The American War in Vietnam 9781501719462

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
Coercive Diplomacy In Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered
The Tet Offensive And Its Aftermath
Nixon And The PRG's 7 Points
China's Role In The Vietnam War
Cooperativization, The Family Economy, And The New Family In Wartime Vietnam, 1960-1975
US Scholarship And The National Liberation Front
The Future Of The Veterans' Lobby And Its Potential Impact For Social Policy
Glossary
Contributors

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Jayne Werner & David Hunt, Editors

THE AMERICAN WAR IN VIETNAM

Southeast Asia Program Series Number 13

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Jayne Werner & David Hunt, Editors

THE AMERICAN WAR IN VIETNAM

SEAP Southeast Asia Program 180 Uris Hall Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1993

© 1993 Cornell Southeast Asia Program ISBN 0-87727-131-3

Typeset by Donna Amoroso

CONTENTS Introduction David Hunt and Jayne Werner

1

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered Gareth Porter

.. 9

The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath Ngo Vinh Long

23

Nixon and the PRG’s 7 Points George McT. Kahin

47

China’s Role in the Vietnam War Allen Whiting

71

Cooperativization, the Family Economy, and the New Family in Wartime Vietnam, 1960–1975 Jayne Werner

77

US Scholarship and the National Liberation Front David Hunt

93

The Future of the Veterans’ Lobby and its Potential Impact for Social Policy Paul Camacho

109

Glossary

... 123

Contributors

125

MAP Vietnam and its Neighbors

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Vietnam and its Neighbors

INTRODUCTION David Hunt and Jayne Werner

his volume is the outcome of a conference held in Hanoi November 25-27, 1988, during which scholars from Vietnam and the United States met for the first time since 1975 to discuss the war. The gathering was hosted by Vietnam's Institute of Military History, with assistance from the Social Sciences Commission and the International Relations Institute. On the US side, the conference was coordinated by Jayne Werner (Long Island University and Columbia University), with funding provided by the Samuel Rubin Foundation and the William Joiner Center for the Study of War and Social Consequences at the University of Massachusetts/Boston. Participants included Hoang Phuong (Director), Cao Pha (Deputy Director), and Tran Buoi, of the Institute of Military History, Luu Doan Huynh of the International Relations Institute, Le Thi Nham Tuyet, Vice-Director of the Center for Research on Women in the State Committee for Social Science, and Quynh Cu, also from the State Committee for Social Science. On the US side were Paul Camacho and David Hunt (University of Massachusetts/ Boston), Ngo Vinh Long (University of Maine), Allen Whiting (University of Arizona), and Jayne Werner. Last minute complications prevented George Kahin (Cornell University) and Gareth Porter (American University) from joining the others in Hanoi, but their papers were read and discussed during the conference and are included in the present volume. The purpose of this introduction is to describe the organization and atmosphere of the conference; to summarize the Vietnamese view of the war that emerged; and to discuss the American papers and the reception accorded them. Whereas many academic conferences in the United States highlight formal presentations, often intended for publication and read verbatim, with the question period as an afterthought, the Vietnamese put less emphasis on the written papers than on the debates they occasioned. For circulation among conference participants and observers, they provided summaries in Vietnamese of the American essays. English-language versions of the Vietnamese contributions, which the Americans received when they arrived in Hanoi, were similarly prepared by the Foreign Ministry. Individual conference sessions were organized around a single theme, with one representative from each side making a presentation, followed by general discussion. Paragraph-by-paragraph translations were offered by staff members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with help from bilingual speakers among the participants. It quickly became apparent that the Vietnamese in their oral statements were elaborating considerably on the cautious essays they had submitted, and that, since the US papers had been only summarized in Vietnamese, the Americans had to employ a similar approach.

T

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The American War in Vietnam

Although confusing at first and imposing a slow pace on the proceedings, this arrangement did not inhibit discussion. On the contrary, the tone was set during the first session, when Allen Whiting went beyond the circumspect terms of his paper to declare that up to 1965 China had done more for Vietnam than it had for Korea before the beginning of the Korean War. "I deliberately engaged in a provocation to escalate the level of discussion/' he later confessed. When Luu Doan Huynh riposted in excellent English that Whiting's was a "lame" defense of the Chinese contribution, a lively debate ensued, the first of many exciting and thought-provoking exchanges during the weekend. On the Vietnamese side, the conference appeared to be the outcome of a collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, and, among themselves, the Americans spent more than a little time searching for signs of possible tensions between the "renovation" and "hard line" postures these ministries are supposed to represent. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach offered keynote remarks, welcoming the event as a "new development helping the people of our two countries understand the war better" and as a step toward reconciliation between Vietnam and the United States. And throughout the conclave, Luu Doan Huynh, from the International Relations Institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, played an active role. On the other hand, Hoang Phuong, Cao Pha, and Tran Buoi from the Institute of Military History framed most of the questions on the Vietnamese side, while Le Thi Nham Tuyet and Quynh Cu functioned more on the margins of the proceedings. The result was a conclave more oriented toward diplomacy and battlefield strategy than toward class or gender. American presentations in the military/diploma tic register characteristic of the Vietnamese view touched off the most animated exchanges, while papers offering political and especially social analysis stimulated less of a response from our hosts. The "Vietnam War" poses different kinds of historical questions for the Vietnamese than for Americans. First, Vietnamese terminology is different: they refer to the war as the "American" war, to distinguish it from the "French" war, the "Japanese" war, and the border war with China in 1979. The Vietnamese disagree among themselves over many aspects of "the American War," for example, the meaning and impact of the Tet Offensive, and there are at least three different published assessments of the final offensive in 1975, which led to the capture of Saigon and the reunification of Vietnam.1 The US delegation functioned harmoniously at the conference, but perhaps the Vietnamese detected differences in background and orientation within our ranks as well, especially when the Americans, who had been in different places during the 1960s, stepped all over each others' toes to "explain" the antiwar movement to a no doubt confused audience on the other side of the table. *On the Tet Offensive, see Tran Van Tra, 'Tet—the 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising/' in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, ed. Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993), which refers to different Vietnamese assessments of Tet. On the Final Offensive, differing published accounts include: General Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); Hoang Van Thai, 'The Decisive Years/' English translation in JPRS SEA 87-084, June 23,1987, originally published in Saigon Giai Phong (Ho Chi Minh City), March 13-May 14, 1986. Also see Tran Van Tra, Ket Thuc Chien Tranh 30 Nam (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe, 1982), translated into English as Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years' War (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast Asia Report, No. 1247, Joint Publication Research Service [JPRS] 82783, February 2,1983).

Introduction

3

A sequence of three presentations, by Tran Buoi, Cao Pha, and Hoang Phuong, provided an overview of the war as seen from the perspective of the Institute of Military History. In his study of US efforts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Tran Buoi paid little attention to the air war launched by the United States in 1965, but instead dwelt on Eisenhower's subversion of the Geneva Accords and John Kennedy's covert operations in the South. In spite of massive US involvement, he argued, the special war was bankrupt by the end of 1963, at which point only 30 percent of the villages in the South had been "pacified."^ In his paper on 1968, Cao Pha affirmed that the objective of the Tet Offensive was to destroy a large part of Saigon's military and bureaucratic apparatus, to break the will of the United States, and to pave the way for a negotiated settlement. Three North Vietnamese divisions at Khe Sanh took heavy casualties, but fulfilled their strategic purpose of diverting the Americans from the main theaters of battle elsewhere in the country. The biggest victories were won in the first and second waves of the Offensive, but tactical errors and the failure to achieve a general uprising led to setbacks in the third phase. "We lost ground and control over the population to some extent,'7 Cao Pha noted, but in spite of high casualties among troops and cadres, a military, political, and diplomatic victory was achieved. Hoang Phuong's paper implicitly distanced itself from the American perspective on the war, which tends to view the period 1965-1968 as the high point of the conflict. The struggle culminated not in Tet '68, he argued, but in the early 1970s, when fighting spread to Laos and Cambodia, the DRV was blockaded, and the air war was greatly intensified. Nixon's "China card" and his attack on the antiwar movement helped to make this the most perilous moment in the war for the Vietnamese side. At the same time, US escalation, especially the invasions of Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971, which provided breathing room for both the northern regular forces and for guerrilla units in South Vietnam, created conditions that enabled the revolutionaries to regain the initiative and bring the war to a successful conclusion. Antiwar sentiment in the US has a place in the Vietnamese view of the war. Quynh Cu's portrayal of the movement included interesting and obscure detail, but was too optimistic in depicting intellectuals and, by implication, the general public as massively opposed to US intervention. When American participants voiced reservations about such a portrayal, Quynh Cu replied, "We may indeed have overlooked the shortcomings of the antiwar movement, but it was because of our love for you that we exaggerated." On the US side, recruitment for the conference was difficult, as budget considerations forced organizers to keep the delegation small and logistical considerations made it impossible for a number of potential participants to reserve the two weeks necessary for a trip to Vietnam. As a result, the list of topics covered by the Americans was somewhat arbitrary. There were no papers on US society during the war, little mention of class, race, and gender issues, and nothing on the media, the economy, or the universities. On the other hand, the resulting focus on military and diplomatic aspects corresponded rather well to the concerns of our hosts and in the 2

Tran Buoi, 'The American War of Destruction against the D.R.V.: Its Goal and Defeat." The other Vietnamese papers included: Cao Pha, "The Year of Mau Than: Turning Point of the Vietnamese People's War of Resistance Against U.S. Aggression and For National Salvation"; Hoang Phuong, "For Nixon: The Highest Escalation of the War and the Most Disastrous Defeats"; Quynh Cu, 'The U.S. Intelligentsia and the War in South Vietnam, 1961-68"; and Le Thi Nham Tuyet, "Vietnamese Women During the Period 1960-75."

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The American War in Vietnam

end was faithful enough to the situation in the United States, where policy making and battlefield strategy still predominate over social issues. All of the US papers included in this volume were presented at the conference. Each has been revised, sometimes considerably, in response to commentaries and suggestions offered during the meeting in Hanoi and in the light of subsequent criticisms and second thoughts over the intervening years. Gareth Porter's paper deals with Vietnamese reactions to US policy at the time of the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August 1964. He argues that the incident should be studied as a case of "coercive diplomacy" that failed and even boomeranged. The aim of US policy was to prevent North Vietnam from supporting the revolution in the South by stepping up the military pressure against the DRV, but the Hanoi Politburo drew just the opposite conclusion from the ploy. It had correctly assumed for some time that Washington would bomb the North and send troops to the South in order to stop the National Liberation Front (NLF), a necessity that President Johnson was still unwilling to recognize. The Tonkin Gulf incident was taken in the DRV as a sign that this turning point toward escalation had been reached. Expecting the air war and the arrival of American soldiers, Hanoi committed People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units to the South. The tragedy of Tonkin, Porter argues, is that, although the Vietnamese at the time were willing to accept a neutral South through a negotiated settlement, US policy foreclosed a non-military solution. The Vietnamese were not persuaded by Porter's argument that Hanoi's dispatch of regular forces to the South was prompted by the Tonkin Gulf incident's "signal" that the Pentagon was abandoning special for limited war. On the contrary, they resisted any suggestion that the DRV took an initiative, even for rational, morally defensible reasons, to escalate the war. There was no agreement on when the choice was made (Tran Buoi's insistence on December 1965 constituted an outside limit), but all located the introduction of PAVN forces after the March 1965 arrival of the Marines at Danang. To sum up, in the words of Hoang Phuong, Porter confused "preparation for decision." In his paper on the Tet Offensive, Ngo Vinh Long argued that the revolutionary leadership mishandled the Offensive in its third and concluding phase. After the NLF strike force achieved dramatic gains, the attack should have been broken off, with fighters retreating into the countryside to consolidate their victories in newly liberated areas. When units were left too long in forward positions, the resulting casualty rate was high, temporarily crippling the southern movement and leaving Front cadres exposed to the Phoenix Program. Losses were also extensive for the northern forces who subsequently had to play a larger role in the South and who, out of necessity and inclination, functioned in a conventional manner, without tactical support from the grassroots. The revolutionaries reclaimed the initiative only after the southerners rebuilt connections between peasants and soldiers and the northerners returned to a guerrilla approach. Long's paper accepts a view of the Tet Offensive as a victory for the revolutionary side, but his observations on the leadership's inflexibility during the Offensive and PAVN's subsequent over-reliance on conventional tactics amount to a criticism of Hanoi and a reaffirmation of the southern revolution. So it was all the more striking when Cao Pha seconded Long's conclusions and even endorsed the analysis of

Introduction

5

Tet provided by Tran Van Tra, an NLF veteran and historian whose study of the war met with a cool reception in official circles when it was published in 1982.3 In one other respect, Long's analysis is in agreement with the line of thinking presented by the Vietnamese historians in Hanoi. His paper hesitates between two projects: one focused on the aim of demonstrating that the Tet Offensive was a turning point toward victory for the guerrillas, rather than a defeat as claimed by conservative scholars in the US; the other tending to de-emphasize the significance of Tet and to locate the war's turning point during the Nixon period. Manifestations of the first interpretation are evident in his (we think not entirely successful) attempts to re-argue the "casualty" and "general uprising" premises employed by conservatives to prove that the Offensive did not turn out as the revolutionaries had planned. Long's more original contribution is to show, based on interviews with southern veterans, that the outcome of the war remained in doubt after 1968 and that victory for the insurgents was not assured until the NLF had been able to rebuild its ranks and reaffirm the primacy of people's war. None of the Vietnamese papers at the conference dwelt on the 1965-1968 period, the moment when US troops poured into Vietnam and when, from the American perspective, the decisive battles were fought. Hoang Phuong made this shift of emphasis explicit in declaring that the aftermath of the Tet Offensive was more crucial than Tet itself. The losses incurred by the southern guerrillas were balanced by the presence of PAVN troops and equipment in the highlands. The US incursion into Laos and Cambodia fueled the antiwar movement and provided the revolutionaries with more room for maneuver. Nixon's strategy was shrewd, but the expansion of the war was a mistake because it provided the PAVN with breathing space inside Vietnam and enabled the resistance to rebuild its forces and mount the 1972 Offensive. The China/Vietnam axis remains a key focus of Vietnamese concerns (the Soviet role was not addressed by either side during the conference), and Allen Whiting's sinophilic reading was rejected with verve and much attention to the evidence by all the Vietnamese who responded to his paper. Whiting argues that the Chinese calculus of deterrence in Vietnam was largely successful. Learning from their mistakes in Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRO never revealed publicly that there were over 50,000 non-combat Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops stationed north of Hanoi. These were introduced in 1965 to maintain antiaircraft installations defending MIG airfields and to signal Washington that the Chinese would intervene if the United States invaded the North or escalated the war into China. The PRC also had bases and airfields across the border in China, which DRV pilots used as sanctuaries, and the PRC and DRV engaged in joint aerial exercises. The signal that the Chinese sent to Washington was therefore more credible than in the case of Korea. Luu Doan Huynh responded that Chinese motives were less than pure and that they had their own reasons for preventing US escalation of the war. The PRC at the time strongly supported wars of national liberation and was critical of US imperialism. Mao Ze-Dong was about to launch the Cultural Revolution, in which he sought to undermine pro-Soviet elements in the Communist Party. The slogan used at the beginning of that campaign was, "Let there be turmoil in the world," in part 3

Cao Pha's paper on the Tet Offensive presented at the conference closely followed Tran Van Tra's analysis of the Tet Offensive (translated and published in 'Tet—the 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising/' in The Vietnam War, ed. Werner and Huynh).

6 The American War in Vietnam

referring to the Vietnam War as a bulwark against US imperialism. Mao's defense of Vietnam was linked to his internal political position and had the added incentive of keeping the PRC out of the war since the Chinese did not want to get bogged down in a military conflict on their border. On the other hand, Mao began to angle for an alliance with the United States in 1965, both for anti-Soviet reasons and to limit the Vietnamese Revolution. Summing up, in a polemical tour de force, Luu Doan Huynh almost made it sound as if the PRC was responsible for the suffering of the Vietnamese and American people during the war. Continuing the discussion, Hoang Phuong acknowledged that China did provide Vietnam with assistance and said that the PRC would probably have intervened on the side of the Vietnamese if the US had invaded the North. Returning to the fray, Luu Doan Huynh added that Beijing had reneged on the secret agreement to provide the DRV with air cover and was hardly a reliable ally. Two days after the NLF had made its seven-point peace plan public in 1971, the Vietnamese were undercut by the announcement that Nixon and Kissinger were going to Beijing. The signals sent to Washington by the Chinese need to be seen in this light. Their efforts to maneuver the Americans into a rapprochement worked. The US was more prudent and the PRC more adroit than they had been in Korea, and as a result the two great powers were more successful in protecting their interests—at the expense of the Vietnamese. George Kahin's paper is a re-examination of the July 1971 seven-point peace proposal advanced by the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and the negative reaction of the Nixon administration. Noting that the terms of the proposal were seriously misrepresented to the American public by the administration, Kahin argues that they provided an opportunity for the US to achieve a negotiated settlement of the war on terms better than those secured at Paris in 1973 and without the civilian and military casualties suffered during the intervening period. Kahin suggests that the PRG was encouraged to issue the seven points partly because Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy was a manifest failure and partly because Kissinger hinted to Hanoi that a coalition government in the South would be acceptable to Washington. However, the Nixon administration refused to permit a free election in South Vietnam, one that could have led to Nguyen Van Thieu's displacement by Duong Van Minh, who was prepared to negotiate a peace agreement. The paper notes that one reason Nixon and Kissinger spurned this opportunity was their expectation that detente with China would result in a decrease in Chinese support for Hanoi and a subsequent deterioration in the bargaining position of the DRV. The Vietnamese did not respond to Kahin's suggestion that the PRG's sevenpoints offered the Nixon administration terms more favorable than those eventually accepted in the Paris Peace Agreement. But they agreed that the proposal constituted a realistic basis for a negotiated settlement and that the US/PRC rapprochement helps explain why Washington did not respond to the Vietnamese offer. A note of skepticism came from Allen Whiting, who was not sure that Kahin's position as participant/observer in this episode allowed him to form an accurate impression of the administration's state of mind. On the eve of the conference, prospects for the session on Vietnamese women in the war, based on presentations by US conference organizer Jayne Werner and the distinguished Vietnamese scholar Le Thi Nham Tuyet, seemed bright. But the results were somewhat disappointing. The Vietnamese did not react to Jayne Werner's outline of tensions between women and patriarchal household production and her call for a gender-based analysis of northern society during the war. In her turn, Le Thi

Introduction

7

Nham Tuyet commented on the place of women in northern cooperatives, on southern wives and mothers of regroupees lobbying the Hanoi government for a resumption of the war, and on women in the postwar work force. And she demonstrated sensitivity to the political concerns informing Werner's paper ("The tradition of sexual discrimination still exists in Vietnam/7) But her presentation began by returning to earlier debates on the introduction of PAVN forces into the South and on the Tet Offensive, a framing device that diverted attention from gender issues. The other Vietnamese seemed content to affirm that women's involvement in the war effort was a symbol of the mass character of the Vietnamese resistance to foreign invaders. The Vietnamese responded sympathetically when Paul Camacho, who served with the US Marines near the Demilitarized Zone in 1968/69, outlined difficulties faced by the veterans' movement in the United States. And they were obviously moved when he declared, "The spraying that killed the beautiful forests of Laos and the DMZ is also killing us." But, perhaps too quickly, they appeared to rule out comparisons between Vietnamese soldiers, who fought for their country and won, and GIs, who encountered all sorts of obstacles once they returned to the United States. David Hunt's review of American scholarship on the NLF distinguished between work with a political focus, conducted largely in terms inherited from the disputes arising from US intervention, and a more social and comparative approach that, he feels, better promises to account for the strength of Vietnamese popular movements. In commenting on Hunt's suggestion that Vietnam's peasant revolution poses an interpretive problem, one that must be solved with reference to socio-cultural as well as to material conditions, Hoang Phuong shifted the emphasis from the social back to the political (requiring Communist Party leadership, the southern peasantry was incapable on its own of organizing a united front to oppose Diem and the US). When pressed, he insisted that no special analysis was required to explain rural insurgency, given that Vietnamese peasants were exploited by landlords, conscripted, taxed, and imprisoned by the state, and oppressed by imperialism. Perhaps the Vietnamese are conducting their own "Scott/Popkin debates," but no echoes of such exchanges were heard during the conference. In spite of these missed engagements, the conference was a resounding success. Some of the scholars in the US delegation went so far as to call it the most stimulating they had ever attended. We hope that this volume will help readers to appreciate the pleasures and insights of a path-breaking encounter, one that surely deserves many sequels.^ ^The first of these occurred in 1990, at a conference at Columbia University, attended by General Tran Van Tra and Luu Doan Huynh, resulting in the volume cited earlier, The Vietnam War, ed. Werner and Huynh.

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COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN VIETNAM: THE TONKIN GULF CRISIS RECONSIDERED* Gareth Porter

F

or many years the controversy surrounding the Tonkin Gulf crisis of August

1964 centered on whether a second North Vietnamese attack actually occurred and whether the Johnson administration used the incident to obtain Congressional authority for commitment of US troops to the war.1 Since the war, however, scholars have become aware that the Tonkin Gulf crisis occurred in the context of a US effort to use the threat of military pressures, as well as actual air strikes against North Vietnam, to persuade the Hanoi government to back away from support of the war in the South. The interactions between the policies of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) therefore offer a case study in "coercive diplomacy." Coercive diplomacy first emerged as a theoretical concept in the literature on American foreign policy and national security only during the 1960s.^ It was defined by Alexander George as a strategy that seeks to "persuade the opponent to do something, or to stop doing something, instead of bludgeoning him into doing it, or physically preventing him from doing it." In a strategy of coercive diplomacy, the threat of force is more important than its actual use; if force is used, it is discreet and carefully controlled, being integrated into a broader process of bargaining and negotiation with the opponent, in which positive inducements might be also used.^ Before the publication of the Pentagon Papers, US policy in the period from Spring 1964 through the Tonkin Gulf crisis was not recognized as a case study in coercive diplomacy, even by those who studied the Vietnam conflict in light of that concept.4 The Pentagon Papers, however, showed that Washington had planned a series of *

The author would like to thank George McT. Kahin, Allen S. Whiting, and Edward Moise for offering helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. * Increasing evidence that there was no second North Vietnamese attack continued to accumulate during the 1980s. See U.S. News and World Report, July 23,1984, pp. 56-67; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Become Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 21823; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), pp. 370-76. 2 The key theoretical work on the subject during that period was Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 3 See Alexander K. George, 'The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Alexander George, David K. Hall and William R. Simons (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 18-19. 4 See William E. Simons, 'The Vietnam Intervention, 1964-65," in ibid., pp. 144-210.

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coordinated measures aimed at diplomatic coercion in May and June 1964, and that they were implemented in the aftermath of the alleged second incident in the Gulf on August 4.5 Only more recently, however, have the US policy and the North Vietnamese response been analyzed in terms of "coercive diplomacy/7 Major works on the international diplomacy of the conflict, including the first full-length study of US coercive diplomacy in Vietnam, have sought to explain the failure of US efforts at coercion as the result of an American failure to make convincing to Hanoi the threat to carry the war to the North. According to this interpretation, Hanoi failed to take US threats seriously in 1964, underestimating American determination to prevent the loss of South Vietnam, and thus went ahead with its plans for defeating the South, including infiltration of northern combat units.** This analysis ignores another explanation for the North Vietnamese decisions on the South in 1964 that fits the evidence much more closely: that Washington's coercive diplomacy did in fact succeed in convincing the North Vietnamese that the United States would use force against the North, but that it had the unintended effect of provoking Hanoi's decision to send regular combat units to the South. This article argues, on the basis of published documents as well as previously unpublished interviews with Vietnamese officials, that the real problem in US coercive diplomacy was not that Hanoi refused to believe the US would intervene, but that it read too much into American diplomatic and military moves in mid-1964. The North Vietnamese interpreted US "retaliatory" bombing raids after the alleged second attack on US naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf as signaling a general decision for US military intervention in Vietnam—North and South. As a result, Hanoi moved to prepare itself to fight the United States in the South. HANOI'S CAUTIOUS STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH

To evaluate US coercive diplomacy in Vietnam, it is necessary to take note of the potential for a diplomatic compromise on South Vietnam that would have left it a separate non-Communist state for an indefinite period. North Vietnamese policy toward the South in the 1959-1964 period was marked by evidence of a willingness to compromise on the short and even medium term status of South Vietnam in return for rolling back the US military presence and the extreme anticommunism of the Saigon regime. Hanoi's willingness to countenance such an arrangement was the counterpart to its unwillingness to see the party apparatus in the South destroyed and a regime dependent on US assistance permanently ensconced in the South. The armed struggle by the Communist Party resumed in South Vietnam in 1960 without the support of either China or the Soviet Union7 The party leadership in 5

United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. Study Prepared by the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), vol. 4, pp, IV, c. 2 (b) "Evolution of the War, Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, July-October 1964," pp. 1-12. 6 Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, vol. 2 (New York: St Martin's, 1985), pp. 50-51 and 389. ' The advice of Hanoi's allies against armed struggle in the South is described, though in guarded terms, in Tai Lieu Huong Dan Hoc Tap Nghi Quyet Dai Hoi IV cua Dang [Guidance Document for Studying the Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Sach Giao Khoa Mac-Le-Nin, 1977), pp. 79-80.

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

11

North Vietnam adopted a strategy that would minimize the risk of drawing the US into direct participation in the conflict.8 It did so by stressing that the conflict would not end with a military offensive as in the Maoist three-stage people's war. Instead the strategy would rely on a "general offensive and general uprising/' in which political, rather than military forces would play the main role.^ Despite its conclusion that the US was unlikely to respond to an escalated conflict by doing more than sending additional military advisers to South Vietnam,1^ Hanoi pursued diplomatic options to minimize the risk of greater American involvement. In February 1962, the Politburo warned that increasing US intervention, even short of large-scale troop deployments, would "create many difficulties for the Southern revolution" and suggested that the conflict might end in ways other than a "general uprising," such as negotiations.11 When the US agreed to the neutralization of Laos in August 1962, the DRV immediately hailed the Laotian settlement as a model for South Vietnam.12 At the same time DRV officials approached the leader of a small Paris-based group of Vietnamese exiles favoring neutralism for South Vietnam and encouraged him to play the role of neutralist Laotian Prince Souvanna Phouma in a South Vietnamese coalition government.13 As the war in the South escalated, Hanoi decided in early 1963 to send larger groups of cadres in company- and even battalion-sized groups to the South to help strengthen the southern forces.14 But the unraveling of the strategic hamlet scheme, the Buddhist crisis, and rising tensions between the Diem regime and its US sponsors were seen as improving the prospects for a negotiated compromise more than as an opportunity for military victory. During the final weeks before the overthrow and assassination of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ho Chi Minh sent a secret 8

As the initial decision to support armed struggle in the South was being implemented, VWP General Secretary Le Duan was declaring, "We can and must guide and restrict within the South the solving of the contradiction between imperialism and the colonies in our country." See Le Duan, "Leninism and Vietnam's Revolution," On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, vol. 1 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 48. 9 For a clear delineation between the Chinese protracted war strategy and the Vietnamese "general insurrection" strategy, see Le Duan, 'To Muoi Cue and Other Comrades in Nam Bo," February 7, 1961, Letters to the South (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), pp. 9-10. Also see Committee on Party History, 50 Nam Hoot Dongcua Dang Cong San Viet Nam [50 Views of Activities of the Vietnamese Communist Party] (Hanoi: Su That, 1979), p. 171. 10 Interview with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Hanoi, August 1982; Interview with Hoang Tung, Hanoi, August 1982. 11 "Resolution of the Politburo on Revolutionary Work in the South," February 26-27, 1962. Mot So Van Kien cua Dang va Chong My CuuNuoc [Some Party Documents on Resisting the US, Saving the Nation] (Hanoi: Su That, 1985), pp. 140,147,157. For an internal document of the party apparatus in the South, dated April 1963, outlining various alternatives to either a general uprising or a military victory, including negotiations, see Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 160-61. 12 Nhan Dan, July 24,1962. 13 Journal de Geneve, August 29,1963. ^ Interview with Lt. Gen. Tran Cong Man, Hanoi, June 23,1984; interview with Col. Bui Tin, a Vietnam People's Army Staff officer in 1963-64 and now Deputy Editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, June 23,1984.

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The American War in Vietnam

letter to Diem to begin a dialog for peace.1^ Through the head of the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission, Hanoi also agreed to the basic principles of a negotiated settlement under which US military personnel would be withdrawn from South Vietnam and a coalition government, still led by Diem, would be formed in which representatives of the National Liberation Front (NLF) would be included.1** In the new circumstances created by the coup against Diem the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) leadership was ready for both a negotiated settlement and a further escalation of the military struggle. The Ninth Central Committee Plenum in December 1963 warned the party in the South that the revolution in the South might have to pass through a "transitional period" that would entail "complex forms and methods of struggle."17 This was another indication that the VWP leadership was giving serious consideration to a negotiated political settlement that would leave the structure of the Saigon government intact. At the same plenum the Central Committee decided to widen the Ho Chi Minh trail through eastern Laos to accommodate heavier weapons, including 75 mm. guns, in order to support large-unit offensives.18 The Central Committee resolution called for a "supreme effort to quickly increase military forces" and thus create a "fundamental change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy." For the first time southerners were to be prepared to "take advantage of sudden changes in the situation" that could bring "opportunities to gain victory in a short time." That buildup was to be supported by a major increase in assistance to the South that would require a revision of the Five-Year Plan for DRV development.19 While the party leadership was ready to support a new escalation of the war, it still drew the line at committing regular North Vietnamese troops to the South. "Because we must confine the enemy to 'special war/ and keep the war within the confines of the South," said the resolution, "the manner of participating in the struggle by each region must be different."^ The party leadership was convinced that the southern forces would win a "special war" (i.e., one fought by US-supported Vietnamese troops), without the involvement of Vietnam People's Army (VPA) combat units. If the US did enter the war, however, the party leadership knew that the VPA would have to be committed in the South.^1 The resolution assessed the likeli15

The letter from Ho to Diem began with "Thua Ong Ngo Dinh Diem"—the respectful form of address for the South Vietnamese president. Interview with Central Committee spokesman Hoang Tung, Hanoi, December 29,1974. ™ Mieczyslaw Maneli, "Vietnam, '63 and Now," New York Times, January 27,1975. For further evidence that Hanoi was seeking through contacts with neutralist statesmen to promote a settlement with Diem, see Bernard Fall's article in San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 1963, p. 14. According to Hoang Tung, Hanoi never received an answer from Diem indicating his willingness to negotiate a settlement before his overthrow. Interview, December 29,1974. 17 "Resolution: Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee (Third Session)," December 1963, Mot So Van Kien cua Dang, p. 178. For an English translation of this document, see US Mission, Saigon, Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, no. 96, July 1971. 18 Interview with Bui Tin. 19 "Resolution: Ninth Plenum," pp. 209,177,179. 20 Ibid., p. 209. 21 Interview with Lt. Gen. Tran Cong Man. Stanley Karnow's account of the Vietnam War makes the suggestion, based on a conversation with Col. Bui Tin, that the VWP leadership decided in late 1963 or early 1964 to send North Vietnamese combat units to the South. Karnow's conclusion appears, however, to have confused the issue of moving from guerrilla

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

13

hood of US deployment of large-scale combat troops as "not great" in the short run, but greater should Washington become confident that it could win or thought the North would not respond strongly to such deployment.22 The VWP leadership considered the threat of direct US military intervention in the South great enough for it to send an officer of the VPA to the South in December 1963 to look into the question of what preparations should be made to deal with that eventuality, including the possibility of sending northern combat units to the South before the Americans arrived. Years after the war the People's Army officer assigned to the task, Col. Bui Tin, described the purpose of his mission to the South as being "to research the situation on the spot, the combat capabilities [of the South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces], and the possibility of sending larger and larger units in order to be ahead of the situation of [US] troops being deployed [and] to prepare the battlefield in case American troops were deployed."23 According to North Vietnamese prisoners, the VPA also began to prepare certain military units for possible combat in the South by giving them special military and political training in April 1964.24 In January 1964, the National Liberation Front held its second Congress and approved an appeal to South Vietnamese military leaders to "consider that internal conflicts can be settled by means of negotiations."2^ Ho Chi Minh himself conveyed, through an interview with leftist journalist Wilfred Burchett, Hanoi's support for the proposal by French President Charles DeGaulle for the neutralization of South Vietnam.2^ Acting through the NLF, Hanoi also threw its support behind the proposal of Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk for a neutralized bloc of Indochinese states, including South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.27 In June, when Canadian diplomat Blair Seaborn visited Hanoi to pass on a message from Washington, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong referred to the need for "neutrality" for South Vietnam "in the Cambodia manner." He also brought up the demand for a coalition government with the participation of the National Liberation Front, but said there was no need to fear an NLF takeover of such a coalition.2** VWP officials told French Communist Party delegates that they were prepared to accept an indefinite separation of North and South Vietnam, provided that the South was free of US interference and the two halves of the country enjoyed normal relations and on freedom of movement for civilians/^ The DRV posture in mid-1964 can be characterized, therefore, as having three distinct features: pushing ahead with plans for expansion of the Liberation Armed war to main force war in the South with that of committing VPA forces to the South. See Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 331-32. 22 "Resolution: Ninth Plenum/' p. 169. 23 Interview, Hanoi, June 23,1984. 24 US Department of State, "Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam," Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, no. 37, May 1968, pp. 12,19. 25 Hanoi Radio, January 28,1964, FBIS, February 5,1964, p. KKK2. 26 Vietnam News Agency, International Service in English, April 24,1964, FBIS, April 26,1964, pp.JJJS-9. 27 Le Monde, July 26, 1964; interview with Sihanouk by George Chaffard, June 13, 1964, in Chaffard, Les Deux Guerres du Vietnam (Paris: La Table Ronde de Combat, 1969), pp. 363-64. 28 Thies, When Governments Collide, pp. 37-38. 29 Chaffard, Les Deux Guerres, pp. 363-64.

14

The American War in Vietnam

Forces in the South; beginning preliminary planning for the possibility of direct US combat intervention; and promotion of a compromise political settlement of the conflict as an alternative to the risk of direct US intervention. This posture did not mean that Hanoi was prepared to accept the permanent partition of the country, or that it would not seek to take advantage of any favorable opportunities to reunite North and South under Communist leadership at a later date. The very weakness of the unstable and narrowly based post-Diem regimes in the South meant that accepting a separate South Vietnam after the departure of the US forces would leave plenty of options for reunification without a major war. But the party leadership was firmly committed to avoiding a war between North Vietnam and the United States if possible. As Pham Van Dong stated to Seaborn, "Our people will accept the sacrifices whatever they may be. But the DRV will not enter the war... .we shall not provoke theU.S//3° The prevalent interpretation of DRV policy toward the South in 1964 has been based on a misunderstanding of the North Vietnamese strategic calculus. Far from being incautious about the threat of US military intervention, Hanoi had already incorporated into its strategy an alternative to outright military victory, if that would avert US intervention. It should be noted, however, that Hanoi's policy makers were focused primarily on the issue of US intentions regarding the South. They assumed that, if the US decided to intervene in the South, it would do so in the North as well. Thus a US move against the North would also signal US plans for intervening in the South. The assessment of that issue would dominate Hanoi's response to US coercive diplomacy. US PRESSURES AND THE DRV RESPONSE

Even before the rapid deterioration of the political and military situation of the South Vietnamese government in early 1964, the Johnson administration had begun plans for exerting direct military pressures on the DRV, aimed at persuading Hanoi into abandoning or dramatically reducing its support for the war in the South. The first step was the approval by President Johnson in January 1964 of OPLAN 34 A, a series of sabotage operations initially intended to escalate in magnitude until they hit major economic and industrial targets in North Vietnam.31 During the Spring of 1964, policy-making officials began discussions of a classic exercise in diplomatic coercion against North Vietnam that would coordinate covert military operations, private communication, public threats, and, possibly, the limited use of overt US force against the North. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presented to an April 19-20 meeting of principal policy makers on Vietnam, a proposal for a "well-planned and well executed diplomatic attempt...to persuade [North Vietnam] to call off the VC [Viet Cong]/' The plan involved secret diplomatic contact with Hanoi through a third party, in which an ultimatum would be presented, demanding cessation of its support for the insurgents in the South, and reiterating previously stated threats of punitive strikes. This "stick" would be combined with a "carrot," in the form of an offer of assistance to alleviate North Vietnam's food shortage and even an offer to reduce US military personnel in South Vietnam. 30

Thies, When Governments Collide, p. 38. The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel Edition, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 3, pp. 150-52.

31

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

15

Although there was no agreement on the exact content of the American approach, the principals did decide to go ahead with sending a third-country interlocutor to Hanoi to carry a US message. The choice for the mission was the new Canadian representative to the International Control Commission, J. Blair Seaborn. The principals agreed that Seaborn would communicate to Hanoi both US determination to achieve its objectives and its willingness to provide economic assistance if North Vietnam cooperated.32 The Seaborn mission unfolded in the broader context of a decision by senior policy makers the following month that the US should use limited force, if necessary, against North Vietnam. After meeting on May 24 and 25, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council formally recommended to the President for the first time that the United States "use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam/7 after "appropriate diplomatic and political warning and preparation/7 unless such use of force proved to be unnecessary because of North Vietnamese moves or improvements within South Vietnam or Laos.33 This policy meant that the Seaborn mission would convey an explicit threat of bombing against the North, just as Lodge had originally recommended. The instructions prepared for Seaborn stated: "Unless Hanoi stops the war within a specified time period (i.e., ceases all attacks, acts of terror, sabotage or armed propaganda or other armed resistance to government authority by the VC), the United States will initiate action by air and naval means against North Viet-Nam until Hanoi does agree to stop the war.77 The guidance also offered what US officials viewed as "carrots77 for Hanoi's compliance, such as interzonal trade, diplomatic and trade relations with the US, and phased reduction of US military personnel from the South to the level permitted by the Geneva Accords.34 But the outline called for Seaborn to demand, in effect, the capitulation of the National Liberation Front in the South. After being given the outline for his guidance, Seaborn met with Pham Van Dong on June 18 and conveyed the explicit threat from the US that, if the conflict in the South should escalate, the "greatest devastation77 would result for the North.3^ In an obvious bid to reinforce that threat, US Secretary of the Treasury C Douglas Dillon also told the French finance minister that the US would use force against the North "if necessary77 to achieve its objectives in South Vietnam. Dillon spoke on the assumption that the warning would be passed on to Hanoi.3** Similar public statements were made in Washington in conjunction with these private messages. Only one day before the Seaborn-Dong meeting, General William Westmoreland publicly refused to rule out attacks on the North. That same day the State Department released earlier testimony by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, asserting that the US was determined to eliminate the resistance to the South Vietnamese government, even if it required "attacking countries to the North.77 32

Ibid., pp. 162-63. Ibid., pp. 169-70. 34 "Memo to U. Alexis Johnson from Joseph A. Mendenhall, June 1,1964, Subject: Instructions for Canadian Interlocutor with Hanoi," in The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers, ed. George C. Herring (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), VI.C.l, 'The Seaborn Mission to Hanoi, June 1964-June 1965," pp. 21-24. 35 'The Seaborn Mission to Hanoi, June 1964-June 1965," in ibid., p. 7. 36 Ibid. 33

16

The American War in Vietnam

Bundy again raised the possibility of attacking the North in a press interview in July.3* Meanwhile, US air power was directly committed to the war in Laos for the first time. In late May US aircraft, flying low-level reconnaissance missions over Pathet Lao (PL) territory in support of Royal Laotian Government (RLG) T-28 attacks, were given American fighter escorts. When one such escort was shot down in early June, US planes retaliated by attacking two PL military installations. Then the United States increased the number of T-28 planes given to the RLG, which were used to harass North Vietnamese forces on the Ho Chi Minh trail.38 Hanoi's response to these threats and stepped-up military activity was nonconfrontational. The VWP leadership was increasingly concerned about US military intervention in Vietnam, but it did not try to deter the US by making any explicit public threat to enter the war in the South with combat troops. Party leaders presumably feared that any such threat might be used by hard liners in the US as evidence of aggressive North Vietnamese designs on the South. Moreover, the leadership was not yet ready to reach a definitive conclusion about American intentions. Hanoi's strategy, therefore, still emphasized its respect for the Geneva Agreement.3^ While there was no explicit threat, however, the party's theoretical journal did carry an article suggesting obliquely that Hanoi's response to the US carrying the war to the North might be to intervene directly in the South. The author noted that there were some in Washington "who see the danger to the U.S. if the U.S. madly attacks the DRV." Specifically he quoted CIA Director John McCone as saying, "U.S. intervention in North Vietnam could cause Ho Chi Minh to send all his forces into South Vietnam to attack the government of [South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen] Khanh before it has consolidated its position."^ This alleged quote from a high US official may have been intended by Hanoi to communicate to the US intelligence community that systematic air attacks on the North could remove the previous restraints on the use of Vietnam People's Army combat units in the South.^1 Washington also used military operations as a means of communicating US intentions to Hanoi. South Vietnamese commando raids and naval bombardments of the North Vietnamese coastal islands and mainland under the OPLAN-34 program of covert military operations, US warships' conduct of electronic surveillance patrols close to North Vietnam's coast (called De Soto patrols), and the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail by the Laotian T-28 aircraft that had begun earlier—all tended to reinforce one another, because they occurred within a short time period. There is no evidence that the Johnson Administration anticipated the interception of the Maddox, then carrying out a De Soto patrol, by North Vietnamese patrol boats on August 2, even though the juxtaposition of OPLAN-34 commando 37

Thies, When Governments Collide, pp. 40-42. Ibid., p. 43. 39 See Vo Nguyen Giap's article in Nhan Dan, July 19,1964, trans, in Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, ed. Gareth Porter, 2 vols. (Stanfordville, NY: Coleman, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 300-301. 40 Hong Chuong, "Su Nghiep Giai Phong Dan Toe cua Chong Ta Nhat Dinh Se Thang Loi Hoan Toan" [Our National Liberation Will Definitely Win Total Victory], Hoc Tap, no. 7, July 1964, p. 24. 41 1 have been unable to find this quote from McCone in any US source. It seems likely that the quote was attributed to McCone as an indirect form of communication to the US government. 38

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

17

raids on DRV coastal islands and US naval patrols near Vietnamese territorial waters was potentially explosive. The OPLAN-34 raid on the islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu on the night of July 30-31 was followed immediately by a De Soto patrol that Hanoi believed was connected with it. Hanoi's alarm was further raised by the bombing of a North Vietnamese village and border post by Laotian planes on August 1 and again on August 2.42 The North Vietnamese assumed that the bombing was carried out by the US and that it was coordinated with the OPLAN-34 and De Soto actions.4^ Once informed on the basis of electronic intelligence that the North Vietnamese perceived a connection between the Maddox and the commando operations, however, officials in Washington pursued actions apparently calculated to increase the chances of a second naval clash in the Tonkin Gulf. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the administration's view in a telegram to the embassy in Saigon that the commando attacks were beginning to "rattle" Hanoi, and that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was part of the DRV's "effort to resist these activities." The US response, according to Rusk, was to make "significant additions" to the list of targets for the OPLAN-34 operations.44 In the aftermath of the first Tonkin Gulf incident, therefore, some key administration officials viewed Hanoi as increasingly sensitive about the combination of CIA-sponsored commando raids and the US naval presence in the vicinity, and believed it was ready to use force against US ships in response. The reaction of those officials, moreover, was to press on with the OPLAN-34 operations and the US warship patrols near North Vietnamese territorial waters. American officials were not necessarily expecting the North Vietnamese to attack a US warship two days after the previous unsuccessful attack. But they appear to have believed that some North Vietnamese naval response was possible, if not probable, in the near future, and that any such incident would provide an excuse for the United States to use direct military force against the North. They were well aware that South Vietnamese commandoes, working under US supervision, were scheduled to carry out two more raids to shell North Vietnamese military installations on the mainland on the night of August 3 Saigon time. They also knew that the Maddox was still being shadowed by North Vietnamese patrol boats.45 On August 4, therefore, fragmentary and unclear intercepts of North Vietnamese communications, as well as sketchy reports from a nervous crew aboard the Maddox of a possible attack, were interpreted in light of these expectations. The result was a decision-making process that forced intelligence information to fit a larger strategic design. On the morning of August 4, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara informed President Johnson immediately of the interception of an electronic communication from the North Vietnamese navy regarding "imminent plans" for an unspecified "DRV naval action." Defense Department officials assumed such action would be 42

Thies, When Governments Collide, p. 43. ^ See Douglas A. Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 441-42, n. 81. 44 Telegram from Rusk to Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, August 3, 1964, in Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, ed. Porter, vol. 2, pp. 301- 302. 4 ^ Chronology of Events Relating to the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents by the Joint Reconnaissance Center, US Navy, August 10,1964 [Extract], ibid., pp. 313-15. 4

18

The American War in Vietnam

directed against the De Soto patrol, although it could have involved efforts to defend against further commando raids.46 On that basis, McNamara convened a meeting with other top Pentagon officials to discuss "possible retaliatory measures should an attack materialize."4' When the first unverified reports of a possible attack on the destroyers came in, Secretary McNamara informed the president that a number of options for retaliatory air strikes were being prepared for his approval. At a meeting with his chief advisers, President Johnson quickly approved reprisal air strikes against military bases in North Vietnam, despite the fact that there was still no verification that an attack had taken place. The president's initial order for the strike was still subject to final confirmation, but it was later reaffirmed, despite the fact that the commander of the Maddox himself could find no confirming evidence that an attack had actually taken place and was calling for a thorough reconnaissance by daylight.4** A major preoccupation of the principal policy makers at that key meeting was how the US could use its response to this presumed naval confrontation in the murky waters of the Tonkin Gulf to reinforce the US warnings to Hanoi to call off the war in the South—i.e., how they could be integrated into the larger strategy of diplomatic coercion. Secretary Rusk declared at that meeting, "We have been trying to get a signal to Hanoi and Peking. Our response to this attack may be that signal."49 The signal to Hanoi took the form of sixty-four sorties flown against North Vietnamese naval vessels and an oil storage depot near the coastal city of Vinh. American planes completely destroyed the oil storage depot and hit thirty-three of the thirty-four boats making up the North Vietnamese coastal fleet, destroying seven and severely damaging ten others.^ An estimated 10 percent of the DRV's oil supply was also destroyed in the raids.^1 THE NORTH VIETNAMESE RESPONSE

Until now accounts of the Tonkin Gulf crisis have ignored the question of how this first bombing of North Vietnam, in the context of previous threats and military moves—and North Vietnamese perceptions of US intentions—might have affected Hanoi's policy. If, as the evidence now appears to confirm, there was no second attack by North Vietnamese boats on the Maddox, it is easy to see why the Tonkin 46

"Chronology of Events, Tuesday, August 4 and Wednesday, August 5, 1964: Tonkin Gulf Strike," Third Draft, August 25,1964, Declassified Document from Lyndon B. Johnson Library, p. 3. 47 Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, vol. 2, From Military Assistance to Combat 1959-1965 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, US Navy, 1986), p. 437. Although no documentary source is cited, it appears that this is based on Joint Staff, JCS, 'Tonkin Gulf Composite Diary." 4 ^ Secretary McNamara later testified that the decision was based on communications intercepts. However, the intercepts cited by McNamara were said by officials who had seen them to have referred to the incident on August 2, not the incident on August 4. Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 373-74. 49 Quoted in Kahin, Intervention, p. 224. 50 Marolda and Fitzgerald, The United States Navy, p. 449. 51 Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (London: Thames Methuen, 1981), p. 153.

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

19

Gulf bombing was seen by the VWP leadership as confirmation that the United States planned further military action against the North. But the North Vietnamese response to the Tonkin Gulf bombing went beyond that determination. Evidence now available indicates that it prompted the DRV to revise its overall assessment of US intentions toward Vietnam, North and South. According to three different sources in Hanoi, the Central Committee of the VWP convened an extraordinary plenum about one week after the US bombing raids to consider what they indicated about future US intervention and how Hanoi should respond to the new situation.52 The lengthy debate at the plenum, which has never been mentioned in published VWP documents, was not on whether and how the US would make war on the North, but rather on the likelihood of direct US combat intervention in the South. The plenum focused on the issue of US intervention in the South, because the VWP Politburo had viewed the American attacks against the North as a sign that the United States knew that it would certainly lose in the South, and had decided not to accept such a loss. VWP leaders concluded that the US would now have to change from a "special war" strategy to one of "limited war," with the participation of US combat units.5^ Such a change had already been viewed as a possibility when the Ninth VWP Central Committee Plenum had met in December 1963. Now it became the official basis for North Vietnamese planning. Based in part on an assessment by Politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh, who had arrived in the South to guide the war in early 1964, the Politburo predicted that the US might send "hundreds of thousands" of troops to the South.54 It was apparently a foregone conclusion for the VWP leadership that the United States would carry out systematic attacks against the North. The debate reportedly focused not on whether the US would carry the war to the North but how far it would go. There was some discussion over whether Washington would actually send troops to occupy part of North Vietnam, especially the southern provinces of the North.55 The consideration of that "worst case" scenario represented the logical extension of the VWP practice of always being "prepared for the worst," even if it was thought to be unlikely. Moreover, it was recognized that the Vietnamese would face an unprecedented challenge, since the only previous time a socialist army had undertaken major combat against US forces was when the North Koreans had done so, and that had been alongside Chinese troops. This time the Vietnamese Central Committee understood that there would be no Chinese troops involved in the combat.56 New methods of fighting, therefore, would have to be discovered. Some party leaders reportedly wondered how the revolutionary forces could defeat the United States.5'7 Ho Chi Minh asserted, however, that such fears were unfounded. 52

Interviews with Col. Bui Tin, June 23, 1984; Lt. Gen. Tran Cong Man, June 23, 1984; and Nguyen Co Thach, June 28,1984. None of the three could recall the exact date of the plenum, but Thach thought that it was "perhaps one week after" the bombing. 53 Interviews with Bui Tin and Tran Cong Man. 54 Interview with Tran Cong Man. Nguyen Co Thach recalls that the Central Committee was told that the DRV had to be prepared for as many as one million American troops being sent to South Vietnam. Interview with Thach. 55 Interview with Bui Tin. 56 Interview with Tran Cong Man. 57 Interview with Bui Tin.

20

The American War in Vietnam

According to one account, he told the Plenum he could not say how they would win, but he was sure they would win. He is said to have rejected a proposal by one party leader to send a mission to North Korea to learn from their experiences in fighting the Americans, saying, "If you are determined to win, you will have all the wisdom to win; if you are determined to run away, you will have all the wisdom to run away." The Plenum supported Ho's confident stance on standing up to the Americans.^ The most important decision taken by this secret Plenum was to send regular combat units to the combat theater immediately, without waiting for the arrival of American troops. In September or October the first complete tactical unit of the VPA, the 32nd Regiment, embarked on the long journey across the Ho Chi Minh trail toward the South Vietnamese battlefield. The 95th Regiment also departed in October and the 101st Regiment began its journey in December.59 The dispatch of these units has been viewed erroneously in the past as a logical extension of the December 1963 party Central Committee decision to step up the war in the South rather than as response to the Tonkin Gulf bombing.^ For example, one study of the war argues, "As the level of the fighting increased during 1964 and an early South Vietnamese collapse became likely, North Vietnam decided to send in reinforcements in order to hasten victory and guarantee Hanoi's control after the triumph/'61 But the evidence clearly suggests a different interpretation: the decision to dispatch the first combat units from the North was not only taken in anticipation of US combat intervention but was intended to provide a military counterbalance to American forces. Normally, it would have taken these combat units approximately six weeks to make the trip from their bases in the North to the central highlands in the South. That would have meant that the first unit sent could have arrived in the South at the latest in November 1964, the second in December, and the third in February 1965. The tempo of the war in the South was increasing in late 1964 and the first half of 1965, and Saigon's army was reeling from the Southern Vietnamese Communist forces' offensive. But instead of rushing these three regiments into combat in the South immediately, the VWP leadership kept them well away from the war zone, and they thus eluded US intelligence completely until April 1965.^ Indeed, the latter two may not have been in South Vietnam at all in late 1964 and early 1965 but in southern Laos, where they could more easily remain undetected.^ Wherever the units were located in those months, Hanoi's failure to deploy them against the Saigon army, when they had what would appear to be a golden opportunity to destroy it, points to the conclusion that the August 1964 decision to send the 58

Interview with Nguyen Co Thach. US Department of State, "Working Paper." ^ See, for example, Smith, An International History of the Viet 'Nam War, vol. 2, pp. 346-49. 61 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 39. 62 See Thies, When Governments Collide, p. 326. 63 I am indebted to George McT. Kahin for pointing out that the State Department cited no documentary evidence whatever that the 32nd and 101st regiments actually arrived in South Vietnam before March 1965—the month US marines arrived in South Vietnam. See US Department of State, "Working Paper." 59

Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam

21

units south was aimed at preparing for the US military presence, not at winning a quick victory with Northern troops, as has been argued.^ By the time the US was able to confirm the presence of North Vietnamese combat units in the South in late April 1965, American combat troops had already gone into action in the South and were bombing the North regularly. But the VWP leadership had correctly anticipated the direction of US policy before Washington was ready to make a decision about committing combat forces to the conflict in the South. CONCLUSION

This analysis has drawn together both old and new evidence to show that the US bombing raids on North Vietnam, responding to an alleged naval attack on an American vessel that clearly did not occur, failed to accomplish the larger objective of coercing Hanoi with regard to the insurgency in the South. But it did not fail because the North Vietnamese leaders were not convinced of US seriousness. Contrary to conventional interpretations, Hanoi was so convinced by the totality of the evidence that it decided to prepare actively for the likelihood of US military intervention in the South. This reality has been obscured for years by the official insistence, reinforced by some historians, that the important issue is whether Hanoi's decisions to move regular combat units southward in the latter half of 1964 came before the United States began its regular bombing of the North. Previous accounts of this key period of US-North Vietnamese interaction have failed to focus on Hanoi's decision making in terms of perceptions of US intentions regarding both North and South Vietnam. The US exercise in threat and limited force, of which the Tonkin Gulf bombing was but a part, reveals the fundamental weakness not only of US Vietnam policy but of the whole concept of coercive diplomacy. American officials thought that the "credibility" of the threat was the only real problem in bringing a minor state like North Vietnam to heel. Those officials had no understanding of the framework within which the Vietnamese would respond to US threats. They failed to appreciate that certain objectives can be supremely important to another state and can render threats and symbolic use of force irrelevant except as triggers for further war preparations. US officials were unable to see that Hanoi's leaders would interpret US diplomatic and military moves as evidence that the United States had decided to send troops to South Vietnam to save the Saigon regime from defeat. Assuming an approach to policy making that separated policy issues that must be decided immediately from those that could be deferred until later, US officials constructed an implicit model of North Vietnamese policy making that mirrored Washington's own incremental style. 64 Further reinforcing this "precautionary" interpretation and ruling out the "preemptive" interpretation is a January 1965 resolution by the Communist Party Military Committee in the South, cited by William Turley, which suggested that the infiltration of regular People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units into the South would be necessary to tie down US troops as they arrived and thus maintain the momentum that had been built up. See William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-1975 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), p. 70.

22

The American War in Vietnam

The United States also exhibited a notable lack of realism in formulating its demands on Hanoi. The North Vietnamese leadership's pattern of diplomatic proposals over the previous two years had made clear its willingness to reach a settlement that would fall short of its goal of reunification, at least for a number of years. Contrary to the theoretical concept of coercive diplomacy, which emphasized the importance of accompanying threats with bargaining and compromise in order to terminate a conflict, the exercise leading up to the Tonkin Gulf crisis was based on the assumption that no concession to Hanoi's most fundamental interests in the South was necessary to stop the successful Southern insurgency.^ This analysis suggests an internal contradiction in the concept of coercive diplomacy: the very idea of "coercing" another party into accepting one's demands, rather than arriving at a settlement through an accommodation of interests, is compatible with hegemonic power but not with ordinary diplomacy. Hegemonic power by its very nature tends to be insensitive to the interests of any party that challenges it, because its rests on the assumption that superior power can substitute for normal diplomacy. As the United States was to learn, there were limits even to hegemonic power, and coercive diplomacy which strayed beyond those limits had consequences which were the opposite of those intended. 65

See George, "Development of Doctrine," p. 18.

THE TET OFFENSIVE AND

ITS AFTERMATH* Ngo Vinh Long

1967 the American "war of attrition" and its "pacification program" had failed miserably in Vietnam, allowing the National Liberation Front (NLF) to control most of the countryside in the South. Confronted by the deteriorating situation in the South, the United States stepped up its air war against the North to unprecedented levels throughout 1967 in the hope of getting the North to call off the NLF attacks in exchange for a bombing halt. It was under these circumstances that the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the North decided in October 1967 to carry out a series of widespread offensives against the urban areas in the South. These were aimed at reminding the United States that its main enemies and problems were in the South and not in the North and inducing Washington to call off the bombing against the North and go to the negotiating table. The attacks, which began during the Vietnamese New Year in 1968—and were hence dubbed "the Tet Offensive" in the West—were composed of three phases, lasting until October of that year. During the first phase, from the end of January until the beginning of March, the NLF strike force achieved dramatic gains while receiving relatively light casualties. The attack should then have been broken off, with military forces retreating into the countryside to consolidate their gains in newly liberated areas. But because of Politburo decisions to mount second and third phases of the Offensive, the revolutionary units were left too long in forward positions around the urban areas and were subjected to horrendous air and artillery strikes. In addition, after the third phase was launched, American and Saigon troops "leapfrogged" over the revolutionary forces still massed around the urban areas to attack them from the

B

*

I would like to thank the William Joiner Center for the Study of War and Social consequences at the University of Massachusetts/Boston for suporting my work in 1987 when I conducted interviews in several provinces in the southern part of Vietnam and for helping to arrange my participation in the conference. I also acknowledge with gratitude the comradely criticisms of the Center's Co-Director, Professor David Hunt, on the original paper and a subsequent revision. The original version of this paper was written in early 1988 and was divided into three parts. Parts I and II, which dealt with the Tet Offensive from an overall perspective and from the perspective of the key province of Long An, were published in the January-February and March-April issues of the Indochina Newsletter, a publication of the Asia Resource Center. Copies of this publication can be obtained from 2161 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02140. The entire paper, including Part HI, which focused on the 1969-1972 period, was presented to the History of Vietnam War conference held in Hanoi from November 25-27,1988. The above article is a revised version of that paper.

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The American War in Vietnam

rear, as well as to take over liberated areas. Thus, caught on the outskirts of the urban areas, the revolutionary units not only suffered heavy casualties from late 1968 on, but were also unable to return to the countryside in time to provide the necessary protection to NLF political cadres and the rural population who were now exposed to the Phoenix Program, the Accelerated Pacification Program, and other attacks. Worse still, the Vietnamese leadership in Hanoi made one of the biggest errors in the war by ordering the remnants of the revolutionary units in the South to retreat to the border areas of Cambodia and Laos for rebuilding. This move was tantamount to surrendering populated areas of the South to the American and Saigon forces without a fight. When NLF units decided to return to the villages to help rebuild the revolutionary infrastructures there, they suffered high losses. And northern units sent into the South during 1969 and 1970 could not operate effectively and were killed in large numbers because they did not have the necessary tactical support from the grassroots. In the view of most southern revolutionary fighters, 1969 and 1970 were the two most difficult years in the entire war. The initiative was reclaimed only after the southerners rebuilt connections between villagers and fighters in 1971 and 1972. This rebuilding process was carried out mainly through the tactic of bam tru ("clinging to the post," which will be described below), although the American and Saigon invasions of Cambodia and Laos in 1970 and 1971 and the urban struggles during the same years also helped to divert American and Saigon troops from the rural areas of the South and thus gave the NLF extra space and time to recover. WHY THE PAPER AND WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED

The original version of this paper was meant as part of an ongoing effort to combat what I perceived to be an increasing convergence in the official/dominant treatments of the war in the United States and Vietnam. I had detected a concerted effort since the end of the war in both countries to claim that North Vietnamese forces played a decisive role in the liberation of the South, not only during the final days but also for years previously, reaching as far back as the Tet Offensive of 1968. In Vietnam the dominant forces even resorted to restricting debate on the conduct of the war so that the official party line could remain unchallenged. An example of this was the immediate banning of General Tran Van Tra's book after it was published in 1982, although it provided only a mild and indirect criticism of the official analyses of the war and although General Tra had been the commander of the huge B2 region (Saigon's III and IV Corps) and the deputy supreme commander of all the revolutionary forces in the South.1 Another example was the exclusion of southern political leaders and military commanders from the "Scientific Conference for an Overall Assessment of the Spring Offensive of 1968," held in Ho Chi Minh City from March 1-8,1986. General Hoang Van Thai, chair of the conference and a northerner with long experience in the South, 1

A copy of the book was smuggled out of Vietnam and published in the US under the title Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years' War (Washington, DC: Foreign Information Service, Southeast Asia Report, No. 1247, Joint Publication Research Service GPRS) 82783, February 2, 1983). Even so, as of June 1992, the book was still not permitted to be legally circulated in Vietnam.

The Tet Offensive 25

was thus forced to make the oblique remark in his official summation of the conference, which was made public only in February 1988, that "if regional Party leaders and commanders had been invited, there certainly would have been much richer contributions."^ This was a curious exclusion because the majority of the commanders of the fighting forces in the South during the entire war were southerners. These people ought to know how the Tet Offensive was carried out and how party directives were implemented during this time as well as during later periods. Tran Bach Dang, the planner of the attack on the city of Saigon as well as the party leader of the SaigonGiadinh-Cholon area at the time of the Tet Offensive, was not invited to participate in the conference either. When he was finally allowed to publish an article on the Tet Offensive in February 1988, Dang had to point out that a number of powerful party leaders had prevented even the most cursory compilations of facts (nhung ghi chep don gian) on the Tet Offensive. Worse still, according to Dang, almost all historical writings in Vietnam, as well as compilations of local party histories in the South, had to follow set formulas (cong thuc) and correct political lines (lap truong) and hence did not reflect what actually happened during the war at all.^ Coming from a man who had once also been the chief of Party Propaganda and Education in the South, his statement is indeed very revealing, not only of the extent to which debates about the war had been restricted and controlled, but also of the degree of exasperation felt by many southern revolutionary leaders. The fact that Dang's complaint was allowed to be published in an official journal indicates that by early 1988 there was at least an indirect recognition that control and suppression of debates on issues relating to the Vietnamese Revolution had been a problem. My paper at the 1988 conference in Hanoi spoke directly to this issue by employing information gathered from interviews with NLF military personnel and political cadres at various levels in key provinces in the South to present a new perspective on the Tet Offensive and its aftermath.^ 2 The conference was officially called in Vietnamese: Hoi Thao Khoa Hoc Tong Ket Xuan Mau Than 1968. Presentations and proceedings of this conference were deposited at the Institute of Vietnamese Military History [ Vien Lich Su Quan Su Viet Nam] of the Department of Defense in Hanoi, and excerpts from some of the papers and statements were published for the first time in Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Doi: So Dae Biet 20 Nam Tet Mau Than [Journal of Military History: Special 20th Anniversary Issue on the Tet Offensive], February 1988. General Thai's summary is entitled "May Van De ve Chien Luoc trong Cuoc Tien Cong va Noi Day Xuan 1968" [Some Strategic Questions in the Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1968] and the quote is on page 35. 3 Tran Bach Dang, "Mau Than: Cuoc Tong Dien Tap Chien Luoc" [Mau Than (Tet Offensive): A Strategic Rehearsal], Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, February 1988, pp. 57-64. ^ The interviews were conducted after careful study of most of the published Vietnamese as well as American sources. Leading policy makers and military personnel were the first to be interviewed and then—in descending order—provincial, district, and village leaders and commanders. Top leaders were asked about specific policies, programs, and events, whereas the life histories of provincial leaders and local revolutionary fighters were also taken. Besides talking with top leaders in the South who were now living and working in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, extensive interviews were conducted in the key provinces of Long An, Ben Tre, Quangnam-Danang, and Minh Hai. For a complete list of interviewees, contact the author at History Department, University of Maine, Orono, ME 04473.

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The American War in Vietnam

Another encouraging sign was the publication of an article by Tran Van Tra in the February and April 1988 issues of the Journal of Military History ^ This was an angry—but nuanced and measured—account which cannot be fully understood without a close examination of the literature in Vietnam and a thorough understanding of the underlying political currents and political struggles up to that point. In effect, General Tra accused some party leaders of having come dangerously close to reactionary American analyses of the Tet Offensive in order to deny the significance of the roles and achievements of the southern revolutionary fighters and their supporters during and after the Tet Offensive. As far as the Offensive was concerned, General Tra stated that the Politburo had already decided in 1967 that a complete victory was unattainable while the numbers of American and Saigon forces were still about five times larger than the total revolutionary forces at all levels. Hence in October 1967 Resolution 14—also known as the Quang Trung Resolution after Emperor Quang Trung, who had defeated the Chinese invaders during Tet of 1789—the Central Committee envisioned three scenarios for the planned Tet Offensive: 1) the "highest victory" of forcing the United States to enter into negotiations to end the war; 2) partial success, which would nevertheless allow the United States and Saigon forces to retake important areas and continue the war; and 3) complete failure, which would encourage the United States to bring in more American troops and extend the war to North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. While recognizing the possibility of scenarios 2 and 3, however, the Politburo also ordered attacks to continue until the first objective was achieved. According to Tra, the first phase of the Offensive seemed to have brought about the intended results since it forced the United States to announce that it would limit the bombing of the North to the panhandle area and enter into talks to discuss the means of bringing the war to an end. But when it became clear that the Johnson administration was only trying to pacify public opinion in order to be able to escalate the war both against the North and the South, Politburo leaders ordered the second and then the third phases of the Offensive. Tra said that perhaps the second and third phases should not have been carried out, because the subsequent damage inflicted on the southern revolutionaries in 1969 and 1970 encouraged the United States not to talk seriously until 1972. However, Tra observed that it took the second phase of the Offensive to force the United States and Saigon to join the Paris Talks. And it was not until the beginning of November 1968, a couple of months into the third phase of the Offensive, that President Lyndon B. Johnson finally ordered the unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and announced that a four-party conference with NLF and Saigon representatives participating would start. This was easily understandable, adds General Tra. "In wars, especially such a gigantic war as this last one in Vietnam, results on the battlefields were the key and deciding elements for political and diplomatic developments.... There is never such a thing as snatching political victory from the jaws of military defeat or gaining diplo5

This article was divided into four parts. Because of problems of space, only Part IV was published in the February issue under the title "Thang Loi Va Suy Nghi Ve Thang Loi" [Victory and Thoughts about Victory], pp. 36-45. Owing to popular demand from readers, however, the other three parts were subsequently published in the April 1988 issue under its original title of 'Tet Mau Than: Chien Cong Hien Hach" [The Glorious Victory of Tet Mau Than], pp. 8-23. The article is published in English in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, ed. Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993).

The Tet Offensive 27

matic successes without blood having been spilled and bones scattered on the battlefields." And General Tra goes on to say that, because of the "extraordinary efforts" during the three phases of the Offensive by the revolutionary fighters and their supporters in the South, a decisive victory and a strategic turning point were achieved.^ In his prepared paper at the 1988 Hanoi conference, General Hoang Phuong confirmed the ferocity of the American and Saigon counterattacks on all fronts during the Nixon period and declared that 1969 and 1970 were the two worst years for the revolution in the South. But the paper focused on the argument that, because Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia and Laos, he subjected American and Saigon forces to their worst defeats in years there, which led to further defeats in the South and finally to the Paris Agreement. The implication was that the success of the regular northern forces in Cambodia and Laos was principally responsible for the gains in the South as well as in Paris. In the verbal exchange which followed, however, General Phuong and the other Vietnamese participants concurred with my view that the recovery of southern forces and organizations through bam tru made it possible for northern forces to return to the South to fight effectively again. They also agreed with the contention that increasing urban opposition to the Saigon government also contributed to the NLF's recovery and subsequent military and political successes. And this concurrence served to reinforce my contention regarding the importance of the revolutionary forces and local initiatives in the South as well as my analysis of the significance of the different phases of the Tet Offensive. The above observations and conclusions have been supported by articles and books published in Vietnam during the last four years. An example of these is the lead article in the April 1991 issue of the Journal of Military History in which the author, Mr. Tran Ha, discusses the extent of, and the reasons for, the military successes in 1971. After listing many victorious military campaigns and offensives from the beginning of 1971 throughout South Vietnam and the border areas, which caused 232,000 casualties among Saigon troops, the author writes that, as a result of the increased activities in the South, Our main forces units were again able to return one by one to the battlefronts and to reinforce the base areas along the western corridor of the Central provinces, in the Highlands, in the eastern provinces of the South, and in the Mekong delta. The enemy's resolute effort to push our main force units beyond the borders [of the South] therefore had failed miserably by this time7 The author goes on to say that guerrilla activities and popular struggles against the pacification program and the Phoenix program helped double the liberated areas in 1971 to include close to three million people and expand the contested areas to 7,240 villages that comprised over 11 million inhabitants. And this, Mr. Tran Ha stresses, not only provided the revolutionary forces with a contiguous area throughout the South in which to operate, but also helped solve the logistics and supply 6

'Tet Mau Than," pp. 42-44. Tran Vu, "1971: Nam Phan CongThang Loi Gianh Quyen Chu Dong Chien Truong" [1971: A Year of Successful Counter-Offensives that Regained Initiatives on the Battlefronts], Lich Su Quan Su, April 1991, p. 4. 7

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The American War in Vietnam

problem for the revolutionary side which Saigon's economic blockade had imposed. The author also credits the increasingly strong opposition movements by women, students, workers, and intellectuals in the southern urban areas for isolating the Saigon regime and for causing doubts in official circles in the South and in the United States regarding the chances for success of the Vietnamization program. All these led to further defeats for the US-Saigon side in 1972 which, along with timely diplomatic initiatives by Hanoi and the NLF, finally forced the Nixon administration to sign the Paris accords.** It is clear from a careful reading of the Vietnamese literature during the last four years that discussions of the war have been freer and that official positions are being reassessed. Although many differences remain in terms of nuance and emphasis, there is general agreement on key interpretations and on the need for a more balanced discussion of the roles of the southern revolutionaries and their supporters. Still, a lot of murkiness remains in the Vietnamese literature on relations between the government in Hanoi and the NLF, and Vietnamese historians and analysts have many issues to unravel in the future. RIGHTWING AMERICAN ANALYSES STILL IN VOGUE

What remains a matter of concern to me is that in the United States, with only a few notable exceptions,9 rightwing and official interpretations of the Tet Offensive and its aftermath seem to have gained increasing currency in the treatments of authors who are considered liberals by their peers. For example, in a book dedicated to "the young Americans who fought in the Vietnam war... and those who opposed it/' the author, George Donnelson Moss, basically reiterates the three main arguments of the American right on the Tet Offensive and its aftermath. First, Moss repeats the assertion that Tet was a desperation move—a suicide mission—that the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) undertook because the war had been going badly for them. Moss adds that by the spring of 1967, "Many Vietcong units and some NVA units fighting in South Vietnam had been decimated. Others had been driven out of South Vietnam or forced to take refuge in sparsely populated peripheral areas in the central highlands. The NLF infrastructure controlled fewer villages and less territory in South Vietnam than it had at the time when the Twelfth Plenum had decided to fight attrition with attrition."10 Second, Moss repeats the rightwing assertion that the first phase of Tet not only represented a major military defeat for the revolutionary side, but it also practically destroyed the NLF for good as a political organization in the South. "From January 8

Ibid., pp. 4-5. An ambitious and excellent analysis of the Tet offensive and its aftermath on a national and international scale can be found in Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985). A recent detailed treatment of what happened in a province immediately southwest of Saigon is in Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). Although the two authors' conclusions are basically similar to mine, their reliance on official documents produced nuances and emphases with which, I think, many southern revolutionaries would disagree. 10 George Donnelson Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 243. 9

The Tet Offensive 29 29 through March 31, 1968," he writes, "combined Vietcong and PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] losses were estimated at 58,000"; and "In many provinces, many of those in the Viet Cong political infrastructure, which had been painstakingly erected over the years, were also killed or captured during the Tet-68 battles." No popular uprisings in support of the attackers materialized, and, after being at first caught by surprise, "ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] forces fought well." "After Tet," Moss concludes, "there was no chance that the Saigon regime would be overthrown by a revolution from within South Vietnam. After the spring of 1968, the Vietnam war became, for the most part, a conventional war between the main forces units of the allies and the PLAF [People's Liberation Armed Forces]/NVA."11 Then Moss rephrases the bulk of the rightwing's third argument, namely that Tet was a military defeat, but a psychological victory for the Vietnamese, one that prevented the US side from pursuing the war with the necessary vigor.^ DESPERATE GAMBLE?

Is there any factual basis for the claim that by the spring of 1967 the Vietnamese revolutionaries had been largely evicted from population centers and pushed deep into the jungle and the border areas and hence decided to launch the Tet Offensive as a desperate gamble? A brief look at some 1967 news and official reports in chronological order will show that the revolutionary forces had been gaining both militarily and politically throughout South Vietnam: The Associated Press (AP) reported on February 4,1967 that in January 1967 the NLF had a series of military successes as a result of which the number of American casualties was three times higher than during the same period in the previous year. Le Figaro reported on February 15,1967 that by the end of 1966 Saigon forces had suffered many disastrous defeats; that the number of desertions had consequently reached a monthly figure of 500 per regiment; and that Pentagon generals were obliged to admit that the pacification program had become a complete failure. A Reuters dispatch of March 11, 1967 quoted Major Wilson, the senior US adviser in Long An province, the province immediately south of Saigon, as saying: "For every hectare to pacify, we have devoted to this province more men, more dollars and other means than any other province of South Vietnam. Yet the results of these efforts are meager... In reality, we can control only a very small area, according to the required norms. I would say that we control only 4 per cent in the daytime and only one per cent during the night." The US News and World Report issue of March 20,1967 cited a study from the US Senate Armed Services Committee as saying that "by the end of the dry season, the Viet Cong still controlled 80 per cent of South Vietnam territory." In fact, NLF forces were now even moving freely into the towns and cities as reported, for example, in the May 24, 1967 issue of the New York Times: "Enemy forces overran Quang Tri city, the province capital, freed 250 guerrillas from jail and successfully attacked two regimental headquarters of the South Vietnamese First Infantry Division... A few days later, in a series of events that were not fully reported at that time, they moved virtually unmolested in Hue, while the army and the 11 12

Ibid., p. 252.

Ibid., pp. 252-53. For a similar set of conclusions, see James Wirtz, The Tet Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 2-3.

Offensive:

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The American War in Vietnam

national police fled/7 The New York Times further reported on August 7,1967, citing official United States data on the loyalties of the hamlets, that out of 12,537 hamlets, the number under total Saigon control was a mere 168. On the other hand, 3,978 were totally controlled by the NLF. The rest of the hamlets were listed as "contested" or partially controlled by both sides. And The Pentagon Papers cited the official American "Hamlet Evaluation System" (HES) for having admitted in an overall analysis of the 1967 pacification results that "to a large extent, the VC now control the country-side."^ Confronted by the deteriorating situation, the Johnson administration, according to The Pentagon Papers, escalated the air war against the North to unprecedented levels throughout 1967 in an effort to get the North to call off the NLF attacks in the South in exchange for a bombing halt. This was what Johnson called his "peace offensive," which was later known as the "San Antonio formula" after a speech that Johnson gave at San Antonio, Texas, on September 29,1967. When the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) rejected this demand as incompatible with Vietnamese sovereignty and dignity, Johnson denounced the DRV as intransigent and stepped up the bombing.1"* Meanwhile, to persuade the American public that the Saigon regime was now becoming more popular and was therefore worthy of increased support, the United States helped organize a series of rigged "democratic elections" to legitimize General Nguyen Van Thieu and General Nguyen Cao Ky as president and vice-president of the "Second Republic of Vietnam."1^ It was under these circumstances that the Politburo decided to carry out a series of widespread attacks against the urban areas, not as a desperate gamble, but as a calculated move to get the United States to deescalate the air war and go to the negotiating table. According to Tran Bach Dang, the man who was given the responsibility in August 1967 to draw up the plan for the attacks on the city of Saigon, the idea of a "general offensive" against urban areas in the South—especially against Saigon which was the nerve center of the United States and the Saigon regime—had first been suggested in November 1960. In 1964 "a plan of action" similar to the plan for the 1968 Tet Offensive was put before the Party Central Committee for consideration. At that time there were sufficient sapper units to carry out the initial attacks. But the regular and regional forces were still not strong enough to deliver the necessary follow-up punches, and the political organizations in and around the cities and towns were considered still inadequate to provide the necessary support for sustaining the attacks. Moreover, it was thought that such a general offensive would have the effect of sucking a huge number of American troops into Vietnam because American "hawks" would argue that the introduction of American forces would help change the situation in the South. The plan was therefore temporarily shelved by the Central Committee, which directed the southern revolutionaries to lay a better groundwork for such an offensive by building up their military and political forces. *3 See the Senator Gravel Edition of The Pentagon Papers, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 2, p. 507. 14 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 349-51. 15 For a detailed account of this election farce in English, see Francis H. Craighill III and Robert C. Zelnick, "Ballots or Bullets: What the 1967 Elections Could Mean," in Vietnam: Matter for the Agenda (California: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1968). For two detailed reports in the Saigon press, see Than Chung, August 16, 1967, and Chanh Dao, October 3,1967.

The Tet Offensive 31 By mid-1967 the Politburo and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN, TrungUong Cue) ordered preparation of a contingency plan for attacks on Saigon and other cities. They reasoned that widespread attacks against the urban areas, the centers of the United States and the Saigon regime, would compel the United States to pull back most of its forces and firepower to defend the southern towns and cities, thereby necessarily deescalating the war against the North. The fact that the United States by that time had nearly half a million troops on the ground in South Vietnam, or almost the maximum the Politburo thought the United States was capable of sending there, led them to believe that a general offensive of the type envisioned would clearly show the United States that it had no hope of winning in Vietnam. This, it was hoped, would lead Washington to the logical conclusion that it should go to the negotiating table as well as withdraw its troops. Several conferences which included representatives from the Politburo, COSVN, the B-2 Military Command, and the Saigon-Giadinh Regional Party Committee were held from July to October to debate the Politburo decision and to discuss details of the plans for the offensives.1** Finally, on October 25,1967 the Party Central Committee issued Resolution No. 14, ordering a "General Offensive/General Uprising" (Tong Cong KichlTong Khoi Nghia) in the South with attacks to be carried out mainly against the city of Saigon and the Upper Mekong Delta provinces.17 The main aims of Resolution 14 were as summarized by General Tra at the beginning of this paper.18 As for the strategy and tactics to be used, the Resolution states: "The upcoming general offensive/general uprising will be a period, a process, of intensive and complicated strategic offensives by military, political and diplomatic means.... The general offensive/general uprising is a process in which we will attack and advance on the enemy continuously both militarily and politically as well as a process in which the enemy will counterattack ferociously in order to wrest back and to reoccupy important positions that would have been lost."19 According to most southern revolutionary leaders and fighters I interviewed, the definition of the Offensive as a "process" involving continuous struggles of all kinds, and not military attacks alone, over an extended period to force the United States to enter into negotiations, was repeatedly emphasized in all directives at all levels at the time. This fact has also been registered in the writings of many southern leaders and revolutionary participants. Mr. Tran Hoan, the present minister of information of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), wrote in 1978 that before the Tet Offensive he was instructed by the secretary of the Party Regional Committee of Tri Thien (northern half of Saigon's I Corps), Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang, to send out a directive to all the cadres and soldiers stressing that the "general offensive/general uprising is a process." General Quang emphasized: "I repeat, a process. A process of extremely arduous and complicated military combats and protracted political struggles. At present our cadres and soldiers are still quite simplistic in their thinking on this issue.... It is 16

Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, pp. 57-63. Mau Than Saigon [The Tet Offensive in Saigon] (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Tre, 1988), p. 4. ^ Tap chi Lich Su Quan Doi reprints most of Resolution 14 in its February 1988 issue (pp. 2-3), but says that the document, which was given the code name of Emperor Quang Trung Resolution, was issued by the Central Committee on January 1,1968. 19 Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, February 1988, pp. 2-3. 17

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wrong and dangerous for them to think that the general offensive/general uprising is a one-blow effort."^ In 1986 General Tran Van Quang, who was then the first deputy minister of defense, delivered to the Defense Ministry Conference on Tet a paper, mentioned earlier, that contains many interesting details indicating that, while no one regarded the upcoming Offensive as a desperate gamble, there was considerable difference of opinion between Hanoi and the people in the field on both strategy and tactics. General Quang said that when in October the Ministry of Defense relayed the decision to carry out a general offensive/general uprising, the Regional Party Committee and the Military Command of Tri Thien met to discuss it. At the meeting they cited Lenin's teaching to the effect that one should not lightly undertake staging an uprising and that an uprising means that one has to carry out continuous attacks in order to assure any kind of success. In spite of the reservations expressed, the conferees suggested to the Ministry of Defense that, if a general offensive/general uprising had to be carried out, the Ministry should wait until April or May 1968 to give the local forces enough time to make the necessary preparations. As far as the Tri Thien area was concerned, the conferees requested that the Ministry supply two additional regiments of infantry, two 105mm artillery battalions, one anti-aircraft battalion, and 400 tons of ammunition. The Ministry responded by saying that the party leaders and military commanders of Tri Thien should wait for further decisions to be delivered personally by Mr. Le Chuong, the political commissar of the Tri Thien Military Command, who was at that time in Hanoi. It was not until December 3, 1967 that Le Chuong delivered the message from the Ministry, which stated that attacks should be launched in all areas mainly by local forces, that Hue should try to liberate itself in order to divert enemy forces from the main theater of the war which was the city of Saigon, and that the time for the Offensive would be sometime during Tet of 1968. General Quang says that the Ministry's decision was met with both joy and trepidation by the party leaders and fighters in Tri Thien: joy because they were going to take part in a large offensive aiming at the eventual liberation of the South; trepidation because they were not sure that they had enough force to carry out the assigned tasks. After careful deliberation, however, they decided that, since their main task was to cause a diversion and draw enemy forces away from Saigon, they should try their utmost to occupy the city of Hue and hold it for five to seven days. This decision was also taken, General Quang adds, because of the expectation that the Ministry of Defense would send in the necessary reinforcements as had been planned. As a result, General Quang claims, although on December 25,1967 a representative from the Politburo arrived to remind the leadership of Tri Thien that "the general uprising is a process," which meant that there should be a continual series of attacks, several mistakes were nevertheless committed. One of these was to throw almost all of the forces into the initial attacks without any careful deliberation on the second and third scenarios envisioned in Resolution 14. Another mistake was to enter "such a large campaign with such high objectives without having reserve forces 20

Tran Hoan, "Xung Quanh Ham Chi Huy" [Around the Command Tunnel] in Hue Nhung Ngay Noi Day [Hue during the Days of Uprising] (Hue: Sach Giao Khoa, 1979), pp. 31-32. Tran Hoan personally explained to the writer the impact of this fact on the conduct of the Offensive and its aftermath in April 1980 in Hue and in November 1989 in Hanoi.

The Tet Offensive 33 on the spot and relying instead on reinforcements from the Ministry which never arrived while the battlefields were not yet prepared."21 What emerge clearly from General Quang's statement are the reservations expressed by the southern fighters regarding the idea of continual attacks and a general uprising, which they thought were contradictory terms and which, as they correctly feared, would cause problems in the long run. General Hoang Van Thai addressed this issue in his summation of the 1986 conference on Tet as follows: On this point, almost all of our comrades agree that it is incorrect both in practice and in theory: We have all clearly seen the results of mounting one phase of offensives after another, of continuing with the policy of general offensive/general uprising against the urban areas when favorable conditions no longer existed.22 NO GENERAL UPRISINGS MEANT NO POPULAR SUPPORT?

As we have seen, there was already massive support for the NLF before the Politburo decided on its "General Offensive/General Uprising." However, an American reader may want to know what the term "general uprising" (tong khoi nghia) really meant to the Vietnamese revolutionaries at that point, and why uprisings—as understood or interpreted by American writers and readers—did not come about. At the 1986 Defense Department conference on Tet, General Tran Do, the second most senior northern general in the South during much of the war, said that he had thought hard about the meaning of Tong Cong Kich/Tong Khoi Nghia, ever since the term was first coined. Cong kick was the Sino-Vietnamese equivalent of tan cong, and khoi nghia was a classical Chinese translation of the Vietnamese term noi day. The tactic of "attack and uprising, uprising and attack" (tien cong va noi day, noi day va tan cong) had been used by the people in the South throughout the war. It meant that military attacks had to involve the support of the population and with this support more attacks could be launched at a future time. The classical Sino-Vietnamese word tong (general) put in front of cong kich and khoi nghia, therefore suggested something similar to the regular NLF tactic of "simultaneous uprising" (noi day dong loat) which involved military attacks with logistical support by the population over a large area to avoid concentrated counterattacks by the enemy on key targets. What was perhaps different was that in 1967 the term "termination point" (dut diem)—used as a verb to mean "to take over a target completely"—was a popular one in common use. Hence, according to General Tran Do, he and other high military commanders on the front lines might have been thinking of this term as they were planning the Tet campaign. This was perhaps the reason why, of the three scenarios mentioned in Resolution 14, only the first spread to the people in the field, especially given the fact that by this time everyone was impatient to bring about an end to the war. General Tran Do added that, had the Politburo given the campaign a less ambitious name such as "a large offensive" or "a strategic offensive," and had it stated clearly the campaign's limited objectives, then the people in the field would have 21

Tran Van Quang, "Hue 25 Ngay Dem" [Twenty Five Days and Nights in Hue] in Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, January 1988, pp. 25-28. 22 Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, January 1988, p. 24.

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been able to make better plans for the attacks and better use of the forces available to them. Even more significant, however, are Gen. Tran Do's thoughts on "a subject that has gnawed at my conscience for the last 18, or to be exact, 20 years." This was the question of dut diem, which, he said, the southern commanders and population had constantly advised him and the armed forces against adopting. Their reasoning was that, after taking over a place (dut diem), the armed forces would either advance or fail to defend it, and then it would be the local population that would have to bear all the consequences of destructive retaliation by the enemy. Legal means had to be followed (giu the hop phap), the southern commanders and inhabitants stressed, in order to assure safety for the local population in all military campaigns.23 In other words, the key players in the war—the southern revolutionary fighters and inhabitants—had a very different notion of "uprising" from what the northern policymakers had in mind and from what American analysts have assumed. Tran Bach Dang has written that, at that juncture in the war when the Americans were even dropping bombs on the towns and cities in the hope of driving out the revolutionary forces, "uprising" should not have been understood in terms of the paradigms or models of the October Revolution in Russia, the French Revolution, or even the August Revolution of 1945 in Vietnam. It should instead have been understood in terms of the dong khoi ("simultaneous uprisings") in Ben Tre province in 1959-1960 when the people there used a wide variety of methods to gain political control. Dang added: "Uprisings" in a war situation had to appear in different forms: the taking over of administrative power in the working-class neighborhoods, the disbanding of the puppet administrations, the patrolling of city streets, the searching out for secret police and informers, the maintaining of security and order, the organizing of the population to give direction and supplies to the soldiers, the transporting of weapons and the caring for the wounded.... The extent to which these were carried out differed from neighborhood to neighborhood, but in the entire city [of Saigon] this unusual atmosphere did occur.24 General Tran Van Quang also said that before the Offensive against Hue, it had already been agreed that there would be no way the city inhabitants could stage any kind of uprising, unless the revolutionary armed forces destroyed the various types of enemy forces and took complete control of the situation first. Even then, the uprisings envisaged had consisted only of youth groups going around to call on enemy forces to surrender, searching out local despots, and, at the "highest level," possibly forming armed bands to attack enemy forces along with the local fighters. So, General Quang added, during the attack and occupation of Hue the revolutionary side rallied from 530,000 to 800,000 inhabitants of Hue and the surrounding villages to participate in and give support to the Tet campaign.25 23

Tran Do, 'Tet Mau Than: Tran Tap Kich Chien Luoc" [Tet 1968: A Strategic Offensive], Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, February 1988, pp. 48-54. 24 Tran Bach Dang, "Ban them mot vai khia chanh cua cuoc tong dien tap chien luoc Mau Than 1968" [Additional Remarks on Several Facets of the General Strategic Rehearsal of Mau Than 1968], Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, July 1988, p. 3. 25 Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, February 1988, p. 27.

The Tet Offensive 35 As far as Saigon was concerned, Iran Bach Dang has disclosed that there had been a plan for the different student unions and youth organizations to stage a Tet celebration of several tens of thousands of people in the Tao Dan public garden, situated in front of the Saigon Independence Palace, on the evening of February 4 until the early morning of February 5. Should the sappers successfully penetrate the presidential palace and the national radio station nearby, then the gathered crowd would be asked to occupy these places. But the Politburo, for some unexplained reason, decided to advance the date of the offensive at the very last minute and in fact gave the order for General Tran Van Quang to attack according to the revised Vietnamese lunar calendar date which meant that Quang launched the attack eighteen hours before the designated time. This mix-up, according to Dang, not only destroyed the plan for the Tet revelers to occupy the palace and radio station, but also deprived the sappers of the support of the crack battalions that were supposed to carry out almost instant follow-up attacks on key target areas. Most of these soldiers were still about 100 kilometers away from Saigon when the sappers were ordered to fire their first shots. Consequently, since even the larger sapper units were composed of no more than a couple of dozen fighters, armed with only submachine guns and grenades, they were unable to defend the targets they had occupied for a prolonged period, in face of counterattacks by the American and Saigon forces using helicopters and tanks. As a result, the population of Saigon had to show their support by other means.26 Pham Chanh True, who is presently the deputy mayor of Ho Chi Minh City, but who was secretary of the Youth League for Saigon at the time of the Tet Offensive and the person responsible for organizing the celebration in Tao Dan public garden, as well as other activities by student and youth groups throughout the city, describes the varied activities of the Youth League and student organizations in organizing the population of Saigon before, during, and after the Tet Offensive. He mentions a succession of almost daily "rehearsals" (tap duot) which began on December 20,1967, the anniversary date of the founding of the National Liberation Front, when students raised NLF flags at most schools and university campuses and distributed leaflets throughout the city, and when people's self-defense forces and sapper units simultaneously attacked twenty targets in the central part of the city. By the time Tet was coming around, not only had an unprecedented Tet celebration known as the "Emperor Quang Trung Tet Festival" (Hoi Tet Quang Trung) been planned down to the smallest details, but everywhere in the city people were ready to support the attacking troops in the target areas. However, since the attack date was advanced at the very last moment, the planned events were called off. Instead, every group and individual had to deal with events as they unfolded. At least three examples of the various types of activities True mentions in his article are worth repeating here. The first example was the take-over of the huge Ban Co-Vuon Chuoi area of Saigon by the local inhabitants under the leadership of various units of Section II of the City Youth League. They chased away all the local Saigon forces and administrators and totally controlled the area until the morning of February 1. Meanwhile, Battalion No. 2 of the NLF forces had also penetrated the city from the southwest and controlled the area opposited Ban Co-Vuon, which was separated from it only by the traffic island called Nga Bay. These two forces—the "uprising forces of the city population" and the NLF armed unit, as True calls them—were within "arm's reach" (voi 26

Tran Bach Dang, "Nhat Ky Mau Than" [Mau Than Diary], in Mau Than Saigon, p. 36.

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tay) of each other and if they had been able to link up they would have become a formidable force for the American and Saigon troops to deal with. However, for some reason, which True says he still does not fully understand, these two forces were not aware of each other's presence, although they had each reported their situations to their respective commanding headquarters. The second example described by True was that when Battalion No. 6 of the NLF penetrated Saigon's twin city, Cho Lon, the Youth League organized the local population to aid in taking over a huge area stretching all the way to the district of Binh Thoi. The area's inhabitants provided supplies and moral support for the NLF soldiers, and young people joined them to fight against the American/Saigon counterattacks. The third example occurred when, on the evening of January 31,1968, refugees were streaming into the city from the outskirts to avoid the crossfire. American and Saigon airplanes attacked the heavily populated areas around the city in order to halt the NLF advance, as well as to preempt popular uprisings. Units of the Youth League immediately set up "Support Centers for War-Displaced Refugees" to give support to these war victims, with the result that even the Saigon regime was forced to subsidize their activities. In this way, with the support of the people, the Youth League was able to protect its own members and other revolutionary cadres while at the same time expanding the scope of the activities it would be able to carry out in the future.^7 In other words, according to True, there was plenty of popular support both during and after the Tet Offensive and whether an "uprising" as defined by some northern Politburo members did happen or not was beside the point. Likewise, almost all the revolutionary fighters that I have talked with over the years have defined both khoi nghia and noi day in terms of active political support and participation by the population. The southern revolutionaries have constantly reminded me that, without this support, they would not have been able to recover from some of the "darkest periods" of the long struggle against the most powerful and most destructive war machine in the world in order to see final victory and liberation of the South in 1975. And this leads us back to the American argument that the NLF was crushed in the spring of 1968 so that subsequently the only threat to South Vietnam came from the North. WAS THE NLF CRUSHED IN SPRING 1968?

This assertion is based on the claim that the revolutionary side suffered more than 58,000 casualties from January 29 through March 31. This is obviously an inflated figure, since the US Central Intelligence Agency estimated the total number of NVA and VC (Viet Cong, i.e. NLF) soldiers who participated in the Tet campaign to be around 58,000 and since the US High Command, MAC/V (Military Assistance 27

Pham Chanh True, "20 Nam, Them Mot Lan Suy Nghi" [Twenty Years, Yet Another Occasion to Ruminate], in Mau Than Saigon, pp. 9-12. In the very first sentence of an article published in 1988, True declared that "many comrades" had pointedly "cautioned" (luu y) him against saying anything on the Tet Offensive when the top leadership of the party still had not come to a consensus view on the issue. Therefore, he added, he felt very frustrated and was forced to limit himself to only a few facts in the article even though he was capable of doing much more than that.

The Tet Offensive 37 Command/Vietnam), and General Earl Wheeler all estimated that about 60,000 troops were used during the offensive.^ Certainly not all the NVA and NLF soldiers committed to the attack were killed, and, in addition, not all the soldiers reportedly committed to the battle actually fought. This can be demonstrated in the case of Saigon. As already indicated in this article, Saigon was the main target of the Tet Offensive, and so the largest numbers of attack forces were reserved for it. Besides the sapper units already in place in the city, from fifteen to twenty-two battalions (5,400-7,700 troops if these were full-size battalions) were to be used for follow-up attacks on Saigon once the sappers had succeeded in breaking into the target areas. In addition, three main-force divisions were stationed outside Saigon's first strategic defense perimeter in case reinforcements were needed. The attack forces were divided into the "Northern Vanguard Command'7 (bo tu lenh tien phuong Bac) and the "Southern Vanguard Command" (bo tu lenh tien phuong Nam). The Northern Command, also known as Vanguard 1, was headed by General Tran Van Tra, Mai Chi Tho (political commissar at the time and later minister of the interior of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), and Le Due Anh (presently the minister of defense of the SRV). Their forces were supposed to attack the districts of Cu Chi, Hoc Mon, Di An, Go Vap, Lai Thieu, Thu Due, and Binh Tan, and then finally occupy the ARVN Divisional Headquarters compound at Quan Tre, a portion of Tan Son Nhut airport, the military base in Go Vap, and the Saigon General Command Headquarters. The Southern Command, also known as Vanguard 2, was commanded by Vo Van Kiet (presently the second-ranking Politburo member and prime minister) and Tran Bach Dang. The forces under their command were supposed to attack from the south and southwest and then, in coordination with the sapper units, take over the US embassy, the Saigon presidential palace, the ARVN General Command Headquarters, the national radio station, the Navy Command Headquarters, the National Police Headquarters, the Nha Be petroleum storage compound, a portion of the Tan Son Nhut airport, and a number of other targets.^ However, according to a classified study of Long An province which supplied most of the forces for the attack on Saigon from the south and southwest, only a total of eight battalions—all of them from the Southern Vanguard Command—penetrated different areas of Saigon. Because these battalions had brought along mainly light weapons, with only a few B40 grenade launchers among them, none were able to break through the massively reinforced defense structures in the city to come to the aid of the sappers.^ General Huynh Cong Than (Tu Than), the commander of the Long An forces, told this writer in 1987 that the reason for this situation was because the Long An forces only received the order for the Offensive at four o'clock on the morning of January 30. In order to get to the launching areas, within only eight hours they had to march 30 kilometers or more through rivers and marshes, slipping through the defense perimeter set up by the American 9th and 25th Infantry 28

Wirtz, Tet Offensive, p. 249. 2^ Mau Than Saigon, pp. 4r-5. ^® Bao Cao Dien Bien 21 Nam Khang Chien Chong My va Nhung Bai Hoc ve Toan Dan Danh Giac cua Long An [Report on Developments in the Twenty-one Years of Resistance against the Americans and the Lessons of the Entire Population Fighting the Enemy in Long An] (Long An: Ban Tong Ket Chien Tranh Tinh Long An [Committee on Assessment of the War in Long An Province], August 1985), pp. 98-100.

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Divisions as well as through the defense anchors which the ARVN had set up to block the western and southern infiltration routes to Saigon. Without the active support and participation of several hundred thousand inhabitants of Long An and Saigon, it would have been impossible, in such a short time, to have delivered about 200 metric tons of supplies to the battle areas for the attack.31 Tran Bach Dang writes that the late attack order caught many of the revolutionary forces completely by surprise. The troops were out celebrating Tet, and the battalion commanders were either still drunk or away on personal business. As a result, Huynh Cong Than and a couple of other commanders had to make superhuman efforts to muster enough people in time for the attack. In any case, in face of American/Saigon counterattacks, with aircraft, tanks, and artillery delivering high explosives directly on positions within the city, Dang decided that the Offensive should be called off to minimize casualties. He obtained permission from COSVN to withdraw all armed forces from the city to the surrounding areas. As a result, casualties were kept relatively low. The worst casualties received by a battalion attacking from the outside were 100 dead. And in the fiercest battle that the Southern Command itself engaged in, only one platoon of soldiers was killed and wounded. Phase one of the Tet Offensive officially ended on February 5, and Dang himself left for the COSVN headquarters to participate in the overall assessment of phase one and the planning for phase two.3^ As Gabriel Kolko has documented: "A mere one thousand armed personnel in Saigon, with the aid of local political units, managed for three weeks to hold off over eleven thousand U.S. and ARVN troops and police/'33 It is clear from the above discussion that the NLF—for a variety of reasons—did not actually use very large forces during the first phase of the Tet Offensive and, therefore, could not have been crushed militarily as many American writers have claimed. On the contrary, the NLF actually extended its control over the rural areas after the first phase of Tet. During this phase, the US and Saigon were forced to pull back over 100 battalions to defend Saigon alone. As US troops and ARVN regulars withdrew to Saigon and other urban areas to defend them, Saigon regional and local forces panicked and were easily driven out by local guerrillas and local inhabitants. The villagers then razed outposts and bases abandoned by the various Saigon military forces and helped expand the liberated areas of Long An province, for example, all the way up to the doorstep of Saigon. This situation was repeated in most areas of the Mekong Delta.34 This increased control by the NLF played a role in encouraging the Politburo and COSVN to decide to launch phase two and phase three of the Tet Offensive. General Tran Do has disclosed that Mr. Le Due Tho arrived in the South as the Politburo representative several days after the first phase of the Tet Offensive. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Tho and the Politburo ordered the offensives to be continued and hence the second and third phases came into being.3^ 31 3

Ibid., pp. 96-100.

^ Mau Than Saigon, pp. 36-44. 33 Kolko, Anatomy of War, p. 308. 34 Bao Coo Dien Bien..., pp. 101-02. 35 Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su, p. 52.

The Tet Offensive 39 WHEN AND WHY THE NLF LOST CONTROL

In order to understand why and when the NLF lost control of the countryside and what that meant for later years, it is important to understand how the NLF was able to gain and maintain control in the first place. And I think that this can be achieved by focusing on only one province, the province of Long An where I interviewed many cadres and inhabitants in the summer of 1986. Long An is situated immediately south of Saigon and was considered by the various Saigon regimes and by the United States as the gateway to the Mekong Delta, or vice versa, the backdoor into the city itself. They regarded this province as of utmost importance to them militarily and economically. The Vietnamese revolutionaries, on the other hand, also considered Long An as the crucial staging area for attacks on Saigon from the dangerously accessible southern and western directions. Hence, throughout the twentyodd years of its involvement in Vietnam, the United States and the various Saigon regimes were determined to occupy Long An both to protect Saigon and to penetrate the Mekong Delta. The Vietnamese revolutionaries, meanwhile, were determined to maintain control over the province in order to achieve the reverse. Hence, the struggle to control Long An was one of the fiercest in all of Vietnam. As early as the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, through a combination of "armed propaganda" (which involved the use of a wide variety of methods to win over Saigon soldiers who would then provide the revolutionary movement with support) and attacks on Saigon military outposts, the revolutionaries were already in control of most of the province politically and economically. During the 1964-1967 period, when the revolutionary forces had the strongest control over Long An and when there were no gaps between liberated areas, the provincial forces moved around constantly to carry out their attacks both in the northern and southern regions. The district units and intra-village guerrillas were also able to move freely in their districts and between villages. This enabled the village and hamlet guerrillas to hold on tightly to their infrastructures. This was the reason Saigon and US forces were always off-balance and on the defensive. But, as we will see below, this situation was to change after the second phase of the Tet offensive in 1968. According to its own classified study, NLF forces and civilians in Long An suffered the highest casualties of all the provinces in the South during the three phases of the Tet Offensive.^ Interviews with southern military commanders and political leaders at the time have generally confirmed this fact. And yet in late 1968 US government officials still regarded the province as being mostly under the NLF's control. The second phase of the Offensive, however, presented the revolutionaries in Long An with huge problems. The defense of Saigon, for example, was reorganized into three distinct but well-coordinated perimeters: the national police was responsible for the inner city; ten battalions of paratroopers, marines, and Special Forces occupied the infiltration routes used in the first phase of the Offensive; and in the outer circle US troops and ARVN regulars constantly carried out their counterattacks, hoping to push the NLF forces further back into the countryside. But in spite of the fact that they had to withstand constant counterattacks, the Long An forces managed to cling to the outlying area of Saigon and prepared for the second phase of the Offensive against the city of Saigon. 36

Bao Coo Dien Bien..., pp. 106-10 and 174.

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In general, the plan and the directions of the assault remained the same as in the first phase. The attack forces were divided into five sections, two of which were from Long An. Sections 2 and 3, from Long An, were to attack from the south and southwest and Sections 1, 4, and 5 were to attack from the north and northwest direction. There were only slight changes in tactics, such as reliance on mortars and rockets rather than on sapper units for attacking the key targets within the city. It was clear from the very beginning, however, that the mortars and rockets supplied were not adequate for breaking into a heavily defended and fortified city. In addition, there was no longer the element of surprise either strategically, offensively, or tactically. In fact, when the US military command and the Saigon regime learned of the impending attack, they placed another brigade and hundreds of pieces of artillery on the routes to the city so that if and when the NLF forces advanced toward the capital they would be attacked and shelled from behind. The attack against Saigon by the Long An contingents lasted from May 5 to June 18, 1968. The twists and turns of this six-week campaign are extremely interesting from the military point of view but are too complex to go into here. In general, the attacking forces had to fight every inch of their long journey—from fifteen to twenty kilometers for some of the units—toward Saigon. Along the way they had to combat not only the various Saigon forces, but also the American 9th Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division—forces they had managed to avoid altogether during the first phase of the Tet Offensive, thanks to diversions created by the local guerrillas and villagers. When the Long An contingents arrived at the city, the north and northwestern contingents (Sections 1, 4, and 5) were still being blocked at the outer defense perimeter. The US and Saigon military were therefore able to concentrate most of their forces against the Long An contingents and succeeded in pushing them slowly backward. By the time the northern and northwestern contingents managed to enter the city, where they fought well, the Long An contingents were too weakened and depleted of supplies after so many days of continuous fighting to give them much support. Again, as a result, the US and Saigon side was able to concentrate its forces on Sections 1, 4, and 5. For all the reasons just cited, casualties during this second stage of the Tet Offensive were high. After they were forced to withdraw into the outlying areas of the city, Section 2 found that it had only 775 of its 2,018 troops still battle-ready. The rest had been killed, wounded, or put out of action. In Section 3 only 640 remained out of a total of 1,430. The US and Saigon armed forces were able to draw some valuable lessons from the second stage of the Tet Offensive. They clung closely to the revolutionary units after the latter withdrew into the outlying areas, attacking them constantly to keep them off balance so that they could not prepare another assault. Three additional battalions of ARVN rangers were brought in and, along with the American 25th Infantry Division, coordinated attacks against Section 2 were mounted. ARVN's 199th brigade also reinforced the American 9th Infantry Division and existing troops against Section 3. Five hundred tanks and armored vehicles were placed on Route 4; 360 patrol boats were stationed on the rivers so that there was one every 500 yards; artillery strikes were increased against all the staging areas of the revolutionary forces and all suspected routes; chemical defoliants were sprayed on vast areas considered liberated zones; and, most devastating of all, massive B52 bombings were conducted daily along the banks of all rivers and waterways, as well as on populated areas.

The Tet Offensive 41 In spite of the onslaught, the Politburo and COSVN ordered the various military units of Section 2 and 3 to remain in the outlying areas of Saigon to prepare for the third stage of the Offensive. But in order to resist the constant counterattacks by Saigon and US forces, these units, instead of dispersing, had to remain at the battalion level, as well as coordinate their maneuvers with district and village guerrillas to fight relatively big battles in a number of areas. This created a number of contradictions which had to be resolved. The first was the contradiction between combat and preparation: without fighting back the various units could not survive; but in fighting back they would suffer further casualties and not have enough strength to mount an assault on Saigon. The second contradiction concerned the question of troop concentration and dispersion: by maintaining the troops at battalion size they were exposed to attrition from the bombing and shelling; but in dispersing them into smaller units they lacked the strength to resist mopping-up operations carried out by the Saigon and US forces. The solution at the time was to dig as many "combat trenches" and strong tunnels as possible to minimize casualties from the shelling and bombing, as well as to facilitate counterattacks against the enemy: forces could then be concentrated quickly to counter the enemy and then quickly dispersed to avoid casualties. While the main forces of Section 2 and 3 remained in the outlying area of Saigon and fought against American and ARVN regulars, the guerrilla forces in the districts and villages, unprotected by the regular forces, had to spread themselves too thinly, so they did not have the strength to attack the remaining enemy outposts in the countryside. As a result, Saigon regional forces regained their confidence, augmented their units and, alongside ARVN regulars, began to coordinate attacks against liberated areas. These moves, and the massive destruction of the countryside through air and artillery strikes and chemical spraying mentioned above, served to cut off the Long An contingents fighting in the outskirts of Saigon from the rest of the rural areas. Worse still for the southern revolutionaries, the organizational division of the Long An forces into Sections 2 and 3 made it difficult to coordinate the activities of the units north and south of Route 4. Everyone I talked with in Long An—from General Tu Than, Colonel Le Phai, and Colonel Le Ky to the district and village leaders—said that this division was a crucial factor influencing the ability of the Long An contingents in combat, as well as in maintaining their positions in the outlying area of the capital city. The Long An main units were able to remain and fight for half a year on the outskirts of Saigon (launching the six-week third phase of the Tet Offensive in August) because they were still able to maintain communication lines with the rural areas during this period. But this strategy left the less experienced and ill-equipped guerrillas in the villages and districts exposed to concerted attacks by US and ARVN forces. By the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969 the United States took advantage of the fact that the Long An main forces were still massing in the direction of Saigon to carry out its "Accelerated Pacification Program." The aim of this program was to move large forces quickly behind the Long An forward positions to take over the liberated areas, thereby isolating these Long An main forces in the outlying areas of Saigon. Against the Long An units, Saigon used a combination of forces with the principal aim of keeping them occupied and isolated in forward positions. Meanwhile, the Saigon government deployed an additional 200 patrol boats on the Vam Co East and Vam Co West rivers to facilitate further division of Long An, thus severing NLF supply and communication lines. After successfully dividing the Long

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An battlefront, two brigades of the American 25th Infantry Division, the ARVN 25th Division, and fifty Rural Pacification Teams started to retake the liberated areas. By July 1969 the pacification of the two sections of Long An was completed. This created further difficulties for the Long An forward units in the outlying areas of Saigon which lasted until the end of 1969 when COSVN ordered them to withdraw to the Vietnam-Cambodia border purportedly for rebuilding. This, according to all the Long An commanders I talked with, was the second biggest mistake made by the leadership, because it meant surrendering all the populated areas without a fight. It is of utmost importance in a guerrilla war to maintain contact with one's support base, they said. Even after losing control one should try to maintain what they called the "position of adjoining combs" (the cai luoc), that is to say infiltrating the enemy's area in order get support from the local people and to gain access through enemy territories.

STICKING IT OUT: THE REBUILDING PROCESS For the reason just cited, the Long An leadership decided to disobey COSVN's order and instead send the various provincial forces to the district and village levels to act as local forces and to help rebuild the guerrilla military units there. Political and military cadres thereafter embarked on a policy of bam tru, or literally, "clinging to the post." The post here, they explained, meant the land and the people. The main aim was to get the people to cling to the land and the revolutionary cadres and fighters to cling to the people so closely that it would be difficult for the enemy to "empty the countryside" or to "dry up the ocean to kill the revolutionary fish." Therefore, the revolutionaries also adopted a slogan of their own to remind themselves and the population of their determination to stick it out at any cost: Mot tac khong di, mot ly khong roi, Dan bam dat, can bo bam dan, bo doi bam dich ma danh. (We will not be moved, not an inch, not even a millimeter People cling to the land, cadres cling to the people and soldiers cling to the enemy and fight.) Hence, this policy was also known as the ba bam, or literally, "three clingings." For most cadres, clinging meant staying close to the people, in order to give them the necessary moral support and political guidance and to carry out political and propaganda work among the enemy's ranks (binh van and dich van). This often meant living most of the time in tunnels under people's houses, under roads and highways, under paddyfields, and even under the fences of the so-called "new life hamlets" (ap doi moi) and "camps for refugees fleeing from communism" (trai ti nan cong san). They had to rely on the population to sneak food and water to them. For example, children—especially kids who tended buffaloes—would pretend to go out fishing with bamboo rods and cans of earthworms which they would leave in places where the revolutionary cadres and fighters could pick them up. In reality, beneath the layers of earthworms were fish, meat, or rice. Likewise, the knuckles inside the bamboo canes were knocked out and rice, salt, and sesame seeds stuffed inside. Old men and women also smuggled food to the revolutionary cadres and fighters inside their walking canes. Peasants put rice and meat in plastic bags and hid them inside their manure carts which they pushed out into the paddyfields. Fishermen, on the other

The Tet Offensive 43 hand, tied plastic bags full of food under the bottoms of their sampans or junks and rowed them to prearranged places where the revolutionary cadres and fighters could retrieve them. For their part, the cadres and fighters crept up close to the villages at night to hoe the fields and till the land for the people. During the 1969-1970 period they also planted manioc in the bomb craters, especially those produced by B-52s, in order to provide for themselves and not be wholly dependent on the support of the local population. By planting in the bomb craters they did not have to prepare the soil and could, therefore, avoid exposing themselves since the ever-present enemy reconnaissance airplanes were quick to detect changes on the ground. Each B-52 destroyed an area half a mile in diameter and a mile and a half in length. This area would be covered with an average of fifty to sixty huge bomb craters, each of which could support 150 to 200 manioc plants, producing about eight to ten pounds of manioc roots in five to six months. In bomb craters covered with water, the revolutionary cadres and fighters raised fish and planted bindweed (ran muong), a green vegetable rich in nutrition. The revolutionaries also collected aluminum fragments from downed airplanes and copper artillery casings and empty shells to exchange for needed supplies. A kilogram of scrap aluminum or copper could fetch enough money to buy about ten kilograms of rice or sugar, one kilogram of pork or fish, eight cans of condensed milk, or five kilograms of soap at the going prices in the 1969-1970 period. Clinging to the people and the enemy to fight was a most difficult task to perform militarily. There were only a few dozen village guerrillas left in Sections 2 and 3 of the province in 1969. That was the reason why each section in Long An had to bring its main forces back from the Cambodian border area, disobeying COSVN's order, to rebuild the district and village guerrilla forces. In Section 3 Dong Phu Battalion and d520 Battalion returned to the districts of Can Giuoc and Can Duoc, respectively, and helped rebuild the guerrilla structures there. Members of Dong Nai and Phu Loi Battalion and Battalion No. 1 of Regiment 320 also returned to serve as district guerrilla fighters and commanders. In Section 2 Battalion d264 returned to Due Hoa district. This rebuilding effort had to be carried out with the utmost care, with every effort made to conceal the situation from the enemy, with dedication on the part of many southern political cadres, and with support from the population. The people of Long An and elsewhere in the South frequently told me that the recovery of the guerrilla forces and the revolutionary structures in the South by 1971 was made possible only through efforts by the southern political and military leaders to return to the basics, briefly described above. During 1969 and 1970 North Vietnamese forces, who were sent to the South to help out, could not function effectively and were killed in large numbers. The people of Long An told me that several thousand regular DRV troops were lost in Long An during this period. Previously, they said, main force units operating in the South had included both southerners and northerners so that the latter could function effectively. On the average, every northern soldier arriving in the South had to receive another year of training before he was battle-ready. In addition, regional units required that local guerrilla forces provide the necessary political structure, and hence logistical support, and prevent concentrated attacks on main force units by means of widespread and simultaneous assaults throughout a province or a region to disperse enemy forces or pin them down. Conversely, main forces had the responsibility of drawing enemy units away from vulnerable areas, as well as attacking enemy units too large for the regional and local forces to deal with successfully. The loss of ability to coordinate the activities of these

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three types of forces, among other factors, led to the "darkest years of 1969-1970" as the southern revolutionaries have called them. Bam tru helped rebuild the regional and local forces and restore necessary structures and coordination. The recovery of the southern political and military structures, they maintained, was also aided in part by the urban opposition movement which exploded in the major cities in South Vietnam beginning in 1969 and which caused both the Saigon regime and the United States to expend much energy in dealing with strikes and demonstrations. This was especially the case after May 1970 when over 50,000 US and Saigon troops invaded Cambodia in order to "clean up the sanctuaries" and "dismantle the Vietcong Pentagon." The invasion of Cambodia also tied up for several years considerable American airpower and resources, and thus, in the long run, helped give the southern revolutionaries time and space to recover. They used this to take the initiative in many places through the coordinated deployment of the three types of forces—the village guerrillas, the district units, and the provincial main forces. But in the short run I was told that the invasion of Cambodia actually interfered with the rebuilding efforts in many of the Delta provinces because the revolutionaries had to send reinforcements to the border areas. In fact, both the interviewees and internal classified documents from Long An maintain that the invasion actually caused serious damage to their rebuilding effort. This was because, in order to attack the Parrot's Beak area, the suspected location of the NLF and Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) headquarters, Saigon's 7th, 9th, and 25th Divisions, its 3rd Airborne Brigade, and an Armored Brigade conducted their operation through Long An, with full American air and artillery support. Many people in Long An, especially political cadres, were killed during this operation because they were taken by surprise and were not initially able to find an effective way to counter such a huge operation. But the revolutionary forces were soon able to reorganize themselves and mount counter-attacks. From July to October 1970 they fought seventy-five battles, killed 1,750 Saigon soldiers, destroyed forty tanks, and downed sixteen planes and helicopters.^ In addition to fighting along the border areas, Long An forces also joined the main force units to liberate the Cambodian province of Svayrieng. After that, Long An and Kien Tuong sent five delegations of military cadres of about twenty to thirty each to Svayrieng to help the people there build up their military forces. Together they were able to form eight full companies of provincial main forces, with 300 soldiers in each, all equipped with weapons from Long An and Kien Tuong. In addition, each district in Svayrieng now had one to two platoons of district forces and each village had one to two full squads of guerrillas, who had all been trained by the revolutionary fighters of Long An and Kien Tuong. Because of this diversion, it was not until October 1970 that Section 2 and Section 3 of Long An again merged into a unified administrative unit known as Section 23. After this merging, political and military cadres were sent down to the district and village levels to help rebuild the administrative and military structures there. Subsequently, the Military Command of Section 23 also reorganized its main forces into three special full-strength battalions—battalions dl, d267, and d269—which incorporated a number of newly arrived northern troops. The rest of the provincial recruits were placed in four battalions of regular provincial units, called K2, K4, K7, and K9, two battalion of sappers, and one battalion of "communication troops" who 37

Bao Cao Dien Bien..., p. 174.

The Tet Offensive 45 specialized in attacks along the highways and waterways. The Kien Tuong Section also reinforced its d504 battalion with some newly arrived northern troops and created one company of sappers, one company of urban commandoes, and one mortar and rocket company. Together the above units and cadres worked among the population and coordinated their attacks against Saigon forces until the revolutionary political and military structures in the province recovered by the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972.3^ The people of Long An took pains to stress to me that the key point was not how the southern revolutionary forces were hurt or weakened but how they recovered with the help and support of the southern population—both rural and urban. In their opinion, the people are the biggest asset in a revolutionary war. Cling to the people and you will survive and gain strength. Bam tru, they said, was the key to survival and success during the 1969-1972 period. SUMMARY

In summary, then, the following observations can be made: The Tet victory might well have been greater for Vietnam's revolutionary forces if NLF troops had returned to their rural bases after the first or second phase of the Offensive instead of trying to carry out all three phrases. If the groups had returned to protect their rural bases they would probably still have achieved the original purposes of the Offensive and would have emerged from it in much stronger shape. Far fewer cadres and civilian in the countryside would have been killed in the 1969-1972 period. Instead, because the NLF forces from Long An remained massed around Saigon, US and ARVN troops were able to inflict high casualties on both the NLF forces and on their unprotected guerrilla and civilian rural bases. Worse still, the Politburo and COSVN made the strategic mistake of ordering the revolutionary forces in Long An and many other provinces to leave for the border areas. As a result, 1969 and 1970 were the most difficult years of the war for the NLF and its popular base of support. Even so, because of its popular support, the NLF was not destroyed but managed to rebuild itself through the strategy of "three clingings," and it was only with this recovery that military successes in 1971 and 1972 were possible and forces from the North could begin to operate in the South again without suffering prohibitive losses. In short, the story of Tet and its aftermath shows that, because of popular support in the South, the NLF was like a phoenix rising out of the ashes, in spite of all the American efforts—including the infamous "Phoenix Program"—to kill it. To claim that the NLF was finished after the spring of 1968, never to recover again, is to ignore the facts or intentionally to distort them. In this connection, the story of Tet and its aftermath also demonstrates that traditional scholars of revolutions and wars often overemphasize the role of national leadership and directives at the expense of properly recognizing the role of local leaders, organizations, and initiatives. 38 These facts are also documented in ibid., pp. 122-27, and in the oral histories cited in previous footnotes.

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NIXON AND THE PRG's 7 POINTS George McT.Kahin

has often been noted that at any time during the first four years of his presidency Richard Nixon could have disengaged American military power from Vietnam on terms as favorable to his administration as those he finally secured in the 1973 Paris Agreement. What has not been widely appreciated is that in mid-1971 he was presented with an unusual opportunity whereby he could have done considerably better. This opportunity was embodied in the 7-Point proposal presented in Paris by the foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, Madam Nguyen Thi Binh, on July 1,1971.1 This proposal opened the way for a solution consistent with Nixon's publicly asserted support of the principle of self-determination, and would have provided a substantial "decent interval" before there was any Communist domination of the South, a condition Nixon and Kissinger apparently regarded as essential in neutralizing any adverse reaction from the right wing of the American political spectrum. Such an interval could also have allowed sufficient time for a gradual, incremental accommodation between the North Vietnamese Government (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV), the PRG (NLF),2 and supporters of the Saigon regime which would probably have been much less traumatic than the sudden, wrenching adjustments that followed the unexpectedly precipitate and chaotic collapse of the South Vietnamese regime four years later. The United States could have secured this interval, together with a bilateral cease-fire between American and Vietnamese Communist forces, providing for the safe return of all US prisoners and the safe evacuation of residual US military forces. And this outcome could have been achieved without the heavy toll in American and Vietnamese lives—civilian as well as military—suffered over the twoand-a-half years preceding the Paris Agreements. Salient among the features forming the background of these developments in mid-1971 were a mounting war-weariness throughout Vietnam, the rising tide of the antiwar movement in the United States, and the manifest failure of Nixon's Vietnamization policy. During the first half of that year it became increasingly evident

I

1

See Appendix, pp. 68-70. The PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam), established June 8, 1969, was essentially a continuation of the NLF (National Liberation Front) which served to consolidate the Front and associated organizations and was established in preparation for participation in what was expected to be a transitional period of coalition government in the South. Within a week of its establishment it was accorded diplomatic recognition by Algeria, Bulgaria, Congo, Cuba, Czechosovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, Syria, Yugoslavia, and the DRV.

2

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The American War in Vietnam

that "Vietnamization"3 of the fighting was a failure. With the continuing withdrawal of US forces "all sorts of cracks" were "beginning to appear in the military structure of ARVN [the South Vietnamese army]." This was especially so in the 1st Corps area where the government had been "largely pushed down to the coast and the enemy has the capacity to strike hard whenever he wants." And even in the Mekong Delta the number of military posts lost (seventy-three) was double that of the same period the previous year.4 The most stunning evidence of Vietnamization's failure came when Saigon's best troops were dealt a shattering defeat in their extensive Lam Son 719 invasion into Laos during February and March of 1971. This debacle, and their severe mauling just inside Cambodia at Snoul soon afterwards, vividly demonstrated the vulnerability of Vietnamese ground forces fighting on their own, even when, as in both these cases, they were heavily supported by US airpower and artillery.5 Planned by US officers, these two operations were conducted by elite Vietnamese army units with massive US air and artillery support, but without the participation of American ground forces. As such, the operations were expected to demonstrate the success of Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. Lam Son 719 was meant to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in Laos and to capture the town of Tchepone, some twenty-five miles inside that country. If "Vietnamization" as a formula for US air and artillery support for Vietnamese ground forces were to succeed, Lam Son 719 was a test which, in terms of US input, should have produced a victory. The US committed to the operation, launched on February 8,1971, "more air and artillery support to a single battle than at any time during the Vietnam War." Close to half of all US air assets in South Vietnam were thrown into the battle—659 helicopters and nearly 2,000 fixed wing aircraft. In addition, B-52 bomber strikes preceded the invasion and continued intermittently wherever possible without endangering ARVN forces. Two entire battalions of ARVN's 1st Infantry Division were airlifted to a point near Tchepone in "the largest helicopter combat assault in the history of Army Aviation." The South Vietnamese forces involved were ARVN's best—some 20,000 troops from its Airborne, Marine and 1st Infantry divisions, the 1st Armored Brigade and 1st Ranger Group. The casualty rate for these elite troops was extraordinarily high— 1,146 killed in action, 246 missing in action, and 4,236 wounded. Americans killed in the operation numbered 102, with 53 missing in action, and 215 wounded. Out of 659 US helicopters ninety were lost and 453 damaged.** Ending in a frantic and disorderly retreat of ARVN forces from Laos during the second and third weeks of March, the magnitude of this Lam Son 719 disaster dealt a devastating blow to the morale of the South Vietnamese Army. It was soon afterwards that the ARVN division probing 3

A term introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and adopted by Nixon which called for a progressive assumption of ground combat responsibility by South Vietnamese forces as American troops were gradually withdrawn, but providing for full continuing American air and naval support. 4 Estimates of the Political-Military Affairs Office of the US Embassy, interview with Robert England, head of that office, Saigon, July 29,1971. With a total of seven years experience in Vietnam England was widely respected in the embassy for his knowledge of this subject. 5 With respect to the Snoul operation Robert England observed: "If American air and artillery support had not gone to its rescue the whole division would have been rolled over." 6 These quotes and figures on the Lam Son 719 operation are drawn from "Lamson 719," a three-part series of excellent articles in U.S. Army Aviation Digest, by Captain Jim E. Fulbrook, published June, July, and August, 1986.

Nixon and the PRG's 7 Points

49

into Cambodia near Snoul was routed, with one of its three regiments largely destroyed. The severe loss of morale among Saigon's forces resulting from these defeats and high casualties would in any case have had adverse political consequences for President Nguyen Van Thieu. But the impact became heavier when his long estranged, steadfastly opportunistic vice president, Nguyen Cao Ky, and others seized upon this debacle to accuse him of subserviently following reckless American orders in these operations and agreeing to undertake them without support from American infantry and tanks. The clear failure of Vietnamization demonstrated by these operations lent plausibility to Kissinger's indications to the Hanoi delegation in Paris in late May and early June 1971, that the US was now prepared to discuss the possibility of a coalition government in Saigon. Seymour Hersh cites the secret talks with Le Due Tho in Paris on May 31, where, according to Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Kissinger stated that the US was willing to discuss seriously a possible coalition government in Saigon, and observed that "the withdrawal of American troops would have a big effect on the internal political process in South Vietnam, and [that] the USA would accept a neutral South Vietnam" and political competition between the Saigon regime and the PRG7 In view of Nixon's continuing unilateral withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam in the face of the ongoing antiwar movement in the United States, and the heavy losses of Saigon's military forces, one can understand why Hanoi and the PRG concluded that Washington might be receptive to a political change in Saigon that could pave the way for resolving the struggle through negotiations—if that could be achieved in a manner that would save the face of the United States and especially of its president. A major obstacle was President Thieu, whom the DRV and PRG accurately perceived as critically dependent on US support. To Hanoi and the PRG (as well as to political specialists in the US Saigon embassy) it was clear that, with Nguyen Van Thieu at the head of the Saigon administration, there would be no negotiated settlement of the war. Thieu's vested interest in continuing the conflict was much too strong for him to accept any sort of compromise so long as he could count on American backing. The only alternative he had offered to continued fighting was for the National Liberation Front and its Provisional Revolutionary Government to capitulate, with their individual members invited to lay down their arms and trust to his announced good intentions. Any doubts as to his position were removed by his reiteration of his "Four No's"—no coalition government, no participation of Communists in government, no neutralism, and no loss of territory (i.e. no acceptance of any political accommodation wherein the NLF would retain the areas it then controlled). 7

Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 429. The fact that Kissinger no longer reiterated the previous demand that North Vietnam withdraw its troops from South Vietnam increased the inclination of some North Vietnamese officials to believe that the US might "seriously intend to reach an agreement." Luu Doan Huynh, 'The Seven-Point Proposal of the PRG (July 1, 1971) and the U.S. Reaction," in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, ed. Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993). Luu Doan Huynh, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Hanoi, is co-author of President Ho Chi Mink and Vietnam's Diplomacy (1990), and was a senior member of the Vietnamese delegation to the Conference on the History of the Vietnam War held in Hanoi, November 1988.

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But President Nixon's repeated protestations of concern for the safety and welfare of American troops and prisoners had led Hanoi and the NLF to conclude that these matters were of such importance to him that, if they met this concern, he would become seriously interested in negotiating an end to the war. They realized that Nixon wanted to maintain Thieu at the head of an anti-Communist government in Saigon; but they did not believe that he would be willing to subordinate the interests of American prisoners and soldiers to such an objective, if he were provided with the opportunity for negotiating their release and safe withdrawal. The Vietnamese Communists expected, then, that, out of concern for the welfare of these men, President Nixon would be willing to permit a sufficient change of leadership in Saigon to open the way for negotiations leading to a compromise settlement that would end the war. Having long pressed unsuccessfully for the US to remove Thieu if it was really interested in such a settlement, Hanoi and the PRG now believed that the Nixon administration would be willing to accept his replacement through the South Vietnamese presidential elections scheduled for October 3. They assumed that if these were conducted with reasonable honesty, they would return a candidate who reflected the widespread desire in the South for a settlement that would end the fighting. The prospect for such an election was opened up in secret talks in Paris (paralleling the publicized open talks) between Kissinger and Le Due Tho, Hanoi's top negotiator, when on June 26, 1971, Hanoi offered a 9-Point peace proposal** which incorporated some important changes in its negotiating position. It now agreed to the release of all military and civilian prisoners of both sides (American and Vietnamese) coincident with the withdrawal of residual US troops by the end of the year (points one and two), and no longer called upon the Nixon administration to replace Thieu's regime, but simply to "stop supporting" it (point three) so that a new government could emerge that was prepared to negotiate an end of the war. Kissinger, however, proved unwilling to follow up these secret discussions with a counter-offer or even discussions aimed at clarification of Hanoi's new proposals. Writing eight years later, he stated that he reported to Nixon: "The real meaning of their counter-proposal and their discussion is as of now unclear....there is nothing we lose by waiting right now; their proposal had some positive as well as tough elements, and they were clearly eager to negotiate further and concretely ."^ Presumably Kissinger, who, unknown to the Vietnamese, was due to travel to Beijing in a little over two weeks, expected he would be able to secure sufficient leverage there to increase the administration's bargaining position with Hanoi.10 He does not divulge what assurances he may have elicited from Beijing, but shortly after this first visit, Chinese leaders did begin pressuring Hanoi to make further concessions, including acceptance of Thieu as head of the Saigon regime.11 And Kissinger concludes that his success in Beijing brought Nixon "to harden his Vietnam stand," and that "the 8

For the text of the 9-Point peace proposal see Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, vol. 2 (Stanfordville, New York: Coleman, 1979), p. 555. The text of the agreement was finally released by Hanoi (not by the US) at the end of January 1972. 9 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 1024. 10 Ibid., p. 1020. 11 Hersh, Price of Power, p. 442.

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negotiating framework would never be the same again; it had been fundamentally changed by my trip to Peking." ^ In the meantime, and continuing after Kissinger's trip to the Chinese capital and his meeting again with Hanoi's representatives in Paris on July 12 and 26, the administration sought to fend off criticism with its disingenuous public assertion that Hanoi and the PRG were still calling on the United States to "overthrow" Thieu— even though Kissinger acknowledges that in both of these secret July meetings the Vietnamese negotiators repeated that permitting fair elections was all that the US had to do if it wanted to obtain a Saigon regime free of Thieu.13 Having received no administration response to Hanoi's 9-Point June 26 proposal in the secret meeting in Paris, Hanoi and the PRG concluded that their best move was to make their position public in the expectation that, if the actual terms were known, the American public would put pressure on the administration to get negotiations under way. To this end, the secret 9-Point proposal was spelled out in greater detail and embodied in what was known as the 7-Point plan publicly announced in Paris by the PRG's foreign minister, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh on July 1, 1971. Caught off guard and evidently outraged at the announcement, Kissinger later acknowledged: "Madame Binh's ploy had its intended effect. The Congress and media were at one that the administration was passing up yet another unparalleled opportunity for peace."14 To fend off this criticism Kissinger and the president wrapped themselves in a cloak of moral self-righteousness, asserting, as before, that Hanoi and the PRG were in fact still insisting that the US forceably overturn the South Vietnamese government as a pre-condition for negotiations. The PRG's 7-Point proposal immediately put the White House on the defensive, for in its essence it provided that, once the US ended its support for Thieu, what had now become the central concern of much of the American public could be met: the release of all US prisoners and the "withdrawal in safety" of all remaining US troops. Remembering the disaster that overtook them following the 1954 Geneva agreements, when under pressure from the Communist as well as anti-Communist Great Powers they reluctantly agreed to an armistice prior to a political settlement, the Vietnamese Communists were unwilling to follow that route again. Thus, now they insisted that an armistice and the freeing of US prisoners were dependent upon an American political as well as military withdrawal. They were confident that, left free of American interference, the South Vietnamese would fashion their own government under whose aegis these measures would be carried out. Considerably more detailed than the antecedent 9 Points, the PRG's 7 Points incorporated several important new features. Salient among these were: establishment of an interim coalition government in the South which would establish a ceasefire among the contending Vietnamese parties, take measures against reprisals, release all political prisoners (a matter of special importance and urgency for the PRG), and hold general elections throughout the South.15 The full text of the PRG's 12

Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1026-27. Ibid., pp. 1028 and 1030. 14 Ibid., p. 1025. As Seymour Hersh observes, "there was no elation in the White House" at this prospect and the possibility of a "close out of American involvement in Vietnam" was "echoed in newspaper editorials across the nation." Hersh, Price of Power, p. 430. 15 Mme. Binh had already emphasized to me the high priority which the PRG attached to the release of political prisoners in a discussion I had with her some eight months before in Paris (November 9,1970). In talks with PRG officials in 1971 and 19721 sensed much greater concern 13

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The American War in Vietnam

7-Point proposal can be found in the Appendix to this chapter, but it should be useful at this point to provide an abreviated version.^ The first point called for (a) "the withdrawal in safety" by the end of the year of "the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp." (Of these, the most important were some 50,000 Korean troops); and (b) "the release of the totality of military men of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam)." It was stipulated that these two operations—"withdrawal and release"—would be concurrent. In addition, as soon as agreement was reached on the withdrawal of US forces and those of its foreign allies, a cease-fire would be observed between NLF (PRG) and Hanoi forces on the one hand and those of the US and its foreign allies. ("Foreign allies," of course, did not extend to the South Vietnamese forces led by Thieu, nor was Thieu disposed to go along with any such cease-fire, for it would have left the NLF in control of large areas of the South.) The second point concerned "the question of power in South Vietnam." This called for the US to "really respect the South Vietnamese people's right to selfdetermination" by ending its "interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam" and "cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu... including all maneuvers including tricks on elections" aimed at maintaining him in power. A new Saigon administration—one "favoring peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy"^—and the PRG (NLF) government would then enter into talks with the object of forming an interim coalition "three-segment government of national concord."^ (See below as to its composition.) This would immediately establish a cease-fire between the armed forces of the People's Liberation Armed Forces (this term embraced both PRG and Hanoi units in the South) and those of the Saigon administration (i.e. the successor to Thieu's) and would function until a general election throughout South Vietnam was held. "Concrete measures with the required guarantees" would be taken "to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination" against collaborators on either side and all political prisoners were to be released. Point three stipulated that "the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam" would be settled "without foreign interference." (It was generally understood at the time that "Vietnamese armed forces" covered North Vietnamese units operating in the South as well as PRG and Saigon forces.)^ over this matter—understandably, for this directly affected the fate of their own colleagues— than in my talks with officials of the Hanoi government. Both understood that so long as Thieu remained in power there was scant chance that he would release these prisoners, for, if freed, they would pose a serious threat to his survival. 16 The 7-Point proposal and its political context are described and analyzed in greater detail in my article, "Negotiations: The View from Hanoi," published in the November 6,1971 issue of The New Republic (pp. 13-16). 1' The 7 Points did not spell out the method by which such a new Saigon administration would be formed, but left open the possibility of it being the result of an electoral process held in the Saigon-controlled part of South Vietnam. *° The concept of a provisional coalition government had been earlier advanced in the NLF's 10-Point proposal of May 8,1969, where the call for general South Vietnam-wide elections was also made. The text of this proposal can be found in George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Dial Press, 1967), 2nd ed., 1969, pp. 512-16. 19 In discussing the terms of a settlement with me eight months before, Mme. Binh had indicated that from the PRG's standpoint North Vietnamese troops should be withdrawn from the

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Point four provided for the peaceful reunification of North and South Vietnam on a gradual "step-by-step" basis "without constraint or annexation by either party, without foreign interference," and that "pending the reunification" the two zones would "re-establish normal relations" and guarantee free movement, correspondence, and choice of residence while maintaining economic and cultural relations. There was nothing new in these provisions, and indeed, this gradualist approach had constituted a cardinal tenet of the NLF (PRG) from its very inception in 1960.2^ In conformity with the 1954 Geneva Agreements there was to be no military alliance with any foreign country nor any foreign military bases and military personnel on Vietnamese soil. Complementing this, point five called for South Vietnam to follow a neutral foreign policy, establishing relations with "all countries regardless of their political and social regime," accepting their cooperation "in the exploitation of the resources of South Vietnam." On this basis, South Vietnam and the United States would establish "political, economic and cultural" relations. Point six called upon the United States to bear "full responsibility for the losses and the destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones [i.e. North and South Vietnam]." The seventh and final point called for an international guarantee of the accords arrived at. ****************

Assessing the situation obtaining shortly after Hanoi's 9-Point proposal and the announcement of the PRG's 7 Points, and referring back to the US position as conveyed in secret meetings on May 31,2* Kissinger observes: "It was apparent that agreement was [his italics] within reach on most of the points (the principle of total US withdrawal, release of POWs, reaffirmation of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, internationally supervised cease-fire at the end)." (Note that in secret meetings in May a major obstacle previously blocking progress in the negotiations had been removed when the US had abandoned its insistence that Hanoi remove its troops from the South,22 and Kissinger had indicated the US was willing to discuss the possibility of a coalition government in Saigon.23) This left, states Kissinger, only "two basic disputes: the demand for reparations and Hanoi's insistence that we overSouth prior to the holding of general elections for the whole area—i.e. Saigon and PRGcontrolled. Paris, November 9,1970. 20

This gradualist approach to reunification, with an initial period of a neutralist autonomous South Vietnamese government, was prominent in the NLF's program as early as December 1960, and was repeated consistently in its subsequent announcements. For the relevant texts, see Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vienam, 1st ed., pp. 394-95,401-402,417; and 2nd ed., pp. 514-15; and Kahin, Intervention: Row America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), esp. pp. 115-18. In a disucssion with me in Cambodia in 1967, Nguyen Van Hieu, then still one of the highest officials in the NLF and formerly its secretary-general, informed me that, following the establishment of peace, national reunification would certainly take more than three years and "might well take ten years." 21 For Kissinger's summary of the US proposal of May 31,1971, see Kissinger, White House Yegrs, pp. 1488-^89. 22 Ibid., p. 1018, and Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 423-27. 23 Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 429.

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throw the Saigon government." The question of reparations was "not beyond compromise... We had said repeatedly in the private talks and Nixon had so stated publicly (as had President Johnson before him) that we would contribute generously to the economic rehabilitation of all of Indochina, including North Vietnam, after the war."24 Inevitably, it was the political issue," Kissinger writes, "that turned into the bone of contention."25 And here the pivotal factor was the character of the Saigon government. Nguyen Van Thieu clearly understood that his position was critically dependent on American backing and that the more US troops were drawn down the more vulnerable his regime was to military pressure from the forces of the PRG and Hanoi. A stand-fast armistice, such as the US was prepared to accept, would leave the PRG in control of large areas of the South and reinforce its position as an alternative government there. And if thousands of political prisoners held in Saigon's jails and concentration camps were released, the opposition to his rule could no longer be contained. Having been elected president four years earlier, with only 35 percent of the votes, despite heavy US backing, rampant fraud, and intimidation,26 he was aware of how slight his basis of popular support was, and how any agreement calling for the release of political prisoners would threaten his regime. Yet the PRG wanted no part of a settlement if its many jailed civilian adherents were not freed; and its leaders correctly understood that, if Thieu remained in power, they could expect no such release. Nor, they were certain, would he eyen cooperate in the holding of elections throughout South Vietnam—that is, in both Saigon and PRGcontrolled areas—which remained their post-armistice objective.27 It was abundantly clear that so long as Thieu remained in Saigon's presidential palace there could be no negotiated settlement of the war. He had been placed in power by the US and propped up in that position for more than four years;2** and, having done that, the US clearly had the capacity to remove him. It was hypocritical to assert that the United States, as a matter of principle, did not intervene in South Vietnamese politics, for it had done so repeatedly beginning with its buildup of Diem and the ouster of Bao Dai in 1955. It had been closely involved in the ousting of President Diem in 1963, as well as with his successors Duong Van Minh in 1964 and Nguyen Khanh in 196529 There was, then, plenty of precedent for the US removing any Saigon government head who had outworn his usefulness to American policy. To remove Thieu, US officials could covertly or semi-covertly encourage, support, and guide disaffected elements in South Vietnam—as they had on these previous occasions; they could do so through rigged elections (as they had done before); or they could live up 24

Ibid., p. 1028. Ibid. 26 See Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, 2nd ed., esp. pp. 346-59. The election law, prepared under US guidance, required only a plurality of votes in the election of a president. 2 ^ This assessment was not confined to the PRG and Hanoi. Buddhist political activists in the South, progressive Catholic leaders, university students, middle-level US embassy personnel, and American journalists in Saigon with whom I discussed the question of Thieu were in agreement. 2 ° The US helped ensconce in power a joint Ky/Thieu government in mid-1965 and continued to support it heavily right up to the 1967 Presidential election, in which Thieu bested Ky. 2 ^ For accounts of these actions, see the author's Intervention, chs. 3,6, 7, and 8. 25

Nixon and the PRG's 7 Points

55

to the Nixon administration's professed dedication to the principle of self-determination by insuring a fair electoral contest. PRG and Hanoi leaders assumed that the last of these options would be most attractive to the administration, but they didn't greatly care which route it followed. Kissinger himself understood,30 as did the whole range of leadership in Saigon,31 and numerous Vietnamese and Western journalists, that the stipulation in the 7-Point proposal calling for the US to "stop supporting" Thieu opened the way for his replacement through open elections. Indeed, both the character and timing of these proposals (as well as the then unpublished 9-Point proposal) were attuned to a significant change in the political context for negotiations. This resulted from the fact that, after four years in office, Thieu was bound by South Vietnam's constitution to face a new election for the presidency in October 1971. Electioneering was already under way, and to the dismay of Thieu and the approval of the PRG and Hanoi, a "peace candidate," Duong Van Minh, had emerged as Thieu's principal rival. Hanoi and the PRG believed it was logical and probable that the US would embrace the election and regard it as a face-saving first step in American disengagement. As Luu Doan Huynh observes with respect to the political elements (point 2) of the 7-Point proposal: the PRG tried to have an impact on the forthcoming elections of the Saigon regime. It was hoped that public opinion and political circles in South Vietnam—including members of the Saigon establishment and the US government—would take advantage of the elections to discard Thieu and promote the necessary conditions for the emergence of a new Saigon government favourably disposed to peace and national reconciliation (that the PRG could talk to with a view to establishing a coalition government).3^ Regarding this Hanoi/PRG initiative, Gareth Porter in his study of USVietnamese negotiations noted that it "was prompted by the prospect that this obstacle to a settlement," resulting from the United States' continued insistence that "the Thieu regime was the only legitimate government of South Vietnam" might be removed by "the very electoral process which the United States had created by the constitution of 1967...." Referring to the sentence in part 2 of the PRG's 7 Points calling on the United States to respect the South Vietnamese people's right to selfdetermination, "cease backing" the group led by Thieu, and "stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu" in office, Porter observes: The intention of this language was clear: the United States could prove its willingness to respect free choice by withdrawing support from the Thieu regime before the election. This pointed suggestion took on special signifi30

Kissinger writes that Hanoi's chief negotiator in the secret Paris talks, Le Due Tho, repeatedly argued that "the forthcoming presidential election presented us [the US] with a perfect opportunity" for replacing Thieu. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1028. See also ibid., p. 1030. 3 * This was evident in interviews the writer had in Saigon during the second half of July and early August 1971 with Buddhist and Catholic leaders, South Vietnamese officials, and student leaders, as well as with US embassy personnel, and American and Vietnamese journalists. 32 Luu Doan Huynh, "Seven-Point Proposal of the PRG," p. 199.

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The American War in Vietnam cance in light of NLF broadcasts and captured documents indicating that the Lao Dong Party [headquartered in Hanoi] was urging South Vietnamese not to boycott the presidential election, as it had in 1967, but to use it to defeat Thieu.33

The PRG's 7 Points were meant to form the basis of negotiations, and consequently some of its terms were sufficiently broad to provide a wide range of substantive discussion. But this quality also made it easier for the Nixon administration to misrepresent some of their provisions and falsely sum up their essence as requiring the United States to "overthrow" its "ally," Nguyen Van Thieu. ("Overthrow" is, of course, rather different from "stop supporting,"—the condition which the PRG and Hanoi believed could permit his replacement through an election.) Even on the face of it, any careful reading of the 7 Points suggested that the administration was giving it a highly tendentious interpretation. It was evident that it was trying hard to convince Congress and the American public at large that they called for American concessions alone with no reasonable quid pro quo from the PRG and Hanoi. Dismissed out of hand was any acknowledgement that the people of South Vietnam might welcome Thieu's removal from office—whether by elections or otherwise—and open the way for a new leader disposed to political compromise and negotiating an end to the fighting. And the Nixon administration remained unyielding in its insistence that a precondition for total American withdrawal was Hanoi's agreement to a ceasefire, not only throughout Vietnam, but in Laos and Cambodia as well.3^ ****************

It was to seek clarification of the actual negotiating position of the PRG and Hanoi, in particular the 7 Points, that my wife and I went to North Vietnam on August 6, 1971. Following research in South Vietnam on the ongoing election campaign, we flew via Vientiane to Hanoi. There from August 7 to August 13 we had a series of discussions with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, Colonel Ha Van Lau (who monitored negotiations for him), and with the PRG's delegation to Hanoi. Thanks especially to Ha Van Lau's great patience (our sessions with him totalled six hours) we developed a much clearer understanding of the PRG's 7 Points and of the PRG/DRV negotiating position in general.3^ From these discussions it readily became clear that the Nixon Administration had been seriously misrepresenting the PRG/DRV position to the US Congress and public, and it was evident that the 7 Points represented a willingness to go a considerable distance toward meeting US requirements. It was not an unbending rigid 33

Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 97-98. ^ While Hanoi probably had sufficient influence to promote a ceasefire in Laos, it is highly doubtful it could have done so in Cambodia. 35 Successive drafts, typed up from my wife's shorthand notes, were given to Ha Van Lau for his scrutiny and comments. His penciled comments on the first draft formed the basis of our second round of discussions and led to a second draft, which with a few additional clarifying notations from him constituted a final draft approved by him and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, with whom we also discussed it.

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stance, but allowed for considerable flexibility, a range of possibilities, and margin for interpretation on a number of central points—which could be worked out in negotiations. The 7 Points were, then, to be regarded, just as Kissinger had privately acknowledged the antecedent 9 Points to be: "a negotiating document," with the United States "invited to make counterproposals," and "not as a set of peremptory demands."36 Our talks focused primarily on those elements in the 7 Points that seemed most ambiguous and in need of further explanation. The most significant of the clarifications follow. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from Ha Van Lau, as approved by Pham Van Dong. Not in quotes are my own syntheses of their statements from notes that ran seven single-spaced typewritten pages. The first paragraph of Point One described "a matter of principle"; thus, "stopping the policy of Vietnamization of the war" and withdrawal of all US troops were matters of principle and not "a prerequisite condition," and "it does not mean that we have to solve all these problems [in Point One] first of all and after that solve the problem of cease-fire and the problem of prisoners." Points One and Two were the "basic points." "That means the military problem, the question of US troop withdrawal, and the question of power in South Vietnam are of key importance in the whole 7 Points." "If Points One and Two can be settled we think that the other points can be easily solved." Points One and Two were interdependent; thus, implementation of Point One could not be undertaken separable from and prior to agreement on Point Two—the question of power in South Vietnam...." However, "discussion of these two fundamental points can proceed separately." Although it was suggested that the terminal date for the withdrawal of US troops should be by the end of 1971, the date was flexible; "the Nixon administration can give its own idea on that." Both sides could together work out the modalities on this. The withdrawal of the troops of the US and its foreign allies and the release of all prisoners—military as well as civilian—had to be carried out concurrently, with "the two operations starting and ending on the same date in equal proportions." "The three-segment government of national concord" referred to in para. A of Point Two is consonant with the 8-Point proposal advanced by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh in September 1970, the three components being the PRG, "the Saigon administration without Nguyen Van Thieu," with a "third component composed of people of different political tendencies and different religions, including those who for political reasons have to live abroad, who support peace, neutrality, independence and democracy—in other words those who do not engage in the present Saigon administration and do not engage in the PRG. Regarding the percentages of these three components it is up to the different forces to discuss and agree on this." There had to be effective measures against political reprisals, all the more so because the Nixon administration had used its "bloodbath" argument as an excuse for avoiding a negotiated settlement. Among the ways of insuring against political reprisals would be international supervision. "We have no fixed formula to offer regarding this but are prepared to sit down with the United States and discuss the possibilities for this," as well as "the concrete details about organization, duty, competence, etc." with respect to international guarantee of any negotiated settlement 36

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1023.

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that was reached. As to the major powers that might appropriately participate in providing an international guarantee of a settlement, Pham Van Dong singled out only Japan as being unacceptable.^7 The PRG's representative in Hanoi, Nguyen Phu Soai, was in accord with the foregoing analysis and interpretation of the 7 Points given by Ha Van Lau, as approved by Pham Van Dong. He did, however—as had the PRG foreign minister, Madame Binh—give greater emphasis to the question of the release of military and civilian prisoners, noting that after a first bilateral cease-fire between the US and the PRG/Hanoi forces, there would be "a second cease-fire" between Saigon's forces and the "people's liberation forces" (embracing the troops of both the PRG and Hanoi). With respect to prisoners, "we cannot make a distinction between the Nixon administration and the puppet regime of South Vietnam." It had to be remembered, he emphasized, that the US in capturing both PRG soldiers and civilians had simply turned most of them over to Thieu's government for custody. Consequently, the US could not simply wash its hands of them and escape responsibility for their release. All civilians "captured and put in jail by the US administration and its puppet [Thieu] regime have to be set free.... Civilians here include political prisoners." Both the Hanoi and PRG spokesmen emphasized that progress towards none of the 7 Points could be made, nor any negotiated solution of the war reached, while Nguyen Van Thieu's regime held power in Saigon. If the US stopped supporting him he would fall of his own weight, and such an American disengagement would provide the clearest evidence that the Nixon administration was desirous of negotiating an end of the war. Hanoi and the PRG both assumed that, if the administration wanted this, it would seize on the upcoming October election in South Vietnam as the most acceptable means of insuring Thieu's removal. ****************

Following trips to Vietnam over the previous five years I had regularly discussed my impressions with Senator William Fulbright, and this time, since I had further research to do in Southeast Asia before returning to the US, as soon as possible after departing from Hanoi my wife and I prepared and airmailed him a carefully written six-page memorandum analyzing Hanoi's official interpretation of the 7-Point proposal and asking that he utilize the information in whatever way he thought was in the national interest. He conveyed it directly to the senior State Department officials through whom Kissinger worked on Vietnam, William Porter and Marshall Green. (Nixon and Kissinger had effectively cut Secretary of State Rogers out of Vietnam policy.) Confident that Fulbright would make as good use of our memorandum as he could, we remained on in Southeast Asia. And there on September 28 we read Joseph Kraft's column in the International New York Herald Tribune (published concurrently 37

Bitterness against Japan stemmed not only from its current role as the "logistical base" for American forces in Vietnam, but also because of the harshness of its World War II occupation of Vietnam. Thus, Pham Van Dong stated: 'The Vietnamese people in particular never forget the crimes committed by the Japanese militarists. In 1945 over two million Vietnamese died of starvation [during the Japanese occupation]. After the end of World War II the Japanese did not speak about the question of war reparations [with us], but they actually gave reparations to the Saigon administration"; and Nixon "declares openly that he wants Japan to play a military role in Southeast Asia. So it is impossible to think of a role for Japan in the international guarantee."

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in the Washington Post and some 200 other newspapers) and learned one way in which the Nixon Administration dealt with unwelcome facts. Parts of our memorandum had been distorted and selectively leaked by the State Department in what Kraft described as a report "here revealed for the first time." The extent of this deception was such that he was able to state that the report indicated that Hanoi was "still not disposed to come to terms," and that despite my "dovish inclination" I had been unable to obscure "Hanoi's extremely tough stance," including its demand that the United States "overthrow" Thieu as a condition for release of US prisoners—no mention at all that Thieu could be replaced through elections.3** My own experience was, of course, only one of many instances where the Nixon administration was able to screen out realities that did not accord with the Vietnamese picture it wished to portray to Americans. I cite it not simply because in this instance I can speak from first-hand knowledge, but primarily because the incident throws light on what I believe was an important but little-appreciated opportunity for ending US intervention in a way that would probably have been acceptable to most Americans and been clearly beneficial to them and the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people. For Nixon and Kissinger, however, the formula advanced in the PRG's 7 Points spelled a loss of American control of South Vietnam and unpredictable political consequences there; and it risked alienation of proponents of American intervention, including voters in the American South where Nixon's new base of political strength was now under siege by George Wallace. Nixon and Kissinger wanted to blunt the strong and growing criticism of Thieu by the now broadly based American antiwar movement through endowing him with the greater legitimacy that might come with winning an election against a credible opposition. In any case, the election had to be held, for it had long been scheduled by the same law which in 1967 had governed Thieu's election—flawed as it was by fraud and intimidation.39 Having largely 38

Washington Post, September 28,1971. Some of the fraud and intimidation in the 1967 elections was reported by American and other correspondents in Vietnam. For several years I engaged in a persistent, but ultimately fruitless effort to get the US Department of State to explain the gross disparities in the vote count for the total for all districts and that for all provinces (which, of course, should have been exactly the same). When later in Saigon (July 29,1971), I raised this matter with Nguyen Thanh Vinh, who at the time of the 1967 elections had been head of the Constituent Assembly's Election Committee, he told me that the district level election returns in the presidential elections had never been provided to his committee despite its efforts to obtain them, and that he assumed that this was because of this difference between the totals for districts and provinces. He said that because "hard and clear evidence" showed that the reports from at least 2,539 (out of a total of 8,959) polling places, affecting 1,415,010 votes, did not conform to regulations, his committee had voted 16 to 2 to invalidate the elections. Reports from additional polling places representing another 280,548 looked "suspicious," but could not be checked out. The irregularities noted by his committee were based only on the actual documents submitted to them, and they were convinced these represented "only a small proportion" of the irregularities. (Those reported did not include reports from poll-watchers asserting forgeries.) He stated that the committee was ultimately prevailed upon to change its 16-2 vote against validation to one validating it because of pressure from the American embassy and inducements and intimidation by the Ky-Thieu government. Members of the Assembly were offered from one to ten million piasters to change their vote. Those who resisted such inducei$ents and were of military age were threatened with being drafted into the army or if older having their sons drafted. In addition, Ky's hatchet man, General Loan, had the Assembly surrounded by troops during its deliberations and refused to permit the committee to secure additional data it needed from outside. 39

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written that law themselves, American officials had in a sense been hoisted by their own petard, and had to go along with the election mandated to take place at the end of the four-year term that Thieu was about to complete.40 For its American audience the Nixon administration publicly endorsed the upcoming election; for it was confident it could marshall the means to keep Thieu in office, and his winning the election would make him appear a more legitimate leader and thereby help blunt the antiwar movement in the United States. Both of the major contenders scheduled to run against Thieu—Nguyen Cao Ky and Duong Van Minh—initially believed that the United States was serious about permitting a reasonably fair contest, each thinking he had a real chance to win despite Thieu's control of the bureaucracy and police. As in 1967, only a plurality was required to win. Ky saw his main chance in the marked rise in anti-Thieu sentiment in the armed forces following the heavy casualty rates in the Lam Son 719 and Snoul battles. In the wake of these disasters, Thieu had a special unit of his own army intelligence conduct polls on officers' attitudes. These found that after Lam Son 719 approximately 40 percent of the officer corps favored Ky as against 30 percent each for Minh and Thieu. After the subsequent bloody defeat at Snoul, 60 percent favored Ky, as against 25 percent for Minh and 15 percent for Thieu.41 The ramifications of this sentiment were not confined to officers on active duty, but extended to many of those who were province and district chiefs, with the latter especially in a position to exert considerable influence on the way votes were counted. Ky still had enough followers in military intelligence to learn the results of these polls promptly and he was consequently encouraged to press his candidacy. Though when prime minister he too had obligingly followed American orders, he now attacked Thieu for having cravenly yielded to foolish US military directives at the cost of enormous Vietnamese casualties. Retired General Duong Van Minh was initially convinced that the United States wanted a genuine electoral contest and felt he stood a good chance of outpolling both Thieu and Ky. He still enjoyed some support within the military, where his record was regarded as relatively free of corruption. But much more important, he was widely viewed as the peace candidate, and could thus expect wide backing in any reasonably fair election. Minh's candidacy was believed to have been an important consideration in the PRG's drafting of its 7-Point proposal of July 1, for by his earlier record he had established himself as a leader who was prepared to negotiate with the NLF. Indeed, in early 1964, some three months after he had led the US-backed coup against Diem, he had been ousted as prime minister in a coup engineered by General Paul Harkins and his backers in the Pentagon—not only because he opposed US plans to bomb the North and increase the number of American advisers in the South, but also because it had been learned that he favored exploring the possibility for a 40

This irony is nicely captured in Kissinger's memoir: 'The Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, promulgated in April 1967 and drafted with American advice and assistance, bestowed on South Vietnam the blessing of a four year presidential term.... Thus at a crucial point.... an event imposed on Vietnam essentially by American choice turned into a new source of turmoil and uncertainty." Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1032. 41 The results of these estimates were leaked to the American embassy and some of the better connected American journalists in Saigon.

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negotiated settlement with the NLF.4^ As Minh emphasized to me, he continued to regard himself as "non-Communist, not anti-Communist," pointing out that the difference was important. As had been the case earlier, he enjoyed strong support from Buddhist leaders, but in addition he was now making inroads into Catholic voting strength that had earlier been assumed would automatically favor Thieu.4^ Because of his views and his popularity, Minh had been prohibited by Ky and Thieu, with US agreement, from running in the presidential election of 1967 and been exiled to Thailand.44 With the same American-drafted electoral law in place now as in 1967, Minh realized that its provisions—particularly those excluding individuals charged with being neutralists,45 or who had been dismissed from government "for disciplinary reasons"—could be immediately invoked to disbar him from running now as had been done four years before. But in the spring of 1971 he had tested the waters, found no objection from the American embassy, and understood it wanted to ensure that Thieu had competition from people who were of real prominence. So he entered the campaign. With Minh's candidacy unopposed by the embassy, the PRG and Hanoi were all the more confident that the US wanted to encourage a genuine election. They now urged NLF adherents to vote instead of boycotting the elections as many had done in 1967. Learning of this instruction, Minh was all the more encouraged to stay the course. But by late July 1971, Thieu and senior American officials had begun to worry that, despite his control over the bureaucracy and police, in a three-man race against Minh and Ky, Thieu might not be able to win a plurality. It was this fear that led him, with support from senior US officials, suddenly to add new regulations to the existing 1967 election law that would insure that Ky would be shut out of the race. Having positioned himself to exploit the protest vote among the military against what was seen as Thieu's truckling to the Americans in launching the recent Lam Son 719 and Snoul operations, Ky was now believed able to bring over a significant number of province and district chiefs who had ties with the disgruntled combat officers. In an election where much of the ballot counting would be controlled by these local officials Ky might well be able to pry loose a significant minority of those districts that would normally provide Thieu's major source of votes. Minh's voting potential, on the other hand, lay largely in less tightly controlled constituencies— 4

^ Chapter 7 of my book, Intervention, is entitled 'The Pentagon's Coup" and is devoted to US relations with Minh during the period when he was prime minister, including the American role in his removal. 4 ^ By mid-July 1971, Minh—who had previously been regarded as primarily responsible for Diem's death—scored additional points among Catholics by his well-substantiated accusation that in the 1963 revolt against Diem, it had been Thieu who was responsible for the attack against Diem's palace, in effect accusing him of responsibility for Diem's death. Thieu then came under fire from several leading Catholics and was advised by his principal Catholic adviser, Father Lam, that he was indeed in serious trouble with the Catholic community. It was this that prompted Thieu to call a press conference in mid-July in an effort to vindicate himself and place the blame for Diem's death on Minh—an effort that was by no means completely successful. 44 In defiance of Ky and Thieu, the South Vietnamese Central Election Council, with a supporting Assembly vote of 72 to 13, had ruled Minh eligible for candidacy, but it ultimately yielded to heavy pressure from these two incumbent generals and rescinded the decision. 4 ^ The actual wording of Article 10 of the election law referred to those "who work directly or indirectly for Communism or neutralism."

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especially urban—which did not constitute the main reservoir of Thieu's votes and which, in calculating his elections prospects, Thieu would regard as the most expendable. Although Ky was not credited with being able to muster more than 20 percent of the vote, his electoral support would have been mostly drawn from one of Thieu's main bastions of strength, the military and their dependents.46 Consequently in this situation Thieu saw Ky as the major threat to his electoral success and moved to outlaw his candidacy. This Thieu accomplished by pushing through amendments to the existing election law which gave him the right to decide who, if anybody, would be allowed to compete against him. The CIA, in an action that was not known to the American public, but was soon widely known in Saigon, heavily bribed a sufficient number of the members of Parliament to secure quick passage of the amended law.47 The new provisions stipulated that no candidate would be permitted to run unless he obtained written pledges of support from a minimum of forty members of the National Assembly or one hundred members of provincial or municipal councils. These pledges had to be validated by the local province chief or mayor—all Thieu appointees and directly dependent upon him for continuing in office. Thus, even if Ky or Minh were able to secure backing from the requisite number of councilors, Thieu could have their support invalidated. Encouraged by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, he now moved to prevent Ky gaining a sufficient number of backers to qualify for the election. On August 6 his hand-picked Supreme Court ruled that Ky had not obtained the requisite number of pledges and that he could not be a candidate. But at the same time Thieu released enough of the Assembly members he controlled to augment the relatively small number already pledged to Minh, so that he was able to qualify for the election. In such a two-man contest both Thieu and the embassy were confident that his control over the administrative apparatus and the police would easily insure his victory. With Ky now out of the race, Minh was understandably worried at the prospect of facing Thieu's entire state apparatus undiminished, without Ky drawing off some of the local military administrators. On the other hand, he knew that the American embassy very much wanted him to stay in the race so that an American audience could be persuaded that a genuine electoral contest was taking place. If he could get assurances from the embassy that it would pressure Thieu to permit a reasonably fair election it would seem worth his while to remain in the contest. Initially persuaded that US officials would indeed exert this pressure, he remained in the contest and found that he did enjoy broad support as the candidate who would make at least some genuine effort to end the war. That certainly was a widespread perception even among those southerners who saw him as indecisive and vacillating, and among whom the militant (An Quang) Buddhists were, despite past disappointments, still his strongest supporters.48 At the end of July some influential progressive Catholic leaders put the matter to me very clearly, and in a way that was echoed by a number of Minh's most skeptical "Third Force" supporters—whether Buddhist, Catholic, or other: ^ This was the calculation at the time of American correspondents in Saigon. See, for instance, Time, August 16,1971, p. 15. 47 See Hersh, Price of Power, p. 435. ^ This perception is based on interviews with several prominent Buddhist leaders, including Thich Tri Quang.

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The liberal Catholics are not terribly strong proponents of Minh, but they regard him as clearly preferable to either Thieu or Ky. Minh does not trust the Communists and will be uncomfortable in trying to deal with them. But he could be expected to make one small step in the direction of negotiating with them; and the NLF, recognizing his character and the sentiments of Vietnamese backing him, will probably be realistic and clever enough to take two steps towards meeting him half-way. This could lead to further steps by both sides, narrowing the gap and making possible a settlement....Madame Binh's 7 Points are widely regarded, even by Vietnamese Catholics, as more moderate and flexible than the previous NLF position.^ A prominent student leader, who was one of those most cynical about Minh and regarded him as "a tool of the Americans/7 emphasized to me that it was Minh the United States would use if it really did want "to move towards peace." Many of those who harbored doubts about Minh's decisiveness tended to be reassured by his choice of Dr. Ho Van Minh (no relative) as his running mate. Having won the largest number of votes in the Lower House election of 1967, Ho Van Minh had emerged as deputy speaker, and had earned considerable prestige for his leadership there. With strong ties to progressive Catholics because of his efforts to improve the life of Saigon slum dwellers, he was expected to help Minh garner many votes in its extensive slum districts. With these Catholics, as with the An Quang Buddhist leaders and numerous others at this time, there were three factors singled out as auguring well for the United States' guaranteeing a fair enough election for Minh to win: 1) the fact that Nixon, regarded as the leader of the anti-Communist world, had expressed his intention to go to Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese Communists signified that anti-Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese should be able to do the same with their Communist counterparts; 2) the continuing withdrawal of US military forces from Vietnam; and 3) what was widely regarded as a more reasonable and flexible position taken by the PRG in its new 7-Point program. Taken together, these factors indicated to many South Vietnamese that the US now favored a negotiated settlement and would help insure a sufficiently fair election for Minh to be elected. But despite repeated public protestations of strict neutrality in the election by the White House and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the Nixon administration had no intention of allowing such a free election. Minh's pleas to the ambassador that fair elections be guaranteed were turned aside with disingenuous remarks about the United States' unwillingness to interfere in another country's politics. The Nixon administration feared, with good reason, that if Minh replaced Thieu, the United States could no longer fully control the Saigon government which might then move down the road of negotiations with the PRG and Hanoi, with the United States cut out of the process.50 Fear of such an outcome had repeatedly influenced US policy in the past, contributing to Kennedy's authorization of the removal of Diem in 1963 and being even more decisive in the Pentagon's support of Duong Van Minh's ouster as prime minister at the end of January 1964 and the coup against Nguyen Khanh a year later. The White House view now clearly was that it was safer 49

Interview with Nguyen Dinh Dao, Saigon, July 29, 1971, with two other Catholic leaders attending. 50 See Tad Szulc, The Ilusion of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 487.

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to stay with Thieu. But the administration still wanted to clothe him with the legitimacy of winning an election against a credible opponent. Indeed from the Nixon administration's point of view the primary audience for the election was American, not Vietnamese. The administration would have to countenance widespread fraud to insure that Thieu would remain in power, but while it could not shield the South Vietnamese public from knowledge of this, there was reason to expect that most Americans would be satisfied with the simple fact that Thieu had won the election. They would not be disposed to look into the way that election was conducted, nor be aware of its possible relevance to a negotiated end of the war. Minh, though no friend of Ky, strongly criticized the way Ky had been disqualified by Thieu. Minh came into possession of a twenty-page secret memorandum Thieu had sent to his province chiefs setting forth in detail the measures they were to take to insure he won the election. This memorandum prescribed a whole range of measures, including bribery, cheating, and intimidation, which the governmental apparatus, from the provincial down through the village level, was to take so as to insure Thieu's victory.5* On August 12, shortly after Ambassador Bunker had returned from consultations in Washington, Minh presented the documents to the ambassador, demanding that the embassy publicly back his charge of election fraud and take measures to insure honest elections. After a period of stalling Bunker refused to support Minh's charge or to urge the measures he requested. For Minh and his supporters this "passive neutrality" of the US meant its acquiescence in a status quo where the deck had already been heavily stacked, and was, therefore, equivalent to strong support of Thieu. More than that, they now learned that assets of the United States Information Service in South Vietnam were being turned over to Thieu's government, ostensibly as a gesture to strengthen the Nixon administration's claim of "neutrality" in the election. The idea was that the United States could not be accused of directly employing these facilities in a way partial to Thieu, but, of course, Thieu could, and did, use them to advance his own candidacy.5^ If this cynical hypocrisy were not enough to convince Minh where the Nixon administration actually stood, his discovery that the CIA's massive Phoenix Program was now enlisted behind Thieu's election effort did. No longer were its civilian targets confined to supporters and suspected supporters of the NLF, but they now included numerous backers of Minh in rural areas who had no ties with the NLF.5^ All this made clear to Minh that he was up against the United States as well as Thieu's own administration and police apparatus. In the face of such a hopeless situation, Minh announced his withdrawal from the election on August 20. Bunker offered him substantial funds—later reported to be $3 million—to remain in the contest,54 both the ambassador and Thieu confident that such a large bribe would induce him to stay the course. When it didn't, a desperate Bunker—undoubtedly on instructions from Washington—prevailed upon Thieu to order his Supreme Court to reverse its decision on Ky and declare that, upon further 51

See Hersh, Price of Power, p. 437. 52 Several middle-rank US employees—themselves astonished and outraged at this chicanery—informed the writer of this shifting of USIA assets. 53 Hersh, Price of Power, p. 435. 54 See The Washington Post, May 28,1978; Hersh, Price of Power, p. 437; and Frank Snepp, Decent Interval, p. 11.

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study and new evidence, he had been found eligible to run after all.55 Whether or not Ky was now offered a similar bribe, he was presumably wealthy enough to overlook $3 million. Power he did want, but with the cards now so heavily stacked in Thieu's favor he had little inducement to take part in the election. On August 23, just two days after Thieu's Supreme Court had reinstated him, Ky announced his rejection of its new decision. With no one to run against, Thieu now complacently announced that the South Vietnamese could still exercise electoral choice and would now be called upon to participate in a plebiscite—a sort of vote of confidence in his government. When the ballotting took place on October 3, a Thieu ballot was the only one available. Those desirous of casting a negative vote could do so only by defacing or tearing that ballot. Since such actions had previously been declared illegal, and were difficult to carry out without being noticed by the poll watchers, few voters were inclined to risk this dangerous route of protest. The "official" count of the election gave Thieu 94.3 percent of the "valid votes"—many more than embassy officials thought it wise to claim. What had been lost was not only the opportunity for a free election and a peaceful assertion of self-determination. Lost, too, was a means for ending a war now destined to endure for four more years. ****************

Why did Nixon and Kissinger pass up this opportunity? It is not sufficient to point to their lack of good intelligence on Vietnam (or more accurately their welldeveloped a priori prejudices in selecting from the broad body of information available to them) or to their apparent lack of humanitarian concern for the continuing casualties being sustained by Vietnamese and Americans. However valid, these factors are too amorphous and subjective to assess. But two other matters clearly did weigh very heavily on their scales of calculation. First was Nixon's and Kissinger's exaggerated expectations as to the efficacy of their new China card vis-a-vis the outcome in Vietnam. After having in vain attempted during its first year in office to enlist Soviet influence to end the Vietnam conflict on US terms,5^ the Nixon administration by the end of February 1970 had reason to believe that by working through China it might be more successful. Later, with plans under way for Nixon's unheralded visit to Beijing (which came as a stunning shock to the Vietnamese), he and Kissinger had become confident that through Mao's government they could secure the needed leverage on Hanoi and the PRG. As early as February 22, 1970, Beijing had secretly assured Nixon that "China had no intention of entering the Vietnam war, or for that matter of attacking any other vital American interest.... The road to Peking," Kissinger writes, "was open if we were 55 See Hersh, Price of Power, p. 438. Bunker himself, it should be noted, was strongly opposed to having Thieu run unopposed. See Szulc, Illusion of Peace, p. 491. 56 Kissinger writes: "On about ten occasions in 1969 in my monthly meetings with Drobynin [Soviet Ambassador to Washington] I tried to enlist Soviet cooperation to help end the war in Vietnam." Neither his efforts nor Nixon's with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexei Kosygin, he states, were successful. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 144. In their first foreign policy report to Congress, February 18,1970, he and Nixon acknowledged publicly the failure of Moscow to help reach a settlement in Vietnam. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 254.

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prepared to travel it with skill and delicacy/'57 The Lam Son 719 invasion of Laos temporarily slowed the process of Sino-American rapprochement, but Nixon was apparently successful in convincing Beijing that the action was not directed against China.58 As Luu Doan Huynh observes, news of Kissinger's secret visit to China and Nixon's plans for visiting Beijing, coming so soon after publication of the PRG's 7Point proposal, seriously undercut its impact on the American public.59 The spotlight on China diverted American public attention away from Vietnam and made it much easier for the Nixon administration to ignore the strong supportive domestic public interest initially elicited by the announcement of the PRG's 7 Points. In November 1971, Mao Zedong is reported to have urged Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to accept a compromise with the United States.^ Luu Doan Huynh states that this "compromise" extended to Mao's admonition to Pham Van Dong that Thieu should be kept in office and negotiated with.**1 Although this growing tacit Chinese diplomatic support understandably increased the disposition of Nixon and Kissinger to believe their negotiating position vis-a-vis Hanoi had strengthened, there is no indication that this actually was the case. Among Hanoi's leaders there was simmering non-public outrage at China's new stance, but they made no further concessions to the American position, and as Prime Minister Pham Van Dong forcefully emphasized to me: "One does not go to China to solve the problem of Vietnam."62^ It should be noted that, despite this major shift in China's diplomatic stance, there was apparently no decline in the flow of Chinese food, oil, and war materiel into Vietnam.63 Nor did the supply of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and other sophisticated arms diminish. But probably at least as important as the China factor in inhibiting the Nixon administration's willingness to enter into negotiations on the basis of the PRG's 7 Points was the same consideration that had kept the Johnson administration from accepting free elections as the doorway to a negotiated settlement: the well-founded fear that such an exercise in self-determination would lead to a loss of American control over South Vietnamese politics and the character of the Saigon government. American-designed elections such as those in 1967 that had helped position Thieu and Ky in power were safe and acceptable. But genuinely free elections could easily yield a government that would negotiate an armistice and political settlement with the PRG, with the US being put in the humiliating position of being asked to leave. Such an outcome would not merely expose Nixon and Kissinger (and officials who 57

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 689. Ibid., p. 706. ^ Statement of Luu Doan Huynh at the Hanoi conference on the History of the Vietnam War, November 1988. 60 Hersh, Price of Power, p. 442. See also Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 255. ™ Statement of Luu Doan Huynh at the Hanoi Conference. 62 The author's discussion with Pham Van Dong, Hanoi, August 13,1971. 63 This was attested to by officials in Hanoi and was evident to me when I returned to North Vietnam in September 1972. At that time nearly all of the hundreds of trucks I saw on the roads between Hanoi and the China border were of Chinese make, and oil and gasoline pipelines had been built across the border deep into Vietnam. (Fuller accounts of my trip may be found in articles in the Washington Star of October 22, 1972, and The Washington Post [George Wilson] of October 20,1972.) 58

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had constructed previous American policy) to charges of failure and responsibility for a needless hemorrhaging of American and Vietnamese blood. It could also easily provoke a political backlash on the right of the political spectrum in the United States, especially within the relatively hawkish southern constituency which Nixon in competition with George Wallace was courting for the 1972 elections. An American president whose initial rise to political office in the 1950s owed so much to his exploitation of the fraudulent "loss of China to the Communists" issue could not help being sensitive to the prospect of exposure to attacks by political opponents, such as Wallace, charging him with the loss of South Vietnam to Communist dominance. That risk and any realistic steps towards negotiating an end to the war Nixon would not countenance at least until the American presidential election of November 1972 was behind him.64 64

Even with the signing of the Paris agreements Nixon was privately retaining the option of infusing a massive injection of American airpower to bolster Thieu (as had been the case with Hanoi's 1972 spring offensive) should he again be threatened by a major Communist offensive. Had it not been for Watergate's dramatic erosion of Nixon's power he might have exercised that option, despite Congressional and public opposition, and kept the war going much longer.

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APPENDIX TEXT OF THE PRG 7-POINT PLAN1

1. Regarding the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces. The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of //Vietnamization// of the war, withdraw from South Vietnam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, without posing any condition whatsoever. The government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp. If the U.S. government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities: A) Of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp. B) Of the release of the totality of military men of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes. These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date. A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation armed forces and the armed forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp. 2. Regarding the question of power in South Vietnam. The U.S. government must really respect the South Vietnam people's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, cease backing the bellicose group led by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu. By various means, the political, social and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace and national concord will form in Saigon a new administration declaring itself for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional 1

This translation was checked for accuracy with the PRG mission in Hanoi in August 1971.

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Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will immediately enter into talks with that administration to settle the following questions: A) To form a broad three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and will organize general elections in South Vietnam. A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation armed forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord is formed. B) To take concrete measures with the required guarantees so as to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party, to ensure every democratic liberty to the South Vietnam people; to release all persons jailed for political reasons, to dissolve the concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their occupations. C) To see that the people's conditions of living are stabilized and gradually improved, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country. D) To agree on measures to be taken to enable the holding of genuinely free, democratic and fair general elections in South Vietnam. 3. Regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam in a spirit of national concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation and with a view to making lighter the people's contributions. 4. Regarding the peaceful reunification of Vietnam and the relations between the North and the South zones. A) The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without constraint or annexation by either party, without foreign interference. Pending the reunification of the country, the North and the South zones will reestablish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence, and will maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interests and mutual assistance. All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people in the two zones on the basis of negotiations, without foreign interference.

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B) In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, in the present temporary partition of the country into two zones, the North and the South zones of Vietnam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, from allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil, and from recognizing the protection of any country, of any military alliance or bloc whatever. 5. Regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Vietnam. South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, will establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, accept the cooperation of foreign countries in the exploitation of the resources of South Vietnam, accept from any country economic and technical aid without political conditions attached, and participate in regional plans of economic cooperation. On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Vietnam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic and cultural fields. 6. Regarding the damages caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones. The U.S. government must bear full responsibility for the losses and the destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones. 7. Regarding the respect and the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded. The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

CHINA'S ROLE IN THE VIETNAM WAR Allen Whiting

hina's role in the war was treated very differently from other topics at the conference. I did not prepare a paper, having already written on this topic in my book, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence.1 However, in lieu of a paper, the relevant chapter from this book was submitted to invite refutation or confirmation from the Vietnamese participants. Its information came mainly from my years as director of the Office of Research and Analysis, Far East, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (1962-66). Although classified sources provided direct and indirect indicators of Chinese involvement, such information was subject to error as were the inferences derived therefrom. Reciprocally no Vietnamese paper was tabled on the subject, ostensibly because the appropriate specialist had been ill and unable to meet the deadline. Fortunately he was in good health throughout the meeting and read prepared remarks that expressed both agreement and disagreement with my manuscript. However not all points were addressed, leaving unclear whether silence signaled acceptance of my analysis or resulted from the lack of time in oral presentation. Therefore the following summary of discussion will first focus on the specific items mentioned at the table or thereafter in informal conversation. Mention will follow of those points which failed to elicit Vietnamese reaction.

C

MY ORAL PRESENTATION

A brief summary recapitulated my manuscript and offered supplementary remarks to elicit reactions. Speaking "as an historian" I raised three questions: (1) what did China promise to do in the war, (2) when did this promise occur, and (3) what did China actually do. Then "as a political scientist" I asked: why did the Chinese make their decisions and what impact did the Sino-Soviet dispute have on them? Virtually all questions were answered to some degree, with surprising candor on the more sensitive issues. I also juxtaposed "fact against inference," assuming that intelligence had been accurate on the former but that analysis was susceptible to error on the latter and could be corrected by the Vietnamese. Thus the fact that MIG fighters appeared in North Vietnam within a week of the American attack on naval bases in retaliation for the alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 4,1964 led to our inference that China 1

Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

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had trained Vietnamese pilots in advance.2 A further inference held that Hanoi and Beijing had preplanned their joint response to US escalation which had been threatened by the Johnson administration for several months. Likewise, the fact that a joint radar grid linked North Vietnam with southern China by early 1965 supported the inference that a joint air defense had been agreed upon.3 This inference was strengthened by the fact of joint air exercises over North Vietnam in January 1965. Further support for inferring a joint air defense lay in Chinese airfield construction and aircraft deployment.4 In late 1964 US reconnaissance identified a fighter base being built within twelve miles of the railroad junction at the Sino-Vietnamese border. This logically would provide advance air cover rather than defend Chinese soil, for which purpose it would have to have been located well back from attacking aircraft. Another new airfield appeared adjoining an existing one further west. Its only logical purpose appeared to be to serve another airforce, i.e. Vietnamese, that required separate runways under a different language controller but could be supported by present facilities.5 Last but not least, Beijing concentrated its most advanced fighter planes in the southern region adjoining Vietnam in rapid redeployment from other parts of China. Yet despite these indicators, no Chinese air defense occurred over North Vietnam as US bombing steadily progressed northward, latitude by latitude. Then beginning in late 1965, People's Liberation Army (PLA) anti-aircraft batteries defended roads and railroads between Hanoi and the border.** This raised three alternative explanations of the initial indicators: (1) China had agreed to provide air cover but reneged, (2) China had made preparations for action that would be agreed upon at a later date, depending upon US actions, and (3) China had attempted to bluff the US out of bombing the North. These remarks addressed the three periods of Chinese involvement: August 1964 to February 1965, when Beijing alone backed Hanoi with military assistance while Moscow stood aside; September 1965 to mid-1968, when Beijing deployed ground forces to North Vietnam; and mid-1968 through 1973 when China only furnished weapons up to and including mortars, more sophisticated materials coming from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In conclusion, to provoke discussion I deliberately overstated the Chinese role by declaring that "China did much more for Vietnam than it did for Korea in that war/' I justified this assertion by pointing out how the stationing of uniformed PLA units, identifiable by communications as well as photographic intelligence, deterred an American invasion, whereas the failure to preposition troops in North Korea before the American advance to the Yalu River left Chinese verbal warnings subject to dismissal as mere bluff.7 2

Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., p. 177. 4 Ibid., p. 176. 3

5 6

Ibid., pp. 177-78.

Ibid., p. 186. 7 Ibid., p. 212.

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VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF CHINA'S SUPPORT

Luu Doan Huynh read his critique of my manuscript while additional remarks came from General Hoang Phuong, General Cao Pha, and Colonel Tran Buoi. After the formal conference sessions, the Vietnamese also chatted informally with me, amplifying statements made at the table. All agreed that China's support had been important in delaying US escalation and deterring an American invasion. At the same time, they held that this support fell far short of what had been originally promised and was irrelevant to both the damage from air attack in the North and ultimate victory in the South. On the negative side, the harshest criticism arose over China's failure to provide air cover for North Vietnam as allegedly promised in 1964. Luu Doan Huynh declared that in June 1965 Beijing informed Hanoi it would be unable to defend the North against US air attacks.** As a result, "Bombs were raining on our heads." Luu Doan Huynh explained this change of Chinese policy as resulting from "compromise" between Beijing and Washington whereby both sought to avoid another Korean War. In his words, "the US was more careful and China was more experienced than in Korea." Therefore "Mr. Whiting is a bit unbalanced to say that China did more for Vietnam than for Korea." Luu Doan Huynh claimed that "numerous signals from China" communicated Mao's desire to support the war without risking direct conflict with the US. This allowed Washington to bomb the North and put troops in the South. So long as it did not bomb China it need not fear Beijing's entering the battle. According to this analysis, Mao saw the war as facilitating the Cultural Revolution and the elimination of his domestic opponents, and completing his break with Moscow. But to achieve these aims, it was essential to avoid war with the United States. On the positive side, Luu Doan Huynh declared that Chinese anti-aircraft units defended Vietnamese targets near the border so as "to demonstrate to Chinese and Vietnamese that China would support the Vietnamese war of resistance and to act as deterrence against attempts by US troops to invade North Vietnam." He pointed out that "China implied it would send troops and that it considered North Vietnam in its zone of influence and security as early as September 1965." This, in turn, meant that "the US had to be careful in escalating the war and this did benefit Vietnam. The US did not have a free hand." In an interesting aside on conflicting perceptions, Luu Doan Huynh recalled how Chinese signals were read differently in Hanoi and Washington. Thus after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Beijing said, "aggression against Vietnam is aggression against China." From the Vietnamese perspective, "aggression may cover both bombing and invasion." But later China changed its warning to "invasion" instead of "aggression," so "we thought they are dropping us. But you Americans had to think two, three, or even four times [to figure it out] so we benefitted...These were dangerous details." 8 For an earlier reference to this agreement and its breakdown, see Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987), p. 328. The timing probably reflected the result of a policy dispute in Beijing. In May 1965, Lo Ruiqing, PLA chief of staff, published a uniquely systematic strategic analysis which argued for "forward defense" against an unnamed enemy and seemed to call for joint Sino-Soviet help to Vietnam. Lo fell from power shortly thereafter and in September Lin Biao issued his lengthy creed on "people's war," with guerrilla forces as the main focus.

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General Cao Pha stated the positive case more fully. "We can say that the assistance given to Vietnam by the people of China was great/7 He noted that, after the French defeat, Hanoi wanted to modernize its army and help came from "the socialist countries, including China. We sent people to be trained in the air force.... After the Gulf of Tonkin our air force units in China returned to the country." Furthermore "to show support, China did send some engineering, road-building, and anti-aircraft units. But the air defense units only operated in the area north of the Red River to defend Chinese road-building units. Actually they did not operate on a large scale." Finally, "China did build airfields near the Vietnamese border but we did not use them because we had our own fields,^ some photographed by the US and some not. Our planes were hidden." Colonel Tran Buoi amplified on General Cao Pha's comment, noting the transfer of MIG-17 and MIG-19 fighters from China in addition to the training of pilots and the provision of anti-aircraft units. However he differed with my estimate of 50,000 PLA troops in the North,10 claiming that "they numbered something around 20,000." Speaking later about the anti-aircraft units, Luu Doan Huynh remarked, "They ran heavy casualties during the first month because they refused to take the necessary precautions. They said, 'We're not afraid of the American planes/ They were wearing white shirts and out in the open. We told them this was dangerous and eventually they adopted camouflage and dispersal to reduce the casualties." General Huong Phuong concluded the discussion by asserting that Chinese support was necessary to win Third World approval and to further national liberation movements. In addition China wanted to draw Vietnam into its orbit while using it as a buffer zone to protect China. ANOMALIES AND OMISSIONS

Despite the unprecedented frankness of Vietnamese comment concerning Chinese aid, certain anomalies and omissions continue to leave the record somewhat confused. According to all the participants, anti-aircraft and railroad engineering assistance was limited to the area between Hanoi and the Sino-Vietnamese border so as to keep open the supply routes from China and the Soviet Union. However, graves of Chinese troops reportedly exist far south of this area.11 In addition, aside from Luu Doan Huynh's reference to "heavy casualties" during the first month of deployment, no total figures for Chinese losses were given.1^ Another ambiguity lay in the assertion that Vietnamese planes "did not use airfields in China." It was unclear whether this referred solely to entry and exit from combat over Vietnam13 or for repair and refuge from attack. While the former raised the question of "hot pursuit" which Washington had claimed would remove the sanctuary that had existed in the Korean War, the latter was technically permissible, 9

Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 186. Ibid. 11 A Vietnamese News Agency dispatch of April 12,1989, claimed the Chinese embassy staff was to visit "the tombs of Chinese internationalists who died in Vietnam and whose remains had been reburied at Bat Bat (Hanoi) and Quang Trach (Binh Tri Thien province)," the latter being well below Hanoi. I am indebted to Mrs. Dorothy Avery for this information. ^ A post-war reference from Beijing alluded to 1,000 Chinese bodies remaining in Vietnam. 13 Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, pp. 180-61. 10

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provided the planes had touched down on Vietnamese bases before and after combat. Intelligence on the combat use of Chinese bases was fragmentary, occurring only twice in late 1967. However, it was repeatedly confirmed with respect to repair and refuge usage over an extended period of time. To avoid forcing the "hot pursuit" issue by compelling combat use of China, American planes deliberately left one Vietnamese base free of attack while rotating this "sanctuary" throughout 1965-1967. Conspicuously absent from the Vietnamese presentation was any reference to a large base complex at Yen Bai, northwest of Hanoi, that was constructed and defended by a sizeable Chinese forced With nearly 200 buildings, a large runway, and anti-aircraft guns revetted into caves on railroad tracks, the redoubt came under repeated American attack by bombing, strafing, and napalm. It could have served Hanoi in retreat from an American invasion, or Beijing in the event it had to intervene massively against such a threat. It provided the most credible evidence of Chinese commitment to the ultimate defense of North Vietnam, action which Beijing had failed to take in Korea prior to the UN crossing of the 38th parallel in October 1950. The actual number of Chinese troops involved was not negligible even by the Vietnamese account. Moreover it is unlikely that the cumulative total only reached the stated figure of 20,000. It is more likely that that figure represented the peak presence at any one time. No information was given on the exact timing of PLA deployments, their pace of increase, and their periodic rotation and replacement. Nor was any mention made of PLA activity in Nam Tha and Phong Saly provinces in Laos where road building connected Yunnan with logistical routes into Thailand as well as Vietnam via Laos.^ Finally no details were offered on Sino-Vietnamese negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Chinese forces in mid-1968 after President Johnson de-escalated bombing the North and offered to negotiate at Paris. IN CONCLUSION

Prior to the conference, all public commentary from Hanoi had focused exclusively on allegations of Chinese perfidy and political betrayal with no reference to any beneficial behavior. The new approach was particularly striking, given the clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces in the Nansha or Spratly Islands in March 1988. Although a relatively minor incident, it did result in the loss of two Vietnamese frigates with numerous casualties and underscored Beijing's claim to an important area of the South China Sea where Hanoi has an equally adamant claim. Moreover, the clash seemed to have been begun by the Chinese. Yet it did not inhibit the discussion nor was it even raised. The repeated acknowledgement of Chinese aid in the war, albeit defined as serving China's interests and including a breach of promise on providing air cover, may have been deliberately timed to signal interest in improving Sino-Vietnamese relations. It could be assumed that such acknowledgement would eventually be communicated publicly by the American side, as indeed occurred.16 With Beijing 14 15

Ibid., p. 188. Ibid., p. 194.

^ Allen S. Whiting, "Remembering the Past as a Way to a Better Future," Far Eastern Economic

Review, December 29,1988, p. 28.

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and Moscow moving toward final detente through the scheduled visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Beijing in 1989, it behooved Hanoi to start mending its fences with Beijing. One step in this process could be revision of the wartime record with a more favorable depiction of China's contribution. Whatever the motivation, the consequence of the Vietnamese candor in discussing China's role in the war was to confirm the American intelligence analysis of the time. This analysis had played an important part in Washington's decision not to invade North Vietnam.1'7 It erred in forecasting Chinese air cover but it was correct in inferring initial agreement on this contingency as evidenced by the joint radar grid, joint air exercises, and airfield construction in south China. The Vietnamese participants proved that the fault lay in Beijing's change of policy, not in our interpretation of its initial behavior. Likewise, the Vietnamese participants acknowledged the deterrent role of PLA forces in the North. Beijing never publicly revealed their presence there, much less their anti-aircraft combat role. This failure to claim credit for the sacrifices and risks incurred thereby contrasted with the attention given to Soviet military support, particularly the surface-to-air missile units. This discredited Beijing's claim of militancy in the "struggle against US imperialism" and raised questions concerning the justification for American restraint in Washington's conduct of the war, both at the time and subsequently. Seen in this larger perspective, the Vietnamese acknowledgement of Chinese participation in defense of the North and in deterrence of an American invasion is of greater significance than the particular details and discussion at the conference might imply. Although this falls far short of a definitive history, it represents a major contribution in clarifying how Beijing and Washington carefully calibrated their mutual engagement in the Vietnam War so as to avoid a repetition of the Korean disaster while employing military forces in active confrontation. 17

Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, pp. 194-95.

COOPERATIVIZATION, THE FAMILY

ECONOMY, AND THE NEW FAMILY IN WARTIME VIETNAM, 1960-1975* Jayne Werner

major consequence of the establishment of agricultural producer cooperatives (hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep) and the new economic policies inaugurated in northern Vietnam in the early 1960s was their implication for changes both in family production and within the family itself. Although family-based production was not considered theoretically to be an important component of socialist production until after the liberation of the South (1975), wartime production necessitated reliance on family units in order to attain the needed output. Women producers played a vital role in agricultural production during the war, both in the family and in the newly formed cooperatives. Indeed, the link between women peasant producers and agricultural production was so strong that the slogan devised by the party for women during the war was the "three capabilities" or "three responsibilities" (ba dam dang): to take care of the family, to take charge of production, and to contribute to the war effort.1 In light of the current reform process (doi moi) and the return to household production, it is instructive to go back to the wartime origins of collectivization. This cannot be done without a gender-based analysis of the wartime economy and an understanding of the political, economic, and social ties that linked women producers to cooperative structures. Current efforts to reform agriculture are being obliged to address the historical legacy of the cooperative system. The wartime economy has come under attack for its economic inefficiencies and inability to accelerate economic growth. But it is still not well understood from a cultural and sociological point of view.

A

* The research on which this paper is based was made possible in part by a post-doctoral research grant from the Social Science Research Council. It is based on research trips to Vietnam in July-August 1982 and September-October 1984, under the auspices of the Vietnam Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi. I am grateful to Le Thi Nham Tuyet and the Center for Research on Women for their suggestions and support. Parts of this paper were presented to two conferences: the Regional Conference for Asia on Women and the Household, held in New Delhi, 1985, and the SSRC Workshop on Gender in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, held at Northern Illinois University in 1986.1 am also grateful to my "Women in Development" study group and to the late Phyllis Andors, who helped shape my thinking about this topic. Thanks also to Kristin Pelzer who commented on an earlier draft. 1 See Hoi Lien Hiep Phu Nu Viet Nam, Phong Trao 3 Dam Dang [The Three Responsibilities Movement] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Phu Nu, 1966).

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In the late 1950s and early 1960s, rural families who had gone through land reform pooled their land, tools, and animals to form larger units of collective farming.2 These units were called lower-level cooperatives (hop tac xa bac thap), in which families received remuneration from the cooperative, partly on the basis of what they had contributed in land, animals, and tools. By the end of the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965), agricultural cooperatives comprising fifty to one hundred families had become the norm in the countryside. After 1965, these cooperatives came under increasing pressure to expand in size and reorganize on a "higher" level, in which all renumeration would be allocated according to labor.^ Women's work in agricultural production during the war was divided between the cooperative and what was called the "family economy" (kinh te gia dinh). At the time of collectivization, all households retained garden plots located on land contiguous to the house, where vegetables were grown and pigs and chickens raised. In the North, these plots officially averaged one sao or 360 sq. meters, although they varied greatly in size, depending on the family or the locale. In principle, household plots were supposed to take up no more than 5 percent of the total land available for cultivation by the cooperative which is why they were called "5% land" (dat phan tram) in common parlance. The size of the plots and per capita income from them differed greatly, depending on the labor and inputs allocated to them. Home-grown vegetables and animal products (eggs, meat, and manure) from the household garden were the most important sources of perishable food products for peasant consumption. The family economy was the major, and sometimes the sole, source of cash on the local level.4 It was largely managed by women, who usually decided on the disposition of its profits. While the role of the family economy and the functioning of agricultural cooperatives during the war have been questioned from a number of points of view, and although an overall analysis of cooperativization during the war has yet to be written, certain elements of women's work within the cooperatives during the war merit investigation. This is because of the light they shed on the war effort of the North, the impact of the war on the transformation of gender and age hierarchies within the family, and the impact of the family economy vis-a-vis collective agriculture on these relationships. In examining these questions, I hope to clarify related issues regarding the "efficiency" of agricultural coops, the relationship between collective and non-collective units of production, and discrepancies between the theoretical and actual operation of cooperatives. 2 See Nguyen Xuan Lai, 'The Family Economy of Cooperative Farmers," Vietnamese Studies, No. 13 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1967), for an overview of this process. 3 The author visited four cooperatives in northern Vietnam in preparing this paper—one west of Hanoi and three others in Ha Nam Ninh province. The cooperative movement in each of these began as follows: An Khanh (Hoai Due district), in 1959 the Gold Star Cooperative was formed with sixty-five households; Chau Giang (Duy Tien district), 1959; Yen Loc (Y Yen district), 1959; Ninh Son (Hoa Lu district), 1960. In these four cooperatives, "consolidation" of the lower-level cooperatives occurred at different times. The higher-level coop in An Khanh was not established until 1976 (out of five lower-level coops). In Chau Giang, the higher-level coop was formed in 1966; in Yen Loc it was formed in 1976, from four coops; in Ninh Son, the Hung Dao higher-level cooperative was formed in 1966, from seven smaller cooperatives. 4 Nguyen Xuan Lai, 'The Family Economy." It should be noted that the concept of the "family economy" extends beyond the private plot. It can also include income from handicrafts at home. In the 1980s, the concept also encompassed income from the sale of produce from marginal tracts of land, ditches, and hillsides often located far from the household plot.

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THE SOCIALIST WARTIME ECONOMY

A gender-based analysis is essential to understanding the economy of wartime in northern Vietnam, both because women were the primary producers during the war, and because of their importance in both the collective and family economies. Such an analysis, however, has been lacking in both the orthodox Vietnamese development literature and among Western economists studying the wartime period. In Vietnamese Marxist economic thinking, orthodox theories of economic growth have stressed large-scale socialist development. In theory, collective production was supposed to be the leading element in economic production, and to provide the basis for surplus accumulation for heavy industry. Collective agriculture was to meant to contribute to this goal, as well as furnish the bulk of the grain for rural/urban/state consumption needs. Agricultural collectivization was also meant to play a social transformative role. In the countryside, collectivization alone was deemed capable of transforming rural society into socialist institutions.5 This scenario ignored any analysis based on gender. Women's liberation was perceived as an outgrowth of socialism but not central to its achievement. In fact, Vietnamese economic thinking has considered the role of women in development as a marginal category to the main business of economic growth, be it through orthodox or reform strategies.^ Theoretically, women's work was subsumed under the relationship between the "family economy" and the collective economy.^ In initial Vietnamese economic development theory, the family economy was considered to be a "sideline" or "individual" economy (kinh te phu gia dinh or phu ca nhan). Phu is also translated as "minor." It was not deemed capable of having its own economic viability and was viewed as an adjunct to the collective economy. Cooperatives were to provide basic food sufficiency. The household economy comprised only 5 percent of the total arable land. Arithmetically, the household economy could only supplement the main arena of production. The types of farming techniques used on household plots consisted of age-old and possibly outdated cultivation methods. This economic theory considered that it was on collective fields that technical improvements would occur as household plots were too small to benefit from the application of technology. Accordingly, income and food obtained from the household plot were expected to diminish as advances toward large-scale and specialized agriculture occurred. The cultivation of vegetables and the rearing of livestock would either be mechanized or taken over by specialized cooperatives, with the garden plot eventually superseded by collective agriculture.8 Insofar as the garden plot was valued or preferred by peasant farmers, this was indicative of a "small-scale peasant mentality." This mentality and attachment to the 5 Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards Large-Scale Socialist Agriculture (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975). 6 Ibid. ^ Melanie Beresford succinctly discusses the Marxist debates on this topic in the chapter, "Household and Collective in Vietnamese Agriculture," in her book, National Unification and 8Economic Development in Vietnam (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 130-61.

ibid.

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private plot would diminish as soon as large-scale farming was instituted and its / benefits became clear.9 There were, of course, historical and political prejudices against the family economy. Household plots were considered, at best, as an atavism of the pre-liberation farming system and, at worst, as an incipient form of capitalism. The household economy was seen as representative of the "small-peasant economy" (kinh te tieu nong), and thus, equivalent to private production. This form of production was inherently dangerous, as it was unstable economically and, if not stopped, would inexorably lead to capitalism. The family economy, the remnant of the former system, was also associated with the family's personal enrichment at the expense of the collective and, on these grounds too, was suspect. If allowed to develop, it could provide the basis for the hiring of labor, the exploitation of the poor, and the return of the class and capitalist system.1^ Western liberal analyses of the northern system of agriculture during the war stress quite different concerns. They focus on an evaluation of the economic performance of agricultural production and cooperativization. Invariably this performance is judged to be deficient. Many, if not most, Western economists consider agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam a failure. According to Andrew Vickerman, cooperativization in northern Vietnam was a failure because agriculture remained "stagnant."11 Adam Fforde judged the viability of cooperatives during the war in terms of their efficient use of resources, contribution to surplus accumulation, and responsiveness to local pressures,* ^ and found that, in these terms, they were unsuccessful and should have been abandoned. He saw the proofs of such a failure lying in the nominal operation of many cooperatives during the war years, the later slide toward decooperativization in the 1970s and 1980s, the adoption of market reforms, and the increasing recognition and promotion of household activities. Analyses of collective agriculture in developing countries according to liberal and efficiency-based criteria typically fail to incorporate gender-based and historical perspectives. Over the past decade, the "women in development" perspective and literature have tried to show that, without taking the women's perspectives in development into account, it is impossible to address issues of subsistence production and 9

Ibid. Also Nguyen Huy, "About the Relationship Between the Collective Economy of Cooperative Members/' translated into English in JPRS 84425, SEA No. 1345, September 28, 1983. Originally published in Nghien Cuu Kinh Te, No. 3, June 1983. 10 Nguyen Huy, "About the Relationship." It was not until the Fifth Party Congress (1981) that the official line on the family economy changed. The family economy was redefined and the term "phu" (sideline or minor) was dropped. The class attribution of the family economy was reformulated as a "middle peasant" economy rather than as a small-peasant economy. Since middle peasants were the main beneficiaries of the land reform and were the largest class to emerge from the land reform, this lent greater legitimacy to the concept. Middle peasants by definition farm their own land with their own labor and do not hire extra labor. The implication of a middle peasant economy is that products from the household production will be either consumed by its members or used for its own needs. The association of the family with the middle peasant economy in the 1980s finally lent the family economy ideological respectability and made it palatable to rank-and-file party members. 11 Andrew Vickerman, The fate of the Peasantry (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Monographs, 1987). 12 See Adam Fforde, The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam, 1974-79 (New York: Sharpe, 1989) and Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, Vietnam—An Economy in Transition (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority, 1988).

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rural poverty. An appreciation of the role of women producers, whether in socialist systems or capitalist systems, is vital to an understanding of the development process and to the fulfillment of development goals. The "women in development" literature stresses that it is women's production that maintains basic levels of subsistence.13 The growing recognition of the importance of rural women has led to a greater awareness of and sensitivity to the role of peasant economies in the development process itself.^ As the persistence of peasant production in the Third World becomes more apparent, often despite "development" efforts to reduce peasant-based farming, the experience of Third World socialist countries, such as China and Vietnam, in tailoring their development plans to making peasant economies more viable merits attention. Their current experiments with "market socialism" appear to accept, for the time being, that their large peasantries will not disappear overnight. This was also the assumption behind "collective agriculture" in these countries. The revolutionary mobilization of the peasantry in Vietnam to fight foreign intervention has given a peculiar shape to state-peasant relations, with the socialist state often having to defer to the peasantry. This has resulted in a negotiated relationship between the state and the peasant economy (whether it be collective or reform). As stated above, the persistence of the peasant economy is also linked to the subsistence functions performed by the household and women's productive labor. Thus an understanding of socialist development in Vietnam requires analyzing both the peasant economy and the role of women in production. Unfortunately, studies of development in Vietnam have often ignored these linkages.^ As with any agricultural system, its origins are a key element. Even when the system is judged inefficient and unproductive, and indeed, no longer viable, as is increasingly the case in Vietnam, its historical legacy will have an important impact on peasant attitudes and on attempts to reform the system. It is now well established that agricultural collectivization in Vietnam did not operate as expected. Production did not reach desired levels, and agricultural cooperatives never managed to function as envisaged. The "family economy" remained a vital component of the local peasant economy, even at the height of collectivization. Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, the family economy apparently provided the bulk of the fruit, vegetables, poultry, pork, and manure, and a significant amount of the grain pro13 See Lourdes Beneria and Martha Roldan, The Crossroads of Class and Gender: Industrial Homework, Subcontracting, and Household Dynamics in Mexico City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chapter 1, for an overview of the field. See also Irene Tinker, Persistent Inequalities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), "A Context for the Field...," pp. 3-13. It should be noted that the Center for Research on Women and the newly formed Research Center for Gender, Family, and Environment in Development, both in Hanoi, have been strong advocates for making the connections between women, subsistence, poverty, and development. See Le Thi, "Women and Development," paper presented to the Gender, Economic Growth, and Poverty Conference, Hanoi, October, 1990, and Le Thi Nham Tyuet, "Vietnamese Women and Family Problems at Present," unpublished manuscript, 1989. 14 See Alexander Schejtman, 'The Peasant Economy: Internal Logic, Articulation, and Persistence," CEPAL Review \ I (August 1980): 115-34. 15 From the standpoint of economic analysis, as Schejtman points out, the family is both the production and consumption unit for the peasantry. As such, its use of labor, its approach to the "market," and its attitude towards risk and change are governed by a separate logic which may not be strictly "rational" according to utility analysis. But my argument here focuses more on the war-time and gender specificities of the Vietnamese peasant economy.

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duced. It provided 60-100 percent of the cash income of the domestic unit.16 In one labor team studied in the 1970s in Thanh Hoa province, the family economy was supplying 55 percent of the grain and 60 percent of the cash income of coop family members.1'7 The family economy relied on intensive cultivation, and was highly productive. A common peasant saying during the war was: "5 percent land for the family, but 5 percent gives more than 95 percent."1** Production may indeed have relied on family production. Some authors have claimed that "unspecified contracts" (khoan chui or khoan trang) were widespread during the war, and that cooperatives never actually operated as large-scale units.19 These terms refer to a form of production based on agreements whereby most agricultural tasks and even land were contracted out to individual families. Cooperatives merely furnished inputs (if that) and expected a portion of the harvest. "Contracted work" was a method of allocating to families certain tasks which were not or could not be performed by the cooperatives. Both the lower and higher types of cooperatives were run by management committees, but work was typically performed by sub-units, such as teams or brigades (doi). Remuneration occurred on either a work-point (diem) or contractual basis, that is, the teams were awarded points for which they were paid in kind, or they signed contracts with the management committee for the delivery of an end product. Labor was also performed by the household for the cooperative under contractual agreements (khoan). This work usually included labor-intensive tasks for which large-scale agricultural equipment was neither suitable nor available, such as transplanting and weeding. Typically women performed much of this work. Theoretically, contracted work was not considered part of "socialist production" and was merely an expedient caused by management problems in the cooperative. It was conceptually linked to the "family economy," and, in fact, when families performed work for the cooperatives on the basis of "contracts," they may have perceived this as part of the "family economy." At any rate, contract work for the cooperative (remunerated in kind) and cooperative labor (for work points) was a conceptually gray area between non-collective labor and collective labor. The extent of unspecified contracts is difficult to ascertain. Pressures on lowerlevel cooperatives to "advance" to higher levels may have resulted in the nominal functioning of the higher-level organization while it relied on unspecified contracts as a way of solving managerial problems. Yet, many cooperatives obviously did function adequately as viable economic units. In any event, their performance varied widely, with many of the higher-level organizations rated by Fforde and others as poor to middling/20 Some Vietnamese authorities have conceded that the push to 16 Tran Van Ha, "The Family Economy of the Vietnamese Peasants/' Vietnam Courier 22, 2 (February 1986); Nguyen Van Chieu, "Family Economy and the VAC Ecosystem in Vietnam/' Vietnam Courier 19,12 (1983). Estimates vary widely. 17 Nguyen Khac Trung, "Kinh Te Cay la Vuon" [The Garden Economy], Tap Chi Cong San, No. 1, (January 1982). 1 ^ This saying was often turned around to "Chin muoi lam phan tram khong bang nam phan tram" ("the 95 percent isn't worth 5 percent"). 19 Nguyen Due Nhuan, Le Vietnam Post-revolutionnaire (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), p. 37. 20 Fforde, The Agrarian Question, p. 6.

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higher-level cooperatives during the war was a mistake, and resulted from overly ambitious planning.21 A thornier question is the attitudinal relationship of peasant producers to the cooperatives during the war and their preferences for the private plot versus the cooperative. Once they had experience in the cooperatives, did families prefer to leave them because they found that remuneration from working on a private plot was much higher than working for the cooperative? Adam Fforde argues that it was for this reason that the peasantry "resisted" cooperativization.22 Although all of the dimensions of the debate cannot be addressed here, it can be noted that peasants in the North did join lower-level cooperatives with alacrity in the early 1960s.23 While it is true that economic, political, and wartime pressures to join were compelling, peasants also appear to have accepted cooperativization in the 1960s with little known overt resistance. In part, the question of the peasants' attitude hinges on how "successful" cooperatives were, what they accomplished, and for whom. WAR, COOPERATIVES, PRODUCTION, AND WOMEN

Criticisms of the functioning of cooperatives imply that the viability of cooperatives during the 1960s should be judged in terms of their contribution to economic growth, "economic efficiency," and the output goals Vietnamese planners set for them.24 These economistic standards may be too stringent a requirement for judging "success." While, economically and theoretically, cooperatives may not have performed as expected, they were, above all, wartime institutions and operated under severe constraints. On balance, they made a positive contribution to the ability of the North to wage the war, and helped sustain the endurance of the northern peasantry in the face of great uncertainty, loss, and hardship. There is some evidence that, at least initially, women were more active participants in the early cooperative movement than men. In interviews in northern villages, such as Yen Loc in Ha Nam Ninh province, women cadres related to the author that the cooperativization movement, starting in 1959, was led by women, with men trailing behind. In this village, under the pre-existing system women had rented themselves out to the landlords and lived in the kitchens (di lam thue). They were last hired, got lower wages, and many had become beggars. These women, coming from the poor and middle peasantry, were easily mobilized and became cadres. They formed propaganda teams which visited every family to explain the government's cooperativization policy and became active workers in the new cooperatives, working at night to build a new irrigation system. The Women's Union sent representatives to help families solve their problems, and it was assisted by cadres on the district and provincial levels in this endeavor.25 21

This is the view of Hoang Phuong, as expressed during the Conference on the History of the Vietnam War, Hanoi, November 25,1988. 22 See Fforde, The Agrarian Question, pp. 77,158. 23 One account of early cooperativization in a northern village in the Red River Delta is Pham Cuong and Nguyen Van Ba, Revolution in the Village Nam Hong, 1945-1975 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1976).

24

25

Fforde, The Agrarian Question, passim.

Interviews in Yen Loc, October 8,1984. Cadres included the managers of the cooperative and officials from the Women's Union and People's Committee. Dinh Thi Phan, the deputy

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In An Khanh village near Hanoi, the women's movement was also very strong, with women comprising most of the initial members of the first cooperative formed—the Yellow Star Cooperative (Hop Tac Xa Sao Vang). Women here had suffered under the landlords, and were more oppressed than men. "The living conditions were very bad."2** More eager to join the cooperative in 1959 than men, women would volunteer to lead labor groups. If the wife joined the cooperative, however, the husband also had to agree to join; in fact, every member of the family over the age of sixteen had to sign the document requesting membership, and it was not enough for one member to sign for the whole family. This often led to family conflicts. Men often objected to membership because "they wanted to keep women's labor in the family,"27 so that women could contribute to improving the family fortune under the husband's aegis. Nguyen Thi E, seventy-five years old, a revolutionary cadre from the Me Chien Si (Soldiers' Mothers' Association), gave her account: "Under the old regime, men did not work as hard as women. They were reluctant to join the cooperative because they would have to work more. Women joined to ease their burdens, and because it meant less work for them overall. They could divide their time between the family and cooperative work. Before this, men were masters of the family, and they wanted to continue being so, with their wives as slaves."28 The Women's Union assumed an active role in An Khanh to persuade men to join the first cooperative. There were "consciousness-raising" sessions and discussions of the new state policies of social equality and more equal relations within the family. Also, cadres focused on the benefits of cooperativization for women's health and the villagers' obligation to serve the country.29^ As in Yen Loc, in Chau Giang village in Ha Nam Ninh province, women led the cooperative movement. The women's movement had been very strong during the anti-French war and the land-reform period, and women took the initiative in applying to join the first cooperative in 1959. Women leaders were trained from the poor and middle peasantry, and they had to be literate. Most women were illiterate before 1954. The Women's Union sent down cadres from Hanoi and the province capital to explain the cooperativization policy, broadcasting their message by megaphone and walking from house to house around the village. With a small nucleus of families that initially joined, local cadres organized other families. The main argument used to persuade families to join cooperatives was that collective production would lead manager of the Cooperative, was a chief informant. She had been a guerrilla leader during the anti-French war; her unit liberated the village in 1952. She helped mobilize women in the cooperativization movement as a member of the Ban Van Dong Xay Dung Hop Tap Xa (Committee for the Campaign to Build Cooperatives). Eighty percent of the laborers on the new irrigation system were women. This village was known for its combination of "production and defense." Chi Phan, as she is known, was a member of the National Assembly from 1971-1975. 26 Interviews in An Khanh, September 28,1984. Cadres were from the Women's Union, the People's Committee, and the Party Secretary. This comment was made by Nguyen Due Bao from the People's Committee. 27 Interview with Nguyen Thi Sai, director of the first cooperative from 1963-64, and in 1984 the head of the Women's Union and director of the buying/selling cooperative. 28 Interview with Nguyen Thi E, An Khanh Cooperative, September 28,1984. A book entitled Me Nam Teo, published by the Women's Union, was written about her life. 29 Interviews with Women's Union cadres, An Khanh village.

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to riches and prosperity ("they would grow good rice") whereas private production could not. Also, women were told that their lives would become easier, they could get education and training, and would achieve social equality.3^ At the time of Cooperativization (in 1960) 50 percent of the women in Ninh Son village in Ha Nam Ninh were illiterate. Although only 20 percent of the cadres had been women during the land reform, women were more active than men in joining the Cooperativization movement and were easier to mobilize into labor teams, most of which they headed. From 1965-1975, 70 percent of the cooperative workers were women. In the words of a district cadre, "the cooperative movement liberated women in Ninh Son."3* With the cooperative, women finally benefitted from the state's family planning policies, including free contraception. At first, up to one-third of the women in the cooperative had so many children that they could not perform collective labor. Younger women in the village enjoyed their "outside" work and had fewer children. This cooperative also built a new irrigation system ("the women moved a lot of soil"), achieved full literacy for women, and offered agricultural training courses.3^ This is not to say that peasants were entirely satisfied with the way cooperatives operated once they joined, for they were not. Their complaints centered on the high levels of state procurement, the lack of anticipated deliveries of agricultural supplies from the state, and the lack of adequate machinery to perform their work.33 They often complained that cooperatives "ate off" peasants. There may also have been the problem of labor motivation in cooperative work, as well as greater incentives to produce for the market than to work for the cooperative. These pressures may well have intensified with the push to form higher-level cooperatives, especially after 1968.34 State investment in agriculture during the war years remained low—heavy industry was the priority. Supplies rarely arrived on time, and peasants were paid low prices for state-procured rice. Managerial problems in the cooperatives were rife. The rural economy as a whole did not function well. The systems of exchange, transportation, and food storage remained primitive. Cadres interviewed by the author in villages in the North admitted that there was a recurring problem of peasants withdrawing from the cooperatives. Peasants 3

^ Interviews in Chau Giang cooperative (Huyen Duy Tien), with about 10 cadres in the village. 3 * Interviews in Ninh Son village (Huyen Hoa Lu) with about 12 cadres. The district cadre referred to is Thi Minh Duong, the deputy chair of the People's Committee of the District of Hoa Lu. Ninh Son village was known for its successful family planning program in close cooperation with the district. The cooperative paid a great deal of attention in the early years to literacy and technical skills for women, training cadres, and providing conditions for women to study. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., and interviews in An Khanh and Chiau Giang. A common complaint was, "Hop tac xa loan cuoc" (a cooperative with only an axe), meaning there was no machinery. 3 ^ Problems in labor motivation are pointed out in Fforde, The Agrarian Question, pp. 115 ff. The reasons for the push to form higher-level cooperatives have not been thoroughly studied. It may have been tied in part to the intense pressures for military mobilization in the wake of the Tet Offensive. Ngo Vinh Long suggests that the push for higher-level Cooperativization was mainly designed for military purposes (i.e., to conscript more soldiers), rather than for economic reasons, but Hoang Phuong disputes this. Comments made at the History of the War Conference, Hanoi, November 26,1988.

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who were dissatisfied had this option. The number of withdrawals appears to have been a class, and to a lesser extent, a gender question. In An Khanh village in 1962 there was a movement among middle peasants to leave the cooperative (xin ra), taking their land and buffaloes with them. Since they were "self-sufficient" and had their own instruments of production, it was more economical for them to farm privately. I was told that not one woman made an application (viet don) to leave. Eventually the party persuaded the men to come back, when the cooperative achieved equally good results as private farming.35 A similar situation occurred in Chau Giang. Cadres related that completion of the new irrigation system in 1966 was the key to increasing output, demonstrating to families who had withdrawn that they would be more prosperous as members of the cooperative than if they stayed outside.3** In analyzing why women were more willing than men to join cooperatives, several factors stand out: the perception of the benefits that would accrue to them, the active involvement of the women's movement in mobilizing them, and, particularly in the case of poor peasant women, their lack of "self-sufficiency" in tools, animals, and above all, labor, given military conscription. Was there a connection between an active Women's Union or strong women's movement and cooperativization? Probably, but even in villages where women cadres were not as numerous as in Yen Loc, peasant women still displayed an eagerness to join cooperatives. Gender and class motivations reinforced one another among poor peasant women who could not farm alone. If anything, the existence of the "family economy" appears not to have been a brake or impediment to the formation of cooperatives or a cause of peasant women's dissatisfaction with them. These two economies apparently were not seen as fundamentally contradictory or as mutually exclusive options, and, according to informants in the localities visited, were perceived as reinforcing each other. The family economy was even seen as dependent on the existence of the agricultural cooperative. One cadre from the women's movement in Chau Giang insisted that it was precisely because women were in charge of the family economy that they wanted to join the cooperative.37 Families defined themselves as "family" members of cooperatives, or as families not belonging to cooperatives. As cooperative members (xa vien), economic activities on behalf of the family were conceptually connected to labor performed for the cooperative. "Own-account" activities (in Western economic terminology) and the "family economy" therefore existed within the context of cooperative membership.38 The primary distinction was rarely between "own-account labor" and "collective labor" but between which families belonged to the cooperative and which did not3^ Furthermore, inputs (e.g., fertilizer, seeds, equipment) from the collective and private sectors may have changed boundaries with some frequency. The transferral 35

According to interviews with coop cadres in An Khanh Cooperative, September 1984. Interviews with cadres in Chau Giang, September 1984. 37 Because it would stabilize the family and give the family security. Nguyen Thi Binh, a cadre from Chau Giang village. 38 See Nguyen Huy, "About the Relationship." 39 There may have been an inherent contradiction and zero-sum labor competition between work for the cooperative and in the garden plot, but peasants may not have always perceived this conflict in such black and white terms. 36

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of collective inputs to the private sector ("pilfering/' "corruption") occurred, particularly in the early years. But inputs from the private sector were also transferred to the collective sector when state deliveries failed to arrive.40 The pooling of tools and animals in lower-level cooperatives further blurred the distinction between the private and collective sectors. Nguyen Thi Nhu Mai, a women's union cadre from Hanoi, who was sent down to Thanh Hoa province in the early 1960s to form pilot cooperatives, suggested that gender relations within the family may have played a role with respect to which families first joined the cooperatives. Families with assertive wives tended to join first, with more submissive wives requiring more persuasion.4* Although cooperatives were economic institutions and were meant to attain high output levels and eventually to transform agricultural production, in actuality their most vital function during the war was to contribute to the war effort. Notably, they organized agricultural production in a such a way that they helped sustain the mobilization of millions of soldiers who went away to war. In this regard, cooperatives were highly functional to society and probably helped the North win the war. Cooperatives assured minimal levels of subsistence for the peasantry, and were so perceived. They also provided for urban and state needs, supported families, assured their survival, and helped them cope with the stresses and the suffering of war.4^ Cooperatives are often cited in the Vietnamese literature as having been an important element in the willingness of husbands and fathers to leave home and fight in the war. A popular saying which captures the relationship between cooperative organization, production, and the war: Thoc khong thieu mot can Quan khong thieu mot nguoi (Not one kilo of rice is missing, Not one soldier is left behind.)4^ This saying also reveals the sense of duty to national service that cooperative organizations fostered. Villages met their obligations to increase production and draft soldiers through the new cooperative system. The party slogan was "everything for the front" (tat ca ve tien tuyen).^ Peasant women were an integral part of this campaign. Their role as producers was defined as being active participants in the war. The prevalent image of peasant women, fostered 40 In Yen Loc village, cadres indicated some peasants "stole" from the cooperative in the beginning. In An Khanh cooperative, peasants contributed money to the new cooperative organizations to set up a credit fund and the buy ing/selling cooperative. 4 * Interview with Nguyen Thi Nhu Mai, Hanoi, October 1984. See also Christine White, 'Two Models for the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture: Implications for Gender Relations," in Femmes et Politiques Alimentaires, ed. Jeanne Bisilliat (Paris: Editions de 1'ORSTOM, 1985), p. 297. 42 Jayne Werner, "Women, Socialism and the Economy of War-time North Vietnam, 1960-75," Studies in Comparative Communism 14, 2 & 3 (Summer/Autumn 1981): 165-90. This article argues that women benefitted from state policies, implemented through cooperatives, that targeted women for training and promotion to new cooperative, party, and village posts. As a result, they gained social visibility and political power previously unknown. ^ According to Le Thi Nham Tuyet, personal communication. 44 Phong Trao 3 Dam Dang.

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by the party, but also adopted as a widespread model, was "in one hand, the plow; in the other, a rifle" (tay cay, lay sung).^ It should be noted that cooperativization was accompanied by a wide-scale shift in the labor force. Women bore the brunt of agricultural production during the war, with some estimates stating they constituted as much as 80 percent of the labor forced Collective production, including household production, entailed an organizational reordering of society. Women were encouraged to assume new roles. In spite of rapid and unprecedented changes in their lives and the widespread destruction resulting from the war, these new social organizations and social mores endured.47 Cooperatives may not have functioned in practice as they did in theory. Yet even their Western detractors admit that rural incomes at least remained stable and may even have risen during the war.4** Whether this is attributed to cooperatives, or whether cooperatives are judged to have been "inefficient," these judgments are somewhat misplaced. Many cooperatives achieved per hectare production levels unheard of in northern Vietnam before collectivization. Some of these received state aid, but many others achieved economic viability on their own. Cooperatives were therefore associated with beneficial outcomes during the war, and as such, deemed responsible for them. A Women's Union cadre in Yen Loc explained to the author that "women trusted the cooperative,"49 and, on the whole, cooperatives appear to have benefitted women. They provided women with the means to pool their labor and work more efficiently. Child care centers under cooperative aegis enabled women to leave their homes for collective work, where they were paid for their labor and given a newfound sense of social dignity. Cooperative administrative work gave them political influence for the first time and opened up their horizons. Cooperatives provided for the social welfare needs of the peasantry: dispensing medical care, caring for war invalids and widows, and providing housing and food for the aged. As members of cooperatives, women were directly involved in state institutions which reduced their social isolation and drew them into wider social and political networks.^ THE NEW ECONOMY, THE NEW FAMILY, AND THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR

The new cooperative economy had an important impact on families, in terms of relations within the family, generational relationships, and residential patterns. The economic behavior and composition of the northern family underwent significant changes during the 1950s and 1960s. This was a result of the First Liberation War against the French, land reform, and collectivization. Agricultural cooperatives and 45

Ibid. ° Interviews with district officials, Hoa Luu District, and researchers in the Center for Research on Women, Hanoi, October, 1984. 47 Werner, "Women, Socialism," passim. 4 ° Adam Fforde and Suzanne Paine, The Limits of National Liberation (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 4 ^ Chi Dinh Thi Phan, Yen Loc village, 1984. Women's commitments to cooperatives may have been stronger in more "revolutionary" areas. Interviews conducted in the course of my research may also reflect sentiments more common in areas mobilized by the revolution. 50 Werner, "Women, Socialism." 4

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state institutions replaced kinship as the principal organizer of social and economic activity. Other structures began to compete with the family for the economic activities of its members.^ As household economic activity took place within the larger collective organization, the residential aspect of the generational family structure appears to have started to break down from extended to single-family units. The existence of agricultural cooperatives put less pressure on households to assume the sole burden for production. Household sizes tended to diminish. Investigations undertaken by the Social Sciences Commission (Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi) in the 1970s suggested that the nuclear family had become the predominant residential form in northern Vietnam, for the villages studied. According to data collected by Nguyen Thi Quang in a survey of Tarn Son village, Ha Bac province, twogeneration families accounted for 72 percent of the total, three-generation families composed 25.6 percent, and one-generation families 1.6 percent. Data collected in Dong Duong village, Thai Binh province, revealed that two-generation families made up 90.3 percent, three-generation families 6.7 percent, and one-generation families 3.1 percent.^ Once income from collective labor in the cooperative enabled young couples to build their own houses, they were then able to break away from the parental domicile.^ Where possible, new houses were built of brick, rather than mud and thatch. Single-family residences made of brick, and sometimes even of two stories, became the dream of peasant women throughout the North. Since the presence of agricultural cooperatives in the countryside permitted the economic viability of the singlefamily or two-generation household, these units could be set in place more rapidly. As a result, preliminary data indicate that the number of ho or households in the northern villages appear to have increased during the war years.^4 This increase was a result both of the splitting up of larger domestic units and population increase.^ 51

Ibid. Cited in Le Thi Nham Tuyet, "Women and Families in the Agricultural Collectivization Movement in Vietnam." Paper presented to the Regional Conference for Asia on Women and the Household, New Delhi, 1985. "Nuclear family" is something of a misnomer because the eldest son's household usually takes over the wider family's duties. Vietnamese sociologists are not agreed on the correct term to use for "the" household: "nuclear," "semi-nuclear," "single," or "small family." However, in a recent volume, several family sociology researchers point to the growing nuclearization of the northern household. See Rita Liljestrom and Tuong Lai, Sociological Studies on the Family (Hanoi: Social Sciences Publishing House, 1991). See also footnote 54 below. 5 ^ Their motivation in so doing was graphically explained to the author by a peasant woman cadre from the village of An Khanh. She stressed that it had been their income from the cooperative that enabled her and her husband to start building a new house during the war and move out of her mother-in-law's household as soon as possible. Interview with Truong Thi Cam, a Women's Union cadre. In 1954, Truong Thi Cam joined the youth movement in the village at the age of 15. She learned to read and write and in 1960 became secretary of a production group. Then she headed the youth union, going on to the communal youth and in 1964 the district youth. In 1968, she was named manager of the newly formed cooperative. Phi Van Ba points to a possible additional motivation: Vietnamese peasants also see "the development of the family7' in terms of its size and increase in family units. Phi Van Ba, "How Do the Peasant Families in the Red River Delta Adapt to New Economic Conditions?" in Liljestrom and Tuong Lai, Sociological Studies, p. 133. ^ According to cadres interviewed in Chau Giang, notably Nguyen Thi Binh, a district cadre. The terminology used in this paper is ho (household) and gia dinh (family). Ho is a residential 52

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This trend toward nuclearization of the family was accompanied by the loosening of kin hierarchies and principles of seniority. The authority of the old and of the parents gave way to greater scope for young adults. Generational change inside the family was possibly the most important aspect of family change as a result of the new state policies and collectivization. There was a saying, "Mat tien mua man, thi dam cho thung": "When you pay money to buy a food tray, you can stab the tray." The proprietary attitude towards young wives in the family on the part of mothersin-law started to change during the war years. Young wives had "rights" in marriage, to work outside the family, and in society.56 With smaller household units, wives working outside the household, and greater social authority for younger women, the power of senior adults was substantially reduced. Young adult women had more control over family decisions, household property, and their own children.57 Along with the splitting up of families and growth in new households, the marriage age for girls appears to have risen during the war.5** This may well have been and registration term for "family" in Vietnamese. The terms gia dinh and ho are similar, but there are important differences between them. The term gia dinh refers to the wider family of patrilineal kin. Ho is used to refer to the residential unit of this kinship group, whether it comprises all the family members or not. Members of a household live in the same house or series of houses, and usually eat together, decide on the allocation of labor together, and raise children together. In the majority of cases, the multi-generational family no longer shares the same house, having divided up into several households. If there are two brothers and a sister with spouses and children living in the same village, most likely these will all have established single-family residences. The mother usually lives with one of her sons. 55 While I do not consider a not-for-citation draft presentation given to a workshop to be part of the "literature" on kinship in Vietnam (cf. Werner, 'The New Household, The New Family, and The Sexual Division of Labor in Post-War Vietnam," 1986), as described by Hy Van Luong, "Vietnamese Kinship: Structural Principles in the Socialist Transformation of Northern Vietnam," Journal of Asian Studies 48, 4, (November 1989), some of the inaccuracies in Hy Van Luong's article need to be pointed out. My concern was not and is not kinship. Rather it is gender relations in terms of production and society. I do not make "general propositions" regarding the structural transformation of kinship. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that single-family residential units increased during the American war years for economic, population-growth, cultural, and public policy reasons. With respect to the charge that I support the view that a structure of egalitarian gender relations has emerged in Communist Vietnam, see my "Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 16, 2 (1984): 48-55, which argues the contrary (and is not cited in Hy Van Luong's article). ^ Recounted to the author by women cadres in Chau Giang. The oppression suffered by young wives in the patriarchal family before liberation is poignantly portrayed in the short stories of Thach Lam and other pre-World War II authors. See Thach Lam, Gio Dau Mua (Saigon: n.p., 1965). 57 Interviews and discussions with Nguyen Thi Binh. 58 Le Thi Nham Tuyet, "Women and Families," gives the following statistics: Average Marriage Age. Men and Women. Northern Vietnamese Countryside, 1960-1980 Sex

Before 1960

1960-64

1965-69

1970-75

1975-80

Male

23.6

24.5

24.7

23.0

23.0

Female

20.1

24.0

22.8

26.7

21.0

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due to the desire of young men and women to set up their own domiciles as a result of the new economic circumstances and new marriage policies. The rise in marriage age may also have resulted from general military mobilization. Collective agriculture undermined the previous custom and institution of child marriage, by reducing the uncertainties associated with private production and exclusive reliance on family support systems for survival. Changes in the household structure thus led to the emergence of a new type of family, whose preeminent members were the conjugal couple. This new family was, in effect, given a material base by the socialist system, owing to the role of the cooperatives and the family economy. Cooperatives transformed the form of production and strengthened the nuclear character of the family. The family economy also provided means for the family unit to become viable. It strengthened the role of those members who could provide the most labor—young and middle-aged adults. During the war years, women emerged as social and economic actors in the family. Although peasant women traditionally performed heavy manual labor, the new collectivist system gave this labor a new direction and meaning. Women's role in agricultural production was highly praised by party leaders and state institutions and gained theoretical recognition in official doctrine. The Women's Union, possibly the most important mass organization at this time, devoted its activities to assisting women, mobilizing them, and explaining and implementing party politics. State and party organizations frequently issued statistics to point out and praise women's contribution to and responsibility for production. Women were highly motivated during the war, despite their increased burdens.^ Wartime policies directly targeted women, using quotas and special training courses, and increasing the numbers of women's cadres. The Women's Union and the party were responsible for the implementation of these policies, which were carried out through the cooperatives. Cooperative labor performed by women increased their social sphere of action, strengthened their social position, and reduced their dependence on the family. Working as members of production teams, they received separate remuneration for their labor. The mobilization of women's labor had important implications for their position inside the household. Women also achieved positions of public visibility and importance by becoming local cadres and cooperative leaders. Educational differences between young men and women narrowed. During the American air war, women in the North attained, for the first time, public, political power. While women expanded their social horizons and social networks, they gained a measure of social dignity and equality with men previously unknown. These achievements came about in part because the collective system substituted social authority for familial authority.60 The "new family" became a feature of socialist development in wartime Vietnam, with important implications for women, especially as wives and mothers. As wives, women were expected to participate equally with men in production, while maintaining a harmonious and healthy family life. As mothers, women retained the primary responsibility for raising the children and molding them as suitable socialist citizens. The standard bearer of these responsibilities was the "new socialist woman" who carried out her public and family duties responsibly, cheerfully, and with self-confidence. 59 60

Werner, "Women, Socialism." Ibid.

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The new family in Vietnam was a socialist family.^ It did not hark back to previous models. In wartime Vietnam, the "family" started to undergo change structurally, residentially, and economically, in terms of generational relations and ideology. The key person in this family was the new woman who was, ideally, no longer hidden in the back in kitchen out-buildings, dependent on her husband, and passively awaiting the instructions of her mother-in-law. She was, instead, meant to be the new leader of her family, and, as such, was subject to the direct scrutiny, policies, and supplications of the state.62 The new family was not only a function of state policies. It actually had a material base in the collectivist system, reinforced by the family economy. The garden plot in cooperatives strengthened the productive functions of the new family, creating, in effect, a new family economy. Subsistence food production and income from this family economy, which was far more important than any other source, varied according to the labor power of its members. It put pressure on the conjugal couple, especially women, to increase their productive capacity. This pressure intensified when women were, in effect, heads of households. The sexual division of labor, however, remained gender-based, with their different tasks seen not as unequal, but as complementary work spheres. In point of fact, women bore the major responsibility for household production and maintaining the economic viability of the family. The wartime agricultural economy could then in some respects be called a women's economy. The legacy of the wartime economy in Vietnam for today's postwar reforms are a topic for another paper. Suffice it to say that any balanced assessment needs to include negative and positive legacies of the "cooperative period." Aside from deficiencies in economic performance, cooperatives fostered dependence on the state and a false sense of security. The return to household production and the market obliges women peasants to see profitability, efficiency, and risk-taking as trade-offs for social security and the promise of social equality. It can also be noted that the de-collectivization of agriculture in Vietnam is occurring at a slower rate, for instance, than in China. Controversy continues in Vietnam over the relative merits and demerits and the scope of the cooperative system. A significant factor in the eventual outcome will of course be the judgment of peasant producers themselves. 61 Nancy Weigersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) argues that cooperative agriculture failed to change patriarchal institutions in the northern countryside due to the peasant-based nature of the revolution. This may in part be true, but my argument here is that a new type or model of family emerged during the war which should be seen as a "socialist" family, and this is attributable as much to state policy as to the peasant basis of society. "2 I am not suggesting that these changes affected all families and gender relations equally. Even within the same family, sisters-in-law could be fundamentally different. But the "new socialist woman" became an ideal to strive for. This new model was not one of "gender equality." Recent surveys indicate that rural families still prefer sons, education for girls lags behind that of boys, and men tend to control important family decisions. See Liljestrom and Tuong Lai, Sociological Studies. But any balanced account needs to note the changing dimensions of women's status during the war years.

US SCHOLARSHIP AND THE

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT* David Hunt

uring the war, the originality of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam was not so evident as it is today. At the time, supporters of US intervention argued that the Communist strategy of ''internal subversion" would topple other governments if Washington did not succeed in defending its Saigon allies, while the left ("two, three, many Vietnams") also assumed that the struggle was a prototype. In retrospect, the singularity of the NLF appears more in need of emphasis, and in the literature the sources of its power remain something of a mystery. Extensive study of the institutional aspect associated with Vietnamese communism has not resolved issues that are still charged with polemical significance, and the Front's identity as a popular movement in the countryside has hardly been broached. Taking my cues from a long-standing debate over the legitimacy of the insurgency in South Vietnam and from the comparative study of peasants and revolutions, I argue here that further understanding of the topic requires a move toward social history.1 Without attention to peasants, there can be no measure of the contribution made by other participants in the Vietnam War. Douglas Pike's certainty that the war "was in essence an expansionist drive by the North Vietnamese" is unverifiable within the analytic framework he constructs, which accords no place to the hypothetical alternative, a socially defined impetus for the NLF. "There can be little doubt that the ground in South Vietnam was fertile for armed revolt," he concedes; "preconditions for insurgency did exist." But this aside, cast in impersonal terms, leads nowhere, because people, not "preconditions," make insurgencies, and if one does not evoke

D

* I wish to thank Peter Weiler and Jayne Werner for critical comments on earlier drafts and the

William Joiner Center for its material and moral support. 1 As I worked on this essay, the counter example of the French Revolution was often in my thoughts. The peasant movement of 1789 was generally successful. Hard-won freedom from seigneurial domination benefitted almost all cultivators, and municipal self-government was received with a general enthusiasm. Battles for control of the land resulted in more partial, but not negligible gains, and village culture largely resisted the assaults of de-Christianizers and other champions of modernization and remained intact into the nineteenth century. This progress was achieved even though the movement had no national organization or leadership of any kind. The most recent survey of the topic is found in Peter Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). An earlier attempt to see Vietnam through the optic of French social history is found in David Hunt, "Peasant Routes in France and Vietnam," Peasant Studies 17 (1990): 141-49.

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them in concrete terms, it is impossible to prove that their initiatives were less decisive than those of other actors.2 A similar flaw is evident in William Duiker's suggestion that "the insurgency was a genuine revolt based in the South, but it was organized and directed from the North/' To evaluate Hanoi's role, one must weigh its intervention against the intervention of activists elsewhere in the country. But this way of proceeding is blocked by a conception that makes it seem as if one group "revolted" while another "organized" and "directed." It obscures interactions between organizational forms originating in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the culture that southern peasants had created in their villages and that helped them mobilize against the landlords and the Saigon regime. Since communities are always organizing and directing themselves as well as being organized and directed from outside, a satisfactory picture of what is going on is attainable only if both the internal and the external are made part of the inquiry .^ The misconception I am attempting to pinpoint is also apparent in the work of scholars who are sympathetic to the Vietnamese Revolution. One important text begins with the view, attributed to Lenin, that "a revolution can occur only when there exist both insurrection and conspiracy, both spontaneous mass action and organizational work, both irrational forces and rational preparations." Here again, politics and society are separated, thought and volition are located in the sphere of party activity, and popular movements ("irrational forces") are devalued.4 This essay follows a different path. Class and political relations in South Vietnam hemmed in, but did not immobilize peasants of the region, and, in turn, their wishes and actions defined boundaries for the choices of others. They made history even as others attempted to make their history for them; they were subjects as well as objects. In reviewing the state of the question, I am interested first of all in these peasant activists, in what they did as well as what was done to them at a decisive moment in their country's history. PATRIOTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES

According to one line of analysis, the NLF was, as its name attests, a patriotic movement, and its adherents were primarily concerned to free the country from foreign domination. In this spirit, George Kahin argues that an alliance of Buddhists, students, and even some elements within the Government of Vietnam (GVN), such as the generals associated with the anti-Diem coup of 1963, had the potential to mobilize popular support, dismiss the Americans, and reach an accommodation with the Front, in the process marginalizing its revolutionary Communist wing. But Kahin's 2 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (1966: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), pp. 53,80. 3 William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview, 1981), p. 198. Duiker's formulation is cited in George Herring> America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (1979: New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 66; and George Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 96. 4 Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 306. Khanh does not offer any editorial comment on this passage, but seems to accept the polarity it defines as a useful heuristic device. It was a great loss when the author died prematurely in March 1990, before he was able to bring his study down to the period of the NLF.

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view is countered by other observers from all parts of the political spectrum, from Pike ("What struck one most forcibly about the NLF was its totality as a social revolution first and as a war second") to Frances Fitzgerald ("The Vietnam War was not a civil war; it was a revolutionary war").^ This issue requires a regional treatment. In the Tonkin Delta, Viet Minh calls for a united front to oust the French in the 1946-1954 period elicited a significant response from village elites, many of whom stayed in the liberated zones, paid taxes to the insurgents, and even joined the Communist Party. From that position of strength, these elites were able to obstruct Viet Minh efforts to lower rents and interest rates, and their decision not to leave the countryside meant that there were fewer absentees and collaborators whose land was subject to confiscation and redistribution. These patriotic notables continued to be active in village life, thereby helping to keep alive customary patterns of deference among the peasants. As a result, the poor and the landless appear to have derived only limited material benefits from the struggle against France. Initiated from above, the resort to radical land reform in 1953-1956 emerged out of this pattern of class struggle and accommodation.6 By contrast, landlords in the South before World War II were closer to the French politically and culturally, and many had already vacated the countryside. When the revolution began, this absence> which originally derived from a position of strength, became a weakness, making it easier for peasants to break the grip of the elite on village life. According to Robert Sansom, "The gradual retreat of landlords to the cities that had begun in the 1930s for reasons of role and preference, in the 1946-1948 period became a panic-stricken exodus/7'7 And the skeptical response of these notables to united front appeals meant that from the beginning peasants encountered fewer rivals and exercised more leverage within Viet Minh ranks. As a result, land reform policies that appeared moderate on paper and led to disappointing results in the North were given a more revolutionary thrust in the South. This outcome was reinforced by the fact that there was more land belonging to absentees and collaborators in the Mekong than in the Tonkin Delta, so that selective confiscation/redistribution had a greater impact in the first than in the second region. In Long An Province, peasants stopped paying rents altogether before 1954, and in An Xuyen, only half the tenants paid any rent in the late 1940s. Militancy was even more pronounced under the NLF. Its land reform was a grassroots phenomenon, with property transfers administered by village cadres and rubber stamped by higher echelons. This bottom-up approach should be contrasted with the 1953-1956 northern campaign, where ad hoc teams of activists from the cities had to 5

George Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986). A similar conception, stressing the patriotic and progressive, but non-Communist core of the NLF, at odds with a Marxist-Leninist element linked to Hanoi, is developed in Truong Nhu Tang, A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1985). See also Pike, Viet Cong, p. 55; and Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1972), p. 195. 6 Statistics on Communist Party makeup are found in Christine White, "Mass Mobilisation and Ideological Transformation in the Vietnamese Land Reform Campaign," Journal of Contemporary Asia 13 (1981): 202. See also her "Peasant Mobilization and Anti-Colonial Struggle in Vietnam: The Rent Reduction Campaign of 1953," Journal of Peasant Studies 10 (1983): 187-213; and Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 57-61,65-69. ^ Robert Sansom, Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), p. 55.

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intervene to insure an outcome that villagers were not strong enough to impose on their own.** In the North, the two-stage theory prevailed: the Vietnamese fought for national liberation first, and a social agenda was pursued only belatedly. But in the South, the two objectives were addressed simultaneously, or it might even be said that the revolutionary thrust came before the patriotic. In the words of Jeffrey Race, "by bringing an antifeudal revolution to the countryside," the Viet Minh "motivated the peasantry to serve an anti-imperialist revolution as well." According to his account, the NLF in Long An continued to represent "a social revolution" in the 1960s. Eric Bergerud says the same thing about Hau Nghia, where "the theme stressed most often was class hatred," with national appeals secondary.9 Events took a different course in the Central Lowlands. There, the united front held sway, and expropriation of landlords was still only in the talking stage in 1965. As US troops arrived, the NLF was being described by its adherents as "honest" and "democratic" rather than revolutionary, and "nationalism was the main rallying cry." The guerrillas "never spelled out their land policy in detail," and landlord property was not threatened. Thieu's "Land to the Tiller" legislation in 1970, which sought to undercut the Front by finishing and legitimizing its work, was judged even by the Americans "a miserable failure in Central Viet Nam."^ No one can dispute the importance of land in the rise of the NLF, and the least that can be said about Central Vietnam is that the Front's promise to redistribute property had a substantial impact in the region. Still, the insights of Race, Sansom, and others should not be allowed to consolidate a reading of the insurgency that is too flat, too economist. The land question was part of a larger rural universe, and there is no evidence that peasants in the Central Lowlands fought less tenaciously for the NLF than peasants further south. What is needed here is a more complex, a less reductionist conception of the circumstances that make revolt possible.^ ° On tenants not paying rents during the First Indochina War, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 4. "Patriotic" landlords were theoretically allowed to collect rents, but Race's account implies that none did (ibid., pp. 128-29). See also Sansom, Economics of Insurgency, p. 55. On land reform being administered locally, see Race, Long An, pp. 127, 163; and Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: the Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder: West view, 1991), p. 59. 9 Race, Long An, pp. 40, xviii; Bergerud, Dynamics of Defeat, p. 60. Sansom argues that the NLF was more revolutionary than the Viet Minh, but the putatively moderate Viet Minh of the South that he describes, which "tolerated the landlord's presence as long as he agreed to the redistribution [of land], accepted lower rents, and paid Viet Minh taxes," was much tougher with the landlords than was the Viet Minh of the North. "In terms of their economic welfare," Sansom concludes, NLF policies "were, for the vast majority very effective. . . . From all the benefits it brought to the peasantry, it can probably be said that the impetus behind the Viet Cong land reform was not in the general case terror but the sanction of implied force supported by the general will." (Economics of Insurgency, pp. 56, 65). 10 James Trullinger, Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 45-46, 95,109; and Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 391. Trullinger says that class themes received more attention after 1965 (Village at War, p. 95), a reversal of the trend noted by Bergerud in Hau Nghia, where the arrival of American troops prompted the Front to sound the patriotic chord with greater emphasis (Dynamics of Defeat, p. 60). ^ Characteristic here is the fate of Edward Mitchell's affirmation that middle peasants constituted a firmer constituency for the NLF than their poor and landless neighbors: see "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," World Politics 20 (1968): 421-38. Given

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Further research is needed on this question, for example, on bastions of resistance in the Center, in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and elsewhere, but for the time being, are we authorized to speak of at least two strategies for resistance, two peasantries, within the NLF?12 THE SEARCH FOR PREFIGURATIONS

Villagers of the Central Lowlands and villagers of the Mekong Delta rallied to the NLF. The impetus that set them in motion has been explained in various ways. But surprisingly few scholars have been ready to look within the experience of the peasants themselves for the sources of their engagement. When Douglas Pike's Viet Cong appeared in 1966, it constituted an advance over previous treatments, with their characterizations of the Front as a band of thugs. Pike was no friend of the guerrillas (the text is sprinkled with references to Communist "genocide" and "1984"), but for the most part his tone is curious and respectful. Heir to a prestigious tradition, the NLF was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam," and its success was the product of community organizing. The guerrillas prospered because they studied local conditions and attempted to mold their programs to people's needs, because cadres conducted themselves in a patient, flexible fashion, and because their mass associations, tax-gathering apparatus, and armed forces functioned so smoothly. "The organizational weapon" made the NLF "a Sputnik in the political sphere of the Cold War."13 Pike did not see a way of carrying his analysis past the organizational level. Wedded to a view that Hanoi was behind the revolt, he was unwilling to consider the possibility that the NLF drew vitality from South Vietnamese society. Portraying the rural population as "indifferent" to revolutionary politics or even "filled with distrust" toward Front cadres, he is forced into increasingly labored explanations for the insurgency, according to which it "seduced" the peasants or "enmeshed" them "in a tangled web of NLF control" or manipulated "the individual by persuading him to manipulate himself." The peasant was an ineffectual victim, drawn into activism without ever being "quite sure of how this happened and never with any overt choice presented to him." There were no "motives" here, only "circumstances." The Front came into "an organizational vacuum," it was a Prospero, magically creating a following, a Dr. Frankenstein, turning lifeless bone and tissue into a monster. the comparative literature, this suggestion is plausible and deserves to be explored, as Eric Wolf did in his path-breaking Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper, 1969), p. 202. But Mitchell's shallow research and often weak logic made his work an easy target (see, for example, Sansom's critique, in Economics of Insurgency, pp. 230-33), and the idea he broached was prematurely cast aside. 12 If there were more local studies, invariably one would need a conception not of two, but of many peasantries in the South. See, for example, the distinctive configuration in Tay Ninh, where landlords drew their tenants toward the Cao Dai, in Jayne Werner, Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Viet Nam (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1981). The plurality of peasant routes is clear in the much more thoroughly studied French case, as noted in Hunt, "Peasant Routes." 13 Pike, Viet Cong, pp. 248, 383,110, 111. "In Vietnam today, even in the South, the words Viet Minh and patriotism are virtually interchangeable" (ibid., p. 41). A gangster-like image of the NLF emerges from George Carver, 'The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs 44 (1966): 347-72.

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The NLF constituted a "social revolution/' but it was a revolution without revolutionaries.^ Scholars more interested in the socio-cultural roots of popular movements would seem to be the logical adversaries for the view put forward by Pike. But Eric Wolf is not at his best in discussing NLF success among the putatively individualistic, scattered peasantry of the southern region. "The NLF alone/' he concludes, "among other organizations in the South, offered a viable organizational framework and ideology for an atomized society striving to attain greater social cohesion." This conception—a fragmented, ineffectual society, a self-generating revolutionary organization—is close to Pike's, and indeed, in this section of his analysis, Wolf draws heavily on Viet Cong.^ A similar impression emerges from Frances Fitzgerald's Fire in the Lake, which contains many dense and sensitively observed passages on the guerrilla effort, but which echoes the notion that NLF organizers acted on a passive mass of rural dwellers. Fitzgerald downplays the importance of the horizontal axis in the countryside—the bonds among peasants—and portrays communal solidarity in vertical terms, as dependent on obedience and passivity. When the NLF prodded the villagers "to fight what was to them the extension of parental authority and to stand up as equal members of the society," people were frightened because they thought that such self-affirmation "meant the end of patriarchal society—the end of society as they knew it—and the reversion to that state of bestiality where men have no leaders." Her treatment suggests that peasants, who had been trained to see their rulers as superior beings and who in the text really do seem like children, were lifted up by the guerrillas to assume an adult function. This minimalist view of the popular contribution takes on the circularity already encountered in Viet Cong ("the Front attempted to remake [the villagers] so that they might rule themselves") and underscores the divide between the NLF and its constituency that was fundamental to Pike's approach.16 14

Pike, Viet Cong, pp. 383,172, 111, 167, 33, 376,374, 55. The text does grant that "in general," the Front cadre "was a native of the village" (ibid., p. 230). For a "Prospero" conception of the guerrilla movement, see the "visit of a hypothetical NLF agit-prop team to a Vietnamese village" (ibid., p. 126-28); a "Frankenstein" image emerges on ibid., p. 117. Pike recognizes that some people "actually sought out and joined the NLF. These included draft dodgers, military deserters, those who hated the government for some personal reason, opportunists, the ambitious who were seeking status, the rejected, the adventurers, and all the others in Eric Hoffer's categories of the True Believer." But, he insists, this group constituted only "a small minority" (ibid., p. 376). 15 Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 207. Like Paul Mus, Wolf appears to think that, in the atomized world of the South, sectarian and millennial movements were a more logical outcome than the revolutionary, Communist-led effort that eventually gained preeminence. See ibid., p. 193; and John McAlister and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution (New York: Harper, 1970), pp. 84-92. 16 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, pp. 227, 248. The author's penchant for interpreting the revolutionary process in terms borrowed from individual psychology and for extrapolations from the I Ching to the political realm are perilously reminiscent of the methodology found in "national character" studies. She properly notes that peasants defined themselves in social, relational terms and not as free-standing individuals, but traces this mentality to the lofty reaches of Confucian philosophy rather than to the everyday realities of life in the Vietnamese countryside. Variants of the state of mind she explores are found in many agrarian societies. See, for example, the brilliant discussion of "the person" and related topics in David Sabean, Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Other national character studies, only ntarginally con-

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When it comes to the peasants' role, the "Scott-Popkin debate" is also disappointing. James Scott does not directly address the regional issue, but the implication in his work is that cultivators in the Center and the North, where a moral economy of paternalism was stronger than in the South, would have felt more justified in protesting against dearth. In spite of references to frontier circumstances, French domination, and open village residential arrangements in southern Vietnam, Samuel Popkin's interpretation also lacks regional specificity, though his tireless curiosity leads to the incorporation of much detail that adds texture to the presentation, even if it does not build the argument. Peasants in the Mekong Delta were "bigger risk takers vis-a-vis politics and markets than were the needier peasants of Tonkin and Annam," he declares, but without offering an explanation for this contrast, with its intriguing hint of prefiguration, from gambling on cards and horse races to gambling on revolution. The suggestion that Cochinchina displayed "the most anti-landlord hostility and the most widespread demands for 'land to the tiller'" is also not explored.^ Beginning from different assumptions, other studies arrive at a similarly grudging interpretation of peasant agency. Jeffery Paige declares that French intrusion into the southern part of Vietnam fractured the old regime, loosened the grip of the traditional elite, and opened the way for mass politics. As a result, southern peasants were encumbered by no communal or cultural baggage and were free to draw a revolutionary conclusion from their common sharecropper status. Preoccupied with structural aspects and assuming a rapid jump from shared interest to collective action, Paige says almost nothing about peasant consciousness and activity.1** Sharing with Paige a belief that the destruction of tradition in the South enlarged the prospect for socialism, Nancy Wiegersma offers a more subtle interpretation of the social and especially the gendered dimensions of the revolutionary process in that region. Here, too, however, agrarian populations do not appear capable on their own of breaking from the received culture. "The Vietnamese case leads us to question the progressiveness of peasant-based revolution in areas where the peasantry has not undergone massive transformation through the impact of capitalist markets," she concludes. For Paige and Wiegersma, capitalism plays the role that Pike and others assign to "the organizational weapon." An outside force, it sets an inert peasantry into motion.^ In spite of ideological differences, all of these scholars agree that the NLF was powerful, and all see the Front somehow galvanizing the peasants of South Vietnam. nected to the substance of Vietnamese culture and history, are found in Nathan Leites, The Viet Cong Style of Politics (Santa Monica: Rand, 1969); Paul Berman, Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1974); and William Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979). ^ James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); and Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: California University Press, 1979), pp. 258, 231. Neither text offers a treatment of the National Liberation Front. For more on this subject, see David Hunt, "From the Millennial to the Everyday: James Scott's Search for the Essence of Peasant Politics," Radical History Review 42 (1988): 155-72. ^ Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1975). ^ Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural Economy (New York: Saint Martins, 1988), p. 246.

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But none succeed in explaining how an external impetus was capable of driving events within southern society. "While the NLF was not indigenous as an organization, its support was," Douglas Pike remarks, and the others end in a similar impasse. Everywhere there is a reluctance to acknowledge that peasants chose to affiliate with the NLF and that their activism was articulated through the social and cultural forms they received and shaped, of the sort that people everywhere inhabit by virtue of being human.2^ In studying the guerrilla movement in My Tho Province, I found that local militants were proud of the villages in which they had grown up, communities built by their ancestors and requiring protection during the war. But the documents also show that cadres did not accept customs just as they were, but criticized the power exercised by landlords over peasants, by men over women, by elders over the youth, and called for changes in all these relationships. The trajectory of the NLF was determined by the interaction between these restorative and iconoclastic impulses.2* The poor were sick of the way they had to "kowtow" to the rich and to offer them "the choicest food they had on the anniversaries of the deaths of their ancestors," but they also embraced "the higher classes" who dared "to live and die with the lower classes." The villagers sometimes "ridiculed and mocked" women cadres for "their manly way of living: they were away all night long, going here and there, talking to everyone without caution and care like the other women." At the same time, the community "liked and respected" these activists "because of their comportment and their virtues." When youthful militants argued at communal gatherings about "the world situation, socialism, Russia and China," elders sitting at the same table declared that "the youths didn't even know what went on in the village let alone the world, Russia and China." Free thinkers proclaimed that "there wasn't any spiritual power and that human beings are their own bosses," while nearby "the Buddhist Bonze, staying at the village pagoda, prayed and beat on his gong night and day without being disturbed by the VC." "Sorcerers" who were criticized for promoting "superstition" were generally left alone, and local activists did not seem surprised to learn that one was the uncle of a district cadre.22 Rich and poor, young and old, men and women, all were "so fond of attending the village meetings that, sometimes, they were regretful that some meetings ended so soon. During these sessions, they lingered around the meeting places, discussing the Front's policies, the cadres' behavior and the cruelty of Diem's regime until late at night." The NLF's cultural revolutionaries were in the milieu they criticized, they took responsibility both for defending villages communities and for making them 20

Pike, Viet Cong, p. 80. For more on this subject, see David Hunt, "Village Culture and the Vietnamese Revolution, Past & Present 94 (1982): 131-57. 22 Rand Corporation, Interviews in Vietnam/Series DT: "Activities of Viet Cong Within Dinh Tuong Province" (Santa Monica: Rand, 1971), 182/51,157/89,239/27,257/19,154/27,264/30, 239/139. These citations are from microfilm transcripts of Rand Corporation interviews conducted in Vietnam from 1964 to 1969. Most of the interviewees cited here were defectors from NLF ranks. Pairs of numbers separated by a slash indicate: the interview number/and the number of the response within the interview from which the citation has been taken. "Dinh Tuong" was the GVN name for My Tho Province. After 1975, the name was changed again, to Tien Giang Province. For more on the Rand project and on the revolutionary movement in this Mekong Delta region, see David Hunt, "Village Culture"; and, by the same author, "Villagers at War: The National Liberation Front in My Tho Province, 1965-1967," Radical America 8 (January-April 1974): 3-184. 21

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more democratic. The dynamic they struggled to master remains a major unexplored aspect of the war.23 ORIGINS OF A POPULAR UPRISING

Questions about the NLF's sources of strength and the relative weight of Communist organization and popular culture in driving it forward are posed at many key moments in the Front's history and nowhere more sharply than with respect to its origins in 1959/60. On this point, George Kahin's interpretation, first offered in the 1967 survey he co-authored with John Lewis, has for a long time served as a point of reference and a target for other scholars. In that text, it was argued that rebellion in the South began in 1958 and intensified in 1959, especially in the second half of the year. The Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters (March 1960) called for armed struggle and the overthrow of the GVN, an initiative that was belatedly approved by the Third Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, held in the following September. "The Liberation Front is not 'Hanoi's creation/" the authors conclude; "it has manifested independence and it is Southern. Insurrectionary activity against the Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions."24 This presentation leaves much to be desired. Its evidence of southern initiative is sketchy (once again the social dimension is ignored), and the weight assigned to the North was bound to seem inadequate, given that the authors say nothing about the 15th Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee (January 1959), cited by others to show that the revolt originated in the DRV. According to critics, Kahin had been duped by Communist propaganda into assuming that the NLF was an autonomous movement when in reality it served as an instrument of Hanoi. Kahin returned to the fray in Intervention, still determined to prove that southern activists and their mass constituency pulled a more circumspect DRV leadership into revolutionary struggle against the GVN. Reference in the text to "significant, though apparently largely tactical and never really fundamental differences" between northern and southern revolutionaries might be construed as a concession to his critics, who insist on Hanoi's control. But a further reading suggests that the author wishes to underscore the fact that differences were indeed "significant." He points to the Tra Bong uprising of March/April 1958 (sanctioned by the Trung Bo Regional Committee of the Communist Party); the establishment of a base area in the Highlands in the summer of that year (authorized by the Party's Interzone Committee); and an 23

Rand Corporation, "Series DT," 143/27. Perhaps the best realized local study written by a North American scholar during the war, Jeffrey Race's book says nothing about popular culture in Long An. Trullinger offers tantalizing asides on Thua Thien, for example, "the meetings were interesting, and people liked to go. It was just like the old days in Vietnam, when people went to the dinh... You know, the dinh is very important, and just like at the dinh the spirit of the people is very high at the Viet Cong meetings" (quoted in Village at War, p. 107). Pike begins by recognizing the importance of kinship ties and voluntary associations, acting as "a cement holding together a social structure," but then takes another tack in the rest of his book (Viet Cong, pp. 6-3). 24 George Kahin and John Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (1967: New York: Dial, 1969), p. 120.

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upsurge in guerrilla actions in 1959, in Long An, Quang Ngai, Bien Hoa, and elsewhere.25 All of these steps preceded news of the 15th Plenum, which arrived in the South in November and which ordered armed struggle to begin. But even this policy statement subordinated military to political struggle, it sanctioned violence for selfdefense only, and it ruled out offensive operations against the Diem Government and calls for its overthrow. The Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters exceeded such guidelines, and the Ben Tre uprising of January 1960, which quickly took on an overtly revolutionary tenor, may have, too. Its sequel in September, which liberated 70 percent of the province and triggered land reform, certainly went beyond what the Hanoi leadership had recommended. Three points in Kahin's interpretation must be engaged by critics who remain convinced that his view is incorrect. First, his interpretation is balanced between the Communist Party and southern society: he tests the hypothesis that the DRV called the shots by weighing the social forces in the South, for example, "a peasant-based insurrection/7 that are analytically distinct from the party. Also notable is his evocation of an intermediate, activist element ("residual southern cadre," "southern nonparty adherents/7 "ex Vietminh'7) between the party and the rural population. The research Kahin offers is not extensive enough to pinpoint at every juncture who is doing what, but an analysis that simply ignores actors outside the party cannot prove him wrong. 26 Second, Kahin sees the party itself as complex, with local, provincial, regional, and national levels, all capable to charting a distinctive course. An important part of this story is the discipline and loyalty of village Communists who stayed with the Hanoi line in the 1954-1959 period, at great cost to themselves. But it is not plausible to assume that policy statements issued in the DRV were the only determinants of events hundreds of miles away. As Gabriel Kolko notes, distinctive characteristics, "which vast distances and poor communications among the three main regional committees made inevitable/7 militate against the possibility that the revolt was stage-managed from the North. Kolko sees the southern movement as the most revolutionary and peasant-based sector within Vietnamese communism. "Not until the Party approved armed action in the south were there large-scale upheavals/7 he declares, "though a growing number of symptomatic unauthorized peasant conflicts had occurred earlier and local Party elements had initiated combat without the knowledge of superior echelons.'7^ Third, Kahin is sensitive to revolutionary process, to the ways in which initiatives that may have been ordered by the party went beyond what their sponsors had anticipated. Perhaps Hanoi deserves credit for the idea that there should have been a Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters. But the Declaration's call for the overthrow of the Diem regime exceeded the parameters established at the 15th Plenum and was quickly criticized by the Nam Bo Party Regional Committee and by Le 25

Kahin, Intervention, p. 119; on the origins of the NLF, ibid., pp. lOlff. Ibid., pp. 101,102,105. It must be said that Kahin's treatment, in which references to peasants are not frequent and the mass of the people rise up against tyranny, is more of a "Whig" than a class-struggle interpretation. Emphasizing the revolutionary theme, Kolko affirms that, "Despite its initial effort to contain what looked like a radical poor-peasant movement," the party had "to accept the inevitable" (Anatomy of a War, p. 105). 27 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, pp. 97,103. 26

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Duan. The Ben Tre uprising of January 1960 also went beyond the Plenum, as local organizer Nguyen Thi Dinh had predicted. When asked by an emissary from "higher levels" how the people would respond to the call for a revolt, she answered: "Fm only afraid that once Ben Tre turns to military action we won't be able to restrain them." The September mobilization that followed (liberated zones, land reform) clearly exceeded the limits defined by the Central Committee.28 The conservative, "aggression-from-the-North" school of thought ignores these three points, while other dissenters, more ready to credit the southern side of the story, have difficulty in establishing precisely what nuance separates them from Kahin's interpretation. Indifferent to social conditions, Pike and others attribute an extraordinary power to the Communists, who are held responsible even for the repression aimed against them. Seeing the party as a monolith, capable of starting a revolt as if it were as easy as turning on a faucet, they do not address the possibility that there might have been tensions within its ranks or that the revolutionary process had a momentum of its own.29 Along these lines, Guenter Lewy affirms that "The decision to begin the armed struggle in the south was made by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' (Lao Dong) party (VWP), the Communist Party of Vietnam, in Hanoi in 1959." Searching for allies against Kahin, he cites Jeffrey Race, who notes that While it is obviously erroneous to say that [the fighting going on in South Vietnam] was simply "a subversive campaign directed from Hanoi," because the grievances on which the campaign was founded lay in the South, nevertheless the major strategic decisions were made by the Central Committee in Hanoi [author's emphasis]. At the same time, Race's treatment suggests that Long An militants were preparing for armed struggle before authorization to do so arrived from the North, as seen, for example, in the reorganization and rearmament of main force battalions and the reconstruction of traditional base areas "during the last six months of 1959." A March 1960 analysis from the Party's Regional Committee noted that "many local organizations had been overenthusiastic and premature in their actions, believing that the time for the overthrow of the Diem regime had already arrived." But, the Committee, insisted, "the balance of forces was still not sufficiently favorable" for such "rash and adventurist acts." In short, many participants and not just those in Hanoi were making decisions with "strategic" implications. The thrust of the book is to demonstrate 28

Nguyen Thi Dinh, No Other Road To Take, trans. Mai Elliott (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1976), pp. 62-63. On the reaction of the Regional Committee and Le Duan to the Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters, see Kahin, Intervention, pp. 113-14. According to Kolko, Hanoi overestimated the strength of the Diem regime and was unprepared for the rapid way in which armed resistance, even on a modest scale, destroyed the GVN's rural presence and virtually compelled the insurgents to organize a dual power in the countryside. "The Party did not so much lead as provide its organizational skills to a mass movement whose sheer force soon created anxieties in the Party," he declares (Anatomy of a War, p. 103). 29 See Pike's comment on Communist "techniques for the communication of ideas to foment social strife" (Viet Cong, p. 373). In the same vein, Guenter Lewy affirms that Communist terror tactics "predictably goaded the Diem regime into stepping up its clumsily pursued and often brutal antiterrorist campaign," in America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 16.

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that the revolutionary movement was deeply rooted in the rural society of the province. '3fl There is no way at present to formulate a definitive answer to the question posed in this section. Kahin's view is pitched at a level of complexity above many of the scholars who believe that Hanoi started the war. But his treatment, with its brief commentary on numerous struggles, is only a sketch. Many a local study, encompassing social movements as well as party statements, will be required to settle the matter?1 TRIALS OF A MOVEMENT

According to Jeffrey Race, the NLF flourished in Long An, and "by early 1965 revolutionary forces had gained victory in virtually all the rural areas" of the province. Eric Bergerud's book arrives at a comparable finding. "By the end of 1965," he declares, "the NLF had won the war in Hau Nghia province." And a similar situation prevailed in My Tho and Thua Thien.32 What happened next is less clear. The 1966/67 years, during which US troops arrived on the scene, have not been studied as extensively as the pre-1965 period, the impact of the Tet Offensive has been hotly debated, and the post-Tet situation is shrouded in an even deeper obscurity. It is also now apparent that the social conditions leading to revolt in the late 1950s and early 1960s had been significantly transformed by the last years of the war. Massive rural/urban population movements and "kulak"-oriented US policies that brought tractors and fertilizers into the 30 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 15; Race, Long An, pp. 107, n.5,113, 118. Kahin cites Race to buttress his case for at least partial southern autonomy (Intervention, pp. Ill, 469, n. 44). 31 Among recent surveys, Carlyle Thayer situates his inquiry on an institutional terrain, based on a review of "the policy process at each Party plenum," in War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p. xxv. The resulting focus is too narrow for the issue being considered here, though his conclusions are often not far from the view found in Intervention. William Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-1975 (New York: Mentor, 1986), pp. 28-31, provides an interpretation in some ways overlapping Kahin's, but in the end emphasizing control from Hanoi. The contrary reading is undervalued by a discourse that is more metaphoric than analytic ("Organizations like the NLF and the PLAF did not spring like wildflowers from the tinder-dry padi fields": ibid., p. 31). Marilyn Young's complex analysis is found in The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 69ff; for other surveys, see above footnote 3. Recent critiques of US counter-insurgency strongly emphasize the autonomy of the southern movement. For example, 'The insurgent movement neither started in Hanoi nor was controlled from there," according to Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counter insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 186. 32 Race, Long An, p. 140; Bergerud, Dynamics of Defeat, p. 82. See also Hunt, "Villagers at War," pp. 33-37; and Trullinger, Village at War. Wilfred Burchett, Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (New York: Monthly Review, 1968) portrays a movement growing so rapidly in the early 1960s that its cadres were hardly able to keep up with events. The Australian Burchett is technically beyond the scope of this essay on US scholarship, but his important work influenced many radical scholars in the United States and has been largely confirmed by the local studies that appeared later. For more on this subject, see David Marr, "Burchett on Vietnam," in Burchett Reporting the Other Side of the World, 1939-1983, ed. Ben Kiernan (New York: Quartet, 1986), pp. 212-39.

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countryside called into question the NLF strategy of relying on a disinherited peasantry.^ Right after the war, it was widely assumed that the Front was crippled by Tet, and then gave way before the military might of the US and its stepped-up pacification efforts. These views were found even on the left, for example, in Noam Chomsky's affirmation that, through bombing and shelling, troop sweeps, chemical warfare, and the Phoenix Program, the US had ground down the Vietnamese Revolution in the South, thereby "winning" the war even though it was forced to withdraw from Saigon. In many accounts, the NLF disappears after 1968.34 It now appears that this assessment is too bleak. In his study of a community in Thua Thien Province, James Trullinger estimates that the NLF commanded the support of 80-85 percent of the village population in 1965-1968. After the Tet Offensive, this base shrank to about 50 percent, a retreat that allowed the Saigon regime to register a modest gain (Trullinger says its audience expanded from 5 percent to 10-15 percent) and that resulted in a much more marked increase in attentisme (the uncommitted portion of the population rose from 10-15 percent to 35-40 percent). But by 1974 the Front was back to 70 percent, almost up to pre-Tet levels.^ Trullinger's chronology of NLF fortunes stands up well when compared to the findings of other scholars. Kolko argues that the Tet Offensive imposed significant losses on the guerrillas, that desertions "reached a peak" in 1969, and that the NLF base shrank to a hard core of approximately one third of the peasantry (somewhat more pessimistic, but not too far from Trullinger's 50 percent). The gap between the NLF and the GVN was at its narrowest during those years, though even then Saigon was far from achieving parity with the revolutionaries, a view that again echoes Trullinger, as well as Bergerud, who asserts: 33

On 1966/67, see Hunt, "Villagers at War"; Harvey Meyerson, Vinh Long (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978); David Elliott and W.A. Stewart, Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dink Tuong: 1966-1967 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1969); Konrad Kellen, A- View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp in 1966-67 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1969); and, by the same author, Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale (Santa Monica: Rand, 1970); and, for a discussion of NLF military tactics in this and other phases, Tom Mangold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi (New York: Random House, 1985). On changing social conditions in the countryside, Kolko, Anatomy of a War, is, as on many key issues, the most detailed and persuasive treatment. For more on this extraordinary book, by far the best we have on the war, see David Hunt, "Freedom and Illusion in Vietnam," Radical America 20/2 & 3 (1986): 52-62. 34 George Moss's view that it was "a conventional war" after 1968 is widely accepted (Vietnam: An American Ordeal, p. 252). For a chilling portrayal of pacification, see Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages (New York: Presidio, 1982); and also Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 270. More critical studies of counterinsurgency, for example, Cable, Conflict of Myths, and Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), assume that a revolutionary victory was inevitable after the Tet Offensive and do not have much to say on subsequent events. The Rand Corporation got out of Vietnam at around the same time, and even its most astute commentators might therefore be pardoned for the excessively optimistic way they portray NLF prospects, as in Kellen, Conversations with Enemy Soldiers. Noam Chomsky's analysis is found in "Visions of Righteousness," Cultural Critique 3 (1986): 10-43. 35 Trullinger, Village at War, pp. 129,143,193.

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The American War in Vietnam Without doubt, 1969 was the best year for the allies both in Vietnam overall and in Hau Nghia province. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe 1969 as the worst year for the Front because, regardless of the outward manifestations of progress, the GVN again failed to win the freely given support of the rural population in Hau Nghia province.

1970 was a turning point, as the Cambodia invasion drew ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) forces out of the countryside, thus creating breathing room for local activists. Ngo Vinh Long's account of the NLF rebuilding after Tet in Long An Province provides further detail in support of this interpretation.^ The Communist Party "never fully recovered from the losses of political cadres during the Tet offensive," Kolko affirms, but by 1974 guerrilla organization was "not far below the 1968 level," formulations that recall Trullinger/s view that recovery (70 percent) came close to, but did not match the results achieved by the NLF in the mid1960s (80-85 percent). Emphasizing once again the primacy of grassroots politics, the Front no longer focused on the recruitment of soldiers, preferring to assign "as many new southerners as possible for political work." Progress was especially marked in the Mekong Delta, "where local forces still composed a large majority of the manpower" and where "the political infrastructure and supporters among the masses" held firm. "Given the crucial role of the Delta," Kolko concludes, the "resiliency of the local NLF remained a huge military asset." In the end, "it was this political context that made possible the Revolution's offensive strategy" and proved decisive in the last campaigns of the war.37 In 1975, according to one school of thought, troops and firepower from the North poured across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), conquered GVN fortresses in the Highlands, drove toward the sea, then rolled down the coast to Saigon. But again a closer look reveals a larger role for southerners, whose initiative brought about the liberation of Phuoc Long Province in January, and thereby touched off the chain reaction that led to the collapse of the GVN. Guerrilla units all over South Vietnam tied down ARVN forces and created uncertainty about the direction of the coming attack in the minds of Saigon strategists. Mass mobilization in the Mekong Delta prevented Thieu 36

Kolko, Anatomy of a War, pp. 371, 397; Bergerud, Dynamics of Defeat, p. 254. According to Kolko, "Despite the continuing progressive, systematic weakening of the RVN [Republic of Vietnam] in all domains, it was stronger relative to the NLF during this period [1969-71] than at any other time since 1964." But subsequent events were to prove that "it was still, despite all the Revolution's problems, far weaker in absolute terms" (Anatomy of a War, p. 398). See also Ngo Vinh Long, "The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath" (in this volume). Guenter Lewy indirectly confirms the view suggested here that the NLF was regaining ground in the last years of the war. "By 1970 well over 90 percent of all hamlets had elected councils and chiefs," he writes. But the Saigon regime was "unable to mobilize mass support in the countryside." In 1972/73, 'Thieu once again seriously weakened local self-government by abolishing authority for the election of hamlet chiefs," a move no doubt reflecting the revival of a guerrilla presence and a consequent loss of government control over electoral outcomes at the grassroots (America in Vietnam, pp. 188,218). 37 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, pp. 398,480,371,373. See also Long, 'The Tet Offensive." William Turley notes that the NLF "had been weakened" after 1968, but in 1971, "down in the villages and hamlets," it was still "exacting a fearful toll." He suggests that the 1972 Offensive restored "village and guerrilla movements to their former strength" (Second Indochina War, pp. 132 and 199; see also pp. 143ff). Herring's judgment is more guarded (the NLF's "clandestine apparatus was severely damaged," but "remained intact"), in America's Longest War, p. 232; see also p. 213.

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from falling back on a Cochinchina enclave after his forces had been routed in Central Vietnam, and the cutting of Route 4, which isolated the capital city from the people and resources of the Delta, was as telling a breakthrough as the capture of Xuan Loc. Judged defunct by many of its adversaries, the NLF played a decisive role in the "great spring victory/'38 FATE OF THE NLF

It is widely assumed, even among critics of US intervention, that NLF activists were swept aside by northerners after the end of the war. George Kahin speaks for many when he criticizes "a postwar Hanoi government whose unexpectedly rapid and rough political and economic reunification of North and South has been attended by the shunting aside or demotion of many of the most prominent and dedicated leaders of the NLF/'39 As with the Tet Offensive, however, it may be that this judgment is too summary, that the vast, dispersed, and anonymous movement represented by the Front has been able to define a place for itself more complex than a quick look might suggest. Here, too, distinguishing between the organizational and the social prompts a different way of seeing the problem. The political efforts of peasants who once rallied to the NLF are now taking different and less epic forms and therefore lie outside the scope of this essay. But it seems safe to assume that the patriots and revolutionaries of the National Liberation Front have not stopped trying to make history. This imagining of the movement in the absence of its institutional form is instructive. Before there was an NLF, there was an agrarian culture that made it possible for something like the Front to emerge. Throughout its existence, the guerrilla movement was given definition by an informal sociability, as peasants in exceptional circumstances drew on the habitual conventions that enabled them, as in the past, to negotiate individual boundaries and common projects among themselves. Along with much more thoroughly examined Marxist-Leninist party structures, this organization, this sociability, deserves attention. A stress on the relational over the institutional provides a better focus on the way in which interactions among militants, and between them and the rural population, were constantly changing, and the NLF is interpreted most surely when seen as evolving through time, as in Kahin's treatment of the revolutionary process in 1959/60 or Trullinger's graphing of mass support from 1960 to 1975. Whereas an approach that begins with policy statements and chains of command exaggerates uniformity within the Front, an examination of 38 According to Douglas Blaufarb, "by 1975 the situation in the countryside had become irrelevant to the outcome" of the war (Counterinsurgency Era, p. 270). Kolko provides a reading on the other side; on Phuoc Long, see Anatomy of a War, pp. 517-18; on guerrillas tying down ARVN forces, ibid., p. 527; on Delta revolutionaries blocking Saigon's enclave strategy, ibid., p. 536. Southerners have a role in surveys by Turley (Second Indochina War, pp. 175-77) and Young (Vietnam Wars, pp. 292-95). On the Vietnamese side, see Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review, 1977); and Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B-2 Theater, vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years' War (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast Asia Report, No. 1247, Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS) 82783, February 2,1983). 39 Kahin, Intervention, p. 120. This theme is also affirmed in Tang, A Vietcong Memoir. For a discussion of class struggle in the South after 1975, see Ngo Vinh Long, "Agrarian Differentiation in the Southern Region of Vietnam," Journal of Contemporary Asia 14 (1984): 283-305.

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popular culture in the many villages of the South has the added merit of bringing out the diversity of the NLF. An overall picture of its history will not be feasible until more local studies have been completed. The ideology behind US intervention, which one scholar has characterized as the "logic of techno war/' encouraged an imbalance, even among many critics of the war, in scholarly approaches to the guerrilla movement.^ But now, well after 1975, it should be easier to recognize that the NLF was more than a techno-bureaucratic, war-making machine. Its history, which constitutes an episode in the history of the Vietnamese countryside, remains to be written. 40

William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (Boston: Atlantic Monthly, 1986).

THE FUTURE OF THE VETERANS' LOBBY

AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT FOR SOCIAL POLICY Paul Camacho

T

he history of the perception and treatment of veterans in the United States and the conflict and turmoil surrounding the veterans' movement has always been contentious. In many cases the conflict has been over tangible goods and services. In other cases ideological issues have been at stake. The degree to which the Vietnam veterans have been activists, pressing the government and its bureaucracy over policy and programs, or merely ciphers at their mercy has rarely been explored. As a result of these conflicts over Vietnam there has occurred a tremendous amount of local/state action. This activity provides a rich arena in which to explore the reciprocal impact between the veterans and the society to which they returned. THE IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE OF THE VIETNAM DECADE

The history of relations between the generations of veterans from World War II and Vietnam has been marked by considerable conflict. This conflict has often been over values, orientations, and attitudes toward the social and political world and the social status of veterans within the larger society. The policy stands taken by the traditional veterans' lobby (particularly the American Legion) over the last five decades provide an example. Historically, one of the Legion's major efforts has always been to sponsor and advocate strong national identification through its campaigns for 100 percent Americanism and its adoption of a militant anti-Communist stand, promoting national symbols such as flag displays and advocating positive virtues.1 In particular the traditional veterans' lobby attacked the American Veterans 1

To be sure, the American Legion has not been not alone in this endeavor. In the years after World War I, the Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), together with the Hearst papers' C.H. Miller, pushed for the elimination of particular texts, or entire publications determined to be at variance with their definitions of civic virtue. The Legion facilitated publication of massive blacklists of books, press agencies, and individuals determined to be "unAmerican," and in affiliation or sympathy with Communists, pacifists, and particularly unions and their labor activities. See Col. F. Ely, Selling America (Chicago: Chicago Daily News, 1924); Stephen F. Chad wick, ISMS—A Review of Alien Isms, Revolutionary Communism and their Active Sympathizers in the United States (Indianapolis: American Legion, 1937); F.A. Keller, Straight America (New York: MacMillan, 1947); William Gellermann, The American Legion as Educator (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American

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Committee (AVC). The AVCs concentration on notions of free speech and a free press, the ballot, etc., evidently involved the kind of thinking that challenged the slogans of the traditional organizations. The growing membership and outspoken positions of the AVC infuriated the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). Those two organizations, along with the Catholic War Veterans and the Hearst news machine, attacked the AVC as a Communist front. It is somewhat ironic that Ronald Reagan, a principal leader of the new right, was once a member of the AVC2 The Vietnam antiwar protest movement increasingly challenged traditional American viewpoints of social and political life which the WWII veterans had advanced since 1948. Yet the traditional lobby insulated themselves by holding the protest movement in contempt, characterizing the protesters as Communist sympathizers, and denying them any legitimacy as "real Americans/' The conflict between the generations of veterans became manifest after the Tet Offensive in 1968 as the first great bulge of returning soldiers brought the bad news of the Vietnam situation home with them. The subsequent involvement of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in the antiwar movement had a great emotional impact on the WWII veterans' community. Participation of Vietnam veterans in numerous antiwar demonstrations and the Winter Soldier Hearings on atrocities and other war crimes which the WAW held in Detroit in 1971 brought intra-veteran relations to the boiling point. The presence of Vietnam veterans in the antiwar movement lent veteran legitimacy to a vilified opposition of the "American way." The shield of insulation from the reality of Vietnam was shattered for old-guard veterans. The majority of the WWII generation of veterans saw their entire array of symbols and orientations of meaning—their very world views—brought into question. This state of affairs was directly related to the damage inflicted by the Vietnam War upon the honored status of veterans. The VVAW, in particular, and the younger veterans in general, were accused by their fathers and uncles of losing the war and being "un-American." ^ The most vivid illustration of this conflict was laid out in the Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954); Victor Lasky, ed., The American Legion Reader (New York: Hawthorn, 1953). Throughout the decades, a large body of publications have appeared on the veteran phenomenon. Works critical of the traditional veterans lobby include: Marcus Duffield, King Legion (New York: Cape and Smith, 1931); R. Seelye Jones, A History of the American Legion (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1947); Justin Gray with V.H. Bernstein, The Inside Story of the Legion (New York: Boni & Gaer, 1948); Dorothy Culp, 'The American Legion: A Study in Pressure Politics," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1942; Richard Servero and Lewis Milford, The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Came Home—from Valley Forge to Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); on the other side are Roscoe Baker's American Legion and Foreign Policy and Victor Lasky's The American Legion Reader, which lauds the Legion's Cold War role, as well as Raymond Moley, Jr., The American Legion Story (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1966), which was endorsed by J. Edgar Hoover. Two other accounts of the Legion and its work up to WWII are Bessie L. Pierce, Civic Organizations and Civic Training of Youth (New York: Scribner's, 1933) and Marquis Jones, A History of the American Legion (New York: Macmillan, 1947). 2 See Servero and Milford, The Wages of War. 3 The VVAW was especially singled out because of its leadership and participation in antiwar demonstrations. If anything, its war crimes' seminar in Detroit in 1971 sealed its status in the eyes of the traditional lobby. See The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes, by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (Toronto: Free Press, 1972).

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front pages of the Philadelphia newspapers in 1976. During the height of the Legionnaires' disease crisis, VFW state officials accused "terrorists" of deliberately initiating germ warfare, directly citing the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.4 A WAR OF NUMBERS

Though this generational conflict has somewhat diminished at the grass-roots level, it has in other ways intensified among the leadership elements. A majority of Vietnam veterans, in the judgement of this author, particularly those with a history of involvement in the movement, generally oppose the standard positions taken by the mainline organizations on domestic and foreign policy issues. One principal point here involves the numbers game. During the 1970s, the traditional organizations—the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), Disabled American Veterans (DAV), and to some extent the American Veterans (AMVETS)—all claimed large numbers of Vietnam veterans in their membership. Vietnam veterans' activists would rarely challenge the truth of this claim; rather they would say (did say then, and to some extent still say) that it was irrelevant. Vietnam veterans joined those organizations for two reasons: (1) to use the local club facilities, and (2) to utilize the services they offered in representing the veteran before the Veterans' Administration Rating Boards in connection with disability hearings, which were (are) required for any disability and compensation awards. In contrast, the pocket Vietnam veterans' organizations never claimed more than a few thousand members. Even the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), the most well known of the Vietnam organizations and one of the few surviving, has claimed only 43,000 members. It would be reasonable for those not knowledgeable of the situation to ask, for example: if the animosity was so great then (1) why would Vietnam veterans join the traditional organizations? Did other private and public clubs not exist, nor other means of representation at the board hearings? and (2) why would the traditional organizations tolerate their entry—if they were hated so much? I would respond that, first of all, virtually all these clubs, which were (are) very local and very inexpensive neighborhood establishments, are operated locally. They consist of blood relations, generations of friends, etc. Second, those clubs needed the new membership, and encouraged it—new members meant new revenues. Third, the more significant arena for arguments over issues, values, etc. was at the federal and state level—not in the local clubs. Fourth, the national organizations were (are) in competition with each other for preeminence, and have a history of rivalry; further, their claim to legitimacy before the government and the general public is that 4

See "V.F.W. Suspects Plot in Disease," Philadelphia Daily News, August 5,1976, p. 4. Phrases utilized by those representatives of the traditional veterans' lobby quoted in the paper included "certain groups infiltrating " and "you know who they are." Groups identified by Executive-Board member John Capitolo included among others, "Vietnam Veterans Against the War." All units of the American Legion, from local posts through state organizations, have an executive board which consists of past commanders and other elected Legion officials. They constitute a powerful advisory team to the present office holders. In Massachusetts, from 1973 to early 1978, virtually all the organizing efforts of the Vietnam veterans were condemned, attacked, and/or checked by the state adjutants, and many district and even local leaders of the American Legion, VFW, and the Disabled American Veterans (DAV). From 1978 to 1981 some gains were made in spite of their strident opposition.

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they provide services to veterans, which necessarily include Vietnam veterans. Fifth, these organizations had, and still have, a virtual lock on representing the veteran before the Veterans' Administration. Only recently has any sort of judicial review been in place for veterans. Also, a standing law prohibits a veteran from paying legal counsel more than $10 for representation before the agency. This creates a situation where, for all practical purposes, the only entities willing to represent the veteran have been the veterans7 organizations, and thus these organizations are the only entities to which the veteran can appeal for help.5 Also, disability compensation for Vietnam veterans was never a controversial issue between the different generations of veterans. What was at issue was compensation for particular disabilities such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Agent Orange (which are now recognized, but were not recognized during the early and mid 1970s). More controversial issues, such as programs for incarcerated veterans, programs for discharge upgrade, etc., which local-state groups such as the Vietnam Era Veterans' Association (VEVA) were pushing at that time, were then (and in some cases still are) adamantly opposed by the traditional organizations. In short, the activists among the Vietnam veterans' community all formed their own organizations because the mainstream organizations refused to deal with these controversial issues, which threatened the status quo in valuational or tangible terms.^ FROM SUPER-DEVIANT TO SUPER-HERO

Yet despite the participation of the VVAW, the antiwar movement and its liberal sympathizers viewed Vietnam veterans in general as consumers of the old ideology; VVAW participants were the exception to the general rule. Thus, on one hand, Vietnam veterans endured open social rebuke for their participation as soldiers in the war, while, on the other, they were despised by the older generation of veterans for being unable to secure victory. There is a cliche among Vietnam veterans: "Liberals hated us for killing, and conservatives for not killing enough." Publicly they were not welcomed home by either Hawks or Doves; they came to be a pariah status group. 5

The reader should understand the following. Any citizen seeking redress from any federal agency has a right to litigate that issue in court. Anyone, that is, except a veteran trying to appeal a Veterans Administration (VA) decision. The fact is that, unlike any other citizen, or even non-citizen, who has judicial rights against any federal agency—for example, a Haitian refugee appealing his deportation by the immigration service—a veteran had, until very recently, no legal course of action, no right to the judicial process against the VA. Vietnam veterans lobbied for this right for years in the face of opposition from the traditional veterans organizations (which, because of this arrangement, had control over representation of the veteran before the VA). The best that the Vietnam veterans could do was get a weaker form of judicial review passed through the legislature in September 1988. The Court of Veterans' Appeals was established as a last resort for the veteran against the VA. Even so, the Vietnam Veterans of America and many others involved consider the passage a step back, a derailment of what Vietnam veterans needed before the VA. So typical of the process, it was the best that could be done. See Richard Cowen, "Government Operations—Panel Agrees to Judicial Review for Veterans/' Congressional Quarterly, September 17,1988, p. 2590. 6 For example see Richard P. Fox, "Military Discharge Review Goes Nation-Wide," Case & Comment, July-August 1977, pp. 38-43. The more the traditional lobby saw these kinds of issues brought up the more angry it became.

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The media in general, and the televised media in particular, accentuated this negative reception by tagging the Vietnam veterans with a number of deviant labels. Prime-time television police dramas featured episodes in which the principal deviant was a Vietnam veteran.7 Vietnam veterans began to call this phenomenon the "Kojak syndrome"—if there has been a bizarre crime, check out all recently discharged Vietnam veterans. From the industry's viewpoint this was merely market exploitation of a created exotic type. Yet labeling Vietnam veterans as low-level symbols had very significant and detrimental consequences, creating an atmosphere of discrimination whereby these veterans as a status group were literally shut out of society. The public perception was that they were drugged-out, unemployable psycho deviants, a perception that was articulated by Tom Wicker of the New York Times when he noted in an editorial that the returning soldiers had the "Vietnam Disease/'8 As a result of this discrimination, Vietnam veterans suffered from a policy of official neglect for over a decade. From the very beginning the Veterans Administration's delivery of health and education services to the new veterans was inadequate.^ In the mid 1970s the Carter 35 percent mandate for Vietnam veterans in Title VI Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs was constantly stonewalled—less than 3 percent of those employment opportunities were afforded to Vietnam veterans. Two other national employment programs, Help through Industry Retraining and Employment (HIRE) I and HIRE II, were miserable failures 7

See for example, the T.V. Guide note for "Caribe: Crime Drama—Vietnam Vet Takes Island Hostages," for 10 p.m., May 12,1975. 8 The following are just a few examples of news and journal articles which revolved around the impact of homecoming, guilt, and tragedy on the nation and its veterans. See Robert Keeley and Paul Sullivan, '^et's Nightmare Erupts in Shooting," Boston Herald American, May 9,1978, pp. 1, 9; Tom Wicker, 'The Vietnam Disease," New York Times, May 27, 1975; Caryl Rivers, 'The Vertigo of Homecoming," Nation, December 17,1973, pp. 646-49; Tracy Kidder, "Soldiers of Misfortune," The Atlantic Monthly, March 1978, pp. 41-42, 87-90; G. Lewy, "Vietnam: New Light on the Question of American Guilt," Commentary 65 (Fall 1978): 29-49; Seymour Leventman, "Official Neglect of Vietnam Veterans," Journal of Social Issues 31/4 (1975). ^ Life magazine ran a pictorial expose* on the conditions in VA hospitals—garbage and rats in the wards and rooms. See Charles Childs, "Assignment to Neglect," Life 68/19 (May 22,1970), pp. 24-31. In addition, there were tremendous fights between veterans' advocates on campus and the VA over advance payments. For the most part these advocates were coordinators for the Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Veterans Cost of Instruction Program which was established at various campuses across the nation to assist veterans in college. Starting in 1973 and continuing through the decade, the VA formed and maintained Veterans Advisory Boards, part of the purpose of which was to air grievances and discuss procedures in connection to GI Bill payments. Throughout the several years of my participant observation on the Region I Advisory Board, educational payments were always an issue. The HEW coordinators formed a group called NAVPA—the National Association of Veterans Programs Administrators, which still exists. The VA was totally unprepared for the educational crunch and (at that time) was suffering for its lack of foresight. It had been attacked by the Nader Report—see Paul Starr, The Discarded Army: Veterans After Vietnam (New York: Charterhouse, 1973)—and by a Twentieth Century Task Force Fund which called for the integration of veterans programs into the general social welfare system. See Michael K. Taussig, Those Who Served: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Policies Toward Veterans (New York: Twentieth-Century Fund, 1974). On the education issue, the VA was humiliated by a Princeton University study which it commissioned. See Report of Educational Testing Service, Princeton University, on Educational Assistance Programs for Veterans (House Committee print No. 81, 93rd Congress, 1st Session) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

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as well.10 Further, even though there was more than ample evidence that many Vietnam veterans were suffering from severe trauma associated with the war, PTSD was routinely ignored as a illness by the Veterans Administration until after the American Psychiatric Association officially mandated its recognition as part of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1979. Even now however, only 10 percent of those who have applied for PTSD compensation have been awarded a claim. With the advent of affirmative action and the end of the war, many of those who had been involved with the civil rights and antiwar movements became somewhat complacent. This provided an opportunity for a virulent conservative backlash, which arrived as a politically orientated and evangelical movement of the "new right/' The very heart of its attack concerned the notion of American values, i.e. the direction the nation should be taking, or what America "stands for." The Reagan administration, along with the "new right," and accompanied by southern and other conservative Democrats, pushed to regain and consolidate control over these symbolic definitions. One strategy to bring this about was the Yellow Ribbon Campaign to welcome the returning Iranian hostages. In response to this, Vietnam veterans staged several demonstrations to draw attention to the lack of homecoming afforded them and the subsequent policy of official neglect. Several of the returning Iranian hostages sympathetic to the Vietnam veterans (two had served in Vietnam) publicly reiterated this point.11 These actions helped change the social conditions, breaking the atmosphere of stigma and discrimination against the Vietnam veterans. Simultaneously there was a change in marketing strategy in Hollywood which extended the life of (and ultimately the profits derived from) the exotic character of the war. Television and movies changed the portrayal of Vietnam veterans from psycho deviants to victimized populist heros. Certainly "Billy Jack" and "Rambo" are good examples. Public perception and the real social/political situation began to change. Vietnam veterans were no longer social lepers. In addition, news of the contamination of the soldiers/veterans by chemicals such as Agent Orange and dapsone 10 Interview with Richard Brennen, then State Director for Veterans Employment and Training, US Department of Labor, Summer 1985. At the state level in Massachusetts, the Office of the Commissioner of Veterans Services as late as 1982 had not one Vietnam veteran among its approximately 300 veteran service agents, or on its central staff, much less any programs. They were pressured to hire one in 1983. This was one of the findings of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Special Commission on the Concerns of the Vietnam Veterans. See "Interim and Final Report of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Special Commission on the Concerns of the Vietnam Veterans," (Senate 1824 and Senate 2307, January 24,1983 and December 30,1983). For a good snapshot of the status of veterans' employment in Massachusetts during that time see Francis Cahill, and John Watson, "Massachusetts Labor Market Information on Veterans" (Labor Area Research Publication, Job Market Research Service, Massachusetts Division of Employment, 1979). 11 For example, there was a Associated Press story of February 10, 1981 concerning the protests of the yellow ribbon campaign by Vietnam veterans and the sympathetic reaction of Iranian hostage Donald Cooke of Tennessee. Another example is a "metro scene" feature article written by Jeremiah Murphy of the Boston Globe, February 8,1981, entitled "We Already Had Heroes." "Well, we had our heroes, the veterans of the Tet offensive, Hamburger Hill, Marine firebase Ross in the DMZ, but we didn't recognize them. We turned our backs on them... and blamed them for the policies that were actually set in the White House. The Vietnam veterans paid the price for the mistakes made by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon."

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was just breaking in major newspapers,12 which portrayed the veterans as victims of big business. These events combined to create an atmosphere, albeit warped, of social acceptance. It was this passing moment that the Vietnam veterans seized as a window of opportunity to press their agenda. VIETNAM VETERANS IN MASSACHUSETTS

The narrative description provided below of a few of the events which took place in Massachusetts illustrates the rich but for most part invisible history of political action of Vietnam veterans throughout the United States. Activism by Vietnam veterans in Massachusetts began with the WAW in 1969. Though that organization began to unravel in 1972, much of the elan which it generated became established on various campuses across the state. Most of this veteran population was clustered in the state university and state college system: approximately 2,500 students in the early- and mid-1970s at the University of Massachusetts at Boston were Vietnam veterans. In coalition with Health, Education and Welfare directors of the Veterans' Cost of Instruction (VCIP) program, Vietnam veterans from Massachusetts campuses and other campuses across the nation organized a demonstration in Washington protesting GI Bill inadequacies. Organizational capabilities tended to ebb and flow with the semester calender. To overcome this limitation several activists began to organize within their respective communities across the state. In 1978 a coalition group formalized itself as the Vietnam Era Veterans Association. Simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, other Vietnam veterans' groups began to appear. At this point Vietnam veteran participation in the public space was limited to participation in the Veterans-Day Parade in Boston. In fact the adjutant of the American Legion offered his assistance.13 It appeared that the system was now open. Following the Boston Veterans-Day Parade of 1978, the dozen veterans who constituted the core leadership of the Vietnam veteran activists met at the Arlington Street Church in Boston and decided to pursue three goals simultaneously: participation on the Governor's Advisory Board, space in the State House, and the establishment of an Agent Orange Commission.^ THE GOVERNOR'S VETERANS ADVISORY BOARD: CRABMEAT LUNCHEONS AND AGENT ORANGE

On August 9, 1979, Governor Edward J. King signed executive order No. 162, which created a Governor's Advisory Committee on Veteran Affairs. This was done to fulfill a campaign promise made in 1978 to the state leadership of the traditional veterans' organizations. However, the order provided membership to the Advisory Committee for the recently formed Massachusetts Vietnam Era Veterans' Association 12 See John C. White's "Experts Puzzled by Agent Orange/' Chicago Sun Times, November 6, 1982, or "National Disgrace on Agent Orange," ibid. 13 This was a significant change because just the previous year (1977) Vietnam veterans could only participate unofficially by tagging onto the end of the parade formation, and for their effort they were hissed and booed by those on the reviewing stand. One screamed "... the real veterans have all passed now." 14 All the major veterans organizations in Massachusetts have the privilege of office space in the State House.

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and the Afro-American Veterans. Members of the advisory board from the VFW, the American Legion, and DAV were quiet on the issue of the Afro-American Veterans, but vocal in their opposition to the inclusion of the Vietnam Era Veterans Association. They claimed large Vietnam and Vietnam-Era veteran membership in their organizations, and therefore viewed themselves as more appropriate representatives of Vietnam veterans than was the Vietnam Era Veterans' Association. ^ At the April 1980 meeting, each of the traditional veterans groups on the advisory board was concerned that the governor make some symbolic gesture demonstrating his recognition of the importance of, and his respect for, veterans' status and issues,16 and they viewed his hosting a crabmeat luncheon for their respective National Commanders and fifty invited guests as such a gesture. At the following meeting in May 1980, the sole Vietnam veteran member requested that several issues of concern to Vietnam veterans be placed on the agenda. These included staple issues such as education and employment, and particular issues such as Agent Orange and PTSD. The representatives of the Marine Corps League, the VFW, and the American Legion adamantly opposed inclusion of these issues, which were readjustment issues totally alien to the members of the traditional lobby. The traditional organizations were not geared to address any of these issues, and appeared to be somehow threatened by their being discussed. The credibility of the Vietnam veteran member, Vietnam veterans in general, and the legitimacy of these concerns as viable issues were attacked.1'7 More moderate members had to intercede to quell the shouting. Several months later (February 1981), the Vietnam veteran member was allowed to address the board. He was accompanied by two other activists. This presentation of issues, and particularly the request for addi15

The Afro-American Veterans and the Vietnam Era Veterans' Association were included by the governor because one of his advisors, George Collates, the Commissioner of Veterans Services, was astute enough to point out to him the hazards of racism charges if he excluded the Afro-American Veterans, and that, as far as the Vietnam Era Veterans' Association was concerned, it would be better for others to be the "bad guys/' The Afro-American Veterans were not significantly active at that point, certainly not in a way visible to the "white" leadership of the old guard. The Massachusetts Vietnam Era Veterans Association was another story. Its principal organizer, Bradford Burns of Dartmouth, MA, was very aggressive in his efforts. He was the potential representative, but was refused membership because he had an arrest record. Presumably everyone was investigated, so as not to embarrass the governor. See Paul R. Camacho, "From Quasi Caste to Interest Group: The Vietnam Veteran and the Future of the Veterans Lobby," PhD dissertation, Boston College, 1986, for a more thorough treatment and documentation. *6 As 1980 came to a close, several more tangible issues came to the foreground. These included (1) the appointment of the new commandant of the Chelsea Old Soldier's Home, (2) changes relative to veterans' preference under Civil Service, (3) luncheons for official visits by national commanders, (4) the rebuff of a request that the governor assign someone in his office as a liaison for veterans issues, and finally (5) a position that no legislation pertaining to veterans be signed without input from the Governor's Veterans Advisory Board. ^ The familiar pattern of argument between the generations of veterans was unfolding; regardless of the issue at hand the traditional veterans always reduced the agenda to the lost war, the perceived clash of values, and the fact that Vietnam veterans protested the war. The Vietnam veterans were asked why they didn't back the country and support the president. Since they refused to bow to the simplistic slogans of the traditional organizations they were undeserving and illegitimate. It was the standard method by which those in control of the traditional organizations have sidestepped the conflict of veterans' issues, i.e. readjustment and reintegration versus prestige and pensions.

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tional (Hispanic) representation on the board, created great consternation among the mainline representatives. The spokesman for the Marine Corps League gave a long speech about how they, the Marine Corps League and the other traditional veterans' organizations, represented all veterans, while the American Legion representative mentioned the need to be nationally chartered. In rebuttal, the Vietnam veterans pointed out that other ethnic groups were represented on the Board, i.e. Italian, Polish, and Jewish-American veterans organizations, and argued that Hispanic veterans had a similar right. After some difficulty a member of the Hispanic veterans' group was allowed to address the entire board, and his very heavy Hispanic/Puerto Rican accent caused great consternation. The Vietnam veterans had to translate his Hispanic English into middle-class English so the members of the traditional organizations could understand. They all were vocal in their shock. The American Legion representative exclaimed, "... how did he get into the Army. I thought you had to be... huh, is he a citizen?" Members of these traditional organizations had forgotten that in many cases the European ethnic groups of the 1930s and early 1940s had a similar language barrier and accent, and that, for many, citizenship was secured by serving in World War II. After the presentation, the meeting was adjourned. As the Vietnam veterans left they could still hear the older generation of veterans talking to each other, "... How'd he get in the Army? Jesus Christ, what's going on?" STONEWALLED AT THE STATE HOUSE BY THE AMERICAN LEGION

The effort to secure space in the statehouse began in May 1979. The principal strategy was to gain visibility and subsequently a legitimate voice in veterans' affairs. Vietnam veterans sent several letters to the Superintendent of Buildings and to the traditional veterans organizations, particularly the American Legion. Following this, the activists visited the traditional organizations, located on the fifth floor in the State House, and asked for the assistance they adamantly offered a few months earlier. While there, they noticed that there still was an office with the Spanish American War Veterans logo on one door. The adjutants of the American Legion, VFW, and DAV were asked for help in securing or sharing that space. However, within five working days that office was scrubbed—the logo gone. The adjutant from the American Legion noted that "valuable documents were being stored there" and the veterans could not possibly share the use of it. Despite the assistance of a few sympathetic state representatives, the opposition of the American Legion adjutant and others in control of the traditional lobby in Massachusetts prevailed. It would take another two-and-a-half years of sustained effort to secure office space for a coalition of Vietnam veterans' organizations. The Vietnam Veterans' Day ceremony of March 29, 1981 at the State House brought the Vietnam veterans in Massachusetts to the threshold of achieving their goal. A legislator from the Cape Cod area had helped the veterans secure a proclamation from the Governor in 1978 declaring March 29 Vietnam Veterans' Day. The activist in charge of the annual event scheduled the ceremony to take place in the

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State House Hall of Flags and invited participants from both generations.18 This helped create institutional support. One of the speakers focused on the passage of one piece of legislation, HR 1024, which provided space in the State House for Vietnam veterans, pointing out that the present ceremony was an important symbolic event but meant nothing without HR 1024, and that passage of that bill was a crucial litmus test of the strength of the present symbolic commitment. The speaker closed his remarks with the Marine Corps phrase "Semper Fidelis" and threw up a clenched fist salute as he said it. There was an immediate reaction. The Vietnam veterans cheered and threw up the power salute, shouting the phrase Semper Fidelis. All that was impromptu; the speeches earlier on had everyone worked up, these comments focused on the Bill and moved back to the symbol. Fortunately, Thomas W. McGee, (then) Speaker of the House for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, attended the ceremony and, as a former Marine who had served in the Iwo Jima campaign, he became caught up in the emotion. One veteran pointed out, "You should have seen it, there was the Speaker of the House jumping out of his chair and throwing up the power salute." Immediately after this the Speaker was introduced; he went to the microphone and said, "You guys'll get space in the State House—whatever it takes, if that Bill passes or not, I swear it, so help me God guys." The roar of applause was deafening, and could be heard outside on Beacon Street. The Vietnam veterans had hit it just right. They had consciously constructed the scene, inviting players whose views were known, and when expressed would provide the atmosphere of institutional acceptance. The adjutants of the mainline organizations were furious. An agreement was finally hammered out and articles of incorporation drawn up with assistance from the Speaker's Office, which formally established an umbrella organization, the Vietnam Veterans of Massachusetts Incorporated (VVMI). Towards the end of Summer 1981 there still had been no action. During the Fall the veterans made several calls, but staff persons, influenced by the traditional lobby, blocked access to the Speaker. Finally, after the activists threatened to stage a demonstration, the case was again brought before the Speaker and the remaining technical difficulties worked out.^ The space was dedicated and a press conference held on November 11,1981. VIETNAM VETERAN INFLUENCE IN ESTABLISHING AND FUNDING THE SPECIAL COMMISSION

The effort to establish a joint legislative commission to look into the Agent Orange question began in 1979. A group of core activists created a series of public meetings entitled "Agent Orange Jamborees" which were held in the city of 18

Even General George Fatten, Jr. was there. When he spoke, he talked about "blood on the sword." The old guard veterans loved it, while the antiwar veterans (most of the activists in the Vietnam community) shook their heads in amazement.

™ The Speaker was legitimately worried about every pocket group in the state asking for

space. The outcome of this discussion was an agreement that an umbrella organization would be formed. The principal difficulty was over the inclusion of "Era" veterans in the membership. This "Era" versus "Theater" distinction has often been referred to as "grunt chauvinism." Era veterans served in the military between August 5,1964 and May 7,1975, while theater veterans were in the war zone. It is a unique distinction, unknown to previous conflicts; how, why, and where it originated is uncertain.

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Brookline. Accompanying these were a set of musical fund-raising events, "Agent Orange Jamboree Jams." These events generated a surprising amount of public awareness in the metropolitan Boston area. Several pieces of appropriate legislation were filed over the next two years, but all died in the Ways and Means Committee. Another route began to open up in 1981. A Vietnam veteran working in the Lt. Governor's office secured support for the effort. In turn, through the Lt. Governor, the concept of a commission was brought to the attention of the Speaker, the Senate President, and the Governor, who was already somewhat attuned to some of the problems of Vietnam veterans by way of the Governor's Veterans Advisory Board. Now he agreed to form a commission. He appointed several Vietnam veterans as members by late Summer 1981. There was, however, no funding. In a speech during the dedication of office space for Vietnam Veterans of Massachusetts Inc., a Vietnam veteran pointed out that a Commission without funding was perhaps worse than none at all, and that this was an election year. Plenty of media were on hand and the remarks were reported in all the local news programs at 6 P.M. Whether or not the Governor was influenced by this is uncertain, but that same afternoon he provided $100,000 for the Special Commission.20 The Commission which was established broadened its scope through the leadership of the Senate chairman, who was very committed to veterans' issues. Eight general hearings were held for the Vietnam veteran community, each located in a different city of the Commonwealth. In addition, five special hearings were held on specific issues such as Agent Orange, employment, and housing. There was a toll-free hotline and dozens of bill-boards announcing the Commission, over 350 pieces of individual correspondence being transmitted during its lifetime. The Commission (The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Special Commission on the Concerns of Vietnam Veterans, Senator Francis D. Doris-Revere, Chairman) was one of the most successful efforts of the Massachusetts Vietnam veteran activists. A full Senate report (2307) was filed in December 1983; it contained a large number of recommendations, a number of which were implemented. For example, through the work of the Commission, legislative appropriations were secured for the establishment of a state Agent Orange program. Also, a network of community-based Vietnam Veterans' Outreach Centers was established to augment the federal effort, and funding was recommended for the William Joiner Center at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. Perhaps one of the most innovative projects was the development of the "Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Annual Conference on the Concerns of the Vietnam Veterans."21 20

Certainly no one could be sure that the media would report the incident, but an election year was coming up and his lieutenant governor had alerted the governor to Vietnam veterans as a constituency. At any rate the governor invited the activists to his office immediately afterwards. When the need for funding was again addressed, he turned to a staff person and said, "Pull $100,000 out of the discretionary (budget) for this, will you." Needless to say a cheer arose from the twenty-five veterans present. 21 This was the original name of the conference beginning during the tenure of Speaker O'Neill, and through that of Speaker Wright. The veterans were unable to establish links with the Office of Speaker Foley. Therefore, the conference became sponsored by several members of the Massachusetts delegation and members of other delegations such as Lane Evans of Illinois. It is currently referred to as the Annual Conference on the Concerns of Veterans and is scheduled during the first week of May in Washington.

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The generational and ideological conflict described above represents a tiny fraction of the social and political activity by Vietnam veterans at the local, state, and national level. The emphasis has been on the interchange between a constituent class and political/bureaucratic institutions. The account raises some interesting questions, particularly with respect to the depth and intensity of the schism between the generations of veterans. Is this (1) just a matter of local and individual power contests among those seeking to control the same sector of public concern; or is it (2) a reflection of a deep ideological break with much broader consequences; or (3) is it a combination of the two? At the local level the conflict may concern the distribution of goods and services allocated to veterans. For example, the older generation is facing serious geriatric health care requirements. Vietnam veterans need more services in the area of education, retraining, employment, housing, and long-term commitment to the Veterans' Outreach Center program. Given the rise in national and state deficits, shrinking revenues, and constricting budgets, competition is inevitable. It has had an impact on the structure and allocation of an entire array of tangible goods and services as encompassed by the Veterans Administration and a number of other bureaucratic agencies providing social services. The Small Business Administration's veterans' program, and the Title IV-C (the veterans sector) of the Federal Job Training Act are just two examples. It is not a question of the neglect of the past, but of control of the services and programs for the future which is at stake. Veterans are not only in competition with each other, but with other constituency groups—all seeking government services. Thus arguments about social suffering, rights, benefits, societal obligations, etc. often become paramount. In the past the veterans have held an honored position in view of their special relationship to the vague but politically powerful notions of "patriotism," "100 percent Americanism/' and "the national interest." For the Vietnam veterans, influence over these basic symbolic notions and terms is the very essence of their inheritance, the basis of their claim for exerting influence in the policy arena. On a broader scale, control over the history and meaning of Vietnam, as well as control over what valuational or ideological lessons are drawn from that experience, are at stake. In turn, these notions about Vietnam and its meaning have potential consequences for society's attitude toward future domestic and foreign policy priorities. What role will the Vietnam veterans play in this? Will they be able to influence scholarship concerning the war in Vietnam and war in general? If so, what direction will this take? Will they become as strong an arm supporting the movement toward peace and disarmament as the traditional veterans lobby has been for increased defense spending and Third World intervention? The path is unclear. Vietnam veterans have the potential to be at the very forefront of significant political power and social policy change in matters which extend far beyond the notion of veteran benefits and reach deep into the symbolic orientations of America. Conversely, they may totally fail and slip into "other minority" status and from there skid into consequent obscurity. Or they may fall between these extremes and effect particular, though limited, institutional change. These scenarios suggest themselves given the myriad problems they face and the history of the politics of Vietnam veterans' affairs. Four problematic areas stand out; they are ideology, race, class, and organization. Ideological problems, in addition to being the back-

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bone of the dispute between the generations of veterans, have also caused turmoil within the Vietnam generation. For many Vietnam veterans, the disjuncture between the reality of our conduct in Vietnam and the myths which sent us there is too painful to confront. Consequently these veterans retrench themselves in the mindset of the new right. For others the disjuncture creates bitterness and alienation and often a motivation to move left of center. However, there is no welcome from the liberal or progressive camp. The problem of race was one of the most emotional, and as yet unresolved, issues of the war years. It is encouraging that a dialogue among Black and White veterans has at least begun. Levels of distrust are high, but there is potential for negotiation and the development of horizontal networks, because staple interests such as education, training, employment, and housing are on the line for members of essentially the same socio-economic class. The difficulties of class and organization are closely tied. Veterans are found in all walks of life from "street vets" to attorneys, from construction workers to doctors, from part-time small businessmen to corporate investment officers. Further, a number of Vietnam veterans serve in the various state legislatures and in Congress.^ As a social movement, Vietnam veterans have begun to develop a politically aware leadership cadre which demonstrated its capability throughout the Reagan years. Yet whether Vietnam veterans can come to exert a significant influence in the social and political arena remains to be seen. This must be accomplished within the next decade or the window of opportunity to control their own history will close. The task of forging solid vertical and horizontal networks among the various tiers and sectors of the community, and of developing comprehensive strategies and tactics which will free them from the atmosphere of crisis management has begun, but not yet ended. Also, they need to capitalize more fully on their symbolic gains of recent years. With significant improvement in organization they could overcome their deficiencies and become a powerful political force. 22 In 1987-88 this author conducted one informal survey which identified 302 Vietnam and Vietnam-Era legislators in thirty-six states. At the federal level, there are now four Senators and twelve Congressmen with Vietnam veteran status, and four Senators and twenty-four Congressmen with Vietnam-Era (served in the military between August 5, 1964 and May 7, 1975) veteran status. Though far below the levels of the previous decades, eight Senators and thirty-six Representatives with such status is not insignificant. Those legislators have organized a Vietnam Veterans' Caucus which is becoming a cohesive force.

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GLOSSARY AMVETS

American Veterans, service organization founded after World War II

ARVN

Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the military forces of the Saigon regime

AVC

American Veterans Committee, progressive organization formed after World War II

CETA

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, federal Title VI employment program for veterans

COSVN

Central Office for South Vietnam, NLF headquarters, conceived by the Americans as the "Pentagon" of the guerrilla military effort

DAV

Disabled American Veterans, primarily concerned with health care issues

DMZ

Demilitarized zone, created at the 17th parallel to stop North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam

DRV

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the independent Vietnamese government proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in September 1945; the government of the northern half of Vietnam from 1954 to 1976

GVN

Government of Vietnam, established by the French in 1949 (also known as the "Bao Dai Government" or the "Republic of Vietnam"); later the government of South Vietnam from 1954 to 1975

HIRE

Help through Industry Retraining and Employment, federal employment program for veterans

HES

Hamlet Evaluation System, employed by the Americans to measure the progress of pacification

MAC/V

Military Assistance Command/Vietnam, command headquarters for US military forces in Vietnam

NLF

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, grouping opponents of the Ngo Dinh Diem Regime and of the US military presence, established in December 1960

NVA

North Vietnamese Army, also known as the People's Army of Vietnam

PAVN

People's Army of Vietnam, the army of the DRV

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PL

Pathet Lao, the liberation front of Laos

PLA

People's Liberation Army, armed force of the Chinese guerrilla movement and, after 1949, of the PRC

PLAF

People's Liberation Armed Forces, the army of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

PRC

People's Republic of China, established in October 1949

PRG

Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, set up by the NLF in June 1969

RLG

Royal Laotian Government, allied with the United States

RVN

Republic of Vietnam, also known as the GVN

PTSD

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a psychological reaction to combat trauma

SRV

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, government of reunited Vietnam, created in 1976

VA

Veterans Administration, federal agency responsible for veterans benefits and services

VEVA

Vietnam Era Veterans Assocation, progressive veterans' organization

VCIP

Veterans Cost of Instruction Program, federal program providing funds for campus services to help veterans complete GI bill paperwork

VFW

Veterans of Foreign Wars, conservative lobbying organization

VPA

Vietnamese People's Army; see PLAF

VVA

Vietnam Veterans of America, the most well-known Vietnam veterans organization

VVAW

Vietnam Veterans Against the War, oppositional grouping of soldiers and veterans formed in 1969

VVMI

Vietnam Veterans of Massachusetts Incorporated, umbrella organization of Vietnam veterans' groups in Massachusetts

VWP

Vietnamese Workers' Party, one of the names of the Communist Party of Vietnam, founded in 1930

CONTRIBUTORS Paul Camacho is Associate Director of the William Joiner Center at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. Originally from Cambridge, MA, Dr. Camacho served in Vietnam as a Marine infantry sergeant and was wounded in action. Following the war, he returned to Boston College and finished his undergraduate work and subsequently his Masters and PhD in sociology. He has conducted a number of surveys and published several articles on veterans' issues. David Hunt is Associate Professor of History and Co-Director of the William Joiner Center at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He is the author of Parents and Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early Modern France and of articles on peasants and revolutions in France and Vietnam. George McT. Kahin is Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies Emeritus at Cornell University. He is author of Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam and co-author of The United States in Vietnam. Ngo Vinh Long is Associate Professor of History at the University of Maine at Orono. He is the author of Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants Under the French, co-editor of Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the War, and author of many articles on the history of Vietnam and the Vietnam War. Gareth Porter is Director of International Programs for the Environmental and Energy Study Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism and A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Peace Atreement and the editor of Vietnam: A History in Documents. Dr. Porter has been on the faculty of the School of International Service, the American University; City University of New York; and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Jayne Werner is Associate Professor of Political Science at Long Island University and Associate Research Scholar at Columbia University. She is the author of Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasants and Priests in the Cao Dai in Vietnam, and editor (with Luu Doan Huynh) of The Vietnam War. Allen Whiting is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona. He is the author of China Eyes Japan and The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam, as well as other works. He served in the Department of State as Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, 1962-1966.

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