The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines 9780300145977

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Introduction
1. The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politics
2. The Collapse of Philippine Democracy
3. Sultanistic Rule and the Demobilization of the Opposition
4. The Form, Not the Substance, of Democracy
5. Urban Terrorism after a Stolen Election
6. Boycott and a United Front
7. The Parliament of the Streets and Legislative Polls
8. The Snap Elections and the Fall of Marcos
9. Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Conclusion
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Selected Bibliography

Citation preview

The Anti-Marcos Struggle

The

Philippines

C

E

L

E

B

E

S

S E A

THE

ANTI

Personalistic Rule and Democratic

MARCOS mmmion

STRUGGLE rmnppines MARK

R. THOMPSON

Yale University Press New Haven and London

Frontispiece taken from Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 45. Copyright © 1995 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Designed by James J. Johnson and set in Aster Roman and Gill Sans types by Keystone Typesetting, Inc., Qrwigsburg, Penn. Printed in the United States of America by BookCrafters, Inc., Chelsea, Mich.

Library of Congress Catalogingin-Publication Data Thompson, Mark R. The anti-Marcos struggle : personalistic rule and democratic transition in the Philippines / Mark R. Thompson, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-300-06243-5 (he : alk. paper) 1. Philippines—Politics and government— 1973-1986. 2. Marcos, Ferdinand £. (Ferdinand Edralin), 1917I. Title. DS686.5.T49 1995 959.9'04'6—dc20 95-18890 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

fur Julia and to my parents

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Contents

Preface Introduction

ix 1

1 The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politics 2 The Collapse of Philippine Democracy 3 Sultanistic Rule and the Demobilization of the Opposition 4 The Form, Not the Substance, of Democracy 5 Urban Terrorism after a Stolen Election 6 Boycott and a United Front 7 The Parliament of the Streets and Legislative Polls 8 The Snap Elections and the Fall of Marcos 9 Democratic Transition and Consolidation Conclusion

15 33 49 64 81 96 114 138 162 181

Notes Selected Bibliography Index

187 225 252

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Preface

With this book I hope to contribute to the comparative study of democratization through a case study of the Philippines. However paradoxical it may appear, most democratic transitions from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s were initiated by authoritarian regimes. Popular protest or pressure from opposition groups often played a decisive role in the regime's decision to relinquish power. But many dictatorships in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa surrendered authority before an armed revolution, a popular uprising, or a military coup forced them to do so. Whether communist or anticommunist, military or civilian, these dictatorships were institutionalized regimes that undertook transition either through negotiations with the opposition or a unilateral transfer of power to it. Members of the regime could sometimes save their bureaucratic positions, preserve authority in crucial state institutions, and obtain guarantees that abuses committed during the dictatorial period would not be investigated too carefully. Political power could often be converted into economic gain. In short, many of the political, economic, and bureaucratic interests that were formerly protected in office now achieved a secure place outside it. Many authoritarian leaders decided that it was better to surrender power and salvage something than to cling to office and risk losing everything. In the Philippines, by contrast, Ferdinand E. Marcos had to be brought down because he would never step down. Marcos clung to power because the personal character of his rule meant that he had no outside interests that could be retained if he relinquished authorix

x • PREFACE

ity. In Chile, for example, Augusto Pinochet could give up the presidency and still lead the armed forces and maintain legitimacy among a substantial minority of the population. Marcos had neither an institutional base nor extensive popular support. He, his family, and his friends were the regime. Because this regime was corrupt and lacked strong ideological commitments, Marcos' family-based rule gradually alienated much of the political elite, the middle class, and the poof. His personalism ruled out an authoritarian-initiated transition, making his overthrow necessary if democratization was to take place. But another form of nondemocratic rule long seemed the most likely outcome of the anti-Marcos struggle. Communist insurgents and military rebels both attempted to overthrow the regime. Socalled traditional politicians—the major political actors in the premartial law period—were demoralized by Marcos' standpat dictatorship. Searching for a strategy, some of these political opponents of Marcos briefly opted for urban terrorism, then for an informal alliance with the communists, and later for close contacts with military rebels. The opposition to Marcos thus had a "revolutionary" logic more similar to the urban insurrection against the Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, the armed revolutions against Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, and the coup d'6tat by elements in the armed forces against Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti than to most democratizations of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In this book I explore why the anti-Marcos struggle led (surprisingly) to democratic transition. Focusing on the politicians whose electoral route to power was blocked, I analyze how they outmaneuvered armed groups and brought Marcos down. Even after the success of "people power," however, bloody postdictatorship struggles erupted as military rebels, communist insurgents, and disappointed politicians continued to fight for power. The legacy of the overthrow of a personalistic dictatorship explains the troubled nature of the Philippine transition. The research for this book, based largely on interviews that I conducted with about 150 participants and on unpublished materials collected during my five research trips to the Philippines between June 1984 and May 1992, was made possible by the hundreds of Filipinos who generously shared their time and wisdom with me. The notes and bibliography show the extent of my debt to them (all

PREFACE • xi

translations are my own). Here I will mention only a few names. Eduardo Olaguer granted me several lengthy interviews and provided many documents about a little-known "terror" campaign against Marcos. Former Senator Jovito Salonga and his son, Steve Salonga, were among my first contacts in the Philippines and over a period of several years were extremely accommodating. For their particularly informative interviews, I thank Augusto Almeda-Lopez, Senator Agapito Aquino, Charles Avila, J. Virgilio Bautista, Behn Cervantes, Mar Canonigo, the late Jose Diokno, Congressman Bonifacio Gillego, Norberto Gonzales, the Reverend Romeo Intengan, Victor Lovely, the Honorable Priscilla Mijares, Senator John Osmena, Sergio Osmena III, Alex Padilla, former Senator Francisco Rodrigo, and Karen Tariada. Compiling the history of a period in which much opposition was covert required access to unpublished materials. Among the many people who provided such papers, I would like to thank especially Jose Luis Alcuaz, Bishop Francisco Claver, former Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw, Norberto Gonzales, the Reverend Romeo Intengan, former Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal, Dr. Mita P&rdo de Tavera, former Senator Francisco Rodrigo, Noel Soriano, and the Honorable Abraham Sarmiento. The Rotary Foundation financed my first stay in the Philippines. The Yale Center for Area and International Studies and the Yale Southeast Asia Council generously funded another research trip in 1989. I was first introduced to Philippine politics by my onetime Brown University roommate and longtime friend Alfredo Ayala. I received my first academic training in the field as a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in academic year 1984-1985. Carolina Hernandez's course was enlightening, and Alexander Magno has been a mentor to me since I first studied with him. Wilfredo F. Arce enabled me to affiliate with the Institute of Philippine Culture at Ateneo de Manila University during academic year 1986-1987. Journalist Rigoberto Tiglao influenced my thinking considerably with his deep understanding of the country's political economy, and Margot Cohen s innovative journalism on social and cultural issues in the Philippines was inspiring. James Rush provided me with much-needed encouragement over the nearly decade-long research for this study. One of the pleasures of this project was the long discussions I had with some of the members of a talented new generation of scholars of Philippine politics: Jojo Abinales, Coeli Barry, Erhard Berner, Kit Collier, Manfred Fuchs,

xii • PREFACE

Lotta Hedman, Paul Hutchcroft, Masataka Kimura, Francis Magno, Kay Mohlman, James Putzel, and John Sidel. At Yale University, Kay Mansfield, in her role as coordinator of the Southeast Asia Council (jokingly referred to as "matron-client relations"), offered practical help and sound advice. I would also like to thank my Tagalog teacher at Yale, Edita Baradi, and to express gratitude for a U.S, government FLAS scholarship that enabled me to take an advanced language course at the Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute held at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, during the summer of 1988. At the University of Hawaii, Belinda Aquino, Benedict Kerkvliet, Elias Ramos, and Robert Stauffer graciously showed their willingness to discuss my work in progress. Thanks go also to Gary Hawes, Carl Lande, and David Wurfel, who, at the Third International Philippine Studies Conference in Quezon City on July 13-15, 1989, gave me very helpful critiques of a paper that I presented. Manfred Fuchs, Alexander Magno, James Putzel, Joel Rocamora, Eduardo Tadem, and Olle Toernquist provided helpful comments on an earlier version of chapter 2 that I presented at the European Conference on Philippine Studies, which took place in Amersterdam from April 22 to April 25, 1991. Jojo Abinales, James Rush, and John Sidel were kind enough to read earlier drafts of this book. Several research assistants were of great help. Brenda Jay Angeles went through back issues of the Philippine Collegian, and Imelda M. de Castro, Benjamin S. Padem, and Charmian K. Gloria helped me with secondary source materials. I conducted several interviews jointly with journalist Cristina Luz. I would like to thank Paul Kevenhorster and Dietrich Thranhardt at the Institut fur Politikwissenschaft, University of Minister, Germany, where I was a lecturer from 1990 to 1992, for providing me with flexibility in my schedule in order to allow me to complete this work. Jenya Weinreb of Yale University Press did a wonderful job editing the manuscript. Readers interested in a more detailed account of this subject than can be provided in book form are referred to my Yale Ph.D. thesis, "Searching for a Strategy: The Traditional Opposition to Marcos and the Transition to Democracy in the Philippines, 1991," available from UMI dissertation services. A graduate student's greatest intellectual debt is usually to his Doktorvater, but I was privileged to have had two advisers, Juan J. Linz and James C. Scott. Both were extremely generous with their time and seemed never to tire of reading the many revisions of this book. Juan Linz introduced me to his

PREFACE • xiii

theories of sultanistic rule and democratic transition and provided a wealth of examples that helped put the Philippine case in comparative perspective. To Jim Scott I owe the attempt to combine the best aspects of area studies and theoretically informed political science. Both Juan and Jim also showed me how committed teaching can be coupled with friendship. My parents, Margaret and Richard Thompson, nurtured my interest in learning and have shown a remarkable willingness to support (often financially) the lengthy schooling that has been the result. I am grateful for the patience and love that my wife, Julia Siinskes Thompson, has extended to me during the writing of this work. Having gone through this process herself, she well knows the high and low points that such a task brings with it.

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Introduction

"People power" in the Philippines has become part of the international vocabulary of democratization. The peaceful mass uprising against the regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos gave a name to popular nonviolent protest against dictatorship and showed that it could lead to democracy. As the first democratic transition in Asia during the so-called third wave of democratization, the Philippine transition had a "demonstration effect" on the region. In successful struggles for political change in Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan—as well as in failed movements for democracy in Burma and China— both democratic oppositionists and authoritarian regimes were aware of the parallels between their own experience and that of the Philippines.1 Later, "people power" became a rallying cry for political change in much of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan Africa. Even where the origins of the phrase had been forgotten, the political experience of the Philippines shaped how people spoke about democratic transition around the globe. Although democratic activists have frequently invoked people power, scholars have had difficulty fitting the Philippine case into existing theories of transition to democracy.2 Many such transitions have been initiated by authoritarian rulers.3 Under pressure from civilian protest, these rulers have transferred or surrendered power through negotiations and elections in order to protect their institutional, class, or other collective interests, which could be threatened if the regime were defeated by a revolutionary army or overthrown by a coup d'etat. Obstinate authoritarian leaders have often been deposed by the armed forces or the ruling party, which then turned 1

2 • INTRODUCTION

over governmental authority to the democratic opposition in order to avert popular revolt against the state. Marcos, by contrast, never negotiated with his opponents, and he manipulated elections in order to stay in office. He subordinated all independent institutions of the state, particularly the military, to his personal authority. He ruled primarily for the benefit of his clique, not for an official party or the elite as a whole. With power exercised in such a personalistic fashion, Marcos had no legitimate interests to protect once he had relinquished office. For much of the authoritarian period (from 1972 to 1976) it appeared likely that Marcos, who would never voluntarily step down, would be brought down by communist-led revolution or military revolt. Marcos' intransigence and the deprofessionalization of the armed forces seemed to favor the oppositionists with the most firearms. Unlike other democratizations, the Philippine transition followed Marcos' overthrow, not his withdrawal from power. Usually one must ask why an authoritarian regime gave in to its democratic opponents, but regarding the Philippines one must ask why the democrats, not their armed rivals, won the race to topple the dictatorship. Conceptualizations of the Marcos Regime

Previous conceptualizations of Marcos' dictatorial rule have failed to distinguish it adequately from authoritarian regimes that yielded to democratic transitions in other countries. The Marcos regime has been labeled constitutional authoritarian and bureaucratic authoritarian. I shall critique both characterizations before offering an alternative conceptualization of the regime as "sultanistic." In his many ghostwritten books Marcos argued that the declaration of martial law in 1972 had led to constitutional authoritarianism, which was established to prevent a rightist conspiracy by "oligarchs" or a violent revolution by communist rebels.4 He said that his authority derived from a new constitution approved in 1973. Five referendums were held on whether martial law should be continued and constitutional amendments approved. Elections were revived in 1978, and six polls took place during Marcos' last eight years in power. Marcos' claim to constitutionality appeared similar to the assertion of the regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile that it had established a "new institutionalism" based on a constitution approved by a referendum in 1980.5 It also resembled the Uruguayan military re-

INTRODUCTION • 3

gime's Cronograma (timetable), which set a plebiscite on a militarydrafted constitution and promised subsequent elections.6 Pinochet, however, did not try to manipulate the results of a 1988 referendum in which his bid to extend his stay in office was defeated, and the following year open presidential elections were held. Likewise, the Uruguayan military accepted defeat in the 1980 vote on a new constitution, which led to negotiations with the opposition and competitive polls in 1984. In the Philippines, by contrast, the new constitution was illegally ratified by a show of hands rather than a secret referendum.7 Subsequently, the document was "so manipulated by Marcos that it was not the law of the land, Marcos was/'8 Rigged plebiscites were always "approved" by more than 80 percent of the voters.9 Elections were fixed—the opposition was never given any real chance to win. Whereas the Chilean and Uruguayan authoritarian regimes took their constitutional creations seriously enough to accept defeat at the ballot box, Marcos used a plethora of democratic forms to hide the arbitrary nature of his rule. Transition to democracy in the Philippines thus could not be achieved by playing according to the authoritarian regime's rules. Gary Hawes has suggested that Marcos established a bureaucratic authoritarian regime like the ones in Latin America analyzed by Guillermo O'Donnell.10 Marcos is said to have repressed nationalist and populist sectors that supported import substitution and to have pushed instead for export-led industrialization. Westerntrained technocrats directed this policy change. The role of the military, which tripled in size, also increased in the authoritarian period. The armed forces took over functions previously reserved for the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the legislature and took direct control of several media establishments and public utilities. An obvious objection to Hawes s view is that in Latin America bureaucratic authoritarian regimes were run by "the military as government," whereas in the Philippines the armed forces were subordinate to Marcos, a civilian. But even if we consider the military a state institution, the Philippine armed forces under Marcos were not "reasonably professionalized," as they are under bureaucratic authoritarian rule.11 During the dictatorship large parts of the armed forces became, in effect, Marcos' praetorian guard. Marcos promoted senior officers based on their loyalty to him, not on their military competence or seniority, thus undercutting the institutional autonomy of the armed forces. With military leaders dependent on Marcos'

4 • INTRODUCTION

favor for their advancement, it was not possible for the "military as institution" to seize power from Marcos in order to halt deprofessionalization and end the association of the armed forces with an unpopular regime. In Argentina in 1982-1983, however, the armed forces as a state institution took back authority from the military regime and gave it to civilian opposition politicians to salvage the reputation of the armed forces and affirm their interests with an alienated Argentine populace after a disastrous military defeat. Under bureaucratic authoritarian rule, technocrats exert considerable influence in government. In Marcos' dictatorship, however, the authority of the technocrats was constantly undercut by the presidential favors bestowed on cronies. The technocrats' exportoriented development program was announced with much fanfare, largely to impress international financial institutions whose aid and loans were sought, but its implementation was often blocked by special interests close to Marcos. The technocrats did not constitute a "semiopposition," which is characteristic of more institutionalized authoritarian regimes and represents a potential negotiating partner with moderates in the opposition.12 Nor were the technocrats major figures in the succession struggle dominated by the dynastic ambitions of First Lady Imelda Marcos, which were strengthened in anticipation of Marcos' death. The Sultanistic Tendencies of the Marcos Regime

These characterizations of the Marcos regime neglect its highly personalistic or, to use the Weberian term, "sultanistic" tendencies. Following Max Weber, Juan J. Linz has defined sultanism as "personal rulership . . . with loyalty to the ruler based not on tradition, or on his embodying an ideology, or on a unique personal mission, or on charismatic qualities, but on a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system."13 Linz and H. E. Chehabi have suggested that a small number of authoritarian regimes, including Marcos', have approximated sultanism: those of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the ftihlavi monarchy in Iran, the Somoza family in Nicaragua, Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. Marcos pursued not ideological goals but personal gain, and his

INTRODUCTION • 5

regime was organized around family and friends, not strong state institutions. The regime made little effort to implement the social and economic policies it promised. As Belinda A. Aquino (no relation to Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.) has written, Marcos, "instead of using the vast powers he had conferred upon himself to produce drastic reforms, manipulated the system endlessly to enrich himself and his clique."14 Despite constitutional appearances, Marcos exercised authority arbitrarily. Repression was carried out lawlessly, and periodic elections and plebiscites were not even formally fair. Technocrats gave the regime an aura of economic rationality while private businessmen suffered, and public resources were wasted as presidential cronies enjoyed special government licenses and guaranteed loans. The military was expanded during martial law, but its hierarchy was patrimonialized to ensure that top officers were personally loyal to Marcos. Marcos' "politics of plunder" and arbitrary repression alienated so many segments of Philippine society that he could hardly expect to find a place in it if he stepped down. By contrast, Pinochet in Chile could give up the presidency and still serve as chief of the armed forces because of his support in the military and among a large minority of the Chilean electorate whose interests he was still seen to represent. Opposition to Sultanism

The character of a regime influences the character of opposition to it.15 Most kinds of recent authoritarian rule, for example, advantaged democratic over nondemocratic oppositionists and nonviolent forms of struggle over violent ones. With a strong institutional, often military, base, modern authoritarianism is usually capable of suppressing armed opposition to its rule. Democratic opposition may also be initially repressed, but liberalization by the regime allows its reemergence. Negotiation is the best way for the opposition to gain power when authoritarian rulers decide to relinquish office to protect their collective interests. Extremists from the left and right are usually excluded from roundtables or are not considered reliable partners if there is a need for a rapid transfer of authority. Democratic oppositionists are thus favored in such institutionalized transitions. Under sultanistic rule, by contrast, moderates are often the losers to extremist opposition. Nonviolent democratic opposition appears futile because sultanistic dictators are unwilling to negotiate a trans-

6 • INTRODUCTION

fer of power peacefully, and no state institution is autonomous enough to force a transition to democracy. In addition, repression is not legally circumscribed but arbitrarily exercised, particularly against the regime's most visible opponents. While peaceful democratic opposition is weakened, armed nondemocratic underground groups are strengthened as government tyranny polarizes the political climate. Moreover, the ability of sultanistic rulers to suppress violent challenges is undermined by the extensive patrimonialization of the military. (The corruption of the armed forces, in turn, angers professionally minded officers who wish to restore integrity to the institution.) Armed revolt often appears the only way to remove the standpat regime. Marcos1 sultanistic rule changed the nature of opposition in the Philippines. Before the declaration of martial law in 1972, politics was dominated by oligarchical parties that competed for power according to democratic rules. This system was known as traditional politics or, in Tagalog, as pulitika, "the bargaining and jockeying for power/'16 The traditional political elite in the Philippines originated in a primarily Chinese mestizo landowning class that acquired wealth but was denied power under Spanish rule/But these Filipino oligarchs dominated elections introduced under American colonial rule, which began at the beginning of the twentieth century, by mobilizing an overwhelmingly impoverished electorate primarily through clientelistic ties. After independence in 1946, two elite political parties based on patron-client networks regularly alternated in power in highly competitive elections. An almost continuous procession of unsuccessful peasant-based revolutionary movements in the twentieth century, as well as intermittent rebellion by Filipino Muslims, constituted the "little tradition" of Philippine politics. There were no coup attempts before the authoritarian period. Traditional opposition, dominant during the period before martial law, grew weak during the early years of the Marcos dictatorship. Efforts by opposition politicians to use plebiscites and elections to mobilize support against Marcos1 regime were severely hampered by the fraudulence of these polls. Pre-martial law politicians lost initiative to nondemocratic oppositionists engaged in violent struggle against the regime. Both the communists and the military rebels aimed to topple the regime, while Muslim secessionists fought for a separate state and social democrats for a fairer social order. When the traditional opposition revived after the assassination of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Marcos' unwillingness to negotiate and their own

INTRODUCTION • 7

limited resources forced the oppositionists to turn to civil society, in particular the Catholic Church and business groups, for mass protests against the regime. Classifying the Anti-Marcos Groups

Much scholarly literature suggests that personalistic regimes are particularly vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow.17 With the efficiency of the armed forces weakened by favoritism designed to ensure loyalty to the ruler, revolutionary insurgencies can prosper. The arbitrary repression, corruption, and political exclusiveness of the regime alienate elites as well as lower classes, creating conditions favorable for a broad revolutionary coalition. The regime's unwillingness to transfer power peacefully to its democratic opponents convinces many that only a revolution can overthrow the dictatorship. In the Philippines, the deprofessionalization of the military and mounting social injustice helped transform a small pre-martial law communist movement into a major revolutionary threat to Marcos' regime. The establishment of a united front of anti-Marcos politicians in the early 1980s made it appear that revolution would be the most probable way for Marcos to be brought down. The outcome would likely have been communist rule, as in Castro's Cuba and the Sandinistas' Nicaragua. It has also been argued that sultanistic regimes are vulnerable to coup attempts.18 The corruption of the top brass of the armed forces angers those lower-ranking officers who have retained their institutional loyalties. Such discontented military professionals may join forces with (or may themselves be) losers in a personalized succession struggle. The military as an institution cannot arrange for a transition because its leaders have been chosen based on personal loyalty to the ruler. Rather, a nonhierarchical revolt may break out against the regime in which dissidents in the military or the official party try to seize power in a coup. Capitalizing on the unpopularity of the regime, they may encourage or take advantage of an incipient insurrection in order to seize authority. In Haiti, a popular rebellion against Duvalier supported by the Catholic Church was preempted by a faction of the military, which took power for itself.19 A coup was also in the making in the Philippines. The highranking officers of the armed forces were personally loyal to Marcos and thus unwilling to bring an increasingly illegitimate dictatorship

8 • INTRODUCTION

to an end even after Aquino's assassination, as the more institutionalized Greek military hierarchy had done after the Cyprus fiasco —the attempt to unseat President Markarios and the inability to react to the Turkish invasion of that island. Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, the loser in a personalized succession struggle, found a base of support among mid-level officers upset by massive corruption in the armed forces. He was later joined by General Fidel V. Ramos, whom Marcos had passed over in favor of the "political" general Fabian Ver to head the armed forces. A coup conspiracy began in the early 1980s with the goal of establishing a junta. Other armed opposition groups had agendas short of taking state power. Although Muslim-Christian conflict dates back to the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century, an Islamic secessionist struggle transcending ethnic differences among Filipino Muslims erupted into civil war only after the declaration of martial law. Led by radical activists, the struggle for secession was initially supported by much of the Muslim elite alienated by Marcos' rule. Accustomed to patronage allocation and political autonomy under democracy, Marcos' dictatorship concentrated resources in the president's ruling circle in Manila, which led to a militarization of the southern Philippines. When Marcos later reversed course and actively courted politicians in Muslim Mindanao through economic concessions and offers of political offices, Islamic secessionism subsided, and many of the local Muslim elite defected to the government's side. A more minor opposition group that did not aim to win national political power, the social democrats, also turned to armed struggle under authoritarianism. Emerging from the moderate wing of the 1960s student movement, they were radicalized by mounting government repression and social inequality under martial law. One social democratic faction tried to build an anti-Marcos army, and another launched a terrorist urban bombing campaign in an effort to topple Marcos and establish a new regime—in which the social democrats hoped to participate but which they were not powerful enough to lead. The assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., led to widespread, largely peaceful demonstrations. Two core groups in civil society, the Roman Catholic Church and the business elite, were instrumental in organizing these protests.20 Although most Catholic bishops refused to criticize the regime during its early years, human rights violations and threats to the institutional interests of the church gradually turned the hierarchy against Marcos. After Aquino was killed,

INTRODUCTION • 9

Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin and other leading bishops openly supported the traditional opposition. Most wealthy business executives in the Philippines had embraced martial law because they believed that military rule would improve the country's economic climate. Growing corruption and cronyism soon turned many business leaders into covert oppositionists, however. A few businesspeople joined a brief arson campaign, and public protests followed a government bailout of crony corporations. But it was not until the shooting of Aquino that the economic crisis and moral outrage generated by the murder sparked large demonstrations in Makati, the business district of Manila's metropolitan area, known as Metro Manila. The groups opposing Marcos can be usefully classified along two axes (see the accompanying table). The first identifies whether a group sought just the defeat of Marcos or also aspired to replace him in power. Although the regime-alternative groups had the common goal of toppling Marcos, they were competing to establish a successor government. The nonregime oppositions, by contrast, did not aim to take Marcos' place in office, and thus their alliances with other oppositionists were less likely to become zero-sum games. A second axis distinguishes opposition groups employing violence from those that were largely nonviolent. The Marcos regime's unwillingness to negotiate or hold free elections and its arbitrary use of repression made the nonviolent acquisition of power difficult. Even initially pacifist opposition groups thus sometimes supported those engaged in military conflict with the regime or took up arms themselves. Nonviolent opposition was strengthened, however, when the regime undertook significant political liberalization. The revival of civil society provided a base for legal or semilegal opposition, although some groups continued to use violence. Groups in opposition to Marcos Regime alternative

Nonregime alternative

Nonviolent struggle

Traditional opposition8

Violent struggle

Communists Military rebels

Catholic Church Business elite* Muslim secessionists Social democrats

•Some members participated briefly in an arson and bombing campaign, but most members engaged in nonviolent struggle most of the time.

10 • INTRODUCTION

The Philippines1 Democratic Tradition

The Philippines is the first country in which a democracy directly followed sultanism.21 The exceptional character of democratization in the Philippines has been most commonly explained by pointing to the country's (comparatively) long democratic tradition before the declaration of martial law.22 Although the experience with democracy in the Philippines was crucial, democratic government was by no means the only possible outcome of the anti-Marcos struggle. The triumph of the traditional opposition can be explained by a strategic analysis in historical context. The chapters in this book are therefore organized chronologically to capture the dynamics of the interactions between the traditional opposition, the regime, and other opposition groups. Pre-martial law politics in the Philippines did not closely approximate the ideal type of democracy (see chapters 1 and 2). The opposition traditionally used three political resources to win competitive elections: patronage, coercion, and appeals to morality. Elections in the pre-martial law Philippines were contests between two loosely structured parties made up of political factions. The parties were not ideologically distinguishable and were weakened by constant turncoatism to achieve maximum factional advantage. The factions' goal was winning at the polls in order to reap the economic rewards of running the state. The opposition party—the one that did not control the presidency—faced a handicap in campaigning because it lacked the access to government patronage that was crucial in a clientelistic political system. But after enough disadvantaged members of the ruling administration defected to the opposition's side based on promises of future rewards in a new government, its initial patronage deficit could be overcome and the incumbents defeated. This system of elite party alternation could work only if elections were reasonably fair. Although pre-martial law polls were characterized by vote buying, violence, and fraud, balloting remained competitive as long as these violations of democratic norms stayed within certain limits. If the ruling party exceeded these limits, however, the opposition would respond militarily, establishing contacts with communists, Muslim secessionists, or warlords to counter an administration that employed "guns, goons, and gold" (as Filipinos commonly put it). Incumbent presidents twice used electoral overspending and military intimidation to retain office: Elpidio Quirino in

INTRODUCTION • II

1949 and Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1969. On both occasions opposition politicians retaliated with violence. Coercion, however, was always a means to an electoral end for traditional oppositionists. After "punishing" a rule-breaking administration, the opposition would return to the electoral arena to make another attempt at winning power through the ballot. To offset the ruling party's anticipated use of government patronage and military might at the polls, the opposition would rely not merely on its patron-client ties but also on appeals to the electorate's morality. This tactic drew on the flip side of Philippine political culture, which emphasized honest government and the preservation of democracy. The Catholic Church helped the opposition when the democratic system seemed threatened. Ramon Magsaysay's "moral crusade" led to a landslide victory against Quirino, and opposition politicians defeated the pro-Marcos "forces of evil" in the 1971 elections. The opposition to Marcos could not "save democracy" as Magsaysay had, however, because this time the administration, not the opposition, won the support of the military and the U.S. government. Democratic Opposition to Sultanistic Rule

With the declaration of martial law in 1972, clientelistic democracy was transformed into sultanistic dictatorship in the Philippines (see chapter 3). Marcos had changed the rules of politics in the country altogether. No longer did the two political parties compete for state-controlled resources; the resources were now monopolized by Marcos, his family, and his cronies. Most opposition politicians, who depended on patronage, were demobilized and courted Marcos' favor. Only a few traditional oppositionists, whose zero-sum conflict with Marcos for national political power precluded compromise, remained active. Unable to maintain their patron-client networks and with few arms to fight the regime, they resorted largely to moral appeals for democracy (see chapter 4). This early antidictatorship campaign peaked during the 1978 polls, which the opposition had pressured Marcos to hold for the first time since martial law. Outspent and outgunned, the party of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., ran a strong race for legislative seats that became a moral crusade for democracy, foreshadowing his wife's electoral showdown with Marcos eight years later. But Marcos had no intention of allowing himself to be democratically defeated. Massive poll fraud provoked opposition subversion,

12 • INTRODUCTION

much as rigged elections had before martial law. Through an arson and bombing campaign, the opposition tried to foment an insurrection against the regime (see chapter 5). The opposition had not given up on future polls, using the attacks to attempt to coerce Marcos into making electoral concessions. But this terrorism campaign soon collapsed because of insufficient organization and inadequate popular support. Opposition politicians then turned to the communists, whose "armed struggle" was growing rapidly (see chapter 6). The most important faction of the traditional opposition supported this alliance not out of ideological commitment but in the hope of gaining leverage, both with Marcos and the U.S. government, to force the holding of fairer elections. Even when they seemed to have chosen the bullet, opposition politicians never forgot the ballot. Aquino's assassination forced Marcos to undertake political liberalization and allowed opposition politicians to use popular moral outrage to win a substantial vote in the 1984 legislative polls (see chapter 7). Though its patronage resources increased because of defections from the Marcos camp, the traditional opposition relied more on support from the newly politicized Catholic Church and business elites to carry out its campaign. But the traditional oppositionists did not expect to be allowed to win. Rather, they used elections to mobilize popular support against Marcos for a final showdown. The selection of a candidate who seemed above politics, Corazon C. Aquino, rather than an old-time politician who had once opportunistically collaborated with Marcos, Salvador Laurel, completed the preparations for a full-blown moral crusade against Marcos similar to the campaign of Ramon Magsaysay in the 1950s. Although the opposition was cheated in the 1986 presidential elections, it managed to achieve a moral victory that discredited Marcos' regime at home and abroad (see chapter 8). Communist-led revolution and military coup both seemed possible in the polarized atmosphere after the polls. Yet the traditional opposition enjoyed a decisive advantage in the postelection maneuvering because its campaign had mobilized much of the populace in Manila and elsewhere. The failure of the military rebels1 anti-Marcos plot sparked the people-power insurrection that toppled the regime. Democracy after Sultanism

The legacy of Marcos' personalistic rule and the consequences of his overthrow made the establishment of stable democ-

INTRODUCTION • 13

racy particularly problematic in the Philippines (chapter 9). Marcos left a ruined economy, billions of dollars in stolen wealth, a corrupted bureaucracy, thousands of "elected" officials, a politicized military, and a large communist insurgency. Because the opposition neither came to power through negotiation nor was handed power by the military as institution, the new government was an unstable coalition between the two groups that played the leading roles in bringing Marcos down: the pro-Aquino politicians and the military rebels. The revolutionary character of the transition explains Aquino's decision to abandon Marcos1 constitution and abolish his legislature, which left her open to charges of establishing a new form of arbitrary rule. A series of coup attempts was not based simply on efforts to protect the institutional integrity of the armed forces (as has often been the case in South America) but was also an expression of the unsettled power struggle in the Philippines. Democracy survived and was eventually stabilized by Aquino's popular legitimacy as well as her compromise with the Ramos-led military hierarchy and the economic oligarchy. The decline of armed opposition, the participation of all major factions in the 1992 presidential elections, and the smooth succession of Ramos to the presidency indicate that democratic consolidation has finally been achieved.

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I

The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politics

We were cheated once [in the 1949 presidential elections].... If we are cheated again, let the people take matters into their own hands.... If a man goes to a gambling house and is cheated and then returns and is cheated again, what should he do? What is there for him to do but turn off the light and start shooting? —Jose P. Laurel, Sr., 1951

Neither of the two traditional political parties in the Philippines remained out of power (that is, did not control the presidency) for long in the pre-martial law Philippine Republic. In elections held after independence was achieved in 1946 and before the breakdown of democracy in 1972, the Liberals and Nacionalistas alternated in office with almost mechanical regularity. A Liberal was president for the first seven years, a Nacionalista for the second eight, and a Liberal for the next four. Marcos, a Nacionalista, was legally president for seven years before declaring martial law. This two-party cycle went through the following stages. In the first local election held after a party had won the presidency, the party in power was victorious in 75 to 82 percent of the governorship races.1 In the next presidential polls, three of the four administrations won a second term. But in the second local election under its watch, the party controlling the presidency began showing signs of slippage, with victories in only slightly more than half the contests for governor. No party ever won the presidency for a third consecutive four-year term. The clientelist theory of Philippine politics offers a persuasive explanation of the opposition party's regular success. Carl Lande shows how elite leaders of local, family-based factions in villages and towns made the lower-class electorate into their political clients.2 By using kinship and personal ties and by offering money, jobs, services, and other favors, the largely landowning elite was able to deliver the 15

16 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

votes of its primarily peasant clientele. Politicians exchanged their local vote banks for money and power from one of the national parties. These parties were little more than loose coalitions of political patrons and their clients. Because both parties were multiclass, they were not ideologically different, and party switching was endemic. The party that controlled the presidency had much greater access to government-distributed pork barrel. Many people thus defected from the opposition to the newly elected ruling party and helped it win local elections and usually a second presidential term. But the longer a party controlled the presidency, the greater the conflict over limited government resources became. Inevitably, some important members of the party in power began to feel shortchanged. The opposition could then woo them into switching parties by promising a bigger piece of the political pie after the next presidential election. The opposition's victory started this cycle again. Clientelist theory simplifies the messy reality of pre-martial law politics in the Philippines. This neat scenario does not mention the near breakdown of Philippine democracy between 1949 and 1953. Incumbent President Elpidio Quirino used fraud and terror to win the 1949 election as he bankrupted the state treasury. His victory prompted an uprising by followers of cheated challenger Jose P. Laurel, Sr., and then a discussion of an alliance between opposition politicians and the revolutionary Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB or Huk, the People's Liberation Army). Although elections were never abandoned, the 1951 legislative and 1953 presidential polls were seen "as the last clear chance to save democracy."3 Clientelist theory also overlooks the violence of pre-martial law elections, which were subject to repeated U.S. government intervention and full of moralizing by the opposition against the corruption and dictatorial tendencies of the ruling party. Like anomalies during periods of "normal science," these political phenomena, which cannot be explained by the clientelist model, do not severely undermine clientelism's analytical effectiveness.4 But if the complex nature of Philippine constitutional politics is better understood, then its breakdown and the rise of authoritarianism can be more effectively analyzed. This chapter uses the metaphor of politics as a game in order to make explicit the assumptions underlying clientelist theory and to consider aspects of Philippine politics that the theory ignores.

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 17 The Game Players

The Liberals and the Nacionalistas both sprang from the Partido Nacionalista, an ilustrado (elite, literally "enlightened") party that won control of the legislature in the first national elections held by American colonial authorities in 1907, when the right to vote was reserved for the wealthy. The Partido Nacionalista continued to dominate politics throughout the U.S. colonial era, using patron-client ties to mobilize peasant voters as suffrage gradually expanded. Politics was nonideological: party leaders, although officially favoring immediate independence, struck a modus vivendi with the colonizer in which American patronage was exchanged for acquiescence to foreign rule.5 The party was poorly institutionalized—organized around key factions and active only during elections. Twice, in 1922 and 1934, it split in two when its leaders, Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena, had a personal dispute. Unlike the Dutch in neighboring Indonesia, the Americans built a weak colonial state and quickly surrendered effective control thereof, mostly to members of the Partido Nacionalista. Woodrow Wilson appointed Francis Harrison, a U.S. congressman with ties to the New York political machine, Tammany Hall, to be governor general of the Philippines. Harrison, in consultation with Quezon and Osmena, purged American officials from all but the top government jobs and replaced them with Rlipinos under a program called Filipinization.6 In 1920 the newly established Philippine National Bank was found to have been plundered to fill Partido Nacionalista coffers.7 Corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power increased as the Partido Nacionalista monopolized politics during the Philippine Commonwealth inaugurated in 1935. Elected president, Quezon took over executive power from the American authorities who, although they retained veto powers, essentially had relinquished control of their colony. Quezon did not wait long to use his authority to secure his party's hold on office. In exchange for campaign contributions, he distributed government favors to his business cronies, including choice plots of land in the new capital named, of course, Quezon City. He refined the use of state patronage to assist his allies and harassed his opponents through government regulatory agencies. This, and the introduction of the easily manipulated block voting (allowing one vote to be cast for a party's entire slate of candidates), helped the Partido Nacionalista win an overwhelming

18 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

victory in the 1941 legislative elections. Quezon's rule became increasingly personalistic, and he even nominated his procurer of women and bodyguard for a seat in the Senate. He later persuaded the Philippine Congress to give him emergency powers and then declared that opposition parties and individual liberties were "fetishes" of democracy that had to be abandoned.8 The outbreak of World War II may well have thwarted Quezon's plans for a dictatorship. After the war, a dissident branch of the Nacionalista Party broke away to form the Liberal Party, headed by Manuel A. Roxas, the third-highest-ranking Philippine politician during the American colonial era (after Quezon and Osmena).9 The Liberals successfully contested the presidency against Nacionalista Osmena (who had become president upon Quezon's death in U.S. exile during the war) in the first elections held under the new Philippine Republic proclaimed in 1946. The Liberals differed no more from the Nacionalistas in ideology or social composition than the two branches of the Partido Nacionalista had differed from each other when Quezon and Osmena were at odds during the colonial era. The electoral system was rigged against third parties that tried to offer an alternative to the Liberals and Nacionalistas. The first of these was the Democratic Alliance formed by the Huk guerrillas, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP, the Philippine Communist Party), and peasant, labor, and professional groups.10 It elected six members to the Philippine House of Representatives in 1946 only to find them thrown out of the legislature by the two major parties on trumped-up election fraud charges. Facing military repression, the party disbanded in 1947. To prevent recurrence of this third-party "problem," the major parties revised the electoral code so that only the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties could appoint governmentpaid poll inspectors.11 Not only did the Liberals and Nacionalistas have government patronage that was denied other parties, but only their votes were likely to be counted fairly. Such discrimination prevented victories by the nationalistic National Citizens Party in 1957, the social reformist Progressive Party of the Philippines in 1957, the Grand Alliance in 1959, and the Party of Philippine Progress in 1965. These parties won neither the presidency nor any seats in Congress.12 The Liberal and Nacionalista Parties were so alike that people frequently switched between them. Local politicians, members of Congress, and even two presidential candidates changed sides.13

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 19

Many observers of Philippine politics have decided to analyze the political factions from which the parties were constructed rather than the parties themselves.14 Political factions—informal organizations within political parties based on personal networks, ideological agreement, ethnic ties, or other factors—in the pre-martial law Philippines were organized around a prominent family and their close friends. All factions had local roots, but several achieved national prominence. Elite factions, loosely allied in shifting coalitions within the two major political parties, dominated pre-martial law politics. The Object of the Political Game

Pre-martial law politics was largely about holding high public office in order to expand or protect private economic interests. Senate President Jose Avelino's infamous outburst—"What are we in power for? ... Why should we pretend to be saints when in reality we are not?"—summarizes the attitude the ruling party often took toward the state.15 Civil service appointments, pork barrel projects, the taking of bribes, the illegal sale of government licenses, and the occasional outright plundering of state financial institutions were considered prerogatives of the incumbents. Policy was subordinated to satisfying material demands of government officials and other influential. The top prize of the political game was the presidency, because the chief executive could release and transfer government funds. Although constitutionally required to pass a budget, Congress usually appropriated far more funds than state revenues could cover. (In 1968, for example, Congress passed a budget of 7.5 billion Philippine pesos when government income was only P2.5 billion.)16 To salvage state finances, the president could impound funds, releasing them only to favorite officials. In addition, the chief executive could transfer a large percentage of the budget for any purpose.17 Representatives, and to a somewhat lesser extent senators, depended on the president for their political survival and economic well-being. The Philippine vice president (who was elected separately from the president) had few formal powers, much as in the United States. The vice president was dependent on the president for an appointment to the Cabinet, which would give him some leverage on patronage decisions. But he was influential largely because he would control state finances if he succeeded the president.

20 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

How the Opposition Could Win: The Defection Strategy

Although many oppositionists joined the ruling party to receive government favors that only the Philippine president could provide, such turncoatism had its limits. The president's party followed a "minimum winning coalition" strategy of gaining enough converts to control Congress and local governments but not so many that power and patronage would have to be distributed too widely. What resources did the out-of-power party in the legislature and the localities have to survive the lean early years in opposition? The building block of Philippine politics, clientelism, enabled some antiadministration politicians to be elected even with little or no pork barrel. Patrons, usually landlords, simply translated their family network, social stature, and economic standing into tenants' votes. The power of landlord politicians diminished but did not disappear as campaign costs rose and the number of tenants working for them declined (because of the rationalization of farming methods). Two studies show that in some areas a new breed of politician emerged who built local political machines funded in large part by national patronage. But the same investigations reveal that in other parts of the country landlords retained their predominance and political control.18 These independent landlord politicians helped the opposition to survive when national patronage was scarce. But even where patronage-based machine politics had replaced the more autarkic patron-client ties of the hacienda, alternative sources of campaign funding emerged. Import substitution industrialists—that is, those producing for a protected domestic market in lieu of imports—and Chinese business leaders contributed substantially to campaigns. The imposition of foreign exchange and import controls to stem a balance-of-payments crisis in the early 1950s led to a decade of intense import substitution industrialization. This urban enclave provided campaign contributions to national leaders who, in turn, would distribute them to their local supporters.19 The economic importance of the small Philippine Chinese community (less than 1 percent of the population) was disproportionately large. In the 1950s, Chinese businesses dominated the Philippine retail and wholesale trade.20 Discrimination prevented the direct political involvement of the nonassimilated Chinese, who made sizable behindthe-scenes campaign contributions. Politicians often extorted money from the Chinese community by threatening illegal aliens with deportation, raising the price of a Philippine passport, or passing legis-

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 21

lation to curb Chinese economic activities. Though the party in power usually received more campaign money from Chinese businesses, the opposition also received some financial assistance in case it won the presidency. The opposition did not have to match the incumbents' patronage resources to defeat them. After several years in power, fights inevitably broke out in the ruling party over the fairness of government appropriations. Those who felt disadvantaged were tempted to join the opposition in hopes of doing better under a new government. Promises of future patronage by the "outs" began to exceed the amount of funds the "in" party could actually pay its supporters. With political leaders changing sides, voters proved equally fickle. James Curry argues that the governing party made "every attempt to solidify its position by offering inducement for voter support, but the bargain, at least in the Philippines, is never final, making it somewhat more like renting than buying. . . . If demands remain unsatisfied, the promise of greater inducements by the opposition turns the heads of both the voters and candidates."21 Successful presidential campaigns by the opposition in 1946, 1961, and 1965 were based on this defection strategy. The 1961 election illustrates the pattern. The Liberals had lost the presidency in 1953 and were again defeated in 1957. But their vice presidential candidate, Diosdado Macapagal, won in 1957, showing that their political fortunes were improving. Macapagal's presidential campaign four years later benefited from defections of at least nine prominent national leaders of the ruling Nacionalista Party and from the often halfhearted support that President Carlos Garcia received from those who remained.22 Perhaps most significant was the switch of former Vice President Fernando Lopez, whose family was considered the head of the so-called sugar bloc, the primus inter pares of the elite. With these new members, the Liberals had enough patron-client and campaign contribution resources to defeat the incumbent. The Rules of the Game

Defections to the opposition explain why each party was able to regain power regularly. But the success of this strategy depended on the ruling party's obedience to certain political rules. In theory these rules were the high democratic standards set in the

22 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

Philippine Constitution of 1935. In practice, however, they were the informal codes of conduct assuring that oligarchical politics in the Philippines would stay competitive. Abstract principles were less at issue than was each major national faction's chance at winning the presidency and other high public offices. Civil liberties were violated, election overspending and violence were common, and presidential power was often exercised arbitrarily. But lively media, a balance of electoral terror, limited state expenditures, and orderly succession kept the political system in the Philippines functioning. Juan J. Linz reminds us that "deviation from the democratic ideal does not necessarily constitute its denial/'23 As in pre-Bogotazo Colombia, where fraud and violence were probably even more widespread, elections in the Philippines remained a highly competitive rivalry among elites for control of the state.24 Modeled on the U.S. Bill of Rights, the 1935 Philippine Constitution protected standard political and civil liberties.25 But poor rural Filipinos had few rights compared with local elites, who were served by a submissive police force, a loyal Philippine Constabulary detachment, and corrupt courts. By contrast, in urban areas political rights, particularly freedom of the press, were largely upheld. Objective reporting was less common than harsh attacks on the enemies of newspaper, television station, and radio station owners, many of whom were faction leaders. When several major media groups turned against the president, criticism of the administration could become quite intense. But the ruling party had to be, according to David A. Rosenberg, "tolerant of the steady stream of abuse and criticism it received. Indeed, in the first quarter-century of independence, freedom of the press had become a major part of the Filipinos' claim to democratic government."26 Electoral law in the Philippines provided for regular polls and guidelines to make them fair. Elections for the presidency and the Philippine House of Representatives were held every four years. Two years after these elections, polls for governors and mayors took place. One-third of the Philippine Senate (senators served six-year terms) was elected every two years.27 The election code outlawed the carrying of guns by nonmilitary personnel. It also strictly limited campaign spending, criminalized vote buying, and prohibited partisan electioneering by civil servants.28 Filipinos complained, however, that in reality election campaigns were dominated by "guns, goons, and gold." Poll-related killings

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 23

were common. Most candidates hired bodyguards for protection or to intimidate their opponents. An estimated one-fourth of the electorate sold its vote, making Philippine elections among the most expensive in the world. For example, more than 13 percent of the state budget, or 1.6 percent of GNP, was reported to have been spent in the 1961 presidential and congressional polls.29 As for a curb on the expenditures of individual candidates, E. R. Kiunisala says that politicians "merely laughed at it. The sky is the limit for election expenses: it's an old political tradition." Likewise, government employees were active in campaigns because they "know that political pull is more effective than the civil service law."30 In spite of such brazen disregard for electoral statutes, informal limits on electioneering dictated that violence would be decentralized, watchdog institutions respected, and the fiscal viability of the state preserved. Conflicts between local factions usually led to a balance of terror. The country's armed forces could legitimately intervene when the skirmishes between rival warlords—politicians with particularly large personal armed forces called private armies —turned into full-scale battles. Strictly taboo, however, was the use of the military by the ruling party to intimidate the opposition systematically. The key watchdog of the polls was the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which was usually independent in its conduct and supervision of the polls, though its enforcement capabilities were limited. The Supreme Court remained the last resort for election disputes and often decided against the ruling party on other poll-related matters. "In 1961, for instance, the court invalidated an act enlarging and reapportioning the House of Representatives just before the election even though its ruling threw the [incumbent] Nacionalista party into turmoil and may have contributed to its subsequent defeat at the polls. But no serious consideration was apparently given to ignoring the court's ruling."31 The amount of pork barrel that could be spent safely by the ruling party was constrained by small government revenues, which averaged only about 10 percent of GNP.32 Congressional resistance to new taxes meant that additional income could not be expected. Although incumbents routinely ran large budget deficits during campaigns, they practiced austerity in oft years to balance state finances.33 The ruling party could use state revenues to fund its campaign but dared not destroy fiscal stability. A crucial but fragile rule of the political game was presidential

24 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

succession. With a stranglehold on public patronage, the Philippine president exercised an extraordinary amount of influence. It is therefore not surprising that several defeated incumbents considered retaining power.34 Yet every sitting president who lost his bid for reelection yielded office. Unlike several Latin American countries, the Philippines had no tradition of continuismo. There was no precedent for staying in office, no established formula for legitimizing it, and no guarantee that the military would accept a political innovation of this sort. Despite reluctance to surrender the perquisites of power, all incumbents before Marcos found it wiser to relinquish office. Quirino Breaks the Rules

When these informal rules were threatened, the survival of Philippine democracy was at stake. In fact the democratic political system almost broke down after the young republic's second presidential elections in 1949, in which Elpidio Quirino, who had become president after Roxas' death in 1948, sought a full term as the country's chief executive. A Filipino reporter called the 1949 elections "the most fraudulent and terroristic the country has ever had."35 Another observer noted, "Every device known to fraudulent elections was used. . . . Filipinos sadly wisecracked that even the birds and the bees voted in some provinces."36 Terror employed by proQuirino goons was widespread: "Hired killers and hoodlums of the Quirino group have broken up political meetings in the provinces, beat up oppositionist candidates and supporters and prevented certain [Jose P.] Laurel . . . followers from registering new voters."37 Instead of curbing excessive violence, the military gave warlords who were friendly with the administration free reign. In the worst case, Negros Occidental Governor Rafael Lacson fielded a private army of one to two thousand men, which was charged with assaulting or otherwise intimidating dozens of oppositionists to assure that Quirino won in Lacson's province by more than two hundred thousand votes.38 COMELEC failed to supervise the elections properly: poll inspectors were regularly bribed, voter lists were padded, voting locations were arbitrarily transferred, and block voting made fraud easy. Observers charged that as many as one-fifth of the ballots cast were spurious.39 Largely because of government overspending during the 1949 election, the country was plunged into a foreign exchange crisis.40 The budget deficit was four times larger than it had

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 25

been the year before. An adviser to U.S. President Harry Truman warned that the Philippine economy was "on the brink of collapse/'41 The fraud and terrorism of the 1949 polls made the Huk guerrillas' cry of "bullets, not ballots" more compelling, and their membership expanded rapidly, reaching a peak of 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers and a peasant support base of 1.5 million to 2 million shortly after the election.42 To help fight the communist insurgency, the government suspended the writ of habeas corpus, leading Senator Lorenzo Tariada to warn of the creation of a police state.43 The fraudulent polls and Quirino's dictatorial tendencies threatened to destroy Philippine democracy just as the Japanese occupation had during World War II: "Today another invasion threatens the life of Filipino freedom. It is an invasion within. As in war, this attack is preceded by threats, supported by arms . . . and there is talk of wounded and dead. Without free elections, the Constitution becomes a mere scrap of paper, with those in authority feeling absolutely free to disregard its mandates, being accountable to no one but themselves."44 When the opposition felt cheated in the political game, its first impulse was to rebel. Many Nacionalistas were so outraged by the Liberal government's terrorism and overspending in the 1949 election that they wanted to overthrow the regime.45 A revolt did break out for several weeks in Jose Laurel's home province of Batangas, and several military officers supporting the opposition called for armed struggle against Quirino's administration.46 But apparently Laurel thought better of it and withdrew his support for such an uprising. Laurel realized that his small group of lightly armed followers had no chance of defeating the Philippine army. But the continued threat of violence gave him leverage over the administration. To make this warning more credible, Laurel and several other Nacionalistas may have begun to explore a link with the Huk revolutionary movement, which by the early 1950s had infiltrated the foothills of Manila.47 As the Nacionalistas prepared for the 1951 senatorial elections, Laurel publicly warned Quirino that another fraudulent poll would lead the opposition to "turn off the light and start shooting."48 By putting armed muscle behind its threats, the opposition hoped to force Quirino to play fairly. Laurel was not alone in making contingency plans: in most pre-martial law presidential elections the opposition made preparations for rebellion in case the polls were rigged or the incumbent refused to stand down after defeat.49

26 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

U.S. Intervention and the Opposition's Electoral Strategy

Electoral reform was badly needed. COMELEC was able to secure a peace pact between Liberals and Nacionalistas for the 1953 presidential balloting, in which the two parties promised to obey electoral laws.50 In addition, COMELEC carried out a number of measures on its own: mandating the use of indelible ink on ballots, tightening up registration, and screening electoral inspectors and canvassers to ensure their honesty. Even more significant was the abolition of block voting. Two years before COMELEC's reforms, veterans, civic, and business groups had established the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) as a watchdog for the 1951 senatorial elections.51 NAMFREL's nationwide network of volunteers had done much to keep those polls fair, and its role in 1953 was also significant. The COMELEC reforms and the creation of NAMFREL were largely the result of U.S. pressure on the Philippine government and assistance to the opposition. The Americans were worried that the growing Huk movement would make the Philippines the next communist domino after China. In addition, Quirino's disastrous economic policies threatened the value of extensive U.S. investments on the islands. As a first step toward reform, the U.S. government persuaded Quirino to appoint one of,its close friends, Congressman Ramon Magsaysay, as secretary of defense. With Pentagon advice and funding, Magsaysay began scoring high-profile victories against the Huks and soon became the United States' choice to succeed Quirino as president. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped fund and organize NAMFREL as part of its plan to reduce cheating in Philippine elections.52 U.S. intervention in Philippine politics after independence is ignored by clientelist theorists, who have concentrated exclusively on domestic factors. Some scholars who have studied American involvement view it as an imperialistic move to force Filipinos to act according to American interests.53 Stephen R. Shalom's theory of neocolonialism is an improvement because it considers the U.S. government and Philippine elites to have been protecting their mutual interests.54 Neocolonialism, however, does not stress conflicts within the Philippine elite that led one faction to seek U.S. assistance against another. In fact U.S. government intervention was a political resource for elite groups. Occasionally the ruling party solicited U.S. support, but more often the out party requested American backing.

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 27

The opposition could appeal for assistance in reducing government corruption in order to prevent the rise of communism, which would endanger U.S. interests. The U.S. government gave substantial amounts of money to oppositionist candidates in 1953,1959, and 1961 and encouraged American businesses to contribute to "its" candidate.55 But perhaps more important than the United States' role as financier was its role as enforcer. With enormous economic and military power in the Philippines, the U.S. government could warn a sitting president not to cheat or use force to stay in office, and it did so in 1946, 1953, and to some extent 1965.56 The U.S. government was also a good publicist. The American embassy and the CIA were able to ensure that the candidate they supported got good press in the United States, and the Philippine press often took its cue from its American counterparts.57 Although the 1951 senatorial elections had been fair and the Nacionalistas had won the nine contested seats, the opposition was still worried about being cheated in the presidential polls in 1953. After all, the stakes would be higher for Quirino, who was seeking reelection. Many political pundits expected the Nacionalistas to renominate Laurel; however, Laurel felt that an old party stalwart like himself could not defeat Quirino. Rather than "rewarding those who have served longest and faithfully and with distinction in this battlescarred party/' he suggested that the Nacionalistas needed a "crusader of stout heart and in shining armor."58 The opposition recruited Ramon Magsaysay (who had to switch from the Liberal Party), not only because of his American backing but also because of his reputation for integrity. As one scholar has written, "To the general public, Magsaysay was regarded more and more as the only honest man in a corrupt administration—an administration from which he was somehow aloof."59 The selection of Magsaysay was the first step in the opposition's moral crusade: the Nacionalistas chose the candidate whose unquestioned integrity contrasted most sharply with the incumbent's corruption and who could best project moral appeals for democracy and good government. Magsaysay's presidential campaign, which many Nacionalistas referred to as the "great crusade," was based primarily on calls for ethical rejuvenation in government.60 The opposition anticipated that Quirino would use heavy spending and possibly fraud, and they countered these tactics by appealing directly to the people rather than working only through clientelist networks. Mag-

28 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

saysay claimed to be on a "crusade to save the country1' from an "old, lazy, sick, and morally weak president" who had enriched himself and his friends at the expense of the well-being of the average Filipino.61 He capitalized on the spreading sense of crisis owing to corruption, continued economic difficulties, and the persistence of the Huk rebellion (although it had subsided considerably since 1949). When Quirino accused Magsaysay of being too politically inexperienced to be president, Magsaysay used the occasion to emphasize his moral advantage: "Yes, I admit that I am inexperienced in the ways of graft, in 'ten percenting/ and still immature and ignorant of how to secure immigration quotas and how to junket abroad at the expense of the people. But I deny that I am immature and inexperienced in the service of my country."62 Magsaysay did not, however, make many class-based appeals. Although he offered vague promises of land reform, he ran on the Nacionalista Party platform, which downplayed the issue; such Nacionalista leaders as Jose P. Laurel, Sr., and Claro M. Recto were not committed to those reforms.63 But surveys show that most peasant voters did not know what Magsaysay s agrarian reform entailed. They were instead attracted by his personality and accomplishments as secretary of defense. By concentrating on moral appeals, Magsaysay could win the support of poor peasants without alienating wealthy landowners. For nearly eight months Magsaysay traveled throughout the Philippine archipelago—often reaching remote towns and barrios where no national candidate had been before—to bring his moral message directly to the voters. Nicknamed "the Guy," Magsaysay called himself a "man of the people" and claimed humble origins (although his parents were from the upper middle class). His large rallies came to be known as the Magsaysay boom. Quirino was unable to match this mobility or personableness, as he was confined to a hospital bed abroad during much of the campaign. The incumbent president relied on state patronage to oil the ruling party's extensive political machine. By contrast, writes Jose V. Abueva, "Magsaysay initiated direct, personalized appeals to the voters, short-circuiting the traditional local leaders and linking the awakened mass directly to him as prospective President."64 Upper-middle-class volunteers formed the Magsaysay for President Movement (MPM), an organization that took much of the responsibility for leading the campaign (thus antagonizing traditional Nacionalista politicians, who felt shunted aside by political novices).65

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 29

The Catholic hierarchy "laid aside, for one election, anyway, its natural reluctance to be involved in any political campaign" and strongly supported the supposedly neutral NAMFREL, which was in fact pro-Magsaysay.66 During the campaign Magsaysay received extensive funding from the U.S. government and advice from his friend American Colonel Edward Lansdale.67 It is considered no coincidence that U.S. Navy ships entered Manila Bay shortly before the election, in a kind of antifraud gunboat diplomacy.68 The U.S. government also encouraged the American press to follow the Magsaysay campaign closely. American journalists so openly favored the challenger that Philippine government officials charged twenty-five correspondents with having "unduly intervened in local elections."69 Magsaysay won in a landslide, garnering more than 70 percent of the vote. Moral Appeals in Philippine Politics

Moral appeals were the centerpiece of Magsaysay's campaign because the opposition wanted to counter Quirino's large political machine and prevent him from resorting to fraud again. But calls to save democracy and create honest government were also common in many other campaigns, although in "normal" Philippine politics they were generally subordinated to the use of patronage resources. Carl Lande has tried to fit moral appeals into clientelist theory. He argues that voter approval of the party in power undergoes a "predictable decline" because the electorate are unwilling to "countenance 'anomalies'" by their public officials.70 Yet corruption is inevitable in a clientelist system. "As all officials depend heavily for their election upon the help of petty politicians at the grass-roots level, who demand material rewards in return for their help, and upon the outright purchase of votes from the electorate at large, a politician has little choice but to employ questionable means to recoup his expenses, and this—if uncovered by his opponents—is likely to cost him popular support."71 In other words, the control of state patronage makes anomalies inevitable. But this argument does not fit into Lande's theoretical framework: the electorate s opinion of a candidate's moral character should not matter if all votes are bought either directly or through local politicians' networks, as patron-client theory suggests they are. Moral appeals have to be considered a distinct resource. Calls for ethical behavior in government can be distinguished

30 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

from efforts to win support along class lines, which usually involve promises to put the interests of a poorer class ahead of those of a richer one. Similar to American urban reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Filipino politicians making moral claims have "assumed that there existed an interest ('the public interest')" that pertained to the country " 'as a whole' and that should always prevail over competing, partial (and usually private) interests."72 The American urban reformers promised to eliminate corruption, increase efficiency, and make government more democratic. These views revealed an ethos that, according to Alexander B. Callow, Jr., "was essentially moralistic and conservative. . . . The issue was a total commitment to punishing bad men, not the examination of the institutions and conditions that made it possible for bad men to exist and thrive. To them, the cause of corruption was the work of evil men. Their optimism blinded them to the realities of a rapidly growing society, the massive growth of a great city and the effects it would have on political life."73 It is no coincidence that urban reformism in the United States and moral appeals in Philippine politics are similar. In nearly fifty years of colonialism, the Philippines adopted much of the American governmental system and political culture. One side of Philippine politics was modeled on the most immoral aspects of American machine politics, but Filipino politicians also emulated the American moral rhetoric of reform. Philippine Senator Claro M. Recto remarked bitterly in 1951, "We seem to find our models, which we have already surpassed, in those American political machines, with their Tweeds, Hagues, Pendergasts, and Huey Longs, which have been built by fraud and favor, but which even in their heyday never equalled ours/'74 Yet two years later Recto was involved in Magsaysay's crusade to defeat the corrupt incumbent president. The moral appeals heard during that campaign sound like those found in a textbook on American urban reform. Oppositionists used three kinds of moral appeals in pre-martial law campaigns. The first type warned that freedom and democracy were endangered by the authoritarian tendencies of the incumbent.75 These calls ignored the elitism of Philippine democracy, but that political system was more egalitarian than a dictatorship was pictured to be. Allegations of fraud and terrorism were also part of the opposition's rhetorical defense of freedom. Oppositionists claimed that cheating and the use of military force could doom democracy. A second form of moral attack focused on disgust at the corrup-

PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS • 3 1

tion of the incumbent administration. One senator explained his party's defeat in a senatorial election this way: "Talagang suya na ang tao sa amin [Our people are really fed up]—that's why we lost. When the people are mad, no amount of money can buy their support. This is the time-proven lesson of our political history."76 This moral advantage helped the opposition offset the extra resources of the ruling administration. After corruption had reached a certain level, many voters no longer allowed themselves to be bribed by the ruling party. Survey data showed that national politicians were seen as more corrupt than local ones: "Local politicians are less likely to be considered corrupt for two reasons: first, because they are seen directly instead of through the mass media. The image of national politicians as corrupt is drawn in large measure from the press. Second, the activities of the local politicians probably seem to be attempts to deliver goods and services to local constituents, not corruption."77 The ruling party found itself in a terrible bind. It had to deliver patronage to local politicians to maintain their support, but the means it used to do so were called corruption by the national media. The opposition thus had another opportunity to win power. Finally, the opposition could draw on the awa (pity) and damay (empathy) of the electorate, emotions associated with the pasyon (Christ's passion) in Philippine folk religion.78 If oppositionists were considered unfairly punished or disadvantaged, especially if candidates were physically harmed, then the people would root for them. The death of Moises Padilla, a mayoral candidate who was killed in a Negros Occidental town in 1951 by armed men in the employ of the notorious Governor Lacson, is one such example. Padilla was called a martyr of democracy, and one reporter portrayed him as Christ-like and used religious symbolism in recounting his story.79 The outrage after his death, which was blamed on the national administration that tolerated such warlords as Lacson, helped the opposition sweep to a victory in the Senate. Arthur Alan Shantz argues that moral appeals were crucial to winning votes in urban areas, where the middle class and the media took the lead in denouncing the corruption of the incumbent party.80 Nationwide survey data gathered in 1969, however, suggests that all Filipinos—urban or rural, rich or poor—based their votes primarily on the moral character of presidential candidates (table 1.1). This survey has been criticized because it did not define "honesty" and ignored studies of local politics showing that people often vote based on the patronage resources they receive.81 Moral appeals

32 • PRE-MARTIAL LAW PHILIPPINE POLITICS

Table 1.1 Criteria considered important in choosing a president Criterion Honesty of candidate Help given your area General policy of candidate Candidate comes from your area Promise of help to your area Party of candidate Close friends' or compadres' attitude toward candidate

Respondents who consider each criterion important (%) 90 65 57 50 32 32 16

Adapted from: Averch, Koehler, and Denton, Matrix of Policy, p. 36. Copyright © 1971 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted/reproduced by permission of Princeton University Press.

were indeed predicated on a general notion of the public interest, but that did not make them less effective. Often they were not heeded, and the electorate voted according to the incentives they had received. But when indignation against the ruling party was strong enough, voters would respond to the opposition's cry (which Corazon Aquino repeated in 1986): "Tanggapin ang pera, ilagay sa bulsa, pero Oposisyon ang balota" [Take the money, put it in your pocket, but vote for the opposition].82 In other elections, moral appeals, coercion, and U.S. intervention were used, but they were secondary to the bread and butter of "normal" Philippine politics: patronage. Threats of rebellion or an electoral moral crusade were always possible, however, if an incumbent president started to consider staying in power. Ferdinand Marcos won reelection in 1969 only by breaking the rules of the Philippine political game. The opposition not only deplored his morals but matched his violence, thereby creating the most polarized atmosphere in Philippine politics since 1949.

1

The Collapse of Philippine Democracy

Saw the film Julius Caesar. ... Superb acting but it reminded me of the conspiracy going on now against me by all the envious men who had failed. Remind me to have the guards around me always. I have often wondered why Caesar had no protection when he was assassinated. —Ferdinand E. Marcos, diary entry, March 1,1970 Has the alleged greed of a certain individual acquired imperial dimensions? Marcos Augustus? ... Who knows, we may one day wake up to find an empire in our—or his?—hands. —Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., March 27, 1971

In many ways Marcos was a Filipino Caesar. Even before he established a dictatorship, he had crossed the political Rubicon by using military force to an unprecedented extent in order to win a second term as president in 1969. By spending more patronage resources than any Philippine president had before, Marcos wrecked the economy. Once reelected, he showed an unwillingness to surrender office at the end of his constitutionally final term. He suspended the writ of habeas corpus, floated plans to field his wife as a presidential candidate, manipulated the Constitutional Convention, and threatened to declare martial law. The traditional opposition considered itself not a power-hungry Cassius but an honorable Brutus trying to save the country's democracy. Anti-Marcos politicians felt justified in using coercion, as oppositionists had in 1949, to topple the president or at least force him to hold fair elections. Elite oppositionists supported demonstrations against the government, cooperated with communists and Muslim secessionists, tried to constitutionally ban Marcos from holding office, and even attempted to assassinate him. When the opposition swept the 1971 local and senatorial elections, the party expected to emulate Magsaysay's 1953 triumph with a landslide victory in 1973 over Marcos or his handpicked successor. 33

34 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

In spite of their short-term success, Marcos' opponents were unable to keep him from declaring martial law in 1972. By fighting Marcos' authoritarian ambitions so vigorously, the opposition had polarized the political climate, thereby making martial law an attractive alternative for many Filipinos and foreigners. Although traditional oppositionists were poised to win the next presidential election, Marcos had won the loyalty of the military and the U.S. government, the crucial constituencies he needed in order to implement dictatorial rule. Some theorists suggest that clientelist politics in the Philippines had been in decline long before the declaration of martial law.1 Campaign costs increased as machine politics replaced traditional landlord-tenant relations in some areas, political competition intensified as the economic stakes grew, and the electorate expanded because of rapid population growth. As demands for national government patronage to cover these growing electoral expenses multiplied, the fiscal stability of a state with limited revenue-generating capacity was strained. The financial crisis precipitated by Marcos' overspending in the 1969 election was only the culmination of this cycle. Several scholars have claimed that the campaign-related killings during Marcos' rule merely continued the trend of earlier administrations.2 If patron-client ties had in fact weakened, then perhaps politicians had to employ force more frequently to win at the polls. Martial law was declared, according to this view, when elections had finally caused the fiscal collapse of government and intolerable levels of bloodshed. Overspending and Violence during Elections under Marcos

Such structural arguments about the vulnerability of clientelist democracy do not pay sufficient attention to the abnormal political behavior of President Marcos. Campaign costs did increase in the 1950s and 1960s, and the government did run deficits to finance ruling-party candidates. But Presidents Garcia and Macapagal practiced austerity during years in which no polls were held and never precipitated an economic crisis by overspending during elections. Marcos, by contrast, ran deficits even in off years to fund a massive infrastructure program that was parceled out for maximum political advantage (table 2.1).3 According to one estimate, Marcos spent $250 million in 1969 on his reelection drive.4 Another writer calculated that Marcos' cam-

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 35

Table 2.1 Government net receipts in election and nonelection years, 1957-1968 Year

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

President election election election election election election

Garcia Garcia Garcia Garcia Garcia Macapagal Macapagal Macapagal Macapagal Marcos Marcos Marcos

Net receipts (million Philippine pesos) -123.4 17.8 -60.7 46.9 -159.2 88.8 -110.0 75.3 -208.2 -86.7 -120.8 -85.3

Adapted from: Averch, Koehler, and Denton, Matrix of Policy, p. 101. Copyright © 1971 by PUP. Reprinted/reproduced by permission of Princeton University Press.

paign expenditures were greater than all previous pre-martial law presidential campaigns put together.5 Arthur Alan Shantz offers a more conservative figure, suggesting that Marcos formally spent just $10 million to 13 million on his campaign, a little more than twice the amount his opponent raised. But Shantz also shows that the government's election-related spending may have reached as much as P850 million (then about $200 million). Moreover, the "Marcos style" of dispensing cash directly to local officials revolutionized the art of patronage politics in the Philippines.6 Because the government was already burdened with debt incurred in the nonelection years, Marcos' heavy spending during the 1969 polls caused the Philippines' worst fiscal catastrophe since President Quirino's heavy expenditures in the 1949 elections.7 The number of poll-related killings increased during Marcos' presidency. Donald Lane Berlin points out that after military electioneering under President Quirino, the armed forces remained relatively neutral during the Magsaysay, Garcia, and Macapagal administrations.8 But Marcos undertook the largest reorganization of the armed forces in Philippine history, promoting his relatives and loyalists to top positions. During his first term in office several special forces were established; these paramilitary groups were ostensibly assigned to fight communists but often were linked to pro-Marcos

36 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

politicians and turned their guns on traditional oppositionists.9 This military reorganization and paramilitary activity lent credibility to a speech given by Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., in 1968. He charged that the administration was turning the country into a "garrison state" in which "our armed forces are undergoing . . . a reorientation and redirection geared fundamentally to suit and advance the aims of President Marcos."10 Local elections were usually more violent than presidential polls because provincial politicians were competing for their own political survival. The level of violence during nonpresidential elections was relatively constant from the mid-1950s until the particularly violent election of 1967, the first local polls held under Marcos (table 2.2). More than twice as many killings occurred in the 1967 election as in any other in that period. It is impossible to say how much of this bloodshed is directly attributable to Marcos, but the sharp rise in electoral violence is perhaps best explained by his aggressive efforts —including the use of military and paramilitary forces—to secure victories for the ruling party even in provinces and towns where the opposition previously had a secure hold on office. Many anti-Marcos politicians reacted violently, which may have contributed as much to the growing death toll as the administration's own actions. The 1969 presidential elections were also marred by terror, although official statistics record less violence than in 1967.11 COMELEC reported terrorist acts in twelve provinces. Many were attributed to special forces of the Philippine Constabulary, whose chief, Brigadier General Vicente R. Raval—Marcos' crony from World War II— openly defied COMELEC during the elections.12 As Berlin writes, "Not since the very first presidential political contests of the independent Philippines, those of 1946,1949, and 1953, was military electioneering so extensive."13 Marcos not only violated previous limits on campaign expenditures and poll violence but also disregarded the iron law of premartial law politics: orderly presidential succession. Marcos began warning as early as February 1970 that he might declare martial law, and he repeated this threat many times in the next two years. The Philippine president also suggested that his wife, Imelda Marcos, might run for president, because he was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term. In August 1971 he suspended the writ of habeas corpus after a bombing at a Liberal Party political rally at Plaza Miranda in Manila. When the Supreme Court upheld the legality of Marcos' act in Lansang v. Garcia, oppositionists (correctly, it

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 37

Table 2.2 Deaths and injuries during nonpresidential elections, 1955-1967 Year

President

1955 1959 1963 1967

Magsaysay Garcia Macapagal Marcos

Deaths

Injuries

34 24 23 75

38 — 59 108

Sources: Philippines Free Press, November 17, 1969, pp. 5, 63; Philippines Free Press, November 12, 1955, p. 8. The figure for 1959 is from Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict, pp. 143 and 183. Note: Election-related death counts are often unreliable. Because of the high level of everyday violence in the Philippines, it is hard to determine which deaths and injuries are election related. Even if the numbers are not exact, however, the relation between the years can be established by using a consistent source, Philippine Constabulary figures quoted in the Philippines Free Press. The figures for 1959, for which this source was not available, are from Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict. Wolters compiled his figures from reports in the press, and his figures for the other years indicate an even greater increase in electoral violence under Marcos, from 24 killed in 1959 to 128 killed in 1967.

turned out) claimed that he had received a blank check for martial law.14 Talk of martial law escalated again in the summer of 1972 and peaked in early September when Senator Aquino exposed Oplan Sagittarius, a military blueprint for martial law, supposedly approved by Marcos. Never before had a Philippine president explored so many ways to keep himself in power. The Opposition's Anger

After the 1969 elections the Philippines Free Press reported, "No election since 1949 has touched off louder cries of fraud and terrorism than the last one/'15 Many people believed that Marcos had ignored "with impunity the ground rules of our kind of politics."16 One Philippine magazine editorialized that "after exactly twenty years, our nation seems to have gone a full vicious circle. All the constituent elements that earned for the Quirino Administration the unmitigated opprobrium of the people appear to be present in the Marcos administration."17 The traditional opposition's reaction echoed the uprising of Laurel's followers in 1949. After the 1969 polls "highstrung partisans" of defeated presidential candidate Sergio Osmena, Jr., warned of "revolution and assassination."18 Marcos' second term began with the so-called Rrst Quarter

38 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

Storm. For the first three months of 1970 often-violent student demonstrations, directed at both Marcos and the U.S. government, engulfed Manila.19 The First Quarter Storm has been explained as the "outpouring of popular anger/'20 The demonstrations were led by both radical and moderate student groups. Moderate groups, such as the National Union of Students headed by Edgar Jopson (a student of the Jesuit University, Ateneo de Manila), organized several rallies. The Maoist Kabataang Makabayan (KM, Patriotic Youth), founded by Jose Maria Sison, often held demonstrations that turned into riots. Marcos has stated that opposition politicians helped organize, fund, and publicize the student protests, and his claim may be at least partially true.21 Osmena was in close contact with radical students and their eminence grise, Jose Sison, after the 1969 election.22 Sison had reportedly met with Liberal "Young Turks"—Benigno Aquino, Jr., Ramon Mitra, Jovito Salonga, and Gerardo Roxas—as early as October 1968.23 According to one source, Aquino had several student radicals on his payroll.24 Aquino also had ties to moderate student activists. His brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa, was a major financier of a leading Christian democratic group.25 In a Senate privilege speech, Aquino praised the activists, saying that he and his Liberal colleagues "felt that our place was with the students/' and condemned police suppression of their demonstrations.26 In addition to working directly with the leaders of the demonstrations, the traditional opposition also ensured that the First Quarter Storm protesters received sympathetic treatment from much of the Manila media. Former radical student leader Fernando Barican described the positive reaction of the press as the most significant contribution that the old-guard opposition made to the student protests.27 The most pro-student, anti-Marcos newspapers and magazines were owned by oligarchs who either were allied with opposition politicians or had been alienated by the administration.28 The Roceses, publishers of the Manila Times and several other newspapers, were close allies of Senator Aquino. Graphic magazine publisher J. Antonio Araneta, one of the richest industrialists in the country, was related by marriage to the Liberal Party president, Senator Gerardo Roxas. Teodoro Locsin, another of Aquino's allies, often presented the students' social revolutionary demands positively in his Philippines Free Press despite harshly quelling a labor strike among his own staff members. The Jacinto family founded the antiadministration Asia-Philippines Leader after Marcos cut govern-

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 39

ment subsidies to their steel plant and backed a rival project.29 Among the president's most dangerous opponents were the Lopez brothers—Philippine Vice President Fernando and Manila Chronicle publisher Eugenio. The Lopezes and their Manila Chronicle had been pro-Marcos in the 1969 campaign in which Fernando was reelected vice president. But they turned on Marcos when he would not let them build a lubricating oil factory and a petrochemical complex, or purchase Caltex Philippines and the reclaimed areas of Laguna Bay for an industrial complex.30 By supporting the student demonstrations, the opposition was able to tarnish Marcos' reputation within a year. Like Richard Nixon after his record-breaking reelection in 1972, Marcos had seemed to be in a strong position at the beginning of his second term. But the First Quarter Storm soon left him as discredited and embittered as Nixon would be after the Watergate revelations. Although most Manilenos disagreed with the radicals' revolutionary aims, the demonstrators succeeded, with the help of sympathetic media, in creating a generalized sense of instability and crisis and in making Marcos appear responsible for the social ills that led to the protests.31 Cries of revolution by student demonstrators in Manila were bolstered by reports coming from Central Luzon in the early 1970s of a new communist insurgency. At the same time, the Manila media began discussing the emergence of a Muslim secessionist guerrilla movement in Mindanao and Sulu. Although traditional oppositionists blamed Marcos for the conditions that fostered these new armed groups, some oppositionists were in fact involved in their formation. The old-guard opposition was brazenly double-crossing Marcos, denouncing "social causes" of demonstrations and guerrilla warfare while secretly assisting their organizers, the communists and Muslim secessionists. But the opposition planned not only to erode Marcos1 popularity but also to challenge his coercive advantage in many provinces. The president's deployment of government paramilitary forces in the 1967 and 1969 elections made it difficult for provincial candidates not allied with Marcos to maintain the balance of terror with their own private armies, By working with the new communist party and a Muslim secessionist movement, traditional leaders were able to add muscle to their local election campaigns. Politicians in Tarlac and other Central Luzon provinces often sought contact with the Huk guerrilla army, which, after years of decline, had degenerated into banditry. The mafia-like Huks had to be placated and could be used for particularly persuasive electoral

40 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

"campaigning."32 It is therefore not surprising that Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., a Tarlaqueno with a large private army, had close ties to the Huks.33 Marcos, charging Aquino (who was then Tarlac governor) with "Huk coddling," sent paramilitary troops into the province, which led to considerable bloodshed.34 Fearing military repression, the Huks distanced themselves from Aquino. To restore the balance in Tarlac, Aquino assisted a Huk renegade, Commander Dante (Bernabe Buscayno).35 Disillusioned with the Huk's corruption, Dante was determined to build a disciplined communist guerrilla force. Commander Sumulong of the Huks charged that Aquino and his political sidekick, Congressman Jose Yap, "poisoned Dante's mind so that they could use him and his men in intimidating voters in the election."36 Aquino reportedly let Dante and his armed band use Hacienda Luisita (his wife's family plantation) as a training ground, provided the rebels with food and medicine, and printed Dante's book on good guerrilla behavior.37 Aquino, however, was not content to be just another politician with a Huk in his pocket. Gregg Jones, in an authoritative account of the origins of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), reports that Aquino arranged for Dante to meet Sison, who had just founded a communist party based on Maoist principles.38 The rendezvous in early 1969 led to the merger of Dante's peasant army and Sison s party of student activists. They formed the New People's Army (NPA), which would later become the most potent revolutionary force in the Philippines since the Huks at their height in the early 1950s. Aquino was hoping that out of this seemingly paradoxical alliance a strong guerrilla army would emerge to help him fight the dangerously powerful Philippine president. A military task force that was sent into Tarlac to hunt down the new guerrilla group forced the NPA to largely abandon the province by late 1970. But the group then moved to Isabela province, where Aquino's ally Faustino Dy was preparing to run for governor in 1971. Dy was accused of meeting with Sison to discuss the NPA'S guerrilla base in the province.39 The government thus sent the military task force Lawin to Isabela to fight the NPA. Another prominent oppositionist closely associated with Aquino, Chavit Singson, was also accused of cooperation with the NPA.40 Singson complained that the military was partial to his rival, Congressman Floro Crisologo.41 Before the 1971 election, Aquino said, "If Singson makes it in Ilocos Sur and Dy in Isabela, I don't care if we lose everywhere else. Our cause will have been vindicated. These are the two spots most cruelly

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 41

oppressed by the Marcos military machine. If we win in them, then we know we have pierced his armor. That's consolation enough/'42 In bloody contests, both Dy and Singson won in 1971, showing that candidates who had Aquino's, and possibly the NPA'S, support could play politics rough enough to beat the administration at its own deadly game. Marcos' militarization of electoral politics led to retaliation not only by politicians in Manila, who supported student demonstrations, and those in Central Luzon, who backed a new communist party, but also by traditional oppositionists in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu, who helped launch a secessionist movement. Tensions had risen in Muslim Mindanao after several Marcos-backed candidates mounted strong electoral challenges to previously secure ruling clans, most notably the Matalams, Alontos, and Lucmans.43 Muslim oppositionists looked for outside assistance in their bloody factional conflicts with pro-administration candidates who often had the backing of militias. The so-called Jabidah massacre of Muslim-Filipino soldiers by their military superiors provided them with the pretext.44 In March 1968 a military trainee was fished out of Manila Bay off Cavite province and brought to the governor, Delfin Montano, a vocal critic of Marcos. Montano called in his Liberal allies Senator Aquino and Congressman Raschid Lucman, who heard the survivor's tale of the shooting of Muslim special troops after a mutiny on Corregidor Island, where they were training. Aquino denounced the killings in the Senate, and Lucman helped two Muslim student activists, Nurulladji Misauri and Abul Khayr Alonto, organize demonstrations.45 Lucman—whose checkered past included a scam involving a ship used to transport Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, rumors of timber concessions, and establishment of a large private army—saw political advantage in helping the young Muslims.46 For his part, Misauri felt that he needed the support of traditional political leaders (even though he was a radical and highly critical of the feudal politics of the prominent Muslim families) to realize his hopes for an independent Islamic state. In alliance with the young Muslim activists, old-guard Muslim politicians set up several armed secessionist groups. Datu Matalam founded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) six weeks after the Jabidah massacre. The group's manifesto, which Misauri helped write, allowed Matalam to enlist his private army (estimated by the government at 800 members) in the Islamic cause. A worried Marcos

42 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

met with Matalam, appointed him presidential adviser on Muslim affairs, and gave him his gold watch.47 Similarly, in September 1969 Domocao Alonto established Ansar el Islam, which also had in its ranks a number of student activists and, according to military intelligence, 150 armed troops. Other secessionist organizations were established with the help of traditional oppositionists in Zamboanga, Jolo, and Basilian.48 During the 1971 election campaigns, a number of ethnically related massacres took place. Partisans of the MIM in Cotabato clashed repeatedly with a Christian paramilitary group called the Ilagas (Rats). In Lanao del Norte, where the pro-Marcos Dimaporo clan defeated its Christian Liberal Party rivals, the ethnic struggle was reversed: Muslims were backed by the Marcos administration and Christians were in the opposition. Violence briefly subsided in the entire Lanao region after the polls, but a runoff election two weeks later revived, in both provinces, the "Muslim-Christian" conflict. Because the two religious groups took a different side in each province, however, the so-called religious conflict that broke out shortly before the declaration of martial law should be understood largely as part of the struggle between Marcos and the traditional opposition.49 Record Violence and the 1971 Election Comeback

The human cost of this heightened factional conflict was high. The 1971 election was the most violent in Philippine history, with 223 people reported killed and 250 wounded. Of the electionrelated deaths, 73 occurred in the six provinces (of a total of forty-five provinces in which killings were reported) where traditional politicians were allied with either communists or Muslim secessionists (table 2.3).50 Other factors of course were involved in these high levels of bloodshed, but the existence of new armed groups made violent confrontation more likely. The increased bloodshed may have helped the opposition, which in 1967 had won only one of the gubernatorial races in these critical provinces. With their added coercive resources in 1971, however, the Liberals were victorious in three of the six provinces where Liberal politicians were said to have helped the NPA or Muslim secessionists.51 Two years after its 1969 electoral debacle in presidential elections, the opposition came back to win senatorial and local elections.

THE COLLAPSE OF P H I L I P P I N E DEMOCRACY • 43

Table 2.3 Number of people killed during the 1971 election in provinces in which oppositionist politicians backed communists or Muslim secessionists National rank 1 2 2 6 12 27

Province Cotabato Ilocos Sur Sulu Lanao del Sur Tarlac Isabela

Deaths 19 17 17 11 6 3

Source: Filemon V. Tutay,"Bloodiest Election Yet," Philippines Free Press, November 20, 1971, p. 4.

The victory in 1971 fits the earlier two-party cycle in the Philippines. After six years in office, Marcos' Nacionalista Party was riven by defections that badly weakened it electorally. Yet the defectors were more prominent than ever: Vice President Fernando Lopez, Speaker of the House Jose Laurel, Jr., head of the Nacionalista Party and Senate President Gil Puyat, and Senators Salvador Laurel, Eva Estrada Kalaw, and Jose Diokno. Moreover, the intensity of their turncoatism was unprecedented. Salvador Laurel was active in the Senate investigation of one of the worst pre-martial law scandals, the socalled Golden Buddha affair.52 A media war had broken out between Marcos and the Lopez brothers, with the Manila Chronicle running daily front-page lampoons of the Philippine president. Perhaps most embarrassing for the administration, the Lopezes apparently encouraged American starlet Dovie Beams, who was having an affair with Marcos, to play tapes of her bedroom trysts with the president at a press conference.53 Marcos had angered his Nacionalista Party mates by committing two political sins. First, he did not pass state patronage around as incumbent presidents usually did but concentrated it in the hands of his family and friends. Second, Marcos threatened to propose his wife, Imelda, as Nacionalista presidential candidate in 1973. Salvador Laurel, Fernando Lopez, and other presidential aspirants expected the nominee to come from another faction in the party; it was unprecedented for one clan to dominate the presidency indefinitely. A spokesman for the Laurels summed up this sentiment with a pun:

44 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

he said that the president was turning the NP (Nacionalista Party) into the MP (Marcos Party).54 Discontented Nacionalistas provided patronage resources for the opposition. Eugenio Lopez probably supplied the Liberals with material support, which added to the already substantial campaign contributions made by other rich industrialists, such as Salvador Araneta.55 Although Marcos outspent the opposition again in 1971, most observers did not believe the gap was as great as it had been in 1969.56 Dissident Nacionalistas also helped deliver their bailiwicks to the opposition through their patron-client ties. For example, in Batangas province, in which Nacionalista senatorial candidates normally swept 8-0, the Liberals won 6-2 in 1971. They were victorious largely because the dominant Nacionalista politicians in the province—Jose Diokno and the Laurel brothers, Salvador and Jose Jr.— supported most of the Liberal Party senatorial bets.57 Alliances with extremist groups and defections within the Nacionalista Party had increased the opposition's coercive and financial resources in the 1971 election. But the Liberals had another political resource that was probably even more important: moral appeals. Since the 1969 polls, opposition newspapers and speeches had attacked Marcos' integrity with a harshness unseen since the "great crusade" against Quirino in the early 1950s. But the bombing of a Liberal Party senatorial rally at Plaza Miranda, Manila, in August 1971 infused the diatribes against Marcos with new enthusiasm. Two grenades were hurled at the speakers' platform, killing several bystanders and severely injuring a number of prominent Liberal politicians. The opposition immediately blamed Marcos, whose charge that the communists had planted the bomb was dismissed as ridiculous.58 By suspending the writ of habeas corpus after the bombing, Marcos seemed to show that the opposition's warnings of dictatorship were justified. Liberal senatorial candidate Jovito Salonga, who was victorious in 1971, described the opposition's Manichaean vision of the bombing and its aftermath: "It was a night of shame. It was a night of violence. The forces of evil apparently triumphed Suddenly the skies all over the country darkened. The President suspended the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, and threatened immediate arrests of so-called Communist suspects. . . . The night of shame and terror was transformed into a day of victory for the Filipino people."59 By characterizing the bomb's threat to democracy in quasi-religious terms, Salonga could equate the victory of the Liberals with the salvation of the people.

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 45

Preparing for 1973

After their victory in 1971, the Liberals could "smell political blood in the air" for the 1973 presidential election.60 For the first time since 1951, the ruling party had lost a senatorial election held before a presidential poll (table 2.4). In that year the opposition had defeated Quirino's candidates in a foreshadowing of Magsaysay's overwhelming victory for the presidency in 1953. The Liberals' triumph in the 1971 senatorial elections seemed to show that public opinion had shifted equally decisively against Marcos. The opposition's high hopes for the 1973 presidential election would be dashed, however, if the Constitutional Convention, convened in 1971, opted to change the country's government to a parliamentary system, as Marcos proposed.61 Marcos could then become prime minister, thus circumventing the presidential two-term limit. To stop Marcos, the opposition not only favored retaining the presidential system but proposed banning Marcos from any public office no matter what form of government was chosen. But Marcos soon gained the upper hand at the convention by bribing delegates en masse. Although a delegate exposed the payoffs, the parliamentary system was adopted and the "ban Marcos" resolution defeated.62 Oppositionists grew desperate in their efforts to force Marcos to surrender power. Political assassination had been practiced locally since the commonwealth era. Marcos himself had been convicted of assassinating his father's political opponent in 1935 (although thanks to Salvador Laurel's father, Jose, then Supreme Court chief justice, Marcos was exonerated on appeal). But national politics had Table 2.4 Number of Senatorial seats won by the ruling party and the opposing party in nonpresidential elections Year

Ruling party

Opposing party

1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971

6 0 7 5 4 6 2

2 9 1 3 4 1 6

Note: In 1967 one independent candidate was elected. Nine candidates were elected in 1951 because an extra seat was contested to fill a vacancy.

46 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

been more civil—no president or cabinet official had been murdered during the republic. The only other president who was reported to have faced an assassination plot was Quirino, and the opposition also had accused him of stealing an election and plotting in order to stay in office.63 Apparently several leaders of the opposition rationalized breaking the taboo on killing an incumbent president by arguing that Marcos threatened to destroy the system altogether. Observers of Philippine politics have long been skeptical of Marcos' claim that Sergio Osmena, Jr., and the Lopez brothers were trying to kill him; however, Marcos implicated a number of persons who, when interviewed, confirmed most of these charges.64 Eight assassination attempts in 1972 were foiled by Marcos' tight security, infiltration of the conspiracy, and the plotters' bad luck and incompetence.65 But the conspirators were not short on imagination. They planned, among other things, to dynamite the road on which Marcos would drive, bomb his speaker's platform, blow him up on a golf green, explode a flagpole, employ an assassin who would escape in a scuba suit, and shoot Marcos from a soundproofed Volkswagen Kombi painted with the insignia of the World Health Organization and parked outside the presidential palace, Malacanang. In 1971 traditional oppositionists had electorally punished Marcos for breaking the informal political rules. His use of military intervention in local elections had been answered in some provinces with support for communists and Muslim secessionists. His monopolization of state patronage resources had been addressed through attrition within his own party—most notably the Laurels and the Lopezes. Above all, the opposition had launched a moral crusade against Marcos similar to Magsaysay's against Quirino. The opposition failed, however, to keep Marcos from trying to change the political game entirely. By further polarizing the political climate, the opposition played into Marcos' hands. After blaming the opposition for demonstrations, Marcos started funding student groups of his own.66 He wrote in his diary that he hoped such protests would continue "so that we could employ the total solution."67 He consistently exaggerated the threat that Marxist and Islamic rebels posed to the government. His agents had infiltrated the assassination conspiracy, and he later used their information to extort properties from wealthy enemies. Several intelligence officials have attributed to Marcos a series of bombings that occurred in the Manila area shortly before martial law.68 After rebelling against Marcos in February 1986, Juan Ponce Enrile admit-

THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY • 47

ted that the ambush of his car, which Marcos claimed had precipitated the declaration of martial law, was faked. As in George Orwell's Animal Farm, the opposition (like Snowball) was winning elections, but Marcos gained the loyalty of the military (Napoleon's dogs), which proved more decisive in the end. He reshuffled military commanders once again shortly before martial law to make sure he had their absolute loyalty. The officers of the Rolex Twelve, so named because the president gave them each a watch, helped Marcos plan martial law months in advance.69 His constant warnings about threats from the "oligarchy," communists, and Muslim secessionists may have convinced many military men that national security was endangered. Before declaring martial law, Marcos increased the size of the armed forces from 45,000 to 60,000 and more than doubled their budget. In a survey taken shortly before martial law most of the country's top officers approved of emergency rule.70 Similarly, Marcos had won the trust of U.S. government officials while discrediting his opponents, particularly Aquino. Marcos signaled to the Americans that their military bases were safe with him (although at a higher rent). After the 1971 election, Marcos packed his Cabinet with technocrats who had been trained in the United States and were respected by the Americans. Marcos convinced the U.S. government that he would protect its interests: although the United States strongly criticized Korean President Park Chung Hee's declaration of martial law, Marcos' turn to authoritarianism one month earlier sparked little American protest. Moreover, the U.S. government substantially increased military and economic aid to the Philippines under the new dictatorship. Marcos also courted American businesses by promising to overturn Supreme Court decisions that endangered the property rights of foreign businesses in the Philippines. The letter of congratulations that the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent to Marcos after the declaration of martial law was his reward for skillful handling of American business executives. But Marcos was not content to prove his credentials to the United States; he destroyed the opposition's at the same time. When Marcos told Henry Kamm of the New York Times that Aquino was a communist, Aquino responded, "The question arises: why did he say these things to a New York Times correspondent and, later on, to a Newsweek writer? I think one of his purposes was to frighten away American support of Liberal Party candidates.... Here, pointing at me, is

48 • THE COLLAPSE OF PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY

an Allende, the Philippine counterpart of the Chilean Communist who is giving the Americans such trouble."71 Aquino was not a radical but a traditional politician who worked with the communists when it suited his interests. In the old democratic system such an arrangement might well have been successful. Few observers doubt that Aquino would have been elected had polls been held in 1973.72 Instead of a contest to elect a president, however, there was a contest to determine whether martial law would succeed, which depended largely on military and U.S. approval. In such a competition, Aquino's ties to the radical Left were certainly not helpful. Just before martial law, Aquino seems to have realized how precarious his position had become and, out of desperation, apparently told the U.S. embassy that if he were elected president, he would declare martial law to bring order to the country.73 But once Aquino had accepted this undemocratic theory, Occam's razor applied. If martial law were necessary, then why should the United States not support Marcos, who already was president and did not have dangerous connections to the communists? So instead of becoming president, Aquino became Marcos' first political prisoner, charged as a subversive. The likely winner under the old rules, Aquino became a victim when the rules were altered.

1

Sultanistic Rule and the Demobilization of the Opposition

The martial law regime of Marcos was nothing but an ill-disguised plot to perpetuate himself, his wife and/or son in power by consolidating the political and economic resources of the country under his control. —Primitive Mijares, February 20,1975 Before martial law, opposition politicians used to talk and talk without thinking. Under martial rule, they now think and think without talking. —Attributed to Jovito Salonga

Upon the declaration of martial law on September 22, 1972, elitedominated political parties that competed in free elections were replaced by a system controlled by Marcos' family and friends, who reaped the rewards of the state.1 The opposition had expected to win presidential polls scheduled for the following year, but under authoritarian rule, elections were canceled while Marcos quickly achieved a monopoly on violence and vastly increased his clique's economic base. Most anti-Marcos politicians were demobilized not by arrests or military repression but by Marcos1 monopolization of patronage, which they could no longer win back electorally. From Clientelism to Sultanism

Before martial law, the quest for state patronage, which is at the heart of the clientelistic system, was tempered by democratic constraints. The media and opposing parties exposed government corruption, and occasionally the accused were brought to court. Tightly contested elections forced the ruling party to distribute patronage widely in order to win. These polls remained competitive because the press was free, campaign spending by the ruling party was restrained by the state's limited fiscal capabilities, and the mili49

50 • SULTANISTIC RULE

tary and other government institutions remained neutral. Each major party regularly had its turn in power. With polls canceled, the press censored, Congress abolished, and the courts tamed, restraints on Marcos' accumulation of wealth were removed. There were no independent newspapers or congressional committees to expose corruption or independent courts to punish it. Without elections, Marcos could allocate patronage as he wished. While office holders and voters missed the perks handed out during campaigns, Marcos1 family and friends enjoyed the privileges of power.2 As Robert Shaplen has written, Marcos "shared an endless bounty of profits derived from government-sponsored contracts and concessions as well as private deals . . . with his wife and relatives, and with selected friends who belonged to his inner entourage and became part of the functioning Marcos dynasty."3 Clientelism under democracy had degenerated into sultanism— personal rule without ideological or institutional constraints— under dictatorship. Philippine politics had traditionally involved not a clash of party ideologies but a pursuit of factional gain. Now the limitations imposed by the old democratic system had been removed as well. The academic literature on regimes distinguishes among types of nondemocratic rule, and the terms totalitarianism and authoritarianism have become well established.4 Totalitarianism is monistic (but not monolithic) rule with a guiding ideology and extensive mobilization by the regime. Authoritarianism allows limited pluralism and does not engage in extensive mobilization. It lacks a guiding ideology but has distinctive mentalities. Despite the differences between totalitarianism and authoritarianism, both are institutionalized forms of nondemocratic rule. Power is exercised either according to ideological principles and through a totalitarian party (under totalitarianism) or in line with a specific mentality and through a ruling party or state institution (the military, for example), within ill-defined but usually predictable limits (under authoritarianism). In sultanism, by contrast, power is exercised in a largely uninstitutionalized fashion because such key state institutions as the military are "patrimonialized" by the ruler and his clique (all sultanistic dictators so far have been men, although their wives or female relatives are often politically important). Nor are personal rulers constrained by an ideology or even distinctive mentalities. Given the ruler's discretion and lack of ideological constraints,

SULTANISTIC RULE • 5 1

plundering of the state treasury and the economy is a key feature of sultanism. A sultanistic dictator exercises power not for a particular class but for the benefit of family and friends. Juan J. Linz elaborates on the consequences of this manner of using authority: "The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler become blurred. He and his collaborators, with his consent, . . . appropriate public funds freely, establish profit-oriented monopolies, and demand gifts and payoffs from business for which no public accounting is given; the enterprises of the ruler contract with the state, and the ruler often shows his generosity to his followers and his subjects in a particularistic way. . . . The economy is subject to considerable governmental interference but not for the purpose of planning but of extracting resources."5 Corruption is not unique to sultanism, but two factors are: the systematic manner in which the state is plundered, and the ruler's centrally controlled rent-seeking behavior. The extent of material accumulation under, for example, Somoza's sultanistic rule in Nicaragua or the Shah's in Iran can hardly be compared with the relative financial rectitude of the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes led by Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Ernesto Geisel in Brazil. In addition, sultanism tends to manifest itself in cults of personality that are usually absent in more institutionalized regimes.6 Another characteristic distinguishing sultanism from other forms of nondemocratic rule is the fusion of state and regime. In authoritarian rule the regime, the "formal and informal organization of the center of political power/' can be separated analytically from the state, a "more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it." In sultanism the state and regime become "thoroughly entangled with one another, both closely identified with the ruler."7 The armed forces, judiciary, and civilian bureaucracy lose their autonomy. In bureaucratic authoritarian rule, by contrast, the power of the regime does not destroy the independence of the military, substantially undercut the rule of law, or thoroughly corrupt the administrative apparatus. A sultanistic ruler may attempt to undertake pseudoreforms in order to play on resentment against privileged oligarchies that might otherwise threaten the consolidation of the ruler's personal control of power. But ideology is never taken seriously. As Linz argues, it does not constrain the ruler's discretion.8

52 • SULTANISTIC RULE

Building a Dynasty of Family and Friends

Before martial law, Philippine presidents had to balance family ties and friendship with the dangers of accusations by the press of nepotism and favoritism, and with the demands of other factions in the ruling party whose help was needed to win elections. Familial dynasty building was also limited by the frequent alternation of the major parties in power. But under martial law Marcos' authority was not restrained, and his time in office was not constitutionally limited. Shortly after the declaration of martial law, the First Lady, Imelda Marcos, became the second most powerful person in the government. Marcos appointed her governor of Metro Manila in 1975 and head of the newly created Ministry of Human Settlements in 1977. She was the country's ambassador at large, traveling to the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Libya, and elsewhere, combining diplomatic missions with international shopping. Her informal influence in government was even greater, leading Primitivo Mijares, former media adviser and top aide to Marcos, to label the Philippine dictatorship "conjugal."9 Although the Marcoses were frequently at odds—"his" and "her" factions formed in the presidential palace— he could trust her politically (and in the Philippines there is no divorce). As Marcos' health worsened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, she became in many ways the country's de facto president.10 The use of political authority primarily for private accumulation makes "the country essentially like a huge domain" of the ruler, according to Linz.11 Marcos and his wife became the richest couple in the Philippines and among the wealthiest in the world, amassing a fortune estimated at between $5 billion and $10 billion.12 Known as Mr. Ten Percent, Marcos received a cut of every major business transaction in the country.13 He also owned a number of companies. Marcos' personal tastes were simple, but his wife's were extravagant. Her high-cost and low-utility projects, such as the Miss Universe Pageant and the Muhammad Ali-Joe Frazier fight, symbolized the waste of the regime. Her Ministry of Human Settlements, a "government within a government," was the largest patronage machine in the country.14 With a budget of more than $1 billion, special taxing powers, and $200 million in developmental assistance from the U.S. government, this "superministry" built roads, schools, housing, recreational sites, and ecology projects (all duly displaying a prominent plaque bearing the name of Imelda Marcos).15

SULTANISTIC RULE • 53

Other Marcos family members also held high government positions that they used for personal profit. The First Lady's favorite brother, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, exercised de facto control of the Bureau of Customs, the General Auditing Commission, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Imelda's sister, Alita Martel, was the "franchise holder" of the Central Bank and Ministry of Agriculture.16 The president's brother, Pacifico Marcos, ran the Medicare Commission, which was plagued by corruption. Even Marcos' elderly mother (later famous for her long-unburied corpse) had her sphere of influence, the Rice and Corn Administration.17 Marcos' financial reach was extended furthest through "crony capitalism," a kind of subcontracting to his close friends of important areas of the economy for plundering. Though production remained privately owned, Marcos allowed cronies to monopolize key commodities through special taxes, production privileges, or importexport licenses. Through a corporation controlled by his fraternity brother Roberto Benedicto, Marcos took control of the sugar industry from the landlords who had been the most powerful elite group before martial law. Thanks to a presidential decree, Benedicto's National Sugar Trading Corporation became the sole exporter of sugar and captured PI 1 billion to P15 billion (about $1.7 billion to $2.3 billion) from producers between 1974 and 1983 by paying below market prices.18 Marcos also imposed a levy on coconut producers, which generated P4 billion between 1973 and 1978.19 With these tax funds and a presidential decree that penalized independent millers, Eduardo Cojuangco had purchased 80 percent of the country's coconutmilling capacity by 1980.20 Cojuangco, Marcos' leading crony, later used his coconut-generated wealth to buy San Miguel, the country's largest corporation, best known for its beer. The firms of other cronies dominated crucial industries, thanks to government favoritism. Herminio Disini set up the corruption-ridden $1.1 billion Westinghouse nuclear-power-plant deal. (Westinghouse's competitor General Electric had offered to build two reactors for $700 million but lacked Westinghouse's connections to the Philippine government. Disini reportedly received a commission of up to $35 million from Westinghouse.)21 Disini controlled the Herdis group (with assets of $1 billion), which had gotten its start in the tobacco industry after Marcos imposed a 100 percent tariff on the imported materials of Disini's competitor. Rodolfo Cuenca, a one-time Marcos fund-raiser, built a multimillion-dollar empire through government construction contracts and the exclusive right to ship cargo from the

54 • SULTANISTIC RULE

Philippines to the United States. Ricardo Silverio, another presidential friend, had a Toyota affiliate that won control of the domestic automobile parts industry through a decree that forced Ford and General Motors out of the market. Jose Campos dominated the pharmaceutical industry, Ramon Cruz, Jr., the airline industry, and Antonio Floirendo the banana industry.22 Each crony had his kingdom: Benedicto was the sugar king, Cojuangco the coconut king, Floirendo the banana king, Campos the drug king, and, "according to the buttons on the intercom system at Malacanang Palace, Ferdinand Marcos was simply 'the King/ "23 The economic resources controlled by Marcos and his clique increased enormously as they moved into more areas of the economy. By giving his family and friends economic power, he weakened independent economic groups that might pose a threat. Marcos' redistribution of power and wealth changed the composition of the Philippine elite. By 1975, thirty-one of the thirty-five most economically and politically influential people in the country were closely connected to the Philippine president.24 No politician not allied with Marcos remained in this category. The influence of "nonpolitical" business executives—those who were not presidential cronies—also dropped dramatically. The character of the regime was publicly manifested in the efforts the ruling duo made to glorify themselves. Pictures of the Marcoses in an imperial pose were ordered to be hung in every government office. Imelda Marcos had her husband and herself painted as the Malay version of Adam and Eve, Malakas (Strength) and Maganda (Beauty), in a massive mural in the presidential palace. This selfexaltation peaked when Ferdinand Marcos erected a massive bust of himself north of Manila, overlooking the Marcos Golf and Country Club, near the Marcos highway. The bust, like Shelley's Ozymandias, seemed to be saying, "Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"25 Marcos quickly moved to undermine the autonomy of state institutions, above all the military, to ensure that their leaders were personally loyal to him. He had already begun to politicize the armed forces during his legal presidency by devising ways to circumvent congressional scrutiny and building a faction of loyal young officers headed by his cousin and former chauffeur, Major Fabian Ver. Under martial law, Congress was removed from the picture altogether, and Ver s role increased as the whole officer corps was brought under Marcos' control. Immediately after the declaration of martial law, all officers were promoted one grade, their salaries were

SULTANISTIC RULE • 55

raised, benefits were increased, and a company was set up to help them invest their new wealth.26 But further promotions were usually granted only if officers pledged their fealty to Marcos, and additional pay increases were kept discretionary.27 Marcos put Ver in charge of the Presidential Security Command, an elite military unit that protected Marcos. Eventually Ver was made chief of staff of the armed forces, and his son, Irwin Ver, took over his previous job as presidential watchdog. Marcos promoted his relatives and other loyalists in order to further consolidate his control over the military.28 The armed forces expanded rapidly during authoritarian rule, reaching 102,000 soldiers (nearly double the pre-martial law level) by 1975, and almost 156,000 by 1980.29 Much of this enlarged military was positioned around Metro Manila to guard Marcos, and these units received extra funding to keep them faithful to the president. Because loyalty to Marcos was the organizing principle of the country's armed forces, military professionalism declined. Carl Lande tells of the quid pro quo Marcos provided the military: "Loyalty in turn was rewarded by a growing tolerance of corruption, of the arbitrary use of power, and of other abuses. There was, in short, an increased reliance on primordial ties and traditional incentives rather than on the rewards commonly associated with military professionalism."30 Marcos also undercut the institutional integrity of the judiciary. Even under the democratic system, lower-level judges had been vulnerable to pressure from local politicians. But now the entire judiciary was under Marcos1 influence because of his power to dismiss any judge arbitrarily and to assign jurisdiction of many cases to newly created military tribunals.31 Especially concerned about the loyalty of the high court, Marcos let it be known that the Supreme Court would be abolished and a revolutionary government established if the justices reached a decision contrary to state policy.32 The court submitted to the regime, to the point that Chief Justice Enrique Fernando held a parasol over Imelda Marcos during a public gathering.33 Under martial law, several ministries were run by so-called technocrats whose expertise and integrity won international respect for the regime; however, the thesis that the technocrats, in alliance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, dominated policy making has been discredited.34 The presidential family and cronies plundered the state and the private economy while the technocrats served as contacts to the IMF and foreign banks whose

56 • SULTANISTIC RULE

loans helped subsidize the regime.35 When technocrats tried to limit government corruption and abuse of power, they were overruled or forced out of office. Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor was fired in 1975 when he tried to reform the military, and National Economic Development Authority head Gerardo Sicat was dismissed in 1981 because of his overenthusiasm for the free market. The most important government technocrat was Finance Minister Cesar Virata, who later also held the powerless post of prime minister. When Virata revoked the coconut levy in 1981, Marcos, under pressure from Cojuangco, restored the tax. Imelda Marcos led a campaign against Virata, whom she called Doctor No, for his opposition to some of her schemes.36 In sultanistic regimes the state bureaucracy is staffed based not on universalistic criteria but on particularistic decisions of the ruler, whose aim is to ensure loyalty, not efficiency.37 With technocrats weakened and many ministries dominated by the First Couple's relatives, government competence declined and corruption increased. Robert Shaplen comments that Marcos had "destroyed not only the substance of the democratic process but particularly the principle and practice of public accountability, which, despite the weaknesses of the Philippine system of government over the years, had survived until this time, and ... served as a watchdog of the commonweal."38 Pseudoreform during Martial Law

Marcos could have tried to consolidate his authoritarian rule by carrying out both social and economic policies in a bid for elite or popular support, and state-building measures that would have enhanced the powers of governmental institutions. In Chile, Pinochet's radical program of free-market development won him the backing of much of the country's elite for nearly a decade.39 Social reform helped the military junta that was in power in Peru between 1968 and 1980 to achieve some popularity among the lower classes.40 Some bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America were able to strengthen the military and other institutions.41 In fact, Marcos did try to justify authoritarian rule by claiming that Philippine society required drastic reforms and that the state needed stronger institutions. Even during his legal presidency he had articulated an ideology of "revolution from the center" as an alternative to corrupt oligarchical democracy and violent commu-

SULTANISTIC RULE • 57

nist rebellion.42 With dictatorial powers, Marcos declared that a New Society would be built. Land reform was the promised centerpiece of martial law. Marcos also claimed that an export promotion program would fuel economic growth and that thousands of corrupt government employees would be fired. The state's efficiency was to be increased, and its authority was to be expanded. Labor would be organized into a single government-sponsored trade union, working closely with the Ministry of Labor. Professional groups were to be organized as if they were state institutions.43 Local government positions were no longer to go only to powerful political bosses but would also be given to sectoral representatives chosen by the national government. Although some scholars have taken this rhetoric seriously, it soon became clear that Marcos was undertaking pseudoreforms only to help consolidate his rule. As early as 1976, Primitive Mijares exposed these changes as a sham: "The highly-touted new reforms of the dictatorial regime are meant only to affect certain 'grand issues' and nothing was really supposed to change when it comes to the ruling clique's comfort and convenience, and economic and political interests."44 Much evidence supports Mijares' position. Land reform came to a standstill after the first few years of martial law; it had served largely to undermine Marcos' landlord opponents, not to lessen inequality in the countryside.45 Private businesses and technocrats found their interests subordinated to those of Marcos' cronies. Economic growth in the Philippines fell to become the lowest in Southeast Asia, after the early martial law commodity boom ended and politically painful trade liberalization measures were repeatedly postponed by the regime.46 While reform faltered, government performance worsened. Corruption surpassed pre-martial law levels, state-controlled unions and associations became rackets for their patronage-seeking leaders who neglected members' interests, and local government jobs were parceled out particularisticly, not sectorally.47 Demobilization of the Traditional Opposition

Marcos demobilized much of the traditional opposition by abolishing Congress; shuttering pro-opposition newspapers, radio stations, and television stations; banning demonstrations; and imprisoning many leaders of the opposition. Thirty thousand people

58 • SULTANISTIC RULE

were arrested within the first few months of martial law; most were communists and their supporters, but this group also included several hundred opposition politicians, their followers, and journalist friends.48 By arresting Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.—and his close allies Senator Ramon Mitra, former Senator Francisco Rodrigo, Congressman Jose Lingad, publisher Joaquin Roces, and others—Marcos paralyzed the most powerful opposing faction. The imprisonment of Eugenio Lopez, Jr., and Sergio Osmena III, on charges of plotting to assassinate Marcos, silenced two other important anti-Marcos clans. Aquino was charged with "murder, subversion, rebellion, and illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives/'49 Marcos had long accused Aquino of being a "Huk coddler," but he had never dared to file charges or have the Liberal senator arrested while the country was democratic.50 Although a number of politicians had worked with communists since independence, none had ever been arrested or tried, much less convicted. Such a modus vivendi with the communists was considered legitimate, or at least unavoidable, by much of the elite, and a prominent politician's clout made prosecution too risky. If Aquino had been arrested before the declaration of martial law, he could have counted on the notoriously backlogged civil court system to yield a drawn-out trial that would have embarrassed the administration. The case would have been perceived as political, and the Manila media, much of which had vocally supported Aquino, would have sided with him. Under martial law, however, Aquino was tried before a military court, and there was no independent press to champion his cause. Because of his weakened political following in Tarlac, witnesses could be persuaded to testify against him (although at least one prosecution witness was murdered in an ambush attack, and Marcos accused Aquino of arranging the murders of several people who testified against him).51 There were no demonstrations protesting Aquino's trial and no banner headlines in Philippine newspapers about it. During a 1975 hunger strike Aquino objected that the court's proceedings were "intended to humiliate and dehumanize me, considering all they want is for me to be identified as a common criminal and not a political rival."52 The opposition's ability to mount armed opposition to martial law was quickly crushed. Aquino's alliances with several prominent warlords were rendered useless. Authorities disbanded 145 private armies, confiscated nearly five hundred thousand guns (one hundred

SULTANISTIC RULE • 59

thousand of them high powered), and gathered 1.5 million rounds of ammunition—enough to equip thirty-five army divisions.53 In addition, the opposition's links to the communists were of little use because the insurgents were reeling from a military offensive during early martial law. In the first two years of martial law, several opposition politicians and their allies had begun stockpiling arms and holding meetings in an effort to build a guerrilla force modeled on the anti-Japanese campaign during the Second World War. But they were poorly organized, and their ranks had been depleted by arrests or defections to the regime.54 Not content to neutralize opposition factions through arrests and military force, Marcos also expropriated some of the wealth of his opponents in order to lessen their ability to regain political strength. The financial holdings of the Cojuangcos (the family of Aquino's wife) had included the First United Bank and the Manila Management Corporation, which controlled the Philippines' exclusive Ford dealership, a bus company, and a construction concern. Upon the declaration of martial law, they were forced to sell out to Corazon Aquino's estranged cousin Eduardo Cojuangco, who was a Marcos supporter, and the First Lady's brother, Benjamin Romualdez.55 Marcos also confiscated the hacienda of his presidential rival Sergio Osmena, Jr., and continued to hold Osmena's son prisoner to prevent him from speaking out against the regime. During his presidential term Marcos had attacked the political and economic influence of the Lopez brothers—the country's leading sugar hacenderos (plantation owners), media magnates, industrialists, and presidential kingmakers—but had been forced to back down in mid-1972. With his martial law powers, however, Marcos was able to humble this once mighty clan quickly. He not only seized their media empire but also extorted their industrial concerns, most notably the Manila Electric Company, by (falsely) promising to free the imprisoned son of family patriarch Eugenio Lopez.56 Like part of the Cojuangco holdings, the Lopez properties were handed over to Kokoy Romualdez. Imelda Marcos is said to have commented, "We cannot give Geny Lopez [Eugenio Lopez, Jr.] his freedom as long as the Lopezes are still in possession of great wealth. They must divest themselves first of their economic power. They might use this again to fight us."57 The First Lady's comment was echoed in a statement made by a senior member of the Lopez or Cojuangco families that Marcos' economic confiscation was "all a carefully thought out plan

60 • SULTANISTIC RULE

to prevent any group from staging a comeback against Marcos. . . . If Marcos' friends get richer in the process, that makes it all the sweeter."58 Although the rigors of early martial law cannot be denied (particularly for the Left), they do not fully account for the inactivity of most of the traditional opposition after the first few months of martial law. All traditional politicians and their close allies who had been arrested were released within weeks, except for Senators Jose Diokno and Aquino, who were held two and seven-and-a-half years, respectively. Although properties of a few oppositionists had been confiscated, the Marcos regime left most members of the Philippine elite alone. Meetings in churches and civic clubs were generally not broken up even when they dealt with political subjects. Interviews given to the foreign press did not lead to arrest.59 Yet few opposition politicians spoke out. In pre-martial law politics, opposition to the regime could be quite materially rewarding if the outs got back in power. But now there were no polls, and all state patronage seemed to be permanently in Marcos' hands. Government largesse was available only to those in his good graces. Because the private interests of factions, not ideological programs, drove Philippine politics, it is understandable that most formerly anti-Marcos politicians did not denounce the regime but instead tried to ingratiate themselves with it. Several anti-Marcos factions in the Nacionalista Party that were not directly repressed under authoritarianism remained silent during its early period. The most important example is the Laurel brothers.60 Salvador Laurel's presidential ambitions and Jose Laurel's deposition as speaker of the House of Representatives had turned them against Marcos, who was also a Nacionalista, before martial law. After its declaration, however, the brothers were not involved in any high-profile opposition. Rather, they joined Marcos' political party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, New Society Movement), when it was founded in 1978. The Constitutional Convention had been a hotbed of opposition activity before martial law, and fourteen anti-Marcos delegates were arrested after the dictatorship began. But by promising that all delegates voting yes would become well-paid members of a new legislature and by threatening them with imprisonment if they voted no, Marcos was able to get all but fifteen delegates to approve a constitution that allowed him to legitimate his continued rule.61 In a similar fashion, most congressmen agreed to dissolve Congress in

SULTANISTIC RULE • 61

return for appointment to the Interim National Assembly (INA). Marcos then double-crossed these politicians, including many prominent Liberals, by refusing to convene the INA. Discredited in the eyes of other oppositionists and embarrassed by Marcos, most of them abandoned politics. The Liberal Party, the chief opposition group before the declaration of martial law, virtually disintegrated. With elections canceled and no ideology to sustain the party, Liberals at all levels simply became politically inactive or allied with Marcos. The party's 1971 National Directorate was declared to have been "rendered nonexistent by virtue of massive defections/'62 Many national leaders had defected, but local party officials deserted en masse. After the declaration of martial law, Marcos could replace them at will. Few mayors or governors were so dedicated to the Liberal Party that they were willing to surrender office in order to continue their anti-Marcos activities. Party switching was common before martial law, but never before had the grass roots of one party simply merged with another. Of the twenty-four anti-Marcos premartial law governors, thirteen joined the KBL, three had relatives in it, and only three were active in the opposition (table 3.1). Even Aquino's erstwhile warlord allies, Singson and Dy, collaborated with the regime. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the only significant opposition group during early martial law. With the advent of authoritarianism, MNLF leader Nur Misuari had ample foreign assistance, a well-armed fighting force of approximately fourteen thousand men, and connections to the Muslim elite. Centuries of MuslimChristian conflict had increased dramatically during factional infighting shortly before martial law. Filipino Muslims, who had distrusted Marcos since the Jabidah massacre, were even more suspicious of his new authoritarian powers. When the military confiscated the plentiful, proudly owned guns in Muslim areas, the MNLF launched a civil war.63 Between 1972 and 1976 this war (largely ignored by the international press) may have cost as many as one hundred thousand lives.64 By 1975 the MNLF was in control of the countryside in six provinces in Mindanao and Sulu, keeping a hundred thousand government troops occupied.65 The high point of the Muslim rebellion came in late 1975 when a cease-fire signed in Tripoli set the conditions for the establishment of sweeping autonomy for Muslim areas in the Philippines. The extraordinary cost of the rebellion—the government reportedly lost

Table 3.1 Actions of pre-martial law opposition governors during martial law

Province

Governor

Abra Aklan Albay Antique Aurora (subprovince) Bataan Batanes Batangas Camarines Norte Camarines Sur Cebu Davao del Sur Ilocos Sur Iloilo Isabela Laguna Lanao del Sur Marinduque Northern Samar Nueva Ecija Occidental Mindoro Pampanga Romblon Sorsogon Total

Barbero Garcia Imperial Javier Etcubanez Pascual Gato Carpio Pimentel Alfelor Rama Llanos Singson Norado

Dy

San Luis Lucman Lecaroz Del Valle Joson Villaroza Valencia Solidum Frivaldo 24

Relative Became Joined joined Joined the politically theKBL the KBL opposition inactive xa X

xb X

X X X X X

xc

X X

X X X X

xc

X X X X X X

13

3

xc 3

5

Sources: "Report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the Philippines and the Congress on the Manner the Election was Held on November 8,1971," report; Philippine Commission on Local Government, "List of Governors during Martial Law," document. a ln addition, pre-martial law Liberal Governor Carmelo Barbero served as Marcos' deputy minister of defense. b Felix Imperial, though officially a Liberal, was pro-Marcos before martial law. c Tarhata Alonto Lucman's husband, Raschid Lucman, was friendly with the regime during early martial law, then later opposed the regime and went into exile with his wife; Juan Frivaldo opposed the dictatorship as an exile in the United States; Osmundo Rama's brother, Napoleon Rama, was an active anti-Marcos campaigner.

SULTANISTIC RULE • 63

fifteen thousand soldiers and spent $275,000 daily to fight it—and the threat by Arab governments to put an oil embargo on the Philippines had convinced Marcos to accept such an agreement.66 But Marcos quickly turned the accord to his advantage. With fighting (temporarily) halted and the Arab states satisfied with his apparent willingness to compromise, Marcos moved to win back Muslim traditional leaders. By offering them a share of the spoils of his authoritarian regime, Marcos was able to drive a wedge between Muslim elites and radical activists. He poured patronage into Muslim areas, allowed local leaders to use government programs for "personal enrichment through commissions and cuts/' and created government jobs, including seats in a strictly controlled "autonomous" legislature established in 1979.67 Soon leaders of most Muslim factions were even more cooperative with Marcos than were many of their Christian counterparts.68 Along with heavy casualties and a slowdown in foreign assistance, the desertion of traditional leaders had severely weakened the MNLF by the late 1970s.69 Marcos was thus able to implement martial law without using much force because a large part of the opposition could be bought off with promises of patronage. The change in the distribution of largesse led many previously anti-Marcos politicians to abandon their opposition activities and jockey for Marcos' goodwill instead. Although martial law dramatically changed in Marcos' favor the distribution of political resources, it did not alter the factional nature of Philippine politics. Despite promises of reform, Marcos still aimed to use public monies for private ends, and now he had no democratic constraints. Because his transformation of clientelistic democracy into sultanism demobilized most of the traditional opposition, the few anti-Marcos politicians who remained needed new allies and a new strategy.

4

The Form, Not the Substance, of Democracy

Ours, Mr. Marcos says, is "a parliamentary form of government." B u t . . . ours is the only parliamentary government in the world without a parliament. His "parliament" was first his barangays (town [assemblies]).... To call these a parliament is a preposterous doctrine, a sophistry: this is a travesty of representative government, the supreme heresy of our time. —Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Testament from a Prison Cell, 1977

Marcos' sultanistic rule initially led to growing political stability in the Philippines. The civil war in Muslim Mindanao proved shortlived in part because Marcos won over most of the elite in the region. A fledgling communist insurgency was weakened by arrests and a fierce government anti-insurgency drive (see chapter 6). The prospects for the traditional opposition also appeared poor. As long as Marcos held the state's purse strings, most patronage-dependent politicians would continue to do his bidding. But a few politicians, mostly prominent members of the Liberal Pfcirty, remained active during the early martial law period. Most were national leaders who had either abandoned their provincial political base or had never had one. These political outs had been hostile to Marcos for so long that they could never hope to find favor with the ruling circle. Local oppositionists could compromise with Marcos because they could trade loyalty for patronage and political offices. But the Liberal leaders had presidential aspirations, so their conflict with Marcos was unresolvable. The Philippines' democratic tradition haunted Marcos' effort to legitimate his rule. Both Filipinos and foreigners had come to regard the country as a "showcase of democracy," thanks to a nearly seventy-year democratic tradition.1 Marcos needed to proclaim at home and abroad that his government was democratic despite his 64

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 65

dictatorial powers. The handful of opposition politicians could thus challenge his legitimacy through appeals for democracy. In the early years of martial law, Marcos was most concerned about courting foreign support. For his buildup of the armed forces he depended on U.S. military aid and training. International loans filled the economic gap created by the greed of the regime's inner circle and a stagnant tax base. Marcos would be vulnerable if support from the Americans and foreign banks evaporated. The opposition sought to expose the constitutional hypocrisy of the regime primarily to pressure foreign backers into reducing or even ending their support. Philippine exiles argued that it was unethical for the U.S. government to back a dictator who had destroyed Philippine democracy, particularly because the country's long democratic tradition began under American colonialism. In the Philippines, traditional oppositionists—with the help of the Catholic Church and Manila-based communists—denounced the various pseudodemocratic steps that Marcos employed to deodorize his regime for foreign approval. Marcos' Dependence on Foreign Support

Military muscle was necessary to implement martial law and to suppress Muslim secessionists and the growing communist guerrilla army. To compensate for declining numbers of military professionals, slackening discipline, and the resultant lack of preparation for battle, Marcos needed to enlarge the military apparatus. By contrast, the professionalism of the Indonesian armed forces allowed them to remain roughly the same size during Suharto's rule (since 1965) despite fighting several secessionist guerrilla movements. The Nixon administration, entangled in the Vietnam War and Watergate and skeptical about the efficacy of democracy in developing countries, accepted Marcos' argument that emergency rule was necessary to defeat a communist threat and to achieve political stability.2 Receiving assurances that it could keep its large military bases in the Philippines, the U.S. government did not condemn martial law, and it increased assistance to Marcos' regime, mostly for the armed forces. Official U.S. military assistance to the Philippines grew from $18.2 million in 1970 and $18.5 million in 1972 to $41.2 million in 1974 and $43.0 million in 1976.3 Perhaps most important

66 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

was the psychological impact of this support in the Philippines (particularly in the military, which was possibly more oriented toward and influenced by the United States than the armed forces of any other country in the developing world). This need for American assistance made Marcos keen to ensure that the U.S. government did not change its mind about martial law. Marcos had to increase foreign borrowing because government institutions were too corrupt to be effective revenue collectors and a tax hike would further highlight growing graft in the regime. A stagnant tax base could not finance the mounting demands on public resources by his inner circle, whose greed seemed to know no bounds. After a commodity boom briefly increased export tax income, revenue fell nearly to its pre-martial law levels and remained the lowest in Southeast Asia. With congressional limitations on borrowing swept aside, lending to the Philippines nearly quadrupled during the first six years of martial law, from $2.7 billion in 1972 to $10.7 billion in 1977. These figures represented an increase of external debt as a percentage of GNP from 32.6 percent to 44.5 percent. By 1980 the Philippines' foreign indebtedness was $17.3 billion (49 percent of GNP), reaching $26.3 billion by 1985 (81.7 percent of GNP).4 Marcos was anxious to tell international audiences that he had "not grabbed power."5 Although the U.S. government and foreign financial institutions might accept authoritarianism initially, Marcos felt that he had to promise a return to democracy in order to secure such support for long. The Americans and the international banks worried that the lack of institutionalized succession under authoritarianism could cloud the country's future. Marcos' promise that martial law would be temporary would not only ease lenders' bad consciences and fend off criticism about aiding a dictator but would also bode well for the Philippines' long-term stability and economic growth. Marcos, a skillful lawyer, argued that he had established a constitutional authoritarian regime by legally declaring martial law in order to combat rebellion and by carrying out reforms needed for true democracy. He had a new constitution (unconstitutionally) approved and held five plebiscites between mid-1973 and late 1977 to endorse constitutional changes and determine whether martial law should be continued. The counting of votes in these plebiscites was at best dubious; all were approved by between 83 and 95 percent of the voters.6 Marcos wanted to present foreigners with the appearance of democratic consultation while ruling as he chose.

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 67 Opposing the New Society

Marcos claimed to have created an improved New Society to replace the bad Old Society. Some oppositionists agreed with his critique of the elitism of democracy and accepted the need for social reform while criticizing dictatorship's way of achieving these aims. But only a few anti-Marcos politicians genuinely reflected on the problems of the Philippine democratic system. Others found that by espousing progressive views they could win the support of groups on the Left whose help they needed because their own political networks had been demobilized. Most opposition politicians, however, rejected Marcos' critique of pre-martial law democracy as well as his authoritarian solution. Francisco Rodrigo expressed the typical view in his lengthy poem "P&syori at Kamatayan ng Ating Kalayaan" (The Suffering [Passion] and Death of Our Freedom), written in 1975.7 A senator and a prominent journalist before martial law, Rodrigo began writing anti-Marcos poetry after the advent of authoritarianism. He circulated these poems among friends and then had them published covertly. Couching his condemnation of the regime in the images of Christianity (a technique typical of moral appeals before martial law), Rodrigo, in the title of his poem, compares the crucifixion of democracy to that of Jesus. He asks Filipinos to "mourn for democracy" and decries martial law as the "slaying of our freedom," which has led to greater corruption in government, particularly by the First Lady and Marcos' cronies.8 He rejects Marcos' assertion that the democratic system was a corrupt Old Society that needed renewal. Rodrigo not only defended pre-martial law democracy but maintained that Marcos, not an elitist political system and social inequality, was the cause of any defects it did have: Ay di ang sistema ang may kasalanan Kundi ang may hawak ng kapangyarihan . .. Nguini't anong laking kabalintunaan! Ang bumbatikos sa dating lipunan Ay yaong prinsipal na may kinalaman Sa lahat ng dating mga kapintasan. It was not the system that was at fault But those who held power . . . And what a big contradiction! He who criticizes the past society Was the one who is responsible For all those bygone imperfections.

68 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

Rodrigo was safeguarding the reputation of pre-martial law politics so that all Marcos' attempts to legitimize his regime could be judged by that democratic system. Opposition in Exile

Filipinos in exile in the United States were important in the early phases of opposition against Marcos because of repression and demobilization in the Philippines.9 But the exiles were significant for the opposition not only because they were active at a time when domestic opponents were largely silent but also because they cultivated crucial American support. Filipino exiles were particularly confident of their ability to lobby in the United States because of their command of English and extensive knowledge of the political system, learned in Americanized schools and through extensive contact with U.S. officials. They had a moral argument with which to confront their hosts: why should the Americans, who had introduced democratic government to the Philippines during their colonial rule, support Marcos, who had destroyed it? The most important exile group was the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), founded in 1973 by Raul Manglapus and headquartered in Washington, D.C.10 Like political parties in the Philippines, the MFP was organized along factional lines.11 Manglapus was related by marriage to Eugenio Lopez, the anti-Marcos industrialist who had also sought exile in the United States. Because Marcos was holding his son, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., prisoner, Lopez was forced to confront the regime indirectly. He helped fund the Manglapus exile group, although after the confiscation of his Philippine properties money was running short.12 When the young Lopez and Sergio Osmena III went on a hunger strike in 1974 to protest their prolonged incarceration, Lopez' son-in-law Steve Psinakis became active in the MFP. In 1977 Psinakis freed Lopez and Osmena from prison in a daredevil, cross-continental escape.13 Perhaps the most valuable assistance that Lopez provided Manglapus was favorable publicity in the Philippine News, the biggest U.S.-based Philippine newspaper.14 The Philippine News represented the MFP to much of the Filipino diaspora in the United States, estimated at 1 million people during the 1970s.15 Manglapus undertook a whirlwind propaganda drive to discredit Marcos in the United States, writing numerous newspaper opinion pieces, making television appearances, and offering congressional

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 69

testimony.16 The MFP campaign was clearly successful. The biggest publicity coup during early martial law was the 1975 defection of Philippine media czar Primitivo Mijares and his expose of the Marcos regime's extreme personalism and corruption before the U.S. House International Relations Subcommittee. Even more damaging to Marcos was columnist Jack Anderson's revelation that Marcos had offered Mijares fifty thousand dollars to abstain from testifying.17 Alarmed by the MFP's ability to damage the regime's standing in the United States, Marcos moved to suppress the dissident forces abroad. In 1979 Mike Glennon, the counsel of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, said in a classified report that as early as October 1973 the CIA had become aware that "the Philippine government had become increasingly concerned that President Marcos' enemies in the U.S. might be developing, or had already, an influence that would adversely affect the Philippine Government." The report added that General Fabian Ver began sending military intelligence officers to the United States "for the purpose of infiltrating, monitoring and possibly counteracting the threat of anti-Marcos groups."18 In retaliation for his congressional testimony and his tell-all book, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, Mijares was apparently lured out of the United States and brought to the Philippines, where his son was killed before his eyes and he was then tortured and murdered.19 Such assassinations are characteristic of sultanistic regimes. Because only loyalty in the ruling circle holds the regime together, betrayal by a palace insider is dealt with ruthlessly. Assassination attempts were also apparently made against Manglapus. Other dissidents and their Filipino-American supporters were under surveillance and experienced threats, blackmail, and other forms of intimidation.20 In 1975 Marcos apparently offered Philippine News editor Alexander Escalamado a hundred thousand dollars to tone down the paper's attacks on the Philippine government. When his bribe failed, Marcos pressured companies to stop advertising in the paper.21 Marcos' worries were probably exaggerated. Successive U.S. administrations would continue to back the Philippine president unquestioningly (except for an anti-Marcos group in the State Department, discussed in chapter 6) until the Aquino assassination in 1983. The Reagan White House supported the Philippine dictator almost to the end. But Marcos' concern about his reputation had provided the exiles with a point of attack. They were able to contrast his

70 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

dictatorship and the Philippines' past democracy. Although realpolitik kept the U.S. executive branch from distancing itself from Marcos until much later, his poor standing in Congress and with the U.S. media by 1980 was largely due to the activity of Filipino exile groups who exerted "pressure . . . out of proportion to their numbers/'22 This pressure prepared the ground for an incremental change in U.S. policy in the 1980s, which weakened the Marcos regime. Opposition at Home

While exiles concentrated on sabotaging Marcos' American support, the Philippine-based traditional opposition exploited his desire to present himself as a democrat to international groups, particularly foreign banks. The opposition's goal was to restore elections, through which they hoped to unseat Marcos. But before balloting could be revived, the opposition had to discredit several pseudodemocratic devices that Marcos had created in an effort to legitimate his dictatorial rule. The major flaw in Marcos' claim that his declaration of martial law was constitutional was that his constitutionally final term expired in December 1973.23 Through bribes and threats he was able to get a new constitution approved at the reconvened Constitutional Convention. Marcos was so intent on showing that he was doing everything by the book that he then called a constitutionally mandated plebiscite to approve the new document and lifted restrictions on civil liberties to allow for free debate. A close associate of the stilljailed Aquino, Francisco Rodrigo, who had recently been released from prison, joined a small group of oppositionists campaigning against the new constitution.24 At first unsure how much leeway Marcos would give them, members of the group were soon debating government ministers before packed houses largely sympathetic to the opposition. Afraid that a growing "no" movement might defeat the new constitution, Marcos canceled the referendum and instead arranged for voting to be held in hastily established local barangay (town) assemblies through a show of hands. He contended that barangay democracy was a kind of direct popular rule that was an improvement over the electoral politics of the Old Society.25 The traditional opposition rejected this view and filed several petitions with the Supreme Court challenging the manner in which the referendum was held. Under

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 71

pressure from his opponents, Marcos came up with quick voting results, which appeared to have been fabricated.26 An intimidated Supreme Court ruled that the ratification was unconstitutional but allowed the constitution to be implemented anyway.27 The opposition, though it could not stop Marcos' new constitution, exposed its illegality. Moreover, the opposition had succeeded in forcing the Supreme Court to indirectly declare barangay democracy unconstitutional. In the next referendum, which he held in mid-1973, Marcos returned to the secret ballot. But the opposition boycotted the February 1975 plebiscite on the continuation of martial law.28 It wanted a return to elections, not rigged referendums. Marcos had announced the 1975 referendum in a speech before Chase Manhattan Bank officials. He arranged the next plebiscite to coincide with the International Monetary Fund (iMF)-World Bank Convention in Manila in October 1976. Marcos hoped that this vote would help the Philippines secure more foreign loans. Besides creating a Potemkin village out of Manila by building high whitewashed walls around squatter areas and a dozen new hotels for the delegates, Marcos wanted to convey political stability and democratization. Sixto K. Roxas III, then president of Bancom Development Corporation, explained the "not intangible benefits" of making a good impression on international financial leaders: "The image which we build is very important because in banking, like anything else, there are fads. There will be fads for a particular country. This means all of a sudden the credit of a particular country becomes hot in the market, a situation wherein everybody tries to push financing in that country. I think the Philippines is very much in this position now."29 Former Philippine President and Liberal leader Diosdado Macapagal tried to use the approaching IMF-World Bank convention as leverage to force Marcos to make real democratic concessions. He demanded that the Interim National Assembly be convened as constitutionally mandated. Along with most other Constitutional Convention delegates, Macapagal, who had been head of the assembly, had been tricked into voting for the new constitution by Marcos' promise of a seat in the INA. But the legislature was never convened, and Macapagal's reputation was damaged. After years of silence, Macapagal's challenge to Marcos in early 1976 undermined the Philippine president's repeated claim that his government was parliamentary simply by pointing out that there was no parliament.30 With the Liberal Party decimated by defections and demobilization, Macapagal needed new allies if he was to confront Marcos. In

72 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

1976 the opposition politician apparently won the backing of the Manila-Rizal regional committee branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).31 Communist cadres in Manila had survived the initial martial law crackdown by lying low until 1974, when they felt capable of reviving their organizational work. They began helping slum dwellers to oppose evictions and helping workers to revive strike activity, which had been banned under martial law. They organized workers in a Manila distillery, La Tondena, and formed an underground labor union, Bukluran ng Manggagawang Filipino (BMP, Alliance of Filipino Workers).32 The Manila communists recognized that their groups of union workers, urban poor, and student activists at the University of the Philippines constituted the "mass base" necessary for major political protests.33 The communists needed Macapagal because his stature would assure that their protests received publicity and would help them in their urban recruiting. Macapagal's call for the convening of the IN A clearly had Marcos worried. He prevented a large demonstration planned by the ManilaRizal communists in favor of Macapagal's proposal in late January 1976. A wave of arrests netted dozens of students, workers, and slum dwellers.34 Marcos met with delegates from the Constitutional Convention and persuaded them to reject the call for the INA by bribing them with judgeships and other favors.35 To show IMF-World Bank delegates that he did in fact have a legislature, Marcos hastily established the Batasang Bayan, consisting of 127 handpicked delegates, including a number of his relatives and close friends.36 During the IMF-World Bank meet, Marcos promised that he would hold elections for a parliament (although the 1977 date that he set was later postponed). Macapagal failed to force Marcos to convene the INA, but he did pressure the Philippine president into pledging elections to uphold the regime's international image. By the mid-1970s, human rights violations had become the biggest issue for the opposition. Between September 1972 and February 1977 the regime had made nearly 60,000 political arrests, although most people had been held for only a short time. In May 1975 the regime still held 4,553 prisoners.37 Although no figures document how many were tortured, Amnesty International declared that torture was "part of the general approach to the treatment of suspects."38 Taking the lead in protesting these human rights violations was the Catholic Church's Association of Major Religious Superiors of the

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 73

Philippines (AMRSP), which formed Task Force Detainees (TFD) in 1974 to investigate reports of torture and illegal detention.39 Unlike the Catholic bishops in the Philippines who, with the exception of a vocal minority, had approved of—or at least not protested against— martial law, the AMRSP had been critical of the regime. Founded in 1955, it was an organization to which all active Catholic religious communities in the country, represented by their religious superiors, belonged. Its membership included 4,500 priests, 7,000 nuns, and 450 monks.40 Its leadership had been influenced by liberation theology, which arose largely in Latin America after the Second World War and shifted away from purely spiritual aspects of the gospel to aspects of social justice. Some AMRSP members were in close contact with the communists. Former senator Jose Diokno, released from prison in 1974, founded the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to provide the lawyers that TFD needed to help prisoners.41 With FLAG'S help, TFD became the leading watchdog on arbitrary repression in the country, heavily influencing Amnesty International's damning 1977 report and subsequent publications. Marcos at first denied that there were any political prisoners in the country. He later admitted that there were but insisted that "no one, but no one has been tortured."42 But the damage had been done. In an effort to combat his international reputation as a repressive dictator, Marcos released more than three thousand detainees between June and September of 1977. While Diokno had sought allies in the AMRSP, Jovito Salonga, although a Protestant, found badly needed support among several influential Jesuit priests and their social democratic followers. Salonga, a pre-martial law senator and Liberal leader, was a rising political star in the opposition because of his hard-hitting anti-Marcos speeches delivered at churches and universities while Liberal Party President Gerardo Roxas was largely inactive. Salonga had campaigned against the February 1975 referendum and, along with the Reverend Horacio de la Costa, S.J., issued a statement condemning martial law on its third anniversary in September 1975.43 De la Costa had apparently urged Salonga to work independently of Diokno and the AMRSP because he feared that they were becoming too close to the communists. The Jesuits could promise support from small groups of social democratic activists (see chapter 5) to help compensate for the evaporation of Salonga's Liberal Party base. Salonga began focusing on civil liberties, as Diokno's FLAG and the TFD were already doing, in order to challenge the regime's legit-

74 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

imacy. Marcos hosted a World Law Conference convention on human rights in Manila in 1977 to counter the bad publicity that the regime had been receiving. In response, a thousand people attended the Filipino People's Convention on Human Rights headed by Salonga and backed by priests and social democrats. It was convened to criticize Marcos' record on human rights and to call for the lifting of martial law and the holding of elections.44 Determined not to let his image-building effort on human rights be undermined by the opposition, Marcos announced before the World Law Conference a firm date for the long-promised legislative elections.45 How could he be accused of being a repressive dictator if he was about to hold competitive polls? After five years of trying to claim democratic credentials, Marcos was forced to return to premartial law forms of democracy in his search for legitimacy. Aquino and the Elections

When Marcos announced that polls would be held in April 1978, Liberal Party President Roxas expressed interest.46 Roxas believed that electoral participation would help revive the party. But then the nature of the balloting became known. The opposition was to be allowed no electoral inspectors, and block voting would make cheating easier. To make matters worse, candidates would run in regions, not districts, making campaigning more expensive. The campaign period was shortened, the Supreme Court was removed as the court of last appeal on electoral disputes, and registration was rigged.47 Roxas and Salonga opted for boycott. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., however, was persuaded to participate in the polls by former Senator Lorenzo Tafiada who, at seventy-nine, was the grand old man of the opposition.48 Tanada apparently had the backing of the Manila-Rizal branch of the communist party, which saw the elections as a chance to further polarize the pro- and anti-Marcos elite, disseminate extensive antigovernment propaganda, and build alliances with anti-Marcos reactionaries who could help the communists grow.49 Campaigning in Aquino's home region of Central Luzon was out of the question because his wife's estranged cousin, Marcos' crony Eduardo Cojuangco, had become the area's political leader. Also, the region was too large, and cheating in isolated rural areas was easier than in major cities. In Metro Manila the communists offered to provide Aquino the staff that he needed for campaigning and poll

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 75

watching to compensate for his limited financial resources and political network. In exchange, the Manila-Rizal CPP would choose four of the candidates on the ticket and help write the party's platform. Aquino fielded candidates in Manila, even though it was unlikely that the regime would allow the opposition to win, because he came to believe that the campaign would embolden Manilenos against Marcos. In the tribute that Aquino wrote for Tanada's eightieth birthday in August 1978, he said that Tanada "entertains no illusion of victory because he is realistic enough to know that even if we win the elections we will lose in the counting for the obvious reason that the Dictator who controls all levels of government is no fool to allow himself to be defeated. But [Tanada] believes that we must fight even if our sword hand is empty if only to inspire our people to greater courage."50 Aquino had to solve locational, factional, financial, and ideological problems. First, he was still in jail, and Marcos would not let him out because that would be "dangerous to the security of the Republic." Aquino said that he would campaign in handcuffs and that "if this is not enough, I am willing to wear leg chains/1 but his plea was ignored.51 His wife, Corazon C. Aquino, and young daughter Kris would have to address the voters for him. Next, he needed an electoral vehicle. Roxas, a former rival for the Liberal presidential nomination, was upset by Aquino's participation in the election and would not let him use the Liberal Party label. Aquino's advisers hit on the name Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN, Power of the People). With the Roxas-Salonga faction (which included Macapagal) on the sidelines and Diokno unwilling to stand as a candidate, Aquino had to put together a twenty-one-person slate for Metro Manila mostly from his own allies.52 In addition, four Manila politicians were put on the LABAN slate to appeal to voters' local concerns, as were four radicals, who were known to the other candidates as the Gang of Four because of their close ties to the communists.53 In spite of his alliance with the communists, Aquino still needed some patronage resources and additional staff. Lacking substantial campaign contributions from businesses, he had to spend a reported PI.2 million ($150,000) of his family's dwindling fortune.54 Aquino's brother-in-law Jose "Peping" Cojuangco was the party campaign manager.55 Candidate Neptali Gonzales, a former congressman from neighboring Rizal province, fielded one hundred campaign workers from the remnants of his political machine.56 Militant social democrats in the Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP,

76 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines) also wanted to help LABAN, in part because they hoped to limit the influence of the communists. The PDSP fielded poll watchers for the campaign.57 The unusual alliance of politicians, communists, and social democrats made for an explosive ideological combination, which almost led to a breakup over the writing of the party platform and other matters.58 In spite of the opposition's efforts, it still had far fewer resources than the ruling party, the KBL, whose ticket was headed in Manila by no less than Imelda Marcos. The First Lady wanted to become more publicly recognized, although she was already well known as minister of Human Settlements and governor of Metro Manila. The KBL distributed ample pork barrel, increased social security benefits and the minimum wage, lowered the price of land in slum areas, raised teachers' salaries (which was particularly important, because teachers ran the polling), controlled the media, and had full military support.59 Aquino and his followers carefully arranged the symbols, words, and appeals needed to turn the Lakas ng Bayan campaign into a moral crusade. The widely used acronym LABAN (fight) made clear that this was to be a struggle of people power against the Marcos dictatorship. The slogan was reinforced by the thumb-index finger salute forming the letter L. The effectiveness of such calls for bravery was proved during LABAN's early campaign rallies. At first only a few listeners attended, because of fear of arrest, but gradually larger crowds gathered just outside the stage's lighted area. Finally, people would stand directly in front of the speakers' platform. Carl Lande, an observer of the campaign, points to the cross-class appeal of LABAN's moral crusade and the limited support for the more patronage-dependent KBL: "Neighborhood rallies for the opposition were packed with members of working and lower-middle classes, who stood for hours to hear the candidates lambaste the regime. Neighborhood rallies for the government candidates, on the other hand, drew much smaller numbers, mostly children and neighborhood riffraff who had been provided with chairs and sandwiches and, in some cases, had been paid to attend."60 The key to the opposition's campaign was Aquino's image as a willing martyr, which he had developed during nearly six years of imprisonment: "I have been in almost solitary confinement, I have suffered terrible loneliness and endured many indignities. . . . My desolation has purged me of all hatred."61 Aquino first developed this

THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY • 77

theme in a lengthy letter, which was later reprinted and widely distributed, to his political ally Rodrigo after his solitary confinement in early 1973. He told Rodrigo that he had undergone a religious conversion in prison and compared his plight with that of Jesus: "His life was to become my inspiration. Here was a God-Man who had power over all creation but took the mockery of a crown of thorns with humility and patience. And for all his noble intentions, he was shamed, vilified, slandered and betrayed."62 The parallels were obvious. Aquino was a mighty politician brought low by martial law, and he had come to accept his fate. Reynaldo Clemena Ileto has shown how Jose Rizal's willingness to sacrifice his life for the nation was perceived by many Filipinos as similar to Jesus' crucifixion for humanity.63 Aquino was trying to portray his suffering similarly. In fact, he claimed that he had acted as Rizal would have done under the circumstances: "I have no doubt, Rizal would have been the first to be picked up were he alive today and maybe, re-enact his martyrdom at Bagumbayan. He was a victim of the New Land. Surely, his fate wouldn't be better under a New Society."64 Aquino was tapping the folk traditions of awa (pity) and damay (empathy), which Ileto terms "culturally and socially encoded" emotions associated with the pasyon and Rizal's death.65 The focus of Aquino's suffering was his hunger strike, which lasted for a biblical forty days in April and May 1975. Aquino made his willingness for martyrdom plain: "I prefer a meaningful death to a meaningless life."66 When he was convicted by the military court and sentenced to death in November 1977, it seemed as if his martyrdom would be completed (although there were already rumors that instead he would be allowed to go into exile). Aquino, the pre-martial law politico, had been transformed into Marcos' martyr. Aquino's sensitivity about his image was shown by his reaction to Communist Party Chairman Jose Maria Sison's denunciation of his own inhumane treatment in prison. After his 1977 arrest, Sison claimed that he had been tortured and manacled while Aquino was extended privileged treatment. According to his military captors, who eavesdropped on his conversation with his lawyer, Joker Arroyo, "Aquino's first reaction is one of shock because according to him, as the most senior of MSU [Military Security Unit, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila] detainees, he cannot afford just to stand by without howling any protest. Furthermore he does not want a top communist to become a martyr by portraying unequal treatments to show that

78 • THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY

politicians and capitalists are afforded better treatment than communists. 'Why doesn't Sison ask for the same privileges? . . . I don't want to make a martyr out of him.' "67 The LABAN party's emblem, two handcuffed hands that have broken the chain that bound them, evoked Aquino's imprisonment and candidacy. The jailed Aquino was allowed to make one campaign appearance on television in March. Aquino's articulate defense of himself against the questions of hostile journalists, according to one sympathetic writer, "held the nation mesmerized for the one hour and a half that he was on Channel-4, keeping the streets of Metro Manila, for once, vacated of people and vehicles for its entire duration."68 The Noise Barrage, the Election, and the Aftermath

Aquino and his LABAN colleagues knew that they had the makings of a mass movement. Some were reminded of Magsaysay's campaign in the 1950s.69 But LABAN was sure to be cheated in the voting. How, then, could a moral victory be clinched? Someone involved in the campaign suggested distributing a chain letter calling for a noise barrage against the regime on April 6, a day before the balloting. At the appointed time, noise "rose to the level of bedlam" with Manilenos honking car horns, banging pots, or simply yelling well into the night.70 The opposition later received reports that Marcos had panicked in Malacanang and had prepared to flee.71 Accurate or not, such rumors confirmed LABAN's belief that it had achieved its first major success against the dictatorship. As expected, the elections were fraudulent. LABAN was unable to cope with electoral manipulation because the Manila communists had been ordered to withdraw from the campaign by the national Central Committee, which favored a boycott.72 Social democratic poll watchers tried to pick up the slack, but the military and the police prevented many from reaching the polling places. A New York Times reporter, Fox Butterfield, having apparently chanced upon a ballot-rigging session, was thrown down a flight of stairs by government guards.73 The government used every form of electoral fraud developed during pre-martial law politics: prestuflfed ballot boxes, phony registration, "flying voters" (voters who cast several ballots), manipulated election returns, and vote buying. Aquino and his fellow candidates were defeated by even the lesser-known KBL picks in a 21-0 sweep.74

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This result only added fuel to the opposition's moral fire. Oppositionists launched a "death of democracy" demonstration, complete with mock coffins, the day after the election. But before the several hundred opposition politicians and social democrats could gather popular support, they were apprehended by the government. The arrests led to a crackdown on the PDSP that devastated the social democratic party and sent its leadership underground.75 There were no major protests against the government's action; Manila was quiet again, and the opposition was left wondering how it could rekindle its moral crusade. The participation by the pro-Aquino LABAN party in Manila was the most significant challenge to Marcos in the 1978 election, but not the only one. Other opposition parties, like LABAN, were factionbased groups organized around the few personalities of the opposition who had not defected to the Marcos regime. In Western Mindanao, former Zamboanga Mayor and unsuccessful Liberal senatorial candidate Cesar Climaco founded the Concerned Citizens' Aggrupation. In Northern, Southern, and Western Mindanao, Marcos' former Deputy Information Minister Reuben R. Canoy and pre-martial law Liberal congressional candidate Homobono Adaza formed the Mindanao Alliance. There were also opposition parties in Bicol (the Bicol Saro) and Cebu (Pusyon Bisaya [Visayan Fusion]). Besides Canoy's solo victory in Northern Mindanao, the only opposition success was the victory of all thirteen Pusyon Bisaya candidates in Cebu. The well-organized Cebu opposition had caught KBL candidates cheating and held a large protest rally in Cebu City. Under pressure from the Carter administration and the U.S. Congress to show that there was some substance to revived democratic forms in the country, Marcos unilaterally declared the Pusyon Bisaya's candidates victorious. But the government's overwhelming patronage resources wore down this small opposition party, and several of its members became allies of the regime (as did one candidate on the defeated LABAN slate). Although the overall results of the balloting in 1978 were rigged, it is worth examining the opposition's vote count by region. In areas where Marcos or his cronies were the dominant political forces, no major opposition was formed. Marcos monopolized the votes in his home Ilocos region, as did Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile in Cagayan Valley, coconut king Eduardo Cojuangco in Central Luzon, sugar magnate Roberto Benedicto in the Western Visayas, and Benjamin Romualdez in the Eastern Visayas. In Southern Tagalog, several Cabinet officials and the powerful Laurel clan made the KBL so strong

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Table 4.1 Percentage of the vote received by the KBL and major opposition parties in the 1978 legislative elections Region

KBL (%)

Opposition (%)

Metro Manila Ilocos Cagayan Valley Central Luzon Southern Tagalog Bicol Western Visayas Central Visayas Eastern Visayas Western Mindanao Northern Mindanao Southern Mindanao Central Mindanao

61 100 100 100 100 65 100 44 100 62 58 67 100

39 — — — — 35 — 56 — 38 42 33 —

Source: Data computed from Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Elections, Report of the Commission on Elections to the President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa on the Manner the Elections of Representatives to the Batasang Pambansa Were Held on April 7 and 27,1978 (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 329-346. Note: These figures exclude votes cast for independent candidates and candidates of parties that received less than 1 percent of the vote. The major opposition parties were LABAN, in Metro Manila; Bicol Saro and Young Philippines, in Bicol; Pusyon Bisaya, in the Central Visayas; and Concerned Citizen's Aggrupation and Mindanao Alliance (MA), in Western Mindanao, Northern Mindanao, and Southern Mindanao.

that no significant opposition was possible. But where the opposition did organize, it performed surprisingly well. Opposition parties won between 33 percent and 56 percent of the vote in the regions that they contested. The opposition demonstrated its strength in the country's two major cities (Metro Manila and Cebu), the Central Visayas, Bicol, and most regions of Mindanao (table 4.1). The polls had weakened the regime but had brought the opposition no closer to taking power. Anti-Marcos politicians began to agree that force would have to be used against the regime, but they debated about how much coercion was necessary. Some oppositionists began to argue that the regime could be easily toppled if the hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Manilenos who participated in the noise barrage could be prompted by largely symbolic acts of terror to go one step further and rise up against Marcos.

5

Urban Terrorism after a Stolen Election

One of the ... major accomplishments of the April 7 [1978] so-called election was to convince even the most moderate-thinking Filipino and every political observer at home and abroad that freedom in the Philippines can only be regained, as in the past, through bloodshed. The only reasonable hope one can hold on to is that the bloodshed will not be extensive. —Steve Psinakis, Two "Terrorists" Meet, 1978

Before martial law, the opposition traditionally resorted to subversion when the ruling party broke the political rules, the most important of which was competitive balloting. A revolt was (briefly) carried out against President Elpidio Quirino after the fraudulent elections of 1949. In 1969 oppositionists cooperated with armed groups in order to force Marcos to make future polls fairer. Even during martial law, opposition politicians judged elections by pre-martial law standards. Thus Marcos' manipulation of the 1978 legislative election results led many traditional oppositionists to make an impulsive call to arms similar to those of 1949 and 1969. But the oppositionists were hardly in a position to "punish" Marcos as they had in 1969. How then could the regime be fought? Some anti-Marcos politicians advocated an alliance with the communists. Others proposed backing an army to be built by a social democratic group. A coup plot was also considered. The failure of these plans for armed rebellion led many oppositionist politicians to adopt a strategy of urban terrorism. But they had a double agenda. They hoped to topple Marcos but also wanted more competitive elections. Advocating popular revolt against the dictatorship did not mean that anti-Marcos politicians had abandoned their electoral orientation. As Emmanuel S. de Dios has observed, "The efforts of the urban guerilla groups are incomprehensible unless considered in connection with the bargaining of the traditional opposition for electoral opportunities."1 Urban guerrilla leaders were 8!

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calling for the overthrow of the Marcos regime while opposition politicians were seeking to use arson and bombings to force Marcos to negotiate with them and agree to hold honest elections. The Failure of Armed Rebellion

If the traditional opposition was determined to employ violence against the Marcos regime after the 1978 election, allying with the communists seemed the best way of doing it. The CPP's rural guerrilla force, the New People's Army, had become the strongest anti-Marcos armed group. In an informal opposition group known as the inner circle, which had been meeting since 1976, former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada reportedly led a faction urging an alliance with the radical Left.2 Representatives of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., succeeded in postponing further cooperation with the communists, however. After many years of working with the radical Left, Aquino felt double-crossed. He had helped form the NPA in an effort to gain muscle against Marcos in the 1971 elections. But during martial law the communists had grown rapidly without his help and proved to be unreliable allies. Jose Sison, the CPP's leader, had embarrassed Aquino by complaining that Aquino had received preferential treatment in prison. The radical Left had also betrayed him by withdrawing its poll watchers during the 1978 legislative election. The communists had even become his competitors for power. In mid-1979 Aquino's jailers recorded him saying, "I would like to be the alternative. If there is no alternative the people will go to the communists. I think the Sison line now is hit Aquino by propaganda. I do not trust the communists. I have been dealing with them for 20 years. If you turn your back they will poke a knife. Traitors."3 Some oppositionists argued that if they were to fight Marcos independently of the communists, they would need an army. The Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) made the most serious effort to build a noncommunist guerrilla group.4 The PDSP made contacts with Nur Misauri of the Moro National Liberation Front, which had been waging a secessionist struggle in the southern Philippines. The MNLF turned out to be eager for an alliance with the social democrats because the defection of most Muslim politicians to the Marcos regime had weakened their connections with the elite. By February 1980 a small guerrilla force was training under MNLF auspices in Sabah, Malaysia.5 But the PDSP'S "army" was modest; only about ten party members had managed to make the arduous trip to

URBAN TERRORISM • 83

Sabah by late 1981. In the same year Aquino, then in U.S. exile, began to support the PDSP'S effort to build an army and established his own contacts with the MNLF.6 But with the arrests of several PDSP members, the Philippine government learned of the group's military camp in Sabah and complained loudly to the Malaysian government.7 The Malaysians then quietly forced the PDSP cadre to leave Sabah, spelling the end of its mini-army.8 By the late 1970s the opposition was receiving reports that General Fabian Ver, who was then head of the Presidential Security Command, had effectively supplanted the authority of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Philippine Constabulary Commander General Fidel Ramos.9 Several oppositionists apparently encouraged the losing factions in the military power struggle to stage a coup. According to a U.S.-based oppositionist, Enrile had established covert contacts with the opposition as early as 1976.10 In Manila, former Senator Jovito Salonga was reported to be discussing a coup plan with both Ramos and Enrile.11 Lieutenant Colonel Saturino Domingo, who was known to have had ties to Enrile, was arrested in mid-1979 on his return from the United States, where the Philippine government claimed that he had conspired with Raul Manglapus.12 Manglapus was tried in absentia, and several Manilabased oppositionists were arrested for supposedly backing a failed putsch by Lieutenant Colonel Jose T. Reyes in December 1979.13 The background of this apparent coup attempt remains unclear.14 Whether Enrile and Ramos were involved in the effort is unproved; if so, they quickly distanced themselves from it. But in a sworn statement after his arrest Colonel Reyes justified his actions by criticizing pervasive graft and corruption in the military leadership with words very much like those that the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) would use several years later.15 The Reyes coup attempt, which had been poorly planned and infiltrated by the government, was the first sign of discontent in the military since the beginning of martial law, but its failure made a military coup unfeasible for the next several years. Insurrection and the Light-a-Fire Movement

Without ties to the communists, only a tiny army in Sabah, and little success in stirring discontent in the military, the opposition became interested in an insurrectionary strategy. An insurrection, unlike a revolution, is based on rebellion by the masses

84 • URBAN TERRORISM

rather than on armed revolt. This strategy called for a small urbanbased group to undertake largely symbolic acts of terror to break the pall of fear that kept the populace from rising up against the hated dictator. The oppositionists decided that a rural revolutionary army and a coup were unnecessary because a small urban guerrilla group could inspire ordinary people to rise up. The opposition believed that the regime was highly vulnerable and that little force would be required to topple it. Steve Psinakis (the son-in-law of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., who was close to Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.) later recalled a conversation he had during this period with Charles Avila (who was also an Aquino associate and influential among Philippine social democrats): "We both felt strongly that the 'stability' of the Marcos regime hung on a few thin threads and that a well-organized urban guerrilla plan could easily snap the threads and cause the collapse of the dictatorship/'16 Psinakis, Avila, Aquino, and others distinguished their "people's urban insurrection" from the communists' "protracted people's war."17 The communists' largely peasant army waged prolonged warfare from rural areas, but insurrection would be urban based, with activists engaging in symbolic acts of terror to incite a popular revolt. The cities did not have to be surrounded from the countryside, as Maoism dictated, because Marcos could be toppled in Manila. The opposition did not have to match the military strength of the regime because civilian protests, and a withdrawal of international support, would lead it simply to collapse. A guerrilla group operating out of Manila could be smaller, and would be cheaper to maintain, than a full-scale army. With few recruits and limited funds, the opposition felt that an insurrectionary strategy was the best option. Jesuit priest Antonio Olaguer, constrained by a pledge to Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin not to engage in violence, brought his brother, businessman Eduardo Olaguer, into the inner circle in late 1977.18 With the PDSP busy training its small army, the mobilizing capacity of the inner circle was so limited that its members had to put together an armed group from among their families and close friends. Although a layman, Eduardo Olaguer was deeply influenced by his brother and by American Jesuit priests James Reuter and John Delaney (Delaney had been chaplain at the University of the Philippines while Olaguer was head of the Catholic student group). After studying at Harvard Business School, Olaguer worked as an execu-

URBAN TERRORISM • 85

tive at IBM-Philippines. He resigned when the company's management endorsed martial law, making him one of the few businessmen to express dissatisfaction with the regime openly. He later became president of Business Day Information System and Services, which published the country's leading business daily; chief executive officer of the Pantranco North bus company; and a part-time professor at the Asian Institute of Management. Olaguer traveled to the United States in 1978 to consult with political exiles and raise money for a "third force" that would fight Marcos but stay clear of the communists. After dismissing proposals for a large army, the exiles agreed to an insurrectionary plan, which would be cheaper and less violent. Raul Manglapus later described their plan, Project Public Justice, not as "mindless violence" but as "force that delivers public justice, force that fosters civil disobedience, force that destabilizes the dictatorship, force that organizes the people for the final drive to freedom."19 Returning to the Philippines in mid-1978, Olaguer persuaded the inner circle to accept the scheme, which called for carrying out symbolic acts of sabotage to inspire rebellion and for sending nonlethal letter bombs to shock government technocrats into abandoning Marcos' corrupt regime. Olaguer maintained that the opposition decided to confine itself to the "legitimate use of force" and to refrain from violence in order to uphold Christian precepts against killing.20 In a position paper that he wrote for the inner circle, however, Olaguer provided hard-nosed political reasons for preferring the Public Justice approach over other forms of armed struggle. The group's confidence in its ability to provoke an insurrection was based on the noise barrage in 1978. If those Manilenos who banged pots and pans could be persuaded to revolt, then the regime was finished. The group distributed pamphlets written by Olaguer that urged people to "light a fire" against the Marcos regime, both literally through arson and figuratively by sparking a revolt.21 The Marcos-controlled press dubbed the third force the Light-a-Fire Movement (LAFM). The LAFM hoped that its sabotage campaign would worry the U.S. government. Said one oppositionist, "We were trying to create enough stench here to waft to Washington."22 Traditional oppositionists had expected the Carter administration's human rights policy to translate into pressure on Marcos to keep balloting fair in 1978, or at least into criticism of his administration if balloting were fraudulent. Instead, Vice President Walter Mondale, who visited the Philippines

86 • URBAN TERRORISM

shortly after the polls, praised Marcos and pushed for a new agreement for military bases, which was reached early the following year. Mondale would meet with opposition politicians only if they entered his hotel through the back door.23 One of the opposition's goals in destabilizing the regime was to force the United States to distance itself from Marcos because of the political polarization in the Philippines. If Marcos could not be overthrown, then the LAFM hoped that its arson campaign would at least force Marcos to grant electoral concessions. In 1979 the traditional opposition had publicly organized the National Union for Democracy and Freedom, which called for the restoration of civil liberties, the creation of a caretaker government, and free elections.24 In late 1979 Aquino called on Marcos to lift martial law and reform the Commission on Elections so that fair local and national elections could be held.25 Olaguer was warned by friends in the business community that he was being manipulated by opposition politicians in the inner circle who wanted to bring Marcos to the negotiating table for their own political ends. He answered that he was a willing pawn in the politicians1 anti-Marcos struggle.26 Olaguer recruited his own close associates and key supporters of Aquino. Othaniel V. Jimenez was an old friend of Olaguer's and had worked with him in various executive positions. Jimenez and his wife, Esther, organized a LAFM cell that included their drivers.27 Teodoro Yabut, an advertising executive, knew Olaguer from the elite Apachee Club in Baguio and formed another LAFM cell with his sons. Yabut was financially supported by his friend Vicente Puyat, a major industrialist and son of former Senate President Gil Puyat.28 Also involved in the LAFM was Gaston Ortigas, a classmate of Olaguer s at the University of the Philippines who had been active with him in the campus Catholic action group. Ortigas had also studied with Olaguer at Harvard and was later dean of the Asian Institute of Management, where Olaguer was a part-time professor.29 While in the United States, Olaguer recruited Filipino-American businessman Ben Lim. Informed about the LAFM by messages smuggled into his jail cell, Aquino adopted the plan "lock, stock and barrel," according to Olaguer, even choosing targets to be attacked.30 A plot to free Aquino from prison was added to the group s agenda.31 A political ally of Aquino's, former Senator and LABAN candidate Ramon Mitra, helped carry out operations, and Aquino's brother, Paul Aquino, assisted with coordination and financing.32 Aquino's representative in the

URBAN TERRORISM • 87

inner circle, former Senator Francisco Rodrigo, was also active in the LAFM and enlisted the financial backing of wealthy Filipino-Chinese businessman Alfonso Yuchengco.33 Yuchengco was chairman of the board of Rizal Commercial Banking Company, one of the largest financial institutions in the Philippines, and he apparently provided the most funding for the LAFM. Other contributors were J. Amado Araneta, father-in-law of Gerardo Roxas, and Oscar Ledesma, a former cabinet minister and senator, a Lopez ally, and owner of a large sugar plantation.34 Robin Broad has argued that the "bourgeois bombers" were motivated by Marcos' turn to an export-oriented economic strategy, which undermined their import-oriented industrial base.35 In fact, Marcos' narrow program of nontraditional export promotion was offset by continued protection of import substitution industries, exchange rate discrimination against commodity exporters, and special licenses for presidential cronies.36 Vicente Puyat supported the LAFM because of his friendship with Yabut and because Marcos forced him to sell the family-owned Luzon Stevedoing Company in 1973 and did not allow his other businesses to grow during martial law.37 Alfonso Yuchengco said that he financed the LAFM because of his close relationship to Rodrigo and his desire to help Aquino. He was also critical of Marcos' use of political power for economic gain.38 Other than personal bonds, then, the regime's sultanism, not its export promotion plan, motivated businessmen to fund the LAFM. Olaguer also won the backing of key members of the Catholic Church. He claims that Cardinal Sin endorsed the LAFM's efforts, though Sin insisted that members of the Catholic clergy not be active participants. Although not personally involved in LAFM operations, Olaguer's brother, Antonio Olaguer, was a driving force in the movement. Another Jesuit, the Reverend James Reuter, an American priest who was Director of the National Office of Mass Media of the Philippine Catholic Church and a confidant of Sin, later delivered money from Yuchengco to Eduardo Olaguer when Olaguer was imprisoned for his activities in the LAFM.39 The LAFM was an elite group with a narrow social base. Olaguer's close business associates, a handful of Aquino's followers, a few financiers, and two clergymen with links to Cardinal Sin were the entire organization. If the LAFM had represented a larger group of businesses and a church hierarchy committed to bringing down Marcos, then it would have been of greater significance. Despite the encouraging signals from businesses and the church, only limited

88 • URBAN TERRORISM

support was forthcoming. Although Aquino had had a large following before martial law, during the dictatorship he could offer merely the assistance of his brother and a couple of close associates. The LAFM had no ties to the Manila middle class or the urban poor who were supposed to carry out the insurrection. Based on its membership alone, the LAFM did not seem likely to succeed. The LAFM's arson campaign throughout 1979 did little to destabilize the Marcos regime. The COMELEC building (the hated symbol of the 1978 election fraud), several crony-owned hotels, and the floating casino ship in Manila Bay were burned, but the fires received little publicity because of a government-imposed news blackout and the LAFM s inadequate communication network. Press coverage of the movement increased only after most of its members were safely under arrest. The acts of sabotage inspired no demonstrations or other signs of protest. A small letter bomb sent to Education Minister Onofre Corpus failed to prompt a single so-called technocrat to abandon the government.40 The arson campaign did not weaken U.S. government support for Marcos. An LAFM member fleeing arrest revealed the group's plans to a CIA official in Hong Kong, thinking that the American government would be sympathetic to the group s cause. His application for refugee status in the United States was denied while the CIA apparently shared the newly gathered intelligence with the Marcos administration.41 The Philippine military was able to break up the LAFM after the arrest of member Ben Lim, who was caught smuggling explosives to Olaguer at the Manila International Airport in mid-December 1979. Sixteen other LAFM members, including Olaguer, were apprehended within the next several days, while others escaped or remained undetected.42 Fearful of adverse reaction at home and abroad, the government refrained from arresting a Jesuit priest and several prominent businessmen who were also implicated in the movement.43 But the Marcos-controlled press was full of stories about terrorists and their links to exiles Raul Manglapus and Steve Psinakis.44 Aquino and the April 6th Liberation Movement

The failure of the Light-a-Fire Movement prompted debate among exiles in the United States. Steve Psinakis argued that a successful campaign required sophisticated explosives and better planning. In Arizona in late 1979 he had started training several

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Philippine oppositionists in the use of high-powered rifles and plastic explosives.45 Raul Manglapus, on the other hand, began to question the rationale for an insurrectionary strategy. He argued that without an extensive network of supporters or a mass base, the opposition's efforts to overthrow Marcos would fail as certainly as the LAFM had. Instead, he recommended trying to broaden the opposition s appeal by developing a progressive ideology for a new political party in preparation for future elections.46 Aquino joined this discussion when he arrived in the United States in May 1980 after being released from prison because of heart trouble. He sided with Psinakis and became the informal head of a militant faction of exiles advocating a bombing campaign against the Marcos administration.47 A reporter who interviewed Aquino in August 1980, less than a month after a successful triple bypass operation, found the opposition leader ready to undertake "another cloak and dagger crusade to topple the Philippine government" and added that Aquino "often uses the lingo of a 1920s Chicago mobster talking about the bossman, the joint and the cover. But he is not a musical comedy revolutionary/'48 Aquino and Psinakis supported a new insurrectionary organization, the April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM), organized by a social democratic group, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Filipino (KASAPI, Sectoral Association of the Philippines). KASAPI was a small organization made up mostly of former moderate student activists who had an estimated two thousand followers among the poor in Manila.49 The A6LM was named after the noise barrage that took place a day before the legislative elections on April 7,1978. Like the Light-a-Fire Movement, the A6LM aimed at reviving the spirit of protest that characterized the Aquino-led LABAN campaign and turning it into an uprising.50 The A6LM was to be larger, better equipped, and more professionally trained than the LAFM, but it also would try to minimize the loss of life in its symbolic acts of terror. Bombings were meant to provoke protests, not to substitute for them. From his jail cell Aquino had helped direct and organize the LAFM. He was now free, but he faced political irrelevance as an exile. He wanted to return to the Philippines and run for president, and he may have supported the A6LM less because he still believed in the possibility of insurrection than because he hoped that the A6LM would put him in a better position to bargain for the lifting of martial law and the holding of a competitive presidential election.51 (The

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opposition had again been stymied in the January 1980 local elections, with Marcos' candidates winning 69 of 73 governorships and 1,550 out of 1,560 mayoral posts.52) Aquino is also said to have insisted that the timetable for the bombing campaign be accelerated so that it would be in full swing before the November 1980 U.S. elections, which might bring a conservative Republican administration to power and more military aid to Marcos.53 On August 4, 1980, in a speech before the Asia Society in New York, Aquino warned Marcos that he must reform his regime or face the consequences of violence. Following the "principle of deniability," Aquino warned of terrorist acts but did not admit having anything to do with them.54 I have been told of plans for the launching of a massive urban guerrilla warfare where buildings will be blown up, and corrupt presidential cronies and cabinet members assassinated along with military officers who have engaged in wanton and rampant tortures of political prisoners. There are plans to disrupt tourism. Also to kidnap the children of corrupt aliens who have exploited our people mercilessly and who have profited immensely from their Palace connections. . . . The guerillas are welleducated, articulate young men and women who have patiently studied the latest tactics in urban warfare. If there is such a thing as the Light a Fire Movement, let me assure Mr. Marcos it will not be the last. More are coming, better-trained and better-prepared. ... This is no idle talk.55

Within three weeks of this warning, the A6LM set off its first bombs in Manila. The nine explosions on August 22, 1980, which caused minor damage and injured two people, were timed to coincide with the resumption of the trial of those accused of participating in the LAFM's arson campaign.56 Shortly before the bombings, Filipino politicians in exile in the United States sent over Victor Lovely, their first "foot soldier" trained in Arizona for the urban guerrilla warfare effort. Exile leaders were to follow Lovely, a low-ranking courier in the opposition movement in the United States, to the Philippines if his mission went as planned.57 Lovely did not succeed, however. After meeting with Salonga and other oppositionists in early September 1980, Lovely was severely injured when the bomb that he had prepared exploded prematurely. He was arrested, and the government forced him to confess in order to receive medical treatment for his wounds.58 Barely two weeks after the A6LM attacks had begun, the government, because of Lovely's confession, already had detailed knowledge of its operations.

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After two more waves of explosions in mid-September and early October in which one person was killed, Aquino sent Marcos his conditions for dialogue: lifting martial law and holding fair elections.59 Marcos rejected the ultimatum out-of-hand. The bombings, though numerous, had attracted limited publicity in the local and international press, and there were no signs of popular unrest. Marcos did not feel threatened enough to grant concessions. The A6LM decided to bomb the October 1980 convention of the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), which the Philippine government was sponsoring in Manila to encourage tourism. The choice of this target seems to indicate the A6LM's loss of confidence in its ability to provoke an uprising. Earlier bombings of banks, hotels, shopping centers, and government buildings could be seen as an effort to undercut Marcos' support among the general populace, but this attack would largely affect foreign travel agents, which would bring the dream of an insurrection no nearer. But it would give the opposition a great deal more leverage over Marcos, whose tourist program was one of the cornerstones of his economic strategy. Under an ambitious promotion scheme, tourist arrivals had increased from 166,000 in 1972 to 967,000 in 1979, and their spending rose from $38.2 million to $450 million.60 Besides bringing more money into the country, tourism was "quickly seized upon as a means to refurbish the Philippines' and especially Marcos' image."61 Marcos set up the balikbayan (one who returns to his or her country) program to encourage Filipinos living abroad to visit their homeland. He hoped that the expatriates' favorable impressions would counter the agitation of antigovernment exiles in the United States and other countries. The A6LM sent letters to travel agents warning them not to attend the convention, saying that "the Filipino revolution has begun" and that foreigners "might get caught in the crossfire."62 But after the Philippine government promised to step up security, American travel agents went ahead with the convention. Government security failed, however, because the A6LM had infiltrated the government's Ministry of Tourism. As a tourist official, Doris Nuval-Baffrey was able to slip a small bomb into the convention hall.63 Marcos delivered a speech to the delegates in which he assured them that he had restored peace to the Philippines: "You come to the Philippines perhaps for the first time and you are warned that the Philippines is under martial law, raising fear and apprehension that you come to visit a country where bloodshed is rife, kidnapping, arson, murder,

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pillage, destruction is commonplace. . . . But that is a nightmare which we hope is past and gone."64 Marcos' remarks soon seemed ironic, as an explosion rocked the convention hall shortly after his speech. Marcos was unharmed, but eighteen others, including eleven delegates and a popular Filipino singer, were injured.65 The bombing received extensive local and international press coverage. ASTA canceled the convention's public sessions as many delegates fled the country in panic.66 Aquino was reported to have sent congratulations to the A6LM members who carried out the attack.67 The terrorist campaign had finally achieved a significant success, and Marcos seemed ready to sue for peace. Shortly after the bombing, Marcos contacted Aquino and other exiles in the United States. He indicated his willingness to negotiate. Talks between the Marcos government and the opposition began in earhest when Imelda Marcos came to New York City in December 1980 and met with Aquino for almost four hours.68 Aquino again demanded the lifting of martial law and the institution of fair presidential elections. When martial rule was rescinded in January 1981 and presidential polls were set for June of that year, many in the opposition claimed that their bombing campaign had forced Marcos to make these moves. In spite of the official end of authoritarianism, Marcos continued to rule by decree.69 Aquino's hopes to run in the presidential election were blocked when Marcos raised the minimum age of candidates to fifty (Aquino was forty-eight).70 When Aquino still considered returning to serve as the campaign manager of Salvador H. Laurel (who had joined the opposition and was contemplating running for president), Marcos revived rebellion charges against the exiled politician. The Philippine president then set about rigging the election rules to such an extent that all major oppositionists opted for boycott. While Marcos was carrying out in form, but not in substance, concessions made to the exiles, the military was tracking down A6LM activists. In November 1980 Doris Nuval-Baflrey was arrested.71 In December an A6LM leader, Rolando Montiel, was apprehended.72 Several dozen other activists were jailed, and Aquino, Psinakis, and other exile leaders were indicted in absentia. Senator Salonga was briefly detained in connection with the bombings and then went into exile.73 Manila-based social democratic A6LM members, who were the most repressed by the government, began blaming Aquino and other exiles for their troubles. They claimed that plans had been poorly prepared and operations inadequately funded

URBAN TERRORISM • 93

and supplied. They resented the U.S.-based oppositionists, who directed the effort but took few of the risks. The consequences of the terrorism campaign, however, soon began directly affecting the exiles as well. Shortly after the bombing of the convention, Marcos asked the Carter administration to introduce to Congress an extradition treaty between the Philippines and the United States. Carter refused, but by early 1981 the Reagan administration had introduced the legislation in the Senate.74 Reagan also limited State Department contact with exiles who were considered terrorists and ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to begin probing their anti-Marcos activities. Several exiles left the country, fearing indictment. Aquino, concerned that his U.S. visa might not be renewed, considered moving to West Germany.75 In December 1981 Psinakis' house was raided, and by early 1982 a grand jury investigation of oppositionists had been launched. Psinakis was indicted in 1987 and tried in 1989 on a charge of transporting explosives.76 Rather than winning U.S. government support, the opposition's bombing campaign enabled Marcos to persuade the Reagan administration to crack down on the exiles. Even the New York Times, normally critical of the Philippine government, spoke of the "dismal choice" between the opposition led by Aquino—"a student of urban terror" who claims that "without violence, you don't get recognition"—and the Marcos dictatorship.77 The Insurrectionary Strategy in Comparative Perspective

The failure of the insurrectionary strategy suggests that the opposition's political analysis was badly flawed. Yet in several other countries the belief that a sultanistic regime could be toppled through an insurrection was also prevalent. If popular discontent can be mobilized, then it seems that the regime, with little legitimacy and a narrow social base of support, is doomed. In Cuba on July 26, 1953, Rdel Castro launched his near-suicidal attack on the Moncada barracks "as a means by which the Cuban people would be aroused ... against the Batista regime."78 Believing.Somoza's regime in Nicaragua to be increasingly discredited and therefore unstable, Humberto Ortega and the Tercerista faction of the Sandinistas undertook several small attacks of little military significance in October 1977, hoping that they would prompt a mass uprising.79 Both Rdel Castro and the Sandinistas eventually abandoned the insurrectionary strategy and relied largely on guerrilla armies to fight Batis-

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ta and Somoza, respectively. Yet they and the Philippine opposition shared the view that the regimes were vulnerable. The eventual overthrow of all three rulers (through different strategies) seemed to vindicate this assumption. The massive civilian uprising that radical clerics led in the streets of Teheran to bring down the Pahlavi dynasty seems hardly comparable to the sporadic arson and bombing campaign in Manila. Yet both involved an insurrectionary strategy. Filipino opposition politicians (temporarily) distanced themselves from the communists, and in Iran the Mojahedin, which had opted for violent struggle, was isolated by other opposition groups.80 Both traditional Philippine oppositionists and anti-Shah Iranian clerics were left without significant military means to fight a dictatorship. The Filipinos tried to avoid civilian casualties, and few bystanders were killed. Similarly, aside from the Mojahedin, most of the Iranian opposition made nonviolence a high priority.81 Extensive violence could convert their struggles into military battles that would put unarmed (or inadequately armed) oppositionists at a severe disadvantage. Both the Philippine and Iranian groups built their insurrectionary strategy on an incident that had caused widespread outrage. The legitimacy of sultanistic regimes is so low that one particularly grievous misdeed can ignite popular anger. In the Philippines, the noise barrage was a sign of discontent at the expected rigging of the 1978 legislative elections. A turning point in the Iranian revolution was the Qum riots protesting a pro-government newspaper's defamation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. A crucial distinction between the Philippine and Iranian cases is that Iranian oppositionists enabled protests not only to continue but to grow until millions were demonstrating in Teheran's streets. Khomeini's tapes smuggled in from exile, sermons and prayers by clerics in Iran, and protests during religious holidays and after the traditional forty-day mourning period spurred on the demonstrations. H. E. Chehabi argues that between November 1977 and January 1978 the Iranian revolution "took off" as the masses became involved in demonstrations.82 The anti-Shah protests struck a chord in civil society, bringing all kinds of people—the working class, the merchants, the religious, and the professionals—out in the streets. In the Philippines, by contrast, fires and bombs proved to be the wrong means to mobilize people. In Iran the opposition shrewdly used symbols of the country's religious-political culture to fuel protest, but in the Philippines oppositionists clumsily alienated supporters

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rather than attracting them. The Filipino opposition rediscovered the way to deliver its message against Marcos only after the Aquino assassination and Corazon C. Aquino's candidacy. Another difference between revolutionary Iran and the Philippines from 1979 to 1981 was the extent to which there was sufficient organization in civil society and clear leadership for an insurrection. In Iran demonstrations consisted of largely spontaneous mobilization, but the clergy and activists from the bazaar helped give the movement direction. After the Qum riots Khomeini was clearly the leader of the crowd. In the Philippines a few executives and members of the Catholic Church supported the insurrectionary effort, but there was no strong business opposition, and the church provided little institutional support. The imprisoned Aquino was the symbol of LABAN, but as an exile his popularity declined when he was linked to terrorism. It was not until Corazon C. Aquino clearly became the opposition's leader that the Catholic Church and many business executives actively joined the opposition.

6

Boycott and a United Front

The overt "alliance" fashioned out during these political [boycott] campaigns between known (though never publicly admitted) partisans and advocates of the Marxist-Leninist brand of Communism, and many if not most of the leaders of the ideologically moderate-democratic opposition to Marcos . . . is not just a marriage born of mutual expedience but of desperation and duplicity as well. —Eduardo Olaguer, "Heaven Help the Philippines," June 1981

In the early 1980s many moderates and radicals in the Philippine opposition had begun to study the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution.1 Mounting social injustice, arbitrary repression, and deprofessionalization of the armed forces had enabled the CPP and its rebel force, the NPA, to grow rapidly in the mid-1970s. To complement its strength in the countryside, the CPP revived its urban organizing and courted prominent anti-Marcos politicians. Lacking alternatives after the failure of urban terrorism, much of the traditional opposition showed interest in this united front proposed by the radical Left (including some of the oppositionists who had previously been most hostile to cooperating with the communists). Electoral participation was ruled out after Marcos made sure that the 1981 presidential election would be as rigged as the polls during martial law had been. The agreement between elite politicians and communists to boycott the balloting appeared to be the first step toward a cross-class revolutionary coalition in the Philippines, as similar agreements had been in Cuba and Nicaragua. Personalistic Rule and Revolution in Cuba and Nicaragua

A number of authors have tried to explain why revolutions occurred in Nicaragua and Cuba, but not in many other developing countries where they might have been expected, by pointing to the personalistic nature of the Somoza and Batista regimes.2 They argue 96

BOYCOTT AND A UNITED FRONT • 97

that a strong revolutionary army is likely to develop under sultanism because of the regime's aggravation of social inequality through its corruption, the often arbitrary nature of its military repression, and its lack of ideological legitimacy. Further, revolutionaries have a good chance of flourishing because of the low level of military professionalism. As Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter argue, this military deprofessionalization "makes it possible for revolutionary militias to mount a serious challenge to [the regime's] monopoly of violence over a given territory."3 The rebel armies of both the 26th of July Movement in Cuba and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were instrumental in successful revolutions.4 Rebel militias were first established in areas suffering particular socioeconomic neglect. The brutality of Batista's army and Somoza's National Guard pushed more recruits into the rebels' camp. Favoritism and corruption had sapped the morale of these government armies, and both eventually collapsed before smaller, less well equipped rebel forces. Personalistic regimes tend to generate not only a large radical opposition but also a substantial moderate one. In such regimes, both rich and poor are alienated, and the ruler is unlikely to relinquish control. The frustrated upper class may then rely on radicals who have the guns needed to seize power. In Cuba and Nicaragua, Batista and Somoza were abandoned by most elites, who provided armed revolutionaries with money, prestige, political connections, favorable propaganda, and a psychological boost, which proved crucial to the defeat of the regimes. In El Salvador, by contrast, an alliance between the oligarchy and the military enabled the regime to contain an insurgency for many years.5 But this tie between sultanism and revolution depends on the alternatives that elites have to a revolutionary coalition.6 Even in a personalistic regime not all the military is necessarily patrimonialized. High-ranking officers are usually loyal to the ruler, because the ruler promotes only loyalists to high positions. But dissidents in the lower ranks may launch a coup. Military rebellions were attempted against both Batista and Somoza. In the case of Cuba, the 1956 coup attempted by Colonel Ramon Barguin could possibly have prevented the Castro-led revolution. A military government might have served the interests of Cuba's upper classes better than Batista had, while professionalizing the armed forces or holding fair elections. Batista was overthrown by military officers in January 1959, but by then the revolution could not be stopped.

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Pressure put on a regime by the United States may also make a revolutionary coalition unnecessary. The American government ultimately abandoned both the Batista and the Somoza regimes, but the action was both too little and too late. If U.S. officials had distanced themselves from Somoza earlier, they might have been able to help moderates find an alternative to both Somoza and revolution. Alternatively, the U.S. government could have applied greater pressure or even force against Somoza when American-backed mediation failed in early 1979. Assuming that some officials in the U.S. government learned from this experience, they might be expected to act differently if a similar situation were to arise elsewhere. Whether moderate oppositionists support the available alternatives to revolution depends in part on the attitudes of the revolutionaries. Unless they are desperate, moderates must be convinced that they will be better off under the new regime before they will collaborate with radicals. Both Castro and the Sandinistas skillfully deemphasized their revolutionary agendas to woo elites into broad coalitions. Castro did not say that he was a communist until after the revolution had been won, and the Sandinistas never accepted the communist label. This tactic helped them to negotiate with moderates, who were for the most part hostile to Marxist-Leninism. The July 1957 Manifesto of the Sierra Madre, which Castro and moderate oppositionists signed, promised a mildly populist and democratic government. The Sandinistas' alliances with moderate groups culminated in the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, with representatives from the elite and from the Sandinistas, which issued a democratic program. But what if radical leaders in Cuba and Nicaragua had proved less flexible? What if they had put ideological purity before the pragmatic construction of alliances? If moderates had deserted a coalition with more rigid radicals, then the revolutionaries' chances of success would have been considerably reduced. The views of the moderates are equally important. It is difficult to separate their position from the options that the military and the United States may provide them, and from the radicals' approach. One meaningful factor is how quickly moderates are willing to return to participating in elections. If enough moderates take part in polls, even if they are unfair, then they may be able to mobilize support independently of the revolutionaries.They may thus achieve some democratic legitimacy and compete with the radicals' military stature. In Cuba and Nicaragua moderates showed little desire for competitive elections. The major opposition party in Cuba, the Or-

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todoxos, and the chief Nicaraguan parties never even seriously considered participating in elections in the late dictatorship periods. The Rise of the New People's Army and the Building of a United Front

After setbacks during the first years of martial law in the Philippines, the NPAs strength increased in the mid-1970s. By 1980 the communists claimed to have 8,000 troops fighting on twenty-five military fronts in forty-three provinces, as opposed to 350 troops engaged on ten fronts in nine provinces in 1972.7 Much of the NPA'S success was due to its gifted leadership, flexible military strategy, and growing combat experience.8 Declining wages, rising rural poverty, and growing landlessness during the authoritarian period were favorable for the guerrilla army's expansion. The sultanism of the regime clearly helped the NPA as well. Government corruption, arbitrary repression, and land grabbing fueled discontent.9 The CPP-NPA capitalized on this explosive situation, and its recruiting proved particularly successful in coconut- and sugar-growing regions, where crony monopolies had kept wages low.10 In addition, the declining effectiveness of the Philippine military, despite its nearly tripling in size from 1972 to 1980, allowed the communist insurgency to prosper.11 General Fabian Ver, chief of staff, concentrated the military's elite battalions in Manila to protect Marcos, sapping the anti-insurgency effort in the countryside. By the early 1980s, a rising revolutionary force posed a threat to Marcos' regime that appeared to parallel the rise of the guerrilla insurgencies that had toppled Somoza and Batista. The CPP Central Committee had overruled the Manila-Rizal branch's alliance with the LABAN party of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., in the 1978 legislative elections, and military repression of urban communist-affiliated groups and ideologues had forced cadres there underground. But the communist party was well enough organized in Manila and other urban centers to hibernate until the political climate for a united front had warmed. With the growing strength of the NPA in the countryside evident by 1980, the party decided to reactivate city-based activities as a first step toward building a coalition with opposition politicians.12 The leader of the communists' new coalition effort was Horacio Morales, head of the National Democratic Front (NDF).13 Although Morales had become a party member before martial law, he did not

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share the Maoist fervor of CPP founder Jose Sison and his followers. These dogmatists had argued that all alliances must be fully controlled by the party and should incorporate few ideological concessions to their coalition partners. Morales was gradually able to reduce Maoist fundamentalism and prepare the party for pragmatic negotiations with old-guard political elites. Morales rewrote the NDF s united front program, tossing out the harsh rhetoric of class struggle and introducing the smooth language of liberal democracy. He was more willing to consider a power-sharing arrangement with upper-class allies than were the ideologues in the party. Thanks to his elite background, Morales had the money, contacts, and social grace that he needed to succeed in exclusive Manila circles.14 The communist-originated People s MIND (Movement for Independence, Nationalism, and Democracy), which led the boycott of the June 1981 presidential election, was the culmination of several months of organizing the united front.15 The first initiative was the People s Assembly for the Pope s Arrival (PAPA), an alliance of CPP activists and followers of Jose Diokno, which staged antiregime protests during the pope's visit to the Philippines in February 1981.16 After his release from prison in 1974, Diokno had been active in human-rights campaigns, which impressed the CPP. Diokno had refused to participate in the traditional opposition's arson and bombing campaign and would not join any of the political parties founded to contest elections in 1978 and 1980. He had become a nationalist in the tradition of Senator Claro M. Recto, sharing the communists' antipathy toward the U.S. government but not their call for violent revolution. PAPA'S platform was therefore designed to be moderate enough for Diokno and his allies. In March 1981 the communists set up People's Opposition to the Plebiscite and Elections (PEOPLE) to lead a boycott against a plebiscite that Marcos had called for April in order to approve constitutional changes needed to pave the way for the first presidential election since the declaration of martial law. Gerardo Roxas, Liberal Party president and co-president of the newly formed United Democratic Organization, and former Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal, as well as Diokno and his faction, were persuaded to boycott the plebiscite, although Marcos had warned of legal action against those who did not vote.17 People's MIND was established after Roxas assented to Morales' offer of a formal alliance with the communists to be organized around a boycott of the June 1981 elections.18 The Laurel family's political faction decided to join Roxas in the boycott, although the

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Laurels had participated in the April plebiscite. Most members of the United Democratic Organization were now informally allied with People's MIND. Although Aquino did not publicly support the boycott, many of his close allies—former Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw, former Manila Times publisher Joaquin Roces, and LABAN members Augusto Sanchez and Teofisto T. Guingona—were active supporters of it.19 The operating principle of People's MIND was simple: the radical Left mobilized its legal groups for large demonstrations that were funded, and addressed, by opposition politicians. The ten thousand workers, farmers, professionals, students, and clergy members who took part in the group's final rally before the election composed the largest demonstration since martial law began. Speakers included Salvador Laurel, Jose Diokno, and Lorenzo Tanada.20 People's MIND records show that the chief financial supporters of the organization were friends of Jose Diokno (Sister Christine Tan and Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera), allies of Benigno Aquino (Chino Roces and LABAN party members), and Gerardo Roxas.21 The communists viewed cooperation between People's MIND and the United Democratic Organization on the boycott as a historic step that would improve their chances of revolutionary success.22 In their analysis, the armed resistance to American colonialism and the Huk rebellion had been plagued by the upper classes' traitorous collaboration with the colonialists or the neocolonial state. With the boycott of the presidential election, however, the "lines are drawn between Marcos and the revolutionary forces," as opposition politician Reuben Canoy put it.23 Given electoral manipulation by the government, it is difficult to know how effective the boycott was. One estimate, however, is that as many as 50 percent of eligible voters in Manila declined to participate.24 This represented a huge potential for a revolutionary coalition. Why had most of the pre-martial law politicians active in the opposition decided to join the communist-led boycott of the 1981 presidential elections? Why had the traditional opposition abandoned electoral struggle completely for the first time since martial law? To answer these questions, the impact of Marcos' political liberalization and his holding of elections during late martial law must be analyzed. These changes allowed the opposition to organize more extensively than at any time since the advent of authoritarianism. The expectations of the growing elite opposition were frustrated, however, because rigged elections brought them no closer to gaining

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power. Lacking an alternative strategy, the oppositionists came to believe that collaborating with the communists was the only way to remove Marcos from power. Liberalization, Elections, and Defections during Late Martial Law

Marcos began easing the restrict!veness of his dictatorship in the mid-1970s, resumed elections in 1978, and officially lifted martial law in early 1981. By the mid-1970s politicians could criticize Marcos with little fear of arrest, and sometimes their dissent would even be (briefly) noted by the pro-government press. WE Forum, a small opposition newspaper founded in 1977, discussed anti-Marcos activities in detail.25 Most significantly, two elections in three years (legislative elections in 1978 and local ones in 1980), no matter how unfair, had given the handful of leaders in the Liberal Party who had not collaborated with Marcos an electoral vehicle with which to mobilize their few remaining supporters. After the 1978 polls the Liberals took steps toward creating a national organization.26 In preparation for the 1980 local elections, leading Liberals established the National Union for Liberation (NUL) as an alliance of local opposition parties to contest gubernatorial and mayoral seats nationwide.27 Although opposition victories were few in 1980, the Liberal leaders had succeeded in re-creating a national opposition party.28 Because politicians had little incentive to change allegiances under martial law, few people switched parties during the first five and a half years of authoritarian rule.29 But when elections were revived in 1978, fighting within the KBL, which Marcos established for these polls, created "push" factors for those politicians who lost out in the choice of candidates, which led to several major defections.30 In the 1980 local elections, Information Minister Francisco S. Tatad broke with Marcos over the selection of KBL candidates in Tatad's home province. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile had to fight hard to get his local KBL bets nominated, which worsened tensions within the administration. The number of turncoats was small by pre-martial law standards because the opposition clearly had no chance of winning the rigged elections. Nonetheless, some previously pro-Marcos politicians were so frustrated about being passed over by the KBL that they joined the opposition. Clearly the most significant of these defections was that of former

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House Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr., and his brother, former Senator Salvador H. Laurel. Although the Laurel brothers had been outspoken opponents of Marcos within the Nacionalista Party before martial law, they were largely silent after it was declared. Then in 1978 Salvador Laurel ran for a parliamentary seat as a member of the KBL. But Laurel complained that the administration tried to undermine his political stature by ensuring that his vote count slipped behind that of two Cabinet members also running on the ruling-party ticket in the same region.31 The elder Laurel brother, Jose, Jr., expressed his dissatisfaction this way: "I amfightingMar cos because I have an investment in him. I was hoping to collect but I have waited long enough."32 The final split between the Laurels and Marcos came when Jose Laurel, Jr., criticized the regime in front of Imelda Marcos. The First Lady fled back to the presidential palace in tears, which led to a stern warning from her husband to the opposition on television the next day. The Laurels revived the Nacionalista Party to field opposition candidates in the 1980 local elections. The anti-Marcos Nacionalistas (another faction in the party remained loyal to Marcos) were made up of KBL defectors and oppositionists who had previously been inactive. The Laurels had one of the few local political machines of the opposition that had survived martial law more or less intact. Their candidate, Jose Laurel V, nephew of Salvador Laurel and Jose Laurel, Jr., was thus elected governor of the clan's home province of Batangas despite the patronage that the Marcoses poured into the area to defeat him. Not only did the Laurels have an extensive political network maintained by substantial private wealth, but they were also able to turn the campaign into a moral referendum on the administration. In what Salvador Laurel later claimed was a prelude to people power, thousands of opposition supporters surrounded a military vehicle that was trying to steal ballot boxes and forced the soldiers to back down.33 Founding UNIDO and Boycotting Elections

Several Liberals had been mobilized and a few prominent KBL members had defected to the opposition even though elections had been rigged. This spurt of organizing among anti-Marcos politicians, begun with the 1978 elections, culminated in the formation of the United Democratic Organization (UNIDO) in August 1980. (The original name of this traditional opposition group was changed in

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early 1982 to the United Nationalist Democratic Organization as the Laurel brothers unsuccessfully tried to convince the more militant politicians Jose Diokno and Lorenzo Tanada to join.) Shortly after the local elections of January 1980, the Laurel brothers approached former President Diosdado Macapagal, a leading Liberal Party member, about a coalition. Macapagal had to overcome the reservations of Gerardo Roxas and Jovito R. Salonga, who suspected that the Laurels were still close to Marcos.34 Those who signed the original UNIDO agreement were a Who's Who of pre-martial law Liberal and Nacionalista politicians, representing three major political factions: the Laurels, Roxas, and Aquino.35 Leaders of neither the old Liberal Party nor the Nacionalista Party wanted to concede the political advantage, so Jose Laurel, Jr., and Roxas became co-presidents of UNIDO. The alliance was designed to choose a single presidential candidate for the 1981 elections, although because of the organization's loose structure the task would not have been an easy one. The first decision facing UNIDO was whether to participate in the 1981 elections. Laurels organizing efforts had been motivated largely by his desire to be the opposition's candidate. But he had to decide whether the legitimacy that Marcos would gain by his participation in the polls would be balanced by gains for the opposition. Would his candidacy increase his public standing, or would he develop a reputation as a collaborator? Laurel thought, according to a close adviser, that even though he would not be allowed to win, it would be worthwhile to participate if he could overcome many disadvantages and make a respectable showing. Marcos would be weakened and Laurel would become the undisputed leader of the opposition.36 Marcos, however, had no intention of allowing his opponents even a chance to look good. The voters' list had been compiled by proMarcos politicians, COMELEC was packed with his loyalists, the campaign was limited to fifty-two days and then reduced further to twenty-eight (making it difficult to campaign throughout the seventhousand-island archipelago, particularly without sufficient media coverage), and UNIDO was not accredited, so an opposition candidate could face bureaucratic obstacles.37 When Roxas decided to boycott the polls, Laurel was trapped. Unless he could get Marcos to modify the electoral rules, his candidacy stood little chance of even partial success, and he might again be branded as a collaborator by the

BOYCOTT AND A UNITED FRONT • 105

boycotting Liberals. When Marcos remained unyielding to Laurel's demand for concessions on the conduct of the balloting, the UNIDO politician had little choice but to announce that he was also boycotting the polls. Members of UNIDO had varying motivations for entering into a coalition with the communists, Roxas and other Liberals seemed to have despaired about the worth of ever participating in any election held by Marcos.38 They were also disillusioned by persistent U.S. support for the Philippine dictator, and they doubted that this proMarcos policy would change. They were thus willing to adopt much of the radical Left's revolutionary and nationalistic rhetoric. They vocally supported the "mass politics" (as opposed to elite, electoral politics) of the communists. The radicals praised Roxas' political transformation: "He has proven to be one politician who finally discovered what real politics should be under the present dispensation. It has to be mass politics—that means political acts that rely on the broad number of the people, especially the workers, peasants and students. ... [It must also be] nationalistic politics [that is,] any opposition to the Marcos regime should necessarily mean opposition to his foreign backers, especially the U.S. government and big business."39 The Laurel brothers hoped to use the alliance with the radical Left to achieve other ends, however. They would not rule out participation in future elections if Marcos made concessions.40 The Laurels apparently believed that the opposition would have a chance only if the U.S. government began to pressure the Philippine president. They anticipated that the moderates' flirtation with the radicals would capture the U.S. government's attention more than urban terrorism had. Their pro-Left rhetoric was only tactical; they still wanted American support.41 This approach seemed to be successful almost immediately, as the American embassy in Manila reportedly tried to convince the traditional oppositionists to drop their boycott of the presidential polls.42 The Laurels had always been fair-weather friends of the communists, who made little effort to hide their antipathy toward the brothers. During the boycott campaign the communists treated Salvador Laurel coldly, and afterward the groups had little to do with one another. The most definitive break between a politician and the revolutionaries, however, came after an affiliate of the communistlinked KMU union went on strike against a company owned by the family of UNIDO member Eva Estrada Kalaw.43 In this case the radi-

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cal Left proved unwilling to limit class conflict in order to maintain political collaboration. The Opposition Groups Split Up

The united front had been weakened by the defection of the Laurel brothers and their followers, and it was dealt a severe blow by the arrest of Horacio Morales in early 1982. He was captured with plans for a coalition government, indicating that he was ready to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement in a future revolutionary government consisting of moderates and radicals.44 Morales was replaced by a labor leader, Oca Francisco, and a priest, the Reverend Jose Dizon, who returned to many of the Maoist principles that they felt had been neglected. They slowed discussion of a coalition government and emphasized the construction of local, sectoral, and issue-based alliances to protect radical organizations from state repression and propagate their political platform.45 The communists were now to use politicians in the united front as a shield against military crackdowns and a propaganda bullhorn for the radical Left. They were unwilling to share power in the antidictatorship struggle, much less in a revolutionary government.46 With the death of Roxas in early 1982, the CPP lost one of its few remaining friends in UNIDO. Although a number of lesser-known Liberals continued to work closely with them, the communists began negotiating for a stable, long-term coalition with the more influential Jose Diokno. During the electoral boycott Diokno had been optimistic about reaching an agreement: "That all significant opposition groups have adopted a common tactic despite their differences and disagreements is pregnant with possibilities. Possibilities for additional common actions with broader participation and greater effect; possibilities even of a common front with a common strategy. We must not waste these possibilities by mutual prejudices, unfounded suspicions or imaginary fears/'47 Yet conflict between Diokno and the radical Left arose when negotiations for a full-blown alliance began in late 1982.48 The independent politician chafed at the demands of Dizon, the radicals' new negotiator. Dizon reportedly insisted that the communists' armed struggle was the key to overthrowing Marcos and that all other opposition activity would have to be subordinated to it.49 Diokno wanted peaceful protest to be incorporated in the movement. The former senator also felt that he was being denied any real power in

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the new organization that he was formally to lead, the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy.50 Because of the shift from the eclectic strategy and power sharing proposed by Morales, Diokno now felt that the Left had double-crossed him, and he walked out of the negotiations.51 His defection set back the CPP'S timetable for the launching of the Nationalist Alliance. Instead of the dynamic Diokno, they had to settle for the elderly Lorenzo Tafiada, who apparently took a bemused attitude toward the hard-line tactics of the Left. Many politicians in the Nationalist Alliance had been closely associated with Gerardo Roxas, and after his death they continued his policy of cooperating with the communists. Several of these oppositionists, including Abraham Sarmiento and Manuel Concordia, had been involved in local leftist groups and later joined the radicals' Nationalist Alliance, launched after the Aquino assassination. The new Liberal Party head, Jovito Salonga, in self-imposed exile in the United States following a brief prison term after the A6LM bombings, wrote a lengthy party platform setting out the newly radicalized ideology. U.S. bases would be eliminated, foreign investment would be curbed, and fundamental social reform (particularly land reform) would be undertaken.52 This program represented a profound ideological change from the pre-martial law Liberal Party, which was conservative and elite, like its counterpart, the Nacionalista Party. Although Salonga's platform did not explicitly endorse revolution, it rejected parliamentary struggle and did not rule out the use of violence.53 It even referred indirectly to the inclusion of communists within a provisional government.54 Among the factions of the traditional opposition, the Roxas Liberals were moving closest to the radical Left. The Laurels, however, distanced themselves from the communists after the boycott. Contacts with the U.S. government and signals from dissidents in the military indicated that the traditional opposition's opportunities for negotiations, or electoral chances, might improve. In mid-1982 the CIA held a meeting with Salvador Laurel and other oppositionists. The possibility of the opposition's participation in an interim government and fairer elections were discussed.55 In early 1983 the opposition paper Malaya reported that the American ambassador to the Philippines, Michael Armacost, had met with anti-Marcos politicians.56 The following year Marcos, seemingly reacting to American pressure, promised to revamp the electoral code for 1984 to meet several of UNlDO's demands.57

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One reason for this turnabout in the State Department was concern about Marcos' deteriorating health and fear that Imelda Marcos might succeed her husband. By the early 1980s the CIA became aware that Marcos was suffering from a terminal case of lupus erythematosus, a chronic disorder of the immune system, which had attacked his kidneys.58 Imelda Marcos was already a kind of acting president as her husband's health worsened. She administered the medicines that prolonged his life and made a number of day-to-day decisions.59 Pragmatists in the U.S. State Department hoped to persuade Marcos to accept some of his foes into his government, which would then prepare for national polls and prevent Imelda Marcos from continuing his dictatorship. In a show of gratitude, Laurel's UNIDO dropped its stance against American military bases and seemed to soften its economic nationalism.60 In 1982 Laurel was encouraged by rumors of discontent among junior officers in the armed forces.61 These military dissidents belonged to the two-hundred-member security force formed to defend Defense Minister Enrile against General Ver. To consolidate his and his wife's control of the regime during his illness, Marcos had appointed Ver chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1981, bypassing Philippine Constabulary head Fidel V. Ramos, whose obedience was less certain although he, like Ver, was related to Marcos. Suspecting disloyalty, Marcos had removed his defense minister from the military chain of command, dangerously increasing tension between Ver and Enrile. Fearing an assassination attempt by Ver, Enrile gave his "boys" heavy weapons and extensive training by foreign mercenaries, and soon he had a private army within the military. It is unknown whether the would-be military rebels made any contacts with Laurel. But even if they did not, Laurel's knowledge that this independent armed force might one day topple the government changed the political equation. If revolution could not be stopped, then electoral participation made little sense because it would only tar Laurel in the new political order. But preparing for polls was sensible if Marcos was to be overthrown by junior officers loyal to Enrile who then might turn power over to civilians in an election. Neither U.S. officials nor Enrile's junior officers had promised the traditional opposition success at the polls. But Laurel's faction of UNIDO required only limited encouragement to be enthusiastic about elections. All the Laurels' organizing work would be for naught

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if UNIDO decided to boycott future polls. They had little choice but to hope that U.S. pressure or a military coup would eventually make the elections fairer. UNIDO was not alone in organizing for elections. Raul Manglapus, several Philippine-based politicians, and some social democrats established the Pkrtido Demokratikong Filipino (PDF, Philippine Democratic Party) in early 1982. Manglapus had abandoned the insurrectionary strategy after the collapse of the LAFM. Never a part of the united front, he began to dream of founding an electorally oriented, progressive political party much like the alternative parties that he had been involved in before martial law. With grant money received through his Christian democratic connections in Europe, he invited Aquilino Pimentel (a former Constitutional Convention delegate and then Cagayan de Oro Mayor) and Manglapus' ally Luis Jose, to the United States for consultations.62 Shortly after the presidential election, former members of Manglapus' Christian Social Movement from Davao began laying out plans for the new party with Pimentel.63 Pimentel recruited one-time Cebu KBL candidate Antonio Cuenco, who had been alienated from Marcos during the 1978 election. In Manila, Jose had won the support of members of KASAPI after the military had broken up the A6LM bombing campaign.64 Formed in February 1982, the PDF merged the following year with LABAN, which Aquino had established for the 1978 legislative election. The POP had proposed the merger so that the Manila-based LABAN could geographically complement the Mindanao- and Visayan-oriented POP. The LABAN politicians agreed, drawn by the new style of politics that the social democratic PDP was trying to practice. To show their sincerity, seasoned LABAN politicians consented to attend a two-day seminar on party ideology with students, farmers, and fishers before being admitted to the newly merged PDPLABAN.65 Instead of distributing patronage, the PDP-LABAN planned to woo voters with a program of socioeconomic justice. Aquino Plans His Return

Aquino accepted an invitation by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in July 1981 to see what a revolution looked like. Back in the United States, Aquino began receiving messages from the Philippine communists asking him to join their coalition-building efforts .66 But he was still smarting over such incidents as the betrayal of communist campaigners in 1978.67 He had seen how poorly the

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moderate politicians had fared under the Sandinistas and may have expected a similar fate if the communists' revolution was successful in the Philippines. Aquino, like Salvador Laurel, had his eye on future elections, which the communists were determined to boycott. Although he believed that Marcos would reimprison him if he came back to the Philippines, he wanted to be home before January 1984 when the "country will be preparing for the May [1984 legislative] elections, and this should bring the excitement to a fever pitch."68 Aquino had been sending out feelers to pro-Marcos politicians who indicated that they were ready to jump to the opposition during an election. The old pattern of defections was reemerging as hopes increased for more competitive polls. The balimbings (political turncoats) raised Aquino's hopes for a strong showing. Aquino did not expect Marcos to let the opposition win, but he hoped to "politicize our people" through an anticorruption, antidictatorship campaign that would force Marcos to "spend at least P100 to P200 pesos for every peso we spend/'69 The opposition's moral resources would enable it to mobilize popular support that would offset Marcos' patronage advantage. Aquino's next calculation was that Marcos' overspending would wreck the economy, which was already under severe strain (see chapter 7). If financial collapse did not undo Marcos, then his poor health would. Anything could happen in the succession struggle that would ensue after Marcos' death or disability. Claiming that he had received messages from Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Aquino may have counted on the military to overthrow Marcos before elections or after the government had cheated the opposition at the polls.70 While U.S. officials i Manila had hinted to Laurel and other oppositionists about possible American pressure on Marcos, Aquino had become practically persona non grata with the Reagan administration. Aquino's implication in the bombing campaign in Manila was a poor recommendation to the American government, which was extraordinarily jumpy about terrorism in any form. But despite his bitterness, Aquino refused to join the radicals in denouncing the Americans. The U.S. government was too important to Aquino's plans to be alienated through rhetorical flourishes. He strived to make himself appear an acceptable alternative to Marcos whom the Americans might one day support. But he felt that he had to return to the Philippines in order to persuade the U.S. government to back him and abandon Marcos.

BOYCOTT AND A UNITED FRONT - I I I

Just as Aquino began to think about future polls, his political base in the Philippines collapsed. After Gerardo Roxas' death in April 1982, Aquino expected to be named the new Liberal Party president.71 Heading a major party was an important part of his plan to be elected Philippine president one day. But his factional rivalry with Roxas—which had arisen over the competition for the Liberal presidential nomination of 1973—came back to haunt him. Shortly before his death, Roxas communicated to Liberal Party leaders that he wanted Jovito Salonga, not Aquino, as his successor.72 At about the same time Aquino also lost control of his LABAN party when it merged with the PDF. The POP'S left-wing platform, which called for economic and political nationalism, did not help Aquino's efforts to inch the U.S. government away from Marcos. For all his tactical innovativeness, Aquino was a traditional politician who had no faith in the new brand of ideological electoral politics espoused by the POP. He wanted followers who were personally loyal to him. But he was aware that his allies in Manila were beginning to grumble about his absence.73 Aquino's setbacks in the Liberal Party and in LABAN indicated the extent to which his influence had declined while he had been abroad. But Aquino had not lost his famous self-confidence, or at least bravado. He told supporters, "Pagbalik ko, tatabi sila lahat" (When I return home, they will all step aside).74 To give his faction a political vehicle, he planned to try to win control of the Liberal Party or PDP-LABAN or both after he was back in the country.75 Aquino was leaning toward making the dangerous decision to return to the Philippines not only for elections but also for the leadership battles precipitated by the possibility of more open balloting. Laurel's success with UNIDO had led Aquino, Manglapus, and other politicians to maneuver for leadership of the opposition. Because only one oppositionist could have the winner-take-all Philippine presidency, coalition building in the opposition was more difficult than it would have been if the system had been parliamentary, even though the presidential system intensified organizational efforts among the various rivals.76 While he was maneuvering for political advantage, Aquino could not afford to be seen as another self-interested politician who wanted only to be Marcos' successor. Aquino felt that he needed to restore the aura of saintliness that he had assumed as Marcos' longest-held political prisoner. The bombing campaign and political infighting that marked his years of exile had undercut this image. Aquino

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solved his public relations problem in a peculiar fashion. His fellow oppositionist in exile Bonifacio Gillego described it by saying that Aquino's "mind was quite practical, naughty, and mischievous. . . . [He] was full of schemes, many of which never materialized Then Aquino saw the film Gandhi. He felt if there was a chance to meet Marcos personally and since Marcos had achieved everything, wealth and power—he [Aquino] could convince him [Marcos] to consider history. [Aquino would tell Marcos:] If you restore democracy your place in history is assured/ "77 In the speeches he delivered and interviews he gave before his departure from the United States, Aquino emphasized his nonviolence, his lack of political ambition, and his hope that Marcos could be persuaded to step down voluntarily. How sincere Aquino was about his Gandhian message is disputed, however. One of his associates said that it "was just for show, just for public consumption."78 Not only was Aquino's conversion to nonviolence highly questionable, but it was also doubtful that he had surrendered his presidential ambitions or thought Marcos would yield power so easily. But the Gandhian rhetoric provided Aquino with good political cover. By enunciating a noble purpose, he could get a political jump on his factional rivals. Returning to the Philippines before Salonga would allow him to rally the Liberals even though Salonga was the formal party head. Laurel's UNIDO would also have to be headed off or co-opted, and the PDP-LABAN tamed if Aquino's presidential ambitions, publicly denied but never abandoned, were to be realized. Aquino's return to the Philippines worried the radical Left. The drama of his reentry into the political scene and the preparations for elections would steal the thunder from their demonstrations and boycott campaigns. Not likely to join the united front, Aquino was planning to start campaigning for the legislative polls, which the communists feared would slow revolutionary momentum. Aquino was (wrongly) seen as having the blessing of the U.S. government and therefore a decisive advantage in the struggle for power in the late- or post-Marcos era. Writing mockingly, one radical journalist implicitly revealed the anxiety that Aquino was causing: "But have no fear, for not even the greatest American hero [Aquino] can steal the scene in a political scenario where the people—the workers, farmers, professionals, students and religious—have been playing the role of protagonists all these years This time we will relegate to the dustbin of history the opportunists and mercenaries."79 In early 1981 conditions had seemed nearly perfect for the ere-

BOYCOTT AND A UNITED FRONT • 1 1 3

ation of a multiclass revolutionary coalition against Marcos. On the eve of Aquino's return to the Philippines in August 1983, however, the outlook for such an alliance had dimmed considerably. Of the five major opposition factions, only the one led by Jovito Salonga considered a united front with the radicals its chief strategy. The Aquino, Laurel, and PDP-LABAN factions were preparing for elections, and Diokno and his followers had no clear plan after their break with the communists. This did not mean that a united front could not be revived. In fact, the demonstrations that followed the Aquino assassination were seen as a chance to do so. But in its crucial early phase, the united front had lagged behind expectations. Three reasons for this are the rigidity of the communists, signals from the U.S. government and dissidents in the Philippine military, and the electoral orientation of the opposition. Even if the pragmatic communist leader Horacio Morales had not been arrested, united front negotiations might have failed with Laurel and never begun with Aquino. But Morales' orthodox Maoist successors also managed to alienate Diokno, who was ideologically inclined to the radicals and willing to continue boycotting elections. Most of the communists' remaining allies were politicians of limited stature. Diokno, on the other hand, already had many prominent followers among the Manila elite and could be expected to win considerable support from the upper classes. Overtures by the U.S. government and military dissidents in 1982 led Salvador Laurel and other politicians to start preparing for elections in earnest. By 1983, Marcos began to believe that there was a U.S.-supported conspiracy against his continued rule. Although his fears were exaggerated, the political winds out of Washington had subtly shifted. In addition, Laurel, Aquino, and other opposition politicians were encouraged by signs of dissent in the military. It is striking how much of the traditional opposition continued to have an electoral orientation despite the 1981 presidential election boycott. The declaration of martial law and the cancellation of elections had not dashed many opposition politicians' faith in the ballot box. Opposition politicians' electoral fever was the most important reason why the boycott-based united front with the communists remained so fragile.

I

The Parliament of the Streets and Legislative Polls

I held out for participation in the 1984 elections even if I knew they would be rigged. I was warned by lawyers that I ran the grave risk of legitimizing the foregone results of elections that were clearly going to be fraudulent. But I was not fighting for lawyers but for the people in whose intelligence I had implicit faith It was the only way I knew by which we could measure our power even in the terms dictated by the dictatorship. —Corazon C. Aquino, October 1986

After the assassination of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., on August 21,1983, millions of Filipinos demonstrated against the regime, and this "parliament of the streets" reestablished the possibility of a united front. Several politicians active in the demonstrations opted to join the radicals in a boycott of the 1984 legislative polls. But many Philippine oppositionists believed that they could defeat the family-based dictatorship through elections. This apparent anomaly requires explanation in view of consistent poll boycotts by elite opposition groups to other sultanistic regimes. The Causes and Consequences of the Aquino Assassination

Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., was assassinated in the midst of a succession struggle for the presidency precipitated by Ferdinand A. Marcos' terminal case of lupus erythematosus.1 Marcos' debilitation, like that of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle after his heart attack in July 1977, had weakened his control over the regime in which he had practiced a careful balance of repression and tolerance during nearly eleven years of dictatorship. Although Marcos himself may have ordered Aquino's assassination, the available evi114

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 1 1 5

dence suggests that Imelda R. Marcos and General Fabian C. Ver were behind the killing. Arriving at the Manila International Airport when Imelda Marcos and Ver were preparing to seize power in the event of Marcos1 death after a kidney transplant, Aquino posed a grave threat to family-based rule. In the stronger, better institutionalized military regimes of Uruguay and Korea, returning opposition leaders—Wilson Ferreira in 1984 and Kim Dae Jung in 1985, respectively—were simply placed under house arrest or packed off to jail, where their political influence could be limited without making them martyrs.2 Aquino, by contrast, was murdered in a blatant fashion: he was shot by a Philippine military escort as he descended from a plane full of international journalists. The consequences of Aquino's assassination were also shaped by the personalism of the Marcos regime. Like Somoza after Chamorro's murder, Marcos was isolated domestically and internationally. Rather than sparking class strife, the Aquino assassination unleashed outrage across socioeconomic lines against the Marcoses' material accumulation, arbitrary repression, and dynastic ambitions. The Catholic Church endorsed the anti-Marcos protests, in which business and professional groups participated. The assassination also encouraged members of the military and losers in the Malacanang succession struggle to start plotting a coup. Even the Reagan administration—which was determined not to make the "mistake" of abandoning a friendly dictator, as the U.S. government had done with the Shah and Somoza—was forced to distance itself from Marcos because large demonstrations showed the regime's unpopularity and the growing communist movement made it vulnerable to revolution. By contrast, in the aftermath of the 1980 shootings of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero and popular social democratic politician Mario Zamora in El Salvador, the Duarte regime was able to establish a modus vivendi with the economic oligarchy, strengthen its alliance with the military, and attain U.S. support as class conflict sharpened and civil war intensified.3 Previous efforts by opposition politicians in the Philippines to mobilize the citizenry against the regime either had proved ephemeral (the noise barrage before the 1978 legislative elections), had backfired (the arson and bombing terror campaign), or had relied largely on communist organizers (the 1981 presidential boycott). Antigovernment protests after Aquino's murder, in contrast, lasted for months, put Marcos on the defensive, and provided opposition politicians with a noncommunist following. According to govern-

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ment estimates, 165 rallies, marches, and other demonstrations took place between August 21 and September 30, 1983.4 The largest was Aquino's funeral procession in Manila, which took eleven hours and was attended by an estimated 2 million people.5 Protest demonstrations continued into the following year, with more than 100 held between October 1983 and February 1984. The biggest of these was the 120-kilometer "Tarlac to Tarmac" run (from Aquino's home province to the international airport where he was murdered), attended by an estimated five hundred thousand people.6 Francisco Nemenzo has expressed regret that neither he nor any of the other social scientists attending the rallies of this period carried out a survey of the crowd's social composition. But Nemenzo and most other observers are certain that the post-assassination demonstrations had a different character from the many rallies organized by the radical Left in the early 1980s, because of the involvement of the upper and middle classes, which he terms the middle forces.7 Reynaldo Clemena Ileto has argued that in the context of Philippine folk culture Aquino's assassination seemed a "familiar drama involving familiar themes."8 Aquino was compared to Jose Rizal, whose execution in 1896 helped spark the Philippine revolution against Spain. Similar to Rizal, who gave up the safety of his European refuge to fight the injustices of Spanish rule in the Philippines, Aquino braved great risks to return from his U.S. exile. (Aquino's homecoming was also compared to General Douglas MacArthur's return to defeat the Japanese, as he had promised.) One poster showed Rizal and Aquino and contained the message "great men sacrifice their lives for freedom." After Rizal's death many of his compatriots had seen him as a Filipino Christ, and Aquino seemed to be incorporated into this tradition. When Marcos denied responsibility for the assassination, the almost universal outcry was "Pontius Pilate!"9 Filipinos felt religious pity (awa) and empathy (damay) for the assassinated opposition leader. A journalist spoke of a "griefstricken nation," which identified with its fallen hero.10 The demonstrators' chief slogan was "Ninoy, hindi ka nag-iisa" (you're not alone). How was Aquino seamlessly transformed from a traditional politician whose motives were suspect into a national hero and martyr whose moral stature was so evident? Aquino began this process in prison and in exile. The stature that he had attained as an oppositionist before martial law was tarnished by his rough-and-tumble style of politics, which raised the question whether he would be

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 1 1 7

much different from Marcos should he become president. In prison, however, he was able to portray himself as a willing martyr, despite being convicted by a military court of murder and rebellion. While he was in exile, Aquino's involvement in the A6LM terrorist campaign and reports of fighting within the Liberal and PDP-LABAN parties were offset by his Gandhian rhetoric and his disavowal of presidential ambition. After Aquino's death, his family and the opposition press continued to enhance his image. Aquino's mother decided to keep the body from being touched up by a mortician so that the marks of the brutal killing would reveal the extent of her son's sacrifice.11 After viewing Aquino's body, even cynics were convinced of his sincerity. Philippine columnist Ninez Cacho-Olivares had thought that because Aquino was a politician "he may not have had the interests of the Filipino at heart; that he may not have loved his country and his people. I looked at his ashen face, the bullet wound, and the blood all over his shirt. No, Ninoy, I said to myself. I have no more doubts. You loved your country and your people. God be with you, always, wherever you may be."12 Corazon Aquino addressed rallies simply by recounting how she and her husband had suffered at the hands of Marcos. The Ninoy Aquino Foundation was established to hold an exhibition on Aquino's life that displayed his possessions like the relics of saints.13 It also published his speeches, letters, articles, and books. While the Marcos press largely ignored the assassination and the demonstrations that followed, a growing alternative press cultivated Aquino's memory and reported extensively on the antigovernment movement. Support for the Opposition

Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin and other members of the Catholic hierarchy affirmed Aquino's moral character, reinforcing popular perceptions. In a speech to a Philippine writers' group, Sin said that Aquino was "purified by 8 years in prison and 3 years in exile and his death caused a miracle." Aquino was on a par with Rizal and "now deserves to be called our national hero."14 Sin and twelve other bishops conducted Aquino's funeral, confirming, as Dennis Shoesmith argues, "that the assassination marked a shift in the moral and even the supernatural order: that the regime had lost all moral authority."15 Appointed archbishop of Manila in 1974 and the country's second

1 1 8 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE

STREETS

cardinal in 1976, Sin had defined the Philippine Catholic Church's policy toward the Marcos regime as critical collaboration. Initially, however, there was more collaboration than criticism: only seventeen of more than one hundred bishops had consistently opposed Marcos through most of the martial law period.16 Despite his generally good relations with the Marcos regime during the early dictatorship, Sin had been close to Benigno Aquino.17 But official church policy toward Marcos began to change only shortly before Aquino's assassination. Mounting human rights violations by an increasingly deprofessionalized military led Sin and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) to rebuke Marcos in a statement issued in February 1983. The bishops warned that if the Philippine president did not reconcile with the moderate opposition, bloody revolution might be the result. After Aquino's death, Sin and many other bishops openly sympathized with the opposition, while continuing to warn against violence. Sin and much of the Catholic Church hierarchy provided institutional assistance to the opposition. Fear of repression and frequent denial of government permits for assembly led oppositionists to hold many post-assassination protests in churches, where a crackdown would have risked the ire of the bishops. In the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development (BBC), established in 1971, Sin had established a number of contacts with top executives, which he used after the assassination to assist the anti-Marcos moderates.18 Jose Concepcion, Jr. (head of Republic Flour Mills, one of the country's leading industrial firms), and businessmen Vicente Jayme and Dante Santos were part of Sin's inner circle. With help from the church, BBC business leaders set up the opposition-oriented Veritas magazine and became the core of the electoral watchdog group NAMFREL.19 Two of the most important consequences of the assassination were the open defection of the Makati business community to the opposition and the more secretive anti-Marcos tilt of the FilipinoChinese businessmen of Binondo. Makati (the financial center of Manila, location of most Philippine corporate headquarters and financial institutions) and Binondo (Manila's Chinatown, home to the currency black market run by Filipino-Chinese business leaders) had prospered during early martial law, which brought political stability, docile unions, and rapid economic growth. But anti-Marcos sentiment in the business community grew as corruption and cronyism mounted and the economy declined steeply.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 1 1 9

The second oil shock of 1979 and the Dewey Dee scandal of 1981 were largely responsible for poor economic performance in the early 1980s. Instead of adjusting to higher energy prices, the government increased foreign borrowing to unsustainable levels and allowed the trade balance to deteriorate badly. The economic house of cards of government-granted monopolies and debt-driven growth was toppled by the flight of Filipino-Chinese financier Dewey Dee with $110 million in unpaid debts. This calamity caused a run on a number of investment houses, which then could no longer lend to the crony companies dependent on them for credit. Marcos' cronies had received financial favors that helped them build economic empires, which, as the International Monetary Fund delicately put it, had "overexpanded, or expanded in the wrong direction or had been inefficiently managed/'20 Marcos ordered a bailout of crony firms, which sparked criticism from Benguet Corporation president Jaime Ongpin and the Makati Business Club (similarly, Somoza had pocketed disaster relief funds after a major earthquake, provoking attacks from Nicaraguan business leaders). The government deficit ballooned after the bailout, as economic growth ground to a halt. The country was in grave economic straits even before the Aquino assassination (table 7.1). The assassination turned this economic decline into a financial disaster by creating a crisis of confidence among international bankers. They refused to renew the short-term financing that the Philippine government had relied on to meet its foreign debt payments.21 Increased international scrutiny after the killing revealed that Marcos had overborrowed, pursued overly expansionary fiscal and monTable 7.1 Macroeconomic indicators in the Philippines, 1975-1983

Real GNP growth Foreign debt (billion $US) Trade deficit/GNP Fiscal deficit/GNP

1975-1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

6.4 4.9a -4.9 -1.3

5.0 17.3 -5.4 -1.3

3.4 20.9 -5.4 -4.0

1.9 24.7 -8.1 -4.3

1.1 24.8 -8.1 -2.0

Sources: Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis," in Nelson, Economic Crisis, p. 235; Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Sachs and Collins, Developing Country Debt, pp. 389 and 394. a Data from 1975 only.

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etary policies after many crony firms had failed, and overstated the country's foreign reserves to cover his regime's mismanagement. In order to restore his standing with the IMF and foreign banks, Marcos had to impose rigid import controls and devalue the peso. In the heavily import-dependent economy the result was an inflation rate of 50 percent (high by the Philippines' non-Latin American standards) by early 1984 and a 7.1 percent decline in the gross national product in 1984.22 The Makati-based and Filipino-Chinese business communities were hit hard by the financial fallout. In Makati the severe economic slowdown sent urban land prices, stock markets, and corporate profits tumbling. Filipino-Chinese business traders were especially hurt by a government crackdown on their currency transactions. In an effort to curb speculation on the peso, Marcos secretly established the so-called Binondo Central Bank to control the currency black market and threatened Chinese merchants with arrest if they did not follow rates set by the government. The Marcos regime had become very bad for business in the Philippines. Before the assassination, most business professionals were unwilling to take the financial risks involved in directly opposing the regime, as long as it did not threaten their physical security. A feeling of class immunity had developed among the elite. Aquino's murder, however, shattered the self-assurance of the privileged. As in Nicaragua after the Chamorro murder, the wealthy were shocked that one of their own could be killed on government orders. The anger of business elites against Marcos was evident in the "confetti revolution" in Makati and grumblings in Chinatown. The first demonstration in Makati on September 14,1983, set the tone for subsequent weekly anti-Marcos rallies: one hundred thousand welldressed office workers marched down the streets of the business district showered by tons of shredded yellow paper thrown from windows of the surrounding skyscrapers. Then they held a rally in the privately owned Ugarte field, to avoid the need for a government permit.23 Meanwhile, hitherto pro-administration Filipino-Chinese business leaders began secretly contributing money to the opposition.24 The large crowds that anti-Marcos executives could mobilize and the substantial financial assistance that they could provide made them crucial to the success of the traditional opposition. The opposition also gained military support. The Aquino assassination encouraged Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and his "boys" to plan a rebellion. Enrile, to show that he was not involved in

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the killing, met with the Aquino family and other oppositionists when they came to claim the former senator's body.25 The young officers serving in Enrile's security force intensified their organizing among other low-level officers disillusioned by mounting corruption in the military.26 They launched the We Belong to the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (usually abbreviated RAM), holding their first public protest in March 1985 at the graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy. While advocating nonviolent reform of the military in interviews with the press and consultations with Marcos, the leaders of RAM began making plans for a coup in consultation with Enrile.27 By mid-1985, regular meetings between RAM officers and opposition politicians were being held.28 The Aquino assassination also brought a change in the attitude of the United States toward Marcos. The huge anti-Marcos demonstrations apparently shocked the Reagans, who were personal friends of the Philippine dictator and his wife. Massive demonstrations led the White House to cancel a planned visit. The State Department condemned the murder, and U.S. intelligence officials soon knew that high-ranking members of the Marcos regime had committed it.29 Michael H. Armacost, U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, attended Aquino's funeral and privately expressed his dismay with the dictator, although he had earlier been close to Marcos. When his Philippine tour of duty ended, Armacost became Secretary of State George Schultz's undersecretary of political affairs and helped shift U.S. support toward the opposition. In testimony before congressional committees investigating the Philippine situation, Armacost and other State Department officials were critical of Marcos' failure to contain a growing communist insurgency. Rebellion or Reconciliation?

The parliament of the streets—supported by the Catholic Church and the business community, and indirectly backed by dissidents in the armed forces and the U.S. State Department—had clearly weakened Marcos. But it remained uncertain whether the communists or the traditional politicians would benefit most from this mass protest. The CPP apparently saw the mobilization as a chance to restart efforts for a united front that had stalled earlier because of the CPP'S ideological rigidity. In their Urgent Message to the Filipino People, issued shortly after the killing, the communists

122 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

showed greater willingness to accommodate "Anti-Marcos Reactionaries" and "Bourgeois Reformists/'30 Long committed to "protracted struggle from the countryside/' the CPP began to consider the use of a welgang bayan (national strike) in alliance with the moderates to bring down the regime.31 Their first step was an attempt to regain the support of former Senator Jose Diokno. The communists supported Diokno's leadership of Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA).32 By making Marcos' resignation the major demand in the loosely structured organization, Diokno and the radical Left formed a tactical alliance around nonviolent protest without forging a long-term strategy or a well-defined coalition. Many of the demonstrations in Manila through the end of 1983 were directly organized by JAJA or took place under its auspices. Plans for a communist-led welgang bayan did not materialize until the following year, but some radicals within JAJA apparently began trying to provoke a confrontation with the regime through violent demonstrations that they hoped would lead to its overthrow.33 Perhaps JAJA's biggest political coup was the recruitment of Agapito "Butz" Aquino, younger brother of the slain opposition leader. Agapito, a sometime television actor and businessman with little previous political experience, was nonetheless an Aquino. He may have felt obligated to take up the family mantle. In the context of the large post-assassination demonstrations, being a street parliamentarian and leading light of JAJA seemed a better way for Agapito Aquino to preserve his family's political influence than trying to reestablish his brother's traditional political base. He inherited the close links to Manila communist activists that LABAN had established during its informal 1978 alliance (which Agapito Aquino had helped negotiate). Agapito Aquino worked closely with communist sympathizers in JAJA, even receiving a daily briefing from a radical student activist.34 The August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM, Agapito Aquino's personal organization, made up largely of his high school classmates), Ernesto Lichauco (a relative of the Aquinos), and Diokno's wealthy friends became the major financiers of JAJA.35 Convinced that Marcos would resign if a "militant million" surrounded Malacanang, Aquino seemed to be using his brother's insurrectionary strategy of the late martial law period.36 In spite of the Philippine Catholic Church's strong condemnation of Aquino's assassination, Sin called for reconciliation with Marcos. The church, supported by several business leaders and UNIDO, wanted to find a negotiated, nonviolent solution to the political

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crisis. Corazon Aquino also spoke of reconciliation during many rallies, pleading with the crowd to remain peaceful. At a protest on September 21, 1983, the eleventh anniversary of the declaration of martial law, a major riot left eleven dead and set off clashes and looting throughout Manila. The Philippines seemed on the verge of an urban uprising.37 Opposition leaders did not use this opportunity to provoke an upheaval against Marcos, however, and in the following weeks Corazon Aquino, Sin, and Salvador Laurel maintained calm and helped the moment pass. Why was much of the traditional opposition no longer interested in insurrection, which some oppositionists had supported from 1979 to 1981, even though conditions now seemed much more favorable? A commitment to nonviolence and a calculation of the probable outcome of an urban revolt persuaded the proponents of reconciliation not to seek Marcos' immediate overthrow. The Catholic Church had long advocated nonviolence and reconciliation. Sin continued trying to negotiate with Marcos after Aquino's killing. But in Nicaragua an analogous situation produced different results: a committee headed by Archbishop Obando y Bravo canceled a dialogue planned with Somoza after the Chamorro assassination for fear that church officials would be tagged as collaborators by an opposition outraged by the murder of one of its leaders.38 The difference was that Sin was supported in his call for reconciliation by Corazon Aquino and other leading oppositionists. Although the commitment of Corazon Aquino to nonviolence was undoubtedly sincere, other prominent oppositionists had earlier shown their willingness to resort to terrorism (see chapter 5). Thus the more important explanation of the traditional opposition's moderation was that if Marcos suddenly resigned or was toppled, the communists might hold the strongest political cards. JAJA was leading most post-assassination protests, and radical leftists within the group were reportedly responsible for the demonstrations that had turned violent. Many opposition politicians already distrusted the communists because of failed united front efforts in 1978 and 1981, and they would not support an uprising that might benefit the communists most. Boycott versus Participation

After four months of demonstrations, it was becoming obvious by the end of 1983 that Marcos would neither resign nor negotiate a transfer of power with his opponents. The communists

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tried to use the traditional oppositionists' mounting frustration to convince them to boycott upcoming legislative elections. Their chance came at the January 1984 Kongreso ng Mamamayang Filipino (KOMPIL, Congress of the Filipino People), organized by Agapito Aquino to bring together politicians, business leaders, church officials, and communists to decide what the anti-Marcos forces should do.39 The communists used their overwhelming numbers and organizational unity at the convention—which reflected their dominant role in the parliament of the streets—to pass a resolution committing all delegates to boycott the polls unless the fairness of balloting was assured, the legislature was given real power, repressive decrees (particularly the Preventive Detention Action, a security measure allowing arbitrary imprisonment) were lifted, and political prisoners were granted amnesty.40 Salvador Laurel and other UNIDO politicians at the convention felt that if they refused to sign such a resolution, their participation in elections would legitimize Marcos' regime without forcing him to surrender any real power. Within a month after the convention, however, Laurel announced that UNIDO would take part in the 1984 legislative polls even though Marcos had made only a few procedural concessions.41 He was soon joined by Corazon Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., and his party, the PDP-LABAN. (Benigno Aquino had lost control of LABAN when it merged with the PDF. After his murder, shrewd PDP-LABAN members recruited part of the politically homeless Aquino clan, making Jose Cojuangco the party's secretary general.) Taking a cue from her brother, Corazon Aquino also announced her participation, despite having signed the KOMPIL resolution. Among opposition politicians, only Agapito Aquino, Jose Diokno, and Jovito Salonga's wing of the Liberal Party kept their promise to boycott. (The Liberal Party had split into factions controlled by Salonga and Eva Estrada Kalaw in December 1993.)42 Electoral participation of most of the traditional opposition is unusual in a sultanistic regime. In Nicaragua, Cuba, and Iran, oppositionists consistently boycotted elections. In the Philippines, however, the failure of united front efforts in the early 1980s prevented the easy cooperation between the traditional opposition and the communists that existed in Nicaragua between moderates and the Sandinistas following Chamorro's killing. Factions led by Salvador Laurel and Benigno Aquino became interested in elections again shortly after the 1981 boycott of the presidential polls because of relatively early encouragement from the U.S. government (which

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 125

increased after the murder of Aquino) and hopes that military dissidents might move against the regime. Both factions had already been more electorally oriented than the Chamorro clan in Nicaragua or the Ortodoxo Party in Cuba. The anger generated by the Aquino assassination led the opposition not to sever all dealings with the dictator, as it had in Nicaragua after Chamorro s death, but first to attempt to negotiate and then to participate in elections. In Iran during the last months of the Shah's rule, Mehdi Bazargan wanted to accept the Shah's offer to hold parliamentary elections even though the Iranian oppositionist expected to win only a handful of seats. He saw such a relative victory as part of an overall strategy that might involve negotiations between the opposition and the Shah's reform-oriented prime minister, Ja'far Sharif-Emami.43 But the Mullahs led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were against elections, and their strength forced Bazargan to abandon the idea. By contrast, opposition politicians in the Philippines had sufficient support from the Catholic Church, business leaders, and parts of the U.S. government to push through their plan for participation. The Legislative Election Campaign

In optimistic moments, Salvador Laurel said that the opposition's goal was to win control of the Batasang Pambansa (National Parliament) and impeach Marcos.44 At other times, Laurel would admit that the opposition was likely to be cheated and win no more than a third of the seats.45 But he believed that the 1984 legislative election would give the opposition a psychological boost and revitalize its grass roots. It was to be the first round of a long fight that was scheduled to involve local polls in 1986 and presidential elections in 1987. Uphill electoral battles had been part of the premartial law tradition since the Nacionalistas, led by Jose Laurel, Sr., rallied in senatorial elections in 1951 against Quirino, whom they would defeat in the presidential race two years later. But Salvador Laurel and the rest of the traditional opposition were sure to be outspent, outgunned, and (fraudulently) outcounted to a greater extent by Marcos in 1984 than Laurel's father had been by Quirino. Marcos' party, the KBL, had seemingly limitless government funding (PI.4 billion, about one-tenth of Philippine tax revenue in 1983 or $330 million, in new currency was printed during the campaign), tight party discipline, and the allegiance of most local officials.46 UNIDO and the PDP-LABAN, having been denied access to state

126 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

coffers and the private economic advantages of power, had few resources. The opposition's disadvantage would have made the campaign difficult even if it had been peaceful and fair. It was not. During the campaign 348 people were reported killed and 107 injured, making the 1984 election more violent than the fiercest pre-martial law election (in 1971), in which 223 had died and 250 were wounded.47 As elections were revived in the late 1970s, warlords returned to the political scene, this time almost exclusively on the side of the ruling party. Reports of strong-arming by the KBL were received in all parts of the country: from Cagayan province in the north to Makati in Metro Manila to the Lanao provinces of Mindanao.48 Only in exceptional cases—for example, that of Ramon Mitra, the PDP-LABAN'S candidate in Palawan, whose strength derived in large part from his friendship with Marcos' crony Eduardo Cojuangco—was the opposition able to "match the government... dollar for dollar and goon for goon."49 Although Marcos allowed the opposition one seat on the Commission on Elections, the board was dominated by KBL partisans. More important for the opposition was to be represented on the local canvassing bodies that counted the votes. But COMELEC awarded UNIDO election inspectors in only forty-three of seventy provinces, giving the rest to the Roy wing of the Nacionalista Party, which was collaborating with Marcos. This pseudo-opposition party often failed to field candidates at all and allowed the KBL to sweep the elections in three of the five regions in which it participated.50 The situation was not worse largely because of the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). The original NAMFREL had been a citizens1 watchdog group (with funding from the CIA) established to make sure the 1951 senatorial elections were not as fraud-ridden as the 1949 presidential contest had been. Although the new NAMFREL was not institutionally continuous with the old organization, Jaime N. Ferrer, the original founder of NAMFREL, and several other oppositionists had the idea of reviving a poll watchers' group after the Aquino assassination, and they gave it the same acronym as its forerunner.51 The new NAMFREL also appears to have received U.S. government funding (see chapter 8). The leading figure in the group was Jose Concepcion, who had been active in the BBC and was close to Cardinal Sin. (Many of NAMFREL's leaders were drawn from this pro-Sin business group.) Concepcion had in a sense married into the opposition; he was the son-in-law of Salvador Araneta, a leading Marcos critic who was

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 127

related by marriage to deceased Liberal Party President Gerardo Roxas. One of Conception's leading assistants in NAMFREL, businessman Christian Monsod, had worked for the Lopezes' Meralco Corporation before martial law and had shared their anti-Marcos sentiments.52 Sin and the Catholic hierarchy praised NAMFREL in pastoral letters and provided it with informal institutional support. Parish priests and nuns were often the leaders of local NAMFREL chapters. Because of NAMFREL'S religious base and moral purpose, its biographer has accurately described it as quasi-religious.53 Particularly strong in cities and accessible provinces, NAMFREL had 150,000 volunteers, keeping the 1984 polls fairer than earlier balloting during the Marcos dictatorship. The opposition seemed to have too little patronage and organization to win even if NAMFREL helped them keep fraud and terror from destroying their chances altogether. As in pre-martial law polls, however, the 1984 election was not to be decided by pork barrel alone. The opposition could draw on the popular outrage against the Marcos regime. UNIDO and PDP-LABAN politicians denounced the many sins of the administration—provoking economic crisis, exacerbating poverty among the people, encouraging governmental corruption, maintaining the dictatorship, and so on—but focused on the murder of Aquino. Laurel said, "Our campaign line was: If you want to punish the administration for what it did to Ninoy, vote for the opposition/'54 Because Marcos monopolized all television stations and most radio stations and had the support of major newspapers, the opposition had to rely on the largely urban alternative press and the Catholic radio station Veritas to spread its word. It also tried to reach a large audience through campaign rallies. The star of this road show was Corazon Aquino, who made speeches all around the country. Benigno Aquino had achieved fame by giving witty, cutting speeches, but his wife won her renown by delivering simple, monotone accounts of her husband's life and death. The opposition's moral appeals demanded no fancy words. In fact, Corazon Aquino's unpolitical ways enhanced her message. The PDP-LABAN, UNIDO, the faction of the former Liberal Party headed by former Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw, and several regional opposition parties won 60 of the 183 contested seats of the Batasang Pfcimbansa. Two-thirds of the opposition's victories occurred in just six of the eight city districts and eight of the seventy-three provinces in the countryside. Anti-Marcos candidates triumphed in twenty-one

128 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

of twenty-eight contests in urban areas. Their most important victory was in Metro Manila, where they won fifteen of twenty-one seats (see table 7.2). The opposition did well in the cities in large part because its election inspectors and NAMFREL were able to counter fraud there. Violence was not a problem in any urban area except Makati, where the pro-administration mayor used goons to defeat a controversial opposition candidate, the ex-wife of Tommy Monotoc, who had remarried the Marcoses' daughter Imee. The ruling party had to rely instead on its patronage resources. But the money and government projects that the KBL showered on the cities during the election proved no match for the opposition's moral-oriented campaign, even in many impoverished neighborhoods. Raul P. de Guzman and Luzviminda G. Tancangco, who extensively analyzed the election in Manila, argue that the ruling party recognized that a great segment of Metro Manilans belong to the middle and upper classes. They are literate and well-informed and therefore could not be easily swayed. Thus, it was the KBL'S strategy . . . to offset the force of these sectors by working on certain vote-rich places like slum areas All types of conceivable government programs were poured [in] during the campaign period, an act which was tantamount to bribing the voters. These areas were the sites of wholesale cheating during [the] registration period and massive vote-buying operations While the KBL'S strategy succeeded in certain areas, they failed miserably in others as indicated by the differences in results obtained. In the city of Manila, people power prevailed over all attempts to thwart their collective will.55

The opposition also performed well in the bailiwicks of a handful of its most powerful politicians, winning nineteen of twenty-one Table 7.2 Urban districts in which the opposition won seats City Metro Manila Cebu Davao Zamboanga Cagayan de Oro Baguio Total

Seats 21 2 2 1 1 1 28

Seats won 15 2 1 1 1 1 21

Sources: De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections; Roster of Philippine Legislators 1907 to 1987 (Manila: House of Representatives Congressional Library, 1989).

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 129 Table 7.3 Provincial strongholds of the opposition Province

Local faction leader

Camarines8 Quezon Batangas Pampanga Rizal Palawan Romblon Total

Villafuerte Bolanos Laurel Nepomuceno Sumulong Mitra Beltran

Seats contested

Seats won

5 4 4 4 2 1 1 21

5 4 3 3 2 1 1 19

Sources: De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 BatasangPambansa Elections; author's interviews. •Two provinces, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur.

seats in these provinces (table 7.3). Salvador Laurels candidates were able to win 75 percent of the seats in his home province of Batangas, and one of his close associates, Luis Villafuerte, led a faction that swept the seats in Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. The provinces of Palawan (where Ramon Mitra was victorious), Quezon, and Romblon were also opposition strongholds. Corazon Aquino's family was defeated in Tarlac by her uncle and rival Eduardo Cojuangco, but Francisco C. Sumulong, another uncle, and Emigdio S. Tanjuatco, her cousin, won the two seats in Rizal province. Aquino's allies also dominated Pampanga, which borders on Tarlac. Although NAMFREL was weak in rural areas, opposition politicians were able to prevent the KBL from engaging in extensive fraud or terrorism in the eight provinces where the Laurels and other powerful opposition clans were able to counteract the KBL'S financial advantage with their own family-based political machines. In regions dominated by one of Marcos' warlords or cronies, however, polls were for the most part marked by a highly irregular electoral process and victory for between 63 percent and 100 percent of the KBL candidates. Region II was dominated by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, region III by coconut king Eduardo Cojuangco, region VII by warlord Ramon Durano, region VIII by the Romualdez clan, arid region XII by Marcos' longtime ally Ali Dimaporo. Only in region I, the home province of President Marcos, and in region X did the KBL score a large victory without extensive manipulation. The evaluations that De Guzman and Tancangco have ma.de of the electoral campaigning and their analysis of the credibility of the results in the

130 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

twelve regions and Metro Manila show a clear correspondence between the fairness of the electoral process and the votes received by the ruling party (table 7.4). Limits on the ruling party's cheating were a necessary condition for the opposition's victory in a particular city, province, or region. Fraud was minimized in urban areas through NAMFREL s efforts, while local oppositionist politicians were able to keep balloting relatively fair in their own bailiwicks. In the cities, the moral appeals of the opposition overcame the patronage advantage of the ruling party. Intervening variables make it more difficult to tell if this was also the case in rural areas. The voting was too manipulated to be meaningful in districts dominated by pro-administration warlords, and the opposition won a high percentage of the vote in provinces where anti-Marcos politicians had substantial patron-client networks. But even the Laurels and other opposition kingpins could not match the money and government favors handed out by KBL candidates. Thus the victories of rural politicians also reveal that the opposition's patronage deficit had been offset by moral appeals. The majority of votes received by non-KBL candidates nationwide (53.34 percent) suggests that Marcos' decentralized strong-arm tactics would not be enough to counter his opponents in a presidential election.56 The opposition had achieved its relative victory. Table 7.4 The quality of the electoral process and percentage of victorious KBL candidates by region Region Metro Manila I. Ilocos II. Cagayan Valley III. Central Luzon IV. Southern Tagalog V. Bicol VI. Western Visayas VII. Central Visayas VIII. Eastern Visayas IX. Western Mindanao X. Northern Mindanao XI. Southern Mindanao XII. Central Mindanao

Electoral quality Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable

Victorious KBL candidates (%) 28.60 75.00 100.00 63.16 37.50 33.33 56.25 80.00 100.00 55.56 66.67 50.00 100.00

Source: De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, p. 25.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS • 1 3 1 Consensus on an Electoral Strategy

Almost 90 percent of the electorate voted, giving the 1984 elections the highest turnout since the declaration of martial law.57 Unlike the 1981 presidential elections, in these elections major opposition politicians, including the wife of the slain Aquino, had urged people to vote. Competitive balloting increased the sporting interest in the campaign (elections are often compared to cockfighting in the Philippines). Most important, in Philippine political culture voting had long been the best way to express dissatisfaction with the moral character of the regime, and this remained the case even after nearly twelve years of dictatorship. Almost all noncommunist oppositionists who had advocated boycott accepted that most Filipinos still clung to the country's electoral tradition and announced that they would take part in the next elections. By late 1984 boycott leaders Agapito Aquino and Jose Diokno had become active in the Convenor Group, which was designed to pick a single opposition candidate if Marcos called sudden presidential elections. In January 1985 Liberal Pfcirty President Jovito Salonga returned from nearly four years in U.S. exile to revitalize his party for future polls. Some social democrats had participated in the 1984 elections as members of the PDP-LABAN while others had boycotted; now all major social democratic factions were committed to elections. After years of searching for a common strategy, opposition politicians had chosen electoral participation. The politicians who boycotted the 1984 polls had not given up on establishing an alliance with the communists. Diokno had agreed with UNIDO that Marcos should be brought down with the ballot, but he had a different vision from Laurel of what should happen thereafter. In JAJA and the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD), which had led the boycott drive, Diokno had advocated that U.S. bases be removed, foreign debt be selectively repudiated, and far-reaching social reform be undertaken. None of these points were found in the UNIDO platform, which was courting U.S. government support and had a traditional political membership that was for the most part opposed to land reform and other reformist measures. Diokno, along with Agapito Aquino, wanted to create an organization of all "cause-oriented" organizations—including business executives, social democrats, and communists—to propagate his agenda. (Diokno and Aquino planned to use this new group to provide representation of nonpoliticians in the Convenor Group, which

132 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

was to pick the opposition's presidential candidate.) But Diokno continued to refuse to join the communist-dominated Nationalist Alliance, and moderates had begun to drop out of CORD because the radical Left had come to control it too. In addition, discussions about a post-Marcos coalition government between communists and noncommunists had again foundered because of intransigence within the leadership of the CPP.58 In 1985 the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN, the New Nationalist Alliance) was launched as a "progressive" coalition that was not to be dominated by communists.59 But the founding convention of BAYAN in May 1985 ended in acrimony after the CPP ordered its representatives to take control of the proceedings as part of the party's concept of centralized command.60 Agapito Aquino and the social democrats abandoned BAYAN, instead forming Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA, A Natibn United in Thought and Purpose).61 Jose Diokno also exited BAYAN, having tried to work with the communists for the last time. Former senators Lorenzo Tanada and Ambrosio Pkdilla were the only noncommunist leaders left in BAYAN. When Marcos announced snap presidential elections in November 1985, BAYAN, acting under orders from the CPP politburo, opted for boycott. This abrupt decision angered P&dilla, who quit the organization to join the opposition, and led Tanada to take a leave of absence to support the AquinoLaurel ticket.62 The final breakup of BAYAN suggests that a united front was doomed once politicians and noncommunist activists had chosen elections as their chief strategy. Even if the CPP had proven more flexible on other matters, it probably would not have been willing to compromise on its raison d'etre: armed struggle against the regime. Laurel versus Aquino The biggest winner of the 1984 legislative elections had been Salvador Laurel, who quickly moved to unify anti-Marcos politicians behind his candidacy for the presidency. Of the fifty-nine sitting members of parliament in the opposition, thirty-seven belonged to Laurel's UNIDO, twelve were affiliated with the PDP-LABAN, five with the Liberal Party (Kalaw's wing), and five with regional parties.63 Laurel (represented by Jose Laurel, Jr., who was minority leader in the assembly) could even count on the support of some MPs from other parties, winning forty-five votes on one crucial intraopposition issue.64 This made him the undisputed leader of the anti-

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Marcos forces in the Batasang Pambansa. Laurel's leadership in the parliament became more important when opposition MPs captured media attention with their aggressive antigovernment stance. Because of the growing activism of the opposition legislators, the socalled parliament of the streets lost considerable influence. Demonstrations continued, but middle-class activists increasingly dropped out of the street protests led by radicals. Laurel set up the National Unification Committee (NUC) to choose opposition candidates for the planned 1986 local elections, an important springboard for the presidential polls originally scheduled for 1987. But when Kalaw's wing of the Liberal Party and the PDP-LABAN threatened to boycott the NUC convention unless they were given fairer representation, Laurel was forced to compromise.65 He relinquished the chairmanship of the NUC and agreed that the February 1985 conference would proclaim no presidential candidate. With over four hundred politicians attending, the NUC conference was the largest gathering of opposition politicians since the declaration of martial law.66 Much of the business and professional opposition, which was loyal to the Catholic hierarchy and had become politicized by the Aquino assassination, distrusted Laurel deeply. Opposition newspapers, particularly Veritas, Mr. and Ms., and Malaya, often questioned Laurels credentials as an oppositionist because he had not spoken out against early martial law and had run as a KBL candidate in the 1978 legislative elections, breaking with the Philippine president only in late 1979.67 In addition, his family had long been considered suspiciously close to Marcos.68 More generally, Laurel was seen as the ultimate politician at a time when traditional politics had been discredited. As James Rush has written, "His critics said that he had learned the politician's ways all too well—backroom dealing, horse-trading, double-talking and the other mean arts of insincerity. He was manipulative and very ambitious, they said, and this led to the unkindest (and commonest) observation of all: Salvador Laurel is all too much like the guy we're trying to get rid of/'69 A group of business leaders and professionals came up with an alternative to Laurel's unification plan, in part because they were concerned that a presidential election might suddenly be called and in part because they disliked the kind of politics that Laurel represented. Emmanuel V. Soriano, a successful businessman and former president of the University of the Philippines, and Dr. Alran Bengzon, a leading neurologist and executive at the prestigious Medical City,

134 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

had both boycotted the 1984 legislative elections. But they had since become convinced that Marcos could best be confronted electorally and that the opposition had to prepare for a presidential election, which might be called at any time because of Marcos' deteriorating health and pressure from the United States. Bengzon, Soriano, and their close associates became the core of the Convenor Group, which would "convene" a decision for a presidential candidate.70 Because the amended constitution specified only a seventy-day campaign period, Bengzon and Soriano felt that the opposition had to develop a Fast Track Scheme to pick a single candidate quickly.71 But they also strove for a "principled opposition victory" and not the "same [old] campaign strategies" that some traditional politicians "blindly consider ... as integral to any form of elections, e.g. bribery, deception, etc."72 Such high-mindedness was necessary if the opposition wanted to do more than "change the actors, not the play."73 Under pressure from Jose Diokno, the Convenor Group platform included not only social reform but also economic nationalism and opposition to U.S. military bases in the Philippines. But having principles was practical, because the group knew that the "KBL machinery outclasses us on all counts."74 Bengzon and Soriano felt that the only major electoral resource the opposition possessed was a moral advantage. Bengzon and Soriano wanted to build the Convenor Group around the seemingly nonpartisan politicians Corazon C. Aquino, Lorenzo M. Tafiada, and Jaime V. Ongpin.75 The Convenor Group needed leaders, and the Aquino-Cojuangco faction wanted to expand its political base to counter Laurel. This may explain why Ricardo Lopa, Corazon Aquino's brother-in-law, and Jose Cojuangco, her brother, thus acted on Bengzon and Soriano's request to recruit her. A Convenor Group organizational meeting was held at the Cojuangco building in Makati. Although Corazon Aquino may have been a reluctant enlistee, she soon became the leading figure in the Convenor Group, thanks to her moral stature and her family's participation in the organization. Three of her relatives (Ricardo Lopa, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., and Emigdio Tanjuatco), one of her in-laws (Ernesto Lichauco), and several close associates (Joker Arroyo and Rene Saguisag) were among those active in organizing the group. Of the eleven potential presidential candidates from which the Convenor Group would make its choice, one (Agapito Aquino) was her brotherin-law, and three (Aquilino Pimentel, Ramon Mitra, and Teofisto Guingona) were leading members of her brother's PDP-LABAN.76

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But Salvador laurel was not about to let the Convenor Group steal the political initiative. He and Eva Estrada Kalaw, though nominated by the Convenor Group as Presidential Standard Bearers, refused to sign its unification program.77 Someone close to Laurel in UNIDO articulated a hard-nosed, traditional view of Philippine politics in a critique of the Convenor Group: "The better approach is not to make an arbitrary listing of [presidential] favorites of any one group, but under a prescribed deadline, to initially adopt an 'open system/ . . . It is easy enough to 'separate the men from the boys/ so to speak, after some preliminary discussions, across the table, where the basic requirements of a national campaign is ventilated, with all its hoary details. Anyone who cannot put up, should then be gently asked to shut up/'78 According to this critique Laurel was the realist, the Convenors dreamy idealists. He pragmatically courted U.S. government support instead of alienating it. He had the money and the toughness needed to run a presidential campaign. Most absurdly, from Laurel's standpoint, the Convenor Group was asking its presidential candidate to serve, if elected, as a transitional figure who would supervise the writing of a new constitution but not seek reelection in the next presidential poll, to be called within two years. According to the critique, "Whoever agrees (and none seems to be in sight) to the two-year transition presidency . . . should be declared as the 'Living National Martyr/ anointed to attempt to restore democracy by asking him to commit political hara-kiri."79 Laurels withdrawal from the Convenor Group split the opposition into two informal camps: those of Laurel and Aquino. Laurel, the first to go public, had himself nominated as the opposition candidate at the UNIDO convention in June 1985. But Lorenzo Tanada apparently had asked Corazon Aquino earlier, during the first Convenor Group meeting in November 1984, "Why do we have to go through this whole thing? Why don't you be the candidate?"80 The minutes of a Convenor Group meeting on March 5,1985, showed that Diokno backed Aquino's candidacy because she had "redeeming features of the old game" and also represented a "new kind of politics." Diokno knew that his nationalism had alienated the U.S. government, and he lacked a strong political organization and the money for a presidential campaign. In contrast, Corazon Aquino, with the help of her brother's PDP-LABAN, had many of the same resources as Laurel without his liabilities. She symbolized the moral integrity of the opposition as much as, if not more than, Diokno did. But she had not yet agreed to run for president.

136 • THE PARLIAMENT OF THE STREETS

Appalled by the prospect of choosing between Laurel and Marcos in a presidential election, oppositionists in Manila began to call for a draft of Corazon Aquino. The most organized effort was the Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM) founded by eight business leaders—some of whom were members of Agapito Aquino's ATOM— in October 1984.81 The leader of the group was Joaquin "Chino" Roces, who had been the boss of Benigno Aquino, Jr., at the Manila Times and was a close friend of the Aquino family. The CAPM held office at the Roces family business. Modeled on the Magsaysay for President Movement, which had spearheaded the charismatic candidacy of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953, the CAPM began a signature drive calling for Corazon Aquino to run for president. Initially, however, the campaign was not successful because the CAPM was poorly organized and underfunded, and many people were afraid to sign a petition that might be considered anti-Marcos. Although Marcos had not yet announced an election, signs of U.S. pressure and rumors from Malacanang convinced Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, and her brother-in-law, Paul Aquino, that they should start secretly preparing in the event of a sudden presidential campaign in which they hoped that she would run. The Cojuangco Group began as a family-based faction without a candidate: it involved eleven relatives and close friends of the Aquino-Cojuangco clan. Paul Aquino says that his sister-in-law was determined to remain a kingmaker and was sincere in her protestations of not wanting to be a candidate herself.82 But pressure from the Convenor Group, the opposition press, the CAPM, and family members and friends was beginning to tell on her. In late October 1985 she announced to a gathering of oppositionists that she would run if Marcos called sudden presidential elections and if 1 million signatures could be collected supporting her candidacy. The CAPM seemed in no position to meet this target. However, with the help of the Cojuangco Group, which used its provincial political base to collect signatures, and with assistance from Agapito Aquino's urban network, the goal was easily achieved.83 On November 3, 1985, Marcos told American reporter George Will on This Week with David Brinkley that he would hold snap presidential elections, clearing the way for Aquino's candidacy. Because Aquino was now willing to run, Laurel had to be made to yield if the opposition's vote was not to be split. To counter UNIDO, the political parties represented in the Convenor Group, the PDPLABAN, and Salonga's wing of the Liberals quickly formed a new

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political alliance, Laban ng Bayan, abbreviated LABAN to recall Benigno Aquino's old party. Soon the regional parties joined LABAN, and a number of UNIDO politicians defected, leaving Laurel increasingly isolated.84 Corazon Aquino's image as a potential winner led businesses to contribute more to the Cojuangco group than to UNIDO. Laurel was now lagging even in amassing his one customary advantage: traditional patronage resources. Such leading opposition figures as Vicente Puyat (son of former Senate President Gil Puyat), Francisco Rodrigo (former senator and head of the NUC), and Cardinal Sin came forward to mediate between Laurel and Aquino. But the mediators clearly favored Aquino's candidacy, feeling that her personification of the opposition's crusade against an evil regime was the best chance for victory.85 Laurel yielded to Aquino but insisted that he be her vice presidential candidate and that they run together under the UNIDO label. Aquino had a difficult time convincing her political allies to forfeit a vice presidential bid (Jovito Salonga was Laban ng Bayan's bet) and run under Laurel's party apparatus. Beneath the veneer of a crusade against Marcos, intense factional fighting continued within the opposition. Facing extreme odds against an incumbent, Laurel had given way to a moral figure, as his father had stepped aside to allow Magsaysay to be the Nacionalista presidential nominee.86 But Aquino's faction, like Magsaysay's, was built on traditional family interests and political alliances. By late 1985, then, the democratic opposition had agreed on a single candidate who had an unimpeachable reputation and a strong traditional base. This combination of moral appeals and local political networks had helped the opposition perform relatively well in the 1984 legislative elections. But in five (of thirteen) regions, including Metro Manila, electoral process had been "unacceptable" because of extreme fraud and terrorism by the ruling party (see table 7.4). Cheating and force could be expected to be even worse in presidential elections in February 1986, when the stakes for Marcos would be much higher. Outside of the cities and its provincial bailiwicks, the opposition seemed in no position to stop this manipulation. What would it do if it were simply robbed of electoral victory? Like Magsaysay, who had planned a coup in 1953 in the event he was cheated at the polls by Quirino, the anti-Marcos opposition sought support from military dissidents.

8

The Snap Elections and the Fall of Marcos

We cannot fight Marcos with arms because he has so many. We cannot fight him with money, because we do not have any. The only way we can fight him is with morality. —Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., 1983

In sultanistic regimes there are no institutional mechanisms for arranging a transition to democracy. Unlike the Shah of Iran or Somoza of Nicaragua, however, Marcos appeared to be offering the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power by holding a special presidential election. In fact, he had called the polls not to prove his popularity at home but to improve his standing abroad. The election was an attempt to head off demands by the U.S. government and international financial institutions for reforms that would endanger his rule. Marcos planned to buy votes, employ violence, and disenfranchise opposition voters in order to "win" the election. Because opposition presidential candidate Corazon C. Aquino and her running mate, Salvador H. Laurel, did not have the money or firepower to match Marcos, they adopted a moral crusade strategy similar to Ramon Magsaysay's. Several politicians supporting Aquino had been active in the opposition's 1953 victory against Quirino: Salvador H. Laurel (indirectly through his father, Jose Laurel, Sr.), Raul S. Manglapus, Francisco Rodrigo, and Lorenzo M. Tanada.1 More important, the Magsaysay campaign had entered the folklore of Philippine political culture as a victory of a popular challenger against a corrupt incumbent, and the Aquino campaign wanted to use this symbolism. 138

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The parallels seemed perfect.2 The opposition was united behind Corazon Aquino, who, like Magsaysay, had the image of a nontraditional politician with moral integrity who could turn the campaign into a battle between good and evil rather than a contest won by the candidate who could buy the most votes. The enthusiasm generated by "the Guy's" campaign had been referred to as the Magsaysay boom; Aquino's whirlwind rallies, which attracted millions of supporters, were described as Cory mania. To reach out to the people, the Guy had relied on the Magsaysay for President Movement, which supplemented the backing that he received from old-guard politicians. Similarly, Aquino depended on the Cory Aquino for President Movement and other volunteer groups as well as traditional political networks. The Catholic Church was backing Aquino, as it had Magsaysay. NAMFREL, established as an imitation of the 1950s watchdog movement, was even stronger in 1986. Many oppositionists hoped that the Americans, who had covertly backed Magsaysay's campaign, would abandon Marcos during the presidential elections. Magsaysay had assembled weapons in order to launch a coup if he was cheated at the polls, and similarly, the Aquino camp was holding discussions with rebels in the armed forces. Supporters of "Cory" made the most of the similarities between their campaign and the Guy's: Raul Manglapus' "Mambo Magsaysay," played on an opposition radio station, became a theme song of the people-power insurrection.3 The similarities between the Magsaysay and Aquino campaigns should not be exaggerated, however. Quirino may have been a corrupt president, but he was constitutionally elected and did not try to retain power when he was defeated. Marcos, by contrast, was a dictator who was unwilling to let himself be voted out. Although the United States had wholeheartedly supported Magsaysay, it was split in 1986, with the Reagan White House supporting Marcos and the State Department and most of the U.S. Congress supporting Aquino. Magsaysay had loyal troops ready to seize Malacanang, but Aquino and her followers had only a loose modus vivendi with military rebels who were their competitors for power. These differences became more significant after the opposition defeated Marcos in the election: instead of accepting the results, Marcos manipulated them, the U.S. government remained indecisive, and military rebels plotted to take control of the government. The post-election phase in 1986, unlike 1953, would be more crucial

140 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

than the election itself. The opposition would have to both topple Marcos and outmaneuver armed opposition groups—not only military rebels but also communists. Why Marcos Called Early Elections

The U.S. government had grown increasingly concerned about Marcos' lack of a successor, the communist insurgency, and crony capitalism. In January 1985, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed a National Security Study Directive that was a compromise between anti-Marcos State Department "pragmatists" and pro-Marcos White House "ideologues."4 The new policy continued to back the Philippine president but called on him to change his ways. Marcos' deteriorating health made it imperative that he "set the stage for peaceful and eventual transition to a successor government."5 American policymakers hoped that institutionalized succession and free elections would thwart a takeover by Imelda Marcos. The United States pressed the Philippine president not to reinstate General Fabian Ver, who had been temporarily removed as armed forces chief of staff after the Agrava Commission, which Marcos had established under public pressure to investigate the Aquino assassination, charged him with orchestrating the killing. The U.S. government's targeting of crony monopolies in such agricultural industries as sugar and coconuts found powerful support in the IMF, which made this dismantling of monopolies a condition for a credit agreement that Marcos needed in order to reschedule his foreign debt.6 But economic liberalization would be risky for the regime, whose support depended on using state resources to give material rewards to Marcos' family and close friends. Several officials from the U.S. State Department and the military visited Marcos in 1984 and 1985 to deliver this call for reform. American lobbying peaked with the trips of CIA director William Casey in March 1985 and Senator Paul Laxalt, as the personal emissary to Reagan, in October 1985. Casey and Laxalt, like most of Reagan's inner circle, wanted Marcos to stay in power, not realizing that his regime would be undermined by the very changes that they were suggesting. Research by Raymond Bonner indicates that after Casey's visit Marcos responded to U.S. pressure by proposing to hold presidential polls earlier than in mid-1987, when they were officially scheduled. Despite opposition in the Philippine ruling party (the KBL), Laxalt later convinced Marcos to go through with the plan.7

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The Reagan administration hoped that the polls would help clarify succession, stabilize the economy, and restore Marcos' political legitimacy. On November 3,1985, the Philippine president declared snap elections for February 7,1986. He made his announcement on American television, indicating that the elections were intended more to reassure the U.S. government than to restore his domestic legitimacy. Marcos did not tell his foreign visitors that he planned to use the polls precisely to avoid doing what they were asking. Marcos was supposed to designate a vice presidential candidate in order to solve the succession problem. But Marcos' choice, Arturo M. Tolentino, was older than he was and lacked an independent power base. Marcos did not fear Tolentino as a rival, and Imelda Marcos strongly backed Tolentino's candidacy because he presented no threat to her ambitions.8 In early December 1985 a Philippine court found Ver innocent of plotting the Aquino assassination, blatantly disregarding the evidence gathered by the Agrava Commission and backing up Marcos' original assertion that the killing had been perpetrated by a lone communist. While the U.S. government focused on the Philippine presidential election, Marcos defied the Americans by reinstating Ver, whose brutal style of military "problem solving" would be needed during the campaign. In July 1985 Marcos had agreed to the IMF's demand that he dismantle the agricultural monopolies by January 1986. Despite this promise, presidential cronies remained in charge of these sectors, and target dates were allowed to lapse because of elections.9 Calling presidential polls had given Marcos temporary political, military, and economic leeway, and he hoped that a convincing victory would allow him to further postpone reforms demanded from abroad. Plans for Electoral Manipulation

The KBL was the most impressive political machine ever assembled in the postwar Philippines. It controlled two-thirds of the seats in the legislature and more than 90 percent of local offices. The party extended like a pyramid from Marcos, who was chairman of the campaign's national committee, to all thirteen regions, seventytwo provinces, more than forty-two thousand barangays, and finally eighty-six thousand KBL chapters at the precinct level.10 During the early campaign period, Marcos spent more time on ironing out disputes between quarreling KBL members and wooing disaffected fol-

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lowers with patronage than he did on delivering election speeches. Government workers, employees of corporations owned by close associates of the president, and even leading actors (who formed the Stars for Marcos Movement) were put to work by the KBL for the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. Learning from his party's mistakes in the 1984 elections, Marcos decided to bribe more voters in 1986. According to estimates, he allocated at least $500 million for vote buying, which theoretically allowed party campaigners to try to pay off every voter in the country at the going rate, between P50 and P100 (about $2.50 to $5).n The KBL also reportedly offered PI,000 ($50) per voting tabulation sheet turned over to it for possible manipulation, and P10,000 ($500) to any public school teachers working as election inspectors who would allow the ruling party to cheat in their precinct.12 Marcos entrusted control of the money to his family members, whom he trusted more than his party leaders. Terror was another crucial component of Marcos' campaign strategy. General Ver attended KBL strategy sessions and orchestrated the "reorganization of officers to put into place Marcos loyalists in sensitive vote-rich areas with heavy pro-opposition votes/'13 COMELEC deputized the military, and Ver ordered arms to be issued to proMarcos warlords.14 Marcos was intent on crushing Aquino in her home province of Tarlac, where Eduardo Cojuangco used local militia to murder and terrorize opposition supporters.15 In one of the most gruesome incidents Evelio Javier, a former governor and Aquino supporter, was assassinated in broad daylight in the capital of Antique province by hired guns of warlord Arturo Pacificador. During the campaign 264 people were reported killed and 227 injured.16 These figures were lower than in the 1984 legislative elections (which supports the generalization that the more localized Philippine elections are, the more violent they tend to be) but much higher than in the 1969 presidential polls. Marcos apparently calculated that vote buying and terror would not be enough to win the presidential polls. In its report on the 1986 election, NAMFREL details Marcos' plan to disenfranchise opposition supporters: "When pieced together, reports from the field unravel a systematic, elaborate and well-planned disenfranchisement design that is unprecedented in the nation's electoral history. . . . Pre-election surveys, under the guise of mere opinion polls, were reportedly conducted in many barangays and among government employees. From these, specific persons and their inclinations towards candi-

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 143

dates were known and their specific precincts or areas identified. In addition, results of previous elections must have been used to determine the political inclination of various electoral districts/'17 Marcos disenfranchised individuals by simply striking their names from the voters' list, rearranging names so they could not be easily located, and changing locations of polling stations without prior notice. Observers of the election, myself included, were bombarded with accounts of people who claimed to have been denied their right to vote.18 Although it is difficult to distinguish between those who were prevented from voting and those who simply stayed away from the polls, two estimates of the extent of disenfranchisement are available (table 8.1). The first assumes that participation in 1986 should have been as high as, or even higher than, participation in 1984, because the legislative polls were boycotted by part of the traditional opposition. The other estimate is more conservative because it assumes, as in pre-martial law politics, that participation in presidential elections will be lower than in the more localized legislative Table 8.1 Two estimates of disenfranchisement in the 1986 elections

Region

Turnout (% of eligible voters who voted) in 1986

Decrease from 1984 turnout (%)

Decrease from 1981-1984 turnout (%)

Metro Manila Ilocos Cagayan Valley Central Luzon S. Tagalog Bicol W. Visayas C. Visayas E. Visayas W. Mindanao N. Mindanao S. Mindanao C. Mindanao National

71 86 84 79 78 79 78 81 78 71 75 73 74 77

15 11 12 12 14 9 11 13 9 14 12 12 13 12

11 6 9 7 7 2 13 7 11 8 5 6 12 8

Source: National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, The NAMFREL Report on the February 7,1986 Philippine Presidential Elections (n.p., n.d), pp. 47, 50.

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ones, though turnout in 1986 was expected to be higher than in the presidential polls of 1981, when Marcos faced no major challenger and most traditional oppositionists called for boycott. This estimate thus compares participation in 1986 with the average turnout by region in elections from 1981 to 1984. According to the more conservative estimate, 8 percent (about 2.1 million) of the 26.2 million eligible voters were denied their right to cast ballots. The higher estimate is 12 percent (approximately 3.1 million voters). The latter estimate, based on figures from the 1984 election, shows that disenfranchisement was particularly high in Metro Manila, Southern Tagalog, the Central Visayas, and Western Mindanao, which had favored the opposition in the legislative polls. In the former estimate, based on the average turnout between 1981 and 1984, this pattern of greater disenfranchisement in anti-Marcos regions is less evident. Examination of subregional district totals, however, reveals that more people were disenfranchised in areas thought to be inclined toward the opposition. In the region of Ilocos, for example, disenfranchisement was less than 1 percent in Marcos' home province of Ilocos Norte, but 15 percent in Baguio City, which elected an opposition member of parliament in 1984, and 40 percent in Mountain Province, the most pro-opposition area in region I.19 The Moral Context of Aquino's Campaign

While Marcos' campaign relied largely on the tricks of electoral manipulation that he had perfected, Aquino drew on the moral outrage that Marcos' long rule had generated. The regime had pushed corruption to levels censurable even by the lax standards of pre-martial law politics. The moral decay in government was compounded by the Aquino assassination and the economic catastrophe that followed. The country's political and economic decline added special significance to the "Marian celebration," commemorating the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of the Virgin Mary. In a homily that he gave at the start of the celebration in September 1985, Jaime Cardinal Sin warned against demoralization and a "dying of hope" during these "dark days" facing the country.20 Hundreds of thousands of people throughout the Philippines had enthusiastically greeted Sin as he traveled around the archipelago with a small statue of the so-called Weeping Madonna. An estimated 1.5 million

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Rlipinos gathered at the final mass in this tribute to the Virgin in early December, constituting probably the largest religious gathering in Philippine history.21 A Philippine newspaper commented, "It has become almost a national feeling and conviction that only a miracle can save the day for the nation and this may be realized only by reciting the rosary daily in hopes that several million prayers to the Blessed Lady will be strong enough to gain her attention/'22 The opposition's seemingly miraculous unification behind Aquino must be placed in this context. Crowds that had mobbed Sin and the Weeping Madonna were soon out again to see the "Filipina Mary/' Corazon Aquino.23 She based her campaign on "honesty, sincerity, simplicity and religious faith." She promised to open the presidential palace to all visitors, as Magsaysay had done, and never to show favoritism to family or friends. Her campaign speeches were far from lively, but her style seemed to make her tale more plausible. "I don't seek vengeance, only justice, not only for Ninoy but for the suffering Rlipino people. Here I am, asking for your help to topple the Marcos regime Join me in my crusade for truth, justice and freedom."24 Her answer to the country's many problems was simple: restore democracy and establish honest government. Few promises of specific changes were forthcoming. She made only vague references to land reform. When a court acting under pressure from Marcos ordered her family's sugar hacienda confiscated for redistribution to its laborers, she cried political harassment, missing a chance to address the larger issue of the plight of agricultural laborers. The Convenor Group and many oppositionists active in her campaign had taken a position against U.S. bases in the Philippines, but Aquino insisted on keeping her options open. Her conservative economic policy differed little from Marcos'.25 She made neither class-based promises of social reform, which would have offended her wealthy supporters, nor nationalist pledges, which would have alienated the Americans. Marcos understood the damage that Aquino's moral attacks were causing. He said that she portrayed him as a "combination of Darth Vader, Machiavelli, Nero, Stalin, Pol Pot, and maybe even Satan himself."26 Rather than try to rebut her, Marcos went on the offensive. Aquino's response to these attacks only strengthened her moral standing, however. Marcos said that she was inexperienced in politics and unqualified to be president. Aquino's reply echoed Magsaysay's answer to such charges from Quirino: "1 concede I cannot

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match Mr. Marcos when it comes to experience. I admit that I have no experience in cheating, stealing, lying, or assassinating political opponents/'27 Marcos desperately tried to appeal to male chauvinism to discredit Aquino, by saying that a woman's place is in the bedroom. His wife elaborated, stating that Aquino was the "complete opposite of what a woman should be," which was someone who was "gentle, who does not challenge a man, but who keeps her criticism to herself and teaches her husband only in the bedroom/'28 The First Lady hardly met these supposed criteria either. Philippine society, in fact, has long been noted as affording women more opportunities in politics and business than most Asian nations.29 Before martial law, a number of women, many of whom had replaced their deceased husbands, had been elected to the Senate.30 In this factionalized Philippine political system, the wife of a politician could best keep the family-based political unit together after his death. Aquino was continuing this tradition by "finishing what 'Ninoy' started."31 Imelda Marcos, too, was hoping to be her husband's successor. In addition, Aquino could use her femininity to accentuate her difference from Marcos. He typified the corrupt Machiavellian male politician, and she proclaimed herself a "simple housewife" who offered an upright alternative. Organizing and Funding the Opposition's Campaign

How could Aquino make her appeals when Marcos had a stranglehold on broadcast media? The station owners, who were all friends of the president, kept her almost completely off television until the last phase of the election, when she was able to buy some air time because of pressure from the United States. The opposition had a somewhat easier time purchasing radio commercials, but, except on the Catholic-owned Radio Veritas, announcers were almost all pro-Marcos. Only in the print media did the opposition have substantial access. Two of the five major newspapers, the so-called alternative press, provided favorable coverage to the opposition, whereas the other three were owned by friends of the president and slanted toward him.32 But national newspapers were distributed in Manila and a few other major cities and were too expensive for the average Filipino, who may have found reading an English language paper too difficult anyway. Aquino and Laurel reached the masa (masses) through old-fash-

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 147

ioned barnstorming. Their rallies drew huge crowds. On many occasions people waited hours in pouring rain just to catch a glimpse of them when they arrived hours behind schedule. At the midpoint of the fifty-seven-day campaign, Aquino and Laurel had held rallies in twenty-four provinces and cities, with crowds totaling about 355,000. Marcos and Tolentino, in contrast, had been to only eight provinces and had drawn audiences totaling merely 88,000.33 This was before Aquino's rallies in the cities of Naga, Cebu, and Davao, which drew hundreds of thousands. More than a million people attended her final rally, the miting de avance in Manila. Unlike Marcos and Tolentino, whose popular appeal was confined largely to their home provinces, Aquino and Laurel were met with enthusiastic crowds across the nation, far beyond their political bailiwicks. Money was scarce and party organization weak in the AquinoLaurel campaign. The opposition spent about $6 million during the election, which did not come close to matching the hundreds of millions that Marcos dispensed.34 Moral appeals offset the difference. A slogan endorsed by the Catholic Church asked voters paid by the KBL to cast their ballot for the opposition nevertheless. Party organization during the campaign consisted of Laurel's UNIDO (the official opposition party) and the LABAN coalition formed by pro-Aquino politicians. Instead of working together harmoniously for the Aquino-Laurel cause, the two groups bickered constantly as they maneuvered for advantage in the next local elections.35 Like Magsaysay, Aquino refused to involve herself in matters of party discipline. The opposition thus reached no official agreement on a national campaign committee, and in many localities there were several different, and often antagonistic, Aquino-Laurel campaign offices.36 With opposition party machinery sputtering, Aquino relied primarily on her family and upper-class volunteers to run her campaign. Her brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., was de facto campaign manager; her brother-in-law, Agapito Aquino, was liaison to the causeoriented groups active in the election; another brother-in-law, Paul Aquino, was in charge of security; her sister-in-law, Lupita Kashiwahara, was responsible for media relations; and her sister, Teresita Lopa, was a constant companion during the campaign sorties.37 The Aquino campaign was truly a "family affair."38 The Cojuangco-Aquino clan also coordinated the activities of the CAPM and VICTORY, an umbrella coalition of elite volunteer organizations that were responsible for much of the nuts-and-bolts organizing.

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Minimizing Fraud and Violence

As in 1984, the Catholic Church and NAMFREL were the bulwark of the opposition's anti-terror and anti-cheating efforts. The Catholic bishops issued several pastoral letters criticizing the conduct of the ruling party and admonishing people to vote according to their conscience.39 The most significant assistance that the church gave to the opposition campaign, however, was through NAMFREL. Having learned from its experience in 1984, NAMFREL established a "marine corps" made up of priests and nuns, because they were less likely to be harmed than laypersons. A bishop, priest, or nun often headed the local NAMFREL chapter. The "religious" were to serve as a "moral force against the 'forces of evil' on election day." NAMFREL had grown from 150,000 volunteers in 64 percent of all precincts in 1984 to 500,000 volunteers in 85 percent of precincts in 1986.40 Some support for NAMFREL came from the United States. Although the Reagan administration continued to back Marcos while the State Department and most of Congress supported Aquino, the two camps in the U.S. government were united in their insistence that elections be fair. Ideological conservatives believed that Marcos could win the elections cleanly, whereas pragmatists thought that Aquino's victory was assured in honest polls. The U.S. government apparently channeled nearly $1 million to NAMFREL and also supported Radio Veritas, to strengthen the two organizations' efforts as electoral watchdogs.41 A bipartisan U.S. delegation to observe the election was picked by Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar (who headed the group), the State Department, and the White House to represent different American opinions. Disagreement about whom to support in the Philippine polls spilled over into U.S. press coverage, although the main effect of extensive media attention was to scrutinize Marcos' electoral conduct.42 On the advice of Senator Laxalt, Marcos had hired the Washington public relations firm Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelley, which recommended that he grant more interviews to U.S. reporters. The firm also sent conservative journalist Robert Novak to the Philippines. Novak, along with Jeane Kirkpatrick and William Buckley, pronounced Marcos the likely winner of the election. Liberals in the United States began assisting Aquino after an interview that she gave to the New York Times in December 1985 raised questions about her ability to govern. They supplied her with an American public relations firm (both candidates now had U.S. consultants) and a

THE FALL OF MARCOS .149

speech writer to help her court the American press and cut down on the gaffes that had plagued her early campaign.43 The San Jose Mercury News and the Village Voice published accounts of Marcos' hidden wealth in the United States, an issue that was kept alive in hearings held during the election by Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York. Articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post revealed Marcos' faked heroism and war medals.44 The several thousand foreign journalists who had arrived in the Philippines by the time of the elections were all there to witness whether Marcos would keep his pledge of clean balloting. In early 1985, as the prospect of early presidential elections loomed, many traditional oppositionists had already begun considering the need for "hardware," that is, military force, if they were cheated at the polls.45 At about the same time, members of the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement, in close consultation with their political godfather Juan Ponce Enrile, began planning a coup (see chapter 7). Members of RAM met with representatives of the noncommunist civilian opposition at least three times in mid* 1985. When the snap presidential elections were called, RAM delayed a coup set for December 1985.46 Instead, RAM became active in the campaign, launching the group Kamalayan (conscience) 1986, which urged the armed forces to remain neutral in the elections. The opposition hoped that RAM, funded largely by business oppositionist and Aquino campaigner Jaime V. Ongpin and NAMFREL, would serve as a check against the pro-Marcos military.47 RAM provided intelligence to the opposition about the government's plans to use fraud and violence but could do little to keep most of the military from electioneering on Marcos' behalf.48 Having to Steal the Election Twice

Marcos believed that as long as the vote count—even one produced by bribery, intimidation, and disenfranchisement— showed him in the lead, his foes would have to admit that the results reflected the ballots cast. Complaints about substantive electoral manipulation would be difficult to document and would pale against the hard numbers that put Marcos ahead. The Philippine president was so confident of his ability to rig the election at its grass roots, out of the view of foreigners, that he directed COMELEC to grant NAMFREL permission to conduct an independent count.

I S O • THE FALL OF MARCOS

Electoral violence by the KBL in Makati, where foreign observers and the international press were headquartered, was the first indication that Marcos' plan was not working. During the election the KBL also used coercion in several other areas to which outsiders had easy access. If terror had been restricted to more remote parts of the country, then the foreign media could not have taken pictures or filed reports of priests, nuns, and other members of NAMFREL confronting pro-Marcos goons in an effort to safeguard ballots. To win the majority that had escaped the KBL in 1984, Marcos hoped to cut down the opposition's lead in regions that it had won (in total votes) in the legislative polls. Although Marcos did make some gains in Metro Manila and five other pro-opposition regions, he lost ground in the Central Visayas. Except in his home region of Ilocos, he failed to increase the KBL;s vote in regions that it had won in 1984, losing ground in Cagayan Valley and the Eastern Visayas and even failing to get a majority in Central Mindanao. According to NAMFREL figures, which give an accurate picture of the 74 percent of the electoral returns that could be verified, Marcos received only 48 percent of the vote despite extensive manipulation. This figure only slightly exceeds the 47 percent that the KBL had received in 1984 (table 8.2). The opposition's moral crusade had proved so effective that Marcos' strategy of hidden electoral manipulation was foiled and he had to cheat in ways that U.S. observers and the international press could plainly see. COMELEC tried to counter NAMFREL'S unpleasant vote totals by padding Marcos' votes in regions where warlords had used coercion to prevent NAMFREL volunteers from observing most precincts. The difference between the NAMFREL vote count for a region and the official one was therefore closely related to the number of precincts that NAMFREL volunteers had been able to observe in the region (fig. 8.1). In regions where NAMFREL volunteers were present in 70 to 90 percent of precincts, the official vote count was not much different from NAMFREL'S (the difference was between 0 and 4 percent, with one exception, region IX, where it was 11 percent). But in three regions (I, II, and XII) where NAMFREL was allowed into only one-third to two-thirds of the precincts, the difference between NAMFREL'S figures and the official count was much greater. In these three regions, the official count of votes for Marcos was 19 percent, 18 percent, and 7 percent higher than the NAMFREL totals, respectively. This disparity gave Marcos an advantage (54 percent) in the final government tally.

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 1 5 1

Table 8.2 Comparison of the KBL's vote in 1984 and Marcos' vote in 1986 Region

KBL in 1984 (% of votes)

Marcos in 1986 (% of votes)

Increase (Decrease)

Metro Manila I. Ilocos II. Cagayan Valley III. Central Luzon IV. Southern Tagalog V. Bicol VI. Western Visayas VII. Central Visayas VIII. Eastern Visayas IX. Western Mindanao X. Northern Mindanao XI. Southern Mindanao XII. Central Mindanao Nation

37 64 75 49 37 33 45 50 60 47 50 37 69 47

46 67 66 46 45 36 50 44 58 49 50 46 48 48

9 3 (9) (3) 8 3 5 (6) (2) 2 0 9 (21) 1

Sources: National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, The NAMFREL Report on the February 7, 1986 Philippine Presidential Elections (n.p., n.d), p. 8; De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, p. 32.

Although NAMFREL had difficulty questioning the counting in regions where its volunteers had been given little chance to observe the balloting, computer operators working for COMELEC witnessed the padding of Marcos' votes. Two days after the election, thirty-five of them walked out, telling the press that something "fishy" was going on.49 Their boycott not only virtually shut down the COMELEC tabulation but also exposed Marcos' effort to manipulate the election even at the level of the national vote count, which discredited the polls. A Moral Victory With the collapse of the COMELEC count, the Batasang Pambansa took over the task of canvassing the votes and, no longer even maintaining the pretense of evenhandedness, hastily proclaimed Marcos and Tolentino the winners on February 15, 1986. Because of this blatant fraud, legislators from the opposition boycotted parliament on that day. But by this point few people were paying attention to official election results. The day before, the Catholic

152 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

Figure 8.1. The difference between the NAMFREL vote count and the official vote count, graphed on the percentage of precincts with NAMFREL coverage in each region. Graph based on figures from National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, The NAMFREL Report on the February 7,1986 Philippine Presidential Elections (n.p., n.d.), p. 8, annex E. Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, in a pastoral letter, had denounced the polls as "unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct." The bishops declared that Marcos had lost his right to rule: "A government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of the citizenry.... If such a government does not of itself freely correct the evil it has inflicted on the people, then it is our serious moral obligation as a people to make it do so."50 Marcos understood the seriousness of the CBCP's charges. He sent his wife to try to dissuade the bishops from issuing the statement and encouraged the papal nuncio, who was close to the First Couple, to prohibit them from speaking out.51 When both his wife and the papal nuncio were simply ignored, Marcos wrote Archbishop Ricardo Cardinal Vidal of Cebu, complaining that the bishops' statement had "summarily indicted" the electoral process and cast doubt on his regime's legitimacy.52 Aquino, of course, welcomed the CBCP'S stand,

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using it to reinforce her claim that she was the true winner of the election. With the bishops' support, the opposition's moral victory had been clinched. The election made Marcos into an international pariah. The Lugar-led U.S. team of election observers issued a critical statement on the conduct of the polls after the boycott of COMELEC computer operators convinced even the most right-wing members of the bipartisan group that Marcos had stolen the election. Marcos' many appearances on U.S. television began to backfire, as even such conservative journalists as George Will came to see the Philippine president as an "inveterate liar." But Ronald Reagan, a longtime friend of Marcos, still affirmed, in his first comment on the election, that "there was cheating on both sides."53 After the bishops issued their statement condemning Marcos' election fraud and Corazon Aquino sharply rebuked Reagan, bipartisan U.S. congressional criticism of the American president's statement mounted. Four days later the Reagan White House was forced to admit that the "widespread fraud and violence" in the polls had been "perpetrated largely by the ruling party."54 Still unwilling to accept the State Department's anti-Marcos reports, Reagan sent Philip C. Habib to the Philippines to investigate the situation, only to have the diplomat also advise him to abandon the Philippine president. Marcos' growing diplomatic isolation was not confined to the United States. Only the Soviet Union and a few Eastern bloc countries, in a clumsy attempt to win diplomatic advantage while the Americans were distancing themselves from the regime, sent Marcos congratulations on his electoral "victory."55 Aquino had scored a moral triumph in the elections, but her path to power remained unclear. Marcos refused to transfer authority to her, and the Reagan administration, although its stance toward the Philippine government was rapidly changing, was unwilling to ask him to step down. Given the Philippine president's intransigence and the U.S. government's inaction, four scenarios seemed possible. In the first scenario the Aquino camp, acting alone, would topple Marcos, through either a campaign of civil disobedience or an insurrection led by its social democratic allies. A second possibility was that RAM, led by Enrile, would launch a successful coup. Third, Marcos, after crushing any attempts to overthrow his regime, would declare martial law, leaving an alliance with the communists as perhaps the only alternative available to the Aquino camp. In the final scenario the military rebels would retreat after their plot was discovered, relying on civilians to protect them from government troops (which

154 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

is what actually happened). Aquino's ascension to power was by no means inevitable. But it was highly probable, because the successful electoral crusade had made her the unchallenged leader of the antiMarcos forces. Alexander R. Magno puts the point this way: The intensity with which the electoral campaign was fought threw the whole society into a political pressure cooker.... It brought millions of heretofore passive citizens in direct confrontation with the dictatorship's brutality and moral bankruptcy as they struggled to defend the integrity of the electoral process. . . . The electoral campaign produced an unchallenged focal point of leadership for the broad anti-dictatorship forces. Evident popular support during the campaign vested legitimacy in the Aquino leadership. Evident fraud, in the same manner, rendered the Marcos dictatorship totally void of legitimacy. The stage was set for Aquino to assume central direction over the post-electoral struggle.56

Aquino's leadership of the opposition meant that the crowds, which first emerged after the assassination and reappeared in huge numbers during the presidential campaign, were hers to command. She could use her mass base to defeat Marcos directly, or she could employ it in an alliance with armed groups. Military rebels and communists both counted on support by pro-Aquino crowds in planning their routes to victory. Arms were not enough to bring them to power: they needed the masses that only Aquino's blessing could provide. To get them, they would have to compromise their own claims to the exclusive right to rule. Aquino quickly declared that she had won the election and threatened Marcos with street demonstrations if he did not arrange for an immediate transfer of power. Hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters kept vigils during the ballot counting, which culminated in a large rally in front of the legislature as the Batasang Pambansa did its canvassing. Aquino and her advisers rejected a plan by social democratic activists to storm Malacafiang as too risky and violent.57 After the swift military repression of the opposition's insurrectionary effort in 1979 and 1980, traditional politicians had lost confidence in their ability to lead a successful uprising. Instead Aquino launched the Tagumpay ng Bayan (triumph of the people) civil disobedience campaign on February 16, 1986, when an estimated 2 million gathered at Luneta Park in downtown Manila to hear her condemn the regime.58 Aquino's call for a boycott of pro-Marcos newspapers, banks, and companies showed signs of success as the stock exchange slumped, banks reported runs, and orders for products from crony firms were canceled.59 She began crisscrossing the country to demon-

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 155

strate nationwide backing for her campaign of civil disobedience. But Marcos hoped that the protests would gradually abate, and the initiative passed to the military rebels. RAM, Flower Brigades, and a Coup That Could Have Been

The traditional opposition was well aware of the EnrileRAM plot, and a growing number of anti-Marcos politicians were apparently convinced that a coup would be the only way to force the Philippine president out of office. But Aquino remained cautious, refusing in a January 1986 meeting with RAM to join a proposed committee that would run the country after the coup. Aquino may have correctly guessed that Enrile hoped to head this committee.60 But RAM strategists believed that they could not triumph against pro-government troops' superior firepower unless they had extensive civilian backing. They asked Jose Cojuangco to organize his political followers in Tarlac province to stop government reinforcements from being sent to Manila through Central Luzon, while his wife, Margarita Cojuangco, established a "flower brigade" in Manila. Taking a page from anti-Soviet resistance in Czechoslovakia in 1968, young women and girls were to hand out blossoms to pro-government .soldiers to lessen their hostility toward the military rebels. RAM was also in touch with Cardinal Sin, aware that he could inspire vast numbers of people to support the rebellion. They reasoned that Sin, as head of the church, would be able to recruit priests and nuns to be in the vanguard, and Filipino soldiers would have great difficulty in obeying orders to fire on the clergy.61 What would have happened had the RAM coup succeeded? Comparison with Haiti helps to answer this counterfactual question. As in the Philippines, the Catholic Church in Haiti led protest against the sultanistic regime. Jean-Claude Duvalier was toppled on February 6, 1986, after spontaneous riots spread to the capital, Port-auPrince. Unlike the gatherings in the Philippines, the riots did not take place in the wake of a stolen presidential election and lacked such a clear leader as Aquino. In Haiti, as George A. Fauriol argues, "no one had really been in charge of the movement that brought down Duvalier."62 In this vacuum, the United States supported a transition government headed by General Henri Namphry, whose military faction had turned on Duvalier. Although promising democracy, Namphry held onto power, as Enrile and RAM probably would have tried to do after a successful coup. But even against a civilian opposition

156 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

with diffuse leadership, military rule proved highly unstable in Haiti. Popular mobilization brought down a series of military governments between 1986 and 1990. Although the military toppled Haiti's democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, its hold on power remained tenuous until Aristide was restored to power with U.S. assistance in late 1994. In the Philippines, the military rebels, who were dependent on civilian support for their coup to succeed, probably would have had even more difficulty consolidating power.63 Enrile and RAM, having delayed their coup plans until after the presidential election, were poised to strike in late February 1986. Marcos erred when he did not arrest or annihilate the military rebels immediately after they fled to Camps Crame and Aguinaldo on the discovery of their coup plot. For nearly nine hours RAM held out with no more than three hundred lightly armed men and no civilian protection. It could have been crushed easily by the government. The Philippine president's miscalculation cannot be attributed entirely to chance, however. General Ver, whom Marcos had appointed for his loyalty, not his military professionalism, gave him poor advice. Ver had little battle experience and thought only of defending the presidential palace, not of attacking the rebels when they were vulnerable. Marcos and Ver knew that the patrimonialization of the armed forces had alienated many lower officers, whom they feared would support the rebels if pro-government troops attacked. Also, the U.S. government had warned Marcos not to destroy the breakaway elements of the armed forces. He did not want to risk further international ire. What would have happened if Marcos had quickly defeated the rebels? Ver was planning a return to martial law and the arrests of opposition leaders.64 Facing such repression, the traditional opposition might have turned to the communists. The CPP'S boycott of the presidential elections had proved disastrous, marginalizing its national leadership and alienating local members who wanted to support the Aquino campaign. Having lost the initiative in the antiMarcos struggle, they hoped that Aquino would ask their legal alliance, BAYAN, to join a welgang bayan (national strike). BAYAN had been developing this strategy with limited success since 1984, but many leaders in the communist party had hoped that it could be used to bring down the regime in the polarized climate after the election. But unless the radicals were able to work closely with Aquino, they faced isolation from the gigantic crowds that she had

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 157

repeatedly proved to be able to mobilize. Although some of her advisers apparently seriously considered an alliance with the communists, Aquino continued to refuse to work with them. BAYAN was then caught off guard by the foiled coup, and, although some of its members joined the crowds that protected the military rebels, its role in the people-power insurrection was insignificant.65 But let us assume for a moment that a welgang bayan became the key weapon against Marcos. The communists would probably have been much more dependent on their conservative allies than the Sandinistas were in Nicaragua. Daniel Ortega, worried about losing the advantage to the moderates in the anti-Somoza campaign, had taken bold strategic steps to make sure that the Sandinistas were at the forefront of the struggle. Even then, the Sandinistas faced strong opposition from conservatives when a coalition government that had formed between the two groups collapsed. After years of civil war that involved heavy U.S. intervention in support of the contras, the Sandinistas yielded power through elections. Given her ability to draw hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of supporters, Aquino would have in all likelihood played a greater role in mobilizing people for a revolution than her counterparts in Nicaragua, giving her a stronger bargaining position in forming a new government. U.S. support for anticommunist guerrillas could also not be discounted if the radicals tried to rule on their own in the Philippines, a country with two major American military installations. Controversy abounds about how the Enrile-RAM coup was betrayed, but it is clear that Ver knew about the plan by February 22, 1986. His move to arrest the plotters precipitated their flight to Camp Aguinaldo on that same day.66 Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos had apparently known about the putsch for some time, although it is unclear how active he was in planning it. Facing probable arrest, Ramos joined Enrile and RAM in the military camp. Enrile and Ramos held a press conference in the early evening of February 22 to plead for mass support, but many people reacted with suspicion because of the bad reputation of the military.67 Public response was insignificant until Agapito Aquino, who was in close contact with Ramos, impulsively implored on Radio Veritas for civilians to protect the rebels. Cardinal Sin was persuaded to make a similar request a few hours later. When Enrile reached Corazon Aquino by telephone, she was en route to Davao City on the island of Mindanao, where she planned to set up a provisional government to counter a feared military junta. But Sin avers that he managed to convince her

158 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

the next day to drop her plans and support the military rebels instead.68 Apparently, Aquino had become convinced that Enrile and Ramos would have little choice but to back her bid for the presidency because the crowds would remain loyal to her. The crowd functioned much as Enrile and RAM had planned: priests and nuns helped stop loyalist soldiers from attacking while women and children handed out flowers. The huge mass of humanity around the rebels provided the "defense in depth" that had been part of their strategy.69 But Enrile and RAM found themselves far more dependent on the crowd than they had anticipated. For the first two days of the revolt their survival depended on the millions of civilians in the streets. Even when defections allowed his troops to take the offensive, Enrile could not return to his plan to create a junta because he had already pledged his loyalty to Aquino and was afraid that the crowds would turn on him. After four days of people power, Aquino took the presidential oath in Club Filipino, the traditional bastion of Philippine civilian politics. Why the Crowd Was Successful

How did this gathering of millions succeed in overthrowing Marcos? People reacted quickly, stopping advances by government troops against the rebels. They remained nonviolent, avoiding conflict that the government probably would have won with superior firepower. The defense that civilians provided for the rebels gave Ramos and Enrile time to solicit defections in the military, which, by the fourth day of the uprising, brought the armed forces almost completely under their control. The civilians surrounding the military camps convinced the Reagan administration to finally abandon Marcos and call for his resignation. People power was informally organized through techniques developed during demonstrations after the Aquino assassination and in the course of the election campaign. Experienced street parliamentarians coordinated mass defenses against oncoming troops and tanks. Religious groups, well rehearsed through their NAMFREL activities, took the initiative in organizing the civilians gathered around the military camps. "The various religious orders lent immediate form to the human barricades, turning potential chaos into a well-ordered campground. Taking charge of the sacks of rice, bread, crackers, sardines, and doughnuts that helpful civilians had handed through the gates, they quickly set up food brigades that became the

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 159

crowd's life support system, and used their religious robes to gently coerce the grocers and merchants.1'70 Putting nuns on the front lines was a strategy that had been developed in the post-assassination marches to shame police officers into civility. Nuns had also been pushed to the fore when armed goons threatened the sanctity of the ballot during the presidential election. So when General Artemio A. Tadiar motored up the main Metro Manila boulevard, known as EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos), with a tank division for a frontal assault on the rebel camps during the second day of the revolt (February 23,1986), the "nuns, of course, were placed in the vanguard for maximum emotional impact upon the Marine tank commander/'71 The sisters did not volunteer for the job; a crowd wise to the effectiveness of the tactic begged them to do it. The tanks, needless to say, stopped. Radio Veritas, a major source of independent news during the demonstrations and presidential polls, became the crowd's commander, telling them where to position themselves and calling for reinforcements. When Radio Veritas went off the air on the second day of the revolt after pro-government troops demolished its transmitter, people power was like a "fleet of taxicabs without any central dispatcher."72 The crowd began to thin, and key passageways were left unblockaded. Within six hours, a new station (operating from communications facilities owned by Enrile) was on the air. From what she called Radio Bandido, announcer Jane Keithley directed the crowd through its darkest moment: the attack by pro-Marcos troops on the military camps on the third day, February 24. She helped position the blockaders and played the Philippine national anthem, which radios in the crowd blared as the troops advanced. For her efforts Keithley was tagged the field marshal of the crowd. Religious and political symbols helped unite the diverse assembly. Yellow had been Aquino's color since 1983, when people who were to greet her husband on his return to Manila brought yellow ribbons to the airport as a symbol of the song "Tie a Yellow Ribbon." By the second day of the revolution, EDSA "had become a rhapsody in yellow. Almost everyone was in yellow shirt or skirt, or wore a yellow ribbon round the head. Vendors made a killing selling yellow ribbons for a peso or two. A grotesque item was the yellow hat in the form of a hand flashing the 'L' [LABAN] sign."73 Political symbols showed the crowd's support for Aquino, and religious symbols gave it spiritual strength. Many people had statues of the Virgin Mary and crucifixes. Some came from family altars, and others were brought by priests

160 • THE FALL OF MARCOS

and nuns who knew that the "people will need symbols to rally around."74 Filipinos often claim that it was a miracle that the four-day people-power revolt was peaceful. Although they may have been counting on divine intervention, people were working hard at devising clever tactics that made God's task easier. Since the Aquino assassination, street parliamentarians had developed a sophisticated form of nonviolent praxis. After several demonstrations ended in violence, leaders of the Catholic Church and the business community had invited international consultants to develop a program for training in nonviolent techniques.75 The new techniques were widely employed during people power. The key to this nonviolent strategy was to restrain violent elements within the crowd. A priest, for example, calmed a mob that was threatening soldiers guarding the presidential palace: "These soldiers are our brothers! They are Filipinos like us! Let us be more peaceful! After all we have already won! It is just a matter of time before you can go to Malacanang."76 "Cut, and Cut Cleanly": The United States Abandons Marcos

Washington had discouraged RAM's coup plans—which the CIA had learned about at least a week before Ver uncovered them—because it did not think that they would work.77 Yet U.S. government officials were forced to reexamine their opinion quickly when they saw the huge civilian support that the military rebels were receiving. After he received repeated assurances that Aquino was a moderate with whom the U.S. could do business, Reagan and his aides decided to abandon the Philippine president. The U.S. government warned Marcos not to attack the rebellious troops or the crowds protecting them at the risk of a total cutoff of American aid. The U.S. embassy in the Philippines, a not-so-neutral arbitrator whose sympathy for Aquino was scarcely concealed, gave the rebels valuable intelligence. By the third day of people power, February 24, Reagan had written to Marcos asking him to resign. The Philippine president spoke to Laxalt the next morning to find that the message was true. Laxalt reports that Marcos asked what he should do. The Republican senator responded, "Cut, and cut cleanly. The time has come." Marcos paused for a while and then said, "I'm so very, very disappointed."78 The United States arranged for the dictator's flight out of Manila to Clark Air Force Base. Marcos then wanted to go to

THE FALL OF MARCOS • 161

his home province of Ilocos Norte, where he apparently hoped to regroup to fight Aquino with loyalists in the military. After consulting the opposition, the U.S. troops forcibly disarmed the Marcos party and flew them unwillingly to Guam and then on to Hawaii (which gave rise to the former Philippine president's charges of being kidnapped). People power had both toppled Marcos and determined his successor.

9

Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Look, you have a situation where Marcos falls, you come in, the Communists back off, and people expect you to make miracles So the people will say, "Jesus Christ! You're the guy we waited . . . for. You're even worse." The thing I can say is that the first guy that will come in will be blown out in six months. Then a second guy will come in and he'll be blown out in six months. —Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., 1983

The overthrow of a dictator creates a number of problems for wouldbe democratizers. The new government is formed neither from groups that assumed leadership during negotiations with the outgoing dictatorship nor from an orderly transfer of power but rather from a loose coalition offerees that toppled the ancien regime. The result is bitter struggle for political dominance. Such conflicts cannot be resolved through the legal system, because the new rulers usually abolish the constitution and laws of the old order. The new government often lacks not only a legal basis but also democratic legitimacy. The new rulers have not been elected. They are thus tempted to substitute revolutionary legitimacy for democratic legitimacy. The new government proclaims that the people have spoken through demonstrations or revolution and that therefore elections are unnecessary (as in Cuba under Castro) or can be postponed (as in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas). In Portugal, democratization was achieved only after election results superseded the revolutionary mandate claimed by some elements in the military and the communist party. The Philippine transition was an unusual overthrow because 162

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION • 163

electoral and revolutionary legitimacy went hand in hand. Corazon Aquino was accurately perceived as the real victor of a fraudulent presidential election, and the people-power uprising had carried out the popular will. But the new government still encountered the problems typical of an overthrow. Aquino formed a coalition government composed of the politicians who backed her presidential bid and the military rebels whose failed coup initiated the events that led to Marcos' fall. A power struggle quickly broke out between civilians and the military, with both sides claiming the better credentials for their role in people power. Juan Pbnce Enrile, who had been reappointed defense minister, and Vice President Salvador Laurel, who was made minister of foreign affairs, nonetheless felt that they had been denied the fruits of victory and accused Aquino of creating a new dictatorship. Aquino asserted a popular mandate to rule and fired both Enrile and Laurel from her cabinet. Although Aquino held competitive legislative and local elections, Enrile, Laurel, and the Marcos loyalists continued to try to overthrow her government. The Philippines was plagued by other legacies of Marcos' rule. His extremely arbitrary exercise of power created an institutional vacuum that the Aquino administration took years to fill. The new government inherited a highly politicized military, with both the corrupt pro-Marcos faction and Enrile's Reform the Armed Forces Movement trying to topple it. The legislators and local officials who had been "elected" in the rigged polls of the Marcos era were an obstacle to the establishment of new democratic institutions. The economy was in its worst state since World War II, and the country had one of the largest per capita debts in the world. The Aquino government's attempts to recover the billions of dollars stolen by Marcos and his cronies by sequestering corporations and freezing bank accounts added to political instability. The communist insurgency continued to plague the Aquino regime. Negotiations with these rebels not only failed to end the conflict but also strengthened the military dissidents, who used the talks to justify their attempts to bring down Aquino. More coups were attempted in the Philippines than in any other country of democracy's third wave.1 As in many new democracies in South America, government-sponsored investigations of human rights violations by the armed forces caused unrest among the Philippine military. But in most Latin American countries the armed forces had voluntarily withdrawn from power, and the civilian gov-

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ernment provoked contention by seeming to interfere in a military domain. In the Philippines, by contrast, military dissidents who had tried a coup against Marcos attempted to topple the Aquino government as well. Unlike a withdrawal transition, in which the armed forces return to the barracks, the overthrow of Marcos initiated a power struggle between the military and civilians in the Aquino government. Democratic Transition and Consolidation

The establishment of a democracy requires a constitutional framework and free elections for major political offices. In the Philippines these criteria were first met when a new constitution was overwhelmingly ratified in February 1987 and legislative elections were held in May. Although Filipino democracy continued to be plagued by many problems—most notably human rights violations in the anti-insurgency drive—minimal democratic standards were satisfied within a year and a half after Marcos' fall. Juan J. Linz argues that the consolidation of democracy should be defined inversely: it is the absence of significant disloyal opposition that seeks a nonelectoral route to power, and the sovereignty of democratic institutions.2 Consolidation was achieved in the Philippines when power was peacefully transferred after the 1992 presidential elections, most contenders for the presidency accepted the results, many military rebels surrendered, and the communist threat declined. Political stability remained fragile and could of course be shattered, but the criteria of consolidation had been fulfilled. The First Aquino Cabinet

Aquino's first cabinet (from February 1986 to November 1986) was an unstable coalition between anti-Marcos civilians and military rebels.3 Aquino was the clear winner of the people-power insurrection, but Enrile and Fidel V. Ramos had to be accommodated because their failed coup had prompted the uprising. As in some new democracies in South America, civilians and the military in the Philippines could not agree on how to deal with human rights violations by the armed forces. Aquino appointed several human rights lawyers to cabinet posts, with Jose Diokno, a long-time critic of the military who was named head of the Presidential Commission on

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Human Rights (PCHR), being the most controversial. Several RAM leaders were notorious torturers and feared prosecution from the PCHR.4 The civilian-military conflict in the Philippines went much deeper, however. Enrile and RAM not only attempted to defend military prerogatives but also wanted political power. Ramos was happy to be promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces of the Philippines, but Enrile was not the head of a junta, as he had hoped to be. After RAM attempted a coup that was foiled in November 1986, Aquino fired Enrile as defense minister, and active RAM members in the military were reshuffled. But Enrile continued to lead a conspiracy. Disappointed job seekers have been common in Philippine politics, but Enrile's grievances were particularly dangerous because his troops in the Reform the Armed Forces Movement could threaten the regime. Because Marcos had divided and politicized the armed forces, Aquino was now imperiled. Vice President Salvador Laurel was equally dissatisfied with the new government. Laurel was appointed minister of foreign affairs, but his followers received few offices and began to desert him.5 He was Aquino's vice president, but he had also been her competitor for the presidential candidacy and had obvious presidential ambitions. Laurel maintained that Aquino had broken a preelection promise to share power with him if they won. But Aquino reportedly believed that the revolutionary nature of her rise to power had given her a direct mandate to rule.6 Laurel's disappointment soon translated into political disloyalty. When he publicly supported the August 1987 coup against Aquino's government, she fired him as foreign secretary.7 He served out his vice presidential term as one of her bitterest opponents. The Provisional Government and the Constitutional Commission

Soon after taking office, Aquino decided to void the Marcos constitution and abolish the legislature, the Batasang Pambansa. Laurel urged her to adhere to the old constitution and keep the legislature because he wanted to be appointed prime minister. Enrile also wanted the parliament preserved, because he hoped to make the KBL, the majority party, his political base.8 But Aquino had long argued that the ratification of Marcos' constitution was illegal and had not forgotten the Batasang Pambansa's hasty conclusion that her

166 • DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

opponent had won the presidential election. Aquino declared that her legitimacy was not based on the Marcos constitution. A government proclamation of March 25,1986, stated, "The new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. ... The heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. . . . The direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the government/'9 To keep the old constitution and assembly would have been to hand over to Laurel or Enrile, or both, the authority that Aquino felt people power had bestowed on her. In her provisional constitution, Aquino obligated herself to call a Constitutional Commission within two months. Arguing that new elections would be too costly and disruptive coming so soon after the people-power revolt, Aquino appointed fifty commissioners in May 1986 to write the new document.10 This act led to renewed criticism that she was exceeding her presidential mandate. In an attempt to prove that the commission was representative, she selected members from the major geographical areas and from such significant social groups as the peasantry, labor, women, and the Muslim minority.11 But the drafters of the constitution were a highly elite assemblage, including thirty lawyers, twelve landowners, and several business executives.12 Most important, though, the delegates were largely pro-Aquino. Aside from a few members with links to the radical Left, four with ties to Marcos, and a handful allied with Laurel, the great majority favored the Philippine president. The best evidence of this partisanship was the vote by the commission to extend Aquino's term to June 1992 without holding presidential elections, as Enrile and Laurel demanded.13 Enrile and Laurel found themselves locked out of power until 1992. Aquino used her self-allocated powers not only to abolish the Batasang Pambansa and create the Constitutional Commission but also to replace local officials. She feared that the country's governors and mayors—who, except for a handful, had been candidates of Marcos' KBL in 1980—could destabilize her government. These elected officials complained that their removal was undemocratic. Several barricaded themselves in their offices, and some even threatened to use force to resist the government's efforts to evict them. Enrile criticized the "massacre of local officials," becoming the spokesman for those penalized for association with the Marcos regime.14 (Such

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an alliance brings to mind the election of Manuel Roxas to the presidency in 1946 with the support of a coalition of politicians accused of collaborating with the Japanese during World War II.)15 The appointment of the successors of these local officials also generated controversy. Laurel charged that Minister of Local Government Aquilino Pimentel was favoring members of the PDP-LABAN, of which Pimentel was president and Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., secretary-general.16 Aquino's extralegal removal of local officials thus further polarized her relations with Enrile and Laurel. As in Iran and Nicaragua after the fall of sultanistic regimes, one of Aquino's top priorities in the wake of Marcos' overthrow was to "freeze [the past regime's] assets and bring the corruptly acquired loot back home."17 Aquino used the powers of her provisional government to create a cabinet-level Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG), headed by Jovito Salonga. By January 1987, the PCGG had sequestered 260 corporations, including some of the biggest in the country, on the suspicion that they were secretly owned by Marcos, his family, or his cronies.18 It had also frozen millions of dollars in assets in bank accounts at home and abroad. The government asserted that the obvious need to clean up the corruption of the Marcos years justified its actions. But Aquino's critics used the PCGG's efforts to attack her government's democratic legitimacy. They were asking, "Has the PCGG set in motion a habit for the formalised dispossession of political 'outs' at every turn of the political wheel? At the beginning of martial law in 1972, Marcos sent temporary administrators to run companies owned by family enemies such as the Lopezes and the Jacintos. But the PCGG's sweeping actions dwarf this earlier experiment."19 Not just friends and relatives of Marcos complained. Rene Espina, an ally of Laurel, was angered by the sequestration of the United Coconut Planters Bank, of which he was a major stockholder.20 Eduardo Cojuangco had largely capitalized the bank through a levy on poor coconut farmers who had not benefited from the tax, but the PCGG ignored this. Even more upset was Enrile, who, next to Cojuangco, was the bank's biggest shareholder. His frustrated political aims and his financial interests set Enrile on a collision course with Aquino. In an attempt to recover fiscally from the corruption of the Marcos years, she had further increased tension in her cabinet. Opponents of the Aquino government claimed that evidence of its tyranny was mounting. But the cause c^lebre of Aquino's detractors was her government's approach to the communists. On the insis-

168 • DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

tence of some of her closest supporters, one of Aquino's first acts upon assuming office was the release of communist prisoners as repayment of a political debt after years of united front activity. Soon thereafter, she began negotiations with the leadership of the communist party to end an insurgency that could endanger the country's fledgling democracy. Despite opposition from the military and the U.S. government, Aquino went ahead with the talks.21 But the communists had launched guerrilla attacks two weeks after Aquino took power, and the party's official line was that her regime represented no basic change from Marcos'. Although the communist leaders did agree to a temporary cease-fire, they used it primarily to disseminate anti-Aquino propaganda and refused to accept the new constitution as the basis for negotiations. Sensing the opportunity to build a coalition against Aquino, Enrile asserted that Aquino's talks with the communists could lead to a leftist takeover. To further polarize the political situation, RAM members reportedly assassinated the leftist labor leader Rolando Olalia, who was urging the communist leadership to negotiate seriously with the government.22 The Aquino government's efforts to end the continued communist insurgency that threatened it thus endangered political stability. Coup Attempts against the Aquino Government

The seven major coup attempts between July 1986 and December 1989 were the culmination of the power struggle between Aquino and rebel factions in the military (table 9.1).23 The coup attempts of November 1986 and August 1987 were led by RAM, which was loyal to Enrile. Former President Marcos retained a number of high-ranking loyalists in the military who led four attempts to overthrow the government. In the two most important pro-Marcos coup plots—in July 1986 and January 1987—RAM supported the loyalists behind the scenes. Although Enrile and RAM had rebelled against Marcos and the Ver-led military hierarchy, Aquino's rise to power brought these rival military factions together. The December 1989 coup attempt, the last major effort to depose Aquino and the one that came closest to toppling her, was a joint effort of RAM and the loyalists. A distinction can be made between military rebellions that occurred before the transition to democracy was completed and those that occurred after May 1987. Plots before the approval of the new constitution and the holding of legislative elections were aimed at

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Table 9.1 Major coup attempts against the Aquino regime, 1986-1989 Date

Main location

Military groups

July 1986 November 1986 January 1987 April 1987 July 1987 August 1987 December 1989

Manila Hotel Batasang Pambansa Television station Fort Bonifacio Airport Malacanang Camp Aguinaldo

Loyalists, supported by RAM RAM Loyalists, supported by RAM Loyalists Loyalists RAM RAM and Loyalists

winning popular support by emphasizing the regime's lack of a firm legal basis, trying to block its efforts at institutionalization, and playing on fears aroused by the government's negotiations with the communists. The July 1986 coup, confined to the Manila Hotel, was led by loyalists who proclaimed Marcos' vice presidential candidate, Arturo Tolentino, acting president. The putschists' failure to mobilize large crowds, and an ultimatum set by the Aquino regime, ended this opera bouffe. More serious was the November 1986 RAM plan, which Ramos headed off at the last moment, to seize strategic points in Manila while former MPs convened the Batasang Pambansa and proclaimed its speaker, Nicanor Yniguez, acting president. The coup, which aimed to emphasize Aquino's "illegal" abolition of Marcos' parliament, was to take place at the height of government negotiations with the communists. The January 1987 loyalist plot (which centered on the brief seizure of a government television station that rebels hoped to use to broadcast anti-Aquino statements) was designed to block the constitutional plebiscite. The April 1987 coup attempt by loyalist officers, who managed only to briefly free several military rebels jailed in Fort Bonifacio for participation in earlier plots, was meant to overthrow the government before legislative elections could be held. After Aquino's government restored democratic institutions, ended negotiations with the communists, and renewed the antiinsurgency drive, the military could no longer rationalize coup attempts either by declaring Aquino's regime a dictatorship or by attacking her government's links to the Left. Instead of courting public backing, military rebels focused primarily on secretly recruiting support within the ranks of the armed forces, accumulating

170 • DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

military hardware, and soliciting financial contributions. When they lost hope of gaining mass support, their coup attempts became more purely military affairs. Although plots during the democratic transition period had resulted in only a handful of deaths, later coup attempts (with the exception of the foiled takeover of the Benigno Aquino International Airport—renamed after the slain opposition leader—in July 1987) were much bloodier. The August 1987 RAM attack on Malacanang and the military headquarters left fifty-three dead and more than two hundred wounded. The combined military offensive of RAM and the loyalists on Camp Aguinaldo in December 1989 and the rebels' later retreat to Makati resulted in seventy-six deaths and nearly five hundred major injuries. The Aquino Government's Popular Legitimacy

Aquino's popularity was crucial to the successful transition to democracy in the Philippines. With both the military and the political elite divided after the overthrow of Marcos, public opinion could tip the balance in the struggle for political control. Had crowds rallied in support of the putschists, they might have encouraged more soldiers to join the rebellion and could have doomed Aquino, as people power had toppled Marcos. Instead opinion polls, an overwhelming vote for the new constitution, and clear victory by proAquino parties in the May 1987 legislative elections proved that most Filipinos supported Aquino's administration. Declining government performance—particularly a failed economic policy—took its toll on Aquino's personal popularity but did not undermine the legitimacy of democratic government. Public acceptance of Aquino during her first year in power was greater even than the outpouring of support that she received during the election campaign against Marcos: in a survey conducted by the respected Social Weather Station, 87 percent of Filipinos, more than Aquino's estimated vote count in the presidential elections of February 1986, expressed support for her in late 1986.24 Of the 22 million voters (with a turnout of nearly 90 percent of those registered), 76 percent approved the new constitution on February 2, 1987. Aquino and her foes agreed that the constitutional referendum was a vote on her presidency. Her slogan was "Yes to Cory! Yes to Democracy! Yes to the Constitution!" and her opponents' rallying cry was "No to Cory! No to Communism! No to the Constitution!"25 The constitution's ratification put an end to open attacks on her legitimacy. After

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION • 1 7 1

the vote, even Enrile felt compelled to proclaim publicly, "We accept the will of the people/'26 Aquino's right to rule could no longer be openly questioned. Having failed to impugn Aquino's legitimacy, Enrile, Laurel, and the Marcos loyalists returned to the electoral arena. Activists close to the communist party, wishing to take advantage of the "democratic space" created by Aquino and fearing political isolation if they again opted for boycott, formed the Partido ng Bayan (PnB, or Nationalist Party), the first leftist political party to participate in elections since 1946.27 Pro-Aquino candidates swept the legislative polls. Of the twenty-four senators elected, twenty-two of her personally chosen candidates won. (Enrile was one of the two other winners, finishing twenty-fourth.) The Lakas ng Bansa, an alliance of political groups, and several other parties closely identified with Aquino's administration won 149 seats in the House of Representatives, nearly threefourths of the available positions, and most of the rest went to her rightist opponents in the pro-Marcos KBL, the pro-Enrile Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD), and other parties (table 9.2).28 Table 9.2 Results of the May 1987 congressional elections Political Affiliation Pro-Aquino

Party Lakas ng Bansa PDP-LABAN UNIDO

Rightist opposition

Liberal Party Regional parties Independent Total Independent Nacionalista Party KBL

Regional parties GAD

Leftist opposition

Total PnB

Seats won 53 37 26 19 9 5 149 17 12 10 5 3 47 2

Source: Adapted from Institute for Popular Democracy, "Political Clans and Electoral Politics: A Preliminary Research." Manila: IPD, 1987. Note: Only ninety-five of the winning congressional candidates registered under one party label. Eighty-three were registered under more than one, and twenty-two were independent. But candidates generally chose the party with which they identified most closely as their first label on the ballot, which is therefore used to identify party affiliation in this table. The source used here did not classify the party affiliation of two of the candidates.

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Aquino's electoral battles with Enrile, Laurel, the Marcos loyalists, and the communists showed that they could not match her support from voters. After criticizing her provisional government's dictatorial actions, they were badly defeated when they confronted her on democratic terrain. Their commitment to democracy proved to be temporary, but when they reverted to coup plotting or guerrilla insurgency, there could no longer be any doubt about who was the democrat and who the would-be dictators. Aquino's popularity declined after a sharp drop in the regime's performance beginning in 1987 and 1988, but she continued to have a plurality of public support.29 Opinion polls showed mounting public dissatisfaction with increasing corruption in government and the decline of public safety from 1987 to 1991.30 Most important, however, the economy performed poorly after steady growth and low inflation during the early Aquino period. Although GNP grew by nearly 5 percent annually between 1986 and 1988, it increased just more than 2 percent in 1990, and then declined by almost 1 percent in 1991.31 Inflation surged from less than 1 percent in 1986 to more than 6 percent in 1988 to 18.7 percent in 1991,32 Poverty, as measured in absolute and self-rated terms, stayed at high levels during the Aquino years, with a plurality of survey respondents saying that the quality of their life deteriorated during the Aquino administration.33 Aquino's legitimacy, however, was based less on government performance and her personal popularity than on her reestablishment of democratic institutions. A crowd of more than a hundred thousand people demonstrated against those who would "destroy our democracy" after the December 1989 coup attempt.34 The important issue was the preservation of democracy, not Aquino's continued rule; an opinion poll showed that Filipinos were opposed to her seeking a second presidential term—which many legal experts believed was unconstitutional—by a two-to-one margin.35 Persons and institutions that behaved democratically, notably Aquino and Congress, enjoyed public support, whereas such disloyal oppositionists as Laurel received consistently negative ratings. Rigoberto Tiglao has interpreted the results of the Social Weather Station surveys this way: "The post-Marcos restoration of democracy has taken root in the Philippines. This is despite a perception among many Filipinos that the quality of their lives has deteriorated [The best] explanation is that the satisfaction ratings for Aquino and the Congress reflect an acceptance, not of their actual performance, but of the democratic ethos they represent."36

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION • 173 Surviving the Coup Attempts and Consolidating Democracy

Popular legitimacy is not always sufficient to ensure the survival of a new democracy, as the overthrow in 1991 of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti showed. The Haitian elite s fear of social reforms coupled with discontent in the military doomed this democratic experiment (Aristide was restored to power in late 1994). Aquino's legitimacy probably could not have saved her if she had been abandoned by the military, and a decisive move by a united military undoubtedly could have toppled her. She had antagonized the armed forces with investigations of their human rights violations, a 14 percent cut in the military budget at the beginning of her presidency, and negotiations with the communists. As her confrontation with Enrile intensified, Aquino yielded to Ramos1 demands by increasing the military budget and accepting his previously rejected counterinsurgency plan in fall 1986. Negotiations with the communists were broken off in early 1987. Aquino's political courtship of Ramos undercut the effectiveness of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights. Two years after Aquino took power, Amnesty International reported that not a single military officer or police officer had been convicted of an offense committed during the Marcos years or afterward.37 Aquino won over Ramos just in time. The chief of staff stopped RAM'S coup in November 1986 and strengthened the government sufficiently so that Enrile could be safely dismissed as defense minister that same month. To achieve ideological balance, Aquino also fired Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez and Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel, who were accused by the armed forces of having leftist sympathies.38 In the aftermath of the August 1987 coup attempt, Aquino removed her executive secretary, Joker Arroyo, who had been labeled pro-communist by military critics.39 Ramos—now defense minister—became Aquino's key ally in government during the highly unstable period between the putsch attempts of August 1987 and December 1989. Her endorsement of his (successful) presidential bid merely made this political dependency public.40 While making concessions to the military, the Aquino administration was also careful not to antagonize the country's "oligarchy." The Aquino government was criticized at home and abroad for its failure to carry out significant social reform and substantial restructuring of the country's economy. Part of this failure is attributable to the socioeconomic conservatism of the Aquino administration and the

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Philippine Congress. But it was also the result of the government's instability. With Enrile, Laurel, and the loyalists bent on overthrowing the regime, it could hardly risk provoking other elites. Land reform was a low priority for Aquino. Agrarian Reform Minister Heherson Alvarez was Aquino's last appointment to the cabinet (two months after the government had assumed power) and had no experience with land issues.41 After nineteen demonstrators protesting for land reform in front of the presidential palace were shot in January 1987, however, a faction within the Aquino administration seemed to have won governmental support for a major land redistribution proposal.42 This aroused fierce opposition among landowners (including Jose Cojuangco). Some formed private armies and issued threats of civil war. Enrile allied himself with the militant landlords to try to stage a violent political comeback.43 Aquino backed down and issued a limited plan that Congress further debased. As one journalist argued, "The generally weak 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law—and Aquino's executive orders implementing it—were formulated because the administration feared that a more radical reform programme could have driven landowners to support the coup plotters."44 Under authoritarian rule, state-granted monopolies had come to dominate many industries, a number of bankrupt crony firms had been taken over by the government, and the domestic market had been heavily protected from foreign goods. After Aquino's ascension to power, conditions seemed ideal to break up the monopolies, privatize "nonperforming government assets," and open the country to international competition. But resistance to the reforms soon developed. Managers who had been appointed by the regime to stateowned firms began to enjoy the advantages of public ownership.45 Lawsuits and poor implementation also slowed the privatization effort. Although the dismantling of monopolies established by Marcos was generally popular, trade liberalization endangered the inefficient import substitution industries of independent merchants and Marcos' cronies.46 Not wanting to alienate the powerful industrial elite, Aquino allowed economic reform to be repeatedly delayed.47 This lack of social and economic reform was consistent with premartial law patterns: land reform and economic liberalization were repeatedly thwarted by elite resistance. Aquino felt that large landowners and domestic industrialists had to be placated again if political democracy was to be successfully restored. Aquino's position on military bases also changed. Although she

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had at one point committed herself to removing the U.S. military bases in the Philippines, once in office, she assured the American government that the current treaty would be honored and that negotiations for a new one would begin. Had Aquino called for the immediate removal of the bases, opposition to her regime within the American government (which mounted because of her administration's talks with the communists) might have become tangible. (Gregg R. Jones reports that while Aquino was negotiating with the communists, the CIA prepared a contingency plan to support a coup against her.)48 Her strategy on the military installations and the breakoff of talks with the communists ensured solid U.S. support during a period of unstable democracy. After verbally supporting the government during earlier coup attempts, the United States directly intervened during the December 1989 putsch (American jets flew over Manila, grounding rebel planes), which proved decisive in the survival of the administration. By the time the Philippine Senate rejected the base-renewal treaty in 1991, Aquino no longer needed U.S. support to stay in power.49 The Aquino government's legitimacy, its support by the Ramosled military, its failure to carry out socioeconomic reforms, and its ties to the U.S. government enabled it to survive repeated coup attempts. But democratic consolidation required the decline of the armed threat from both military rebels and communist guerrillas.50 Although communist guerrillas were still capable of harassing government troops in the country's periphery at the end of Aquino's presidency, they had lost considerable territorial control while their armed strength declined from an estimated 25,800 fighters in 1988 to 13,500 in 1992.51 The communists, who had been a major force in the early 1980s, were now merely a military nuisance. Improved governmental tactics (particularly the redeployment of crack troops used to protect Marcos during the last years of his presidency) and arrests of several communist leaders because of improved intelligence contributed to the decrease in communist troops. The communist leadership wounded itself through hard-line military tactics, bloody purges, and splits between exiled leaders and Philippine-based commanders. In addition, the international decline of communism hurt the movement. But the fall of Marcos and the reestablishment of democracy were also crucial. Historian Alfred McCoy argues that the communists' gains were more the "product of a short-term protest against a particular regime [Marcos']" than the result of structural factors in Philippine society.52

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The fading of the communist threat was gradual, but dissidents within the military were defeated swiftly after the failed December 1989 coup. A series of arrests thinned the rebel leadership, while the coup's ferocity undercut support in the military for another such fratricidal undertaking. The last hurrah of military oppositionists, too weak to attack Aquino in Manila, was a minor rebellion in Mindanao in October 1990 that quickly collapsed.53 After Ramos' victory in the 1992 presidential election, the remaining rebels agreed to surrender in exchange for amnesty.54 Ramos seemed to have put the problem of military discontent behind him. Reestablishing the Electoral Rules

Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley argue that "elite convergence"—the acknowledgment of the "legitimacy of existing democratic institutions" and the promise to adhere to "democratic rules of the game"—is one way to achieve democratic consolidation.55 The 1992 elections in the Philippines demonstrated a consensus among the elites that balloting was the best way to compete for power. This consensus was in part prompted by the absence of viable alternatives, particularly after the defeat and surrender of most military rebels. But elections held during the Aquino administration had generated powerful incentives for democratic behavior. One of the apparent paradoxes of the Philippine democratization was that all major elite factions participated in the polls, even those who otherwise behaved disloyally. Under Aquino, elections returned to the competitive but less than high standards of premartial law balloting, allowing opposition politicians a fair chance to gain local, legislative, and even presidential power. Old-guard politicians dominated the polling, pushing aside upstarts on the Left. Free-flowing government patronage smoothed the way for frequent defections in a political landscape where parties remained weak. Each of the four elections that Aquino held chipped away another layer of disloyal opposition politicians. In the combined presidential, legislative, and local polls of 1992 the remaining holdouts among the elite democrats competed for office, with most of the losers accepting defeat. Although the 1987 legislative elections—as well as local polls in 1988 and 1989—were not free of fraud and violence, they were less manipulated and more peaceful than elections had been under Marcos. The 48 reported election-related killings in 1987, compared with

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the 348 reported deaths in the 1984 polls, seemed to mark a return to the pre-martial law levels of violence.56 Most important, there were no indications of military intimidation of the conservative opposition. Although one study declares that candidates in the Aquino administration employed some of the "flawed electoral arrangements" of the Marcos period, there is no evidence that Aquino had anything to do with this manipulation, suggesting that the fraud was carried out at lower levels of government.57 Elections had returned to the pre-martial law pattern of localized violence and decentralized cheating. Democratic standards were not followed strictly, but Aquino partisans had not gone too far. After the 1987 legislative elections, only a few thousand people answered the opposition's call, led by Enrile, for "people power, part II."58 The dominance of the traditional political elite in elections held during Aquino's presidency implies that the old style of politics was being restored. Of the 200 representatives elected in 1987,169 (nearly 85 percent) were classified as belonging to "traditional clans."59 Only 31 were not traditional politicians. The poor performance of the PnB also indicates that Philippine politics was returning to normal. The PnB, hoping to win 20 percent of the congressional seats and a couple of Senate slots, elected only two representatives, and its senatorial candidates finished even behind the discredited KBL. The death of nineteen of its campaign workers in the 1987 polls—nearly half the estimated election casualties—made the party's claim of persecution plausible.60 The PnB's defeat cannot be attributed simply to repression, however. Some local CPP commanders reportedly did not back the PnB candidate, preferring to sell "protection" to a richer, traditional candidate. The PnB was also unable to form an effective alliance with social democrats, reflecting continued sectarianism in the Philippine Left. But most important, the party was greatly outspent by its traditional rivals and largely ignored by the media. The thirtyfour self-proclaimed progressives elected to Congress in 1987 who were not members of PnB had been careful to use pro-Aquino party labels and employ old-style campaign techniques.61 The traditional character of the legislative elections left little room for PnB's "new politics." The pro-Aquino parties had used their access to government funds to build their financial resources for the election and encourage defections from the opposition. This free use of pork barrel indicated that corruption plagued the new administration, as it had the Marcos regime.62 But it was of a different type. Because of the dis-

178 • DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

tributive pressures of elections and the loose structure of the Aquino government, graft was less centralized and more often used for campaign purposes than it had been under Marcos. With ample patronage at hand, pro-Aquino parties revived the pre-martial law practice of tempting oppositionists to become turncoats. In 1987, twenty-four formerly pro-Marcos politicians won legislative seats in parties allied with the administration.63 In the January 1988 local elections, Aquino went so far as to endorse many of the governors and mayors she had once dismissed, including some warlords.64 The 1988 polls solved the problem created by Aquino's earlier purge of pro-Marcos local officials: those ousted by the government had a chance to regain office through competitive elections. All major elite factions were represented in the presidential race in May 1992. There were three pro-Aquino candidates: Ramos, with backing from the military and business communities; Speaker of the House Ramon Mitra, with the support of much of the House of Representatives; and former Senate President Jovito Salonga, with strong backing from the Senate and moderate leftist groups. The Marcos faction was also split, with Imelda Marcos and Eduardo Cojuangco both running. Laurel entered the contest, but Enrile, whose political base had evaporated, left the Senate to compete for a safe seat in the House. An independent candidate, Miriam DefensorSantiago, ran on a reformist platform. Despite all the turmoil of the Aquino years, the political elite competed peacefully to elect a successor. The chances that the results of the polls would be widely accepted at first appeared remote, however. The Supreme Court interpreted the constitution as calling for the holding of polls for all elected offices. On top of this logistical nightmare, the elimination of party-appointed electoral inspectors—which had disadvantaged independents in pre-martial law polls—led to a proliferation of candidates for every office. The pitfalls of the multiparty system that emerged could have been avoided by the establishment of a run-off system. As it was, the seven presidential candidates divided the vote, and Ramos won with less than a quarter of the total ballots cast (table 9.3). The counting of the ballots lasted more than a month, as complicated rules and inefficient administration slowed the process. Yet Ramos was proclaimed president by Congress without major incident, and almost all his political rivals accepted defeat gracefully (with only Defensor-Santiago protesting loudly about fraud). What had happened? Despite its many weaknesses, the voting

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION • 179

Table 9.3 Results of the 1992 Philippine presidential election Candidate

Percentage of the vote

Fidel V. Ramos Miriam Defensor-Santiago Eduardo Cojuangco Ramon Mitra Imelda Marcos Jovito Salonga Salvador Laurel

23.58 19.72 18.17 14.64 10.32 10.16 3.40

process was fair enough to be credible. After his victory, Ramos carefully courted his rivals, meeting each one individually and making deals where necessary. The success of this strategy was demonstrated in Congress. Ramos' Lakas-NUCD (National Union of Christian Democrats) placed only third in races in the Senate (winning just two of twenty-four seats) and the House (taking only forty-four of two hundred seats). But free-flowing government patronage bought enough defectors for pro-Ramos politicians to be elected Speaker of the House (Jose de Venecia, Jr.) and president of the Senate (Edgardo Angarra). The traditional ways of political accommodation had been revived.

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Conclusion

Philippine democratization belongs to a small group of transitions in which the move to democracy had a significant "revolutionary" component.1 In fact, the Philippine case resembles several revolutions and coups that led to another form of nondemocratic rule more closely than it resembles most other democratizations. Negotiated or pacted transitions, which are at the heart of the literature on democratization, have little relevance to the Philippines. The antiMarcos struggle consisted not of cooperation between regime softliners and opposition moderates to arrange an authoritarian withdrawal from power but of competition between moderate and radical oppositionists to overthrow an unyielding regime. The predominance of negotiated transitions is not mere coincidence, as "snowballing" (in which democratization in one country sets an example for others) suggests.2 Spain, and later Brazil, set a precedent that helped make pacted transition the most common "third-wave" path to democracy, used in such countries as Poland and Hungary.3 For authoritarian leaders who faced declining foreign and popular support, voluntarily withdrawing from power seemed preferable to being overthrown. Nondemocratic rulers saw that when dictators had surrendered authority before being forced to do so, the result was usually a smooth transition to democracy in which at least some interests of such state institutions as the military or the ruling party could be protected. Marcos ignored such lessons because he, his family, and cronies could profit only by staying in power. His rule allowed for no other independent actors or institutions that could peacefully arrange for 181

182 • CONCLUSION

redemocratization. He was thus trying to establish a dynastic regime by grooming his wife as his successor. With Marcos clinging to office, Filipino oppositionists found the example set by the institutionalized transitions of Southern Europe and Latin America largely irrelevant to their antidictatorship struggle. Instead, both moderate and radical oppositionists in the Philippines studied the overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua (while the Marcoses appeared to have been worried by the fall of the Shah of Iran).4 Only after the failure of their urban terrorism campaign in the early 1980s and the collapse of their alliance with the communists did the traditional opposition seek a peaceful way to bring down Marcos. The opposition was supported in this effort by elements in the U.S. government. But both the Philippine opposition and the anti-Marcos faction in the State Department concentrated less on replicating successful democratizations elsewhere than on avoiding a violent revolt like those in Iran and Nicaragua. The Philippines' democratic tradition made democracy after sultanism more likely than in Haiti, Iran, or Nicaragua, where previous democratic regimes had been much shorter or nonexistent. But it was not the clientelist basis of pre-martial law Philippine politics that was decisive. On the contrary, clientelism shows why most opposition politicians were demobilized with a minimum of force after the declaration of martial law: Marcos' traditional rivals began to jockey for his favor, which was the only way to gain access to the state treasury when elections were canceled. The revival of polls under authoritarianism in 1978 did not significantly change the situation, because opposition politicians had no real hope of winning power. Although turncoatism and campaign contributions to the opposition increased after the Aquino assassination, Marcos' political opponents were still greatly outspent, terrorized, and cheated in the 1984 legislative elections. Clientelist theory cannot explain why they triumphed in nearly a third of the parliamentary races and why Aquino defeated Marcos in the 1986 presidential election. David Wurfel has rightly said that the 1986 election arid its aftermath represented a "major breakdown in the patron-client system."5 The most important aspect of the Philippines' democratic tradition was the use of appeals for honest government and the preservation of democracy. They had become a standard part of the opposition's pre-martial law campaign repertoire and were particularly important in the campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Liberal senatorial hopefuls in 1971. Direct pleas to the voters based on

CONCLUSION • 183

the opposition's avowed commitment to democratic principles could help neutralize vote fraud, violence, and heavy government spending. After the opposition made various attempts to use appeals for democracy against Marcos during early martial law, the popular outrage following the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., in 1983 led to a breakthrough. Anti-Marcos politicians used this mass mobilization not to overthrow the regime violently, as had occurred in Nicaragua, for example, but to challenge it electorally, as some moderates wanted but were unable to do in Iran. Philippine opposition politicians—backed by the Catholic Church, opposition business leaders, and some U.S. officials—saw elections as a way both to defeat Marcos and outmaneuver the Left. Ethical entreaties once again enabled the opposition to offset the regime's material and coercive advantages. The presidential polls allowed the opposition to adopt a full-scale moral crusade modeled on Magsaysay's successful campaign against Quirino. Marcos had perfected all the dirty tricks devised during years of Philippine electioneering: vote buying, intimidation, disenfranchisement, and phony counts. Yet the campaign of Corazon C. Aquino so aroused the nation that Marcos had to manipulate the vote count crudely in order to claim victory. This was the final blow to the regime's credibility domestically and internationally. No one had intended Marcos to fall to the crowds led by Aquino. Yet her success was not merely luck. Aquino's moral victory in the election was a decisive asset. If RAM's military coup had succeeded, Enrile would probably have presided over a Haitian-style military junta. But because Aquino controlled the Manila crowds, the junta probably would have proved short-lived. If Marcos had crushed the coup, the communists might have had a chance to revolt. But in order for an urban revolt to succeed, the radical Left would probably have had to defer to Aquino. Only she enjoyed the support of the Catholic Church and the business opposition and could mobilize the populace. Aquino was the clear leader of the opposition. The victory of the "unarmed forces of the Philippines," as a popular T-shirt proclaimed after the people-power movement, did not make for an easy transition to democracy. Elections were held before the end of the transformation; the "revolutionary" aftermath of the February 1986 polls represented only the beginning of democratization. People power had not decisively settled who would rule and under what form of government, as negotiated transitions had done

184 • CONCLUSION

in other democratizations. Even in countries where fights over institutional prerogatives led to restlessness in the military (in several Latin America nations, for example), there has seldom been such an all-out struggle for power as there was between 1986 and 1989 in the Philippines. A necessary condition for Aquino's survival was her popular legitimacy, which deprived military rebels of mass support. This legitimacy was a continuance of the moral advantage that she had won during the presidential campaign. Even when Aquino's public standing declined because of her government's poor performance, the population considered the country's new democratic institutions highly legitimate. But legitimacy alone probably could not have saved Aquino if the military, the elite, and the United States had abandoned her. A compromise with professionals in the armed forces, assurances to the business elite and landowners, and tolerance of the presence of U.S. military bases enabled Aquino to fend off armed challenges. The defeat of the military rebels and the decline of the communists in the course of Aquino's presidency were indicators of growing stability. Another was the increasing acceptance by all major political factions of the democratic rules of the game, which culminated in the smooth succession from Aquino to Ramos, despite the latter's narrow margin of victory in the May 1992 presidential election. The Philippine political system had become democratic while falling well short of what most observers would consider good government. Continuing human rights violations by the Philippine military is undoubtedly the worst aspect of current politics in the country, although these violations appear to have lessened as the communist insurgency has declined.6 Such crimes committed in the midst of civil conflict by an otherwise democratic government are not exceptional, unfortunately. Another major flaw of democratic government in the Philippines is its coexistence with a highly oligarchic social structure. But democratization does not ensure social justice.7 Land reform and other socioeconomic reforms have been rejected by an elected Congress. Although social injustice has been a major cause of rebellion in the twentieth-century Philippines, polls show that government corruption and weak economic performance bother most Filipinos more than the paucity of government reforms.8 Despite this dissatisfaction, Filipinos, on the whole, have continued to support democratic institutions and politicians who act democratically. The failings of

CONCLUSION • 185

democracy in the Philippines should be distinguished from its successful consolidation. The removal of U.S. military bases in the Philippines in 1991 has probably contributed to democratic stability in the Philippines by eliminating an issue that was used to justify armed opposition by the radical Left (and by military dissidents, when their coup attempt was put down after American jets intervened). At a time when ties with the United States are becoming less important, the Philippine government has been trying to strengthen cooperation with the country's Southeast Asian neighbors. But as the Philippines becomes more consciously Southeast Asian, unfavorable comparisons are more likely to be drawn between its own poor economic performance and the "miracle" economies of most countries in the region. The Philippines has the "bad luck" of being a democracy with a stagnating economy in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes that have achieved rapid economic growth. Poor performance provides opportunities for nondemocratic political entrepreneurs. The speech of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to Manila business executives in December 1992, which many observers interpreted as a veiled call for a developmental dictatorship in the Philippines, won the support of 70 percent of Filipino executives polled at the conference.9 Earlier, Marcos had used the foreign exchange crisis of 1969-1970 (caused largely by his own electoral overspending) to help justify the declaration of martial law. But as in Portugal and Spain, where democratic transitions were also accompanied by initial economic difficulties, most Filipinos have not engaged in "system blame" for poor government performance. The economic failures of the Marcos dictatorship undoubtedly contributed to this tolerance. Political leadership has also been decisive. Unlike Marcos, who helped create a sense of crisis in order to put an end to democracy, Aquino's and thus far Ramos' commitment to democracy has been strong. Although at the mid-point of the Ramos presidency the Philippine economy is gradually improving, it has a long way to go to catch up with its booming neighbors.10 Whether a democratic Philippines can also achieve sustained development is the major question facing the country.

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Notes

Introduction 1. See Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, pp. 320-321; Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy," pp. 251-252; and Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 103-104. There were limits to democratic "snowballing" in Southeast Asia, however. Because of its poor record of economic growth, the Philippines did not prove an attractive political model for its neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On this point see Thompson, "The Limits of Democratisation," pp. 469-484. 2. Karl D. Jackson, "The Philippines: The Search for a Suitable Democratic Solution, 1946-1986," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, pp. 231-266, does not place the Philippine case in the broader literature on transitions. David Wurfel, "Transition to Political Democracy in the Philippines: 1978-1988," in Diane Ethier, ed., Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia (Hampshire, England: Macmillan Press, 1990), pp. 110-138, recognizes the difficulty of situating the country in the existing literature but does not offer an alternative theoretical conceptualization. 3. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 34. 4. Among these books are Marcos, Notes on the New Society; Marcos, Five Years of the New Society; Marcos, The Marcos Revolution; and Marcos, Progress and Martial Law. 5. Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 19731980," in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 6. Charles G. Gillespie, "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 181-182. 187

188 • NOTES TO PAGES 3-10

7. Rolando V. del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, pp. 92-100. 8. Rush, "Cory Constitution," p. 5. 9. Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, p. 59. 10. Hawes, Philippine State, p. 45. 11. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 33; and David Collier, "Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," in Collier, Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp. 19-32. 12. Juan J. Linz, "Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime," in Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions, pp. 191-192. 13. Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Polsby and Greenstein, Handbook of Political Science, p. 259. For Weber's definition of "sultanism" as an extreme form of patrimonialism, see his Economy and Society, pp. 231-232. In a forthcoming edited volume on sultanism, Juan J. Linz and H. E. Chehabi argue that although Weber's use of the term with the Ottoman sultan in mind was inaccurate, the conceptual value of the term remains. The Ottoman empire "was a highly institutionalized polity in which the ruler did most often not enjoy the type of discretion that Weber ascribed to him. Weber's misinterpretation of the Islamic world does not diminish the value of the conceptualization: it merely means that the concept's name-giving polity is not an empirical referent for it. The term has now acquired a life of its own, independent of its etymology, which has persuaded the editors to retain it in the interest of cumulativeness in the social science, and in spite of its eurocentric flavor." 14. Aquino, Politics of Plunder, p. 73. 15. On types of regimes see Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes." On the influence of regime form on opposition see Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions. 16. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution, p. 12. 17. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail"; Farhi, "State Disintegration"; and Manus I. Midlarsky and Kenneth Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution." An excellent summary and critique of these arguments is Snyder, "Explaining Transitions." 18. Snyder, "Explaining Transitions," pp. 380-383, 387-390. 19. In addition, the patrimonialization of the military in Cuba by Batista and in Nicaragua by Somoza led to coup attempts by military dissidents. See Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, pp. 171 -172; and Booth, End and the Beginning, pp. 165-166. 20. There was little distinct labor opposition to Marcos, with major unions either pro-communist or collaborating with the regime. See Thompson, "Labor Movement Opposition." 21. Democratization in the Dominican Republic followed a postsultanistic authoritarian interlude, an interrupted democratic transition, a brief civil war, and a period of controlled democracy. Nicaragua was ruled by the Sandinistas for nearly eleven years before free elections led to a transition to democracy. A number of unstable military governments ruled Haiti after the fall of Duvalier until competitive polls led to the election of a civilian president in late 1990. 22. For an expression of this view see Barry Rubin, Modern Dictators (New York: New American Library, 1987), p. 79.

NOTES TO PAGES 15-20 • 189

Chapter 1: Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politics 1. Curry, "Philippine Electoral Politics," pp. 230. 2. Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties. Other important works on clientelism in Philippine politics are Hollnsteiner, Dynamics of Power; Ando, "Voting Patterns"; and Nowak and Snyder, "Clientelist Politics." Although clientelism was not widely researched during Marcos' dictatorship, the restoration of democratic institutions during Aquino's administration led to a number of new studies in the old paradigm: Lande and Cigler, "Social Cleavage"; Kimura, "Revolution and Realignment"; and Kimura, "Elections and Politics Philippine Style." 3. Editorial, "Last Clear Chance," Philippines Free Press, November 10,1951, p. 8. 4. Anomalies and normal science are discussed in Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 5. Ruby R. Paredes, "The Origins of National Politics: Taft and the Partido Federal," in Paredes, Philippine Colonial Democracy, pp. 41-66. 6. Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 243-245. 7. Alfred McCoy, "Quezon's Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianism," in Paredes, Philippine Colonial Democracy, pp. 121-122. 8. Quoted in McCoy, "Quezon's Commonwealth," p. 147. 9. After the war, the Partido Nacionalista had anglicized its name somewhat to the Nacionalista Party.

10. Kerkvliet,Huk Rebellion, pp. 138-155.

11. Manuel A. Caoili, "The Philippine Congress and Political Order," in Velasco and Mahiwo, Philippine Legislature Reader, p. 12. 12. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 101-102. 13. Ramon Magsaysay, a Nacionalista, switched to the Liberals and became their presidential candidate in 1953. Ferdinand E. Marcos, a Liberal, changed to the Nacionalistas to run for president in 1965. 14. This view is usefully summarized by K. G. Machado, "Continuity and Change in Philippine Factionalism," in Belloni and Beller, Faction Politics, pp. 193-217. 15. These remarks were reported by journalist Celso Cabrera, who eavesdropped on a Liberal Party meeting. For an account of the incident see Quirino, Apo Lakay, pp. 119-120. In a pun on the country's Catholic faith and political corruption, Manila mayor Arsenio Lacson once described government philosophy in the Philippines as "Let us prey." 16. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 86. 17. In 1948, when President Quirino came to power, the amount the president could transfer was 50 percent, but in 1952 it was reduced to 25 percent. It was raised to 30 percent during the administration of Diosdado Macapagal and was 25 percent during the Marcos years. See Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 87. 18. Howard M. Leichter's Political Regime and Public Policy is a careful study of two cities, one of which (Bacolod) retained traditional landlord-dominated politics while the other (Iloilo) developed machine-style politics. Kit Machado, one of the leading advocates of the transformation-of-clientelism argument, shows in "Continuity and Change in Philippine Factionalism," in Belloni and

190 • NOTES TO PAGES 20-25

Seller, Faction Politics, that although politics changed in Batangas province, it did not undergo much alteration in Capiz province. 19. Doronila, "Transformation of Patron-Client Relations," pp. 106-107. 20. Kunio, Rise of Ersatz Capitalism, chap. 5. 21. Curry, "Philippine Electoral Politics," pp. 228, 230. 22. Meadows, "Philippine Political Parties," pp. 265-270; and Quirino, Amang,pp. 182,188. 23. Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, p. 6. 24. Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Linz and Stepan, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, pp. 31-32. 25. Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Our Political and Civil Rights," in Abueva and De Guzman, Filipino Government and Politics, pp. 68-75. 26. David A. Rosenberg, "Liberty versus Loyalty: The Transformation of Philippine News Media under Martial Law," in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, pp. 149-150. 27. There were 24 senators and 104 members of the Philippine House of Representatives (in 1970). Manuel A. Coili, "The Philippine Congress and the Political Order," in Velasco and Mahiwo, Philippine Legislature, p. 8. 28. E. R. Kiunisala, "Illegal Spending and Partisanship in Elections," in Abueva and De Guzman, Filipino Government and Politics, pp. 76-78. 29. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 98. 30. Kiunisala, "Illegal Spending and Partisanship," pp. 76, 78. 31. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 89. 32. De Dios, Philippine Economic Crisis, p. 11. 33. Averch, Koehler, and Denton, Matrix of Policy, pp. 97-107. 34. Mojares, Man Who Would Be President, p. 155. 35. Nicasio Tumular, "A Lesson in Suffrage: The Old List, the New List and the 1949 Election," Philippines Free Press, November 4, 1949, p. 7, cited in Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 8,20 n. 3. 36. Blake Clare, "Are the Philippines Going the Way of China?" Readers Digest, June 1950, p. 33, cited in Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. 70. 37. Cited in Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, p. 140. 38. Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 1417. 39. Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. 70. 40. Robert E. Baldwin, Foreign Trade Regimes, p. 21. 41. Report of Daniel W. Bell to Truman, cited in Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. 82. 42. Kerkvliet, Huk Rebellion, p. 237; and Shalom, United States and the Philippines, pp. 71, 86-87. 43. Cited in Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, p. 168 n. 20. 44. Editorial, "Last Clear Chance," Philippines Free Press, November 10, 1951, p. 8. 45. One eager insurrectionary was the young Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.: "After the cheating of Laurel, I was running guns. It was up to the mountains for us, we were set for rebellion. We were boiling mad over the worst fraud in Philippine politics, the darkest polls in our history. But the night we were to take off, Laurel

NOTES TO PAGES 25-30 • 1 9 1

aborted the whole plan. It was the re volution- that-never-was of 1949." Quoted in Joaquin, Aquinos ofTarlac, p. 195. 46. Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, pp. 101-102. 47. Documents that the Philippine military captured from the Huks in 1952 contained names of the leaders of the Nacionalista Party, which suggests that political consultation took place between the insurgents and opposition politicians. See Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines (Quezon City: Phoenix Press, 1958), p. 103. 48. Teodoro M. Locsin, "Judgment Day," Philippines Free Press, November 10, 1951, p. 3. 49. Mojares, Man Who Would Be President, p. 155. 50. 1954 Commission on Elections Report, p. 11, cited in Carbonell-Catilo et. al., Manipulated Elections, p. 25. 51. Abueva, Focus on the Barrio, pp. 100-102. 52. Shalom, United States and the Philippines, pp. 86-87. 53. See, for example, Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism, pp. 225-226; and Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines. 54. Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. xiv. 55. Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 353, 363; Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 39. 56. For 1946 see Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. 28; for 1953 see Karnow, In Our Image, p. 353. In 1965 the United States stayed neutral at the request of military officers favoring challenger Ferdinand Marcos: see Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 43. This action was not only a "loss of the mandate from heaven" for incumbent Diosdado Macapagal, who was the American choice in 1961, but also a signal to the Philippine military not to act in Macapagal's favor. 57. Bonner Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 41) describes the U.S. government's coordination of the American press in 1953. 58. Quoted in Starner, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry, p. 49. 59. Ibid., p. 27. 60. Quirino, Amang, chap. 11. 61. Quoted in Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, p. 248. 62. Ibid., p. 255. 63. Starner, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry, pp. 97-99. 64. Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, pp. 254, 270. 65. On the MPM, see Doronila, "Transformation of Patron-Client Relations," p. 108; on the Nacionalistas' reaction, see Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, p. 260. 66. On the pro-Magsaysay bent of the Catholic Church, see Teodoro M. Locsin, "D-Day: Now or Never for Philippine Democracy," Philippines Free Press, November 7,1953, p. 3. Abueva (Magsaysay, pp. 260—263) discusses the partisanship of both the church and NAMFREL. 67. Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay, pp. 265-266. 68. Shalom, United States and the Philippines, p. 92. 69. Coquia, Philippine Presidential Election, pp. 233-237. 70. Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties, p. 54. 71. Ibid. 72. Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 139.

192 • NOTES TO PAGES 30-36

73. Alexander B. Callow, Jr., "The Crusade against the Tweed Ring," in Callow, City Boss in America, p. 21. 74. From a speech by Recto delivered at the Far Eastern University in Manila. Quoted in Teodoro M. Locsin, "Judgment Day/' Philippines Free Press, November 10,1951, p. 3. 75. Sergio Osmefia, Jr., was on a self-proclaimed crusade to "save democracy" when he ran for Governor of Cebu in 1951. See Mojares, Man Who Would Be President, chap. 1. 76. Senator Jose Roy quoted in Edward Kiunisala, "What Will the NPs Do Now?—II," Philippines Free Press, November 27, 1971, p. 61. 77. Averch, Koehler, and Denton, Matrix of Policy, pp. 32-33. 78. Ileto defines these terms in Pasyon and Revolution. 79. Filemon V. Tutay, "Moises S. Padilla: Martyr-Hero of 1951," Philippines Free Press, December 1, 1951, pp. 6-7, 55. 80. Shantz, "Political Parties," p. 98. 81. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "Critique of the Rand Study," pp. 491-492. 82. Paraphrased from Edward R. Kiunisala, "Campaigning with the LP," Philippines Free Press, October 23,1971, p. 50. Chapter 2: The Collapse of Philippine Democracy An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Thompson, "Opposition in the Philippines." 1. Nowak and Snyder, "Clientelist Politics." 2. Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict, p. 143; Stauffer, Philippine Congress, p. 32. 3. Doronila, "Transformation of Patron-Client Relations," pp. 111-113. Wurfel (Filipino Politics, p. 88) points out that Marcos not only handed out more pork barrel than his predecessors but also was often able to bypass members of Congress through a PI00 "barrio contingency fund," thus lessening his vulnerability to political defections by key ruling-party legislators. 4. Petronilo Bn. Daroy, "On the Eve of Dictatorship and Revolution," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, p. 9. 5. Napoleon G. Rama, "The Election Campaign in Review," Philippines Free Press, November 15, 1969, p. 4. 6. Shantz, "Political Parties," pp. 151-162. 7. Baldwin, Foreign Trade Regimes, pp. 21, 72-78. 8. Berlin, "Prelude to Martial Law." 9. One such special force, called the Monkees, terrorized not only suspected Huk guerrillas (inevitably dubbed Beatles by-the popular-culture-conscious Philippine press) but also politicians and landlords accused of "coddling" the communists. See Lachica, Huk, chap. 13. 10. Aquino, Garrison State, p. 20. 11. According to Philippine Constabulary figures, forty-seven people were killed and fifty-eight injured during the 1969 campaign. Reported in Filemon V. Tutay, "A 'Peaceful' Election," Philippines Free Press, November 22,1969, p. 10. 12. Commission on Elections, Report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the Philippines and the Congress on the Manner the Election held on

NOTES TO PAGES 36-40 • 193

November 11, 1969 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1971), pp. 13-15, 49-52. On Raval, see Berlin, "Prelude to Martial Law," p. 188. 13. Berlin, "Prelude to Martial Law," pp. 200-201. 14. Rolando V. del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, p. 89. 15. Editorial, "Post-Election Tensions," Philippines Free Press, December 20, 1969, p. 5. 16. Napoleon G. Rama, "The Future of the Opposition," Philippines Free Press, November 22, 1969, pp. 4, 67. Emphasis added. 17. Manuel F. Almario, "A Vicious Circle—The 1971 Polls," Graphic, November 24, 1971, p. 5. 18. Editorial, "Post-Election Tensions," p. 5. 19. A good account of the First Quarter Storm is Lacaba, Days of Disquiet. 20. Mojares, Man Who Would Be President, p. 147. 21. Marcos, Progress and Martial Law, pp. 14-15. In a number of diary entries from January to April 1970, Marcos reveals that his knowledge of such plans came from a spy in the inner circle of the opposition. My interviews with oppositionists confirmed this espionage. 22. I interviewed Jesus Terry Adevoso, whose father, Eleuterio Adevoso, led the "Workshop" group that was set up during Osmeria's presidential campaign and continued meeting after its defeat. He recalls that his father saw "no alternative to armed conflict" with Marcos. Though pro-American and politically conservative, the elder Adevoso, needing allies, read Si son's book Philippine Society and Revolution and traveled to several communist countries. 23. Lachica (Huk, p. 182) reports that the Young Turks of the Liberal Party met with "one of the China scholars" who, it is clear from the context, was Sison. 24. Interview with Salvador Araneta in Oranato, Salvador Araneta, p. 30. 25. Father Romeo Intengan, S J. (a former Hasik Kalayaan [Sowing Freedom] leader), interview by author. 26. Aquino, Black Friday, p. 38. 27. Barican, interview by author. 28. Pineda-Ofreneo, Manipulated Press, chap. 5. 29. The Philippines Free Press ran several articles on the dispute between the Jacinto's Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc., and the Marcos administration: Teodoro M. Locsin, "The Necessity for Industrialization and the Role of Steel, February 27, 1971; Don Fernando Jacinto, "The Iligan Integrated Steel Mills Case," March 6,1971; Edward R. Kiunisala, "What Happened to Our Money in IISMI," parts I and II, March 13,1971 and March 20,1971; Edward R. Kiunisala, "The Pi-Billion IISMI Case," August 5, 1972. 30. "Political War—and Martial Law," Philippines Free Press, January 23, 1971, p. 3. 31. Napoleon G. Rama, "Where the Demos Went Wrong," Philippines Free Press, March 14,1970, p. 4. 32. Lachica, Huk, chap. 12. 33. Aquino originally contacted the guerrillas through his older stepbrother, who had World War II guerrilla connections and set up a meeting between Aquino, then a newspaper reporter, and Huk Supremo Luis Taruc. Aquino helped arrange Taruc s surrender to the government in 1954. As mayor and later gover-

194 • NOTES TO PAGES 40-42

nor, Aquino, by his own admission, was in contact with remaining members of the Huks. See Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Man of the Year in 1973," Philippines Free Press, January 8, 1972, pp. 2,47; and Burton, Impossible Dream, pp. 52, 66-67. 34. See note 9. 35. Lucy Komisar (Corazon Aquino, pp. 35-36) interviewed former Huk Luis Taruc on November 13, 1986. Also see Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 27-30 (Jones interviewed several communist leaders) and Lachica, Huk, pp. 165-166. 36. Lachica, Huk, p. 165. 37. See note 35. 38. Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 27-30. 39. Enrique C. Dimacali, "Leader of a Troubled Province," Examiner, January 22,1972, p. 5. 40. Jose F. Lacaba, "Have Gun, Will Run for Office," Philippines Free Press, October 18, 1969, p. 68. 41. Michael Duenas, "Showdown in Ilocos Sur," Philippines Free Press, April 29, 1972, p. 36. 42. Quoted in Locsin, "Man of the Year," p. 2. 43. The Liberal governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam, was forced to yield to a pro-Marcos Nacionalista candidate in 1967. Political tensions rose further when Marcos-backed Colonel Carlos Cajelo used a paramilitary group to defeat the Matalams' candidate for governor in 1971. In Lanao del Sur, the Alonto and Lucman families' long political domination of the province was challenged by the Marcos-supported Dimaporo clan, which attempted to expand outside its traditional bailiwick, Lanao del Norte. Macacuna Dimaporo defeated Domocao Alonto in the race for governor of Lanao del Sur in 1967 and then ran for congress in 1969, beating incumbent Raschid Lucman. 44. Jabidah, the name of a ravishing woman in Muslim folklore, was the code name given to the secret Philippine military operation, reportedly aimed at carrying out Philippine territorial claims on the Malaysian province of Sabah. George, Revolt in Mindanao, pp. 122-123. 45. Aquino delivered a privilege speech, "Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil?" on March 28, 1968. Abul Khayr Alonto discussed Aquino, Lucman, and the student activists' role in the Jabidah affair in an interview with the author. 46. Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," p. 411. 47. Matalam claimed to have returned the gift "lest his followers think he was 'bought for a mere watch.'" George, Revolt in Minadanao, p. 136. 48. These newly established secessionist organizations also received substantial foreign assistance. Afraid the paramilitary force revealed by the Jabidah massacre was being trained to carry out Marcos' plans to seize the Malaysian province of Sabah (a territory the Philippines had claimed), the Malaysian government began training Muslim youth activists connected with the MIM in 1969. The Libyans and later the Saudis contributed substantially to the Muslim rebels because they believed that Filipino Muslims were being persecuted by the Christian government. Nelly Sindayen, "Start of MNLF in South Recalled," Bulletin Today, October 12, 1980, pp. 1, 18; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, pp. 139-142; Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," pp. 409-411. 49. The intensification of Christian migration to Muslim areas between 1948 and 1960 was the greatest source of communal tension (George, Revolt in Minda-

NOTES TO PAGES 42-46 • 195

nao, pp. 91-94). Yet this does not explain the timing of Muslim secessionism. Why did it break out in the 1970s and not the 1950s, when Christian immigration as well as banditry and insensitivity of the schools was greatest? Much of the bloodshed was related to Muslim politicians who, in alliance with Aquino, were trying to check Marcos' violent electoral tactics by increasing the opposition's coercive resources. 50. Filemon V. Tutay, "Bloodiest Election Yet," Philippines Free Press, November 20, 1971, p. 4. 51. In 1971 the Liberals won governorships in Lanao del Sur, Isabela, and Ilocos Sur. In 1967 they were victorious only in Cotabato. 52. A treasure hunter had found a Buddha that he believed was part of the fabled " Yamashita's gold" buried by a Japanese commander during World War II. After Marcos' mother offered to buy the object and was turned down, the government confiscated the "Golden Buddha" in a police raid. The raid was approved by a judge who was Marcos' brother-in-law. 53. Seagrave, Marcos Dynasty, p. 222. 54. Michael Duenas, "What Will the NPs Do Now?—Ill," Philippines Free Press, November 27, 1971, p. 6. 55. Edward R. Kiunisala, "What Will the NPs Do Now?—II" Philippines Free Press, November 27, 1971, p. 4. 56. Edward R. Kiunisala, "Moment of Truth," Philippines Free Press, November 13,1971, p. 2; Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Why the Liberals Won," Philippines Free Press, November 20, 1971, p. 7. 57. Duenas, "What Will the NPs Do Now?" pp. 6, 58. 58. Evidence indicates that Marcos may have been telling the truth. In 1987 Victor Corpus, the Philippine military officer who defected to the NPA, claimed, based on information he gathered as a party leader, that the communists were in fact responsible for the bombing, which they (correctly) predicted would further polarize traditional politics in the country. Gregg Jones makes a persuasive case that Corpus' account is accurate. See Jones, Red Revolution, chap. 5. 59. Quoted in H. C. Molina, "Remember Plaza Miranda!" Philippines Free Press, September 2, 1972, p. 42. 60. Mojares, Man Who Would Be President, p. 147. 61. The convention had been initiated by oppositionists who originally favored a parliamentary system to reform the country's politics. But when Marcos seized on the idea to stay in power, the opposition turned against it. 62. Edward R. Kiunisala, "Dissolve Con-Con?" Philippines Free Press, May 27,1972; Teodoro M. Locsin," Who'sLy ing ?"P/zi/fppmes Free Press, June 10,1972; E. P. Patanne, "Aftershocks of the Con-Con Bomba," Asia-Philippines Leader, June 9, 1972. Marcos' victory was incomplete, however, because the convention dragged on, meaning that the new constitution might not have been ratified before the end of Marcos' second term. 63. Quirino, Apo Lakay, p. 120. 64. The only contested issue among the people I interviewed was whether the Lopezes had been involved. In an interview, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., said that there was an assassination plot but that he and his family were not involved. Sergio Osmefia III (the son of Sergio Osmefia, Jr.), John Osmefia (the nephew of Sergio Osmefia, Jr.), and Renato Tanada (a prominent opponent of Marcos and son of

196 • NOTES TO PAGES 46-52

former Senator Lorenzo Tanada) all confirmed the existence of the plot in interviews with the author. There were some hints of Lopez involvement, but only one source, not for attribution, confirmed it. 65. The eight attempts are discussed in detail in Marcos, Progress and Martial Law, pp. 16-17. 66. Raymond Bonner cites Philippine and American intelligence officials who claimed that Marcos organized demonstrations, including several in front of the U.S. embassy (Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 125). Alex Bello Brillantes interviewed two high-ranking aides to Marcos who claimed that the president funded student protests (Brillantes, Dictatorship and Martial Law, p. 49). Former Marcos spokesman Adrian Cristobal told Sandra Burton that both Marcos and the opposition financed youth protest rallies (Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 76). 67. Cited in Friend, "What Marcos Doesn't Say," p. 103. 68. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 116-119, 242. 69. Brillantes, Dictatorship and Martial Law, pp. 37-47. 70. Cited in Canoy, Counterfeit Revolution, p. 23. 71. Quoted in Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Who Helped the Huks?" Philippines Free Press, October 2, 1971, p. 47. 72. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 18. 73. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 82. Chapter 3: Sultanistic Rule 1. Marcos later claimed that martial rule began on September 21, perhaps because it is a multiple of his lucky number, seven, or because he wanted to convince insufficiently cautious historians that Congress was still allowed to meet on the date that "constitutional authoritarianism" began. 2. Walters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict, pp. 216-219. 3. Shaplen, Turning Wheel, pp. 220-221. 4. This account draws on Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Polsby and Greenstein, Handbook of Political Science, pp. 175-411. 5. Ibid., p. 260. 6. The Shah, for example, called himself Aryamehr (light of the Aryans), and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic gave himself the labels generaltsimo and benefactor de la patria. Geographic traces of this megalomania are also often apparent. In Zaire, Lake Albert was renamed Mobutu Sese Seko, and in Nicaragua a new port was called Puerto Somoza. The Somoza clan passed power down for two generations and between brothers. The Shah was preparing a dynastic succession, as he had succeeded his father. 7. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime," p. 428. 8. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 259. 9. Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship. 10. A number of sources discuss the First Lady's growing role in government. Her activities during the late authoritarian period are best summarized in Pedrosa, Imelda Marcos, and Ellison, Imelda. 11. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 260. 12. The estimate was made by former Senator Jovito R. Salonga, then head

NOTES TO PAGES 52-56 • 197

of the Philippine Commission on Good Government. Quoted in Russell Watson et al., "Hard Up in Hawaii/' Newsweek, March 31,1986, p. 25. 13. Rigoberto Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, p. 41. 14. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 241. 15. Ellison, Imelda, p. 144. 16. Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship, pp. 206-207, 219. 17. "Some Are Smarter than Others," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and KalawTirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 404-405. 18. De Dios, Philippine Economic Crisis, p. 86. 19. Tiglao, "Consolidation of the Dictatorship," p. 47. 20. Hawes, Philippine State, p. 76. 21. Bello, Kinley, and Elinson, Development Debacle, p. 187. 22. Cuenca, Disini, Silverio, Campos, Cruz, and Floirendo are discussed in Aquino, Politics of Plunder, pp. 39-50. 23. John Crewdson et al., "Marcos Graft Staggers," Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1986, cited in Aquino, Politics of Plunder, pp. 47-48. 24. Makil, Mobility by Decree, cited in Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 236-237. 25. Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," pp. 569-586. 26. See Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship, p. 60, citing General Order No. 11, dated September 30, 1972, on pay increases; see Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, p. 24, on the other plums given the armed forces. 27. Alfred W. McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution: Filipino Elite Factions and the Struggle for Power," in Krinks, Philippines under Aquino, p. 22. 28. Carl H. Lande, "The Political Crisis," in Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 136. There has been no systematic sociological study of the military during the dictatorship, and the popular thesis that Marcos disproportionately promoted his fellow Illocanos or "integrees" (those officers integrated into the military through reserve officer training courses, not graduation from a military academy) has never been proved. There is even some evidence to the contrary. See Felipe Miranda, "The Military," in May and Nemenzo, Philippines after Marcos, pp. 108-109 n. 6. Marcos promoted military officers based less on seniority or competence than on allegiance to him, regardless of their ethnic or educational background. 29. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, pp. 108-109. 30. Lande, "Political Crisis," p. 137. 31. On Marcos' power of dismissal see Rolando del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, pp. 99,108-109; on military courts see Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 107. 32. Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship, pp. 418-419. 33. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 165. Highly respected before martial law, the court's credibility sank further when justices were caught improving the bar examination scores of their children and friends. 34. The best statement of this thesis is Broad, Unequal Alliance. A good critique of Broad is Hutchcroft, "Oligarchs and Cronies," pp. 429-434. 35. Thompson and Slayton, "Credit Arrangements," pp. 59-81. 36. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 241.

198 • NOTES TO PAGES 56-61

37. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 260. 38. Robert Shaplen, "A Reporter at Large—From Marcos to Aquino—I," New Yorker, August 25, 1986, p. 64. 39. Paul E. Sigmund, "Chile," in Wiarda and Kline, Latin American Politics, pp. 211-218. 40. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 4. 41. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 156163. 42. Marcos, Today's Revolution. 43. Stauffer, "Philippine Corporatism," pp. 393-407. 44. Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship, p. 188. 45. Putzel, Captive Land. Also see Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 165-176; Agrarian Reform Institute Advisory Council, The Agrarian Reform Program: A Decade after P.D. 2 and 27 (Los Bafios, Philippines: Agrarian Reform Institute Advisory Council, 1983); Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "Land Reform: Emancipation or Counterinsurgency?" in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, pp. 113-144. 46. Tiglao, "Consolidation of the Dictatorship," pp. 30-31; Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 166. 47. On the Trade Union Conference of the Philippines see King, "Confused State," pp. 86-87. On local government see Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 138-139. 48. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Mission, p. 6. 49. Gregorio Brillantes, "More Than a Martyr of the Bourgeoise: Ninoy and the Left—3," National Midweek, September 24, 1986, p. 10. 50. Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Who Helped the Huks?" Philippines Free Press, October 1971, p. 2. 51. "This Week, Philippines," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 9,1979, p. 7. Marcos' accusation is recounted in Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 132. 52. Quoted in Policarpio, Ninoy, pp. 131, 133. 53. Crisol, Armed Forces, pp. 18-19. 54. In interviews, Augusto Almeda-Lopez and Lorenzo Tariada III—employees and close associates of Eugenio Lopez, Jr.—told me of their group, Freedom Fighters of the Philippines. Teofisto Guingona said in an interview on April 14, 1989, that he and Jaime Ferrer, a former Commission on Elections chairman and World War II guerrilla hero, organized another small armed force. 55. Fox Butterfield, "Once Powerful Families in the Philippines Lose Heavily under Government Pressure," New York Times, January 18, 1978. 56. Aquino, Politics of Plunder, pp. 37-38. The Lopezes were paid fifteen hundred dollars for their holding company, which was worth nearly a half billion dollars. 57. Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship, p. 191. 58. Butterfield, "Once Powerful Families." 59. However, documents that the imprisoned Aquino mailed to foreign reporters led him to be put in solitary confinement for several months. 60. Another is that of former Senate President Gil Puyat, who was quite critical of Marcos before martial law but largely silent during it. 61. Rodrigo, "Mga Bakas ng Kahapon," p. 167. 62. "The Liberal Party: A Brief History, 1945-1986," manuscript, n.d.

NOTES TO PAGES 61-68 • 199

63. Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," pp. 405-412. 64. Robert Stauffer, "The Politics of Becoming: The Mindanao Conflict in the World System," manuscript, 1980. 65. Tiglao, "Consolidation of the Dictatorship," pp. 67-68. 66. Ibid., p. 68. 67. Lela Garner Noble, "The Philippines Autonomy for the Muslims," in Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 120. Also see Che Man, Muslim Separatism, pp. 155-156. 68. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, pp. 84, 155; Majul, Contemporary Muslim Movement, pp. 90-91. 69. Malloy, "Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front," pp. 59-76. Chapter 4: The Form of Democracy 1. Marcos found an avid defender in Beth Day, an American journalist who later married Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo. Her book Shattered Showcase of Democracy tries to rebut a common perception of martial law. 2. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, chap. 6. 3. Bello and Rivera, Logistics of Repression, p. 8. 4. Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Sachs and Collins, Developing Country Debt, pp. 412-418, 506-507. 5. Quoted in Roland Del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, p. 87. 6. Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 58-60. 7. Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, Mga Tula at Tilamsik ng Diwa (Poems and Sparks of the Spirit) (n.p., 1985), pp. 1-57. 8. Rodrigo, "Pasyon at Kamatayan ng Ating Kalayaan," in Mga Tula at Tilamsik ng Diwa, stanzas 56 and 62. 9. Much of this section is drawn from Shain and Thompson," Role of Political Exiles." There were several kinds of exiles during martial law: Filipino Muslims in Sabah, Malaysia, and the Middle East; radical expatriates in Europe and the United States who were close to—or members of—the communist National Democratic Front (NDF); social democratic activists in Europe; and former politicians residing primarily in the United States. The last group is the focus here. 10. After Aquino's assassination in 1983, the Ninoy Aquino Movement, made up of people who followed Aquino while he was in the United States, was also an important group of exiles. 11. MFP member Gaston Ortigas, interview. 12. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., interview. 13. Psinakis, Two "Terrorists" Meet, pp. 149-159. 14. Alexander Esclamado had been an employee of Lopez' Manila Chronicle and was sent to the United States in 1959 to start a U.S. edition of the newspaper. Instead, Esclamado decided to found his own newspaper, the Philippine News, with the Lopez' blessing. Although he lived in the United States, Esclamado retained close ties to Lopez, traveling frequently to the Philippines to do such things as public relations work for Lopez' extravagant fortieth wedding anniver-

200 • NOTES TO PAGES 68-72

sary in 1969, best known for its fountain of flowing champagne. Esclamado, interview, September 9, 1989. 15. Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 57. 16. Manglapus describes his propaganda work in Pen for Democracy. 17. Jack Anderson, "Marcos Bribe Offer Cited by Witness/' Washington Post, July 2, 1975. Cited in Psinakis, Two "Terrorists' Meet, pp. 180-181. 18. Quoted in Fred Poole and Max Vanzi, "Marcos's Secret War in America," The Nation, May 12, 1984, pp. 577-578. 19. A number of interviews have led me to this conclusion, which is shared by Sterling Seagrave. See Seagrave, Marcos Dynasty, p. 274. 20. Poole and Vanzi, "Marcos's Secret War"; Poole and Vanzi, Revolution in the Philippines, chap. 13. 21. Cherie M. Querol, "View from San Francisco: Who Is Alex Esclamado?" Mr. and Ms., April 21, 1987, p. 27; Esclamado, interviews, September 9 and 10, 1989. 22. Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 57. 23. Del Carmen, in "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," p. 87, argues that the declaration of martial law was in accordance with constitutional provisions. 24. Francisco Rodrigo, interview, February 5, 1987. Also active in the campaign against the new constitution were Eduardo Olaguer, whom I interviewed on March 11,1987, and Charito Planas, interviewed on February 6, 1987. 25. Ferdinand Marcos, "Address to the Nation on the First Anniversary of Martial Law," September 21,1973, cited in Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 118. For an analysis of barangay democracy see Belinda A. Aquino, "The Philippine Barangays as Instruments of Central Control," in Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Asian Studies (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1982), pp. 365-374. 26. Mijares, Conjugal Dictatorship, p. 420. Mijares claims that he was part of a committee that manufactured the vote in the referendum. 27. Del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," pp. 90-100. 28. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 119-122. 29. Sixto K. Roxas III, quoted in the Philippine Daily Express, October 4, 1976. 30. Macapagal formed the Interim National Assembly Association, whose activities are documented in Macapagal et al., Road Back to Democracy. 31. Planas, interview; Rogaciano Mercado, interview, March 2,1987; and an interview with a former communist party member active in these events. 32. The BMP led most of the 13 strikes reported in 1975,305 strikes reported in 1976, and 146 strikes reported in 1977. See Santiago, "Strike Situation," p. 34. 33. From my interview in May 1987 with a former Manila-Rizal CPP member who requested anonymity. Gregg R. Jones reaches a similar conclusion in Red Revolution, pp. 113-114. 34. Rocamora, "Preparing for the Revolution," p. 9. 35. Macapagal et al., Road Back to Democracy, p. 40.1 discussed this and other points in interviews with Macapagal, October 20,1986, and with an ally of his, Abraham Sarmiento, October 31,1986.

NOTES TO PAGES 72-75 • 201

36. David A. Andelman, "Marcos Opponents Active in Philippines," New York Times, October 3, 1976. 37. Butler, Humphrey, and Bisson, Decline of Democracy, p. 32. 38. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Mission, p. 6. 39. Rigoberto Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, p. 60. 40. Giordano, Awakening to Mission, pp. 33-34. 41. Diokno also headed the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, whose State of the Nation was one of the strongest public condemnations of Marcos. 42. Youngblood, Marcos against the Church, pp. 140 (quotation), 151-162. 43. Salonga and De la Costa, Message of Hope. 44. Jose Veloso Abueva, "Ideology and Practice in the 'New Society,'" in Rosenberg, Marcos and Martial Law, p. 51. The opposition's convention led to the creation of Katipunan ng Bayan para sa Kalayaan (KABAKA, People's Alliance for Freedom), with Salonga as its chairman and social democratic activists in most other leadership positions. Most major opposition politicians (except Diokno), progressives in the Catholic Church, and a number of human rights activists signed the program, which called for nationalization of major industries, economic nationalism, a nonaligned foreign policy, and social reform. KABAKA showed how far left martial law standards had moved even those politicians not affiliated with the communists. With local political networks dissolved, it seemed necessary to adopt a progressive ideology to attract activist supporters as an ersatz political base. 45. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 129. 46. Planas, interview; Francisco Rodrigo, interview, February 5, 1987. 47. Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 6162. 48. Tanada, interview. Aquino confirmed Tanada's role in "Why Tanada?"— Ninoy Aquino's speech on the occasion of Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada's 80th birthday on August 10, 1978 at Club Filipino. Read by Cory C. Aquino. I learned from interviews with Francisco Rodrigo and Charito Planas that they were also trying to persuade Aquino not to boycott. 49. Jones, Red Revolution, p. 115; P. N. Abinales, "The Left and Other Forces: The Nature and Dynamics of Pre-1986 Coalition Politics," in Marxism in the Philippines (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines), pp. 32-33. 50. Aquino, "Why Tanada?" 51. Policarpio, Ninoy, p. 148. 52. Aquino himself was a candidate, and his followers on the LABAN slate were former Senators Ramon Mitra and Francisco Rodrigo; former Congressman Neptali A. Gonzales; Constitutional Convention delegates Aquilino Pimentel, Noli Santos, and Teofisto Guingona; journalists Napoleon Rama, Alejandro Roces, and Ernesto Rondon; Aquino's defense lawyer, Juan David; and two defectors from the Marcos regime, former Executive Secretary Ernesto Maceda and former Commission on Elections Chairman Jaime Ferrer. 53. The local candidates were Felicisimo Cabigao, Primitive de Leon, Antonio Martinez, and Cesar Lucero, Jr. The radicals were Gerardo Barican, Alexander Boncayao, Trinidad Herrera, and Charito Planas.

202 • NOTES TO PAGES 75-82

54. Malvar, interview. 55. Balboa, interview. 56. Neptali Gonzales to Jovito Salonga, December 8,1983. Social democratic leader Norberto Gonzales, in an interview with me, provided the estimate of one hundred campaign workers. 57. From my interviews with PDSP leaders Noberto Gonzales and Romeo Intengan, April 12, 1989, and Mar Canonigo, October 21, 1986. 58. From my interviews with Rodrigo and with Charito Planas and Gerardo Barican, June 7, 1989. 59. Carbonell-Catilo, Manipulated Elections, pp. 65-66. 60. Carl H. Lande, "Philippine Prospects," pp. 1159-1160. 61. Quoted in Policarpio, Ninoy, p. 130, from Aquino's statement to the military court on August 27, 1973. 62. From Aquino's "dearest 'Monsignor'" letter to Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, June 19, 1973, in Aquino, Letters—Prison and Exile, p. 7. 63. Ileto, Posy on and Revolution, pp. 63-64. 64. Aquino, Letters—Prison and Exile, p. 7. 65. Ileto, "The Past in the Present Crisis," in May and Nemenzo, Philippines after Marcos, p. 13. 66. Quoted in Policarpio, Ninoy, p. 133. 67. "Headquarters Military Security Unit, PA, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, Subject: Ex-Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. To: Comdr, MSU, Post, 16 June 1979." 68. Policarpio, Ninoy, p. 152. 69. Francisco Rodrigo, interview, February 5, 1987. 70. Policarpio, Ninoy, p. 160. 71. Gonzales, interview, March 12, 1987. 72. This order led to the most serious dispute among CPP leaders since the party was founded a decade before. Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 115-122. 73. Pineda-Ofreneo, Manipulated Press, p. 142. 74. Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Elections, Manila, Report of the Commission on Elections to the President I Prime Minister of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa on the Manner the Elections of Representatives to the Batasang Pambansa Were Held on April 7 and 27, 1978 (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1979) pp. 332-333. 75. Gonzales, interview, March 12, 1987. Chapter 5: Urban Terrorism 1. Emmanuel S. de Dios, "The Erosion of the Dictatorship," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, p. 74. 2. I interviewed several inner-circle members: Norberto Gonzales, Antonio Olaguer, Eduardo Olaguer, Francisco Rodrigo, Jovito Salonga, and Maximo Soliven. Informally organized, the group varied in size but at any one time had about a dozen members, including pre-martial law politicians, members of the Catholic Church (mostly Jesuits), and social democratic activists. 3. "Confidential, June 16,1979, Subject: Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., To: Comdr, MSU Post, Hontucan," unpublished memo. Italics in the original. 4. There were several other plans for such a group. U.S. exile Raul Man-

NOTES TO PAGES 82-84 • 203

glapus presented perhaps the most extravagant proposal, calling for an antiMarcos army to launch an invasion of the Philippines from the northernmost island, Batanes. Gillego, interview, May 16, 1989; Avila, interview, June 9, 1989. 5. I discussed the creation and training of the opposition army in interviews with PDSP chairman Norberto Gonzales, March 12, 1987, and Party Secretary General Romeo Intengan, May 2, 1989. 6. Raul Daza, interview, April 12,1989. Daza contacted the PDSP for Aquino. On Aquino's MNLF contacts see Pamela G. Hollie, "Marcos Foe, in U.S., Dreams of a Filipino Democracy," New York Times, July 21, 1980; "Marcos Foes Weigh Overture to Rebels," New York Times, April 20,1981; Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., "The Future of the Moderates," interview in Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21, 1981, pp. 20-21. Aquino met with Misauri in July 1980 in Syria and in April 1981 in Saudi Arabia. Aquino apparently persuaded the MNLF to support an operation called June Bride that he was planning in order to attack Marcos in Manila. Arrests by the military foiled the plot. Gonzales, interview, May 23, 1989; Willie Ng, "7 More Muslims Arrested," Bulletin Today, June 11, 1981, pp. 1, 12. 7. "Lopez Man Who Bolted Prison in '77 Nabbed," Bulletin Today, November 7,1981, pp. 1,9; Jose de Vera, "Rebel Camp in Sabah," Bulletin Today, November 17, 1981, pp. 1, 12. 8. I discussed the PDSP leadership's forced departure from Sabah with Intengan, May 2, 1989, and Gonzales, May 23,1989. 9. Dennis M. O'Leary, "The Philippines Edges towards a Civil War," Filipino Information Service (San Francisco, 1980?), p. 6. 10. Psinakis, Two "Terrorists' Meet, p. 129. 11. Dennis M. O'Leary, "Letter from San Francisco," Filipino Information Service (San Francisco, 1979), p. 2. 12. Sheilah Ocampo, "Marcos Shows He Is Master," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1, 1980, p. 21. Olaguer said that Domingo was close to Enrile, who was trying to make contacts with the opposition at the time. Olaguer, interview, March 7, 1989. 13. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Military Tribunals, Office of the Prosecuting Division, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, People of the Philippines v. Raul Manglapus, June 4, 1980. Also charged with helping Reyes plot his coup were former Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw and former Constitutional Convention delegate Ernesto Rondon. 14. In interviews with me many oppositionists dismissed the claim that Reyes had any contact with opposition politicians. Others suggested that there was some very limited cooperation. For descriptions of the plot see Sheilah Ocampo, "Marcos Shows He Is Master," pp. 21-22; Sheilah Ocampo, "The Advantages of Overkill," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 14,1980, pp. 2930. Also see the Manila-based Bullet in Today stories "Ex-Senator Kalaw Linked to Plot against Regime," November 3, 1980, pp. 1, 15; and Jose de Vera, "Kalaw, Rondon Are Arrested," December 5, 1980, pp. 1, 10. 15. The Office of Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, Malacanang Park, Manila, "Sworn Statement of Jose T. Reyes," January 2, 1980. 16. Psinakis, Two "Terrorists" Meet, pp. 22-23. 17. Charles Avila, "An Analysis of the People's Urban Insurrection," manuscript, 1986.

204 • NOTES TO PAGES 84-88

18. The following paragraph is based on my interviews with the Reverend Antonio Olaguer, March 25,1987, and Eduardo Olaguer, March 11 and March 17, 1987, March 7,1989, and March 28, 1989. 19. "Force: the Last Campaign," speech delivered by Raul S. Manglapus at the Sixth Annual MFP Convention, September 1979, reprinted in Manglapus, Pen for Democracy, p. 169. 20. Eduardo Olaguer, to the staff of the Ateneo de Manila University newspaper Guidon, September 24, 1981. 21. Eduardo Olaguer, "Light a Fire," pamphlet, 1979. 22. Puyat, interview. 23. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 242. 24. The National Union for Democracy and Freedom is discussed in Sheilah Ocampo, "Martial Law Marches On," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 5, 1979, p. 24; and in "The Liberal Party: A Brief History, 1945-1986," manuscript, n.d. 25. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1981 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Review Publishing, 1981), p. 228. 26. Eduardo Olaguer, interview, March 28, 1989. 27. Eduardo Olaguer, "Background Information," 1980. 28. Yabut, interview; Puyat, interview. 29. Olaguer, "Background Information"; Ortigas, interview. 30. Eduardo Olaguer, interview, March 17,1987. 31. Yuchengco, interview; Eduardo Olaguer, interview, March 17, 1989. 32. Mitra admitted his involvement during a news conference, "Justice for Psinakis, Justice for All," San Juan, Metro Manila, May 10, 1989. In various interviews with me, Olaguer discussed the roles that Mitra and Paul Aquino had played in the LAFM. 33. Yuchengco, interview; Francisco Rodrigo, interview, April 11,1989; Eduardo Olaguer, interview, March 28,1989. 34. Rodrigo, "Mga Bakas ng Kahapon," p. 199. 35. Broad, Unequal Alliance, p. 116. 36. Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Sachs and Collins, Developing Country Debt, pp. 453-457. 37. Puyat, interview. 38. Yuchengco, interview. 39. Reuter, interview. 40. Jose de Vera, "Link M'lapus Group to Urban Terror Scheme," Bulletin Today, December 31, 1979, p. 10. 41. Yabut, interview. 42. Jose de Vera, "Media, Business Offices Marked for Bombing—PC," Bulletin Today, December 30, 1979, pp. 1, 10. After a trial that lasted almost four years, Olaguer and eleven of his fellow accused were given the death sentence. Thanks largely to the intervention of Cardinal Sin, however, Olaguer was provisionally released in early 1986. Under a Supreme Court revamped by the Aquino government, Olaguer's conviction was overturned in 1987. 43. Alfonso Yuchengco asserts that his name, that of his business associate Ramon Diaz, and that of the Reverend Antonio Olaguer were struck off the arrest

NOTES TO PAGES 88-92 • 205

list by Enrile, who recommended against arresting priests and prominent businessmen who were not directly involved in LAFM arson operations. Yuchengco, interview. 44. De Vera, "Link M'lapus Group," pp. 1,10. 45. Psinakis mentions the Marcos government's charge that he trained oppositionists in Arizona in his book Two "Terrorists" Meet, p. 219. In an interview with me, Psinakis refused to confirm or deny the accusation. But several other oppositionists described the training: Victor Lovely, interview, March 16, 1989; Yabut, interview; and Renato Tariada, interview. 46. I discussed this debate over strategy with several exiled opposition leaders: Gaston Ortigas; Bonifacio Gillego, February 24, 1987; Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., March 16, 1989; and Cesar Arellano. 47. Members of the militant exile faction included Aquino, Psinakis, former Congressman Raul Daza, Charles Avila, and former Constitutional Convention delegate Heherson Alvarez. 48. Julia Wallace, "Aquino Plans Revolution in RP 'in style,'" Bulletin Today, August 8, 1980, pp. 1,9 (reprinted from the Dallas Times Herald). 49. Avila, interview, March 10, 1987. 50. April 6th Liberation Movement, The Philippine Struggle (Manila: Filipino Information Service, 1981), p. 60. 51. I interviewed Rolando Montiel, a leader of the A6LM, May 17, 1989. 52. Lela Garner Noble, "Politics in the Marcos Era," in Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 97. 53. "'Antis' in US Influencing Polls—Lovely," Bulletin Today, November 3, 1980, pp. 1,12. 54. Avila, interview, March 10, 1987. 55. Cited in Neher, "Philippines in 1980," p. 264. 56. "9 Offices Hit by Explosions," Bulletin Today, August 23,1980, pp. 1, 8. 57. Lovely told me that before he left for the Philippines Psinakis gave him two thousand dollars at the request of Aquino, who called Lovely to give words of encouragement and promises of greater payments after bombings were carried out. Lovely, interviews, March 16, 1989 and March 28, 1989; Eduardo Olaguer, interview, March 28, 1989. 58. Ibid. 59. Willie Ng, "Marcos Repeats Conditions Set by Aquino for Talks," Bulletin Today, October 12, 1980, p. 1. 60. Richter, "Tourism by Decree," p. 27. 61. Ibid., p. 29. 62. "US Group Out to Sabotage ASIA Meet," Bulletin Today, October 9, 1980, p.l. 63. Doris Nuval-Baffrey, interview. See also "Baffrey Links Student to Plot," Bulletin Today, November 5, 1980, pp. 1, 11. 64. Excerpts from Marcos' speech quoted in "Marcos Cites Goals of Martial Law as ASTA Meet Opens," Bulletin Today, October 20,1980, p. 10; "Marcos Speech before ASTA," Bulletin Today, October 20, 1980, p. 16. 65. C. C. Resales, "Cancel ASTA Public Sessions," Bulletin Today, October 21, 1980, p.l. 66. Francis Blackwell was one delegate who claimed not to be frightened by

206 • NOTES TO PAGES 92-96

the bombing: "When you live in New York . . . nothing bothers you." Resales, "Cancel ASTA Public Sessions/' p. 12. 67. "Stude Says Ninoy Cited Terrorists/' Bulletin Today, November 6, 1980, p.l. 68. Psinakis, Two "Terrorists" Meet, p. 27. 69. Marcos had several constitutional amendments ratified in a 1976 referendum, the sixth of which allowed him to issue presidential decrees and bypass the interim Batasang Pambansa (parliament) even after martial law was lifted. 70. John Lewis, "Questions, but Few Answers," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 24, 1981, p. 23. 71. "ASTA Bomb Planter, 14 Others Arrested," Bulletin Today, November 1, 1980, p.l. 72. Rolando Montiel, interview, May 17, 1989. 73. "Salonga, 3 Other ex-Senators in US Ordered Held," Bulletin Today, October 21, 1980, p. 1; Willie Ng, "4 ex-Solons, 55 Others Charged before JAJO," Bulletin Today, November 30, 1980, p. 16. 74. Richard Nations, "Threatened Sanctuary," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 22, 1982, pp. 18-19. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the proposed extradition treaty. 75. Taca, interview. 76. James Clad, "The Psinakis Affair," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20,1987, pp. 10-11; United States District Court, Northern District of California, U.S. v. Steven Elias Psinakis, CR 86-1064 RHS. Psinakis was found not guilty. 77. Editorial, "Philippine Rights, and Wrongs," New York Times, November 15,1980. 78. Farber, Revolution and Reaction, p. 185. 79. Christian, Nicaragua, pp. 47-49. 80. See H. E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics, pp. 210-213. 81. Jerrold D. Green, "Countermobilization in the Iranian Revolution," in Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 137. 82. Chehabi, Iranian Politics, pp. 234-236. Chapter 6: Boycott and a United Front 1. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., was one of several traditional oppositionists who studied the Nicaraguan case. See Burton, Impossible Dream, pp. 110-111. On the reaction of the CPP to the Nicaraguan revolution see Jones, Red Revolution, p. 136; Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, pp. 16, 231. 2. The literature also usually includes the case of Iran, which is excluded here. Although in Iran there was a radical-moderate coalition—an important variable in a revolutionary strategy—the Shah was overthrown largely nonviolently, without a significant rebel militia. The Iranian transition thus has been classified in this book as insurrectionary rather than revolutionary. Studies on thev link between personalistic rule and revolution include Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed"; Farhi, "State Disintegration"; Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolutions and Superpowers," in Superpowers and Revolutions, ed. Jonathan P. Adelman

NOTES TO PAGES 97-100 • 207

(New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 38-48; Midlarsky and Roberts, "Class, State, and Revolution"; Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba; and Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions." A summary of this literature is provided in Snyder, "Explaining Transitions." 3. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 32-33. 4. The major sources on Cuba referred to here are Dominguez, Cuba; Farber, Revolution and Reaction; and Perez, Cuba. For Nicaragua, see Booth, End and the Beginning; Thomas W. Walker, ed., Nicaragua: The First Five Years (New York: Praeger, 1985); and Christian, Nicaragua. 5. Enrique Baloyra, "El Salvador/' in Wiarda and Kline, Latin American Politics, pp. 488-491. 6. Snyder, "Explaining Transitions," makes a similar argument. 7. From issues of Liberation and Ang Bay an, cited in Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, p. 56, table 3.1. Estimates by the U.S. government, also cited in Kessler, were lower but also showed a dramatic increase in armed strength. 8. The best account is Jones, Red Revolution. 9. Hawes, "Theories of Peasant Revolution," p. 277. 10. Hawes, Philippine State, pp. 82,100-101. 11. The combined troop strength of the Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as the Philippine Constabulary increased from 54,100 in 1972 to 156,300 in 1980. Cited in Kessler, Rebellion and Repression, pp. 108-109, table 4.1. If Local Home Defense Forces, created by Marcos in 1975, are factored in, the size of the armed forces was 223,000 by 1980. 12. Legal urban organizations secretly affiliated with the communists provided the mass base for demonstrations and protests to be organized with opposition politicians. The communist-linked Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU, May First Movement) labor union, founded in 1980, initially included 350,000 workers and, after the repeal of martial law in 1981, led a large number of strikes. Student and church groups linked to the CPP also became active in 1980. Communist organizing among Catholic Church clergy had progressed sufficiently by 1978 for the party to call a conference to clarify the role that the clergy should play in CPP activities. 13. Morales was a communist mole working as a high-ranking government technocrat until fear of detection and personal matters led him to go underground dramatically in 1977. As if following the script of Rodger and Hammerstein's musical The Sound of Music, Morales defected on the evening that he was scheduled to receive a reward as one of the Philippines' Ten Outstanding Young Men at a gala Manila social event. 14. Jones, Red Revolution, p. 146. Morales was the underground leader of the united front effort; student activists Leandro Alejandro, J. Virgilio Bautista, and Alexander Padilla could operate legally. 15. Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," p. 45; People's MIND, "Today History Is Being Made," June 1, 1981. 16. Roekarts, "Church and State"; "PAPA Procession Rally," The Philippine Collegian, Feb. 18,1981, p. 1. Close associates of Diokno who were active in PAPA included Zeneida Quezon-Avancena, daughter of Commonwealth President Manual L. Quezon; Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera, granddaughter of the famous ilustrado

208 • NOTES TO PAGES 100-102

politician T. H. Pardo de Tavera; and Sister Christine Tan, member of a prominent Manila family. I interviewed Tavera, Quezon-Avancena, and Tan. Their role was confirmed by unpublished PAPA documents. 17. "To Charge Roxas, Macapagal Next," Bulletin Today, June 10, 1981, pp. 1,9. 18. Horacio Morales, interview in Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 146, 327 n. 3. Roxas was the leading figure among the politicians in the boycott, although he did not officially join People's MIND. 19. People's MIND, "Isang Kasunduan para sa Demokratiko at Malayang Pilipinas" (An accord for a democratic and free Philippines), unpublished document, May 10, 1981. 20. Ding Marcelo, "Marchers Press Boycott," Bulletin Today, June 13, 1981, pp. 1, 16. 21. People's MIND, "Financial Report as of June 2,1981." 22. People's MIND, "Today History Is Being Made"; Sheilah Ocampo, "The Communists' Growth Strategy," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21, 1981, p. 22. 23. Quoted in Wurfel, Filipino Politics, p. 252. 24. Ibid., pp. 252-253. 25. See Soriano, Quiet Revolt. 26. The Liberal-dominated National Union for Democracy and Freedom was organized in 1978-1979: The Liberal Party Newsletter 1, no. 6 (October 1978); Sheilah Ocampo, "Martial Law Marches On," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 5, 1979, p. 24. 27. C. Valmoria, Jr., "New Opposition Group Formed," Bulletin Today, December 30, 1979, pp. 1, 8. NUL leader Rogaciano Mercado, although a Nacionalista before martial law, was closely associated with Roxas and the Liberal Party. 28. In the January 1980 local elections the ruling KBL party won 94 percent of the gubernatorial positions and a similar percentage of mayorships in polling marked by extensive fraud and violence. See Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, p. 69. 29. The most significant defection from the Marcos regime during early martial law was that of media czar Primitivo Mijares (see chapter 4). Ernesto Maceda defected to the opposition in the mid-1970s after being fired by Marcos as presidential executive secretary. Deputy Information Minister Reuben Canoy's jump to the opposition shortly before the 1978 polls may have been prompted by Marcos' unwillingness to support Canoy's ambition to build a political base in Northern Mindanao around Cagayan de Oro, where he had been mayor. If so, Canoy's was the first major election-related defection of the martial law period. 30. Former Cebu Governor Rene Espina, a Nacionalista before martial law, and Liberal Antonio Cuenco, a former congressman and heir of one of the most powerful political families in Cebu, broke with Marcos shortly after the 1978 polls. Both were losing KBL candidates in Cebu. Espina would later become a leader in the opposition's United Democratic Nationalist Organization, and Cuenco became a key figure in the Partido Demokratikong Filipino (Philippine Democratic Party). In addition, the defeat of Central Visayas KBL candidate Emilio R. Osmena, Jr., nephew of former presidential candidate Sergio Osmena,

NOTES TO PAGES 103-106 • 209

Jr., and brother of former Senator John Osmena, alienated the Osmena clan, which had been collaborating with Marcos since martial law, and led them gradually back into the opposition. 31. Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, p. 282. 32. Quoted in Sheilah Ocampo, "The Veterans' New Covenant," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1980, p. 13. 33. On the 1980 Batangas campaign see Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, pp. 287-290. 34. Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, p. 290; Ocampo, "Veterans' New Covenant," p. 13; Liberal Party, "A Brief History, 1945-1986," manuscript, n.d; Macapagal, interview, October 20, 1986. 35. The Laurels were allied with former Vice President Fernando Lopez, former Senator Dominador R. Aytona, and KBL defectors Rene Espina and Luis Villafuerte. Former President Macapagal, former Senators Salonga and Tecla San Andres-Ziga, former Congressmen Manuel Concordia and Rogaciano Mercado, and former Constitutional Convention delegate Abraham Sarmiento were Roxas' followers. Aquino, who did not officially join the early UNIDO because he was in exile, nonetheless had close ties to former Senators Ramon P. Mitra, Jr., and Eva Estrada Kalaw (Aquino's cousin), who were members. "A National Convenant for Freedom," August 28,1980, unpublished document. Espina joined the group in early 1981 and Villafuerte joined in late 1981. 36. UNIDO spokesman Manuel Malvar, interview. 37. Lela Garner Noble, "Politics in the Marcos Era," in Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 111. 38. Liberal Party, "Brief History"; Macapagal, interview, October 20, 1986. 39. People's MIND, "Ecumenical-Memorial Service for Senator Gerardo Roxas," held at the Sanctuario de San Jose in Greenhills by members of the National Council of the People's Movement for Independence, Nationalism, and Democracy, April 26,1982. Emphasis in the original. 40. Congressman Rogaciano Mercado (then a leading UNIDO member), interview, March 2,1987; Malvar, interview. 41. Malvar, interview. 42. Ding Marcelo, "Marchers Press Boycott," Bulletin Today, June 13, 1981, p.l. 43. Kalaw, interviews, July 11 and 21, 1989. 44. Sheilah Ocampo, "Prescription for Power," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 27, 1982, pp. 8-9. 45. In the Southern Tagalog region, for example, Liberal Party members Abraham Sarmiento, a former Constitutional Convention delegate, and Manuel Concordia, a former congressman, led the peasant, labor, and professional group Kilusang Bayan ng Timog ng Katagalugan (Association of Southern Tagalog Towns), which denounced military activity in Quezon province, where NPA fighters had met with considerable success in organizing coconut farmers. In mid-1982 Lorenzo Tanada formed a sectoral group, the National Coalition for the Protection of Workers' Rights, which strongly protested the arrest of KMU labor leaders. 46. Bautista, interview.

210 • NOTES TO PAGES 106-112

47. Diokno, Jose W., "Manuscript of Senator Diokno's Speech at the PEOPLE'S National Consultation," May 9, 1981. 48. Bautista, interview. 49. Author's interview, anonymity requested. 50. Bautista, interview; Alexander Padilla, interviews, May 18, 1989, and May 24, 1989. 51. Tavera, interview. 52. "The Liberal Party Vision and Program of Government" (Manila: Regal Publishing, 1985). 53. "Memorandum Number One of Acting Liberal Party President Jovito Salonga," unpublished document, July 14, 1982. 54. A provisional government "representing the various sectors of society which have been engaged in the historic struggle against the Marcos dictatorship" was proposed. "Liberal Party Vision," p. 7. 55. The meeting was reported to the Eleventh Luzon Council session of the PDP on August 12, 1982, as recorded in the unpublished minutes. 56. Malaya, April 18-24,1983. 57. Noble, "Politics in the Marcos Era," p. 108. 58. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 340-341. 59. Puyat, interview. Also see Ellison, Imelda, chap. 12. 60. United Nationalist Democratic Organization, "The Five-Point Program of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization," May 26,1982. 61. Sheilah Ocampo, "Renewed Opposition," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 7, 1982, p. 11. 62. Manglapus, interview. Bonifacio Gillego (a close associate of Manglapus), interview, February 24, 1987. 63. I interviewed key members of the Davao Group, Rey Magno Teves and Zafiro Respicio. 64. I interviewed KASAPI members Jose Luis Alcuaz, March 4,1987; Rolando Montiel, May 17, 1989; Cristina Montiel; and Herman Laurel. 65. Gillego, interview. 66. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., interview in "The Future of the Moderates," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21, 1981, p. 21. 67. Agapito Aquino (Benigno's brother), interview, Makati, October 12,1986. 68. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., to former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, June 27,1983. 69. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., to former Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal, August 23, 1982. 70. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 229. 71. Gillego, interview. 72. Manuel Concordia to Salvador Laurel, December 23, 1983. 73. Neptali Gonzales to Jovito Salonga, December 8, 1983. 74. Gillego, interview. 75. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., to former Congressman Antonio Cuenco, June 27, 1983. 76. Juan J. Linz discusses the difficulties that a presidential system may pose for democratic transition. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," pp. 153-154. 77. Gillego, interview. Several other associates of Aquino whom I interviewed confirmed that the film led Aquino to emulate Gandhi.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 1 2 - 1 1 8 • 2 1 1

78. From my telephone interview with Dr. Arturo Taca. Taca added, "I can say one of his last orders to us before he returned to the Philippines was to keep on accumulating ..." (Taca laughed when I then added the word "guns" to complete the sentence.) 79. Marichu C. Lambino, "The Greatest American Hero," Malaya, August 2224,1983. Chapter 7: The Parliament of the Streets 1. This account of the Aquino assassination relies largely on Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator; Burton, Impossible Dream; and The Reports of the Fact-Finding Board on the Assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino (Manila: Mr. and Ms. Publishing, 1984). 2. The reaction of the South Korean and Uruguayan governments to opposition homecomings may have been restrained because the Aquino assassination had taught them a lesson. Marcos, however, could have learned the same lesson from the Chamorro killing in Nicaragua, and all politicians can study the difficulties that Becket's murder posed for Henry II. 3. Enrique Baloyra, "El Salvador," in Wiarda and Kline, Latin American Politics. 4. Government figures are cited in Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino, "The Philippine Situation and the National Assembly Elections in May," pamphlet, Utrecht, Holland, 1984, p. 3. 5. Ma. Serena I. Diokno, "Unity and Struggle," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, p. 133. 6. Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino. "Philippine Situation," p. 3. 7. Quoted in Gregorio Brillantes, "More than a Martyr of the Bourgeoisie: Ninoy and the Left—3," Midweek, September 24, 1986, p. 37. 8. Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, "The Past in the Present Crisis," in May and Nemenzo, Philippines after Marcos, p. 12. Also see Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, "Rizal and the Underside of Philippine History," in Wyatt and Woodside, Moral Order, pp. 274-337. 9. Ileto, "Past in the Present Crisis," p. 12. 10. Mr. and Ms., September 30, 1983, cited in Ileto, "Past in the Present Crisis," p. 14. 11. Simons, Worth Dying For, p. 38. Simon's book, which draws its title from Aquino's statement "the Filipino is worth dying for," is an example of how the international press helped enhance Aquino's moral standing. 12. Mr. and Ms., September 9, 1983, quoted in Ileto, "Past in the Present Crisis," p. 9. 13. I attended one such exhibit in Makati in August 1984 and was also reminded of the display of Jose Rizal's clothing and other personal articles at Fort Santiago in Manila. 14. Quoted in Malaya, December 14-15, 1984. 15. Dennis Shoesmith, "Church," in May and Nemenzo, Philippines after Marcos, p. 73. 16. On November 4, 1976, seventeen bishops signed the highly critical "Ut Omnes Unum Sint," reprinted in Reflections on the Philippine Church: Human

212 • NOTES TO PAGES 118-122

Society (Manila: Human Development Research and Documentation, 1983), pp. 15-21. 17. Sin visited Aquino in prison during his hunger strike in 1975 and in 1979 apparently lent his implicit support to the Aquino-linked LAFM. Sin reportedly even provided Aquino with information on Marcos' health to help him judge when to return to the Philippines. See Burton, Impossible Dream, pp. 109,126. 18. From my interviews with BBC Executive Director Teresa Nieva and with Christian Monsod, BBC member and later NAMFREL secretary general and then chairman. 19. The genesis of Veritas magazine is described in detail in Bautista, Cardinal Sin, pp. 131-139, and in Rush, "Voice of Veritas." In addition, I interviewed Veritas columnist Melinda de Jesus and discussed NAMFREL's origins in an interview with Monsod. 20. International Monetary Fund, "Philippines—Stand-By Arrangement— Review and Modification" (EBS/81/1980), July 30,1981, p. 3, cited in Thompson and Slay ton, "Credit Arrangements." 21. De Dios, Philippine Economic Crisis, p. 17. 22. Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Sachs and Collins, Developing Country Debt, p. 394. 23. Ugarte field was owned by leading businessman Jaime Zobel, who was active in the opposition. See Simons, Worth Dying For, pp. 55-56. 24. From my interview with Rigoberto Tiglao, formerly a writer for the prestigious Business Day newspaper, later editor of the Manila Chronicle's business section, and then a financial correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review. Corazon C. Aquino told Sandra Burton that she received secret contributions from Chinese professionals during the post-assassination period. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 277. 25. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 233. 26. Arillo, Breakaway, p. 167; The Final Report of the Fact Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) (Metro Manila: Bookmark, 1990), p. 121. 27. Johnson, Four Days of Courage, pp. 36-44. 28. Tarrazona, After Edsa, pp. 26-29. Opposition politician Rene Saguisag confirmed in an interview that these meetings took place. 29. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, chap. 14. 30. Cited in P. N. Abinales, "The Left and Other Forces: The Nature and Dynamics of Pre-1986 Coalition Politics," in Marxism in the Philippines, Second Series (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, 1988), p. 39. 31. Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, pp. 220-233. 32. Like the Nationalist Alliance formed in November 1983, JAJA was nominally headed by former Senator Lorenzo Tanada. 33. From my interview with a leading member of JAJA who requested anonymity, June 18, 1989. 34. In a July 6,1989, interview, Behn Cervantes said that Leandro Alejandro was Agapito Aquino's briefer. Aquino's own account of his links with the Left has changed. In an interview with me on March 19, 1985, he expressed openness

NOTES TO PAGES 122-125 • 213

toward the radicals. When I interviewed him again on May 5,1985, shortly after the breakup of BAYAN (discussed later in this chapter), and on October 12,1986, he was much more critical of the communists, maintaining that his anger toward them went back to the 1978 LABAN campaign. In an interview on May 10,1989, he acknowledged the leading role of radical activists in JAJA and the close ties he had had with them, while expressing regrets. 35. ATOM Executive Vice President Orlando Guerrero, interview; Justice for Aquino, Justice for All, "Statement of Receipts and Disbursements," September 19,1983-January 2,1984. 36. Jose Diokno and Agapito Aquino moved closer to the communists in January 1984 when they signed, along with Tariada and the Liberal Party politicians in the Nationalist Alliance, a "Compact" that adopted much of the radical Left's program and called for a provisional government (which the communists were implicitly invited to join). "Compact," unpublished document, January 6, 1984, signed by Diosdado Macapagal (Liberal Party), Lorenzo M. Tariada (Nationalist Alliance and Justice for Aquino, Justice for All), Abraham Sarmiento (Interim National Assembly Association), Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (PDP^LABAN), and Jose W. Diokno (Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan). 37. Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 156. 38. Christian, Nicaragua, p. 56. 39. "Kongreso ng Mamamayang Filipino (KOMPIL)," convention program, Ateneo University, Loyala Heights, Quezon City, January 7-8,1984. Gregg Jones documents that Agapito Aquino negotiated with CPP leader Rudolfo Salas to assure communist participation in the convention. The convention delegates proposed several opposition leaders as successors to Marcos, ranging from conservative businessman Enrique Zobel to communist party founder Jose Maria Sison. Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 148-149. 40. "A Call for Meaningful Elections: To the President and the Filipino People," Business Day, January 19,1984, p. 7. 41. Marcos lengthened the campaign period to forty-five days, eliminated block voting, allowed the opposition to field election inspectors in order to assure fair counting, permitted private organizations (specifically NAMFREL) to monitor balloting, and ordered several other fraud prevention measures. See CarbonellCatilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 81-82. 42. The rift occurred after Salonga's wing left UNIDO for two reasons: because Salvador Laurel dominated the organization at the expense of Liberal Party interests, and because Salonga's faction was close to the radical Left, which loathed Laurel. Kalaw had long broken with the communists and was (at least temporarily) prepared to work with Laurel. 43. Chehabi, Iranian Politics, p. 241. 44. Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, p. 317. 45. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Philippines' Laurel: The Opposition's Traditional Politician," Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 1984, p. 12. 46. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 30, 1984, p. 24, cited in David Wurfel, "The Aquino Legacy and the Emerging Succession Struggle in the Philippines, 1984," Southeast Asian Affairs 1985 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 272.

214 • NOTES TO PAGES 126-133

47. The 1984 figure is from De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, p. 57. The 1971 figure is from Filemon V. Tutay, "Bloodiest Election Yet," Philippines Free Press, November 20, 1971, p. 4. 48. See Carbonell-Catilo, De Leon, and Nicolas, Manipulated Elections, pp. 83-90; De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, pp. 39-57. 49. Quinn-Judge, "Philippines' Laurel," p. 12. 50. De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, pp. 60-61. 51. Teresa Nieva, member of NAMFREL national council, interview. 52. Christian Monsod, NAMFREL Metro Manila coordinator in 1984 and then NAMFREL national chairman in 1986, interview. 53. Byington, Bantay ng Bay an, p. 90. 54. Joaquin, Doy Laurel in Profile, p. 310. 55. De Guzman and Tancangco, May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections, pp. 170-171. 56. Ibid., p. 32. The non-KBL total includes votes for thirteen self-proclaimed political independents elected to the legislature, who later often sided with the Marcos forces. But during the balloting most had distanced themselves from the administration. 57. Ibid., p. 14. 58. Interviews with Alexander Padilla (then executive officer of the Nationalist Alliance and once one of the chief advocates of such a coalition) and Rogaciano Mercado (a former congressman who unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the communists). 59. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, press release, March 22, 1985. 60. Porter, Politics of Counterinsurgency, p. 34. 61. "A Proposal to Form Bandila—A New Alliance," unpublished document, July 1,1985. 62. For an account of the CPP'S boycott decision and its effect on BAYAN see Jones, Red Revolution, chap. 14. In an interview on May 18, 1989, I discussed Padilla's resignation from BAYAN with his son Alexander. 63. "Opposition MPs," unpublished document, 1984; "National Unification Conference (NUC)," pamphlet, March 10, 1985. Cesar Climaco won a seat as a candidate for a regional party but chose to remain mayor of Zamboanga rather than serve in the national legislature. 64. Forty-five MPs signed a resolution declaring UNIDO the dominant opposition party, which entitled them to election inspectors to curb fraud. See Veritas, June 30, 1985, p. 10, cited in Rush, "Bringing Marcos Down—III," p. 4. 65. John Osmena, interview, March 11, 1985. 66. I attended the NUC convention on March 10,1985, at Valle Verde Country Club, Pasig, Metro Manila. I interviewed a number of participants and received a copy of the delegate list and minutes of the proceedings. 67. Jimmy Vicente, "In Search of a Leader," Veritas, November 11,1984, p. 4. Several other anti-Laurel articles are cited in Rush, "Bringing Marcos Down— III," p. 4. 68. His father, a Supreme Court judge, had engineered the overturning of Marcos' murder conviction in 1940. Although Marcos was then a Liberal, Jose

NOTES TO PAGES 1 3 3 - 1 3 8 • 2 1 5

Laurel, Sr., an arch-Nacionalista, had backed his bid for the Senate in 1959. Jose Laurel, Jr., had arranged for Marcos' admission to the Nacionalistas and helped him win its presidential nomination in 1965. 69. Rush, "Bringing Marcos Down—Ill," p. 4. 70. Soriano and Bengzon were active in the informal Wednesday Club, which later became Manindigan! (Take a Stand!). The club was organized by Jaime Ongpin, a leading business oppositionist, and included major industrialist Ramon Rosario among its members. 71. Convenor Group, "A Draft Concept Paper on a Sudden Presidential Election Situation (or the 'FT' Situation)," November 23, 1984. 72. Convenor Group, "Backgrounder," September 1984. 73. Convenor Group, "Reflections on the FTS," December 18,1984. 74. Convenor Group, "Backgrounder." 75. Convenor Group, "XCOM, No. 10," n.d. 76. The other Presidential Standard Bearers chosen by the convenors were Salvador Laurel, Eva Estrada Kalaw, Raul Manglapus, Jose Diokno, Rafael Salas, Jovito Salonga, and Ambrosio Padilla. 77. Laurel claimed that he had left because he opposed the Convenor Group's stance against U.S. military bases, and Kalaw said that the group was undemocratic. Another important factor for both was undoubtedly their realization that the group, seeking a "new politics," would be unlikely to choose either of them as the presidential candidate. 78. "A Critique of the Concept Paper for a 'Fast-Track System,'" December 1984. 79. Ibid. 80. Cited in Komisar, Corazon Aquino, p. 61. Komisar interviewed Emmanuel Soriano. 81. Interviews with CAPM members Victor Sison, Danilo Olivares, and Jesus Marcos Roces. 82. Interview with Paul Aquino, February 14, 1987. 83. Interviews with Paul Aquino, February 14, 1987; Victor Sison, February 12, 1987; and Danilo Olivares, February 20, 1987. 84. Laban ng Bayan, "Minutes First Meeting, Governing Council Laban ng Bayan," November 25, 1985; Laban ng Bayan, "Minutes Second Meeting, Governing Council Laban ng Bayan," November 29, 1985. 85. Puyat, interview; Francisco Rodrigo, interview, April 11,1989; Sin, interview. 86. In an interview with me, Laurel discussed the similarities between his "sacrifice" and that of his father. Chapter 8: The Fall of Marcos 1. Raul S. Manglapus, then head of the anti-Marcos Movement for a Free Philippines in the United States and former leader of the Magsaysay for President Movement, wrote in 1985 that the opposition's formula against incumbent President Elpidio Quirino "culminated in the election to the presidency of the popular Ramon Magsaysay.... [This] success can be duplicated in the Philippines today, though, for obvious reasons, not in exact detail." Manglapus, "The Philippines:

216 • NOTES TO PAGES 139-145

Will the U.S. Learn from Success?" Harvard International Review 7, no. 5 (March/ April, 1985), reprinted in Manglapus, Pen for Democracy, p. 269. In an interview with me, Salvador Laurel also spoke of the opposition's awareness of the similarities between its campaign and Magsaysay's. 2. For a more detailed comparison see Thompson, "Cory and 'the Guy.'" 3. Johnson, Four Days of Courage, p. 186. 4. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 362-363, 379; Bello, Creating the Third Force, pp. 55-59. 5. Quoted in Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 363. 6. Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Sachs and Collins, Developing Country Debt, pp. 539-546. 7. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 372-374, 381-388. Laxalt provided his own version of events in "My Conversations with Ferdinand Marcos: A Lesson in Personal Diplomacy," Policy Review (Summer 1986). 8. Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, "The Fall of the Regime," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 189-191. 9. Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economic of the Philippine Debt Crisis," in Nelson, Economic Crisis, p. 244. 10. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, pp. 233-234. 11. The estimates are from De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, p. 265, and Malaya, February 9, 1986. Marcos also promised wage increases for workers, land titles for urban squatters, more government jobs for the unemployed, new school buildings for students, and so on. 12. The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, The NAMFREL Report on the February 7, 1986, Philippine Presidential Elections (n.p., n.d.), p. 61; De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, p. 265. 13. Maximo V. Soliven, Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 3,1986. The quote is from Homobono Adaza in Malaya, November 24,1985. 14. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, pp. 266,318. 15. Guy Sacerdoti and Jose Galang, "Resorting to Violence to Ensure Victory," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 20,1986, p. 16. 16. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, pp. 128-129. 17. The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, NAMFREL Report, p. 41. 18. I observed the election in several towns in Bulacan province, Central Luzon. 19. Turnout by electoral district is shown in The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, NAMFREL Report, pp. 118-130. Also see p. 145. 20. Malaya, December 9,1985. 21. Ibid. 22. Editorial, Malaya, December 7,1985. 23. In an interview with me, Sin said that he first thought of the slogan "people power" during the Marian celebration. 24. Quotes from Komisar, Corazon Aquino, p. 78.

NOTES TO PAGES 145-149 • 217

25. She enunciated her position on the economy most clearly in "Building from the Ruins," speech of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino before the Consortium of Philippine Bishops and Businessmen's Organizations, Manila, January 6, 1986, reprinted in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 690-695. 26. Quoted in Burton, Impossible Dream, p. 312. 27. Quoted in Simons, Worth Dying For, p. 224. 28. Ibid. 29. Tomas D. Andres and Pilar B. Ilada-Andres, Understanding the Filipino (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987), p. 44. 30. Magnolia W. Antonino, Helena Benitez, Eva Estrada Kalaw, Maria Kalaw Katigbak, Pacita Madrigal Warns, and Tecla San Andres Ziga were the premartial law female senators. 31. Guy Sacerdoti, "Finishing What 'Ninoy' Started," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 19,1985, p. 40. 32. The pro-Marcos papers were the Bulletin Today, the Times Journal, and the Daily Express. The alternative press dailies were Malaya and the Daily Inquirer. 33. Teodoro Benigno, "Halfway through Campaign, FM Faces Foe's Groundswell," Malaya, January 9, 1986, p. 1. 34. The figure is drawn from Burton, Impossible Dream. Burton had close contacts with Aquino during the campaign. 35. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, pp. 235-238. 36. Ibid., pp. 235-237; Almendral, "Fall of the Regime," p. 195. In Sorsogon province in the Bicol region, four separate Aquino-Laurel campaign organizations represented the various local factions, according to former Senator Teodoro P. de Vera. Personal correspondence, February 26,1986. 37. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, p. 237; Paul Aquino, interview. 38. Marites Danguilan-Vitug, Business Day, December 30, 1985. 39. The most important letter was the Joint Pastoral Exhortation of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines on the Snap Election, "We Must Obey God Rather Than Men," January, 25, 1986, reprinted in "Serving God or Caesar? Documents on the Philippine Church and the February Revolution," Pulso 2, no. 4 (1986), pp. 327-331. 40. Byington, Bantay ng Bayan, pp. 89-92. 41. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 408-409,497. 42. David Howard Bain, in "Tipping the Balance against a Tyrant," Colombia Journalism Review (May/June, 1986), shows that American television coverage during the four-week Philippine election averaged 180 minutes a week on the major networks, compared with three stories a year from 1972 to 1981. Cited in Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 421,498. 43. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 383-405. The American most directly active in the Aquino campaign was Robert Trent Jones, Jr., a golf course architect and an old friend of the Aquino-Cojuangco family (since he had designed their Tarlac golf course). Jones described his role in "The Philippine Revolution and Human Rights," Lowenstein Lecture Series, Yale University Law School, April 19,1988.

2 1 8 • NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 9 - 1 5 5

44. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 399-401. U.S. media reports documented the Marcoses' extensive financial holdings in the United States (particularly in real estate). The American press also followed up on the research of oppositionist Bonifacio Gillego and historian Alfred McCoy, which showed that Marcos, rather than being an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter, was engaged in wartime profiteering. 45. Saguisag, interview. 46. Interview with Navy captain and RAM leader Rex Robles in "RAM Officer Talks on February 1986 Mutiny," Daily Globe, February 23,1989, pp. 1, 8. 47. On Ongpin's role see Joaquin, Jaime Ongpin, pp. 256—257. Bonner (Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 409) reports that NAMFREL funded Kamalayan 1986 during the polls. Christian Monsod, then NAMFREL secretary general, confirmed this in an interview with me. 48. "Intelligence Report of the Reform the AFP Movment (RAM) on the Snap Presidential Election," Manila, December 22,1985, reprinted in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 705-707. 49. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections, pp. 383-384. One of the computer operators was the wife of RAM leader Eduardo Kapunan. RAM may have encouraged the walkout (and it did provide security to the boycotters after their departure), but I was unable to find evidence in support of this theory. 50. "CBCP Pastoral Letter: Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines Post-Election Statement," reprinted in "Serving God or Caesar?" pp. 336-337. 51. Francisco F. Claver, "The Church and Revolution: The Philippine Solution," in "Serving God or Caesar?" pp. 380-387.1 discussed the drafting of the bishops' pastoral letter and the efforts to stop its publication with Bishop Claver in an interview. 52. President Ferdinand E. Marcos to His Eminence Ricardo Cardinal Vidal, February 15, 1986. 53. Quotes from Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 417-418, 420. 54. Ibid., pp. 420, 431. 55. Komisar, Corazon Aquino, p. 100. 56. Magno, "The Anatomy of Political Collapse," in Magno, De Quiros, and Ofreneo, February Revolution, p. 8. 57. Remnants of the A6LM formed the Sandatahang Mandirigma sa Kalunsaran para sa Kalayaan ng Bayan (SMK, or Urban Armed Freedom Fighters) and proposed to undertake a "series of militant destabilizing tactics toward a massing of people at Malacanang supported by urban guerrila forces that would lead the initial assault on the formidable palace guard." The SMK claimed to have three hundred armed men and women in Manila. See Phil Bronstein, "AntiMarcos Battle Plans: Shadowy Coalition Vows Violence if Election Rigged," San Francisco Examiner, February 2, 1986, pp. Al, A10; Johnson, Four Days of Courage, pp. 150-151. 58. De Guzman and Tancangco, 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Election, p. 395. 59. Almendral, "Fall of the Regime," p. 209. 60. Simons, Worth Dying For, pp. 267-268. 61. Ibid., p. 269. Also see Rosca, Endgame, p. 117.

NOTES TO PAGES 155-163 • 2 1 9

62. Georges A. Fauriol, "Haiti: The Failures of Governance," in Wiarda and Kline, Latin American Politics, p. 572. 63. Subsequent coup attempts in the Philippines failed in part because they lacked popular support (see chapter 9). 64. This planned repression is an often forgotten chapter of people power. Ver, in a plan code-named Operation Everlasting (the hoped-for duration of the Marcos regime), was preparing to arrest oppositionists and imprison them on an island near Corregidor. See Johnson, Four Days of Courage, pp. 26-27; Arillo, Breakaway, p. 8; Crisostomo, Cory, p. 202; and Komisar, Corazon Aquino, p. 109. 65. Kotte, Parlament der Strasse, p. 198. 66. Alfred McCoy (in "The RAM Boys," cited in The Final Report of the Fact Finding Commission [pursuant to R.A. No. 6832] [Makati: Bookmark, 1990], p. 129), points out that RAM'S security was so lax that the plot could have been betrayed in a number of ways. Nonetheless, two theories have gained widest acceptance. First, RAM member Lieutenant Colonel Rodolfo Aguinaldo disclosed the plans to the CIA in an unauthorized meeting, and some RAM members suspect that the Americans passed the information on to Ver. Another possible source of the leak was Major General Doromal, a Malacanang security officer who was reluctantly recruited into the plot at the last minute and may have confessed to Ver's son Irwin. 67. Burton, Impossible Dream, pp. 378-387. Burton reports that before Agapito Aquino's and Cardinal Sin's calls on the radio for support, Ramos was able to find only sixty volunteers. "I need a million," Burton quotes Ramos as saying in exasperation. 68. Mercado, People Power, p. 119. 69. On "defense in depth" see Aguirre, People's Revolution, pp. 22-24. 70. Johnson, Four Days of Courage, p. 83. 71. Ibid., p. 107. 72. Ibid., p. 169. 73. Joaquin, Quartet of the Tiger Moon, p. 43. 74. Quoted in Nudas, God with Us, p. 21. On the origins of the religious symbols in the crowd see UST [University of Santo Tomas] Social Research Center, Philippine Revolution. 75. By 1985 a Church-based Philippine group, Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA, or Action for Justice and Peace) was holding seminars nationwide. The best account of AKKAPKA is Elwood, Philippine Revolution, pp. 24-27. 76. The Reverend Bernardo Perz, OSB, quoted in Nudas, God with Us, p. 33. 77. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 419-440. 78. Quoted in Bernard Gwertzman, "For Marcos, a Restless Night of Calls to US," New York Times, February 26, 1986, p. 14. Chapter 9: Democratic Transition 1. There were eight coup attempts in the Philippines. This is the figure that The Final Report of the Pact-finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) (Makati: Bookmark, 1990) arrived at, adding to it the October 1990 coup attempt. For an overview of coup-prone democratizations see Huntington, Third Wave, p. 233.

220 • NOTES TO PAGES 164-167

2. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy/' pp. 158-160. 3. Most of Aquino's first cabinet was made up of her allies and her husband's friends, however. Four ministers—Neptali A. Gonzales (minister of justice), Ernesto Maceda (minister of natural resources), Ramon Mitra, Jr. (minister of agriculture), and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. (minister of local government)—had been candidates in Benigno Aquino's LABAN party in the 1978 legislative elections in Manila. One of the assassinated senator's lawyers, Joker Arroyo, was given the powerful position of executive secretary. Heherson Alvarez, who had been an associate of Benigno Aquino while he was in exile, was named minister of agrarian reform. Aquino's journalist ally Teodoro Locsin, Jr., became minister of information. A member of the Convenor Group, Jaime Ongpin, became minister of finance, and NAMFREL chairman Jose Concepcion, Jr., was appointed minister of trade and industry. 4. Alfred McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution: Filipino Elite Factions and the Struggle for Power," in Krinks, Philippines under Aquino, p. 24. 5. Art A. Borjal, "Laurel Loses Support," Philippine Star, November 17,1986, p. 4. 6. James Clad, "Look Back in Anger," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 30, 1988, p. 33. In an interview with me on December 28, 1985, Jovito Salonga revealed the existence of such a secret power-sharing pact between Aquino and Laurel. 7. Laurel's cabinet position was renamed foreign secretary after the enactment of the new constitution in 1987. 8. Francisco Nemenzo, "From Autocracy to Elite Democracy," in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 228—230. 9. "Declaring a National Policy to Implement Reforms Mandated by the People Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a Provisional Constitution, and Providing for an Orderly Transition," Proclamation 3, Malacanang, Manila, March 25, 1986, reprinted in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution, pp. 764-765. 10. The Constitutional Commission consisted of only forty-eight members, as two people refused their appointments. 11. Rush, "Cory Constitution," p. 2. 12. Paez-Hidalgo, Saguil, and Israel, "Socio-Demographic Profile," pp. 3664. 13. Republic of the Philippines, the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Journal of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1 (Metro Manila: n.p., n.d.). If the delegates had chosen a parliamentary system instead of a presidential one, Enrile and Laurel could have hoped to gain power sooner if their parties performed well in elections for the new assembly or outmaneuvered Aquino in forming party alliances. Instead, a zero-sum game had been established in which Enrile and Laurel soon became disloyal players. See Linz, "Transitions to Democracy." 14. Quoted in Nemenzo, "From Autocracy to Elite Democracy," p. 228. 15. McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution," p. 20. 16. Pimentel was in such a hurry to replace local officials that some Officersin-Charge, as the appointees were called, had criminal records, one was undergo-

NOTES TO PAGES 167-172 • 221

ing psychiatric treatment, and two were accidentally appointed to the same position. See Nemenzo, "From Autocracy to Elite Democracy/' p. 227. 17. James Clad, "Tainted Watchdog," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 17,1987, p. 22. 18. Aquino, Politics of Plunder, p. 87. 19. Clad, "Tainted Watchdog," p. 24. 20. Nemenzo, "From Autocracy to Elite Democracy," p. 225. 21. Porter, Politics of Counterinsurgency, p. 59. 22. Sworn Testimony of former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Antonio Carpio, cited in Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission, p. 151. Also see McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution," pp. 26-27; Virgilio Makalalad, "Enrile Ex-Aides Held for Murder," Philippine News, March 2-8, 1988, pp. 1-2; "'Gringo' Also Named in Olalia Case," Philippine News, March 9-15, 1988, pp. 1,15. 23. For a description of the major coup attempts see Final Report of the FactFinding Commission. On an eighth, more minor coup attempt, which took place in October 1990 on the island of Mindanao, far from the center of power in Manila, see John McBeth, "Suspect Loyalties," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25,1990, pp. 15-16. 24. Results of an October 1986 poll by the Social Weather Station, cited in Mahar Mangahas, "People's Evaluation the Bottom Line," Manila Chronicle, June 29, 1992, p. 4. See chapter 8 for a discussion of Aquino's vote count. 25. James Clad, "Cory's Constitutional Gamble," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 29,1987, p. 21. 26. James Clad, "Vote for Stability," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1987, p. 10. 27. The n in PnB's acronym is lowercased to avoid confusion with the PNB, the Philippine National Bank, which was at the other end of the ideological spectrum. 28. Laurel, who was beginning to move into open opposition to Aquino, had allies in both in the pro-Aquino UNIDO and the anti-Aquino Nacionalista Party. 29. Aquino's net approval rating (those satisfied minus those dissatisfied) in the Social Weather Survey went from 71 percent in October 1986 to 35 percent in October 1987 to 29 percent in September 1989 to 7 percent in April 1992. 30. Mahar Mangahas, "Scanning the Social Environment," Manila Chronicle, November 25,1991, p. 4. 31. Computed from Dohner, "Aquino and the Economy," p. 26; Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1992 (Hong Kong: Review Publications, 1991), pp. 6-7; Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1993 (Hong Kong: Review Publications, 1992), pp. 6-7. 32. Dohner, "Aquino and the Economy," p. 26; Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1993, pp. 6-7. 33. Mahar Mangahas, "War vs. Poverty Flying Blind," Manila Chronicle, June 22, 1992, p. 4; Redemnto Anda, "Survey Shows Life Harder under Aquino," Manila Chronicle, September 30,1992, pp. 1, 6. 34. Associated Press, "Crowds Cheer Cory," News-Times (Danbury, Conn.), December 9, 1989, pp. 1, 20.

222 • NOTES TO PAGES 172-175

35. Mahar Mangahas ("Who Wants a Cory Reelection," New Chronicle, October 28, 1991, p. 4) reports the results of a Social Weather Station poll that took place from June 7 to July 15,1991. Of 1,220 voters, 66 percent opposed Aquino's candidacy, 31 percent favored it, and 3 percent gave no answer. The 1987 constitution establishes a six-year presidential term without reelection, but it was unclear whether this provision applied to Aquino, who assumed office before the constitution was approved. 36. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Poorer but Free," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1991, p. 18. 37. Cited in John Andrews, "The Philippines: A Question of Faith," Economist, May 7, 1988, p. 12. 38. In addition, two other cabinet members, Rogociano Mercado and Ernesto Maceda, were fired for alleged corruption. 39. Rodney Tasker, "Cory's Fading Magic," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1,1987, p. 10. Legal Council Teodoro Locsin, Jr., another bete noire of the military, was also fired, along with Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin. 40. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Payment in Full: Aquino Backs Ramos as Candidate for President," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1992, pp. 11-13. 41. The authoritative source on the failure of land reform under the Aquino administration is Putzel, Captive Land. Also see Wurfel, "Land Reform," pp. 4445. 42. James Clad, "Rhetoric and Reality," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1987, pp. 32-34; and Putzel, Captive Land, chap. 7. 43. Jose Galang, "Resistance to Reform," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1987, p. 31. 44. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Window Dressing," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5,1991, p. 20. Aquino's executive secretary, Joker Arroyo, warned her that reform would create too many powerful enemies, endangering her government. Putzel, Captive Land, p. 248. 45. Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis," in Nelson, Economic Crisis, p. 255; Haggard, "The Philippines: Picking Up after Marcos," in The Promise of Privatization, ed. Raymond Vernon (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 91-121. 46. Haggard, "Political Economy," pp. 245-255. 47. See Rigoberto Tiglao, "Failure to Meet the Need for Change," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1991, pp. 40-41. A March 1992 World Bank report argued that this failed liberalization left "deep underlying inefficiencies" in the structure of the economy, which was one of the chief causes of the country's poor overall economic performance during Aquino's presidency. Quoted in Alfredo P. Hernandez, "Fight against Poverty a Failure—World Bank," Philippine Daily Globe, March 30, 1992, p. 21. 48. Jones, Red Revolution, pp. 166—167. 49. In fact, American-Philippine relations did not significantly worsen. The end of the cold war and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo (which rendered one of the two major American installations unusable) made the military withdrawal less painful for the Pentagon. Philippine financial losses owing to the withdrawal are gradually being offset by an influx of foreigners (largely Taiwanese) at the former Subic Naval Base, which has been turned into a duty-free port.

NOTES TO PAGES 175-178 • 223

50. Rebellion by the Moro National Liberation Front and other smaller guerrilla groups advocating an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines was already substantially repressed by the late Marcos period and continued to decline under Aquino. See John McBeth, "Rebel Hopes Dashed," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 6, 1990, pp. 30-31. 51. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1993, p. 192. 52. McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution," p. 32. 53. John McBeth, "Suspect Loyalties," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25,1990, pp. 15-16. 54. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., "Reading the Pact with the Rightist Rebels," Manila Chronicle, December 29, 1992, p. 5. 55. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation. They argue that another possible path to consolidation is "elite settlement," a more explicit form of elite transformation. 56. .See chapter 7 and James Clad, "On Cory's Coat-Tail," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 21, 1987, pp. 12-13. 57. Tancangco, Anatomy of Electoral Fraud. Amando Doronila ("Matter of Fact, Not of Motive," Manila Chronicle, March 14, 1991, pp. 1, 9) defends an earlier version of Tancangco's study from attacks on her personal motives and her methodology, but points out the lack of evidence that the Aquino administration coordinated the fraud. 58. "Grand Alliance for Democracy," Mr. and Ms., May 22-28,1987, pp. 7, 8; "It's Their Turn," Mr. and Ms., May 15-21, 1987, pp. 17-18. 59. Institute for Popular Democracy, "Political Clans and Electoral Politics," (Manila: IPD, 1987) classifies members of traditional clans as those who either had been elected or had run as candidates in polls held under the authoritarian regime or before martial law. 60. Clad, "On Cory's Coat-Tails"; Clad, "Cory's Candidates Can," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1987, p. 37. 61. In an interview with me on April 20, 1987, Bonifacio Gillego, one of the leading progressives in the new Congress, described the traditional style of his campaign in Sorsogon, Bicol. He promised to help people find government jobs, lined up support from local politicians, and limited discussion of policy issues. 62. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated government corruption at $2.5 billion, one-third of its total budget, in 1987. Cited in Seth Mydans, "In Post-Marcos Philippines, Corruption Still a Way of Life," New York Times, October 17, 1988, p. 10. 63. Institute for Popular Democracy, "Political Clans." 64. Two examples were Aquino's endorsements of Faustino Dy for governor in Isabela province and of Chavit Singson for governor in Ilocos Sur. Both were warlords associated with Benigno Aquino before martial law (see chapter 2). They then backed Marcos during the authoritarian period. Upon taking power, Aquino removed Dy and tried to replace Singson (he successfully held off the military by barricading himself in his office). When both Dy's and Singson's congressional candidates won in 1987, Aquino welcomed them back into a proAquino party for the local polls.

224 • NOTES TO PAGES 181-185

Conclusion 1. See Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 64-84. What Samuel P. Huntington terms a replacement democratic process—in which "mass demonstrations, protests, and strikes played a central role"—corresponds closely to my thinking here (Huntington, Third Wave, p. 146, and more generally 142-149). Aside from the Philippines, Huntington's replacement category includes Argentina, Greece, East Germany, Portugal, and Romania. Argentina and Greece, however, involved the transfer of power by the "military as institution" more than a revolutionary overthrow. Portugal may simply have had the misfortune of being the first in the latest wave of democratization, before the model of negotiated transition had been established in Spain. Personalistic regimes in the Philippines and Romania had to be overthrown because rulers refused to give up power. In East Germany, however, the chief factor motivating hard-liners to cling to office was the (justified) concern that liberalization, much less democratization, would threaten the survival of the state. See Mark Thompson, "No Exit: 'Nation-Stateness' and Democratisation in the German Democratic Republic," Political Studies, forthcoming. 2. Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 100-106. 3. If Huntington's two major categories of democratic transition other than replacement—transformation and transplacement—are combined, then more than 80 percent of transitions from 1974 to 1980 involved some form of negotiation. Even if we confine ourselves to the cases in which authoritarian regimes took the greatest initiative in inaugurating pacted democratizations (transformations), this category remains the largest. See Huntington, Third Wave, p. 113. Many of the recent democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa have also been negotiated. See "Democracy in Africa," Economist, September 4, 1993, pp. 4649. 4. Imelda Marcos began methodically investing in New York real estate "after the fall of her friend the Shah of Iran encouraged both Marcoses to stash more funds abroad." Ellison, Imelda, p. 185. 5. Wurfel, "Manila and the Barrio: Anatomy of a Relationship," in "The Philippines: Domestic Challenge, International Consequences," Proceedings of a Conference at Yale University, April 5, 1986, CALC Report 12, no. 3 (May-June, 1986), p. 14. 6. Conrado de Quiros, "Human Rights Day," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 11, 1993, p. 5. 7. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 5. 8. Danilo Villadolid, "Church Survey Shows Ecology, Graft, Weak Economy Concern Filipinos Most," Veritas (Manila), July 16,1990, p. 1. 9. Alex Magno, "A Signal of Great Dispair," Manila Chronicle, December 5, 1992, p. 5. 10. The Philippine economy grew at a rate of 5.1 percent in 1994 and a projected 6.5 percent in 1995.

Selected Bibliography

This book is a study of one of the most widely publicized and influential transitions to democracy, which has yet to be integrated into the growing literature on democratization. "Thick description" of this case of democratic opposition to personalistic rule is necessary so that theorizing can be made on a solid, empirical basis. A few general scholarly works on the Marcos period and its aftermath have appeared but do not focus on the anti-Marcos struggle. Among these are Wurfel, Filipino Politics; De Guzman and Reforma, Government and Politics of the Philippines; Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution; Timberman, Changeless Land; and Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines. There has also been work on opposition groups other than the antiMarcos politicians. The best book on the Philippine communists during and after the Marcos period is Jones, Red Revolution. An excellent article on the origins of the CPP is Francisco Nemenzo's "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Joo-Jock, Armed Communist Movements, pp. 71-101. Another account is Hansen, Philippinen. Other works on the communists include Porter, Politics of Counterinsurgency, and Kessler, Rebellion and Repression. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, is a good account of the Muslim secessionist movement, and George, Revolt in Mindanao, is an informative journalistic study. Lela Garner Noble has written a number of articles on the topic, including "The Philippines: Autonomy for the Muslims," in Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Alfred W. McCoy has written several informative articles on the military rebels, including "Ram Boys," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 1-11, 1990. The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission is a very useful 225

226 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

source on the history of RAM and its coup attempts, as is Kessler, Rebellion and Repression. A good source on the relation between the Catholic Church and Marcos' regime during the early years of the dictatorship is Yu and Bolasco, Church-State Relations. Another work is Youngblood, Marcos against the Church. But these case studies of particular opposition groups neglect the interaction among the anti-Marcos forces and do not pay enough attention to how the nature of the regime shaped the opposition to it. Among the "title wave" of journalistic books published about the dramatic events from Aquino's assassination to people power, a number concentrate on the role of anti-Marcos politicians. See Charles Trueheart, "The Philippines' Title Wave: 15 Books to Compete for Readers," Washington Post, July 21,1987, pp. E1-E2. Particularly helpful are Burton, Impossible Dream; Simons, Worth Dying For; and Crisostomo, Cory: Profile of a President. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, is an exhaustive study of the U.S. government's role during Marcos' rule. But the period before Aquino's assassination is rarely explored, and theoretical conceptualization is lacking. Because of the opposition's understandable need for secrecy, government censorship, and the limited interest of the foreign press during much of the authoritarian period, conversations with participants and unpublished documents were frequently the best (or only) way to research the anti-Marcos struggle. To make a government crackdown more difficult (and because of the lack of standardization in some Philippine publishing houses), full publication information was often withheld from books published under Marcos' rule. I conducted numerous interviews between 1984 and 1992 with traditional opposition politicians, communists, military rebels, Muslim secessionists, social democrats, activists in the Catholic Church, business oppositionists, and officials of the Marcos regime. In order to avoid some of the problems of retrospective interviewing, I cross-checked information with other informants and asked interviewees for letters, political pamphlets, minutes of meetings, and so on, that documented their activities. In addition, I consulted diaries, government documents, newspaper reports, and other sources. These primary sources are listed in the notes. The excerpts of the Marcos diaries to which I gained access contained interesting information about pre-martial law politics. Unfortunately, the Philippine government has not published the diaries. For an analysis by a journalist who was able to read them anyway, see William C. Rempel, Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in His Secret Diaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1993). My visits to the Philippines enabled me to observe the opposition's activity after Aquino's assassination and during the snap presidential polls, several coup attempts, and most of the elections in the period of

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 227

democratic transition. The interviews that I conducted are listed at the end of this bibliography. Selected Works Abueva, Jose V. Focus on the Barrio. Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1959. . Ramon Magsaysay: a Political Biography. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971. Abueva, Jose V., and Raul P. de Guzman. Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics. Manila: Bookmark, 1969. Adevoso, Eleuterio L. A Personal Story—50 Years. Metro Manila: Guaranty Press, 1989. Agoncillo, Teodoro A., and Milagros C. Guerrero. History of the Filipino People. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing, 1983. Aguirre, Alexander P. A People's Revolution of Our Time—Philippines, February 22-25, 1986: An Inside Story with Politico-Military Analysis. Quezon City: Pan-Service Master Consultants, 1986. Amnesty International. Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines, 22 November-5 December 1975. London: N.p., 1977. Anderson, Benedict R. "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective." Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (May 1983): 477-496. Ando, Hirofumi. "A Study of Voting Patterns in the Philippine Presidential and Senatorial Elections, 1946—1965." Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (1969): 567-586. . "Voting Turnout in the Philippines." Philippine Journal of Public Administration 13, no. 4 (1969): 424-441. Aquino, Belinda A. Politics of Plunder: The Philippines under Marcos. Manila: Great Books Trading, 1987. Aquino, Benigno S., Jr. Black Friday, January 30: Speech by Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Senator of the Philippines, February 2, 1970. Manila: Ninoy Aquino Position Papers, 1970. . A Garrison State in the Make and Other Speeches. Makati: Benigno Aquino Foundation, 1985. . Letters: Prison and Exile. Metro Manila: Aquino Family in Cooperation with the La Ignaciana Apostolic Center, 1983. -. Testament from a Prison Cell. Los Angeles: Philippine Journal, 1988. Arillo, Cecilio T. Breakaway: The Inside Story of the Four-Day Revolution in the Philippines, February 22-25,1986. Metro Manila: CTA and Associates, 1986. Averch, Harvey A., John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton. The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

228 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baldwin, Robert E. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: The Philippines. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. City Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Baron, Cynthia A., and Melba M. Suayo. Nine Letters: The Story of the 1986 Filipino Revolution. Quezon City: Gerado P. Baron, 1986. Bautista, Felix. Cardinal Sin and the Miracle of Asia. Manila: Vera-Reyes, 1987. Bello, Walden. Creating the Third Force: U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1987. Bello, Walden, and Edward S. Herman. U.S.-Sponsored Elections: The Philippine Example. Washington, D.C.: Philippine Support Committee, 1984. Bello, Walden, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson. Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982. Bello, Walden, and Severina Rivera, eds. The Logistics of Repression: The Role of U.S. Assistance in Consolidating the Martial Law Regime in the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977. Belloni, Frank P., and Dennis C. Beller. Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1978. Berlin, Donald L. "Prelude to Martial Law: An Examination of Pre-1972 Philippine Civil-Military Relations." Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1982. Bernas, Joaquin G. Dismantling the Dictatorship: From MIA Tarmac 1983 to EDSA1986—A Collection of Essays by Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ. Quezon City: Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Ateneo de Manila University, 1990. Bhutto, Benazir. Daughter of Destiny. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Bonner, Raymond. Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy. New York: Times Books, 1987. Booth, John A. The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982. Bresnan, John, ed. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Brillantes, Alex B., Jr. Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972. Manila: Great Books Publishers, 1987. Broad, Robin. Unequal Alliance, 1979-1986: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 229

Bunge, Frederica M., ed. Philippines: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1983. Burton, Sandra. Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution. New York: Warner Books, 1989. Butler, William J., John P. Humphrey, and G. E. Bisson. The Decline of Democracy in the Philippines. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1977. Byington, Kaa. Bantay ng Bayan: Stories from the NAMFREL Crusade 1984-86. Manila: Bookmark, 1988. Callow, Alexander B., Jr., ed. The City Boss in America: An Interpretive Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Canoy, Reuben R. The Counterfeit Revolution: The Philippines from Martial Law to the Aquino Assassination. Manila: Philippine Editions, 1984. Carbonell-Catilo, Ma. Aurora, Josie H. de Leon, and Eleanor E. Nicolas. Manipulated Elections. Manila?: N.p., 1985. Carroll, John J. The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. Casper, Gretchen G. "Leadership Strategies and Regime Change under Authoritarianism: Government Performance and Support Building in the Philippines." PhD. diss., University of Michigan, 1987. Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines. "CBCP Post-Election Statement (14 February 1986)." Pulso 1, no. 4 ("Serving God or Caesar? Documents on the Philippine Church and the February Revolution," 1986): 336-339. Cayongcat, Al-Rashid I. Bangsa Moro People in Search of Peace. Manila: Foundation for the Advancement of Islam in the Philippines, 1986. Chapman, William. Inside the Philippine Revolution: The New People's Army and Its Struggle for Power. New York: W. W. Norton, 1987. Chehabi, H. E. Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. Che Man, W. K. Muslim Separatism: The Mows of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990. Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986. Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines. The State of the Nation after Three Years of Martial Lawf September 21,1975. Makati: Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, 1975. Collier, David, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Constantino, Renato, and Letizia R. Constantino. The Philippines: The

230 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Continuing Past. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978. Coquia, Jorge R. The Philippine Presidential Election of 1953. Manila: Manila University Publishing, 1955. Corpus, Victor N. Silent War. Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989. Cotton, James. "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea." Political Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1989): 244-259. Crisol, Jose M. The Armed Forces and Martial Law. Makati: Agro Printing and Publishing House, 1980. Crisostomo, Isabelo T. Cory: Profile of a President. Quezon City: J. Kriz Publishing Enterprises, 1986. Curry, James. "Continuity and Change in Philippine Electoral Politics: A Re-evaluation." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (Summer 1976): 226-234. Dahl, Robert, ed. Regimes and Oppositions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Day, Beth. Shattered Showcase of Democracy. New York: M. Evans, 1974. De Dios, Emmanuel S., ed. An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis: A Workshop Report. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1984. De Guzman, Raul P., and Mila A. Reforma. Government and Politics of the Philippines. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988. De Guzman, Raul P., and Luzviminda G. Tancangco. An Assessment of the May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections: A Summary of Findings. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1985. . An Assessment of the May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections in Manila. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1985. -. An Assessment of the 1986 Philippine Special Presidential Elections: A Study of Political Change through People Power. Vols. 1 and 2. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1986. Del Rosario, Simeon G. Surfacing the Underground: The Involvements of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. Quezon City: Manlapaz Publishing, 1977. Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Democracy in Developing Countries. Vol. 3, Asia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Platter, eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Dix, Robert H. "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail." Polity 16 (1983): 423-446. Dohner, Robert S. "Aquino and the Economy: An Assessment of the First Three Years." Pilipinas, no. 11 (Fall 1988).

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Abaya, Hernando. Member, Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines; author; journalist. New Haven, Conn., March 2,1988. Adaza, Homobono. Former governor, Misamis Oriental; former assemblyman, Batasang Pambansa; president, Mindanao Alliance. Makati, December 4,1986. Adevoso, Jesus Terry. Son of Eleuterio Adevoso; former member, Liberal Party Executive Committee; businessman. Manila, August 10, 1989. Alcuaz, Jose Luis. Former chairman, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); former deputy secretary general, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN); former commissioner, National Telecommunications Commission. Quezon City, November 19, 1986; Quezon City, March 4,1987; Quezon City, June 1, 1989. Almeda-Lopez, Augusto. Vice chairman, ABS-CBN Corporation. Makati, April 27, 1989. Almonte, Jose. Former adviser, Reform the Armed Forces Movement of the Philippines (RAM); commissioner, Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance. Quezon City, August 1, 1989. Alonto, Datu Abul Khayr. Former acting mayor, Marawi City; former vice chairman, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); former member, UNIDO Council of Leaders; president, Muslim Federal Party. Makati, May 30, 1989. Alonto, Datu Ahmad Domocao. Former congressman; former senator; former member, UNIDO Advisory Council. Makati, May 25,1989. Alvarez, Heherson. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; former secretary general, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); former president, Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM); former minister of agrarian reform; senator. Manila, March 22,1987; Manila, June 30,1989. Angarra, Edgardo. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; former president, University of the Philippines; former board member, National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL); senator. Quezon City, February 16, 1987. Aquino, Agapito. Brother of Benigno Aquino, Jr.; former leader of Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA); president, August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM); president, Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA); senator. Makati, March 19, 1985; Pasig, May 5, 1985; Makati, October 12,1986; San Juan, May 10, 1989.

242 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquino, Paul. Brother of Benigno Aquino, Jr.; businessman. Makati, February 14, 1987. Araullo, Eduardo. Member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); professor, St. Scholastica College. Manila, July 26, 1989. Arellano, Cesar. Former chairman, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), midwest region; former director, Ninoy Aquino Movement. Makati, March 27, 1987. Avila, Charles. Former secretary general, Federation of Free Farmers; activist in the Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); a mayor in Southern Leyte. Makati, November 19, 1986; Makati, December 3, 1986; Manila, March 7, 1986; Makati, March 10, 1987; Makati, June 9, 1989. Ayala, Jesus. Businessman; presidential consultant for region XL Makati, February 18, 1987. Balboa, Ben Hur. Representative of Rafael Salas, Convenor Group; businessman. Makati, March 17, 1989. Barican, Fernando. Former president, student council, University of the Philippines; Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate in 1978; businessman. Makati, June 7, 1989. Bautista, J. Virgilio. Former secretary general, League of Filipino Students (LFS); director, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN). Quezon City, March 18, 1987. Bengzon, Alran. Cofounder, Convenor Group; member, Manindigan!; secretary of health. Pasig, May 5, 1985. Bernardo, Olimpio. Co-accused in People of the Philippines v. Manglapus, June 4, 1980; salesman. Manila, August 10, 1989. Binay, Jejomar. Former member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); mayor of Makati. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Makati, June 26, 1989. Bolasco, Mario (deceased). Former professor of Philosophy, St. Scholastica College. Manila, July 26, 1989; Manila, July 31, 1989. Brillante, Roberto. Former member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); Makati city councilor. Makati, January 21,1987; Manila, March 11,1987. Burgos, Jose. Former editor, WE Forum; editor, Malaya. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Quezon City, June 26, 1989. Canonigo, Mar. Former secretary general, Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP); secretary general, Liberal Party. Pasig, October 21, 1986. Carroll, Rev. John. Director, Institute on Church and Social Issues. Quezon City, April 10, 1989. Castillejos, Epifanos. Former congressman. Chicago, August 1985.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 243

Cervantes, Behn. Former member, Movement for the Abolition of the Presidential Commitment Order (MAPCO) National Council; former chairperson, Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP); member, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) National Council. Quezon City, July 6, 1989. Claver, Rev. Francisco. Former bishop of Bukidnon; director, National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA); associate director, Institute on Church and Social Issues. Quezon City, May 26, 1989. Cojuangco, Jose, Jr. Brother of Corazon Aquino; former secretary general, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN); former president, Lakas ng Bansa; congressman. Pasig, March 10, 1985. Concordia, Manuel. Former congressman; member, Liberal Party Executive Committee. Quezon City, November 18, 1986. Danguilan-Vitug, Marites. Former reporter, Business Day; freelance journalist. Quezon City, August 15, 1989. Da vide, Hilario, Jr. Cofounder, Pusyon Bisaya political party; former assemblyman, Interim Batasang Pambansa; former chairman, Commission on Elections. Manila, August 17, 1989. Daza, Raul. Former congressman; former board member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); former board member, Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM); former deputy commissioner, Philippine Commission on GoodGovernment(PCGG); congressman. Pasig, February 19,1987; San Juan, April 12, 1989. De Jesus, Melinda. Former columnist, Bulletin Today; former editor and columnist, Veritas; columnist, Philippine Daily Inquirer. San Juan, July 12, 1989. Deles, Jose. Former coordinator, Movement for the Advancement of Ninoy Aquino (MANA); member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); program manager, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Manila, March 14, 1987; Makati, June 1, 1989. De Vera, Teodoro P. Former senator. Sorsogon, Bicol, January 1986. Dimaporo, Ali. Former governor, Lanao del Sur; congressman. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz and John Sidel.) Pasig, July 25, 1989. Diokno, Jose (deceased). Former senator; former chairman, Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); former leader, Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA); former presidential standard bearer, Convenor Group; former chairman, Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY); former head, Philippine Commission on Human Rights (PCHR). Quezon City, March 23,1985. Diokno, Ma. Serena I. Daughter of Jose Diokno; former member, Movement for the Abolition of the Presidential Commitment Order

244 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(MAPCO); former member, Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA); former board member, Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY); professor, University of the Philippines. June 5, 1989. DuPfeiya, Tito M. (deceased). Pre-martial law congressman; congressman. Quezon City, February 18, 1987. Enrile, Juan Ponce. Former minister of national defense; senator. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Makati, July 31, 1989. Esclamado, Alex. Publisher, Philippine News. South San Francisco, September 9, 1989; September 10, 1989. Espina, Rene. Former governor of Cebu; former board member, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) board member. P&sig, March 10,1985; Makati, March 5, 1987. Feria, Maria. Former member, Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC); former board member, National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA); member, Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY); executive, Department of Foreign Affairs. Manila, March 31, 1989. Ganzon, Rodolfo. Former senator; mayor, Iloilo City. Pasig, March 10, 1985. Garcia, Edmundo. Former member, Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY); Former delegate, Constitutional Commission; professor of political science, University of the Philippines. Telephone interview, May 20, 1985. Gascon, Jose Luis. Former president, student council, University of the Philippines; former delegate, Constitutional Commission. Quezon City, October 14, 1986. Gillego, Bonifacio. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; director of intelligence, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); congressman. P&sig, February 24, 1987; Bulan, Sorsogon, April 20, 1987; Quezon City, May 16, 1989. Gonzales, Norberto. Chairman, Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP). Manila, March 5, 1987; March 12, 1987; San Juan, May 23,1989. Guerrero, Orlando. Former vice president, August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) Executive Committee; former administrator, Manila International Airport. Pasay, December 5, 1986. Guingona, Teofisto. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate, 1978; former national board member, Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (NAJFD); presidential standard bearer, Convenor Group; vice president, Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA); former chairman, Commission on Audit; senator. Quezon City, May 22, 1985; Manila, April 14,1989. Herrera, Ernesto. Secretary general, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP); senator. Manila, April 6, 1989.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 245

Intengan, Rev. Romeo. Vice chairman, Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP). Quezon City, April 12,1989; May 2,1989; May 23, 1989. Juntilla, Alfred. Former Officer in Charge (oic) mayor, Las Pinas; member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI) member; Makati, November 19, 1986. Kalaw, Eva Estrada. Former senator; former vice president, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); former assemblywoman, Batasang Pambansa; former president, Liberal Party (Kalaw wing). Pasig, March 10, 1985; San Juan, March 29, 1989; July 11, 1989; July 21, 1989. Laurel, Herman. Member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); administrator, Philippine Refugee Processing Center. Makati, November 19, 1986. Laurel, Salvador. Former senator; former president, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); vice president, Republic of the Philippines. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Mandaluyong, August 29, 1989. Lopez, Eugenio, Jr. Former board member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); president, ABS-CBN Corporation; president, Manila Chronicle. Pfcsig, May 2, 1989. Lopez, Salvador P. Diplomat; writer; journalist; former president, University of the Philippines; former columnist, Veritas; ambassador at large, Republic of the Philippines. Manila, June 22, 1989. Lovely, Victor Burns, Jr. Former member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); former member, April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); businessman. Quezon City, March 16, 1989; March 28, 1989. Macapagal, Diosdado. Former president, Republic of the Philippines; former president, Constitutional Convention; honorary president, Liberal Party. Quezon City, October 19, 1986; Makati, October 20, 1986. Magno, Alexander. Professor of political science, University of the Philippines; columnist, Manila Chronicle. Several interviews in 1985-1988 and 1989. Malay, Armando, Jr. Assistant professor, Asian Center, University of the Philippines. Quezon City, May 1, 1987. Malvar, Manuel. Former spokesman, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); lawyer. Manila, March 4, 1987. Manglapus, Raul. Former senator; former chairman, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); secretary of foreign affairs. Makati, November 20,1986. Mercado, Orlando. Former television talk show host; former assemblyman, Batasang Pambansa; senator. San Juan, July 3, 1989. Mercado, Rogaciano. Former congressman; former chairman, National

246 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Union for Liberation (NUL); former assemblyman, Batasang Pambansa; former minister of public works and highways; congressman. Quezon City, February 23, 1987; March 2, 1987. Mijares, Priscilla. Wife of Primitivo Mijares; judge, regional trial court. Pasay, August 2, 1989. Mitra, Ramon, Jr. Former senator; Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate, 1978; former assemblyman, Batasang Pambansa; speaker, House of Representatives. Quezon City, March 13, 1985. Monsod, Christian. Former secretary general, National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL); co-chairman, Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC); chairman, Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Makati, August 4, 1989. Montiel, Cristina. Member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Filipino (KASAPI); member, Partido Demokratiko ng Pilipinas—Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN). Telephone interview, October 29,1986. Montiel, Rolando. Former member, April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Filipino (KASAPI); officer, Quezon City General Services. Quezon City, October 15, 1986; May 17, 1989. Morales, Horacio. Former vice president, Development Academy of the Philippines; reputed former chairman, National Democratic Front (NDF); president, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Manila, June 24, 1989. Munoz-Palma, Cecilia. Former justice, Supreme Court; former assemblywoman, Batasang Pambansa; former president, National Unification Council; former president, Constitutional Commission. Quezon City, March 15, 1985. Nemenzo, Francisco. Former dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines; faculty regent, University of the Philippines. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Quezon City, June 19, 1989. Nieva, Teresa. Former chairperson, Concerned Women of the Philippines (CWP); former treasurer, National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL); executive director, Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC). Manila, August 15, 1989. Nuval-Baflfrey, Doris. Former employee, Ministry of Tourism; activist in the Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Filipino (KASAPI); former member, April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); Manila, March 14, 1987. Olaguer, Rev. Antonio. Brother of Eduardo Olaguer; member, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM). Manila, March 25, 1987. Olaguer, Eduardo. Former president, Business Day Information System and Services; former leader, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); businessman. Makati, March 11,1987; March 17,1987; Manila, March 7,1989; Quezon City, March 28, 1989; April 12, 1989. Olivares, Danilo. Former chairman of publicity, public relations and

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 247

propaganda, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM); businessman. Quezon City, February 20, 1987. Ongpin, Maribel. Wife of the late Jaime Ongpin; former officer, national capital region, National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL); chairperson, Alliance of Women for Actions towards Reform (AWARE). Mandaluyong, June 13,1989. Ople, Bias. Former minister of labor; former Constitutional Commissioner. Makati, February 12, 1987. Ordonez, Sedfrey. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; former vice president of legal affairs, Liberal Party; former solicitor general, Republic of the Philippines; former secretary of justice, Republic of the Philippines. Makati, February 3, 1987; February 4, 1987. Oreta, Len. Brother-in-law of Benigno Aquino, Jr.; businessman. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Makati, August 17, 1989. Oreta, Teresa Aquino. Sister of Benigno Aquino, Jr.; congress woman. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Makati, August 17, 1989. Ortigas, Gaston. Former member, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); former executive director, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); dean, Asian Institute of Management. Makati, March 24, 1987. Osmena, John. Nephew of Sergio Osmena, Jr.; former city councilor, Cebu; former congressman; former senator; former secretary general, Liberal Party (Kalaw wing); senator. Manila, March 11, 1985; March 17, 1985. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) Manila, June 22, 1989. Osmena, Sergio, III. Son of Sergio Osmena, Jr; former special assistant to the mayor of Cebu; former chairman, Los Angeles Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); businessman. Telephone interview, September 9, 1989. Padilla, Alexander. Son of former Senator Ambrosia Padilla; former president, student council, University of the Philippines; former secretary general, Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (NAJFD); former member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); former customs commissioner; lawyer. Quezon City, March 27,1985; San Juan, May 18, 1989; May 24, 1989. Padilla, Ambrosia B. Former senator; vice president, Constitutional Commission. Pasig, December 4, 1986. P&laez, Ramon. Former member, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM); businessman. Manila, February 21, 1987. P&lma, Alexander. Member, Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM). New Haven, Conn., October 1987. Planas, Charito. Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate, 1978; board member, Friends of the Filipino People (FFP); Quezon City mayoral candidate, 1987. Quezon City, February 6, 1987.

248 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Prudente, Nemenzo. President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP); former underground opposition figure. Psinakis, Priscilla L. Daughter of Eugenio Lopez; wife of Steve Psinakis; former member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); former member, Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM). San Juan, April 14, 1989. Psinakis, Steve. Former member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); supporter of the April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); member, Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM); businessman. Pasig, October 28, 1986. Puyat, Vicente. Son of former Senate President Gil Puyat; president, Manila Banking Corporation; Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) senatorial candidate, 1987. Quezon City, March 17, 1989. Quezon-Avancena, Zeneida. Daughter of former President Manuel Quezon; former commissioner, Philippine Commission on Human Rights (PCHR). Quezon City, June 7,1989. Ramiro, Teresita. Former member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); director, Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA). Telephone interview, November 18, 1986; Manila, June 2, 1989. Respicio, Zafiro. Former Davao City Officer in Charge, mayor; member, P&rtido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN). Makati, February 18, 1986. Reuter, Rev. James. Former editor, Communicator; supporter, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); director, National Officer of Mass Media. Manila, April 17, 1989. Rocamora, Joel. Former leader, Campaign Against the Marcos Dictatorship (CAMD); director, Transnational Institute. Amsterdam, April 23, 1991. Roces, Alejandro. Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate, 1978; president, Manila Bulletin. Manila, June 30, 1989. Roces, Jesus Marcos. Former chairman, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM); chairman, Magsaysay Foundation; businessman. Manila, August 18, 1989. Roces, Joaquin (deceased). Journalist; publisher; former president, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM). Manila, February 21, 1987. Rodrigo, Francisco. Journalist; poet; former senator; Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) candidate, 1978; member, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); constitutional commissioner. Quezon City, February 5, 1987; Quezon City, April 11, 1989. Rodrigo, Francisco, Jr. Former consul general, Philippine consulate, New York; attorney. Quezon City, April 11, 1989. Rondon, Thelma. Wife of Ernesto Rondon. Former member, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Makati, August 10, 1989.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 249

Resales, Loretta. National council member, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN). Telephone interview, May 20,1985. Saguisag, Rene. Member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); senator. Manila, May 10,1989. Salonga, Jovito. Former senator; president, Liberal Party; senate president, Republic of the Philippines. Pasig, March 24,1985; December 28, 1985; New York City, May 28, 1986; Pasig, February 10, 1989. Salonga, Steve. Son of Jovito Salonga; lawyer. Pasig, March 24, 1985; Quezon City, May 23, 1985; May 28, 1985; New York City, May 28, 1986; Pasig, December 28, 1985; Quezon City, September 30, 1986; Muntinlupa, October 11, 1986; Makati, December 3, 1986; March 3, 1987; February 10, 1989. Sanchez, Augusto. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; former minister of labor; member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); member, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN); lawyer. Quezon City, March 13,1985; March 14,1985; Makati, April 18, 1989. Sarmiento, Abraham. Former delegate, Constitutional Convention; former president, Interim National Assembly Association (INAA); former secretary general, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); former board member, Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (NAJFD); justice, Supreme Court. Quezon City, Metro Manila, October 31, 1986. Sheehan, Rev. Paul. Former staff member, Communicator; former columnist, Malaya. Manila, May 31, 1989. Sin, Cardinal Jaime. Archbishop of Manila. New Haven, Conn., May 26, 1986. Sison, Victor. Former vice chairman, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM); former director, Manila Hotel; businessman. Manila, February 12, 1987. Soliven, Maximo. Former columnist, Manila Times; former columnist, Mr. and Ms.; publisher, Philippine Daily Inquirer. (Interview conducted with Cristina Luz.) San Juan, June 12, 1989. Soriano, Emanuel. Former president, University of the Philippines; cofounder, Convenor Group; former national security adviser. Makati, February 17,1987; February 31,1987. Tabora, Rev. Joel. Project director, Institute on Church and Social Issues. Quezon City, March 30, 1989. Taca, Arturo. Chairman, Former Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP). Telephone interview, September 25,1989. Tadem, Eduardo. Nephew of the late Cesar Climaco; professor of development studies, University of the Philippines. Quezon City, July 14, 1989.

250 • SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tamano, Mamintal. Former commissioner of national integration; former senator; former council member, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); vice president, Muslim Federal Party; senator. Manila, April 4, 1989; April 10, 1989. Tan, Sister Christine. Former superior, Association of Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP). Manila, May 1, 1989. Tanada, Karen. Granddaughter of former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, Jr.; former member, April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI); congressional candidate, 1987; employee, Canadian International Development Agency. Quezon City, December 10, 1986; Manila, February 21, 1987; Makati, March 27, 1987; San Juan, May 10, 1989. Tanada, Lorenzo, Jr. Former senator; convenor, Convenor Group; former chairman, Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (NAJFD); former chairman, Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA); former president, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN); former chairman, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN). Makati, March 28, 1985. Tanada, Lorenzo, III. Son of Lorenzo Tanada, Jr. Executive, ABS-CBN. Makati, April 27, 1989. Tanada, Renato. Son of Lorenzo Tanada, Jr. Former member, April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM); member, Kapalungan ng mga Sandigan (KASAPI); lawyer. Quezon City, April 25, 1989. Tanada, Wigberto. Son of Lorenzo Tanada, Jr. Former member, Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (NAJFD) Executive Committee; member, Bagong Alyansang Makabayn (BAYAN) Executive Committee; member, Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI); senator. Manila, April 24, 1989. Tatad, Francisco. Former minister of information; former assemblyman, interim Batasang Pambansa; former columnist, Business Day. Quezon City, June 27, 1989. Tavera, Mita Pardo de. Former chairwoman, Medical Action Group (MAG); secretary of social welfare and development. Makati, April 10, 1989. Teves, Herminio. Chairman, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) in Negros Oriental. Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, April 10, 1985. Teves, Margarito. Son of Heminio Teves; candidate for the Batasang Pambansa, 1984; congressman. Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, April 10, 1985. Teves, Rey Magno. One of the founders of the Partido Demokratikong Pilipino (PDP), Davao branch; member, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN); employee, Philippine Information Agency. Quezon City, February 18, 1987.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • 2 5 1

Tiglao, Rigoberto. Former business writer, Business Day; former business editor, Manila Chronicle; correspondent, Far Eastern Economic Review. Manila. Several interviews in 1985-1986, 1986-1987, and 1989. Tipon, Ross. Regional coordinator, Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM), Ilocos Norte. Manila, February 21, 1987. Trinidad, Guillermo. Former spokesman for former President Marcos. Honolulu, July 10, 1988. Villafuerte, Luis. Former member, United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO); assemblyman, Batasang Pambansa; governor, Camarines Sur. Quezon City, March 13, 1985. Yabut, Teodoro. Former member, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); former member, Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP); businessman. Quezon City, March 16, 1989. Yuchengco, Alfonso. Financier, Light a Fire Movement (LAFM); chairman, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. Makati, August 3, 1989. Ziga, Victor. Son of former Liberal Party Senator Tecles San Andres Ziga; senator. Quezon City, August 19, 1989.

Index

Abueva, Jose V., 28 Adaza, Homobono, 79, 216nl3 Alonto,AbulKhayr,41 Alonto, Domocao, 42 Alvarez, Heherson, 174, 220n3 Amnesty International, 72-73, 173 Anderson, Jack, 69 Angarra, Edgardo, 179 April 6th Liberation Movement (A6LM), 88-93, 107, 117,205n45,218n57 Aquino, Agapito, 122, 124, 131-132, 134, 136, 147, 157,212n34,213n36 Aquino, Belinda A., 5 Aquino, Benigno S., Jr. ("Ninoy"): assassination of, 6, 8-9, 69, 1 14-1 17, 125, 140-141, 183; and elections, 1 1 , 74-78, 101, 124-125; and Marcos, 33, 36-38, 40, 47-48, 64, 86, 91, 138, 162; and communists, 40, 75, 82, 109, 1 12, 193n33; and Muslim secessionists, 41, 83, 203n6; arrest of, 58, 60; exile in U.S., 83, 89, 92, 95, 1 16-1 17, 206nl ; and April 6th Liberation Movement, 88-93, 205n57; return to Philippines, 109-1 13, 1 16, 21 In78; as eager insurrectionary, 190n45 Aquino, Corazon C. ("Cory"): moral appeal of, 12, 32, 139, 144-146; and 1978 election, 75; and opposition support, 95, 139; and 1984 election, 114, 124, 127, 129, 131; after Aquino assassination, 117, 123-124; and 1986 election, 134, 138, 144-148, 152-154, 183; and communists, 154, 173; and people power, 154, 158-160, 166; and Enrile-RAM coup attempt, 157-158 252

Aquino government: popular legitimacy of, 13, 170-172, 184; economic policies of, 163, 170, 172-174, 222n47; cabinet of, 164-165, 220n3; coup attempts against, 164-165, 1681 70, 2 1 9n 1 ; appointment of local officials, 166-167, 220nl6, 223n64; and communists, 167-168; and second presidential term, 172, 222n35; lack of social reform, 173, 184; and U.S. military bases, 174-175, 222n49; corruption of, 177-178 Aquino, Paul, 86, 136, 147 Araneta, Salvador, 44, 126 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 156, 173 Armacost, Michael H., 107, 121 Arroyo, Joker, 77, 134, 173, 220n3 Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), 7273 August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM), 122, 136 Avelino, Jose, 19 Avila, Charles, 84 Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), 132, 156-157 Bain, David Howard, 217n42 Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA), 132 Batasang Pambansa, 125, 127, 133, 151, 154, 165 Batista, Fulgencio, 4, 93-94, 96-97 Beams, Dovie, 43 Benedicto, Roberto, 53, 79 Bengzon, Alran, 133-134 Berlin, Donald Lane, 35-36

INDEX • 253

Bishop-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development (BBC), 1 18 Bonner, Raymond, 140 Brazil, 51, 181 Broad, Robin, 87, 197n34 Buckley, William, 148 Business elite opposition, 8-9, 49, 54, 101-102, 118, 120, 133-134, 160, 174, 212n23 Campos, Jose, 54 Canoy, Reuben R., 79, 101 , 208n29 Casey, William, 140 Castro, Fidel, 7, 93, 98, 162 Catholic Bishops Conference in the Philippines (CBCP), 118, 151-152, 217n39 Catholic Church: demonstrations after Aquino assassination, 8-9; links to NAMFREL, 29, 1 18, 127; moral appeals campaigns, 31 ; human rights investigations, 71-72; links to Light-a-Fire Movement, 87, 21 2n 17; anti-Marcos protests, 115; after Aquino assassination, 117-118; reconciliation with Marcos, 122-123; support for Corazon Aquino, 139, 147; electoral fraud and violence and, 148-149; nonviolent protest techniques of, 160 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 4 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 26-27, 69, 88, 107-108, 140, 160, 175, 219n66 Chamorro Cardenal, Pedro, 1 15, 123, 211n2 Chehabi, H. E., 4, 94, 188nl3 Chile, 2-3, 5, 5 1,56 Chinese in the Philippines, 6, 20-21, 118, 120,212n24 Clientelism, 11, 15-16, 20-21, 26, 29, 34,49-51,63,182 Climaco, Cesar, 79 Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD), 131-132 Cojuangco, Eduardo, 53, 59, 74, 79, 126,, 129, 142, 147, 167, 178 Cojuangco, Jose, Jr., 75, 124, 134, 136, 155, 167, 174 Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 23-24, 26, 36, 80, 86, 104, 126, 142, 149-151,153 Communist Party of the PhilippinesNew People's Army (CPP-NPA): links to Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., 40, 75, 109; Plaza Miranda bombing, 44, 195n58; in pre-martial law Philippines, 46; and anti-insurgency drive, 64; growth of, under martial law, 65, 72; and elections, 74, 96, 1 12, 123-124, 172; and Sison, 77; alliances of, 82, 100, 105-

107, 122, 132; united front strategy, 99-102, 121-122; andCorazon Aquino, 154, 167-168, 173; communist guerrillas, 175-176 Concepcion, Jose, Jr., 118, 126-127, 220n3 Constitutional Commission, 165-168, 220nl3 Constitutional Convention, 45, 60, 70, 195nn61-62 Constitutions, 3, 22, 66, 164 Convenor Group, 131-132, 134, 136, 145,215nn76-77 Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM), 136, 139, 147 CPP-NPA. See Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army Crisologo, Floro, 40 Cronies, 4-5, 53-55, 67, 1 19, 129, 140, 163, 167, 174 Cuba, 4, 7, 93, 96-99, 124-125, 162 Cuenca, Rodolfo, 53 Cuenco, Antonio, 109, 208n30 Curry, James, 21 De Dios, Emmanuel S., 81 De Guzman, Raul P., 128-129 De Tavera, Mita Pardo, 191 De Venecia, Jose, Jr., 179 Defensor-Santiago, Miriam, 178 Democracy, 10-13, 33-48, 138, 173176, 182. See also Democratization Democratization: in countries other than the Philippines, 1-4, 162, 181, 182; people power in, 1-2; "snowballing" and "demonstration effect" in, 1 , 181, 187nl; theory of, 1-2, 164, 176, 181, 223n55; and "sultanistic" rule, 5-7, 10, 12-13, 138, 167, 181-182; in Philippines, 12-13, 162-179, 181182, 187n2; and "revolutionary" component, 13, 162-163, 181,224nl, 224n3; "third wave" of, 163, 181; and provisional government, 165-168; and coup attempts, 168-170, 173176; and popular legitimacy, 170172; and electoral rules, 176-179 Dimaporo, Ali, 129 Diokno, Jose, 43-44, 60, 73, 75, 100, 104, 106-107, 113, 122, 124, 131-135, 165, 191,231n36 Disini, Herminio, 53 Dominican Republic, 4, 188n21 Durano, Ramon, 129 Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 4, 7, 155 Dy, Faustino, 40-41 , 61 Economy: under Marcos, 13, 25, 33, 1 10, 1 18-1 19, 140, 144; and tourism, 91;

254 • INDEX

Economy (continued) macroeconomic indicators, 119; under Aquino, 145, 163, 170, 172-174, 185,222n47,224nlO El Salvador, 115 Elections in the Philippines: fraud in, 3, 66, 71, 92, 128, 130, 137, 141-144, 148-149, 152, 176-177, 223n57; expenditures on, 10, 34-37; pre-martial law (1946-1971), 10, 15, 21-25, 2629, 34, 37-44; political rules of, 2125; violence in, 35-37, 42-44, 126, 142, 148-150, 176-177, 192nll; 1973 elections (cancelled), 45-49, 70; 1978 elections, 74-80; 1980 elections, 90, 103, 208n28; 1981 elections, 100, 104, 115; boycott of, 103-106, 113, 115, 123-125, 131; 1984 elections, 114, 125-137, 213n41, 214n56; 1986 snap presidential election, 132, 136, 138154; disenfranchisement in, 143-144; 1987 elections, 164, 171-172, 176177, 223n61, 223n64; 1992 elections, 176, 178-179; and democratization, 176-179 Enrile, Juan Ponce: and military, 8, 83, 108, 158, 168, 183; car ambush, 4647; and elections, 79, 102, 129, 171172, 178; coup plans of, 120-121, 149, 153, 155-158; and Corazon Aquino, 163-167, 173; and land reform, 174; and people power, 177 Escalamado, Alexander, 69, 199nl4 Espina, Rene, 167, 208n30 Fernando, Enrique, 55 Ferrer, Jaime N., 126 Floirendo, Antonio, 54 Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), 73 Garcia, Carlos, 21, 34-35 Gillego, Bonifacio, 112, 218n44, 223n61 Golden Buddha affair, 43, 195n52 Gonzales, Neptali, 75, 220n3 Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD), 171 Greece, 8, 224nl Guingona, Teofisto T., 101, 134 Habib, Philip C., 153 Haiti, 4, 7, 155-156, 173, 182 Harrison, Francis, 17 Hawes, Gary, 3 Huks, 16, 18, 25-26, 28, 39-40, 191n47, 192n9, I93n33, 194n35 Human rights violations, 72-74, 85, 118, 163-164, 173, 184

Huntington, Samuel P., 187nl, 224nl, 224n3 Hutchcroft, Paul, 197n34 Ileto, Reynaldo Clemena, 77, 1 16 Insurrectionary strategy: after 1978 elections, 12, 81-82; and Light-a-Fire Movement, 83-88; and April 6th Liberation Movement, 88-93; comparative perspective, 93-96; Manglapus' abandonment of, 109; decline of interest in, 123 Interim National Assembly (INA), 61 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 7172,119,140 Iran, 4, 51, 94, 124-125, 167, 182-183, 206n2, 224n5 Jacinto family, 38-39, 193n29 Javier, Evelio, 142 Jones, Gregg R., 40, 175, 195n58, 206nl,213n39 Jopson, Edgar, 38 Judiciary, 55, 70-71, 197n33 Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA), 122, 131 Kabataang Makabayan (KM), 38 Kalaw, Eva Estrada, 43, 101, 105, 124, 127, 133, 135 Kapalungan ng mga Sandigang Pilipino (KASAPI), 89, 109 KBL, 60-61, 76, 79-80, 102-103, 125126, 129-130, 140-144, 147, 150151, 165, 187 Keithly, Jane, 159 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 94-95, 125 Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. See KBL Kim Dae Jung, 115 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 148 Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL), 124,213n39 Korea, South, 115, 21 In2 LABAN (Lakas ng Bayan), 75-76, 78-79, 99, 101, 109, 111, 113, 122, 124, 171, 201n52 Laban ng Bayan, 137, 147 Labor unions, 72, 105, 106, 168, 188n20,200n32,207nl2 Lacson, Rafael, 24, 31 Land reform, 28, 57, 174, 184 Lande, Carl, 15,29,55,76 Lansdale, Edward, 29 Latin America, 51, 56, 163, 182, 224nl Laurel family, 100-101, 129 Laurel, Jose P., Jr., 43-44, 60, 103-107, 132,214n68

INDEX • 255

Laurel, Jose P., Sr., 15, 24-25, 28, 37, 125, 138,214n68 Laurel, Jose, V, 103 Laurel, Salvador: as presidential aspirant, 12, 60, 132-137, 215n86; and elections, 43-44, 101, 103-104, 124125, 129, 146-148, 171-172, 178; and communists, 105-107, 131; and military dissidents, 108, 113; and UNIDO, 111, 113; reconciliation strategy of, 123; and U.S. government support, 124-125; and Convenor Group, 135, 215n77; and Corazon Aquino, 138, 163, 165-167, 221n28 Laxalt, Paul, 140, 148, 160 Lee Kuan Yew, 185 Liberal Party: in pre-martial law Philippines, 15, 17-19, 21, 25-26, 42, 193n23, 195n51; and Plaza Miranda bombing, 36, 44; and elections, 4548, 74-75, 103-104, 124, 127, 132, 182; during martial law, 61, 64, 7172, 102, 111, 209n45; ideological change of, 107; split of, 124, 213n42; and boycott of NUC convention, 133; and UNIDO, 136 Light-a-Fire Movement (LAFM), 83-88, 109, 204n43, 205n44 Linz, Juan J., 4, 22, 51-52, 164, 188nl3, 210n76 Lopa, Ricardo, 38, 134 Lopa, Teresita, 147 Lopez, Eugenio, 39, 44, 46, 59, 68, 199nl4 Lopez, Eugenio, Jr., 58-59, 68 Lopez, Fernando, 21, 39, 43, 46, 59 Lovely, Victor, 90, 205n57 Lucman, Raschid, 41 Lugar, Richard G., 148, 153 Macapagal, Diosdado, 21, 34-35, 7172,75, 100, 104, 189nl7 Machado, K. G., 189nl8 Magno, Alexander R., 154 Magsaysay, Ramon, 11-12, 26-28, 33, 35, 46, 78, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 182, 189nl3,215nl Manglapus, Raul, 68, 69, 83, 85, 88, 89, 109, 111,138, 139, 200nl6,215nl Marcos, Ferdinand E.: people power against, 1-2; political corruption of, 2-4, 1 1-12, 32, 50, 141-144, 149, 163, 183; "sultanistic" rule of, 2, 4-6, 11, 49-56, 182; cronies of, 4-5, 5355,67, 119, 129, 140, 163, 167, 174; dynasty of, 5, 11, 52-56; fall of, 13, 160-161; and Nacionalista Party, 15; assassination attempts against, 33, 45-46, 58, 195n64; and elections, 34-

37, 101-102, 104, 140-144, 147, 150; and First Quarter Storm, 37-38, 196n66; and Muslim secessionists, 41-42; and Plaza Miranda bombing, 44; Constitutional Convention, 45; family of, 53, 55-56; pseudoreforms of, 56-57; economic confiscation, 5960; and International Monetary Fund, 71-72; release of detainees, 73; and balikbayan program, 91; illness of, 108, 1 10, 1 14; and Aquino's assassination, 116, 140; snap presidential election, 132, 136, 138, 141; and Corazon Aquino, 145-146, 153; and pork barrel, 192n3. See also Marcos regime; Martial law Marcos, Imelda R.: increasing power after Marcos' illness, 4, 108; as possible successor to Marcos, 4, 36, 108, 140, 182; as presidential candidate, 43, 178; "conjugal" dictatorship, 52; corruption of, 67; and elections, 76, 152, 178; meets with Benigno Aquino, 92; and Laurel's criticism, 103; and Aquino assassination, 115; and Tolentino, 141; and women's position in Filipino society, 146; and Shah of Iran, 224n4 Marcos regime: and people power, 1-2, 219n64; conceptualizations of, 2-4; "sultanistic" character of, 2, 4-6, 4956, 115; succession issue, 4, 36, 108, 115, 140-141, 182; character of, 54; foreign loans of, 65-66, 71, 119, 138, 140; liberalization of, 102-103; legacies of, 163 Martial law, 1 1, 34, 37, 47-49, 56-57, 65-66,92, 102-103, 123, 182, 196nl Matalam, Datu Udtog, 41-42, 194n43, 194n47 McCoy, Alfred, 218n44, 219n66 Media, 127, 133, 146, 148, 150, 154, 159 Mijares, Primitive, 49, 52, 57, 69, 208n29 Military: deprofessionalization of, 2-4, 6-7, 55, 97, 1 18; and military regimes, 3; in Argentina, 4; in Chile, 5; coup attempts against "sultanistic" rule, 7, 97, 155-156; in Haiti, 7, 155156, 173; Marcos loyalists in, 7-8, 161, 168, 170, 197n28; in Greece, 8; in pre-martial law elections, 10-1 1, 2324, 35-26, 46; under martial law, 101 1 , 35-36, 54-55, 207nl 1 ; power struggle in, 83; in Cuba, 97; and human rights investigation, 163-164, 173, 184 Military dissidents: coup plots of, 7-8, 83, 115, 121, 139, 149, 155-158, 163, 168-170, 176, 219nl; and Marcos'

256 • INDEX

Military dissidents (continued) downfall, 13, 153-154, 158, 160; and Manglapus, 83; and traditional political opposition, 83, 108, 113, 137, 139, 154, 203nl4; and Laurel, 108, 113; and Corazon Aquino, 139, 153-155, 164-165, 168-170, 184; and people power, 158-160; defeat of, 176, 184; and NAMFREL, 218n47 Misauri, Nurulladji, 41, 61, 82 Mitra, Ramon, 38, 58, 86, 126, 129, 134, 178,204n32,220n3 Mobutu, Seko Sese, 4, 196n6 Mondale, Walter, 85-86 Monsod, Christian, 127 Montano, Delfin, 41 Moral appeals: and democratic tradition, 11, 182-183; Magsaysay's use of, 11-12,27-28, 138-139; traditional political opposition's use of, 1 1, 2932, 44, 87, 79; types of, 29-32, 67; and thepasyon, 31, 77, 1 16; and Benigno Aquino, 76-78, 112, 116-117, 138; Corazon Aquino's use of, 138, 144146, 147, 150, 153 Morales, Horacio, 99-100, 106, 1 13, 207nl3 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 61, 82-83, 223n50 Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), 68-69 Muslim secessionists, 6, 8, 39, 41-42, 46, 61, 63-65, 82-83, 194nn48-49, 223n50 Nacionalista Party, 15, 17-19, 21, 2528,43-44,60, 103, 104, 125, 126 NAMFREL, 26, 29, 126, 128-130, 139, 142-143, 148-151, 158-159,218n47 National Movement for Free Elections. See NAMFREL

National Unification Committee (NUC), 133 Nemenzo, Francisco, 116 Neocolonialism, 26 New Society, 57, 67-68 Nicaragua, 4, 7, 5 1,93, 96-99, 114, 123125,157,162,167,182,183 Nixon, Richard, 39, 65 NPA. See Communist Party of the Philippines— New People's Army Nuval-Baffrey, Doris, 91-92 O'Donnell, Guillermo, 3, 97 Olaguer, Antonio, 84, 87 Olaguer, Eduardo, 84-85, 96, 204n42 Olalia, Rolando, 168 Ongpin, Jaime V., 119, 134, 149,215n70, 218n47,220n3

Opposition groups, classification of, 7— 9. See also Business elite opposition; Catholic Church; Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army; Military dissidents; Muslim secessionists; RAM; Social democratic opposition; Traditional political opposition Ortega, Daniel, 109, 157 Ortega, Humberto, 93 Osmena family, 208n30 Osmena, Sergio, 17-18 Osmena, Sergio, Jr., 37-38, 46, 59 Osmena, Sergio, III, 58, 68 Padilla, Ambrosio, 1 32 Padilla, Moises, 31 Pahlavi monarchy. See Shah of Iran Partido Demokratikong Pilipino (PDF), 109,111 Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN), 109, 111,113, 124-127,131-136,167 Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP), 75-76, 79, 82-84 Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), 18 Partido ng Bayan (PnB), 171, 177, 221n27 People power, 1-2, 12, 154, 157-161, 163, 177, 183 People's Assembly for the Pope's Arrival (PAPA), 100, 207nl6 People's MIND, 100-101 Personalistic rule. See "Sultanistic" rule Peru, 56 Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 167 Pimentel, Aquilino, 109, 134, 167, 173, 220n3 Pinochet, Augusto, 2-3, 5, 51, 56 Plaza Miranda bombing, 36, 44 Portugal, 162, 185, 224nl Presidential Commission on Human Rights (PCHR), 165,173 Psinakis, Steve, 68, 81, 84, 88-89, 9293, 205n45 Puyat, Gil, 43, 86 Puyat, Vicente, 86-87, 137 Quezon, Manuel L., 17-18 Quirino, Elpidio, 10-1 1, 16, 24-28, 35, 37,45_46,81, 125, 138-139, 189nl7 Radio Veritas, 127, 159 RAM, 83, 121, 149, 153-160, 163, 165, 168, 170, 173, 183,218n47,218n49, 219n66 Ramos, Fidel V., 8, 13,83, 157, 158, 164165, 173, 174, 178-179, 185,219n67

INDEX • 257

Reagan, Ronald, 93, 115, 139-141, 148, 153 Recto, Claro M., 28, 30, 100 Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement. See RAM Revolution, 2, 7, 12, 96-99, 1 12-113. See also Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army Rizal, Jose, 77, 116-1 17 Roces, Joaquin ("Chino"), 58, 101, 136 Rodrigo, Francisco, 58, 67-68, 70, 77, 87, 137-138 Romania, 4, 224nl Romualdez, Benjamin, 53, 59, 79, 129 Rosenberg, David A., 22 Roxas, Gerardo, 38, 73-75, 100-101, 104-107, 111, 208nl8 Roxas, Manuel A., 18, 167 Roxas, SixtoK., Ill, 71 Rush, James, 133, 188n8 Salonga, Jovito: and student radicals, 38; and Plaza Miranda bombing, 44; on martial law, 49; on human rights issues, 73-74; and elections, 74, 124, 137, 178, 194; and coup attempts, 83; and A6LM, 90, 107; exile of, 92; as Liberal Party head, 107, 111,113; return from exile, 131; and PPGG, 167 Sanchez, Augusto, 101, 173 Sandinistas, 7, 97-98, 110, 124, 157, 162 Sarmiento, Abraham, 107 Schmitter, Philippe C, 97 Schultz, George, 121 Shah of Iran, 4,51, 94, 115, 125, 138, 182,196n6,224n4 Shalom, Stephen R., 26 Shantz, Arthur Alan, 31,35 Shaplen, Robert, 50, 56 Shoesmith, Dennis, 1 17 Silverio, Ricardo, 54 Sin, Jaime, 9, 84, 87, 1 17, 122-123, 126, 137, 144-145, 155, 157-158, 212nl7 Singson, Chavit , 40-4 1,61 Sison, Jose Maria, 38, 40, 77, 82, 100 Social democratic opposition, 8-9, 7576, 79, 82-84, 89, 107, 109, 1 13, 131 , 218n57 Social reform, 28, 56-57, 173, 184 Solarz, Stephen, 149 Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 93-94, 96, 114-115, 119, 123, 138, 182, 196n6 Soriano, Emmanuel V., 133-134 Spain, 181, 185, 224nl "Sultanistic" rule: of Marcos regime, 2, 4_6, 49-56, 115, 182; Weber's original use, 4, 188nl3; opposition to, 5-7, 97; coup attempts against, 7, 97, 155-

156; democracy following, 10, 12-13, 138, 182; democratic opposition to, 11-12; from clientelistic democracy to, 49-51, 63; definition of, 50-51; pseudoreform under, 5 1 ; legitimacy of, 94; and revolution, 96-99; and boycotted elections, 124 Tanada, Lorenzo, 25, 74-75, 82, 101, 107, 132, 134-135, 138 Tancangco, Luzviminda G., 128-129 Task Force Detainees (TFD), 73 Tatad, Francisco S., 102 Technocrats, 3-4, 47, 55-56 Terrorism. See Insurrectionary strategy Tiglao, Rigoberto, 172 Tolentino, ArturoM., 141, 147, 151, 169 Traditional political opposition: description of, 6; pre-martial law, 6, 1013, 15-48; origins of, 17-19; and communists, 39-41, 75-76, 82, 96, 100-106, 114, 121-123, 131-132, 209n45, 212n34, 213n36; and Muslim secessionists, 41-43, 83; demobilization of, 57-63; exposing constitutional hypocrisy, 64-68, 70-74; exile activities of, 65, 68-70, 86, 93, 199n9, 202n4, 203n6, 205nn46-47; and social democrats, 75-76, 79, 83, 89-93, 107, 109, 117, 131; and military dissidents, 83, 108, 113, 137, 139, 154,203nl4; defections to, 102-103, 208nn29-30; after Aquino assassination, 1 14-125. See also Elections in the Philippines; Insurrectionary strategy; Moral appeals; United Nationalist Democratic Organization; and specific politicians Trujillo, Rafael, 4, 196n6 Truman, Harry, 25 United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), 100-101, 103109, 124-127, 131-132, 136, 147, 209n35 United States: colonialism in Philippines, 6, 17; intervention in Philippine politics, 26-29; urban reformers, 30; government support of Marcos, 47-48, 65-66, 69, 79, 105, 1 10, 115, 138; military bases in Philippines, 47, 131, 145, 174-175, 185,222n49; and Philippine exiles, 68-70; and "sultanistic" regimes, 98; support of traditional political opposition, 107108, 121; change in attitude toward Marcos, 121, 140, 153; reaction to Aquino assassination, 121; funding of NAMFREL, 126; and Laurel, 135; sup-

258 • I N D E X United States (continued) port for Corazon Aquino, 139, 148, 175; election fairness, 148; in Haiti, 155; withdrawal of support for Marcos, 160-161 Uruguay, 2-3, 115, 21 In2 Ver, Fabian, 8, 54-55, 69, 83, 99, 108, 115, 140-142, 156-157, 168, 219n64

Villafuerte, Luis, 129 Virata, Cesar, 56 Warlords, 24, 58, 61, 129, 142 Weber, Max, 4, 188nl3 Will, George, 136, 153 Wilson, Woodrow, 17 World Bank, 7 1-72 Wurfel, David, 182, 187n2 Zaire, 4