The anatomy of a small war : the Soviet-Japanese struggle for Changkufeng-Khasan, 1938 0837194792

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CONTRIBUTIONS IN M IL IT A R Y HISTORY

SERIES EDITORS: Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvaas The River and the Rock: The History of Fortress Westpoint, 1775-1783

Dave R. Palmer Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945

Jay Luvaas, editor Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Pacific, 1898-1902

John M. Gates American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889

Kenneth J. Hagan The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views

C. Robert Kemble The Memoirs of Henry Heth

Henry Heth, edited by James L. Morrison, Jr. Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917

John P. Finnegan The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783

Dave R. Palmer History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History

Hans Delbruck, translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925

Allan R. M illet The Twenty-First Missouri: From Home Guard to Union Regiment

Leslie Anders The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943

Mark A. Stoler

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR THE SOVIET-JAPANESE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGKUFENG/KHASAN, 1938 by Alvin D. Coox foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer cartography by Dana Lombardy

CONTRIBUTIONS IN MILITARY HISTORY, NUMBER 13

greenwood WESTPORT

•

press

LONDON,

ENGLAND

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Coox, Alvin D The anatomy of a small war. (Contributions in military history ; no. 13) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Changkufeng Incident, 1938. I. Title. II. Series. DS784.C64 957'.7 76-51924 ISBN 0-8371-9479-2

Copyright © 1977 by Alvin D. Coox All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 76-51924 ISBN 0-8371-9479-2 ISSN: 0084-9251 First published in 1977 Greenwood Press, Inc. 51 Riverside Avenue, Westport, Connecticut 06880 Printed in the United States of America

First shot point-blank, then finished off with bayonets. What for? For his freckles? For his blue eyes? Yevtushenko Valiant warriors fell where now the summer grasses wave, remnants of a dream. Basho

/

Contents

Illustrations Foreword by Edwin 0. Reischauer Preface Prologue Notes to Reader Abbreviations

ix xi XV

xix xxiii XXV

1.

The Setting

2.

Early Rumblings

11

3.

The Tokyo Command Level

21

3

4.

Reconnaissance in Force

25

5.

First Involvement of the 19th Division

35

6.

The High Command Consultants

47

7.

The Failure to Win Imperial Sanction

57

8.

The Effort to De-escalate

71

9.

Shachaofeng: Japanese Curse or Boon?

83

10.

Crossing the Tumen

11.

Mounting the Assault Against Changkufeng

128

12.

The Night Attack

138

13. 14.

95

The Anchor Heights: Sato Kotoku and the Loneliness of Command

156

Postmortem: Costs, Claims, and Critiques

167

V III

CONTENTS

15.

Fait Accompli and Problems of Rapport

173

16.

Russian Retaliation

187

17.

Intensification of the Ground War

199

18.

Reorganizations, Frustrations, and Restraints

217

19.

The Second Soviet Offensive

229

20.

Crisis on the Crest

238

21.

Continuation o f the Soviet Offensive

249

22.

Developments o f 8-9 August

264

23.

A ttritio n 's Toll

278

24.

Escalation or Break-off?

287

25.

The Role o f Diplomacy

297

26.

Achievement o f a Cease-fire

306

27.

Stilling the Guns

319

28.

Implementation and Pull-back

332

29.

M ilitary Wind-up and Unfinished Business

348

30.

Lessons

355

31.

Questions o f Causation and Cartography

362

32.

Changkufeng in the Context o f Limited War

370

Appendix: Dramatis Personae

375

Bibliography

383

index

395

Illustrations

MAPS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Changkufeng and Environs Disputed Boundaries, Changkufeng Area Changkufeng, Evening, 30 July 1938 Changkufeng, Noon, 11 August 1938 (Ceasefire) Soviet Version of Events, 29 July—11 August 1938

4 6 129 324 356

FIGURE 1. Soviet Positions on Changkufeng, 30 July 1938

139

PHOTOGRAPHS Gen. Nakamura Kotaro, Korea Army Commander Prince Kan'in, Chief of Army General Staff Col. Inada Masazumi, Chief, AGS Operations Section Lt.-Gen. Itagaki Seishiro, Minister of War

112 113 114 115

Lt.-Gen. Suetaka Kamezo, 19th Division Commander Col. Sato Kotoku, 75th Infantry Regiment Commander Capt. Yamada Teizo, 1st Infantry Company Commander Maj. Nakano Toshichi, 1st Battalion Commander, 75th Infantry Regiment

116 117 118 119

X

IL L U S T R A T IO N S

Soviet Bombing o f Chiangchunfeng and Changkufeng, 4 August 1938 Soviet Tank Destroyed on 6 August 1938, Takenouchi Front

120 121

Japanese and Soviet Positions, Changkufeng Crest, 11 August 1938 75th Infantry's Regimental Colors, Changkufeng Crest, 11 August 1938

123

Soviet Photo o f Zaozernaya Peak w ith Red Arm y Standard Soviet Positions Seen From Changkufeng Crest

124 125

Soviet Cartoon lapanese Cartoon

126 127

122

Foreword

During the murky decade that preceded the outbreak of the Pacific War, no name was more clouded in sinister mystery than Changkufeng. It belonged to an insignificant hill in a remote corner ot the world. In the hilly back country of the eastern portion of China's northeastern provinces—then known as Manchuria, or the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo—a tiny finger of land protrudes close to the Japan Sea, all but cutting o ff what was then Japan's colony of Korea from the Mari­ time Province of Siberia. Here stood Changkufeng in a desolate area, populated mainly by a handful of Korean peasants. It is a name that never would have been known to history but for three facts. The exact border at this point between Manchuria and the Soviet Union was some­ what obscure; on either side stood the growing military might of Japan and the Soviet Union, bristling with suspicion and animosity toward each other; and Changkufeng, in strictly local terms, could be regarded as a strategic height. From these ingredients, there developed in the midsummer of 1938 a desperate two-weeks' battle, fought over and around Changkufeng be­ tween the Japanese 19th Division, stationed in northern Korea, and some­ what larger Soviet ground forces with air support. The battle remained limited because both sides had good reason to avoid a full-scale war—the Japanese because of their unfolding conflict with China, the Russians be­ cause of the threatening situation in Europe. The rest of the world, appre­ hensive of Japanese and Soviet military power, did its best to discover what really had happened and what it portended, but it was not easy to

xii

FOREW ORD

make sense of the scraps of contradictory reporting from the two sides. A year later, a larger conflict at Nomonhan on the western borders of Manchuria clarified Soviet-Japanese relations less than it added to the mystery of Japanese and Soviet intentions. Professor Coox has been on the trail of the Changkufeng "Incident," as the Japanese called it, for close to three decades, trying to track down every available bit of evidence. The result is this book, which he hopes will be definitive. And this it undoubtedly will be, except in the unlikely eventuality that all Soviet archives become open to scholarly perusal and surviving Soviet participants to questioning. Professor Coox has tracked down all documentation on the Japanese side and interviewed all the Japanese survivors who will ever be interviewed. From these materials and such Soviet documents as are available, he has drawn an extremely complex but fascinating picture of the Japanese in­ volved, their various attitudes, motivations, and subsequent rationaliza­ tions, and an almost minute-by-minute account of the fighting as seen from the Japanese side. But the view of Changkufeng Hill is perforce seen mostly from the one side. The Soviet participants are known only in gen­ eral terms, their motives and attitudes remain uncertain, and there is no detail or feel of the tide of battle on their side. It is a bit like a football game in which the spectator sees one team in sharpest detail but the other is largely invisible and can be perceived clearly only when in direct con­ tact with the visible team. It is not quite a full view, but it is probably the best we shall ever have. Changkufeng was a very significant event in its time, but it also has more than mere historical interest for us today. It is a case study of the decision-making process, the problem of the control of military units in the field by the authorities back home, and the possibilities and dangers of limited war. Once, Americans presumed that such problems applied only to the Japanese and other foreign nations. In recent years, we have discovered that they are our problems, too. The decision-making process seen in this study is typically multilayered and confused. The 19th Division and its officers on the spot had a large role; the Korea Army to which it belonged, unlike the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, played a more passive role; the Army General Staff was the direct controlling force at home, though it had to operate with the coop­ eration of the Cabinet and was subject to Imperial sanction. How much Imperial sanction was the product of the attitudes of the high-court bureauc-

FO REW O RD

xiii

racy that surrounded the throne and how much it reflected the Emperor's individual preferences will probably never be known. Within this frame­ work, decision making was Byzantine. It was perhaps clearest at its two extremes. Unwarranted actions by the 19th Division clearly started the battle. It was limited and contained on the Japanese side largely thanks to the clear Imperial opposition to its spread. The military on the spot, while able in an obscure situation to act on its own at first, eventually had to swallow the bitter limiting orders from Tokyo. The battle at Changkufeng was a small, limited war—limited to two weeks, limited to a few kilometers of frontier, and limited on the Japanese side to one division of ground troops with some supplementary artillery, despite the participation of Soviet air power and their more lavish use of ground forces. The battle probably would never have started if each side had not been convinced that the other could not afford a full-scale war, and it certainly was contained as strictly as it was because this estimate was essentially correct. It would no doubt have been much more d ifficult to lim it the conflict if either government had been a democracy and there­ fore open to the influence of popular passions. Changkufeng was much smaller in scale, though in some ways not en­ tirely unlike, our two limited wars of recent years in Korea and Vietnam. It bears even more resemblance to recent border clashes on the same Man­ churian frontier between China and the Soviet Union. The unclarities of the Japanese decision-making process and the problem of control over field forces both had a peculiarly prewar Japanese stamp, but nonetheless they do contain analogies with problems the United States faces. Profes­ sor Coox's study of Changkufeng clarifies a fascinating and significant event in history, but at the same time it throws light on continuing human problems. Edwin O. Reischauer Cambridge, Massachusetts

\

Preface

In the summer of 1938 my curiosity was piqued by daily newspaper accounts of a fierce Russo-Japanese struggle on a disputed frontier for the obscure hillock called Changkufeng. Pundits dreaded or looked forward to inevitable full-scale war between the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan. After mid-August 1938, however, the name of Changkufeng disappeared from press and conversation. One wondered whether the true story would ever be known, given the impenetrability of the curtain that masked Japanese-Russian relations. When I went to Japan during the postwar Occupation, I retained my interest in the mystery of Changkufeng. By then there were thousands of pages of the partisan, shallow, but presumably definitive transcript of the Tokyo trial, as well as the gossipy Saionji-Harada memoirs. Used judiciously, these oft-garbled materials might yield valuable information, but one still derived no feeling of comprehensiveness or of intimate detail. Perplexed scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese, continued to produce speculative concoctions larded with misinformation and bias. Rehashes relied on un­ enlightening passages from Pravda and Izvestiya. I hoped for a breakthrough in 1955 when I was historian with the Japan­ ese Research Division, the Tokyo branch of the U.S. Army's Office of the Chief of Military History. From the Historical Records Branch of the Repa­ triation Relief Bureau, I received for editing the manuscript o f an official Japanese postwar report on the Changkufeng Incident. In typescript, the materials came to 26 pages. Drawing on collateral data available to me, by 1956 I prepared an anonymous, unclassified 158-page monograph subse­ quently distributed by the Department of the A rm y.1 Although this pub­ lication represented the largest, most authoritative treatment of the Chang-

X VI

P R E FA C E

kufeng hostilities, I realized that it contained errors and was very incom­ plete. Therefore, I determined to prepare my own definitive account one day. I had conducted my first important private interview for the Changkufeng project in 1954 when I conferred with Kitano Kenzo at my home in Shiga Prefecture. Later, I visited Sato Kotoku at Gokokuji Temple in To­ kyo. Between 1961 and 1963, thanks to postdoctoral research grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, I traversed Japan and tracked down veterans. The interview program proved indispensable, since mortality continues to take its toll. For example, Marshal Hata and Generals Kitano and Sato died soon after I had been able to confer with them. Approximately 75 Japanese granted me interviews, while another 25 individuals assisted me in other ways. During field work in Japan, I was able to uncover unpublished primary materials, including diaries, letters, journals, albums, photographs, sketches, maps, and notes, as well as official records only recently made available. The crop of postwar Japanese historians has also begun to produce sub­ stantial studies incorporating concrete data whose absence was long de­ cried.2 For faculty research grants which enabled me to maintain my currency in the literature, I thank the San Diego State University Foundation. The University of Hawaii, my academic sponsor at the time, administered the grants awarded me by the Rockefeller Foundation. I am grateful to Dr. Laurence H. Snyder, former President of the University of Hawaii, and Dr. Robert W. Hiatt, former Vice President, for their cooperation. Instrumental in getting my project under way were two distinguished friends, now deceased: Hattori Takushiro, ex-Colonel, IJA, and Ben Bruce Blakeney, barrister and scholar in Japanese studies. Four experts enriched my raw manuscript by counsel and honing: Charles Burton Fahs, Profes­ sor Emeritus of Political Science and Director of International Programs, Miami University (Ohio); Maurice Schneps, former Editor-in-Chief of Orient/West; Arthur Marder, Professor of History, University of California, Irvine; and Ward D. Smith, Far East hand. I am also pleased to acknowledge the special helpfulness of John Erickson, George Furness, Seong-hoon Koh, Anne L. Leu, Michael Parrish, Glynnis Sears, Shirley Seip, and Billie K. Walsh. To record my indebtedness to the Japanese who provided assistance and encouragement is a responsibility and a pleasure. First, I must mention

V

PREFACE

xvii

the invaluable services of my senior adviser, Omae Toshikazu (ex-Captain, UN), my military consultant, Imaoka Yutaka (ex-Colonel, IJA), and my peripatetic friend Fujii Makoto. The impossibility of establishing preced­ ences of other professional debts may be mitigated by alphabetical listings of sources. These men, singly or in groups, consented to lengthy and often numerous interviews in Japan. Frequently, they followed meetings with correspondence and with loans of important personal materials. Japanese veterans' organizations were especially cooperative. For the following mil­ itary and diplomatic personnel whom I have interviewed, I indicate the main expertise or level of acquaintance with matters under study. The spectrum of military ranks ranges from enlisted man to field marshal. ARM Y HIGH COMMAND, COURT Arao Okikatsu, Asada Saburo, Ayabe Kitsuju, Hashimoto Gun, Flata Shunroku, Inada Masazumi, Iwakuro Hideo, Kato Michio, Kotani Etsuo, Matsumura Tomokatsu, Miyashi Minoru, Miyoshi Yasuyuki, Sawamoto Rikichiro, Shishikura Juro, Sugai Toshimaro, Takei Seitaro, Tanemura Sako, Usami Oki'iye, Yabe Chuta, Yano Mitsuji DIPLOMATIC, ATTACHE, GOVERNMENT SERVICE Doi Akio, MakiTatsuo, Miura Kazu'ichi, Nishi Haruhiko, Nishimura Ko, Shimanuki Takeji (Takeharu), Takahashi Tsuruo KOREA ARM Y HEADQUARTERS Iwasaki Tamio, Kitano Kenzo, Tsuchiya Sakae 19TH DIVISION, 38TH BRIGADE, INFANTRY REGIMENTS3 Hayano Ichimi, Floriguchi Yoshio, Ichimoto Yoshiro, Miyajima Sei'ichi, Murakoshi Kimio, Nakazawa Makoto, Otsuka Masahiro, Saito Miyoshi, SaitoToshio (19th Division), Sakata Hideru, Sasai Shigeo (19th Division), Sato Kotoku, Tatsuno Tomio (38th Brigade), Tezuka Masayoshi, Tominaga Kametaro (73rd Infantry Regiment)

xviii

PREFA CE

KWAN TUNG ARMY Giga Tetsuji, Harada U'ichiro, Hattori Takushiro, Katakura Tadashi, Morita Norimasa, Morita Sutezo, Noguchi Kamenosuke, Nyumura Matsu'ichi, Dgoshi Kenji, Shoji Tatsumi, Suemori Isamu, Sumi Shin'ichiro, Takumi Hiroshi NA VY HIGH COMMAND Kusaka Ryunosuke, Tomioka Sadatoshi, Yamaguchi Suteji Thanks are also due the following Japanese for innumerable courtesies: Hata Ikuhiko, Inaba Masao, Inoue Tadao, Ishijima Tatsu, ltd Masanori, KatoTakeo, Misawa Shigeo, Nagashima Kiyoshi, Nishihara Yukio, Nishiura Susumu, Ohata Bunshichi, Ohi Sadako, Mrs. Sato Kotoku, Shirai Masatatsu, Takagi Hajime, Tokugawa Yoshitoshi, Toyoda Kumao, Ueda Toshio, Ugaki Matsushiro, Utsunomiya Naokata, and Yano Muraji. Last, I must record my special gratitude to Hisako Suzuki Coox and to my son Roy, who fairly cheerfully vacated the Tokyo premises when called upon so that interviews could proceed without juvenile interruption. To each preceding individual, as well as to others unnamed, the present volume owes whatever merits it may possess. Needless to say, errors of omission or commission are entirely my own. Alvin D. Coox Tokyo and San Diego, California

NOTES 1. Japanese Research Division, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Small Wars and Border Problems: The Changkufeng Incident, vol. 11, pt. 3, bk. A (hereafter cited as JRD/JSM 1 1 ,3/A). 2. Inoue Kiyoshi, "From the Meiji Restoration to the Present," in Le Japon au Xle Congres international des sciences historiques a Stockholm (Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1960), pp. 33-39. 3. All from the 75th Infantry Regiment, unless otherwise noted.

I

Prologue

If a nation should seek an insurance policy of alternative options, where could we locate actuarial tables for the assessment of premiums? Specific­ ally, where could we encounter significant evidence of Soviet Russian pat­ terns of contingency warfare? Military theoreticians have usually turned to the Russo-German experience.1 That choice, however, does not accord with the most concise and accurate definition of limited war: "w ar limited consciously in three dimensions—terrain, weapons, and objectives."2 The cases of Korea and Vietnam, duels by proxy, offer scant evidence. Episodes of the suppression of revolts, in Hungary and East Germany in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, furnish even less material for meaningful study of limited war. We must move back in time. The RussoFinnish war of 1939-1940 approximates the desired conditions; yet, for all of their valor and limited successes, the Finns can hardly be termed a first-rate antagonist in the geopolitical and military sense. As for the Soviet invasion of outmatched Poland in 1939, by mid-September Polish military resistance had been smashed by the Germans prior to Russian entry from the east. We must similarly discard the White and Polish campaigns shortly after the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet mop-up of the warlord Chang Hsueh-liang in 1929. Nevertheless, the USSR had engaged in major undeclared wars against a formidable power: Imperial Japan. Despite an incredible lack of substan­ tive literature on the pocket wars in the Far East, we know that the Japan­ ese alone, in 1938-1939, suffered at least 20,000 casualties in action against the Red Army. On the Soviet side, no less a personage than Marshal Blyukher directed operations at Changkufeng in 1938; Marshal Zhukov, at Nomonhan in 1939. Ely correctly calls these actions "the first international

XX

PRO LO GU E

test" of the Red Army, and Dinerstein concludes that Soviet "defensive campaigns" in the late 1930s demonstrated "willingness to fight a limited war for limited ends."3 Inspired by Kennan's rummagings and working primarily with Soviet newspapers and periodicals, Tinch found that a quasi-war had been fought between Japan and the USSR but that facts were hard to come by.4 Yet the headlines of August 1938 were ominous: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border—Russia Warns that 'Playing with Fire' in Local Clashes May Bring on War."5 After World War II, Soviet prosecutors contended that "a battle in which participated a [Japanese] division with artillery cannot be considered as a minor fron­ tier incident. . . it was not a spontaneous clash."6 A folklore born of ignorance has developed. Some have called Changkufeng a strategic village, not a h ill.7 Many authors insist that Japanese operations in 1938 were conducted by the Kwantung Army, not the Ko­ rea Arm y.8 The Changkufeng Incident has been termed a border clash, a midget Russo-Japanese war, a little world war, a trial of strength. Dates have been fuzzy, motives obscure. One author solves his dilemma by term­ ing the affair a Russian gamble at one point, a Japanese gamble at another.9 Until recently, the supposedly best documented versions have derived from Soviet sources.10 The most important reason was that the USSR won its case at the postwar Tokyo trial, charging Japan with "conspiratorial and aggressive responsibility." With respect to the Changkufeng affair, "the Japanese imperialists made an open attack against the USSR . . . the Japanese militarists knew that they were consciously and deliberately committing a violation of the established state borderline." Events at Changkufeng were not separate and isolated but a link in the general system of aggressive actions of the Japanese imperialists against the USSR and, moreover, a link in the aggression of imperialistic powers against all democratic nations.. . . The actions of the Japanese imperialists in the Lake Khasan area did not develop as planned. This was so only because of the . . . powerful blow delivered by the Soviet army in reply.11 The evidence adduced by the defense witnesses, affidavits, and documenta­ tion "could in no way change or alter the charges." While defense testimony

PRO LO GU E

XXI

was "o f absolutely fabulous nature" or stemmed from ignorance and clumsy fabrication, Soviet documentation was termed incontestable and confirmed, and Russian witnesses reliable.12 The tribunal, by a majority, found for the prosecution, not unexpect­ edly. The court described the Changkufeng hostilities as war and the oper­ ations of Japanese troops as clearly aggressive.13 The member from India lodged a vigorous dissent and defense counsel appealed in vain.14 Japan stood condemned by an international court. Unless some effort was made to study the affair more thoroughly, posterity would be burdened by the flimsy verdict. The present study represents such an effort, of necessity mounted mainly from the Japanese side. Apart from vicarious historical pleasures, we seek insight into the techniques of contingency war and escalation practiced by the USSR and Japan (surrogate for the People's Republic of China in today's context). That the subject remains alive in Kremlin thinking is shown by recent Soviet allegations that the Changku­ feng Incident represents only one of a series of "imperialist soundings" of Russian strength.15 From Changkufeng in 1938 to the Sino-Soviet border warfare at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River in 1969, we have thus come full circle. NOTES 1. See B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Red Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. xiv, and The Other Side o f the H ill (London: Cassell, 1951). 2. W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Simon and Schuster, Clarion Books, 1969), p. 319. 3. Colonel Louis B. Ely, The Red Army Today (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1953), p. 155; H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 28-29. 4. George F. Kennan, "Is War with Russia Inevitable?" Reader's Digest 56 (March 1950): 1-9; Clark W. Tinch, "Quasi-War Between Japan and the USSR, 1937-1939," World Politics 3 (January 1951): 174-199. See also Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 98-101. 5. New York Times, 3 August 1938, p. 1. 6. See "Introduction by the Prosecution," Minister Golunsky, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Transcript o f Proceedings (mimeo­ graphed), 8 October 1946, pp. 7250-7251; ibid., "Summation by the Prosecution," General Vasiliev, 17 February 1948, pp. 39851-39852. 7. Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (NewYork: John Day, 1950), pp. 272-273. From Moscow on 1 August 1938, U.S. Charge Alexander Kirk

X X II

PRO LO GU E

referred to "the town of Changkufeng, the original center of disturbances." U.S., National Archives (NA), Dispatch No. 215,761.93 Manchuria/135. 8. Tinch, for one, claims that "the elite Kwantung Army had lost prestige in the mire of Changkufeng." "Quasi-War Between Japan and the USSR," p. 182. 9. Martin Blumenson, "The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng," World Politics 12 (January 1960): 250. 10. For detailed discussion see my "Changkufeng: One Face of War," Orient/ West 7 (September 1962): 77-88. 11. "Summation by the Prosecution," General Vasiliev, IMTFE, Transcript, 17 February 1948, pp. 39830-39832, 39853-39854. 12. Ibid., pp. 39840-39841,39848. 13. "Judgment," IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, p. 49395. 14. "Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Pal, Member from India," IMTFE (typescript), pt. 3, pp. 807-808. 15. Thus, in February 1968 Marshal Kyril Moskalenko, a deputy defense minister, charged that "the imperialists tried more than once to sound out the strength and power of our state, but each time got what they deserved." He referred specifically to Changkufeng, Nomonhan, the 1929 affair of the Chinese Eastern railway, and the Soviet-Finnish war. "F ifty Heroic Years," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report 2 (28 March 1968): 24.

Notes to Reader

Japanese names follow the Japanese style, family name first. Military ranks are stated as of the time of the Changkufeng Incident. Korean place names in the battle zone are generally given Chinese readings, which are most familiar in Western literature. Thus, the hill it­ self is called Changkufeng, not Chokoho as in Japanese, and Shachaofeng is the reading for Shasoho, Fangchuanting for Bosenko, and Chiangchunfeng for Shogunho. Macrons are generally reserved for footnotes and bibliography. In chapter notes, only the author and title are given for Japanese-language sources. Full bibliographical details are to be found in the bibliog­ raphy. All translations of Japanese-language sources are by the author unless otherwise stated. The names and positions of Japanese military and diplomatic interviewees are detailed in the preface. The following format is used in chapter notes referring to volume, part, book, and page: For vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 22—1/3:22. For vol. 3, p. 482—3:482. For vol. 1, pt. 3, bk. A, p. 22-1/3A :22.

Abbreviations

AAA ADC AGS AP AT BGU CG C/O CP

c/s GPU HE HFA H.M. HMG HQ IGHQ IJA UN IMTFE KIA LMG MG MIA mt arty

antiaircraft artillery aide de camp Army General Staff armor-piercing antitank border garrison unit commanding general commanding officer command post chief of staff Soviet Russian secret police and paramilitary border guards; State Political Administration high explosive heavy field artillery His Majesty heavy machine gun headquarters Imperial General Headquarters Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy International Military Tribunal, Far East killed in action light machine gun machine gun missing in action mountain artillery

xxvi

NCO

NGS NKVD OP OSS

S/O WIA

A B B R E V IA T IO N S

noncommissioned officer Navy General Staff People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs observation post IJA secret intelligence organization (Tokumukikan, special service agency), resembles U.S. wartime Office of Strategic Services most closely staff officer wounded in action

The Setting

1

Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations. Lord Curzon A tongue of poorly demarcated land juts southeast from Hunchun, along the east side of the Tumen River, between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within it, Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors to the sea, stands in the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The twin-peaked hill reminded the Korean natives of their changgo, a long snare drum constricted in the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they reproduced the phonetic sounds in three ideo­ graphic characters that meant “ taut drum peaks"—Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese saw the excellence of the imagery and retained the Chinese read­ ings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their vantage points to the east, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "h ill behind the lake." Soviet troops thought of it as a sugar-loaf h ill.1 For many years, the natives and few officials in the region displayed a relaxed attitude toward matters of boundaries and sovereignty. Even for a while after the Japanese took over Manchuria (renamed Manchukuo) in 1931-1932, matters were not brought to a head, partly, it is said, because an island people cannot easily visualize border lines. With the buildup of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Five-Year plans, both sides paid increasing attention to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party chose to act aggressively, force majeure was adduced as the justification

U.S.S.R.

T H E S E T T IN G

5

for that unexpected and disruptive event known to international law. Most often erupting along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each affray contained the seed of all-out warfare.2 The borders dated essentially to pacts consummated by the Ching dynasty and the tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the agreement of Mukden in 1924, there had been a dozen ac­ cords governing the borders. Affecting the region o f Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, which supplemented the Tientsin Treaties (November 1860), the maps of 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun (Yenchu) Border Protocol of 1886. By the basic treaty of 1860, the Chinese empire ceded to tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia. What was meant by "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained vague. As a consequence, a further border agreement was worked out in June 1861 (the Lake Khanka Border Pact), by which map demarcations were drawn and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to pass from Khanka along the ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, to reach a terminus 20 Chinese // (some six miles) from the mouth of the Tumen.3 A Russo-Chinese commission, established in 1886, drew up the Hun­ chun Border Pact, with new or modified markers to be set up along the lines of the agreements of 1860-1861 and a Russian resurvey. To the Japan­ ese, in 1938 as at the war crimes trial in Tokyo after World War II, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the Hunchun agreement of 1886 were con­ trolling: The red line on the map marks the border all along the water­ shed, and the water which flows westward and pours into the river Tumen belongs to China, while the water which flows eastward and pours into the sea belongs to Russia. . . . Pro­ ceeding northwestward from the border mark Tu [ " T " ] , crossing a hill, and reaching a sand hill via the west side o f Lake Khasan, the border mark no. 1 is established. (Italics added.)4 On the assumption that "the hill crossed by the red line" is the same as Hill 52 (which the Japanese asserted was the intent of the original text of the Hunchun Protocol), the boundary must have extended east of Chang-

+

BORDER MARKER

A H ILL

( a)

BORDER LINE BASED ON HUNCHUN BORDER PACT, 1886.

(B )

BORDER LINE BASED ON MAP BY CHINESE ARMY SURVEY BUREAU, 1915-1920.

( C ) BORDER LINE BASED ON MAPS BY RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, 1911; AND CHINESE ARMY, 1909.

MAP 2. Disputed Boundaries, Changkufeng Area.

T H E S E T T IN G

7

kufeng and west of Khasan. Acceptance of the Russian interpretation of "all along the watershed" might imply that the border passed through every summit west of Khasan and would thereby have given the Soviets jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all the heights, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng—precisely what the Russians did claim. Since the Ching dynasty and the house of Romanov were by now defunct, the new sovereignties appealed publicly to the opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not admit that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by Ching commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or at least could be located. What the Japanese could ascertain on their own about the Russian-language version derived from a partial text.5 Too much has been made of Japanese diplomacy's alleged disdain for the Russian copy of the Hunchun Protocol produced in Moscow in July 1938. A t worst, even the Japanese Army took the position that the Hun­ chun accord was a secondary attachment and that the Peking agreement was the basic document. The Japanese not only knew about the Hunchun instrument but also about other significant but conflicting cartographic documents bearing on the boundary problem. First, there were Imperial Chinese Army maps of the region, dated 1911. Both the Chinese and Russian military maps drew the frontier gen­ erally along the watershed east of Khasan; this seemed to be in accord with the 1861 readings, which were based upon the Khanka agreement. A major Japanese newspaper, Asahi, in the midst of the Changkufeng In­ cident, told its readers that the Soviet government's claims in 1938 were based on tsarist AGS maps, while it was the Japanese side that insisted upon upholding the "tru e " Hunchun pact.6 Second, the Chinese (Republican) Army had conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than tra­ versing the highland crest ridges. Japanese AGS maps demonstrated a marked preference for this interpretation of the Hunchun agreement.7 None of the military delimitations o f the border was sanctified by of­ ficial agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or unknown, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers. Still, there can be little doubt that the matter of borders was extremely complicated around Changkufeng

8

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Hill. The red lines drawn on the musty map of 1886 were not unambiguous in the first place, as the commissioners of that year realized. In addition to efforts to assure the permanence of markers, the officials had agreed to increase their number. Between 9 and 11 lettered markers and 26 num­ bered markers replaced the wooden posts of 1861. Nevertheless, the fron­ tier to be demarcated, between Lake Khanka and M arker'"T" near Podgornaya, stretched 400 miles. Neither ditches, wire, nor fences supplemented the few markers. By 1938 the situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features— mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley—would have complicated even honest men's discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact all the way between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—one every 25 miles, at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker " K ," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that, of the 20 markers originally set up along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefec­ ture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938.8 The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk!9 The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary to mean the road line just west of Khasan, in practice at least. Free road movement, how­ ever, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931-1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted or inherited the Chinese interpretation, which was based upon the agreement of 1886 on border roads; the key clause was that the frontier west of Khasan was to be the road along the lake. Japanese sources insist that the rancor of local residents mounted against gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory. Many of the natives seemed of the opinion that the original boundaries lay east of the lake but that the Soviets chose to adjust the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were preventing use of the roads just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Ko­ rean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to a takeover of the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan-Japanese side. Villagers who went to the streams or the lake to launder their cloth-

T H E S E T T IN G

9

ing found themselves sniped at. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans who were acquainted with the Tumen area mentioned agrarian, seasonal Korean re­ ligious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, replete with the sacrifice of fattened pigs and the thumping of changgo.10 Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng H ill.11 Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, none could doubt that the easy days were past. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) observers described the explosive situation along the Korea-Manchuria-USSR borders: it was strictly a matter of de facto fron­ tiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy atti­ tude seemed to be summed up in the colloquial phrase, "Take another step and we'll 'let you have it.' " 12

NOTES 1. Nakamura Bin, Man-So kokkyd funso shi, p. 278; Sato, Tominaga, Koh interviews; John Erickson, personal letter; Ward Smith, personal letter. 2. Akinaga butai, Jinchu biclan, p. 353; Matsumura Shuitsu, Miyakezaka, p. 164; B. Nakamura, Man-So, p. 14; Imaoka Yutaka, "Man-So-Mo kokkyo funso nitsuite no gaikan," pp. 5-14. 3. Masuda Tadao, ManshU kokkyo mondai, pp. 102-104; Akamatsu Yusuke, Showa 13-nen no kokusai josei, pp. 342-344; Gaimusho [Foreign M inistry], SP No. 234, pp. 4-8; ibid., SP No. 232, pp. 36-41,51-58; IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, pp. 22695-22698. 4. From Collection o f Border Treaties Between Manchukuo and the USSR, Bureau of Treaties, Gaimusho (July 1943), pp. 78-80, IMTFE Defense Document No. 2706 (from personal files of Ben Bruce Blakeney, Tokyo; hereafter cited as Blakeney Collection). 5. Rikugun sanbo honbu [A G S ], Chokoholiken shi soan, pp. 271 -274 (here­ after cited as AGS, Chokoho soan); Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 36-41,51-58; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 10-11; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 344-345; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 164; "Kokkyo mondai," Chuo Koron (August 1938): 125-127. 6. Tokyo Asahi, 17 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 7. JRD/JSM 1 1 ,3/A: 11-13; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, fig. 1, p. 343; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 66; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 10-12. 8. Tsuji Masanobu tells how he "corrected" an instance of Russian relocation of markers by personally hauling a stone 200 meters eastward in a sector north of Changkufeng in early June 1938. Nomonhan, p. 17.

10

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

9. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 29-30; Gaimusho, SP No. 234, p. 8; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 23-24; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 8, 342-343; Masuda, Manshu, pp. 110-125; Kanafu Kizo, Kokkyoron, p. 264; AGS, Chokohb soan, pp. 277-278. 10. In Moscow in 1938 Nishi and Shigemitsu attempted without success to demonstrate that religious rites conducted for many years atop Changkufeng proved that the locality belonged to Manchukuo. At the postwar trial, the Russians denied that ceremonies were conducted; the president of the tribunal prevented defense counsel's exploration of the point. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7802-7804; also Nishi and Sato interviews. 11. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 36-37, 56-57; ibid., SP No. 234, pp. 9-11,17-29; Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, pp. 5, 9, 341; Kunimatsu Hisaya, Kokkyo no hanashi, p. 206; Imaoka, "Kokkyo funso," pp. 5-14; Koiso Kuniaki, Katsuzan koso, p. 640; Hoshino Naoki, Mihatenu yume, p. 277; B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 13-14, 279-280; Matsumura, Miyakezaka, p. 164; Jinchu bidan, p. 354. 12. Gaimusho, SP No. 232, p. 62.

Early Rumblings

Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog that swirled over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian-Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and threw up his hands in surrender. A t headquarters, the po­ lice searched and questioned the dark-haired, husky, 38-year-old man. It did not take long to realize that this was no routine border-trespassing case. The defector was no less than a Russian general—the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he was wearing full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class. The card was countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese m ilitary author­ ities, who transferred him to Seoul and thence to Tokyo under close es­ cort. On 1 July the Japanese press was allowed to reveal that Lyushkov was in the refuge of Japan. Ten days later, to exploit the publicity value of the commissar and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyush­ kov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign corres­ pondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far Eastern strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique fund of high-level intel­ ligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk.1 Polish intelligence, reputedly the world's best anti-Soviet service, picked up news of Lyushkov's defection as early as 24 June. From Warsaw emanated the most specific predictions of the consequences so far as Japan was con­ cerned. On 2 July, the day after the Russian general's escape was announced

12

TH E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

by the Japanese war ministry, Polish informants advised the Japanese that the Lyushkov affair, or the revelation of it, had heightened the possibility of conflict along the borders between the USSR and Manchuria.2 This es­ timate proved accurate and timely. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been re­ ported. The natives of the hamlet of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol had appeared in June, apparently for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More important, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a flurry o f Soviet mes­ sage traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After the defection of Lyushkov, there had apparently been a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command, which must have been held responsible for laxity in border surveillance. Japanese AGS records indicate that the Novokievsk security force com­ mander was relieved and that the sector garrison was replaced by one from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a Soviet border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector.3 Kwantung Army signal monitors intercepted a pair of significant front­ line messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region which were addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded and translated, the items revealed (1) a complaint that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the re­ quired supply; and (2) a recommendation to higher headquarters that Russian elements ought to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan. In justifying the proposed action, the Soviet commander com­ mented on the terrain advantages; construction of emplacements would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presum­ ably Changkufeng) and to set up four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July that conveyed the import of the deciphered messages.4 On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng.5 The disconcerting intelligence from the Kwantung Army and from the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Japanese mil­ itary authorities were not sure about the significance of the developments, but there was no doubt that trouble was brewing: the arrival of Russian

E A R L Y R U M BLIN GS

13

horsemen might represent the first stage of Soviet headquarters' sanction­ ing of aggressive local requests for action. One Kwantung Army Intelli­ gence officer, however, admits that he is no longer so sure that the Russian messages were not a deliberate plant designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng.6 On 7-8 July all staff officers in Seoul assembled at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but, on the basis of maps and other data, it seemed that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex in the Man­ churian border area just west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to all subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. Not even a patrol was to enter zones that lacked definitive demarcation. Now, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at the village of Fangchuanting. The matter of ownership of the high ground arose early. One officer remarked that, when he served on the AGS in Tokyo, some studies had been conducted. It was his understanding that the border extended west of Khasan and east of the hill complex. This implied that the hill lay within Manchuria and that the Russians had committed a trespass. Such a view seems to have been shared by the staff officers present. A number of other points were raised:7 1. As yet, negligible Soviet elements had been reported in the area. 2. The intrusion should not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit weakness. Halfway measures would not suffice, especially in terms of the Japanese defensive mission along 125 miles of frontier. 3. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the adjacent sector of the Manchurian tongue. 4. Troubled by dissidence and purges, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal gaps on the border, particularly after Lyushkov defected. Additionally, the Russians may have wanted to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese domination of high ground lying north. 5. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate sta­ tus quo and could lead to a contest for control of observation posts of comparable value.

14

T H E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

6. In overall terms, it mattered little if the Russians sought to establish a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor importance. Japan's main con­ cern was the China theater; Changkufeng was irrelevant. The Japanese ought not to expend their limited strength or allow themselves to be distracted. 7. The high command in Tokyo must be consulted. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army ought to pursue a policy of ignor­ ing or disregarding the Soviet actions, at this stage at least. Meanwhile, a watchful eye should be kept on the area. The consensus was conveyed to Maj. Gen. Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon hearing the recommendation to adopt a low posture, Koiso asked only whether this represented the unanimous opinion of the staff. Assured that it did, he approved the policy.8 Koiso, who was 58, was on the verge of departing from his post in ac­ cordance with the routine personnel changes that took place about 15 July each year. He had just received the unexpected news that he was being retired and that General Nakamura Kotaro would be his replace­ ment.9 To those who knew Koiso well, he appeared to be viewing the d if­ ficulties on the border as a petty anticlimax to his tour of command. He seemed to be unenthusiastic or relaxed about matters generally as he pre­ pared to leave the post he had held for 214 years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff relished the Soviet activities that appeared to be under way, his reaction probably reflected reluctance to reach decisions which might commit his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized dispatch of a warning to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) branch at Hunchun.10 These units were to take every precaution and tighten security along the frontier north of Shuiliufeng. Alerted by the appearance of the first Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit (BGU) of the 76th Infantry Regiment conducted close watch from across the Tumen. Patrols detected a dozen Russian troops beginning construction atop Changkufeng at about noon on 9 July. Somewhere between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to 40; there were also 30 horses and 11 camouflaged tents.11 Working in shifts on the west side 30 meters from the crest, the Russians

E A R L Y R U M BLIN GS

15

set up barbed wire and firing trenches; 50 meters forward, they dug ob­ servation trenches. In addition to existing telephone wires strung between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a port­ able phone net. Logistical support was supplied by three boats on the lake. About 20 kilometers to the east, indubitably inside Soviet territory, large forces were being assembled. Steamship traffic into Posyet Bay increased.12 As soon as the 19th Division commander, Lt. Gen. Suetaka Kamezo, learned of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, he dispatched staff officers to the front and made preparations to send elements to buttress the border units. Col. Sato Kotoku says that the first he heard of any in­ cident at Changkufeng (or the name of the hill for that matter) was on 11 July, when Suetaka inspected Sato's 75th Infantry Regiment in Hoeryong.13 The special importance of Suetaka and his division derived from a num­ ber of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province—including the zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had ap­ peared—lay within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the shape of the territory enclosed by the frontiers, as well as the terrain and transportation facilities, more closely linked the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80 percent of the people were of Korean origin, which meant that they were Japanese, not Manchukuoan subjects. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the OSS detachment located there.14 In case of war, the Korea Army's mis­ sion was defined clearly: to mobilize and carry out subsidiary operational assignments against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army, which was based in Manchuria. The Korea Army ordi­ narily disposed of two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot (Replacement and Cadre) Division at the Ko­ rean capital. Apart from sparse ground units, devoid of armor and weak in heavy artillery, there were but two air regiments in all of Korea, the nearest to Changkufeng being the unit at Hoeryong.ls The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security in Korea as well as fu lfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army hardly re­ quired a full-time operations officer, and there was none as such. When need arose, as it did in mid-1938, the task was assumed by the senior staff

16

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

officer, in this case Col. Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training was the main concern. The problems of the army in 1938 were accentuated by the development of a situation that was neither war nor peace in a locale ill-defined so far as the USSR was concerned and even ambiguous, in terms of jurisdiction, with regard to the neighboring Kwantung Army. Logistics and ordnance were not strong points of a garrison army, whose work centered on security and upkeep. Koiso seemed most concerned with civil administration and the development of natural resources. This was understandable in view of the scantiness of his combat elements, his overall mission, and the comparative tranquility and narrowness of the border sector. Korea Army Headquarters tended to delegate defensive responsibility to its division commanders.16 Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with the defense of northeast­ ern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a dedicated infantryman, was galled by the fact that his elite force was one of only two standing divisions which had never seen combat in China.17 Suetaka turned to training with fury. His emphasis was on the strictest of discipline, bravery and sincerity, aggressiveness, and perfect preparation. In characterizing him, Japanese veterans have used such terms as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hotblooded, high-strung, unbending, and stubborn. His moods were transient, his partialities immovable. One sophisticated Japanese officer, Sasai Shigeo, called Suetaka "a Patton type in public." But there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, which he kept under firm, even violent or excessive, personal surveillance. His men agreed that Suetaka was a pro­ fessional, an old samurai who whipped the division into superb condition. In private, he had a reputation for sensitivity and warmth. A Japanese phrase, yakamashii oyaji, possessing connotations of both stern father and martinet, sums up the Japanese Army's characterization of Suetaka. There is a character in a play by Shaw who claims that "the people who get on in this world are the people who get up and look for the cir­ cumstances they want and, if they can't find them, make them." To date, circumstances had not smiled. Did Suetaka "m ake" his own in July 1938? Sources higher than division headquarters have surmised that, from the first appearance of Russian patrols at Changkufeng, Suetaka "licked his chops" and expected or even hoped for a "good scrap." Some have gone so far as to say that, to Suetaka, the Soviet-induced incident appeared to be a heaven-sent opportunity. Division officers deny the second-hand con­ clusions. As reports came from the border, they recall, no stir was caused at headquarters. The gist of the initial thinking was that

E A R L Y R U M BLIN GS

17

it is just another border fracas with a new serial number at­ tached. So far as we are concerned, the Russians can have the damned hill. It lies in an unmarked, disputed zone. Of course it is irritating to see the Russians atop a nice little hill which we too would have liked to occupy, especially since the place has been left unmanned till now by implicit understanding.18 The staff officers say that if they had been convinced of a Soviet invasion, the intruders would have had to be evicted. But at the beginning, at least, Suetaka was not at all aggressive. Although it is not known widely, he did not appreciate the orders that were forthcoming from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until near the end of July he was somewhat op­ posed to the idea of evicting the Soviets from the crest, an idea which did not originate within the division staff. Sato adds that, for a week after the Russians were reported digging in on Changkufeng, "we did nothing more than prepare against a possible emergency, for we were thinking it was a local affair that would be settled by diplomacy."19 Sources outside division circles believe that Suetaka was more enthu­ siastic than diffident. There is even more important evidence of Suetaka's role. As revealed in Koiso's notes, on 14 July Suetaka arrived to pay his respects in Seoul. No interviewee mentioned this visit or the import of the discussions that ensued. The question arose whether. . . the 19th Division . . . would be placed in an unfavorable position if the Russians were to advance. Therefore, Suetaka would like to concentrate forces in Korean territory on the right shore of the Tumen . . . and what did I think of this? I replied: " I t is my interpretation that there is nothing objectionable fo r a division commander to handle matters as he sees fit, in terms of assigning impor­ tance and strength, so long as it falls within his zone of respon­ sibility. Nevertheless, since Soviet forces, whose intentions are unknown, are on the move facing the Manchurian area, one cannot venture any predictions. Hence, I am going to ask the high command about its desires at once and will notify you accordingly." Suetaka replied, "Please do so."20 Although one can speculate about Suetaka's influence on army think­ ing at this early stage, a number of sources suggest that the first escalation, so far as the Japanese side was concerned, stemmed from Kwantung Army

18

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Headquarters in Hsinking. Kwantung Army staff officers, dynamic and positive, did not enjoy what they felt was tim idity on the part of the Ko­ rea Army. We are an operational field army with considerable experience against the Soviets. Last summer we showed how to deal with the Russians during the Amur River incident. That is the only way to cope with their outrageous actions around Changkufeng; they are always probing weak spots where they can get something "free." The Changkufeng locale happens to belong to Manchukuo, our administrative zone, although the Korea Army, unfortunately, is responsible for its defense; we are very interested in seeing that our concerns and honor are up­ held. The Russians are obviously attempting to upset the Ko­ rean natives at the expense of their Japanese protectors. A l­ ready, the Manchurians are saying that the Kwantung Army is a tiger in the south but a pussycat in the north.21 Korea Army officers admit that at about the time the Soviets built up their outpost strength at Changkufeng, a personal and unofficial telegram appeared at Seoul from a field-grade officer in Kwantung Army Intelli­ gence who was an expert on Soviet affairs. Although the telegram cannot be found today and the staff officer mentioned is dead, a number of in­ terviewees agree as to the gist; if the Korea Army was hesitant, the Kwan­ tung Army would be obliged to evict the Russians; the affair could not be ignored. Although the telegram required no reply and struck some officers as high-handed and nonsensical, the message was shown promptly to Koiso Some say that he was goaded into taking instant action—he wired Tokyo that the Korea Army alone could and would handle the incident. Koiso's senior staff officer, however, insists that his reaction to the unofficial tele­ gram was remarkably mild, considering his customary temper.22 Messages had continued to come from the 19th Division concerning reports it was receiving about developments at the border. Some sources recall no particular comments accompanying the communications, and Tokyo provided no guidance. Was it Suetaka's urgings that led to Koiso's wire to Tokyo, or was it because the Kwantung Army "came along and booted the Korea Army in the rear"? Proponents of the latter interpreta­ tion assert that the Seoul authorities had, until then, been pondering quietly, in full realization that defensive responsibility was theirs but with

19

E A R L Y RU M B LIN GS

the idea that unilateral action was not warranted. One staff officer remem­ bers: "Now we felt that we had to act, out of our sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference."23 The Korea Army staff was convened shortly after receipt of the unof­ ficial telegram from Hsinking. On the basis of the latest intelligence re­ ceived from the division on 13 July, the officers prepared an estimate for submission to the army commander. Hypotheses were reduced to three: 1. The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion-. Slightly possible. 2. The USSR is seeking to restrain Japan on the eve of the crucial operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize the Chinese provisional capital at Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. 3. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by taking the Changkufeng ridges, he would be proving his loyalty, impressing his superiors, and gain­ ing glory. Conclusion-. Possible. Late on 13 July or early on the 14th, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the AGS deputy, the vice min­ ister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff. Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian ac­ tions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and request­ ing pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firm ly by use of force.24 The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly.

NOTES 1. See my " L ’Affaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector," Soviet Studies 19 (January 19681: 405-420. 2. Tokyo Asahi, 4 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3 (Warsaw dateline, 2 July 1938).

20

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A LL WAR

3. AGS, Chokohd soan, p. 2; Gaimusho, SP No. 232, p. 34; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 78. 4. Inada Masazumi, "Soren kyokutogun to no taiketsu," p. 279; Inada, "Kantogun to Chokoho jiken," p. 48; Ogoshi, Inada interviews; Gendaishi shiryo (here­ after cited as GSS), 10/3:xxxii; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 7 July 1938. 5. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, p. 642; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 15. 6. Ogoshi interview. 7. Composite of interviews with Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, Kitano, and Inada. 8. Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, and Kitano interviews. 9. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, pp. 641-642; Tokyo Asahi, 31 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 1. 10. Tokumukikan, literally "Special Service Agency," was the Japanese Army's secret intelligence organization, most resembling the U.S. wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 11. Japanese records differ widely as to the sequence of events. The first troops to dig in on top of Changkufeng may have arrived on 9, 11, or 12 July; the figure of 40 men may have been reached on 11, 12, 13, or even 14 July. I have selected the classified Korea Army report of August 1938 as the most authoritative. Chosengun shireibu, Chokohd jiken no keii, p. 2 (hereafter cited as CS, Chokoho). 12. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 8, 9, 11 July 1938; ibid., p. 15; CS, Chokohd, p. 2. 13. Sato interview. 14. Since 1918 the Japanese forces in Korea had been designated Chdsengun (commonly called the Korea Army or, misleadingly, the Korean Army). 15. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 4-5; Iwasaki and Kitano interviews. 16. Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, and Imaoka interviews. 17. For a biographical sketch of Suetaka, see my "Qualities of Japanese Military Leadership: The Case of Suetaka Kamezo," Journal o f Asian History 2 (1968): 32-43. 18. Composite of interviews with Saito, Sasai, Iwasaki, and Arao. Also see Akaishizawa Kunihiko, Chokoho, pp. 57-58. 19. Sato interview. 20. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, p. 643. 21. Composite of interviews with Ogoshi, Katakura, and Kotani. In late June 1937, Kwantung Army gunners had attacked Soviet warships which had allegedly violated the Manchurian side of the Amur River. 22. Iwasaki and Tsuchiya interviews. 23. Tsuchiya, Iwasaki, and Sasai interviews. Imaoka believes that, although it is d if­ ficult to substantiate the existence of the famous but "implausible" telegram, it is true that some of the staff officers at Hsinking were thinking along those lines. "Chokoho jiken," p. 33. AGS staff officer Nishimura Toshio, however, heard in specific fashion about the Kwantung Army's "indirect warning” to Seoul. Boeicho boeikenshusho senshi shitsu (Defense Agency, Institute for Defense Studies, Office of Military History) [T o k y o ], hereafter cited as BBSS Archives. 24. CS, Chokohd, p. 2. Also Hashimoto, Inada, and I. Hata interviews.

The Tokyo Command Level

3

The members of the Japanese cabinet who had the closest relations with the overall handling of the Changkufeng Incident were Premier Konoe Fumimaro and his ministers of foreign affairs and of war, Generals Ugaki Kazushige (Kazunari) and Itagaki Seishiro, respectively. The vice minister of war was Lt. Gen. Tojo Hideki. The latter's navy counterpart was Vice Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, who served under the minister of navy, Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa. Within the war ministry, the key post of m ilitary affairs bureau chief was held by Maj. Gen. Nakamura Aketo. The Japanese Army chief of staff was Prince Kan' in, in the post since 1931 and 73 years old by 1938. Under such a feeble but venerable personage, a key role had to be played by a younger deputy. The deputy was Lt. Gen. Tada Shun, who was 57. A t AGS working levels, the most influential element was the 1st (Operations) Bureau. The chief from January 1938 was Maj. Gen. Hashimoto Gun, 52 years old, who had a reputation for intelligence, remark­ able memory, and ability. In terms of Changkufeng, the key figure serving at the AGS level was Col. Inada Masazumi, 42 years old, "project officer" for the affair. A star graduate of the military academy, Inada had gone through the war college course and had seen line service as well as instructor and staff duty at the war college, AGS, and war ministry. In March 1938 Inada became chief of the 2nd (Operations) Section under the Operations Bureau. He was known as a sharp and driving personality of great ability, although some found him enigmatic. Perhaps the greatest compliment comes from Inada's counterpart in naval operations, the able Capt. Kusaka Ryunosuke, who considers Inada the best type of army staff officer—lavish praise, consid­ ering the embittered relations that often existed between the services.1

22

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A LL WAR

Dominating Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the troubles at Changkufeng were a digression. As Inada says, the Changkufeng Incident cannot be understood without reference to the situation in China. An impressive series of Japanese tactical victories had been achieved before summer. Tsingtao fell in January. In March the Yellow River was reached; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later. The port of Amoy was taken in early May, strategic Suchow on the 20th. The northern and central battle fronts could now be linked by the Japanese. But Chinese resistance continued. Although the Japanese spoke publicly of the im­ minence of fatal dissension on the part of the Chinese, there were private admissions that the secondary effects of the fall of Suchow were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese de­ fiance might accelerate, and the USSR might become involved. A drive against Hankow appeared inevitable to symbolize that the m ilitary phase of hostilities was at an end. On the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns, the Japanese were in full accord with their foes. Even after Suchow fell, the Japanese government had the domestic press and radio discourage assumptions that enemy resistance was collapsing. A t the time that Chiang was exhorting his people on the first anniversary of hostilities. Premier Konoe declared, "The war has just begun."2 Inada and his operations section had been working against this compli­ cated background. After the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Head­ quarters (IGHQ) on 18 June ordered the field forces to undertake opera­ tional preparations for a drive to secure the Wuhan complex—Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow. Inada's idea was not to play an endless game, but to seize trumps with a view toward early consummation of a political set­ tlement. Inada admits that it would have been critical if the Soviets had inter­ vened in 1938 when the Japanese were so involved in China. While the Japanese forces could undoubtedly have continued to defeat the Chinese, against the Russians the overcommitted Japanese Army might have been trapped fatally. Soviet assistance to China had already proved galling. The Russians disposed of an estimated 20 rifle divisions, four or five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of 3,000 kilometers—twice the distance from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower strength in Siberia probably approached 370,000.3 The Japanese central authorities had accordingly been stressing a no-trouble policy vis-a-vis the USSR while seeking to "w a ll" the border and to rein-

T H E T O K Y O COMMAND L E V E L

23

force the Kwantung Army as soon as possible. Still, the target date for correction of the imbalance could be no earlier than 1943. The army not only lacked surplus strength for new theaters of operation but also was suffering from supply deficits in existing battle zones in China. There was scarcely enough ammunition for regular divisions, yet the Suchow-Hankow operations required vast amounts of men, materiel, and shipping. Logis­ tical considerations dictated that the drive be completed by autumn 1938. By the end of 1937 Japan had already had to send 16 of its 24 divisions to China. The grand total of troop strength—700,000 men—approximated the number of soldiers in the entire standing army to date. The AGS plan­ ners had to shift three ground divisions, indirectly earmarked for a north­ ern contingency, from north to central China, with full knowledge that the Kwantung Army was operating in an inferior posture.4 Although oppressive concern about the northern problem may have been widespread in senior military circles, it was not universal.5 But while the campaigns on the mainland grew wider in scope and longer in duration, planning began to deteriorate at the high command level. Confusion and worry inevitably spread to the field armies in China.6 Japanese Navy chiefs had their ideas why the AGS was raising the specter of the USSR. Was it because the army had a notion of commencing something serious against the Russians? This would have affected the navy's desperate competition with the army, aimed at focusing highest-level Japanese attention on the main hypothetical enemies of the navy, the United States and Britain, al­ though army leaders denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time.7 Thus, the plan to reduce Hankow had encountered considerable internal opposition in high places. A two-front war, army planners admitted pri­ vately, would be premature from the standpoint of operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were the new senior war-ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking AGS officers also shared their apprehen­ sions, as did Court circles.8 Violent but private arguments were reported even among staff experts. Of aggressive temperament, colored by forceful subordinates and by influences emanating from the Kwantung Army, Inada is known to have visited Tada, the deputy army chief of staff, throughout the drafting of the Hankow operation. He was striving to convince Tada of the validity of his conviction that the Wuhan drive was imperative and feasible and that, regardless of gnawing concern in certain quarters, the USSR was not going to intervene against Japan. Inada argued that the Soviet Union stood to gain immensely from the weakening of both bel-

24

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

ligerents, without any cost in blood to itself. Stalin was no fool; time was working for the USSR in the Far East, where Siberian industrialization and a military buildup were well under way. The Soviet purges militated against adventures with Japan, as the Amur Incident of 1937 had proved. Nazi Germany was evolving into a critical threat on Russia's western fron­ tiers; Stalin ought to be preparing against war on that front in the near future. The Japanese and the Russians, insisted Inada, should steer clear of each other—Japan because of China, and Russia because of Germany. While most of the army was locked in combat in China, Tada did not wish to weaken the defenses of Manchukuo or to transfer Kwantung Army forces south. Not until he had completed an inspection tour of the Man­ churian borders in April 1938 did he finally concur with Inada's repeated proposals, so far as they applied not only to the north but to China. Mean­ while, Inada had been studying the daily stacks of intelligence from the Kwantung Army. After the startling news of Lyushkov's defection in June, word came that the Soviets appeared to be implementing their sector com­ mander's recommendation. Russian troops had been sighted on Changkufeng, and it looked as if they were digging in to stay. Inada remembers his reaction: “ That's nice—my chance has come."9

NOTES 1. Kusaka interview. 2. Chiang Kai-shek, broadcast of 7 July 1938, Hankow, in Vital Speeches o f the Day 5 (1 November 1938), pp. 60-61; Konoe Fumimaro, statement of 7 July 1938, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 1: 470; FRUS 1938 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 3: 162-163 (Tokyo dateline, 28 April 1938); ibid., 3:172 (Tokyo dateline, 21 May 1938). 3. The best summary of army intelligence estimates is in Imaoka Yutaka, "Nihon no tai-So handan," pp. 14-1 5, 34, 44. 4. See my "Effects of A ttrition on National War Effort: The Japanese Army Experience in China, 1937-1938," Military Affairs 32 (Fall 1968): 57-62. 5. See Harada Kumao, Saionji kd to seikyoku, 6:248 (24 February 1938); I. Hata et al., Taiheiyd senso e no michi (hereafter cited as TSM), 4/2: 43, 368. 6. Imaoka interview. 7. Kusaka, Yamaguchi, Toyoda, Inada, Hashimoto, Arao, and I. Hata interviews; Harada, Saionji kd to seikyoku, 7:56, 65-66. 8. Hata Ikuhiko, Ni-Chu senso shi, pp. 248-249. 9. Inada interview.

Reconnaissance in Force

4

Once the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. A search of documentation indicated maps new, maps old, and concordances various. It was certain, however, that Changkufeng was by no means the highest land feature in the area. From far more useful eminences in Japanese possession, telescopes swept Soviet terrain across the borders. Nor were the advantages exclusively Japanese. Wherever the borders were ill defined, the Russians, almost by tacit un­ derstanding, had divided the occupation of commanding terrain on a rough basis of parity since the Manchurian Incident. Indeed, Changkufeng may have been overlooked because it was situated at the southerly edge of the line of leapfrogged hills, although its location seems to have given it more of the quality of an anchor point.1 Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers were impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers called rowing across the stream “ rather d iffic u lt." Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles could move easily; the Maanshan section constituted the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line be­ tween the harbor and town of Novokievsk (Kraskino). Near Changkufeng,

26

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for ve­ hicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover versus aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiang­ chunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement d ifficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. A t Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited.2 Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no men­ tion of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, however, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use—as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Rus­ sian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Man­ churia from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changku­ feng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation be­ tween Hongui and Shikai stations. From Changkufeng to the railway,

R EC O N N A IS S A N C E IN FO R C E

27

it was only 214 to 4'/4 miles. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, was 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of myth­ ical Japanese shelling of Vladivostok (at an incredible range of 80 miles) which was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border.3 Hills and questions are supposed to have two sides. It is the consensus of Japanese participants that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to the Japanese, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. I nada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights; "The calm outlook of the Korea Army vis-a-vis the disputed hillock was admirable. Even we in Tokyo, under ordinary circumstances, would have ignored matters, giving the matter an 'Oh, really?' reaction at most, although the Kwantung Army would probably have grumbled."4 Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts were crystallizing. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force (iryoku teisatsu) in the strategic sense.5 Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat in­ telligence, at the IGHQ level the concept was far more sweeping: to test, "fish fo r," and quickly prove (so far as Inada was concerned) the degree of seriousness of Soviet intentions of intervening on the side of China against Japan in the "China Incident," which had been raging since July 1937. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome co­ incidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese ex­ ploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war o f attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostil­ ities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Jap­ anese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Chang­ kufeng sector, "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artil­ lery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control

28

T H E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division w ithout tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by IGHQ working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces (“ quite an unusual occur­ rence in our history," Inada has observed wryly). Calm, clear, and dispas­ sionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demar­ cation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not in­ sist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the lo­ cal forces would be withdrawn. “ In the process," says Inada, "we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved."6 The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal—the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had been wisely keeping the aggressive division away from Chang­ kufeng Hill, but now IGHQ had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one in-

R ECO N N A IS S A N C E IN FO R C E

29

fantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada has answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on IGHQ's re­ sponsibility, without considerations of "face." A t worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overcom­ mitted in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight IGHQ control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. "How would the Rus­ sians react?" Inada asked himself. "That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it . " 7 By the middle of July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan entitled, "IGHQ Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Con­ sidering the fact that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the fron­ tier of Korea, IGHQ would immediately get the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest.8 Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw volun­ tarily.9 On the basis of the guidance received from IGHQ, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July.10 Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. A t the same time, m ilitary authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal.

30

T H E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Even today, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident are not in agreement that everybody at com­ mand level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada says he was. Some think that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youth­ ful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; other deny the existence of such an idea. Inada remains clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insists, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restric­ tions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved by 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the AGS and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease."11 The only real opposition, Inada recalls, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN opera­ tions section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly.12 The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as op­ posed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If we are to lend credence to comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallowminded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army.13 Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, are astringent, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, Gen. Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the

R ECO N N A IS S A N C E IN FO R C E

31

course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristically displayed a wariness that was rein­ forced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. A t 10 A.M. on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by IGHQ of­ ficers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalls that when he saw Nakamura o ff on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserts, promised full cooperation. There is no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force.14 When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area.15 Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the AGS chief.16 The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters.17 Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Col. Arisue Yadoru (Operations) and Maj. Kotani Etsuo (a specialist in Soviet intelligence). Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada says that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admits that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalls hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of

A

32

T H E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

the Wuhan operation. Koiso has disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division.18 By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem ."19 Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff.20 Its commander had been allotted prime responsi­ bility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the com­ mand and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. IGHQ would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It was not the type of inci­ dent which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. IGHQ had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explains that operational guidance by IGHQ and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "w ild boars." "One must highly rate the fact," concludes Imaoka, "that this field army tried its best to localize matters and loyally obeyed the intentions of the central authorities."21 There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after

33

R ECO N N A IS S A N C E IN FO R C E

telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two AGS experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalls that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue per­ formed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order.22 Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japan­ ese press was not according the incident page-one treatment yet. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japan­ ese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japan­ ese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. In­ formants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937.23 NOTES 1. Inada, Sasai, and I. Hata interviews. 2. Terrain analysis based on AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 9-12. 3. See my "Changkufeng and the Japanese 'Threat' to Vladivostok, 1938," Journal o f Asian History 5 (1971): 119-139; Gaimusho, SP No. 232, pp. 17-18, 22; Tominaga, Matsumura, Sasai, Arao, Inada, Kitano, and I. Hata interviews. 4. Inada interview. 5. Sometimes called iryoku sosaku, "search in force." 6. Inada interview. 7. Ibid. 8. AGS Message No. 143 (to Korea Army and Kwantung Army commanders), CS, Chokoho, p. 2. 9. War Ministry, Manchukuo Affairs, Message No. 118 (to Korea Army and Kwantung Army commanders), CS, Chokoho, p. 3. 10. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 15 July 1938. 11. Inada interview. 12. Ibid. 13. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:65-66. 14. Hashimoto, Inada interviews.

34

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

15. IGHQ Army Order No. 154 (sanctioned by the Throne on 16 July 1938), CS, Chokoho, p. 4; Inada and Iwasaki interviews. 16. AGS Message No. 160 (to commanding generals in Seoul and Hsinking), CS, Chokoho, p. 4. 17. See ch. 2, n. 24. 18. It has been suggested that Major General Kitano was operating as acting army commander during the brief but important interregnum. 19. Koiso, Katsuzan koso, pp. 643-644; Iwasaki interview. Also see IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, pp. 22742-22743, 22751 (suppositions of Tanaka Ryukichi), and 31 October 1947, pp. 32232-32233 (rebuttal by Koiso). 20. See ch. 2, pp. 15-16. 21. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 29-30. 22. Kotani and Iwasaki interviews. 23. Tokyo Asahi, 16 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; New York Times (Tokyo) 17 July 1938, p. 21.

First Involvement of the 19th Division

Omnia prius tentanda. [Fair means should first be tried.] Livy: Hannibal to Scipio Irked by the Korea Army's so-called tim idity and anxious to obtain first-hand information, the Kwantung Army sent two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu, a "hawk” famous for interventions throughout a stormy career. In his memoirs, Tsuji says that he and Ogoshi clambered up Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian ter­ ritory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion."1 Although his account is similar, Ogoshi asserts that Tsuji could not accompany him. According to sources serving with the 19th Division, when Koiso heard that Tsuji and Ogoshi were de­ riding the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted! Ogoshi replies that the army staff was not angry but that Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Koiso's concern, Ogoshi surmises, was that if emotional outsiders such as Tsuji came to Changkufeng, they could only cause trouble, perhaps war. Such a view is shared widely. Inada says that he made it a practice to keep away in order to maintain that degree of detachment and impar­ tiality required of high command authorities.2 One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by ob­ servers from Hsinking has been provided by Lt. Col. Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which dealt with Manchukuo

36

TH E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

affairs, primarily political direction. When he visited the Operations Sec­ tion, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways of evicting the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. Gen. Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff. The latter was already in possession of the draft of an operations order call­ ing for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Rus­ sians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a problem to be handled only by the operations staff. Bor­ ders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section as well as the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions on the basis of having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participa­ tion by forces under Kwantung Army command.3 Upon receipt of the text of IGHQ's policy reply to the Korea Army's proposals, the Kwantung Army responded again. On 15 July Hsinking wired Seoul that "the Kwantung Army will gladly cooperate in matters related to . . . operational movement, operational materiel, and the like."4 Insight into the aggressive counsels prevailing in Kwantung Army Head­ quarters is found in navy captain Takagi's notes recorded during the last week of July: 1. It is imperative to make the Soviet forces withdraw from Changkufeng; use of force is necessary. 2. Even if there is resort to force, the Russians will not escalate the incident on a big scale because aggravation of the situation (such as pre­ parations for combat or troop reinforcements) has not been observed on the Soviet side; the relationship between the Red Army and the GPU [secret police] is extremely tense.5 Staff officers in Tokyo felt that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate aggravation of a negligible frontier affair undoubtedly stemmed from fail­ ure to comprehend the strategic requirements of national defense—pro­ secution of the campaign in China, the nurturing of Manchukuo, and the

F IR S T IN V O L V E M E N T OF 19 TH D IV ISIO N

37

buildup of operational readiness for ultimate solution of the Soviet prob­ lem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities were pressing for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Thus, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as "background." Meanwhile, it was the Imperial w ill that utmost pru­ dence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautionary instructions to subordinate units, especially the forces on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions neither ended the dis­ content and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Head­ quarters nor stilled the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki.6 Nevertheless, the Kwan­ tung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army sought naively to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Hsinking regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements.7 On the spot, the situation was becoming inflamed. During the after­ noon of 15 July a Japanese military police patrol from Korea was reconnoitering at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claim that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria; OSS Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro told a reporter that GPU soldiers dragged Matsushima's corpse into Soviet territory.8 The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier which had been violated by th irty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, has asserted that Ma­ tsushima's effects included a notebook containing the results of recon­ naissance and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled on being challenged.9

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T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the dis­ puted border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a coun­ terprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the nego­ tiations. In his memoirs, he states that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. This interpretation is supported by Nakamura Bin, the correspondent who first learned of the death of Matsushima: "Compounded by the Russians' illegal occupation of the crest, the killing proved to be the direct cause of the Changkufeng Inci­ dent."10 The shooting occurred at the same time the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter seemed to have no such intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they were claiming to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might be imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north asTungning on the eastern Man­ churian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. A t Changkufeng, Russian soldiers were fortifying the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence esti­ mated that Soviet troop strength in the vicinity of Changkufeng had been built up to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July.11 As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, " I t would seem that settlement of the affair has become increasingly d iffic u lt."12 In Tokyo, public concern mounted. The press gave full play to reports from the scene, and foreign correspondents reported that the trouble at Changkufeng was virtually the only subject of public discussion. An Ameri­ can newsman cabled that conversations with Japanese in all walks of life revealed uneasiness lest Russia seize the opportunity of the Chinese war

F IR S T IN V O L V E M E N T OF 19 TH D IVISIO N

39

to attack Japan. The crisis might develop into another incident such as the one that had started the war with China in 1937.13 Local Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities were ordered to give the Russians "one last chance." The following message was addressed by the commander of the Hunchun detachment to the Soviet Border Garrison Unit (BGU) at Novokievsk: Your country's border guards have invaded Manchukuo ter­ ritory in the neighborhood of Changchih [Lake Khasan] and have been constructing fortified positions which can never be permitted. From the standpoint of our border defense, we cannot overlook acts of invasion. . . . Therefore it is desired that [your soldiers] speedily evacuate the area. . . . In case this demand fails to be responded to favorably, necessary action w ill . . . be taken. . . . with firm determination. The entire responsibility, we now declare, will have to be borne by your troops.14 Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya had two emissaries bear the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor," set out on 18 July, message in one hand, white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report, next day, that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which was transmitted to higher authorities.15 Still the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. The Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles be­ hind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front in­ creased from the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping inci­ dents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on day-

40

T H E A N A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

time reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese said that their for­ bearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair on the Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Jap­ anese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mor­ tars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; o f­ ficers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory.16 Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces were infuriating the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because of fear that fighting would begin soon in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was monopolized by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo pub­ lisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen."17 Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached in­ dependently. Either it had taken almost a week for the decision to be made in Moscow or the diplomatic conversations in the Russian capital had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." A t midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "M y assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident,

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41

our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese ver­ sion.18 Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese m ilitary to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a So­ viet border unit drove o ff a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to in­ vestigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100-150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as the same in substance as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July.19 Jap­ anese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to nought, the local authorities and the press made two observations on the affair. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down. It had been d ifficu lt even to reclaim the emissaries and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to remain on guard: "A ll de­ pends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave."20 But the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is d ifficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, ad­ mits that after receipt of the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denies categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters.21

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T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out IGHQ's first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July Korea Army Headquar­ ters wired an important operations order to Suetaka.22 With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army was going to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin pre­ parations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instruc­ tions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th.23 The fol­ lowing units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Bri­ gade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order en­ joined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution of the border troubles was by now concrete and aggressive. Senda force is to be particularly careful not to provoke So­ viet troops, but, if enemy advances onto our side of border or attacks friendly outpost units, you w ill crush him immedi­ ately. However, crossing of border is expressly forbidden. K. Sato force is to annihilate foe on heights west of Khasan but will not cross lake line.

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43

From the night of 17 July, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact time for the attack would be the subject of subsequent orders; in Senda's area, no such restriction applied to "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance connected with communications, billeting, food, and sup­ ply. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally.24 Having ordered the division to begin concentration and stand by, Ko­ rea Army Headquarters was ready on the next morning, the 17th, to di­ rect the movement. Still, there was concern in Seoul lest Suetaka's advance elements cross the Tumen into Manchurian territory, in which case "there would be a high probability of their clashing with Soviet troops. The re­ sults might run counter to the principle laid down by IGHQ."25 It was decided that "movement east of the [river] would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order."26 Nakamura wired his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6 A.M. on 17 July. No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. So­ viet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Con­ sidering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi.27 Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of 17 July and to be com­ pleted on the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit ad­ vance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks. Late that day Suetaka had an order phoned to his subordinates in accord with his instructions from Seoul.28 Senda would handle concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative action against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division was going to dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four

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from Nanam. A t 11:58 P.M. on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. The Japanese had by then dispatched to the border 3,236 men (including the 76th In­ fantry Regiment BGU) and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Div­ ision Chief of Staff Y. Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert pro­ cess by 11 P.M.29 Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July.30 Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regi­ ment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several officers from the engineers. A t Kucheng, the officers put on white Korean clothing—presumably the disguise directed by the division—and got aboard native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The innocent-looking "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a few soldiers were visible—probably in platoon strength, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Capt. Yamada Teizo conducted secret recon­ naissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours on the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful bi­ noculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; but the camouflage work had been completed that day and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not establish whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with what had been learned from local police.31 Artillery Col. R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Rus­ sian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through bino­ culars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 me­ ters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two com­

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panies (about 200 men).32 Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18-19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.33 To obtain first-hand information the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the con­ sulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He was able to observe Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly "on Manchukuoan territory even according to [Soviet] maps." Miura insists that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and ob­ served no provocative actions on the part of the Japanese. These state­ ments are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio—a sketch which Miura retained as late as 1947.34 Miura's reliable testimony in vitiated by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention is at variance with all evidence for, as Russian lawyers on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, "highly interested in camouflage," would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th.35 NOTES 1. Tsuji Masanobu, Nomonhan, pp. 38-39. Also see Hoshino, Mihatenu yume, pp. 278-279. 2. Ogoshi, Inada, Sasai, Kotani, Iwasaki, Saito, and Tsuchiya interviews. 3. Katakura interview. 4. AGS. Chdkohd soar, Chronology, 15 July 1938. 5. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:55 (26 July 1938). 6. Ibid., 7:56 (26 July 1938), citing Gen. Kawashima Yoshiyuki and Super­ intendent Abe Motoki. Compare statement by Kwantung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi, BBSS Archives. 7. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 66. 8. Tanaka TetsujirS, OSS branch chief in Hunchun, not to be confused with Tanaka Ryukichi, the artillery regiment commander. T. Tanaka told his story to Nakamura Bin. B. Nakamura, Man-So, p. 275. Also see report by Vice-Consul Katagiri (Hunchun) to Ugaki, Defense Document No. 1584, IMTFE Exhibit No. 2642 (Blakeney Collection).

46

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

9. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7806-7807 (Soviet BGU report); ibid., 30 October 1947, pp. 32106-32109 (Batarshin); ibid., 31 October 1947, p. 32172 (Chernopyatko); ibid., 26 January 1948, pp. 38291-38292 (Grebennik); ibid., 27 January 1948, pp. 38320-38321 (Grebennik). 10. B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 40, 275; Shigemitsu, Showa no doran, 1:202. 11. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 18 July 1938. 12. Sawamoto Rikichiro, "N ik k i" [Diary], 18 July 1938. 13. Tokyo Asahi, 19 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; New York Times, 18 July 1938, p. 4; ibid., 19 July 1938, p. 12. 14. New York Times, 19 July 1938, p. 12; ibid., 22 July 1938, p. 7. 15. Tokyo Asahi, 20 July 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid. (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 16. Jinchu bidan, p. 23; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 67; Tokyo Asahi, 21 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), pp. 2, 3; ibid., (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 22 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. 17. Tokyo Asahi, 23 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 3. 18. B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 285-289; Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 67; ibid., SP No. 235, pp. 8-9; Jinchu bidan, p. 24. Also see IMTFE, Transcript, 26 January 1948, pp. 38292-38293; ibid., 27 January 1948, pp. 38321-38326 (Grebennik). 19. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, p. 7814; ibid., 30 October 1947, pp. 32071 -32072, 32109-32113; ibid., 31 October 1947, pp. 32174-32175, 32180; ibid., 26 January 1948, p. 38293; ibid., 27 January 1948, pp. 3832138326. 20. B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 289-290; Tokyo Asahi, 27 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), P. 3. 21. IMTFE, Transcript, 26 January 1948, p. 38293; ibid., 27 January 1948, pp. 38327-38328, 38330-38332. 22. CS, Chokoho, pp. 5-6. 23. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 24. Ibid., pp. 9-11. Also see JRD/JSM 1 1 ,3/A:60, fig. 2. 25. By IGHQ Order No. 154. 26. CS, Chokoho, p. 11. 27. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 28. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 29. Ibid., p. 14. 30. Sato interview; CS, Chokoho, pp. 11,13; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 17 July 1938. 31. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 15. 32. IMTFE, Transcript, 21 May 1947, pp. 22716-22717; ibid., 22 May 1947, pp. 22751-22752. 33. Sasai interview. 34. Gaimusho, SP No. 312, p. 67; IMTFE, Transcript, 22 May 1947, pp. 2290022901; ibid., 23 May 1947, pp. 22895-22899, 22942-22952; ibid., 26 May 1947, pp. 22958-22968. Also Miura and T. Saito interviews. 35. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7799-7800; ibid., 30 October 1947, p. 32113; ibid., 31 October 1947, pp. 32148-32149, 32175; ibid., 27 January 1948, pp. 38302-38303, 38328-38329; ibid., 17 February 1948, pp. 39846-39850 (summation by General Vasiliev).

The High Command Consultants

6

The two AGS consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived at Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert by the 19th Division "w ith a view toward a possible attack against enemy in­ truders." Inada says that he dispatched them only to inspect the front­ line situation; he had not quite made up his mind about reconnaissance in force. Since he did not impart his innermost intentions to either of them, their assignment was "relatively light." A t Shikai, Arisue and Ko­ tani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimates that, if the Japanese did decide to take Changkufeng, it ought not to be too d if­ ficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo, detailing their analysis and recommendations.1 Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities re­ ceived a cable from the Japanese attache in Moscow, Col. Doi Akio, who reported that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a strong stand because Japan was deeply involved in China, although there were also domestic considerations. The Russians, however, were manifesting no intention of utilizing the border incident to start a war. It would be best for the Japanese first to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan ought to conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign.2 Operational circles in Tokyo shared the foregoing opinions; the dip­ lomats may have endorsed them, too. Feeling was mounting in the high

43

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

command that negotiations, "unaided," would cost an opportunity. Ex­ periences along the Manchurian frontiers (such as the Amur Incident of 1937) suggested that Doi's way was best, but the Korea Army seemed to be dragging its feet. On the basis of reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army was toying with an unimaginative, ponderous plan that called for an infantry battalion to cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally while a crossing was made south of Kyonghun with another two battalions that were to drive south along the river and assault Changku­ feng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "re f­ erence." Prospects had lessened that Soviet troops would withdraw as the result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas mentioned by Arisue, in Inada's opinion it was necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng by a night attack, employing small forces. To avoid enlarging the situation, the best plan was to conduct a limited, surprise attack using ground units.3 The notion of a surprise attack was influenced by the Kwantung Army's excellent combat experience in Manchuria since 1931. Specific mention of ground units was intended to suggest that the air force not be com­ mitted. Arisue acquainted Korea Army Headquarters with Inada's message; the staff in Seoul promptly dispatched a telegram to the division on 18 July: "Desire immediate information concerning estimated date and time possible for portion or all alerted units to conduct surprise attack against Soviet forces on Changkufeng, together with plans for implementation under various alternatives."4 Suetaka wired his reply the same day. Although we have not yet received recon reports from spot, estimate date possible to conduct surprise attack either night 20 July or night 21st. Our idea to secure area after wiping out enemy in one swoop by means of night attack using 75th Infantry Regiment, artillery, main body of engineers. s On the next morning, with completion of the forward concentration of troops, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Chang­ kufeng district and "decided on concrete plans for use of force."6 Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any "hawks" at the front. As high command sources later admitted privately, the younger officers in Tokyo almost felt as if the commander were doing too good a job; there was covert opinion that it might be nice if somebody acted on his own before the chance was lost forever. This is significant in view of the usual com­ plaints voiced by responsible central authorities about the practice of

T H E HIGH COMMAND C O N SU LTA N TS

49

gekokujo ("insubordination") by local commands. Influencing the high command's view was an important report received by IGHQ and Seoul from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: "According to our agents in Khabarovsk, USSR will not let Changkufeng Incident develop into war. Russians are also of opinion that there will be no large-scale entry into Soviet territory by our forces."7 By 19 July the operations staff in Tokyo was considering the best method of getting the Korea Army to recover the lost hill by force, since the authorities in Seoul would apparently continue their laissez-faire at­ titude indefinitely. On the 18th Arisue and Kotani had been instructed by IGHQ to "assist" the Korea Army and the 19th Division in matters concerning the Changkufeng Incident. What was desired by the AGS oper­ ations officers was an IGHQ order, which, of course, would have required Imperial sanction, instructing the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng in the way the Kwantung Army would have done, using those units already under Nakamura's command. The feeling was that the affair could thus be handled locally, but if the USSR did seek to enlarge the incident, it might be better for this to materialize before the Hankow operation got under way. The drafting of an IGHQ order was coordinated with the war ministry on 19-20 July. "The wording was mild enough," says Inada, "b u t it meant unleashing the energetic front-line units." Meanwhile, Inada sent another telegram to Arisue on the 19th, replete with circumlocutions but indica­ tive of operations' train of thought. We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeas­ ures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength pos­ sible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu.8 The last sentence meant that a third AGS staff officer would be joining Arisue and Kotani at the front. Inada says that communications problems

50

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

played a part in the decision; to the elements massing on the spot, railway telegraph lines posed a bottleneck. Since an Imperial order was thought to be in the offing, time was vital. Arao knew Inada's outlook and would be in a position to provide up-to-the-minute assistance for the proposed offensive, with its covert and delicate connotations of scouting in force. Another reason for selecting Arao, Inada suggests, was the fact that "he had once served as a splendid junior officer in Suetaka's regiment, and the two men seemed to be on close terms." According to Inada, Arao flew to Korea bearing the draft of the Im­ perial order, sanction for which was expected momentarily; "his mission was not only to convey the order but also to explain the intention under­ lying it and to guide implementation from behind the scenes." Neverthe­ less, Inada claims, although the assignment he gave Arao was weightier than the one given Arisue and Kotani, nothing (official?) was handed to Arao. "He was merely instructed," insists Inada, "to provide guidance to the division, regardless of materialization of an offensive."9 Clearly, the high command wanted to crystallize the Korea Army's thoughts and to transmit detailed offensive plans. The matter of using force was now "practically fixe d"—a development well beyond the situa­ tion conceived in Tokyo at the time Arisue and Kotani had departed.10 But, according to the historian Hata Ikuhiko, Arao strikes a look of in­ nocence when asked about his mission.11 My experience in interviewing Arao was a bit more favorable. He told me: I was dispatched to investigate how to react to the situation at Changkufeng. My original intention was to counterattack the Russians and drive them back across the border. I was to confer with the division, explain the intent of IGHQ (specif­ ically, the Operations Section of AGS), and ask the division commander how best to implement matters. The decision lay with Tokyo; my assignment was only to appraise and counsel operationally. When I arrived at Hoeryong, I conferred with the air unit commander. We had no intention of using aircraft, but, in case we ever had to, I looked into such mat­ ters as morale and readiness. Then I proceeded by bumpy car to Kyonghun, where I met General Suetaka that night.12 Here the cloak of mystery falls again. The 20th of July was a hectic day in Korea (and even worse in Tokyo). The division had told the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go"—

T H E HIGH COM MAND CO N SU LTA N TS

51

news obtained at Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue had received the wire from Inada that presented limited-attack plans and advised him that Arao was on the way. As of that day, Japanese intelligence judged, there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. The Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but "no aggressive intentions could be detected." Soviet ground elements as well as materiel seemed on the move from Vladivostok and Slavyanka to Posyet.13 Suetaka headed for the front again. Sato told him that it was "abso­ lutely necessary" to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. When Suetaka reached the Wuchiatzu sector and inspected the situation, he agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchun­ feng on his own authority. The division, in other words, was on the verge of taking major action on its own. That morning Suetaka had issued the necessary orders: the division was continuing preparations for an attack and was going to shift part of its concentration sites. In midafternoon, Nakamura received a telegram from Suetaka about the desire to occupy Chiangchunfeng.

Since such occupation would facilitate reconnaissance, we are going to have Kucheng BGU take it during night of 20th [to n ig h t], on basis of their inherent mission but on this divi­ sion's own responsibility. We shall be very careful not to en­ large situation.14

Nakamura had to reach a swift decision. Suetaka's opinion was sound, in terms of preparations for a surprise attack against Changkufeng. Move­ ment of units to the Manchurian side of the Tumen, however, could cause a dangerous confrontation at close range and presupposed authorization for use of force. About two hours after hearing from Suetaka, Nakamura had this message sent to the division, "checking their intentions, since we feared an untoward incident. . . which might unnecessarily aggravate the situation": "Although we agree in principle with division idea of oc­ cupying heights . . . west of Changkufeng, such action is apt to trigger fighting and exert overall effects. Kindly defer implementation until army commander confirms attack against Changkufeng."15 On the evening of the 20th, Nakamura telegraphed the AGS chief and war minister that

THE ANATOMY OF A SMALL WAR

not only have Soviet positions Changkufeng area been grad­ ually strengthened on daily basis but Soviet forces are tight­ ening border defense in other sectors of Korea Army's respon­ sibility. If we delay, degree of difficulty in attacking [Chang­ kufeng] heights will only increase. But were we to leave mat­ ters "as is," this might set bad example. Consequently, if dip­ lomatic negotiations do not progress, we believe it advisable to sweep enemy from Changkufeng area resolutely and sw iftly.1 The unexpectedly cautious army telegram arrived at Kyonghun after 7 P.M., but the units had long ago (at 10:30 A.M.) received orders to "shove o ff" as soon as the sun went down. Suetaka did everything in his power to suspend the movements. Only around 9 P.M. on the 20th were the units held up at the edge of the Tumen. A t the time, all that Korea Army Headquarters had to go by was a respectful wire, received at mid­ night, that stated that the division had received the instructions and un­ derstood their intent.17 One other communication of importance was forthcoming. Arao, already in Korea, conferred with Suetaka on the evening of the 20th and dispatched the following telegram to Tada, the AGS deputy: Alerted units of 19th Division completed concentration around Agochi as scheduled by dawn 19 July. They are steadily making preparations for attack. Judgment of senior force (75th Reg­ iment) commander that moved-up units should commence preparations on 20th and attack at dawn 22nd. Strength would be four infantry battalions, two mountain artillery battalions, one heavy field artillery battalion, and engineer regiment. His current preference, however, is night attack.18 Kotani gives this sequence of events. Arao, on the morning he joined the AGS field team, set out with Arisue to inspect the frontier. While Kotani was alone in Kyonghun studying available information, word ar­ rived from an observation post at Shuiliufeng that twenty-five Soviet ves­ sels, loaded with men and materiel, had been observed entering Posyet Bay, filling the sky with smoke. Japanese logistical planning factors called for th irty to forty 3,000-ton ships to move one division over a period of several days. Although the observation post (OP) intelligence was not

T H E HIGH COMMAND CO N SU LTA N TS

53

confirmed, Vladivostok was so near Posyet that the Russians could be loading troops on deck. This might mean about two divisions on the move; earlier estimates concerning Soviet difficulties in reinforcing the sector might be in error. Large-scale movement would transcend a "demonstration" and represent warlike action. Kotani concluded that drastic military ac­ tivity by the USSR which the 19th Division would not be able to contain was in the offing. Since he felt that the report was significant, he phoned the border post where his colleagues were heading and told the BGU to advise them to rush back. Meanwhile, Kotani worked alone on a telegram to be sent to Tokyo, warning that a Japanese effort to retake Changku­ feng might encounter very large enemy forces. From the overall viewpoint, China represented the main battle front; therefore, the plan for a division offensive ought to be suspended. When Arisue and Arao returned, having had almost no time to observe anything at the front, they conferred at length with Kotani. The latter remembers asking Arisue to send out the wire he had drafted. Arisue listened with closed eyes, asked many questions, but expressed no opposing views and eventually agreed rather easily. Arao seemed displeased and left for his quarters. Kotani went to get a staff captain to send the secret wire to Tokyo at highest priority. "Although I knew this intelligence officer [Sasai] and not only outranked him but was two years his senior, I could not order a division staff officer. Not until later did I learn that this rascal held up the wire for two or three days. Could a mere captain 'sit on' such an important telegram? If you see him, ask h im !" I did inquire when I interviewed Sasai. His reply was disarmingly frank. "Sure. I was young and full of vim in those days. It sounds like me to have done such a thing. If such a wire had been sent by Kotani to IGHQ, it would no doubt have thwarted my division commander's will. I would not have wanted this to occur, would I? "19 A Korea Army staff officer, Tsuchiya, accompanied Kotani and Arisue on a visit to Kucheng. The AGS officers were uncommunicative while they plied their investigations, but one morning Arisue made a surprising statement: "A ll right, you people can do it." I [Tsuchiya] had nothing to say, for Korea Army Fleadquarters had already submitted its recommendations, with which I was familiar. I still do not know whether Arisue was jesting, for there was nothing else that he or Kotani ever said or did by way of clarification.20

54

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Tsuchiya felt that Kotani must have been using information on enemy troops on the move as an unconvincing excuse to calm the overeager forces on the spot; OP reports went straight to the AGS staff officers. "B ut later we did hear something about large-scale Soviet ship movements. Somebody said they were mere fishing boats! I still do not know ."21 What had Arao told Suetaka? The division commander must have been keenly expecting Arao's arrival with an attack order, but, when the major came in, there was an odd top-secret cable awaiting him. For reasons he could not fathom, the execution of the attack had been postponed. Arao, who had come to Korea in a state of excite­ ment, must have felt let down. . . . Although we shall not pry into their discussions, there can be little doubt that the com­ mander was provided a certain "h in t." It would seem that Suetaka now had in mind, consciously or unconsciously, a feeling that "sooner or la te r".. . .22 The staff at Kyonghun had the impression that Arao (as opposed to Ko­ tani) had brought with him the offensive concept.23 As for the "odd top-secret cable" awaiting Arao when he got to Korea, Inada had dispatched an urgent message which left Tokyo at 8:30 P.M. on 20 July and was addressed to Arisue and Arao: "Unable to obtain Im­ perial sanction for use-of-force order. Way of thinking here has reverted to situation obtaining at time . . . Arisue departed. Be prudent in your guidance so as not to provoke incidents."24 Inada's message was followed by a very important IGHQ directive to the Korea Army. Received on the 21st, this brief communication indicated that units concentrated on the Manchurian-Korean border must be cautious, especially regarding reconnaissance and combat preparations. It was imper­ ative that Soviet forces not be irritated.25 The message was significant for what it implied. It was dispatched as a Tai-Riku-Shi (IGHQ army directive), which meant that it contained IGHQ explanatory instructions dispatched by the AGS chief or deputy but not possessing Imperial sanction per se. A Tai-Riku-Mei (IGHQ army order) did require Imperial assent. The con­ clusion was obvious that the Throne had not authorized forceful action by the Korea Army, although the restraining directive was issued on the same day that IGHQ ordered the Korea and Kwantung armies to take

T H E H IGH COM MAND CO N SU LTA N TS

55

subversive action (boryaku) against the Russians in connection with the Changkufeng Incident.26 Even before official receipt of the IGHQ direc­ tive, Nakamura had acted wisely in restraining the division from dispatch­ ing reconnaissance elements across the Tumen. Suetaka was notified promptly. Arisue emerged from his quarters on 21 July and announced that it was the Imperial w ill and the intention of IGHQ that matters be let alone henceforth and that Changkufeng not be "touched." There was some feeling at the front that, because of the Russian buildup, the Japan­ ese had lost whatever chance there might have been to mete out a blow.27 Kotani, who shared this view, mistakenly thought that his (blocked) mes­ sage had affected the command's decision.28 Recently, however, Arao has been quoted as saying, "I did not inter­ pret the fact that Imperial sanction for use of force could not be obtained as meaning the same thing as an Imperial order forbidding use of force. I ascribed importance to coping with the situation, given the circumstance of the suspension of resort to force."29 This has led I. Hata to observe, "One could easily surmise that Suetaka must have interpreted things in the same way as had Arao—from the way the Schachaofeng affair devel­ oped" on 29 July.30 In view of Suetaka's impending decisions, this must indeed be termed a formative period. The division's preparations to at­ tack from the Korean bank of the Tumen had been completed and morale was high. Complementing the readiness of Japanese troops opposite Chang­ kufeng were the actions of the Hunchun BGU, which sent reinforcements to the frontier to the north.31

NOTES 1. Kotani, Inada, Hashimoto, Iwasaki, and Tsuchiya interviews. 2. AGS, Chokoho sdan, Chronology, 17 July 1938; JRD/JSM 11, 3 /A ;33-34; Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 3. AGS Message No. 173, 6 P.M., 17 July 1938 (received 9 A.M. next day), CS, Chokoho, p. 16. Arisue's telegraphed report undoubtedly referred to the cross-river concepts mentioned above. 4. CS, Chokoho, p. 16. 5. Ibid. 6. AGS, Chokoho sdan, Chronology, 19 July 1938. 7. Ibid. 8. CS, Chokoho, p. 17. 9. Inada interview. 10. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives.

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11.1. Hata interview. 12. Arao interview. 13. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 20 July 1938. 14. CS, Chokoho, p. 18; AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 20 July 1938. 15. Nakamura Kotaro affidavit, 22 December 1947, Defense Document No. 1223 (Blakeney Collection); CS, Chokoho, pp. 18-19. 16. Korea Army Message No. 985, 7:40 P.M., 20 July 1938, CS, Chokoho, p. 19. 17. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 18. The same text was wired by Chief of Staff Kitano to the AGS deputy, vice minister of war, and Kwantung Army chief of staff. CS, Chokoho, pp. 17-18. 19. Kotani and Sasai interviews. 20. Tsuchiya interview. 21. Ibid. 22. Inada, "Soren kyokutogun," pp. 281-282. 23. Tsuchiya and Kotani interviews. 24. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 20 July 1938. Understandably, Korea Army records do not mention an AGS operations section chief telegram transmitted to the general staff officers at Kyonghun; the Korea Army may not have had official knowledge of the message. Apparently, there was some delay in the transmission of the telegram to the AGS officers, possibly because of decoding problems in Korea. Ugaki heard that an AGS section chief (actually Arao) had flown to Nanam, bearing a copy of Kan'in's petition to the Throne and "having some kind of new intention in mind." When the wire came from Tokyo, saying that the addendum regarding use of force had not been sanctioned, the AGS officer was "discomfited, since his ulterior motive had been ruined." Takamiya Tahei, Tenno heika, pp. 269270. 25. IGHQ Army Directive No. 204 (AGS Message No. 217) was dispatched from Tokyo on the night of 20 July but was not received until the next day. CS, Chokoho, pp. 14-15. 26. According to I maoka, bdryaku in this case meant psychological warfare preparations, such as possible dissemination of propaganda leaflets by balloon. 27. Tsuchiya interview. 28. Kotani interview. 29. Arao-I. Hata interview, 18 December 1955, cited by I. Hata et al., TSM 4/2:375. Italics added. 30. Ibid. 31. AGS, Chokoho soan, 20 July 1938.

The Failure to Win Imperial Sanction

7

By mid-July Japanese high officials were disturbed by the potential danger at Changkufeng; Admiral Yamamoto, navy vice minister, was par­ ticularly apprehensive lest the Moscow authorities misunderstand the affair. Foreign Minister Ugaki admitted that, on the Japanese side, "those who do not know the facts about the problem with the USSR are handling matters confusedly, so there is a bit of concern." The Emperor was also worried, and a trip to the villa at Hayama had had to be deferred.1 The Japanese government remained hopeful. A Gaimusho bureau chief felt that the Changkufeng area was not too significant and that the crisis might end w ithout serious consequences. Ugaki, too, assured Baron Harada that the incident ought to be settled without too much trouble. After the five ministers' conference on 19 July, Premier Konoe observed: "We have absolutely no intention of making trouble with [the Russians]. This is quite a different situation from that of the Marco Polo Bridge [at Peking in 1937]. My only great fear concerns what the Soviet central authorities have in mind." On the next day, Ugaki told Harada that matters were proceeding smoothly and that "w e'll be able to finish up after a few more meetings." Konoe agreed that policy would be determined shortly.2 On 20 July, amid this delicate situation in Tokyo, the AGS received another aggressive cable from Doi, the influential attache in Moscow. The USSR was adopting a "tough" position, Doi reiterated, because of Japan's involvement in China and because of strong views held by Litvinov and other Soviet diplomats. Still, the Russians were evincing no desire for war with Japan; there had not even been press coverage of the Changkufeng

58

T H E AN A TO M Y OF A S M A L L WAR

Incident. Doi was convinced that "prom pt Japanese Army action to evict the invaders was imperative, coupled with vigorous propaganda at home and abroad."3 Asked about his thinking at the time, Doi responded: The Russians would never have backed down voluntarily; they must have judged that they could behave in "hard-nosed" fashion because of knowl­ edge that the Tokyo authorities always opposed enlargement of border affrays. Hence, the Japanese should have dealt the Soviets "one hefty blow" and worked afterward from a position of strength.4 About noon on the 20th, the government and the military reached agreement that the timing for use of force at Changkufeng—which would set the preparations in motion—should be determined only after consul­ tation between AGS Chief Kan in and War Minister Itagaki.5 Operations Section Chief Inada was concerned about Foreign Minister Ugaki's attitude. In a conversation with Itagaki, Inada remembers asking that the meaning underlying the desired Imperial order be conveyed to Ugaki.6 Itagaki con­ ferred with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazami Akira at 2 P.M.; at 2:35 he went to see Ugaki.7 The latter expressed disagreement as to "premature" use of force, his opinion being that negotiations were already under way and that these ought not to be abandoned so soon, as was implied.8 Baron Harada believed that, rather understandably, the foreign minister had given an impression of neither clearly nor thoroughly opposing Itagaki's view. Ugaki must have said to the war minister: "T o a certain extent I agree with the de­ ployment of troops to intimidate the Soviets, but we must by no means use force." Nevertheless, the foreign minister was also a soldier originally and he may have been thinking: "We might be able to employ force if it is limited only to that spot." There is reason to speculate that his attitude may have affected the war minister, too.9 Harada questioned Yamamoto, the navy vice minister. Yamamoto re­ plied that the ministers of war, foreign affairs, and navy had convened, War Minister Itagaki had requested concurrence for the use of force, and the other ministers had said that they could not go along. Itagaki arose, said "That's really too bad," and left the room in dejection; Navy Minister Yonai had evidently objected.10 Since Yamamoto was known for forth­ rightness, it is probable that Navy Operations Section Chief Kusaka's

F A IL U R E TO WIN IM P ER IA L SAN CTIO N

59

earlier acquiescence to Colonel Inada's plans may have served to confuse Itagaki, that is, led him to conclude that the mid-ranking navy officers' views represented those of Admiral Yonai, whose opposition Itagaki con­ sequently underrated. The prestigious Marquis Kido Koichi told Baron Harada, " I have advised Premier Konoe definitely to resign if the army insists on fighting the Soviets. He, too, is determined on this course."11 Foreign Minister Ugaki's role in the deliberations of 19 July is best described by the historian Takamiya Tahei. A t one cabinet meeting, he says, Itagaki stated that the 19th Division was to be mobilized and dis­ patched speedily to the scene as a first step. Two or three Kwantung Army divisions, on a wartime footing, were then to be moved to the eastern Manchurian border to take emergency measures. Premier Konoe . . . and the others looked at each other w ith­ out saying a word. They were thinking they could not bear to contemplate war with the USSR at a time when the China problem was causing such trouble. Thereupon Ugaki spoke up: "I think it is an unavoidable measure—the army's strength­ ening its defenses to cope with an emergency. But in case the concentrated troops were going to assume the offensive and crash across the frontier, I would want that approved before­ hand by the cabinet. We are in the midst of the China Incid­ ent, where we need to achieve desired results swiftly, applying all our strength. . . . It would be extremely dangerous to ex­ acerbate matters with the USSR in addition. I also deem it inappropriate for the army to split its strength. If we shift to China the forces and materiel which would have to be poured against the Soviets, I believe we could obtain that much more effectiveness. Would it not be better to resolve the Changku­ feng affair by diplomacy?" Konoe concurred from the outset, as did Finance Minister Ikeda Seihin with apparent relief. Itagaki meekly followed suit, saying "Let's do th a t."12 Inada was well aware that the Emperor entertained misgivings concern­ ing the military, induced by the latter's high-handed actions for a decade. He had, therefore, labored for mutual understanding and confidence, and had used various channels to keep the monarch apprised of the staff's "true and innermost" concepts and intentions. Matters did seem to be

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improving so far as Imperial faith in the army was concerned, as well as war ministry and AGS confidence in the operations bureau.13 An AGS mobilization expert can remember no instance, from 1932 until the Changkufeng Incident, when the Emperor had not, on the day of sub­ mission, approved the chief of staff's report on mobilization matters.14 Since Inada lacked direct access to the Emperor, however, he made every effort to insure that his superiors explained matters clearly and logically. He talked with Itagaki and Kan'in as well as other heads; all seemed to understand him and agree. Inada felt sure that the measures for possible use of force and troop mobilization had been reported to the Emperor by Kan'in at the time sanction was granted for the precautionary concen­ trations.15 On 20 July, according to the Imperial aide Sawamoto's diary, Inada visited the senior military aide-de-camp, Lt. Gen. Usami Oki'iye, and explained matters exhaustively:

Colonel Inada began his exposition with comments on the relationship between the government and AGS at the time of escalation of the China Incident. . . . Decisions concerning the USSR had been reached long before; now Japan was en­ gaged in preparations for the Hankow campaign. If we had to, now would be the best time to begin, but it was the unani­ mous estimate of the AGS as well as of those concerned in the Kwantung Army and Korea Army that the USSR would not mount a war against Japan. Incidents such as Changkufeng had occurred often in Kwantung Army history; although usually handled by force, none ever became a problem. This time, because matters had been delayed by the Korea Army, it had been decided tentatively to conduct m ilitary action parallel with diplomacy, but this did not mean that we were depending on diplomacy exclusively. A t the moment, there was little prospect that negotiations would bear fruit; we had to signify our intention to resort to force. In order to do so, however, an offensive had to be prepared. This, in turn, re­ quired that the Korea Army commander be authorized to start an offensive. Naturally, the AGS chief retained control of the timing, which also had to be determined in conjunction with diplomatic efforts.16

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The military had had no hint of a breakdown in coordination with the civilian authorities. It was the general staff's understanding that the con­ currence of Ugaki had been obtained "somehow or other."17 Sawamoto's diary entry for 20 July is couched in the following terms: The AGS was desirous of obtaining Imperial sanction yester­ day for use of force but held o ff for a day so coordination could be arranged with the cabinet. As a result. . . the under­ standing of both the premier and foreign minister was obtained. Since the war minister had thus cleared matters with the gov­ ernment officials most directly concerned, the AGS was ready to submit its report to the Throne. It was now 3 P.M.18 The command planned that the AGS chief, Prince Kan'in, should address the Throne at 4 P.M. on the 20th; Itagaki, a half-hour later.19 What has been known concerning the audiences of 20 July derives from Baron Harada's sensational account, upon which numerous postwar forensic edifices repose. The fallacies are so numerous, one wonders whether the fault lies with the recorder or with the informants. Among the confu­ sions or errors, the following are egregious: 1. The audience or audiences took place on the morning of 21 July, not the afternoon or evening of the 20th.20 2. War Minister Itagaki was supposed to address the Throne be­ fore AGS chief Kan'in.21 3. Kan'in begged o ff from seeing the Emperor after Itagaki encountered difficulties; he did not even confer with Itagaki.22 4. Kan'in and Itagaki went to the palace together although the Emperor was unenthusiastic about seeing them; 23 supposedly, they did not enter the audience chamber but kept the Emperor waiting for close to an hour.24 Consultation of other sources, mainly contemporary diaries, confutes the allegations. After Ugaki had reported to the Throne on the afternoon of 20 July, Prince Kan'in went to the palace and was received at 4 P.M. as scheduled. When informed of the use-of-force petition, the Emperor asked what countermeasures Kan'in envisaged in the distressing event that serious hostilities with the Soviets ensued. Clearly, the question derived from the monarch's profound concern, within the context of national strength. Kan'in's presentation appeared to reflect a situation "p rio r to achievement of an understanding between the AGS and government," although his petition concerning the use of force was prerequisite to Itagaki's regarding mobilization.25

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The Emperor respected Kan'in for his age and exploits in the Meiji period. But whenever the prince came to report, His Majesty would merely listen, ask no questions, and afterward consult the Imperial aide for details. Old Kan'in was essentially a figurehead who dreaded questioning. His deputy, Tada, had to attend to details. Kan'in must have been at a terrible loss when the Emperor was a bit severe with him. The whole pro­ cedure was atrocious. If the deputy had been able to report to the Throne as early as 16 July, full explanations might have been conveyed and the Emperor's rightful alarm put to rest. Also, if Tada had overseen every detail for Kan'in, matters might have gone smoothly even on the 20th. Knowing His Majesty's profound dislike for hostilities, the high command ought to have gone out of its way to reassure him and not expected automatic sanction.26 After about ten minutes in the Emperor's presence, Kan'in withdrew— ''most unusual," says Sawamoto, for the Emperor never imposed tight limits on the duration of audiences.27 Itagaki had been scheduled for an audience for 4:30 to allow Kan'in time to submit his petition. But Kan'in emerged so quickly that Itagaki had not arrived at the palace by that time. A hurried call went to Itagaki's office. As soon as he came, at 4:20, he was intercepted by the senior aide. Lieutenant General Usami, who acquainted him with what had just hap­ pened; matters were badly out of kilter. Kan'in had not left the palace, and Itagaki did talk with him. It was obvious that the 4:30 appointment could not be kept, and the Emperor was asked for a delay to allow coor­ dination involving Itagaki, Privy Seal Yuasa Kurahei, and the senior aide Usami. It looked for a while as though Itagaki would not be received, but he was eventually granted an audience at 5:50, an hour and a half after he had arrived at the palace. The report and the questions took 20 minutes, after which he withdrew.28 Sawamoto put it mildly when he said that there seemed to be slipshod or perfunctory points and contradictions or errors in detail in Itagaki's report. "Apparently the war ministry, which had conducted the negotia­ tions with the cabinet, committed some slip in coordinating with the AGS. There was, incidentally, no one connected with the war ministry who had communicated with the Throne prior to the war minister's report."29

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Predictably, Baron Harada's version is much more dramatic. Imperial Household Minister Matsudaira Tsuneo told him that Itagaki had brought up the problem of the use of force, as the Emperor had guessed would happen. Thereupon, the Emperor inquired about coordination with other cabinet ministers concerned. Itagaki replied that both the foreign and the navy ministers had concurred. The Emperor had already been informed that those two ministers approved only troop deployment, not the use of force. Therefore I [Matsudaira] had the feeling that His Majesty thought that the war minister was deceiving him. With a some­ what agitated expression, the Emperor rebuked him: "From the outset, the army's methods have been outrageous. In the case of . . . the Manchurian Incident and again . . . the early stage of the present [China] incident, the army has frequently acted basely and only in accordance with judgments made locally, without obeying the central authorities' orders. These are measures unbecoming Our army. It is Our feeling that these matters are truly abominable. . . . This time, there must not be anything resembling those other incidents." Then the Emperor added emphatically: "N o t even one man may be moved without Our order."30 It was a shaken and uncharacteristically depressed Itagaki who spoke with the senior Imperial aide, Usami, at 6:10 on 20 July, upon emerging from the audience.31 "I dare not look up to the countenance of the Emperor ever again," Itagaki was heard to say, according to Harada. " I should like to resign."32 Prince Kan'in, too, had supposedly stated that, as senior man in the army, he could not bear further responsibility for assisting His Maj­ esty. "I feel so humiliated that I should like to resign."33 The Emperor must have been particularly irked by the difference be­ tween Foreign Minister Ugaki's explanations and Itagaki's petition regard­ ing mobilization, especially since he had been pleased by the idea of solving the Changkufeng Incident through diplomacy. Ugaki had advised the Throne, earlier on 20 July, that some units are going to be concentrated and held in waiting for purposes of defense. It is agreed, however, that if those

troops have to go across the boundary and attack, the matter would be brought up in the cabinet beforehand. I should like to secure Your Majesty's assent, if and when such a circum. 34

With respect to the difficulties of kan'in and Itagaki during their audiences, it was Ugaki's understanding that, when Kan'in proposed the dispatch of troops to the Soviet border. His Majesty looked down at the petition and left it on the desk as is. . . . The prince was obliged to retire. Kan'in there­ upon called Itagaki and asked him the meaning o f all this. So Itagaki came to inquire of me about it: "The chief of staff made his report about the army order but the Emperor said, 'This petition differs from what the foreign minister has told me' and did not grant sanction. What on earth did you advise the Throne last night [sic]?" I replied: "I reported exactly along the lines of our consultation yesterday—nothing else." "Is that so?" remarked Itagaki, and he left.35 Ugaki, however, discerned more profound and more dangerous prob­ lems in the army's behavior on 20 July:

Apparently, an attempt had been made to secure Imperial sanction after making certain alterations in the petition to be submitted by the AGS chief. According to what I learned later about the text, this petition contained the army order directing mobilization of the Nanam [19th] division and the movement of two or three divisions stationed in Manchuria to the eastern border in the near future. This was identical with what Itagaki and I had discussed. Nevertheless, at the end of the petition, there was an inconspicuous addendum: "K ind ly empower the chief of the AGS with regard to sub­ sequent use of these military forces." Upon hearing of this, I had the profound impression that if the petition had eli­ cited sanction in the form presented, the decision as to war or peace with the USSR—so vital a matter, involving the fate of our country—would have been entrusted easily to the

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chief of staff by means of a mere postscript; or, to be more specific, the so-called power of the supreme command pre­ rogative would have been left in the hands of the AGS—the military. It is inconceivable, from the standpoint of common sense, that Imperial sanction should have been sought by w illfully inserting a mere note somewhere in the corner of a document, where nobody should see it, rather than by prominently incorporating such a vital matter into the text. If we were to interpret this in the pejorative sense, we would have to conclude that it was some sort of wicked trickery, an effort to pull the wool over the eyes of the perspicacious monarch. I don't like to think in those terms. Instead, the staff must have been hoping that they would not be fore­ stalled [by the Russians], which might happen if they missed the chance to manipulate the troops. With this end in view, they may have gone too far. . . . Even if this interpretation is accurate, I must say that it was the result of imprudence on the part of those narrow-minded officers who think ex­ clusively of the army and not of the nation. It is obvious their way was wrong. That the Emperor did not grant sanc­ tion in this case was attributable to His Majesty's sagacity.36 Colonel Inada is convinced that the Emperor intended his remarks as a warning to Itagaki "n o t to play with fire against Russia during such critical times." The matter of mobilization apparently constitu­ ted the crux of the difficulties.37 Full-scale operations could not be undertaken with the existing strength of the 19th Division. Under the proposed IGHQ order, mobilization of the division would have had to be effected—and reinforcement from the homeland demanded Imperial sanction. Inada thinks that Itagaki took this for granted when he re­ ported concerning his draft but that the Emperor, hearing about "m o­ bilization against the USSR," must have feared a challenge to real hos­ tilities by a war minister who had not been popular with the Throne since the Manchurian Incident. Later, a frustrated Inada, who had be­ gun to doubt the extent of AGS Chief Kan'in's briefing of the Emper­ or, went to see Kan'in. The prince admitted to Inada that he had fo r­ gotten to mention mobilization, "the most important thing," at the time Imperial sanction had been obtained on 16 July for concentra­ tion of Korea Army forces.38

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The events of 20 July spawned serious repercussions within the Japan­ ese Army. Great bitterness was engendered against Foreign Minister Ugaki for allegedly "double-crossing" Itagaki and treating him "like a child"; indeed, Ugaki lost his post in September 1938, after less than six months in office.39 Many officers also felt an increased antipathy toward the "antim ilitary retainers," the "brokers," and the "gangsters" who allegedly surrounded the Throne in league with the "useless" Imperial household agency.40 By the same token, many of the most important Imperial advisers, such as Saionji, distrusted the army even more. As Yuasa, the privy seal, told Harada: In connection with the Soviet-Manchurian border issue, the AGS chief . . . at first adopted a very strong attitude in telling His Majesty that "the spot in question is as decisive as Tennozan. We should seize it, even by force." Later [Kan'in] stated clearly that "no action will be taken without Imperial sanction." . . . I am concerned.41 No interviewees, even those least friendly to Itagaki, have hinted that he sought deliberately to deceive the Emperor.42 But the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which accorded utmost credence to the unreliable Harada materials despite Itagaki's and Ugaki's protestations,43 reached the judgment in 1948 that on the 21st [sic] o f July 1938 War Minister Itagaki with [sic] the chief of the [AGS] obtained an audience . . . and re­ quested that the Emperor sanction the use of armed force at Lake [Khasan] to enforce tha Japanese demands. The eagerness with which the war minister and the army desired to resort to military operations is illustrated in Itagaki's un­ truthful statement to the Emperor, that the use of force against the USSR had been discussed with the navy and foreign ministers, who were in entire agreement with the 44 army. The international tribunal's sentencing of Itagaki to death by hanging was based, in part, upon the verdict that when he was war minister, he "tried by a trick to obtain the consent of the Emperor to the use of force against the USSR."45

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The officers in the war ministry and general staff, of course, had been upset by the unexpected developments at the palace on 20 July. The judgment concerning further steps to be taken by the Korea Army was obviously unrealistic, and responsibility for "lack of sagacity" might have to be assumed.46 Presently, however, it was learned from the palace that such dismay was excessive. As Premier Konoe told Itagaki: It is totally erroneous to imagine that the Emperor does not have confidence in you. It is equally untrue to conclude that he places no faith in the army. He is merely wondering why such incidents occur so often. His Majesty may have stressed this point with a critical tone, advising [the army] to be more prudent hereafter.47 Consequently, Itagaki, Kan'in, and their deputies did not feel constrained to tender official resignations or to commit suicide. Political scientists, however, who have long been fascinated by the role of the Throne in pre­ war decision-making processes, w ill find that the momentous and novel workings of 20 July 1938 demonstrated the prudence of the Emperor and the occasional possibility of thwarting the ill-conceived and poorly meshed plans of subordinates. The Imperial aide, Sawamoto, recorded his impres­ sions as of 20 July: A mere 30 Soviet soldiers or so have caused this whole need­ less problem by their intrusion. There were not only faults of omission and commission in our central command, but re­ ports to the effect that the navy minister also disagrees have unfortunately reached the Throne, too. Carelessness after carelessness has piled up and it looks as if a whopping inci­ dent is building.48 As Inada puts it, "Matters had proceeded smoothly till an unexpected event occurred, after which there was an impasse. Our whole setup favored formalities and my meaning was lost en route."49 On "gloomy, restless" 21 July, Ugaki conferred with Itagaki at 5 P.M. at the latter's residence. What must the two men have said to each other! Sawamoto soon heard that the army had already abandoned its idea of an offensive: " I t was easy to suspend after all, inasmuch as the Emperor is disinclined. The plan had been originally projected on the assumption

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that the Changkufeng Incident was not much of a thing anyhow /'50 From the complex events which had taken place in Tokyo between 19 and 21 July, one can now understand why the unexpected "red light" was flashed to the military authorities in Korea. Or was it merely amber, as some skeptics have alleged?

NOTES 1. Harada, Saionji kb, 7:46-47. 2. Ibid., 7:47-48. The five ministers' conferences mentioned in this chapter and elsewhere are the official meetings of the premier, foreign minister, war minister, navy minister, and finance minister. 3. AGS, Chokoho soan. Chronology, 20 July 1938. Also see ch. 6, p. 47. 4. Doi interview. 5. Sawamoto, "N ikki," 20 July 1938. Privately, the AGS believed that, from the command standpoint, it was undesirable to defer decisions in case of "trifling incidents” until a full-fledged cabinet session was convened in every instance, but there was also the covert admission that Changkufeng might have serious conse­ quences. Nishimura Toshio notes, BBSS Archives. 6. Inada interview. 7. Despite censorship, the Japanese vernacular press provides correctives to the Saionji-Harada materials. See Tokyo Asahi, 16 July 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 19 July 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 20 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2; ibid., 20 July 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; ibid., 21 July 1938 (A.M. ed.), p. 2. Examination of these open sources would have spared the IMTFE prosecutors ridiculous errors. Even­ tually, in 1968, Misuzu Shobo began to publish the unexpurgated Ugaki diary. 8. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 9. Harada, Saionji kb, 7:53. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 7:54; Tsunoda in GSS 10/3:xxxvi; I. Hata interview. 12. Takamiya, Tenno heika, p. 267 (drawing on Ugaki's writings). 13. Inada interview. 14. Sugai interview. Also Takei and Imaoka interviews; Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. Early in the China Incident, two reports dealing with mobilization secured sanction on the same day they were submitted. 15. The references are to IGHQ Army Order No. 154, CS, Chokoho, p. 4, and to IGHQ Army Directive No. 204, ibid., pp. 14-15. 16. Sawamoto, "N ik k i," 20 July 1938. 17. Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 18. Sawamoto, "N ikki,” 20 July 1938. 19. Ibid. 20. Harada, Saionji kb, 7:50 (Matsudaira Tsuneo, Imperial household minister, 21 July 1938).

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21. Imaoka-Usami interview. 22. Authoritative Japanese historians still accept this version, e.g., Tsunoda Jun, in GSS 10/3:xxxv. All second-hand accounts can be traced to one source: Lt. Gen. Usami Oki'iye, the senior Imperial military aide (1936-19391. The latter reiterated the story when Imaoka visited him in my behalf. Imaoka-Usami interview. 23. According to Takagi, "The Kwantung Army incessantly urges the AGS to use force. This seems to be why [Itagaki] and the chief of staff visited the palace.” Harada, Saionji kd, 7:56 (letter of 26 July 1938). 24. Ibid., 7:50-51 (Matsudaira, 21 July 1938). The British historian Richard Storry has been completely taken in by this garbled account. Kan'in and Itagaki, he has concluded, "committed what must have been a calculated act of discourtesy. They made the Emperor wait an hour before going in to see him” ; Itagaki "may even have felt uneasy, at heart, at having kept the Emperor waiting." Richard Storry, The Double Patriots, p. 233. 25. Sawamoto, "N ikki,” 20 July 1938; Tsunoda in GSS 10/3:xxxvii; Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken,” p. 13. 26. Based on Inada, Takei, Imaoka, and I. Hata interviews. 27. Sawamoto, "N ikki,” 20 July 1938. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Harada, Saionji kd, 7:51 (Matsudaira). Having learned this startling infor­ mation, Harada went to see Marquis Kido, still on 21 July. Kido asked: "Why didn't the privy seal work things out beforehand with the prime minister? . . . I am disturbed." Ibid., 7:53. 31. Itagaki finally left the palace at 6:25 P.M.; times are from Sawamoto, "N ikki,” 20 July 1938. 32. Harada, Saionji kd, 7:51 (Matsudaira). 33. Ibid., 7:51-52 (Matsudaira). 34. Takamiya, Tenno heika, p. 268. After his audience, Ugaki transmitted instructions to Shigemitsu to pursue the parleys in Moscow. 35. Ibid., pp. 268-269 (citing Ugaki). 36. Ibid. , p. 269 (citing Ugaki). A number of AGS officers, Takamiya admits, denied the validity of Ugaki's remarks. 37. Alternatively, the bungling of the use-of-force petition may have been the main problem. Imaoka and Iwakuro interviews. 38. Inada interview. Also see Kido diary, IMT 2, p. 204 (21 July 1938) (Blakeney Collection). 39. Kido diary, IMT 2, p. 204 (21 July 1938); Inada interview; Harada, Saionji kd, 7:52 (Matsudaira). 40. Inada interview. 41. Harada, Saionji kd, 7:48 (Yuasa, 20 July 1938). Harada's memoirs are replete with powerful statements exhibiting fear of war with Russia and critical of Japanese Army activities in general. Ibid., 7:48-49 (Yuasa, Emperor); ibid., 7:49-50 (Saionji); ibid., 7:50 (Matsudaira); ibid., 7:54 (Saionji). Tennozan is a hill in the Kyoto area. It was the site of a decisive battle in 1582 between Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the victor

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mho went on to become the military dictator of all Japan, and Akechi Mitsuhide, a treacherous general. The seizure of Tennozan was of such importance that the fate of the realm was said to hinge on its possession. 42. Information on Itagaki from Kato and I. Hata interviews. Also see Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 13. 43. IMTFE, Transcript, 10 October 1947, pp. 30471-30477, 30520-30521 (Itagaki); ibid., 9 June 1947, pp. 23870, 23884-23892 (Ugaki). 44. Ibid., 10 November 1948, pp. 49392-49393 (Judgment). Italics added. 45. Ibid., 12 November 1948, pp. 49797-49798 (Verdicts). 46. Iwakuro, I. Hata, and Imaoka interviews; Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives; Sawamoto, "N ik k i," 20-22 July 1938; Kido diary, IMT 2, p. 204 (21 July 1938). 47. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:52 (Matsudaira). 48. Sawamoto, "N ik k i," 20 July 1938. Also see Harada, Saionji ko, 7:53 for Admiral Yamamoto's version. 49. Inada interview. 50. Sawamoto, "N ik k i," 20 July 1938.

The Effort to De-escalate

After Kan'in and Itagaki got back from separate audiences on 20 July, there may have been varying degrees of uncertainty about their personal fates, but there could be no room for doubt concerning the actions pro­ posed for the Korea Army: they were suspended. Inada rushed a telegram to AGS observers Arisue and Arao at 8:30 P.M., about two hours after Itagaki had been rebuked. A formal IGHQ directive went to the army commander.1 "Long vexed by its inability to fight in China," Inada com­ ments, "the 19th Division had great expectations of being allowed to strike at the Russians. Surprising instructions to suspend the attack extin­ guished that notion. The resentment of the troops, from General Suetaka down, was obvious." An answer to General Nakamura's specific recommendation of the 20th was still necessary—that something be done quickly to counter So­ viet actions not only at Changkufeng but also along the Manchurian bor­ der to the north. A brief telegram, over AGS chief Kan'in's name, was dispatched at 2:37 P.M. on 21 July: the central authorities had been con­ tinuing to examine the timing for the use of force since the original con­ centration was ordered, but "various elements in internal and external situation dictated caution."2 Consequently, an IGHQ directive had been issued for the time being, and Nakamura's proposal could not be adopted. Although Korea Army Headquarters was apprised promptly, there was reason to believe that the AGS officers at the front were not receiving instructions in timely fashion.3 Arao, in particular, still seemed to be pressing for permission to use force "since offensive preparations were

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nearly completed."4 This elicited another telegram from Inada on the 21st, stressing that there was no prospect of obtaining Imperial sanction for force because of the "internal circumstances" mentioned in the pre­ ceding message. Diplomatic negotiations were being accelerated but would be ruptured without delay if success was not forthcoming. Meanwhile, the troops concentrated near the front were to stay for the time being, but the main forces were to be returned to stations. In other words, the situation had become reversed and had already moved far beyond the limits of AGS responsibility or initiative. Arao and the other AGS officers were to "renovate" their outlook to deal with the latest developments.5 Earlier, on the morning of 21 July, an important visitor had arrived in Seoul—Vice War Minister Tojo Hideki. Nakamura and he met at army headquarters to discuss Changkufeng. The messages from Tokyo, although cryptic, suggested some unspecified change at the capital since Tojo had set o ff on his inspection trip. He had missed the high-level conferences that followed the Kan'in-ltagaki fiascoes on the 20th but apparently had been originally desirous of expelling the Soviet intruders decisively and would have wanted to enact the mobilization measures necessary to beef up the 19th Division. Since the situation had worsened, Tojo was hurry­ ing back to handle details with Itagaki. Now, from Seoul, he asked the military affairs bureau in Tokyo to bring him up to date. A reply was received the same day. Estimate of situation concerning Changkufeng Incident has undergone no change during period . . . after departure of General Tojo. Full agreement was reached between AGS and war ministry, and certain steps were taken between 4-6 P.M. on 20 July. For imperative reasons, however, use of force was suspended for the time being and IGHQ directive was is­ sued accordingly. Present policy stresses negotiating at dip­ lomatic level while dealing appropriately with any changes in situation in so far as the other is concerned.6 [Italics added.] "The other" refers, in roundabout fashion, to the question of the use of force, but the phrase "fo r the time being" is explicit and open-ended. Tojo implemented the reversal of military policy as soon as he got back to Tokyo and learned the full story. In Korea, this turnabout does not seem to have permeated every level of command, possibly because

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of delays in communication or the decoding of messages, as suggested earlier. On 21 July Col. Y. Nakamura was still transmitting the fo l­ lowing recommendations of his chief, Suetaka, to Seoul: As reported by division earlier, occupation of [Chiangchunfeng] is extremely important to achievement of mission. . . . Unit amounting to something less than one company plus engineers would suffice to crush enemy in Changkufeng area within one night, without causing undesirable reverberations in other sectors. Although d ifficult to ascertain latest inten­ tions of Soviets, at least those forces in region south of Novokievsk have apparently not undertaken emergency deploy­ ment. If division could obtain authorization on 21st to use force, we are confident not only of being able to defeat enemy in vicinity Changkufeng next night, 22 July, but also of keeping fight from spreading. Col. Y. Nakamura closed his message by reporting vigorously, "We are convinced that nonenlargement of the incident and eradication of adverse precedents depend on a decision to use force as soon as possible."7 That morning, 22 July, a similar recommendation arrived from Korea Army Staff Officer Yoshida Eijiro, who had been sent forward.8 Army Headquarters also received an alarming report from m ilitary police at the front which stated that the Kucheng BGU had occupied the heights west of Changkufeng. Korea Army Senior Staff Officer Iwasaki sent orders immediately to Division Staff Officer Yamazaki that it was the policy of IGHQ and Army Commander Nakamura that units not be sent to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. If any Japanese troops had crossed the river, they were to return at once.9 Unknown to the army, Suetaka had issued a "combat headquarters operations order" from Kucheng at 9 A.M. His division still intended to reconnoiter for the purpose of attacking in the Khasan area, although movement to the Manchurian bank in unit strength or the use of force (including firing from the Korean bank) re­ quired separate orders.10 As for the division's plea of the 21st, that an early decision be reached to authorize the use of force, Kitano sent a reply at 2:15 P.M., recapitu­ lating recent decisions. His message concluded: "Therefore be patient for a while about attacking heights west of Changkufeng. A t same time kindly

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pay close attention to compliance with principle laid down in the IGHQ directive."11 On 21 July K. Sato did dispatch an officer-led patrol in company strength across the Tumen and had them occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill. Nevertheless, at 11 P.M. on the next day, a presumably reas­ suring telegram reached the Korea Army from Division Staff Officer Saito: "According to front-line reports, patrols were sent to opposite shore of Tumen in Changkufeng area but no units were dispatched."12 In Tokyo, there was little confidence that the lid had been closed. Recommendations were still coming in from Korea, and the necessary "renovation of ideas" had apparently not been effected. Over the signa­ ture of Tada, the deputy chief of staff, a new telegram was transmitted to Seoul and Hsinking on the evening of 22 July. The AGS was of the opinion that use of force will not be authorized unless new developments occur such as grave deterioration in situation. . . . Consequently, handling policy is progressing even more cautiously than at time Korea Army commander left Tokyo. Moreover, use of force was not approved, because of Imperial w ill solely. Fur­ ther discussion or study is not warranted. Bear these facts in mind and take proper steps to deal with developments from new vantage point. Provide sufficient guidance to preclude careless exacerbation.13 A complex background underlay the issuance of the "no-go" instruc­ tions. The morning cabinet session and afternoon conference of the five ministers held on 22 July must have been very influential. Convening so soon after the difficult audiences with the Emperor on the 20th, the meetings must have featured a troubled Konoe, chastened Itagaki, and triumphant or cautious Ugaki—hardly the climate for bellicose decisions of national importance. Even hitherto "tigerish" AGS operations officers must have abandoned hope of obtaining sanction for force and attendant mobilization measures. The ministers' deliberations led to the dispatch to Ambassador Shigemitsu of information that Japan had determined to maintain "an ominous silence and to watch the Soviet attitude for the time being.''14 In the evening, the AGS notified the Korea Army that government policy would center on the "steady but tough" conduct of diplomatic negotiations.15

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Given the restrained language employed in Ugaki's telegram to Shigemitsu in Moscow, it comes as a shock to encounter what purports to be the text of the decision reached at the five ministers' conference of 22 July: "1. Preparations have been made for the emergency. 2. The use of force, which had been readied, w ill be issued by Imperial order, after negotiations between the parties concerned."16 This passage is taken from Japanese government records located by the IMTFE prosecution for the Tokyo trial after World War II. It does not detract from the credibility of the document to observe that it is the only textual refer­ ence to a Japanese government decision concerning the Changkufeng Incident to be found in 322 pages of documentation culled by the pro­ secutors from policy decisions reached at conferences of the five mini­ sters, cabinet meetings, and Imperial conferences.17 Acceptance of the authenticity of the quoted five ministers' decision would suggest that the idea of securing sanction for the petitions submitted on 20 July was not dead; only more efficacious coordination was envisaged before resubmission.18 A t the postwar Tokyo trial, the prosecution concluded that the sum­ mary of the decision demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy on the part of the Japanese government and of aggressive intent by Itagaki, in particular. In the final judgment of the tribunal, "Thus was obtained authority for the use of armed force at Lake [Khasan]; the only question remaining unsettled was the date of commencement of hostilities."19 Such a neat finding would mean that subsequent combat actions by the Japanese were the direct product of instructions from Tokyo, particularly from "trickster" Itagaki, and were not local decisions.20 Actually, the high command had deterred Korea Army Headquarters in a message that reached Seoul (and Hsinking) on the morning of 23 July. Specifically, the 19th Division was to "break up its offensive pre­ parations" and return to its previous setup.21 The Korea Army immedi­ ately retransmitted the AGS telegram to the 19th Division and elements in Hunchun. Late on the 23rd Suetaka replied that he perfectly under­ stood the army's cautionary instructions.22 It was higher headquarters' understanding that the division's advance forces, known to have been preparing offensive action near the Tumen shore, were being returned to their former dispositions. Presumably, everyone in Korea had by now been informed and the status quo ante would be restored shortly by a Japanese withdrawal. To

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the general staff's amazement, still another telegram arrived in the Oper­ ations Section on 23 July, from Arao: the 19th Division was devising a plan whereby Changkufeng could be retaken without enlarging the in­ cident.23 Something was amiss; the division (incited by Arao?) had trans­ gressed the spirit of the decision to suspend the offensive and was resorting to a variety of devices to circumvent it. Inada rushed o ff a businesslike telegram to Colonel Iwasaki at Korea Army Headquarters, not to his own consultants: "front-line units are apparently still preparing with idea of attack. Did you or did you not forward contents of our telegrams to front-line units?"24 Inada's message was passed to the division and to Hunchun shortly after receipt on the 24th. Iwasaki advised Inada promptly "We definitely conveyed all messages mentioned by you to the front, and we received confirmation from division commander that he understood perfectly. Furthermore, in accord with principle laid down in AGS wire, we have reiterated warnings to act cautiously, so please rest assured."25 But warnings and cautions seemed insufficient. What if a small unit, de­ spite the central authorities' injunctions, lost its head at sight of Soviet intruders and got into a fire fight? Tokyo had come around to the view that there was now no alternative to the abandonment of Changkufeng, Russians atop it or not. Even Attache Doi agreed reluctantly; his cable from Moscow on 23 July stated, "Decisive m ilitary action is still indicated but, if force could not be sanctioned, best to break off 'hopeless' parleys without hesitation."26 Tokyo's preference became Seoul's choice. Korea Army Headquarters now agreed that Soviet troops had not been acting too aggressively. At Changkufeng, no change had been observed since 24 July except strength­ ening of the crest positions. The areas to the north were also remaining quiet. Takagi wrote to Harada on 26 July that Russian front-line troops numbered only 200 and that there was no evidence of Soviet preparations for fighting. Meanwhile, foreign observers noted around 22 July that the Japanese government seemed to be taking steps to minimize the crisis lest the populace be alarmed. Wide publicity was accorded an interview with Koiso on his arrival at Shimonoseki on 20 July under the headline, "USSR Lacks Intention to Fight."27 (The text, on analysis, proves not entirely reassuring.) After the mix-up on 20 July, Inada resolved to start afresh. "Recon­ naissance in force was not mandatory, and I wanted nothing to trouble relations between army and Throne. Accordingly, I decided to abandon

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my idea and to play things by ear. I requested postponement of any IGHQ order concerning the use of force." Staff Officer Iwasaki flew to the front from Seoul and cautioned local commanders about the latest policy and the need for quiet. The same thoughts were imparted orally to Suetaka. Iwasaki was impressed by what Suetaka told him on 24 July: We have been at the front for about ten days now but the division has no real staying capacity. We are quartered in Korean huts and the natives do not like it, either. Enforced inactivity is not good, since training is not possible. Would you kindly recommend to the Korea Army that this division be sent back? K. Sato bears out this train of thought: " I t no longer seemed that the in­ cident would enlarge. On 24 July, soon after the directive denying resort to force was received, both I and Colonel Tanaka recommended to the division commander that the troops be returned speedily to duty stations."28 On the following night, Suetaka wired army headquarters that, "from various points of view," he believed it imperative to occupy Chiangchunfeng with approximately one company; since it had been determined not to use force, most of the dispatched units should be withdrawn quickly. Two infantry battalions and one artillery battery should be left at the front for a while under the 76th Infantry BGU commander. "With the above-mentioned steps," Suetaka concluded, "the Korea Army should put an end to this incident; it is important that the army simultaneously clarify this point to the central authorities."29 A t the next higher level, General Nakamura reached prompt conclusions about what should be done.30 His policy might be called "wait-and-see." Echoing Suetaka's recommendations, Nakamura saw f it to leave at the front, for the moment, somewhat less than two infantry battalions and an artillery battery assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Senda. In addition, Nakamura judged it imperative to retain the hill west of Changkufeng— "from various points of view," as Suetaka had also put it. This must be taken to mean that Japanese troops were already atop Chiangchunfeng. Soviet Army records indicate that 40 Japanese were indeed deployed 600 meters west of Changkufeng as of 22 July.31 But had not the Korea Army already warned the front-line forces, after learning about the occupation from local police, that units must not

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cross the Tumen? And had not an army liaison officer wired back that only patrols had gone across on the 21st? Here must lie the key: “ Patrols'' were not “ units." More weaseling rests on the interpretation of "occupa­ tio n ": patrols could not occupy heights, but units would. Korea Army records are vague, yet the impression is given that Seoul knew what had been done and indirectly endorsed it. Sato explains that he had dispatched one company, about ninety men, to Chiangchunfeng, which was occupied on 21 July, and another th irty men southwest of Shachaofeng. A t first, Suetaka objected to the movements, but later he authorized them. All of this suggests what I. Hata meant when he wrote that "the division secretly occupied Chiangchunfeng . . . on the 21st; then asked for post factum ap­ proval and was instructed to withdraw; but eventually wheedled the Korea Army into approving the fait accompli as the result of bandying words."32 Korea Army records do not mention specific liaison with the high com­ mand concerning the directive to pull back forces. IGHQ was mainly exer­ cised by continuing reports that front-line preparations were still being planned or conducted in Korea. The AGS telegram received in Seoul on 23 July had been intended to discourage any lingering hopes that force would be sanctioned unless the situation underwent drastic change. As Inada observes, it was "to cut things o ff clearly"—to restore the status quo ante—that a new IGHQ directive was issued on 26 July, the second in a week.33 This directive, in close accord with the Korea Army's thinking, reached Seoul before midnight. Pursuant to the original IGHQ order which had authorized dispatch of units to the border, the Korea Army commander was now to arrange their return.34 "As necessary," a portion might be used to reinforce frontier defenses. On the morning of the 27th, General Nakamura wired an operations order to Suetaka and other important field commanders. Intelligence in­ dicated that, although Soviet forces in the Changkufeng vicinity had con­ tinued to buttress their positions, matters had quieted in other areas. The Korea Army must strengthen the borders while returning most of the division to the original set-up. A detailed explanatory directive was issued by army headquarters in the afternoon: "A rm y commander directs that concentrated units be returned to stations. For time being, however, pre­ pare against facing enemy by assigning one infantry battalion and one mountain battery to 76th BGU. Simultaneously reinforce defense of Manchukuo-USSR frontier and secure Shangchiaoshan."35

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"Prepare against facing enemy" meant, "take no 'positive' steps beyond the present set-up." A second point of clarification stipulated: "B y one infantry battalion and one mountain battery, we mean strength which would eventually remain behind on semi-permanent basis. Division com­ mander can make appropriate decisions . . . until he reaches indicated final strength level." The matter of crossing the border was then raised explicitly, that is, authority to cross the Korean-Manchurian (not Man­ churian-Soviet) border by moving to the Manchurian bank: "Such crossing ordinarily requires permission of Korea Army commander, but you may interpret this to mean authority is of course granted to cross Tumen as necessary to accomplish missions assigned."36 In practice, the last point provided blanket authority for patrol movement atop the ground west of Changkufeng, as desired by Suetaka and K. Sato.37 Suetaka issued orders concerning the next actions, on the morning of 28 July, from his advance post at Kyonghun. The preponderance of the dispatched units were to return, starting that night. Upon arrival at can­ tonments, the alert status would be rescinded.38 Everybody claimed to be relieved now that the 19th Division was o ff alert and the crisis seemed to have blown over.39 By 28 July the Japanese pullback had begun in all seriousness. Five trainloads were readied at Agochi for return of the off-alert forces. Two trains departed on the night of the 28th, carrying 589 men. Left at or near the front were five infantry battalions, a mountain battery, two heavy field artillery batteries, and two engineer companies. Most of these elements—1,366 men, including, significantly, all of the infantry supposed to withdraw—were awaiting transportation. But Lieutenant Colonel Senda, with his two BGU companies and the reinforcements, was now on the Manchurian side of the Tumen.40 Sato was planning to leave with his Regimental Headquarters staff on the 29th. The last to depart would be his 3rd Battalion and the engineers. Suetaka's transportation plan made sense: withdraw the artillery and ser­ vice elements first; leave an infantry regiment and the engineers intact till the last minute. Therefore, Sato was still at the front on 29 July. But Suetaka had not gone back to Nanam aboard Train 1, which carried his division headquarters from Agochi on the 28th. He was still lingering with four headquarters people whose talents in transportation, mobilization, and logistics were necessary for the pullback. While the Korea Army had

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given Suetaka leeway in deciding the tempo for decreasing advance ele­ ments to final, semi-permanent levels, did he have to remain personally until the end of the process? No one can know what thoughts crowded Suetaka's mind as he put o ff leaving for Nanam, but there is evidence that anger and frustration commingled. A division major puts it this way: "The Soviet forces had been 'seeing o ff' our troops with derision and scorn. Atop Changkufeng, which they had grabbed, the Russians waved their large red banners [s ic ]. The Soviet front-line troops were acting to humiliate us."41 Imaoka has offered the suggestion that perhaps Suetaka sent the bulk of his staff back to Nanam to handle matters which piled up at division headquarters, while he stayed at the front to oversee the 75th Regiment's pullout before heading back. I can hardly believe he remained in expectation of some incident, for it was he, after all, who had recommended return of the main forces to duty stations.42 The most plausible positive theory is suggested by a staff officer who was at the front at the time. " I t is my hunch, based on close relations with him, that Suetaka stayed because of his forceful personality. I mean that, in all probability, he didn't want to withdraw. If something happened, if some 'golden opportunity' still arose, I think he desired—subconsciously perhaps—to 'get' the enemy."43 Other officers believe it was not impos­ sible that the frustrated division commander harbored the covert notion that justified, unavoidable action, once it had been taken, might yet elicit high command approval.44

NOTES 1. IGHQ Army Directive No. 204 (AGS Message No. 217), CS, Chokohd, pp. 14-15. 2. Circumlocution entered into the phrasing about "various internal and ex­ ternal circumstances"—an "indescribably delicate matter" to convey in a few lines. CS, Chokohd, p. 20; Nishimura notes, BBSS Archives. 3. Communications in northeastern Korea were notoriously inefficient, and there may have been deciphering problems again. 4. CS, Chokohd, p. 17.

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5. AGS, Chokohd soan, Chronology, 21 July 1938. 6. CS, Chokohd, pp. 20-21; Iwakuro interview. 7. CS, Chokohd, pp. 22-23. Message received in Seoul on morning of 22 July 1938. The first phrase of the extract, "As reported by division earlier,” refers to a division operations report received at Korea Army Headquarters on the afternoon of 20 July 1938. CS, Chokoho, p. 18. 8. Message transmitted 6:24 P.M., 21 July 1938, CS, Chokoho, p. 23. 9. CS, Chokoho, p. 23. 10. Korea Army Headquarters only learned of this order when it was disseminated in printed form on the 25th. CS, Chokoho, p. 24. 11. CS, Chokohd, pp. 23-24. 12. Ibid., p. 24. 13. AGS Message No. 236, CS, Chokoho, pp. 24-25. 14. From a secret Gaimusho study made in December 1938, it can be surmised that this message, with the wording cited by Inada, was transmitted after the return of the local Japanese emissaries from the maritime province on 26 July. SP No. 31 2, p. 68. The wire from Ugaki was transmitted on the 27th, shortly after issuance of IGHQ Directive No. 210 advising the Korea Army commander to return the concen­ trated forces to stations. CS, Chokoho, p. 28. 15. AGS Message No. 236, 16. Translation from Chokoho jiken shori n i kanshi toritaru tetsuzuki, Showa 13-nen 7-gatsu 22-nichi go-shd kaigi kettei [Procedures adopted in connection with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident, Five Ministers' Conference decision, 22 July 1938]; IMT 357. IPS Document No. 820, pp. 309-310. 17. The title of IMT 357, IPS Document No. 820, is "Documents Relating to Policy Decisions Concerning the China Incident, National Mobilization, and Other Matters, Made at Cabinet Meetings, Imperial Conferences, and Five Ministers' Conferences, 16 October 1937-29 July 1938." 18. The tribunal's clumsy translation: "The use of prepared military power is to be carried out by the Imperial order." IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, p. 49393 (Judgment). 19. IMTFE, Transcript, 10 November 1948, pp. 49392-49393, 49395. Also see ibid., 12 November 1948, pp. 49797-49798 (Verdicts). 20. Ibid., 12 November 1948, pp. 49797-49798 (Verdicts). 21. AGS Message No. 236 was transmitted over the signature of the AGS deputy, Tada. 22. Suetaka's wire left Kyonghun at 10:33 P.M. on the 23rd and was received in Seoul at 9 A.M. next morning. CS, Chokoho, p. 25. 23. CS, Chokoho, p. 25. 24. Ibid., pp. 25-26. Also see I. Hata in TSM 4/2:85, 375-376. 25. CS, Chokoho, p. 26. 26. AGS, Chokoho soan, Chronology, 23 July 1938. 27. Harada, Saionji ko, 7:55; CS, Chokoho, p. 27; Tokyo Asahi, 20 July 1938 (P.M. ed.), p. 1; New York Times, 22 July 1938, p. 7. 28. Inada, Iwasaki.and Sato interviews.

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29. Kyonghun, 9:45 P.M., 25 July 1938; CS, Chokoho, p. 27. Already, on 24 July, fifteen Japanese soldiers had been sent to occupy Shangchiaoshan. 30. Korea Army records list Nakamura's decision as having been reached on 25 July, Suetaka's recommendations afterward. CS, Chokohb, p. 27. I have reversed this sequence because it is unlikely that Suetaka would have submitted a formal recommendation that parroted or anticipated Korea Army policy in terms not only of fact but also of phraseology. Korea Army staff officers say Seoul authorities acted after receipt of the division recommendation. 31. IMTFE, Transcript. 15 October 1946, p. 7814. 32. I. Hata et a l„ TSM 4/2:376. 33. IGHQ Army Directive No. 210 (dispatched 8:19 P.M., 26 July 1938, received 11:50 P.M.), CS, Chokoho, p. 28. The first of the two directives was No. 204; see ch. 6, n. 25. Also see I. Hata in TSM 4/2:85; K. Nakamura affidavit (Blakeney Col­ lection); Inada and Hashimoto interviews. 34. IGHQ Army Order No. 154 (sanctioned 16 July 1938), CS, Chokoho, p. 4. 35. Korea Army Operations Order No. 27 (10 A.M., 27 July 1938), CS, Chokoho, pp. 29-31. The Korea Army commander’s directive was phoned by Staff Officer Yoshida (Seoul) through Staff Officer Saito (Nanam) to the 19th Division, 3:20 P.M., 27 July 1938. Ibid., p. 28. 36. Ibid., pp. 28-29. 37. Sato and Tominaga interviews. 38. Kyonghun, 7 A.M., 28 July 1938, CS, Chokoho, pp. 31-32. 39. Inada, Arao, and Kotani interviews. 40. CS, Chokoho, pp. 32 (Chart), 34. 41. Saito, "Oetsu kyoki," unpaginated. 42. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," p. 24. It is also possible that Suetaka wished to observe the 76th Infantry Regiment BGU after its reinforcement. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 20. 43. Sasai interview. 44. Iwasaki, Saito, and Imaoka interviews.

Shachaofeng: Japanese Curse or Boon?

Chaque fois que /'occasion s'en presente, faisons justice. P.-J. Proudhon Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company across the Tumen to Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a movement which did not go unnoticed by the Russians.1 On 24 July, the same day that another Japanese element occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division (stationed in the Posyet area) to be made combat ready and to allocate a force of regulars to back the Soviet border guards; two rein­ forced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve.2 According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began to appear around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but nothing serious was reported at this stage.3 What happened next has been obscured by fogs historical as well as meteorological. Whether the affray which occurred stemmed from pro­ vocation by either side or from accident, one matter is clear even from Suetaka's official reports: trifling Soviet forces were involved. A t about 9:30 A.M. on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his cantonments at Kucheng. Through his glasses, Kanda discerned four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in con­ struction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda no­ tified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to go

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across the Tumen and have a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 A.M., they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda ver­ ified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters—"even by the So­ viets' contention"—and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "prom ptly and resolutely," in view of the basic mission assigned his unit. He tele­ phoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation.4 Even authoritative Japanese sources are not in agreement as to the roles played by Suetaka and Senda, once the news of Soviet intrusion at Sha­ chaofeng was reported, although the decision was never in doubt. According to one version, Senda obtained the prior concurrence of Suetaka to eject the intruders by force. " I am going to have the Kucheng BGU drive them o ut," reported Senda; phone reception was not good and Suetaka could not ascertain details, but he approved Senda's resolve. Suetaka also ordered that the assault forces regroup quickly to the rear after the enemy was ex­ pelled, to avoid further trouble.5 In another version, the decision sprang from Suetaka's own brain: as soon as Suetaka heard about the Russian border violation, he ordered Senda "to attack and repulse the enemy forces, and to pull back afterward. . . . General Suetaka took this action on his own initiative, in view of his con­ cept of the divisional mission."6 The two versions are not irreconcilable, although fine points are involved. Senda made his report(s); it was not un­ usual to have added his own recommendation. The question is whether Suetaka concurred or whether he prompted Senda; the responsibility, in any case, was the division commander's, and Senda would have been acting under substantive orders.7 Subordinates remember Suetaka's first reactions when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion a mere mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The ar­ rogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Im­ perial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."8 When the Soviet forces' "border violation" was demonstrated to Suetaka's satisfaction (which may have taken little effort), it was only natural that he should act decisively to carry out the division's mission of frontier defense.

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85

A limited amount of discussion ensued at Suetaka's command post. Major Saito was rather opposed to the idea of arbitrary action. Had not use of force been prohibited explicitly at Changkufeng? Ought not the Korea Army to be consulted before taking counteraction, however small? Suetaka countered these points with determination. Suetaka reflected deeply. He considered the developments of 29 July to be a second stage of the Changkufeng Incident. The prohibitions of the first phase no longer " f it . " No dis­ obedience to Imperial orders was intended or implied; the orders in effect were merely being applied to another but imperative situation.9 As might be expected, Japanese interpretations vary regarding the matter of limitations on force. There had admittedly been a hitch in Tokyo, but a more considered approach could be expected to succeed even now; the withholding of sanction allowed useful leeway to the local forces, who were not hamstrung by an explicit restriction. Yet, did not specific permission for offensive action require separate and prior directives? The command's mode of calling off the offensive plans led to confusion. Whereas AGS representatives had twice been dispatched in connection with reconnais­ sance and offensive planning, only "a telegram or tw o " had notified the forces in Korea about the withholding of permission to strike. Some inter­ viewees, however, believe that further communications were unnecessary: "A Yes may have required considerable guidance and explanation; a No meant just th at." Others insist that it was incomprehensible not to have received detailed directions after the series of stops and starts in policy to date. "We were not where we had started." Perhaps a silent understanding concerning countermeasures existed by now, in lieu of impermissible overt connections. No concrete evidence from Japanese sources supports this oft-heard surmise.10 But were Changkufeng and Shachaofeng really to be viewed as separate geographical entities? Even Foreign Minister Ugaki said, at the Tokyo trial, "I hardly believe that there is an army officer capable o f making such a poor excuse."11 A number of interviewees stress that both the division and army headquarters were using maps which allowed study in detail; "the terrain would look very different on large-scale strategic maps, which tend to lump things together." Others argue that this approach does

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not contradict Suetaka's outlook: "The Shachaofeng sector is really part of Changkufeng, lying rather at its foot. Even the Korea Army did not differentiate between the two locales." Changkufeng and Shachaofeng were so inseparable, in terms of terrain, that "the Russians must have known, if they crossed in the Shachaofeng region, we would have to take action to assault them there. This, in turn, would expose us to flank attack from Changkufeng, already held by the Soviets."12 Viewed thus, the Russians were throwing down the gauntlet. The preceding discussion hints at the process of escalation. The Japanese had never acquiesced in Soviet occupation of Changkufeng Hill. With Rus­ sian troops appearing in the Shachaofeng district, a rationale was evolving to justify ejection of them from there and from Changkufeng. It was not difference or identity of terrain features that mattered, but the newness of the situation. Thus, the turn of events on 29 July was crucial, since the status of Changkufeng could be reopened. Everything was piecing together, consciously or not, in Suetaka's thoughts. Perhaps the idea o f retaking Changkufeng had never left his mind, conditioned as it was in a certain direction, especially after Arao's stimulating visit. If so, the Shachaofeng incident was truly a heaven-sent opportunity, exploited or even sought by Suetaka. It should not be forgotten that BGU elements were now operating across the Tumen in the Chiangchunfeng area. Their presence, legal or not, enhanced the prospects of a hair-trigger situation, which Tokyo had for­ bidden. But in Suetaka's own words, Passivity would ruin the dignity of the Empire and exert ad­ verse effects on national policy toward China. Unless Japan dealt firm ly with the USSR, there was actually greater danger that the Changkufeng Incident could lead to full-scale war. The direct cause of the troubles was not the Soviet seizure of Changkufeng but the Russians' obvious violations of the bor­ der (as many as four times) in the hilly area south of Shachao­ feng.13 Perhaps Suetaka would have found a pretext for vigorous counteraction before the last Japanese troop trains left for home regardless of the location of a "provocation." Although Japanese sources have given little thought to Soviet motivations, the authoritative historian Tsunoda Jun suggests that the Russians were provoked by Japanese seizure of Chiangchunfeng H ill.14 Imaoka takes a stiffer line.

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87

Why did the Russians push into the Shachaofeng area as if challenging our forces? It is d ifficult to judge whether it was planned by Soviet higher headquarters or was merely recon­ naissance undertaken by front-line units. If done to scout our side, occupation of Changkufeng crest would have sufficed. Most probably it was a careless border crossing by forward elements. It was only natural, I imagine, for the Russian side to know that the 19th Division had already begun the w ith­ drawal.15 Imaoka remains convinced that "the direct cause of escalation of the in­ cident was the Soviets' trespass, and it is only right that the USSR bear responsibility for instigating the a ffa ir."16 Suetaka would certainly have agreed. The preceding interpretations hardly accord with the findings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, nor do they take account of the Russian claim that all of the Shachaofeng (Bezymiannaia) district lay from 250 to 300 meters inside Soviet territory. Still, even assuming that the heights south of Shachaofeng was honestly believed by the Rus­ sians to fall within their frontier, one wonders why Soviet troops should have to be sent atop it on 29 July, at a time when the dangerous front­ line situation (although it was abating with the Japanese pullback) was far from settled. Were the Russians moving in to fill a vacuum or to ex­ ploit Japanese "tim id ity"? Was an enthusiastic local commander testing how far he could go by sending up a small force? Or was it felt that, since occupation of Changkufeng had produced no repercussions, surely the lower heights near Shachaofeng could be taken for tactical adjustment? To say that the Soviets took action with knowledge that seizure of the high ground to the north would compel the Japanese to do something at Changkufeng suggests that the Russians were playing with fire unless they were convinced that their opponents were unwilling or unable to act. One can explain Russian actions at Shachaofeng on 29 July no more easily than those at Changkufeng in the first part of the month. From Japanese Army records, we know that Lieutenant Colonel Senda, after talking with Suetaka before noon on 29 July, issued oral orders to Captains Kanda and Noguchi at Chiangchunfeng.17 According to Senda, five or six Red soldiers had crossed the frontier.18 Senda's unit was going to attack promptly and expel the enemy beyond the border. Kanda was to assault the Russians on the heights with the aid of one pla­

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toon from Noguchi's company. As soon as Kanda received this order, he phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 P.M. Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30 (which suggests that the time of Senda's first oral order was between 11:30 A.M. and noon).19 Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless shot at and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they were advancing in deployed formation but kept moving and did not re­ spond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned the fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself had been pressing forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envel­ op the enemy from the right. A t the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma was able to move forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda himself was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun happened to let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets but, when about to bring down his saber, he was stabbed in the face while an­ other Russian hit him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma chopped him down. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 P.M. the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his pla­ toon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and covered by forces firing from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, which was part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 P.M. and swung right until it reached the Crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced the 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other, the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Chang­ kufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's

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unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's move­ ments and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary (in accord with instructions from Suetaka?) and gradually withdrew his forces (under duress?) to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 now. By 5 P.M. Soviet reinforcements, which had apparently been brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish posi­ tions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed to the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachao­ feng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported on the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked fo r reinforcements.20 As army headquarters at Seoul understood the developments reported by Suetaka, "in response to the hostile border violation," about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU, un­ der Lt. Sakuma, drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 P.M. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe.21 Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a gre­ nade and was bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and was also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with rain­ coats.22 The official account focuses attention on a mere 2nd lieutenant—not the captain or lieutenant colonel who were also there—and does not ex­ plain how a subaltern came to take such forceful and dangerous action. The Korea Army carefully omits mention of specific orders by Suetaka until shortly after the Japanese had wiped out the little Soviet force near Shachaofeng. According to the records, the division issued orders at 3:20 P.M. to drive out the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng. Further orders transmitted that day were intended to con­ tinue the assault against the foe in the Shachaofeng area. These orders refer to support for Senda and to counterattacks. If we are to believe the timing and sequences of the 3:20 order, Senda must have had Sakuma charge the Russians somewhat before formal authorization was received.

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Such an interpretation would be misleading and contrary to the text of Suetaka's operations order at 3:20 in which he merely stated that the two sides had been exchanging fire in the Shachaofeng district since 3 P.M. and that Russian strength had been increased. The order provides no details concerning the inception of the fire-fight and says nothing about ejecting the enemy south of Shachaofeng.23 Korea Army records are reticent not only about who ordered whom and when but also about the progression of reporting and the strengths committed. Around 3:20 P.M.—the very time an initial division order is recorded for that day—Soviet elements are said to have pulled back once. This version hardly accords with the earlier-mentioned phrase "destruction of the Russian detachment." Suetaka's own wording, like the wording of another report made in the evening, was that "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as the result of our attack at about 2:30 [?] P.M." By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the pla­ toon which was on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattackers, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously, several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 P.M., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides.24 Suetaka's modesty in mentioning the numbers of Japanese troops in­ volved is important, for Seoul had little more to go by than the news that one platoon had been in action. Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping.25 Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. Suetaka vaguely mentioned reinforcements dispatched to Senda between 5 and 6 P.M. on 29 July in response to his "sound" request.26 A t 8 A.M. on the 28th, Suetaka had also ordered Senda—to whom Takenouchi's bat­

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talion was now attached—to strengthen the border defenses and to secure Chiangchunfeng and other heights. A t Kucheng, Senda had had only one company (Noguchi's 9th) from the 75th Regiment; this unit was dispatched across the river to occupy Hill 147, west of Changkufeng. To cover the Kucheng sector, across from vital Changkufeng-Shachaofeng, Senda had to shift reinforcements. His choice was Imagawa's company.27 With the sole exception of time factors and inevitable propaganda, the narratives of the Shachaofeng affair published in the Japanese press were almost identical with the text of classified materials. Initial but brief treatment appeared on the night of the incident, under page-two headlines, from "a certain place in Korea."28 Subsequent press coverage was based mainly on releases by the Korea Army Information Section, but little of substance was disclosed. In Moscow, Tass divulged that on 29 July detachments of JapaneseManchukuoan intruders had tried to seize high ground ostensibly located VA miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly.29 Walter Duranty, a veteran American newsman in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, "doubtless tended for internal consumption," that there had been hours of furious fighting at the points in question. Since the unsubstantiated dispatches "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed, this "may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of 'ap­ plying force' unless their demands were satisfied. . . . Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully."30 The Soviet communique on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, was published unostentatiously in next day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the single headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation."31 The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communique spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven o ff the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Never­ theless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich

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addressed an immense crowd . . . in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said no more than: "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet w ill abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forces the issue. As for the disputed high ground, the USSR was maintaining its strong posi­ tion: "The heights are Russian and w ill remain so."32 During the Tokyo trial, Tereshkin stated that on 29 July the 11 Rus­ sians were assaulted by about two companies of Japanese field troops to ­ taling 100 to 150 men. The Russian senior commander in the area, Greben­ nik, testified that he was advised by phone that the gunfire he was hearing emanated from an attack made by a Japanese unit of company size deployed in two groups. Grebennik personally observed a platoon of enemy infantry in action. Of the 11 Soviet border guards, five were killed and six wounded.33 For the foreign audience, the first news of the Shachaofeng affair was cabled from Tokyo on 29 July, but some of the facts differed from the version that appeared in Japanese newspapers and there was one important embellish­ ment: "Seoul .. . reported today that ten Soviet soldiers invaded Manchukuo to a depth of about 900 feet [sic] north of Changkufeng at 2:40 P.M. and fired on Japanese border patrols. After an hour's fighting, the Soviet soldiers were repulsed."34 The assertion that the Russians fired on Japanese border patrols and thus began the attack does not often appear in con­ temporary reports and is mentioned rarely afterward, although in 1947 General Nakamura did state that on 29 July, at about 9:30 A.M., the Soviet Army advanced to a hill approximately 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng (which lies . . . about 350 meters west of the boundary . . . ) and began to fo rtify the hill. Consequently, our guards in front of the hill were forced to repulse them and occupy the line, since our patrols were fired upon by the Soviet machine guns.35 [Italics added.] The Japanese foreign ministry's semiofficial account, edited by Akamatsu Yusuke, refers to Soviet provocations from 28 July but does not go so far as to say that the Russians initiated the hostilities on the 29th. Contending

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that Japanese BGU actions were taken on the basis of the unit mission, he asserts that Soviet forces were built up, “ even adding tanks, and fired on us, so we naturally responded, and both sides ended by confronting each other." On Soviet "provocations" after the 28th, Akamatsu says, "The USSR seems to have misjudged our gentlemanly attitude as weakness."36 Nakamura Bin, a widely read journalist, does little better, although he insists that the frontier struggle erupted because of the Russians' "illegal firin g " at Sha­ chaofeng. His facts are obscure and imaginative.37 The preceding samples convey some idea of the gruel fed the Japanese reading public (and the world) at the time. Although Suetaka did not allude to a provocative Russian attack on 29 July, perusal of Korea Army documents suggests that his eventual reports to his superiors were hardly more enlightening than those of the Japanese Army's Information Section or the journalists. He not only allowed more troops across the Tumen than either Seoul or Tokyo knew about or desired, but he also played down the numbers involved around Shachaofeng. It was inevitable that his interpretation of events should have affected decisions of higher headquarters.

NOTES 1. See ch. 8, pp. 74, 78. 2. Information provided by John Erickson, who calls particular attention to V. Dushenkin, Of soldata, pp. 166-173. The detached regiments, Erickson suggests, must have been the 118th and 119th. Erickson correspondence. Soviet prisoner data on the later-alerted 94th and 96th regiments of the 32nd Rifle Division were collated by the Kawame observer team dispatched by the Kwantung Army. 3. AGS, Chokoho soarr, p. 16. 4. CS, Chokoho, pp. 34-35, 38; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 17; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:39, 62-63; I. Hata etal., TSM 4/2:86. 5. AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 20-21. 6. JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:62. 7. Saito interview. Also I. Hata interview. Saito, who was with Suetaka, cannot recall that the commander issued specific attack instructions to Senda. 8. Sasai interview. 9. Saito interview. 10. Paragraph based on Saito, Tsuchiya, Sasai, Iwasaki, and I. Hata interviews. 11. IMTFE, Transcript, 10 June 1947, pp. 23892-23893. 12. Sato, Iwasaki, Tsuchiya, and Sasai interviews. 13. These remarks were penned in September 1938; they and other recollections by Suetaka are found in Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 318-324.

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14. GSS 10/3:xli. 15. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 20-21. 16. Ibid., p. 21. 17. AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 17. 18. The variant figure of ten is not used here. 19. The printed version of the Senda unit order bears the time of 2 P.M., a fact which has occasioned confusion. 20. Account based on AGS, Chokoho soan, pp. 17-20. Also see JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:63; Shachaofeng is not inhabited, as stated erroneously. 21. CS, Chokoho, pp. 35, 38. 22. Akaishizawa, Chokoho, pp. 79-105, treats the period 28-29 July. 23. CS, Chokoho, p. 35. 24. Ibid., pp. 34, 39. 25. Ibid., p. 38. 26. Suetaka refers to the Takenouchi battalion of the 76th Regiment, plus infantry guns, from Kyonghun. As of 3:30 P.M. on the 29th, these forces were ordered to cross to the left shore and head for Yangkuanping "to cooperate with the Senda unit's attack." One platoon of mountain artillery was to move from Sozan. CS, Chokoho, p. 36. 27. CS, Chokoho, pp. 32, 34; AGS, Chokoho soan, p. 20; Hohei dai-75 rentai [75th Infantry Regiment], Chokoho jiken sento shoho [Changkufeng Incident de­ tailed combat report] (1 October 1938), entry for 29 July 1938, hereafter cited as 75th Infantry Regiment, Sento shoho. 28. Tokyo Asahi, 30 July 1938 (A.M. ed.)„ p. 2. 29. FRUS 1938. 3:459; New York Times, 30 July 1938, p. 1. 30. New York Times, 30 July 1938, p. 1. 31. Ibid., 31 July 1938, p. 26. 32. Ibid. 33. IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, pp. 7776-7777, 7804-7805 (Tereshkin); ibid., 26 January 1948, pp. 38294-38295 (Grebennik). Also see IMTFE, Transcript, 15 October 1946, p. 7808 (Report of Frontier Corps Department, People's Commis­ sariat for Home Affairs, 21 March 1946); ibid., p. 7809 (Chernopyatko); ibid., p. 7812 (Batarshin); ibid., 30 October 1947, pp. 32072-32073, 32116 (Batarshin); ibid., 31 October 1947, pp. 32176-32177 (Chernopyatko). 34. New York Times, 30 July 1938, p. 1. Also see New York Times, 1 August 1938, p. 7. 35. K. Nakamura, Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 17 (Blakeney Collection). 36. Akamatsu, Showa 13-nen, p. 346. 37. B. Nakamura, Man-So, pp. 257-259, 290-292. Also see Jinchu bidan, p. 24.

Crossing the Tumen

10

The second troop train was to leave Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. A t Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 4 P.M. when he was advised by the division that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 3 o'clock and that the Russians were building up in that area. Suetaka was ordering Sato's 3rd Battalion—which was not scheduled to leave until next night—to head for Kucheng; the rest of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After conferring with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that “ overall developments do not warrant optimism" and an acknowledgment that " it is imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield."1 One of Sato's first actions was to phone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved and, at 5:30 P.M., Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 3 P.M. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artil­ lery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 6:20 P.M., called for Sato to have two of his battalions—the 1st and 3rd—cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area.2 Sato arrived at 9:15 in Shikai. There he assembled a number of his

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officers, including Yamada, and explained what he had in mind. The 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to help the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amidst heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 10:15 P.M. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, although Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29-30 July. A night attack w ill be launched against Changkufeng on the night o f 30-31 J u ly."3 (Italics added.) Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit (1st Battalion, 75th Regiment) at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan and, additionally, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. We have been discussing events within the context of lower echelons of command. Even division-level participants are so overwhelmed by the events of 30-31 July that they sometimes prefer to view the fire-fight of the 29th as only a BGU affair. It is generally admitted, however, that the troubles began from the moment Senda asked Suetaka for instructions. Interviewees frequently use the term dokudan senko (arbitrary or independent action) in describing Suetaka's decision on the 29th. Japanese operational regu­ lations contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stip­ ulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact super­ iors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full re­ sponsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-a-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."4

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The most striking detail about the Korea Army's version of events on 29 July is that no mention is made of any report received from the division prior to 5:30 P.M. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divi­ sional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August (although the date of preparation was 29 July). The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 7:15 P.M. Their texts were almost identical with the brief accounts we have gleaned from Japanese Army, Gaimusho, and press sources. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. A t 9:20 P.M. on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. A t present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences.5 Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers were to move to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 6:20 P.M., 29th); (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (10 P.M., 29th); (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (6:40 A.M., 30th). Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important com­ munication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening

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by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix. Re­ gardless of what the Seoul authorities learned eventually, one cannot over­ look the fact that significant actions occurred in the divisional zone w ith­ out prior notice to or inquiry of army headquarters. Reporting to the Korea Army was post factum in every case. After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be pro­ voked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policfy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his com­ mand.6 Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at this time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about ag­ gressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decision­ making process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a pos­ itive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post are known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possess considerable in­ formation about thinking at the Korea Army level. Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been rela­ tively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the de­ ployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Re­ ports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own in­ itiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although

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much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a trouble­ some matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been w ith­ held and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be ap­ proved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Naka­ mura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked [=counterattacked?] us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have.7 Nakamura adds: " I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division."8 Such sanction was granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post factum. A t 1:20 A.M. on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phraseology suggestive of his grave concern: One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to

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the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked.9 Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, war minister, and Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura went on: In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . un­ lawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fun­ damental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Man­ churian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident.10 A senior officer, Morimoto, who spoke with Suetaka just before the outbreak of the Shachaofeng affair, remembered that Suetaka was upset about the withdrawal of troops from the frontier. He sought to calm Suetaka by suggesting that IGHQ, which had decided against fighting, must have the overall picture in view. But Suetaka retorted, " I f we w ith­ drew cravenly now, without resisting, Tokyo would surely regard me as a coward."11 As for 29 July specifically, Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya observes: It is true that the Korea Army always left responsibility for defending the borders to front-line commanders, who needed only to be instructed carefully and watched, but I still feel somewhat odd about Suetaka's actions. He was explicitly directed not to cause trouble, yet he acted on his own and did cause trouble. Why didn't he contact Seoul if he had so much time to ponder before the Shachaofeng incident?12

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Tokyo-level interviewees corroborate the view that only the AGS and the 19th Division were involved operationally. The Korea Army ("painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major) was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By now, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had come back to Japan—an important fact, given the "M o ltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembers that his AGS subsec­ tion was giving him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. " I t was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day."13 Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with mini­ mal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this was the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubor­ dination, one cannot overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted pro­ perly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur.14 It would be unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "so ft­ er" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There was no con­ cern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army was a many-layered process. The AGS was of the opinion that initial guidance ought to be pro­ vided the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high com­ mand staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible AGS officers con­ ferred at length. Stress was laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It was also evident that further information was required. On this basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng In­ cident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura received the telegram at 4:50 P.M. and

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had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, now at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy—leave things to local units, who have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation w ithout fa il."15 The AGS and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the divi­ sion-well down the rungs of the ladder of command—was initiating ac­ tions that were to jeopardize the government's basic policy. Earlier quib­ bling about restraints on "unit-size" elements' crossing into Manchuria was abandoned after the fire-fight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. A t 3:30 P.M. Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 6:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to as­ sault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest is Suetaka's acceptance o f Sato's recom mendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.16 Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid de­ ployment of his forces across the river. A t Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders (conveyed orally by staff officers) had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immedi­ ately, even i f the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore . . . reinforce Senda's unit and maintain strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area."17 (Italics added.) Around 11:20 P.M., the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train (primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion) was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 12:30 A.M. and reaching the crossing site at 3 A.M. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembers. A t the crossings, the hard­ working engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 4:30, he traversed the river. The movement was completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 8 A.M. did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147 (already held by Noguchi's com­

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pany) west of Changkufeng. By now, plans were behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembers torrential rains; other officers mention darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpoint a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff o ffi­ cer rightly thinks that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to “ attack at an opportune tim e," and that the night of 29-30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." While most interviewees say that the boat shortage did not delay the offensive, Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing opera­ tion approximately as scheduled.18 Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses on the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commanding the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, proceeded across the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery, which took up positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa had been attached to the 75th Infantry on the 29th, he had brought his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to cross two weak and narrow bridges in the darkness. Since there were two 15-cm. howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit had some anx­ ious moments. The gun sites proved worrisome, too. They were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, while the single road to them from the unloading station traversed a paddy zone and was similarly exposed. Sato exercised operational control of the following units by midday on 30 July: of his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting,

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Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng, a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52, and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; of other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company, two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Re­ giment, near Shachaofeng, and a 75-mm. half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery, on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery numbering two 15-cm. howitzers was in place from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery. The 19th Engineers were operating near the crossing sites, but one platoon was at Fangchuanting. "We were now deployed at last,” said Sato, "to cope with any situation." His command post was established in foxholes in open ground at Chiangchunfeng, an excellent central hill from which to observe and control the actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north.19 Not content with suspending the pullout of units and with deploying a number of combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to bring back division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinarian personnel from Nanam. A t dawn on 30 July, headquar­ ters at Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to take 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail. Most of the increment was from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 5 A.M. on 31 July. The preceding emergency meas­ ures were being conducted by Suetaka although he was the recipient of Nakamura's calming telegram of the 30th enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by the fact that Kitano was flying to the front. Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up wire at 10 A.M. on the 30th: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." A t 1:45 P.M., Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure . . . Chiang­ chunfeng and . . . the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an attack by the enemy, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 4:50 P.M., Nakamura received instructions from Tada: The Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were deemed to be pursuing the desired

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policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. A t 7:30 P.M., the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun.20 Why did Suetaka proceed with the execution of combat plans, although it was clear that specific authorization was not provided him in blanket form and that Changkufeng was excluded from his area of initiative? Part of the answer is to be found in loopholes allowed by Tokyo and Seoul; despite the fundamental limitations imposed on Suetaka's freedom of action, his activities stressed the exceptions and not the substance. After the cease-fire, Suetaka wrote that the front-line forces had not originally termed the events of July-August the Changkufeng Incident but had al­ ways referred to the entire period as the Shachaofeng Incident.21 The message traffic, however, indicates that all actions across the Tumen from early July were classified at higher headquarters under the heading of "Changkufeng Incident." Still, the army commander did concur with Suetaka's interpretation of the 29 July affair in reporting to Tokyo early on the 30th. Much of the semantic sensitivity derived from complications caused by earlier failure of the AGS to win sanction for force at Chang­ kufeng. Despite circumlocutions, the local commanders' comprehension of the enormity of the self-imposed operation cannot be denied. Describing the eventual decision to assault Soviet positions, the 75th Infantry records for 30 July state: "Since it had reportedly been decided not to use force against Changkufeng because of the Imperial w ill, we felt truly awe-struck."22 A queer logic had to be invoked. The Changkufeng and Shachaofeng areas might be termed inseparable with respect to topography but distinct whenever headquarters' restrictions were concerned. Complicating the hairsplitting is the charge that Suetaka "passed the buck" about the operation of 30-31 July. It has even been suggested that Suetaka was mesmerized by his local regimental commander. Although some interviewees cannot believe that Sato acted without prior concur­ rence of Suetaka, others retain the impression that Sato staged the attack on his own. Inada, for example, thinks Suetaka authorized assault action against the Russians near Shachaofeng on 29 July; Sato must have taken advantage of this assent to try to take Changkufeng heights by storm on the night of 30-31 July. I recall hearing from Sato later that

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he had not received orders from the division to attack. But, I must say, types like Sato and Tanaka were very skillful in "covering" themselves. So, if the division commander did issue even some kind of unofficial instructions, that would pose a real problem!23 AGS documentation states clearly that Suetaka personally ordered K. Sato, on the afternoon of 30 July, to launch a "counterattack" if and when he discerned hostile offensive action. Such a triggering was detected by Sato toward evening of the same day, whereupon he resolved upon a night attack on his own initiative. The 75th Regiment's records suggest that Sato did stage a night attack on his own, "understanding the division commander's intention by a communion of minds."24 Underlying this telepathy is a startling charge that the official combat history of the regi­ ment, a top-secret document, was doctored after the incident, the decision having been reached to "pin the rap" for an arbitrary night attack on Sato! According to Major Saito, copies of the division order to the regiment were never pre­ pared. One pencilled order for the offensive was made by Suetaka himself and hand-carried by a major [sic: by the general himself?7 to Sato. This was not unusual in combat situations; after the fighting, the text would ordinarily be mimeographed. But, in this delicate case, the one clerk could not be authorized to reproduce the division order. Did this not place Sato in an unbearable predicament? "Yes, if he had failed, it would have been unfortunate for h im ."25 Sasai remembers no pencilled order to Sato. The operational preparation instructions were probably con­ veyed orally before I got to the front. They would have given details; the regiment was ready to go, and no special instructions were necessary. But there should have been an official follow-up order. Suetaka, a conscientious officer, always kept detailed notes; so he must have written down the order and issued it formally later.

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"Then," I inquired, "you people didn't report the proposed attack to Korea Army Headquarters in advance?" "Hell, n o!" was Sasai's candid reply.26 It remains d ifficult to trace the parentage of the Changkufeng assault plan. Apparently, Suetaka had already (on the night of the 29th or early morning of the 30th) reached the basic decision to attack the Russians—a decision which he shared with Sato. One Japanese historian asserts that Suetaka, "who had been looking for an opportunity to smash the enemy once, acted in collusion with Sato . . . who was another 'tough type.' " 27 Saito heard "much discussion" between Suetaka and Major Tanaka, the aggressive OSS commander. Sasai, the division intelligence officer who had arrived at Kucheng from Nanam with his logistics colleague at 5 A.M. on the 30th, adds: When we got there, the commander described his plan for a night attack against Changkufeng. It was my opinion (which, incidentally, the division chief of staff shared) that the pro­ posed assault ought to be cancelled. The Wuhan operation was in progress. . . and now was not a good time to get mixed up with the USSR. The general replied: "L e t me think over your recommendation." He retired for an hour and a half or two hours, after which he told us that he had decided to proceed with the attack. Our reply was that we would, of course, co­ operate, since the commander had overcome our reservations. So we all set to work to prepare the attack, and the division commander himself drew up the plans. Sato must therefore have had considerable notice of the envisaged attack by his regiment. "Yes. By the time we reached the division command post, the 75th Infantry was on the move, readying for the assault. One battalion was already there and the regimental commander had been briefed."28 Saito, the logistics major with Suetaka, corroborates Sasai's account: The commander's resolve was overpowering; he explained his reasons very firm ly. Colonel Y. Nakamura phoned from Nanam in an earnest effort to change his mind, but Suetaka turned a deaf ear and told him, very emphatically, that he

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didn't have to bother to come to the front since he wasn't "listening" to him. We all abandoned our original opposition at this point. I was determined to die, if need be, with my commander—to share his fate.29 Sasai adds: "Nobody outside our division combat headquarters—except the 75th Infantry, of course— officially knew what was in the wind. Probably the forces at division rear suspected something, inasmuch as we two staff officers were rushed to the front from Nanam at midnight on the 29th." But would not arbitrary combat action have endangered Suetaka, too? "Yes, indeed," Sasai admits; "n ot only the general but the nation as a whole. That is why a number of us had opposed the plan."30 Imaoka offers the best critique of events on 29-30 July: As a result of the latest incident near Shachaofeng, the pre­ vious interpretation concerning use of force was erased. Ex­ actly who issued the Changkufeng attack order? No matter how brave Sato may have been, the central authorities had been clear about prohibition of force; nor did the Shachaofeng area lie within the 75th Regiment's operational sector. More­ over, Suetaka was located just behind Sato and there must have been ample time for the colonel to obtain orders. Viewed in this light, the story of an arbitrary attack by Sato based on "thought transference" with the general sounds implausible. But if it is true that Suetaka had the 75th Infantry rewrite the combat journal in accord with his personal desires, one wonders why, for this would suggest that he sought to evade responsibility. After the eruption of the "new " incident on 29 July, Suetaka had reacted strongly. If the division went through army headquarters and Tokyo, the chance for counteraction might be lost by having to clear so many eche­ lons. " I t is therefore likely that Suetaka made up his mind to launch an arbitrary attack on his own initiative." Imaoka believes that the general apparently evaluated the situation carefully before concluding that there was no better alternative. However, the high com­ mand's previous thinking concerning the use of force may

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have remained on Suetaka's mind. Similarly, the background to the Imperial decision suspending force must have been known to him to a certain extent. Various elements entered into his ultimate decision. He probably felt that, by attacking, the division would be able to choke off the Soviet moves, enhance the unit's reputation, and firm ly accomplish the mission of border defense. Yet, if the operation failed, Sue­ taka must have been fully prepared to assume responsibility.

Could Suetaka be “ mesmerized” by subordinates? The division staff consisted mainly of young and gentle of­ ficers, including even the chief of staff. In both capability and experience, they couldn't touch the commander, so he took the lead and directed operations.. . . The command de­ pended on him and he never let them down. His regimental leaders were all able, but they tended to be "tigers" [except T. Sato of the 73rd In fa n try], and he must have had a hard time keeping them in line, since his headquarters staff could not handle them. Still, Suetaka could rely on the colonels to cope with situations in their own way. ( . . . The story told by Shigemitsu and others that Sakura-kai [m ilitant Cherry Blos­ som Society] rascals were concentrated in the 19th Division is not accurate. The regiment commanders were not selected in expectation of trouble.) Suetaka's talent and temperament were extraordinary; he manipulated the regimental commanders just as he wanted and got them to perform to the best of their abilities.31 Imaoka's professional appraisal of Suetaka's command capability is shared by all AGS-level interviewees. A number remain of the opinion, however, that apart from some private understanding between Suetaka and Sato, there must have been an even earlier secret accord between Suetaka and his protege Arao about Inada's theory of strategic recon­ naissance. One Korea Army staff officer says that, from the outset, he //32 felt such an atmosphere (of a possible AGS hint to Suetaka) "in his skin The notion is shared by the brigade commander, Morimoto, who visited

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Suetaka at the command post in Kyonghun in late July. " I t is the high command's principle," Suetaka is quoted as saying, "to mete out a [de­ cisive] blow to the enemy." No mere regimental commander could have attempted such critical action on his own. It must have been Suetaka's decision, made only because he was convinced that Tokyo would "take care of things" in case of crisis.33 This is a plausible speculation, pro­ pounded by a senior officer who saw Suetaka frequently. But Inada denies any "play acting," and Arao says that it would have gone against his command principles, although he did talk alone with Suetaka at some length.34 The answer lies in moods and attitudes, and their oral or metaphysical conveyance.35 NOTES 1 .75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shdhd, 29 July 1938. Also Sato interview. 2. CS, ChdkohS, p. 36. 3. AGS, ChdkohS sdan, p. 69. 4. This section is based on interviews with Inada, Imaoka, Nishihara, Sumi, and Hashimoto. 5. CS, ChdkohS, pp. 34-40. 6. According to a statement by Morimoto Nobuki. BBSS Archives. 7. For Korea Army level, Kitano, Iwasaki.and Tsuchiya interviews; for 19th Division level, Sasai and Saito interviews. 8. Nakamura Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 17 (Blakeney Collection). 9. CS, Chdkoho, p. 43; JRD/JSM 11, 3/A:63. The message of "request" was not received until 12:50 P.M. 10. CS, ChdkohS, p. 39. 11. Morimoto statement. BBSS Archives. 12. Tsuchiya interview. 13. KOtani, Ogoshi, and Arao interviews. 14. Says Inada: "The Russians crossed the border near Shachaofeng. All com­ manders had permission to attack if a frontier violation occurred, and Suetaka therefore authorized such action. Unavoidable small-scale fighting was not unheard of in connection with border disputes." Arao agrees. 15. CS, ChdkohS, pp. 43-44; Nakamura Affidavit No. 2, paragraph 17. 16. CS, Chdkoho, pp. 35-38. 17. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shdhd, 29 July 1938. 18. The train sequence stipulated in the regiment order issued at 5:30 P.M. on 29 July was reversed in practice on receipt of the division order; this may explain part of the delays in displacing forward. AGS, ChdkohS sdan, pp. 70-72; Sat5, Murakoshi, Tezuka, Miyajima, and Sakata interviews. 19. Sato interview; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shdhd, 29 July 1938; AGS, ChdkohS sdan, pp. 23-24; CS, ChdkohS, pp. 37-38.

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20. CS, Chdkoho, pp. 40-41,43; IMTFE, Transcript, 3 February 1948, pp. 38850-38851 (R. Tanaka). The division's intelligence summary of 6:40 A.M. on 30 July merely stated that fighting mas going on in the Shachaofeng area. 21. Suetaka in Akaishizawa, Chdkoho, p. 325. 22. 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shdhd, 30 July 1938. The term for the as­ sault on positions is kogeki busho. 23. Inada interview. 24. Hokkai Times, 31 July 1963 (A.M. ed.), p. 3; AGS, Chokoho sdan. Chronol­ ogy, 30 July 1938; Sato interview; 75th Infantry Regiment, Sentd shdhd, 30 July 1938. 25. Saito interview. 26. Sasai interview. 27. I. Hata et al„ TSM 4/2:86-87, 376. 28. Sasai interview. 29. Ibid. In addition, the division operations officer. Lieutenant Colonel Mori, had only recently arrived in Korea and did not know the unit commanders, "so the general said that he did not have to bother to come to the front," either. 30. Sasai interview. 31. Imaoka, "Chokoho jiken," pp. 21-23, 25-27, 41-43. 32. Tsuchiya interview. 33. Morimoto statement, BBSS Archives. Also Hashimoto interview. 34. Inada and Arao interviews. 35. The latest critic to accuse Suetaka of "collusion with elements of the high command" is Hayashi Katsuya in Nomonhan senki, p. 169.

General Nakamura Kotaro, Korea Army Commander [painting by Y. Mizuhira]

Lt.-Gen. Suetaka Kamezo, 19th Division Commander

i

Captain Yamada Teizo, 1st Infantry Company Commander [courtesy K. Murakoshi]

Major Nakano Toshichi, 1st Battalion Commander, 75th Infantry Regiment [courtesy K. Murakoshi]

Soviet Bombing of Chiangchunfeng and Changkufeng, 4 August 1938 [K. Akaishizawa]

Soviet Tank Destroyed on 6 August 1938, Takenouchi Front [courtesy K. Tominaga]

Positions 15 Meters Apart on Changkufeng Crest Immediately After Ceasefire, 11 August 1938; Japanese in Foreground, Russians in Background [Mainichi]

75th Infantry's Regimental Colors Facing East on Changkufeng Crest, 11 August 1938 [afterphoto by 1st-Lt. Shiratake]

Soviet Photo of Zaozernaya Peak with Red Army Standard [courtesy

Erickson]

Soviet Positions Seen from Japanese Positions on Changkufeng Crest [K. Akaishizawa]

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