The Arctic: A Drifting Future 9781536197716, 1536197718

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The Awakening of the Arctic
Abbreviations
Chapter 1
The Geography of the Arctic
1.1. Basic Concepts
1.2. The Artic Zone
Chapter 2
The Hydrocarbon Resources of the Arctic: An Attractive Deposit
2.1. Preliminary Estimates
2.2. Russia: A Careful Count on Hydrocarbon Resources
2.3. Alaska Is the Testing Ground of U.S. Politics
2.4. The Invaluable Experience of Norway
2.5. Canada: A Gradual Move towards Hydrocarbons
2.6. Denmark’s Hydrocarbon Production in the Arctic
2.7. New Opportunities by Overcoming Major Challenges
Chapter 3
The International Legal Status of the Arctic
3.1. The Geographical Principle of the Division of the Arctic
3.2. Hydrocarbon Resources Fueled Interest on the Arctic
3.3. The Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and Policies of the Arctic States
3.4. Towards the Arctic Resources
3.5. The Delimitation of Arctic Spaces
Chapter 4
The Sea Routes
4.1. The History of the Northern Sea Route
4.2. The Northern Sea Route Is the Great Hydrocarbon Route
4.3. The Northwest Passage Is an Analogue of the Northern Sea Route
4.4. The Icebreaker Fleet Is the Basis for Northern Sea Route’s Operation
4.5. The Icebreaking Fleet of the Arctic and Non-Arctic States
Chapter 5
Ambitions and Realities of Russian Policy in the Arctic
5.1. The Arctic Beachhead: From Stalin to Putin
5.2. The Arctic Direction of the Russian Policy
5.3. How Putin Recovered the Arctic to Russia
5.4. Cooperation with Foreign Companies
5.5. The Arctic Is a Priority of Russian Policy
5.6. Technology and the Extraction of the Arctic Resources
Chapter 6
Illustrations of Practical Works in the Arctic
6.1. The Infrastructure
6.2. The Prirazlomnaya Oil Field
6.3. The Yamal Peninsula
6.4. The Shtokman Field
Chapter 7
The “Cold” Militarization of the Arctic
7.1. The Arctic Is the Focus of Arctic and Non-Arctic States
7.2. The Military and Political Significance of the Arctic for Russia
Chapter 8
Scientific Research in the Arctic
8.1. Science and Geopolitics
8.2. International Cooperation in Arctic Research
8.3. U.S.-Russia: Scientific Rivalry in the Arctic
8.4. Scientific Operations of Non-Arctic States
Chapter 9
The Silent Arctic Started Speaking
9.1. Resources of the Arctic
9.2. International Cooperation in the Field of Environment
9.3. The Ecologization of Russian Policy in the Arctic
9.4. The U.S.’s Dismissive Attitude towards Environmental Issues
9.5. New Technologies for Dealing with the Consequences of the Accidents
Chapter 10
The Arctic – The “Weather Kitchen”
10.1. On the Issue of Ice Area Estimation
10.2. Climate Change and Coastal Residents
10.3. Consequences for the Ecology
10.4. Unsure Predictions
10.5. Climate Change and Shipping
10.6. Climate Change Opens up Access to the Shelf
10.7. The Impact of Сlimate on the Development of the Arctic
Chapter 11
Arctic Policies of Non-Arctic States
Conclusion
Appendix
The Major United Nations Conventions
Other Relevant International and Inter-State Agreements
Canada
China
Denmark
Iceland
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Norway
Spain
Sweden
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The Russian Empire/The Soviet Union/ The Russian Federation
United States of America
References
About the Authors
Index
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ARCTIC REGION AND ANTARCTICA ISSUES AND RESEARCH Additional books and e-books in this series can be found on Nova’s website under the Series tab.

ARCTIC REGION AND ANTARCTICA ISSUES AND RESEARCH

THE ARCTIC A DRIFTING FUTURE

SERGEY ZHILTSOV AND

IGOR ZONN

Copyright © 2021 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. We have partnered with Copyright Clearance Center to make it easy for you to obtain permissions to reuse content from this publication. Simply navigate to this publication’s page on Nova’s website and locate the “Get Permission” button below the title description. This button is linked directly to the title’s permission page on copyright.com. Alternatively, you can visit copyright.com and search by title, ISBN, or ISSN. For further questions about using the service on copyright.com, please contact: Copyright Clearance Center Phone: +1-(978) 750-8400 Fax: +1-(978) 750-4470 E-mail: [email protected]. NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the Publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: H%RRN

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS List of Tables

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

xi

Abbreviations

xxi

Chapter 1

The Geography of the Arctic

1

Chapter 2

The Hydrocarbon Resources of the Arctic: An Attractive Deposit

23

Chapter 3

The International Legal Status of the Arctic

57

Chapter 4

The Sea Routes

91

Chapter 5

Ambitions and Realities of Russian Policy in the Arctic

135

Chapter 6

Illustrations of Practical Works in the Arctic

185

Chapter 7

The “Cold” Militarization of the Arctic

203

Chapter 8

Scientific Research in the Arctic

227

Chapter 9

The Silent Arctic Started Speaking

243

Chapter 10

The Arctic – The “Weather Kitchen”

259

Chapter 11

Arctic Policies of Non-Arctic States

275

Conclusion

285

Appendix

293

vi

Contents

References

299

About the Authors

353

Index

355

LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. Table 9. Table 10. Table 11. Table 12. Table 13. Table 14. Table 15. Table 16. Table 17.

Table 18. Table 19. Table 20. Table 21.

Seas and bays of the Arctic Ocean 3 The hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic regions 27 The distribution of oil and gas resources by marine areas of the Russian Federation 29 Claims of Arctic states 79 The largest shipwrecks in the Arctic seas 101 The Arctic transport system 104 The volume of cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route 107 The main characteristic of the icebreakers under the Project 21900 117 The characteristic of the icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin 118 The characteristic of the icebreaker Arktika 119 The characteristic of the icebreaker Healy 125 The characteristic of the icebreaker Louis St. Laurent 128 The characteristic of the icebreaker Amundsen 129 The characteristic of the icebreaker John G. Diefenbaker 129 The characteristic of the icebreaker Oden 130 The characteristic of the icebreaker Xue Long 2 132 A list of major trips, meetings and speeches of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to establish the Arctic Shield (2000-2017) 168 Russia’s fundamental documents on the Arctic region 172 Major research bodies for Arctic Studies 240 Possible environmental risks due to the extraction of hydrocarbon resources on the Arctic shelf 245 Major accidents on offshore platforms and wells 249

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book was written thanks to the support of many people. Relevant suggestions and recommendations were made during several discussions regarding many parts of the book. This collaboration made it possible to comprehensively cover the many issues surrounding the Arctic, which is at the cutting edge of world politics. The authors are especially grateful to Marina M. Murashko, who coordinated all the preparatory work. Her active participation at all stages of preparation of the manuscript had a positive effect on the final version of the book presented. The authors would also like to express their gratitude to Thais D. Ribeiro (University of Florida) for her help and support with the editing of this manuscript. Her invaluable contribution was of paramount importance to the overall improvement of this book. The authors express their deep appreciation to Dr. A.V. Semenov. During the discussion of certain parts of the book, he provided valuable comments and suggestions.

INTRODUCTION THE AWAKENING OF THE ARCTIC “Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.” John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the USA “The difficult is what takes a little time; the impossible is what takes a little longer.” Fridtjof Nansen, Norwegian polar explorer “If you do not think about the future, you cannot have one.” John Galsworthy, English novelist and playwright “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.” George Orwell, English novelist and essayist

Over recent decades, the Arctic has been the focus of attention of many countries around the world. The region is believed to have potential, though not yet fully explored, and natural mineral resources. This is particularly true for hydrocarbons, which are estimated to account for a quarter of the world’s reserves. Natural and climatic transformations are caused by global warming and the accelerated melting of Arctic ice. This leads to the extension of the navigation season of the Northern Sea Route. Interest in Arctic oil and gas fields is growing due to the depletion of traditional onshore hydrocarbon deposits, rising prices and increased consumption. Oil companies in Russia “are utilizing the Soviet

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legacy in a wasteful manner.” Moreover, the main fields, where most of the oil is currently produced, will be depleted in 10-15 years. New oil and gas provinces that commensurate with the West Siberian lowlands or the Volga-Urals oil and gas bearing region are not yet considered as promising regions for exploitation. Other indicators showing deterioration of the raw material base of oil recovery are also progressing – the average water cut of production wells is increasing, their flow rates are decreasing, and the amount of non-operating wells is rising. Yet, despite challenging conditions of hydrocarbon production, expectations of their rapid development are fuelled by loud statements by politicians of various ranks and part of the expert community. This has intensified the negotiation process and defined the international legal regime in the Arctic. Less than a hundred years ago, the first icebreakers, airships and airplanes made a breakthrough into the Arctic spaces. Then the exploration and development of the Arctic was continued by the use of nuclear submarines and bathyscaphes, subsea mining complexes and robots, giving us access to what lurks beneath the Arctic ice. For many years, the word “Arctic” was associated with the struggle or competition for the discovery of the Northwest and Northeast Passages and the North Pole, the “boreal center of the world,” as it was called by the famous American polar explorer Frederick Cook. The discovery of new oil and gas fields in the north of the Tyumen oblast and the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous district and oil fields in Alaska in the middle of 20th century has changed the situation. The future of the Arctic began to be associated with hydrocarbon resources. Comparing the Arctic with Alaska, Russian scientist Dmitry Mendeleev wrote: “the future of Russia lies in the Arctic Ocean. We were strong enough to defeat the strongholds of mountains, now we must overcome the ice. Where the ice is drifting, there is a lot of both gold and many other goods, – that is our own Alaska.”1 Indeed, more than 60 years ago, some Soviet researchers and military men drew attention to the political leadership of the country and to the importance of the Arctic. Of course, then it was not about hydrocarbon resources. They defined the geopolitical, military and economic benefits of the region. In 1945, Igor Maximov, First Deputy Director of the Arctic Institute, noted, “we can already foresee that the struggle to preserve the Soviet priority will require us to pay more attention to this issue. Hard, active and extensive work in the Arctic and, 1

Dmitry Mendeleev, Cherished Thoughts (Saint Petersburg: M. P. Frolova’s Printing House, 1904), 209.

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I would add, a lot of business alertness and reasonable vigilance.”2 Three years later, the well-known polar pilot Mikhail Kaminsky wrote in a note to the Political Department of the Main Northern Sea Route: “unlike the last Patriotic War, which didn’t affect the Arctic too heavily, any future war is likely to make the Arctic an arena of fierce battles.”3 The assessments of the Arctic’s potential and possible scenarios in this region seem to coincide. The Arctic, including the Arctic Ocean and the adjacent territories of five countries: Russia, the United States (Alaska), Norway, Denmark (Greenland) and Canada, due to significant hydrocarbon reserves and the emerging prospects for the region’s participation in global energy became known as the Klondike of the 21st century, resembling the gold rush of Alaska in the late 19th – early 20th centuries. Unlike the American Klondike, which quickly exhausted itself, the Arctic Klondike still exists, although in mythical figures that can melt, just as the Arctic ice does. This is what makes us re-evaluate the prospects for the Arctic, bringing to the forefront the issue of access to its resources. More recently, by the standards of our time, in 1991, Daniel Yergin, one of the world’s recognized authorities in the field of energy, in his fundamental work The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power,4 did not even consider the whole Arctic as a resourceful hydrocarbon region, except for the “Alaskan Giant.” But already 25 years later, in his new book he wrote “one shouldn’t forget, that the exploration of Arctic reserves involves huge technical difficulties as the ice cover is present from October to June. Its thickness reaches 2 meters. The temperature in the region drops to -50°C. Severe storms last for weeks and, of course, remoteness to be expected in the Arctic. It requires much more investment than the Sakhalin projects. But the Arctic remains one of the most attractive regions in terms of resources. The scale, complexity, and cost of Arctic projects, as well as the need for advanced marine mining technologies, have forced Russia to look for an international partner.”5 Arctic development projects are traditional long-term enterprises. It is not known how much oil and gas they will bring. Large-scale production will start before 2030-2040s. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “their total value can result in a sum – ‘one shudders to say’ – of several hundreds of billions or even half a trillion dollars. This money will be invested for decades. For now,

2

Yuri Zhukov, Stalin: The Arctic Shield (Moscow: Vagrius, 2008), 491. Ibid, 494. 4 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Moscow: Denovo Publishing House, 1999), 968. 5 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World, trans. I. Evstigneeva, O. Mazak (Moscow: Aplina, 2017), 47-48. 3

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one thing can be said – the ice has been broken. The development of the Russian Arctic has begun.”6 At the same time, Gwynne Dyer, a lecturer at the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, writes “it is not clear why the Arctic Ocean, which is only 1/36 of the planet’s surface, can accommodate a quarter of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves.”7 It is worth reminding that the Arctic breakthrough was possible due to the development of science and technology and the introduction of new technological methods of deep-sea drilling. They have allowed us to find and evaluate the first reserves of hydrocarbons in the Arctic sea’s shelf deposits. As new data on reserves became available, issues related to the definition of limits of the continental shelf became more acute. The present development of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region, in many ways reminds and repeats the path of another, southern region of the world, and namely the Caspian region. Although the Caspian Sea is not in any way comparable in water area and depth with any of the Arctic seas, interest in the Caspian region has increased since the publication of data on huge oil and gas accumulations. At the time, the Caspian Sea was hastily called the oil Eldorado, the second Kuwait or the second Persian Gulf. Similar challenges are seen in determining the international legal status of the Arctic seas and the Caspian Sea, caused by the divergence of economic interests of both the Caspian countries and the group of so-called the “Arctic Five.” There are also significant problems because of oil and gas production from offshore fields. All this can be observed in the region over the past decade, where the struggle between the Arctic countries for access to hydrocarbon resources is intensifying. The growing number of publications of many popular and scientific books, encyclopedias, newspaper and journal articles is a reflection of the interest in the Arctic. Although this list is too long, some of them should be mentioned. According to Oran Young, one of the authoritative American experts in international Arctic governance, wrote, “in the past, the Arctic was considered an exotic but difficult to access region of interest to anthropologists, biologists, glaciologists, and historians. Now we are confronted not only with reports that appear daily in leading newspapers and magazines, but also with a substantial number of books on the analysis of the profound changes in the Arctic and their significance for the future of this region of the fate of the planet as a whole.”8

6

Ibid. Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Random House Canada, 2008), 288. 8 Oran R. Young, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” MSU Bulletin, no. 2 (2011): 244-255. 7

Introduction

xv

In the last ten years alone, “the Arctic Library” has been enriched by such works as “The Arctic: Russia’s interests and international conditions of their realization” (2002); V. N. Burlak “Walking to the ice cold seas” (2004); D. A. Dodin “Sustainable development of the Arctic” (2005); M. I. Tsiporukha “Forgotten researchers of Russian seas” (2005); Y. N. Zhukov “Stalin: the Arctic shield” (2008); A. B. Shirokorad “The battle for the Russian Arctic of the XVI-XXI centuries” (2008); A. N. Chilingarov, V. M. Gruzinov, Y. F. Sychev, “Essays on geography of the Arctic” (2009); A. A. Injiev, “The battle for the Arctic. Will the North be Russian?” (2010); Yu. F. Lukin, “The great remarking of the Arctic” (2010); S. A. Terentyev, “The Arctic and the Antarctic” (2011); V. N. Konyshev, A. A. Sergunin, “The Arctic in international politics: a cooperation or rivalry” (2011); “The Arctic: A zone of peace and cooperation” (edited by A. V. Zagorsky) (2012); “‘The new’ Arctic and the interests of Russia” (edited by V.A. Huseynovа) (2012); M. O. Morgunova, A. Y. Tsunevsky. “The energy of the Arctic” (2012); O. B. Aleksandrov “The Northern vector of Russian foreign policy: foreign policy in the Baltics, Northern Europe and the Arctic” (2012); N. A. Marchenko “The seas of the Russian Arctic. Conditions of navigation and incidents” (2012, the book is published in English and Russian by the German Publishing House Springer), M. I. Tsiporukha “Russia and Russians in the Arctic” (2012); V. Zilanov “Russia is losing the Arctic?” (2013); V. N. Polovinkin, A. B. Fomichev “Russian North” (2013); “The Russian Arctic in the XXI century: natural conditions and risks of exploration” (2013); “The Arctic region: problems of international cooperation in three volumes” (edited by I. S. Ivanov) (2013); A. Gromov “The battle for the Arctic” (2016); A. B. Shirokorad “The Arctic. The Northern Sea Route” (2017); V. Kalinin “Stalin’s Arctic project” (2018); S. Samchenko and D. Puchkov “Russian Arctic: ice, blood and flame” (2020); and even the first military fiction stories written by G. Savitsky “The Arctic is a battlefield” (2009); and A. Tsaregorodsky “The Arctic impact” (2013). Several major encyclopedic works on the Arctic and the Arctic seas have also been written by V. I. Magidovich “The Arctic is my home. The history of Northern exploration in the biography of famous people” (2001); the fundamental work “Northern Encyclopedia” (2011). A series of encyclopedias of all northern seas of Russia are composed by I. S. Zonn and A. G. Kostyanoy “The Barents Sea” (2011); I. S. Zonn, A. G. Kostyanoy and M. I. Kumantsov “The Bering Sea” (2012); M. I. Kumantsov “The Chukchi Sea” (2013); I. S. Zonn and A. G. Kostyanoy “The Kara Sea” (2013); A. G. Kostyanoy and A. V. Semenov “The White Sea” (2014); I. S. Zonn and A. G. Kostyanoy “The Laptev Sea” (2014); I. S. Zonn and A. G. Kostyanoy “The East Siberian Sea” (2014);

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A. V. Semenov “The Arctic Ocean” (2016, in 2 volumes). A comprehensive and in-depth analysis was published by Paulsen Publishing House “The Encyclopedia of the Arctic in 2 volumes, supplemented and revised, 2017), written by I. S. Zonn, A. G. Kostyanoy and A. V. Semenov “The Arctic: a chronology of historical events” (2017). In 2005 the “The Encyclopedia of the Arctic” was published in the USA. We should also mention the initiative of the Moscow Publishing House Veche. From 2008 to 2013, Veche published about 100 books entitled “The Sea Chronicles.” A number of them tells the history of Arctic exploration.9 Additionally, the publication of such major international reports as “The Arctic pollution issues: a state of the Arctic environment report” (1998) and “The Arctic Human Development Report” (2007), which promote regional cooperation in the Arctic should be also noted. The informational and analytical bilingual journal “The Arctic Herald10” (since 2012) and the journal “The Arctic Review” (since 2013), have significantly contributed to the coverage of Arctic issues. The interest in the Arctic has been also enhanced by the promoting work of Paulsen Publishing House, established in Moscow by the famous polar explorer, the conqueror of the poles and businessman Frederik Paulsen. This is the only Russian publishing house specializing in the production of documentary, fiction and popular science literature. It also produces reprint works, which have already become classics during the lifetime of the authors. All these publications are bound by one “guiding star” – the Arctic – and constitutes a rich Arctic heritage.11 Furthermore, we would also mention the activities of the Integrated All works listed below published by Veche: S. Kovalev, “Swastika over Taymyr” (2008); N. Cherkashin, “Emergencies in the Soviet Fleet” (2009); M. Chvanov, “The Mystery of the Death of the Schooner ‘Saint Anna’” (2009); S. Kovalev, “Arctic Shadows of the Third Reich” (2010); V. Shigin, “‘Kursk’: 10 years later. Facts and Versions” (2010); S. Kovalev, “Mysteries of Missing Expeditions” (2011); V. Koryakin, “The Chelyuskin Epic” (2011); R. Buikov, “Engaged with the North. In the footsteps of ‘Two Captains’” (2012); V. Koryakin, “The War in the Arctic 1941-1945” (2013); N. Cherkashin, “The Commander of the Polar Seas” (2014); M. Chvanov, “The exploits of the navigator Albanov” (2012); V. Redansky, “In the ice and under the ice” (2014). 10 The journal is issued in the Russian and English languages. 11 For example: V. Albanov, “South to Franz Josef Land!” (2007); B. Pilnjak, “Zavolochie” (2007); Yu. Burlakov, “’Papaninskaya Four: ups and downs” (2007), F. Paulsen, A. Chilingarov, McDowell M. Depth, “4261 meters” (2007); V. Vize “The Seas of the Russian Arctic. Essays on the History of Research in 2 volumes” (2008) (The original edition of 1948 was entitled “In the Seas of the Soviet Arctic. History of Research”); “Islands and Archipelagos of the Russian Arctic. New Land” ed. P. Boyarsky (2009); V. Andrienko, “The Russian Icebreaking Fleet in the 1860-1918s (2010); V. Blinov, “The icebreaker Lenin. The First nuclear-powered one (2010); S. Larkov, F. Romanenko, “Enemies of the People behind the Arctic Circle” (2010); V. Volovich, “The polar diaries of the participant of secret polar expeditions of 19499

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Marine Arctic Expedition, led by its chief, Honorary Polar Explorer Professor P. V. Boyarsky. The expedition makes an invaluable contribution by delivering a comprehensive description of the archipelago islands of the Russian Arctic. All expedition reports are being issued by Paulsen publishing house. Eksmo Publishing House issues a series of books called “Great Voyages,” which includes biographical data and the main works of the largest Arctic explorers. The installation of the Russian flag on the ocean floor near the North Pole in 2007 played a significant role in the expansion of the underwater resource geography and geopolitics of the Arctic. Thus, Russia’s territorial claims to the Arctic seas shelf has been unearthed. As Arthur Chilingarov12 noted “first of all, the results of the expedition Arctik-2007 led to the fact that the Arctic countries began to hurriedly unfold work on the delimitation of the shelf.”13 It is clear that the Arctic countries already without Russian actions gradually increased their attention to the region. However, one has to admit that the addition of the Russian tricolor was a signal for the start of the “Arctic race,” which a lot of countries around the world have already entered. The flag’s installation undoubtedly became a major scientific and technological achievement. Nevertheless, it provoked mixed response from the international community. In the 1990s, Russia lost the technological as well as the human resources to restart its scientific sector and had nothing more to offer. It began to lag behind the development of a modern instrumental arsenal of equipment for exploration and industrial deep-water drilling. Moreover, a number of other challenges arose in the region. Among of them: the strengthening militarization of the Arctic, and a revision of international norms regulating activities between countries. Additionally, delimitation of the continental shelf, development of new technologies for deepsea drilling and combating accidents and oil spills on wells appeared on the agenda. Non-Arctic countries have also begun to organize their scientific

1955” (2011); A. Pochtarev, L. Gorbunova, “The polar aviation of Russia 1914-1945, book 1” (2011); I. Zotikov, “Winter Soldiers” (2011); R. Aliyev, “Underside White. The Arctic from Vikings to Papaninites” (2016); P. Filin, M. Emelina, M. Savinov, “The Arctic beyond fiction” (2018); V. Koryakin, “Piri vs. Cook. The Polar Detective is a century long” (2018). 12 In 2008, Artur Chilingarov was appointed the Russian President’s Special Representative for the Arctic. In August 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing Chilingarov as Russia’s Special Representative for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic. 13 Maria Sotskova, “Arthur Chilingarov: I hope that the dispute over the Arctic will be resolved soon,” TASS, accessed January 23, 2020. https://tass.ru/interviews/4454824.

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research in the region and discuss the use of the Northern Sea Route. This has identified not only possible areas of cooperation but also potential conflicts. While the former Soviet Union was building up its military potential by producing large quantities of obsolete weapons, the leading Western countries heavily invested in the development of innovative technologies for deep-sea water drilling in oil and gas fields on the continental shelf. They focused on the creation of infrastructure for subsea mining complexes for shallow Arctic waters as well as the environment, so those countries could succeed in their projects. As an Academic of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgeny Velikhov said, “the world practice shows that the development of offshore oil and gas production is based on the introduction of new, advanced technologies at all stages of field development. Their application is the main factor of competitiveness of any oil and gas company.”14 As a result, it turned out that Russia does not have enough of its own technological units to carry out deep-water drilling operations, taking into account industrial and environmental safety in hydrocarbon fields of the Arctic shelf all year round. At a meeting of the Russian Government, Sergey Donskoy, Minister of the Ministry of Natural Resources, stated that “enormous financial resources, billions of dollars are needed, and that is why we are talking about inviting large transnational companies. Our companies lack infrastructure, technology.”15 Thus, the struggle for the Arctic eventually became a rivalry for technology and technology development. The countries who are the first to offer new technological solutions will become the leaders in this region. Oil and gas production in the Arctic fields will be the “prize” in this Arctic race. These countries will rely on three Arctic “whales”: technology, money and personnel. Over the past hundred and fifty years, oil and gas production centers have moved from region to region, each time causing a stir around new “wealth.” In the 19th century, the geopolitical rivalry unfolded on open spaces of Afghanistan and Central Asia between Russia and England. It was named “The Great Game.”16 In the 20th century in the Caspian region around the Caspian hydrocarbons unfolded “The Great Game-2.”17 By the end of the 20th century “Development of Offshore Oil and gas Fields: Status, Problems and Prospects,” A collection of scientific papers, ed. D. Mirzoev, M. Mansurov, P. Nikitin (Moscow: POE “VNIIGAZ,” 2008), 370. 15 Tatiana Zamachina, “Medvedev figured out a way to make 9 trillion,” Moscow Komsomolets, August 3, 2012. 16 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game against Russia (Moscow: Ripol Classic, 2004), 656. 17 Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, The Great Game 2 (Moscow: Edel-M, 2002), 105; Sergey Zhiltsov and Igor Zonn, The USA in pursuit of the Caspian Sea (Moscow: International Relations, 2009), 194. 14

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all major hydrocarbon deposits had been discovered with the exception of the Arctic, which became known as the last storehouse of hydrocarbons. Nowadays, we may say that in the 21st century the world is entering “The Great Game-3.” However, this time it is associated with the exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic seas shelf. A lot of works have been written about the history of Arctic exploration and, as a rule, according to a single scheme, starting with the chapters on the milestones of its development. For this reason, we have not included such a chapter in this work, since we have already mentioned “The Arctic: a chronology of historical events,” which for the first time includes not only historical events, but also general humanitarian ones, accompanying them or indirectly related to them. In 2013, the authors of this work presented the book “The Arctic Race. Capture and Drill.”18 It outlined the main issues that primarily the Arctic countries face and may face in the future. That book has not been left without attention. A number of reviews noted its comprehensive approach to the study of the region. It reflected almost all current challenges in the Arctic. Not all of the comments made can be agreed with, but some of them were taken into account in this work. Our sincere gratitude for the attentive and thoughtful reading of the book and the comments made to the candidate of historical sciences, senior research fellow at the Center for Scientific Support of the Marine Collegium of the Government of the Russian Federation Pavel Gudеv. The authors are deeply grateful to all those whose books and materials helped to develop the topic and were used in this work. In spite of the above mentioned lags, Russia has managed to achieve a lot in the development of the coastal part of the Arctic, establishment of a tankergas carrier fleet, icebreaker support, using the Northern Sea Route, re-equipping and creating a zone of national Arctic security on land, in the air and underwater. Of course, the sanctions imposed by the West on participation in the development of oil and gas fields have played its role in promoting the development of the Arctic shelf. Despite this, however, it has been possible to create the necessary basis to respond to them and preserve the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. In preparing this work, the authors experienced certain problems due to the lack of reliable data on hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic fields. There is also 18

Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, The Arctic Race: Capture and Drill (Moscow: Eastern Book, 2013), 264.

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a wide variation in the assessment of Russia’s policy toward the Arctic over the past two decades. Nevertheless, based on a wealth of information, expert data and assessments, and analysis of the outcomes of various projects in the Arctic, the authors have come to certain conclusions.

ABBREVIATIONS AZRF AEPS BP BOEM CPSU CLCS CPC EEZ EU GDP GUSMP IMEMO ICR LNG MACE MChS

NATO NORDEFCO NWP OSC OCS

Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy British Petroleum Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Communist Party of the Soviet Union United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Council of the People’s Commissars Exclusive Economic Zone European Union Gross Domestic Product General Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science Initial Combined Resources Liquefied Natural Gas Marine Arctic Complex Expedition Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nordic Defence Cooperation Northwest Passage Open Stock Company Outer Continental Shelf

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Sergey S. Zhiltsov and Igor S. Zonn RGO RSFSR SCRF SGCF USA UN UNCLOS USSR WWF

Russian Geographical Society Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Security Council of the Russian Federation Shtokman gas and condensate field United States of America United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Wildlife Fund

Chapter 1

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE ARCTIC 1.1. BASIC CONCEPTS The Arctic is the northernmost circumpolar region of the globe. It includes the Arctic Ocean with its constituent seas and islands, the adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the surrounding northern margins of the continents of Eurasia and North America, from the south bounded by the Arctic Circle, located at 66°33′N. This definition is most frequently found in encyclopedic and scientific publications. The generally accepted boundaries of the Arctic are still not defined. However, there are many approaches on how to define them. The Arctic area is 21 million km2 (4.12% of the total surface area) if it is bounded by the Arctic Circle (66°33' N),19 from the south, or 27 million km2 (5.29% of the total surface area) if its southern border is the border of the tundra zone – close to the outlines of the isotherm 10°C on land and 5°C at sea. There are 5.14 million km2 (70%) permanently under Arctic ice, of which 1.5 million km2 is under pack ice.20 In order to resolve the issue of the width of spatial claims of the pre-Arctic states and, consequently, the need to delimit the continental shelf, a number of Russian scientists proposed the following definition: “The Arctic should be understood as the waters of the Arctic Ocean and its seas off the coasts of states with direct access to the North Pole and limited to these coastlines. They are the northern coasts of the Russian Federation, the state of Alaska (USA), Greenland 19

The Arctic. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 3rd edition, ed. A.M. Prokhorov (Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1970), 2:203-205. 20 Pack ice is ice formed by frozen seawater. It is mobile by virtue of not being attached to the shoreline. Typically, pack ice presents massive ice platforms, their debris and broken ice.

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(Denmark), Canada, and the northern coast of the Svalbard Archipelago (Norway). These coasts are washed by the seas, respectively: the Barents Sea, the White Sea, the Kara Sea, the Greenland Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Laptev Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Beaufort Sea, the Lincoln Sea, the Bering Sea and the Nares Strait, as the agreement on delimitation of maritime spaces in the Bering Sea and Nares Strait simultaneously covers the waters of the Chukchi Sea and the Lincoln Sea respectively.”21 The Arctic should not be confused with the Geographic North Pole. The latter is just “the point at which the imaginary axis of rotation of the Earth crosses its surface in the Northern Hemisphere”22 or the center of the Arctic. Therefore, when some authors write about the extraction of hydrocarbon resources at the North Pole, one cannot help but smile. In fact, there are four poles in the Arctic as a whole: the Geographic North Pole, the Magnetic North Pole (Boothia Peninsula, Canada), the North Pole of Inaccessibility and the Ice Pole. The latter is difficult to reach due to the distance from the settlements. It is located in the center of the ice massif between the Geographic North Pole and Alaska and the Pole of Cold near the Oymyakon settlement in Siberia (Russia).23 The majority of the Arctic is composed of the Arctic Ocean and its marginal seas: the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Beaufort Sea, the Lincoln Sea, the Greenland Sea, the Norwegian Sea, as well as its (Arctic Ocean) inland seas and gulf: the White Sea, Baffin Bay and Hudson Bay and many straits and bays of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (Table 1). The length of the coastline along the Arctic Ocean reaches almost 40,000 km, including the coastline of the northern islands.24 22,600 km of the coastline belongs to Russia, and with the islands it is about 62,000 km:25 10,600 – to Canada; 4,000 km – to the USA (Alaska); about 1,500 km – to Norway. Most of these seas are on the shelf, which represents more than a third of the total ocean area. Its width reaches 1,300-1,500 km, which is a distinctive feature of its bottom terrain with depths below 200 m. The area of the Arctic mainland is 7.16 million km2, of which 3.843 million km2 are islands, with the Arctic Ocean ranked second after the Pacific Ocean. The average depth of the Arctic Ocean is 1,130 m and its maximum reaches 5,449 m. 21

Artem Gubanov, Delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic (Moscow: Zerzalo-M, 2015), 312. 22 Semyon Terentyev, The Arctic and the Antarctic (Moscow: Knigovek, 2011), 416. 23 Ibid. 24 Caitlyn Antrim, “The new maritime Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 5 (2010): 56-73. 25 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, ed. Yu. Barsegov, V. Korzun, and I. Mogilevkin (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 47.

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The area of the Arctic shelf is 8.359 million km2. The transition zone between the shelf and the Arctic basin, one of the three basins in the Arctic Ocean, is represented by a continental slope with depths of 180-3000 m and an area26 of 1.632 million km2. Table 1. Seas and bays of the Arctic Ocean Seas and bays

Total area, thousand km2 1414 511 87 889

The total depth, m The deepest The average point point 600 228 2414 1160 350 92 358 47

The total volume of water, thousand km3 322 593 8 42

The Barents Sea Baffin Bay The White Sea The East Siberian Sea The Greenland Sea Hudson Bay The Kara Sea The Laptev Sea The Norwegian Sea The Chukchi Sea The Lincoln Sea The Arctic Ocean

1181

5527

1473

1740

819 885 663 1383

274 600 3385 3970

112 118 510 1741

92 104 338 2408

587 38 8457

1256 592 5527

87 289 532

51 11 5709

The Arctic region features, first and foremost, a severe climate with long winters and short vegetation periods, which determine its ice coverage. In most of the territory, perennially frozen rocks are widespread. There is a poorness of flora and fauna; ecosystem structures and their functioning are similar on the whole territory. There are two groups of states in the Arctic: Arctic states and coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean. The arctic states are a group of five countries whose coasts directly extend to the ocean. They have their own inland waters, territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone: Norway (Spitsbergen), the USA (Alaska), Canada (Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories, Quebec, Newfoundland), Denmark (Greenland), and Russia. They are often named the “Arctic Five.”

26

The Russian Arctic in the 21st Century: Natural Conditions and Exploitation Risks (Moscow: Feoriya, 2013), 6.

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Historically, other states bordering the Arctic Ocean – the Nordic countries such as Finland27, Sweden, and Iceland – have had their own interests in the region, especially since some sections of their land are part of the Arctic Circle. Along with the Arctic states they form the Arctic region. Often, we talk about the Arctic G8, which is considered as the “Circumpolar Group.” Andrey Golovnev, a well-known Russian scientist, and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, being the editor of the Russian edition of the “Report on Human Development in the Arctic” (DORCHA), wrote in the preface: “How realistic and promising is the notion of the Arctic as a special region? Skeptics consider it an artificial construct, referring to the Arctic’s fragmentation between different states, and the different roles of Arctic territories in the history and modernity of North America, Fennoscandia, and Russia.”28 As a response to this, the DORCHA’s authors draw attention to reality, in which the Arctic is an original region integrated by recent Arctic initiatives: the “Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy” (AEPS) (1991), the Northern Forum (1991), and the Arctic Council (1996).29 Besides the Arctic, the Arctic basin, and the Arctic sector are often used in popular-scientific literature. The Arctic basin is believed to be the central deep-water basin (over 5000 m) of the Arctic Ocean submarine ridges. It is bounded by the edge of the mainland shoal, which has an oval shape and divided into two parts by a large underwater blocky structure – the Lomonosov Ridge, discovered by a Soviet expedition in 1948. The Arctic sector is a territory or water area of triangular shape, the top of which is the North Pole, the base – the Arctic mainland coast, and the side borders – meridians, passing from the North Pole through the western and eastern extremes of the coast. In the circumpolar zone, there are three major sectors that relate to the Arctic: North American, Scandinavian and Russian ones. The North American sector includes Alaska (USA), the northern provinces of Canada (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, Labrador), the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (36,563 islands with an area of 1.4 million km2) and Greenland administered by Denmark.

27

Finland was part of the Arctic region until 1944. After the transfer of the Badjanak region to the Soviet Union, it lost access to the Arctic seas. 28 “Report on Human Development in the Arctic (DORCHA),” transl. from English, ed. A. Golovnev (Ekaterinburg-Salekhard: 2007), 244. 29 Ibid.

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The Scandinavian sector is represented by the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway (Nordland, Tromsø, Finnmark, including the Svalbard Archipelago, the northern territories of Sweden (Västerbotten and Norrbotten), and Finland (Oulu and Lapland provinces). Russia’s Arctic sector covers about 9.46 million km2. 6.8 million km2 of that area is covered by water, where 45% of the total space is a part of the Arctic Ocean, and 6.19 million km2 of it is continental shelf, or 41% of the total area of the Arctic.30 The Russian sector includes six of the eleven Arctic seas and the main icefree polar areas of terrestrial Arctic ecosystems. The seas are located on a continental bank, which determines their shallowness (up to 200 m), although there are also some deep troughs in the Barents and Kara Seas. The mainland shoal, bounded by a 200 m isobath, occupies 37.4% of its area in the Arctic Ocean. Russia’s coastline stretches from the Norwegian border on the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. It is washed by the White Sea, the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea, while the White Sea, the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea belong to the Western Arctic Seas, and the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea – to the Eastern Arctic Seas. The island territory of the Russian Arctic is represented by the large archipelagos Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya, and a number of other islands. The largest of them are Wrangel Island, Novosibirsk Islands and continental territories: the Taymyr Peninsula, Chukotka Peninsula, and others. The Russian Arctic region is the native land of the indigenous peoples of the North. This group includes people living in the areas of the North, Siberia and the Far East in the territories of traditional settlements of their ancestors, who preserve the traditional way of life, economic activities and crafts, numbering less than 50 thousand people and consider themselves part of an independent ethnic community. Traditional crafts account for 0.4% of GDP in the northern regions of Russia.31 Their activities include reindeer herding, hunting, fishing, sea hunting and folk crafts, which are dispersed throughout the territory. Their average life expectancy is 49 years of age. 48% of them have primary and secondary education. The unemployment rate is four times higher

30 31

David Dodin, Sustainable Development of the Arctic (Saint Petersburg: Nauka, 2005), 282. Sargilan Baisheva, “National daily life settlement Yakutii in the context of sociological research,” Arctic and North, No. 14 (2014): 83-97.

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than the average for northern regions of Russia. The average population density is 0.1 inhabitants per km2. With regards to the economy of the Arctic region as a whole, it can be characterized as follows: typological similarity of traditional branches32 on most part of the territory, poor development of agriculture due to soil and climatic conditions,33 and complex types of industrialization, which is dominated by the extractive industry. The ethno-demographic structure of the population is mostly homogeneous. The Circumpolar North or the Circumarctic North is another name for the region. It presents the arctic, subarctic and boreal regions of Northern Eurasia and North America, located around the North Pole. They are united by the geographical commonality of biota and ecosystem origin, similar climate, the spread of perennially frozen soils, and the proximity of the ethno-demographic structure of the indigenous population. With respect to the definition of Arctic lands, Far North, the authors of the Northern Encyclopedia describe it as, “the territory located north of the Polar Circle (Russia). It includes the Arctic ice zone, tundra, forest tundra and part of the taiga, which is characterized by severe climatic conditions. The aboriginal population is the indigenous small peoples of the North. The areas of the Far North are also called the Arctic Belt.”34 The term the Arctic Belt means the Earth’s belt that covers most of the Arctic space. On land it includes the Arctic desert zone. The seas have a stable ice cover. The boundary of the Arctic Belt is usually drawn on isotherm 5°C of the warmest month: July or August. There are also the Foreign North and the Russian North.35 The Foreign North is the northern area of the globe outside the Russian North. According to the Russian wording, it consists of the Alaska Peninsula, northern Canada (Canadian North), Greenland, Iceland, northern Norway, Sweden, Finland, as well as the Norwegian-owned Svalbard Archipelago and Jan Mayen Island.36 The Russian North is a natural and socio-economic region of the Russian Federation (an area of 11 million km2 or 62% of Russia’s territory). It includes the following territories: Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia); the oblasts – 32

There is a predominance of large-scale reindeer herding and coastal sea fishing. In fact, only suburban economy – vegetable growing, meadow farming – is developed. 34 Northern Encyclopaedia (Moscow: European editions, Northern Spaces, 2004), 439. 35 Grigori Agranat, The Foreign North: Essays on Nature, History, Population and the Economy of the Districts (Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1957), 319. 36 Ibid. 33

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Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Magadan, Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Tyumen, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Chita and Amur; the autonomous okrugs – Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Khanty-Mansiysk-Ugra, Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets), Evenkia, Chukotka, Koryak, northern regions – Krasnodar, Khabarovsk, Primorsk, and northern areas in the krais – Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, Primorsky. So far, there has been no general consensus or scientifically grounded concept of the Russian North. Vastness of territories, ambiguity of natural and climatic conditions, social factors, the gradual transition from “northern” to a “non-north” environment excludes the delimitation of the southern borders of the region. The Polar Region is defined as the area north of the Arctic Circle lying within the polar circles and the North Pole in the Northern Hemisphere.37 As we can see, at present there are lots of different “arcticisms,” but in most cases their concepts are duplicated.

1.2. THE ARTIC ZONE In addition to the terms of Arctic spaces, there is also the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) in scientific literature. The concept was legally established by the decision of the State Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Arctic Affairs on April 22, 1989. At that time, the AZRF included the territories of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs and partially the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and Krasnoyarsk Krai; lands and islands specified in the decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926 “On declaring the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean”; internal sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation. After two years, in 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR approved the Regulations on the Commission for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR, and the personal composition of this Commission.38 37 38

The Northern hemisphere represents 20% of Russia’s territory. “Resolution No. 308 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR of 29.05.1991 ‘On Approval of the Regulations on the Commission for the Arctic and Antarctic Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR and the Personal Composition of this Commission’,” Pravo.gov.ru,

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In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin instructed the chairman of the Russian government Viktor Chernomyrdin to develop a draft of the “Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.” To implement the presidential decree “On the Federal Target Program ‘The World Ocean’ of January 17, 1997,” the government commissioned the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Northern Affairs (Goskomsever) to develop a federal law in the Arctic, and as an integral part of the program activities of the sub-program the “Development and use of the Arctic” of the Federal Target Program “The World Ocean.” The new law was planned to go into effect in 1999, however, results did not come until 2008. In 1998-1999, some drafts of a federal law on the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation were prepared and sent to the State Duma. Under the draft law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” as of 1998, “the Arctic zone is a part of the Arctic that is under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The Arctic zone included: a) the territories of the subjects of the Russian Federation: Kolsky, Lovozersky, Pechengsky districts, closed administrative-territorial formations Zaozyorsk, Ostrovnoy, Skalisty, Snezhnogorsk, cities of Polyarny and Severomorsk of Murmansk Oblast, the city of Murmansk; Nenets Autonomous Okrug; The territory of the Vorkuta city administration of the Komi Republic; Priuralsky, Tazovsky and Yamalsky Districts, the territory of the Labytnang and Salekhardy city administrations of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District; Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug; The territory of the Norilsk city administration of Krasnoyarsk Krai; Allaikhovsky, Anabarsky, Bulunsky, Nizhnekolymsky, Oleneksky and Ust-Yansky Uluses of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Chukotka Autonomous Okrug; Olyutorsky District of Koryaksky Autonomous Okrug; b) discovered and not yet discovered lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean, from north of the coast of the Russian Federation to the North Pole, which are within the borders passing within the west along

accessed November 23, 2019. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?doc_itself=&nd=1020116 02&page=1&rdk=0&link_id=2#I0.

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the meridian of 32°04'35" E (and within 74° to 81° N – along the meridian of 35° E), in the east – along the meridian of 168°58'37" W; c) inland waters and the territorial sea of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories (areas) specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article; d) the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories (areas) specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article, within the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.”39 The Russian parliament did not support this draft law, and soon after in 1999, a revised draft was prepared.40 According to the new version, “the Arctic zone was understood to be the part of the Arctic under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The Arctic zone included: a) the territories of the subjects of the Russian Federation: Kolysky, Lovozersky and Pechengsky Districts, closed administrative and territorial formations Zaozyorsk, Ostrovnoy, Skalisty, Snezhnogorsk, cities of Polarny and Severomorsk of Murmansk Oblast, the City of Murmansk; Belomorsky District of the Republic of Karelia; Nenets Autonomous Okrug; Mezensky, Leshukonsky, Onega, Pinezhsky, Primorsky, Solovetsky Districts, the City of Severodvinsk of Arkhangelsk Oblast; the City of Vorkuta of the Republic of Komi; Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug; Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous District; the City of Norilsk in the Krasnoyarsk Krai; Allaikhovsky, Abyisky, Anabarsky, Bulunsky, Verkhnekolymsky, Srednekolymsky, Nizhnekolymsky, Oleneksky, Ust-Yansky Mining Uluses of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); “Draft Federal Law ‘On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” introduced into the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, July 9, 1998, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, accessed February 13, 2020. http://council.gov.ru/ activity/documents/4335/. 40 “Draft Federal Law ‘On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” introduced to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the text as of April 21, 1999, ConsultantPlus, accessed January 12, 2020. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/ online.cgi?req=doc&base=PRJ&n=56536#09281430790945857. 39

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Sergey S. Zhiltsov and Igor S. Zonn Chukotka Autonomous Okrug;Penzhinsky and Olyutorsky Districts of the Koryak Autonomous Okrug; b) Archipelagos Franz Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Novaya Zemlya Island group, and other islands located in the Arctic Ocean within the borders: in the west and east – within the State border of the Russian Federation, in the north – in accordance with international law; c) inland sea waters and the territorial sea of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories (areas) specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article; d) the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories (areas) specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article, in which the Russian Federation has sovereign rights and exercises its jurisdiction in accordance with legislation.”41

Nevertheless, these draft laws were never adopted and required further support to harmonize the positions of ministries and state agencies. For the first time the Arctic region has been considered as an independent object of state policy in the “Concept of State Support for Economic and Social Development of Northern Regions,”42 approved by the Russian government in March of 2000. As Andrey Golovnev later wrote, “the idea of perceiving the Arctic as a special region is not so obvious. Unlike commonly identified regions such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or South America, the Arctic consists primarily of segments of states whose political centers are mostly located in the south.”43 In the official document“ The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond,” approved by the President on September 18, 2008, the Russian Arctic zone was defined as the part of the Arctic that includes all or part of the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs, as defined by the decision of the State Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Arctic Affairs of April 22, 1989, as well as the lands and islands specified in a decree 41

Ibid. “Decision No. 198 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 07.03.2000 ‘On the Concept of State Support for Economic and Social Development of Northern Regions’,” ConsultantPlus, accessed December 23, 2019. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc _LAW_26438/. 43 Andrey Golovnev, “Northernness of Russia: fragments of historical experience,” in the Northern Dimension of Global Challenges (Moscow: Nauka, 2009), 150-163. 42

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of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926 “On Declaring the Territory of the USSR Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean,” and the adjacent territories, lands and islands of the inland sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation, within which Russia has sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international law.44 After a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on protecting Russia’s national interests in the Arctic on September 17, 2008, attention to Russia's Arctic zone increased. In addition to the approval of the updated “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond,” the council was instructed to legally fix and establish normative basis of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as an independent object of state policy.45 Acting at that time as President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev noted, “we need a strong regulatory framework which would govern Russia’s activities in the Arctic. First of all, we need to finalize and adopt a federal law on the southern border of the Arctic zone of Russia. The nearest agenda is the agreement on legal consolidation, registration of the outer limit of the continental shelf.”46 On January 23, 2013, the Russian Ministry of Regional Development issued a draft federal law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.”47 Article 2 stated that the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is a part of the Arctic that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. It included: a) Murmansk oblast; Loukhsk, Kemsk and Belomorsk municipal districts of the Republic of Karelia; Onega, Primorsk, Mezensk municipal districts and urban districts of Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk and Novodvinsk of Arkhangelsk Oblast, as well as its constituent islands; the Vorkuta City Okrug of the Komi Republic; Nenets Autonomous Okrug; Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug; Taymyr (DolganoNenets) Municipal District, the Norilsk City Okrug, the municipal

“Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed January 11, 2020. https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovydok.html. 45 “Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation ‘On Protecting Russia’s national interests in the Arctic on September 17, 2008’,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed January 17, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1434. 46 Ibid. 47 “Draft Federal Law ‘On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” prepared by the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation, but not submitted to the State Duma, the text as of January 31, 2013. 44

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b)

c)

d)

e)

formation of the City of Igarka of Turukhan Municipal District of Krasnoyarsk Krai; Abyi, Allaikhovsky, Anabarsky, Bulunsky, Verkhoyansky, Zhigansky, Momsky, Nizhnekolymsky, Oleneksky, Srednekolymsky, Ust-Yansky, Eveno-Bytantaysky, Verkhnekolymsky Uluses of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Chukotka Autonomous District; discovered or not yet discovered lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean north of the Russian Federation coast to the North Pole, located within the boundaries passing in the west along the meridian of 32°04'35" E (and within 74° N to 81° N – along the meridian of 35° E), in the east – along the meridian of 168°58'37" W; inland waters and the territorial sea of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article; the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article, within the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation; the airspace above the territories and water areas specified in paragraphs a) and b) of part 2 of this Article”48.

The draft was not submitted to the State Duma, however, delaying progress on the matter. A month later, the President approved the document “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020.”49 It defined the main mechanisms, ways and means to achieve strategic aims and priorities for sustainable development of the Arctic zone. In May 2014, in order to implement the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond,” the Russian president issued a decree no. 296 on the “Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of

“Draft Federal Law ‘On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” prepared by the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation, but not submitted to the State Duma, the text as of January 31, 2013. 49 “On the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed March 22, 2020. http://government.ru/info/18360/. 48

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the Russian Federation.”50 The document defined the land territories in the following composition: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

7) 8)

9)

a territory of the Murmansk Region, a territory of the Nenets Autonomous District, a territory of the Chukotka Autonomous District, a territory of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, a territory of the municipal entity of the Vorkuta City District (the Republic of Komi). the territories of Allaikhovsky Ulus (District), Anabarskiy National (Dolgano-Evenkiyskiy) Ulus (District), Bulunsky Ulus (District), Nizhnekolymsky District, Ust-Yansky Ulus (District) (Republic of Sakha). territories of the City District of Norilsk, Taymyr Dolgano-Nenets Municipal District, Turukhanovsky District (Krasnoyarsk territory). territories of the municipal entities of Arkhangelsk City, Mezensky Municipal District, Novaya Zemlya, Novodvinsk City, Onega Municipal District, Primorsky Municipal District, Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Region). the lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean, specified in a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926 on “Declaring the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean and other acts of the USSR.”51

The shortcoming of this document was that it did not include the water areas in any way, since inland waters and territorial seas are located within state borders, therefore, Russia has sovereign rights within them, and this area may be included in the Russian Arctic zone. Beyond the state border is the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation. The size of EEZ is defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982,52 which Russia ratified in 1997. With respect to the limits of the continental shelf, however, the situation is different. “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 296 ‘On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” the text as of May 13, 2019, accessed January 20, 2020. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201405050030.pdf. 51 Ibid. 52 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. A historical perspective,” United Nations, accessed February 21, 2020. https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_historical_perspective.htm. 50

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In 2016, the Russian government drafted a law on the “Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” Under the draft, the AZRF is the territory of the Arctic region within which Russia has sovereign rights and jurisdiction, which for the purposes of this federal law are included: a) territories (parts of the territory) of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation; b) discovered or not yet discovered land and islands located in the Arctic Ocean north of the Russian Federation coast to the North Pole, within the boundaries passing in the west along the meridian of 32°04'35" E (and within the meridian of 74° N and 81° N along the meridian of 35° E), and in the east along the meridian of 168°58'37" W; c) inland waters and the territorial sea of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories specified in subparagraphs a) and b) of this Article; d) the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories specified in subparagraphs a) and b) of this Article, within the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation; e) the airspace above the territories and waters specified in subparagraphs a) and d) of this Article.53 The composition of the land areas forming part of the Arctic zone was to be determined by a legal act of the Russian President and, thus, was not regulated by the drafted law of 2016. The document also included “a support zone for development in the Arctic.” It was understood as “a complex project of planning and ensuring the socioeconomic development of the Arctic zone, aimed at achieving strategic interests and ensuring national security in the Arctic, providing for a synchronous and interconnected application of existing instruments of territorial and sectoral development and mechanisms for investment projects, including the principles of public-private partnership.”54 The draft law was not submitted to the parliaments, as it lacked clarifications for some definitions. In 2017, the Russian authorities again addressed the issue of defining the Arctic zone. The president amended a decree of May 2, 2014, No. 296 “On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” and signed a decree No. 287, according to which the White Sea, Loukhsky and Kemsky Municipal districts of the Republic of Karelia were included into the AZRF.55 “Draft Federal Law ‘On the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’,” prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, ConsultantPlus, accessed December 23, 2019. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online. cgi?req=doc&base=PRJ&n=149389#007527826661115933. 54 Ibid. 55 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 296 ‘On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’.” 53

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After these steps, the Russian Arctic zone included only land areas and there were no sea areas (water areas). At the same time, the definition given in the draft law on the “Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation,”56 the term the Arctic means the northern area of the Earth, which covers a deep Arctic basin, shallow marginal seas with islands and adjacent parts of continental land in Europe, Asia and North America, the center of which is the North Pole, and the marginal border – the Arctic Circle, which runs at 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. Under the definition, inland waters and the territorial seas were the space within national boundaries, within which, Russia had all sovereign rights. Consequently, these spaces can be included in the Arctic zone of Russia. Outside the state border there are two categories of water areas: the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation. Concerning them, Russia has various types of limited sovereign rights, defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and the respective federal laws: the law of December 17, 1998, No. 191 on the “Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”57 and the law of October 30, 1995, No. 187 on the “Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation.”58 These areas include seaports, gulfs, straits and the shallow coastal shelf. Most of the Northern Sea Route passes through the EEZ, and any regulations on the Northern Sea Route in Arctic law require that the zone be given the appropriate status with regard to the regulation of navigation in ice-covered seas, as provided by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In August 2017, a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation considered and approved the updated state program the “Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone until 2020.”59 Its previous version was adopted in 2015. Acting at that time as Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, said, “the document was rather of an analytical nature and represented a set of measures from sectoral state programs, which was repeatedly emphasized at 56

The draft law was prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, however, not submitted to the State Duma. 57 “Federal Law No. 191 of 17.12.1998 ‘On the the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation’,” as amended and supplemented, Garant, accessed January 19, 2020. https://base.garant.ru/179872/. 58 “Federal Law No. 187 of 11.11.1995 ‘On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation’,” Latest revision, Consultant-Plus, accessed February 23, 2020. http://www.consultant.ru/ document/cons_doc_LAW_8560/. 59 “Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation of 31.08.2017 ‘On Introducing Amendments to the Decision No. 366 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 21 April 2014,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed February 23, 2020. http://static.government.ru/media/files/GGu3GTtv8bvV8gZxSEAS1R7XmzloK6ar.pdf.

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meetings on this issue. Most importantly, it does not have normal own financing, which does not correspond to the scale of our plans to develop this unique region.”60 This led the basis for the development of a new draft program, which was considered as the main mechanism for implementing the “Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security up to 2020.”61 As a result, the government’s program was extended until 2025, as the task was to implement various projects on development of the Arctic shelf. Additionally, Russia was expected to implement plans to set up transport infrastructure. In general, efforts were to be focused on the formation of places for economic growth or so-called support zones in the Arctic regions, further development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the necessary facilities, as well as the prospecting of the continental shelf, which required the development of new technologies and modern equipment. According to Maxim Oreshkin, Minister of Economic Development, in 2018-2020 the budget financing was to amount to 12 billion rubles, and in 2021-2025 – 59 billion rubles. The implementation of the Arctic shelf development program is scheduled for 2021.62 Yet, the program did not provide answers to questions about what social and economic instruments would be applied for those territories nor what the support zones would consist of. In November 2017, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development published the draft version of a law on the “Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” The document was devoted to the creation and operation of support zones in the Russian part of the Arctic. According to the presented draft, “the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” is “the part of the territory of the Arctic within which the Russian Federation possesses sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, including territories (parts of territory) of the subjects of the Russian Federation, lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean northwards from the coast of the Russian Federation to the North Pole and located within the spaces delineated by lines determined by “Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone until 2020,” updated version, Future of the Arctic, accessed January 24, 2020. https://будущее-арктики.рф/gosudarstvennayaprogramma-socialno-ekonomicheskoe-razvitie-arkticheskoj-zony-rossijskoj-federaciinovaya-redakciya/. 61 “On the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed March 22, 2020. http://government.ru/info/18360/. 62 “Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone until 2020,” Updated version, Future of the Arctic, accessed January 24, 2020. 60

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international treaties of the Russian Federation and legislation of the Russian Federation.”63 In the document, the Arctic zone was identified as a special object of state administration. It was envisaged that the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone would be based on the support development zones. Furthermore, the version provided an updated definition of support zone: “the territory of the Arctic zone, where mutually linked projects are implemented, aimed at integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone, achievement of strategic interests and ensuring national security in the Arctic, providing for the coordinated use of existing instruments of territorial and sectoral development, mechanisms for investment projects implementation, including the principles of public-private partnership, as well as special regimes for economic activity.”64 As the bill did not have specific information on the work to be done on sectoral legislation, it was not submitted for further consideration.65 Thus, the preparation of the official document on the Arctic zone’s development reached an impasse. A set of legislation became an urgent issue. Yet, there was no clear picture on how to develop such a law. Previous attempts proved unsuccessful, although there were already five versions presented in 1998, 1999, 2013, 2016, 2017. In 2017, the Ministry of Economic Development refused to work further on the law, explaining that its experts do not intend to consider a wide range of issues concerning the Arctic zone. Particularly, it was about public administration, environmental management, environmental protection and ecological activities, the development of the transport system, the national sphere and life safety.66 In addition, the ministry announced that it had already begun drafting at least two other bills: the first one would address support zones, and the second one would deal with the finalization of sectoral legislation.67 At the same time, the ministry’s lawmakers also stressed the

“Draft Federal Law ‘On the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’,” Consultant-Plus, accessed February 17, 2020. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/ online.cgi?req=doc&base=PRJ&n=165571#05876473437483982. 64 Ibid. 65 Artur Chilingarov, Vladimir Gruzinov, Georgy Ivanov and Yuri Sychev, “On the unified transport system on the North of the Russian Federation,” The Herald Arctic, No. 1 (2009): 112-120. 66 Denis Gudkov, “Russia’s return to the Arctic region requires a special legal regulation,” The Arctic Herald, No. 4 (2017): 82-85. 67 Ibid. 63

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extensiveness of the existing basis of the sectoral legal norms,68 noting that “the present framework is sufficient and does not require a separate law.”69 Despite the ministry’s announcement, at the 7th International Forum “The Arctic: Present and Future,” held on December 4-6, 2017, Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the State Commission on Arctic Development, stated that “the federal law on the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is being finalized. It should be aimed at the formation of support zones for development. However, there is a need to analyse and improve the entire legislative framework governing the situation in the Arctic.”70 There were no significant steps towards the law’s finalizations in 2018. Only on February 27, 2019, following a meeting with the government’s members, President Vladimir Putin instructed to develop a strategy for the development of the Arctic zone until 2035.71 Three months later, a decree on “Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation'' was issued. It was amended on the basis of a decree No. 296 of May 2, 2014. The Arctic zone was extended by the territory of the municipal district of Vorkuta (Komi Republic), territories of Allaikhovsky Ulus, Anabarskiy National Ulus, Bulunsky Ulus, Nizhnekolymsky District, Ust-Yansky Ulus (Republic of Sakha), territories of Norilsk City District, Taymyr Dolgano-Nenets Municipal District, Turukhansky District (Krasnoyarsk Krai), territories of municipal entities of Arkhangelsk City, Mezensky Municipal District, Novaya Zemlya, Novodvinsk City, Onega Municipal District, Primorsky Municipal District, Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). In addition, the Arctic zone included the lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean, specified in a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926 on “Declaring the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean” and other acts of the USSR.72

Denis Gudkov, “Whether or not there is a need to establish a special legal framework for environmental management and protection in the Russian Federation Arctic zone?” The Herald Arctic, No. 1 (2018): 40-43. 69 Denis Gudkov, “The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation so far thinks it inadvisable to adopt a separate saw on the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, The Herald Arctic, No. 4 (2017): 10-13. 70 “The State Commission for the Development of the Arctic sums up the results of Russia’s state policy in the Arctic in 2017. At the VII International Forum Arctic: Today and the Future,” The Arctic Herald, No. 1 (2018): 4-11. 71 “The fundamentals of state policy in the Arctic submitted by the Government,” Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, accessed December 23, 2019. https://minvr.ru/presscenter/news/23740/. 72 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the Territories Areas of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’,” the text as of March 5, 2020, Digital Fund of Legal and 68

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On October of the same year, a draft bill on the “Special Economic Regime in the Arctic” was submitted to the parliament,73 and in a month, the Ministry for Development of the Far East and the Arctic presented to the government a draft presidential decree on the “Foundations of State Policy and National Security until 2035.”74 This document was seen as part of a new Arctic strategy document system, which should also include the mentioned legal act on the “Special Economic Regime of the Arctic zone,” a strategy for the development of the country’s Arctic zone until 2035, and a new program that would contain special financial mechanisms for that purpose.75 Such an approach was criticized as the draft law on the Arctic zone had already been discussed and prepared for submission to the State Duma. Moreover, as early as 2014, the “Сoncept for the Development of Arctic Law,” designed by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Russian Government, emphasized that “at present, a complex, ineffective, uncoordinated and inconsistent system of regulations, including numerous legal documents of the USSR continues to operate in the field of the regulation of relations in the Arctic. There is another problem: the general array of legislation of Russia, its subjects, municipal structures contains a large volume of so-called patchwork acts, from which only a few norms remain in force.”76 In order to put a special economic regime of the Arctic zone into effect, the government submitted a draft law to the parliament prepared by the Ministry for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic. It provided for the introduction of benefits for investors planning to implement new innovative projects in the Arctic territories.77 The benefits’ volume should not exceed 25% of the investments. They were envisaged for four groups of investment projects: offshore hydrocarbon production, continental production, liquefied natural gas

Normative Documentation, accessed January 18, 2020. http://docs.cntd.ru/ document/499093267. 73 Valentin Yushkevich, “The Arctic: what to wait from the Ministry for Development of the Far East?” Regnum, accessed February 3, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2766529.html. 74 “The Strategy of Development of the Arctic until 2035 will be submitted to the Russian Government after the adoption of the fundamentals of the state policy in the Arctic,” Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, accessed February 13, 2020. https://minvr.ru/press-center/news/23895/. 75 “The document on the fundamentals of the state policy in the Arctic has been introduced into the Government,” RBC, accessed January 14, 2020. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/ 5dc430f39a79474e2690c85f. 76 The Arctic Law: The Development Concept, ed. T. Khabriyeva (Moscow: The Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Auspices of the Government of the Russian Federation, Yurispudentsiya, 2014), 152. 77 Alexander Kozlov, “The strategy goes North,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 25, 2019.

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production (LNG), and other projects.78 In March 2020, the bill was passed at first reading by Parliament.79 The draft law on the special economic regime in the Russian Arctic for the first time legally fixed the concept of the Arctic Zone and its special management system. According to the lawmakers, its adoption should reduce the tax burden and, thus, launch projects on the continental shelf. It was expected that the strategy of the Arctic zone development would be ready by March 2020 and submitted to the Security Council of the Russian Federation.80 Earlier, in December 2019, two other official documents were approved: the “Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic” by the Security Council, and the “Plan for the Infrastructure Development of the Northern Sea Route until 2035” by the Russian government.81 According to the Ministry of the Far East and the Arctic, the Russian Arctic zone should provide up to 87-89% of gas, 22-25% of oil and 90-120 million tons of liquefied gas by 2035. At the same time, all existing settlements in the Far North should be connected by transport.82 In February 2020, at a meeting of the strategic planning section of the Scientific Council of the Security Council, the issue of the Arctic Zone Development Strategy was discussed. The participants concluded that the Arctic strategy 2035 met current challenges and threats to national security and contained a set of measures to accelerate economic development in the Arctic regions and improve the quality of life of their population, including indigenous peoples.83 A month later, President Putin signed a decree on the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035.”84 According to “A special economic regime of the Arctic zone will start operating in June,” Arctic-TV, accessed February 26, 2020. https://арктик-тв.рф/news/pro-zakony-18/osobyy-ekonomicheskiyrezhim-arkticheskoy-zony-zarabotaet-uzhe-v-iyule---minvostokrazvitiya. 79 “The main package of bills on state support for entrepreneurs in the Arctic adopted by the State Duma in the first reading,” Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, accessed March 23, 2020. https://minvr.ru/press-center/news/24489/. 80 “The strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation will be finished by March 20,” Sever-Press, accessed February 21, 2020. https://severpress.ru/2020/01/24/strategija-razvitija-arkticheskoj-zony-rf-budet-gotova-k-20-marta/. 81 Ibid. 82 “Warm up the Arctic,” Interfax, accessed January 23, 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/business/689678. 83 “The preparation of a draft strategy for the development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and for ensuring national security until 2035 has begun,” Security Council of the Russian Federation, accessed February 19, 2020. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/ allnews/2737/. 84 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035’,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed 78

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the document, the Arctic zone means “land territories defined by presidential decree No. 296 of May 2, 2014 on ‘Land Territories of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation,’ as well as those adjacent to these territories, inland waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation.”85 Sergey Djenyuk, a Russian researcher, however, pointed out that due to significant differences between the European and Asian sectors, it makes sense to abandon the notion of the Russian Arctic zone as a whole, but to separate it into objects: the European Arctic zone and the Asian Arctic zone.86 The increased attention to the Arctic zone is explained by its crucial role in the Russian economy. It provides about 11% of Russia’s national income and 22% of all Russian exports. In relation to global deposits, it provides 30% of diamonds, 20% of platinum metals and nickel, 15% of copper, 10% of cobalt, 10% of oil (without offshore deposits), 30% of natural gas, 50% of apatite, 15% of tin, up to 8% of tungsten and mercury, 35% of niobium are concentrated there. Gold was found in Chukotka Autonomous District, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Bolshevik Island, Chelyuskin Peninsula, and diamonds in the White, Barents and Laptev Seas. There are large reserves of forests, 40% of fresh water, 50% of seafood, more than one million reindeer, a unique herd of musk oxen, a significant number of whales, walruses, harp seals, ringed seals, white whales, and of course– the symbol of the Arctic – polar bears. The fishery complex produces about 15% of total fish production and other biological resources. The Russian zone is home to about 50,000 pink gulls, 30,000 red-breasted gulls and 15,000 small swans.87

March 6, 2020. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/f8ZpjhpAaQ0WB1 zjywN04OgKiI1mAvaM.pdf. 85 Ibid. 86 Sergei Djenyuk, “Information resources for marine environmental management in the European sector of the Russian Arctic zone,” The Issues of Geography, No. 141, Geography of Polar Regions (Moscow: Kodex, 2016), 368-391. 87 All of them are listed in the Red Book.

Chapter 2

THE HYDROCARBON RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC: AN ATTRACTIVE DEPOSIT 2.1. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES The world’s hydrocarbon deposits are being depleted, as a result, the development of new deposits is an urgent issue. The extraction process is also gradually moving from land to the shelf zone. According to forecasts, British wells in the North Sea will be exhausted in five years, Norwegian reserves in seven years, developed oil fields of the USA in ten years, Russian fields in 35 years, and its gas in 65 years.88 The growing interest in the Arctic, which occupies 6% of the Earth’s surface, stemmed from the unearthing of data on significant hydrocarbon accumulations in this region – up to a quarter of the world’s reserves.89 Primarily, it is about the Arctic seas shelf, the depth of which is not more than 500 m. Another reason for the interest is prospects for trade routes there. Theу may be built in the region in case of the worsening of global warming which will continue the melting of the ice that covers the Arctic seas. Of fundamental importance is the fact that much of the Arctic Ocean has ice throughout its bottom as well. The impulse to exploit new areas was given by the trend of global warming, which in the Arctic Ocean is several times faster than in any other part of the

Elena Mahler-Matyazova, “Return of the Russian Arctic,” Rustrana, accessed February 23, 2020. http://рустрана.рф/34213/Vozvrashchenie-russkoy-Arktiki. 89 Viktor Fauser and Andrey Smirnov, “World Arctic: natural resources, population settlement, economy,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economy, No. 3 (2018): 6-22. 88

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world. According to current projections, due to the gradual melting of the ice, by 2040 the Arctic is likely to be ice-free for most of the year, except for the waters off Greenland and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.90 This will open up new opportunities not only for the hydrocarbons’ prospecting, but also for the development of navigation systems between European, Southeast Asian and North American countries. In this regard many of them were ready to actively invest in the richest natural reserves. Today, all information on hydrocarbon accumulations that may be found in the Arctic is of tentative nature. The reason for this is the short history and depth of geological and geophysical research in the Arctic spaces, which until recently remained inaccessible to humans. In spite of the fact that at different times, the Arctic countries have conducted investigations on their own, there is still no clear picture of the reserves, and no scientifically proved data on their actual volumes.91 The media as well as specialized literature often tends to characterize oil and gas deposits by the words gigantic, fantastic, enormous. It is believed that this trend was launched by the authors of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). In 2008, they claimed that the Arctic contains up to 25% of undiscovered hydrocarbon resources.92 A year later, USGS published another report on promising technically recoverable oil and natural gas reserves in the Arctic area, which is beyond the Arctic Circle. According to their studies, approximately 22% of the world’s unexplored oil resources and 78% of natural gas are found in the Arctic regions of Russia, Norway, Greenland, the USA and Canada.93 However, 93% is found in only ten major fields. Of these, 63% are located in Eurasia: 88% of Arctic gas and 35% of oil. The rest of the resources are in North America, as of 2009.94 Approximately 61 major oil and gas fields have been discovered in the Arctic, 43 of which are in Russia and only two are oil fields. The remaining 18 fields

Smith Lewis, “By 2040 will the Arctic be ice-free?” Inosmi.ru, accessed October 14, 2020. https://www.inopressa.ru/article/12dec2006/times/ice.html. 91 Terentyev, The Arctic and the Antarctic. 92 “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. United States Geological Survey, 2008,” accessed March 24, 2020. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 93 “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. United States Geological Survey, 2009,” accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.usgs.gov/congressional-statement/statement-brenda-pierce-programcoordinator-energy-resources-program. 94 Sandi Lansetti, “The ‘keep in the ground future’ of Arctic fossil fuel resources,” Arctic and North, No. 25 (2016): 5-22. 90

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are distributed as follows: six are in Alaska, eleven in northern Canada and only one is in Norway.95 Based on this, researchers gathered that firstly, the Arctic is not as rich as many projections suggest. Potential undiscovered deposits are about 90 billion barrels of oil. Moreover, the accumulations are in different areas. Secondly, gas is the main hydrocarbon resource in the Arctic. There is about 47.2 trillion m3 and 44 billion barrels of natural gas condensate there.96 As a result, the region is not so much a storehouse of oil as it is of gas. This finding, if confirmed by subsequent research and geological exploration of potential fields, could shift the focus of Arctic foreign policy, many of which go to the Arctic mainly for oil reserves. Thus, the experts concluded that “the resource potential of the Arctic remains highly uncertain because with the exception of a few heavily explored areas, the region is still largely unexplored.”97 The third conclusion concerned the Lomonosov Ridge and the central deepwater Arctic, i.e., the areas claimed by Russia. According to the USGS data, these Arctic areas are not very promising in terms of possible oil and gas reserves, and most of them are concentrated in the coastal zone of the continental shelf at depths up to 500 m. At the same time, 70% of the estimated undiscovered natural gas deposits are located in three basins: the southern basin of the Kara Sea (40%), the East Barents Sea (19%), and Alaska (13%).98 Among the most promising areas – the Kara and the Laptev Seas.99 The Russian Shtokman field in the eastern Barents Sea was estimated to have the equivalent of 3.8 billion barrels of fuel. About 45% of Arctic oil resources are concentrated in four regions: in the Alaska platform – 31%, in Canning Mackenzie – 7%, in the North Barents Sea basin and the Yenisei – Khatanga River Basin – 6% each. Thus, the study of USGS made a conclusion that Russia has no reason to struggle for other Arctic regions because potential Arctic accumulations are

Mikhail Morgunov and Anatoly Tsunaevsky, “Resources of the Arctic,” Energy: Economics, Technology and Ecology, No. 2 (2014): 22-31. 96 “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. United States Geological Survey, 2009.” 97 Donald L. Gautier and Thomas E. Moore, Introduction to the 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA). Professional Paper, accessed December 12, 2020. https://pubs. er.usgs.gov/publication/pp1824A. 98 Nikolay Eremin, Aleksander Kondratyuk and Alexey Eremin, “Oil and gas resource base of the Russian Arctic shelf,” Georesourсes, Geoenergy and Geopolitics, No. 1 (2010): 1-15, accessed January 25, 2020. http://www.ipng.ru/files/_0c7ee907-47d4-453a-8133cc43a481f478-EreminNA_Kondrat%27uk_EreminAN_ 2010_Resource_base.pdf. 99 “Energy Resources Program,” USGS, accessed September 14, 2020. http://energy. usgs.gov/arctic/. 95

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already in the zone of the Russian continental shelf, as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Experts from the research companies Wood Mackenzie and Fugro Robertson also found that gas accounts for 85% of the discovered reserves in the Arctic.100 More than 60% of the undiscovered deposits, in the equivalent of 412 billion barrels of oil are located on Russian territory. However, only a small percentage of these accumulations are available onshore or within Russia’s exclusive economic zone.101 Research investigations carried out by many institutions and organizations expands the present data. For instance, according to the UN, the explored reserves of Arctic oil are more than 100 billion tons, and gas reserves are 1.7 times more than those of Russia (51 billion tons) and Iran (33 billion tons) combined.102 Estimates of potential recoverable resources and adjacent areas vary greatly. Some researchers claim that the Arctic region has up to 66 billion tons of oil and 100.5 trillion m3 of gas.103 Other specialists refer to the information, that the region has recoverable reserves of 90 billion barrels of oil, 50 trillion m3 of gas104 and 44 billion barrels of gas condensate or noted that gas accounts for 30% of the world’s unexplored gas reserves which makes up only 47.3 trillion m3 of gas.105 As is well known, studies have been carried out and published even by highly renowned scientific institutions, which have repeatedly served as a tool for the implementation of geopolitical objectives. It is enough to recall the 1990s, when the great interest in the Caspian region and its hydrocarbon resources was provoked by the data, which indicated the presence of fantastic oil and gas reserves in the Caspian fields. The Caspian was called the “second Kuwait.”106 A few years after the opening of the development of the Caspian fields, the information on the deposits have decreased many times. However,

Nikolay Shvetc and Polina Beresneva, “Arctic oil and gas resources: legal status and reserves assessment,” MGIMO Review of International Relations, No. 4 (2014): 60-67. 101 Caitlyn Antrim, “A new shipping Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs, accessed February 22, 2020. https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/novaya-sudohodnaya-arktika/. 102 Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, “Arctic oil and gas front,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 13, 2011. 103 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 356. 104 Andrey Fedyashin, “The forum in Moscow: how we will divide the Arctic,” RIA-Novosti, accessed March 23, 2020. http://rian.ru/arctic_analytics/20100917/276520692.html. 105 Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenger to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High North,” Russia in the Arctic, (2011): 1-42. 106 Igor Zonn, The Caspian Memorandum (Moscow: Korkis, 1997), 290. 100

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the published forecasts have played a role in drawing political attention to the Caspian region and increasing its investment attractiveness to investors. It should be noted that the assessments of those specialists were not based on practical research. The absence or presence of hydrocarbons can only be confirmed by drilling. If the reports on the accelerated ice melting in the Arctic prove to be true, this could radically change the conditions for access to resources that are currently inaccessible due to ice. For this reason, all information requires careful treatment. The table below lists the estimates of hydrocarbons in the Arctic (Table 2). Table 2. The hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic regions107 Region The Arctic region The Beaufort Sea The Russian Federation (All territories) The Russian territories of the Arctic Ocean The Arctic territories claimed by Russia

Source The U.S. Geological Survey The Government of the Northwest Territories The U.S. Energy Information Administration The Russian state bodies

Oil 90 billion barrels (estimated)

The Russian state bodies

586 billion barrels

60 billion barrels (proven) 3 billion barrels (proven) 67.7 billion barrels (estimated)

Natural Gas 47 trillion m3 99 trillion m3 (estimated) 47,5 trillion m3 (proven) 7,7 trillion m3 (proven) 88,3 trillion m3 (estimated) -

Some domestic researchers believe that Russia is far superior to other Arctic powers in terms of proven gas reserves: its gas “storerooms” contain up to 44 trillion m3 of gas. Canada has much more modest accumulations: 33 billion barrels of oil and about 2 trillion m3 of gas. The third place is occupied by the USA – 28 billion barrels of oil and about 7 trillion m3 of gas. U.S. hydrocarbon deposits are concentrated in the Beaufort Sea off the coast of Alaska.108 Forty-three out of sixty-one large Arctic fields are located in Russia. At the same time, some U.S. analysts stressed, the greatest potential is hidden in the Russian “Gulf of Mexico” – the Barents and Kara Seas.109 According to some data, oil reserves there are about 90 billion barrels, and 10 billion barrels, 107

Cohen, 1-42. Oleg Aleksandrov, The Northern Vector of Russia’s Foreign Policy: Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Baltic, Northern Europe and the Arctic (Moscow: Sputnik, 2012), 133. 109 Vladimir Motyashov, Gas and Geopolitics: an opportunity for Russia (Moscow: Book and Business Publishing House, 2011), 293. 108

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respectively.110 But in fact, the estimates of oil and gas reserves in the Barents and Kara Seas vary widely, which is of interest to the scientific community. Canadian researcher Michael Byers believes that 83 billion barrels of oil is about three years of global oil demand, and 44 trillion m3 of gas is about 14 years of supply.111 Despite the current technological upgrading and the need for prospecting new territories, the exploitation of Arctic resources is a costly and risky business. The key challenge is the extreme climate: year-round severe frosts, long polar nights, the threat of damage to offshore drilling rigs by Arctic ice, marshy tundra, which defines seasonal works in most regions and, as well as limited biological activity. Moreover, the region has an underdeveloped infrastructure. This leads to significant investments and at the same time threatens the fragile Arctic environment. In addition, the development of the Arctic requires things such as special tankers and icebreakers, as well as the laying of a long communication system, etc. Over the past decade, Arctic hydrocarbons have to compete with other sources: traditional and unconventional ones. This applies mainly to shale gas, coal seams, and liquefied natural gas.

2.2. RUSSIA: A CAREFUL COUNT ON HYDROCARBON RESOURCES Russia possesses the largest and longest sea shelf area in the world – 6.2 million km2, or 22% of the total world shelf area. The Arctic accounts for up to 85% of the Russian shelf.112 It is believed that the Arctic seas shelf is highly promising for oil and gas deposits due to the continuation of the fields proven on land in the north (Table 3).

110

111

112

Maria Malysheva, “Hard to extract resources,” Gazeta.ru, accessed February 11, 2020. https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2012/05/26_a_4602393.shtml. Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty disputes in the North (Vancouver: Douglas and Mcintyre, 2009), 179. Vladimir Vasiliyev, Mikhail Zhukov, Anatoly Istomin and Vladimir Selin, An Assessment of Conditions and Prospects for the Use of natural Resources of the non-demarcated marine Areas in the Arctic zone (Apatity: Kola Science Center of the RAS, 2007), 147.

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Table 3. The distribution of oil and gas resources by marine areas of the Russian Federation113 The area

The Russian shelf Including the seas: In the Arctic seas In the Far East seas The Caspian Sea In the AzovBlack Sea basin The Baltic Sea

Potential resources, %

The scope of total development, %

The number of open offshore hydrocarbon deposits

Initial potential reserves Oil Free condensate gas (recoverable) 100 100

including proven reserves Oil Free Condensate gas (recoverable) 100 100

Oil

Free gas

3,4

9,1

24

86,1

88,3

35,1

81,2

1,1

8,4

9

10,5

10,3

60,1

17,3

13,6

15,3

8

0,8

1

1,5

0,3

4,4

2,8

1

0,2

0,5

0,9

0,8

12,5

15,1

4

2,5

-

1,7

-

16,1

-

2

The continental shelf of Russia’s Arctic seas covers the Barents Sea,114 the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea. In total, it makes up an area of over 3.1 million km2, where 2.1 million km2 of this space is occupied by the Western Arctic (the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas). The rest of the Arctic shelf belongs to the Eastern Arctic, but it is difficult to access due to the long period of ice cover, which lasts up to 9 to 10 months. Soviet scientists began their geological studies of the Arctic shelf in the 1970s. Almost immediately, they noticed the potential for oil and gas deposits there. Since then, the Russian shelf has been explored by less than 5%. However, more than 20 large oil and gas fields have been discovered even in such a small area. It has been found that the total recoverable hydrocarbons are about 100 billion tons in oil equivalent (including 13.5 billion tons of oil and about 73 Vladimir Rabkin, Fuad Mirzoev and Ismat Karaev, “The main factors affecting the possibility of application of underwater technology in the conditions of the Arctic shelf of Russia,” Gas Industry (Moscow: Kamelot, 2009), 54-56. 114 The Barents Sea includes the Pechersk Sea. It is the name of the south-eastern part of the Barents Sea between the Kolguyev and Vaygach islands. 113

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trillion m3 of natural gas). This was the basis for the deployment of extensive oil and gas exploration work on the shelf of the Arctic seas of the Soviet Union, which made it possible to open large oil and gas provinces. In 1973-1985, deep wells were drilled on the islands of Spitsbergen, Graham Bell, Alexandra, Heiss, part of the Archipelago of Franz Josef Land, and on Sverdrup Island.115 The first commercial deposit was discovered and explored in 1982-1985 on Kolguyev Island in the Barents Sea. The lack of technical drilling facilities suitable for operation in the extreme climatic conditions and the need for considerable capital investments impeded further prospecting. In 1982, the first attempt was made to drill in Arctic waters, at the mouth of the Pechora River. Two decommissioned vessels were erected offshore on the ice-resistant drilling platform of Sevastopol, but in 1983, they were crushed by the ice and then cut into scrap metal. In the same year, however, the drilling in the Arctic was continued with the help of a unique ice class drillship Valentin Shashin,116 capable of performing deep-water drilling. The results showed that there were potentially enormous hydrocarbon deposits. A year later, Russia announced the opening of the Barents-Karskoye gas and oil province, one of the largest in the world, and in 1988, the Valentin Shashin drilled the first exploration well with a depth of 3153 m.117 As a result, in the Barents-Karskoye province, two gas deposits with gas condensate were discovered. The largest share of hydrocarbon reserves (about 70%) falls on the Western Arctic seas – the Barents Sea with the Pechora Sea and the Kara Sea.118 This data is confirmed by the discovery of major gas and oil fields there. In total, 11 oil and gas fields have been discovered in the Barents Sea. One of them is the unique Shtokman field - 3.8 trillion m3, and seven other large fields: the gascondensate Ledovoe field, the gas Ludlovskoye field, the gas Murmanskoye field, and the oil and gas-condensate fields: the Dolginskoye and the Prirazlomnoye fields, the Medynskoye Sea and the Severo-Guliaevskoye fields;

115

The Geology of the Russian Shelf and Seashores, ed. N. Aybulatov (Moscow: Noosphera, 2001), 10. 116 Shashin Valentin Dmitrievich (1916-1977) was Soviet statesman, Minister of Oil Industry of the USSR in 1965-1977. 117 According to different sourses, the drilling was carrid out together with the drillship Victor Muravlenko. Viktor Ivanovich Muravlenko (1912-1977) was first head of Glavtyumenneftegaz (1965-1977) – the largest enterprise in the USSR oil industry. 118 Ludmila Bondarenko, Aleksander Apolonsky and Andrey Tsunaesky, The Arctic zone of Russia. Hydrocarbon Resources: Problems and Solutions (Moscow: Publishing and Analytical Center Energia, 2009), 120.

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two medium-sized fields: the gas-condensate Pomorskoye field and the gas Severo-Kilda field, and one small field: the Varandey Sea field. Two gas condensate fields were discovered on the Kara Sea shelf: the Rusanovskoye field – 3.0 trillion m3 and the Leningradskoye field – 3.0 trillion m3, in 1987 and 1989 respectively.119 Additionally, gas deposits were discovered in the Ob and Taz Bays: the Kamennomysskoye-Sea, SeveroKamennomysskoy, Chugoryakhinskoy fields and others.120 These accumulations made it possible to consider the Russian part of the Arctic as a new fuel and energy base. The next stage of Arctic exploration and development began after 1991. Russia was forced to shape its Arctic policy taking into account two factors: the rapidly changing geopolitical situation, and new data on oil and gas deposits of the Arctic seas shelf. The western part of the Russian Arctic is the most studied from the geological point of view. These are the Pechora-Barents Sea region (the Shtokman and adjacent areas, discovered deposits and promising areas of the Pechora Sea), the Kara region (the water area of the Ob and Taz Bays, the Priyamal shelf). In these areas there are discovered deposits with recoverable and preliminary estimated reserves of categories A + B + C1 + C2, including unique and large deposits (the Prirazlomnoye, Shtokman, Ludlovskoye, Leningradskoye, Rusanovskoye fields).121 The recoverable initial combined hydrocarbon resources of the Barents Sea is estimated at 25.7 billion tons of fuel equivalent.122 Their structure is dominated by gaseous hydrocarbons – 21.6 trillion m3, and liquid hydrocarbons (oil and condensate) which amount to 1.1 billion tons. The Barents Sea continental shelf is second only to Western Siberia in terms of gas potential. In the last decade, oil deposits in the Barents Sea have been discovered only in the

“The Rusanovskoye gas field,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed February 12, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/tech-library/mestorozhdeniya/142139-rusanovskoe-gazokondensatnoemestorozhdenie/. 120 The Ob and Taz Bays field has been identified as the priority area of gas production in the Kara Sea under Gazprom’s Work Program for the Russian Federation offshore hydrocarbon resources development until 2030. 121 According to the oil and gas reserves classification system in Russia, reserves have the following categories: A – (under development, drilled), B – (under development, undrilled and explored), C1 – explored, C2 – estimated. 122 “Initial total hydrocarbon resources in the Barents Sea are estimated at 25,727 million tons of fuel equivalent,” Mineral.ru, accessed March 19, 2020. http://www.mineral.ru/ News/3938.html. 119

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Norwegian sector. Nevertheless, on the shelf (including the Pechora Sea) there are 12 areas that can be classified as potentially oil-bearing.123 In 1997, Russia resumed research and began further study of the geological structure of the Arctic seas floor to determine whether it belonged to the mainland and to explore mineral resources. In 1999, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources announced that the potential deposits of the entire Russian Arctic shelf within the borders of 1926 were 586 billion barrels (88 billion tons of fuel equivalent), of which 80% was gas.124 The ministry’s experts believed that proven oil reserves in Russia’s waters in the Barents, Kara, East Siberian, Laptev and Chukchi Seas could reach 418 million tons (3 billion barrels of oil) and 7.7 trillion m3 of natural gas, and unexplored reserves could be 9.24 billion tons (67.7 billion barrels of oil) and 88.3 trillion m3 of natural gas.125 In 2007, some domestic “experts” shared their own thoughts on the estimated hydrocarbons in the Russian part of the continental shelf: 9-10 billion tons of fuel equivalent.126 Leopold Lobkovsky, Deputy Director of the P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, estimated the Russian part of the Arctic contains 51 billion tons of oil and 87 trillion m3 of gas.127 Later in April 2011, speaking at a conference about “Oil and Gas of the Russian Arctic,” Valery Yazev, President of the Russian Gas Society, estimated the initial recoverable reserves of oil and condensate of the Russian Arctic shelf at 13 billion tons and 70 trillion m3 of gas.128 After replacing his colleague, Valery Yazev, in 2014, Pavel Zavalny said that gas deposits in the Russian Arctic amounted to approximately 69.5 trillion m3.129 Russian experts then believed that up to 140 billion tons of oil equivalent of hydrocarbons were concentrated in the Russian Arctic, of which 87 billion tons is natural gas.130 Finally, in the opinion of Dmitry Kobylkin, the Minister Morgunov and Tsunevsky, “Resources of the Arctic,” 22-31. The “New” Arctic and Russian Interests, ed. V. Guseynov (Moscow: Krasnaya Zvezda, 2012), 49-50. 125 Mikhail Krutikhil, “When the price matters,” Kommersant, May 30, 2008. 126 Kyrill Martynov, “The Arctic is a hotspot,” Siberian oil, accessed January 23, 2020. https://www.gazprom-neft.ru/press-center/sibneft-online/archive/2007-october/1104765/. 127 Ekaterina Kalyisheva, “The ice will feed us,” Rossiyskaja Gazeta, accessed September 24, 2019. https://rg.ru/2010/11/02/lobkovskij.html. 128 Yuri Pushchaev, “North Pole is the stumbling stone,” Rossiyskaja Gazeta, accessed January 29, 2020. https://rg.ru/2011/05/17/polus.html. 129 “Extracted hydrocarbon resources in the Russian Arctic are estimated at 106 billion tons,” TASS, accessed November 14, 2019. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/1121534. 130 Elena Telegina, The resources of the Arctic: prospects and problems of their development. The Arctic: A Zone of Peace and Cooperation, ed. A. Zagorsky (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 2011), 40-45. 123 124

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of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation, “oil deposits in the Russian zone alone are estimated at 7.3 billion tons, condensate at 2.7 billion tons, and natural gas at about 55 trillion m3.”131 Foreign specialists estimated oil and gas accumulations in the Russian Arctic at 25% of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves (approximately 15.5 billion tons of oil and 84.5 trillion m3 of gas).132 Such data has pushed some experts to make loud statements about the possibility of extracting significant amounts of hydrocarbons. For example, Viktor Baranov, President of the Union of Independent Gas Producers, believed that “if ambitious plans are implemented, Russia may produce up to 95 million tons of oil and 320 billion m3 of gas annually in the northern seas.”133 It is worth noting that many projections were based merely on assumptions and preliminary information. Most Russian oil and gas fields have not yet been explored enough. Only in the distant prospect could the Russian shelf of the Arctic Ocean seas become the object of commercial production. So far, all figures are approximate. In order to prove them, the research project needs to apply the exploratory drilling. Talking about the shelf of the Barents Sea, there are 11 fields there. As mentioned above the Shtokman gas condensate field (3.6 trillion m3), is a unique one in terms of gas reserves. The field is located in the central part of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea shelf; 650 km from the port of Murmansk and 290 km west of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. It was discovered in 1981 during the comprehensive marine geophysical surveys conducted by the Russian company Sevmorneftegeophysika from the research vessel Professor Shtokman. The sea depths in this area vary from 320 to 340 m. At the depth of the sedimentary layer of 1814-2473 m, there are three gas condensate deposits in the Early- and Late Jurassic sandstones with a total effective capacity of more than 160 meters that have been identified. The maximum gas flow rate is 1270 thousand m3 per day. This volume has already been obtained in one of the wells; in the others – it does not exceed 300 thousand m3 per day. In addition to Shtokman field, there are other major fields in this area: the Ledovoe gas condensate field (422.1 billion m3), the Ludlovskoye gas field (211.2 billion m3) and the Murmanskoye gas field (120.6 billion m3).134 “The oil reserves of the Russian Arctic zone are estimated at 7.3 billion tons,” TASS, accessed February 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7109643. 132 Alexander Golts, “The Arctic: A Clash on Interests or Clash of Ambitions,” in Russia in the Arctic (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 1-47. 133 Kyrill Martynov, “The Arctic is a hotspot.” 134 Morgunov and Tsunaevsky, “Resources of the Arctic.” 131

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The recoverable initial combined hydrocarbon resources of the Pechora Sea is estimated at 4.9 billion tons of fuel oil. In their structure, liquid hydrocarbons make up 2.2 billion tons, and gaseous hydrocarbons – 2.7 trillion m3. Overall, five oil fields with total ABC1 + C2 reserves of 401.6 million tons or 17% of the North-Western region reserves have been discovered in the Pechora Sea. ABC1 industrial category deposits account for only 26% (104.3 million tons).135 The Prirazlomnoye oil field, which was discovered in 1989, is located in the Pechora Sea shelf. It was one of the first unique projects under the implementation to prospect the Russian Arctic shelf to become an important factor in the oil business development.136 The deposit is located between Kolguev, Vaygach and Novaya Zemlya islands, 60 km off the coast (Varandey settlement, Nenets Autonomous District), 950 km from Arkhangelsk and 1025 km from Murmansk. The field is located at a depth of 19-20 m. Three sand layers of Cretaceous age are productive here. Oil is sulphurous (0.7-1.6%), paraffinic (3.1-4.1%), and the density is within is 840-885 kg/m3. Proven oil reserves are 233.4 million tons. Oil reserves exceed 70 million tons. The maximum annual production volume is 5.5 million tons of oil. 3.2 million tons of oil were produced in 2018, and in 2019, 3.14 million tons of oil.137 The principal natural features of the water area in this place during the cold season, which lasts more than 200 days, are severe ice conditions. Ice thickness can reach 1.5 m, and air temperatures drop as low as -30°C. For the autumn and spring seasons, strong winds and frequent storms (waves as high as ten meters) are typical phenomena. Such settings are also complicated by the presence of vulnerable biogeocenosis nearby, which can be damaged in case of a man-made accident. The license to develop the Prirazlomnoye oil field is held by the Gazprom Neft Shelf LLC, a subsidiary of Gazprom Neft. All operations such as well drilling, production, storage, shipment of oil to tankers, etc. are provided by the special Prirazlomnaya offshore ice-resistant stationary platform, which was constructed by the JSC PO Sevmash. The new type of Russian oil produced at the field: Arctic Oil, (ARCO) was first shipped in April 2014. The Medynsko-Varandey area, which is of 2405 km2, presents another prospective zone in the Russian Arctic. It is located in the south-eastern part of

135

Ibid. “Prirazlomnoye field, Gazprom,” accessed April 24, 2020. https://www.gazprom.com/ projects/prirazlomnoye/. 137 Ibid. 136

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the Barents Sea,138 where the Medynskoye Sea oil field was discovered in 1997. The depths of the sea in the area of the field are 10-18 m. The estimated recoverable reserves amounted to 133.9 million tons of oil. This data almost doubled the capacity of the Prirazlomnoye field.139 Production is expected to reach 4.9 million tons of oil per year in 2023.140 The main volume of ABC1+C2 oil reserves – 235.8 million tons (58.7%) is presented by the large Dolginskoye field discovered in 1999. It is located 110 km from the mainland at a depth of 35-55 m. In 2014, the company Gazprom Neft discovered a gas flow after drilling an exploratory well. At the forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in April 2019 Andrey Patrushev, Deputy Director General for Development of Gazprom Neft’s Offshore Projects said, “the possibility of connecting the Dolginskoye oil and gas field to the infrastructure of Prirazlomnoye offshore the Pechora Sea is being highly considered”141 Present studies of the Pechora Sea water area report the potential capacity is of 117.1 million tons of promising and 1808 million tons of projected oil deposits, as well as 21.7 billion m3 of promising and 2219 billion m3 of projected free gas resources.142 The Kolokolmorsky and Pomorsky license areas in the southern part of the Pechora Sea are also promising for oil reserves, since sea depth within the fields does not exceed 40 m. The Kolokolmorsky’s total area is 1,404 km2, and the Pomorsky – 1,677 km2. The estimate of recoverable oil resources at the license areas is 300 million tons.143 There are seven large structural folds in the water area on the Kara Sea shelf. The formation of already discovered gas condensate fields Rusanovsky and Leningradsky, as well as promising for exploration Nyarmeiskaya and Skuratovskaya structures, located 25 km off the coast of the Yamal Peninsula are linked to them. These fields are located between the Malyginskoye and the Rusanovskoye and Leningradskoye fields, where up to 30 gas-bearing areas have been discovered. However, commenting on the information about hydrocarbons’ reserves on the shelf of the southern part of the Kara Sea, adjacent to the western coast of the Yamal Peninsula, Russian experts stressed 138

This part is a shallow water area of the Pechora Sea with depths up to 19 m. “The estimated reserves of the shelf deposit increased by 75%,” Barents Observer, accessed March 2, 2020. https://barentsobserver.com/ru/sections/energy/ocenka-zapasov-shelfovogomestorozhdeniya-vyrosla-na-75. 140 “Gazprom Neft pants to operate the Dolginskoye field to Prirazlomnoye,” RIA-Novosti, accessed March 2, 2020. https://ria.ru/20190409/1552516831.html. 141 Ibid. 142 Morgunov and Tsunevsky, “Resources of the Arctic.” 143 Ibid. 139

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that “the contours of 14 gas blocks discovered by the first wells at the Rusanovskoye and Leningradskoye fields, where gas reserves are estimated at a total of C2 – nine trillion m3, remain unknown.”144 Exploration and production in the Yamal Peninsula have been underway since the Soviet period. In 1974-1976, the largest offshore gas condensate fields in terms of accumulations were discovered there: the Kharasavey and Kruzenshtern fields (about two trillion m3 of gas). At the Kharasavey field, 22 deposits were discovered at depths up to 3310 m, and at the Kruzenshtern field 11 deposits – at depths up to 2331 m.145 The Yamal Peninsula is one of the most important strategic oil and gas regions in Russia. Thirty-two fields have been discovered on the peninsula and adjacent water areas with total reserves of 26.5 trillion m3 of gas, oil and condensate about 1.64 billion tons. Of these, four fields are located on the shelf of the Ob Bay, and two fields – in the Kara Sea with the rest on land. The Bovanenkovskoye field (4.9 trillion m3) is the most significant gas field in Yamal by reserves. Both first launching complexes for the development of the Bovanenkovskoye field with the annual capacity of at least 15 billion m3 of gas and facilities for the Bovanenkovo-Ukhta trunk gas pipeline system began to operate in 2016.146 Currently, the Yamal Peninsula is Gazprom’s major production base, with only three fields: Bovanenkovo, Kharasavey and Novoportovskoye, which amount to about six trillion m3 of gas, and over 100 million tons of condensate and almost 230 million tons of oil. Overall, 12 trillion m3 of gas has been explored, and forecast estimates exceed 50 trillion m3 of gas147. In October 2012, Gazprom launched the project at the Bovanenkovskoye field. In 2019, it produced 96.4 billion m3 of gas.148 In perspective, the production volume is expected to reach 140 billion m3 of gas per year.149 In spite of Gazprom's progress, Russian experts, however, still criticize the company’s activities. From Vasily Bogoyavlensky’s point of view, “despite the success of Gazprom, the number of exploration wells that are drilled annually

144

Ibid. Ibid. 146 “Bovankovskoye field,” Gazprom, accessed April 26, 2020. http://www.gazprom.ru/ about/production/projects/deposits/bm. 147 Sergey Golubchikov, “The Arctic and Russia’s geopolitical Prospects,” Energy: economy, technology, ecology, No. 3 (2011): 38-44. 148 “Bovankovskoye field,” Gazprom. 149 Ibid. 145

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on the Norwegian shelf is 10-30 times more than was drilled in the Arctic and other Russian seas in recent years.150” In the spring of 2019, President Putin started the development of the Kharasavey gas field. Its reserves will last more than 100 years, but gas production is due for 2023. The LNG-project was developed for the field, which has the expected production of up to 24 million tons of LNG per year. In 20252029, facilities are planned to be erected at the Kruzenshternovskoye field and in full operation.151 The large Nyarmia, Skuratovo and North Kharasovo structures discovered by seismic survey off the western coast of Yamal have a total of four trillion m3 of prospective gas resources. Twenty kilometers west of the Kruzenshternovsky gas condensate field, located on the western coast of the Yamal peninsula, according to seismic data, are areas forming the Sharapovskaya local structure. If confirmed, it would be possible to open fields with deposits of up to one trillion m3. Three industrial zones are planned to be created for complex development of hydrocarbon reserves in Yamal: the Bovanenkovskaya, Yuzhnaya and Tambeyskaya zones. In this context, climate change must be taken into account. At present, there is an increase in the duration of the navigation period due to ice cover reduction. Melting of frozen rocks leads to erosion and the subsidence of the soil. Rising sea levels may cause inundation of coastal areas. These challenges affect the technological concept of the region’s development, with both positive and negative directions. As a whole, the North-East region is the least investigated. Only reconnaissance geological surveys have been carried out there. According to the observations, the North-East region has similar natural features to other oil and gas-producing areas (the Laptev Sea area), or the surveys showed that the area is a continuation of the already open basin (the Chukchi Sea area). Due to insufficient exploration, there are no discovered hydrocarbon deposits in the North-East region in the waters of the Laptev, East Siberian and Russian part of the Chukchi Seas. As the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology reported, recoverable resources in the waters of these seas are about

150

151

Vasily Bogoyavlensky, “Arctic oil and gas field development,” The Arсtic Herald. Special Edition (2018): 8-17. “Gas reserves in the Kruzenshtern field are increased to 2 trillion m3,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed October 29, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/news/Geological-exploration/516104-dlyayamalskogo-tsgd-zapasy-gaza-na-kruzenshternskom-mestorozhdenii-uvelicheny-do-2-trlnm3/.

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12 billion tons of fuel equivalent. The shelf of the Bering Sea has not been studied with respect to possible oil and gas bearing capacity. Nevertheless, the possibility of large hydrocarbon accumulations seems promising in the North-East region. To date, the total capacity of the sedimentary cover has been identified, and its overall geological structure has been investigated. The boundaries of the major oil and gas bearing provinces and regions have been delineated, and initial hydrocarbons have been estimated. According to U.S. experts, oil and gas deposits in the Russian WestSiberian basin amount to 132.6 billion barrels of fuel equivalent.152 This is almost twice the reserves in the largest Arctic region of the USA and Canada – Alaska, with the volume of 72.8 billion barrels of conventional fuel.153 The assessment of the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas is not better. The data is also quite similar. Not a single deep well has been drilled there yet. 154 Though in the Chukchi Sea in 2013-2014, gravel and magneto exploration on the area of 440 thousand km2 was carried out. The development of the Russian Arctic could cost between 300 and 700 billion dollars. It is believed that exploration should be considered only if recoverable reserves in one individual area are ranges from 500 million to one billion barrels. Installation of one platform may cost from 1 to 1.5 billion dollars. Despite the lack of technologies to obtain accurate information, interest in the region is steadily growing. It is supported by various forecasts and reports. They prove “convincingly” the presence of tens of trillions of cubic meters of gas and tens of billions of tons of oil. Such data is attracting various countries, which in the future expect to strengthen their economic and political positions, although there are already some signs of competition between states such as Denmark, the USA, Canada, Norway, Russia, and even Iceland for control of Arctic resources.

2.3. ALASKA IS THE TESTING GROUND OF U.S. POLITICS The United States of America began prospecting for oil in its Arctic regions of Alaska after World War II in 1946. After conducted investigations, U.S.

Vasily Kashin, “U.S. has counted billions of Arctic,” Vedomosti, accessed September 27, 2020. https://www.vedomosti.ru/library/articles/2008/07/24/ssha-podschitali-milliardy-arktiki. 153 Ibid. 154 The Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation, ed. A. Zagorsky (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 2011), 44. 152

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researchers identified that the key hydrocarbon reserves are concentrated on the North Slope of Alaska. The Alaska Northern Slope is a wilderness area of tundra part of the state of Alaska, covered with thousands of small lakes. It stretches from the Canadian border in the east to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the Chukchi Sea in the west, and north from the Brooks Ridge to the shores of two seas, the Chukchi and Beaufort seas. The richness of this slope is presented by unspoiled nature and hydrocarbon deposits. It is a unique ecosystem in need of protection and a storehouse of oil. About 58,000 km2 in the center of the slope belongs to the state of Alaska. Several large areas are owned by the indigenous population Inupiat, and the rest of the land is in federal ownership. In the east of the federal lands there is a picturesque Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and in the west is the largest single US federal land area of 93,000 km2, known as the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. There are no harbours on the Arctic coast. Alaska’s oil and gas province has three oil and gas bearing basins: North Alaska, Cook Bay and St. Elias. There have been 78 mostly oil and gas fields discovered there. Twenty-two of them are located in the Beaufort Sea, including a land-sea transition zone.155 In the U.S. Department of Energy Report of 2007, the authors indicated that Alaska’s North Slope potentially contains 36 billion barrels of oil and 3.8 trillion m3 of gas, what is roughly equivalent to Nigeria’s reserves.156 According to the report, the outer shelf slopes of the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea contain 14 billion tons of oil and about 2 trillion m3 of natural gas. These deposits are particularly attractive because their development is less restricted by federal, state and local legislation, as is the case with the ANWR, and thus – more accessible for drilling.157 The U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) provided, however, other assessments. BOEM’s experts reported that the potential of the Alaska continental shelf is about 27 billion barrels of oil.158 It is notable that the differences in the estimates remain, despite the fact that the United States, after conducting extensive research of the Arctic seas, began drilling the shelf in its part of the Chukchi Sea. Modern high-tech drilling rigs created by the Americans and the presence of more favourable conditions than

Nikolay Laverov, “The Arctic: zone of peace and cooperation,” in A Collection of Reports by Participants of the 2nd International Arctic Forum ‘The Arctic: Territory of Dialog’,” Arkhangelsk, September 22-23, 18-21. 156 Cohen, 1-42. 157 Ibid. 158 “Trump turned to the reserves of Alaska: a disaster for the Arctic,” Regnum, accessed April 3, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2339532.html. 155

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in the Russian part of the Chukchi Sea allowed the U.S. to launch extracting hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic fields. Historically, Alaska’s oil production began in 1950 with the well-known Umiat oil camp, located 150 km upstream of Nuixat on the Colville River. Its geological accumulations amount to approximately 140 million tons.159 On the Arctic coast of Alaska, in 1923, U.S. President Warren G. Harding established Navy Petroleum Reserve Number 4. In the following years, individual companies at their own risk conducted exploration drilling in this region. The discovery of significant oil deposits on the American shelf was called the “Alaska Giant.”160 In 1956, the companies Shell and Standard Oil of New-Jersey explored oil there. In 1959, “when drilling of the most expensive well of that time was unsuccessful, the work was suspended.”161 After a while, the exploration work was continued by the company Richfield. The first offshore well was drilled in 1963.162 Next year, Standard Oil of New-Jersey also began its exploration operations. In 1965, Richfield, together with Jersey Standard’s subsidiary Humble Oil, won a tender to prospect the North Slope offshore structure in Prudhoe Bay in the Beaufort Sea. The Sinclair Oil Corporation was announced as the other winner. Simultaneously, the company Atlantic Refining (ARCO) was established, headed by Robert O. Anderson, one of the last great oil explorers and oil magnates of the 21st century. In the winter of 1966, ARCO spent enormous financial resources and drilled a well about 120 km south of the North Coast of Alaska. However, the well was dry. Previously, six dry wells had been already drilled by BP and Sinclair. Severe frosts, storms, ice movements, and the polar night made it difficult for mining enterprises to operate. “It was inaccessible, with extreme temperatures, harsh and exceptionally hostile environment, ‘an evil, unpleasant and unforgiving area to work in.’ It was not like any other region of oil production. There was no technology to exploit fields in this environment. The soils in the tundra zone were as hard as concrete when the temperature in winter fell to -600C. In the summer season, they thawed and became soggy and swampy. There were no roads through the tundra, and there was permafrost

Vasily Bogoyavlenskiy, “The current state and prospects of oil and gas resources development in the Circumartic region,” in The Arctic Region: Problems of International Cooperation in 3 Volumes (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2013), 2: 72-109. 160 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Moscow: Denovo, 1999), 600. 161 Ibid. 162 Robert J. Blaum, “Oil and Gas Development and Opportunities in the Arctic Ocean,” in Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Springer, 2013), 175-184. 159

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underneath, which went a thousand feet deep in some places. Normal steel piles, when driven into permafrost, would break like straws for cocktails.”163 Despite all the environmental challenges, at the end of December 1967, the Prudhoe Bay State Number 1 well found oil. The well was located in Beaufort’s Prudhoe Bay, 320 km east of Cape Barrow. It was the discovery of a gas and oil giant with reserves of up to 10 billion barrels. At that time, the drilling site occupied 26 hectares, consisting of three parts and covering an area of 73 × 30 km. At present, oil is extracted there in an area of 26 thousand km2. Nineteen deposits have been developed, and 3,000 km of pipeline have been laid. This is one of the largest industrial complexes in the world. Originally, the Prudhoe Bay oil reserves were estimated at 9.6 billion barrels. By 2006, however, 10 billion barrels of oil had already been produced there. In 1969, the large Kuparuk River field was discovered, with total initial recoverable reserves of 2.4 billion tonnes of oil and 780 billion m3 of gas.164 The Alpine oil field is located in the delta of the already mentioned Colville River, merging with a huge oil reservoir, the saddleback Barrow. It has been developed since 2000 using horizontal wells. During 11 years of field exploitation 75 million tons were extracted, which makes 50% of the initial geological accumulations.165 Almost a third of the total U.S. oil production is provided by Alaska’s North Slope. Here, 20% of all oil is produced in the United States. Wells are drilled in coastal waters at a depth of 10-20 m. Today, specialists in the area of offshore hydrocarbon production are developing new methods that should provide reliable access to oil and gas while minimizing the negative impact on the environment. For example, Norwegian marine technology expert Ove Gudmestad suggested using horizontal tunnels, which should start on land. According to his proposals, it is necessary to go 200300 m below the sea bottom level, and from there to lay a horizontal tunnel directly to the field. The length of the tunnel with a diameter of six meters may reach 30 km. It should end with a chamber that will accommodate all drilling equipment used to extract hydrocarbon resources.166 As Gudmestad estimated, the cost of such a tunnel may reach several billion euros. It is comparable to the

163

Yergin, 600. National Geographic. Russia, No. 32 (2006): 96-123. 165 “U.S. Oil Field Survey,” Neftegaz, accessed May 26, 2020.https://neftegaz.ru/ analisis/oil_gas/329259-obzor-neftyanykh-mestorozhdeniy-ssha/. 166 “The Norwegian specialist proposes going through horizontal tunnels to the oil fields,” RusEnergy, April 17, 2020. https://rusenergy.com/ru/news/news.php?id=59263. 164

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building of a drilling platform capable of withstanding the onslaught of ice and designed for operation in the far north. He also added that “the notion is not good enough for drilling test wells. However, if it comes to developing an already explored rich field, the tunnel can financially compete with a drilling platform. Also, it would be much easier to operate, since one would not have to think about the damage from the drifting ice.”167 Such drilling principles have already been applied to practice. The company ConocoPhillips pays great attention to drilling horizontal multi-bore wells. There are several hundred of them in Alaska fields alone. In the Kuparuk river oil field, the company widely applies sidetracking with coiled tubing from wells already drilled. The main advantage of this method is cost reduction. The modern equipment allows drilling of fields from compact sites of various lengths and configurations of horizontal shafts, with the excess of the horizontal to vertical composition in a ratio of 3:1, and to carry out the sinking of the shaft in thin pay zones. Often, when developing horizontal wells, multistage hydraulic fracturing is additionally performed to increase well productivity by several times and reduce costs by 25-50%, in comparison to the costs required to build a new well. The ability to involve non-drainable, deadend zones and real-time monitoring of penetration allows adjustments to the well trajectory. It is possible to drill up to seven sidetracks with horizontal ends from one well. Given that the share of hard-to-recover reserves is only increasing, the need to master technologies that allow to extract them becomes even more urgent. In 1977, the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline was built to transport oil from the North Slope to the port of Valdez on the southern coast of Alaska. Russian photojournalist Vasily Peskov called it “the eighth wonder of the world.”168 In his book Alaska is greater than you think he wrote, “built with the highest level of responsibility, intelligence and reliably, the Alaskan oil pipeline is today an example of harmony of technology and nature.”169 The unique pipeline with a diameter of 1,200 mm and a length of about 1,300 km is laid on the permafrost territory in the seismic zone. It crosses 800 rivers and streams, including the Yukon. Construction, which involved 70 thousand workers with weekly earnings of 2000-3000 dollars, took 3 years and 2 months. The project’s cost reached 8 billion dollars.170 Oil enters the pipe with the temperature of 600C. Half of the pipe is laid underground, and the other – supports to prevent 167

Ibid. Vasily Peskov, Alaska is greater than you think (Moscow: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1994), 36. 169 Ibid. 170 To compare: the cost of landing on the Moon was about 20 billion dollars. 168

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permafrost from melting. The supports are equipped with special radiators that give heat to the atmosphere so that they do not deform from the heating of the sun and from the heat that comes from the oil. In places of possible earthquakes, the pipe is enclosed in rubber “clamps,” allowing it to vibrate 3 meters horizontally and 160 cm vertically in each side without breaking. The length of time that the oil stays on the way is 5 days. In 1978, after its launching, more than one million barrels per day were pumped through the pipe, and in the 1980s – more than 2 million barrels. The U.S. drive to prospect and exploit new sources of raw materials and energy far into the Arctic Circle has increased drastically after the discovery and development of the largest U.S. oil and gas field Prudhoe Bay and the identification of significant reserves by Russia in the Arctic part of the Eurasian continent and continental shelf. At that time, the companies BP and ConocoPhillips had been working on a gas pipeline construction project that would supply the main territory of the United States with natural gas from Alaska. The gas pipeline, which would be the largest commercial construction project in North American history, would cost about 30 billion dollars. The 3.2 thousand km long pipeline was planned to be built from the city of Prudhoe Bay in Alaska to the Canadian province of Alberta. It would allow domestic resources from Canada to be sent to the market of the United States. The building of the pipeline, whose capacity should be about 40 billion m3, was projected to be completed in ten years. The idea of the construction was driven by data on gas reserves in Alaska, which were estimated at 35 trillion m3. Its production has so far been delayed by the lack of necessary transport capacities.171 The largest gas field in the Cook inlet is the Kenai gas field discovered in 1959, with reserves amounting to 100 billion m3. Among oil fields, the largest one is the McArthur River field in the central part of the bay. Its initial oil reserves are estimated at 72 million tons. Only one small oil field has been discovered in the Saint-Elias Basin.172

171

In 2012, Ukrainian media reported on a large project to transport natural gas from the remote North Slope field, Alaska, to Asian markets. Under the project concerned a construction of a 1,300 km gas pipeline, a gas liquefaction plant and of up to 20 tanker fleets. The project initiators, the companies ExxonMobil, BP and ConocoPhillips estimated the project at 45 to 65 billion dollars. 172 Aliye Zabanbark, “The perspectives of oil and gas bearing capacity of Anadyr Bay basin,” Geology, geophysics and development of oil and gas fields, no. 9 (2008): 34-41.

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In 2005, the company Royal Dutch Shell acquired 137 license areas in the Beaufort Sea,173 and in 2008, it had already obtained 275 license areas in the Chukchi Sea for 2.1 billion dollars. The latter acquisition became the first one on the Outer Continental Shelf of the Chukchi Sea to be sold in the last 17 years174. Due to the fact that the production costs and legislative barriers were high, the overall costs exceeded 5.5 billion dollars. License purchases involved such companies as StatoilHydro (Norway) and Eni (Italy). In total, seven oil and gas enterprises participated in the license acquisition in the Chukchi Sea on an area of 5,354 blocks. According to some data, oil reserves in the American sector of the Chukchi Sea are estimated at approximately 15 billion barrels and over 2 trillion m3 of gas.175 In late 2009, the U.S. Department of the Interior issued a preliminary approval for Royal Dutch Shell to prospect on two licenses in the Beaufort Sea in Camden Bay, west of the city of Kaktovik. Additionally, Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, pre-approved Shell’s plan to drill three exploration wells for obtaining specific data for oil in the Chukchi Sea in July-October 2010. This could open the door for oil and gas production in the new Arctic region. As Salazar pointed out, “by cautiously approving this exploration plan, we are taking a balanced step towards obtaining more information about the Chukchi Sea.”176 In 2012, Royal Dutch Shell prepared two drilling platforms and dozens of support vessels for drilling exploration wells on the OCS of Alaska. The work was designed to last two decades. A special plug similar to the one used in 2010 to stop a spill at the Deepwater Horizon emergency well in the Gulf of Mexico was also built. One of them, the plug Kulluk, ran aground off the coast of Alaska. Its repair cost 50 million dollars. In 2013, the company announced that it would suspend its oil exploration activities in both the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea. Having spent about 4.5 billion dollars on the project, Royal Dutch Shell has not drilled a single well. At that time, it planned to start oil production in the Beaufort Sea in 2020, and in Chukchi – in 2022.177

173

The Beaufort Sea is a shallow sea. It is located close to the infrastructure of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 174 “Alaskan Oil and Gas blocks for Sale,” Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, accessed January 29, 2020. http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2008/02/ntn80617. 175 Ibid. 176 Cohen, 1-42. 177 Anna Razintseva, “Whether Russia should hurry with the development of the Arctic shelf?” Vedomosti, accessed June 11, 2020. https://www.vedomosti.ru/library/articles/2013/ 03/04/ostorozhno_arktika.

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2.4. THE INVALUABLE EXPERIENCE OF NORWAY The pioneer of hydrocarbon development of the continental shelf was Norway. Among the countries of Western Europe, it has the largest reserves of oil, which made it one of the states that fully covers the need for energy resources through the production of its own resources. Most of them are in the fields of the continental shelf. Furthermore, the Norwegian sector accounts for half of all North Sea natural gas reserves. The area of the Norwegian continental shelf is about 1.5 million km2. The shelf is divided into three separate oil provinces: the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, including the island of Jan Mayen, and the Barents Sea, including the Spitsbergen Archipelago. Most of Norway’s oil is produced in the North Sea. Geological characteristics, oil potential and technological challenges are different for each area. Norway supplies the mainland with most of the liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas. It is estimated that hydrocarbons in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea are 1.6-1.7 billion tons of oil and 1.3-2.9 trillion m3 of natural gas. Proven oil accumulations are estimated at 10.4 billion barrels.178 In the 1960s, there was no such oil industry in Norway. Since the Norwegian oil industry did not have the necessary data to carry out oil and gas operations, the Norwegian government invited leading international oil companies to work on the continental shelf of the country. In partnership with them, which usually acted as project operators, the state oil company Statoil began to prospect and develop the Norwegian shelf, thus acquiring knowledge and accumulating their own experience. In May 1963, the Norwegian parliament adopted a proclamation on sovereignty over continental shelf areas. Under the act, the state owns these areas, and only the king has the right to issue permits for oil and gas exploration and production.179 The first licenses for oil production on the continental shelf of Norway were issued in 1965. In 1966, after the demarcation and the signing of the relevant agreements on the demarcation of the North Sea bottom sections with Denmark and Great Britain, the first exploratory well was drilled in one of the sections of the North Sea. In 1964-1969, more than 200 prospecting and exploration wells up to 4300 m deep were drilled in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, but the end result was not satisfactory. Nevertheless, in 1969, the “Petroleum Industry Review,” Infocom Recruit Agency, accessed July 23, 2020. https://www.info-com.org/oilcomp.htm. 179 In real practice, however, such permits are issued by the government. 178

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American company Phillips Petroleum managed to make the first commercial discovery – the Ekofisk gas and oil field. Its initial commercial deposits were estimated at 300 million tons of oil and 400 billion m3 of gas. The first oil at the field was produced in 1971. According to forecasts, oil and gas production may be carried out until 2028. Oil is transported via a 360 km long pipeline to the settlement of Teesside, and then to the UK. Gas is transported via a 443 km long pipeline to the city of Emden, and then to Germany.180 By 1975, Norway was already producing more oil than was needed for its own needs. In 1979 in the North Sea, 65 km off the coast of Norway at a water depth of 340 meters, a giant gas field Troll was discovered. It covers an area of 700 km2 and is divided into Eastern and Western parts. The eastern part contains about 1.3 trillion m3 of gas and 250-750 million tons of oil. Currently, gas production in the field has decreased significantly. In 2012, 70 billion m3 of gas was produced, and by 2018 – about 40 billion m3.181 In the 1980s, prospecting work started in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Thus, in 1984, the unique deep-water gas condensate field Snøhvit was discovered in the Barents Sea, 140 km off the coast (700N), with reserves of 190 billion m3 of natural gas, and 113 million barrels (20 million tons) of condensate.182 The field was Norway’s first experience with implementing LNG-projects and the first major offshore project in the European Arctic. A unique metal-clad LNG processing facility was designed for the production of hydrocarbons in the Snøhvit field. It was built in the port of Cadiz, Spain, in two years and weighs 35,000 tons. The total cost reached a sum of 400 million dollars and was delivered fully assembled by a special ship within 11 days to Melkøya Island, Norway. The Hammerfest LNG plant on Melkoya Island receives gas from the offshore Snøhvit field.183 Since 2006, field development has been carried out exclusively by subsea equipment using remote control systems. The products are delivered to the onshore LNG terminal in Hammerfest, Norway, via a 143-km subsea pipeline.184 The capacity of one line of the first European LNG plant was 5.7 billion m3 of gas per year. Statoil ASA started field development in 2002, and “Oil and gas bearing pool of the North Sea,” Geogmap, accessed February 23, 2020. http://www.geogmap.ru/sydols-451-3.html. 181 Yuri Barsukov, “The Norwegian Troll will not become bigger,” Kommersant, July 4, 2017. 182 “Gazprom, Rosneft and Statoil sign memorandum of understanding,” Regnum, accessed November 23, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/economy/322490.html. 183 “LNG plant in Norway stopped due to fire,” Interfax, accessed November 24, 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/world/729014. 184 “Oil production won’t interfere with fishing,” Kommersant, accessed November 12, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/657809. 180

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in 2007, LNG production and supplies to North American and European markets began. Every day the field provides the world’s northernmost LNG plant in Hammerfest with more than 48 thousand barrels of oil equivalent. The second largest field is the giant field Statfjord. It provides more than half of Norwegian oil production. Oil was first produced there in 1979. In recent years, oil production in the field has also decreased several times compared to the initial figures: up to 20-25 thousand barrels of oil.185 In 2018, Statoil worked on plans to develop the Askeladd field, from which gas should also go to the Hammerfest LNG plant.186 Moreover, the company has made a decision to invest 640 million dollars in the Snøhvit project. 187 The company Equinor188 intends to produce gas from the Johan Kastberg field in the Barents Sea in 2022. 189. In the mid-1990s, Norway was the world’s second largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. In 2008, it took fifth place,190 and already in 2018, the country was not even in the top ten oil exporters.191 Since 1999, proven oil reserves in Norway have decreased from 11.3 billion barrels to 9.7 billion barrels, and natural gas reserves have increased from 1.87 trillion m3 to 2.41 trillion m3. By the end of 2018, Norway’s inferred reserves offshore the North Sea, Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea were estimated at 1.505, 2.706 and 890 million tons of oil equivalent, respectively.192 By mid 2019, more than 84 fields were being developed in Norway. Of these, 64 – in the North Sea, 18 – in the Norwegian Sea and 2 – in the Barents Sea.193 Despite the considerable success achieved by Norway, at the beginning of the 21st century the country faced technological difficulties. Further development of offshore fields required fundamentally new approaches. In “An incident in a Norwegian oil field resulted in almost 35 tons of oil being spilled into the sea,” TASS, accessed October 17, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/2330250. 186 Ibid. 187 “The Askeladd field in the Barents Sea will become a resource base for Statoil’s LNG plant,” PRIME, accessed October 8, 2020. https://1prime.ru/energy/20180312/828589871.html. 188 In 2018, Standoil changed its name to Equinor. 189 “Johan Castberg Field Development Project, Barents Sea. Offshore Technology,” NS Energy, accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/johan-castbergproject-barents-sea/. 190 Natalya Smirnova, “Scandinavia built an ideal state of trust between the government and the people,” Regiony Rossii, accessed August 7, 2020. https://www.gosrf.ru/news/39308/. 191 “Rating of countries by oil production and export,” Take-Profit.org, accessed November 23, 2020. https://take-profit.org/statistics/crude-oil-production/. 192 Andrey Krivorotov, “The oil and gas industry in Norway - a trajectory of takeoff,” Neft Kapital, accessed August 24, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/article/general/22-08-2019/neftegazovayaotrasl-norvegii-traektoriya-vzleta. 193 Ibid. 185

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order to initiate technological solutions, a discussion platform “Oil and gas for the 21st century” (OG-21) was created in Norway.194 In 2002, a report on Norway’s oil and gas industry was submitted to the Norwegian parliament. The document stressed that without urgent action, production levels would decline in two decades.195 The main task to overcome this challenge was to maintain steady production rates. To meet this need, the country actively carries out geological work, increasing the efficiency of the existing fields and exploring potential ones. On a platform at the Goliat oil and gas field (operated by Eni) in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, the recoverable reserves were 180 million barrels of oil196 and production started in 2016. Later, in October 2019, oil production began at the Johan Sverdrup field – phase two is due in 2022.197 Some of the fields discovered earlier (Oseberg, Gullfaks, the giant Statfjord, which provided more than half of Norwegian oil production, etc.) are almost depleted. The peak of oil production in Norway was reached back in 2001.198 Since then, oil production in Norway has been gradually declining. From the point of view of Norwegian experts, the trend will continue, and with respect to gas production, Swedish researchers from the University of Uppsala pointed out that it would decline rapidly after 2020. By 2030, Norway is expected to supply only 20-30 billion m3 of gas to the European market, while in recent years this figure has been 100 billion m3 per year.199 Production in 2019 was 1.7 million barrels per day. 200 Oil and natural gas are Norway’s main export commodities. Their share in total exports is 35 times higher than another traditional commodity – fish and “Oil and Gas for the 21st Century,” Government.no, accessed September 13, 2020. https://www.regjeringen.no/ en/topics/energy/energy-and-petroleum-research/og21--oil-and-gas-in-the-21stcentury/id439227/. 195 Andrey Krivorotov, “The Norwegian model of oil and gas management,” Energy policy, accessed October 15, 2020. https://energypolicy.ru/a-k-krivorotov-norvezhskaya-modelupra/regiony/2020/14/11/. 196 Maria Kutuzova, “Arctic Goliat launched,” Neftianka, accessed November 24, 2020. http://neftianka.ru/arkticheskij-goliaf-zapustili-v-ekspluataciyu/. 197 Sergey Tikhonov, “Norway is preparing to increase the surplus of oil on the market,” RG.ru, accessed October 28, 2020. https://rg.ru/2020/03/30/norvegiia-gotovitsia-uvelichit-izbytoknefti-na-rynke.html. 198 In 2001, production was 3.4 million barrels per day, and in 2013 – 1.8 million barrels. In 2014, it slightly increased to 1.9 million barrels per day. Since 1993, gas production has been continuously growing, except for the years of 2011 and 2013. 199 Anna Ryizhova, “Norway is exploring the resources of the Arctic,” Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed April 14, 2019. http://riss.ru/analitycs/28154/. 200 “Export of Oil and Gas. 2020,” Norwegian Petroleum, accessed November 25, 2020. https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/. 194

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seafood. Private and public investments in exploration, production, transport and onshore infrastructure are considerably high. In the last decade Norway has been a leader among Arctic countries in the organization of integrated marine planning and development of industry standards. Their most important contribution was the development of new technologies, such as the transportation of multiphase hydrocarbon flows. With this method, the entire range of produced raw materials are transported from the shelf all at the same time, and are eventually separated into oil, gas, or condensate. The multiphase long-distance pipeline transportation represents a real technological breakthrough. Together with the construction of subsea production facilities, it has played a crucial role in the development of the reserves in the Norwegian section of the Barents Sea shelf. The company Statoil was successful in regard to advancing this method. Its transporting activity has developed in two directions: from the North Sea region further to the north, and from areas with relatively shallow depths to deeper waters. In addition, Statoil has come a long way from solid concrete surface platforms to underwater structures located on the seabed which are not visible from the surface. In the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, the largest fields in Norway were Troll, Ekofisk in the North Sea, and Snorre in the Norwegian Sea. The country produced the bulk of its oil in these fields.201 Norway has sought to put new fields into operation, many of which were discovered back in the 1980s. Still, due to technological difficulties and the need for additional research, the works on those oil and gas fields have been postponed to a later date. Norway was expected to put the Martin Linge gas and condensate field in the North Sea into operation back in 2016, (reserves of the field were estimated at 38 million barrels of oil and 20 billion 3 of gas202 and the exploitation period was to last until the 2030s)203 however, the field is due to be put into operation by early 2021. A similar problem occurred in the Aasta Hansteen gas condensate field, one of the largest in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, its development was due in 2017 201

202

203

Anastasia Nikitina, “EIA: Norway’s Oil and Gas,” Oil and gas vertical, accessed August 12, 2020. http://www.ngv.ru/analytics/eia_neft_i_gaz_norvegii/. Anastasia Nikitina, “Equinor drills new wells in the Martin Linge field,” Neftegaz, accessed October 28, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/news/dobycha/629736-equinor-burit-novye-skvazhinyna-mestorozhdenii-martin-linge/. “Norway’s Statoil has become the operator of the Martin Linge and Garantiana fields in the North Sea,” Novosti Energetiki, accessed November 24, 2020. https://novo stienergetiki.ru/norvezhskaya-statoil-stala-operatorom-mestorozhdenij-martin-linge-igarantiana-v-severnom-more/.

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but it actually started at the end of 2018.204 Norwegian producers have begun to send gas to the European market via the new Polarled pipeline. The recoverable reserves were estimated at 55.6 million m3 of gas and 600 thousand m3 of condensate.205 The Aasta Hansteen field is located at a depth of 1,300 m – the deepest oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf. Norwegian producers hope that production in the field will provide long-term gas supplies to the foreign market. In addition to the Aasta Hansteen field, the company Equinor launched production at the Snefrid North field in September 2019. The recoverable resources were estimated at 4.4 billion m3 of gas.206 The field is expected to increase the period of gas supply to the European market.207 In November 2020, ConocoPhillips discovered a gas condensate field in the Norwegian Sea. Its reserves were estimated at 50-190 million barrels of oil equivalent. Back in 2014, the consulting firm Rystad Energy estimated the resource potential of the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea at 20 billion barrels of oil equivalent and 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent – in the northern Norwegian Sea.208 Norway has high hopes for oil production from the new fields. In March 2016, oil production started at the Goliat field in the Barents Sea, which is located on the Arctic shelf of Norway and is one of the largest. Its reserves were estimated at 180 million barrels of oil. Moreover, Norway has been producing oil in the field Johan Sverdrup. 209 At the beginning of 2020, this field produced 440 thousand barrels per day. The capacity of the second stage was estimated at 220 thousand barrels of oil per day, and due to be launched in 2022.210

“Equinor has commissioned the Aasta Hansteen gas field in the Norwegian Sea,” RamblerFinance, accessed September 17, 2020. https://finance.rambler.ru/other/41439599-equinorvvela-v-ekspluatatsiyu-mesto rozhdenie-gaza-aasta-hansteen-v-norvezhskom-more/. 205 Ibid. 206 Denis Davydov, “ConocoPhillips has made its fourth Norwegian offshore discovery,” National Association of Oil and Gas Services, accessed December 25, 2020. https://nangs.org/news/upstream/conocophillips-sdelala-chetvertoe-otkrytie-nanorvezhskom-shelyfe. 207 “In the Norwegian Sea, production started at the Snefrid North gas field tied-in to Aasta Hansteen,” Oligas.com, accessed July 23, 2020. https://oilgascom.com/v-norvezhskommore-nachalas-dobycha-na-gazovom-mesto rozhdenii-snefrid-nord-v-privyazke-k-aasta-hansteen/. 208 Kutuzova, “Arctic Goliat launched.” 209 Ibid. 210 Tikhonov, “Norway is preparing to increase the surplus of oil on the market.” 204

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In December 2020, ConocoPhillips drilled a new oil well, 23 km away from the Heidrun field in the Norwegian Sea.211 The company has also discovered another new field in the Norwegian Sea. According to preliminary estimates, it may contain up to 200 million recoverable reserves.212 The country continues its commercial production in the North Sea. Norwegian authorities gave permission to launch a subsea rig with two new wells – one in the Gjøa field, and the other in the North Sea by the end of 2020. The project is expected to produce about 15 million barrels of oil per year.213 Thus, Norway has consistently implemented its strategy on the development of deposits on the shelf of the Barents and Norwegian Seas. This policy is aimed at turning the northern fields into a new center of hydrocarbon production. New fields are to replace the dwindling fields of the North Sea. The reasons for the stable position of the oil and gas in industry in Norway are, first of all, high world energy prices and a favourable Norwegian krone exchange rate against the U.S. dollar – covering the high offshore production costs. Prices starting at 100 dollars per barrel make it profitable to produce hydrocarbons in new areas such as the Arctic. At one time, the price of 12 dollars per barrel made profitable oil production in the North Sea (even earlier Saudi Arabia began its oil production at a world price of 1.5 dollars per barrel). As a whole, the competitiveness of Norway’s oil and gas industry is facilitated by the high level of technological development, the integration into the world market system, as well as the political stability of the country. In a short amount of time, Norway managed to establish state structures responsible for offshore development, and a legal framework that protected the interests of local manufacturers and suppliers of equipment for the competition –U.S. companies. Norway has become the world’s largest producer of oil and gas equipment for offshore developments. The basic principle underlying the use of oil and gas resources in Norway is that hydrocarbons are an irreplaceable national resource. Therefore, according to the Norwegian government, their exploitation should be carried out in a way that maximizes their value and provides the highest share of oil and gas revenues for the country as a whole, taking into account the needs of future generations. The main objectives of the state policy in the use of oil and gas resources in “Oil discovery north of the Heidrun field in the Norwegian Sea - 6507/5-10S,” Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, accessed December 23, 2020. https://www.npd.no/en/facts/news/Exploration-drilling-results/2020/oil-discovery-north-ofthe-heidrun-field-in-the-norwegian-sea-6507-5-10-s/. 212 Davydov, “ConocoPhillips has made its fourth Norwegian offshore discovery.” 213 “Go-ahead for Gjøa expansion,” Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, accessed December 23, 2020. https://www.npd.no/en/facts/news/general-news/2020/go-ahead-for-gjoa-expansion/. 211

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Norway are as follows: first, it is necessary to note the creation of the highest possible profitability of the process of development, development and production of hydrocarbons, as well as ensuring a stable level of welfare and employment. Secondly, the policy aims at creating conditions for the internationalization of the Norwegian oil and gas industry in order to ensure the development of this sector of the economy during the depletion of the main reserves. Thirdly, it is aimed at combining the role of one of the leading energy producers with the role of one of the advanced countries in achieving production performance that meets environmental requirements, including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.214 This model is now called “Norwegian,” and Norway has acquired the status of a gas power house. The share of the oil and gas industry is 45% of exports and provides 25-30% of government spending. The first five major consumers of Norwegian crude oil and condensate in 2014 included the U.K. (41%), the Netherlands (27%), Germany (12%), Sweden (5%) and Denmark (3%) – and the situation is not expecting any changes.215 Be that as it may, 98% of crude oil and condensate shipments are supposed to be delivered to European countries.216 In November 2013, the Norwegian consulting firm Rystad Energy published a report, which informed that the construction of one of the largest oil and gas production centers in Norway should be completed by 2030 and will be located in the Barents Sea, near the Russian maritime border. Furthermore, it is estimated that by 2030 the projects in the Norwegian and Barents Seas will come to 25 billion euros. By 2040, Norway is projected to be the leader for oil production in this area.217 At the same time, it was stressed that geological exploration will play a major role on which new fields are discovered.218 As Kjell Giæver, Head of the Petro Arctic Supplier Union, stated “most experts agree that Northern Norway will inevitably become the largest oil region, and companies need to keep this in mind.”219 According to Petro Arctic, Knowledge Park North and Innovation Norway, the resource potential of the water areas surrounding Northern Norway is equivalent to 27 billion barrels of oil. Although Egil Helle, “Norway as an Oil Producer,” accessed April 13, 2019. http://www.reisenett.no/ norway/facts/economy/oil_producer.html. 215 “Norway in figures,” Pro-Arctic.ru, accessed July 24, 2020. https://proarctic.ru/21/10/2015/resources/18648. 216 Nikitina, “EIA: Norway’s Oil and Gas.” 217 Atle Staalesen, “Norway is a new oil province,” Pro-Arctic, accessed December 23, 2019. https://pro-arctic.ru/19/11/2013/press/5765. 218 Espen Erlingsen, “Oil and gas Production in Norway,” Rystad Energy, accessed June 24, 2019. https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/oil-and-gas-production-innorway/. 219 Atle Staalesen, “Norway is a new oil province.” 214

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Russia, as a possible participant in the development of Norwegian water resources, is not mentioned in the report, representatives of Norwegian companies consider it advantageous to maintain good neighbourly relations with it.220 Norway’s current and future economic prosperity is largely based on energy resources ensured by the Pension Fund,221 formerly known as the “Oil Fund,” to which “surplus” money not used in the economy is allocated.

2.5. CANADA: A GRADUAL MOVE TOWARDS HYDROCARBONS Since the 1970s, Canada has been conducting exploratory drilling in its part of the Arctic. It began prospecting and carried out exploration work in promising areas of the Arctic in 1960. The first oil well was drilled in 196, on the largest island of Melville (Parry Archipelago). In 1967, Panarctic Oils Ltd. was established on the basis of a partnership between the state and the oil and gas industry. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Canadian government invested in the exploration of Arctic oil and gas fields. A number of fields were discovered in the Mackenzie River Delta, the Beaufort Sea Basin and the Arctic Archipelago. By 1994, there were already 90 of the main known oil fields. After exploratory drilling in the Mackenzie River Basin, the Beaufort Sea and the Arctic Archipelago, oil and gas reserves were discovered, estimated at about 1.9 billion barrels and 560 billion m3. Commercial production of hydrocarbons never started, however, due to difficult geological conditions and the cost of production – which proved to be much higher than in other North American regions. The cessation of state support and the lack of infrastructure for oil and gas supplies to consumers predetermined the gradual phase-out of operations on most of the Arctic shelf. 222 Recently, the geological exploration company MDM Energy has discovered a large natural gas field in the Mackenzie River Delta.

220

Ibid. The Norwegian Pension Fund is one of the world’s largest institutional investors. 222 Alisa Onyakova, “The Prospects and problems of Canadian Arctic oil and gas resources development,” The Newsletter of contemporary studies, No. 2 (2019): 58-61. 221

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2.6. DENMARK’S HYDROCARBON PRODUCTION IN THE ARCTIC Denmark ranks third in Western Europe after Norway and the U.K. in oil and gas production. Its reserves are estimated at 159 million tons of oil, and it consumes only about 8 million tons.223 The country is currently engaged in geological exploration off the Faroe Islands and in Baffin Bay. If the exploitation is successful, the Danes will be able to catch up with the Norwegians. Denmark is producing hydrocarbons on the North Sea shelf, confirming its work experience in high latitudes. In 2012, Denmark and Canada signed a treaty regarding the border in the Lincoln Sea in the Arctic Ocean. Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. The Government of Greenland supports the development of oil fields. It expects to find new sources of income, which will reduce the Danish subsidies and contribute to economic development and independence from Denmark. Exploration for hydrocarbon resources was started in 1970. Before 1990, six wells were drilled, showing unprofitable production. In 2010, however, the Scottish company Cairn Energy first discovered hydrocarbons in Greenland. It gave new momentum to their development on the continental shelf of 85,000 km2. A project worth one billion dollars was implemented, and 8 exploration wells were drilled, but expectations were not met. Most of the deposits, which could give commercial production, did not contain significant reserves. Nevertheless, this situation did not stop both Cairn Energy and the Government of Greenland. They continued to work on action plans concerning the licensing of areas in the Greenland Sea and the north-eastern shelf of Greenland.

2.7. NEW OPPORTUNITIES BY OVERCOMING MAJOR CHALLENGES Projected Arctic oil and gas reserves exceed those of the continental margins of any ocean on Earth.224 Despite the fact that these accumulations are attracting increased attention in many countries, Arctic hydrocarbons are Artem Nikitin, “This oil production is not ours alone,” Itogi, accessed September 24, 2020. http://www.itogi.ru/delo/2012/39/182472.html. 224 Boris Ivchenko, “Problems of National Security in Developing Arctic Shelf Deposits,” Bulletin of the Admiral Makarov State University of Maritime and Inland Shipping, no. 3 (2013): 151161. 223

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unlikely to become an alternative energy base in the coming years. Challenges associated with shelf extraction and the large spread of renewable energy sources are pushing back the prospect of large-scale development. However, the exploitation in this region is one of the prerequisites for Russia’s economic prosperity, which is possible, among other things, through a competent government policy. Its components should include improving new deep-water drilling technologies, reducing environmental hazards and more research of the Arctic. The exploitation is an opportunity for oil and gas companies, but at the same time, there are many risks involved. The companies need to prove that they can guarantee safety when developing the Arctic and prevent environmental disasters. Extraction requires economic calculations that are directly related to world markets. If oil production in the Arctic region is to be economically attractive, the price would need to be significantly higher than what it currently is. Drilling in the Arctic climate of one exploration well can reach from 150 to 200 million dollars.225 So far, the prospects for prices do not allow to speak definitively about the time when production will acquire commercial scale. For this purpose, the prices should be considerably higher than those observed in the last decade. With the fall in oil prices, as it happened in March-April 2020, Arctic projects have lost their attractiveness. In the Arctic, the interests of many countries, both Arctic and non-Arctic, are clashing with each other. So far, this has occurred in a diplomatic manner. The efforts are mainly aimed at solving the issues of legal justification for the possibility of establishing its influence or expanding the outer limit of the continental shelf. As a result, it is difficult to expect the signing of long-term contracts. At the same time, the rivalry between individual countries and oil and gas giants such as ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Statoil, Eni, Total, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Rosneft and Gazprom – and the combination of advanced technologies – may create further challenges for further development of the Arctic territories.

225

Maria Malysheva, “Hard to extract resources.”

Chapter 3

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARCTIC 3.1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE DIVISION OF THE ARCTIC Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Arctic countries of Russia, United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark had only developed the Arctic Ocean coast, not claiming the rights to its surface and ocean floor. As a result, the boundaries of the Arctic spaces were not clearly defined, as the issue of their international legal registration was not on the agenda. The first step to establish control over the Arctic and its lands were made in the 19th century. Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the United States launched negotiations to define the international legal regime for the Arctic seas by proposing the sectorial principle. The Arctic coast was the basis for the division, and the side borders were the meridians passing through the extreme points of the Northern coast of the Arctic countries—the heart of each sector being the North Pole. This principle reflected the centuries-long need to control that space. Based on established views, the Arctic states brought to the forefront the military, political, economic, and transportation factors related to access to coastal areas of the Arctic seas and the resources found there. International legal treaties concluded during that time between the Arctic countries have not changed in decades and defined the borders of polar possessions. They were not declared as sovereign territories. In 1824, Russia and the United States signed the Convention on Trade, Navigation and Fishing. In 1825, the Convention on Trade, Navigation and Fishing between Russia and

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Great Britain was signed. The Anglo-Russian document defined the border between Alaska, which was part of the Russian Empire, and the Canadian Yukon. In 1867, the U.S.-Russian treaty on the cession of Russian possessions to the United States, also known as the Treaty of Cession was signed. Under this document, the border between the two states was established. The demarcation line ran along the meridian, which served as a side border of the sector. These bilateral documents recorded the positions of the parties, for whom the northern policy represented an important but not a determining factor of foreign policy. The sectorial principle had been consistently supported by Canada. In its laws dating back to the second half of the 19th century, Canada reaffirmed its claim to Arctic space. Thus, according to the Royal decree on the Northwest Territories of 1880, Canada received all British possessions in North America.226 In Canada, the Arctic regions include three entities.227 The first one is Yukon County, established in 1885.228 In 1898, the Canadian parliament passed the Yukon Act, which “established a federal territory of the same name with an administrative council appointed by Ottawa.”229 In addition to Yukon Country, the Arctic territories of Canada include the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The latter was established only in 1999 by dividing the Northwest Territories into two parts: Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. Canadian public claims to the Arctic lands and the entrenchment of the sectorial principle took place in 1904, when the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a map in which the western and eastern borders of the state were defined by 1410 and 600 meridians respectively with the borders extending to the North Pole, Canada was therefore, openly advocating the sectoral division principle.230 In 1907, while addressing the Canadian parliament, Senator Pascal Poirier stated that “all islands and lands located between the 1410 and 600 meridians of western longitude are under Canadian sovereignty.”231 In 1909, Canada became the first of the Arctic countries to legislate a territory west of Greenland from the coast to the North Pole.

Valery Konyshev and Aleksander Sergunin, “The strategy of Canada in the Arctic and Russia: is it possible to find mutual?” Arctic and North, no. 8 (2012): 4-26. 227 These administrative territories have partial autonomy. 228 Vasily Sokolov, “Northern territories in Canada: management and economy,” The USA and Canada: Economics – Politics – Culture,” no. 8 (2008): 45-62. 229 Ibid. 230 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 356. 231 Pavel Savaskov, “The legal regime of the Arctic,” in The Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation, ed. A. Zagorsky (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 2011), 28. 226

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Canada has repeatedly affirmed its rights to the Arctic sector in national documents. In May 1925, it adopted an amendment to the Northwest Territories Act, prohibiting all foreign states from engaging in any activity within Canadian Arctic lands and islands without required permission from the Canadian government. In 1926, Canada’s sovereignty was confirmed by a Royal decree.232 In subsequent years, the authorities have consistently pursued a policy of securing sovereignty over “their” sector by calling it “Canadian waters.” In this regard, Lester Pearson, as Canada’s Ambassador to the United States in 1945-1946, referred to Canada’s claim to the territories within the sector and the maritime spaces that connected them.233 The United States of America was the first to follow the Canadians in recognizing the sectorial principle of the division of Arctic spaces.234 The principle implied the right to own only land (islands and archipelagos) and not water, much less the ocean floor. However, under the influence of military and political factors, the U.S. gradually departed from the sector concept. In 1909, a civil engineer, the American Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, hoisted the U.S. flag at the North Pole. On one hand, it was a sign that the USA was open to the possibility of establishing U.S. sovereignty over the Arctic regions.235 On the other hand, however, Peary’s action was more political in nature, as the Arctic countries did not have naval vessels adapted for navigation in the ice and could not support the claims to Arctic spaces. The sector principle was put forward at a time when there was no data on natural reserves on the Arctic shelf. As research evolved and significant accumulations within the region were found, the United States actively began to promote the idea of internationalizing the Arctic, expecting to gain access to hydrocarbon deposits. The authorities became intrigued due to the fact that since 1923 exploratory drilling had been conducted on the Arctic coast. The first successes in the production of hydrocarbon resources on the Beaufort Sea shelf had a strong impact on the U.S. approach to Arctic policy. The development of the Arctic fields required the USA to construct ships and design technologies necessary to work in harsh Arctic environments.

Igor Bartsits, “The legal status of the Arctic,” Zakon.kz, accessed June 23, 2019. https://www.zakon.kz/203585-pravovojj-status-arktiki.html. 233 Leaster Pearson, “Canada looks ‘Down North’,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 24., no. 4 (1946): 638647. 234 Terentyev, The Arctic and the Antarctic. 235 It is believed that Peary was the first to reach the North Pole on April 6, 1909. However, an American doctor, polar explorer F. Cook claimed that he reached the North Pole a year earlier, on April 21, 1908. 232

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In 1924, the United States claimed its rights to the Arctic, noting that the North Pole is an underwater extension of Alaska. Speaking in the Congress, the U.S. Secretary of State for Marine Affairs expressed the idea of joining the Pole to North American holdings as an extension of Alaska. At the same time, the U.S. authorities stressed that they could not allow a huge unexplored territory to fall under the control of another power.236 Promoting the internationalization of the Arctic, the United States believed that this idea upon which the international legal status of the Arctic is based, would address their concerns. Eventually, the U.S. began to advocate their position that the freedom of navigation and economic development of the Arctic spaces should be established. Back in the 19th century, U.S. Secretary of State William Seward237 argued that “our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the North.”238 The Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union, and now – the modern democratic Russia, has consistently asserted its rights to the Arctic, adhering to the sectorial principle. A number of countries at the beginning of the 20th century, however, have questioned Russian ownership of lands and islands previously discovered. This required Russia to act, and sometimes, at the cost of the lives of the best polar explorers. On September 4, 1916 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire sent a circular note to the governments of allied and friendly countries. The note said that all discovered lands and islands located north of the Siberian continental plateau belong to the Russia Empire. Russia was able to make such a statement based on the research of the Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expeditions conducted by Andrey I. Vilkitsky239 in 1913-1914, and the expeditions led by his son, Boris A. Vilkitsky240 in 1914-

The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 23-38. U.S. Secretary of State William Seward held this position from 1861 to 1869 under Presidents Lincoln and Johnson. He significantly contributed to the accession of Russian American territory to the United States, which enemies called the “Seward’s Refrigerator.” Alaska commemorates the last Monday of March as Seward Day. An Alaskan city and a peninsula are named after him there. 238 Dmitry Petrov, Colonial expansion of the United States in Japan in the middle of 19th century (Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955), 277. 239 Andrey Ippolitovich Vilkitsky (1858-1913) – a military hydrographer and geodesist. From 1894 to 1905 he annually led various expeditions to the North. 240 Boris Andreyevich Vilkitsky (1885-1961) – Rear Admiral, polar hydrographer. In 1913-1915, he participated in the Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expedition (GESLO) on the icebreakers Vaygach and Taymyr (B. Vilkitsky was head of the crew on Taymyr), and after the death of his father, Andrey Vilkitsky, Vilkitsky was head of the expedition. He discovered the archipelago Severnaya Zemlya (the former name Emperor Nicholas II Land). Since 1920, B. Vilkitsky was in exile. 236 237

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1915. Their voyages discovered new islands and lands, as at that time, it was not about maritime spaces. Two years later, on September 20, 1918, the government once again sent out a note to foreign governments in which it determined that the islands of Henrietta, Jeannette, Bennetta, Herald, Uyedineniya, Wrangel, Novaya Zemlya, Kolguyev, Vaygach, New Siberian Islands and others were part of Russia. This became the official declaration of the Russian authorities regarding their rights to the Arctic sector, «due to the fact that their belonging to the territories of the Russian Empire has been universally recognized for centuries.”241 Russia then extended its sovereignty to the territorial waters that constitute an area of 12 miles. This decision was formalized by a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of RSFSR “On Protecting of Fish and Beast Lands in the Arctic and the White Sea” of May 24, 1921.242 The document defined the external border in the Barents Sea and enshrined Russia’s rights to the natural resources of the White Sea (the line running from the Kanin Nose Peninsula to Cape St. Nose, and to Chosha Bay) and the Arctic Ocean (from the border with Finland to the north of Novaya Zemlya). Russia also claimed a 12-mile sea zone along the islands and the coast of the mainland. The documents adopted by the USSR drew the attention of other Arctic states. In 1924, Russia’s actions were discussed in the U.S. Congress. Soviet officials reacted to the American claims, and on November 4, 1924 a Memorandum was sent to all states. The paper repeated and confirmed the note of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated September 20, 1916.243 As a result, the special rights of coastal states within their sectors have been recognized by other states that have not only contested the rights of coastal states over the islands and lands of the sector but have also sought special permission for access within the sector.244 On April 15, 1926, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its position concerning the Arctic with the publication of a decree of the Presidium of the Central Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, “Oil matrix of the North,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 9, 2008. 242 “Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of RSFSR of 24.05.1921 ‘On Protecting of Fish and Beast Lands in the Arctic and the White Sea’,” (A decree lost force on 25.01.1928), Consultant-Plus, accessed June 12, 2019. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online .cgi?req=doc&base=ESU&n=17812#048669504632742155. 243 The Memorandum referred to the Washington Convention, signed by the United States and Russia on March 18, 1867. The convention defined the territories for which the USA had no right to make claims. It also stipulated the passage of the eastern border of these lands. The Memorandum emphasized that all the territories claimed by Russia are located to the west of this border, which is in full accordance with the Washington Convention. 244 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 26. 241

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Committee of the USSR “On the Declaration as the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic of the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean.”245 The act de facto formalized the sectorial principle, as it concerned the Arctic territory located between the meridians of 32004'35'' E and 168049'30'' W, excluding the eastern islands of the Spitsbergen Archipelago. The USA, Canada, Norway, and Denmark did not protest, thus agreeing with the sectorial principle of Arctic division. Then, in 1929, All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR issued a resolution “On the Arctic Ocean Islands Administration,” which did not address the legal regime of the Arctic polar sector maritime spaces.246 This allowed the USSR to define the boundaries of the polar possessions from the Kola Peninsula through the North Pole to the Bering Strait. The total area of the polar possessions of the USSR in the sector was 5.8 million km2. The boundaries of the polar sectors were not considered to be recognized as state borders, and the establishment of the polar sector along the meridian lines did not resolve the issue of the legal regime of the maritime spaces belonging to this sector, i.e., the establishment did not concern the seabed or biological resources.247 Practically, the Arctic was cut into five “pieces” with the North Pole as its center. Accordingly, the maritime spaces in the Russian sector of the Arctic were not Russian inland waters. Moreover, the Arctic Ocean should be considered a high sea with all the international legal consequences that apply. At the same time, the Arctic ocean represented a large surface of ice that would therefore be considered a special type of state territory of the five adjacent countries, which divided the water space into polar sectors, and all lands and islands, as well as ice covered surfaces within the polar sector of a country are part of the state territory.248 The Soviet Union was extremely careful to clearly define the eastern, western and northern borders of the Russian sector. In 1935, the USSR officially joined the Paris Treaty, establishing that “the western border of the polar “Decree of Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union of 15.04.1926 ‘On the Declaration as the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic of the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean,” Library of laws and regulations of the USSR, accessed April 14, 2020. http://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/ussr_2885.htm. 246 “Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Council of People’s Commissars of 10.11.1929 ‘On the Arctic Ocean Islands Administration’,” (The Resolution on 26.06.1969), Consultant-Plus, accessed March 12, 2019. http://www.consultant. ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ESU&n=22223#02957958942549521. 247 Alexander Kovalev, Modern International Maritime Law and Practice of its Application (Moscow: Science Book Publishing House, 2003), 119-120. 248 Ibid. 245

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possessions passes along the meridian of 32004′35′′, bypassing the Svalbard square from the east.”249 Then, in 1979, due to inaccurate mapping of the earlier coordinate line running along the middle of the Bering Strait separating the Islands of Ratmanov and Kruzenshtern, the Soviet Union altered the eastern boundaries of its polar possessions. A decree from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 21, 1979, provided “In order to make the eastern boundaries of the polar possessions of the USSR in the Arctic Ocean more clear on Soviet maps, which were defined by a decree of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR on April 15, 1926, we are replacing the last phrase of this decree with the following information with regards to the meridian ‘168 degrees 58 minutes 30 seconds’ by ‘168 degrees 49 minutes 49.4 seconds’.”250 With respect to the actions of Norway and Denmark, the policies of both countries are follows: Norway did not specify Arctic territories within its legislation. However, as noted by Russian legal scholar Alexander A. Kovalev, when signing in June 1997 by the Ministers of the Environment of the Arctic States the “Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines,”251 Norway has determined that its Arctic territory is constituted by the areas of the Norwegian Sea north of 650 N, and the area of polar possessions is 746,000 km2.252 Denmark included Greenland and the Faroe Islands in its Arctic region. The extension of Danish sovereignty to Greenland was consolidated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933. 253 The area of the Danish polar possessions is 372,000 km2.

Thus, in the 20s of the 19th century circumpolar countries actually divided the Arctic using the principle of national sectors, which led to a new international legal concept. This approach, however, was not enshrined in international treaties. Accordingly, the sectorial principle could have been challenged by any of the Arctic states.

Andrei Gorodetsky, Vladimir Ivanov and Boris Filin, “Legal and methodological problems of strategic planning for the development of the Arctic regions of Russia,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economy, No. 4 (Moscow: Publishing House of the Federal State Budgetary of the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014), 4-13. 250 Ibid. 251 Vladimir Selin, “Economic Policy in the Arctic: Comparative Analysis,” Problems of Territory’s Development, no. 5 (2016): 176-190. 252 Ibid. 253 Kovalev, 119-120. 249

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The Soviet Union and Canada have long justified their claims. According to Aleksander N. Vylegzhanin, a member of the Executive Committee of the International Maritime Law Association, “for a long time, the national administration of the Tsarist Russia and Canada in the Arctic did not cause objections from other states.”254 This principle was formulated in the documents of other Arctic countries, recording their special rights and concerns. The United States, Norway, and Denmark relied on their national legislation on the continental shelf, fisheries, and economic zones, which also applied to Arctic areas. In 1945, the USA first introduced the concept of the continental shelf into international law.255 In this regard, U.S. President Truman’s Proclamation No. 2667, promulgated on September 28, 1945, is well known.256 It declared that the natural riches of the surface and subsoil of the continental shelf are under the high seas, but since they are adjacent to the U.S. shores, they belong to the United States and are subject to the jurisdiction and control of the American authorities.257

3.2. HYDROCARBON RESOURCES FUELED INTEREST ON THE ARCTIC The new figures on extensive hydrocarbon accumulations on the Arctic seas shelf and the development of production techniques and technologies have generated momentum to formalize national claims to the Arctic spaces and most importantly – to the shelf, which had significant reserves of natural resources. The first attempt to clarify the issue was the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva on April 29th, 1958. Out of the four adopted documents, the first was the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.258 In the international treaty the parties agreed that “the sovereignty of coastal States extends to the air space over the territorial sea as

Tatyana Romanenko, “The criminal Ocean,” Ogonyok, no. 39, (2006): 32. Artem Gubanov, The Delineation of the continental shelf in the Arctic: international legal problems and perspectives (Moscow: Zerzalo-M, 2015), 104. 256 “Proclamation 2667 of September 28, 1945. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,” accessed January 21, 2020. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_proc_2667.pdf. 257 Ibid. 258 “United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 1958,” United Nations, accessed February 23, 2020. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/ 8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf. 254 255

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well as to its bed and subsoil,”259 and it also defined the conditions for admission of foreign ships to waters of the state.260 The second document, the Convention on the High Seas, also ensured a right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of the state. 261 It stated that the “the freedom of the high seas comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states: freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and freedom to fly over the high seas.”262 The third Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas provided for a right of all states “for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas.”263 The fourth international treaty, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, defined universal rules for its delineation.264 Article 1 of the convention stated “the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 m or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters permit the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.”265 Thus, under the Convention, the continental shelf ends where the depth of the water does not allow for exploitation of natural resources. This means that states are not required to submit any data to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for the justification of rights to the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. The Convention on the Continental Shelf did not define the international legal status of Arctic spaces. At the same time, it contained a clear reference for the right of coastal states “to construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources by establishing safety zones around such installations and devices to take in zone measures necessary for their protection.”266

259

Ibid. Ibid. 261 “United Nations Convention on the High Sea. 1958,” United Nations, accessed January 11, 2020. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf. 262 Ibid. 263 “United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 1958,” United Nations, accessed February 12, 2020. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/ documents/8_1_1958_fishing.pdf. 264 “United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf. 1958,” United Nations, accessed January 23, 2020. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_ continental_shelf.pdf. 265 Ibid. 266 Ibid. 260

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In the 1960s, interest in the issue of the legal regime for the Arctic spaces arose again. The impetus for this process was given by Canada, which believed that the Northwest Passage, which represented a large number of routes through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago belonged to its inland waters.267 In its turn, the U.S. took the position that the passage meets the criteria of the international strait and can be used for unhindered passage along it.268 In 1969, the activities of Humble Oil & Refining Company caused a confrontation between the U.S. and Canada. The company sent its icestrengthened super-tanker Manhattan, which transported oil through the Northwest Passage. Canada gave its permission for the passage, although the U.S side did not apply for it. It would not have affected Canada’s actions, if the weather conditions have not played their roles. The tanker became stuck in ice. It was only thanks to the efforts of the Canadian icebreaker John A. Macdonald, who was assigned to escort the tanker, that the situation did not lead to an environmental disaster. This near-calamity set the precedent for the Canadian government to enact the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act in 1970.269 It allowed Canada to assert its claims to Arctic spaces. At the same time, as Michael Byers pointer out, the act established “strict requirements for the equipment and environmental safety of ships passing within 100 nautical miles of the Canadian Arctic border, which is contrary to international law.”270 The document rekindled discussions once again on the legal regime of Arctic waters. Russian researcher Pavel A. Gudev, referring to the analytical works of IMEMO,271 drew attention to the fact that in 1970 the U.S. proposed to organize an international conference with the aim to develop an international legal regime for the Arctic based on the principle of its internationalization.272 267

The Canadian Arctic Archipelago is made up of over 19 thousand islands and reefs. Michael Byers, “The Legal Status of the Northwest Passage and Arctic Sovereignty of Canada: Past, Present, Desired Future,” The Bulletin of Moscow State University, series: International Relations and World Politics, no. 2 (Moscow: Publishing House of Moscow State University, 2011): 92-128. 269 Richard Bilder, “The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea,” Michigan Law Review, vol. 69, No. 1 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Law School, 1970), 56. 270 Michael Bayers, “The Legal Status of the Northwest Passage and Arctic Sovereignty of Canada: Past, Present, Desired Future,” The Bulletin of Moscow State University. Series: International Relations and World Politics, no. 2 (Moscow: Publishing House of Moscow State University, 2011), 92-128. 271 Grigory Lukyanov, Arctic’s Problems. Analytical paper. IMEMO Archiv (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 1980), 42. 272 Pavel Gudev, “Arctic in the study of IMEMO. Part I,” World Economy and International Relations, vol. 61, no. 5 (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 2017), 99-110. 268

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North American approach was to apply international legal norms regulating the high seas regime to the water space of the Arctic seas, with the exception of 12mile territorial waters.273 The internationalization of the Arctic spaces was supported by the USA, Norway and Denmark. They have not adopted any special documents on the Arctic areas adjacent to their territories, although their national legislations have extended to these areas. As Vylegzhanin said, due to the fact that “the length of the American Arctic coastline is incomparably shorter than in Russia or Canada, it makes sense that the U.S. prefer to internationalize the high-latitude area of the Arctic beyond the 200-mile limit from the coasts of Canada and Russia.”274 Debates on the international legal status did not prevent the USSR from starting geological investigations in its part of the Arctic shelf. The Soviet largescale scientific research was aimed at obtaining data on the hydrocarbon potential. Additionally, the Northern Sea Route was actively operating, and the exploitation of northern territories happened. Thanks to the USSR’s actions at that time, new cities and port infrastructure were built in the coastal areas. A new stage in defining the international legal status of the Arctic spaces began after the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Montego Bay on December 10, 1982.275 The convention entered into force in 1994.276 The UNCLOS’s adoption was preceded by years of negotiation. With a number of amendments and clarifications, it also contained provisions of the following documents: the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The UN Convention of 1982 defined that all ocean spaces are divided into inland waters, territorial waters, contiguous zone, archipelagic waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, high seas, and seabed area.277

In 1970, the UN General Assembly established the “International Ocean Governance.” Under the regime, all states have the right to exploit the high seas and are responsible for their resources. 274 Romanenko, 32. 275 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982,” United Nations, accessed December 16, 2019. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 276 The convention was subsequently amended on July 23, 1994. See “Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. New York, July 28, 1994,” United Nations, accessed December 23, 2020. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6-a&chapter=21&clang=_en. 277 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982.” 273

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With respect to internal waters, Article 8 states that “with the exception of the list provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the state; where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in Article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal water areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this convention shall exist in those waters.”278 As for the territorial sea, the convention describes the territory, as “the sovereignty of a coastal state that extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters stretch to the adjacent belts of the sea.” In addition, “every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with the convention.”279 According to Article 33, “in a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea” and “the contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”280 With respect to archipelagic waters, Article 49 defines that “the sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with Article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast; this sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein; this sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part IV; the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic state of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.”281 Article 57 of the Convention states that the exclusive economic zone “is an area outside and adjacent to the territorial sea which is subject to the special legal regime” established in the convention, and “according to which the rights 278

Ibid. Ibid. 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid. 279

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and jurisdiction of the coastal state and freedom rights of other states are regulated by the relevant provisions of the UN Convention of 1982.”282 The continental shelf “is the area of the seabed, including its subsoil, extending from the outer limit of the territorial sea for the entire natural prolongation of the land (mainland or island) territory of states up to the limits defined by international law (200 nautical miles or about 370 km) over which a coastal state exercises sovereign rights for the exploration and exploitation of its natural resources. All states have a 200-mile shelf, whether or not there is territorial continuity (Article 76). According to Article 136, the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, are the common heritage of mankind. The common heritage is also the seabed resources.283 “In respect to the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, all parties with relation to the 1982 Convention are required to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the United Nations.”284 High Seas are waters that “are open to all states, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to the Convention; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all states with due regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this convention with respect to activities in the area.” The international seabed area is “the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”285 The convention reaffirmed the absolute sovereignty of the coastal state over the 12-mile zone of territorial waters. It established that the state has the sole sovereign right to dispose of the continental shelf in its entirety. Outside territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone up to 200 miles wide may be established. Within that zone, the coastal state exercises its sovereign rights and 282

Ibid. Kovalev, 416. 284 Anatoly Kolodkin, Vasily Gutsulyak and Julia Bobrova, The World Ocean. International Legal Regime. Main Problems (Moscow: Statute Publishing House, 2007), 598-599. 285 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982.” 283

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jurisdiction over navigation, fishing, exploration and exploitation of natural resources. However, the sea area within the 200 miles zone remained open for navigation and fishing. The document also defined that the exclusive economic zone is not part of the state territory. In its EEZ, the state has the sovereign rights to extract mineral resources. The rest of the subsoil is in common use. Beyond the exclusive economic and legal zones of coastal states, an “international seabed area” was approved. Its resources have been declared as “common heritage of mankind,”286 for which no state, individual or natural or juridical person can claim (Art. 137). 287 The convention determined that the exclusive economic zone could not exceed 200 miles. However, bordering countries may agree during the negotiation process to extend the exclusive economic zone beyond 200 miles by an additional 150 miles if the state can prove that the Arctic shelf is an extension of its territory. In this case, the limit of the continental shelf should be established based on the recommendations of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).288 Thus, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea formalized the limits of the territorial claims of the Arctic States. As noted by Ivan S. Zhudro, a member of the Scientific-Expert Council of the Maritime Board under the Government of the Russian Federation, “Article 76 of the convention did not address the issue of delimitation, i.e., the question of the continental shelf. Article 83 is devoted to this problem. It provides for the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts by means of an agreement.”289 The inland waters and territorial sea are the space within the state borders, where Russia has full sovereign rights. These internal spaces can be included into the Arctic zone of Russia without any diplomatic complications. Outside the state border there are two categories of water areas: the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation. With respect to them, the Russian Federation has various limited sovereign rights. They are defined by an international treaty – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and by two federal laws: the Federal Law of 17 December, 1998,

286

Ibid. Ibid. 288 “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” Oceans and Law of the Sea, accessed December 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm. 289 Ivan Zhudro, “International legal regime of the Arctic Ocean Bottom. Delineation issues,” Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University, no. 4, vol, 14 (2014): 4-19. 287

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“On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation,”290 and the Federal Law of 30 October, 1995, “On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation.”291 The fact that Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic is spatially defined must also be taken into account. Russia has its internationally recognized borders. Concerning the Russian Federation’s continental shelf in the Arctic, the northern limit of the shelf has been defined. At the same time, a state may submit an application to extend the continental shelf. This issue falls within the competence of the CLCS. Mikhail A. Zhukov, a member of the Council for Arctic and Antarctic under the Federation Council of the Russian Federation pointed out that “nothing prevents Russia from including inland sea waters and territorial sea in its Arctic zone. These are the most important water areas for the development of the Arctic zone of Russia: the space of seaports, bays, straits, shallow coastal shelf. As for the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation, due to their location beyond the state border, they can be extended by the AZRF regime in terms of stimulating economic activities carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and national legislation. With regard to the regime of free navigation within the limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Russian Federation has the right to regulate navigation in order for environmental security of ice-covered water areas, which is implemented in federal legislation.”292 The aim to establish the sectoral division of the Arctic was the desire of individual Arctic states, particularly Russia, to exclude from the general provisions of international law areas whose geographical and climatic characteristics make them especially important for these states.293 A lot of lawyers held this view and believe that the Arctic Ocean is a specific case with unique features in terms of legal regulation. Maritime spaces in the Arctic “cannot be considered in the same context, as maritime spaces in general.”294 At “Federal Law No. 191 of 17.12.1998 ‘On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation’.” 291 “Federal Law No. 187 of 30.11.1995 ‘On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation’.” 292 “On the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Interview with M.A. Zhukov. November 28, 2016,” The Rare Earth Magazine, accessed January 28, 2020. http://rareearth.ru/ru/pub/20161128/02717.html. 293 The International Law, ed. A.N. Vylegzhanin (Moscow: Urait, 2009), 181-192. 294 Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, “On the legal regime of the Arctic,” in International Sea Law, 2nd edition, ed. M. Blitschenko (Moscow: Publishing House, 1988), 139. 290

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the same time, Russia and Canada have not issued a single piece of legislation declaring any special rights in maritime areas beyond the limits of sovereignty not provided for by international law.295

3.3. THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 1982 AND POLICIES OF THE ARCTIC STATES The adoption of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 has not diminished the urgency of how to define the international legal status of the Arctic. There were discussions on two principles. The first one was on a sector principle, which assumed that every state owned a sector of the Arctic Ocean, with the highest point at the North Pole. It allowed the Arctic states to stipulate special conditions in the Arctic, thus excluding them from international law areas that are of particular importance to Arctic states. As noted by the experts Gorodetsky, Ivanov and Filin, “the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 does not abolish the sectoral principle of determining the status of territories in the Arctic.”296 The second principle was the convention principle, based on the UN Convention of 1982. In this case, each of the Arctic states “received” its continental shelf, and beyond it, the seabed and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. Consequently, the sector of the Arctic states was limited to the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone. These two approaches had different grounds. The convention principle was based on an international instrument, and namely the UN Convention of 1982, while the sectoral method reflected the historical approaches of some Arctic states but lacked a legislative basis. Under the 1982 UN Convention, the side lines marking the borders of the Arctic sectors are not the state borders of the respective states that pass through the outer limit of the territorial waters of the Arctic states. The sectoral approach has not been further consolidated in international legal instruments. Russian scholar Pavel V. Savaskov wrote that the analysis of the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and other international legal acts did not allow to conclude that the legal regime of the Arctic maritime spaces

295 296

Savaskov, 34. Gorodetsky, Ivanov and Filin, 4-13.

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should be based on the sector principle.297 Another Russian specialist Igor N. Bartsits drew attention to the fact that “a sectoral division of the Arctic did not cause any objections from other, non-arctic states at the time of its implementation and was de facto adopted. This de facto recognition was sufficient until, as they say, due to the development of science and technology, the issue of Arctic resources exploitation moved from the science fiction field into the practical sphere.”298 An essential point was the fact that when the 1982 Convention was adopted, none of the Arctic states declared the need for special international legal provisions that would establish a special legal status for Arctic spaces. Accordingly, this customary rule was not confirmed in the Convention on the Law of the Sea.299 As a result, in the 1990s, the Arctic states, except the USA, ratified the international treaty of 1982. Norway ratified it in 1996, Russia in 1997, Canada in 2003, and Denmark in 2004. By ratifying the convention, Russia actually abandoned the sectoral approach to Arctic division. This principle had been advocated for a long time, although it was not confirmed by international documents. Some Russian researchers expressed the view that if the sectoral division was abandoned, then when calculating the area of the Russian shelf, based on the Convention, “Russia loses sovereign rights over approximately 1.7 million km2 of the Arctic sector.”300 However, one should not forget that by ratifying the UN Convention of 1982, Russia recognized the priority of international norms. In fact, Russia capitulated in the Arctic and began to lose its historical priority in space exploitation there.301 This was despite the fact that no one questioned the document that was adopted in the USSR in 1926. As mentioned above, the rights of the USSR in the Arctic areas belonging to its territory were secured by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the Continental Shelf of the USSR” of 1968302 and a law of

297

Savaskov, 33. Bartsits, “The legal status of the Arctic.” 299 Ibid. 300 The “New” Arctic and Russian Interests, 27. 301 Yuri Lukin, The Great Redrawing of the Arctic (Arkhangelsk: Publishing House of Northern (Arctic) Federal University, 2010), 160. 302 “Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR of 6.02.1968 ‘On the Continental Shelf of the USSR’, a decree became invalid due to the adoption of the Federal Law ‘On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation of 30.11.1995’,” Consultant-Plus, accessed February 9, 2019. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online. cgi?req=doc&base=ESU&n=799#07137403247624845. 298

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the USSR “On the State Border of the USSR” of 1982.303 On April 22, 1989, the Arctic zone of Russia was defined by the decision of the State Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Arctic. The Soviet Union proclaimed its right to all islands and lands that were or could be discovered within the sector in the future. The Soviet Union assumed that the Arctic states had special rights within their Arctic sector. Similar rights within the so-called Soviet sector were recognized by other states that not only did not dispute Soviet Union rights, but also applied for permission to enter the sector. Thus, the USSR approach, as well as permission to access from other states, illustrated that the sector principle was recognized by all Arctic states. At the same time, some other Russian specialists believe that despite the ratification, Russia could have insisted on granting the Arctic spaces a special status. They refer to Article 234 of the convention, which states that “coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas.”304 Interpretation of this article as recognition of the sectoral division of the Arctic is highly questionable. It is an environmental issue and, moreover, the article is silent on the sectoral division of Arctic spaces. It is unlikely that the UN Convention could have contained such assumptions, since its adoption was precisely intended to question the positions of the USSR and Canada, which followed the sector principle, as reflected in their national legislation. The Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 regulates the management and protection of the seabed. However, the nature of the operations on hydrocarbon resources, as well as subsoil use in the Arctic Ocean, are not reflected in this document. Therefore, the Arctic states have yet to regulate rights to the exploitation of subsoil. As already mentioned, the United States did not accede to the 1982 Convention and limited the extent of its continental shelf to the provisions of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April, 1958. Although back in 1994 the administration of President Clinton prepared all the documents required, the Senate did not agree with the arguments presented, and the

“Federal Law of 24.11.1982 ‘On the State Border of the USSR’, the Law became invalid due to the adoption of the Agreement on Foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ of 8.12.1991,” Consultant-Plus, accessed January 23, 2020. http://www.consultant.ru/ cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ESU&n=1534#0702 413749589784. 304 Kovalev, 122. 303

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convention was not ratified.305 As a result, the U.S. never signed the convention and, accordingly, retained the possibility to claim the continental shelf located 200 miles away. According to Vylegzhanin, “the refusal of the USA to ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 will not only not limit the opportunities of the USA in the Arctic, but also give it additional competitive advantages in the use of the shelf resources.”306 At the same time, the U.S., as a party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, “believes that there is a need for strict compliance with the provisions of Article 76 of this convention in defining the outer limit of the continental shelf.”307 In 2008, the U.S. Senate adopted two documents on boundaries defining: the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Act.308 After a while in the same year, the University of New Hampshire released data, according to which the continental shelf of the United States extends north of Alaska more than 100 nautical miles further than previously assumed.309 U.S. President Bush, Jr., in a directive on Arctic Policy of January 2009 to the Senate called for a decision to accede to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but with no success.310 Commenting on the U.S. Arctic policy, Ivan S. Zhudro stressed that “for the United States, which has not ratified the Convention of 1982, there is no remote, 200-mile, and geological criteria of Article 76 that determines the length of the shelf. At the same time, the length of the American shelf may be justified by the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 defining the limits of the extension of sovereign rights to the shelf to the depths that allow their development (Article 1 of the 1958 Convention).”311

“Non-participating in the Convention on the Law of the Sea gives the United States advantages,” RIA-Novosti, accessed January 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120719/704132667.html. 306 Ibid. 307 Yuri Kazmin, “On the Outer Limit of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic,” The International Affairs, No. 3 (2010): 12-35. 308 “The U.S. Senate adopted a regulation on defining boundaries of a continental shelf,” Newsru.com, accessed December 13, 2019. https://www.newsru.com/world/ 16jan2009/senat.html. 309 Andrei Terekhov, “A very cold war for energy recourses,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 11, 2008. 310 Dinan Stephen, “Bush stakes U.S. claim in Arctic,” The Washington Times, accessed January 23, 2020. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/13/bush-policy-stakes-usclaim-in-arctic/. 311 Zhudro, 4-19. 305

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3.4. TOWARDS THE ARCTIC RESOURCES The accelerating internationalization of the Arctic was facilitated by the creation of the Arctic Council in Ottawa, Canada, in 1996.312 The main objectives of the body are to organize and coordinate works among the Arctic Ocean coastal states on Arctic issues (with the exception of the military ones) as well as cooperation in the field of ecology and the conservation of Arctic nature and fauna. However, the broad representation of countries in this organization and its tasks are rather aimed at preventing a return to a sector principle, which is in line with the American policy, since for the U.S. the internationalization of the Arctic has opened up additional opportunities for access to hydrocarbon resources on its shelf. In this matter, the United States counts on the support of the observer countries: China, Japan, Germany, Canada, India, South Korea, as they have declared their readiness to exploit the Arctic shelf. Many of them, in order to “enter” the region, equip scientific expeditions for declaring the rights to the maximum possible areas of the Arctic Ocean. A number of Russian experts note that the position of some domestic authorities leads to a de facto rejection of the sector principle in the Arctic, as it based on the incorrect international legal hypothesis: national jurisdiction may be justified under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea if there is geological evidence of the continuation of the outer limit of the Russian continental shelf beyond the 200-mile zone. Proponents of this approach believe that this will further strengthen Russia’s priority in the exploitation of natural resource-rich shelf spaces in the Arctic Ocean. At present, within the dispute on the size of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the Russian Federation itself damages the principle of sectoral division of the Arctic, although it is the most important issue for the country and is more justified in international legal and political terms. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea should not have changed the situation in any way.313

312

The Arctic Council includes eight Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA. Within the council, England, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and several international organizations have observer statute. 313 Pavel Gudev, “International political contradictions in the Arctic and Russian interests,” in Russia in World Economy and International Relations, ed. A.Kuznetsov and F. Voitolovsky (Moscow: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS, 2009): 90.

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In May 2008, in Ilulissat, Greenland, a conference of foreign ministers of the “Arctic Five” adopted the Ilulissat Declaration.314 The document states that the five coastal states “see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” and “recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean.” The declaration stressed that the Arctic states are committed to the existing international legal framework that “provides a solid foundation for responsible management” in the region.315 The U.S. authorities continued to advocate the internationalization of the Arctic and broad access to its resources by all interested countries. In March 2010, at a meeting of foreign ministers of the Russian Federation, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, U.S. Secretary of State H. Clinton said: “meaningful international discussions on Arctic issues should involve all those who have legitimate interests in the region. And I hope that the Arctic will always demonstrate our ability to work together without creating new dividing lines.”316 The meeting of the “Arctic Five” was the second attempt to address delimitation issues under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The principle of internationalization of the Arctic will mean the application of a common international regime. This position is advocated by many nonArctic countries. China317 and India have already organized research expeditions to the Arctic. European countries are also in favor of the internationalization of Arctic spaces. They believe that the exploitation of energy resources, regulation of fisheries and shipping issues should be addressed jointly. Within the European Union, Denmark has been actively presenting the Union’s interests in the Arctic. Due to the exacerbation of political debate over the division of the Arctic, the strengthening of its presence in the Arctic has become even more urgent for the EU. In the middle of 2010, Brussels launched official negotiations on the admission of Iceland to the EU, which applied only in July 2009. After Iceland’s accession, the European Union could expand towards the Arctic, where large

“The Ilulissat Declaration. Arctic Ocean Conference Ikulissat, Greenland. May 28, 2008,” Arctictoday.com, accessed November 23, 2019. https://www.arctictoday.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. 315 Ibid. 316 Andrei Terekhov, “The closest allies have not shared the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 31, 2010. 317 In 2001, the first scientific expedition of the Science Society of China arrived at Spitsbergen. China erected a research station in Ny-Alesund on Svalbard. 314

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accumulations of raw materials are believed to be located.318 However, after six years of negotiations, Iceland refused to join the EU. In turn, on January 1, 2009, Iceland became Chairman of the Nordic Council of Ministers319 and declared its priority to create a computer data bank on navigation in high latitudes because of the increasing number of ships engaged in commercial voyages in Arctic waters.320 To sum up, two factors create instability in the region: firstly, the absence of clear legislation to regulate subsoil use in the Arctic, and, secondly, concerns of other states of unilateral action by the U.S. The tone of the negotiations on the international legal status is set by the discussions on the timing of oil and gas exploitation on the Arctic seas shelf. At the same time, as a rule, it is noted that the effective exploitation of Arctic deposits is impossible without a clear delineation of the outer limit of the shelf. Such a statement indicates that most countries are technically unprepared to exploit the Arctic accumulations. In this regard, agreeing with the need to define the boundaries of Arctic spaces, it is necessary to understand that this process will be time-consuming and costly. According to Vylegzhanin, “you should be very careful with any legal initiatives that concern the future of the Arctic. The Arctic legal policy of our country (Russia – authors’ note) is a matter of the future.”321 The countries have not started to develop oil and gas fields in the Arctic yet. They are discussing the outer limits of the continental shelf. The CLCS has received applications for ownership of various areas of the Arctic from Russia (December 20, 2001), Canada (December 10, 2013),322 Denmark (December 15, 2014). The latter went beyond its national polar sector and was attributed to the Danish shelf, not only the North Pole, but also a large part of the polar sector of Russia.323 Later on, on August 3, 2015, Russia submitted again its application which was based on the deep seabed drilling and obtaining soil samples, in order Evgeny Grigoriev, “Brussels is preparing for the battle for the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 28, 2010. 319 The Nordic Council of Ministers also includes Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. 320 Valery Zhuravel, “The Chairmanship in the Arctic Council: from Finland to Iceland,” Contemporary Europe-Sovremennaya Evropa, No. 4 (2019): 97-107. 321 Romanenko, 32. 322 Alexander Bratersky and Alexander Atasuntsev, “Russia’s exceptional shelf,” Gazeta.ru, accessed November 13, 2020. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/08/08_a_10109081. shtml. 323 “Comments by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the filing of Denmark’s claim to the Arctic continental shelf,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed February 28, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/legal_problems_ofinternational_cooperation/-/asset_publisher/HCN0yFLs7lFy/content/id/849083. 318

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to prove that some areas are an extension of its continental shelf, and therefore by right belong to it. In 2019 (May 23, 2019), Canada applied.324 Table 4 lists the territorial and equatorial claims of Arctic states. Table 4. Claims of Arctic states325 Arctic State Denmark

Norway Canada

Russia USA

Claims to control                

the Northwest Sea Route; the North Pole in the Greenland area; Hans Island and the island archipelago (untitled) adjacent to Greenland and Canada; a part of the Lincoln Sea area of 200 km2. the Northern Sea Route; to most of the North Pole. the Northwest Sea Route; to Hans Island and the island archipelago (untitled) adjacent to Greenland; to a large area of the Beaufort Sea; to extend its shelf to include the Lomonosov Ridge. the largest shelf in the Arctic – 1.3 million km2, including the North Pole; the North Sea Route (refusal to transfer it under international administration). the Northwest Sea Route; the North Sea Route, not under Russian control; to a large area of the Beaufort Sea; to act as arbitrator in all Arctic disputes.

3.5. THE DELIMITATION OF ARCTIC SPACES In 1944, Finland, the USSR, and Great Britain, acting on behalf of the countries at war with Finland concluded an agreement in Moscow. Under the document, Finland returned the Badjanak region (Pätsamo) to the Soviet Union. The region was voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet Union under two peace treaties: the first one dated October 14, 1920,326 and the second one March

324

325

326

“Canada has submitted an application to the UN to define the boundaries of its shelf in the Arctic,” RIA-Novosti, accessed October 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20190524/1554864337.html. Based on the data of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, published in Business Week Russia of June 17, 2006, and added by the authors. “The Treaty of Tartu of February 14, 1920,” HroNo.ru, accessed February 17, 2020. http://www.hroNo.ru/dokum/192_dok/1920tartu.php.

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12, 1940327. The only oceanic port of Pechenga and all Finland was the port of Liinakhamari, which had access to the Barents Sea. For almost 40 years the USSR (Russia) and Norway could not divide the maritime space in the Barents Sea. In February 1957, Soviet and Norwegian authorities concluded an agreement on the maritime border between the states in Varanger Fjord, and a protocol describing the delimitation line of this border.328 Then, in 1974, the Soviet Union offered Norway to base its maritime delimitation on historical legal grounds for the western boundary of the Arctic sector, provided for in 1926. Norway, however, which does not have its own Arctic sector, “insisted on the application of an equidistance line without regard to historical bases.”329 In June 1977, the Norwegian Government unilaterally decided to establish a 200-mile fisheries protection zone around the Svalbard Archipelago330 and Bear Island, and created a number of binding orders for vessels fishing in the area, i.e., control functions.331 Shortly, the Soviet Union voiced against the actions of the Norwegian side, noting that the government’s decision to establish a 200-mile fishing protection zone meant “non-compliance with Norway’s obligations under the Svalbard Treaty of 1920.”332

“The Treaty of Peace between the Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of March 12, 1940,” Heninen.net, accessed November 16, 2019. http://heninen.net/sopimus/1940.htm. 328 “Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the maritime border between USSR and Norway in Varanger Fjord of February 15, 1957,” Digital Fund of Legal and Normative Documentation, accessed on November 19, 2019. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1900087. 329 Konstantin Voronov, “The successful conclusion of the Treaty between Russia and Norway on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean: its historical role and international political significance,” (Speech, the Moscow House of Nationalities, Commentative meeting of the Russian Society of Friends of Norway, May 13, 2011), Norge.ru, accessed January 21, 2020. http://www.norge.ru/2728/. 330 In Norway, the archipelago is called Svalbard (“Land of the cold shore”). In Russia until the 19th century the archipelago was called Grumant. Spitsbergen Archipelago is located in the Arctic Ocean, at the junction of three seas: the Norwegian, Barents and Greenland Seas. It consists of more than a thousand islands, the total area of which is more than 62 thousand km2. The archipelago is almost 500 km long and about 400 km wide. West Svalbard is the largest and only island in the archipelago where people live permanently. Among the larger islands are also Prince Charles Land, North-Eastern Land, Edge Islands, Barents Islands, White Islands, Bear Islands, Hope Islands. About 60% of the archipelago is covered with ice and snow. The relief of the archipelago is predominantly mountainous. See Igor Mikhailov, Spitsbergen Archipelago: Crossroads of events and fortunes (Moscow: Publishing House Academic World, 2004). 331 Vyacheslav Zilanov, Does Russia lose the Arctic? (Moscow: Algorithm, 2013), 44. 332 Lev Poval, “Russian-Norwegian agreements about the division of Arctic spaces,” The Arctic and North Journal, No. 6 (2011): 118-144. 327

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During the preparation of the Svalbard Treaty and its signing in Paris, Russian representatives were not invited, although Russia had participated jointly with Sweden and Norway as early as 1914 in the development of the multilateral agreement on the management of Svalbard.333 Article 10 of the treaty stated, “until the recognition by the high contracting parties of a Russian government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present treaty, both Russian citizens and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties.”334 There was no article in the document on the restructuring of the right to establish a zone of national jurisdiction around this part of the territory (e.g., shelf, fishing and economic zone). According to the Svalbard Treaty, the sovereignty of Norway was established over the Spitsbergen Archipelago, and states parties to the treaty were granted the right to develop and use the resources of the archipelago and to conduct operations in its territorial waters. Beyond its territorial waters (12 nautical miles), all countries had the right to free commercial and military navigation, free passage over the sea, and the right to fish and engage in other economic activities. There was no exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles) around Spitsbergen, which operated only off the Norwegian mainland coast. The EEZ retained the freedom of navigation and the related exploitation of vessels, while the coastal state was granted sovereign rights with regard to the exploration, exploitation and conservation of natural resources on the seabed, in its subsoil and covering waters, as well as other activities. Due to the mining of coal by enterprises of some states on Svalbard, it has been granted demilitarized zone status. Under Article 9, Norway undertook “not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base,”335 and in “not to construct any fortification” in the territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes.336 Norway’s sovereignty extended to Spitsbergen’s land area, giving the other states equal rights to economic operations. Russia and Norway had sovereign rights to the shelf in the Svalbard area. Nevertheless, Norway considered it possible to extend Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. This 333

The participants of the Paris conference had to recognize the significant contribution of Russia to the centuries-long activity on the exploitation and research of the archipelago. 334 “The Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920,” Library.artcicportal.org, accessed January 17, 2020. http://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf. 335 Ibid. 336 Ibid.

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arbitrary interpretation of the treaty in relation to the economic zone created a legally unusual situation. Fishing by other countries cannot be prohibited within Svalbard’s territorial waters, however, it can be excluded within the 200-mile zone of resource jurisdiction outside these territorial waters. In 1924, the Soviet Union recognized Norway’s sovereignty over Spitsbergen, and in 1935 joined the treaty. In 1944, the USSR took the initiative to jointly manage Svalbard with Norway on the basis of a condominium, but this proposal was rejected.337 It should be noted that the Norwegians, having actually captured Spitsbergen, made it a prosperous “Arctic oasis.” Norway, as the main NATO support base in northern Europe, set up satellite tracking stations on Svalbard, equipped a military airfield and provided its territory for training landing units of the Marines of England, the U.S. and Germany. In addition, the Norwegians built the Global Seed Vault, where seeds from around the world are collected in case of nuclear war. The Soviet Union limited itself to creating the minimum necessary infrastructure for coal mining from 1946 to 1991, and practically abandoned it.338 The Russian-Norwegian negotiations over the Barents Sea did not prevent the signing of other treaties regulating fisheries: the first one addressed cooperation in the fishing industry of April 11, 1975, and the second one was about mutual relations in the field of fisheries of October 15, 1976.339 In 1978, the Soviet and Norwegian sides concluded an agreement establishing a zone of joint fisheries jurisdiction in the Barents Sea concerning the disputed water area or so-called grey zone340 or sector in the Barents Sea with the area of 67,500 km2. 341

Alexander Porzel, “The dispute about Svalbard is not over yet,” Regnum, accessed December 21, 2019.https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1451899.html. 338 Russia began mining coal in 1913, bringing 5000 poods of coal to St. Petersburg in the same year. 339 “The Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” accessed January 17, 2020. https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ TREATIES/NOR-RUS2010.PDF. 340 “The grey zone (sector) is a fishing area, which includes part of the disputed waters and parts of the exclusive economic zones of Norway and Russia. The idea of creating the so-called Soviet-Norwegian grey zone of cooperation was put forward in 1976 by the Norwegian Minister of Maritime Law J. Evensen. 341 “Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea with Attached Protocol of January 11, 1978,” Digital Fund of Legal and Normative Documentation, accessed January 9, 2020. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901827469. 337

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This zone provided for a total catch quota of both states, as well as catch quotas for third states under Soviet or Norwegian licenses. The water areas were divided into the exclusive economic zone of Russia, the exclusive economic zone of Norway, an adjacent area for joint catching, which is located in close proximity to the mainland parts of the two countries and in the grey zone, the fish protection zone of Spitsbergen, a part of the high seas not included in the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. A collision between countries arose due to the fact that each side offered its own version of the delimitation line. Norway first favored a division along a midline equidistant from the Russian islands and Spitsbergen. The USSR, and then Russia, advocated the principle of justice, noting the need to take into account the special circumstances existing in the Barents Sea. On this basis it was supposed to use the western border of the Soviet polar possessions, adopted by a decree of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR of April 15, 1926, when delimiting. The reason for the refusal to make concessions to each other was the presence of one of the promising areas of hydrocarbon reserves on the shelf – an oil and gas bearing field – the Fedynsky Vault.342 In 2003, Norway set national fishing regulations. A year later, it unilaterally increased the width of its territorial waters in the Barents Sea, moving the border from 4 miles to 12 miles, and soon three Russian trawlers were detained in this 12-mile zone, which crossed the border near the Spitsbergen Archipelago. In 2005, Russian-Norwegian relations deteriorated following the incident with the Russian trawler Electron, as it was fishing in the controversial grey area.343 In 2005, the Norwegian government classified the European Arctic: the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the southern Arctic Ocean as a region of strategic priority. In the report to the Storting of 2004-2005 the “Opportunities and Challenges in the North” the government formulated policy objectives for the northern regions.344 The following year, the Norwegian Strategy of the High Atle Staalesen, “What do the subsoils of Fedynsky Vault hide?” Pro-Arctic, accessed February 8, 2020. https://pro-arctic.ru/28/07/2013/press/4215. 343 The Russian trawler Elektron was stopped by Norwegian Coast Guard vessels and two Norwegian inspectors were boarded. They wanted to escort the detained vessel to their port of Tromsø, but Captain Electron V. Yarantsev disobeyed the order and took the vessel to the Russian economic zone with two Norwegian inspectors. Elektron was escorted by two Norwegian coast guard vessels, but no force was used. Eventually, with permission from the Russian side, the Coast Guard vessel Tromsø entered Russian territorial waters and took on board its inspectors. The Elektron came to Murmansk, and in 2006 its captain was fined 100 thousand rubles. 344 “Integrated Management of the Marine Environment of the Barents Sea and the Sea Areas off the Lofoten Islands. Report №8 to the Storting (2005-2006),” The Royal Norwegian Ministry 342

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North was presented.345 As its authors stressed, “the question of the international importance of the northern regions also concerned both Russian and Norwegian oil and gas resources located in the Barents Sea and future energy transportation routes.”346 Since then, Norway’s foreign policy in the Arctic has been guided by this strategy. Its key message was that by 2020 Norway should be a leader in scientific research and dominant in this region of the world. 347 In 2006, Norway asked the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to include 250,000 km2 of the Arctic shelf in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, insisting that Lomonosov Ridge belongs to it. Three years later, the CLCS approved the request. The Commission’s decision enabled Norway to extend its jurisdiction by 235,000 km2 of the Arctic shelf, which represented about 75% of the country’s territory. 348 As a result, Norway, having strengthened itself in the Arctic, was the first Arctic state whose application was approved by the CLCS.349 In 2007, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy completed a seabed mapping exercise north of Spitsbergen. As a consequence, Norway began to claim waters six times larger than its land area, considering Svalbard as an extension of the Norwegian shelf. In April 2010, Russia and Norway, after 40 years of negotiations, managed to find a compromise on a disputed territory of 175,000 km2. At the meeting with the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, and Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, it was decided to divide the disputed area of the Barents Sea approximately into equal sections (about 88,000 km2) along the modified median line, into western and eastern parts. Beyond this line, Russia and Norway pledged not to claim the sovereign rights of each other. The agreements reached during the visit were consolidated on 15 September, 2010, in Murmansk by signing the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents

of the Environment, accessed February 17, 2020. http://www.barentsportal.com/ barentsportal/documents/no_management_plan_ 2006_barents_sea.pdf. 345 The strategy was updated in 2009, but the main policy goals remained unchanged. 346 “Norwegian Government Strategy for the Northern Regions (2005-2006),” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed February 23, 2020. https://www.regjeringen.no/ globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategiru.pdf. 347 Ibid. 348 Alexander Samozhnev and Daria Yureva, “Oil in muddy water,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 13, 2009. 349 International Relations of Russia in the “New Political Spaces.” Space. Subpolar Zones. Air and Sea Spaces. Global Information Sphere, ed. A. Bogaturov (Moscow: Lenand, 2011), 62.

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Sea and Arctic Ocean.350 In the preamble, the parties referred to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.351 Russia has once again confirmed that its policy in the Arctic is based on international documents that do not provide for the division of Arctic spaces based on the sector principle.352 Officially, the Russian-Norwegian treaty is considered a major diplomatic breakthrough, as contentious issues in bilateral relations have been resolved. The division of the disputed sea area paved the way for the development of oil and gas fields on the shelf in that area. According to optimistic forecasts, about 2% of world oil and gas reserves are located there,353 and the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment reported that geological and recoverable gas reserves in that region reach 5.87 trillion m3, and oil reserves - 1.36 billion tons and 410 million tons, respectively. Estimates on the Barents Sea shelf exceed 7 billion tons of fuel equivalent.354 However, some experts have strongly criticized the agreements. They believed that the completion of the Russian-Norwegian agreement of 2010 was a mistake.355 The critics noted that Russia should not have rushed to sign the treaty with Norway due to many controversial terms. Moreover, the specialists considered the document a clone of a similar treaty – the co-called Shevardnadze-Baker Treaty– the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Line of Maritime Delimitation, signed on June 1, 1990, in Washington, USA.356 According to Mikhail Delyagin, Head of the Institute of Globalization Problems, “the unjustified transfer of the shelf with oil and gas reserves of 30 billion euros to Norway has not only damaged our country by denying us access to modern technology”357 (Russia – authors’ note), but it also deprived Norway of incentives to participate in the development of the Russian shelf”358 The representative of UNIVER Investment Group Company, Dmitry “The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed January 23, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/707. 351 Ibid. 352 Ibid. 353 Konyshev and Sergunin, “The strategy of Canada in the Arctic and Russia: is it possible to find mutual?” 47. 354 Vladimir Shishlin, “Indisputable Arctic,” Interfax, accessed September 27, 2019. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/154965. 355 Valery Polovinkin and Andrei Fomichev, Russian North (Saint Petersburg: Vozdukh, Publishing House, 2013), 343. 356 Vyacheslav Zilanov, The Secrets of Fish Diplomacy (Moscow: Algorithm, 2013), 131. 357 Mikhail Delyagin, “Freedom to Dmitry Medvedev,” Moskovskij Komsomolets, accessed September 18, 2019. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2013/05/26/859789-svobodu-dmitriyumedvedevu.html. 358 Ibid. 350

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Aleksandrov, pointed out that Russia is unlikely to start exploring the Arctic shelf in the coming years, as it does not have the technology and equipment necessary to organize the production of hydrocarbons in difficult Arctic climate.359 Russian experts also stressed: “we have voluntarily given up the richest oil and gas fields explored by Soviet geologists. In particular, the Vault of Fedynsky was given to the Norwegians. The reserves of gas condensate at the Vault of Fedynsky are estimated at about 10 trillion m3, which is three times more than the Shtokman field.”360 According to the report of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, when the Norwegian side carries out exploration on an area of 44,000 km2 (40% of the area, which was transferred to Norway under the contract) is about 300 million m3 of hydrocarbons (about 1.9 billion barrels). At current prices, it amounts to about 30 billion dollars.361 Russian fishermen are also dissatisfied with the bilateral treaty. They believe that Russia had received areas with much poorer fish stocks and much worse climate conditions, while Norway had the most fish-rich areas. Some experts note that Russian fishermen would lose about 20 thousand tons of seafood annually.362 In summer 2011, the Russian-Norwegian Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean came into force.363 It defined the exclusive maritime boundary between the two countries. However, it in no way concerned the status of waters and the shelf around the Spitsbergen Archipelago. By the signing of the treaty, Norway has adopted a stricter policy in the Svalbard region. In particular, in 2011, the Norwegian Coast Guard arrested the Russian fishing trawler Sapphire II, which complicated bilateral relations.364 “An expert: the Treaty with Norway is promising, but Russia is unlikely to start even the exploration of the Arctic shelf in the coming years,” Oilru.com, accessed January 22, 2020. http://www.oilru.com/news/243741/. 360 Poval, 143. 361 Svetlana Vet, “How Russia gave up to Norway the territories in the Barents Sea,” Maxpark, accessed January 23, 2020. https://maxpark.com/community/13/content/5758744. 362 Damir Bekyashev, The International legal Issues in Fisheries Management (Moscow: Prospekt, 2017), 512. 363 The Norwegian Parliament ratified the document on 8 February 2011, and the Russian Parliament on 25 March 2011. 364 On 28 September, 2011, the Norwegian Nordcap inspected the Russian vessel and then reported the arrest of the vessel for dumping dead fish at sea. Captain V. Pisarenko opposed the order of the Coast Guard vessel to go to the port of Tromsø to investigate violations. The Norwegians used force: they forbade the Russian crew to leave the vessel, withdrew documents, cut off the communication system and started forced towing of the vessel in Tromsø. 359

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Because of this, the 40th session of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission took place, where the parties sought to agree on a unified procedures fishing in the Spitsbergen archipelago area.365 As Zilanov commented, the signing and entry into force of the Russian-Norwegian treaty was considered by the Norwegians as an “approval” for such detentions.366 For his part, Jørn Krog, Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Coast Affairs of Norway, stated that in the Spitsbergen area only one country has the right to establish and control the enforcement of legislation, and it is Norway.367 New data on significant hydrocarbon accumulations has changed Norway’s attitude regarding Svalbard. The authorities have adopted a consistent policy that seeks to establish its sovereignty over the archipelago and ignores the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. Norway’s efforts are aimed at ensuring that, if oil and gas production starts there, the preferential export regime stipulated in the Treaty would not be applied. The newspaper Stratfor reported follows: “Norway and Russia are the most important players in the region due to their leading role in the oil and gas sector. Protecting Norwegian interests beyond the Arctic Circle, as well as relations with Russia, are increasingly important for Oslo. The Nordic countries and Russia treat each other with suspicion, but as neighbors they also see benefits in economic cooperation. For example, Norway emphasizes its NATO membership and strong defence ties with the other Nordic countries, however, it also cooperates with Russia in the energy sector. Russia, in turn, benefits from the cooperation by gaining access to Norwegian technical expertise, especially in deep water drilling. At the same time, Russia reinforces its interests in the Barents Sea region and the Arctic in general by expanding transport infrastructure and strengthening its military presence.”368 Complex relations between the U.S. and Russia on delimitation of sea borders on the eastern edge of Russia dated to 1867, when the Convention for the cession of the Russian possessions in North America to the United States was concluded.369 In 1983, the U.S. unilaterally marked the borders of its 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the Arctic, measuring them from all points of the Arctic 365

The meeting took place on 10-14 October 2011 in Kaliningrad, Russia. Sergey Konstantinov, “‘Grey zones’ in Norway and Russia,” Rybatskaya Gazeta, OctoberNovember 2011. 367 Ibid. 368 “Russia and Norway compete over the Barents Sea region,” Stratfor, accessed January 21, 2014. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-and-norway-compete-over-barents-sea-region. 369 “Convention for the cession of the Russian possessions in North America to the United States of 1867,” Digital Fund of Legal and Normative Documentation, accessed January 23, 2020. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901762626. 366

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coast.370 In response to U.S. actions, in 1984, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree “On the USSR Economic Zone,” which also established a 200-mile economic zone.371 It should be noted, however, that, until 1984, the Soviet-American negotiations referred to the line of the 1867 Convention as applied only to the delimitation of fisheries and conservation jurisdiction. Later on, positions of the parties were consolidated in the bilateral Agreement on the Line of Maritime Delimitation. The document was signed by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze and the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Washington on June 1, 1990. Article 1 of the Agreement stated that “the parties agree that the line described as the ‘western limit’ in Article 1 of the 1867 Convention, as defined in Article 2 of this agreement, is the maritime boundary between the United States and the Soviet Union.”372 The agreement defined this line more accurately and, in addition, introduced the terms “eastern special area” and “western special area.”373 Under these documents, the U.S. was given a part of the USSR exclusive economic zone with the area of 7,700 km2 and a part of the continental shelf with the area of 46,300 km2 in the open central part of the Bering Sea, located beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, as well as territorial waters in the Bering Strait between the islands of Ratmanov (Russia) and Kruzenshtern (the USA). The bilateral document meant territorial concessions by the USSR. The agreement was ratified by only one party, the U.S. Congress in 1991. The USSR Supreme Council refused to ratify it. Having convinced that its ratification by Moscow was impossible, the heads of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department, Shevardnadze and Baker, in violation of accepted norms, merely exchanged notes on the provisional procedure of the agreement. Thus, the Secretary of State sent a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, which suggested that the governments “agreed to be bound by the provisions of the said Agreement before it enters into force, beginning on June 15, 1990.”374 Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, “Oil matrix of the North.” “Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of February 28, 1984 ‘On the Economic Zone of the USSR’,” Consultant-Plus, accessed February 5, 2020. http://www.consultant.ru/ document/cons_doc_LAW_14556/. 372 “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary, 1 June 1990,” the Agreement has been applied provisionally since 15 June 1990, Digital Fund of Legal and Normative Documentation, accessed October 13, 2019. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901756969. 373 Ibid. 374 Aleksander Vylegzhanin, “Twenty Years of the ‘Temporary Application’ of the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Line of Maritime Delimitation,” MGIMO Bulletin,” no. 1 (2010): 104-113. 370 371

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On June 1,1990, the Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent his note, which contained a positive response. The Agreement on the Line of Maritime Delimitation of 1990 between Russia and the USA did not meet Russian demands. It was imposed on Russia when it reached its highest level of geopolitical and economic weakness.375 As a result, Russian interests concerning the use of biological and hydrocarbon resources in the Chukchi and Bering Seas have been infringed. Thus, both the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea shelves are de facto divided between Russia and the United States in the proportion of 30% to 70%, respectively. Under the agreement, Russia has lost 46,000 km2 of the Russian shelf and 7,000 km2 of the deep central part, up to 200 thousand tons of fish annually, as well as potential oil fields on the seabed. The exclusive economic zone of the USSR shrank to 150 miles, while the American zone grew to 250 miles.376 Given these changes, Russian scholar Lev M. Poval wrote, “the Soviet Union lost not only its oilbearing wells on the shelf, but also the richest bioresources of this zone.”377 According to other data, about 55 thousand km2 of continental shelf in the open part of the Bering Sea rich on oil and gas have been lost.378 Russia’s failure to ratify the treaty of 1990 gave its U.S. opponents an excuse to demand a revision of the Russian-American agreements on the grounds that the United States “has ceded” to Russia the “Arctic empire,” including Wrangel Island and a group of smaller islands in the Arctic Ocean discovered by the U.S. in 1881. After the ratification of the agreement, American side considers it to have entered into force and persecutes Russian vessels for violations of the border lines it defined.379

375

Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Random House Canada, 2008), 310. Konstantin Gurdin, “Fish war in the twilight zone,” Argumenty Nedeli, accessed October 12, 2019. https://argumenti.ru/toptheme/n278/95756. 377 Poval, 143. 378 Igor Zonn, Andrey Kostyanoy and Michael Kumatsov, The Barents Sea. Encyclopedia (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2012), 190. 379 Ibid. 376

Chapter 4

THE SEA ROUTES 4.1. THE HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Stepan O. Makarov, the prominent Russian admiral—also known as the “father” of the world’s first icebreaker, once said: “If we compare Russia to a building, we must admit that its facade looks out to the Arctic Ocean. It means that the Northern Sea Route is not the back roads, but the main military street.”380 Nowadays, these words are engraved on the tetrahedral obelisk, which was erected in the Senyavin Strait, on the eastern outskirts of Chukotka. The admiral also believed that “if the Arctic Ocean were open for sailing, it would provide great benefits.”381 For Russia, the Northern Sea Route or the Northeast passage, which runs along its northern shores, is an essential component of the economic development of Arctic territories. The NSR is the shortest sea lane that connects Russia’s western and eastern regions, European and Asian ports. It is the only transport route that provides access to the natural resources of the North, Siberia and the Far East, the reserves of which, according to project estimates, in the 21st century will become almost the main raw material base of the planet. Russia has a clear position towards these territories. This is “a historically established national single transport communication or transport corridor of Russia in the Arctic.”382 It makes clear Peter Zimin, “Northern Sea Route: what it was,” Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda, accessed January 16, 2020. https://toz.su/archive1/?ELEMENT_ID=85847. 381 Peter Galkov, The Northern Sea Route. A historical and geographical description, vol. 1, no. 1 (1959): 3. 382 According to the text of the Federal Law “On Natural Monopolies,” and the Federal Law “On the Northern Sea Route.” 380

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the strategic significance of the NSR – for the national and regional economy of Russia and its role in the international transit traffic; for northern cargo delivery, in the large-scale economic development of the Far North, and especially the AZRF. The Russian Merchant Shipping Code has a separate definition of the NSR: “the water space adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation, encompassing internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and bounded on the east by the line of maritime boundary with the United States and parallel to Cape Dezhnev in the Bering Strait, from the west by the meridian of Cape Zhelaniya to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, the eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western boundaries of the Matochkin Strait, the Kara Gate and the Yugorsky Strait.”383 The NSR passes through the Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas and partially the Pacific Ocean (the Bering Sea) connecting the European part of Russia with Siberia and the Far East. The length from Murmansk to Vladivostok is about 10,740 km. The route from Murmansk to Japan via the Suez Canal is 23,780 km or via the Panama Canal, which is 27,590 km. The road around the Cape of Good Hope runs almost 30,000 km. The length of the main, ice part from the Archipelago Novaya Zemlya (Kara Gate) to the Providence Bay in Chukotka 5600 km. It is estimated that the waters of the Arctic seas contain about 25% of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves.384 The NSR serves the ports of the Arctic and those of major Siberian rivers for the import of fuel, equipment, food, export of forest, including abroad, etc. The largest non-freezing port of Russia beyond the Arctic Circle is the port of Murmansk —the Russian Northern Gateway and the departure point for vessels via the NSR from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Then, the route goes through such port cities and settlements as Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar, Varandey, Amderma, Igarka, Sabetta, Dudinka, Dixon, Khatanga, Tiksi, Green Cape, Pevek, Cape Schmidt and Providence. The port of Dudinka is the border between the western (from Dudinka to Murmansk) and eastern (from Dudinka to Chukotka) sectors of the Arctic and the NSR.

383

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“Merchant shipping code of the Russian Federation. No. 81-No 81-FZ of April 30, 1999. Adopted by the State Duma on March 31, 1999,” Garant, accessed December 24, 2020. https://base.garant.ru/12115482/. “The Arctic. Siberian Oil Magazine Supplement,” no. 10 (2013): 32, accessed December 7, 2019. https://www.gazprom-neft.ru/files/journal/SNp107.pdf.

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The positive aspects of the NSR include: a short route reduces fuel and ship freight costs, which affects the cost of cargo; the NSR has no queues and fees for passage of a vessel (except when an icebreaker must be involved); there is no maritime piracy. At the same time, there are also negative sides of the NSR: a short navigation period, when navigation is possible without icebreaker escort; necessity of using special ships of high ice class; special requirements to the crew, trained to work in the Arctic. The Sea Route is the most extensive sea lane in the world. There are about 70 transit points and ports along the route. Some of them are erected not on the banks, but in the mainland such as the ports of Dudinka and Igarka, which are situated a few hundred kilometres from the Kara Sea on the bank of the Yenisei River. The port of Khatanga is also located in the depths of the mainland on the river of the same name. The key functions of the Arctic ports and transshipment complexes include the assistance of Arctic transit and servicing of vessels operating on the NSR shipping routes; the support of life and socio-economic development of the Arctic regions of Russia, their foreign trade relations and tourism. Due to the harsh and extremely cold climate, navigation season along the NSR lasts from July to October. Given this limit, the navigation may operate up to four months freely, and the rest of the year, the ships need to be accompanied by nuclear-powered icebreakers. In recent years, the area of sea ice in the Arctic has ranged from 4 to 6 million km2. The ice thickness in the polar seas can reach 4 m, and the air temperature can drop to -50°C. There are two features of the NSR shipping lane to be mentioned. First, it stretches along the shores of Russia, and thus does not depend on the international situation. Secondly, it runs along the estuaries of the largest rivers in the Asian North, which extend in a meridional direction and form an extensive network of inland waterways with their tributaries.385 As the Russian historian Aleksander B. Shirokorad wrote, “the great Siberian rivers are also the Northern Sea Route.”386 Russia has a long tradition of laying, exploiting and planning the NSR. The Russian Empire, and later the USSR, claimed their rights to particular water areas. In the USSR, the Kara, Laptev and East Siberian and the Chukchi Seas, within the Arctic sector, were considered as historic seas under the regime of

385 386

Alexander Arikainen, Transport Artery of the Soviet Arctic (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 192. Alexander Shirokorad, The Arctic and The Northern Sea Route. Security and Wealth of Russia (Moscow: Veche, 2017), 272.

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inland waters.387 At the same time, the Soviet position was based on an international norm that recognized the extension of the coastal state’s sovereignty over certain gulfs and bay-type seas and the long-term implementation of the rule of the Russian Empire and the USSR over these waters. Probably for the first time ever, the notion of the existence of the Northeast Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean was exposed by the Russian diplomat and the head of the Embassy mission in Rome, Dmitry Gerasimov to Pope Clement VII in a conversation with the Italian historian and geographer Paolo Giovio, which became known from the Book about the Embassy of Vasily, Grand Duke of Moscow to Pope Clement VII, printed in 1525. The Northern Sea Route was developed in large “pieces” defined by the seas, and within them by the borders of ice fields. The single NSR was laid out in stages from west to east, and in total the process took at least five centuries. The first such “pieces” were the White and Barents Seas. Their shores were explored from 11 to 16th centuries by Russian Pomors and Siberians, or “the White Bone”388 of the Russian nation, and the Scandinavian Vikings while fishing and hunting. They have pioneered the sea route by cruising to Novaya Zemlya and Svalbard, as well as many of the islands open near them. During the first half of the 16th century, the Pomors became the pioneers of the Arctic. The first recorded information about the voyage east of the mouth of the Northern Dvina River dates back to the beginning of the 17th century. Pinega Pomor, Lev Shubin, nicknamed Plekhan, went to the settlement of Mangazeya in 1601-1602.389 Until 1619, he repeatedly went by sea to Mangazeya and back. The merchant Luka Moskvitin, having left in 1605 from the Gulf of Ob on the nomads, reached the mouth of the Yenisey and went further east to the Pyasino Gulf. This route, but already to the Pyasina River in 1610 was repeated by Kondratiy Kurochkin and Osip Shepulov. The Mangazeya seaway is considered to be an early precursor to the Northern Sea Route. To the east lay the most difficult section of the NSR in terms of ice conditions. The route remained underdeveloped until 1878. Its development went in two directions: to the west, and to the east of the Lena Delta. In 1633According to the law “On the State Border of the USSR” of November 24, 1982, the inland waters of the USSR include “waters of gulfs, bays and limans, seas and straits that historically belonged to the USSR.” 388 Mikhail Veller, Our merciful fathers (Moscow: Astrel, 2012), 163. 389 Mangazeya was a city in the 17th century in Western Siberia. It was founded as a stockaded town in 1600 on the Taz River 200 km from its mouth. At the beginning of the 17th century, it was a stronghold for the moving of Russian servicemen to the depths of Northern Siberia, in the Yenisey and Lena basins. 387

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1634, Ivan Rebrov, having passed to the west, opened the sea way from the Lena River to the mouth of the Olenyok River. In 1633, a group of Cossacks headed by Ilya Perfilyev, moving east, mastered the Lena-Yansky of the NSR, and in 1639, Elisey Buza went even further – to the Chondon River. In 1941, Ivan Erastov discovered the route section between the mouths of the Indigirka and Alazei Rivers. Two years later, he first sailed from the Alazei to the west, to the Lena River. In the same year Mikhail Stadukhin and Dmitri Zyrian reached the mouth of the Kolyma River, and Vasili Sychov, moving to the west from the mouth of the Olenek River, reached the Khatanga River. Most likely, in the 40s of the 17th century, during their expedition, brothers Akaky and Ivan Muromtsy sailed west of the Lena River and overcame a small part of the Taymyr way of the NSR but died in the Simsa Bay or on the Faddey Islands. To the east of the Kolyma River to the Chaun Bay in 1646 passed Isay Ignatiev by the nickname Mezenetz. The advancing of Russians “to meet the sun” along the NSR in 1648 completed the voyage of Fyodor Popov and Semen Dezhnev. From the Kolyma River they sailed eastwards and, having opened the strait separating Asia from America for the first time in the history of navigation Popov and Dezhnev entered the Pacific Ocean from the north. The next attempts by Russians to repeat their voyage from Kolyma bypassing the Chukchi Peninsula ended in failure. Only in the summer of 1662 explorer and navigator Ivan Rubets (Baksheev) succeeded with this task. Russian Emperor Peter the Great considered the development of the northern route as a state mission. The idea of the possibility and necessity to develop the NSR was first put forward in 1713 by Russian shipbuilder Fedor Saltykov. However, only in 1724 Peter the Great signed a decree on the organization of an expedition that was to find out the location of the strait between Asia and America.390 A significant contribution was also made by the first Kamchatka Expedition of 1724-1729 led under the leadership of Vitus Bering. The Great Northern Expedition, also known as the second Kamchatka Expedition, in the years 1733-1743 became the first step to solve the NSR issues on a national scale. Thanks to the hundreds of its members, almost all Russian coast of the Arctic Ocean was mapped, and the coast of Alaska, the islands of the North Pacific, was explored. In the mid-18th century, Mikhail V. Lomonosov drew attention to the great prospects of northern maritime communication. He made a significant scientific 390

Denis Brig, “Vitus Bering, or the Commander’s Northern Way,” Voennoye Obozrenie, accessed November 17, 2019. https://topwar.ru/117205-vitus-bering-ili-severnyy-put-komandora. html.

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contribution to the study of the Northern Sea Route’s problem by summarizing the experience of Russian pioneer navigators and making a suggestion about the existence of east-west ice drift in the Arctic basin. In 1763, Lomonosov sent to the President of the Admiralty Collegium the “Brief description of various voyages across the northern seas and demonstration of the potential passage of the Siberian Ocean to East India.”391 In his paper, Lomonosov substantiated his project on the development of the Northern Sea Route. But the expedition of Vasily Chichagov organized on Lomonosov’s initiative in 1765-1766 unsuccessfully tried to find the sea passage “by the Northern Ocean to Kamchatka and further.”392 Considerable research operations was done by Russian navigators of the second half of the 18th – the first quarters of the 19th century: Nikita Shalaurov (1761-1764), Stepan Andreyev (1763-1764), Ivan Lyakhov (1770-1774), Joseph Billings and Gabriel Sarychev (1786-1792), Matvei Gedenstrom (18081911), Peter Anjou, Ferdinand von Wrangel, and Fyodor Matyushkin (18201824). In the 19th century gold producers of Siberia Mikhail Sidorov and Alexander Sibiryakov wanted to implement the idea of commercial voyages in the Arctic Ocean, but they did not find support from authorities in Saint Petersburg. With Sidorov’s money, the British captain Jozef Wiggins in 1874 passed to the mouth of the Yenisey. In 1878-1879, the Russian-Swedish polar expedition of Niels A.E. Nordenskiöld with significant funding from Sibiryakov, on the vessel Vega (Captain Adolf A. L. Palander) for the first time in history carried out a thorough voyage along the NSR from west to east with one wintering (in the Kolyuchinskaya Bay). The expedition “provided a good example of international co-financing for the NSR.”393 Nevertheless, it was difficult to say if the route would soon play an important role in trade. This opinion was quite objective, as it was an era of low-powered steamers rather than icebreakers. There were no airplanes or radio yet. No radio meteorological stations along the

Maria Dukalskaya, “Russian government expeditions of V. Chichagov (1765-1766),” Polar University, accessed September 14, 2019. http://polaruni.ru/istoriya-polyarnyhissledovaniy/ekspedicii/russkie-pravitelstvennye-ekspedicii-v-ya-chichagova-17651766/. 392 Arseniy Zamostyanov, “Chichagov’ polar expedition: failure or success?” accessed November 12, 2019. https://goarctic.ru/work/polyarnaya-ekspeditsiya-chichagova-neudacha-iliuspekh/. 393 Sergey Pisarev, “The Northern Sea Route: an oceanologist’s view,” accessed November 12, 2019. https://ocean.ru/index.php/novosti-left/smi-o-deyatelnosti-instituta/item/1109severnyj-morskoj-put-vzglyad-okeanologa. 391

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entire northern coast of Eurasia was set up. The formation of the Arctic route took place intermittently, with pauses over many decades. At the beginning of the 20th century, Vladimir A. Rusanov, one of the youngest Russian Arctic explorers, outlined the main components in the organization of the future polar transport highway: the use of icebreakers, the need for scientific data, particularly about ice, regular communication, including radio, as well as observations from the air by using balloons. Rusanov himself went missing in 1912 during the expedition of one of the ways to the mouths of Siberian rivers. Realization of his ideas began with the setting of polar stations: in the Strait of Ugorski Shar in 1913, on Vaygach Island and Yamal Peninsula in 1914, on Dixon in 1915. As the necessary data was obtained, the duration of Arctic voyages was considerably reduced. The second in-depth voyage along the Northern Sea Route (from east to west) in 1914-1915 was made by the Hydrographic Expedition of the Arctic Ocean under the command of Boris A. Vilkitsky on the ice-breaking steamers Taymyr and Vaygach, also with one wintering at the Taymyr Peninsula on the route Vladivostok-Arkhangelsk. In 1918-1920, the Norwegian expedition led by polar explorer Roald Amundsen on the polar ship Maud with two overwinterings for the third time in history overcame the NSR from Norway to the Pacific Ocean. In 1919, Admiral Alexander V. Kolchak, who called himself the Supreme Ruler of All the Russians, created under his government of the White Movement a special committee of the Northern Sea Route (Komseverroute) to organize and conduct trade expeditions from European Russia to Western Siberia. In the 1920s, a lot was done to establish regular maritime communication in the Western Arctic,394 which formed the basis for the economic exploitation of the Kara Sea Route. Since 1924 polar aviation has been used for ice exploration. Vladimir Rusanov’s ideas were finally applied during the organization of the campaign of the icebreaker Krasin (Head of the expedition Rudolf L. Samoylovich, Captain Carl P. Eggy) to save the crew of the airship Italia in 1928. The first through rigorous along the whole route of the NSR without wintering, as part of one navigation, was carried out by the Soviet expedition led by Prof. Otto Yu. Schmidt in the summer of 1932, during the second International Polar Year on the icebreaker Sibiryakov (Captain Vladimir I. Voronin, Research Director Prof. Vladimir Yu. Wiese). For 66 days (from July 28 until October 1) the vessel passed from Arkhangelsk to the Bering Strait, 394

As an example – the Kara Sea Route commodity exchange expeditions from 1921 to 1931.

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having finished the trip in the Japanese port of Yokohama. This marked the beginning of regular navigation along the shores of Siberia, the legendary sea route395, the formation of a unified transport system in the north of the USSR, for the normal functioning of which the appropriate infrastructure was needed. One of the consequences of this voyage was the organization at the USSR Council of People’s Commissars in December 1932 of a single special transport and economic body, the General Directorate of the Northern Sea Route or Glavsevmorput (GUSMP). The regular navigation along the NSR was thus started. Subsequently, in 1933 the Hydrographic Department was established within GUSMP. Glavsevmorput was also responsible for the “Northern delivery,” i.e., supply of the Far North and Far East. After successful voyage of the ship Sibiryakov, in 1933 for through passage from west to east along the NSR it was decided to repeat the passage by steamboat Chelyuskin,396 which, according to shipbuilders,397 was not designed for independent navigation in ice. In the end, Chelyuskin was crushed by the ice in the Chukchi Sea. The first through voyage from east to west, from Vladivostok to Murmansk, in one navigation season was made by a research expedition led by Vladimir Yu. Wiese in 1934 on the ice cutter Litke (Captain Nikolai M. Nikolaev). In 1935, on the route without wintering and accidents in both directions, the first through transport and cargo voyages were held, in particular, the loggers Vanzetti and Iskra from Leningrad to Vladivostok. In 1936, the squadron of destroyers Voikov and Stalin, leaving Kronstadt on July 2 and overcame the ice of the Arctic Ocean, accompanied the icecutter's Litke and the icebreakers Ermak and Krasin through the Bering Strait on October 17 arrived in Vladivostok. It was the first voyage of warships on the Northern Sea Route. The general management of the crossing was carried out by Soviet academician Otto Schmidt. Further development of the Northern Sea Route was still constrained by the lack of navigation equipment, an underdeveloped network of hydrometeorological stations and the absence of ports, coastal infrastructure and Vladimir Putin, “The Arctic is the Territory of Dialogue,” speech, IV International Arctic Forum, Arkhangelsk, March 30, 2017, accessed October 23, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/54149. 396 The steamship Chelyuskin was built in Denmark by order of the USSR under the name Lena. Later, it was renamed after the Russian polar explorer of the 18th century Captain S.I. Chelyuskin. The length was 100 m, width 16.6 m, displacement 3.6 thousand tons. The steamboat had an ice protection in the bow. 397 Vitaly Dotsenko, The Secrets of the Russian Navy. Chelyuskin and its Crew. A Tragedy or Farce (Moscow: Eksmo, 1995), 352. 395

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supply bases. However, despite the objective difficulties, the volume of goods transported at the NSR has increased significantly. In 1876-1919 50 thousand tons of cargo were transported, and from 1933-1938 one million tons of cargo were transported. In order to scientifically develop Arctic navigation, in 1935-1938 a highlatitude expedition on the icebreaker Sadko was arranged. The Soviet Union was the first and only country to actively use drifting polar stations. In 1937, the first one named North Pole398 was erected. The station was headed by the chief Ivan D. Papanin and its members Ernst T. Krenkel, Evgeniy K. Fyodorov, Peter P. Shirshov. After nine months of drifting, it passed 2050 km from the North Pole to the Greenland Sea, after which it was removed by the icebreaker from the ice. Important research works were conducted during the drift of the icebreaker Georgy Sedov in 1937-1940. In 1939, the icebreaker Stalin made a double through voyage in one navigation season. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) due to the Soviet Arctic exploration, a single water transport system of the NSR and an icebreaking and specialized transport fleet had been established. Airfields and landing sites were set up. There were installed 11 beacons and 315 lights. The war interrupted the economic functioning of the Northern Sea Route. Navigation in the summer season, which was only possible for a period of four months, was used for the transfer of warships and cargo for the front. The captains of the sea routes had to act as military sailors. They heroically resisted the attacks of the German Navy, especially so-called wolf pack submarines. In the post-war years, cargo turnover along the route was constantly increasing. This required replacing old coal-fired ships with new ones: diesel and nuclear vessels. The icebreakers of the Moskva-type built in Finland with the capacity of 26 thousand h.p. and the new icebreaker Ermak399 with the capacity of 40 thousand h.p. were put into operation. In the late 1950s, the firstborn of the Soviet nuclear fleet, the civil icebreaker Lenin,400 went on its first route. It was followed by a group of even

398

After the first station NP-1 in 1937, the drifting station NP-2 started working in 1950, and yearround observations began in the Arctic. Up to three drifting stations operated simultaneously on the ice floes. This operation ran until 1991 and finished with the station NP-31. In 2003, the first Russian NP-32 was launched. In October 2012, the drifting research station North Pole-40 started its work in the Arctic. 399 The first icebreaker Ermak had 10 thousand h.p. 400 The icebreaker Lenin is the world’s first icebreaker with a nuclear power plant. It is the only object of science and technology, which is under state protection. It is a cultural heritage object of federal importance. Today, the icebreaker stands in the Murmansk harbor and operates as a floating museum.

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more powerful, 75 thousand h.p. each, atom-powered ships of the Arktika-type. Thus, the nuclear icebreaker fleet of the country was established. The main function at that time was the northern delivery to Arctic settlements, delivery of scientific expeditions, supply of military facilities with equipment and food. The Northern Sea Route became an integral part of the national economy, providing vital activity of a number of regions of the Far North and the Far East. In 1977, the nuclear icebreaker Arktika first made a research and practical voyage to the North Pole, having covered the distance of 12.5 days. In the spring of 1978, the old wish of sailors from the North came true as the optimal highlatitude route along the NSR was laid. It ran not along the shores of Eurasia, but through the Central Arctic and the circumpolar space. Under the escort of Sibir, a nuclear-powered ship, such an experimental voyage for national economic cargoes from Murmansk to Magadan was carried out by the Kapitan Myshevsky cargo diesel-electric ship. In 1978, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin together with the Arktika and Sibir icebreakers built by that time mastered year-round navigation. The Arctic has always been a hostile environment to man. Regardless of extreme climate, the difficulty of passing the NSR route exists constantly. The navigation season of 1983 confirmed it, when suddenly the Northern Sea Route near the port of Pevek was blocked by the Aion ice massif401. More than 30 ships and icebreakers were blocked off the coast of Chukotka. The whole icebreaking fleet was thrown there for release. One of the ships, the freighter Nina Sagaidak sank, and a lot of transport ships were crushed by the ice and seriously damaged. Fortunately, there were no human casualties, and no ships were left for forced wintering. The data presented below illustrates how dangerous it was to navigate the Northern Sea Route between 1900 and 1983 (Table 5). In 1987, the annual volume of transportation along the NSR reached a record of 6.5 million tons.402 In 1990, a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers “On Measures to ensure the Implementation of a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1984 ‘On Strengthening of environmental Protection in the Far North and marine Areas adjacent to the northern Coast of the USSR’403” was adopted. The document defined the NSR 401

The Aion ice massif is the most difficult part of the SMP. In the summer season, the winds from the Arctic Ocean bring to the shore perennial ice. 402 “The Northern Sea Route expects an ‘explosive’ increase in cargo traffic,” Neftyanka, accessed November 11, 2019. http://neftianka.ru/sevmorput-ozhidaet-vzryvnoj-rost-gruzopotoka/. 403 “Decision of the USSR Council of Ministers ‘On measures to ensure the implementation of a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1984 ‘On strengthening of environmental protection in the Far North and marine areas adjacent to the

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as the inner sea waters, territorial sea or economic zone of the USSR adjacent to the northern coast of the USSR, its national transport communication including routes suitable for ice escorting of ships, whose extreme points are bounded to the west by the western entrances to the straits of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the meridian north of Cape Zhelaniya, and to the east by the Bering Strait parallel to 660 00' N and the meridian to 1680 58' 37'' W. In addition, the document obliged the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR to develop and approve the “Rules of Navigation along the Northern Sea Route.” In the same year the rules were approved by the Soviet Ministry of the Marine Fleet.404 After that the Northern Sea Route was opened for international navigation in 1991. Table 5. The largest shipwrecks in the Arctic seas405 Sea

The Kara Sea

The Laptev Sea

The East Siberian Sea

The Chukchi Sea

Year 1900 1912-1914 1913 1921 1921 1924 1941 1938 1980 1929 1933 1947 1965 1914 1919 1922 1933-1934 1983

Vessel The yacht Dream The schooner Saint Anna The schooner Hercules The steamboat Yenisey The steamboat Ob The schooner Agnessa The icebreaker Sadko The logger Rabochiy The ship Bryanskles The schooner Elizabeth (USA) Revolucionniy parakhod The ship Mossovet The ship Vitimles The brigantine Karluk The schooner Beloveders The schooner Eagle The steamboat Chelyuskin The ship Nina Sagaidak

northern coast of the USSR’,” accessed February 15, 2020. http://www.alppp.ru/law/ konstitucionnyj-stroj/federativnoe-ustrojstvo/22/postanovlenie-sovmina-sssr-ot-01-06-1990-565.pdf. 404 “The Rules of Navigation along the Northern Sea Route. Notifications to Mariners,” Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, July 13, 1991, №29. 405 Nikolay Marchenko, Seas of the Russian Arctic. Navigation Conditions and Accidents (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012), 274.

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4.2. THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IS THE GREAT HYDROCARBON ROUTE The collapse of the USSR and the subsequent systemic socio-economic crisis in the early 1990s had a negative impact on the Northern Sea Route, as the interest in its development declined. The dismantling of centralized logistics destroyed the system of importing industrial and food products to the North from other Russian regions. The price of liberalization and the restructuring of the monetary system had put most of the enterprises that had previously constituted the route’s infrastructure in a difficult situation. First of all, it affected icebreaking and other types of specialized Arctic fleet, ports, polar stations, and settlements located on the NSR. Their economy directly depended on the servicing of the route. Due to the acute shortage of financial resources, the Arctic Fleet started earning currency by making tourist cruises on icebreakers in high latitudes. An indispensable part of those voyages was the visiting of the infamous North Pole. Twice a year, tourists were also offered trips on expedition vessels along the NSR from Anadyr to Murmansk lasting 27 days and starting at 22 thousand dollars. They went to uninhabited islands, and visited Wrangel Island, New Siberian Islands, Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land.406 Such tourist tours took place in 1990, 1991, 1992 when nuclear-powered icebreakers brought foreign tourists to Franz Josef Land Archipelago, the North Land, on Wrangel Island, and the North Pole. 407 In the second half of the 90s of the 20th century interest in the NSR began to grow once again. In 1997-1998, as part of the European Commission’s international transport project the “Arctic Demonstration and Exploratory Voyage” (ARCDEV),408 an experimental voyage of Russian and Finnish tankers was made to transport gas condensate from the Ob Bay and the Yamal Peninsula to the Dutch port of Rotterdam.409 In 1999, the NSR was defined as an independent Euro-Asian transport corridor.410 This proposal was made at the First International Euro-Asian Konstantin Vorontsov, “Voyages prices have gone up in prices,” Businessman, Tourism. Magazine Supplement, no. 52 (2004): 30. 407 Ibid. 408 The Arctic Demonstration and Exploratory Voyage Project, European Commission, accessed March 23, 2020. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/WA-97-SC.2191. 409 Vsevolod Peresypkin and Anatoly Yakovlev, “The Northern Sea Route in the problem of international transport corridors,” Transport of the Russian Federation, no. 3 (2006): 16-19, accessed February 4, 2020. http://rostransport.com/transportrf/pdf/3/05.pdf. 410 Ibid. 406

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Conference in May 1998 in Saint Petersburg. In April 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting held on the nuclear-powered ship Russia noted that there was “a need to develop a state shipping policy. The development of the Arctic maritime transport network may become a good testing ground for working out the principles of such policy.”411 In the late 1990s - early 2000s, due to the growing interest in the Arctic fields, the role of the NSR was revised, and its revival began. Despite the relatively low volumes, the transport system of the NSR was a very complex technical, technological and organizational-economic entity.412 In 2001, the “Non-commercial Partnership of the Coordination of the Northern Sea Route Usage”413 was formed to manage the Russian clients of the NSR. The partnership assisted in organizing commercial shipping. The attention of the state to the most essential sea line and shipments growth required the development of new legal instruments. In 2001, the Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020414 was adopted. Under the doctrine, the NSR was to ensure the implementation of any decisions related to the transport service of the northern coast of the country. Among them, were maximum satisfaction of the population’s transportation needs in the northern territories; creation of social and cultural conditions for the peoples of the North; involvement in the domestic economic use of natural resources located in the coastal and shelf zones of the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas; export of hydrocarbons; development of intra-Arctic coasting communications; international transit traffic; enhancing economic security and defense capabilities.

“Vladimir Putin held a meeting on the problems of the Northern Sea Route and development of the Russian shipbuilding industry,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed November 23, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/37474. 412 Sergey Kozmenko and Vladimir Selin, “Priorities to protect national interests in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” in Proceedings of the International Conference “The Northern Sea Route,” April 11-12, 2013, 14-16. 413 Non-commercial Partnership of the Coordination of the Northern Sea Route Usage, accessed December 23, 2019. https://nsrassociation.ru/ob-assotsiatsii-smp.html. 414 “Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020,” Laws, Codes and Regulations of the Russian Federation, accessed January 23, 2020. https://legalacts. ru/doc/morskaja-doktrina-rossiiskoi-federatsii-na-period-do/ On 31 August 2019, the new Strategy for the Development of Russia’s maritime activities up to 2030 was approved. 411

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Major cargo types Dry-bulk goods General cargo (including containers) Liquid-bulk goods (oil and oil products)

Destinations of shipments Northern delivery; From the west; From the east; Cabotage; Shipments from Dudinka port; Transit on the NSR

Perspective block Large-scale The oil transportPechora ation Sea

Liquefied natural gas

The Ob bay The Yenisei Bay Yamal Peninsula

Freight transport subsystem Bulk carriers Tankers with deadweight up to 50 tons Container ships

Port subsystem Eastern and western port actors Port sites (including the bunkering port sites) Fixed terminals

Timber lorries Refrigerated vehicles

Offshore terminals

Tankers (linear) with deadweight up to 100 tons and more

Storage terminals on mining platforms

Transport infrastructure subsystem Icebreaker Fleet

Economic regulation subsystem Merchant shipping laws

Support Fleet

Tariff regulations

Security services (including the service on economic issues) Hydrometeorological and navigation monitoring services

Tax legislation

Icebreakers of a new generation (including the nuclear icebreakers LK-60 of Project 22220 capable of navigation of vessels with deadweight of 100 tons and more

The Federal Law on the Northern Sea Route and the corresponding Federal target program

Customs legislation Insurance scheme Environmenta l regulations

Gas carriers with deadweight up to 100 tons and more

In 2003, the State Council of the Russian Federation approved the Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020.415 According to the strategy, the

415

“Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020,” Zakonprost.ru, accessed January 27, 2020. http://www.zakonprost.ru/content/base/part/441592 On November 22, 2008 the new Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation till 2030 was approved.

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major objectives are follows: transport support in the development of Arctic oil and gas fields, including offshore fields, sea export of oil and gas, the development of potential large-scale regional, transit transportation and northern delivery of socially significant goods, the formation of self-sustaining and revenue-generating Arctic Marine Transport System.416 This has allowed for the continuation of in-depth navigation along the NSR and increased international commercial attractiveness in the Europe-Japan way. British, German, Scandinavian ships started transporting their goods to Japanese ports by the shortest road between the two oceans. To its own advantage, the foreign vessels were served by Russian northern shipping companies, ice air reconnaissance, and radio meteorological and polar stations. On September 18, 2008, Putin approved the Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond.”417 As the document outlined, one of the main national interests in the region is the availability of the Northern Sea Route as the national single transport communication of Russia in the Arctic. The prospects for the NSR were related to the scale of investment and production activities in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Among the high-priority measures adopted in the government programs for the development of the Arctic was the following: the development of specialized ice shipbuilding and shipping; the port infrastructure development; the development and reconstruction of airport and road complexes, and the provision of integrated transport communication in the region; the creation of a universal system of emergency rescue centers and complexes; the solution of ecological problems of the region exploitation and development, as well as hydrometeorology. 418 As a whole, the national economic priorities in the Arctic were as follows: ensuring effective exploitation of the NSR, turning it into a national transit highway; efficient and environmentally safe development of offshore hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf of Russia. The adopted document also addressed the issue of the development of the fleet capable of servicing the NSR. The main task of the icebreaker fleet, which the Russian government intended to develop, was to conduct convoys of transport vessels to ensure the northern delivery. “Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020.” “On the ‘Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond’,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed February 11, 2020. http://government.ru/info/18359/ On March 5, 2020, a Decree on the new version of the Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic for the Period until 2035 was issued. 418 Ibid. 416 417

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One of the benchmarks, i.e., defining events of the modern “discovery” of the Northern Sea Route was the successful passage in August 2010 of a tanker of the Sovcomflot Group and the commercial building company Baltika along the route from Cape Zhelaniya to Cape Dezhnev within 2 days. This crossing became part of the Arctic voyage from Murmansk to Ningbo, China. 70,000 tons of gas condensate were delivered to Novatek. The tanker of the Sovcomflot was the largest vessel in history that passed the Northern Sea Route. The voyage confirmed the technical feasibility and economic benefits of transporting large volumes of hydrocarbons along the route from the northern part of Europe to the countries of the Asian-Pacific region. In general, in 2010 the volume of transportation by the NSR exceeded three million tons. According to Sergey Popravko, First Deputy General Director of Sovcomflot, “the potential cargo traffic of the route was estimated at 50 million tons per year.”419 In September 2011 at the Second International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, an ambitious task was set to make a transport breakthrough – to bring transportation through the NSR to a new level, which should become one of the key trade lines of global importance. Addressing the forum, President Putin said: “the key task is the formation of modern infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route. It is a complex transport project designed to ensure dynamic development and exploration of the northern territories of the Russian Federation, the solution of the most important economic and social problems, the creation of new industries and jobs. We intend to expand existing ports and build new ones, such as Varandey port on the Yugorsky Strait and Sabetta port on the Yamal Peninsula. The Northern Sea Route itself and its support harbours will be integrated with other modes of transport. Our plans include the modernization of river, road, rail and communications routes, northern airfields, airports and the renewal of polar aviation. We also intend to significantly increase the size of the Russian icebreaker fleet. Today we have ten linear icebreakers. By 2020, three more universal nuclear icebreakers and six dieselelectric ones will be built.”420

“The prospective cargo traffic of the Northern Sea Route is estimated at 50 million tons per year,” TASS, accessed August 3, 2019. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/560641. 420 Vladimir Putin, “Welcoming Speech,” in Proceedings of the Second International Arctic Forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue,” September 22-23, Arkhangelsk, 2011, 11-13. 419

422

421

30 1,7

211 4,4

821 25,2

2011 3258 1262 32,6

2012 3876 1355 34,6

2013 3913 274 6,9

2014 3982 40 0,7

2015 5431 214 3,2

2016 7480 194 1,8

2017 10700 491,3 2,4

2018422 20100

697,2 2,2

2019404 31500

The Northern Sea Route Administration, accessed September 23, 2019. URL:http://www.nsra.ru/. “Freight traffic along the Northern Sea Route increased by 57% in 2019,” TASS, accessed November 17, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7816947.

Total amount, in thousand tons Transit, in thousand tons Transit’s share, in %

2001 1800

1991 4804

Table 7. The volume of cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route421

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The government’s efforts have resulted in an increase of the transport volume along the NSR. In subsequent years, the growth was due to the upgrading of infrastructure created during the Soviet era, as well as the construction of new facilities. Originally, it was projected that by 2020 the volume of cargo transportation would reach 44 million tons, and by 2030 – 70 million tons.423 In March 2018, in his message to the Federal Assembly, Putin set a task to increase cargo transportation up to 80 million tons by 2025 and make the Northern Sea Route a “global competitive transit artery.”424 Several mega-projects have been underway in the Arctic over the past decade: 1) Construction of seaports (Sabetta, Indiga, etc.); 2) Construction of new universal nuclear-powered icebreakers of 22220 project, three nuclear-powered icebreakers of Lieder project, 16 rescue and salvage vessels and tug and tow vessels; 3) Launching of one of the world’s largest shipyards (large-capacity shipyard), Zvezda, to build arctic-class tankers (Arktika-class) and supply icebreakers; 4) Construction of the Northern Latitudinal Railway (NLR) – an arctic railroad, 707 km long on the route Obskaya-Salekhard-Nadym-Novy Urengoy-Korotchaevo. By 2022, its transportation volume should reach approximately 24 million tons. The NLR is being implemented in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District and is to bring the flow of cargo to the world ocean through the built port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula. The NLR is to connect two railroads – the Northern and Sverdlovsk railroads. Both are included in the Transport Strategy of Russia until 2030. Support for the construction of the railway is closely linked to obtaining a freight base of 30 million tons for the Northern Sea Route; 5) Construction of the Yamal LNG mega-pipeline. The project provides for the extraction, liquefaction and supply of natural gas. The capacity of the natural gas liquefaction plant is 16.5 million tons. The resource base is the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field; 423

424

Boris Kheyfets, “The Northern Sea Route is a new transit route ‘One Belt One Road’,” The International Affairs, no. 7 (2018): 68-87. “The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018,” The President of the Russian Federation, accessed July 18, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.

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6) Laying of an Arctic fiber-optic cable on the bottom of the Arctic seas from Murmansk to Vladivostok; 7) Construction and modernization of 40 Arctic airports; 8) Construction of military bases beyond the Arctic Circle. The Arctic transport system (including the NSR, sea and river steamships, ports, hydrometeorological and hydrographic enterprises, aviation enterprises of Siberia and the Far East) serves the industrial zones of the Arctic related to the extraction of non-ferrous, rare earth metals and hydrocarbons (the areas of the European North, West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex, Norilsk Industrial Hub, industrial complexes of north-east Russia), and the main Russian clients of the NSR are such major companies as Gazprom, LUKOIL, Rosneft and Norilsk Nickel. The main route from Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal is three times as long as the northern way. One can also doubt the future development of commercial traffic in the Arctic. It is easy to get carried away by facile speculations that the Arctic routes are half as short as ways through the Suez and Panama Canals. In the foreseeable future, the passages may be open for navigation for only a short period of the year, but even so, ships will be at risk of collision with icebergs and ice floes. Perhaps, under certain conditions, the most accurate prediction would be the assumption that the bulk of commercial traffic in the Arctic will consist of intra-regional cargo flows through the NSR. However, transporting a container along a long way costs between 500 and 1000 dollars, while along the NSR it is about three times as expensive due to icebreaking and the size of container ships.425

4.3. THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE IS AN ANALOGUE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Along with the Northeast Passage or the Northern Sea Route, there is its analogue – the Northwest Passage (NWP). It is also considered as the NSR as the most important transport line and it also has its history full of rises and falls. The Northwest Passage is a sea route, which passes through the Arctic Ocean and runs along the northern coast of North America through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. It connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The different 425

Oleg Timofeev, “Leader instead of Lenin,” Voennoye Obozrenie, accessed October 23, 2019. https://topwar.ru/91019-lider-vmesto-lenina.html.

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islands of the archipelago are separated from each other and from the Canadian coast by numerous waterways. They pass from the east, from Goose Bay to Cape Prince of Wales. Since the 16th century, the leading maritime powers have been searching for the NWP to shorten the sea route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the northern hemisphere. However, extreme climate made the NWP unusable for navigation. In 1498, a Venetian navigator Sebastian Cabot was first to undertake a trip to explore the Northwest passage. He managed to reach Newfoundland, but at 580 N Cabot encountered solid pack ice and had to turn back to England. A few years later, in 1501, the Portuguese navigator Gaspar Corte Real went to find the NWP, however, he went missing. In 1527, British sailor Robert Torn proposed to set sail to try to find the sea route to India through the North Pole. Despite going on the expedition with two ships, not only did he not achieve his goal, he ended up losing one of his vessels. In 1534, the French navigator Jacques Cartier undertook the search for NWP. He entered the estuary426 of the St. Lawrence River and discovered the Bay of Chaleur. But he also did not succeed in making any further progress. He subsequently organized two more search expeditions, which also failed. In the last quarter of the 16th century, in 1574, English explorer and navigator Martin Frobisher, being familiar with the results of the journeys of Corte Real made another attempt to set search sail. He received a license to launch his voyage from the Muscovy Company.427 However, his three expeditions between 1576 and 1578 were unsuccessful. He did not advance further than Baffin Island. In the 17th-19th centuries, there were several more search trips. In 16071611, British navigator Henry Hudson went on four expeditions financed by the Muscovy Company and then by the Dutch East India Company. Between 1615 and 1616, William Baffin, who sailed with Hudson on the ship Discovery explored the Davis Strait and the Hudson Strait, named after the British navigator. The Hudson Strait was located between Baffin Land and Greenland. The vessels advanced along the bay named after him to the Strait of Smith. In 1631-1632, however, the voyages led by Thomas James and Luke Foxe ended without results. In the years 1816 to 1817, the Russian expedition of Otto von Kotzebue on the Naval brig Rurik searched for the NWP from the side of the Bering Strait. 426 427

An estuary is an area where a freshwater river or stream meets the ocean. The Muscovy Company was sounded in 1551. It had a monopoly on trade between England and Muscovy until 1698 and it survived as a trading company until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

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His trip was prepared by the Russian statesman and diplomat, Count Nikolay Rumyantsev. In 1818, an expedition was initiated by the well-known navigator John Barrow. The British Admiralty equipped two voyages: the first one under the command of Captain David Buchan and the second one – John Ross. David Buchan’s expedition on the ships Trent and Dorothea tried to traverse east of Greenland first to the North Pole, then to the Bering Strait. However, behind the Western Spitsbergen, the expedition hit the winter sea ice and had to go back to England. Nevertheless, the ships managed to reach the latitude 80030′. John Ross’ expedition also went on two naval ships Alexander and Isabella. First, the expedition went to Baffin Bay (the Baffin Sea), reaching the western coast of Greenland 76054′ N and penetrated the Strait of Lancaster. Unfortunately, the ships were met with ice along the way, thus also being forced to return. In 18291833, Ross again went on an expedition on the steamer Victoria to explore the Boothia Peninsula. During his voyage, he discovered King William Island and the North Magnetic Pole. Having spent the winter in the Gulf of Boothia, Ross had to return to Lancaster Strait by boat. In the years 1819 until 1822, voyages were made by British explorer William Parry. He was looking for a passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. During the second expedition, he reached 81044′ W, and mapped the coast of the sea Baffin. Parry, like other researchers, did not reach his goal and had to return unsatisfied. Later in 1845-1848, a British expedition led by John Franklin set out to search for the NWP but unfortunately, all of the expedition crew died. In its search and study of the expedition’s sailing route participated Edward Inglefield, John Rae, Francis McClintock, Charles Francis Hall. In the years between 1850 and 1853, an Irish Arctic explorer Robert John McClure passed the Northwest Passage. He was the first who to traverse it on a sled.428 For the first time the NWP was entirely crossed by Roald Amundsen on the small motor vessel Gjøa only in 1903-1906. Over the following decades, the Arctic countries adhered to the sectoral principle of dividing the Arctic spaces. Accordingly, the issue of the status of the Northwest Passage (as well as the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route) was not on the agenda. Its belonging to Canada was not questioned, as it ran through thousands of Canadian islands. A different stand was held by the United States. For the U.S. the Northwest Passage met the criteria of an international strait connecting two parts of the 428

After his journey, McClure returned to England on the ship of another expedition.

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high seas - the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. Accordingly, the American side believed that although the passage was Canadian territory, it could be used for shipping, including transit shipping. However, Canada has continued to insist that the Northwest Passage is inland waters. In addition to applying the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1970), Canada has promoted the thesis that the straits and waterways between the Arctic islands are its “historic waters.”429 The discovery in the late 1960s of the oil “Alaska Giant” in the Prudhoe Bay area of northeast Alaska has put “a daunting oil transportation problem” on the agenda.430 At that time numerous scenarios of its solution were considered: construction of a monorail road, transportation by road, use of nuclear submarines, giant jet air tankers, pipeline construction and use of icebreakertype tankers as tankers. In 1969, escorted by the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind and the Canadian icebreaker John A. Macdonald through the McClure Strait crossed the NWP the converted from an oil tanker to a heavily ice-breaking oil tanker SS Manhattan with a tonnage of 115 thousand tons and a capacity of 43 thousand h.p. This was twice the capacity of any other tanker of its size and nine times the largest Soviet icebreaker Lenin. The project itself cost a significant amount of funds – 43 million dollars. Over 80% was paid by the Humble Oil and Refining Company.431 In 1985, the icebreaker of the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Sea sailed along the NWP from the U.S. Thule Air Base, Greenland, to the home port in Seattle. Shortly after this, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark noted that “Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible and extends over land, sea and ice. It extends uninterrupted from the continental shoreline to the coast of the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. The water space does not divide but unites the islands. Most of the year, they are connected by ice. Since time immemorial, the Inuit living in Canada have developed and inhabited this ice-covered territory just as they have developed and inhabited the land.”432

429

Pearson, 638-647. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Moscow: Denovo, 1999), 602. 431 Keating Bern, “North for oil: Manhattan makes the historic Northwest Passage,” National Geographic, vol. 137, No. 3 (March 1970): 374-391. 432 Bayers, 92-128. 430

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After a while, the United States and Canada managed to resolve the issue of the Northwest Passage by signing the Arctic Cooperation Agreement433 on January 11, 1988. According to the document, “the Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada.”434 At the same time, a reservation was made, that “nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.”435 Yet, despite the bilateral agreement, both Canada and the United States have repeatedly reiterated their stands in recent decades. Canada considers the passage its “inland waters,” emphasizing that the Northwest Passage has never been an international strait. The United States insists that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. In the first decade of the 21st century, Canada’s position began to change. Canadian officials began to depart from a rigid commitment to a sectoral division of the Arctic, increasingly adhering to the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention. In 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that Canada’s Arctic Archipelago boundary “extends from the northern tip of Labrador all the way up the East coast of Ellesmere Island to Alert. Then it traces the western perimeter of the Queen Elizabeth Islands down to the Beaufort Sea. From there it hugs the coasts of the Northwest Territories and Yukon to the Canada-U.S. border at Alaska. All along the border, our jurisdiction extends outward 200 miles into the surrounding sea, just as it does along our Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. Securing Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. No more. And no less.”436 The U.S. actively used climate change in its arguments concerning the Northwest Passage. The U.S. side appealed to the fact that the Arctic space is “Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation. Canada Treaty Series. 1988. 11 January. Registered by Canada on 27 January 1995, accessed December 22, 2020. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201852/volume-1852-i-31529english.pdf. 434 Ibid. 435 Ibid. 436 Speech. International Scientific Conference. Saint Petersburg, February 21-22, 2008. “Securing Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” Speech by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 12, 2006, Iqaluit, Nunavut. 2009. 3 August,” Who owns the Arctic? accessed December 25, 2020 http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2009/03/securing-canadian-sovereignty-in-thearctic.html. 433

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being freed from ice. 437 European researchers held a similar position. In September 2007, the experts at the European Space Agency reported that during the period of about 30 years of satellite observations the area of Arctic sea ice had been reduced to the minimum level and this made the Northwest Passage navigable.438 In 2006, the cruise liner Crystal Serenity made a voyage from Alaska to New York. In September of the same year, the cargo vessel Camilla Desgagnés delivered the cargo from Montreal to four communities in western part of Nunavut.439In August 2008, the Danish cable ship Peter Faber made its way through the passage without any obstacles. As the Northwest Passage is deeper than the Panama Canal and for this reason large ships can pass through it. Apart from commercial shipping, the prospects for the NWP are linked with the discovery and development of new fields. In the Mary River area of Baffin Island, there is an open pit iron mine operated by the Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation for shipment to Europe. In the western part of Nunavut in the Kitikmeot region in Coronation Gulf was planned to build a deep port for serving the mining industry in Bathurst Inlet. Moreover, the project “Mackenzie Valley Pipeline”440 was developed to transport crude oil and liquefied natural gas from North Alaska and the Beaufort Sea to refineries and markets on the U.S. east coast via the Northwest Passage.441 In terms of the level of development, the NWR is much inferior to the NSR. The population of the Canadian Arctic is smaller than that of Russian. The passage’s infrastructure is poorly developed. Given that, the settlements along Cambridge Bay and Resolute Bay from other parts of Canada can be accessed only by air, whereas the Russian city, non-freezing port of Murmansk has direct rail connection with Saint Petersburg. Ice drifting in the Canadian Arctic is not monitored, the route along the passage is not clearly geographically mapped. Jonathan Amos, “Arctic Summer ice-free ‘by 2013’,” BBC News, accessed December 25, 2020 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7139797.stm. 438 “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, accessed November 21, 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/syr/. 439 “Canada has decided to develop the Arctic, but its sovereignty is challenged by the US,” Newsland, accessed December 26, 2020. https://newsland.com/community/politic/ content/kanada-reshila-osvaivat-arktiku-no-ee-suverenitet-osparivaet-ssha/6250813. 440 The project was developed in the 1970s, but it was revised after an investigation by Judge Thomas Berger. In 2004, the project was worked out again, and in March 2011, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline was approved by the federal government. 441 Alexei Zabanbark and Leonid Lobkovsky, “Geological structure and oil and gas content of the Arctic part of the North American continent,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economics, no. 3 (2013): 64-75. 437

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There are also a lot of environmental risks. Despite being at approximately the same latitudes, the NWP is more covered by ice than the NSR. Unlike Russia, Canada does not have icebreakers to guide vessels through the passage, and companies are reluctant to transit their cargo from the Suez Canal to the Northwest Passage.

4.4. THE ICEBREAKER FLEET IS THE BASIS FOR NORTHERN SEA ROUTE’S OPERATION Russia possesses the world’s largest ice-breaking fleet. It is a recognized leader in the icebreaker building. It also remains the only country in the world that has a civilian nuclear icebreaker fleet in use, which provides safe navigation to military and civilian vessels in the Arctic. The building in 1959 of the icebreaker Lenin has dramatically increased the opportunities of the Arctic transport system. The Russian icebreaker fleet allows not only to conduct systematic navigation, but also to organize a full-fledged transit along the Northern Sea Route. This undoubtedly contributed to the development of Arctic territories located beyond the Arctic Circle.442 Back in the days of Tsarist Russia, it was already the fact that the Arctic can be developed only with the help of icebreakers. The conductor of this idea was one of the most honored and respected admirals of Russia, naval commander and scientist Stepan Osipovich Makarov. His article “The Influence of Icebreakers on Naval Operations”443 is one of the results of his active research work on the Arctic. In 1982, Makarov started considering the possibility of reaching the North Pole on a powerful icebreaker while foreign researchers tried to overcome this challenge using the natural ice drift and Arctic currents. Being a military man, Makarov predicted the strategic significance of the icebreakers and the North Sea Route for the interfleet maneuver. In his note to the manager of the Maritime Ministry, Vice Admiral Tyrtov of January 9, 1887, Makarov wrote: “I believe that a large ice-breaker in the Arctic Ocean may have a strategic importance, allowing us to move the fleet in the Pacific Ocean in case of need by the shortest and safest way militarily.”444 Oleg Timofeev, “Leader instead of Lenin.” Stepan Makarov, “Yermak in the ice,” (Saint Petersburg: Typography E.Evdokimov, 1901), 508. 444 Makarov and the Conquest of the Arctic, ed. D. Levonevsky (Moscow, Leningrad: Glavsevmorput, 1943), 10. 442 443

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Stepan Makarov convinced the Minister of Finance Sergei Witte of building an icebreaker. On November 14, 1897, Witte reported to Nikolas II on the allocation of 1 million 546 thousand dollars for the construction of a powerful icebreaker.445 Next month in the heart of British shipbuilding Newcastle Makarov signed an agreement to build an icebreaker Yermak – in honor of the famous Cossack, the first conqueror of Siberia. Since then, the icebreaking fleet has come a long way from steam and diesel-electric constructions to nuclear-powered ones. During that process, their power, size, navigation endurance increased and, what is equally important, the workload of the icebreaker seaman was greatly decreased by creating an extremely comfortable work environment for the crew. In the first decade of the 21st century Russia started paying greater attention to the development of the icebreaking fleet. The Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry for the Period up to 2020 and beyond outlined the scope of icebreaker construction.446 The document stressed that “in total, to perform the projected amount of work for the period up to 2030 on the transportation of hydrocarbons of the Russian continental shelf, the need for specialized transport vessels in Arctic navigation is about 90 units with a total deadweight of about 4 million tons and the service fleet about 140 units.”447 Additionally, it was necessary to build up to 12 new icebreakers together with more than 40 icebreakers of various types, which will also provide transportation by sea. President of the Russian Scientific and Technological Society of Shipbuilders named after Krylov, Vladimir Aleksandrov, noted that there is the need of unique ships for the revival of the Northern Sea Route: one nuclear icebreaker-leader with capacity of 110 MW, five universal 60 MW nuclear icebreakers, 12 linear diesel-powered icebreakers 25 MW and 18 MW, eight auxiliary and port icebreakers 4-7 MW, seven floating nuclear power plants for the northern regions.448 Two icebreakers: Moskva and Sankt Peterburg, constructed by the Baltic Shipyard (Project 21900) belonged to the class “ARC 6” and were put into operation in 2008-2009. Three other modernized icebreakers built by the Vyborg Shipyard (Project 21900M) were upgraded to the class “ARC 7.” These Timofeev, “Leader instead of Lenin.” “Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding Industry for the Period up to 2020 and beyond,” Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation, accessed June 12, 2020. http://lenoblinvest.ru/images/klastery/strategy_sudostroj.pdf. 447 Ibid. 448 Vladimir Aleksandrov, “River infantry,” VPK, no. 21 (2016): 1,9. 445 446

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are the icebreakers Vladivostok (laid down in October 2012; commissioned in 2015), Murmansk (laid down in December 2012; commissioned in 2016), and Novorossiysk (laid down in December 2012; commissioning in 2016). Table 8. The main characteristic of the icebreakers under the Project 21900 Length Beam Draft Tonnage Capacity Speed Crew

119,4 m 27,5 m 8,5 m 14000 t 4 х 6750 KW 17 knots 35 men

In recent years, the operating nuclear fleet of Rosatomflot includes 6 nuclear-powered icebreakers, 1 lighter carrier and five vessels for technological service: 2 twin-reactor icebreakers Yamal (1992), the 50 Let Pobedy (1993), 1 lighter carrier with an ice-breaking nose Sevmorput (1988) and 2 shallowdraught nuclear-powered icebreakers Taymyr (1989) and Vaygach (1990).449 Most of these vessels have already served their purpose. They are to be decommissioned by 2021, and Rosatomflot will most likely operate merely one icebreaker. So, the government is quite rightly planning to build up new nuclearpowered icebreakers to prevent an “ice pause” while transportation cargo is constantly growing. As stressed by Atomflot CEO Mustafa Kashka, “in this year (2019 – authors’ note) we decide to extend the operation of the icebreaker’s nuclear reactor Yamal up to 200 thousand hours. The icebreaker will be able to operate approximately until 2028. Next year the research works on the icebreakers Taymyr and Vaygach will be completed by the company I. I. Afrikantov OKB Mechanical Engineering. The reactor facilities of these vessels have already been extended to 200 thousand hours, and the next step is to extend it to 235 thousand and 260 thousand hours respectively. In this case their operation is possible up to 2025 and 2027.”450 In August 2012, the companies Rosatomflot and the Baltic Plant signed an agreement on building a new generation nuclear icebreaker. It was named after the legendary icebreaker Arktika, which first reached the North Pole by water. 449

The nuclear icebreaker Sovetsky Soyuz is out of service for repairs. It was re-equipped to become the command center of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Arctic Group. 450 “Rosatom intends to extend the service life of operating nuclear icebreakers,” RIA-Novosti, accessed May 13, 2020. https://ria.ru/20190311/1551689214.html.

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The new icebreaker replaced the nuclear-powered icebreakers Arktika and Taymyr and features a special system that regulates the diving depth and allows it to operate on the NSR and the rivers of the Arctic region. By collecting water in ballast tanks, the nuclear-powered vessel increases the draft, which is necessary to work in an Arctic environment. When approaching the estuaries of Siberian rivers, where the draft should not exceed 8.5 m, Arktika can drop ballast and float.451 In October 2012, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev took part in the ceremony of laying down a new diesel-electric icebreaker of the project 22600 (LK-25) Viktor Chernomyrdin at the Baltic Shipyard. It should be put into service by the end of 2015, but it happened only in 2019: first due to the discrepancy between the technical documentation and the project itself, then because of the fire on the icebreaker in November 2018, which destroyed about 200 m2 of the deck. The vessel Viktor Chernomyrdin is the world’s most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker. It has a capacity of 25 MW and can break ice up to 2 m thick by moving continuously backwards and forwards.452 The new icebreakers have the capacity to break ice of 1.5-1.6 m thick when moving continuously, and with the stern – 1.3 m. They have a reinforced stainless-steel ice belt and a management system, which enables them to rotate by 1800 in any direction to increase maneuverability, as well as milling ice. The bow of the ship has a bow thruster in the form of a screw in the annular casing, which serves as an engine, can milling the ice, as well as pump water out of the ice as a support for its breaking. Table 9. The characteristic of the icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin Length Beam Draft Tonnage Capacity Speed Endurance Crew

147 m 29 m 8,5-9,5 m 22258 t 25 MW 17 knots 60 days Up to 90 men

“The only one in the world: a nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet,” Atomnaya Energiya, accessed September 30, 2019. https://www.atomic-energy.ru/smi/2012/09/21/36187. 452 Anastasia Vedeneeva, “That is another place to be,” Kommersant, accessed August 23, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4143291. 451

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In 2013, the first of five leading universal nuclear-powered icebreakers of the project 22220 (LK-60Ya) Arktika was laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in Saint Petersburg and in 2016 the ship was launched.453 Arktika is the new pride of the Russian icebreaker fleet. The universal nuclear icebreaker LK-60Ya of the project 22220 Arktika has become the largest and most powerful icebreaker in the world. The height of its board is 17.2 m. The icebreaker has a capacity to lead ships in the Arctic conditions, breaking through the ice up to 3 m thick. Table 10. The characteristic of the icebreaker Arktika Length Beam Draft Tonnage Capacity Speed Crew

173,3 m 34 m Working – 10,5 m; Minimum – 8,55 m 33540 t 175 MW 22 knots 75 men

By reducing the draft, it can operate not only in the ocean, but also in the mouths of rivers such as the Yenisey. The option of the icebreaker to conduct rescue operations at potentially dangerous shallow depths of less than 10-15 m is of exceptional importance. The major technical modernization is the nuclear reactor RITM-200. It is a two-reactor plant with a thermal capacity of 175 MW each. This is more than the capacity of the KLT-family used in modern nuclear icebreakers, as they have the capacity of 140-150 MW. RITM-200 is almost twice lighter and more compact, which makes it cheaper in terms of material intensity and takes up less space on the ship and therefore more it is costeffective. The reactor uses fuel enriched to 20% uranium-235. It is to be refueled every seven years, with a life expectancy of 40 years. The cost of construction is approximately 600 million dollars. It should be noted that Arktika is the first large-capacity vessel with a nuclear power plant built from scratch in Russia in the last 30 years. In November 2020 sea trials were completed and the ship was commissioned. 454 The Arktika icebreaker is capable of replacing ships of two projects at once: 10520 и 10580.

453

In February 2020, during the tests of the icebreaker, the propulsion motor on the right shaft was broken, which postpones its commission. 454 “Putin and Beglov commissioned the icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin,” PD.ru, accessed November 23, 2020. https://www.dp.ru/a/2020/11/03/Putin_vvel_v_stroj_ledoko.

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In September 2012, at a government meeting, the Ministry of Finance announced the allocation of funds in the draft federal budget for 2013-2015 for the construction of three new nuclear icebreakers, which are needed to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic.455 As a result, two identical serial icebreakers Sibir and Ural were laid down in May 2015 (launched in September 2017) and in July 2016 (launched in May 2019), respectively. The cost of the two icebreakers amounts to about 1.2 billion dollars.456 The lay down of the two remaining icebreakers is scheduled for 2021 and 2022, and commissioning in 2024-2026. In 2016, the multifunctional icebreaker Ob entered its assembly phase at the floating dock, a semi-submerged barge platform called “Atlant.” The vessel, commissioned in October 2019, will provide operations in the area of the Novoportovskoye oil field in the west of the Ob Bay. There will be two such ships, both of which are superior in their capacities to the project 21900M457 and belong to the class “ARC8.” That means that the icebreakers can break through continuous ice up to 2 meters thick and lead oil tankers. The icebreaker vessels are designed to operate under temperatures down to -50°C, i.e., they can withstand the most severe natural conditions. The ships will be able to perform many functions, including placement on board a medical hospital. The major international project for liquefied natural gas production “Yamal LNG” was implemented in the Ob Bay. In December 2018, the third technological line was launched. “The blue fuel” is intended mainly for European consumers. In April 2015, Vyborg Shipyard signed a contract to build two icebreakers for Yamal LNG. Also, ice-class tankers were ordered from shipyards in Japan and South Korea. All in all, 29 ships, including 15 icebreaking tankers for the transportation of liquefied natural gas within the Yamal LNG project.458 They will be escorted through the ice by Russian-made icebreaker vessels.

“Comments delivered by Minister of Finance, A.G. Siluanov, at a session of the Government of the Russian Federation, September 20, 2012,” Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, accessed August 23, 2019. https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=32327vyskazyvaniya_a.g._siluanova_na_zasedanii_pravitelstva_rf. 456 Vyacheslav Ruksha, “The Northern Sea Route is the Russian way to India,” Regnum, accessed November 12, 2019. https://regnum.ru/news/2578711.html. 457 22 MW vs. 16 MW. 458 “Russia ordered 29 vessels in South Korea, including tankers for the Yamal LNG project,” Energybase.ru, accessed August 14, 2020. https://energybase.ru/news/industry/rossiazakazala-v-uznoj-koree-okolo-45-sudov-vklucaa-tankery-dla-proekta-amal-2018-07-16. 455

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Moreover, the world’s first asymmetric icebreaker Baltika was built up, which due to the non-standard hull can operate sideways, breaking the ice and forming a channel with a width that is inaccessible to other icebreakers.459 In October 2012, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade published the State Program of the Shipbuilding Development for 2013-2030.460 According to the document, the total amount of funding was to be about 1.3 trillion rubles. The program was also focused on the development of defense enterprises, while in the area of the civil shipbuilding amount of attention was paid to offshore projects and construction of ice class vessels. Russia’s needs were estimated at 26 ice breakers, 230 tankers and 40 gas carriers.461 This issue was addressed at the government meeting with President Putin in November 2014 on Russky Island, Primorsky Krai. The matter concerned the creation of the Shipyard “Zvezda,” which was to prioritize the production of ice class ships. In general, for the next 30 years it was planned to build up more than 150 Arctic vessels for various purposes, 10 nuclear icebreakers, 30 ice platforms for hydrocarbon production.462 Under these conditions, the expansion of the domestic nuclear icebreaker fleet should be considered as a means of consolidating Russia’s leading position in Arctic exploration. Two completely new projects should become a real breakthrough, and namely the construction of nuclear-powered icebreakers of the project 10510 “Leader” (LK-110YA, LK-120YA) and multifunctional offshore atomic vessels of the project 10570. The planned service life of these icebreakers from 2027 to 2066. The German magazine Stern called such projects “a steel fist of the Russian ice armada.”463 Then, on January 15, 2020, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree to allocate 127 billion rubles from the budget to construct the nuclear icebreaker Leader.464

“Modern Russian icebreakers,” Pro-Arctic, accessed August 24, 2019. https://pro-arctic.ru/23/ 08/2016/technology/22859. 460 “On approving of the state programme ‘Shipbuilding Development for 2013-2030’,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed April 14, 2020. http://government.ru/ docs/3349/ 461 Ibid. 462 Anatoly Aleksashin and Valery Polovinkin, “The current status and development perspective of the ice shipbuilding and shipping industry,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economics, No. 1 (2015): 18-30. 463 Timofeev, “Leader instead of Lenin.” 464 “Resolution No. 11 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 15.01.2020 ‘On budget investments into construction of the lead nuclear icebreaker of Project 10510 ‘Leader’,” Official internet portal of legal information, accessed February 26, 2020. http://publication. pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202001160008. 459

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In June 2020, the construction of the Leader was launched at the Zvezda Shipyard Company. The icebreaker will have a super-powerful nuclear power plant (110-120 MW) and have capability to break through the ice with a maximum thickness of 4.0 m in the Arctic at a speed of 2-3 knots and two-meter ice with a speed of 13 knots. Tonnage should be 70674 tons, length 209 m, beam 47.5 m. The increased beam of the hull will allow the ship to lead large-tonnage vessels. The height of the board should be 20,3 m, draft 13 m. The cruising speed should be about 24 knots. The icebreaker shall be operated by a crew of 127 persons. Leader will be able to lay a 50 m wide shipping channel with a speed of 10-12 knots.465 The icebreaker is designed by Central Design Bureau “Aisberg,” and its operator is the federal state unitary enterprise Atomflot of the state corporation Rosatom. According to the Head of the Northern Sea Route Directorate, Vyacheslav Ruksha, the prospective nuclear-powered ship was designed, “to provide yearround navigation in the eastern part of the NSR with commercial speed.”466 At the same time, the vessels of the project 10510 are necessary for navigation in the Arctic shelf and shallow waters. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin was convinced that without the project 10510, Russia would fail to realize the potential of the Northern Sea Route.467 “If we want to remain a leading Arctic power, we need to build up the icebreakers Leader and ensure the work of transport vessels at the Northern Sea Route all year round.”468 In the last decade, Russia is re-establishing its military presence in the Arctic. However, warships cannot operate in the Arctic latitudes without a powerful icebreaker escort, as their sides are too thin to protect them from the ice. The leadership of the Russian Armed Forces in the future plans to create a fleet of military icebreakers and attack ships of ice class, capable of breaking through the ice up to 2 m thick at a speed of 14 knots. It is expected that the new icebreakers will ensure navigation of warships not only through the NSR but also in the high Arctic. The first combat icebreaker was Ivan Papanin. It is to be put into service in 2023. The ship can operate as an icebreaker and crash the ice up to 1.7 m thick. It can also be used in rescue operations and for security and patrolling. Ivan Papanin is the first of its family to be equipped with heavy weapons. The KaVladimir Teslenko, “‘Leaders’ will make the Northern Sea Route all year-round,” Kommersant Nauka, no. 45 (2018): 22-23. 466 Anastasia Vedeneeva, “Sevmorput as long as a year,” Kommersant, July 26, 2019. 467 Alexey Zakvasin, “The Arctic is close: Russia’s achievements in the development of the Northern Sea Route,” RT, accessed February 12, 2020. https://russian.rt.com/ russia/article/465433-severnyi-morskoi-put. 468 Vedeneeva, “Sevmorput as long as a year.” 465

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27 anti-submarine helicopter and “Kalibr” cruise missiles can be based on the vessel. In 2024, the second patrol icebreaker Nikolay Zubov is to join Ivan Papanin. Moreover, President Vladimir Putin noted, “by 2035, the Arctic Fleet will consist of at least 13 heavy icebreakers, including 9 nuclear ones.”469 Due to the extreme climate in the Arctic, the lion’s share of the cost of navigation is the creation of infrastructure to assist the crew. Statistics show that 60-80% of errors are made by personnel, and the damage is estimated at 1.5 million dollars per day.470 In order to advance shipbuilding, researchers of the State Corporation of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center – All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics are developing a digital model of a crewless vessel together with Krylov State Research Center and Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.471 Under this project, the institute also conducts modeling taking into account the impact of hydrometeorological conditions and geographical features on the objects and processes of modeling. This involves replacing people on the vessel with machinery. The latest equipment should provide transmission, signal reception, diagnostics, monitoring of ship systems, etc. Besides, the model of a crewless vessel will allow improving other, traditional ships. In particular, it will significantly improve and optimize the ship’s size ratio. This, in its turn, will have a favorable effect on the crew, since the negative impact of a sharp swing on the personnel’s habitability is reduced. The digital model will also allow increasing the area of cargo holds and prolonging the ship’s sailing time. This innovative implementation should give a positive economic effect. Similar works are carried out in China, Norway, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The weak point of the Northern Sea Route’s infrastructure was the Arctic ports. Since 1990, most of them have not been reconstructed. Thus, after the construction of new ships for navigation in the Arctic began to expand, certain tasks have been set: the modernization of Arctic ports of Providence, Pevek, Tiksi, Khatanga, Salekhard, Dudinka, Dixon, Naryan-Mar.472 It is planned to install navigation, hydrographic and hydrometeorological support systems, as Mikhail Metzel, “Putin: The new strategy of the Russian Arctic development until 2035 will be adopted this year,” TASS, accessed January 21, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6312429. 470 “An easy way out to the Arctic: Rosatom creates a crewless vessel,” The Russian Academy of Sciences, accessed April 25, 2020. http://www.ras.ru/news/shownews.aspx?id=b63dba3367e1-4ba3-8815-05ccdecc8c13#content. 471 “Rosatom will create a digital model of a crewless vessel for the Arctic,” SKS Rosatom, accessed June 25, 2020. https://www.skc.ru/press/news/item/4243387/. 472 Oleg Kazakov, “New prospects of Sevmorput,” Russia in the ATR, no. 2 (2012): 68-75. 469

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well as to form rescue services. In 2013, an emergency rescue center was established in Dudinka.473 To sum up, the icebreaker fleet needs to be renewed, as the cargo traffic at the Northern Sea Route increases every year. According to Rosatomflot, from 2023 on, the Russian nuclear icebreaker fleet will need to be increased to 6 ships, and after 2026 to 7. Currently, there are about 40 icebreakers in use in Russia, including 4 nuclear vessels under the projects 10520. All of them are subject to planned disposal which will start in 2023 and should be completed in 2035. The Soviet generation of icebreakers should be replaced by 5 ships of the project 22220 (of the LK-60Ya type) with a more powerful nuclear plant (60 MW vs. 55 MW).474

4.5. THE ICEBREAKING FLEET OF THE ARCTIC AND NON-ARCTIC STATES Other Arctic and non-arctic states, neither now nor within the next few years will have resources to compete with Russia on the quantity and quality of transport icebreaking units. As a comparison: Denmark operates 4 vessels, and Norway only 2. The similar situation is in Sweden and Finland, which both possess 7 icebreakers. A number of non-arctic states: China, South Korea, Germany, and Japan have only one ship each.475 The United States operates only 3 heavy diesel-electric icebreakers (operated by the Coast Guard). Two of them have been operating for 40 years: since 1977, the heavy icebreaker the Polar Star, and since 1977 the icebreaker the Polar Sea.476 Since 1999, the vessel Healy has been operating.477 The capacity of U.S. icebreakers, however, is much less than that of Russian vessels. “The USA does not have an icebreaker fleet. They had no incentive to develop this sphere. In Russia, the activity of one of A. P. Zavenyagin Norilsk Mining “The second in the Arctic Search and rescue unit of the Ministry of Emergency Situations will open by the end of the year,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/ 20130925/965633619.html. 474 Alexey Zakvasin and Elizaveta Komarova, “The universal ‘Ural’ and the breakthrough ‘Leader’: the renewal of Russia’s icebreaking fleet,” RT, accessed July 28, 2020. https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/634993-ledokol-ural-arktika. 475 “The U.S. Coast Guard published a list of icebreakers by country of the world (illustration),” Portnews, accessed November 16, 2020. https://portnews.ru/news/173436/. 476 “The only heavy icebreaker in the USA,” Sea News, accessed August 25, 2020. https://seanews.ru/2020/05/22/ru-edinstvennyj-tjazhelyj-ledokol-ssha/. 477 Ibid. 473

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and Metallurgical Combine’s department required a year-round maritime transport system in the Kara Sea,” as General Director Atomflot, Vyacheslav Ruksha, emphasized.478 Table 11. The characteristic of the icebreaker Healy Length Beam Tonnage Capacity Speed Cruising speed

128 m 25 m 16000 t 175 MW 12,5 knots 17 knots

This disparity raises concerns by U.S. authorities. Back in 2015, answering a question about the rivalry between Russia and the United States, Commander of the Coast Guard, Paul Zukunft, said that “we are not even in the same league with Russia today.”479 U.S. experts lobby to design new icebreakers and ice class ships. They are planned to be used both for research, search and rescue operations, protection of the environment, and to defend U.S. sovereignty, enforcement of international law and demonstration of the flag in international waters. The Coast Guard believes that 3 heavy and 3 medium icebreakers are required to accomplish these tasks. In the future, the number should increase to 10, which includes 6 heavy and 4 medium class vessels.480 In 2018, the U.S. Senate allocated 750 million dollars to modernize the Arctic fleet, but funds were redirected to build the US-Mexico border wall. Accordingly, this will keep the U.S. behind Russia. In the United States, the Coast Guard intends to purchase 3 new heavy icebreakers. In this regard, in April 2019 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security signed a contract value of 745 million dollars with VT Halter Marine Inc. The icebreaker will be designed under the “Polar Security Cutter programme.” According to the project, 3 similar ships of medium and heavy Mikhail Mokshin and Oleg Moskvitin, “Why Russia overtook the USA in the ice-breaker race,” Vzglyad, accessed September 24, 2019. https://vz.ru/economy/2018/12/7/267131. html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop. 479 Andrey Todorov, “Icebreaker fleet breaks Russia’s way to the Leaders of the Arctic region,” RISS, accessed January 19, 2020. https://riss.ru/analitycs/32948/. 480 Pavel Gudev, “Modernization of the icebreaking fleet of Russia: a tribute to the conjuncture or a strategic necessity?” Russian International Affairs Council, accessed February 28, 2020. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/modernizatsiya-ledokolnogoflota-rossii-dan-konyunkture-ili-/. 478

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class should be constructed and replace 2 ageing icebreakers. “The mission of the PSC will be to ensure continued access to both polar regions and to support the economic, commercial, maritime, and national security needs of the country.”481 The first ship is expected to be designed and built by June 2024, and the rest by November 2027. The total contract value will be 1.9 billion dollars.482 The construction is due to start at VT Halter Marine shipyard in 2021.483 The announcement followed shortly after the release of a new strategy U.S. Coast Guard in the Arctic.484 Under the document, the U.S. will have to confront this region, “as America’s two nearest-peer powers, Russia and China, have both declared the region a national priority.”485 In June 2020, President Trump issued a “Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions.”486 The document calls on the responsible authorities to develop a plan within 60 days, which would include building at least 3 heavy icebreakers by 2029, as well as recommendations on locations for the establishment of 2 support bases in the United States and 2 more bases outside the country. As the memorandum outlined, “the new ice fleet will be used for the full range of national and economic security tasks, including assisting in resource exploration and exploitation and the laying and maintenance of submarine cables.”487. The paper was sent to the Pentagon, State Department, Ministry of Trade and Homeland Security. The document was to expand and update the U.S. Coast Guard’s plan to build 3 heavy and 3 medium icebreakers. Trump’s memorandum showed that the U.S. Administration is increasingly concerned about the actions of Russia and China in the Arctic. “The USA signed a contract for the construction of an icebreaker for the Coast Guard,” RIANovosti, accessed January 7, 2020. https://ria.ru/20190424/1552987468.html. 482 Andrey Riskin, “The USA builds ice-breakers to break through to the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya, accessed September 21, 2019. http://www.ng.ru/columnist/2019-04-24/100_kolonka 240419_2.html. 483 “Polar Security Cutter (PSC),” Naval Technology, accessed February 13, 2020. https://www. naval-technology.com/projects/polar-security-cutterpsc/#:~:text=The%20polar%20security%20cutters%20will, delivery%20is%20planned%20in%202024. 484 “United States Coast Guard. Arctic Strategic Outlook. 2019. April,” accessed March 9, 2020. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/uscgarctic_strategic_outlook_20190422.pdf. 485 Ibid. 486 “Memorandum of Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions. 2020. June 9,” The White House, accessed August 26, 2020. https://www.whitehouse. gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-safeguarding-u-s-national-interests-arctic-antarcticregions/. 487 Ibid. 481

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The Canadian ice-breaking fleet is also far below the Russian one. During the revision of the Canadian Transportation Act in 2016 the conclusion was made about the bad condition of Canadian icebreakers. They are the oldest in the world: their average age is 33.8 years.488 In 2016, Canada developed a program to build 6 new icebreakers. The patrol icebreaker Harry DeWolf was laid down in March 2016 and launched in September 2018. It was named in honour of Vice-Admiral, who commanded the destroyer St. Lauren, which was the first of the Canadian vessels entered World War II. Harry DeWulf was the largest ship built in Canada in the last 50 years. It is 103 m long and has a displacement of 6,615 tons. At present, 2 more patrol class icebreakers Margaret Brooke and Max Bernays are under construction in Canada. In general, the National Ministry of Defence ordered 6 such ships with a total cost of 1.76 billion dollars.489 According to Vice-Admiral Art MacDonald, commander of the Canadian Navy, “the Harry DeWolf-class ships will be essential to expanding our presence in the Arctic, effectively complementing other ships.”490 By the end of 2018, Canada had 15 diesel-electric icebreakers: 2 heavy class, 4 medium class vessels, 9 multipurpose ships and 2 hovercrafts in use.491 The Canadian government has announced a 550 million dollars investment to replace the flagship CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent. There are also plans to build four military icebreakers.492 In 2018, Canada purchased from Norway for the first time in 25 years the medium class icebreaker CCGS Captain Molly Kool, which became part of the Coast Guard fleet. The vessel is 93.7 m long, 18 m wide and has a crew of 19 members. In the same year, the Quebec Shipyard received a 600 million dollars contract to rebuild 3 Norwegian icebreakers for Canada.493 At present, Canada has several ships that are suitable for ice navigation in use. The icebreaker Louis St. Lauren belongs to the family of heavy Arctic icebreakers and is still the flagship of the Coast Guard of Canada. It was built in 1969 and modernized in 1988-1993. During the summer period the ship carries out annual maritime arctic voyages and research expeditions. In the

In Russia, the average age is 18.1 years, and in the USA – 20.6 years. “Canada has launched a second patrol icebreaker of a new generation,” Seldon News, accessed August 10, 2020. https://news.myseldon.com/ru/news/index/219649715. 490 Ibid. 491 “Canada’s first ‘new’ icebreaker,” High North News, accessed November 4, 2020. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/canadas-first-new-icebreaker. 492 Ibid. 493 Ibid. 488 489

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winter months, the icebreaker operates in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to assist in the entry of ships into the port of Montreal. Table 12. The characteristic of the icebreaker Louis St. Laurent Length Beam Draft Tonnage Propulsion plant Speed Operational range Composition of aviation Crew

119,8 m 24,8 m 9m 11441 t Diesel-electric plant with a capacity of 34.000 hw 17,8 knots 16.000 nautical miles 2 helicopters 46 men

Amundsen is a medium class Arctic icebreaker, as well as a research vessel (formerly Sir John Franklin) built in 1979 for the Canadian Coast Guard. It was then handed over to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). The ship is depicted on a 50-dollar banknote. As early as 2012, the DFO decided to build a new flagship of the Coast Guard fleet, calling the decision “an important step in the implementation of the Canadian northern policy.”494 According to the DFO document, “the state plans to maintain the Arctic fleet of the country and add new ships to it specifically for conducting operations in the Arctic. Our ships should be able to patrol the Northwest Passage, both in navigation and all year round if necessary.”495 Prime Minister Stephen Harper called the initiative to build an icebreaker “Canada’s national security project in the Arctic.”496 In 2021, the newest icebreaker John G. Diefenbaker is due to be put into operation. The icebreaker will become the most powerful diesel-electric ship in the world and the third most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker.497 Its shaft capacity will be about 34 MW, the same as that of the Russian nuclear-powered vessels Taymyr and Vaygach. The icebreaker will be able to break up the ice with a thickness of 2.5 m at the speed of 3 knots.498 It is equipped with a hull air lubrication system, reducing ice friction during ice-breaking operations. “Departmental Performance Report 2012-13,” Government of Canada, accessed January 23, 2020. http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2012-13/SupplementaryTables/mcp-gpe-eng.html. 495 Ibid. 496 “Canada will build a new generation icebreaker to work in the Arctic by 2017,” RIA-Novosti, accessed January 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120206/559240907.html. 497 The first two icebreakers are USCGC Polar Star and USCGC Polar Sea with gas turbines. 498 “Canada builds a new icebreaker,” Korabley.net, accessed June 23, 2019. http://korabley. net/news/kanada_stroit_novyj_ledokol/2016-09-16-1802. 494

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Table 13. The characteristic of the icebreaker Amundsen Length Beam Draft Tonnage Capacity Speed Operational range Endurance Crew

98,15 m 19,5 m 7,16 m 5911 t 10142 KW 14 knots 15.000 nautical miles 192 days 38 men

Table 14. The characteristic of the icebreaker John G. Diefenbaker Length Beam Draft Tonnage Propulsion plant Speed Operational range Composition of aviation Crew Ice class

150 m 28 m 10,5 m 23700 t 6 diesel generators with a total capacity of 39,6 MW Max – 20 knots, on ice – 3 knots 26.200 nautical miles 2 helicopters 60 men Polar Class 2 Icebreaker (+)

The vessels may accommodate up to 40 scientific employees in different laboratories. It is capable of year-round operation in polar latitudes. This icebreaker is to replace the icebreaker CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent. Currently, in Sweden, instead of the icebreaker Oden, built in 1988, an ecoicebreaker is being developed that will run on methanol. China expresses its interests in the navigation development along the Northern Sea Route, and regularly organizes scientific expeditions. China’s growing activity in the Arctic is due to both the possible discovery of new routes for cargo delivery and the desire to develop mineral resources on the continental shelf.499

499

Yuri Morozov, “China in the Arctic: goals and risks for Russian-Chinese relations,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 5 (2016): 21-32.

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Length Beam Draft Tonnage Capacity Speed Crew

108 m 31 m 8,4 m 9605 t 4 х 4500 KW 16 knots 15 men

In August 2013, its first commercial voyage from the Chinese port of Dalian to the Dutch port of Rotterdam was made by the Chinese vessel Yong Sheng of the company COSCO Shipping, which is one of the ten largest world container operators.500 The journey took 33 days, which is two weeks less than the usual 48-day voyage through the Suez Canal, the most popular way to deliver goods from Shanghai to Rotterdam. According to Bestway Development’s representative Li Bin, “Chinese business has an interest in this area, but it is confused by the state of infrastructure.”501 “For example, if you send goods through the Suez Canal, the ships on the way can enter the ports of Malaysia, and the Northern Sea Route is only ports of Russia. The population in those areas is small, the number of goods is not significant, and the economic efficiency of such transportation is still in question. As soon as there is enough cargo, there will be transportation,” Li Bin stressed.502 Speaking of China’s interests in the Arctic, Rear Admiral Yin Zhou is often quoted as saying occasionally that “the Arctic belongs to the whole world, so that no people have sole authority over it and that China should play its role in the development of the Arctic, as the country is home to one fifth of the world’s population.”503 The one and only icebreaker operated by China, Xue Long 1, was reequipped from the Soviet class ship Vitus Bering (Project 10621). But in fact, it is not an icebreaker but a supply vessel. It was purchased from Ukraine in 1993. Since 1994, it has carried out 22 expeditions to the Antarctic region and 9 to the Arctic. In the fifth expedition to the Arctic (July 22 to August 2, 2012), the

Romanycheva, “An invitation to walk onto the stage.” Ibid. 502 Ibid. 503 Valentina Samoylova, “Battle of the Arctic: Asia is eager,” Regnum, accessed February 13, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2284997.html. 500 501

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icebreaker left the Chukchi and Bering seas, crossed about 3,000 miles along the NSR and became the first ship in China to conquer the route.504 In recent years, China has arranged several more Arctic expeditions. The eighth expedition took place from July 20 to September 6, 2017. Xue Long left Shanghai for the Arctic.505 The ninth expedition took place from July 20 to September 26, 2018. Research was conducted in areas such as: environment, underwater topography, ecology, fisheries and ice conditions in the Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, Canadian Basin, central areas of the Arctic Ocean.506 In October 2019, China completed its next, tenth, expedition to the Arctic. The oceanographic vessel Xiang Yang Hong 01 covered about 10,300 nautical miles and conducted research in the eastern Bering Sea.507 In May 2017, at a meeting of foreign ministers of China and Russia discussed the project “Polar Silk Road.” It implied the development of the Northern Sea Route’s infrastructure and the construction of ports with the direct involvement of Chinese enterprises. Chinese experts addressed the need to achieve a “high level of confidence” with Russia and offered to choose 5 ports as the basis for the participation of China: Murmansk, Sabetta, Arkhangelsk, Tiksi and Uelen.508 Later on, in January 2018, after the State Council of China published the “White Paper,”509 Chinese officials have negotiated more diplomatically. The statements were limited to the fact that China would not interfere with the sovereign affairs of the Arctic states. It was stressed that China would certainly be present in the region, as a state located near the Arctic.510 In July 2019 at the Jianghan Shipyard in Shanghai the first, self-built by China, the icebreaker Xue Long 2 worth 153 million dollars was launched. It was built in two years according to the project made by the Finnish company Aker Arctic Technology Oy. The icebreaker is designed for research polar expeditions with a displacement of more than 13.9 thousand tons, length 122.5 m, beam 22.3 m, maximum draft 7.85 m. Xue Long 2 has a capacity to carry on “Arctic ambitions. Why China is building an icebreaker fleet,” RIA-Novosti, accessed October 24, 2020. https://ria.ru/20190722/1556683024.html. 505 “The eighth Arctic expedition started in China. 2017,” Regnum, accessed November 12, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/innovatio/2303677.html. 506 “The Chinese icebreaker Xue Long completed its eight Arctic expedition and returned to Shanghai,” TASS, accessed October 10, 2020. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5610581. 507 “China has completed its tenth Arctic research expedition,” Regnum, accessed December 24, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/innovatio/2735732.html. 508 Ilya Plekhanov, “Military news: why does China need nuclear icebreakers?” Inosmi.ru, accessed January 23, 2020. https://inosmi.ru/military/20180629/242609069.html. 509 The White paper is China’s Arctic policy on the development of the Polar Silk Road. 510 Plekhanov, “Military news: why does China need nuclear icebreakers?” 504

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board up to 4.5 thousand tons of cargo, and the maximum speed, according to technical characteristics, is about 15 knots. It has been designed to break through ice up to 1.5 m thick, both at the stern and at the bow.511 The vessel has a cruising range of up to 20 thousand nautical miles and has an endurance of 60 days. Table 16. The characteristic of the icebreaker Xue Long 2 Length Beam Draft Tonnage Speed Operational range Crew Ice class

122,5 m 22,3 m 7,85 m 13990 t 15 knots 20.000 nautical miles 90 men PC3

The Chinese Xue Long 2 has modern equipment, allowing it to operate in any ocean and to conduct oceanographic research and advanced monitoring of the polar regions, study their biodiversity, atmospheric and environmental conditions, as well as to survey fish resources. In late 2019, as part of the International Maritime Conference and Exhibition in Shanghai, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation presented the model and specifications of a new icebreaker with a traditional engine. With a displacement of 26 thousand tons and the ability to break through the ice 3 m thick at a speed of 2 knots, the ship of the second polar class in terms of size and icebreaker capabilities is approaching the latest Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker Arktika (Project 22220). China’s interest in the Northern Sea Route goes beyond scientific interest. Expert Li Zhengfu believed that “the use of the Arctic shipping lane has the potential to provide China with huge strategic opportunities.”512 In his view, “the one who will gain control of the Arctic route, will control the new route of world trade.”513 In March 2019 in the city of Haimen in the eastern province of Jiangsu was launched the first Chinese ship for polar expeditions. It was constructed at the shipyards of the shipbuilding company China Merchants Group. The length of the vessel is 104.4 m, beam 18.4 m, displacement 7.4 thousand tons, maximum

511

During this maneuver, the speed should be 2-3 knots. Vyacheslav Balakin, “China’s strategy in the Arctic and Antarctic,” China in the world and regional politics. History and the Present, no. 17 (2012): 227-241. 513 Ibid. 512

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speed 15.5 knots. It can accommodate up to 255 people. SunStone Ships, which is one of the world’s largest suppliers of scientific expedition vessels, has ordered a total of 10 such vehicles from China Merchants Group.514 In other words, China has taken the first steps towards its expansion in this direction. In April 2019, speaking in China at the forum “One Belt – One Way,” Russian President Putin announced an extensive development of transport infrastructure, in particular, of the Northern Sea Route.515 As he said, “we are considering the possibility of connecting it with the Chinese “Silk Road,” thereby creating a global and competitive route that connects the North-Eastern, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia with Europe.”516 Previously, Beijing announced plans to build a nuclear icebreaker. In 2019, China General Nuclear Power Group submitted an application for the design and construction of a prospective ship. Experts suggested that the nuclear icebreaker could become a technological test for further development of nuclear power plants on large surface ships, such as aircraft carriers for the Chinese fleet.517

“China launched its first own vessel for polar expeditions,” TASS-Nauka, accessed March 12, 2019. https://tass.ru/nauka/6212073?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop. 515 “The international forum ‘One belt – one way’,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed January 23, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60378. 516 Pavel Matveev, “The Development of the Northern Sea Route, digital economy, energy Vladimir Putin’s speech at the forum ‘One Belt, One Way’,” First Channel, accessed January 23, 2020. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2019-04-27/364278razvitie_severnogo_morskogo_puti_tsifrovaya_ekonomika_energetika_vystuplenie_vladimi ra_putina_na_forume_odin_poyas_odin_put. 517 “‘Icebreaker Race’: China reveals the details of its new project,” Kont, accessed February 6, 2020. https://cont.ws/@vv900535441/1531944. 514

Chapter 5

AMBITIONS AND REALITIES OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE ARCTIC 5.1. THE ARCTIC BEACHHEAD: FROM STALIN TO PUTIN Tsarist Russia did not consider the Russian North as a strategically important part of its territory. They made the mistake of selling one of the richest areas in the world—Alaska. Soon after, it lost the rights over Russia’s GrumentSpitsbergen,518 making further development of the region an idea of the past. In 1894, after his trip to the North, Russian Finance Minister Sergei Yu. Witte proposed an action plan for the economic development of coastal areas in Murmansk,519 and shortly after, Vice Admiral Stepan O. Makaro voiced the possibility of “conquering the Arctic” with the help of icebreakers.520 After Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the government started studying the conditions of navigation along the NorthEastern Sea Route, which later became known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR). World War I forced Russia to give serious consideration to the development of ports in the north and their rail connection with the central regions of the country. It was at that moment the proposals made by both Witte and Makarov deserved a reasonable interest. We also should not forget about historical 518

In 1867, the Russian Empire sold Alaska to the United States. Witte proposed to build a port and a naval base in Murmansk, to develop the economy of Russia’s Arctic territories, to build a railway, a power station and communication lines in the region. 520 In January 1897, S. O. Makarov submitted to the Minister of the Sea, Vice Admiral P.P. Tyrkov, a report on the possibility of Arctic exploration by means of icebreakers. 519

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Russian polar expeditions of the late 19th – early 20th century: the tragic expeditions of Vladimir A. Rusanov, Georgy L. Brusilov, Georgy Y. Sedov, and the unique Hydrographic Expedition of the Arctic Ocean in 1913-1915, which crossed the NSR from east to west. At that time, the core of unique polar explorers was formed: Vladimir Yu. Vise, Rudolf L., Samoylovich, Leonid M. Starokadomskiy, Nikolay N. Zubov, Aleksander V. Kolchak, Nikolay I. Evgenov, Boris V. Davydov, Boris A. Vilkitskiy, etc. Under Soviet rule for 70 years, the issue of the Arctic had been the focus of attention. Soviet power performed heroic, and simultaneously, repressive, “educational,” economic and political-ideological functions. Its sector in the Arctic had been investigated, exploited as planned, albeit slowly. Budgetary, technical, and human resources were steadily increasing. In 1930-1950, under the leadership of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Joseph V. Stalin the first Soviet Arctic Shield was created. The famous Russian historian Yuri M. Zhukov first wrote about it in his monograph Stalin: the Arctic Shield.521 The Arctic Shield included economic, military and strategic power, transport targeted at protecting the territorial integrity and security of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent Perestroika could not but affect the Arctic as part of a great country. According to Zhukov, “events of 1991 and 1993 shattered the Arctic Shield.”522 Even ten years after the collapse, researches of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) emphasized that “the abrupt end of the previous state policy, and in fact the sudden ‘withdrawal’ of the state from the Arctic region, where its role had been decisive, has caused economic and social disaster. It has become a real catastrophe, especially in the harsh environment of the North. All attempts to correct the situation that the authorities had made during the ‘transitional period’ of the 90s failed. Today, the Russian Arctic is a disaster area.”523 From the beginning of the 21st century Russia launched the second entering the Arctic region. In other words, the Arctic Shield was upgraded given the conditions of the multipolar world, which is linked with the policy of the Russian President Vladimir V. Putin. In the 1920s, “Soviet society wasn’t excited about the Arctic just yet, and at the time, the country’s leadership did not realize that polar expeditions could

521

Yuri Zhukov, Stalin: the Arctic Shield (Moscow: Vagrius, 2008), 544. Ibid. 523 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 355. 522

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be used as a serious political resource.” 524 Although then, the Soviet Union “fought back” from the “tick-born” attempts of the West and the East, the Norwegians and Americans, who tried to acquire the territories of the Soviet islands of Franz Josef and Wrangel Land, located in the Arctic Ocean. Traditionally, the starting point for analysing Russia’s foreign policy in the Arctic was a decree of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR of April 15, 1926, “On the Declaration as the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic of the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean.”525 Under this document, the USSR not only marked the boundaries of its Arctic possessions,526 but also fixed its position on the principles of the division of Arctic spaces, based on the sectoral approach. As is known, a decree did not address the issues of the Arctic seas shelf delineation and did not impose restrictions on navigation in the Arctic seas beyond the territorial waters. In 1928, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs published a work written by a well-known jurist, air law specialist, V.L. Lakhtin. In his brochure, the author wrote, “the issue of ownership of the northern circumpolar spaces is essential. It provides the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic with successful resolution of a number of important tasks. This includes protection of safety of the whole vast line of our northern border, and the development of the economy of the northern regions of Siberia, and the preservation of the Northern Sea Route, and the development of profitable mountain, fur, hunting and fishing industries, and, finally, promising grand prospects for the operation of the transArctic air route.”527 “With the increasing international significance of the Soviet polar possessions, their political and geographical location [...] they should involve us in the creation of measures from to protect these possessions, by better study of them, by more frequent expeditions, by early arrangement of first of all meteorological and radio stations and then airfields. It is mainly necessary to establish periodic patrols of our sea and air vessels, with their oversight functions over foreign and hunting, fishing and etc. consignments.”528 As

524

Ramiz Aliyev, Underside White. The Arctic from Vikings to Papaninites (Moscow: Paulsen Publishing House, 2016), 408. 525 “Decree of Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union of 15.04.1926 ‘On the Declaration as the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic of the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean.” 526 It defined the boundaries of the polar possessions from the Kola Peninsula through the North Pole to the Bering Strait with the total area of 5.8 million km². 527 Igor Zonn, “The Arctic ‘Upgrade’ of President V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation,” Post-Soviet Issues, no. 1 (2017): 4:20-40. 528 Ibid.

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Zhukov wrote, “this is how the Arctic doctrine of the USSR was first formulated and made public.”529 Despite challenging times in the economic and political spheres, on February 4, 1931 Stalin, having won in the internal party struggle for power and returning to direct participation in the state activities, spoke at the All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry, proclaiming a new course of the government. Its essence overcoming the underdevelopment in all sectors of the economy. Stalin then stressed, “we are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must run this distance in ten years, either we do it or they will crush us.”530 Sixteen days later, in the framework of his new program, the Soviet leader specified it in relation to the Arctic by sending to the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party a note “On the Protection of the Northern Coast.”531 This was due to the fact that at that time the northern part of the Soviet Union was quite vulnerable to a potential enemy. The borders from the oceans were not protected by naval forces. In the middle of the 19th century, the Anglo-French during the Crimean War and in the first half of the 1920s, the Entente troops took advantage of the vulnerability of these lands. Moreover, English warships sometimes entered Russian territorial waters without authorization to protect illegal fishing by English fishermen. This threatened the national interests and security of the country. To address this problem after the completion of the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal,532 Stalin suggested using it for the transfer of warships from the Baltic Sea to the Barents Sea. Besides, the task was to find a place for a naval base in the Kola Bay, near the city of Murmansk, using its rail connection with industrial centers of the country. Stalin’s note was submitted to the Defense Commission (established under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee), and the commission immediately adopted a number of strategic decisions.

529

Zhukov, 544. Joseph Stalin, “The Tasks of Industrial Managers” (Speech, First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry, Moscow, February 4, 1931), Historical Materials, accessed March 13, 2020. http://istmat.info/node/20360. 531 “Protocol No. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) of 25.02.1931, para. 7/23 ‘On the Protection of the Northern Coast’,” Historical Materials, accessed March 25, 2020. http://istmat.info/ node/48207. 532 The White Sea-Baltic Canal connected the White Sea with Lake Onega. It has access to the Baltic Sea. Until 1961, it has a name the Stalin White Sea-Baltic Canal. 530

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Thus, already on March 20, 1931, the Politburo adopted the resolution “On Spitsbergen Coal” (for supplying ships of the future Soviet fleet).533 Later on, the trust Arktikugol534 was organized, which started mining coal on Spitsbergen. The notion of a single structure of the NSR’s route was discussed back in the first era of Arctic exploration, in the 1930s. At that time Stalin doubted that the People’s Commissariat for Water Transport (Narkomvod) was able to manage transport, industry, radio communications, hydrometeorology and other issues in the Arctic. Given that in 1932, under the Council of the People’s Commissars (CPC) the General Directorate of the Northern Sea Route was established. By the end of the same year, Soviet officials ordered a sea expedition along the Northern Sea Route from Arkhangelsk to Vladivostok in order to prove the possibility of crossing it in one navigation season. The expedition was headed by the famous polar explorer Otto Yu. Schmidt on the icebreaker Fedor Litke.535 It lasted from July 28 to October 15, although 1000 km off the Bering Strait bent blades of the icebreaker’s propeller were changed. The trawler Ussuriets from Vladivostok towed the icebreaker Fedor Litke to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. After this successful expedition, on December 17, 1932, the government adopted a resolution of the CPC of the USSR no. 1873. The document fixed follows: “to establish under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR the General Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput or GUSMP); to authorize the GUSMP to finally lay the Sea Route from the White Sea to the Bering Strait, to equip this route, to maintain it in good state and to ensure safety of navigation along this route.”536 At the same time, Stalin did not entrust the development of Arctic territories to the government. It was decided to abandon the involvement of relevant specialized People’s Commissariats because of the fear that they “will not be able to pay appropriate attention to this project.”537

“Resolution ‘On Spitsbergen Coal’,” approved by the Politburo of the CPSU (b), April 8, 1932, Historical Materials, accessed April 14, 2020. http://istmat.info/node/54977. 534 The Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Trust Arktikugol” was set up by a decree of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars of October 7, 1931 no. 836 for the extraction of coal and other minerals on the islands and the coast of the North Polar Sea to meet the needs of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions and the Northern Navy. 535 The previous name of the icebreaker was Bellaventure. 536 “Resolution No. 1873 of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of 17.12.1932 ‘On the Organization by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of the Northern Sea Route General Directorate’,” Consultant-Plus, accessed March 23, 2020. http://www. consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base =ESU&n=24839#07233638468094108. 537 Mikhail Chernov, “Putin’s Arctic Ambitions,” Pro-Arctic, accessed October 24, 2020. https://pro-arctic.ru/25/04/2014/press/8108. 533

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According to the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation, polar explorer Mark I. Shevelev, at the time of Stalin’s decision to establish Glavsevmorput, he said, that “the Arctic is a complex region. You have to create an organization that would be in charge of everything. And it should also know that it is responsible for the Arctic and for nothing else. And we will ask such organization, and do it strictly!”538 On January 1, 1933, GUSMP started to operate. In order to exploit the Arctic air space, considerable attention has been paid to airship construction. Already in 1933, the first Soviet airship B-5 of 2340 m³ volume was built at the Dolgoprudnenskiy Shipyard near Moscow. Such a largescale one was Stalin’s project to develop the Arctic.539 Hardly anyone knows whether or not Stalin had real interest in the Arctic. He never visited the region. The reason for that might be the fact that “the North was harmful” to the Caucasian man, especially after the Turukhan exile.540 However, he never forgot about the Arctic. Stalin was near the Arctic once, having made a polar voyage in spring 1933 on the steamer Anokhin together with Sergey M. Kirov and Kliment E. Voroshilov. This trip took place along the newly commissioned White Sea-Baltic Canal, which was constructed on his initiative and order. In his memoirs, the well-known Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov wrote, that according to Ivan S. Isakov, Chief of Staff of the Expedition of Special Forces (EON-1),541 Stalin, delivering a speech at a rally on the airlock 19 of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, said, “this is the North, you need to know it, you need to investigate it, get acquainted with it, and to master it. Only then are you allowed to talk about it”542 During that voyage, on the towing ship Burevestnik the Soviet leadership entered Ekaterininskaya Harbour in search of a place for the future main base of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Stalin personally chose this location near the settlement of Polyarny.543 On how the Soviet leader understood the significance of the Arctic for the country and the Northern Fleet, Admiral Isakov wrote, “in Polyarny, in the ship’s cabin, looking 538

Mark Shevelev, The Arctic is my Destiny (Voronezh: NPO Modek, 1999), 208. Leonid Ivashov, Igor Kefeli and Oleg Malafeev, “The Global Arctic Game. Securing Russia’s national interests in the Arctic,” in Works of the Research Department of the Institute of Military History, no. 9 (Saint Petersburg: 2014), 1: 21-49. 540 In March 1913 Stalin was arrested in Saint Petersburg and imprisoned. In June he was deported to the Turukhansky region of Yenisei province under police supervision for 4 years. He was in exile until the autumn of 1916. 541 Later, Ivan S. Isakov became Admiral of the Soviet Navy. 542 Konstantin Simonov, Through the Eyes of a Man of my Generation (Moscow: APN, 1998), 480. 543 Dmitriy Gerasimov, “The History of the Murmansk coast. North of Russia in naval and economic relations,” in Works of the Research Department of the Institute of Military History, no. 6 (Saint Petersburg: 2013), 2: 32-45. 539

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out the window Stalin suddenly asked: ‘What is the Black Sea? Lohanka.544 What is the Baltic Sea? It is a bottle, and we do not have a ccap. The sea is here, the window is here! This is the place where the Great Fleet should be, here! Now, we can impress England and America. There is nowhere else!”545 In the summer of 1933, in accordance with Stalin’s note through the canal from the Baltic city of Kronstadt to the White Sea arrived the destroyers Uritskiy and Rykov, the patrol ships Smerch and Uragan, the submarines Dekabrist and Narodovolets. These warships of the EON-1 became the core of the Northern Military Flotilla546 which was established near Murmansk547 on June 1, 1933. During the next few years, the Northern Fleet became the major Arctic force. In the 1930s the country made up for the years of the Civil War and established a new state. It developed, studied, and explored its vast expanses. As rightly pointed out by Pavel Baev, researcher from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), “that romanticism of conquering the North was foreign to any kind of mercantilism. The call to ‘storm the far sea’548 captured the imagination of the first revolutionary generation.” 549 According to Dmitry Bykov, “the USSR took the matter seriously: the country was to be presented in a different light, and polar romance was an integral part of the Soviet propaganda.”550 At Stalin’ initiative on the coast of the Arctic seas plants and factories were raised; canals, railways and highways were laid, and settlements, ports and cities were built there. In 1936, near Murmansk, the settlement “SR3-35” was rebuilt into the “area district of special construction.” In the same year, by Stalin’s special order, 35 km off Arkhangelsk, the city of Sudostroy was laid on the shore of the White Sea. Two years later it was renamed into Molotovsk, and in 1958 – into Severodvinsk. Most of the new industrial facilities were erected, and as the famous writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote, “without modern equipment and without great supplies from the country.”551 The result of these efforts was the 544

Lohanka is a bowl of round or oval shapes for washing clothes, dishes or used for other household needs. 545 Konstantin Gnetnev, “Stalin on Belomorkanal,” The North, no. 7/8 (2014): 74-83. 546 Since 1937, it has been called the Northern Fleet. 547 The coast of the Kola Peninsula to the west of Cape St. Nose. 548 The call came from the song The country sends us to storm the sea far away from the Soviet patriotic film “Seven Courageous” (1936). It was about the Komsomol polar explorers mastering the northern Soviet model of exploration of the North. 549 Dmitri Trenin and Pavel Baev, The Arctic. A View from Moscow (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment, 2010), 31. 550 Dmitri Bykov, “Veniamin Kaverin,” Diletant, no. 6 (2015): 88-93. 551 Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (Moscow: New World Publishing House, 1990), 6.

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creation of industrial and transport infrastructure of the North, which provided the use of natural resources of territories and water areas from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. That was around the same time Arctic expeditions began. In the 1930s and 1940s, the legendary Arctic voyages and heroic drifts of the icebreaking ships G. Sedov, Krasin, A. Sibiryakov, F. Litke, Chelyuskin and others took place. Their crews conducted a great complex of research. In 1937, the world’s first drifting station “SP-1” was landed on the Arctic basin ice at the North Pole point. Its head was Chekist, a famous polar explorer Ivan D. Papanin. Valery Chkalov and Mikhail Gromov set world records by flying all over the country and to America via the North Pole. This was Stalin’s serious political resource. As Bykov wrote, “in it (the era - the authors’ note) preserved the freshness of discovery, fresh polar breath of the Arctic, the excitement, the desire for endless expansion, the exploitation of new territories and the development of new sensations.”552 Bykov’s words are complemented by Simonov: “at the time, the Arctic was also part of Stalin’s perception – the rescue of Chelyuskin’s crew, the landing at the North Pole of Papanin with his comrades, Chkalov and Gromov’s flights. Behind the organization of all this, behind all these brave enterprises in our sense was Stalin,”553 who cherished with his peculiar “Stalinist love” his “Arctic children”: polar explorers and pilots. As noted by Sergey Larkov and Fedor Romanenko, “the hierarchy of Soviet values also included a hierarchy of professions of prestige, the main component of which was ‘heroism’, and it was ‘Soviet heroism’.”554 One of the highest places in this heroic professional hierarchy was occupied by the polar explorers, comparable to them at the top were only pilots. The first Heroes of the Soviet Union were people who pursued two occupations: polar pilots who took members of the Chelyuskin Expedition off the drifting ice floe in the Chukchi Sea. At the same time, Yuri Zhukov pointed out that “these are not separate heroic episodes, but a logical chain of events to conquer the vast space of the Arctic.”555 However, not everything was perfect with “the great helm communism and the leader of the world proletariat” Joseph Stalin in the Arctic region. If we carefully analyze his actions and those of his entourage, then along with such successes as the “Stalin’s routes” of the great pilot Chkalov556 and Gromov, 552

Bykov, 88-93. Simonov, 480. 554 Sergey Larkov and Fedor Romanenko, “Enemies of the People” behind the Arctic Circle (Moscow: Paulsen Publishing House, 2010): 432. 555 Zhukov, 544. 556 For the first time the inscription “Stalin’s Routes” on board the aircraft of V.I. Chkalov appeared in 1936. The plane made a flight Moscow-island Ud in the Sea of Okhotsk and set a world 553

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there were also failures. A good example for this is one of the Stalin routes, made in 1940 by the German raider Comet557 on the Northern Sea Route. The destruction of the cargo ship Chelyuskin in 1934 in the ice of the Chukchi Sea was also on his list. Being an unsurpassed master of public mobilization, however, the Soviet leader turned it into a folk epic. In 1937, the crew of Sigizmund Levanevsky disappeared in the Arctic ice during his flight to America. In 1938, the dirigible B-6 Osoaviakhimovets and others crashed. After World War II, the Soviet leadership allowed the idea of a radical military operation in the Arctic. Stalin understood that the atomic bombing by the United States in 1945 of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in the Far East was a warning to his country. Accordingly, immediately after the war with Japan, Stalin issued an order, which was approved by a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars no. 2358 of September 14, 1945. In the document, 126th the Light Mountain Rifle Corps was tasked “to build defensive outposts on the Chukotka Peninsula, to cover the main sea bases on the coast of Anadyr Bay and those of Providence Bay, to ensure them with anti-landing defence on land.”558 During the Cold War (1946-1990), which began after the famous speech of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Fulton in February 1946, the attention to the Arctic began to grow. In the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the matter became a military and strategic testing ground. Giving his lecture on the Polar Strategy and Polar Expansion in January 1947, Isaak I. Ermashev, a lecturer of the All-Union Lecture Bureau of the Ministry of Higher Education, emphasized that the struggle for air routes had begun in the Arctic.559 Analyzing that lecture, Zhukov drew attention to the fact that “the polar region for the first time appeared without the ever accompanying halo of romance and heroism, in its new true appearance as the arena of a fierce battle between the great powers, as a zone that was now of interest primarily to the military, who planned a new world war against the Soviet Union.” 560 At the beginning of the Cold War in 1946, with the use of four-engine strategic bombers B-29, the U.S. Air Force carried out operation the “White Grouse,” organizing regular reconnaissance of meteorological conditions in the record. This inscription was kept on board the ANT-25 aircraft during its flight across the North Pole to America in 1937. 557 A dry cargo ship Ems. 558 Mikhail Timoshenko, “We just need to cling onto the coast of Alaska,” The Homeland: The Russian Historical Magazine, no. 3 (2015): 42-49. 559 Isaak Ermashev, “The Polar Strategy and the Polar Expansion,” Pravda, 1947. 560 Zhukov, 544.

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Arctic Ocean. Since 1947, the U.S. began weekly flights of reconnaissance aircraft from Alaska to the North Pole and back. Along these routes, the U.S. strategic bombers could be led to the military and administrative and economic centres of the USSR.561 In 1947, the Soviet Union adopted a policy to design and build powerful icebreakers to ensure navigation in the region. A year later, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved a multi-year thematic plan of air expeditions in the high Arctic, codenamed the “North.”562 Shortly after this, the first drift station was erected and, in 1948, the Soviet Union resumed scientific research in the Arctic region. Two years later, the USSR had an atomic bomb and its delivery vehicle in use: strategic bombers Tu-4 with a range of 5,100 km. However, this was not enough to make the return of the aircraft more secure, and airfields for jumping up and refuelling were built. For their construction temporary air-raid platforms of World War II were utilized. During the war, they had served for land-lease programs that provided supplies along the Alaska-Siberia route.563 For flights over the North Pole and launching strikes against the U.S. continental territories along the coast of the Arctic Ocean seas airfields were constructed in Murmansk, Olgino, Safonovo, Arkhangelsk, Amderma, Vorkuta, Dixon, Norilsk, Igarka, Dudinka, Khatanga, Tiksi, Chokurdakh, Chersky, Nizhneyansk, Pevek, Cape Schmid, Anadyr, Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya), Alykel (Norilsk), Nadym, Ugolnye Kopi (Chukotka). The northernmost settlement was set up on Graham-Bell Island.564 Besides, units of radiotechnical and anti-aircraft troops, and fighter aircraft regiments of air defense were deployed in the Arctic. In order to set up a radar field on the distant approaches to the protected objects, on all major islands of the Arctic Ocean: Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, Novosibirsk Islands, Wrangel Island the Soviet Union also placed radio engineering air defense units. Thus, a full-fledged strategic defense of the region was formed.

Zonn, The Arctic ‘Upgrade’ of President V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation,” 2040. 562 Pavel Palchikov, “Cold War in the cold Arctic,” Aviation Explorer, accessed March 15, 2020. https://www.aex.ru/docs/1/2015/2/4/2183. 563 On October 1, 1941, the USSR and the USA signed the First (Moscow) Protocol. According to the document, the U.S. was to supply fighter jets, bombers, tanks and trucks. In addition, the U.S. was to supply aluminum, toluene, trotyl, petroleum products and wheat. Subsequently, the list of goods was expanded. 564 The distance from the island to the North Pole is 896 km. 561

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By 1948, the 14th Strike Army was deployed in Chukotka with its aircraft and artillery. Marches and training hikes to Ratmanov Island were practiced.565 In the same year the USA developed another plan for a potential attack on the Soviet Union called the “Charioteer.” Under the project, 200 nuclear bombs should have been dropped on 70 Soviet cities, and according to another U.S. operation, the “Dropshot,” already 300 nuclear bombs should have been dropped on 200 Soviet cities, settlements and facilities.566 Stalin, who largely determined the situation in the Arctic, by the lessons of World War II in high latitudes did not make a single attempt in Tehran, Yalta or Potsdam to declare the sea along the Northern Sea Route on a par with the Sea of Okhotsk as inland waters of the USSR. Although there were all grounds to do so. Stalin’s death in 1953 and the objectivity proved by military science at that time that the polar conditions were of little use for military operations made the withdrawal of ground troops from Chukotka possible. The issue of the Arctic drew attention once more in October 1987. Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Murmansk, while presenting the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star of Hero (the Hero City) to the city, in his speech outlined the directions for negotiations with states concerned about solving problems of the Arctic region. His program known as the “Murmansk Initiative”567 included “the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe; the limitation of military activity in the seas that surround Northern Europe; cooperation between the countries of the North in the sustainable development of the resources of the North and the Arctic; the protection of the environment of the North; the scientific study of the Arctic; the opening of the Northern Sea Route to foreign ships in the event of the normalization of international relations.”568 Despite the fact that in the context of the Cold War this initiative failed, Gorbachev’s speech and the proposals became the first sign of change in the closed position of the Soviet Union and the beginning of real transformation in 565

Ratmanov Island are part of the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait and is the easternmost point of the Russian Federation. The Soviet part of that land, Big Diomede Island, is separated from the American island, Little Diomede, only 7 km. The width of the Bering Strait is 86 km. 566 Igor Zonn, “The Arctic ‘Upgrade’ of President V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation,” Post-Soviet Issues, no. 1 (2017): 20-40. 567 Anatoly Smirvov, Murmansk corridor. Russian-Norwegian relations in the Barents Sea. (Murmansk: North Publishing House, 1998), 88. 568 “Murmansk Initiatives,” Kola Encyclopaedia, accessed February 23, 2020. http://ke.culture.gov-murman.ru/ slovnik/?ELEMENT_ID=97862.

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the Arctic. It is believed that the “Murmansk Initiative” gave the impetus to modern intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic. Thus, in September 1989, the Finnish government initiated a meeting of eight Arctic countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, USSR, USA in Rovaniemi to discuss joint measures targeted at environmental protection.569 This resulted in arrangements to prepare a high-level meeting of Arctic Ministers in charge of the Arctic environment.570 Moreover, in 1991, the countries developed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS).571 The document outlined follows: “certain issues with respect to oil pollution in the Arctic are insufficiently covered by the existing international agreements and conventions. For example, some instruments are limited in their application and only partially apply to the Arctic region. There is a need to consider the possibility of extending the geographic scope of these instruments. The provisions of the various instruments also need to be further assessed to determine their adequacy under Arctic conditions taking into account the particularly vulnerable nature of the region. Strict standards in the transportation of oil in the Arctic are needed. Such standards should be developed under the framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Arctic countries should consider becoming parties to or applying the relevant principles of the various existing conventions and agreements on oil pollution management.”572

5.2. THE ARCTIC DIRECTION OF THE RUSSIAN POLICY Each stage of the Russian policy in the Arctic has its own features. The main efforts of the Soviet authorities have been aimed at defending the sectorial concept and countering U.S. actions to impose the principle of internationalization of Arctic spaces. As mentioned above, the U.S. approach has not met with objections of other Arctic states, however, it has not gained international recognition. The Soviet state failed to legally secure the status of the Russian Federation’s borders in the Arctic, thus legalizing its rights to own the sector. “The Arctic Council. Dossier,” TASS, accessed February 26, 2020. https://tass.ru/info/4244655. Some preparatory meetings were held in April 1990 in Canada, in January 1991 in Sweden, and in June 1991 in Finland. 571 “The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,” Digital Fund of Legal and Normative Documentation, accessed February 2, 2020. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902061. 572 Ibid. 569 570

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A fundamentally new situation brought the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. At that time, by adopting the law, the USSR did not declare the need to develop particular international legal provisions fixing the special legal status of the Arctic spaces based on the sectoral approach that it had long advocated. After the Soviet Union’s collapse both positive and negative issues of the Arctic policy passed to Russia. To tackle the challenges, in 1991, the RSFSR State Commission on Arctic and Antarctic Affairs was established. A year later, it was replaced by the Interdepartmental Commission on Arctic and Antarctic Affairs, which worked until 2004. The commission was to coordinate scientific, social, economic and environmental activities in the Arctic (including the Svalbard Archipelago) and the Antarctic.573 In August 1994, the Russian president Boris Yeltsin issued a decree on the formation of the Arctic Group of the Border Troops, with the task to reinforce military presence in the region. The next stage began in 1997, when Russian officials ratified the UN Convention. Having done this, Russia gave up two points: first, the sectorial principle of the Arctic space division, which was not questioned by other countries, and second, the sole claims to the “polar possessions of the USSR” declared in a decree of the CEC of 1926. As is known, Article 76 of the Convention defines the boundaries of the shelf of the “exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles.”574 There is a significant clarification: a state can only claim a shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles of the exclusive economic zone.575 In order to extend the limits of the continental shelf sector, an application must be submitted to the CLCS. It must then justify a state’s claim to extend the limits of the shelf. This particularly refers to merely the limits of the continental shelf, not the exclusive economic zone, i.e., the state can expect to receive the right to regulate the extraction of natural resources, but it cannot restrict fishing. After the ratification of the UN Convention, the Russian government began to advance and conduct its Arctic policy with full consideration of the international documents, focusing on the justification and legal consolidation of the outer limit of Russian continental shelf area beyond the 200-mile zone. This was also facilitated by the new data on hydrocarbon resources in the region.

Alexander Tamitsky, “Public policy of modern Russia in the Arctic: stages, priorities and some of the outcomes,” Arctic and North, no. 6 (2012): 110-117. 574 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982.” 575 Ibid. 573

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Some domestic experts believe that by ratifying, Russia has thus confirmed “the international legal way of securing its Arctic sector.”576 It is difficult to agree with such an assessment, as under the convention Russia can claim the 200-mile zone. Only if it can be proved that the shelf is an extension of the continental land will it be possible to claim the extension of the outer limit of the continental shelf to 350 nautical miles. In this regard, Aleksander Vylegzhanin drew attention to the fact that “the outer limits of the continental shelf will be internationally recognized only if they are in conformity with Article 76 of this Convention.”577 In the early 1990s, one of the main disputes also addressed the great underwater mountain range – the Lomonosov Ridge. It was discovered by Soviet high-latitude expeditions in 1948 and named after the Russian scientist Mikhail V. Lomonosov. The range spans for around 1,800 km (with a width of 60 to 200 km) from the Russian New Siberian Islands through the central part of the Arctic Ocean to Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. It rises above the ocean floor at 3,300-3,700 m. The minimum depth over the individual peaks is above 900 m.578 After the ratification, discussions on the geology of the Lomonosov Ridge have become particularly relevant. There are different views on the geological records of the formation of the Lomonosov Ridge. Given its continental nature, most foreign geologists note that the ridge has been shifted aside and isolated from the adjacent shelf, and there is a large fault at the point of displacement. According to Russian geologists, however, there is no fault and there is a zone of transition from shelf to deep water.579 In order to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the continental part, it is necessary to conduct largescale and expensive research operations. The final conclusion can be drawn merely on its outcomes. With respect to the total hydrocarbon accumulations in the area of the Lomonosov Ridge, in 2008, Yuri Trutnev, acting at that time as Head of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, noted that there is about five billion tons of fuel equivalent there.580

576

Oleg Aleksandrov, 149. Romanenko, “The criminal Ocean,” Ogonyok, no. 39, (2006): 32. 578 Igor Zonn, Andrey Kostianoy and Aleksander Semenov, The Eastern Arctic Seas Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia of Seas (Springer, 2016): 201. 579 Romanenko, 32. 580 “Lomonosov Ridge could bring Russia up to five billion tons of fuel,” RIA-Novosti, accessed October 13, 2020. https://ria.ru/20071001/81793929.html. 577

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5.3. HOW PUTIN RECOVERED THE ARCTIC TO RUSSIA Due to the discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits offshore and the growing awareness of global warming, the matter of the Arctic drew even more attention. The situation in the Russian Arctic was a catastrophic one. The half-century period of observations that had been made from drifting Arctic ice was interrupted. Due to a lack of funds, coastal hydrometeorological stations were shut down, and equipment and ships were sold to other companies or private buyers. The core of the old high-class specialists went into oblivion. The seasonal deliveries of stockpiles to the Far North practically stopped.581 The seabased points of the Northern Fleet were left behind, and the fleet was significantly reduced. Military bases, radar stations and border outposts were closed. As the well-known polar geographer Grigori A. Agranat wrote, “the process of feverish, completely unprovoked destruction of the Soviet armed forces, dismantling the military presence began in the Arctic.”582 Moreover, there was an ecological “heritage” such as pollution of islands and coastal zones. Hundreds of thousands of barrels with remnants of solarium, fuel oil and diesel, metal structures, wreckage of radar, machinery and ship equipment, landfills around cities remained there. Such conditions led to a massive population outflow of northern settlements to the mainland. In order to re-establish the region, Putin set a strategic objective to establish his own Arctic Shield, while understanding that a significant part of the infrastructure there would have to be rebuilt in 1998 the Russian Security Council formulated the concept of the “Northern Strategic Bastion.”583 According to the document, the Northern Fleet became the basis of the maritime component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.584 Given the geographical location of Russian territories in the Arctic, it is the Northern Fleet that bears the brunt of the defending Russia’s interests there. It

581

The seasonal deliveries of stockpiles are a set of annual activities implemented by the state. It is aimed at providing the Far North, the Far East and the European part of Russia with vital goods (food and oil products). 582 Grigori Agranat, “Military confrontation in the Arctic. Historical and geographical essay,” First September Publishing House, accessed March 7, 2020. https://geo.1sept.ru/ article.php?ID=200300903. 583 Alexei Fenenko, “Moscow and Washington in the Arctic space,” Russian International Affairs Council, accessed February 21, 2020. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/ analytics/moskva-i-vashington-v-arkticheskom-prostranstve/. 584 Ibid.

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explains Putin’s steps to ensure the strengthening of the combat power of the fleet on the basis of the Arkhangelsk-Murmansk military industrial complex. His first visit to the Red Banner Northern Fleet, which had suffered most from the reform in the 1990s, was made in the spring of 2000. In the city of Severomorsk, Putin awarded orders and medals to the Marines of the 61st Separate Brigade. Speaking at the Northern Fleet headquarters he emphasized that “there was a time when it seemed that the Russian fleet was not needed, and the army was not in demand. Now everyone understands that this is a fundamental misconception.”585 Putin went out to the Barents Sea on a strategic missile submarine K-18 Karelia. According to naval tradition, after that voyage, the President became a submariner. During his visit to Murmansk, on board the nuclear icebreaker Russia, Putin held a meeting on the development of the Arctic seas shelf.586 After the sinking of the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea in August 2000, President arrived in Vidyaevo and met with wives, mothers and relatives of the 118 submariners. After listening to many comments on the country’s leadership, he said: “I will stay with the army, I will stay with the navy. And I will stay with the people. Together we will rebuild the army, the navy and the country. I don’t doubt that at all.”587 After the tragedy, the president paid a lot of attention to the submarine’s raising. The decision to lift the unique submarine with the support of foreign specialists and their equipment from NATO countries allowed it to solve a number of fundamental scientific and technological problems. As the creator of the submarine, Academician Igor D. Spassky, General Director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, commented “the raising of the Kursk is a striking example, when the president made a decision, and it was strictly and firmly implemented, considering every step. This operation opened our eyes to new technologies.”588 The Kursk tragedy played a special role in the President's attention to the development of the Russian submarine fleet.589

“Murmansk calendar: April 5, While on “Karelia” Putin became a submariner,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, accessed February 2, 2020. https://www.murmansk. kp.ru/daily/26057/2968067/. 586 “Russian President awarded the Order of Peter the Great in Severomorsk,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, accessed February 27, 2020. https://www.murmansk.kp.ru/online/news/1338498/. 587 Vladimir Putin, “No words are enough. One wants to howl,” RTR channel. August 23, 2000, accessed November 13, 2020. https://www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/27/zdesjnikakih.shtml. 588 Alexei Zakhartsev, “God of the depths and his ‘Rubin’,” VPK, accessed November 2, 2020. https://www.vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_30_645.pdf. 589 Vladimir Shigin, The nuclear-powered Oscar-class submarine Kursk. 10 years later. Facts and Versions (Moscow: Veche, 2010), 261. 585

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The issue was addressed in the “Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020.”590 The document was approved by the President in July 2001. One of the key directions of the domestic maritime policy was the Arctic regional policy. Its significance was determined by the free access of the Russian fleet to the Atlantic, the wealth of the Russian Federation’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf sector, the crucial role of the Northern Fleet in the defence of the state from the danger on the maritime and ocean routes, and the growing importance of the Northern Sea Route for the sustainable development of the state. At the same time, the doctrine established framework for such long-term tasks as research and exploration of the Arctic with a focus on the development of import industries; creation of ice class ships for sea transportation; specialized vessels for fishing, research and other specialized fleets; consideration of the defence interests of the state in the exploitation and exploration of bioresources and mineral commodities in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation. Moreover, it was a matter of ensuring the national interests over the Northern Sea Route and observing Russia’s concerns in the delimitation of maritime spaces and the Arctic Ocean floor with the Arctic States.591 Under the official document, the key tasks related to construction of new nuclear icebreakers, development of ports and use of northern rivers of Russia. In this regard, Transport Minister Igor Livitin estimated that six powerful nuclear-powered icebreakers with new-type power plants were to be built in Russia by 2020.592 These steps should not only have revived the Northern Sea Route, but also made it the main transport artery in the Arctic. In November 2002, the Council on Issues of the Far North and the Arctic under the Russian government decided to elaborate the Concept of Sustainable Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.593 This concept defined the goals and mechanisms of Russian policy in the field of sustainable development of the Arctic for the period up to 2015. Of particular concern for the Russian President, was the issue of the outer limits of the continental shelf. On 20 December 2001, Russia was the first of the Arctic states to make an official submission to the CLCS in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Particularly, the Russian authorities “Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020,” Laws, Codes and Regulations of the Russian Federation, accessed January 23, 2020. https://legalacts.ru/ doc/morskaja-doktrina-rossiiskoi-federatsii-na-period-do/. 591 Ibid. 592 Evgeny Shestakov, “Cold NATO,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed January 16, 2019. https://rg.ru/2009/01/16/arktika.html. 593 The document was presented in 2006. 590

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applied for the extension of the outer limit of its Arctic continental shelf beyond the established 200-mile economic zone.594 The application concerned four geographic regions of the Arctic: the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, the central Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk. The application, however, did not entail very specific data, and, in 2002, was rejected with the comments to provide the required information. It was also recommended to complete the delimitation with Norway595 and the USA in the Barents Sea and Bering Sea regions, and with respect to the central part of the Arctic Ocean, Russia had to submit a revised application, which should provide additional records confirming the continental and structural connection of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ranges with the adjacent continental shelf and primary information on the topography of the Arctic floor. It took almost 15 years to collect additional materials. Nine expeditions were conducted using icebreakers, submarines, research vessels, etc. For example, after one of them, organized jointly by the Russian Ministry of Nature and the Ministry of Defense in 2000, it was announced that the submarine mountain Ranges of Lomonosov and Mendeleev are an extension of the continent, and the Arctic continental shelf of Russia is 1.2 million km2 more than previously thought. However, after all the efforts, the CLCS considered the data to be insufficient to unequivocally define this structure as an extension of the continental shelf. In fact, it actually postponed the issue of defining Russia’s eastern and western borders of the Arctic shelf until the time it concluded agreements with Norway and the United States on this matter. At the same time, the commission practically did not consider the question of passing the outer limit of Russia’s continental shelf sector in the high-latitude Arctic, as it could not confirm the accuracy of its conduct due to the lack of bathymetric and navigational charts and a database on depths, which, in accordance with Russian regulations, were confidential. In addition, the geophysical data provided by Russia did not fully meet the scientific and technical requirements of the CLCS.596 Despite the rejection, Russia continued working on its Arctic policy. Between May and June 2007, Russia arranged the expedition “Arktika-2007.” For over 40 days scientists of All-Russia Research Institute of Geology and “International legal status of the Arctic. Dossier,” TASS, accessed December 19, 2020. https://tass.ru/info/895685. 595 The Treaty between Norway and the Russian Federation on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean was signed on September 15, 2010. Under the treaty, the continental shelf is delineated in the eastern part of the Western Nansen Basin. 596 Kazmin, 12-35. 594

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Mineral Resources of the World Ocean named after I.S. Gramberg (VNIIO) explored the underwater Lomonosov Ridge from the board the icebreaker Russia. The expedition collected additional data and investigated the joint zone of the ridge with the shelf. A total of 600 km of seismic profiles were made. All efforts were aimed to confirm that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ranges is an extension of Russia’s polar possessions, and therefore, it can claim most of its huge oil and gas reserves.597 During the second stage of the expedition, in August 2007, two deep manned submersibles Mir were submerged to the bottom near the North Pole and samples of the bottom soil were taken. Based on this data, in mid-September 2007, the Russian Ministry of the Natural Resources issued a statement, that “on September 20, preliminary data from the analysis of the Earth’s crust model for the Arctika-2007 profile were obtained, which allows to confirm the fact that the crust structure of the Lomonosov Ridge corresponds to the world analogues of the continental crust, and therefore, is part of the adjacent continental shelf sector of the Russian Federation.”598 While officials considered the expedition a success, the scientific community had various opinions on the research operation. The director of VNIIO, Valery Kaminsky, noted that thanks to the expedition Russia, “can prove most of the application.”599 Other experts, however, believed that by the bathyscaphes’ diving, Russia did not receive any evidence that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the continental part. According to Leopold Lobkovsky, Deputy Director of the Institute of Oceanology, “it’s just ridiculous. You can’t prove its origin (the Lomonosov Ridge – authors’ note), you need deep drilling.”600 He also added, “it is a very risky business to calculate the ridge structure according to seismic profiling data. Maybe it is of volcanic origin at all.”601 Such statements were not without reason, as there are no special vessels for deep-sea drilling in Russia,602 and many scientists and geologists are convinced that the question of the origin of the Lomonosov Ridge can only be obtained by drilling to a depth of 5,000 m to reach the granite or basalt.

Shamil Idiatullin, Alexander Kukolevsky and Olga Shkurenko, “A low blow for the Arctic,” Kommersant. Vlast, August 13, 2007. 598 Alexey Topalov, Artem Tuntsov and Galina Shakirova, “Russia cooks the Arctic before catching it,” Gazeta. ru, accessed July 23, 2019. https://www.gazeta.ru /business/2007/09/20/2177404.shtml. 599 Idiatullin, Kukolevsky and Shkurenko, “A low blow for the Arctic.” 600 Ibid. 601 “A weak policy.” 602 Lukin, The Great Redrawing of the Arctic, 400. 597

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Despite the different opinions on the outcomes of “Arktika-2007,” the expedition had a strong political effect. During the dive at a depth of 4,261 m, the corrosion-resistant titanium national flag of the Russian Federation was placed by a mechanical hand.603 As one of the domestic publications noted, in fact, Arthur Chilingarov’s blitz-assault “was undertaken not so much in the name of Siberia’s growing up by the Arctic, but in party and propaganda interests, only slightly disguised by economic expediency.”604 However, the conquest of the deep pole should not be considered as amateur polar explorers’ activity.605 This was confirmed by Chilingarov himself: “yes, it was my idea. I am a politician. I am not only a polar explorer, but my main occupation is also politics, and wherever I go I raise the Russian flag everywhere.”606 Later on, Chilingarov added, “the fact that all this has been politicized is not our fault.”607 Mikhail Delyagin, Scientific Director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, believed that Russia itself has initiated the hype around the Arctic. According to him, having started the Arctic race, the Russian authorities have not taken care of its worthy continuation: “not everyone in the government knows what the Arctic is and how risky and costly it is to work there. I doubt that we will be able to do anything there in the next few years, as it will require enormous efforts, both financial and military.”608 It is well known that flags were set on the Moon, on Everest, and on other points of the Earth.609 However, this did not cause such a political reaction from other countries, as neither the Moon, nor Everest, nor other territories have as much desirable and expensive prospective hydrocarbon reserves. For this reason, the flag fingerprint for hydrocarbons will continue to be disregarded by the Arctic countries. At the same time, Russia’s action gave a start to the “Big North Game.” It has brought the issue of Arctic division from the sphere of calm negotiations to PR, forcing the leaders of the Arctic coastal states to equip national expeditions. From the point of view of geology and oceanology, Russia

603

Frederik Paulsen et al., The depth of 4261 m (Moscow: Paulsen Publishing House, 2007), 160. Idiatullin, Kukolevsky and Shkurenko, “A low blow for the Arctic.” 605 Ibid. 606 Dyer, 308. 607 Arthur Chilingarov, “Diving to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economics, no. 3, (2012): 112-117. 608 Mikhail Kalmatsky, “The struggle for the Arctic,” Novye Izvestiya, August 15, 2008. 609 In 1969, the first man, U.S. astronaut Neil Armstrong, set foot on the moon and put a U.S. flag there. He passed away on August 25, 2012 at the age of 83. 604

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has not much chance to win in that game, as it will be difficult to prove that the Pole region is a shelf.610 After the flag’s installation Russia was forced to explain to the international community its actions. In May 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, at a conference of foreign ministers from Denmark, Canada, Norway and the United States, said that “the installation of the Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in the summer of 2007 does not mean that Russia claims these ‘underwater lands’.”611 Lavrov added that “we have no claims on the territory and there can be no claims, as there is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the mechanism for implementing this convention, including the continental shelf sector. This mechanism is clearly and appropriately implemented by the Russian Federation, as well as by other countries.”612 At the same time, the Minister pointed out that “the purpose of the current expedition is not to stall Russia’s right, but to prove that our shelf extends to the North Pole.”613 Such statements could not reduce the political attention of countries to the Arctic, let alone abandon the implementation of practical steps to protect their own interests. First of all, it refers to the plans to build up the power of the Arctic states’ naval forces. This gave a new impetus to the militarization of the Arctic, making the Arctic states more tough in defending their rights to the Arctic shelf. It should be recognized that Russia in the first decade of the 21st century was not prepared for competition with the Arctic countries. It was not only about active media campaigns and political opposition from abroad, but also about Russia’s low level technical and technological capabilities to exploit the Arctic shelf. Insufficient facilities of seas organizations, lack of new vessels and technologies necessary for deep-sea drilling in the Arctic were considerable obstacles for Russia to defend and promote its interests.614 Moreover, extraction of hydrocarbons also required long-term research and infrastructure development. This involved significant investments, the benefits from which could be expected many years later.

“A weak policy.” Katherina Labetskaya, “There’s no claim to icebergs,” Vremya Novostey, May 28, 2008. 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid. 614 Telegina, 46. 610 611

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5.4. COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COMPANIES At the turn of 2009-2010, it became clear that the country did not advance in exploiting Arctic resources, at a time when many available fields on land in Russia have been depleted. As a result, it led to the problem of producing technologically complex hydrocarbons and finding alternative sources of energy. All these factors forced Russia to make a turn towards attracting foreign companies with the necessary technologies of deep-sea drilling. In autumn 2010, the Russian company Rosneft started looking for a partner and chose the British Petroleum (BP), which was present in Russia by the open joint stock company TNK-BP Holding. At that time BP began to experience difficulties due to the loss of its projects in Alaska and the accident at the Macondo oil field in the Gulf of Mexico. At a meeting in Moscow in January 2011, between Vladimir Putin in the capacity of Russian Prime Minister and BP President, Robert Dudley, Putin stressed that the Russian government supported the Rosneft and BP deal and promised companies to provide “the most favourable tax and administrative regime for the Arctic shelf development project.”615 Particularly, Putin meant the following: “oil resources amount to five billion tons, and gas resources to ten trillion m3. These significant figures require approval, but they are quite realistic, and I hope that these resources will turn into reserves.”616 It was about opening the Arctic Technology Center, which was to develop a program for the safe exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources.”617 Following the meeting, in London, Rosneft and BP announced a stock exchange agreement. BP was to transfer 5% of its ordinary voting shares to Rosneft, receiving 9.5% of the treasury shares of the Russian company in return. The value of each stake was almost 8 billion dollars.618 Moreover, the parties agreed to establish a joint venture to develop three East Prinovozemelskoye sites in the Kara Sea.619 However, TNK-BP’s Russian shareholders, who held a 50% stake in BP, were opposed. In May 2011, the Stockholm Arbitration Court ruled that the share swap between BP and Rosneft was possible provided TNK-BP “About the meeting of Vladimir Putin with the company’s management of BP,” Kommersant, assessed December 1, 2019. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1623890. 616 “Rosneft and BP agreed on offshore cooperation in Russia,” RIA-Novosti, accessed August 24, 2019. https://ria.ru/20110115/321772704.html. 617 Ibid. 618 Kyrill Melnikov, “Russian Petroleum,” Kommersant, accessed January 29, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1568681. 619 “ExxonMobil will receive 33.3% in the JV with Rosneft in the Kara Sea,” RIA-Novosti, accessed October 8, 2019. https://ria.ru/20110830/427192451.html. 615

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entered the Arctic project. The parties failed to reach an agreement and, as a result, the deal was terminated.620 In August 2011, the Russian Rosneft and the American ExxonMobil signed a strategic partnership agreement for drilling in the Kara Sea.621 The bilateral document provided for joint implementation of projects in geological exploration and development of oil and gas fields, as well as exchange of technologies and experience. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin622 estimated potential investments in the three blocks of the Kara Sea (East Prinovozemelsky 1,2,3) at 200-300 billion dollars.623 According to Sechin, the first exploration well in the Arctic, “should be drilled by Rosneft and ExxonMobil in 2015, and the first oil in the Kara blocks is expected about a year and a half after the launch of exploration drilling.”624 The companies agreed to launch a joint Arctic Research and Design Center for Offshore Development in Saint Petersburg, which would apply ExxonMobil and Rosneft’s technologies.625 The center’s tasks also included: development of new technological solutions related to tight oil production; provision of a wide range of services to ensure all stages of oil and gas reserves exploitation on the Arctic shelf, including ice-monitoring and control, design of ice class vessels, ice-resistant offshore structures and pipelines adapted to the Arctic conditions, logistics and industrial safety.626 This agreement was seen as a breakthrough in the oil and gas development of the Russian Arctic and as an opportunity to get access to modern technologies for exploration and production of hydrocarbons applying the practical experience of the American company. Such expectations, however, had proved unjustified. Russia was involved in a challenging negotiating process, as foreign oil and gas giants always specified the conditions of their activities in the Arctic shelf within the framework of previously signed documents. The concerns to ensure unhindered access to hydrocarbon resources, create conditions for development of navigation and, and most importantly, prevent “The Stockholm arbitration allowed the exchange of BP and Rosneft shares,” Neft Kapital, accessed February 23, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/news/markets/07-05-2011/stokgolmskiyarbitrazh-razreshil-obmen-aktsiyami-bp-i-rosnefti?ind=3. 621 Alexey Topalov, “ExxonMobil instead of ВP,” Gazeta.ru, accessed March 2, 2020. https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2011/08/30/3750009.shtml. 622 Igor I. Sechin is President of Rosneft since June 2012. 623 “Rosneft and ExxonMobil have started exploration on the Kara Sea shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed November 14, 2019. https://ria.ru/20120816/724773896.html. 624 Ibid. 625 “Rosneft received 100% of the Arctic Centre’s capital,” RIA-Novosti, accessed March 26, 2020. https://ria.ru/20111024/469351958.html. 626 Ibid. 620

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the country from weakening its position in this region had certain grounds, as other Arctic states have also demonstrated increased interest in the Arctic potential, which was reflected in the foreign documents, where the Arctic policy was addressed. In 2012, at a meeting on the development of the continental shelf, Putin repeatedly drew attention to the objectives of Russian policy for the exploitation of oil and gas fields.627 To reach them, attracting of foreign oil and gas companies was an essential task. In April 2012, the Russian company Rosneft signed an agreement on strategic cooperation with Italian company Eni.628 The parties agreed on the establishment of a joint venture to develop the Fedynsky and CentralnoBarentsevsky fields in the Barents Sea. Eni’s share in the joint venture was 33.33%.629 The company was to provide financing for geological exploration operations, which were necessary to confirm the commercial viability of the plots. The agreement also provided for technology and personnel exchange and Rosneft’s participation in Eni’s international programs. The total recoverable resources were estimated at 2 billion tons of oil and 1.9 trillion m3 of gas. Investments into geological exploration should have made up 2 billion dollars, and the total volume of joint investments into projects in the Barents Sea amounted to 50-70 billion dollars.630 Simultaneously, Rosneft and ExxonMobil specified the terms of their previous agreement on cooperation in the development of the Russian continental shelf sector (2011).631 Thus, ExxonMobil was to participate in the exploitation of license areas in the Kara Sea. Based on preliminary data, at least 15 offshore platforms have should been built for deposits there,632 and the total

“Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin held a meeting on stimulation of continental shelf development,” Archive.Government, accessed October 23, 2020. http://archive.government.ru/special/docs/18680/. 628 “Rosneft and Italian Eni agree on cooperation on the shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed April 25, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120425/635155455.html. 629 Ibid. 630 “Investments of Rosneft and Eni in the fields on the shelf of the Black Sea and the Barents Sea will amount to 100-125 billion dollars,” TASS, accessed April 14, 2020. https://tass.ru/ ekonomika/573256. 631 “Rosneft and ExxonMobil announce the successful implementation of the Strategic Cooperation Agreement,” Rosneft, accessed July 17, 2020. https://www.rosneft.ru/ press/releases/item/177645/. 632 “Rosneft will develop the Kara Sea shelf together with the Americans,” B-Port.ru, accessed July 17, 2020. https://b-port.com/news/79582. 627

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amount of resources was estimated at 4.9 billion tons of oil and 8.3 trillion m3 of gas.633 Acting as Prime Minister, Putin forecasted the total amount of direct investments in joint projects at 200-300 billion dollars.634 Speaking about the involvement of foreign enterprises, Sechin said “the Russian government simply needs foreign investments to secure the status of an energy superpower.”635 However, in fact, foreign investments made Russia’s policy in the Arctic a hostage for overseas partners. With respect to launching the projects, Rex Tillerson, Head of ExxonMobil, said “exploration drilling on the shelf of the Kara Sea may begin in 2014-2015. The final investment decision to develop this area two companies will take in 2016-2017, and production will begin in 2018-2020.”636 However, these plans remained unrealized. In May 2012, Rosneft and Norwegian Statoil also signed a cooperation agreement, which provided for joint development of Perseevsky license block in the Barents Sea, as well as Magadan 1, Lisyansky and Kashevarovsky areas in the Sea of Okhotsk. The agreement stipulated 66.67% of each JV will belong to Rosneft and 33.33% to Statoil. The Norwegian company was to cover 100% of exploration costs, including 6 exploration wells in 2016-2021. The total projected deposits of the four areas, located at a depth of 100 to 350 m, was about 2 billion tons of oil and 1.8 trillion m3 of gas.637 Eduard Khudainatov, at that time Rosneft President, drew attention to the fact that “upon confirmation of resources at Perseevsky license block investments into exploitation and development may amount to 35-40 billion dollars, and for the other three areas in the Sea of Okhotsk – 10-20 billion dollars per each.”638 The total investment volume would have been estimated at 65-100 billion dollars.639 In June 2012, at the Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, Rosneft and Eni signed a package of documents on creation of joint ventures for production on

“Rosneft and ExxonMobil announce the successful implementation of the Strategic Cooperation Agreement.” 634 “ExxonMobil to become Rosneft’s strategic partner instead of BP,” TASS, accessed June 5, 2020. https://tass.com/russianpress/659442. 635 “Russia wants to become a superpower at the expense of Western investment,” Argumenty Nedeli, accessed August 2, 2020. https://argumenti.ru/economics/2012/04/172456. 636 “Rosneft and ExxonMobil will start drilling on the shelf of the Kara Sea and the Black Sea,” Kommersant, accessed July 23, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4573440. 637 Kyrill Melnikov, “Statoil found its place on the shelf,” Kommersant, accessed November 7, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1930535. 638 Ibid. 639 “Rosneft and Italian Eni agree on cooperation on the shelf.” 633

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the Russian shelf.640 Mostly, it was about projects aimed at developing the Arctic shelf in the Barents Sea,641 and a month later, the companies concluded one more agreement on the financial issues of the development of the Fedynsky and Centralno-Barentsevsky license blocks. Rosneft also signed an agreement with Statoil to participate in tenders for the development works on the Norwegian shelf and the exploitation of hard-torecover oil reserves in Russia. Simultaneously, at a meeting of the Russian government a long-term program for exploration and production of mineral resources up to 2030 was presented. It was aimed at increasing the production of hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic fields. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said: “with a favorable scenario, by 2030, annual oil production on the continental shelf will increase from 13 million tons to 66.3 million tons, and natural gas production – from the current 57 billion m3 to 330 billion m3.”642 During the meeting on innovative development of the fuel and energy complex held in August in Rostov-on-Don chaired by Medvedev, it was emphasized that Russia’s oil and gas industry was entering a phase of depletion of traditional fields. There was a significant increase in the future share of oil and gas production in regions with difficult conditions and low level of development. Among the priority area that could determine the situation in 1015 years, Energy Minister Alexander Novak singled out the Russian Arctic: “the potential of the Arctic cannot be unlocked without a significant technological breakthrough in the creation of autonomous systems of under-ice and subsea exploration and exploitation of fields using modern, new robotic facilities.” Rosneft President Sechin had a similar position. In his report at the APEC summit in September 2012, he declared that “the company is concluding a contract to develop concepts for the design and construction of a platform for the shallow Arctic shelf on a joint project with ExxonMobil in the Kara Sea. Technological analogues of such a platform, which is necessary for the projects in the Kara Sea, do not exist in the world today.”643 At the same event, the basic

640

Ibid. “Rosneft signed agreements on joint projects with Eni and Statoil,” Oilcapital, accessed July 12, 2020.https://oilcapital.ru/news/companies/22-06-2012/rosneft-zaklyuchila-soglasheniyapo-sovmestnym-proektam-s-eni-i-statoil. 642 “Russia’s offshore oil production will increase fivefold by 2030,” Regnum, accessed October 5, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/1557801.html. 643 “President of Rosneft Igor Sechin speaking at the APEC summit. 2012. September 7,” Rosneft, accessed October 21, 2020. 641

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technical requirements to be met by the planned platform from which hydrocarbons were to be extracted were also discussed.644 The platform could have allowed the drilling season in the Arctic region. At the same time, the plant would have ensured high standards of environmental safety during operation even in the Arctic, and withstood extreme ice, wind, wave and temperature loads. High costs and extreme Arctic climate forced many oil and gas companies to revise their plans regarding the timing of Arctic field exploration. The company Royal Dutch Shell, having spent 6 years and 4.5 billion dollars on preparations, began to explore and produce oil in the Arctic. A floating drilling rig the “Noble Discoverer” started its work on the Chukchi Sea offshore area north-west of the Alaska coast in September 2012. There oil lies at the depth of 2.5 km under the sea bottom. As Peter Sleiby, Alaska Vice President of Shell, reported after the start of drilling operations, “this well may open a new chapter in the oil industry.”645 However, already in two days, on September 11, drilling was suspended because of the risk of colliding with a drifting ice floe.”646 Eventually, the company announced that it was postponing drilling an exploratory well until next year. Because of the obvious environmental risks, the company BP also decided to postpone its plans to drill in the Arctic shelf and abandoned the expensive Liberty Arctic project in the Beaufort Sea in Alaska (USA).”647 Commenting on the companies’ decisions, World Wildlife Fund Arctic Oil and Gas Project Coordinator Mikhail Babenko said that “these projects also have a high degree of economic uncertainty and considerable financial risks.”648 Due to the restrictions which had been imposed on foreign companies in 2006, Gazprom and Rosneft were made the full owners of the Russian shelf. At the same time, there was neither breakthrough in the offshore fields’ exploration nor new large agreements with overseas partners. This was particularly evident in the case of the constant delay in the development of the Shtokman field. Speaking at a government meeting, Minister of Natural Resources and “Rosneft and ExxonMobil announced the selection of ZAO Vostochny Marine Structures Plant as a contractor for concept evaluation to develop a feasibility study for a drilling platform for shallow water areas of the Arctic shelf,” Rosneft, accessed September 23, 2020. https://limited.rosneft.ru/press/releases/item/177707/. 645 “Shell began drilling the Arctic,” Live-energo, accessed September 18, 2020. http://live-energo. ru/news/company-short/11602. 646 “Shell and BP have suspended oil exploration on the Arctic shelf. Environmentalists are pleased,” B-port.com, accessed October 28, 2020. https://b-port.com/news/87902. 647 Ibid. 648 “The Arctic of Uncertainty,” Ecoreporter, accessed November 24, 2020. https://eco reporter.ru/node/1085. 644

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Environment Sergey Donskoy noted that “the activity of the companies to conduct exploration on the shelf is minimal and frankly insufficient.”649 The similar position was expressed by Denis Khramov, Director of the Department of State Policy and Regulation in the Field of Geology and Subsoil Use of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment: “despite the optimistic assessments, it should be recognized that, firstly, the study of the shelf has gaps, and secondly, it is not enough even in the most surveyed regions. For example, the study of the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Kara Sea, which are the most explored in our country, is tens or even hundreds of times behind the world level. And the water area of the Far Eastern seas, such as Laptev Sea, Chukchi Sea, 650 is a large white spot.”651 Thus, Russia was faced with the urgent task of increasing the investment attractiveness of domestic offshore programs, which have a low degree of geological exploration and reliability of geological data based on information obtained in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the critical assessments by experts and members of the government, Dmitry Medvedev, Head of the Cabinet of Ministers, set ambitious goals. He believed that by 2030 Russia should increase offshore oil production fivefold and gas production fourfold.652 Nevertheless, the efforts of the Russian authorities to get foreign partners to start working on field development projects failed. In fact, the oil and gas giants were merely discussing various aspects of future production. The anti-Russian sanctions imposed after 2014 put an end to the joint development of the Arctic, allowing the states and their companies to act on their own.

5.5. THE ARCTIC IS A PRIORITY OF RUSSIAN POLICY The short-lived cooperation of Russian oil and gas companies with foreign partners came to nothing. However, this did not change Russia’s Arctic policy. Besides modernization, Russia was still strongly focused on the issue of definition of the outer limit of the continental shelf. As noted by Maciej Rus, a “Rosneft and Gazprom will unite their efforts on the shelf,” Oilcapital.ru, accessed November 4, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/news/markets/24-09-2012/rosneft-i-gazprom-ob-edinyatusiliya-na-shelfe?ind=5. 650 These seas are not Far Eastern seas but belong to the Arctic basin. 651 “MNR: Arctic shelf riches are huge, but poorly explored,” Interfax, accessed November 8, 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/presscenter/98793. 652 “Russia intends to increase the production of oil on the shelf by 5 times, gas by 4 times,” Finmarket, accessed September 24, 2020. http://www.finmarket.ru/news/3006230. 649

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research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at University in Warsaw, “Putin’s interest in the Arctic originally stemmed from his desire for Russia to reaffirm its presence in areas once controlled by the USSR. Gradually, with the development of production technologies and rising commodity prices, the Kremlin has decided that the development of potentially vast Arctic deposits could be profitable.”653 In his book The Future History of the Arctic, Charles Emmerson, an expert on the Arctic’s issues, explained, that from the Kremlin’s point of view, for Russia, extracting Arctic resources is not a choice but a strategic necessity.654 In the last decade, the region has provided about 11% of Russia’s national income. Twenty 2% of all Russian exports are still being generated there. More than 90% of nickel and cobalt, 60% of copper and 96% of platinoids were mined in the Arctic. The volume of oil reserves is about 90 billion barrels and over 50 billion m³ of natural gas.655 In order to further take hold in such an important region, Putin proposed the establishment of a new state body in the Russian Arctic and stressed that “what is needed is not a cumbersome bureaucratic body, but a flexible, responsive structure.”656 After 2007, Vladimir Putin in his capacity as Russian Prime Minister constantly addressed the issues of the boundaries of its continental shelf. Eventually, it led to the signing of a government decree, which gave the Marine Collegium under the Government of the Russian Federation additional powers to develop both the Northern and Southern Poles in political, economic and military spheres.657 The Marine Collegium was mandated to coordinate actions of federal authorities, subjects of the Russian Federation and specialized organizations in the field of national maritime policy and neutralization of military threats from sea.658 Another strategic document, the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2008, set the task “to establish, in accordance with international law, Marcin Łuniewski, “The Arctic: melting dream of Putin,” INOSMI, accessed January 25, 2020. https://inosmi.ru/world/20151116/231389136.html. 654 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (London: The Bodley Head, 2010), 419. 655 Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, The Arctic Race: Capture and Drill (Moscow: Eastern Book Publishing House, 2013), 264. 656 “Meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of state policy in the Arctic,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed October 18, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/20845. 657 Viktor Yadukha and Denis Zhuykov, “The Marine Collegium will be given broad powers,” National Energy Security Fond, accessed January 26, 2020. http://www.energystate.ru/ news/706.html. 658 “Marine Collegium under the Government of the Russian Federation,” accessed February 14, 2020. http://marine.gov.ru/. 653

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the boundaries of its continental shelf, thus expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.”659 The concept also stressed the need “in boosting further the dynamics of bilateral trade, economic links and investment cooperation as well as interaction in the Arctic.”660 In September 2008, a meeting of the Russian Security Council was held at the “Nagurskaya” frontier outpost, which guards the northernmost borders of Russia on the Franz Josef Land Archipelago.661 Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of the council, emphasized the following: “the meeting addressed issues of Russia’s increasing presence in the Arctic.”662 In 2009, the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective was approved,663 which also included the issues of the Arctic’s security. Particularly, the document set the goal of “the creation of an actively functioning coast guard system under the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and raising the effectiveness of cooperation with the border agencies (coast guards) of neighboring states on terrorism on the high seas, the prevention of smuggling and illegal migration, the protection of hydro-biological resources; the development of border infrastructure of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and technical and economic refurbishing of the border agencies.”664 The basics also outlined works on the exploitation of the Arctic and set the task to ensure international legal registration of the external border of the Arctic “Concept of of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. 2008,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed October 19, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/785. 660 Ibid. 661 “The Arctic should be the main strategic resource base of Russia - the Security Council,” RIANovosti, accessed January 14, 2020. https://ria.ru/20080912/151224313.html The Nagurskaya frontier outpost is the border department of the Russian Federal Security Service in the Arkhangelsk region. It was erected in 2007 in permafrost. The complex with an area of 5222 m2 is located on the Alexandra Land Island on the bay shore. The residential building is supplied on 6 m piles and connected by tunnels with support sections. The building has a cafe-bar, a winter garden with a fountain, a three-meter aquarium, a boiler room with a diesel generator, a garage with bulldozers for snow removal, all-terrain vehicles, a buffer store, from which the building is a fuel pipeline. The complex includes a 1.5-ton monument of 5 m bronze St. Nicholas the Wonderworker and the northernmost on the planet St. Nicholas Church with a bell tower. A space and ground control system has been built along the coastline. There is an aerodrome. In Soviet times there was a military and scientific proving ground. There was a polar station, parts of the Air Defense and Navy, a top-secret acoustic institute. The station was named after a Pole, an officer of the Russian service Yan Nagursky, who in 1914 made the first flight north of the Arctic Circle on a small hydroplane. 662 Ibid. 663 “On the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective. 2008,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed December 11, 2019. http://government.ru/info/18359/. 664 Ibid. 659

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zone of Russia by 2015 and on this basis to achieve Russia’s competitive advantage in the production and transportation of energy resources. Moreover, Russia had to create an Arctic troop group to protect its economic and political interests in the area.665 A first step was the restoration of garrisons on territories where they had existed during the Soviet period. Primarily, it concerned two facilities: the border complex “Nagurskaya” on the Archipelago of Franz Josef Land and garrisons on Novaya Zemlya. In the long run, similar complexes would have been created on Wrangel Island and along the entire Arctic coastline.666 In accordance with the document further Russia’s priorities in the Arctic were as follows: active exploitation of natural resources of the region, development of transport and border infrastructure.667 To enhance the process, President Dmitry Medvedev urged the government to finalize and adopt a law on the southern border of the Arctic zone of Russia, as well as an agreement formalizing the outer boundaries of the continental shelf.668 “Our first and major task is to turn the Arctic into the resource base of Russia of the 21st century. The key issue is to provide reliable protection of Russia’s national interests in the region.”669 Moreover, the Arctic Frontier Force was re-established.670 In 2004, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation formed a special department on the Arctic to provide a coastal defence system671. To the Arctic referred the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020,672 approved in 2009. According to the strategy, “in the long term, the attention of international politics will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including […] the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic.”673 The document also emphasized “the need to ensure the security of the state border in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation,” as well as “the

665

Ibid. Egor Shilov, “Along the perimeter of the maritime boundaries,” Voenno-promyshleny Curier, September 23-29, 2008. 667 “On the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective. 2008.” 668 “Address at the Security Council session ‘On Protecting Russia’s National Interests in the Arctic’,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed January 28, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1433. 669 Ibid. 670 In June 2006, it was dissolved. 671 Cohen, 1-42. 672 “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed February 24, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/424. 673 Ibid. 666

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completion of a basic transport, energy, information and military infrastructure, especially in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.”674 As Arthur Chilingarov pointed out, the essence of that document was that “we will not give the Arctic to anyone.”675 In the middle of March 2010, the Russian Security Council held an extended session “On measures to prevent threats to national security in connection with global climate change.” At the session, Dmitry Medvedev stressed that “already today the circumpolar countries are taking active steps to expand their research, economic and even military presence in the Arctic zone. At the same time, unfortunately, there are actions to limit Russia’s access to the development and utilization of Arctic deposits, which, of course, is legally unacceptable and unfair from the point of view of geographical location and history of our country itself.”676 Later on, at the Extraordinary Congress of the Russian Geographical Society (RGO) in Moscow, President Putin, as Chairman of the Russian Government, headed the RGO Board of Trustees and supported the proposal to hold an annual forum on the Arctic: “The Arctic: The Territory of Dialogue.” In 2009, acting as Prime Minister, Putin signed a decree on the establishment of the National Park in the “Russian Arctic” in the northern part of Novaya Zemlya in the Arkhangelsk region.677 Parallel to that, the Russian Federal Agency for Fisheries decided to completely ban hunting of harp seals less than one year old in the White and Barents Seas, which were often slaughtered to death with clubs by hunters. In 2010, the president visited the Russian frontier guard outpost “Nagurskaya,” where he put forward the idea to arrange an expedition that would assess the pollution of Russian territories, and then begin eliminating environmental damage.678 During that visit, together with scientists, the President also put a satellite collar on a polar bear (230 kg), which was put to sleep, in order to monitor its population in the Russian Arctic.679

674

Ibid. Mikhail Zygar, “Strategic Arctic Ocean,” Kommersant, January 14, 2009. 676 “Restrictions of access of the Russian Federation to Arctic fields is unacceptable – Medvedev,” RIA-Novosti, accessed October 16, 2019. https://ria.ru/amp/20100317/215094318.html. 677 “A decree to create the Russian Arctic Park has been signed,” Kommersant, accessed November 11, 2019. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1187592. 678 “Putin declared Russia’s strategic interests in the Arctic and promised to arrange a ‘general cleaning’ there,” Newsru.com, accessed December 26, 2019. https://www.news ru.com/russia/29apr2010/putinarc.html. 679 “Putin: The polar bear is in danger,” Actual Comments, accessed October 11, 2019. http://actualcomment.ru/putin_polyarnyy_medved_v_opasnosti.html?PAGEN_1=2. 675

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In June 2014, on World Environment Day in Saint Petersburg, at a meeting on the effective and safe exploitation of the Arctic at the headquarters of the RGO, President Putin said, “we need a new logic, modern working principles in the Arctic. At a time when Russia’s Arctic zone is undergoing a new stage of industrial, socio-economic and infrastructural revival; it is especially important to focus on nature conservation.”680 The President constantly monitored the implementation of key hydrocarbon production programs on the Arctic seas shelf in order to compensate for possible oil losses from the Middle East. This was reflected in his participation in both online tele- and video conferences on projects’ realization: in 2014, during the first oil shipment from the Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora Sea, by launching of the Rosneft project for exploratory drilling on the West Alpha platform of the University-1 well in the Kara Sea, and during oil shipment the Bovanenskoye oil and gas condensate field; then, in 2016, during the loading oil from the Novoportovskoye field at the “New Arctic Gate” terminal, and, in 2017, – since the start of the Bovanenkovo-Ukhta-2 gas pipeline. In February 2015, Putin ordered the establishment of the State Commission of the Russian Federation for Arctic Development.681 His decision was aimed at coordinating the activities between federal and regional executive bodies and other agencies to address socio-economic issues on national security and the development of the AZRF.682 In late July 2015, on Russian Navy Day, a new version of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved.683 The document, along with military and commercial aspects, included matters of resource development. Particularly, the doctrine outlined that “the prospect of depletion of hydrocarbon reserves and other mineral resources on land predetermines reorientation of exploration, excavation, and processing of mineral resources on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation, and in the future on the ocean slopes and seafloor of the World Ocean.”684 “Meeting on the Effective and Safe Exploitation of the Arctic,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed November 13, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/45856. 681 “On the State Commission of the Russian Federation for Arctic Development,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed November 23, 2019. http://government.ru/docs/17319/. 682 “On approving the regulation on the State Commission of the Russian Federation for Arctic Development,” Static.government.ru, accessed December 14, 2019. http://static. government.ru/media/files/Cozw5FAxCGc.pdf. 683 “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 26.07.2015,” Laws, Codes and Regulations of the Russian Federation, accessed October 24, 2019. https://legalacts.ru/doc/morskajadoktrina-rossiiskoi-federatsii-utv-prezidentom-rf-26072015/#100004. 684 Ibid. 680

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Table 17. A list of major trips, meetings and speeches of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to establish the Arctic Shield (2000-2017) Year 2000

2001

2004 2005 2007

2008 2010

2011

2012

2013

Event Visit to Murmansk as Acting President of the Russian Federation. Meeting on board the atomic icebreaker Russia on the development of northern regions of the country and the shelf of the Arctic seas; Participation in the exercise of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea. Going to sea on the SSBN Karelia and the initiation of the Navy tradition in the submariners; Visit to Vidyaevo settlement and meeting with family members of deceased submariners (118 people). Participation in Severodvinsk in the ceremony of handing over the third-generation nuclear-powered submarine Gepard standing at Sevmash’s pier (In 1999, as prime minister, Putin participated in its launching ceremony). Visit to the Murmansk region and familiarization with the course of strategic command exercises on board the Arkhangelsk nuclear submarine. Participation in tactical exercises of the Northern Fleet on the cruiser Peter Velikiy. Joint meeting of the Presidium of the State Council of Russia and the Maritime Collegium of the Government of the Russian Federation, at which the General Development Scheme for the Murmansk Transport Hub in Murmansk on board the nuclear-powered icebreaker, 50 Let Pobedy was considered. Meeting in Severodvinsk on the development of the oil and gas complex. Speech in Moscow at the First International Forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue”; As Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Franz Josef Land and the northernmost Russian border outpost “Nagurskaya” (Alexandra Land Island); Meeting in Murmansk on the development of the fishing industry and visiting the largest fish processing company in Northwest Russia Nord-West F.C.; Visit to the Tiksi hydrometeorological observatory on the coast of the Laptev Sea, as well as the Ust-Lena Nature Reserve on Samoilovsky Island in the Lena River delta. Visit to Severodvinsk Visit to Alexander Nevsky nuclear submarine after the first test float; Participation in the ceremony of signing seven contracts under the state defense order; Speech in Arkhangelsk at the Second International Forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue.” Meeting in Severodvinsk on the equipment of the Navy. Participation in the laying of the fourth generation submarine Prince Vladimir at Sevmash; Meeting in Arkhangelsk seaport with participants of the expedition on liquidation of ecological damage on Franz Josef Land islands. Speech in Salekhard at the Third International Forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue”; Participation via video link in the reception of the RSCC Yuri Dolgoruky into the Northern Fleet and the ceremony of naming the supply icebreaker Vitus Bering in Murmansk Oblast; Presentation at the Northern Fleet Naval Base in Severomorsk of the Order of Nakhimov to the flagship of the Northern Fleet TARC Peter Velikiy for the performance of combat missions in the Northern Sea Route, landing on the Novosibirsk Islands in the Laptev Sea.

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2017

169

Event Speech at the enlarged meeting of the Security Council ‘On the implementation of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the interests of national security’; Participation in the Navy Day celebration in Severomorsk. Together with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev V.Putin visited Alexandra Island, Franz Josef Land and acquainted with the results of works on cleaning up the Arctic.

However, because of the global financial and economic crisis, sanctions imposed by the USA and EU, the collapse of world oil prices and the uncertain effect of the shale-energy revolution, Russia has several times reduced the scope of work in the Arctic. The assumption that extraction of hydrocarbon resources would become easier due to global climate change has not proved itself yet. To achieve tangible results in opening a new oil and gas region, Russia needs to catch up with leading Western countries. Russian authorities need to look ahead, negotiate wisely and act with purpose with their partners, bearing in mind that tomorrow this approach may contribute to overcoming the “technological boondocks” of the Arctic and ensure a breakthrough in its exploitation.685 In this regard, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2016 emphasized that “Russia pursues a policy aimed at preserving peace, stability and constructive international cooperation in the Arctic,”686 and the expert Michael Byers pointed out that “if humanity cannot cooperate in the Arctic, it will not be able to cooperate anywhere.”687 In 2016, the famous American film-maker Oliver Stone created a filminterview with Vladimir Putin. Stone also wrote the book The Putin interviews,688 which cited questions and answers that were not included in the film. “Oliver Stone: I’m hearing rumours that the Arctic is the place for the next race between the United States and Russia. Vladimir Putin: There are three major issues related to the Arctic. I’m not a military specialist, but I don’t think that I am going to divulge some secret if I say that this territory, the North Pole, has the trajectories of ballistic missiles going over both American and Russian missiles. Let me remind you that the socalled flight assignments of both American and Russian missiles are aimed at 685

Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, The Arctic Race: Capture and Drill, 264. “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 640 of 30.11.2016 ‘On Approving the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed March 23, 2019. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451. 687 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? 179. 688 Oliver Stone, The Putin Interviews (Moscow: Alpina Publisher, 2018), 350. 686

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each other, which is regrettable. And these trajectories are right over the Arctic. Considering the deployment of the ABM system and by Americans, including the Aegis system and their military vessels, and in the North Sea, we are certainly contemplating ways to protect our territory. The Arctic is of great strategic importance because it helps us to secure our defense capabilities, which secure the state. Oliver Stone: It is not about oil or anything like that? Vladimir Putin: No, absolutely not. Secondly, mineral resources. And we have started to extract hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas – a couple of years ago. And there might be many discussions, but I think that all these arguments can and should be resolved within the framework of existing international law. The international law of the seas. We had long discussions with Norway on certain parts of the border. And we managed to arrive at the agreement on all the controversial issues. And there is the third element – the transport element. Given the fact of global warming, the period of time each year when this part of the planet can be used for navigation purposes is becoming longer. In the past, we could only use two or three weeks for vessels to go through the Northern Sea. Presently, these routes can be used for several months. And it decreases significantly the cost of supplies from Europe to Asia, from Asia to Europe, and even to the United States. That is another reason why this region is becoming so important. Very interesting. There are certainly other considerations, but these are three main elements. I believe that is why many countries of the world, not even the Arctic countries, are showing great interest in this region. We have the Arctic Council, we have fostered a toolkit for cooperation. I believe all these instruments are going to be employed, and we are going to seek mutual understanding on all of these most important issues.”689 Putin’s engagement in the Arctic issues is the principal guarantee that the region will be preserved for future generations. The president has not only a “Nordic character,” political will, pragmatism, telescopic train of thought, but also a high historical and geographical patriotism of the Russian man. At the same time, he is aware that the price of every political maneuver in the Northern theater is extremely high, and that positive return is not guaranteed. Putin’s name relates now to the renaissance of the Russian Arctic, as it is built on a tradition of cooperation and peace. In March 2019, President instructed the Russian government to develop a draft strategy for the development of the Arctic Zone up to 2035, as the both previous strategic documents: the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian 689

Ibid.

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Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond and the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020 were due to terminate. Moreover, Putin instructed the authorities by June 1, 2019, to submit to the State Duma the bill on State Support for Investment Activities in the Arctic Zone.” While drafting, special attention was paid to stimulation of geological exploration works and construction of infrastructure facilities with support of private investment. The federal authorities together with the heads of the regions, whose territories are within the Arctic Zone borders, were to submit proposals to ensure the indicators of social development of these territories up to the level not lower than the Russian average. In March 2020, a decree “On the Basics Principles of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2035” was published. 690 It defined the main directions of Russian policy in the region. According to the text, the document was of strategic planning in the sphere of ensuring national security, and it has been developed to secure the national interests of the country.”691 In October 2020, the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035692 was adopted. The strategy was aimed at improving the defense capabilities of the state, solving long-term problems in the Arctic. Of great importance for Russia at that time was the modernization of the nuclear icebreaker fleet, since Russia had always considered it one of the key conditions for the development of the Northern Sea Route. New technological solutions were used in their construction. In December 2020, Putin signed a decree according to which the Northern Fleet was equated with an interspecific strategic territorial unit of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.693 Thus, for the first time in the history of Russia, the status of the Northern Fleet was equated to the military district. The decree entered into force on January 1, 2021. As noted in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “this will make

“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035’.” President of the Russian Federation, accessed March 6, 2020. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/f8ZpjhpAaQ0WB1z jywN04Og KiI1mAvaM.pdf. 691 Ibid. 692 “On the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035,” The President of the Russian Federation, accessed November 11, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/64274. 693 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 803 of 21.12.2020 ‘On the Northern Fleet’,” Official internet portal of legal information, accessed December 28, 2020. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202012210110. 690

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it possible, among other things, to improve cooperation in solving defense tasks in the Arctic strategic area.”694 Table 18. Russia’s fundamental documents on the Arctic region Title of the document The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 The Concept of Long-term Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation until 2020 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020 The state program “Social and Economic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020’695 The Presidential Decree “On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2030 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035 The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035

The approval date Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of July 27, 2001 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of September 18, 2008 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2009 Approved by the Government Decree of the Russian Federation of November 17, 2008 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of February 12, 2013 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of February 20, 2013 Approved by the Government Decree of the Russian Federation of April 21, 2014

Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of May 2, 2014 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of July 26, 2015 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of March 3, 2020 Approved by the President of the Russian Federation of October 26, 2020

“The Northern Fleet from January 1, 2021 will receive the status of a military district,” Newsru.com, accessed December 29, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/russia/ 21dec2020/sevflot.html. 695 According to the Decree No. 1064 of August 31, 2017, the program is updated. Its duration has been extended to 2025. 694

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To sum up, Putin’s doctrine on the Arctic shield with “Stalin’s mark” has a broad nature. It includes the creation of a large oil and gas region in high latitudes, a transport and logistics hub for an interdepartmental group of troops and navy, and missile and nuclear bases to protect national interests. History repeats itself as goals and objectives, strategies and tactics, opportunities and desires do. As Yuri Lukin noted, “Putin’s Arctic breakthrough is Russia’s Arctic breakthrough. That is strategically important steps of the Russian state as the beginning of the great actual work on securing national interests of the country in the 21st century and continuation of the centuries-old process of Arctic exploration.”696

5.6. TECHNOLOGY AND THE EXTRACTION OF THE ARCTIC RESOURCES Despite poor scientific knowledge of the Arctic seas shelf, and the later integration of Russia into the process of offshore drilling, there are a lot of myths about the possible creation in the shortest time of a highly efficient technology that would confirm the presence of considerable oil and gas reserves on the Russian Arctic shelf. There are some important constraining factors for Russia's plans in the Arctic region. Firstly, Russia lacks a consistent government policy, in which the political objectives would take into account the issues of technical and technological development. This is closely linked with the availability of financial resources necessary to implement the provisions laid down in the official documents. Secondly, there are disagreements between individual power bodies, and there is no consensus concerning the rate of Arctic deposits development. Thus, Valery Nesterov, analyst at the company Troika Dialog, believed that “Russia may be late in exploitation of the Arctic shelf: if it fails to start developing the territory in the foreseeable future, it will lead to a strategic lag of the country in the global energy market,”697 and Deputy Director of the Institute of Oil and Gas Problems of the RAS, Vasily Bogoyavlensky, argued that “Russia has no reason to rush to increase hydrocarbon production in the

Yuri Lukin, “The Arctic breakthrough of President Putin,” Arctic and North, no. 8 (2012): 2736. 697 Oksana Gavshina, “The author of the reform on payment system in the electric power industry leaves for VBRR,” Vedomosti, accessed October 13, 2020. https://www.vedomosti.ru/ finance/articles/2012/08/17/rosneft_doshla_do_arktiki. 696

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Arctic, as it is already a leader in this area. It is much more promising to invest in the exploration of fields.”698 Thirdly, there is the fundamental divergence of interests that existed between private capital and the state. Russian resource companies pursued a policy of maximizing profits, which determined their strategy for new fields. The state proceeded from their long-term interests, which led its policy in the Arctic. As one may note, the political component dominated the discussion of Arctic issues. The fact that the practical implementation of many projects can be achieved only after several decades – provided the technical and technological progress – was often ignored. According to the All-Russian Research Institute of Oceanology, “it would take at least 10-15 years to prepare for extraction on the Arctic shelf.”699 The practice has shown that the time interval from the discovery of an offshore field to the beginning of its exploitation usually ranges from 10 to 20 years.700 It is likely, however, that there will be no less challenges concerning hydrocarbon production in the Arctic region even in 20-30 years. Despite the difficulties, Russia made considerable efforts to prove that the Arctic Ocean shelf is an extension of the Siberian continental platform. Particularly, the problem is linked with the Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Rise. At the same time, this is not a matter of sovereignty over the declared territory, but only a preferential right to explore and use the subsoil and seabed.701 In 2010, Arthur Chilingarov, at that time the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for international cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic reported that “the Russian application for legal consolidation of the outer limit of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean may be submitted to the UN Commission no earlier than 2014.”702 To prove its rights, Russia had to

Timur Abdullayev, “A cold calculation,” RG.ru, accessed November 18, 2020. https://rg.ru/2012/08/14/raschet.html. 699 Idiatullin, Kukolevsky and Shkurenko, “A low blow for the Arctic.” 700 Anatoly Kuznetsov, “Oil unrest,” NG.ru, accessed August 23, 2020. https://www.ng.ru/ regions/2012-03-26/6_volneniya.html. 701 Valery Konyshev and Aleksander Sergunin, The Arctic in International Politics: Cooperation or Competition? (Moscow: Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 39. 702 “Russia is preparing an application to the UN for consolidating the shelf boundary in the Arctic Ocean,” Interfax.ru, accessed August 24, 2020. https://www.interfax-russia.ru/main/rossiyagotovit-zayavku-v-oon-dlya-zakrepleniya-granicy-shelfa-v-severnom-ledovitom-okeane. 698

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submit to the CLCS geophysical data, which could be obtained only by deepwater drilling.703 In February 2012, the Russian enterprise Sevmorgeo, which was part of the Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, was granted a license to investigate the Mendeleev Ridge. According to Yuri Kuzmin, Deputy Chief Engineer of Sevmorgeo, drilling and sampling of bottom rocks would have started in September 2012.704 The operation was supposed to be conducted with the domestic special bottom-based drilling rig, which was to sink to the bottom from the icebreaker to get a core depth of two m. Diesel-electric icebreakers Captain Dranitsyn and Dixon were used for this task. Captain Dranitsyn was equipped with a drilling rig of the bottom base, and Dixon – with a towing tank and seismic tail buoy.705 The operation raised the question of Russia’s own drilling ships development. In September 2012, it was announced that the researchers of Krylov State Research Center within the framework of the Federal Target Program the Development of Civil Marine Equipment for 2009-2016 had worked on a construction project of a drilling vessel for the Arctic shelf,706 designed for exploration drilling at 500 m. According to Aleksander Butenin, a Center’s representative, the well “may reach 7,000 m.”707 However, the project existed merely on paper, and Western partners were about to launch their newest drills by 2013. Before the operation, Kuzmin noted that “no one in Russian has ever drilled native rocks, and drilling results are a prerequisite for the application.”708 To drill, the Russian Navy brought an inhabited deep-water device, which determined the places where the rocks outcrop. In October 2012, the works were

“The icebreaker for the expedition to the shelf is being re-equipped in St. Petersburg,” RIANovosti, accessed September 21, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120412/497556709.html. 704 Anna Yudina, “The Sevmorgeo expedition will start drilling the Arctic shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed December 23, 2019. https://ria.ru/20120831/734289717.html. 705 Ibid. 706 The vessel has a displacement of more than 75,000 tons. Length is 255 m, width 38 m, draft 10.5 m. It can operate in the Arctic seas at the thickness of thin ice up to 1.5 m. 707 “The design of the offshore drilling vessel was developed at the Krylov Central Research Institute,” RIA-Novosti, accessed July 12, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120904/742924869.html. 708 “Sevmorgeo will supplement the geological data for Russia’s offshore application in summer,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 14, 2019. https://ria.ru/20120227/578879489.html. 703

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completed. According to Kuzmin, during the expedition managed to drill three wells at a depth of 2-2.5 km and took three cores709 of rock.” 710 Concerning the operation, Oleg Korneev, Deputy Director of Sevmorgeo for Geoecology concluded that “the key challenge in working on the Mendeleev Rise was that there is a very large depth difference: from 350 up to 2600 m. On this section it was necessary to find rocks and drill them. At the Mendeleev Rise there are areas where sediments at the bottom of the Mendeleev Rise up to 300 m, and underneath them there are already rocks. That is why during the expedition we will have to find the places where the native rocks come to the surface of the bottom or the so-called escarpments.”711 Without questioning the significance of those works, it should be noted that the value of the shelf for Russia can only be considered in combination with other factors, primarily the availability of equipment for deep-sea drilling. Without technology the shelf is merely an expensive, but little usable resource. This made the Russian position in this part of the world vulnerable and will affect the subsequent development of the international legal status of the Arctic spaces. If Russia will prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the continental shelf of Russia, the zone of its economic interests can be extended, but not more than 350 miles. In its exclusive economic zone, the Arctic states have a preferential right to mineral extraction. However, the water area of the Arctic seas remains accessible to other countries. As the Chairman of the Council for the Study of Productive Forces Gleb Fetisov stressed, “Russia’s rights to its continental shelf does not depend on participation or nonparticipation in a particular convention, they exist due to the fact of the sovereignty of these territories.”712 Lukoil president Vagit Alekperov noted, “there are many enthusiastic reports in the mass media on the grandiose oil and gas prospects of the Russian shelf. However, none of the fields discovered back in the Soviet times are being exploited in the most extensive and rich Arctic sector (over 80% of all

709

Cores 60, 30 and 20 cm long were supposed to be transferred to geological scientific institutions: the All-Russian Research Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources of the World Ocean named after Gramberg (VNII Okeangeologiya) and the All-Russian Research Geological Institute named after Karpinsky (VSEGEI). 710 “Saint Petersburg scientists will study samples of the disputed Arctic shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed February 24, 2020. https://ria.ru/20121017/500096834.html. 711 “Conversion of icebreakers for offshore operations will be carried out in Saint Petersburg,” RIA-Novosti, accessed March 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120412/624886244.html. 712 “Russia intends to return the section of the Arctic that it once gave to mankind,” Newsru.com, accessed December 12, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/finance/08dec2011/arctic.html.

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resources), and the commissioning dates of the most prepared fields are being postponed all the time. So, deep drilling has not yet been carried out in the northern regions of the Barents and Kara Seas, in the Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. And it should be frankly admitted that at present the oil and gas base of the Russian continental shelf has a relatively low investment attractiveness, which is due to high investment risks due to unfavorable geographical and economic location of most fields and promising areas. It significantly increases the cost of their study and development.”713 In this connection, Massimo Nicolazzi, a consultant and adviser from the company Agip/Eni, in his book wrote: “oil is an adventure with a high, even the highest concentration of capital.”714 When developing offshore hydrocarbon deposits, the Russian oil and gas sector will inevitably face engineering and economic problems well above those of working on land. At the same time, it should be taken into account that on the Russian shelf the risks of field development are higher than in other parts of the World Ocean due to extremely difficult natural and climatic conditions and the need to use unique technologies.715 In this case, neither partner agreements, nor tax benefits, nor government support will help the companies. First of all, they will have problems in both the construction of production platforms and the creation of coastal infrastructure.716 Nevertheless, some Russian experts gave a positive forecast of offshore hydrocarbon production. According to Director of the Institute of Oil and Gas Problems Anatoly Dmitrievsky, “by 2030 Russia intends to produce up to 30 million tons of oil and 130 billion m3 of gas on its Arctic shelf.”717 The aspiration of many countries to “book,” as it is considered, prospective oil and gas fields makes sense. For this reason, the agreements signed between the USSR and the United States in 1990, and between Russia and Norway in 2010,718 on demarcation of maritime spaces, are a source of heated controversy, as has been shown above. Notably, such delimitation has set a precedent, which some countries are already trying to apply against Russia.

713

Vagit Alekperov, Oil of Russia: Past, Present and Future (Moscow: Creative Economics, 2011), 371. 714 Massimo Nicolazzi, The Price of Oil (Moscow: International Relations, 2012), 312. 715 Alekperov, 378. 716 Irina Gerasimova, “A long road to the shelf,” Neftegaz.ru. Offshore, no. 1 (2020): 13-15, accessed October 24, 2020. https://magazine.neftegaz.ru/upload/iblock/ecc/ecc 2143277a 55142823901e3ca818957.pdf. 717 Andrey Evplanov, “The Arctic is gaining power,” RG.ru, accessed October 3, 2020. https://rg.ru/2012/11/20/dobicha.html. 718 On September 15, 2010, Russia and Norway signed a treaty on maritime delimitation.

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The approach of arctic and non-arctic states to the division of the Arctic shelf fully reflects the current level of technical development and technological equipment. Thus, as announced by Norwegian Minister of Oil and Energy, Ola Burten Moe, “the ministry is ready to open the road (to oil and gas companies the authors’ note) to the northernmost border of Norwegian waters.719 It was a question of putting 22 licensing round 72 blocks in the Barents Sea, some of which are near the polar ice border. Minister Moe emphasized, “The plans I am talking about are designed for 25-30 years.”720 In the last decade, the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic, the shelf of the Arctic seas remained unexplored. In this respect, of great importance is the ability of individual countries to gain access to Arctic hydrocarbons as it will decide on the future of the international legal status of the Arctic, and the development of shipping and coastal infrastructure. Various research institutions leave many questions unanswered. They concern climatic and political conditions needed for oil and gas volumes indicated in the forecasts, the desirable scope of technological development, ice cover, as well as the cost issues of the Arctic. One of the main questions is the price of oil and gas production in the Arctic. Research from the All-Russian Research Geological Oil Institute presented their data and drew attention to the fact that “by the price less than 100 dollars per barrel and the current tax regime, only less than 1 precent of the initial recoverable oil reserves of the Arctic shelf can be classified as highly profitable.721 The experts also stressed that “only at the price of 100 dollars per barrel and with the application of tax vacations for the mineral extraction tax of 7 to 10 years, the Russian Arctic shelf may be of interest to Russian state oil companies.”722 Back in 2005, Yury Trutnev, Natural Resources Minister, believed that “the cost of oil production on the Arctic shelf can reach up to 170 dollars per ton.”723 Generally speaking, estimates of the level of prices at which the extraction of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be economically justified have not changed. As Konstantin Simonov, Director of the National Energy Security “Norway is forcing the development of hydrocarbons in the Arctic,” Fishretail.ru, accessed November 11, 2020. https://fishretail.ru/news/norvegiya-forsiruet-razrabotkuuglevodorodov-v-arktike-280629. 720 Ibid. 721 “Low oil price makes the ‘battle for the Arctic’ unprofitable for Russia,” Newsru.com, accessed September 9, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/finance/18Nov2008/arctica.html. 722 Ibid. 723 Alena Kornysheva, “A conciliatory ambition,” Kommersant, accessed November 24, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/576799. 719

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Fund noted, “prices are still far from the projected cost of the Arctic shelf. Definitely, the price will not be lower than 110-120 dollars per barrel; this is the prime cost, not lower.”724 Experts of the Norwegian consulting company Rystad Energy had similar estimations. According to the company’s analyst Daria Surova, “the development and exploitation of fields in the Arctic under the current price conditions is impossible.”725 The Norwegian company reported that “the development of the most profitable fields is not seen before 2025.”726 As of the year 2020, the situation has not changed. Among the barriers that hinder the development of the Arctic shelf is an economic factor: “the cost of oil and gas, making the development of many fields unprofitable due to the high cost of production at the current level of technology.”727 Consequently, “in the medium term until 2030, due to falling oil prices, sanctions and poor development of domestic (Russian – authors’ note) technologies for the development of deep-water fields on the Arctic shelf, it will be mainly geological exploration and preparation of shallow coastal fields for subsequent exploitation.”728 According to some other estimates, 62 trillion rubles should be spent on development of oil and gas fields within the recognized boundaries of the Russian shelf until 2050. 16 trillion rubles of the sum are necessary for geological exploration and 46 trillion rubles for exploitation of fields.729 Moreover, as the Russian Ministry of Economic Development announced, “additional exploration of the Russian shelf water area and its development requires investments in the amount up to 310 billion dollars.”730 According to calculations of 2012, only for the implementation of the state program of Arctic development until 2020 it was necessary to invest about 1.3 trillion rubles.731 Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Energy Ivan Grachev at the 12th Saint Petersburg International Energy Forum in September 2012 said that “the “Experts: the development of the Arctic shelf is unprofitable at oil prices below 100 dollars per barrel,” TASS, accessed August 12, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6927654. 725 Ibid. 726 Ibid. 727 Nikolay Shabalin and Gulnara Khurmatova, “Integrated Marine Research in the Arctic Region,” Neftegaz.ru. Offshore, no. 1 (2020): 37-43. Accessed October 24, 2020. https://magazine. neftegaz.ru/upload/iblock/ecc/ecc2143277a55142823901e3ca818957.pdf. 728 Ibid. 729 The Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation, 46-47. 730 “Investments in shelf development will amount to 9.3-9.5 trillion rubles until 2039 - Ministry of Natural Resources,” Forbes, accessed October 24, 2020. https://www.forbes.ru/news/ 13605-investitsii-v-osvoenie-shelfa-sostavyat-93-95-trln-rublei-do-2039-goda-mpr. 731 “About 1.3 trillion rubles are required for the development of the Arctic until 2020 - Ministry of Regional Development,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 24, 2020. https://ria.ru/ 20120405/618392851.html. 724

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exploitation of the Arctic shelf requires at least 1 trillion dollars of investment,”732 and according to the Russian Ministry of Energy, for the realization of the program of shelf development Russia needs investment of 500 billion dollars.”733 The media and scientific reports published other figures. However, on the whole, all preliminary data showed significant costs, the benefits of which can be seen much later. So far, much less money has been allocated to Arctic research alone. The money issue was extremely relevant, as the used equipment is subject to higher requirements for the development of the Arctic shelf at low temperatures to ensure industrial and environmental safety. Oil and gas projects implemented or being prepared for implementation on the shelf, including those with the participation of foreign companies, should bring in new technologies necessary for hydrocarbon production. On June 15, 2017, an order on the construction of four artificial islands in the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea for the needs of the Сonstruction Center for Large Marine Structures was signed. The center began its work in late 2019. The customer of the construction was the company Novatek-Murmansk (a subsidiary of Novatek). The shipyard is engaged in building and equipping floating reinforced concrete structures for creation of marine platforms of gravity type (it is transported to its destination afloat and submerged on the bottom under the influence of its own weight). The platforms are designed to locate natural gas liquefaction and transshipment plants. The operations at sea makes in demand many years of experience in the building of the infrastructure of northern water areas and territories. Head of the Marine Arctic Complex Expedition (MACE), Honored Polar Explorer Peter Boyarsky with scepticism noted that “the idea of installing drilling platforms in the area of drifting ice looks absurd. Collision with a more or less large iceberg will inevitably lead to the destruction of such a platform and, consequently, to

732

733

Alexander Pirozhkov, “The Russian Government expects to attract 500 billions dollars of private investment in offshore projects,” Delovoj Peterburg, accessed November 24, 2020. https://www.dp.ru/a/2012/09/19/Pravitelstvo_RF_rasschiti/. “Development of the Arctic shelf of Russia will require up to 500 billions of investment by 2050 – Novak,” Oilcapital.ru, accessed November 5, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/ news/markets/10-10-2012/osvoenie-arkticheskogo-shelfa-rf-potrebuet-do-500-mlrdinvestitsiy-do-2050-g-novak.

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an environmental disaster,”734 and “in addition, the production of oil or gas from 4 km deep in Arctic waters is quite expensive.”735 Discussions about the expediency of hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic were based on data published by leading research centers. One of the first reports was presented by the U.S. Geological Survey in 2000. The paper estimated that oil and gas production in the Arctic had significant prospects. In 2006, the Wood Mackenzie Company issued another report in which it, however, questioned the role of the Arctic as a region with promising reserves.736 Nevertheless, a 2008 the U.S. Geological Survey confirmed the presence of potential oil and gas reserves offshore the Arctic seas.737 According to the paper of 2008, the central deep Arctic is virtually unpromising in terms of possible oil and gas reserves. Most of the accumulations are concentrated in the coastal zone of the continental shelf.738 Furthermore, the researchers argued that the North Pole itself is not of great interest as a location for fossil fuel deposits. Andrew Latham, Vice President of Exploration and Production at Wood Mackenzie believed that “since the depth of the ocean at the North Pole is 4 km, production there is impossible, even if the thickness of summer ice is small. The existing deepwater drilling and production technologies do not allow us to work at such a depth.”739 Finally, pack ice distribution does not meet with promising areas of intensive hydrocarbon production, and their melting is unlikely to facilitate field development. In addition, the rate of warming in recent decades does not have a significant impact on the seasonal ice cover of the Arctic seas, thus it cannot prevent the annual ice formation.740 Nowadays, the geopolitical situation in the Arctic region makes it possible to formulate several basic provisions, which should be taken into account when developing the Russian policy for the long term. First, the Arctic countries are at the initial stage of solving international legal problems related to the division of the Arctic space. The complexity of Mikhail Moshkin, “The Arctic should not be treated coldly,” Vremya Novostej, accessed October 7, 2020. http://www.vremya.ru/2008/167/51/212372.html. 735 Ibid. 736 Lars Lindholt and Solveig Glomsrød, “The role of the Arctic in future global petroleum supply,” Discussion Papers No. 645, February 2011 Statistics Norway, Research Department, accessed October 24, 2020. https://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp645.pdf. 737 Ibid. 738 Shvetc and and Beresneva. “Arctic oil and gas resources: legal status and reserves assessment.” 739 Ibid. 740 Alexey Konovalov, “Transport infrastructure of the Russian Arctic: problems and ways of their solution.” In The Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2011), 120-141. 734

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defining the legal regime of the Arctic Ocean is determined by the different positions of the Arctic states on this issue. Relatively calm discussion may be disrupted due to the emergence of new technologies that will open access to oil and gas reserves in the Arctic fields. This will lead to a tightening of the Arctic countries’ positions and make it difficult to find a compromise. Secondly, the majority of countries do not have the technology that can provide access to hydrocarbon deposits in the region. As a result, the Arctic battle will eventually become a technology rivalry. The countries that will be the first to offer new technological solutions, will receive a “prize” in that race. Thirdly, it is safe to say that the coming decades will be a preparatory period for the development of the Arctic. Industrial production from the fields there will begin by the middle of the 21st century. Given that, Russia should already prepare today for the strengthening of competition with various countries for the right to develop hydrocarbon deposits. Fourthly, for Russia the development of coastal infrastructure (e.g., construction of new deep-water ports) and construction of new drilling platforms pose a serious problem. Fifth, the realization of geopolitical ambitions to defend its interests in the Arctic will require the concentration of significant financial resources. The costs of Arctic exploration are quite comparable with space exploration programs. The funds are needed for further research, technological modernization and construction of new equipment. Without it, the declared goals of Russian policy in the Arctic will be impossible to implement in practice. Sixth, Russian interests’ defence in the Arctic region requires the development of a long-term state policy capable of comprehensively taking into account a variety of factors. Balance between the objectives and financial resources, the availability of technical base and technologies will help to avoid failures and prevent Russian positions from weakening. Seventh, Russia faces increasing international pressure. Geopolitical theories that have justified the struggle against Russia may again be put into effect. This scenario will inevitably lead to an anti-Russian rhetoric, with the aim to limit Russian participation in addressing key Arctic issues. Eighth, Russia does not yet have opportunities for independent development of the continental shelf. It is only possible to prove that a certain part of the shelf belongs to a certain geological structure based on drilling results. Russia currently does not have the technical means to obtain such evidence. In the future this factor may be used by Western countries, justifying the need for greater involvement of foreign oil and gas companies in the development of Russian fields. This will require Russia to pursue an active

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foreign policy, primarily in regulating the international legal status of the Arctic spaces. So far, only basic contours for possible geopolitical clashes in the future have been outlined. In addition to environmental issues that need to be addressed even before hydrocarbon production begins, there are also risks associated with Arctic militarization and international conflicts. It should not be forgotten that the current discussion of the international legal status of the Arctic territories takes place given that there are still no precise figures on the total volume of reserves. New data and the emergence of corresponding technologies may intensify the rivalry between the states. Both the outcome of that struggle and the Arctic resources will determine not the geopolitical concepts, adjusted to the prevailing conditions in the region, and even not the military factor, with which some countries pin their hopes for strengthening their roles. The victory will be won by those who are better prepared in technical and technological terms.

Chapter 6

ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRACTICAL WORKS IN THE ARCTIC 6.1. THE INFRASTRUCTURE Russian’s increased attention to hydrocarbon resources has led to the development of projects on oil and gas extraction on both the shelf and in coastal areas. For this purpose, Russia has begun to create the necessary infrastructure. Some successful projects were implemented by oil and gas companies, and the others were postponed. However, the experience accumulated by enterprises and government agencies will be undoubtedly in demand due to the advancement of Arctic hydrocarbons. Hydrocarbon production in the Arctic fields is accompanied by the creation of the infrastructure for its transportation to the world market. The optimal solution was to build transshipment facilities capable of increasing oil exports in the shortest possible time without attracting government funds for the construction of port terminals. In autumn 2002, the Murmansk Shipping Company started oil transshipment through the transshipment complex RPK-1 at the Murmansk Commercial Sea Port. The further development of such transshipment was driven by some factors: the presence of great depths in the Kola Bay (e.g., about 25-60 m at the RPK-3), good protection of the water area from storms, the proximity of Murmansk to promising hydrocarbon production areas on the Arctic shelf, and the possibility of year-round navigation without ice-breaker assistance in the Kola Bay, where the water area does not freeze in winter. Moreover, the Kola Bay has free access to the ocean not constrained by straits, and the port of Murmansk has a well developed port infrastructure.

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Additionally, the Maritime Administration of the port has created some special coordination centers, modern program systems and other objects to ensure safety at sea. In 2004, according to the General Development Scheme of the Murmansk Port Transport Hub, which was elaborated by the Maritime Administration of the Murmansk Port, and approved by the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Murmansk Region, an oil reloading complex RPK-3 was erected in the water area of the external raid of the Murmansk Commercial Sea Port near the settlement of Belokamenka in the middle knee of the Kola Bay. The construction was initiated by Rosneft and sponsored by The Far Eastern Marine Company. The working draft was designed by the organization GT Morstroy from Saint Petersburg, and the operator of oil transshipment at the RPK-3 was the company Oil Terminal Belokamenka. In February 2004, a complex operation was performed to escort and ship the tanker Belokamenka with a deadweight of 360 thousand tons to the RPK3.741 Its length reaches 340.5 m, width – 65 m, height – 31.5 m. At that time, Belokamenka was the largest tanker under the Russian flag, which operated in the RPK-3 as a storage tanker or floating oil storage for receiving and storing oil. Oil was delivered to the RPK-3 by manned tankers of 20-80 thousand tons displacement from the White Sea ports (Arkhangelsk-Murmansk), as well as from oil fields under development on the Barents Sea shelf (VarandeyMurmansk). For oil delivering to the foreign market, transportation tankers with 150 thousand tons displacement were used. In 2009, the volume of oil transshipped by Belokamenka exceeded 12 million tons. In 2015 the tanker Belokamenka was transferred to another ship owner and left the water area. It was replaced by the vessel Umba, which serves as Gazprom Neft’s main oil storage facility for the Prirazlomnoye and Novoportovskoye projects. The company Lukoil applied various options for year-round transportation of oil produced in the Timan-Pechora Basin province. First, oil was shipped for export via an underwater pipeline, which was put into operation in August 2000. Then, in September 2002, the Arctic underwater transshipment terminal started its work. Finally, a unique project of building an oil offloading terminal in the settlement of Varandey on the coastline of the Barents Sea was implemented. 741

The tanker Belokamenka is ex-Berge Pioneer. It was built in Japan at Mitsui E&S Co., Chiba Works for the Norwegian shipping company Bergesen d.y. ASA in 1980. The company became a partner of Rosnefteflot. In 2004, the tanker underwent training in the port of Dubai and was named Belokamenka.

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The building of the terminal, capable of handling up to 12 million tons of oil per year, was completed in late 2007, and already in May 2008 it started operating. Shallow coastal zones and strong tidal currents hampered the construction of a loading berth of the terminal on the shore. Therefore, to load large tankers with deadweight up to 70 thousand tons, a stationary sea iceresistant shipping terminal (FOIROT) at a distance of about 20 km from the shore was built. FOIROT is a structure with a height of more than 60 m and total weight of 12 thousand tons. The terminal structure has two parts: “a support base with a residential module for 12 people and technological systems, as well as an off-loading arm and off-loading arm and helicopter pad which can rotate by 360º. The octagonal shape of the basement was designed to withstand the highest possible ice load. It was secured with 24 powerful piles hammered into the bottom rocks. Oil was loaded into the bow of the tanker from the off-loading arm with the help of a flexible hose.”742 FOIROT is connected to the onshore facilities by two lines of a subsea pipeline in a concrete casing with a diameter of 820 mm, that is looped on the shore. Since the oil arrived at the pier in a heated form, it circulated “from shore to shore” between tanker loads to maintain the required temperature in the pipeline. Thus, the oil did not freeze during the planned shutdowns of the pipeline and the works on its cleaning and diagnostics continued.”743 The shore-based oil storage facilities included a tank farm of 325 thousand 3 m , a pumping station, power supply facilities, a shift camp and a number of other production objects. The terminal was built on permafrost, so the foundations for 50 thousand m3 of reservoirs have been equipped with forced soil freezing systems. All the tanks had double walls and made use of the “glass in glass” principle to prevent oil spills and leaks. According FOIROT, “the pumping station at the Varandey terminal had an increased capacity of 8 thousand m3 per hour. This ensured loading of the tanker with deadweight of 70 thousand tons in just 10-12 hours, which made transshipment operations in the conditions of extremely difficult climate of the Barents Sea more secure. FOIROT was assisted at sea by an auxiliary icebreaker and an icebreaker tug by an order of Lukoil. These vessels were designed to ensure the safety of the terminal and tankers, to assist tankers in maneuvering, 742

743

Yuri Banko, “The Arctic oil transshipment: Murmansk or Kirkenes?” Arctic-TV, accessed October 17, 2020. https://xn----7sbhwjb3brd.xn--p1ai/news/murmanskaya-oblast-arktika16/perevalka-arkticheskoy-nefti-murmansk-ili-kirkenes. “Varandey Terminal,” Lukoil, accessed July 25, 2020. https://trans.lukoil.ru/ru/ About/Structure/VarandeyTerminal.

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mooring and cargo operations near the terminal in ice conditions. Both ships were equipped with fire extinguishing systems at the terminal and tankers, as well as modern oil spill response equipment. Three degrees of oil spill protection were provided at the Varandey terminal.”744

6.2. THE PRIRAZLOMNAYA OIL FIELD The priority of the domestic project was oil production at Prirazlomnoye field. For this reason, the unique Prirazlomnaya offshore ice-resistant, oilproducing, stationary platform was built there.Two enterprises worked on its construction: at the first stage – the Severodvinsk refinery, and at the second – the Murmansk Shipyard. The Prirazlomnaya platform is a multifunctional complex providing for all field development operations. It is the world’s first construction that operates in pack ice and at temperatures up to -500. Prirazlomnaya can perform all necessary technological works all year round: drilling and operation of wells, oil production and storage, its shipment to tankers, power generation. There are 40 directional wells drilled from the platform. Initially, it was designed to receive oil from other fields. This makes it possible to efficiently and without the construction of similar platforms – to involve neighboring fields into profitable development by reducing specific costs for their development.745 On August 28, 2011, the Prirazlomnaya platform was delivered by several icebreaking and towing vessels (Vladislav Strizhov, Kigoriak, Neptun, Ims and others) to the field and installed there. Towing began on August 18 in Murmansk. The distance of about 1200 km took about 10 days. The platform was installed on a concrete base – the “caisson,” where the produced oil is stored in special tanks. Around the structure itself, there is a protective holding belt: a berm of gravel and rubble stone to strengthen the base on the sea bottom. Prirazlomnoye’s exploitation is the first and the only unique Russian project to produce hydrocarbons on the Arctic shelf so far. Special attention is paid to environmental safety issues during the development. The project provides for all measures necessary for maximum oil production safety. Structural features of the platform prevent oil spills. Marine and onshore emergency response 744 745

“Varandey Terminal.” “The Prirazlomnaya platform went to the field in the Pechersk Sea,” News29.ru, accessed October 5, 2020. https://www.news29.ru/m/ekonomika/Platforma_Prirazlomnaja_otpravilas_na_mestorozhde nie_v_Pechorskom_more/13688.

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complexes equipped with modern technologies have also been created.746 The state of the platform is monitored by over 80 sensors. Oil storage tanks use the “wet” method of oil storage: they are always filled with either oil or water, eliminating the possibility of explosion. The Prirazlomnaya operates according to the zero-discharge principle: drilling mud, cuttings and other waste are re-injected into a special purpose absorbing well taken to the mainland to be disposed of. On the platform that pumps oil into the tankers, a set of devices operate the direct shipment of oil, which have no analogues in the world.747 Oil production at the Prirazlomnoye field was due in 2010, but then it was postponed. At the Second Annual Conference “Oil and Gas of the Russian Arctic,” the Governor of the Nenets Autonomous District, Igor Fyodorov, announced that oil production would start by the end of 2012, and according Deputy Director General of Sevcomflot Igor Pankov made by him at the Conference “The Northern Sea Route: Oil and Gas Logistics in the Arctic,” held in September 2012, the transportation of oil from the Prirazlomnaya field was postponed to 2013. In fact, it started only in December 2013, and in November 2015, the first one million tons were extracted. The continued postponement just confirmed the fact that working in the Arctic takes much longer than in the onshore fields and involves more challenges. The field produced 3.14 million tons of oil in 2019.748 However, even after the field reaches its design capacity of 6 million tons per year, it is unlikely that new oil production projects will be implemented in the Arctic. The next decade will be a period of “learning” in the field of hydrocarbon resources production. This experience will be in demand later, when oil and gas production in the Arctic becomes economically viable. It is no coincidence that in 2015 the start of production at the Dolginskoye field in the Pechersk Sea was postponed from 2021 to 2031.749 In subsequent years, Russia was not able to increase oil production in the Arctic shelf. Among the many reasons, experts noted the high dependence on equipment that comes from abroad. “At present, all high-tech components of “The Offshore Ice-Resistant Fixed Platform (OIRFP) - Prirazlomnaya is the main facility for the development of the Prirazlomnoye field, Neftegaz, accessed November 4, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/science/offshoredrilling/331853-morskaya-ledostoykaya-statsionarnayaplatforma-mlsp-prirazlomnaya-osnovnoy-obekt-obustroystva-priraz/. 747 Kyrill Sidorov, “Own oil,” Vokrug Sveta, no. 11 (2016): 80-86. 748 “The project Prirazlomnoye,” Gazprom, accessed November 11, 2020. https://www.gazpromneft.ru/company/major-projects/prirazlomnoe/. 749 Aleksander Amiragyan, “The development of hydrocarbon resources of the shelf,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 8 (2017): 16-23. 746

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offshore platforms operating in Russia are imported. For example, Prirazlomnaya’s drilling and technical modules were taken from decommissioned Norwegian platform Hutton. Only its base is completely ‘Russian’ one. It is obvious that under sanctions Russia has to look for partners and suppliers in South Korea and China in order to build offshore rigs.”750

6.3. THE YAMAL PENINSULA Over the last decade, Russia’s efforts have been focused on developing the gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The gas reserves there are estimated at 26.5 trillion m3 of gas, 1.6 billion tons of gas condensate and 300 million tons of oil.751 Based on the estimates, the largest Russian companies have strategized the expansion of the production in this area. For example, the Bovanenkovo field was launched in 2012. A year later, the field produced 22.8 billion m3 of gas, in 2016 - 67.4 billion m3, in 2019 - 96.3 billion m3 of gas.752 The projected production capacity was 115 billion m3 of gas per year.753 In 2019, Gazprom began developing the Kharasaveyskoye field, with deposits estimated at 2 trillion m3 of gas. Gas production is due in 2023, in the amount of 32 billion m3 of gas per year. 754 One of the most promising production projects in the Russian Arctic zone was the Yamal-LNG project. Gas production was to be carried out at the SouthTambeyskoye field. The construction of the plant involved the introduction of three process lines, each with a capacity of 5.5 million tons of liquefied gas per year. The first LNG delivery was launched in December 2017 with the gas carrier tanker Christophe de Margerie (built in 2016). This vessel can navigate yearround without icebreaker escort in the westbound direction and eastbound direction in the summer navigation season. “The first LNG shipments were sent by the westbound route with transshipment to tankers at European terminals and subsequent delivery to consumers. Eastbound shipments began in July 2018.”755

Irina Gerasimova, “A service of the Arctic level,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 5 (2019): 12-15. Irina Gerasimova, “Unlimited gas source,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 10 (2018): 16-19. 752 “The Yamal Peninsula,” Gazprom, accessed October 23, 2020. https://www.gazprom.ru/ projects/yamal/. 753 “Bovanenkovskoye field.” 754 “Kharasavey field,” Gazprom, accessed January 13, 2020. https://www.gazprom.ru/projects/ kharasaveyskoye/. 755 Alya Schegolkova, “The New Arctic,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 8 (2019): 66-72. 750 751

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In April 2019, a third processing line was commissioned, and the total capacity of the liquefied natural gas plant reached 16.5 million tons per year. 756 Sabetta sea-port was erected as part of the Yamal-LNG project realization. The port operates year-round and serves gas carriers that travel along the Northern Sea Route. In 2019, the volume of cargo exported through Sabetta reached 19.5 million tons. 757 The port significantly reduced the transportation cost of production in the Arctic Russian regions. In the fall of 2019, the company NOVATEK made a final investment decision for the new project “the Arctic LNG-2.” Its cost is expected to be USD 21.3 billion.758 The project was supposed to be operated on the Utrenneye gas field, with proven reserves of 388.5 billion m3 of gas. 759 The capacity of three technological lines of the “the Arctic LNG-2” was supposed to reach 19.8 million tons of LNG per year. The lines are due to be commissioned in 2023, 2024 and 2026. 760 In total the two projects can provide LNG supplies of 37 million tons per year. The implementation of projects on the construction of LNG plants has given reason to expect that it would increase the volume of shipments along the Northern Sea Route. LNG projects were supported by Russian banks. In January 2021, the Russian bank Sberbank made a decision on long-term financing of the Arctic LNG-2 project in the amount of up to 3 billion euros. Previously, the bank financed the Yamal LNG project to the amount of 2.7 billion euros.761 Another project associated with the Yamal peninsula is the oil and gas condensate field Novoportovskoye. It is located 30 km off the coast of the Gulf of Ob. Its recoverable reserves are estimated at 250 million tons of oil and condensate and 320 billion cubic meters of gas.762 The field is developed by Gazprom Neft and production began in May 2014. With the commissioning in May 2016 of the fixed offshore ice-resistant offloading terminal (FOIROT) the Elena Katysheva, “Gas Industry of the Russian Arctic,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed November 29, 2020.https://magazine.neftegaz.ru/upload/iblock/d78/d7898deeed9740dbdd774d2da542642 d.pdf. 757 “The volume of cargo exported through the port of Sabetta doubled in 2019,” TASS, accessed November 4, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7565197. 758 “Billion dollars for Arctic LNG-2,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed October 3, 2020. https://magazine.neftegaz.ru/upload/iblock/7b6/7b676a81f6a8e1e9036b8c3f6caabc86.pdf. 759 Arseniy Mitko, The Arctic development: problems and solutions,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 11 (2019): 52-56. 760 Ibid. 761 Dmitry Savosin, “Sberbank will finance the Arctic LNG-2 project,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed January 23, 2021. https://neftegaz.ru/news/spg-szhizhennyy-prirodnyy-gaz/660365sberbank-profinansiruet-proekt-arktik-spg-2/. 762 “Novoportovskoye field,” Gazprom, accessed October 11, 2020. https://www.gazpromneft.ru/company/major-projects/new-port/. 756

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Arctic Gate, restrictions on oil deliveries were lifted.763 The terminal is designed to operate in the Arctic climate and meets strict environmental protection requirements. Its oil transshipment capacity is up to 8.5 million tons.764 In 2018 the field produced 7.1 tons of oil.765

6.4. THE SHTOKMAN FIELD Increased political attention to the Arctic and its problems has been faced with technical and technological issues. Both arctic and non-arctic states do not have the capacity to drill wells and produce oil and gas in the Arctic climate, and even more so for their commercial production. This can be clearly seen in the example of a strategically important project – the development of the Shtokman gas and condensate field (SGCF) on the Barents Sea shelf. Lack of own technologies for deep-water drilling at the Arctic fields has increased Russia’s interest in establishing cooperation with Western oil and gas companies. This has prompted Gazprom, which intended to develop the Shtokman field, to look for foreign partners with the required deep-water drilling and hydrocarbon transportation technologies. At that time many experts drew attention to the fact that the adjustment of technological scheme of its preexploration and then exploitation will determine the development of other fields in the Barents Sea.766 The structure of the Shtokman field was discovered in 1981 during comprehensive marine geophysical studies of the Barents-Kara oil and gas bearing basin conducted by specialists of the trust Sevmorneftegeofizika (SMNG) on the board of the survey vessel Professor Shtokman. In 1983, the first exploratory well with depth of 3153 m was drilled from the ice class drilling ship Valentin Shashin (and the drilling ship Victor Muravlenko). As a result, two free gas deposits with gas condensate were discovered. Valentin Shashin drilled

Elena Alifirova, “Accumulated oil production at the Novoportovskoye field reached 20 million tons. 2019,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed November 13, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/news/ dobycha/455789-nakoplennaya-dobycha-nefti-na-novoportovskom-mestorozhdeniidostigla-20-mln-t/. 764 “How the ‘Gate to the Arctic’ opened the way for New Port oil,” Arctic-Russia, accessed October 11, 2020. https://arctic-russia.ru/project/kak-vorota-arktiki-otkryli-put-dlya-neftinovyy-port/. 765 “Gazprom Neft will increase production at the Novoportovskoye field,” Finanz.ru, accessed September 18, 2020. https://www.finanz.ru/novosti/aktsii/gazprom-neft-v-2019-g-uvelichitdobychu-na-novoportovskom-mestorozhdenii-do-7-4-7-5-mln-t-1028115058. 766 The Arctic: Russia’s Interests and International Conditions for their Realization, 47. 763

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in the western part of the field with sea depth of 240 m, and Victor Muravlenko drilled in the eastern part, closer to Novaya Zemlya with sea depth of 135 m. It is located in the central deep-water part of the Barents Sea 650 km to the northeast of Murmansk. The distance to the coast (Tereberka settlement) is 550 km, the sea depth within the deposit area varies from 307 to 351 m. According to the estimates of that time, the reserves of the field (by categories C1, C2) were about 4 trillion m3 of gas and 56 million tons of gas condensate, which made the field the largest offshore Arctic field and one of the largest in the world. In 1997 the SMNG Trust together with the foreign company WesternGeco, which provided a vessel for seismic survey on Gazprom’s order, performed 3D seismic survey on the 1,700 km2 area of the SGCF. In 2012, the operation was carried out by the research vessel Western Trident with 12 seismic slopes 5,100 m long.767 It was planned to exploit the SGCF for LNG production and in future to supply it to the American and South-East Asian markets through Gazprom Marketing and Trading.768 The fact is that at -160°C natural gas liquefies, and its volume decreases 600 times, which makes it possible to transport it by sea tankers. Production of Shtokman gas condensate should reach 70 billion m3 per year. In order to ensure the planned gas production volumes, the complex scheme of the Shtokman gas condensate field development implied connection to offshore fixed platforms by infield pipelines of the Zapadnoye Shtokmanovskoye, Zapadnoye Ludlovskoye, Ludlovoye, Ice and Terskoye fields. There are projects to construct and install two ice-resistant deep-water (318 m) TLP (Tension Leg Platform) type platforms to be constructed in Severodvinsk in the Murmansk region. To each of them should be connected 60 wells, subsea modules in well clusters, subsea infield pipelines and cables, condensate storage on the platform, and main underwater gas pipeline 635 km long (to the shore of the Kola Peninsula). The Stokman field was to be developed in three or more phases. Each stage should produce 23.7 billion m3 of gas per year. There are two ways to develop the field. According to the first, the production was to reach up to 67.5 billion m3 of gas, up to 52 billion m3 of liquefied natural gas, and 350 tons of condensate. It was also planned to drill 156 wells, including 144 producing wells with the production rate up to 2.6 million m3 per day, 9 – reserve wells and 3 767 768

Bogoyavlenskiy, 72-109. Olga Mordushenko, “Gazprom set a course for India,” Kommersant, October 2, 2012.

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control wells. The second way was to produce up to 45 billion m3 provided for drilling of two clusters of 27 wells with subsea complexes similar to the natural gas field Snohvit in the Norwegian Sea.769 The company WorleyParsons and its specialized subdivision Intecsea were to prepare a project of a production vessel for Gazprom for the 2nd and 3rd phases of the Snohvit development. In addition, WorleyParsons was to design an integrated floating complex for production, storage and shipment of products capable of producing 70 million m3 of gas per day. The gas was to be transported from the SGCF to the shore via the subsea trunk pipeline system. As the possible gas pipeline exit points from the sea to the mainland were considered the Rybachy Peninsula (50 kilom northeast of Pechenga), the Teriberka settlement (120 kilom northeast of Murmansk, Kola Peninsula) and the Kanin Peninsula (400 kilom northeast of Arkhangelsk). Teriberka (three gas pipelines) was considered as the main base option for a 500 km long gas pipeline to the mainland, where an LNG plant and a terminal for its export to the USA are to be built. At depths of over 125 m the gas pipeline was to be laid on the bottom surface, before that it was to be buried in the ground. It has been several decades since the field was discovered in 1983, and a detailed plan for its development was written, but the project was never implemented in time. Although a consortium consisting of Gazprom, Fortum (Finland), Conoco (USA), Norsk Hydro (Norway), Total Fina Elf (France) was formed to launch the project, in 1999, sluggish research and development work started to prepare a field development project and to justify investment attraction. It is still in progress to this day. In 2002, for the development of the field Gazprom and Rosneft created Sevmorneftegaz, which in 2004 became a subsidiary of the monopoly Gazprom Neft Shelf. In 2003, Gazprom announced its plans for joint development with ConocoPhillips of the OGCF. Aleksander Ryazanov, Deputy Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee, informed about the proposal of the U.S. company to organize the production of liquefied natural gas in the Murmansk region with the subsequent delivery of products to the USA.770 The project provided for production of 22 billion m3 of gas per year (19 billion m3 of which were to be liquefied), construction of a liquefied gas plant near Murmansk, 769 770

Bogoyavlenskiy, 72-109. “Gazprom and ConocoPhillips discussed the prospects for LNG supplies to the USA,” Neft Kapital, accessed March 22, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/news/markets/10-09-2003/gazprom-iconocophillips-obsudili-perspektivy-postavok-spg-v-ssha.

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construction of specialized tankers and infrastructure for LNG reception in the USA. The costs were estimated at 110 billion dollars. The hope for the success of the project was that ConocoPhillips would take over the gas marketing issues in the American market. In September 2005, a group of five foreign companies, potential members of the consortium for the development of gas condensate, was formed. It included Hydro and Statoil (Norway), Total (France), Chevron and ConocoPhillips (the USA). In October 2006, Gazprom stated that none of the above companies was able to provide technologies required for its development. As a result, the company decided to develop the field independently. However, the following year, they changed their position, and in July 2007, it was announced that the French company Total would be a partner of Gazprom (51% of the capital) in the project implementation, and it would receive 25%. Another 24% was transferred to the Norwegian joint company StatoilHydro. 771 At that time, the companies’ heads Christophe de Margerie (Total), Alexey Miller (Gazprom) and Helge Lund (Statoil) were optimistic about a promising and profitable project. In February 2008, they signed an agreement to set up Shtokman Development AG as a managing company for the field’s development, with their stakes determined in 51% (Gazprom), 25% (Total) and 24% (Statoil). Initially, the idea was that in 2013 the first gas from the Barents Sea shelf would be supplied by pipelines to Europe, and the liquefied gas would be transferred to the USA in 2014. The established company was to start construction of the infrastructure that was to ensure gas transmission to the shore. At the same time, the project participants had different views regarding technical issues. The Russian side proposed to separate condensate from gas on the production ship, and the French side advocated the delivery of gas and condensate through one pipeline and separate them from each other on shore.772 In 2009, Valery Golubev, Deputy Chairman of Gazprom’s Management Committee said: “the Shtokman field is to be launched in 2013, and the first gas from it will be supplied via pipeline to the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia. So far, we have no intentions and plans to change the Shtokman field commissioning schedule. First, there are no objective reasons for that: neither technical, nor financial, nor organizational, nor legal. Second, today it is enough

“Gazprom chose the Shtokman partner: the French Total will get 25%,” Newsru.com, accessed April 12, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/finance/12jul2007/stockman.html. 772 Olga Mordushenko, “The gas bubble,” Kommersant, August 30, 2012. 771

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for us to enter the global liquefied natural gas market as a matter of principle. We will do our best to meet the announced deadlines.”773 Despite Russian’s efforts, western partners were reluctant to start developing the Arctic field. The parties were unable to agree on technical specifications. It was also not clear for whom the gas should be intended, as the cost of extraction could have been too high. The next attempt to attract a foreign company for the joint development of Arctic hydrocarbons was made in April 2010, during the visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to Norway. Then, in negotiations with Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, the possibility of joint development of the SMNG was discussed. Particularly, it was about participation of the companies in the project. The agreements with Western partners and statements made by Russian officials and Gazprom representatives did not clarify the launch of the project. The parties could not make investment decisions and agree on a technological scheme for gas production at Shtokman. Moreover, in 2011, Russian officials and Gazprom representatives announced that the field development would be postponed for a longer period. In February of the same year, the Deputy Head of the Federal Agency Rosnedr Peter Sadovnik stated: “the commissioning of the Shtokman field may be postponed until 2018. Such a decision may be taken due to oversupply in the gas market. In particular, the USA actively produces and uses shale gas, which reduces the demand for raw materials,”774 and some months later, Valery Golubev, said: “an investment decision on the Shtokman development will be taken before the end of 2011,”775 although it was initially expected that the development would start only in 2013. After some time, the deadline was already postponed to 2016. Eventually, by the end of 2011, Vladimir Putin, acting at that time as Prime Minister, called on the parties to take the decision to develop the field by December of the same year.776 He also noted that “we (Russia – authors’ note) are not going to give up this project. The first phase of Shtokman development – gas supply via pipeline from the shelf to the shore – should be launched no later than the end of 2016, and the second phase – LNG

“Gazprom insists on a deadline for Shtokman,” Neftegaz.ru, accessed September 18, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/news/gas/273367-gazprom-nastaivaet-na-sroke-dlya-shtokmana/. 774 Olga Mordushenko, “Stockman is again at risk of postponement,” Kommersant, February 18, 2011. 775 Dmitriy Belikov, “Stockman was postponed until the end of the year,” Kommersant, April 8, 2011. 776 Dmitriy Belikov, “Prime Minister set a deadline for Shtokman,” Kommersant, September 6, 2011. 773

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plant launch – in 2017. The project will enable Russia to become one of the leaders in the global LNG market.”777 However, the situation was still unclear. In March 2012, during a meeting with Helge Lund and Christophe de Margeria,778 Head of the Russian government said that the tax decisions taken at the federal and regional levels create good conditions for the implementation of the project. At the same time, the operator Shtokman Development AG stated that the decision would be taken before July 1. However, already in May 2012 the French Total announced the year 2013 for the decision, although earlier Gazprom referred to a date no later than summer 2012. Delays in decision-making were initially due to a review of the entire development scheme. As mentioned above, it was assumed that Gazprom, with the participation of Total and Statoil, would implement the first development phase, which provided for the production of 23.5 billion m3 of gas. Half of the gas was to come ashore via the pipeline and the other half was to be processed into LNG and delivered via the Murmansk-Volkhov pipeline to the Nord Stream gas export pipeline. In 2012, the parties discussed the option that implied three phases of the field development.779 Some of the gas was supposed to be delivered by pipeline and some of it would be processed into liquefied natural gas. Then, the parties started to favor the project on the construction of three LNG plant stages of 7.5 million tons each. By abandoning the pipeline construction, this should save considerable funds. By that time, the companies Gazprom, Total and Statoil had already invested about 1.5 billion dollars in the field development. The costs have been constantly increasing due to the risks of working in harsh Arctic conditions. If earlier they were estimated at 20 billion dollars, in 2012 it was about at least 30 billion dollars.780 In August 2012, serious changes affected the Shtokman project. Norwegian company Statoil announced the suspension of its participation. It transferred its stake of 24% to the major shareholder Gazprom and wrote off almost 340 million dollars of expenses. As stated by Vsevolod Cherepanov, a member of the Gazprom Board of Directors at an industry conference in Norway, the parties agreed on the inability to develop the Shtokman field due to costs being too

777

Ibid. Christophe de Margeria died on October 21, 2014 in a plane crash at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport, when the aircraft collided with an airfield snow plow vehicle. By a decree of the President of the Russian Federation he was posthumously awarded the Order of Honor for his contribution to the Russian-French relations. 779 The production of 23.5 billion cubic m of gas. 780 Dmitriy Belikov, “Stockman got a new postponement,” Kommersant, May 4, 2012. 778

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high.781 In fact, he admitted that the field development was not feasible, despite the fact that Gazprom, Total and Statoil had already invested considerable funds in Shtokman, they have not started the construction.782 One of the reasons to terminate the project was the production of shale gas in the USA or so-called the shale revolution which had a tremendous impact on the American market. The Shtokman field development project was focused on the U.S. market. So, the Shtokman gas was not not in high demand. The shutdown of the Shtokman field creates uncertainty around Russia’s plans to develop its Arctic resources, which was already very vague. As it became clear what technical and financial difficulties would have to be faced, the project timeline began to be constantly postponed. In 2012, the project was frozen, and only one of foreign partners, the French Total, remained. All the challenges reflected by the Shtokman project have been analyzed by Russian researcher Yuri F. Lukin. Particularly, he identified the following issues: 1) Unstable economic situation in the global gas markets; changes due to the ongoing European financial crisis, lower gas demand and lower prices; 2) The widely advertised increase of still expensive and environmentally hazardous shale gas production in the USA and similar projects in other countries; 3) Discovering new promising natural gas fields on the Mediterranean, Caspian and other seas where exploration, drilling and production costs are lower than in the Arctic. Development and logistics projects there are based on the latest technologies; 4) Difficulties in technical implementation of the project; gas liquefaction technology in Arctic conditions led to disagreements between partners; 5) Economically inefficient model of Shtokman development, investment; increasing project costs during its development. 6) Underestimation of modern liquefied gas production technologies using floating LNG plants; technological backlog in Russia as a whole; 7) Insufficient Gazprom experience in hydrocarbon field development in the Arctic Ocean;

781 782

Olga Mordushenko, “Shelf does not justify the means,” Kommersant, August 30, 2012. Dmitry Belikov, “Stockman got a new postponement.”

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8) The existing legal and tax regime in Russia, which according to foreign partners, did not contribute enough to the conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements and the development of strategic partnership.783 Also, among the reasons for stopping the Shtokman field was the “lack of a market for this gas giant. Initially, it was assumed that one part of the gas would go through the pipeline to Europe, and the second, more significant part, after liquefaction of gas on the coast of the Kola Bay would go to the US market, which at the time seemed bottomless.”784 As events have shown, neither change of investment partners nor promises have brought the project closer to fruition. After Statoil’s release, the prospects became even more uncertain, as Russia could not independently manage the implementation of such an expensive project without leading foreign companies and their technologies and investments. Despite the uncertainty of the projects, in October 2012, Energy Minister Alexander Novak said that the project would be implemented after all economic issues are resolved.785 In the same month, at a meeting with the governor of the Murmansk region, President Putin said that the investment decision on the Shtokman gas condensate field development project will be taken in the near future, and the development should begin in 2017.786 However, none of the previously announced deadlines for the field's implementation had been met, which makes the validity of new forecasts doubtful.787 Thus, there has been no progress beyond the claims that the development of Arctic resources is a strategic task in ensuring energy independence. This was due to objectively existing problems, which Russia could not solve in a short time. In addition, the general situation in the world economy and the price level for hydrocarbon resources affected. This reduced the need to invest huge amounts of money in the development of Arctic oil and gas fields. Yuri Lukin, “Stockman cannot be frozen,” Arctic and North, no. 9 (2012): 25-39. Yuri Ampilov and Viktor Starostin, “Key issues of Arctic development,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 4 (2020): 158-163. 785 “Head of the RF Ministry of Energy believes that Shtokman will be implemented,” Neft Kapital, accessed June 10, 2012. https://oilcapital.ru/news/markets/10-10-2012/glava-minenergo-rfverit-chto-shtokman-budet-realizovan. 786 Alexey Mikhailov, “Putin: investment decision on Shtokman will be made soon,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 31, 2012. 787 The initial terms of the start of production from the world’s largest Caspian field Kashagan (Kazakhstan) in the past 40 years has repeatedly shifted. First, production was scheduled for 2005, then the date was postponed several times: to 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013. Production started at the end of 2016. Among the main reasons were technological difficulties during the development of the field. 783 784

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As a result, the time horizon could only be approximately determined. The departure of the Norwegians from the project not only increased the uncertainty in the development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources, but also once again confirmed the fact that Russia is unable to independently act in extremely harsh Arctic conditions. Nevertheless, the postponement of the project for an indefinite period of time, with obvious technical and technological unpreparedness, did not reduce interest in it. A number of Russian experts assumed that the project itself and the gas at Shtokman would be in demand in the coming years. According to Denis Borisov, an analyst at Nomos Bank, Shtokman’s raw materials might be in demand not earlier than 2020, and Mikhail Korchemkin, Director of East European Gas Analysis, believed that it should happen after 2025.788 Due to economic sanctions, fluctuating oil and gas prices, domestic economic problems and the current political situation, the development of the Shtokman field has been postponed indefinitely. Oran R. Young, the Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the Arctic Governance Project Consortium, drew attention to the fact that “extraction and transportation of gas and oil from the Arctic to the markets of southern countries will be expensive, which means that their attractiveness will largely depend on such global factors as the dynamics of the global economic downturn and price trends in global energy markets. Thus, it is very indicative that Russia has again postponed the start of development of the giant Shtokman gas condensate field in the Barents Sea.”789 Thus, the Russian projects in the field of production of hydrocarbon resources on the shelf and in the Arctic zone illustrate that their implementation faces a lot of challenges. “A number of areas are located not only in harsh climatic conditions, but also in deep waters, and the technologies for them just do not exist.”790 Moreover, it is evident that a surplus of hydrocarbon resources in the world market (as the events of March 2020 showed), lowered the interest in Arctic oil and gas to a minimal level. In the meantime, Russia is working on mastering operations in the frigid Arctic climate, focusing on the fields’ development in the coastal zone. Energy resources of the Arctic have promising prospects and can become the resource base of the 21st century country. Nowadays, however, access to them is affected by other factors than international legal disagreements, which “Gazprom promises to recruit new partners for Shtokman within a month,” Polit.ru, accessed August 23, 2020. http://polit.ru/news/2012/08/30/gazprom/. 789 Oran R. Young, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” MSU Bulletin, no. 2 (2011): 244-255. 790 Irina Gerasimova, “Not ready for the Arctic,” Neftegaz.ru, no. 11 (2019): 12-16. 788

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have so far existed in the form of diplomatic statements and not a shortage of financial resources, although this factor certainly plays a role. The main reason that hinders the development of oil and gas production on the Arctic seas shelf is the lack of deep-sea technologies necessary for hydrocarbon production in the region. According to the Director of All-Russian Research Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources of the World Ocean named after I. S. Gramberg, V. Kaminsky, “so far our country does not have the necessary technologies and investment resources to begin large-scale development of Arctic deposits.”791 In 2015, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed at a meeting of the Mercury Club to reconsider the approaches of Russian policy to the development of fields in the Arctic. Then, he reported follows: “at most of the fields an acceptable profitability is already provided by the price of USD 60 per barrel of oil. On the Arctic shelf, the profitability of production is ensured only at the price of 100-120 dollars per barrel. Should we under such conditions accelerate oil production on the shelf of the Ice Ocean?”792 At the same time, Primakov highlighted the advisability of making a pause in the development of the Arctic oil and gas fields: “such a break has already been made by some of our competitors: the USA drilled the last well on the Arctic shelf in 2003 and Canada made it in 2005.”793

Valery Kaminsky, “75 Years since the Start of Studying and Development of Northern Sea Route (NSR),” speech, International Scientific Conference, Saint Petersburg, February 2122, 2008. 792 “Primakov offered to make a pause in the development of the Arctic shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed December 7, 2020. https://ria.ru/20150113/1042426281.html. 793 Ibid. 791

Chapter 7

THE “COLD” MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC 7.1. THE ARCTIC IS THE FOCUS OF ARCTIC AND NON-ARCTIC STATES The Arctic region, as the “top of the world” is of great military and strategic importance. It has especially increased in the aftermath of the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations in 1991, when the USSR fell. As a result, the Arctic has taken a special place in the foreign policy of many states, both Arctic and non-arctic. During the Cold War, the territories of the Arctic were highly militarized, as the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in confrontation. In recent years, the Arctic countries have been building up their naval, air and missile capabilities in response to the changed military and political situation, calling for more cooperation in the Arctic. The first steps have already been taken. They are aimed at strengthening the naval component, deployment of non-nuclear highprecision long-range weapons, construction of new military facilities and training of military units capable of operating in the Arctic climate. In that regard, the northern space is becoming the most important, directly affecting Russia’s national security. Military strategic interests and the upgrading of the equipment and technology allowed both the Soviet Union and the United States in the middle of 20th century to begin military “development” of the Arctic. There, in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, the two countries have joint maritime borders of great length. As Finnish journalists Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola wrote, “the United

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States of America has traditionally been a ‘reluctant Arctic power’ that has paid a limited amount of policy attention to the region, and only primarily to its own Arctic backyard, Alaska. Lack of public awareness, long distances, the lowthreat environment, budgetary concerns, and more pressing global issues have all ensured that the Arctic has remained in the background of policy-making.”794 Even during World War II, the U.S. erected 4 Air Force bases and 2 Ground Force bases in southern Alaska, as well as a joint Air Force and Army Elmendorf-Richardson base. The latter served as a command center for more than 21 thousand U.S. military men, and 11th Air Force. Moreover, there were 26 mine-based missiles at Fort Greely, Alaska. In 2013, the Pentagon announced the deployment of 14 more interceptor missiles there.795 In the 1960s, the waters of the Arctic Ocean became accessible to nuclear submarines. In 1958, the first American submarine Nautilus accomplished the voyage to the geographic North Pole. In 1959, the U.S. Navy submarines Skate and Seadragon reached the Arctic three more times. Soviet submarines began exploring the Arctic waters in the 1960s. In 1962, the first Soviet submarine K3 Leninsky Komsomol reached the North Pole, and in 1963, the submarine K115 made the voyage along the Northern Sea Route under the ice from west to east. In subsequent years, the USSR built submarines specially designed for navigation under the Arctic ice. In the 1990s, the United States continued its scientific and practical research in the Arctic. In Gakona, Alaska, the U.S. High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) within the Commission for Atmospheric Sciences (CAS) has been operating since 1997.796 The discovery of significant hydrocarbon resources on the Arctic continental shelf was a powerful factor of long-term strategic importance for both Russia and the United States. As noted by Captains First Rank Mikhail Soloviev and Sergey Tikhomirov, North Americans had a consistent policy of coordinated multidisciplinary implementation in the Arctic region. At the same

Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, “The Global Arctic. The growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union,” Inosmi, accessed February 18, 2020. http://inosmi.ru/arctica/ 20131112/214688101.html. 795 “The deployment of 14 additional interceptors will cost 1 billion dollars,” RIA-Novosti, accessed February 12, 2020. https://ria.ru/20130316/927552093.html. 796 Anastasia Kislyakova, “The world is scared by the American HAARP,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 28, 2011. 794

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time, “the priority area of the U.S. ‘Arctic Breakthrough’ remains the military one.”797 Issues of U.S. policy and interests in the Arctic were fixed in the report of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (ARC) “Goals and Objectives of Arctic Research, 2005.”798 The main goal of the United States and other Arctic countries was to expand economic presence in the Arctic regions, internationalize the Northern Sea Route and displace Russia from the region. To meet this goal, the U.S. intended to develop military infrastructure. It was a question of the construction of two new advanced Coast Guard bases in Alaska – in the cities of Barrow and Nome. As early as 1947, the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory began its work in Barrow. The United States faced the need to create a modern class of multi-purpose icebreakers to conduct mapping and establish their rights in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard had 3 icebreakers, of which only Healy was relatively new. The other 2icebreakers, though more powerful than the icebreaker Healy, had been working for nearly 30 years. Normally, it takes 8 to 10 years before the new icebreakers enter service. To protect “present and future interests” in the Arctic and Antarctic, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation approved a bill to allocate 8.2 billion dollars to the Coast Guard, supporting the decision to build 2 new icebreakers in order to able to overcome the Arctic ice, and to modernize the existing third icebreaker, the Polar Star.799 The ships should complement Healy and the Polar Sea. According to A. Cohen, “the U.S. needs to reconsider its Arctic policy, giving it a national priority instead of a third-rate status. To this end, an interdepartmental group on the Arctic should be established, including representatives of the leading departments, to expedite the acquisition of icebreakers to expand and deepen mapping of the outer continental shelf and the Arctic as a whole; to provide sufficient funding for the maintenance of the U.S. Coast Guard in order to support the growth, regularity and impact of its presence in the Arctic; to provide arrangements with Canada, Norway, Denmark and, where possible, to prevent conflicts with Russia; to establish a public-private group on the Arctic issues to ensure private sector participation in advising the U.S. government on 797

Mikhail Soloviev and Sergey Tikhomirov, The Arctic: Russian Interests and International Conditions for their Implementation (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 2002), 49. 798 “Report on Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research. 2005,” United States ARC, accessed October 22, 2020. https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/usarc_goals_2005.pdf. 799 Zurab Nalbandyan, “The United States start fighting for the Arctic,” Trud, accessed August 18, 2019. https://www.trud.ru/article/06-082007/210663_soedinennye_shtaty_vkljuchajutsja_v_borbu_za_arkti.html.

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economic development in the Arctic; to grant permits for exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Arctic areas.”800 The U.S. authorities also considered a permanent presence of an aircraft carrier flotilla in the Arctic and an increase in the number of patrol vessels. Since 2008, the Black Hawk multirole helicopters adapted for operations in harsh climates have been supplied in the Arctic.801 Besides that, the authorities strengthened anti-submarine warfare and landing operations, as well as the military control over the Arctic seas as a whole. In January 2009, U.S. President George W. Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, which “establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and directs related implementation actions.”802 It was seen as a strategic road map for a more specific region and provided for a stronger presence of the USA in the Arctic. The document emphasized: “the United States of America has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests.”803 The presidential directive called for the peaceful resolution of all disputes in the Arctic.804 As a result, the U.S. administration believed it was necessary to pursue national interest in the Arctic, which was a crucial element of its national security strategy. In accordance with Bush’s directive, already in the autumn of 2009, the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change issued the US Navy Arctic Roadmap.805 It detailed measures to protect these very interests: "missile defense and early warning capabilities, deployment of naval and air force capabilities for strategic maritime transport, strategic nuclear deterrence and a naval presence. In addition, the Directive tasked the Ministry of Defense with developing a project for a sovereign maritime presence in the Arctic. The concerns of the U.S. authorities were closely intertwined with the task of providing access to oil and gas resources, to which Washington attached a great deal of importance. 800

Cohen, 1-42. Timothy Borisov, “Without war penguins,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed November 11, 2019. https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika.html. 802 “National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 NSPD-66/HSPD-25. 2009. January 9,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed August 24, 2019. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 803 Ibid. 804 Ibid. 805 “U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap. October 2009,” Department of the Navy of the United States of America. Task Force Climate Change, accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.wired. com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf. 801

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Subsequently, the former U.S. President Barack Obama continued George Bush’s policy, as he did not abandon the 2009 directive. He remained committed to the desire to establish national interests in this area and to get access to hydrocarbon accumulations. In that regard, the U.S. authorities considered plans to build their own military base. In 2014, the U.S. approved the revised Naval Arctic Roadmap for the period of 2014 to 2030.806 The document defined the functions and tasks of the U.S. Navy for the coming decades, including that it “will guarantee freedom of navigation in Arctic Ocean waters and help ensure the free flow of commerce on the global commons’807 with a detailed implementation plan for possible Arctic operations. In doing so, the U.S. set a goal to ensure unhindered access to the Arctic maritime space and to protect its interests by 2030. At the same time, the U.S. Administration warned the international community about the possibility of conflict over natural resources and the Arctic lands.808 In the middle of 2019, a new version of the Arctic Strategy of the U.S. Department of Defense was published.809 The paper outlined the U.S. approach to protect national interests in the Arctic region, noting the increased military presence of the Arctic and non-Arctic states there. 810 For the strategy’s implementation, the USA is supported by the Naval base in Norfolk, with the established 2nd Fleet. Its task is to “facilitate the expansion of the naval presence in the Arctic Ocean region and counteract the activity of the Russian Navy in northern latitudes.”811 Since 2003, Canada has begun patrolling the Arctic territories without allowing foreign vessels to enter them. It ordered new patrol vessels, and as Canadian then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper said, “the first principle of sovereignty in the Arctic: use it or lose it.”812

“U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030. 2014,” Department of the Navy of the United States of America. Task Force Climate Change, accessed November 15, 2019. https://pdfslide.net/documents/us-navy-arctic-roadmap.html. 807 Ibid. 808 Yuri Morozov, “Military-political aspects of U.S. national interests in the Arctic and challenges to regional stability,” 20-24. 809 “Report to Congress. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for policy. June 2019,” Department of Defense of the United States of America, accessed August 23, 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF. 810 Ibid. 811 Sergey Afanasiev, “Military and strategic realities of the international situation: challenges and threats to the Russian security,” Foreign Military Review, no. 1 (2019): 3-11. 812 Tim Reid, “Arctic military bases signal new Cold War,” Inosmi.ru, accessed November 17, 2019. http://inosmi.ru/world/20070813/235988.html. 806

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Canada has considerable experience in protecting national interests in the Arctic region. Back in the late 1950s, it launched the North Warning System along the Arctic coast, and in the world’s northernmost settlement of Alert on Ellesmere Island the Canadian Forces Station Alert for approximately 55 personnel was built there. “In 1970, the Canadian Forces Northern Area Headquarters Yellowknife was established, which in 2006 was replaced by Joint Task Force the North’. By the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century it had 13 icebreakers, 29 surface ships, 4 submarines, more than 130 airplanes and several dozens of helicopters in use.”813 Since 1994, a forward operating base has been operating in the settlement of Rankin Inlet in the northwestern Hudson Bay. Another forward operating base was also formed in Inuvik.814 Canada was the first to react negatively to the flag planting by Russia at the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 and to accelerate the measures to promote its interests in the Arctic. In 2008, the Canadian government adopted the Canada First Defence Strategy.815 In 2007, Canada launched the RADARSAT-2 satellite system, which provides surveillance of the Arctic space. Canadian authorities also announced their plans to build up 8 Arctic patrol vessels to control the Arctic territories.816 According to the statement of then-Prime Minister Harper, two military facilities would be constructed in the Arctic territories to support Canadian claims: a naval base to control the movement of ships in Arctic waters in Nanisivik817 and a deep-water port in Arctic Bay on the northern tip of Baffin Island for military and commercial vessels.818 Furthermore, Canada strengthened its military presence by deploying an additional special unit of 900 Canadian Rangers.819 In the long run, the authorities planned to form its own Arctic grouping of up to 5 thousand personnel. Its activities were to cover the Anton Mukhataev, “Arctic arms race,” Ogonyok, October 14, 2013. Ibid. 815 “Canada First Defence Strategy,” Government of Canada, accessed February 14, 2020. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/migration/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/ about/CFDS-SDCD-eng.pdf. 816 Nova Scotia, “Navy enters new era by welcoming long-awaited Arctic warship into fleet,” CBC, accessed January 23, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/navy-acrticwarship-hmcs-harry-dewolf-welcomed-1.5670090. 817 The base was partly opened in 2014, and fully in 2017. 818 Steven Chase, “Myth versus reality in Stephen Harper’s northern strategy,” The Globe and Mail, accessed September 9, 2020. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-north/myth-versus-reality-in-stephenharpers-northern-strategy/article16397458/. 819 Canadian Rangers were formed in 1947 by transforming volunteer detachments that had been patrolling the Arctic territories since 1942. 813 814

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coast and numerous northern islands. As Harper noted, “it is intended to strengthen Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.”820 Thus, Canada hoped to enhance its position before future negotiations on the North-West Sea Route, which runs to Asia along Canada’s northern coast. According to Harper, Canada’s measures also included the deployment of a new army training camp in the province of Nunavut in Resolute on Cornwallis Island, located 595 km from the North Pole, to prepare 100 soldiers to carry out combat operations in the Arctic.821 At the same time, Canada expected to build up approximately 8 ice class warships by 2012. By 2025, the national annual military budget should be increased from 18 billion to 36 billion dollars.822 In 2011, the largest training exercise of the Canadian Armed Forces in recent history, called “Operation Nanook,” took place in the islands of Baffin Island and Ellesmere. Infantry units, CF-18 Hornet fighters, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, as well as the Royal Canadian Navy took part in the exercise. The acting Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay at the time said before that the operation twas meant to demonstrate “the strengthening [...] of our occasional yet permanent presence in the North.823” In 2014, specialists from Canada’s Department of National Defence conducted research on the use of unmanned technology in the Arctic. The Canadian Armed Forces Joint Arctic Experiment, led by Defense Research and Development Canada, consisted of 34 experiments applying 2 unmanned ground vehicles and one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). During the experiment the possibility of the UAV’s deployment in the Far North and their performance in the Arctic climate were studied. Besides, the researchers also focused on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to improve the capabilities of the armed forces in the Arctic.824 Many countries in Europe have also had they eye on the resources of the Arctic. In 1951, the Danish military came across a naval base in the Kangilinnguit settlement in southern Greenland, built by the Americans during World War II. In the same year, a Danish Navy base near the capital of the Faroe Islands, Torshavn, started working. Since 1943, Denmark and the United States have been utilizing the joint Thule Air Base in northern Greenland. In 2011, Anatoly Tsyganok, “The battle for the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 27, 2008. Zonn and Zhiltsov, “Oil matrix of the North.” 822 Alexey Usov, “Canada claimed the rights to the shelf and the North Pole,” Novyj Den, accessed January 29, 2020. https://newdaynews.ru/yamal_ugra/475073.html. 823 “Hot August in the Arctic,” Arcticuniverse.com, accessed November 18, 2019. https://arcticuniverse.com/ru/analytics/20110801/01183.html. 824 “Canadian Defence Ministry conducts research on the drones’s use in the Arctic,” TASS, accessed March 23, 2020. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1450284. 820 821

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Denmark adopted the Strategy for the Arctic for 2011 – 2020.825 In 2014, the Danish Armed Forces set up an Arctic military command and a task force with a unit trained to conduct combat operations in the region.826 In total, the northern territories of Denmark were protected by 40 ships, 79 airplanes and 30 helicopters.827 To tackle the challenges in the region, Denmark planned to develop special Arctic military units.828 Danish intelligence has carefully studied the possible challenges of the Arctic region. They provide for the collisions and diplomatic conflicts in the intensified struggle for local resources. Considering the seriousness of Russia’s plans for the Arctic, Denmark considers Moscow’s growing influence in the region a problem for other states.829 Norway, neighboring Russia, has been cooperating with the United States on the issues of neutralizing Russian nuclear potential for a long time. In 2007, in the policy statement of the Norwegian Government the North had a priority role in the country’s defense area. A total of 6 land forces bases, including one of the northernmost military bases in the world in the municipality of Porsanger, five Air Force bases and two Navy bases are located above the Arctic Circle. Over 70 airplanes, 30 helicopters, 51 ships and 6 submarines defend the Arctic territories.830 In 2010, Norway became the first Arctic state, which moved its military command center beyond the Arctic Circle. Norwegian Operational Command Headquarters also changed its location from Stavanger to Bodø – a five-tier complex, set up during the Cold War and able to withstand a nuclear strike. At the initiative of Norway, 5 Nordic countries have established the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a mechanism for cooperation in the defense area. According to Will Rogers, an expert on national security and the Arctic at the Washington Center for a New American Security, “the importance of why we need troops capable of operating in the Arctic is the very essence of force projection. To show other players of the international community that we are an Arctic nation and are going to protect our interests beyond the Arctic

“Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Kingdom of Denmark. Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020,” Arctic Portal Library, accessed December 20, 2019. http://library. arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf. 826 “Denmark plans forces for the Arctic,” BBC News, accessed March 19, 2020. http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/8154181.stm. 827 Mukhataev, “Arctic arms race.” 828 Golts, 1-47. 829 Terentyev, 407. 830 Mukhataev, “Arctic arms race.” 825

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Circle.”831 Moreover, the U.S. used the Biugn Cave Facility on the Norwegian Fosen Peninsula for the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway.832 Norway has sought to increase not only its political and economic influence in the Arctic region, but – as other Arctic states – its military presence. The country’s leadership joined the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program and expressed its intention to develop 52 such aircraft. The Norwegian patrol aircraft Orion regularly undertook reconnaissance in the airspace near the Russian borders, while the reconnaissance vessel Marjatta spent most of its time in neutral waters near the Kola Peninsula conducting electronic intelligence operations. In 2009, Sweden hosted a major NATO exercise, the Loyal Arrow.833 Great Britain carried out a large-scale modernization of its naval forces, which were to solve various tasks in the Arctic. That country, whose previously discovered hydrocarbon deposits were already depleted, turned its attention to the Arctic fields. Since the 21st century, NATO’s interest in the Arctic region has increased. In 2003, the Alliance opened the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger. Before that, the center was the headquarters of the Norwegian Armed Forces Command. It was the “pearl in the crown of the transformation command.”834 Since then, the Svalbard Satellite Station, a telemetry station for monitoring orbiting objects at the missile range near the settlement of Ny-Alesund has been operating in the interests of NATO. Besides that, the EISCAT Svalbard radar located in Longyearbyen was also capable of measuring the trajectory of ground-based ICBMs and missiles launched from strategic submarine missile cruisers of the Northern Fleet. Back in 1998, the Globus II radar was put into service in the town of Vardø, Norway, tracking launches of Russian missiles from submarines in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.835 NATO’s activities in the Arctic were the subject of the conference on the “Security Perspectives in the High North,” held in January 2009. It was the first NATO event where Arctic issues were discussed in the context of the Alliance’s

Rick Rozoff, “Top of the world: NATO rehearses for war in the Arctic,” Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization, accessed November 2, 2019. http://mixednews.ru/archives/17403. 832 Ibid. 833 Rick Rozoff, “Norway: NATO Rehearses for War in the Arctic,” Voltarenet.org, accessed December 24, 2020. https://www.voltairenet.org/article173833.html. 834 Ibid. 835 Lev Zakharov, “Norwegian Component of the U.S. ABM,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, accessed October 12, 2020. https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2007-07-20/6_pro.html. 831

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future-oriented development plans.836 Its engagement in the Arctic was linked to new opportunities for shipping, due to global warming and access to mineral resources. The conference reflected NATO’s ambition to become a platform for developing a unified position of the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway on all contentious issues, including the legal status of the region. For example, in 2009, former Norwegian Foreign and Defense Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, developed the Nordic Defense Pact. The project involved the creation of a simplified version of NATO for Scandinavia and the Arctic, a bloc that would include a joint military and border forces, intelligence services, a center of protection against cyberattacks, as well as a coordination system for the Arctic. Stoltenberg made no secret that the idea of the Scandinavian “miniNATO,” a defensive alliance of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, was a response to Russia’s efforts to “survey” and develop the Arctic shelf and natural resources of the Arctic region.837 The Baltic states expressed their wish to join the future organization. The former Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, proposed to form a group of the Northern Six, which would include the defense ministers of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.838 Acting at that time as Permanent Representative to NATO headquarters, Dmitry Rogozin addressed some of the NATO’s plans, which had held several major military operations focusing on the Arctic region, and the United States, “there is serious concern that the USA is speculating on the possibility of an arctic fleet deployment in the northern seas,”839 and added “according to NATO and the United States military leadership, the Alliance fleet may have floating platforms with a guided missile system.”840 As Rogozin further noted, the vessels were to be equipped with air defense systems with different types of anti-missile weapons.841 In that regard, the Russian military department’s efforts to develop the northern territories and create a group of troops and forces to ensure military security and protect national interests in the Arctic became more urgent.

Alexander Gabuev, “North Atlantic Alliance,” Kommersant, January 21, 2009. “The leadership of Scandinavian states will discuss the creation of a mini-NATO North in London,” Neft Rossii, accessed November 11, 2019. http://www.oilru.com/news/227406/. 838 Olesya Khantsenich, “The Scandinavians threaten to create a mini-NATO,” Nezavisimaya, accessed February 21, 2020. https://www.ng.ru/world/2011-01-18/1_skandinavy.html. 839 “Rogozin: The U.S. Navy may soon appear in the Baltic, North and Barents Seas,” Interfax.ru, accessed October 5, 2019. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/215784. 840 “Ibid. 841 Ibid. 836 837

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The Arctic space has been of interest to NATO and the security of individual members who intend to conduct continuous monitoring in Arctic waters. Icebreakers were to be one of the elements in advancing NATO’s concerns there. The Alliance’s spokesman James Appathurai said, “NATO has declared the Arctic territories ‘strategically important to the alliance’.”842 This statement pursued the initiatives previously signed by the U.S. President concerning the Arctic. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that “the Alliance will build up its military presence in the Arctic region,”843 and as the climate warms, the ice melts and new transport routes open, NATO would need a military presence in the Arctic.844 Thus, the organization clearly demonstrated its willingness to support its geopolitical aspirations directly with military force. It is no coincidence that in recent years, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and their NATO allies have become more active there. In the Barents Sea, warships and nuclear submarines of the U.S. Navy are on constant voyages. The past decade has seen a significant increase in the training and combat activity of NATO troops and their partners in the Arctic region. On the land, in the air and in Norwegian waters, NATO’s Air Force, Navy, ground and mobile forces regularly carry out training exercises to practice combat missions in the Northwest theater of war. Since 2006, there have been regular military exercises called the “Cold Response” in Norwegian waters conducted by NATO. The scenario included resolving a conflict over access to resources. Full-scale military operations by the air force, navy and ground forces, as well as special forces, were conducted because of intensified competition for Arctic natural resources and control over transport routes. NATO plans to increase the permanent groups of the Combined Maritime Forces to “actively engage them in the High North, develop the capabilities of the Joined Air Defense System in the Arctic and organize more operational and combat training exercises of the Joint Maritime Forces in the Arctic.”845 The European Union has been also building up its own military structures in the Arctic. In November 2008, the EU adopted its first Arctic communiqué that defined the major directions of European policy towards the region.846 In Evgeniy Shestakov, “Cold NATO.” Gabuev, “North Atlantic Alliance.” 844 Ibid. 845 Marina Kutchinskaya, “The Arctic focus on the U.S. and NATO and Russian security interests,” Issues of the National Strategy, no. 1 (2020): 68-89. 846 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The European Union and the Arctic Region. Brussels. 2008. 20 November,” European Union, accessed January 29, 2020. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/ docs/com_08_763_en.pdf. 842 843

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July 2012, the European Commission presented the policy directions in the Arctic. The EU Arctic policy provided a wide range of actions for research and sustainable development of the region, as well as for the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in maritime transport and mining.847

7.2. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARCTIC FOR RUSSIA After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to reduce its focus on the Arctic. In the early 1990s, during the crisis period, the navigation of Russian submarines became a rare phenomenon, and was subsequently stopped completely. However, already in the middle of 90s, the Arctic agenda gained a firm place in Russia’s foreign policy. At that time, the Russian Federation sought to compete on equal terms with other Arctic countries. In 2007, Russia, for the first time after the USSR’s breakup, resumed flights of strategic bombers Tu-95MS to the North Pole. In recent years, the intensity of flights of aircraft of the Eastern Military District in the Arctic zone has increased many times. Nowadays, flights over the Arctic and in the area of Alaska perform strategic missile carriers Tu-95MS, Tu-142, accompanied by interceptors MiG-31 without violating the U.S. borders.848 In September 2008, a meeting was held at the northernmost border outpost of the Russian FSB, Nagurskaya (Franz Josef Land), which resulted in important decisions.849 The Secretary of the Council Nikolai Patrushev stated that “the focus of many countries to the Arctic is dramatically increasing, and competition between Arctic countries and transnational corporations for access to and control over its energy resources has grown. The circumpolar states: the USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, have become more active in the military sphere with respect to the Arctic. Many of them are developing their infrastructure; they are not only extracting minerals, but also are building up

“The EU presented guidelines for more active implementation in Arctic affairs,” Vzglyad, accessed March 13, 2020. https://vz.ru/news/2012/7/3/586729.html. 848 “Russian Defense Ministry: Russian missile carriers flew along the northern part of Alaska,” TASS, accessed August 23, 2020. https://tass.ru/politika/1456415. 849 The meeting took place on September 12, 2008 on Alexandra Island, on the shore of the Arctic Ocean, at the northernmost FSB border outpost Nagurskaya (Franz Josef Land). 847

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their military bases. If we don’t take active action now we will miss our chance. Then it will be too late and we will be forced out of there.”850 For the first time since 1991, warships of the Northern Fleet were sent to the Arctic. In the same year, the navigation of nuclear submarines resumed. There was a thirty-day campaign of the submarine Ryazan, which traveled from the Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In June 2009, Russia demonstrated its military might. During the operations, strategic missile submarine cruisers of the Northern Fleet conducted combat training launches of ballistic missiles. Russia also announced the beginning of development of ice zone patrol vessels, which would be able to operate in ice for a long time. Moscow did not hide the fact that these ships were built to protect northern waters,851 and subsequently, “a military conflict in the circumpolar spaces, which previously seemed technically impossible, began to acquire a material and technical shapes.”852 According to Yuri Morozov, a leading researcher at the Center for Military and Strategic Studies at the Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “if in the future there should be a ‘power reconfiguration’ in the region, a scenario of interstate armed conflict is possible.”853 In 2010, Vladimir Putin, acting as Prime Minister at the time, speaking at the Arctic Forum said, “we have to face all sorts of futuristic predictions about the coming battle for the Arctic. We closely follow the situation in the region, make our responsible forecasts and clearly see that most such scenarios in the Arctic have no real ground.”854 Then, during a meeting of the Arctic Council in Nuuk, Greenland, in 2011, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed that the Arctic could serve as an example of a positive impact that gives good will, willingness to cooperate, mutual consideration of each other’s interests.855 Despite statements about the importance of international cooperation in the Arctic, many countries continued to build up military capabilities in the region. “The Security Council approved the Russian state policy in the Arctic until 2020,” Newsru.com, accessed July 23, 2020. http://www.newsru.com/russia/17sep2008/sovbez.html. 851 Sergey Pankratov, “The Snow Kingdom,” Itogi, accessed March 17, 2020. http://www.itogi.ru/ vokrug/2008/7/3454.html. 852 Russia’s International Relations in the “New Political Spaces”: The Space. Subpolar zones. Air and Sea Spaces. Global Information Sphere, 264. 853 Yuri Morozov, “Military-political aspects of U.S. national interests in the Arctic and challenges to regional stability,” 20-24. 854 “Putin: no plans for a battle for the Arctic,” Kommersant, accessed February 12, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1509159. 855 Dmirty Yerusalimsky, “Russia concluded the agreement on cooperation with the Arctic countries,” Russkiy Mir, accessed April 3, 2020. https://russkiymir.ru/ news/30431/?sphrase_id=1066308. 850

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In July 2011, the Russian Defense Ministry announced plans to form two separate military brigades to protect Russian interests in the Arctic. For the needs of the Northern Fleet, the Arctic Logistical Support Center was set up in 2012 to supply vessels, engineering and transport ships, as well as facilities, technical supply bases, fuel storage facilities and other units in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. Russia also set up new frontier outposts with automatic technical control posts, and under the Federal Targered Program for the period 2012-2020856, there should be twenty frontier posts built, with up to twenty personnel on each post.857 Some of the outposts were located near nine rescue centers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) and the Ministry of Transport. The rest of them were located on difficult to reach islands.858 Parallel to these measures, the MChS’s units started operating, and Integrated Emergency Rescue Centers were created to supplement the existing groups of forces and facilities of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. At present, such centers function in the cities of Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, NaryanMar, Anadyr, Vorkuta, Murmansk, Pechenga and Tiksi. In May 2012, Vladimir Putin instructed the government “to ensure the development of the Navy, primarily in the Arctic zone and the Far East, in order to protect its strategic interests.859” According to the decree, in the Arctic and the Far East it is necessary to provide for transport links in those regions of difficult to reach territories.860 In 2012, Russia launched a number of programs aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The Russian Defense Ministry prepared a technical task for the development of a special patrol aircraft for the Arctic. The reason for this step was the announcement that several dozens of IL-38 and IL-38N vehicles of similar purpose would be written off in the coming years.861 Simultaneously, by

“Russia’s borders in the Arctic will be guarded in automatic mode,” BPK, accessed February 11, 2020. https://www.vpk-news.ru/news/1127. 857 Vadim Ponomarev, “The border padlocked,” Expert.online, accessed July 15, 2019. https://expert.ru/2012/04/16/granitsa-na-zamke/. 858 Ibid. 859 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the Implementation of Plans (Programs) for the Construction and Development of the Russian Armed Forces, Other Troops, Military Formations and Bodies and for the Modernization of the Defence and Industrial Complex’,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed February 16, 2020. http://www.kremlin. ru/acts/bank/35267/print. 860 Ibid. 861 Evgeniy Damantcev, “IL-38N is the major asset of the near and middle sea zone,” Armeysky Vestnik, accessed January 19, 2020. https://army-news.org/2015/07/il-38n-glavnyj-aktivblizhnej-i-srednej-morskoj-zony/. 856

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some FSB orders, the Zelenodolsk Shipyard named after A.M. Gorky in Tatarstan began construction of two ice class border patrol vessels of Project 22100, designed to protect the border in the Arctic latitudes.862 The Northern Fleet received the frigate of Project 22350, Admiral Kasatonov, constructed to destroy submarines. The water displacement of the Admiral Kasatonov is 5,000 tons; length – 135 meters, beam – 16 meters. The frigate’s sailing autonomy is designed for 30 days. It was planned that by the end of 2020, the Northern Fleet should receive four more surface ships, submarines and boats. Later, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu reported, ‘in total, more than 180 weapons and military equipment, adapted for the Arctic climate should have arrived.”863 The first Borei-class strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Yuri Dolgoruky armed with Bulava entered service in 2012,864 the second SSBN Alexander Nevsky in 2013, and the third SSBN Vladimir Monomakh in 2014. The SSBN of the 955F Project Borei-A Prince Vladimir was built in 2020. Each of them carries 16 R-30 Bulava-30 intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 9,000 km and 150 kt.865 Russia constantly conducted military training exercises to protect its interests in the Arctic. As an example, in 2012, the Murmansk region hosted interspecies command post simulations exercises of the Western Military District. The training grounds were located in the Pechenga District, the Murmansk region, on the Sredny and Rybachy Peninsulas, and in the Barents Sea. The exercises simulated air defense and the protection of other important Arctic zone facilities. Special features of that exercise were isolated from the Alexey Leonkov, “Northern borders guardians: what are the patrol ships of the project 22100 capable of,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed February 28, 2020. https://rg.ru/2019/05/ 29/strazhi-severnyh-granic-na-chto-sposobny-storozhevye-korabli-proekta-22100.html. 863 Andrey Arkadyev and Igor Lapik, “Northern Fleet will receive more than 180 weapons and equipment, designed for the Arctic,” Zvezdamedia, accessed July 9, 2020. https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/2020228133-8wzZK.html. 864 SSBN Yuri Dolgoruky is the first serial submarine of the project 255 Borei, laid in 2004. The main armament of each submarine is 16 solid-fueled R-30 Bulava submarine ballistic missiles with a range of over 8,000 km. The missiles are equipped with separable head units of individual targeting. The submarines are equipped with a rescue chamber designed for the whole crew. The length is 170 m, beam 13,5, immersion depth of 450 m, underwater speed is 29 knots, displacement 14.800 tons, the crew of 107 people. SSBNs of the Borei project armed with the Bulava SLBMs should become the core of Russia’s maritime strategic nuclear forces for the coming decades. A total of eight submarines of this class are planned to be built by 2020: three of them as the 955 project and five submarines – the 955A project. 865 Alexei Ramm and Bogdan Stepovoy, “‘Prince’ of this sea: a new submarine cruiser will join the Pacific Fleet,” Izvestiya, accessed September 22, 2020. https://iz.ru/914852/alekseiramm-bogdan-stepovoi/kniaz-moria-sego-novyi-podvodnyi-kreiser-popolnittikhookeanskii-flot. 862

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main forces and drills of the autonomous units were created to protect critical objects, such as scientific stations, drilling complexes and energy facilities.866 In the same year, warships’ naval exercises headed by the heavy nuclearpowered missile cruiser (TARKR) Peter the Great took place in the Barents Sea. It provided the basis for the permanent presence of ships flying the Andreyevsky flag in this strategically important region for Russia. Rob Hubert, Professor at the Canadian University of Calgary, noted that “the Russians have thoroughly reorganized their military arsenal in the Arctic and significantly increased control over the territory through bombers and submarines.”867 In September 2013, the restoration of the military air base of the former Soviet Union began on Kotelny Island in Novosibirsk, and already in a month, after a 30-year break, the first aircraft of the Russian Military Transport Aviation, an AN-72, landed at the airport Temp. A working group was headed by First Deputy Defence Minister, Army General Arkady Bakhin. As he later reported to Minister Shoigu, “the landing is well-built, the runway is ready and allows for operating aircrafts of this class. As we speak there is ongoing work being done to build up the runway to receive other types of aircraft.”868 Bakhin also added that the formation of the commandant’s office of the airfield Temp had been completed on the Archipelago in the area of the Northern Sea Route.869 Within a month and a half a huge work was done to restore the previously existing airfield. About 8,500 tons of cargo were delivered there, the site has been leveled, and the technical support area created. The construction of the modular residential complex was completed, and the energy, water filtration and purification systems were in the final stages. In September of the same year, Northern Fleet vessels delivered a special detachment of about 150 men, 40 units of equipment, accommodation units, construction and engineering equipment, as well as special equipment for the building of the commandant’s office and reconstruction of the runway to Kotelny Island.870 For Russia, the importance of the Arctic direction was determined by the possibility of free access of the Russian fleet to the Atlantic, the richness of the “About 7,000 servicemen of the Western Military District were involved in the exercise to protect Arctic facilities,” TASS, accessed April 24, 2020. https://tass.ru/arhiv/613070. 867 Tomáš Lébr, “Is it really the Cold War? Armies in the Arctic,” Inosmi.ru, accessed March 2, 2020. https://inosmi.ru/arctica/20120503/191507066.html. 868 “The airport in the Arctic again operate aircraft,” VRNS.ru, accessed February 23, 2020. https://vrns.ru/news/2232. 869 Ibid. 870 “Northern Fleet ships completed a visit to the Novosibirsk islands,” RIA-Novosti, accessed November 24, 2020. https://ria.ru/20130920/964686828.html. 866

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exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Russia, and the crucial role of the Northern Fleet for the defense of the country from the sea and ocean. According to First Deputy Defence Minister Makarov, “the Russian side will adequately respond to attempts to militarize the Arctic. First of all, it refers to the tasks of the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets. The military leadership will pay special attention to protecting the national interests of the country in the Arctic along the entire length of Russia’s northern maritime borders. The main role will be given to nuclear submarines, which are the core of marine strategic nuclear-powered forces.”871 Ambassador at Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Anton Vasilyev, acting as Russia’s Representative in the Arctic Council, during the International Conference and Exhibition for Oil and Gas Resources Development of the Russian Arctic and CIS Continental Shelf in 2017 noted that “information on the competition of the powers in the Arctic being discussed in the media is not true and baseless, as more than 90% of the Arctic’s natural resources are in the territorial waters of the respective countries, and therefore there is ‘nothing to share’.872” At the same time, he acknowledged that “military presence is growing there due to the melting ice and the need to protect the infrastructure.”873 Earlier, at the conference “Be strong: the guarantee of Russia’s national security” in June 2013, Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation at the time, stressed that “it is likely that Russian oil and gas production facilities will be subject to sabotage.”874 By the end of 2013, Defence Minister Shoigu announced the establishment of an Arctic troop group.875 Later on, in his address to the participants of the conference the “Development of a System for the Implementation and Protection of National Interests and Security in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” held in Saint Petersburg in 2014, then-Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, emphasized that “we proceed from the understanding that the polar regions can be used to form new threats for the entire territory of the Russian Federation.”876 He also pointed out that “the Olga Kolesnichenko, “The Arctic is a priority of Russian foreign policy,” VPK, August 26 – September 1, 2009. 872 “Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador: there are no more resources in the Arctic that can be shared,” The International Expert Council on Cooperation in the Arctic, accessed September 28, 2019. http://www.iecca.ru/novosti-soveta/item/176-posol-mid-rf-v-arktike-bolshe-netresursov-kotorye-mozhno-razdelit. 873 Ibid. 874 Ibid. 875 “Shoigu instructed to develop a project to deploy the army in the Arctic,” RIA-Novosti, accessed November 14, 2019. https://ria.ru/20131216/984325863.html. 876 Yuri Banko, “The Arctic as a confrontation zone.” 871

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Arctic represents a sphere of extremely important political, economic and defence concerns for Russia. Due to the military and geographical conditions of the Arctic, the largest share in ensuring Russia’s military security in that region will belong to groups of forces of the North, Pacific Fleets and the Russian Aerospace Forces.”877 “All the measures are being implemented in strict accordance with the ‘Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond’, approved in September 2008, as well as the provisions of the ‘Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020’, approved by in early 2013,”878 Chirkov added. In the spring of 2014, as part of the command and staff exercise “Vostok2014” Russia held a unique exercise of Airborne Forces with the landing on Kotelny Island. The 350-man parachute battalion of the 98th Ivanovo Airborne Division was alerted and landed on the island at night utilizing the specialpurpose parachute system Arbalet. This operation was conducted by Russian paratroopers for the first time in their history. In the same period of time, strategic missile bombers and other forces were involved in the Arctic. Then, the restoration works of the military bases on Novaya Zemlya, on Wrangel and Schmidt Islands began, and the Arctic military town of Polyarnaya Zvezda was put into operation. In April 2014, President Putin instructed to create a unified system of basing submarines and submarines of new generation in the Arctic, to reinforce the borders, as well as to form a new state body to implement Russian policy in the region. Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council on the issues of the Arctic policy, he stressed, “the Arctic has been and remains in the sphere of special interests of Russia. Almost all aspects of national security: military and political, economic, technological, environmental and resource ones are concentrated there.”879 The strengthening of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic space has become an object of necessity. In December 2014, the Northern Fleet joined the United Strategic Command “Northern Fleet.” The command represents a military administrative unit, a new strategic center within the Russian Armed Forces, designed to provide complex security measures in the Arctic region of Russia and unified management of military forces and infrastructure on the territories from Murmansk to Anadyr. As the Northern Fleet has been 877

Ibid. Ibid. 879 “Putin: In the Arctic, almost all aspects of national security are concentrated,” RBC, accessed January 23, 2002. https://www.rbc.ru/spb_sz/freenews/5592abbd9a794719538d25de. 878

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withdrawn from the Western Military District, for present, in fact, it is the fifth military district.880 The Joint Command consists of submarine and surface forces, naval aviation, coastal troops, the military base Nagurskaya881 and air defense. In 2014-2015, the Federal Agency for Special Construction (Spetsstroy) launched work on the infrastructure of military cities and airfields in six Arctic regions, on the archipelagos of the Arctic islands. Among them the complex “Arctic Trefoil.” The complex is a Russian military base on Alexandra Land island in the Franz Josef Land Archipelago. Its total area is 14 thousand m3, autonomy of operation - 18 months. The garrison number equals to 150 soldiers. This is the world’s only capital construction facility erected at 800 north latitude.882 The complex “Northern Clover” on Kotelny of the Novosibirsk Islands in the Laptev Sea, other military facilities on the archipelagos Novaya Zemlya in the settlement of Rogachevo and Severnaya Zemlya on Sredny Island and Wrangel Island at Cape Schmidt were also erected:883 In recent years, the Russian Northern Fleet has developed into the most powerful and effective element of the Navy, as two thirds of the Russian Navy is concentrated in the Northern Fleet. As of June 2020, it includes 86 warships: 44 surface ships and 42 submarines and two Arctic motor rifle brigades. 884 All Northern Fleet naval bases are located in the Arctic region: Murmansk, Severomorsk, Polarny, Gadzhiyevo, Zaozersk and Vidyaevo. The Marine Corps is located in Sputnik in the Murmansk Region. The 80th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade was formed especially for the Arctic climate in 2015. It is armed with special armoured personnel carriers with wide caterpillars and self-propelled howitzers Gvozdika of Arctic cross-country ability. Additionally, its arsenal was supplied with an anti-aircraft missile system TOR-M2DT with 16 missiles with a range of 16 km and hitting the target at an altitude of 10 km. The brigade also included an anti-aircraft missile and a cannon system Panzer-SA armed with 18 missiles with a range of 20 km and the ability to hit targets at an altitude of 15 km.885

880

The other four are the Western, Eastern, Central and Southern districts. The military base Nagurskaya is a military closed camp. 882 Ibid. 883 Alexander Shimberg, “Russian Arctic is strengthening,” Regnum, accessed April 12, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2324005.html. 884 “Warships of Russian Navy,” TASS, accessed June 13, 2020. https://vmf-rf.tass.ru/white-sea/. 885 Alexey Mikhailov, “Russian troops in the Arctic are armed with what is known as the Russian Army,” RG.RU, accessed June 24, 2020. https://rg.ru/2018/07/03/chem-vooruzhenyrossijskie-vojska-v-arktike.html. 881

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On May 9th 2017, a special piece of Arctic equipment of high cross-country ability was demonstrated for the first time at a military parade on in Moscow at the Red Square: Two-link tracked, armored cross-country vehicles DT-10PM and DT-30PM. Recently, the Arctic ground forces have been using snowmobiles TGM-1901, special tracked vehicles to transfer them, as well as acquiring survival techniques from indigenous people. For their movement, the troops use dogs and deer, however, walking marches and skis still remain the main means of transportation. Since that time, the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) and the Underwater Special Operational Forces of the Russian General Staff has been involved in the Arctic Ocean research activities to obtain hydrographic and oceanographic data of both military and economic significance. It has a separate brigade of special purpose submarines for basic services. Russia reconstructed airfields on Novosibirsk Islands, Franz Josef Land, Tiksi, and Naryan-Mar. In the Arctic, Russia completely controlled the radar field by building near-range radars called the “Sunflower.”886 There are also some projects to develop ground-effect vehicles to provide year-round transportation in regions with weak transport infrastructure. The ground-effect vehicles for civil purposes can initially be used on the Northern Sea Route. China and Europe are interested in increasing traffic along this route. According to calculations, “to transport 50 million tons of cargo from Murmansk to Shanghai needs up to 100 ships deadweight 65 thousand tons. In this case, the transition along the NSR with an average speed of 13.4 knots takes about 23 days. No more than 18-20 ships will be required to deliver similar cargo with heavy screen plans with a deadweight of 10 thousand tons at a speed of 324 knots or 600 km per hour. In this case, the transition time will not exceed 24 hours. Potential demand for transportation along this route exceeds 650 million tons or the volume transporting through the Suez Canal.”887 Besides, the use of blimps in the Arctic oil and gas developments were also considered.888 The military developed its own program for diesel-electric icebreakers, the Project 21180. Its first vehicle was the icebreaker Ilya Muromets, built in 2017. It was the first in 45 years icebreaker designed specifically for the needs of the Navy. The next Navy’s order was the construction of the combat icebreaker of the Project 23550 Ivan Papanin, a patrol ship of ice class Arc7 with functions “’Sunflower’ surface wave radars are deployed in the Arctic,” Interfax.ru. accessed August 18, 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/424531. 887 Vladimir Yatskov, “The ‘Caspian Monsters’ comeback,” VPK, November 16-22, 2016. 888 “Russia developed a no-analogue project of an airship for the Arctic,” TASS, accessed January 26, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/4785437. 886

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of an icebreaker and a tug with guided missile armament. The icebreaker is able to overcome the ice up to 1.7 meters thick. The length is 115 meters, beam – 20 meters, displacement – 8,500 tons. The sinking is 7 meters, cruising speed – 18 knots, crew of 60 people. Officially it was laid in April 2017, and in August 2019, it was launched for further adjustment.889 The political, social and economic situation in the world of that time was a challenge for Russia. In its context, the role of the Arctic region has become more important. The shortest flight routes of strategic aviation and sea-based ballistic missiles run through the Arctic Ocean, making the region the most suitable way to face enemies. This has led to the deployment of not only defensive, but also offensive nuclear missile forces and hypersonic devices. As Defence Minister Shoigu at a meeting of the board of the Russian military department in 2018 stressed, “at present, the Arctic has become the object of territorial, resource and military strategic interests of a number of states. This may lead to the growth of conflict potential in this region.”890 In the last decades, all Arctic countries voiced out their willingness and desire for a peaceful resolution of the problems in the region, however, in fact, they pursued a policy aimed at building up military capabilities in the region. Russia has been no exception. According to Shoigu, “we have laid a solid foundation for building up military infrastructure there. Administrative and residential complexes have been built on the islands of the Arctic archipelagos which have no analogues in the world. They purpose is for military service, which performs its duties on a rotational basis.”891 Until then, the Arctic and non-Arctic states tried to gain access to Arctic deposits on their own, and international competition for hydrocarbon resources was growing. For example, at the International Arctic Forum, Russian President Vladimir stated that “Russia proceeds from the premise that there is no potential for conflict in the Arctic region. International norms clearly define the rights of both coastal and other states and serve as a solid basis for joint work in resolving any problems.”892 According to Putin, “it concerns such sensitive issues as delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, prevention of “The first combat icebreaker Ivan Papanin was launched in St. Petersburg,” Regnum, accessed September 14, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2759264.html. 890 “Shoigu: The Arctic become the center of interests of several states, which can lead to conflicts,” TASS, accessed December 14, 2019. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5509944. 891 “The Russian military prepared for military expansion in Artic and repel the S-400 system’s conventional enemy attack,” Newsru.com, accessed April 24, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/russia/17mar2020/arctic_army.html. 892 “Putin found no potential for conflict in the Arctic,” Interfax, accessed November 18, 2020. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/556103. 889

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unregulated fishing in its central part, closed exclusively in the economic zones of the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia”893 Yet, international competition for hydrocarbon resources was growing. “Contrary to public statements about peace and cooperation in the Arctic coming from the Arctic states, the strategic value of this region is getting higher. Thus, each state attaches increasing importance to its own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may appeal to cooperation, but they are preparing for a conflict,”894 as Hubert noted. According to the expert Cohen, “such statements run counter to the spirit of international cooperation, striking inappropriateness and impeding scientific missions.”895 In his science fiction story The Arctic is a battlefield, the Russian writer Georgy Savitsky predicted that “in the near future, the Arctic will become a new ‘gunpowder barrel’ – only its huge reserves of minerals can save the collapsing economy of the West, and thus, the war for these resources is inevitable.”896 Nowadays it is difficult to determine how peaceful and non-conflict the development of the Arctic will be. Researchers argue that the North and Barents Seas, the underwater Lomonosov Ridge and Spitsbergen Island may become a confrontation arena. At the same time, it is often overlooked that the international rivalry may escalate around the Arctic not only because of energy resources, but also because of bioresources, fresh water, as well as transport shipping and air routes.897 The present rivalry between the Arctic states has not gone beyond international legal disagreements. Although, as noted by U.S. expert Roger Howard, Russia and the United States would face a new Cold War for the undeveloped resources of the Arctic.898 The Danish Institute of International Studies and the Australian Armed Forces published similar predictions: if the disputes over the right to mine cannot be resolved peacefully, weapons may be used.899 It is unlikely that in the coming years, discussions about the extraction of hydrocarbons in the Arctic will move into practical implementation. Until then,

893

Ibid. Terry Macalister, “The U.S. and Russia stir up political tension over the Arctic,” Inosmi.ru, accessed July 17, 2020. https://inosmi.ru/arctica/20110707/171710582.html. 895 Cohen, 1-42. 896 Georgy Savitsky, The Arctic is a battlefield (Moscow: Eksmo Publishing House, 2009), 309. 897 Kolesnichenko, “The Arctic is a priority of Russian foreign policy.” 898 “USA and Russia waiting for Cold War for Arctic resources,” BFM.ru, accessed August 13, 2019. https://www.bfm.ru/news/35092. 899 “The hot Arctic,” Novye Izvestiya, accessed November 21, 2019. https://newizv.ru/ news/world/21-01-2009/104509-zharkaja-arktika. 894

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the Arctic territories may witness geopolitical rivalries, numerous research expeditions and continued militarization of the region. Only after detailed studies of the Arctic deposits, when accurate information is obtained, and if the necessary technologies are available to make their production profitable, an escalation may become possible. Much will depend on whether the countries are able to reach consensus on the division of Arctic spaces and accumulations there or whether the military component will be the key argument in the dispute.

Chapter 8

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE ARCTIC 8.1. SCIENCE AND GEOPOLITICS Scientific research in the Arctic has been conducted by the Arctic states for many decades during the 20th century. Expeditions and polar stations, which were set up by individual countries, have played a significant role in the study of the Arctic space. In recent decades, for geopolitical reasons the interest in the Arctic has been growing. This process is due to the study of global climate change, since the Arctic is the earth’s “weather kitchen”; it has potentially rich sources of natural resources, primarily oil and gas, as well as rare-earth metals. The region is one of the largest bases of bioresources. The Arctic has long been investigated. The forms and methods of its study have changed over time, depending on the scientific tasks set and the development of technology to solve them. Among recent developments in this field are automatic scientific complexes – meteorological and oceanological stations, various buoys which are frozen into the ice, remote sensing using satellites for obtaining information about the ice situation in the visible, infrared, radar and microwave range. However, all data collected require verification. A crucial role was played by the North Pole (NP) research stations. The USSR, and later Russia, have accumulated great experience in that field. From 1937, the USSR served the SP-1 station. Similar research continued until 2012, when the SP-40 operated. The ongoing interest in the Arctic issues is due to studying the continental shelf, the definition of its outer limits, as well as global climate change. As a result, in the 1990s, many Arctic states began to pay increased attention to the

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region, including its study. For this purpose, back in the 1990s, Arctic expeditions were organized by the United States, Norway, and Germany.

8.2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ARCTIC RESEARCH In order to facilitate investigations, the countries started organizing international expeditions and implementing long-term international programs. In 1993, a Russian-German expedition began its work in the Arctic under the research project named the Laptev Sea Ecosystem, which is still presently running, using the German icebreaker Polarstern,900 and the Russian expeditionary vessels called Ivan Kireev, Professor Multanovsky, Captain Dranitsyn, and Boris Petrov. In 2003, seven research expeditions of Norway, the USA and Germany were carried out in the Russian sector of the Arctic. In 2004, the international Arctic drilling expedition, the Arctic Coring Expedition (ACEX), for the first time in history was able to drill the Lomonosov Ridge.901 It was done with the help of the Norwegian ice-breaking ship Vidar Viking. Support in its work was provided by the Russian nuclear-powered ship Sovietskiy Souz and the Swedish icebreaker Oden.902 The drilling, which cost USD 12.5 million, reached a depth of 428 meters. However, it did not go beyond the sedimentary cover, and the samples obtained only allowed them to determine that the glaciation of the Arctic began 45 million years ago.903 In 2004 and 2006, Norway conducted a drilling operation of the Barents Sea bottom. Representing the interests of the EU in the Arctic, in 2007, “Polarstern” (North star) is a German research vessel, the icebreaker of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (Germany). It was put into service in 1982. The vessel has a double hull, 118 m long, 25.07 m wide. Precipitation 11.21 m. It is able to break through ice up to 1.5 m thick. The ship participated in expeditions to the North Pole. In 2008 Polarstern became the first research vessel ever to travel both the Northwest and Northeast passages in one expedition and make a circular voyage around the North Pole. 901 Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, “Arctic Coring Expedition (ACEX) retrieves first Arctic core,” EurekAlert, accessed May 23, 2020. https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/200408/sprs-ace082504.php. 902 Valery Akimov, Konstantin Kozlov and Oleg Kosorukov, “The Northern Sea Route is the core of the Arctic transport system of Russia,” In Current challenges of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (Moscow: All-Russian Research Institute for Civil Defense and Emergencies of Russian Emergencies Ministry, 2014), 139-160. 903 Igor Zonn and Sergey Zhiltsov, “Capture and Drill,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, accessed October 13, 2020. https://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2012-04-10/14_arktika.html. 900

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Denmark sent again an expedition to the North Pole in order to submit evidence that the Lomonosov Ridge is an underwater continuation of Greenland.904 A year later, the Swedish-Danish expedition LOMROG again visited the Arctic with the same purpose. In August 2010, a joint expedition was organized by the United States and Canada. Its main task was to map the Arctic Ocean floor, which was to help countries to deal with the issues of the extension of the national borders. This expedition was the third since 2007 to collect data, which should confirm the claims of these states to extend their sovereignty in the region.905 Besides that, during the expedition, the U.S. and Canada intended to jointly explore oil and gas-rich areas in the Beaufort Sea that were disputed by the two countries. It was about an area of 21,500 km2, where it is believed that there are large oil reserves. Based on these studies, Shell planned to start drilling on the Arctic shelf already in 2012. If Canada could have managed to prove that its shelf stretches over a 200-mile zone, it would have expected to add an area of 676,000 miles2 to its maritime possessions. The company Statoil together with Chevron and Pepsol had a plan to launch exploration work in the Canadian part of the Arctic shelf, and seismic exploration – in the Beaufort Sea. Moreover, in 2013 Norwegian Statoil intended to continue drilling exploration wells in the Barents Sea and triple the budget for Arctic technological developments from 11 million euros to 34 million euros.906 These included exploration near the Snøhvit and Goliat fields, as well as the Skrugardfeltet field with reserves of 150-200 million barrels.907 Transocean, one of the world’s largest offshore drilling companies, believed that oil and gas exploration in the Barents Sea would be significantly expanded in the coming years. It was expected that 38 wells would be drilled by 2017, whereas in 2011 only 6 wells were drilled.908 It should be also noted that since 1968, the deep-sea drilling method has been applied by the international consortium the Joint Oceanographic

904

The Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy participated in this expedition. Denis Voroshilov, “The USA and Canada organize an expedition to study the Arctic shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed August 14, 2020. https://ria.ru/20100807/262628667.html. 906 “In 2013 Statoil will be continuously drilled in the Barents Sea,” Neft-Kapital, accessed May 27, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/news/upstream/07-09-2012/v-2013-godu-statoyl-budetbespreryvno-burit-v-barentsevom-more. 907 The field was discovered in April 2011. 908 Kyrill Borodin, “In the next 5 years, 158 wells will be drilled in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea,” accessed May 29, 2020. http://energo-news.ru/archives/96577. 905

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Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES), and since 1985, the Ocean Deepwater Drilling Program has been implemented.909 In order to justify the continental shelf and deep-water zone boundaries of the Arctic states and neighboring countries, an international research group developed a European project of deep-water drilling for joint construction and use of an ice-class vessel, the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) – the Aurora Borealis. The ship was designed as a multi-purpose diesel research icebreaker for the Arctic and Antarctic ice conditions and is capable of independently overcoming more than 2.5 meters of ice fields, as well as breaking through 15 meters of ice hummocks. Aurora Borealis should have three purposes: an icebreaker, a sea-bead drilling platform, and a multi-purpose polar research vessel. Under the project, the length of the vessel is 200 meters, width – 49 meters, draft – 13 meters, and displacement is 65 thousand tons. Maximum speed on the open water is 15.5 km. It should accommodate 120 people, including crew and researchers. Its maximum work period is 90 days. As a multi-purpose polar research vessel, it was constructed to place 32 scientific laboratories on board. The icebreaker was to have a drilling tower 85 meters high above the keel. It was supposed to accommodate 6,000 meters of drill pipes ready to be launched. The ship was to drill in ice fields with ice thickness up to 2 meters for water depth of 5,000 meters and for 1000 meters bottom (to lift the core). Aurora Borealis was supposed to be equipped with a dynamic positioning system, which would allow drilling without drifting both in open water and in ice conditions. The vessel was to have two drilling shafts (7 x 7 meters each): one for deep sea drilling and the other for fixing submersible equipment that served the equipment submarine. In 2020, the annual international expedition under the project The Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAIC) was completed. The icebreaker Polarstern was frozen in the ice of the Arctic Ocean and thus a new type of drifting station was created. It began drifting around the North Pole.910 The project was organized by the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (Germany). “Scientists from 37 countries studied the impacts of climate change in the Arctic and new conditions of ice formation. The

909

910

The USSR participated in these projects, however, they ended up not taking part towards the end. The similar route was taken by the famous polar explorer F. Nansen, and then schooner Tara frozen into the ice.

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rotation of the scientists’ staff911 was carried out by the research vessels of the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute Akademik Fyodorov and Akademik Treshnikov. The ships also conducted an extensive set of works to deploy a complex system of observations using the most modern equipment. More than 100 instrument complexes were installed on ice.”912 The budget of the expedition was 140 million euros.913 The data will be processed over several years.

8.3. U.S.-RUSSIA: SCIENTIFIC RIVALRY IN THE ARCTIC Speaking about the U.S. research activities towards the Arctic in the recent decades, it has invested heavily in its investigations. Already in 1984, an act on domestic research policy in the Arctic was adopted.914 In 1994, the U.S. began a large-scale project using nuclear submarines, which carried out mapping of the seabed and bottom sediments. The scientific research in the region was an essential point in the Presidential Decision.915 Since 2003, the USA has mapped the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and the entire continental slope, having conducted 5Arctic expeditions. Annually, USD 25 million were spent for these purposes.916 The works were mainly aimed at obtaining evidence of significant oil and gas reserves in Arctic fields. The U.S. State Department was wary of its response to the Russian scientific expedition Arktika-2007. According to Deputy State Department spokesman Tom Casey, “I’m not sure if it was a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a plate on the bottom of the ocean that they planted. But whatever it is, it has no legal significance or effect on this application (to the UN commission – author’s note).917 Nevertheless, Russia’s active investigations in the region prompted 911

A total of five expedition crews were replaced. “An international expedition has completed a research program near the North Pole,” TASSNauka, accessed December 28, 2020. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/9718319. 913 “The largest expedition to the Arctic: what the German icebreaker learned,” Deutsche Welle, accessed October 12, 2020. https://www.dw.com/ru/krupnejshaja-jekspedicija-v-arktikuchto-uznal-nemeckij-ledokol/a-55248796. 914 “Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984. Public Law 98-373 July 31, 1984. (Amended 1990),” National Science Foundation, accessed August 23, 2020. https://www.nsf.gov/ geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/arc_res_pol_act.jsp. 915 “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26. 1994, June 9,” Presidential Decision Directive, accessed June 23, 2020. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd26.htm. 916 Since 2005, the cost has been increased to USD 35 million per year. 917 “The World on the Arctic Expedition: from Irritation to Delight,” Vesti, accessed December 24, 2020. https://www.vesti.ru/article/2283594. 912

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U.S. researchers to pay greater attention to the Arctic problems, its international legal status and hydrocarbon resources. For instance, since 2007, the United States has been conducting a large-scale research program in its part of the Chukchi Sea with the help of the icebreaker Healy. In August 2008, Canada and the United States arranged a joint expedition to map an area 400 to 600 miles north of the Alaska coast in the Chukchi Sea. The expedition’s project cost USD 1.2 million. The icebreaker Healy was paving the way through the ice, followed by the icebreaker Louis Saint Laurent, which was carrying seismic sounding equipment in tow.918 The mission was to collect data on oil and gas reserves in the Arctic Ocean, as well as to obtain information necessary for subsequent determination of the continental shelf limits north of Alaska. First of all, it was a question of drawing a three-dimensional map of the bottom near the Chukchi Sea. The parties expected to use the information obtained to confirm the figures on the length of the Alaska continental shelf. According to the representative of the U.S. Department of State Margaret Hayes, the conducted research should have helped to assess the possibility that the United States919 may have new sources of oil and natural gas and prove that the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf may extend 600 miles from the coastline.920 With respect to Russia, for several centuries, its whalers, fishermen and scientists have explored the Arctic spaces. In the last more than a hundred years, Soviet and Russian scientists have made great contributions to the knowledge of the Arctic. As Chilingarov said, “our country was and remains a pioneer in the study and development of the polar regions.”921 He also stressed that “thanks to our efforts, the structure and dynamics of the Arctic Ocean’s waters were mainly studied. Our drifting stations ‘North Pole’ and expeditions the ‘North’ have played a significant role in the exploration of the Arctic region, including the ocean, atmosphere, ice, continental shelf, biology of the Arctic seas and Arctic Ocean at the geographical point of the North Pole.”922

“Canada and the U.S. organize a ‘controversial’ expedition to the Beaufort Sea,” Izvestiya, accessed November 7, 2020. https://iz.ru/news/429019. 919 “The USA equipped the expedition for the wealth of the Arctic,” Finance.ua, accessed June 23, 2020. https://news.finance.ua/ru/news/-/134451/ssha-snaryadili-ekspeditsiyu-zabogatstvami-arktiki. 920 Sergey Merinov, “Healy’s mission,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 15, 2008. 921 “The history of the Russian Arctic exploration: from the Pomor coasts to nuclear icebreakers,” Arctic.Russia, accessed June 17, 2020. https://arctic-russia.ru/article/istoriya-osvoeniyarusskoy-arktiki-ot-pomorskikh-kochey-k-atomnym-ledokolam/. 922 Vladimir Snegirev, “The temperature according Arthur,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed June 23, 2020. https://rg.ru/2012/01/27/arktika.html. 918

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the number of the research operations of the Arctic in Russia declined. This led to a loss of leadership in various areas. Russian geographer Alexander Pilyasov believed that “the country, which has the largest territory and water area in the Arctic zone, is no longer a leader in any of the new areas of Arctic research”923. Such assessments referred to the 1990s. This idea was emphasized in the speech of the Russian polar explorer Artur Chilingarov. At the Forth Northern Socio-Ecological Congress in Syktyvkar, 2008 he said, “By 2001 ... in our country there was such a situation that the Arctic had practically stopped being dealt with.”924 After a deep dive near the North Pole in 2007, Russia continued its scientific investigations of the Arctic seas shelf. In August 2008, an expedition was conducted on the Russian vessel Akademik Fedorov, 925 which was to obtain data to determine the outer limits of the continental shelf and confirm that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Rise along the geological structure are an extension of the continental part. The importance of the region, conducting research, was reflected in the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond” approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008. The document stated that “the aim of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology is to ensure a sufficient level of fundamental and applied scientific research to accumulate knowledge and create modern scientific and geoinformation basis for the management of the Arctic territories, including the development of tools to address the challenges of defense and security, as well as the reliable functioning of life support systems and production activities in the natural and climatic conditions of the Arctic.”926 The main measures to be implemented by the state policy in the field of scientific research and scientific support of activities in the Russian Arctic zone are as follows: substantiation of long-term prospects and basic directions of development of various forms of activity in the Arctic; studying of dangerous

Aleksander Pilyasov, “Scientific research and innovations in the Arctic region,” in The Arctic region: problems of international cooperation, Volume 2 (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2013), 361-369. 924 Artur Chilingarov, “Russia’s National Priorities in the Development of the Arctic,” in The Northern Dimension of global problems (Moscow: Nauka, 2009), 18-22. 925 “The vessel Akademik Fedorov went to study Arctic ecology,” Lenta.ru, accessed November 3, 2020. https://lenta.ru/news/2008/08/18/fedorov/. 926 “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed August 23, 2020. https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovydok.html. 923

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and crisis natural phenomena, working out and introduction of modern technologies and methods of their forecasting in the conditions of a varying climate; forecast and estimation of consequences of global climatic changes occurring in the Arctic zone Russian Federations under the influence of natural and anthropogenic factors, in intermediate term and long-term prospect, including an increase of stability of objects of the infrastructure; carrying out investigations in the field of history, culture and regional economy, and also legal regulation of activity in the Arctic; studying of influence on health of the population of harmful environmental factors, development of requirements on health care of the population and polar explorers, substantiation of a set of actions directed on improvement of the inhabitants of the population and diseases prevention.”927 The document also fixed the actions necessary to justify the application concerning the external boundary of the Russian Arctic zone. By 2020, when the deadline for the document came up, there was no data on the extent to which the task set out in the document had been accomplished. In the official Russian document the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035”928 a lot of attention is paid to the development of science and technology. In particular, it fixes “increasing activities on basic and applied research in priority areas of scientific and technological development, as well as the implementation of comprehensive expeditionary research in the Arctic.”929 Moreover, the document set a task to “develop and implement technologies that are critically important for the development of the Arctic.” Thus, the document continues to guarantee the continuity of the tasks formulated earlier. Profound scientific research in the Arctic, and even more so, commercial production of hydrocarbons, was impossible without appropriate equipment at the beginning of the 21st century. Russia had a developed geophysical fleet, provided with modern equipment of foreign production, which allowed it to conduct mainly 2D seismic surveys and only in some cases, also 3D. At the same time, the Soviet research fleet which had been passed to Russia, gradually exhausted its resources. The vessel Akademik Fedorov became obsolete and of little use for work. In 2005 and 2007, the research vessel Akademik Fedorov conducted work to collect data needed to clarify the boundaries of the Russian shelf in the Arctic Ocean. In 2008, the Director of the Institute of Geography of 927

Ibid. The paper was signed by the Russian President on March 5, 2020. 929 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035’.” 928

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the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician Vladimir M. Kotlyakov said “there is already a decision to allocate funds for the construction of an icebreaking class of research vessel of the most advanced level.”930 However, the design and building of such ships took a long time, during which other Arctic countries could get certain advantages in the study of the Arctic. In 2010, Academik Fedorov again went on an expedition to study the shelf near the Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Rise.931 According to Lev Merklin, an expert of the Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “this vessel will mainly perform bathymetric surveys of the required areas using multi-beam echo sounder. The research operation will provide greater completeness to our application, but it will most likely not be enough to prove the validity of Russia’s claims to these areas of the Arctic shelf.”932 The scientist also drew attention to the fact that “so far, no country can get unequivocal evidence in the Arctic. More or less grounded data can only provide deep-sea drilling, when it is possible to lift samples of rocks whose composition will confirm that the crust is an extension of the continental shelf.”933 Moreover, Merklin believed that “our next application, as well as the Canadian one, will again be criticized by the UN and new recommendations will be made to collect additional information.”934 One of the interests of oil companies in prospecting and developing the Arctic stems from the fact that they need a comprehensive approach to the assessment of their activities on the environment in the region. For this reason, the largest Russian oil company Rosneft, established its own Arctic research center. Since 2012, this center has been working closely with scientific institutions and organizations to study the hydrometeorological, ice, engineering and geological conditions in its license areas for exploratory drilling. This primarily concerned the Kara Sea. Every year Rosneft by support of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute operates ships of various classes, unmanned aerial vehicles, submarine and surface autonomous stations, surveillance systems, descending submersibles for the investigation of hydrological and meteorological conditions of the Kara Sea, and a comprehensive analysis of ice conditions there. Three autonomous weather stations were installed on the 930

Ibid. “The vessel ‘Academk Fyodorov’ is completing its expedition to substantiate the continental shelf of the Russian Federation,” Interfax, accessed August 7, 2020. https://www. interfax.ru/russia/159582. 932 Evgeny Grigoriev, “Arctic shelf of contention,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 3, 2010. 933 Ibid. 934 Ibid. 931

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eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, transmitting data on weather conditions in the western part of the Arctic. The expeditions “Kara-Zima,” “Kara-Leto” and “Chukotka-Leto” were arranged, which are held not only in cold but also in warm seasons. Research works in the winter season are necessary to determine the ice phases, physical and chemical properties of ice, as well as weather and water masses’ conditions. In 2014, the drift of ice formations and icebergs of the Northern Earth was studied for the first time by installing autonomous buoys on them. During this expedition, researchers conducted ice engineering surveys, and a number of ice and meteorological measurements at 35 stations in the water areas of the Laptev, Kara, East Siberian and Chukchi seas, as well as in the archipelagoes located there.935 “In addition to solving applied tasks important for the company Rosneft, the expeditions have made an invaluable contribution to the complex scientific exploration of the Arctic: the data they received allowed for a better understanding of the mechanisms of global study of climate and the functioning of unique Arctic environmental systems.”936 Thus, the process of developing the hydrocarbon base of the Arctic shelf is closely connected to scientific work, which at first glance, is not associated with oil and gas production. During the unique expedition “Sevmorgeo” in 2012 to prove that the underwater ridge of Lomonosov and Mendeleev are the continuation of the Russian continental shelf the key research operation was carried out by the nuclear deep-water stations of the project 10831 “Losharik” and their carrier BS-136.937 Due to limited budget financing Russia could not to fully organize complex expeditions and use ships for continental shelf research. As noted by Lev Merklin, “one seismic slip costs 5 million dollars. The hour of its work in the ocean is up to 50 thousand dollars. Particular calculation may reach 2 thousand dollars. For example, the results of a seismic survey of our northern shelves will cost USD 24 million.”938 In 2019, Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Russian Academy of Sciences began to develop an automated system of under-ice sensing – an autonomous ice station for monitoring the marine environment, meteorological Pavel Orlov, “Rosneft conducted exploration in ice,” Pro-Arctic.ru, accessed June 17, 2020. https://pro-arctic.ru/26/06/2014/press/9249. 936 Elena Krauzova, “The cold calculation,” Kommersant. Review “the Arctic,” April 7, 2015. 937 In official statements of the Russian Ministry of Defense the submarines were called research submarines or NIPL. 938 Pavel Orlov, “The lower space,” Ogonek, October 1, 2020. 935

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conditions, and the prevention of natural and man-made disasters in the Arctic. “The station should automatically measure vertical profiles of water velocity, temperature and salinity, as well as ice thickness during a long polar night. Monitoring data obtained via satellite channel can be used to prepare diagnostic and prognostic materials. It firstly concerns hydrometeorological service of marine activities, and is necessary for scientific research and prediction of the Arctic Ocean natural environment.”939 According to the Head of the Ocean Acoustics Laboratory of the Institute Alexander Ostrovsky, “stations can be utilized for observing natural and anthropogenic anomalies, prevention of natural and man-made disasters.”940 He further stressed that “this system will become a prototype of Russian drifting oceanological ice stations, which will provide operational monitoring of the state of the marine environment of the Arctic water areas, including the Northern Sea Route, for environmentally sustainable development of the region.”941 In addition, there is research work on creating maps with anomalous zones942 located in the Arctic regions. In 2020, a project to build a modern Arctic polar station “Snezhinka” was announced. According to the project, the station will be set up in the north of Yamal and put it into operation in 2022. “Snezhinka” should serve for testing new modern technologies developed at Russian enterprises for further application in the Far North. It is planned to install solar panels and devices, windmills at the station. This should allow receiving electricity with zero environmental pollution. Management at the station should be carried out using technologies of artificial intelligence. Moreover, new technological solutions will be tested in the field of telecommunications, medicine, agro-industrial complex, 3D-printing, which can be applied in the Polar Region in the future. In the same year, the vessel of project 00903 - the ice-resistant selfpropelled platform “North Pole" was launched from the slipway of the shipbuilder “Admiralty Shipyards” (St. Petersburg).943 Its commissioning in 2022 will allow Russia to consolidate its priority in conducting comprehensive scientific research in the Arctic.

“Russian scientists will develop an autonomous station to monitor the ice situation in the Arctic,” TASS-Nauka, accessed June 24, 2020. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/6441291. 940 Ibid. 941 Ibid. 942 Anomalous zones are understood to be zones where warm and cold water masses are mixed in certain areas. The result is the phenomenon of internal waves. Their appearance is typical for continental ocean margins with depth differences, with pronounced tidal and tidal processes. 943 “The unique ice-resistant platform ‘North Pole’ was launched,” National Association of Oil and Gas Service, accessed January 12, 2021. https://nangs.org/news/technologies/na-voduspushtena-unikalynaya-ledostoykaya-platforma-severnyy-polyus. 939

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In September 2020, Yury Trutnev, chairman of the State Commission on the Development of the Arctic, held a meeting on the organization of scientific research in the Arctic.944 The meeting addressed the issue of improving the efficiency of research works, so that they become competitive. To do this, it was proposed to form the Arctic Research Council under the State Commission. The Council should ensure coordination of federal executive authorities and scientific organizations, and assist to shape the research agenda on the Arctic topic. The Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District in 2021 should begin construction of a year-round autonomous Arctic station of a new generation. Its building will be supplied with energy, received from renewable sources, first of all, from wind generators. In the summer period it should use solar panels. The station’s building should be heated with the help of hydrogen produced through electrolysis. The station should conduct scientific research on ecology and climate change in the Arctic Council’s member states. Both the U.S.-Canadian and Russian Arctic expeditions – conducted practically parallel to each other – should have been considered as a preparatory stage for the industrial development of Arctic deposits. So far, none of these research projects failed to give an answer about the geological structure of the Arctic Ocean floor. Objective data may be obtained only during deep-water drilling after studying the raised rock samples. Their analysis may show whether the Arctic shelf is an extension of the continental shelf or not. Such drilling requires a fundamentally different scale of financing and equipment, which none of the countries had at that time. Given the different interests of the Arctic countries, it was difficult to find a compromise, and the most realistic option seems to be to reach bilateral agreements. Commenting on this, Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the International Polar Year Eduard Sarukhanian admitted that “research and challenges unite us, and the question ‘how shall we share them?’ only divides us.”945 Nevertheless, there are some international documents fixing a significant role of scientific operations. For example, the Kiruna Declaration of the 8th Ministerial Session of the Arctic Council, as well as The Vision for the Arctic released by the body’s Secretariat in 2013 emphasized the need for cooperation

“Yury Trutnev held a meeting on the organization of research and development in the Arctic zone,” Government of the Russian Federation, accessed December 25, 2020. http://government.ru/news/40437/. 945 Natatia Skurenok, “On ice edge,” Vremya Novostey, July 9, 2008. 944

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in research and monitoring of biodiversity, development of contingency plans for emergency situations, as well as finding solutions to climate change.946

8.4. SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS OF NON-ARCTIC STATES Non-Arctic states also have their interests in Arctic development.947 Since recently, China, India and Japan have actively arranged expeditions to assess the potential of the Arctic spaces. For instance, China more than once sent to the North Pole its icebreaker Xue Long and launched a research station on Spitsbergen. In mid-2012, another international expedition on board the Xue Long worked. According to an official of the State Oceanic Administration of China, Liu Bin, “China is ready to intensify cooperation with other countries, including Canada and Iceland.”948 There is a lot of evidence that the country is preparing for the Arctic race. Particularly, it has already developed a program to create high-powered icebreakers for polar expeditions.949 Scientific and research stations were also opened by India, China, Sweden, and Germany. Their research operations focus on the issues of studying the impact of continental runoff from the catchment area (this is about 60 percent of the Russian Arctic rivers) on the Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea; assessment of changes in the Arctic ecosystems under the influence of present climate trends; monitoring and research of the state of radioactive waste disposal. In general, scientific research in the Arctic unites the following Arcticrelated directions. Firstly, the works relate to the geology of the shelf and climate change, aquatic bioresources and thawing permafrost. Furthermore, a lot of attention is paid to social research aimed at studying biodiversity, protecting Arctic nature, expanding protected areas and national parks, and improving the lives of indigenous peoples of the North. These issues have become a center of intersection of national interests of both Arctic and nonArctic states. “Kiruna Declaration. Kiruna, Sweden, 15 May 2013,” Arctic Council Secretariat, accessed June 18, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/documents/10180/1335229/2013-05-15+Kiruna+Declaration +Final+Signed.pdf/084614d7-349a-4aee-aa98-169a1d6ef9d4. 947 Robert Slater, Seizing Power. The Grab for Global Oil Wealth (Moscow: Eksmo, 2011), 226227. 948 “China wants to be more active in the Arctic and Antarctica,” TASS, accessed May 25, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/581151. 949 Semyon Terentyev, The Arctic and The Antarctic (Moscow: Knigovek Publishing House, 2011), 418. 946

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It is no coincidence that scientists are interested in such a problem as permafrost. According to Ural Federal University, the depth of permafrost thawing was observed in Southern Yamal in 2020 at highest rate. Its depth was 10 cm, compared to 2 cm in previous years.950 The previously mentioned document the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035” does not ignore the high-tech and scientific sector. It implies construction and creation of its own satellite constellation for constant Earth sounding, as well as for ensuring constant observation of the latitudes above 70 degrees; construction and creation of the research fleet of Russia, by building new and domestic (Russian - authors' note) research vessels, including the erection of an ice-resistant drifting platform for the study of the Arctic. As well as the development of international cooperation in this area. Table 19. Major research bodies for Arctic Studies State Canada

Norway

United States of America

Denmark

The Russian Federation

950

Organization Canadian Polar Commission (CPC) Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (ACUNS) Canadian Polar Information Network (CPIN) Canadian network ArcticNet Canadian Northern Studies Trust (CNST) Canadian Network of Northern Research Operators (CNNRO) Norwegian National Committee on Polar Research, the Research Council of Norway (NNCPR) Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI) National Fisheries Institute (NFI) Norwegian Meteorological Institute (NMI) Svalbard Science Forum (SSF) U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS) National Academies' Polar Research Board Centre for Polar Studies (CPS) Center for Permafrost at Copenhagen University (CENPERM) Arctic Research Centre at Aarhus University Greenland Institute of Natural Resources (GINR) The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Hydrometeorological Research Center of Russian Federation N.N. Zubov State Oceanographic Institute

“Scientists have recorded the highest level of permafrost thawing in the Arctic,” TASS-Nauka, accessed November 28, 2020. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/9472691

Scientific Research in the Arctic State

Finland

Sweden Austria The UK Germany Switzerland

The Netherlands France Japan South Korea India Poland China Czech Republic

Organization All-Russia Research Institute of Hydrometeorological Information - World Data Centre (RIHMI-WDC) Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) The Academy of Finland Finnish National Committee of Arctic and Antarctic Research Finnish Forest Research Institutes (METLA), and since 2015 MELTA is as part of the Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE) Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) Swedish Polar Research Secretariat Austrian Polar Research Institute (APRI) Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) Swiss Polar Institute (SPI) International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) The Swiss Committee on Polar and High Altitude Research (SKPH) The Arctic Centre at University of Groningen (ACUG) The French Polar Institute Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV) National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) Arctic Environment Research Center (AERC) Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI) National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) Committee on Polar Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences (CPR PAS) Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) Center for Polar Ecology (CPE)

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THE SILENT ARCTIC STARTED SPEAKING 9.1. RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC The development of the Arctic in the 20th century, and namely its island and maritime spaces and coastal areas took place without consideration of the environmental factor. Only since the beginning of hydrocarbon field development and the use of the Arctic for military purposes, attention to the environment increased. So, after the discovery of an oil field in Cook Bay in 1950, the Alaskan economy was mainly based on oil production. The funds from its sale made up a large part of the state budget revenues. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) classifies the Arctic as a region of the planet that under no circumstances should oil pollution be at risk due to its special natural value and vulnerability.951 At present, no oilfield operator can absolutely guarantee that there would be no oil spills. In this context, we should mention the collapse of the tanker Exxon Valdez in the area of the southern coast of Alaska in March 1989. 952 951

952

“Oil Spill Response Challenges in Arctic Waters,” WWF International Arctic Programme, accessed September 24, 2020. https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/ nuka_oil_spill_response_report_final_jan_08.pdf. Robert Slater describes in his book Seizing Power: The Grab for Global Oil Wealth, the accident: “On March 23, 1989, at 21:00 a.m. the tanker “Exxon Valdez'' set sail from the oil terminal of Trans-Alaska pipeline. Pilot William Murphy led the ship through the narrow spaces of the Valdez passage along with Captain Joe Hazelwood and Helmsman Harry Claar. When the narrowings were left behind, Captain Hazelwood took the helm. However, icebergs appeared in the ship’s path and he ordered Claar to temporarily deviate from the course to avoid the obstacle. Hazelwood then gave the control to his third assistant Gregory Casins. After that, for unexplained reasons, Claar was replaced by Robert Kagan as helmsman, and together with Casins, they could not manage to take the ship on its original course. As a result,

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About 245 thousand barrels of oil was spilled in Prince William Bay. Because of the accident more than 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 seals and 250 eagles died.953 The cleaning works cost Exxon over 2 billion dollars.954 Of these, 100 million dollars was spent on hospitalization of birds and animals alone. Volumes of salmon deaths were not specified at all. After the accident, the United States passed the “Oil Pollution Act-90.”955 Under the act, the owner of the tanker must contribute about 1 billion dollars to the federal insurance fund to eliminate the consequences of a possible accident. In addition, the case forced the U.S. Congress to impose a ban on offshore oil production. In 1990, President George H. W. Bush supported the decision of the Congress by his decree.956

9.2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENT The Exxon Valdez oil spill drew the attention of European countries to environmental problems, primarily due to the threat of irreparable damage in the development of oil and gas fields.

the tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef at 12 p.m. on March 24. At this time Captain Hazelwood was in his cabin. The liquidation of the oil spill required more equipment, people and time than all other leaks in U.S. history. From April to September 1989 more than 11 thousand workers, 1400 ships and 85 aircraft were involved. Over the next two years, remediation work continued. However, it was carried out only in the summer months, and in winter, the condition of the coastline was simply monitored. 953 Vladimir Bogdanov, “Alaska is covered in oil,” Rossijskaya Gazeta, March 16, 2006. 954 Andrey Grigoriev, Alexey Knizhnikov and Ksenia Pahorukova, The People, oil, birds. Overview of the World Experience of Bird Rescue in Oil Pollution, ed. by K. Pahorukova (Moscow: World Wildlife Fund WWF, 2014), 4. 955 “Public Law 101-380-Aug. 18, 1990 (Oil Pollution Act of 1990),” accessed September 12, 2020. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-104/pdf/STATUTE-104-Pg484.pdf. 956 “Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 1990. August 18,” The American Presidency Projects, accessed August 23, 2020. https://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-oil-pollution-act-1990.

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Table 20. Possible environmental risks due to the extraction of hydrocarbon resources on the Arctic shelf957 Type of activity/Environmental risk Well drilling Emergency oil spills Combustion of associated petroleum gas Greenhouse gas emissions Emissions of non-methane volatile organic hydrocarbons because of evaporation of crude oil during storage or transshipment to terminals Prolonged exploitation of the fields Tanker transportation of hydrocarbons Transportation by pipeline system Accidents on offshore platforms

Possible consequences Release of pollutants into the atmosphere and marine environment, formation water discharges Flush blowouts of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons from the well during drilling Formation of thin unstable films on the sea surface around platforms Climate change because of the emission of large amounts of greenhouse gases such as CO2 and CH4, as well as NOx Growing of ozone concentrations in the ground layer can harm human health, vegetation, and buildings

Substantial increase in the level of seismological hazard of the region due to subsidence of rocks over vast areas Spills during loading and unloading operations and bunkering operations, in emergency situations Spills due to accidents Environmental disaster involving loss of life, marine pollution, destruction of marine and coastal flora and fauna

In recent years, environmental pollution risks have increased dramatically because of accidents on drilling rigs. In 2007, WWF commissioned the report Oil Spills Response Challenges in Arctic Waters.958 It was first presented in January 2008 at an international conference on the Arctic in Tromsø, Norway. According to the paper, the only way to avoid the severe consequences of oil spills in the Arctic is to suspend the development of new offshore hydrocarbon fields until effective mechanisms to respond to spills in ice seas are developed and tested.959 However, despite all warnings from environmentalists, individual countries and oil and gas companies continued their policy. In September 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to lift the ban on oil production on the American shelf, including the Arctic reserve in Alaska.960 Alexei Fadeev, “International environmental cooperation in the Arctic,” in The Arctic region: Problems of international cooperation. Russian Council on International Affairs, ed. I.S. Ivanov (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2013), 296-309. 958 “Oil Spill Response Challenges in Arctic Waters.” 959 Ibid. 960 “Bush authorized oil production on the U.S. continental shelf,” Newsru.com, accessed November 24, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/world/14jul2008/oil.html. 957

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In the same year, the issues of climate change and its consequences for European security were discussed at the EU summit. Brussels called on European governments to coordinate their actions in an era of energy conflicts, while global warming has the potential to provoke a dangerous confrontation between Russia and the West that challenge the vast mineral wealth of the Arctic.961 As Frances Binchke, an expert from the U.S. Presidential National Offshore Drilling Commission, said that based on the results of the commission’s research, it is recommended “to abandon hydrocarbon production plans in the Arctic, as companies are unable to ensure environmental safety in offshore oil production.”962 Particularly, it concerned the production on the shelf of the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea. A similar position expressed British parliamentarians. They proposed to introduce unlimited financial responsibility for mining companies in case of accidents and to create an Arctic reserve. Such a statement was prompted by the Committee for Environmental Protection. According to its conclusion, oil spills could cause irreparable damage to the Arctic nature.963 In this context, an expert on the Arctic at Cambridge University Peter Wadhams pointed out that “if an oil spill is not eliminated before winter, the next attempt can be made only in summer, and before that the spilled oil and gas will be under the ice.”964 In the summer of 2010, when it became clear that the catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico went beyond a major accident,965 WWF called for a moratorium on drilling in the Arctic seas, where production must occur in extreme severe environmental settings. Commenting on this, Head of the WWF Marine Program Konstantin Zgurovsky stressed, “there are no ways to combat oil spills in the harsh Arctic climate.966 Environmentalists demanded absolute guarantee of environmental safety when extracting hydrocarbon resources. Yet, such a demand was quite difficult to implement in practice, and even more so in the Arctic. There can be no Andrei Terekhov, “A very cold war for energy resources,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2008. March 11, 2008. 962 “Experts call on the US to postpone Arctic shelf drilling for 5 years,” B-Port.com, accessed April 26, 2020. https://b-port.com/news/75239. 963 “The British Parliament is concerned about oil spills in the Arctic,” B-Port.com, accessed April 29, 2020. https://b-port.com/news/88289. 964 Ibid. 965 Sergey Zhiltsov, Andrey Kostyanoy and Igor Zonn, “Does the Caspian Sea await the fate of the Gulf of Mexico?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 9, 2010. 966 “Norway seeks to hurry hydrocarbon development in the Arctic,” Fishretail, accessed March 19, 2020. https://fishretail.ru/news/norvegiya-forsiruet-razrabotku-uglevodorodov-v-arktike280629. 961

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competition between oil and gas companies when dealing with oil spill cleanup. On the contrary, cooperation is required. That is why after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico 4 global companies: ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and the British-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell began to work out a system to eliminate oil spills in the development of deep-sea areas. They planned to spend 1 billion dollars to develop the latest spill control technologies.967 Besides, the companies also tried to provide the U.S. Government with additional environmental security guarantees. As the developers of the new system believed, it was to operate at a depth of up to 3,000 meters. This was twice the depth at which oil spilled in the Gulf of Mexico.968 Canada was one of the first countries to respond to calls from environmentalists. Canada’s National Energy Council969 has revised the rules for Arctic shelf drilling,970 requiring energy companies to have an emergency plan.971 The new rules provided for the closure of a well within one drilling season.972 It is noteworthy that the Canadian authorities showed concern on this issue, as at the end of 2011 no drilling was being carried out in the Canadian part of the Arctic shelf. At a meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2011 in Nuuk, Greenland, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the next step would be a drafting of a document on preventing oil spills in the Arctic. This directly correlated with the initiative of the Russian president, which was put forward after the case in the Gulf of Mexico to develop international norms as much as possible to prevent such disasters and regulate the obligations of countries to eliminate their consequences.973 Participants in the 10th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in September 2012 in Iceland drew attention to the fact that the production of hydrocarbons in the Arctic should be conducted in consultation “The oil giants will spend 1 billion on the oil spill response system in the Gulf of Mexico leakeage repair system,” Forbes, accessed March 17, 2020. https://www.forbes.ru/ news/53383-neftyanye-giganty-potratyat-1-mlrd-na-sistemu-likvidatsii-utechek-vmeksikanskom-zalive. 968 Ibid. 969 The council is an independent federal agency established in 1959 to regulate international and interprovincial aspects of the oil, gas and electric utility industries. 970 “Canada unveils Arctic drilling rules,” Phys.org, accessed June 23, 2020. https://phys. org/news/2011-12-canada-unveils-arctic-drilling.html. 971 “Canada has published the rules of drilling on the Arctic shelf,” Rosinvest, accessed June 24, 2020. http://rosinvest.com/novosti/886531. 972 Edward Welsch, “Canada Releases Rules for Offshore-Arctic Drilling,” The Wall Street Journal, accessed May 15, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB1000142 4052970204026804577100762112504738. 973 Vladislav Vorobyov, “The stumbling iceberg,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 13, 2011. 967

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with scientists.974 The similar opinion was expressed by participants in the annual environmental workshop in October in the Norwegian national park Svanhovd. According to Thor Christian Andvik, Project Manager for the Barents region INSTOK, “the development of appropriate technologies is particularly important in vulnerable Arctic regions.”975 The British Environmental Audit Committee called on specialists to assess the environmental safety of Arctic policy of the states and to consider the possible consequences of this process for the country’s economy, politics and energy security.976 At the same time, British expert Joan Walley said that “it is necessary to understand whether safe production of hydrocarbons in this remote region is possible at all.”977 The lack of scientific ground and the inability of companies to prevent accidents during the development of fields on the sea shelves has caused the largest accident in the last decade, which occurred in late March 2012 at the oil and gas production platform Elgin off the coast of Scotland in the North Sea.978 After the catastrophe, a huge cloud of poisonous and explosive gas containing hydrogen sulfide was formed above the platform.979 The World Wildlife Fund warned about possible ecosystem collapse in the whole region. Environmentalists estimate that the accident could have disrupted the ecological system of the entire North Sea. At that time, a marine protection expert Stefan Lutter reported, “if the gas leak continues for a long time, as the experts fear, dead zones may appear in the area of the accident, which will adversely affect the whole ecosystem of the North Sea.” The accident at the Elgin platform was another proof that wells at great depths in the sea could not be fully controlled.980 Over the past 35 years, there have been about 60 major accidents in the world during the production of hydrocarbons on the shelf. The table below is

“Oil production in the Arctic should be carried out in agreement with scientists,” Neft Kapital, accessed May 23, 2020. https://oilcapital.ru/news/upstream/18-09-2012/dobycha-nefti-varktike-dolzhna-vestis-po-soglasova-niyu-s-uchenymi. 975 Elena Shmeleva, “Arctic is sober,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 30, 2012. 976 “British experts will discuss the safety of drilling on the Arctic shelf,” RIA-Novosti, accessed April 17, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120111/536949548.html. 977 Ibid. 978 The platform belongs to French concern Total. 979 To avoid an explosion on the platform was cut off electricity and evacuated 238 people. Work on the nearby Franklin and West Franklin platforms has also been suspended. 980 Yuriy Paniev, “In the North Sea smells of hydrogen sulfide,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 29, 2012. 974

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based on WWF’s records of the largest accidents on offshore platforms and wells:981 Table 21. Major accidents on offshore platforms and wells Year

Oil spill location

Oil spill volume

The platform or well

1969

Near the city of Santa Barbara, Southern California The North Sea

80 thousand barrels

The Union Oil Alpha platform

202 thousand barrels 3.3 million barrels 200 thousand barrels 100 thousand barrels 780 thousand m3 About 10 million m3

The Ekofisk Bravo platform Sedco, the Ixtoc 1 well

8 days

The Funiwa No. 5 well

14 days

The Hasbah No. 6 well

8 days

The Macondo prospect The Elgin platform

90 days 50 days

1977 1979 1980

The Bay of Campeche of the Gulf Mexico Niger River

1980

Persian Gulf

2010 2012

The Gulf of Mexico The North Sea

Pollution period 11 days

90 days

9.3. THE ECOLOGIZATION OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE ARCTIC Modern Russia began to pay close attention to its environmental policy in the middle of 1990. In 1996, the Center for Environmental Policy of Russia (CREP) commissioned an analytical review “Russian Arctic: On the Brink of Catastrophe.” 982 Its key message was about the fact that Russian Arctic was on the verge of an environmental disaster, and some of its territories had already entered this catastrophic state.983 When the Soviet Union conducted a nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic territories had for many years excluded the possibility of developing these territories. Eventually, it caused radioactive contamination and led to significant changes in the state of biological resources. A further problem was the appearance of artificial radioisotopes in the Russian Arctic seas from such Sergey Kulikov, “Ecologists took up oil production in the Arctic,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 18, 2010. 982 Russian Arctic: On the Brink of Catastrophe, ed. A. Yablokov (Мoscow: Center for Ecological Policy of Russia, 1996), 8. 983 Ibid. 981

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sources as Russian mining and chemical plants and dumping of solid and liquid radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas, and the activity of the Northern Navy and its bases, enterprises for construction and repair of nuclear submarines (submarines), the icebreaker fleet Atomflot, etc. In the Arctic, especially in its western part, since the 1950s, on islands and coastlines building of polar bases and various military facilities, weather stations and airfields required fuel, lubricants and other materials which were imported there, however, they were very rarely exported from the territories. All the instruments that would eventually become unusable were left in place and not disposed of in any way. As the geography of Arctic development expanded and equipment advanced, pollution due to the construction and organization of ports and port points, polar stations, border posts, naval and military bases increased as well. Up to 250 thousand barrels with oil products reaching 60 thousand tons,984 as well as scrap metal, coal, and broken machinery were abandoned to the Franz Josef Land. This was the case in every archipelago, on every island, and eventually the situation has led to the problem that can take many decades to solve.985 Economic activity in the region over the last 50 years made the situation even worse. According to experts of the All-Russian Research Institute for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, since 1955 the Soviet Union has sunk a total of 17,000 containers and 19 cargo ships with radioactive garbage in the Arctic Ocean, as well as 735 parts of heavy vehicles, 14 nuclear reactors, three submarines and five reactor compartments contaminated by radiation. And there is nothing to say about the mountains of metal, plastics, and other potentially environmentally hazardous materials.986 The situation has not changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. “After the air defense forces, aviation, and border guards were removed from the Arctic, piles of construction debris, scrap metal from cars, planes, and pipelines,

984

Julia Gutova, Our corner. How we will save the Arctic and all of Europe from pollution, Russkiy Reporter, no. 38, September 27 – October 4, 2012. 985 In the open Soviet press, information about radioactive contamination of Russian Arctic waters was published in the mid-1980s. The appearance of man-caused radioactive nuclide Caesium137 in the waters of the Barents, White and Kara Seas were explained by the releases of Western European radiochemical plants. 986 Maksim Mayorov, “Ecological Problems of the Russian Arctic,” Goarctic, accessed November 28, 2020. https://goarctic.ru/society/ekologicheskie-problemy-rossiyskoy-arktiki/.

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waste coal, and barrels of fuel and lubricants were left there, which immediately began to pollute the soil, lakes, and coastal ocean waters.”987 Russian policy on the assessment of environmental risks has changed gradually. In April 2010, Vladimir Putin stressed that “the level of pollution in the Arctic seas is 6 times higher than allowed norms.”988 Yuri Trutnev, acting at that time as the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, speaking at a meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on State Regulation of Environmental Protection in May 2010, referred to 194 “hot ecological spots,” which had been identified after the monitoring of the most polluted areas, and named 6 promising projects to develop technology to eliminate accumulated waste: former military bases and polar stations on the Franz Josef Land archipelago islands.989 Almost immediately after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, then President Dmitry Medvedev instructed the government to develop a bill on the protection of Russia’s seas from oil pollution.990 The draft law proposed to specify 2 terms: the first one on the “source of increased danger” in relation to ships, platforms and other facilities involved in the process of offshore hydrocarbon production and the second one – concerning the owner of these objects. The draft called for stimulating “progressive technical solutions” in the field of oil transportation, including meeting the requirements of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78). Yet, by the end of 2011, the law had not been adopted. The document, if adopted, would initiate a gradual transition to the use of two-hull tankers and barges not only in international trade but also in coastal navigation. In addition, requirements for seagoing vessels, ports and environmental equipment should have been unified to “ensure proper preparedness for oil spill response,” a spill prevention and response system complying with international standards should have been established, and a procedure for financing environmental measures should have been set up. The most costly measure for the business would be to create funds to compensate for oil spill response costs and to finance emergency response operations. In other words, it was suggested that the oil companies should provide funds. This 987

Ibid. Julia Mironova, “Not to become the farthest one in the North,” Vremya Novostey, April 30, 2010. 989 “Verbatim record of the meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on Improving State Regulation in the Area of Environmental Protection,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed August 18, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/133/events/7872. 990 Zonn and Zhiltsov, “Arctic oil and gas front.” 988

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conceptual idea was presented by Dmitry Medvedev at the summit of the G20 in Toronto, Canada, in June 2010.991 Expanding access to the Arctic Ocean raised the issue of Arctic border security in a new way, especially given Russia’s Siberian rivers flowing deep into Russian territory. It was primarily the Ob, Yenisei and Lena rivers, which play an important role in the transport infrastructure in the north of the country. In June 2010, the Russian Government approved measures aimed at reducing and preventing negative impact on the environment of the Russian Arctic zone. The package provided for the establishment and development of the multipurpose space system “Arktika” to monitor the Russian Arctic. The implementation period was scheduled for 2010-2016, and studies of hazardous and extreme events in the Arctic areas of the World Ocean – for 2010-2012.992 Additionally, the authorities proposed to conduct individual monitoring of organizations located in the Arctic zone. At the same time, acting as Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin visited the Arctic islands and put forward the idea of an expedition that would assess the extent of the pollution of Russian territories and then begin to eliminate environmental damage. At the First Arctic International Forum “The Arctic – A Territory of Dialogue,” held in Moscow in 2010, Putin said, “we plan to conduct a permanent general cleaning up of our Arctic territories. In the literal sense – to clean up those landfills, which for decades accumulated around the Arctic cities and towns, fields, military bases, ports and airfields, in the tundra, islands and water areas of the Arctic Ocean.”993 By the end of 2011, an action plan for the elimination of environmental damage on Franz Josef Land and the Spitsbergen Archipelago as well as corresponding measures to reduce environmental threats due to the expansion of economic activities on the continental shelf was developed. Parliament adopted the bill “On the Protection of the Seas from Oil Pollution” in the first reading, which was “to put an end to speculation about the great prospects for oil production on the Arctic shelf.”994 Environmental security issues were discussed at a meeting of the Russian Security Council in April 2012 in Murmansk. Two months later, before the planned drilling in the Pechora Sea from the Prirazlomnaya platform, Dmitry Vladimir Kuzmin, “Where to go,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 29, 2010. Kulikov. 993 “Putin called for a general clean-up in the Arctic,” Vesti.ru, accessed June 28, 2020. https://www.vesti.ru/article/2035628. 994 “The law on protection of seas from oil pollution came into force,” RIA-Novosti, accessed April 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20130701/946706914.html. 991 992

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Medvedev again addressed the topic of environmental safety of hydrocarbon production in the Arctic at the Presidium of the State Council for Environmental Safety.995 He instructed the government to ensure mandatory environmental safety during oil exploration and production, as well as to conduct oil production in ice conditions only if the company has a proven plan to eliminate possible oil spills. Despite the existing zero-discharge technology, which Lukoil has developed while drilling in the shallow North Caspian, Russian oil companies, after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico, have revised the early warning of such accidents and increased their focus on creating underwater robotics. During his trip to Arkhangelsk in July 2012, Vladimir Putin met with participants of the Arctic expedition to clean up garbage on the islands of Franz Josef Land. President said: “This is a momentous event for all Russia, because first of all, it confirms our growing activity in the Arctic. We are going to increase our efforts here and we will work in many areas: we will develop new fields, build infrastructure and we will strengthen our military component here. But in carrying out all these activities we will definitely strive for a balance between development and preservation of nature. Today’s event - your expedition - in fact, is starting a big new project: a general clean-up of the Arctic.”996 Putin also mentioned, “Russia is ready to increase funding for environmental programs to clean up the Arctic.”997 According to the President, 2.3 billion rubles would be spent for these purposes in the next 3 years.998 The expedition was arranged as part of the Arctic cleaning program with its primary task being to clean up the islands of the Franz Josef Land Archipelago. The project included the Russian Geographical Society, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the enterprise Sevmorgeo, and the non-profit organization Polar Research Foundation ``Polar Fund.” The expedition was served by the motorboats Polaris and Technolog Konyukhov. It deployed garbage cleaning shops with specially brought equipment. It was planned to remove from the Arctic about 60,000 barrels of fuel, more than 2,500 tons of lubricants and to eliminate 8,000 tons of scrap metal and garbage.999 “Meeting of the Presidium of the State Council on environmental safety,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed July 2, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/statecouncil/11519. 996 “Meeting with the participants of the ecological expedition to the archipelago of Franz Josef Land,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed July 11, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru /events/president/news/16082. 997 Ibid. 998 Ibid. 999 Anna Chistyakova, “President will fly to Pomorie,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 30, 2012. 995

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This operation initiated the cleaning of all the islands in the Arctic region. In 2012, the cleaning of Alexandra Land, one of the islands of the Franz Josef Land Archipelago, was carried out. According to Arthur Chilingarov, “a total of 50 thousand pieces of scrap metal were collected and sent for recycling. These are barrels made of fuel and lubricants, all-terrain vehicles and other equipment that came into disrepair. Before the program began, the island was practically strewn with this Soviet-era heritage.”1000 Despite all the measures taken by oil and gas companies to reduce the negative impact on the environment, environmentalists conducted their campaigns. In August 2012, Greenpeace landed its members on a platform operated by Gazprom Neft Shelf.1001 Earlier, the “green” activists had organized a press conference to call on the company to abandon oil projects in the Arctic. They claimed that the Prirazlomnaya operator had no oil spill response plan,1002 and remembered that if a spill occurred, an area of more than 140,000 km2 of water might be in the zone of possible contamination.1003 In order to improve environmental safety, ecologists proposed to transport oil from Prirazlomnaya not by tankers but through a pipeline that could be laid to the terminal in the settlement Varandey. This initiative was put forward at the conference “Eco Pechora – 2012” by Alexey Knizhnikov, Head of Environmental Policy Program in the fuel and energy complex at WWF Russia.1004 In August 2013, Greenpeace activists again landed at Prirazlomnaya and called for a moratorium on exploratory and industrial oil drilling in the Arctic.1005 Environmental issues have constantly remained in the focus of attention of the Russian leadership. In 2015, a regional environmental center of the Northern Fleet was to join the monitoring of the environmental situation in the Arctic zone of Russia. This was due to the development of the Northern Fleet's infrastructure in the Arctic, which required increased attention to environmental issues. Anastasia Gnedinskaya, “About 50 thousand pieces of scrap metal were taken away,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, 24 July, 2013. 1001 “Greenpeace landed on Gazprom’s oil platform in the Arctic,” Newsru.com, accessed August 26, 2020. https://www.newsru.com/russia/24aug2012/greenpeace.html. 1002 Ibid. 1003 “Greenpeace: an oil spill on the Prirazlomnaya platform will lead to an environmental disaster,” Rosbalt, accessed August 20, 2020. https://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2012/08/14/1022503.html. 1004 “WWF offered Gazprom to build a pipeline to Prirazlomnaya,” Polit.ru, accessed September 22, 2020. https://polit.ru/news/2012/10/12/ekologia_WWF_Prirazlomnoe/. 1005 “Greenpeace failed to ‘capture’ the Prirazlomnaya platform for a peaceful action,” TASS, accessed May 13, 2020. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/678407. 1000

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9.4. THE U.S.’S DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The Deepwater Horizon accident played a special role in the perception of the impact of offshore oil and gas production. In the spring of 2010 due to the fire that caused the destruction of the Deepwater Horizon oil platform operated by BP, from the well Macondo in the Gulf of Mexico, began an uncontrollable oil release, which lasted 3 months. 1006 It took place at a depth of 1.5 km.1007 This accident became one of the largest environmental disasters related to hydrocarbon production. Despite the fact that it occurred in a subtropical climate, the case sparked heated discussions in the United States about the feasibility of drilling wells in Alaska. Such an oil spill in the Arctic could lead to much more severe consequences. All the more so because Alaska is home to polar bears, rare whale species and a number of endangered animals. Oil spills and pollution have devastating effects on birds: “sea birds spend most of their lives in the water, often in rough seas, at low temperatures of water and air. Their plumage should provide very effective protection against the penetration of water into the body. When interacting with even a small amount of oil products, the insulating properties of the plumage are deteriorated. In this case, the plumage gets wet, the weight of the bird increases, it gradually loses its ability to fly, then there are problems with buoyancy and thermal regulation. Birds are rapidly overcooling, especially in the waters of the northern seas and the Arctic.”1008 In 2010, the U.S. Minerals Management Service (US MMS) issued the paper “Arctic Oil Spill Response Research and Development Program: A Decade of Achievement.”1009 In the report, experts stressed that “crude oils and oil products behave quite differently if spilled in the Arctic environment due to the physical and chemical properties of the oil spilled.”1010 However, environmental warnings have not changed the USA’s policy. In 2010, the Administration of President Barack Obama renewed the ban on deep-

1006

The oil rig fire burned for over a day before the Deepwater Horizon sank. Of the 126 people onboard, 11 were killed and 17 were transported to trauma centers. 1007 The flow rate was about 800 tons of oil per day. 1008 “Oil Spill Response Challenges in Arctic Waters.” 1009 “Arctic Oil Spill Response Research and Development Program: A Decade of Achievement,” U.S. Department of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, accessed September 23, 2020. https://www.iucn.org/downloads/wgwap_9_inf_1_mmsarcticresearch.pdf. 1010 Ibid.

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water drilling that had been imposed after the accident on the BP platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Whereas previously it was prohibited to drill in waters deeper than 152 meter for 6 months, now “any deep-water floating facilities with the drilling possibility is prohibited.”1011 At the same time, drilling would be resumed if industry safety standards improved, which was completely new. To do so, companies had to prove that they would be able to immediately block oil spills in the event of an accident. Despite a number of accidents at offshore fields, the U.S. authorities did not refuse to prospect and develop them. In January 2012, President Obama ordered the discovery of about 75% of U.S. hydrocarbon resources in 15 new fields, 2 of which are in the Arctic.1012 This concerned Shell, which received permission to drill in the Chukchi Sea in northwestern Alaska. By that time, the oil company had already spent 7 billion dollars and 7 years trying to open up the Arctic to oil and gas drilling.1013 Three months later, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency almost immediately after the North Sea accident, confirmed the permission given to Shell, to drill offshore the Arctic Ocean.1014 Although initially the permit was issued by the Agency back in October 2011 and concerned the vessel Kulluk and the escort ships, which the company intended to operate for drilling 2 wells in 2013 in the Beaufort Sea. In connection with Shell’s activities, the U.S. The Coast Guard wanted to launch the operation “Arctic Shield 2012” to strengthen control over the Arctic Ocean.1015 As the Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Robert J. Papp said, “the start of hydrocarbon development on the shelf by Shell may add to our work to ensure environmental and other safety in the Arctic.”1016 It was about the deployment of 2 teams in the northernmost city of Alaska, Barrow, to search for and rescue those in distress in the ice. So, in August 2012, the U.S.

“The USA extended the moratorium on deep-water drilling,” Kommersant, accessed September 19, 2020. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1732599. 1012 “Obama allows drilling at more than 75% of US shelf deposits,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 7, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120125/548181250.html. 1013 “The Obama Administration allows Shell’s Arctic oil wells but drilling is still restricted,” The Guardian, accessed September 12, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/ 22/shell-arctic-oil-drilling-obama-interior-department. 1014 “Shell allowed drilling on the US Arctic shelf,” Neft Rossii, accessed July 23, 2020. http://www.oilru.com/news/311008/. 1015 Graig Collins, “Arctic Shield 2012,” Defense Media Network, accessed July 26, 2020. https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/arctic-shield-2012/. 1016 “The US Coast Guard will launch the Arctic Shield program in 2012,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 30, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120229/580766470.html. 1011

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Coast Guard planned to conduct, for the first time since 1970, oil spill response exercises for offshore drilling.1017

9.5. NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS Elimination of the consequences of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico showed that at a depth of more than 1 km due to many factors, traditional methods of well killing do not work. According to the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Protection (BSEE), James Watson, “only increased requirements for the reliability of downhole equipment can compensate for the catastrophic manifestation of human factors.”1018 For this reason, immediately after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, leading companies began developing special tools to clear the deep wellhead from debris, test the ways how to apply and deliver them to the accident site. One of the most thought-out systems, the Global Deepwater Well Cap (GDWC), worth 50 million dollars, was created by engineers of British Petroleum and Cameron in May 2012. The maximum depth of GDWC deployment was 4000 m.1019 As BP Vice President Richard Morrison said, “the GDWC system is disassembled into containers and is based at the company’s facility in Houston. In the event of an accident, the system can be delivered anywhere in the world ocean within a week. This will require 35 trailers and seven aircraft of the AN124 or Boeing 747 type. Upon arrival at the destination, the containers will be moored to the cargo helicopters and transported to the drilling platform. There, after being assembled by crane, the plug will be sent to the bottom.”1020 After the Gulf of Mexico blowout, the search for new technologies were accelerated. An emergency pyrotechnic system was set up in Shell’s technical center in the Dutch town of Noordwijk in cooperation with engineers from National Oilwell Varco. Oil and gas companies, government regulators and scientific organizations, developed their own version of the emergency plug with working pressure of

1017

Ibid. “How do you extract oil under water,” Pro-Arctic, accessed August 29, 2020. https://proarctic.ru/25/02/2016/technology/20283. 1019 Ibid. 1020 Ibid. 1018

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1055 atm. to be used in the North Sea in the Shetland Islands area at depths from 40 to 1670 m.1021

1021

Vladimir Sannikov, “The case of Macondo,” Populyarnaya mechanika, no. 10 (2012): 76-82.

Chapter 10

THE ARCTIC – THE “WEATHER KITCHEN” 10.1. ON THE ISSUE OF ICE AREA ESTIMATION Modern research is increasingly focused on the issue of climate variability and the unpredictability of climate change. Due to so-called global warming, changes in the Arctic natural environment occupy a special place in the climate studies. Not least the impact of such powerful factors as the Siberian anticyclone, the source of cold in the world, and the warm ocean current, the Gulf Stream determines the state of the climate there. Climate change has given new impetus to discussions about how this will affect both navigation in the Arctic and, in the longer term, the extraction of hydrocarbon resources. With this in mind, scientists and politicians have begun to work actively on managing hydrocarbon resources. Looking ahead, there is an urgent need to respond to rapid changes in biological systems such as transformations of marine and terrestrial ecosystems, loss of polar bear habitat, and the emergence of new species in the Arctic. Also in focus is the melting of permafrost, reduction of ice cover and expansion of Arctic shipping. All this will have an effect on industrial development and the lives of indigenous peoples. Most climate scientists agreed that at the beginning of the 21st century there was a shrinking of the Arctic’s ice cover. In recent decades, the sea ice extent has ranged from 4 to 6 million km2. In the late 1970s, the total area of Arctic ice

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was 7.5 million km2. In 2005, the area decreased to 5.5 million km2 and in 2007 – to 4.17 million km2 of ice1022. As of September 2011, the total area of ice cover fell to a record low in the history of observations – 4.2 thousand km2. That was only 160 thousand km2 more than the minimum of 2007 – 4.17 million km2. A year later, in August 2012, the record of 2007 was broken, and the area of ice in the Arctic was 4.10 million km2, and in September 2012, it fell even lower – to a new record low of 3.39 million km2, which was about 50% of the average area over the period 1979-2000.1023 According to other data, the ice area has decreased by 10-15% between 1975 and 2005.1024 The average Arctic ice area in 2015 was 4.4 million km2.1025 Nevertheless, due to global warming, the multi-year Arctic ice cover has virtually disappeared in 2018.1026 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), referring to data of U.S. National Data Center on Snow and Ice (NCSDL) reported, the area of sea ice in the Arctic in September 2020 was 3.74 million km2, 1027 and the University of Bremen, said that this area in the same period was 3.8 million km2.1028 This was above the record low level of 2012. In addition to the shrinking ice cover, melting seasons are getting longer, and in the long term, sea ice will be losing its longevity.1029 WMO further noted that “sea ice in the Arctic, which is a key indicator of climate change, has reached its minimum annual length after the summer melting season.” In this regard, the head of the NCSDL, Mark Serreze, drew attention to the fact that “the year of 2020 has confirmed the trend to reduce the Arctic ice. We are approaching the situation when the Arctic Ocean will be free of ice in seasons.”1030

“Report: Climate change impacts on the Russian Arctic: analysis and solutions. WWF Russia,” Moscow: WWF Russia, 2008), 4, accessed February 8, 2020. https://wwf.ru/upload/iblock/ d50/wwf_arctica_rus.pdf. 1023 “The area of ice in the Arctic in October doubled, exceeding 8 million km2 in 2012,” RIANovosti, accessed June 12, 2020. https://ria.ru/20121106/909680711.html. 1024 Nikolay Kondratov, “Climate of the Russian Arctic and its changes,” Russia’s Ecology: Towards Innovation, no. 13 (2016): 17-20. 1025 Maria Portnyagina and Alexander Trushin, “The Arctic is opening,” Ogonyok, September 26, 2016. 1026 “Twelve years left. The catastrophic melting of the poles,” Korrespondent.net, accessed December 12, 2019. https://korrespondent.net/tech/science/4023543-ostalos-12-letkatastrofycheskoe-taianye-poluisov. 1027 Elizaveta Isakova, “The area of sea ice in the Arctic has reached an annual minimum.” 1028 “WMO: the area of sea ice in the Arctic has significantly decreased due to warming,” TASSNauka, accessed April 4, 2020. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/9537643. 1029 “The Long Decline of Arctic Sea Ice,” NASA Earth Observatory 2021, accessed January 7, 2021. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/147746/the-long-decline-of-arctic-sea-ice. 1030 Ibid. 1022

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The German Alfred Wegener Institute also identified this dynamic: “in 2019, glaciers in Greenland lost a million tons of mass every minute. The total loss of ice mass for the year was 532 billion tons, which was a record in the history of observation.”1031 From 1980 to 2007, the Arctic ice cover has shrunk by 14%,1032 and this process continued. According to former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “the Greenland and Arctic ice sheets are melting faster than anyone expected.”1033 At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that this warming is a temporary phenomenon based on cyclical temperature change. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that this warming is a temporary phenomenon based on cyclical temperature change. A group of scientists, with the participation of researchers at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) conducted a study and identified the reasons that caused the ice in the Eurasian part of the Arctic to melt faster than in the U.S. in the 21st century. In the future, this data can be applied to predict economic activity in the region. Observations showed that “since the 2000s, the ice cover in the European Arctic has been shrinking even in winter, while in the U.S. it has been shrinking only in summer.”1034

10.2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND COASTAL RESIDENTS The warming of the climate is directly affecting residents of coastal areas of Alaska. Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) said that the settlement of Shishmaref,1035 located on the west coast of Alaska could literally move into the sea. As a result, the problem of adapting to warming becomes one of the key one for the Arctic.1036 Information about the complete liberation from the ice, which should facilitate access to hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic seas shelf encourages “Melting glaciers of Greenland in 2019 set a new record,” TASS-Nauka, accessed November 23, 2020. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/9251711. 1032 Dyer, 310. 1033 Shestakov, “Cold NATO.” 1034 “Scientists have found reasons for different ice melt rates in the Eurasian and U.S. Arctic,” TASS-Nauka, accessed February 2, 2021. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/6371113. 1035 The settlement became its name in honor of Russian round-the-world navigator, Rear Admiral Shishmarev Gleb Semenovich (1781-1835). 1036 According to the terminology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), adaptation is defined as ‘the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects.” 1031

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many countries to ignore environmental issues. In 2004, the Arctic Council prepared a fundamental report, the “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.” According to the paper, climate change in the Arctic is occurring at a faster rate, and the consequences there will be most serious.1037 In October 2020, President Putin said, “due to global warming compressed polar ice caps and melting of permafrost. And, as experts say, the frequency and intensity of this process will only increase in the coming decades. This is a serious challenge for the whole world, for all humanity, and of course for us, Russia, where permafrost occupies 65% of the territory. Such changes can cause irreparable damage to biodiversity, have an extremely negative impact on the economy and infrastructure, and create direct risks for people. This is very important for all of us. It concerns pipeline systems, residential complexes in permafrost and so on. If about 25% of the surface of permafrost layers, 3-4 meters, melts by 2100, then we will feel it directly and the situation may worsen. A kind of chain reaction is likely, because melting of permafrost stimulates the release of methane into the atmosphere. Its greenhouse effect is 28 times stronger than carbon dioxide. Consequently, the temperature on the planet will continue to rise, permafrost will continue to melt faster and faster, and more and more methane will be emitted, creating a spiral effect.”1038 In 2020, the magnitude of extreme temperatures was unprecedented. The Wired Agency pointed out that “Arctic extreme warming could have been caused by three factors: First, the reflectivity of the surface1039 changes as the planet heats up. Because ice is white, it reflects the sun’s rays, which allows it to remain cold in summer. If the ice in the Arctic melts, the white surface of the ocean will disappear. In turn, the darker surface will absorb more of the sun’s heat, warming the region’s waters and potentially causing a rise in temperature on land. Secondly, extreme warming correlates with the change in currents. Ocean currents usually bring warmer water from the Pacific Ocean, while colder water flows into the Arctic and Antarctica. But these currents can change, as melt ice fills the Arctic Ocean with fresh water that is less dense than salt water. Third, the lack of ice also increases the wind on the surface, accelerating the Beaufort cycle, which captures the water normally discharged into the Atlantic.

1037

Susan Joy Hassol, Impacts of a warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 140. 1038 “Meeting of the Valdai discussion club. Speech of the Russian President at the final plenary session of the 17th annual International Discussion Club Valdai. 2020. 22 October,” President of the Russian Federation, accessed October 10, 2020. http://www.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/64261. 1039 The amount of light it throws back into space.

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This acceleration mixes colder fresh water on the surface and warmer salt water on the bottom, raising the surface temperature and further melting the ice.”1040 Researchers at the University of Colorado in 2020 drew attention to the fact that “for the first time in the history of observations, the Laptev Sea remains icefree by the end of October. The climatic crisis has led to the fact that the Arctic heats up 2-3 times faster than the entire planet. Abnormal heat in Siberia in 2020 was also connected with that crisis, forest fires for the first time reached the Northern icy ocean. As a result, the water in the Laptev Sea warmed up by 5°C above normal, and the Arctic ice began to melt faster than ever before in 40 years of observation.”1041 These changes: melting permafrost, changing wildlife habitats, and new temperature regimes directly affect coastal residents, effectively forcing them to adapt to new living conditions.

10.3. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ECOLOGY Until recently, governments and oil companies have sought to demonstrate their willingness to comply with all environmental requirements and to protect nature. However, the voices of environmentalists will only be listened to until countries have access to technology that opens up reliable access to Arctic shores. This confirms the history of oil production on the shelf of other seas. Even major accidents have not yet resulted in a complete ban on offshore drilling. As previously mentioned, Nicolazzi wrote, “reserves are no longer determined by price alone, but also by policy and, if you like, by general consensus. The balance between price and environment plays a big role. Or, better said, between price and targeted costs”1042. In case of further climate warming, fishing conditions will change. In 3-4 decades, vast fishing grounds that were almost inaccessible to humans may become available. The colonization of new water areas is merely one of many changes in fish and crab behaviour. Law of the Sea expert Kamil Byakishev noted that the report of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission in 2003 stated that

Lubov Sokovikova, “Arctic heats up twice as fast as the rest of the planet,” HI-News.ru, accessed August 26, 2020. https://yandex.ru/turbo/hi-news.ru/s/research-development/ arktika-nagrevaetsya-v-dva-raza-bystree-chem-vsya-ostalnaya-chast-planety.html. 1041 “The ice in the Arctic did not freeze for the first time in history,” Atomnye Goroda, accessed July 29, 2020. http://eco.atomgoroda.ru/news/led_v_arktike_ne_stal_zamerzat_ vpervye_v_istorii. 1042 Nicolazzi, 184. 1040

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“some species of fish and sea animals move north through the Bering Strait, where it is cooler. According to the document, climate warming could revive fishing in the Arctic”1043, particularly, in the Barents Sea, but also in the areas of Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where commercial activity was at minimal level in the past. The American researchers at the Arctic Council have drawn attention to the fact that snow crabs are moving from Alaska to Russia as the ice retreats. According to the scientists, because of warming, most valuable fish stocks may completely move from U.S. territorial waters to Russian, Canadian and Danish ones, from Swedish and Icelandic ones to Norwegian and Danish ones, and so on forever1044. The melting of the polar caps will lead to geostrategic changes and new trade routes. The economic opportunities offered by this process are no less intense than the environmental consequences of global warming. The study carried out at Stanford University of Oceanology under the direction of Kevin Arrigo clearly confirmed it.1045 In June 2010, as part of the research program “Impacts of Climate on Ecosystems and Chemistry of the Arctic Pacific Environment” (ICESCAPE), the first expedition on the U.S. research icebreaker Healy began its works in the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea.1046 During U.S.’s research operations, huge spots of blooming phytoplankton with a diameter of 50 to 100 km were found under the Arctic ice, which indicates serious changes in the ecology of Arctic waters due to the increase in average summer temperatures. According to Kevin R. Arrigo, “microorganisms lived not only near the ice surface, but also at a fairly large depth – 50 meters and more. As a rule, the thicker the ice, the less light penetrates through it and the less resources are left to sustain life. They were shocked for the second time – the deeper we drilled wells in the ice, the more microorganisms we encountered in the ice thickness.” 1047 He also noted that this anomaly can be partly explained by a change in the structure of the Arctic ice.1048 In 2004, the Arctic Council issued a fundamental report “Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)”1049 The main

Ludmila Yudina, “The Arctic and the Law of the Sea,” New Tribuna, accessed January 13, 2020. http://newtribuna.ru/news/2012/11/29/22234/. 1044 Ibid. 1045 “The ICESCAPE oceanography expedition started from the Aleutian Islands,” RIA-Novosti, accessed May 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20100616/246823092.html. 1046 Ibid. 1047 “Oceanologists have found a blooming phytoplankton under the ice of the Arctic,” RIANovosti, accessed September 24, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120607/668030438.html. 1048 Ibid. 1049 https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786. 1043

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conclusion of this paper was that climate change in the Arctic is occurring at a faster rate and that the consequences here will be the most severe.1050 Climate change in the Arctic threatens the total extinction of many species. Polar bears are in the greatest danger. For hunting and resting they need ice like seals do. As the area of sea ice shrinks, the animals are forced to move to the coast, where their food supply is poorer. Péter Molnár, a wildlife biologist at the University of Alberta, pointed out that “for a population of adult males polar bears, mortality from starvation may increase from 3-6% to 28-48% if the summer season increases from 120 to 180 days. Moreover, the chances of females meeting a partner during the breeding period also depend on the area of sea ice and its fragmentation.”1051

10.4. UNSURE PREDICTIONS It is believed that the complete liberation of the Arctic from the ice should facilitate access to hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic seas shelf, and in 2005, a group of scientists from Russia, Norway and Germany, after having completed an international research project, concluded that by the end of the 21st century the Arctic Ocean would freeze only in the winter season.1052 For this comprehensive investigation on prediction of the future state of Arctic ice, they received the 1 million euro research Descarter Prize. Calculations based on global models of the future climate, in particular, the reduction of ice cover of the Arctic seas and the Arctic basin in the summer period to almost complete disappearance of ice in 40-70 years, can not be considered as a final prediction of the fate of Arctic ice. At the same time the experts stressed, “by 2035, the Arctic may for the first time completely lose permanent ice.”1053 It is projected that by 2036 there will be 0.72 million km2 of ice, and by 2050 there will be 0.6 million km2 of ice. The Arctic Ocean will be completely ice-free for the summer period by 2050.1054 With such a forecast, the Arctic 1050

Hassol, Impacts of a warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 140. “Climate change pushes polar bears to the ‘point of no return’,” RIA-Novosti, accessed June 12, 2020. https://ria.ru/20100525/238371102.html. 1052 “Scientists from Russia, Norway and Germany received an award for Arctic research,” RIANovosti, accessed May 11, 2020. https://ria.ru/20051202/42294749.html. 1053 Ibid. 1054 Alexander Schevchenko, “No hope to save?” Neftegaz.ru. Accessed December 24, 2020. https://neftegaz.ru/news/ecology/544913-uzhe-ne-spasti-letnego-lda-v-severnomledovitom-ne-stanet-uzhe-k-2050-g-i-chelovek-bolshe-ne-v-silakh/. 1051

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Ocean will become navigable everywhere except for areas near Greenland and the Canadian archipelago - only there will be some ice left. Over the next decades, winters are expected to become less cold due to an average temperature increase of several degrees. In this case, coastal areas will be free of ice for a longer time, increasing the period of navigation. Already in recent years, the shores of the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas have been cleared of ice. Access to the Arctic resources will depend on weather and ice conditions, the cover of which has been rapidly decreasing in recent years. Consequently, as the area of ice decreases, the thickness of sea ice has also continued to shrink. This was primarily true for the amount of multi-year ice1055. However, observation data for the period 1980-2011 demonstrate that the most significant decrease in ice cover in the Arctic has occurred mainly in the Laptev and Bosporus seas1056. As the climate warms, the ice cover in the Arctic will become smaller and thinner. Measured in the summer of 2019, the thickness of the sea ice cover at the North Pole was the smallest for a 41-year period1057. The conclusion is that the period of navigation in the coastal zone and on rivers will increase, and new opportunities for water transport will arise. The projected changes will have major strategic implications for trade, especially between Asia and Europe1058. Eventually, according to some forecasts, within the next few decades we should expect complete melting of ice in the summer period1059, which will increase the opportunities for navigation in the Arctic Ocean seas. Other forecasts also show that, by 2030 the Arctic Ocean will be completely ice-free, which will facilitate access to the shelf. As Peter Wadhams, Professor at the University of Cambridge, believes “perennial ice in the Arctic will completely disappear in the next 20 years and the polar area can be crossed without ice breakers. The Arctic Ocean, however, will freeze for many hundreds of years in

Alexander Danilov, Henry Alekseev and Alexander Klepikov, “The Impacts of climate change on marine activities in the Arctic,” Ice and Snow, no. 54(3) (2014): 91-99. 1056 Valentin Meleshko and Alexey Baidin, “The atmospheric climate reaction to the decrease of the ice area in the Arctic and other external impacts in the last decades,” Studies of Voeykov Main Geophysical Observatory, no. 568 (2013): 80-117. 1057 “The Arctic is melting at a record pace,” Meteonovosti, accessed December 23, 2019. https://www.meteovesti.ru/news/63711826204-arktika-taet-rekordnymi-tempami. 1058 Vladimir Selin and Vladimir Vasilyev, “The Impact of possible climate warming on economic activity in the Arctic,” The North and the Market: the Formation of an economic Order, no. 1 (2009): 27-30. 1059 Gennady Panin et al., “Assessing climate change in the Arctic in the 21st century on a combined forecast,” The Arctic: Ecology and Economics, no. 2(26), (2017): 35-52. 1055

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winter”1060. Similar estimates were made by researchers at the University of Hamburg. In their opinion, by 2050 in summer period the Arctic Ocean can be entirely free of ice1061. Thus, there is no doubt that climate change will lead to a reduction in ice cover. Nevertheless, projections for the next decade still do not provide clear estimates. While some experts believe that warming will increase the chances for navigation in the Arctic, other researchers point out that the Arctic could see a cold spell in the 2020-2030s and a shorter navigation period1062. Moreover, there are estimates that climate change will not completely free the Arctic of ice. Representatives of various scientific schools claim that ice melting in the Arctic is nothing more than the changes in cyclical fluctuations of climate over the past 400 years. Calculations based on global models of future climate cannot be regarded as a final prediction. In particular, it is a question of reducing the ice cover of the Arctic seas and the Arctic basin in summer to almost complete ice disappearance in 40-70 years. Given the two-century cyclical variation in solar energy, an alternative forecast indicates an end to present warming after 2015 and the beginning of a transition to a cold climate with increasing ice cover in the Arctic seas1063. All this leads to the conclusion that predictions based on data from the past 30 years are merely incorrect, as many questions remain open.

10.5. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SHIPPING Along with the growing interest in the NSR, increased attention is paid to the role of the icebreaker fleet and approaches to commercial resource development. Different data and forecasts cause heated discussions on many issues of further development of the Arctic, primarily related to the development of navigation. Navigation is possible from July to October, i.e., 2-4 months, when ships can walk freely and at other times it is possible to be accompanied by “The Arctic will be completely ice-free for the summer in 20 years,” RIA-Novosti, accessed November 13, 2019. https://ria.ru/20120402/614641748.html. 1061 “Geophysical Research Letters. SIMIP Community Arctic Sea Ice in CMIP6,” accessed June 5, 2020. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1029/2019GL086749. 1062 Gennady Panin et al., 35-52. 1063 Igor Erofeev and Dmitry Petrovsky Dmitry “On the conditions, state and possible directions of improvement of legislative provision of safety and activity of icebreaking fleet and Russian presence in the Arctic as a whole,” Juridical Herald, no. 3-4 (2009): 26-36. 1060

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atomic ice-breakers. For this reason, despite the reduction of the ice cover of the Arctic Ocean, in the foreseeable future the need to use the icebreaker fleet will remain. Additionally, the basis for the loading of the NSR may become export transportation of hydrocarbons produced on the Arctic shelf. According to the data of A.M. Obukhov Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “the navigation season on the Northern Sea Route in the period up to 2025 with the concentration of sea ice not exceeding 25% can last from 3 to 5 months a year, which does not significantly exceed the navigation on the NSR at present”1064. Another Russian expert Andrey Zagorsky held a similar position. According to him, “the ice cover will remain for most of the year, and even during its retreat, the concentration of ice in the water will most likely hinder navigation”1065. An alternative forecast, taking into account the two-century cyclical variation in solar energy indicated a halt to modern warming after 2015 and the transition to a cold climate with increasing ice cover of the Arctic seas.1066 The functioning of the NSR will largely depend on climate change at high latitudes. Over the past 40 years, the extent of sea ice in the Arctic has almost halved, and the period of ice-free navigation in northern seas has significantly increased. Vast open water expenses are of interest for both oil and gas businesses and fishing companies. At the same time, the number of commercial ships passing through the NSR is still in the tens, not thousands, as it was through the Suez Canal. By contrast, 18 ships passed in 2015, which is 25 thousand times less than through the Suez Canal1067. As David Feirhall noted, “the ice covering the Arctic Ocean will not disappear overnight”1068. The amount of ice in the region is constantly changing. It depends both on the season as well as on climatic changes. The two processes are interconnected. There is no accurate data that can provide a comprehensive picture of climate change and assess its effects on shipping. High degree of uncertainty in

Igor Mokhov, “Diagnostics and modelling of the Arctic climate features and its changes,” accessed February 23, 2020. http://www.ras.ru/FStorage/Download.aspx?id=469997d8f446-4316-803b-96fa72172111. 1065 Andrey Zagorsky, “The Global Outlook: the Arctic: 2019-2024,” Russian International Affairs Council: RIAC, Accessed March 18, 2020. https://russiancouncil.ru/2019-arctic. 1066 Erofeev and Petrovsky, 26-36. 1067 Igor Cheremnykh, “The Northern Sea Route and Suez Canal,” Delovye Novosti, accessed December 18, 2019. https://delonovosti.ru/analitika/3921-severnyy-morskoy-put-i-sueckiykanal.html. 1068 Fairhall, 187. 1064

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the forecasts limits the ability to implement policies aimed at the development of the Arctic, particularly the extraction of hydrocarbon resources and the use of the Arctic as a navigable transport artery. Different data and forecasts generate sharp discussions on a wide range of issues related to the further development of the Arctic. Due to its harsh and extremely cold climate, navigation along the NSR is limited. The growing interest in the NSR is reflected in the Arctic’s economic development prospects, and the hope for the launching of large-scale exploitation of the richest hydrocarbon resources. In recent years, more than 20 reinforced ice-class vessels, such as Norilsk1069, have been operating at the NSR. They can navigate without being escorted by an ice-breaker in ice of thickness up to a meter. Navigation tactics have also changed and their seasons have expanded. Dynamic Arctic fields exploitation launched the construction of the Arctic transport fleet – ice-class tankers with deadweight of 50-100 thousand tons, which will lead the transportation through the NSR to a new level. Regardless of climatic changes, the sea route in the Arctic is becoming not only the most efficient way to bring technology and technological equipment, food and other resources to the population and operating enterprises, but also a lever to ensure the independence of shipments from the political situation and a certain flexibility of Russian energy supplies to the world markets1070. Geographers from the University of California at Los Angeles have modeled conditions for shipping along the NSR route due to ice melting under two scenarios of climate warming (moderate and significant) between 2040 and 2059. That model showed that the route along the Russian coast will be open for any vessels.1071. Northwest passage will be open not so wide. However, it will be easier to pass through it in September than now.1072 As a result, the Arctic Ocean may become just an ice ocean, losing its Arctic nature. This will affect navigation, exploratory oil and gas development, life support and life activities of the indigenous peoples of the North. The enthusiasm for opening the Northern Sea Route from the ice and the possibility of extending the navigation period contrasts with the skepticism of those who believe that the warming climate and melting of the Greenland 1069

Each vessel carries up to 20,000 tons of cargo. Alexey Konovalov, “Transport infrastructure of the Russian Arctic: problems and ways of their solution,” in The Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2011), 138. 1071 Smith Laurence and Stephenson Scott, “New Trans-Arctic shipping Routes navigable by midcentury. 2013,” PNAS, accessed January 18, 2021.https://www.pnas.org/content/ pnas/110/13/E1191.full.pdf. 1072 Ibid. 1070

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glaciers will increase the number of drifting ice and icebergs, which pose a danger in case of collision. In addition, the melting of the ice starts at different times each year. For this reason, the task to make an accurate schedule of ship movements poses a challenge. According to Frederic Lasserre, a researcher at the University of Quebec Laval, “we cannot expect any substantial development of transit shipping in the foreseeable future.”1073 The information about the entire liberation of the Arctic from ice, which should facilitate access to the hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic seas shelf, will encourage a lot of the countries to ignore environmental issues. In 2004, the Arctic Council prepared a fundamental study, the “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)”1074. The main conclusion of this document was that climate change in the Arctic is occurring at a faster rate, and the consequences will be most severe1075. According to former UN Secretary General Ban Kimoon, “the ice cover of Greenland and the Arctic is melting faster than anyone has ever imagined”1076. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that this warming is a temporary phenomenon based on cyclical temperature change. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that this warming is a temporary phenomenon based on cyclical temperature change.

10.6. CLIMATE CHANGE OPENS UP ACCESS TO THE SHELF The interest of both the Arctic powers and oil and gas businesses in exploiting the subsoil of the Arctic grew exponentially as the Arctic ice cover shrank. Close attention to the issue of Arctic ice melting is directly connected with two factors. Firstly, with the prospects of access to oil and gas fields located on the Arctic seas shelf, and secondly, with new shipping routes that will save both ship passage time and fuel volumes. It is estimated that hydrocarbon production

Frederic Lasserre, “We should not expect serious development of transit shipping in the Arctic in the foreseeable future,” Nord-West.ru, accessed December 23, 2020. https://nordnews.ru/news/2013/ 04/04/?newsid=46585. 1074 “The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), 17” accessed February 23, 2020. https://acia.amap.no/. 1075 Nikolay Poroskov, “The cold world,” Vremya Novostey, accessed January 12, 2020. http://www.vremya.ru/2008/204/4/216106.html. 1076 Evgeny Shestakov, “Cold NATO,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, accessed January 16, 2009. https://rg.ru/2009/01/ 16/arktika.html. 1073

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will increase as a result of climate warming and reduced ice cover1077. Thus, some experts believe that the warming in the Arctic will increase the duration of navigation along the NSR and facilitate the exploitation of oil and gas fields on the shelf1078. In general, the positive climatic anomaly contributes to more efficient carrying out work on the shelf, i.e., prospecting and exploration, installation and operation of fixed platforms, transport operations, and pipeline laying. As the amount of ice decreases, the safety of hydrocarbon resources extraction increases1079. If the warming trend continues, offshore fields in the Kara Sea will be available. In the future, we may speak about the resources of the Arctic Ocean continental slope. That is why in recent years the problems of delimitation of economic zones between coastal states and access of other countries to the Arctic basin have become more acute1080. Gaining access to hydrocarbon deposits remains a key issue in Arctic development. In this regard, shipbuilding for offshore hydrocarbon fields development, including production of exploration and production platforms, support vessels, technical and service support facilities, gas pipelines, including ice class, are of particular relevance. The resources’ exploitation of the Arctic seas shelf and coastline is impossible without efficient transport and engineering infrastructure that can operate in extreme climate conditions. Obviously, the development of hydrocarbon deposits on the shelf and the northern areas of Western Siberia will take place using the Northern Sea Route, which is an essential part of the Arctic transport network. The freight volumes through the NSR should be steadily increasing1081. At the same time, the development of Russian Arctic shelf deposits is characterized by a large number of adverse factors, both natural and man-made nature1082. Among the greatest risks are the threat of strong ice

Boris Porfiriev et al., “The consequences of climate change on the economic growth and development of some sectors of the Russian Arctic,” Arctic: Ecology and Economy, no. 4 (28) (2017): 4-17. 1078 Vladimir Hovhannisyan, “The climatic changes as risk factors for Russian economy,” Hydrometeorological Research and Forecasts, no. 3 (2019): 161-184. 1079 “How Russia will benefit from this,” Lenta, accessed January 30, 2020. https://lenta.ru/ articles/2017/01/29/belov/. 1080 Gennady Matishov et al., Studies of Kola Science Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, no. 1 (2013): 56-71. 1081 Vladimir Selin and Elena Teretshenko, “Climate change in the Russian Arctic and hydrocarbon production and transportation problems,” The North and the Market: the Formation of an economic Order, no. 1 (2008): 114-118. 1082 Ruslan Mochalov, “The economic aspects of hydrocarbon resources development on the Russian continental shelf,” Inter Expo Geo-Siberia, no. 1 (2014): 127-132. 1077

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compression and the impact of ice on the facilities for the extraction of hydrocarbon resources. However, much will depend on the ice mass. Experts believe that the risk of strong ice compression will remain, and that heavy pressure ice ridges during the cold season will continue to hamper navigation1083. In addition, there could be severe swells in the case of broken ice1084. In the last decade, Arctic shelf mining has been constrained by a lack of technology and technical solutions. Multi-year ice up to 2 meters thick makes the development of hydrocarbon resources very difficult1085. Besides, the oil industry faces challenges such as icebergs, extreme winter temperatures and huge waves that can reach up to 30 meters. It is likely that the number of polar storms and hurricanes will grow in the coming years. This could significantly worsen the conditions for the oil industry as it could disrupt drilling, production and transportation. In addition, it will increase the risk of possible oil spills, which may result in higher than expected oil and gas development costs. Consequently, climate change will continue to have a direct impact on areas such as oil and gas production1086. A tourism boom is expected in the Arctic due to warming. Before the coronavirus pandemic, it was expected that a French excursion icebreaker would sail to the North Pole in 2021, and dozens of ships would make polar cruises by 2023. However, the pandemic led to a revision of plans to develop tourism in the Arctic.

10.7. THE IMPACT OF СLIMATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC The question of predictive estimates straight influences approaches to Arctic development. Moreover, most expectations regarding climate change are based on the assumption that technology development and opportunities will enable the commercial production of hydrocarbon resources to begin, and

Anna Nikolaeva, “A possible impact of climate change on the functioning of the Northern Sea Route, The North and the Market: the Formation of an economic Order, vol. 58, no. 2, (2018): 25-35. 1084 Alexander Danilov, Henry Alekseev and Alexander Klepikov, 91-99. 1085 Anna Nikolaeva, “Some problems of Arctic shelf hydrocarbon resources development,” The North and the Market: the Formation of an economic Order, no. 4(51), (2016): 171-178. 1086 Olga Voronkova, Yulia Semenova and Tatyana Bikezina, “The economic impacts of climate change in the Arctic,” Science and Business: Ways of Development, no. 2 (2019): 206-210. 1083

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shipping will receive a strong impetus for development1087. Due to the melting of the Arctic ice, the region is becoming “the world’s hottest real estate.” American analyst Peter Schechter wrote about this in his article.1088 The key issue is to assess climate change for the human economy and economic activity. The conducted research does not give a full understanding of the impact of these changes on the Arctic shipping industry and hydrocarbon resources production, as well as the impact on the country’s economy in general1089. Not all scientists also share the opinion that climate change, and warming in particular, will continue. Some of them believe that the coming years are likely to see a cooling in the Arctic, leading to a new reshaping of marine ecosystems and a negative impact on the maritime economy1090.

Boris Sherstyukov, “Arctic climate and new approaches to predicting climate change,” The Arctic and the North, no. 24 (2016): 39-67. 1088 Peter Schechter, “The West is losing the battle for the Arctic,” The Hill, accessed January 13, 2021. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/462155-the-west-is-losing-the-battle-forthe-arctic. 1089 Dmitry Eliseev, “The economic consequences of climate change in the Russian Arctic: infrastructure aspects,” Bulletin of the Russian New University. Series: Man and Society, no. 4 (2017): 57-61. 1090 Gennady Matishov, Jenyuk Sergey Jenyuk and Denis Moiseev, “Climate and large marine ecosystems,” Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Science, vol. 87, no. 2 (2017): 110-120. 1087

Chapter 11

ARCTIC POLICIES OF NON-ARCTIC STATES Interest of Non-Arctic states to the region began to grow in the late 1980s. The countries of Northern Europe, which are geographically closest to the Arctic, were among the first to pay attention to their Arctic policy. Concerns of European countries were due to climate change and environmental protection. In 1989, Finland proposed to hold a meeting of the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, and the United States) to discuss environmental issues. There was preparatory work in 1989-1991 which resulted in the meeting in mid-1991. During this work, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was developed.1091 The event contributed to the interest of the states that do not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean: Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. Eventually, their attention to the region was turned to scientific research. In 2010, Finland published its first Arctic strategy: Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic region.1092 In subsequent years, this document was amended, and three years later, the country adopted the revised version which outlined in detail Finland’s involvement in the Arctic region.1093

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“Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Rovaniemi, Finland, June 14, 1991,” accessed January 26, 2021. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902061. “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic region. 2010. 4 June,” accessed February 2021. https://arcticportal.org/images/stories/pdf/J0810_Finlands.pdf. “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013,” Prime Minister’s Office Publications, accessed January 29, 2021. https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/1093242/J1613_ Finland%E2%80%99s+Strategy+for+the+Arctic+Region.pdf/cf80d586-895a-4a32-8582435f60400fd2?version=1.0; “The Government’s strategy session on 27 March 2017. Action Plan for the Update of the Arctic Strategy,” Prime Minister’s Office Publications, https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/3474615/EN_Arktisen+strategian+toimenpidesuunnitelma/

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The key objectives of its policy concerned maintaining security in the Arctic, environmental protection, expansion of tourism, economic development, improvements on the infrastructure of the region, using renewable energy sources and so-called clean technologies, providing assistance for local communities, and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, especially the Sámi minority.1094 In 2015, Finland presented the report “The growth of the North.”1095 The paper introduced the concept of the “Nordic Arctic.” According to the authors, it included Norway, Sweden, and Finland. They played a key role in achieving sustainable development of the entire region. In the same year another document called “A Strategic Vision for the North: Finland's Prospects for Economic Growth in the Arctic Region (2015)”1096 was issued. In contrast to previous published documents on foreign policy and international cooperation, it dealt with the prospects of economic development in the Arctic and the role of Finland. Much attention was given to Nordic energy cooperation. Due to rapidly changing situations in the region and the world, in 2016 Finland updated its Arctic strategy.1097 The new version highlighted the increasing importance of the Arctic region in world politics. The document stressed the need for peaceful and negotiated solutions to territorial conflicts. Unlike the Strategy of 2013, the focus was given to security issues in the region. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Sweden began to give special attention to the foreign policy of the Arctic region. As a member of the “Arctic Eight,” it has no access to the Arctic Ocean, which has determined the state approach regarding the Arctic. Given that, Sweden considers itself as a country that can provide services on conducting scientific research.

0a755d6e-4b36-4533-a93b9a430d08a29e/EN_Arktisen+strategian+toimenpidesuunnitelma.pdf. 1094 ““Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013.” 1095 “Growth from the North. How can Norway, Sweden and Finland achieve sustainable growth in the Scandinavian Arctic? Report of an independent expert group. 2015,” Prime Minister’s Office Publications, accessed January 19, 2021. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/ 10616/1095776/J0415_Growth+from+the+North_net.pdf/2613b2d6-96f8-4ca1-813a658eaad7f858. 1096 “A Strategic Vision for the North. Finland’s prospects for economic growth in the Arctic region. 2015, accessed January 24, 2021. https://ek.fi/wp-content/uploads/A-StrategicVision-for-the-North.pdf. 1097 “Finland’s Arctic Strategy. 26.09.2016,” accessed January 19, 2021. https://vnk.fi/documents/ 10616/334509/Arktisen+strategian+p%C3%A4ivitys+ENG.pdf/7efd3ed1-af83-4736-b80bc00e26aebc05.

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Sweden published its Arctic strategy in 2011.1098 The document “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region” was formulated during the country’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council. As one of the priorities, the strategy ensured peace and security within the region, increasing the role of the Arctic Council, promoting the development of the EU Arctic policy. Moreover, Sweden proposed to boost cooperation between the Arctic Council and the Barents EuroArctic Council, and to expand coordination with EU programs and funds. The Strategy identified climate, environmental issues, the development of the Arctic’s economic and human potential as key points of the Swedish policy in the Arctic.1099 In general, Sweden sought to strengthen its position in the region. It is no coincidence that the document noted that the Arctic is an important region for Sweden in terms of national security, development of the region’s resources and adaptation to changing natural conditions. Following the EU policy, Sweden has paid close attention to environmental issues. At the same time, it stressed the significance of developing the Arctic resource base through elaboration of technologies and development of the icebreaker fleet. Sweden paid great attention to protecting the indigenous peoples and their adaptation to climate change. Against the backdrop of the EU’s desire to develop an Arctic strategy and assert itself as an influential player, individual European countries have been no less active in promoting their Arctic concerns. As for Sweden, it focused on its environmental policy, and in 2016, the “New Swedish environmental policy for the Arctic” was published.1100 In the document, Sweden stated the responsibility of the “Arctic Eight” with respect to the Arctic and called on countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It also advocated “developing regulatory frameworks to protect Arctic ecology and biodiversity, including beyond national jurisdiction, as well as the development of Arctic deposits and biological resources based on scientific solutions.”1101 The 2016 environmental strategy largely repeated the main ideas of the 2011 document: relying on scientific knowledge, promoting international cooperation, and caring for the region’s fragile environment. “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region. Government offices of Sweden official website. 2011,” accessed January 17, 2021. https://www.government.se/49b746/contentassets/ 85de9103bbbe4373b55eddd7f71608da/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region. 1099 Ibid. 1100 “New Swedish environmental policy for the Arctic. January 25, 2016,” accessed January 30, 2021. https://www.government.se/4901d4/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/miljodeparte mentet/ pdf/160125-environmental-policy-for-the-arctic.pdf. 1101 Ibid. 1098

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As a whole, the country of Sweden has supported the EU policy and shared the vision that activities in the Arctic must preserve the environment and be carried out with consideration of the rights of indigenous peoples. Iceland is also a member of the Arctic Council and considers itself an Arctic state as well. However, for a long time the country did not have any document reflecting the main directions of the Arctic policy. It was not until 2011 that the state paper “Iceland 2020 – Government policy statement for the economy and community. Knowledge, sustainability, and welfare”1102 was presented. Iceland’s policy was proclaimed as a foreign policy priority. After the publication, the provisions of the Arctic policy were confirmed by a Parliamentary Resolution.1103 It was adopted in 2011 and laid out the main challenges in the region. The policy’s goal was to ensure Icelandic interests in the face of climate change and environmental challenges as well as strengthen relations and cooperation with other states in the region. Iceland sees the Arctic as a region of great strategic opportunities, which in the future will contribute to the development of its economy. Thus, it is safe to say that the policies of the Arctic Council’s states with no access to the Arctic Ocean have much in common. They pay attention to the issues of preserving the Arctic nature and sustainable development of the Arctic. These countries focus on issues related to the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. They are also in favor of increased scientific research and multilateral cooperation. The implementation of these tasks is seen in the context of the overall policy of the EU. By combining the pursuit of common European interests with their own objectives, the subarctic countries expect to increase their role in the region in the future. For a long time, the non-Arctic countries did not develop any comprehensive documents on the Arctic. Germany looked at the Arctic only in 2012 by initiating its own “Arctic Dialogue,” and in 2013, the Federal Government adopted “Germany’s Arctic policy guidelines.”1104 The paper outlined the strategic importance of the region for the country and formulated

“Iceland 2020 – governmental policy statement for the economy and community. Knowledge, sustainability, welfare. 2011,” accessed January 25, 2021. https://www.government.is/ media/forsaetisraduneyti-media/media/2020/iceland2020.pdf. 1103 “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy. March 28, 2011. Government of Iceland,” accessed January 24, 2021. https://www.government.is/media/utanrikisraduneytimedia/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policyapproved-by-Althingi.pdf. 1104 “Germany’s Arctic policy guidelines. 2013. November,” accessed January 11, 2021. https://www.arctic-office.de/fileadmin/user_upload/www.arcticoffice.de/PDF_uploads/ Germanys_Arctic_policy_guidelines.pdf. 1102

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the main directions of activities. The emphasis was placed on the economic opportunities and the need for long-term, economically stable and environmentally friendly imports of hydrocarbons and raw materials. The government stressed the role of new technologies capable of working in the harsh Arctic climate, since they might provide new opportunities for German companies. The document also drew attention to the importance of fish resources of the Arctic Ocean and Germany’s desire to create conditions for stable development of biological resources. In general, Germany advocated the development of resources while respecting environmental norms and preserving biological diversity in the region. Its approaches largely coincided with the ideas of the EU policy documents. In particular, Berlin, like Brussels, placed great emphasis on research cooperation, ecosystem protection, and resource management. At the same time, Germany hoped to utilize the economic opportunities of the Arctic to strengthen its own economy. With limited mechanisms for political influence on the situation in the Arctic region, Germany hoped to apply the potential of the EU. Thus, “Germany played a major role in the process of developing the European Union’s ‘Comprehensive Arctic Policy,’ emphasizing the need to establish frameworks and behavior patterns.”1105 Since 2000, France has been a permanent observer to the Arctic Council and participates as an observer in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Paris’s interest in the Arctic was determined by the economic reasons. The country’s lack of hydrocarbon deposits has increased its interest in Arctic oil and gas fields. At the same time, it is combined with the demands to improve environmental standards. France believes that it is unlikely that hydrocarbon resources will be extracted on a commercial scale in the coming decades. Biological resources are of great importance for Paris, as “France is the largest European consumer of fish. At the same time, the main sources of imported fish are the northern seas.”1106 France also paid much attention to the impact of global warming on the environment. As other European countries, France promoted scientific research on a wide range of issues, particularly on studying biodiversity and Arctic ecosystems. In 2016 France published a document that defined the state’s Arctic policy. The roadmap named “Grand Challenge of the Arctic” which outlines the

1105 1106

Vladislav Belov, “Germany’s strategy in the Arctic,” The Arctic and North, no. 24 (2016): 100. Yuri Rubinsky, “The Arctic interests and France’s policy,” The Arctic and North, no. 24 (2016): 169.

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key directions of France’s regional policy.1107 The roadmap fixes the priority of research activities and the development of cooperation in the Arctic, as the documents of other EU countries did. Further, the paper emphasizes the communication between France and the European Union in the field of scientific research, including the Horizon 2020 program.1108 The roadmap also reflects the economic factors: the development of hydrocarbon resources, the use of transport potential, and the implementation of infrastructure projects. French policy implied the development of renewable energy sources. Besides, as a member of the EU and NATO, France declared its interest in maintaining stability and security in the region. At the same time the roadmap says that “military and defense issues are on the back burner, as economic and environmental issues are of primary interest. First of all, to ensure energy security, fight against pollution and solve the legal issues of freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean.”1109 In 2016, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs published another strategic paper which stressed that “the Arctic ecosystem is extremely vulnerable to oil leaks or spills that may occur as a result of field development, as well as to global warming, changes in the chemical composition of the air.”1110 In the second half of the 1990s, Great Britain began to show its interest in the Arctic, and in 1998, joined the Arctic Council. A little later it joined the European program “Horizon 2020” and participated in programs on the study of climate change and its impact on weather in the Arctic region. In 2013, the report “Protecting the Arctic”1111 was published, which to some extent can be considered an Arctic strategy. This document addressed various issues, including hydrocarbon extraction and security, etc. The extraction of oil and gas from the Arctic is regarded by Britain as one of the important areas of Arctic policy. That same year, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued the document “Adapting to Change: UK Policy towards the Arctic.”1112 It also “The great challenge of the Arctic: National roadmap for the Arctic. June 17, 2016,” accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/frna_-_eng_-interne_-_prepa__17-06-pm-bd-pdf_cle02695b.pdf. 1108 “Horizon 2020” is the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme designed for the years 2014-2020. 1109 “The great challenge of the Arctic: National roadmap for the Arctic. June 17, 2016.” 1110 Ibid. 1111 “Protecting the Arctic. 2013,” accessed January 29, 2021. https://publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvaud/171/17102.htm. 1112 “Adapting to Change: UK Policy towards the Arctic, October 17, 2013,” accessed January 26, 2021. 1107

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outlined the approaches of UK policy in the Arctic: respecting the rights of Arctic states and indigenous peoples; leadership in the region by the Arctic states and the UK, promoting cooperation in the Arctic region1113. In 2018, the UK presented the strategic paper “Beyond the Ice: UK Policy towards the Arctic.” 1114 The document redefined the country’s objectives in the Arctic region. In particular, it was supposed to use international organizations (such as the Arctic Council) and bilateral relations with the countries of the region to provide leadership in the Arctic. Science diplomacy was to become an important element of the country’s policy. Besides political matters, the document also set the goal to protect people and the environment and to increase international cooperation against the consequences of global warming.1115 Since 1996, the Netherlands has been a permanent observer at the Arctic Council. As for the Netherlands’ priorities, it looked at the possible cooperation with other regional states, especially in the area of hydrocarbon extraction. Like other European countries, the Netherlands has promoted the matter of scientific research. There are no official documents formulating the objectives of the Netherlands in the Arctic. Its policy is being implemented in the framework of the strategy of the Netherlands Polar Program.1116 The newest version of this document was designed for 2016-2020.1117 The paper outlines scientific problems. The greatest attention is paid to the study of the state of the climate in the polar regions and its changes, the air composition and the biosystem, identifying the impact of hydrocarbon field development on the ecological system. Since recently, the Arctic policy began to be implemented by Spain. In 2016, it published the paper the “Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy,1118 however there is no national official document devoted to the Arctic policy, what is explained by the geographical location of the country, as well as the lack https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat a/file/251216/Adapting_To_Change_UK_policy_towards_the_Arctic.pdf. 1113 Ibid. 1114 “Beyond the Ice: UK Policy towards the Arctic, April 4, 2018,” accessed January 17, 2021. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat a/file/697251/beyond-the-ice-uk-policy-towards-the-arctic.pdf. 1115 Ibid. 1116 “Netherlands Polar Programme,” accessed 15 January 2021. https://www.nwo.nl/en/ researchprogrammes/netherlands-polar-programme. 1117 Ibid. 1118 “Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy,” accessed 3 January 2021. https://www.ciencia.gob.es/stfls/MICINN/Investigacion/FICHEROS/Comite_Polar_definiti vo/Directrices_estrategia_polar_espanola.pdf.

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of opportunities to use the resource potential of the Arctic region. Spain’s attention is due to the task of its reducing dependence on imported hydrocarbon resources. In this regard, the Arctic deposits, the opportunities for the development of which are associated with global warming are of great interest to Madrid . Fish resources of the region are also significant for Spain: about 5% of fish are caught in the waters of the Arctic region. The country does not insist on both internationalization of management of the region and development of Arctic resources. For Madrid, cooperation in environmental protection and research activities plays a special role. Spain attaches great importance to projects implemented by the EU. Another European country that has become active in the Arctic in the last decade is Italy. In December 2015, it published a document “Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines.”1119 Among them the document identified: development of international cooperation, ecology and human dimension, research activities, economic activities related to oil and gas extraction.1120 In fact, the number of European countries which pay attention to the Arctic is much more than the above mentioned. However, with the respect to the countries mentioned, we can conclude that many of them are actively working on their Arctic policies. Due to their economic weakness and geographical remoteness, they can not have a great influence on the geopolitical situation in the Arctic. However, their contribution to scientific research and climate studies, which is rapidly changing the Arctic landscape, is indisputable. In addition to the European states, there is a group of Asian countries, which have also increased their attention to the Arctic. For the most part, China, India, and Japan. China has long lacked a policy document on the Arctic. Although it has been pursuing an active policy in the region. In January 2018, China’s State Council released a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy.”1121 The document reflects China’s approach to policy implementation in the Arctic. According to the paper, “the integration and globalization of the world community has conditioned international interest in the Arctic region, the role of which is determined by its research, logistics, resource and economic potential.”1122 “Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines dated December 1, 2015,” accessed January 24, 2021. https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2016/06/ strategy_for_the_arctic_may_2016.pdf. 1120 Ibid. 1121 “China’s Arctic Policy,” accessed January 18, 2021. http://english.gov.cn/archive/ white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 1122 Ibid. 1119

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Furthermore, the document stressed the global importance of the Arctic for humankind, emphasizing that China’s activities in the region went beyond scientific research. The Chinese side stated the increasing role of China in the Arctic. Based on the strategy, China's priority areas should be as follows: development of research activities; environmental protection and climate change control, and lastly, lawful and rational use of resource potential. The white paper stressed that exploration and development of Arctic energy resources would be of great importance for China. Accordingly, China is interested in cooperating with the Arctic countries to develop clean energy sources.1123 India seems to limit its current involvement in the Arctic issues to scientific research. In 2013, the Ministry of External Affairs published an article “India and the Arctic,”1124 however the country has never developed an Arctic policy strategy. The article outlined the main directions of the country’s Arctic policy. India has mainly focused on studying the issues on global warming, environmental protection and scientific research. In recent decades, an active policy towards the Arctic has been pursued by the EU, and then by other international organizations and forums. Unlike the heavyweights of Arctic policy, the “Arctic Five,” which are geographically and historically linked to the region, many other “newcomers” only touch the Arctic. Good examples are the countries of Latin America and the Middle East. Thus, the number of non-Arctic interested in the region has grown considerably in recent decades. The extraction of hydrocarbon resources, shipping, economic development, and tourism is an incomplete list of issues that are in their focus. In addition, much attention is paid to the environment, the climate and the implementation of scientific programs. The time when the situation of the region was discussed and determined by a few states is a thing of the past.

1123 1124

Ibid. “India and the Arctic. 2013. June 10,” accessed December 18, 2021. https://www. mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/India&.

CONCLUSION Over recent years, the geopolitical importance of the Arctic has increased dramatically. This turn is due to global climate change, which opens up new opportunities for the use of coastal waters.1125 According to the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin, “the Arctic region remains in the sphere of special interests. It is here that virtually all aspects of national security are concentrated: military and political, economic, technological, economic and resource.”1126 Being between European countries in the west and the United States and Canada in the east, Russia has sought to pursue a balanced and consistent Arctic policy. However, it does not always succeed. Insufficient coordination between individual government bodies, the lack of a clear strategy for action, which contains specific aims and time periods for their realization, as well as often illconceived steps in the Arctic – all this has created certain difficulties in the implementation of the objectives of Russian foreign policy, which are enshrined in fundamental documents. After the book “Arctic Race: Capture and Drill” was published in 2013, there have been important events in the region that determined the further development of the New Great Arctic Game. One of its key participants was Russia, which paid close attention to the Arctic. Russia’s efforts were aimed at ensuring that none of the neighboring countries have a desire to draw strategic military maps in their own way in the expectation of at least some win.

Marina Antropova, “Russia is building a new strategy in the battle for the Arctic,” NotumInfo, accessed September 23, 2020. http://www.notum.info/news/politika/rossiya-vyistraivaetnovuyu-strategiyu-v-bitve-za-arktiku. 1126 Ibid. 1125

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Russia’s main priority in the Arctic was the development of natural resources. It required huge both domestic and foreign investments, the generally recognized extension of the continental shelf, the consolidation of the Russian status of the Northern Sea Route and the development of its infrastructure1127, as well as ensuring national security at the Arctic borders. In addition, as a longterm task, Russia attached great deal of importance to research and exploitation of the Arctic with the region’s focus on the development of export industries, the creation of ice class vessels for sea transportation, specialized ships for fishing and research fleets. At the beginning of the XXI century, the Arctic became one of the main directions of development of modern Russia, turning into an outpost of military and economic power and security. Enormous sums of money, which are allocated to government orders for the implementation of projects in the Arctic: the construction of a new nuclear fleet, the development of the newest weapons in the Arctic, the restoration of airfields and ports and the whole polar infrastructure shows that the Russian state retains a keen interest in this region. Additionally, individual research centers, faculties in educational institutions and military schools have been established, which will allow for training personnel in the future. This approach of Russian policy, the so-called industrialization of the Arctic entails significant risks. Russia balanced between the search for new sources of resources and attempts to get access to Arctic oil and gas as soon as possible. At the same time, it was not about “intensification of technological development or scientific presence of Russia in the Arctic”1128. The impending decline in oil production has worried not only Russia and, above all, those who produce it, but also other participants. As Sadad AlHusseini, former Vice President for exploration and production at Saudi Aramco, noted, that very soon “the world will start to feel a shortage of oil.”1129 This predetermined the increased attention to the Arctic not only the Arctic countries, which saw themselves as major suppliers of Arctic hydrocarbons, but also from the consumers of oil and gas. For the latter, potentially vast hydrocarbon deposits were attractive for many reasons. First of all, they could reach the position of those states that traditionally belonged to the club of countries producing oil and gas. The struggle for hydrocarbon resources gave Sergey Zhiltsov and Igor Zonn, “Russian policy in the Arctic at present stage,” Bulletin of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Series Political Science, no. 2 (2015): 7-22. 1128 “Arctic watch. Written by the Editorial board,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11, 2012. 1129 Maass Peter, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (Moscow: United Press Publishing House, 2011), 331. 1127

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rise to various over-optimistic estimates and inflated expectations. For example, Alexei Kontorovich, leading specialist in the field of oil and gas, speaking about the Arctic accumulations, drew attention to the fact that “oil and gas fields after 2040 will be comparable in value with those of Western Siberia and the Persian Gulf countries.”1130 The growing competition for Arctic resources was directly linked to the cost of oil and gas on world markets. The fact was cited that at the turn of the 2000s, oil was worth about USD 20 per barrel. At this price level, exploration and exploitation of hard-to-reach deposits was considered unprofitable. However, a decade later, the high price of hydrocarbon resources represented production of oil and gas on the Arctic seas shelf as economically feasible. According to Denis Demin, Head of the Analytical Department of the construction company BFADevelopment, “ten years ago, neither oil prices nor the capabilities of Russian enterprises allowed for serious planning of the Arctic shelf development. Nowadays, the world as a whole has an understanding of the rapid depletion of easily accessible oil reserves, and the development of production and transportation technologies allows us to count on the profitability of production in some fields of the northern shelf of Russia.” 1131 However, there were other estimates. Ilya Kokarev, General Director of Caspian Energy Group (construction of ice-resistant drilling platforms for Lukoil), pointed out that development of offshore fields in the Arctic would be profitable only if oil prices exceed USD 150 per barrel.1132 Rosneft estimated the cost of producing a ton of oil in the Arctic shelf at USD 500-700. 1133 A number of experts noted that the increase in oil prices no longer stimulated expensive explorations in difficult natural conditions aimed at increasing oil production, as they did five-ten years after the previous crises of this kind.1134 For this reason, oil and gas production in the Arctic region is likely to become possible if several factors are combined: the depletion of large hydrocarbon deposits, which provide the main supply to the world market, the demand for oil and gas from major consumers, the availability of technologies “Expert: Reserves of Arctic deposits are equal to those of the Gulf countries,” Regnum, accessed October 17, 2020. https://regnum.ru/news/1205654.html. 1131 Maksim Logvinov, “Drilling to the Pole,” Metropol, accessed September 14, 2020. http://www.metropol.ru/news/about_us/article.wbp?article_id=99dffcb5-205d-460b-82b0807f4b21d744. 1132 Ibid. 1133 “Arctic oil will cost USD 500-700 per ton to Rosneft,” Energyland.info, accessed September 18, 2020. http://www.energyland.info/news-show-tek-neftegaz-22505. 1134 Dyer, 131. 1130

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that allow drilling in the harsh Arctic conditions. It is no coincidence that specialists of Lloyd’s Syndicate considered oil production in the Arctic as the most risky for insurance and urged the producing companies to invest in technologies that would allow them to avoid accidents. It is estimated that investors should invest about 100 billion dollars in the development of the Arctic over the next ten years.1135 Thus, exploration of oil and gas reserves still depended on the level of prices, demand and success of field exploitation in other regions of the world. Apparently, the Arctic fields may be in demand after 2040-2050, when fundamentally new technologies of deepwater drilling will be applied in those challenging conditions. Until recently, most of the (assumed) Arctic hydrocarbon potential has not been included in any report precisely because no one knows how to get access to it.1136 That is why, a decade ago, expert assessments questioned the role of Arctic hydrocarbons in solving energy problems. It was pointed out that oil and gas reserves on the Arctic shelf may play a less important role in meeting energy needs than previously expected. In particular, this was mentioned in the report of the Norwegian Center for International Climate and Environmental Research and Statistics, published in 2011. According to researchers’ estimates, “less ice in the Arctic will open up for increased activity, but most likely there will be no significant increase in the extraction of Arctic oil and gas towards 2050.”1137 Moreover, the specialists believed that oil production in the Arctic region would double in absolute terms by 2050, but its share in global production would decline from 10% in 2010 to 8% in 2050, and the share of Arctic gas would decrease from 27% to 22%.1138 Already in that time, researches explained that the reasons for the decline in the share of Arctic resources are related to the growth of oil and gas production from unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. Particularly, the increase in shale gas production in the USA and natural gas production in the Middle East countries was expected. In this regard, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, believed that “the total volume of shale energy production in the U.S. by 2025 will exceed oil and gas production

“Insurers consider oil production in the Arctic the most risky,” RIA-Novosti, accessed September 23, 2020. https://ria.ru/20120412/624886200.html. 1136 Nicolazzi, 178. 1137 Jan S. Fuglestvedt and Glen Peters, “Expected no increased production,” CICERO, accessed August 13, 2020. https://www.cicero.oslo.no/en/posts/climate-news/expect-no-increasedproduction. 1138 “The Arctic riches: myth or reality?” Russian International Affairs Council, accessed September 2, 2020. https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/arctic/32309/. 1135

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in Russia.” 1139 The specialists from the Norwegian company Rystad Energy were convinced that the Middle East countries in terms of gas production would overtake Russia within ten years.1140 Due to the ice melting, which a number of scientists consider as global warming, there could certainly be new opportunities for the extraction of hydrocarbon accumulations. However, it is impossible to explore it until some more ice melts.1141 Moreover, the lack of technology and high environmental risks continue to have an impact. The development of new technologies will greatly facilitate the extraction of natural wealth from the seabed of the Arctic Ocean. This refers not only to oil and gas, but also to rich deposits of diamonds, gold, tin, manganese, nickel, etc. Along with discussing the prospects for oil and gas production in the Arctic, there is a great struggle for control of sea transport routes. Different approaches to their use give rise to discussions between individual states, which hide longterm interests of both Arctic and non-Arctic states. However, most of them are not prepared for a scenario where Arctic spaces become more accessible. Shipping routes require the creation of appropriate coastal infrastructure, which is not yet sufficiently developed. In this regard, all talk about changes in the Arctic Ocean routes is merely an assessment of the opportunities that may open up in a few decades. It is interesting how Russian science fiction authors, who responded quickly to the needs of the day, describe drilling in the Arctic: “the massive drilling platform seemed to be a tiny spot among the boundless white ice space and leadgray water. The platform ‘Polar Bear’ was the highest latitude and the largest structure for industrial oil and gas production. It was located on the submarine Mendeleev Ridge, which was part of the Arctic Ocean shelf, owned by Russia. Quite justifying the name of the great Russian chemist, this geological underwater formation gave its country countless treasures. Recently, it was here, on the border of the polar possessions, that the richest oil and gas reserves were discovered, which lie at great depth. This unique ultra-deep drilling platform was designed and built at the Sevmash shipyards in Severodvinsk as quickly as possible. Shortly afterwards, the platform was towed to the new field. The drilling rig was designed for extremely adverse conditions of the North and it “The IEA believes that the U.S. will overtake Russia in total oil and gas production by 2025,” TASS, accessed October 17, 2020. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7911025. 1140 “By the end of the year the Middle East will overtake Russia in gas production – Rystad,” Strana.ua, accessed October 15, 2020. https://strana.ua/news/217425-strany-blizhnehovostoka-obhonjat-rf-po-dobyche-haza-uzhe-k-kontsu-hoda.html. 1141 Dyer, 131. 1139

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was equipped with everything necessary for long and difficult work during the polar night. A compact nuclear reactor was installed there as an autonomous power source, just like on submarines. The drilling rig also had its own dock site, oil loading terminal and an entire unit of Ka-32 helicopters, which proved exceptionally well in polar conditions. Mining of “black gold” started.” 1142 So, according to the writer-fantasist, it is quite simple enough that Russia should start production of hydrocarbons in the Arctic fields. However, it is on paper. The reality is very different from what is described in the book, because the Arctic environment is extremely severe to carry out technically complex operations. The complexity of conditions is due to low temperatures, almost year-round ice cover, poorly developed coastal infrastructure, outdated systems of navigation and hydrometeorological equipment and assistance. Another reason is the slow pace of innovative developments’ application. In recent decades, new extra-regional players have emerged in the Arctic with their ambitions and capabilities. If Russia wants to achieve tangible success in creating a new oil and gas region, it needs to catch up with the leading Western countries, as it was already in the middle of XX century. This should become a new “race” of technologies, which would allow reducing the existing gap with other countries in the field of exploration and production of deep-water hydrocarbons. In the past decade, the circumpolar space of the Arctic has become a geopolitical and cultural-historical reality, largely due to Russia's entry into a constructive dialogue with its Arctic neighbors. Regarding the exploration and development of the North, Russia relies on its own priorities and is simultaneously taking advantage of international cooperation. The recent “Arctic breakthrough” was possible due to the development of science, technology, and the introduction of new technological techniques for studying underwater and onshore resources and the natural environment. The sanctions policy of recent years, beginning in 2014, by Western countries has put Russia through a series of new challenges. Initially, they did not have a significant impact on the country’s economy. However, over time, as they intensified and diversified, they began to be felt. Furthermore, the ongoing drop in oil prices affected the filling of the budget and required the adjustment of plans concerning the implementation of national projects. The issue of COVID-19, which emerged at the end of 2019, also had an impact and affected Russian projects and the development of new fields.

1142

Savitsky, 21-22.

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Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry is taking place in the Arctic. The new stage in defining the borders on the Arctic shelf has led to a shift in geopolitical emphasis in the activities of the five leading countries with direct access to the Arctic Ocean. Three other countries, which are close to the ocean - Iceland, Sweden and Finland - gravitate to them. This “Eight” has been a member of the Arctic Council since 1996. It should be recalled the words of the queens from L. Carroll’s famous book Through the Looking-Glass: “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”1143 This is the principle that Russia should take on if it wants to maintain its leadership in the Arctic. Once, a hundred years ago, many scholars wrote that “the North Pole is inaccessible.” U.S. General Adolphus W. Greely returning from the Arctic called “mindless” the way of suicide Dr. Nansen, when Nansen in 1895 left his ship Frame and continued the journey to the Pole.on foot. Nowadays, to some extent, history is repeating itself. There are many talks about the impossibility of conducting deep sea drilling in the Arctic due to lack of technology. And what will happen in 50-100 years? As Aleksandrs Garross wrote, “everything is stored here forever, nothing spoils: neither the Pole nor the feat.”1144 The sanctions policy of the collective West against Russia has already slowed down a number of promising Arctic projects. In 2020, the COVID-19 and economic crisis (COVID-19) created more problems. This has led to a significant drop in demand for oil and gas and changed prices for hydrocarbon resources. The global economic environment, coupled with continuing climate change, will undoubtedly lead to a rethinking of approaches to exploration and exploitation of the Arctic.

1143 1144

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (Moscow: Eksmo Publishing House, 2018), 160. Aleksandrs Garross, “The burden of the White,” Vokrug Sveta, no. 12 (2011): 28-52.

APPENDIX THE MAJOR UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Sea 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958 United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-STATE AGREEMENTS 1824 Convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, Relative to Navigating, Fishing, Etc., in the Pacific Ocean 1825 Convention concerning the Limits of Their Respective Possessions on the Northwest Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean 1867 Treaty concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to the United States of America 1920 The Treaty of Tartu 1940 The Treaty of Peace between the Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1957 The Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the maritime border between USSR and Norway in Varanger Fjord 1975 The Agreement between the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on cooperation in the field of fisheries 1978 The Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea with Attached Protocol 1990 The Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary 1995 The Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 2008 The Ilulissat Declaration 2013 The Kiruna Declaration

CANADA 1898 The Yukon Territory Act 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy 2009 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future

CHINA 2018 China’s Arctic Policy

DENMARK 2011 Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020

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ICELAND 2011 Iceland 2020 – Governmental policy statement for the economy and community Knowledge, sustainability, welfare

FINLAND 2010 2013 2015 2016

Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region Growth from the North Finland’s Arctic Strategy

FRANCE 2016 The great challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for the Arctic

GERMANY 2013 Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines

ITALY 2015 Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines

NORWAY 2006 The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy 2017 Norway’s Arctic Strategy – Between Geopolitics and Social Development

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SPAIN 2016 Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy

SWEDEN 2011 Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 2013 Protecting the Arctic 2013 Adapting to Change: UK Policy towards the Arctic 2018 Beyond the Ice: UK Policy towards the Arctic

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE/THE SOVIET UNION/ THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1916 A note of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire concerning the ownership of all the lands that are extensions to the north of the Siberian continental plateau 1921 The Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of RSFSR of 24.05.1921 ‘On Protecting of Fish and Beast Lands in the Arctic and the White Sea’ 1926 The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union ‘On the Declaration as the Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic of the Lands and Islands located in the Arctic Ocean’ 1929 Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of People’s Commissars ‘On the Arctic Ocean Islands Administration’ 1932 Resolution ‘On Spitsbergen Coal’ 1932 Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR ‘On the Organization by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of the Northern Sea Route General Directorate’ 1984 The Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ‘On the Economic Zone of the USSR’

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1987 The Murmansk Initiatives 1990 The Decision of the USSR Council of Ministers ‘On measures to ensure the implementation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1984 ‘On strengthening of environmental protection in the Far North and marine areas adjacent to the northern coast of the USSR’ 1991 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR ‘On Approval of the Regulations on the Commission for the Arctic and Antarctic Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR and the Personal Composition of this Commission’ 1995 Federal Law ‘On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation’ 1998 Federal Law ‘On the the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation’ 2000 The Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation ‘On the Concept of State Support for Economic and Social Development of Northern Regions’ 2001 The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020 2007 The Strategy for the development of the shipbuilding industry for the period up to 2020 and beyond 2008 Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2008 The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective 2009 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 2012 State Program ‘Shipbuilding Development for 2013-2030’, the Russian Federation 2013 The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020 2014 Decree ‘On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’ 2015 The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2016 Decree ‘On Approving the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ 2017 State Program ‘Socioeconomic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’ 2020 The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035 2020 Decree ‘On the Northern Fleet’ 2020 Decree ‘On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035’

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1984 1990 1990 1994 2009 2009 2014 2019 2019 2020

The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 Public Law 101-380-August Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 NSPD-66/HSPD-25 The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 Report to Congress. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, the USA United States Coast Guard. Arctic Strategic Outlook Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Prof. Sergey Zhiltsov, Doctor of Political Science, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and Political Philosophy at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation in Moscow, Professor at People’s Friendship University of Russia in Moscow, and a research fellow at S. Yu. Moscow Witte University. Editor-in-Chief of the academic journals The Post-Soviet Issues and the Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Russia and the World.” Research interests include the areas of key challenges of the Arctic region. Among them: policies of Arctic and non-Arctic states, legal regime of Arctic spaces, economic relations in the Arctic region, hydrocarbon extraction and shipping, environmental issues and climate change. The author and co-author of more than 15 articles on Artic issues. Co-author (with Igor Zonn) of the book “The Arctic Race: Capture and Drill” (2013).

Prof. Igor Zonn, Doctor of Geographical Sciences, General Director of the Engineering Research and Production Center for Land Reclamation, Water Management and Ecology Soyuzvodproekt (Moscow). Member of the Editorial Board of the international Journal Problems of Desert Development (Turkmenistan). Author of scientific articles and monographs, including encyclopedias of the Black, Caspian, Aral, Japan, Okhotsk, Bering, Barents, White, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, Chukchi, Baltic, Adriatic, Ionian seas, Arctic Ocean and Danube River, published in publishing houses International Relations (Russia) and Springer (Germany).

INDEX

# 20th century, xii, xviii, 57, 60, 97, 102, 136, 203, 227, 243 21st century, xiii, xix, 40, 47, 49, 91, 113, 116, 136, 155, 165, 173, 182, 200, 208, 211, 234, 259, 261, 265, 266, 276, 328

A agencies, 10, 164, 167, 185 agriculture, 6 air temperature, 34, 93 airports, 106, 109 Alaska, xii, xiii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 25, 27, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 58, 60, 75, 95, 112, 113, 114, 135, 143, 144, 156, 161, 204, 205, 214, 232, 243, 244, 245, 255, 256, 261, 264, 304, 329, 334, 340 alternative energy, 55 Arctic ice, xi, xii, xiii, 1, 6, 28, 127, 128, 143, 149, 204, 205, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 270, 273 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 39 Arctic Ocean, vii, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23, 27, 33, 40, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 91,

95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 109, 112, 115, 131, 136, 137, 144, 148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 166, 174, 182, 198, 204, 207, 214, 222, 223, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 237, 238, 250, 252, 256, 260, 262, 265, 266, 268, 269, 271, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 289, 291, 296, 304, 306, 309, 332, 334, 340, 343, 345, 349, 351, 352, 353 Arctic oil, xi, 25, 26, 34, 37, 53, 54, 105, 161, 181, 187, 199, 200, 201, 222, 251, 255, 256, 279, 286, 287, 288, 302, 303, 304, 327, 328, 338, 351 armed conflict, 215 armed forces, 149, 209 Asia, 15, 95, 109, 130, 133, 170, 209, 266, 335 Asian countries, 282 assessment, xx, 26, 38, 148, 181, 235, 239, 251, 289, 338 atmosphere, 43, 232, 245, 262

B ballistic missiles, 169, 215, 217, 223 Baltic states, 212 benefits, xii, 19, 87, 91, 106, 155, 177, 180 bilateral, 58, 85, 86, 88, 113, 157, 164, 238, 281 biodiversity, 132, 239, 262, 277, 279

356

Index

biological activity, 28 biological systems, 259 birds, 244, 255, 315

C carbon dioxide, 262 Caspian region, xiv, xviii, 26 Caspian Sea, xiv, xviii, 29, 246, 351 challenges, xiv, xvii, xix, 20, 37, 41, 45, 55, 147, 174, 189, 198, 200, 207, 210, 215, 228, 233, 238, 272, 278, 290, 301, 325, 353 chemical, 236, 250, 255, 280 chemical properties, 236, 255 China, 76, 77, 106, 123, 124, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 190, 204, 222, 239, 241, 282, 283, 294, 302, 303, 306, 317, 318, 325, 329, 341 cities, 8, 9, 67, 92, 141, 145, 149, 205, 216, 221, 252 clean energy, 283 cleaning, 166, 169, 187, 244, 252, 253, 254, 331 climate change, 37, 113, 230, 238, 239, 246, 259, 260, 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 277, 278, 280, 283, 291, 308, 311, 324, 326, 328, 329, 337, 349, 353 coal, 28, 81, 82, 99, 139, 250, 251 Coast Guard, 83, 86, 112, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 205, 256, 298, 346, 348 Cold War, 143, 144, 145, 203, 207, 210, 218, 224, 321, 328, 331, 335, 348 commercial, 30, 33, 43, 46, 51, 54, 55, 78, 81, 96, 103, 105, 106, 109, 114, 122, 126, 130, 158, 167, 192, 208, 234, 264, 267, 268, 272, 279, 326 communication, 28, 86, 91, 97, 101, 105, 135, 280 Communist Party, xxi, 136, 138, 330 community, xii, xvii, 5, 28, 86, 114, 153, 155, 207, 210, 278, 282, 295, 305, 317, 348

competition, xii, 38, 51, 155, 182, 213, 214, 219, 247, 287 competitive advantage, 75, 165 composition, 7, 13, 14, 42, 235, 280, 281 conference, 32, 66, 77, 81, 155, 197, 211, 219, 245, 254 conflict, xiv, 200, 207, 213, 215, 223, 224, 331, 350 confrontation, 66, 143, 149, 203, 219, 224, 246, 300, 303 Congress, iv, 60, 61, 88, 166, 207, 233, 244, 298, 332 construction, 43, 49, 52, 108, 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 131, 133, 138, 140, 141, 144, 151, 160, 171, 175, 177, 180, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 198, 203, 205, 217, 218, 221, 222, 230, 235, 238, 240, 250, 269, 286, 287, 332, 346 consumers, 52, 53, 120, 190, 286, 287 continental shelf, xiv, xvii, xviii, xxi, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 29, 31, 32, 39, 43, 44, 45, 50, 54, 55, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 84, 88, 89, 116, 129, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 174, 176, 177, 181, 182, 204, 205, 219, 223, 227, 230, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 245, 252, 271, 286, 293, 297, 304, 306, 307, 309, 312, 318, 324, 330, 346, 348 controversial, 83, 85, 170, 232, 305 convention, 13, 61, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 148, 155, 176, 347 cooperation, xv, xviii, xix, 39, 76, 78, 80, 82, 87, 145, 146, 156, 158, 159, 162, 164, 169, 170, 172, 174, 192, 203, 210, 215, 224, 233, 238, 239, 240, 245, 247, 257, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 290, 294, 307, 312, 320, 329, 333, 334, 349, 350 coordination, 186, 212, 238, 277, 285 cost, xiii, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 53, 60, 93, 112, 119, 120, 123, 127, 170, 177, 178,

Index 179, 191, 196, 204, 228, 231, 232, 236, 244, 287, 302, 341 crude oil, 52, 114, 245, 255 cruise missiles, 123 cultural conditions, 103 cultural heritage, 99 culture, 145, 234, 325

D danger, 151, 166, 251, 265, 270, 331 deepwater drilling, 288, 346 Denmark, xiii, 2, 3, 4, 38, 45, 52, 54, 57, 62, 63, 64, 67, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 98, 124, 146, 155, 205, 209, 210, 212, 214, 224, 229, 240, 275, 294, 307, 309, 346 Department of Defense, 207, 298, 332 Department of Energy, 39 Department of Homeland Security, 125 deposits, xi, xiv, xix, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 51, 54, 59, 78, 105, 149, 158, 159, 160, 163, 166, 173, 177, 181, 182, 190, 192, 201, 211, 223, 225, 238, 256, 271, 277, 279, 282, 286, 287, 289, 304, 311, 327 depth, xiv, xvi, 2, 3, 23, 24, 30, 33, 34, 35, 41, 46, 50, 65, 68, 97, 105, 118, 148, 153, 154, 159, 161, 175, 176, 181, 192, 217, 228, 230, 237, 240, 247, 255, 257, 264, 289, 329 destruction, 143, 149, 180, 245, 255 disaster, 39, 66, 136, 181, 245, 249, 254, 315, 340 disaster area, 136 displacement, 98, 127, 131, 132, 148, 175, 186, 217, 223, 230 draft, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 118, 119, 120, 122, 131, 170, 175, 186, 230, 251 dream, 163, 321 Duma, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 92, 171, 179, 310, 323, 343 dumping, 86, 250

357

E ecology, 36, 76, 131, 233, 238, 264, 265, 277, 282, 312, 315, 336, 346 economic activity, 17, 261, 266, 273, 337 economic consequences, 273, 311 economic cooperation, 87 economic crisis, 102, 169, 291 economic development, 14, 17, 20, 54, 60, 91, 92, 93, 135, 206, 269, 276, 283 economic downturn, 200 economic efficiency, 130 economic growth, 16, 271, 276, 299, 329 economic power, 286 economic problem, 177, 200 economic relations, 140, 314, 353 ecosystem, 3, 6, 39, 248, 279, 280 emergency, 44, 105, 124, 188, 239, 245, 247, 251, 257 energy, xiii, xv, 24, 25, 31, 35, 43, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 75, 77, 84, 87, 118, 133, 156, 159, 160, 165, 169, 173, 199, 200, 214, 218, 224, 238, 246, 247, 248, 254, 267, 268, 269, 276, 280, 283, 288, 307, 311, 322, 327, 340, 341, 342, 344 energy prices, 51 energy security, 248, 280 engineering, 144, 177, 216, 218, 235, 236, 271 entrepreneurs, 20, 343 environment, xvi, xviii, 7, 28, 40, 41, 100, 118, 125, 131, 136, 145, 146, 204, 235, 237, 243, 252, 254, 255, 259, 263, 277, 278, 279, 281, 283, 290, 291 environmental conditions, 132 environmental factors, 234 environmental issues, 183, 254, 262, 270, 275, 277, 280, 353 environmental management, 17, 18, 316 environmental policy, 249, 277, 325 environmental protection, 17, 100, 146, 192, 275, 276, 282, 283, 297, 308 Environmental Protection Agency, 256 environmental standards, 279 environmental threats, 252

358

Index

Europe, xv, 15, 27, 78, 82, 105, 106, 109, 114, 133, 145, 170, 195, 199, 209, 222, 250, 266, 275, 301, 316, 352 European Commission, 102, 214, 340 European market, 47, 48, 50 European Parliament, 213, 307 European policy, 213 European Union, xxi, 77, 204, 213, 279, 280, 307, 318 evidence, 76, 153, 182, 229, 231, 235, 239 exercise, 68, 69, 84, 168, 209, 211, 217, 218, 220, 300 exile, 60, 140 exploitation, xii, 3, 28, 41, 49, 51, 54, 55, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 97, 105, 126, 142, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 165, 167, 169, 173, 174, 179, 180, 188, 192, 245, 269, 271, 286, 287, 288, 291, 323, 345 exports, 21, 48, 52, 163, 185, 312 extraction, vii, 2, 23, 55, 108, 109, 139, 147, 155, 169, 174, 176, 178, 181, 185, 196, 200, 224, 245, 259, 269, 271, 272, 280, 281, 282, 283, 288, 289, 353

F federal agency, 247 federal authorities, 163, 171 federal government, 114 federal law, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 70 financial, xviii, 19, 40, 102, 154, 160, 161, 169, 173, 182, 195, 198, 201, 246 financial crisis, 198 financial resources, xviii, 40, 102, 173, 182, 201 Finland, 4, 5, 6, 61, 76, 78, 79, 80, 99, 124, 146, 194, 212, 241, 275, 276, 291, 293, 295, 299, 302, 312, 313, 315, 345, 352 fish, 21, 48, 81, 83, 86, 89, 132, 168, 263, 279, 282 fisheries, 64, 77, 80, 82, 88, 131, 294 fishing, 5, 6, 46, 65, 69, 70, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 94, 137, 138, 147, 151, 168, 224, 263, 268, 286, 319, 327, 348

foreign companies, 156, 161, 180, 195, 199 foreign investment, 159, 286 foreign policy, xv, 25, 58, 84, 137, 183, 203, 214, 219, 224, 276, 278, 285, 319 formation, 12, 16, 18, 35, 97, 98, 105, 106, 147, 148, 181, 218, 230, 245, 289 France, 76, 81, 123, 194, 195, 241, 279, 280, 295, 334, 346 freedom, 60, 65, 69, 81, 207, 280 freezing, 92, 114, 187 funds, 112, 120, 125, 149, 182, 197, 198, 235, 243, 251, 277

G gas fields, xi, xii, xviii, xix, 24, 29, 30, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 53, 78, 85, 86, 105, 157, 158, 177, 179, 190, 198, 199, 201, 244, 270, 279, 287, 350 geography, xv, xvii, 250 geology, 148, 154, 239 global climate change, 166, 169, 227, 285 global energy, xiii, 173, 200 global warming, xi, 23, 149, 170, 212, 246, 259, 260, 262, 264, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 289 government funds, 185 government policy, 55, 173 government spending, 52 governments, 60, 61, 88, 246, 263 greenhouse gas emissions, 52, 277 greenhouse gases, 245 growth, 103, 108, 205, 223, 276, 288 guidelines, 214, 278, 314, 342

H history, xv, xvi, xix, 4, 24, 43, 95, 96, 97, 106, 109, 166, 171, 209, 220, 228, 232, 234, 260, 261, 263, 291, 342, 343 human health, 245 human resources, xvii, 136

Index hydrocarbon deposits, xi, xix, 23, 27, 29, 30, 37, 39, 59, 105, 149, 160, 177, 182, 211, 271, 279, 286, 287 hydrocarbon production, xii, 19, 41, 51, 121, 167, 173, 174, 177, 180, 181, 183, 185, 201, 246, 251, 253, 255, 270, 271, 337 hydrocarbons, xi, xiv, xviii, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 86, 103, 106, 109, 116, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 170, 178, 185, 188, 196, 206, 224, 234, 245, 247, 248, 268, 279, 286, 288, 290, 326 hydrogen, 238, 248, 328 hydrogen sulfide, 248, 328

I icebreakers, vii, xii, 28, 60, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 135, 144, 151, 152, 175, 176, 205, 208, 213, 222, 232, 239, 324, 333, 334, 342, 346 Iceland, 4, 5, 6, 38, 76, 77, 78, 146, 212, 239, 247, 275, 278, 291, 295, 299, 317, 352 India, 76, 77, 96, 110, 120, 193, 239, 241, 282, 283, 317, 324, 335 indigenous peoples, 5, 20, 239, 259, 269, 276, 277, 278, 281 infrastructure, xviii, 16, 28, 35, 44, 49, 53, 67, 82, 87, 98, 102, 104, 105, 106, 108, 114, 123, 130, 131, 133, 142, 149, 155, 164, 165, 166, 171, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 185, 195, 205, 214, 219, 220, 222, 223, 234, 252, 253, 254, 262, 269, 271, 273, 276, 280, 286, 289, 290, 311, 319 institutions, 26, 176, 235 intelligence, 42, 210, 211, 212 international law, 10, 11, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72, 125, 163, 170 international relations, 145, 203 internationalization, 52, 60, 66, 67, 76, 77, 146, 282

359 intervention, 261 islands, xvii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 29, 30, 34, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 69, 74, 80, 83, 88, 89, 94, 95, 102, 110, 111, 112, 137, 139, 144, 149, 168, 180, 209, 216, 218, 221, 223, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 326

J Japan, 60, 76, 81, 92, 105, 120, 124, 143, 186, 239, 241, 282, 329, 346, 353 joint stock company, 156 jurisdiction, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 64, 69, 70, 76, 81, 82, 84, 88, 113, 277

K knots, 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 217, 222, 223 Kola Peninsula, 5, 62, 137, 141, 142, 193, 194, 211

L laws, 10, 58, 62, 68, 74, 104, 309 laws and regulations, 62, 68, 74, 309 leadership, 95, 122, 136, 140, 143, 150, 211, 212, 219, 233, 254, 281, 291, 343 legislation, 10, 17, 19, 39, 63, 64, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 104 liquefied natural gas, 19, 28, 114, 120, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197

M marine environment, 21, 236, 245, 310 matter, iv, 12, 76, 78, 121, 141, 143, 149, 151, 152, 174, 196, 281 media, 13, 15, 21, 24, 43, 155, 167, 171, 180, 207, 219, 278, 299, 308, 309, 317, 328, 332

360

Index

melting, xi, 23, 24, 27, 43, 163, 181, 219, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 273, 289, 321, 340, 347 meridian, 9, 12, 14, 58, 62, 63, 92, 101 migration, 164, 208, 305 militarization, xvii, 155, 183, 225 military, xii, xv, xviii, 57, 59, 60, 76, 81, 82, 87, 91, 99, 100, 109, 115, 122, 126, 127, 131, 136, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 154, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 172, 183, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 243, 250, 251, 252, 253, 280, 285, 286, 331, 343, 344, 348 military exercises, 213 military school, 286 mineral resources, xi, 32, 70, 129, 160, 164, 167, 170, 212 modernization, 106, 109, 119, 123, 162, 171, 182, 211 Moscow, xiii, xvi, xviii, xix, 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 19, 21, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 38, 40, 42, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94, 98, 112, 115, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 149, 150, 154, 156, 163, 166, 168, 169, 174, 177, 181,197, 205, 210, 215, 222, 224, 228, 233, 239, 244, 245, 252, 260, 261, 269, 286, 291, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 329, 331, 332, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 345, 348, 349, 350, 351, 353

N national borders, 229 national income, 21, 163 national interests, 11, 103, 105, 138, 140, 151, 165, 171, 173, 207, 208, 212, 215, 219, 224, 239, 318, 319, 323, 325, 328 national security, 14, 17, 20, 126, 128, 166, 167, 169, 171, 203, 206, 210, 219, 220, 277, 285, 286, 331

National Strategy, 213, 320 natural gas, 21, 24, 25, 30, 32, 39, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 53, 104, 108, 120, 160, 163, 180, 193, 194, 198, 232, 288 natural resources, 23, 61, 64, 65, 69, 70, 81, 91, 103, 142, 147, 165, 207, 212, 213, 219, 227, 286, 312 Netherlands, 52, 76, 81, 123, 241, 281, 325, 346 North America, 1, 4, 6, 15, 24, 43, 47, 53, 58, 60, 67, 87, 109, 114, 204, 293, 307, 350 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, xxi North Pole, xii, xvii, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 32, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 72, 78, 79, 99, 100, 102, 110, 111, 115, 117, 137, 142, 143, 144, 153, 154, 155, 169, 181, 204, 208, 209, 214, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 237, 239, 266, 272, 291, 299, 306, 330,346, 348 Northern Sea Route, vii, xi, xiii, xv, xviii, xix, xxi, 15, 16, 20, 67, 79, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 115, 116, 120, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 139, 143, 145, 151, 168, 171, 189, 191, 201, 204, 205, 218, 222, 228, 237, 268, 269, 271, 272, 286, 296, 301, 306, 313, 318, 319, 322, 326, 329, 332, 335, 337, 343, 344, 345, 349, 351 Norway, xiii, 2, 3, 5, 6, 24, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 62, 63, 64, 67, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 97, 123, 124, 127, 146, 152, 155, 170, 177, 178, 181, 194, 195, 196, 197, 205, 210, 211, 212, 214, 224, 228, 240, 245, 246, 265, 275, 276, 294, 295, 300, 301, 311, 315, 316, 319, 320, 321, 326, 334, 335, 336, 339, 340, 345, 346, 348, 349 nuclear submarines, xii, 112, 204, 213, 215, 219, 231, 250

Index

O officials, 61, 113, 131, 139, 147, 153, 196 oil companies, xi oil fields, xii, 23, 24, 30, 34, 41, 43, 53, 54, 89, 186, 343 Oil Pollution Act, 244, 298, 330, 339 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 244, 298, 330, 339 oil production, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 157, 160, 162, 178, 188, 189, 192, 201, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 252, 253, 263, 286, 287, 288, 301, 304, 317, 320, 326, 331, 335 oil spill, xvii, 187, 188, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 272, 315, 341, 344 operations, xviii, 34, 40, 45, 53, 74, 81, 96, 119, 120, 122, 125, 128, 145, 148, 158, 161, 176, 180, 187, 188, 200, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 233, 238, 239, 245, 251, 264, 271, 290, 333 opportunities, 24, 75, 76, 115, 132, 164, 173, 182, 212, 261, 264, 266, 272, 278, 279, 282, 285, 289 organize, xvii, 66, 76, 86, 97, 115, 194, 213, 229, 232, 236, 305, 349

P participants, 20, 81, 168, 195, 219, 248, 253, 285, 286, 323 peace, xiv, xv, xix, 39, 79, 169, 170, 200, 224, 277, 320, 350 permafrost, 40, 42, 164, 187, 239, 240, 259, 262, 263, 336 petroleum, xxi, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 51, 84, 86, 156, 257, 312, 314, 323, 327, 329 pipeline, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 49, 50, 108, 112, 114, 164, 167, 186, 187, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 243, 245, 254, 262, 271, 349 plants, 133, 141, 180, 191, 198, 250

361 platform, 25, 30, 34, 38, 42, 48, 120, 160, 161, 167, 174, 180, 188, 189, 190, 193, 212, 230, 237, 240, 248, 249, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 289, 315, 333, 344, 346 Poland, 76, 241 polar, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, 5, 7, 21, 28, 40, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 78, 83, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 105, 106, 126, 129, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 164, 166, 178, 219, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, 237, 239, 250, 251, 255, 259, 262, 264, 265, 266, 272, 281, 286, 289, 306, 316, 325, 329, 331, 351 police, 140 policy, xv, xx, 10, 11, 18, 19, 31, 48, 51, 58, 59, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 103, 126, 128, 131, 136, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 162, 163, 169, 171, 174, 181, 182, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 214, 215, 220, 223, 231, 233, 245, 248, 251, 255, 263, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 290, 291, 295, 299, 300, 303, 307, 314, 317, 320, 325, 332, 334, 339, 341, 342, 345, 348 political aspects, 207, 215, 325 political leaders, xii political opposition, 155 politics, ix, xv, 78, 85, 132, 154, 165, 248, 276, 303, 304, 329 pollutants, 245 pollution, xvi, 74, 146, 149, 166, 237, 243, 244, 245, 250, 251, 252, 255, 280, 316, 339, 343 population, 6, 20, 23, 39, 60, 103, 114, 130, 149, 166, 234, 265, 269, 312 population density, 6 power generation, 188 power plants, 116, 133, 151 preparation, iv, ix, 17, 20, 81, 179 presidency, 244, 339 prevention, 74, 164, 223, 234, 237, 251 principles, 14, 17, 42, 72, 103, 137, 146, 167

362

Index

project, xv, 14, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 54, 91, 96, 102, 106, 108, 112, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 131, 133, 139, 140, 145, 156, 157, 160, 161, 167, 175, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 206,212, 217, 219, 222, 228, 230, 231, 232, 236, 237, 253, 265, 316, 317, 318, 321, 334, 335, 336, 338, 340, 344 protection, 18, 39, 65, 74, 80, 83, 98, 99, 125, 137, 145, 164, 165, 185, 188, 212, 217, 248, 251, 252, 255, 276, 278, 279, 316, 343 public administration, 17 public awareness, 204 public investment, 49 Putin, Vladimir, xiii, xvii, 18, 98, 103, 106, 123, 133, 150, 156, 163, 168, 169, 170, 196, 215, 216, 251, 252, 253, 300, 322, 349

R race, xvii, xviii, 125, 154, 169, 182, 208, 210, 239, 290, 324, 325 radioactive contamination, 249, 250 RAS, 28, 32, 38, 58, 66, 76, 136, 173, 240, 315, 316, 321, 336, 339, 341, 348 ratification, 74, 88, 89, 147, 148 raw materials, 43, 49, 78, 196, 200, 279 regional cooperation, xvi regional policy, 151, 280 regions of the world, 288 requirements, 52, 66, 93, 152, 161, 180, 192, 234, 251, 257, 263 research institutions, 178 researchers, xii, xv, 25, 26, 27, 39, 48, 73, 111, 114, 115, 123, 175, 181, 209, 230, 232, 236, 261, 264, 267, 288 reserves, vii, xi, xiii, xiv, xix, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 64, 83, 85, 91, 92, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 163, 167, 173,

178, 181, 182, 183, 190, 191, 193, 224, 229, 231, 232, 263, 287, 288, 289, 313, 338, 340, 342, 344 resolution, 62, 137, 139, 206, 223 resource management, 279 response, xvii, 4, 88, 89, 188, 203, 212, 231, 243, 247, 251, 254, 257, 327, 344 rights, iv, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 84, 93, 135, 146, 155, 174, 176, 205, 209, 223, 276, 278, 281, 348 routes, 23, 66, 84, 93, 99, 101, 106, 109, 129, 142, 143, 144, 151, 170, 213, 223, 224, 264, 270, 289

S safety, xviii, 17, 55, 65, 66, 137, 139, 157, 161, 180, 186, 187, 188, 246, 248, 253, 254, 256, 267, 271, 304, 311, 323 sanctions, xix, 162, 169, 179, 190, 200, 290, 291 Scandinavia, 47, 212, 338 science, xiv, xvi, 28, 73, 99, 114, 145, 189, 224, 233, 234, 260, 289, 290, 302, 322, 344, 347 scientific investigations, 233 scientific knowledge, 173, 277 scientific papers, xviii Secretary of Defense, 207, 332 security, xix, 71, 103, 122, 126, 136, 138, 164, 165, 206, 207, 212, 213, 220, 233, 246, 247, 252, 273, 276, 277, 280, 286, 301, 320, 329, 336 settlements, 2, 5, 20, 92, 100, 102, 114, 141, 145, 149 shores, 39, 64, 91, 93, 94, 98, 100, 263, 266 social development, 171 social problems, 106 society, 136, 250, 322 solution, 105, 106, 112, 181, 185, 269, 319 sovereignty, 8, 9, 16, 45, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64, 68, 69, 72, 81, 82, 87, 94, 112, 113, 114, 125, 174, 176, 207, 209, 229, 305, 336

Index Soviet Union, xviii, xxi, 4, 30, 60, 61, 62, 64, 74, 79, 80, 82, 88, 89, 99, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 203, 214, 218, 233, 249, 250, 294, 296, 300, 309 Soyuz, 117 speech, 98, 133, 140, 143, 145, 201, 233, 322 strategic cooperation, 158 strategic planning, 20, 63, 171, 315 structure, 4, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 114, 139, 152, 153, 163, 182, 187, 188, 192, 232, 233, 238, 264, 289, 350 submarines, xii, 99, 112, 141, 152, 204, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 231, 236, 250, 290 sustainable growth, 276, 315 Sweden, 4, 5, 6, 52, 76, 78, 81, 124, 129, 146, 211, 212, 239, 241, 275, 276, 277, 278, 291, 296, 315, 319, 339, 346

T technical support, 218 techniques, 64, 222, 290 technological developments, 229 technological progress, 174 telecommunications, 237 temperature, xiii, 40, 42, 161, 187, 232, 237, 261, 262, 263, 266, 270, 338 terminals, 104, 185, 190, 245 terrestrial ecosystems, 259 territorial, xvii, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 83, 88, 92, 101, 136, 137, 138, 171, 219, 223, 264, 276, 347 territory, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 42, 43, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63, 68, 69, 70, 73, 81, 82, 84, 112, 135, 155, 169, 173, 174, 218, 219, 233, 252, 262 threats, 20, 163, 166, 207, 219, 301 tourism, 93, 272, 276, 283 transport, vii, 16, 17, 20, 42, 43, 49, 87, 91, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 114, 115, 116, 122, 124,

363 125, 133, 136, 139, 142, 151, 165, 166, 170, 173, 193, 206, 209, 213, 214, 216, 222, 224, 228, 252, 254, 266, 269, 271, 280, 289, 301, 306, 329 transportation, 49, 57, 84, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 112, 116, 117, 120, 130, 146, 151, 165, 185, 186, 189, 191, 192, 200, 222, 245, 251, 268, 269, 271, 272, 286, 287, 337 transshipment, 93, 180, 185, 186, 187, 190, 192, 245, 303 treaties, 17, 57, 63, 67, 79, 82, 113, 301 tundra, 1, 6, 28, 39, 40, 252

U U.S. Department of the Interior, 44, 255, 302 U.S. Geological Survey, 24, 27, 181 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 24 U.S. history, 244 underwater robotics, 253 unemployment rate, 5 United Nations, xxi, xxii, 13, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 147, 293, 301, 347, 348 United States, xiii, xxii, 24, 25, 38, 39, 41, 43, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 111, 113, 124, 125, 126, 135, 143, 152, 155, 169, 170, 177, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 224, 228, 229, 232, 240, 244, 255, 275, 285, 293, 294, 298, 300, 301, 307, 318, 325, 326, 329, 330, 332, 346, 347, 348, 349

V vehicles, 104, 133, 164, 209, 216, 222, 235, 250, 254 vessels, 30, 44, 59, 74, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92, 93, 99, 102, 104, 105, 108, 110, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 133, 137, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 170, 187, 188, 206, 207, 208, 212,

364

Index

215, 216, 217, 218, 228, 231, 240, 251, 269, 271, 286, 334

W war, xiii, 79, 82, 89, 99, 143, 144, 206, 211, 213, 224, 304, 316, 335 water resources, 53 waterways, 93, 110, 112 wealth, xviii, xx, 151, 232, 246, 289, 346 wells, vii, xii, xvii, 23, 30, 33, 36, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 54, 89, 159, 176, 188, 192, 193, 229, 248, 249, 255, 256, 264, 304, 325, 327

West Siberian lowlands, xii Western countries, xviii, 169, 182, 290 Western Europe, 45, 54, 250 Western Siberia, 31, 94, 97, 271, 287 White House, 126, 323 wilderness, 39 wildlife, 263, 265 withdrawal, 136, 145 work environment, 116 workers, 42, 244 workload, 116 World War I, 38, 127, 135, 143, 144, 145, 204, 209 worldview, 87, 334