Text, History, and Philosophy: Abhidharma Across Buddhist Scholastic Traditions 2016013224, 2016022593, 9789004316669, 9789004318823

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
List of Figure and Tables
Notes on Contributors
Introduction
Part 1: Mātṛkā and Abhidharma Terminologies
1. Abhidharma and Indian thinking
2. Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism
3. Interpretations of the Terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā
4. Some Remarks on the Proofs of the “Store Mind”
Part 2: Intellectual History
5. Sanskrit Abhidharma Literature of the Mahāvihāravāsins
6. The Contribution of Saṃghabhadra to Our Understanding of Abhidharma Doctrines
7. Pratītyasamutpāda in the Translations of An Shigao and the Writings of His Chinese Followers
8. Abhidharma in China: Reflections on ‘Matching Meanings’ and Xuanxue
9. Kuiji’s Abhidharmic Recontextualization of Chinese Buddhism
10. Traces of Abhidharma in the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Tibet, Tenth Century)
Part 3: Philosophical Studies
11. Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras
12. Svalakṣaṇa (Particular) and Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (Universal) in Abhidharma and Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
13. Perspectives on the Person and the Self in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
Index

Citation preview



Text, History, and Philosophy

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_001

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Brill’s Indological Library Edited by Johannes Bronkhorst In co-operation with Richard Gombrich, Oskar von Hinüber, Katsumi Mimaki, Arvind Sharma

VOLUME 50

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bil





Text, History, and Philosophy Abhidharma across Buddhist Scholastic Traditions Edited by

Bart Dessein Weijen Teng

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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Cover illustration: Mogao Grottoes, cave 341, northern wall. Illustration of Maireya’s Pure Land, Early Tang dynasty (courtesy of Dharma Drum). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Conference "From Abhidhamma To Abhidharma. Early Buddhist Scholasticism in India, Central Asia, and China" (2013 : Ghent University), author. | Dessein, Bart, editor. | Teng, Weijen, editor. Title: Text, history, and philosophy : Abhidharma across Buddhist scholastic traditions / edited by Bart Dessein, Weijen Teng. Description: Boston : Brill, 2016. | Series: Brill's Indological library, ISSN 0925-2916 ; VOLUME 50 | "Papers ... of the conference 'From Abhidhamma To Abhidharma. Early Buddhist Scholasticism in India, Central Asia, and China' held on 8 and 9 July 2013 at Ghent University, Belgium"--Preface. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016013224 (print) | LCCN 2016022593 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004316669 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 978-90-04-31882-3 (e-book) | ISBN 9789004318823 (E-book) Subjects: LCSH: Abhidharma--Study and teaching--India--History--Congresses. | Abhidharma--Study and teaching--Asia, Central--History--Congresses. | Abhidharma--Study and teaching--China--History--Congresses. Classification: LCC BQ4195 .C66 2016 (print) | LCC BQ4195 (ebook) | DDC 294.3/824--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016013224 Want or need Open Access? Brill Open offers you the choice to make your research freely accessible online in exchange for a publication charge. Review your various options on brill.com/brill-open. Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0925-2916 isbn 978-90-04-31666-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-31882-3 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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In memory of Lance S. Cousins (7 April 1942–14 March 2015)

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Contents Contents

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Contents Preface ix List of Figure and Tables xi Notes on Contributors xii

Introduction 1

Part 1 Mātṛkā and Abhidharma Terminologies 1

Abhidharma and Indian thinking 29 Johannes Bronkhorst

2

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism: Groups of Four and the abhedyaprasādas in the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra 47 Andrea Schlosser and Ingo Strauch

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Interpretations of the Terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā: From the Pāli Nikāyas to the Abhidhamma 108 Tamara Ditrich

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Some Remarks on the Proofs of the “Store Mind” (Ālayavijñāna) and the Development of the Concept of Manas 146 Jowita Kramer

Part 2 Intellectual History 5

Sanskrit Abhidharma Literature of the Mahāvihāravāsins 169 Lance S. Cousins

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The Contribution of Saṃghabhadra to Our Understanding of Abhidharma Doctrines 223 KL Dhammajoti

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Pratītyasamutpāda in the Translations of An Shigao and the Writings of His Chinese Followers 248 Eric M. Greene

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Abhidharma in China: Reflections on ‘Matching Meanings’ and Xuanxue 279 Bart Dessein

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Kuiji’s Abhidharmic Recontextualization of Chinese Buddhism 296 Weijen Teng

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Traces of Abhidharma in the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Tibet, Tenth   Century) 314 Dylan Esler

Part 3 Philosophical Studies 11

Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras: The Case of Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi 353 Goran Kardaš

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Svalakṣaṇa (Particular) and Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (Universal) in Abhidharma and Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism 375 Chen-kuo Lin

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Perspectives on the Person and the Self in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 396 Yao-ming Tsai



Index 413

PrefacePreface

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Preface The papers included in this volume are the outcome of the conference From Abhidhamma To Abhidharma. Early Buddhist Scholasticism in India, Central Asia, and China held on 8 and 9 July 2013 at Ghent University, Belgium. The conference was initiated to commemorate the 120th anniversary – two 60-year cycles in Chinese chronology – of the appointment of Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1869–1938) as professor at Ghent University. During the almost 30 years he was affiliated with Ghent University (he resigned in 1929), Louis de La Vallée Poussin, son of a French father and a Belgian mother who chose to become a Belgian national, laid the foundations of Belgian Buddhology. Louis de La Vallée Poussin is generally recognized as one of the greatest Abhidharma scholars in the history of Buddhology. The contribution “Rétrospective: L’oeuvre de Louis de La Vallée Poussin” in the Bibliographie bouddhique of 1955 enumerates no less than 323 works of his hand, published between 1891 and his death in 1938. The conference From Abhidhamma To Abhidharma. Early Buddhist Scholasticism in India, Central Asia, and China was a joint initiative of Bart Dessein and Weijen Teng, and was organized by the Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies, Belgium, and the Department of Buddhist Studies of Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts (Formally Dharma Drum Buddhist College), Taipei, Taiwan. Researchers on Abhidhamma / Abhidharma work at different institutes all over the globe, and their precise research activities concern different epochs of Buddhist history, spanning from the life time of the historical Buddha to the contemporary period; deal with Abhidharmic developments in different geographical regions, extending from India, over Southeast Asia, Central Asia, China, Mongolia, Japan, and Tibet; and concern different types of materials, with some researchers working on (recent) manuscript founds, and others working on edited editions of texts in Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese, Mongolian or Tibetan. While some scholars investigate the Abhidharma of one particular school, others work in a comparative framework, or work cross-culturally. Bringing together scientific papers of scholars dealing with such a wide variety of subjects and materials in one coherent conference did not announce itself to be an easy task. To our surprise, however, the conference papers did show a surprising coherence, thus proving that despite the long chronological development and the large geographical dissemination of Abhidhamma / ­Abhidharma traditions, old Abhidharmic materials that are at the foundation of the tradition have continued to determine and impregnate later develop-

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ments. The ‘World of Abhidharma’ proved to be a more interwoven complex than one might expect. This prompted us to publish an edited volume of a selection of conference papers. The papers collected here concern the very beginnings of Abhidhamma / Abhidharma in India, and discuss the development of the genre and Abhidharmic notions and concepts in India, Central Asia, China and Tibet from the life time of the historical Buddha to the 10th century CE. As such this volume forms a geographical (continental South, Central and East Asia + Sri Lanka) as well as a philosophical unity, determined by the development of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmic tradition and its ramifications. The editors of this volume are grateful to the Fund for Scientific Research, Flanders, the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy of Ghent University, and Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts for providing funds to organize the conference. Thanks also go to Ann Heirman and Christophe Vielle for supporting our application for funding with the Funds for Scientific Research, Flanders. The editors of this volume especially want to thank Bhikkhunī Dhammadinnā for her help and valuable suggestions during the editorial process. Bart Dessein

Sint Amandsberg, Belgium

Weijen Teng

Jinshan, Taiwan

List of Figure and Tables

List of Figure and Tables 1

1

2 3 4 5

Figure Extract from BajC2, part 1 (frame 2) 52

Tables Development of lists based on the bodhipakṣya-dharmas after Bronkhorst, 1985 54 Sequence of dhyāna, apramāṇa and ārūpya in the different versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya 55 Comparison of the list in BajC2 with the groups of four occurring in the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya 57 Listings in Prajñāpāramitā texts in comparison to the list in BajC2 61 Modular composition of the list in BajC2 67

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notes on Contributors

Notes On Contributors

Notes on Contributors Johannes Bronkhorst (PhD Pune 1979, doctorate Leiden 1980) is professor emeritus at the University of Lausanne. He has published numerous research papers and books, including Greater Magadha (Brill, 2007) and Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism (Brill, 2011). His book How the Brahmins Won (Brill, 2016) has recently come out. Lance S. Cousins was active at Oxford University until his death on March 14, 2015. He taught Pali and Middle Indian at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, and Buddhism in the Faculty of Theology. He is the author of numerous publications on Pali texts, early Buddhist schools, Buddhist meditation and Buddhist ethics. Dhammajoti KL Bhikkhu is currently the Glorious Sun Professor at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong. He has taught Buddhism in several institutes around the world including the University of Kelaniy, Sri Lanka; the University of Calgary, Numata Chair in Buddhist Studies; and the International Buddhist College, Thailand. Prof. Dhammajoti specialized in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhi­ dharma, as well as Mahāyāna doctrines of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. He has published many journal articles and is the author of The Chinese Dharmapada, The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and is the Editor of Journal of Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka. Bart Dessein is Professor at the Department of Languages and Cultures of Ghent University, Belgium. His research focus is on philosophical developments in early Buddhism and early school formation. He has published mainly on the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas. Tamara Ditrich has been researching and lecturing Sanskrit, Pali and a variety of academic subjects related to Asian religions and languages at several universities in Europe and Australia. Her research areas include Buddhist studies (mainly in Pāli), Sanskrit linguistics and Vedic philology.

Notes on Contributors

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Dylan Esler is a scholar and translator of Tibetan Buddhist texts. He holds an MA in Buddhist Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, and is currently a research scholar at the Institut Orientaliste of the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium), where he is preparing a PhD. He is working on a translation and study of an important tenth-century Tibetan text on the subject of meditation. His research interest focuses on early rNying-ma expositions of rDzogs-chen and Tantra. He is also an associate member of the Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies, Ghent University. Goran Kardaš is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Indology and Far Eastern Studies, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. His research interests are Buddhist philosophy (mainly Abhidharma and Madhyamaka), Nyāya epistemology and Indian theories of meaning. Eric M. Greene is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Yale. His research focuses on the early history of Buddhism in China, with a particular emphasis on the transmission of Buddhism to China, early translation practices, and the history of Buddhist meditation. His articles have appeared in T’oung Pao, Journal of Chinese Religions, Artibus Asiae, and History of Religions. Jowita Kramer completed a doctorate (Hamburg, 2004) and habilitation (Munich, 2010) in Indology. The main focus of her research lies on Indian and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. She has held positions at the Universities of Oxford, Heidelberg and Göttingen in the past and is currently a research fellow at the University of Munich. Chen-kuo Lin is a Distinguished Professor in both the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Institute of Religious Studies at National Chengchi University. His research interest includes Buddhist philosophy (Buddhist logic and epistemology, Yogācāra, Mādhyamika), Chinese philosophy (Neo-Confucianism, Daoism), and comparative philosophy. In addition to three books and many articles, recently he has published (co-edited with Michael Radich) A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism (Hamburg University Press, 2014).

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Andrea Schlosser studied Indian philology, Indian art history, and culture sciences at the Free University in Berlin. She received her Master (Magister) degree in 2008 with an edition of a South Indian copperplate donation record of the Western Gaṅgas. As a research assistant she focused on Buddhist manuscripts, working with the Sanskrit fragments of the Berlin Turfan Collection in cooperation with the International Dunhuang Project, as well as participating in a project about the edition of Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts from the Bajaur Collection. For her dissertation, submitted in 2013, she edited two Gāndhārī manuscripts that illustrate the practices of a bodhisattva. Currently, she is a research associate in the ­project “Buddhist Manuscripts from Gandhāra”, where her focus lies on early Mahāyāna texts. Ingo Strauch is Professor for Sanskrit and Buddhist Studies at the University of Lausannne. He received his PhD (2000) and his habilitation (2010) in Indian Philology at Freie Universität Berlin. His current research focusses on early Buddhist manuscripts from Gandhāra. He is currently preparing an edition of Vinaya and Sūtra texts from the Bajaur Collection of Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts. Together with Andrea Schlosser (Munich) he is editing an early Mahāyāna sūtra from Gandhāra. His research also covers early Buddhist epigraphy in Brāhmī and Kharoṣṭhī scripts. Weijen Teng received his PhD in the Study of Religion from Harvard University. He is currently teaching at Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts, Taiwan. His interests of research include Chinese Buddhist intellectual history, the study of Sanskrit grammar in Chinese Buddhism, and Pāli Abhidhamma theory of meditation. Yao-ming Tsai Professor of Philosophy at National Taiwan University and editor-in-chief of Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies, received his Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies in 1997 from the University of California, Berkeley. His teaching and research focus on Buddhist philosophy as well as philosophy of life. He is the author of four books: The Teachings of Prajñāpāramitā and the Purification of the Buddha-field (2001), An Open Path for Constructing Buddhology (2006), Research Methods and Academic Resources for Buddhist Studies (2006), Philosophy of Life and Worldview from the Perspective of Buddhist Teachings (2012), as well as of dozens of scholarly articles and book chapters on Buddhist studies.

Introduction Introduction

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Introduction

Abhidharma as Rational Inquiry (Bart Dessein)

Although discussion exists on the precise meaning of the word Abhidhamma / Abhidharma, the compounds abhi and dhamma / dharma suggest that Abhi­ dhamma / Abhidharma is a historical development of the Buddha’s doctrine (dhamma / dharma).1 The word Abhidhamma / Abhidharma is used both to refer to the method in which the Buddhist doctrine is set forth, and to the genre of literature in which this is done. In what follows, focus will not primarily be on the creation of the so-called Abhidhammapiṭaka / Abhidharmapiṭaka, the third of the three collections (Tipiṭaka / Tripiṭaka) in which Buddhist literature is traditionally categorized (Sutta/Sūtra, Vinaya, Abhidhamma/Abhi­dharma), nor on the development of the textual format of the works of the Abhidharma genre, but on the Abhidharma as exegetical method.2 Discussing Abhidhamma / Abhidharma as a specific exegetical method, this volume contains three parts. The first part, “Mātṛkā and Abhidharma Terminologies,” contains contributions on the development of the Buddhist argumentative technique and on the creation of lists of technical elements (mātikā / mātṛkā) that are the outcome of the Buddhist exegetical method and that are the argumentative material used in philosophical discussions. The second part, “Intellectual History,” investigates the importance of the Buddhist rational tradition for the development of Buddhist philosophy in the homeland of Buddhism, as well as for the peculiar developments that were the result of the contact of Buddhism with the philosophical traditions of Central and East Asia. The third part, “Philosophical Studies,” focuses on some peculiar doctrinal issues that resulted from rational Abhidharmic reflections. For a tradition of rational inquiry to develop, thinkers have to accept the legitimacy of questions and critique, even if these are directed against convictions that are sanctioned by intuition, generally accepted truth, or revealed truth. Rather than accepting ‘revealed truth,’ rational inquiry is aimed at 1 For an overview of scholarship on the meaning of the word ‘Abhidhamma / Abhidharma’: see Malalasekera, 1961: 38–40; Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 13–15 and the contribution by Dylan Eslar in this volume. For a recent study of the meaning of the term: see Anālayo, 2014: 70–71, 78–79, 171. 2 For discussions on the development of the Abhidharmic genre and the Abhidharmapiṭaka: see Gethin, 1992 and Dessein, 2013. For a discussion of the development of the textual format of the Abhidharma texts: see Cox, 1995: 29–37.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_002

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Introduction

‘revealing truth’.3 It is through rational thinking and argumentation that this aim can be achieved. It is obvious that such a ‘rational attitude’ is stimulated when a thinker “seriously contemplates the pervasiveness of the possibility that he may be wrong, that he needs reasons and arguments to support the validity of his views,”4 and that this situation especially occurs when confronted with an intellectual opponent. The question as to the reason why a tradition of rational inquiry – and of ‘philosophy’ for that matter – develops is therefore a contextual one,5 and can be rephrased as follows: Where and when were circumstances such that ‘philosophers’ were confronted with the possible fallibility of (their) traditional concepts, and / or with the need to convince others of the correctness of their views? It is, further, precisely because rational inquiry does not take convictions that are sanctioned by intuition, generally accepted truth, or revealed truth as granted, that systems of rational thinking have the possibility to cross the borders of the cultural context in which they originated and first developed. The latter is important with respect to the following: scholarly opinion differs on the number of scientific traditions, that is, traditions of rational inquiry as defined here, that have developed in the history of mankind.6 While the West Eurasian tradition (which includes the Greek and Islamic traditions) and the Indian cultural tradition are generally accepted to be characterized by an attitude of rational inquiry,7 the Chinese tradition would arguably be devoid of this attitude.8 Buddhism is then accepted to have considerably influenced the Chinese ‘philosophical’ tradition.9 These characteristics of rational inquiry – its aim to reveal truth through rational thinking and argumentation, and its possibility to cross cultural boundaries – are particularly important with respect to the present volume: Abhidharma as exegetical method and its importance for the development of Buddhist ‘philosophy’.

3 See Bronkhorst, 2001: 34. 4 Harbsmeier, 1998: 261. 5 For a study of ‘context’: see Scharfstein, 1989. For reflections on the possible justification of Abhidharma as philosophy: see Malalasekera, 1961: 48–49. 6 See Dessein, 2001: 97. 7 Staal, 1993: 16. For arguments for Egyptian, Babylonian, Hittite and Phenician influence on the Greek tradition: see Needham, 1974: 55. For Greek philosophy’s indebtedness to Indian philosophy: see Garbe, 1987: 36–46 and Conger, 1952: 103, 105, 107, 109–11. Przyluski, 1932: 286 has laid emphasis on the Iranian (Persian) borrowings in both the Greek and the Indian culture. 8 Staal, 1989: 308. 9 See Zürcher, 1972; Ch’en, 1973; Frankenhauser, 1996; and Harbsmeier, 1998.

Introduction

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Judging from early Buddhist texts in which especially the Jains are referred to,10 it appears that in the region of Magadha where the historical Buddha lived, the Jains (and sometimes also the Ājīvikas) were important religious competitors of the Buddhists.11 This competitive context gives Buddhism a peculiar position in the Indian religious/philosophical landscape, and is important for our understanding of the development of Abhidharma as exegetical method – above, we have claimed that the argumentative skills that religions/philosophies develop in a competitive context are important for them to become conversant and cross-cultural.12 Indeed, because texts of the Vedic oral/aural tradition were primarily aimed at delivering a message to the realm of the Vedic gods, who, by definition, did not need to be convinced of the truth revealed in the Vedic texts, these texts do not show a development of argumentative techniques. In contradistinction to the Vedic texts, the Brāhmaṇa prose texts – as do the Upaniṣads – explain the offers that are performed. This suggests that, with the development of Brahmanism, the religious audience were no longer the mere passive spectators they had been in the Vedic period, but became – at least passive – participators in a religious dialogue. It therefore may be the development of Brahmanism that, in the Indian context, laid the basis for what eventually would become a tradition of rational inquiry.13 This transformation should not be overstressed though, as the debates that are included in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads are not ‘rational’ in the sense that they want to convince someone of the Brahmanic or Upaniṣadic truth. Their explanations are for internal use. While on the one hand pointing to the Indian oral/aural tradition in which Buddhism originated,14 the introductory formula to many Buddhist sūtras “evaṃ me sutaṃ” (“Thus have I heard”) also alludes to it that, for the early Buddhists too, the word spoken by the Buddha primarily had the value of ‘revealed truth’ and was the guideline to be followed.15 The following passage included in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra testifies of this: When Ānanda lamented 10 11

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See, e.g. T.1.12: 227b7–10; T.26.1536: 367b8–24. For some reflections on the Buddhist-Jain encounter: see Bronkhorst, 2011: 130–142. For the different religious groups who were active contemporaneous with the Buddha: see Hirakawa, 1990: 16–18. See Assmann, 2003. See von Simson, 1965: 139–141. See Cousins, 1982: 1; von Hinüber, 1989: 22; and Dessein, 2012. For the suggestion that also early Buddhist debates were primarily for internal use: see Bronkhorst, 2001: 32–33. Bronkhorst, 2000: 23 remarks that, indeed, no matter how interconnected the Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist philosophy may be, what the Buddha taught was a ‘doctrine,’ not a ‘philosophy’.

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Introduction

that the doctrine would be without teacher after the Buddha had died – thus urging the Buddha to appoint a successor – the Buddha is reported to have replied that the doctrine and discipline he had taught them should also serve as teacher after his demise.16 Also the following two viewpoints, attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (Yibuzong lun lun 異 部宗輪論) testify of this acceptance of the word of the Buddha as ‘revealed truth’: “Everything that has been preached by the World-honored One is in conformity with the truth (yathārtha),”17 and “The sūtras proclaimed by the Buddha are all perfect in themselves (nītārtha)”.18 In his Yibuzong lun lun shuji 異部宗輪論述記, his commentary to the Chinese version of the Samayabhedo­ paracanacakra, Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) explains these claims as that nothing the Buddha has said is without benefit for living beings, and that, therefore, everything he has said should be considered as the turning of the wheel of the doctrine.19 Mentioning of the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (Treatise on the Development of the Different Sects) brings us to one of the major peculiarities connected with Abhidharma as exegetical method: the formation of Buddhist (Abhidharma) sects. The territorial expansion of the Buddhist doctrine and the concomitant different living conditions for Buddhist monks and nuns, must have made it impossible for all monastics to live according to exactly the same set of rules (Vinaya), and the Buddha’s choice not to appoint a successor must have invoked different interpretations of the precise meaning of his sermons. Debates with non-Buddhists must further have encroached on this tendency and must be responsible for it that non-Buddhist – particularly Vedic and Jain – concepts and elements were introduced in the Buddhist doctrine. All this eventually resulted in the formation of different schools and sects.20 It is especially in the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma literature that developed from the Sutta / Sūtra and the Vinaya literature that these developments can be discerned.21 There is evidence that not only the formation of a corpus of sūtra texts, but that also the Abhidharma practice originated as part of an oral/aural tradi-

16 17 18 19 20 21

Mahāparinibbāna suttanta, chap. 6, v.1. T.49.2031: 15b28–29. See also Bareau, 1955: 58. See also T.27.1545: 912b.8–9 T.49.2031: 15c24. See also Bareau, 1955: 67. See Kuiji: I 16b-17a and II 42a. For the discussion on which event should be considered as the first turning of the wheel of the doctrine: see Dessein, 2007. For the distinction between monastic ‘schools’ and philosophical ‘sects’: see Bechert, 1961. For the development of Abhidharma from the Sūtra and Vinaya literature: see T.24.1451: 408b2–8.

Introduction

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tion.22 It has hereby been suggested that it are the mnemotechnical skills of the Brahmans who joined the Buddhist order that made the memorization of the Buddhist texts possible.23 Although we may indeed assume that the oral/ aural tradition of the early Buddhist community with synods (saṃgīti) meant to recite the words of the Buddha, occurred in a context very similar to that of the Brahmanic tradition – early saṃgha members claimed that they had maintained in their memories the words as they had been spoken by the Buddha himself and had, generation after generation, been publicly recited – it is very likely that, contrary to general acceptance, Buddhism did not start as a reactionary movement against Vedic Brahmanism. There is evidence that Brahmanism only started to reach the northeastern domains of the Indian subcontinent during the Aśokan period. It are the territorial expansion and enhanced possibilities for adherents of all beliefs and faiths to freely travel the country that characterizes this period that must have brought Buddhists in contact with Brahmins.24 This claim is supported by the following: tradition connects king Aśoka with the so-called Buddhist ‘synod’ (saṃgīti) that resulted in the first schism in the Buddhist community – the one between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviravādins.25 Contrary to what was the case for Brahmanism, however, Buddhists, as adherents of a new faith, were quickly confronted with the fact that, for their religion to survive, non-Buddhists had to be convinced of the Buddhist truth – one may be born a Brahmin, however, one is not born a Buddhist.26 The necessity to convert non-Buddhists helps to explain why early Buddhists culled the most important elements of the Buddhist doctrine from the Buddha’s sermons, and organized them in lists of technical elements, the so-called mātṛkās that are the fundament of all later Abhidharmic developments.27 These 22

23 24 25 26 27

See T.22.1428: 968b15 ff. This oral recitation is connected to Ānanda, one of the first five disciples of the Buddha, in Sumaṅgala (Rhys Davids and Carpenter, 1968, vol.1: 17), Aṭṭhasālinī (Bapat and Vadekar, 1942: 3), Samantapāsādikā (Takakusu and Nagai, 1975: 18), T.1.1: 1a9–10; T.49.2030: 14b8; T.22.1428: 968b25–26; T.24.1463: 818a28–29. See von Hinüber, 1989: 68. See Bronkhorst, 2001: 2–4 and 8–11. This event is likely to have occurred 116 years after the demise of the Buddha. See Nattier and Prebish, 1976–77: 239, 271–272. It can also be recalled here that many of the first converts used to be adherents of Jainism. See Bronkhorst, 2000: 77. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, Shi song lü 詩誦律, T.23.1435: 449a19 ff. identifies the Abhidharma with teachings that are presented in list form. For arguments that the first mātṛkās predate the ‘age of Abhidhama’ and that the beginnings of the Abhidharma seem to go back to an early period before the formation of schools: see Anālayo, 2014: 21–25; 167–168.

6

Introduction

mātṛkās were doctrinally interpreted, and became the argumentative material used in philosophical discussions. Mnemotechnical skills were undoubtedly a major asset in remembering and expounding these lists. Also the questionsand-answers format – illustrative for a tradition of rational debate – that is frequently used in Abhidharma texts to explain the elements that make up a mātṛkā facilitates the memorization of such lists.28 This questions-andanswers format echoes the dialogue form of most of the Pāli Nikāyas and Sanskrit (Chinese) Āgamas in which not only the Buddha, but also his chief disciples had discussions with other monks and with non-Buddhists.29 The famous Milindapañha (Questions of King Milinda) records a debate that allegedly took place between the Greek king Milinda / Menandros, member of the Hellenistic tradition, and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena. Although Édith Nolot (1995: 9) has argued that there has been a historical King Menandros who reigned in the northwest of India around the second century BCE, but that this historical figure is not the actual participant in the alleged discussion with Nāgasena who, moreover, might be a fictitious person as well, this does not diminish the importance of the fact that a text written in a language of northwestern India, records this debate and, thus, witnesses of the confrontation of Buddhists with members of the Oriental Hellenistic tradition that flourished in Central Asia starting from around 185 BCE. The date suggested by Édith Nolot (1995: 9) of the second century BCE for the earliest version of such a text might be too early – committing Buddhist texts to writing is likely to only have started in the second century BCE,30 it remains a fact that the Milindapañha testifies of an early philosophical debate.31 In its Chinese rendering, this work that is likely to be dated in the beginning of the common era, belongs to the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism that had Gandhāra as one of its strongholds.32 Gandhāra and Sri Lanka have become of particular importance for the two main Abhidhamma / Abhidharma traditions: the southern Theravāda tradition, and the northwestern Sarvāstivāda tradition. The encounter of the Sarvāstivādins of Gandhāra with members of the Greek rational tradition of which the Milindapañha testifies, must have inspired the Sarvāstivādins to systematize the word of the Buddha into a sound 28 29 30 31 32

See Norman, 1995: 309; von Simson, 1965: 142; Stache-Rosen, 1968: 8. See Watanabe, 1983: 76. For the early appearance of the questions-and-answers format in Buddhist literature: see Anālayo, 2014: 28; 167–168. See Norman, 1992: 248 and Norman, 1993: 280. The final version of this record was rendered into Pāli in the fifth century CE. See Finot, 1992: 7–9. See Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 104–105.

Introduction

7

philosophical system, as creating their peculiar system was to all likelihood seen as the only way to defend their faith against the well-developed Greek tradition of rational debate. These particular circumstances may explain why the development of a Buddhist rational tradition was especially prominent among the Sarvāstivādins, why this tradition may have started in Gandhāra, and why it are the Sarvāstivādins who have the most exhaustive collection of Abhidharma texts.33 It is to the development of Gandhāran Sarvāstivāda thinking in its confrontation with the Hellenistic world, as well as to the influence this development has had on other currents of thought in India – the grammarians, Jains, and Brahmins – that Johannes Bronkhorst devotes his attention in his contribution “Abhidharma and Indian Thinking”. Also Ingo Strauch and Andrea Schlosser study Abhidharmic developments in the region of Gandhāra. In “Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism. Groups of Four and the abhedyaprasādas in the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra,” they discuss the data contained in the so-called Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra, a text in Kharoṣṭhī that was allegedly discovered in the ruins of a Buddhist monastery near the village of Mian Kili at the Dir-Bajaur border. The text belongs to one of three genres that can be considered as authentic products of a Gandhāran literary tradition: Avadāna texts, scholastic and commentarial texts, and early Mahāyāna sūtras. Investigation of this text that contains two levels – a dialogue between the Tathāgata and his disciple Śāriputra that is reminiscent of early Buddhist sūtras, and a ‘Mahāyānistic’ description of the bodhisattva path – sheds light on the peculiar development of Mahāyāna notions (especially the character of dharmas and of saṃjñā) in the region of Gandhāra. The particular Abhidharmic developments in Kashmir, Gandhāra, and Bactria (together also referred to as ‘Greater Gandhāra’34) can therefore be interpreted as the coming to full maturation of a tendency that was already present in early Buddhism. In “Interpretations of the terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā: From the Pāli Nikāyas to the Abhidhamma,” Tamara Ditrich discusses the terms ajjhattaṃ (internally), bahiddhā (externally) and ajjhattabahiddhā (internally and externally) as they are used in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (Sutta on the Applications of Mindfulness) of the Pāli canon, that is, as possible modes to practice application of mindfulness on the body (kāyānupassanā), on feelings (vedanānupassanā), on the mind (cittānupassanā), and on mental objects (dhammānupassanā).35 33 34 35

Beckwith, 2012: 24 remarks that “it is highly improbable that the Greeks and the early Buddhists had no influence at all on each other”. See also Beckwith, 2012: 55–56. See Salomon, 1999: 2. MN I 55–63, DN II 290–315.

8

Introduction

A study of the Theravāda Abhidhamma literature shows that Buddhaghosa’s (fifth century CE) interpretation of this early mātṛkā has, with some modification, been followed by most modern scholars and practitioners who appear to have developed a common understanding of the meaning of ‘internally’ and ‘externally’. This, however, does not seem to be the case for the compound term ajjhattabahiddhā. Tamara Ditrich therefore suggests that diverging interpretations of the compound term may be due to the fact that the “Indian Buddhist oral transmission may have adopted the already established stylistic and linguistic patterns and markers (that is: patterns of the Vedic language), such as the usage of dvandva compounds, for indicating specific contexts such as the modes of contemplation, especially in relation to the four satipaṭṭhānas”. The connection of a mātṛkā of three types of practice with a mātṛkā of four applications of mindfulness illustrates how, already in an early period of Abhidharmic development, existing mātṛkās were brought into an ever more intricate connection, with elements of one mātṛkā used to explain the elements of one or another mātṛkā. The list of four avetyaprasādas discussed in Ingo Strauch and Andrea Schlosser’s contribution mentioned above, is further a fine illustration of it that these mātṛkās as oldest fundament of the mature Abhidharma texts,36 are a common heritage of both the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma traditions.37 While the authors prove that the term abhedya was first used in Gandhāra, and that there is good reason to believe that Sarvāstivāda circles were the first to refer to the ‘four avetyaprasādas,’ the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra connects this concept with the intentional reflection on the positive qualities of Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha and morality (śīla). This reflection is qualified as to its either having originated internally (adhyātmasamutthita), or having originated externally (bahidhāsamutthita), or having originated both internally and externally (adhyātmabahidhādamutthita). In this text, the wellknown Śrāvakayāna concept of the āryaśrāvaka and his avetyaprasādas is thus linked with a Mahāyāna type of notions. That Sarvāstivādin yogācāra masters inherited the Sarvāstivādin analysis of dharmas and contributed, together with a certain section of the Sautrāntikas, 36

37

This explains the occurrence of the term ‘Mātṛkāpiṭaka’. See T.50.2042: 113c2–9; T.50.2043: 152a15. That a separate authoritative collection of mātṛkās – a Mātṛkāpiṭaka – must have existed prior to the moment the originally orally transmitted texts were submitted to writing, is also suggested in the Mahāsāṃghikavinaya. See T.22.1425: 334c20–22. See Frauwallner, 1964. In his contribution to this volume, Bhikkhu KL Dhammojoti suggests that it could even be said that, to some extent, the Theravāda Abhidhamma development cannot be satisfactorily understood without at least a basic understanding of the possible influence from the broad Sarvāstivāda lineage. Also the contribution by Lance S. Cousins hints in this direction.

Introduction

9

to the establishment of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra school is evident from the contribution by Jowita Kramer. In “Some Remarks on the Proofs of the ‘Store Mind’ (Ālayavijñāna) and the Development of the Concept of Manas,” she discusses the change in interpretation of the mātṛkā of five aggregates (skandha) under influence of the innovative Mahāyāna concept of the “store mind” (ālayavijñāna). This is, more precisely, done through an examination of Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka and its commentaries. Illustrative for the process of debate and inquiry that characterizes later Abhidharma texts, it is shown how the authors of these works sometimes try to compromise on the varying teachings of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Abhidharmic works of the Yogācāra tradition, and sometimes appear to develop their own interpretations. It may be clear from the above that the Sarvāstivādins who lived in a different context than the one that existed in the region of Vidiśā that was the stronghold of the Theravādins before they migrated to Sri Lanka,38 enjoyed a long period of philosophical development, and that their doctrines had an immense impact on the development of Ṥrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and methodology. Moreover, the influence of the Sarvāstivādins was not restricted to India and Central Asia, but their method of rational inquiry also had an impact on the Chinese tradition. It is to the issue of philosophical influence that the second part of this volume, “Intellectual History,” is devoted. The mutual influence of different Buddhist traditions in India is addressed in Lance S. Cousins’s contribution. In “Sanskrit Abhidharma Literature of the Mahāvihāravāsins,” he examines the Sanskrit citations in the thirteenth century sanne to the Pāli Visuddhimagga. He argues that at least some of these citations prove that the seventh century Jotipāla, a major figure of the Mahāvihāravāsin tradition who most likely came from the major center of non-Mahāyāna tradition in the Tamil country, wrote in Sanskrit as well as in Pāli. Confronted with the difficulty that they had to establish their legitimacy as a reform movement – Mahāyāna doctrine differing from the early doctrine in some essential points of theology – the early Mahāyānists of around the first century BCE were to all probability the first to turn to the use of script to expound and spread their views.39 It is then suggested that, in these circumstances, also the Theravādins started to write down their texts.40 The language 38 39 40

See Frauwallner, 1956: 18. See McMahan, 1998: 251. Gombrich, 1990: 29 dates the earliest surviving Mahāyāna texts back to the second or first centuries BCE. See Norman, 1993: 280.

10

Introduction

in which this was done was Pāli. The use of Sanskrit in southern India is interesting because it to all probability is Brahmanism that introduced the use of Sanskrit in virtually the whole of South Asia and larger parts of Southeast Asia, a development that is likely to be related to the fact that Brahmanism had become a socio-political ideology, with Brahmins offering their services as advisor to the political elites.41 With respect to the question of philosophical interaction, the evidence provided in the sanne to the Visuddhimagga thus opens a new perspective on the activities of the Brahmins, as well as of the Theriya in South Asia in the later part of the first millennium CE.42 It is an important trait of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa that it criticizes Vaibhāṣika viewpoints as they are expounded in the so-called vibhāṣā compendia, the commentarial literature that was produced by the so-called Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins of Gandhāra. According to the Chinese monk and translator Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664), Saṃghabhadra (ca. fifth century CE) determined to refute Vasubandhu’s critique on the Vaibhāṣikas.43 Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti discusses the importance of Saṃghabhadra in “Saṃghabhadra’s Contribution to our Understanding of Abhidharma”. Kuiji, a disciple of Xuanzang, even records and identifies Vaibhāṣika theories as “neo-Sarvāstivāda”.44 This makes Saṃghabhadra, who is by Xuanzang’s pupils taken to represent the correct Vaibhāṣika viewpoint, an important exponent of Abhidharma thinking. In this way, Saṃghabhadra’s doctrinal expositions allow us insight in at least that section of the Dārṣṭāntika Sarvāstivādins who developed into the Sautrāntikas. The work of Saṃghabhadra is also important for the study of the doctrinal evolution of the Mahāyāna, as his importance was acknowledged by the Yogācāra masters (as also discussed in Jowita Kramer’s contribution) who took him as representative of the true Vaibhāṣika viewpoint in their Sarvāstivāda studies. It is through the intellectual context of Greater Gandhāra that both Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism reached China around the beginning of the common era. While the Chinese Buddhist monastic code developed to be essentially the Dharmaguptaka code, the doctrinal school that had the largest impact in China was without any doubt the highly rationalistic Sarvāstivāda 41 42

43 44

See for the latter: Bronkhorst, 2011: 42–43, 51–61. Lance S. Cousins suggests that it must have been after the fourteenth century that the Sanskrit literature from which Jotipāla drew was lost and could, probably, not be recovered from Southeast Asia where Pāli rather than Sanskrit were more used for Theriya Buddhist purposes, either having never been taken there or not having been preserved. T.51.2087: 891c16ff.; T.50.2053: 232c22ff. See also T.41.1821: 11a20ff. and T.41.1822: 457c26ff. T.43.1830: 271a10.

Introduction

11

school that, in its Vaibhāṣika interpretation, flourished in the Kuṣāṇa empire. After Emperor Ming 明 (r. 58–75 CE) of the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) had sent Zhang Qian 張騫 and Qin Jing 秦景 as envoys to Central Asia to establish an alliance against the Xiongnu 匈奴, thus opening the road to Central Asia,45 Buddhist missionaries from the regions of Gandhāra, Parthia, Sogdiana, Khotan, and Kučā reached China.46 After an initial period in which Buddhism mainly flourished among the immigrants and merchants who had settled in China, the second half of the second century CE saw the first translations of Abhidharma texts into Chinese. Especially the Parthian monk An Shigao 安世高 (fl. 148–168) has to be mentioned here. It is to the translations of An Shigao and his followers that Eric M. Greene devotes his attention in “Pratītyasamutpāda in the Translations of An Shigao and the Writings of his Chinese Followers”. This contribution shows how pre-Buddhist Chinese understandings of sense perception – and particularly the relationship between sense perception and desire – decisively influenced the early translations of Abhidharma texts into Chinese. It is, more precisely, shown how the notion of sense contact (sparśa) as a neutral process occurring prior to the arising of desire conflicted with the traditional Chinese understanding that desire is located in the sense organs themselves and seek out their desired objects independently from the will. This contribution thus allows us to see how key Buddhist ideas were (or were not) initially understood by the Chinese audience. When Buddhism entered China, Confucianism had been elevated to official orthodoxy. It has already been said repeatedly by different scholars that the unification of the empire in the third century BCE and the subsequent victory of Confucianism as orthodoxy in the Han dynasty have had a devastating impact on the development of ‘rational inquiry’ as defined here.47 Scholarship had become highly institutionalized and bureaucratized, and the philosophical profession had become organized in ‘schools’ (jia 家) of thought. In China, books came to be seen as texts that were accepted by and commented upon by a peculiar ‘school’ in accordance with that particular school’s interpretation of the words of old sages.48 Membership of a ‘school’ was the prerequisite to gain 45 46 47 48

See Shiji 史記, 63.123: 345a2–11 and Han Shu 漢書, 61: 250b35-c1. See Gernet, 1990: 188. See Lloyd and Sivin, 2002: 27. See Lloyd and Sivin, 2002: 73. Cheng, 1997: 318, note 4 remarks: “Concernant la notion d’écoles dans la Chine ancienne, Nathan Sivin (cf. Philosophy East and West, 42, 1, 1992, 27) remarque que, contrairement à la conception grecque de l’école formée d’orateurs et de polémistes sur la place publique, elle correspond bien plus à des classifications bibliographiques qu’à des groupements de personnes. En Chine, les écoles se distinguaient entre elles en ce qu’elles préservaient et transmettaient des corpus différents de textes

12

Introduction

knowledge and understanding of this interpretation. Traditional Chinese philosophy was therefore not characterized as a “search for truth,”49 as the truth of the words of antiquity was considered to stand beyond doubt. Rather, traditional Chinese philosophy was aimed at engaging with the world, conceived as a holistic whole, the good order of which is dictated by the past, and consists in bringing a specific and transmitted interpretation of the words of the past into practice. The fall of the Han dynasty in 220 CE was a major challenge for the Confucian scholar’s identity. This, on the one hand, as argued by Eric M. Greene resulted in it that Buddhist writings of the period posterior to the Han reflect an effort to find ways of talking about Buddhist theories that would be resonant with a more general Chinese audience. On the other hand, this period also witnesses a ‘conservative’ Confucian movement, with Confucians blaming a degenerate Confucianism for the fall of the Han dynasty. In “Abhidharma in China: Reflections on ‘Matching Meanings’ and Xuanxue,” Bart Dessein describes how, when the originally Abhidharmic exegetical technique of ‘geyi’ – explaining Buddhist mātṛkās through matching them with traditional Chinese numerical lists – had proven unsuccessful to make clear the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine, the technique might have continued to be used by ‘conservative’ Confucians who tried to redefine Chinese culture in a context of a growing influence of Daoism and Buddhism. That the Abhidharma technique was thus reinvented as a technique to redefine Confucian orthodoxy shows the influence of the Abhidharmic rational debate on Chinese traditional philosophy. That is to say, a technique that was originally used in a Buddhist context was integrated in Confucian orthodoxy in so far as the social cohesion of the Chinese world view was maintained.50 For the integration of Buddhist elements in Confucian doctrine also a development within Buddhism itself was important: The Mahāyāna Buddhist position that salvation can be reached in the sentient world did no longer confine Buddhist adepts to monasteries. This opened the road for Buddhist adherents to also become politically active – in this taking the path also the Brahmins had done earlier.51 While some Buddhist monks thus became increasingly involved in ‘Confucian’ politics, other monks continued to devote

49 50 51

écrits, dans une lignée de transmission qui ressemblait fort à une filiation (d’où le mot jia qui désigne le clan)”. Bauer, 2006: 17. See Seiwert, 1994: 532. See Bronkhorst, 2011: 236–237. For some concrete examples: see Forte, 2000: 9–10, 51; Dessein, 2003: 329–332.

Introduction

13

their time to Abhidharma studies. In this way, an Abhidharma School started to flourish in fourth century South China. This Abhidharma School became superseded by the Kośa School after Xuanzang and his translation team had translated the famous Abhidharmakośa in 653 CE.52 The importance of these Chinese Abhidharma and Kośa Schools as ‘conservative’ schools that tried to set Chinese understanding of Buddhism aright by reorienting it toward Indian Buddhist systems of thought – in this undoubtedly inspired by the direct contacts with the Indian world that existed in Tang 唐 dynasty China (618–907), is discussed by Weijen Teng. His “Kuiji’s Abhidharmic Recontextualization” shows that Kuiji employs Abhidharma as an exegetical strategy to recontextualize Chinese Buddhism, that is, to prove that this methodology can offer a common and normative foundation for discussion and argument about Buddhist doctrines and concepts. Dylan Esler’s “Traces of Abhidharma in the bSam-gtan mig-sgron (Tibet, Tenth Century),” outlines how the tenth century bSam-gtan mig-sgron, a treatise on the subject of meditation and the first indigenous Tibetan doxography is concerned with knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality and with the methods of spiritual realization. Although not an Abhidharma treatise per se, through its implicit and explicit references to the Abhidharmic framework, the text reveals that it is Abhidharma that provides the metaphysical, cosmological and phenomenological backdrop against which any form of Buddhist meditative praxis takes place. Abhidharma therefore is not only the philosophical construct to explain the Buddhist doctrine and the framework within which philosophers interpreted internal developments and external influences, but also the context that informs and defines Buddhist meditative praxis. In a period in which sectarian disagreements and discussions between different Buddhist groups had become prominent, the practice to sanction one specific interpretation of the meaning of the elements enumerated in a given mātṛkā against another interpretation is likely to have gained importance. Sectarian disagreement and a transition from an oral/aural transmission of the word of the Buddha to a written transmission with new means to build up argumentation, also opened new perspectives for the development of the textual format of the texts in which ‘philosophical’ positions were outlined. Developed from simple mātṛkās that had been culled from sūtras and Vinaya texts, Abhidharma texts increasingly became polemical, and became characterized by an increasing “attempt to cogently summarize salient doctrinal 52

On the history of the Chinese Abhidharma and Kośa Schools: see Dessein, 2010: 57–62, 66–67.

14

Introduction

positions and yet also refute, point by point, positions thought to represent rival groups”.53 In this process, the original mātṛkās were not only adapted to suit doctrinal interpretations and developments, but they also became the force of doctrinal development themselves.54 New interpretations of the transmitted material were also included in commentarial texts on earlier Abhidharma texts, and sectarian self-identification also culminated in the creation of well-structured pedagogical manuals of Buddhist doctrine in which, through sophisticated methods of argument, the own position is established and the view of others is refuted.55 This development of peculiar philosophical positions is the subject of the third part of this volume: “Philosophical Studies”. Harivarman lived in the third-fourth century and is likely to have belonged to the Bahuśrutīyas, a sub-group of the Mahāsāṃghikas.56 He is credibly attested as being a pupil of Kumāralāta who, himself, was connected to the Sautrāntika development of the Sarvāstivādins.57 By the time of Harivarman, the early Buddhist dharma theory – the Sarvāstivādin atomic world view that all that exists is composed of phenomena (dharma) that are themselves subject to constant change, and that therefore all that exists is devoid of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) – had experienced a major reinterpretation. Rational inquiry could not but lead to the advanced opinion that when all that exists is composed of phenomena, it should necessarily be so that these phenomena (themselves dharmas too) should equally consist of further dharmas. The only logical outcome was that all that exists was taken to be empty (śūnya).58 It especially were the Madhyamaka philosophers, the most important of whom are the second-third century Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva, who took this thinking to its logical and methodological extreme. As masters of logic argumentation, they even dared to use logical argument to discuss the proper dogmas of Buddhism. “Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras: The Case of Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi” is Goran Kardaš’s investigation of the Madhyamaka viewpoints in Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhiśāstra. In this Abhidharma treatise that is one of the very few to refer to the Mādhyamikas, Harivarman is seen to put Madhyamaka argumentation – that most likely stems from Āryadeva – in favor of the non-existence of things in the mouth of his opponent who, through this, appears as a Madhyamaka adherent. This contribution thus witnesses of the 53 54 55 56 57 58

Cox, 1995: 30–31. See Gethin, 1992: 161. See Cox, 1995: 35. See Potter, 1999: 255–256; Dessein, 2009: 39–40. T.55.2145: 78c9f.; T.45.1852: 3c11–14. See also Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 107–110. For more on this development: see Bronkhorst, 2000: 139–148.

Introduction

15

third-fourth century intellectual debate between adherents of the Ṥrāvakayāna and early Mahāyānists. One of the consequences of the growing importance and popularity of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China was that Abhidharma studies rapidly started to decline after the eighth century.59 Although Abhidharma studies disappeared as a separate branch of Buddhist activity, the Abhidharmic methodology continued to live on in the Chinese Mahāyāna schools. In “Svalakṣaṇa (Particular) and Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (Universal) in Abhidharma and Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism,” Chen-kuo Lin outlines how the seventh-eighth century Chinese Yogācārins disagreed with the theory the Ābhidhārmikas Kuiji and Huizhao 慧 沼 (632–682) proposed on whether liberation through meditation can be attained when taking the universal characteristics of things as object or when taking the particular characteristics as object, and how they appropriated Abhidharma teachings in their Yogācāra theory of truth and liberation. In its focus on Yogācāra Buddhism’s relation to the Sarvāstivāda, this chapter corroborates the importance of the latter for the former also Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti discerned, and its subject – the mātṛkā of meditation leading to liberation – is also the subject matter discussed in the contributions by Tamara Ditrich and by Ingo Strauch and Andrea Schlosser. Another pedagogical manual is the already mentioned Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu. In “Perspectives on the Person and the Self in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,” Yao-ming Tsai examines Vasubandhu’s (ca. fourthfifth century CE) approach to the nature and identity of the person and the self. It is, more precisely, shown how Vasubandhu’s thesis of the selflessness of a person (pudgala-nairātmya) is a critique of the Pudgalavādins (those who accept the existence of a person) or the Tīrthikas (heretics). Discerning a development from an ‘Abhidharmic’ approach to a ‘not-dharmic’ approach, Yao-ming Tsai argues that the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya reveals the significance of the role played by soteriology in Buddhist intellectual thought. He makes clear that the issue of not-self is not about an existential differentiation, but about metaphysical identification: while it is conventional knowledge to speak of the five aggregates that constitute a person and that explain why there is no such thing as a ‘self,’ it is wise to state that these five aggregates are in reality not the five aggregates and are only designations of provisional naming without any substantial or ontological distinction per se. It may also be recalled here that Vasubandhu was a native of Puruṣapura in Gandhāra, the region we characterized as having been important for the development 59

See Dessein, 2010: 67.

16

Introduction

of ‘Buddhist philosophy’ and for the maturation of Mahāyāna Buddhism.60 This development towards the metaphysical might have been stimulated by the development of the dharma theory outlined above, and by the fact that, as mentioned, the Brahmins had taken up a political role, a possibility that was unavailable to the adherents of Śrāvakayāna Buddhism that is overall characterized by a denunciation of mundane life. This lack might have made it possible that Buddhism became more oriented towards the metaphysical. It is thus clear that Abhidharma studies, their long history and diverse contexts of development notwithstanding, continued to deliberate over the same fundamental Buddhological questions. Abhidharma was at once the philosophical construct to explain the Buddhist doctrine as the framework within which philosophers interpreted internal developments and external influences.

Methodological Remarks (Weijen Teng)

Thus far, we have signified the very nature of the Abhidharma tradition as an enterprise of rational thinking, sketched its historical transmission and transformation across South and East Asia, and outlined the arrangement and the main points of the chapters. The following part of the introduction highlights the methodological significance of this edited volume as a whole, and teases out some of the methodological features reflected in the individual chapters. The compilation of this volume, which covers cross-regional and longue durée studies of Abhidhamma / Abhidharma traditions, appears to encapsulate a methodological intuition – a demonstration of how the Abhidharma study, which is often envisioned as a lofty, hypertechnical, and relatively marginal subject within Buddhist Studies, could be approached in a way that could contribute to a broader inquiry into the Humanities. Given the intention of offering some new lights to the study of the Abhidharma tradition methodologically, this volume does not claim to offer a methodological ‘paradigm shift’. As the three thematic divisions of this volume suggests, the authors have adopted the methods that are fundamental to the study of Abhidharma study, namely a meticulous textual criticism and historical philology, contextualized intellectual history, and doctrinal philosophy. Nonetheless, in their studies, these authors take up issues that go beyond the Abhidharma tradition itself and therefore reveal verily some methodological significances and potentials. We will point out these methodological features shortly, but before that, we 60

See Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 270.

Introduction

17

will try to signify some methodological advantage this volume as a whole encapsulates. One methodological advantage of this volume apparently lies in its coverage of the birth, growth, and changes over time and space of this Buddhist scholastic enterprise we call ‘the Abhidharma tradition’.61 This volume can be imagined as a satellite in space: in its surveying down the river system of the Abhidharma, an overall picture is produced that enables us to connect its remote sources with its ends, and to trace its turns and stops across regions. In this way, through Johannes Bronkhorst’s delineating of the intellectual network of Gandhāran Abhidharma, we can connect the Hellenistic philosophical world not only to the South Asian world of the Brahmanical philosophies and to the Tamil country and Ceylon addressed in Lance S. Cousins’s study, but also across East Asia, to the seventh century Abhidharmic recontextualization by Kuiji in Weijen Teng’s study, and to the Chinese seventh-eighth century Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism that Chen-kuo Lin studied. We can even connect the Hellenistic philosophical methodology to the otherwise untraceable end of “geyi Confucianism” in which the Abhidharmic technique was adopted by Confucians to redefine their orthodoxy, a case studied in Bart Dessein’s chapter. In Ditrich’s trace of the genealogy of the Pāli syntagms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā, a stylistic current that originated in the Vedic textual tradition flows into the Pāli Nikāyas through the oral practice of mātikā, and was later formulized and formalized by Buddhagosa in the later Theravāda Abhidhamma literature. Through the vintage point this volume stands upon, the complex nature of these intellectual connections, that has an enormous coverage in time and space, reveals, in a much fuller manner, the cross-cultural influence and confluence of the Abhidharma tradition in the intellectual history of the globe. Another methodological feature this volume presents, is that many chapters offer potential contributions to the areas of studies that go beyond the subject of Abhidharma scholasticism itself. In general, the subject of Abhidharma is studied in its own right, whereby the origins of the Abhidharmic enterprise are sought, its philosophies and doctrines are interpreted, and its intellectual 61

The enterprise of Abhidharma is universally treated as the Buddhist “Scholasticism”. To name a few book titles or chapters that contain this usage: Kalupahana, 1967, Chapter 9 “Scholasticism, Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Sautrāntika”; Aviv, 2014, Chapter 9 “Ouyang Jinwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology”; Willemen, 2006; Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998. As a scholastic enterprise, Abhidharma studies could naturally fit in the broader field of Comparative Philosophy of Religion. See José Cabezón (ed.), 1998, Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives.

18

Introduction

dynamics are revealed. This is surely a legitimate and necessary approach. However, the study of Abhidharma also has the potential to go beyond its own philosophical and religious significance. Through Johannes Bronkhorst’s as well as Ingo Stauch and Andrea Schlosser’s studies of the rational form of intellectual debate and its reception and development in “Greater Gandhāra,” the cultural richness and complex intellectual network of this ancient region can be inferred. To some extent, Lance S. Cousins’s study of the “Sanskrit Abhidharma Literature of the Mahāvihārāvāsins” likewise enhances our knowledge of the intellectual history of the Theriya school of Southern India and Ceylon. The materials these authors document and analyze constitute a cogent case for Randall Collins’ “sociology of philosophies,” and thus engage in the dialogue with the “global theory of intellectual change” that he proposed.62 A varied methodological move of going beyond Abhidharma itself can be discerned in the history of East Asian Abhidharma. As demonstrated in this volume, Abhidharma is taken not only as a scholastic system of thought per se. It is also viewed as a peculiar genre of Buddhist literature as is the case in Eric M. Greene’s chapter, as an exegetical technique by Bart Dessein, and as an exegetical strategy by Weijen Teng. Methodologically speaking, Eric M. Greene rightly takes the ‘problematic’ Chinese translations of Buddhist terms seriously, a methodological move that contrasts with the studies that simply dismiss such problematic Chinese translations as doctrinal deficiency, and thrive for the ‘authentic’ meanings of the Indic terms. In his seeking out semantic and/or cultural explanations for the “mistranslated” terms, Greene makes an interesting case for the study of “cultural translation,”63 vis-à-vis literal rendering, and he hence offers an alternative approach to the study of Chinese translations of Buddhist texts. Bart Dessein’s and Weijen Teng’s approaches to Abhidharma are similar in that they do not focus on any particular Abhidharma literature or theory. Instead, they approach Abhidharma as an exegetical technique or strategy employed by fourth-fifth century and seventh century Chinese intellectuals respectively, and they try to bring about the historical significance of this technique or strategy for the intellectual world of medieval China. Dessein’s study is particularly interesting in that the Chinese Buddhist pedagogy in relation to Abhidharma, that is, geyi, unintendedly helped some ‘conservative’ Confucian literati to redefine the Confucian orthodoxy of the time. In the same vein, Teng’s approach to Abhidharma looks into the methodological nature of 62 63

For example, he proposes that “conflict is the energy source of intellectual life, and conflict is limited by itself”. Collins, 1998: 1. For a general discussion of the term, see Pym, 2010, Chapter 8 “Cultural Translation”.

Introduction

19

Abhidharmic scholasticism, and shows how Kuiji attempted to construct a normative foundation for the Chinese Buddhist intellectual practice. Rigorous philosophical and philological approaches to Abhidharma studies are not lacking from this volume. Due to their close investigations into important Abhidharma texts that have not received due attention from Abhidharma scholars, the discoveries and arguments advanced in these studies improve our knowledge of the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma tradition. In the case of Jowita Kramer, the primary text of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā was recently edited and published by the same author.64 Her study of this text with a comparison primarily of the Pañcaskandhaka, the Yogācārabhūmi, and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, enables us to trace the various lines of the development of the concepts of kliṣṭamanas and ālayavijñāna from early Buddhism to Mahāyāna via Abhidharma developments. It is worth mentioning that the text Goran Kardaš studies, the *Tattvasiddhi, is a Sanskrit text that has been reconstructed from its Chinese translation, the Chengshi lun 成實論. The *Tattvasiddhi probably is the only extant Mahā­ sāṃghika Abhidharma text, whose importance in terms of the intellectual history of the Abhidharma tradition is evident. Methodolgocially speaking, Kardaš’s choice and study of the Sanskrit reconstruction, instead of the ‘original’ Chinese translation, offers some interesting perspectives for textual criticism when the Sanskrit text is compared with its Chinese translation. We have already seen that several papers in this volume work on Chinese materials. How Chinese materials can be important for more historically informed and philosophically engaged Abhidharma studies is made explicit in Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti’s and Chen-kuo Lin’s studies. They bring to our attention, though not for the first time in this field of studies, the Abhidharma literature persevered only in Chinese translation as well as the Abhidharmic discussions found in Chinese Buddhist commentaries. Through his close examination of the Chinese Abhidharma translations, in his chapter, the *Nyāyānusāra (Shun zhengli lun 順正理論) and the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā (Apidamo xianzong lun 阿毗達磨顯宗論) of Saṃghabhadra, Dhammajoti demonstrates how Abhidharma scholars can be misled by relying solely on the Indic Abhidharma literature, for instance, the Abhidharmakośa, and by overlooking the vast corpus of Chinese translations of Abhidharma texts, in particular Xuanzang’s 玄奘 translation of the gigantic Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā, a fundamental Abhidharma text of the Sarvāstivāda school. In his philosophical study of the Chinese Yogācārins of the seventh-eighth century, Chen-kuo Lin introduces the scholastic and philosophical discussions 64

Kramer, 2014.

20

Introduction

found in the indigenous commentaries to the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts. Lin’s study cogently demonstrates the value of these Chinese commentaries to the extent that they do not only continue some core philosophical debates of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions, but also offer new and plausible philosophical insights which might be informed by the Chinese world-view. In terms of the diversity of research material as a methodological gesture, we should also mention Dylan Esler’s study of a tenth century Tibetan treatise, the bSam-gtan mig-sgron composed by gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes. That also literature that does not necessarily possess an Abhidharmic outlook might contain useful references to the Abhidharma philosophy, is shown in his chapter. The methodological remarks presented so far, fall into the categories of ‘descriptive’ or ‘interpretative’ (or explanatory). From a methodological perspective, Yao-ming Tsai’s approach stands out uniquely. The main thesis in his study on the Person and the Self in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya relates to an interesting methodological method less common in the field of religious studies. Tsai’s study expresses an urge to re-orientate the perspective in the study of Buddhist philosophy from ‘Abhidharmic’ to ‘non-Abhidharmic’. With his emphasis on ‘first hand’ observation and his caution for an “Abhidharma orientation” which tends to “organize, classify, analyze and compare conceptual factors,” Yao-ming Tsai takes side with the domain of the phenomenology of religion. His urge to side with a phenomenological approach for an appreciation of the Buddha-dharma seems to be less a philosophical interpretation or description than a ‘normative’ proposition. It will be quiet interesting to see how Yao-ming Tsai’s approach could re-open a discussion on the problematics and the appropriateness of the ‘normative discourse’ in Buddhist studies as an academic discipline.65

Abbreviations

DN MN T.

Dīghanikāya (ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter, [1890–1911] 1995–2007) Majjhimanikāya (ed. Trenckner and Chalmers, 1888–1902) Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 (ed. Takakusu 高楠, Watanabe 渡邊 and Ono 小野, 1924–1934)

65

For a previous discussion on this issue of “normative discourse”, see Cabezón, 1995: 231– 268.

Introduction



21

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Stache-Rosen, Valentina (1968). Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus. Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya. 2 vols. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Takakusu, Junjirō 高楠順次郎, Watanabe, Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭, and Ono Gemmyō 小野 玄妙 (ed.) (1924–1934). Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大蔵經, Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai.   - T.1.1: Dīrghāgama, Chang ahan jing 長阿含經, Buddhayaśas and Zhu Fonian 竺 佛念.

  - T.1.12: Saṃgītisūtra, Da ji famen jing 大集法門經, Shihu 施護.   - T.22.1425: Mahāsāṃghikavinaya, Mohesengqi lü 摩訶僧祇律, Buddhabhadra, Faxian 法顯.   - T.22.1428: Dharmagupta[ka]vinaya 四分律, Si fen lü, Buddhayaśas, Zhu Fonian 竺 佛念, et. al.   - T.23.1435: Sarvāstivādavinaya, Shi song lü 十誦律, Puṇyatara, Dharmaruci, Kumārajīva.   - T.24.1451: [Mūlasarvāstivāda]Vinayakṣudrakavastu, Genben shuo yiqieyou bu pi­ naiye zashi 根本說一切有部毘奈耶雜事, Yijing 義淨.   - T.24.1463: Vinayamātṛkā, Pinimu jing 毘尼母經.   - T.26.1536: Śāriputra, [Abhidharma]saṃgītiparyāya[pādaśāstra], Apidamo ji yi men zu lun 阿毘達磨集異門足論, Xuanzang 玄奘.   - T.27.1545: 500 arhats, [Abhidharma]mahāvibhāṣā[śāstra] Apidamo da piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, Xuanzang 玄奘.   - T.41.1821: Puguang 普光, Jushe lun ji 俱舍論記.   - T.41.1822: Fabao 法寶, Jushe lun shu 俱舍論疏.   - T.43.1830: Kuiji 窺基, Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記.   - T.45.1852: Jizang 吉藏, San lun xuan yi 三論玄義.   - T.49.2030: [Ārya]Nandimitrāvadāna, Da aluohan nantimiduolo suo shuo fa zhu ji 大阿羅漢難提蜜多羅所說法住記, Xuanzang 玄奘.   - T.49.2031: Vasumitra, Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Yibuzong lun lun 異部宗輪論, Xuanzang 玄奘.   - T.50.2042: Aśokarājāvadāna, Ayu wang zhuan 阿育王傳, An Faqin 安法欽.   - T.50.2043: Aśokarājasūtra, Ayu wang zhuan 阿育王傳, Saṃghabhara.   - T.50.2053: Da Tang Daci’en si sanzang fashi zhuan 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, Huili 慧立, Yancong 彥悰.   - T.51.2087: Da Tang xiyu ji 大唐西域記, Bianji 辯機, Xuanzang 玄奘.   - T.55.2145: Sengyou 僧祐, Chu sanzang ji ji 出三藏記集. Takakusu, Junjirō and Nagai Makoto (eds.) (1975). Samantapāsādikā. Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Vinaya Piṭaka. 3 volumes. Pali Text Society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Trenckner, Vilhelm and Chalmers, Robert (ed.) (1888–1902). Majjhimanikāya. London: The Pāli Text Society.

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Watanabe, Fumimaro (1983). Philosophy and its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidharmma. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Willemen, Charles (2006). The Essence of Scholasticism: Abhidharmahṛdaya. T1550. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Willemen, Charles; Dessein, Bart & Cox, Collett (1998). Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism. (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/11). Leiden etc.: Brill. Zürcher, Erik ([1959] 1972). The Buddhist Conquest of China. The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China. 2 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

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Part 1 Mātṛkā and Abhidharma Terminologies

∵

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Abhidharma and Indian thinking

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Chapter 1

Abhidharma and Indian thinking Johannes Bronkhorst 1

Introduction

Much could be said, and has been said, about the influence of Buddhism on other currents of thought in India. This chapter will deal with this same topic, but limit its attention to one specific form of Buddhism: Abhidharma. And even here, it will only take into consideration the form of Abhidharma that was created in the northwestern corner of the Indian subcontinent, in an area that nowadays belongs to three different political entities: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. This form of Abhidharma is primarily, but not exclusively, associated with the Sarvāstivādins, and the region in which it arose is often referred to as “Greater Gandhāra,” a somewhat vague term, to be sure, but appropriately so, for it is hard to determine with certainty which regions can legitimately be included in it, and which cannot.1 Kashmir and Gandhāra may be taken to belong to it, and if we add Bactria, we can call it, with David Gordon White (2012), KGB. The Abhidharma of Greater Gandhāra (I will call it Gandhāran Abhidharma) exerted a major influence on Buddhist thought in India, to be sure. Most, if not all, of the philosophical schools of Indian Buddhism – both Main Stream and Mahāyāna – are based on the foundations laid here. I have argued elsewhere that already the very earliest Mahāyāna texts we possess are based on Abhidharma thought; these texts may date from the first century BCE.2

* This paper brings together a number of observations made and conclusions drawn in other publications, duly referred to in the footnotes, along with new observations. In its present form it has profited from various critical remarks, most notably by Collett Cox and Shoryū Katsura. Bronkhorst, 1996 overlaps to some extent with parts of this paper, but concentrates on Buddhist notions of language and their influence on Brahmanical philosophy. 1 A Buddhist presence in this region from at least the 2nd century BCE seems certain. Cp. Behrendt, 2004: 256: “[Phase I] began with the founding of the earliest Buddhist centers in Greater Gandhāra: Butkara I and the Dharmarājikā stūpa in Taxila […]. An early 2nd century bce date seems a conservative benchmark for the beginning of this period.” On the extent of Greater Gandhāra, see also note 6, below. 2 Bronkhorst, 2013.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_003

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In this chapter, I will concentrate on Abhidharma influence outside Buddhism. I will begin with a short sketch of some important features of Abhidharma thought, then turn to a number of Indian schools of thought that took over one or more of those features. Gandhāran Abhidharma, it should be emphasized right from the beginning, was different from other forms of Abhidharma, most noticeably so from the Abhidharma preserved in Pāli by the Theravāda Buddhists of Sri Lanka and some countries of Southeast Asia. It is not my intention to give an exhaustive characterization of the two Abhidharmas and their differences, even if I had the competence to do so. I will rather concentrate on Gandhāran Abhidharma, emphasizing those of its features that will play a role in the remainder of this chapter. Gandhāran Abhidharma, like Theravāda Abhidharma, is based on old lists of items, and therefore on old material. Gandhāran Abhidharma dealt with this old material in its own manner, and in doing so went far beyond the old heritage. Already in our oldest documents, it presents itself as the result of an attempt to rethink this traditional material, to systematize and modify it so as to make it part of a coherent philosophy. The emphasis in this philosophy is on ontology: the question “what exists?” is central to this form of Abhidharma, and inspired a number of highly original, and surprising, answers.3 What does exist? Put very briefly, the answer is: the dharmas. Dharmas are the items that had been enumerated in lists, apparently with the purpose of preserving the essential elements of the Buddha’s teaching. Unsurprisingly, given the nature of the Buddha’s teaching, many dharmas were of a psychological nature; they referred to mental states. But not all of them did so. It is not always easy to figure out why certain dharmas were included in the lists, and presumably the early Gandhāran scholiasts faced the same problem. They offered an easy yet radical solution: the dharmas are the ultimate elements of existence. Everything that exists is made up of dharmas. This applies to human beings, of course. After all, we have numerous psychological constituents. But the same vision also applies to material objects; fortunately there were a number of dharmas in the traditional lists that are of a material nature and can therefore account for the existence of material objects, too.

3 It is true that this question is rarely, if ever, explicitly formulated in the technical texts of early Abhidharma. However, this aspect is emphasized, presumably at least from the time of King Menander onward, in texts that draw the consequences of this form of Abhidharma, including the Milindapañha and Prajñāpāramitā texts right from the beginning. See Bronkhorst 2013.

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This, then, was the first step taken by the Gandhāran Ābhidharmikas. They introduced an atomic vision of reality, in the sense that they maintained that there are ultimate constituent elements of all that exists, and that these ultimate elements are the dharmas which they had collected in lists. But they did not stop there. The next step was the claim that dharmas are the only things that exist. The objects that they constitute – this covers all there is, including the macroscopic objects of our everyday experience – do not exist. And the list of dharmas is an exhaustive enumeration of all that exists. This second step can easily be understood in the light of the persistent Buddhist tradition that the self, or the person, does not exist. If the person is conceived of as the aggregate of all its constituent dharmas (and this became the generally accepted way in Buddhism to think about it), this can easily be interpreted to mean that the person does not exist because it is an accumulation of dharmas. Other accumulations of dharmas therefore do not exist either. The Gandhāran Buddhist scholiasts found themselves in this way in the possession of an exhaustive enumeration of all there is, viz., the inherited and slightly adjusted list of dharmas. These dharmas were now thought of as momentary, i.e. as each lasting no more than one single moment. Once again, a traditional Buddhist doctrine could be invoked in defense of this new view: the Buddha had taught that all conditioned factors are non-eternal. This could easily be interpreted to mean that all dharmas are momentary, and this is what happened.4 Gandhāran Abhidharma reduced in this manner the whole world, both animate and inanimate, to an uninterrupted sequence of some seventy-five momentary dharmas; more precisely, some seventy-two momentary dharmas, plus three eternal ones, the so-called asaṃskṛta ‘non-conditioned’ dharmas. The world of our experience thus turned out to be ultimately unreal, with the real world of momentary dharmas hidden below it. How could we possibly be misled into believing that we live in a world of persons and other macroscopic objects? The Buddhist texts frequently respond by pointing out that this or that macroscopic object is a mere name and does not really exist. This is what, in the Milindapañha, Nāgasena pointed out with regard to King Milinda’s chariot, and numerous other Buddhist texts state the same. The objects we are familiar with in our everyday world owe their relative existence – or rather our mistaken conviction that they exist – to the words of language. There is one more point I wish to add to this brief characterization of Gandhāran Abhidharma. Words, as we have seen, are responsible for our 4 On the beginning of Buddhist momentariness, see Rospatt, 1995, along with Bronkhorst, 1995.

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mistaken belief in the reality of a world of persons, chariots and much else. But words, one might object, are themselves ultimately non-existing entities. Does this not undermine the system in some vital manner? It is possible that the Gandhāran scholiasts were aware of this objection. All we know for certain is that they introduced some dharmas in their list that we might call linguistic dharmas. There are three of them, originally perhaps only two. They correspond to individual speech sounds, words and sentences. If we concentrate on words, this means that, beside the sequence of speech sounds that make up a word, there is a momentary dharma (or perhaps better: a series of identical momentary dharmas) that are the word. The word exists in this way beside, and independently of, the speech sounds. This is a highly remarkable conception, and the only justification for its existence I can think of is to save the reality, the real existence, of words and with it the fundamental coherence of the Abhidharma system that was being developed. 2

Grammar

It is time to leave the details of the Abhidharma system and turn to the schools of non-Buddhist thought on which it exerted an influence. The first to be considered is the tradition of Pāṇinian Sanskrit grammar, and more in particular one specific text that belongs to it, Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya “Great Commentary”. It is known that Patañjali wrote this work during the decades following the middle of the second century BCE, and that he was at some time in the service of King Puṣyamitra, one of the successor kings of the Mauryan empire. He was already alive during the inroads of Indo-Greeks into northern India, around 150 BCE. There is some evidence to believe that he settled in Kashmir, and this may explain his interest for us at present.5 For Kashmir was on the one hand a part of Greater Gandhāra,6 with a substantial Buddhist presence. On the other hand, Kashmir was conquered by Puṣyamitra, a Brahmanical ruler who, as we saw, had scholars like Patañjali in his service. Kashmir may therefore have been the place par excellence for Buddhist philosophy, i.e. Gandhāran Abhidharma, and Brahmanical scholarship to meet. Judging by certain features of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, this is what actually happened. Let me explain. Gandhāran Abhidharma was preoccupied with ontology; this we have seen. There are reasons to think that the Buddhists who created it were the first to 5 Aklujkar, 2008; Bronkhorst, 2016: 43–46 and § III.3.2. 6 The map given by Salomon, 1999: 2 suggests that he includes Kashmir in “Greater Gandhāra”; Behrendt, 2004: 16, 22 does so explicitly.

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introduce this preoccupation. It is absent from all contemporary Indian sources, which includes grammatical treatises. Pāṇini does not show the slightest interest in the question what exists. This changes with Patañjali. His Mahābhāṣya discusses the ontological status of words and speech sounds, and proclaims that both have independent existence and are eternal. This is highly remarkable. To begin with, there is no discernible reason why Patañjali should be interested in the ontological status of sounds and words. As a matter of fact, his claim that words exist eternally obliges him to reinterpret Pāṇinian derivations of words. No longer do words come about by adding suffixes to stems, as had been the case in Pāṇini. No, since words are eternally existing independent entities, there can for Patañjali be no question of parts of words, whether they be stems or suffixes. He therefore has to justify grammatical derivations differently. The details do not concern us at present. The main thing is that Patañjali had come to look upon words as ontologically existing entities, and that this forced him to interpret grammatical derivations differently.7 But why had Patañjali come to look upon words as ontologically existing entities? And why do his ontological interests stop at words? The obvious answer is that Gandhāran Abhidharma exerted an influence on him. This does not only explain his ontological preoccupations, but also the fact that he took the audacious step of postulating that words are not just a sequence of sounds, but independently existing things. This is exactly what Gandhāran Abhidharma had done. There the preoccupation with ontology was not surprising, for its philosophy was deeply interested in ontology. In the case of Patañjali, on the other hand, ontology played no useful role in his grammatical reflections; it even made them more complicated. A closer look at grammatical derivations as conceived of by Patañjali reveals that Abhidharma influence had gone further, and caused him greater and more subtle difficulties than the ones just described. Patañjali, it turns out, imposed upon grammatical derivations a scheme that is completely parallel to the vision the Buddhist scholiasts had imposed on reality in general. What is the Abhidharma vision of reality in general? Basically it is a linear vision. All the things we know are successions of momentary dharmas. Each dharma is replaced, after a moment, by another dharma. This next dharma is usually similar to the preceding one. After all, a cow does not become a horse from one moment to the next; this continuity is explained by the regularity with which dharmas are succeeded by identical or similar dharmas. Moreover, the nature of each next dharma is largely determined by the immediately pre7 For details, see Bronkhorst, 1987: 46 ff.

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ceding dharma, not by dharmas that occurred earlier and that have gone long since, nor indeed by dharmas that are still to appear.8 A grammatical derivation, too, is a succession of stages. What determines each next stage? For Pāṇini this could be any of the preceding stages, or occasionally even a stage that was still to come. Patañjali changed all this. For him, each next stage was completely determined by the immediately preceding one. He imposes in this way a linear scheme that is in all essential respects parallel to the linearity of Gandharan Buddhism. This imposition confronted him with major difficulties, for Pāṇini had never intended anything of the kind. Patañjali was therefore obliged to introduce new procedures, add metarules and use various other tricks to make derivations conform to his vision. But this vision was extraneous to Pāṇini’s grammar. Patañjali imposed it, without telling us why. However, it seems safe to assume that the explanation of this strange change imposed by Patañjali lies in his acquaintance with the Abhidharma vision of the world.9 3

Jainism

One of the old texts of the Śvetāmbara Jaina canon, the Sūyagaḍa (in Sanskrit: Sūtrakṛtāṅga), shows awareness of a number of characteristics of Buddhism. It mentions the five skandhas, but also – and this is more interesting in the present context – the notion of momentariness. Momentariness, as we have seen, is one of the innovations introduced by Gandhāran Abhidharma. We may assume that the author of this text (or of this portion of the text) was acquainted with the developments that had taken place in north-western Buddhism. Other texts of the Śvetāmbara canon – all of them no doubt younger than the Sūyagaḍa – do not only know the notion of momentariness: they have adopted it themselves. The moment (samaya) as the smallest unit of time appears to occur for the first time in the Uttarajjhayaṇa, and this same text further knows the notion of santati, the sequence of moments that is also common in Buddhism. Beside moments, other significant notions are found in the Uttarajjhayaṇa, among them pradeśa (the smallest unit of space) and paramāṇu (atom). In other words, we find here an atomic vision of time, space and matter. It is true that Buddhism does not appear to have accepted the

8 The justification for this way of viewing the succession of dharmas lies in the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). 9 For details, see Bronkhorst, 2004. See further Bronkhorst, 1994; 2002b.

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atomic nature of space, it did accept and elaborate the atomic nature of matter, and of course of time. The Sūyagaḍa is also acquainted with the Buddhist notion of the person as a collection of skandhas. It tells us that the Buddhist person is neither different nor not different from the skandhas; this is a position that was held by the Buddhist Pudgalavādins. The Sūyagaḍa, we learn from this passage, was already aware of the issue regarding wholes and their parts that occupied the Buddhists. Most Buddhists, with the exception of the Pudgalavādins, rejected the existence of wholes; subsequent texts from the Śvetāmbara canon accept it. Perhaps the most surprising feature that Jainism took over from Abhidharma Buddhism, if my reflections are correct, is the use of the word pudgala. In Buddhism the pudgala is the person, conceived of as the combination of the skandhas, i.e. of the dharmas, that make up a person. Many Buddhists thought that this conception does not correspond to any reality; the Pudgalavādins were of a different opinion, and specified that the pudgala is neither different nor not different from the skandhas. All this we know. Interestingly, Jainism too adopted this word pudgala. For them, it does not refer to the person, but rather to material objects. A closer study of the relevant passages brings to light that one of the earliest occurrences of this word in the Jaina canon does refer to a person. In subsequent Jaina developments the emphasis is more and more on the aggregate. We know that in Buddhism pudgala refers to an aggregate, but only to one special kind of aggregate: the person. In Jainism it comes to include other aggregates as well: early texts use it in the sense of “portion, quantity”. It appears indeed that within Jainism the meaning of this word developed from “person” (the meaning also used in Buddhism) to “material object”. This development only makes sense if we start from the Buddhist notion of the person as an aggregate. It is not possible to enter more deeply into this discussion. Further reflections and textual references can be found in another publication, to which I must refer for details.10 Here a few words must be said about the time and place of the interaction between Gandhāran Abhidharma and Jainism. Jainism was not present in Gandhāra.11 Gandhāra is beyond the lands where a Jaina monk is allowed to travel, which extend westward until Thaneshwar.12 However, 10 11 12

Bronkhorst, 2000. See however Pal, 2007, which shows that Jaina merchants may have ventured into Gandhāra and Afghanistan. See Jain, 1984: 23–24 (with note 2), 337 ff.; further PPN II s.v. Saṃpai (Samprati), with references. Kalpasūtra 1.50 reads: “monks and nuns may wander eastward as far as

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Jainism was strongly present in Mathurā under the Kuṣāṇas, i.e. at a time when Buddhism, too, had a strong presence in that region. There are also reasons to think that Buddhism and Jainism interacted in other respects in this region during this period. It seems, for example, that Jainism at that time abandoned the worship of relics of the Jina and of stūpas that contained them. This would not be an example of Jainism borrowing from Buddhism but rather of Jainism consciously differentiating itself from Buddhism. Once again, there is no space to pursue this issue further at present.13 4

Brahmanical Philosophy

Let us now turn to Brahmanical philosophy. The influence of Gandhāran Abhidharma is here most obvious in the case of the Vaiśeṣika school of thought. Vaiśeṣika philosophy imposes an ontological scheme on the world, and it can easily be seen that this scheme has been inspired by Gandhāran Abhidharma. Remember the important features of Gandhāran Abhidharma I enumerated earlier, and consider the following three: 1. Gandharan Abhidharma interpreted its lists of dharmas as exhaustive enumerations of all there is. 2. These dharmas, these elements of existence, can form aggregates, but these aggregates do not themselves exist; no wholes exist, only their ultimate parts. 3. These aggregates yet play roles in our daily lives and experience, but ultimately they owe their relative existence to words. There are no chariots beyond their ultimate parts, yet we believe there are on account of the word “chariot”. These features reappear in Vaiśeṣika, though the details are different.14 1. Like Abhidharma, Vaiśeṣika has an exhaustive enumeration of all there is. These are its well-known categories (of which there are six, or seven, or ten, depending on the sub-school concerned), and a large number of well specified subcategories.

13 14

Anga-Magadha, southward as far as Kosambī, westward as far as Thūṇā and northward as far as Kuṇālā. They may wander thus far, (for) thus far there are Āryan countries, but not beyond unless the Dhamma flourishes there” (tr. Bollée, 1998: xxiv). According to PPN I s.v. Thūṇā (Sthūṇā), this place is Thaneshwar, north-west of Mathurā. See Bronkhorst, 2016: Appendix VIII. For a different opinion, see Lysenko, 2011.

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2. Vaiśeṣika, too, recognizes the importance of aggregates; but contrary to Gandhāran Abhidharma, it considers these aggregates as really existing. Chariots therefore exist, as do their parts. 3. In Vaiśeṣika, as in Gandhāran Abhidharma, words correspond to aggregates. But where these words ultimately did not correspond to anything real in Abhidharma, words correspond to reality in Vaiśeṣika. This is true to the extent that the existence of certain entities is concluded from the fact that there is a word for them. Once again, it is not possible to enter into details.15 It seems however clear that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is indebted to Gandhāran Abhidharma, not just in some details, but in its very structure. It is further appropriate to recall that Vaiśeṣika ontology was taken over by the Nyāya school of thought, virtually wholesale. It was taken over in part by numerous other thinkers, and we can safely state that Vaiśeṣika ontology is the most important Brahmanical ontology of classical India. The fact that it was more or less a mirror image of Gandhāran Abhidharma ontology shows the historical importance of the latter. 5

Influence Elsewhere

It cannot be the purpose of this chapter to give a complete survey of the ways in which Gandhāran Abhidharma has influenced non-Buddhist traditions in India. Some of its notions, such as that of momentariness and that of the person as an aggregate, appear unexpectedly in texts such as the medical Caraka Saṃhitā.16 Instances could no doubt be multiplied. Here I will mention one more feature of Gandhāran Abhidharma that was enthusiastically taken over by certain Brahmanical thinkers. Recall that in this philosophy the world of our experience is ultimately unreal. This became a central element of Buddhist systematic philosophy, one that distinguished it for a long time from the Brahmanical systematic philosophies with which it coexisted.17 This changed around the middle of the first millennium CE, when philosophies like Advaita Vedānta joined the inter-philosophical debate. One of its most important early thinkers was Śaṅkara, and it is not surprising that some of his contemporaries accused him of being a crypto-Buddhist:18 15 16 17 18

See Bronkhorst, 1992. See Bronkhorst, 2002a. Bronkhorst, 2012. Bronkhorst, 2009: 187, with note 440.

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Śaṅkara’s philosophy had adopted the essentially Buddhist notion that the world of our experience is not ultimately real. There is no need to recall that Advaita Vedānta became in due time India’s most popular philosophy, and Śaṅkara its most famous thinker. There is one more case of Abhidharma influence that deserves to be mentioned. However, for reasons that will become clear, it makes most sense to deal with this case after a brief discussion of the origin of Gandhāran Abhidharma. That is therefore the topic to which I will turn now. 6

Whence Gandhāran Abhidharma?

It should be clear from what has been mentioned so far that Gandhāran Abhidharma has been extremely influential in the subsequent development of Indian thought. Not only did it to a large extent determine the shape of subsequent Buddhist philosophy in all of its forms. Non-Buddhist philosophies and other forms of Indian thought, too, were profoundly influenced by it. I think therefore that we can state without hesitation that Indian philosophy – or at any rate systematic, rational philosophy in South Asia – began in Greater Gandhāra. How did this happen? Hard-headed philologists rarely ask this question. They often feel that it is difficult enough to extract from the texts what their authors thought, and that those same texts rarely, if ever, tell us why these authors thought the way they did. There are some exceptions. T.R.V. Murti – whose book The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1960) was once widely admired, but whose influence seems to be beyond its peak – emphasized the importance of intellectual strife and the resolution of contradictions in the development of new ideas. According to him, “the Ābhidharmika schools […] grew as the rejection of the ātmavāda of the Brāhmanical systems”.19 This cannot be right. To the best of our knowledge there were no, or few, Brahmins in Greater Gandhāra at that time.20 Gandhāran Abhidharma cannot therefore have been based on a rejection of the Brahmanical ātmavāda. I have elsewhere dealt with Murti’s ideas in general, which I do not accept.21 However, it does seem right to assume that revolutionary new ideas tend to arise in appropriate surroundings, especially in challenging intellectual surroundings. It does therefore make sense to ask, if there were no Brahmins in 19 20 21

Murti, 1960: 8. Bronkhorst, 2011: 202–205; 2016: § I.1.3. Bronkhorst, 2006.

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Greater Gandhāra at that time, who else may have been there to challenge the Buddhists into creating a vision of the world that was to inspire Indian thinkers, directly or indirectly, for the next two thousand years. The answer to this question seems simple and straightforward. Gandhāra and most of what we call Greater Gandhāra (with the exception of Kashmir, see above) fell again in the hands of the Indo-Greeks around 185 BCE, at the time of the collapse of the Mauryan empire. At that time, and perhaps already before that time, the Buddhists of that part of the subcontinent had to deal with Hellenistic rulers. And we know that Hellenistic rulers had a tendency to surround themselves with philosophically cultivated sages, and that discussions of a philosophical nature had become part of Hellenistic tradition. It is hard to imagine that representatives of the clearly numerous Buddhists who inhabited those regions were not sometimes challenged to take part in such discussions. However, to take part in a sophisticated discussion, you better present, and represent, a coherent position yourself. Presumably the Buddhist scholiasts of Gandhāra realized this, and the result is that they created, for the first time in Buddhist history, a coherent philosophical ontology: Gandhāran Abhidharma was born. I realize that these few words about the possible origin of Gandhāran Abhidharma do not but scratch the surface of an important and complex historical question. I have tried to do it more justice in some other publications,22 and I remain aware that the question has not been fully explored even there. Others may take it up and, who knows, they may come to different conclusions. However, I do wish to emphasize that, if it is true that Indian systematic philosophy began in the north-western region we call Greater Gandhāra, reflections as to how this happened, and why, cannot be ignored. After these summary reflections about the origin of Gandhāran Abhidharma, we are ready to address a theory recently launched by Christopher Beckwith in his book Warriors of the Cloisters: The Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval World (2012). Beckwith’s theory concerns what he calls the recursive argument method that, he claims, came to be used in Indian philosophical texts, but not only there. The recursive argument method, according to Beckwith, ended up being used in medieval Europe which borrowed it from the Islamic world. The Islamic world itself, still according to Beckwith, took it from Buddhism in Central Asia. This recursive argument method supposedly played a crucial role in the development of European science. This is why the

22

Bronkhorst, 1999; 2001.

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subtitle of Beckwith’s book is The Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval World.23 Where did this recursive argument method ultimately come from? Beckwith writes the following about it (p. 56): The earliest text so far identified that uses a primitive version of the method, and indeed uses it throughout the text, is the Central Asian Aṣṭagrantha [or Aṣṭaskandha; Taishō 1543]. In this work, each topic argument is followed by a list of arguments about it – usually a rather long list – and then they are repeated and disputed, one by one, in order.24 By contrast, the later Jñānaprasthāna [Taishō 1544] does not use the recursive argument method at all. It strictly follows the two-part Question: Answer format.  The Vibhāṣā, a scholastic work of the Bactrian-Gandhāran branch of the Sarvāstivāda school dated possibly to the first century AD, during the Kushan Empire, contains the earliest known example of what eventually became the fully developed recursive argument method. The method apparently thus developed specifically within the Bactrian-Gandhāran branch of the Sarvāstivāda school, and was only later partially adopted by the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika sect of Sarvāstivāda.  Examples of the recursive argument do not occur in earlier Buddhist texts, earlier non-Buddhist Indian texts, or earlier texts connected to other branches of the Sarvāstivāda school.

23

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Beckwith’s theory does not only concern the recursive argument method, but also the development of medieval European colleges under the influence of Islamic madrasas, which themselves presumably arose under the influence of Buddhist vihāras. Beckwith claims, with a reference to Dutt, 1962: 62ff. and 211 ff., that “the plan of the vihāra is strikingly different from that of the saṅghārāma, the typical earlier, strictly Indian, Buddhist monastic design” and he adds that “[t]he vihāra design is […] a specifically Central Asian innovation developed under the Kushans and spread by them” (p. 41). These claims, and especially the second one, are not substantiated but cannot here be further examined; see however Schopen, 2004: 73–80; 2006. Beckwith refers here to Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 223, where we read: “the two Chinese translations of the *Aṣṭaskandhaśāstra (30 fascicles) and Jñānaprasthāna (20 fascicles) do differ in length, at least in part, as a result of a difference in format: the *Aṣṭaskandhaśāstra lists the questions that will be addressed at the beginning of each section and then repeats the questions with each answer; the Jñānaprasthāna gives the questions only once prior to the answer.”

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This passage raises a number of questions, among them the following: Does Beckwith not overemphasize the role of Central Asia? Is the Aṣṭagrantha (or Aṣṭaskandha) really a Central Asian text?25 And is the Vibhāṣā really a scholastic work of the Bactrian-Gandhāran branch of the Sarvāstivāda school?26 At present we can leave these questions aside, and reformulate Beckwith’s theory slightly, so that it now states that the recursive argument method originated in Abhidharma Buddhism. Put this way, Beckwith’s claim is that the origins of science in the Medieval European world have to be looked for in Gandhāran Abhidharma. What is this recursive argument method? Beckwith dedicates a chapter (Chapter Two) of his book to explaining and illustrating what he means by this. Here I will merely repeat his statement of its essence, which occurs on page 89 and reads:27 I. Argument (the Main Argument, Question, or Topic) II. Subarguments1 about the Argument III. Subarguments2 about the Subarguments1 about the Argument Suppose now, for argument’s sake, that Beckwith is right in maintaining that examples of the recursive argument do not occur in earlier texts, whether 25

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27

Beckwith refers to Willemen, but all Willemen says is, 2006: 6: “Kātyāyana’s Aṣṭagrantha […], the main text of the Gandhārans, [was] probably written in Gāndhārī and Kharoṣṭhī, in the late first century BCE. In the second century CE this text was rewritten in Sanskrit, and called Jñānaprasthāna.” (my emphasis, JB). See also Willemen, 2012: 163–164: “The Sarvāstivāda ‘orthodoxy’ rewrote the old Gandharan Aṣta-grantha in Sanskrit, now called Jñāna-prasthāna. Because the old text had many Vibhāṣās, commentaries, the new text needed a new commentary. This is the Mahāvibhāṣā.” On p. 59, Beckwith specifies that “[t]he earliest vibhāṣā preserved (in Chinese translation) […] is the Central Asian work known as the Vibhāṣā [Taishō 1547]”. And p. 62: “the Bactrian Aṣṭagrantha and Vibhāṣā are the models for the later Jñānaprasthāna and Mahāvibhāṣā.” Contrast this with Cox’s remark: “It is with the composition of the vibhāṣā compendia that the Sarvāstivāda school within Kaśmīra comes to be defined both doctrinally and textually.” (Willemen, Dessein & Cox, 1998: 229). See also Willemen, 2006: 6–7: “The western [i.e. non-Kashmirian, JB] Sarvāstivādins, a very heterogeneous group, seem to have had more than one Vibhāṣā on the Aṣṭagrantha.” Beckwith’s concern with Central Asia finds expression in his earlier book Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (2009). See also pp. 25–26: “The recursive argument is, minimally, an argument that is disputed by an argument that is disputed by an argument, or more simply (but in reverse order), an argument about an argument about an argument.”

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Buddhist or non-Buddhist, whether Asian or European. It will yet be hard to believe that this way of arguing was unknown before the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā. Is this stylistic expression not simply a literary reflection of oral disputations in which the different participants are given the occasion to present their arguments in full and to refute, point by point, those of their opponents? After all, the recursive argument “is at heart a way to examine a problem systematically, logically, and in great detail” (Beckwith, 2012: 25). And do such oral disputations – systematic, logical, and detailed – not constitute the background against which Gandhāran Abhidharma arose and could arise? If so, the literary feature to which Beckwith draws attention is no more and no less than the reflection of the real life situation that allowed Gandhāran Abhidharma – and not just the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā – to arise.28 Beckwith may not be right in thinking that recursive arguments do not appear in texts older than the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā. The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali is such a text, and it appears to use the recursive argument method. Here is what specialists say about it. According to George Cardona (1976: 253), the Mahābhāṣya is composed “in the form of dialogues in which take part a student (śiṣya) who questions the purpose […] of rules and their formulations, an unaccomplished teacher (ācāryadeśīya) who suggests solutions which are not fully acceptable, and a teacher (ācārya) who states what is the finally acceptable view.” Hartmut Scharfe (1977: 156) analyzes a passage from the Mahābhāṣya and concludes: “With great stylistic art Patañjali has created the impression of a freely progressing debate with new disputants butting in now and then in which all possibilities of an interpretation are scrutinized”. This, one might think, is precisely what Beckwith finds in the Aṣṭagrantha and so many other texts. 28

Beckwith emphasizes the difference between structure and content, but believes that the former can influence the latter (2012: 35–36): “The overt, explicit, formal structure of the recursive argument is its most crucial factor. It is not quite true that ‘the medium is the message’ in recursive method books, but because they typically consist exclusively of lists of recursive arguments, each of which contains many contrasting views on the same problem, they clearly did encourage scepticism and speculation by the authors. In that respect, therefore, it is true that the form of the recursive argument did have a significant indirect impact on the content of works written according to it. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the specific overt structure, per se, of a recursive argument is not directly or even implicitly connected, structurally or semantically, to its specific overt content or to the implicit logical structure of the internal content. In other words, in a recursive argument method, the way it is said has essentially nothing to do with what is said. It does, however, have a great deal to do with the general way the content is approached and understood […].”

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Recall now that the Mahābhāṣya underwent the influence of Abhidharma Buddhism. Since it is older than the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā, it cannot have undergone the direct influence of these texts. However, it may have undergone the influence of earlier Buddhist Abhidharma texts that displayed this style, or perhaps not the influence of any particular text but rather the influence of the specific way of discussing that was the background of Gandhāran Abhidharma. In this way the Mahābhāṣya may add an interesting dimension to Beckwith’s theory. We have come to the end of this chapter. We have briefly touched upon many details related to the history of Gandhāran Abhidharma. Each of these may merit further discussion and critical assessment. But there is one conclusion that in my opinion cannot be seriously doubted: the historical importance of Gandhāran Abhidharma is beyond dispute. Anyone interested in the intellectual history of South Asia – and perhaps in the intellectual history of Eurasia in general – will have to pay serious attention to this system of thought, both in its origin and in its development, because of the tremendous influence it has exerted over the centuries.

Abbreviation

PPN

Āgamic Index, vol. I: Prakrit Proper Names (ed. Malvania, 1970–1972)



Bibliography

Aklujkar, Ashok (2008). “Patañjali: a Kashmirian”, In Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir. Essays in memory of Paṇḍit Dinanath Yaksha. Edited by Mrinal Kaul & Aklujkar Ashok. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, pp. 173–205. Beckwith, Christopher I. (2009). Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present. Princeton NJ & Oxford: Princeton University Press. Beckwith, Christopher I. (2012). Warriors of the Cloisters. The Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval World. Princeton NJ & Oxford: Princeton University Press. Behrendt, Kurt A. (2004). The Buddhist Architecture of Gandhāra (Handbook of Oriental Studies, 2/17). Leiden etc.: Brill. Bollée, Willem B. (1998). Bhadrabāhu Bṛhat-kalpa-niryukti and Sanghadāsa Bṛhat-kalpabhāṣya. Romanized and metrically revised version, notes from related texts and a selective glossary. Part One: Pīṭhikā and Uddeśa 1. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

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Bronkhorst, Johannes (1987). Three Problems Pertaining to the Mahābhāṣya (PostGraduate and Research Department Series, No. 30. “Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures” [Third Series]). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1992). “Quelques axiomes du Vaiśeṣika”, Les Cahiers de Philosophie 14 (“L’orient de la pensée: philosophies en Inde”), pp. 95–110. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1994). “A note on Patañjali and the Buddhists”, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 75, pp. 247–254. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1995). Review of Rospatt, 1995. Études Asiatiques / Asiatische Studien 49(2), pp. 513–519. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996). “Sanskrit and reality: the Buddhist contribution”, In Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the history of the Sanskrit language. Edited by Jan E.M. Houben. Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, pp. 109–135. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1999). Why is there philosophy in India? Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (Sixth Gonda lecture, held on 13 November 1998 on the premises of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences). Bronkhorst, Johannes (2000). “Abhidharma and Jainism”, In Abhidharma and Indian Thought. Essays in honor of Professor Doctor Junsho Kato on his sixtieth birthday. Edited by the Committee for the Felicitation of Professor Doctor Junsho Kato’s Sixtieth Birthday, Nagoya. Tokyo: Shuju-sha, pp. 598–581 ([13]–[30]). Bronkhorst, Johannes (2001). “Pourquoi la philosophie existe-t-elle en Inde?” La rationalité en Asie / Rationality in Asia. Études de Lettres 2001/3, pp. 7–48. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2002a). “A note on the Caraka Saṃhitā and Buddhism”, In Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Thought: In Honor of Doctor Hajime Sakurabe on His Seventy-seventh Birthday. Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, pp. 115–121. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2002b). “Patañjali and the Buddhists”, In Buddhist and Indian Studies in Honour of Professor Sodo Mori. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyoto Kyokai (International Buddhist Association), pp. 485–491. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2004). From Pāṇini to Patañjali: the search for linearity (Postgraduate and Research Department Series, 46). Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2006). “T.R.V. Murti’s Reason”, Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 60(4), pp. 789–798. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2009). Buddhist Teaching in India. Boston MA: Wisdom Publica­tions. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2011). Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/24). Leiden – Boston: Brill. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2012). “Buddhist thought versus Brahmanical thought”, In World View and Theory in Indian Philosophy (Warsaw Indological Studies Series, 5). Edited by Piotr Balcerowicz. New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 21–28.

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Bronkhorst, Johannes (2013). “Reflections on the origins of Mahāyāna”, Septimo Cen­ tenario de los Estudios Orientales en Salamanca. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad (Estudios Filológicos, 337), pp. 489–502. Bronkhorst, Johannes (2016). How the Brahmins Won (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/30). Leiden-Boston: Brill. Cardona, George (1976). Pāṇini. A survey of research. Reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980. Dutt, Sukumar (1962). Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India: Their history and their contribution to Indian culture. London: George Allen & Unwin. Jain, Jagdishchandra (1984). Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon and Commentaries: 6th century BC to 17th century AD. Second rev. and enl. edition. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Lysenko, Victoria (2011). “Buddhist motives in some doctrines of Praśastapāda”, In Vacaspativaibhavam. A Volume in Felicitation of Professor Vachaspati Upadhyaya. Edited by Radha Vallabh Tripathi et al. Delhi: D.K. Printworld, pp. 1223–1233. Malvania, Dalsukh (ed.) (1970–1972). Āgamic Index, vol. I: Prakrit Proper Names. Compiled by Mohanlal Mehta & K. Rishabh Chandra. 2 parts (Lal Dalpatbhai Series, 28 & 37). Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. Murti, Tirupattur Ramaseshayyer Venkatachala (1960). The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. A study of the Mādhyamika system. Second edition. Reprint: Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1980. Pal, Pratapaditya (2007). “Evidence of Jainism in Afghanistan and Kashmir in ancient times”, Bulletin of the Asia Institute 21, pp. 25–33. Rospatt, Alexander von (1995). The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A survey of the origins and early phase of this doctrine up to Vasubandhu (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 47). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Salomon, Richard (1999). Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra. The British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments. London: The British Library. Scharfe, Hartmut (1977). Grammatical Literature (A History of Indian Literature, 5/2). Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Schopen, Gregory (2004). Buddhist Monks and Business Matters. Still more papers on monastic Buddhism in India. Honolulu HI: University of Hawai’i Press. Schopen, Gregory (2006). “The Buddhist ‘monastery’ and the Indian garden: aesthetics, assimilations, and the siting of monastic establishments”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 126(4), pp. 487–505. White, David G. (2012). “Netra Tantra at the crossroads of the demonological cosmopolis”, The Journal of Hindu Studies 5, pp. 145–171. Willemen, Charles (2006). The Essence of Scholasticism: Abhidharmahṛdaya. T 1550. Revised edition with a completely new introduction. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

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Willemen, Charles (2012). “Remarks about the history of Sarvāstivāda in Northwestern India”, In Buddhism in Kashmir (Śata-Piṭaka Series, 639). Edited by Nirmala Sharma. New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations & Aditya Prakashan, pp. 162–164. Willemen, Charles; Dessein, Bart & Cox, Collett (1998). Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholas­ ticism (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/11). Leiden etc.: Brill.

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Chapter 2 Schlosser and Strauch

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism: Groups of Four and the abhedyaprasādas in the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra Andrea Schlosser and Ingo Strauch 1

Introduction

From the various collections of Gāndhārī manuscripts, an increasing number can be ascribed to the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism. As of now seven early Mahāyāna sūtras have been identified, supplemented by some scholastic texts, which also appear to bear a Mahāyāna character. The Gāndhārī Mahāyāna sūtras can be divided into two chronologically – and probably also regionally – different groups.1 The more recent one is repre­sented by manuscripts which most likely originate from Bamiyan. According to the paleography of their script and the advanced stage of their orthography and language, they can be ascribed to the later period of Gāndhāran literature, i.e. the third, early fourth century CE. This date is also confirmed by radiocarbon dating. This more recent group comprises fragments of Gāndhārī versions of already known Mahāyāna texts: Skt. Bhadrakalpika-sūtra (ca. 60 fragments, Schøyen Collection, see Allon and Salomon, 2010: 6f.; Baums, Glass and Matsuda, forthcoming) Skt. Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra (MS17, see Allon and Salomon, 2010: 8) Skt. Sarvapuṇyasamuccayasamādhi-sūtra (MS89, see Allon and Salomon, 2010: 7f.) The older manuscripts preceding this group were written most likely in the late first, early second century CE. Again this date could be confirmed by radio­ carbon dating (for the Prajñāpāramitā cf. Falk, 2011: 20). Although two of these early manuscripts contain texts which can also directly be linked to extant versions of Mahāyāna works, two of them seem to represent texts which are hitherto unknown and have not been transmitted in any of the known Buddhist literary traditions. These texts promise new insights into the formative phase 1 For more details cf. Strauch, forthcoming. See also Allon and Salomon, 2010.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_004

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of early Mahāyāna, when texts had yet to be harmonized into authoritative versions. The texts of this second group comprise: “Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra” (BajC2, see Strauch, 2010; Strauch, forthcoming) Skt. Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (G. prañaparamida, SplitC5, see Falk, 2011; Falk and Karashima, 2012, 2013) Skt. *Sucitti-sūtra (unpublished private collection, see Allon and Salomon, 2010: 11) Skt. Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhi-sūtra (unpublished private collection, see Harrison and Hartmann, 2014: xvi, note 19) At least two of these four early texts – the “Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra” and the Prajñāpāramitā – hail, according to reliable records, from the region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in the modern-day districts of Bajaur and Dir, i.e. east of the Hindukush range.2 Among these early texts, the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra is of special interest. First, it is by far the largest of these early Mahāyāna texts, and the longest text in Gāndhārī known so far, comprising around six hundred lines on a large composite birch bark scroll of about 2 meters length. Second, it belongs to those texts, for which no parallel in another language is known. The Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra is part of the Bajaur Collection, which was allegedly discovered in the ruins of a Buddhist monastery near the village Mian Kili at the Dir-Bajaur border. The collection comprises texts of various Buddhist literary genres, such as āgama, vinaya, rakṣā and stotra texts. A considerable number of texts belong to the genre of scholastic literature, some of which have a distinctive Mahāyāna tendency.3 Even non-Buddhist texts such as a rājanīti verse anthology and a loan contract could be identified among the birch barks of the Bajaur Collection.4 The study of the large Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra is still ongoing. Although the edition still needs some further research regarding certain passages, a more general discussion and summary of its contents will be published soon.5 2 For the origin of the Bajaur Collection cf. Strauch, 2008; for the Split Collection see Falk, 2011. 3 The best preserved texts of this group were edited by Andrea Schlosser in her dissertation “On the Bodhisattva Path in Gandhāra – Edition of Fragment 4 and 11 from the Bajaur Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts” (2013, revised version 2016). 4 For a general survey of the collection see Strauch, 2008. Separate texts are dealt with in Strauch, 2011; Strauch, 2014a and 2014b. 5 The editing of the text is carried out by Ingo Strauch and Andrea Schlosser within a cooperation between the Chair of Buddhist Studies at Lausanne University and the project “Early Buddhist Manuscripts from Gandhāra” of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Munich.

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The entire sūtra can be divided into two different narratives. The first, frame narrative represents a dialogue between the Buddha and Śāriputra. This dialogue occurs at the Vulture Peak in Rājagṛha. The Bajaur sūtra shares this location with other early Mahāyāna sūtras, as e.g. the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and the Gāndhārī Prajñāpāramitā (cf. Falk and Karashima, 2012: 28). The second narrative, which is mainly devoted to the description of the bodhisattva path, reports the dialogue between the Buddha and 84,000 gods (devaputra). This part contains many elements which are known from other early Mahāyāna texts, as e.g. the prediction of a future buddha land (vyākaraṇa). It is a distinctive feature of the text that this prediction refers to the buddha land Abhirati of the Buddha Akṣobhya. Moreover, the text celebrates dharmakṣānti, “endurance towards the [non-arising of the] factors of existence,” as the major characteristic of a bodhisattva. As a characteristic passage of the sūtra’s approach we cite the following passage:6 (*e)[va vuto] bhag̱ava aï[śpa] (*śa)[r](*ip)u(*tro edad oya sarvadharma) [ṇa] śariputra · ṇa as̱i prañayati · ṇa maje prañayati · ṇa p(*r)ayos̱aṇo prañayati ◦ yado ya · śariputra sarvadharma[ṇa] (*ṇa as̱i praña)yati ṇa maje prañayati [‧] ṇa prayos̱aṇo prañayati · ṇa tas̱a śariputra dha(*r) mas̱a [haṇi] praña[yati] ṇa ṭ́hi[di] (*pra)[ñayati ṇa veul](*o)[do pra] (*ñayati ◦) yado ya śariputra ◊ sarvadharmaṇa ◊ · ṇa haṇi prañaïdi · ◊ ṇa ṭ́hidi prañaya[d]i ◊ ṇa veulodo prañayadi ◊ ida ta śariputra · prag̱idie (*acalo aṇalao dha)[rm](*o · ya) [śa]riputra ◊ acalo aṇalao ◊ dharma ◊ ida ta śariputra · imasvi dharmaviṇae ◊ saro (BajC2: 3H.44+1F.33–1F.36) Thus addressed, the Blessed One said to the Venerable Śāriputra: (*Of all dharmas), Śāriputra, a beginning (ādi) is not conceived, a middle (madhya) is not conceived, an end (paryavasāna) is not conceived. And because, Śāriputra, of all dharmas a beginning is not conceived, a middle is not conceived, an end is not conceived, of this [single] dharma, Śāriputra, a decrease (hāni) is not conceived, a stability (sthiti) is not conceived, an increase (vaipulyatā) is not conceived. And because, Śāriputra, 6 The quotations and translations in this article are based on the ongoing edition by Ingo Strauch and Andrea Schlosser. The conventions are those of the series Gandhāran Buddhist Texts, i.e. [ ] uncertain reading, (*) editorial restoration of lost text, ⟨* ⟩ editorial addition of omitted text, { } editorial deletion of redundant text, ? illegible akṣara, + lost akṣara, /// textual loss at left or right edge of support (cf. ). ◊ signifies an intentional space.

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of all dharmas a decrease is not conceived, a stability is not conceived, an increase is not conceived, this [single] dharma, Śāriputra, is by nature immovable (acala) and baseless (anālaya). Which dharma, Śāriputra, is immovable and baseless, this, Śāriputra, is the essence of this Dharma and discipline (dharmavinaya). Passages like this are not rare in early Mahāyāna sūtras, as is, for example, shown by an almost literal parallel from the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (see Aṣṭa §2, ed. Vaidya, 1960: 32). The focus of early Mahāyāna sūtras towards the character of dharmas was interpreted by Johannes Bronkhorst as clear evidence for the influence of Gandhāran scholasticism on early Mahāyāna.7 As Bronkhorst (forthcoming) argues: It was in Greater Gandhāra, during this period, that Buddhist scholasticism developed an ontology centered around its lists of dharmas. Lists of dharmas had been drawn up before the scholastic revolution in Greater Gandhāra, and went on being drawn up elsewhere with the goal of preserving the teaching of the Buddha. But the Buddhists of Greater Gandhāra were the first to use these lists of dharmas to construe an ontology, unheard of until then. They looked upon the dharmas as the only really existing things, rejecting the existence of entities that were made up of them. Indeed, these scholiasts may have been the first to call themselves śūnyavādins. No effort was spared to systematize the ontological scheme developed in this manner, and the influence exerted by it on more recent forms of Buddhism in the subcontinent and beyond was to be immense. But initially this was a geographically limited phenomenon. It may even be possible to approximately date the beginning of this intellectual revolution. I have argued in a number of publications that various features of the grammarian Patañjali’s (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābhāṣya must be explained in the light of his acquaintance with the fundamentals of the newly developed Abhidharma. This would imply that the intellectual revolution in northwestern Buddhism had begun before the middle of the second century BCE. If it is furthermore correct to think, as I have argued elsewhere, that this intellectual revolution was inspired by the interaction between Buddhists and Indo-Greeks, it may be justified to situate the beginning of the new Abhidharma at a time following the renewed conquest of Gandhāra by the Indo-Greeks; this was in or around 7 On Sarvāstivāda scholastisicm in the northwest (Gandhāra and Bactria) see Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 255–285.

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185 BCE. The foundations for the new Abhidharma may therefore have been laid toward the middle of the second century BCE. Based on this statement, it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at the interrelationship of both literary genres. The present paper will confine the discussion to the evidence of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra as one of the earliest attested manuscripts of a Gandhāran Mahāyāna text. It will focus on a passage within the introductory portion that is devoted to the description of an ideal disciple of the Buddha (āryaśrāvaka) and culminates in a list of Buddhist scholastic terms, which are grouped as four. The list of fours is followed by the discussion of another category of fours, called abhejapras̱ada, Skt. abhedyaprasāda. According to the amount of text, which is devoted to this category (ca. 53 out of 121 lines of the introduction), they play a dominant role among the characteristics of an āryaśrāvaka as conceived in this text. The first part of this paper – written by Andrea Schlosser – investigates the relationship of the list of groups of four to Abhidharma and Prajñāpāramitā literature.8 The second part – written by Ingo Strauch – is particularly devoted to the abhedyaprasādas, which seem to represent the raison d’être which caused the inclusion of this list into the text of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra. Both parts try to establish the position of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra within the debates of early Abhidharma discourses and to find the mechanisms that accompanied the transition of Abhidharma thinking into a Mahāyāna context. 2

Groups of Four

2.1 Position in the Text Immediately preceding the list consisting of groups of four, Śāriputra enumerates several things, such as rūpasthiti or vedanotpāda, that are not perceived by a tathāgata. The bhagavant approves and says that also his disciple does not perceive anything of it. He goes on to ask: ta ki mañas̱i śariputra ◊ vida⟨*vi⟩di9 te dharma ya ma ? ? + + + + + What do you think, Śāriputra, … these dharmas, which …

8 Thanks go to Paolo Visigalli and Lin Qian for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of this part. 9 The meaning of this word is yet uncertain. The vi is inserted based on the spelling in the preceding passage, where the word occurs twice as vidavidi.

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Figure 1

Extract from BajC2, part 1 ( frame 2).

Since the end of the line is not preserved any more (1B.14, see fig. 1), the exact wording cannot be established and also the verbal connection to the following passage is unclear, but it should still be spoken by the bhagavant and the missing portion should only comprise the end of the rhetorical question addressed to Śāriputra. 2.2 The List The following passage in response to the preceding question contains a long list of items. All of them consist of four members. The reconstruction is as follows (BajC2, 1B.15–17+E.27–28): (*catvari ś̱paḏovaṭ́haṇa ·) (*catvari) samapra[s̱aṇa] · [catvari] irdh[ipada] · catvari jaṇa10 · catvari saca · catvari apramaña · catvare ? + + + + +11 [catvare] (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida · catvare va[ś]ida · ca[tvare veharaja] · 10 11

(*Four establishments of mindfulness), (*four) right endeavours, four bases of [supernormal] power, four [stages of] meditation, four truths, four unlimited, four …, four analytical knowledges, four masteries, four self-confidences,

Possibly written with a stroke above the j (G. j̄aṇa) as etymologically expected, but the manuscript is folded here, concealing the upper part. Perhaps a term corresponding to the four ārūpyasamāpattis or the four samādhibhāvanās.

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism

catvare ñaṇamulea dharma · catvare so[ḏavati](*aga ·) ++++++??+ catvare taṣ̄amulea dharma (*·) catvare paḍ̱i[va](*da ·) ++++++++++ +++++++??? [catvare] ? ? ? ? + +12 + + + + + + ? ? ? [ca]tvare sakṣig̱araṇia dharma catvari as̱aharia dharma

53

four things rooted in knowledge, four factors of stream entry, …, four things rooted in craving, four kinds of progress, …, …, [four] (*stations of consciousness), …, four things to be realized, four unconquerable things.

2.3 Context and Meaning 2.3.1 Similar Lists in Buddhist Literature Parts of the list in the Bajaur manuscript are familiar from other texts, but the whole set is, to my knowledge, not found in any other Indic text source. The first three items are identical with the first three items of the thirty-seven bodhipakṣya-dharmas, the factors conducive to awakening. These are: four smṛtyupasthānas, four samyakpradhānas, four ṛddhipādas, five indriyas, five balas, seven bodhyaṅgas, and the eightfold mārga. This listing was studied by Johannes Bronkhorst in his article “Dharma and Abhidharma” (1985), where he compares its occurrences throughout Buddhist literature and divides them into four phases of development.13 The sequence in BajC2 corresponds to Bronkhorst’s categories III or *IV with addition of the four dhyānas (II14) and the four apramāṇas (III) and possibly also the four ārūpya(samāpatti)s (*IV15), see table 2.1. Since at the crucial point in BajC2 the birch bark is broken off, it cannot be determined if the ārūpyas had been included or not, but the remaining traces of the first akṣara do not suggest an a, thus speaking against ārūpya. 12

13 14

15

Most probably this is G. viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio, based on the remaining traces of ink and the sequence in two versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya, namely G Cm and T.1.1 (cf. table 3). Cf. also Gethin, 2001, especially pp. 264–283 about the ‘seven sets expanded’. Cf. Bronkhorst, 1985: 306, note 8: “It is remarkable that the Dīrghāgama preserved in Chinese seems to have only list II, not I”. Also a list in another Gāndhārī manuscript (fragment 5 of the Senior Collection) contains this extended list (II) corresponding to the Chinese Dīrghāgama (see Glass, 2007: 35). This combination is not extant in any text but a “hypothetical construction” (Bronkhorst, 1985: 308).

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Table 1

Development of lists based on the bodhipakṣya-dharmas after Bronkhorst, 1985.

I

II

III

*IV

smṛtyupasthāna samyakpradhāna ṛddhipāda

smṛtyupasthāna samyakpradhāna ṛddhipāda dhyāna

smṛtyupasthāna samyakpradhāna ṛddhipāda dhyāna apramāṇa

indriya bala bodhyaṅga ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga

indriya bala bodhyaṅga ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga

indriya bala bodhyaṅga ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga

smṛtyupasthāna samyakpradhāna ṛddhipāda dhyāna apramāṇa ārūpya

bodhipakṣya-dharmas > sūtras and Vinaya

> some canonical sūtras > Ch Dīrghāgama (only II, not I)

> Dhātukathā, Vibhaṅga

groups of four > Saṃgītisūtra/paryāya

The same set of items (III, excluding the ārūpyas) also occurs in the Dhātukathā16 or the Vibhaṅga. In the latter, the next (and last) group comprising four items are the four paṭisambhidās, quite similar to the BajC2 list: (4) ariyasaccāni, (7) satipaṭṭhānā, (8) sammappadhānā, (9) iddhipādā, (12) jhānāni, (13) appamaññāyo, (15) paṭisambhidā (the numbering reflects the chapters, cf. also Frauwallner, 1995: 17f.).17 Thus, all seven fourfold categories discussed in 16 17

Bronkhorst, 1985: 306 (page 1 of the PTS edition, cf. also Narada, 1962: xlviii). The ārūpyas have been included under the heading jhāna, but this is thought to be a later addition. According to Bronkhorst, 1985: 308, a part of the Vibhaṅga (pp. 193–305) is based on the following list: (1) 4 satipaṭṭhāna, (2) 4 sammappadhāna, (3) 4 iddhipāda, (4) 7 bojjhaṅga, (5) 8-aṅgika magga, (6) 4 jhāna, (7) 4 appamaññā, (8) 5 sikkhāpada, (9) 4 paṭisambhidā, thus excluding the 4 sacca. The Vibhaṅga is believed to “have developed out of an earlier work [before 200 BCE] which also underlay the Dharma­ skandha of the Sarvāstivādins” (Bronkhorst, 1985: 308). There, the ārūpyas as well as the satyas are contained (T.26.1537: 453b24–514a10, 阿毘達磨法蘊足論, Apidamo fayun zu lun, tr. by Xuanzang 玄奘). However, the sequence of the chapters is different (Frauwallner, 1995: 15f. (= 1964: 73–74)): (2) srotāpattyaṅgāni, (3) avetyaprasādāḥ, (4) śrāmaṇyaphalāni, (5) pradipadaḥ, (6) āryavaṃśāḥ, (7) samyakpradhānāni, (8) ṛddhipādāḥ, (9) smṛty­upasthānāni, (10) āryasatyāni, (11) dhyānāni, (12) apramāṇāni, (13) ārūpyāṇi, (14) samādhibhāvanāḥ (only chapter (1) [the 5 śikṣāpadāni] and chapter (15) [the 7 bodhyaṅgāni] of the first part (–494b29) are not groups of four).

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism

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the Vibhaṅga are contained within the BajC2 list under the first eight items, leaving no indication for the uncertain item no. 7 though. Nevertheless, one tentative conclusion might be that the listing in BajC2 is based on a list also occurring in the Vibhaṅga and Dhātukathā, but with the inclusion of the ārūpyas or another additional group of four. The satyas, however, are positioned not at the beginning but in the middle of two categories pertaining to meditation. Interestingly, they are placed likewise in the Sanskrit version of the Saṃgītisūtra (‘Skt’) and its Chinese commentary (T.26.1536), additionally followed by saṃjñā / xiang 想, see table 2. The Pāli version (‘P’) lists samādhibhāvanā instead, the satyas (P. sacca) or saṃjñās (P. saññā) are not contained at all; in the Gāndhārī commentary and the other Chinese versions they are inserted later (satya: G Cm 23., T.1.1: 23., T.1.12: 9.; saṃjñā: G Cm 34., T.1.1: 34., T.1.12: –).18 Table 2

Sequence of dhyāna, apramāṇa and ārūpya in the different versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/paryāya.

G Cm

T.1.1

T.1.12

P

13.a jaṇa

14. 禪

04. 禪定 04. jhānāni 05. samādhibhāvanā

BajC2

04. dhyānāni 05. āryasatyāni 06. saṃjñāḥ 15. apravaṃñā 15. 梵堂 b 05. 無量 06. 06. 07. appamaññāyo apramaña apramāṇāni 16. arupa­ 16. 無色定 06. 無色 07. arūpā 07. ? 08. ārūpyāṇi [sa]⸨ma⸩vatie 定 (v.l. āruppā) a b

04. jaṇa 05. saca

Skt

T.26.1536 04. 靜慮 05. 聖諦 06. 想 07. 無量 08. 無色

G Cm interchanges idhivaḏa (14.) and j̱aṇa (13.). ~ brahmavihāra.

Thus, G Cm, T.1.2, and T.1.12 seem to represent an older version of this particular sequence, where the first three fourfold items of the bodhipakṣya-dharmas plus the dhyānas are immediately followed by the ‘unlimited’. The list in BajC2 should be more recent than the list preserved in these versions, but older than the one in Skt/T.26.1536, however being part of the same strand of development that included the satyas at this position (so far only attested in 18

For references and more information about the different versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/paryāya see table 3.

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Sarvāstivāda versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya). After the ‘unlimited,’ all versions of the Saṃgīti◦ agree again in listing the ‘formless,’ but it has to be left open what is to be reconstructed in BajC2. All other legible groups of four occurring in the Bajaur manuscript are mostly contained in the extant versions of the Saṃgītisūtra and its commentaries, even though not in the same sequence, see table 2.3.19 The (Gāndhārī) terms only occurring in some versions are: - saca - (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida - taṣ̄amulea dharma - sakṣig̱araṇia dharma

Skt,

T.26.1536,

Skt, Skt,

T. 26. 1536, P, T. 26. 1536, P,

T.1.12, T.1.12, T.1.12.

T.1.1, G Cm. T.1.1, G Cm. T.1.1, G Cm.

No unambiguous pattern can be observed that would show a distinctive affiliation of BajC2 to one or other version of the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya. The list in BajC2 resembles the Skt/T.26.1536/P/T.1.12 versions in that it likewise begins with the smṛtyupasthānas. Among these, it seems somehow connected with T.1.12 in that it includes the (*pa)ḍ̱isabhidas (wu’aijie 無礙解), although on the other hand T.1.12 strangely lacks the sakṣig̱araṇia-dharmas and also adds the sacas (shengdi 聖諦) at a later position. Regarding the sequence, BajC2 seems most similar to P (though with gaps) but includes, as already said, the sacas and the (*pa)ḍ̱isabhidas. Terms only occurring in BajC2 are: - va[ś]ida - [veharaja] - as̱aharia dharma

19

In the Sanskrit Dīrghāgama manuscript from Gilgit, the relevant passages of the Saṃgītisūtra are too fragmentary to be taken into consideration here. Apparently, only IV.12 and IV.20 are preserved partly (thanks to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for sharing unpublished information). In the table, ~ indicates that the equivalence is uncertain.

–

– –

~ 13. jñāna

12. aṅgaiḥ samanvāgataḥ 12. 證淨 srotāpannaḥ

08. [catvare] (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida ·

09. catvare va[ś]ida · 10. ca[tvare veharaja] ·

11. catvare ñaṇamulea dharma ·

12. catvare so[ḏavati](*aga ·)

13. + + + + + + ? ? + 14. catvare taṣ̄amulea dharma (*·) 15. catvare paḍ̱i[va](*da ·) 16. + + + + + + + + + + 17. + + + + + + + ? ? ? 18. [catvare] ? ? ? ? + + (= viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio?)

01. smṛtyupasthāna 02. samyakprahāṇa 03. ṛddhipāda 04. dhyāna 05. āryasatya 07. apramāṇa

01. (*catvari ś̱paḏovaṭ́haṇa ·) 02. (*catvari) samapra[s̱aṇa] · 03. [catvari] irdh[ipada] · 04. catvari jaṇa · 05. catvari saca · 06. catvari apramaña · 07. catvare ? + + + + +

~ 34. 愛 21. 行

33. 識住

~ 24. tṛṣṇotpāda 31. pratipad

23. vijñānasthiti

~ 13. 智

– –

–

01. 念住 02. 正斷 03. 神足 04. 靜慮 05. 聖諦 07. 無量

Skt

T.26.1536

~ 07. 智

– –

26. 無礙解

01. 念處觀 02. 正斷 03. 神足 04. 禪定 09. 聖諦 05. 無量

T.1.12

18. viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo

~ 20. taṇhuppādā 21. paṭipadā

13. 識住

~ 30. 愛生 17. 神通道

14. sotāpannassa aṅgāni 18. 預流身

~ 11. ñāṇāni

– –

–

01. satipaṭṭhānā 02. sammappadhānā 03. iddhipādā 04. jhānāni – 06. appamaññāyo

P

Comparison of the list in BajC2 with the groups of four occurring in the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya.

BajC2

Table 3

~ 26. ñaṇa

– –

27. paḍisaṃbiḏa

11. [ś̱paḏ]ova[ṭ́ha]ṇa 12. saṃmepras̱aṇa 14. idhivaḏa 13. j̱aṇa 23. arias̱aca 15. apravaṃña

G Cm

28. 識住處

– 22. 道

28. viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio

– 22. paḍivaḏa

20. 須陀洹支 20a. soḏavatiaga

~ 26. 智

– –

27. 辯才

11. 念處 12. 意斷 13. 神足 14. 禪 23. 聖諦 15. 梵堂

T.1.1

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Skt

T.26.1536

–

–

–

–

T.1.12

–

21. 受證

T.1.1

–

21. sakṣiḵatava

G Cm

a Also BajC1 (*Gautamīsūtra) has a closely related, though not identical Chinese version that has been translated by Dānapāla (T.1.84, ca. 980–1000 CE, cf. Strauch, 2007/2008: 19–21, and Strauch, 2014a: 33). He was from Uḍḍiyāna (Swat), his school affiliation is unknown (cf. Strauch, 2014 a: 26 and 35). b Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 177.

BL15, ca. 0–100 CE, not published yet (groups of four to be edited by Stefan Baums). Saṃgītisuttanta, DN III 221–233. Saṃgītisūtra, Central Asian manuscripts, ca. 7th c. CE, ed. Stache-Rosen, 1968. ~ Saṃgītisuttanta (眾集經, Zhongji jing, DĀ, sūtra no. 5), T.1.1.50b23–51b4, tr. Buddhayaśas, ca. 5th c. CE, tr. in Behrsing, 1930. ~ Saṃgītiparyāyasūtra (大集法門經, Daji famen jing = *Mahā-saṃgīti-sūtra), T.12.1.228b16–230a5, tr. by Dānapālaa, ca. 1000 CE. T.26.1536: ~ Saṃgītiparyāya (阿毘達磨集異門足論, Apidamo jiyimen zulun = *Abhidharma-saṃgīti-paryāya-pāda-śāstra), T.26.1536.26.391b11–411c11), tr. by Xuanzang, 660–663 CEb, tr. in Stache-Rosen, 1968. Skt is closely connected to T.26.1536 (Sarvāstivāda), which is a commentary on it. P (Theravāda) and T.1.12 (affiliation unknown) seem to stand for themselves, although being connected to Skt/T.26.1536 due to the same beginning. G Cm is closely connected to T.1 (Dharmaguptaka).

G Cm: P: Skt: T.1.1: T.1.12:

21. catvari as̱aharia dharma

30. sacchikaraṇīyā dhammā

P

Comparison of the list in BajC2 with the groups of four occurring in the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya (cont.).

19. + + + + + + ? ? ? 20. [ca]tvare sakṣig̱araṇia dharma 20. sākṣīkaraṇīya dharma 20. 應證法

BajC2

Table 3

58 Schlosser And Strauch

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism

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G va[ś]ida. The vaśitās (“masteries / powers”) are normally classified as being ten20, but they are different from the ten balas (of a tathāgata or bodhisattva)21. So far, it seems that the only Sanskrit texts mentioning only four vaśitās are the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Msa) and the Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV) transmitted by Asaṅga, and Vasu­bandhu explains them as “the masteries in the absence of conceptual discrimination, in the purification of a field, in awareness, and in action” (caturdhā vaśitā nirvikalpavaśitā kṣetrapariśuddhivaśitā jñānavaśitā karmavaśitā ca, tr. D’Amato, 2012: 140, commentary on MAV 2.15, ed. Nagao, 1964: 35; cf. Msa 11.45–46). In the Chinese version of the Madhyāntavibhāga, this is rendered as si zizai 四自在 (four kinds of unhinderedness / mastery), explained as being the unhinderedness of non-discrimination, wufenbie zizai 無分別自在, pure land, jingtu zizai 淨土自在, knowledge, zhi zizai 智自在, and karma, ye zizai 業自在.22 The four vaśitās (si zizai 四自在) seem far more frequent in Chinese than in Sanskrit, but a more detailed study of this group of four has to be postponed.23

20

21

22

23

Dhsgr 74: āyur-, citta-, pariṣkāra-, dharma-, ṛddhi-, janma-, adhimukti-, praṇidhāna-, karma-, jñāna-◦. A partly different explanation is given in the Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttiḥ sphuṭārthā (AAV, ed. Tripathi, 1977: 3–44) on Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA) 8.4: āyuś-cittapariṣkāra-karmopapatty-adhimukti-praṇidhāna-rddhi-jñāna-dharma-vaśitā iti daśa vaśi­ tāḥ. See Brunnhölzl, 2011: 114 and also Brunnhölzl, 2010: 659 (chart 12) for a translation. The same list is given e.g. in the PvsP (fol. 532b; ed. Kimura, 2006 [VI–VIII]: 59) and the Sāratamā (ed. Jaini, 1979: 176), and – slightly varied – the Catuḥstavasamāsārtha (ed. Tucci, 1956: 239). Cf. e.g. Dhsgr 75: bodhisattvānāṃ daśa balāni / tadyathā // adhimuktibalaṃ prati­saṃ­ khyāna­­balaṃ bhāvabala­ṃ kṣāntibalaṃ jñānabalaṃ prahāṇabalaṃ samādhibalaṃ pratibhāna­balaṃ puṇyabalaṃ pratipattibalaṃ ceti // 76. tathāgatasya daśa balāni / tadyathā // sthānāsthānajñānabalaṃ karma­vipāka­jñānabalaṃ nānādhātu­jñāna­balaṃ nānādhimuktijñānabalaṃ sattveṃdriya­parāparajñāna­balaṃ sarvatra­gāminī­pratipatti­­­­ jñāna­balaṃ dhyāna­vimokṣa­samādhisamāpatti­saṃkleśavyavadāna­vyutthāna­jñāna­balaṃ pūrva­nivāsānusmṛti­­jñāna­balaṃ cyutyutpatti­jñānabalam āsravakṣayajñānabalaṃ ceti. T.31.1599: 455a7–8 (MAVBh, Paramārtha), T.31.1600: 468b5–6 (MAVBh, Xuanzang); root text: T.31.1601: 478b25, MAV, Xuanzang). Another explanation of the ‘four sovereign ­powers’ is: jie 戒 the moral law; shentong 神通 supernormal powers; zhi 智 knowledge; and hui 慧 wisdom (Soothill, according to the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, www. buddhism-dict.net). A worthwile start would be the passages in T.1.13 (Chang ahan shi bao fa jing 長阿含十報 法經), T.2.125 (Zengyi ahan jing 増一阿含經 ~ Ekottarāgama), T.9.272 (Da sazhe niganzi suoshuo jing 大薩遮尼乾子所説經 ~ Mahāsatyanirgrantha-sūtra), T.10.279 (Dafangguang fo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴經).

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G [veharaja]. In the Pāli canon, the four vesārajjas are explained as the self-confidences or fearlessnesses of a buddha, because of which he cannot be reproved by an “ascetic or brahmin or deva or Māra or Brahmā or anyone in the world” of (1) not having reached full enlightenment, of (2) not having destroyed all taints, of (3) not having understood the obstructions, of (4) not having taught the correct way to the destruction of suffering.24 Also, in the Mahāvastu, they are enumerated as one of the characteristics of a buddha.25 They are more often mentioned in Sanskrit texts, most of which are Mahāyānarelated, where they likewise determine characteristics of an awakened being. The four vaiśāradyas are also included in similar lists in Prajñāpāramitā texts, but here they are always preceded by the (ten tathāgata-) balas and not by vaśitās (cf. table 4).26 The apparently only text listing the (ten) vaśitās is the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, where they occur adjacent to and precede the (ten) balas (cf. table 4, A).27 This list is similar to the list in BajC2 in regard to the sequence of the fours, even though some of the groups are not mentioned (jaṇa = Skt. dhyāna, saca = Skt. satya, and the uncertain one). It is however different from other lists in Prajñāpāramitā texts (cf. table 4, B).

24

25

26

27

AN II 9, book of fours, sutta 8 (tr. Bodhi, 2012: 394f.); MN I 7, Mahasīhanāda-sutta (tr. Bodhi/Ñāṇamoli, 1995: 167f.). Cf. also AN IV 83, book of sevens, sutta 55 (tr. Bodhi, 2012: 1056f.); here they are listed as the “three things about which he is irreproachable” (the three things are the four vesārajja related to the dhamma, sutta, and saṃgha). Cf. Binz, 1980: 81 and 88. The characteristics are: 32 marks (lakṣaṇa), 80 secondary marks (anuvyañjana), 18 special characteristics (āveṇikadharma), 10 powers (bala), 4 self-confidences (vaiśāradya), setting the wheel of Dharma in motion (dharmacakrapravartana), and the harmonic leading of the saṃgha. Also in a Kharoṣṭhī manuscript of the first century the four vaiśāradyas are preceded by the ten balas, cf. BL9 r3: vriṣavida‧daśabalada ca‧caduveharajada ca‧“mastery and the state of possessing the ten powers and the state of possessing the four confidences” (Baums, 2009: 329). AA 8.4 sarvākārāścatasro ’tha śuddhayo vaśitā daśa / balāni daśa catvāri vaiśāra­dyāny arakṣaṇam, which is part of a list of the 21 features of a dharmakāya (AA 8.2–6, cf. Conze, 1954: 96f.). The Abhisamayālaṃkārāntaḥ, AAV and Sāratamā refer to this passage and thus contain the vaśitā as well.

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism Table 4

61

Listings in Prajñāpāramitā texts in comparison to the list in BajC2.

a. BajC2

AA 8.2–6 / AAV / Abhisamayālaṃkārāntaḥ (ed. Tripathi, 1977: 1–67), the last one is being cited.

01. (*catvari ś̱paḏovaṭ́haṇa ·) 02. (*catvari) samapra[s̱aṇa] · 03. [catvari] irdh[ipada] ·

(1.) smṛtyupasthānādyārabhya āryāṣṭāṅgamārgaparyantā saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣāḥ,

04. 05. 06. 07.

(2.) catvāryapramāṇāni maitryādicaturbrahmavihārāḥ, (3.) aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ, (4.) navasamāpattayaḥ, (5.) kṛtsnāyatanāni daśa (6.) aṣṭau abhibhvāyatanāni, (7.) araṇāsamādhiḥ, (8.) praṇidhijñānam, (9.) ṣaḍabhijñāḥ,

catvari jaṇa · catvari saca · catvari apramaña · catvare ? + + + + +

08. [catvare] (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida · 09. catvare va[ś]ida · 10. ca[tvare veharaja] ·

(10.) catasraḥ pratisaṃvidaḥ, (11.) āśrayālambanacittajñānapariśuddhaya iti cataśraḥ śuddhayaḥ, (12.) daśa vaśitāḥ, (13.) daśa balāni, (14.) catvāri vaiśāradyāni,

11. catvare ñaṇamulea dharma · 12. catvare so[ḏavati](*aga ·) 13. + + + + + + ? ? + 14. catvare taṣ̄amulea dharma (*·) 15. catvare paḍ̱i[va](*da ·) 16. + + + + + + + + + + 17. + + + + + + + ? ? ? 18. [catvare] ? ? ? ? + + (= viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio?) 19. + + + + + + ? ? ? 20. [ca]tvare sakṣig̱araṇia dharma

(15.) trīṇi arakṣaṇāni, (16.) trīṇi smṛtyupasthānāni, (17.) asammoṣadharmatā, (18.) kleśajñeyāvaraṇānuśayarūpabījaprahāṇāt vāsanāsamudghātaḥ,

21. catvari as̱aharia dharma

(19.) sakalajanahitāśayatā mahākaruṇā, (20.) aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmāḥ, (21.) sarvākārajñatāditrisarvajñatā

62 Table 4

b.

Schlosser And Strauch Listings in Prajñāpāramitā texts in comparison to the list in BajC2 (cont.).

Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Larger PP (T.8.222) ed. Vaidya 1960: 97 [Lokakṣema, 268 CE]

Larger PP (LPG), ed. Conze 1962, 1974

(四禪 ~ 4 dhyāna)* catvāri dhyānāni (四等心 ~ 4 apramāṇa)* (四無色三昧 ~ 4 arūpya)* saptatriṃśadbodhipakṣyā dharmā *= catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni *= catvāri samyakprahāṇāni *= catvārariddhipādā *= pañcendriyāṇi *= pañcabalāni *= saptabodhyaṅgāny *= āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgo

四意止 ~ 4 smṛtyupasthāna 四意斷 ~ 4 samyak-prahāṇa 四神足 ~ 4 ṛddhipāda 五根 ~ 5 indriya 五力 ~ 5 bala 七覺意 ~ 7 bodhyaṅgāny 八由行 ~ 8-mārgo

catvāry apramāṇāni catasraḥ ārūpyasamā­pattayo

Larger PP (PvsP), ed. Kimura, 1986–2009

Śatasāhasrikā, ed. Kimura, 2009–2010

catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni catvāri samyak­pra­hāṇāni catvārariddhipādā

catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni catvāri samyakprahāṇāni catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ

pañcendriyāṇi pañcabalāni

pañcendriyāṇi pañcabalāni

saptabodhyaṅgāny

saptabodhyaṅgāni

āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgo catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni catvāri samyakprahāṇāni (catvāry āryasatyāni) catvārariddhipādā pañcendriyāṇi pañcabalāni saptabodhycatvāry apramāṇāni aṅ­gāny āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgo catvāri dhyānāni catasraḥ ārūpyasamā­papramāṇāni attayo catvāry catvāri dhyānāni (triṇi vimokṣamu­khāni) (aṣṭau vimokṣā) (aṣṭau vimokṣā) (navānupūrva(navānupūrvasa­māpattī) samā­pattī) (…) (śūnyatānimittā­praṇi­ ­hitavimokṣamukhāni) (abhijñāḥ) (sarvaśūnyatāḥ) (sarvasamādhayaḥ) (sarvadhāraṇīmu­khāni)

āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgaḥ

catvāry āryasatyāni

catvāri dhyānāni catvāry apramāṇāni catasra ārūpya­samā­pdhyānāni attayaḥ catvāri catvāry apramāṇāni

aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ navānupūrvavi­hāra­ samāpattayaḥ śūnyatānimittāpraṇi­hita­vimokṣamukhāni pañcābhijñāḥ sarvasamādhayaḥ sarvadhāraṇī­mu­khāni

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Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Larger PP (T.8.222) ed. Vaidya 1960: 97 [Lokakṣema, 268 CE]

Larger PP (LPG), ed. Conze 1962, 1974

Larger PP (PvsP), ed. Kimura, 1986–2009

balāni

怛薩阿竭十種力 ~ 10 tathāgatabala

daśatathāgatabalāni daśatathāgata­balāni

vaiśāradyāni

四無所畏 ~ 4 vaiśāradya 四分別辯 ~ 4 pratisaṃvid

daśatathāgata­ balāni catvāri vaiśāradyāni catasraḥ pratisaṃvido

十八不共諸佛之 法 ~ 18 aveṇikabuddha­dharma (大慈 ~ mahāmaitrī)* (大悲 ~ mahākaruṇā)*

pratisaṃvido aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmāḥ

* 154b19–22: without dhyāna etc. 153a16–19: with dhyāna etc. 149b08–09: with maitrī/karuṇā

Śatasāhasrikā, ed. Kimura, 2009–2010

catvāri vaiśāradyāni

catvāri vaiśāra­dyāni

catasraḥ pratisaṃvido

catasraḥ pratisaṃvidaḥ

mahāmaitrī * mahākaruṇā *

((mahāmaitrī)) ((mahākaruṇā))

mahāmaitrī mahākaruṇā

aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmā

aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmā

aṣṭādaśāveṇikabuddhadharmāḥ

* placed here or at the end of the list

These lists can be analysed as consisting of several modules (consisting themselves of several terms), the positions of which can change and in between of which additional terms can be added. The most basic list is found in the presumably oldest Prajñāpāramitā text, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (8th chapter, viśuddhiparivarta, ed. Vaidya: 97). It consists of the 37 bodhipakṣyadharmas, followed by the bala / vaiśāradya / pratisaṃvid, and concluded by the 18 āveṇikabuddha­dharmas.28 In the earliest Chinese translation of the Larger Prajñāpāramitā by Lokakṣema (268 CE), the same list is found (T.8.222.1.154b19–22), but so is an enlarged version which adds the four 28

saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣā dharmā balāni vaiśāradyāni pratisaṃvido aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmāḥ. In other passages (ed. Vaidya: 37, 103, 246) these categories are already combined with other terms (like the abhijñās or the three vimokṣamukhas).

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dhyānas / apramāṇas / ārūpyas at the beginning (T.8.222.1.153a16–19). This list is further expanded by the addition of the mahāmaitrī and mahākaruṇā (T.8.222.1.149b8–9). In the Gilgit manuscript of the Larger Prajñāpāramitā (LPG), for example, this list was still further expanded by the insertion of several terms between the bodhipakṣya-dharmas and the daśatathāgatabalas. Moreover, the two ‘mahās’ (maitrī and karuṇā) could change their position with the 18 āveṇikadharmas.29 Furthermore, as for the instance preserved in the Nepalese manuscript of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (PvsP) and in the Śatasāhasrikā, the first block (dhyāna / apramāṇa / ārūpya) was moved, so that the list would begin again with the traditional bodhipakṣya-dharmas.30 Although more details are to be taken into account in studying the development of these lists, it becomes clear that they consisted of several blocks or modules. The list in BajC2 seems to be based on the same module-based system, beginning with the fourfold groups of the bodhi­pakṣya-dharmas and adding the fourfold categories related to meditation (up to the ‘unlimited’ and probably also the ‘formless absorptions’) plus adding the four ‘truths.’ Subsequently, three Mahāyāna- or Prajñapāramitā-typical categories that characterize a tathāgata (pratisaṃvid / vaśitā / vaiśāradya) were added, although the (four) vaśitās are replaced by (ten) balas in other texts. In a passage in the PvsP (ed. Kimura, 2009 [I-2]: 27, also 32) the bodhipakṣyadharmas and the tathāgatabalas etc. are characterized as anāsrava- and asādhāraṇa-dharma (together with the three vimokṣamukhas), while the dhyāna-block is analysed as sāsrava- or sādhāraṇa-dharma (together with the five abhijñās). Furthermore, the tathāgata­balas etc. are called lokottarakuśaladharma. Also, the bodhipakṣya-dharmas and everything up to the tathāgatabalas are dharmas of a śrāvaka and meant to be practiced, while the tathāgatabalas up to the āveṇikabuddhadharmas are dharmas which are to be 29

30

References for the LPG parts edited by Conze: ed. Conze, 1962: 57 (fol. 229b), 142f. (fol. 251a–b), 162 (fol. 255b), 180 (fol. 260a), 185f. (fol. 261b); ed. Conze, 1974: 11 (fol. 268b), 24 (fol. 273a), 29 (fol. 274b), 46 (fol. 279a–b), 80 (fol. 290a), 126 (fol. 305a). Four times the list does not begin with dhyāna etc.; thrice these terms are missing, once they are inserted after the 37 bodhipakṣya-dharmas (ed. Conze, 1974: 29, fol. 274b). The mahāmaitrī etc. can be placed after the āveṇikadharmas or before it, but they are – with one exception – always included. The text references for the PvsP are too numerous to list here, one example is ed. Kimura, 1990 [IV]: 13. In some instances, near the beginning and the end of the whole text, also the “old” sequence is given, beginning with dhyāna etc. (e.g. ed. Kimura, 2007 [I-1]: 149, and ed. Kimura, 1992 [V]: 151). The same with the Śatasāhasrikā (ed. Kimura, 2009–2010, see e.g. Kimura, 2010 [II-3]: 39). In contrast to the LPG and the PvsP, the list in the Śatasāhasrikā is stable. Cf. also Advayaśatikā, ed. Shakya, 1988: 82–84.

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possessed by a tathāgata or by which a tathāgata is distinguished (cf. PvsP, ed. Kimura, 1990 [IV]: 58: […] ebhiś ca subhūte dharmais tathāgata iti prabhāvyate).31 It is noteworthy that all groups of four occurring in these Prajñapāramitārelated-texts are enumerated within the first ten items of the BajC2 list. With the exception of the four ārūpyasamāpattis, there is no group of four left that is not represented in the Gāndhārī manuscript. This could be a further argument in reconstructing this group as item no. 7 in BajC2. However, the Arthaviniścaya contains a very similar list (named the dharmaparyāya)32, including additionally the four samādhibhāvanās, which could be another option for the reconstruction, even though the traces of the first akṣara in BajC2 do not suggest a reading of sa either. Another supporting fact is that the P Saṃgītisuttanta inserts this term between the jhānas and the appamaññas, thus approximately at the same position (the Sanskrit version places it very late at position 33., T.26.1536 at position 23 (xiuding 修定); T.1.12 at position 21 (sanmodi xiang 三摩地想); T.1.1 and G Cm do not include it). To conclude, as is often the case in studies of Gāndhārī manuscripts, the intertextual relation to other Buddhist texts in Pāli, Sanskrit or Chinese is not an easy one. What is common to all of them are the first three items (smṛtyupasthāna, samyakpradhāna, ṛddhipāda). This is the beginning of the bodhipakṣya-dharmas, a list that precedes the first schism (Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 11). This basic list was expanded by terms related to meditation (dhyāna, apramāṇa), which served as a basis for Abhidharma texts such as the Vibhaṅga and the Dharmaskandha, both of which supposedly go back to a common source that predates the splitting of the two schools (Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda). This source is therefore dated earlier than the mission under Aśoka (Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 69). The beginning of the list of fourfold groups got further expanded by the ārūpya(samāpatti)s in the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya versions (extant in G Cm, T.1.1 (Dharmaguptaka), and T.1.12). In some of the versions (Skt, T.26.1536 (Sarvāstivāda), and P (Theravāda)) further categories had been inserted before the ‘unlimited’. In this respect, 31 32

Cf. Migme Chodron, 2001: 1314f. The 27 items (ed. Samtani, 1971: 2) are: 5 skandhāḥ, 5 upadānaskandhāḥ, 18 dhātavaḥ, 12 āyatanāni; 12 pratītyasamutpādaḥ; 4 āryasatyāni, 22 indriyāṇi, 4 dhyānāni, 4 ārūpya­sa­māpattayaḥ, 4 brahmavihārāḥ, 4 pratipadaḥ, 4 samādhibhāvanāḥ; 4 smṛtyupasthā­ nāni, 4 samyakprahāṇāni, 4 ṛddhipādāḥ, 5 indriyāṇi, 5 balāni, 7 …, 8 …; 16 …, 4 srota āpattyaṅgāni, 10 tathāgatabalāni, 4 vaiśāradyāni, 4 pratisaṃvidaḥ, 18 …, 32 …, 80 … (parallel terms are set in bold, possible candidates for reconstruction are set roman). Similarly, the list can be subdivided into semantic modules (cf. Samtani, 2002: xx): First, four traditional lists of terms, then the pratītyasamutpāda, then satya and meditation, the bodhipakṣya-dharmas, and finally characterizations of a tathāgata.

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BajC2 seems to agree more closely with the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda versions than the Dharmaguptaka. Between these two, the enumeration in BajC2 shares some features with the Pāli (Theravāda) on account of the sequence. At the same time, however, there are exceptions, where it fits better to the Skt version and T.26.1536 (Sarvāstivāda), and it also contains a category (G. saca) not extant in the Pāli version. A special connection is given to T.1.1, T.1.12 and G Cm due to the term (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida (T.1.1: biancai 辯才, T.1.12: wu aijie 無礙解, G Cm: paḍisaṃbiḏa), which only occurs in those versions, although at later positions. Among all versions, the list in BajC2 is perhaps most similar to T.1.12 in representing an intermediate state between the Theravāda / Sarvāstivāda and the Dharmaguptaka versions. A link to Prajñāpāramitā texts is indicated by the four veharajas (Skt. vaiśāradya), a term that is not known from the Saṃgītisūtra. Also the va[ś]idas (Skt. vaśitā) point to an early Mahāyāna affiliated context. The groups that have been mentioned so far are represented as the first ten items of the list in BajC2, as far as they are characterized as being fourfold. The subsequent ten items are a seemingly random selection of fourfold groups, also known from the Saṃgītisūtra. The last of the altogether twenty-one items are the asaṃhārya-dharmas, a term peculiar to the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, which will be discussed later. The modular composition of the list is summarized in table 5. 2.3.2

Explanation of the groups and its items

The several items of each group are:33 1. (*catvari ś̱paḏovaṭhaṇa): smṛtyupasthānāni; satipaṭṭhānā; establishments of mindfulness. 1. body (kāye kāyānupaśyana◦), 2. feeling (vedanāyāṃ …), 3. mind (citte …), 4. mind-objects (dharmeṣu …). 2. (*catvari) samapra[s̱aṇa]: samyakprahāṇāni (= samyakpradhānāni); sammappadhānā; right endeavours. 1. for the abandoning of unwholesome mental states that have arisen

33

The sequence of terms under each point is: »G: Skt; P; E«. Unless otherwise stated, the citations are taken from the reconstructed Sanskrit version given in the edition of StacheRosen, 1968. If there are significant differences to the other versions in Pāli or Chinese this is noted.

Abhidharmic Elements in Gandhāran Mahāyāna Buddhism Table 5

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Modular composition of the list in BajC2.

01. (*catvari ś̱paḏovaṭ́haṇa ·) 02. (*catvari) samapra[s̱aṇa] · 03. [catvari] irdh[ipada] ·

fourfold groups of the bodhipakṣya-dharmas (anāsravā / saṃskṛtā / asādhāraṇā dharmāḥ)

04. catvari jaṇa · 05. catvari saca · 06. catvari apramaña · 07. catvare ? + + + + +

fourfold groups related to meditation (sāsravā / asaṃskṛtā / sādhāraṇā dharmāḥ) + satyas

08. [catvare] (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida · 09. catvare va[ś]ida · 10. ca[tvare veharaja] ·

fourfold groups characterizing a tathāgata/buddha, related to Prajñāpāramitā or early Mahāyāna texts (anāsravā / asādhāraṇā / lokottarāḥ kuśaladharmāḥ)

śrāvakadharmas, to be practised

buddhadharmas, to be possessed

11. catvare ñaṇamulea dharma · fourfold groups, also occurring in the Saṃgītisūtra, apparently random 12. catvare so[ḏavati](*aga ·) selection 13. + + + + + + ? ? + 14. catvare taṣ̄amulea dharma (*·) 15. catvare paḍ̱i[va](*da ·) 16. + + + + + + + + + + 17. + + + + + + + ? ? ? 18. [catvare] ? ? ? ? + + (= viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio?) 19. + + + + + + ? ? ? 20. [ca]tvare sakṣig̱araṇia dharma

dharmas to be known

21. catvari as̱aharia dharma

buddhadharmas

fourfold category, peculiar to the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, synonym to awakening and a ­characteristic of a tathāgata/buddha

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(utpannānāṃ pāpakānām akuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ prahāṇāya …),34 2. for the non-arising of unwholesome mental states that have not yet arisen (anutpannānāṃ pāpakānām akuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ anutpādāya …), 3. for the arising of wholesome mental states that have not yet arisen (anutpannānāṃ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ utpādāya …), 4. for the stabilizing, increase, etc. of wholesome mental states that have arisen (utpannānāṃ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ sthitaye …). 3. [catvari] irdh[ipada]: ṛddhipādāḥ; iddhipādā; bases of [supernormal] power. 1. … through will (chanda-◦), 2. … through energy (vīrya-◦), 3. … through mind (citta-◦), 4. … through investigation (mimāṃsā-◦ / P vimāṃsā-◦). 4. catvari jaṇa: dhyānāni; jhānāni; [stages of] meditation. 1. with initial thought and sustained contemplation, born from detachment, experiencing joy and happiness (savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ), 2. without initial thought and sustained contemplation, born from concentration, experiencing joy and happiness (avitarkam avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ prītisukhaṃ), 3. characterized by equanimity and mindfulness, not experiencing joy but happiness (upekṣakaḥ smṛtimān sukhaṃ viharatīti niṣprītikaṃ), 4. characterized by being purified due to equanimity and mindfulness, experiencing neither pain nor happiness (aduḥkhāsukham upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddhaṃ). 5. catvari saca: āryasatyāni; ariyasaccāni; [noble] truths. 1. suffering (duḥkha), 2. the origin of suffering (duḥkha-samudaya), 3. the cessation of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha), 4. the path that leads to the cessation of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha-gāminī pratipad).

34

P interchanges (1.) and (2.).

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6. catvari apramaña: apramāṇāni; appamaññāyo; unlimited.35 1. loving-kindness (maitrī), 2. compassion (karuṇā), 3. sympathetic joy (muditā), 4. equanimity (upekṣā). 7. catvare ? + + + + + Uncertain. Most probably either the ārūpyasamāpattis36 or the samādhibhā­ vanās.37 8. [catvare] (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida: pratisaṃvidaḥ; paṭisambhidā; analytical knowledges.38 1. … of the meaning of things (artha°), 2. … of the condition of things (dharma°), 3. … of their linguistic explanation (nirukti°), 4. … of eloquence/perspicuity (pratibhāna°). This category is only extant in G Cm, T.1.1, and T.1.12: - G Cm: catvari paḍisaṃbiḏa: atha, dhaṃma, niruti, parivhaṇa; - T.1.1: 謂四辯才。法辯義辯詞辯應辯。 ~ dhamma, attha, nirutti, paṭibhāna; - T.1.12: 復次四無礙解。是佛所說。謂義無礙解。法無礙解。樂說無礙解。 辯才無礙解。 ~ artha, dharma, nirukti, pratibhāna. In G Cm, paḍisaṃbiḏa goes back to √vid,39 and also in T.1.1, biancai 辯才 (“talent for debating”) is connected with √vid rather than with √bhid. T.1.12 35 36 37

38

39

In T.1.1 these are called fantang 梵堂 (~ brahmavihāra). Skt IV.8, T.26.1536 IV.8, P IV.7, T.1.12 IV.6, T.1.1 IV.16, G Cm IV.16. Skt IV.33, T.26.1536 IV.23, P IV.5, T.1.12 IV.21. The four ‘concentrative meditations’ are characterized by (1) leading to happiness in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihārāya), (2) obtaining knowledge-and-vision (jñānadarśanapratilābhāya), (3) analysis through under­standing (prajñāprabhedāya) / P mindfulness and clear awareness (satisampa­ jaññāya), and (4) the destruction of [all] defilements (āsravakṣayāya). Cf. e.g. the explanations in Aung and Davids, 1915: 377–381 (related to the Kathāvatthu and the Vibhaṅga); Ñāṇamoli, 2011: 436 (related to the Visuddhimagga); de La Vallée Poussin / Pruden, 1988–1990: 1151ff. (related to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya); or, for a Mahāyāna context, see e.g. Migme Chodron, 2001: 1322ff. (related to the MPPŚ, with a summary of relevant references); Apple, 2009: 164–165; or Brunnhölzl, 2010: 659 (chart 12): ‘of dharmas (knowing the individual characteristics of all phenomena), meanings (knowing the classifications of all phenomena), semantics (knowing the languages, terms, etc.), self-confidence (hearing and explaining the dharma without doubts)’. It is explained by ki pa[ḍisaṃ](*biḏa) [39] ? as̱a va paḍivijaṇati (preliminary unpublished transliteration), thus giving the synonym √jan for √vid.

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combines both possibilities by writing wu aijie 無礙解 (“unobstructed understanding/knowledge”). By using (*pa)ḍ̱isabhida, BajC2 seems to be closer to the P tradition.40 9. catvare va[ś]ida: vaśitā; –; masteries. It is uncertain what exactly the four vaśitās refer to (see earlier discussion). Looking at the Saṃgītisūtra, the vaśitās could be a synonym of the four balas (missing only in G Cm and T.1.1).41 Since other groups of ten vaśitās and ten balas exist and do not overlap, and since the Abhisamayālaṃkāra lists both terms side by side (see above), it seems unlikely that they refer to the same group here. Therefore, the four vaśitās mentioned in the Bajaur sūtra can perhaps be related to the ones in the MAV(Bh) and the Msa discussed above: nirvikalpa-/avikalpa-, kṣetra(pariśuddhi)-, jñāna-, karma-vaśitā (“mastery in the absence of conceptual discrimination, in the purification of a field, in awareness, and in action”). 10. ca[tvare veharaja]: vaiśāradyāḥ; vesārajjā; self-confidences.42 1. regarding supreme awakening (abhisaṃbodhi), 2. … destruction of [all] defilements (āsravakṣaya), 3. … [understanding of all] obstructing factors (antarāyikadharma), 4. … [knowing and teaching the correct] way to salvation (nairyāṇikapratipada). 11. catvare ñaṇamulea dharma: ~ jñānāni; ~ ñāṇāni; things rooted in knowledge.43 1. [true] doctrine (dharma), 2. the following (anvaya),44 3. other’s mind (paracitta), 4. common knowledge (saṃvṛti). 40 41

42 43

44

Cf. PTSD s.v. paṭisambhidā: “BSk. pratisaṃvid is a new formation resting on confusion between bhid & vid”. Skt IV.15 śraddhā, vīrya, samādhi, prajñā; P IV.26 sati, viriya, … There are also four other balas “leading to a Bodhisattva’s cittotpāda, Bbh 13.22, listed 17.8–9 as adhyātma-, para-, hetu-, prayoga-bala” (BHSD s.v. bala). Source of explanation: Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidh-s 98). Due to the different terminology it is not entirely certain that the Gāndhārī refers to the four jñānas as given in the Saṃgītisūtra. Another secondary explanation of the four knowledges relates to the four truths (Skt IV.14: duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga; also P IV.12). G Cm seems to mix the two alternative explanations. Cf. the explanation in T.26.1536 (Stache-Rosen, 1968: 100).

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12. catvare so[ḏavati](*aga): śrotāpattyaṅgāni; srotāpattiyaṅgāni; factors of [the state of] stream entry.45 1. being endowed with perfect / unbreakable46 faith in the Buddha (buddhe ’vetya- prasādena saṃpannaḥ), 2. … in the Dharma (dharme …), 3. … in the Saṃgha (saṃghe …), 4. … in the ethics estimated by the noble ones (āryakāntaiḥ śīlaiḥ saṃpannaḥ). 13. + + + + + + ? ? + Uncertain. 14. catvare taṣ̄amulea dharma: ~ tṛṣṇotpādāḥ; ~ taṇhuppādā; things rooted in craving.47 1. raiment (cīvara), 2. alms-food (piṇḍapāta), 3. lodging (śayanāsa), 4. existence or non-existence (bhavavibhava)48. 45

46

47

48

There are two different explanations. The above-mentioned one seems more likely here, since the four avetyaprasādas / abhedyaprasādas (G. abhejapras̱ada) are referred to later in the text, although this is no conclusive evidence. Most versions list both explanations, the first is named Skt. srotāpattyaṅgaḥ / T.26.1536 yuliuzhi 預流支 / P sotāpattiyaṅgāni / T.1.12 – / T.1.1 –; the second one is named Skt. caturbhir aṅgaiḥ samanvāgataḥ srotāpannaḥ / T.26.1536 zhengjing 證淨 / P sotāpannassa aṅgāni / T.1.12 yuliushen 預流身 / T.1.1 xutuohuanzhi 須陀洹支. G Cm calls both soḏavatiaga, and says that the second explanation is favored “here” (G. iśa). The alternative (and probably older) explanation would be: 1. associating with good people (satpuruṣasaṃseva); 2. listening to the good doctrine (saddharmaśra­vaṇa); 3. investigating it thoroughly (yoniśo manasikāra); correct behaviour according to the doctrine (dharmānudharmapratipatti). Skt avetya◦ / T.26.1536 zhengjing 證淨 / P avecca◦ / G Cm aveca◦ / T.1.12 buhuai 不壞 / T.1.1 buhuaixin 無壞信. In the subsequent text of BajC2, the term is spelled abhejopras̱ada (= abhedyaprasāda). In the Saṃgītisūtra preserved in the Gilgit Dīrghāgama manuscript, the form avetya◦ is used (thanks to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for the information on this unpublished manuscript portion). For a more comprehensive discussion of the term abhedyaprasāda cf. § 3 of this article. Similar to the four jñānamūlaka-dharmas (11.), it is uncertain if the tṛṣṇāmūlaka-dharmas equate to the tṛṣṇotpādas in the Saṃgītisūtra at all, since they denote things that have tṛṣṇā as a cause and not as a result. There are however no four tṛṣṇāmūlaka-dharmas, but only nine (taṇhāmūlaka-dhamma) in the Aṅguttaranikāya (AN IV 400–401, cf. DN II 58–61), the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Ps 130), and the Vibhaṅga (Vibh 390). Mss. (Hoernle, Hs. 47/48): bhavatibhava◦ (cf. Stache-Rosen, 1968: 79, note 133); bhavā­ bhava, for which Thomas W. Rhys Davids gives “dainty foods” like “oil, honey, ghee, etc.”

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15. catvare paḍ̱i[va](*da): pratipadaḥ; paṭipadā; kinds of progress.49 1. painful progress with slow comprehension (duḥkhā pratipad dhandhābhijñā), 2. painful progress with quick comprehension (duḥkhā pratipad kṣiprābhijñā), 3. pleasant progress with slow comprehension (sukhā pratipad dhandhābhijñā), 4. pleasant progress with quick comprehension (sukhā pratipad kṣiprābhijñā). 16. + + + + + + + + + + Uncertain. 17. + + + + + + + ? ? ? Uncertain. 18. [catvare] ? ? ? ? + + (= viñaṇaṭ́hiḏio ?); vijñānasthitayaḥ; viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo; stations of consciousness. 1. being directed to form (rūpopagā50), 2. … to feeling (vedanopagā), 3. … to perception (saṃjñopagā), 4. … to volition (saṃskāropagā). 19. + + + + + + ? ? ? Uncertain.

49

50

according to the commentary of Buddhaghosa. T.26.1536 explains bhava as the five skandhas, thus ‘existence’. The translation is taken from Walshe, 1995: 492 (P). The Sanskrit and Pāli versions also contain another explanation, that is however not contained in the Chinese versions, which is why the given explanation has been preferred. The alternative would be (Skt IV.32, P IV.22): 1. inability to endure (akṣamā), 2. taming / self-control (damā), 3. ability to endure (kṣamā), 4. appeasement (chamā). P has ◦upāya instead of ◦upaga; G Cm has ruovao / veḏaṇ[o]vao / saṃñ[o]ao / ­saṃkha­rovao (preliminary unpublished transliteration), which can be both.

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20. [ca]tvare sakṣig̱araṇia dharma: sākṣīkaraṇīyā dharmāḥ; sacchikaraṇīyā dhammā; things to be realized.51 1. by the body (kāyena), i.e. the eight deliverances (P vimo(k)kha)52, 2. by mindfulness (smṛtyā), i.e. former lives (P pubbenivāsa), 3. by the [heavenly] eye (cakṣuṣā), i.e. decease and rebirth (P cutūpapāta)53, 4. by understanding (prajñayā), i.e. destruction of intoxicants (P āsavānaṃ khaya). 21. catvari as̱aharia dharma: asaṃhāryā dharmāḥ; asaṃhāriyā dharmā; unconquerable/insuperable things. This term has no parallel in the Saṃgītisūtra. The asaṃhārya-dharmas are mentioned in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, where they are associated with the attainment of the highest form of awakening: May that thought of enlightenment which they have wished for, thought over and taken hold of, bring to fulfillment in them the dharmas of a Buddha, and dharmas associated with all-knowledge, the dharmas of the Self-Existent, the insuperable dharmas [asaṃhārya-dharmāṇāṃ]! (tr. Conze, 1973; xxvi 434, ed. Vaidya: 215). They signify a state of mind or knowledge, by which a bodhisattva becomes irreversible (avinivartanīya) and can no longer be overcome by disciples or pratyekabuddhas (xviii 341, ed. Vaidya: 170; cf. xxii 401, ed. Vaidya: 199) or others (xx 380, ed. Vaidya: 188), especially not Māra (xvii 329, ed. Vaidya: 164; xvii 332, ed. Vaidya: 165; xvii 337, ed. Vaidya: 168): An Arhat, a monk whose outflows are dried up, does not go by someone else whom he puts his trust in, but he has placed the nature of dharma directly before his own eyes, and Mara has no access to him [asaṃhāryo bhavati māreṇa]. Just so an irreversible [avinivartanīyo] Bodhisattva cannot be crushed by persons who belong to the vehicle of the Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas, he cannot, by his very nature, backslide into the level of Disciples or Pratyekabuddhas, he is fixed on allknowledge, and 51 52 53

The sequence varies: Skt 1–2–3–4; P 2–3–1–4; T.1.1 3–1–2–4 (cp. Behrsing, 1930: 75–76 note 169); G Cm 3–2–1–4. T.1.1 and G Cm have here “cessation [of perception and feeling]” (G. ṇiros̱o; T.1.1 shenshou mie zheng 身受滅證 ~ P vedayita-nirodha…). T.1.1 and G Cm have here “forms” (~ rūpa).

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ends up in perfect enlightenment. It is quite certain that a Bodhisattva who stands firmly in the element of irreversibility cannot possibly be led astray by others (tr. Conze, 1973; xvii 329, ed. Vaidya: 164). This state of irreversibility is closely connected with the realisation of emptiness (ix 205, ed. Vaidya: 102) and the perception of all elements as a dream (svapnopamāḥ sarvadharmā iti, xx 380, ed. Vaidya: 188). As a further example, another passage reads: He can no longer be led astray by others, and on the stage which is his by right he cannot be crushed. For, as he has stood firm on it, his mind becomes insuperable, his cognition becomes insuperable (aparapraṇeyo bhavati, anavamardanīyaś ca bhavati svasyāṃ bhūmau / tatkasya hetoḥ? tathā hi sa sthito ’saṃhāryeṇa cittena asaṃhāryeṇa jñānena samanvāgato bhavati, tr. Conze, 1973; xvii 337, ed. Vaidya: 168). Also, a passage in the Larger Prajñāpāramitā from Gilgit (fol. 253b) circumscribes the practice of the perfection of wisdom as a state, in which [one] cannot be overpowered by Mara or the deities of his host, or by the persons who belong to the vehicle of the Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas, nor can this perfection of wisdom of the Bodhisattva, the great being, be taken away by any heretics or bad spiritual friends. And why? Because all these cannot be apprehended in this perfection of wisdom, on account of the emptiness of own-marks (tr. Conze, 1975: 521, asaṃhāryā mārair vā mārakāyikābhir devatābhiḥ śrāvakapratyekabuddhayānikair vā pudgalair yāvan na kaiścid anyatīrthikaiḥ pāpamitrair iyaṃ prajñāpāramitā śakyam ācchetuṃ bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya. tat kasya hetos? tathā hi te sarve ’tra prajñāpāramitāyāṃ nopalabhyante svalakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāya, ed. Conze, 1962: 152).54 In other words, the list given in BajC2 culminates in the asaṃhārya-dharmas, which are synonym to the perfect awakening of a tathāgata, and represent his all-encompassing knowledge. When one is endowed with the asaṃhāryadharmas, one becomes unconquerable. Thus, the succeeding passage (BajC2, 1E.28–32) states:

54

Similarly LPG fol. 247a (tr. Conze, 1975: 479f.).

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[ye]hi caduhi ⸨as̱a⟨*ha⟩r[i]ehi⸩ dhamehi samuṇag̱ada b[o]s[o] ṇa sahariadi ◊ añatithiecarag̱aparivayag̱ehi ṇiaṭ́ha­pariva(*yag)e[h]‍(*i ṇa sa)[hariadi] caduraghimaras̱e[ṇa](*e) ◊ ṇa sahariadi ◊ + + [dehi] ◊ ṇa sahariaṃti duha­vedaṇehi ◊ ṇa sahariati adukham asuehi ? ? ? ?55 [ṇa sa](*hari)[a]di triṭhi ṭ́haṇehi ◊ ṇa sahariati + ? ? ṇa [sahariadi] aṇuśea ṭ́haṇ[ehi] ◊ ṇa pa[ḍ̱i]śe-ṭ́ha[ṇe]hi ◊ [ṇa] sahariati ◊ sa[s̱a]ve[hi] ◊ puṇa bhaviehi ◊ kudha56­dhadu­aïdaṇehi + + + + + + + +57 (*ṇa saha)‍[riati] ◊ yava sarva bosa-­pa[kṣia] dha(*rma) sarva sa[kil](*eśa) [pa]kṣia dha(*r)[ma] ◊ sarva vodaṇa-­pakṣia dharma [va sarva] + + + + + + + + + + + ? [s̱]i · [kas̱a] deśati ? ? ? ? dha[rma]58 v[i]d[i]da · ◊ pruṭho me [sa]martho · An awakened one59 who is endowed with these four unconquerable things (asaṃhārya-dharma) is not conquered.

55 56 57

58 59

Reconstruct vedaṇehi ? Clearly written ku, but perhaps kaṃ was intended, like in other Gāndhārī manuscripts (next to kadha or ḱadha). Maybe pratītyasamutpāda is to be inserted here, as it follows after skandhadhātvāyatana (and precedes the bodhipakṣya-dharma) in lists in the Larger Prajñāpāramitā (LPG). Also, those lists are concluded and analysed by terms like saṃkleśa and vyavadāna, just as in BajC2 a few words later. Maybe tasagadadharma (Skt. tathāgatadharma) is to be reconstructed. G. b[o]s[o]: Skt. bodho (?). Skt. buddho is excluded, since it should be written budho or bodho. Nevertheless, since a translation as “awakening” seems rather unlikely due to the associated verbal forms (G. samuṇag̱ada = samanvāgata and sahariadi = saṃharīyate), it appears to be an unusual bahuvrīhi (“possessing awakening”). Alternatively, the translation would be “A state of awakening, which is endowed with these four unconquerable things is not conquered”.

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[He] is not conquered by adherents of other sects like the caraka mendicants60 or the nirgrantha mendicants61, [He] is not conquered by the fourfold army of Māra62, [He] is not conquered by …, [He] is not conquered by feelings of suffering, [He] is not conquered by (feelings ?) [such as] non-suffering [or] non-happiness, [He] is not conquered by states of [wrong] views, [He] is not conquered by …, [He] is not conquered by states of propensity [or] by states of aversion (?)63, [He] is not conquered by defiled (sāsrava) aggregates, elements, [or] sensory bases (skandhadhātvāyatana) leading to rebirth (punarbhavika) […] [etc.] up to all characteristics (dharma) associated with awakening (bodhipākṣika), all characteristics associated with defilement (saṃkleśapākṣika), or all characteristics associated with purification (vyavadānapākṣika), all … 60

61 62

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G. añatithiecarag̱aparivayag̱ehi: Skt. anyatīrthikacarakaparivrājakaiḥ. It remains unclear whether carakaparivrājaka refers to a specific religious group or to non-settled men­dicants in general (cf. e.g. BHSD s.v. caraka, SWTF s.v. nānā-tīrthya-śramaṇabrāhmaṇa-caraka-parivrājaka). A contextually similar passage can be found in the Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā (ed. Vaidya: 56) or the PvsP (ed. Kimura, 1990: 149), where the bodhisattva also cannot be overcome by Māra and his assembly nor by non-Buddhist mendicants (Suvikrānta◦: anyatīrthika, carakaparivrājaka, PvsP anyatīrthika, parivrājaka), because he courses in the perfection of wisdom, i.e. he does not perceive any dharma (na kaṃcid dharmaṃ samanupaśyati). G. ṇiaṭ́ha­pariva(*yag)e[h](*i): Skt. nirgranthaparivrājakaiḥ, usually referring to Jainas. Cf. e.g. Dhsgr 80: catvāro mārāḥ / tadyathā // skaṃdhamāraḥ kleśamāro devaputramāro mṛtyumāraś ceti. Interestingly, in BajC2 there is no specific mention of the bodhisattva being insuperable in regard to disciples or pratyekabuddhas (which is the case in the preserved Sanskrit versions of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and LPG), but only in regard to Māra and non-Buddhists. BajC2 thus represents a stage of development, where the opposition to śrāvakas has not been established yet. An observation that holds true throughout the text. G. aṇuśeaṭ́haṇ[ehi] ◊ ṇa pa[ḍ̱i]śeṭ́ha[ṇe]hi ◊ [ṇa] sahariati. These terms were not found in other texts. They could refer to anuśaya◦, “propensity,” and – based on that – perhaps to *pratiśaya◦ in the meaning of pratigha◦, “aversion” (possibly G. pa[ḍ̱i]śe◦ can also directly be derived from pratigha◦ with ś < h < gh in analogy to the development h < ś in veharaja < vaiśāradya). The position of the first ṇa is grammatically odd and it probably has to be elided.

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Why has it been shown? [Now] the characteristics (dharma) (of a tathā­ gata ?) are known. Having been asked, I have answered adequately (samartha). 2.3.3 Meaning of the list(s) The list in BajC2 summarizes the characteristics or constituents (dharma) of awakening explained by the bhagavant after having been asked about it by Śāriputra. In the Saṃgītisūtra, similar groups are listed as items that should be known as the Dharma and Vinaya of the Tathāgata, and the whole text is said to have been recited in order to memorize the teaching that leads to awakening. Generally, such lists function as “succinct compendia of the Dhamma” (Gethin, 1992: 157). More important to BajC2, however, are the Prajñāpāramitā texts, as they are likewise dealing with the concept of emptiness in general. In the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (ed. Vaidya: 97), the list is used within an enumeration of things that a bodhisattva should not be attached to in order to course in the perfection of understanding (prajñāpāramitā).64 In the Larger Prajñāpāramitā, the listings are summarized as the “gift of the Dharma” (dharmadāna, cf. e.g. LPG fol. 279ab, ed. Conze, 1974: 46, VIII 5,2) or more often as “wholesome dharmas” (kuśala-dharma, e.g. LPG fol. 20a, ed. Zacchetti, 2005: 214; kuśalā bodhipakṣā dharmāḥ, PvsP, ed. Kimura, 2009 [I-2]: 136) that are conducive to awakening and that constitute the path of a bodhisattva to reach omniscience (sarvajñatā) (e.g. PvsP, ed. Kimura, 2007 [I-1]: 171; 2009 [I-2]: 115 or 171; 1986 [II–III]: 71 or 168; 2006 [VI–VIII]: 119). The list in the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra pursues the same purpose: It is used to describe the state of awakening, either by the qualities that are part of this state or that lead thereto. The main difference between the Bajaur list and the lists in Prajñāpāramitā texts is that the latter also include groups of five or seven or more. The restriction to fourfold groups in BajC2 may be explained by the passage that follows them, where the abhedyaprasādas are discussed at length.65 Thus, it appears that the list of groups of four is merely a rhetorical 64

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[…] evaṃ saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣā dharmā balāni vaiśāradyāni pratisaṃvido aṣṭādaśā­ veṇikā buddhadharmāḥ sasaṅgāsaṅgā iti na carati, carati prajñāpāramitāyām […] (viii 194, cf. tr. Conze, 1973: 146). As the next part of this article will show, it is a peculiar feature of Sarvāstivāda traditions that they consist of four (and not three) items. In this context, it is also worthy to note that the four noble truths apparently had been a prevalent organizational feature in Abhi­ dharma texts of the northwest, as has recently been indicated by Collett Cox (2014: 38f.). Thus, the number four might have been important or at least popular in this region, or even specifically among the Sarvāstivādin.

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device to introduce the four abhedyaprasādas, while at the same time illustrating the author’s knowledge of certain lists and categories, of which he enumerated all those fourfold ones that came to his mind in order to represent the Dharma. 3

The Four abhedyaprasādas

The discourse about the groups of four culminates in a long exposition about the abhedyaprasāda “unbreakable confidence/trust”. Despite its obviously different etymology this term has to be related to its Pāli equivalent aveccapasāda or its Sanskrit representative avetyaprasāda which are usually translated as “perfect confidence/trust/faith” or “confidence/trust/faith based on understanding,” respectively. As in our text, in canonical literature, these terms describe one of the characteristic features of an āryaśrāvaka or srotāpanna “stream-enterer”. But not only the altered etymology distinguishes our text from these parallels, the inclusion of the abhedyaprasādas/avetyaprasādas among the group of four is similarly remarkable. Based on the amount of text devoted by the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra to this issue, the abhedyaprasādas played a key role in the concept of an āryaśrāvaka. In order to determine the specific role of the abhedyaprasādas in the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra, our exposition will focus on three major points: 3.1 From aveccapasāda to abhedyaprasāda: shifting etymologies 3.2 The abhedyaprasādas as a group of four 3.3 The reinterpretation of this category in the context of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra 3.1 From aveccapasāda to abhedyaprasāda: Shifting Etymologies The etymology of the term in Gāndhārī seems to be quite clear: abheja has to be derived from Old Indian abhedya “unbreakable”. This is also supported by the text’s own explanation: yado ṇa samaṇupaśati tado ṇa bhijati ta vucati abhejeṇa pras̱adeṇa samuṇag̱ada [And] because he does not perceive [anything], he is not broken. [Therefore] it is said: ‘[he is] endowed with unbreakable confidence’. In Pāli texts, the same term regularly occurs as aveccapasāda. The etymology of the first member of this compound is doubtful. Modern Pāli dictionaries,

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including the Critical Pāli Dictionary, derive avecca from the root ava-(ā)-√i “to understand, to know”. This explanation appears to be based on two aspects.66 First, some of the Pāli commentaries paraphrase the initial avecca with words meaning “to understand, to know”. Thus, Buddhaghosa’s commentaries explain avecca by paññāya ajjhogahetvā, paṭivijjhitvā, ñatvā or jānitvā (cf. CPD s.v. avecca). Secondly, an etymology based on Skt. ava-(ā)-√i is also indicated by the Sanskrit variant of this term, which is usually given as avetyaprasāda (cf. BHSD s.v.). Consequently, modern studies on the Buddhist concepts of faith and belief characterize this scholastic category as “confidence/trust/faith based on understanding”. Thus, Rupert Gethin writes: There is some reason for thinking that pasāda is often thought of as denoting a more refined and developed stage of saddhā; it is used especially in contexts where this seems appropriate. In this case pasāda is especially aveccapasāda, that is full-trust, trust that results from a certain degree of understanding (Gethin, 2001: 113, my emphasis). In his monograph on the “Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,” Kulatissa Nanada Jayatilleke also underlines the fact that the term prasāda is specifically associated with the act of intellectual understanding (1963: 386). Consequently, he translates aveccappasāda as “faith born of understanding”. As Jayatilleke points out, the Pāli commentators give sometimes a different explanation for the initial word avecca, using attributes like acala “immovable” or acyuta “firm, solid”. Thus, Buddhaghosa paraphrases aveccappasāda repeatedly by acalappasāda (see CPD s.v.), not regarding this as contradictory to his alternative explanation. This is, for instance, indicated by his commentary on DN II 93,27 (Sv (II) 544,22): buddhaguṇānaṁ yathābhūtato ñātattā acalena accutena pasādena. Here, he combines both possible meanings, “understanding” and “immovable,” by explicitly deriving the immovable, solid character of pasāda from the true knowledge of the qualities of the Buddha (yathābhūtato ñātattā). Based on this alternative explanation given by Buddhaghosa, many modern translators prefer the connotation “unwavering” for avecca. It seems that at a certain point, the origin and background of this term became obscure.67 This uncertainty probably paved the way for different expla66 67

Cf. also the detailed note by Samtani in his edition of the Arthaviniścaya (1971: 241). During the discussion at the 1st Lausanne Gāndhārī Workshop in June 2013, Harry Falk suggested an alternative etymology of the Pāli word avecca based on the root √vic “to sift, separate”. In this case one would certainly have to distinguish the absolutive avecca used in isolated position in a phrase and the gerundive avecca used as first member of a

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nations and interpretations. One of these alternative interpretations, which is semantically very close to Buddhaghosa’s acala or acyuta is represented by the connotation abhedya “unbreakable” attested in our Gāndhārī text. But is this occurrence the only instance for this variant of reinterpretation? As far as I could ascertain, there are also some other, although very few, Skt. texts which use this very variant. One of them is the Daśabhūmikasūtra. In its description of the third bhūmi, the Brilliant One (arciṣmatī), the text re­peatedly refers to the abhedyaprasādas, e.g. triratnābhedya­-prasāda-­niṣṭhā-gama-­natayā (ed. Vaidya, 1967: 24; ed. Rahder, 1926: 38) “by certainty with regard to the unbreakable confidences in the Three Jewels”. Describing the ten ways by which the career of a bodhisattva (bodhisattva­ caryā) is to be considered with regard to his invincibility (asaṃhāryatā), the text lists one feature for each of the ten bhūmis. With regard to the arciṣmatī bhūmi it says according to Vaidya’s edition (1967: 66): arciṣmatyāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau buddhabhedyaprasādaikarasataḥ There can be little doubt that the text has to be corrected into buddhābhe­ dyaprasād°68 and can be translated as: On the arciṣmatī bodhisattva level [he is invincible] because of the single affection towards the unbreakable confidence in the Buddha. The same form abhedya also occurs in the summarizing verses (upasaṃhāra­ gāthā) devoted to the fourth bhūmi (ed. Vaidya, 1967: 79–80): saha­prāptu arciṣmati bhūmi mahānubhāvaḥ saṃvṛttu śāstu kuli bhūyu vivartiyatve/ abhedya buddharatane tatha dharmasaṃghe udayavyayasthiti nirīhaka prekṣamāṇaḥ // 8 // Immediately at reaching the arciṣmatī level, the powerful [bodhisattva] becomes member of the Buddhas’ family – and does [not] return anymore [from that status].

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compound word. According to this explanation, the meaning of the Gāndhārī variant abheja would nearly correspond to the original meaning of the term. In any case, the commentaries of Buddhaghosa as well as the Sanskritized term avetya leave no doubt that the etymological origin of this term was no longer understood. This is in fact the reading given in the older edition by Rahder, 1926: 97.

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Unbreakable with regard to the Buddha jewel and the Dharma and the Saṃgha, he sees that things are inactive with regard to their production, cessation, and stability. A closely-related term in the Daśabhūmikasūtra is bodhisattvasyābhe­dyāśayatā, i.e. “a bodhisattva’s unbreakable resolve” (bhūmi 6: ed. Vaidya, 1967: 34; ed. Rahder, 1926: 53). According to Rahder’s glossary (1928: 18), Skt. abhedya is rendered in all these instances in the Tibetan version as mi phyed pa, in Śīladharma’s Chinese translation as buhuai 不壞.69 The same coherence between the Sanskrit version and the later translations can be observed in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa.70 The only preserved Sanskrit manuscript of this text conveys the attributes dṛḍhavajrādhyāśayābhedyabuddha­dharmaprasādapratilabdhaiḥ, i.e. “who have obtained unbreakable confidence in the Buddha and the Dharma by their diamond-firm resolve” (1.3, ed. Study Group, 2006: 2), and buddhe ’bhedyaprasādaratiḥ (3.64, ed. Study Group, 2006: 40) as qualities of bodhisattvas. A synopsis of these two Sanskrit terms and their translations in the Tibetan and Chinese versions71 yields the following picture: dṛḍhavajrādhyāśayābhedyabuddha dharmaprasādapratilabdhaiḥ Tib hag pa’i bsam pa rdo rje ltar sra bas sangs rgyas dang | chos dang | dge ’dun la mi phyed pa’i dad pa rnyed pa T.14.474 有金剛志得佛聖性 T.14.475 深信堅固猶若金剛 T.14.476 於諸佛法得不壞信流 Skt

buddhe ’bhedyaprasādaratiḥ sangs rgyas la mi phyed par dad cing dga’ ba dang 樂於喜不離佛 樂常信佛 法苑樂者 謂於諸佛不壞淨樂

It is obvious that both the Tibetan and the Chinese translation by Xuanzang 玄 奘 (T.14.476) confirm the reading of the Skt. version and use the already mentioned translations for abhedya (Tib. mi phyed pa, Chin. buhuai 不壞). The two earlier Chinese translations are more difficult to evaluate. Whereas T.14.474 at 69 70 71

The glossary’s reference “(10M)” for one of the occurrences seems to refer to the Parīndanā section, which corresponds in Rahder’s edition to ch. C. The reference to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa I owe to Dan Stuart. The Tibetan translation from the Derge edition of the Kangyur and the Chinese translations T.14.474 by Zhiqian 支謙 (223–228 CE), T.14.475 by Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 (406 CE) and T.14.476 by Xuanzang 玄奘 (650 CE) can be easily accessed in Jens Braarvig’s excellent Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae (URL: , accessed 2/11/2105).

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least in the second case seems to render abhedya by buli 不離, the other translations leave the element abhedya untranslated or altered its meaning. Thus, abhedyaprasāda is represented in T.14.475 either as changxin 常信 “eternal faith” or as shenxin 深信 “profound faith.”72 Another text which uses this variant is the Sarvatathāgatādhiṣṭhāna­ vyūhasūtra, the Sanskrit version of which is only partially preserved in two manuscripts from Gilgit.73 The text describes the effects of a meditation practice called sarva­tathāgatādhiṣṭhāna-sattvāva­lokana-buddhakṣetra-sandarśanavyū­ho nāma samādhiḥ. One of these effects is described as follows: […] smṛtimantaḥ prajñāvantaḥ buddhe dharme sa(ṃ)ghe (’)bhedya­ prasādena samanvāgat(ā)ḥ […] (transliterated from Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, 1995, plates 1751–1752)74 […] being mindful [and] knowledgeable, they [will] be endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṃgha. Again the reading of the Sanskrit manuscript is confirmed by the Tibetan translation mi phyed pa (Dutt, 1984: 53, note 1).75 It is, however, interesting to note that despite the use of abhedya, the text maintains the association of the term with mindfulness and knowledge. The three texts cited above consistently rendered this term as abhedya in the manuscripts and in the corresponding Tibetan translations. It can therefore be assumed that their original versions or at least one or several of their rather early recensions did show this variant. There is some evidence that the variant abhedya could also replace an original avetya/avecca. Such a case is probably represented by the Gilgit manuscript of the so-called Larger Prajñāpāramitā76 which replaces the conventional 72 73

74 75

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For this last variant cf. the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. (). The facsimiles of both manuscripts are reprinted in Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, 1995: plates 1746–1815 and plates 1816–1837. The passage, which mentions abhedyaprasāda is found only in the former. The text given by Dutt is not entirely correct: smṛtimantaḥ prajñāvantaḥ buddhe dhama saṃghe abhedyaprasādena samanvāgatā (ed. Dutt, 1984: 53). The late Chinese translations T.19.1022 by Amoghavajra (eighth century CE) and T.19.1023 by Dānapāla (tenth/eleventh century CE) cannot confirm this reading. They use dingxin 定信 “firm faith” (T.19.1022A: 710 a23) and shanxin 善信 “good faith” (T.19.1023: 715 a19) instead. For a detailed description of the Gilgit version of the Larger Prajñāpāramitā see Zacchetti, 2005: 19–28.

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avetyaprasāda found in other manuscripts by the distinct reading abhedya77 (fol. 143 recto, lines 6–8, transliterated from Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, 1995: plate 453): bhagavā āha. tat kiṃ manyase kauśika kiyantah jāṃbūdvīpakā manuṣyā ye buddhe abhedyaprasādena samanvāgatā//s te saṃghe abhedya­pra­ sādena samanvāgatā […]? śakra āha. alpakās te bhagavaṃ jāṃbūdvīpakā manuṣyā ye buddhe abhedya­prasādena samanvāgatāḥ//s te saṃghe abhedyaprasādena samanvāgatā The Blessed One said: What do you think, Kauśika, how many people of Jambūdvīpa are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Buddha, [are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Dharma,] are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Saṃgha. Śakra said: Few people of Jambūdvīpa, Blessed One, are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Buddha, [are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Dharma,] are endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Saṃgha. According to the majority of later manuscripts78 and the commentaries, abhedya was most likely not the original reading of the Larger Prajñāpāramitā text. Within their commentaries ad Abhisamayālaṃkāra 2.18–19 on adhimukti (cf. ed. Stcherbatsky and Obermiller, 1929: 13; tr. Conze, 1954: 37), both Ārya Vimuktasena and Haribhadra quote this same passage from the Pañcaviṃśati­ sāhasrikā. According to Sparham’s translation of Vimuktisena’s commentary, which is based on an unpublished single Nepali manuscript,79 Vimuktisena seems to quote the text by replacing the avetya of the mūla text by abhedya: 77 78

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This variant was already indicated by Conze, 1973: 87. See Kimura, 1986: 59 for reference. The text edited by Kimura states: evam ukte bhagavān śakraṃ devānām indram etad avocat: tat kiṃ manyase kauśika kiyantas te jāmbūdvīpakā manuṣyā ye buddhe ’vetyaprasādena samanvāgatā, ye dharme ’vetyaprasādena saman­ vāgatā, ye saṃghe ’vetyaprasādena samanvāgatā […]? atha khalu śakro devānām indro bhagavantam etad avocat: alpakās te bhagavan jāmbūdvīpakā manuṣyā ye buddhe ’vetya­ prasādena samanvāgatā ye dharme ’vetyaprasādena samanvāgatā ye saṃghe ’vetya­prasā­ dena samanvāgatā […]. Sparham’s translation is based “on a photocopy of a single manuscript kept in the National Archives in Kathmandu (Ms. No. 5–55, Reel No. A37 / 9)” (Sparham, 2006: vii). For the catalogue entry see (accessed 2/11/2015).

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There they have ‘unbroken faith’ [(abhedyaprasāda), i.e. ‘knowledgeable faith’ (avetyaprasāda)] when having destroyed doubt, they have faith that a knowable (avagamya) good quality is possible […] (Sparham, 2008: 22). However, the microfilm copy of this manuscript at the Berlin State Library confirms the variant avetyaprasāda. This reading is clearly the preferable one since it corresponds to the following explanation of avetya as avagamya. Vimuktisena’s commentary was taken up by the later commentator Haribhadra,80 who comments on the same passage in his ālokā as follows (ed. Wogihara, 1932: 213): avagamyaguṇasambhāvanāpūrvakaḥ prasādo ’vetyaprasādo vicikitsāpra­ hāṇād ity eke. dṛṣṭatattvasya śraddhā triṣu ratneṣv āryakāntaṃ ca śīlaṃ caturtham avetyaprasāda ity anye Some [say], ‘perfect confidence’ is confidence accompanied by the realisation of knowable good qualities resulting from giving up doubts. Others say ‘perfect confidence’ (avetya-prasāda) is a confidence in the Three Jewels and fourth, morality pleasing to noble beings, of one who has seen the true reality (modified from Sparham, 2008: 160). According to the available editions, Haribhadra uses the conventional variant avetyaprasāda throughout.81 Another aspect of interest in Haribhadra’s commentary is that the text cites an opinion, which lists four a°prasādas82 including morality (śīla). This development of a fourfold list of a°prasādas will be investigated in the next paragraph. In the selected examples above, we have seen that the term abhedyaprasāda was rendered in Tibetan as mi phyed pa’i dad pa / mi phyed par dad cing and in some of the Chinese translations as buhuaixin 不壞信 or buhuaijing 不壞淨. Both translations leave little doubt about the association of the compound’s 80

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Haribhadra wrote his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra “about the year 800 during the reign of Dharmapāla (rg. C. 770–810), the greatest of the Pāla kings” (Sparham, 2006: xv). Once more, Sparham’s translation suggests that the commentary used the term abhedyaprasāda: One, [i.e. Ārya-Vimuktisena] says, “they have ‘unbroken faith’ [(abhedyaprasāda), i.e. ‘knowledgeable faith’ (avetya-prasāda)]” (Sparham, 2008: 160). However, neither the text edited by Tucci, 1932: 182, nor Wogihara’s edition of the AAA (cf. above) refer to this reading. In the following the term a°prasāda is used to designate both variants of this term: avetyaprasāda and abhedyaprasāda.

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first member with Skt. abhedya. There seems to be some evidence that this variant was far more widely used than our small survey suggests. Thus, the Mahāvyutpatti (ed. Sakaki, 1916: 440) lists not only the more common term avetyaprasāda, but also adds the variant abhedyaprasāda: 6823. (562). śes nas dad pa: avetyaprasādaḥ 6824. (563). dad pa mi phyed pa: abhedyaprasādaḥ The Tibetan mi phyed pa (< ’byed ba “to split, to break”) clearly points to Skt. abhedya. It seems that the majority of the early Chinese translators up to Paramārtha (563 CE) even preferred this variant. The first element of the compound a°prasāda is here usually represented by Chinese buhuai 不壞 “indestructible, unbreakable, incorruptible.” Thus, we find the form buhuaixin 不壞信 in the Chinese Dīrghāgama (T.1.1), in the separately translated Saṃyuktāgama (T.2.100), in both translations of the Larger Buddhāvataṁsaka (T.9.278 and T.10.279), and in several Prajñāpāramitā texts translated by Kumārajīva (e.g. T.8.227, T.25.1509). Only from the late sixth century onwards (and in particular in the translations by Xuanzang) is the first element of the compound usually represented by zheng 證 “to realize,” which may be related to Skt. avetya.83 It is hardly probable that in all these aforementioned cases the underlying Indic text really contained the reading abhedyaprasāda. But at least in cases where the older variant buhuai 不壞 is used by post-6th c. translators (such as some of Xuanzang’s translations), there is good reason to argue that the original text contained abhedya rather than avetya. A systematic investigation of this question is beyond the scale of the present study. There is some evidence that certain Abhidharma texts are aware of this alternative interpretation of the term. Discussing this issue with Lin Qian, he drew my attention to an important passage from the Mahāvibhāṣā (T.27.1545, 534c14–29) and provided the following translation: Question: Why [they] are referred to as avetya-prasāda? What is the meaning of avetya-prasāda? Answer: (1) [They are referred to as] ‘purities’ (prasāda, jing 淨) because [they refer to] faith (śraddhā, xin 信) and virtue (sīla, jie 戒) removed from defilements. Having contemplated, pondered, and apprehended the four noble truths one after another, [one] attains these purities, therefore [they] are referred to as avetyaprasāda. 83

I am most grateful to Lin Qian and Jan Nattier, who kindly provided this evidence for me.

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(2) The Venerable Pārśva (xizunzhe 脇尊者) says that it should be ‘unbreak­able purity’ (*abhedya-prasāda, buhuaijing 不壞淨). It is referred to as ‘unbreakable’ (*abhedya) because it is not to be broken by faithlessness (*aśraddha, buxin 不信) and those false virtues (*duḥśīla, ejie 惡戒). ‘Purity’ (prasāda) means pure faith (śraddhā, xin 信), because it is the pure characteristic of the mind, and virtue (śīla) is the pure characteristic of the great elements (mahābhūta, dazhong 大種). (3) The Venerable Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友) says thus, they should be referred to as ‘uninterrupted purities’ (*nitya or *abhedya, buduanjing 不 斷淨), namely, once attained, they are not to be led astray by the power of any śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, etc., interrupted or destroyed. As it is said in the sūtra, ‘This is referred to as faith having [right] view as its root, and associated with the knowledge of comprehension, śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas etc. of this world are not able to lead astray and cause it to be interrupted and destroyed.’ (4) The Bhadanta [Dharmatrāta] says, if [one] cannot contemplate, ponder, and apprehend the Buddha dharmas, the faith and virtue attained can be easily moved like a boat on water. If [one] can carefully contemplate, ponder, and apprehend the Buddha dharmas, the faith and virtue attained are immovable like an *indradhvaja (dichuang 帝幢). Correctly it should be ‘immovable-purity’ (budongjing 不動淨). (5) The Venerable Ghoṣaka says that these four should be referred to as the ‘purities of view’ (*dṛṣṭi-prasāda, jianjing 見淨), because these purities are attained after seeing the four noble truths. Or [they] should be referred to as the ‘purities of understanding’ (*prajñā-prāsāda, huijing 慧 淨), because they function together with the noble understanding (*āryaprajñā, shenghui 聖慧). It seems that at least two of the five explanations given here, numbers 2 and 3, point to abhedya as the underlying form rather than to avetya.84 A slightly different explanation based on the same etymology is given by the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya: Question: What is known? Answer: The four noble truths. It is further said that they are called ‘perfect faith’: just as the increase of sūra (= strength, power, Skt. śūra). Furthermore, some say that what is not abandoned because of agitation is called ‘perfect faith’: just as the increase of confidence (pratiśaraṇa). 84

Dharmatrāta’s interpretation (no. 4) recalls Buddhaghosa’s acala.

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These two kinds of increase both acquire the first path. Māra cannot destroy or break [it]. Each is named by depending on the specific explanation (Dessein, 1999,1: 681, my emphasis). As Bart Dessein points out, Saṃghavarman’s Chinese translation of Dhar­ ma­trāta’s Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya (T.28.1552) uses the Chinese term buhuaijing 不壞淨 (Skt. abhedyaprasāda) throughout (see Dessein, 1999,3: 31, s.v. avetyaprasāda). In his note on stanza 169, Dessein argues that this Chinese rendering buhuaijing 不壞淨 is “a wrong translation of the Sanskrit” (Dessein, 1999,2: 201–202). As stated above, the preference of pre-Xuanzang translators for this variant cannot prove that the original text contained this variant. But in light of the explanation given in the text, one might assume that the variant abhedya was not completely unknown to the author of the Saṃyuktā­bhi­dharmahṛdaya.85 Without a doubt, the earliest extant attestation of the term abhedya comes from our manuscript from Gandhāra. Like the examples from the Mahāvibhāṣā and, probably, the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, the Gāndhārī text not only uses this term, but it even tries to explain the specific meaning of the attribute abhedya as “unbreakable, indivisible,” based on its etymology. In addition, the text uses the simile of space (ākāśa), which is described as “indivisible as a hole pierced by a hundredfold split tip of a hair:” [ṇa sukaro ag̱aśo chidido vi bhidido vi ◊] (*chidro vi) [sakato] atamaśo ◊ śadadha chiṇa vi valagrakoḍ̱ie ◊ (BajC2, 2A.4–5) It is not easy to split or break the space, (*just like a hole) that was pierced by an even hundredfold split tip of a hair. Is it therefore possible to argue that the new term was introduced in a northwestern environment before it was introduced into other contexts including the translational practice of early Chinese translators? There is no easy way to explain the sound change from Middle Indic avecca to Gāndhārī abheja. Such a transformation can only be justified by an intentional reinterpretation of an inherited, but obscure term. This transformation might be at least partially due to a hypersanskritisation based on the language of the Indian northwest. Only in the orthography of the northwest is Old Indian bh- regularly represented by the sign for the labio-dental v or its aspirated variant vh. Besides that, the “historical” spelling bh is frequently attested (e.g. Skt. 85

The variant buhuaijing 不壞淨 is also used in the other Hṛdaya works by Dharmaśreṣṭhin and Upatrāta. See footnote 96 below.

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prabhā > prava, pravha, prabha). Inherited intervocalic bh was obviously pronounced as a fricative with or without aspiration, in clear departure from other Middle Indic languages where we observe the change bh > h (von Hinüber, 2001: §§ 190f.). In a Gāndhārī environment a term avecca could easily be misunderstood as a word containing an aspirated labial. The change from cca to j( j)a is more complicated. It could be explained as an intentional shift from a no longer comprehensible form aveca / abheca to a hypersanskritized form abheja (Skt. abhedya). However, it cannot be completely excluded that this shift also had a phonetical background. That the pronounciation of c and j was sometimes confused, is demonstrated by some Prakrit grammarians (von Hinüber, 2001: 155, § 177). Moreover, Kenneth R. Norman (1970: 134–135) lists a number of words where this change obviously occurred. The interchangeability of c and j is also occasionally attested in a Gāndhārī environment, as shown by one of the Senior fragments where OI añjali is written as G acali (GD, Index s.v. acali). Thus, both changes (v > bh, c > j) are at least hypothetically within the range of possible phonetical developments of Gāndhārī. Especially the characteristic shift from v to bh makes a Gāndhārī influence on the emergence of this variant highly probable. 3.2 The abhedyaprasādas as a Group of Four The Abhidharma sources and commentaries cited above refer to a tradition which knows four varieties of a°prasādas. According to Haribhadra, the “‘perfect faith’ (avetyaprasāda)” comprises the “perfect faith in the Three Jewels” and, as fourth, the “morality pleasing to noble beings in those who have seen true reality”. This fourfold list is in accordance with the text of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra, which clearly refers to four abhedyaprasādas (cadu­ abhejapras̱ada), namely: 1. towards the Buddha 2. towards the Dharma 3. towards the Saṃgha 4. towards the noble virtues This fourfold list is not attested in the earliest layers of Buddhist literature but appears to belong to a specific scholastic tradition. Usually, the early texts refer only to three such items, namely the three jewels. These three a°prasādas are arranged together with (ārya)śīla to another fourfold list: that of the srotāpattyaṅgas, the constituents of stream entry. As locus classicus for the definition of the a°prasādas as a part of the srotāpattyaṅgas in canonical literature, I quote a passage from the Pāli Saṃgītisuttanta (DN 33 III 227):

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Cattāri sotāpannassa aṅgāni: idhāvuso ariyasāvako buddhe avecca­p­pasādena samannāgato hoti: iti pi so bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasam­panno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathī satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho bhagavā’ti. Dhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato hoti: svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattaṃ vedi­tabbo viññūhī’ti. Saṅghe avec­ cappa­­sādena samannāgato hoti: supaṭi­panno bhagavato sāvaka­saṅgho, ujupaṭi­panno bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho, ñāya­paṭipanno bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho, sāmīcipaṭipanno bhagavato sāvaka­saṅgho, yadidaṃ cattāri purisayugāni, aṭṭha purisapuggalā, esa bhagavato sāvaka­saṅgho āhuṇeyyo pāhuṇeyayā dakkhiṇeyyo añjalikaraṇīyo anuttaraṃ puñña­ k­khet­taṃ lokassā’ti. Ariyakantehi sīlehi samannāgato hoti akhaṇ­ḍehi acchiddehi asabalehi akammāsehi bhujissehi viññūppasat­thehi aparā­ maṭṭhehi samādhisaṃvattanikehi. Four characteristics of a Stream-Winner: Here, the Ariyan disciple (ariya­ sāvaka) is possessed of unwavering confidence (aveccapasāda) in the Buddha, thus: ‘This Blessed Lord is an Arahant, a fully-enlightened Buddha, endowed with wisdom and conduct, the Well-Farer, Knower of the worlds, incomparable Trainer of men to be tamed, Teachers of gods and humans, enlightened and blessed.’ He is possessed of unwavering confidence in the Dhamma, thus: ‘Well-proclaimed by the Lord is the Dhamma, visible here and now, timeless, inviting inspection, leading onward, to be comprehended by the wise each one for himself.’ He is possessed of unwavering confidence in the Sangha, thus: ‘Well-directed is the Sangha of the Lord’s disciples, of upright conduct, on the right path, on the perfect path; that is to say the four pairs of persons, the eight kinds of men. The Sangha of the Lord’s disciples is worthy of offerings, worthy of hospitality, worthy of gifts, worthy of veneration, an unsurpassed field of merit for the world.’ And he is possessed of morality dear to the Noble Ones, unbroken, without defect, unspotted, without inconsistency, liberating, praised by the wise, uncorrupted, and conducive to concentration (tr. Walshe, 1995: 490–491). This fourfold list of srotāpattyaṅgas is also part of the Sanskrit, Gāndhārī and Chinese versions of the Saṃgītisūtra and its commentaries (see § 2.3.2). As seen above, the srotāpattyaṅgas (G so[ḏavati](*aga)) are also mentioned among the groups of four listed in the respective section of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra.

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Apparently, this well established and widely known arrangement of srotā­ pattyaṅgas influenced the list of the a°prasādas and resulted in the inclusion of the additional element ‘morality’ (śīla). It is difficult to ascertain when and in which environment this altered, fourfold, list of a°prasādas originated, but there appears to be good reason to believe that Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma circles were the first to refer to the ‘four avetyaprasādas’. Already the Dharmaskandha, according to Frauwallner “the Sarvāstivādin’s earliest Abhidharma work after the Saṃgītiparyāya” and composed in the time “before Aśoka’s missions” (Frauwallner, 1995: 20),86 lists the four a°prasādas (T.26.1537: 460 a21–28) in the first part. The Dharmaskandha begins its discussion by quoting a sūtra passage that corresponds to the 836th sūtra of the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama (T.2.99: 214 b7–19), which is a parallel to Pāli SN 55.17 (V 365–366).87 The Chinese version of this sūtra clearly speaks of four a°prasādas (T.2.99: 214 b10+12: si buhuaijing 四不壞淨). Consequently, the Dharma­skandha takes up this Āgama passage and states (T.26.1537: 460 a21–24): What are the four *avetyaprasādas (si zhengjing 四證淨)? They are: buddha-avetyaprasāda, dharma-avetyaprasāda, saṅgha-avetyapra­sāda, and the virtue favored by the nobles. Why? The four great elements, namely, the elements of earth, water, fire, and air, are capable of change; those noble disciples who have achieved the four avetyaprasādas definitely will not change (translation: Lin Qian).88 It seems therefore that the transformation of the a°prasādas into a group of four was also introduced into the canonical text of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Saṃyuktāgama.89 The original understanding of this sūtra was probably a different one, as indicated by the Pāli version that refers instead to the four sotāpattiyaṅgas (SN V 365–366). As in the Saṃgītisuttanta, the three avecca­ pasādas are mentioned as the first three. It is therefore possible that the text 86 87 88

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But cf. Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1999: 69. Based on the quotations in the Saṃgītiparyāya, they consider the Dharmaskandha as “the oldest of the seven Abhidharma works”. I am once more indebted to Lin Qian, who guided me through the Chinese texts of the Dharmaskandha and the SĀ. For more parallels to this sūtra see Chung, 2008: 185. Although the Chinese translation of the SĀ (Guṇabhadra, 443 CE) uses the term buhuaijing 不壞淨 (Skt. abhedyaprasāda), the Dharmaskandha (Xuanzang, 659 CE) refers to zhengjing 證淨 (Skt. avetyaprasāda). This again shows the difficulties in making any conclusions that are solely based on the terminology of early Chinese translations. For the school affiliation of the Chinese SĀ see the discussion by Chung (2008: 11–20).

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underlying the Chinese SĀ had already replaced the reference to the four srotāpattyaṅgas by that to the four a°prasādas. The character of a°prasādas as a group of four had become firmly established in the later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition, although the distinction between the first three members of this group and śīla as its fourth element had been a matter of discussion. For example, the Mahāvibhāṣā discusses this problem in the passage directly preceding the one cited above (T.27.1545: 534c5–10, quoted after Dessein, 1999: 513, note 450): Question: How are the four forms of perfect faith established? Is it because of uniqueness or is it because of that which is taken as supporting object? When because of uniqueness, there are only two: faith and restraint. When because of that which is taken as supporting object, there are only three: perfect faith in Buddha, in the doctrine and in the order: because moral precept does not have that which it takes as supporting object. Answer: This statement should be made: it is both by the uniqueness and by that which is taken as supporting object. Of the forms of perfect faith, the one established by uniqueness is perfect faith in moral precept: because moral precept has nothing it takes as supporting object. Produced by that which is taken as supporting object, are the other three forms of perfect faith: because faith takes the three treasures as supporting object. The same sort of discussion is also found in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa. In the kārikās we find the following passage (6.73–74): trisatyadarśane śīladharmāvetyaprasādayoḥ lābho mārgābhisamaye buddhatatsaṃghayor api (ed. Pradhan, 1975: 386) The relevant expression in the kārikā text, i.e. śīladharmāvetyaprasādayoḥ, is not quite clear and did pose certain problems to its later commentators and translators depending on whether the dual dvandva compound is dissolved as “morality and the Perfect Confidence in the dharma” or “the two Perfect Confidences in morality and dharma”. Thus, Louis de La Vallée Poussin translates (1925: 292): Quand on voit trois vérités, on obtient la moralité et l’avetyaprasāda relativement au Dharma: quand on comprend le chemin, aussi l’avetyaprasāda relativement au Bouddha et à son Saṃgha.

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In his note to this passage he remarks (293): Hiuan-tsang dit: ‘Le Sūtra dit qu’il y a quatre avetyaprasādas: à l’endroit du Bouddha, du Dharma, du Saṃgha, de l’āryaśīla.’ On peut dire qu’il y a āvetyaprasāda en ce qui concerne la moralité, śīla, car prasāda = pureté […]. Mais Paramārtha et le tibétain montrent qu’il ne faut pas entendre notre kārikā: ‘obtention de l’avetyaprasāda relativement à la moralité et au Dharma.’ However, the auto-commentary makes quite clear that Vasubandhu indeed refers to four prasādas without ignoring the fundamental differences between the first three (in Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha) and the fourth one (in morality). Thus, the bhāṣya commenting upon kārikā 74 and 75 states: ta ete śraddhādhiṣṭhānabhedān nāmataś catvāro ’vetyaprasādā ucyante dravyatas tu dve śraddhā śīlaṃ ca, buddhadharmasaṃghāvetyaprasādāḥ śraddhāsvabhāvāḥ, āryakāntāni ca śīlāni śīlam iti dve dravye bhavataḥ […] avetyaprasādā iti ko’rthaḥ? yathābhūtasatyāny avabudhya sampratyayo ’vetyaprasādaḥ | yathā ca vyutthitaḥ saṃmukhīkaroti tathaiṣām ānupūrvīm | kathaṃ vyutthitaḥ saṃmukhīkaroti? samyaksaṃbuddho vata bhagavān, svākhyāto ’sya dharmavinayaḥ, supratipanno ’sya śrāvakasaṃgha iti; vaidya­bhaiṣajyopasthāpaka-bhūtatvāt | cittaprasādakṛtaś ca śīlaprasāda ity ucyate caturtha uktaḥ | evaṃ prasannasyaiṣā pratipattir iti; ārogyabhūtatvād vā, deśikamārgasārthikayānavad vā | (ed. Pradhan, 1975: 387)90 On a donc, vu la variété de l’objet du prasāda, quatre prasādas distingus au point de vue des noms. Au point de vue des choses, ces quatre sont deux choses, foi et moralité. Les avetyaprasādas relativement au Bouddha, au Dharma, au Saṃgha, sont, de leur nature, foi (śraddhā). Les moralités chères aux Āryas, sont de leur nature, moralité (śīla). Donc deux choses. […]

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Quel est le sense de cette expression avetyaprasāda? Foi consécutive à la compréhension exacte des vérités. Les avetyaprasādas sont rangés dans l’ordre où, en sortant de la contemplation des vérités (vyutthita), on se les rend présents (saṃmukhīkaroti). – Comment se les rend-on présents en sortant de la contemplation? – “Oh! Bhagavat est parfait Bouddha! Bien prêché son Dharma-Vinaya! Bien en route son Śrāvakasaṃgha !” c’est ainsi qu’on se les rend présents, car le Bouddha, le Dharma et le Saṃgha sont, dans l’ordre, le médicin, le remède, l’infirmier. Comme le prasāda de la moralité résulte du prasāda de la pensée, il est nommé, quatrième, à la fin: c’est quand la pensée est ainsi croyante (prasanna) qu’on possède la moralité chère aux Āryas (de La Vallée Poussin, 1925: 294–295). Although Vasubandhu clearly admits the difference between these two types of avetyaprasāda, his commentary leaves no doubt that āryakāntaśīlaavetyaprasāda has to be regarded as part of a fourfould list of avetyaprasādas. For his Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu used “the Abhidharma system as it had been systematized by Dharmaśreṣṭhin and revised and enlarged by Upaśānta and Dharmatrāta” (Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 270). The *Abhi­dharmahṛ­dayaśāstra, written by Dharmaśreṣṭhin/Dharmaśrī from Bactria probably between 220 BCE and 220 CE91 and translated into Chinese in 391 CE (cf. Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 255–256) represents the earliest preserved systematic compilation of Sarvāstivāda dogmatics. Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s work was the basis of the two Gandhāran Abhidharmahṛdaya works by Upaśānta and Dharmatrāta who lived in the third and early fourth centuries (cf. Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998: 259 and 261). All these works consistently refer to a fourfould list of a°prasādas.92 91 92

For a detailed discussion of the different opinions regardings Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s disputed life-time cf. Willemen, 1975: v-viii. Moreover, all Chinese translations of these Hṛdaya treatises use the variant abhedya­ prasāda (buhuaijing 不壞淨 / buhuaixin 不壞信). Since these translations belong the pre-Xuanzang phase (cf. for the exact dates Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 1998 : 253–263), the value of this terminological usage is restricted. In Dharmaśreṣṭhin’s Abhidhar­ mahṛdaya (T.28.1550: 827c) we find the following passage: “Question: The World-Honoured One has expounded four perfect faiths (si buhuaijing 四不壞淨): perfect faith in the Buddha, perfect faith in the dharma, in the saṃgha, and in noble morality. What about these? Answer: (188) Pure and stainless faith in the qualities of the self-awakened and of the disciple, in deliverance and in the remaining causality, and noble morality have attained certainty. Pure and stainless faith in the qualities of the self-awakened and of the disciple, in deliverance and in the remaining causality: a self-awakened one is a Buddha.

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In Dharmatrāta’s Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, we find a discussion of the list that closely resembles that of the Mahāvibhāṣā, without leaving any doubt about the integrity of the group as a whole: Question: How many actual entities (vastu) do these forms of perfect faith have? Answer: ‘There are two forms of these actual entities’: Faith and moral precept. Faith is awarenesses that are clean; moral precept is the four elements that are clean. ‘It is said that there is the name of four forms’: Because of being established by the actual entities as supporting object, there are four [forms]; because of the difference of being with faith as supporting object, there are three forms (Dessein, 1999,1: 681). All these references demonstrate that the tradition, which refers to the a°prasādas as a group of four was well established in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, although the different character of its three original members (Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha) and the later incorporated moral (śīla) continued to be discussed. Vasubandhu, as well as his direct predecessors Upaśānta and Dharmatrāta, lived in Gandhāra. It might, therefore, be hardly surprising that the author of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra referred in his work to this fourfold list of a°prasādas that had become commonplace at least in the northwestern Abhidharma traditions. The Reinterpretation of this Category in the Context of the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra In the “Mainstream Buddhism” traditions the concept of avetyaprasādas is usually based on the intentional reflection on the positive qualities of Buddha, 3.3

That Buddhahood is comprised within the fruit of being without attachment. The qualities of one who has no more training to do are the qualities of a Buddha. When one has pure faith in these qualities, it is called perfect faith in the Buddha. Having taken up the realization of that which is right, one is a disciple. The qualities of one in training and of one who has no more training to do are said to be the qualities of a disciple. When has pure faith in these qualities, it is called perfect faith in the saṃgha. Pure faith in nirvāṇa and faith in the remaining formed dharmas, such as the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, faith in the pure qualities of the bodhisattva, and faith in the qualities of the pratyekabuddha who is in training or who has no more training to do, this is called perfect faith in the dharma. Noble morality is pure morality. This is called perfect faith in morality” (Willemen, 1975: 135–136).

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Dharma, Saṃgha and morality. This is obvious from the above quoted passage from the Saṃgītisuttanta and it is also evident from the passage extracted from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The author of the Gāndhārī sūtra chooses a different approach, which is, however, in accordance with the general message of the text, which is based on the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā). Usually the notion of emptiness is expressed by the phrase na samanupaśyati, “does not perceive”. In accordance with this rhetoric, the abhedyaprasādas are defined. For sake of briefness I quote only few characteristic extracts for each of the four items:93 Buddha utamaṭ́haṇaṭ́hido vi tasag̱ado ◊ ṇa samaṇupaśati ◊ paramaṭ́haṇaṭ́hida vi ◊ tasag̱ada ṇa sa(*maṇupaśati ·) (BajC2, 1A3–4) […] yado ya śariputra ◊ mamo ṣ̱avag̱a · edehi ca ◊ añehi ca karaṇehi ◊ ṇa samaṇupaśati · tado budho abheja­pras̱a(*deṇa samuṇaga)[d]a bho[di] (BajC2, 1.A7–8 + 1CD.18) He also does not perceive the Tathāgata as being in the highest place (uttamasthāna-sthita). He also does not perceive the Tathāgata as being in the supreme place (paramasthāna-sthita). […] And because, Śāriputra, my disciple does not perceive [the Tathāgata (?)] out of these and other reasons, he is endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Buddha. Dharma yoda94 [vi] dharma­viharam eva ṇa samaṇupaśati ◊ tado vi dharmo ◊ abh[e]jo­pras̱{e}deṇa samuṇag̱ado bhodi (BajC2, 1.A8 + 1CD.18) And also because he does not perceive a dwelling in the Dharma (dharmavihāra), he is endowed with unbreakable confidence in the Dharma. Saṃgha ya[s̱a] yeva tu[a] (*śariputra) dharma ṇa samaṇupaśas̱i ◊ yeṇa dharmeṇa samuṇag̱ado raha di voharias̱i ◊ evam eva śariputra ◊ yeṇa dharmeṇa ◊ mama ṣ̱avag̱a-sagho ṣ̱avag̱a(*sa)[gha] saṃkho gachati ◊ ta dharmo aria · ṣ̱avag̱o ◊ yoṇiśo vavarikṣata ◊ · ṇa as̱ig̱achadi ◊ yado ya ṇa as̱ig̱achadi tado ya (*sagho a)[bhejo]­pras̱adeṇa samu{s}ag̱ado bhoti ◊ (BajC2, 1CD.18–21) 93 94

Some of these passages are also discussed in Strauch, forthcoming. Read: yado.

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Just as you, Śāriputra, do not perceive a dharma by [lit. “endowed with”] which you are called an arhat, just so, Śāriputra, an āryaśrāvaka does not realise (adhigacchati) a dharma by which my assembly of disciples is called [“reckoned as”] an assembly of disciples, even when thoroughly investigating it. And because he does not realise it, he is endowed with unbreakable confidence (*in the saṃgha). Śīla

yado ya śariputra ◊ mamo ṣ̱avag̱o ◊ ṇa aj̄atvo samaṇupaśati ◊ kudo ⟨*bha⟩ hidho · tado ya (*ṇa aj̄atva­samu)[ṭ́hi]da śilo samaṇupaśati ṇa bhahidha­ samuṭ́hida śilo samaṇupaśati ◊ ṇa ajatva­bhahidhasamuṭ́hido śilo (*sama­ṇupaśati ·) […] (*yavado a)[ria]­ṣ̱avag̱o ◊ aribhutehi śilehi samuṇa­ g̱ado bhoti · etavado śariputra ◊ caduhi abhejapras̱adehi ◊ samuṇagado bhoti (BajC2, 1CD.21–23; 2B.13) And because, Śāriputra, my disciple does not perceive [anything] internal let alone [anything] external, he does not perceive morality having originated (*internally) (adhyātmasamutthita), he does not perceive morality having originated externally (bahidhāsamutthita), he does not perceive morality having originated both internally and externally (adhyātmabahidhāsamutthita). […] (*The extent to which) the āryaśrāvaka is endowed with noble virtues (āryabhūta śīla), to this extent, Śāriputra, he is endowed with the four unbreakable confidences.

The whole treatment of the four abhedyaprasādas is concluded by the statement: evam eva (*śariputra) [mamo ṣ̱avag̱o] ◊ edehi ca añahi ca karaṇahi ◊ {samuṇag̱ado} budho ṇa samaṇupaśati · dharma sagho ◊ ṇa samaṇupaśati ◊ śilo samasi praña vimuti (*vimutiñaṇadarśaṇa sa)[vado sava] ◊ ṇa samaṇupaśati · yado ṇa samaṇupaśati tado ṇa bhijati ◊ ta vucati ◊ abhejeṇa pras̱adeṇa samuṇag̱ada · (BajC2, 2.D36–39) Just so, (*Śāriputra), out of these and other reasons my disciple does not perceive a Buddha, does not perceive a Dharma [or] a Saṃgha. He does not perceive morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi), understanding (prajñā), release (vimukti), he does not perceive anything at all. [And] because he does not perceive [anything], he is not broken. [Therefore] it is said: ‘[he is] endowed with unbreakable confidence’. It becomes evident that the Bajaur text explicitly links the well-known śrāvakayāna concept of the āryaśrāvaka and his a°prasādas with a Mahāyāna

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type of notions. The confidence in the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṃgha and the śīla does not arise out of reflexion upon their positive qualities, but out of their complete non-perception. The entire concept of an āryaśrāvaka and his characteristic confidences are, thus, clearly reinterpretated in terms of the theory of emptiness. As in other passages, the text uses well-established categories of Buddhist thinking and re-defines them according to its own ideological needs. The same attitude towards the a°prasādas can be observed in Nāgārjuna’s Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra. In its 20th chapter, the sūtra quotation (and its commentary) regarding the seventh bhūmi lists twenty things a bodhisattva should avoid (viṃśatidharmā na kartavyāḥ). Among them are the following four elements (ed. and tr. Lamotte, 1980: 2421–2422):95 17. buddhaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśo na kartavyaḥ. tathā hi na buddhadṛṣṭi­ niśra­yād buddhadarśanam utpadyate. 18. dharmaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśo na kartavyaḥ. dharmasyādṛṣṭatvāt. 19. saṃghaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśo na kartavyaḥ. saṃghanimitta­ syāsaṃskṛtatvāt aniśrayatvāc ca. 20. śīlaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśo na kartavyaḥ. āpattyanāpattitām anabhiniveśāt. 17. Ne pas s’attacher à la vue du recours en Buddha. En effet ce n’est pas de cette vue que provient la [vraie] vision des Buddha. 18. Ne pas s’attacher à la vue du recours en Dharma. Car le Dharma est invisible. 19. Ne pas s’attacher à la vue du recours en Saṃgha. Car le Saṃgha est en soi inconditionné et ne constitue pas un support. 20. Ne pas s’attacher à la vue du recours dans les [hautes] moralités. Car le Bodhisattva ne s’attache pas [à distinguer arbritrairement] la culpabilité de l’innocence. 95

The text of the quotation roughly corresponds to the following passage from the Pañcaviṃsa­ti­praj­ñā­pāramitā: punar aparaṃ subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya sapta­myāṃ bhūmau vartamānasya viṃśatidharmā na bhavanti. katame viṃśatiḥ? yad uta ātmagrāho ‘sya na bhavati sattvagrāho jīvagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāha ucchedagrāhaḥ śāśvata­grāho nimittasaṃjñā hetudṛṣṭiḥ skandhābhiniveśo dhātvabhiniveśaḥ, āyata­ nam ṛddhis traidhātuke pratiṣṭhānaṃ traidhātukādhyavasānaṃ traidhātuke ālayo buddhaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśo dharmaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśaḥ saṃghaniśraya­dṛṣṭyabhi­ ni­veśaḥ śīlaniśrayadṛṣṭyabhiniveśaḥ śūnyā dharmā iti vivādaḥ śūnyatāvirodhaś cāsya na bhavati, ime subhūte viṃśatidharmā bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya saptamyāṃ bhūmau vartamānasya na bhavanti (ed. Kimura, 2009: 90).

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As Étienne Lamotte rightly remarks, “les articles 17 à 20 sont une critique discrète contre le noble disciple animé d’une foi éclairée à l’endroit du Buddha, du Dharma et du Saṃgha, et doué des moralités chères aux saints” (Lamotte, 1980: 2422, note 1). The sūtra text and Nāgārjuna explicitly justify these twenty avoidable things by referring to the notion of emptiness. The same kind of critique against the traditional view of an āryaśrāvaka based on the doctrine of emptiness can certainly be stated for the treatment of the abhedyaprasādas in the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra. 4

Conclusion

Within the introductory passage of the “Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra” (BajC2, Frag­ ment 2 of the Bajaur Collection) which is concerned with the emptiness of all dharmas, the text stresses two categories: the four asaṃhārya-dharmas and the four abhedyaprasādas. Both are explained in longer passages. The four asaṃhārya-dharmas, “unconquerable things,” are the last item in a list of altogether twenty-one groups of four. They circumscribe the highest perfect awakening and omniscience of a tathāgata, which make him invincible in regard to Māra or other adversaries. While the asaṃhārya-dharmas are specific to Prajñāpāramitā texts, especially the Aṣṭadaśasāhasrikā, all other categories of the list occur in both Abhidharma and/or Prajñāpāramitā texts, where they represent the teaching or the characteristics of a buddha. The first three items of this list are part of the bodhipakṣya-dharmas, and the next four are related to meditation and include the four noble truths. Up to here everything belongs to the śrāvakadharmas and is also known from canonical or Abhidharma texts. The next three items characterize a tathāgata, an awakened being. Elsewhere these items are also called buddhadharmas or lokottarakuśaladharmas and they are only known from Mahāyāna texts. This seems to indicate that the original Abhidharma list had been expanded in order to fit into an explict Prajñāpāramitā or rather early Mahāyāna context. The following ten groups of four (as far as they are preserved on the manuscript) appear to be random selections of terms, which also occur in the Saṃgītisūtra/-paryāya. None of the different versions of the Saṃgītisūtra/paryāya shows a particular parallel in regard to the sequence, selection or spelling of the terms. However, the Gāndhārī text (BajC2) is in principle closer to the Pāli version of the Theravādin or the Sanskrit version of the Sarvāstivādin rather than to the Chinese and Gāndhārī versions of the Dharmaguptaka. Despite certain parallels, it was not possible to determine a close connection to any of the Prajñāpāramitā texts. Furthermore, its restriction to groups

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of four distinguishes the list of the Bajaur sūtra from all extant parallels. Nevertheless, a common background of the lists occurring in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra is clearly discernible. This is confirmed by the general diction of the text that uses terms and concepts typical to Prajñāpāramitā. However, the term itself, prajñāpāramitā, is not mentioned even once in the preserved portions of the text. The list of the groups of four leads to a discussion of the four abhedyaprasādas, “unbreakable confidences”. The extensive treatment of the abhedyaprasādas appears to be an original trait of the sūtra that cannot be found in other early Mahāyāna texts. The peculiar variant abhedya replacing the more common avecca / avetya of other traditions as well as the arrangement of the traditional three a°prasādas together with morality (śīla) in a group of four can be traced back to early Abhidharma traditions attested for the Sarvāstivādins. While the arrangement as a fourfold group seems to be a pan-Sarvāstivādin feature, the specific interpretation of the a°prasādas as abhedyaprasādas, “unbreakable confidences,” could have its origins in the circles of early Gandhāran Abhidharma specialists. From there, however, it seems to have spread out to various traditions including the translational Chinese literature. The Bajaur Mahāyāna sūtra uses this well-established concept of “Mainstream Buddhism” and reinterprets, or to use an expression by Paul Harrison, “Mahāyāna-ises” it “in terms of the doctrines of Śūnyatā” (1978: 55). It thus follows a strategy that can also be observed in other early Mahāyāna texts. As Johannes Bronkhorst (forthcoming) correctly noticed, the dogmatic discourses of early Mahāyāna literature presupposed the existence of a well-developed Abhidharma tradition, and there seems to be good evidence that the rich Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, which was particularly influential in the Indian northwest, was one of the main sources for the upcoming Mahāyāna and its terminology and scholarly debates in early Gandhāra. AA AAA AAV AN BajC BHSD BL Ch.

Abbreviations Abhisamayālaṃkāra (ed. Wogihara, 1932) Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā of Haribhadra (ed. Wogihara, 1932) Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti Sphuṭārthā of Haribhadra (ed. Tripathi, 1977) Aṅguttaranikāya Bajaur Collection, fragment no. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (Edgerton, 1953) British Library Collection, fragment no. Chinese

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Cm CPD DĀ DN Dhsgr G. GD

Commentary Critical Pāli Dictionary (Trenckner et al., 1924–) Dīrghāgama Dīghanikāya Dharmasaṃgraha of Nāgārjuna (ed. Müller and Wenzel, 1885) Gāndhārī A Dictionary of Gāndhārī, Stefan Baums and Andrew Glass, eds., LPG Larger Prajñāpāramitā from Gilgit (partly ed. Conze, 1962, 1974, Zacchetti, 2005) MAV(Bh) Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (ed. Nagao, 1964) MPPŚ Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (T.25.1509) MS Martin Schøyen Collection, fragment no. Msa Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (ed. Lévi, 1907) MN Majjhimanikāya P. Pāli PP Prajñāpāramitā Ps Paṭisambhidāmagga (ed. Taylor, 1905) PTSD Dictionary of the Pali Text Society (Rhys Davids and Stede, 1921–1925) PvsP Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ms. Cambridge, ed. Kimura, 1986–2009) SĀ Saṃyuktāgama Skt. Sanskrit SN Saṃyuttanikāya SplitC Split Collection, fragment no. SWTF Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvāstivāda-Schule. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen hrsg. von Heinz Bechert u.a. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. T. Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 (ed. Takakusu 高楠, Watanabe 渡邊, and Ono 小野, 1924–1934) Tib. Tibetan Vibh Vibhaṅga (ed. Rhys Davids, 1904)



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Conze, Edward (1974). The Gilgit Manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (II). Chapters 70 to 82, Corresponding to the 6th, 7th and 8th Abhisamayas (Serie Orientale Roma 46). Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Conze, Edward (1975). The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, with the Divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Cox, Collett (2014). “Gāndhārī Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts: Exegetical Texts”, In From Birch Bark to Digital Data: Recent Advances in Buddhist Manuscript Research. Papers Presented at the Conference, Indic Buddhist Manuscripts: The State of the Field, Stanford, June 15–19 2009. Edited by Paul Harrison and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 35–49. D’Amato, Mario (2012). Maitreya’s Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga). Along with Vasu­bandhu’s Commentary (Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya). A Study and Annotated Translation. New York NY: American Institute of Buddhist Studies. Dessein, Bart (1999). Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. Heart of Scholasticism. 3 vols. (Buddhist Tradition Series 33–35). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Dutt, Nalinaksa (1984). Gilgit Manuscripts. Vol. I. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications (2nd ed.). Edgerton, Franklin (1953). Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. New Haven CN: Yale University Press. Falk, Harry (2011). “The ‘Split’ Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Texts”, Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 14, pp. 13–23. Falk, Harry and Karashima, Seishi (2012). “A First‐Century Prajñāpāramitā Manuscript from Gandhāra – parivarta 1 (Texts from the Split Collection 1)”, Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 15, pp. 19–61. Falk, Harry and Karashima, Seishi (2013). “A First-Century Prajñāpāramitā Manuscript from Gandhāra – parivarta 5 (Texts from the Split Collection 2)”,  Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 16, pp. 97–169. Frauwallner, Erich (1995). Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems. Translated from the German by Sophie Francis Kidd as Translator and Under the Supervision of Ernst Steinkellner as Editor. Albany NY: State University of New York. Gethin, Rupert (1992). “The Mātikās: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the List”, In In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Edited by Janet Gyatso. Albany NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 149–172. Gethin, Rupert (2001). The Buddhist Path to Awakening. Second edition. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.

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Glass, Andrew (2007). Four Gāndhārī Saṃyuktāgama Sūtras. Senior Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 5. Seattle WA: University of Washington Press. Harrison, Paul (1978). “Buddhānusmṛti in the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-SaṃmukhāvasthitaSamādhi-Sūtra”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 6, pp. 35–57. Harrison, Paul and Hartmann, Jens-Uwe (2014). “Introduction”, In From Birch Bark to Digital Data: Recent Advances in Buddhist Manuscript Research. Papers Presented at the Conference, Indic Buddhist Manuscripts: The State of the Field, Stanford, June 15–19 2009. Edited by Paul Harrison and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. vii-xxii. Hinüber, Oskar von (2001). Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch‐historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 467. Band / Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 20). Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Jaini, Padmanabh S. (1979). Sāratamā. A Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra by Ratnākaraśānti (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series). Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute. Jayatilleke, Kulatissa Nanada (1963). Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (1986). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā II–III. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (1990). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā IV. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (1992). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā V. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (2006). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā VI–VIII. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (2007). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā I-1. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (ed.) (2009a). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā I-2. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (2009b). Ś atasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā II-1. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (2010a). Ś atasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā II-2. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Kimura, Takayasu (2010b). Ś atasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā II-3. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. La Vallée Poussin, Louis de (1925). L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Cinquième et sixième chapitres. Société Belge d’Etudes Orientiales. Paris: Paul Geuthner. La Vallée Poussin, Louis de / Pruden, Leo M. (1988–1990). Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Translated into English from the French Translation of Louis de La Vallée Poussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vols.: I.1988, II.1988, III.1989, IV.1990. Berkeley CA: Asian Humanities Press. Lamotte, Étienne (1980). Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñā­pāramitāśāstra). Tome V. Chapitres XLIX–LII, et Chapitre XX (2e série)

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(Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 24). Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste. Lefmann, Salomon (1874). “Lalita Vistara: Erzälung von dem Leben und der Lere des Çâkya Simha”. PhD. Lévi, Sylvain (ed.) (1907). Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra. Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. Vol. I. Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honoré Champion. Migme Chodron, Gelongma (2001). The Treatise on the Great Virtue of Wisdom of Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra), Ētienne Lamotte, Translated from the French by Gelongma Migme Chodron. 5 vols. Gampo Alley. Müller, Max F. and Wenzel, Heinrich (ed.) (1885). The Dharma-Saṃgraha. Amsterdam: Oriental Press (reprint 1972). Nagao, Gajin (ed.) (1964). Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. A Buddhist philosophical treatise. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu (2011). The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Revised, third, online edition. Buddhist Publication Society. Narada, U. (1962). Discourse on Elements. Bristol: Pāli Text Society. Norman, Kenneth R. (1970). “Some Aspects of the Phonology of the Prakrit Underlying the Aśokan Inscriptions”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 33, pp. 132–143. Pradhan, Prahallad (ed.) (1975). Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8). Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (rev. 2nd ed.). Raghu, Vira and Lokesh, Chandra (1995). Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts. Revised and enlarged compact facsimile edition. Vols. 1–3. Delhi: Satguru Publications. Rahder, Johannes (1926). Daśabhūmikasūtra. Leuven: J.-B. Istas. PhD. Rahder, Johannes (1928). Glossary of the Sanskrit, Tibetan, Mongolian and Chinese Versions of the Daśabhūmika-Sūtra. Paris: Geuthner. Rhys Davids, Caroline A.F. (ed.) (1904). The Vibhaŋga. Being the Second Book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. London: Henry Frowde. Rhys Davids, Thomas W. and Stede, William (1921–1925). The Pali Text Society’s PaliEnglish Dictionary. Chipstead: Probsthain. Sakaki, Ryōzaburō (1916). Mahāvyutpatti. Vol. 1. Kyōto: Shingonshū Kyōto Daigaku. Samtani, Nārāyana Hemanadāsa (1971). The Arthaviniścaya-Sūtra & Its Commentary (Nibandhana) (Written by Bhikṣu Vīryaśrīdatta of Śrī-Nālandāvihāra). Critically edited and annotated for the first time with Introduction and several Indices (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 13). Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Schlosser, Andrea (2016). “On the Bodhisattva Path in Gandhāra. Edition of Fragment 4 and 11 from the Bajaur Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts”. PhD. . Shakya, M.B. (1988). Advayaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. Nepal: Nagarjuna Institute of Exact Methods.

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Shukla, Karunesha (1973). Śrāvakabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 14). Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Sparham, Gareth (2006). Abhisamayālaṃkāra with vṛtti and ālokā. Vṛtti by Ārya Vimuktisena. Ālokā by Haribhadra. Volume 1: First Abhisamaya. Fremont CA: Jain Publishing Company. Sparham, Gareth (2008). Abhisamayālaṃkāra with vṛtti and ālokā. Vṛtti by Ārya Vimuktisena. Ālokā by Haribhadra. Volume 2: Second and Third Abhisamaya. Fremont CA: Jain Publishing Company. Stache-Rosen, Valentina (1968). Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Stcherbatsky, Theodor and Obermiller, Eugene (1929). Abhisamayālankāra-prajñāpāra­ mitā-upadeśa-śāstra: the work of Bodhisattva Maitreya (Bibliotheca Buddhica 23). Leningrad. Strauch, Ingo (2007/2008). The Bajaur Collection: A New Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts – A Preliminary Catalogue and Survey – Online Version 1.1 (May 2008). URL: (accessed 2/11/2015). Strauch, Ingo (2008). “The Bajaur Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts – A Preliminary Survey”, Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 25, pp. 103–136. Strauch, Ingo (2010). “More Missing Pieces of Early Pure Land Buddhism: New Evidence for Akṣobhya and Abhirati in an Early Mahayana Sutra from Gandhāra”, The Eastern Buddhist 41, pp. 23–66. Strauch, Ingo (2011). “The character of the Indian Kharoṣṭhī script and the ‘Sanskrit revolution’ writing system between identity and assimilation”, In The Idea of Writing. Writing Across Borders. Edited by Alex de Voogt and Joachim Quack. Leiden: Brill, pp. 131–168. Strauch, Ingo (2014a). “Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the Order of Nuns in a Gandhāran version of the Dakṣiṇāvibhaṅgasūtra”, In Women in Early Indian Buddhism: Comparative Textual Studies. Edited by Alice Collett. New York NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–45. Strauch, Ingo (2014b). “The Evolution of the Buddhist rakṣā Genre in the Light of New Evidence from Gandhāra: The *Manasvi – nāgarāja – sūtra from the Bajaur Collection of Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 77, pp. 63–84. Strauch, Ingo (forthcoming). “Early Mahāyāna in Gandhāra. New evidence from the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra”, In Early Mahāyāna. Edited by Paul Harrison. Sheffield: Equinox Publishing. Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (2006). Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. A Sanskrit Edition Based upon the Manuscript Newly Found at the Potala Palace. Tokyo: The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University.

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Takakusu, Junjirō 高楠順次郎, Watanabe, Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭, and Ono Gemmyō 小野 玄 妙 (ed.) (1924–1934). Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經, Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai. - T.1.1: Dīrghāgama, Chang ahan jing 長阿含經, Buddhayaśas, Zhu Fonian 竺佛念. - T.1.12: *Saṃgītisūtra, Daji fa men jing 大集法門經, Shihu 施護. - T.1.13: Chang ahan shi bao fa jing 長阿含十報法經, An Shigao 安世高. - T.1.84: Fenbie bu shi jing 分別布施經, Shihu 施護. - T.2.99: Saṃyuktāgama, Za ahan jing 雜阿含經, Guṇabhadra. - T.2.100: Saṃyuktāgama, Bieyi za ahan jing 別譯雜阿含經. - T.2.125: Ekottarāgama, Zengyi ahan jing 增一阿含經, Saṃghadeva. - T.8.222: *Pan͂ caviṃśatisāhasrikāprajn͂ āpāramitā, Guang zan jing 光讚經, Zhu Fahu 竺法護.

- T.8.227: *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajn͂ āpāramitā, Xiaopin boruopoluomi jing 小品般若波羅 蜜經, Kumārajīva. - T.9.272: Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśa, Da sazheniganzi suo shuo jing 大薩遮尼乾子所說經, Bodhiruci. - T.9.278: [Buddha]avataṃsakasūtra, Dafangguang fo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴經, Buddhabhadra. - T.10.279: [Buddha]avataṃsakasūtra, Dafangguang fo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴經, Śikṣānanda. - T.14.474: Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Weimojie jing 維摩詰經, Zhi Qian 支謙. - T.14.475: Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Weimojie suo shuo jing 維摩詰所說經, Kumārajīva. - T.14.476: Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Shuo wugou cheng jing 說無垢稱經, Xuanzang 玄奘. - T.19.1022: Yiqie rulai xin bimi quanshen sheli baoqie yin tuoluoni jing 一切如來心祕 密全身舍利寶篋印陀羅尼經, Amoghavajra. - T.19.1022A: Yiqie rulai xin bimi quanshen sheli baoqie yin tuoluoni jing 一切如來心 祕密全身舍利寶篋印陀羅尼經, Amoghavajra. - T.19.1023: Yiqie rulai zhengfa bimi qie yin xin tuoluoni jing 一切如來正法祕密篋印 心陀羅尼經, Shihu 施護. - T.25.1509: Nāgārjuna, Mahāprajn͂ āpāramitopadeśa, Da zhidu lun 大智度論, Kumārajīva. - T.26.1536: Śāriputra, [Abhidharma]saṃgītiparyāya[pādaśāstra], Apidamo jiyimen zulun 阿毘達磨集異門足論, Xuanzang 玄奘. - T.26.1537: Mahāmaudgalyāyana, [Abhidharma]dharmaskandha[pādaśāstra], Apidamo fayun zulun 阿毘達磨法蘊足論, Xuanzang 玄奘. - T.27.1545: 500 arhats, [Abhidharma]mahāvibhāṣā[śāstra], Apidamo da piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, Xuanzang 玄奘. - T.28.1550: Dharmaśreṣṭhin, Abhidharmahṛdaya[śāstra], Apitan xin lun 阿毘曇心 論, Saṃghadeva, Huiyuan 慧遠. - T.28.1552: Dharmatrāta, Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya[śāstra], Za apitan xin lun 雜 阿毘曇心論, Saṃghavarman.

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- T.31.1599: Vasubandhu, Madhyāntavibhaṅgaṭīkā, Zhongbian fenbie lun 中邊分別 論, Paramārtha. - T.31.1600: Vasubandhu, Madhyāntavibhaṅga, Bian zhongbian lun 辯中邊論, Xuanzang 玄奘. - T.31.1601: Maitreya, Madhyāntavibhaṅga, Bian zhongbian lun song 辯中邊論頌, Xuanzang 玄奘. Taylor, Arnold (ed.) (1905). Paṭisambhidāmagga. Vol. I. London: Henry Frowde. Trenckner, Vilhelm et al. (1924-). A Critical Pāli Dictionary. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters / The Department of Asian Studies, Univer­ sity of Copenhagen. Tripathi, Ram Shankar (ed.) (1977). Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstre Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛttiḥ Sphuṭārthā Ācāryaharibhadraviracitā. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. Tucci, Giuseppe (1932). The Commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitās. Volume 1: The Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 62). Baroda: Oriental Institute. Tucci, Giuseppe (1956). Minor Buddhist Texts. Roma: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Vaidya, Paraśurāma Lakṣmaṇa (1960). Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā with Haribhadra’s Commentary called Āloka (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4). Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. Vaidya, Paraśurāma Lakṣmaṇa (1961). Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha. Part 1 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17). Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. Vaidya, Paraśurāma Lakṣmaṇa (1967). Daśabhūmikasūtram (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 7). Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. Walshe, Maurice (1995). The Long Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya. Boston MA: Wisdom Publications. Willemen, Charles (1975). The Essence of Methaphysics. Abhidharmahṛdaya. Translated and annotated (Série Etudes et Textes 4). Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques. Willemen, Charles; Dessein, Bart & Cox, Collett (1998). Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism (Handbuch der Orientalistik 2/11). Leiden etc.: Brill. Wogihara, Unrai (ed.) (1932). Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā. The Work of Haribhadra. Vol. 1. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko (repr. 1973 Sankibo Buddhist Book Store). Zacchetti, Stefano (2005). In Praise of the Light. A Critical Synoptic Edition with an Annotated Translation of Chapters 1–3 of Dharmarakṣa’s Guang Zan Jing, Being the Earliest Chinese Translation of the Larger Prajñāpāramitā. Tokyo: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University.

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Chapter 3

Interpretations of the Terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā: From the Pāli Nikāyas to the Abhidhamma Tamara Ditrich 1

Introduction

The terms ajjhattaṃ “internally,” bahiddhā “externally,” and ajjhattabahiddhā “internally and externally” are attested repeatedly in the recurring refrain of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta as well as in many other Pāli canonical and post-canonical texts, indicating their significance in the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. Although they appear frequently, the texts provide very scant information on their meaning, especially for the compound ajjhattabahiddhā. This chapter systematically surveys occurrences of the three terms in the Pāli Canon, aiming to outline specific functions and meanings of the terms in various contexts. Firstly, it identifies the main syntagmatic formulae comprising these terms in specific collocations in the Nikāyas. Secondly, it investigates how these formulaic stylized expressions, occurring in a variety of syntagms, are presented and explicated in the Abhidhamma, and how those interpretations are linked to the explications established in the later Pāli commentarial literature which serve today as the standard interpretations of the terms. Through a delineation of the semantic spectrum of ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā, additional information on the interpretation of the four satipaṭṭhānas is indicated which is of particular significance in the light of the current prominence given to the Satipaṭṭhānasutta, often regarded as the Ur-text for the practice of mindfulness in modern Buddhism. 2

Ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattaṃbahiddhā in the Suttapiṭaka

2.1 Syntagms Comprising ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā There are relatively numerous attestations of ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā in the Tipiṭaka, appearing on their own or as a component of compounded words. Having examined all the occurrences of ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā in the Nikāyas, attested as they are in several

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types of collocations, a number of patterns emerge which may indicate specific meanings and usages of the terms in various contexts. Based on an analysis of lexical collocations of the three terms, the main typological and semantic patterns identified in the Nikāyas are overviewed below as a way to mark out their functions and meanings. 2.1.1 ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā The terms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā are attested together in collocation in several suttas in the Nikāyas,1 always in a specific context of instructions given about meditation, especially on the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas, prescribing or describing the practice in three modes of contemplation.2 In all instances, the compound ajjhattabahiddhā is attested only together with ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā, forming a group of three, often connected by the correlative conjunction vā. Typically, this triad appears in a formulaic structure, as exemplified in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta3 where the same stylized formulaic refrain follows each of its fourteen sections; e.g. the first satipaṭṭhana on contemplation of the body (kāyānupassanā)4 always begins: iti ajjhattaṃ vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhatta-bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati.5 1 2

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DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63; MN III 111–112; SN V 143, 294–297; AN III 450; Nidd I 1, 28, 63, 72, 78, 99; 340, 354, 370, 387; Nidd II 78, 124, 128. The only exception appears in the Niddesa section of the Khuddakanikāya where the triplet is not attested within the framework of contemplation but instead in the context of explication of the doctrine; e.g. in the Kāmasuttaniddesa, the three terms are listed in the discussion on kāmā: “…ajjhattā kāmā bahiddhā kāmā ajjhattabahiddhā kāmā …” (Nidd I 1). These specific occurrences of the triad in the Niddesa seem to reflect the commentarial nature of the text. Here references are given for the shorter version in the Majjhimanikāya (MN I 55–63), with parallel passages from the Dīghanikāya (DN II 290–315) noted when relevant; the longer Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta in the Dīghanikāya (DN II 290–315) differs only in giving a longer explanation of the four noble truths and hence, this difference is not consequential for the study of the three modes of contemplation. The same refrain appears after each of the following sections: breathing, once (MN I 56, DN II 292); postures of the body, once (MN I 57, DN II 292); bodily activities, once (MN I 57, DN II 293); parts of the body, once (MN I 57, DN II 294); elements, once (MN I 58, D II 294); cemetery contemplations, nine times (MN I 58, DN II 295–298). MN I 56–58; DN II 292–298); trans. Ñāṇanamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 146: “In this way he abides contemplating the body as a body internally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body externally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body both internally and externally”. For all Pāli quotations in this chapter, the existing English translations are given in

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The formulaic refrain occurs also after the three other sections – the contemplation of feelings (vedanānupassanā),6 the mind (cittānupassanā),7 and mental objects (dhammānupassanā);8 in total it is attested in 21 places in the sutta, suggesting very clearly that these three modes were an important or perhaps even essential aspect of the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. The three terms appear also connected asyndetically (without vā) in close or distant collocation; e.g. in the Dhammānupassīsutta, when describing how six dhammas are to be abandoned in order to practice contemplation of the body, feelings, the mind and mental objects. Cha bhikkhave dhamme appahāya abhabbo ajjhattaṃ kāye kāyanupassī viharituṃ … pe … bahiddhā kāye … ajjhattabahiddhā kāye … pe … vedanāsu … ajjhattaṃ vedanāsu … bahiddhā vedanāsu … ajjhattabahiddhā vedanāsu … citte … ajjhattaṃ citte … bahiddhā citte … pe … ajjhattabahiddhā citte … dhammesu … ajjhattaṃ dhammesu … bahiddhā dhammesu … ajjhattabahiddhā dhammesu …9 The triad appears in the Nikāyas consistently only in the context of meditation instructions, as three different modes or ways of contemplation in the practice of the satipaṭṭhanas. Since the suttas discussing the four satipaṭṭhānas seem to be prescriptive, it means that the monks were instructed to contemplate in one or another of the three modes (vā). In the Satipaṭṭhānasutta the terms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā are linked by the conjunction “or” (vā); there is no clear indication that they refer to three successive stages of contemplation respectively, to be practiced in progression, starting with the internal, followed by the external and then both the internal and external mode, which has been suggested by some modern interpreters.10 Rather the

6 7 8

9

10

the footnotes (usually from Pāli Text Society versions). However, when those translations are problematic in relation to the terms and topics discussed, alternative options are suggested. MN I 59; DN II 298. MN I 59; DN II 299. MN I 60–62; DN II 301–304, 313–314; this refrain follows each of the sections comprising dhammānupassanā, i.e. five hindrances, five aggregates, six sense-spheres, seven factors of enlightenment and four noble truths. AN III 450; trans. by Bodhi, 2012: 988: “Bhikkhus, without having abandoned six things, one is incapable of contemplating the body in the body internally … externally … both internally and externally … contemplating feelings in feelings … mind in mind … phenomena in phenomena … internally … externally … both internally and externally”. Anālayo, 2006a: 94; cf. Gethin, 2001: 54.

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implication seems to be that each mode is a distinctive and valid way of contemplation in its own right. Neither the Satipaṭṭhānasutta nor other suttas in the Nikāyas explain the meaning of the three terms nor do they inform on their actual practice, especially of the third mode. To my knowledge, there is only one exception in the Nikāyas, in the Janavasabhasutta:11 Ajjhattaṃ kāye kāyānupassī viharanto tattha sammā samādhiyati, sammā vippasīdati. So tattha sammā samāhito sammā vippasanno bahiddhā para-kāye ñāṇa-dassanaṃ abhinibbatteti …12 Here the term ajjhattaṃ is not explained, whereas bahiddhā is explained as referring to the body of another (para-kāye).13 It is noteworthy that this is the only sutta in the Suttapiṭaka that gives instructions on contemplation, yet the terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā occur, atypically, in a pair and not in a group of three (together with the compound ajjhattabahiddhā). This may indicate that the sutta reflects a different layer of textual transmission; in comparison, the relevant section from the Chinese (Dharmaguptaka) parallel to the Janavasabhasutta also interprets the external mode as referring to another and includes only two modes of contemplation.14 2.1.2 ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā Throughout the Tipiṭaka, the terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā appear most frequently in close or distant collocation, often as a pair linked asyndetically or with the correlative conjunction vā. They function as complementary antonyms, i.e. externally versus internally, usually rendered into English as 11 12

13 14

This sutta is referred to by most scholars discussing the interpretations of the internal and external; e.g. Gethin, 2001: 54; Schmithausen, 2012: 292. DN II 216; trans. by Walshe, 1995: 298: “As he thus dwells contemplating his own body as body, he becomes perfectly concentrated and perfectly serene. Being thus calm and serene, he gains knowledge and vision externally of the bodies of others”. The translation adds “his own” body which is not in the Pāli original (ajjhattaṃ kāye kāyānupassī); the translation suggested here is to use the word “internally”. Explained in the same way for the other three satipaṭṭhānas (DN II 216). Dīrghāgama fascicle 5, T.1.1: 34c25–35a4; trans.: “There being internal body contemplation, knowledge of other bodies arises. There being internal feeling contemplation, knowledge of other feelings arises. There being internal mind contemplation, knowledge of other minds arises. There being internal mind-object contemplation, knowledge of other mind-objects arises”. I am grateful to Rod Bucknell for providing this reference and translation from the Chinese. Cf. Schmithausen, 2012: 292, note 9.

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ajjhattaṃ “externally” and bahiddhā “internally,” or “oneself” and “others;” no clarification for the particular choices in translating the terms is given by translators.15 In the Nikāyas, the pair repeatedly occurs in the context of explicating or describing various aspects of the teachings such as the aggregates and the hindrances, discussing their external and (or) internal aspects; e.g. in the Mahāpuṇṇamasutta: Yaṃ kiñci, bhikkhu, rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā, ayaṃ rūpakkhandho.16 This sutta explicates, among other attributes, two aspects for each of the five aggregates, internal or external (ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā) but does not talk about their contemplation. Only in the context of contemplation is the third mode (ajjhattabahiddhā) given as well; for example, in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta, in the section on dhammas,17 the contemplation of the arising and passing away of each aggregate is to be conducted in one of the three modes, as reiterated in the refrain. Similarly, in the Bojjhaṅgasaṃyutta the five hindrances are described as internal and external: katamo ca, bhikkhave, pariyāyo, yaṃ pariyāyaṃ āgamma pañca nīvaraṇā dasa honti? yadapi, bhikkhave, ajjhattaṃ kāmacchando tadapi nīvaraṇaṃ, yadapi bahiddhā kāmacchando tadapi nīvaraṇaṃ. ‘kāmacchandanīvaraṇan’ti iti hidaṃ uddesaṃ gacchati. tadamināpetaṃ pariyāyena dvayaṃ hoti.18

15

16

17 18

The translations “oneself” and “others” are more common rendering for the pair whereas “externally” and “internally” are used for the triad; e.g. in the English translation of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (DN II 290–315) by Walshe, 1995: 335–350, the triad is translated ajjhattaṃ “internally,” bahiddhā “externally,” and ajjhattabahiddhā “internally and externally;” whereas in the same Nikāya, in the Sangītisutta (DN III 249) the pair ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā is translated as “yourself” and “others” respectively (ibid., p. 500). MN III 19; trans. by Ñāṇanamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 888: “Bhikkhu, any kind of material form whatever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near – this is the material form aggregate”. MN I 60–63. SN V 110; trans. by Bodhi, 2000: 1603: “And what, bhikkhus, is the method of exposition by means of which the five hindrances become ten?” Whatever sensual desire there is for the internal is a hindrance; whatever sensual desire there is for the external is also a hin-

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But when instructions on the contemplation of the hindrances are given these are to be contemplated in one or another of the three modes.19 The pair ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā in the Nikāyas most commonly refers to a range of pairs in opposition, such as internal-external, inward-outward, inside-outside.20 The English rendering of the terms as pairs of the opposites personal–impersonal or oneself-others seems to draw mainly on the interpretation of the aṭṭhakathā texts, to be discussed below (2.2). It has to be noted here that since the pair and the triad occur in specifically different contexts, the semantic ranges inferred from the usage of the pair (ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā) should not be simply, and without caution, inferred and applied to the interpretations of the meaning of the triad (ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, ajjhattabahiddhā), especially of the compound ajjhattabahiddhā which seems to refer to some other, a specific mode or method of contemplation. 2.1.3 bahiddhā The term bahiddhā is most frequently attested in a pair with ajjhattaṃ. When bahiddhā occurs on its own, it usually refers to things being external, outside, or aside.21 Another common occurrence of bahiddhā is in conjunction with ito, referring to those people that are outside the Buddhist teachings or community (ito bahiddhā); e.g. in the Brahmajālasutta: Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā sassata-vādā sassataṃ attānañ ca lokañ ca paññāpenti, sabbe te imeh’ eva catuhi vatthūhi etesaṃ vā aññatarena, n’ atthi ito bahiddhā.22 2.1.4 ajjhattaṃ The term ajjhattaṃ occurs more frequently on its own than bahiddhā does. It usually signifies “inwardly, internally,” often referring to states of mind; e.g.

19 20 21 22

drance. Thus what is spoken of concisely as the hindrance of sensual desire becomes, by this method of exposition, twofold”. For example, MN I 60–63. Cf. PED s.v. ajjhatta. For example, in the Janavasabhasutta: … na cassa bahiddhā ghoso niccharati… “… its sound does not carry outside …” (DN II 211). DN I 16; trans. by Walshe, 1995: 75: “And whatever ascetics or Brahmins are Eternalists and proclaim the eternity of the self and the world, they do so on one or other of these four grounds. There is no other way”. Cf. DN II 151, 283; AN III 206, 372; AN IV 25, 27, 136; MN I 323; MN II 121, 122; Nidd I 249, 397; SNII 133; SN V 229, 230; Th I 141.

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ajjhattaṃ kathaṃkathī “internally uncertain,”23 or ajjhattaṃ vūpasantacitto “inwardly peaceful,”24 or ajjhattaṃ abyāseka-sukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti “… he experiences inwardly an unimpaired happiness”.25 When attested on its own, ajjhattaṃ appears often in collocation with atthi, specifically referring to the presence or absence of various mental factors. The phrase atthi me ajjhattaṃ is commonly translated as “I have in myself,” pointing to an internal presence; e.g. in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta ajjhataṃ occurs in this sense in two sections concerning the contemplation of dhammas (dhammānupassanā) – the five hindrances (nīvaraṇapabbam) and the seven factors of enlightenment (bojjhaṅgapabbam). For each of the five hindrances,26 the sutta instructs that he (i.e. a monk) contemplates whether the hindrance in question is present in him (atthi me ajjhattaṃ) or not (natthi me ajjhattaṃ);27 e.g. concerning the hindrance of sensual desire: idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu santaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandaṃ ‘atthi me ajjhattaṃ kāmacchando’ti pajānāti, … asantaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandaṃ ‘natthi me ajjhattaṃ kāmacchando’ti pajānāti …28 The entire section on hindrances is followed by the refrain, reiterating that they are to be contemplated either internally or externally or both internally and externally.29 This implies that a monk knows that a particular hindrance is present in him (internally) and it is to be contemplated in one of the three modes; however, the sutta does not inform – and it seems that it was not its purpose in the first place – about the actual practice, especially in the case of the third mode (i.e. he knows a hindrance which is in him internally both internally and externally). 23 24 25 26 27

28

29

MN I 8. DN III 49. MN I 181. Namely, sensual desire (kāmacchanda), aversion (byāpāda), sloth and torpor (thīna­ middha), restlessness and worry (uddhaccakukkucca) and doubt (vicikicchā). Then the sutta continues instructions on how an unarisen hindrance can arise, an arisen hindrance can be removed and the future arising of the removed hindrance can be prevented. MN I 60; trans. by Ñāṇanamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 151: “Here, there being sensual desire in him, a bhikkhu understands: ‘There is sensual desire in me’; or there being no sensual desire in him, he understands: ‘There is no sensual desire in me”. iti ajjhattaṃ vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānu­ passī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati (MN I 60, DN II 301).

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Similarly, ajjhataṃ occurs on its own under the contemplation of the seven factors of enlightenment (bojjhaṅgapabbam)30 where for each factor a monk is instructed to know whether the factor in question is present in him (atthi me ajjhattaṃ) or not (natthi me ajjhattaṃ).31 Once again, each of the seven factors, perceived as internal phenomena, are to be contemplated in one or another of the three modes, as instructed in the refrain following this section. 2.1.5 ajjhattikabāhira The two stems also appear frequently in the adjectival forms ajjhattika “internal” and bāhira “external”. They are attested either on their own or in a dvandva compound, in each case with specific meanings and usages of the terms, depending on the context. When compounded in a dvandva they always refer to the six internal and external sense-spheres (āyatana);32 e.g. in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta the compound ajjhattikabāhira occurs in the section on sense-spheres (āyatanapabbaṃ), referring to the six internal and external sense-spheres (āyatana) respectively. The sutta lists all the six senses and their objects (cakku and rūpa, etc.) and the fetters arising dependent on them; e.g. for the eye sense: Kathañ-ca bhikkhave bhikkhu dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati chasu ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu: Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu cakkhuñca pajānāti rūpe ca pajānāti, yañca tadubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saṃyojanaṃ tañca pajānāti …33 The Satipaṭṭhānasutta does not directly explain the meaning of the two adjectives; however, ajjhattika “internal” is commonly interpreted as referring to the 30 31

32 33

Namely, mindfulness (sati), investigation of dhamma (dhammavicaya), energy (viriya), joy (pīti), tranquillity (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi), equanimity (upekkhā). For example: idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu santaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ satisambojjhaṅgaṃ ‘atthi me ajjhattaṃ satisambojjhaṅgo’ti pajānāti, asantaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ satisambojjhaṅgaṃ ‘natthi me ajjhattaṃ satisambojjhaṅgo’ti pajānāti (MN I 62, DN II 304); trans. by Ñāṇanamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 153: “Here, there being the mindfulness enlightenment factor in him, a bhikkhu understands: ‘There is the mindfulness enlightenment factor in me’; or there being no mindfulness enlightenment factor in him, he understands: ‘There is no mindfulness enlightenment factor in me’”. DN II 302–303; DN III 102; AN V 109; MN I 61, 190, 191; MN III 32, 63; Nidd I 430, 431, 441. MN I 61, D II 302; trans. by Ñāṇanamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 152–153: “And how does a bhikkhu abide contemplating mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the six internal and external spheres? Here a bhikkhu understands the eye, he understands forms and he understands the fetter that arises dependent on both …”.

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six senses and bāhira “external” to their respective objects.34 In the case of the sixth sense-sphere, the internal sense-sphere is the mind (mano) and the external sense-spheres are dhammas which are the objects arising through the mind-door (mano).35 The sutta instructs that the entire set of sense-spheres – internal (the senses) and external (objects of the senses) – are to be contemplated either internally, or externally, or both internally and externally;36 e.g. in the case of the sixth sense-sphere, both the internal sense, the mind (mano), and its corresponding external sense-sphere, phenomena (dhamma), are to be contemplated either internally, or externally, or internally and externally. When the two adjectives are not compounded but occur in close or distant collocation they are usually used as attributes describing or explaining various aspects of the phenomena; e.g. in the Mahāhatthipadopamasutta, the adjectives refer to two aspects of the element of earth as internal or external: pathavīdhātu siyā ajjhattikā, siyā bāhirā “The earth element may be internal, may be external”.37 2.1.6 ajjhattika The adjective ajjhattika always occurs in close or distant collocation with bāhira; e.g.: Aṭṭhārasa kho pan’ imāni bhikkhave taṇhāvicaritāni ajjhattikassa upādāya, aṭṭharasa taṇhāvicaritāni bāhirassa upādāya.38

34

35

36 37 38

Namely, internal: eye (cakkhu), ear (sota), nose (ghāna), tongue (jivhā), body (kāya), mind (mano); external: visible form (rūpa), sound (sadda), odor (gandha), flavor (rasa), tangible object (phoṭṭhabba), phenomena (dhamma); cf. DN III 243; Ps I 287. The later subcommentary, the Līnatthapakāsanā Ṭīkā by Dhammapala, further explicates that the sixth internal sense-base is the bhavaṅga, the so-called life-continuum: chaṭṭassa pana bhavaṅgamanasaṅkhāto manāyatanekadeso uppatti dvāraṃ (Soma, 1981: 133). Modern interpreters such as Ñāṇamoli, 1980: 159, suggest that ajjhatikāyatana represents the “organisation of experience” and bahiddhāyatana the “experience as organised”. Cf. Anālayo, 2006a: 215. iti ajjhattaṃ vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānu­ passī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati (MN I 61). MN I 185. AN II 212; trans. by Bodhi, 2012: 586: “There are, bhikkhus, these eighteen kinds of craving related to the internal and eighteen kinds of craving related to the external”.

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2.1.7 bāhira The adjective bāhira, when attested on its own, does not refer to the senses but mostly refers to “external, outside, outward;” e.g. bāhiraṃ cammakāyaṃ “outer hide;”39 bāhirāni vā kammantāni paṭivekkhituṃ “or attending to outside works;”40 bāhirehi paccatthikehi paccāmittehi “by external adversaries and enemies”.41 The adjectival stem bāhira appears very frequently in compounds (e.g. bāhira-assāda, bāhira-samaya, santara-bāhira) and in secondary nominal derivations (e.g. bāhiraka, bāhirima). As an adverb bāhire, it usually refers to those who are outside the Buddhist order or teachings. Some semantic inferences may be drawn for the context dependent use of the terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā in the Nikāyas, studied at the syntagmatic level. The usage of the triad is very specific, with a very restricted semantic range: it is attested only in the instances where instructions are given on the three modes of contemplations and this is also the only context for the occurrence of the compound ajjhattabahiddhā. Similarly, the use of the compound ajjhattikabāhira is restricted only to the sense-spheres. The use of the pair (ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā) is less restricted, appearing in a range of contexts, explicating various aspects of the teachings. The stylistic patterns of formulaic repetitions of the terms – in dvandva, asyndeta or constructions with the conjunction vā – seem to reflect the style of the ancient Indian tradition of oral transmission of sacred texts, particularly the transmission of the Vedas where the specific stylistic and linguistic patterns in the Vedic language act as semiotic markers, related to the religious beliefs and ritualistic acts.42 The Indian Buddhist oral transmission may have adopted the already established stylistic and linguistic patterns and markers, such as the usage of dvandva compounds, for indicating specific contexts such as the modes of contemplation, especially in relation to the four satipaṭṭhānas.43 Although the study of lexical collocational patterns informs on the use of the two terms in distinct contexts, most evidently in the case of the triad, the Nikāyas do not explicate the meanings of the terms in question, nor do they 39 40 41 42 43

MN III 275. AN I 69. AN IV 106. Ditrich, 2010; and forthcoming. Although Buddhist oral literature may not have fully followed the rather precise conventions of the Vedic oral transmission and exhibits, through variations and divergences, many characteristics similar to ancient epic transmissions (as pointed out by Cousins, 1983: 1–11), it is likely that many mnemonic formulae, stylistic and linguistic devices were adopted and adapted by early Buddhists from the already well established Vedic tradition.

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provide clarification of or comment upon their significance in the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas. Ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā in the Pāli Commentaries The interpretations transmitted by Buddhaghosa – presumably the fifth century44 author of the commentaries on the four primary Nikāyas and the Visuddhimagga – became the standard reading of the terms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā in Theravāda doctrine. These are also reflected in contemporary interpretations of the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas.45 In the Papañcasūdanī, the commentary on the Majjhimanikāya, Buddhaghosa comments upon the section on breathing from the Satipaṭṭhānasutta:46 2.2

iti ajjhattaṃ vāti evaṃ attano vā assāsapassāsakāye kāyānupassī viharati. bahiddhā vāti parassa vā assāsapassāsakāye. ajjhattabahiddhā vāti kālena attano, kālena parassa assāsapassāsakāye … ekasmiṃ kāle panidaṃ ubhayaṃ na labbhati.47 The Papañcasūdanī as well as the other commentaries on the Nikāyas consistently explicate the three terms in the same manner: ajjhattaṃ refers to oneself (attano), bahiddhā to another (parassa), and ajjhattabahiddhā alternatively to oneself and another (kālena attano, kālena parassa),48 the latter actually being only a reiteration of the first two modes to be applied alternatively. It is stated that both modes cannot occur at the same time (ekasmiṃ kāle panidaṃ ubhayaṃ na labbhati). The terms are commented upon in a similar manner in the Visuddhimagga; e.g. in the description of the aggregates (khandhaniddesa):

44 45 46

47

48

von Hinüber, 1996: 103, proposes 370–450 CE. For example, in the writings of Mahāsi Sayādaw (stemming partly from the teachings of U Narāda) who was instrumental in popularizing vipassanā in the twentieth century. The passage being commented upon is: Iti ajjhattaṃ vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati (MN I 56). Ps I 249; trans. by Soma, 1981: 51–52: “He dwells in contemplation of the body in his own respiration body, or he dwells in contemplation of the body in another’s respiration body, or dwells at one time in his own and at another [time] in another’s respiration body … both cannot occur at once”. The Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, the commentary on the Dīghanikāya, gives identical commentary (Sv III 765). Ps I 252.

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Ajjhattabahiddhā-bhedo vuttanayo eva. Api ca idha niyakajjhattam pi ajjhattaṃ, parapuggalikam pi ca bahiddhā ti veditabbaṃ.49 Ajjhattaṃ is explained as niyakajjhattam “one’s own,”50 bahiddhā as parapuggalika “another person”. The compound ajjhattabahiddhā receives a comment in the Visuddhimagga only in one instance: Catutthattike attano khandhe gahetvā āraddhā vipassanā-paññā ajjhattābhinivesā, parassa khandhe bāhiraṃ vā anindriyabaddharūpaṃ gahetvā āraddhā bahiddhābhinivesā; ubhayaṃ gahetvā āraddhā ajjhattabahiddhābhinivesā ti evaṃ ajjhattābhinivesādivasena tividhā.51 In distinction to the commentaries on the Nikāyas which interpret the third mode as an alternation between the first two (kālena attano, kālena parassa), here it is referred to as ubhayaṃ “both,” without specifying whether the contemplation in both modes is to take place alternatively (which is more likely) or not. Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the three terms has been generally accepted in the Theravāda tradition and has remained the standard interpretation in a large section of secondary modern works on the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas. There have been several attempts by modern scholars and practitioners to interpret ajjhataṃ and bahiddhā, especially in terms of meditation practice. Most of them follow Buddhaghosa, occasionally with modifications or drawing from the interpretations in the Abhidhamma. 3

Ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattabahiddhā in the Abhidhamma

In contrast to the Nikāyas, the Abhidhamma provides interpretations for ajjhataṃ as “oneself” and bahiddhā as “another,” however, there is no clear explanation of the third mode, i.e. ajjatthabahiddhā. The analysis of collocation of the three terms shows that they follow the same main typological 49 50 51

Vism 473; trans. by Ñāṇanamoli, 1994: 537: “It is internal in the sense of one’s own that should be understood here as internal and that of another person as external”. Cf. As 46. Vism 440; trans. by Ñāṇanamoli, 1994: 484: “In the fourth triad, insight-understanding initiated by apprehending one’s own aggregates is interpreting the internal. That initiated by apprehending another’s aggregates or external materiality not bound up with the faculties, is interpreting the external. That initiated by apprehending both is interpreting the internal and external. So it is of three kinds as interpreting the internal, and so on”.

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and semantic features as identified in the Nikāyas and overviewed above (2.1.1–2.1.7). Nearly all occurrences of the three terms in collocation are in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi and Vibhaṅga which are examined here in conjunction with their commentaries, i.e. the Atthasālinī and the Sammohavinodanī respectively.52 3.1 The Dhammasaṅgaṇi and its Commentaries 3.1.1 Dhammasaṅgaṇi In the Dhammasaṅgaṇi the words referring to internal and external (ajjhatta, bahiddhā, ajjhattika, bāhira) generally follow the same typology identified for the Nikāyas (2.1.1–2.1.7). The mātikā section, which provides the classification of dhammas that are discussed and analyzed in the Abhidhamma texts, includes the three terms in collocation under the section of 22 threefold designations (tikamātikā), listed in two sets of triplets (tikas): Ajjhattā dhammā, bahiddhā dhammā, ajjhattabahiddhā dhammā. Ajjhattārammaṇā dhammā, bahiddhārammaṇā dhammā, ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā dhammā.53 The dhammas are classified as “internal” (ajjhattā), “external” and “internal and external” (ajjhattabahiddhā); and “dhammas having internal object(s),” “dhammas having external object(s),” and “dhammas having internal and external object(s)”.54 The three terms are listed (as adjectives) at the very beginning of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, among the triplets (tika) in the mātikā, in reference to all dhammas.55 In contrast, in the Nikāyas the three terms (as adverbs) occur in collocation exclusively in passages giving instructions on the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas, only referring to selected categories listed as 52

53 54

55

The largest number of attestations of the three terms in collocation is in the Vibhaṅga, followed by the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, and a very few instances in the Dhātukathā and the Paṭṭhāna. Dhs 2. Trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: M2: “States that belong to one’s self; are external to one’s self; are belonging or external to one’s self. States that have for an object one’s self; an object external to one’s self; an object that is both”. This translation is based on paragraphs 1044– 1049 (Dhs 250). Frauwallner, 1964: 67, comments on the list of the attributes (“Eigenschaften Mātṛkāḥ”) as being artificially contrived, and claims that ajjhattabahiddhā was added later as the third aspect to the original pair. This explanation is problematic in relation to the evidence in the suttas (see 2.1) as well as in the Vibhaṅga where the group of the three terms (as adverbs) is consistently incorporated into the texts on the four satipaṭṭhānas.

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objects of contemplation (e.g. the sixteen states of the mind, five hindrances, five aggregates, seven factors of enlightenment etc.),56 indicating that these were viewed as either essential, most relevant or sufficient for the development of meditation practice. It is noteworthy that out of the twenty-two triplets listed in the mātikā there is only one triplet (ajjhattā, bahiddhā, ajjhattabahiddhā) that occurs adverbially, as the three modes of contemplation, in the refrain of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta, indicating that for some reason it was viewed as an essential aspect of the satipaṭṭhāna practice; this may be further underlined by the positioning of the three modes at the forefront in the beginning of the refrain in the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga (Vibh 193–207) (discussed in 3.2.1 below). The two triplets listed in the mātikā are further explained in the Nikkhepa­ kaṇḍa section of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi: katame dhammā ajjhattā? ye dhammā tesaṃ tesaṃ sattānaṃ ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ niyatā57 pāṭipuggalikā upādiṇṇā, rūpaṃ, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā ajjhattā. katame dhammā bahiddhā? ye dhammā tesaṃ tesaṃ parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ niyatā pāṭipuggalikā upādiṇṇā, rūpaṃ, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā bahiddhā. katame dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā? tadubhayaṃ – ime dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā.58 The internal dhammas are explained as those of one’s own (sattānaṃ) which are internally, individually bound – the five khandas. By way of contrast, the external dhammas are presented as those for other beings, other people (parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ), and dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā are simply presented as those dhammas that are both (tadubhayaṃ). Although the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, as distinct from the Nikāyas, comments on the meaning of 56 57 58

Cf. MN I 55–63; DN II 290–315. Rhys Davids, 2012: 250, note 5, suggests reading niyakā instead, presumably based on niyakajjhatte as explained in As 46. Dhs 187–188; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 250: “Which are the states that are personal? Those states which, for this or that being, are of the self, self-referable, one’s own, individual, the issue of grasping; [in other words,] the five skandhas”. “Which are the states that are external? Those states which, for this or that other being, for other individuals, are of the self, self-referable, their own, individual, grasped at; [in other words,] the five skandhas. Which are the states that are personal-external? States which are both [personal and external]”.

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the internal and external dhammas, there is no clarification of dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā apart from the very brief reference to both (tadubhayaṃ).59 The dhammas with the three types of objects are explained in the Nikkhepakaṇḍa: katame dhammā ajjhattārammaṇā? ajjhatte dhamme ārabbha ye uppajjanti cittacetasikā dhammā – ime dhammā ajjhattārammaṇā. katame dhammā bahiddhārammaṇā? bahiddhā dhamme ārabbha ye uppajjanti cittacetasikā dhammā – ime dhammā bahiddhārammaṇā. katame dhammā ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā? ajjhattabahiddhā dhamme ārabbha ye uppajjanti cittacetasikā dhammā – ime dhammā ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā.60 The dhammas having an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇā) are those having the mind and mental factors (cittacetasikā) arising with reference to the internal dhammas; the dhammas having an external object (bahiddhārammaṇā) are those arising with reference to the external dhammas; and the dhammas with ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā objects are those arising with reference to the internal and external dhammas. Apart from the triplet, the pair ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā appears frequently in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi in close or distant collocation, functioning as complementary antonyms, i.e. externally versus internally, similar to the Nikāyas (2.1.2). They are attested in two contexts: in the Cittuppādakaṇḍa section (rūpāvacarakusalaṃ), where kusala dhammas are discussed in the context of the jhānas, they repeatedly occur in the phrase … ajjhattaṃ arūpasaññī bahiddhā rūpāni passati parittāni …;61 and in the Rūpakaṇḍa section where 59 60

61

This explanation is adopted in the commentaries, e.g. Vism 440; As 46, 325. Dhs 188; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 251: “Which are the states that have an object of thought concerning the self? Conscious states and their mental properties, which arise in connection with states of the self. Which are the states that have an object of thought concerning that which is external [to the self]? Conscious states and their mental properties, which arise in connection with that are external [to the self]. Which are the states that have an object of thought concerning that which is ‘personal-external’? Conscious states and their mental properties, which arise in connection with states that are ‘personal-external’”. Dhs 42–53; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 54: “When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he cultivates the way [thereto], and unconscious of any part of corporeal self, but seeing external objects to be limited …”. This translation which follows Buddhaghosa’s comments (As 188, 189, 191) is problematic and a clearer rendering of ajjhattaṃ may be simply “internally”.

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they are listed among attributes of the elements, e.g. in the description of the earth element: … kakkhaḷattaṃ kakkhaḷabhāvo ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā upādiṇṇaṃ vā anupādiṇṇaṃ vā – idaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ pathavīdhātu.62 The term bahiddhā has several occurrences on its own in the Nikkhepakaṇḍa,63 referring to people outside the Buddhist teachings, whereas ajjhattaṃ does not appear outside its collocation with bahiddhā. The adjectives ajjhatika and bāhira are listed in the mātikā section among twofold designations (dukamātikā): ajjhattikā dhammā, bāhirā dhammā.64 The two terms are attested only in the Rūpakaṇḍa section, in the same semantic range as in the Nikāyas (2.1.5–2.1.7): they refer to internal and external sense-spheres respectively,65 or appear among the pairs of attributes related to rūpa.66 In distinction to the Nikāyas, ajjhatika and bāhira do not appear compounded (ajjhattikabāhira) but only in asyndetic collocation. 3.1.2 Commentaries In the last section of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, in a supplement of commentarial nature, called the Atthuddhāra67 or Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍa,68 the terms ajjhattā, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā are further discussed: anindriyabaddharūpañca nibbānañca ṭhapetvā, sabbe dhammā siyā ajjhattā, siyā bahiddhā, siyā ajjhattabahiddhā. anindriyabaddharūpañca nibbānañca bahiddhā.69 It is stated that form (rūpa) which is not bound up with the faculties, and nibbāna are external whereas all other dhammas may be internal (siyā ajjhattā), external (siyā bahiddhā), or internal and external (siyā ajjhattabahiddhā). Then dhammas in relation to objects are explained:

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

Dhs 177; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 222: “That which is hard, rough, hardness, rigidity, whether it be of the self, or external, or grasped at, or not grasped at”. For example, Dhs 183. Dhs 5. Dhs 129. Dhs 125. As 6, 38. As 409, 422. Dhs 241; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 340: “With the exception of form which is not bound up with faculties, and Nirvana, all states may be personal or external or personal-external. [Material] form which is not bound up with faculties, and Nirvana, are both external”.

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katame dhammā ajjhattārammaṇā? viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ – ime dhammā ajjhattārammaṇā.70 Dhammas having an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇā) are the sphere of infinite consciousness (viññāṇañcāyatana) and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana), whereas those with an external object include the following: katame dhammā bahiddhārammaṇā? rūpāvacaratikacatukkajjhānā kusalato ca vipākato ca kiriyato ca, catutthassa jhānassa vipāko, ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ, cattāro maggā apariyāpannā cattāri ca sāmaññaphalāni – ime dhammā bahiddhārammaṇā.71 Dhammas with an external object (bahiddhārammaṇā) are the threefold and fourfold jhānas related to the form realm (rūpāvacaratikacatukkajjhānā) (arising from wholesome, resultant, inoperative), the result of the fourth jhāna (catutthassa jhānassa vipāko), the sphere of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana), the four paths (cattāro maggā apariyāpannā),72 and the fruitions (sāmañña­ phalāni). The text does not comment separately on the third component, i.e. ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā, but rather continues with a discussion of those dhammas that have any one of the three objects: rūpaṃ ṭhapetvā sabbeva kāmāvacarā kusalākusalāvyākatā dhammā, rūpāvacaracatutthajhānaṃ kusalato ca kiriyato ca – ime dhammā siyā ajjhattārammaṇā, siyā bahiddhārammaṇā, siyā ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā.73 70

71

72 73

Dhs 241; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 340: “Which states have a personal [internal] object of thought? The sphere of infinite consciousness and the sphere where there is neither perception nor non-perception – these are states that have a personal object of thought”. Dhs 241–242; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 340: “Which states have an external object of thought? The threefold and fourfold Jhāna relating to the heavens of Form, whether it arise as good (karma), as result (of good karma), or as completed thought, also results of Fourth Jhana, the sphere of infinite space, the four Paths that are the Unincluded and the four Fruits of the life of the recluse: these states have an external object of thought”. Apariyāpannā means here: not including the worlds of the senses, form and the formless. Dhs 242; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 340–341: “Excepting form, states, good, bad and indeterminate relating to the sensuous universe, and the fourth Jhāna relating to the worlds of Form, whether it arise as good (karma), or as completed thought: all these may be either a personal [internal] object of thought, or an external object of thought, or a personalexternal object of thought”.

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Apart from form, all dhammas (wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate) related to the desire realm, and the fourth jhāna, related to the form realm (wholesome and inoperative), may have an internal object, an external object, or an internal and external object. The text continues: ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ na vattabbaṃ ajjhattārammaṇanti pi, bahiddhārammaṇanti pi, ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇanti pi-rūpañca nibbānañca anārammaṇā.74 The section concludes that it should not be said that the sphere of nothingness has an internal, external or both internal and external object.75 Form and nibbāna are without an object. To summarize, in the commentary on the first triplet, form (rūpa) and nibbāna are external, all other dhammas may be internal, external, or internal and external. Apart from form, all dhammas related to the desire realm and the fourth jhāna (related to the form realm) may have an internal, external, or internal and external object. Dhammas having an internal object are the sphere of infinite consciousness and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. Dhammas having an external object are the threefold and fourfold jhānas, the result of the fourth jhāna, the sphere of infinite space, and the four paths and fruitions. Although the text does provide more details on the meaning of internal and external, it does not give any new information on ajjhattabahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇa dhammas; apart from rūpa and nibbāna, all cittas and cetasikas may be ajjhattabahiddhā, and all dhammas, apart from rūpa and the fourth jhāna, may have as an object ajjhattabahiddhā­rammaṇa. In the Atthasālinī, the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi by Buddha­ ghosa,76 the comments on the first triplet (dhammā ajjhattā, dhammā bahiddhā, dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā) focus almost entirely on ajjhatta: Ajjhattattike evaṃ pavattamānā ‘mayaṃ attā ti gahaṇaṃ gamissāmā ti’ iminā viya adhippāyena attānaṃ adhikāraṃ katvā pavattā ti ajjhattā. 74 75

76

Dhs 242; trans. by Rhys Davids, 2012: 341: “But it is not proper to say that the sphere of nothing whatsoever is all three. Form and Nirvana are without objects of thought”. Cf. Ajjhattadhammāpagamamattatova ākiñcaññāyatanārammaṇassa ajjhattabhāvampi bahiddhābhāvampi ajjhattabahiddhābhāvampi ananujānitvā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ na vattabbaṃ ajjhattārammaṇantipītiādi vuttaṃ (As 423). Three commentaries on the Abhidhamma texts are attributed to Buddhaghosa: Atthasālinī, Sammohavinodanī and Pañcappakaraṇāṭṭhakathā; cf. von Hinüber 1996: 149– 153; Norman, 1983: 120–130.

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Ajjhattasaddo panāyaṃ gocarajjhatte niyakajjhatte ajjhattajjhatte visayajjhatte ti catūsu atthesu dissati.77 Ajjhatta is here interpreted as referring to oneself and its four meanings are listed: internal in field/sphere (gocarajjhatte), internal in oneself (niyakajjhatte), internal in internal (ajjhattajjhatte), internal in range/object (visayajjhatte). These four terms are not attested in the Tipiṭaka but only in the commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghosa. They are discussed in the Atthasālinī, starting with gocarajjhatte78 exemplified by the mind focused on the sign of concentration (samādhinimitte),79 inwardly rapt and composed (ajjhattarato samāhito).80 The term niyakajjhatte is explained as internal to oneself, illustrated by inner tranquility (ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ)81 when contemplating dhammas internally; this term is usually translated as subjective, personal or referring to oneself.82 The third term, ajjhattajjhatte is explained as referring to the six sense organs (cha ajjhattikāni āyatanānī).83 The last term, visayajjhatte is referred, in a sense of dominion (visayajjhatte issariyaṭṭhāne ti attho), to inner emptiness (ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ),84 as achieved by the Tathāgata by disregard-

77

78

79 80 81 82

83 84

As 46; trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60: “In the triplet of ‘personal,’ this word refers to states which occur after making a locus of selves as though with the understanding ‘we shall consider or take things thus existing to be we ourselves’. The word ‘personal’ (ajjhatta) has a fourfold content, namely personal in field, in self-reference, (just) personal, personal in range”. Ten’ Ānanda, bhikkhunā tasmiṃ yeva purimasmiṃ samādhinimitte ajjhattam eva cittaṃ saṇṭhapetabbaṃ. Ajjhattarato samāhito ti ādīsu hi ayaṃ gocarajjhatte dissati (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60: “In such sentences as, ‘Ānanda, mind should be well focussed by that bhikkhu as ajjhattam, namely, only in that symbol of concentration which has been practised before;’ ‘inwardly rapt (ajjhattarato) and concentrated’ ajjhatta means ‘personal in field’”. Cf. samādhinimitta (MN I 249) is explained in the commentary (Ps II 292) as suññata­ phalasamāpatti, fruition of arahatship; see also MN III 112. Cf. DN II 107–108; SN V 263; AN IV 312; Dhp 101; Ud 64; Th 89. ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ occurs in numerous places in the Tipiṭaka in the context of jhānas (e.g. DN I 37; DN I 74; MN I 21; SN II 211; AN I 53). Ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharatī ti ādīsu niyakajjhatte (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60: “In such passages as, ‘He lives contemplating states, even among states which are pleasing as ajjhatta, ajjhatta means ‘subjective’”. Cha ajjhattikāni āyatanānī ti ādīsu ajjhattajjhatte (As 46); trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60: “[In] the six ajjhatika sense-organs, ajjhatta means ‘personal’”. Cf. the Mahāsuññata Sutta (MN III 111) where ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ leads to the fruition of arahatship. 

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ing all signs and symbols (sabbanimittānaṃ amanasikārā).85 The commentary concludes that internal dhammas are to be understood as those in the continuity of oneself (attano santāne), pertaining to the individual (pāṭipuggalikā).86 While the Atthasālinī gives significant attention to the term ajjhata, the other two terms of the triplet are only briefly touched upon. It depicts bahiddhā dhammā as those that are external (bāhirabhūtā), bound or unbound by the faculties (indriyabaddhā vā anindriyabaddhā vā).87 For the ajjhattabahiddhā dhammā it is only stated that these are states by virtue of both (tadubhayavasena).88 The compound is attested again only once, in the commentary on the Cittuppādakaṇḍa, in the context of jhāna attainments, where the text mentions ajjhattabahiddhā in reference to the kasiṇas having internal and external bases.89 The next triplet listed in the mātikā (i.e. ajjhattārammaṇā dhammā, bahiddhārammaṇā dhammā, ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā dhammā)90 is only briefly commented upon in the Atthasālinī, saying that these three refer to the dhammas which attend to the three kinds of objects.91 In the commentary on the Atthuddhāra, dhammas having an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇā) are said to be those arising with reference to objects of oneself (attano), the dhammas having an external object (ajjhattārammaṇā) arise with refer85

86

87

88 89 90 91

Ayaṃ kho pan’ Ānanda vihāro Tathāgatena abhisambuddho yad idaṃ sabbanimittānaṃ amanasikārā ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ upasampajja viharatī ti visayajjhatte issariyaṭ­ṭhāne ti attho. Phalasamāpattīhi buddhānaṃ issariyaṭṭhānaṃ nāma (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60: “In such passages as, ‘This, Ānanda, is the life fully attained by the Tathāgata, to wit, that he, by disregarding all provocative signs and symbols, has reached the ajjhatta Void and therein abides, ajjhatta means ‘range’ in the sense of ‘dominion’. The attainment of Fruition is named the dominion of the Buddhas’”. Tasmā attano santāne pavattā pāṭipuggalikā dhammā ajjhattā ti veditabbā (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 60–61: “Hence states occurring in one’s own continuity and pertaining to each individual are to be understood as ‘personal’”. Tato bāhibhūtā pana indriyabaddhā vā anindriyabaddhā vā bahiddhā nāma (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 61: “But states outside that personality, whether bound up with the controlling faculties or not, are termed ‘external’”. Tatiyapadaṃ tadubhayavasena vuttaṃ (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 61: “The third term is spoken by virtue of both”. For example: Rūpāni passatī ti bahiddhā pi nīlakasiṇādirūpāni jhānacakkhunā passati. Iminā ajjhattabahiddhāvatthukesu kasiṇesu jhānapaṭilābho dassito (As 191). Dhs 2. Anantarattiko te yeva tippakāre pi dhamme ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattanavasena vutto (As 46). Trans. by Maung Tin, 2013: 61: “The immediately following triplet refers to states (dhamme) occurring in the act of attending to just these three kinds of states (i.e. personal, external, externo-personal) as objects”.

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ence to those of another (parassa), and those having internal and external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā) with reference to both (tadubhaya).92 Ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā is consistently interpreted in the commentary as “both,” except in one instance when it is said that it refers to objects sometimes internally, sometimes externally (kālena ajjhattaṃ kālena bahiddhā, pavattiyaṃ ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ).93 In other commentaries by Buddhaghosa the same interpretations are given.94 3.2 The Vibhaṅga and Sammohavinodanī 3.2.1 Vibhaṅga Although the Theravāda tradition positions the Vibhaṅga after the Dhamma­ saṅgaṇi,95 the chronology of the two texts is problematic and some scholars suggest an alternative one, viewing the Vibhaṅga as the oldest among the seven canonical texts of the Abhidhammapiṭaka.96 However, as in the case of most ancient Indian texts, establishing a textual history of Abhidhamma texts requires considerable circumspection in drawing conclusions since the texts may have gone through several revisions and may reflect various historical layers.97 In relation to the three terms investigated here, it will be shown that the

92

93

94 95 96

97

For example: … ime terasa cittuppādā attano rūpādīni ārabbha pavattiyaṃ ajjhattāram­ maṇā, parassa rūpādīsu pavattā bahiddhārammaṇā, tadubhayavasena ajjhattabahiddhā­ ram­maṇā (As 425). This passage discusses powers (iddhi) manifesting internal and external objects: Iddhi­ vidha­­catutthaṃ kāyavasena cittaṃ cittavasena vā kāyaṃ pariṇāmanakāle bahiddhā­ ramma­ṇaṃ attano kumārakavaṇṇādinimmānakāle ca sakāyacittānaṃ āram­maṇa­karaṇato ajjhattāramma­ṇaṃ, bahiddhā hatthi assādidassanakāle bahiddhārammaṇaṃ, kālena ajjhattaṃ kālena bahiddhā, pavattiyaṃ ajjhattabahiddhāra­mmaṇaṃ (As 426); cf. Vibh-a 375. For example, in Ps I 249: ajjhattabahiddhā refers alternatively to oneself and to another (kālena attano, kālena parassa); in Vism 440: ajjhattabahiddhā refers to both (ubhayaṃ). Budddhaghosa lists the texts in the following order: Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Dhātu­ kathā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka, and Paṭṭhāna (As 3, 21–23). Frauwallner, 1971: 106–121, suggests that the Abhidhamma texts were written in the period between 200 BCE and 200 CE; he proposes a relative chronology with the Vibhaṅga as the earliest and the Dhammasaṅgaṇi as the latest text. The supposition by Frauwallner, 1964: 73–80, that the Vibhaṅga may have developed out of an earlier text which was also the foundation of the Dharmaskandha of the Sarvāstivādins, is developed further by Bronkhorst, 1985: 305–320, who argues, with rather convincing evidence, that “original” layers of the Vibhaṅga may well stem back to before the Sūtrapiṭaka that we know at present. See Kragh, 2002: 123–168; cf. Frauwallner, 1971: 69–12; Willemen, Dessein, and Cox, 1998: 10–16, 139–145; Wynne 2005: 35–70.

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Vibhaṅga may be considered to reflect the oldest layers of the Abhidhamma tradition. Among the seven Abhidhamma texts, the terms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā occur by far the most frequently in the Vibhaṅga. In its seventh division, the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga, the three modes of contemplation are positioned at the forefront, at the very beginning of the suttanta part of the text, delineating the four satipaṭṭhānas: Cattāro satipaṭṭhānā: idha bhikkhu ajjhattaṃ kāye kāyānupassī viharati, bahiddhā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā kāye kāyānupassī viharati …; ajjhattaṃ vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati, bahiddhā … ajjhattabahiddhā …; ajjhattaṃ citte cittānupassī viharati, bahiddhā … ajjhattabahiddhā …; ajjhattaṃ dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati, bahiddhā … ajjhattabahiddhā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati …98 The text presents the four satipaṭṭhānas in five sections (as opposed to 23 in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta99): contemplation of the body comprising one section only, i.e. the repulsiveness of the body (paṭikkūlamanasikāra); contemplation of feelings; contemplation of the mind; contemplation of phenomena comprising two sections, i.e. the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) and the factors of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga). Under each section, the three terms are explained: idha bhikkhu ajjhattaṃ kāyaṃ … paccavekkhati: atthi imasmiṃ kāye … idha bhikkhu bahiddhā kāyaṃ … paccavekkhati: atthissa kāye …100 A monk contemplates the body internally (ajjhattaṃ) as “it is in this body” (atthi imasmiṃ kāye), and externally (bahiddhā) “it is in the body of this one” (atthissa kāye), and then the text lists the body parts. The distinction between the two modes lies in the use of two different cases of the pronominal stem idam: in the locative (imasmin) it can be interpreted in a deictic adjectival meaning “in this [body],” usually translated, following the commentary,101 as referring to one’s own body. The pronominal stem in the genitive (assa) is commonly interpreted as the third person pronoun, translated “of him” or “that one’s”.102 The phrase atthissa is attested only in the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga, in 98 99 100 101 102

Vibh 193. MN I 55–63; DN II 290–315. Vibh 193–194. Vibh-a 219. For example, the translation by Thiṭṭila, 2010: 251–252.

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the kāyānupassanā and dhammānupassanā sections in the presentation of contemplation of the body, the five hindrances and the seven factors of enlightenment in the external mode. It is later, in Buddhaghosa’s commentary, that the reading of assa as referring to “other” (parassa)103 became established and adopted; in the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga there is no direct indication that assa would refer to the “other” and hence, interpretation of this phrase requires further exploration. One suggestion here is that the external mode (bahiddhā) indicates that the meditator’s body (and not another’s) is contemplated externally, i.e. in a dissociated impersonal state or mode.104 The third mode is explained in the Vibhaṅga: idha bhikkhu ajjhattabahiddhā kāyaṃ … paccavekkhati: atthi kāye …105 A monk contemplates the body internally and externally (ajjhattabahiddhā) thus: “it is in the body” (atthi kāye), and then the text lists the body parts. This is the only instance in the Tipiṭaka that represents the third mode as “there is”. No text provides any further clarification of the third mode and hence, the question how this mode was practiced remains an open one.106 Based on this phrase from the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga, the object in the third mode is contemplated without reference to anything internal or external, to one’s own or other (i.e. without the usage of any pronoun); it may be viewed as experiencing the body as such, which may suggest that contemplation is perhaps occurring while experiencing anattā. The Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga continues in the section on feelings (vedanā): kathañca bhikkhu ajjhattaṃ vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayamāno: sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayāmīti pajānāti … . bahiddhā vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayamānaṃ: sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayatīti pajānāti … ajjhattabahiddhā vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ: sukhā vedanā ti pajānāti …107 103 104

105 106 107

Vibh-a 219. The author was told that this was a method of satipaṭṭhāna practiced in the mid-twentieth century in Burma and handed down as such by the meditation teacher Premasiri of Sri Lanka (personal interview, December 2014). It is said to go back to the predecessors of Mahasi Sayadaw; however, no further information on the origins of this method has yet been traced. Vibh 194; cf. Burmese edition: atthi imasmiṃ kāye (Be 201). Cf. Dharmaskanda (T.26.1537: 475c24–479b23), noted by Schmithausen, 2012: 293. Vibh 195–196.

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In the contemplation of feeling internally (ajjhattaṃ), a monk experiencing feeling (vedayamāno) knows: “I feel pleasant feeling” (sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayāmīti); externally (bahiddhā), he knows the feeling experienced (vedanaṃ vedayamānaṃ): “he feels a pleasant feeling” (sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vedayatīti). Here the modes ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā are distinguished through the use of the verb in the first person (vedayāmi) and the third person (vedayāti), and may refer to oneself and to another respectively. Alternatively, the external mode (bahiddhā) could be interpreted here (again) as an external, dissociated mode of contemplation of feeling. In the case of the third mode (ajjhattabahiddhā), the text simply says: “[there is] a pleasant feeling” (sukhā vedanā ti), indicating, as in the section on the kāyānupassanā, experience of the feelings as such, without any reference which may, again, suggest that contemplation is occurring while experiencing anattā.108 In a similar way the three terms are presented in the section on the mind (citta): kathañca bhikkhu ajjhattaṃ citte cittānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ: sarāgaṃ me cittan ti pajānāti … bahiddhā … sarāgaṃ vāssa cittaṃ: sarāgamassa cittan ti pajānāti … ajjhattabahiddhā … sarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ: sarāgaṃ cittan ti pajānāti.109 A monk contemplates the mind internally by knowing the lustful mind “my mind is lustful” (sarāgaṃ me cittam); externally by contemplating the mind of this one (or his) (assa cittam) “the mind of this (one) is lustful” (sarāgamassa cittam); and internally and externally by contemplating “the mind is lustful” (sarāgaṃ cittam), without relating it to anyone. In the section on dhammas, only hindrances and factors of enlightenment are discussed, starting with the hindrances: Kathañ ca bhikkhu ajjhattaṃ dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati? Idha bhikkhu santaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandaṃ: atthi me ajjhattaṃ kāmacchando ti pajānāti … Kathañ ca bhikkhu bahiddhā …? Idha bhikkhu santaṃ vāssa kāmacchandaṃ: atthissa kāmacchando ti pajānāti …

108

109

Thiṭṭila (2010: 255) omits ajjhattabahiddhā in his translation of the sentence kathañca bhikkhu ajjhattabahiddhā vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati: “And how does a Bhikkhu dwell contemplating feeling in feelings?” Vibh 197–198.

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Kathañ ca bhikkhu ajjhattabahiddhā …? Idha bhikkhu santaṃ vā kāmacchandaṃ: atthi kāmacchando ti pajānāti …110 In internal (ajjhattaṃ) contemplation of the first hindrance, a monk, having sensual desire internally (ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandaṃ), knows “there is in me sensual desire” (atthi me ajjhattaṃ kāmacchando); in external (bahiddhā) contemplation, a monk knowing sensual desire of this one (of him) (assa kāmacchandaṃ) knows “there is sensual desire of this (one)” (atthissa kāmacchando). In contemplation internally and externally (ajjhattabahiddhā), a monk knows “there is sensual desire” (atthi kāmacchando), indicating an impersonal mode. In this way the text continues through all the five hindrances and the seven factors of enlightenment. In the Vibhaṅga nearly all attestations of the three terms occur in the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga, in the context of the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas, thus consistently following the stylistic pattern for the three modes identified in the Nikāyas (2.1.1). Consequently, concerning the presentation of the three terms, the Vibhaṅga may reflect an older layer of the Abhidhamma literature than the Dhammasaṅgaṇi where the three terms are listed as three different approaches or perspectives for examination of all dhammas (i.e. mental states and material qualities). Furthermore, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the difference between the internal and external is explained quite unambiguously: the internal dhammas are one’s own (sattānaṃ) and the external dhammas are those of others (parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ),111 an interpretation that is followed up in the commentaries. In comparison, although the Vibhaṅga indicates that ajjhataṃ may refer to oneself and bahiddhā to another, there is more space for ambiguity and alternative interpretations; e.g. atthi imasmiṃ kāye … versus … atthissa kāye … (Vibh 193–194) cannot be translated with any certainty as meaning only “one’s own” and “another’s body;” it may be interpreted as two ways of viewing one’s own body. In the Vibhaṅga the third mode is presented differently than in other Pāli canonical texts. The interpretation of ajjhattabahiddhā in the Satipaṭṭhā­ navibhaṅga may indicate contemplation accompanied by anattā; e.g. atthi kāmacchando indicates only a presence of this particular hindrance, without reference to an individual. It is noteworthy that this interpretation in the Vibhaṅga is not followed up by the commentaries. In comparison, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi explains ajjhattabahiddhā as “both” (tadubhayaṃ), internal

110 111

Vibh 199–201. Dhs 187–188.

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and external;112 this is reflected in the commentarial literature. Concerning these three terms, the Vibhaṅga seems to preserve in their presentation a different, perhaps older layer of textual transmission than the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.113 The three terms are also attested in other sections of the Vibhaṅga. In the Khandhavibhaṅga section, they always occur in relation to the dhammas being internal, external, and internal and external, and having internal, external, and internal and external object(s);114 e.g. in the presentation of feelings (vedanākkhandha): tividhena vedanākkhandho: … atthi ajjhatto, atthi bahiddho, atthi ajjhattabahiddho, atthi ajjhattārammaṇo, atthi bahiddhārammaṇo, atthi ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇo …115 The stems referring to internal and external (ajjhatta, bahiddhā, ajjhattika, bāhira) generally follow the same typological and semantic features as identified for the Nikāyas (2.1.1–2.1.7). The pair ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā often occurs among other attributes describing the five khandhas,116 and the two terms are explained in the same way as in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi; e.g. in the Khandhavibhaṅga section the two aspects of material quality (rūpa) are discussed: tattha katamaṃ rūpaṃ ajjhattaṃ? yaṃ rūpaṃ tesaṃ tesaṃ sattānaṃ ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ niyakaṃ pāṭipuggalikaṃ upādinnaṃ … tattha katamaṃ rūpaṃ bahiddhā? yaṃ rūpaṃ tesaṃ tesaṃ parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ niyakaṃ pāṭipuggalikaṃ upādinnaṃ … .117 The internal rūpa is explained as one’s own (sattānaṃ), the external as for any other beings, other people (parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ).118 The semantic context for the occurrences of the terms in pair is different to the context for the triad which is consistently within the framework of contemplation. 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

Dhs 188. However, it has to be added that both texts are, in their present form, nevertheless mutually related and dependent. Cf. Gethin, 1992: 163–164. There are numerous attestation; e.g. Vibh 19–21, 26–29, 38–41, 55–62, 75, 92, 115, 311–315, 327–328. Vibh 16–17; cf. Dhs 187–188. See Vibh 1, 3, 5, 7, 10. Vibh 2; Cf. Dhs 187–188. Vibh 3, 5, 8, 10.

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The adjectival stems ajjhatika and bāhira occur in the Khandhavibhaṅga section among the pairs of attributes related to the khandhas.119 In distinction to the Nikāyas, ajjhatika and bāhira are not attested in a compound (ajjhattikabāhira) but only in collocation. 3.2.2 Sammohavinodanī The commentary on the Vibhaṅga, the Sammohavinodanī, ascribed to Buddha­ghosa, gives similar interpretations of the three terms as those in the Atthasālinī. The three terms are discussed in the commentary on the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga, starting with the three modes of contemplation of the body:120 Ajjhattaṃ ti niyakajjhattaṃ adhipettaṃ. Tasmā ajjhattaṃ kāye ti attano kāye ti attho.121 Bahiddhā kāye ti parassa kāye. Ajjhattabahiddhā kāye ti kālena attano kāye, kālena parassa kāye.122 The internal mode is understood as niyakajjhatta which is discussed further in the Atthasālinī.123 The phrase ajjhattaṃ kāye is explained as referring to one’s own body (attano kāye), bahiddhā kāye to another’s body (parassa kāye),124 and ajjhattabahiddhā alternatively to one’s own and another’s body (kālena attano kāye, kālena parassa kāye).125 The phrase atthi kāye which is an explanation of the third mode of the body contemplation (ajjhattabahiddhā kāyaṃ) in the Vibhaṅga,126 is commented upon in the Sammohavinodanī: atthi kāye ti idaṃ yasmā na ekantena attano kāyo, nāpi parass’eva kāyo adhippeto, tasmā vuttaṃ.127 119 120 121 122 123

124 125 126 127

See Vibh 13, 67, 79, 82–85. See Vibh 193. Vibh-a 217. Vibh-a 219. As 46. Similarly, in the commentary on the section rūpāvacarakusala (Dhs 31), in the context of the second jhāna, ajjhattaṃ is presented as niyakajjhattam; here Buddhaghosa adds: vibhaṅge pana ajjhattaṃ paccattan ti ettakam eva vuttaṃ (As 169). Cf. Vibh-a 261. Cf. Ps I 249, 252, 270–273, 279–280; 286–287. Vibh 194. Vibh-a 261; trans. by Ñāṇamoli, 1996: 321: “There is in the body: this is said because it is not exclusively his own body nor another’s body that is intended”.

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The commentary states that neither one’s own body (attano kāyo) nor another’s (parass’eva kāyo) is meant exclusively. Similarly, the Sammohavinodanī comments on the section on feelings: Ajjhattabahiddhā ti kālena attano kālena parassa vedanāsu cittaṃ upasaṃharati. Imasmiṃ vāre yasmā neva attā na paro niyamito, tasmā vedanāpariggahamattam eva dassetuṃ.128 The third mode is presented here as neither oneself (neva attā) nor another (na paro). There is no comment in the Sammohavinodanī on the three modes in the sections on the mind (citta) and phenomena (dhamma). The interpretation saying for the third mode to be neither one’s own nor another’s exclusively is, to my knowledge, found only in the Sammohavinodanī and is not further discussed or followed up by any other Pāli text of that period. In other commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghosa the usual interpretation of the third mode is “sometimes one’s own, sometimes another’s,” or “both”. Other comments on the three terms in the Sammohavinodanī are presented in a similar way as in other commentaries by Buddhaghosa. In the commentary on the Khandhavibhaṅga the aggregates are discussed, having internal and external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā) as being sometimes internal, sometimes external: kālena ajjhattaṃ kālena bahiddhā dhammesu evaṃ pavattentassa ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā.129 The adjectival stems ajjhatika and bāhira are attested in the Sammohavinodanī in reference to internal and external senses respectively,130 or occur among the pairs of attributes.131 To summarize then, several interpretations for the three terms are given in the Abhidhamma. In the last section of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍa, the terms are related to different stages of high absorptions: e.g. dhammas having an internal object are the sphere of infinite consciousness and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception; dhammas having an external object are the threefold and fourfold jhānas, the result of the fourth jhāna, the sphere of infinite space, and the four paths and fruitions (3.1.2). The third mode is given a different interpretation in the Vibhaṅga: ajjhattabahiddhā 128

129 130 131

Vibh-a 268; trans. by Ñāṇamoli, 1996: 330: “Internally and externally: he applies the mind at one time to his own and at another time to another’s feelings. In the [last] section, because neither self nor other is specified, therefore in order to point out the mere laying hold of feeling …”. Vibh-a 44; Cf. As 426, Ps I 249, Vibh-a 375. See Vibh-a 51. See Vibh-a 55, 276.

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is presented as contemplation of phenomena without reference to oneself or another; this is further implied in the commentary, the Sammohavinodanī, explaining the third mode as neither oneself (neva attā) nor another (na paro) (3.2.2). On the other hand, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the internal dhammas are presented as those of one’s own (sattānaṃ), the external as those of others (parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ), and dhammā ajjhattabahiddhā as those of both (tadubhayaṃ) (3.1.1). Only the latter interpretation was followed by Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimagga. 4

Interpretations of ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattabahiddhā: From Buddhist Traditions to Modern Scholarship

Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the three terms (2.2) has become generally accepted in the Theravāda tradition and has remained the standard interpretation in a large section of secondary modern works dealing with the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas. As noted by several scholars,132 the rendering of bahiddhā as “other” is problematic: while mindfulness of the body practiced by observing the bodies of others may be viable, the contemplation of the mind and phenomena of others is certainly questionable. Although in several instances in the Nikāyas there is mention that knowledge of others’ mental states can be obtained through seeing, hearing, inference or mind reading,133 there is no reference to these four means of knowledge in the texts giving instruction on contemplation in the three modes. Anālayo suggests that another person’s mental state can be contemplated indirectly through observation of their posture, tone of voice, or facial expression.134 He comments that mindfulness practice focused only internally can cause self-centeredness and hence, external mindfulness builds up a balance between introversion and extroversion.135 These comments are interesting yet still problematic. Even in the case of contemplation of another person’s body, it has to be noted that the suttas generally instruct the monks to go into solitude; e.g. in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta it is said: “having gone to the forest or to the foot of a tree, or to an empty place”136 which 132 133 134 135 136

Gethin, 2001: 92–99; Anālayo, 2006a: 92–99; Kuan, 2008: 117–119; Schmithausen, 2012: 291– 303. D III 103, noted by Anālayo, 2006a: 93; cf. Schmithausen, 2012: 294–295. Anālayo, 2006a: 93–94; cf. Schmithausen, 2012: 295. Anālayo, 2006b: 247. Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā nisīdati (M I.56).

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indicates that there would be no other people to observe, especially since the monks were instructed to sit alone in meditation and develop concentration and mindfulness.137 The three modes of contemplation are an integral component of most texts on contemplation, retained to a large extent in the early schools of Buddhism, and seem to have originated from a very early stage of Buddhist tradition and hence, it can be presumed that they were initially addressing wandering mendicants rather than large groups in monasteries. Thus the instructions on the three modes would probably target primarily ascetics who would practice in silence and solitude, not observing other people. The interpretation of the term ajjhattabahiddhā is even more puzzling: neither the Nikāyas not the commentaries by Buddhaghosa shed any light on what this mode of practice involves. Interpretation of the three modes, especially of the third one, seems to have been problematic already at early stages of canonical transmission, as reflected not only in the Pāli Canon and its commentaries but also in the Chinese translations of the Sarvāstivāda and Dharmagupta texts.138 The overview by Schmithausen of several texts attesting the three modes shows that their interpretations vary; e.g. in the Śrāvakabhūmi the three modes are presented is several ways: internally as referring to one’s live body, externally to observation of a dead body, and both internally and externally referring to insight that the dead body was once alive and that one’s own live body will also become a corpse; or internally refers to one’s live body, externally to non-living matter, and internally and externally to the body of another living being; or internal contemplation of feelings refers to one’s own feelings emerging in one’s own body, external to one’s own feelings emerging in relation to non-living matter, and internal and external to those emerging in relation to another.139 A different interpretation of the two modes may be drawn from the Chinese translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra by Kumārajīva.140 In the section on mindfulness of the body, one’s own body (svakāya) is inner, another’s body (parakāya) is outer; the five organs (indriya) are the inner body whereas the five 137 138

139 140

There are many instances in the suttas where the delight of seclusion is recommended, e. g. AN V 134–135. For example, the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhānasutta in Chinese, translated from the Madhyamāgama by Kuan, 2008: 146–151, prescribes, unlike the Pāli Canon, only two modes – internal and external; e.g. “Thus a monk contemplates body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body” (2008: 147). Schmithausen, 2012: 296–299. Lamotte, 1970: 1173–1175 (cited by Gethin, 2001: 54), Anālayo, 2006a: 97, Schmithausen, 2012: 296.

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objects of the senses (viṣaya) are the outer body. The text does not elucidate the third mode of contemplation, however, it states that the body can be examined internally and externally simultaneously (yugapat), at the same time (ekakāle), or as two distinct operations (bhinna).141 In comparison, Buddhaghosa also interprets the third mode as “at times internally, at times externally” (kālena attano, kālena parassa)142 which may refer to two distinct operation, or as “both” (ubhayam),143 however, it is unlikely that this would refer to simultaneous contemplation since he states that both cannot occur at once (ekasmiṃ kāle panidaṃ ubhayaṃ na labbhati).144 The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra distinguishes bodily feeling as external and mental feeling as internal, and the feelings associated with the [first] five consciousnesses as external, and those linked to the mind consciousness as internal. The mind is external when it has for its object an external dharma, and internal when its object is an internal dharma. Mental consciousness (manovijñāna) is the internal mind, and the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) are the external mind. Notably, the text does not elucidate the third mode (external and internal).145 Most modern scholars and practitioners, attempting to interpret ajjha­ taṃ and bahiddhā, especially in terms of meditation practice,146 follow Buddhaghosa, often with some modifications: e.g. only the internal mode can be practiced as direct contemplation;147 the external mode is to be contemplated by inference;148 the external mode refers to bodily feelings at skin level, and internal to the feelings deeper in the body.149 The meaning of the 141 142 143 144 145

146 147

148 149

Lamotte, 1970: 1173. Ps I 249. Vism 440. Ps I 249. Here, an alternative interpretation may be suggested in relation to the practice of mindfulness of the six sense-spheres, depending on which aspect becomes prominent during the practice: (1) ajjhattaṃ: the internal sense-sphere is the object of mindfulness (e.g. when seeing, one is primarily aware of the eye); (2) bahiddhā: the external sense-sphere is the object of mindfulness (e.g. when seeing, the object of seeing is predominant); (3) ajjhatta-bahiddhā: the specific consciousness (one of the six) is the object of mindfulness, i.e. the knowing of the process (e.g. when seeing, one is primarily aware of consciousness arising with the visual object and the eyes). A good survey of various modern interpreters is given by Anālayo, 2006a: 95–99. Ñāṇapoṇika, 1962: 59, says that “only internal objects are taken up” since only these are “accessible to direct experience” (paccakkhañāṇa “direct experience”); cf. Anālayo, 2006a: 94. Mahāsi Sayadaw, 1994: 41, follows Buddhaghosa, adding that bahiddhā refers to “contemplation of the life processes of others, by way of inference (anumāna)”. Goenka, 1999: 22; cf. Śrāvakabhūmi noted by Schmithausen, 2012: 297, note 29.

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antonyms internal-external can be expanded, drawing from the Sarvāstivāda sources, to the correlation past-future and further to the Upaniṣadic correlation the personal-the cosmic.150 The interpretations from the Vibhaṅga are viewed to be among the more plausible ones.151 5

Conclusion

The prominence and frequency of occurrences of ajjhattaṃ “internally,” bahiddhā “externally,” and ajjhattabahiddhā “internally and externally” in the texts concerning meditation in the Pāli Canon indicate their significance in the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. In this chapter, all occurrences of the three terms in the Pāli Canon are surveyed, their semantic ranges outlined and linked to a variety of contextual usages. Firstly, and in terms of new findings, through identification of the main syntagmatic formulae comprised of the three terms in various types of collocation, their specific functions and typological and semantic patterns are outlined (2.1.1–2.1.7). These passages have been problematic for interpreters and translators alike, hence new approaches seem needed. As revealed here, in the Nikāyas the compound ajjhattabahiddhā always appears in collocation with ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā in a triad, consistently so only in the passages (probably of a prescriptive nature) where instructions on contemplation of the four satipaṭṭhānas are given. Consequently, we have to assume that the three modes were probably a significant or even essential aspect of the meditation practice, as evidenced by their integration and many occurrences in the Pāli canonical and other early Buddhist sources. The attestations of ajjhattabahiddhā in the context of contemplation only signal that this dvandva may have served as a semiotic marker, referring to a particular type of meditation practice, presumably known to the audience of the time. The formulaic repetitions of the three terms (in dvandva, asyndeta or constructions with the conjunction vā) seem to follow the style of the Vedic tradition which cannot but have influenced the early Buddhist oral transmission. This is further supported by occurrences of another triad which appears, yet again, only in the context of satipaṭṭhāna practice, namely samudayadhammā, vayadhammā, samudayavayadhammā.152

150 151 152

Sujato, 2005: 174–177. Kuan, 2008: 119; Anālayo, 2006: 95. For example, samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati (D II 292).

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In contrast, as identified in this chapter, ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā occur linked as a pair in close or distant syntactic collocation in a broader range of contexts, explicating or describing various aspects of the teachings such as the aggregates or the hindrances, but not when contemplation practice is discussed. The adverb bahiddhā is only rarely attested outside the syntactic correlation to ajjhattaṃ; on its own it refers to things being external, outside, or to people outside the Buddhist teachings. The term ajjhattaṃ is frequently used without bahiddhā, mostly referring to the states of mind such as the presence or absence of various phenomena. The adjectival forms ajjhattika “internal” and bāhira “external,” when compounded in a dvandva, always refer to the six internal and external sense-spheres respectively, however, when not compounded they are used among attributes describing various phenomena or doctrinal aspects. The adjective ajjhattika always occurs in close or distant collocation with bāhira whereas the adjective bāhira, when attested on its own, refers to things that are external or outside. To summarize, each type of collocation of the three terms has a rather well defined semantic range which is signaled, as suggested here, by the particular syntagmatic formula; e.g. the triad ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, ajjhattabahiddhā refers to a specific mode of contemplation; the dvandva ajjhattikabāhira refers to the six internal and external sense-spheres respectively. However, no sutta (except for the Janavasabhasutta, 2.1.1) in the Nikāyas provides information on the meanings of the three terms in question, nor do any provide clarification of their significance in the satipaṭṭhāna practice itself. It is in the Abhidhamma that the meanings for the three terms are given or implied. Secondly, this chapter investigates how formulaic stylized expressions, occurring in a variety of syntagms comprised of the three terms, are presented and interpreted in the Abhidhamma, and linked to the explications established in the later Pāli commentarial literature which serve today as the standard interpretations of the terms. As discussed, the instructions on the four satipaṭṭhānas in the Nikāyas consist largely of very brief comprehensive lists; it is very likely that oral commentaries and instructions on the actual practice were handed down along with the texts and supposedly it was taken for granted that the audience was well versed in the topic. It was only much later, through the commentaries from the fifth century onwards ascribed to Buddhaghosa that the interpretations of the terms ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā were established and have since then remained the standard reading in the Theravāda tradition – ajjhattaṃ referring to oneself, bahiddhā to another and ajjhattabahiddhā to both or alternatively to oneself and another (2.2). The commentaries seem partly to draw from the Abhidhammapiṭaka where the first two modes are explained in several ways. In the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, ajjhattā

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dhammā is said to refer to oneself and bahiddhā dhammā to others while ajjhattabahiddhā refers to both (3.1.1). The terms are further commented upon in the Atthasālinī, largely reflecting the interpretations in other aṭṭhakathā texts (3.1.1). Another interpretation is given in the last section of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍa, where the terms are related to different stages of high absorptions (3.1.2). The Vibhaṅga though contributes a different angle to the interpretation of the three terms. The Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga may explicate ajjhataṃ in reference to oneself and bahiddhā to another, as commonly read by most interpreters; however, there is space for alternative readings, as suggested here (3.2.1). The third mode ajjhattabahiddhā is presented in the Vibhaṅga as contemplation of phenomena or processes without reference to oneself or another; this study proposes that the term may refer to the experience of anattā, implied also in the commentary Sammohavinodanī where the third mode is presented as neither oneself (neva attā) nor another (na paro) (3.2.2). It is noteworthy that other canonical and post-canonical texts do not comment upon or follow up this presentation of ajjhatta bahiddhā in the Vibhaṅga. This may be an indication of the Vibhaṅga reflecting a different, perhaps earlier layer of Abhidhamma texts, which is further evidenced by the attestations of the triad in the Vibhaṅga, occurring only in the context of the four satipaṭṭhānas (following the pattern identified in the Nikāyas, 2.1.1), whereas in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi the three terms are listed as three different perspectives for examination of all the dhammas. From all the interpretations of the three terms given in the Abhidhamma, only the explanation given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, referring ajjhattā dhammā to oneself, bahiddhā dhammā to others, and ajjhattabahiddhā to both (3.1.1), has been followed by Buddhaghosa and by the later Theravāda tradition. In this chapter some semantic inferences are drawn from the context depen­dent use of the terms in question, occurring in a range of formulaic expressions. The complete lack of any explanation of, or comment upon ajjhattabahiddhā in the Nikāyas, the very scant information given in the Abhidhamma texts, along with the variety of interpretations found in the Chinese translations of the texts originating from other early Buddhist schools, indicate that interpretation of the three modes, especially the third one, may have been problematic already at an early stage of the canonical transmission. Since the triad (ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, ajjhattabahiddhā), the pair (ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā) and the single terms occur in specifically different contexts, the semantic ranges inferred from the usage of the terms in pair, functioning as complementary antonyms, should not be simply applied to the interpretations of the terms in triad (ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, ajjhattabahiddhā), especially in the case of the compound ajjhattabahiddhā which seems to refer to a specific

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meditation practice (e.g. may refer to contemplation without reference, as suggested before). As evidenced by the consistent integration of ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā and ajjhattabahiddhā in the Pāli canon and other early Buddhist sources, the three modes form a very important aspect of the satipaṭṭhāna practice and hence, their significance requires investigation from several perspectives, and within the broader context of ancient Indian traditions of the time. This chapter exemplifies how the analysis of the context-dependent usage and the typological and semantic patterns formed by these terms can be used as a way to mark out their functions and meanings. Undoubtedly, the problem of the interpretation of the three terms in question remains open to further research.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations and the quotation system of Pāli sources follow the Critical Pāli Dictionary (Epilegomena to vol. 1, 1948, pp. 5*–36*, and vol. 3, 1992, pp. II–VI). The numbers in the quotations of Pāli sources refer to the volume and page of the Pāli Text Society edition (e.g. MN I 21 refers to the Majjhimanikāya, vol 1, p. 21). AN As DN Dhp Dhs MN Nidd I Nidd II PED

Aṅguttaranikāya (ed. Morris and Hardy, [1885–1900] 1999–2013) Atthasālinī (ed. Müller; rev. Cousins, [1897] 2011) Dīghanikāya (ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter, [1890–1911] 1995–2007) Dhammapada (ed. von Hinüber and Norman, 1994) Dhammasaṅgaṇi (ed. Müller, [1885] 2001) Majjhimanikāya (ed. Trenckner and Chalmers, [1888–1902] 2013) Mahāniddesa (ed. de La Vallée Poussin and Thomas, [1916–1917] 2001) Cullaniddesa (ed. Stede, [1918] 1988) Pāli-English Dictionary. Rhys Davids, Thomas W. and Stede, William. London: The Pāli Text Society, 1921–1925. Ps Papañcasūdanī, Majjhimanikāyāṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosa (ed. Woods, Kośambi, Horner, [1922–1938] 1976–1979) SN Saṃyuttanikāya (ed. Feer, [1884–1898] 1975–2006) Sv Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (ed. Rhys Davids, Carpenter, Stede, [1929–1932] 1968–1971) T. Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 (ed. Takakusu 高楠, Watanabe 渡邊 and Ono 小野, 1924–1934) Th Theragāthā and Therīgāthā (ed. Oldenberg and Pischel, [1883] 1966) Ud Udāna (ed. Steinthal, [1885] 1982) Vibh Vibhaṅga (ed. Rhys Davids, [1904] 2003) Vibh-a Sammohavinodanī (ed. Buddhadatta, [1923] 1980) Vism Visuddhimagga (ed. Rhys Davids, [1920–1921] 1975)

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Anālayo Bhikkhu (2006a). Satipaṭṭhāna: The Direct Path to Realization. Selangor: Buddhist Wisdom Centre. Anālayo Bhikkhu (2006b). “Mindfulness in the Pāli Nikāyas”, In Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research: Transcending the Boundaries. Edited by D.K. Nauriyal, Michael S. Drummond, and Y.B. Lal. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 229–249. Bodhi Bhikkhu (2000). The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Boston MA: Wisdom Publications. Bodhi Bhikkhu (2012). The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Boston MA: Wisdom Publications. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1985). “Dharma and Abhidharma”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48, pp. 305–320. Buddhadatta, Ambalangoda Polwatte (ed.) ([1923] 1980). Sammohavinodanī. London: The Pāli Text Society. Cousins, Lance. S. (1983). “Pāli Oral Literature”, In Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern. Edited by Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky. London: Curson Press, pp. 1–11. Ditrich, Tamara (2010). “The Variety of Expression for Heaven and Earth in the Ṛgveda”, Crossroads 5(1), pp. 35–44. Ditrich, Tamara (forthcoming). “Stylistic Analysis of Coordinative Nominal Constructions for Dual Deities in the Ṛgveda”, Bulletin d’Études Indiennes. Feer, Leon (ed.) ([1884–1898] 1975–2006). Saṃyuttanikāya. 5 vols. London: The Pāli Text Society. Frauwallner, Erich (1964). “Abhidharma-Studien, II”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie 8, pp. 59–99. Frauwallner, Erich (1971). “Abhidharma-Studien: III. Abhisamayavādaḥ“, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie 15, pp. 69–121. Frauwallner, Erich (1972). “Abhidharma-Studien: IV. Der Abhidharma der anderen Schulen”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie 16, pp. 95–152. Gethin, Rupert (1992). “The Mātikas: Memorisation, Mindfulness, and the List”, In In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Edited by Janet Gyatso. Albany NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 149–172. Gethin, Rupert (2001). The Buddhist Path to Awakening. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oneworld. Goenka, S.N. (1999). Discourses on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Igatpuri: Vipassanā Research Institute. Hinüber, Oskar von, and Norman, Kenneth R. (eds.) (1994). Dhammapada. London: The Pāli Text Society.

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Hinüber, Oskar von (1996). A Handbook of Pali Literature (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies 2). Berlin: De Gruyter. Kragh. Ulrich L. (2002). “The Extant Abhidharma-Literature”, The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 3, pp. 123–168. Kuan, Tse-fu (2008). Mindfulness in Early Buddhism: New Approaches through Psychology and Textual Analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit Sources. London and New York: Routledge. La Vallée Poussin, Louis de, and Thomas, Edward J. (eds.) ([1916–1917] 2001). Mahāniddesa. London: The Pāli Text Society. Lamotte, Étienne (1970). Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). Vol. 3. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste. Mahāsi, Sayadaw (1994). The Progress of Insight: A Modern Pali treatise on Buddhist Satipaṭṭhāna Meditation. Trans. by Nyānaponika. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Maung Tin, Pe ([1920–1921] 2012–2013). The Expositor (Atthasālinī): Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Rev. by Mrs Rhys Davids. 2 vols. Bristol: The Pāli Text Society. Morris, Richard and Hardy, Edmund (eds.) ([1885–1900] 1999–2013). Aṅguttaranikāya. 5 vols. London: The Pāli Text Society. Müller, Edward (ed.) ([1897] 2011). Atthasālinī. Rev. by L.S. Cousins. London: The Pāli Text Society. Müller, Edward (ed.) ([1885] 2001). Dhammasaṅgaṇi. London: The Pāli Text Society. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu (1980). A Thinker’s Notebook. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu ([1956] 1994). The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) by Bhantā­ cariya Buddhaghosa. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu (1996). The Dispeller of Delusion (Sammohavinodanī). Rev. by L.S. Cousins;  Nyanaponika Mahāthera and C.M.M. Shaw. 2 vols. Oxford: Pāli Text Society. Ñāṇanamoli Bhikkhu and Bodhi Bhikkhu (1995). The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya. Boston MA: Wisdom Publication. Ñāṇapoṇika Thera (1962). The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. London: Rider. Norman, Kenneth R. (1983). Pāli Literature (A History of Indian Literature VII, 2). Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Oldenberg, Henrik and Pischel, Richard (eds.) ([1883] 1966). Theragāthā and Therīgāthā. London: Pāli Text Society. Rhys Davids, Caroline A.F. ([1900] 2012). A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. Bristol: Pāli Text Society. Rhys Davids, Caroline A.F. (ed.) ([1904] 2003). Vibhaṅga. London: The Pāli Text Society.

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Rhys Davids, Caroline A.F. (ed.) ([1920–1921] 1975). Visuddhimagga. London: The Pāli Text Society. Rhys Davids, Thomas W., and Carpenter, Joseph E. (eds.) ([1890–1911] 1995–2007). Dīghanikāya. 3 vols. London: The Pāli Text Society. Rhys Davids, Thomas W., Carpenter, Joseph E. and Stede, William (eds.) ([1929–1932] 1968- 1971). Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, London: Pāli Text Society. Schmithausen, Lambert (2012). “Achtsamkeit ‘innen’, ‘außen’ und ‘innen wie außen’”, In Achtsamkeit: Ein buddhistisches Konzept erobert die Wissenschaft – mit einem Beitrag S.H. des Dalai Lama. Edited by Michael Zimmermann Christof Spitz and Stefan Schmidt. Bern: Hans Huber, pp. 291–303. Soma Thera ([1941] 1981). The Way of Mindfulness. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Stede, William (ed.) ([1918] 1988). Cullaniddesa. London: The Pāli Text Society. Steinthal, Paul (ed.) ([1885] 1982). Udāna. London: The Pāli Text Society. Sujato Bhikkhu (2005). A History Of Mindfulness: How Insight Worsted Tranquility in the Satipatthana Sutta. Taipei: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation. Takakusu, Junjirō 高楠順次郎, Watanabe, Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭, and Ono Gemmyō 小野 玄妙 (eds.) (1924–1934). Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經, Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai. - T.1.1: Dīrghāgama, Chang ahan jing 長阿含經, Buddhayaśas and Zhu Fonian 竺佛 念

Thiṭṭila, Sayadaw U. (2010). The Book of Analysis (Vibhaṅga). Pāli Text Society (PTS Translation Series No. 39). Bristol: Pāli Text Society. Trenckner, Vilhelm and Chalmers, Robert (eds.) ([1888–1902] 2013). Majjhimanikāya. 3 vols. London: The Pāli Text Society. Walshe, Maurice (1995). The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya. Boston MA: Wisdom Publications. Willemen, Charles, Dessein, Bart and Cox, Collett (1998). Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholas­ ti­cism (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/11). Leiden: Brill. Woods, James H., Kośambi, Dharmananda, Horner, Isaline B. (eds.) ([1922–1938] 1976– 1979). Papañcasūdanī, Majjhimanikāyāṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosa. 5 vols. London: The Pāli Text Society, Wynne, Alexander (2005). “The Historical Authenticity of Early Buddhist Literatue: A Critical Evaluation”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 49, pp. 35–70.

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Chapter 4

Some Remarks on the Proofs of the “Store Mind” (Ālayavijñāna) and the Development of the Concept of Manas* Jowita Kramer This chapter is concerned with two main topics: The first part provides a comparison of the four proofs for the existence of the ālayavijñāna found in Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka and Sthiramati’s Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā with the eight proofs included in the “Proof Portion”1 of the Yogācārabhūmi and the six proofs of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The second part deals with the concept of manas, trying to trace its development from early Buddhism to the Yogācāra theory of kliṣṭamanas. 1

Proofs of the ālayavijñāna

The four arguments to establish the existence of the ālayavijñāna mentioned in the Pañcaskandhaka (PSk 16,11–17,4) and explained in the Pañcaskandha­ kavibhāṣā (PSkV 51b1–57b5) may be summarized as follows:2 1. 2. 3.

Actual perception (pravṛttivijñāna) reappears after a person has risen from unconscious states as for instance the equipoise of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti). Actual perceptions appear in different modes (prakāra) depending on different kinds of object conditions (ālambanapratyaya). Actual perception reappears after it has been interrupted by sleep (middha) or a swoon (mūrchā).

* I would like to thank Ralf Kramer, Constanze Pabst von Ohain, Alexander von Rospatt, Lambert Schmithausen, and Robert Sharf for offering very helpful comments and corrections to previous drafts of this chapter. I am also grateful for the support received from the German Research Foundation (DFG), which enabled me to complete this article. 1 The name “Proof Portion” for this part of the Yogācārabhūmi was introduced in Schmithausen, 1987: 299, note 226. 2 A detailed study of the four proofs is included in Kramer, 2014b: 316–319.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_006

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Without the ālayavijñāna an individual could not (a) arise in and (b) be liberated from saṃsāra, because, on the one hand, the process of rebirth would not be possible and, on the other, the contaminations (kleśa) could not be removed.

These four arguments presented in the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā) appear considerably different from the eight proofs provided in the “Proof Portion” of the Yogācārabhūmi and in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (which includes an identical listing):3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

appropriating (upātta; ASBh 12,1–13) beginning (ādi; ASBh 12,14–19) clarity (spaṣṭatva; ASBh 12,20–24) seed (bīja; ASBh 12,25–13,3) function (karman; ASBh 13,4–7) corporeal sensation (kāyiko ’nubhavaḥ; ASBh 13,8–11) two unconscious absorptions (acitte samāpattī; ASBh 13,12–15) death (cyuti; ASBh 13,16–20)

Apart from these two obviously different traditions there is a third alternative enumeration found in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha,4 which includes the following six5 proofs: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

defilement [consisting in] the contaminations (kleśasaṃkleśa; MSg I.30–32) defilement through deeds (karmasaṃkleśa; MSg I.33) defilement through birth (janmasaṃkleśa; MSg I.34–42) mundane purification (laukiko vyavadānaḥ; MSg I.43) supramundane purification (lokottaro vyavadānaḥ; MSg I.44–49)  ālayavijñāna is necessary in nirodhasamāpatti (MSg I.50–55)

3 The edition of the Tibetan text of the “Proof Portion” is found in Hakamaya, 1978: 7–15. The Sanskrit text is preserved in ASBh 11,15–13,20. See also Yid kun 40a-48b. For investigations of these eight proofs, see Griffiths, 1986: 96–104 and 130–138; Schmithausen, 1987: 194–196; and Waldron, 1995: 16–18. Moreover, a very insightful study of the eight proofs and their possible meditative implications has recently been published by Nobuyoshi Yamabe (see Yamabe, 2015). 4 MSg I.29–55. 5 As already pointed out in Schmithausen, 1987: 402, note 710, the sixth proof is not included in the systematic enumeration of five proofs (the first three concerning “defilement” [saṃkleśa] and the latter two relating to “purification” [vyavadāna]) stated in advance in MSg I.29.

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Although these three lists of proofs are formally different, the arguments they include are partly similar and may be classified into three main categories. 1.1 First Category of Proofs A first group of proofs comprises arguments concerned with issues related to the presence of the mind in the body. These proofs deal for a great part with what one could call the “vitalizing aspects” of the mind, i.e. with bringing life to the body and keeping the latter alive, and with the ālayavijñāna’s function of ensuring the continuity of the mind. The vitalizing function of the store mind refers mainly to what Lambert Schmithausen calls the “somatic” aspects of the ālayavijñāna,6 that is its appropriation of the body at the beginning of a new existence and throughout life and its gradual abandonment of the body at the point of death. The ālayavijñāna’s function of appropriating the body at the moment of conception and throughout life is discussed in the first argument of the “Proof Portion”. In the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, only the first aspect of the appropriation is mentioned, namely in the first part of the fourth proof. Sthiramati explains that the ālayavijñāna is essential for the process of rebirth since the vijñāna mentioned in the series of dependent origination cannot have the nature of an actual perception (pravṛttivijñāna).7 Parallel arguments are also expressed in the second and third proof of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, that is “defilement through deeds” (karmasaṃkleśa) and “defilement through birth” (janmasaṃkleśa).8 Another proof that could be assigned to this first category is proof number seven of the “Proof Portion,” the “two unconscious absorptions” (acitte samāpattī). This argument expresses the view that the ālayavijñāna is necessary to keep the body alive during meditative states, in which no actual perceptions occur. This statement is related to Vasubandhu’s first proof, in which the reappearance of actual perception after a person has risen from unconscious states (or the state of being without conception [āsaṃjñika]) is mentioned. Parallel arguments are also found in paragraphs 50–52 of the 6 Schmithausen, 1987:195. 7 PSkV 55b6ff. See also Kramer, 2014b: 318. 8 For a detailed discussion of these arguments, see Waldron, 1995: 26f. Notably, the reasons given in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to support the idea that the ālayavijñāna is necessary for the process of rebirth in all the three spheres of the world and for sustaining the body during the whole life are more multifaceted than those in the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā). MSg I.37, for instance, mentions the concept of vijñāna “nourishing” the body, i.e. securing the subsistence of corporeal matter (on this function, see also Schmithausen, 1987: 70), as one of the four “nourishments” (āhāra).

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Mahāyānasaṃgraha’s first chapter (= proof 6 mentioned above). Notably, Vasubandhu’s third proof, actual perception “reappears after it has been interrupted,” which points in a similar direction, has no parallels in the other two lists. This argument refers to states in which actual perception is interrupted due to incidents not connected to meditation but to phases of sleep or fainting.9 Another proof that seems to be related to the somatic function of the store mind is number six in the “Proof Portion”. This proof ascribes the fact that corporeal sensation (kāyiko ’nubhavaḥ) can occur regardless of whether the person is thinking properly (yoniśas) or improperly (ayoniśas) or whether the person’s mind is in a state of contemplation or not to the existence of ālayavijñāna. This argument is not entirely clear and has been interpreted differently by modern scholars. Lambert Schmithausen understands it as pointing to the problem that physical sensation can be present even in meditative states where there is no functioning of the tactile sense perception.10 In contrast to this view, Paul Griffiths seems to take this argument to indicate the fact that physical experience can vary in the same individual and that this variation cannot originate from the sensation itself (and can only be explained if the existence of the ālayavijñāna is accepted).11 Finally, the eighth proof of the “Proof Portion,” stating that the existence of ālayavijñāna is necessary in order to make the vijñāna’s gradual withdrawal from a dying body possible, may also be allocated in the first category of proofs. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not discuss the problem of bodily experience, but refers to the withdrawing vijñāna at death in connection with its third proof, “defilement through birth (janmasaṃkleśa)” (MSg I.42). Neither proof six nor eight are mentioned in any form in the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā). It therefore seems most likely that these somatic aspects of the store mind lost their relevance in the course of time. It should also be noted that some of the arguments discussed above appear similar but have to be distinguished with regard to their emphasis. While the “Proof Portion” seems to be mainly concerned with the vitalising quality of the store mind in the strict sense of its being the “principle of life,”12 the Pañcaskandh­a­ka(vibhāṣā) places more weight on the aspect of mental continuity after states of interruption. Both, the “Proof Portion” and the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣa) explain for instance that the ālayavijñāna is necessary because perception is interrupted in meditative states. However, 9 10 11 12

PSkV 55a6ff. Schmithausen, 1987: 44. Griffiths, 1986: 102f. See also Yamabe, 2015: 153–155, and Schmithausen, 2014: 17–21. On this function, see Schmithausen, 1987: 44.

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the “Proof Portion” emphasizes the fact that the ālayavijñāna keeps the body alive during these states, whereas the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣa) focuses on the assumption that actual perception can reappear after a person has risen from unconscious states only on the basis of the store mind. It is therefore possible that the eighth proof of the “Proof Portion” (i.e. the indispensability of the store mind in the moment of the mind gradually leaving the body at the point of death) is not mentioned in the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā because this issue is only related to the vitalizing mechanism (and not to continuity). Summarizing the results of our investigation so far, the following proofs have been subsumed under the first category concerned with the ālayavijñāna’s relevance for the presence of the mind in the body: a. b. c.

 Yogācārabhūmi proofs 1 and 6–8  Mahāyānasaṃgraha proofs 2, 3, and 6  Pañcaskan­dhaka(vibhāṣā) proofs 1, 3, and 4a

1.2 Second Category of Proofs The common characteristic of the arguments which I have grouped in the second category of proofs is their concern with the actual perceptions (pravṛttivijñāna). While some of these arguments refer mainly to the function of the ālayavijñāna as the store of impressions and seeds of the pravṛttivijñānas, others deal with the possibility of the simultaneous arising of several vijñānas. As for the first group, the “Proof Portion” describes in connection with its fourth proof the condition that the varying pravṛttivijñānas cannot be the seeds of each other. This argument is very closely related to Vasubandhu’s second proof, that is the statement that ālayavijñāna is needed because actual perceptions appear in different modes (prakāra) depending on different kinds of object conditions (ālambanapratyaya). In his comments on this proof Sthiramati explains that actual perceptions appear in various modes because of various kinds of object conditions. Thus, it is usually impossible for a preceding perception to be the seed of the following one, for example a beneficial perception is not appropriate as the seed of an unbeneficial perception.13 Therefore a “store,” namely the ālayavijñāna, is necessary to hold the seeds from which the different perceptions may arise. These seeds, in turn, are nourished by previous actual perceptions that leave imprints (vāsanā) in the ālayavijñāna.14 As for the Mahā­yānasaṃgraha, its first proof, the “defilement [consisting in] the contaminations” (kleśasaṃkleśa), seems to deal with a rela­ 13 14

PSkV 55a1f. PSkV 55a4f. See also Kramer, 2014b: 318.

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ted issue, namely the condition that only an entity having the nature of the ālayavijñā­na can be the recipient of the imprints (vāsanā) made by the actual sense perceptions (MSg I.30). As mentioned above, some of the proofs which I have assigned to this second group – because they are also concerned with the pravṛttivijñānas – refer to a slightly different issue, namely the simultaneous arising of several vijñānas. These proofs are only dealt with in the Yogācāra­bhū­mi, namely in proofs 2, 3, and 5, and have no parallels in the other texts. As already indicated by Lambert Schmithausen, the arguments presented in these “proofs” are not directly proving the existence of the ālayavijñāna but are aiming to show that several vijñānas, i.e. the pravṛttivijñāna(s) and the ālayavijñāna, may occur at the same time.15 According to the first of these proofs, more than one actual perception may occur at the same time because there are cases when someone wants to see, hear, taste etc. simultaneously. Neither the meaning of this argument nor the reasons for its being indicated as “beginning” (ādi) in the summarizing verse at the beginning of the “Proof Portion” are entirely clear. Paul Griffiths seems to take the latter to mean that ālayavijñāna is necessary as the basis for the first moment (ādi?) of a particular actual perception. His example is “the occurrence of visual consciousness in the mind of a man whose eyes have been closed for hours”.16 Moreover, Griffiths understands the argument in the sense that ālayavijñāna is needed as the immediate condition for simultaneously arising sense perceptions.17 In contrast, Lambert Schmithausen considers it not to be intended as a direct proof of the ālayavijñāna but of the appropriateness of the assumption that the pravṛttivijñāna(s) and the store mind can exist simultaneously since even several pravṛttivijñānas can occur at the same time.18 The second of this category’s proofs (i.e. proof 3) is adduced to show that mental perception (manovijñāna) could not function clearly if it could not arise at the same time as the other sense perceptions, the sense data of which the manovijñāna analyses. In order to illustrate this issue, the thinking about present objects of the sense perception (i.e. analyzing them by manovijñāna) is compared with the thinking about remembered objects. While mental perception is explained to function clearly with regard to the first, it is considered to be unclear with regard to the latter objects.19 The last of the proofs of this 15 16 17 18 19

Schmithausen, 1987: 195f. Griffiths, 1986: 99. Griffiths, 1986: 99, 133. For a critical discussion of Griffiths’ understanding, see Yamabe, 2015: 145–149. Schmithausen,1987: 46. Griffiths, 1986: 134.

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category (proof 5) is concerned with the simultaneity of the actual perceptions, the notion of “I” (by the kliṣṭamanas), and the ālayavijñāna’s continuous perceiving of the surrounding world (bhājana) and one’s own corporeal basis (āśraya).20 Neither the Mahāyānasaṃgraha nor the Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā) mention any of the arguments of this category. Maybe the question of whether simultaneous existence of subliminal kinds of vijñāna (i.e. the store mind and the kliṣṭamanas) and actual perception is possible lost its relevance in the course of time.21 However, the issue of the simultaneous arising of several pravṛttivijñānas appears to have remained a controversial topic up to the times of Sthiramati. In the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Sthiramati explicitly states that manovijñāna follows the sense perception,22 whereas in his commentary on the Triṃśikā he explains that manovijñāna occurs simultaneously with the sense perceptions and that all six kinds of perception may arise at the same time.23 Mental perception is traditionally described as the perception that is based on dharmas, which are mental objects that cannot be sensed by the other five indriyas, and on manas, the mental faculty.24 The essential difference between the five sense perceptions and manovijñāna results from the assumption that the former cognize only their own respective objects being free of conceptualization, whereas the latter is concerned with conceptualizing the sense data of all sense perceptions.25 In some Yogācāra sources, the description of this process was further systematized. The first occurrence of a more detailed explanation is to be found in the “Basic Section” of the Yogācārabhūmi. There it is explained that after the actual sense perception, which is called aupanipātika (“occurring directly”), follows the investigating (paryeṣaka) and the determining (niścita) manovijñāna. By means of these two

20

21 22 23 24 25

See Griffiths, 1986: 101f, 135f., and Schmithausen, 1987: 90, 196, 386f., note 631a. Griffiths considers this proof and the fourfold vijñapti mentioned in it to be parallel with a passage in the Madhyāntavibhāga and seems to understand vijñapti here in the context of the vijñaptimātratā (see especially p. 102). In contrast, Schmithausen points out that this passage in the “Proof Portion” does not presuppose the “representation only” concept and refers merely to the cognitive functions of the eight vijñānas. The fact that it was important in the early developmental stages of Yogācāra thought is discussed in Schmithausen,1987: 45f. PSkV 49b4. TrBh 102, 9ff. See, for instance, MN I 112. See Schmithausen, 1967: 122f.

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stages of manovijñāna, the object is conceptualized (vikalpyate).26 The model described by Sthiramati in his commentary on the Pañcaskandhaka is probably to be considered a further elaboration of the system explained in the “Basic Section”. According to Sthiramati, after the actual perception of an object, the investigative (paryeṣaka) mental perception (manovijñāna) arises, being followed by the classifying (vyavasthāpaka) and finally by the conceptualizing (vikalpaka) manovijñāna.27 Although the terminology used is not identical and the vikalpaka stage is not a separate level of the manovijñāna in the “Basic Section,” there are clear parallels between these two models visible: As already indicated, the pravṛttivijñānas correspond to the aupanipātika function, the investigating manovijñāna is mentioned in both texts as paryeṣaka, and the manovijñāna qualified as niścita in the “Basic Section” is parallel to the “classifying” (vyavasthāpaka) manovijñāna of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā. This understanding of cognition seems to be related to (though not identical with) the stages of the process of perceiving explained in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, which is described as follows. As soon as there is an object, the mind becomes attentive or alert which is referred to as āvajjana and which is the moment just before the actual perception. After the actual sense perception has arisen, the moment of mental reception or apperception of the sense-data called sampaṭicchana follows. Both the moment before and the moment after the actual sense perception are referred to in the Visuddhimagga as manodhātu.28 Notably, the moment of becoming attentive has no correspondence in the Yogācāra model.29 Moreover, the understanding of the concept of manas seems to differ in the two traditions, and we do not find an equivalent of the sampaṭicchana function in the Yogācāra description. However, the following two moments of the Visuddhimagga, the investigating (santīraṇa) and the determining (voṭṭha­pana) manoviññāṇa are parallel to the paryeṣaka and the vyavasthāpaka moments of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā. What follows is the stage of impulses (javana), which does not include the “conceptualizing” aspect of the Yogācāra model, but is similar to the vikalpaka aspect insofar as it represents the moment of intention (cetanā) and produc26 27 28

29

Y 10,2f. and 58,18f. See Kramer, 2014b: 314f. The whole perception process is described in Vism XIV, 458–460. See also Karunadasa, 2010: 138–143. On the concept of manodhātu in the Śāriputrā­bhi­dharma, see Schmithausen, 2014: 222f. and 223, note 973. On the Theravāda theory of the heart (hadayavatthu) as the material basis for the mind, see Karunadasa, 2010: 78–82. Remarkably, the term āvarjana (which corresponds to Pāli āvajjana) is mentioned in ASBh 5,1f. (see also PSkV 20b1f.) in the context of the definition of manaskāra: ālaṃbane cittadhāraṇaṃ tatraiva punaḥ punar āvarjanaṃ veditavyam.

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tion of karmic activity. The next moment mentioned in the Visuddhimagga is tad­ā­rammaṇa, which indicates “[the retaining of] the object [of the javana]”30. There is again no direct equivalent in the Yogācāra system, which instead mentions the process of leaving an imprint (vāsanā) in the ālayavijñāna as the final step of perception.31 To sum up, the relations between the three sources may be depicted in the following way:

“Basic Section”

Visuddhimagga

Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā

āvajjana aupanipātika

5-fold sense perception sense perception sampaṭicchana

paryeṣaka niścita

santīraṇa manomanovijñāna vijñāna (vikalpyate) voṭṭhapana

paryeṣaka vyavasthāpaka

javana >> cetanā