The Americanization/Westernization of Austria [1 ed.] 076580803X, 9780765808035

Table of contents :
Dedication
Table of Contents
Introduction
Austria in McWorld • Günter Bischof
Section 1: Setting the Stage
I’m Made for America from Head to Toe (The Project for a New American Century) • Reinhold Wagnleitner
The Americanization of Vienna • Armin Thumher
Section II: Business/Finance
Travel Accounts from the United States and their Influence on Taylorism, Fordism and Productivity in Austria • Helmut Lackner
The Americanization of Austrian Business • Andre Pfoertner
The Impact of U.S. Management on Austrian Management Cultures in Tourism • Matthias Fuchs and Klaus Weiermair
The Americanization of Austrian Banking and Finance • Anton Fink
Section III: Culture
American Jazz in Ernst Krenek’s opera Jonny spielt auf • Kurt Drexel
Belonging to a Never - Never Land? Television and Consumer Modernityin Postwar Austria • Monika Bemold
Hollywood Movies, Significant Events and the Alteration of Styles and Worldviews • Anna Schober
American Painting: The New York Museum of Modern Art's International Program in Austria • Christina Hainzl
Wo ist Daheim?—America in Narrative Identity Constructions of Contemporary Austrian Literature • Maria-Regina Kecht
Section IV: Society/Gender
Americanizing/Westernizing Austrian Women: Three Scenarios from the 1950s to the 1970s • Ingrid Bauer
From Patriarchy to New Fatherhood? Private Life and the Process of Modernization in Twentieth-Century Austria • Reinhard Sieder
Section V: Politics/Political Culture
Austria's Postwar Occupation, the Marshall Plan, and Secret Rearmament as “Westernizing Agents” 1945-1968 • Günter Bischof and Martin Kofler
The Impact of American Scholarship on Austrian Political Science: The Making of a Discipline • Anton Pelinka
Assessing the Americanization of Austrian Politics and Politicians • Fritz Plasser
Review Essays
The Ancient Hatred: Postwar Austrian Anti-Semitism • Andrei S. Markovits
A Homely Picture Book? • Peter Berger
The Westernization of Austria • Dieter Stiefel
Unmastered Pasts: Czechs, Sudeten Germans and Austrians • Martin David
Book Reviews
Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europäische Grossmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg • Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.
Brigitte Hamann, Winifred Wagner oder Hitlers Bayreuth • Steven Beller
Stefan Moritz, Gruft Gott und Heil Hitler: Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus in Österreich • Evan Burr Bukey
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents • Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer
Annual Review
Survey of Austrian politics 2002 • Reinhold Gartner
List of Authors

Citation preview

Westernization of Austria

Contemporary Austrian Studies Sponsored by the University of New Orleans and Universitiit Innsbruck Editors Giinter Bischof, CenterAustria, University of New Orleans Anton Pelinka, University of lnnsbruck

Production Editor Ellen Palli

Copy Editor Jennifer Shimek

Editoral Assistant Martin David

Executive Editors Franz Mathis, UNO Coordinator, University of Innsbruck Robert L. Dupont, Dean, Metropolitan College Advisory Board Ingrid Bauer University of Salzburg Siegfried Beer University of Graz Hans-Georg Betz Geneva EvanBukey University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Mario Caciagli University of Florence Gary Cohen Center for Austrian Studies University of Minnesota Michael G. Huelshoff University of New Orleans Wilhelm Kohler University of Linz Jacques Le Rider University of Paris VIII Kurt Richard Luther University of Keele Andrei S. Markovits University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Richard Mitten Trinity College Margareta Mommsen University of Munich Hanspeter Neuhold University of Vienna MaxPreglau University of Innsbruck Sonja Puntscher Riekmann University of Salzburg Peter Pulzer Oxford University Oliver Rathkolb University of Vienna Sieglinde Rosenberger University of Vienna Dieter Stiefel University of Vienna Franz Szabo Center for Austrian Studies, University of Alberta RuthWodak University of Vienna

Publication of this volume has been made possible through a generous grant from the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Austrian Cultural Forum in New York and the Austrian Marshall Plan Anniversary Foundation in Vienna. The University oflnnsbruck and Metropolitan College of the University ofNew Orleans have also provided financial support.

Contemporary Austrian Studies, Volume 12

Gunter Bischof Anton Pelinka editors

Westernization of Austria ~~ ~~o~~~~~~~up LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2004 by Transaction publishers Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2004 by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2003066161 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Americanization/westernization of Austria / Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, editors. p. cm.— (Contemporary Austrian studies ; v. 12) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 0-7658-0803-X 1. Austria—Civilization—20th century. 2. Austria—Civilization— American influences. 3. Popular culture—Austria—American influences. 4. Austria—Politics and government—1945- I. Bischof, Günter, 1953- II. Pelinka, Anton, 1941- III. Series. DB91.2.A54 2003 303.48'2436073—dc22 ISBN 13: 978-0-7658-0803-5 (pbk)

2003066161

Dedicated to Reinhold Wagnleitner and Berndt Ostendoif

Table of Contents INTRODUCTION Gunter Bischof, Austria in McWorld

1

SECTION I: Setting the Stage Reinhold Wagnleitner, I'm Made for America from Head to Toe (The Project for a New American Century)

18

Armin Thumher, The Americanization of Vienna

29

SECTION II: Business/Finance Helmut Lackner, Travel Accounts from the United States and their Influence on Taylorism, Fordism and Productivity in Austria

38

Andre Pfoertner, The Americanization of Austrian Business

61

Matthias Fuchs and Klaus Weiermair, The Impact of U.S. Management on Austrian Management Cultures in Tourism

74

Anton Fink, The Americanization of Austrian Bmrking and Finance

97

SECTION ID: Culture Kurt Drexel, American Jazz in Ernst Krenek's opera lonny spielt auf

102

Monika Bemold, Belonging to a Never- Never Land? Television and Consumer Modernity in Postwar Austria

112

Anna Schober, Hollywood Movies, Significant Events and the Alteration of Styles and Worldviews

122

Christina Hainzl, American Painting: The New York Museum of Modern Art's International Program in Austria

139

Maria-Regina Kecht, Wo ist Daheim?-America in Narrative Identity Constructions of Contemporary Austrian Literature

153

SECTION IV: Society/Gender Ingrid Bauer, Americanizing I Westernizing Austrian Women: Three Scenarios from the 1950s to the 1970s

170

Reinhard Sieder, From Patriarchy to New Fatherhood? Private Life and the Process of Modernization in Twentieth-Century Austria

186

SECTION V: Politics/Political Culture Gtinter Bischof and Martin Kofler, Austria's Postwar Occupation, the Marshall Plan, and Secret Rearmament as "Westernizing Agents" 1945-1968

199

Anton Pelinka, The Impact ofAmerican Scholarship on Austrian Political Science: The Making of a Discipline

226

Fritz Plasser, Assessing the Americanization of Austrian Politics and Politicians

235

REVIEW ESSAYS Andrei S. Markovits: The Ancient Hatred: Postwar Austrian Anti-Semitism

255

Peter Berger: A Homely Picture Book?

265

Dieter Stiefel: The Westernization of Austria

272

Martin David: Unmastered Pasts: Czechs, Sudeten Germans and Austrians

284

BOOK REVIEWS Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.: Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europiiische Grossmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg

291

Steven Beller: Brigitte Hamann, Winifred Wagner oder Hitlers Bayreuth

296

Evan Burr Bukey: Stefan Moritz, Gruft Gott und Heil Hitler: Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus in Osterreich

301

Zoltan Tarr: Erwin A. Schmid!, Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Osterreich: Mit einem Vorwort von Paul Lendvai Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents

305

ANNUAL REVIEW Reinhold Gartner, Survey of Austrian politics 2002

309

LIST OF AUTHORS

314

INTRODUCTION Austria in MeWorld Gunter Bischof Throughout the course of history the blanket term Americanization has been used to bundle a variety of European reactions to the historical unfolding of the American liberal order. 1 [ ... ]I reject the term "Americanization," a term that represses and hides more than it explains. This term attempts to define the development of the modem world with the unsuitable criteria of nationalistic stereotypes, which serves, for the most part, only one task-namely, to conceal the fact that behind the phenomenon 'Americanization' lies the actual "Europeanization" of the world. The development of the modem world has much less to do with the propagation of the supposed national characteristics of those people who live in the United Sates than with the further development of the system of capitalism. 2

"Modernization''-"Americanization"-''Westernization"-"Globalization": all these terms signify broad processes of economic, social, and cultural transformations across the Atlantic and throughout the world in the course of the twentieth century. They resemble each other in the sense that they are diffuse and hard to pin down. They indicate different--often overlapping-key phenomena of modern international co-existence, an economic and cultural confluence in a globalizing world moving ever more closely together through modern mass media and communication techniques. The starting point to any debate on Americanization has to recognize the fact of the ascendancy of the United States to imperial status in the twentieth century. We no longer need to debate reluctantly whether we live in the world of the "American empire" but rather what kind of imperial presence the United States is emanating today. The American Empire is more powerful than the Roman one was in its heyday. Washington's projection of global military power is far more complete than Rome's. Ever since the United States began to exert its influence overseas in 1898,

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American political and military power was accumulated to build and protect markets abroad and to spread the opportunities for liberal capitalism around the world in order to increase wealth at home. Formulas of American exceptionalism such as "making the world safe for democracy" always had the core mission of "making the world safe for American capitalism." Pax Americana relies on a "strategy of openness," Andrew Bacevich asserts in this new bookAmerican Empire, and adds, "Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor and enforces of norms.'' 3 Along with projecting its awesome military power and the ideology of exporting its democracy came the rejection of the ''universality of reigning American values.'' Bacevich also questions "whether moral relativism, radical individualism, and conspicuous consumption constitute a formula guaranteeing the fulfillment of mankind's deepest aspirations.'"' The American global military presence during the Cold War-in postwar occupation regimes and through a global ring of military bases encircling the Soviet Union-laid the groundwork for the advent of American popular culture. In other words, cultural exports followed on the heels of a preponderance of American military power. 5 Modernity/modernization accelerated as a result of a variety of historical forces during the last years of the Habsburg Monarchy. Fin-de-siecle Vienna became one of the hothouses to shape modem life in Western philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the arts (as evidenced by the preeminence of figures like Wittgenstein, Freud, and Schiele). Yet while the modem era was launched in European capitals, both technological and business innovation frequently radiated from the periphery in the United States. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Taylorism (scientific management) and Fordism (conveyor belt driven mass production and mass consumption) increasingly influenced and shaped European business practices between the great wars, as the essays in the "Business" section of this volume amply demonstrate. 6 Americanization-Philipp Gassert calls it "the term of the century"increasingly came to be seen to be synonymous with modernity/modernization. 7 During the interwar years, jazz, Hollywood movies, and a general trend towards a commodification and mass consumer products (usually called "Americanism") became popular as well as duly contested in European societies, too. 8 Given the structure of Austria's deeply conservative culture shaped by the Catholic Church, the advent of Americanism/Americanization set in with time lags, or at times via German mediation. 9 While there was an "efficiency craze" in Austria in the 1920s related to the discourse around Taylorism and Fordism, the advent of "Austro-Fascism" and National

3

Socialism stopped the infatuation with all things American in its tracks. Fuelled by the American occupation regime, Americanization took off in Austria after World War II. 10 The American global presence-"the American century"-originated in the United States' rise as the preeminent industrial power in the world after the American Civil War. The United States made its global presence felt with its participation in the "imperial scramble" in the late nineteenth century. The American victory of German National Socialism and Japanese militarism in World War II precipitated the global American presence. 11 Historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley describe the ambiguity and legacy of the "American Century" rather exuberantly: In the twentieth century, the United States turned back the forces of totalitarianism-the Kaiser's Germany, Hitler's Nazi Germany, Japan's militarist and expansionist government, Mussolini' s Fascist Italy, and Soviet Communism. Surely justice has never been better served. The legacy of the American Century is a world in which more people are relatively freer to make their own choices, certainly freer than they were under any of the isms [sic], than ever before. That is a splendid legacy. The counterpart is American hubris. The experiences of the Cold War gives Americans a sense that they can run the world because of their military power is so much greater than that of any other nation or group of nations. 12

Indeed, the advent of the American Century also sparked an intensification of anti-Americanism. As the American presence in the world grewespecially the global military presence during the Cold War-the resentment of American predominance escalated as well. Americanization and anti-Americanism are twin brothers. William T. Stead announced and partly dreaded the advent of the American century with his book The Americanization ofthe World in 1901. In his famous Life magazine article "The American Century," publisher Henry Luce pronounced the Americanization of the world to be America's mission and ideology. In the age of fascism, Luce reminded his isolationist countrymen, America had a moral responsibility to spread its basic values of freedom and justice around the world. 13 Philipp Gassert cautions that the scholarly discourse of the past years became fixated on a negative view of "Americanization" as consumerism and mass cultirre. Yet since President Woodrow Wilson's admonition "to make the world safe for democracy" and his free trade/open markets peace program announced at the end of World War I (Fourteen Points) and reinforced in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Atlantic Charter" of 1941, Americanization has also meant political and cultural democratization and a liberal-capitalist economic order, Gassert rightly insists. 14 Berndt Ostendorf's opening citation of

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Americanization as the "historical unfolding of the American liberal order" concurs. While Americanization trends accelerated in Central Europe after 1945, aided by the strong American military presence, the Austrian trajectory was different from the German one. 15 The United States was the most powerful and probably most popular occupation power in Austria's quadripartite occupation (1945-1955). The Marshall Plan shaped the American "empire by invitation"/"empire by persuasion." 16 It furthered Austria's strong anti-communist tradition 17 and strengthened the process of both Western economic and political integration (OEEC-OECD, GATT, UN, Council of Europe, EFfA). 18 Yet Austria did not end up a divided country like Germany. The State Treaty launched Austria on a neutral trajectory that prevented integration into the military bloc system and seemingly immunized it against U.S.-driven militarization, alliance pressures, and the worst Cold War tensions. During the earlier Cold War, Americanization frequently came within the context ofWestern European economic reconstruction (Marshall Plan) and with a strong American military presence (NAT0). 19 Austria greatly profited from the Marshall Plan and partook in early Western European economic integration, yet had a different trajectory from Western Europe's. While the Federal Republic became militarily integrated into NATO and the "Atlantic community" and the European Economic Community, 20 Austrian neutrality slowed down the process of full economic and political integration into "the West" until Austria joined the European Union after the end of the Cold War. Austrian neutralism-along with a deep-seated rejection of militarism-has inhibited military integration into the West to this day. Yet in the postwar transmissions of popular mass culture and consumerism, of the American way oflife (for example, the advent of soft popular entertainment forms and fast-food culture), and of political democratization, Americanization trends in Austria more closely resembled those of the Federal Republic and Western Europe. 21 Like much of Western Europe, Austria participated in the circular transfer of ideas and values in the Western community of values ("westliche Wertegemeinschajf') that has characterized the Euro-American Atlantic community ever since the massive migration to America and the French Revolution. Given the continued persistence-of absolute/constitutional monarchy in Austria into the early twentieth century, Austria's process of Westernization lagged behind. Leftist/Marxist scholarship has often characterized Americanization as a one-dimensional transfer process stemming from the growing hegemony of the United States and its economic and military power in the past century. But the concept of Westernization as a multidimensional circular process developing over the

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past 200 years stresses the recurring transmissions of ideas and values as well as an environment of mutual trans-Atlantic enrichment. 22 The majority ofAustrians joined the Western liberal consensus against totalitarianism and communism pushed by American occupiers after World War ll. Here neutrality and growing neutralism did not stop Austria from firmly being integrated in this Western value system, which was also fuelled by the Western Cold Warconsensus ofanti-communism. Yet liberal democracy and a free market economy arrived relatively late in Austria. 23 Chancellor Bruno Kreisky "dared" more democracy in the 1970s, and a more fully market-oriented economy only emerged in the 1980s/1990s after the privatization of the huge sector of state-directed economy and the waning of the Austro-corporatist Sozialpartnerschaft. 24 American popular culture in all its continuing multiple variations has been highly popular in postwar Austria. Youngsters eagerly welcomed much of it, their receptivity producing "self-Americanization." Like in West Germany and the rest ofWestern Europe, the adoption of American pop culture sparked generational conflicts in Austria, too. Many in the generation that lived through and fought World War II on Hitler's side adhered both to Nazi-era and t;raditional earlier bourgeois prejudices and stereotypes about European elite high culture being superior to "degenerate" American popular mass culture. Working class urban Austrian baby boomers adopted American popular culture hook, line and sinker as a form ofrebellion against their authoritarian-minded parents. In Austria, too, jazz, jeans and rock'n'roll stood for freedom and liberation from hidebound Austrian folk culture and condescending elite high culture.25 More recently, globalization has been seen as a process of accelerated Americanization of worldwide consumer and communication structures and business and investment climates driven by American corporate power and political clout. Per capita use of the Internet and cell phones are higher in Austria than in nearly all other western countries. The homogenization of world culture in practical terms often means Americanization. "Globalization is-U.S.," notes Thomas Friedman. 26 But globalization is not only driven by American multinational corporations such as Microsoft, but also European ones such as Nokia and Vivendi, or Japanese ones such as Toyota. The same goes for global fast food culwres. Sushi may be as popular in the West as Big Macs and Starbuck'"s coffee is in the East. Globalization goes beyond the Americanization (orAnglo-Americanization as Rupert Murdoch defines it) of the world. Globalization is a more diffuse multilateral process than Americanization. It also produces more apocalyptic counter images of Western decadence and hedonism-and more drastic attacks on the West such as the recent terrorist attacks of September 11-than Americanization ever has. 27 Yet globalization is often perceived

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to be driven by American "turbo-capitalism," thus intensifying antiAmericanism in the world. 28 The resentment against and rejection of American invasiveness keeps smoldering around the world, because of the United States' predominance in popular culture and music, fast food 29, mass media and television fashions, and global news networks. Critics assert "that American values have less to do with authentic freedom than with a culture that they depict as vulgar and meretricious." These antagonists of"debased and dehumanizing" American popular culture "are determined to prevent that culture from overwhelming their own."30 Americanization patterns have produced a love-hate relationship of the world with America. Austria is no exception to this. 31 Austria's Americanization needs to be seen as part of these global patterns, its Westernization as part of the larger Western European postwar trends. Austria's full-fledged ''Western-Europeanization," so-to-speak, came late, only once the country was fully integrated into the European Union in 1995.32 Yet Austrian national peculiarities in as well as its resistance against all these transmission processes need to be carefully defined and redefined as well. As some of the following essays indicate (particularly Ingrid Bauer's and Fritz Plasser's), Americanization and Westernization trends could also an assertion/reassertion of Austrian traditions and thus produce Austrification and/or "Re-Austrification" reactions. What was the trajectory of Austria's path to the West'P 3 When did Austria "arrive in the West"? How marked and strong are its ties ("Bindungen") to the West? How strong was the Austrian resistance to the American and Western presence? Has neutralism inhibited and slowed down Austria's Americanization and Westernization? Have there been regional varieties? Has the former Soviet zone been lagging in "Westernization" due to ten years of a burdensome and exploitative Soviet occupation presence? Did the "Iron Curtain" overshadow the process of Westernization of border areas to the Soviet bloc? Was the former American zone of Austria Americanized more deeply than the French and the British zone, and did the American presence leave more permanent legacies there? ''How Western are the Austrians?" ("Wie westlich sind die Osterreicher? ). This volume does not pretend that it can answer all these questions, but it begins to suggest answers to some of them. The answers to these questions in the following essays are tentative. Recent scholarship has clearly shown that Americanization and Westernization is never a one-way transfer, but always a complex giveand-take between societies. Modern anthropology sees Americanization as encounters between societies whereby cultural imports are blended with the

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indigenous and mutual influences are being negotiated (and at times rejected). Wilfried Fluck has called it the "tool-kit argument" of cultural studies where recipients appropriate elements of foreign cultures selectively. 34 Political scientist Fritz Plasser calls this selective appropriation the "shopping malf' model. In his lead essay, Reinhold Wagnleitner, Austria's leading scholar on America's presence in the world, touches on the subtle ambiguities of the Americanization phenomenon in the contemporary world. He sees the capitalist world system as the motor behind the "Euro-Americanization" of the world and finds that the hegemony of American popular culture does exit, "but it is a hegemony by invitation at least as much as it is one of subjugation (and self-colonization)." Viennese journalist and editor Armin Thurnher shows how Austrian traditions frequently prevail over Americanizing influences or reshape them. What Thumher says about Vienna society is true for much of Austria: the structural conservatism is deeply rooted. Austrians' "conservatism of the heart" and their fear of change and resistance to things modem makes for a slow and particularistic absorption of American (and Western) influences. After World War II, this cultural conservatism also prevailed because powerful officials like minister of education Heinrich Drimmel vigorously pushed it. 35 In postwar Austrian journalism, a case can be made for American influences that go deeper. Most leading journalists studied in the United States for a while, or visited, or encountered American (or Western) style journalism during the Allied occupation. Both Thumher and Eric Frey from Vienna's daily Der Standard (who in 2001/2002 taught at the University of New Orleans as Marshall Plan Chair) showed in their personal life stories how crucial American journalistic influences and professional standards contributed to their professional careers. 36 In his weekly Falter, Thumher created an Austrian style Village Voice-a muckraking paper he encountered as a student in New York. Frey told the story how Oscar Bronner aimed at creating an American-style, quality paper when he launched Der Standard, where fact and opinion would be strictly separated. Thurnher also demonstrated that creations such as the recent magazines News and Format by the Fellner brothers incorporated many American P.R. strategies only most superficially; unfortunately, they did not adopt the quality reporting of similar American news magazines. As the first section of this volume shows, the Americanization of Austria began after World War I in the economic and business arena, where American paradigms exerted an early and strong influence. Both Helmut Lackner from the Vienna Technical Museum and German business historian Andre Pfoertnershow how American technology, rationalization and productionism impressed Austrian visitors to world exhibitions already in

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the late nineteenth century. By the 1920s, scientific management and mass production (Taylorism and Fordism) was keenly studied and copied in Central Europe. In 1920, the Vienna business community started a TaylorZeitschrift, the Osterreichisches Kuratoriumfor Wirtschaftlichkeitwas set up, the "Refa movement" began, time studies were done at Alpine-Montan, and motion studies were undertaken at Siemens-Halske in Vienna. Private organizations like the Rotary Clubs began to propagate the American efficiency model. National Socialism interrupted the Americanization of business practices, only to be resumed even more furiously after World War II through the Marshall Plan. Pfoertner demonstrated how the Austrian Productivity Center (APC), started in 1950 played a crucial role in implanting American management pr;actices in Austria. In the 1960s, leaders from the APC founded the leading Austrian private management institutes such as Hernstein, years before the universities began to preach American management practices. But there were numerous obstacles for the success of American management styles in Austria, too. Innsbruck tourism scholars Matthias Fuchs and Klaus Weiermeier demonstrate how in the tourist industry traditional Austrian family businesses have resisted marketing practices. Traditional low price Austrian tourism has a hard time adapting to modern individualistic quality "destination" tourism offered through an Americanized global tourist industry. Vienna banker Anton Fink noticed such Austrian resistance to American paradigms even as late in the 1990s in the development of capital markets and in the entrepreneurial arena. The high-risking taking entrepreneur, who also wins high rewards if successful, is only slowly arriving in Austria. In the field of European accounting practices, valuing the stakeholder rather than producing quick profits for the shareholders, offers a visibly different model of capitalism that has resisted American influence (and will do so even more after the "creative" accounting disasters that led to the collapse of Texas energy giant Enron). The second section of this volume indicates that the Americanization of Austrian culture followed in the tracks of business after World War II, even though the process began before the war. With his analysis of Ernst Krenek's 1927 jazz opera lonny Spielt Auf, Innsbruck music historian Kurt Drexel explains that there existed a "jazz craze'' in Central Europe along with the "efficiency craze" in business circles. Europe's post-World War I fascination with jazz signaled a larger obsession with America and all things American. America and jazz symbolized an escape to freedom. 37 Krenek admired America and detested European pretenses. After the Nazis maligned and then denounced his opera as "degenerate music" ("Jewishnigger filth"), Krenek emigrated to America. He lived the rest of his life in Hollywood, in the real America he had idolized in his opera lonny.

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Viennese cultural historian Monika Bernold posits how television represented the paradigm of Americanization. It introduced the hegemony of mass culture and consumerism in postwar Austria. The "never-neverland" of California came to stand for America. TV was associated with total consumption. But given that Austrian television was state-controlled, the structural conservatism of Austrian politics and society began the "ReAustrification" of Austrian Broadcasting (ORF). The paternalistic ORF told the viewers what the state felt they needed to know rather than selecting American-style shows, where the audience-viewing habits determine programming decisions. Nevertheless, TV did become the shopping window to the West in Austria as well. 38 Viennese cultural historian Anna Schober demonstrated how American movies "stepped out" into city spaces and deeply influenced youth cultures. Cinema opened up the encounter with new visual worlds and replaced traditional ones. Youth cultures in particular were transformed by American styles as encountered in movies and became a form of rebellion against hidebound Austrian society. The movie opened up apocalyptic visions of an America full of rebellion, decadence, and discontinuity of life. Hollywood's hegemony produced new perceptions of the world, particularly for teenagers. Wagnleitner has stressed again and again that nowhere has the American pop cultural predominance been as overpowering as in Hollywood's global reach. A staggering 80 to 90 percent of films shown on European screens are American. "Reel history is real history," as he put it. The American dream producers more than anyone have produced the global American media empire-the "empire offun."39 Salzburg historian Christina Hainzl carries the subtle Americanization process into the field of fine arts. In the struggle against communism, the U.S. State Department aimed at reshaping the European mind through American culture. It wanted Europeans to accept the United States as a cultural and spiritual force rather than as a purely materialistic culture. The high brow elite officials in Foggy Bottom, however, looked down their noses when it came to modem American art (abstract expressionism and pop art) and its popularity in Europe. It was the New York's Museum of Modem Art (MOMA), led by emigre Austrian director Rene D'Hamoncourt and privately financed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, which became the principal venue to bring modem art to Europe. 40 Numerous MOMA exhibits were sent as travelling shows to Europe and made it to Austria, too. One of Hainzl' s implicit conclusions is that these shows had an important influence on the Westernizing of young Austrian artists, but Paris attracted them more than New York. 41 More often than not, a hybridization occurs where American influences are only partially adopted. Austrians pick and choose what they like or perceive as being American (like the consumer at the shopping mall). The

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lack of profound knowledge about America frequently leads to stereotypical receptions of"America" and Americana. Austrian-born professor of literature Maria-Regina Kecht demonstrates with Peter Henisch' s recent novel Schwarzer Peter (partially situated in New Orleans) that the author's representations of the Crescent City are often superficial. In the recent past, Austrian writers repeatedly wrote books featuring America after only weeks or months of shallow immersion. "America" is what these writers' perceptions want it to be, argues Kecht. The section on "Society/Gender'' suggests that postwar social transformations in Austria occurred within a larger framework of a rapidly modernizing Western world. Salzburg gender historian Ingrid Bauer analyzes the changing gender roles, mirrored in her different scenarios about the place of women in society. While most women were "Re-Austrified" during the occupation years, someAmibriiute "betrayed" Austria by taking as boyfriends, lovers, and husbands the American Gis stationed in Austria, thus experiencing the "hedonistic identification of life" long before the rest of the Austrians got there. The model of the American efficient household resonated with Austrian women, too. Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, American feminist influences and ideas were frequently filtered via West Germany. Such "Umwege" also may have tamed and modified pure American influences along the way. Bauer suggested such .filtering occurred in the transfer of American feminism to Austrian women. In television detours of Americanizing influences via West Germany were not unusual either. In academia, American ideas and methodology at times arrived via German professors who were exposed to them before teaching them in Austria. Vienna social historian Reinhard Sieder demonstrates how postwar Austria followed Western trends in the private sphere. The roles of "masculine domesticity" changed dramatically after World War II. While the "German" patriarchal model prevailed into the 1960s, the "postpatriarchal" family with its increasing divorce rates and marital separation dramatically changed the role of fatherhood and led to the new "binuclear family." Bauer and Sieder seem to suggest that changes in postwar Austrian society indicate Westernization more than Americanization. The final section on politics intimates that Americanization is often inchoate and hard to pin down. Historians Gunter Bischof and Martin Kofler follow three trajectories in the occupation decade and beyond. The Western powers wanted the Austrian "grand coalition" to succeed because it guaranteed political stability in the Cold War and, thus, helped build democracy. In the economic arena, Austro-corporatist traditions typically resisted the productionist nostrums of the American Marshall Planners in the 1950s. The highly state-regulated Austrian "chamber state" resisted orienting itself on the American model of a market driven economy. The

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Americans secretly rearmed Western Austria in the early 1950s so it would be able to throw up some indigenous resistance to communist takeover scenarios, and this trend continued into the early 1960s. But, since neutral Austria was not allowed to join NATO, it was never Americanized to the degree West Germany was. Moreover, homegrown military traditions and mentalities (including Nazi ones) persisted in the postwar Austrian Army. In spite of the occupation, then, there is no straightforward trajectory of Americanization, only intimations. In a highly suggestive case study of postwar Austrian academia, Innsbruck political scientist Anton Pelinka demonstrates how Austrian political science was born as an academic discipline out of the Institute of Advanced Studies founded in 1963 in Vienna. Austrian emigre social scientists Paul Lazarsfeld and Oscar Morgenstern returned to their native Vienna to act as the "Geburtshelfer." Here, too, the Ford Foundation provided the necessary funds to revolutionize hidebound and restorative Austrian academia by socializing young social scientists like Pelinka into Western scholarly discourse. The training received at the Institut fiir Hohere Studien by a younger generation of political scientists was highly liberating. Politics was no longer viewed through strict partisan lenses as had been the case in Austria. With the genesis of the scholarly discipline of political science in Austria, internationalization meant Americanization. But again, the trajectory is not a straightforward one of America bringing its gifts to Europe. The transmitters back to Austria are, rather, Austrian Jewish emigres who had contributed so much towards shaping American social sciences and elevating it to a leading position in the world. 42 More such studies of Americanizing influences in individual disciplines are needed to find out whether political science is a unique case. We have noted above that Innsbruck political scientist Fritz Plasser has coined the term "shopping mall modef' for the appropriations of American practices in the contemporary Austrian political arena. American political consultants have "Americanized" Austrian politics with their image-driven campaign strategies, but Austrian political institutions (for example, public campaign finances, party rather than individual candidate driven campaigns) have also been extraordinarily resistant to Americanization. In Plasser's analysis, Austrians have "Austrianized" American campaign strategies. Again, we have the ·selective picking and choosing from American models and the adaptation to homegrown Austrian practices ("Austrification"). Many of the articles in this volume were initially papers presented at "The Westernization-Americanization of Austria in the Twentieth Century" conference, and the discussions that took place there, more than any individual paper, stressed the importance of visitors programs for the subtle transfer of intellectual Americanizing influences. While individual

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

tourists or study groups might have visited the United States before World War II, visits to America were frequently paid for by government visitors programs after the war. Austrians encountered American ideas while discussing them at the famed Salzburg Seminar, or encountered them during year-long stays as AFS or Fulbright foreign exchange students. But thousands of Austrian professionals first "discovered" America through Marshall Plan visitors programs (many of them organized by the Austrian Productivity Center), or later by way of study trips organized through the United States Information Agency. Thousands of Austria's fledgling elites participated in such programs. Study seminars in Austria or visitor programs to the United States may well have been one of the most powerful Americanizing institution.43 The conference 'TheWestemization-Americanization of Austria in the Twentieth Century" was organized by CenterAustria of the University of New Orleans and the University oflnnsbruck. Two dozen scholars met 6-8 May 2002. Its discussions raised more questions than were answered. The transfer of cultures and ideas is always a complex process, going through many refractions and adaptations by host societies. It comes in fits and starts. So it is with the processes of American and Western ideas coming to Austria. Structurally conservative Austria seldom swallowed these modernizing influences hook, line, and sinker. More often than not they were adapted, reshaped, and frequently rejected. Compared to Western European nations such as Germany, Italy, and France, Austria's "Americanization" and "Westernization studies" are still in their infancy. Reinhold Wagnleitner has been a "one-man-show" in the field. This volume is designed to get the debate fired up. Hopefully, the frequently tentative answers given in these essays will spark further research that will provide firmer results. The conference and this volume resulting fromitcould not have taken place without some generous sponsors and committed officials. The core finances came from the partnership funds of University oflnnsbruck and the University of New Orleans. Professor Franz Mathis and Dean and ViceChancellor Robert Dupont and Gordon "Nick" Mueller, director of the The National D-Day Museum, generously contributed their time and enthusiasm to this project. Ernst Aichinger at the Austrian Cultural Forum in New York secured governmental support. The-Austrian Marshall Plan Anniversary Foundation in Vienna was generous, as always, in its support of CenterAustria projects. We would like to thank its managing directors Wolfgang Stoiber and Eugen Stark for their unstinting support. At CenterAustria, a highly dedicated staff took care of the logistical details for the conference. Gertraud Griessner, Sebastian Bihari, and Barbara Marschik put in lots of overtime. Karl Roider (LSU), Hermann Freudenberger (Tulane), Bernard Cook (Loyola), KatinkaNowotny (Vienna) and

13

UNO colleagues Michael Huelshoff and Inge Fink all chaired sessions and contributed to the discussions. Hannes Androsch (Vienna), chairman of AIC Androsch International Management Consulting, graciously gave the keynote address. This was the first conference to be staged at the new Lindy C. Boggs Conference Center in the Research Park of the University of New Orleans. Anne 0 'Herren Jacob and her staff allowed for a smooth set-up. We would like to thank all the authors for their timely submission of manuscripts. Jennifer Shimek copy-edited them with her usual sharp eye. Martin David and Gertraud Griessner helped with the management of the individual manuscripts from copy-editing to proof-reading. Ellen Palli did her customary professional job of type-setting them. At Transaction Publishers, Anne Schneider was patient with us and shepherded the volume towards publication. I would like to dedicate this volume to two leading Central European "Americanization" scholars in the world. Berndt Ostendorf and Reinhold Wagnleitner have shaped and greatly enriched the field with their signal scholarly contributions over the past twenty years. They have invited me as a guest professor to the Amerika Institut at the Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversity in Munich (1992-1994) and the Paris-Lodron University in Salzburg (1998) to test some of these ideas. They both have also enriched our students at UNO as guest professors. They have greatly influenced and inspired me in my academic career, and I deeply treasure their intellectual companionship and personal friendship. May it continue for many years to come. Larose, Louisiana, June 2003

Notes

1. Berndt Ostendorf, "Americanization and Anti-Americanism in the Age of Globalization," in The "Norte-Americanizaci6n" of Latin America?, ed. Stefan Rinke and H.J. Konig (Eichstiitt forthcoming). 2. Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, 2nd ed., trans. Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 2001), 6. 3. Andrew J. Bacevich,American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002), 3. 4. Ibid., 241; see also Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2003, 66-83, who notes; "It is a cliche these days that the United States possesses a global empire--different from Britain's and Rome's but an empire nonetheless. It is time to move beyond a statement of the obvious [ ... ] [h]ow should we operate on a tactical level to manage an unruly world?" (66).

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

5. The rise of American postwar power and its spreading throughout the world system is

best described in Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 1992); see also the same phenomenon from a Wallersteinian "world systems" approach, Thomas J. McCormick, American's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995). 6. On the larger background of American promotion ofknowledged-based economy and a social contract of abundance, see Olivier Zunz, Why the American Century? (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998). 7. Philipp Gassert, "Was meint Amerikanisierung? Uber den Begriff des Jahrhunderts," Merkur 617/618 (2000): 785-96 (here 790). 8. AlfLtidke, IngeMarssoleck, and Adelheid von Saldern, eds.,Amerikanisierung: Traum undAlptraum imDeutschlanddes 20. Jahrhunderts(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996); Heide Fehrenbach and UtaPoiger, eds., Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan (New York: Berghahn, 2000); for the long-term trajectory, see Kaspar Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnugen: Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850-1970 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997). 9. The deeper roots of Austria's social, cultural, and economic transformation after World Warn, along with the adventofFordism, are subtly analyzed in the essays in Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, and Emmerich Talos, eds., Osterreich 1945-1995: Gesellschaft, Politik, Kultur, z•d ed. (Vienna: Verlag fiir Gesellschaftslaitik, 1996). 10. Andn!Pfoertner, Amerikanische Betriebswirtschaftlehre im deutschsprachigen Raum: Versuch der Nachzeichnung eines historischen Prosesses unter besonderer Berqcksichtigung der Verhaltnisse in Psterreich und der Schweiz 1945-1970 (Frankfurt: Deutsche Hochschulschriften, 2001 ); W agnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, Chapter One. 11. GUnter Bischof, "Das amerikanische Jahrhundert: Europas Niedergang-Amerikas Aufstieg," Zeitgeschichte 28 (2001): 75-95. 12. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, 8 ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997), 380. Of course, what enthusiastic American historians tend to oversee is the fact that the "-isms" were not single-handedly defeated by the United States, but by global alliances . . 13. For a reprint of Luce's signal essay, along with an extensive analysis of its crucial importance, see Michael J. Hogan, ed., The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century" (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). 14. Gassert, "Was meint Amerikanisierung?," 785f. For the larger context ofWilsonism and the democratizing mission of America, see Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994), and Klaus Von Beyme, VorbildAmerika: Der Einjlussder amerikanischen Demokratie in der Welt (Munich: Piper, 1986). . · 15. On the launching of the Austrian occupation, see Giinter Bischof and JosefLeidenfrost, eds., Die bevormundete Nation: Osterreich und die Alliierten 1945-1959 (lnnsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 4) (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1988). 16. "Empire by invitation" was coined by the Norwegian Cold War scholar Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263-77, and idem, The American "Empire" and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (London: Oxford UP, 1990); for informal American "empire by persuasion" as opposed to the Soviet imposed "empire by coercion," see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War Histo-

15 ry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 26-53 (esp. 43).

17. Ingrid Fraberger and Dieter Stiefel, '"Enemy Images': The Meaning of' Anti-Communism' and Its Importance for the Political and Economic Reconstruction in Austria after 1945," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 8, The Marshall Plan in Austria, ed. Giinter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000), 56-97. 18. This is now persuasively argued by Michael Gebler's exhaustive study, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Osterreich vom Ende der Monarchie his zur EU, 2 vols. (lnnsbruck: StudieDverlag, 2002); see also Dieter Stiefel's review essay in this volume. 19. For the German case, see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds.,Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der fiinfziger Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1993); Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999); Reiner Pommerin, ed., The American Impact on Postwar Germany, rev. ed. (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997). 20. One this process, see the essays in Bude Heinz and Bernd Greiner, eds., Westbindungen: Amerika in der Bundesrepublik (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999). 21. This is one ofWagnleitner' s principal conclusions; see his Coca-Colonization and the Cold War.

22. Most useful for subtle definitions and differentiations for the German case is Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert(GOttingen:Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999), also featuring an excellent bibliography; see also idem, "Im Westen angekommen? Die Westerniserung der Bundesrepublik seit 1945 ," Vorgiinge 2 (2001 ): 4-14 (along with the entire issue on ''Im Sog des Westens"), and idem, ''Dimensionen der Amerikanisierung in der westdeutschen Gesellschaft." Archiv for Sozialgeschichte 35 (1995): 1-34. 23. Gunter Bischof. Restoration, Not Renewal: From Nazi to Four-PowerOccupationThe Difficult Transition to Democracy in Austria after 1945, Hungarian Studies 14/2 (2000): 207-31. 24. Anton Pelinka,Austria: Out ofthe Shadow ofthe Past (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998). 25. The "classic" analysis on Austria, which also now figures as signal contribution to the "Americanization" of Europe debates, is Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War. On the deeper roots of the liberating traditions of American popular culture, see the brilliant essay by Berndt Ostendorf, "Why Is American Popular Culture So Popular? A View from Europe," Amerikastudien/AmericanStudies4613 (2001): 339-66; see also the essays in "Pop Culture: Only a Wasteland?" Wilson Quarterly 25 (Summer 2001 ): 25-47. 26. Quoted in Bacevich, American Empire, 40. 27. On the roots of9/11, see Fred Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World-September 11: Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi, 2002). 28. The larger trajectories of these debates are subtly presented in Reinhold Wagnleitner, "'No Commodity Is So Strange As This Thing Called Cultural Exchange': The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony," Amerikastudien/American Studies 46/3 (2001): 443-709 with a complete bibliography ofWagnleitner' s rich contributions to the Americanization debate); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds, "Here, There

andEverywhere":TheForeignPoliticsofAmericanPopularCulture(Hanover,NH:Uof

New England P, 2000); see also the issue on globalization inAus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 22 March 2002, and Tony Judt, "Anti-Americans Abroad," New York Review ofBooks, 1 May 2003, p. 24-27.

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29. For a thorough critique of American fast-food culture, see Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side ofthe All-American Meal (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), and George Ritzer, Die McDonaldisierung der Geselleschaft (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997). 30. Bacevich, American Empire, 241. For a descriptive and light-weight recent survey of Americanization and its discontents, see Mark Hertsgaard, The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002); for a subtle and fascinating analysis in a specific regional context, see Tom Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization ofIsrael (New York: Henry Holt, 2002). 31. The dyad of Americanism producing anti-Americanism, has been thoroughly studied in the case of Germany; see Berndt Ostendorf, "The Final Banal Idiocy of the Reversed Baseball Cap: Transatlantische Widerspriiche in der Amerikanisierungsdebatte, Amerikastudien/American Studies 4411 (1999): 25-48; Philipp Gassert, Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus und Amerikanisierung, Archivfiir Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999): 531-61; for the Austrian case, see Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, and Giinter Bischof, "Is There a Specific Anti-Americanismin Austria" [forthcoming 2004]; see also "How the World Views America." Wilson Quarterly 25 (Spring2001): 45-80, andJiirgen Konig, "Jihad versus McWorld," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 5 October 2001, p. 35. 32. Pelinka, Out ofthe Shadow ofthe Past, 4ff., 157-72, 229f.; for the "Westem-Europeanization" of Austria, see the interesting volume by Heinrich Neisser and Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, eds., Europiiisierung der Osterreichischen Politik: Konsequenzen der EUMitgliedschaft (Schriftenreihe des Zentrums fiir angewandte Politikforschung, vol. 26) (Vienna: WUV-Universitatsverlag, 2002). 33. Along the lines of the analysis of Axel Schildt, "Sind die Westdeutschen amerikanisiert worden?", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 8 December 2000, p. 3-10. 34. See the essays by Volker Berghan and Wilfried Fluck in Alexander Stephan, ed.,Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The Impact on American Culture on Gennany After 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina UP, forthcoming). 35. The role of"Austrianists" such as Drimmel is powerfully demonstrated in Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 2001), 110-60. 36. Eric Frey's paper "Americanizing Influences in the Austrian Media," delivered at the "The Westernization-Americanization of Austria in the Twentieth Century" conference (New Orleans, 2002), is not published in this volume. 37. For the larger context ofjazz as a "liberating force," see Berndt Ostendorf, "Subversive Reeducation? Jazz as a Liberating Force in Germany and Europe," Revue Fram;aise D'Etudes Americaines Hors Serle (December 2001): 54-72. 38. Kaspar Maase has demonstrated that postwar German broadcasting suggested a form of"self-Americanization." While the culturally conservative broadcasters were pushing highbrow German elite culture first on radio, then on TV, the audiences increasingly demanded American mass culture. Since the 1980s, the adoption of American entertainment television was not imposed by Hollywood, but demanded by German audiences whose "democratic" tastes welcomed American light entertainment. See Maase' s "From Nightmare to Model? Why German Broadcasting Became Americanized," in Stephan, ed.,Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The popular Austrian radio station 0-3 suggests that the Austrian trajectory is not dissimilar from the German one. 39. Wagnleitner, "The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony," 457 passim. 40. Such Cold War American influencing ofEuropean intellectuals and journalists, financed by American foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller and also secretly funded by the CIA, meanwhile, is a well-researched field; see Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War:

17 The CIA and the World ofArts and Letters (New York: New, 1999); Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001); Michael Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongressfor kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic, 1997). 41. On the stultifying and reactionary "restorative" climate in postwar Austrian art scene, beholden to the previous authoritarian era, and the liberating influences on a younger generation of artists coming by way of their first contacts with ''the West" (for example, Paris and New York), see Robert Fleck, "Kunst in einer Zeit der Restauration: Die Rekonstruktion einer Szene modemer Kunst in der osterreichischen Nachkriegszeit, in Inventur45155: Ostereich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik, ed. Wolfgang Kos and Georg Rigele (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 1996), 441-71. 42. On the subtle, yet crucial, influences ofbehind-the-scenesnetworkers and transmitters such as Sheperd Stone who was also involved in initiating the Vienna HIS and the funding of the large American foundations, see Berghahn,America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. 43. On the Austrian Marshall Plan visitors program, see Kurt Tweraser, "The Politics of Productivity and Corporatism: The Late Marshall Plan in Austria, 1950-54," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. Giinter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), 91-115; a model study analyzing the importance of visitors program in the intellectual Americanization of postwar West Germany is Oliver Schmid, "A Civil Empire by Co-optation: German-American Exchange Programs as Cultural Diplomacy, 1945-1961," PhD. diss., Harvard University 1999.

SECTION 1: Setting the Stage I'm Made for America from Head to Toe (The Project for a New American Century) Reinhold Wagnleitner The first American Century had hardly been over and the Project for a New American Century had just commenced when the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 created a new playing field, not only for U.S. foreign and domestic policies, but also for the global cultural standing as well as the worldwide image of the United States of America. While the immediate response, especially in Europe, was a dramatic increase of positive attitudes toward and sympathies for the United States, the disregard for a number of international treaties by President George W. Bush, the proclamation of the "War Against Terror," the following war in Afghanistan, as well as the war against Iraq were confronted by a growing resistance, not only in the Muslim world, but by the majorities of the population of many European 'societies as well. 1 It will be the task of future research to find out whether these changes of opinion resemble short or long-term trends and have any deeper influence on U.S. cultural hegemony. Whatever the future may bring, two basic notions have been at the bottom of the economic, cultural, social, and political relations between Europe and the United States for a long time. First, the histories of America as well as that of the United States have:, to a large degree, been part of the phenomenon of the Europeanization of the world. Second, the United States has always meant more to the world than the world has meant to the United States.

The Problem of America as Artifact of European Expansion The history of mentalities is always a history of ambiguities, and the history of the meaning of America in European discourse(s) especially so. Since Columbus, the European reaction to America was situated

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somewhere between condescension and fear, ignorance and fascination, superiority complexes and inferiority feelings, apprehension and (dis)information. At best, it resembled a marriage of convenience where alienation (on both sides) was programmed, at worst a dangerous mixture of a love-hate relationship (in the German term "Hassliebe," hate comes first) that hardly ever could overcome the worst cliches and stereotypes. For many centuries, the term "America" has been most ambivalently placed in the landscapes of most European minds. On the one hand, it has represented the prime example of modernity and a laboratory for global social change; on the other hand, it has stood for a nostalgia longing for a pioneering past, simple freedom and individualism. The list of the appropriation and rearrangement of various modules of"typical American" images, of their use and misuse by Europeans from all nations and walks of life is nearly endless. For centuries, "America" (probably more as construct, invention, and simulation than as "reality") has functioned as a distorting mirror and as a screen on which European social, economic, political, and cultural changes were reflected and, often conveniently, misinterpreted. European stereotypes and cliches, dreams and nightmares about America are as old as the discovery of America. They clearly predate the foundation of the United States but later were projected on the United States US when it assumed a hegemonic position, first in its own hemisphere and then globally. America had become a metaphor for total enthusiasm, but also for total rejection, already in the sixteenth century. The mental baggage of Europeans filled with images, prejudices, and stereotypes in which the New World was situated between ElDorado and barbarian wilderness, paradisiacal deliverance and hell, noble savages and bloodthirsty cannibals, in short, between wishful thinking and nightmares. The phantasmagorias provoked by the real existence of America definitely show that the discovery of the New World was accompanied by a simultaneous invention of America. 2 Module One: U.S. Popular Culture In order to understand the ambiguities of U.S.-European cultural relations, one musical example may suffice, Earl King's song "(Let's) Make a Better World" in the version of James Booker: Make a Better World" by Earl King The world we know Was built on skills But that alone dont count Without the sweat and toil of mine Well it wouldn't be worth a dime. You gotta live and give Gotta share and care Really put love in the air When your neighbour's down (in trouble) You gotta pick him up Nobody can live in despair

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

Everybody let's sing, sing, sing Everybody let's sing, sing, sing Let's all pretend, do our thing Make a better world to live in Everybody let's sing, sing .. .3

This New Orleans anthem written by Earl King and performed by James Booker is a perfect starting point to grasp the meaning of the cultural background ofU.S. hegemony, especially during the Cold War. Booker's performance of "(Let's) Make a Better World" represents a decisive moment within the cultural history of the Cold War. It contains-in a nutshell-the enormous attractions and contradictions of the role jazz and other forms of U.S. music played during this global conflict as well as the paradoxes of the appeal of American culture in general. In short, it exemplifies the Cold War as Cool War. JamesBookerperformancewasrecordedattheKarlMarxUniversitat Leipzig in October 1977! Yet, while American artists were rare in East Germany, there is a much deeper meaning to this music. Eight years after Booker's death, it became the last album ever produced in East Germany: "Let'sMakeaBetterWorld!" 1991 AmigaRecords "James C. Booker Live in Leipzig, 29 Oktober '77 DIE ALLERLETZTE Sic Transit Gloria Mundi." Figure 1: Cover of James Booker's "Let's Make a Better World"

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After his confinement in the Angola Prison Farm, James Booker, managed by a German blues impresario, toured Europe and played the Karl Marx University. There, he found a congenial audience that also had the blues. Much of the clapping and singing on the album was produced by the two front rows filled by the Leipzig STASL Booker's artistry stands for the immense draw ofU.S. pop music. Yet it is an attraction that largely is counter-cultural, sub-cultural, or subversive. It contains the American Dream as well as the nightmare. In addition, it is highly ironic that most of the creators of the "Sound ofFreedom," who won sympathies for the United States the world over, were not only branded onAmerican at home, but experienced a system of apartheid within their own society. The decisive contributions of American popular culture in general and African Americans in particular to the process of democratization outside as well as inside the United States are rarely understood. The major attraction of American popular culture for young people lies in the fact that it always contains an element of rebellion against the tastes of the parental generation, politicians, priests, and teachers. Berndt Ostendorf found a brilliant answer for the essential question, "Why is American Popular Culture so Popular?" By identifying popular sovereignty "as the sociopolitical engine of the encompassing cultural project," Ostendorf argues that "the success of American popular culture lies not in any one of its individual formal or aesthetic properties, but in its overall design which is that of a consciously constructed, liberal New World utopia."4

Module Two: America

America first and foremost signifies wealth, power, youth, and success. It is not only the center of the capitalist culture of consumption but itself its most successful product. In the culture of capitalism, in which the marketplace is promoted as the highest cultural value, the market has become the supreme cultural good, the quasi-fetish and mantra of cultural globalization. It is self-evident that the culture of capitalism must by definition be popular culture, and pop connotes the US. European debates about popular culture always have been debates abo~tAmerica. In semiotic terms, America no longer stands for a country in any classical sense but rather represents a multi-trillion-dollar brand. America is not different from other famous brand names which are not only sold to the citizens of the United States, but to consumers worldwide. The brand name America is associated with catchwords such as democracy, opportunity and freedom but as is the case with many advertisements, the reality may be rather different than the brand image. 5

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Module 3: The United States as a Product of Popular Culture

Is patriotism becoming? Yes, screamed the textile industry and the first Fashion Week in New York after September 11 presented itself conspicuously American. America-we do not only carry you in our hearts, we also show it. And Austria was hit by the American breeze. It took a while until the first US-flag-fashions peeped out from shop windows, but now stars and stripes-anything that lets the hearts of US-fans pound faster can be purchased. Belt buckles, shoes, sweaters, T-shirts, bags, and much more. The palette ranges from discreet to shrill. The elegant way is to confine the Stars and Stripes to accessories: one may combine a mono coloured outfit in blue, white and red with outrageous pumps, belts and bags. You also are totally hip in shirts or sweaters with unobtrusive star patterns. A tip: fashion ala "United Stateslight" can also be worn to work. During leisure time a bit more can be done: jeans-jackets souped up with buttons, hot hotpants and a top are an especially seductive way to show the flag. The peppy shoe alternative are sandals with plateau heels. The gag: stars and stripes on the inner sole.6 This fashion text, with its proclamation of the gospel of patriotic eroticism, was published in the Sunday edition of the Austrian newspaper Kurier on 24 February 2002, in its section "Kult," subsection "STYLEZONE." It clearly proves that the United States of America itself had become an icon of popular culture during the twentieth century, but it also explains the gist of Module 2: America is fun, Europe is boring; America is leisure, Europe is work. While this performance of patriotic eroticism is hard to surpass, it was outclassed, if not outstripped, by the greatest performer of American patriotic eroticism.

Module 3: Bill Clinton's Sermon on the Mount

Following Naomi Campbell, Elton John, and Tina Turner, Bill Clinton had his gig high above Ischgl in the Tyrolean Alps at 7,546 feet on 13 April 2002. The tickets cost $880, and Bill Clinton superstar made $220,000 that April afternoon. It must have been the highest hourly pay in the history of the Tyrol since btzi.7 For his whistle stop, Clinton was flown in from Innsbruck by helicopter. His "Message from the Mountains" was titled "Learning from the United States Means Learning to Win." The purpose of the speech was to uplift Europe's youth. As the press text stated, no one else but William Jefferson Clinton managed to master each and every crisis with cool

23

elegance. In addition, the latest news from Ischgl included a snowboard park in the form of a female body. The piste, named "Pamela," opened in the winter season 2002/03. Pamela's bosom is represented by two colossal hills and the knees by two ski-jumps. Further anatomic details are quite unnecessary, but it is clear that Bill and Pamela constitute an ideal virtual pair. It cannot come as a surprise that the whole event was sponsored by MTV! So right at Pamela's bottom, Austria's hippest of tourism met the hoppest of American politics.

Module 4: The Empire of the Fun

During the last decades, American symbolic power has reached such proportions that it often is overlooked as if it were a natural part of the international environment. The sway of soft power has reached its highest degree of subtlety when an ideological and symbolic superiority is installed as quasi-natural, although in reality it rests on economic, commercial, military, and financial power. 8 For over a century, the United States of America has been the largest emitter of signs, by far the most visible country. 9 But despite the best amplifiers, one wonders whether Uncle Sam is not rather in need of a hearing aid. My epithet, The Empire of the Fun, was a spoof on the Japanese Empire of the Sun, which, like all other earlier empires, has vanished in the dustbin of history. There is only one cultural empire remaining on which the sun never sets, that of the American infotainment industry. Still, the question remains, fun for whom? Just as the power base of the British Empire rested on the military control of the shipping lanes of the world, the massive, unprecedented, and unparalleled military build up by the United States as well as the rapid exploitation of global natural resources forms the material core of the American Empire of the Fun. Yet, while this empire is global indeed, the fun itself has been kept well inside a circle of a comparatively small minority of the world's population. So the Empire of the Fun Is not much more than a Pun Because it always rests on the Power of a Gun.

Module 6: Geopolitical Aesthetics

For the specific aesthetics necessary for the establishment of this multimediaempire, the American philosopher Fredric Jameson coined the term geopolitical aesthetics. 10 Bit by bit, the American dream producers have perfected their enormously successful strategies of supplying the basic

Contemporary Austrian Studies

24

archetypes to interconnect local milieus with the international system-as this street scene from Karachi during October 2001 illustrates.

Figure 2: Street Scene from Karachi

The parochial universe ofU.S. film locations has effectively become the global location for the kaleidoscope of human passion. Production costs and aesthetic expenses of geopolitical aesthetics are extraordinary. But they contain enormous commercial as well as politic~. potential.

Module 7: Film

In no other field is American cultural hegemony as visible as in the area of film. Film history is world history, and nowhere else has the American Century become so much a "reality" as in the collective subconscious of the American movie empire, where reel history becomes real history. This global domination has never been as strong as it is today, not

25

even after 1945. A hardly measurable 1 percent of all movies in the United States come from the rest of the world, while 80 to 90 percent of European screens are occupied by American movies. While the privatization of European TV and new technologies approximate a coup de grace for European production, these developments at the same time resulted in the biggest bonanza for American media conglomerates ever. No wonder that theBritishOscarWinnerLordDavidPutnamcharacterizedU.S.-European film relations as an undeclared war. How can European governments be a match for the United States if they are already dwarfed by the Gulliver of Hollywood ?11

Module 8: Globalization Fredric Jameson's definition of globalization as the insertion of the American perspective on the rest of the world is plausible, but not moreso than the assumption that globalization represents theEuro-Americanization of the world. 12 All of this simply also could be understood as a further developmental phase of the capitalist world system: Westernization, for the majority of the population of the globe, does not mean for the most part democratization, but physical exploitation and cultural humiliation. In the age ofhypercapitalism, cultural capital has been morphed into capitalized culture. The media giants have become the global controllers of access to the whole specter of cultural experiences, tourism, theme parks, entertainment centers, wellness, fashion, food, sports, play, music, film, TV, Internet, and publication companies of books, journals, and newspapers. Cyberspace has become the first perfect space for the global extension of instant capitalism. 13 Module 9: The Marilyn Monroe Doctrine The diffusion of the U.S. modelis the result of the enormous American military and economic power and the biggest propaganda campaign ever. But even if the Monroe Doctrine was succeeded by the Marilyn Monroe Doctrine, the pursuit of happiness as pursuit of consumption, there is nothing inherently "American" about the culture of ~nsumption. After all, America is the result of the Europeanization of the world, so before America could consume Europe, Europe already had consumed America. Since 1945, more than ever before, the United States signified the codes of modernity and promised the pursuit of happiness in its most updated version as the pursuit of consumption. Whenever real consumption climbed into the ring, chances were high that real socialism had to be counted out. 14

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

Module 10: Hegemony by Invitation

The hegemony of American popular culture is a hegemony by invitation, but not only by the young. Discredited as collaborators with fascism and lacking much needed capital, most conservatives in postwar Europe hardly despised anything more than "American civilization," but they desperately needed American assistance. Y etAmerican assistance not only meant there-empowering of a large number of the old economic elites and the inclusion into a system of interdependent liberal market economies; it also brought an unprecedented influx of American pop, which was only grimly accepted with much gritting of teeth. My central argument runs like this: however important the military power and political promise of the United States were for setting the foundation for American successes in Cold War Europe, it was the American economic and cultural attraction that really won over the hearts and minds of the majorities of young people for Western democracy. To be sure, abstract American freedoms and liberties had their attraction for quite a few, but how much greater was their appeal when they came in a new package-as Liberty Corn, Freedom Grain, and Equality Beans. However alien, especially for the older generation, some American practices seemed, however often American gadget-mania was ridiculed, however much American naivete and pragmatism were mocked, however strongly American civilization was despised-and the list is long-the century-old attraction the United States had held, especially for the European poor, was now bolstered by a variety of important factors: the presence of the incredibly powerful, rich, and wasteful U.S. Army; the generous assistance programs; and the ubiquitous presence of American wealth and the concept of the good life in the products of American popular culture which had an unbeatable allure, especially for the young. Europeanization, Americanization, Euro-Americanization, Westernization, modernization, Coca-Colonization, Disneyfication, McDonaldization, Sili-Colonization-the resulting ambivalences of all attempts at conceptualization, scholarly outlined in Giinter Bischof s introductory essay to this volume, may best be termed Creolisation or hybridization, not only because the conference these essays were written for convened in New Orleans. No one has ever expressed those contra4ictions more aptly than Louis Armstrong in 1962 in "The Real Ambassadors," written by lola and Dave Brubeck and introduced by the alarmingly precise vocal acrobats, Hendrix, Lambert, and Ross: ''No commodity is quite so strange/As this thing called cultural exchange." 15

27

Notes

1. See the impressive poll results of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press with more than 38,000 interviews in forty-four nations: "What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 4 December 2002, (17 June 2003); and "America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties, But Post-War Iraq Will Be Better Off, Most Say," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 18 March 2003, (17 June 2003). 2. Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: U of NorthCarolinaP,2001);ReinholdWagnleitnerandElaineTylerMay,eds., "Here, There andEverywhere": TheForeignPoliticsofAmericanPopularCulture(Hanover,NH:UP of New England, 2000). 3. Booker's live album from his concert in Leipzig, while available only in a limited pressing of about fifty(!) LPs, is still awaiting publication as a CD. A good introduction to Booker's genius is theCDJuncoPartner,Rykodisk 1993 HNCD 1359, which contains a studio version of "Lets Make a Better World." The cover of the final East German LP Amiga 00191 may be found at and . The album contains the following songs: "Life," "On The Sunny Side Of The Street," "Junco Partner," ''Tico Tico, "One Helluva Nerve," ''Booker's Original," "Baby Face," "So Swell When You're Well," "Since I Fell For You," "Black Nightis Falling," "Come On In This House," "Let's Make A Better World," "People Get Ready," "Chopin One Minute Waltz," "Little Tune For Lefty," ''Malaguena A La Louisiana." A James Booker discography can be found at "Discography: James Booker," Offbeat Magazine, 1997, . See also Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Jazz: die klassische Musik der Globalsierung," Aurora Magazin, Winter-Friihjahr 2003, (17 June 2003). 4. Berndt Ostendorf, "Why Is American Popular Culture So Popular? A View from Europe," Amerikastudien/American Studies 46/3 (2001): 339-66. Also see Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Coca-Colonisation und Kalter Krieg: 'Amerikanisierung' als historisches Phanomen und der 'Fall' Osterreich," in Erfurter Beitriige zur Nordamerikanischen Geschichte, vol. 3, Kulturtransfer & Kalter Krieg: Westeuropa als Biihne undAkteur im Amerikanisierungsprozess, ed. Ursula Lehmkuhl, Stefanie Schneider, and Frank Schumacher, 312000: 12-23. 5. Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: How to Reverse America's Suicidal Consumer Binge-And Why We Must (New York: Quill/HarperCollins, 2000); Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism, Where All of Life is a Paid-For Experience (New York: J.P. Tarcher, 2000); Todd Gitlin, Media Unlimited: How the Torrent oflmages and Sounds Overwhelms Our Lives (New York: Metropolitan, 2002) 6. "Stars & Stripes: Das Stemenbanner als Friihjahrsmoile-Hit: Von Kopfbis Fu6 auf Amerika eingestellt," Kurier, 24 February 2002: 39. 7. "Die 'Bergpredigt' des Bill Clinton. Kommenden Samstag tritt der ehemalige USPriisident in Ischgl auf," Der Standard, 8 April2002: 8. ''Message from the Mountains, William J. Clinton 42nd President of the US, Live in Ischgl," Workshop Ischgl, 13 April 2002, (16 June 2003). 8. Georg Schmid, Die Geschichtsfalle: Crber Bilder, Einbildungen und Geschichtsbilder (Wien: Bohlau, 2000).

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9. Reinhold Wagnleitner, "The Empire of the Fun, or Talkin' Soviet Union Blues: The Sound of Freedom and U.S. Cultural Hegemony in Europe," Diplomatic History 2.3 (Summer 1999): 499-524; R. Wagnleitner, ''The Irony of American Culture Abroad: Austria and the Cold War," in Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age ofCold War, ed. LaryMay (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989): 285-301; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "American Cultural Diplomacy, the Cinema, and the Cold War in Central Europe," in Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony, ed. David W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes (Amsterdam: Paul Consortium, 1994): 197-210; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Where's the Coke? There's The Coke!", in Living with America, 1946-1996, ed. Christina Giorcelli and Rob Kroes (Amsterdam: Vu UP, 1997): 61-69; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Von der CocaColonisation zur Sili-Colonisation" in KiHner Beitriige zur Anglo-Amerikanischen Geschichte, ed. Michael Wala (August 2000); Reinhold Wagnleitner, "'No Commodity Is Quite So Strange As This Thing CaiJed Cultural Exchange': The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony," Amerikastudien/American Studies 46.3 (200 1): 443-70. 10. Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992). 11. David Puttnam, The Undeclared War: Cinema, Cash, and the Struggle to Control Culture (London: HarperCollins, 1997). Tyler Cowen, "Why Hollywood Rules the World, and Whether We Should Care," Department of Economics, George Mason University, 5 April 2001, ( 17 June 2003 ); Andre Lange, ed., Statistical Yearbook2()(X]: Film, Television, Video (Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2000): 27. See also European Audiovisual Observatory, (accessed 17 June 2003). S.E. Siwek, "The Dimensions of the Export of American Mass Culture" in The New Global Culture: Is It American? Is It Good for America? Is It Good for the World?, ed. Ben J. Wattenberg (Washington, 1992), 1-49; Annemoon van Hemel, Hans Mommaas and Cas Smithuijsen, eds., Trading Culture: GATT, European Cultural Policies and the Transatlantic Market (Amsterdam, 1996). 12. Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic. See Reinhold Wagnleitner "Giobalisierungwovon reden wir eigentlich?", Aurora-Magazin, Winter-Friihjahr 2003, (17 June 2003). 13. Reinhold Wagnleitner, "eLeaming Content-Commodity or Educational Asset?", Electronic Journal Literatur Primiir, February 2003, ( 17 June 2003 ). See also Media Ownership "Who Owns What?", Columbia Journalism Review, (17 June 2003). 14. See Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Die Marilyn-Monroe-Doktrin oder das Streben nach Gliick durch Konsum: Die US-Popkultur und die Demokratisierung Osterreichs im Kalten Krieg," Institutfor die Wissenschaften vomMenschen, 1997 (17 June 2003). 15. "Cultural Exchange" (Lyrics by lola and Dave Brubeck, Music by Dave Brubeck) from the album The Real Ambassadors, Various artists, Audio CD'(1994, original recording 19 September 1961 ), Sony/Columbia, ASIN B0000029FQ. "Jazz-Musical-Revue" by Dave and lola Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, Various artists, Audio CD; also Louis Armstrong, Ambassador Satch, Audio CD, (2000, Live in Amsterdam and Mailand, 1955), Sony/Columbia, ASIN B00004U1GZ. Penny von Eschen, "Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz, Race, and Empire during the Cold War," in Wagnleitner and May, "Here, There and Everywhere," 163-178.

The Americanization of Vienna Armin Thurnher Please allow me to start with me and my story of how I became Americanized and how I, in turn, Americanized Austria a bit, too. Originally, I come from the other end of Austria. So, like most Viennese, I am not real Viennese but an immigrant. Vienna since the Middle Ages has been a city capable of assimilating all kinds of foreigners. This ability to assimilate strangers forms a curious contrast to its periods of hostility towards foreigners and to its constant feeling of xenophobia. As I said, I come from the other end of the Austrian galaxy. From my early childhood, I was driven by a kind of American desire which was kindled by the appearance of a great- granduncle of mine who, like so many from our state, emigrated to the United States in the 1920s and who, unlike many others, managed to make a small fortune in Minnesota. So in my mind, going to America was somehow linked to making it big, and I made sure I had two scholarships when I was finished with high school. I went to Staten Island, New York, lived in a student's apartment overlooking the Verrazano Bridge into Brooklyn, and made sure I spent most of my free time in Manhattan. Besides studying Beowulf and Grendel, Wordsworth and Emily Dickinson, I also got to know newspapers, real newspapers such as The New York Times. To my surprise, I discovered the existence of press-products like The East Village Other or The Village Voice. I almost stayed on Staten Island, for I was offered a further scholarship, not for academic excellence, I admit, but for soccer. However, I decided to stay European and go home, although I knew no academic institution other than an American college would give me a scholarship for playing soccer. By the late 1960s, having spent a Year in New York City, I found that once in Austria I was years ahead of my peers for some time to come. When two colleagues and I founded a weekly paper called Falter (which to the Austrian ear does have a double meaning, but no English connotation), I was able to tell them of a model for our paper, which hardly any Austrians knew about at that time: The Village Voice. Of course, our

30

Contemporary Austrian Studies

weekly Falterdidn' t come close to The Village Voice, but it tried to capture something of the spirit of The Village Voice (or of what we considered that spirit to be): irreverent columnists, openness and lack of bias in reporting and investigating, a certain sense of community, many cultural listings, and, of course, lots of classified advertisements. Thus, as a product of Americanization myself, I contributed in a way to the Americanization of Vienna. When I returned from New York City to Vienna in 1968, I had a grave problem with velocity. I constantly bumped into people from behind on the boardwalk or while boarding a tramway. People were just moving so slowly. In the following years, that changed. (In fact, the institute that measures different walking speeds in different cities is situated in Vienna.) Vienna has become-not only as far as its speed is concerned--quite a typical middle-sized European city. It would not be classified as global city by Saskia Sassen, but it is a central European metropolis with a certain regional and even supraregional significance, burdened with its past which is still overwhelming. Even if Vienna is moving at a typical contemporary speed now, it still has a problem with its own modernity. Certainly one cannot simply equate "modernization" with "Americanization," but there is something in the city which one could call "resistance against modernization." There is a certain structural conservatism, which embraces all aspects of life, all political parties, and all parts of society. This conservatism does not necessarily have to be a disadvantage. On the contrary, one can quietly outwait developments elsewhere and avoid mistakes others make in the meantime by just not doing anything at all. In business and politics, this cautious element in Viennese mentality often is regarded as being a problem. In fact, Austria's entrance into the European Union can be interpreted as the only solution the political and commercial elites saw to modernize the country. They knew that reform from within was impossible. The famous Austrian consociationalism, which seemed to block any kind of modernization, seemed insurmountable. I am not sure whether one should consider Vienna's resistance against modernization as a kind of conservatism of the heart, as a remembrance of past greatness which manifests itself in pride of tra!

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109

The sensational performance of lonny at 1927 New Year's Eve in Vienna led to the creation of an Austrian cigarette brand, the Jonny, which is still in existence today. The producers tried to cash in on the recipe of combining modern images with that special illusionary sense of vitality symbolized by J onny, the black protagonist of the opera. Ernst Krenek immigrated to America in 1938. In supplication for Austria, his war-torn homeland, he wrote his choral Lamentatio 1eremiae prophetae (op. 93) in 1942. It was a work that, he thought at the time, would never be performed and which foreshadowed the concept of serialism in music. 22 The Zeitoper lonny spielt auf seems a short-lived example of an experiment to bring opera into everyday life, an attempt to bring realism mixed with a satirical view to the stage. It tried to change the opera to the here and now and to close the gap between serious and popular music. It was an experiment to stage the opera as a forum for new ideas often dealing with ideological issues of the so-called Left. In the 1920s, Krenek's lonny was for many a symbol of change to a new modern democratic age in these years of the declining German Weimar Republic and the Austrian First Republic. 23 Today patrons of the arts witness the rediscovery of suppressed music of the Third Reich. The careers of many Austro-German composers had been interrupted or cut short by the advent of Nazism in Germany and Austria. In 1991, the Decca Record Company launched their distinguished Entartete Musik series with two operas: Das Wunderder Heliane by Erich Wolfgang Korngold and lonny spielt auf by Ernst Krenek. These two Viennese composers of similar age were both exiled and both wholly Americanized, spending their last years in Southern California.24 Krenek's lonny is still well-known, in part due to the fact that it was branded a jazzy and supposedly most subversive opera. 25 As a result, the Nazis used it as a symbol of their general attack on the Neue Musik (New Music). 26

Notes

1. Rich quoted in John L. Stewart, Ernst Krenek: The Man and His Music (Berkleley, CA: U of California P, 1991), 89. 2. Adolf Weissmann, "WasisteineJazzoper?," B. Z. am Mittag (Berlin) 5 October 1927; Alfred Heuss, "Ernst Krenek's Jazz-Opera: lonny spielt auf," Zeitschrift fiir Musik 94 (1927): 168-169; AdolfWeissmann, "Jazz Opera at Leipsic [sic] and Berlin," The Musical Times68 (1927): 357; Walter Jacob, "'JazzOperain Vienna," The London Times,4January 1928; L. Van Vassenhove," 'Jonny' ou le triomphe du jazz," Courriermusical et thiatrel 30 (1928): 142-143; Hugo R. Fleischmann, "The First Jazz Opera and Operetta," The Chesterian (March 1928); Alfred V. Frankenstein, "Jazz arrives at the Opera," Review of Reviews19(1929): 138-140; Walter Jacob, "JazzOperaforBenefit," The New York Times 9 February 1929.

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3. lonny spielt aufwas an unexpected success; it appeared just as the later famous Krolloper opened (1927) and the Weimar Republic enjoyed a short period of financial and social stability until the stock market crash of October 1929. The Krolloper was a symbol of Berlin as the innovative center of German operatic life. 4. Libretto by Ernst Krenek. 5. David Even, The Complete BookofTwentieth Century Music (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 210-11. 6. The relationship between Schreker and Krenek collapsed by the end of 1920 and along with it Krenek's initial respect for Schreker as a teacher and composer. There were significant differences between the two men over their understanding of musical modernity and the role of the artist in political and cultural life. 7. Among the young emergent expressionists who proclaimed their radical refusal to accept the conservatism of the postwar musical life in Germany, Krenek was considered the ultramodernist. 8. Garret Bowles, "Krenek, Ernst," The New Grove Dictionary ofMusicandMusicians, vol. 13 (2nd ed., New York: Macmillan, 2002), 859. 9. See Krenek's recollections of the Leipzig premiere in Ernst Krenek, lm Atem der Zeit (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1998), 336-38. 10. Fred K.Prieberg, Musik und Macht (Frankfurt: Fischer 1991 ), 47-9. Between 1927 and 1930, more than 450 performances at German opera-houses were given. 11. Some colleagues and critics accused Krenek of betraying his earlier beliefs by pandering to the masses. 12. See also ''Zeitoper," in The New Grove Dictionary ofMusic and Musicians, vol. 27 (2nd ed., New York: Macmillan, 2002), 773. 13. Towards the late 1920s the well-known proponentsoftheZeitoperwereEmstKrenek, Wilhelm Grosz, Max Brand, Kurt Weill, Paul Hindemith, Eugen d'Albert, Ernst Toch, Georges Antheil, Karol Rathaus, and Arnold Schoenberg. 14. The action takes place in the public and private spaces of the modem world of the 1920s: in a hotel lobby, a modem living room, a police car, and a train station. Slide projections or an animated film is required to make the police car appear to move, a special staging was created to allow the depiction of the trains' arrival. See Krenek, lmAtem der Zeit, 630. 15. Stewart, Ernst Krenek, 88. 16. Quoted in Susan C. Cook, Opera for a New Republic: the Zeitopern ofKrenek, Weill, andHindemith (AnnArbor,MI: U ofMichiganResearchP, 1988), 87,235. See also Fred K. Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1982), 48. 17. Ernst Krenek was married to Anna Mahler from 1922 to 1924. 18. Ernst Krenek, "lonny erinnertsich," Osterreichische M!ISikzeitschrift Jg. 35/4-5 (1980): 187-189. See also: Stewart, Ernst Krenek, 81. 19. Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, 276 -279. 20. JosefWulf, Musik im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1983), 460-74. 21. "Jetztist die Geigemein und ich will drauf spielen wie Old David einst die Harfe schlug [He takeshishatoff; Yvonne raises herself to her knees] und preisen Jehova, der dieMenschen schwarz erschuf.....Da kommt die neue Welt iibers Meer gefahren mit Glanz und erbt das alte Europa durch den Tanz..... "

111 22. Gladys N. Krenek, Ernst Krenek Through the 20th Century . 23. Coming out of the discussions and attempts for an operatic renewal by many critics, lonny was widely regarded as something altogether new. See Cook, Opera for a New Republic, 3. 24. Michael Haas, "Introduction to the Series 'Entartete Musik"' in the booklet of the Decca CD 436 631-2 DH02 Krenek-Jonny spielt auf, 16. 25. Ernst Krenek's reuvre shows a wide variety of contemporary styles and techniques. For that reason he has sometimes been declared a one-man history of twentieth century music and was called one of the most prolific composers of this century. See Gladys N. Krenek, Ernst Krenek Through the 20th Century and Bowles "Krenek, Ernst," 859. One of the most famous critics in Germany, Hans Heinz Stuckenschmidt, wrote in 1930: "What is so stunning about this young blond intellectual of czech origin is the incredible speed with which he launches one work afer the other. He sutpasses Hindemith in fecundity and from the start we find both piano and orchestral music, chamber music and songs, stage and instrumental music." Quotation from Thomas Gayda, "Ernst Krenek. A Composer between Worlds," booklet of the Decca CD 436 631-2 DH02 Krenek-Jonny spielt auf, 34. For further discussion by Stuckenschmidt, see Stuckenschmidt, Hans Heinz, Die Musik eines halben Jahrhunderts, 1925-1975 (Miinchen: Piper, 1976) and his Neue Musik (Berlin: Suhrkamp 1981). 26. JosefWulf,MusikimDrittenReich, 38,223,337,386,392,415,468. Fred K. Prieberg, Musik im NS-Staat, 296-300.

Belonging to a Never- Never Land? Television and Consumer Modernity in Postwar Austria Monika Bemold In December 1955, two months after the start of television in Austria when the first evening news program Bild des Tages was replaced by Zeit im Bild, the news program which is still on today, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) started to buy "world news" from the American news agency, the United Press. The 16mm film rolls were sent by aeroplane via Paris each day to Vienna. Many years later, the opening sequencefromanAustrianT.V.youthprogramfrom 1912calledSpotlight (English names for Austrian television programs were very rare before the 1970s) shows an American rock band, Dr. Hook, landing at an airport, a kind of non-place, as Marc Auge 1 would call it, maybe located in Vienna or any other city, ''bringing in" American rock music, fun culture and wildness. After this, the moderator in the studio, Peter Rapp, was doing what we could call cultural translation/transmission. He did an interview with the American rock guests in English and translated each word immediately. The second band presented in the Spotlight studio came from Germany: Udo Lindenberg. After the German, finally the Austrian pop star Wilfried was presented in the same program. These are probably two very significant examples for the path of Austrian postwar culture to the West via television. Nevertheless, the question in the heading ''Television: The Path to the West?" is significant and hints at the slightly dubious concepts of Americanization and Westernization. Both of these terms often function as projection screens for very different meanings, values and, of course, ideologies. The question mark in the heading indicates that the source of the light on those screens is as important as the context in which their meaning was and is historically articulated and understood. One problem with the concept of the West, for example, is the problem, as Judith Butler recently put it, that it collapses the complexity of

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the political field into a dichotomy and tends to reproduce false ideas of unity, even within academic discourse. The main problem with Americanization as a European instrument for analysis, on the other hand, is a consequence of its structural and historical link to contradictory values and meanings. Nevertheless, this study concentrates on the paradigm of Americanization, which relates to the most interesting questions from the perspective of consumer history and which also complicates the question of Westernization. In doing so, this study will not focus on the material route to theWest via television/ or on the entrance of the American way of life through and on Austrian TV screens, but will reconstruct some different and changing sign posts within cultural traffic in postwar Austria.

"See America": Television as Paradigm for Americanization

On the meta-level, where television is an audio-visual technology and cultural form, 3 television has generally been seen from the beginning as the example and, even more and very often, as the paradigm of Americanization after World War II. The same was true for the cinema at the beginning of the last century, with slightly different implications of course. As Miriam Hansen puts it, 4 cinema very soon adopted Fordist-Taylorist principles of industrial organization. Beginning even in the 1920s, Hollywood became one of the leading generators of what Victoria de Grazia called the "American paradigm" for consumer modernity. 5 But the uses of the technology, the actual forms of perception of the movies were at the same time still structured by locally and historically variable dynamics of production and processes of articulation, which did never fully fit into a model called Americanization. This is trueforpostwartelevision, too. 6 After 1945, television tended to be the most powerful example of-or even a paradigm for-the universal model of the development of mass consumer societies in Europe, a model still called Americanization or the "American paradigm." What gave television this paradigmatic power? Television was a central object for the formation of the serialized individual hollle as a specific object domain, within and by which purchasing decisions were established and standardized. In addition, it generated and symbolized a modem inner space, in and towards which a large part of the Western European postwar generation's consumer desires were concentrated and developed. Television co-produced a kind of serialized idea of the modem home, which became more and more the center of post-Fordist principles of economic organization.7

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At the same time, television from the start has been in adynamic state of transformation within continuously changing media environments and has been used in vastly different ways in different local and cultural contexts. During the 1950s and 1960s in Austria, for example, it still was used primarily in contexts outside the home. From a critical perspective against totalizing concepts of Americanization, it is necessary to reclaim studies on those differences. It is a significant paradox that on the other hand, that research on television was a form ofknowledge production from the beginning, which, like consumer measurement, was part of marketing strategies that signify the American paradigm of consumer modernity. Moreover, there is another significant paradox in this context: the practices of consumer and audience measurement strongly represented American influence in Western Europe after 1945, although they were actually the result of earlier European transmissions to the United States-Paul Lazarsfeld is one famous name for this. See America Live became areality in Austria for the first time in 1962. At this time, "in Austria" referred to 380,000 so-called "TV participants," their friends and families, and their neighbors or ·guests that were registered, predominantly in the Austrian cities and not so often in some parts of Carinthia or in Burgenland, for example. A photograph from 1962 that shows Mount Rushmore in the frame of a TV screen, refers to this television event that was recorded within the daily press as follows: "On Thursday, July 24, 1962," the headlines of the newspaper Neues Osterreich read, ''24 minutes live from the U.S.: Telstar experiment successful. John Kennedy came to 200 Million European TV viewers."8 The beginning of the article re-dramatized the power of a technology of simultaneity: At exactly 58 minutes past seven p.m., a signal was sent up to the satellite Telstar. In this historical moment it was flickering on millions of TV screens. After a short break, the imposing figure of the Statue of Liberty slowly appeared on the screen. The huge lady still was a little bit wobbly, but the BBC technicians at the British receiving station Goonhilly Downs were able to solve the problem very soon. The name of the sensation was a LIVE program from America. Teams of cameramen showed different places typical of the U.S.: the Golden Gate Bridge, Mount Rushmore, Niagara Falls, and so forth. 9

The article then reported that the twenty-four minutes of live programming from the United States were followed at 22.52 by a Eurovision program sending national self-images from Western European countries live to the United States. The ORF contributed to this Eurovision event with live transmitted images of "our Lippizaner with Oberst Podhajski, as they came dancing through the hall." 10 To be part of the televisual image ofWestern Europe for America was as important for the Austrian broadcasters as sending a live image

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representing the connection to America and to Western Europe. To see, but also to be seen within and as "the West" was of high relevance for a country that was only slowly recovering economically and was situated in the middle of Europe, but at its eastern border. Television as a paradigm for Americanization has historically been discussed predominately ideologically in terms of colonization and cultural imperialism; on the other hand, it has simultaneously been discussed in terms of participation and democratization in the liberal tradition at the same time. In complex relation to these ideological understandings, different fields of meaning have been attributed historically to the idea of television as paradigm of Americanization: 1. modernization and technological progress (including visual power and visual control); 2. serialization and standardization of life experience and the homogenization of the audience; 3. loss of history and the excess of the surface; and 4. the hegemony of popular culture and mass culture and the shift towards (total) consumption. The last point deserves further consideration, particularly in terms of some significant dimensions of the link between the notion of television and the notion of consumption in the context of Austrian postwar consumer culture. The identification of television with the mode of consumption was one main horizon in which the promises of consumer modernity were reflected and produced, rejected and negotiated.

Politics of Belonging: Television and Consumer Culture in Postwar Austria

At a very early stage in the context of Austrian postwar society, on which this article's research on television was predominately based, double images of plenty and loss, disappearance and over-presence (or overappearance) were attributed to television in popular as well as in academic discourses. Television invoked images of "total consumption" for which the image of incorporation is probably one of the most popular. Locating television within the transformations of life in the early second half of the twentieth century onward immediately calls to mind the term "couch potato." This is probably the most popular image in which both concerns about the subject turning into the object of consumption and the danger of American consumerism were expressed. The fact that this famous AngloAmerican name for the TV viewer never really became popular in Austria and also that there is no German translation for it indicates the complexities

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of cultural transmission and the moments of resistance within the traffic of cultural meanings attributed to and by television. The philosopher Giinter Anders, who in the 1950s wrote one of the earliest conceptual studies on television, returned to Vienna from emigration to the United States in the 1950s. He used the metaphor of "eating and being eaten" to describe the new technology. Referring to the dialectical relation of the human body and the electronic machine, Anders described television, in his Californian diary, in terms of a "Schlaraffenwelt, or a never-never land," which is signified by deleting the spatial or financial distance between the consumer and the commodity. The critical view of television by the Austrian re-immigrant and philosopher of critical theory, Anders, is predominately a critical view of American culture. "If the pieces of this world," says Anders, "have no other purpose than to be incorporated, eaten, assimilated, the only sense of existence for this nevernever-land is to lose its state of being a world."11 Television's identification with the mode of consumption was based not only on the abstract relations of the electronic and the organic, the body and the machine, but also on very concrete and multiple historical articulations and practices of positioning the technology in the domestic space, the space of daily cooking, food consumption, and everyday life. Beverley Houston thus called television's big promise the promise of life itself. 12 The term "live" became common in the German language at an early stage. This was not the case for other technical terms of television coming from the United States, such as serial, prime time, soap, tube, couch potato, and so forth. It was the "live effect" within the lived-ness of daily life that generated television's power to connect and to gather audiences simultaneously as viewers and as consumers. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, television in Austria only very slowly became a force of imagined economic integration and collective political imagination, for certain conditions were present that prevented that from occurring. In this early phase of the new technology, the economic and technical prerequisites for its broad dissemination, namely relatively well-off households and wide transmission, were still lacking. A broad sense of identification with Austria, a national identification for which television-that was widely discussed as and- within the paradigm of Americanization-became more and more a central generator during the 1960s, was also lacking. This paradox of the increasing ideological "Austrification" as a kind of reflex against the increasing influence of American culture seems to be symptomatic of Americanization via TV in postwar Austria. The question if and in which way television was an agent of Americanization in Austria during the 1950s and 1960s also leads to the ORF's conception of the audience. From the beginning, there were at least two

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different types, two different concepts of the audience (and with this, of course, two concepts for organizing broadcasting itself): the European model of the audience as public (GB, BBC), and the U.S. model of the audience as market. Give the people what they need versus give the people what they want-these were the very simple precepts of those concepts. 13 Instruction and education of the audience in the perspective of social partnership was the leading programoftheORFuntil themid-1960s. This conception of the audience was legitimized by anti-American arguments and was effective as a form of the de-Americanization of popular culture within the process of Austrian modernization. The institutional organization, the program itself, but also the very late introduction of a professional audience measurement in the ORF, namely not before 1968, also indicate this very paternalistic and anti-competitive model of the broadcaster's relation to the audience. In Austria the televisual representation of this public/audience was strongly homogenized until the late 1960s. The image of Austria that was depicted was middle class, heterosexual, and predominantly Viennese. Television functioned in the period of the 1950s and 1960s as a great homogenizer on the level of private consumption as well as on the level of the program of the public broadcaster. It was only in the 1970s, when most Austrian households were connected, that television, or at least its programming, slowly turned into an organizer and mediator of social differences within a national context. The conservatism of Austrian cultural politics during the 1950s and 1960s, which Ernst Hanisch 14 has termed the "conservative paradigm"-as the counterposition to American mass culture-was also represented in the ORF's programming. But this conservatism was not, as Siegfried Matti wrote, the reason for the late entrance of liberal mass culture, but the precondition for its realization in the 1970s. 15 During the 1960s, the Austrian way of establishing the TV set in the home was based on the specific contract of the social partners which was rooted in pacification that functioned largely by incorporating the notion of"consumption for all" into the state/public sphere represented on national television, beyond the very different gender or class-specific opportunities for participation. As consumer artifact and as technology, televisipn offered the promise of a better life. The almost universal metaphor of television as the window to the world turned, in many countries of this world, into the (shopping) window to the West. In 1962 the so-called director of the ORF, Gerhard Freund, wrote in his popular book on television: "Because of our Austrian experience, we know that in the countries of the eastern block many TV viewers view and participate in the programs ofWestern Europe. For them, the window to the world has turned into a peephole in the Iron Curtain." 16 The powerful promise of belonging to the West, seeing America without

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being there, that was why the imagined gaze of the East "through" the peephole of the Iron Curtain was so important for the processes of national identity-building via the ORF.

Televisual Traffic: Travelling Codes, Waves and Images, Travelling Artifacts and Subjects

Heinz Bude recently discussed four dimensions of Americanization: the politics of power relations, the dimension of consciousness building, the processes of imagination, and the dimension of things and material worlds. 17 This framework is helpful for discussing questions of westernisation and of televisual traffic too. The following section briefly and unsystematically identifies four areas that could be important for future research with regards to television in Austria. The political and legal preconditions for the travelling of waves or for an Austrian broadcasting system after 1945 have been already discussed at length by Oliver Rathkolb and many others. The technical and economical preconditions-what, for example, Georg Schmid once called the "German technoparadigm" 18-need to be analyzed in more detail for the early history of television in Austria, too. The German company Siemens, for example, was the leading company in the context of sender technology hardware in Austria. The receiver industry, on the other hand, remained firmly in "national" hands for the most part. Until the late 1960s, there were only few imports of receivers due to very restrictive monopoly regulations and national protectionism in retail electronics. One aspect of the dimension of consciousness building, the production and distribution of programs, could start with research on Eurovision and its programs, projects, and failures. Eurovision, a collaborative endeavour of western European countries, started in 1954 with the broadcast of Pope Pius XII' s Pentecost address, and was soon followed by the broadcast of the football World Cup in Switzerland and Intervision, the organization of Eastern European countries, which started six years later. With this organization of ideological/territorial viewing communities, television in Austria and in its neighboring countries was politically situated within the power relations of the so-called Cold War. Nevertheless, the institutional and ideological formation of a dichotomy of broadcasting communities in Europe did-especially not in the various contexts and practices of reception-function in a universal and continuous way and should, therefore, be reconstructed in its relational and dynamic qualities. On the topic of the production and distribution of programs, it would also be necessary to differentiate between bilateral exchanges and coproductions. On this subject, the so-called "broadcasting family of the Alps" (co-productions by the ORF, ZDF, and SRG) was formative in

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Austria from the late 1960s onward. It would be necessary to differentiate between the import of films and TV programs, the import of information and know-how (for example, Quiz 21), the import of program ideas (for example, the Edgar Wallace Crime Stories), and their local adoption and, of course, the various and different forms of their reception. 19 Finally, there is the aspect of the program as text, in which Americanization and the orientation to the West, images of the internal and external "other" were represented most complexly and dynamically. I have completed some research in this area, for example, with the Austrian family sitcom Familie Leitner and the famous prime-time program of the 1970s Wunsch dirwas (Make a Wish). 20 Dietmar Schonherr, the moderator of this very popular 1970s show, is an interesting figure concerning travelling codes of cultural identity. He played in a Hitler Junge during the 1940s, gave the German voice to James Dean during the 1950s, and was the star of the very G version of Star Trek, Raumschiff Orion, during the 1960s. This example indicates that for the investigation of program as text, it would be helpful to take a media-historical perspective, which also reflects on the intermediality of cinema, radio, and television during that period. One last example exemplifies the relation of what Bude called the "processes of imagination" and the dimension of things and material worlds in regard to the paradigm of Americanization. Especially when technology was new, product names were part of the complex structure of representing and establishing the television set as part of the modern home, as well as a part of national prosperity. The 1965 Austrian trade fair catalogue shows some of the sociocultural terms by which Austrian manufacturers thought consumers could be led to accept and even desire the receiver itself:

Televista, Forum, Wesir, Phi/etta, Rubens, Savoy, Weltblick, Regent, Panorama, Luxus, Format, Journal, Raffael, Colosseum, Ambassador, Videomat, Bellevue, Lord, Elektra, Excelsior, Universum, Westminster, Weltmeister, Resident, Weltblick, Consul, Senator, and Horizont. (It was only in the

early 1960s that the Austrian receiver industry started to sell their products by specific names.) In Austria, it was definitely not the image of"America" or associated connotations of modernization or technological progress that were attributed by manufacturers to the new product and artifacts. Neither the new world, American culture, nor the English language were dominant within the politics of naming the TV set; rather, Latin and Greek names, references to high culture, old values, credibility and tradition were the sources for the names. The names by which television receivers were marketed were part of the specific cultural meanings attributed to television within specific local and national contexts. In the United States, for example, names with continental references like "The Devonshire," "The Continental," ''The Cherbourg," but also colonial and revolutionary references to American

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history, like "The Plymouth" and "The Jefferson," were very popular. 21 In East Germany, early production was dominated by names referring to history, politics, and high culture, too. In 1951 the first TV generation called ''Leningrad" went into production in Dresden. Whereas the reference to one's "own" history was very popular in the United States, in Austria historical references to Austrian history cannot be found. There were no receivers called "Habsburger" or "Babenberger" to legitimize and facilitate technological change. Only the legitimization of the new technology by and through references to the tradition of European visual arts seemed to be a transnational and even transideological reference system for naming receivers during the 1960s in Austria, the DDR, and the United States. Receivers were called "The Vermeer" or "Mona Lisa," "Rubens," or "Titian" in all of these very different cultures and countries. A press photograph from 1962 finally refers to one more meaning of televisual traffic. It shows the arrival of a man at the main station in Munich. It is the arrival of a so-called "guest worker" from Turkey, who is welcomed by the mayor of the city and by the press. The man is welcomed with publicity and a present that looks like a big travelling bag, but is actually a television set. This photograph very helpful for understanding television and televisual traffic in the perspective of the historically changing ideas ofbelonging-the idea of belonging to the never-never-land of consumption often called the West. The photograph also relates to television's effects in the cultures of diasporas, which were deeply connected with the shift towards consumer modernity in Europe and in postwar Austria, too. 22 The study of television in relation to migrant and minority communities should try to focus on various practices and media ensembles in and by which identities and dynamic forms of belonging were elaborated and constructed. 23

Notes

1. SeeM. Auge, Orte undNicht-Orte: Voriiberlegungenenzu einer Ethnologie der Einsamkeit (Frankfurt: 1994). 2. On this, cf. Peter Ludes, Kulturtransferund transkulturelle Prozesse: Ameriknnisierung und Europiiisierung des Femsehprogramms in der Bundesrepublik (Heidelberg: Universitiit Siegen, 1991). 3. Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (New York: Schocken 1975). 4. Miriam Hansen, "America, Paris, the Alps: Kracauer (and Benjamin) on Cinema and Modernity," in Leo Charney, Vanessa Schwartz, eds., Cinema and the Invention ofModem Life. (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1995), 362-402.

5 Cf. Victoria de Grazia, "Amerikanisierung und wechselnde Leitbilder der Konsum-Modeme (consumer-modernity) in Europa," in Europiiische Konsumgeschichte: Zur Gesell-

121 schafts-und Kulturgeschichte des Konsums (18.-20.Jahrhundert) ed. H. Siegrist et al. (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997), 113. 6. See David Morley and Kevin Robbins, Spaces ofIdentity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London: Routledge, 1995). 7. See: Monika Bernold and Andrea Ellmeier, "Addressing the Public: Consumption, Television and the Family in Austria in the 1950s and 1960s," in Buy this Book: Studies in Advertising and Consumption, ed. MicaNava, et al. (London: Routledge, 1997), 191-207. 8. Neues Osterreich, 24 July 1962. 9.Ibid. 10. The image of the Lippizaner was and is a dominant sign for "national" identiy in Austria. It was even attributed to the ORF itself by its most important director, Gerd Bacher, when he named the ORF "Medienlippizaner" recently. For television and nation building processes in Austria, see Monika Bernold, M. "'Der Medienlippizaner' Fernsehen in Osterreich nach 1955." Medien & Zeit 4 (2000): 47-53. 11. Gunter Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Ober die Seele imZeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution. vol.1. (Miinchen: 1988), 195. 12. BeverleHouston, "Viewing Television: TheMetapsychology ofEndless Consumption," Quarterly Review of Film Studies 9.3 (1984): 183-195. 13. len Ang, Desperately Seeking the Audience (London: Routledge, 1991). 14. Ernst Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates: Osterreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (Wien: Uberreuter, 1994), 427ff. 15. S. Matti, "Die regulierte Demokratie. Eine kritische Bilanz der sozialen Systeme in Osterreich," in Inventur 45155: Osterreich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik, ed. Wolfgang Kos and Georg Rigele (Wien: Sonderzahl, 1996), 350. 16. Gerhard Freund, Femsehen in Osterreich (Wien: Verlag des Osterreichischen Geweikschaftsbundes, 1962), 6. 17. Heinz Bude, "Vorwort," in WestbindungenAmerika inder Bundesrepublik, ed. Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 8ff. 18. G. Schmid, "Die 'Falschen' Fuffziger: Kulturpolitische Tend~!1Zf!n der flinfziger Jahre," in Literatur der Nachkriegszeit und der fonfziger Jahre in Osterreich, ed. Friedbert Aspetsberger, et al. (Wien: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984), 7-23. 19. See Franz Rest, "Die Explosion der Bilder: Entwicklung der Programmstrukturen des Osterreichischen Fernsehens," inMedienkultur in Osterreich, ed. Hans Heinz Fabris and Kurt Luger (Wien: Bohlau, 1988), 265-316. 20. See Monika Bernold, "ein paar osterreich - von den 'Leitners' zu 'Wiinsch dir was': Mediale Bausteine der Zweiten Republik," Osterreichsche ZeitschriftforGeschichtswissenschaft4 (1996): 517-533. 21. See Ann Marlin Karl, As Seen on 1V: The V~.sual Culture ofEveryday Life in the 1950s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1994). 22. See Marie Gillespie, Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change (London: Routledge, 1995). 23. For Austria, see Martina Bose and Cornelia Kogoj, "Minderheiten und elektronische Medien in 6sterreich," SWS-Rundschau, 42.3 (2002).

Hollywood Movies, Significant Events and the Alteration of Styles and Worldviews Anna Schober A photograph from 1940 (see Figure 1) reveals several illuminated faces inside a dark cinema-hall: some of them look firmly, directly at the camera, some are turning themselves away and covering themselves protectively with their hands; yet others look astonished. Beside them are some who ignore the camera.

Figure 1: Opening night for the Nazi film Mutterliebe in the Apollo Cinema, Vienna 1940

Source: © Archiv Franz Graft Vienna.

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The photograph 1is in no way spectacular. It only attracts our attention because seeing people in photographs of cinema architecture is unusual; and here, those in it display also different kind of actions, including gazing and looking back. The different reactions of all these p~ople toward the camera indicate that this cinema space is not homogeneous and transparent, but broken up by all these people. There are not only different points of view and actions, but also obviously different feelings-shame, pride, ignorance-as well as different anxieties and wishes-to be recognized or hopefully not to be recognized-and diverse projections and attitudes. Henri Lerebvre2 has used the notion of "social space" to describe such a brokenness and involvement of space. In fact, this phrase refers precisely to this phenomenon-that in their everyday lives, people never deal with transparent and fully knowable spaces but instead with socially made spaces, which create social inclusion and exclusion and which are occupied by sensory phenomena, by desires and disavowals, and by products of the imagination such as plans and projections as well as by buildings, streets, and different kinds of people. Another photograph, from 1942, shows not the inside but the outside of a Viennese cinema of the time (See Figure 2). The entrance and the sidewalk outside the Astoria cinema in the Hernals district is lined by a huge queue ofpeople dressed in heavy coats and waiting for the beginning of a film, as well as some small children, one of them with a pedal scooter, playing with each other and with that what is happening in the queue.

Figure 2: The Astoria Cinema in the Hernals, 1942

Source: © Archiv Franz Graft Vienna.

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Similar to the space inside the cinema, the city is also thus simultaneously perceived, represented, and lived by different groups. Cinemas such as the Apollo or the Astoria appear as social spaces within the social space of the city-similar to a Russian doll.

Cinema, Modernity, and the History of Perception

Both cities and cinemas transformed themselves dramatically in the twentieth century: the cinema changed from the early traveling cinemas into the cinema theaters of the 1920s and 1930s, then into the fashionable single-screen cinemas of the 1950s, after that into the multi-screen cinemas of the 1980s and, last but not least, into the multiplex cinemas of the tum of the millennium. And the city of Vienna reshapes itself parallel to that from the multi-ethnic center of the Habsburg monarchy to the capital of a democratic welfare state close to the Iron Curtain, and from that to a tourist attraction and a center of European integration inside a globalized economy. These changes of both city and cinema did not occur independently; instead, they affected each other. The early cinema palaces emerged together with shopping streets in the 1920s when cities grew as a result of the rural exodus. Similarly, multiplex cinemas originated out of an event culture, which also shows itself in massive shopping malls as well as in a new festival culture and in changing leisure habits. In this way, modem and postmodern cities and the cinema are social spaces that are constantly transforming themselves. And in this process of transformation, modern and postrnodern cities and the cinema are bound together in a relationship of mutual need. Modernity can be described, as Hannah Arende put it, as being characterized by a break with tradition (a past transmitted as tradition) and a loss of authority (an authority which presents itself as tradition), which are irreparable. Change towards modernity thus not only concerns transformation in the social and economic structures of communities but also in the ways in which attention is formed and directed and in the forms performances of the self are staged. In this way, a cultural practice emerged in European cities during the second half of the nineteenth century that was no longer characterized by experience, but by events; not by an aura of things, but by the surprise of shock; not by announcement, but by information; and so forth. Such a slow and asynchronous change can be read as a human's transition to a being in the world without the symbolic ties of tradition, without the so-called "rescuing shores." This means that where members of traditional societies aimed for salvation and justification through integration in pre-existing orders, the subjects of modernity are thrown back upon themselves in dealing with the impossibilities of modem life.

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This newly emerging modem being in the world is dominated by the city, or rather by a kind of "cityfabric,'o4 that is, a entirety of appearances that manifest the dominance of the city over the country. And the cinema plays an important role in this newly emerging modem regime of perceiving and of treating the self and others. City streets and cinema halls require, for instance, the same form of fragmented and distracted perception described, for example, by Georg Simmel in his essay "Die Grofistiidte und das Seelenleben. " 5 According to his analysis, the modem metropolis has triggered an "intensified nervous life" with a quick and incessant change of inner and outer imprints as well as a compression of varying images, a rough gap inside what can be reached by the gaze and the unexpectedness of intruding impressions. In this "intensified, nervous life" movie images and lived life very often quote each other. We see models of our innermost experiences in films and we are, from time to time, overwhelmed by the wish to perceive ordinary, daily life in the form of a movie sequence. The American film critic Jonathan Rosenbaum remembers the latter, for example, in his writings about the "moving place" of his grandfather's cinema: I wanted there to be singing and music in the air in the same way, and with the same intensity, that I wanted there to be a movie of my life, a movie that moved where I moved, showed what I saw, spoke and sang what I heard, said or wanted to hear. Like a camera, I would record this movie faithfully as I walked down the hall from my room to the front of the house or back; a movie that didn't stop, that recorded whatever I saw from the toilet or in the bathroom mirror and carried everything that happened to me along with a softly flowing rhythm, each thing leading to another. 6 Part of this break towards modernity with which Hannah Arendt is so concerned is, thus, the transformation of perception and attention towards something one can describe as a "persistent eventful subjectivized seeing," which becomes dominant and separated from the other senses.7 This modem form of perception implies that our gaze is attentive for all that is visible; it is at the same time distracted and fixed upon details and allies itself to a creed that no longer refers to a God outside the world but to the tangible things in the world. In other words, we believe what we see. In this way a "postulate of visibility" emerges, 8 which means that in order to get the believer going, that is, to motivate and enthuse us as believer, something has to be visible, showable, and placed in the light of day in order to be regarded as true. One can say that in modernity visibility is valorized in an enhanced way and this shows itself in the opulent mise-enscene for the eye one encounters in the new shopping centers, as well as in new sciences such as criminology, ethnography, or psychiatry, which also try to discover a "truth" behind visible signs. In this way, a desire for vivid

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and visible evidence emerges as well as a new practice which can be called a "gastronomy of seeing." It is this desire and this practice that are soon incorporated by the new emerging institutions such as the panorama and the cinema. The cinema is thus a specialized space of the visual; this is one quality that binds this space strongly to the newly emerging modern cities. On the other hand, as early as the 1920s the cinema spaces were characterized by the fact that "inner pictures" were privileged over any exterior ones. The long, attention-holding feature films of the movie palaces of the time sent the spectator on his or her own perception process as described, for example, by the psycho-physician Hugo Miinsterberg as early as 1916.9 The cinema can thus be described as a very "private public space," that is, as a space where we find ourselves withdrawn from the demands of the modem cities, where we can reflect upon ourselves and experience our inner worlds "behind" the pictures we see on the screen. It seems that the modem-and even the postrnodem--city needs the cinema--even in an always different shape-as a sort of "place of public retreat." There is also an orientation towards the inside in the architectural construction of cinemas, which in Vienna, with a few exceptions, are not very expressive on the outside. Cinemas match the design of the streets, the shop windows, and the house facades, but unfold themselves generously inside in the form of extensive rooms, mirrors, and lights. In these inner spaces of the cinemas we find a room for "inter-esse", a room of interest: in the theater we as viewers sit in numbered seats, which demand immobility, concentration, and composure. Here I can't move or taste, but I can hear, and, above all, I can see and imagine and experience myself. When the lights go down and the screen lights up, the space mutates into the private sphere. In its culturally dominant form, the cinema is, thus, a space dedicated to the onlooker and not so much to the actor; it is a space for identification and sympathy and not so much a room for expressing oneself, for discussion and collective action. In the modem but also the postrnodem city, a lot of new tools threaten people's bodies in the workplaces; in the traffic on the streets and in new means of transportation such as the train, streetcars, buses, cars, and airplanes; in the news, transmitted via media such as radio, film, television, and the Internet; via new hygiene products and modified food. All these implements together form a kind of training for our bodies, a training that produces a specific kind of interplay of "three bodies." 10 This training forms an always insufficiently perceived body of our daily routine, a new ideal body, and desired and feared demonstrative bodies, from which we learn, for example, what movements, dress, and gestures are desired and which ones are ridiculous or even ugly. Cinema is a place inside cities where one can find and study a whole range of interesting demonstrative

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bodies. Here a viewer can dream of ideal bodies and forget our own never perfect, perceived bodies. In doing so, we are traveling away from these imperfect bodies of daily life to the demonstrative bodies of the stars and to ideal fantasized bodies. Names of cinemas, such as the "Apollo," "Kosmos," "Eden," "Urania," and so forth, seem fitting for a space set apart, above and beyond the city, a space where it is possible to confront the impossibilities of modern life through self-mirroring, imagination, and fantasy. But here, in this travel from our non-perfect perceived bodies to the-loved and hated--demonstrative bodies of the movie stars and to our ideal bodies, from time to time, something else also happens-something which then binds us again finnly into cinema spaces.

Two Letters and How They Differ

The above-described modern form of perception, which connects the cinema experience with the happenings of the street, is also characterized by what have been called "significant events." Two letters, written by the same person-Elfriede M.-and sent within one week of each other, demonstrate how these "significant events" operate in history. Elfriede M. sent these two letters after a public appeal that a colleague and I placed in a local newspaper, the Wiener Bezirksbliitter, in which we asked for reports on memories of the cinema in Vienna between the 1940s and the 1970s. 11 The first of these two letters was relatively unspectacular. In terms of the stories it told, the form of narration it used, its length, and the formality with which the author addressed us as scholarly writers, it was in no way different from other letters we received on this subject from other people. In this first letter, Elfriede told us, for example, about her relationship to some of her screen idols, about her frequent cinema visits with her female friends to escape the boredom of postwar Vienna, or about some especially interesting minor events in Viennese cinemas of the time. The second letter, sent on 23 August 2000, however, was all the more unusual and is, therefore, quoted here in full: I am sending you an addendum to my letter of August 20. It seems important to me to tell you that there was one cinema visit which was decisive in my life. I have listed several cinemas. that no longer exist, for example the Dianaldno ... Krugerkino ... Lowenkino ... the old Gartenbaukino ... All this was harmless amusement. But there was one film, or rather, a documentary that has influenced my life in a decisive way. It was in the years 1958/59 in the Kreuzkino in the Wollzeile. I no longer remember how I ended up watching that film. I can only explain it to myself that I just wanted to go to the movies, that I didn't look very carefully and that I associated the title, "Judgement at Nuremberg," with a crime film. What I got to see was a documentary which shocked me deeply. Until then I did not have the slightest idea of all the horrible

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occurrences during the "thousand-year Reich." I remember that I left the cinema in a daze and walked to my "local" pub, the "Schmauswaberl," and that nobody could talk to me for a long time. I was in a state of shock. Neither at home, nor in school, nor anywhere else had I heard, read or seen what then hit me, completely unprepared, in the cinema. After that, as I got only evasive answers to my questions or was told "it's all not true," from that moment on I was interested and taken up with everything regarding this issue. That cinema visit sensitized me for life. With best regards Elfriede M. 12

I am not concerned here with the accuracy of all the details in this story, for example with the fact that Elfriede M. mentions the years 1958/59 whereas Judgment at Nuremberg (directed by Stanley Kramer and featuring Spencer Tracy, Burt Lancaster, Richard Widmark, Marlene Dietrich, Maximilian Schell, Judy Garland, Montgomery Clift, and William Shatner), to which she is probably referring, was made in 1961. Perhaps she is referring instead to a documentary about the Nuremberg Trial that was made in 1957 and then shown in several German and Austrian cinemas. These are not the first questions I pose at these two letters. In this second letter, it is important that Elfriede M. is trying to describe for us an event of perception, a materiality involved in a certain way of seeing. In doing so, she is not so much describing the event as circumscribing it. She is writing more about the moments before, when she did not yet know what was awaiting her, and about the moments after, when she was dazed and in shock because of this event. Her description shows that language is not well suited to grasping such an event. Other attempts, which have been set out by political theorists or psychologists, note this same inadequacy oflanguage. They demonstrate that, even if it is necessary to find a word as a kind of placeholder, language offers only inadequate, provisional names for that event. Walter Benjamin, for example, has used the term "shock" and tried to locate this event specifically in the period of modernity. 13 Roland Barthes 14 coined the terms "punctum" and "third meaning," and Slavojzek, following the theories of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, introduced the term mana, the empty signifier with no determinate meaning, since it signifies only the presence of meaning as such" 15 to describe a surprising en46 Noteworthy is Valie Export's use here of the phrase "determine independently." Self-determination was one of the key concepts developed by Western feminism at this time, whereby the body and sexuality became the central setting for the appropriation of the female self. 47 Austrian activists in the new women's movement also developed contents, conceptual and rhetorical patterns, as well as symbols for their critique within the framework of this international discourse. It is widely recognized that Actionism itself- the idea of conceiving of art as a deedwas an import from the United States. Beyond the field of art, the provocative act and the playful transgression of the traditional gender order's habituated rules of how things should be seen, conceived, and judged would have an impact on the feminist movement as a whole. To be sure, there were distinctive national varieties of feminist actionism. Historian Ernst Hanisch claims to be able to identify a typically Austrian nuance in the actions, performances, and happenings that took place in the context of the domestic cultural rebellion of the 1968 movement: its "baroque trait of theatricality."~8 His hypothesis is lent considerable support by feminist public events such as the one staged in 1972 in conjunction with the demand for the decriminalization of abortion: actionist artist Erika Mis donned a prison inmate's uniform and got inside a cage mounted on wheels that was then towed through one of Vienna's busiest shopping streets by three men dressed as a Catholic priest, a physician and an attorney, who thus symbolized all those custodians of the law that regulated women's right of self-determination over their own bodies.

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In a symbolic act of self-liberation and the autonomy to which women aspired, she ended the performance by demolishing the cage with an axe. 49 Throughout the western world, it was one particular issue within the discourse of women's self-detemrination of their bodies that incited women to mobilize- the "self-determination of their own bellies," as this was phrased at the time in the discussion of the question of abortion. The "National Organization ofWomen," founded in 1966 in the United States, made the liberalization of abortion laws a central part of its platform. Spectacular actions in European countries followed. 50 The Austrian media and Austrian politicians followed with great interest the discussion abroad. According to the analysis of Austrian historian Maria Mesner, "[a]mong some, it evoked fears of the decline of the state founded on the rule oflaw, whereas others saw it as a highly 'effective challenge to the lawmakers. "'51 The battle against Paragraph 144 that banned abortion in Austria also became a crystallization point for an autonomous Austrian women's movement that had made an organizational break with its roots in the youth and student organizations of the labor movement. References to traditionally socialist and Marxist lines of thinking were paired with feminist thought in the early 1970s.52 This also manifested itself in the bookcases of the female activists in those days-the author of this paper among them. Her shelf included such works as August Bebel' s Die Frau und der Sozialismus; Rosa Luxemburg's speeches, articles and letters;53 the elaborations of Hungarian Marxist Agnes Heller in Ober die Zukunft der Beziehungen zwischen den Geschlechtem,.s4 key feminist texts by American authors, such as Betty Friedan's Der Weiblichkeitswahn oder die Selbstbefreiung der Frau, 55 Kate Millet's Sexus und Herrschaft. Die TyranneidesMannes in unsererGesellschaft,56 and Shulamith Firestone's Frauenbefreiung und sexuelle Revolution, 57 all of which had recently been translated into German; Margaret Mead's work of comparative cultural anthropology Mann und Weib: Das Verhiiltnis der Geschlechter in einer sich wandelnden Welt; 58 the French classic of emancipation Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau 59 by Simone de Beauvoir; and Alice Schwarzer's pioneering work of German feminism Der "kleine Unterschied" und seine groften Folgen: Frauen uber sich- Beginn einer Befreiung .60 To this list can be added the frrst issues of the magazine AUF - Aktion Unabhiingiger Frauen, which became ·the public voice of feminism in Austria in 1974.61 The Austrian variant of the feminist women's movement of the 1970s thus was active within the larger scope of the international women's movement, which in turn carried on to a certain extent traditions of thought from the African-American civil rights movement in the United States.62 These activists had developed the approach of linking demands for withheld rights to intensive debate about and confrontation with the

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discrimination they faced, and indeed among the very people who were impacted by it. Slogans calling for independent thinking, independent living, and independent politics liberated from established normality and linked the process of calling defmitional monopolies into question with the strategy of empowerment. In the second half of the 1970s, a young Cheryl Benard-today a prominent feminist social scientist-made a determined effort to bring this discourse to Austria. 63 Perhaps it was her biographical background extending back to the occupation era-she was born in 1953 in New Orleans to an Austrian mother and an American father-that predestined her to accomplish this transfer. In her postdoctoral dissertation "Die geschlossene Gesellschaft und ihre Rebellen," she used the examples of the civil rights movement in the United States and the international women's movement to investigate the emergence of oppositional discourses. In doing so, she focused on the question of how these groups and movements "from their position on society's periphery form a consciousness of themselves and an identity on the level of the symbolic and argumentational construction of an image of society and a worldview.'>M Large segments of the new women's movement initially constituted themselves as sensitivity and learning groups, ascribing a central role to the question of the interrelationship between changing oneself and changing society. In this orientation, American models had an especially strong impact on the women's movement. 65 The strategy of consciousness-raising that had been developed in the United States as well as self-help strategies spread like wildfire through Europe and also reached the women's scene in Austria. Spontaneously formed (provided there was at least one woman serving as the driving force), ad hoc groups sprang up even in small Austrian communities to discuss publications like Getting Clear, 66 a therapy handbook for women by Anne Kent Rush, Our Bodies, Ourselves,67 a handbook published by the Boston Women's Health Collective that pointed out numerous interconnections between body and subjectivity, and Nancy Friday's My Mother, My Self. 68 By the late 1970s, the highly distinctive feminist subculture that could be found from San Francisco to London, from Amsterdam to Frankfurt had also made its way to Vienna and Austria as a whole; it featured specific symbols and outfits, women's musical groups, women's associations, women's magazines, women's cafes, women's bookshops, and a wide variety of projects providing advice and support by women for women. The stimuli and thought provoking critiques provided by feminism accelerated the erosion of the traditional gender order in Austria. Nevertheless, the new women's movement here never became a mass movement, as was the case at a certain point in other countries. There were numerous reasons for that.

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The emergence of new social movements did indeed signal a gradual transformation of the Second Republic's political culture, but there was still scant acceptance of strategies aimed at what is called "civil society" in the Anglo-American discussion. The monopoly of the traditional political parties and interest group lobbies was still too strong for that. 69 This also held true for the position of the Catholic Church, even if religious teachings like the indissolubility of marriage had declined in significance. When, in 1975, the Social Democratic government established the legislative basis for the so-called "term solution" that provided for the possibility of terminating a pregnancy during the first trimester, the result was a massive conflict with the Catholic Church, which, in the words of Ernst Hanisch, escalated "to the brink of a new Kulturkampf." 70 Moreover, it was primarily in urban areas that the new lifestyles and norms initially took hold. In an empirical study conducted in 1973, twothirds offemale respondents characterized the average Austrian womanand thus, ultimately, themselves to a certain extent-as "rather conservative and mindful of tradition .•m At the same time, this poll also made it clear that the majority of women surveyed certainly were aware "that the social position of women had shifted in recent decades in the direction of progressive emancipation" and that this process had not yet been completed.72 These contradictions and instances of parallel developments not proceeding simultaneously could be largely neutralized by the reform policies that the Social Democratic governments pursued in the 1970s. Thus, women's issues were "nationalized" in a manner of speaking. 73 Family law reform and the introduction of a limited "term solution" to the abortion issue-which came about only in the wake of massive pressure from women both in and outside of the party-meant the fulfillment of old Social Democratic demands for equal rights going back to the First Republic. The autonomous women's movement in Austria was organizationally and quantitatively small but nevertheless could not be overlooked; indeed, Social Democratic policymaking in the late 1970s reacted to it "with a significant increase in the quota of women present at various decisionmaking levels of the political system."74 Other featured initiatives were those to enhance the compatibility of family and career. Sweden with its "welfare state social concept characterized by greater gender equality"75 emerged strongly in the 1970s as the contemporary model society for Social Democratic policymaking on women's issues. The Decade of the Woman proclaimed by the United Nations and the first UN-sponsored International Women's Conference in Mexico constituted in the years after 1975 an additional framework of international impetus to Social Democratic policymaking on women's

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issues, and led to the publication of a first official Report on the Situation of Women in Austria.16 Finally, a brieflook at the new feminist women's movement in Austria is warranted. As with political scientist Anton Pelinka' s assessment of the student movement, one may regard it-as discussed above-in many respects as a precursor of"intemationalization in the form of de-Austrification. " 77 Significant in this respect is the fact that this new women's movement did not initially link up in any way with specifically Austrian lines of tradition going back to the first women's movement. Austrofascism, National Socialism, and the narrowly focused intellectual climate of the postwar years meant that women were cut off from these resources or that it was evidently unimaginable that there could be models for a process of breaking out of the traditional gender order even in Austria itself. The task of bringing these traditions to light became the responsibility of historical women's studies, a scholarly discipline that has been establishing itself at Austrian universities since the 1980s.

Notes

1. Kaspar Maase, "Amerikanisierung von unten: Demonstrative Vulgaritlit und kulturelle Hegemonie in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre," in Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. AlfLiitke et al (Stuttgart: Franz SteinerVerlag, 1996), 292. 2. Alf Li.idtke, et al., Introduction, in Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. AlfLi.idtke et al. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), 15. 3. Kaspar Maase, "Amerikanisierung von unten," 292. 4. See Peter Freese, "Amerika- Traum und Alptraum," in West Wind: Die Amerikanisierung Europas, ed. Bernd Polster (Cologne: DuMont, 1995), 8. 5. Alf Li.idtke et al., Introduction, 14. 6. Cited in: IFKnow, ed. Intemationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissenschaften, Vienna, 2/2002:30. 7. See Ernst Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates: Osterreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (Wien: Ueberreuter, 1994), 413, 427-430. 8. Ingrid Bauer, "'DieAmis, dieAusliinderund wir.' Zur Erfahrung und Konstruktion von 'Eigenem' und 'Fremdem' nachdemZweiten Weltkrieg,"in Walz-Migration-Besatzung: historische Szenarien des Eigenen und des Fremden, ed. Ingrid Bauer, Sylvia Hahn, and Josef Ehmer (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2002), 208. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 240 and 267. On this subject, also see UrsulaJ. Neumayr, Osterreichbilder: Eine Analyse nationaler Identifikationsmuster am Beginn der Zweiten Republik (Diplomarbeit, University of Salzburg, 1995), 46. 11. See Ingrid Bauer, "Austria's Prestige Dragged into the Dirt? The 'GI-Brides' and Postwar Austrian Society (1945-1955)," Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 4, Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future, ed. Giinter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick,NJ:

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Transaction, 1998), 41-51; Ingrid Bauer, "'TheGI-Bride': On the (De)Construction of an Austrian Post-war Stereotype," in When the War was Over: Women, War and Peace in Europe, 1940-1956, ed. ClaireDuchen and IreneBandhauer-Schoffmann (London: Leicester UP, 2000), 222-232. 12. On this subject, see also Ernst Hanisch, "Reaustrifizierung in der Zweiten Republik und das Problem eines osterreichischen Nationalismus," in Gestorte 1dentitdten? Eine Zwischenbilanz der ZweitenRepublik, ed. Lutz Musner et al. (lnnsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2001). 13. See Ingrid Bauer, "Die Amis, die Auslander und wir," 209; Ingrid Bauer, "Austria's Prestige Dragged into the Dirt?", 41-55. 14. Ingrid Bauer, "Die Amis, die Auslander und wir," 241. 15. Ingrid Bauer, "Zwischen Goldhauber streichen und Telehaus-Modernisierung der Geschlechterverhiiltnisse im landlichen Raum," in Salzburg: zwischen Globalisierung und Goldhaube, ed. Ernst Hanisch and Robert Kriechbaumer (Wien: Bohlau, 1997), 216. 16. Karin M. Schmidlechner, "Youth Cultures in the 1950s," Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. Gunter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), 128. 17. Ibid. 18. See Marina Fischer-Kowalski and Elisabeth Wiesbauer, "'Friichterln' und was sie fruchten. Gedanken und Notizen zur Jugendkulturin den fiinfziger Jahren," in Die "wilden" fonfziger Jahre, ed. Gerhard Jagschitz and Klaus Dieter Mulley (St. POlten, Vienna: Verlag Niederosterreichisches Pressehaus, 1985), 76. 19. Die Frau, 6 (1950), 49: cover. 20. Brigitte Lichtenberger-Fenz, "'Frauenarbeit mehrt den Wohlstand': Frauen und das 'Wirtschaftswunder' der 50er Jahre," Zeitgeschichte 19 (July/August 1992): 228. 21. This could also have had a totally pragmatic background. In the Socialist Party of Austria in the early 1950s, the proportion ofhousewives among female party members was almost 50 percent even in the metropolis of Vienna, and in the western provinces of Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg, it clearly exceeded 60 percent. See Ingrid Bauer, ''Eine Chronologie abnehmender weiblicher Bescheidenheit: Die Sozialdemokratische Frauenorganisation in Salzburg: Nicht nur ein Fallbeispiel," in Beharrlichkeit, Anpassung und Widerstand. Die Sozialdemokratische Frauenorganisation und ausgewiihlte Bereiche sozialdemokratischer Frauenpolitik, 1945-1990, ed. Karl-Renner-lnstitut (Vienna: Renner-Institut, 1993), 365. 22. Ingrid Bauer, "Frauen, Manner, Beziehungen ... Sozialgeschichte der Geschlechterverhiiltnisse in der Zweiten Republik," in 194511955: Entwicklungslinien der Zweiten Republik, Sonderband der lnformationen zur Politischen Bildung, ed. Johann Burger, Elisabeth Morawek (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1995), 108. 23. BrigitteLichtenberger-Fenz, "Gleichberechtigung-Was nun? Zur sozialdemokratischen Frauenrechtsdebatte in den J ahren des 'Wirtschaftswimders,'" in Zeitgeschichte 23 (November/December 1996): 351. 24. Ingrid Bauer, "Von den Tugenden der Weiblichkeit: Zur geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung in der Politik," in Osterreich in den Fiinfzigern, ed. Thomas Albrich et al. (lnnsbruck: StudienVerlag, 1995), 45. 25. See Ingrid Bauer, "Von den Tugenden der Weiblichkeit," 45-4 7; Monika Bernold and AndreaEllmeier, ''Konsum, Politik und Geschlecht. Zur 'Feminisierung' von Offentlichkeit als Strategie und Paradoxon," in Europdische Konsumgeschichte: ZurGesellschafts- und

183 Kulturgeschichte des Konsums ( 18. his 20. Jahrhundert), ed. Hannes Siegrist et al. (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997), 464-465. 26. BrigitteLichtenberger-Fenz, "Gleichberechtigung- Was nun?", 343; see Erika Thurner, Nationale 1dentitiit & Geschlecht in Osterreich nach 1945 (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2000), 78-79. 27. "Wie macht' s die amerikanische Hausfrau," Frauenarbeit Frauenrecht 4 ( 1955) 5/6: 13-14. 28. See "Schnelle Ktiche," Die Frau 12 (1956) 18: 11; "In einer halben Stunde," Die Frau 13 (1957) 22: 6. 29. "Hausfrauenparadies Amerika," Die Frau 14 (1948). Also see Beatrix Bechtel, "Beistrich einftigen, and streichen Emmy Freundlich," in "Die Partei hat mich nie enttiiuscht... ": Osterreichische Sozialdemokratinnen, ed. Edith Prost (Vienna: Verlag ftir Gesellschaftskritik, 1989), 123. 30. See Erika Thurner, Nationale Identitiit & Geschlecht in Osterreich nach 1945, 79. 31. Brigitte, Lichtenberger-Fenz, "Gleichberechtigung- Was nun?", 343. 32. The proportion of the budget that had to be expended for foodstuffs was considered an indicator of the standard of living and prosperity. According to estimates made at the time by the International Labor Board, a proportion of one-third would have been reasonable. On this subject, see Die Frau, 12 (1956), 6: 23. 33. Gerda Kautsky-Brunn, "Der Haushalt im Wandel der Zeiten," Die Frau 10 (1954) 39: 4. 34. Brigitte, Lichtenberger-Fenz, "Gleichberechtigung- Was nun?", 349. 35. Ingrid Bauer, ''Eine Chronologie abnehmender weiblicher Bescheidenheit," 273; Brigitte Lichtenberger-Fenz, "Gleichberechtigung- Was nun?", 347. 36. Monika Bernold and Andrea Ellmeier, "Konsum, Politik und Geschlecht," 464. 37. Monika Bemold and Andrea Ellmeier, "Zur Geschichte des Sendens. Konsum und Politik im Osterreich der 50er- und 60er Jahre," abridged version of the above-named study in cultural studies,forschungsberichte 07, ed. Bundesministerium fiir Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur (July 2000): 4. 38. Ibid., 4. 39. Dora Horvath, Bitte recht weiblich! Frauenleitbilder in der deutschen Zeitschrift "Brigitte" 1949-1982 (ZUrich: Chronos, 2000), 19. 40. Wolfgang Kos, Eigenheim Osterreich: Zu Politik, Kultur undAlltag nach 1945 (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 1994), 154. 41. Gerd Ruge, "Die verlorene Unschuld. Nachrichten aus einem anderen Amerika," in Westwind: die Amerikanisierung Europas, ed. Bernd Polster (Cologne: DuMont, 1995), 19. 42. Ibid., 22. 43. V alie Export's first perfomances and films were even made "in the two or three years before the intellectual hiatus of 1968 occurred in many countries"- Christina von Braun, "Why show something that can be seen?," in Split: Reality VALIE EXPORT, ed. Museum Modemer Kunst Stiftung Ludwig (Vienna: Springer, 1997), 199. 44. See Helena Reckitt, ed., Art and Feminism (Berlin: Phaidon, 2001), 64. 45. Christina von Braun, "Why show something that can be seen?", 200. 46. Valie Export quoted in Reckitt, Art and Feminism, 64.

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47. See Yasmine Ergas, "Der Feminismus der Siebziger Jahre," in Geschichte der Frauen, ed. Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot; volume 5: 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Francoise Thebaud (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), 567. 48. EmstHanisch,Miinnlichkeiten: Eine andere Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: Bohlau, forthcoming). 49. For an account of this actionist performance, see Maria Mesner, Frauensache? Zur Auseinandersetzung um den Schwangerschaftsabbruch in Osterreich (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1994), 206. 50. Yasmine Ergas, "Der Feminismus der Siebziger Jahre," 577; Gisela Bock, Frauen in der europiiischen Geschichte: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), 320. 51. Maria Mesner, Frauensache? Zur Auseinandersetzung um den Schwangerschaftsabbruch in Osterreich, 180. 52. Liane Pluntz, 'Uffentlichkeit fiir Frauen. Die Herstellung von Frauenoffentlichkeit am Beispiel der Untersuchung der 'AUF. Eine Frauenzeitschrift,"' Ph.D. diss., University of Salzburg, 1983; Maria Mesner, Frauensache? Zur Auseinandersetzung umdenSchwangerschaftsabbruch in Oste"eich, 206. 53. Frederik Hetmann, ed.,RosaLuxemburg: EinLeben.fiirdie Freiheit. Reden, Schriften, Briefe. Ein Lesebuch (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1980). 54. Agnes Heller, ''iiber die Zukunft der Beziehungen zwischen den Geschlechtern," in Die neue Linke in Ungarn, ed. Andras Hegedus (Berlin: Merve-Verlag, 1974). 55. Betty Friedan, Der Weiblichkeitswahn oderdie Selbstbefreiung der Frau (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1970); original American edition: The Feminine Mystique, 1963. 56. Kate Millett, Sexus undHerrschaft. Die Tyrannei des Mannes in unsererGesellschaft (Munich: Desch, 1971); original American edition: Sexual Politics, 1970. 57. Shulamith Firestone, Frauenbefreiung und sexuelle Revolution (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1975); original American edition: The Dialectic ofSex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, 1970. 58. Margaret Mead, Mann und Weib: Das Verhiiltnis der Geschlechter in einer sich wandelnden Welt (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1963); original American edition: Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World, 1950. 59. Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1968); original French edition: Le Deuxieme Sexe, 1949. 60. Alice Schwarzer, Der "ldeine Unterschied" ein.fiigen und seine grojJen Folgen. Frauen iiber sich-Beginn einer Befreiung (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1975). 61. See Liane Pluntz, "Qffentlichkeit fiir Frauen." 62. For a general discussion of the roots of international feminism, see Ergas, "Der Feminismus der siebziger Jahre," 572. 63. Since the late 1970s in cooperation with Edith Schlaffer, she has been providing ''women and educable men"-as the jacket text of her numerous publications puts it-with analyses of the interrelationship of the genders. 64. Cheryl Benard, Die geschlossene Gesellschaft und ihre Rebellen: Die internationale Frauenbewegung und die Schwarze Bewegung in den USA (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 198l),jacket text. 65. See Gisela Bock, Frauen in der europiiischen Geschichte, 318.

185 66. Anne Kent Rush, Getting Clear: Ein Therapie-Handbuchfiir Frauen (Munich: Verlag Frauenoffensive, 1977); original American edition: 1973. 67. Unser Korper, unser Leben, ed. Boston Women's Health Book Collective (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1980); original American edition: Our Bodies, Ourselves, 1976. 68. Nancy Friday, Wie meine Mutter (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1979); original American edition: My Mother My Self, 1977. 69. See Maria Mesner, Frauensache? Zur Auseinandersetvmg um den Schwangerschaftsabbruch in Osterreich, 207; Anton Pelinka, "Die Studentenbewegung der 60er Jahre in Osterreich," in Wendepunkte und Kontinuitiiten. Ziisuren der demok.ratischen Entwicklung in derosterreichischen Geschichte, Sonderband der lriformlltionenzur Politischen Bildung, ed. Forum Politische Bildung (lnnsbruck: StudienVerlag, 1998), 148.

70. Ernst Hanisch, Miinnlichkeiten. Eine andere Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, forthcoming. 71. Cited in Anneliese Gidl,/n einer (un)weiblichen Gesellschaft? Eine Analyse der osterreichischen Printmedien 1945-1995 (lnnsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2001), 65. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid., 55. 74. Anton Pelinka, "Die Studentenbewegung der 60er Jahre in Osterreich," 152. 75. Erika Thurner, Nationale ldentitiit & Geschlecht in Osterreich nach 1945, 79. 76. Bericht iiber die Situation der Frau in Osterreich. Frauenbericht 1975, ed. Bundeskanzleramt (Vienna: 1975). 77. Anton Pelinka, "Die Studentenbewegung der 60er Jahre in Osterreich," 157.

From Patriarchy to New Fatherhood? Private Life and the Process of Modernization in Twentieth-Century Austria Reinhard Sieder The processes of transformation and modernization undergone by Austrian society in the twentieth century naturally include the sphere of private life as wel1. 1 Older, Marxist-inspired theoretical models tended to explain private life as being determined by the public sphere and by society. By now, however, scholars no longer tend to believe that the dynamics of modernization depend exclusively on economics or changes in the modes and means of production. Instead, they have come to recognize the private sphere as being one of the major impulses towards the modernization of society, even ifprivate life is connected in practice to the world of work and society at large in thousands of different ways. Thus, the private sphere is neither completely autonomous nor wholly determined by society. It is seen as a "desire machine"2 in and of itself, producing consumer wants, desires for love and protection, and the wish for relaxation, retreat, and so on. Yet, this "machine" also produces desires that society either forbids or looks down upon, such as the urge to be lazy, aggressive, violent, or sometimes even perverted. These illegitimate desires remain, for the most, part hidden within the private sphere, and one might even say that private life fulfils the function of keeping these illegitimate desires away from the public. From this psychoanalytically oriented point of view, it's clear that the private sphere brings forth desires which create a cumulative energy helping to drive "culture" in general and the "modernization" of society in particular. Many of these desires are produced within the family circle, where individuals long to be fed and protected from their first days onwards - a longing that remains throughout one's life. However, as Sigmund Freud3 and, subsequently, Herbert Marcuse4 and others have made clear, it is precisely desires such as these which will eventually be destroyed in the very place that gave birth to them, namely in the family. In practice, this only serves to strengthen further the deeply rooted belief in the potential of the parent-child unit, or-to use the conventional

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term-family life. The myth of the family (Familienmythos) is still very much at work in contemporary society, even in a world where separations and divorces have increased dramatically since the 1970s. The text that follows asks a series of questions relating to private life in Austria during the twentieth century: What changes are observable? What effect have these changes in private life had on state and society in Austria? Have people become mere "puppets on the string" oflate modem or postmodern capitalism? Or does the experience of being a responsible mother or father contribute to a further process of modernization? Finally, what does modernization mean when applied to private life? Given the scholarship oflngrid Bauer,5 who focuses on the politics of Austrian women, this article focuses on the situation faced by Austrian men: How have male patterns of being "private" altered in a rapidly changing economy? How have men shaped or reshaped their private careers as husbands and fathers? How have they dealt with the divorce and separation that has become so common since the 1970s? How have they rebuilt their private lives in second and third marriages (or similar relationships) as step-fathers or non-resident fathers? Lastly, how does all this influence the intra-psychic model, the societal discourse and the cultural design of masculinity? Beginning with some general remarks on the long-term development of men in family life during the twentieth century, the article develops the background for the second part of the article that discusses more recent trends. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a new conception of masculinity arose that called men back into the home. Intellectuals from different ideological backgrounds, social workers, psychologists, social democratic politicians, as well as Catholic priests, youth movement representatives and many others coincided in proclaiming a relatively new cultural ideal of masculinity, which may be called "masculine domesticity" (or "domesticated masculinity"). Contrary to what is often assumed in general histories, this model was even accepted by militant Austrian fascists and the National Socialists in the 1920s and 1930s, at the same time as they were preparing themselves physically and mentally to conquer Europe. For these groups, too, the myth of the "German family" always included the father playing with and educating his _children, even if his fatherly activities were clearly limited in scope and time. For the man, staying at home primarily meant rest and relaxation, and secondarily, performing the role of husband and father. Despite the extensive ideological differences in society, this was part of the widely accepted model of the modern, child-centered, companionate marriage, characterized by romantic love, sexual fulfillment, mutual respect, and emotional satisfaction.6

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Certainly, this was primarily the guiding ideal for middle-class families and fathers, but we should not overlook the fact that skilled workers who participated in the modernization of the working class fully accepted the concept as well. Modernizing the working class by means of better education in kindergartens and schools, and by new forms ofhousing and social control was part of the general modernization process in the 1920s and 1930s, mainly conducted by Social Democrats, first of all in the city government of Vienna. The famous Viennese municipal housing schemes (Gemeindebauten) of the interwar period were clearly aimed at integrating working-class men into family life, in the first instance by emphasizing their role in bringing up children. 7 Increased leisure opportunities gave millions ofAustrian men the time and the ability to focus on intensified fathering. Fathers started to engage in sports and hobbies and to monitor their children's progress in school. In the upper reaches of the working class at least, this intensified fathering included influencing the political and ideological orientation of their offspring, much as it did for many sections of the middle-classes. Many of those who took part in the discourse on male domestication knew very well that this new concept clashed with certain aspects of patriarchal authority which had predominated during the nineteenth century. 8 Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this new discourse of fathering did not challenge the basic gender-based division oflabor and the still dominant ideology of the male breadwinner. When fathers participated in family life and child rearing, they did so from a definitely patriarchal standpoint. Fathers were still those who fed the family, represented it in public, and knew best what would help it to succeed; they left no room for doubt that wives and mothers were expected to do the daily domestic work. Up to the 1950s and 1960s, this late patriarchal model profoundly influenced the private sphere among the upper working class as well as the enlarged middle classes, having survived the severe crisis of family life during and after the Second World War, when thousands of men were away at the front orin prisoner-of-war camps. It even survived the postwar crisis resulting from the displacement of thousands of families, or the return of men who had been physically or mentally disabled. In the subsequent Cold War era, the companionable father constituted. an important line of defense-both in terms of discourse on the family as well as in actual practice-against social disorder, sexual anxieties, and fears of being misled by political movements. To live as a responsible father became an important marker of social class, and above all, of being "middle class." This was an image propagated in countless advertisements, magazines, movies, and the like. For example, the male breadwinner worked hard in order to earn the money for the family's first car, and the small family was advertised with a proudly posing father, mother and child alongside the

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commercial slogan: Dad has done it! ( "Vati hat's geschafft! ").9 Although the middle class father did not play much of a part in household affairs-except when washing the new car-both his self-esteem and his concept of manliness included being a responsible father. However, two factors limited this first step in the emancipation of men from earlier patriarchal models. First, advertisers helped maintain more traditional images of men, as they began to invade family life and reshape its desires, promising the good life to those who bought a new car, or the first refrigerator, radio, or television. "Culture as a whole way of life" 10 changed to a Fordist type of (re)production, a point argued elsewhere: 11 people were now eager to work and earn money in order to take part in the expanding consumer society. Yet earning a better living kept men away from their spouses and children and prevented them from realizing the new ideal of forming a companionate family in all aspects of everyday life. Second, the leisure time of both fathers and children was increasingly reshaped in opposite directions, which tended to separate, rather than unite, the different generations-a process that is still going on today. From roughly 1910 onward, diverse youth cultures started to pull children away from home, where parents tried to maintain control over them. Some of these youth cultures consciously set themselves against the generation of their parents. Moreover, fathers often constituted the first line of the ideological enemy, because they represented society and societal establishment, or-as thepsychoanalystJacquesLacan has putit-"the law." 12 For example, on the eve of World War I, the youth movement (Jugendbewegung) in Austria claimed that fathers could no longer meet the hopes and expectations of their sons and daughters. Similarly, some local youth cultures opposed the Nazi regime in Austria (1938-45) mainly for cultural reasons: they did not want to be trained as soldiers and be subjected to party discipline. Distrusting Nazi promises and visions of a better life, youth sub-cultures preferred music, dance, and fashion emanating from the United States, such as swing, movies, and elegant clothing. 13 By the late 1950s, the so-called "semi-strong ones" (Halbstarken) again identified with popular music (rock 'n' roll) from the United States, though this time they wore much more casual clothes (denim jeans and leather). In the 1960s and 1970s, the new mass universities and the expansion of the whole education system produced a new generation of young rebeis who confronted their fathers with the legacy of the immediate past by asking, ''What did you do in the war?" Youthful protest was reinforced by the fact that, for the first time in history, the pictures of a dirty war in the Far Eas-Vietnam-were broadcast directly into millions of family homes in Austria. Subsequent to the 1970s, the segmentation of leisure, the prolongation of schooling (accompanied by crises and deficiencies in the education system), and different patterns of consu-merism among children and parents have allied

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to growing ideological and aesthetic cleavages between fathers and children. In short, conflict between the generations has during the twentieth century become more and more of a cultural conflict, with certain moral and political issues at its core. 14 The main factor contributing to intensified fathering has been the movement of mothers into the labor force (not women in general, but mothers who have returned to wage earning after childbirth). 15 This trend can also be related to the expansion of the education system and the job market, especially in public services and in trade and consumer industries. These changes have, in fact, refashioned the nature of generative fathering and have involved men more and more in the day-to-day care of children. At the same time, this has opened up a new battlefield between spouses because these developments certainly did not take place without male resistance. Men often adapt only belatedly to the new circumstances of family life, although disputes over caring for children are still a major reason for many marital conflicts, which frequently lead to discontent and the greater readiness of women to contemplate divorce. 16 Since the early 1970s, feminist discourse has challenged head-on the traditional assumption that childcare is primarily a maternal responsibility. Women activists have called for better childcare options, improved kindergartens, more flexible working hours, and the expansion of both maternity and paternity leave. Indeed, government policy has, to some extent, met many of these demands, thus bringing into the mainstream a series of ideas first raised by a comparatively small, elitist feminist movement. While there are differing positions in feminist discourse as regards the importance of fathers in children's upbringing, feminism has generally strengthened the view that fathers should engage in looking after children. Many fathers have indeed started to do just that, and a dense network of discourses by politicians, journalists, psychologists, psychotherapists, social workers, teachers, kindergarten workers, radio and television programs, and so forth continues to encourage men to follow this course of action. When comparing the last three decades with the first half of the first century, it's clear that fathers now tend to provide more intimacy than authority, and they offer more time as a confidant than as a teacher or instructor. Also, they spend more time with their babies and young children, while seemingly enjoying fewer opportunities to spend time with older children, who have increasingly preferred the company of their peers. In short, fathers are continuing to explore new models of generative fathering, which are reshaping assumptions about family life and male identity or manliness. Despite the social reality of many fathers drifting

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away from their children, others have come to find a-historically speaking-new place in family life. 17 This raises the question as to what the recent increase in separations and divorces means. Will the increase in family break-ups lead to the early demise of a post-patriarchal family model that has barely had a chance to establish itself properly? What happens to men who have adapted themselves to active "fatherwork" after divorce or remarriage? As in other Western societies, divorce and marital separation rates in Austria have steadily increased since the 1970s. Today, a third of all marriages end in divorce, while in large cities such as Vienna, the figure has already reached 50 percent. Certainly, some of these break-ups involve childless couples, but in a great many cases, children and fatherhood are involved. In what follows, the experience of non-resident fathers after divorce and the experience of fathers who have either remarried or entered anew long-term relationship are examined. In particular, we must ask three specific questions: 1. Which are the main obstacles to the continuance of generative fathering once separation or divorce has taken place? 2. What happens to fatherhood after remarriage? , 3. Lastly, what would help fathers to deal more effectively with the problems they face? Addressing these issues draws on the results of a major, interdisciplinary research project, involving psychotherapists, social workers, and historians, which has just recently been completed. 18 The project looked at families in Austria, which differ from the normative family model in two key respects: either one parent, usually the father, is absent from the household of his (former) spouse and his children, or one of the adults in the new household is not a biological parent of at least one of the children. This latter family type is usually called a "step-family." In the former instance, if the father is non-resident and does not hold custody over the children-as occurs most often-the type of fathering common before divorce becomes very limited, or sometimes, eliminated altogether. Thus, redefinition of the self and fatherhood roles are highly probable in both cases. At this point, a crucial question arises: What prompts fathers to disengage from their children? Usually, fathers are pushed out of the old family household due to a combination of reasons: geographical mobility; new family responsibilities, which often accompany remarriage; or the outcome oflegal decisions regarding custody, visiting rights, and child support. Our research suggests that many fathers-indeed, the majority-experience considerable emotional pain, frustration, anger, and confusion about how to maintain meaningful relationships with their children after divorce. For

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a minority, the predominant feeling after separation or divorce is one of relief, and these men welcome their new freedom from parental responsibility. It is worth taking note of the legal framework that regulates responsibility for children in Austria. Aside from the courts, which have the power to make basic decisions on issues such as accommodation, financial support, and the like, there is also a special "Youth Bureau" (Jugendamt) in every administrative district. This office adjudicates on the nature of the visiting rights accorded to the non-resident parent (usually, the father), if the separated couple has been unable to reach an agreement on access to the child. In most cases (about 90 percent), mothers retain custody of their children after divorce. When the separated couple still has significant conflict in their relationship, it will be up to the Youth Bureau to determine the extent of the father's active involvement in maintaining a relationship with his children. The outcome of this process clearly affects men's selfesteem and their definition of their role as fathers, quite apart from the emotional difficulties involved. Our findings concur with those of other scholars who suggest that joint legal custody, which has recently been established in Austria, gives men the conviction that society acknowledges their importance to their children. Court orders and societal discourses that fail to recognize the value of fathers only constitute obstacles, which discourage closer involvement by fathers and ultimately disadvantage the children, too. The visitation rights granted to many fathers seem to diminish the possibilities for active fatherwork and contribute to the loss of fatherhood. Aside from the obstacles to paternal involvement resulting from court or Youth Bureau decisions, mothers sometimes block contact between nonresident fathers and children. There are many different reasons for this protective gate-keeping on the part of mothers. Some women simply want to avoid further conflicts with their former spouses or partners, though such a stance can also prove counterproductive. In other words, conflicts can be prolonged by parents fighting over the father's desire to see his child(ren) on a regular basis and to play a meaningful part in education. Our study actually brought to light the fact that conflicts between former spouses tend to continue when the question of access to the chi)d(ren) becomes paramount. On the other hand, our research showed that continuing parenting by both partners after separation or divorce can help to de-escalate conflict and to rebuild a post-marital relationship, which in the most successful cases may well lead to lasting and genuine friendship. To move on to the second of the two categories identified above, we now have to ask, what happens to fathers and children after men remarry? Generally speaking, fatherhood becomes even more complicated (in the sense of more challenging) when remarriage occurs. Again, men have to

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redefine themselves in order to incorporate a new identity, because they commence a different experience as father in a new (second, third, and so on) family. Or, alternatively, they are now obliged to perform an additional role as a "step-father" or "fatherly friend" to their new partner's child(ren). Frequently, men also have to cope with the fact that their own children, still living in the former household, receive a new step-father or fatherly friend too. Thus, we seem to be witnessing the emergence of a novel kind of competition between men concerning the intensity and quality of their performance as fathers. As a comparatively widespread phenomenon, the relationship between step-fathers (or fatherly friends) and biological fathers is historically new. For this reason, the roles involved are more weakly codified in cultural terms, a situation that frequently leads to insecurity and uncertainty. However, the main advantage is that the lack of norms and codes allows greater freedom for all family members to shape motherhood, fatherhood and even childhood. There is no space here to go into further detail, suffice it to say that the complex social and communicative system created when two former spouses with children remarry-the so-called "binuclear family system" 19-may increase the opportunities for social and affective leaming 20 (for adults as well as children). Needless to say, however, this system does not always function well, and children can be drawn into conflicts between the former spouses. The degree of exchange concerning experiences, mutual help, and advice depends on the level and form of communication between the members of the two new family units (including fathers and step-fathers). During our research, we came across a number of successfully communicating binuclear family systems, as well as several which used the child as a kind of "bouncing ball" between the former spouses. In some cases, the child may be exploited as a "spy" in the ongoing conflict between the expartners, with the result that the new family units end up hating and attacking each other. Whatever the outcome, though, children are always at the very center of these forms of communication. In all second and third family groups, including step-families, we discovered strong desires for change, greater awareness of potential dangers, and generally speaking, greater preparedness to counteract problematic developments. However, this by no means guarantees that the actors concerneq are always successful in dealing with the difficulties that arise. If we turn now to the more specific question of"step-fathers," as they are known according to the old terminology, we are dealing here with men who have-metaphorically speaking-come into an existing family via the side-entrance. At the start of their step-fatherly career, at least, they lack both the knowledge and understanding of pre-existing patterns of social interaction and family life. Adjustment to life as part of a new couple hence occurs simultaneously with the learning process involved in the parenting

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of children. Our study shows that step-fathers require a substantial amount of time to adapt successfully to the new family. Moreover, they have to do this with relatively little help and guidance from society as a whole. The norms and standards surrounding step-fathering are far from clear, and there is much more confusion about how to be a parent than in the case of first families and biological fathers. A particularly relevant question is, therefore, whether men who have already been fathers in other families manage the transition process better. Here, one of the most surprising outcomes of our research was that previous experience as a biological parent does not translate well to step-parenting. That is to say, parenting behavior that worked well in first-marriage families is less effective when applied to step-families. Indeed, not only is it often ineffective, it can also prove quite destructive. If, for example, the step-father wishes to supervise and discipline his step-child(ren) in a way similar to that used before with his biological children, he will frequently run into trouble. In cases where the step-children are already older than ten or twelve years, it seems that assuming the role of "fatherly friend" is a more appropriate and effective strategy, at least if the child has a regular relationship with the non-resident father. 21 Many step-fathers learn this quite quickly; others do not. Overall, we concluded that both divorced non-resident fathers and step-fathers do best when they define themselves in ways that consciously differ from the models adopted and practiced in first-marriage families. For non-resident fathers, this initially means working out a pattern of contact with children that makes the relationship predictable and stable, while still being responsive to the alterations which have taken place and to the evolving situation in the years after separation and divorce. As mentioned above, a prerequisite for such a relationship is that former spouses have overcome their conflicts and grievances. This, of course, takes time, because those concerned must learn to differentiate their previous relationship as spouses from the ongoing relationship as parents. One of the main reasons that this proves to be so difficult in practice is that, for many parents, their spouse-relationship was shaped from the outset by the demands of the "third partner," the child who was born in the name oflove and received so much attention from the former couple. In some cases, short-term intervention by psychotherapists may be helpful. For couples with high levels of conflict in their relationship and those with a history of domestic violence, far more intensive and extensive intervention is required in order to promote greater (re-)involvement on the father's part. Only in certain extreme instances does it seem that a complete, permanent break in contact is necessary. Lastly, we should also remember that the late twentieth century saw a process of pluralization not just with respect to family types, but also as regards parenthood. The greater frequency of parenthood by mothers and

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fathers has been accompanied by an increase in what has come to be known as single-parenthood. For example, in the year 2000, nearly 25 percent of all Austrian families with children were single-parent families, and it is predicted that this proportion will rise to no less than a third by the year 2030.22 Certainly, these recent trends have produced more diverse experiences of childhood as well. More and more children grow up in more than one family. They learn to know and to cope with different family styles. In addition, ever more children are obliged to commute between the newly built family units of their separated biological parents, where they meet their parents' new partners (their step-parents), as well as their step-siblings, half-siblings, and new relatives. In conclusion, let us return to the questions raised by the processes of modernization, westernization, and globalization undergone by Austrian society in the twentieth century. Most of the changes described in the second part of this article have taken place since the 1960s, a period when Austria experienced the further development of democracy and a period of unprecedented prosperity. Social actors had acquired greater opportunities and space in which to fulfil their various desires. In short, they have witnessed and produced a further stage in the process of modernization: greater individual autonomy and more space to shape private life has been accompanied by increasing fluidity and the growing need for repeated reshaping. In today' s Austrian society, it is something of a cultural maxim that an unhappy marriage or relationship can-and perhaps, should-be ended. Obviously, this is no sense a fully autonomous decision, because hegemonic discourse forces the individual to behave in such a way or at leastto bear the possibility in mind. Or, to put it another way, the individual is always confronted with a societal script. 23 Increased readiness for change is, of course, not just true of private life. In the economic sphere too, more frequent changes and uncertain working relationships have become normal (short-term contracts, greater job mobility, periods of unemployment, rapid increases in self-employment and so forth). The greater willingness to undertake change in family life coincides with these parallel processes in the economy, and similar developments can be observed in political behavior as well. More and more people nowadays are going to ~:equire a social skill that previous generations did not possess to the same extent, namely the competence to dissolve and to rebuild stable family arrangements. The increased preparedness to dissolve a marriage or a fixed living arrangement with a partner, change one's place of residence, take up with a new partner, form a new household, and reshape fatherhood and motherhood are all seen as ways of increasing the individual's autonomy. Yet autonomy is a tricky thing because it brings with it less reliability. As is the case in the economic and political field, the individual sees his or her status as "a fixed partner"

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increasingly being called into question. The revocability of life-decisions--except those of having children-has become something of a strategic maxim although the desire for stable and safe relationships continues to exist. In short, this comprises the double-edged process of individualization, which is an integral part of modernization in the western mode. At a crucial stage in that process, namely in the early 1970s, the famous American sociologist Peter L. Berger (who was originally born in Austria) wrote that the private life-course was increasingly understood as a migration through social worlds and the gradual realization of a range of possibilities. 24 This assessment has clearly gained validity since Berger frrst noted it. Personal identity has become more reflexive and individuated. Personal autonomy and individual rights have not only become key discursive terms, they have also become accepted moral imperatives. As in all western societies, the greatest maxim for Austrians has come to be to plan and shape one's life as "freely" as possible. The illusion that the power to do so is in the hands of the individual appears to make bearable and worthwhile all the complications and frustrations, as well as the physical, emotional, and material costs that constitute the price for the breaks and new starts in private life.

Notes

1. Here, I am referring to changes in private life, which has developed in Western Europe over a "longue duree" of two to three hundred years. I define "private life" as that which is not in the workplace and is outside the public sphere. "Private life," thus, refers primarily to the sphere of personal relationships as a system of interaction and communication by which bodily, social, psychic, intellectual, and emotional competences and abilities are produced and re-produced. Taken together, "private life" constitutes an area of "human capital" or human resources which is essential for society as a whole.

2. See Gille Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Antiodipus. Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 7-63. ff.

3. Sigmund Freud,Das Unbehagen in der Kultur(1930), in Sigmund FreudStudienausgabe vol.IX, 192-270. 4. HerbertMarcuse, Eros and Civilization (1957), German: Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft. Ein philosophischer Beitrag zu Sigmund Freud (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979).

5. See her article in this volume. 6. See Reinhard Sieder, "Besitz und Begehren, Erbe lfnd Eltemgliick. Farnilien in Deutschland und Osterreich," in Geschichte der Familie, vol. 4, Das 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Andre Burguiere, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Martine Segalen, Frailr;oise Zonabend (Frankfort: Campus Verlag, 1998), 210-84. 7. Gottfried Pirhofer and Reinhard Sieder, "Zur Konstitution der Arbeiterfarnilie im Roten Wien. Farnilienpolitik, Kulturreform, Alltag und Asthetik," in Historische Familienforschung, eds. MichaelMitterauer and Reinhard Sieder (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 326-68.

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8. See, for instance, Otto Felix Kanitz, Das proletarische Kind in der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft(Frankfurt: 1970); Max Adler, Neue Menschen (Berlin 1926); Kurt Kerlow-LOwenstein, Das Kind als Triiger der werdenden Gesellschaft (Wien 1924); Anton Tesarek, Das Kind ist entdeckt (Wien 1933); and many others. 9. See the advertising "Vati hat's geschafft. Goggomobil- Stolz der Familie!", Funk und Film 14/10, 8.Miirz 1958,reproducedin, andquotedfromGerhardJagschitzandKlausDieter Mulley, Die "wilden "fonfziger Jahre. Gesellschaft, Fonnen und Gefiihle eines Jahrzehnts in Osterreich (St. Polten: Seiten, 1985), 206, Tafel18. 10. Raymond Williams, Culture (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981). 11. Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, and Emmerich Talos, "Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Republik," in Osterreich 1945-1995. Gesellschaft, Politik, Kultur, 2nd ed., eds. Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, and Emmerich Talos (Vienna: Verlag fiir Gesellschaftskritik 1996) 9-32. 12. Jacques Lac an, "Die Familie," in Schriften Jll, 3rd revised edition, (Weinheim 1994), 39-100. 13. Christian Gerbel, Alexander Mejstrik, and Reinhard Sieder, '"Die Schlurfs'. Verweigerung und Opposition von Wiener Arbeiterjugendlichen imDrittenReich," inNS-Herrschaft in Osterreich. Ein Handbuch, eds. Emmerich TaJos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer, Reinhard Sieder (Vienna: ovb shpt, 2000), 523-48. 14. Jiirgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativenHandelns, vol. 2, Zur Kritik derfunktionalistischen Vernunft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), 567-70. 15. As a historical survey, see Reinhard Sieder, Sozialgeschichte der Fami lie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1986). 16. See, for example, Norbert F. Schneider, "Woran scheitem Partnerschaften? Subjektive Trennungsgriinde und Belastungsfaktoren bei Ehepaaren und nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaften," in Zeitschrift for Soziologie 19 (1990): 458-70. 17. For this argument, see Reinhard Sieder, "Von Patriarchen und anderen Vatem. Manner in Familien nach Trennung und Scheidung," Osterreichische Zeitschriftfor Geschichtswissenschaften 11.3 (2000): 83-107. 18. Forschungsprojekt "Beziehungskulturenabseitsder Nonn. Eine qualitative kulturwissenschaftliche Studie zu Stieffamilien und Einelternfamilien, imAuftrag des Bundesministeriumsfiir Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur. Endbericht, typoscript Vienna 2002; the final report will be published in 2003. 19. Ahrons Constance R., "The Binuclear Family: Two Households, One Family," in Alternative Lifestyles 2 4 (1979): 499-515. 20. See Alexander Mitscherlich,Aufdem Weg zurvaterlosen Gesellschaft. Ideen zur Sozialpsychologie, 1Oth ed., (Munich 1973); Mitscherlich distinguishes three aspects or goals of education: intellectual, affective, and social competences; see pp. 26-45. 21. In this point we agree with scholars like Ingrid Friedl and Regine Maier-Aichen, Leben in Stieffamilien. Familiendynamik undAlltagsbewiiltigung in neuen F amilienkonstellationen, (Weinheim: Seiten Juventa, 1991 ); E. Mavis Hetherington and John Kelly, For Better or For Worse: Divorce Reconsidered (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 182. 22. Karl Schipfer, Familien in Zahlen.lnformationen zu Familien in Osterreich und der EU aufeinen Blick, Osterreichisches lnstitutfiir Familienforschung, (Vienna: Osterreichisches lnstitut fiir Familienforschung, 2001), 19. .

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23. See Reinhard Sieder, "Gesellschaft und Person: Geschichte und Biographie," in

Briichiges Leben. Biographien in sozialen Systemen, ed. Reinhard Sieder (Vienna 1999), 234-64.

24. Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner,Das Unbehagen inder Modernitiit, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1975), 70.

SECTION V: Politics/Political Culture Austria's Postwar Occupation, the Marshall Plan, and Secret Rearmament as "Westernizing Agents" 1945-1968 Gunter Bischof and Martin Kofler1 Introduction American writer Rosina Lippi's brilliant first novel Homestead is set in the Bregenzerwald, a Vorarlberg valley symbolizing traditional, hide-

The Austrian Ambassador in Washington Wilfried Platzer presents a gift to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower: a book covering the 10 years of the Marshall Plan and its Counterpart Funds in Austria.

bound, rural-agricultural life in Austria. Modernity arrives in this remote Alpine valley after the AnschluB in 1938 when the first cars begin to

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appear. Trucks bring the materials for building a textile manufacturing plant for an entrepreneur from the German Rhineland who looks for cheap labor in the fictional, remote Alpine village of Rosenau. This is the beginning of the industrialization of a valley that had hitherto strictly adhered to dairy farming and seasonal human labor. At the same time, a slick Mercedes Benz limousine arrives with a cool, uniformed Nazi driver from Vienna. He appears out of the blue and takes with him a pair of handicapped ("feeble") twins for "evaluation," one of them never to be seen again. 2 This haunting novel by a young American writer is a reminder that the modem era arrived in much of rural Austria with National Socialism's ''regressive modernization," a phrase used by Ernst Hanisch. "Modernization" meant improved economic production and productivity, industrialization and technological innovation, social urbanization and mobilization, cultural rationalization and secularization, and more political participation. While in most of these arenas National Socialism brought recognizable shifts in modernization, especially the incipient "deprovincialization" of Western Austria, it certainly did not come with more democratization and political participation. The great paradox is that the Nazis' "antiliberal modernization" also came with the mass murder of minorities and Jews. 3 Lippi is entirely correct to intimate this paradox in her novel. The Nazis arrive in the remote regions of Austria in automobiles to secretly carry their "euthanasia" program into the deepest provinces, thus initiating the process that ultimately would lead to mass slaughter of innocent Austrians and ultimately precipitate the genocide of the Jews. This is a reminder that the larger process of "modernization," which lurks behind "Westernization" and "Americanization," is a jagged road of uneven trends that came in fits and starts. In Austria, it slowly began to emerge after the "industrial revolution" (standing for technological innovation, industrialization, and dramatic economic growth) and the French and American Revolutions (signifying the advent of constitutional republican government and modern participatory democracy) in the course of the nineteenth century. But it arrived earlier in urban areas than in the countryside. As Lippi's Homestead and Ernst Hanisch's social history of twentieth century Austria suggest, in much of rural Western Austria it did not come before the advent of the National Socialist ''revofution" in the guise of ''regressive modernization." This process of modernizing Austria's more rural areas was further accelerated and completed during the mid-twentieth century's "second" quadripartite occupation of Austria: the one from 194555 following the Nazi occupation during World War II (1938-45). The quadripartite post-World War II occupation brought two opposite social, political, and economic systems into Austria that frequently threatened to partition the country along the ljnes of ideological division as they

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did in the case of Germany and Korea (and temporarily in Vietnam). In Eastern Austria, the Soviet Union clandestinely threatened to impose its system of total government economic control (by way of the Upravlenie sovetskim imushchestvom v Avstrii, or USIA, holding company, also known as the Administrative Authority for Soviet Property in Austria), but did not succeed with its intent to impose a new constitution that might have led Austria towards a people's democracy. In Western Austria, the American, British, and French occupation powers aimed at building a democratic Austria based on a reconstructed capitalist economy. The second Control Agreement (June 1946) gave the Austrian government-democratically elected in November 1945-additional powers with which to inch towards full sovereignty. The four-power occupation came as a result of the 1938 invasion and subsequent incorporation of Austria into Hitler's Third Reich. As a result of the increasingly close collaboration (voluntary and forced) between the two countries and the participation of many Austrians with the Nazi imperialist and genocidal practices, the Allies felt Austria needed to pay a price. In the process of constructing a politically democratic and economically capitalist Austria, the Western powers, during the initial phase of''total occupation," were as interested as the Soviets in rooting out the Nazi mentality in Austria. With the coming of the Cold War's ideological divisions, however, saving Austria from communism became a higher priority than cleansing the country of its fascist past. 4 In this maelstrom ofEast-West tensions, the processes of"Westernization" and "Americanization" began to emerge and form. 5 This article will not be able to analyze the "Westernization" of Austria in the sense that it failed to become a full-fledged member of the Western community during the occupation and thereafter by way of membership in theN orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC).6 As has been suggested elsewhere, this process took longer and did not progress in a parallel fashion. 7 With Austria's overpowering two-party system (the conservative People's Party OVP and the Social Democrat SPO) and long-term prevalence of"grand coalition" governments by these parties, Western-style liberal democracy and contentious public political discourse emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s.8 The following items are only a partial list of factors that militated against Austria fully joining the Western community of values ("westliehe Wertegemeinschajf') as it emerged in Western Europe after the war: first, the relative failure of deNazification (both Austrofascist and National Socialist) and the resultant mentality of authority-accepting control of the political parties and the state; second, a hidebound authoritarian top-down statism often referred to as the mentality of"Josephinism" in the Austrian political culture; third, a huge state industrial sector (as a result of gaining control over the "German assets" from the Austrian war economy) that fostered state economic

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planning; and fourth, a corporatist "chamber mentality" and "cartel mentality" in Austrian big business further solidified in the practical arrangements with labor and agriculture in complexities of the corporatist "social partnership" run by a few elites. Austria's post-1955 neutrality did not allow the country to join the fledgling Western defense and economic communities (NATO and the European Economic Community, or EEC/Common Market). Neutral Austria had to keep her distance from these Western communities with their common military defense agenda and free market values. Austria's "secret rearmament" and clandestine defense cooperation with the West as well as joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) helped bridge some of this distance. In the process of containing communism in Austria, the U.S. occupation power became increasingly predominant among the three Western occupation powers and influential over most of Austria's political, economic, and cultural life. America's postwar political and economic hegemony increased its influence in Austria (and around the world) and sparked "Americanization." How can one make this process transparent and visible? Can Americanization be measured? Did it meet resistance in Austria, or was it tempered by local "habits of the heart" and traditions? These questions are addressed here by looking at three case studies: first, U.S. support of the "un-American" grand coalition government as a yardstick for Austrian political stability in the struggle against communism; second, U.S. economic aid through the Marshall Plan as a means to make Austria economically viable and to build an American-style, free market, capitalist economy-even utilizing the Marshall Plan counterpart funds after 1955 as a lever to enforce the "Westernization" ofAustria; and third, the "secret rearmament" of (Western) Austria as an additional geostrategic containment strategy against domestic communist agitation and as a means for Austrian cooperation with Western defense efforts-a trend not discontinued by Austria's declaration of neutrality in 1955. The "Grand Coalition," Postwar Political Stability, and the Westernization of A.ustria Among the Western occupation powers in general and the Americans in particular, it was an article of faith that Austrian political stability could only be guaranteed by the cooperation of the two major Austrian political parties (OVP and SPO) in a coalition government. The Austrians and the Western allies drew lessons from the past: the trauma of the First Republic had been a constant conflict between the principal political camps of Christian Conservatives and Socialists, eventually causing violence and incipient civil war. This unbridgeable political antagonism led Engelbert

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DollfuB to get rid of parliament and utilize emergency decrees to rule in authoritarian fashion and impose a new dictatorial corporatist constitution. Austria's tum to authoritarianism also weakened its international position so remarkably that it would open the breach for Hitler's Germany to exert enormous leverage over Austria's foreign policy orientation and eventually force the AnschluB. In late 1954, the British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Wallinger summarized this marriage of convenience well: "This Austrian coalition is in turth, a strange phenomemon. Based upon groups who twenty years ago were shooting out their differences, it has been brought together by the three disparate catalysts of common suffering under Hitler, enforced collaboration under Allied occupation, and a combination ofhabit and achievement over nine years."9 Such a climate of mutual suspicion between the principal political Lager-the Communist Party was small and the German nationalist camp was tainted by its Nazi past-needed to be overcome after the war by way of new consensus politics. While before the war the enemy lurked on the right, after the war it threatened from the left. In the early years of the Cold War, the politics of anti-communism became Austria's official ideology of sorts and constituted the glue that held this strange marriage of convenience of two unlikely bedfellows together. It also fit the U.S. containment strategy regarding communism in Austria perfectly. The reliable anti-communism of the Grand Coalition also became the tool for Austria's increasing Western orientation. 10 The basic documents ofU.S. policy for Austria after the State Treaty and into the 1960s-NSC 5603 of 1956, NSC 6020 of 1960, and the State Department Guidelines for Austria of 1962 and 1964---dearly show Washington's determination not only to preserve an independent but, above all, a pro-western Austria. The overly dominant Grand Coalition was not perceived as a threat to liberal Western democracy, but as a decisive stabilizing factor with its support of the United States' containment strategy .11 The United States recognized the growing erosion of the Grand Coalition consensus in the early 1960s. The 1964 State Department Guidelines intimated a lessening of support for the Grand Coalition: even though "the coalition creates the conditions of internal stability which we desire," any of the major parties governing alone would not be !lgainst U.S. interests. Washington was not willing to make any compromises when it came to the continuation of the Grand Coalition as it had done so often during the occupation era. 12 After 1955, the American ambassadors in Vienna were not longer as influential as the high commissioners had been during the occupation. But Llewellyn Thompson (1952-1957), H. Freeman Matthews (1957-1962), and James Riddleberger (1962-1967) 13 were leading Washington career diplomats and maintained close supervision of Austrian foreign policy

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orientation. They made sure that its neutrality would be strictly proWestern and not veer off towards too much independence, even though Austria was losing its importance for the United States as a crucial Cold War battleground in Europe after the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. 14 The regular ambassadors' reports to Washington also continued to pay close attention to the dynamics of Austrian domestic politics. These keenly discerning American diplomats-after his years in Vienna Thompson was soon appointed ambassador to Moscow-kept informing the State Department in Washington about the different positions the conservatives and the socialists took towards European integration, neutrality, and defense policies. Washington highly appreciated Austria's "western" voting behavior in the United Nations in the 1960s. Austria's record was closer to U.S. voting patterns than to some of the NATO allies. As early as 1958, the National Security Council (NSC) had praised Austria's pro-Western neutrality policy in one of its regular reviews, ''The voting record of neutral Austria in the 12th UN General Assembly was more like that of the U.S. than that of any otherEuropeanmembercountry and compared favorably with records of many Latin American countries." The NSC added, "The vote of Austria, a neutral country recognized by the United States, was more favorable to U.S. interests in the matter [of blocking Red Chinese representation in the United Nations] than the votes of the two NATO allies, Norway and Denmark." 15 Seen from Washington, the "Austrian example" would serve as a model for non-aligned nations in the early 1960s. 16 Washington did not hesitate to display the muscle of its political and military hegemony and use its economic leverage if needed. Austria's reliable politics of anti-communism remained crucially important to Washington. Any perceived veering of Austrian politicians towards acting friendlier vis-a-vis the Soviet Union precipitated American counterpressures. When during his 1958 Moscow visit Chancellor Julius Raab thanked the U.S.S.R. for the State Treaty and protested against American overflights of Austrian air space during the Lebanon crisis, Ambassador Matthews castigated this "Soviet-Austrian honeymoon. " 17 In retaliation for Raabs' friendliness towards Moscow, for two years Matthews blocked Marshall Plan counterpart funds that were essential for Austrian economic reconstruction. 18 Raab' s silence during Khrushchev's rabble-rousing tour of Austria in 1960 caused Matthews further anguish. He officially protested Khrushchev's public critiques of the United States and finally forced the Austrians to speed up the signing of the Vienna Memorandum that provided for compensation of Anglo-American oil companies for properties lost in Austria due to the Nazi and Soviet occupations. These Western claims had been part of State Treaty negotiations from the beginning and were not settled in 1955. 19 Matthews' heavy-handed interventions and

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strong-arm tactics in his use of European Recovery Program (ERP) counterparts as leverage indicated his determination to act as post-occupation American "proconsul" in Austria. American tutelage continued and demanded that Austria would show its unalloyed Western orientation. The Grand Coalition was internally divided in its foreign policy orientation-a bipartisan foreign policy was hard to agree on.20 The conservative OVP chancellors, Raab and his successor Alfons Gorbach, were enamored with the traditional Austrian foreign policy paradigm of a bridge between East And West and wanted to initiate more friendly relations with the communist bloc. The Socialist and rigid anti-communist Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky adhered to the strong pro-American policy of the SPO that was forged during the occupation. Oliver Rathkolb notes that Kreisky kept pictures of all American presidents from Truman to Jimmy Carter in his living room but favored, above all, the picture of John F. Kennedy. Kreisky too got enamored with the modernity, attractiveness, and media savvy of the Kennedy presidency and fell for the Kennedy myth. 21 In March 1961, Kreisky confessed to an official of the U.S. embassy Vienna, "[l]fhe were in America, he had no doubt that he would be 'a most loyal partisan' of the new Administration."22 After his private conversations with Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk during the Vienna Summit in the summer of 1961, Kreisky' s strong sentiments towards America were further invigorated. During his lecture tour of the United States in October 1963, he touted "The New Image of America in Europe." This landed him an invitation from President Kennedy to the White House. 23 Given both the alliance problems Kennedy had with his NATO allies during the Berlin and Cuban crises and the challenges he faced from President Charles De Gaulle's "new designs" for Europe, 24 he welcomed Kreisky's devotion, coming from a neutral nation to boot.

American Aid, the Marshall Plan, and the Westernization of the Austrian Economy

The accelerated Westernization of both the Austrian economy and business during the postwar occupation decade is well known. It is less often appreciated that this process already started· when the Third Reich incorporated Austria hook, line, and sinker into its advanced war economy and pressed forward with its modernization program. Massive investment in heavy industry, raw materials, and basic infrastructure, especially in the Western part of the country, were not entirely wiped out by Allied bombing campaigns during the war and by the destruction wrought by invading Allied armies and senseless Nazi resistance in the final weeks of the war. The Austrian economy came outofWorld War ll strengthened, particularly once the bottlenecks in food, raw materials, and foreign currency as well

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as the dislocated transportation networks and industrial plants were overcome with the help of massive Western economic aid. Apart from some modest British support, "Western" aid was American assistance. It came in the critical immediate postwar years ( 1945-48) in the form of food and raw materials worth 500 million dollars, covering Austria's entire gaping trade deficit. With the Marshall Plan (1948-52) and post-Marshall Plan Mutual Security Agency (MSA) aid, the United States provided food, raw materials, machinery, and business know-how for Austria's economic reconstruction amounting to one billion dollars. Moreover, the U.S. grants generated so-called "counterpart funds" within Austria which became the most important source of investment capital for the reconstruction of the Austrian economy during the occupation decade-and for many years thereafter. 25 During the occupation decade, the Austrian economy dramatically reshifted its traditional focus from the East to the West. In the years between the two great wars, a third of Austria's trade was with its neighbors to the East. When the Iron Curtain rattled down after World War II, this trade became insignificant. Both of the superpowers restricted trade in numerous ways: the Soviets with their closed trading system, the United States with its COCOM-rules (the Paris-based "Coordinating Committee" strictly controlled the export of strategic goods to the communist bloc). For the duration of the Cold War, Austria lost much of its traditional economic "bridge function" between Western and East Central Europe. On top of this international phenomenon, Austria's industrial heartland shifted within the country from the Vienna basin westward. Hitler's massive investments in heavy industry in his "home province" of Upper Austria/Upper Danube initiated this trend. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Austria and massive economic exploitation and bleeding of its zone advanced the "ruralization" of Eastern Austria. In addition, more than 80 percent of Marshall Plan aid flowed into the three Western zones of occupation, thus accelerating the process of rapid industrialization and modernization of Western Austria. American Marshall planners were always highly mindful of treating Austria as an economic unit so as not to allow the country to be partitioned by the East-West conflict. Yet the net effect of Marshall aid was still the acceleration of the shift of Austrian economic preponderance from the Eastern to the Western Bundesliinder. 26 Next to these basic westward macro-economic shifts as a result of a new set of geopolitical realities after the war, how did the Marshall Plan "westernize" the Austrian economy? Austria was lucky to participate in the largesse of the European Recovery Program at all, especially since it had such far-reaching institutional and mental effects. Western European and Atlantic economic integration was a central strategy in the containment of communism, and Austria became part of it, at least for a while. Soviet

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dominance forced Austria's neighbors behind the Iron Curtain to reject participation in the ERP. These countries thus were set on the path to low economic growth and decline in productivity and prosperity. The Marshall Plan unintentionally produced the outcome of making the Iron Curtain a basic prosperity gradient running through Europe. The countries west of the Iron Curtain participating in the ERP saw massive economic growth and prosperity. Those under Soviet economic tutelage and exploitation experienced stagnation and increasing backwardness. The European Recovery Program set up a specific set of international institutions that dramatically accelerated the process of Western European economic integration by way of "Americanizing" the national actors.Z7 In the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in Paris, the OEEC (later to be followed by the Organization of European Cooperative Development, the OECD28 ), politicians and chief "Marshall planners" (ministry officials, economists, and the like) learned the art of bargaining not only to achieve national goals, but also to pursue the larger purpose of integrated Western European reconstruction and economic productivity (like today, when a new generation of technocrats among Austria's neighbors to the East have been "Westernized" in the course of the completed negotiations for European Union accession). The annual trips to the OEEC meetings in Paris (or to the Washington based Economic Cooperation Administration for the Marshall Plan) internationalized (Westernized and Americanized) mindsets and broke down parochial nationalist and autarchic preconceptions. Keen, young economists like Hans Seidel, or chief Austrian Marshall Plan technocrats like Hans Igler, stressed how much their Marshall Plan work initiated them into a more international 'Western" outlook. Among young economists, this meant following the American discourse and paradigms of economic thought (which paradoxically had been influenced by notable Viennese economists like Ludwig von Mises, Fritz Machlup, Gottfried von Haberler, or Joseph Schumpeter). 29 The European Payments Union, established in 1950 as part and parcel of the Marshall Plan, did the same for the "Western Europeanization" of the European Recovery Program. The parallel inititation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community completed this process of Western European econqmic integration.30 The fact that neutral Austria was not allowed to participate in these institutions slowed down the process of Western integration for Austria. The 1972 association agreement and the growing contacts with EEC in the 1980s prepared the way for Austrian membership in the European Union forty years after the signing of the Austrian treaty in a very different post-Cold War geopolitical environment. U.S. Marshall planners were less successful in "Americanizing" Austrians in their basic productivity and business philosophy. In the course

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of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Austrians developed their own set of corporate institutions that were top-heavy with government and chamber controls. After World War I, sailing through the troubled seas between the Scylla of Eastern European protectionism and the Charybdis of fascist, state-directed economies, Austria's corporatist traditions never allowed a Western-style free market economy to emerge fully. This did not change after World War II in spite of repeated and, at times, harsh pressure tactics by American Marshall planners to the contrary. When the first American ERP administrator in Vienna tried to force the Figl government to balance the budget by firing employees from the oversized state sector of government officials and railroad employees, the Austrian government refused to embark on such austerity measures and successfully resisted. 31 Similar "advice" from the Americans in the later Marshall Plan years was ignored as well. Austrian labor unions and lobbies successfully resisted the establishment of a "Productivity Center" to initiate American-style production techniques along with a philosophy of high productivity. Numerous business and union leaders along with government officials signed up to go on extensive tours in the United States. They visited U.S. factories and shop floors. Labor leaders in particular returned unconvinced that U.S.-style capitalism, with its anemic welfare system, had much to teach them. Studies on the Marshall Plan's productivity drives in Austria come to the conclusion that they only experienced moderate success in breaking down traditional Austrian statist thinking. 32 A concerted American effort to defeat the Austrian "chamber state" (Kammemstaat) and break down the numerous state directed controls in trade and investment failed as well. When the young U.S. embassy official Harry Johnstone wrote a massive 160-page analysis of the Austrian "chamber state" business mentality, it still did not lead to any basic economic reforms. When the Benton Amendment to the Mutual Security Program demanded economic reforms and liberalization to make American aid more productive, the Austrian Socialist Party dismissed such nostrums as "American economic dictates." The Austrian government refused to tolerate the strings attached to American economic aid. The issue of American interventionism could be utilized time and again to block liberalization. As long as American economic aid compensated Austria for the Soviet economic depredations its Eastern zone suffered, Washington was unable to seriously cut the flow of aid to Austria. In the age of containing communism, threatening aid cuts would have come at a price.33 The Austrians simply used their age-old methods of procrastinating rather than implementing the Americans' advice for liberalization and of waiting out the American aid nostrums in order to continue with their traditional corporatist ways after the occupation by setting up the "Paritiitische Kommission" and their much-vaunted "social partnership"-their

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high-priced social welfare system that guaranteed controlled, slow economic progress and social equality among all classes. The Austrian Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950s and early 1960s-no less dramatic than the German economic miracle--came in spite of these ''un-American" chamber institutions. On top of this, the tax benefits of the Raab-Kamitz policy and the Raab-Olah-Abkommen of 1961162 eased or even avoided class conflict between workers and employers, which had been so poignant in the interwar years. All this happened alongside the continuing trend of the Western orientation of Austrian (as noted above, the major trade links to Eastern Europe had been cut off or were strongly reduced after 1945). 34 This raises the question of the degree to which Austria's statist political economy affected the ongoing process of modernization that inevitably occurred with the Western Europeanization of Austria. Austria's rapid economic progress would have been slower without the Marshall Plan, or may have been more conflict-ridden as other examples of European economic policies show. What most people fail to realize is that the story of the Marhall Plan in Austria continues to this day. U.S. Ambassadors Thompson and Matthews used the release of counterpart funds to pressure Austria towards a Western political alignment. They also utilized the ERP-produced counterparts as a propaganda tool against the U.S.S.R. throughout the 1950s.35 In the early 1960s, Washington handed control over the counterpart funds to the Austrian government by transferring some 11 billion Austrian Schillings to the care of the Austrian government. Ambassador Matthews and Chancellor Raab signed the official agreement in March 1961. It was published in the Bundesgesetzblatt in July 196236 and led to the foundation of the Austrian ERP Fonds. This institution has been highly beneficial for Austria's continued economic growth. The ERP Fund provided the investment capital for innovation, modernization, and free market capitalist development in all-important economic sectors from industry and farming to tourism and technology. 37 The ERP Fund husbanded its reserves to ensure its continued existence to this day. 38 It thus can be seen as a stabilizing factor in the Austrian economy similar to the Grand Coalition in the polity. By the early 1960s, it became clear to the A~strians that neutrality presented a stumbling block on the road to Brussels and, therefore, to the completion of Austria's incorporation into the Western economic communities. 39 In Moscow's view, West Germany's NATO and European Economic Community membership prevented Austria from joining these Western European integrative bodies since it would have clashed with the spirit of Article 4 of the State Treaty which prohibited any future AnschluB. Nevertheless, Austrian trade continued to grow with West Germany and also Western Europe to the point where critics later spoke of a secret

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"economic AnschluB." Between late 1961 and early 1963, Vienna considered its membership in the newly-established European Free Trade Association as a step towards a closer cooperation with the EEC and was in the forefront of this association policy with the other neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden. Austria continued this policy on her own after General Charles de Gaulle vetoed Great Britain's accession to the EEC. Finally, as a result of the Austro-Italian tensions over a South Tyrol settlement, the Italian veto ended Austrian accession talks with Brussels. With the agreement on South Tyrol (Paket and Operationskalender) and de Gaulle's forced retirement in the late 1960s, the road was open for Great Britain's membership and the neutral countries' closer ties with the EEC in the early 1970s. Only after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union did Moscow's stranglehold on interpreting Austrian neutrality come to an end. The U.S.S.R. could no longer block Austria's full accession to the West. Austria finally joined the European Union (EU) in 1995 and at last became a full member of Western Europe's integrated economy. 40 It is fair to conclude that the Marshall Plan never "Americanized" the Austrian economy. Instead, with every step that it moved closer to full accession to EECIEU membership, Austria became steadily "Western Europeanized."

Austria's Secret Rearmament and the Americanization of the Austrian Military

After World War II, the United States emerged as the hegemonic power in the world arena. Its nuclear arsenal gave America military might unprecedented in history. 41 At the height of the "first" Cold War, the American military establishment in Washington and Vienna perceived Austria to be in a vital geopolitical location right on the dividing line through Europe-the Iron Curtain. "The strategic importance of Austria cannot be overemphasized," waxed General Geoffrey Keyes, the American High Commissioner in Austria, "The abandonment of the country to a possible Communistic [sic] infiltration or penetration would expose the south flank of Germany as well as the East flank of Switzerland to similar veiled aggression."42 America's national security ~tablishment judged the scenario ofdomestic communist subversion in Austria (with the help of the Soviet occupation power) far more threatening than direct Soviet military intervention. Indeed, not only did putative Austrian communist takeover plans for Vienna fall into the hands of Western intelligence, but the Austrian political leadership consistently fanned the fires of the "Communist takeover by subversion" threat scenario. Consequently, the communist labor unrest in September/October 1950, protesting a burdensome new wage-and-price agreement for workers, was presented to the world by the

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Viennese government as a "Communist putsch attempt" to seize power in Austria. Given the communist coups on Austria's borders in Hungary (1947) and Czechoslovakia (1948), this was not an unreasonable perception of a threat. Austria needed to be immunized against such a danger, American military planners insisted, and a military vacuum in the country should be prevented in order to secure the NATO flanks to the north and south. 43 Austria's secret rearmament by the West after World War IT-fuelled and largely paid for by Washington-can only be understood against this specter of communist takeover threats in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Whereas the Western powers started their first programs of rearming Austrian police with small arms and establishing mobile gendarmerie units ("alarm batallions") in the three Western zones after the Prague Coup in 1948, the process was vastly accelerated and intensified after the "Vienna putsch" in the fall of 1950. The "American Military Assistance" program treated Austria like a NATO ally and financed Austria's military buildup with Military Assistance Program (MAP) aid. During the second half of the occupation (1950-55), American military planners sped up Austria's "secret rearmament" with the help of a small group of Austrian military experts in a "conspiracy of silence." Only top cabinet members were informed about these machinations; most of the Austrian government officials, the parliament, and the public knew nothing. The Americandriven militarization ofWestem Austria could only follow in lockstep with the U.S.-driven militarization ofWestern Europe by keeping it hidden from the Soviets and the Austrian public. The key ingredient of American military assistance was the building of a "core" for a future Austrian Army (between 1952-55, some 6,500 policemen were trained and the "BGendarmarie" was launched). This "core" army had to be strong enough to resist domestic subversion after the Western powers left Austria, following the signing of the Austrian treaty. From this "core" the 57,000man Austrian Army had to be built. 44 As it turned out, the Austrian Army would never be tested with communist subversion attempts, but faced severe border crises in 1956 and 1968 during Moscow's military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Along with this secret build-up of a regular ~ustrian Army, other activities tried to prepare the Austrians to resist anticipated communist invasion or subversion. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hid sizable arms deposits throughout Western Austria for future guerillatype activities against communist invaders (the full extent of these "CIAWaffenlager' became only public knowledge in Austria in the mid-1990s). The British made preparations in their zone, too.lrregular Austrian guerilla fighters would be drawn from local populations to utilize these arms caches and resist invaders. Austrian politicians like Foreign Minister Karl Gruber

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rightly argued that Austria must never be invaded again as it had been in 1938 without even token local resistance being mounted. In their Western Austrian zone, the French initiated a vigorous program of their own, preparing the defense of the Tyrolese and Vorarlberg mountain passes and potential invasion routes against enemy incursion (the potential French "enemies" were probably not only Soviet Communists but also the Germans). If a future "Bataan"-type withdrawal would have to occur into the "alpine fortress" ("reduit alpine"), French and Austrian defenders would be ready to blow up all crucial bridges and mountain roads to stop invaders. The plans of these French preparations were handed over to the Austrian Army after 1955 to continue the concept of defending vital geostrategic locations and transverses in the Alps. 45 What has never been fully explored to this day is the extent of Austrian Army cooperation with NATO defense planning in Europe. 46 It has been noted above that in the latter part of the Austrian occupation, the three Western occupation zones of Austria were treated like a quasi-NATO ally. The importance of Austria to NATO planning can be clearly gauged in guarded language such as Austria's "existence as a nation friendly to the West serves as a valuable shield to NATO countries." Since the Allied agreements with the Soviets prevented Austria from participating in the NATO defense pact, the State Department concluded that Austria's "tolerance" of the interminable occupation of the country could be considered as "aiding in Western European defense" (emphasis added). 47 When President Eisenhower dispatched General Matthew Ridgeway as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to "energize NATO" and establish a credible deterrent, he actively negotiated with U.S Forces in Austria to secure the vulnerable southern flank. 48 After 1955, Austria's neutral status prohibited the country from joining the Western military community, including NATO. But Austria's strategic position in the heart of Europe continued to be vital for the West. Neutral Austria was squeezed between the two military Cold War blocs: NATO and theWarsaw Pact. Astride the Alps, it separated the southern and northern NATO flanks, thus remaining important in U.S. national security strategy for the defense of Western Europe after the occupation ended. Yet the Western powers only agreed to vacate Austria in the fall of 1955 after making sure that Austria's neutrality would be an armed one. The secret rearmament of the Western zones prior to 1955 had been undertaken for that pmpose. 49 In the initial post-occupation phase (1955/56), when the new Austrian Army was launched, the Americans handed it military hardware left by the occupation forces as well as MAP-stockpiles ("Stockpile A") stored in Italian port cities such as Leghorn since the early 1950s.50 The Austrian Army used this American equipment during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956.51

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Starting in 1956, the former PVP State Secretary for Internal Affairs Ferdinand Grafheaded the newly established Ministry of Defense. Yet his meager defense appropriations-and that of his successor Karl Schleinzer -never exceeded 3-4 percent of the Austrian budget. The Grand Coalition partner, the SPO, with its deep-seated trauma from the civil war of February 1934 when their party army was crushed by the regular Austrian Army, refused to increase the defense expenditures. The Social Democrats preferred building schools to barracks. 52 One might say that the Austrian Socialists practiced what President Eisenhower preached. He bemoaned in his famous "The Chance for Peace Speech" the social burdens of the nuclear arms race, "The cost of one modem heavy bomber is this: a modem brick school in more than thirty cities." 53 The Austrian government in 1960 spent 1.84 billion Schillings on defense; in 1961 it spent 1.91 billion; in 1962 it slightly increased defense spending to 2 billion; and in 1963 it forked out 1.99 billion ATS. 54 In 1960, defense spending amounted to 4.36 percent of the budget, in 1961, 4.02 percent; in 1962, 3.71 percent; and in 1963, 4.06 percent. 55 In 1962, Austrian defense expenditures amounted to 271 Schillings per capita. This was the third lowest per capita defense spending in Europe, slightly ahead of Spain and Portugal. Neutral Sweden spent eight times as much (2, 107 ATS), France seven times as much (1 ,890 ATS), and neutral Switzerland six times as much (1,440ATS). Unsurprisingly, the United States outspent its allies more than three times with 6,500 ATS spent per capita. 56 During the late occupation period, Western defense plans for Austria were constantly changing. But the basic plan of U.S. Forces Austria (USFA), along with U.S. Forces in Trieste and the skeleton staff of the British and French, was a "retardation mission" into Northern Italy. Giving up the Danube plains to Commmunist invaders and defending the mountainous ridges and valleys as a quasi "Alpine fortress" was part of defense planning fortheB-Gendarmerie. The irregular guerilla units were supposed to utilize the arms caches buried by the CIA in underground atttacks against the Soviet invaders. 57 Austrian defense policy after 1955 adopted and modified some of the ideas of the so-called "Schild-Schwert" theory. The basic defense plan for the late 1950s and 1960s aimed to stop an initial attack by the Warsaw Pact with border units ("shield"), to be complemented later by a strike of the armed forces of the regular Army ("sword"). With brand new modem materiel produced by Austrian industry, along with old stores of American weaponry, the Austrian army was supposed to slow down an (Eastern) attack without help (from the West) at least for a few hours or days. 58 American nuclear weapons presumably would take care of the rest. The Austrian military staff continued to maintain close ties with NATOanditsdefenseplanning. In late 1955, U.S. Ambassador Thompson

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was surprised when Italian Defense Minister Paolo Taviani informed him about talks between Rome and Vienna regarding common "defense planning." Taviani even shared details of NATO defense planning with his Austrian counterpart Graf. During 1955/56, Washington desired the continuation of Austrian rearmament both for the defense of the country and towards securing at least Western Austria air space between the two NATO flanks. The U.S. concept of "split neutrality" envisioned a proWestern neutrality beholden to Western defense planning.59 1n early 1957, Graf told the Americans about his contacts with West German and Italian officials, working towards closer cooperation "in regard to organization and equipment so it [the Austrian Army] will fit into the NATO pattern." Austria also parlayed with the Swiss on defense. 00 In mid-1958, Ambassador Matthews urged NATO Supreme Commander Lauris Norstad not to forget about Austria, disregarding its neutrality. 61 Taviani seems to have been quite a talkative defense minister. After concluding the Austrian Treaty, Taviani worried about the strategic implications of Austrian neutrality for Northern Italy. Vis-a-vis a British interlocutor, he had noted in May 1955 that if Austrian neutrality were violated in case of war, "we [NATO] should of course lose Vienna but we could save the mountain provinces by blocking the valleys with atomic bombs" (emphasis added). He then continued: "The Austrians could help at least with 'partisan' warfare." In the same conversation, Taviani had indicated that NATO "missiles" that were to "save" Austria would be stationed in the Dolomites south of the Austrian border at Pontebba and Ampezzo. The Italian government would deny that atomic bombs were involved, "since even if this should be the case the 'heads' would be stored separately on board ship."62 Focusing on the strategic importance of Austria, the United States kept a close eye on any developments regarding Viennese defense policies. Depending on specific situations, such as the Lebanon crisis in 1958 when U.S. planes needed to cross Austrian airspace on their way to the Near East, Washington's ambassadors intervened. In mid-1959, Matthews asked for and received the State Department's agreement to inform the Austrians of a possible end to Washington s continuing arms deliveries. During the extended negotiations between the SPO and the OVP.overthe formation of a new Coalition Government in 1959, rumors flew around Vienna about substantial cuts in Austrian defense spending. David Mcintosh observes, "Matthews's hard line reveals that the United States was sensitive to any developments which could hamper the Austrian military buildup." Only Austrian assurance of maintaining defense expenditures on the same level as in previous years eased the tensions with the disconcerted Americans.63 In early 1962, Otto Rosch, the Socialist state secretary in the Defense Ministry, announced in a speech that theWest threatened Austrian neutra-

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lity more significantly than the East: "Vom Westen drohen unserer Neutralitiit groj3ere Gefahren als vom Osten ... Auch militiirisch droht uns vom Westen die groj3ere Gefahr." Rosch referred to Austria being squeezed in between the NATO countries West Germany and Italy. With the exception of the communist papers, the Austrian press strongly criticized Rosch, who also happened to have a Nazi past. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk muffled the excitement in Vienna by telling the U.S. embassy in Vienna to keep quiet and let Rosch's comment pass. Rusk had been reassured by numerous declarations by the Austrian government that clearly stated that the country was "unalterably part of the West, not repeat not politically neutralist."64 Rusk surely was informed by the State Department bureaucracy about the late Eisenhower administration's contentions with Austria that Washington should not "react with personal indignation to the wayward statements of Austrian politicians." "U.S. officials began to accept in the late 1950s," notes Mcintosh, "that they could not expect from Austria, conduct as favorable to our intersts as [that] of our NATO allies.'"65 Regarding the acquisition of fighter-jets for the defense of its air space, the Austrians were cautious. After U.S. protests, Graf stepped back from a Czech offer.66 Interest in American planes was expressed, but in the end, Austria went with the Swedish SAABs and began a long history of buying Swedish jets featuring financial and technical advantages. 67 Austrian defense planners also considered the purchase of American, Polish, or Italian jets.68 In the end, the decision to purchase SAABs from neutral Sweden also was politically opportune. Attempts ofU.S. tutelage of Austrian defense policies continued well into the 1960s. In mid-1955, Washington signed a secret five-year agreement with the Raab government for furnishing military stocks from the U.S. Military Assistance Program without cost to the Austrians. Until 1962, Washington delivered materiel worth 100 million dollars for Austria's 57 ,000-man Army. Some of these stocks had been stored since the early 1950s in West Gern1any and Italy; some materiel was new. The Pentagon also sponsored advanced training programs for Austrian officers in U.S. military academies. The fact thatthe Austrian cabinet (the Ministerrat) had to provide its agreement for each officer visiting the United States shows how tenuous the defense relationship was. The United States usually covered most of the cost of these visits. 69 When the agreement for such defense-related grants was coming to an end in the early 1960s-and as a result ofWashington' s growing balance of payments problems-the United States no longer offered Austria military equipment free of charge. The idea was to make Austria pay for its own defense, athough on favorable terms of credit. 70

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In early 1962, the Grand Coalition agreed to a credit deal with the United States to buy American hardware. But the Austrian government did not want to arouse Soviet suspicion and hid the arms credit as commercial loans from the Export-Import Bank. Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky made sure that the 50 million dollar credit, which was based on the 1957 AustroAmerican arms agreement, did not violate Austrian neutrality and requested such assurances from RudolfKirchschlager, the chief of the International Law Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.71 There is no evidence that either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration worried much over Austria's neutrality when it came to arms deals. 72 At least up until the late 1950s, when the Soviet Union started to supervise Austria's neutrality policies more carefully, the Austrians eagerly welcomed American military largesse. They gladly accepted the continuation of the military training program as well as U.S. offers of reasonable defense credits. As noted above, the first military credits deal was finally concluded in August 1962?3 One year later, the State Department informed JFK that the transfer of military hardware to Austria, based on the 50 million dollar-credit, "[was] proceeding well."74 The "Americanization" of Austria's defense via U.S. hardware and personnel training did proceed into the 1960s, but ran parallel to and was increasingly offset by a growing number of Swedish and French weapons imports and an increasing amount of homemade weapons production. Until the early 1960s, most Austrian weapons were of U.S. origin. A secret list from March 1962 itemized the stocks (as of November 1961): 560 of 641 mortars were from the United States; a11648 artillery pieces and 2,257 3.5-inch M20 Rocket Launchers were American, so were 180 of295 canons in the arsenal of the Austrian Army, 368 of 554 tanks and tank -like vehicles, 3,631 of5,002 trucks and tractors, as well as nineteen of thirtythree helicopters. Military hardware originating in Moscow was miniscule by comparison: thirty-one mortars, thirty-two canons, thirty tanks and vehicles, as well as eight training planes came from Soviet production. 75 Even though historians have not unearthed much detailed evidence yet, one may assume, based on the cooperative spirit of the mid-1950s, that NATO had a plan for the Austrian Army in its grand strategy. The new March 1962 "Guidelines" of the State Department stressed Austria's strategic importance. Washington continued to encourage Vienna to execute its traditional "retardation mission" in Western defense planning, namely "to raise and maintain armedforces adequate to delay any Soviet Bloc thrust toward the mountain passed leading to Italy and Western Europe" (emphasis added). 76 This mission was quite similar to the one of USFA in 1952, as General Paul Freeman recalled in an oral history interview: "We had a secret mission which was to protect the right flank or the Southern flank of the Seventh Army [Germany] and we had battlefield

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positions extending from Degensburg [Regensburg?], I believe it was, in Germany all the way down to Salz-Kammergut. We were to hold those mountain passes and delay into Italy" (emphasis added). 77 The Warsaw Pact could not ignore such close defense cooperation between Austria and NATO. In March 1963, the Czechoslovak Prawda published in nearby PreBburg/Bratislava strongly criticized the fact that French NATO officers had taken part in an Austrian military maneuver. Such joint maneuvers had been conducted since the early 1950s when the "Frosty" exercises first trained Austrians for warfare maneuvers in the Upper Austrian Alpenvorland?8 U.S. Ambassador James Riddleberger confirmed such joint maneuvers in an internal report, but typically played them down, "This is not new or unusual." After two Austrian officers had received training in elite French military academies, the French came to Austria. Before such French visitors came to observe and critique Austrian maneuvers, British, Swiss, and Swedish military personnel had done the same and attended field trainings exercises.79 In the early 1960s, the Austrians even considered purchasing defensive rockets from Switzerland, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union. Internally, the British Foreign Office thoroughly debated the restrictions of Article 13 of the State Treaty, which explicitly prohibited Austria from buying rockets. London also thought that Washington suspected the British of entering into a rocket launcher deal with Vienna. The Austrians were quite irritated about such British reservations. Vienna interpreted the State Treaty such that "defensive" rockets were permitted. On top of this, in late 1963 Soviet Marshall Malinovsky offered a visiting Austrian delegation headed by Defense Minister Karl Schleinzer Soviet anti-tank missiles. In the end, the Ballhausplatz, always skimpy on defense expenditures, refused to buy either Western rockets or Soviet missiles due to both a lack of money and state treaty prohibitions. To improve its maneuvering space on modernizing its defense, Austria planned on following the Finnish lead. Helsinki had managed to renegotiate the rocket and missile prohibition written into the Finnish Peace Treaty of 1947. Such amove would have been welcomed by the British. 80 But throughout the 1960s, the Kremlin blocked such a renegotiation of the Austrian State Treaty. 81

Conclusion It may be splitting hairs to conclude that, whereas Austria's postwar polity and economy were Westernized, or better "Western Europeanized,"82 its military and popular culture were Americanized. Yet such distinctions are useful to assess the extent of Western influences in the overall "modernization" of postwar Austria. Had Lippi continued her novel more deeply into the postwar period, she would have noted that the youth of the

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Bregenzerwald were Americanized too after the war and that such remote rural areas also benefitted from the Marshall Plan. She also would have observed that young recruits in the Austrian Army trained on American artillery pieces, rode U.S. tanks, and drove huge Dodge trucks. After the war, the German Mercedes was no longer the symbol of modernization. After World War II, the United States aimed above all to democratize Austria thoroughly and build a stable political economy by favoring the marriage of convenience in the OVP/SPO Grand Coalition governments. Since 90 percent of Austrian voters favored these two political camps, it amounted to an arrangement akin to national unity governments. Western pressure at the height of the Cold War to maintain this "shotgun wedding" when the communist threat to Austria seemed most acute paid rich dividends. Such close Western tutelage helped overcome the low intensity, civil war-like conditions of the prewar years. It also produced a rapid withdrawal of the Western powers from Austria's "de-Nazification" process. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Western powers ceased putting pressure on the Austrian government to cleanse the "brown" detritus from its body politic. Hundreds of thousands of Nazi fellow travellers were thus reintegrated into the Austrian body politic, and the stern justice meted out in trials of the "people's courts" (Volksgerichte) against Nazi perpetrators quickly began to wane. One of the major benefits of such Western intervention was that it came with the largesse U.S. economic aid. As the British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Wallinger observed, "[I]n the difficult times when Western aid was all-important, there was an astonishingly patient acceptance of tutelage."83 The Pre-Marshall Plan UNRRA and U.S. Army aid programs amounted to half a billion dollars in U.S. aid; the Marshall Plan programs poured a billion dollars into all sectors of the Austrian economy. The "counterpart funds" produced by Marshall aid in Austria continued to provide a bonanza for reinvestments in the Austrian economy throughout the 1950s, and with the setting up of the ERP Fonds in 1962, the reinvestment continues to this day. But hidebound Austrian elites resisted U.S. pressure to "Americanize" the Austrian economy and business practices. Whereas Austrian management had looked to "Fordist" and "Taylorist" methods since the 1920s, Austria's corporatist arrangments were not given up; the national economy was not liberalized in spite of American pressures. Austria followed a Western European path of building a mixed state/private economy with a solid welfare state. Through joint ERP institutions such as the European Payments Union, Austria initiated its close cooperation with Western Europe, but the Soviet occupation presence did not allow it to join the European Coal and Steel Community, and Soviet objections would not allow Austria to consummate an "AnschluB" to the European Economic Community throughout the Cold

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War. Austria was forced to live in the "half-way house" ofthe European Free Trade Association, and since 1972, in the EEC association agreement. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Austria finally completed its ''Western Europeanization" by joining the European Union. Despite the fact that, ever since the occupation Austrian youngsters imbibed U.S. popular culture hook, line, and sinker, in part as a form of generational rebellion against their elders, 84 neutrality prohibited Austrian from openly joining Western European defense arrangements. But the Pentagon's tutelage over Austrian defense matters continued after the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. The U.S. military establishment in Washington would not have vacated the country had not the "core" of an Austrian Army been created during the late occupation that could guarantee Austria's domestic tranquilty. The Pentagon also had included Austria in joint NATO defense planning for Western Europe before 1955. When the U.S. insisted on overflights during the 1958 Lebanon crisis, the Soviet Union demanded a stricter maintenance of Austrian neutrality. At the same time, U.S. Ambassador Matthews kept a close eye on Austrian politicians being too friendly with the Soviets. American weapons stocks helped accomplish the initial stages of postwar Austrian rearmament. The Americanization/Westernization/Western Europeanization of the postwar Austrian polity, economy, and society came in fits and starts and at various speeds. Notes

I. We are grateful to Erwin A. Schmidl and Walter Blasi for their many useful suggestions offered to improve this essay. 2. Rosina Lippi, Homestead (London: Flamingo, 2001), 87-9. 3. Ernst Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates: Osterreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994), 348-62. 4. Giinter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The Leverage of the Weak (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 30-77.

5. For a useful distinction between the multi -dimensional circular transfer of ideas and values across the Atlantic over three centuries ("Westernization") and the one-dimensional cultural, economic, and political transfer of Americana due to growing U.S. hegemony in the twentieth century ("Americanization''), see Anselm Qoering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westemisierung im20. Jahrhundert(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999), 10-16 and passim. 6. Michael Gebler has just published an exhaustive two-volume study (the second volume containing the pertinent documents) of the deep roots of Austria's relations with Western Europe and accession to the European Union; seeDer lange Weg nach Europa: Osterreich vom Ende der Monarchie his zur EU (lnnsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2002). 7. Gunter Bischof, "Restoration, Not Renewal: From Nazi to Four-Power OccupationThe Difficult Transition to Democracy in Austria after 1945," Hungarian Studies 14.2 (2000): 207-31.

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8. Anton Pelinka,Austria: Out ofthe Shadow ofthe Past (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 205-13. 9.1954endoftheyearreview,No.1, WallingertoEden, lJanuary 1955,RR 1011/l,FO 371111776. Public Record Office, Kew, England, [PRO]. 10. For the best analysis of the "grand coalition" and its close cooperation with and dependenceon the Western powers, see Manfried Rauchensteiner,Die Zwei: Die Grofle Koalition in Osterreich 1945-1966 (Vienna: Bundesverlag, 1987); for a shorter introduction, see idem, "Geregelte Verha.J.tnisse? bmenpolitischeMani:ivrierraume und ihre Spielregeln," inlnventur 45155, ed. Wolfgang Kos and Georg Rigele (Vienna: Sonderzahl1996), 268-86. The most useful analysis of the ''ideology of anti-communism" is Ingrid Fraberger and Dieter Stiefel, "'Enemy Images': The Meaning of' Anti-Communism' and Its Importance for the Political and Economic Reconstruction of Austria after 1945," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 8, The Marshall Plan in Austria, eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000), 56-97. 11. NSC 5603, "U.S. Policy Toward Austria," 23 March 1956, Records Relating to State Dept. Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council 1947-1963,Lot63D351,Genera1RecordsoftheDepartmentofState,RecordGroup[RG] 59, National Archives [NA], College Park, Maryland; NSC 6020, "U.S. Policy toward Austria," 9 December 1960, ibid.; State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, March 1962, "Austria General4/61-5/62," Countries Files, Box 9, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library [NSF,JFKL], Boston. Massachusetts; State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, July 1964, Records of the Ambassador at Large, Llewellyn E. Thompson 1961-70,Lot67D2,RG59,NA. Therewasnoprocessof de-Westernization of Austria in the early 1960s as Rathkolb posits without providing any evidence, see Oliver Rathkolb, "International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 9, Neutrality in Austria, eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 69-91, here 74f. 12. State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, July 1964, Records of the Ambassador at Large, Llewellyn E. Thompson 1961-70, Lot 67 D 2, RG 59, NA. 13. U.S. Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs ofMission 1778-1990 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1991),51; on Thompson, see also David Mayers, The AmbassadorsandAmerica's Soviet Policy (New York: Oxford UP, 1995), 212-59. 14. Oliver Rathkolb, Washington ruft Wien: US-Groflmachtpolitik und Osterreich 19531963 (Vienna: Bi:ihlau, 1997), 93, 278. 15. OCB Report on Austria, NSC 5603, 22 October 1958, Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, NSC, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 17, Folder ''NSC 5603," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [DDEL], Abilene, Kansas. 16. State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, March 1962, "Austria General4/61-5/62," Countries Files, Box 9, NSF, JFKL; State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, July 1964, Records ofthe.Atii.bassador at Large, Llewellyn E. Thompson 1961-70, Lot 67 D 2, RG 59, NA. 11.ForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates(FRUS), 1958-1960, voLIX, Berlin Crisis 19591960; Gemulny; Austria (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 791. On the Lebanon crisis, see also Walter Blasi, Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Oberfluge, in Osterreich imfriihen Kalten Krieg 1945-1958: Spione, Partisanen, Kriegspliine, ed.

Erwin A. Schmid! (Vienna: Bi:ihlau, 2000), 239-59. 18.FRUS, 1958-60,IX, 772f., 780-85,791-93, 797-800,805-7,807note 12,815f., 819, 821f.; Rathkolb, Washington, 132f., 139-41, 165-173,277-79.

221 19. Martin Kofler, "Eine 'ArtNabel der Welt': Osterreich und der Chruschtschow-Besuch 1960," Zeitgeschichte 26 ( 1999): 397-416; also idem, "Berlin, Neutrality, and Cold War Propaganda: Nikita Khrushchev's Visit in Austria in 1960," masters thesis U ofNew Orleans, 1998, as a ''working paper" at . 20. Giinter Bischof, "Spielball der Miichtigen? Osterreichs auJ3enpolitischer Spielraumim beginnenden Kalten Krieg," in lnventur45155, 126-56. 21. Oliver Rathkolb, "Bruno Kreisky's Perceptions of the United States," in From World War to Waldheim: Culture and Politics in Austria and the United States, eds. David F. Good and Ruth Wodak (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 36-50, quote 43; idem, Washington, 132f., 283f., 288. 22. Memorandum of Conversation Kreisky-Bennett, 25 March 1961, in: Matthews (Vienna) to Department of State, 28 March 1961,763.00/3-2861, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, RG59,NA. 23. Martin Kofler, "Die Kennedy-Administration und das neutrale Osterreich 1961-1963," Diss. U oflnnsbruck, 2002, 67f., 83f [forthcoming 2003]; for the K-Kmeeting especially, idem, "'Neutral,' Host, and 'Mediator': Austria and the Vienna Summit of1961, The Marshall Plan in Austria, 487-505. 24. Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization ofWestern Europe, 1955-1963 (Chapel Hill; U of North Carolina P, 2002). 25. Hermann Freudenberger and Radomir Luza, National Socialist Germany and the Austrian Industry, 1938-1945, in Austria Since 1945, ed. William E. Wright (Minneapolis: Centerfor Austrian Studies, 1982), 73-100; Giinter Bischof, Foreign Aid and Austria's Economic Recovery," in New Directions in European Security Policy, ed. Werner Feld (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 79-91; idem, "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics, 1940-1950," Diss. Harvard U, 1989, 447-525. 26. Fritz Weber, "Osterreichs Wirtschaft in der Rekonstruktionsphase nach 1945," Zeitgeschichte 14 (April1987): 267-98; Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 93-98. 27. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions ofEurope: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean Acheson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994); Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: The UnitedStatesandEuropean1ntegration, 1945-1997(New

York: Oxford UP, 1998). Changes in the "Americanization" of Austrian business mentality are hard to document For a beginning see Andre Pfortner, "Amerikanisierung der Betriebswirtschaftlehre im deutschprachigen Raum: Versuch der Nachzeichnung eines historischen Prozesses unter besonderer Beliicksichtigung der Verhiiltnisse in Osterreich und der Schweiz,'' Diss. U of Vienna, 1999. The Marshall Plan and the partition of Europe is discussd from an Austrian perspective by Andrea Komlosy, "The Marshall Plan and the Making of the Iron Curtain in Austria," The Marshall Plan in Austria, 98-137. 28. See the essays in RichardT. Griffith, ed., Explorations in OEEC History (OECD Historical Series) (Paris: OECD, 1997). 29 Hansjorg Klausinger, "Von Mises zu Morgenstern: Der Austroliberalismus und der Stiindestaat," Zeitgeschichte [forthcoming]. 30. See the various essays in Osterreich und die europiiische Integration; Hans Seidel, "Austria's Economic Policy and the Marshall Plan," The Marshall Plan in Austria, 247-89; Gebler, Der lange Weg nach Europa. Hans Seidel and Hans Igler related these personal perspectives in informal conversations with Gunter Bischof. 31. Wilfried Miihr, "Der Marshallplan in Osterreich: Tanz nach einer ausliindischen Pfeife?", in lnnsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 4, Die bevonnundete Nation: Osterreich und die Allierten 1945-1949, eds. Giinter Bischof and JosefLeidenfrost (Inns-

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bruck: Haymon, 1988), 245-72. 32. Kurt K. Tweraser, "The Politics of Productivity and Corporatism: The Late Marshall Plan in Austria, 1950-54," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, eds. Giinter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), 91-115. 33. TheJohnstoneReport, 1 December 1951,863.0012-151: Kommentarzumlohnstone Bericht 1952 [sic], enclosed in Thibodeaux dispatch, 10June 1953, 863.00/6-1953,RG59, NA. See also Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 128. 34. See: Franz Mathis, "Die osterreichische Wirtschaft. Grundlagen und Entwicklungen," in Osterreich im 20: Jahrhundert, 2 vols., eds. Rolf Steininger and Michael Gebler (Vienna: Bohlau, 1997), vol. 2, 415-53; Roman Sandgruber, Okonomie und Politik: Osterreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom Mittelalter his zur Gegenwart (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1995), 46774; Emmerich Tlilos and Bernhard Kittel, "Sozialpartnerschaft. Zur Konstituierung einer Grundsaule der Zweiten Republik,"in Osterreich 1945-1995, eds. Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, and Emmerich Talos (Vienna: Verlag fiir Gesellschaftskritik, 1995), 107-21, here 115, 120. 35. Oliver Rathkolb, "Der ERP-Fonds und Option en zur Transformation der osterreichischen Wirtschaftnach 1953,"in "80Dollar": 50 Jahre ERP-Fonds undMarshallPlan in Osterreich 1948-1998, eds. Giinter Bischof and Dieter Stiefel (Wien: Ueberreuter, 1999), 103-110. 36. Bundesgesetzblatt for die Republik Osterreich, 50. Stiick, 206 and 207, 20 July 1962. 37. For details, see KurtLoffler and Hans Fuessenegger, "The Activities ofthe ERP Fund from 1962 to 1998," The Marshall Plan in Austria, 15-55. 38. For these special guidelines, see Bundesgesetzblatt fiir die Republik Osterreich, 50. Stiick, 206 and 207, 20 July 1962. 39. Useful WestGermananalysisofMay 1962in83.20/94.19,Ref. 203, Vol.193, Politisches Archiv/Auswartiges Amt (PA/AA), Bonn (now Berlin). 40. Kofler, "Kennedy-Administration," 98-128; Gehler,Der lange Weg nach Europa, 170356. 41. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991); idem, A Constructed Peace: The Making ofthe European Settlement 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton UP , 1999); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988). 42. Keyes to European Command, US Army, 10 November 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol.II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 1201. 43. Giinter Bischof, "Osterreich -ein ,geheimer Verbiindeter' des Westens?", in Osterreich und die europiiische Integration, 425-50; idem, Austria in the First Cold War, 111-15; James Jay Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria (College Station, TX: Texas A and M UP, 2002). 44. Giinter Bischof, '"Austria Looks to the West': KommunistischePutschgefahr, geheime Wiederbewaffnung und Westorientierung am Anfang der fiinfziger Jahre," in Innbrucker Forschungenzur Zeitgeschichte, vol. I I, Osterreich indenFiinfzigern, eds. Klaus Eisterer etal. (lnnsbruck: Studienverlag, 1995), 183-209; idem, Austria in the First Cold War, 11623; Walter Blasi, Die B-Gendarmerie I 952-I955 (Vienna: Bundesministerium fiir Landesverteidigung, 2002); Christian Stifter, Die Wiederaufriistung Osterreichs: Die geheime Remilitariseriung derwestlichenBesatzungszonen 1945-1955 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 1997); Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatvertrag, Neutralitiit und das Ende der Ost- West-Besetzung Osterreichs 1945-1955 (Vienna: Bohlau, 1998), 192-220; Carafano,

223 Waltzing into the Cold War. 45. Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 121; Rathkolb, Washington, 183-89,201-6,27274; Bruno W. Koppensteiner, "Bethouarts Alpenfestung: Militlirische Verteidigungsvorbereitungen der franztisischen Besatzungsmacht in Tirol und Vorarlberg," in Osterreich im friihenKaltenKrieg 1945-1958,ed. Schmid!, 193-237; Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War, 154-72. 46. To date, the evidence on this important field of"Americanization" is circumstantial and intuitive. No serious studies have been made on Austrian-American personnel contacts in the early and post-occupation phases of rearmament. West German military personnel linkages with the United States are much more thoroughly researched; see Klaus Naumann, "Der Beginn einer wunderbaren Freundschaft: Beobachtungen aus der Fri.ihzeit der deutschamerikanischen Militarbeziehungen," in Westbindungen: Amerika in der Bundesrepublik, eds. Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), 138-80. 47. "Austrian Aid Program," attached in memo Bon bright to Ohly, 20 November 1951, 763.5-MAP/11-2051; "Position of Austria in WestemEurope,"5 February 1951,763.00/2551, both in RG 59, NA; see also Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 121. Carafano presents the most complete survey of NATO defense planning for Western Europe, including the Austrian role on "securing the Southern flank," Waltzing into the Cold War, 135-53. Carafano definitely shows thatNATO-USFA ties were much closer than hithterto thought. 48. Ibid., 135. 49. Giinter Bischof, "Osterreich- ein ,geheimer' Verbiindeter des Westens?", 437,449. 50. Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War, 19l.lt needs to be noted that some ofthe hardware handed over to the Austrian army was regarded as "American trash." Many of the officers in the Austrian Army had been socialized in the German Wehrmacht. Their model military culture was German, not American. We are grateful to Erwin Schmid! and Walter Blasi for pointing out to us these various strains of traditions in Austrian military culture. 51. See the essays and the photo material in Erwin A. Schmid!, ed., Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Osterreich (Vienna: Bohlau, 2003). 52. Christine Mitterwenger-Fessl, "Julius Raab und das Bundesheer der Zweiten Republik," in Julius Raab. Eine Biographie in Einzeldarstellungen, eds. Alois Brusatti and Gottfried Heindl (Vienna-Linz: Verlag RudolfTrauner [1986]), 306-22,310-2, 315f.; Christine StOck!, Osterreichische Schriftenreihe for Rechts- und Politikwissenschaft, vol. 8, Die Verteidigungspolitik der OVP und der Stellenwen der militiirischenLandesveneidigung im osterreichischen Neutralitiitskonzept (1955-1985) (Vienna: Braumiiller, 1985), 79-107. 53. Cited in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 95. 54. Austrian expenses for defense, 6 May 1963, Zl. 27186-4(pol)/63 (GZL 27186-4/63), Osterreich 5, II-pol, Bundesministerium fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten, Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik [BMfAA, OStA/AdR].

55. Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, "Landesverteidigung und Bundesheer," in Osterreich. Die Zweite Republik, 2 vols., eds. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz: Styria, 1972), vol. 1, 347-414, here 585, note 135. 56. Osterreichische Neue Tageszeitung, 6 March 1962. 57. Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War, 134-72. 58. See Otto Heller, "Die 'Schild-Schwert-These' und die Neutralen: Eine strategischoperative Betrachtung tiber die Zeit von der Aufstellung des zweiten Bundesheeres bis zum Beginn der Reform 1970," in Forschungen zur Militiirgeschichte, vol. 2, Schild ohne

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Schwert. Das osterreichische Bundesheer 1955-1970, eds. Manfried Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (Graz: Styria, 1991 ), 61-87, 61f., 70-74; Allmayer-Beck, ''Landesverteidigung," 380f. 59.Rathkolb, "lntemationalPerceptions,"71;idem, Washington,122-21;Biasi, "Libanonkrise 1958," 239-59 .In late 1956, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the continuation of supporting Austrian defense measures only if there were some evidence for progress of the Army's build-up. But they could not convince the State Department, though the "extensive shopping list" of Austrian Defense Minister Graf in 1959 was even too much for Foggy Bottom. Idem, 178f. 60. Thompson (Vienna) to Department of State, 11 February 1957, 763.3/2-1157, Central Decimal File 1955-1959, RG 59, NA. 61. Matthews (Vienna) to Norstad (Paris), 6 May 1958, Box 47, Austria, Lauris Norstad Papers 1930-87, DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation Sloan-Graf, 2 May 1958, ibid. 62. ''Top Secret and Personal"Ietter A.D.M. Ross to J.G. Ward, 23 May 1955.1n his answer to Ross, Ward noted that the Americans "take a more optimistic view of Austria's prospects than we have done ourselves," letter Ward to Ross, 18 June 1955, both RR 1071/441 FO 371/1117801, PRO. 63. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol.IX, 807f, 808 note 1. On Matthews hard line, also see the essay by David Mcintosh, ''In the Shadow of Giants: U.S. Policy Toward Small Nations, the Cases of Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Austria in the Eisenhower Years," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 4, Austrocorporatism: Past- Present- Future, eds. G\inter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996), 222-79 (on Matthews esp. 248 ff., citation, 249). 64. Kofler, "Kennedy-Adminstration," 39f. 65. Mcintosh, "In the Shadow of Giants," 256f. 66. Background Paper "Possible Purchase ofMIG-17 Planes," Under Secretary's Visit to Vienna July 1960, 6 July 1960 (Confidential), "Austria Military Equipment Sales 196011961"Fo1der, Bureau of European Mfairs, Records Relating to Austria, Lot 68 D 123, RG59,NA. 67. For the first transaction, see Memorandum of Conversation Platzer-Phelan-Wells, 13 October 1960, 763.00110-1360, ibid. 68. Matthews (Vienna) to Secretary of State, 24 June 1960, 763.5622/6-2460, ibid. 69. Mario Duic, "Das Erbe von Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit," Schild ohne Schwert, 89-128, 94,11 0-3; Kofler, "Kennedy-Administration,"159f. Scholarship still needs to research the influences on postwar Austrian military culture from the "old" pre-World War II Austrian Army, the Wehrmacht, and contacts with NATO armies (including the U.S. Army) after 1955. Presumably the Austrian and German Wehrmacht traditions influenced Austria's postwar Army more profoundly than contacts with the Americans. 70. Above all, see Wainhouse (Vienna) to Secretary of State, 2 February 1960, 763.5MSP/2-260, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, RG 59, NA; Dillon to Eisenhower, 26 March 1960, 763.5-MSP/3-2660, Lot 68 D 123, RG 59, NA. 71. Matthews (Vienna) to Secretary ofState, 23 May 1962,763.56/5-2362, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, ibid.; Kirchschlliger to Waldheim, 23 May 1962, o. Zl. (GZl. 662224(pol)/62), Osterreich 5, ll-pol, BMfAA, OStA/AdR; copy of the 1957 agreement, ibid.; see also Kofler, "Kennedy-Administration," 165f. 72. For the Eisenhower Administration, see Oliver Rathkolb, "Historische Bewlihrungsproben des Neutralitlitsgesetzes: Am Beispiel der US-Amerilgmischen Osterreich-Politik 1955 bis 1959,"in Veifassung. Juristisch-politische undsozialwissenschaftliche Beitriige

225 anliiftlich des 70-Jahr-Jubiliiums des Bundes-Veifassungsgesetzes, eds. Nikolaus Drimmel and Alfred-Johannes Noll (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1990), 122-41, 128-30; for the early 1960s, see Kofler, "Kennedy-Administration," 161, 166.

73. Memorandum of Conversation Waldheim-Tyler, 28 September 1962,033.6311/9-2862, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, RG 59, NA; Harrer, Ministry of Finance, to U.S. Treasury Department, 27 May 1963, Zl. 28720 (GZI. 20131-4/63), Osterreich 5, II-pol, BMfAA, OStA/AdR. 74. TalkingPaperKennedy-Kreisky, 90ctober 1963, "AustrianForeignMinisterKreisky's Visitto N.Y. (U.S.) September- Washington October 1963" Folder, Bureau of European Affairs, Records Relating to Austria, Lot 68 D 123, RG 59, NA. 75. Inventory of Arms and Equipment (Austria), 27 March 1962 (Secret), "Austrian Defense Minister Schleinzer-Rosch Visit 1962" Folder, ibid. 76. State Department's Guidelines for Policy and Operations Austria, March 1962, "Austria General4/61-5/62" Folder, Countries Files, Box 9, NSF, JFKL. 77. Quoted in Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War, 122. 78. Ibid., 122f (with picture). 79. Riddleberger (Vienna) to Department of State, 25 March 1963 (Confidential), "350 Austria 1962-1964" Folder, Box 22, Austria, Vienna Embassy, RG 84, NA. 80. See the extensive correspondence 1961-1963 in: Foreign Office 371, 160822/CU 1192/2, 163889/CU 1192, 169588/CU 1192, PRO; Riddle berger (Vienna) to Secretary of State, 27 September 1963, "Austria General6/62-10/63 and undated" Folder, Countries Files, Box 9, NSF, JFKL. 81. Riddleberger (Vienna) to Secretary of State, 4 June 1964, Country File, Box 163, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; Background Paper "Military Sales," 2 April1968, "Austrian Chancellor Klaus Visit! 4/8-13/68" Folder, Country File, Box 164, ibid. 82. More recently, political scientists have been speaking of the "Europeanization" of Austrian politics afterits joining the EU in 1995. See Heinrich Neisser and Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, eds., Europiiisierung der osterreichischen Politik: Konsequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft (Vienna: WUV-Universitatsverlag, 2002). 83. Annual review for 1954, No. 1, Wallinger to Eden, I January 1955, RR 1011, FO 3711117776, PRO. 84. Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, trans. Diana Wolf(Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1994).

The Impact of American Scholarship on Austrian Political Science: The Making of a Discipline Anton Pelinka Political science as an independent academic discipline did not exist in Austria prior to 1963, when a U.S. foundation (the Ford Foundation), advised by U.S. social scientists, established the Institute for Advanced Studies (lnstitutftir Hohere Studien) with an autonomous department of political science. Thus, there is some reason to argue that from the very beginning U.S. social sciences played a decisive role in Austrian political science. But there is plenty of reason to argue that Austrian political science had roots deeply embedded in Austria's pre-1938 (and pre-1934) academic tradition. It is striking that these indirect Austrian roots came via Austrian academics who--driven into exile-fed their Austrian background, enriched by American expertise, back into Austria's post-1945 academic life. In contrast to what took place in Germany, Austria's universities did not systematically call back their lost sons and daughters who had been academically successful outside Austria before 1945. The main reason for this difference between Germany and Austria was that in post-1945 Germany, the Allies had taken over direct responsibility for a new beginning in academic life. Under the auspices of "re-education," prominent academics in the fields of social sciences or humanities were invited to return to Germany. Among them, political scientists like Ernst Fraenkel, Ossip K. Flechtheim, Carl-JoachimFriedrich, Karl LOewenstein, Ferdinand A. Hermens and others were instrumental in defining political science as an independent academic discipline for German universities. Unlike Germany, Austria did not invite their exiled academics back in a systematic way. Austrians like Hans Kelsen, Paul Lazarsfeld, Maria Jahoda, Hans Zeisel, and others were never offered a position at an Austrian university after 1945. Erich Vogelin, who had a professorship at the University of Vienna until1938 and had made a career as a political scientist at Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton Rouge, was offered

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-and accepted-a position as professor of political science at the University of Munich. Willam Johnston's and Carl Schorske' s work contains many references to what can be called the Austrian impact on modern social sciences, including political science. 1 Austria's intellectual history prior to 1934/38 is full of significant input into the international development of social sciences. Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis added significantly to the medical as well as non-medical understanding of society. EugenEhrlich's approach to law from a non-normative, empirical, and functional viewpoint was a cornerstone to what became the sociology of law. Carl Menger's, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk' sand others' "Austrian School ofEconomics" played an important role in developing a rational understanding of economic (and social) behavior. Joseph Schumpeter's theory of democracy helped significantly to free the perception of democracy from a purely moralistic viewpoint. Hans Kelsen's dualism-his strict distinction between law and politics--enriched the analysis of law as well as politics. Finally, Paul Lazarsfeld, Maria Jahoda, and Hans Zeisel established a new understanding of the impact of economic crises on society. But all these beginnings seemed to be lost in 1945. The academic tradition of social science was buried and/or exiled. Post-1945 Austria did not seem interested at all in using this tradition for the benefit of a new generation. The new democratic freedom of 1945 was not inclined to use the Austrian academic greatness of the future. Austria's intellectual and academic capacity had been victim to political (and, in 1938, so-called racial) cleansing twice. In 1934, most of the left-oriented intelligentsia had to leave or was silenced; in 1938, all Jewish and all independent-minded persons who were able to survive 1934 at universities and other academic institutions were immediately expelled, forced into exile or--even worse-had to wait for the mills of extermination within the Nazi empire.

The Alliance of an American Foundation with Austrian born American Scholars No disciplines were more affected by these events than the social sciences. Sociology, underdeveloped even before 1934, had become an ideology of anti-democratic forces, more or less following the impact of Othmar Spann and his fascist school of thinking and teaching, yet even Spann and his followers had to leave Austrian universities after the Nazi take-over. 2 Political science did not exist as an independent discipline in pre-Nazi Austria, and some of the scholars, who-like Joseph Schumpeter, Hans Kelsen, Paul Lazarsfeld and Eric Voegelin-did research and published in fields neighboring political science, had either left Austria

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already (like Schumpeter, Kelsen and Lazarsfeld) or had to leave in 1938 (like Voegelin). Economics, by far the best developed among social sciences in Austria, was-in its leading tradition-labelled "Jewish," and the most prominent Austrian economists became Americans (like Joseph Schumpeter, Oskar Morgenstern, and Friedrich von Hayek). It was exactly this triad of disciplines-economics, sociology, and political science-that Paul Lazarsfeld and Oskar Morgenstern helped to establish within the Institute for Advanced Studies. The Ford Foundation gave the money necessary to start such an institute. Lazarsfeld and Morgenstem provided the academic goals: to begin social science studies (as in the case of political science) or to advance them (as in fields like sociology and economics) by bringing together eminent foreign scholars and young Austrian graduates. Before the Institute for Advanced Studies could start in Vienna in 1963, Lazarsfeld had characterized the intellectual situation in Austria. In a paper written for the Ford Foundation, he stated: The revitalization of intellectual activities in Austria is faced by three major difficulties: a. A sequence of "purges" since 1934 has led to an unusual scarcity of talent. b. The present political situation in Austria makes acceptance by one of the two party machineries a major condition for personal advancement and thereby favors conventional performance. c. The greater prosperity of Western Germany makes for a continuing emigration of talent, a problem incidentally which has existed since the end of the First World War ... In Austria both ruling parties have a strong anti-intellectual bend ... The young people are not only badly trained, they do not have anyone to emulate and no institutional setting in which they could develop strong interests of their own. 3 Lazarsfeld summarized his advice, based on such critical perception. He suggested "some temporary importation of creative personalities ... This can take two forms: a. The creation of some kind of new teaching and research center, which would offer work suppleme.ntary to the Austrian institutions. b. Giving the existing institutions the financial opportunity to invite outsiders."4 Option A was implemented, and the Institute for Advanced Studies became the very much needed door by which Austria's social science community could become international in general, while influenced by U.S. standards in particular. For economics, the Institute, modelled upon Lazarsfeld and Morgenstern's suggestions, became a center for excellence, supplementing the already existing university departments with international scholars and with a new type of post-graduate Austrian economist. For

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sociology, the Institute added significantly to the field and to the standards that the small sociology departments at Austrian universities were able to provide. Political science, the third of the three departments at the beginning of the Institute, created the discipline itself. A testament to the Institute's seminal influence is reflected in the fact that, in 2002, seven out of the sixteen full professors of political science in Austria were alumni from the Institute's political science department. Lazarsfeld' s recipe worked; among the frrst American visiting professors were Heinz Eulau and Dwaine Marvick. Their impact included research and publications, the first by Austrian political scientists on an Austrian topic. Eulau' s teaching in Vienna inspired a research project about the Viennese City Council. The interviews of all members of the City Council (and the analysis) were published in a book, edited by Peter Gerlich and Helmut Kramer. 5 Marvick' s stay resulted in the publication of three volumes about parties and elections in Austria. The book was published as a Seminar-Projekt unter Leitung von Dwaine Marvick. 6 The younger generation had responded to the incentive that the Ford Foundation and scholars like Lazarsfeld and Morgenstern had provided.

The Austrian Delay-The Austrian Periphery At Austrian universities, political science started as an independent discipline in 1971. Using the impact of the Institute for Advanced Studies, political science became a field in which students could graduate at the universities of Vienna and Salzburg in 1971, and at Innsbruck in 1985. This was a completely new beginning. What used to be called "Staatswissenschaften" (state sciences) was not a discipline, but a curriculum that mixed law and economics with some sociology and statistics. What became "Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften" (social and economic sciences) in the 1960s improved the status of economics, business administration, and sociology, but it did not include political science. Between 1945 and 1971, nobody could study political science in a systematic way at Austrian universities. There was no department teaching political science; there was no curriculum that included political science. Nobody was able to study Austrian politics using the methods established by international standards. It was, significantly enough, a group ofU .S. and German scholars who published the first results of research on Austrian politics: the Americans included H. Pierre Secher/ Frederick C. Engelmann, 8 Kurt L. Shel1, 9 G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 10 , Thomas 0. Schlesinger/ 1 Kurt Steiner,12 and William T. Bluhm; 13 and the Germans were Gerhard Lehmbruch 14 and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher. 15 Significantly, Secher, Engelmann, Shell, and Steiner were all Austrian exiles.

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The beginning of Austrian political science in the 1960s and 1970s was defined by its status as a periphery in the periphery. First, it was in the periphery of German political science-dependent on the much better developed German discipline which had started almost one generation earlier. This dependence was not only expressed by the impact of German political scientists on Austrian political science, but also by career patterns, Among the first professors of political science at Austrian universities were Germans like Heinrich Schneider in Vienna and Franz-Martin Schmalz and Klaus Faupel in Salzburg. The German professors and the US-oriented Austrian alumni from the Institute for Advanced Studies dominated the political science departments at the Universities ofVienna, Salzburg, and lnnsbruck from the very beginning. But some of the first generation of Austrian political scientists spent parts of their careers at German universities, most of them using their positions at German universities as steppingstones to enhance their chances at Austrian universities, scholars like Peter Gerlich and this author. But German political science was just the center in the periphery. The center of the center, the real center, was (and still is) U.S. political science. Most of the established Austrian political scientists spent some part of their careers at U.S. universities, in many cases using the different Austrian programs in the United States (like the Austrian chairs at the University of Minnesota and Stanford University, the Schumpeter program at Harvard University, and CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans). The dominant role American academicians (most prominent among them Austrian exiles) played during the years the discipline was established had been prolonged due to the global dominance American social sciences (and particularly political science) enjoyed and still enjoy.

Political Science-The Allure of Openness There is no question that political science attracted young Austrians because of the discipline's ability to approach politics from a nontraditional angle by using a non-traditional approach. In Austria, politics was seen traditionally through automatically partisan glasses-colored "red" for socialists, "black" or "brown" for Catholic-conservatives, or "blue" for Pan-Germans. Not only politics itself, but also the perception of politics, was extremely fragmented. 16 Political science offered a different understanding of political procedures and contents. It was possible to view politics independently from one's personal political attitudes. Political science transformed politics from the dimension of beliefs into the dimension of analysis. It is telling that the Austrian exiles who played an important role in the post-1945 understanding of Austrian political science were victims of the

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purely partisan perspective of the past. They were not always able to overcome the past personally; and they felt the burden of the past in many ways. In St. Louis in the 1950s and 1960s, two prominent Austrians were teaching political science at different universities. At Washington University, John Kautsky was a professor as well as an heir to a prominent name and to the tradition of Austro-Marxism. At the Catholic St. Louis University, Kurt Schuschnigg was a professor. The former Catholic was an Austro-fascist dictator, while the latter was a survivor of Hitler's concentration camps. Despite the fact that they were living for many years in the same city and in spite of knowing of each other's presence, they never established any contact-the gap between left and right, expressed in the civil war of February 1934, was still too deep. 17 It is also significant that anti-Semitic prejudices had an impact on the treatment of exiled intellectuals after 1945. When Adolf Sturmthal, an activist of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers' Party, who had survived World War II in the United States, returned to Austria for the first time after 1945, he contacted Adolf Scharf, chairman of the SPO and vicechancellor of the coalition government. Sturmthal, who was at the beginning of a successful career as a scholar of labor relations (he would later become a professor at the University of lllinois) asked Schfuf about the general possibility of the return of leftist emigres to Austria. Sturmthal remembered: At this point, the conversation took a very interesting tum. At first Schfuf told me that my return, which was not even being discussed, would be very welcome ... "You know, there is not a single party board meeting without Schneidmadl asking why Sturmthal does not return." With all respect to the vice-chancellor, this story seemed odd to me. Of all people, Schneidmadl, who hardly knew me personally, and was considered the leading anti-Semite of the party, was supposed to be interested in my return? To this day I consider this account by Schfuf hardly credible. Admittedly, Schfuf was not an anti-Semite, but he would probably have regarded a flood of returning Jewish emigres as a problem for the party in a country with a long anti-Semitic tradition. 18 These episodes reflect the survival of pre-1938 fragmentation and the existence of anti-Semitic prejudice and the effect they had on the development of the academic life. That political science by definition was able to go beyond political creeds and beyond all kinds of stereotypes, this was the factor that attracted young Austrians to this newly established discipline. Political science's openness also had a methodological aspect. Generations of Austrians had been trained by law schools that-simplifying Kelsen's dualism-had been more or less blind to the linkage between a society's legal and political system. Following an interpretation of political

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science as social science and going beyond a purely normative understanding of politics as well as a purely positivistic understanding of law, Austrian political scientists challenged the dominance of law as the ultimate criterion in an analysis of Austrian politics. Since some of the alumni of the Viennese Institute for Advanced Studies who became tenured professors of political science at Austrian uni versities had a law degree from an Austrian university (like Norbert Leser, Peter Gerlich, Anton Pelinka, and Eva Kreisky ), the frustration with a training in law and the experience with a training in political science must be considered an important background of the establishment of Austrian political science. In the law schools of the 1950s and 1960s, nothing could be learned about political parties and electoral behavior, economic interest groups and their corporative networking, the "Realveifassung" (the constitution as it works), but one could learn everything about the written constitution. The Austrian Political Science Association ("Oesterreichische Gesellschaft fuer Politikwissenschaft"), established in 1971, and the association's quarterly journal Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft (Austrian Journal of Political Science), established in 1972, started to discuss the identity of political science by stressing the differences between it and the law. By doing so, the Austrian political scientists based their arguments on the specifics of their discipline as defined by international standards. Austria's political science community gratefully used Johan Galtung's argument that the quantitative importance of law-trained academics in any society is negatively correlated to the society's developments.19 Political science-seen by Austrian political scientists- was perceived as a step towards a more internationally oriented as well as a more enlightened university. By arguing against the tradition of Austrian law schools, political scientists stressed that the negligence of political factors was builtinto that tradition. Within this tradition, a law was a law was a law, independent from its social and political and economic conditions and independent from its consequences for society. By distinguishing their discipline in such a principal methodological way from that oflaw schools, these early political scientists found the example of U.S. political science to be an important point of reference. 20

Conclusion For reasons that have a lot to do with Austria-the history of intellectual cleansing and the unwillingness to bring back the exiled intelligentsia -political science had started as an American discipline, shaped by Americans for young Austrians who were intellectually hungry to experien-

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ce a different approach to politics. More than other university departments, the three fully developed political science departments in Austria today (Vienna, Salzburg, Innsbruck) have been and still are strongly linked to U.S. political science. The evidence for these links is, first, the pattern of international academic exchange. Almost all established Austrian political scientist have spent some time at U.S. universities and/or U.S. research institutions. In addition, many American political scientists have been teaching in different capacities (for example, within the Fulbright program) at Austrian universities. Second, the links are visible (and readable) in the literature. The publications of Austrian political scientists are based upon U.S. political science literature. By far the (at least quantitatively) most important literature in the field is from the United States. More than any other academic discipline, political science can only flourish in a free and democratic society. Engineering and medicine, even law and economics and history (with the exception of contemporary history), can reach a level of excellency in a non-democratic political system. But by its very nature, political science cannot develop under the conditions of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Keeping this in mind, it has a strong and significant meaning that Austrian political science did not exist as a discipline before American political science started to have such a decisive impact on Austria's academia.

Notes

1. William M. Johnston, The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, I 8481938 (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1972); Carl E.Schorske, Fin-de-siikle Vienna, Politics and Culture (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1980). 2. Klaus-Jorg Siegfried, Universalismus und Faschismus: Das Gesellschaftsbild Othmar Spanns (Vienna: Europa, 1974). 3. Bernd Marin, Politische Organisation sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschungsarbeit: Fallstudie zum Institutfor hiihere Studien- Wien (Vienna: Braumtiller, 1978), 44. 4. Ibid. 5. Peter Gerlich, Helmut Kramer, eds.,Abgeordnete in der Parteiendemokratie: Eine empirische Untersuchung des Wiener Gemeinderates und Landtages (Vienna: Verlag fiir Geschichte und Politik, 1969). 6. Rodney Stiefbold, Arlette Leupold-LOwenthal, Georg Ress, Walther Lichem, eds., Wahlen und Parteien in Osterreich. Osterreichisches Wahlhandbuch, 3 vols. (Vienna: Jugend und Yolk, 1966). 7. H. Pierre Secher, "Coalition Government : The Case of the Second Austrian Republic," American Political Science Review 52 (1958): 791 ff.; and by the same author, Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor ofAustria: A Political Biography (Pittsburgh, P A: Dorrance, 1993 ). 8. Frederick C. Engelmann, 'ThePoolingofOpposition,"inPolitical Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1966), 260 ff.; and by the same author, Government by Diplomacy: The Austrian Coalition 1945-1966 (Vienna:

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Braumi.iller, 2001). Engelmann was trained as a political scientist in the United States, but for most of his career he was a professor in Canada. 9. Kurt L. Shell, Jenseits der Klassen? Osterreichs Sozialdemokratie seit 1934 (Vienna: Europa, 1969). (First published as The Transformation ofAustrian Socialism by New York: SUNY). Shell became-after writing this book- a professor in Germany. lO.G.BinghamPowell,Jr.,SocialFragmentationandPoliticalHostility:AnAustrianCase Study (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 1970). 11. Thomas 0. Schlesinger,Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe: The Domestic Roots of a Foreign Policy (Vienna: Braumi.iller, 1972). 12. Kurt Steiner, Politics in Austria (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). In the 1970s, Steiner played an important role in the program "Stanford in Austria" and in the establishment of the "Austrian Chair'' at Stanford University; see Elisabeth Welzig and Ernst Kilian, Zwischen den Welten. Kurt Steiner: Ein Wiener beim Tokioter Kriegsverbrecherprozess (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2002). 13. William T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation: The Politicallntegration ofa Western State (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1973). 14. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und Politische Kulturin der Schweiz und in Osterreich (Ti.ibingen: C.B. Mohr, 1967). 15. Karl-HeinzNassmacher,Das osterreichische Regierungssyste: Grofle Koalition oder altemierende Regierung? (Koln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968). 16. See Powell, Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility, 29-47; Steiner, Politics in Austria, 119-54; William T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation, 12-46; and Anton Pelinka, Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past (Boulder, CO: (Westview, 1998), 15-36. 17. John Kautsky, Personal interview, St. Louis, January 1991. 18. Adolf Sturmthal, Democracy Under Fire: Memoirs ofa European Socialist (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1989), 176. 19. Johan Galtung, ''Intellektuelle und Entwicklung: Erziehungsmusterund Entwicklungsmuster," Osterreichische Zeitschriftfiir Politikwissenschaft 1 (1972): 75 ff. 20. See, for example, Hans-Heinz Fabris, Georg Heinrich, Helmut Kramer, Peter Kreisky, and Erich Schmidt, "Zum Politologenbedarf in Osterreich," Osterreichische Zeitschriftfiir Politikwissenschaft 2 (1973): 419 ff.

Assessing the Americanization of Austrian Politics and Politicians Fritz Plasser Introduction Since the 1980s, observers of Austrian political communication and election campaigns have stated that there is a universal process of Americanization in politics, though this concept is defined in many different ways. 1 In simplified terms, there are two contrary points of view: diffusion theory and modernization theory. According to diffusion theory, Americanization is a directional (one-way) convergence process. Seen from this angle, communication styles of Austrian, German, French, and British politicians become similar to those in the United States. This results in a directional (one-way) convergence between U.S. and Western European election communications, where-independent of institutional restrictions on the political competitive situation-foreign actors of communication adopt central axioms and strategic parameters of the behavior of American politicians. 2 Examples of a unilateral adoption of an American style of political communication are the orientation of planning strategies for political communication along the lines of political marketing, 3 or the adoption of U.S. forms of political coverage and their underlying news values. 4 However, the advocates of modernization theory argue differently. They consider the Americanization of political communication to be the consequence of an ongoing structural change in politics, society, and the media system. 5 The fragmentation of the publio sphere, which is linked to these changes, leads to a higher degree of specialization and professionalization among the actors of political communications. From this point of view, similarities in the practice of political communication, such as excessive personalization, a political star system, mass media impression management, and an increasing negativity of campaigns, are the consequences of an endogenous change. The supporters of this theory admit that some communication and campaign practices are borrowed from the far more professionalized competition of the United States; the characteristic

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components of political communication in Europe, however, are basically retained, they say. Thus, Americanization is seen as a synonym for modernization and professionalization. 6 Accordingly, what is happening between the United States and Western Europe is a process of non-directional convergence, which results in an increased similarity between the political communication process in media-centered democracies. 7 However, the diffusion ofU.S. campaign and marketing techniques is not a linear process resulting in a uniform standardization of international political practices. The most widespread model of adopting selected innovations and techniques of U.S. election campaigns might be the shopping model, whereby certain techniques and organizational routines of professional campaigning practice are imported from the United States and are modified and implemented taking the national context of political competition into account. 8 The shopping model primarily focuses on downto-earth techniques that can easily be implemented in the national context while maintaining country- and culture-specific campaign styles and philosophies.9 A model that will probably have more far-reaching effects on the political competition in Western Europe is the adoption model. In this case, the foreign observers tend to adopt the strategic axioms of American consultants and campaigning experts, which are regarded as more promising than the traditional local campaign approach. While the shopping model concentrates on the implementation of select U.S. campaign techniques as a supplement to country- and context-specific campaign practices, the adoption model stresses the transformational consequences of winning on-air, research-driven message development and targeted message delivery. Based on the example oflong-term changes in the political practice of communication and competition in Austria, the following article assesses the Americanization of Austrian politics and politicians. From the perspective of modernization theory, far-reaching changes in the media system and in the relationship between voters and parties shall be described. Following this, the reactions of politicians, party managers, and campaign professionals as well as political journalists regarding a changed media- and voterlandscape will be dealt with under the perspective of Americanization. Does professionalization only imply an imitation of selective American practices, or are the Austrian political elites adopting the role model offered by the American style of politics?

The Rise of Telepolitics and the Erosion of Party Attachments

During the last decade, a continuing technological revolution led to a profound transformation of the Austrian media system. An increasing

237

variety of programs with simultaneously growing competition among the media for ratings and circulation characterizes the current situation of the Austrian media system which is also forced to cope with the progressive internationalization of the markets for news and programs. In 2001, 97 percent of Austrian households already had at least one television set, compared to only 16 percent in 1961. In 2001, 78 percent of households were also able to receive about thirty foreign programs via cable or satellite besides the two Austrian channels, while in 1961 only one ORF program could be received whose time of broadcasting was limited to a few hours in the evening. Daily viewers of the main TV news broadcast Zeit im Bild only included 8 percent of the adult population in 1961. In contrast, in 2001 network news is seen daily by 42 percent of adults on public broadcasting (ORF). On a weekly average, 74 percent of the electorate are reached repeatedly by TV news. In 1961, the maximum reach of TV news was 31 percent. While in 1961 only 11 percent of the electorate received their information about political matters mainly from TV news reports, in 2001 79 percent gained this information primarily from television. The rise of television as the primary source of news lagged behind the same phenomenon in the United States and only took place in the early 1970s.

Figure 1: TV as Primary Source of News* 80

70 60

50

FUSAl

40

~

30

20 10 0

11 1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

Source: FESSEL-GfK, Political Surveys (1961-200 I); American National Election Studies (ANES). * Percentage of respondents who get usually most of their news from television.

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

The second precondition of an Americanization of Austrian politics was the decline of party identification. The process of partisan de-alignment started in the late 1970s and accelerated during the late 1980s. 10 During the 1950s and 1960s, approximately three-quarters of the Austrian electorate had a stable affiliation to a political party; by the end of the 1990s, only one half of the electorate shows a long-term affinity to a particularpolitical party. Compared to conditions in the middle of the 1970s, the share of persons with a strong party affiliation decreased by one-half and was only 16 percent in 1999. Almost cut in half also was the percentage of registered party members just as the organizational capacity for mobilization and campaigning had, in part, dramatically decreased among the Austrian traditional political parties. This decline of party affiliated core voters among Austrian parties contrasts with a continually increasing share of volatile, independent voters. While in 1972 only 8 percent of the electorate could be classified as shifting voters, this share was 53 percent in 2002. Almost every other eligible voter cast his/her vote at national or regional elections for different parties. Only 41 percent of the electorate could be classified as voters who consistently voted for the same party during all elections in which they participated. There has also been a continuous increase of the percentage of party changers among national elections. While in the national elections of 1975 only 3 percent voted for a different party than in the elections of 1971, there were 24 percent of shifting voters at the national election in 2002. At the same time, the percentage of voters who only decided definitely about the party of their choice during the last phase of the election campaign strongly increased. In 1975 only 5 percent were late deciders, but at the national election of2002, 23 percent belonged to this group. This increasing share of late deciders obviously increases the potential influence of mediated political communication as well as the effect of critical media events and media appearances on television. 11

"Americanization" of Austrian Politicians

The erosion of voter loyalties, the almost complete vanishing of the party press, and the declining mobilization capacity ·ofparty organizations has, in tum, increased the importance of independent media in general and of television in particular. During the late 1960s, the traditional party journalism gave way to a professional political journalism oriented upon news values and the expectations of the public. For example, during the Socialist Party convention in 1968, no journalist was allowed to enter the meeting hall and only a short statement was sent to the press after the weekly cabinet meeting of the members of the government, but no press conference took place. This practice of restrictive political communication

239

changed radically with the start of the Kreisky era in 1970. Bruno Kreisky was the first Austrian chancellor who recognized the importance of mass media for the work of the government. What in the United States under Ronald Reagan has been referred to as governing with the news, Kreisky had already practiced impressively during the early 1970s. Bruno Kreisky introduced holding a press conference after the weekly meeting of the cabinet, propagated his planned reforms through targeted exclusive interviews with selected daily newspapers, and was always available to journalists by telephone, a fact that earned him the title "media-chancellor." The personalization of politics-frequently used as an indicator for Americanization-reached its first culmination during the long years of Kreisky' s government. The year 1970 also marks a turning point in the Austrian practice of campaigning. During the parliamentary election campaign of 1970, the first live TV debate between two candidates for chancellor took place, in which Kreisky proved his competence with a camera-ready impression management. In this same election campaign, commercial advertising agencies were first commissioned with the development of messages, and foreign campaign experts were included in the campaign planning. The election 1970 thus marks the beginning of the modernization and professionalization of the political communication culture in Austria. The televisation of politics has reached a new quality in the late 1980s and 1990s. Television appearances by politicians became more important than ever before in terms of image management and election success. Campaigns have become more TV-centered, including media eventsespecially television debates and confrontainments-that play an extremely important part for the evaluation of candidates. This, in turn, has given a more important role to professional media advisors. A new media logic has replaced the traditional party logic. 12 All parties tried to adjust to these changes in their environment by providing more resources for the communication with voters and by professionalizing their communication practices. By doing so, political parties opened themselves to becoming a mobile target. The media reports about politics considerably changed during the past years. Especially live "duels" on television between two party leaders became a central attribute of campaigns since 1994. Such "duels" or confrontainments cannot be prepared in the same way as the official self-presentation of politicians that was characteristic of earlier periods. In spite of professional media training and the advice given by experts, politicians' natural abilities to present themselves in the media and the quality of party leaders to engage in impression management are decisive factors for the impact of their media appearances. The risks of telepolitics can best be studies on the example of the OVP, whose chairmen presented themselves fairly unsuccessfully on TV before

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

1995. This fact contributed considerably to the decline of the electoral success of the OVP. In order to reverse this process, the OVP frequently replaced their leading figures (in 1989, 1991, and 1995). But every replacement of another party leader caused serious conflicts within the party, which in turn contributed again to the political decline of the OVP' s success during elections. The long-term FPO party chairman Jorg Haider is the best example of the opposite. He is an excellent performer on television and has successfully used his media appearances for strategic agenda-setting and image-styling. It was mainly his appearance in TVdebates with political opponents that became the basis for the image of the FPO as an effective opposition party. Compared to the representatives of the government parties who tried to appear as statesmen, Haider acted like a gladiator. His style during televised debates was offensive, his language mostly informal. His contributions to TV confrontations are typically an endless stream of attacks, which for the most part do not respond directly to the statements of his opponents. Haider's attacks, as a rule, did not concentrate upon the "big" political questions themselves. Rather, they centered on small details of high symbolic weight and connected them to the arguments he wanted to make. Since the reports about Haider and the FPO in the print media are mostly dominated by a distant and critical attitude, the TV appearances of Haider gained central importance for the public image of the FPO and its electoral success. 13 Parallel to the attempts to make mass party organization more attractive, there were also endeavors in the Social Democratic Party for an increase of professionalization and personalization. While the chancellorship ofKreisky' s successor-Fred Sinowatz-failed due to his inability to create an appropriate image of himself for media-consumption, the SPOrelaunched itself in 1986 with Franz Vranitzky and his image as the modem manager-type. During the first years of the Vranitzky era, professional image-building as well as staging techniques used in the mass media by his advisors were quite successful. Only during the last of his years as chancellor did the criticism about unsubstantial statements and empty, staged appearances intensify. With his successor as chancellor and party chairman-Viktor Klima-image politics in Austria reached their culmination. Fascinated by the professionalism ofBill.Clinton and Tony Blair in handling the mass media, his advisors tried to stage the administration of Viktor Klima as if it were a promotional and political marketing operation. With colorful stories about his private background, professionally staged media events, and the relentless efforts of aggressive spin doctors to frame the issues and to instrumentalize the leading media, Klima's popularity over periods reached an all time high. But, in time, there was oversaturation. What had originally been planned as a clear, disciplined message was criticized by journalists as repetitive and empty statements, and many

241

commented critically that his advisors tried to market their candidate like a product. Overexposure in the mass media, repetition of staged appearances in the mass media, and considerable weaknesses of argumentation led to the heaviest defeat of the SPO in the parliamentary elections 1999. After the failure of the negotiations of the coalition with the OVP, Klima resigned from his political functions by the end of January 2000. His successor as SP6 chairman, Alfred Gusenbauer, is now leading the party in their role as opposition. Attempts to do without professional media consulting were soon given up again. Stylists began to attend to the outer appearance of the oppositional leader. Gusenbauer, too, is also seeking the expertise of professional public relations (PR) and media consultants and has been strategically advised by the top American consultant Stanley Greenberg during the past months. Since the early 1980s, the OVP has also been trying to modernize and professionalize their organization. They have invested more attention and resources in order to advance their strategic planning, opinion research, new party programs, and computerization of party headquarters. The party sought stronger support by non-socialist experts of science and economy. Party activities profiting most from the modernization process were public relations and election campaigns. Journalists were hired as party speakers and PR specialists. During the preparation of critical media appearances of the party chairman (for example, TV debates and speeches at party conventions), the 6VP used external media advisors. External experts and representatives of advertising agencies were increasingly involved in the planning of election campaigns. Wolfgang Schiissel, who became party chairman in 1995, first tried as the vice-chancellor of a great coalition government with the SP6 to represent a new leadership style and to present himself as an innovator and reformer. Yet he remained in the shadow of the periodically dominant SPO-chancellor Viktor Klima. After the breakdown of the great coalition, he became chancellor of a coalition government with the FP6 in February 2000. Political setbacks both in foreign and national politics dominated the first two years of his government. Regarding the mass media, Schiissel acts constrained and largely defies the imperatives of the American style of political communication. Compared to the SP6 and the OVP, the party organization of the FP6 has been traditionally weak. Therefore, Haider, when he became the new party chairman 1986, hardly met any internal resistance within the party regarding the far-reaching organizational changes he introduced. Being aware of the widespread critical attitudes toward his party, which he also used when attacking the government parties, Haider could not let the FPO remain an old-fashioned party. Moreover, he tried to remodel his party into a "movement for political renewal." It was the goal of this reform to integrate the FP6 and its newly won supporters by means of a new structure.

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

Many of these new voters had a critical attitude toward political parties and could hardly be organized in a political party or addressed by one. Regardless of the possible long-term effects of this organizational reform, the media reports about its introduction were quite helpful for the FPO. They helped the party establish the desirable image of being "different" from other parties and not old-fashioned. Other activities that were geared toward gaining this image included the founding of the "F-Clubs" and the organization of evenings at the disco. Part of this strategy was also the change of generations among party activists, which was advanced with much energy by the party leadership. Younger activists, who had been primarily attracted by the image of the party chairman and also been frequently recruited by him personally, have increasingly replaced the traditional FPO functionaries. 14 Similarly to the other parties, the FPO followed a strategy of professionalization by employing external consultants. Advertising and campaigning are concentrated in one advertising agency, which was founded by the party and is owned by it. This agency hires external advisors. It is worth mentioning that Jorg Haider's clothes have been selected with the help of a design agency. This political style was closely linked to a new style of personal appearance. Haider dressed in a fashionable, non-official style, participated in a "culture of the body," including bungee jumping, wearing "sexy outfits" and the like, and staged media events often with a nonpolitical theme. As an Austrian observer put it, "Mr. Haider is the only pop star on the political stage." By styling himself thusly, he struck a responsive chord not only among (especially younger) voters but also among journalists who, irrespective of their evaluation ofFPO politics, regarded the traditional style of Austrian politics (and politicians) as outdated and boring. 15 The FPO party organization was largely a forum in which events were staged in order to draw the attention of the media to the party and, especially, to its chairman. Although this applies to a certain extent to all parties, the FPO surpassed them all in this respect. The FPO convention of 1996, for example, was modeled after a "smoothly running" U.S. convention-"made for TV." The party chairman appeared on a screen, in a discussion with journalists in the style of a talk show. f.n internet-connection to this event gave the impression of total accessibility. 16 The electoral success of the FPO depended on its media presence and performance to a much greater extent than did the other parties. In fact, the FPO depends much more than the other parties on its presence within the media due to its deficient organization, its weak anchoring in the social structure, and its extreme dependence on public moods and emotions. More than the other parties, the FPO must try to influence the media agenda and

243

manage political and social issues in an active way, and to direct public attention to its own framing of problems. Under its chairman, Haider, the FPO was an extremely candidatecentered party. The FPO presented itself as a television or media party, a symbolic mobilization agency that tries to focus latent protest attitudes, resentments, and deeply rooted frustrations upon the figure of a leader who is also a media "star." The FPO was also a charismatic party in which there is a total symbiosis between the leader and the organizational identity. 17 The success of the FPO-despite the fact that Haider resigned as party chair when the FPO formed a coalitional government with the OVP-was . linked inseparably to the successful political communication performance, the populist self-staging, and the rhetorical strength of Haider. Escalating internal disputes resulted in a coalitional crisis and an electoral defeat at the parliamentary election 2002. The political cycle of the FPb generally reached its peak during electoral campaigning when the party and its leadership pursued offensive issue management, sharpened criticism, strengthened popular emotions, mobilized latent resentments, and polarized the electorate, all with a cool and calculated professionalism. 18 Under Haider the FPb needed the attention of the media for its strategic management of the electorate. Populist actors need a public resonance and the mass media provide a necessary and permanent soundboard for neo-populism. 19

"Americanization" of the Strategic Elites In Western Europe, the professionalization of party management and the imperatives of media-centered news management and professional political marketing are forming a common field of action and reaction for ideologically and programmatically highly differentiated political parties.20 As a rule, the incentive for endeavors toward increased professionalization has been election defeats, the change from government responsibility to the oppositional role or measures of central competitors toward modernization and professionalization. In Austria, such measures of professionalization in the party and its communication management have already been applied by the SPO and OVP at the end of the 1970s and were reinforced by an increasing orientation toward political marketing during the 1980s. The intensive use of opinion research for the formulation of central political messages, cooperation with communication and marketing experts from outside the party, widespread investments in new communication technologies (fax, e-mail, internet), and professional attempts to create cameraappropriatemediaevents as well as an intensified political public relations and media work now have priority in Austrian party headquarters compared to programmatic policy planning, which has largely been delegated and

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

divided up between the parliamentary factions and their staffs since the 1990s. Since the 1980s, transnational platforms and the possibilities of cooperation, which can be used for the mutual exchange ofinformation and strategic experiences, have played a central role regarding the professionalization of political parties. This pattern of learning by cooperation has mainly been important for the professionalization and modernization of the political communication management and campaigns. For example, platforms like the Campaign Conference of the European Democratic Union (EDU}-ajointforum of Christian Democratic and conservative partiesand repeated meetings of the advertising and communication managers of the Social Democratic and socialist parties are available to party managers for transnational contacts. Both platforms offer conferences and workshops several times annually, at which the leading campaign experts of parties exchange their professional experiences, present and analyze their campaigns, and discuss current strategic issues.21 At these conferences, top representatives of the U.S. Consultancy business are repeatedly invited in order to report about the newest trends and innovations in the campaign practice of the United States. The organization of trips to observe other campaigns and a tight transnational network of information and contacts are yet further ways in which knowledge is shared. The professionalization or Americanization of the Austrian strategic elites has been further advanced through direct contacts with American political consultants. During the 1980s, high-ranking delegations of staff from the SPO and OVP traveled to the United States for study purposes. Besides observing the election campaigns Austrian party managers were seeking contacts with prominent representatives of the U.S. Consultancy business, visited the national party headquarters of Democrats and Republicans, and educated themselves in the headquarters ofAmerican presidential candidates about the newest trends and techniques of the media and advertising campaigns.22 But with increasing frequency, professional political consultants from the United States have also been invited to internal workshops, and since the 1990s, they have also been hired for consultancy at the planning of Austrian regional and parliamentary election campaigns. Frank Luntz has been under contract as a political consultantfor the OVP in 1995. In 1999, Jennifer Laszlo supported the top candidate of the SPO in Carinthia in his (unsuccessful) campaign againstJorg Haider. During the spring of 2001, the Vienna SPO asked for the competence of Stanley Greenberg, who also advised the SPO-candidate for chancellor, Alfred Gusenbauer, 2002. Since the early 1970s, the formerly organization-centered mobilization campaigns, which concentrated on mass rallies and huge billboards, have turned into technically complex marketing and communication operations.

245

Indicators for the progressive professionalization of Austrian parliamentary elections are, among others: • the commission of professional advertising agencies and the integration of external advertising and communication experts in the strategic process of communication planning; • the cooperation with media and PR experts from outside the party as well as the use of professional media consultants for the preparation of candidates for "critical" media events like TV debates and their performance in the mass media; • the increase of staff in the departments for press and communication in party headquarters and parliamentary clubs; • the extraordinary value of polls for strategic decisions; • the dense monitoring during the decisive weeks of the campaign through continuous, sometimes twice weekly telephone surveys (track polling) and the accumulation of data for detailed strategic analyses of target groups; • the segmentation of the electorate by large scale opinion research and special typologies (target voter profiles) as well as the connection of survey data with statistical census-data (geodemography); • the excessive use of qualitative group discussions (focus groups) for the planning of central campaign messages, strategic arguments, and thematic positions during the campaign (message development); • the priority of the logic of political marketing at strategic campaign decisions; • the integration of American political consultants in the planning and preparation of the media and advertising campaigns; • first experiments with fifteen- to thirty-second TV spots in Austrian advertising slots of German private TV channels, which are currently still offered at extremely reasonable costs; and • first attempts to use the potential of the internet through newly designed websites, homepages, or online chats. A transnational research project-the Global Political Consultancy Survey-as part of which about 600 leading campaign managers and political consultants from the United States, Latll! America, Australia, Asia, and South Africa, as well as Western and Eastern Europe, were asked about their professional self-image and their evaluation of the practice of political marketing, also allows us to look at the view of the professional role of a sub-sample of thirty-one Austrian party managers and external political consultants. 23 The Austrian party managers and political consultants showed a distinct orientation toward U.S. standards. More than two-thirds defined the continuous observation of U.S. campaigns as well as the knowledge and familiarity with the newest U.S. literature as absolute

Contemporary Austrian Studies

246

requirements for any professional political strategist. Every second one admits to having worked with an American political consultant in the past. Every fourth is member of a professional group like the International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC) or the European Association of Political Consultants (EAPC). It also speaks for the above average degree of professionalization of Austrian campaign managers that 60 percent are constant readers of Campaigns & Elections. A total of90 percent of Austrian political advisors regard the medium of television as the most important and decisive factor in a successful can1paign, while they regard reports in the daily newspapers as second in importance at only 30 percent. The importance campaign managers attach to television as a communication platform is identical to the evaluation of the U.S. consultants interviewed, of whom 90 percent also regarded television as the by far most important medium of political communication. As a consequence, Austrian political consultants also attach unusually high importance to the TV presence of top candidates for a successful campaign. According to the interviewed experts, the central success factors for a candidate include personality, image, and public appearance (87 percent); followed in second place by his or her presence in TV news reports (81 percent); and third by the communicative competence of a top candidate at media events (71 percent). The central campaign message of the top candidate or candidates is only considered to be important by 55 percent of Austrian campaign experts. This evaluation clearly differs from the professional orientation of U.S. consultants, of whom 72 percent see the central campaign message of a candidate as the by far most important factor for the success of a campaign. Personality, image, and ability to communicate rank behind the central, target-orientated campaign message according to the American understanding of political marketing.

Table 1: Important Factors for the Success of a Candidate* U.S. Political Consultants

Austrian Campaign Professionals

1.

Central Campaign Message

72

1.

Personality, Image

87

1.

Personality, Image

87

2.

Presence in the media

51

2.

Presence in the media

81

2.

Communication ability

74

3.

Personality, Image

47

3.

Communication ability

71

3.

Presence in the media

71

German Campaign Professionals

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998-2000). *"Very important" in percent

247

This orientation toward the image of the candidate, which is typical for the campaign understanding of Austrian and German political consultants, is thereby clearly different from the professional evaluations of American political consultants. U.S. consultants tend to view image and issues as equally important factors, while the majority of German and Austrian advisors places issues definitely behind the appearance of a candidate in the mass media. The reasons for this can be found on the one hand in a different culture of competition, and, on the other hand, in a different understanding of the function and tasks of political marketing, which are viewed more strongly from the viewpoint of issue positioning and message development in the United States. 24

Table 2: Issues versus Image as Central Factors for Success; in response to the questions: "What is more important in parliamentary campaigns: the issues or the image and personality of the top candidate?" United States

Austria

Germany

Issues

28

6

3

Images

36

62

68

both

38

32

29

N==

105

31

31

In percent

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998-2000). Far more problematic and potentially consequential for the competitive reality in a party democracy like in Austria appears to be the marked skepticism of the interviewed party managers and political consultants regarding the function, importance, and meaning of the party organization within parliamentary election campaigns. Three-quarters of Austrian experts assume that the factor of the party organization has lost importance for parliamentary election campaigns in the last years. In Germany and the United States, only every second one sees a declining importance of the party organization. 25

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248

Table 3: Evaluation of the Importance of Party Organizations for Election Campaigns; in response to the question: "Has the importance of party organizations for parliamentary campaigns gained or lost importance during the last years?" United States

Austria

Gennany

Gained importance

29

10

29

Lost importance

50

77

48

No difference

21

13

23

N=

105

31

31

In percent

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998-2000). Seen from a long-term perspective, the media logic, which obviously was taken over from the U.S. understanding of marketing, leads to a general devaluation of the traditional organizational structure. What in the short run appears to be a vote-maximizing recipe for success, could in the long run reinforce weariness among the parties and thereby contribute to Americanization in terms of weakening an essential part of the Austrian party democracy.

"Americanization" of Political Journalism

How does the Americanization of political competition appear to professional observers from the media? On-depth interviews with thirtytwo leading Austrian political journalists provide the answer to this question. An indicator for the progressive Americanization of political competition is for members of the journalistic elites first of all the excessive personalization of Austrian politics, which led to virtual candidates and a system of political stars directed by TV and media staging. The media and camera appropriate self-staging of the top representatives is experienced as overdone and as favoring the emptiness of a political platform that has been reduced to slogans and repetitive messages. But the increasing lack of substance in the content of public statements and positions also appears to be favored by some questionable trends in Austrian journalism. The preference for home stories and the pre-occupation with the private life of top candidates increase the tendency toward reducing the political value of the reports in the mass media as a consequence of the increased competition for ratings and sales.

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As an additional indicator of the Americanization of Austrian political competition, the journalistic elites also view the progressive reduction of messages to sound bites that are suitable for quoting and broadcasting. The increasingly faster change of news cycles thereby leads to more and more superficial coverage of statements and messages of political elites in the everyday work ofjournalists. Regarding the progressive superficiality and lack of substance of political positions and statements, professional observers ascribe an essential role to the spin doctors or press officers of the political parties, who are trying quite aggressively to implement their stereotypical pictures and lines of argumentation in mass media reports. Professionalization, staging, and the lack of substance of narrow messages adapted to the media have contributed to a video clip style of Austrian politics and degenerated the political process into an ostensible show. From the viewpoint ofleadingjournalists, Austrian top politicians are more experienced today in handling journalists than five years ago. The consequences of this professionalization of political elites are, on the one hand, that top politicians are preparing themselves for interviews with the support of their media consultants and are surrounding themselves with a Teflon-coat that deflects the tougher questions of interviewers; on the other hand, it results in professional maneuvers to avoid uncomfortable questions. Therefore, interviews are becoming increasingly unsatisfactory for the journalistic elites and-by repetitive and stereotypical replies of their interview partners-to a ritual self-staging of the political elites. 26 The importance of professional media consultants for the political communication process consequently raises the need for research if one is not satisfied with tactically placed rumors ordemonstrativemessages. This research activity has become increasingly difficult due to the small number of persons capable of providing such information and due to the danger of being instrumentalized. Several leading journalists also reported a growing distance in the relationship between top politicians and journalists. As a result, confidential background discussions and unprotected personal evaluations of the situation off the record have become a rarity. The relationship between political journalists and political elites is increasingly taking on a critical, in some cases even confrontational, character. The members of the journalistic elite viewthe potential changes within the political competition in the next ten years with much pessimism. From the viewpoint of professional observers, the political practice of communication will become even more devoid of content and substance. The number of staged appearances as well as the character of Austrian political events as entertainment will increase considerably. The journalists interviewed are expecting an even faster change of news cycles and a further restriction of statements and messages of professionally advised top politicians in the coming years. The growing distance in the relationship between

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journalists and political elites will lead to a tougher and more adversarial attitude among journalists, which might additionally increase the negative tone of reports. Recent studies regarding the practice of political communication in media-centered democracies assume an increasing consonance of the understanding of political processes between strategic and journalistic elites. A comparison between the professional perspectives of Austrian party managers and political consultants with the estimates of leading Austrian journalists shows a high measure of agreement concerning the central factors and parameters of political competition. Party managers and journalists not only agree that the Austrian top politicians have become considerably more experienced in handling journalists during the last few years, but they also stress the priority of image before substance in terms of the position on strategic issues. There is also a striking agreement regarding the decreasing importance of party organizations for election campaigns in the opinions of the strategic and journalistic elite.

Table 4: "Americanization" from the Perspective of Strategic and Journalistic Elites (agreement in percent) Statements

Strategic Elites

Journalistic Elites

1.

Austria's top politicians are more experienced in handling the mass media than 5 years ago.

74

87

2.

Image and personality of top candidates are more important for election campaigns than issues.

62

68

3.

The importance of party organizations for election campaigns has decreased in the last years.

77

84

Source: Survey among N==31 Austrian party managers and political consultants and of N==32 Austrian leading journalists as part of the Global Political Consultancy Project. Agreement mostly exists regarding the evaluation of central factors for the success of a political top candidate. Strategic as well as journalistic elites regard the personality and image and TV presence and communicative competence at media appearances as the preeminent factors for the political success of a top candidate. But, while the interviewed campaign

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professionals stress the central importance of the main message, only three of thirty-two leading journalists believe that the contents offered by a top candidate represent a very important factor for a successful candidacy. Journalists also see the issues of competence, leadership qualities, and political experience as less relevant to the success of a candidate than do the strategic elite. In sum, the estimates of Austrian journalists also reflect a primary orientation on factors of personality and image.

Table 5: Important Factors for the Success of a Candidate* U.S. Political Consultants (N=l05)

Austrian Campaigns Professionals (N=31)

Austrian Political Journalists (N=32)

Central campaign message

72

55

10

Communication ability

57

71

58

Presence in the media

51

81

78

Issue competence

28

39

23

Professional media consultants

22

26

39

Looks and habits

14

35

35

Being a good speaker

13

26

26

Leadership qualities

7

36

3

Unified party support

5

10

23

Political experience

1

1

3

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998-2000). *"Very important" in percent

Discussion

Within the confines of the institutional arrangements characteristic of Austrian politics (parliamentary system, coalitional government, partydriven style of political competition, public finance of parties, and campaigns and dominance of public television and radio), there is convincing evidence for an ongoing Americanization of political communication and

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campaign practices. But this form of Americanization can be regarded as a selective imitation and implementation of American techniques and approaches by Austrian political elites, comparable to the shopping model introduced in the first section of this article. As reaction to a severe structural modernization of the media and to the changing electoral environmenis of domestic politics, Austrian political elites showed intensified interest in learning from innovations and development in the most advanced media-centered democracy-the United States. Despite the fact that numerous American political consultants transformed or even revolutionized select Austrian campaign practices, and despite the fact that Austrian politicians and their managers closely observe the latest trends in American communication and campaign politics, structural and institutional impediments counteract an outright Americanization of Austrian politics. From the viewpoint of modernization theory, a hybridization or a merger of traditional styles of competition with modem styles and strategies has occurred. Referring to the temporal dimension of the concept of Americanization and recent changes and political innovations in the United States, one might find some evidence of a time lag between the Austrian style of political communication and the American style, which it follows. While American consultants moved in the direction of targeted message development and carefully crafted micro-messages addressing select groups of voters, Austrian political managers and campaign professionals still can be classified as image marketers, concentrating on the superficialities of image politics and the positive media acceptance of candidates and their television performances. This was characteristic of American politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but is nowadays replaced by relentless endeavors to deliver targeted messages and to strike a responsive chord with suburban swing voters. Notes

1. Patrick Donges, "Amerikanisierung, Professionalisierung, Modernisierung? Anmerkungen zu einigen amorphen Begriffen," in Trans-Atlantik-Trans-Portabel? Die Amerikanisierungsthese in derpolitischen Kommunikation, ed. Klaus Kamps (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000); Klaus Kamps, "America ante Portas?Grundziige der Amerikanisierungsthese," in Trans-Atlantik-Trans-Portabel? Die Amerikanisierungsthese inderpolitischen Kommunikation, ed. Klaus Kamps (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000); Fritz Plasser with Gunda Plasser, Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis ofCampaign Professionals and Their Practices (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 2. Fritz Plasser, "Amerikanisierung der Wahlkommunikation in Westeuropa: Diskussionsund Forschungsstand," in Wahlen undPolitikvermittlung durchMassenmedien, ed. Hans Bohrmann, Otfried Jarren, et al. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000).

253 3. David Farrell, "Campaign Modernization and theW est European Party: Shopping in the U.S. Political Market?", in Political Parties and Democracy in Western Europe, ed. Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Miiller-Rommel (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 4. Andreas Genz, Klaus Schon bach, and Rolli A. Semetko, "Amerikanisierung? Politik in den Femsehnachrichten wlihrend der Bundestagswahlkampfe 1990-1998," in Wahlen und Wahler, ed. Dieter Klingemann and Max Kaase (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001 ). 5. Ralph Negrine and Sylianos Papathanasopoulos, "The "Americanization" of Political Communication: A Critique," The Harvard International Journal ofPress/Politics 1 (2) 1996. 6. FritzPlasser, "American Campaign Techniques Worldwide," The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5 (4) 2000. 7. Negrine and Papathanasopoulos, 'The "Americanization" of Political Communication"; Plasser, "Amerikanisierung der Wahlkommunikation in Westeuropa." 8. Fritz Plasser, Christian Scheucher, and Christian Senft, "Is There a European Style of Political Marketing?" in Handbook ofPolitical Marketing, ed. Bruce I. Newman (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999). 9. Farrell, "Campaign Modernization and the West European Party." 10. Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, Das osterreichische Politikverstiindnis. Von der Konsens- zur Konjliktkultur? (Wien: WUV, 2002). 11. Fritz Plasser, "Medienzentrierte Demokratie: Die "Amerikanisierung" des politischen Wettbewerbs in Osterreich," in Die Zukunft der osterreichischen Demokratie, ed. Anton Pelinka, Fritz Plasser, and Wolfgang Meixner (Wien: Signum, 2000). 12. Plasser, "Medienzentrierte Demokratie." 13. WolfgangC.Miiller, FritzPlasser,andPeter A. Ulram, "WeaknessasAdvantageand Strength as Handicap: Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria," in

Political Parties in Electoral Markets: Challenges and Responses in Contemporary Western Democracies, ed. Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Miiller, and Fritz Plasser (Thousand Oaks: Sage,

2003, forthcoming); FritzPlasser and Peter A. Ulram, "Striking a Responsive Chord: Mass Media and Right Wing Populism in Austria," in The Media and Neo-Populist Movements, ed. Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Bruce Horsfield, and Julianne Steward (Westport CT: Praeger, 2003). 14. Max Riedelsperger, "The Freedom Party in Austria: From Protest to Radical Right Populism," in The New Politics of the Right: New Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, ed. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan lmmerfall (New York: St. Martin's, 1998). 15. Plasser and Ulram, "Striking a Responsive Chord." 16. Miiller, Plasser, and Ulram, "Weakness as Advantage and Strength as Handicap." 17. Ami Pedahzur and AvrahamBrichta, 'The Institutionalization of Extreme Right-Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?" Party Politics 8 (1).2002. 18. Duncan Morrow, "JOrg Haider and FPO: Beyond the Democratic Pale?", in The Politics ofthe Extreme Right: From Margins to Mainstream, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000). 19. Plasser and Ulram, "Striking a Responsive Chord." 20. Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Miiller, and Fritz Plasser, eds., Political Parties in Electoral Markets: Challenges and Reponses in Contemporary Western Democracies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003, forthcoming). 21. Plasser, Scheucher, and Senft, "Is There a European Style of Political Marketing?"

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22. Peter Filzmaier and Fritz Plasser, Wahlkampjum das Weij3e Haus. Presidential Elections in den USA (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2001). 23. Plasser, "Global Political Campaigning." 24. Paul R. Baines, Christian Scheucher, and FritzPlasser, 'The Americanization Myth in European Political Markets: A Focus on the United Kingdom," European Journal ofMarketing 35 (9/19) 2001. 25. Fritz Plasser, "Parties' Diminishing Relevance for Campaign Professionals," The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 6 (4) 2001. 26. Anton Pelinka, Fritz Plasser, and Wolfgang Meixner, "Von der Konsens- zur Konfliktdemokratie? Osterreich nach dem Regierungs- und Koalitionswechsel," in Die Zukunft der iisterreichischen Demokratie, ed. Anton Pelinka, Fritz Plasser, and Wolfgang Meixner (Wien: Signum, 2000); Plasser, "Medienzentrierte Demokratie."

REVIEW ESSAYS The Ancient Hatred: Postwar Austrian Anti-Semitism Heinz P. Wassermann, ed.Antisemitismus in Osterreich nach 1945 (lnnsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2002) Andrei S. Markovits When the editors of Contemporary Austrian Studies contacted me to review this book, I agreed in a perfunctory way, more out of a deeply felt admiration for this journal's two editors and an equally strong commitment to the success of this fine publication than the book's topic. Through my own periodic but sustained work on subjects in political sociology to which Austrian, German and European anti-Semitismhave been central, I actually believed that this book will tell me few things that I did not already know. I am delighted to report at the outset that I was completely wrong. To be 5ure, the book indeed conveyed little new factual information to me-as I believe it would to any otherreader familiar with this sorry topic-and yet I find this volume to be of great importance. There are two kinds of anthologies: the vast majority in which the parts comprise decidedly less than a whole; and a small minority whose whole is of much greater value than its individual parts. I would place the book under review in this latter group for the following decisive reason: Once the reader has finished all the contributions, in other words once all the trees have been inspected, one actually gets to appreciate a conceptually relevant forest that gives a solid picture of the issue at hand: in this case that of Austrian anti-Semitism after 1945. To be sure, as a political scientist, and thus beholden to a discipline whose hegemonic epistemology demands the elegance of parsimony via analytic models to the direct detriment of factual narratives so preferred by historians, I found only one article-the last one by Georg Schmid (to

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which I will return in detail later in this review)-in the entire book that had anywhere near the ratio of analysis to description that I appreciate in first-rate scholarship. But having confessed to my biases right up front, I can thus dispense with this wholesale criticism and proceed to the volume's nitty gritty. The book commences with a perfunctory preface by its editor, Heinz P. Wassermann who merely summarizes each chapter's topic in a sentence or two. While this proves helpful to a reviewer who needs to summarize the gist of a chapter in nary a paragraph, it bespeaks the shirking of an editor's minimal duty that--one would expect--demands at least an honest attempt to place the contributions into some kind of conceptual framework. Since there is neither an introduction nor a conclusion to this volume-truly a shame since the presence of at least either but preferably both would have made a fine book a great one-it remains up to the reader to arrive at any kind of overview and synthesis of the detailed materials presented by the empirical chapters. That I, as already stated, was able to do this is testimony to the high quality of most of this book's individual contributions. The first one, by Evelyn Adunka, is a solid account of a bevy of antiSemitic incidents that have occurred throughout the fifty plus years of Austria's Second Republic and have attained substantial notoriety. Adunka offers a fine overview of these in a chronological order starting with the "Kunschak Mfair" in 1945 in which Leopold Kunschak, one of the conservative People's Party's labor leaders and arguably one of the founding giants of the Second Republic, proudly confirmed the vile antiSemitism that he repeatedly voiced in the inter-war years by confidently declaring yet again that yes indeed, he remained an anti-Semite after the war as well. The chapter ends with a description of an incident in 1997 in which Vienna's alternative newspaper with the cryptic title "Wiener'' reported on an alleged scandal in the main office of Austria's Jewish community by using barely concealed anti-Semitic tropes and overt antiSemitic language. I will voice two criticisms of this otherwise fine chapter: The author mentions the omission of the Kreisky-Wiesenthal-Peter affair but never offers any reasons for this decision which would have been an interesting datum for the reader since-without any doubt-this affair was arguably much more important and prevalent in Austria's postwar history than many an incident to which Adunka provides ample space. To be sure, the Kreisky-Wiesenthal-Peter affair was much better known internationally than most of the others discussed by Adunka and would have strengthened her meager presentation of Kreisky' s deeply problematic relationship to Jews, Israel, anti-Semitism and the whole complex comprising the essence of this book. My second criticism pertains to one of Adunka' s cryptic but highly interesting remarks wherein she states that the Taras Borodajkewycz

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affair in 1965 was not only one of the most prominent anti-Semitic incidents of the Second Republic (in the wake of which, after all, the first politically motivated murder occurred in postwar Austria), but also constituted a watershed after which things improved markedly. Alas, the author never makes clear how and why this would have been the case. Indeed, even a cursory reading of this very volume demonstrates quite clearly how dubious-perhaps even erroneous-Adunka' s vague assertion remains. And yet, she is not totally wrong. It is not so much the lessening of anti-Semitism in Austria that has infonned the post-Borodajkewycz era but rather the more public voicing of this ugly phenomenon by folks like the contributors to this volume. Especially since theW aldheim affair-and accentuated by Joerg Haider's rise to international prominence-antiSemitism and everything pertaining to it have become much more subject to public debate than they were prior to the mid-1960s. Lastly, something not discussed in this book at all, it has been the self-assurance of the Jewish community in Austria (meaning Vienna for all intents and purposes) that-just like elsewhere in Europe-has become much more certain ofits legitimacy and its identity as Jews thereby creating a situation that, too, has altered the whole complex of anti-Semitismin Austria, particularly in tenns of its standing as a public issue. This self-assurance of Jewish communities in Europe--even of such precarious and weak ones as those in Germany and Austria-vis-a-vis the fellow citizens of their respective countries, but also in relations to Israel and the American Jewish community (Judaism's two main bastions) embodies yet another empowering-albeit indirectlegacy of "1968". In the volume's second chapter, Thomas Albrich offers a solid account of the vocal and manifest anti-Semitism that the Austrian population brought to bear against Jewish Displaced Persons following the conclusion of the Second Word War. Albrich' s work shows how anti-Semitism was yet a particular and more emphatically hostile phenomenon in the larger complex of the dislike of all Displaced Persons who irked Austrians in two fundamental ways: first, they were disliked in general since they hailed from Europe's eastern countries whose populations were never appreciated by those of the continent's middle or western part with Austrians not being exceptional on this count. Add to this the remaining legacy of the Nazi experience with its overt racism and xenophobia, and it was obvious that these Displaced Persons were anything but welcomed in a war-ravaged Austria of the mid-to-late 1940s in which they represented a direct competition to the Austrians in quest of the rare material resources that were available at the time. But there was a second-particularly Austrianreason that the Austrians hated these Displaced Persons, especially the Jews. With the Nazi legacy still alive and well, and its Weltanschauung still solidly in tact in Austria, there however also emerged with a vengeance

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already at this time the so called "victim myth" which depicted Austrians as victims of Nazi Germany. But with the bevy of Displaced Persons visible over the land, it was clear that this myth met a tangible challenge. The contradiction between these two emotions-perceived victims on the one hand confronting the real victims on the other-exacerbated the resentment felt for Displaced Persons, particularly the Jews among them. Albrich, like many other contributors to the volume, argue persuasively that there never was a "Stunde Null" in Austria's anti-Semitism and that continuity prevailed. I have only one criticism of this fine contribution: While I have no doubt that many Jews selfishly "instrumentalized" anti-Semitism in the immediate postwar period to obtain various personal advantages and enhance their own interest, mentioning this fact repeatedly could lead one to believe that the author used it to relativize the gist of his article which is to depict the anti-Semitism and hostile environment that awaited these true victims of Nazi barbarity upon their arrival to Austria after the war. One of the book's best pieces appears in Chapter 3 wherein Margit Reiter offers an excellent overview of anti-Semitism on the Austrian Left. Having read Reiter's fine monograph on this topic, I was familiar with her overall argument, yet found it a wonderful read in its shorter form as well. Indeed, I would rate Reiter's work as the Austrian parallel to Martin Kloke' s superb study of the German left's relations to Jews, anti-Semitism, Israel and Zionism (Martin Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke. Zu Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhaeltnisses, Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1990). Everybody knows that virtually all European rights-most certainly extreme rights-are anti-Semitic. There has never been any doubt about the absolute centrality of anti-Semitism to the Austrian and German rights: they have always proudly announced this to the world and have never tried to hide it. Thus, in a sense, working on the right's anti-Semitism is easy-both conceptually and empirically. (This in no way is meant to denigrate scholarly work on that important topic.) But writing about something in which virtually all subjects emphatically deny any involvement, as most German, Austrian and European leftists constantly do when anything related to anti-Semitism concerning them is raised, no matter how analytically persuasive and empirically sound the evidence might be; indeed when much of the self-understanding and selfidentification of this group hinges on its claiming to be not anti-Semitic, in fact on its allegedly active opposition to anti-Semitism, is not only difficult but also immensely important. Reiter demonstrates how both representatives of the Austrian old left-the Social Democrats as well as the Communists-harbored their own anti-Semitism with the former mostly in terms of having actual anti-Semites in its ranks and the latter tilting more to various ideological positions on Jews and Israel that Reiter correctly identifies as barely veiled anti-Semitism. And this brings us to the ever-

259

more salient topic as to whether criticisms oflsrael and its policies are ipso facto anti-Semitic or legitimate unprejudiced opposition. The author confirms a position that I have long advocated in the most diverse fora on both sides of the Atlantic: it is not the criticism of Israel per se that is antiSemitic, but its intensity, its frequency, its one-sidedness, its wholesale nature that clearly bespeaks an obsession with Israel on the part of the Austrian (indeed European) left that in its sheer quantity and quality is unique. This uniqueness in turn can only be gauged by the particularly complex position of the Jews in European history of which anti-Semitism has remained an integral part. As Reiter summarizes her position, the equating of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism is as erroneous as is the negating of a compelling relationship between the two. True enough, but then again I do not know one single conflict anywhere in the world where one has to separate consistently criticisms of policies from the very existence of the entity as remains the case with Israel in the eyes of many Europeans, certainly of the left. With no other country in the world does one preface a debate of its policies thus: I do not question the legitimacy of country X' s right to exist, but ...What this says is clear: To many members of Europe's old New Left, the legitimacy of Israel's very existence is still not a given. Worse, as Georg Schmid so brilliantly argues in the concluding essay of this volume (again, more on that soon), this essential credo of the New Left has permeated much of European public opinion since the El Aksa intifadah and is an absolutely acceptable notion of legitimate discourse the way conventional anti-Semitism is not. Indeed, I would go even further by arguing that few, if any, tropes-with the notable exception of an unmitigated hatred for the United States and everything Americanhave been as ubiquitously accepted by virtually all European lefts as an intense hostility towards Israel. Being anti-Israel and despising Zionism furnish the core "Glaubensbekenntnis" for the European left and serve as one of the few unifying commitments to an otherwise fractured political entity. Reiter mentions the Austrian left's support for radical Palestinian organizations such as the Progressive Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). But the left's ani-Zionism and hatred for Israel do not stop at sympathies for and alliances with these two Marxist organizations. I am much too ignorant about the specificity of the Austrian left to group it together with important wings of the French, Belgian, German and even the British lefts, but it is quite clear that these latter groups expressed at least tacit approval of, even open admiration for, various expressions oflslamic fascism, from Hammas to AI Queida. One need only extend a cursory reading to the various publications that these groups offer to see that their hatred oflsrael, the United States and increasingly also Jews has led them to embrace a powerful political movement in the current Islamic world that any

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knowledgeable historian or political scientist would have serious difficulties in classifying as "left" in a meaningful sense of that term. But on the issue of Jews, anti-Semitism, Israel, Zionism and America, distinctions between left and right have always been blurred, despite the left's claims to the contrary. Never has this been clearer than today. Again, I cannot speak for the situation in Austria, but there have been well-documented contacts between members of the radical left and radical Islamists in Britain, Germany, Belgium and France. Guenther Tetpotitz offers a fine chapter on the anti-Semitism of the Austrian extreme right's key publications. Karl Mueller follows with an erudite discussion of postwar Austrian literature's inability and unwillingness to deal with Jews and their fate. However, I was particularly encouraged by the last sentence of his contribution that mentions the creation of the Austrian Center at Jerusalem's Hebrew University and concrete discussions at the University of Salzburg (Mueller's home institution) concerning the establishment of an undergraduate major in Jewish Studies, possibly in conjunction with Austrian Studies. Dieter A. Binder's chapter complements Mueller's nicely by focusing on certain antiSemitic and anti-American tropes in the work of some postwar Austrian writers. Eduard Gugenberger and Roman Schweidlenka confirm convincingly the long known fact that important strains of the ecology movement have always harbored openly anti-Semitic intetpretations of their enemies' alleged destruction of the environment. Heinz P. Wassermann, the volume's editor, offers an interesting contribution on how key scandals and controversies concerning Jews in the Federal Republic of Germany (Passbinder play, Bitburg visit, Jenninger speech, Walser-Bubis row) were reported by the Austrian press. Let me end this review by focusing on the three undiscussed articles in this volume that spoke to me with particular power and relevance. First, as a frequent author on subjects pertaining to sports-to what I have termed "hegemonic sports culture" in particular-! was deeply interested in the chapter authored by Michael John and Matthias Marschik that focused on anti-Semitism in Austrian sports since 1945. Since it has been soccer-in addition to Alpine skiing-that have comprised Austria's "hegemonic sports culture" throughout the period under inyestigation, the authors' complete concentration on the world of soccer is a more than justified analytic choice. In the beginning of their article the authors give a fine account of anti-Semitism's massive presence on the soccer grounds of the new Republic. Here, too, there was a visible and audible continuity and no Stunde Null. Then, for reasons that remain unexplained and mar this otherwise fine piece, the authors take their story straight to the 1980s and 1990s omitting the second half of the 1950s, and all of the 1960s and 1970s. I can only provide totally random and unsystematic data from the

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period between 1958 and 1967 when Ilived in Vienna as a young boy and a teenager, and spent virtually every Saturday and/or Sunday afternoon attending various soccer games on the grounds belonging to the many Viennese clubs that were playing in Austria's top league at the time. Thus, I spent many an afternoon on "Admira' s" grounds in Jedlesee, just as I did on "Wacker's" in Meidling, "Vienna's" on the Hohe W arte, "Sportklub' s" in Hernals, "WAC's" in the Prater, and-of course-"Rapid' s" in Huetteldorf and then homeless "Austria's" in the huge Prater Stadion. (For the reader not versed in matters of Austrian soccer, please note that one of the two most prominent Austrian clubs is called "Austria"; another, decidedly less successful, club goes by the English name of"Vienna" .) I always went to the games with my father who was a huge "Austria" supporter, like virtually all ofVienna' s Jewish community at the time. I remember clearly with what disdain the other team's fans would eye my father and me and how-even, or perhaps especially, as a boy-1 felt that this contempt went way beyond the manifest fact of our being "Austria" fans. But to my retrospective surprise, I can remember only one overt and explicit antiSemitic incident that-as expected-occurred on the "Rapid" ground in Huetteldorf during one of the derbies with "Austria" when both teams were actively vying for the championship. I would have loved to have read some serious scholarship pertaining to anti-Semitism on Austria's soccer grounds during the era when I lived in Vienna and begrudge John and Marschik for not providing any. What the authors do discuss amply is the vocally aggressive anti-Semitism that has become commonplace on Austria's soccer grounds in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. That "Austria" and its fans are constantly subjected to anti-Semitic attacks does not come as a surprise since for reasons that cannot be explained in this short review "Austria" has been viewed as the Jewish club since well before the Second World War, a tradition that continues unabated. And that it is particularly fans of"Austria' s" arch-rival "Rapid" that are the most vocal in these antiSemitic denunciations also does not qualify as unexpected. However, much more telling of how generally pejorative-how universalized-the term "Jude" has become is the fact that whatever opponents one does not like for whatever reason quickly become saddled with this most viciously felt expletive. Opponents of the working class club ·:sK Voest" from Linz which never ever had any connections to anybody or anything Jewish regularly deride the club and its supporters as "SK VAU- Judensau". Notable in this anti-Semitic discourse in Austria's soccer stadia is its unmitigated aggression which-naturally-invokes tropes from the Nazis, the Holocaust, and other ills befalling the Jewish people. It needs to be stated that this vile behavior is in no way limited to Austrian soccer. Fans of "Feyenoord Rotterdam" invariably invoke chants about Auschwitz, Hammas and gas (rhymes with Hammas) when their team plays its major

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rival "Ajax Amsterdam", another club intimately identified with Jews. Germany's star side "Bayem Muenchen" is frequently derided as the "Judenklub," and there are many anti-Semitic incidents in the club's semiannual confrontations with its Munich rival "1860." The two north London clubs "Arsenal" but particularly "Tottenham Hotspurs" are regularly greeted by anti-Semitic chants on the part of their opponents' fans. The worst, of course, has been "Ferencvaros" in Budapest whose fans engaged in such overtly racist and anti-Semitic behavior that Europe's soccer federation, UEFA, punished the club by actually forcing it to play some home games with no spectators allowed into its stadium. "Celtic Glasgow's" supporters wield Palestinian and Hezbollah flags whereas fans of "Glasgow Rangers", their cross-town rivals, have appropriated the Israeli flag as one of their symbols. What is amply clear in all of this is the fact that a very vocal and often violent segment of young European men (this milieu is almost totally male) have appropriated overt anti-Semitism and racism as an expression of their aggression towards various real and imagined targets in contemporary Europe. Austria is no exception on this dimension. As John and Marschak so aptly conclude their chapter on antiSemitism in Austrian sport, soccer in particular, "the sporting venue appears to be a locus where anti-Semitism as a cultural code can be openly expressed without it however thus becoming public." Anti-Semitism has thus remained very much part of Austria' s-as well as Europe' s-pays reel of soccer stadia, the local bar, the neighborhood cafe, private dinner parties. It is open without being public, real without being salonfaehig. The latter space is reserved for anti-Zionism and overt antagonism towards Israel in contemporary Europe. I was particularly impressed-even moved-by Peter Dusek's superb article on the futility of the electronic media (radio and television in particular) to alter anti-Semitic sentiments and prejudices in a massive manner. Dusek should know. As a life-long employee of Austria's public television and one of its leading intellectuals, Dusek is better qualified than most to speak about this immensely relevant topic both with knowledge but also with passion. It is in the context of the latter that Dusek introduces a highly personal and autobiographical note that speaks clearer than many a learned study on the history and structure of anti-.Semitism in Austria (or Germany, even other European countries for that matter). Dusek describes how his mother, a seventeen year-old typical Viennese girl at the time, danced with German soldiers on the Ringstrasse in March of 1938. Far from ever becoming a committed Nazi, she and her husband tried to make ends meet during the war, dodging his service in the Wehrmacht as best they could. However, Dusek's maternal grandfather was a different case altogether. An erudite lover of the humanities, profound connoisseur of Mozart, Goethe, Beethoven and da Vinci, he was a soft-spoken man who

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seemed never to be able to harm anybody. But given a tad more alcohol than he could handle, this Dr. Jekyll would turn into a monstrous Mr. Hyde who repeatedly bemoaned the fact that Hitler had not murdered all Jews, that he [the grandfather] would have rejoiced about the Holocaust of which-to his chagrin-he knew nothing while serving with the Wehrmacht in the Balkans, that the Jews invented the Holocaust to lead the German people into servitude, and on and on. Never mind the usual contradiction committed by anti-Semites who on the one hand insist that the Holocaust is nothing but a figment of evil and manipulative Jewish imagination, while on the other wishing that it had been even more brutal and thorough than it already was ("Hitler did not finish the job"). What matters in Dusek's story is the persistence of these tropes among countless ordinary Austrians and the inability of the most modern of media to make any serious dent in them. Far from the media being this controlling Orwellian agent as we so often fear, Dusek shows that they can at best reinforce or drive underground but rarely improve or change. Anti-Semitism for Dusek is like a fungus: It is nearly invisible in dry weather, not bothering any of its surrounding fauna. But given the right amount of irrigation and the requisite temperature, the fungus suddenly emerges to manifest ubiquity with a force that appears surprising only to the uninitiated. In concluding his powerful and moving essay, Dusek equates the media and its practitioners to Sisyphus who continues to roll the rock up a hill merely to see it drop to the bottom just as the evanescent top seems ever so near. The book concludes Georg Schmid's impressive piece on antiSemitism. Appropriately, this contribution does not deal with Austria at all but offers a conceptual account of anti-Semitism as a very particular kind of prejudice and hatred that has far from disappeared from the European scene. At best, so Schmid argues, it has mutated yet again but like Dusek's fungal analogy, it remains very much part of Europe's fabric with nary a sign of its disappearance. Schmid points out how the usage of the term "Jude" in the singular-as is so often the case in anti-Semitic terminology-always bespeaks a pejorative view. He then proceeds to argue persuasively that words and language have meaning, and that anti-Semitic language and thought always preceded anti-~emitic action. A superb section on "the Jew" as Europe's "other" merely confirms in a theoretically sound way the empirical findings that we encountered in Austria's (indeed Europe's) soccer stadia where "Jew" and anything related to being Jewish has become a universalized Schimpfwort. Schmid concludes his brilliant article by showing how the whole victim-perpetrator axis has been inverted in today's global discourse and how in fora such as the conference in Durban a "new judeophobia" has become the lingua franca of the most motley of organizations. Not only in Durban were we witnesses of some of

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the vilest expressions of anti-Semitism in the guise of liberation and progressive politics. The same occurred in Porto Alegre in Brazil, as it did at the annual conference in Davos. The last words in Schmid's impressive work perhaps best summarize the enigma that anti-Semitism remains to this day and will continue for the indefinite future. Schmid quotes a Holocaust survivor in English: "'He [God] owes me answers to many questions."' There can be no higher praise for this fine volume than that it raised many questions about anti-Semitism in postwar Austria. However, its contributors cannot be faulted for failing to offer anywhere near the same amount of answers.

A Homely Picture Book? Robert Kriechbaumer, Ein vaterliindisches Bilderbuch: Propaganda, Selbstinszenierung und Asthetik der Vaterliindischen Front (Vienna: Bohlau, 2002) Peter Berger The Austrian composer, Ernst Krenek (1900-1991), in his recently published memoirs 1 tells the story of a successful conspiracy in 1934 to prevent his work, "Karl V," from being performed at the famous Viennese opera house. Active in this plot were the Wiener Staatsoper's chief conductor Clemens Krauss, and a music critic for a daily paper owned by the fascist Austrian Home Guard (Heimwehr). The journalist objected against scenes in "Karl V" which he considered offensive to the Catholic religion. Krauss suggested that Krenek rework his opera and denounce "protestant heresy" by using atonality and dissonance as means of stylistic expression whenever Protestants appeared on stage. 2 Unwilling to compromise his artistic standards while at the same time hoping to gain support of influential figures in Austrian politics, Krenek had leather-bound copies of the libretto of "Karl V" presented to Prince Starhemberg (the Heimwehrcommander), Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, and Vienna's archbishop, Cardinal Innitzer. Somewhat surprisingly, Starhemberg was alone among the three to answer this gesture. As Krenek later recalled, "[ ... ] an armed member of his [Starhemberg' s] gang, on a roaring motorcycle, stopped right in front of my home and delivered a message written by the Prince, saying how much he appreciated my gift." Such princely courtesy notwithstanding, the premiere of "Karl VI" took place in Prague, not in Vienna. Despite his disappointing experience, Ernst Krenek remained a member of the Fatherland Front, the patriotic movement launched in 1933 by Dollfuss to replace all political parties and to counter pan-Germanic Nazi propaganda with deliberate efforts at promoting pride in "Austrian-ness."

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No doubt Krenek's Austrian sentiments were sincere, and no doubt he disapproved not only of German Nazis but of German presumptuousness in general, as is made overly clear by some derisory comments in his memoirs. But unlike him, most of the Fatherland Front's astonishingly large membership (500,000 in 1934, 2.5 million in 1937) signed up for reasons other than Heimatliebe or anti-Nazi convictions. As Robert Kriechbaumer, author of the work under review here suggests, the number of convinced followers of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime within the Fatherland Front was actually very small. The organization owed its impressive size to various benefits attainable through wearing its badge. Most important, it could provide members with jobs at a time when 20 percent or more of the national workforce were unemployed. Kriechbaumer' s volume ~s not a conventional history of the Fatherland Front, but-as its title Ein Vaterliindisches Bilderbuch somewhat inaptly suggests-a collection of captioned photographic documents. Most of the original pictures are in possession of Russia's Central War Archives in Moscow and were selected for reproduction by a team of Austrian scholars associated with Salzburg's Wilfried Haslauer Library, of which Kriechbaumer is the director. In an introductory essay of sixty-odd pages, Kriechbaumer takes some pains to define the essence of Austria's regime in the years between 1933 and 1938. How it entered the historical stage is well known. 3 On 4 March 1933, Austrian parliament ceased to function after its three speakers had resigned following a bitter dispute between Social Democrats, Christian Socials, and Pan-Germans over the issue of how to deal with railroad workers on strike. The golden opportunity of a paralyzed lower house (in which the despised Social Democrats held the majority of seats) was after some hesitation seized by Chancellor Dollfuss. He proclaimed that Austrians would now, at least temporarily, be governed without involving elected representatives of the people. In May 1934, a new constitution was promulgated. Its initial paragraph replaced the common reference in democracies to popular sovereignty by an invocation of "God the Almighty, who is the source of justice and law."4 A few weeks earlier, in a cruel episode known as the Austrian civil war, armed bands of the Heimwehrtogetherwith regular army units crushed an ill-prepared socialist uprising at Vienna, Linz, Steyr, and several other places. The February uprising, although clearly provoked by the aggressive stance of the Heimwehr and the head of its Vienna branch, Emil Fey, resulted in a legal ban of Austria's Social Democratic Party. Its top echelons went into Czechoslovak exile or were imprisoned together with combatants of the party's paramilitary organization (Republikanischer Schutzbund). Ten Schutzbund fighters were executed.

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Already in July 1933, the Dollfuss government, responding to terrorist attacks by Nazi hooligans, outlawed the Austrian National Socialist Party. National Socialism's meteoric rise in the wake of the Great Depression led to resounding victories at municipal and provincial elections during 1932 and certainly added to the belief of Dollfuss and his friends that parliamentary democracy was bound to bring about either Socialist or Nazi rule in Austria and, therefore, ought to be discarded. The question raised ever since is that of how to appropriately characterize Austria's new dictatorial regime, based as it was on the substitution of the "Fatherland Front" for party pluralism (Dollfuss' own Christian Social Party was dissolved), and on professional corporations ("Stiinde") to replace popularly elected representative bodies. Professor Kriechbaumer encourages readers to follow him in his condemnation of the term "Austro-Fascism," which he says is too intimately linked up with socialist rhetoric of class warfare (Kampfrhetorik). For Kriechbaumer, the regime ofDollfuss and his successor Schuschnigg was "authoritarian, with the government clearly dominant in the process of political decision-making" (p. 22). Unfortunately, this rather benevolent description of Austria's "Christian-Corporatist State" (Christlicher Stiindestaat) fails to take into account two aspects of considerable importance. First, the constitution of May 1934-though it was mainly based on the ideas of the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno and hence bore witness to conservative Catholic leanings-reflected a significant amount ofltalian fascist influence. 5 Second, Austria after 1933 was, if not outrightly fascist, nonetheless one of only four countries outside Germany and Italy to grant fascist-type movements an important role in domestic and foreign politics. (The others, according to Stanley Payne, were Spain, Hungary, and Romania. 6) It seems fair to say that until1936, the year of its defeat at the hands of the shrewd tactician Kurt Schuschnigg, theHeimwehr was the tail which more often than not wagged the dog of Austrian Catholic corporatism. Heimwehrinfluence and pressure from Mussolini, its powerful foreign protector, were largely responsible for the fact that Dollfuss in early 1934 came to see complete elimination of socialist power as a necessary precondition for his political survival. For men like Emil Fey (who in 1933 acted as head of Austria's internal security forces) fighting "Marxists" was a joyful task from the outset, very much different from what he called the dull routine of rounding up Nazi rogues. The results of such myopia are well illustrated by Kriechbaumer' s pictures of bombshelled workers' homes and corpses of killed Schutzbund members scattered in the streets of Vienna on 13 February 1934. Soon thereafter it became clear that the bloody suppression of Social Democracy failed to endear Dollfuss to the masses of his countrymen. Instead, the "illegal" National Socialists, having

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watched the civil war as neutral bystanders, continued to gain public support as the Great Depression unabatedly weighed down on Austria's fragile economy. On 25 July 1934, Austrian SS members staged a coup intended to overthrow Dollfuss and replace him as head of government by the ambitious Styrian provincial Governor, Anton Rintelen. The Nazi putsch failed, but Dollfuss was killed by a conspirator. Schuschnigg became his successor. It was with the aim to counter an increasingly efficient, Germansponsored Nazi propaganda machine that the Fatherland Front as early as 1933 resorted to similar means of mass suggestion. Repeatedly, Kriechbaumer stresses the plagiarizing nature of the Fatherland Front's symbolism. The photographs inEin vaterliindisches Bilderbuch underscore his point. In what certainly was the most conspicuous move towards "external fascistization,"7 the Fatherland Front adopted as its emblem the "crutched cross" (Kruckenkreuz). For all this emblem's Christian connotations (the knight-crusaders wore it on their tunics), the wish to emulate the Nazi swastika seemed obvious. Another fascist trait of the Fatherland Front was its obsession with marches and parades, at which the marchers saluted with their stretched right arms raised to the height of their shoulder in an imitation of the Hitlergruss. The Austrian counterpart of Germany's Hitlerjugend (and Italy's fascist youth movement Balilla) was called Jungvolk, and the Sturmkorps of the Fatherland Front was clearly modelled after the SS. Its motto, "Unser Wille werde Gesetz" ("May our will be the law"), paraphrased the SS slogan, "Unsere Ehre heisst Treue." All this is not meant to suggest that the Fatherland Front's mythbuilding efforts were devoid of original elements. Reliance on Catholic imagery was one of them. The conspicuous presence of Catholic high clergy and Catholic insignia at every occasion of political importance (and the equally visible participation of political leaders in religious ceremonies like Austria's famous Corpus Christi Day processions) testified to the symbiotic relationship of Church and authoritarian state between 1933 and 1938. A concordat concluded in May 1934 between the Dollfuss government and the Holy See, which granted extensive rights to the Church in educational matters, gave Austria's clergy a key position in promoting the regime's plans to achieve "social justice through corporate organization of society instead of class warfare" (p. 52). As is well known, Austrian corporatism of the 1930s drew heavily on Papal teachings contained in the two encyclicals, RerumNovarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931 ). Both documents rejected the Marxist notion of society divided along lines of capital versus labor, and instead spoke of a common interest shared by all men and women of equal profession. Besides providing the regime with a solid ideological basis for its anti-Marxist social policies, the Church also

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gave legitimacy to Austria's claim of exceptionalism within the greater framework of Germanic culture. As the Catholic episcopate untiringly repeated in public, it was and had always been Austria's mission in history to protect occidental Christendom from ''the Eastern threat"-whether that assumed the form of Muslim aggression in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or of Bolshevism after 1917. The Fatherland Front, with the blessing of the Church, styled itself the legitimate heir to the armies led against the Turks by Emperor Leopold and Prince Eugene of Savoy in the late 1600s. A huge Heimwehr rally on 14 May 1933 at the SchOnbrunn Palace's gardens commemorated the 250th anniversary of the breaking of the Turkish siege of Vienna. Heimwehr leader Ernst Rudiger Starhemberg evoked the memory of his like-named ancestor who commanded Vienna's defence forces in 1683. Following Dollfuss' assassination, the Catholic clergy played an important part in nurturing the myth of the "chancellor as a martyr." Numerous memorial services were held for the man who without hesitation sacrificed his life in the struggle against "pagan" Nazism. Churches all over the country were named after Dollfuss, and the renowned Austrian architect, Clemens Holzmeister, was commissioned to build a memorial chapel holding the tombs of the two outstanding leaders of Catholic Austria, Chancellors Dollfuss and Seipel. Ein Vaterliindisches Bilderbuch contains ample illustrations of the fact that the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, besides obtaining ecclesiastical support, successfully courted the old elites of Austria-Hungary: wealthy aristocrats, officers of the dismantled imperial army, even archdukes and duchesses of the Habsburg family. While these "royals" performed merely decorative functions in Christian-corporate Austria, former field commanders of the Habsburg military came to hold decisive posts both in the Heimwehr and the regular Austrian fighting force. As Ernst Krenek (himself the son of an Imperial officer) tells us in his memoirs, a government decision of 1934 to reintroduce prewar Habsburg uniforms to the Austrian army was greeted with enthusiasm among his friends. The decree was seen as a forceful indication of how far the Austria of the Fatherland Front had moved away from the revolutionary Socialist spirit ofNovember 1918.8 Austria's Achilles heel in a losing battle against Nazi aggression was her poor economic performance during the years of the Great Slump. Halfhearted attempts at deficit-financed job creation were made, but failed to produce lasting effects. In Vienna, the Dollfuss government abandoned a tradition of community-sponsored housing projects introduced by the socialist city council after World War I. Instead, a fraction of the workforce formerly used to build apartment complexes found employment at the construction site of a new bridge across the river Danube. The opening of the

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Reichsbriicke on 10 October 1937 provided a welcome opportunity for speeches and parades of Stiindestaat dignitaries. At the same time, jobless young men received meager food rations in Fatherland Front soup kitchens, and towns around the country introduced the Bettlergeld, a small money allowance paid out to people who registered as "local poor." All this is impressively documented in Ein Vaterliindisches Bilderbuch. H there is something critical to say about Kriechbaumer' s project, then this concerns methodological questions and relates exclusively to the extensive historical commentary preceding the illustrated part of the book. In this introduction, the author resorts to excessive citations from writings and speeches of Stiindestaat functionaries. It requires an effort to find Kriechbaumer' s original sentences among the host of borrowed text, and readers may find themselves repelled by the frequent appearance, in a doubtful context, of populist catchwords of the 1930s. It is not always as obvious as it should be, for instance, whether political parties are "volksfremd" (and members of Parliament are just vain egotists) in the opinion of some contemporary commentator of Austrian political life, or whether this is Kriechbaumer' s personal judgment (p. 24). To make things even more confusing, Kriechbaumer displays a tendency to carelessly blur distinctions between his own language and that of Fatherland Front propaganda. How else could one explain his usage of a high-sounding phrase like "Transformation der parlamentarischen Demokratie," when the issue is simply the introduction of dictatorial rule in Austria? In what looks like an attempt at putting his professional objectivity beyond doubt, Professor Kriechbaumer in his footnotes frequently refers to authors of leftist leaning. The way this happens is unconvincing and sometimes even intellectually offensive. A case in point is the appearance of the communist historian, Eric Hobsbawm, in footnote forty-six. Kriechbaumer relies on Hobsbawm' s testimony to the fact that Salazar's Portuguese and Franco's Spanish dictatorships were "authoritarian, corporatist regimes." Banalities of a like kind are quoted from a book by the notoriously left-wing member of Austria's post-1945 Socialist Party, Josef Hindels. He serves as the source of an observation of limited historical novelty, namely that, contrary to the hopes ofDollfuss and his colleagues, very few formerly socialist workers threw in the!f lot with the Christian Corporate State (p. 28). The same has been asserted by much more reliable historians of diverse political shadings, and it is hard to escape the impression that Hindels' name (even more so than Hobsbawm' s) got listed among Kriechbaumer' s references with no other purpose than to present a balanced score of"progressive" and conservative sources. Readers with the time to run over the footnotes of Ein Vaterliindisches Bilderbuch may find it amusing to play the game of forming pairs of quoted authors of very

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dissimilar political persuasion: Eric Hobsbawm/ Gustave Le Bon, Otto Bauer/Ernst Nolte, Pierre Bourdieu/ Andre Franyois-Poncet, and so forth. The concluding paragraph of Professor Kriechbaumer' s introduction contains what this reviewer considers the most controversial statement of the whole book. In it, the author maintains that the second Austrian Republic's peaceful social-political climate warrants speaking of a resurrection of the Fatherland Front idea ''under modified circumstances," with a patriotic and conciliatory workers' movement supporting it. Whatever the words "unter anderen Voraussetzungen" are meantto imply, the message is too twisted to be true. The Fatherland Front of 1933-1938 was a joint project of Heimwehr fascism and political Catholicism. Both did not reemerge as significant moving forces in Austria after the end ofNazi rule. This (and not so much the experience invoked by Kriechbaumer of common suffering in Nazi concentration camps by Socialists and Christian Socials) cleared the road for a Grand Coalition in 1945, and for the subsequent creation of Austria's successful postwar social partnership. Fatherland Front-ideology cannot justifiably claim a share in new Austria's positive development.

Notes

1. Ernst Krenek, lmAtemder Zeit. Erinnerungen an die Moderne (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1998). 2. Ibid., 862. 3. For a recently published brief summary see Tim Kirk, "Fascism and Austrofascism," in Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. II, The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: AReassessment, eds. Gunter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Alexander Lassner (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003), 10-31. 4. Barbara Jelavich, Modem Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), 202. 5. Ibid., 203. 6. Stanley G. Payne, A History ofFascism 1914-45 (London: University CollegeP, 1997), 245.

7. Payne, A History, 250. 8. Krenek, lm Atem der Zeit, 826.

The Westernization of Austria Michael Gebler, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Osterreich vom Ende der Monarchie his zur EU, Vol.l Darstellung, Vol. 2 Dokumente (lnnsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2002) Dieter Stiefel There can be no doubt that Austrian contemporary history as a field of academic specialization is in a state of crisis. Participants in an increasingly disappointing discourse fail to reach common ground on how to define the scope and limits of Zeitgeschichte. That it should encompass the study of National Socialism seems one of very few points of general agreement. The work of the Austrian "historical commission" testifies to the importance of the subject, and the flow of publications released since the commission took up its activities has not seemed to ebb. However, one must bear in mind that Austria was in the grip of Nazism for only a relatively brief period (seven years), and that this took place more than half a century ago. It should not come as a surprise, then, that an increasing number of scholars focus on what are considered emerging new cores of Zeitgeschichte: gender and cultural studies. Unfortunately, adherents to these new paradigms often act like zealous dogmatics, accusing "dissenters" of being hostile to the recognition of women's role in history or deriding them as "traditional," that is, methodologically inept, historians. Political history and the history of diplomacy are treated with scorn. Scholars publishing in those fields face serious disadvantages when seeking academic appointments. At the University of Vienna, four historical research units are dealing with the twentieth century (the Historical Institute, the Institute of Economic and Social History, the East European History Department, and, finally, the Institute of Contemporary History). They all now devote a good deal of their efforts to gender and cultural studies. It is a serious concern to many that, should this tendency prevail in the future, Zeitgeschichte will lose its distinct feature.

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Seemingly unimpressed by the troubled state of the field, the University of Innsbruck' s distinguished historian, Michael Gebler, confronts us with two heavy volumes of clearly "traditionalist" contemporary history. This fact lends itself to dual interpretation. Proceeding from a Viennese perspective, one might be inclined to comment that most recent trends of "culture" and "gender" seem to have bypassed Austria's remote western provinces. But if one adopts a less rigorously metropolitan stance, an acknowledgement of the creative force of lnnsbruck among Austrian centers of research into Zeitgeschichte might well be indicated. Michael Gehler' s magnum opus-the epithet is appropriate given the sheer size of the publication-runs counter to mainstream Austrian contemporary history in several ways. First, it represents sound political and diplomatic history based on the knowledge of archival sources and a profound acquaintance with recent literature both from within and outside Austria. Gebler defines critical moments when Austria found herself at political, social, and economic crossroads, and he skillfully embeds his discussion of policies pursued by Austrian decisionmakers in a description of the larger European context. Second, Gebler's book is nothing less than a general survey of Austria's relationship with Europe, from the fall oftheHabsburg Monarchy in 1918totheSecondRepublic'saccession to the European Union in 1995. This deserves acclaim, for it does not happen often that Austrian historians adopt a broad synaptical approach. In their majority, they stick to the path of rigid specialization, with few notable exceptions such as Ernst Bruckmiiller in Nation Osterreich (1996), or Ernst Hanisch in Der lange Schatten des Staates (1995). Gebler displays considerable courage in transgressing the limits of narrowly focussed expert studies, but also in writing a book which deals as much with the whole of Europe as it does with Austria. Gebler's European perspective does justice to the fact that Austria, a small country of under eight million, fails to command the leverage needed to alter the course of an entire continent's history. Austrian developments always were, and still are, shaped by the European impact and not-as parochial minds sometimes want us to believe-the other way round. An important reason why the historical profession seems to shy away from "encyclopedic works" lies in the fact that those who write them are highly vulnerable to criticism. Every specialist's judgment on general works will depend on the degree to which he or she includes his or her narrowly focussed expertise. Set against the benchmark of compartmentalized research, surveys appear more often than not fault-ridden. Also, every single historian holds personal opinions as to which facts deserve mention in a survey and which don't. Most writers would disagree about how best to structure a general narrative. As the author of this review, I am

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no exception to the rule. My approach being sometimes different from Gebler's does not, however, diminish my appreciation for his great achievement. In the following pages, I will first briefly describe the structure of Gebler's work, and then elaborate on the points where I feel there is disagreement among us. Gebler has broken up his book into twelve chapters of unequal length, dependent on the issues with which they deal. Chapter 1 covers the period 1918-1933, from the creation of republican Austria to the forced abandonment of parliamentary democracy. It focusses on the conflicting strategic options considered by Austrian political and intellectual circles of "AnschluB" (that is, unification of Austria with Germany) and a nostalgically tinted "Confederation of Danubian States." The idea ofPan-Europeanismdeveloped by the cosmopolitan aristocrat, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, is awarded a great deal of attention. Chapter 2 is about Austrian fascism of the 1930s and the dictatorial regime of 1934-1938 commonly referred to as the "Christliche Stiindestaaf' or Christian corporate state. According to Gebler, pro-European feelings in those days became meaningful as expressions of resistance against National Socialism. Chapter 3 discusses the views of Europe held among Austrian emigrants of 1934-1945, who as a result of their loyalty to mutually exclusive political philosophies failed to build a common front against the German occupants of their homeland. Chapter 4 deals with the problem of South Tyrol, to which the 1946 agreement between Austrian and Italian foreign ministers Gruber and De Gasperi was supposed to bring a solution. Chapter 5 illustrates political and economic reconstruction between 1947 and 1957, under the auspices of a resuscitated, independent Austrian republic. The Marshall Plan is shown to have triggered early steps towards European integration, but there is also mention of the difficulties arising from the need to reconcile integrationist policies with Austria's status of ''perennial neutrality." Chapter 6 focusses on the years 1956-1960. Its topics are the failed attempt at creating an all-encompassing European free trade area, the consequent birth of the European Econorpic Community of only six members (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the BENELUX countries), and Britain's reaction of forming an European Free Trade Association (EFTA), with Austria joining. Chapter 7 is undoubtedly essential for an understanding of Austrian attitudes related to European integration. What reasons were there for neutral countries to join the European Economic Community (EEC)? Should Austria team up with Switzerland or Sweden in its approach to the

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EEC? Going it alone turned out a fatal strategy for Austria in the 1960s, as Gehler' s detailed description aptly shows. Chapter 8 is devoted to the extended period stretching from Austria's initial agreement of association with the EEC in 1972 to her filing of a formal application for European (EU) membership (1989), a step followed by accession in 1993 to the newly created European Economic Area (a joint undertaking of EU and EFfA to forge the world's then largest trading zone). Simultaneously, in domestic politics, the ground was prepared to remove potential obstacles to EU membership. Chapter 9 draws a picture of Austria's negotiations with Brussels and summarizes the government's efforts at convincing the public that accession to the EU was a boon. Chapter 10 returns briefly to the problem of South Tyrol. Chapter 11 attempts to analyze in a systematic and conclusive way the issue of Austrian integrational policies since 1945. Chapter 12 offers a view of most recent developments. It is titled "Austria as a Latecomer to the European Union." Much room is devoted to what later came to be called the "sanctions," that is, the joint reaction by the heads of state and government of fourteen member states of the Union to the right-wing populist Freedom Party's inclusion in Austria's government in early 2000. Gehler' s second volume contains a selection of printed archival documents intended to bolster the narrative in Volume One. Any choice of such material is, of course, a matter of taste and, therefore, disputable. But there is no doubt that Gehler has succeeded in putting together sources not easily accessible and, therefore, of great practical value for both researchers and teachers in the field of European integration. Before entering into a detailed discussion of Gehler' s first volume, a remark concerning the difference between Anglo-Saxon and German perceptions of critical reviewing is necessary here. In English speaking countries, reviews of historical works by fellow members of the craft are part of the process of mutually respectful intellectual exchange. In the German speaking world, critical comments are often seen as expressions of malevolence. Michael Gehler has laid the groundwork based on which further discussion on Austria's relationship with Eqrope can build. I have no intention whatsoever to belittle his remarkable effort, and will certainly not succumb to the temptation of searching for factual details he fails to report in his book. Such lacunae might be hard to find, anyway, as Gehler' s mastery of the sources is beyond doubt, and he knows how to skillfully blend them into a convincing narrative. In what follows, I will ignore issues of content and be more concerned with the book's structure and its appeal to groups of potential readers. The core of Gehler' s frrst volume is represented by chapters five to nine, where he discusses Austrian attitudes and

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strategies concerning European integration, from the final days ofWorld War II until1995. In this section of his book, the author displays (I dare say it in spite of declining appreciation for such skills) an impressive degree of historical craftsmanship. His reasoning is systematical and creative. Anyone interested in long-term perspectives of European integration will benefit from what Gebler has to say here, and his arguments will exert their influence on historians for a long time to come. But I am not so sure whether this also holds true for the remaining chapters of Der lange Weg nach Europa. To begin with, I have my doubts as to whether his treatment of the period between 1918 and 1945 really fits into the general concept of Gebler's study. Also, I strongly believe that Gebler like others before him overrates the importance of Coudenhove-Kalergi' s Paneuropean Movement. Historically speaking, European integration as a strategy unfolding on three levels: intellectual, military, and economic. Dealing with the intellectual phenomenon one would have to consider-besides and before Coudenhove-Kalergi-the impact ofMaximilien de Bethune Sully, Hugo Grotius, Abbe de Saint Pierre, Immanuel Kant, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Victor Hugo (to name just a few!). As a late product of an intellectual tradition, however, Coudenhove-Kalergi' s Pan-Europeanism was doomed to failure--conquering an important place in politicians' Sunday speeches, but falling short of any practical relevance for European unification after 1945. Rather than European feelings, ultra-nationalism became a potent driving force of interwar politics. To understand this, one only needs to compare the number of 100,000 demonstrators for peace in Vienna in 1924 (at the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War) with anothernumber, that of one million Austrians wearing the uniform of Germany's Wehrmacht in 1944. Even if it is true that Count Coudenhove found 100,000 Austrians who cheerfully embraced his idea of a single, unified Europe, the Nazi Party in Austria and its affiliated organizations during the early 1940s mustered 536,000 members completely unsupportive of the European idea (unless it meant forcing the whole continent under the rule of the swastika)! My guess would be that not one single Austrian of the 1920s or 1930s imagined ever sharing a common "European fatherland" with the French, Portuguese, or Irish. Following 1918, there seemed to be just two feasible alternatives." One consisted in aiming at preservation of close economic ties between all former Habsburg lands in East Central Europe, but here the successor states' nationalism worked as a strong opposing force. The other option was merging Austria with the Weimar Republic. This idea flew right into the face of the Entente powers, but also encountered stiff resistance from sections of Austria's business community. In what seemed an odd compromise, Austrian foreign relations emphasized strong ties with the Danubian area as far as economic matters

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went (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia took a common share of about 50 percent of Austria's foreign trade). Politically speaking, the orientation was clearly towards Germany. This state of things mirrored a major problem of Europe in its entirety between the two world wars, namely that of an unbridgeable gap between economic interests and political loyalties. All along, Germany was the main point of reference for Austrian foreign politics. Before 1933, strong bonds of friendship prevailed, but Hitler's open hostility to the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime created similarly strong tensions between the neighbors after theNazis' rise to power. Besides "Deutschlandpolitik" there was practically no Austrian "Europapolitik." In dealing with the period after 1945, Gebler seems to lose interest in the ideological component of European integration, focussing instead on political and economic controversies of a more practical nature. This contributes to the isolated character of his first two chapters on European thought. They stand out as solid history writing, but do not truly promote an understanding of how "Europe" (in a new sense) became the focus of Austrian foreign policy after World War II. Similar objections can be made, in my view, against chapter three dealing with Austrians in exile. What was their impact on developments after 1945? If we discount some oft-cited special cases such as that of Bruno Kreisky (who returned to Austria from Swedish exile) and a few others, we must aske the questions, "Did not postwar Austrian politics remain a matter of those who survived the occupation years without leaving home? Assuming this is true, wouldn't it have been more appropriate instead of discussing the exiles to concentrate on the impact of National Socialism and World War II upon the development of Austria's new European attitudes?" Here, the military factor enters into play. There were repeated attempts to forge a unified Europe by means of coercion of one predominant dynasty or nation-state. One just has to think of the Spanish Habsburgs, Napoleon, or Hitler. They all failed, for the benefit of our continent. But the Second World War cannot be denied having had tremendous influence on the way European integration was achieved after Germany's defeat. This is particularly true from an Austrian perspective. Austria between 1938 and 1945 was, in the full sense pf political, military, and economic integration, part and parcel of the Greater German Reich. Admittedly, there was a military occupation in March 1938, and many leading administrative functions in Austria were given to Reich Germans after the AnschluB. These facts have contributed to the longevity of the post-1945 Opferthese (that is, the official state doctrine that Austria was occupied completely against her own will). The doctrine of Austria's victimization ignores, however, that the same groups of people were singled out for oppression and "Gleichschaltung" in pre-AnschluB

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Germany and the annexed Austrian lands, and that Austria in this respect at least was no special case. Seen from another perspective, Austria was. Austrians in unproportionately high numbers participated in the effort to create National Socialism's New Order, that is, to bring Europe under German domination while reserving a good deal of influence for Hitler's fellow countrymen. National Socialist expansionism was in all probability the last of many historical attempts at "unifying" Europe by the use of anns, and Austrians cannot deny their share in this enterprise. They learned lessons during their years under Nazi rule, lessons that must have had an impact on postwar Austrian perceptions of Europe. It would have been worthwile for Gehler to discuss them in his book. This is not to say that National Socialism and World War II are ignored by him as factors stimulating cooperation between European governments after 1945. Gehler pays due attention to the efforts of containing Germany by her inclusion into a European structure, and to the Marshall Plan's and NATO's beneficial effects in building a unified "Western" Europe as opposed to the Soviet-dominated East. But it is important to remember in this context that both the European Defense Community and the European Political Community collapsed in the early stages of their formation. They could not grow into a solid foundation for an emerging European Union. The single, forceful factor achieving this was the economy. Like it or not, what stimulated European integration above all other things was the perspective of increased material wealth for each and every citizen of the future Union. United Europe began to take shape with the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Today, the EU's greatest visible success is the Euro, the common currency of twelve of her member states. In full agreement with their fellow Europeans, Austrians to this day are skeptical of everything smacking of integrationist utopia, or even of ambitious political planning aimed at European unity. A common European foreign policy failed to materialize so far due to such scepticism. Moreover, the Union's impending enlargement by inclusion of ten former East block countries will owe its popularity (if we can expect any of it to emerge) to the prospect of economic benefits for Austrians and other Western Europeans-and certainly not to widespread belief in an idealistic concept of EU enlargement as such, let alone to genuine concern for the peoples of formerly communist Eastern Europe. Economic self-interest is the prime mover and true foundation of social action, as was accurately pointed out by capitalism's prime philosopher, Adam Smith. The process of European integration, as it unfolded under the auspices of capitalism (or an industrializing market economy, which some may prefer over the "ideolo-

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gical" term of capitalism), was driven by economic motives that came to replace earlier "atavistic" concepts of idealism and military might. Michael Gebler could have built a theoretical framework for his book around this notion. In failing to do so, he betrays his own claim for theory-based historical narratives. Another aspect of Gebler's work to me seems objectionable, though it might not be of preeminent importance: two full chapters are devoted to the South Tyrol question. This is probably due to the fact that Gebler lives in Innsbruck and adopts a more Tyrol-centered perspective than would be the case if he were a Viennese scholar. Besides that, he must be counted among the leading experts in the field of Austro-Italian tensions over South Tyrol-Alto Adige. Undoubtedly, these tensions had a retarding effect on Austria's accession to the European Union. Their negative impact was felt until the early 1970s when a satisfactory solution to the South Tyrolean problem was reached between the Austrian and Italian governments. But does this warrant so much scholarly attention? More than two decades later, when Austria held a plebiscite to decide on EU membership (in 1994), her government coined the slogan: "Austria needs Europe, and Europe needs Austria!" At this point, Italy as much as Germany was strongly interested in Austria becoming a full partner within the European Union. Italy's economy depended on Alpine transit routes controlled by her northern neighbor. Austrian consumers mattered very much to Italian industry. Moreoever, with Austria being a prospective net contributor to the EU' s budget, its accession was bound to ease strains on the Italian budget. At all stages of the European integration process, political obstacles have made their appearance in one way or the other. For a most recent example just look at the excitement created by the Czech Republic's "Benes Decrees." But if our earlier contention is true that in the end economic interest determines the fate of integration, there must be constant and strong pressure working to overcome opposing political forces. Austria could not have possibly renounced joining Europe for the sake of the South Tyrol. She was not in a situation comparable to Switzerland or Norway, whose resources (finance in the first case, oil wells and fisheries in the latter) allowed them to watch European unification from the sidelines. Austria's economic strength relied on her export industries and on tourist traffic. To preserve the success of both, EU membership became imperative. A third point I wish to raise here concerns the title chosen for Michael Gehler' s book, which I feel is somewhat inappropriate. It might have been more fitting if the Cold War was still dragging on. Gebler's conception of Europe includes the successor states of the Habsurg Monarchy only as far as 1940. When he deals with more recent periods, there is no longer any mention of them. But Europe never ended where the Iron Curtain had fallen, and this is especially true from an Austrian viewpoint. In 1947/48,

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three of Austria's neighbor states with whom it entertained long-standing relations of a political, economic, and social nature became part of the "Soviet block." But in spite of this, historical ties continued to result in Austria's "special relationship" with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. It has been repeatedly stated with some justification that her geographic position at the European dividing line between capitalism and socialism turned Austria into a sort of "microcosm" in which the current state of East-West relations used to be mirrored. After assuming the status of neutrality in 1955, Austria stepped up her conscious efforts of creating an "all-European" image of herself as a country equally connected to the east, west, north, and south of Europe. That is why she did not need "to travel along distance to become European," as Gebler suggests in his title. Rather, he should have spoken of Austria's progressive "westernization," meaning her falling in line with the pace of European institutional integration after 1950. Considering the twentieth century in its full length, alternating movements of disintegration andre-integration (as exemplified by the Habsburg Empire's breakup in 1918, the Great Depression, "AnschluB" of Austria to the German Reich, re-emergence of an independent Austrian republic in 1945, the Cold War, the Marshall Plan, EFTA membership, association with the EEC, and finally EU membership in 1995) all seem to have worked together in slowly but steadily pushing Austria towards the West-both economically and politically. Let us not forget in this respect the importance of Austria's economic relations with Germany. Half of Austria's European trade currently involves the Federal Republic of Germany, and German capital controls large sections of Austrian business and the media world. The provinces of Upper Austria, Salzburg, and Tyrol felt the economic attractive force of nearby metropolitan Munich long before there was any mention of Austria joining the EU. What remains to be seen now is how the European Union's eastward enlargement will affect Austria's western ties in the future. Given the recent impressive buildup of her financial investments in Eastern Europe's emerging markets, we may well expect an increase of these countries' overall importance for Austria in the years to come. In modem Austrian history, progressive westernization (not "Europeanization," as I tried to make clear in the precedipg paragraphs!) was accompanied by a long, drawn out struggle to cope with the status of a small country. For Austrians, 1918 marked the loss of imperial grandeur. Only their capital city, Vienna, managed to partly preserve its European importance during the 1920s. Arts flourished, and so did segments of the economy: banking, forwarding, wholesale trade, and the insurance business. It took the Great Depression to deal a lethal blow to Vienna's international ambitions. After the Second World War and during most of the Cold War period, Austria was confined to a state of smallness and

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irrelevance. She became the fringe of"Western Europe" in all imaginable respects: economically, politically, culturally. Unlike in earlier days, visitors coming to Vienna did not habitually travel on to regional metropoles like Budapest, Prague or Sofia. Vienna in the 1950s and 1960s was not a connecting place; it was a final destination. More than ever, Austrians adopted a self-centered, provincial views of things. I can cite an example of my own experience. The university I attended (known at that time by the name ofHochschule fiir Welthandel) did not require students of economics and business administration to attend foreign language classes, let alone to read management or economics textbooks in English. Only during the early 1970s, was English made a compulsory part of all curricula. If there was a positive side to isolation, it was the emergence of what came to be called Sozialpartnerschaft, the specifically Austrian way of corporatist collusion. Organized labor and employers through their statesponsored cooperation turned Austria into an all-encompassing cartel. Her internal market was shielded from the rough winds of competitive capitalism, and almost every important economic policy decision came to depend on prior agreement between the two large political camps, irrespective of who held formal power in government. Matters started to be different in the early 1970s. First steps towards modernization were taken under the Kreisky administration, but Kreisky' s chancellorship, rather than being instrumental in bringing about the changes,justreflected a new mood among Austrian elites. The Second Republic began to shake off the vestiges of outdated postwar institutions. In this endeavor, Austria was aided by her growing affluence, the successful drive towards increased exports, and participation in a series of international agreements and organizations like OEEC, GATT, the Bretton Woods system, and EFTA. Deregulation and modernization of the Austrian economy and society did not come as a sudden shock, but proceeded slowly and steadily, almost in homeopathic doses. Therefore, I find Gebler's talk of Austria as a "delayed member of the European Union" unconvincing. Austria had enough time to prepare for EU accession; it joined the club as a wealthy and economically efficient nation no longer in need of a brand of social partnership which hampered rather than protected further development. In the last chapter of his book, Michael ·Gebler discusses the "sanctions" imposed against Austria by her fourteen fellow EU members. They followed the Freedom Party's inclusion in a conservative coalition government in February 2000. Gebler mentions that he wrote the sanctions chapter when his original manuscript was already finished. It is a piece of political analysis worth reading, but one may wonder why Gebler insisted upon its inclusion in his book. He thereby upset its topical balance in favor of a relatively minor issue. Most historians for good reasons are reluctant to deal with events of a very recent nature. After Haider's party was

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elevated to the rank of a partner in government, several other populist right wing groups moved to the forefront of European politics or even acquired ministerial portfolios, often losing voter support very quickly when the strain of daily government business proved too hard for them to endure. Given these developments, it is a good guess that future commentators will be less excited about anti-Austrian EU measures of early 2000 or of Austrian uniqueness in promoting a renaissance of the extreme right. Gebler's subject is the long-term development of a relationship between two partners (Austria and the European Union) both engaged in an ongoing process of institutional development. While working on his analysis, he had to focus on Austria and, hence, was compelled to treat the history of the Union as a secondary matter. This creates a problem for the reader who wishes to find out to what extent Austria's difficulties in dealing with the EU were caused by internal problems of the Union as such. This may well have been the case, as Gehler repeatedly indicates. Even before Austria became a fully-fledged member of"Europe," she was drawn into the Union's internal affairs. One has only to think of the issue of monetary policy, one that is treated a bit briefly in Gebler's book. its way to full integration into the Bretton Woods system, Austria participated in the European Payments Union, and in the early 1970s made the decision of pegging her currency to the Deutschmark. This did not, as might be suspected, amount to a loss of economic sovereignty. Rather, it constituted a remarkable achievement. Many countries at some point of their history opted for a dollar- or Deutschmark-peg, but few were able to follow a course of economic policy enabling them to keep up with recurrent increases in the value of their "anchor" currency. Austria's Schilling stayed aligned to the Mark despite the latter's increasing strength. This situation worked as a strong incentive for the Austrian economy to modernize, and it can serve as proof of Austria's full monetary integration into Europe as early as the 1970s. Consequently, when the EURO replaced the Schilling in 2002, Austrians did not perceive this as fundamental economic change, but as a cultural challenge (which turned out to be met very quickly and successfully). At the end of this review, let me raise the issue of who might benefit from Gebler's book. The author himself claims its usefulness for students at the college and university level, and for aduit education. As is often the case in textbooks, each of Gebler's chapters is followed by a list of questions designed to help those who prepare for academic tests. I have always been skeptical about preparing for exams that way because it encourages mechanical repetition of facts without understanding their meaning, and it even may lead to business-minded students selling their own catalogues of answers to those who are unwilling to spend precious time with books of awe-inspiring length. As far as Gebler's case is

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concerned, I do not consider a study with a hundred pages offootnotes (and a high price tag) a students' textbook in the familiar sense of the word. Both volumes of Gebler's work taken together are a scholarly effort of remarkable value, addressed in my view atreserachers and scholars, not at students. For teaching purposes, it might be useful to consider reprinting the crucial chapters on Austria's way into the European Union, and sell them as a paperback. Despite some minor flaws, Gebler has produced a landmark work on Austria's European politics. He has to be congratulated for his achievement. No book can claim to have final answers to the questions it poses, but Gebler's will provide contemporary historians as well as economic historians with a vast range of important, new impulses. Not much more can be said in favor of a scholarly work.

Unmastered Pasts: Czechs, Sudeten Germans and Austrians Barbara Coudenhove-Kalergi and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., Die Benes-Dekrete (Vienna: Czernin, 2002) Eva Hahnova and Hans Henning Hahn, Sudetonemecka vzpomfnanf a zapomfnanf (Prague: Votobia, 2002) Radomir Luza, The Hitler Kiss: A Memoir of the Czech Resistance (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2002) Martin David In the course of the 1990s, when the Cold War had come to its end, the pasts of many central European countries were re-examined. For the first time since World War II, Nazi victims living on the other, the Eastern side, of the Iron Curtain, demanded just compensation. Many of them were, for instance, forced to serve Hitler as enslaved laborers and have never seen any just compensation for their work under those conditions. Also Jews whose property was taken by the Nazis and who were never able to get money for their losses due to legal gaps raised their voices. Germany, Austria, and Switzerland appeared to be unprepared to engage in this debate. When the negotiations concerning the compensation of these forgotten victims of the Third Reich were taking place, Sudeten German organizations also demanded a discussion about their fate. After World War II, nearly all Germans, regardless of their citizenship (as some of them were, in fact, Czechoslovak, Polish, or Yugoslav citizens), were expelled from Central and Eastern European countries as retribution for atrocities committed by the Nazi occupation forces. In the case of Czechoslovakia, about 2.5 million people eventually had to leave their homes in the course of the "expulsions" (Vertreibungen ), or

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"evacuation" (odsun), which is the term used in the official Czech language. During the so-called ''wild expulsions" immediately after the end of World War II, tens of thousands of Germans died as a result of the poor treatment they received at the hands of Czechoslovak Revolutionary Guards. After the first phase, state officials organized the transfer in a more orderly way and no more cruelties were committed. The confiscation of the property of Sudeten Germans was written down in the transitory laws, usually called Benes Decrees. However, there is no decree that rules the evacuation of the Sudeten Germans although this is widely believed to be the case and frequently argued in thepublic debate. The term "Benes Decrees" originates from the name of the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Benes, who dominated Czech exile policy in World War I and World War II. Generally, these rules can be described as simple transition legislation in the absence of a parliament, but when the first elected Czechoslovak postwar parliament started its sessions, all these decrees were adopted as laws. The demand to "Abolish the Benes Decrees" raised by various participants in the ongoing debate is, therefore, misleading as only a few of the Benes decrees concern the Sudeten Germans directly. Only a minority of the Austrian and German public seems to understand that the term "Benes Decrees" is not synonymous with the expulsions. Czechs are horrified or, in some cases, amused by such a demand because it is simply impossible and legally absurd to abolish the vast body of transitory legislation. In the late 1990s, a German TV documentary about the expulsions had very high ratings and was widely discussed by the public. Furthermore, the German left-wing author Giinter Grass described war crimes committed by the Red Army on German civilians in his novel Im Krebsgang. This book sold exceedingly well which was, perhaps, the reason for other German publishing houses to ask historians to write about the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II. In The Hitler Kiss, Radomir Luza, a retired history professor at Tulane University in New Orleans and native Czechoslovak citizen, published memories about his past in the Czechoslovak resistance. As the son of General Vojtech Luza, one of the most prominent personalities in the Czechoslovak army in the interwar period and a leader of a resistance group, the teenager Radomir followed his father in the underground. It is very interesting to read about the daily problems for members of the resistance who were hiding from the Nazi-collaborators. They could never be sure whom and whom not to trust. Every mistake could lead to their discovery by the Gestapo and, consequently, to certain death. The resistance fighters also had to worry about their shelter constantly. Always frightened of denunciation or discovery, they had to change their accommodations frequently. Furthermore, it was irresponsible to involve

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the supporters of the resistance too much, for doing so could have lethal consequences for them as well. The title of the book The Hitler Kiss mirrors the permanent presence of death. A "Hitler Kiss" was a euphemism for being shot. Due to the high efficiency of the Gestapo and their collaborators in the Czech lands and Moravia, the resistance movement was confined to conducting intelligence work and anticipating the right moment to fight the Nazis. When German troops were no longer victorious, the armed resistance began. Together with escaped POWs, mostly soldiers from the Red Army, the Czech resistance committed only small acts of sabotage since the police were still very effective. Because nearly all Czechoslovak intellectuals were oriented towards the East, they very much appreciated the friendship with Russian and Ukrainian soldiers. Since the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement, in which Great Britain and France forced Czechoslovakia to cede large sections of territories with a German ethnic majority to Germany, their disappointment with the Western forces was a decisive factor in encouraging Czech orientation towards the Soviet Union. A further consequence of Czech disappointment with the Munich Agreement was that non-communist politicians were also favoring a close postwar alignment with the Soviet Union. Luza' s perspective is that of a Czech resistance fighter and not that of a history professor. What I missed when reading the book was a critical analysis about the actual effectiveness of the resistance. Furthermore, the high degree of collaboration with the Nazis in the Czech lands is not discussed in detail either. Although there are many traitors mentioned in the book who could be regarded as a threat for the resistance, and even though Luza' s father is eventually shot by collaborators, the author does not seem to accept that Czechs also committed crimes. When the Red Army liberated Czechoslovakia, the nation had to suffer again. Drunken soldiers looking for girls, alcohol, and watches moved in immediately after the German withdrawal. ''Then [after their excesses], their habitual good humor restored, they would urge gifts upon the distraught family, handing over their horses or emptying knapsacks full of jewelry on the kitchen table, such donations being easy to replace. Contrite in the face of tears, they would have given the girls back their virginity if they could have" (p. 233). It seems as if Luza shows understanding for them because they had to fight a cruel war in the best years of their lives. The perspective of the raped girls and women, however, is likely a different one. Neither does Luza deal very much with the fate of the Sudeten Germans after World War II although he must have much inside knowledge because he was at that time the head of the police and gendarmes in

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the Velke Meziffcf district (p. 233f.). The author clearly represents the official view of the history of the Czech Republic, still maintained by most politicians in Prague and yet increasingly questioned by many intellectuals. The phrase "We were a country of victims" (p. 236) is characteristic of the traditional Czech view. A critical re-thinking and re-writing of their own history would also become the Sudeten German organizations, at least if we follow Eva Hahnova' sand Hans-Henning Hahn's book Sudetonemecka vzpomfnanf a zapomfndnf [Sudeten German Memory and Forgetting]. Even if we would be familiar with the scholarly work of both authors, the quoted sources in the book show their excellent knowledge of that issue. The anthology of essays is organized into three parts: "The Never-Ending Past," "The Past in Pictures and Words," and "The Past about which One Talks", moreover, it contains twenty-one short articles and an open letter. The "Open Letter to Sudeten German Friends" comes at the end of the volume and describes the previous essays as a contribution to the ongoing debate-and what a contribution it is! The style of the whole book is highly polemical, possibly overstating the importance of many issues for the present, but the message is striking. According to the Hahns, numerous relicts of the Nazi past can be found in nearly all Sudeten German organizations. They severely criticize the selective memory of the Sudeten Germans who, according to the authors overstate their own victim status and ignore the Czech perception of history completely. The history of two prominent organizations is examined, the Seliger Community and the Witiko League. The Sudeten German community is very well organized. Therefore, the political parties in Germany and Austria have tried to establish links to them in order to win over voters. Although these organizations are working together, divisions along their old political persuasions still exist. Named after the Social Democratic politician of the interwar period, the SeligerCommunity is the left-wing Sudeten German organization. In their attempt to prove the affiliation of Josef Seliger with German nationalism, Hahn and Hahn ova uncovered some of his articles, written soon after the end of World War I and the Munich agreement. In these Seliger advocates the division of states following ethnic lines. Seliger is portrayed as an enemy of the Czechoslovak state. Although Seliger himself was not a Nazi, he worked together with some of them in the framing of a postwar Sudeten German organization. The "Witiko League" got its name from a book by Adalbert Stifter, a nineteenth century Austrian author born in Bohemia. Founded by Walter Brand, a close collaborator of Konrad Henlein's (was the German Nazi leader in Czechoslovakia imprisoned in concentration camps between 1939 and 1945), the Witiko League is situated at the far right of the political

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spectrum of the expelled Germans. Having examined the curricula vitae of many Witiko members, the authors discovered many members who had been high-ranking Nazis, such as the leader of the Germans in Slovakia during World War II. Even today, the Witiko League still maintains its connection with extreme-right wing circles in Germany. "The Past in Pictures and Words" is documented in various publications given to the historical memory of the Sudenten Germans. For instance, the Catechism for Sudeten Germans was first edited in 1919 and became a bestseller in theNazi era. This might be no big surprise since the Catechism contains explanations of the basic history of the old kingdom of Bohemia and the country of Moravia from a strictly German nationalist perspective, including numerous factual mistakes. What is surprising is that the book was republished in 1994 without any corrections or an introduction explaining its historical context. Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahnova also criticize the fact that most of the artists in Czech history are described as Germans. This is unpersuasive. It is a fact that the university in Prague was the first university within the Holy Roman Empire. Emperor Charles IV was also the king of Bohemia and a German prince. Due to the high reputation of the rulers of Prague, many artists came from other countries to the court of Prague to work there, amongst them many Germans. It does not make much sense in stressing the national origin of any artist considering the interaction within the international atmosphere at the imperial court of Prague. In the last part of the book, "The Past about which One Talks," the Hahns criticize the efforts of Sudeten German organizations to present their view as the ultimate historical truth without regarding the results of Czech research or perceptions. The Hahns are critical of the Catholic Ackermann League. One who is not too familiar with the issue of the history of the Sudeten Germans reading this book, might think that it would be easy to discuss these issues today critically in an open forum. That observer would have been very surprised if witnessing the debate following the lecture of Eva Hahnova in Vienna at a conference in June 2002 where the Benes Decrees were discussed by an international forum of experts. Forgetting basic rules of etiquette, Sudeten German representatives offe!J.ded Hahnova publicly. The discussion in the breaks, however, proved to be far more constructive, as I myself witnessed. Oliver Rathkolb, a Viennese history professor, and Barbara Coudenhove-Kalergi, a renowned Austrian journalist born in Prague, have now published the contributions of the panel in the volume Die Benef-Dekrete. In her brilliant lead essay to the volume, Coudenhove-Kalergi describes the two different memories of Sudeten Germans and Czechs. Both sides see themselves as victims. The Czechs consider themselves victims

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of theNazi regime and, the Sudeten Germans, who were strong supporters of the Hitler regime. The extinction of two small Czech villages as a retribution for the assassination of the high-ranking Nazi Reinhard Heydrich in 1943 can be seen as a turning point. From that moment forward the Czechs considered the Sudeten Germans as a homogenous group aligned with the Nazis. Volker Zimmermann analyzes the role of the Sudeten Germans in the first Czechoslovak Republic and during the National Socialist era. On the one hand, he shows the tensions between both ethnicities; on the other, he reveals efforts to overcome nationalism on the German side. The crisis of the world economy and mistakes in Czechoslovak domestic policy finally led to the radicalization of the Sudeten Germans, later deftly exploited by Hitler. The Sudeten Germans, for their part, are exclusively fixated only on the expulsion. According to their memory, many Sudeten Germans opposed Hitler. Therefore, they cannot understand their expulsion. Furthermore, many of them have witnessed cruelties during the "wild expulsions," committed by Czech forces on their parents or even themselves, when they were little children. A separate article in this volume is given to a passage taken from the memories of Edvard Benes himself. It is clear that the Czechoslovak president describes himself as a caring and responsible person. The most recent biography, however, written by Zbynek Zeman, paints a different picture. According to Zeman, Benea was not really prepared to deal with the problem of ethnic minorities in his country, neither in the interwar nor in the postwar period. It would have been a good idea to introduce this article with the current state of research on Benes. V aclav Havel, a leading intellectual and former Czech president, tried to build a bridge between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs. He analyzes the meaning of Edvard Benes as a symbol for the Czechs, for whom he is the founder of the state after two World Wars. For the Sudeten Germans, he is amass murderer. At the end of his article, Havel advocates a more candid discussion of the past because it should enable us to bury negative mutual stereotypes between Czechs and Germans. Peter Mahner' s essay builds on his participation in a research project on the impact of high politics on a small village in South Moravia. It is interesting to see in this important contribution how the national tensions in Czechoslovakia and, consequently, Hitler's ethnic policies influenced such a microcosm. This article also describes the expulsion of the Germans and its role in local historical memory. Bradley F. Abrams and Rainer Miinz analytically lay out the macrocosm of the international, historical, and legal contexts. To their credit both authors avoid-as do nearly all contributors to this volume-to give a verdict, which usually happens on

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this subject matter. In this same unbiased vein, Oliver Rathkolb restricts himself to analysis when he describes the Austrian perception of the Sudeten Germans in his essay. Rathkolb stresses that the Sudeten German issue was widely ignored in Austria until the mid-1980s, when the debate about Austria's own Nazi past was exploding in public discourse. Anne Bazin-Begley's contribution seems to be representative of both the French and the British standpoint if we compare the official declarations from London and Paris. The debate about the BeneS Decrees isaccording to Bazin-Begley-nothing more than an attempt to delay European Union enlargement. In my view, Bazin-Begley falls short of fully understanding the ongoing debate by stressing only the political implications and using only current, official, political statements as sources while leaving out the historical context not fitting into the line of her argumentation. Presented as "Voices of the Second Generation," Alena MfSkova and Peter Becher both advocate an open debate and, consequently, the ability to re-think the traditions and stereotypes on both sides. Quoting the prominent Czech intellectual and former dissident Pavel Tigrid, MfSkova demands an official statement referring to some of the Benes Decrees as a failure in Czech history. Should that be done without any pressure from outside as the result of a free Czech decision, this would be a sign of a proud nation, not of a nation of cowards. What is still missing in the literature is a publication presenting the Austrian, the Czech, and the Sudeten German points of view in a comparable and comprehensive way.

BOOK REVIEWS Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europiiische Grossmachtund AUianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 2002) Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. The Dreibund exerted a significant influence upon European international relations from 1882 until the outbreak of the First World War. Unique in its emergence as a secret peacetime arrangement between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, the alliance constituted part of the political framework within which each of the three powers operated. The alliance occasionally functioned as a coherent whole, more often as a platform for general discussions. Because its precise terms remained secret, the Triple Alliance later found itself charged with being-along with the larger practices of "secret diplomacy"-as one of the causes of the Great War. Now, in a distinguished study, Holger Afflerbach re-examines the evolution of the alliance, its internal politics, and its impact upon European diplomacy while never neglecting its influence on the domestic politics of each of the three signatories. Der Dreibund weaves a complex, nuanced portrait of the diplomatic alignment. Carefully and thoughtfully, the author integrates the practice of traditional diplomatic history with an understanding of the domestic politics of the member states. Paying attention to the ebb and flow of public opinion in each country (illustrated by wonderful cartoon representations), he also reminds readers of the economic setting in which the governments operated. Comparative in its very structure, the study focuses its attention upon the elite decision-makers in each country. With deft pen portraits, he places these men in the context of their domestic political and bureaucratic structures, sometimes bringing new detail that even those quite familiar with the period will find swprising.

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The most unusual, innovative, and new contribution is the study's probing examination of the Italian role in the alliance, from membership in the Austro-German alliance to the part the agreement played in the fickle arena of Italian politics. Because this aspect of the book provides a wealth of new insights, some of these dimensions deserve further comment. Afflerbach reminds us, as did William Langer two generations ago, that Italy was the power who pressed for membership in the older alliance. Initially, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck gave only modest attention to the Italian desire to escape diplomatic isolation. Miffed because the Congress of Berlin had ignored Rome and afraid that France would seize not only Tunis but also Morocco and Tripoli, Foreign Minister Pasquale Mancini started the long process of convincing his own skeptical prime minister, Agostino Depretis, of the value of such an understanding. Helped by the success of King Umberto I's visit to Vienna and then by Bismarck's alarm over a sudden turn in Franco-Russian relations, the negotiations for the treaty began in earnest in late 1881. If the AustroHungarians were less enthusiastic, Vienna nevertheless believed the new arrangement might strengthen its own position as well. Despite Italian desires, the first alliance had no territorial guarantees, but instead contained provisions for consultation, aid against France, and neutrality in case of a war in which Italy was not involved. Entirely secret until publicly acknowledged in February 1883, the Triple Alliance would be renewed five times. But its exact terms always remained secret, even as it developed, from successive chiefs of staff of the Italian army. From the start, the treaty's place in the affections of the Italians waxed and waned. Many among the Italian elite were gratified to be associated with the older monarchies and thus accepted into the great powers' circle. This elite, like those in Germany and Austria-Hungary, saw the alliance as helping the cause of monarchy in Italy. King Umberto I strongly agreed, even if his son, Vittorio Emanuele III, appeared less appreciative. The Italian elite also saw the alliance as a way to keep Berlin and Vienna from interfering in the vexing question of Rome and the Papacy. Still others saw it offering support and cover for an aggressive colonial policy. More negatively, the alliance always had to face fundamental and inherent contradictions. The irredenta issue posed the most consistent stumbling block to good Austro-Italian relations. Afflerbach argues that the irredenta problem was often more narrowly based than later historians (or Vienna at the time) thought. Because monarchical supporters in Italy feared the efforts ofltalian radicals to exploit the issue, successive Italian governments were usually able to contain it while reassuring Vienna. On the other hand, Austrian actions after 1912 converted the irredenta issue into a popular political issue, all the more so once Italy moved to universal male suffrage. By 1914 the tensions were reaching new heights, tensions

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German-Austrians in Innsbruck and elsewhere often managed to fan as much as the Italian nationalists. Moreover, the two southern partners always sparred over the Balkans. In the first two renewals of the alliance, the Italian foreign ministers managed to expand the Dreibund to cover questions of possible compensation in the Balkans and along the shores of the Adriatic and Aegean if the status quo were altered. As Afflerbach shows, the Italian leadership always consciously linked any potential Habsburg gain in the Balkans with demands for compensation either there, or more likely, in the Trentino. Later, of course, Albania became a key pawn in this jockeying for position. Rome's tough bargaining for territorial gain from July 1914 to April1915 would not have surprised previous generations of Italian statesmen. To these contradictory undercurrents were added bouts of Austrophobe or Italophobe attitudes among the respective military and political elites. General Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf' s conspicuous views get deserved attention in Afflerbach's text, as do the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Habsburg ambassador Kajetan von Merey. By contrast, most of the senior Italian leaders always appeared more pragmatic, less rigid, and willing to negotiate their differences, at least until July 1914. Nor were Austro-Italian tensions the only source of contradiction in the alignment. Germany always remained the dominant partner, Kaiser Wilhelm ll a reasonably popular figure in Italy. But the start of the AngloGerman naval race threatened Italy with its long coastlines. Not surprisingly, Rome began a certain flirtation with France and Britain, anxious not to be permanently estranged from them. Italy's colonial ambitions also added to the possible areas of tension. As Mflerbach shows, those ambitions were centered in Africa, first the north coast, then along the Red Sea. He chronicles the successes and failures of these efforts, including the eventual triumph against the Ottoman Turks in Tripoli in 1911-1912. Yet he also reminds us that Berlin never entirely forgot Italy's failure to support it during the First Moroccan crisis, a failure that amounted to betrayal for many in Berlin. Nor was Vienna happy about the blatant Italian ambitions for an eventual part of Anatolia. Despite the contradictions and tensions among the allies, the author argues-correctly-that the Dreibundbrought stability to European international politics. Even the emergence of the Triple.Entente after 1907 did not immediately and automatically bring confrontation between the two groupings. In fact, the Triple Alliance held together better during the two Balkan wars, even being renewed in the midst of the first, than the geopolitics of the situation might have suggested. Afflerbach also insists that the alliance was a peacetime arrangement; it could not actually survive if war came regardless of the periodic military and naval conversations that took place between the army and navy staffs. The July crisis revealed this

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fundamental flaw since the inherent contradictions between the partners' interests could not be overcome in theinterestofeitherpeaceorwar. To be sure, Habsburg Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold might have offered a larger concession to Italy than the possession of Valona, but only if he wanted to have still further political troubles from the German-Austrians at home. Given the situation, Afflerbach properly concludes that the chances of ·Italy entering a European war on the side of Berlin and Vienna were virtually nil. In a brief analysis ofltaly' s move to war after 1914, he describes the shifting alignments in Italian domestic politics that finally brought Rome to war. Nor does he hesitate to conclude that Italy's decision to enter the war effectively condemned its two former allies to defeat. Any study of the Dreibund must of necessity address the question of the outbreak of the war. Afflerbach's analysis includes a prompt dismissal of the so-called "War Council" of December 1912 and a focus instead upon the unfolding crisis. He describes the mounting German fears about future Russian military strength, the growing sense of desperation in Vienna about Serbia, and the impact of the military leaders, especially the German, upon the decision process. In this, his earlier work on General Erich von Falkenhayn serves him well. One could quarrel that he overstresses the role of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in the game of "bluff," but that is an issue which will always remain contentious. His summary of the July crisis provides readers with a useful introduction to contemporary thinking about the outbreak of the war. By contrast he is less successful in explaining why the two allies so blatantly ignored Italy in July 1914, nor does he note the efforts of German ambassador Hans von Flotow to alert Rome to the impending moves. R. J. W. Bosworth's older volume still provides a better, more detailed explanation of the fateful dismissal of Italy as not even the least of the great powers. In a long and complex book, there are inevitably peaks and va].leys. Throughout, the author conveys new insights and details about the Italian political process. By contrast, his assessment ofltaly becomes less detailed after 1900, and the reader retraces a familiar presentation of the Italian domestic scene. The same unevenness is true for the Habsburgs as his descriptions of Vienna's policies after 1910 are often quite brief and staccato. Two other comments are necessary. His practice of including long quotations inside the footnotes of the evidence used to buttress his narrative statements may occasionally be useful. Nevertheless, an editor should have insisted that most of those be deleted. The editor could also have asked him to break up paragraphs and to treat separate themes in separate paragraphs.

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These caveats aside, the reviewer remains staggered by the sheer work undertaken for this study. Afflerbach has a done pathbreaking exploration of the Italian archives, public and private, and matched that with an extensive exploitation of the German and Habsburg papers along with the relevant printed documents. Moreover, his command of the recent published material shows commendable attention to the trans-Atlantic discussions on this era of international relations. Afflerbach's new study must, finally, be set in the broader historiographical context. His book represents the most thorough analysis of the Triple Alliance in German, now replacing Fritz Fellner's thoughtful but brief essay. Coupled with Jtirgen Angelow's Kalkiil und Prestige: Der Zweibund am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 2000), we now have a comprehensive assessment of the core Double Alliance and the Triple Alliance. But readers will also continue to benefit from the classic works ofWilliamLanger, whose two volumes (European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 and The Diplomacy of1mperialism, 1890-1902) remain indispensable. Though written in the 1930s without access to the archives, the Langer volumes in particular remind us that historians can often do a good deal with printed sources and a thorough, sensitive feel for the subject. Afflerbach has provided historians with new perspectives by which to judge the Triple Alliance and its novel impact upon international relations. His insights into the forn1ation ofltalian foreign policy provide new vistas for our understanding of why the alliance remained so important to Italian statesmen, even to the Italian public at least to 1913. Our appreciation of alliance politics, that tricky interaction between and among allies, gains from his comparative evaluation. Ever mindful of the inherent contradictions between the interests of the three powers, Afflerbach ably shows their ability to work together for more than three decades. Yet his assessment never allows the reader to forget that each state remained sovereign. Thus, as the spring of2003 revealed fractures in the NATO alliance, Holger Afflerbach provides a timely reminder that such disagreements should not come as a surprise. Great power politics, whether in 1914 or in 2003, remain just that-politics among states with different perspectives and differing ambitions, led by elites with their own agendas and ambitions. For contemporary historians, Der Dreibund provides useful reminders of the prevalence of state self-interest and that even a fabled alliance of the past never functioned as smoothly as its critics believed or its advocates desired. A major addition to our understanding of alliances, this significant book will remain central for future discussions about European international relations for years to come.

Brigitte Hamann, Winifred Wagner oder Hitlers Bayreuth (Munich: Piper, 2002)

Steven Beller As its subtitle suggests, Brigitte Hamann's new bookis a follow up to her very successful book, Hitler's Vienna. 1 It is, though, not so much a sequel as a companion piece. It does not deal directly with Adolf Hitler's subsequent career after Vienna, but comes at that topic very much from the perspective of its real subject, Winifred Wagner, the "mistress of Bayreuth." As such it has little relevance to Austrian history: Hamann, having in the previous book denied Vienna the responsibility for turning Hitler into an anti-Semite, proceeds in this one even to deny that Hitler's "Austrian" politeness-his courtly kissing of ladies' hands and so forth-was of Austrian origin. (Instead, his early patroness, Helene Bechstein, taught him manners.) That said, for anyone interested in the history of Central European right-wing thought, the cultural origins of National Socialism, or the curious history of Wagnerism in the twentieth century, this is a fascinating and most stimulating account that reveals many insights and raises a whole host of intriguing questions about Central European modernism and the Nazi legacy. Hamann's new book is more in the style of Hamann's previous Habsburg books, where the dynastic personalities and the details of their subjects' lives took precedence over larger historical questions. In Hitler's Vienna there was large amount of instructive detail about the context of Hitler's life, and it was this context that gave the book most of its value. Such a contextual approach is almost entirely missing in this text, which is much more a straight, biographical account of one figure, Winifred Wagner, with context occasionally added to explain the biographical details. It is, in a way, more a companion piece to Hamann's book about another female interloper into a famed dynastic enterprise, Empress Elisabeth, than it is to Hitler's Vienna. One almost suspects that having exhausted the historical and biographical possibilities in and about the Habsburg dynasty, Hamann has found a new field of opportunity in the other great dynasty of

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nineteenth and twentieth century Central Europe, not the Hohenzollerns, but the Wagners. There is certainly enough material in the Wagnerian dynastic saga, enough scandal, farce, horror, and tragedy, to satisfy the most avid seekers of psychodrama and, at times, of melodrama. At times this book reads like an elevated (and occasionally not so elevated) form of soap opera. Hamann's straightforwardly narrative style, which sometimes veers off into the picaresque, is partly responsible for this, but it is a sober style which cannot explain the sometimes sensationalist aspects of the book. The main reason for that sensationalism appears to be that life in the Wagner family was far closer to the mythical internecine struggles and family conflicts of Wagnerian opera than they were to what most people usually call normal life. Whether it was the battles between Richard and Cosima Wagner's children, or between their grand-children, the themes of jealousy, usurpation, betrayal, repudiated mother love, and sibling hatred and reconciliation, would have been more than suitable for a work by the "master" himself, down to the theft and ferreting away of treasure, in the form of personal documents as well as personal property. It is a fascinating story with many surprising twists and turns, and at the center of this saga of one of the great, and most notorious German families is an English woman: Winifred Wagner. It is one of the many ironies of the Wagner family history that the two outstanding matriarchal figures of this notoriously German nationalist clan were both foreigners. Cosima was half-Hungarian and half-French; Winifred was born Winifred Williams in Hastings, Sussex, in 1897. Orphaned early, she was shunted around distant relatives and orphanages until at age ten she was able to settle down with the Klindworths, an AngloGerman couple living, in Wagnerian style, in a rural co-operative colony near Berlin. Through the Klindworths, Winifred entered the circle of the Wagners; the beautiful, bright and very lively girl made such an impression among the Bayreuth set that she was eventually chosen to be the wife of Siegfried, Cosima's son and heir. Honoring his mother's wish to provide an undisputed, male heir for the family overcoming his apparently homosexual preferences, Siegfried proceeded to marry Winifred in 1915 and produce the desired guarantees for the dynastic succession rather quickly: Wieland(1917), Friedelind (1918), Wolfiang (1919) and Verena (1920). Winifred proved to be much more than just an heir-and-a-spare producer, for she quickly became an avid admirer of all things Wagnerian, including the family's extreme German nationalism, with its large dose of anti-Semitism, which became ever more radical as the First World War went from bad to worse. The "intellectual leader'' of the Wagner family at this point was, after all, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the leading antiSemitic and racialist theoretician and one of Hitler's favorite writers.

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Chamberlain, it might be noted, was also English, had been raised in France, where, as Hamann puts it, he became "converted" to Germandom by Wagner's music, before going on to write his most famous book, The Foundations ofthe Nineteenth Century, in Vienna. Hamann chronicles how the family-and Winifred-became ever more reactionary, responding to the defeat of 1918 by supporting the anti-republican, nationalist Right in the chaotic first years of the Weimar Republic, and were very early supporters of the new hope of the radical Right, Adolf Hitler, even marching in the crowd in Munich during the Putsch of November 1923. Siegfried had even scheduled a concert for the next day to celebrate the assumed success of the coup. From the very start, Winifred adored Hitler. She and Siegfried even helped him raise money in America, asking Henry Ford for funds on the tour therein 1923-24. Hitler was an honored guest at the Bayreuth Festival of 1925, and became a frequent visitor. At Hitler's personal request, Winifred became a Nazi party member in 1926, and the Festival became ever more linked up with National Socialism. When Siegfried died in 1930, a few months after his mother, Winifred became the director of the Festival and the mistress of Bayreuth. While she relied on Heinz Tietjen to move the Festival artistically in a modernist direction, she became ever more committed to the increasingly successful Hitler, and was delighted when her friend "Wolf' became chancellor and then proceeded to overturn the old Weimar Republic and establish the Third Reich. At the same time, she could not see why "non-Aryan" star singers and conductors, especially if they were only partly Jewish and committed Wagnerians, could not take part in the Festival. She also took umbrage at the persecution of Jewish Wagnerians and Jewish friends of the family, or their descendants and relatives. Hamann develops a fascinating, deeply ironic dialectic between Winifred's complete besottedness with Hitler and her constant and increasingly desperate attempts to use her influence with Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy (many of whom were honored guests at Bayreuth before March 1933) to protect both threatened individuals, including many Jews and partly Jewish individuals, as well as the artistic integrity of the Festival, especially as it related to her partner, Tietjen. Hamann also develops with a great deal of sympathy Winifred's travails during the Second World War and in its devastating aftermath. She develops a portrait of a woman becoming increasingly alienated from her Nazi comrades, due to her humanitarian efforts and the betrayal of the family cause by the anti-Nazi daughter, Friedelind. The last time Winifred met Hitler was in 1940, while her other children continued to be favorites of "Wolf." Yet, when it came to deNazification after tl1e war, it was Winifred who was the main scapegoat in the family. Wolfgang got off because he had never been a party member;

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Verena, though married to a high-flying Nazi, Bodo Lafferentz, was too young; and Wieland, who had tried to use his status as a protegee of the Fuhrer to muscle his way into control over the Festival, stayed in the French Zone until the de-Nazification wave passed. By the time he came back had transformed himself into a modernist and an avant-gardist who had always been against the Nazi friends of his Nazi mother. The book ends with a similarly sympathetic account of Winifred's later years, including the dramatic scenes around Wieland's death, and her exclusion from the subsequent funeral by Wieland's children, as well as scandal around her filmed interview by Syberberg, which led to her exclusion from the Festival by her other son, Wolfgang. To Wieland's children, Winifred was known as the "monster." Hamann shows how in many ways this was an unfair dismissal of a complicated and even decent figure. However, "monster" is not so far off the mark. Hamann's account of Winifred Wagner demonstrates the close, historical connections between authoritarian German nationalism, antiSemitism, and Wagnerism, at least as it was practiced in Bayreuth. It also shows that no amount of personal and artistic integrity can compensate for moral and political error. Winifred Wagner's behavior-especially during the war-in some ways closely parallels E.M. Forster's privileging of the personal over the political (friends above country). Yet her good works in the saving of a few, or even many lives, from the Nazi death machine, which Hamann stresses, and Winifred's attempt to see Wagnerian art above politics, cannot in the end mask the fact that Winifred and Siegfried were involved with the beginning of the Nazi rise to power, that they put the Bayreuth Festival at the service of National Socialism, and that Winifred profited greatly from allowing the Festival to becoming Hitler's Bayreuth, a blatant tool of Nazi propaganda. Her later defense that her admiration of Hitler was only personal not political is simply not tenable, and is contradicted by the very success of the fusion ofHitlerism and Wagnerism over which she presided. Hamann's book shows just how inseparable the personal and artistic fates of the Wagner clan and cause were with the rise ofNational Socialism and how much Winifred herself contributed to sustaining and cementing this connection. Wieland might have denied his past, but at least he realized that the only way to rescue ''Wagner'' was to throw over the past. Winifred, thinking that remaining true to her previous views was "integrity," stayed true to her memories of"USA" (unser seliger Adolf) and continued calling the house where Hitler had stayed in Bayreuth the "Fiihrerbau," giving tea parties there to old friends such as Emmy Goring and Ilse Hess. She shielded her memories of Hitler by denying he could have known about the horrors committed in his name. She continued to rail against "the Jewish influence on cultural life" and to applaud racist tracts of former Nazis. She

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died a tragic figure, and in some ways a sympathetic one, but amid all the many contradictions of her dramatic life as described so thoroughly by Hamann, she remains a "monster" nonetheless.

Note

1. See my review in CAS, vol. 8 (2000), p. 533-43.

Stefan Moritz, Grufl Gott und Heil Hitler: Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus in Osterreich (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 2002) Evan Burr Bukey Those acquainted with the history of the "church struggle" in Nazi Austria will find themselves traversing familiar ground in this important book. They should be prepared, however, for troubling encounters that may provoke resentment, confirm stygian suspicions, or impel a reconsideration of Catholic behavior during the AnschluB years. It is startling to learn, for example, that Cardinal Theodor Innitzer employed over one-hundred slave laborers to till his country estates. Stefan Moritz is one of the first scholars to gain access to diocesan archives in Vienna and Graz, a not insubstantial achievement. He neglects, however, to explain which collections he has consulted and which documents remain under lock and key. The frrst half ofMoritz' s account is less sensational than his publisher would have readers believe. There are, admittedly, new details on the efforts of the Austrian episcopate to seek a political settlement in the months following the AnschluB. But while Moritz condemns the bishops for their willingness to cooperate with Hitler's regime and for their refusal to speak out against wholesale theft and racial terror, he reaches conclusions only marginally at odds with those of Erika Weinzierl, Maximilian Liebmann, and Ernst Hanisch. 1 That the Austrian episcopate genuflected to Berlin is hardly news. ''The Church,'~ Hanisch noted long ago," acted as a partial ally of the Nazi state, thereby contributing to the stabilization of the Nazi order."2 On the other hand, Moritz's careful examination of pastoral letters, church bulletins, and other ecclesiastical publications makes it all too clear that Austrian Catholicism embraced National Socialism to a greater degree than contemporary scholars have recognized or been willing to admit. He marshals persuasive new evidence that bishops and priests welcomed the AnschluB regime with enthusiasm, in some cases idolatry. Parish news-

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letters regularly praised Nazi employment policies, extolled German pronatal practices, and even acclaimed the Fiihrer as redeemer. While the Austrian clergy registered complaints about divorce legislation, restrictions on religious holidays, and the expropriation of Church property, they also portrayed their flock as "reliable partners" of the Nazi establishment. This meant, Moritz writes, more than reticence about anti-Semitic outrages. Priests intensified homilies against the Jews and published articles every bit as invidious as those appearing in Joseph Goebbels' media. Further, numerous parishes profited by providing baptismal certificates and other genealogical documents to furnish proof of Aryan ancestry. Moritz has made it clearer than others how preposterous it is to portray the Austrian Church as the Church of Resistance. On the other hand, his account remains undifferentiated. He neglects to compare or to contrast his findings with the many cases of clerical opposition published by the Documentation Archives of the Austrian Resistance, nor does he allude to the martyrdom of Franz Jagerstiitter, the peasant-pacifist executed for his refusal to serve in the German army because of his Christian faith. Moritz reserves his heaviest fire for a full-frontal assault on the Austrian hierarchy. Following the self-assured arguments of John Cornwell's Hitler's Pope, 3 he chastises the bishops for their promotion of the German war effort, especially their enthusiastic endorsement of Hitler's "holy crusade" against Soviet Russia. At the same time, he partially undermines his own argument by revealing that a widely-read letter of pastoral support for the Reich's policies resulted from Gestapo pressure. More disconcerting are Moritz's archival discoveries concerning Catholic reaction to Nazi euthanasia and to the Holocaust. Like their German brethren, the Austrian dignitaries were among the first to learn about the slaughter of the mentally ill and physically handicapped. One of them, Andreas Rohrbacher, the vicar-general of Carinthia, even filed a formal protest. But when the bishops met in Vienna to discuss medical mass murder, they decided to confine their concern solely to the killing of "normal people."Nine months later, on 1 August 1941, Bishop Clemens August von Galen condemned Hitler's program from his pulpit in MUnster; his Austrian colleagues, however, chose to keep silent. With regard to the Holocaust, Moritz furnishes hard evidence that the Austrian episcopate was well aware ofHitler' s extermination of the Jews. He takes the bishops to task for their antipathy toward both Judaism and Jewry, even holding them "responsible for the greatest crime of the 20th century" (p. 203). What he does not provide is detailed information on their debates and deliberations. Since recent research in diocesan archives in Berlin and Munich reveals that German bishops agonized over the news from the East, it strains credulity to assume that their colleagues in the Ostmark did not join in the general discussion. 4 Whether they deliberately

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expurgated their thoughts from the official protocol is unclear. Moritz needs to explain the omission to the reader. Perhaps, additional research will cast light on this difficult question. If Moritz loses sight of the fact that the Church of Rome did not conceive of nor execute the Holocaust, he is on firmer ground in excoriating the Holy See for helping Nazi war criminals escape retribution. He emphasizes the role of his countryman Bishop Alois Hudal, rector of the Collegia del Anima in Rome, in this disgraceful episode. Yet his account scarcely breaks new ground and contributes little information about the activities of other Austrian clergymen involved in the notorious Rat Line that enabled hundreds of war criminals-including Adolf Eichmann, Franz Stangl, and Alois Brunner-to flee Allied-occupied Europe. Moritz does, however, provide a list of pro-Nazi clergy who rose to prominent positions in the Second Republic. After 1945 the Austrian Church characterized itself as a stalwart opponent of the Nazi regime. Since nearly a thousand clergymen had suffered imprisonment and thirty-five had died or been executed, the claim appeared well founded. Moritz shows, however, that Cardinal Innitizer and his associates pursued a "double strategy" devised to conceal their own record of collaboration and to recover Catholicism's preeminent position in state and society. Invoking the doctrine of Christian charity, they also claimed the moral right to minister to "misguided" National Socialists. This meant that the Roman Church rejected any notion of guilt, called for clemency for Hitler's followers, and expressed no remorse for the victims of the Holocaust. The result was the survival of authoritarian and anti-Semitic attitudes that persist, Moritz contends, to this day. The publication of Gru.P Gott und Heil Hitler has precipitated a small uproar in Austria. 5 This is partly because Moritz-a trained theologian-tackles a sensitive issue, partly because he presents his findings in an impassioned style. Within the academic community, one prominent historian has criticized his use of sources, but acknowledged the veracity of his findings. Other scholars may find additional matters to dispute. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that anyone interested in understanding the complex and controversial behavior of the Church ofRome during the Nazi era can ignore this valuable contribution.

Notes

1. Erika Weinzierl, Priifstand: Osterrichs Katholiken und der Nationalsozialismus (Mooling, 1988); Maximilian Liebmann, Theodor Innitzer und der Anschluj3: Oste"eichs Kirche 1938 (Graz, 1988); Ernst Hanisch, "Austrian Catholicism: Between Accommodation and Resistance," in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today, ed. F. Parkinson (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1989), 16-76. 2. Hanisch, "Austrian Catholicism," 166.

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3. John Cornwell, Hitler's Pope: The Secret History ofPius XII (New York: Viking, 1999). 4. Michael Phayer, The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965 (Bloomington, IN: U of Indiana P, 2000), 66-81 passim. 5. George Jahn, "Pro-Nazi Priests Outed," The Washington Times, 24 November 2002.

Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Osterreich: Mit einem Vorwort von Paul Lendvai (Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 2003) Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003) Zoltan Tarr The literature of the defeated 1956 Hungarian revolution falls into three categories: 1) original documents, the source material of events; 2) evaluation of events via the social sciences: history, sociology, political science; and 3) biographical and eyewitness reports. Philosophers from Hannah Arendt to Jean-Paul Sartre have discussed the events of 1956 in Hungary. A recent example of the "evaluation" category of literature listed above is the two related themes that are the subject of the Ungamkrise, based on lectures held at a conference in Vienna in 2001: the 1956 Hungarian crisis in an international context and the role of neighboring Austria in it. There is an enormous body ofliterature on the subject, and the problems described therein may be approached from many angles such as the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Empire-an anti-colonial uprising. As an evaluation of the events of 1956 via the social sciences category above, Die Ungamkrise 1956 und Osterreich is more than the title indicates. Only six of the eighteen essays deal explicitly with the problem indicated in the title. A host of prominent scholars from a variety of international backgrounds tackles the Hungarian events of 1956 from many angles, beginning with four essays that discuss historical events, followed by five essays that place the events in an international context, and concluding with six essays specifically relating to Austria. Events of the ten days that shook the Soviet Empire and the almost half-century that followed started with two actors, the people of Hungary rising up against the occupying Soviet Army and its collaborators, the Hungarian secret

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police. The circle of actors broadened in many ways when Great Britain, France, and Israel undertook military action over the Suez Canal and created more international repercussions that involved small neighboring countries. A most important consequence was that Tito's Yugoslavia encouraged the second Soviet intervention that put down the uprising and Austria lent a helping hand to the 200,000 refugees, including myself, who left Hungary after the second Soviet intervention and dispersed in every direction of the globe. When discussing the contributions the impressive wealth of material of the Ungarnkrise volume, one must be selective and acutely aware of the inevitable subjectivity of a person like me, an eyewitness and participant of the events in Hungary and a refugee who was a beneficiary of Austrian Gastfreundschaft after the Soviet intervention on 4 November 1956. Two essays discuss the role of the United States during the October crisis. Giinter Bischof s essay is a tour de force survey of the literature of the Eisenhower presidency and narrates how the announced rollback policy of the Eisenhower years disseminated by Radio Free Europe and by the Voice of America to the populace of Eastern Europe for many years contrasts with the do-nothing Realpolitik in October 1956. It is highly speculative to suggest that a stronger U.S. stand against the Soviets in support of the Hungarians would have risked the plunging the world into another world war or even nuclear catastrophe. Laszlo Borhi certainly exaggerates the significance of alleged and amateurish anti-communist plots on Hungary in the 1950s, which were financed by Americans. He is more correct in asserting that an ineffective U.S. response to events was due to poor intelligence which, in light of recent events, seems to be perennial problem that plagues American foreign policy makers due to their lack of knowledge of foreign languages and world history. The concluding six essays deal with the role of Austria during the 1956 crisis. One possible approach would be to discuss the 1956 events in the context of the 400 years of Austrian-Hungarian cohabitation in central Europe, a relationship with its ups and downs that began with Hungary's liberation from Ottoman-Turkish domination. That situation was followed by Austrian colonization, and Hungarian uprisings against it, led by Ferenc Rak:6czi and Lajos Kossuth, the latter defeated wjth the help of the Russian Tsarist army. Again, oppression andAusgleich followed in 1867 as did a more peaceful coexistence and cooperation leading up to defeat in World War I, dismemberment and defeat in World War II, and a partial occupation of Austria and a total occupation of Hungary by the Soviets. In 1955, Austria achieved independence and neutrality, which served as an inspiration and model for Hungarians in 1956 as the declaration of Prime Minister lmre Nagy on 1 November and the writings ofhis minister Istvan Bibo made clear. The idea of neutrality is forgotten by present-day Hun-

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garian memorials of the events of 1956 by leaders of the socialist party and its allies for obvious reasons: Hungary is a trusted member of NATO and a faithful ally of the United States in the war on terrorism. Not even lip service is paid to the ideas of socialism professed by the 56ers, by an allegedly socialist party that is faithful servant of western multinational corporations that own and run 75 percent of the economy. Many of the details, participants, and ideologies of the events are still controversial and debated even in Hungary, as I witnessed during the celebrations of October 2002 in Budapest. The reasons for the controversial nature of the events are many, as eloquently discussed by historian Istvan Deak of Columbia University. Other critics point out that there was no real break with the Stalinist past. Instead, only a smooth, agreed-upon transition from the goulash Communism of the Janos Kadar era to the post-Kadarist new democracy was negotiated between the reformist communist leadership and the heterogeneous oppositional forces. Since then, alternating power sharing by the two groups has occurred. The crux of the matter for today' s controversies in Hungary seems to be the general lack of consensus in respect to the recent past; thus the manipulation of the past becomes a tool in the struggle for power. The control over the secret police files has been seen and used by the main political players as an instrument in the political battle. From this reviewer's perspective, only one aspect is missing in Ungarnkrise: the discussion of the spontaneous revolutionary organs, the councils of workers and intellectuals which sprang up in the first days of the revolution and took the place of former authorities, thus playing an important role. In "Memories of '56 ... ," an article published in the Sunday, 29 December 2002 edition of The New York Times, Celestine Bohlen called attention to a recent publication, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, asking the rhetorical question: can a superpower handle more than one crisis at a time? The reference was to the problem of the United States today: handling the North Korean and Iraqi crises simultaneously, and invoking the dual crises of the 1956 Hungarian revolution and the British-FrenchIsraeli Suez military action. The publication is a monumental documentary collection in English of the events of 1956 in Hurrgary. With the use and inclusion of new and hitherto unknown material recovered from Russian archives, the book will be a gold mine for any future interpretive work. In terms of the consolidation of the counterrevolutionary Kadar regime, two important things are discussed here in some detail under the heading "Hungary in the Aftermath": the trial and execution of Imre Nagy, and the crushing of all opposition including 400 executions, tens of thousands sentenced to long prison terms, destruction of the workers' and intellectuals' councils, and the establishment of a wide network of informers, who-

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se activity is still not fully disclosed. From the account ofVeljko Micunovic, a Yugoslav diplomat, the reader learns about the 2-3 November meeting between Nikita Khrushev and Josip Tito where Khrushev declared, "British and French aggressive pressure on Egypt provided a favorable moment for a further intervention by Soviet troops. It would help the Russians. There would be confusion and uproar in the West and the United Nations, but it would be less at a time when Britain, France and Israel were waging a war against Egypt." (p. 349, emphasis added). While Ungarnkrise is a giant step in the interpretation and analysis, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution is an unsurpassed, thoroughly up to date collection of documents that is likely to stimulate further research and interpretation by future generations of scholars.

ANNUAL REVIEW Survey ofAustrian politics 2002 Reinhold Gartner

Elections 2002 The Forming of a New Government Economic Data

Elections 2002

The main political event in 2002 was the early National Council elections on 24 November. The drama of these elections rested upon previous events. In February 2000, the FPO-OVP coalition government was set up, and the next regular elections were due to be held in autumn 2003. The formation of the Schiissel government in February 2000 was followed by intense protest of the other fourteen European Union (EU) member states and some other countries like United States and Israel because of the FPO' s ambiguous attitude towards National Socialism. Since February 2000, though, the main problems for the coalition government were the internal conditions within the FPO. From the year 2000 until now, Jorg Haider and his followers became more and more annoyed about both the behavior ofFPO members of government and the fact that the FPO lost in all state diet elections following the National Council elections of 1999 (Styria and Burgenland in 2000, Vienna in 2001). Moreover, polls showed a continuous loss for the FPO. Since then, it has never been clear ifFPO was willing to be and act as partofthe government or if it finds the opposition role as more appropriate. Thus Haider again and again attacked theFPO members of government and accused them of violating the coalition agreement of February 2000. One point was the question of tax reform; the coalition had announced in 2000 that tax reform should come in 2003, but long before that, it was clear that this was not realistic because of the budgetary situation.

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

Haider also used other opportunities to disavow those within the FPO who were trying to succeed in government and Austria as a whole. His visit to Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2002 caused anger among Austria's political elites (and among many FPO supporters, too). Previous to this, at the end of2001, Haider had accused the Supreme Court (Verfassungsgerichtshoj) of being biased due to the Court s finding that, in bilingual communities of Carinthia, bilingual topographical signs had to be erected. Finally, in the summer of 2002, Austria was hit by a serious flood which caused damages of some Euro 3 billion and affected the political arena as well. When Karl Heinz Grasser, the minister of finance, used these costs as an excuse for not being able to initiate tax reform in 2003, Haider struck the decisive blow. Hardliners within the FPO collected signatures among members of the main party organ (Bundesparteitag) to give the party chairwoman, Susanne Riess-Passer, an ultimatum. This was executed at the special convention in Knittelfeld (Styria), and Riess-Passerresigned. Chancellor Wolfgang Schiissel then announced elections for the autumn of 2002, and the showdown within FPO became disasterous. Riess-Passer's successor was Mathias Reichhold, minister of infrastructure. During the election campaign, though, he experienced serious health problems and was replaced by Herbert Haupt, minister for social affairs. The elections were held on 24 November, and the result was in many ways extraordinary (see Table 1).

Table 1:2002 Election as Compared to the 1999 Election, in Percentage Percentage of Votes per Party by Year 1986

1990

1994

1995

1999

2002

Change in Percentage of Votes from 1999 to 2002

SPO

43.1

42.8

34.9

38.1

33.2

36.5

+3.2

OVP

41.3

32.1

27.7

28.3

26.9

42.3

+15.4

FPO

9.7

16.6

22.5

21.9

26.9

10.0

-16.9

Griine

3.8

4.8

7.3

4.8

7.4

9.5

+2.1

6.0

5.5

3.7

0.98

-2.7

LIF

Source: Interior Ministry, Official Election Results. With a loss of 16.9 percent, the FPO was set back to its 1986 percentage, and the LiP (Liberals) was condemned to insignificance. Both SPO (+3.2) and the Griine (+ 2.1) could win in comparison to 1999, but the

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really astonishing success belongs to the OVP (+ 15.4). For the first time in National Council Elections since 1966, the OVP was stronger than the SPO and could end a long time of continuous losses at national council elections. The result was even more surprising, as most of the FPO' s losses went to the OVP. Meanwhile, the SPO could only take note of this mass movement from the FPO to the OVP. The result also showed that the mobility of Austrian voters was greater than at any time previously. Ultimately, Chancellor Wolfgang Schiissel was ordered to start coalition negotiations, but until February 2003 they occurred without concrete results.

The Formation of a New Government

Despite the fact that a government without the OVP was more than unrealistic, the negotiations of the OVP with the other three political parties seemed to be endless. During December2002 and January 2003, the OVP again and again was talking with the other political parties. At the end of January, a coalition government of the OVP and the Griine seemed to be possible. At the end of the negotiations, though, there were too many discrepancies between these two, so the OVP continued talks with the SPO. Finally, in February 2003, the OVP congress decided to form a coalition with the FPO again, and on 28 February, the new OVP-FPO government was sworn in by President Thomas Klestil (see Table 2).

Table 2:Distribution of Cabinet Posts in the OVP-FPO Coalition Government OfficeHolder Dr. Wolfgang Schtissel

Party Affiliation OVP

Office Chancellor

Mag. Herbert Haupt

FPO

Vice-Chancellor Federal Ministry for Social Security and Generations

Maria Rauch Kallat

OVP

Federal Ministry for Health and Women' 1> Issues

Hubert Gorbach

FP6

Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation, and Technology

Dr. Dieter Bohmdorfer

FP6

Federal Ministry of Justice

Dr. Martin Barteinstein

OVP

Federal Ministry for Economic Mfairs and Labor

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Contemporary Austrian Studies

Dipl.Ing. JosefProll

OVP

Dr. Benita FerreroWaldner

OVP

Elisabeth Gehrer

OVP

Mag. Karl Heinz Grasser

*

Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment, and Water Management Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Federal Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture Federal Ministry of Finance

Dr. Ernst Strasser

OVP

Federal Ministry of the Interior

Gunther Platter

OVP

Federal Ministry of Defense

FranzMorak

OVP

State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery

Mag. Karl Schweitzer

FPO

State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery

Ursula Haubner

FPO

State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Social Security and Generations

Dr. Alfred Finz

OVP

State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance

Mag. Herbert Kuk.acka

OVP

State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation, and Technology

Dr. Reinhart Waneck

State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Health and Women's Issues

* Karl Heinz Grasser was the FPO Minister for Finance in the previous government, but withdrew from the FPO during the election campaign. Source: http://www.austria.gv.at/e The main question for the stability of the new Schiissel government is whether or not the FPO can be a stable partner. 'fllere are discrepancies within the party that led to the collapse of the first Schiissel government in autumn 2002, and it is doubtful if the FPO has become a more reliable partner in the meantime. The results of regional elections in Lower Austria, Upper Austria, and the Tyrol in 2003 will show if the decline of the FPO is a continuing trend or if it can be stopped. Given current conditions, the former is more likely to occur than is the latter.

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Economic Data In 2002, an average of3, 154,500 people were employed, and 232,400 were unemployed (as compared to 203,900 in 2001). Thus, the unemployment rate in 2001 was 4.0 percent (International Labor Organization figures), and 6.9 percent in 2002. Austria's GOP was at 216 billion-, with inflation at 1.8 percent. According to the Maastricht criteria, the public deficit was at 0.6 percent of GOP, and public debt at 67.9 percent of GOP.

List of Authors Ingrid Bauer is a professor of modern and gender history at the University of Salzburg Steven Beller is an independent historian in Washington, D.C. Peter Berger is a professor of history, Department of Social and Economic History, Wirtschaftsuniversitiit Vienna and was the 2002/2003 Marshall Plan Chair of Austrian Studies at the University of New Orleans Monika Bernold is the Hertha Firnberg Research Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary History, University of Vienna Evan Burr Bukey is a professor of history at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville Gunter Bischofis a professor of history the 2003/4 Marshall Plan Professor of Austrian Studies and the director of CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans Martin David was the 2002/2003 Austrian Ministry ofEducation, Science and the Arts fellow at CenterAustria, University of New Orleans Kurt Drexel is an assistant professor in the Music Department at the University of Innsbruck Anton Fink is the managing director and partner, Institutional Asset Management, Bank Gutmann AG in Vienna Matthias Fuchs is an assistant professor, Institute of General Management and Tourism Management, University of Innsbruck

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Reinhold Gartner is an associate professor of political science at the University oflnnsbruck Christina Hainzl is completing her PhD in history at the University of Salzburg Maria-Regina Kecht is an associate professor of German Studies and director of the Rice Center for the Study of Languages, Rice University in Houston, Texas Martin Kofler is a historian and the contemporary history editor of the Studienverlag, Innsbruck Helmut Lackner is the deputy director of the Technical Museum, Vienna Andrei S. Markovits is the Karl W. Deutsch Collegiate Professor of Comparative Politics and German Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Anton Pelinka is a professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and the director of the Institute of Conflict Research, Vienna Andre Pfoertner is a scientific consultant, Investment Department, Eidgenossische Bankenkommission, Berne, Switzerland Fritz Plasser is department chair and professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and a highly respected Austrian pollster Anna Schober is a lecturer in the Institute of Contemporary History, University of Vienna Reinhard Sieder is professor of history, Department of Economic and Social History, University of Vienna, and the founding editor of the Osterreichische Zeitschrift Geschichtswissenschaft Dieter Stiefel is a professor of history, Department of Economic and Social History, University of Vienna and visiting fellow at the Center for European Studies at the University of California in Berkeley in the spring of2003 Zoltan Tarris a professor emeritus of sociology and history at City College ofthe City University of New York; he also taught at the New School for Social Research and Rutgers University