). Tecsult International Ltd, a Canada-based company, did the consultancy for this project in association with SODEV Consult Bangladesh, Natural Resource Planning (NRP), House of Consultant Ltd., and Engineering and Planning Consultant (EPC) (Khan 2013, 143). INCORPORATING THE LNP-ADJACENT BHANUGACH RESERVE FOREST The visit of Bill Clinton to Bangladesh witnessed the original involvement of Chemonics International in 2000 as a consultant of the USAID to produce the necessary blueprint for the conservation project to be implemented in Bangladesh’s future. A consultation team of the Chemonics advised the FD, in the beginning, to bring 281 hectares of land located at West Bhanugach Reserved Forest, north of LNP, within the operational area of the National Park for the implementation of the project (Chemonics 2002b, 12–13, 17). Bringing the Bhanugach Reserved Forest under the project and the change in the legal status of the protected areas had significance in terms of its future. Such change and expansion would ensure the adoption of measures to protect the forest areas and modify the resource-use model in legal terms in the future. When it comes to National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries, article 23 (3) of the Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation (Amendment) Act 1974 allows the relaxation of all the prohibitions it incorporates for “scientific purposes or betterment of the national park or aesthetic enjoyment of the scenery, or any other exceptional reasons.” Again, article 23 (4) provides for the planned construction of the infrastructures such as access roads, rest houses, hotels, among others, in National Parks. On the contrary, the Reserve Forests and the Forest Act 1927 forbid such exceptions entirely (Khan 2013, 145). When Chevron conducted the seismic survey in 2008, Bhanugach Reserved Forest fell within its survey area. The FD did not raise any objection in reaction to it then as the area of LNP extended to incorporate Bhanugach Reserved Forest (Khan 2013). NSP, CONCERNED OFFICIALS, AND THE 3-D SEISMIC SURVEY When NSP started its operation in Bangladesh, there was no lack of popular discourses in the relevant public arena on “conservation through stakeholders’

50

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

participation,” “sustainable use of local resources,” “local development,” among others. But it was only in May 2006 the government made sure through a gazette notification that the local communities would take part in the conservation project along with the FD officials and other concerned actors. The co-management structure of the project was of two-tier. The first tier was named co-management committee—more an executive committee— with fifteen to nineteen members (CMC) and Assistant Conservation of Forest as secretary for the day-to-day management. The second ceremonial tier or general body was called the co-management council of fifty-five members. This two-tier structure had the legal authority for forest conservation and the development of alternative means of livelihood for the forest-dependent people. Its members were the “guardians of forests” (Khan 2013, 152). The LNP—accounting for 20 percent of the total area surveyed—was the first project site to adopt a formal management structure for the project. The CMC of the Lawachara did not take any official position on the proposed seismic survey until the last week of May 2008. When the CMC officially reacted, the survey was almost complete. The president of the CMC was only able to send an official letter to Chevron on the May 28, 2008 in which he expressed concern over what the CMC saw as a failure to reveal the “practical aspects” and “true information” related to the environmental impacts of the seismic survey. The letter also “condemned” Chevron for ignoring the biodiversity conservation issue and local community’s interests. The CMC alleged that Chevron had undertaken the seismic survey without holding a “formal official meeting” to make them aware of it. The story was not different for the concerned government officials either. When Chevron was doing the seismic survey in the LNP area in February 2008, the concerned divisional forest officer of Sylhet purported that the FD did not know about this survey (The Daily Star February 22, 2008). But the process of allowing Chevron’s seismic survey in Lawachara started in August 2007 by engaging the Ministry of Energy, the Forest Department, and the Department of Environment (DoE). The DoE indeed issued an environmental site clearance certificate to Chevron to construct infrastructure for gas exploration in the area in October 2007 (Khan 2013, 151–152). The growing negative media coverage from February 2008 to highlight the impact of the seismic survey at Moulvibazar forced the FD to send a letter to the MoEF expressing its “concern” over the planned seismic survey in LNP and the West Bhanugach Reserve Forest. The MoEF did not take the official letter into account. On the contrary, they issued a gazette notification in consultation with the Ministry of Law for suspending the applicability of article 23 (3) of the Wildlife Preservation (Amendment) Act 1974. This Act prohibits such surveys at LNP. The secretary for the Ministry of Energy (MoE) assured earlier, publicly, that the surveys would not go against the

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

51

national interest of the country nor would violate the existing laws (Khan 2013). Eventually, DoE issued the Environmental Clearance Certificate in the last week of February 2008 (Khan 2013).

ENGAGEMENT WITH SMEC AND THE CRITICAL REVIEW OF EIA The IUCNB became a subcontracted agency of SMEC for reviewing the already prepared EIA report for the LNP with its submission of the revised budget in August 2007.3 But this process of formalizing the business agreement with SMEC was not, for the IUCNB, trouble-free. SMEC, in their “Sub-Consultancy Agreement,” is designated as a “consulting house” with a liability clause. Interestingly, this liability clause4 had nothing to do with the environmental or ecological impact of the seismic survey in the Lawachara forest area. It made the IUCNB concerned that the Bangkok regional office might not give legal approval for the survey. They were particularly worried that the regional office might suggest they withdraw from the agreement because the two said features that include the Liability Clause seemed designed to pre-empt the usual legal processes involved in obtaining regional office approval. Nor the agreement included any payment schedule for the services the IUCNB was to provide. As a result, the IUCNB sought to have the “alternative of a simpler contract” of commission. To sign the agreement with SMEC, IUCNB was desperate to avoid the legal review and approval process of their regional office. To do this, they relied on their experience of subcontracted partnerships. They entered into three sub-consultancy agreements5 with SMEC by becoming a member of the project team with a “Letter of Commissioning” signed only by the team leader of SMEC.6 Meanwhile, the initial difficulties in finalizing a formal agreement with SMEC Dhaka Office did not deter the IUCNB from developing a partnership with the former. As soon as they received the “Sub-Consultancy Agreement” (effective from November 2007), their local consultant began working on the EIA report. To do it, the IUCNB requested SMEC to provide them with an already prepared draft EIA.7 SMEC issued the letter of commission on the same day the IUCNB expressed its concern over the prospects of getting approval from its regional office. With the issuance of this letter, the IUCNB finally entered into a formal partnership contract for “EMP review of the 3D seismic survey with an especial focus to [on] forested areas.”8 The IUCNB agreed with SMEC to work within the agreed terms of reference the latter drew up. The agreement imposed two conditions on the assigned member of the project team. First, they would “serve SMEC

52

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

diligently to the best of his/her ability. . .” and second, they would “not act or be seen to be acting, in conflict with SMEC’s best interests.”9 The legally binding commitment to serving the interests of SMEC placed the IUCNB in a partnership of subordination. The relationship of subordination got exposed once the IUCNB started the critical review of the EMP, part of SMEC’s already prepared EIA. IUCNB had to start its work, not with the original EIA report already made available, but with the one that had been modified and updated by SMEC at the request of Chevron. They sought to do it before holding its scheduled consultation meeting10 on “input to critically review the EMP review report” with a panel of expert organizations. On the other hand, a private environmental consultancy company, Environmental Conservation Management Consultants Ltd. (ECOMAC), was charged with critically reviewing the EMP on IUCNB’s behalf in line with the demands of SMEC. The IUCNB raised no doubts or questions over any alterations or modifications proposed by SMEC. Its only concern was to give SMEC what it wanted. Rather than “critically review,” it operated as a mere service provider. It can be observed from the following correspondence between the IUCNB and SMEC as the review took place: IUCNB to SMEC: As discussed, I am sending our revised draft based on your comment. Please insert the comments you just have mentioned on [the] phone.11

SMEC replied on the same day: Thank you for looking through the document and our proposed alterations. I have gone through and accepted all of your changes. I have then added the additional changes that we have discussed on the phone. So, the areas you see as tracked changes are now only the latest changes. [emphasis added]12

After doing the needful, the IUCNB sent the final draft of the “critical” review to SMEC. They then received the following correspondence from a top official of SMEC saying: Please find attached a draft copy of your report with comments added. Please note that I have not changed any significant sections, though have added a conclusion. Can you please review the document and the changes I have made and indicate if you agree with them? [emphasis added]13

Given this “mutual consultation,” it is vital to see what changes the IUCNB, as a sub-consultancy client of SMEC, incorporated in the final version of the EMP, which then became part of the EIA report prepared by the SMEC. The

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

53

changes included editorial modifications, deletions, and additions. Perhaps, the omissions meant to ensure that wildlife biodiversity monitoring by an independent third party could not inhibit the interest of Chevron in extracting hydrocarbon resources from the Lawachara forest area. One paragraph removed by SMEC reads: Importantly, any project staff member will be permitted to report serious environmental non-compliance directly to DoF [Department of Forest] or IUCN staff, in the event that a report to their supervisor or the EMR [Environmental Management Representative] is not dealt with adequately or effectively. (IUCNB 2007, 9)

Now, this paragraph was, in the first place, already a compromise of conservation values—for there was no responsibility to report grave environmental non-compliance, merely the “permission” to do so if unhappy with EMR’s response. But even this attenuated permission was, apparently, too much. One might not report the EMR for not dealing “adequately or effectively” with environmental non-compliance. And—hardly a surprise—the EMR is a Chevron-employed field staff charged with “control[ling]” and “oversee[ing]” the implementation of the EMP in the Lawachara forest (IUCNB 2007, 16). Eventually, the final draft report made it compulsory that a Special Biodiversity Monitoring Team (SBMT) be formed to assess the impact on the wildlife in the Lawachara forest area before and after the seismic survey as part of an “independent” third-party monitoring process (IUCNB 2007). To make the EMP properly seismic survey-friendly, SMEC further deleted one important suggestion put forward by the IUCN’s panel of experts focusing on ecological conservation values. Here is the suggestion: The space-time [distribution]s of animals that are of conservation significance is needed to define periods and areas when seismic surveys can be safely carried out, without endangering feeding, breeding, and migration. Of particular importance might be the primate’s daily ranging routes. The space-time distributions of those mammals [e.g. slow loris, pig-tailed macaque, rhesus macaque, Assamese macaque, capped langur, phayre’s leaf-monkey, hoolock gibbon, jackal, wild dog, sambar, barking deer, Indian giant squirrel etc.], together with their behavior patterns should be determined so that critical concentrations at critical times can be avoided by seismic surveys. (IUCNB 2007, 10)

In short, the IUCNB accepted SMEC’s deletions and its inserted conclusion without any questions whatsoever.14 This unquestioned business partnership with SMEC in “successfully” producing the “critical” review of the EMP put IUCNB in a direct relationship with Chevron Bangladesh Thirteen Fourteen Blocs Ltd in the second stage of the business partnership.

54

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, CHEVRON, AND IUCNB The initiation of IUCNB’s direct business relationship in the second stage can be found in the correspondence made by Chevron Bangladesh for communicating with the IUCNB in the last week of January 2008. Chevron sent this correspondence after it had held a meeting at its office with IUCNB for finalizing the environmental monitoring plan.15 Chevron Bangladesh made sure that the IUCNB would assume the responsibility of drawing up the draft of an environmental monitoring plan, including pre- and post-baseline sampling surveys. For the monitoring team, the IUCNB again required a legal review to be done by their regional Bangkok office and approval from the latter. For obtaining permission from the regional office, the IUCNB would not have to depend on the ecological or conservational sensitivity of the forest sheltering the red-listed hoolock gibbons. Its eagerness was more important to undertake a business project with Chevron Bangladesh, camouflaged under the environmental norm of “sustainable development.” The IUCNB did not have much time to get regional office approval. They wanted to have it as soon as possible because Chevron was planning to start its survey by the beginning of March 2008. Thus, they were more concerned with whether they had to fill in the Due Diligence (DD) form for legally getting the legal approval of the regional office. Their way of presenting the case to its regional office is worth attention. Their correspondence with the regional office started with the following plain introductory statements about the survey: Chevron has planned to do a 3D seismic survey in [the] northern part of the country. Their survey block unfortunately also covers one of the best preserved rainforests of Bangladesh which has high biodiversity value. Chevron employed SMEC to do an EIA of the project. [The] Forest Department was reluctant to give [a] green signal to EIA submitted to [the] Department of Environment. With FD’s request (our networking as well), DoE [Department of Environment] issued a notice that the project would require to employ a team of biodiversity monitoring experts from FD, IUCN and DOE to oversee and ensure minimum damage is done to the forest and its biodiversity during the operation .16

To convince the two top officials of the regional office concerned with the Business and Biodiversity Program (BBP), the IUCNB confirmed in the same correspondence that Chevron had managed to get EIA clearance from the highest authority of the government on the ground of energy security.

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

55

This was not the case. The DoE had not issued the EIA certificate when the IUCNB communicated with the regional office. The certificate was issued the next day and sent to Chevron two days later (Khan 2013, 163). The concerned official of the IUCNB, in an email, to the Bangkok regional office confirmed that it was mainly a fruitful business/conservation conjunction that would ensure the following terms and prospects for the organization: Overall budget is about 100k for 3 months of monitoring operation. We find this is a very good opportunity to [showcase] business and conservation can go hand in hand. I have talked to Chevron people and they agreed to put some budget for documentation as future promotional material. I am also talking with their External Affairs div (basically CSR div) regarding this and there is [an] opportunity to develop it as [an] IUCN-Chevron program later. [emphasis added] (Khan 2013)17

IUCNB was driven more by the financial benefits such a partnership could deliver rather than by a commitment to conservation values. The correspondence between the officer responsible for monitoring the project and the officer of the IUCNB looking after financial matters stands as proof in this regard. The monitoring officer wrote: [W]e need to send our reaction to Chevron by tomorrow . . . 120k is waiting for us with around 25k solid income in just 3 months . . . march-may’08 . . . so speed up please.18

Unsurprisingly the IUCNB could not avoid some difficulties about its relationship with Chevron from its regional office. The regional office saw this partnership as a “risky project” and warned that the IUCNB must not sign the project agreement until they completed the DD process.19 But it was too late. Two days before sending this warning, the IUCNB had informed the regional office that it had signed the formal partnership agreement with Chevron.20 It left the regional office with little option but to go along. The partnership agreement became effective from March 1, 2008 (Khan 2013, 164). Given this business partnership, it now becomes impertinent to ask: What were the implications of this partnership when the IUCNB prepared and made the biodiversity monitoring report on the seismic survey public? True or false, the monitoring report exonerated Chevron from any responsibility, as the last paragraph of its executive summary authenticates: The monitoring results show that there had been no significant changes in the population status of the wildlife due to the project activity. Due to the shot hole

56

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

drilling the ground vegetation consisting of herbs and seedlings were removed. No trees or threatened plants of conservation significance were damaged during the 3D seismic survey. The post project assessment also shows that the affected areas are showing signs of recovery due to monsoonal rainfall. [emphasis added] (IUCN 2008, 3)

CONCLUDING REMARKS The case study of seismic survey and the concept of co-management applied in the forest conservation project have provided the necessary empirical essentials to analyze the Nishorgo Support Project in Bangladesh. The analysis of some specific issues involving the project demonstrates that the forest conservation project based on the “co-management approach” or in other forms might not be as harmless as it appears. And the officially declared values, norms, and ideational elements which provide for the governance of such projects are perhaps for something else in many cases. In this regard, the analysis has probably exposed a pandora’s box indeed. Thus, one must not get derailed in his/her judgment by only focusing on such a normative framework of governance based on some universal values such as transparency, participation, accountability, among others. To understand the complex dynamics, one, perhaps, requires digging deep into such projects for assessing the intrinsic relationship of the actors to assess and understand who is playing on whose ground and for what reason. And to do so, s/he must pay particular attention to the politicaleconomic interests that bind both state and non-state actors together within an ideological framework and thus functioning and interacting with each other.

NOTES 1. Signed the business contract on May 1. 2. Those include: Ecological Significance (comprised of conservation value, biophysical condition, eco-region and significant biodiversity features); Management Status (based on the strategy of addressing biodiversity threats, current protection status, management plan, existing conservation measures); Leverage (potential to have wide demonstration effect, local credibility), Feasibility (presence of any conservation organization, local initiative for conservation, interest of the local conservation authority, state of community rights in managing local resources, prospect of sustainability, etc.) (Chemonics 2002b, 2–3). 3. As stated by an SMEC official working at Dhaka office in his e-mail sent to the concerned staff of IUCNB, dated 12 August 2007.

Co-management, Corporate Interests, and Conservation

57

4. The Liability Clause (#9) of the Sub-consultancy Agreement reads: (i) “The Sub-Consultant indemnifies SMEC against: (a). all losses suffered by SMEC; (b) all liabilities incurred by the SMEC; and (c) all legal costs (on a solicitor and own client or full indemnity basis, whichever is the greater) and other costs and expenses incurred by the SMEC in connection with a demand, action, arbitration or other proceeding (including mediation, compromise, out of court settlement or appeal); arising from the death or injury of any employee or agent of the Sub-Consultant, directly or indirectly as a result of or in connection with a breach of contract or any negligent act or omission or non-performance of this agreement by the Sub-consultant, its agents and officers”. 5. One such contract was done in 2005 for providing SMEC with Advice on Legislation on Mine Development, Operation, Closure, and Associated Activities for the now defunct Phoolbari open coal mining project of UK-based Asia Energy in face of local resistance; and the other two were in 2006 for doing literature review and legislation review needed for the Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of coal transportation through Sundarban Reserve Forest. 6. The concerned IUCNB officer expressed this official position in his reply to the concerned SMEC engineer, dated 20 November 2007. 7. Deputy team leader and environment specialist of SMEC international informed it to another. Ecologist in his e-mail correspondence, dated 19 November 2007. He sent the CC of this mail to the concerned officers of the IUCNB, Chevron 8. A top SMEC official stated it in his e-mail sent to deputy team leader and environment specialist, dated 20 November 2007 with CC to IUCNB. 9. The text of the Letter of Commissioning for the National Program Coordinator of IUCNB signed on 23 April 2005. It was for the consultancy on Advice on Legislation for the Development of Mining. The National Program Coordinator was originally from the Ministry of Environment. He was serving the IUCN Dhaka Office on deputation. He was recruited by SMEC for the Legislation Project as Legislation Adviser. 10. It was scheduled to be held on 1 December 2007. Invitations to the meeting were sent on 27 November 2007. 11. IUCNB sent it to SMEC on 6 December 2007. 12. SMEC sent it on 6 December 2007. 13. The draft was sent to SMEC on 6 December 2007. 14. IUCNB confirmed it to SMEC in an email sent on 7 December 2007. 15. The correspondence was done on 28 January 2008. 16. IUCNB officer stated it in his e-mail correspondence with two officials of its regional office at Bangkok, dated 23 February 2008. 17. See the above mentioned note 43. 18. The correspondence was done on 24 February 2008. 19. It was internally opined on 10 March 2008 by the concerned senior official at the regional office in correspondence with another senior official. The latter senior official informed this position of the IUCN regional office on the same day. 20. It was on 8 March 2008.

58

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan

REFERENCES Borrini-Feyerabend, G., M. Taghi Farver, Jean Claude Nguinguiri, and Vincent Ndangang. 2000. Co-Management of Natural Resources: Organising, Negotiating and Learning-By-Doing. Kasparek Verlag, Heidelberg: GTZ & IUCN. Chemonics International. 2002a. Strengthening Arannayk Foundation (Bangladesh Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation), Phase I: Proposed Long-term Implementation Strategy for the Arannayk Foundation. Task Order Under the Biodiversity & Sustainable Forestry IQC (BIOFOR). USAID Contract No. LAG1-00-99-00014-00, Task Order 813. Washington: Chemonics International Inc. Chemonics International. 2002b. Strengthening Arannayk Foundation (Bangladesh Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation), Phase I: Site Selection, Inventory and Monitoring. Task Order Under the Biodiversity & Sustainable Forestry IQC (BIOFOR). USAID Contract No. LAG-1-00-99-00014-00, Task Order 813. Washington: Chemonics International Inc IUCN Bangladesh (IUCNB). 2007. Critical Review of the EMP of Proposed 3D Seismic Survey of the Moulvibazar Gas Field. Final Draft, Submitted to SMEC International. Unpublished Official Report. Dhaka: IUCN. IUCN Bangladesh (IUCNB). 2008. 3d Seismic Survey at West Bhanugach Reserve Forest by Chevron Bangladesh: Biodiversity Monitoring Report (Final) Volume I. Unpublished Official Report. Dhaka: IUCN. Khan, Mohammad Tanzimuddin. 2010. “The Nishrogo Support Project, the Lawachara National Park and the Chevron Seismic Survey: Forest Conservation or Energy Procurement in Bangladesh?” Journal of Political Ecology, 17, no. 1: 68–78. Khan, Mohammad Tanzimuddin. 2013. The Project in Bangladesh: Gas, Forests, and Livelihood! PhD Dissertation, University of New England. The Correspondent. 2008. “Eco Damage Feared from Chevron’s Seismic Survey.” The Daily Star, February 22, 2008. US Geological Survey-Bangladesh Gas Assessment Team. 2001. “U.S. Geological Survey–Petro-Bangla Cooperative Assessment of Undiscovered Natural Gas Resources of Bangladesh: Petroleum Systems and Related Geologic Studies in Region-8, South Asia.” U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 2208-A. Accessed March 28, 2008. http://geology​.cr​.usgs​.gov​/pub​/bulletins​/b2208​-a/. USAID. 2000. USAID/Bangladesh Strategy for FY 2000- 2010: a focus on Survival and Global Economy. Dhaka: USAID USAID. 2003. Program Design: Co-management of Tropical Forest Resources in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Strategic Objective 6 (Environment) Team, USAID. Accessed August 25, 2012. http://rmportal​.net​/library​/content​/nric​/3154​.doc​/view.

Chapter 3

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and Immigrants in the United Kingdom The New Agent/Actors in Transnational Environmental Politics Samina Luthfa

When transnational environmental groups decide which local movement to pick from the Global South, they choose one where they can make the most significant, visible, and measurable impact. The example of Phulbari Resistance shows that such transnational-local connections support each other’s goals and the relationship is reciprocal (Luthfa 2017, 127–145). Though, globally, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these local-transnational coalitions is mixed (Baviskar 2004, 2010; Guha 1997, 17–39; Incla`n 2009, 85–106; Kirsch 2007, 302–321; Luthfa 2017, 127–145; Muradian et al. 2003, 775–792; Tsutsui 2004, 63–87; Widener 2007, 21–36). In the case of Phulbari resistance, the transnational movement organizations do not act as saviors of the local movement, instead, the movement is rooted in the local and national interest of Bangladesh. Nonetheless, literature on transnational coalitions resisting environmental injustice rarely discuss the role of the immigrants in persuading companies based in their “host” country to stop projects in their “origin” country. This chapter details the roles and limitations of Bangladeshi immigrants as new agents in the transnational coalition against environmental injustice in Phulbari. I explore the space for contention created by the immigrants in the transnational environmental politics relating to both the United Kingdom and Bangladesh. Phulbari resistance illustrated a loosely connected coalition with a shared concern but multiple belongings and tolerant identities (della Porta et al. 2006; Rootes 2005, 27–28, 1997, 319–330; Snow 2004, 396–400). At the 59

60

Samina Luthfa

local level, people from all political backgrounds, from radical left to centerright, were involved primarily to resist their displacement led by the Oil-Gas Protection Committee, Phulbari (OGPCP)1. At the national level, though the left-led National Committee steered the resistance, numerous non-left intellectuals and NGO activists opposed the mine to protect the broader national interests of Bangladesh. The transnational organizations and individuals, who opposed the mine, comprised church-based religious groups, human rights organizations, trade unions, leftist political parties, women’s organizations, and several other NGOs that included Bangladeshi immigrants. Some joined the movement to stop probable human rights violations by the mining company, while some others joined to protect the local environment from pollution of open mining. Pellow’s (2007) study of the circular flow of environmental injustice shows that southern countries had been increasingly successful in reverting the injustice based on their tolerant identities within the transnational environmental justice coalitions. I argue that credit for part of this success goes to the diaspora activists that opened up space for new politics in the core countries of the extractive industry. In this chapter, I show how all these play out in the case of Bangladeshi immigrants against the Phulbari mine. According to Tarrow , immigrant activists live in two worlds: their host country and their country of origin (2007, 88). Traditionally they engage in the politics of their origin countries by sending remittance , participating in the electoral process, and nurturing nationalism in the diaspora. He reported a spectacular rise in immigrant transnationalism, which one can study by focusing on the common forms of political actions of immigrants in both their host and origin countries. To reveal the nature of such political actions in the Phulbari resistance, I used qualitative interviews, participatory action, and archival data from 2005 to 2011. I used three sources for archival data: the company, the protestors, and the media. Company’s data included published reports and communication materials, letters, excerpts of discussion from online investors’ forum, and government documents. I also used protestors’ leaflets, pamphlets, reports, letters, petitions, websites, and emails, and international news reports as archival data.

IMMIGRANT ACTIVISTS—BRITISHBANGLADESHI AND PHULBARI RESISTANCE The National Committee is an alliance of several left political parties in Bangladesh that many immigrants living outside also supported. Tarrow’s argument that the immigrants often support their origin country fits our case here. The National Committee made ties with the UK- and Australia-based

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

61

solidarity groups of the Bangladeshi immigrants. The immigrants became their patrons, offering financial assistance, mobilizing popular support, participating in protest activities, and leading demonstrations outside the company’s annual meetings in London. In the transnational movement arena, incentives and resources for immigrants exist so they can become politically active where their “host” countries are their targets. Tarrow has called this type of immigrants the “nesting pigeons” (2005, 51–53). The British Bangladeshi community is the largest Bangladeshi population outside Bangladesh and a major stakeholder in decision making in Bangladesh. They also form a significant minority in the United Kingdom, constituting the largest bilingual minority group in London (Lawson and Sachdev 2004, 49). The vast majority of Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom come from Sylhet, a division in northeastern Bangladesh with a long tradition of emigration. They speak Sylheti which some regard as a “diglossic,” low variety of Bangla. Bangla or Bengali—the official language of Bangladesh—is regarded as a high variety (Lawson and Sachdev 2004, 49). Non-Sylhetis often have a language edge over that of the Sylhetis while the Sylhetis outnumber the former. Tension within the British Bangladeshi community revolves around the language or national politics of Bangladesh. Earlier research on the Phulbari resistance ignores the role of these immigrant Bangladeshis. In a non-Sylheti British Bangladeshi view, Sylhetis do not care about anything happening outside Sylhet, and thereby, will not be interested in the Phulbari resistance. I interviewed two veteran community leaders and supporters of the National Committee from London’s Tower Hamlet where most Bangladeshi immigrants live. The interviews quite quickly showed that such assumptions by non-Sylhetis were wrong. A freelance journalist and senior British Bangladeshi from Sylhet division (his pseudonym is Abdul Majid) argued that people from Sylhet know more and are more actively involved in the energy-related politics of the National Committee than other Bangladeshi immigrants. He explained: [M]agurchhora Gas field in Kamolganj, Sreemangal is within the Sylhet division. The well that blew out was managed by Occidental Petroleum Corporation . . . . My village home is in Kamolganj. Back in those days I was a local news reporter in Sreemangal. There I came to know about the problems of collusion of these corporations and our government, and how the National Committee was mounting resistance against such problematic resource extraction business. I joined the resistance. Coming from there makes you more knowledgeable because of the prior experiences with the natural gas sector. (Interview, 2011, translated by the author)

Bangladesh’s major oil and gas reserves are in the Sylhet region, and this led Sylhetis to support the National Committee’s energy politics for long.

62

Samina Luthfa

The experience in Sylhet region made them more learned about the energy issues of Bangladesh. My participatory action research revealed similar findings: people become involved in this politics because of the resonance of the movement with their lived experiences or their prior political connections make them more likely to do so though they no longer live there. However, would British citizens with more distant connections with the origin country be concerned about mining in Bangladesh? Abdul Majid also pointed out that most of these British Bangladeshi people have land, houses, or other assets in Bangladesh (Gardner’s findings are similar) who are concerned with maintaining their connections with their community: [I] live in this country with my whole family. I still have my home in Sreemangal. So do ninety-nine (99) percent of the other British Bangladeshis. Don’t we need electricity for our homes there? Because our electricity is plundered by the foreign companies, we have to pay high bribes . . . . If I have my village home, I still can go back there . . . my roots will be there. That is why I am saying every British Bangladeshi has to get involved about the gas-coal and electricity issues of Bangladesh. It is imperative for our own sake. (Interview, 2011)

Gardner found that British-based Sylhetis were more than keen to invest in viable businesses in Sylhet, and actively sought opportunities for their business acumen (2008, 477–495). She also noted that not only access to the income-earning potential in the United Kingdom, but also connectedness with desh (homeland) was desired. This is a consequence of the rising Islamophobia in the United Kingdom, which decreases their sense of belonging in the host country and increases concerns for their long-term security. Therefore, “Londonis” invest heavily to improve the status of their village kins in Sylhet (Gardner 2008, 486). “BOOMERANG” BY “NESTING PIGEONS”? The British Bangladeshi cannot vote in Bangladesh. But Bangladeshi political leaders depend on this community for both financial support and their influence on the local community of origin. Through their connections with political leaders in Bangladesh, first, they can put pressure on the government of Bangladesh to bring the necessary changes in the national arena and thus limit the company’s ability to act. Second, since they are British citizens, they can ask their constituent political leaders of the United Kingdom to influence their (the UK) government to make the UK-based company accountable.​ Following Keck and Sikkink (1998), the first ability of the diaspora to exert pressure on the Bangladesh government can be regarded as an extension of the classical “boomerang pattern” of influence. The second ability is also

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

63

Figure 3.1  Nested Pigeon and Extended Boomerang Model. Created by the author.

one way for protestors to evade the government of Bangladesh and reach the supranational actors to work for them. In the latter case, they are connecting with the government of the country (UK) where the company is listed so that their government can control the company. This is more of a nesting pigeon strategy than a boomerang pattern since energy issues in Bangladesh matter to people based in the United Kingdom. The second ability also indicates how the resistance can use different political opportunities to its own gains (figure 3.1). Another leader (Pseudonym Safdar bhai) thought that Sylhetis were not active enough to support the Phulbari resistance. However, he thought that if they were shown how and why the development of the Phulbari Mine would directly affect them and their access to electricity in Sylhet, they would more actively resist the mine. He thought that the Sylheti community should be targeted for greater mobilization. Both were very optimistic that they could convince their community to become more active, and they thought they needed to do so. Safdar bhai told me: ”[i]f the situation becomes urgent, I believe they will come out and take the streets of London to stop the coal mine. Even in 1971, British Bangladeshis were the most vocal against the atrocities committed against the Bangladeshis. [. . .] We, being the citizens of Britain, feel that we need to do at least this much to protect the people of Phulbari from the destruction brought by a British company. (Interview, 2011, translated by the author)”

64

Samina Luthfa

MEDIATING NEW CONNECTIONS Protestors in the United Kingdom either belonged to the left parties in Bangladesh before the former moved to the host country (e.g., Safdar bhai) or joined one for their long attachment with the National Committee and its politics (e.g., Abdul Mojid bhai). Since they acted on behalf of the Phulbari resistance for so many years, they are both well-prepared to reach out and create new ties to strengthen their legitimacy within UK politics and within the diaspora community. They have connected with British political parties such as the Communist Party and brought them into the alliance resisting the Phulbari mine. They have also reached out and connected with the South Asian Solidarity Group and the Tamil Solidarity while working alongside the broader transnational coalition. They decided to get the British political parties involved in this resistance, in particular, because GCM is a British company. The Socialist Party of the UK had been with the campaign for a long time, and since 2011 the south asian immigrant activists were in touch with the Communist Party of the UK directly. Furthermore, a memo from one of their earlier meetings in 2011 illustrated that they had created new connections which had evolved through working together with other groups. MAINTAINING CONNECTIONS Academics and activists draw attention to the internal tensions between the different fields, local versus transnational that limit the success of resistances against extractive industries (Guha 1997, 17–39; Incla`n 2009, 85–106; Kirsch 2007, 302–321; Muradian et al. 2003, 775–792; Tsutsui 2004, 63–87; Widener 2007, 21–36). I have also identified tensions among various allies and the factions within the larger Phulbari coalition based on: first, lack of financial resources; second, unease emerging from different ideological goals among organizations, for example, radical left parties versus transnational advocacy organizations and the resultant tension; and finally, factions and divisions within immigrant groups. RESOURCES Activists from all levels—local, national, and transnational organizations—all identified financial constraints as one of the major limits to their interactions and activities. All of these organizations from the local to the transnational are dependent on membership dues and the majority of members are involved in the movement voluntarily. At the local level, there were no paid positions;

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

65

activists contributed their time to the local movement. Activists lacked funds to publish more leaflets or to buy more fuel for their motorbikes so they could regularly keep people motivated. At the national level, two administrative staff were paid, the rest of the members were volunteers. Political parties contributed monthly dues while members collected money from their supporters within the limits of their group’s policies. They do not accept corporate support, sponsorship, or funds from any NGOs. In the Ecuadorian context, local resistances were heavily dependent on the transnational resources that limited the protestors within the transnational groups’ goals and visions (Widener 2007). The Phulbari resistance was not dependent on transnational financial resources. Unlike environmental movement organizations in the west , transnational partners in Phulbari resistance are not all big organizations with resources, instead they are smaller and themselves have resource constraints (Doyle 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rootes 2005, 1997, 2004; Widener 2007). For example, Anna (pseudonym) employed by one of the core partners of the transnational coalition had to work as a volunteer of Phulbari resistance for three years because of a lack of funds in her organization. Though large and resourceful organizations like Amnesty International, Oxfam-America, or Action Aid were present in the coalition, they were not involved as strongly so that local resistance could “piggyback” and get the resources they needed. When investigated further, I observed that local and national leaders of the National Committee and its volunteers in the United Kingdom took deliberate initiatives not to involve big transnational NGOs due to their critical political stand against such organizations. They regarded NGOs as tools of neoliberal accumulation. The difference of Phulbari resistance from the Ecuadorian example lies with its national-level far-left mediator—the national committee.

TENSIONS AND HOSTILITY The construction of a “we-them” dichotomy between organizations within the same movement increases the chances of hostility between organizations and factions within the movement (Saunders 2008, 227-253), which can affect relationships among local-national-transnational partners. Saunders (ibid, 227–253) identified how shared collective identity led groups to attain high solidarity and how the inverse—the lack of a shared collective identity—led to tensions and hostility between groups. However, these high solidarity groups were reluctant to collaborate with other groups even with shared interest but not ideology. Similarly, the Phulbari resistance shares many different identities.

66

Samina Luthfa

The left party members of the National Committee alliance are uneasy working with national or international Non-Government Organizations and civil society members. This tension stems from the left party members’ negative perception of NGOs as advocates of neoliberal capitalism and its imperialist plots. Feldman (2003) suggested that NGOs in Bangladesh and their international donors work as buffers between the citizens and the state, protecting the state and donors by letting them off the hook and putting all the responsibilities on the shoulders of citizens (5–26). The leftist supporters of the National Committee did not trust civil society promoting NGOs and were not enthusiastic about working with them. Indeed, these leftists also did not trust individuals without party affiliations.2 Sultana apa (pseudonym), the coordinator of transnational advocacy, networking, and visibility of the resistance, in the beginning, was often mistrusted since she did not belong to any left parties present in the National Committee. Her intentions were often questioned and characterized as shushil (its literal meaning is civil, but here it means member of the “civil society” with a pejorative meaning close to Feldman’s description). Sultana apa says: ”[I] felt quite offended, unwelcome, and isolated by the party activists throughout the last week. . . . a number of people in the group led by [~Leader of Group1~] are active in forming a committee on their own, they were quiet [sic.] hostile to us, especially to me. . . . A few of them even commented that they don’t know me or I am a stranger (after knowing of my work for four years). Others have felt threatened that I would have become the chair of the potential committee (which I never wish to be). (Email to National Committee Secretary General copied to author, September 06, 2011)”

I was actively involved in organizing two seminars in London in 2011 to create more awareness among the British Bangladeshis about the devastating impact of the mine. Phulbari Solidarity Group, made up of individuals who are resisting the mine, organized these seminars instead of supporters of the National Committee. Speakers at both the seminars included non-party “experts” or individuals from academia or global justice activism. Studying the long email chains about these seminars, I realized that some of the National Committee support group leaders were also part of the planning and organizational process. Nonetheless, these supporters portray the seminars as events that were organized by people from “outside” the National Committee. When asked why they did not declare their involvement in organizing the seminar, the leaders argued that some supporters oppose working with international NGOs and civil society members. They declared that these seminars were organized by the Phulbari Solidarity Group, International Accountability Project, and London Mining Network, and not by the National Committee. Thus, they could not support the seminars without alienating their followers.3

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

67

This is analogous to Saunders’s (2008, 243) account of sectarian solidarity of the Environmental Direct Action Group. Their rigid position and relentless anti-capitalist identity are rather similar to at least some of the supporters of the National Committee in the United Kingdom and Bangladesh. They attended one seminar as audience members rather than organizers. They refused to enter the shareholders meetings since this suggested collusion with the company, even though only one of the activists had shares in the company. They also ridiculed the advocacy meetings with the UK government officials, where some activists hoped to increase the visibility of the potential devastation if the mine went ahead. They only participated in demonstrations outside the company’s annual general meetings or events that their groups had organized. My observation is that much of this mistrust and hostility results from their lack of knowledge about the partner organizations. Their deep mistrust of civil society and NGOs in Bangladesh also feeds their hostility to all such individuals and organizations that identify themselves as part of global civil society. Although I do not want to over-generalize NGOs as angels or devils, this sort of insularity stemming from rigidly held ideologies is not beneficial for Phulbari resistance. Leaders of the National Committee supporters in the United Kingdom need to pay attention to this and work to mitigate it.

FACTIONS In the transnational field of protests and actions, the last and one of the most complicated concerns is the existence of factions among the supporters of the National Committee. The factions and resultant tensions were visible in the seminars I was organizing as a participant. In December 2011, two factions attempted to overcome their differences and heal any breaches between them. According to one of the group members: we are all very happy that after so many years [since 2002] we will be able to get a committee for the first time—a proper one. (Personal communication with author, December 15, 2011) The differences between these two groups were so severe that it was impossible to have a proper branch of the National Committee in the United Kingdom for a long time. First, divisions from the national-level factions in any left party would directly feed to similar divisions in the United Kingdom. Rivalry and enmity between major left political parties, especially Communist Party of Bangladesh, Workers Party, and BA.SHO.D, is directly reflected in factions in their branches. One source revealed that one leader was suspended from CPB in Dhaka and this led to the emergence of a faction in the United Kingdom with his supporters. One group accuses

68

Samina Luthfa

another of being “anti-liberation.” There were two groups and one founder of the first group had been labeled as an “anti-liberation” collaborator. He was expelled from the supporters’ group and deleted from the mailing list. It was alleged that he had overtly supported the Jamaat-e-Islami4 and disrespected the birth of our nation. (Personal communication with author, July 2, 2011) At the UK level, there are two sources of factions: one is personal dislikes and grudges, while the other is the Sylheti issue. First, some people simply do not like some others for personal reasons, but these manifest as grudges, creating distance among supporters. A leader of the first group was a restaurant owner who allegedly had recruited several of his workers as supporters of the National Committee, UK. These workers spread rumors against him out of personal dislike, and these aggravated pre-existing differences into divisions. Second, Sylheti members are seen as lacking the competence to be effective leaders by non-Sylheti, and this has created unnecessary differences within activist groups. Language plays a role here since Sylheti language is regarded as lower in standard than Bangla and not being fluent in Bangla is looked down upon even by rank-and-file non-Sylheti supporters. However, Sylheti members perceive that they are powerful and competent leaders because they have a large number of supporters. Both of these arguments only deepen the split between the two segments of the British Bangladeshi community and underscore the extant tension and mistrust within immigrant actors of Phulbari resistance. While these issues may seem trivial, they served to sustain the two factions and made it difficult for the National Committee to operate there. This antagonism becomes sharply visible, especially when events are planned. Although neither faction had been formally named as a proper branch of the National Committee, each insisted that they were the UK branch of the National Committee. Therefore, naming leaders and identifying speakers for any event was always tricky. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this point: at the demonstration outside the company’s Annual General Meeting in 2010, each faction brought their banners rather than having a single banner for the whole group. The second example is when trouble ensued around who gets to speak as the Convener of the National Committee in a seminar. In one of the seminars arranged by the Phulbari Solidarity Group in September 2011, both groups were invited. The second group did not show up claiming that they were not consulted from the beginning and accused organizers of favoring the other group that attended the seminar. Consequently, in the next seminar in December 2011, both groups were informed even earlier but the second group was allowed to speak to ensure balance of power remembering the last seminar. However, during the seminar when their convener spoke, the other group left the auditorium.

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

69

The second group’s refusal to participate in the seminar in September 2011 was disturbing and problematic since they not only refused to participate but also dissuaded some of the volunteers (who were in charge of logistic arrangements) to withdraw from participating. In the second instance, when the first group exited the seminar, one of the companies’ investors present there interpreted this exodus as the speaker’s inability to retain the audience’s attention. He ridiculed the speakers at the seminar for ineptness and made this public in the company’s online investors’ forum.5 Therefore, these factions made it difficult to organize successful events and helped to undercut the committee’s claims to represent British Bangladeshi views. It is a major achievement for the UK-based national committee activists to have now resolved these issues and managed to form one committee with leaders of both groups and other activists. These groups are major opponents of the mine, but they are understudied. The official narratives of the National Committee do not even mention them. In my opinion, even the central National committee was embarrassed with the factions within the UK supporters. Nonetheless, they form a strong opposition group against the company for quite a while in spite of their lack of resources and deep personal and ideological differences. They also developed a moderate support base among the British Bangladeshi community. However, this is not enough as one of the leaders pointed out: There are challenges to organise resistance here in the UK because of very busy lifestyle. Finance is also another important issue. We have a website to run regularly, we need a regular web developer. If we had enough resources, we could do that. To keep everybody united is also a big challenge. [. . .] Also we need to reach out to these people: mainstream ordinary people [. . .] from all walks of life and overcome the divide and perception about leftists that keep us apart. (Interview, December 11 2011)

Studying these groups is an untapped resource for activists and researchers alike. To conclude, British Bangladeshis are very important since they do feel connected with their homeland which does not necessarily include only Sylhet. They felt obligated as British citizens to resist, when they saw that a British company was trying to uproot people from Bangladesh. CONCLUSION The Phulbari resistance reached out to the world when the declaration of emergency rule in 2007 restrained political opportunity at the national level. Leaders of the National Committee reached out to the world through their “nesting pigeons”—the expatriate Bangladeshis spread around the

70

Samina Luthfa

world. Meanwhile a few organizations “picked up” the Phulbari resistance because this case fits their organizations’ scopes of work. In some cases, the connections or ties to the transnational coalition was mediated through a third party, in a few it was direct. The British Bangladeshi population that supports the National Committee in the United Kingdom was directly connected with the transnational resistance and formed a major part of the coalition. Like nesting pigeons , the British Bangladeshi activists against the mine are an important pressure point that helps restrain the Bangladesh government from exploring the mine (Tarrow 2005, 51–56). However, actors in the transnational coalition against the Phulbari mine suffer from lack of financial resources, rising tensions and hostility due to the rigid collective identities of the radicals and factions within the movement community. In this chapter, I focused on the discussion of the involvement of the diaspora which will help broaden the horizon of transnational movement research by including one more category of protestors we have ignored so far. I have identified some limits of the transnational coalition, which are probably not very unexpected in any coalition. However, they showed how the Phulbari case was different from other cases with similar coalitions but unequal power and resource relationships (e.g., Widener 2007). First, I have demonstrated how it was not necessary to have resource dependence on the Western transnational organisations to continue a transnational coalition. Second, the Western NGOs that had been perceived by most movement scholars as the providers of ideology, values, and “master frames” of environment-based movements across borders were not seen to perform such roles at all. Instead, all partners within the transnational coalition had kept their values intact. Even if they were learning from each other, it was not ideological. The transnational partners performed only the pieces that were required from them and they were best able to do so.

NOTES 1. The name is National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power, and Ports, Bangladesh (NCBD), but it is popularly known as Oil-Gas Protection Committee. 2. Meeting note in London 2011. 3. Personal communication with author, November10 2011. 4. The party that overtly opposed the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and continue religion-based politics in Bangladesh. 5. Based on the discussion in the forum of the investors at www​.iii​.co​.uk​/investment (download date February 2011.)

Resisting a Coal Mine in Bangladesh and the UK

71

REFERENCES Baviskar, Amita. 2004. In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts Over Development in the Narmada Valley. Delhi, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2010. “Social Movements.” In The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, edited by Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter. 2006. Globalization From Below: Global Movement and Transnational Protest. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Doyle, T. 2002. “Environmental Campaigns Against Mining in Australia and the Philippines.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7, no. 1: 29–42. Feldman, Shelley. 2003. “Paradoxes of Institutionalisation: The Depoliticisation of Bangladeshi NGOs.” Development in Practice 13, no. 1: 5–26. Gardner, Katy. 2008. “Keeping Connected: Security, Place, and Social Capital in a ‘Londoni’ Village in Sylhet.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14, no. 3 (August): 477–495. Guha, Ramchandra. 1997. “The Environmentalism of the Poor.” In Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest, edited by Richard Gabriel Fox and Orin Starn, 17–39. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Incla`n, Maria. 2009. “Sliding Doors of Opportunity: Zapatistas and Their Cycle of Protest.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 14, no. 1 (April): 85–106. https://doi​.org​/10​.17813​/maiq​.14​.1​.13q7002642355002. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kirsch, Stuart. 2007. “Indigenous Movements and the Risks of Counter-Globalization: Tracking the Campaign against Papua New Guinea’s Ok Tedi Mine.” American Ethnologist 31. https://doi​.org​/2​:303​-321​.10​.1525​/ae​.2007​.34​.2​.303. Lawson, Sarah, and Itesh Sachdev. 2004. “Identity, Language Use, and Attitudes: Some Sylheti-Bangladeshi Data From London, UK.” Journal of Language and Social Psychology 23, no. 1 (March): 49–69. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0261927X03261223. Luthfa, Samina. 2017. “Transnational Ties and Reciprocal Tenacity: Resisting Mining in Bangladesh With Transnational Coalition.” Sociology 51, no. 1 (February): 127–145. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0038038516668132. Muradian, Roldan, Joan Martinez-Alier, and Humberto Correa. 2003. “International Capital Versus Local Population: The Environmental Conflict of the Tambogrande Mining Project, Peru.” Society and Natural Resources 16, no. 9 (October): 775– 792. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/08941920309166. Pellow, David Naguib. 2007. Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Rootes, Christopher A. 1997. “Environmental Movements and Green Parties in Western and Eastern Europe.” In The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology, edited by Michael Redclift and Graham Woodgate, 319–330. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

72

Samina Luthfa

———. 2004. “Environmental Movements.” In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 608–640. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ———. 2005. “A Limited Transnationalization? The British Environmental Movement.” In Transnational Protests and Global Activism, edited by Donatella della Porta and Sydney Tarrow, 21–43. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Saunders, Clare. 2008. “Double-Edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement.” British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 2 (May): 227–253. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1468​-4446​.2008​.00191​.x. Snow, David A. 2004. “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields.” In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 380–412. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Tarrow, Sidney G. 2005. The new transnational activism. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, Sydney. 2007. “Rooted Cosmopolitans and Transnational Activists.” Lien social et Politiques 58: 87–102. Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. 2004. “Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World.” Sociological Forum 19, no. 1 (March): 63–68. Widener, Patricia. 2007. “Benefits and Burdens of Transnational Campaigns: A Comparison of Four Oil Struggles in Ecuador.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12, no. 1 (February): 21–36. https://doi​.org​/10​.17813​/maiq​.12​.1​ .t1g5814j9v358067.

Chapter 4

Pursuing Justice for All Eviction and Environmental Injustice in Dhaka Lutfun Nahar Lata

Environmental justice as a body of scholarship and a platform for activism against environmental racism is now more than thirty years old. Earlier studies documented the unequal impacts of environmental risks on different racial/ethnic groups and social classes. Most studies found that ethnic minorities, indigenous people, and low-income communities bear a higher burden of environmental exposure than other groups (Boone, Geoffrey, Buckley, Grove & Sister. 2009; Mohai, Pellow and Roberts 2009; Pastor et al. 2001). Nonetheless, these studies have not considered the institutional aspects that might implicitly or explicitly produce subtle forms of racism that determine the relations between rich and poor, white and non-white (Bolin, Nelson, Hackett, Pijawka, Smith, Sicotte, Sadalla, Matranga, and O’ Donnell 2002; Boone et al. 2009). It leads to the discussion of citizenship and citizenship rights. Within this context, this chapter analyses housing policies and slum eviction episodes in Dhaka to explore how the urban poor’s right to urban space, particularly their right to shelter, is denied by the government and its agencies, drawing connections between urban citizenship, the right to the city, environmental justice, and the rights to nature perspectives. The chapter contains a literature review and fieldwork done at the Sattola slum in Dhaka. Fieldwork was carried out over four months in Dhaka, from November 2015 to February 2016. As many as ninety-nine slum-dwellers (twenty-eight women and seventy-one men), and thirty-seven key informants agreed to give in-depth interviews. All interviewees were from the Sattola slum, other than sixteen government officials and an academic. The themes

73

74

Lutfun Nahar Lata

covered in the interviews were slum eviction, access to public space, and resettlement programs. The chapter first discusses the conceptual framework of citizenship, the right to the city, environmental justice, and rights to nature. Then the chapter discusses how the government and its agencies have violated the urban poor’s right to housing by evicting them without any resettlement program. The chapter concludes by explaining the importance of incorporating the notion of the right to urban space in the discourse of environmental justice.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY Existing literature suggests a disjuncture exists between citizenship in theory and practice (Gilbert and Phillips 2003). It is evident in urban areas where different social groups live separately, based on a constitution that often excludes and suppresses some of them, including poor people, women, and linguistic and ethnic minorities. Thus, they seek different degrees of cultural recognition and self-governance within and across the existing order (Kymlicka 2001; Tully 1995; Kymlicka 1995). In the discussion of marginalized groups’ citizenship rights, Lefebvre (1996), Harvey (2008), and Marcuse (2012) propose a new form of urban right that incorporates a renewed politics of inhabitants of cities. They argue that every citizen has a right to claim a city’s space. Lefebvre termed this form of right as the Right to the City (RTTC). Lefebvre first introduced the RTTC framework in his 1968 book Le Droit à la Ville (translated into English as The Right to the City in 1996). In the book, he calls for a revolution to establish an RTTC for everyone in a city (Lefebvre 1996, 1991). Later the idea of RTCC became popular through the writings of Harvey (2003, 2008) and others (Purcell 2002; Brenner et al. 2009; Marcuse 2012). Lefebvre defines RTTC as, “the right to information, the rights to use of multiple services, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in urban areas; it would also cover the right to the use of the center” (1991, 34). Lefebvre (1968, 1996) calls for a revolution based on an RTTC to establish everyone’s user rights over urban spaces rather than only those who are in the politically dominant position or own land. This idea of managing urban space by citizens of a city emphasizes the use-value of urban space over the exchange value, going beyond the realm of capitalism and state to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. RTTC could be a good starting point for claiming the disenfranchised groups’ RTTC. However, Lefebvre’s idea is considered a utopian one because the modern city still prioritizes private property rights over common

Pursuing Justice for All

75

property rights (Purcell 2002, 103). As a result, the city residents cannot make decisions about the use-value of space (Purcell 2002, 103). In this debate, Harvey made a contribution linking the RTTC to the conceptualizations of justice and establishing a grounded, process-oriented view of justice, which is linked to capital and the role of the state to provide benefit for all, especially those who are marginalized (Harvey 2008; Harvey and Potter 2009). This discussion is important in the framing of an RTTC as it indicates that there is a possibility to materialize marginalized groups’ RTTC only if better coordination could occur between capitalists and the state to ensure everyone’s benefit to the city rather than only serving the bourgeoisie interests of making profits using city’s space and resources (Walters, Khan and Kamal 2014, 4). However, in the real world, urban spaces have been commodified, and industrial capital has now transformed into financial capital (Harvey 2010). Due to the expansion of neoliberalism and financial capital, the exchange value of urban space has taken over use-value (ibid, 323). In addition, the focus on governance rather than the government has been prioritized in the policies of the IMF and the World Bank since the mid-1970s with the establishment of neoliberalism (Lee and McBride 2007, 10). The neoliberal economic model undermines social development and emphasizes economic growth. The outcome is the denial of common welfare to serve the interests of a few. Given this situation, Lefebvre (1996) pointed out the importance of the right to claim rights due to the gap between “granted” and “practised” rights (Gilbert and Phillips 2003, 317). While the discussion of democratic citizens’ rights is recognized and useful in practices, its relation to environmental rights has not been prioritized (ibid, 318).

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND RIGHTS TO NATURE Over the last few decades, there were debates over different environmental issues such as genetic modification, the wise use of natural resources, preservation and conservation, animal rights, urban sustainability, and biodiversity (ibid, 317). Due to these movements, many legislations have expanded citizens’ legal rights at various scales—national, subnational, and international. Despite the differences in the focus of these movements (environmental justice, rights of recognition, rights to services, and so on), “each struggle raises questions about the rights and responsibilities of humans within and toward nature” (ibid, 317). Environmentalism is also associated with ideals of political participation, individual’s engagement in politics, and public sphere renewal (Dobson 2000). Although environmental issues are not directly related to citizenship discourse , the histories of the

76

Lutfun Nahar Lata

environmental movements, particularly environmental justice movements, make a discussion of citizenships relevant (Jelin 2000, 51). The environmental rights have been formulated in a range of ways over the years, for example, as prerequisites to established civil, political, and social rights ; as independent and parallel to other sets of rights ; as responsibilities toward nature, among others (Collins-Chobanian 2000, Van Steenbergen 1994, Benton 1993). While many studies have focused on the legislative changes for non-human entities, this chapter focuses on the environmental rights and citizenships of humans, particularly, citizenships of the urban poor and their right to housing. Contemporary environmental rights for humans have two main streams; one stream emphasizes formal rights to a clean and healthy environment, and the second stream focuses on rights of participation for interested and affected citizens (Pulido 1994, 915). The former is documented as legal environmental rights in procedural justice and regulatory agencies, whereas the latter emphasizes “the need for discussion of governmental and corporate policies and practices through mechanisms such as roundtables or public consultation meetings” (Gilbert and Phillips 2003, 318). It indicates that some claims for environmental rights occur within governmental frameworks or are developed by public institutions in consultation with NGOs (ibid, 318). For example, humans have been granted fundamental environmental rights in the Brundtland Report, the Draft Declaration of Principles of Human Rights and the Environment, and most recently the Aarhus Convention (ibid, 318). In an attempt to establish a connection between human rights and environmental rights, nature becomes both an entitlement and a responsibility for humans (ibid, 318). It also poses a challenge to the existing civil, political, and social rights as ecological citizenship involves the “implosion of supposedly separate civil, political and social rights” (Urry 2000, 69). Environmental citizenships have broken the dichotomy between local/ global and public/private by endorsing “changes in consumption, disposal and character that are usually considered part of the private realm, but that are also publicly pursued, accountable, and have repercussions beyond the private” (Gilbert and Phillips 2003, 318). Environmental rights and practices cross the boundary of the nation-state in the sense that pollution does not respect borders. The notion of citizenship is also changing with the change of environmental rights and practices. As Gilbert and Phillips note, “environmental and urban citizenships challenge similar experiences of injustices created by state and market-led development” (2003, 319). Within this context, I adopt Lefebvre’s idea of the RTTC to explore whether marginalized groups such as poor people have the right to appropriate urban space for shelter. As urban space is part of natural resources, poor people have a stake in managing

Pursuing Justice for All

77

and using urban space. However, the neoliberal economic model has transformed the use-value of urban space to exchange value. As a result, it has become difficult for the growing number of urban poor in Dhaka to access urban space for shelter. The government of Bangladesh has recognized the rights to housing in its constitution as well as drafted national policies to ensure housing rights for all. Additionally, the government has signed and ratified many international conventions such as the Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) and the UN Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlement to ensure poor people’s right to housing. Regarding the right to housing, the ICSECR Committee in its General Comment No. 4 mentioned that the government should provide legal security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, location, habitability, affordability, accessibility, and cultural adequacy. This convention also pointed out that the instances of forced evictions are incompatible with the requirements of covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances and following the relevant principles of international law (UN 1991). The universal goals of ensuring adequate shelter for all and making human settlements safe, healthier, more liveable, equitable, sustainable, and more productive are further endorsed by the UN Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlement (1996) (UN 1999). However, the government of Bangladesh nowadays acts as an enabler rather than the provider of housing due to the introduction of neoliberal policy in the housing market (Morshed 2014, 386). Due to this enabling policy, housing has become less important to the government as “its social allocation and cutbacks are justified as housing reforms which have taken many forms and manifestations” (Sengupta 2010, 323). For example, public housing projects disproportionately favor the middle- and upper-income groups than prioritizing poor people’s housing needs in Bangladesh (Nahiduzzaman 2012, 4). In addition to ignoring poor people’s housing needs, the government of Bangladesh has been evicting slums without any resettlement program since 1972.

EVICTION, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY Like many cities of the Global South, one-third of Dhaka’s population lives in the city’s 4,966 slums (Angeles et al. 2009, 8). Most of Dhaka’s slums, including Sattola, are not recognized by the government planning bodies. That is why these slums are under constant threat of eviction. In addition, no government agencies approve or provide any services in slums except Dhaka

78

Lutfun Nahar Lata

Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (WASA). Recently a local NGO called Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK, Health Center for the Distressed) has been providing water and sanitation facilities in some slums in Dhaka in collaboration with Dhaka WASA. Apart from lack of basic services, slum dwellers in Dhaka often face evictions as they have no tenure rights over their land or homes. Slums are cleared without any resettlement program, although as mentioned earlier the government has adopted many laws, obligations, and international conventions that guarantee the rights to housing of the poor. In most cases, the government evicts slums without resettling slum dwellers. As a consequence, slum dwellers often go back to their old settlements and later the government demolishes those slums again. For example, Siffat, one of my participants, who had been living in this slum for over thirty years, described how they were evicted several times between 1990 and 2003 without any resettlement program: They [Dhaka North City Corporation (DNCC) officials] first evicted us 12 years ago. I cannot remember whether they gave prior notice at that time. But the second time they gave a short notice before bringing the bulldozer. They told us to leave the slum before demolishing our houses. They also told us if we don’t demolish our houses, they will bring the bulldozer and smash everything. So we left the slum at that time [. . .] Everyone left the slum. We went to Badda. Every family moved out of the slum. Some went to their village. Some went to Badda. Some slum dwellers rented houses in other slums [. . .] The slum was left empty for one year. They put a fence around the slum area. One year later we returned and built houses and started living here again. (Interview, owner of a house, November 20, 2015)

Like slum dwellers of Sattola, in most cases, other slum dwellers become homeless after slum eviction and get shelter in other places, go back to their villages, or live under the open sky, as the government does not provide shelter for them. Since 1999 the government has evicted 102 slums in Dhaka without any resettlement program, despite the government being party to international conventions that affirm the rights to housing of the poor (Rahman 2001; Nawaz 2004). In many cases, slum dwellers were evicted forcefully either by burning down slums or using police and military officials. In some cases, slums were evicted using police and armed forces; for example, 173,000 slum dwellers were evicted from different slums in Dhaka with the help of the police and paramilitary forces in the first week of January 1975 (Rahman 2001, 52). A one-party government was in power at that time, and they ignored the right to shelter of the slum dwellers as the slum dwellers neither had voting rights nor was their participation required to organize political rallies (ibid, 52).

Pursuing Justice for All

79

Sometimes slums in Dhaka are evicted by the use of brutal techniques. One of them is the use of arson. In April 1990, some slum dwellers died in an arson attack in Kalyanpur slum. In January 2016, an eviction drive in Kalyanpur slum by the Ministry of Housing and Public works was halted by a High Court injunction for three months. Following this order, 100 shanties of the slum were burnt down, and the slum dwellers believe the authorities initiated this attack (The New Age 2016). Arson is used to evict the slum dwellers by hiring muscle men. Arson is often used to evict slums in Dhaka. For example, arson was used to evict slums from Kalyanpur, Mohammadpur, Tejgaon, Maghbazar, Babupura, and Kazipara in Dhaka city (Rahman 2001, 52; The New Age 2016). In addition, slum dwellers receive very little notice before eviction, even though the Government and Local Authority Land and Building (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance 1970 compels the concerned authorities to give thirty days’ notice to legally evict slum dwellers (ibid, 53). In most cases, they receive only 48 hours’ notice to abandon their shelters. In February 1994, the slum dwellers of Agargaon received a notice from the Department of Public Works to evacuate the slum within a week and were evicted to please the then Prime Minister who went to the vicinity to initiate the National Science and Technology week (ibid 2001, 52). The irony is this slum was in the name of the ruling party at that time (ibid 2001, 52). In 2005, several thousand people from the Amtoli slum in Banani were evicted by RAJUK (Capital Development Authority) without any prior notice (Center on Housing Rights and Evictions 2006, 64). Sometimes slum dwellers get two hours’ notice before eviction (The Independent 2016). It is a serious violation of the fundamental human rights of the slum dwellers and a serious offence against the Court’s order (Nawaz 2004). The government does not follow the stay order that is often imposed by the High Court in favor of the rehabilitation program for the evicted slum dwellers. For example, when the Amtoli slum was demolished and slum dwellers were evicted in February 2002, a case was filed against the eviction notice served upon the Amtoli slum dwellers. The court declared a stay order until disposal of the case against the eviction, however, the police evicted this slum regardless (Nawaz 2004). Besides this, almost 20,000 residents were evicted from Korail slum on April 4, 2012, violating a high court order of 2008 that asked the administration to make arrangements for resettlement before evicting Korail slum dwellers. Later they sat in on the airport road till the district administration announced that the evictions would stop temporarily (Terminski 2015, 132; Al-Mahmood 2012). The government has tried to evict the Korail slum four times since 1996, but the slum dwellers have resisted these evictions using the court’s order and with support from political actors, NGOs, civil society, and the media, especially two legal aid organization; Law

80

Lutfun Nahar Lata

and Mediation Center (ASK) and Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) helped them to file cases against these evictions (Shiree-DSK 2012, 7). The government has also evicted Sattola slum twice since 2003 without any resettlement program (Lata 2020, 225). As slum dwellers of Sattola had no alternative shelter in Dhaka, they returned to the slum once the police and other state actors left the slum. The government has built two apartment buildings for public hospital staff evicting slum dwellers of Sattola, but the government has not taken any initiative to resettle the evicted slum dwellers. Apart from re-appropriating public land, slums are evicted in the name of development programs. For example, in 2004 over 40,000 people were affected by large-scale evictions of slums in the Agargaon area where many government offices were later built (Terminski 2015, 132). Several thousand slum dwellers were evicted from Jhilpaar slum in March 2008 (Terminski 2015, 132). Wakely reported that 27,055 people were evicted in 17 incidents between January 2004 and June 2005 and the reasons behind these evictions include environmental clean-up, building shopping complexes, land grabbing, and development of infrastructure (2007, 132). Over 40,000 slum dwellers became homeless between 2006 and 2008 during which time 27 slums were evicted in Dhaka (Terminski 2015, 125). In Dhaka, state actors and planners frequently evict slum dwellers and deny their access to public space or their rights to basic services, housing, and livelihoods, by labeling them illegal encroachers who have no right to appropriate those spaces. My interviews with some state officials indicate that they consider slum dwellers as inferior and creators of all sorts of problems in the city such as crime and congestion, and mostly deny the urban poor’s right to the city including their right to housing. State actors are able to justify slum eviction when they can successfully label poor people as illegal encroachers/ criminals. The term “encroachment” began to appear in the late 1980s in legal judgments to deny an encroacher “right to possession and use of land that belongs elsewhere” (Ramanathan 2004, 11). This image of an encroacher provides a valid ground on the basis of which “the poor can be seen as unworthy of legal and constitutional protection” (Ramanathan 2004, 11). The government cannot deny poor people’s constitutional rights to housing and basic services under any condition. Yet, the government and its apparatuses label slum dwellers as “improper citizens” (Bhan 2009, 139) to justify denying a citizen’s constitutional rights. Apart from labeling slum dwellers as improper citizens, many state actors also mentioned that poor people should go back to their villages rather than appropriating space in Dhaka. When asked if the government does not organize any resettlement program for the poor, what options they have other than encroaching on public space, the Ward Councilor of Sattola said,

Pursuing Justice for All

81

That is a difficult question to answer. For example, where did I come from? Suppose I came from Barisal. But I appropriated a huge amount of property here [Dhaka] but it is not my property. It is the property of the government. I should not grab the government’s property. I should go back to my village. (Interview, Ward Councilor, December 29, 2015)

However, the urban have a right to appropriate urban space as urban space is part of natural resources. The urban poor also have a right to participate in decision-making processes surrounding the production of urban space (Purcell 2002, 102). Yet, the urban poor of Dhaka cannot participate in decision-making processes in terms of use of urban space as RAJUK is the main planning and development agency for the Dhaka Metropolitan area (Begum 2007). Yet, RAJUK has not materialized a single housing project for slum dwellers. That is how the urban poor’s right to urban space, particularly their right to housing, is denied by the government and its agencies.

CONCLUSION This chapter argues that the slum dwellers of Dhaka are treated as a kind of pollution and are not considered as citizens of the city although many of them have been living in Dhaka for over thirty years. They are often evicted to build a clean and green city. Other reasons for slum evictions are environmental clean-up, building shopping complexes, and development of infrastructure. Often slum dwellers are not viewed as people, rather as undesirable elements of the urban environment that should be removed from the city and sent back to their villages. One may raise the question of why slum dwellers living in a slum should be viewed from an environmental perspective. This is because when poor people are seen as pollutants of the city and city officials deprive them of their basic human right to habitat, it is important to raise a concern about their right to housing. The experience of slum living without having adequate services of water and sewerage, electricity and gas, means poor people are living in inhuman conditions in slums. In addition, they are evicted without any resettlement which makes them homeless. The concept of environmental justice emphasizes that the environment is not something centered on a place rather all the places where people eat, sleep, play, and live their lives (Bullard and Wright 1993, 836). Environmental injustice occurs not only when people are deprived of clean air and water but also when they are denied appropriate urban space for habitat.

82

Lutfun Nahar Lata

This chapter contributes to environmental justice scholarship by focusing on housing rather than focusing on hazardous waste facilities or polluting industry. Measuring the uneven distribution of a city’s space in relation to where social groups live and the living condition of different income groups is a legitimate and important justice concern. Existing literature on environmental justice mostly paid close attention to pollutants and toxins for their negative health impacts. However, living in a slum without having access to basic services has negative impacts on the physical and mental health of slum dwellers. Also evicting them without resettlement too has consequences on their physical and mental health. They live under constant threat of eviction as the government and its agencies have denied their right to habitat in the city. If human health is a fundamental concern for environmental justice, then adequate housing should fall within the realm of environmental justice inquiries. The right to housing should be explored for other reasons beyond health concerns, particularly this is an important aspect in ensuring redistribution of city’s space in an equitable manner as all citizens have a right to the city.

REFERENCES Al-Mahmood, Syed Zain. 2012. “Dhaka Slum Dwellers Live under Threat of Eviction.” The Guardian, 11 April 2012. https://www​.theguardian​.com​/global​-development​/2012​/apr​/11​/dhaka​-bangladesh​-slum​-dwellers​-eviction. Angeles, Gustavo, Peter Lance, Janine Barden-O’Fallon, Nazrul Islam, A. Q. M. Mahbub, and Nurul Islam Nazem. 2009. “The 2005 Census and Mapping of Slums in Bangladesh: Design, Select Results and Application.” International Journal of Health Geographics 8, no. 32: 1–19. https://doi​.org​/10​.1186​/1476​-072x​-8​-32. Begum, Anwara. 2007. “Urban Housing as an Issue of Redistribution Through Planning? The Case of Dhaka City.” Social Policy & Administration 41, no. 4 (August): 410–418. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1467​-9515​.2007​.00563​.x. Benton, Ted. 1993. Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice. London: Verso. Bhan, Gautam. 2009. “‘This is No Longer the City I Once Knew’: Evictions, the Urban Poor and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi.” Environment and Urbanization 21, no. 1: 127–142. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​%2F0956247809103009. Bolin, Bob, Amy Nelson, Edward J. Hackett, K. David Pijawka, C. Scott Smith, Diane Sicotte, Edward K. Sadalla, Eric Matranga, and Maureen O’Donnell. 2002. “The Ecology of Technological Risk in a Sunbelt City.” Environment and Planning A 34, no. 2 (February): 317–339. https://doi​.org​/10​.1068​%2Fa3494. Boone, Christopher G., Geoffrey L. Buckley, J. Morgan Grove, and Chona Sister. 2009. “Parks and People: An Environmental Justice Inquiry in Baltimore,

Pursuing Justice for All

83

Maryland.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99, no. 4: 767– 787. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/00045600903102949. Brenner, Neil, Peter Marcuse, and Margit Mayer. 2009. “Cities for People, Not for Profit.” City 13, nos. 2–3: 176–184. Bullard, Robert D., and Beverly H. Wright. 1993. “Environmental Justice for All: Community Perspectives on Health and Research.” Toxicology and Industrial Health 9, no. 5 (September–October): 821–841. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​%2F0​7482​ 3379​300900508. Center on Housing Rights and Evictions. 2006. Forced Evictions: Violations of Human Rights—Global Survey 10. Geneva: Center on Housing Rights and Evictions. Collins-Chobanian, Shari. 2000. “Beyond Sax and Welfare Interests.” Environmental Ethics 22, no. 2 (Summer): 133–148. Dobson, Andrew. 2000. “Ecological Citizenship: a Disruptive Influence?” In Politics at the Edge, edited by Chris Pierson and Simon Tormey, 40–62. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gilbert, Liette, and Catherine Phillips. 2003. “Practices of Urban Environmental Citizenships: Rights to the City and Rights to Nature in Toronto.” Citizenship Studies 7, no. 3: 313–330. http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.1080​/1362102032000098896. Harvey, David. 2003. “The Right to the City.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 4: 939–941. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.0309​-1317​.2003​ .00492​.x. ———. 2008. “The Right to the City.” In The City Reader, edited by Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout, 23–40. London: Routledge. ———. 2010. Social Justice and the City. Vol. 1. London: University of Georgia Press. Harvey, David, and Cuz Potter. 2009. “The Right to the Just City.” In Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice, edited by Peter Marcuse, James Connolly, Johannes Novy, Ingrid Olivo, Cuz Potter, and Justin Steil, 40–51. London: Routledge. Jelin, Elizabeth. 2000. “Towards a Global Environmental Citizenship?” Citizenship Studies 4, no. 1 (February): 47–63. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/136210200110021. “Kalyanpur Slum Dwellers Clash With Police: HC Stays Eviction for 3 Months.” 2016. The Independent, 22 January 2016. http://www​ .theindependentbd​ .com​ / printversion​/details​/31208. “Kalyanpur Slum Dwellers Keep Watch Fearing Further Arson.” 2016. New Age, 24 January 2016. http://archive​.newagebd​.net​/196276​/kalyanpur​-slum​-dwellers​-keep​ -watch​-fearing​-further​-arson/. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2001. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press. Lata, Lutfun Nahar. 2020. “Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to Housing of the Urban Poor in Dhaka, Bangladesh.” Environment and Urbanization ASIA 11, no. 2: 218–230.

84

Lutfun Nahar Lata

Lee, Simon, and Stephen McBride. 2007. Neo-Liberalism, State Power and Global Governance. Dordrecht: Springer. Lefebvre, Henri. 1968. Le Droit à la Ville (The Right to the City). Paris: Anthropos. ———. 1991. The Production of Space. Translated by D Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1996. Writings on Cities. Translated by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas. Oxford: Blackwell. Marcuse, Peter. 2012. “Whose Right (s) to What City?” In Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City, edited by Peter Marcuse, N. Brenner, P. Marcuse, and M. Mayer, 24–41. London: Routledge. Mohai, Paul, David Pellow, and J. Timmons Roberts. 2009. “Environmental Justice.” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 34: 405–430. Morshed, Md. Manjur. 2014. “Illegality of Private Subdivision and Access to Land for Housing by the Urban Poor in Dhaka.” Habitat International 44 (October): 386–393. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.habitatint​.2014​.08​.004. Nahiduzzaman, Kh. 2012.”Housing the Urban Poor: An Integrated Governance Perspective: The Case of Dhaka, Bangladesh.” PhD Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). Nawaz, Rasheda. 2004. “Right to Shelter: Bangladesh.” International Conference on Adequate and Affordable Housing for All, Center for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Canada. Pastor, Manuel, Jim Sadd, and John Hipp. 2001. “Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-In, and Environmental Justice.” Journal of Urban Affairs 23, no. 1 (December): 1–21. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/0735​-2166​.00072. Pulido, Laura. 1994. “Restructuring and the Contraction and Expansion of Environmental Rights in the United States.” Environment and Planning A 26, no. 6 (June): 915–936. https://doi​.org​/10​.1068​%2Fa260915. Purcell, Mark. 2002. “Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant.” GeoJournal 58, no. 2 (October): 99–108. Rahman, Mahbubur. 2005. “Role of the NGOs in Urban Housing for the Poor in Dhaka, Bangladesh.” Global Built-Environment Review (GBER) 5, no. 1: 16–29. Rahman, Mohammed Mahbubur. 2001. “Bastee Eviction and Housing Rights: A Case of Dhaka, Bangladesh.” Habitat International 25, no. 1 (March): 49–67. Ramanathan, Usha. 2004. “Illegality and Exclusion: Law in the Lives of Slum Dwellers.” International Environmental Law Research Center Working Paper. Geneva: International Environmental Law Resource Center. Sengupta, Urmi. 2010. “The Hindered Self-Help: Housing Policies, Politics and Poverty in Kolkata, India.” Habitat International 34, no. 3 (July): 323–331. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1016​/j​.habitatint​.2009​.11​.009. Shiree, D. S. K. 2012. Moving Backwards: Korail Slum Eviction. Dhaka: Shiree-DSK. Terminski, Bogumil. 2015. Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes, Consequences, and Socio-Legal Context. Stuttgart: Ibidem. Tully, James. 1995. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pursuing Justice for All

85

UN. 1991. “General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant).” Last Modified 13 December 1991. https://www​.refworld​.org​/docid​ /47a7079a1​.html. ———. 1999. “Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements.” Last Modified 28 July 1999. http://www​.unhabaitat​.org​/unchs​/english​/hagenda​/partners​/index​.htm1. Urry, John. 2000. “Global Flows and Global Citizenship.” In Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City, edited by Engin F. Isin, 62–78. New York: Routledge. Van Steenbergen, Bart. 1994. The Condition of Citizenship. London: Sage. Wakely, Patrick. 2007. Quick Guide on Approaches to Low-Income Housing. Nairobi: UN-Habitat. Walters, Peter, M. Adil Khan, and Kamrul Ashan. 2014. “Access to Knowledge as Prelude to a Right to the City for the Urban Poor in Rajshahi, Bangladesh.” UPE11: 11th Symposium of International Urban Planning and Environment AssociationIUPEA. La Plata, Buenos Aires, 16–19 September 2014.

Chapter 5

Rohingya Influx Impacts on Environment and Local Host Communities in Bangladesh Mrittika Kamal

Findings of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) state that Bangladesh has registered the second-largest new refugee arrivals in 2017 due to the Rohingya influx (The Independent 2018). Consequently, Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh have been facing a mass influx of displaced Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, following ethnic cleansing led by their military government in its western Rakhine state since August 2017. Understandably, this crisis has created substantial pressure on Bangladesh, one of the world’s most densely populated countries, consisting of a population of 162 million (BBC News 2019). Geographically located in the northeastern part of South Asia, the country has an area of 1,47,570 square kilometers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). The Bangladesh–Myanmar border cutting through hills, forests, rivers, canals, and the sea is highly porous making it easy for people from Myanmar to travel frequently to Bangladesh. However, the historical process of Rohingyas merging with the local population of Bangladesh, particularly in Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, has been occurring through mass exoduses resulting from numerous occasions of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar over a significant period of time since 1977–1978, 1991, 2012, 2016, and the most recent migration in 2017–2018 (Reid 2020). Despite the concerns of demographic pressure, resource scarcity, and internal security, the repeated ethnic cleansing and genocide on this minority community have forced Bangladesh to give refuge to approximately 9,32,000 Rohingyas from at least 1.2 million Rohingyas dislocated worldwide (Hammond 2018). In fact, the influx of 2017–2018 has had the most impact in terms of environmental damage and distress on local host communities as

87

88

Mrittika Kamal

the demographic pressure of this influx has surpassed the impacts of previous Rohingya arrivals (Figure 5.1). The recent Rohingya influx is causing irreversible damage to the environment of Bangladesh. The camp settlement process itself has caused environmental problems initially by clearing land and destroying the natural resources. For example, the Kutupalong camp and its extensions are now officially the world’s largest refugee camp (World Food Program USA 2019). The forests near the camps are still being destroyed at an alarming rate to build new shelters and to meet their need for fuel. Unplanned housing, sanitation, and water supply are leading to unhygienic living conditions, improper waste management, water and soil contamination, and air pollution as well as various diseases which in turn are affecting both the Rohingyas and the host communities. In summary, the Rohingya crisis now has an environmental face that has reached the deadly potential of long-term impacts on the subregional climate. The current Rohingya situation is a culmination of abuses over centuries, of both human lives and their environment. The problem substantially intensified due to the fact that the recurring influxes had short intervals between them. The following sections of this chapter demonstrates the complexity of problems—including a historical overview of the influxes, resultant

Figure 5.1  Rohingya Refugees Waiting at the Bangladesh border near Naf River. Photograph by Uzan Rahman/ Terracotta Creatives Multimedia.

Rohingya Influx

89

deforestation, loss of biodiversity , destruction of ecological balance, humanwildlife conflict, water resource depletion, damage to property, land degradation, disrupted distribution of natural resources, loss of land, increased cost of living, added competition in the labor market, price hike of commodities, integration of Rohingya community in mainstream society.​

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The word “Rohingya” refers to a predominantly Muslim people with ancestral lineage in the present Rakhine state of Myanmar (Rahman 2016). According to Thomas Ragland , they are “an ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority both within Burma and within their own province” (1994, 305). In addition, because of the geographical proximity, Bangladesh and Myanmar share a common history. The Rakhine state, previously known as the Kingdom of Arakan, extended, for some time in the medieval period, up to Chittagong of present-day Bangladesh. On the other hand, Arakan was captured and brought under Bengal at other junctures of history. According to the findings of Human Rights Watch (2000), the military government of Myanmar has been systematically oppressing the Rohingya community since 1962. The Nagamin census of 1977 purposefully excluded the Rohingya community as citizens of Myanmar which resulted in the mass exodus of 2,00,000 Rohingyas to neighboring Bangladesh. As per the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act, soon followed by the 1982 Citizen Act, the Rohingya community was finally deprived of their Myanmar citizenship (Rahman 2016). The crisis intensified following the Citizenship Act of 1989 when colorcoded Citizens Scrutiny Cards were introduced. Citizens were categorized into different groups, but the Rohingyas were again deliberately excluded and hence categorized as foreigners. These allegations lead to long-standing consequences which are unfortunately still victimizing the Rohingya population through varied forms of persecution including rape, torture, killings, psychological trauma, among others. The persecution, in turn, forced another 300,000 Rohingyas to escape to neighboring Bangladesh in 1991–1992 (Ullah 2011, 151). The next significant population shift of the Rohingya community took place in 1997, but since the community merged with the local host communities, any strong statistics regarding their population cannot be found (ACAPS 2017, 3). In June 2012, another ethnic cleansing attempt forced 1,40,000 Rohingyas to seek refuge in Bangladesh (Goodman 2014). Further, in October 2016, 87,000 Rohingyas arrived following similar circumstances (Asrar 2017). Within this timeline, both repatriated Rohingya refugees and new arrivals have trickled through the porous Bangladesh–Myanmar border

90

Mrittika Kamal

because of continued persecution and insecurity in Myanmar. Often unable to gain access to Rohingya camps, these invisible refugees have settled down in villages or slums around Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf (Ullah 2011, 151). Now, after August 2017, Bangladesh is facing the biggest Rohingya influx and fastest growing refugee emergency in history (Molla 2018). On the other hand, Bangladesh is a multiethnic country consisting of at least seventy-five indigenous communities apart from the overwhelming singular majority of the Bangali, which has been estimated to be approximately 98 percent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). The Bangali community is the mainstream population of this country. The host communities of the Rohingya crisis primarily involve the population of Cox’s Bazar district as well as the three districts of Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region. However, for the sake of discussion, the host communities can be divided into the following segments: Bangali Muslim community, Bangali religious minority communities, and indigenous communities. At least eleven indigenous communities have historical ties to and live in the CHT region of Bangladesh. These communities include the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, Tanchangya, Chak, Khumi, Lushai, Khyang, Bawm, and Pankho. Along with many of these communities, another indigenous community referred to as the Rakhine lives in Cox’s Bazar. These indigenous communities primarily practice Buddhism. Besides, another community known as the Barua live in these regions, who, from ethno-religious features, appear to have originated from indigenous background but with time have integrated with the mainstream Bangali Buddhist community. Alongside the Buddhist communities, people practicing Hinduism and Christianity are also residents of the affected areas. After decades of failed repatriation attempts and repeated influxes, Bangladesh continues to provide refuge to the stateless Rohingya population through encampment and to some extent, social inclusion. Because of the uncertainty caused by recurring incidents of violence in Myanmar, facilities provided by the UNHCR and partner organizations, and feelings of security of residing in a Muslim-majority country, many Rohingyas have chosen to remain as refugees in Bangladesh rather than as non-citizens in Myanmar.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT The UNHCR Environmental Guidelines (2005) have discussed some of the environmental impacts of refugees in host countries: Uncontrolled fuel wood collection, poaching, and over-use of limited water supplies, add pressure to ecosystems in many regions, including some unique areas set aside by local governments as parks, reserves or even World Heritage Sites.

Rohingya Influx

91

“In the worst case, these activities, if allowed to continue, could result in irreversible losses of productivity, the extinction of plant or animal species, the destruction of unique ecosystems, the depletion or long-term pollution of groundwater supplies, or a variety of other destructive outcomes (UNHCR 2005).”

The concerns stated in the UNHCR’s general Environmental Guidelines are applicable to Bangladesh since the country has been facing multiple Rohingya influxes of which the recent Rohingya influx of 2017–2018 has the most impact. Demographic Pressure No exact statistics can be found concerning the Rohingya community currently residing in Bangladesh. According to UNHCR, as of June 30, 2020, 8,60,356 Rohingya individuals live in Cox’s Bazar area which includes 35,060 registered refugees (2020, 1). The available statistics do not extend to members of the Rohingya communities who have merged with the local host communities prior to and between the major mass influxes. The statistics also fail to cover the Rohingya population inhabiting other districts of Bangladesh, including Bandarban, Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Chittagong. However, as per the findings of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 303,070 Rohingya refugees were already living in Bangladesh before the influx of August 2017 (Strategic Executive Group and Partners 2018, 9). Land Occupation Bangladesh has repeatedly been suffering from Rohingya influxes (Figure 5.2). Till April 2018, 6,340 acres of land, mostly forests, was allocated for establishing temporary Rohingya camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf (Aziz 2018b). Massive Rohingya shelters have been built without considering the existing environmental rules and laws of Bangladesh. Previously we hosted 32,527 Rohingyas. After the August 2017 influx, the country has had to take on more burden than she can bear. Because of the new arrivals, shelters have also taken over nearby hills in the surrounding plains, forests, and hills which include rubber gardens, khas land or government-owned land, as well as fallow or croplands—a substantial amount of which was previously occupied by the local population (Saha 2017). According to the Commissioner of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) in Cox’s Bazar, Mohammed Abul Kalam, Myanmar nationals have set up approximately 200,000 makeshift tents mostly in the Ukhiya sub-district as they have failed

92

Mrittika Kamal

Figure 5.2  Overcrowded Rohingya Camps, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Photograph by Uzan Rahman/ Terracotta Creatives Multimedia.

to secure spots at the registered camps (Shuvo 2018). The hills have been stripped naked and leveled in order to build thousands of temporary shelters. The destruction of hills is creating new challenges as the barren hills have become soft, unstable grounds. Despite the massive environmental impact on land and the local communities, it is evident that the space allocated for Rohingyas is insufficient. They are being forced to survive in inhumane living conditions in cramped and overcrowded spaces. Contamination of Water Resources The groundwater sources of affected areas are quickly being depleted and the freshwater streams have become contaminated. The refugee settlements have jeopardized a number of previously existing sources that were commonly used by local host communities, particularly the indigenous peoples. As per the findings of the World Health Organization, 62 percent of water available to Rohingya households was found to be contaminated. In addition, a total of 36,096 acute watery diarrhea cases were reported between August and November, 2017, involving ten related deaths (The Dhaka Tribune 2017).

Rohingya Influx

93

Improper Waste Management The Rohingyas in encampments are dependent on plastic products on a daily basis and most of the plastic is not disposed of appropriately. Therefore, the environment in and around Rohingya camps is being greatly affected by the building up of plastic waste, which in turn is blocking the drainage system. Also, some common materials used for building makeshift shelters in the Rohingya camps include harmful materials such as tarpaulin and aluminum. Besides, huge amount of human waste is another concern. A single outdoor latrine is used by around twenty people (Reid 2020). As the number of sanitation facilities is inadequate in comparison to the population of the camps, open defecation is an everyday problem. The increasing mountains of waste can cause serious health hazards to both the camp residents and the local population of nearby areas, especially because of the absence of viable waste disposal facilities. This problem is also affecting local host communities by depleting various water sources. Deforestation Deforestation by Rohingya refugees is not new in Bangladesh. The phenomenon has recently come to the limelight as the change in the landscape of Bangladesh has become quite visible through the sudden influx of approximately a million people within a short span of time. As tens of thousands of refugees poured into the green hills, the familiar geography transformed into an unknown territory in just a matter of weeks. In 2018, the 6,000 acres of land deforested by Rohingya camps were estimated to be worth US $86.67 million ( The New Age 2018). In 2019, this number increased to an alarming 8,000 acres of reserved forest land. The damage has been estimated to be over BDT 2,420 crore or US $285.35 million. A report conducted by an expert team of the forest ministry further states that the Rohingya settlements (thirty-four camps in Ukhiya and eight camps in Teknaf) have been built on 6,164 acres of reserved forest land and an additional 1,837 acres of forests have been consumed for firewood (Hasan 2019). According to UNHCR, the source of 80 percent of the fuel used in Rohingya camps comes from tree cutting (2018, 1). A UNDP report on the “Environmental Impact of Rohingya Influx” raises concerns about the effect of the Rohingya population’s consumption of fuel. The report estimates that unless alternative fuel is supplied, around 26,000 hectares of forest land in the 10-kilometers radius of the Rohingya camps will be destroyed within a year (cited in Shuvo 2018). Mohammed Ali Kabir, Cox’s Bazar South Forest

94

Mrittika Kamal

Figure 5.3  Hills Abandoned by Relocated Rohingyas near Kutupalong Camp, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Photograph by Mrittika Kamal/ Terracotta Creatives Multimedia.

Department official, claims that the Rohingya refugees were consuming approximately 10,000 tons of firewood collected from adjoining forest land on a daily basis before measures were taken to reduce this demand (Aziz 2018a). At present, Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders are being supplied to the Rohingya families which is gradually lessening the demand of fuel wood, and consequently the rate of deforestation has gone down (ibid). In addition, initiatives for reforestation have been taken, and in 2019, more than 300 acres of land has been reforested (Amin 2020).​​ Construction Because of the Rohingya influx, the areas accommodating the refugees are undergoing extensive construction work (Figure 5.3). Various aid agencies are continuously undertaking activities including increasing the stability of grounds to support construction, constructing improved shelters, sewage facilities, drilling wells, installing water points, toilets, showers as well as building roads to reach key access points. Unfortunately, these unplanned construction efforts are adversely affecting the environment and local host communities. The existing scenario of the Rohingya camps gives us a glimpse of the extent of infrastructure that will be furthered in the Rohingya camp areas

Rohingya Influx

95

in the upcoming years until the living condition is deemed “acceptable” for human habitation by the aid agencies and international community. Natural and Man-Made Disasters The unplanned development of the Rohingya camp areas and the subsequent environmental impact have put Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban areas in a vulnerable position in terms of natural and man-made disasters. Because of deforestation and the subsequent soil vulnerability, the hills are more prone to landslides. Besides, Cox’s Bazar has become more susceptible to damage caused by cyclones as the natural protection provided by the trees and hills has been reduced considerably. UNICEF estimated that the lives of approximately 200,000 Rohingya refugees, comprising 50 percent children, were jeopardized during the monsoon season of 2018. The data provided by aid agencies suggest that at least 900 shelters and 200 latrines were destroyed by heavy rain. Furthermore, people were crushed by collapsed mud walls (Modola 2018). In addition, cooking indoors in the camp areas can cause potential fire hazards in these overcrowded settlements.

Air Pollution Air pollution is caused by vehicle fumes from increased numbers of cars and jeeps being mobilized for the various activities centering on the Rohingya camps. The firewood burned by refugees also causes an alarming amount of air pollution. This is particularly concerning as most Rohingya households cook indoors, which also impacts their health. Abdus Salam, a surgeon from Cox’s Bazar stated, “Indoor air pollution can affect health and here in the camps, people are highly dependent on inefficient stoves. The smoke from firewood is increasing health risks. Respiratory infections, breathing problems are common among the camp’s residents” (cited in Jahan 2018). LPG, another source of air pollution, is being used by 97 percent of Rohingya families as an alternative fuel to firewood (Amin 2020). Another concern is the rise in greenhouse gas emissions triggered by deforestation which can potentially change the climate of southeastern Bangladesh. Endangered Biodiversity Deforestation and cutting hills have changed the landscape of the region which in turn is reducing the biodiversity of the affected areas. This loss of habitat has put a variety of species of flora and fauna at risk of extinction.

96

Mrittika Kamal

The Asian elephant species has been categorized as “critically endangered” by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is historically a core habitat for this critically endangered species. The Kutupalong camp has extended inside the Reserved Forest areas of Cox’s Bazar South Forest Division cutting off a vital migration corridor. The refugee camp obstructs the movement of the thirty-eight wild elephants through their natural habitat and roaming grounds. Also, because of deforestation, several open points have been created through which the elephants may enter and attack the refugee camps. This increasing human-wildlife conflict has led to twelve human deaths since the August 2017 influx. The number of Asian elephants in Bangladesh has already decreased to 268 from 500 since the mid-twentieth century. IUCN has identified fragmentation and destruction of their habitat caused by the expansion of agricultural land and human settlement as the main causes of their decrease in number (cited in Hussain 2018). Various measures have been taken to stop elephant-human conflicts and now elephants have stopped coming to the area (Hasan 2019). Lack of Security The overcrowding of Rohingya camps has exposed women and children to insecurity. The refugee settlements provide hardly any protection. They are just pieces of plastic framed by bamboo or wood. In addition, the showers and latrines often do not have working locks which jeopardizes necessary privacy. This condition is worsened as the night comes. The inhabitants of the camps have to access the latrines and water points in the dark because of the absence of electrical connections. This insecure condition extends outside the camps as well. Often the family members responsible for collecting firewood have to scavenge for wood and carry it a long distance to the camp. This movement places them in a vulnerable position for assault. The potential risks are prevalent equally both outside and inside camp areas. In 2018, twenty-two members of the Rohingya community in the unregistered camps were reported to be killed (The Daily Star 2019). In addition, the security of these areas is threatened by various crimes such as rapes, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and robberies (ibid 2019). Impact on Local Host Communities The humanitarian assistance provided in crisis zones focuses primarily on the victims, often by overlooking the host communities. As a result, the impact of Rohingya arrivals and mass influxes on the local population has been neglected for decades. The host communities continuously have to

Rohingya Influx

97

accommodate the Rohingya population, but the aid agencies and the government repeatedly fail to provide them with the support necessary to deal with the recurring influxes. This gap in local resource distribution creates undesired tension and hostility between the Rohingya refugees and the host communities. In addition, after the voluntary repatriation of a portion of the refugees, steps are seldom taken to mitigate the impact on the host communities, whether the impact is environmental, social, political, or economic. ECONOMIC IMPACT The continuous Rohingya influxes and consequent self-settlement and encampment have not only put pressure on employment but have caused depression of daily wages in the local labor market as well. In fact, this crisis has been present for several decades since before the recent mass influx of 2017–2018. As per government rules, the Rohingya population that has been accommodated in the camps is allowed to live on Bangladeshi soil but is not permitted to leave the camp area or explore employment opportunities elsewhere. However, the physical and lingual similarities between the Rohingya community and the mainstream Bangali population allow them to easily infiltrate the local job and labor market. The increased labor supply creates high competition between the people of the Rohingya community and the locals, particularly for work requiring minimal skill. Driven by their desperate conditions, Rohingyas often settle for lower wages than the local population, costing the local population their jobs. The Rohingya influx of 2017–2018 has created additional challenges for the local communities through damage to property, price hike of commodities, and increased cost of living. The Rohingyas have cut down trees of social forestation projects and built shelters on land and forests owned or occupied by the local host communities. The people who depended on available natural resources for their livelihood, particularly the indigenous communities, have thus been greatly affected economically. Even the locals are suffering economically because of deforestation, water resource depletion, and land degradation. In addition, land ownership is of particular concern in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and neighboring areas of Bangladesh. The indigenous communities of Bangladesh, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have been struggling for their traditional land rights and rights over natural resources for decades. This is a concern since the indigenous communities do not perceive the allocation of land to Rohingya refugees with a humanitarian perspective—they identify the Rohingya influx and the consequent environmental impacts as a threat to their lifestyle and livelihood.

98

Mrittika Kamal

SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT The merging of the Rohingya community with the host communities has caused various social and political challenges. Many members of this community have married into the local Bangali community in the process of settling down in this country. However, after the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) banned marriage between Rohingyas and Bangalis, fraud and forgery have become more popular ways for getting access to Bangladeshi citizenship. For example, in 2010, the Election Commission (EC) scrutinized the draft voter lists in six sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar and identified the names of 45,866 Rohingyas. EC sources revealed that influential persons, including representatives of the local government, aid the Rohingyas to get enlisted. In a similar draft list prepared in 2009, approximately 1,00,000 Rohingyas illegally tried to get enlisted as voters but were identified and dropped from the list (The Daily Star 2010). The Bangali and indigenous host communities claim that Rohingyas are now not only enlisted as voters in Bangladesh, they also hold fake birth certificates, national identity cards, and passports which is threatening national security in Bangladesh. In addition, representatives of indigenous communities state that amalgamation in the local host communities has enabled the members of the Rohingya community located in Naikhyonchari (a sub-district of Bandarban hill district of CHT) to become active politicians in national political parties of the country. Some of them have even been elected in different capacities of the local government. Local indigenous leaders claim that these empowered Rohingya leaders misuse their influence. According to a headman of Naikhyonchari, Rohingya leaders have been facilitating the process of illegal immigration of Rohingyas for more than five decades. The headman further claimed that the Rohingyas have settled down in Naikhyonchari by evicting local indigenous peoples from their ancestral land. Furthermore, he stated that Rohingya militants are still active in Bandarban with the help of local Rohingyas who have taken up Bangladeshi identities1 (Kamal 2020). Even though the GOB affirms that there is no presence of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) members in the camps here, a Rohingya militant informed Deutsche Welle (DW), a German media organization, that Rohingya militants of ARSA are present in the camps and approximated their number to be around 3,500 fighters. He further added that ARSA kills suspected informants in the camps and also takes people hostage for ransom (Conrad et al. 2019). Besides, insecurity and the growing hostility and conflict between the indigenous peoples and the Rohingya community are vital reasons which compelled at least 500 indigenous families to leave for Myanmar (Kapaeeng

Rohingya Influx

99

Foundation 2018). In addition, a section of people is creating fear and tension by spreading propaganda of Rohingya rehabilitation on indigenous peoples’ ancestral lands, compelling them to abandon their villages (ibid 2018). Another concern is the porous nature of the Bangladesh–Myanmar border region which is a popular channel for different forms of international crimes, including human trafficking and drugs and arms smuggling. The Bangladesh Department of Narcotics Control has identified the Bangladesh–Myanmar border as a vital point in the notorious Eastern route. Members of the Rohingya community play the roles of carriers, intermediaries, or traffickers (Bashar 2012). Around 1.1 lac (equivalent to 1.1 hundred thousand) yaba pills (methamphetamine drug) were recovered along with a pistol and four rounds of ammunition in a gunfight between Rohingya drug peddlers and the police in which a Rohingya refugee (resident of Balukhali Rohingya camp) was killed (The Daily Star 2020). In two years, around 1,105 Rohingyas have been accused in 471 cases—208 of these cases are related to narcotics and 43 are related to murder (The Business Standard 2019). In many situations, members of the host communities are being attacked. Furthermore, the presence of various Rohingya militant groups on Bangladeshi soil is a major security concern for Bangladesh. Units like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Rohingya National Alliance (RNA), Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), and Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) are potential threats to the internal security of the country (Bashar 2012). CONCLUSION Described as “one of, if not the, most discriminated people in the world” by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the Rohingyas have been a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (BBC 2020). The recurring genocides conducted by the Myanmar government leave the Rohingya community with no other choice but to migrate primarily to an already densely populated Bangladesh along with other countries, where they are desperately trying to survive. Amidst their perils, the COVID-19 pandemic has sprung upon overcrowded camps as a novel challenge the refugees are ill-equipped to deal with. In this situation, the Government of Bangladesh declared that the country will not give entry to more Rohingyas (Human Rights Watch 2020). Yet, despite the COVID-19 crisis and the extensive damage Bangladesh has already faced, the government has again provided refuge to 306 Rohingya refugees rescued at sea—this time in Bhasan Char, an island located in the

100

Mrittika Kamal

Bay of Bengal (UNHCR 2020, 1). Relocation to the said island initiated by the GOB is a controversial issue, especially since UNHCR possesses a different opinion on this matter. Even during the pandemic crisis, approximately 13,000 Rohingya refugees have been relocated in five phases to Bhasan Char (The Dhaka Tribune 2021). Moreover, till December 31, 2020, more than 5,600 people have been diagnosed as COVID positive in the Cox’s Bazar district, of which at least 360 positive cases, including 10 deaths, are residents of Rohingya camps (UNHCR 2021, 1). As this study shows, despite the humanitarian agencies’ and Bangladesh Government’s goodwill and efforts, a vicious cycle is at work here, which is taking its toll on our natural environment and wildlife, and jeopardizing the lives of the local host communities. In fact, the environmental problems associated with the Rohingya influxes are a result of accommodating high concentrations of refugees over a short period of time. The sudden demographic pressure has degraded the surrounding environment of the refugee settlements, especially in the absence of proper mitigation methods. Unfortunately, this environmental destruction, as well as social, economic, and political challenges, will have a lasting impact on both the Rohingyas and the host communities. Unless an eco-friendly, sustainable solution is found soon, the damage will be irreparable. It is high time that the government and international agencies devise a sustainable solution to put an end to this crisis once and for all, for the world must not abandon this stateless community again.

NOTE 1. Based on interviews taken by the author; the identity of the interviewees remains undisclosed.

REFERENCES ACAPS. 2017. Rep. Review: Rohingya Influx Since 1978. Assessment Capacities Project. https://www​.acaps​.org​/sites​/acaps​/files​/products​/files​/20171211​_acaps​ _rohingya​_historical​_review​.pdf . Amin, Mehedi Al. 2020. “97% Rohingya Families Use LPG.” he Dhaka Tribune, January 8, 2020. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/rohingya​-crisis​/2020​ /01​/08​/97​-rohingya​-families​-use​-lpg. Asrar, Shakeeb. 2017. “Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps.” Aljazeera. October 28, 2017. https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/indepth​/interactive​/2017​/09​/rohingya​-crisis​ -explained​-maps​-170910140906580​.html​?xif=.

Rohingya Influx

101

Aziz, Abdul. 2018a. “Rohingyas in Teknaf Get Another 540 Acres of Land.” The Dhaka Tribune, April 7, 2018. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/2018​/04​ /07​/rohingyas​-in​-teknaf​-get​-another​-540​-acres​-of​-land. Aziz, Abdul. 2018b. “LP Gas Phases out Use of Firewood in Rohingya Camps.” The Dhaka Tribune, August 28, 2018. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/ nation​/2018​/08​/28​/lp​-gas​-phases​-out​-use​-of​-firewood​-in​-rohingya​-camps. Bashar, Iftekharul. 2012. “Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Myanmar: Quest for a Sustainable Solution - Bangladesh.” Nanyang Technological University. RSIS Commentary. June 22, 2012. https://dr​.ntu​.edu​.sg​/handle​/10356​/95197​?mode​=simple. BBC News. February 26, 2019. “Bangladesh Country Profile.” In: BBC News https:// www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-south​-asia​-12650940. BBC. 2020. “Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know about the Crisis.” BBC News. January 23, 2020. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-asia​-41566561. Bhuiyan Humayun Kabir. 2021. “Bhashan Char: UN Team Concludes Visit, Will Report to the Government.” Dhaka Tribune, March 22, 2021. https://www​ .dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/rohingya​-crisis​/2021​/03​/22​/bhashan​-char​-un​-team​ -concludes​-visit​-will​-report​-to​-the​-government. Conrad, Naomi, Stefan Czimmek, and Arafatul Islam. 2019. “Rohingya Militants Active in Bangladeshi Refugee Camps.” DW, September 24, 2019. https://www​ .dw​.com​/en​/rohingya​-militants​-active​-in​-bangladeshi​-refugee​-camps​/a​-50490888. Goodman, Jack. 2014. “No Respite for Rohingya in Bangladesh.” Aljazeera. January 16, 2014. https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/indepth​/features​/2014​/01​/no​-respite​-rohingya​ -bangladesh​-201411675944519957​.html​?xif=. Hammond, Clare. 2018. “As 1.2 Million Are Displaced from Myanmar, UN Calls for Solidarity.” Frontier Myanmar, June 20, 2018. https://frontiermyanmar​.net​/en​/as​ -12​-million​-are​-displaced​-from​-myanmar​-un​-calls​-for​-solidarity. Hasan, Rashidul. 2019. “Rohingya Settlements: 8,000 Acres of Forests Razed.” The Daily Star, October 18, 2019. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/frontpage​/news​/ rohingya​-settlements​-8000​-acres​-forests​-razed​-1815400. Human Rights Watch. 2000. Rep. Burma / Bangladesh Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution. Human Rights Watch. www​.hrw​.org​/reports​ /2000​/burma/. Human Rights Watch. 2020. “Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees Stranded at Sea.” Human Rights Watch. April 25, 2020. https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/04​/25​/ bangladesh​-rohingya​-refugees​-stranded​-sea. Hussain, Anwar. 2018. “Rohingya Camps Impede Movement of Wild Elephants in Cox’s Bazar.” The Dhaka Tribune, April 7, 2018. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/2018​/04​/07​/rohingya​-camps​-impede​-movement​-wild​-elephants​-coxs​-bazar. Jahan, Afrose. 2018. “Indoor Air Pollution a Huge Problem in Rohingya Camps.” The Dhaka Tribune, August 27, 2018. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/ nation​/2018​/08​/27​/indoor​-air​-pollution​-a​-huge​-problem​-in​-rohingya​-camps. Kamal, Mrittika, dir. 2020. From Burma to Bangladesh: Experiences of the Rohingyas and the Host Communities. Dhaka: Terracotta Creatives Multimedia. Kapaeeng Foundation. May 8, 2018. “5 Hundred Indigenous Families Migrate to Arakan Due to Insecurity in Bangladesh and Alluring Policy of Myanmar.”

102

Mrittika Kamal

https://www​.kapaeengnet​.org​/5​-hundred​-indigenous​-families​-migrate​-to​-arakan​-due​ -to​-insecurity​-in​-bangladesh​-and​-alluring​-policy​-of​-myanmar/. Mahmud, Tarek. 2017. “Rohingya Influx: Refugees Outnumber Ukhiya, Teknaf Locals.” Dhaka Tribune, October 23, 2017. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/2017​/10​/23​/rohingya​-influx​-refugees​-outnumber​-ukhiya​-teknaf​-locals/. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. n.d. “Know Bangladesh.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Government of Bangladesh. Accessed June 17, 2020. https://mofa​.gov​.bd​/site​/page​ /6dde350b​-1ca6​-4c69​-becd​-a3f12cf14ac1​/Bangladesh-​-An​-Introduction. Modola, Siegfried. 2018. “Monsoon Season Threatens Rohingya Refugees ,in Bangladesh.” Aljazeera. July 3, 2018. https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/indepth​/inpictures​/monsoon​-season​-threatens​-rohingya​-refugees​-bangladesh​-180703094225815​ .html. Molla, Mohammad Al-Masum. 2018. “One Year into the Biggest Rohingya Influx : Funds so Far Inadequate.” The Daily Star, August 26, 2018. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/news​/rohingya​-crisis​/funds​-so​-far​-inadequate​-1624606. Ragland, Thomas K. 1994. “Burma's Rohingyas in Crisis: Protection of ‘Humanitarian’ Refugees under International Law.” Boston College Third World Law Journal 14 (2): 305. https://lawdigitalcommons​.bc​.edu​/cgi​/viewcontent​.cgi​?article​=1275​ &context​=twlj. Rahman, M Mizanur. 2016. “Rohingya Crisis: Politics of Denial.” The Daily Star, May 7, 2016. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/op​-ed​/politics​/rohingya​-crisis​-politics​ -denial​-1219666. Reid, Kathryn. 2020. “Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help.” World Vision. World Vision Inc. June 12, 2020. https://www​.worldvision​.org​/ refugees​-news​-stories​/rohingya​-refugees​-bangladesh​-facts. Saha, Polin Kumar. 2017. “Rohingya Crisis and the Environmental Challenge It Poses.” The Independent. Independent Publications Limited. http://www​.theindependentbd​.com​/arcprint​/details​/118497​/2017​-10​-13. Strategic Executive Group and Partners. 2018. JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (March - December 2018). Humanitarian Response. Strategic Executive Group and Partners. https://www​.hum​anit​aria​nresponse​.info​/sites​/www​.hum​anit​aria​nresponse​ .info​/files​/documents​/files​/jrp​_for​_rohingya​_humanitarian​_crisis_-​_for​_distribution​_0​.pdf. Shuvo, Mokammel. 2018. “Trees, Hills Razed by Rohingyas.” The Daily Star, March 21, 2018. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/backpage​/trees​-hills​-razed​-rohingyas​-1551199. The Business Standard. 2019. “Two Years in Rohingya Camps: 1,100 Arrested in Various Cases.” The Business Standard, August 25, 2019. https://tbsnews​.net​/ bangladesh​/two​-years​-rohingya​-camps​-1100​-arrested​-various​-cases. The Daily Star. 2010. “45,866 Rohingyas off Voter List.” The Daily Star, August 5, 2010. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/news​-detail​-149475. The Daily Star. 2019. “Crimes in the Rohingya Camps.” The Daily Star. https://www​ .thedailystar​.net​/editorial​/news​/crimes​-the​-rohingya​-camps​-1722538.

Rohingya Influx

103

The Daily Star. 2020. “Suspected Rohingya Drug Peddler Killed in Gunfight in Cox’s Bazar.” The Daily Star, May 10, 2020. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/country​/news​/ suspected​-rohingya​-drug​-peddler​-killed​-gunfight​-coxs​-bazar​-1901386 . The Dhaka Tribune. 2017. “62% Water in Rohingya Camps Contaminated.” Dhaka Tribune, November 22, 2017. https://www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/nation​ /2017​/11​/22​/62​-water​-rohingya​-camps​-contaminated. The Dhaka Tribune. 2021. “Bhashan Char: UN Team Concludes Visit, Will Report to the Government.” Dhaka Tribune, March 22, 2021. https://www​.dhakatribune​ .com​/bangladesh​/rohingya​-crisis​/2021​/03​/22​/bhashan​-char​-un​-team​-concludes ​ -visit​-will​-report​-to​-the​-government. The Independent. 2018. “Bangladesh Registers 2nd Largest Number of Refugees in 2017: UNHCR.” The Independent, June 19, 2018. http://www​.theindependentbd​ .com​/printversion​/details​/154444. The New Age. 2018. “Deforestation by Rohingyas Eats up Land Worth Tk 741.31cr.” New Age, August 26, 2018. http://www​.newagebd​.net​/article​/49129​/deforestation​ -by​-rohingyas​-eats​-up​-land​-worth​-tk​-74131cr. Ullah, AKM Ahsan. 2011. “Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 9 (2): 139–61. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/15562948​.2011​.567149. UNHCR. 2005. UNHCR Environmental Guidelines. UNHCR. Geneva, Switzerland: IUCN and UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/3b03b2a04 /unhcr‑environmental‑guidelines.html ———. 2018. Bangladesh Refugee Emergency Factsheet – Energy and Environment. Dhaka: UNHCR. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65637. ———. 2020. UNHCR Bangladesh – Operational Update External – June 2020 (#53). Dhaka: UNHCR. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/77667. ———. 2021. UNHCR Bangladesh – COVID 19 Preparation/Response – 31 December 2020. Dhaka: UNHCR. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/84361. World Food Programme USA. 2019. “Rohingya Crisis: A Firsthand Look Into The World's Largest Refugee Camp.” World Food Program USA. December 18, 2019. https://www​.wfpusa​.org​/articles​/rohingya​-crisis​-a​-firsthand​-look​-into​-the​-worlds​ -largest​-refugee​-camp/. Accessed 31.01.2020

Part Ib

HAZARDOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 6

Ironeaters A Story of Scrapped Men Fahmidul Haq

South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, have become a global center of the ship-breaking and recycling industry, accounting for 70–80 percent of the international recycling market for ocean-going vessels. China and Turkey are the two other countries that contribute to the industry. Both the countries mostly melt the ship scrap, while Bangladesh is one of the leading ship-breaking industries in the world. The businessmen from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India buy scrapped steel from recycled ships for re-rolling mills. Re-rolled steel has a high demand in urban construction. About 80 percent of the iron comes from the re-rolling mills in Bangladesh.1 In the shipyards, payment, health, and safety standards are minimal, but it does not suffer from a shortage of workers, because desperate job-seekers are always around. The majority of the workers come from the poverty-stricken northern part of Bangladesh. Famine was once an annual feature of this part of the country. Most of the ship-breaking yards in Bangladesh are mainly in Sitakundu, located in the north of Chittagong city, close to the Bay of Bengal. According to Jobaid, Khan, Haque, and Shawon. (2014), in these ship-breaking yards, environmental policies and laws are not enforced, labor wages are among the lowest in the world, and there is no standard for occupational health and labor safety. Therefore, environmental pollution and an inhuman working environment are the two major issues in the ship-breaking yards. Against such background, this chapter explains how a documentary portrays the situation in the ship-breaking yard in Bangladesh which follows the laborers working there. In doing so, it adopts a narrative analysis of the film and background study of the shipyard and the ship-breaking process in Bangladesh. 107

108

Fahmidul Haq

A Berlin-based Bangladeshi filmmaker Shaheen Dill-Riaz’s (2008) documentary Ironeaters (Lohakhor in Bangla and Eisenfresser in German) is in perspective for the analysis. It is one of the most acclaimed films made by him. It represents a humane story, following poor farmers from Northern Bangladesh who wants to escape their famine-stricken area and find a job in the ship-breaking yard in the southern part. Their desperate move for a living turns them into mighty men, metaphorically called “the iron-eaters” in the film. However, at the end of the scrapping of the gigantic metallic ships, the workers transform into scrapped men as shown in the documentary. Dill-Riaz, the documentary maker, does not focus solely on the environmental issues of the ship-breaking yard; nor does he want to label his film as “environmental.” He sheds light on the hazardous working condition under which the desperate laborers of the ship-breaking industry have to toil. Thus, he looks for human stories. In this regard, the documentary maker opines: For me, our “environment” is present in every film we make. The issue of climate change, global warming, or salinization in Bangladesh is of course an important theme to be discussed and it is definitely worth making a film about them. But the actual strength lies among the people who are living with them. (Shaheen Dill-Riaz, Email to author, September 9, 2011)

Therefore, this chapter does not only address the environmental aspects of the ship-breaking yard, but also the human environment created by the businessman or the owner of the shipyards in the film Ironeaters. PLOT NARRATIVE The documentary starts with a tale of a village called Shitalpur (literally meaning “a tranquil place”), in Chittagong district situated beside the Bay of Bengal. The place had divine tranquility. In a storm in 1960, a ship got stuck there. The nearby people could not primarily decide anything about the giant vessel. They eventually decided to dismantle it. When they had been doing so, they broke the divine silence of Shitalpur. This incident perhaps was a prelude to the expanding ship-breaking yards at the Sitakundu area in Chittagong, established in the 1980s. As in reality, the jobless peasants from the poverty-stricken north Bengal districts move to Chittagong ship-breaking yards during the annual famine. The film shows Khalil and Gadu traveling by bus for Chittagong. Khalil, an old worker, brings some more new workers with him.

Ironeaters

109

The film narrates how the laborers work at the shipyard, how they live, and how they struggle to balance between their earnings and grocery bills. Many of the local people work either as contractors or as foremen. They are the privileged ones. Even if they work as laborers, they get better jobs like cutting metal with blowtorch; and their payment is relatively high (approximately 3 USD per day). But all the hazardous jobs such as carrying cables and metal plates, among others, are done by the people coming from North Bengal districts, and they remain underpaid (between 1 and 3 USD per day). The documentary also shows how a ship is brought to the beach and dismantled gradually. It consists of the views of the entrepreneur on his business and the laborers. The role of the contractors and the middlemen find a substantial space in the film. The grievances of the laborers regarding the working environment, low wages, and irregular payments also steal the limelight highlighted in the documentary. A climax situation arrived when the laborers wanted to leave the yard to join the harvesting season at home, and the contractors did not want to give them their total wages. The contractors think that once the workers get the full payment, they will not rejoin their work, and the yard will suffer. At the fag end of the documentary, some workers return to their homes and intend not to return to the ship-breaking yard again. The contractors still believe that they will return after the harvest, and things do happen in that direction. In the end, a winch starts moving around with the workers chanting “heiyo” (the chorus for inspiring co-workers) in the soundtrack.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION Ship-breaking yards are one of the reasons responsible for polluting the environment by the toxic elements carried by the ships. The ship-breaking process threatens both the terrestrial and the marine environment and public health. While dismantling the ships, toxic effluences pollute water and beach soil creating health hazards to the workers. The paints used in these ships also contain lead, cadmium, arsenic, zinc, chromium, and asbestos, which are harmful too. A large amount of various types of oil that include engine oil, hydraulic oil and lubricants gets discharged in the process. Also, the ship tankers contain residual oil. Ships with these materials inside are manually cut on the open beaches without any safe waste management system. These ship-breaking activities lead to the contamination of the coastal soil and seawater. People exposed to these pollutants get cancer, and their hormonal system becomes dysfunctional. With the indiscriminate expansion of the ship-breaking yards, the pollution of water, soil, and public health also increases exponentially.

110

Fahmidul Haq

The film communicates these environmental pollution and public health hazards to the audience. Robert Cox (2006) suggests that this kind of communication helps constitute, compose nature, and transform environmental problems into subjects of our understanding. The audience expects that by reporting on the environment, the media will play a role in building awareness and in compelling authorities to take necessary steps to improve the quality of life in this part of the world. But Dill-Riaz focuses mainly on the human working environment, the laborers’ desperate need for work, and how they get exploited by the owners without concentrating much on the pollution issues. The hazardous work environment is, indeed, part of environmental injustice. The ship-breaking business has come to the Global South because it is risky for the environment and health of the workers. The western industrialized countries do not allow such industries in their backyards. They have strict environmental regulations and standards requiring huge investment for ensuring environmental safety and labor rights. In the beginning, the director mentions how a ship was stuck on the beach, and later it got dismantled, and the Shitalpur area lost its divine tranquility in return. It indicates that the dismantling process causes noise pollution in the area. Some workers also mention the presence of splinters in the mud on the beach. HAZARDOUS WORKING ENVIRONMENT The film shows skinny men scrapping a metallic giant. It is the scenario at the ship-breaking yards, but the protection measures are scarce. The dismantling of ships is a dirty and dangerous job. The main health/life risks related to ship-breaking are of two types—intoxication by poisonous substances and accidents on the spot. The explosions involving the left-over gas and fumes in the tanks are the main cause of accidents. The workers at times fall from the ships (which are up to 70 meters high), and as they do not have any safety measures, they either die or get seriously injured. Or at times, they get crushed by the falling steel beams and plates and receive electric shocks. The laborers work with bare feet; sometimes some of them are fortunate to wear rubber slippers. They do not have access to boots and gloves. They cut metals with fuel-gas without any protection of the eyes and neither their hands. Chemical and toxic substances get washed or blown into the beach. Small, sharp iron splinters get inside the mud where workers walk bare-footed as the rubber slippers do not have any use in the mud. In the film, while working, laborers were found saying: We work like animals. The cable is heavy. Careful there are sharp splinters. (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25)

Ironeaters

111

Many organizations call the ship-breaking yards “a deathtrap.” Roy and Dey, citing data from a joint survey done by Greenpeace and the International Federation for Human Rights, state that over the past two decades, at least 1,000 workers have died in ship-breaking yard (2014). The Daily Star further reports that at least 181 laborers got killed between 2005 and 2017 (January 30, 2018). The reasons were toxic gas, explosion, or a sudden fall from the roofs of the ships during scrapping. While filming the Ironeaters, a worker was seriously injured, and the laborers and crew members of the film experienced an explosion. The narrator says, “We were all lucky. You always have to be lucky here.” On an average, a worker dies a week in the ship-breaking yards, and a worker is injured every day.2 After returning home, one worker expressed her relief: If I keep working in Chittagong, I won’t live much longer. The wound (at the neck) will have healed in six months at the earliest. After finishing such hard work, you don’t even get any money to go home. I had to leave behind everything I earned down there. (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25)

According to www​ .shipbreakingbd​ .info, when there is an injury, the worker(s) may receive immediate treatment, but there is no long-term treatment for those having a long-term or permanent wound. When a worker gets disabled in a major accident, he gets a maximum of USD 125 to USD 190 and is forced to return to his home district. When a worker gets killed in an accident, the contractor responsible for hiring the workers will only pay the cost of sending the body back to his family and arranging for the burial. 3 LABOR RIGHTS VIOLATED In a ship-breaking yard, the workers are not allowed to join or form a union. Their labor rights are violated, to be correct, they have no rights at all. Considering the risks and the load of the work, the wage of the workers is very low (1–3 USD per day). According to a baseline survey conducted by YPSA in 2003, 10.94 percent of the workforce at yards comprises children.3 The Ironeaters shows that some laborers below eighteen years of age work in the ship-breaking yard. A coworker, pointing his fingers at an under-eighteen worker, commented that he has come here due to poverty. Child labor is allowed and the wage for the children is even lower. There is no job security and one can lose the job at any time. Even though this is a hazardous job, there are no regular medical services in the yard. In one scene in the film, a worker is seen cleaning feces. He says it was the shit of the workers. As there was no toilet, the workers had to use one corner

112

Fahmidul Haq

of the old ship for that purpose. Also, the original owner of the ship did not clean the toilet pipes before selling them. The workers have to cut the pipes that are full of feces. The low wages make the workers frustrated. Their loans in the grocery shops sometimes cross the money they earn. The grocery owners living near the yard, who have a good rapport with the contractors, complain to the contractors about the debt of the workers. One contractor teases, they eat more than they earn. One worker leaves the yard and says: If I stay any longer my family will have to borrow money. If I work as a rickshaw driver at home or harvest rice, we can at least go by day today. (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25)

When the time of harvest comes, workers want to leave the yard for their home districts, which are predominantly agro-based areas. They will either harvest rice on their land or will work as laborers on others’ lands. But the yard contractors do not want to pay their wages. Even they want to pay the debts at the groceries directly instead of giving the hard-earned wages at the hand of the laborers. This creates discontent among the workers. One aggrieved worker says: They always put pressure on us at work. Every Friday we have to go begging. [. . .] We always have to beg for our money. But this is our hard-earned money! Why should we beg for it? (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25)

Another worker says, “Screwing us is always fun, paying is not” (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25). The Bangladesh government enacted the Labor Law Act 2006, which has provisions on working conditions, health, and safety, hours, leave, and compensation. However, enforcement and compliance with the Act are almost non-existent in the yards. The working conditions are hazardous. The gas cutters do their job almost round the clock. There is no leave for the workers. Health and safety concerns are nominally addressed. Compensations for the injured and dead workers are insignificant. A PROFILE OF THE COMPANY: PHP The director of Ironeaters selected the yard of the PHP group for filming. PHP is a prominent conglomerate that has an investment in steel, glass, petroleum, textile, power, real estate, aluminum, among others. The elaboration of PHP is Peace, Happiness, and Prosperity. The yard was established by Sufi Mohammad Mizanur Rahman in 1982. Now his son Mohsin is looking

Ironeaters

113

after the yard business. The worker Khalil says, “Mohsin is not as good as his father Mizan. Mr. Mizan is a known face in the business community in Chittagong as well as in Bangladesh. He is a confident businessman though his statements are somewhat rhetorical” (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25). Mizan says to the director of the film: PHP (Peace, Happiness, and Prosperity) is more than a slogan. It’s a reality, it’s our existence. It’s a dream, an inspiration. That’s the feeling—everybody belongs here. [. . .] In my whole life, I’ve never faced any labor problems—any violence, intolerance, or impatience among the workers. Because I love my workers. And they love me very much. (Dill-Riaz 2008, 1: 25)

After this statement, the director shows the worker who was cleaning feces inside the ship. The worker is leaving the yard because of very low wages that cannot meet his needs. Grocery debts are higher than what they earn. Some cannot go to their houses because the contractors hold back their payments. Thus, Mr. Mizan’s claim and the director’s findings of low wages and labor exploitation were found to be contradictory. However, Mr. Mizan’s rhetoric continues: The biggest disease in the world today is not leprosy, it’s not diabetes, it’s not tuberculosis, it’s not cholera, it’s not cancer. The biggest disease today in the world is the feeling of being unwanted. (Dill-Riaz 2008)

SCRAPPING REALITY THROUGH FILM The “creative treatment of actualities”4 in the documentary Ironeaters is evident in different parts of the text. The way the storyline is developed gives us the feeling of watching a feature film. It tells how a tranquil place turned into a graveyard of giant abandoned ships. It tells us the story of individuals such as Khalil and Gadu who travel from another part of the country just to survive at the time of the annual food scarcity. It also tells us how difficult the working environment in the ship-breaking yard is—how the workers are exploited, and how their rights are violated. Documentaries must maintain the narrative as not pre-conceived, rather the final storyline should be determined at the editing table. And the core policy of editing is conflict (as suggested by the idea of “montage” given by post-revolution Russian directors in the 1920s)—conflict between images, the conflict between shots, the conflict between characters, and so on. At the beginning of the film, from a high-angle extreme long shot, we find a large ship on a wide beach, a few workers moving like ants in a row with heavy metal cable on their neck, suggesting how small, weak, and helpless they are.

114

Fahmidul Haq

In the very next shot, which is a close shot, we see a worker is cutting a part of the metal body of the ship with a gas torch. The conflict of the shots, from extremely long to close, and the subject matter simultaneously suggest that the helpless one is now powerful in terms of the controlling the fire. Also, the first shot was silent, and the next shot consisted of a high-pitched sound of cutting metal pieces and burning flame. The conflict of shots and incidents is a common language in the film. In the final part of the film, after Mr. Mizan’s rhetorical speech where he claims that the workers are happy and they love him, we see a worker cleaning feces. We know that there is no toilet in the yard for the workers and contractors are holding back the wages of the workers. This conflict of claim and reality is cleverly presented. The director was successful in developing a good relationship with the workers, enabling them to talk freely in front of the camera. The owner and the contractors also stated their views to the director. The director did not portray the workers as a monolithic entity—poor people struggling in a difficult situation. Rather he shows how they interact and have fun, how they plan for a better future, and how they express their inner beauty through songs and music.

CONCLUSION The ship-breaking yard provides the major share of the need for steel and iron in Bangladesh. But these yards are a major source of environmental pollution and labor exploitation. The film Ironeaters primarily focuses on labor and hazardous working conditions of the ship-breaking industry in Bangladesh, and it is successful in portraying these two aspects. The film earned several international awards and is the most acclaimed work of art made by Shaheen Dill-Riaz. The film reveals the cruel situation in ship-breaking yards, which is a directive to the policymakers. The safety of the workers must be ensured and the wage must be increased. The owners must maintain the compliance aspects of the ship breaking yards. The government should monitor and check the violations of the laws on labor rights and environmental conservation and take necessary legal steps to eradicate such violations.

NOTES 1. According to a Young Power in Social Action (YPSA) report, Bangladesh was the top ship-breaking nation in the years 2004-2009. It was second in position in 2012, scrapping around 270 ships. It dismantled 210 ships in 2013 and became the third-largest country in ship-breaking (see Overview of Ship Breaking in Bangladesh,

Ironeaters

115

accessed on 6 March 2020, https://www​.shipbreakingbd​.info​/overview​.html). However, a 2019 report states that Bangladesh was first in position, scrapping 236 ships (see The Toxic Tide: 2019 Shipbreaking Records, accessed on 6 March 2020, https:// www​.offthebeach​.org/). 2. Ship Breaking in Bangladesh, accessed March 6, 2020. https://www​.shipbreakingbd​.info​/Worker​%20Rights​%20Violation​.html. 3. ibid. 4. The term “documentary” was coined by John Grierson, founder of the British documentary movement in the 1920s, who famously described the documentary film as “the creative treatment of actuality.”

REFERENCES Cox, Robert. 2006. Environmental Communication and the Public Sphere. London: Sage. Dill-Riaz, Shaheen. 2008. Lohakhor (Iron Eaters). Lemme Film. Jobaid, Md Imrul, Md. Moniruzzaman Khan, A. K. M. Kamrul Haque, and Ishtiak Ahmed Shawon. 2014. “Ship Recycling and Its Environmental Impact: A Brief Overview of Bangladesh.” IOSR Journal of Business and Management 16, no. 10 (October): 31–37. https://doi​.org​/10​.9790​/487X​-161013137. Roy, Pinaki, and Arun Bikash Dey. 2014. “4 Killed by Toxic Gas.” The Daily Star, April 4, 2014. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/4​-killed​-by​-toxic​-gas​-18659.

MORE INFORMATION Film Details Title: Iron Eaters/Eisenfresser/Lohakhor Release Date: 2008 Length: 85 Minutes Format: HD/35 mm Production: Lemme Film

Awards Grimme Award: Germany, 2010 First Prize: Tel-Aviv International Documentary Film Festival, 2008 First Prize: Le Festival International Du Film D’Environnement, Paris, 2007 First Prize: South Asian International Film Festival in Katmandu, 2008 First Prize: Eine-Welt-Film-Preis NRW FrensehworkshopsEntwicklungspolitik, 2008 Best Documentary: HachenburgerFilmfest, 2008 Best Documentary: Achtung Berlin, 2008

Chapter 7

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction in the Ready-Made Garments Industry in Bangladesh Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

The public discourse on the Ready-made Garment (RMG) industry in Bangladesh is rife with many accounts of terrible working conditions, lack of safety measures in factories, presence of abuse, and an unacceptable level of wages. These are often referred to as causes of labor unrest and political turmoil, particularly by various labor movements that grew in the country ever since the industry’s initial growth in the early 1980s. However, a recent survey of a sample of women workers in Bangladesh reveals that despite these vulnerabilities, there are elements of job satisfaction in the opinion of the workers in the sector (Choudhury et al. 2016). After all, the RMG industry—the leading export earner for the country (World Bank 2020) and the second largest apparel supplier in the world (Mirdha 2020)—has grown to be the country’s largest employer of women (Islam et al. 2016). A recent “Enterprise Level Survey” by ILO and UN Women found a high proportion of its female respondents satisfied with their current employers and jobs (Matsuura and Teng 2020). However, one does not need to be an expert to conclude that the perceived job satisfaction is not generalizable for the sector. There remains variation and any sector-wide reform attempt must examine the causes of such variation. Why do some workers express work satisfaction while others do not? This chapter aims to explore this question for women workers, particularly by looking at various aspects of work environments in the RMG factories in Bangladesh. This chapter, therefore, sheds light on an element in the sector that can catapult the sector toward a better work environment by reducing vulnerability of Bangladeshi females in the apparel industry. Traditional management literature relates work satisfaction with the employee’s job performance and productivity and the economic outcome of 117

118

Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

their organization and society in general. The crux of the argument placed in this literature is that a host of working, industrial, and sociopolitical environment interacts with personal attributes, including demographic characteristics, capability, perception, and expectation to determine the level of an employee’s overall job satisfaction (Seashore and Taber 1975; Wexley and Yukl 1984). Wexley and Yukl (1984) differentiate between the employee’s expected and actual working environment and argue that employees’ job satisfaction increases as the gap reduces. Job satisfaction, in turn, translates into individual effectiveness in terms of better task performance and reduced absence and demission rates that enhance organizational efficiency and productivity (Seashore and Taber 1975; Wexley and Yukl 1984; Weiss 2002; Harrison et al. 2006). While I follow this literature to formalize the empirical linkages between work environment and workers’ job satisfaction, I believe the business attitude (efficiency, productivity, and profit) in the management literature may be counterproductive when designing public policies to reform the RMG sector in Bangladesh. The challenge that policymakers in the country must face is maintaining the critical balance between the industry’s business performance and enhancing the well-being of its workers. I propose that an Environmental Humanities (EH) perspective—the common theme of this volume—could help policymakers create the necessary balance (Heise et al. 2017; Kueffer , Forêt, Hall, and Wiedmer 2018; Kull, Kueffer, Richardson, Vaz, Vicente, and Honrado 2018). An EH-based strategy would offset the dominance of the business mindedness by focusing on the socio-cultural, emotional, and aesthetic dimensions of the factory environment in the RMG sector. It would do so by incorporating the narrative of the women workers into the policy process. An EH strategy would create a work environment that allows the engagement of the workers as a way to negotiate the imperatives of scientific management. While I believe an EH-based management strategy would improve the sustainability of the RMG sector in Bangladesh, I acknowledge that systematic research needs to be done on the area before we consider it at the policy level. The scope of the current chapter does not allow me to dig deep into the possibilities of the EH perspective in Bangladesh’s context. It primarily aims to contribute to our systematic understanding of the overall state of the work environment in the country’s RMG sector and its relationship with its workers, a vast majority of whom are women. We need to understand how these women feel about their workplaces and conditions before changing them. The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the current state of the literature on work environment and satisfaction in the RMG sector in Bangladesh. The review focuses on a sample of the empirical literature on the RMG issues developed in the last two and a half decades. It helps find

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction

119

testable hypotheses about the relationship between “work environment” and “work satisfaction” among the RMG workers. After the review, a methodology on how to test these hypotheses is discussed, followed by analyses of data. The study uses the survey data collected by Choudhury et al. (2016) within an ordered logistic regression framework. Overall, the study finds that the following factors can partially explain a typical RMG worker’s perceived level of work satisfaction: whether she endured harassment by superiors in her workplace, her level of safety feeling, feeling of being listened to by superiors, available leisure time, quality of training, and whether her workplace was a knit or woven, as opposed to a sweater factory. I conclude by summarizing the implications of these findings for the sector’s sustainable growth.

WORK ENVIRONMENT AND JOB SATISFACTION IN THE RMG SECTOR The dominant workforces in the RMG industries in Bangladesh are women (Matsuura and Teng 2020, 3). Given the popular account of adverse working conditions, an interesting set of literature investigates why these females flocked to these factories despite the odds of being abused, poorly paid, and marginalized. Some other scholars emphasize the current condition of the workers and reveal how vulnerable these workers are. Still, others show how the RMG sector has indeed empowered a large number of women to change the traditional social fabric of the country in general. According to a study (Kibria 1998), economic scarcity at home and a host of other “push” factors, such as family conflicts, marital breakdown, problems of harassment, and uncertain marriage prospects, encouraged women from rural and semi-urban backgrounds to join the garment factories. The study argues that the RMG sector offered these women a window of opportunities to join the labor market and achieve social and economic independence that would not have been possible without the flourishing of the sector. Subsequent surveys have attested to this assertion. Ali and his colleagues found that 62 percent of their respondents reported improved socioeconomic conditions due to their work in the factories (Ali et al. 2008, 454). One may speculate that these women workers are generally happy with their job because it improves their socioeconomic status. However, contradictorily, Paul-Majumder reports that a vast proportion of these women worked in insecure conditions inside factories (1997, 135). Abusive behavior by the management staff, including beating, sexual coercion, and blackmailing (by the threat of public humiliation) occurred in factories (Siddiqi 2003; Paul-Majumder 1997). Generally, supervisors, linemen,

120

Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

line chiefs, and production managers were reported as perpetrators (Siddiqi 2003, 30–33). Women’s insecurity was even worse in the ways between the workplace and home. Mastans, touts, or police perpetrated brutality/violence upon the workers as they commuted between work and home (Paul-Majumder 1997; Ali et al. 2008). The primary source of these abusive behaviors, as Siddiqi argues, was the extreme job insecurity that generally characterizes the garment industry in Bangladesh (2003, 21). Workers regularly fear layoff and delayed or no payment of salary and such financial insecurity coerces them to silently tolerate harassment and exploitation (Siddiqi 2003; Ali et al. 2008). She suggests that the incidences of sexual harassment occur comparatively more frequently in smaller factories than in established larger ones. It was not only the workers who suffered; such abusive practices adversely affected the productivity of the factories as well (Siddiqi 2003, 48). Wage-related discontent is a significant concern in the literature. Bangladesh emerged as a major exporter of garments to the North American and European countries, but it pays its workers the lowest wages (PaulMajumder and Begum 2006). Even though the minimum wage increased to Tk. 5000 (US $0.35 per hour) per month in December 2013, the scenario did not change much (Choudhury et al. 2016). Besides low monthly wages, workers often are deprived of timely payment and cheated of their overtime and other benefits, including festival benefits (Paul-Majumder 1997; Ali et al. 2008). As a result, their aggregate family savings shrinks (Kamal et al. 2010). Irregular payment and reduced savings also diminish workers’ functional capability. The workers and their families cannot afford to buy health improving food, maintain minimum housing, and afford adequate medical treatment (Paul-Majumder and Begum 2006; Akhter et al. 2010; Choudhury et al. 2016). One direct implication of irregular payment is lower job satisfaction. Kamal, Billah, and Hossain found that if paid as per the declared standard of the wage board, the workers would be less likely to be dissatisfied with their job (2010). The ILO and UN Women’s “Enterprise Level Survey” also reported that a vast majority of the workers (85.7% in their sample) were not satisfied with their jobs mainly due to irregular payment of salary (Matsuura and Teng 2020, 22). Besides irregular payments, lack of leisure time contributes to work dissatisfaction in garment factories. Paul-Majumder (1997, 2006) shows that workers in garment factories enjoy less leave than those in other industries. Within the industry, women laborers are generally allowed a lesser amount of leave than their male counterparts. She estimates that about one-third of the female garment workers worked more than thirteen hours a day. When considering commuting time and household chores, they ultimately secure

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction

121

less than six hours of sleep per night (Paul-Majumder 1997, 140–141). They often cannot rest on the weekends as they get paid for their work per day. Even worse, these female workers were denied paid maternity leave guaranteed by the existing labor law (Paul-Majumder 1997, 142). Other subsequent studies also capture this trend. Kamal, Billah, and Hossain showed that an overwhelming majority of the surveyed women garment workers reported having worked more than eight hours a day and had to forsake the fourteenday paid sick leave guaranteed by the Bangladesh Labor Act 2006 (2010, 10). Another common theme in the literature is the state of hygiene in factories. Most factories (except those in the Export Processing Zones) did not have separate rooms for lunch, adequate toilet facilities with essential cleaning elements like hand soap, a clean supply of drinking water, first aid facilities, or in-house clinics for workers. Besides, overcrowding significantly contributes to the unhygienic working environment (Paul-Majumder 2006; Kamal, Billah, Hossain, 2010). Manmade hazards, especially fire-related hazards in Bangladeshi factories, are another common issue discussed in the literature. According to the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies, 431 workers died in the 14 major fire incidents between 1990 and 2012 (cited in Choudhury et al. 2016, 19). However, the Bangladesh Fire Department reported that the 213 incidents of factory fires between 2006 and 2009 alone killed 414 garment workers (ibid 2016, 19). The literature reports that an unplanned work environment, poor building design, faulty electrical wiring, short-circuit, risky pieces of machinery, smoking materials, and boiler explosion are common sources of fire in the factories (Kamal et al. 2010; Choudhury et al. 2016). The factory managements are unaware of the needs and importance of the means to escape a fire. As a result, workers remain locked in the cases of fire causing higher incidents of death and injury. Stampede, locked exit route, an inadequate number of stairs, closed pathways, and smoke-induced suffocation are the leading causes of death during a fire (Paul-Majumder and Begum 2006; Akhter et al. 2010). Therefore, workplace safety is a concern for these women. In sum, the RMG workers in Bangladesh work in a highly stressful work environment marked by harassment and abuse by factory management, questionable safety and hygiene, personal and job insecurity, long working hours without leave and benefits, lack of opportunity for advancement, and poor wages. The management literature on job attitude and performance confirms that such a stressful work environment translates negative cognitive or rational evaluation (Moorman 1993) and affective evaluation (Weiss 2002; Harrison et al. 2006) of the working condition leading to depression and work dissatisfaction (Chamberlain and Hodson 2010; Sloan 2011).

122

Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

HYPOTHESES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION I developed the following hypotheses from the above literature review about the relationship between various components of the work environment and work satisfaction of women workers in the RMG factories in Bangladesh. First, we expect that the level of work satisfaction of a typical garment worker will be lower if superior authorities inflict harassment on them in the factory. Second, decreases in the level of safety feeling of workers will decrease their level of work satisfaction. Third, the less a worker feels that her supervisor does not listen to her, the less will be her work satisfaction. Fourth, the less a worker feels that she is a part of the team, the less her level of work satisfaction will be. Fifth, the less the available leisure time, the less the level of work satisfaction. Sixth, the less is the quality of training available for the workers, the less their level of work satisfaction will be. Finally, factory type matters. The level of workers’ dissatisfaction will be higher in knit and woven factories than in sweater factories. I have specified two separate models to test these hypotheses, where the first is nested within the second, more inclusive model. In the first model, work satisfaction is a function of seven factors including harassment by superior, feeling safe at work, care by the supervisor (“supervisor listened to me”), team feeling, leisure time, quality of training and development, and factory type. The more inclusive second model specifies work satisfaction as a function of eleven factors including the previous seven factors plus the respondents’ age, monthly wages, monthly expenses, and the size of the factory where they worked. As it turns out in the analysis section, the shorter model is more efficient than the inclusive one for the data at hand. METHODOLOGY AND DATA The dependent variable of the analysis is work-satisfaction level as perceived and reported by the respondents. Work satisfaction reflects a composite measure or an index of nine survey question items that directly asked respondents about their satisfaction level on a four-point ordinal scale ranging from very satisfied to unsatisfied. The component questions of the index measure the respondents’ overall degree of satisfaction, their satisfaction with job assignments, the level of their pay, the terms of their contracts, and their work environment. It also includes measures on how the factory management recognizes their job performance, the extent their supervisors and co-workers support them, the level of their relationship with co-workers, and whether they would recommend the factory to others as a place to work. The index takes each of the items and scales it by nine, the total number of items.1 Then

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction

123

the index is scaled back to its original levels for consistency of interpretation. Consequently, the emergent index ranges from one to four, measuring four levels of work satisfaction—very satisfied, mostly satisfied, sometimes satisfied, and unsatisfied. Table 7.1 presents the statistical distribution of this composite measure. There are six major covariates of interest and three further covariates used as a control in a fuller version of the regression model. “Harassment by superior” measures whether or not the respondent thought someone organizationally superior harassed her. The other five covariates of interest measure to the extent respondents “felt safe at work,” her “supervisor listened to her,” she “felt like part of a team,” she had “leisure time,” and she found opportunities to develop through “training” at work. These variables take ordinal values (similar to the Likert Scale) between one and five, where one represents positive perception and five represents negative perception. Conceptualized together these covariates are argued to be constitutive of the overall work environment of the respondent workers. Other covariates include age, monthly wages, and expenses measured at the interval level. There are three types of factories in the sample used in the present analysis: knit, woven, and sweater. These factories are characteristically different, and therefore, are expected to influence the way workers perceive their job and the work environment. Factory size emerged as an artifact of the broader sampling scheme of the study. The distribution of all the BGMEA factories in terms of their total number of workers has been divided into quartiles. The first quartile represents the smallest factories while the fourth represents the largest. About 37 percent of the respondents work in the largest quartile of factories and the next largest quartile has about 26 percent of the respondents. Similarly, about 45 percent of the respondents work in Knit and 37 percent came from weaving factories (Choudhury et al. 2016, 31–36). The current study is based on a cross-sectional survey of a sample of 1,026 women garments workers from randomly selected 48 garments factories (knit, woven, and sweater) from Dhaka, Gazipur, and Narayanganj. The selected factories were drawn from a list of all members (in the 2013–2014 period) of the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), the largest association of the RMG factories in Bangladesh. As of December 2013, the membership size of the BGMEA was 2,922. We collected names, addresses, contact numbers, and production types of 2,913 of these factories, and information regarding employee numbers of 2,808 of these factories from the BGMEA’s web portal and printed directories. A typical BGMEA member factory had 742 employees. Although most of the factories had less than 1,000 employees, the number of employees varied highly (standard deviation 1093). About 41 percent of the employees worked

N

466

720

731

732

732

Variable

Work Satisfaction

Harassment by Superior

Feeling Safe at Work

Supervisor Listens to Me

Feeling as Part of a Team

2.04

2.11

2.17

0.42

2.47

Mean

1.02

0.89

0.94

0.49

0.80

Std. Dev.

Table 7.1  Descriptive Statistics of “Work Satisfaction” and Its Covariates

1

1

1

0

1

Min

5

5

5

1

4

Max Scale: Satisfied to Unsatisfied Very satisfied = 1 (7%), Mostly satisfied = 2 (41%), Sometimes satisfied = 3 (40%), Unsatisfied = 4 (13%). Scale: No harassment to harassment No = 0 (55%), Yes =1 (45%). Scale: Safe to unsafe. Very safe = 1 (22%), Mostly safe = 2 (39%), Sometimes safe = 3 (26%), Not safe = 4 (8%), Extremely unsafe =5 (3%). Scale: Always to never. Always = 1 (23%), Mostly = 2 (43%), Sometimes = 3 (26%), Few occasions =4 (6%), Never = 5 (2%). Scale: Always to never. Always = 1 (30%), Mostly = 2 (44%), Sometimes = 3 (9%), Few occasions =4 (10%), Never = 5 (3%).

Scales, Values and Frequency (rounded %)

124 Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

732

732

1013 1005 732

732

Leisure Time

Satisfaction with the Quality of Training and Development

Monthly Expenses Monthly Wages Factory Type

Factory Size

2.71

14339.91 5661.49 2.22

2.29

2.87

1.17

5620 1170.47 0.71

1.18

1.11

1

2500 300 1

1

1

4

46400 12000 3

5

5

Scale: As needed to never. As Per Required = 1 (8%), Often =2 (28%), Sometimes = 3 (31%), Few Occasions =4 (23%), Never = 5 (9%). Scale: Always to never. Always = 1 (21%), In most aspects = 2 (29%), In some aspects = 3 (12%), In few aspects = 4 (9%), Never = 5 (6%). Measured in Taka(Median = 13860) Measured in Taka(Median = 5678) Scale: Nominal Sweater = 1 (16%), Knit = 2 (44%), Woven =3 (41%). Scale: Nominal Small (1st Quartile) = 1 (25%), Small-to-medium (2nd Quartile) = 2 (20%), Medium-to-large (3rd Quartile) = 3 (20%), Large (4th Quartile) = 4 (35%)

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction 125

126

Zahid ul Arefin Choudhury

in the “woven” factories, 32 percent in “knit” factories, and 26 percent in “sweater” factories. Most of these factories were in the broader Dhaka (Savar included) district, and “woven” was the largest factory type, both in Dhaka and overall. Naturally, the majority (52.83%) of the employees lived in the Dhaka district. About 37 percent of the employees worked and lived in Gazipur and about 8 percent lived and worked in Narayanganj districts. The sample selection scheme began by categorizing these factories along two dimensions—the size of employees and production types. The size of the employee, an interval-level variable, was divided into four quartile groups. There were three production types—knit, woven, and sweater. Joining these dimensions, the study created twelve sample groups of factories. Five factories from each of these sample groups were randomly selected, creating a sample size of sixty factories. Since the study’s unit of analysis was individual workers, we mapped the sample for each of these sixty factories. Based on our experience in statistical research, we selected 100 individual workers from each of these twelve sample groups for the interview, making the total sample size for the study 1,200. The survey instrument was semi-structured and prepared for face-to-face interviews. The survey questionnaire consisted of 147 questions of which 15 asked for a detailed qualitative response and the rest sought answers on pre-defined categories. It took, on average, an hour to complete an interview. Thirty field enumerators working on a rolling basis (ten enumerators per day on average) completed the survey in 42 days.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS The hypotheses developed in an earlier section are tested within a latentvariable regression framework. In this framework, the categories in the dependent variable are the observed attributes of an underlying, continuous latent variable (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975). The observed categories have been placed on an ordinal scale since the survey respondents rank-ordered their perceived level of job satisfaction. Ordered regression models provide the appropriate framework to explain the average variation in such an ordered response variable (Long 1997). This chapter uses the ordered logistic regression (ordered logit) model, which is more convenient than other approaches, mainly due to the ease of interpretation through the odds ratio. Table 7.2 presents the results in maximum-likelihood estimates of the regression analyses. The coefficients are exponentiated to translate the estimates from a log scale to the odds ratio. Since the model is linear in the dependent variable, the interpretation of the coefficients indicates a partial change in the dependent variable that is expected from a one-unit change in a

127

Work Environment and Its Effect on Job Satisfaction

Table 7.2  Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Dependent Variable “Work Satisfaction”) Covariates Harassment by Superior Feeling Safe at Work Supervisor listens to me Feeling as part of a team Leisure time Quality of Training Factory type Knit Woven Age Monthly Expenses Monthly Wages Factory size Small-to-medium Medium-to-large Large N Ll df.m aic (Akaike’s information criteria) bic (Bayesian information criteria)

Model (1)

Model (2)

1.605* (0.369) 3.307** (0.531) 1.882** (0.289) 2.551** (0.374) 2.428** (0.288) 2.285** (0.306)

1.592* (0.374) 3.290** (0.537) 1.901** (0.294) 2.576** (0.390) 2.446** (0.295) 2.267** (0.306)

0.419** (0.123) 0.498* (0.147)

0.375** (0.117) 0.465* (0.145) 0.991 (0.019) 1.000 (.0000) 1.000 (.0000)

459 -291.825 8.000 605.651 651.070

0.744 (0.274) 0.523+ (0.186) 0.703 (0.217) 456 -288.292 14.000 610.584 680.666

The analysis is done in STATA 13. It uses maximum-likelihood estimates. The thresholds or cut-points (in proportional-odds ratio) with standard errors in parentheses are: /cut1: 5.27 (.490), /cut2: 10.70 (1.08) and /cut3: 15.073 (1.274), which are significant at 95% confidence level. Coefficients in the table are Exponentiated. Standard errors are in parentheses. “p” values are to be read as: +p