The Anti-Federalist: An Abridgment of The Complete Anti-Federalist 9780226775623

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The Anti-Federalist

The Anti-Federalist An Abridgment, by Murray Dry, of The Complete Anti-Federalist Edited, with Commentary and Notes, by

Herbert J. Storing

The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1981, 1985 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1985 Printed in the United States of America I I 12 13 12 I I 10

ISBN: 0-226-77565-8 (paper)

Library o/Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Complete Anti-Federalist. Selections. The Anti-Federalist. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. United States-Constitutional historySources. 2. Political science-United StatesHistory-Sources. 3. United States-Constitutional law. 1. Dry, Murray. II. Storing, Herbert J., 1928-77. III. Title. JK155·C6525 1985 342.73'029 84-16207 347.3022 9

§ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39·48-199 2.

Contents

Preface by Murray Dry Introduction

vii 1

Centinel, Letter I Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention: Letters from The Federal Farmer, I-VII and XVI-XVII Essays of Brutus

7

23

103

PENNSYLVANIA

Introduction The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents

199

201

MASSACHUSETIS

Introduction Letters of Agrippa, I-XI

225 227

MARYLAND

Introduction A Farmer, Essay V

255 257

Contents VIRGINIA

Introduction The Impartial Examiner, Essay I Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention

273 275

293

NEW YORK

Introduction Speeches by Melancton Smith

Bibliography Index

329 33 1

Preface

The purpose of this abridgment of Herbert J. Storing's The Complete AntiFederalist is to provide students of American political thought, especially those concerned with the American founding, with a one-volume companion to The Federalist. The writings and speeches have been chosen on the basis of the importance of their arguments and their prominence in the ratification campaign. In making the selections I have followed my late teacher's suggestions as implicit in his commentary to the entries in the complete work and in his extended essay What the Anti-Federalists Were For (see bibliography). The first chapter of that essay forms the introduction to the present book. Storing's manner of presenting the Anti-Federalists was to begin with the non-signers' objections and the first major essays, moving to a geographical order that follows the chronology of the ratification-Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New England, Virginia and the South, and New York. My abridgment adopts the same order, with material from each area. The most substantial selections are the letters of Brutus (complete) and those of The Federal Farmer (abridged). These are the ablest and most influential of the Anti-Federalist writings and offer an alternative to The Federalist on such subjects as federalism, republicanism, judicial review, and a Bill of Rights. Much of the editorial apparatus of The Complete Anti-Federalist has been retained-Storing's introductions to each part of the ratification campaign and to each selection included here; the notes with their extensive cross references; and the marginal paragraph numbers. (The three-part number system was devised for convenient cross reference; the first number denotes the volume of The Complete Anti-Federalist, the second the position of the essay within that volume, and the third the paragraph.) Where omissions have been made within a selection, the original paragraph and note numbers remain unchanged. Some numbers are therefore nonconsecutive, and Storing's introductions in some instances refer to passages not included in this abridgment. The reader wishing to consult the complete edition should have little trouble locating particular passages there. (A table of contents of The Complete Anti-Federalist may be found in the Appendix to the paperback What the Anti-Federalists Were For.) The bibliography for this abridgment consists of two parts. To the list of works frequently cited by Storing, with the abbreviations he uses in the notes, I vii

Preface have added a number of books and articles--some cited by or known to Storing and others published since his death in 1977. I have sought to keep the one-volume edition faithful to the high quality and thoroughness of Storing's original work. MURRAY DRY

viii

Introduction

The Constitution of the United States was viewed by the founding generation as distinctive, even unique, in the extent to which it was the product of deliberation. Most previous foundings seemed to have been the result of chance or the edict of one all-powerful man. But the United States Constitution was framed by a numerous and diverse body of statesmen, sitting for over three months; it was widely, fully, and vigorously debated in the country at large; and it was adopted by (all things considered) a remarkably open and representative procedure. Viewed in this light, those who opposed the Constitution must be seen as playing an indispensable if subordinate part in the founding process. They contributed to the dialogue of the American founding. To take only the most obvious case, the Constitution that came out of the deliberations of 1787 and 1788 was not the same Constitution that went in; for it was accepted subject to the understanding that it would be amended immediately to provide for a bill of rights. Moreover, the founding of a nation does not end with the making of a constitution. The Constitution did settle many questions, and it established a lasting structure of rules and principles-we do not adopt the current cant that fundamental law is shapeless stuff to be formed at will by future generations. But it did not settle everything; it did not finish the task of making the American polity. The political life of the communit~ continues to be a dialogue, in which the Anti-Federalist concerns and principles still play an important part. The Anti-Federalists are entitled, then, to be counted among the Founding Fathers, in what is admittedly a somewhat paradoxical sense, and to share in the honor and the study devoted to the founding. In general, however, they have not enjoyed such a position. Champions of a negative and losing cause, they have found only a cramped place in the shadow of the great constitutional accomplishment of 1787. They have often been presented as narrow-minded local politicians, unwilling to face the utter inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation or incapable of seeing beyond the boundaries of their own states or localities. They have been described as men without principle, willing to use any argument to drag down the Constitution, yet willing, many of them, when the Constitution was adopted, to change their colors and become enthusiastic Federalists. 1 It is true that with the rise of the Beardian critique of the Constitution and its framers, the Anti-Federalists have been viewed with a more friendly eye. Merrill Jensen

Introduction has taught us to take seriously the possibility that the Anti-Federalists were right about the need for only modest changes in the Articles of Confederation and about the departure of the Constitution from the principles of the Revolution. He has inspired a full historical account of the Anti-Federal movement, and he has pointed to the need to take up the serious study of Anti-Federal thought. At the same time, the harsh edges of Beardian analysis have been worn away, and we are now in a position to consider afresh the class differences involved in the constitutional controversy, freed of many of the Beardian excesses. 2 Yet valuable as all of this has been, the corrected Beardian eye betrays still its original squint. It tends to see simple democratic agrarians among the Anti-Federalists as it tends to see selfseeking commercial oligarchs among the Federalists. 3 There is some basis for these views, but the picture is thin and distorted. Indeed, one of the few substantial accounts of Anti-Federal thought is a persuasive refutation of the Beardian thesis as applied to the Anti-Federalists and an attempt to show that the Anti-Federalists were in fact "men oflittle faith" in American national self-government. 4 Gordon Wood has added greatly to our understanding of the Anti-Federalists in his rich and encyclopedic account of the American founding and the way the Americans gradually blundered into a new political theory. Deep and lucid as his insights often are, however, Wood is finally less interested in understanding the Anti-Federalists (or the Federalists) as they understood themselves than in exposing the deeper social forces from which the whole sphere of "ideology," to use Bailyn's term, is derivative. Thus a debate that was for the Anti-Federalists fundamentally political becomes for Wood fundamentally sociological. S There has been no sustained, comprehensive attempt to examine the thought, the principles, the argument of the Anti-Federalists, as they were understood by the Anti-Federalists themselves and by the other men of that time. Such an examination will be undertaken here. The aim will not be a history of the Anti-Federal movement or an analysis of its economic, sociological, or psychological underpinnings. We shall try to avoid presupposing some external set of questions or framework of analysis. Rather, we shall try to proceed from inside Anti-Federal thought, seeing the questions as they saw them, following the arguments as they made them. We shall explore the different levels of Anti-Federal theorizing, working our way critically through and if necessary beyond them, but always with the idea that the Anti-Federalists may have something to teach. Because the American founding took the form of a debate or dialogue, Anti-Federal thought is best examined within the movement and different levels of that dialogue. For this reason it will be necessary to take some note of the Federalist as well as the Anti-Federalist side of the debate, but the purpose is to present only so much of what the Anti-Federalists were against as is necessary to understand what they were for. In beginning with the question of what the Anti-Federalists werefor, we

2

Introduction are not, it most be admitted, adhering to the aim of presenting the AntiFederalist argument as it presented itself. The Anti-Federalists were primarily against the Constitution. We do remain true to our aim in a deeper and more significant sense, however, because the Anti-Federalists themselves understood their negative conclusions about the Constitution to be derived from a positive political theory or set of political principles. 6 The aim, then, will be to give a sympathetic, critical, and full account of the fundamental Anti-Federal position. Was there, however, a single Anti-Federal position? In the most obvious sense there surely was not. The Federalists claimed that the opposers of the Constitution could not agree among themselves, that they shared no common principles, that their arguments canceled each other out. This is an exaggeration, for there was more agreement about many points of opposition to the Constitution than might appear at first glance. 7 Yet it is not possible to read far among the Anti-Federal writings without being struck by an extraordinary heterogeneity. It would be difficult to find a single point about which all of the Anti-Federalists agreed. They did not, finally, even agree unanimously in opposing the adoption of the Constitution. Many favored adoption if amendments could be secured; and others finally accepted the Constitution, even without a guarantee of amendment, as the best of the available choices. There is in fact no hard and fast way of even identifying .. Anti-Federalists." Some men, notably Edmund Randolph, were Federalist and Anti-Federalist at different times. Moderate or lukewarm adherents to either side were often almost indistinguishable from one another. Moreover, the specific points of disagreement and the reasons given by the Anti-Federalists were various and even contradictory. This is not to say that the Federalists were in much better condition. There is an impression of greater unity here because the Federalists were (in general) unified in supporting the Constitution, although some Federal reservations are scarcely distinguishable from Anti-Federal objections. That impression has been strengthened by the Federalists' victory and by the massive impact on later generations of The Federalist papers, which have tended to occupy the Federalist stage and lend their unity to the whole group supporting the Constitution. I There were in fact diverse and contradictory opinions among the Federalists just as there were among their opponents. If the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were divided among themselves, they were, at a deeper level, united with one another. Their disagreements were not based on different premises about the nature of man or the ends of political life. They were not the deep cleavages of contending regimes. They were the much less sharp and clear-cut differences within the family, as it were, of men agreed that the purpose of government is the regulation and thereby the protection of individual rights and that the best instrument for this purpose is some form of limited, republican government. It is their common ground that explains, to a large extent, the relatively unclear line

3

Introduction between the two camps and the diversity within each of them. This is not to say that the differences are negligible, as those would argue who claim that there is no basic political controversy or political theorizing in the United States. 9 The differences are limited, but they are nevertheless substantial and well formed. The nation was born in consensus but it lives in controversy, and the main lines of that controversy are well-worn paths leading back to the founding debate. In searching for the underlying unity in the Anti-Federal position we are not tabulating the frequency of different arguments. We are looking not for what is common so much as for what isfundamental. We might well find the foundations laid in a very few writings, even a single one. Thus, on the Federalist side, a James Madison is more important in this kind of quest than a Tench Coxe, not because he is more typical or more influential in a direct sense but because he sees farther or better. He can explain more. The same is true on the Anti-Federal side of The Federal Farmer, Brutus, and such little known writers as A [Maryland] Farmer and The Impartial Examiner. Not all of these men were widely read, and some of them made arguments that were uncommon; but they explored or at least exposed the theoretical ground that most other Anti-Federalists took for granted. Proceeding in this way, clearing our path through the superficial tangle, dealing as well as we can with the patches of obscurity and looseness we find in even the best Anti-Federal thinkers, we shall discover a set of principles that is a good deal clearer and more coherent, and also more relevant to an understanding of the American founding and the American polity, than has usually been supposed. But we shall also find, at the very heart of the Anti-Federal position, a dilemma or a tension. This is the critical weakness of Anti-Federalist thought and at the same time its strength and even its glory. For the Anti-Federalists could neither fully reject nor fully accept the leading principles of the Constitution. They were indeed open to Hamilton's scornful charge of trying to reconcile contradictions. to This is the element of truth in Cecelia Kenyon's characterization of them as men of little faith. They did not fail to see the opportunity for American nationhood that the Federalists seized so gloriously, but they could not join in grasping it. They doubted; they held back; they urged second thoughts. This was, however, not a mere failure of will or lack of courage. They had reasons, and the reasons have weight. They thought-and it cannot easily be denied-that this great national opportunity was profoundly problematical, that it could be neither grasped nor let alone without risking everything. The AntiFederalists were committed to both union and the states; to both the great American republic and the small, self-governing community; to both commerce and civic virtue; to both private gain and public good. At its best, Anti-Federal thought explores these tensions and points to the need for any significant American political thought to confront them; for they were not resolved by the Constitution but are inherent in the principles and traditions of American political life. 4

Introduction I. See John Fiske. The Critical Period of American History. 1783-1789 (Boston 1888) ch. 7; George Bancroft. History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States ofAmerica (New York 1882) II. book 4 passim; George Ticknor Curtis. Constitutional History ofthe United States: From Their Declaration of Independence to the Close of the Civil War (New York 1889) I. 626; Andrew McLaughlin. The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-1789 (New York 19(5) ch. 17; Forrest McDonald. E Pluribus Unum (Boston 1965) 208. 2. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York 1913. 1935); Merrill Jensen. The Articles of Confederation (Madison, Wise., 1940); Jensen, The New Nation (New York 1950); Jackson Turner Main. The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution (Chapel Hill. N.C., 1960); Forrest McDonald. We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago 1958); Robert E. Brown. Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton 1956); Jackson Turner Main, "Charles A. Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Review of Forrest McDonald's We the People," William and Mary Quarterly January 1960, 8S-102. with a rebuttal by Forrest McDonald, ibid. 102-10. 3. See, e.g .• Main, Antifederalists 28()-81. 4. Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government," William and Mary Quarterly January 1955; Kenyon, "Introduction," The Anti-Federalists (Indianapolis 1966). 5. Gordon Wood. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C .• 1969) ch. Il. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge. Mass .• 1967). 6. For this reason" Anti-Federalist" seems the best rendering of the name. There was no consistent usage at the time and there has been none since. "Anti-Federalist" balances the positive and negative sides by giving the group (or the position) a proper name. while still emphasizing its character as opposition. The typographically convenient "Antifederalist." now generally in favor. suggests more cohesion than actually existed. while "anti-Federalist" suggests a merely negative. dependent unity. Forrest McDonald. apparently the only other writer to consider this little question in print, agrees about the implications of the main forms. He adopts "anti-Federalist" as "the more neutral term"; and while it is not neutral. it does accurately reflect his opinion, contrary to the conclusion here, that there was no significant theoretical coherence in the Anti-Federalist arguments or principles. Forrest McDonald. "The anti-Federalists, 1781-1789," Wisconsin Magazine of History Spring 1963. 206n. 7. Plebeian 6.11 and others. 8. The fundamental unity of The Federalist can be disputed. See Douglass Adair. "The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers" part 2, William and Mary Quarterly April and July 1944; repro in Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers, ed. H. Trevor Colbourn (New York 1974) 27-74. Alpheus Mason, "The Federalist-a Split Personality," American Historical Review LVII. no. 3 (1952). Gottfried Dietze, The Federalist (Baltimore 1960). 9. See Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago 1953). 10. The Federalist no. 23. 151.

5

Centinei, Letter I (PHILADELPHIA) INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER

and (PHILADELPHIA) FREEMAN'S JOURNAL

October 1787

The most prolific and one ofthe best known of the Anti-Federalist essayists was the Centinel, whose essays appeared in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer and the Philadelphia Freeman's Journal and were widely reprinted. although not in their entirety. 1 The first two numbers were printed in numerous newspapers and also appeared separately as broadsides. z The first nine letters were reprinted in an Anti-Federalist collection, issued in New York in 1788.3 There are three groups of Centinel essays. The first eighteen numbers, published between 5 October 1787 and 9 April 1788, discuss the principles of the new Constitution and of its advocates. Papers XIX to XXIV, published in October and November 1788, were aimed at influencing the election of representatives to the new Congress, the Constitution having been adopted; they are concerned chiefly with party politics in Pennsylvania, past and present. and with the financial affairs of Robert Morris and his associates. Finally, in the autumn of 1789, there appeared another dozen essays under the heading "Centinel Revived," which deal with the proposed amendments to the federal Constitution and with the state constitution and state political affairs. Only the first group is reprinted here. The Centinelletters were generally attributed at the time to Judge George Bryan. a prominent Pennsylvania legislator and judge, who was the principal leader of the Anti-Federalists in his state. However, Judge Bryan's son, Samuel, claimed to be the author in several private letters;4 and it is now generally thought that he was the author, although reflecting the views of and no doubt working in close collaboration with his father.s Centinel does not present systematic arrangement and development of argument, like, say, the letters of The Federal Farmer, or the essays ofCato or Brutus; his essays are rather like a series of partially spontaneous speeches made over a period of time to a shifting and somewhat inattentive audience. Variations on a set of themes rather than a schematic development of themes is Centinel's style. Typically he starts an essay by going over some of the ground of the last one, sometimes moving on to new 7

Centinel matters, sometimes developing themes barely mentioned before, sometimes substantially repeating earlier arguments. Centinel tends to lay his heaviest emphasis on rather shallow statements of certain standard themes-the importance of resisting the influence of great names, the critical position of the press and the attempts by Federalists to stifle it, the various nefarious practices indulged in by the friends of the Constitution, etc. The more significant and substantial arguments typically spin out from these primary themes. Except for their length and their notoriety, it can hardly be maintained, as Konkle attempts to do, that "these papers at once took rank, on their side, with The Federalist papers on the other. "6 There are substantial and important arguments, in addition to information of a historical interest, scattered throughout the papers; but the papers do not, taken as a whole, compare in quality with the best Anti-Federalist writing, to say nothing of The Federalist. The first essay is indeed of major importance in the corpus of Anti-Federalist writings; the second essay is important; the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eleventh contain material of interest to the student of AntiFederalist ideas; the remaining essays will properly be passed over by most nonspecialist readers. There follows a brief description of the content of each essay. In his first essay, Centinel, after urging the need for dispassionate and deliberate examination, turns to a discussion of John Adams' principle of balanced government. Centinel objects that, first, there is not human wisdom enough to construct such a government; second, it would not last; third, it would not, in any case, answer the purpose of preserving liberty. The correct principle offree government is responsibility of the government to the people where the people are virtuous and property is pretty equally distributed. Thus the best government has a simple structure, short terms of office, rotation, etc. The proposed Constitution is neither balanced, as Adams wants, nor responsible, as Centinel thinks best. Centinel next turns to the powers of the Congress under the new Constitution, concluding with the warning that it is the opinion of all writers that a very extensive country cannot be governed on democratic principles except by a confederation of a number of smaller republics (2.7.11-19). He then discusses the structure of the new government, concluding that the Senate will be the great efficient body and that the government will be in practice an irresponsible aristocracy. Finally Centinel objects that no provision has been made for the liberty of the press or for jury trial. Repeating the need for fundamental and free discussion, free of the "splendor of names," Centinel turns in his second essay to a point-by-point refutation of one of the most influential Federalist statements, James Wilson's brief address to the citizens of Philadelphia on 6 October. 7 Centinel argues that the powers of the federal government, particularly in the area of taxation and the judiciary, will destroy the states and endanger the freedom of the press and personal liberty, which are unprotected by a bill of rights.

8

Letter I He argues that no standing army should be permitted in time of peace except with the vote of two-thirds of the legislature, that the Senate will become the nucleus of a permanent aristocracy, that the provisions for amendment are illusory, and that the opposition to the Constitution, far from consisting of interested men, includes the respectable yeomen, a number of the members of the Philadelphia Convention, and the majority of the Congress. The third essay begins with repetition of earlier arguments about the importance of the decision to be made, the need for fundamental investigation, and the dubious motives of the Federalists. Centinel describes the events leading to the Constitution and its ratification in Pennsylvania, which show an intention to establish a new permanent aristocracy, hidden by the old forms. He goes on to criticize the power given to the Congress to alter state regulations regarding the times, places, and manner of holding elections for the federal congress, for calling forth the militia, and for protecting the slave trade for a period of twenty years-this last being the only significant contribution of this paper (2.7.76). He concludes with an expression of surprise at Quaker support of the Constitution and a reference to Brutus' discussion of the impracticability of maintaining a free government over so extensive a territory. The fourth essay is more substantial. Here Centinel contends that the present difficulties ofthe United States are due to the enormous demands of financing the Revolution rather than to intrinsic deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation. Warning against the danger of governing overmuch and thus weakening the people's sense of obligation and duty, so important in free government, Centinel argues that the only amendment necessary is one giving Congress the power to lay an impost on commerce and to regulate trade. He concludes by yet again discoursing on the secrecy with which the Constitution was formulated, the stifling of discussion, the reliance on great names, the exaggeration of present distresses, the attempt to represent the new government as the only alternative, the weight of the opposition, and the need for reconsideration. The fifth essay is cast in the form of a reply to a remark by James Wilson in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that a consolidation of the United States would be improper. It is largely a repetition of arguments made in numbers I and II about the extensive powers of the general government under the new Constitution, but Centinel discusses the "necessary and proper" clause for the first time and rebuts Wilson's argument that the Constitution requires the preservation of the states by showing that the states might become mere boards of election and eventually (by means of Congress's ultimate power to provide for elections) be eliminated altogether. This paper contains brief but interesting remarks on dual sovereignty (2.7.99-100) and on the object of government being to check and control the ambitious and designing (2.7.101). Commenting on the "incredible transition" of a people once fuD of zest

9

Centinel for liberty now about to sacrifice it, ignoring acknowledged danger in the new Constitution "in order to reap the golden harvest of regulated commerce," Centinel expatiates in his sixth essay on the lust of dominion and the need to guard against it in establishing political systems: "the great end of civil government is to protect the weak from the oppression of the powerful to put every man upon the level of equal liberty .... " (2.7.107). The seventh essay contains nothing of substance. Centinel goes beyond his earlier remarks only in the strength of his denunciation of the Pennsylvania Federalists and in his suggestion that, despite the favorable action of the Pennsylvania convention, the people, aroused by "the enlightened pen of patriotism," will "assert their liberty, if necessary, by the sword" (2.7.116). He ends by calling for a second convention. The eighth essay contains further reflections on the benefits of freedom, the dangers of the new Constitution, the corrupt character and treasonable activities of the advocates of the Constitution, concealed behind such respected names as Washington. The essay adds little to previous discussions except violence of language and a remark on the character of the merchant who, immersed in his narrow schemes of wealth. is the last to see a threat to public liberty (2.7.126). Essay IX opens with praise of the Pennsylvania constitution as the triumph of patriotism over ambition. a victory which the well-born few seek to overturn. The Constitution contains a mere pretense of reservations in favor of liberty and is in fact a surrender at will and pleasure to our rulers. The illicit activities of the Federalists are further traced. The tenth essay describes the success of the press in rousing the people to the dangers of the Constitution and the reaction of James Wilson and the Federalists in establishing a committee to collect funds to increase the stream of Federalist propaganda and to prepare for the use of force if necessary. In his eleventh essay Centinel returns to more systematic argument. There are three arguments chiefly relied upon by the advocates of the Constitution: (I) the distresses of the community. (2) the evils of anarchy. (3) and the horrible consequences of the dissolution of the Union. The first having been treated in previous papers, Centinel here discusses the second and third, arguing that even anarchy is preferable to certain despotism because good government may grow out of it, that in any case anarchy is more likely if the Constitution is adopted than if it is not, that the event of separate confederacies is improbable-is in fact a hobgoblin sprung from the brain of the author of The Federalist-and that, even admitting that disunion would be the result of rejection of the Constitution, occasional wars are preferable to despotism. Centinel closes with a complaint about the Post Office suppression of the circulation of newspapers from state to state. In the twelfth_essay Centinel defends his contention that the activities of the proponents of the Constitution constitute a conspiracy, by exposing

IO

Letter I their sensitiveness to the charge, their reliance on the authority of names, their precipitation in such places as Massachusetts, and their attempt to shackle the press, particularly in Pennsylvania. The thirteenth essay contains further denunciations of the activity of the "conspirators," ending with a call for the establishment of local societies by and communication among the "patriots" to "frustrate the machinations of an ambitious junto" (2.7.160). In his fourteenth essay Cenl;nel presents extensive extracts from Luther Martin's Genuine Information to prove that the new Constitution does not and was not intended to establish a federal government but provides instead for a consolidation. He ends with further discussion of the suppression of the circulation of Anti-Federalist newspapers. Returning to the theme of the first essay, Centinel observes in his fifteenth paper that, the science of government being most difficult and abstruse,. men are likely to be imposed on by the artful and designing, particularly at times like the present, when the healthy distrust of innovation has been lost. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a consideration of the Massachusetts ratification, showing that circumstances in Massachusetts led many men of property to join the Federalist conspiracy, that the elections were held in the heat of enthusiasm, and that few able Anti-Federalists were elected, and that even so, the Constitution was ratified by a bare majority and with qualifying amendments. In his sixteenth essay Centinel argues that the ex post facto provision precludes the new Congress from taking measures to compel public defaulters to render an account. If Congress should desire nevertheless to secure the money for the government, the members would be precluded by their oath to support the Constitution; and if they proceeded nevertheless, they would be restrained by the Supreme Court, which (Centinel argues here) will have the power to construe the Constitution in last resort. The failure to secure the old debts due to the United States would also be unjust to certain states, like Pennsylvania, which had made unusual exertions to meet their obligations, and would give unfair advantage to the delinquent states. Centinel devotes the first part of his seventeenth essay to a continuation of his argument that the Constitution was intended to screen public defaulters, discussing particularly the financial affairs of Robert Morris and of General Thomas MiflIin, the quartermaster general. He alludes again to the Post Office "suppression" of "patriotic" newspapers and concludes with a defense of Anti-Federalist writer, Benjamin Workman, against the attack of Francis Hopkinson. The eighteenth and last essay contains further discussion of the insidious measures taken to promote the establishment of the Constitution, particularly the propagation of false information of unanimous Federalist sentiment in various parts of the country and the muzzling of the press. The strength of

II

Centinel Anti-Federalist sentiment in Pennsylvania is described. The Centinel retains his anonymity in order to avoid mere personal attacks, which would deflect attention from the proper object. I. With the exception of the second essay, the essays appeared first in the Independent Gazetteer. Most but not all were printed shortly thereafter in the Freeman's Journal. 2. It was these broadsides, presumably. that were distributed by the New York Federal Republican Committee. See Main. Antifederalists 235. 3. Observations on the Proposed Constitution for the United States of America. Clearly Shewing It To Be a Complete System of Aristocracy and Tyranny and Destructive of the Rights and Liberties of the People (New York 1788. Contains, in addition to the Centinel essays, the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention [below, 3. I n, Edmund Randolph's letter of 10 October 1787 to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates [above, 2.5) and the proposed Constitution). 4. According to McMaster and Stone, whose source is a private communication from the historian Paul Leicester Ford. Samuel Bryan wrote to George Clinton, saying, "I have not the honor of being personally known to your Excellency, but ... I ftatter myself that in the character of Centinel I have been honored with your approbation and esteem." McMaster and Stone 6-7n. Burton Konkle's version of the letter is significantly different: " ... I ftatter myself that in the character of Centinel I, I have been honored with your approbation and esteem." Burton Alva Konkle, George Bryan and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1731-1791 (Philadelphia 1922) 309. The correct version is probably McMaster and Stone's, which Konkle seems to have misread. The original letter has been lost. Samuel Bryan also claimed authorship of Centinel in letters to Thomas Jefferson, 27 February 1801 and 24 July 1807, and to Albert Gallatin, 18 December 1790. Files of Ratification of the Constitution Project, National Archives. See Pennsylvania Convention Minority 3. 11.2 n. 2. 5. McMaster and Stone 6-7. A contemporary critic referred to "the author (I should have said authors) of illiberal and scandalous performance .... " A Federalist, Independent Gazetteer 25 October 1787, McMaster and Stone 166. Konkle reftects all the uncertainties involved. First he contends that "there can be as little doubt that Samuel Bryan was the author of them all, as that they expressed in fullness and accuracy the sentiments and convictions of Justice Bryan." George Bryan 309. Or perhaps the father wrote them: "No one familiar with Justice Bryan's writing but can see the Bryanesque ear-marks in both style and verbal expression in this paper [I), as well as the rest." Ibid. 31()-II; cf. 320. The father must have written one of them: "There is a wealth ofiegaI knowledge in this paper [II) that sounds very much like Justice Bryan, rather than the son, so that one is inclined to feel that, even though the son wrote 'No. I,' the father must have written 'No. II.' " Ibid. 313. 6. Ibid. 309. 7. See below, 2.7.35 n. 14. Konkle suggests, "It would seem as though Mr. Wilson's speech of the 6th had Centinel's paper of the 5th in contemplation, as Centinel No. II did his of the 6th of October." Ibid. p. 313. But the supposition is unlikely. Wilson would barely have had time to read the first number of Centinel and fonnulate his reply, and according to his biographer, Wilson spent much time and thought in preparing the address. Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742I7¢ (Chapel Hill 1956) 264-65. Moreover, Wilson does not reply to the most interesting part of Centinel's argument, that dealing with responsibility, and he does not follow Centinel's more detailed argument. It is more likely that Wilson was replying to arguments made in the legislature, at the early sessions of the state ratifying convention, and particularly by the sixteen seceders from the Pennsylvania Assembly. See below, 3.2.

12

I MR. OSWALD,

As the Independent Gazetteer seems free for the discussion of all public matters, I expect you will give the following a place in your next.

To the Freemen of Pennsylvania. Friends, Countrymen and Fellow Citizens, Permit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the constitution of this commonwealth, and to beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government submitted to your consideration, before you surrender these great and valuable privileges up forever. Your present frame of government, secures to you a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further provides "that in controversies respecting property. and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." It also provides and declares. "that the people have a right of FREEDOM OF SPEECH, and of WRITING and PUBLISHING their sentiments, therefore THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED." I The constitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as yet you have the right to freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments. How long those rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine. Whether the trial by jury is to continue as your birth-right, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to declare. Without presuming upon my own judgement. I cannot think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my private opinion, and call upon others for their's; and if I use my pen with the boldness ofa freeman, it is because I know that the liberty of the press yet remains un violated, and juries yet are judges. The late Convention have submitted to your consideration a plan of a new federal government-The subject is highly interesting to your future welfare-Whether it be calculated to promote the great ends of civil society, viz. the happiness and prosperity of the community; it behoves you well to consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of that frenzy of

13

2.7. I

2.7.2

2.7.3

Centinel

2.7.4

2.7.5

enthusiasm, that has actuated the citizens of Philadelphia, in their approbation of the proposed plan, before it was possible that it could be the result of a rational investigation into its principles; it ought to be dispassionately and deliberately examined, and its own intrinsic merit the only criterion of your patronage. If ever free and unbiassed discussion was proper or necessary, it is on such an occasion.-All the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen, are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct. Those who are competent to the task of developing the principles of government, ought to be encouraged to come forward, and thereby the better enable the people to make a proper judgment; for the science of government is so abstruse, that few are able to judge for themselves; without such assistance the people are too apt to yield an implicit assent to the opinions of those characters. whose abilities are held in the highest esteem. and to those in whose integrity and patriotism they can confide; not considering that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents, abilities, and superior acquirements; and that the men of the greatest purity of intention may be made instruments of despotism in the hands of the artful and designing. If it were not for the stability and attachment which time and habit gives to forms of government, it would be in the power of the enlightened and aspiring few, if they should combine, at any time to destroy the best establishments, and even make the people the instruments of their own subjugation. The late revolution having effaced in a great measure all former habits, and the present institutions are so recent, that there exists not that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities, and which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot foresee the full operation of material changes on civil polity; it is the genius of the common law to resist innovation. The wealthy and ambitious. who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, have availed themselves, very successfully, of this favorable disposition; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments. have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government; all the distresses and difficulties they experience. proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government; and in the other event, immediately ruin and annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in whom America has the highest confidence, and now triumphantly exult in the completion of their long meditated schemes of power and aggrandisement. I would be very far from insinuating that the two illustrious personages alluded to, have not the welfare of their country at heart; but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one, has been imposed on, in a subject of which he must be necessarily

14

Letter I inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness and indecision attendant on old age, has been practised on in the other. 2 I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated in Mr. Adams's treatise,3 and enforced in the numerous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well designing members of the late Convention.-But it will appear in the sequel, that the construction of the proposed plan of government is infinitely more extravagant. I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams's sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers, whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests betweeen the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third. 4 This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he indeed says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue? not a day-for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom and industry of mankind, that the scale would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, for want of that perfect equallity of power and distinction of interests, in the three orders of government, they exist but in name; the only operative and efficient check, upon the conduct of administration, is the sense of the people at large. Suppose a government could be formed and supported on such principles, would it answer the great purposes of civil society; if the administrators of every government are actuated by views of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests? Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of

15

Centinel

2·7·10

the whole, we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds those entrusted with power, in the greatest responsibility to their constitutents, the best calculated for freemen. s A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided[;] in such a government the people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy or despotism will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on-If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct, some will impute it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power in one body of men (separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility for then, whenever the people feel a grievance they cannot mistake the authors, and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature, and will the best secure the rights of the people. Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the essential requisites of a free government; that it is neither founded on those balancing restraining powers, recommended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British constitution, or possessed of that responsibility to its constituents, which, in my opinion. is the only effectual security for the liberties and happiness of the people; but on the contrary, that it is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among freemen, that the world has ever witnessed. I shall previously consider the extent of the powers intended to be vested in Congress, before I examine the construction of the general government. It will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government, and that all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim, that legislation necessarily follows the power of taxation. 6 By sect. 8, of the first article of the proposed plan of government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Now

16

Letter I what can be more comprehensive than these words; not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive powers of a confederation, and a STANDING ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the absolute controul over the commerce of the United States and all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, etc.-they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation; -whatever taxes, duties and excises that they may deem requisite for the general welfare. may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Congress, distributed through every district in America; and the collection would be enforced by the standing army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare. and thereby seize upon every object of revenue. The judicial power by 1st sect. of article 3 ["]shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admirality and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects." The judicial power to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The objects of jurisdiction recited above, are so numerous, and the shades of distinction between civil causes are oftentimes so slight, that it is more than probable that the state judicatories would be wholly superceded; for in contests about juriSdiction, the federal court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail. Every person acquainted with the history of the courts in England, knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at different periods, extended the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution, and contrary to their very nature; courts of a criminal jurisdiction obtaining cognizance in civil causes. To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and jUdicatories out of all doubt, the 6th article ordains that "this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. and the jUdges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." By these sections the all-prevailing power of taxation, and such extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the general government, as must in their operation, necessarily absorb the state legislatures and judicatories; and that such was in the contemplation of the framers of it, will appear from 17

Centinel the provision made for such event, in another part of it; (but that, fearful of alarming the people by so great an innovation, they have suffered the forms of the separate governments to remain, as a blind.) By sect. 4th of the 1st article, "the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time. by law. make or alter such regulations. except as to the place of chusing senators. " The plain construction of which is, that when the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation of this government, then Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and senators. If the foregoing be a just comment-if the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it becomes you to consider, whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so extended a territory; and whether it would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be governed on democratical principles, on any other plan. than a confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers of internal government, but united in the management of their foreign and general concerns. It would not be difficult to prove, that any thing short of despotism, could not bind so great a country under one government; and that whatever plan you might, at the first setting out, establish, it would issue in a depotism. If one general government could be instituted and maintained on principles of freedom, it would not be so competent to attend to the various local concerns and wants, of every particular district[,] as well as the peculiar governments, who are nearer the scene, and possessed of superior means of information[;] besides, if the business of the whole union is to be managed by one government, there would not be time. Do we not already see. that the inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniencies and disadvantages they are subjected to on this account, and that, to enjoy the comforts of local government, they are separating into smaller divisions. 7 Having taken a review of the powers, I shall now examine the construction of the proposed general government. Art. I. sect. I. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives." By another section, the president (the principal executive officer) has a conditional controul over their proceedings. Sect. 2. "The house of representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year, by the people of the several states. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants. " The senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, is formed by the legislature of each state appointing two senators, for the term of six years. The executive power by Art. 2, sec. I. is to be vested in a president of the United States of America, elected for four years: Sec. 2. gives him "power,

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Letter I by and with the consent of the senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law, etc. And by another section he has the absolute power of granting reprieves and pardons for treason and all other high crimes and misdemeanors, except in case of impeachment. The foregoing are the outlines of the plan. Thus we see, the house ofrepresentatives, are on the part of the people to balance the senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort. the well born. etc. The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information, of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers; the term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained, for as Congn:ss have the controul over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering the representatives of a whole state, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most inconvenient. The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of government, is constituted on the most unequal principles. The smallest state in the union has equal weight with the great states of Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania-The Senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the Executive; none of the principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and consent. The term and mode of its appointment, will lead to permanency; the members are chosen for six years, the mode is under the controul of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by rotation, they may be continued for life, which, from their extensive means of influence, would follow of course. The President, who would be a mere pageant of state, unless he coincides with the views of the Senate, would either become the head of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion; besides, their influence being the most predominant, could the best secure his re-election to office. And from his power of granting pardons, he might skreen from punishment the most treasonable attempts on the liberties of the people, when instigated by the Senate. From this investigation into the organization of this government, it appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that so far from being a regular balanced government, it would be in practice a permanent ARISTOCRACY. The framers of it[,] actuated by the true spirit of such a government, which ever abominates and suppresses all free enquiry and discussion, have made no provision for the liberty of the press, that grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants; but observed a total silence on that head. It 19

Centinel is the opinion of some great writers. that if the liberty of the press. by an institution of religion. or otherwise. could be rendered sacred, even in Turkey, that despotism would fly before it.' And it is worthy of remark. that there is no declaration of personal rights. premised in most free constitutions; and that trial by jury in civil cases is taken away; for what other construction can be put·on the following. viz. Article III. Sect. 2d. "In all cases affecting ambassadors. other public ministers and consuls. and those in which a State shall be party. the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases above mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. both as to law and fact?" It would be a novelty in jurisprudence. as well as evidently improper to allow an appeal from the verdict of a jury. on the matter of fact; therefore. it implies and allows of a dismission of the jury in civil cases. and especially when it is considered. that jury trial in criminal cases is expresly stipulated for. but not in civil cases. But our situation is represented to be so critically dreadful. that. however reprehensible and exceptionable the proposed plan of government may be. there is no alternative. between the adoption of it and absolute ruin.-My fellow citizens. things are not at that crisis. it is the argument of tyrants; the present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on that quarter, and as to domestic dissentions. we have not so much to fear from them. as to precipitate us into this form of government. without it is a safe and a proper one. For remember. of all possible evils. that of despotism is the worst and the most to be dreaded. Besides. it cannot be supposed. that the first essay on so difficult a subject. is so well digested, as it ought to be,-if the proposed plan, after a mature deliberation. should meet the approbation of the respective States. the matter will end; but if it should be found to be fraught with dangers and inconveniencies. a future general Convention being in possession of the objections. will be the better enabled to plan a suitable government. Who's here so base, that would a bondman be? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who's here so vile, that will not love his country? If any, speak; for him have I offended. 9 Centinel.

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Letter I I. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, arts. 10, I I, 12. 2. Centinel goes further here in his criticism of Washington and Franklin than most Anti-Federalists thought prudent, and he was strongly criticized on this account. Cf. A Federalist, in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 25 October 1787 (McMaster and Stone 168). Resisting the weight of these venerable statesmen provided one of the Anti-Federalists' major rhetorical problems. The following Federalist appeal .• exaggerated in style but characteristic in substance. was made by One of the Four Thousand, writing in the Independent Gazetteer 15 October 1787 (McMaster and Stone 117- I 8): "Freemen of Pennsylvania. consider the character and services of the men who made this government. Behold the venerable FRANKLIN, in the 70th year of his age. cooped up in the cabin of a small vessel. and exposing himself to the dangers of a passage on the ocean, crowded with British cruisers, in a winter month. in order to solicit from the court of France that aid, which finally enabled America to close the war with so much success and glory-and then say, is it possible that this man would set his hand to a constitution that would endanger your liberties? From this aged servant of the public. tum your eyes to the illustrious American hero, whose name has ennobled human nature-I mean our beloved WASHINGTON. Behold him, in the year 1775, taking leave of his happy family and peaceful retreat, and flying to the relief of a distant, and at that time an unknown part of the American continent. See him uniting and cementing an army, composed of the citizens of thirteen states, into a band of brothers. Follow him into the field of battle, and behold him the first in danger, and the last out of it. Follow him into his winter quarters, and see him sharing in the hunger, cold and fatigues of every soldier in his army. Behold his fortitude in adversity, his moderation in victory, and his tenderness and respect upon all occasions for the civil power of his country. But above all, tum your eyes to that illustrious scene he exhibited at Annapolis in 1782, when he resigned his commission, and laid his sword at the feet of Congress, and afterwards resumed the toils of an American farmer on the banks of the Potomac. Survey, my countrymen, these illustrious exploits of patriotism and virtue, and then say, is it possible that the deliverer of our country would have recommended an unsafe form of government for that liberty, for which he had for eight long years contended with such unexampled firmness, constancy and magnanimity." For other Federalists who stress the respectability of the framers, and particularly Washington and Franklin, see McMaster and Stone "7, 129,136,168; Ford, Essays 23, 26; Ford, Pamphlets 64, 74, 221, 245-47. See Federal Republican 3.6.5 n. 4. The Anti-Federalists frequently shared their opponents' high opinion of the framers. The Federal Farmer (V. 2.8.62) thought that" America probably never will be an assembly of men of a like number. more respectable." There were, however, frequent criticisms. See Martin 2.4.13, 19-20; Cato I, 2.6.5-6; Brutus I, 2.9.1-3; Old Whig VII, 3.3.41-42; Aristocrotis 3.16.1-3; Yeomanry of Massachusetts 4.19.1-3; American 4.20. 1-3; Countryman from Dutchess County 6.6.2--4. 3. John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States. The first volume of the Defence was published in England in 1787, arriving in the United States "in the midst of the agitation caused by the assembling of the convention to form the federal constitution." Editorial note, John Adams, Works IV, 275-76. Two more volumes of the Defence followed in 1788. 4. See the "Preface" of the first volume of Adams' Defence (Works IV, 283ff.); Letters V, XXIII (ibid. 284, 322, 380-82); Conclusion (ibid. 579 ff.); and Thoughts on Government (1776) (ibid. 193 ff.). While some Anti-Federalists join Centinel in his opposition to balanced government (see Brutus XVI, 2.9.202; [Maryland] Farmer V, 5.1.71-72; Lowndes 5.12.4; Impartial Examiner 5.14.35-40; Republicus 5.13.7; Monroe 5.21.19-28). others display views very similar to Adams' (see Federal Farmer VII, 2.8.97 n. 60). Note that Centinel, while opposing a balancing of orders, emphatically supports the principle of separation of powers. See II, 2.7.50 and n. 29. 5. A Federalist writer replied: "The Centinel asserts, that responsibility in the rulers is the best security the people can have of their rights. Now were this true, every discerning person will see that there is as great a responsibility in this plan as if all the powers of government were blended in one body of men. But the assertion is false. Interest is the greatest tie that one man can have on another, I mean taking mankind in general. And for the truth of this I appeal to your own experience and

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Centinel observation. The thief. the robber knows that he is responsible to the state. and in danger of the halter or the wheel-barrow. yet this does not influence his conduct; but convince him in any particular instance that it is more for his interest to forbear this practice. and he will. for that time. be honest. According to the proposed plan, the interest of the rulers and the ruled are the same; they never can be separated. for they are all one mass. having no difference of rights or privileges; or, as I said before, it is the people governing themselves; and therefore their rights will be secure." A Citizen. Carlisle [Pennsylvania] Gazette 24 October 1787. 6. The argument in this section is repeated and somewhat elaborated in V, 2.7.96. Cf. also 11,2.7.40. 7. See Cato III. 2.6.16 n. II. 8. See [Gordon and Trenchard]. Calo's Letters III, no. 71: "In Turky, Printing is forbid. lest by its Means common Sense might get the better of Violence. and be too hard for the Imperial Butcher." 9. Shakespeare. Julius Caesar act 3. sc. 2.

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Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System Of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. In a Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican

and An Additional Number of Letters From the Federal Farmer to the Republican Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; To Several essentiaL. and Necessary Alterations in It; And Calculated to Illustrate and Support the Principles And Positions Laid Down in the Preceding Letters

Letters I-VII and XVI-XVII The Observations of The Federal Farmer are generaIly, and correctly, considered to be one of the ablest Anti-Federalist pieces; they deserve to be read fully and carefully by any student of Anti-Federalist thought. Contrary to a common impression, the letters were surprisingly little reprinted in the newspapers, apparently only the Poughkeepsie Country Journal printing the whole series. But they enjoyed wide popularity in pamphlet form. 1 Four editions totaling, according to the publisher, several thousands of the pamphlet were sold in a few months; and in January 1788 the author published An Additional Number of Letters, which, being longer and more diffuse, apparently enjoyed less success. The texts of the original pamphlets are foIlowed here. 2 Paul Leicester Ford printed only the original five letters, finding the Additional Letters largely repetitious. Forrest McDonald gener-

23

The Federal Farmer ally agreed and printed only four of the Additional Letters in his 1962 paperback edition. 3 There is no doubt that there is much repetition and that the Additional Letters are somewhat loosely constructed; but there is scarcely a letter that does not contain material of the first importance. and it is a mistake to confine one's study of The Federal Farmer's arguments to the first five letters. One of the best criticisms of these letters was made by Timothy Pickering in a letter to Charles Tillinghast dated 24 December 1787. They were also reviewed in Noah Webster's American Museum. 4 The Federal Farmer is generally supposed to have been Richard Henry Lee, but this was unequivocally denied by William W. Crosskey in his Politics and the Constitution. 5 Crosskey promised to discuss the matter in a later volume, which. unfortunately, was never published. 6 While Crosskey's case against Lee's authorship does not appear to have been very strong, neither. it turns out, is the case to support the usual view. The present editor's review of the evidence was at an advanced stage when he was pleased to discover that Gordon Wood's independent and often parallel investigation, also stimulated by Crosskey's remark. had led him too to doubt the solidity of the usual attribution. 7 Wood makes a powerful and substantial rebuttal to the usual assumption that Lee's thought and style are evident in The Federal Farmer. The reader may make his own comparison of The Federal Farmer and Lee's letter to Governor Randolph, also printed here. s The yield of such a comparison seems to be. generally speaking, many differences but none that are flatly contradictory. and many similarities. but none that were not shared with many other Anti-Federal writers. Perhaps most telling against the case for Lee's authorship is the fact that the primary concern of The Federal Farmer is the question of consolidation and the destruction of the states. about which Lee's letter says nothing. This is a puzzling difference, and it seems to have been the source of Crosskey's doubt. Of course to attempt to deny, and especially to establish, authorship on such grounds is an extremely treacherous business. Lee's private letters during the fall of 1787 and the first half of 1788 show many points of similarity with The Federal Farmer (though no more, perhaps, than with several other Anti-Federal writers), and they demonstrate in particular that Lee, like The Federal Farmer, was concerned with the issue of consolidation and doubtful that a single government could extend over the whole United States. 9 Crosskey's contention that Lee's opinion changed shortly before the Virginia ratifying convention, while not without some foundation, is not very persuasive. 10 Yet it is striking that Lee does not in his official letter of opposition give any attention to the argument that is most prominent in the Observations. Lee is positively identified as The Federal Farmer in a piece by New England published in the Connecticut Courant on 24 December 1787. This piece was quite widely reprinted and seems to have given rise to a handful of essays in Massachusetts in which Lee is named as The Federal Farmer. I I

24

Letters This is probably also the source of George Cabot's penciled note, in his copy ofthe Additional Letters, of Lee's "supposed" authorship. This copy of the Additional Letters was given to the Boston Athenaeum and was, as Wood shows, apparently the authority for the attribution of The Federal Farmer to Lee in the Athenaeum Catalogue published in 1874, thence to Sabin's Dictionary of Books Relating to America, and tbence to Bancroft, Ford, and American historians generallyY This is a slim basis for attribution, but the evidence in these matters is usually slim, and it would hardly have been contradicted, even given the discrepancies in tone and argument between The Federal Farmer and Lee's letter, but for silence or ignorance among contemporaries who might be expected to know of Lee's authorship. J3 Webster and Pickering, in their reviews of the essays, gave no evidence of knowing the author. 14 Virginian Edward Carrington sent The Federal Farmer's two volumes to Jefferson, describing them as reputedly "the best of anything that has been written in the opposition," but reporting that "the author is not known. "15 There is no evidence of authorship in Lee's correspondence or in the Lee family papers.'6 Moreover, while Lee's grandson and early biographer refers to "the objections of Mr. Lee to the constitution, and his arguments in support of them, [which] may be seen by the reader in eloquent and powerful detail, in his letters in the body of correspondence written during the years 1787 and 1788," he makes no reference to The Federal Farmer, as he surely would have done had he thought Lee was the author.17 Considering the success and reputation of The Federal Farmer, it is strange that Lee never acknowledged authorship if they were his-yet the same could be said of just about any other possible author. The case against Lee's authorship remains inconclusive. But if, as seems probable, the only solid positive evidence is the essay of New England and its derivatives, the case for Lee's authorship is surely a good deal weaker than has usually been assumed. Why is there so little extant evidence about a pamphlet so widely known and respected? Part of the reason, at least, is that these eighteenth-century Americans, while sharing with the rest of humankind a curiosity and disposition to gossip about personalities, really did think that what counts most (or at least what ought to count most) in political debate is what is said rather than who said it.'s The Observations fall into four parts: first, a preface dealing with the way in which the Constitution ought to be considered (1,2.8.1-8); second, an examination of the feasibility ofa consolidation of the United States into one government on free principles (1,2.8.9-14; II, 2.8.15-23); third, an examination of the organization and powers of the proposed government (III, 2.8.24-43; IV, 2.8.44-58); fourth, a conclusion (V, 2.8.59-66). Of particular importance are the excellent discussions of representation and the jury trial that run throughout these and the Additional Letters. The Additional Letters, which are taken up largely with an

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The Federal Farmer examination of the organization of the three branches of the government, also contain especially important discussions offederalism (VI, 2.8.72-73), the federal republic (VI, 2.8.7y-80; XVII, 2.8.204-13), and bills of rights (XVI, 2.8.196-203). What follows is an extended outline of the argument of the essays.

OBSERVATIONS

I. Preface (I, 2.8.1-8). There is no reason for hasty or ill-considered adoption. While the plan proposed appears to be partly federal, it is principally calculated to make the states one consolidated government, as is seen by examining the plan. its history. and the politics of its friends.

II. The states cannot be consolidated into one entire government on free principles (I. 2.8.9-14; II. 2.8.1Y-23; III. 2.8.24). A. A consideration of the several forms on which the United States might exist as one nation (1.2.8.10-13). B. Impracticability of free and equal government extending over large and heterogeneous territory (I. 2.8.14). C. The Constitution does not. and cannot. provide the two essential parts of free government. a substantial representation ofthe people in the legislature (II. 2.8.15) and the jury trial of the vicinage (II. 2.8.16). D. Other considerations: I. The center and the extremes will not share benefits; and. because of the limited operation of the laws of a free government. the law will have to be enforced at the extremes by fear and fraud (11.2.8.17-18). 2. It is difficult. though not impossible. to frame a Bill of Rights for such a varied country (11.2.8.19-21). E. The Constitution lodges very extensive powers in an inherently defective government. with the result either of neglected laws or military enforcement leading. in either case. to despotism (II. 2.8.22-23)· III. Organization and powers of the new government (III. 2.8.2Y-43. IV. 2.8.44-58). A. Organization (III. 2.8.2Y-34): Each part of the government briefly examined and criticized (III. 2.8.2Y-30). The deficiencies. particularly the smallness of the House of Representatives, the compromise basis of the Senate. and the blending of powers. are admittedly the inevitable result of our situation. which reinforces the conclusion that it is not possible to consolidate the states on proper principles (III. 2.8.31-34).

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Letters B. Powers improperly or prematurely lodged (III. 2.8.35-43; IV. 2.8.44): I. Powers regarding external objects and some regarding internal objects ought to be lodged in the general government. but unlimited power to lay taxes and extensive control of military strength of the country are dangerous; power in these critical areas should be granted extremely cautiously so long as the federal government is so defective especially regarding representation (which is further discussed here) (III. 2.8.35-40). 2. The extensive jurisdiction given to federal judiciary is examined and shown. in many points. to be unnecessary and dangerous. Jury trial of the vicinage is not secured (III. 2.8-41-43; IV. 2.8·44)· C. Undefined powers (IV 2.8.44-45): Provisions regarding direct taxes. regarding qualifications of the vice president. regarding appointment of inferior officers. regarding congressional control over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. D. Powers the exercise of which is unsecured (IV. 2.8.4~58): I. Supremacy clause-no provIsion that treaties shall be made in pursuance of Constitution. 2. Necessary and proper clause-power of Congress not restricted to a few national objects. 3. No Bill of Rights with reservations for states and individuals: (a) religion. (b) trial by jury. (c) press. 4. Provision for amendment-Constitution will transfer power from the many to the few. who will resist further change. IV. Conclusion (V. 2.8.59-66). Government ought to preserve. not undermine. the equal division of our land and the free and manly habits of our people. We need improved federal government. and there are many good things here. but the value is lessened by the want of a representation of the people. Extreme partisans favoring and opposing the Constitutionexamination of activities of partisans for the Constitution. Constitution should be considered freely and carefully and amendments proposed. ADDITIONAL LETTERS

I. General and introductory (VI, 2.8.67-92). A. Character of Federalist and Anti-Federalist partisans (VI, 2.8·71-73):

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The Federal Farmer This is a continuation of the preface in letter I and of discussion in V, with important discussion of "honest" federalists, "pretended" federalists, "true" federalists, and of misleading terms, "federalist" and" anti-federalist." B. General positions and principles (VI, 2.8.74-80): A (rather miscellaneous) brief restatement of earlier points about the need for a more efficient government, the necessity of a federal republic in such an extensive territory. the importance of a substantial representation and jury trial. A distinction is drawn between natural. constitutional. and common or legal rights. C. Leading features of the Articles of Confederation (VI. 2.8.81-86). D. Organization of state governments (VI. 2.8.87-92). II. Legislative branch (VII-XII. 2.8.93-165). A. Introduction (VII. 2.8.93-96): Must have government-aim is to have one operating by persuasion. or it will operate by force. Criteria of fair and equal representation: same interests. feelings. opinions, and views as people at large. B. Representation is insubstantial and ought to be increased (VII-X. 2.8·97-142). I.

Substantial representation should contain representatives of all orders of society to maintain balance. Two major classes, aristocracy and democracy; their subordinate classes. their characteristiq; and subsidiary interests and parties. (An important discussion.) The representation in the House of Representatives is too small to reflect these classes and interests and will be drawn largely from the aristocracy (VII. 2.8.97-100). Observations in defense of representation as provided Constitution listed (VII. 2.8.101).

2.

In

the

England as a genuine balance among the several orders (VIII. 2.8.102-10):

Contrast to Rome-the differences lie in substantial representation in England. (Secondary discussion but still important on question of represe,tation.) 3. Observations of advocates answered (IX-X. 2.8.111-42):

People will elect good men (important on representation) (X. 2.8.111-18).

Members of Congress must return home and bear the burdens they impose on others (IX. 2.8.1 Icr26). People have a strong arm to check their rulers (X. 2.8.127).

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Letters States are part of the system and will balance the general government (but states have no constitutional check) (X, 2.8.128). Objects of Congress are few and national (X, 2.8.130-32). House of Representatives will increase in size in time (X, 2.8.133-34). Difficulty of assembling many men without making them a mob 2.8.136).

(X,

Congress will have no temptation to do wrong (X, 2.8.138). People will be free as long as they possess habits of free men (X, 2.8.139)· 4. Organization, appointment, powers of Senate (XI, 2.8.143-47): Cannot have genuine representation of aristocracy in the United States; so Senate will contain generally same kind of men as high posts of House of Representatives; checks will be only those limited ones derived from different modes of appointment, different terms of office, mere fact of a second branch, etc. While Senate is useful, some revisions should be made: terms of office should be shortened, senators should be recallable, and provisions should be made for rotation. Treaty power might be dangerous, but whole Congress has power to make commercial regulations. C. The elections ought to be better secured (XII, 2.8.148-65): All general principles regarding electors and elected, mode of election (which should be by majority vote in districts, etc.), should be laid down in Constitution. Any necessary discretion should reside in state legislatures, closest to the people.

III. Executive branch (XIII-XIV, 2.8.166-82). A. Appointments (XIII, 2.8.166-72; XIV, 2.8.173-76): Executive necessary but dangerous-need to keep it balanced by distributing appointments. Various methods of appointment sketched and discussed-in selecting from among these the aims are to keep balance in government and to prevent legislature from becoming infected by the spirit of office-men. B. Election and powers of President (XIV, 2.8.177-82): Unity in executive; general need for "first man."

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The Federal Farmer Must be given ample powers; chief concern should be to avoid perpetuation of power in any man or family. Thus should not be

reeligible. Veto power-combination of executive and judges is best. IV. Judicial branch (XV. 2.8.183-95). Peculiar character of judicial branch and its dangerous tendency in popular government (2.8.183-84). Organization of judiciary (2.8.185-88). Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over fact and law (2.8.189). Importance of trial by jury (2.8.190-94). Law and equity (2.8.195). V. Powers of new government (XVI-XVIII. 2.8.196-230). A. Bill of Rights (XVI. 2.8.196-2°3). I. Basic purpose of Bill of Rights in limited government (XVI. 2.8.196-98). 2. Specific protections needed. relating to trial by jury. ex post facto laws. habeas corpus. judicial procedure. quartering of soldiers. and freedom of press (XVI. 2.8.199-2°3). B. Need for federal republic to preserve free and mild government in the United States (XVII. 2°4-13; XVIII. 214-30). I. Description offederal republic (XVII. 2.8.204-13). Essential characteristics of federal republic (2.8.204-5). Additional powers needed but checks of federal system must be maintained (2.8.206-9). Additional federal checks that may be desirable (2.8.210). Enlightened and spirited character of the people will not be sufficient if state governments possess no real power (2.8.211-13)· Discussion of powers granted to new government (XVIII. 2.8.214-29). 3· The true bond of the American union must be formed of pure federal principles (XVIII, 2.8.230). 2.

I. See J. Wadsworth to R. King. 16 December 1787. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King X. 264; DePauw. The Eleventh Pillar 104. 113; Samuel Bannister

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Letters Harding. The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (Cambridge. Mass .• 1896) 17. Robert Rutland mistakenly says that the letters of The Federal Farmer were published in the New York Journal; they were in fact published in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, November 1787 through January 1788. as Rutland later correctly notes; The Ordeal of the Constitution 22. 2. Both the Observations and the Additional Letters were printed in New York by Thomas Greenleaf. 3. Ford. Pamphlets 277 ff.; Empire and Nation, ed. McDonald. The text of the McDonald edition is extremely unreliable. containing numerous alterations of spelling and punctuation which the reader is not led to expect and. more seriously. a substantial number of misreadings. misprints. omitted lines. etc. A copy of the original edition of the Additional Letters was brought out by Quadrangle Books. Chicago. in 1962. but it is now out of print. 4. Octavius Pickering and Charles Upham. The Life of Timothy Pickering (Boston 1873) II. 352-68; American Museum May 1788. 422-33. 5. (Chicago 1953) II. 1299-1300. 6. [A third volume was completed by Crosskey's literary executor. William Jeffrey. Jr.. and published in 1980 under the title The Political Background of the Federal Convention, but. since it covers events through 22 May 1788 only. it does not include the Federal Farmer discussion.-M.D.]I am informed by Professor Jeffrey that Crosskey's opinion was based on the following grounds. First. Crosskey reportedly discovered in the John Lamb papers a letter from Lee to Lamb saying that he "would be interested in seeing the Letters of a Federal Farmer." There being no reason why he should conceal his authorship from Lamb. this would strongly suggest that he was not the author. But I find no such letter in the Lamb papers. Lamb's committee did distribute. among other materials. the Observations of The Federal Farmer; and Lee did thank Lamb for sending him some Anti-Federal materials. promising to read them with pleasure; but there is no evidence that The Federal Farmer was included in the packet sent to Lee. See Letter of Joshua Atherton. 23 June 1788. John Lamb Papers. box 5. no. 25. New-York Historical Society; letter of Richard Henry Lee to John Lamb. 27 June 1788. in Leake. Memoir of the Life and Times of General John Lamb 3~1O. [On reconsidering this question. Professor Jeffrey reports that he may have misled Storing about this ground for Crosskey's opinion. Jeffrey believes that Lamb's letter to Lee. and Lee's response acknowledging receipt of the Anti-Federal materials. including The Federal Farmer. persuaded Crosskey that Lee was not the author.-M.D.] Crosskey's second ground was the fact that Lee published over his own name his objections to the Constitution in his letter to Governor Randolph of 16 October 1787 (see below. 5.6). and would therefore. Crosskey reasoned. have had no motive for concealing his opposition by assuming a pseudonym for the longer pamphlet. But a pseudonym was used not merely or even mainly to enable the author to conceal his opinion or to protect himself; it was a convention aimed at directing attention at the arguments rather than at personalities. A public figure might well declare his own position in a speech or letter and go on to publish a longer. more analytical piece over a pseudonym. Many of the prominent figures in the debate over the Constitution did precisely that. 7. Gordon S. Wood. "The Authorship of The Letters from the Federal Farmer," William and Mary Quarterly April 1974. 8. See below. 5.6. 9. Lee. Letters 11.433-76. 10. Crosskey. Politics and the Constitution II. 1300. II. New England was reprinted in the New Hampshire Mercury 2 January 1788; New York Daily Advertiser 4 January; Massachusetts Centinel 5 January; Gazette of the State of Georgia 21 February; Charleston City Gazette 7 April 1788; Charleston Columbian Herald 14 April. Subsequent items identifying Lee as The Federal Farmer (and not mentioned by Wood) appeared in the Massachusetts Gazette 1 January (and was reprinted in New York and Pennsylvania papers); Massachusetts Centinel 2 January; and Boston American Herald 7 January. I am indebted for most of this

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The Federal Farmer information to Steven R. Boyd. University of Texas. San Antonio, who finds here a widespread assumption among contemporaries that Lee was the author. 12. Wood, William and Mary Quarterly April 1974, 304-7. See Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution II, 230; see also 451-52; Ford, Pamphlets 277. 13. One further shred of evidence is provided by the title page of the copy of the Observations of The Federal Farmer in the American Antiquarian Society, which bears a notation, "Richard Henry Lee." The handwriting does not. however, appear to be contemporaneous with the publication of the pamphlet. 14. See above, note 4. 15. 9 June 1788. Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 2d series, XVII (1903),501. Oliver Ellsworth (as A Landholder) contended that Lee had revised Mason's and Gerry's statements of their objections and was "supposed to be the author of most of the scurrility poured out in the New York papers against the new constitution." but he did not mention The Federal Farmer specifically. Ford, Essays 161. See letter from J. Wadsworth to Rufus King, 16 December 1787 (above, n. I), describing the distribution of the Letters, without identifying the author. One of John Lamb's correspondents. Hugh Ledlie. writing from Hartford. reported insinuations made in the Connecticut convention "that out of the impost £8,000 was paid by this State annually to the State of New York out of which you recd. upwards of £900 which enabled you & others to write the foederal farmer and other false Libels and send them into this & the Neighbouring States to poison the minds of the good people against the good C--n." John Lamb Papers. box 5. no. I; New-York Historical Society. 16. Lee. Letters passim; Lee Family Papers. 1742-1795 (microfilm, University of Virginia Library). 17. Richard H. Lee. ed., Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee (Philadelphia 1825) I. 240. Lee's most recent biographer calls the Letters of The Federal Farmer "Lee's greatest literary achievement," but he does not consider the grounds of attribution to Lee. Oliver Perry Chitwood, Richard Henry Lee: Statesman of the Revolution (Morgantown. W.Va. 1967) 173. 18. "It is not material whether the federal farmer belongs to Virginia or Kamtschatka-whether he owns five hundred negroes. or is a man of no property at all-if his arguments are cogent-his reasonings conclusive .... Nor is it of consequence to the publick. or to the general cause. whether mr. Lee is an enemy, or a devotee to the fame and to the merit, of general Washington . ... We are not contending for the characters of men .... We wish to view every thing on the broad scale of independence to America-the sovereignty of the United States. and the freedom of the people .... " Helvidius Priscus. below, 4.12.9.

I

2.8.1

October 8th, 1787. Dear Sir. My letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced national government for the United States, were the result of free enquiry;1 when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past administration, etc. I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention. It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly to one consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the powers of government, and the representation of the people, so

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Letters unnaturally divided between the general and state governments, that the operations of our system must be very uncertain. My uniform federal attachments. and the interest I have in the protection of property. and a steady execution of the laws. will convince you. that. ifl am under any biass at all. it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages. The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government; but then. I can consent to no government. which. in my opinion. is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community . My object has been to join with those who have endeavoured to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper administration of them. Though I have long apprehended that fraudalent debtors. and embarrassed men. on the one hand. and men. on the other. unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men. 2 Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted. a prudent administration. Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope's maxim, that "That which is best administered is best," that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. 3 I know our situation is critical. and it behoves us to make the best of it. 4 A federal government of some sort is necessary. We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable purposes. it is now but of little importance. I will pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and, perhaps, for governments not very favourable to the people at large. A constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which we may accept. with or without amendments; and to which point we ought to direct our exertions, is the question. To determine this question, with propriety, we must attentively examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the conduct of others. on the present occasion, I do not mean, hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed. I shall be open to conviction, and always disposed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the community. It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government, however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.

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The Federal Farmer 2.8.2

2.8.3

The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering our situation. we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution? If we remain cool and temperate. we are in no immediate danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace. and in no danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies, except the regulation of trade, securing credit. in some cases. and providing for the interest. in some instances. of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change. three or nine months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals; their happiness and prosperity. after all. depend principally upon their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war: The farmers. fishmen. &c. have not yet fully repaired the waste made by it. Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station. Private debts are lessened. and public debts incurred by the war have been. by various ways. diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive source for diminishing them much more. I know uneasy men, who wish very much to precipitate. do not admit all these facts; but they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It must. however. be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that some of the state governments are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion. as on all similar ones. They will urge a thousand pretences to answer their purposes on both sides. When we want a man to change his condition. we describe it as miserable, wretched, and despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume. And when we wish the contrary. we reverse our descriptions. Whenever a clamor is raised. and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully. and without unreasonably suspecting men offalshood. to examine. and enquire attentively, under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in political concerns, that men state facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be true. Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient. or disorderly men. I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken fully to examine and consider the system proposed. Men who feel easy in their circumstances. and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing governments. Many commercial and monied men. who are uneasy. not without just cause. ought to be respected; and. by no means. unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions. and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another. they are very little to be

34

Letters regarded: and as to those who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor. they are to be despised. It is natural for men. who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure. to tell us. now is the crisis--now is the critical moment which must be seized. or all will be lost: and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it. which time and investigation will probably discover. This has been the custom of tyrants and their dependants in all ages. If it is true, what has been so often said. that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse. I presume it still behoves them to endeavour deliberately to change it for the better. The fickle and ardent. in any community. are the proper tools for establishing despotic government. But it is deliberate and thinking men. who must establish and secure governments on free principles. Before they decide on the plan proposed. they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a curse to this people. The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object has been all along. to reform our federal system. and to strengthen our governments--to establish peace. order and justice in the community-but a new object now presents. The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change. in time. our condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics. under a federal head. it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government. Of this. I think. I shall fully convince you. in my following letters on this subject. This consolidation of the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time past. Whether such a change can ever be effected in any manner; whether it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country-time only can determine. To have a just idea of the government before us, and to shew that a consolidated one is the object in view. it is necessary not only to examine the plan. but also its history. and the politics of its particular friends. The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals. and of the respective states; and the framers of it. to guard against usurpation. so limited and checked the powers. that. in many respects. they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union. We find. therefore. members of congress urging alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, etc. but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting with power. that the vestment. even of these. was proposed to be under several checks and limitations. During the war. the general confusion, and the introduction of paper money. infused in the minds of people vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too much from the return of peace, and of course we have beerr disappointed. Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures. by making tender. suspension. and paper

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2.8·5

2.8.6

The Federal Farmer

2.8.7

money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which, in some cases, has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favourite object. And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not only a few overbearing unprincipled men. but those parties in the states which have misused their powers. The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of-when by the evils, on the one hand. and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war. A general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for-the authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that. had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed members to the convention. The idea of destroying, ultimately, the state government. and forming one consolidated system, could not have been admitted-a convention, therefore. merely for vesting in congress power to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it. September. 1786. a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787. for the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation-this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived-stilI not a word was said about destroying the old constitution. and making a new one-The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation-and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States. till Within these ten or twelve days. had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking-The States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being agreed to there. would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in America: In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address. Ten other states ap-

Letters pointed. and tho' they chose men principally connected with commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good republican characters-had they all attended we should now see. I am persuaded a better system presented. The non-attendance of eight or nine men. who were appointed members of the convention. I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States.s-Had they attended. I am pretty clear. that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discemable in every part of the plan. 6 There would not have been so great an accumulation of powers. especially as to the internal police of the country. in a few hands. as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them-the young visionary men. and the consolidating aristocracy. would have been more restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention. and after four months close attention presented the new constitution. to be adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but, I presume. the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution presented for their adoption. a candid and thorough examination; and silence those designing or empty men. who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance-We shall view the convention with proper respect-and. at the same time. that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it. we must recollect how disproportionably the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community were represented-Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rest solely on its own merits. or be condemned for its own defects. In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is a plan of accommodation-and that it is in this way only, and by giving up a part of our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government founded in freedom and compact. This circumstance candid men will always keep in view, in the discussion of this subject. The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however. calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government. The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how far the states can be consolidated into one entire government on free principles. In considering this question extensive objects are to be taken into view, and important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all their consequences. The happiness of the people at large must be the great object with every honest statesman, and he will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages under one government. the consolidation of the states cannot be admitted. There are three different forms of free government under which the United States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to determine to which we will direct our views. 7 I. Distinct republics con-

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nected under a federal head. In this case the respective state governments must be the principal guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively regulate their internal police; in them must rest the balance of government. The congress of the states, or federal head, must consist of delegates amenable to, and removeable by the respective states: This congress must have general directing powers; powers to require men and monies of the states; to make treaties, peace and war; to direct the operations of armies, etc. Under this federal modification of government, the powers of congress would be rather advisary or recommendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the several state governments, and form or consolidate all the states into one entire government, with one executive, one judiciary, and one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts of the union: In this case there would be a compleat consolidation of the states. 3. We may consolidate the states as to certain national objects, and leave them severally distinct independent republics, as to internal police generally. Let the general government consist of an executive. a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers extend exclusively to all foreign concerns. causes arising on the seas to commerce, imports, armies. navies, Indian affairs. peace and war. and to a few internal concerns ofthe community; to the coin. post-offices, weights and measures, a general plan for the militia. to naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies, 8 leaving the internal police of the community, in other respects, exclusively to the state governments; as the administration of justice in all causes arising internally. the laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the forming of the militia according to a general plan prescribed. In this case there would be a compleat consolidation. quoad certain objects only. 9 Touching the first, or federal plan. I do not think much can be said in its favor: The sovereignty of the nation, without coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be depended on to answer the purposes of government; and in a congress of representatives of sovereign states. there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands. As to the second. or compleat consolidating plan, it deserves to be carefully considered at this time, by every American: If it be impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing our views ultimately to it. The third plan, or partial consolidation. is, in my opinion, the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan was practicable,tO but from long attention, and the proceedings of the convention. I am fully satisfied, that this third plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. Making this the standard to point out, with candor and fairness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to be improper, is my object. The convention appears to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire

Letters government; and from its views in this respect, and from the tenacity of the small states to have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated the greatest defects in the proposed plan. Independant of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective government cannot be extended over large territories, a few reflections must evince, that one government and general legislation alone, never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a century will, probably, contain ten millions of people; and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles. Before we do away the state governments, or adopt measures that will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one entire government, several principles should be considered and facts ascertained:These, and my examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pursue in my next. Your's &c. The Federal Farmer.

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II October 9, 1787. Dear Sir, The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and equal representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the vicinage in the administration of justice-a full and equal representation, is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all assembled-a fair representation, therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of men in the community, according to the common course of elections, can have a share in it-in order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous I I-We have about 200 state senators in the United States, and a less number than that of federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full representation of this people, in the affairs of internal taxation and police, were there but one legislature for the whole union. The representation cannot be equal, or the situation of the people proper for one government only-if the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully as the central-It is apparently impracticable that this should be the case in this extensive country-it would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government.

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Under one general government alone. there could be but one judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due administration of justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial of the vicinage, 12-there are now supreme courts in each state in the union; and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to each supreme court-most of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant, and hold their sessions in different parts every year of their respective states. counties and districts-with all these moving courts, our citizens, from the vast extent of the country must travel very considerable distances from home to find the place where justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as to afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a good government. that each citizen should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance. perhaps, within a day's travel of his home; so that. without great inconveniences and enormous expences, he may have the advantages of his witnesses and jury-it would be impracticable to derive these advantages from one judiciary-the one supreme court at most could only set in the centre of the union, and move once a year into the centre of the eastern and southern extremes of it-and, in this case, each citizen, on an average, would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court-that, however, inferior courts might be properly placed in the different counties, and districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be intolerable and expensive. If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the features of a free government, still it is evident that the middle states. the parts of the union, about the seat of government, would enjoy great advantages, while the remote states would experience the many inconveniences of remote provinces. Wealth. offices, and the benefits of government would collect in the centre: and the extreme states l3 and their principal towns, become much less important. 14 There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-founded-the laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and operate gently-and never can extend their influence very far-if they are executed on free principles. about the centre, where the benefits of the. government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes-This has been the case with every extensive republic of which we have any accurate account,15 There are certain unalienable and fllndamental rights. which in forming the social compact. ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed-a free and enlightened people. in forming this compact, will not resign all their rights to those who govern. and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers. which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed. as well as by those who govern: and the latter will know they cannot be passed un-

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Letters perceived by the former, and without giving a general alarm-These rights should be made the basis of every constitution: and if a people be so situated, or have such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing them, it is a very strong argument against their attempting to form one entire society, to live under one system of laws only.-I confess, 1 never thought the people of these states differed essentially in these respects; they having derived all these rights from one common source, the British systems; and having in the formation of their state constitutions, discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are very similar. However, it is now said that the states differ so essentially in these respects, and even in the important article of the trial by jury, that when assembled in convention, they can agree to no words by which to establish that trial. or by which to ascertain and establish many other of these rights, as fundamental articles in the social compact. 16 Ifso, we proceed to consolidate the states on no solid basis whatever. But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming the new constitution on a better bill of rights. 1 still believe a complete federal bill of rights to be very practicable. I? Nevertheless 1 acknowledge the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many new and strong reasons, against a complete consolidation of the states. They tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety very far-that the convention have gone much farther in one respect than they found it practicable to go in another; that is, they propose to lodge in the general government very extensive powers--powers nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and the sword. But, in its organization, they furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs, or parts of a government. to support and execute those powers on proper principles (or in which they can be safely lodged) cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere in every society; but then they should be lodged where the strength and guardians of the people are collected. They can be wielded, or safely used, in a free country only by an able executive and judiciary, a respectable senate, and a secure, full, and equal representation of the people. I think the principles 1 have premised or brought into view, are well founded-I think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner. It is in connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases, or a few well formed features, that will prove its merits; or a few small omissions that will produce its rejection among men of sense; they will enquire what are the essential powers in a community, and what are nominal ones; where and how the essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to secure true liberty. In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial representation of the people. The state governments will exist, with all their governors, senators, representatives, officers and expences; in these will be

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nineteen-twentieths of the representatives of the people; they will have a near connection. and their members an immediate intercourse with the people; and the probability is. that the state governments will possess the confidence of the people. and be considered generally as their immediate guardians. The general government will consist of a new species of executive. a small senate. and a very small house of representatives. As many citizens will be more than three hundred miles from the seat of this government as will be nearer to it. its judges and officers cannot be very numerous. without making our governments very expensive. Thus will stand the state and the general governments. should the constitution be adopted without any alterations in their organization; but as to powers. the general government will possess all essential ones. at least on paper. and those of the states a mere shadow of power. And therefore. unless the people shall make some great exertions to restore to the state governments their powers in matters of internal police; as the powers to lay and collect. exclusively. internal taxes. to govern the militia. and to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon their own laws final. the balance cannot possibly continue long; but the state governments must be annihilated. or continue to exist for no purpose. It is however to be observed. that many ofthe essential powers given the national government are not exclusively given; and the general government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those which may still be exercised by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impropriety of giving powers. the exercise of which prudent men will not attempt. and imprudent men will. or probably can. exercise only in a manner destructive of free government. The general government. organized as it is. may be adequate to many valuable objects. and be able to carry its laws into execution on proper principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will not contend. that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect. without calling to its aid a military force. which must very soon destroy all elective governments in the country. produce anarchy. or establish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system. we may. allowing things to have their common course. have a very tolerable one. The powers lodged in the general government. if exercised by it. must intimately effect the internal police of the states. as well as external concerns; and there is no reason to expect the numerous state governments. and their connections. will be very friendly to the execution offederallaws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have been under their own immediate management. There is more reason to believe, that the general government. far removed from the people. and none of its members elected oftener than once in two years. will be forgot or neglected. and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a multitude of officers and military force be continually kept in view. and

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Letters employed to enforce the execution of the laws. and to make the government feared and respected. No position can be truer than this. that in this country either neglected laws. or a military execution of them. must lead to a revolution. and to the destruction of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion; and a military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point--