Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany: Cases of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 3658290196, 9783658290191

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
Abstract
Zusammenfassung
Formalities
1
Introduction
1.1
Background
1.2 Literature Review
1.3 Relevance of Research
1.4 Case Selection
1.5 Research Methodology
1.6 Dissertation Structure
2 Terminological and Theoretical Considerations of International Student Migration
2.1 Tertiary-Level Student Migration
2.2 Brain-Drain: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges
2.2.1 Return Migration and its Deficits
2.3 Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain and the Migration-Development Nexus (MDN)
2.4 Summary
3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period
3.1 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: A Brief History
3.1.1 Kazakhstan
3.1.2 Kyrgyzstan
3.1.3 Uzbekistan
3.2 Migration Flows and Tertiary Student Migration from Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
3.3 Germany’s Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan within the Framework of the EU and Bilaterally
3.3.1 Germany and Kazakhstan
3.3.2 Germany and Kyrgyzstan
3.3.3 Germany and Uzbekistan
3.4 Summary
4 Profiles and Decision-Making of Students and Graduates Enrolled at German HEIs from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
4.1 Theoretical Considerations
4.1.1 Student Migrants: Who Moves, When and Why?
4.1.2 Student Migrants: When and Why Does Return Takes Place?
4.2 Methodological Considerations
4.2.1 Online Survey (OS)
4.2.2 Fieldwork
4.3 Empirical Findings from the Online Survey and In-Depth Interviews
4.4 Summary
5 Source (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and Host (Germany) Countries’ Policies Towards the Regulation of Tertiary Student Migration
5.1 Theoretical and Methodological Aspects
5.2 Policies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Regulate Student Migration to Germany
5.2.1 Policies of Sending Central Asian (CA) States Accounting for the Period Prior to Pursuing Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Retention and Restriction of Student Migration
5.2.2 Policies of Sending CA States Accounting for the Period During the Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Temporary Return (Brain Circulation), Transfer of Social Remittances and Diaspora Issues
5.2.3 Policies of Sending CA States, Accounting for the Period After Graduation of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Permanent Return Migration
5.3 Germany as a Receiving Country for International Student Migrants
5.3.1 International Student Migration and Germany’s Interest in it
5.3.2 Germany’s Development Policy
5.4 Summary
6 Conclusion
6.1 Theoretical Contributions
6.2 Methodological Contributions
6.3 Empirical Contributions
Bibliography
Appendix

Citation preview

Nargiza Abdullaeva

Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany Cases of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany

Nargiza Abdullaeva

Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany Cases of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Nargiza Abdullaeva Berlin, Germany Dissertation an der Humboldt-Universität, Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Deutschland, 2019

ISBN 978-3-658-29019-1 ISBN 978-3-658-29020-7  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7 © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Acknowledgements

As is well known, the completion of the dissertation can never be the product of one person, but rather involves the support of many people acting in various roles. The completion of this doctoral thesis would not have been possible without the permanent support of the many people who were around me over these lengthy PhD thesis-writing years. First and foremost, I want to thank both of my supervisors: Professor Silvia von Steinsdorff and Professor Klaus Schlichte. From the outset of my doctoral study they led me patiently through the hurdles, which foreign doctoral students often face along their academic path. Their professional and loyal support combined with their excellent intercultural awareness kept me strongly motivated and balanced. They both, in their individual ways, did everything possible to help me grow and flourish in my PhD project. Moreover, their generous support helped me to ensure I gained the financial backing to realize the doctoral project. In this regard I greatly appreciate the financial and moral support provided by the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, and am particularly grateful for their familyfriendly policies and welcoming employees. There are many challenges involved in balancing family and study commitments, and my most productive writing phase for the PhD thesis would perhaps never have happened, had my mother not supported me throughout the last years. My parents made sacrifices in many ways and helped me enormously in my endeavour. My husband and children accompanied me on this not-so-easy path by giving me their constant love and inspiration. I also give thanks to all my colleagues and friends, who took an interest in the progress of my doctoral project throughout these years and who both directly and indirectly contributed to its submission. I want to express specific gratitude to all students and graduates from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, who through their participation in the online survey and qualitative interviews contributed to the realization of this project considerably. Nargiza Abdullaeva

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. V List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................... XI Abstract ..............................................................................................................XV Zusammenfassung .......................................................................................... XVII Formalities ....................................................................................................... XIX

1 Introduction .........................................................................................1 1.1

Background .......................................................................................... 1

1.2

Literature Review ................................................................................ 5

1.3

Relevance of Research ....................................................................... 14

1.4

Case Selection .................................................................................... 14

1.5

Research Methodology ...................................................................... 16

1.6

Dissertation Structure......................................................................... 17

2 Terminological and Theoretical Considerations of International Student Migration .....................................................19 2.1

Tertiary-Level Student Migration ...................................................... 19

2.2

Brain-Drain: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges ................ 24 2.2.1 Return Migration and its Deficits ........................................... 27

2.3

Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain and the Migration-Development Nexus (MDN) ............................................. 31

2.4

Summary ............................................................................................ 37

VIII

Table of Contents

3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period .................................................................................................39 3.1

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: A Brief History ..................................................... 39 3.1.1 Kazakhstan ............................................................................. 41 3.1.2 Kyrgyzstan .............................................................................. 46 3.1.3 Uzbekistan .............................................................................. 50

3.2

Migration Flows and Tertiary Student Migration from Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan ........................................... 53

3.3

Germany’s Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan within the Framework of the EU and Bilaterally ............ 59 3.3.1 Germany and Kazakhstan ....................................................... 63 3.3.2 Germany and Kyrgyzstan ....................................................... 64 3.3.3 Germany and Uzbekistan ........................................................ 66

3.4

Summary ............................................................................................ 68

4 Profiles and Decision-Making of Students and Graduates Enrolled at German HEIs from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan ..................................................................................71 4.1

Theoretical Considerations ................................................................ 71 4.1.1 Student Migrants: Who Moves, When and Why? .................. 72 4.1.2 Student Migrants: When and Why Does Return Takes Place? ...................................................................................... 76

4.2

Methodological Considerations ......................................................... 80 4.2.1 Online Survey (OS) ................................................................ 81 4.2.2 Fieldwork ................................................................................ 85

4.3

Empirical Findings from the Online Survey and In-Depth Interviews .......................................................................................... 88

4.4

Summary .......................................................................................... 126

Table of Contents

IX

5 Source (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and Host (Germany) Countries’ Policies Towards the Regulation of Tertiary Student Migration ...........................................................135 5.1

Theoretical and Methodological Aspects ......................................... 135

5.2

Policies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Regulate Student Migration to Germany ........................................................ 137 5.2.1 Policies of Sending Central Asian (CA) States Accounting for the Period Prior to Pursuing Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Retention and Restriction of Student Migration ................................................................. 138 5.2.2 Policies of Sending CA States Accounting for the Period During the Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Temporary Return (Brain Circulation), Transfer of Social Remittances and Diaspora Issues ............ 165 5.2.3 Policies of Sending CA States, Accounting for the Period After Graduation of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Permanent Return Migration ................................................ 179

5.3

Germany as a Receiving Country for International Student Migrants ........................................................................................... 187 5.3.1 International Student Migration and Germany’s Interest in it ........................................................................................ 187 5.3.2 Germany’s Development Policy ........................................... 191

5.4

Summary .......................................................................................... 198

6 Conclusion .......................................................................................201 6.1

Theoretical Contributions ................................................................ 201

6.2

Methodological Contributions ......................................................... 202

6.3

Empirical Contributions ................................................................... 204

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 219 Appendix ............................................................................................... 241

List of Abbreviations

ADB

Asian Development Bank

AUCA

American University in Central Asia

BAMF

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)

BD

Brain Drain

BMI

Bundesministerium des Inneren (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

BMZ

Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

BPB

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education)

BTI

Bertelsmann Stiftung

CA

Central Asia

CIM

Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung (The Centre for International Migration and Development)

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CPI

Corruption Perceptions Index

DAAD

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service)

DCI

Development Cooperation Instrument

DKU/GKU

Deutsch-Kasachische Universität (German-Kazakh University)

DVV

Der Deutsche Volkshochschul-Verband (German Adult Education Association)

DW

Deutsche Welle

XII

List of Abbreviations

DZHW

Deutsches Zentrum für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung (German Centre for Higher Education Research and Science Studies)

EBRD

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EPCA

Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

EU

European Union

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

FEKA

Federation of European Kazakh Associations

GDP

Gross domestic product

GIZ

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)

GNI

Gross National Income

GKCS

German-Kyrgyz Cultural Society

HEI

Higher Education Institution

HRST

Human Resources in Science and Technology

ICEF

International Consultants for Education and Fairs

ICG

International Crisis Group

ILO

International Labour Organization

IOM

International Organization for Migration

IGU

International Geographical Union

ISCO

International Standard Classification of Occupations

KIST

Korean Institute of Science and Technology

LDC

Least developed countries

MDN

Migration-Development Nexus

MHSSE

Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education

MLSPP

Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Population

MPG

Migration Policy Group

MPI

Migration Policy Institute

List of Abbreviations

XIII

NPPT

National Program for Personnel Training

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

OS

Online Survey

PCA

Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

PPP

Purchasing power parity

SVR

Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration)

TEMPUS

Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Studies

TLP

Teaching and Learning Process

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNT

Unified National Test

UCA

University of Central Asia

UK

United Kingdom

US

United States

VAK

Высшая аттестационная комиссия (Higher Attestation Commission)

WTO

World Trade Organisation

WUS

World University Service

ZAV

Zentrale Auslands- und Fachvermittlung (International Placement Services)

ZFA

Die Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen (Central Agency for Schools Abroad)

Abstract

The PhD thesis, which is an exploratory comparative study, seeks to explore the student migration phenomenon from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Germany. The research positions student migration as an indispensable part of highly skilled migration and argues that the low rate of return intentions during the study period and after graduation is an indicator for brain drain. The doctoral dissertation aims to study the profiles of tertiary students, tracing their return intentions and the reasons behind them as well as exploring how sending and receiving governments regulate student migration. For this reason an online survey and in-depth interviews with students and graduates living in Germany has been conducted. In analyzing policy mechanisms of host and source countries the focus was laid on the promotion of brain circulation and permanent return. Having started with the analysis of brain- drain discussions, the analytical part of the doctoral dissertation is framed by the migration-development nexus i.e. transnationalization, which in general terms, considers migrants as agents of development who have a huge potential to bring changes in their home countries.

Zusammenfassung

Den Gegenstand der vorliegenden Dissertation, die als empirische Vergleichsstudie angelegt ist, stellt das Phänomen der studentischen Migration aus Kasachstan, Kirgisistan und Usbekistan nach Deutschland dar. Die Arbeit positioniert die studentische Migration als Bestandteil der Migration hochqualifizierter Arbeitskräfte und argumentiert, dass die niedrige Rate der Rückkehrabsichten während des Studiums und auch nach der Graduierung ein Indikator für die Abwanderung von hochqualifizierten Arbeitskräften ins Ausland (brain drain) ist. Die Dissertation untersucht die Profile von Hochschulstudenten, wobei ihre Rückkehrabsichten und die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Motive betrachtet werden. Ebenso wird untersucht, wie Regierungen der entsendenden Staaten und des empfangenden Staates die Migration von Studierenden regulieren. Zu diesem Zweck wurden eine Online-Befragung und Tiefeninterviews mit Studierenden und Absolventen in Deutschland durchgeführt. Bei der Analyse der politischen Mechanismen der Gastgeber- und Herkunftsländer wurde der Schwerpunkt auf die Förderung der Zirkulation hochqualifizierter Arbeitskräfte und dauerhafter Rückkehr gelegt. Anschließend an eine Analyse der Diskussionen zur Abwanderung hochqualifizierter Arbeitskräfte folgt der analytische Teil der Dissertation. Dessen Rahmen bildet der Zusammenhang von Migration und Entwicklung, d.h. die Transnationalisierung, die im Allgemeinen Migranten als Agenten von Entwicklung betrachtet, die ein großes Potenzial haben, Veränderungen in ihren Heimatländern zu bewirken.

Formalities

All translations from Russian, German and Uzbek are made by the author. The access to all online sources, used for the dissertation, was checked shortly before submission i.e. 06.07.2017. For this reason the mentioning of access after each reference was waived. The page numbers in text references are omitted in two cases: a) if a source was summarised; b) a concept was used throughout the whole source

1 Introduction

1.1 Background Despite the fact that student migrants are only a small percentage of “the total stock of migrants” around the globe (King and Findlay 2012: 259), the proportion of international student migration flows has increased enormously in recent decades. If there were only over 2 million students in 2005 worldwide “enrolled in tertiary institutions as foreign (non-resident) students”, it is expected that “by 2025, almost 8 million students are projected to be studying outside their home country” (Bhandari 2009). The vast majority of international students (80 per cent in 2006) were enrolled at higher education institutions (HEI) in only a few countries: the US, the UK, Australia, Japan and Germany (Dustmann et al. 2009). Thereby 76.3 percent made up total Asian enrollments at HEIs of these five dominating countries. These five countries are by far the most popular study destinations for Asian students. 76.3 percent of total Asian student enrollments at HEIs are in one of these countries (Rosenzweig 2006: 1). As student migration experts King and Findlay, who worked extensively on European and British student migration, noticed, “three things enhance the importance of student migration”: firstly, student migration is the fastest growing migration form. Between 1998 and 2004, student migration rose 52 percent, as compared to total world migration which rose only 13 percent. So, it grew four times faster than total world migration in this period. Secondly, student migration, “like highly skilled migration in general, has important economic, social and cultural effects, given the elite background of most internationally mobile students”. Thirdly, the student migration experience influences the person concerned a lot in terms of “subsequent propensities for migration throughout the rest of life” (King and Findlay 2012). The increasing role of international students as valuable and qualified personnel finds its validation in the respective policies of industrially developed countries (e.g. North America, Australia, Canada, Western European countries). This is due to declining demographic changes in the developed countries, where international students and graduates are seen as an element for wealth security. International students from third countries “are first recruited and trained, and then used to fill key skill shortages in national labour markets” (King and Find© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_1

2

1 Introduction

lay 2012). This process is also called the “education-migration nexus” and is explained in detail by Robertson, using the example of Australia. Australia uses a point based system whereby policies are adjusted to retain international students’, because the latter are seen as “desirable workers” or “designer migrants” (Robertson 2013, 2014). There is a clear tendency that more and more industrialized countries consider international students as a labour migration source (OECD 2014). One of the most important advantages developed countries see to hiring foreign nationals, trained locally, is that foreign students are believed, to be a promising group for successful integration. After finishing their studies in a host country, “foreign students usually have acceptable levels of language proficiency, their academic qualifications come from within the country,” and they are familiar with local “culture, norms and mentality” (Kuptsch 2006). Mau formulated it as follows: “differently than tourists, student migrants are institutionally integrated and stay in a receiving country during many months and years. International experiences during the studies (intercultural competence, language skills and networks) may constitute a disposition for transnational activities later on” (Mau 2007). Additional incentives to retain international students in the host country, along with the high study fees the latter can provide, are: “compensation for potentially insufficient demand for higher education among domestic students, economies of scale in the educational system, diversity and creativity on campus, increased R&D activities, and cheap foreign labour for institutions (in labs, as TAs, or as support for research activities)” (Lange 2009). Thus, being a ‘productive human capital’ international student migrants possess huge potential to contribute to not only host countries but also to their home countries through their return (temporary or permanent) and the transfer of different kinds of remittances (social, financial, etc.) (OECD 2017). Germany is not an exception in terms of its involvement in the global competition for talent. Some years ago Germany hosted “approximately 6 per cent of internationally mobile students” making “it one of the four leading host nations” (BAMF 2013). Albeit the fact that German immigration policy is not based on a point system, it has significantly liberalized its traditionally restrictive policies towards international student migration in recent years. Specifically, the employment opportunities for foreign students during the course of their studies in Germany were extended from 90 full or 180 half days to 120 full or 240 half days annually. Foreign graduates from German HEIs are now permitted to stay on in Germany and seek employment for 18 months. Notably, during this jobseeking period, foreign graduates are allowed to work without any restrictions. Also residence regulations have been relaxed and a settlement permit was

1.1 Background

3

introduced, which can be obtained by international graduates of German HEIs after two years of regular labour relations1 in Germany (DAAD 2012).2 This development and the positive effects for host countries from taking and recruiting international students as “desirable migrants” is one side of the coin. The reverse side of the coin is that while receiving countries may profit, sending developing countries may suffer under the loss resulted from the outmigration of the best qualified people, in other words, from the brain drain. Apart from the existing discussions accounting for possible positive (mainly short-term) effects of emigration for sending countries too, it is likely that in the long run there are much more negative effects from the loss of highly qualified persons for source developing countries. This is also supported by the fact that “the better-educated emigrants tend to go to the wealthier countries” (OECD 2017) where they receive attractive chances for self-realization, hence, become reluctant to return home. This study testifies to this argument, where 83 percent of student respondents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan possess a higher education diploma before they start their studies at a German HEI and almost 90 percent of respondents are reluctant to return home implying the brain drain problem. Economic and social reasons played thereby a significant role. At this point it has to be mentioned that while there are many nuances around the brain drain phenomenon i.e. there is no clear-cut criterion on when the brain drain begins and no statistical data on the student migrants under consideration exists, this inquiry focuses on the return intentions of respondents after graduation as an indicator of brain drain. Over the years alternative definitions for brain drain emerged: brain circulation (Hunger 2003) (promotion of temporary return) reverse brain drain (promotion of permanent return) (Yoon 1992). They laid a focus on potential ways migration can contribute to the development of the respective countries. The discussions around the changing terms are framed by the relationship between migration and development or the migration-development nexus (MDN) (e.g. Glick Schiller and Faist 2010). At different times MDN discussions were held focusing on certain aspects in the international arena. The last phase of the MDN discussion called also “migration for development” (UNDP 2011) considers returning migrants as “agents of development and change” because they possess “human capital, financial means and social norms” (Kleist 2008) that can contribute to the development of source countries after their return there.

1 2

Labor relations are considered to be regular when they are recognized by the social insurance system in Germany, particularly by the German Federal Pension Fund. More details about reforms are discussed in chapter 5.

4

1 Introduction

However, development and change in sending countries will take place if adequate policy mechanisms exist. Thereby the mutual cooperation between sending and receiving countries is of utmost importance. In particular, sending countries play the key role to prevent brain drain, and to promote reverse brain drain and brain circulation. Receiving countries may not necessarily be directly involved in promoting permanent return of migrants, but they may contribute significantly to the implementation of policy mechanisms supporting, at least circular (temporary) migration. The meta basis of the PhD thesis seeks to explore and understand what is going on in student migration from CA to Germany (specifics) in order to classify it within a certain MDN phase. The overarching research question of the dissertation project is posed as follows: What are the specifics of tertiary student migration from Central Asia to Germany? Research sub questions: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

What are the profiles and life-courses of people from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, who come to Germany to pursue tertiary education? What are their return/non-return intentions after graduation in Germany and the motivations behind these intentions? Does the brain circulation and the transfer of social remittances take place? Is there an emergence of diaspora among the CA students and graduates living in Germany? If yes, which role does it play in enhancing the potential of CA students and graduates? What are the policy responses of sending (Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek) and receiving (German) governments to promote brain circulation and permanent return?

The analysis consists of micro-, meso- and macro- levels. The micro-level of analysis studies the profiles and life-courses of students from CA who came to Germany to pursue tertiary education and their return/non-return intentions after graduation in Germany and the motivations behind them. The meso-level focuses on brain circulation and diaspora issues. The macro-level deals with policy responses of the respective sending and receiving countries’ governments to regulate the tertiary student migration. This research project bears an interdisciplinary character and covers the fields of migration research, sociology and political sciences. In view of the “multi-faceted nature” of the migration, it is essential that “the analyses are conducted on multiple levels and with methodological tools from more than one

1.2 Literature Review

5

discipline (Massey et al. 1993; Mansoor and Quillin 2006; Castles 2008b; Collinson, 2009)” (Kurekova 2011).

1.2

Literature Review

Before switching to the analysis of the research in the field of student migration it should be mentioned that when I started this PhD project in 2010, the number of studies on student migration in general were much more limited as compared to recent years. The main challenge, which I identified while conducting the literature review, was that numerous works conceptualized the student migration as a blurred phenomenon. Although this gap has been increasingly filled, it still remains as the major challenge in dealing with student migration processes. In many ways the international student migration was overlooked because it was not seen “as part of ‘mainstream’ migration” (King and Findlay 2012) and student migrants remained “the least studied of the major categories of migrants“ (King and Raghuram 2012). Due to particular characteristics of student migration (e.g. it is an ‘openend’ migration) 3, which shape its uncertain nature, a clear reference where student migrants to be situated is difficult to make. Therefore, in various sources the student migration was approached as a passing reference within the discussion of highly skilled migration or even highly skilled labour migration (Galinski 1986, Appleyard 1989, Mundende 1989, OECD 2002, 2008, 2009, Gokhberg and Nekipelova 2001, ILO 2001, 2002, Teichmann 2003, Germenji and Gedesh 2008). To give few examples: While analysing the student migration between and towards OECD countries, Tremblay assumed that “a study of qualified labour flows cannot ignore international student mobility.” In the author’s opinion student migrants sometimes represent highly skilled migrants, or they may also be a “precursor” for that i.e. being “a potential flow of qualified workers either in the course of their studies or through subsequent recruitment.”(OECD 2002) While tackling the issue of brain drain as the process of exodus of highly qualified people from the source countries, a German scholar, Teichmann considered student migrants as including Russian researchers and higher education staff (“Hochschulangehörige”). Nonetheless, one of Teichmann’s important contributions is the author’s indication of an imbalance between emigration and immigration among Russian scientists. The author emphasized that the imbalance between emigration and immigration is hardly likely to be restored by 3

More details are elaborated in Chapter 2.

6

1 Introduction

Russia alone since there is a lack of financial resources. In Teichmann’s opinion positive changes would take place through, amongst others, measures to encourage Russian scientists to return and to attract foreign scientists to live and work in Russia (Teichmann 2003). In a similar manner Nekipelova and Gokhberg, who conducted numerous studies about the brain drain from Russia in 1990s (Nekipelova and Gokhberg 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998), analysed tertiary student migration within the Russian research and scientific community without paying a special attention to it. Analysing data sources and methods used for data collection regarding the international migration of researchers from Russia since the 1990s, the authors were faced with a general problem existing in Russia; a lack of statistics. This explains why tertiary students had not been considered as a separate group of migrants. Due to a lack of “clear-cut government policies” towards the outflow of researchers in Russia, “neither national statistical authorities nor migrationrelated agencies” collected statistical data on the migration of scientists and engineers (Gokhberg and Nekipelova 2002). The uncertain nature of student migration contributed to under-theorization and under-conceptualization of this issue, although a solid number of studies on student migration has been conducted in the meantime. An uneven positioning of student migration in the literature sources is explained by the lack of unity regarding the question on whether international students are to be considered as highly skilled individuals prior starting studies in a host country or after the graduation there. This also impeded the discussions concerning whether the tertiary student migration can be addressed in the frame of brain drain, because the latter presumes the loss of highly skilled people. In turn, when this loss starts i.e. with highly qualified individual’s move from or their non-return to source countries is also an unclear issue in literature, mainly due to the quantification problems of the brain drain. Due to various nuances around the student migration issue, while carrying out the literature review I had to examine sources dealing with different migration types: labour migration, migration of scientists, skilled/highly skilled migration and other areas where student migration could be potentially situated. Moreover, I had to sort out and focus on literature sources on student migration from developing to developed countries, because there are other paths such as student mobility within developed countries, and rather seldom, student migration from developed to developing countries. I additionally tried to pay attention to the literature sources, which were written not only in English but also in Russian and German. The prevailing number of works in English, which focused on international student migration as a separate issue, were written in form of articles and similar and were published predominantly after 2000: Olesen 2002, Cassarino 2004,

1.2 Literature Review

7

Baláž and Williams 2004, Güngor and Tansel 2006, Anthias 2007, Mau 2007, Gribble 2008, Bessey 2010, Dreher and Poutvaara 2005, Carlson 2012, Tan 2012, Kind and Findlay 2012, Haupt et al. 2013, Kind and Raghuram 2013, Mosneaga and Winther 2013, Kritz 2013, Lange 2009, Abdullaeva 2014 (a,b), Bokareva 2014, Nga Tran 2014, Valentin 2014, Robertson 2014, Bilecen 2013, Bilecen and Faist 2015). Many works were written on student migration from China (Shen 2005, Poston et al. 2007, Le Bail and Shen 2008, Liu-Farrer 2009, Lu et al. 2009, Mosneaga 2013, Kosheleva et al. 2015, Ziguras and Gribble 2015, Bijwaard and Wang 2016, Lan and Wu 2016, Tan and Graeme 2016) and India (Baas 2010, 2014, Rafi and Lewis 2013, Qureshi et al. 2013, Walton-Roberts 2015, Sondhi and King 2017), where particularly the analysis of regulatory mechanisms on the part of sending and receiving countries were well elucidated. Here are some examples of these works that served as a useful insight for some key aspects of the dissertation at hand: an exploratory study by Shen, which focused on a broader Chinese target group studying at universities in the UK, provided interesting insights into the regulation mechanisms of Chinese student migration flows to a developed country such as the UK. In a laconic, but comprehensive manner the author made recommendations to modify and improve immigration policies of both sending and receiving countries to return Chinese students from the UK (Shen 2005). A study titled “The Return of the “Brains” to China: What are the Social, Economic, and Political Impacts?” (Le Bail and Shen 2008) analysed changing policies of the Chinese authorities towards the return of Chinese nationals from abroad. The authors argued that these policies have undergone various phases since 15th century (“from rejection to approachment”) and that the beginning of the 20th century can be marked as the starting point for the “engagement with China’s overseas communities”. Despite the complexity of the whole process with ups and downs in attracting Chinese people to return home, Chinese officials consistantly worked on finding solutions for turning the brain drain into the brain gain. In the authors’ opinion, such efforts by Chinese authorities and economic growth in China pushed especially many Chinese engineers and entrepreneurs to return to the home country. However, since the “return statistics are much more uncertain” than the “exit statistics” one cannot definitely say how many are back, it is believed that “the returnees figures are most probably higher than the ones issued by the ministry” of China. One more interesting finding of this work is that Chinese government acknowledged the mobility of returnees, which served as the key factor for successful policies to reverse brain drain. This implies that by respecting the mobility of overseas Chinese talent, Peking officials promoted “the circulation of their professional elites” (Le Bail and Shen 2008).

8

1 Introduction

Lu et al.’s study focusing on the process of the transition of student migrants from temporary to permanent residents served as a useful source in terms of students’ intentions to return or stay on in Canada and the influence of immigration policies of this receiving country on the intentions of student respondents from China. In their study authors surveyed 172 undergraduate Chinese students studying at the University of Saskatchewan and gathered 160 valid answers of survey participants, who did it voluntarily. For understanding students’ decisionmaking process, authors elaborated on “models of intentions” that included individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status, family, financial situation, experiences in living in Canada) as well as undergraduate students’ aspirations from China living in Canada. The results of this study showed that “demographic characteristics, pre-move traits, and Canadian experiences all influence students decisions to immigrate. Family characteristics, both family structure and family finances, are important factors influencing migration intentions […].” In relation to the immigration policies of Canada and their influence on Chinese students’ migration intentions, authors’ models shed light on the following findings: “more than half of the respondents are uncertain about whether they will stay permanently or return; 12.5% of them report no interest in applying for immigrant status; and, unexpectedly, the students who have made their mind to settle permanently are a minority.” At the same time authors argued that “although causal models of students’ migration intentions cannot predict how many students will actually stay (Baker and Finn 2003), they can provide insights into the factors that students consider as critical in making their decision and provide a context in which we can make a best guess at migration outcomes.” Authors suggested that apart from “more social and emotional support” of Chinese students in Canada particularly in Saskatchewan, Canadian authorities need “to implement policy to make it easier to attract foreign students and to facilitate their decisions to stay in Canada” by e.g. launching “cultural orientation programs through social service/counselling” (Lu et al. 2009). While being a useful guide for a set of factors concerning university students and providing an input for the policy analysis, this study, however, by focusing only on undergraduate students and using only the quantitative method limited its relevance since there can be indeed differences in decision-making between e.g. undergraduate and graduate students. As the authors themselves formulated in this regard: “research would profit by extending the study of immigration intentions to all types of foreign students by focusing on consistency and difference across culture in understanding students’ intentions to stay or return. The investigation of sources for particularly theorisation of student migration constituted the most voluminous part of the literature review. The classification of these sources demanded multi-sided approach and covered following research works: In particular, for the elaboration of theoretical part regarding the

1.2 Literature Review

9

brain drain and other alternative concepts (e.g. brain gain, circular migration), I refered to works of Mundende 1989, Sousa 1989, Massey 1993, Beine et al. 2001, ILO 2001, Hunger 2002, 2003 Commander et al. 2004, Güngor and Tansel 2006, Haupt et al. 2013, Perna et al. 2014). Theorisation of transnationalization and the migration-development nexus were elaborated in consideration of findings of particularly Glick Schiller et al. 1992, 1995, Faist 1997, 2010, Levitt 2001, Olesen 2002, Bratsberg 2005, Khadria 2007, 2010, Mau 2007, Faist et al. 2013, Robertson 2013, 2014, OECD 2017. The questions of return migration found useful insights in the works of Cassarino 2004, Martin 2005, Lange 2013, Bijwaard and Wang 2016 etc. SVR 2012, DAAD 2016, OECD 2017. The decision-making aspects of student migration were supported by the works of Lee 1966, De Jong and Gardner 1981, Salt and Findlay 1989, Albert and Hazen 2005, Kley 2010, González et al. 2011, King and Findlay 2012, Carlson 2012. Only a limited number of monographs or edited volumes in English, dealing directly with international student migration has been written. Most of these works focus on international student migration as a general phenomenon (Lipson 2008, Andrade and Evans 2009, Brooks and Waters 2011, Gürüz 2011, Robertson 2013, Alberts and Hazen 2013, Bilecen 2014). The analysis of student migration that was done by individual countries can be found in the monographs of Güngör 2003, Baas 2010. A book by Brooks and Waters (2011) “Student Mobility, Migration and Internationalization of Higher Education” intended to address the gap in “students’ own perspectives – on their motivations, objectives and experiences.” In this book the authors focused on different case studies of student mobility from the UK, Mainland Europe and East Asia. They aimed to contribute to knowledge about “the commonalities and differences in the experiences of students from different parts of the world.” The chapter about student mobility policies tackles the student movements “at international, regional and national scales” arguing that even if globalization plays a significant role in the formation of education policy, “the nation-state continues to play an important role in policy-making.” Brook’s and Water’s message in this regard stipulates that “it is important not to overlook they way in which policy is made and/or resisted at other scales.” The chapter on “geographies of student mobility” shows that there are “social inequalities within international student mobility” meaning that “international education continues to favour the “West” over non-Western countries – the US, UK and Australia are dominant when it comes to attracting internationally mobile students”, although there are education hubs in Asia emerging gradually such as e.g. Singapore. The changing nature of student mobility and higher education are discussed in the last chapter, which provides practical information on commercialisation of higher education systems overseas.

10

1 Introduction

One exceptional study that has been published very recently on migrationdevelopment nexus is the OECD research. It analyses the interrelations between public policies, migration and development. Taking the positive contribution of migration to the development of sending and receiving countries as the basis of the study, which was conducted 2013-2017, the group of researchers aimed to scrutinise the following aspects: “(1) how migration affects a variety of key development sectors, including the labour market, agriculture, education, investment and financial services, and social protection and health; and (2) how a range of sectoral policies can enhance, or undermine, the development impact of migration.” Although this does not explicitly focus on student migration, tackling rather different kinds of migrants, it provides a helpful tool to conceptualize different aspects such as return migration, remittances etc. (OECD 2017). Among the deficits of this study, taking into account its focus on migration and development, is that it did not analyse social remittances and diaspora issues. A number of works, which rather indirectly concentrated on student migration from the CA region and were written in the form of papers, include elaborations of Alimukhamedov 2006, 2015, Ilkhamov 2006, Sahadeo 2006, Thieme 2011, Thieme et al. 2013, Holloway et al. 2012, Sadovskaya 2013, Kurzmann 2014, Chankseliani and Hessel 2016). In particular, Ilkhamov’s paper “Geographic mobility of Uzbeks: the emergence of cross-national communities vs. nation state control” is of special interest. It addresses the issue of tertiary student migration from Uzbekistan from the perspective of labour migration. In his paper the author analysed migration types from Uzbekistan, geographic aspects and the motivations of migrants, possible impacts of migration experiences on Uzbek society and politics. After a brief historical analysis, the author dealt in detail with the issue of labour migration from Uzbekistan to Russia, identifying four main reasons that Uzbek migrants choose Russia as their destination. As the next step, taking a closer look at Uzbek students’ motivations in the West, the author sampled a small group of Uzbek students (two female, two male) who “recently graduated from LLC (MA degree) programs at Western universities with specialization in human rights.” In this very small sample Ilkhamov identified “at least three individual strategies: 1) to stay in the West by all means possible; 2) to return home but work with a well-paying international organization that can provide certain protections; and 3) to return home and start working with local institutions.” He argued that “the observed majority of alumni belong to the first category” and that “dozens of alumni” managed to stay and find the ways to apply their professional skills in the West. “Those who fail to stay in the West move to the second category. Participation in the last category is very rare” assumed the author. While analysing the third category, the author became very sceptical in his views since he believed that Uzbek alumni’s possibilities for “targeted impact” in Uzbekistan,

1.2 Literature Review

11

which were aimed at fostering social and political changes there, were extremely limited since e.g. a political carrier was only possible within the governmental structures. In the following sections of his paper, Ilkhamov assessed the Uzbek government’s policies towards the outmigration of Uzbek citizens from a critical perspective and tried to come up with possible implications for social and political changes in the republic in his conclusion. His prognosis on outmigration and its impacts on domestic changes is phrased as follows: “one has to be realistic: the process of expansion of the Uzbek Diasporas will not benefit Uzbekistan in the observable future even if political changes take place. Successful Uzbeks abroad will need to weigh the advantages of progressing further where they already are or returning to a country marked by economic devastation and an uncertain future. Some of these Uzbeks will turn their interest to Uzbekistan, but only as investors buying lucrative assets in the economy and the government as investors do in any country of the Third World” (Ilkhamov 2006). Two aspects of this study: students’ intentions and the formation of Uzbek diaspora were picked as relevant for my PhD thesis and developed in detail respectively. No monographs or edited volumes on student migration from the CA region in general or from the CA republics separately, have been found. This is somewhat different to the studies (monographs) on labour migration, which were conducted by Marat 2009 and Rahmonova-Schwarz 2012. The literature review on international student migration written in German provided me with a number of works, which, in most of the cases, were written in form of monographs and for obtaining an academic degree: Madl 2002, Aits 2008, Penitsch 2003, Bouchara 2010, Dickel, 1974, Choi 2015 Martin 2005 and, to a lesser extent, in form of journal articles (Kändler 2005, Glorius 2016). Comparatively much work on international student migration in Germany (especiall on return intentions of international students in Germany, retain policies and etc.) has been done by various institutions e.g. BAMF 2012, SVR 2011, 2012, 2015, DAAD 2014, 2015, 2016, BPB 2015. But no study (journal articles or books) could be found on particularly student migration from written in German. Among these works, of special interest was the dissertation of Benedict Madl, who wrote about the study abroad, brain drain and policy regulations. China was taken as the case for study as the sending country and the UK, Germany and France as receiving countries. Similar to my research, Madl took return migration as an indicator for brain drain. However his statements on return migration were based on official statistical data that implied that 2/3 of Chinese student migrants, who study abroad, do not return to China. The whole work can be separated in two main parts: the state-institutionalized and student-individual perspectives. The first level of analysis provides detailed historical information on Chinese student policies starting with 19th century. The policies of receiving countries such as the UK, Germany, France and some other European countries

12

1 Introduction

were analysed rather briefly. The second individual level of analysis interviews Chinese students who were enrolled at HEIs in China at the time of survey. The survey questions reflected on factors (e.g. quality of life, lifestyle, child-friendliness) that might be hypothetically important/attractive for students’ decisionmaking to pursue study in the afore-mentioned European countries. The main shortage of this work is that the author did not show the reader the linkage between the institutional and individual levels hardly paying attention to the aspect of return migration. Moreover, the individual level remains hypothetical that strongly focused on the “attractive” (pull) conditions existing in receiving countries (Madl 2002). Another dissertation that was published in Germany by Jeanette Martin (2005) focused on return migration of graduates from German HEIs to Ghana and was placed in the field of academic migration from the South to North. This inquiry analyzed the life-courses of returners: before the migration to Germany, during the stay in this country and after the return to Ghana. Empirical data was collected in Ghana during the fieldwork in 1997 and 1998 by means of (biographical) narrative interviews and interviews with persons who more or less had to deal with returners from Germany. In total 45 interviews were conducted and 41 of them were analysed. Other methods such as observation (e.g. family environment) and focus group discussions were also used. The latter was led with 5 students from Ghana who lived in Germany and its results were used as the basis for narrative interviews in Ghana. This inquiry made clear that the picture of Ghanaian graduates regarding their paths before migration to Germany (motivations for studying in Germany) and living and studying conditions there is diverse. The interview participants have a range of cultural, social, religious and chronological reasons for returning. This is obviously due to the fact that the interviewees used to study in Germany in different time spans meaning that they belonged to different student generations. After sorting out the data, the author decided to concentrate in her dissertation on the third generation of graduates, who returned to Ghana between 1984-1997 (34 people). This group provided findings that could be interpreted as uniting for all participants. One of main findings made clear that two factors were decisive for the return: social i.e. hope for better carrier integration through stronger recognition of personal and professional characteristics and personal such as closeness to family members living in Ghana. The information regarding aspects of life in Ghana at the moment of interview (e.g. social, economic problems etc.) was most homogeneous. This study provided valuable information regarding the theorization of return migration and confirmed in parts findings of the dissertation at hand (Martin 2005). In contrast to the limited amount of works on student migration from Central Asian countries separately or in general to overseas countries, but mainly to Russia, written in Russian (Rakisheva 2011, Troitzkaya 2012, Sadovskaya 2014,

1.2 Literature Review

13

Blum 2014), the literature review of Russian sources provided a myriad of studies (papers and some monographs) on labour (mainly low-skilled) migration from CA to Russia: Guz’ 2007, Ergeshbaev 2009, Maksakova 2003, 2006, Olimova and Bosk 2003, Zayanchkovskaya 2003, Umarov 2006, Gavrilov 2008 and many others. This is due to high rates of labour migration from CA, especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, to Russia in particular. This phenomenon has been thoroughly discussed in academic circles, although effective political measures to regulate this phenomenon have yet emerge and the labour migration from these countries bears a mainly illegal character. Almost all of the afore-mentioned studies, directly or indirectly touched upon the issue of the socio-economic consequences of labour migration for source countries and other issues such as patterns, tendencies, reasons, controlling and regulation methods of labour migration from the Central Asian region in general and three CA republics individually. Thus, the literature review of sources that were written in English shows that the works on student migration as a separate phenomenon started to gradually emerge from 2000. Their numbers have been rapidly increasing in recent years. From all available studies, which analysed student migration in the form of papers or articles, most of the works were focused on Indian and especially Chinese student migration to various destinations of the world. Therefore, the studies on both of these groups of students can be considered as established knowledge. In particular, the policy regulation area on the part of both sending and receiving countries was analysed in detail and from numerous perspectives. The studies on tertiary students from other countries can be assessed as rather sporadic. The investigation of literature on student migration from Central Asia in general and from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan individually yielded that they were written mostly in the form of papers and contain indirect references to this phenomenon. Only a limited number of monographs or edited volumes in English concentrating explicitly on student migration could be found. Thereby most of them focused on international student migration and only few were dedicated to student migration from individual countries. Among them no works have been found on tertiary student migration in general that focus CA republics individually or the CA region generally. In contrast to the English sources, the works on student migration in German in most of the cases were written as monographs and covered various aspects of student migration from individual countries and regions e.g. Ghana, North Africa. Moreover, there is a solid basis of studies, conducted by different German institutions such as e.g. DAAD, SVR. However, the sources written in German do not contain any inquiry into student migration from the CA countries separately or as the CA region.

14

1 Introduction

The sources written in Russian show that student migration as a general phenomenon and from CA republics in particular is the least studied as compared to English and German sources. Most of the works in Russian approach student migration within the framework of highly skilled migration, mostly from Russia (e.g. Gokhberg and Nekipelova). The latter therefore testifies that there is a general lack of scientific inquiries regarding highly skilled migration from the CA countries or from the CA region in general. In contrast, a lot of works, dealing with migration issues from the CA region, were written on low skilled labour migration in particular to Russia. The analysis of the above mentioned literature sources written in English, German and Russian provides evidence that no in-depth study (in the form of a monograph) on student migration from CA countries and CA region in general could be found. Moreover, the above-mentioned analysis demonstrates that only a few studies combine micro and macro levels of research through concentrating both on students and policies. If done, works rarely show a clear linkage between both. The positioning of this group of migrants is in bulk of the sources not explicit i.e. no clear reference is given to handle student migrants as an indispensable part of highly skilled migration. This surely impedes the discussions of student migration from the brain drain perspective.

1.3

Relevance of Research

Although the topic on student migration per se is not new and several aspects of the dissertation were discussed by various studies, the inquiry at hand bears an exploratory character and represents one of the first attempts4 to provide a comprehensive study on tertiary student migration from CA to Germany. It attempts to theoretically and empirically augment existing literature on international student migration in particular and highly skilled migration in general.

1.4

Case Selection

Germany’s candidacy to be the case study is justified by the following factors: Firstly, in contrast to Russia, the US or Turkey, which also host large numbers of CA students, Germany has been increasing the rates of CA students throughout 4

“One of” in terms of somebody has been pursuing research on this topic currently since one can never fully know how the state of the art looks in reality.

1.4 Case Selection

15

the given period of time (1992-2012) in a very stable manner without significant ups and downs in tertiary student migration rates. Secondly, among all EU member-states, Germany has the strongest presence in the CA region5 and makes considerable efforts to advance bilateral/multilateral cooperation with the CA republics,6 though to different degrees, which obviously resulted in the highest rates of CA tertiary students in this country as compared to the rest of the EU member-states. Thirdly, the internationalization of study programs, availability of a wide range of academic scholarships, low study fees, compared to e.g. the UK and liberalization of immigration rules for the highly qualified, make Germany an attractive destination for the international tertiary-education seekers. Fourthly, as a receiving country Germany fits well to the CA region’s case, since there are interesting variations of tertiary student migration rates among the given republics. The focus of this project on the Central Asian region can be explained as follows: Firstly, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, CA countries have been experiencing the process of socio-economic and political transformation and are in a strong need of highly-qualified personnel. Secondly, CA’s student migration is a comparatively new phenomenon with rapid growth. According to the Global Education Digest 2009, the outbound mobility ratio7 in CA8 between 1999 and 2007 rose by 1.1% - the second highest index after Sub-Saharan Africa. Thirdly, youth comprises a large percentage of the populations in all five CA republics9 and “there is no doubt that Central Asia’s population will continue to grow substantially over the coming decades” (Lutz 2010 10). Fourthly, the post5 6

7 8 9

Germany is the sole country of the EU that has diplomatic representations (embassies) in all five Central Asian republics. For example, during its EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2007, Germany set the cooperation with Central Asian states as a priority sphere that put ahead the elaboration of the EU Strategy for Central Asia. The Strategy determined new frameworks to deepen cooperation between the EU and Central Asian region and clearly mentioned the education sphere as a second key area to promote. cf. The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership. Available online: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_ init_en.pdf “The number of students from a given country studying abroad as a percentage of the total tertiary enrolment in that country.” In: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest 2009. Comparing Education Statistics Across the World. Montreal, Canada, p.256. It has to be noted that UNESCO’s Global Education Digest 2009 definition of Central Asia covers also three South-Caucasian countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia as well as Mongolia. In Kazakhstan, 47 per cent of the population is under the age of 24; in Kyrgyzstan, 55 per cent; in Tajikistan, 61 per cent; in Turkmenistan, 58 per cent; and in Uzbekistan, 59 per cent.” In: Jones, Peter (2010): The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative, EUCAM Working Paper No.9.

16

1 Introduction

Soviet republics of CA present an interesting case, because unlike other countries at similar stages of development, they entered the era of post-Soviet history with highly literate populations: “nearly universal school participation rates and well-qualified teachers” (Chapman et al. 2005: 515). Fifthly, the migration wave from CA republics to Germany is predominantly highly qualified, as compared to insignificant numbers of asylum-seekers and labour migrants, where student migration makes up a substantial part. Only three CA republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are researched, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are excluded due to the low number of tertiary students in the latter two countries. Moreover, in terms of data collection Turkmenistan represents a problematic case because this country is extremely closed off in many regards. Tajikistan has the same attributes as Kyrgyzstan i.e. it is the poorest country in the region with, however, more or less liberal education policies.

1.5

Research Methodology

Being an inter-disciplinary product of social sciences including sociology, political science and human geography, the PhD thesis, which is comparative in nature, combines different kinds of methods stemming from both qualitative and quantitative social research. It benefited from qualitative methods such as focus group discussions, observation, interviews and document analysis (content analysis). The quantitative method (descriptive statistics) was deployed in the form of the online survey. Thus the project combines quantitative and qualitative methods using the advantages of both methods. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods can be assigned to the “Vertiefungsmodell” (‘consolidation model’, own translation) proposed by Mayring. This model implies the supplementation of a completed quantitative study through the qualitative method and enables to better interpret the results of quantitative method. It may even point to a possible causality. The initial idea behind using the survey method and going beyond the opportunities of the qualitative method can be explained, in part, by the lack of return statistics and my eagerness to gain as many respondents as possible enabling, thus, the study at hand to have more transparency and methodological rigor for making study results, more or less, generalizable (Mayring 2001). Quantitative method used in the form of the online survey was conducted from December 2nd 2012 until February 28th, 2013 with 218 students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan enrolled at German HEIs. Thereby it has to be emphasized that the quantitative method is about the descriptive and not the inferential statistics. This implies that the hypotheses were not generated

1.6 Dissertation Structure

17

and tested. The data was instead described and summarized with patterns emerging during this analysis.10 The online survey contained closed, semi-closed and open questions and was aimed at primarily finding out the return intentions of CA students after their graduation in Germany.11 The qualitative method was applied using semi-structured in-depth interviews, which last up to two hours, and explained in detail the quantitative part. The in-depth interviews shed light among other things, on the multi-causal process of decision making of CA students for a) choosing Germany as study destination; b) the reasons for their return intentions; c) interaction ways with host and home societies. Both of these methods are used intensively to compile the empirical part of the research in the form of chapter 4. After finding out the return intentions of students and the reasons behind those intentions, the policy analysis is conducted. In particular, the policies of receiving country Germany on the one hand, and three CA sending countries, on the other hand, were analysed in order to see what is being done to harness the potential of student migration for development on both sides.

1.6

Dissertation Structure

The dissertation consists of six chapters: the background of the research topic, literature review of English, German and Russian sources, relevance of research, case selection, research methodology and dissertation structure are covered by the introduction (Chapter 1). The conceptual part deals with key concepts and theoretical perspectives that frame the research inquiry (Chapter 2). In this chapter I clarify for the reader the complexity of the student migration phenomenon, guide him/her through the development path of the brain drain definition and competing concepts. Return migration and its deficits are also discussed in this chapter. This chapter provides a theoretical basis (micro-, meso and macro levels) for the empirical sections in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 provides a brief insight into the socio-economic and political situations of the focus republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet phase. It also discusses quantitatively and qualitatively migration flows, in particular student migration flows from these republics abroad and analyses Germany as the main study destination of the potential students from three CA republics. Specifically, chapter 4 gives a detailed overview of the methodology used for data gathering 10 For a simple understanding of differences between both methods see e.g. descriptive and inferential statistics. Available online: https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/descrip tive-inferential-statistics.php 11 A detailed description of the online survey can be found in chapter 4.

18

1 Introduction

and analysis for this chapter (online survey and in-depth interviews). It provides information on the life courses of respondents before coming to Germany for study purposes, during their studies in Germany and after graduation in Germany. Amongst other things, it uncovers the return intentions of students and graduates and the motivating factors. Chapter 5 analyses, based also on the results of Chapter 4, the policies of receiving country Germany and the three sending CA republics regarding the regulation of respective student migration. The focus was on the promotion of circular and permanent return migration. Conclusion (chapter 6), consisting in fact of two parts, discusses contributions of the research inquiry, provides input for future research and formulates policy recommendations for sending CA republics and host country Germany.

2 Terminological and Theoretical Considerations of International Student Migration

2.1

Tertiary-Level Student Migration12

As indicated previously, the tertiary student migration is a complex phenomenon: it is a migration form with a variety of nuances, which makes its conceptualization and the formation of a clear-cut concept challenging. Therefore it is important to ‘purify’ all uncertainties right from the beginning in order to create a consistent picture of the student migrants and enable the operationalization of the dissertation at hand. According to the glossary of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD: 2001), a “full-time tertiary level student” is an individual, who participates in an education program to at least 75 percent “of a fulltime commitment of time and resources” and remains involved in this program for at least an entire year. In line with this definition, student migrants are to be understood as tertiary-level students who, particularly at the time of the online survey (OS), attended education programs at German HEIs full time. In other words, they are ‘degree-earning students’, which is different from e.g. ‘creditearning students’ attending part of a study programme (King/FindlayAhrens 2010: 7). The ‘degree-seeking students’ include undergraduate and graduate (bachelor and master) students, postgraduate (PhD) students, students who attended programs with Staatsexamen as the final examination (studying in the areas of e.g. medicine, jurisprudence, teaching) and also those students who attended “old” German degree programs such as Diploma or Magister. According to the definition proposed by the IOM (2011) any “movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State” is considered as migration. However, the use of the term student migration has certain characteristics that are different to those of student mobility. The 12 Throughout the work, the terms “tertiary-level student migration” will be interchangeably used with “tertiary student migration” and “student migration.” © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_2

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2 Terminological and Theoretical Considerations of International Student Migration

latter is often interchangeably used with the term student migration. The main differences between both account for the timeframe, distance and development levels, which might influence the probability of return. It is accurate to use the term student migration for longer timeframes and distances i.e. in reference to the ‘degree-seeking students’, who travel from remote destinations to countries with differing development levels i.e. higher economy countries. Student migration is addressed in this regard, quite often, from the perspective of the non-return aspects (King and Findlay 2012: 261, King/FindlayAhrens 2010: 7) because qualified migrants from developing countries are usually more likely to stay on in the host developed countries (OECD Observer 2002) entailing, thus, the braindrain problematic. In contrast, student mobility implies as a rule shorter distance moves and shorter timeframes e.g. Erasmus students between the European countries, and “a high probability to return” (King and Raghuram 2012: 129). In a similar way, the findings of the OECD (2008: 163) research on international migration indicate “migrant mobility is greater between countries at a similar level of development, whereas when income disparities are greater, migrants are more likely to stay. Return rates to OECD countries are on average twice as high as those to developing countries.” There are also authors, who use the term international student circulation (Wit et al. 2008) or consider international students as “visitors, sojourners or even tourists (Battisti and Portelli 1994; Hazen and Alberts 2006; Huang 2008)” (King and Findlay 2012: 261). Thus, there are two major paths of student flows: 1) from developing to developed countries (student migration) and 2) within the developed countries (student mobility). It is typical and comprehensible that particularly international student migration takes place from developed to developing countries. Due to the non-competitiveness of the quality of higher education in the latter “very few students move from developed to less-developed countries for their university education, even for a short-term mobility experience” (Ibid: 263). The definition of migration introduced by the United Nations (UN) differentiates between short- and long-term migrants. Short-term migrants are individuals who move to a country “other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends [...]” and similar. Long-term migrants are people, who move “to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence” (UN 2017; Fassmann 2008: 21). Given the fact that the target group of this study are full-time degree students with at least one year stay in the destination country, in line with the UN definition, CA student migrants can be considered as long-term migrants.

2.1 Tertiary-Level Student Migration

21

However, the change of usual residence does not necessarily imply the maintenance or giving up of the place of residence in the country of origin through a bureaucratic process e.g. a deregistering from the country of origin. This is because the student migration counts formally as a temporary migration form, while someone who leaves the country of origin on a permanent basis has to deregister his or her place of residence there. Although old and new places of residence are physically separated, from the point of view of a student migrant, they constitute a unified place of residence located in different territorial spaces (translation from German, Fassmann 2008: 23). Student migration is an “open-end” migration type where young people leave their source countries without a “firm idea of how long they will be away” (Conde 1989: 327). Due to the fact that the outcome of student migration is not predictable initially, since graduates can change their temporary status into a permanent one after graduation in a host country, and enter the labour market there, international student migration can be indeed tackled as a channel for immigration challenging thereby the perceived temporality of student migration. Some authors argued in this regard that international student migration represents “a prelude to immigration after the course of study has finished” (King/Findlay/ Ahrens 2010: 7). Taking the case of international students in Australia, Robertson and Runganaikalo (2014: 212) assumed that, in particular, the temporality of students’ statuses might be considered a disadvantageous factor because it makes the situation of international students precarious. For certain periods of time international students stand in “the interstitial position of being legally resident but not legally considered to be migrants.” In other words, the student migrants have to “earn” permanent status in the host country if they want to stay on there. The “earning” of permanent status is “contingent on the migrant meeting various criteria” meaning passing through “multiple gates” in order to be able to “enter the nation-state.” Student migration is considered by authors, thus, as a “staggered” process placing student migrants for some time “in various states of insecurity”, foremost in terms of social and legal insecurity. These arguments may also hold true for Germany because, as it will be shown below, student migrants must overcome serious hurdles before their stay is recognized as full time, although the German immigration policies towards international students can be regarded as attractive. One of the main challenges in conceptualizing student migration is the lack of clarity in the literature, as it has been mentioned earlier, accounts for the aspect on whether international students are to be considered as highly skilled individuals prior to starting studies in a host country or after the graduation there. A number of sources argue that international students become highly skilled after graduation in a host country. They consider the tertiary student migrants,

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thus, as potential immigrants (Kuptsch 2006: 39); “a prelude to skilled migration to form the international managerial class” (King 2009, IGU 2009:4) and a “semi-finished human capital” that migrates “through the academic gate” (Khadria 2007: 8). This perspective may be consistent with the condition that international students start their tertiary studies in a host country as undergraduate students with no prior possession of particular education degree. But if student migration covers predominantly graduate or even postgraduate students, they in no way can be regarded as e.g. “a prelude to skilled migration” but rather as highly skilled individuals who migrate with higher education diplomas. 13 Similarly inconsistent are the studies (e.g. Felbermayr/Reczkowski 2012, She/Wotherspoon 2013) which oversimplify and trivialise the tertiary student migration as the migration of highly qualified people because they ignore the afore-mentioned differentiation (with or without higher education degree). Only few studies convincingly showed the linkage between the tertiary student migration and highly skilled migration (Lowell/Findlay 2001: 7): Highly skilled persons are ““tertiary” educated persons, primarily those with at least four years of education after primary and secondary school (12 years).” To overcome the bias emanating from the discussions as to whether tertiary student migration is an inherent part of highly skilled migration from the outset or it becomes such after the graduation of students, this project’s approach is based on the definition of highly skilled proposed by Guerrero and Bolay in one of the IOM studies (2005). In their research paper the authors defined the following persons as highly skilled: a) “individuals who have completed tertiary education and are employed in a professional area within the fields of science or technology; b) individuals with this educational background and who are not employed in a professional area within science or technology; c) individuals who do not have such an education but who are employed in a professional area within science or technology” (Guerrero/Bolay 2005: 4).

To sum up this categorization: as far as individuals do not possess a tertiary education diploma and/or are employed “in a professional area within science or technology”, they cannot be regarded as highly skilled and vice versa. The categorization of highly skilled, elaborated by Guerrero and Bolay (2005) was adapted from the OECD Canberra Manual that designated highly skilled persons as “human resources in science and technology (HRST)” (OECD 1995). This definition was also deployed by, primarily, EU countries and Eurostat (OECD 13 This is the usual and basic understanding of highly qualified persons i.e. the possession of a higher education diploma.

2.1 Tertiary-Level Student Migration

23

2002, Hunger 2003) and indicates the deficit of an internationally standardized definition of highly skilled professionals, discussed below. Despite certain attempts of scholars to differentiate between the terms of highly skilled and skilled, one can hardly find a clear-cut distinction between both terms in literature (translation from German, Hunger 2003: 16). In many sources these terms are used interchangeably, in other sources scholars try to draw a line between them e.g. “it is difficult to consider […] middle level professionals such as nurses, teachers, […] at the same level as highly skilled professionals or high tech skill” (Wickramasekara 2002: 4). For Meyer (2001: 214215) the highly skilled are: “professionals, semi-professionals and technical professions” (including architects, engineers, technicians, researchers, scientists, and professionals in the health and dental sectors, education, science and the arts, sports and entertainment), as well as “managers, supervisors and senior officials” (public and private sector).” The last update of International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) by International Labour Organization (ILO) was carried out in December 2007 and is known under “ISCO-08.” In its “occupational classification system”, the ISCO-08 clearly differentiates between “major, sub-major, minor and unit groups” and the “skill level” and “skill specialization” constitute the basic classification criteria (ILO 2010: 1). Nonetheless, the OSCO08 has to be used and adapted by as many countries as possible in order to gain a functional ISCO on the international level.14 Following the afore-mentioned categorization of “highly skilled resources” proposed by Guerrero and Bolay and the results of the online survey (OS) conducted with tertiary student migrants from three CA republics15, it can be clearly argued that the migration of tertiary students from the CA region to Germany, who are considered by this study, constitute an inherent part of highly skilled migration. In particular, the OS results testify that the majority of tertiary students from CA pursuing their studies in Germany (83 percent in total) have previously obtained undergraduate or even graduate degrees from their home universities and they from the outset can be seen as highly skilled personnel. This is due to the fact that school-leaving certificates, with some minor exceptions, do not enable tertiary education seekers from CA region to immediately start studies at German universities. Therefore the possession of a higher education diploma from a local HEI before the departure is the easiest way for CA students to start/ continue their studies in Germany.16 Thus, being supported by the categorization of Guerrero and Bolay (2005) and at the same time representing a contradictory stain towards the argument stating that tertiary student migrants should be se14 To avoid uncertainties, this study consistently focuses on the concept of ‘highly skilled’. 15 Details are discussed in chapter 4. 16 For details see chapter 4.

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parated from the highly skilled individuals, the approach taken in this inquiry represents and strengthens the view of those scholars, who address international student migration within the framework of highly skilled migration. The strategy to approach international students as highly skilled individuals also contradicts the official German position. Yet, Germany’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) treats foreign students (third-country nationals) within a separate section “Studying and education in Germany” differentiating them thereby from highly-qualified persons (section 19 Residence Act) and researchers (section 20 Residence Act). The latter two fall under the category of “Working in Germany”. For BAMF the highly qualified persons or “highly-qualified foreigners are scientists with special technical knowledge, as well as teaching personnel and scientific personnel in prominent positions” (BAMF 2014). It is interesting to note that even doctoral candidates, who of course possess at least one higher education degree, are not treated either as “highly-qualified persons” or “researchers” and fall into the category of “students” too. Doctoral candidates, as postulated by BAMF (2013), can be recognized as researchers if they fulfil the following condition: “If a research facility that is recognized by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has concluded a hosting agreement with you that is effective to implement a research project, and your livelihood is secured by a specific minimum monthly net income. This can be documented by salary, grants or your own savings showing that your livelihood is secure.” The dubious status of foreign doctoral candidates is also evident by the fact that their, and generally international students’ “study hours and training hours in Germany are counted by half”, when it comes to the recognition and the issue of settlement permit (BAMF 2013 (a)).17 Student migration, hence, is approached in Germany officially as a precondition for highly skilled migration. Thus, viewing tertiary student migration from CA through the lens of highly skilled migration, the problem of brain-drain in the respective countries begins to take shape.

2.2

Brain-Drain: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges

The concept of brain-drain became known in 1962, when it was first coined by the British Royal Society “in reference to the outflow of engineers, scientists, and technicians from Britain to North America. Since then the term has been 17 Nevertheless, Germany has liberalized its policies a lot towards international students. The detailed information in this regard is provided by chapter 5.

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widely used, particularly in connection with the migration of skilled manpower from developing to developed countries” (Sousa (1) 1989: 197). One can find numerous definitions of brain-drain in different sources. In her PhD project about the brain-drain from developing countries, Galinski concluded that due to diverse understandings of the term highly qualified individuals, and also due to the conditions under which the international migration takes place, a homogeneous definition of brain-drain was missing in both academic and political circles (translation from German, Galinski 1986: 1). Brain-drain has been studied from various perspectives by different disciplines. In particular, demographers focused on a detailed collection of data to trace the brain, historians have tried to trace the historical developments and explain them, for sociologist important are migration motives, and political scientists focused their research on political measures primarily industrialized countries towards the regulation of brain-drain (Madl 2002: 31-32). In his paper about brain gain, Uwe Hunger stated that every brain-drain is a potential brain gain. Therefore concerned countries must try to turn the braindrain (“loss of important intellectual and technical resources”) into the brain-gain (“a long-term resource profit”) (Hunger 2002: 1). Two conditions must be available in order to apply the brain-drain to a sending country: “firstly, there should be a significant loss of the country’s highly skilled population and secondly, this loss must result in net adverse economic consequences.” Adams (2003) believed that the “brain-drain occurs when a country loses more than 10 percent of its tertiary-level educated population to emigration” (Guerrero/Bolay 2005: 5). One of the first comprehensive efforts to quantify the brain-drain phenomenon and “put together a harmonized international data set on migration rates by education level” was made by economists Carrington and Detragiache in 1998 (Docquier and Rapoport 2012: 214). In their study Carrington and Detragiache covered outmigration processes in 61 countries, which accounted for about 70 percent of the total least developed countries (LDC). As the authors stressed, due to lack of data they did not analyse brain-drain from “the former Soviet Union and from Eastern Europe, even though causable evidence suggests that it is a sizeable phenomenon.” They also excluded from their analysis, migration flows between developing countries. The estimations were based on US Census Data from 1990, the statistical data of the OECD and the UN population information. Their key findings included that migrants are much better educated than the rest of their countrymen in the countries of origin meaning that people with no or less education do not move or only limitedly take part in international migration. This resulted in the highest migration rates among individuals with tertiary education, with the exception of Central American countries. Some African countries, Caribbean and Central America delivered the highest rates of brain-drain (Car-

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rington and Detragiache 1998). The study had a number of caveats although it opened up new perspectives for brain-drain debates: “i) they transposed the education structure of the US immigration to the immigration of the other OECD countries (transposition problem); ii) immigration to EU countries was estimated based on OECD statistics reporting the number of immigrants for the major emigration countries only, which led to an underestimation of immigration from small countries (under-reporting problem)” (Docquier and Rapoport 2012: 214). Similarly to the study of Carrington and Detragiache, efforts to quantify the brain-drain have been made by Adams (2003), Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) (Ibid: 215). Remarkably, as a common feature of these studies the loss of highly skilled individuals was addressed to define the brain-drain. However they and many other sources on brain-drain did not explicitly clarify when the brain-drain begins i.e. whether it starts with the move itself or after the non-return of the respective persons to the source country. This is crucial to determine because a simple move of highly skilled student migrants from the source countries can not indicate brain-drain. The factual non-return or, at least non-return intentions of the highly skilled may serve as meaningful indicators for the loss of highly skilled individuals i.e. the brain-drain. Moreover, it has to be clarified here that the non-return of particularly tertiary graduates to their source countries is considered as an act of prolonging their stay after graduation from a HEI in a receiving country for any purposes. I believe that if return (permanent, for at least 12 months)18 to the home country does not take place comparatively soon after the graduation in the host country, the propensity for doing it will be declined gradually. Only a few studies handled this issue regarding the timing when the braindrain begins, with clarity. Particularly, Baruch/Budhwar/Khatri (2007) took the deficit of a physical interaction of migrants with a source (developing) country i.e. the stay on in a host country as the key indicator for the brain-drain. The authors defined the brain-drain as a “phenomenon in which people of a high level of skills, qualifications, and competence, leave their countries and emigrate.” By examination of “attitudes and perceptions of foreign students” in the UK and the US and analysing factors influencing their decisions for either return or non-return to their source countries, the authors aimed “to provide insights into the existence of the BD phenomenon”. In the authors’ opinion students represent valuable human capital for both sending and receiving countries and once they decide not to return to their home destinations, which are predominantly developing countries, they decrease thereby the human capital there and increase it in receiving countries. The authors assert, thus, that return migra18 For details see chapter 4.

2.2 Brain-Drain: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges

27

tion is the key indicator for the brain-drain. They endeavoured to shift a positive view on global student flows that are bound to globalization, into a more realistic, even if somewhat negative, perspective. Two theories guided this project: “push and pull model” and “the theory of reasoned action.” The latter “predicts that the actual action of students (to stay in a host country or return to their home country) will be positively related to their inclination to do so, which, in turn, will be affected by their attitudes”. Authors arrived at the conclusion stating that their “results highlight the severity of BD (or the significance of the free talent flow), whereby only 30.5% of the foreign students intend to return to their homecountries after the completion of their studies. While very few admit an initial intention to stay permanently, over 40% indicate that they plan to stay for a considerable time, which will probably lead to a permanent stay.” By tackling foreign students’ inclinations to stay on in host countries and not return to their home-countries, the authors wanted to raise the relevance of “the issue of braindrain versus brain gain […] for both individuals and their nations.” In a similar manner as Baruch et al., Turkish scholars Güngör and Tansel (2006) in a discussion paper “Brain-drain from Turkey: an investigation of students’ return intentions” tackled the “non-return of students” or of the “highly educated” from the Western countries as “an important source of brain-drain.” Based on survey results, which was conducted in 2002 and being guided by human capital theory and the push and pull model, authors assumed a high probability of non-return of Turkish students from host developed countries. Nonetheless “prior return intentions and the role of the family” were found to be influential for the decision to return to Turkey or stay on abroad. Moreover, Turkish scholarship holders, who were funded by their national government, demonstrated a high probability to return since the latter was a compulsory requirement of the governmental scholarship. One more factor that played a significant role for the intention to return or not to return is the length of stay in a host country. It was assumed that the longer the length of stay, the higher the probability of “having non-return intentions”(Güngör/Tansel 2006). Similarly to these two studies, the research inquiry at hand does not have an aim to measure the brain-drain as economists do. Rather based on a sociological survey it takes the low non-return intentions of CA tertiary students (almost 90 percent) after the graduation at German HEIs as an indicator for brain-drain. 2.2.1

Return Migration and its Deficits

In order to know whether sending CA republics are in fact concerned with the problem of brain-drain emanating from the student outflows, it would be easier and more accurate to have a look at the domestic statistical data on the return migration of the concerned groups of students.

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However, given the condition that the “magnitude and configuration [of return migration] are scarcely measurable and comparable” (Cassarino 2004: 253), “no country [except for the United States] has a comprehensive system for recording or monitoring skilled migration flows at the international level” (Wickramasekara 2002: 4). The United States can be considered as “the only country to systematically compile data on the stay rates of foreign students after receiving their degree (Finn, 2003)” (IOM 2008a: 120). In general it is assumed that return migration remains as “the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration (Ghosh 2000a)” (Olesen 2002: 135). What does return exactly imply? The return migration implies various situations and it can be differentiated between “secondary or repeat migration, temporary or definitive return” (OECD 2008: 163), it can be forced and voluntarily (Kreienbrink 2006). According to the non-binding definition of the European Commission, return comprises “the preparation or implementation aiming at the way back to the country of origin or transit, irrespective of the question whether the return takes place voluntarily or forcibly (Europäische Kommission 2002b: 28).” In Germany, the voluntary return is addressed mainly within the refugee policy issues, and the concept of return as such, is not defined by respective legal documents (German law). There are instead, different definitions such as e.g. expulsion (Ausweisung), rejection (Zurückweisung), which in fact regulate judicially forced return (Kreienbrink 2006: 14-15). Although the return issues of international students are not prescribed by the German law, the international students were expected, through policy regulations, until recently (until 2005), to return to their home countries after qualifying in Germany.19 The UN Statistics division suggested the following definition for the returners, these are: “persons returning to their country of citizenship after having been international migrants (whether short- term or long-term) in another country and who are intending to stay in their own country for at least a year” (OECD 2008: 164). With some changes, the UN definition of returners is adopted for the research project covering temporary and permanent returners and is formulated as follows: Returners are persons, who return to their country of citizenship while studying (temporary returners) and after having studied (permanent or definitive returners) at German HEIs. Permanent returners are expected to stay in their source destinations for at least a year. While measuring the return migration, the OECD indicated the following concrete difficulties: 19 For analysis of policies of Germany and three sending CA republics see Chapter 5.

2.2 Brain-Drain: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges

29

“An analysis of migrant inflows and outflows offers an initial overview of the scale of return migration and some of its characteristics. Yet this approach does not establish an explicit link between exits and entries, because they do not necessarily relate to the same individuals. It is therefore sensitive to cyclical variations in flows, and cannot be used to estimate return rates. Moreover, inter-country differences in the recording of inflows and outflows limit international comparability (OECD 2008: 164).”

Moreover, the statistical agencies in the focus CA republics, due to various problems (e.g. lack of financial resources), cannot provide reliable statistical data in general, and return migration is no exception to that.20 Additionally, even if any figures on the latter were available, they would be seen as inherently critical of the state in terms of the low return tendencies, so it is very unlikely that CA republics would make them accessible. Therefore, while investigating the data on return migration, I heavily relied on sources of German and international organizations such as German Statistical Agency, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, OECD, UNESCO. However, due to the afore-mentioned challenges in measuring the return migration, and consequently the lack of required data, I had to admit that none of these institutions could be helpful regarding the quantification of the return migration of tertiary students from the CA republics. Mayer et al. (2012: 68) put the deficit of return migration statistical data in Germany in a nutshell: “Neither the data of the Central Register of Foreigners nor the official migration statistics or the higher education statistics permit a quantitative assessment of the remigration of foreign graduates of German higher education institutions to their countries of origin. The Central Register of Foreigners and the Federal Statistical Office only record emigration by foreigners, but do not state their level of education or qualification. The higher education statistics do record the number of foreign graduates, but do not contain information about their migration conduct.”

Lowell and Findlay (2001: 4) indicated that there is a basic method to compile statistical data on “tertiary educated emigration” that is “the cumulative loss.” The latter measures “the percentage of all educated persons born in a given country” and who leave or left the country. This seemingly easy method, however, repeats the afore-mentioned problem of the brain-drain definition and does not reflect the number of returners, considering instead the initial leave of the source country by highly qualified as the indicator for the “loss” or brain-drain.

20 To my requests on statistics on Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek returners respectively, I either was informed that such data was not available or did not receive any response to my request.

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I am not an expert in statistics and can not make valuable suggestions of how to effectively measure the return migration. Perhaps the US experience in compiling data on non-returned international students would be exemplary to other countries, especially to receiving countries as they have more possibilities to register returners and stayers (through the process of visa re-issue. e.g. former students staying on in a receiving country for employment purposes). Obviously a close cooperation between receiving and sending countries in this regard is of great importance so that the problem of brain-drain can be recognized and respective measures undertaken. Despite of such an obscure data access on return migration rates among the statistical agencies, there are fortunately, at least a number of empirical (sociological) studies conducted by different German organizations that shed light on this issue. In particular, in order to find out the return tendencies among the international students studying in Germany, these studies focused on their return intentions. A comparative study that was conducted by the Research Unit of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Group (MPG) analysed intentions of international graduate students (MA and PhD students in “the final two years of their studies”) to stay on in host countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) and the institutional possibilities available for staying on there. One of the crucial findings of this study is that “almost two-thirds of the respondents are interested in remaining in their country of study after graduation, and plan to do so for a relatively limited time period (one to two years).” Germany has the highest rates of respondents, willing to stay in this country after graduation: 79 percent of MA students and 67 percent of doctoral students intended to stay on in Germany after graduating. The vast majority of those who were unsure about how long they would stay on in Germany after graduation composed 39 percent. The second largest group of “stayers” estimated the length of their stay in Germany between 1-2 years before they would return to their home destinations or any third country; 18.8 percent between 3 and 5 years and 12.5 percent were likely to settle longer than 5 years (SVR 2012). The reasons behind the intentions of the surveyed respondents of the SVR study are discussed in the next chapter. Similarly, in one of the latest studies, which was conducted within the framework of the STIBET Evaluation and where more than 11.000 foreign students enrolled at German HEIs participated, the DAAD provided information on return intentions of foreign students in Germany in general. The anonymous survey results pointed out that “20% of foreign students questioned were already sure that they would take up a job in Germany after completing their studies, 34% were relatively sure they would stay, and 31% were still undecided”

2.3 Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain

31

(DAAD 2014a: 24).21 Thereby it was specified that almost a half (47 percent) of doctoral students showed them already sure and relatively sure to stay on in Germany after graduation. In the case of bachelor and master students the percentage was even higher (58 percent and 60 percent respectively) (DAAD 2015: 3). This survey also identified that respondents from India, Italy and Russia were “far more likely to intend to stay than for e.g. students from Turkey, Spain or Iran” (DAAD 2016: 35). This study also identified key reasons for staying on in Germany, which are discussed in the next chapter. Although based on these results it is not possible to judge any specific information on the return intentions of students from CA countries, the above-cited studies serve as a solid basis to believe that the majority (at least half) of international students stay on in Germany serving, thus, as “an important recruitment pool for highly qualified specialists in science and business” (DAAD 2014a: 24). In this regard, the empirical findings of the study at hand on CA students’ return intentions, which are based on the OS survey, complement the existing data on return intentions of international students from Germany and, in fact, they contribute to the mitigation of statistical deficit. Moreover, these findings that indicate concrete information on low return intentions among the CA students studying in Germany enable the operationalization of the dissertation project at hand.

2.3

Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain and the Migration-Development Nexus (MDN)

The discussion of the brain-drain concept underwent several analytical and practical phases, which were led within the nexus of migration and development (MDN). The initial MDN phase (1950s and 1960s) can be characterized as optimistic i.e. it was believed that migration to the developed countries would lead to development in the developing countries (Faist et al. 2013: 69). Kindleberger 21 STIBET stands for „Grant agreement programme“. „The stated objective of the STIBET programme is to contribute to strengthening the attractiveness of Germany as a place for academic study and thus attracting the “best minds” from around the world. By reducing the number of university dropouts and promoting the academic success of foreign students via STIBET-funded support measures and grants it was also possible to achieve effects in terms of educational economics.“ For more information see: DAAD (2014a): Ergebnisbericht zur Evaluierung des DAAD-Programms – STIBET I und STIBET III Matching Funds. Available online: https://www.daad.de/medien/der-daad/medien-publikationen/ publikationen-pdfs/2014-06_stibet_00_dokmat_bd76.pdf.

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(1967) argued that development would “result from financial remittances, return migration, and the subsequent transfer of human capital” (Faist 2010: 68). In this phase, the research scholars i.e. economists focused primarily on labour migration and elaborated in this regard on a number of economic theories and models such as neoclassical economics (NE) and the new economics of migration (NEM) known also as rational choice theories. NE, the macro theory, saw the causes of international migration in “geographic differences in the suply of and demand for labour” i.e. “by differences in wage rates between countries” (Massey et al. 1993: 433-434). On a macro-level, modernization theory, the most prominent analytical tool at that time, “represented world development as the universal, progressive evolution towards increasing urbanization and industrialization” (Morawska 2012: 61). According to this theory, the brain-drain was considered as a somewhat natural process due to the missing employment conditions or the “brain overflow” (Madl 2002: 28) in the source countries. In countries where specialists could not realize themselves, the brain-drain took place consequently i.e. in conformity with the global world market’s laws of supply and demand. The modernization theory did not see the brain-drain impacts in this regard as negative but rather positive i.e. as a relief for developing countries’ labour markets. In response to the modernization theory, Latin American scholars were the first, who pointed out that “the world is in fact not experiencing an inexorable progression toward modernization and development. Rather, they argued, undeveloped and underdeveloped regions of the world are trapped in enduring poverty as a direct result of their subordinate exploitative relationship to more highly developed capitalist countries” (Morawska 2012: 61). This less optimistic period (70s and 80s of the last century) is known as the second MDN phase of brain-drain discussions, which broadly analysed the reasons for the outmigration of highly qualified people and emphasized that migration is caused by the underdevelopment of source countries. It was postulated that the underdevelopment or poverty in migrants’ source developing countries serves as the main reason for the brain-drain to the developed North (Faist 2010: 69). The discussions of this period were framed by development aid research (Hunger 2003: 10). Therefore the concept of development was replaced in this stage by the term “‘dependency’ as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by a centre, and ‘underdevelopment’ was seen as its inevitable result.” Two analytical tools became prominent: dependency theory and world systems theory and the “assumed causality” between migration and development were considered as “not from migration to development but from the underdevelopment to migration” (Faist 2010: 69). The dependency theory explained the underdevelopment of poor developing countries as the result of established world structures that were created by rich

2.3 Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain

33

Western countries. The underdevelopment was seen as the reason for brain-drain and the source for exploitation of labour force from the developing countries. As a response, the dependency theory proposed developing countries to free themselves from the Western-dominated structures and elaborate on a “self-reliance strategy” (Hunger 2003: 24). The world-system theory of international migration evolved from dependency theory and “historical analyses of the expansion of the global capitalist system from the sixteenth century onward by scholars such as Fernand Braudel (1981, 1982) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980).” The origins of international migration were linked, according to this theory, “not to the bifurcation of the labour market within particular national economies, but to the structure of the world market that has developed and expanded since the sixteenth century.” In other words, with the expansion of capitalist development, the shares of human population were also growing and coming under the influence of the world market economy (Massey et al.1993: 444-445). Thus, the effects of brain-drain that these theories assumed were underlined as detrimental for developing countries because the benefits and resources were asymmetrically distributed. This can still be witnessed nowadays: “in 2005, between one-third and one-half of the so-called developing world’s science and technology personnel lived in OECD countries”, hence, there is an “asymmetric distribution of benefits and resources (Faist 2010: 69). Indeed sending developing countries possess considerably lower numbers of highly skilled people: according to the statistical data of UNESCO (2003), while 3 out of 3000 people in developed countries were researchers, there were only 3 out of 10 000 people were researchers in developing countries (Guerrero and Bolay 2005: 2). 22 As a result, the brain-drain has negative implications for economic growth in the South “due to the loss in education, investment and the reduction in human capital (Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Lowell, Findlay and Stewart, 2004)” (Guerrero and Bolay 2005: 5). The argument of Findlay (2001: 2) that “if a nation loses significant numbers of its most educated, it stands to lose a critical asset that can damage the earnings of its low-skilled workers, increase poverty, and widen inequality”, can be taken as another negative effect of brain-drain. 22 According to the UNESCO data from 2009, a growing tendency (56 percent between 2002 and 2007) on numbers of researchers in developing countries was observed, where Asia i.e. China had the biggest share in it. In: UNESCO (2009): Number of researchers in developing countries is rising, according to UNESCO study, but women researchers still a minority. Available online: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/ news/number_of_researchers_in_developing_countries_is_rising_acc/

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In this connection, Galinski emphasized the moral side of brain-drain that suggest that highly skilled individuals, who out-migrate, must contribute to the development of their home-countries (Galinski 1986: 156). Particularly, the reparation or “taxing the brain-drain” was offered as compensation to developing countries for the loss of highly qualified workers (Hunger 2003: 11). So, “Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) proposed a tax on emigrants, with that tax levied by the receiving (developed-country) party and transmitted in one form or another to the sending (developing) country.” However, such a compensation method proved to be as non-feasible due to the “practical aspects of taxing nonresident citizens” since the taxation is “based on citizenship” and “extensive assistance from the receiving countries would be required” for a successful outcome. As a result, no developing country could get a profit from the taxation of its out-migrated citizens so far (Commander/Kangasniemi/Winters 2004: 245). Moreover, as Galinski noticed it would thereby hardly be possible to quantify the loss of developing countries and the gain for developed countries in this regard (Galinski 1986: 198). The brain-drain discussions, which were led from the development aid perspective, started to change from 1980s onward when globalization and worldwide networking processes in many areas became more visible. The “mobility of the highly qualified” became a well-known term to describe the migratory flows of highly qualified people (Hunger 2003: 12). With the advancement of globalization processes, new paradigms “transcending” national borders and “spanning” nation-states (Bloemraad/Korteweg/ Yurdakul 2008: 164) emerged. The new, third phase of MDN discussions, also known as “migration and co-development” (Faist 2010: 70) or “migration for development” (UNDP 2011) started in the mid-1990s and changed the brain-drain approached “dramatically” (Faist et al. 2013: 70). The discussions, which had been led previously within two dichotomies brain-drain (for sending countries) vs. brain gain (for receiving countries), were complemented by the assumptions that migration flows can also bear a circulatory and temporary character. Thus, the migration flows started to be recognized as not merely a linear (O’Reilly 2012: 64-65) process and ‘a one-way street’ but rather as having the potential to bring benefits for all sides: migrants, sending and receiving countries. As a result of this conceptual shift, new terms such as brain circulation (“circulation des élites” by Ladame, see Hunger 2003: 14) and reverse brain-drain (Yoon 1992) have been introduced. The concept of brain circulation or circular migration “involves migrants sharing work, family, and other aspects of their lives between two or more locations. It is usually differentiated from return migration, which refers to a single emigration and return after an extended absence.” This underscores that both

2.3 Alternative Definitions to the Brain-Drain

35

modes of movement have “important development” potential, which flourish with effective policy regulations (Graeme 2013: 2, 8). As Khadria (2010: 179) emphasized, the circulatory character of migration flows is encouraged through the shuttle “between temporary modes of stay (in the host country) and return (to the home country).” Thereby the focus on contributory elements for migrants’ source countries is not limited to transfer of merely “financial remittances and human capital”, but includes the transfer of social remittances and knowledge (Faist 2010: 70). It is assumed that through the transfer of social remittances, which are “ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital” (Levitt 2001: 3), and knowledge which include “new technological competencies, […], valuable management experience, entrepreneurial skills and access to global networks” (Cervantes and Guellec 2002), highly skilled migrants can bring positive changes in sending developing countries. The latter are acknowledged therefore as “agents of development and change” (Kleist 2008). In this regard it was emphasized that the “story is not simply about migration and development, but also transnationalization” (Faist 2010: 71). The term transnationalization (synonym transnationalism (Glick Schiller/ Bash/Blanc-Szanton1992) implies, in general terms, the “cross-border ties of individual and collective agents such as migrants, migrant associations, multinational companies, religious communities, which constitute a social category”. To avoid the “catch-all term” transnationalism, Faist deliberately applied the term transnationalization and two other concepts such as “transnational social spaces” and “transnationality” (Faist 2012: 51-52). Interestingly, while the transnationalization or transnationalism is approached nowadays from mainly sociological perspective, the adjective ‘transnational’ was initially used by political scientists. It was deployed to criticize the statecentred model in international relations in view of an increased number of supraand international regulatory forms and the raise of political, social and economic actors as well as the forms of organization. Further, there are significant differences of transnationalism from globalization. While globalization suggests the decentralization and deterritorialization of social processes, transnationalism processes are positioned within certain national territories and focus strongly on subject-, and action oriented perspective. Transnationalism accounts for relationnal and horizontal character of current political, economic and social processes and is interested for social actions and transactions that make the borders of a national state increasingly porous and permeable (translation from German, Mau 2007: 37). However, the role of state in transnationalism is not diminished, the state rather reinforces migrants’ transnational practices by “creating and sustaining transnational space. ”Thereby it should be differentiated between the transnationalism from “above” and “below.” The former implies “global governance

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and economic activities” and the latter concerns “everyday, grounded practices of individuals and groups” (Levitt 2011 63-66). An “antecedent”, “perhaps rather an accompanying” field of study to transnationalism is on diasporas (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012: 109). It had originally “specific and restricted meaning” and was used towards the “dispersal and exile of the Jews.” Gradually, this term covered “the involuntary dispersal of other populations, especially Armenians and people of African descent.” Starting with 1980s the diaspora is used for almost any kind of migrants (Kenny 2013: 1). According to the latest developments, the definition of diaspora included “a category of practice” that focuses “on the conditions and processes through which migrant or refugee groups define themselves as diaspora – or are ascribed this label by other actors in the country of residence (Brubaker 2005; Dufoix 2008).” Thus, if any migrant group has “an emerging sense of a collective identity related to a common point of origin” and a desire to keep or create the relationship with their home-countries”, it can be designated as diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012: 110). From the above-mentioned explanations it becomes clear that at different periods the relationship between migration and development had varied roles. If in the first MDN phase the development of sending countries was seen under the motto “ from migration to development”, the second phase considered the brain as reasoning by underdevelopment of source countries (Faist 20010: 69). The third phase, transnationalization, approached the brain-drain problematic through adding a circulatory element and introducing alternative terms such as brain circulation or reverse brain-drain. The latter stressed the importance of temporary return and the reversibility of brain-drain. Along with the existing potential of migrants through remittances and return migration, the transnationalization phase started to consider the special role of social remittances and knowledge as contributing elements to migrants’ countries of origin. The third MDN phase basically discovered the new “transformative potential of migrants’ cross-border economic, political and social activities” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012: 118). While focusing on the low return intentions of CA students as the indicator for brain-drain and the motivations behind it, the dissertation at hand integrates into the analysis also the aspect of transnationalization. In particular, the analysis covers both aspects: “temporary modes of stay” and “return” (Khadria 2010: 179) as having development potential through, particularly, transfer of social remittances and knowledge to sending CA republics. Both modes of movement are situated within the concepts of temporary return of student migrants (during the study years) and permanent return (after graduation) and interpret the former as temporary return (during the study years) and the latter as permanent return (after the graduation). The analysis is widened by the aspect of diaspora and aims to identify whether diaspora formation among the CA students and gra-

2.4 Summary

37

duates living in Germany takes place and to what extent it has the potential to contribute to the countries of origin. Moreover, the study at hand, though briefly, sheds light on the lives of CA graduates who returned to their home countries (repatriates). In other words, the dissertation focuses not only on the decision-making of students to come to Germany and their return intentions after the graduation in Germany (micro-level) but it is also interested in the questions; what happens after the migrants have moved to Germany and what happens to those, who after graduation returned to their home-countries (meso-level). Further, it is assumed that being “the outcome of the behaviour of an individual” migration has “an aggregate social form”, shifting thus “from micro level decision processes to forces operating on national or international levels” (Kurekova 2011:), which is the macro level of analysis. In return, the behaviour of migrants may determine how they can use the resources resulting from mobility for their own wellbeing, and for that of their communities and nations” (UNDP 2011). This shows how strong micro and macro levels of analysis of the migration processes connected with each other. De Jong and Fawcett (1981: 13) stated that the “different approaches are actually dealing with the same aspect of human social behaviour” i.e. “the determinants at the macro-level are motivations at the micro-level.” The macro-level analysis of the dissertation focuses on the policies of the receiving country Germany and of sending CA republics as entities that are able “to develop mechanisms and concepts to promote the potential inherent in migration” (GIZ 2017).

2.4

Summary

As mentioned earlier, the meta-level of this research is aimed at understanding what is going on with student migration from CA republics to Germany in order to be able to classify it within a certain phase or phases of the MDN. Following this aim, as the first step, the profile of student migrants under consideration was defined: these are degree-seeking students from CA, who attend full-time education programs at German HEIs. Further, it was explained, why the term student mobility can not be applied to student migration from the CA region. Due to the fact that student migration is an ‘open-ended’ migration type, it may be regarded as a channel for immigration challenging thereby its temporary status, which is in fact a highly-contested issue. Studies have been conducted on international student migration in Australia, which indicate that particularly the temporary status of student migrants make students’ position in this receiving

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country precarious, due to the various social and legal hurdles they have to overcome before they are recognized as fully-fledged residents. The same is true for Germany, as it was shown above, the study years are only recognized by half which prevent student migrants from applying for e.g. a settlement permit after the studies at a German HEI, although Germany’s immigration policy towards the highly qualified has been significantly liberalized in recent years. However, the ‘precarious’ position of student migrants does not make them give up, and as many afore-cited studies testified, the majority of foreign students have the intention to stay on in receiving countries, particularly in Germany. Many investigated sources demonstrated that there is an uncertainty regarding whether international students should be handled as highly skilled individuals prior to starting studies in a host country or after graduation there. In order to overcome this bias, the dissertation at hand deployed the definition of highly skilled individuals proposed by Guerrero and Bolay and under consideration of respective OS results, it concluded that tertiary student migrants are highly qualified and that their low return intentions pose the problem of brain-drain. Having clarified all these distorted aspects around student migration, a theoretical basis (MDN phases) to analyse and operationalize (in view of missing statistical data on the return rates of CA students from Germany) the student migration phenomenon has been delineated and the basis of levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro) was laid. In particular, the discussed theories showed that the brain-drain phenomenon is now approached from the perspective as having the potential to either reverse (promotion of permanent return) or to promote brain circulation (temporary return of migrants). It stressed thereby the potential of social remittances and knowledge as contributory elements for the development of particularly source countries. Moreover, the role of state was underlined as having a regulatory function for allowing this potential to flourish.

3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period

3.1

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: A Brief History

The newly independent states of Central Asia (CA): Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (known also as the Kyrgyz Republic), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan23 arose in the international arena in 1991 after the dissolution of the USSR. Located in an area of 3,994,300 sq. km and populated with primarily Turkicspeaking nations: Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbeks, Tajiks being Persianspeakers, Central Asia is a natural resources rich region sharing borders with Russia, China, Afghanistan and Iran. In contrast to other communist republics e.g. Baltic states, the sovereignty of the five CA states was not the result of national independence struggles but rather an inevitable response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. There were no serious efforts by local political elites to end Soviet rule in the region. As independence occurred without the individual populations struggling for it, the political leaders had no appreciation for it.24 Furthermore, history testifies that the CA population had no experience with democratic rule, neither in the middle ages, nor during the Tsarist period or the Soviet era. An invasive governing force from Moscow throughout the Soviet period did not provide political leaders in CA with an opportunity to get much practice to rule independently. Moreover, being the least economically developed among all former Soviet republics, the CA states were unprepared for their new sovereign status. Despite a growing anti-Soviet mood among the Union’s population “at the end of the 1980s, in the referendum held on 17th March 1991 on the future of the Soviet Union, over 90 percent of the Central Asians (98 percent in Turkmenistan) voted to remain within the Union” (Akiner 1995: 14-15). 23 This is a narrow defintion of Central Asia. There is also a broad defintion which encompasses other neigbouring countries e.g. Mongolia. 24 Earlier attempts by political elites in wider Turkestan to end the rule of Russian invaders in the first half of 20th century were brutally suppressed by Russian colonizers and have never resurfaced since then. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_3

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The transition period for CA states was a painful experience in terms of the extremely difficult social, political and economic conditions that they were confronted with. The enormous reserves of natural resources, particularly gas and oil of certain CA countries, did not adequately contribute to the development of local industries during the Soviet times. The countries served rather as “the primary source of raw materials” for the growth of economies in Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine; the so-called Slavic states (Snyder 1995: xxi). Having been thus a raw-material appendage in the Soviet Union, the CA republics inherited from particularly cotton industry, massive environment pollution, and the desiccation of the Aral Sea, which turned later into an environmental-catastrophe for the entire CA region. A huge wave of emigration of ethnic Russians and other national minorities from CA republics mostly to the Russian Federation soon after independence posed new administrative challenges for the political elites of the republics. This was due to the fact that many indigenous ‘new-comers’ at almost all levels of state power were not adequately trained due to a lack of professional education. Only a very small percentage of people had the opportunity to get professional training in Russia through being actively involved in the system of the Soviet power apparatus. Initially, demonstrating readiness to follow a democratic path, the independent CA rulers25 incorporated democratic principles and norms in the national constitutions that guaranteed a myriad of rights and freedoms for their citizens. The adoption of constitutional norms adhering to western standards in the beginning of 1990’s was made because it helped to consolidate and uphold political power; promising big investments and support. In fact these norms were largely misused by the CA ruling elites to increase their personal wealth and power. The CA leaders gradually established authoritarian and “constitutional-patronage regimes” (Efegil 2004). A strong patrimonial system has prevailed in all CA societies. The presidents, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan26, are de facto holders of order and stability and have the responsibility and right to appoint regional authorities. The latter carry out the same politics in their districts. All these allow the elite in power to strengthen their control and seize vital resources. For the ruling elite this structure is perfect for making fast profits, creating a small elite at the top that controls almost all resources while a large stratum of the population lives below the poverty line. Moreover, these structures of informal rule are very hard to break or disrupt which tends to drive away all possible rivals. Ordinary people

25 With a few exceptions, they were former leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. 26 In 2010 Kyrgyzstan changed from a presidential to a parliamentary republic.

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can not influence the decisions made by the government because of extremely weak democratic institutions. The constitutional-patronage regime has worsened mechanisms established in the Soviet era such as using personal ties, networks, corruption and other coercive means27 that in turn drastically undermine people’s trust in their government and, not least, in each other. Due to low wages and other reasons, bribery as a source of income became a norm in the society. Throughout the years Transparency International rated Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as some of the most corrupt countries in the world. Throughout the post-Soviet period “Central Asian nations have established a grimly familiar pattern for elections, be they presidential or parliamentary” (Kimmage 2006). The three CA republics also have security as a common concern. Due to their geographical and ethnic-religious compositions this question is essential for their survival. History has shown that the CA region has been a place for rivalries between different actors and it remains so nowadays. Regional actors such as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and other overseas players try to keep/establish their influences there with different measures, also with bloody ones. In this regard, the three CA republics have to juggle their national and external interests. Although there is a wide range of further similar patterns between the CA republics, each of these republics has at the same time its own specific features that make them unique. The next sections will focus on three cases of the research at hand - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – and approach them individually. 3.1.1

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a large country with the biggest territory among the CA republics and counts as the ninth largest country in the world (World Atlas n.d.). Comprising a multi-ethnic population, during the Soviet period Kazakhstan was the “only Soviet republic in which the titular nationality was a minority population.28 27 Even though the basic goods were provided by the state during the Soviet Times, the personal relations helped to get access to the deficit resources, elite education and higher positions in the government, and were an established ‘currency’ in the society. In: Kühnast, Kathleen and Dudwick, Nora (2004): Better a Hundred of Friends than a Hundred Rubles? Social Networks in Transition - The Kyrgyz Republic. Available online: http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/821201468774540164/pdf/297890PAPER00182131 589817.pdf 28 “During the Soviet period, the Russian and Slavic population actually represented a majority at one point, as the Russian population grew at a significantly faster rate than did

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3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period

According to the last Soviet census, taken in 1989, Kazakhs constituted 39.5 per cent of the population. Russians made up 37.7 per cent, Ukrainians (5.4. per cent) and the Belarusians (1.1 per cent), Slavs constituted around 44 per cent of the population” (Cummings 2003: 26). Hence, the emergence of the designation ‘Central Asia and Kazakhstan’ served to distinguish the Kazakh29 republic from other Central Asian states by its particular geographical location i.e. the closeness to Russia and the Eurasian character (Matveeva 2006: 12) 30 Historically, non-Kazakhs have been living in the northern part of Kazakhstan, which borders on Russia; some authors deem that this fact explains the moving of the capital from Almaty to Astana. Such governmental steps are explained in two ways: first is an official one, which states that “Almaty is both situated in an earthquake zone and unable to expand physically because of surrounding mountains” and the second explanation is that this step was made “to secure greater control over those northern border provinces” (Cummings 2003: 27). The second explanation seems more plausible if one takes into account massive reforms in favour of ethnic Kazakhs aimed at the restoration of national identity. As a consequence many Slavic people, mostly Russians left the country and moved to Russia. Despite an extensive outmigration of people of Russian descent, they still compose a solid share of Kazakh society and play a significant role in building the statehood.31 The Russian language has an official status32 in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that is different to Russian’s status as the language of inter-ethnic communica-

29 30

31

32

the Kazakh, largely due to the Soviet Union’s migration policies. Overall, Russians and other Slavs were dominant in all official and public spheres of life in Kazakhstan until independence, including the domination of culture, history and mass media, by the Russian language. This had the effect of a large percentage of the non-Russian population spoke Russian fluently by 1989 (72.9 percent), whereas very few Russians and other Slavs learnt Kazakh.” In: Minority Rights Group International (2017): Kazakhstan-Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusians. Available online: http://minorityrights.org/minorities/russians-ukrainiansbelarusians/ Author uses an adjective ‘Kazakh’, however many politicians of Kazakhstan would say ‘Kazakhstani’ emphasizing the multi-ethnic character of this state. From the point of author’s view such a designation sounds artificially. Incumbent Kazakh authorities widely employ this term too in order to demonstrate partially European nature of Kazakhstan trying to provide it with an access to some European institutions or events, which consolidate only European countries (e.g. participation in the UEFA Cup, the Chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)). In 2009 Russians made up 23.7 percent of the total Kazakh population, in Kyrgyzstan they accounted for 7.7 percent and in Uzbekistan only for 5.5 percent. For more information see: Central Intelligence Agency (2017): Central Asia: Kazakhstan. Available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html This fact may not contribute to the learning of Kazakh language among ethnic minorities.

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tions in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is constituted of a wide range of other nationalities including repatriated Kazakhs, who alone however could not solve the demographic crisis of the state. “TFR [Total Fertility Rate] during the 1990s fell well below replacement level, while the decline in life expectancy was more than five years” (Tolesh 2012). The population growth in Kazakhstan annually looked as follows: + 0.6 percent in 1990, - 0.3 percent in 2000 and + 1.4 percent in 2010.33 According to the estimations of the World Bank the population of Kazakhstan totalled 17.54 million people as of 2016 (World Bank 2016). Since independence in 1991 Kazakhstan has made enormous progress in developing its economy. A rash spurt forward was possible mainly thanks to the development of its energy sector with huge reserves of oil, and to a lesser extent, gas. The successful governmental strategy of opening the Kazakh economy to foreign investments brought the country “some $34 billion of outside investment, making it the highest FDI per capita rate among all CIS countries” (Matveeva 2006: 64). In view of its huge energy potential, Kazakhstan is considered to be one of the most geo-strategically important players in the CA region. By the World Bank Kazakhstan’s level of income is graded as “upper middle income”. The GDP (current US$) amounted to 184.5 billion in 2015. The life expectancy at birth was 69.6 (in years) in 2014. Kazakhstan’s international reserves amounted to 29.969 billion US$. The inflation rate was 8.3 percent in 2011, in 2012 – 5.1 percent, in 2013 – 5.8 percent and rose to 9.2 percent in 2014. The unemployment rate since 2011 has been between 5.4 percent and 5.2 percent (World Bank 2016). Kazakhstan’s economy is oriented first and foremost at the exploitation of natural recourses (oil and gas) and is characterized by some experts as “a rentier state, meaning that the nation rents its oil fields to the highest bidder. […]. Without this oil rent the economy and people would suffer” (Li/Molina 2014: 573). What is more, its incomes have not been distributed rationally among the Kazakh population: “only a small percentage of the population has benefited from raw materials” (Cummings 2003: 32). Therefore, it is obvious that the

33 “Population growth (annual %) in Kazakhstan was last measured at 1.43 in 2011, according to the World Bank. Annual population growth rate for year is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin.” See: Trading Economics (2017): Population growth (annual %) in Kazakhstan. Available online: https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/population-growth-annual-percent-wbdata.html

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human security34 issue in Kazakhstan is not guaranteed until such problems as inequality, poverty, disease (tuberculosis and poliomyelitis are widespread), high maternal and infant mortality, violation of fundamental rights, repression and such issues have not been solved. Even if Kazakhstan, in comparison with other republics under consideration, has made positive alterations in the economic sector and to a less degree in the socio-political sphere, there are still many problems to be solved. The solution of human security issue becomes extremely important if one takes into account Kazakhstan’s endeavour to enter the list of the 30 most developed countries in the world according to its Strategy “Kazakhstan 2030” and the followed document “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy” (BTI 2014). 35 The existing political system is monopolized by the executive power of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has held his position since Kazakhstan’s proclamation of independency in 1991. Even though some oppositional parties in Kazakhstan exist, they do not dare in their activities to overstep the limits prescribed by the President.36 37 As Matveeva vividly described, the President is “both a player and referee”; in company with his close allies he concentrates a huge state power. Other parties or groups must compete to gain the President’s sympathy in order to get a ‘piece of power cake’ (Matveeva 2006: 16-17). 34 The notion ‚human security’ was introduced initially in Human Development Report of UNDP in 1994. In: Kreikemeyer, Anna (2005): Menschliche Sicherheit in und für Zentralasien – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Available online: http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/archiv/themen/frieden/spezial143pdf.pdf 35 For more information regarding strategy see: Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. Available online: https://strategy2050.kz/en/ 36 The case of Nazarbayevs’ former son-in-law Rahat Aliyev demonstrates how political aspirations can be suppressed. Aliyev, once deputy foreign minister, who turned into a major political figure, challenged President Nazarbayev through his critique against the amendments to the Kazakh constitution that would permit the Kazakh leader to be de facto president for life. In the train, Aliyev faced fabricated charges against him and had to apply for asylum in Austria. In: Ferganews (2007): An interview with Rahat Aliyev. Available online: http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=1998 37 “Although Nazarbayev rejected a proposal to hand him the presidency for life in 2009, a constitutional amendment in 2010 gave him immunity from prosecution and made his family’s property effectively inviolable. In January 2011, at Nazarbayev’s request, the Constitutional Council blocked parliamentary proposals for a referendum that would have extended his current term through 2020. A snap election was called instead, with the necessary constitutional changes rushed through in February. After Nazarbayev’s only genuine opponents were disqualified or decided to boycott the race, he was left with three little-known competitors, all of whom publicly expressed support for him. Nazarbayev ultimately won 96 percent of the April vote. OSCE observers found that the election failed to meet democratic standards.” See: Freedom House (2012): Kazakhstan. Available online: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kazakhstan#.VLPQ9_4U_KI

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Some sources designated the political system of Kazakhstan as “dictablanda” (limited authoritarianism) meaning partial violation of human rights and limitation of political rights (Warkotsch 2006: 105). Kazakhstan, similarly to other CA republics, is still in the transition from communism to democracy. Moreover, Kazakhstan stands at the threshold of power transition, due to mainly the on-going presidency of President Nazarbayev, who will be turning 77 years old soon. Different political scenarios have been predicted so far, although peaceful models of power transfer seem to be most expected, as in the cases of postSoviet Turkmenistan and recently, Uzbekistan showed. However, the sudden death of the President as was the case in Turkmenistan would be “extremely undesirable for Kazakhstan, because it would be fraught with serious intra-elite conflicts” (Satpayev et al. 2013: 339). In 2013 a group of experts from Kazakhstan concluded that the following conditions such as “economic basis” (strong economy), “political will” (clear strategy) and “sequence” (long-term perspective) would be necessary for the peaceful transition of political power in Kazakhstan. These conditions must be based on principles such as; “political institutions” (that would act as a “buffer” and a “safety bag” during the political power change), “legal reform” (liberalization of political parties’ activities, of mass media and so on), “parliamentary reform” (strengthening of “the operating system of checks and balances” and i.e. of parliament’s role and the representation of parties), “party reforms” (political parties must have effective channels to influence political life through parliament, interaction with civil society and so on), “decentralization” (horizontal decentralization in terms of “separation of powers” and vertical in terms of “development of local self-government institutions”) and “strong economic foundation, based on the developed human capital assets (educational, health care, science and other reforms)” (Satpayev et al. 2013: 338-343). The progress so far: a “smooth and well-organized” power transition in Uzbekistan inspired Kazakh officials in December 2016 to host “the first meeting of a working group on the issue of redistributing powers between branches of government, established by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.” A number of important (re) appointments took place, however, whether they will be final is now unclear because the inner political dynamics change. How the various political actors will behave regarding the current and upcoming transitional changes in Kazakhstan, who indeed have more power and scope to act than their colleagues in Uzbekistan, are the questions which will decide the future (Pritchin 2017).

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3.1.2

3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan was designated in the past as an “island of democracy and the Switzerland of Central Asia” (ICG 2001). After gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan, similar to Kazakhstan, selected a ‘revolutionary’ path of development with a ‘shock therapy’ model. The Kyrgyz republic made positive steps in its new role as a sovereign state: opened its local markets for foreign investors, liberalised foreign trade and carried out numerous other reforms typical for the market economy, which resulted in the country entering the World Trade Organization (WTO)38 in 1998. However, faced with a number of significant problems i.e. few reserves of natural recourses39 and a high rate of poverty40, Kyrgyz governmental reforms were “patchy and […] have not been implemented fully” (Luckins 2003: 36). Kyrgyzstan’s level of income was graded as “lower middle income” by the World Bank. The country’s GDP (current US$) was estimated in 2016 as 6.6 billion. The total population in 2016 was 6.0 million. Life expectancy (in years) in 2015 was 70.0 years (World Bank 2016a). By providing international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with space for their activities in promoting liberties, freedoms, civic participation as well as liberal climate for the activities of the opposition, the first Kyrgyz President Akaev could obtain extensive financial support from the international community including western democracies and international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and so on. Akaev was supposed to be non-communist “but a wellregarded scientist open to western ideas” (Luckins 2003: 37). However, Akiner had a different opinion in this regard due to that fact that in 1986 Akaev held a senior communist Party post and “apart from specific appointments, he, like the others was formed in an environment in which at least superficial adherence to

38 Among the main benefits from the membership in the WTO is that member-countries gain wider access to the world markets through lower trade barriers and other favourable conditions. For more information see: The WTO (2017). Available online: https://www.wto. org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm 39 Unlike Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan’s natural resources are very limited. There are some gold supplies at the Kumtor mine managed by Kumtor Operating Company (Kyrgyz-Canadian JV); “its output made up 10.6% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP in the 1st quarter of 2002”. See: Kumtor. Presentation and history. Available online: http://www. winne.com/kyrgyzstan/to14.html 40 In 2015, 32.1 percent of Kyrgyz population lives blow the poverty line. ADB (2015a): Poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic. Available online: https://www.adb.org/countries/kyrgyzrepublic/poverty

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communist ideology was a basic requirement for anyone with career aspirations” (Akiner 1995: 24). The political situation in Kyrgyzstan started to deteriorate after October 29, 2000 which was provoked by unexpectedly high results in Akaev’s re-election (74 percent of votes). By that time, since 1998 with economic crisis in Russia, social conditions of the Kyrgyzstan’s population had worsened serving as a negative factor for the voters. Furthermore, the cases of corruption increased drastically, the decision-making process was highly centralized41 and opposition parties were suppressed. Serious opposition leaders and politicians of Ar-Namys party such as deputy chairman Emil Aliyev and party leader Feliks Kulov were arrested on charges of corruption and alleged fraud in 2000 (State.gov 2001). Many other prominent politicians were arrested and a veto was put on the oppositional press. The government of President Akaev could not reduce political and economic problems inside the country, which caused the population uprisings in different parts of the country. During one of the uprisings against the dismissal of the prime-minister and the resignation of the whole government in 2002 five demonstrators were shot dead and sixty two were wounded by Kyrgyz police. These uprisings or protests are said to be the first incidence in the history of the sovereign Kyrgyz Republic where violence “directly impacted the national government” (Jones 2011: 4). This negatively affected the image of Kyrgyzstan in the international arena. The initially somewhat liberal rule of President Akaev became authoritarian over the years. A broad consolidation of the state power using his family members and a radical decrease of supporters from the political elite weakened Akaev’s position significantly. The results of the parliamentary elections in February/March 2005 caused a lot of controversy among the opposition that led to overall instability in the country. The population protests increased. Akaev’s popularity declined even in the north of Kyrgyzstan, where it was traditionally higher than in the south. The opposition forces under the leadership of Kurmanbek Bakiev (20002002 he was the Prime Minister) carried out a wide range of anti-Akaev campaigns in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. This resulted in the population 41 The former president’s family was actively involved in the politics of the country and played a major role in it. Mayram Akaeva influenced her husband greatly in decisionmaking processes, she was thought, for instance, ‘to distribute’ seats in the government. Akaev’s daughter climbed her way to become Parliamentarian through the progovernmental party ladder of Alga Kyrgyzstan! (Kyrgyzstan, go forward!), and was seen as possible successor to her father. Her husband (ethnic Kazakh) – Adil Toigonbaev owned large enterprises of tobacco, construction materials, oil and alcohol etc. See: ICG (2004): Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects. Available online: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/81-political-transition-in-kyrgyzstan-problemsand-prospects.pdf

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demanding to overthrow the president. On May 24, 2005 the protestors stormed the White House in the capital Bishkek. Akaev and his family members fled to Russia most probably on that day, because the day before Akaev made some changes in his cabinet (ICG 2005: 8) In such a way the so-called ‘Tulip revolution’ put an end to the fourteen years’ rule of the first Kyrgyz President. It was not a revolution in a full sense of this notion, rather the change of an incapable regime, which became too weak to be in power and collapsed within less than an hour.42 After Akaev’s resignation only small political and economic changes in the system were initiated. The opposition leaders, who came to power after the regime replacement, were not well positioned to put Kyrgyzstan on a different course. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the new Kyrgyz President, could not even shape his administration. The state appointments represented “a mixture of opposition leaders and former office holders” who served in Akaev’s administration (ICG 2005:10). The Bakiyev’s position, stemming from the south of Kyrgyzstan, was fragile; the fear of Akaev’s associates returning or other rivals like Feliks Kulov43 was constantly looming. In order to strengthen his control he practiced a great degree of nepotism which made Kyrgyz political system very unstable. Kyrgyz statehood was close to collapse, since each political group fought for its own interests hindering the development of a national agenda and national interests of Kyrgyzstan (Saidazimova/Ibid 2008). Furthermore, the insatiable greed of the new elite hindered successful realization of economic reforms. The financial situation of people, who largely participated in protests to overthrow President Akaev, remained poor. In 2006 alone there were 29 protests and rallies that happened across the Kyrgyz republic. Some of them demanded resignation of officials, but some insisted on political and social reforms. A series of protests and demonstrations against Bakiyev’s rule demanding his resignation took place during his incumbency. As Jones noted in his analysis, “in other words, the Kyrgyz republic has adopted a culture of protest” (Jones 2011: 2). According to Matveeva, an obvious weakness of Bakiyev’s administration widened “the gap between formal and informal power.” Kyrgyzstan suffered from a “security vacuum” and became the only place in Central Asia where 42 President Akaev and his government that consisted at the end of less than ten people, failed to find a resolution for conflict issues putting, finally, the country in turmoil. 43 Kulov “was a political prisoner during Akaev’s rule […] and probably the most popular politician at the time”. After the regime change Kulov was appointed as Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan but Bakiyev’s strategy to gradually get rid of fellow revolutionaries and bring his relatives into key positions led to dismissal of Kulov from his Prime Minister position in 2007. See Saidazimova, Gulnoza (2008): Three years later the Kyrgyz President was taken to task for rampant nepotism. Available online: http://www.rferl.mobi/a/Three_ Years_On_Kyrgyz_President_Taken_To_Task_For_Nepotism_/1182894.html

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people’s physical security was at stake, and murders of prominent politicians and businessmen, threats, robberies and street violence proliferated. Criminal groups and security agencies were used against each other by power-holders” (Matveeva 2006: 21). Despite massive irregularities during his first-term of presidency, Bakiyev was re-elected in July 2009; though with many inaccuracies on the Election Day. Nonetheless his new term did not last long and on April 7th, 2010 as a result of harsh protests between armed people and security personnel, President Bakiyev was overthrown and fled to Belorussia. On the same day Rosa Otunbayeva, declared the interim government, becoming the first female President in CA, though only for a short-term. During her presidency she and her administration put forward a new constitution that increased the role of parliament and decreased presidential power limiting it to a single six-year term. On June 27th, 2010 the constitutional referendum took place and was followed by parliamentary elections on October 10th, 2010 and presidential election on October 30th, 2011. As Freedom House notes, Kyrgyzstan held its parliamentary and presidential elections as the “first genuinely competitive” elections, “becoming the first country in Central Asia to transfer political power by means of elections” (Freedom House 2012a). Since December 2011 Kyrgyzstan has been ruled by President Almazbek Atambayev. Despite some progress towards the democratic transition processes in Kyrgyzstan, there are however serious problems that have remained unresolved for decades. Ethnic clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, which have occurred several times, threaten to lead to more ethnic violence and the country’s instability. At least twice, in 1990 and 2010, such clashes claimed hundreds of victims – mostly Uzbeks. In the aftermath of violence in June 2010 Freedom House reported as follows: “One of the gravest challenges Kyrgyzstan’s government faces is arresting and prosecuting all perpetrators of the Osh violence. Most of the suspects arrested so far have been ethnic Uzbeks, despite the fact that most of the victims were also Uzbeks. Government officials are concerned that the prosecution of ethnic Kyrgyz could cause further unrest, and the fact that most law enforcement officials and judges in southern Kyrgyzstan are themselves Kyrgyz likely leads many to make decisions along ethnic lines”(Freedom 2012a)

The recently made amendments to the constitution of Kyrgyzstan granted “more authority to security services” and restricted judiciary powers. In practice this means that the government of Atambayev became constitutionally authorised “to disregard international law, arbitrarily restrict human rights in the name of state security, persecute LGBTI citizens, and weaken the judiciary” (Freedom House 2016).

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Thus, interethnic inequality, restrictive policies violating civil liberties, and as the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI 2016) noted, “continuous instability” have been the main challenges Kyrgyzstan has been faced with in recent years. 3.1.3

Uzbekistan

From the perspective of security, Uzbekistan is the most important country in the CA region. Its central location44 and densely populated territory (31.5 million of people in 2016) (World Bank 2016b) are seen by many CA experts as decisive factors for the ensuring stability of the whole region. The possession of natural resources as solid reserves of gas and gold45 are additional factors for the importance of the country. Nevertheless, “insufficient pipelines to export higher volumes of hydrocarbons and an aging energy infrastructure have slowed the production, distribution, and exports of hydrocarbons in recent years” (Facts and Details 2016). Uzbekistan’s level of income is graded as “lower middle income”. In 2015 the GDP was estimated as 67.1 billion (World Bank 2016b)). Since 1991 and until his death in September 2016 Uzbekistan was ruled by the first President Islam Karimov46. The latter was officially replaced by Shavkat Mirziyoyev in December 2016, who served in Karimov’s administration as Prime Minister 2013-2016. Under President Karimov Uzbekistan was in some way the continuation of the past Soviet system. Strong executive controls, the obedience of people and elite solidarity groups were clearly reminiscent of the Soviet totalitarian system. Moreover, the unfavourable business environment47 and massive human rights violations kept economic and political development of the country in deep stagnation. Starting with 1999 the Freedom House has rated Uzbekistan’s civil liberties and political rights between 6” and “7” (where 7 is the smallest degree of free44 In terms of borders (it shares borders with all four republics of CA including Afghanistan), trade and transport opportunities. 45 “Uzbekistan ranks the “world’s 13th largest producer of natural gas and 11th largest producer of gold”. It also has 31 percent of CA’s oil reserves. In: Export.gov (2016): Uzbekistan - Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction (2016). Available online: https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Uzbekistan-Mining-Quarrying-and-Oil-and-GasExtraction 46 Karimov died at 78 years old. 47 Uzbek economy was “largely driven by the state” which greatly limited attractive opportunities for potential investors and aggravated poverty. For more information see: Global Finance (2013): Regional report: Central Asia. Available online: https://www.gfmag.com/ magazine/julyaugust-2013/regional-report-central-asia

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dom and 1 is the greatest degree of freedom) and gave this CA country the status “Not Free” (Freedom House 1999). Despite signing a multitude of international documents binding Uzbekistan to human rights commitments, the Uzbek government drastically restricted and violated human rights after the Andijan [in Uzbek: Andijon] events in May 2005. Designated as a ‘massacre’ by Human Rights Watch, the popular uprising in the Uzbek city Andijan, which occurred in response to a trial of twenty three Andijani businessmen accused of membership in extremist organization ‘Akromiya’, was suppressed by local security forces killing hundreds of innocent civilians (Ikhamov 2006). The international community tried to put pressure on the Uzbek administration in this regard. It called for Uzbekistan to allow an independent (international) investigation into the massacre. However the Uzbek government denied the investigation declaring that the massacre in Andijan was an internal affair. In November 2005 the EU responded by imposing sanctions such as a visa ban for 12 Uzbek politicians, who were directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. Moreover, the export to Uzbekistan of “arms, military equipment and other equipment that might be used for internal repression” was banned too (ICG 2006: 2). In the aftermath of Andijan events the persecutions of NGOs, attacks on human rights activists and the curtailment of mandates of international organizations from the side of Uzbek authorities became a frequent practice. As a result of governmental harassment international NGOs and organizations such as Freedom House, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Internews, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Open Society Institute (OSI) were denied re-accreditation. They were accused of undermining the local government or provocation to revolution in Uzbekistan and were defined by Uzbek authorities as carrying out “political activities” or activities beyond the scope of the NGO’s mission” (VOA 2006). Except for a slight liberalization of the media in the late 1980s and early 1990s, during which some opposition newspapers and Islamic periodicals were published independently, media in the Republic of Uzbekistan have largely remained under strict state control although there was not any censorship officially. Religious freedoms have been harshly curtailed in Uzbekistan. Many individuals were imprisoned without proper investigation and judicial procedures, and were accused of crimes such as extremism, attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime and so on. The registration of religious organizations were widely prohibited and strictly controlled by the state. U.S. Department of State indicated the following: “There were reports of deaths in custody, torture, beatings, and other harsh treatment of prisoners the government considered religious extremists, and some

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reports of police beating members of unregistered religions. By continuing to deny registration to some religious groups and punishing members for their activities, authorities effectively deprived these individuals of their right to worship freely, which is also provided for in Uzbekistan’s constitution. NGOs estimate that approximately 10,000 to 12,000 people reportedly remain imprisoned on vague charges of religious extremism due to their religious beliefs or practice” (State.gov 2013). Bombing in 1999 in Tashkent and the Andijan unrest in 2005 were seen by some as signs of popular dissatisfaction with the governmental system i.e. poor economic performance and the lack of improvements and reforms throughout the years of independence. Indeed, the existence of extremist activity from the side of radical Islamists such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) cannot be denied. President Karimov’s stance on this activity, and his generally hardliner course, has been seen as his main appeal by ordinary people in Uzbekistan; believing the president curbed the radical Islamists and thus guaranteed the security and stability of the country. Uzbekistan was frequently compared to Tajikistan that suffered under the civil war, which lasted 1992-1997, or even Kyrgyzstan, which experienced a couple of coups. Nevertheless, through pursuing repressive policies and making no dynamic changes within society, Uzbek authorities contributed somewhat to religious extremism and terrorism, as the number of young people, who could be easily recruited by radical Islamists rose with the dissatisfaction of the youth with their government. The problem was solved superficially but not from inside meaning that the radical religious attitude was not vanquished. It is still early to evaluate the politics of Karimov’s successor; President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. What is clear so far is that Mirziyoyev is willing to improve and develop relations with neighbouring countries (e.g. with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) more dynamically than his predecessor. Also socio-economic (e.g. improvements in the debit card system) and political sectors (e.g. to a certain extent Uzbek citizens can freely send a petition to the president or any other governmental staff, media are allowed to broadcast critical issues) in Uzbekistan experienced some tangible changes but whether this will continue long-term, only time will tell. Moreover, the success of reforms depends much on the “regional and global challenges” (extremism, terrorism, water scarcity) due to the special location of Uzbekistan in particular and the CA region in general.

3.2 Migration Flows and Tertiary Student Migration

3.2

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Migration Flows and Tertiary Student Migration from Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

The disintegration of the former USSR in the early 1990s caused significant migration in the whole post-Soviet Central Asia. Among the émigrés were large numbers of people of Slavic and other origins e.g. Krim-Tatars, repatriates of German origin (Spätaussiedler), Jewish quota refugees (jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge), and to a lesser extent, individuals who moved for family (re)unification purposes, labour and study migrants, refugees and irregular migrants. Therefore it should be differentiated between émigrés who initially moved on a temporary basis like labour (seasonal) migrants and study seekers (student migrants) and the rest of migrant groups, who had the intention to leave their source countries permanently. Large numbers of people of Slavic and other origins out-migrated towards primarily Russia and other destinations of their historical origins. During the period between 1992 and 2003 there were 35.3 percent of migrants from Kazakhstan to Russia, 13.9 percent from Uzbekistan and 6.2 percent from Kyrgyzstan (Tishkov/Zayinchkovskaya/Vitkovskaya 2005:10). The substantial share of people of mainly German and Jewish origins, moved outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) i.e. to Germany, Israel and the US. Among the three focus countries, Kazakhstan experienced the highest population loss: “according to the 2000 census, 2 million people departed Kazakhstan since 1989, or 12% of its original population.” Between 1992 and 2002, with 28.5 percent of emigrants outside the CIS region, Kazakhstan counted, after Russia (38.6 percent), as the second-largest country as compared to other CIS’ states. Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s emigration rate was comparatively high in the CIS space too. It composed about 10 percent of the whole emigration rate outside the CIS region (Ibid, 15). With some exceptions48, it must however be emphasized that this massive movement of people from these CA countries and the CA region in general, was different from the forced migration from conflict zones like the South Caucasus. For the most part people from that region fled from the long-lasting dangers of violence between different ethnic groups (e.g. between Armenians and Azerbaijanis). There were different kinds of motives for the outmigration from the CA: economic motives, ethnic motives e.g. a non-willingness of ethnic Russians to become “second-class” citizens, dissatisfaction with political regimes, increased 48 Most well known of them: ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan in 1989; between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990.

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criminal rates, an extreme pollution of environment etc. (Sulaimanova 2004: 379). 49 Statistical data provided in this section are based mainly on international sources, while local statistical data are scanty and neither systematic nor reliable. Moreover, the available statistical data for some indicators within three CA republics and in the CIS in general are indeed non-comparable with each other since mostly non-standardized methods are used for data collection. Such a complexity of statistical information and their deficits in the CIS region can be explained by historical, institutional, geographical and definitional aspects (BAMF 2012: 133). While in general, permanent migration is well documented by even national sources, temporary migration i.e. labour migration, suffers some deficits. The data on labour migration, especially low-skilled labour migration, seem to be extremely inaccurate due to a partially illegal character of this migration type. Indeed, the actual numbers of labour workers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in Russia and Kazakhstan may be much higher than those of national and international sources. The figures on student migrants from the countries under consideration, who leave their source countries for tertiary study purposes, are comparatively well systematized. The latter relates to specifically receiving countries’ sources, in this case Germany’s Federal Statistical Office, BAMF and other sources such as EUROSTAT and UNESCO. The numbers of tertiary students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan studying at the EU countries are given below. The data gathered from sending CA countries’ sources differ from those of receiving country Germany and other Western sources, varying from country to country significantly, and are not always reliable. The statistical data on student migration from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Germany cover different kinds of students, who come to Germany as self-financing students, as scholarship-holders receiving funds from either national, German or other sources. According to these types of students, there are various programs and ways to start a long-term tertiary study with earning an academic degree from a German HEI. They vary between short-term exchange programs, language courses, internships, voluntary year and preparatory colleges (Studienkollegs). Moreover, young people from CA often use a non-academic program called “Au-Pair” (AuPair n.d.), as the first step to start tertiary studies in Germany later on. This is often the case for those people, who do not possess the initial qualifications to immediately start studies e.g. insufficient level of German language 49 Motives of CA students considering to study in Germany and other aspects are discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.

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or unfulfilled diploma requirements etc. However, the “au-pair” program is also used by many young people, who fulfil the official requirements to start studying at a German HEI, but have strictly limited financial opportunities and can not finance their studies in Germany. In particular, in order to get the student visa issued, a proof of funds to the amount of 8.640 EUR50 at least for one study year must be provided by applicants from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the German Embassy in Tashkent. Therefore if an applicant does not possess such a large amount of funds, or a scholarship, and/or does not have a guarantor to attest to his or her creditworthiness, the option to start as “au-pair” remains the most realistic. During the working period as “au-pair”, interested individuals have the opportunity to save their pocket money or even to work additionally, if the guest family allows it. Sometimes guest families act as guarantors to the creditworthiness of their “au-pairs” during the student visa issue, thus, enabling the latter to stay on in Germany for study purposes. Marriage is another non-academic method to initially move countries and start tertiary studies there. The study at hand focuses on tertiary students, who came to Germany with a student visa, either as scholarship-holders or as a non-scholarship holder. The tables below show the favourite study destinations for Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek students during the period between 1995-2007, where Germany takes prime position. Figure 1was compiled from the data, which included a broad spectrum of countries. 10 countries with most significant numbers of Kazakh students were identified. Among these countries the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Czech Republic show a steady increase in student numbers and have been the leading destinations for Kazakh students in recent years. The number of students from Kazakhstan to Turkey was initially higher compared to these countries, however starting with 2002 it constantly dropped over time. After the UK Germany as study destination is the second-favourite country for Kazakh studyseekers. It is interesting to note that Czech Republic has dynamically increased the number of students from Kazakhstan since 2004.

50 This amount was calculated assuming living costs amounting to 720 EUR monthly. Available online: http://www.taschkent.diplo.de/contentblob/3533004/Daten/6890367/ Studium_Merkblatt_Download.pdf; http://www.bischkek.diplo.de/contentblob/40924 80/Daten/7445704/Merkblatt_Studium.pdf and http://www.kasachstan.diplo.de/content blob/4929944/Daten/7375994/mb_studium.pdf

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Figure 1: Tertiary study destinations of students from Kazakhstan (1995-2012)

According to figure 2, the main destinations for higher education for Kyrgyz students in the period between 1995 and 2012 were Turkey, Germany, Austria and France. In this case too, Germany is the second-top study destination for students from Kyrgyzstan. Turkey has been the primary destination for students from Kyrgyzstan for many years and has remained so since the mid-90s. Noticeable in the case of Kyrgyz students is that the UK seems to be the least favourite country for tertiary study purposes, obviously due to financial reasons i.e. high study fees in this country. In the period under consideration, Uzbek students’ main study destinations were Germany, Turkey and the UK, France and Czech Republic (see figure 3). Germany, hence, is for Uzbek students the top destination country, replacing Turkey as the leading country from the end of 90s - beginning of 2000s. Germany is followed nowadays by the UK. Latvia earns a special mention because the numbers of Uzbek students in 2012 almost doubled.

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Figure 2: Tertiary study destinations of students from Kyrgyzstan (1995-2012)

Figure 3:

Main tertiary study destinations of students from Uzbekistan in the Western countries and Turkey (1995-2012)

From table 1 it becomes evident that starting with the academic year 1992/93 until 2011/2012 Germany has steadily increased intake of students from the three CA republics under consideration. Kazakhstan heads the list, followed by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan has the smallest population rate in this group of countries, while Uzbekistan has the largest share of the population among these and the CA republics generally.

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Table 1:

3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Period

Numbers of tertiary students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Germany

Years WS 1992/93 WS 1993/94 WS 1994/95 WS 1995/96 WS 1996/97 WS 1997/98 WS 1998/99 WS 1999/00 WS 2000/01 WS 2001/02 WS 2002/03 WS 2003/04 WS 2004/05 WS 2005/06 WS 2006/07 WS 2007/08 WS 2008/09 WS 2009/10 WS 2010/11 WS 2011/12

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

24 52 102 148 198 263 341 431 466 581 759 876 975 1064 1112 989 1103 1136 1096 1127

1 1 6 11 19 37 74 112 163 212 289 386 446 494 517 527 627 660 665 689

1 6 9 27 51 80 119 152 234 311 402 520 621 724 785 853 885 974 1.000 1.046

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt and Eurostat WS – Winter Semester; however it covers a whole academic year.

For comparison, in table 2 are the numbers of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek students, who have studied in Russia. The huge numbers of tertiary students from Kazakhstan in Russia, and to a less degree from Kyrgyzstan in Russia, are hardly comparable with those numbers of students, who studied in the European countries and Turkey as cited in the figure 1-3 and table 1. This ‘Russian phenomenon’ can be explained by the “absence of visa regime, closeness of culture, mentality and geographical location.”51 51 Isakulov, S. (2010): The State Control of Migration in Uzbekistan and the Some Aspects of its Further Improvement. Available online: http://econpapers.repec.org/article/ pdcjrpieb/v_3a6_3ay_3a2010_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a112-115.htm (11.12.2014)

3.3 Germany’s Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Table 2:

Flows of mobile students at the tertiary level (ISCED 5 and 6) from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Russia (2000-2007)

Year/Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

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Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan

15300 18486 20022 18501 20098 20780 18787 19627

1010 1244 1226 659 715 838 870 765

2860 3288 2462 1504 2430 3190 4391 5566

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt

In this regard, it would be interesting to know the intentions of CA students studying in Russia. Particularly, whether the majority return to their countries of origin or stay on in Russia or even move to third countries e.g. Western Europe.

3.3

Germany’s Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan within the Framework of the EU and Bilaterally

With more than12 million migrants in 2015 Germany was the second most popular migrant destination after the United States of America (USA). However, with 14.9 percent of “immigrant share of total population” Germany took in the most migrants relative to population size (Migration Policy Institute 2015) (MPI 2015). The internalization of Germany’s higher education landscape has been developed in recent years significantly. As data from 2015 shows the number of international students enrolled at German HEIs, reached 321.569, accounting for 11.9 percent of all students enrolled in Germany (DAAD 2016). International students in Germany are differentiated between two groups: Those, “who did not do their schooling in Germany” and have “a foreign higher education entrance qualification” – “Bildungsausländer” and those, who received an entry qualification for a German HEI as a result of schooling in Germany – “Bildungsinländer” (DAAD 2013). The focus of this dissertation are Bildungsausländer, those who initially came to Germany to pursue tertiary studies. In 2015 the Bildungsausländer (+8 percent) have increased in number more than the Bildungsinländer (+4 percent) as compared to 2014. Chinese and Indian

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students constituted a leading group among Bildungsausländer from third-countries (38 percent), followed by Russian students. Foreign students from European countries’ who, with 44 percent, formed the biggest group of Bildungsausländer (DAAD 2016). According to the latest data, around 15.4 million people worldwide are learning German. The largest group of German learners are Polish people (2.28 million), and China, to take one example, has doubled the numbers of German learners in the last 5 years (Federal Foreign Office 2015). Uzbekistan belongs to the fifth (in absolute numbers) largest group of German learners worldwide (Federal Foreign Office 2017). Germany’s cooperation with CA republics takes place at both the bilateral and the EU level. Starting with the EU’s cooperation it can be assumed that apart from the regional approach of the EU towards CA republics, there is to some extent an individual cooperation of the EU with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In this regard it has to be noted that after many years of the EU’s relations with CA republics, the important question that is posed is whether the EU should better approach the CA republics as a homogeneous unity or an individual approach toward them is more promising (Böttger and Plottka 2017). The EU considers CA region as a geostrategic area, as a “bridge” linking the EU to China, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Also, vast energy sources of the CA region are interesting for the EU to import from. In the initial phases the EU relations with CA republics was based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), which were signed bilaterally with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1995 and with Uzbekistan in 1996 but entered into force in 1999 (European Commission 2017). The PCAs serve as a framework for the cooperation with individual CA republics that put forward “market economy and democratic values, including political dialogue and the rule of law” (European Commission 2004). One of the important milestones in EU relations with the CA region was the EU-Central Asia Strategy, which advanced the cooperation and replaced the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). TACIS provided the CA states with extensive support in the initial phases of transformation from planned to the market economy. The EU-Central Asia Strategy was initiated during the EU presidency of Germany in 2007 (Böttger and Plottka 2017). Already in July 2006 the Federal Foreign Office of Germany gave the first signals about the course of future German EU presidency by reshaping its eastern policy. Better known as the New Eastern Policy, Germany determined its presidency in three key directions: deepening of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Realignment of European-Russian relations and elaboration of the EU-Central Asia Strategy. The EUCentral Asia Strategy or Strategy for a New Partnership that was supported by

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the European Commission’s assistance program encompassed a seven year period (2007-2013) and provided the EU’s doubled financial commitment of around € 750 million. This financing was allocated under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) in addition to the assistance that had been provided on a bilateral level basis and by other international financial institutions. The Strategy covered 7 priority areas: 1.“Human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation”; 2.“Investing in the future: youth and education”; 3. “Promotion of economic development, trade and investment”; 4.“Strengthening energy and transport links”; 5.“Environmental sustainability and water”; 6. “Combating common threats and challenges”; 7.“Building bridges: inter-cultural dialogue” (Council of the European Union 2007) (Council of the European Union 2007). An underlying motive for the elaboration development of this strategy was the interest in the EU to diversify energy sources. In addition, the CA republics are geographically close to Afghanistan which makes the security question highly relevant. The region could also facilitate the development of a transcontinental transport infrastructure that connects Europe, Russia and Central Asia (Federal Foreign Office 2012). Through this initiative, the EU’s presence in the CA region became more or less visible, however many challenges in the EU’s involvement in the CA region (possible reduction of the above-mentioned priorities, finding balance between pragmatism and values) remained. The Latvian EU presidency tried to reconsider the involvement of the EU - Central Asia Strategy in 2015 and elucidate open questions. But due to bad timing i.e. that the financial and other instruments for CA states for the 2014-2020 had been already fixed, the Latvian initiative failed. Therefore the endeavour to pass the EU Strategy through reforms has to wait until 2019/2020 when the next financial framework will be discussed (Böttger and Plottka 2017). At the level of bilateral relations with the EU, Kazakhstan has enjoyed a special status that culminated with a new level of Kazakh-EU relations in December 2015. In that period an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed which will replace the PCA once ratified by all EU members and the European Parliament. This document reinforces “political dialogue, cooperation in justice and home affairs among other sectors”, and advances mutual relations in trade and investment. Also, the cooperation in 29 key policy areas such as energy, environment, education research and so on will be deeply enhanced (European Union 2016). So far, the EU is Kazakhstan’s “primary trade partner” and “largest foreign investor” with over 50 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While the EU countries profit from exports to Kazakhstan of machinery, pharmaceuticals and other products, Kazakhstan attracts the EU as an entirely raw materials country exporting oil and gas (93 percent), chemicals and similar products. In 2015, with

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strong support of the EU, Kazakhstan became the second CA member of the WTO after Kyrgyzstan (Ibid). Unlike Kazakhstan, bilateral cooperation of the EU with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is based solely on a PCA. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements cover three main sectors such as development in political, economic as well as trade spheres52 Being a member of the WTO since 1998, Kyrgyzstan was granted in the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) in 2016, which allows this CA country to “diversify its exports and strengthen its economy” (European Union 2016a). Moreover, the EU is one of the main donors of Kyrgyzstan within the development politics and their relations are described as “partnership for development”. Within the framework of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the EU allocated 184 million EUR at the bilateral level for the period between 2014 and 2020. The key areas of bilateral aid are “integrated rural development, education and the rule of law” (European Union 2017). In the past the bilateral relations of Uzbekistan with the European Union experienced a deep crisis. Following the massacre in Andijan in May 2005, the EU responded to Andijan events by imposing sanctions against Uzbekistan in November 2005. These sanctions covered the visa ban for twelve Uzbek politicians, who were directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, the export to Uzbekistan of “arms, military equipment and other equipment that might be used for internal repression” was banned too (ICG 2006). Nevertheless, right from the beginning the EU had to think about finding a balance between its energy and security interests and the sensitive issue of human rights in Uzbekistan. Germany’s role in this regard was crucial. Shortly after the sanctions had entered into force in November 2005, Germany allowed one of the previously banned Uzbek politicians to enter the country for the purpose of medical treatment or on humanitarian grounds. During his political tour through the CA republics in November 2006, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier visited Uzbekistan and articulated the EU’s readiness to ease sanctions if the human rights situation in Uzbekistan was improved. During its EU Presidency Germany pushed EU foreign ministers to drop the sanctions, which were suspended in October 2007 for six months with their potential reapplication if the human rights situation would not be improved. One year later, in October 2008 the visa ban for Uzbek politicians was abandoned. The arms embargo was 52 For details see: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Uzbekistan. Available online: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/116743.htm and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kyrgyzstan. (05.11.2014). Available online: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/html/116742.htm (05.11.2014)

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ultimately lifted by the EU in October 2009. This act of the EU was strongly criticized by human rights groups and organizations, whose main argument was that an independent investigation did not take place and the human rights record was not improved at all although some reforms on the side of Uzbekistan were made: abolishment of the death penalty and the release of some prisoners. The EU’s role as democracy promoter was hence questioned. Uzbekistan is not a member in the WTO, but benefits from the EU’s GSP. Recent projects of the EU in Uzbekistan support “rule of law and criminal justice reform, social services - in particular mother and child health and inclusive education — rural development, civil society and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).” As compared to Kyrgyzstan, the financial aid for Uzbekistan is modest considering the population is 5 times greater than that of Kyrgyzstan: 168 million EUR between 2014-2020. And this figure is a 124 percent increase compared with the previous period between 2007-2013 (European Union 2016b). The latter makes clear that the partnership of the EU with Uzbekistan is the least developed and has been determined throughout the years by the EU’s conditional policies. This is obviously due to Uzbekistan’s record in human rights and democracy issues. Germany has the leading role in the EU, correspondingly Germany’s bilateral relations with three CA republics are significant. Germany is the only country of the EU that has diplomatic representations (embassies) in all five CA republics (Rule of law n.d.). Within the EU, Germany has the largest share from trade partnerships with CA republics (World integrated trade solution 2017). 3.3.1

Germany and Kazakhstan

Despite the economic crisis in 2015, Kazakhstan is Germany’s fourth largest oilsupplier and the “most important trading partner in Central Asia.” German-Kazakh cooperation in education and cultural spheres is manifold. It comprises extensive opportunities for the local population to learn German language at numerous centers of the Goethe Institute. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) supports interested students to attend specialized summer schools, language courses as well as of German HEIs to obtain academic degrees. The state funded scholarship program “Bolashak” operates with the support of DAAD staff members too. “Bolashak” scholarship-holders, who come to Germany for study purposes at a HEI, are provided with many kinds of assistance e.g. logistical support by the DAAD. Partnerships between German and Kazakh schools and the HEIs of both sides are highly developed. Apart from a great opportunity for junior diplomats to participate in respective training courses in Germany, young people from the Kazakh republic can annually participate in the international parliamentary internship program of the German Bundestag. The latter

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is a unique offer from the German government for Kazakhstan since it is the only country in the CA region, which was included in this program. The German-Kazakh University (DKU), which was established in 1999, is one-of-a-kind in the whole CA region. DKU provides its students with a double-diploma after their attendance for a semester or more at any German HEI. As compared to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan is also known for having the highest rate of German ethnic minority, who used to live in this country throughout the second half of the 20th century. It composes 1.1 per cent of the total population in Kazakhstan and regularly gets funded by Germany. “The origins of most of the German minority in Kazakhstan can be traced back to Stalin’s edict of 28 August 1941 ordering the deportation of ethnic Germans from Russia’s Volga Region.” After the dissolution of the Soviet Union 800.000 ethnic Germans emigrated towards their historical motherland. (Federal Foreign Office 2017b). 3.3.2

Germany and Kyrgyzstan

According to an official position of the German Federal Foreign Office (2017a), the existence of a substantial German minority in the early 1990’s (about 100.000 people) in Kyrgyzstan became a milestone for an intensive post-Soviet cooperation between the two countries. Kyrgyzstan gained its independence on August 31, 1991 and one year later, in 1992 Germany opened its diplomatic mission in Kyrgyzstan. Nowadays there are about 8.000 Kyrgyz citizens of German origin, who are actively supported by the German government through various cultural, social and education projects. Since 1991 the presidents of Kyrgyzstan have visited Germany regularly: the first president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev visited Germany 3 times. The current President Almazbek Atambayev was in Berlin in 2015 and 2017. A number of official visits have been made since then by the German side too: by the Federal President in 1998, Federal Foreign Minister in 2010, Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development in August 2012. In 2016 several German officials visited Kyrgyzstan: Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier, Federal Chancellor Merkel in 2016 and Federal Minsiter of Food and Agriculture Schmidt (Ibid). Talking about the economic cooperation between Germany and Kyrgyzstan one should firstly stress the cooperation in the development sector. The latter is comprised of two priority areas including “sustainable economic development and health care” for Kyrgyzstan (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development n.d.). Germany counts as one of the largest bilateral donors to Kyrgyzstan and implements a substantial number of its projects through GIZ

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(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit/German Organization for International Cooperation) (BMZ 2017). Since 1993 the amount of technical and financial support to Kyrgyzstan from Germany has accounted for nearly 306 million EUR. Separate funds have been allocated by Germany within the framework of multilateral development cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Asian Development Bank, World Bank and other institutions. The existing trading relations between Kyrgyzstan and Germany are insignificant and mainly account for imports of German goods to Kyrgyzstan. “In 2015, Kyrgyz imports from Germany were worth almost 51.1 million euros, while exports to Germany amounted to a mere 12.8 million euros” (Federal Foreign Office 2017a). German firms have little interest to reside in Kyrgyzstan due to corruption, legal uncertainty, inadequate taxes and customs duties and other practices. Moreover, Germany represents the opinion that economic problems account for political instability like e.g. the political instability between April and June 2010, which led to a strong household’s deficit (Deutsche Botschaft Bischkek n.d.). At that time the so-called Kyrgyz revolution took place leading to the escalation of ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, as it was thoroughly explained in section 2.1. In contrast to bilateral trading relations, there are quite vital relations between Kyrgyzstan and Germany in education and cultural spheres. The German language is promoted not only for ethnic Germans but also for all interested people in Kyrgyzstan. This is done through the provision of special assistance to 8 (before 10) Kyrgyz schools by an initiative “Schools: Partners for Future”, Goethe Institute and the Central Agency of Germany for Schools Abroad. Unfortunately, as the German side noted the teaching of German in Kyrgyzstan has become problematic due an “increasingly widespread use of the Kyrgyz language in teaching and the growing popularity of English at the country’s schools” (Federal Foreign Office 2017a). Although there is not a Goethe Institute in Kyrgyzstan, it is represented by a German reading room, a language learning center whose work is fully or partially supervised and coordinated by the Goethe Institute located in Almaty (Ibid). Also the DAAD, the largest scholarship organization, is represented in Bishkek with its Information Center (IC). It regularly supports Kyrgyz students, scientists and academics to pursue different types of study and research in Germany. Since 1991 DAAD awarded almost 1000 scholarships for talented Kyrgyz people, who pursued their studies or research in Germany. It makes up about 70 scholarships every year. Currently there are 10 partnerships between German and Kyrgyz HEIs (Deutsche Botschaft Bischkek n.d.): for example between the Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University and Free University Berlin (FU).

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Germany and Uzbekistan

Turning to Uzbekistan under President Karimov one can see a complicated picture of relations of Uzbekistan both with the EU and Germany bilaterally. An investment climate in Uzbekistan was harsh for foreign partners. Such difficulties as “the issue of currency conversion, bureaucracy, lack of legal certainty and localisation requirements” were and are still the main obstacles in this regard. Germany, hence, is foremost a trading partner not an investor. In 2016 Germany (2.1 percent) ranked 7th among the trading partners of Uzbekistan after Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, South Korea and Afghanistan. Only few big German investors are represented in Uzbekistan e.g. Knauf, Man and so on (Federal Foreign Office 2017). Political relations with Uzbekistan, especially for Western partners, have been for years even more challenging. Known for having the worst record of human rights in the CA region, Uzbekistan’s political image deteriorated significantly after Andijan massacre that was described above. However, it was Germany that made efforts to ease EU sanctions that were imposed to Uzbekistan by the EU following the violence in Andijan in 2005. This can be explained by particularly Germany’s willingness to keep the German military base in Uzbeki53 stan and the EU’s ‘Realpolitik’ interests (energy and security of the region) in a wider sense. Hence, Germany’s overall tolerant attitude towards different kinds of violations and harassments in Uzbekistan and its leading role in the EU, contributed in turn to Germany remaining the most important EU partner for Uzbekistan (Ibid 2017). Germany’s presence in Uzbekistan is visible especially in the cultural/education sphere. Today Germany and German culture are represented in Uzbekistan through the Goethe Institute, the Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA), German Adult Education Association (DVV) and secondary and grammar schools with intensive learning of German language (Federal Foreign Office 2017). These schools are part of an initiative “Schools: Partners for the Future”, which are aimed at expansion of “particularly in the growth economies of Asia, the Middle East and in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia” (Federal Foreign Office 2015). There are also German reading rooms in Samarkand and Tashkent and a service point in Fergana. Goethe Institute’s courses are in

53 In the period between 2002 and 2015 Germany’s “Federal Armed Forces used the air transport base in the southern Uzbek city of Termez for their missions in neighbouring Afghanistan.” In: Federal Foreign Office (2017): Uzbekistan. Available online: http:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Usbekistan _node.html

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great demand, and as mentioned above, “Uzbekistan ranks fifth in absolute numbers of German learners” worldwide (Federal Foreign Office 2017). After Russian and English, German is the third most taught foreign language at Uzbek schools. There are more than 2000 schools teaching German language, where 400.000 pupils learn German. At almost 64 HEIs of Uzbekistan one can study German. At 12 of them there is a chair or a faculty of German philology; at 3 of them German lectors teach. Regular advanced trainings are offered for German teachers by Goethe Institute, ZfA and the German Embassy in Tashkent (Deutsche Botschaft Taschkent n.d.). In this regard it is interesting to note that on December 10th, 2012 the presidential decree on “Measures to improve the learning system of foreign languages” was issued. It envisages the learning of foreign languages such as English, German and French starting already with primary schools and the general increase of teaching hours for learning foreign languages at schools and HEIs of Uzbekistan (O’zbekiston Respublikasi Halq Ta’limi Vazirligining Ahborot – Ta’lim Portali (2013). Unfortunately, the Information Centre (IC) DAAD in Tashkent has been closed by the Uzbek authorities since 2013. This was done due to the ‘unclear’ status of the DAAD, from the perspective of the authorities, who required the DAAD in Uzbekistan to take an NGO status. There are still DAAD lectors at Uzbek HEIs who were forced to adjust their services in providing full information and support regarding study and research in Germany. They have continued their work through the cultural department of the German Embassy in Tashkent (Deutsche Botschaft Taschkent n.d) meaning that for all information and application procedures, interested candidates must initially contact the German Embassy in Tashkent (DAAD 2016).54 The suspension of the IC DAAD work in Uzbekistan is partly due to the fact that there have been significant numbers of DAAD scholarship-holders from Uzbekistan throughout the years, who have been reluctant to return home after qualifying in Germany. This circumstance apparently posed a problem for the local administration in Uzbekistan.55 Thanks to the “modus operandi” of German authorities, the closure of the IC DAAD in Uzbekistan did not influence, at least much, the number of applicants from Uzbekistan (DAAD 2016).

54 Information and application procedures can be found here: Posol’stvo Federativnoy Respubliki Germaniya (n.d.): Visshee obrazovanie v Germanii I stipendii dlya obucheniya v nemezkih vuzah. Available online: http://www.taschkent.diplo.de/Vertretung/ taschkent/ru/06/Studieren__in__Deutschland/Studienberatung__Seite.html 55 Excerpt from the interview with a German education worker in Tashkent.

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The DAAD employers based in Uzbekistan, largely, see the following concrete problems: on the one hand, at the working level there are tightened controls over and a rising pressure on them and other German personnel. On the other hand, although there is economic development in the country, the national higher education system is underfinanced which surely affects its quality. In this connection, there are extremely high numbers of interested candidates who want to study in Germany either with scholarship or without. These high numbers of potential candidates are non-proportional towards the offered numbers of scholarships. And this can be mostly explained by the low quality of many applicants, who account mostly for rural students (Ibid). This implies that if the quality of Uzbek candidates rises, the number of DAAD scholarships would rise too. In view of Uzbekistan’s rich architectural heritage and the need for its proper preservation, the cooperation with Germany for the restoration of historical monuments in Uzbekistan has been well developed and Germany supplied a lot of support (Deutsche Botschaft Taschkent n.d.).

3.4

Summary

The three CA republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are similar in many ways (cultural aspects, mindset etc.), but also different. The differences became strongly visible after the collapse of the Soviet Union and manifested in the reformation processes. Three republics went along different paths to develop in particular their socio-economic and political situations. If Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were in favour of rash reforms, Uzbekistan supported “evolutionnary”methods and very cautiously approached different kinds of innovations. Economic opportunities for each country mostly determined the development of other sectors. The huge energy resources of Kazakhstan allowed it to make largescale changes inside the country. Kyrgyzstan, with its modest economic potential was limited in its capacity to make essential changes to the socio-economic life in the country. However, it forged ahead in terms of political transformation. In return, the political systems of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strong patrimonial ties which have remained in place without change for years. Also, economically Uzbekistan has stayed in stagnation. In all these aspects the issue of security was doubtless central. Being located in the heart of Asia, close to global players such as Russia, China and other countries such as Iran and Afghanistan, the three CA republics have always had to take into account the question of security. This was done individually adjusting their interests to geo-political circumstances in the region. The ethnic composition of the individual CA republics caused various massive migration flows in the initial phases of independence. It should be em-

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phasized here that those migration flows bore a mostly peaceful character and were not caused by violence. Most of those flows had a permanent character (Jews, ethnic Germans, Russians etc.), while the tertiary student migration took place on a temporary basis. The numbers of tertiary students who have left the three CA republics to study in Western Europe and neighbouring countries since 1991 varies in number and destinations. In this regard, the UK crystallized as the favourite study destination, followed by Germany, in the case of Kazakh students. In Kyrgyzstan’s’ case, Turkey proved to be the leading study place for many years, followed by Germany again. In turn, Germany is the top country for Uzbek study-seekers, which is followed by the UK. Without any doubt, Russia is for all three CA republics the study destination number one. Also substantial numbers of CA students remain in the region (in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) for study purposes. This can be apparently explained by cultural and financial opportunities. The reasons for this go beyond the scope of this dissertation. The cooperation of Germany with the three CA republics takes place at both levels: bilaterally and at the EU level. Having a leading role within the EU structures, Germany has impacted various processes in cooperation with CA republics individually. Geo-strategic and economic interests, German ethnic minority and other issues push Germany to develop dynamic relations with CA republics. Especially strong are trade relations with Kazakhstan, where moreover significant numbers of German ethnic minority still exist. Also in the educational area both countries have close ties. German minorities remain also in Kyrgyzstan, who as in the case of Kazakhstan, receive regular funding from the German government. Germany supports Kyrgyzstan within the development sector extensively and contributed within the EU to Kyrgyzstan’s becoming a member state in the WTO in 1998. Similarly to Kazakhstan, Germany fosters vital cultural and educational relationships with Kyrgyzstan too. Also with Uzbekistan, this area of cooperation is well developed if one takes into account the complexities of GermanUzbek and EU-Uzbek relations. Despite all the challenges that came into being throughout the years (human rights issues and so on), Germany persevered in order to prevent German-Uzbek relations from hitting a dead end.

4 Profiles and Decision-Making of Students and Graduates Enrolled at German HEIs from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

4.1

Theoretical Considerations

The analysis of the current chapter, which bears a primarily psychological and sociological character (decision-making), is conducted at individual (micro) level of analysis and is based on the findings of the online survey (OS). The chapter covers the following aspects: General information: students’ personal characteristics (gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity origin, marital status, dependants). Before leaving for Germany (pre-move traits): previous academic degree in students’ home countries or/and a third country and quality of education; the role of family members in students decision- making processes to come to Germany for study purposes initially; language proficiency; previous experience of visiting Germany; overall travel experience before coming to Germany; work experience in their home countries; social and political activities while living in the home countries; students’ motivations to come to Germany. Experiences in Germany and plans after graduation: current study in Germany and quality of the education; financial support for studying in Germany; emotional state of students while living in Germany; on-going problems while living in Germany; social and political activities while living in Germany; students’ intentions/plans after their current graduation; students’ motivations56 and factors to stay on in Germany, or return to a home country, or leave to a third country after achieving qualifications in Germany and the role of family members in their decision making; opinion on whether the majority of compatriots returned to home countries after graduation in Germany; feeling of being needed 56 The nouns motivation and motive are used synonymously throughout the work. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_4

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by the home country; the role of patriotism in decision-making to return to their home countries; information about scholarships and their policies to regulate return. The findings of this chapter have been partially used in the fifth chapter, where sending CA countries’ and Germany’s policies to regulate student migration are scrutinized at the macro level. Other aspects of the OS survey such as bureaucratic formalities in students’ home countries before departure; frequency of home country visits while studying in Germany; maintaining contacts with compatriots and the embassies/ consulates of students’ home countries in Germany etc. have been also incorporated in the fifth chapter. 4.1.1

Student Migrants: Who Moves, When and Why?

Due to the fluid nature of student migration and owing to the condition that “most studies continue to focus on immigrants – people who migrate with a clear intention to stay in the host country – and not on people who adjust their status after a temporary stay” i.e. international student migrants (Alberts and Hazen 2005: 134), the theoretical underpinnings regarding the decision making of this group in both directions (leave and return) are rather weak. Nevertheless, various works tried to understand the process of decision-making of students, many of them based on sociological surveys. In explaining the process of decision-making to migrate, the deep complexity of this issue is commonly emphasized. According to Kley (2010: 469) this complexity is conditioned upon the “structural factors” that “interact with individual characteristics, social embedding, life-course events, and psychological characteristics. Last but not least, migration is a process over time.” Moreover, international student migration is an “intersection of many fields of study – migration, education, human capital, youth studies and so forth” (King and Findlay 2012: 262), which obviously does not simplify the endeavour and requires the use of different theories and approaches for explaining the decisionmaking of student migrants. The conventional push and pull model of Everett Lee, which is based on Ravenstein’s work “The laws of Migration” (1885), differentiated between four factors: those associated with the area of origin (“push”), the area of destination (“pull”), intervening obstacles (distance, immigration laws, etc.) and personal factors (family etc.). In author’s opinion push factors are low living standards, low wages, demographic growth, political unrest etc. in the country of origin and pull factors are, in contrast, high living standards, high wages, political freedom etc. in a destination country. At the same time Lee emphasized that since an “exact set of factors which impels or prohibits migration for a given person”

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cannot ever be specified, one can “only set forth a few that seem of special importance and note the general or average reaction of a considerable group.” He also stressed that “personal sensitivities, intelligence etc.” must be taken into account during the analysis of migrants’ perception of factors. For example, “there are personalities which are resistant to change – change of residence as well as other changes – and there are personalities which welcome change for the sake of change.” According to Lee, lots of migrants leave for short distance (geographically close) countries, while ‘long distance migrants’ go “by preference to one of the great centres of commerce and industry.” In the process of decisionmaking, factors in countries of origin and destination that push and pull migrants, do differentiate but it is possible to identify people, who similarly react to these factors in both source and receiving countries. Lee finally assumes that “since migration is a very complex phenomenon”, the decision-making process to migrate is “never completely rational, and for some persons the rational component is much less than the irrational.” Therefore, during the investigation of the whole process, one must expect “to find many exceptions to [his/her] generalizations since transient emotions, mental disorder, and accidental occurrences account for a considerable proportion of the total migrations” (Lee 1966: 50-51). The critics of Lee’s push and pull model De Jong and Fawcett (1981) noticed that Lee did not “conceptualize the motivational dimension in migration decision making in a concrete way”, the motivations were not “systematically integrated into the theory.” In the authors’ opinion, Lee primarily relied on macro-level variables while classifying the factors influencing the decision to migrate and ignored the micro (individual) level. Despite this critique, De Jong and Fawcett recognized that Lee generated “several basic hypotheses concerning the volume of migration between areas, the development of streams and counter streams, and the characteristics of persons in migration streams.” In this point to add, albeit the fact that several assumptions became obsolete in the contemporary globalized and transnationalized world, Lee’s work “A theory of migration” serves as an important source for reducing the complexity and a better understanding of the decision-making process of migrants. Student migration experts, have indicated that Lee’s model can be reasonably applied to the phenomenon of student migration because it provides a clear picture about “how the individual decision to move” “is made by an evaluation of the balance” between various factors while pull factors are considered to be dominant (King and Findlay 2012: 262). In the classification given by UNESCO one can find concrete factors influencing the decision of study-seekers to pursue higher education or advanced research abroad (“cross-border education”). These are: “cost of education”; “ideological affinity”; “language proficiency”; “perceived academic superiority of the institutions in the host countries”; “acquisition of foreign language and

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culture”; “employment opportunities”; “increasing income levels in the countries of origin and easy visa formalities” (Varghese 2008). Thereby personal characteristics of students such as e.g. possession of foreign languages, “mobility capital” and “pre-university international experience” are perhaps the most influential factors for students’ getting mobile (King and Findlay 2012: 266). Moreover, age, marital status and ethnicity are also influential in the decision-making of students to move. Economists, who elaborated on neoclassical economics (NE) and the new economics of labour migration (NELM) known also as rational choice theories, postulated that individuals decide to migrate rationally “because a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, from movement.” The rational decision is concretized as follows: “Net returns in each future period are estimated by taking the observed earnings corresponding to the individual’s skills in the destination country and multiplying these by the probability of obtaining a job there. These expected earnings are then subtracted from those expected in the community of origin [...] and the difference is summed over a time horizon from 0 to n, discounted by a factor that reflects the greater utility of money earned in the present than in the future” (Massey et al. 1993: 434). In this regard, Salt and Findlay (1989: 161-162) pointed out the “inadequacy” of the neoclassical economic approach in elucidating the determinants for highly skilled migration because highly skilled people, who are in fact represented in smaller numbers in the share of migrants worldwide than those with low skills, are influenced by not merely the logic of “income maximization” (Cassarino 2004: 255). I believe that the main shortcomings of the neoclassical economics in terms of its application to student migrants’ decision making accounts for students’ status in a host country, which envisages study purposes not employment. There are surely students who abuse their student status and work instead, but to be objective, such practices proved to be non-successful with various failed cases. Therefore student migrants cannot act from the beginning as purely high income hunters in general. They surely have an initial idea or expectations regarding the attractive wage they could earn in a receiving country after graduation and employment there, but as a possible outcome of their rendezvous, which is truly open. This outcome might be blurred since student migrants are not able to know right from the beginning whether they will manage to find a job in a destination country. They instead can try to navigate in that direction. And this is consistent with the nature of student migration, which is, as it was mentioned in the previous chapters, an ‘open ended’ migration type. Ziguras and Gribble (2015: 255) underlined in particular the complexity for international students of the transition period from study into work, which involves “the negotiation of family relationships, residency requirements, employ-

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ment options, and a wide range of personal aspirations.” Therefore, it can be assumed that the logic of “income maximization” is applicable for the latter stages of student migration rather than for their initial move from the home to host country for study purposes. Similarly, while talking about the European students’ mobility, King and Findlay (2012: 262) assumed that the rational choice theories do have a partial relevance for studying this phenomenon “because in reality student migration is about life-experience, quality of education and the building up of human capital for their long-term future rather than immediate work and income.” In contrast to the European students, CA students in general have few opportunities to find “immediate work” in e.g. the EU countries after graduation from their local HEIs. A Blue Card57 may be an option but its prospective employee’s salary and the associated bureaucratic requirements are quite steep and this can be prohibitive for people with diplomas issued by Central Asian HEIs, which are still in many cases non-competitive in terms of graduates’ quality. The new economics of migration seems to provide, in part, a more plausible explanation regarding the aspect considering the “migration as a household decision taken to minimize risks to family income or to overcome capital constraints on family production activities.” According to this theory, migrants’ decision making is not “isolated” but rather it is a product of “larger units of related people – typically families or households- in which people act collectively not only to maximize expected income, but also to minimize risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, apart from those in the labour market” (Massey et al. 1993: 436). Similarly, King and Findlay (2012: 265) emphasized the special role of family members like parents and siblings in the decision-making process of students.” No wonder, student migrants leave a home country mostly in their early 20s, when especially the parents’ role matters. Moreover it can be assumed that this role increases depending on the destination of the target country: the further the destination is, the stronger the demand to communicate with parents and other close relatives. No need to mention that parents’ role is even stronger in conservative families, as will be demonstrated by empirical results in the doctoral theses. However, referring to the example of Western countries’ students, who are extremely mobile, King and Findlay concluded that due to many opportunities for mobility, the former became “disembedded from traditional social roles and constraints such as social class, family and hometown” (King and Findlay 2012: 266). 57 For more information see Blue Card EU for Germany (n.d.): Available online: http:// www.bluecard-eu.de/. For related details see chapter 5.

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Faist emphasized that families or households should be differentiated depending on the different settings they are defined by. These settings include variations in “household size and expectations directed towards family members”, “variations pertaining to historical links between sending and receiving regions, current exit and admission policies, income, wage and unemployment differentials between receiving countries” (Faist 1997: 205). All these variations may influence, to a different extent, the decision-making of migrants and contribute to the emerging of different patterns of student migration. So, e.g. students from families with low income, “regardless of the general degree of international mobility [in the individual countries surveyed]” take much less advantages from the study abroad programs than those students, who stem from families with higher income” (Findlay 2012: 266). 4.1.2

Student Migrants: When and Why Does Return Takes Place?

As discussed earlier in detail, the return migration is per se a highly intricate phenomenon, which is reasoned foremost by the quantification challenges of return flows. Two theoretical approaches - structural and transnational, were chosen as giving most comprehensive explanations for the decision-making regarding return because they clearly demonstrate the differences between permanent/ definitive and temporary return. In line with the explanations of the structural approach, the return migration is influenced not solely by the individual experience of migrants but also “social and institutional factors in the countries of origin.” While making the decision to return, migrants usually weigh and try to identify congruencies and discrepancies between their expectations and the structural circumstances in their home countries or destinations where they are going to return (Cassarino 2004, Structural approach 2011, Kunuroglu/de Vijver/Yagmur 2016). Furthermore, according to the structural approach, “traditions and values” are considered by migrants as determinants for making the decision to return (Kreienbrink 2006: 45). Empirical evidence testifies that “especially highly skilled people are very sensitive to the migration option when they find the human rights/governance situation in their home country unacceptable” (Olesen 2002: 137). “Emblematic examples of how complex the relationships between the returnee’s expectations and the social and economic context (i.e. “reality”)” were demonstrated by Cerase (1974) in his seminal work on return migration from the United States to Southern Italy, where he elaborated on four categories of returnees: “return of failure” (migrants who could not integrate in their host societies for various reasons e.g. prejudices), “return of conservatism” (migrants who from the initial stages had the intention to return and moved to another

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country only for e.g. collecting money and buying property in the source country afterwards), “return of retirement” (retired persons who want to spend the rest of their lives in their countries of origin) and the “return of innovation.” The latter category covers persons, who are being mobile and dynamic, “prepared to make use of all the means and new skills they have acquired during their migratory experiences with a view to achieving their goals in their origin countries, which, according to them, offer greater opportunities to satisfy their expectations.” Cerase called these innovative actors as “carriers of change” and they might bear certain characteristics of international students or graduates. Nonetheless, there could be some factors that constrain ‘innovators’ from returning to the source country and bringing about changes there. Referring to Italy, Cerase mentioned among such factors the “resilience of strong power relations and vested interests” in “the traditional power structure”, which were unlikely to be successfully challenged by return innovators (Cassarino 2004: 257-258). Gmelch (1980) assumed that the success or failure of remigration to the country of origin can be analysed after actual return of migrants through particularly knowing in how far their expectations correlate with their experiences at home (Kunuroglu/de Vijver/Yagmur 2016: 6). 58 According to the transnationalization or transnationalism approach, which has been discussed also in the second chapter within the MDN, the “return does not constitute the end of a migration cycle.” It is “part and parcel of a circular system of social and economic relationships and exchanges facilitating the reintegration of migrants while conveying knowledge, information and membership”. By means of retaining constant ties to their countries of origin and regular visits there, returnees do in fact “prepare their reintegration at home” (Cassarino 2004: 262, 268). Hence, it can be assumed that if links with the countries of origin are weak and no regular visits take place, so the “reintegration” or return of migrants is unlikely. To dig deeper, it was found that “only a small proportion of immigrants can be characterized as active transmigrants, that transnational activism declines with time in the country of settlement, and that it rarely survives into the second generation [...]” (Bloemraad/Körteweg_Yurdakul 2008: 167). Numerous empirical studies testify that the decision-making regarding permanent return in particular, is multi-staged and protracted consisting of various strategies and life-choices. In one of the earlier studies on return migration of international students, Mundende argued: “as far as students studying abroad are concerned, the likeli58 In line with this assumption, the dissertation at hand included former students, who after graduation in Germany returned to their home countries and with whom semi-structured interviews have been conducted (see methodology below).

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hood of their return to the country of origin diminishes the longer they stay abroad, especially those on private, non-government scholarships.59 The chances of non-return are even greater if the student receives no communication from his country of origin (Glaser 1978, Mckee, 1983a, UN, 1971)” (Mundende, 1989: 184). The author also indicated that the higher an academic degree the students obtain, the lower the probability of return (Glaser, 1978) (Ibid: 184). The latter statement was refuted by the findings of OECD (2008: 177) of the newer period showing that “highly skilled migrants generally exhibit a high return rate.” Here to be emphasized, that different findings on the same issue are indeed typical for migration studies, this is due to differing conceptual and methodological approaches that are used. Guided by the work of Cerase’s return typologies (1974), four main reasons were suggested by the OECD study (2008: 163) to explain the return migration. These are: “i) failure to integrate into the host country, ii) individuals’ preferences for their home country; iii) achievement of a savings objective, or iv) the opening of employment opportunities in the home country thanks to experience acquired abroad.” Also “immigration policies” were emphasized as having a significant role for the decision making to return to the home country or stay on in the host country. Those policies might be implemented with different aims: to promote the temporary return of migrants, to promote their long-term or permanent return to the source countries or they may focus on retaining migrants in the host country e.g. through eased naturalization regulations. The influence of immigration rules on migrants’ return intentions was also discussed by Lowell (2001: 5) who argued: “emigrants may be loath to return to their source country if they risk losing residency status.” If not interrupted, in the long-term, migrants’ residency status60 opens up opportunities in the host country to obtaining the settlement permit or citizenship. He formulated it as follows: “Having made the decision to move to a higher-wage economy, the emigrant is likely to wish to retain access to the earnings and lifestyle available there; as well as to any family, home ownership, or investment commitments they have made. Simultaneously, if they are able to secure and retain permanent residency (citizenship) rights in their new country, the emigrant may feel freer to return to their home country: the option to go back to the higher-wage economy at any time creates an option that buffers the risk of returning home to the lowerwage economy” (Ibid: 5-6).

59 Generally governmental scholarship-recipients are obliged to return. 60 A residence permit (in German: Aufenthaltserlaubnis) holders in Germany may stay abroad up to maximally six months in order to keep it in the non-interrupted status.

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Further, he assumed that the possession of the receiving country’s citizenship, especially of dual citizenship contributes to the transfer of social remittances to the source countries: “advocates of dual nationality or citizenship argue that the maintenance of rights encourages regular movement and even return.” However, as he added, the practice shows that dual citizenship is not allowed by many sending countries so that migrants have to make a choice between both, which surely have certain implications for migrants’ ties with their countries of origin: “Having established residency or citizenship status abroad, but having lost it at home, undercuts a host of legal rights and connections to the source country—and, hence, the likelihood of return. If they lose the right to own land or other privileges (including the right to vote) in their home country there is little incentive to return” (Ibid: 6).

These are crucial points regarding the student migrants from CA, who settled down in Germany and have to decide between national and German citizenship because none of the CA countries allow dual citizenship. Further factors that may influence the ‘stay on’ decision of highly skilled people in the host countries, according to Galinski (1986 65-72) are cultural estrangement, lack of information concerning the labour market in a source country, lack of educational conformity in a home country, financial barriers, and insecure basis for existence. The comparative report of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Group (MPG), which was partly discussed in the second chapter and showed that 2/3 of respondents plan to stay after graduation in their country of study, where Germany scored the highest rates of ‘stayers’ (79 master and 69 percent of doctoral students), also delivered the reasons for stay on intentions. In particular, for all five countries’ respondents (Germany, France, the Netherlands, UK and Sweden) “employment opportunities” and the “desire to gain international job experience” accounted for the main reasons to stay on after qualifying in a host country. It implied that ‘professional’ or “career-related” factors are more important for international students than the source country’s “quality of life”, “financial reasons”, “way of life” and “mobility within EU”. In the case of German respondents in particular, the stay on intentions were bound to “better German language skills, work experience in Germany, higher levels of satisfaction with the study experience, familiarity with the legal regulations for international students” and an overall welcoming-atmosphere in Germany. Further, according to this report, ‘family’ factors like relationships to family, other relatives or friends played comparatively insignificant roles for the decision to stay on after graduation. Other interesting findings of the study conducted by SVR and MPG accounted for the fact that permanent migration was “clearly not the intention of the bulk of respondents” i.e. “international students who intended from the outset

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to use their study abroad experience as a stepping stone to permanent migration became an exception “rather than the rule.” Furthermore, this study confirmed the important role of personal characteristics of respondents for their intentions to stay on after a qualifying. So, the “stayers” are likely to be younger, possess work experience in a host country and do not have children and they are mostly from “science- and technology-related fields” (SVR 2012). The latest OECD (2017: 249) study, which was based on surveys, interviews and regression analysis, revealed that the return decision of migrants might be strongly influenced by “personal preferences, for instance reunification with family” in the countries of origin. The second significant factor referred to ‘failed migrants’ in terms of failed opportunity to “obtain legal status for work or residency in destination countries.” The third factor accounted for the challenges to integrate “economically and socially in destination countries.” The number of repatriates, who returned for reasons of attractive “employment and investment opportunities” in the source destinations, was small. Moreover, this study found out that return promoting programmes of host countries were unpopular among returners and were used least. Another study, which was also touched upon by the second chapter regarding the figures of international students, who planned to stay on in Germany after graduation, identified that “economic factors are the main reason foreign graduates decide to stay in Germany or leave the country.” They accounted in particular to “workplace-related criteria (gaining professional experience, income level, opportunities on the labour market) and quality of life in Germany.” In return, established social contacts (friends, colleagues and similar) proved to be of secondary importance (DAAD 2016: 35).

4.2

Methodological Considerations

Based on theoretical discussions, which were discussed in the previous section and in chapter two, where research rationale elaborated on, the operationalization of the PhD project covers the following objectives of the current research: To understand the profiles and the life courses of students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan prior to and during their studies in Germany, as well as their intentions regarding returning or non-returning to their home countries after graduation in Germany. Furthermore, it is aimed at understanding the motivations behind the concrete intention to choose whether to return or not after graduation in this country and also operating ways of social remittances’ and knowledge transfer.

4.2 Methodological Considerations

4.2.1

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Online Survey (OS)

From December 2nd, 2012 until February 28th, 2013 I conducted the online survey (OS) via the software package Social Sciences Survey (SoSci Survey), which was developed in Germany for scientific surveys. 61 The target population sampled for the OS were students (studying BA, MA, PhD and including “old” degree-seekers such as Staatsexamen, Magister, Diplom) holding citizenship from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. During the time of the survey they were enrolled at a Higher Education Institution (HEI) in Germany. Both scholarship-holders and non-scholarship-holders were included. The sampling was not representative, meaning that findings are not generalizable for the entire population of students from the focus countries studying in Germany. However, taking into account that no similar research has been conducted so far and that the survey had quite a high turnover meaning that a heterogeneity of area (from German: “Heterogenität des Feldes”) is represented, the findings of the current chapter, in particular, and of the dissertation project in general, do present, according to Kruse, an authentic representation of a case or cases (from German: “authentische Repräsentation eines Falles”).62 A variety of methods were used for collecting data on the sampled population: Snowball method, personal approach via personal messages and posting in the appropriate online lists. I first of all, used the biggest Facebook groups of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Germany. Membership of the group fluctuated but it comprised up to 700 people (mostly young people). In these groups I deliberately declined to post the link to the OS publicly in order to avoid the link being ignored as people receive requests to participate in surveys in this way quite often. I used instead a personal approach, messaging those members of the groups, who study in Germany. I selected them using the personal information provided on their profiles e.g. “lives in Mainz”. Profile pictures also helped me to identify possible students. After I had found the right people, I sent a private message with German and Russian texts that, amongst other content, stressed the conditions for participation: (1) To be a citizen of either Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. (2) To be currently enrolled at a German HEI. Moreover, I asked people to circulate the information among their compatriots, 61 For more information see SoSci Survey (2017). Available online: https://www. soscisurvey.de/index.php?page=home&l=eng 62 German version: “Grundgedanke hierbei ist, dass eine strukturell maximal variierende Stichprobe auch bei geringerer Fallzahl (15-30 < n < 100, je nach Forschungsfragestellung und -zielen) Verallgemeinerungen zulässt, wenn auf der Grundlage des Fallmaterials eine empirisch begründete Typenbildung möglich ist (vgl. Kelle/Kluge 1999; Flick 1995a: 435ff.)” In Kruse, Jan (2011): Reader “Einführung in die qualitative Interviewforschung”. Freiburg, pp. 267-268.

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friends and other people who might meet the criteria even if they themselves were not eligible. Many people responded and gave me advice on further sources to circulate the survey information, or just reported that they had participated in the OS. Everyone, who approached me, was very helpful and some of them thanked me for using a personal approach since, due to deactivated message notifications from a particular group, they would not have learnt about the OS if I had not done it in such a way. A remarkable outcome for me was that many people in their messages were trying to emphasize the importance of my research endeavour and asked me to share its results as soon as possible. Next I contacted the international offices of German universities, where I asked the responsible people to circulate the OS information among the given countries’ students, so called “degree students”. I received a positive response from more than half of those contacted. Those international offices, which rejected my request, explained that a great deal of similar requests was received by their students every day and that my call for survey participation could be an additional strain on them. They wanted to avoid pressuring their students and would not circulate the information. Others responded that the number of eligible students from the target region was very low. I contacted a person at the German Academic Exchange Service’ (DAAD) office in Bonn, who was responsible for the CA region, and the call for OS participation was promptly circulated among the current DAAD scholarship-holders (BA, MA and doctoral students). The languages used for the OS were English, Russian and German. I presumed that the survey participants from CA would be proficient in at least one of these languages. To briefly describe the scope of the questionnaire for the OS: there were almost 150 questions (including “filter questions”63) that made up 49 pages (50 pages including the “Welcome-Text”). The questionnaire for the OS was developed by means of focus group discussions (rather informal), face-to-face informal and formal interviews, theoretical considerations, and shaped by my own background and experiences.64. Before the OS was activated, multiple pre-tests were completed by a couple of CA students. Pre-test results of the OS showed that participants needed, on average, 30 minutes to complete the survey. The OS was a mix of primarily close-ended questions with some openended questions (nominal, ordinal, metric, text). Those variables can be divided into three main parts: 63 One example of a “filter” question: Do you have siblings? If “Yes” a respondent was asked about the role of siblings to come to Germany for study purposes. If the answer was “No”, he/she went to the next question with different subject. 64 I was born and grown up in Uzbekistan and came to Germany as an international student.

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The questionnaire was designed in that way so that each participant got the possibility to express him- or herself. For that reason I put “Other. Please specify” into those questions, where I believed the pre-defined answers could not fully cover all important points. All questions (except for a couple of specific questions for Uzbek students only) had to be answered before a respondent was able to continue to the next page. An alternative response “do not want to answer the question” was not offered because I did not see any value in it. The results of the OS dataset analysis are based on a total of 218 valid answers of students from the CA region pursuing their tertiary studies at German HEIs. The return rate’s statistics showed 813 clicks i.e. retrievals of the OS link. Each click was counted, irrespective of the completion of the OS, accidental double clicks and whether the same person retrieved the link once or many times. Moreover, the retrieval of the OS link by search engines was also counted as a click. For the analysis of the dataset I used statistical software STATA 11 and 1265. I started my work by sorting out invalid answers (incomplete and “wrong”66 responses). Some more time was required for the recording of variables i.e. giving them number values. Afterwards, I started with the analysis by means of the STATA. This program works with commands and all procedures were saved in a do-file. The initial idea behind using the survey method and going further than the opportunities given by qualitative methods can be explained, first of all, by the lack of return statistics on graduates from the focus CA republics and my eagerness to gain as many respondents as possible enabling, thus, the study at hand to have more transparency and methodological rigor for making study results, more or less, generalizable. After having analysed the data by means of STATA and having completed the descriptive statistics, I complemented the results of the quantitative part by the qualitative method i.e. the in-depth semi-structured interviews, which last an average of two hours each. The current chapter combines therefore quantitative and qualitative methods and can be assigned to the consolidation model (in German: “Vertiefungsmodell”) proposed by Mayring (2001). This model implies a supplementation of a completed quantitative study through the qualitative method. According to the author, this model enables better interpretation of results,

65 For more information see: Why STATA (2017). Available online: http://www.stata.com/ why-use-stata/ 66 For example, there were responses from respondents, who were citizens of Russia or Turkey.

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particularly through the analysis of cases that correlate, it is possible to identify a direction of possible causation.67 Further, the interview data was supplemented by the results from the interviews and information from secondary sources. In Germany I conducted qualitative face-to-face interviews with the following groups from target countries: 

First-time stayers68 (without legal interruption): Current CA students of German HEIs or employees/employers who may have already graduated from a German HEI previously and stayed on in this country, however, without legal interruption69.



Return-stayers (with legal interruption): current students or employees/ employers, who used to study in Germany at a HEI, then returned home and after some time came back to Germany again.



Graduates in transition:70 graduates of German HEIs, who at the time of interview were looking for another place to study or an employment opportunity.

Expert interviews were conducted in Germany with integrated experts from the Centre of International Migration and Development (CIM) who used to work in CA or who currently work there, with a current coordinator of CIM working in Germany, a representative of the World University Service (WUS) and a representative from DAAD. The interviewees in Germany were all open-minded and supportive. Nobody rejected the recording of the interview. Before the interview was started, each interview participant received a consent form for the interview that was signed by two parties. 67 In German: “[...] die Ergebnisse werden so besser interpretierbar; beispielsweise kann durch Fallanalysen in Korrelationen die Richtung einer möglichen Kausalität gedeutet werden. In Mayring, Philipp (2001): Kombination und Integration qualitativer und quantitativer Analyse. Available online: http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/ fqs/article/view/967/2111 68 Adapted and modified from “first-time movers” and “return-movers” proposed by Faist, Thomas (2007): The Crucial Meso-Level. In: Hammar et al. (Ed.): International migration, immobility and development: Multidisciplinary perspectives. Oxford. New York: Berg, pp. 187-217 69 If international students are absent in Germany for more than six months, their residence permit will lose its validity. Therefore “without legal interruption” implies that CA graduates of German HEIs did not interrupt their German residency for more than six months and started, instead, a new study or job in Germany. 70 Own term.

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Finding interview partners (especially students) for in-depth interviews was not problematic, except in the case of Kyrgyz students/graduates. The latter’s participation in the face-to-face interviews was totally different from the OS. I sometimes had to face a kind of uncertainty emanating from potential informants from Kyrgyzstan, who finally rejected or just ignored my interview request. This might be explained by the complicated relationships between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that were aggravated through ethnic tensions inside Kyrgyzstan in 1990 and 2010. Therefore could not gain a valuable personal access to Kyrgyz community in Germany and the number of Kyrgyz respondents in the qualitative part is thus not as significant as numbers of Uzbek and Kazakh informants. Nevertheless, I happened to meet few Kyrgyz students with good will towards the research, who attended face-to-face in-depth interviews and to whom I am very grateful: two female and one male respondent. One of the female respondents left Germany after her graduation for a third country, the second one stayed on in Germany and was planning to return home after a while. The male respondent settled down in Germany. 4.2.2

Fieldwork

Within the period between April 3rd, 2013 and May 8th, 2013 I conducted the fieldwork in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) and Kazakhstan (Almaty). In particular, it was my first visit to my home country Uzbekistan after a seven-year absence. In Tashkent (almost the whole period) and Almaty (five days) I conducted qualitative interviews with returners – graduates, who after their graduation in Germany returned back home and who lived and worked there at that time. I also had contacts to non-movers71 in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: people living in target countries, who have graduated from a local HEI and had the potential (educational basis, language skills) for starting studies in Germany but have not done it yet. Expert interviews were conducted with former and current academics from HEIs, academic staff of the Academy of Sciences, a representative of DAAD-Alumni Association, representatives of DAAD Information Centres (IC), and CIM Experts as GIZ employees. The call for participation in interviews was previously distributed by employers of local DAAD offices via the mailing lists for DAAD Alumni. As a result, I received personal messages expressing willingness to participate. In addition, the call for participation was distributed via the mailing lists connecting 71 Adapted from Faist, Thomas (2007): The Crucial Meso-Level. In: Hammar et al. (Ed.): International migration, immobility and development: Multidisciplinary perspectives. Oxford. New York: Berg, pp. 187-217

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people with German academic degrees through e.g. A German social club meeting (in German: Stammtisch). In particular, through such a distribution channel, during a five-day visit in Almaty I interviewed as many people in Kazakhstan (10 people) as in Uzbekistan (10 people) during one month. This indicated that graduates of German HEIs from Kazakhstan stay connected with each other after their return to the source country. In the case of Uzbekistan, I could not find any ‘Stammtisch’ or active network of DAAD Alumni. Among the overall impressions I gained from respondents coming from Kazakhstan, both in Germany and in Kazakhstan were that while DAAD scholarship-holders and self-financing students/graduates were easier to approach, scholarship-holders of the national program “Bolashak” (“Future”)72 were more reserved in their attitude towards the qualitative interview and less likely to participate. This attitude applies to current and former Bolashak scholarship-holders. Comparing returners – graduates of German HEIs, who were interviewed in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, I had to confront the fact that Uzbek graduates were less willing to be interviewed. In particular I had theoretically more access to Uzbek returners through my longer visit in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan but could not win the same number of Uzbeks as Kazakh respondents. Moreover, many Uzbek returners did not answer my request to participate in the interview and some refused to participate (in total twelve people). One of the potential respondents, whom I personally knew from my university time in Uzbekistan and who also studied in Germany and worked at Uzbek state organs during my field work in Uzbekistan, excused himself and told me that it was better not to interview him. My invitation for an informal meeting, since we had not talked to each other for a long time was rejected too. Further, except for three persons (one from Uzbekistan and two from Kazakhstan), all returners from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who participated in interviews felt confident and were not irritated by the fact that the interview was recorded. Expert interviews at state organs for instance, Ministries, e.g. at the Ministry for Higher and Secondary Specialized Education of Uzbekistan, turned out to be impossible. I was required, as a first and foremost step, to provide an official letter from my German HEI in order for my request to be considered. From the Republic’s Statistical Committee I received the requested data on numbers of those, who migrated as students. The data that I received was very different (with much lower student numbers) from what I received from the Federal Statistical Office in Germany. My requests to the official organs of Kazakhstan were not fruitful either.

72 Bolashak is the leading foundation established by Kazakh government in 1993. For more information see chapter 5.

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The interview languages for the respondents in Germany and those from my field trip were Russian, German and Uzbek. I have never met anyone from Kazakhstan, in Germany or in Kazakhstan, who does not speak Russian. From Uzbekistan there were a couple of participants living in Germany and Uzbekistan, who either were not able to speak Russian or had very poor command of this language. With them I used both Uzbek and German interchangeably, because my command of Uzbek is unfortunately not at a level I would feel comfortable conducting the whole interview in my actual ‘mother tongue’. Due to tough conditions as a researcher inside Uzbekistan and the strained relationship between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks mentioned above, I could not manage to leave for Kyrgyzstan during my field research in CA in 2013. Moreover because the number of those who gave their consent to be interviewed in Kyrgyzstan (two returners and two local experts) was low, I was even more demotivated to travel there. Each interview was recorded using a digital voice recorder, an Olympus WS-210S and took on average between 1-2 hours. Afterwards I transcribed all the recorded interviews myself with the help of the transcribing program F473 Although F4 supports a user in saving time while transcribing data significantly, the process of interview transcription was the most time-consuming part of the whole data analysis. Once the interview transcripts were ready, I organized and coded them using the software for qualitative data analysis (QDA) ATLAS.ti.74 This program helped to follow the content of interviews systematically and effectively and code them according to the questions, which were used in the quantitative part (online survey). The theoretical basis served as a tool to deduce codes and subcodes for handling the empirical material. Moreover, codes and sub-codes were developed in an inductive way i.e. out of the material. The quotations that arose from the respective codes served as a complimentary and explanatory addition for the results of the online survey, as mentioned above. In particular, the standardised survey results delivered the information about the return intentions of students from three republics. The qualitative data supported these results through detailed life-course stories of those, who returned or did not return to the home countries shedding light on their motives in this regard. I tried to observe differences and/or similarities between the case groups of students from the three republics and to compare them with each other. Thus, the quantitative and qualitative parts were interlocked and the bridge between 73 Details on F4 software: Audiotranskription.de (n.d.): F4transkript. Quick transcription. Available online: https://www.audiotranskription.de/english 74 Details see at: Atlas.ti (n.d.): What is Atlas.ti? Available online: http://atlasti.com/ product/what-is-atlas-ti/

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both was created. According to Kruse (2011: 249), the interlocking of quantitative and qualitative results contributes to the achievement of evidence and conclusiveness of empirical data. The “naked numbers” of quantitative part, which are often not enough to interpret the social phenomena, are deepened by the qualitative results and may explain these standardized results.

4.3

Empirical Findings from the Online Survey and In-Depth Interviews

In total, two hundred and eighteen (218) valid answers were gathered from survey participants. The biggest group participating in the survey was Uzbek students (39 percent), followed by Kazakh (32 percent) and Kyrgyz students (29 percent). The high percentage of Uzbeks might be explained by the fact that the survey organizer, stems from Uzbekistan. Most of personal contacts I have established are to Uzbek students studying in Germany. Most of the survey participants from Kazakhstan (63 percent) preferred to use Russian for filling out the questionnaire. The popularity of Russian among the students from Kazakhstan gives evidence that Russian accounts for the language in which most of the students from Kazakhstan feel comfortable communicating in. This can be explained by the still relatively high percentage of the Russian minority living in Kazakhstan as compared to the other two CA republics75. This fact also influenced the percentage of ethnic Russians represented in the survey: respondents from Kazakhstan proved to have the highest rate of ethnic Russian respondents (25 percent). Also during the face-to-face interviews, there was not anyone from Kazakhstan who could not speak, or understand, Russian. Kazakh respondents became the largest and the youngest group containing respondents between 20 and 25 years old (54 percent). There were even 9 percent of total Kazakh respondents aged less than 20 years old. This accounts for the condition that until 201176 many Kazakh governmental scholarship-holders 75 In 2009 Russians made up 23.7 percent of total Kazakh population, in Kyrgyzstan they accounted for 7.7 percent and in Uzbekistan only for 5.5 percent. In: Central Intelligence Agency (2017): Central Asia: Kazakhstan. Available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html 76 In 2011 the finance of bachelor studies was terminated and the focus was shifted to master and doctorate programs. In: Bolashak (2016): Training Kazakh Youth in High-Demand Fields at World’s Top Universities Is a National Educational Priority. Available online: http://bolashak.gov.kz/en/k-20-letiyu-programmy-bolashak/mneniya-expertov/321-aslansarinzhipov-training-kazakh-youth-in-high-demand-fields-at-world-s-top-universities-is-a-

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came to Germany for bachelor studies. In return, more than half of the respondents from Kyrgyzstan (52 percent) and Uzbekistan (60 percent) ranged in age between 25 and 35 years old. Thereby Kyrgyz students with 9 percent of responses have the highest percentage of students, who are 35 years old and older. At the same time with 27 percent of responses, Kyrgyz students constitute the largest number of respondents, who possess a Diplom (an “old” five-year program introduced in the Soviet times) from their home country and they lead the group of people, who belong to the outriders of “old” German degree programs like Diplom, Magister or Staatsexamen. Additionally, respondents from Kyrgyzstan lead the group of married people. Thereby, the married Kyrgyz respondents have the highest rate of spouses, among the married respondents in total, with German citizenship. All this can suggest that Kyrgyz students from the OS came to Germany for pursuing tertiary studies with a bigger share of older people than those from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In terms of gender parity, in the cases of Kazakhstan (60 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (69 percent) the female respondents outnumbered male respondents, while in case of Uzbekistan there were only 47 percent of female respondents. Looking at the general result, it is evident that there is a difference of about 15 percent with female respondents prevailing over the male respondents. The results from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reflect the latest rating by the Gender Gap Index 2015 of the World Economic Forum, particularly in terms of “female gross tertiary enrolment ratio over male value”. These two countries scored 1 out of 1 (World Economic Forum 2016). Some sources suggest that “the strong leadership role played by women in the higher education system” of particularly Kyrgyzstan is explained by the legacy of the Soviet Union (ADB 2015). This principally can be applied for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan too. Unfortunately, the Gender Gap Index does not provide any data regarding Uzbekistan. Other sources like the World Bank clearly emphasize that Uzbekistan has since many years had the problem of gender disparity particularly in gross tertiary enrolment rates.77 To the question regarding the parents’ education, the students from three CA republics most frequently checked the option “both with higher education” (63 percent altogether). Kyrgyz students’ answers lead this group meaning that ¾ of them (73 percent) belong to well-educated families. Kazakh students, in turn, lead the category “both without higher education” implying that 9 percent of Kazakh students have uneducated parents. In all three cases, though, students whose parents do not possess higher education degree are represented as the national-educational-priority/693-aslan-sarinzhipov-training-kazakh-youth-in-highdemand-fields-at-world-s-top-universities-is-a-national-educational-priority.html 77 For more information see chapter 5.

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minority group. “Middle income” of parents became the most frequently declared answer by all three countries’ students (63 percent), with a leading position of Kazakh students in this option. These conditions may imply that most of the respondents from three republics come from well-to-do families in terms of both: educational and financial background. More than half of Kazakh (54 percent), the bulk of Kyrgyz (75 percent) and Uzbek students (69 percent) do not get any financial support from their parents. This implies that the bulk of Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents are financially independent from their parents. While Kazakh students are most dependent from their parents in terms of financial support while studying in Germany, there may be a correlation with more economic opportunities in Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan and especially in Kyrgyzstan. To the question whether students send remittances to their home countries, the vast majority had either negative answers or indicated that they did it irregularly. Another Uzbek researcher who interviewed 18 highly qualified (with PhD degrees) people from Uzbekistan residing in some European countries for the last 4-19 years came to a similar conclusion. The author found that her respondents remitted to their home countries (families, relatives) in case of “emergency or a special need.” Their remittances did not bear “a systematic character” and were “rather ad hoc.” As the reason for low shares of remittances from the highly skilled, the author assumed, was the condition that they came “from families with higher social status” and they did not emigrate “to financially help their families left in Uzbekistan” as the low-skilled migrants did (Kayumova 2015: 2, 6). The latter argument is consistent with the above-mentioned findings regarding the educational and financial background of student respondents from the three CA republics. Moreover, the incomes of students can not be estimated as especially high, in particular for self-financing students it is tough to work and study at the same time, so that not much savings remain. In the Kyrgyz case and especially in the Uzbek case, parents in both of the decision-making situations i.e. to start studies in Germany and later to stay on in the country, explicitly acted as strong motivators for their children. This is different to the reaction of Kazakh students’ parents, who reacted in the beginning moderately and neutrally and kept a moderate position in the later phase of students’ decisions to stay in Germany. According to the findings of the qualitative interviews, the motivation or support of parents took place in the majority of three cases, foremost, in the form of emotional support. The financial support in this regard was of secondary importance because only few families could afford it for their children initially, although many of them were financially well situated in local conditions comparatively. The interviewees’ answers show that parents have a strong impact on their children in the societies of target countries

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and that their encouragement was enough to motivate respondents to take action to study in Germany. As an example of a respondent from Uzbekistan in the qualitative part shows, a negative attitude on the parents’ side towards the children’s leaving for Germany can also occur. Such an attitude can be explained by traditional family patterns i.e. a limited role of a woman who was expected to get married between 20-25 years old in that particular case. The woman’s role was limited to being a good wife and mother. The study abroad was considered, thus, as an unnecessary step. A female respondent U. from Uzbekistan completed bachelor and master studies in Tashkent, and finally, one more master degree in Germany. She currently lives in Germany and is married to a German citizen: “My father has a higher education diploma; my mother has a secondary-level education. My parents have a middle income. They did not finance my stay in Germany. They gave me money for a flight ticket and for the initial costs - around 1000 USD, but no regular financing. I came initially to Germany as an au-pair. My guest family took all financial and other responsibilities. My father was strictly against my leaving for Germany and he told me: “For a woman, in the first line, must be the family: Marriage. The marriage is a sense and happiness for a woman, I do not want to hear about that anymore and you should be concerned about that.” Well, his attitude was very negative. He was, how to put it, he was attuned to it very negatively, to what I told him, that I want to leave for Germany and so on, he was extremely against it and I did not tell him anymore about it, about my further actions. I was at that time 22 years old. Yes, for Uzbek circumstances it is actually the age when you should get married as a woman. I anyway acted further, everybody [in my family] was aware of this, except for my father. I was supported by my mother, my brothers – two elder brothers and one younger brother; they were not against my travel to Germany. My mom, how should I put it, she was not against, but in our family our mother has a special position, she did not study, she does not have a higher education degree, she is not employed anywhere and sits at home, for such a position she was a kind of open. Her attitude towards my endeavour was normal and she was not as conservative as my father, who has a higher education degree. Probably there were other things in play, fathers are stricter, I do not know, but my mother did not say anything negative towards my endeavour. My father was informed one week before my flight to Germany. After I prepared everything, the flight ticket was bought, the luggage was packed, everything was ready but I could not even then tell him about my departure. I thought if I told him, he would start to bluster and would want me to stay, would try to persuade me. And I told my eldest brother, whom I consulted about my concerns, that I would not tell anything to my father, but he said that it would not be nice if I would do it: “you should inform him before you leave”. Then I said him that he himself should tell him [father], it would probably be better. And it was like that, my brother informed him, and he, of course, how to put it, was very angry, he did not talk to me three days. And on the fourth day he started talking to

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me, then he was OK, he even accompanied me to the airport, we said goodbye to each other, everything was OK.”

The survey results demonstrated that the vast majority of respondents from the three republics have siblings (87 percent altogether). Overall the siblings had a rather neutral attitude towards the decision of respondents to study in Germany. Individually, from the answers of Uzbek respondents it was evident that there was a slight increase of siblings’ reaction in the option “strongly motivated me”. This implies that Uzbek respondents while making a decision to study in Germany were strongly and most frequently influenced by their siblings, similarly to the reaction on their parents’ part. The fact that the parents and siblings of Uzbek students influenced the decision of the latter to pursue tertiary study in Germany most strongly and frequently may indicate more common family ties and conservative values that are practiced among Uzbek respondents than among of those from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time Uzbek students turned out to most commonly have siblings with a ‘German background’, where the total OS results show that only a tiny percentage of respondents’ (12 percent) siblings had or have personal experience of studying at a German HEI. Based on this and the qualitative part it can be assumed that persons who themselves experienced a stay in Germany strongly motivate their siblings to pursue tertiary studies in Germany. Below is a vivid example of how people can exert influence on their siblings in making a decision to study in Germany. It gives evidence on respondent’s mental and financial support to his siblings and on sharing his best experiences of Germany while trying to prevent his siblings from making mistakes e.g. studying without a scholarship in Germany. Moreover, in this example a changing reaction of parents is illustrated. A male respondent R. graduated from an “old” five-year study program in Kyrgyzstan and then completed the Staatsexamen in law (in English: Civil service examination) in Germany. While he himself had been influenced by his HEI and friends in his home country to come to Germany for study purposes, the respondent in turn influenced both of his siblings: “[…] Yes, my brother. I told him, visit Germany, and observe how the life functions here because it enriches, it enriches a lot. Based on my own experience, I can say that I changed a lot after my stay in Germany, my world view became totally different, my thoughts, my estimation changed. There we have another world.” “My brother came, he is an engineer, and engineers are in demand. And he stayed on [in Germany]. He works at a university, in his subject field. I must say that my parents’ attitude was more negative towards his travel to Germany as compared to mine, where their attitude was more positively neutral. They did not want him to leave for Germany. When I said them that he would leave only for a year they told me that I say so – only for a year, that they have other examples. Well, it turned out

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that our parents accepted it eventually. The same situation happened with my sister. Basically, she made a decision consciously too – regarding her stay and working in Germany.” “I financially supported my brother while I myself studied [due to a scholarship]”. And he worked too.” “But I advised my sister, after she came here [as an au-pair] she wanted to stay on in Germany immediately. I told her not to do it in any case and that she must return home, finish her studies, wrap up everything. “If you then want to come again [to Germany] later, you can come as a specialist.” Because the first alternative would be to stay here [in Germany] as a non-qualified person, there are then no chances in Germany.” “She then came to Germany as a specialist, as a physician.” “She is now in process of recognition of her qualifications. It is very difficult too. But it is much easier than the other option [as being non-qualified].”

Over 90 percent of Uzbek students, 89 percent of Kyrgyz and 69 percent of Kazakh respondents (83 percent in total) hold a higher education degree from their home country. It shows that student migration from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Germany is an indispensable part of highly qualified migration from these countries. 78 The high percentage of higher education diploma holders from the home countries’ HEIs (83 percent of all respondents) can be explained as follows: as an expert from the DAAD IC in one of the CA republics clarified, according to the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (in German: Kultusminsterkonferenz (KMK n.d.) young people from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, who are secondary school graduates, cannot directly enter German HEIs with school-leaving certificates79. He further added that it is bound to the fact that the quality of CA secondary school-leaving certificates does not comply with the German equivalent (Abitur). Therefore applicants from the target CA countries must fulfil numerous requirements in order to be able to study in Germany. As a rule, it is easier to start tertiary studies at home and then continue higher education in Germany. To specify: To get a direct admission to a German HEI (for undergraduate courses), interested candidates from CA republics, who possess secondary school-leaving certificates, have to demonstrate a two-year attendance at a state HEI or any private HEI, which must be staterecognized, located either in a home country or in any other CIS country. This 78 For the definition of highly qualified see Chapter 2. 79 Since there are two types of secondary school-leaving certificates in Uzbekistan i.e. with and without local university admission, it should be stressed that the former type is addressed here.

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regulation is particularly applicable to potential Kyrgyz and Uzbek applicants. For potential candidates from Kazakhstan this regulation is slightly different: a two-year proof of attendance must be issued by a state HEI or any state-recognized private HEI, but only located in Kazakhstan. Otherwise there are some other options like joining an assessment test (Feststellungsprüfung)/preparatory college (Studienkolleg)) enabling one to enter a German HEI after a successful one-year attendance there. However, even a possible attendance in a preparatory college or an assessment test prerequisites that the secondary school-leavers from Kyrgyzstan (who attended school until 2013) and Uzbekistan have to prove the attendance of at least one successful year at a state HEI or any private HEI (state-recognized), which are located either in their home country or any other CIS country. For Kazakhstan the same regulation applies with a slight difference; the state HEI or private HEI must be located in Kazakhstan. Only those secondary school graduates from the target countries, who possess secondary school-leaving certificates with distinction, school-leaving certificates from 2014 as in case of Kyrgyzstan, school-leaving certificates from 2015 as in case of Kazakhstan as well as secondary school-leaving certificates proving good knowledge of the German language, can be directly admitted to an assessment test/ preparatory college in Germany. Also graduates of specialized schools (Academic lyceum) from Uzbekistan can be admitted directly to the assessment test/ preparatory college in Germany i.e. without the requirement of a one-year attendance at a HEI in Uzbekistan or any other CIS country, since summer term 2014. Interested persons from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, who possess a diploma from a specialized middle school (Fachmittelschule, mittlere berufstechnische Lehranstalt), must comply with the same requirements as secondary-school graduates (Anabin n.d.) The above-mentioned alterations, which were made regarding the direct admission to assessment test/preparatory college in Germany, show evidence that some improvements have been made to ease the way for pursuing higher education in Germany on the part of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek students. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that joining the courses of an assessment test or a preparatory college in Germany, with the exceptions mentioned above, requires at least a one-year attendance at an HEI in CA or any other CIS country or a two-years attendance at the latter for getting a direct admission for a German HEI, it can be assumed that only few study-seekers would interrupt their HEI studies at home after one year to join a preparatory course or after two years in order to be able to get an admission for an undergraduate course at the HEI in Germany. A rational decision in this regard is to finish a study course started at the home country’s HEI, obtaining a university degree e.g. B.A. and afterwards enter a German HEI to get a graduate degree e.g. M.A. Indeed, the bulk of respondents from especially Kazakhstan (70 percent) and Uzbekistan (71 percent)

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possess a bachelor diploma from home country’s HEIs. In the case of Kyrgyzstan there are 44 percent of respondents with a B.A. diploma. These numbers make up 62 percent of the whole survey respondents. This is very different to opportunities for PhD-seeking candidates. In fact, the PhD students at German HEIs from all three republics made up only an insignificant share (13 percent) of all valid answers in the OS. Moreover, the option to obtain a M.A. degree in Germany increases one’s chances to apply for a respective scholarship from particularly the DAAD. Being one of the important funding organizations in the CA region, the DAAD supports mostly M.A. studies in Germany. The survey results testify that half of the respondents from Kazakhstan (50 percent) and Uzbekistan (47 percent) pursue M.A. studies in Germany. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, there were more B.A. students (42 percent), who pursued their studies in Germany during the survey participation, than M.A. students (27 percent). For comparison: in Kazakhstan (29 percent) and in Uzbekistan (30 percent). From my observations, it can be generally asserted that those (few) people from CA, who despite the possession of a higher education diploma from the home country’s HEI started a B.A. study in Germany (instead of the M.A.), did it because of the incompatibility of their previous study in the home country with a new one in Germany or they just wanted to change their qualification e.g. a German philologist started to study business administration. The latter, in particular, opens up better job opportunities in Germany after the qualification. There may be a correlation between two conditions: a) Kyrgyz students have the lowest share of people with bachelor diplomas and the highest number of people with Soviet-style diplomas issued in Kyrgyzstan and b) the highest share of bachelor degree-students in Germany. This may indicate that Kyrgyz students were more willing, than Kazakh and Uzbek students, either to interrupt their studies in their home countries or they did not enter local HEIs at all or their Soviet-pattern diplomas were often not recognized by German HEIs so that they started their studies in Germany from scratch, specifically B.A. The afore-mentioned challenges associated with the recognition of seconddary school-leaving certificates by the German side make clear that it is indeed more comfortable for target countries’ students to initially complete undergraduate courses at home country’s HEI (or any third country) and afterwards come to Germany for graduate studies. The knowledge of German language was estimated by the vast majority of OS respondents from three republics (with the lowest share of Kazakh students), at a proficient level (C1-C2). This can be explained by further results of the OS, where the majority respondents started learning German in their home countries i.e. before coming to Germany for study purposes (70 percent of total respondents). In general the German language proficiency, at least at B1 level, is the

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prerequisite for applicants to start their tertiary studies in Germany. The exceptions in this regard are courses for international students with English as language of instruction e.g. at newly established graduate schools in Germany. The latter came into being as a result of Germany’s efforts to massively internationalize its higher education landscape.80 According to the results from the qualitative part, the possession of German language skills while living in a home country served for many respondents as a strong trigger for making a decision to study in Germany. The latter decision was crystallized through either learning German at school or at a local HEI. For some of them the roots went deeper i.e. to the German community they grew up with. A female respondent U. from Uzbekistan completed both a bachelor and master in Tashkent, and finally, one more master in Germany. She currently lives in Germany and is married to a German citizen: “I decided to study in Germany because I studied German philology […] German culture and language.”

A female respondent O. from Kazakhstan, who earned her master degree from a German HEI and currently pursues her doctoral studies in Germany: “I chose my bachelor study in Kazakhstan with a focus on Germany. I chose that specialization because at that time I had already learnt German. I was always interested in this country. Perhaps I was influenced by the fact that in our city and generally in northern regions of Kazakhstan many Germans lived – Russian Germans. I had a very good German language teacher. We are still friends in spite of our 40 years’ difference. She always had a very good attitude to people. That woman was probably an exemplar for all Germans of Germany.” “At the University my teacher influenced me too. She is a very enthusiastic person and also loves Germany. We were working in that direction a lot: organized different conferences, meetings, seminars, when I was studying in Kazakhstan. And it perhaps affected my desire to continue the tertiary education in Germany.”

Thereby a significant role of the DAAD was stressed: for many respondents the realization of the desire to study in Germany became possible only because of the DAAD scholarship. The application for the DAAD scholarship was intensively advised and supported by German language lecturers at respondents’ local HEIs. There were also cases, where heads of DAAD offices in some target CA republics, actively (personally) supported applicants. A female respondent A. from Uzbekistan, got M.A. degree in Germany and currently lives in this country:

80 For detailed information in this regard see chapter 5.

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“I was a third-year student at my bachelor’s study; it was a German-English group, all the members of our group applied for the DAAD scholarship. We were told by our German course organizer that those, who would apply for a DAAD scholarship, would get a better mark. And everybody did it, including me. I was awarded the scholarship later. I came to Germany for one year and studied there as an exchange student, I liked the education system in Germany and I decided then to continue my Master studies here. After a one-year study I returned home, applied again for the DAAD’s Master program, won the scholarship and came to Germany again [for the M.A. study].”

A male respondent R. from Kyrgyzstan, graduated from an “old” five-year study in Kyrgyzstan and then the Staatsexamen in Germany. Currently lives in Germany: “I learnt German both at school and at the university in Kyrgyzstan. It was my foreign language. At school, because there was not any other alternative to German, and at university because I could not speak English at all and had only the basics of the German language. Therefore I decided to learn German further. And I think it was a fortunate choice, the right and fortunate choice, because we had a very strong teacher at university. I had to suffer a lot while learning German language [in terms of the complexity of German]. She raised our German knowledge up to the Mittelstufe II (Intermediate level). This is [a solid] knowledge base. She [the German language teacher] wisely recommended us at that time to consolidate and fix our knowledge and invited a commission from the Goethe Institute in Almaty. We passed exams, tests, and received language certificates.”

A female respondent C. from Kazakhstan, former DAAD scholarship-holder, got a M.A. degree in Germany and currently lives in Almaty. She reflected in this regard as follows: “I received a call from the DAAD and was told that everything with my application fitted but my German language was at zero level. [...]. I was explained that everything depended at that time on the condition whether I would start learning German or not. In this regard I am very grateful for the former DAAD head, who was a wonderful person, who believed in me, I do not know to what extent, but this person said that I should do my best to learn German in order to be able to speak in this language in six months. Some time later I came to the DAAD head and said that there was no place at Goethe Institute to learn German and asked this person whether I could get an advice regarding a teacher, who would support me in my endeavour. I was recommended to attend German courses at the German-Kazakh University, where I took courses twice a week, each one lasting one hour and a half. Within three months I reached the B1 level. Afterwards I came to the city of Pavlodar, where the German minority is still very strong and it is represented through different national clubs - there one can learn German for free. I attended one such course, which were organized by the association of Germans in Kazakhstan “Wiedergeburt”. There were young ladies from Switzerland – volunteers, who were teaching

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me German language during 10 days. When I arrived in Germany, four months later, I principally could speak German. When I passed the exam there, I got B2 level.”

Further, intensive contacts with the German-speaking community at the respondents’ home countries helped some people to even deepen their German language skills. Those people, who had to deal with German language through other sources than school or a HEI at home i.e. those with relatives living in Germany, could form an opinion about Germany as a study destination at early stages of their life. However, such kinds of respondents were rather an exception. According to the OS results, approximately half of the respondents from three republics have German as the language of instruction at the HEIs in Germany. For Uzbek and Kyrgyz students German and English are the second most prevalent languages of instruction. For Kazakh respondents it is English, which points to the fact that many national scholarship-holders pursue their tertiary studies in Germany with English as the language of instruction. In this case German is learnt on the side i.e. if students have desire and time to learn, which could pose the problem of German language deficit. So, Kazakh students most frequently, as compared to Uzbek and Kyrgyz students, declared in the OS that while living in Germany, among the most persistent problems they had to struggle, are the lack of German language skills and flat hunting. The problem of German language deficit among many Kazakh respondents, apart from the condition that German is not the language of instruction at a HEI and learnt by many Kazakh students incidentally, can be also explained by the fact the latter are younger than Uzbek and especially Kyrgyz students and in the beginning of their study process in Germany. It seems that there is a correlation between German language skills and the problem of flat hunting of respondents. This is proved by the example of Kyrgyz respondents, who suffer least from the problem of the lack of German language and simultaneously are most lucky in finding an accommodation in Germany. Additionally, as the findings of the qualitative interviews with Kazakh students testify the lack of German language proficiency impaired the wellbeing of respondents during their long-term study (2 years and above) in Germany. For some of them, it was even one of the reasons to return home soon after the graduation in Germany. From the answers of respondents in general, it became clear that for gaining a successful command of German or deepening it, a willingness to learn German and to practice it in a German-speaking circle is a primary precondition. Finding free time to study the language is rather a secondary precondition. A female respondent L. from Kazakhstan, got a M.A. degree in Germany, and currently lives in Almaty. Before starting her master studies in Germany she did not possess the German language and started learning it after arriving in Germany and attended an intensive four-month German course:

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“In the early months I had to struggle with serious difficulties in learning German and right away I understood that I could not achieve much [in Germany] with English only. Therefore I had to learn it in order to be able to communicate. German language persisted as a challenge until the end. I, for example, could not attend some [required] courses which I wanted to take additionally; and that I could not work [in my area of expertise] in Germany, [...] because I cannot speak German. I did not want to know this language at the level which would allow me to work in it.” “Even if I used in the corporation [internship place and a temporary job later] English language, I felt uncomfortable when my colleagues during dinner after the work-end, started talking German to each other. My German was not at that level to communicate with them. Therefore it was boring for me. And the Germans, in substance, were not interesting for me. I did not even have, except for a few, German friends, who were extremely globalized and Americanised. I did not understand people. And in any case, I experienced a lot of cultural shock in relations with them. Those relations were completely different. I felt myself emotionally uncomfortable”.

Moreover, with 12 percent of answers in the OS, Kazakh students are those, whose emotional condition changed in a negative manner most often after moving to Germany. As the outcome, Kazakh students turned out to be most unsatisfied with life in Germany because they checked most frequently the options feel “uncomfortable” and “not comfortable at all”. In return, Kyrgyz students’ answers constitute the highest percentage of students who feel “very comfortable” in Germany. This is apparently due to the fact that the respondents from Kyrgyzstan live longer in Germany and thus, are better integrated than other target countries’ students. However, as compared to Uzbek and Kazakh students, Kyrgyz respondents have to struggle most frequently with visa formalities in Germany. In this regard, the German language proficiency, which is actually at advanced level among 2/3 of Kyrgyz respondents, plays for Germany’s Aliens Department perhaps a minor role. In general, the results of qualitative in-depth interviews testify that the respondents from three republics equally do not like the way of how local Aliens Departments in Germany work. Particularly, the respondents from Kazakhstan, who studied in the federal land Bavaria, did not like “weird” questionnaires that they had to fill out in order to receive a residence permit in Germany. Some of Uzbek interviewees, amongst others, stressed that the employees of the Aliens Department in Germany have an initial aggressive attitude towards the foreign applicants. Therefore it is beneficial for an applicant to appear convincing and somewhat ‘strong’ in order to be able to accomplish his or her business as soon as possible there. The “convincing” aspect was confirmed by a respondent from Kyrgyzstan too, who, as a result, had a positive experience with the Aliens Department. Thereby the respondent emphasized that the outcome from dealing with the Aliens Department depends predominantly on the individual employee’s attitude towards an applicant.

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As numerous examples of this study show, a good command of the local language is not a sufficient incentive to influence the decision for choosing a study destination. There should be other favourable factors that play a role. To specify and provide an example, due to historical circumstances, many CA students possess Russian language at a native speaker level. This actually enables them to pursue tertiary studies in Russia or any other neighbouring country. Some respondents from the in-depth interviews, who do not have Russian language barriers at all, explained why they did not decide to study in particularly Russia. As reasons for that they mentioned such factors as Russia’s negative image in some aspects (e.g. hostility towards foreigners) or a deficit of attractive opportunities (e.g. quality of education, cost-benefit ratio, scholarships etc.) for overseas students.81 A female respondent O. from Kazakhstan, who earned a master degree from a German HEI and currently pursues her doctoral studies in Germany: “Albeit my relatives live in Russia, there would have been less pleasure from studying in Russia [if I had done it] because Russia was an odd country for me. In Germany, in contrast to Russia, it was easier to settle in the social sphere – in looking for a job, hiring a room.”

A female respondent U. from Uzbekistan completed both bachelor and master in Tashkent, and finally, one more master in Germany. She currently lives in Germany and is married to a German citizen: “I have never thought about studying in Russia, I do not like Russia, how to put it, I have an impression that it was messy. It feels uncomfortable, even dangerous, because ultra-nationalism and skin heads are developing there. And I, because I am of Asian origin, could go there for a short period of time, for holidays, but not for long. I am a little bit afraid in this regard. This feeling of fear is also influenced by the negative attitude towards our guest-workers [from Uzbekistan] there.”

A male respondent E. from Uzbekistan pursuing his PhD study in Germany: “I have never thought of living in Russia. I like this country but not its people. It sounds absurd, but I like the incumbent administration in Russia, I feel sympathy for Putin’s politics. But people: I heard a lot of stories about the attitude of Russian population towards the people from the ex-Soviet republics. It is neglectful. So, for me it is the reason not to live there. Why should I live and study there if I will be 81 Nevertheless, Russia remains ‚number one“ country in terms of shares of CA student studying in this country. Russia is followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This implies that CA student migration is most visible in terms of „regional mobility.“ In: Kurzmann, Stefan (2014): Departures from the Periphery - Central Asia in Times of Global Student Mobility. Available online: http://iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Paper_ Kurzmann.pdf

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[neglected there]. And the quality of education there is not especially good. Concerning the US: I have never considered this as an option. It is easy, in contrast, I have many friends there, but I do not like this country because of its political ambitions.”

The results of the OS also confirmed that (social) factors such as education quality, HEI’s reputation, low fees or fee-free HEIs (“cost of education”) played equally most important role for the decision of respondents from three republics to choose Germany as their study destination. The qualitative interviews delivered similar evidence: in particular, interviewees from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan while choosing Germany as tertiary study destination, appreciated the fee–free or low-fee study opportunities in Germany a lot. This aspect went along with the opportunity to undertake a tertiary study in English. Moreover, the interviewees stressed the top quality of tertiary education in Germany and the overall safety and the openness of this country. As discussed above, “language proficiency” and “ideological affinity” are factors of secondary importance while other factors e.g. “cost of education” have stronger driving power. This is also the case for the inquiry of Top Universities.com that found out why Germany as study destination is attractive among international students: “Germany does have a large and consistently strong higher education system, embedded in one of the world’s leading economies. Factor in the absence of tuition fees at public universities in Germany, the large selection of attractive German cities in which to study, and the liberal immigration laws that have made it easier for international graduates to stay on and work in Germany… and it’s pretty easy to see why this thriving nation at the geographic, economic and political heart of Europe is attracting a growing number of students from around the world” (Topuniversities n.d.). Also to the OS’ question regarding the TLP (teaching and learning process together with available facilities, internationalization efforts) of higher education in Germany, almost all of survey respondents from three republics answered as “good” and “very good”. The findings of the qualitative interviews confirm this positive trend. The reasons behind, as explained by Kazakh respondents, were lack of bribery in higher education in Germany. Further, excellent facilities (libraries, research labs etc.), the independent work of tertiary students in Germany was assessed as very high. The right to choose between electives was considered as part of the autonomous work of students in Germany. Specifically, one can choose the way of learning (presentation, paper work etc.) and an examination type. Respective respondents from Kazakhstan could develop abilities to independently work with literature and to sort out important from the less important information. Although some informants perceived the aspects of selforganization and time-management in the beginning of their studies as very challenging, it proved to bring positive results for their professional and personal

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abilities later. Among interesting aspects, respondents from Kazakhstan stressed that most of the German students have practical knowledge through making an internship, work and similar. Among all those predominantly positive assessments of the quality of higher education, there were some critical opinions too. Specifically, the attitude of German teaching personnel while transmitting knowledge to students was perceived by one Kazakh respondent as ‘dry’ i.e. with lack of motivation and enthusiasm. Another Kazakh respondent, among the negative aspects in the higher education system of Germany, mentioned overcrowded lecture halls, where hundreds of students tried to get knowledge. Furthermore, the lectures in such cases took place in a boring atmosphere, where a lecturer was showing a monotonous presentation with endless slides, and again, with little enthusiasm. Talking about the German higher education system and its quality, Kyrgyz respondents emphasized the practice-oriented curriculum of in particular law study in Germany and different expectations of teaching personnel from students in Germany and Kazakhstan. Moreover, it was mentioned that the teaching staff was well-prepared in Germany. A majority of Uzbek respondents, similarly to Kazakh respondents, mentioned in the in-depth interviews, among the advantageous aspects of higher education in Germany; autonomous work by students, practice-oriented research, lack of bribery, freedom of speech and many other aspects, which they indeed missed in the teaching and learning process of the Uzbek higher education system. Among those few critical aspects articulated by Uzbek respondents, there were poorly organized lectures sometimes and a constant rotation of different teaching personnel for the same subject, particularly in the medical sphere, were mentioned. As compared to a clearly positive tendency in rating the TLP in German higher education system, the TLP at the home countries of respondents was rated by the majority of the OS respondents from all three republics as “partially positive” and “partially negative”. Both options such as “positive” and “very positive” taken together gathered 49 percent of Kazakh, 44 percent of Kyrgyz and only 25 percent of Uzbek survey respondents testifying that Kazakh students became most positive about the TLP in their home country, as compared to Kyrgyz and especially Uzbek respondents. Thus, Uzbek students became most negative in rating the TLP of their home country’s HEIs from a positive perspective also because they most frequently checked the options “extremely negative” and “negative” (13 percent). Nevertheless the overall results testify that only a non-significant part of students from all three countries assessed the quality of higher education at the home country’s HEIs negatively and extremely negatively (9 percent of all students altogether in both options). This is completely different from the findings of the qualitative part, where almost all of the respondents, including Kazakh students, sound very sceptical about the TLP in their home countries’ HEIs. The respondents of face-to-face interviews from

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three republics, who were all graduates of state-funded HEIs in their home countries, among the most burning problems mentioned bribery, corrupt practices, the still existing Soviet-style in the TLP, low wages of teaching personnel and the lack of essential facilities. A female respondent C. from Kazakhstan was an exchange student during her bachelor study and later earned her M.A. degree in economics in Germany. She currently lives in Kazakhstan: “I am upset about the fact that after the bachelor defence at my university in Kazakhstan, we [students/graduates] were forced to collect money in order to organize a table/lunch for the teaching staff. The collected money made up in total 1000 USD. In Germany, when I was ready with my masters I wanted to thank my supervisor and give a present (a rare alcohol drink). But the supervisor rejected it and said that there was no need for that. Indeed, why should I thank somebody, if it is his or her job to teach me? These aspects, I mean, of course, I can gift a box of chocolates, but not golden jewellery.”

A female respondent R. from Kazakhstan, did her B.A. in Germany, and currently lives in Kazakhstan: “I also experienced the system of informal fees. We had some subject, I do not remember which one, and our professor told us if we buy a CD Rom, he needed something from electronic devices, and then you will pass an exam. We went and bought it for him. I faced this problem during my first year of study in Kazakhstan. And this is considering the fact that the teaching staff gets on average higher wages at this HEI than at state ones.”

It is notable, among other things, as the quotations of the Uzbek respondent below vividly testify that differences in the quality of TLP in the groups with national/Uzbek and Russian languages of instruction as well as depending on the geographical origin of students exist. Moreover, it seems to be common for Uzbekistan to set a HEI lecturer under the pressure if he or she does not want to grade a student, who did not even attend a course. Among other numerous critical points of Uzbek interviewees were many unnecessary courses e.g. “the struggle against terrorism, struggle against drugs” in the curricula of HEIs in Uzbekistan, which does not have any relation and relevance to the specialty. Nevertheless, such courses, similarly to the rest of the courses, are required ones. A male respondent I. from Uzbekistan, did his Diploma in his home university and PhD in Germany, he currently lives in Uzbekistan: “The legacy of communism is still present in the Uzbek higher education system. The Soviet system, Soviet past are still there. Though the old Soviet system with a five-year higher education was replaced and Bachelor and Master were introduced, the teaching methods and approach to the learning process stayed the same. It means: if you are required to study you will do it, if not, you won’t. If I talk about the last two-three years, it came so far that study as the process and the education

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system as a whole were pulled back. What became important are municipal improvements e.g. each faculty has its own land which should be cultivated. I think that the quality of education deteriorated as compared to what we had right after the gaining independence. And this deterioration has been progressing from year to year. For example, a faculty of mine admits 80 students each year. After the first semester it becomes clear who is who and why students are here. Out of 80 students, a maximum of 10 students came here consciously to study and are motivated to do it. They chose this subject intentionally and did their best to enter this University. The rest consists of those students, who were arranged to come to this faculty, or they did it because the competition to get accepted here is relatively low. Such students are not interested at all to study here, whether you force them or not they won’t study.” “In most cases students offer money to the teaching personal on their own initiative, and it works, because many teaching professionals have financial problems. Even if the latter would refuse to be corrupted, there are ways for students to approach a certain teacher through someone working e.g. in a rector’s office, a ministry, a court, parliament. I do not know where they find the right person, but at the end of the day a teacher will bend under the pressure and grade such a student enabling him or her admission to the next semester. It will happen anyway with or without money. So, this corrupted system is extremely different as compared to the German system of higher education. Moreover, there is a difference here if you study in a national (language of instruction is Uzbek) or European (language of instruction is Russian) group/faculty. The former group is worse. [The respondent works with national groups and his example related in the first line to the national groups]. In our faculty only 5 percent are students from Tashkent, other people come from different regions of Uzbekistan. This condition [generally the level of students’ knowledge from remote regions are lower than of those from the capital and its surroundings] affects academic performance too, the quality of lectures and seminars. Some students do not show up at all [at seminars and lectures], because they work either in the first half of the day or in the second half. Sometimes they work a full day.” “The teaching personal is demotivated, the monthly wage is low, each teaching person has at least two jobs, apart from working at a HEI, he or she works as an editor, or teaches at some separate course for school-leavers, or as a coach/tutor for school-leavers, who want to enter a HEI. The teachers do not spend much time at the university, they come, teach and go. The research does not take place and all is bound to the financial shortages. But there are also teachers, whose financial situation is solid, but they are oriented to those teachers, who come and immediately go, and do the same. They could stay here longer and work. We have six working days in a week (including Saturday), but this is a kind of an unwritten law - the teaching staff shows up here only when they have seminars or lectures.”

The interviewees from both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan criticized the implementation of the Bologna reforms. Joining the Bologna program and the modernization processes are in progress in Kazakhstan, though with less visible outcomes in respondents’ opinion. The reforms are not done from the bottom but from the

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top resulting in an unstable fundamental basis and rather superficial outcomes. In other words, those reforms did not really penetrate the existing higher education system, which was once established by Soviets. The deficit of textbooks in the Kazakh language was mentioned as another problem by Kazakh respondents. A female respondent O. from Kazakhstan earned a master degree from a German HEI and currently pursues her doctoral studies in Germany: “Once the bachelor system was introduced in Kazakhstan, we were the first generation of bachelor students. We made jokes that it was like a new soviet slogan “a five-year plan in four years.” How do people here [in Germany] manage to finish their study in four years? Because there are electronic libraries. They contribute a lot to independent learning. We have limited opportunities in this regard. Many books you can borrow only for the use in a reading room, you cannot always take them to use at home. To download something is in general problematic. Especially for those people, I know, who studied applying Kazakh language as their working language, had in practice problems in finding literature in the Kazakh language. So, they [responsible authorities for the introduction of Bologna system in Kazakhstan] try to make it like here [in advanced European countries]. However they do not consider the basics, they only see what is on the surface, thinking, OK, we will introduce the credit system and everything will function like in Europe. No, for this purpose new libraries must be enacted first of all, for example like the library at Humboldt University, where a student can work until the midnight.”

Kyrgyz students also mentioned several times the lack of practice oriented study and research at the home HEIs. A former student B., who used to attend linguistics studies in Kyrgyzstan, was motivated to start an analogous course of studies in Germany mostly by the fact that students-predecessors of the same study course could hardly speak German even after the graduation of their HEI. The respondent did not want to have a similar destiny and decided to leave for Germany: “I studied German as a foreign language there [in Kyrgyzstan]. I was expected to work as a German language teacher. [...]. Almost everything during the studies there was in Russian language. Therefore, even those who finish their studies after five years cannot fluently speak German.”

The practice of assigning methods in study and research in Kazakhstan demonstrates negative implications for Kazakh students while staying abroad for study purposes, particularly while pursuing doctoral studies in Germany. In fact, advanced postgraduate study requires from a doctoral candidate a high degree of independent work in his or her research area. In particular, a lack of independent work and lack of creativity in doctoral candidate’s projects became visible and problematic in the German conditions. In this regard the respective respondent had to make a mental shift in order to grasp how doctoral studies function in Germany. This was the case for a female respondent J. from Kazakhstan, who

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did her B.A., M.A. and PhD in Kazakhstan and finally one more PhD in Germany: “Comparing doctoral studies in Kazakhstan and Germany, I can say that during my doctorate in Kazakhstan I received explicit directions from my supervisor, he provided me with a ready research topic, its aims and methods. They were indeed so directly elaborated so that I just followed those instructions not thinking about whether the topic was interesting to me, why I need it etc. I needed only results in order to be able to defend. And I moved towards this aim.” “In Kazakhstan the supervisor decides/determines a lot, many things. He or she has a project at the Ministry [Ministry of Higher Education] and works according to this project and wants a doctoral candidate to work in the same area, and it is irrelevant whether a doctoral candidate is interested or not. And our doctoral candidates, including me at that time, wanted only one thing, to defend and get a title. And other people do the same – they start their PhD studies only because they need this title. The content does not matter, I assume. In Germany one starts such an endeavour consciously, because one is interested in the topic.”

Only one respondent from Kazakhstan, who was a graduate of the GermanKazakh University (GKU), spoke in a predominantly positive manner about the latter HEI. The respondent emphasized the absence of bribery and other similar practices at GKU. In the respondent’s words, everything in teacher-student relationships was fair there. It was also stressed that because of the absence of corrupt practices, the students of the GKU do differ, in terms of quality, from many other students of e.g. state HEIs in Kazakhstan. The differences are evident in their level of knowledge because GKU has a separate internal exam and overall high admission standards: “The teaching staff there [at GKU] is in fact strong, the teaching process is very comprehensible, at the modern level i.e. the lectures are not simply read without visual tools, it is very well established and the information is very well transmitted.” “I can say that the vast majority of people, as compared to other local HEIs, have a higher level of knowledge when entering our HEI. Because there is a separate internal exam, well, I speak about the times when I studied there. Maybe it is different now […]. Basically, the majority of students now say the same. Therefore I want to believe that it remained liked that. Surprisingly it was the only such university, […]; one can solve problems in any other university with the help of this [corruption]. It did not work at our HEI. If you really do not know, you have three chances. But if you really have insufficient level of knowledge, or you do not want to study, I do not know, you are lazy, and then you do not have chances to finish the study normally. Therefore there are really people, who need it, who are interested in it, who have an aim in their life. In other words, they are not those, who do not know why they came to the HEI. They came in order to study.”

Although the total majority of CA respondents from the OS rated the TLP at their home countries as partially positive and partially negative, there are indeed

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a myriad of shortages in the TLP in the higher education systems in three republics, according to the results of the qualitative interviews. Based on the latter, it can be assumed that there is a strong need for the improvements, otherwise the higher education of focus countries will remain highly non-competitive as compared to the German HEI system.82 As the results of the OS testify, almost half of respondents from three republics altogether hold a scholarship (44 percent): 63 percent from Kazakhstan, 39 percent from Kyrgyzstan and 31 percent from Uzbekistan. Kazakh students are, thus, the largest group consisting of scholarship-holders and Uzbek students with 69 percent are the largest group consisting of non-scholarshipholders. Almost all of Uzbek (90 percent) and Kyrgyz (89 percent) scholarshipholders received financial assistance from the German side. Only half of Kazakh respondents (53 percent) did the same. The vast majority of German scholarshipholders applied for their scholarships (any kind) while still in their home countries. This can be explained by the fact that many German foundations enable people to apply for a long-term scholarship i.e. degree study only while being based in the home country. This is the case for the DAAD. By the time of the application one must have been based in the home country for the last two years, as one Uzbek respondent, who himself was a recipient of a German scholarship but other than the DAAD, explained. As the very first option the respondent himself tried to apply for the DAAD scholarship initially, but could not do it because he lived in Germany. To the OS question regarding a possible return obligation through the German scholarship, 70 percent of all German scholarship holders from three republics answered that they were not obliged to return home because their scholarship did not prescribe the return of students’ after the graduation in Germany. Another 24 percent of scholarship-holders from three republics answered that their scholarship envisaged return. However, that regulation did not have any legal implication so that the students could actually decide autonomously whether to return home or not after the qualification in Germany. Only a minority of students were, according to their German scholarship’s regulation, obliged to return home after qualifying. This picture gives evidence that almost all German scholarship-holders from three republics, in fact could autonomously decide whether to return home or not after the graduation in Germany. Almost all of Kazakh and all Kyrgyz and Uzbek scholarship-holders were positive about the return policy of their German foundations and assessed it as “very good”, “good” and “satisfied”. 82 For the detailed analysis of higher education systems in three CA republics see chapter 5.

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Almost all of the respondents, German scholarship-holders, from three republics who participated in the qualitative interviews, turned out to be financed by the DAAD, the most visible German academic organization in CA, and they praised the funders ‘free-choice’ return policy. Among the respondents from Kazakhstan were both: former DAAD scholarship-holders, who at the same time experienced the application procedure for the Kazakhstan’s stipend and those, who have never applied for it. Kazakh respondents rated the DAAD’s policy that does not oblige foreign graduates to return, though eventually expect them to do so due to the development policy goals, as very positive and non-interventionist. DAAD provides basically a chance to gather an experience. Whether one wants to return home or stay on in Germany or move to any third country after the graduation is an individual decision, according to respondents’ opinion. DAAD enables a person to study for him-, herself and does not put any pressure on a respective scholarship-holder, while e.g. Bolashak does. A female respondent L. from Kazakhstan, received her M.A. degree in Germany; lives currently in Kazakhstan. Concerning the return policy of the DAAD she reflected as follows: “I like this policy, it is a non-interventionist, it is like: if you want, you leave, if not then stay. They are glad about any outcome. Basically, it is like: we gave you a chance, the chance to see how it is there and you can then individually decide. I very satisfied with such a DAAD policy.”

Those respondents from Uzbekistan, who were or are DAAD scholarship-holders, like the respondents from Kazakhstan, appreciated the non-obligatory, return policy of DAAD. Such a free decision-making opportunity after the graduation enables one to be “mobile and flexible” and it wakens the huge interest of applicants towards the DAAD scholarship, according to them. A male respondent E. from Uzbekistan, who is currently a doctoral candidate in Germany, to the question of an obligatory return, answered that regarding the DAAD: “There is not any obligation, therefore the interest for this program is high.” “Principally, DAAD invests money in human capital in order for people contribute to their home countries, but there is nothing at the level of obligation, in other words you are basically mobile and flexible.”

Another Kyrgyz respondent R., a former DAAD scholarship-holder, who three times applied for the DAAD and was only successful the third time, stressed that if he had not received the DAAD scholarship, he would not have been able to come to Germany. Since neither he nor his parents could have financed him and he would not have undertaken the many risks connected to individual travel. In the respondent’s opinion, the DAAD should not introduce compulsory methods to return the graduates to their home countries because they would be indeed

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non-effective. If a person is not willing to return home, he or she will find ways to stay on in Germany. Therefore, attractive conditions must be created on site i.e. in the home countries of graduates, in the respondent’s words. Moreover, the respondent stressed that he had a purely DAAD scholarship, not DAAD/OSI, which is indeed prescribes return but in practice does not apply any sanctions against non-returners. “I knew DAAD because I was in this circle. It composed also DAAD lecturers; we talked with them. Therefore the structure of DAAD was known to me and people from my circle, so to say, were in Germany with different stipends. Usually they travelled [to Germany] for a month, for summer schools, for two months, like this, for learning language. Germany was somewhat unreachable [in contrast to Russia], far-away, bright. I applied initially for the summer school during my study. But I was not successful. After I graduated from the university or one year before it, I applied again, this time for a master study. But again, it did not work out. So. After graduation I started working in line with my specialty, as a lawyer, and thought - no, no, let’s try again, and applied again. I applied three times, and the third time was successful. I got a scholarship. And this was, I think, a decisive moment. If I had not got the scholarship, I would not have come to Germany individually/independently. Because it is extremely expensive, firstly, secondly, there are many risks. […]. I could not afford it myself. My parents are not a kind of rich landowners; they are ordinary people, so, they could not have supported me. Therefore this DAAD scholarship provided me an opportunity, indeed. It opened up a new direction that is why I came to Germany.” “My DAAD scholarship did not have a regulation of an obligatory return home after my study. It was a pure DAAD scholarship [in contrast to the DAAD/OSI scholarship].”

Kazakh students turned out to be the only group in terms of receiving finance for study in Germany from the national government. The latter made up 16 percent of the total scholarship-holders’ from three countries (44 percent) and 35 percent of all scholarship-holders from Kazakhstan (63 percent). 100 percent of all national scholarship-holders, apparently “Bolashak” scholarship-holders, applied for their scholarship while still in Kazakhstan. Almost all of them (93 percent) indicated that their scholarship regulated their return and they must definitely return to Kazakhstan after graduation from a German HEI. Only a tiny percentage of respondents (7 percent) indicated that although the scholarship envisaged his/her return, it did not have any legal implications so that he/she could actually decide individually whether to return or not after graduation. Hence, two groups can be identified here: the majority group (93 percent) who must return and the minority (7 percent) who may not return. The majority must return home after the graduation in Germany and the minority can escape this obligation. The tendency is that the majority answered questions in a positive manner while the minority did it negatively. To specify, the majority was “very satisfied” or “satis-

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fied” with the amount of their national scholarship, while the minority was “not satisfied at all”. The question about the assessment of the policy to promote return by the national scholarship, again demonstrated two poles: so, the majority of national scholarship-holders assessed it as “very good”, “good” and “satisfying” and the minority of national scholarship-holders, considered the return policy of the state foundation as “bad”. This is an interesting outcome that varies from the findings of the qualitative part. The latter included non-Bolashak scholarship recipients but who have had dealings with this scholarship and also Bolashak scholarship-holders. All of them showed their lack of enthusiasm towards this scholarship. The return obligation stipulated by Bolashak seems to be thereby, the main point for discussions. So, a high scepticism about the sustainable effectiveness of the Bolashak stipend’s obligation to return was articulated by some people, who were non-Bolashak scholarship recipients. This obligation did not function in reality because people, who returned home, did it only because they must return and were indeed not willing to work off the invested money by Bolashak. It was also mentioned that such people could escape the return obligation through registering at a job (owned by a brother or any other relative) only symbolically. They did it artificially i.e. only for getting a confirmation of their employment in Kazakhstan and apparently being then able to leave Kazakhstan again. A female respondent O. from Kazakhstan earned a master degree from a German HEI and currently pursues her doctoral study in Germany. Her nonapplication for the Bolashak scholarship was explained by her fear of the condition to pledge a property which would be confiscated in the case of non-return: “Another issue is that when they return, they get registered for a month at some job, at a brother’s place, son-in-law’s, wherever, and get their confirmation of work [in Kazakhstan], but nevertheless they leave the country. It happens too.”

A former DAAD scholarship-holder J., who herself has never applied for Bolashak, tried to be realistic and argued that the obligation and measures forcing Bolashak graduates to return might be a negative condition, but it is a necessary step that is taken by the Kazakh state. Otherwise many scholarship-holders would not return home and Kazakh investments in human capital would be in vain: “This is a necessity [for Bolashak to have restrictive measures to return]. Otherwise the state would spend a lot of money and it would be in vain. Though, I personally know two former Bolashak scholarship-holders, who are still abroad, despite the fact that they have to be in Kazakhstan. Well, there are ways to pass it [the obligation] over, yes. I think it is [the obligation] not quite correct, but it is a necessity. The state needs it in order to insure that highly qualified people return home and the money is not spent in vain. And a person, who applies for Bolashak scholarship must be aware himself of what kind of contract he/she is getting into and is obliged to return. If

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there is not a willingness to sign this contract, one should look for another ways, maybe, again the DAAD or British Council, give grants too. Or, the living costs in Germany are not that much different from those in Almaty. One can finance oneself and not sign any contracts [in terms of an obligatory return].”

Another respondent asserted that the return obligation, as being per se a stressful condition for recipients, is not as effective as other attractive measures could be. Instead of coercive measures adequate conditions must be created for returners in Kazakhstan. Otherwise, positive and sustainable implications from the return policy of Bolashak for the development of Kazakhstan are hampered. Moreover, the quality of the selection procedure of Bolashak must be improved. The latter is sometimes non transparent and unfair and may be seen as the reason for the condition that many Bolashak scholarship-holders are non-qualified and indeed do not deserve to hold their scholarships. This was related mostly to the young people from the southern part of Kazakhstan, who were selected by Bolashak administration because of their strong ethnic (Kazakh) affiliation and the inclination to return (one can put much pressure on them in this regard). The former Bolashak scholarship-holder R., who did her B.A. study in Germany, applied for the Bolashak due to support and encouragement from her father. At that time i.e. 2005, similarly to the previous respondent who applied for the Bolashak stipend twice unsuccessfully, there was a big PR regarding the Bolashak scholarship so that one could hardly resist the application. Moreover, this respondent could not apply for other scholarships e.g. DAAD because most of the scholarships were provided for graduate studies. Therefore the Bolashak scholarship was considered by her and her family as the only one realistic option for that time. The respondent stressed that if she could turn back time, she would not start with B.A. study in Germany and would undertake instead master degrees, because the former was lengthy and she was young and not as conscious as she would have been during the application for M.A. The respondent criticized Bolashak foundation’s adaptation policy of graduates after their return to Kazakhstan because it did not support the returners sustainably and long-term. Another former DAAD scholarship-holder (M.A. in Germany), a female respondent L. from Kazakhstan who returned home after graduating in Germany, deliberately did not apply for the Bolashak scholarship. Among the reasons why she did not do it, she mentioned, first of all, the obligation to pledge a property e.g. belonging to her parents, which is a threat in case of non-return and the compulsory employment of Bolashak scholarship-holders after the return to Kazakhstan. Moreover, an overall unwillingness to deal with local people prompted her to apply for the DAAD instead of Bolashak. This sounded mistrustful towards the program and its organizers: “I have never thought about it [application for Bolashak scholarship]. First, this obligation with compulsory return and work afterwards stressed me; because any-

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thing could happen [during the studies]. I did not like that one should give in pledge a property, which I do not possess myself.” “A property of my parents, well, we have not much of this, or it is not the best, shortly, this competition is for the best property. It is an absurd business for me. And I did not want to have any dealings with our people, it was easier without any obligation to apply for the DAAD scholarship.”

Additionally, a lack of knowledge of the Kazakh language hindered some people from the application for Bolashak scholarship. A former DAAD scholarshipholder M. (B.A. in Germany) assumed that the non-possession of the Kazakh language became the main reason for her not to apply for Bolashak scholarship. She also stressed that if she had not had an alternative such as DAAD, she would have started to learn Kazakh in order to be able to apply for the Bolashak scholarship. She also explained why she does not speak the Kazakh language: “Despite the fact that we learn Kazakh equally, for example, with Russian, and foreign languages, practically from the first class on at schools, but if we do not use this language at home, for those whom it is not a mother tongue, it is not realistic to learn this language to the level of fluently speaking it. In other words, I myself, for example, have never had any stereotypes that we do not have to [learn Kazakh language] or something like this. I believed that it is correct, we live in such a country, and it would not be bad to speak this language. But taking into account all my willingness, it was not realistic because if in a language lesson sit those, who fluently speak this language and those, who completely started from the alphabet to learn the language – it is difficult to learn it at one level and communicate in it at a normal level. For me the non-possession of the language [Kazakh language] – is a problem. And for the Bolashak it is one of the decisive factors if you do not speak Kazakh, as far as I know.”

As declared earlier, no one among the respondents from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan got funding from the governments of their home countries according to the OS. Among the reasons the respondents of the in-depth interviews from Uzbekistan mentioned, they either did not hear about any national scholarship or they simply did want to deal with local donors in terms of property pledges and the obligation to work for years in an assigned state position. Concerning the respondents from Kyrgyzstan, likewise the Uzbek students, they either did not hear about the national scholarship or they doubted the good reputation of such a scholarship in terms of an extreme non-transparency of the application procedure. A female respondent A. from Uzbekistan (M.A. in Germany) who voluntarily returned to her home country stated that during the application period a state scholarship was missing at that time. However, she perhaps would not have applied for that if it had existed:

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“When I studied [in Uzbekistan] there were not any state financed scholarships. [Even if there had been some], I would have been fearful about Uzbek scholarships because of some obligations afterwards. [...]. And the return obligation is not as scary as the obligation to work at some state institution [for five years].”

A female respondent T. from Kyrgyzstan, who earned her PhD degree in Germany, explained her non-application due to the highly corrupt selection procedure: “Well, we had state scholarships, but at that moment they were corrupt, and only children of high officials could travel [with these scholarships]. And ordinary people could not.” “I did not believe in them [a successful application for state scholarships] at that time. Now it is more or less better. At that moment, during 2002-2003 the corruption was widespread, we had very few chances.”

According to the results of the online survey, Kyrgyz students (72 percent), though with a slight difference, turned out to be the most socially active group (e.g. voluntary engagement in an association, initiative etc.) while living in in the home country. For all countries’ respondents the tendency for social activity83 dropped while living in Germany. The percentage of political engagement (e.g. member of any political party, participation in an election campaign) of the three countries respondents at home was predominantly low. So, half of Kazakh and Kyrgyz students indicated that they have never been politically active in their countries of origin. The share of Uzbek students (66 percent) was even higher in this regard. This implies that Uzbek respondents turned out to be most politically passive, than Kazakh and Kyrgyz respondents, while living in their home country. There is an analogous picture of an increased percentage of politically passivity of students from three republics while living in Germany. The general tendency for all three target countries was thus identified: the social and political engagements of CA respondents seem to drop while studying and living in Germany. The reasons for that, as respondents from the qualitative part explained were lack of time and appropriate knowledge while living in Germany. A Kyrgyz respondent R. indicated that there was a continuum between social/political engagements in the-home country and in Germany: if individuals were engaged in different kinds of political and social activities in their home countries, then they become active in Germany too. His personal experience accounted for this continuum.84 While living in Kyrgyzstan he was engaged in 83 The terms activity and activeness are used here synonymously. 84 This continuum was also demonstrated by the findings of Rother (2009: 273) regarding the “political remittances”. Based on a survey among 1000 Philippine returners from six destinations found out that “‘political activism’ before and after migration was closely

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election campaigns, was engaged in parliamentarian work etc. Although, the respondent had to deal at that time with rather “dirty” politics, in his words, and lost the willingness to keep his political activeness in Kyrgyzstan, he kept going to vote even if he believed that his vote would bring nothing. After the respondent had moved to Germany, he rediscovered his interest in becoming politically active again. The respondent even went so far that he took German citizenship as soon as it became possible, in order to be able to vote at all possible levels and to influence current developments in Germany. Similarly, through different projects, the same respondent was and currently remains socially active in both countries. Another Kyrgyz respondent T. proves basically the very reverse of the previous case. Being politically passive in Kyrgyzstan, this female respondent kept her distance from politics in Germany. The respondent did not particularly like the political climate in Kyrgyzstan and stated that all those revolutions there were no more than a provocation and one should not take part in them. Likewise, she was not politically engaged in Germany. However, the respondent was socially active, both in Kyrgyzstan and Germany. A slightly higher social activeness of Kyrgyz students particularly in Germany might be reasoned by the fact that on average Kyrgyz students’ live in Germany longer than Kazakh and Uzbek students, thus, as mentioned above, they are more advanced in the process of integration in Germany than the latter. Additionally, as it was previously shown, Kyrgyz respondents are most frequently married with German citizens implying that this condition apparently opens up more opportunities to them in Germany than for other kinds of students. In return, Uzbek students’ increased political passivity in their home country can be explained by more negative political atmosphere in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakh respondents’ answers from the qualitative part support Kyrgyz respondent’s arguments regarding the condition that if people were politically or socially active at home, they get active in Germany too or vice versa. Being rather an exceptional case, only one respondent from Kazakhstan was active in the political sphere in Kazakhstan and kept her activeness in Germany too. While in Kazakhstan, this interviewee O. was trying to find an alternative way of thinking that was the opposite of the state one. Nevertheless her political activism did not last long and was soon prohibited. In Germany the same respondent O. found her interest in politics again and tried to develop it through the engagement in activities of different political institutions. The same is valid for her social interest in both countries. related” i.e. those respondents who had been active before they left as OFW (overseas Filipino workers) were also active after they returned home.

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The rest of the respondents from Kazakhstan demonstrated their social and political passivity in Kazakhstan and Germany. Among the reasons for political apathy in both directions were mentioned the lack of self-confidence, lack of time, lack of appropriate information sources, general disinterest, and the fear of possible repercussions. Notably, Uzbek students’ responses form the online survey demonstrated the highest rate of political passivity both in Uzbekistan and Germany. Uzbek respondents’ answers from the qualitative part confirmed the tendency that is characteristic for previous two cases: the qualitative part testifies that Uzbek students were not politically and socially active, either in Uzbekistan or in Germany. Thereby, as one of the Uzbek respondents explained, his political and social disinterest while living in Germany was triggered by the desire to escape possible problems with Uzbek authorities after his return to Uzbekistan. This respondent I. believed that there was a kind of surveillance among Uzbeks in Germany and therefore it was better to keep a low profile to avoid any problems later. This statement was also supported by a group of students from Uzbekistan, with whom I had a rather informal discussion. Although these respondents themselves were rather open for meetings with compatriots, they stressed that such a fearful atmosphere was characteristic for many people from Uzbekistan to whom they had personal contacts. The latter felt a constant control on the part of Uzbek authorities even living abroad and were worried about the implications of their deeds in Germany or any other country after the return to Uzbekistan. This demonstrates how fearful some students from Uzbekistan could be, owing to the tough political conditions existing there, at least during the time of interviews (in 2013-2014). Another respondent E. from Uzbekistan did not see any practical implications for becoming politically active, for e.g. voting in elections in his home country because his vote would not mean anything for the outcome due to the nature of elections, in his opinion. The lack of appropriate structures was seen by the same respondent as the main hindrance for social activism in Uzbekistan. The general tendency for all three target countries is that the social and political engagement of CA respondents seems to drop when they are studying and living in Germany. The reasons for this, as respondents to the qualitative study explained, were lack of time and appropriate knowledge. Thus, it can be concluded that generally there is a negative tendency for respondents to be politically active in their home country which, together with the lack of necessary resources (e.g. time, self-confidence, information sources) for respondents living in Germany, gives rise to low engagement and contributes to the lower levels of political activity in CA students studying in Germany. All this implies that the accumulation of political remittances by CA students while studying in Germany and their transfer to their home country is rather insignificant. This

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may be also applied for the social activeness of respondents, although the social sphere offers a wider space for taking actions. In some cases, the continuum between being active at home and in Germany may work out if students find appropriate resources to become engaged. The answers of respondents from three CA republics about their plans after the graduation of the current study in Germany showed evidence that almost 90 percent of them plan either to “first stay and then return home” (47 percent) or “to settle down in Germany” (20 percent) or students plan “to move to a third country” (12 percent) or they have “other” plans (10 percent), which did not necessarily relate to the return intentions to their home countries. Among those respondents Kyrgyz students most frequently checked the options “first stay and then return home” and “to settle down in Germany” (55 and 30 percent respectively). In the case of Uzbekistan there were 50 and 17 percent respectively, and in the case of Kazakh students there were 37 and 14 percent respectively. It made up, thus, a tiny percentage of those three countries’ students, who would “immediately return home” after the graduation in Germany (11 percent altogether). The low return tendencies among the students from all three republics to their home countries that became evident from the results of the online survey were reinforced by the answers of respondents to the OS’ question concerning the return tendencies among the compatriots.85 So, around 2/3 of Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents and half of Kazakh students believed that the majority of their compatriots were inclined to stay on in Germany after graduation. The latter was supported by the statements of respondents from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who participated in face-to-face interviews and who indicated that the majority of their compatriots stay on in Germany after graduation in this country. Only few of them return, specifically those who have an obligation to return. Moreover, everybody around those respondents seemed to support them not to return. It was emphasized that especially women are inclined to stay on because they more frequently get married to local Germans or people of other nationalities residing in Germany. And also people with children are eager to stay on in Germany because of the many opportunities they see for their children in this country. However, sometimes the desire to stay on does not coincide with someone’s opportunities and she or he has to leave Germany.

85 Kazakh national scholarship-holders are an exception in this regard, the majority of particularly “Bolashak” scholarship-holders, due to obligatory mechanisms return. There are surely cases, where the return obligation is abused but they constitute only a minority. Moreover, attested by witnesses, in the recent years “Bolashak” administration strengthened the controlling mechanisms and re-considered the whole databank of returners so that many non-returners had to either return to Kazakhstan or pay penalties.

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To the question whether respondents feel to be valued/needed by their home country, more than half of students from Kazakhstan (53 percent) and Uzbekistan (52 percent) as well as 48 percent of Kyrgyz students feel that they are needed/valued by their home countries. The second half of respondents distributed its answers between the options “Rather not” and “No”. The largest group of respondents that categorically does not feel to be needed by the home country account for Uzbek students (22 percent), while there are only 8 percent of Kyrgyz and 11 percent of Kazakh students, who selected this option. Almost a similar majority i.e. half of respondents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (47 percent in total) believe that patriotism (emotional connection to the home country) plays a “significant role” in the decision making of students to return home (for temporary and permanent return decisions). For 18 percent of Kazakh respondents, 17 percent of Kyrgyz and 13 percent of Uzbek respondents, patriotism plays even an “absolutely significant role”. The qualitative interviews stressed a linkage of ethnic aspect to the question of patriotism. A female respondent C. from Kazakhstan (ethnic Kazakh), who earned her M.A. degree in Germany and returned home after graduation, claimed that non-Kazakh ethnic groups, in particular Russian students, do have a weaker emotional connection to Kazakhstan and therefore they are more reluctant to return to Kazakhstan after the graduation in Germany. She believed that ethnic Kazakhs affiliate themselves with Kazakhstan more intensively than non-ethnic Kazakhs and she articulated her criticism on latter’s reluctance to learn the Kazakh language: “Yes, for ethnic Kazakhs it [patriotism] probably plays a significant role. Because you are, anyway, Kazakh and you understand, at least at some point, that it is your motherland. Perhaps for other Kazakhstanis i.e. non-ethnic Kazakhs, I talk about Russians now, this aspect is less important. Why. I give you an example: some Kazakhstanis used to study with me, Russian guys, they stayed on in Germany. “Why did you stay on, you miss Kazakhstan so much?” In other words, they miss the country a lot; if I posed them that question they said that their future in Kazakhstan was dim. As the reason for that they mentioned their lack of Kazakh language. Then I asked them whether they in Germany speak Russian too. They speak German, why? They gave a vague answer for that. [...]. I think Kazakh students they are more tied to their families, home, these moments are more developed in us [ethnic Kazakhs]. In other words, we are more patriotic perhaps. [From my observations] those people, who felt offended by life, who believed that it was so bad in Kazakhstan and so on, stayed on in Germany. Or those stayed on, who had a huge desire to stay on in Germany, they got married there and similar.”

The poor command of state language, in this case of Kyrgyz language, by nonethnic Kyrgyz, a male respondent R. from Kyrgyzstan, was also mentioned as a possible reason to stay on in Germany. Moreover, the respondent admitted, and confirmed the above-mentioned citation of Kazakh respondent C., stating that

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non-ethnic Kyrgyz are less patriotic than ethnic Kyrgyz. Further, it was mentioned that especially Uzbek national minorities might suffer under discrimination in Kyrgyzstan: “I can imagine this. [...]. If you are an ethnic Kyrgyz, you have, surely, a little bit more eagerness, connection to Kyrgyzstan. [...]. Non-ethnic Kyrgyz have a language barrier and if they may return to Kyrgyzstan they can have problems in certain regions there. And this [the requirement to possess a good command of Kyrgyz language] becomes higher and higher. [...]. If you have to reach something you have to possess the state language. This is the same in Germany – if you do not possess German language, you will fail. This is applicable for any country. [...]. Therefore I think that non-ethnic Kyrgyz have difficulties to return and they are less patriotic. Moreover, it depends also on the specifics of the ethnicity of a returner. If you e.g. ask someone with Uzbek roots [whether he or she wants to return to Kyrgyzstan after the graduation in Germany], you will face a lot of rejection [due to tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan].” “I, myself, experienced there [in Kyrgyzstan] very positive moments, but there were also negative moments and the national factor played thereby a certain role. [...]. Well, intellectually advanced people were adequate, but I also dealt with people, who were less intellectually advanced. I had conflict with them at a private level. I know that when you are in the country [in Kyrgyzstan] you deal with different people and events. And the events, which have taken place in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, are very negative [ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks]. Therefore this factor [national/ethnic factor] must be taken into account and it plays a certain role [for the decision of non-ethnic Kyrgyz to return to Kyrgyzstan]. Although Kyrgyzstan is considered to be somewhat liberal, it has problems from the legal perspective in this regard.”

Moreover, as the OS results delivered there is a scarce awareness of the German return promoting programs among the majority of students from three republics. Only 16 percent of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek students altogether (35 people), from the whole share of respondents, are aware of any German program that promotes return of foreign graduates (particularly of the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM)) to their home countries. Among these 35 people (16 percent of total answers), who gave positive answers, only 4 persons have made use of them. The majority of respondents, among 16 percent of total answers, from Kazakhstan (75 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (61 percent) do believe that return promoting programs of Germany are less effective, while 43 percent of Uzbek students consider them as effective in promoting return migration. According to the results of the qualitative in-depth interviews, nobody among the students from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had heard about any return promoting program on the German part. Thereby, a female respondent O. from Kazakhstan mentioned that it is even better not to know about such a return-promoting organization and as a joke she added, that she would not like to be

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trapped by such an organization. Even if she knew about the CIM, she would not use its services, because she does not want to return to Kazakhstan. In her opinion, Kazakhstan does not need her i.e. her experiences and competencies, even if there are sectors in Kazakhstan that must be developed. In the respondent’s opinion, the attitude among people in Kazakhstan is somewhat ‘we know ourselves what to do’. She has neither heard nor received any offer, which would demonstrate a need for her to be useful in Kazakhstan. The respondent instead would go to work in the development sector e.g. to Romania or Croatia that demonstrate openly their consent to receive a kind of ‘development aid’. A comparatively high number of Uzbek respondents, in return, were mostly aware of the CIM in particular. However, none of those respondents, due to different reasons, could make use of CIM or any other similar program. One of the female respondents, while studying in Germany a specialty that was created for development countries, happened to take part at the information event organized by the CIM on return migration. She was immediately interested in such a service of CIM and asked a representative whether she could make use of it because she would like to return to Uzbekistan after the graduation in Germany. However, the CIM representative said that she could not do it because there were not any services provided for Uzbekistan. Another female respondent U. heard about STUBE86, which regularly organized events and informed people from developing countries about the return opportunities after graduation. The respondent wanted to get the relevant information concerning Uzbekistan but could not get any because neither of the programs was aimed at the development cooperation with Uzbekistan and promotion of return migration. A male respondent I. from Uzbekistan was told by his supervisor that there was an opportunity for working in Uzbekistan and for a financial support in terms of salary within the framework of CIM. However, the respondent did not make use of that information because he believed that one of the conditions to be able to apply for that program was the availability of a job offer in the home country. He therefore, felt himself, limited, while living in Germany, in putting forward his application for jobs in Uzbekistan, because he believed that for finding any job there he should have stayed in Uzbekistan.

86 A study-accompanying program “STUBE” was created for students from Africa, Asia and Latin America and is represented currently in eleven counties in Germany. It complements the individual study of students through offering high-quality events outside their HEIs, which enables the raising of students’ awareness of developmental issues and their qualification. For more information see (in German): STUBE (n.d.): Was ist STUBE? Available online: http://www.stube-info.de/was-ist-stube/index.html

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According to the OS, the vast majority of students from three republics, who checked the option “first stay and then return home”, would do it in order “to work” in Germany. The second-biggest group composes those students, who would “do an internship”. Thereby the number of Kazakh students (36 percent) notably differed from those of Uzbek (21 percent) and especially Kyrgyz students (12 percent), who preferred to do an internship in Germany. This may point to Kazakh students’ more frequent obligation to return home because an internship implies a temporary stay rather than a permanent one as in the case of an employment. Altogether both options (work and internship) give evidence that 84 percent of Kazakh students, 64 percent of Kyrgyz and 79 of Uzbek students, after the graduation, would gather practical experience in Germany. Only an insignificant share of respondents altogether (8 percent) would pursue a further study in Germany. Prior to starting the description of factors, which were indicated by the OS respondents as influential for their return intentions after graduation in Germany, it is important to stress again that migration is a process that is seldom influenced by only one factor. In most of the cases there is a combination of factors, which are, to a different extent, influential on the decision to move. It is especially relevant for decision-making of student migrants who stay before various changes in their lives (employment, marriage etc.) and have therefore various strategies and life-choices (protracted and multi-staged process). For the work at hand, five main factors were chosen and the relevant questions contained the brief description of all suggested factors, including: “social factors (e.g. quality of education, quality of health system etc.)”, “economic factors (e.g. amount of salary, economic status, job market perspectives etc.)”, “political factors (e.g. political regime, human rights etc.)”, “personal factors (e.g. family, friends, etc.)” and “intervening factors (e.g. geographical location, immigration law etc.)”. Thereby, the possible responses presumed the belonging of these factors to the source country e.g. political factors in my/respondent’s home country or in Germany respectively. By answering these questions, the respondents determined the level of influence of a certain factor choosing between five options e.g. “no influence at all” or “very strong influence”. In many cases the assessment of the role of certain factors, to take an example the option “first stay and then return home” during the in-depth interviews took place in such a way that respondents simultaneously started to contrast the factors in Germany with those in the home country (“pull” and “push” factors). This means that interviewees in the qualitative part talked about the “push” factors in their home countries instead of “pull” factors in Germany. This is evidence of the interdependency of factors in both directions.

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Moreover, as mentioned-above, the decision-making is rather a protracted process consisting of various stages. As the in-depth interviews of this study testify, only few made their return decisions ‘spontaneously’ (except for some of those with personal factors) and had a clear-cut idea to return i.e. knew it before they started studies in Germany that they would return. The majority of respondents from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who chose the option “first stay and then return home” in the OS, indicated that the “social factors in Germany” would play the strongest role for their decision-making to stay in Germany for a while. The second and third leading factors in the cases of Kazakh and Uzbek respondents, who showed similar preferences, are economic and political factors in Germany. Other than the OS findings, the distribution of factors in the qualitative interviews clearly showed the dominant role of economic factors. Both of Uzbek respondents from the in-depth interviews, who currently study in Germany and would “first stay and then return home”, indicated that economic factors i.e. gathering of work experience in Germany and job market opportunities would be significant for their decision-making. While the first respondent was going to realize the latter explicitly in Germany, the second respondent could also imagine gathering work experience in a third country. Both of the respondents showed a strong willingness, after becoming specialists in their field of study, to contribute to the development of Uzbekistan afterwards. One of them stressed that a long-term stay (settlement) in Germany would be conceivable only for the benefit (e.g. due to a better quality of education in Germany) of his children that may come in future. The role of the political factor was demonstrated as having no significant power for the decisionmaking of respondents. There was no one in the qualitative part among Kazakh respondents, who would choose the option “first stay and then return home”. In the case of Kyrgyz respondents “economic factors” became dominant in the OS for the option “first stay and then return home”. The second and third leading factors were “social” and “political” factors respectively. A respondent from Kyrgyzstan from the in-depth interview, who planned to “first stay and then return home”, in line with the results of the OS, stressed economic factors as playing generally an important role for the decision-making of Kyrgyz students to stay on in Germany. Thereby the gathering of practical experience and job market opportunities in Germany were stressed as very important for someone, who wants to return home and make a career there later. This is also applicable for the respondent personally. Thereby it was underlined that there is a strong linkage between economic factors and social factors. The qualitative part shows that the plans of respondents from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to stay for a while in Germany after graduation are driven by economic factors i.e. gathering of work experience in Germany. The Kyrgyz

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case is indeed in line with the results of the OS in this regard. In the case of Uzbekistan, the social factors were leading in the OS for the option “first stay and then return home”. Notably, in the OS, the political factors in Germany seem to play an insignificant role for students from the three republics in their decision to stay in Germany for a while. This is also in line with the results of the in-depth interviews, where the political factors in the home country did not prove to be decisive; neither for Kyrgyz nor for Uzbek respondents. Analysing the results of the online survey, it is possible to identify that the majority of respondents in the OS, who plan “to settle down in Germany” after graduating in this country, in addition to selecting, “first stay and then return home”, also stated that they would start working (73 percent of total respondents). Thereby “economic factors” would be most influential for the majority of respondents from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in deciding “to settle down in Germany”. After economic considerations, “social” and “personal factors” are both equally important for Kyrgyz respondents, and for Uzbek respondents “social factors” are most influential. In the case of Kazakh students, who participated in the OS, the decision “to settle down in Germany” after the graduation is mostly influenced by “personal factors”, followed by “economic factors.” The results of face-to face interviews vividly demonstrate that during the decision-making, factors function in an interdependent manner, though at different levels. While reflecting on their decision-making process, respondents were confronted with different factors and tried to identify the most influential of them. Thereby, the level of clarity regarding factors depends on the level of respondent’s experience with them e.g. if someone had to deal a lot with economic problems then the decision-making would be led by this factor; as demonstrated by the example of a respondent from Uzbekistan from the qualitative part. This female respondent comparatively clearly identified economic factors for her decision to settle down in Germany i.e. unwillingness to lead a “humiliating” way of life in Uzbekistan (in terms of economic distress there). In the case of Kazakhstan, the role of economic factors was not assessed as being as significant as political and personal factors. In the words of one female respondent O., “it is not actually a serious problem for a person with foreign qualifications to find a well-paid job in Kazakhstan”. But the political factor, in her case, plays the most decisive role for not returning to Kazakhstan and for her willingness to settle down in Germany. Unfavourable political situation i.e. the political outrage prevails there and is disruptive for significant positive changes. Moreover, referring to herself, the respondent mentioned that it would be hardly possible for her to work at state structures without proficiency in the Kazakh

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language, due to the policy of “kazakhization” (Smagulova 2008)87 in Kazakhstan. Another Kazakh respondent R., a former Bolashak scholarship-holder, stressed, though hypothetically, the strong role of personal factors: even those, who have the obligation to return home, would bypass/ignore such an obligation and settle down in Germany, first of all, due to personal factors e.g. marriage and similar. In the words of the respondent, she would have escaped the return obligation if she had met her soul mate in Germany for whom it would have been worth to take all the consequences from not fulfilling the return condition. An interviewed respondent from Kyrgyzstan R. acknowledged that the decision to settle down in Germany was the most challenging so far. He had to weigh numerous factors at that time, however as the most decisive factor, in his words, was a personal factor, i.e. his German girlfriend (now his wife). 12 percent of three countries’ respondents (26 persons) in the OS checked the option “move to a third country” after the graduation in Germany, where more than half were Uzbek students, followed by Kazakh students. The option to “work” in a third country was most frequently checked by all three countries’ students. Accordingly, the economic factor was the most influential for moving to a third country after graduation in Germany. Only one female respondent T. could be interviewed face-to-face as the graduate of a German HEI, who after the qualification moved to a third country. This respondent, after the doctoral study in Germany, moved to Turkey because of sustainable professional contacts to her former Turkish colleagues that enabled her to get an attractive job in Turkey. Her qualifications were highly assessed there and she was quite satisfied with her salary in this country. She would mostly prefer to return to Kyrgyzstan and work there, however because of the limited economic opportunities and the low salaries there, she felt unable to do that. The role of other factors, specifically of the political ones, seems to be non-significant for her decision to possibly return later to Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the economic factor too, is dominant for not returning to the home countries in the case of this type of students. As already mentioned, the option of the OS “to immediately return home” was checked by only a tiny percentage (11 percent or 23 out of 218 people) of respondents from three republics. Thereby out of 23 people, who were willing to return home immediately after graduation in Germany, 17 were Kazakh students, 5 Uzbek students and only 1 was the respondent from Kyrgyzstan. The majority of students - both altogether and separately would “work” in their home coun87 Within the policy of „kazakhization“ the government of Kazakhstan is aimed at „maintenance and restoration of Kazakh in official domains.“ For a detailed information see in Smagulova, Juldyz (2008): Language Policies of Kazakhization and Their Influence on Language Attitudes and Use. In: International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, Vol.11 (3-4), pp. 440-475

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tries after the return there. The decision “to immediately return home” after the qualification in Germany is strongly influenced by “personal factors”, as respondents from three republics indicated. A solid number of home-returners from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could be won for the in-depth interviews. There was, unfortunately, no respective person from Kyrgyzstan, who could be interviewed face-to-face. Thereby it has to be mentioned, that also in the case of non-movers (graduates of local HEIs with knowledge of German and other potential for studying in Germany, however they have not started their studies in Germany) from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, personal factor played the decisive role for not moving to Germany. They all got married during or after the graduation of their local HEIs and were therefore somewhat constrained from doing it. In this regard it has to be mentioned that all of those respondents, non-movers, were economically well situated in their home countries. In the case of Kazakh respondent, it was even stressed that her family would not to move to Europe until the age of reason of her children because she wanted them to penetrate Kazakh culture. Despite different patterns, clear tendencies in the in-depth interviews with people, who after graduation in Germany returned to home (home country returners), could be identified: the personal factors (family) became the main reason to immediately return home after the qualification in Germany for two out of five Kazakhs respondents. For another two respondents it was predominantly economic factors that triggered the desire to return to Kazakhstan. However, in both cases they were accompanied, to a different extent, by other factors (personal, social). For the last respondent it was the Bolashak obligation. Those, who returned because of the personal factors and the Bolashak obligation made a decision to return because they had to do it. The other two, whose return actions were driven by economic factors, made their decisions autonomously because they actually could stay in Germany and looked further for other opportunities in the German job market but expected better perspectives regarding their career in Kazakhstan. Notably, those respondents, whose return was prompted by personal reasons and due to the Bolashak obligation, showed themselves as unsatisfied with their life in Kazakhstan and were willing to leave the country again. Perhaps, this is due to missed opportunities for self-realization in Germany. The respondents, who were driven by predominantly economic factors, were satisfied with their life in Kazakhstan and did not regret their decision to return home. All of these respondents had jobs at the time of interview but differently perceived working conditions. The level of their satisfaction varied between the underestimation on the part of an employer and the perception of the functioning of the Kazakh system. Both of the returners, who were generally satisfied with their life in Kazakhstan, were positive about their working conditions too. To the question about their future plans, they responded that they did not want to leave Kazakh-

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stan in the near future. The unsatisfied respondents demonstrated their dissatisfaction regarding their working/economic conditions and were willing to leave Kazakhstan as soon as possible again. In the case of Uzbek respondents from face-to-face interviews, even four out of five respondents were influenced by personal factors (family, boy-friend). The economic factors did play a role in the decision-making of the last respondent. Three of the respondents (two, who were influenced by personal and one by economic factors) were satisfied with their life in Uzbekistan and did not want to leave the country. The other two with personal factors, were willing to do so because of unsatisfying working/economic conditions in Uzbekistan. For a female respondent H., who graduated from an M.A. study in Germany and who did not want to be recorded during the interview, returned immediately to Uzbekistan after the qualification in Germany. She did so because of a job, which was waiting for her in Uzbekistan. She indeed could find a similar job in Germany, however after her calculations, the financial opportunities proved to be better in Uzbekistan. The respondent did not want to limit herself while living in Germany in comparison to the life style she got used in Uzbekistan (e.g. possession of a big apartment). She returned thus, foremost, because of better economic prospects in her home country than in Germany. Moreover, she stressed that it was advantageous, while living in the home country, to be close to her parents and other relatives. Political factors e.g. the deficit of democracy had, in her words, insignificant implications for her everyday life in Uzbekistan. She stressed, there was indeed no need for democracy if it would mean civil disturbance and instability like e.g. in Kyrgyzstan. In this context, it can be assumed: if economic conditions (job market, wage, working atmosphere) are attractive in the home country then the level of satisfaction of respondents remains high and they are not willing to leave the country i.e. they do not regret their initial decision-making to return home. The economic factors, thus, with some exceptions, plays the most decisive role for the CA respondents’ decision –making after graduation in Germany: either to stay temporarily in Germany or to settling down there, or to moving to a third country, or finally to return to Germany after the initial return to the home country. Similarly, the attractive employment opportunities may play also a retaining role for local graduates to stay on their home countries after graduation there. Personal factors, in all three cases, proved to be most influential for students’ decision-making to return home.

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Summary

The first section of this chapter is focused on the decision-making theories that guide students and graduates to move back and forth between countries. Both international student migration and the decision-making process are by nature multifaceted issues, requiring the use of multifarious theoretical and methodological perspectives for their analysis. Lee’s push and pull model, which is based on Ravenstein’s migration laws, undoubtedly serves as a reasonable tool for classifying the various factors involved in decisions to migrate. It sets out four groups of factors associated with source and recipient countries, as well as intervening and personal factors. First and foremost, without doubt the students’ personal characteristics such as their linguistic skills and travel experiences are important factors in students becoming mobile. While economic considerations are obviously the main motive for labour migrants to move, the reasons for student migration – which involves the interaction of various factors – are not clear-cut. As some authors have explained, student migration is rather about gathering of human capital, experiences and knowledge. Given this, factors such as cost of education, employment opportunities and institutional frameworks in destination countries play a significant role in where students decide to study. Neoclassical economic theory, which is based on wage differentials between receiving and sending countries, can not therefore adequately explain the initial decision of students to migrate, though it may be able to explain graduates’ decisions after their qualification in the receiving country. The theory of new economics of migration seems, at least in part, to manifest itself in students’ decision-making especially in cases where migration is seen as a household or family decision. This is also supported by the meso-level of Faist (1997). In a similar manner, King and Findlay (2012) underlined the importance of family in decisions to study abroad and the variations in family characteristics that can influence this e.g. financial situation of a family. Empirical studies testify that students’ paths for making the decision both to migrate and to return can be very challenging. In particular, as Robertson and Runganaikalo (2014) have shown student migrants’ have numerous strategies to particularly stay on in the host country and they may overcome various barriers in their source country in order to e.g. receive their permanent status. Therefore, as Albertz and Hazen (2005) explained, the micro-level is not enough to analyse the decision-making of students, which can be strongly influenced the macrolevel of constraints” (sending and receiving states’ policies). This aspect is particularly covered by the structural approach that vividly shows how return (perma-

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nent) migration to source countries involves finding a balance between the institutional and other factors that function in both directions. According to the transnational approach, the return of migrants is seen not as a final end but rather as the result of subsequent contact with and visits to the source country. It considers migration as a circular process with an open-end. However, to apply this approach to real life, effective structural opportunities must be available particularly in source countries in order that the transnational factor is substantially realized. Moreover, according to this theory it can be assumed that if contacts with and visits to the source country are weak and rare, then the aspect of transnationalization is not or only randomly present in movements of students. For statistical agencies handling the issue of return migration, it is a highly intricate phenomenon due to the quantification challenges it presents. They e.g. the statistical division of the UN consider return migration as the process of remaining for at least 12 months in one’s home country after returning from a host country. Various empirical studies have proposed explanations for the return of student migrants and made a number of observations: According to Mundende (1989), self-financed students are generally more prone to stay on in host countries, with unfavourable conditions in source countries and poor communication between student migrants and their origin countries also diminishing the willingness to return. Lowell (2001) mentioned that the fear of losing residency status and thus the chance of obtaining a settlement permit or citizenship in the host (developed) country may make migrants reluctant to return. In turn, any permanent residency or (dual) citizenship obtained in the host country makes migrants more flexible in terms of being able to return to their source country and transfers of social remittances. However, if dual citizenship is not allowed by the source country and the migrant chooses the citizenship of the host country, then the probability the migrant will stay actively connected to his or her home country is rather low. Further factors like limited employment opportunities, barriers for the recognition of foreign qualifications, “cultural estrangement”, “financial barriers, and insecure basis for existence” in the source countries were indicated by Galisnski (1986) as contributing to non-return there. Meanwhile, favourable factors such as employment opportunities in host countries, the desire to gather international experience and other “carrier-related” factors were found by the SVR study (2012) as decisive for international students seeking to stay on in five EU countries in Western Europe after the graduation there. Factors like “quality of life”, “financial reasons”, “way of life” and “mobility within EU” proved to be of secondary importance. The study also revealed that specific personal characteristics of international students enrolled at

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German HEIs such as age, marital status, German language proficiency, (positive) work experience as well as the generally welcoming atmosphere in Germany played an important role in students’ decisions to stay on in the country. According to this study the role of family proved to be unimportant for decisions on whether to stay on in Germany. Meanwhile, in line with the OS results of the study at hand, families, especially those well-situated, played an important role in students’ initial decisions to move to Germany. In contrast to the SVR survey, the study conducted by the DAAD (2016) among international students in Germany found out that economic factors were the primary motivations for the latter’s intentions to stay on in Germany after graduating. In turn, “workplace-related criteria (gaining professional experience, income level, opportunities on the labour market) and quality of life” were of secondary importance. Further research, such as an OECD study (2017), has shown that only a minimal share of migrants from the surveyed countries returned due to attractive employment opportunities in the source countries, while the biggest share of migrants returned due to personal factors e.g. reunification with family at home. Moreover, this empirical study showed that only a minority of them used return promoting programmes. The doctoral thesis delivered following findings: 218 valid answers were gathered from survey participants in total, with Uzbeks students comprising the biggest share among them. Kazakh respondents accounted for the youngest (between 20–25 years old) group, while Kyrgyz respondents made up the highest share of survey respondents aged 35 years old and older. Subsequently, Kyrgyz respondents led the group of married people with the highest rate of spouses, among the married respondents in total, with German citizenship. In terms of gender parity, in the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan female respondents outnumbered male respondents, while in case of Uzbekistan males outnumbered females. The survey results showed that most of the respondents from the three republics come from well-to-do families in terms of both educational and financial background. In the Kyrgyz case and especially in the Uzbek case, parents in both situations acted explicitly as strong motivators for their children seeking to start studies in Germany, though with a decreasing tendency they also influenced students’ decisions to stay on in Germany. In contrast, the parents of Kazakh students reacted moderately and neutrally in the beginning and maintained this moderate position in the latter phase of students’ decisions to stay in Germany. The survey results demonstrated that the vast majority of respondents from three republics have siblings, who typically remained rather neutral towards the

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decision of respondents to study in Germany. The options taken individually showed that Uzbek respondents deciding to study in Germany were most frequently and strongly influenced by their siblings, as with their parents. This may reflect family ties and conservative values that are held more strongly by Uzbek respondents than they are by those from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The bulk of Uzbek and the vast majority of Kyrgyz students received no financial support from their parents, implying that they were financially independent while studying in Germany. Kazakh students were an exception in this regard because more than half of them were dependent on their parents. This might be explained by better economic opportunities in Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan and particularly in Kyrgyzstan. The vast majority of each country’s respondents reported that they did not make remittances to their home countries or that such payments were sporadic. This suggests that no parallels can be made between the student migrants surveyed and labour migration, countering the notion that student migration is abused and used as a channel for labour migration. The OS results showed that 83 percent of survey respondents, of which Kazakhs are a minority, hold a higher education degree from their home country. It provides evidence that the migration of students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is an indispensable part of the overall migration of highly qualified people from these countries to Germany on student visas. The reasons for this are numerous and complex, as explained above. The vast majority of OS respondents from the three republics (with Kazakh students making up the smallest share) rated their German skills at a proficient level (C1-C2). This corresponds with reports that the majority of respondents started learning German in their home countries before coming to Germany to study. This study showed that there is a correlation between German language proficiency and issues of flat hunting and emotional wellbeing for students in Germany. This was illustrated by the example of Kazakh students, who reported their lack of German language skills and difficulty finding a flat as the most persistent problems with which they had to contend while living in Germany and Kyrgyz students, who were most proficient in German and faced the fewest problems in these areas. The findings of this study confirmed that along with German skills, factors such as cost of education, the reputation of the HEI and the receiving country were decisive in choosing Germany as study destination. CA respondents demonstrated a positive attitude toward the TLP in Germany in the majority of their answers. In particular, the respondents from the indepth interviews stressed a lack of bribery, excellent facilities (libraries, research

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labs etc.) and independent work of tertiary students in Germany as particularly attractive. The TLPs in CA respondents’ home countries were estimated by interviewees in the qualitative part in particular as highly negative, while half of Kazakh and Kyrgyz OS respondents rated them positively or very positively. The participants in the face-to-face interviews mentioned deep-rooted bribery, corrupt practices, Soviet-era TLPs, low wages for teaching personnel and a lack of essential facilities as the most prominent issues. These statements were primarily related state-funded HEIs. As the results of the OS testified, almost half of respondents from the three republics combined held a scholarship (44 percent). Those with scholarships comprised the largest group of the Kazakh cohort (63 percent), and made up 1/3 of Kyrgyz and Uzbek students respectively, with almost all of the latter DAAD scholarship-holders. Half of Kazakh students with scholarships were financed by the Kazakh government (Bolashak scholarship), with none of the Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan cohorts financed by their national governments. Except for the Bolashak scholarship-holders, none scholarship-holders from three republics had an obligation to return. The OS question on the social and political activeness of the three countries’ respondents both in their home countries and Germany revealed the following results: Kyrgyz students were most socially active while living in Kyrgyzstan (though with marginal difference) and Uzbek students were the least politically active while living in their home country of Uzbekistan. The general tendency for all three target countries is that the social and political engagement of CA respondents seems to drop when they are studying and living in Germany. The reasons for this, as respondents to the qualitative study explained, were lack of time and appropriate knowledge. Thus, it can be concluded that generally there is a negative tendency for respondents to be politically active in their home country which, together with the lack of necessary resources (e.g. time, self-confidence, information sources) for respondents living in Germany, gives rise to low engagement and contributes to the lower levels of political activity in CA students studying in Germany. All this implies that the accumulation of political remittances by CA students while studying in Germany and their transfer to their home country is rather insignificant. This may be also applied for the social activeness of respondents, although the social sphere offers a wider space for taking actions. In some cases, the continuum between being active at home and in Germany may work out if students find appropriate resources to become engaged. Answers by respondents from three CA republics about their plans after graduation in Germany showed that almost 90 percent planned to “first stay and then return home”, “to settle down in Germany”, “to move to a third country” or had “other” plans which did not involve returning to their home countries.

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The low return tendency among students from the CA republics was reinforced by the answers of respondents to the OS question concerning return tendencies among compatriots. Around 2/3 of Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents and half of Kazakh students believed that the majority of their compatriots would be inclined to stay on in Germany after graduation. The latter observation is also supported by the statements of respondents from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who indicated during the face-to-face interviews that the majority of their compatriots stayed on in Germany after the graduation in this country. The few that did return had return obligations. Moreover, the people in the respondents’ social circles seemed to support their remaining in Germany. The results emphasized that women in particular were inclined to stay on because they were more likely to marry German nationals or other people resident in Germany. People with children were eager to stay on in Germany because of the opportunities they perceived for their children in the country, though sometimes a person’s desire to stay on was not matched by their chances, leading them to subsequently leave Germany. According to the OS, the vast majority of students from the three republics who reported wanting to “first stay and then return home”, would do it for professional purposes i.e. for gaining employment in Germany. The majority of respondents from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the OS who had such plans indicated that “social factors in Germany” would play the strongest role in their decision to stay in Germany for any period. The second-, and third-most reported factors for Kazakh and Uzbek respondents who again made similar preferences were the economic and political conditions in Germany. Besides the OS findings, the distribution of factors in the qualitative interviews with Kyrgyz and Uzbek students showed clearly the dominant role of economic factors such as prospects for gaining work experience and job market opportunities in Germany (no one from Kazakhstan was found for this part). This implies that the Kyrgyz case was indeed in line with the results of the OS in this regard. In the case of Uzbekistan, social factors led in the OS for those planning to “first stay and then return home”. Notably in the OS, the political situation in Germany played an insignificant role for students from three republics making the decision to stay in Germany. Indeed, this was in line with the results of the in-depth interviews, with neither Kyrgyz nor Uzbek respondents considering political factors in their home countries as decisive. Like those wanting to “first stay and then return home”, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the majority of OS respondents who planned “to settle down in Germany” after graduation also mentioned that they would start working in Germany (“economic factors”). After economic factors, “social” and “personal factors” were both-equally important for Kyrgyz respondents, while for Uzbek respondents “social factors” carried weight. In the case of Kazakh students who

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participated in the OS, the decision “to settle down in Germany” after graduation was mostly influenced by “personal factors”, with “economic factors” also contributing. The qualitative part of this study showed that for the Kazakh interviewees the most decisive factor in choosing not to return to Kazakhstan but to settle in Germany is the unfavourable political situation in Kazakhstan. For one respondent from Kyrgyzstan personal factors were decisive in choosing to settle down in Germany (the respondent married a German). The minority of OS respondents (12 percent) reported wanting to “move to a third country” after graduation in Germany. More than half of these were Uzbek students, with the second largest group comprising Kazakh students. The option to “work” in a third country was checked most frequently by students from the three countries. Accordingly, economic factors again became the most influential for decisions by OS respondents to move to a third country after graduation in Germany. An attractive job opportunity and sustainable professional contacts enabled the respondent from Kyrgyzstan, who participated in the qualitative interviews, to move to a third country. The OS option “to immediately return home” was checked by only a small percentage of respondents from the three republics (11 percent or 23 people). Of those 23 willing to return home immediately after graduation in Germany, 17 were Kazakh students and five were Uzbek, alongside the respondent from Kyrgyzstan. A majority of the cohort from each of the countries and a majority of the whole group studied would also “work” in their home-countries after returning there. However, in deciding “to immediately return home” after graduation in Germany respondents reported “personal factors” as being important. The qualitative study, despite difficult patterns, revealed clear tendencies in interviewees’ responses to the in-depth interviews: personal factors (family) became the main reason to immediately return home after graduation in Germany for two out of five Kazakh respondents. For the other two respondents it was predominantly economic factors triggering a desire to return to Kazakhstan. For the remaining respondent it was the Bolashak obligation. Those who returned because of personal factors and the Bolashak obligation returned because they had to do it. The other two, whose return actions were driven by economic factors, made their decisions autonomously because they could have stayed in Germany and looked for further opportunities in the German job market but instead anticipated better prospects for their career in Kazakhstan. Notably, those respondents whose return was prompted both by personal reasons and the Bolashak obligation reported being unsatisfied with their life in Kazakhstan and would be willing to leave the country again. Perhaps this is due to the opportunities for self-realization in Germany that they missed. The respondents who were driven by predominantly economic factors were satisfied with their life in Kazakhstan and did not regret their decision to return home. All of these respondents had

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jobs at the time of interview but perceived working conditions differently. Both of the returners, who were generally satisfied with their life in Kazakhstan, were also positive about their working conditions. On the question about their future plans, they responded that they did not plan to leave Kazakhstan in the near future. Dissatisfied respondents demonstrated their dissatisfaction with their working conditions and were willing to leave Kazakhstan as soon as possible. For the Uzbek respondents to the face-to-face interviews, four out of five respondents were influenced by personal factors (family and relationships). Economic factors did play a role in the decision of the last respondent. Three of respondents (two of whom were influenced by personal and one by economic factors) were satisfied with their life in Uzbekistan, due to attractive jobs, and did not want to leave the country. The other two reporting personal factors were willing to leave Uzbekistan because of unsatisfactory working/economic conditions (“brain waste”) in Uzbekistan. No one from Kyrgyzstan was interviewed for this part. In line with the empirical findings mentioned above, if the state of the economy and working conditions (job market, wage, atmosphere) are attractive in a person’s home country, then the level of satisfaction of respondents remains high and they are willing to remain in the country i.e. they do not regret their initial decision to return home. Economic factors play the most decisive role for CA respondents’ decisions about what they do after graduation in Germany, with some exceptions. Choices include remaining for a time in Germany, settling down in Germany, moving to a third country or indeed returning to Germany after initially going back to one’s home country. Similarly, attractive employment opportunities may also play a role in local graduates deciding to stay on their home countries after graduation there. Half of students from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan indicated that they were valued and needed by their home country, with the other half of respondents replying “Rather not” or “No”. The largest group of respondents not feeling at all needed by their home country was the Uzbek students. A similar proportion (i.e. more than half) of respondents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan believed that patriotism (an emotional connection to one’s home country) played a “significant role” and “absolutely significant role” in students’ decisions to return home (for temporary and permanent return decisions) Moreover as the OS results showed, the majority of students from the three republics have little awareness of German return promoting programs (e.g. CIM).

5 Source (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and Host (Germany) Countries’ Policies Towards the Regulation of Tertiary Student Migration

5.1

Theoretical and Methodological Aspects

As it was discussed earlier, the third phase of the migration-development nexus (MDN) represents a shift of the “challenges that migration presents to the opportunities it offers” and is considered as the “positive” MDN. For EU countries in particular the MDN serves as an instrument to harness the potential of “remittances and diasporas” with a goal to increase their development impacts and poverty reduction (Gropas 2013:2). After having completed the analysis of the previous chapters, where background information on CA republics’ socio-economic and political situations along with their cooperation with the EU and Germany were discussed in the third chapter, the fourth chapter based mostly on micro-level theories touched upon the profiles and life –courses of students before and during the studies in Germany and their return intentions and the reasons behind them. In line with macro-level theories, which consider migration as the process taking place “in the realm of historically conditioned macro-structural forces” (Morawska 2012: 57) and which analyse political, economic and other structures “on the level of the international system, the country of origin and the country of destination (structural level”) (Faist 1997: 195), this chapter focuses explicitly on state mechanisms existing in the receiving country Germany and sending countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to regulate the tertiary student migration. Further, this chapter integrates the meso-level approach and explores the policies to promote the temporary return of student migrants (brain circulation). In this context and according to one of the aims of this project, it is important to know what has been done so far on the part of host German and sending CA countries’ governments to mitigate negative brain drain effects for sending countries especially, and promote temporary return and brain circulation. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_5

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More than a quarter of a century ago Galinski (1986: 156) pointed out that a systematic deduction of possible measures to regulate brain drain, is virtually non-existent.88 Moreover, as Hollifield (2008: 184) noticed due to “the paucity of theorizing about the politics of international migration, it is therefore not surprising that migration theory tends to be dominated by economic or sociological explanations.” In particular, he argued that the aspect of state intervention i.e. the state as a central actor that significantly influences international migration flows has been for a long time overlooked by academics. Only starting with the 1990s, “politics of international migration” has begun to emerge and theorists have been trying since then to theorize this field. Since that time, there has been a number of studies conducted on the political mechanisms to regulate international highly skilled migration and student migration in particular (Yoon 1992, Lowell, 2001, Olesen, 2002, Gribble, 2008, Le Bail/Shen 2008). However, most of them still focus on the perspective of the receiving country, despite the fact that it is foremost sending countries’ responsibility to prevent (by providing adequate local conditions) and reverse brain drain through promotion of temporary and permanent modes of return. In recent years the industrialized countries e.g. of Western Europe, being influenced by socio-economic needs, increasingly try to retain highly qualified people in the country. This is done through internationalization of higher education, eased regulations for the employment of third-country nationals and other measures. Now there is talk of “education for trade” policies instead of “education for aid” (Han 2005). Thereby the implementation of respective policies accommodates a number of challenges because through such goal-oriented policy means they face a conflict: on the one hand, receiving countries are interested in the retention of qualified persons, on the other hand, they must comply with their development policy goals such as e.g. reduction of poverty and structural deficits in the partner countries. For the analysis of sending CA republics’ strategies to regulate student migration, the current chapter scrutinized the works of Lowell (2001) which are based on “an extensive survey of literature” to elaborate on the policy responses of source countries towards the migration of highly skilled individuals. The analytical framework is complemented with Gribble’s work (2008), who from the sending countries’ perspective offered three policy options to regulate international student migration. 88 German version: “Es gibt jedoch keine systematische und auf eine einheitliche Theoriegrundlage bezogene Ableitung möglicher entwicklungspolitischer Maßnahmen gegenüber dem Brain Drain.” In: Galinski, Doris (1986): Brain Drain aus Entwicklungsländern. Theoretische Grundlagen und entwicklungspolitische Konsequenzen. Frankfurt am Main, Bern, NY: Peter Lang, p.156.

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The analysis of Germany’s policies is framed by contemporary discussions considering the internationalization of the higher education system by developed countries as part of their ‘education for trade’ policies and its reconciliation with development-aid policies (e.g. Robertson 2013, Graeme 2013). Lowell (2001: 5) clustered six types of possible policy responses for the regulation of highly skilled migration, known as “Six Rs: return, restriction, recruitment, reparation, resourcing (diasporas) and retention.” While the “restriction of international mobility” (exit and entry visas) and “retention through economic development” can be viewed as measures aimed at the prevention of brain drain; the “return of migrants to their source countries”, the “recruitment of international migrants” and the “resourcing expatriates (diaspora options)” can be regarded as explicit measures to reverse brain-drain and reinforce brain circulation. The “reparation for loss of human capital (tax)” is in Lowell‘s opinion, “a favorite but never implemented economic prescription in the 1970s”. It envisages that developed countries either compensate sending countries or emigrants themselves pay taxes to their home countries. This policy will not be considered in this dissertation. Gribble’s (2008: 28) research on sending countries’ policy responses suggested three main options for sending states: “retain, return and engage.” These policy options proposed by the authors largely complement each other, whereas policy strategies proposed by Lowell (2001) have two further options, which touch upon restrictive measures and the measures to promote diaspora options. The analysis of the current chapter draws on a wide range of official policy documents, research reports of German foundations, scholarly research literature, media sources, personal observations and interviews with students/graduates and expert interviews that were conducted both in Germany and in three CA republics.

5.2

Policies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Regulate Student Migration to Germany

Based on the afore-mentioned elaborations, the analysis of policy responses of sending CA republics is conducted within three main phases regarding the students’/graduates’ move: 

Policies of sending CA states accounting for a period prior to tertiary studies of CA students in Germany: retention and restriction of student migration.

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



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Policies of sending CA states accounting for the period during the tertiary studies of CA students in Germany: promoting temporary return (brain circulation) and transfer of social remittances as well as diaspora issues (“resourcing of expatriates”). Policies of sending CA states accounting for the period after graduation of CA students in Germany: promoting permanent return migration.

5.2.1

a)

Policies of Sending Central Asian (CA) States Accounting for the Period Prior to Pursuing Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Retention and Restriction of Student Migration Retention policies

Effective retention mechanisms are considered as the most important in terms of the prevention of the emigration of highly skilled people. These policies are closely bound to the availability of viable domestic opportunities that in the long run may boost human capital and economic growth. They include strong domestic HEIs because “a highly educated workforce begins with strengthening domestic educational institutions” and economic development with bright employment perspectives (Lowell 2001: 9). Referring concretely to the retention of students, Gribble (2008: 28-29) assumed that non-effective retention policies such as “insufficient domestic supply, real or perceived advantages associated with foreign degrees, and a domestic environment that fails to support and encourage research, innovation and entrepreneurship” are some of the reasons for the “increased student mobility and subsequent migration.” In this regard she recommended the source countries to strengthen higher education, research and development through providing sufficient funding, making more internationalization efforts and the provision of employment opportunities. These measures would “limit the number of students who go abroad to study and, therefore, reduce the level of international student migration” (Gribble 2008: 28-29). Analyzing Kazakhstan’s development strategy to achieve ranking in the top 30 developed countries by 2050, Riboud (2015: 28) focused on four dimensions of human development: education, employment, health and social protection. In the author’s words, they are “essential for offering the Kazakhstani people a high degree of life satisfaction.” The analysis of this section lays focus on a key dimension: higher education. Employment and labour market dimensions will be discussed in one of the following sections. Other dimensions such as health and social protection stay in close relationship to the first ones and are partially incorporated into them.

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Higher education systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan As it has been mentioned in the beginning, the CA region can be characterized as a region consisting predominantly of young people. The question of quality of higher education, and education in general, is therefore more important than ever. Generally, the promotion of high quality public education and health system are counted as the most important pillars of state politics. They are the key branches that contribute to a mentally and physically healthy population. Education helps to reduce inequality and poverty and “lays a foundation for sustained economic growth” (OFID 2017). If it comes to the preparation and training of specialists, professionals and highly qualified personnel, the role of higher education is of the utmost importance. The development and modernization of the tertiary education system is a challenging task, which unlocks youth’s potential for productivity in society. One of the main merits of the Soviet legacy in the sphere of education was an almost universal literacy rate among adults in 1990. The literacy rate is still high in the CA republics but is gradually dropping, due to low financing of respective facilities and institutions (Jones 2010) particularly in remote and rural areas. Independence brought new challenges and opportunities: each CA republic adopted its own model of reforms, likewise an educational model. “Due to differences in social openness and progress in the transition to a market economy” (Nessipbayeva/Dalayeva 2013: 392), those reforms were faster in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, than in Uzbekistan. To differing extents, CA republics still live on the socio-political and infrastructural heritages of the Soviet Union. In general terms, there are still many parallels (mostly negative) to be found between the higher education systems in the Soviet times and the current system in the three CA republics. As it is known, the Soviet education system was monopolized by the state and was strictly controlled by the state apparatus: the “centrally developed curriculum, teacher training, textbooks, and educational materials”. Everywhere in the socialist world’s republics a unified model of teaching and learning process governed; this model “denied any questioning and critical thinking. Teaching was teacher-centered and emphasized repetition as evidence of mastery. Students were not invited to be inquisitive or to apply concepts to real-life applications” (Mertaugh 2004: 9-10). These are the circumstances that, to differing extents, can be found nowadays in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The collapse of the Soviet Union urged the CA republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to take individual responsibility for the education branch and the rest. The absence of financing from Moscow, the disintegration of the Soviet economy and high rates of inflation made the process of initial transition

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challenging (Gilster/Hättisch 2007: 511). One of the significant challenges of the early years of independence was the creation of a “functioning Ministry of Education with the capacity to establish education policy as well as to oversee the provision of education and to ensure its quality.” The second challenge was “to reorient education programs to the new needs arising from the transition from a command economy to a market economy” (Mertaugh 2004: 3). Economic decline, poor governance and all those weaknesses inherited from the Soviet era, led CA countries to a “systemic crisis” including the education systems. Another important consequence of the “systemic crisis” was the “brain drain of talented educators from the region and out of the educational sector, especially in information technology and foreign languages” (Dresen 2011). In early years of independency, many specializations were created in target republics, which in a number of cases were not fully conformed to the realities and conditions of that time. Also many state HEIs were established, together with private ones, with the exception of Uzbekistan, which were in fact overlapping and surplus. In particular, in CA countries the Soviet methods of teaching and curricula at HEIs did not change much because they did not become “more flexible, more student-centered, more focused on problem solving and application” rather remaining focused on a “simple mastery of facts” (Mertaugh 2004: 3). Due to low wages and corrupt practices that became widely spread, the image of teaching personal suffered much. In order to combat bribes and reduce corruptive practices, the standardized entrance examination at tertiary education institutions was introduced (Nessipbayeva and Dalayeva 2013: 394). This could not totally end corrupt practices since there are various other mechanisms, which pass over official controlling systems. These are some of the numerous problems in the higher education system, which CA republics faced in the early years of independence and are still struggling against. Despite the common problems in the higher education systems, each CA republic has its peculiar concerns, which are discussed below. Higher education in Kazakhstan In the initial phases of Kazakhstan’s independence in the early 1990s, higher education experienced “shockwaves” meaning that “the number of higher education institutions ballooned, from 55 state institutions in 1990 to 182 public and private institutions by 2001” (ICEF Monitor 2014). A strong need for reforms emerged. As a result, a broad legal basis was developed, which among other documents, include the “State Program of Education Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2020” (Nessipbayeva/ Dalayeva 2013: 392). The latter has a goal to increase the “competitiveness of

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education and development of human capital through ensuring access to quality education for sustainable economic growth” (AKKORDA 2010). Due to reforms and increased quality control, the number of HEIs in Kazakhstan gradually decreased. In 2010 there were 148 HEIs: 93 private including 16 corporate ones, 32 state HEIs, 12 non-civilian (military), 9 national and 2 international (Ibid). If one looks at the statistical data provided by the Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan, the number of HEIs in this country had been significantly reduced to 127 in 2015 (Sate.gov.kz n.d.). According to Kazakh officials, the reduction of HEI numbers is essential for the quality improvement of the tertiary education sector (ICEF Monitor 2014). But this policy “appears to have had a disproportionate impact on oblasts with a greater incidence of poverty.”89 Due to the greater financial opportunities in Kazakhstan, as compared to Uzbekistan and especially Kyrgyzstan, extensive reformation efforts of the higher education system became possible. With the growth of its GDP, Kazakhstan has remarkably increased its expenditure on education since the 2000s “after experiencing an extreme drop to almost 2% in the late nineties” (UNICEF 2008). In 2012 public spending on education reached around 5 percent of GDP (Riboud 2015: 29). In 2013, Kazakhstan spent 0.1 % of its GDP on research. By 2020 the plan is to increase the expenditure for research up to at least 1.5 % of the GDP (European Commission 2012a: 15). In 2013 Kazakhstan spent 0.44 percent of its GDP on higher education. However, it could have spent more in terms of the proportionality to its GDP level. For example Russia, in terms of “annual expenditure per student by educational institutions for all services, relative to GDP per capita”, spent more than threefold as much as Kazakhstan in 2010 (Canning 2015). An estimated total enrolment in tertiary education composed 24.4 percent in 2014. Of the enrolled students in Kazakhstan in 2015, almost half (47) percent of Kazakh students were enrolled at state HEIs. Enrolment rates between urban and rural areas are different, with rural areas having lower rates. This may indicate a lower quality of school education in rural areas and the difficulties of students in “achieving the grades in the Unified National Test [UNT] required for access to full time higher education” (Ibid). 89 The policy of HEIs’ decrease led apparently to a decrease of absolute enrolments since 2011/12: from about 630 000 students in 2011/12 up to 520 000 students in 2013/14. See Canning, Mary (2015): Eurasian Higher Education Leaders’ Forum 2015. Special Session of the ‘Development of Strategic Directions for Education Reforms in Kazakhstan for 2015-2020’ Project. Astana: Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Education. Available online: http://ehelf.nu.edu.kz/ehelf/archive/Conference2015/Presentations/ 18C7DFA94F11E645E050010AA90117C5

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Indeed, according to the results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) from 2012, where Kazakhstan actually changed its position from 59th place in 2009 to 49th place in 2012, a “cross-regional comparison” demonstrated “low scores in rural schools, with scores in mathematics and reading 8-10% below the national average. Moreover, on Kazakhstan’s UNT “students from rural schools scored on average 66.50 points, while students from urban schools scored 76.16 points” (UNESCO n.d.). As mentioned above, the number of HEIs has been decreased throughout the years. The Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan does not specify which types of HEIs were affected by the decrease in HEIs. However, according to a relevant source, negative implications emerged from this decrease for public HEIs: “the number of public institutions declined and limitations in public financing led even public institutions to admit fee-paying students” (Riboud 2015: 32). This affected the number of fee-paying students, who made up 70 percent of tuition-fee paying students in 2015, meaning Kazakhstan’s higher education system is heavily reliant on students’ fees (Canning 2015). But the study fees increase more speedily than the improvements in the higher education system that makes a cost-benefit ratio of the local higher education generally non-attractive. In such circumstances it can be assumed that those, who have enough financial resources,90 would rather pay for tertiary education abroad, where one can find a broad palette of solutions for costs and quality. Under such circumstances it is hard to believe that those, who can afford the tertiary education abroad would decide to pursue higher education at local HEIs, especially at those expensive ones. However there are people, who do it. Who they are exactly, to which social strata they belong and which reasons they have, are questions, which need to be scrutinised in a separate study. As a source in Kazakhstan mentioned, the people (who study at private expensive HEIs) belong to children of influential and/or rich people, who do not want to let their offspring study abroad because the parents want to keep them close to themselves. Individuals, who cannot afford to pay fees, either in Kazakhstan or abroad, try to win a student grant to pursue higher education. If their grades are not high enough, they are excluded from further educational opportunities. This may be the fate of many students from rural areas. These arguments were supported by some of the Kazakh interviewees, who themselves could not afford to study at one of those expensive HEIs in Kazakh90 „There is a growing middle class who really looks at the value of the education overseas, and the quality of the programmes offered.“ Available online: ICEF Monitor (2014): Market Snapshot: Kazakhstan. Available online: http://monitor.icef.com/2014/09/marketsnapshot-kazakhstan/

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stan and entered instead a state HEI, and afterwards a German HEI. From respondents explanations it became clear that most attendees of the private Kazakh HEIs are children from wealthy families, whose parents did not want to send their children alone to study abroad, at least in their early university years (undergraduate study). In addition people, who have a high level of English language skills and international experience (strong educational capital), have the chance to enroll at private HEIs in Kazakhstan and receive full or partial scholarship. The possession of these skills is, however, usually impossible with a regular pre-university education. Moreover, the respondents stressed that people with strong financial opportunities would generally not choose Germany as their study destination but prefer going to renowned HEIs e.g. in the UK or US. This was also confirmed by the majority of a group of Kazakh exchange students, whom I met in Germany. This sounds plausible if one looks at the number of Kazakh students overseas: the UK has been the main destination for years. Nonetheless, the government of Kazakhstan has taken some concrete measures to make the local higher education landscape competitive, navigating it to the path of internationalization. Specifically, in 2010 on a personal initiative of Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Nazarbayev University (NU) was created. As it is described in its homepage, the NU is “a unique project that does not have an analogue in the Eurasian area. The project aims to develop a world-renowned university” [...] and “provide a qualitative breakthrough in training national engineering and scientific experts to meet the requirements of the industrial and innovative development of the country.” It is “the first university in Kazakhstan that is committed to working according to international academic standards and guided by the principles of autonomy and academic freedom” (Nazarbayev University n.d.). The creation of NU can also be seen as a measure to retain students in the country, hence, prevent them from pursuing their tertiary studies abroad. For this reason, similar to the Singaporean case, the focus was amongst other things, on the expansion of “publicly funded places”. Specifically, the tuition fees at NU are “currently funded from the Republican Budget, which provides grants for students under the state order for training of specialists with technical and professional education in educational institutions” (Ibid). However, this HEI combining quality and affordability is rather an exception. Until recently, “there has been limited support and structure to share learning from this model in ways that can be applied by higher education institutions that are less well resourced” (Weko 2017). Another step in the internationalization efforts was the joining of Kazakhstan, as the first CA state, to the Bologna process in 2010 where the country took a position as a Bologna-Signatory Country (Tempus 2012). Through joining the

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Bologna declaration Kazakhstan became the 47th member of the European Higher Education Area and its higher education system underwent the following significant changes: firstly, the HEIs of Kazakhstan accessed the Great Charter of universities that envisages the adjustment of local standards to the European ones. Secondly, the transition to a three-stage model of higher education i.e. “Bachelor-Master-PhD” took place. Thirdly, “all universities introduced the credit system, 38 of them offer dual-degree education, 42 universities offer distance learning.” Fourthly, the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) has been introduced that should ease the process of credit transfer during the academic mobility of students (IQAA n.d.). Academic mobility in Kazakhstan is realized within the framework of the “EHEA Mobility Strategy for 2020” and the “Strategy of academic mobility in Kazakhstan for 2012-2020” (ENIK n.d.). The latter outlines several calls for action: “a) to greatly increase capacity both to host students from abroad and to send more of its own students, staff, and faculty overseas on mobility programmes; b) to increase the number of Kazakh students with foreign language ability; c) to grow the number of international cooperation agreements between Kazakh and foreign institutions; d) to increase the number of international students studying in Kazakh universities by 20% annually through 2020.” The promotion of short-term mobility is a further aim of the internationalisation strategy of Kazakhstan. “By 2020, the government hopes that at least 20% of learners will spend at least one academic study period abroad” (ICEF Monitor 2016). There were more than 10.000 foreign nationals pursuing their higher education in Kazakhstan in 2010 (AKORDA 2010). In 2012, according to the latest statistical data of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Kazakhstan hosted 8.982 students, making a total of 1.4 percent of the inbound mobility rate. Over 60 percent of those students were from Central Asia (UNESCOa n.d.)91 But these numbers are insignificant in terms of the real effects of internationalization efforts. For example, in 2012, the Singaporean HEIs enrolled 227 000 students, which made up 56 percent of domestic and 44 percent of international students (Ziguras and Gribble 2015: 252). Students from Kazakhstan have several opportunities to pursue tertiary studies abroad. One of them is the well-known program “Bolashak” (“Future”). It is a scholarship program for sending talented youth to study abroad that was established in 1993 and is funded by the government of Kazakhstan.91 Another possibility is for students to be self-funded, or gain funding through various international scholarship foundations, which fund around 1/3 of all students from Kazakhstan studying abroad. 91 Details of this program are discussed in further sections of this chapter.

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The development of the internationalization process in the education sphere requires much work and effort. Numerous sociological surveys have testified that there is still a strong need for improvements. A sociological survey from 2013 with 126 participants from Zhezkazgan Baikonurov University and Zhetysu State University uncovered that among the main obstacles for the process of internationalization at the researched HEIs were lack of funding (97 percent), lack of knowledge of foreign languages (82 percent), big differences in the curricula of the universities (78 percent), lack of affordable housing (53 percent) and other problems (Maudarbekova and Kahskinbayeva 2014: 4095). Another sociological study was conducted within the framework of the project “The Kazakhstani model of education: international experience, national traditions (2011)” in order to find out the attitudes of students, scientists, doctoral candidates and the teaching staff from Kazakhstan towards the academic transformations in their country. The respective survey was conducted at 12 Kazakh HEIs from 7 regions. A total of 1.500 respondents participated in this survey. 67 percent of survey respondents admitted that expediency and efficiency of innovations is vital for the assurance of high quality in higher education. In the respondents’ opinion this can be achieved particularly through the “integration of science, scientific and technical developments, production and higher education.” The negative attitude of respondents was linked to the “frequent system and organizational transformations” that indeed deteriorate the quality of existing education. Moreover, “outdated educational and scientific support” together with the still existing leftovers of Soviet higher education and the peoples’ mentality hamper the process of transformation, particularly the transformation to the credit system and the low level of academic mobility, of learning and of teaching staff at the HEIs of Kazakhstan under consideration (Abdiraiymova/Duisenova/Shayakhmetov 2013). Higher education experts stress that the reforms were made hastily and nonconsistently with the realities of Kazakhstan. One such reform is the transition to a three-level higher education system and the closure of dissertation councils. As the result, “a deficit of newly- trained research staff was caused that could not entirely “substitute the “old” candidates and doctors of sciences” (Feoktistova 2013: 349) The survey results of the work at hand demonstrated that almost half of Kazakh students assessed the TLP in their home countries in general positively and very positively. This was, however, different to the responses of the interviewees from Kazakhstan who took part in the in-depth interviews of this study. While comparing the higher education quality in both directions i.e. in their home country Kazakhstan and in Germany, Kazakh respondents numerously

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talked about the problems in higher education of Kazakhstan such as bribery and corrupt practices92 between teaching and learning personnel.93 Among further problems at Kazakh HEIs lack of practice-oriented study and research, still existing Soviet-style methods in the TLP, the lack of essential facilities for an effective organization of every-day life at local HEIs and the transmission of knowledge, low wages of teaching personnel at state HEI and deficit of literature in Kazakh language were mentioned. Moreover, as respondent C. explained, after an exchange year in Germany, she had to face massive problems until her credits from a German HEI were recognized by her home country HEI. Although, the joining of the Bologna program and the modernization processes were in progress in Kazakhstan, there were less visible outcomes in the respondents’ opinion. The reforms were not done from the bottom but from the top resulting in an unstable fundamental basis and rather superficial outcomes. In other words, those reforms did not really penetrate the existing higher education system, which was once established by the Soviets. In particular, the still existing practice of assigning methods in study and research in Kazakhstan has negative implications for Kazakh students abroad, especially while pursuing doctoral studies in Germany. The resulting lack of creativity and non-independent work as a doctoral candidate were seen as a real problem in German conditions. Thereby it has to be stressed that these critical aspects were mostly related to state HEIs, because (almost) all of the respondents from the qualitative part were graduates of state HEIs in Kazakhstan. The high cost of education at private HEIs were seen by them as the main constraint to pursue higher education there. From the above-cited passages, it becomes apparent that Kazakhstan faces many challenges in the internationalization efforts of its higher education system. Homogeneous mechanisms to make essential reforms are missing. Higher education in Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan has a colorful and at the same time complex, higher education landscape. A successful pass of an entry examination (a unified nationwide testing system) is a precondition for gaining the certificate of secondary education, which opens up the opportunity to study at a local HEI (university, institutes, academies, specialized HEIs). 92 According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Kazakhstan belongs, together with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to one of the most corrupt countries in the world (126 out of 175 in 2014). However, it scores better than these two CA republics. For more information see: Transparency International (1999): Background information. Available online: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1999/0/#background 93 German-Kazakh University (GKU) turned to be rather an exception in this regard. For more details see chapter 4.

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A university offers programs of higher and post-graduate education in a wide range of specializations, while institutes, which can be a separate HEI or a branch of a university or academy, implement higher and post-graduate education programs. At academies one can gain knowledge through the programs of higher and post-graduate education “in fields of scientific activity”. A specialized HEI offers programs of higher and post-graduate education bearing a narrow specialization character (Mertaugh 2004: 15). At these HEIs one can acquire either a one level higher education or a twolevel higher education. The first one, the Soviet style model, represents an uninterrupted study process of 5 years for many specializations such as pedagogical and juridical, for medical specializations (except for stomatology and veterinary) it is 6 years. The process is then completed by acquiring a specialist’s diploma. The two-level higher education consists of bachelor (3 or 4 years) and master (1 year or 2 years) degrees. The master degree provides the right to start postgraduate study: a licentiate (in Russian: aspirantura) that can be followed by Ph.D. (in Russian: doktorantura). The highest academic degree in Kyrgyzstan is Doctor of Science (in Russian: doctor nauk) (Minobrazovaniya in Nauki: n.d.). In this regard it was pointed out that “Kyrgyzstani universities have programs based on contact hours and credit hours (sometimes both in the same institution); Soviet-style diplomas, […], three-year European-style bachelor’s degrees; four-year US-style bachelor’s degrees and oneand two-year master’s degrees. Local educators call the system kasha —literally, porridge, but in slang, “a mess”” (Merrill/Yakubova/Turlanbekova n.d: 3).

During the academic year 2011/12 there were 54 HEIs (33 public and 21 private) in Kyrgyzstan. In the same academic year there were over 239 000 students enrolled at Kyrgyz HEIs (European Commission 2012b). Similarly to Kazakhstan, most of the inbound students stem from the CA region. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, thus, can be considered as regional hubs for higher education (Masterstudies.com 2014). According to the Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyzstan, the expenditure on the education system in 2011 “amounted to KGS 19.3 billion and on HEIs KGS 2.9 billion (15 % of GDP).” This expenditure proportion has been increased throughout the years significantly e.g. in 2001 the education expenditure accounted for 3.9 percent of the GDP, in 2005 there were 5 percent of the GDP and 6.5 percent in 2007 (European Commission 2012b). However, in line with the World Bank’s review from 2014, the spending on education is unequally distributed and does not cover needs adequately. In particular, “the general education sector accounts for only 57 percent of all education expenditure while being responsible for almost 73 percent of students. Higher education expenditure represents more than 15 percent of total education spending but enrols almost 20 percent of students” (World Bank 2014a). Thus, the

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case of Kyrgyzstan, similar to Kazakhstan, also shows the underfinancing of the higher education system. International cooperation and study abroad programs are multifaceted in Kyrgyzstan. They cover about 70 institutional agreements in total: 20 agreements with CIS states and almost 50 of them with other countries around the world. Kyrgyzstan is in contrast to Uzbekistan particularly, quite open for international cooperation with foreign HEIs and the internationalization of its higher education system. Throughout the independency years Kyrgyzstan has signed a number of agreements to establish interstate universities like the Kyrgyz-Turkish University, Kyrgyz-Russian University (World Bank 2014a), American University in Central Asia (AUCA), The University of Central Asia (UCA) known also as Aga Khan University and others. The main aspects of these cooperation’s are promotion of academic exchange, “international recognition of Kyrgyz higher education, and improving connections with the international donor community”. There is a great array of academic exchange programs, which are realized through the financial support of international organizations like DAAD, Erasmus Mundus, ACCELS, Soros Foundation, UNDP and many others (European Commission 2012b). Officially Kyrgyzstan has intentions to join the European Bologna process. The Kyrgyz delegation attended the First Bologna Policy Forum in Belgium in 2009 and in 2011 the conference on accreditation and assessment of higher education systems was held in Kyrgyzstan (Merrill/Yakubova/Turlanbekova n.d: 4). The Kyrgyz Republic, being a non-signatory country implements the Bologna process “by ad hoc groups under the supervision of the Ministry of Education” (Tempus 2012). The formulation and implementation of the national education policy, standard setting for different levels of education, curriculum development, training of teachers and other important tasks are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science (MES). However, the specialized HEIs are regulated and controlled, additionally to the MES, by the Ministry of Health as in the case of the Kyrgyz Medical Academy. According to data for the academic year 2011/12 out of 209 400 students at public HEIs, only 13.5 percent studied on a state-scholarship basis meaning that they received financial support from the state budget and the rest of the students had to finance their study at HEIs from private or other sources. It is evident that the bulk of students are paying fees, even at public HEIs. As the OECD indicated, in 2008 Kyrgyzstan had “one of the largest private funding sources in higher education in the world” (European Commission 2012b). This surely does not contribute to the involvement of deprived groups in the higher education system, if one takes into account the pervasive poverty among the Kyrgyz population, especially in rural areas.

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Due to the fact that a high proportion of the rural population in Kyrgyzstan lives “mostly in mountainous areas”, the education delivery to this group remains a challenging issue. The challenges that affect education quality include widespread poverty in rural areas depriving people of textbooks, school-clothes and other school supplies. Moreover, local governments in rural areas “are not able to finance school inputs beyond the meagre inputs financed through the Republican budget” (Mertaugh 2004: 9). In general the quality of the Kyrgyz schools is bad: The weak performance of pupils was demonstrated by OECD’s PISA results, where Kyrgyz pupils had the worst results: in 2006 (65 place out of 65 participated countries) and 2009 (57 place out of 57 participated countries) (OECD n.d.) Despite a comparatively open system for higher education reforms and internationalization efforts in Kyrgyzstan, the gamut of possibilities in higher education has been criticized for its complexity and the failure of quality control of the tertiary education system (Mertaugh 2004: 24). In particular, it was pointed out that there was no “generally accepted interpretation of terms such as “quality of education” and “evaluation of education quality” in the Kyrgyz republic. Therefore a methodological basis of how to evaluate the quality of higher education is missing (Brunner/Tillet 2007: 117). The only procedure that conducts management of the education quality is the certification process consisting of licensing and attestation. But they have a rather legislative character and are ineffective in terms of quality improvement. “There are no appropriate criteria or standards to assess higher education institutions and there is no independent accreditation institution that would systematically control compliance with these standards” (European Commission 2012b). According to the online survey of the study at hand, almost half of the survey participants from Kyrgyzstan (43 percent) assessed the TLP in their home country positively and very positively. 5 percent of Kyrgyz students rated the TLP at their home country’s HEI negatively and extremely negatively. Respondents from Kyrgyzstan from the in-depth interviews among the problems of the higher education system in their home country, primarily referring to state HEIs, mentioned deep-rooted bribery, existence of Soviet teaching and learning methods despite the incorporation of Bologna system’s standards, lack of practical experience during the studies and a limited ability of students for independent work. Similarly to Kazakh respondents of the face-to-face interviews, students stated that the students at private HEIs are either people from well-to-do families (not necessarily from Kyrgyzstan) or those, who have a strong educational capital (e.g. language proficiency). Thus, despite having a broad palette of private HEIs where the quality of education is comparable with well-known international HEIs, these institutions are rather inaccessible for a regular Kyrgyz high-school graduate. The HEIs that

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are financed from the state budget are rather non-competitive and the reforms there bear a fragmented character with unbalanced spending of education costs. Moreover, the growing tendency of student-fees contributes significantly to the exclusion of deprived groups from Kyrgyz HEIs. Higher education in Uzbekistan In 1997 Uzbekistan started large-scaled reforms in the educational sphere. At that time an updated “Law on Education”, which was first brought in 1992, and the National Program for Personnel Training (NPPT) were adopted. These two documents together with Constitutions of Uzbekistan and of an autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan as well as the presidential decrees and the resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan constitute the legal basis for the educational policy in this country. The Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education (MHSSE) is the main coordinator of higher education in Uzbekistan. Moreover, actors such as “the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Population (MLSPP), Ministry of Finance (MF), Ministry of Justice (MJ), as well as other sectorial ministries and agencies (and associated TEIs)” are cooperators in pursuing the tertiary education policy Brunner/Tillet 2007: 162). NPPT was adopted as “a long-term strategy for improving the educational system, the development of continuing education and the strengthening of a twotier system of higher education” (Nessipbayeva/Dalayeva 2013: 392). It extended the duration of compulsory education to 12 years: primary education (grades 1-4), secondary education (grades 5-9) and the secondary specialized vocational education (grades 9-12).94 Interested candidates, who wish to be eligible to enter a local HEI, must complete the secondary specialized vocational education at an academic lyceum or a professional college. The higher education system in Uzbekistan underwent some significant reforms and consists now of two levels: bachelor (4 years) and master (2 years), although a “particular mechanism supporting the implementation of the Bologna process has not been elaborated yet.”95 Starting from 2013 “the two-stage postgraduate education” (Russian: Kandidat Nauk and Doktor Nauk) became onestage with obtaining only “a single level of “Doctor of Sciences” (Erasmus+ 2017) or Doktor Nauk. 94 For more information see: Secondary general education. Available online: http://www. edu.uz/en/tashkent_list/schooling/ (currently not working) 95 Uzbekistan, like Kyrgyzstan, is a „Non Bologna-Signatory Country. See: “State of play of the Bologna process in the Tempus partner countries (2012). Available online: http:// eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/tools/documents/bologna2012_mapping_country_120508_v02. pdf

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As compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan reformed its higher education system in a reserved manner and has remained until recently rather closed to various innovative reforms.96 This was done in line with the socalled “Uzbek model” of development that chose an evolutionary tempo of making reforms during the transition to a market economy, having rejected a revolutionary reformation or “shock therapy”.97 This becomes evident when analyzing different aspects of the higher education landscape. Three types of HEIs in Uzbekistan exist: university, institute and academy. In the academic year 2014/15 there were 82 HEIs in Uzbekistan: 32 universities (including 20 public universities, 6 branches in rural regions and 6 international HEIs), 44 institutes (including “36 institutes of MHSSE, and other ministries, 7 branches in rural regions and 1 international institute), 6 academies (including 2 branches). There are non-private HEIs in Uzbekistan, as compared to Kyrgyzstan and especially Kazakhstan (Erasmus+ 2017). Those non-local HEIs that are available in Uzbekistan do not enjoy the status of private HEIs but were established on the basis of partnership with public institutions (World Bank 2014), the so-called ‘semi-private HEIs’. Principally, the legislation of Uzbekistan allows the establishment of nonstate (private) institutions for higher education. But before they get the right to exercise training activities, private institutions must run through the process of a rigorous state accreditation and certification by the State Testing Center (STC) under the Cabinet of Ministers. A failed certification can be the reason for revocation of accreditation.98 The STC was established, amongst other strategies, to challenge the non-transparent corrupt practices during the entry exams i.e. testing procedure to the HEIs in Uzbekistan. Moreover, it carries on the nostrilfication (recognition) of foreign diplomas, control of education quality and many other tasks (DTM 2004). A German scholar Christine Teichmann (2008: 4), who prepared an expert opinion about the development of education in Uzbekistan on behalf of the Uzbek government in 2007, observed the following: those limitedly available branches of foreign HEIs in Uzbekistan were admitted by Uzbek authorities because the latter were hoping in that way to retain local students in Uzbekistan. However, according to the report, the official stance was that Uzbek authorities generally praised the quality of local higher education in Uzbekistan considering 96 Such a constellation may change with the incumbent President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who was elected as President in December 2016. His election was preceded by the death of the first and long term President Islam Karimov. 97 „Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations Office and other International Organisations in Geneva. 98 Higher education. Source: access is currently unavailable.

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it as the reason for low numbers of ‘semi-private HEIs’ and the absence of private HEIs. Teichmann stressed that low numbers of private and/or international HEIs hamper competition in the Uzbek higher education system. These conditions have surely had negative implications for the quality of the higher education system, which generally has not improved but deteriorated instead significantly in the post-independent period. Only 32 percent of teaching staff at HEIs in Uzbekistan in the academic year 2011/12 held “the equivalent of a PhD (either a Doctor or a Candidate of the sciences)” (World Bank 2014). The poor quality of higher education is also confirmed by the results of the in-depth interviews, where respondents elaborated in detail on these aspects. In particular, along with corrupt practices, the still existing Soviet-style in the TLP, low wages of teaching personnel and the lack of essential facilities, Uzbek respondents, mentioned the qualitative differences in the TLP of the groups with national/Uzbek and Russian languages of instruction, where latter had a better quality of instruction. Moreover, they also stressed that it was common for Uzbekistan to set a HEI lecturer under pressure if he or she did not want to grade a student, who had not even attended a course. Other Uzbek interviewees criticized, amongst other things, many unnecessary courses in the curricula of HEIs in Uzbekistan, which do not have any relation to the study focus. Such courses were required ones. As in the Soviet period, there is strict governmental control of the curricula of local HEIs, based on the State Education Standards (SES). The SES, which have a centralizing role, are developed and approved by the MHSSE and they define the requirements for higher education degree programs and “for each specific professional education field,” “including; the structure, content, and implementation of curricula, quality control of personnel training, compulsory (core) components (the list of academic subjects), learning outcomes, and descriptions of competencies”) Thus, HEIs cannot autonomously manage the curriculum except for a leeway of 5 percent of change, which they are allowed to make. Optional subjects are also not provided and they do not allow double majors or majors and minors (Ibid). Despite the fact that Uzbekistan allocated significant resources to the education sphere99, the expenditures for higher education were extremely low. According to the World Bank’s report from 2011, expenditures for the tertiary education were around 0.4 percent of GDP or 5 percent from the education budget in total, one of the lowest in the world. In comparison, Russia spent 0.9 of

99 In 2009 spending composed 10.8 percent. In: European Commission (2012): Higher education in Uzbekistan. Available online: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_ countries/reviews/Uzbekistan.pdf

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GDP on tertiary education, which accounted for 23 percent of the overall education budget in 2011 (World Bank 2014). The instructional staff at Uzbek HEIs are poorly paid, although salaries were increased 12 times within 9 years. As of September 2015, the minimum wage for teaching personnel at schools in Uzbekistan composed 417 USD (according to the official currency rate)100. Teacher salaries are low by international standards (starting at USD 365 per month) in 2013/2014. Moreover, “the spending patterns within tertiary education are misaligned”: as compared to the miserable monthly salary of the teaching staff, each student receives monthly “generous” and “nearly universal” stipends (130 USD in 2013/2014). However, the relatively high costs per student can be considered as one of the implications for low tertiary enrolment rates, which in part can be explained by the low financing of higher education. For comparison, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have tertiary enrolment rates of around 40 and 49 percent respectively (World Bank 2014). Indeed, since independence, Uzbekistan’s gross tertiary enrolment rate has declined drastically: in 1991 the total enrolment rate in higher education composed 17 percent, in 2015 there were only about 9 percent UNESCO (b) n.d.) of tertiary enrolled students. In practical terms, it means that “9 out of every 10 secondary school graduates cannot enter university.”101 By international standards, countries with similar levels of development to Uzbekistan (lower middle income) “have an average tertiary enrolment rate of 18 percent.” Also, in proportion to its GDP Uzbekistan should have a tertiary enrolment rate of around 20 percent (World Bank 2014), which signifies that public funding of tertiary education in Uzbekistan is extremely underfinanced. At the same time the easing of the way for private donors interested in investments in higher education system in Uzbekistan would contribute positively both to the increase of higher education spending and raise the gross tertiary enrolment rates. Also the issue of gender disparity in tertiary enrolment rates needs to be improved. Uzbekistan is the only country in the CA whose tertiary enrolment 100 Due to a high inflation of the Uzbek sum there were two or more exchange rates in Uzbekistan for a long period of time: official (at banks) and the non-official one (in bazaars/markets). The difference between both is huge so that for 1 USD one gets twice more in a bazaar than at a bank. See at (in Russian): Sputniknews (2015): V Uzbekistane srednyaya zarplata uchiteley sostavlyaet 1.2 millionov sumov. Available online: http://ru. sputniknews-uz.com/society/20151006/653439.html 101 Official version: „In the system of higher education, there is an average of 766 students applying for 100 places. The following chart shows the degree of competition in the different fields of study.“ Global Partnership (2013): Republic of Uzbekistan. Education sector plan for 2013-2017. Available online: http://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/ default/files/2013-09-Uzbekistan-Education-Sector-Plan-2013-2017.pdf

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ratio of women has remained persistently low over time with a declining tendency. In 2011 there were only 39 percent of enrolled students at Uzbek HEIs were female, while in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it was 58 and 55 percent respectively (World Bank 2014). The OS results, as demonstrated in the chapter four, confirm this gender disparity among the students from Uzbekistan. Although these results, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, seem to be better than the official figures: Uzbek female students constituted only 47 percent of the OS respondents, as compared to Kazakhstan (60 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (69 percent). Specific socio-cultural norms in Uzbekistan were suggested as one of the explanations for existing gender disparity particularly in tertiary enrolment rates in Uzbekistan. But this explanation is not exhaustive, other aspects matter too. Further research is needed to fully understand this phenomenon (Sabzaliyeva 2016). Uzbekistan’s higher education system, similarly to those of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, experiences a declining quota of students financed from the state budget. Now they make up approximately 1/3 of students. Self-financing students and their tuition fees contribute therefore a large share to the revenues of Uzbek HEIs. This share is even larger than in the US and the UK with 57 and 52 percent respectively. 102 This condition is also bound to high tuition fees, the amount of which rises from year to year. For example, the tuition fee for obtaining an M.A. degree varies between “EUR 2,100 and EUR 3,200 per year.” They have almost reached an international level, where fees vary in average between 3,000 EUR and 5,000 EUR.103 Although the tuition fees cover monthly stipends (around 130 USD), thisdoes not even cover basic costs. Put simply, Uzbekistan’s higher education can be characterized as somewhat “old-fashioned” and slow to develop. Some efforts to internationalize the tertiary education landscape have been made, but their scope is very limited. One of the main reasons for ‘small-step’ reforms are the reservations of the Uzbek authorities towards the development of international cooperation in the higher education sphere. For example, the program for fostering academic staff mobility like Erasmus Mundus has enabled only 200 teachers and researchers to study at partner European HEIs since 2004. Over time the work of many educational programs were quitted in Uzbekistan (Soros, Accels, Fulbright etc.); the problem 102 „Between 2008 and 2012, the average size of the student contract increased fourfold— from US$453 to US$1,842“. In: The World Bank (2014): Uzbekistan. Modernizing tertiary education. Available online: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/236211484721686087/ Uzbekistan-Higher-Education-Report-2014-en.pdf 103 Please note that the amount of tuition fees in Uzbekistan were indicated taking the official exchange rate. In: Erasmus+ (2017): Overview of the higher education system. Uzbekistan. Available online: http://erasmusplus.uz/images/shared/countryfiche_uzbekistan_ 2017.pdf

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with the work of DAAD has been already tackled in the fourth chapter. All those up- and downturns had, in most cases, political connotations. As part of the internationalization efforts, in 1997 the former Uzbek President Islam Karimov launched the national foundation “Umid” (Hope) for supporting bright Uzbek youth to study abroad. However, the foundation’s work did not prove successful and long-term because of the low return rates of Uzbek graduates and the employment challenges in Uzbekistan for returnees. All this shows that the higher education system of Uzbekistan is poorly financed, although the expenditures for education in general are relatively high. The tendency of raising study fees reduces the number of students financed by the state budget. Among the significant problems in education is the non-competitiveness of the higher education landscape, mainly due to slow internationalization reforms and the overall insularity of the country. Moreover, strict systems of hierarchy and control, similar to that of the Soviet times, persist, which also have implications for the work of various international organizations e.g. DAAD. International educational donors lack a sustainable basis for effective and durable work in Uzbekistan. It is now a matter of waiting to see whether positive changes will be introduced by the incumbent Uzbek leadership. Labour market in Kazakhstan This sub-section relies mostly on secondary sources because primary sources do not consistently provide data on employment and labour market indicators. In many cases the data is simply not available. This is especially true of Uzbekistan. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the “unemployment rate” between 2011 and 2016 was between 5.0 and 5.4 percent .104 In the 2000s the overall unemployment rate in Kazakhstan started to fall: “from 12.8 percent in 2000 to 5.2 percent in the third quarter of 2012.” This became possible due to “an increase in both labour force participation rates and the working-age population.” What was remarkable was the fall in the sum of the population living below the poverty line “(or minimum subsistence)”: between 2001 and 2012 it fell from 47 percent to 4 percent. A majority of socially deprived people live in rural areas, and typically have lower education levels and live in larger households (Riboud 2015: 39-40, 52)

104 “The unemployment rate is the number of persons who are unemployed as a percent of the total number of employed and unemployed persons (i.e., the labour force).”In: ILO (n.d.): ILOSTAT country profiles. Kazakhstan. Available online: https://www.ilo.org/ilostatcp/ CPDesktop/?list=true&lang=en&country=KAZ

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In 2013, the “youth unemployment rate”105 among those aged 15 and 24 was 3.91 percent. The “share of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET)” in 2016 was 9.49 percent of the total (those between 15 and 24 years old). 106 The economy of Kazakhstan is still in need of reorganisation and an adequate distribution of labour force: in 2013 the agricultural sector comprised only 5.5. percent of GDP though it employed almost 30 percent of the population (in developed countries this share is between 5 and 6 percent). This implies that the transition from a predominantly agricultural economy to an industrial one is not yet complete in Kazakhstan. This circumstance surely has negative implications for the supply of jobs across the population. There is a need to create jobs in sectors other than agriculture and for highly qualified people in particular, boosting the Kazakh economy. It is projected that by 2030 Kazakhstan will need between 1 million and 1.7 million new jobs. Moreover, the labour market of Kazakhstan is dominated by the public sector (50.2 percent in 2008) though this is changing. This surely limits the opportunities for moving towards “a flexible and adaptive labour market.” Therefore one of the main challenges for the Kazakh government for the years ahead is the replacement of public sector jobs with those from the private sector (Riboud 2015: 40-41). In the meantime, Kazakhstan has launched a population employment 2020 program, which is aimed at young people under 29 and older people over 50. This program aims, among other things, to create work opportunities (temporary and permanent), develop entrepreneur activities, and educate skilled personnel and others (EGov 2017). To recall, according to the OS, 63 percent of surveyed Kazakh participants had completed work experience in their home country. Around 42 percent of these respondents assessed the working conditions as “good”. Overall, survey participants from Kazakhstan turned out to be the most positive in their judgements when compared to Kyrgyz and Uzbek students: around 14 percent noted that their working conditions were very good. Due to significant differences Kazakh interviewees from the qualitative part clearly distinguished between the working conditions (wage, atmosphere, self105 “The unemployed comprise all persons of working age who are without work, available for work, and looking for work, unless otherwise stated. The unemployment rate expresses the number of unemployed as a percent of the labour force. This indicator refers to the young population only, which comprises persons of ages 15 to 24 inclusive, unless otherwise stated” In: ILO (n.d.): ILOSTAT country profiles. Kazakhstan. Available online: https://www.ilo.org/ilostatcp/CPDesktop/?list=true&lang=en&country=KAZ 106 “The youth not in employment, education or training are persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years who are unemployed and out of the education system. Data provided conveys the share of this category of youth as a percent of total youth. In practice, some countries define different age band to identify the youth” (Ibid).

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realization opportunities etc.) in the state and private sectors. Even if the wages at state institutions appeared sufficient, the working atmosphere was described as boring, especially for foreign graduates, who were enthusiastic and full of new ideas. A former Bolashak scholarship-holder R. shared in detail her experiences with working conditions in both sectors after the return to Kazakhstan: “I received a job offer from the career centre of the Bolashak foundation. It was the only one job offer that I got from this centre. It was a state company [...]. I left for Astana, worked there for a couple of days and realized that the work at state organs is not for me. [...]. Well, the payment would be OK, but people who work there, they seem to be aimless, and they miss a team spirit. They do not try to develop something; they just use what they already have. They are demotivated, because they can get state funding any time they wish. They are not motivated to acquire finances and work for that respectively. If there is a financial need for the implementation for a project, employers of a Ministry write an official letter where they indicate that there is a need for a couple of million tenge for the implementation of a certain project. And the money from the state budget flows. Even if the project was not implementted properly, they get financed [again]. Such an attitude does not fit to my life stance.”

It is a paradox: although there are a number of renowned private and semi-private HEIs in Kazakhstan which deliver well-prepared cohorts and significant numbers of Bolashak returners, the results of various surveys from the private sector show that an adequately trained labour force in Kazakhstan is lacking. This relates to foreign language proficiency, “mathematics, and science as well as the lack of “higher order” skills.” For some companies this factor was even seen as a constraint on doing business in Kazakhstan (Riboud 2015: 30). This may indicate that there is a lack of qualified specialists in the domestic labour market, and may be explained in part by two trends: the mass emigration of highly qualified people and a labour force supply that is inadequate for the needs of local markets. Given the greater financial opportunities that Kazakhstan has over Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Kazakh authorities have made efforts to integrate the private sector into the education sphere. Priority has been given to vocational training based on the German dual system model. However, a focus on theoretical content that was not adequately complemented by practical application was seen as the main constraint on a successful roll-out of vocational education. As a consequence, given the relatively small number of adequately qualified workers and managers available for recruitment by foreign companies in Kazakhstan, these firms prefer to train their employees outside the CA republics in order to get the quality they need e.g. a dairy company based in Kazakhstan trained its employees in France (translation from German, see Stehling 2015: 3).

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Another problem is the lack of fruitful cooperation between the higher education sector and industry due to the “lack of economic incentives for the private sector.” Such cooperation would contribute to both a growth in employment opportunities and also the development of science and technologies (AKORDA 2010). Labour market in Kyrgyzstan The general situation in Kyrgyzstan, as explained in the second chapter, does not promise much in terms of incentives for graduates to return there after graduation in Germany. Due to fragile institutions and the “fragmentation in the parliament and frequent coalition breakdowns”, the political situation is still instable (European Parliament 2015), which surely serves as a destabilizing factor for other sectors. Widespread corruption together with poor economic performance are further challenges for potential returners. Poverty and unemployment can be considered the main problems among the population and the rural population in particular. According to the statistical information provided by ILO, in 2013 the “share of unemployed persons with advanced education” comprised 16.32 percent.107 In 2015 the youth unemployment rate among young persons aged 15–24 was 15.0 percent. The share of youths (15–24 years old) not in employment, education or training (NEET), was 21.4 percent in the same year (Ibid). Moreover, in line with the data provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the level of poverty in the country was 38 percent in 2012 (UNDP 2016). Although women and men have equal opportunities in terms of access to education, in higher education women make up a greater share of the student population than men, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). With reference to the World Bank data from 2012, EBRD indicated that there is a big gender gap in the labour force participation in Kyrgyzstan. Specifically, the data for people aged between 15 and 28 show that 52 percent of labour market participants are female and 77 percent are male. Women from Kyrgyzstan are also over-represented in low-wage occupations. This was explained by slower career progression, a lack of child care, and, to a lesser extent, traditional attitudes assigning women the role of housewives (EBRD 2015). This means that the potential of Kyrgyz women is neglected and 107 “The adult population is defined as persons aged 25 and over, unless otherwise specified. This indicator expresses the adult population with advanced education (tertiary education) as a percent of the total adult population,” In: ILO (a) n.d.): ILOSTAT country profiles. Kyrgyzstan. Available online: https://www.ilo.org/ilostatcp/CPDesktop/?list=true&lang= en&country=KAZ

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they are deprived of employment opportunities, which may serve for them as good reasons not returning home after graduation in Germany. Empirical results of this study show that about 61 percent of Kyrgyz students had worked in Kyrgyzstan before they came to Germany for study purposes. Almost half of respondents rated the working conditions at their former workplaces in Kyrgyzstan as “partially good/partially bad”. 38 percent of Kyrgyz respondents rated the same as “good.” Kyrgyz students became the only group that selected the “very bad” working conditions option. A male respondent R. to the face-to-face interview reported extreme dissatisfaction with the amount of wage he used to get in his former job in Kyrgyzstan, though he highlighted the interesting work and good carrier perspectives on offer. The latest study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes that “the secondary technical and vocational education sector represents an opportunity for many higher education institutions to align their education programs with the immediate needs of the labor market” (ABD 2015:1). However, Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to reform its system of vocational training at HEIs and vocational schools are hindered by its poor financial state. Therefore, ambitious reforms can only be partially implemented or indeed not at all. There are strong and growing needs in this regard to motivate HEIs to acquire finances and institutionalize the role of the private sector in the training of young people (Stehling 2015: 4). Labour market in Uzbekistan Similar statistical data to that used for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could not be found on ILO’s homepage for Uzbekistan. This is also the case for other statistical sources e.g. the World Bank, which lacks data on Uzbekistan for a number of indicators. National sources of data in Uzbekistan usually provide numbers that do not reflect the reality. Referring to the previous sub-section it can be argued that due to extremely low “investments in local research and development/science and technology” (Gribble 2008: 31), Uzbek graduates’ chances of finding decent employment inside the country are slim. As shown in the third chapter, Uzbekistan scores worse than both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in terms of corruption levels. According to the data provided by the UNDP, in 2013 16 percent of the Uzbek population were living “below the national poverty line” 75 percent of whom were living in rural areas. (UNDP 2013). Uzbekistan’s labour market does not have a balance between supply and demand, which is essential for economic development. There are a number of challenges faced by Uzbekistan’s labour market: annually there are thousand of graduates of vocational schools and HEIs, who then remain unemployed. Uzbekistan has a large population of people of employable age: “about 68 percent of

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the country’s working-age population” (World Bank 2014). The problems faced in this regard include a mismatch between the number and specialty of cadres and the demands of economy, reflecting a need to introduce forecasting methods to determine the demands on cadres at certain professional areas. In order to provide the graduates of vocational schools with employment, a dual system similar to that in Germany should be introduced (with for example the creation of professional training centres in companies). Another problem concerns the barriers to creating new job opportunities. This is due to highly unfavourable business conditions in Uzbekistan, something that can be changed through the reduction of bureaucratic barriers and high costs. This confirms my observations: it is extremely difficult for graduates of Uzbek HEIs to find an adequate job with an adequate salary. Many have to undertake tasks, which do not fit their qualifications or their personal preferences. The aim of many graduates in such a situation is to leave for abroad i.e. to usefully deploy the abilities and qualifications which they possess. It is indeed the dream of many graduates to leave for Europe and start working there in order to be able to enjoy decent working conditions and salary. However, as mentioned in chapter three, the quality of CA graduates’ qualifications is far from perfect and due to this and other reasons, they are constrained from getting employed e.g. in Europe after graduation from local (state-funded) HEIs. Regarding low salaries, Rasanayagam (2011: 688) put it as follows: since independence “salaries in state institutions have become at best only a small supplement to household income, and pensions, child support and other transfer payments are also very small. Access to healthcare is nominally free, but in practice doctors often demand bribes for adequate treatment.” According to the results of the online survey, almost 62 percent of Uzbek respondents indicated having work experience from the home country. The majority of Uzbek students who participated in the online survey (45 percent), assessed the working conditions in their home country as “partially good/partially bad”, 32 percent checked the “good” working conditions option. Uzbek respondents checked the “bad” working conditions option more frequently than both Kazakh and Kyrgyz respondents. The respondents from the in-depth interviews were extremely critical about the working conditions in the state sector. Among the most acute problems mentioned were ineffective bureaucracy, low wages, bleak carrier perspectives, and the irrelevance of their personal skills and development. Moreover, according to a respondent I., in Uzbekistan there is a huge deficit of teaching staff at schools: bachelors students of the second year are strongly encouraged by their administration to teach at schools, albeit without appropriate qualifications. Many of them are themselves poorly educated because of the weak school basis they

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come to the HEI with. Nobody really controls how this work takes place, only the school children see the effects of this. In return, the working conditions in the private/international sectors were assessed as being rather positive. The positives included higher wages as well as interactive and interesting work. A male respondent E. from Uzbekistan pursued his PhD study in Germany at the time of interview. He had a solid work experience in both: state and private sectors (more than six years). He described his experience as follows: “The working conditions of state and private sectors are completely different; they are not comparable, at least in Uzbekistan. After a couple of years working at a local bank I felt really uncomfortable: a variety of bureaucracy and routine, there was no motivation for self-development anymore; degradation. Carrier perspectives were dim, an hour of triumph had to be awaited, what I have never wanted to do, just to stay there and wait that I someday will be promoted, no. It means that personal/work performance was irrelevant there, and there were other conditions for promotion that did not fit me. Although my wage was, in comparison with other similar working places, better, it did not cover monthly costs of even one person, for half of a month; it was not enough for a normal life. It was a kind of pocket money for me.” “When I started working on international projects it was different: This concerns not only the wages, although it is important. It is [actually] one of the reasons why after a stay in an English-speaking country I did not return to my bank where I worked previously and there were options for promotion, well, firstly, it is the amount of wage, secondly, I was always attracted by work at an international organization. It is more interesting, more interactive, you have more to experience e.g. different stakeholders, constant communication, it is not work with numbers and routines with documents, you have a project and you can realize it through different ways, it is interesting for me. It is a more interesting job.”

A female respondent A. from Uzbekistan, got her M.A. degree in Germany and currently lives there: “As a fourth year B.A. student, I worked for a big international company. For the Uzbek circumstances I had a very good wage at that moment, the working and employment conditions were very good. We were picked up and brought back after work, got a meal, my tasks were very interesting. I liked it. […]. Moreover, the inflation in Uzbekistan was not at that moment so high, and the wages were good for living conditions in Tashkent. Indeed, with my two month wages I could pay for my study at the HEI [where she graduated from in Uzbekistan].”

In recent years there have been serious efforts to create more jobs by increasing the quality of vocational training (Uzbekistan is regional leader in this regard) and encouraging a favourable investment climate, however the issue of teaching staff being unqualified and of low quality persists. There is also a lack of integration of the private sector with vocational training. Operational training, espe-

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cially in small- and medium-sized local companies is therefore unsystematic and is not adapted to the official curriculum at universities and vocational schools (Stehling 2015: 5). b) Policies to restrict migration This policy option proposed by Lowell (2001) touches “on the rights of the individual international migrant” and is “largely counter-productive.” The restrictive policy can be considered as one of the most impetuous ways to attempt to restrict brain drain on the part of a state. This may include the practice of the so-called ‘exit visa’, which prevents citizens from freely travelling free abroad. Among three CA republics under this focus, only Uzbekistan practices the ‘exit visa’ or travel restriction policy.108 Therefore this section will focus on the case of Uzbekistan. The practice of this policy dates back to Soviet times when Soviet citizens had to obtain the permission from the state in order to be able to travel abroad. After Uzbekistan had gained its independence in 1991, this practice was abolished and was bound to the agreements with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Soon after, the right for freedom of movement was again restricted in 1995 and was based on the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “On establishing the procedure of exit for citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan” and several other documents. From that period on, the policy of exit visa took effect in independent Uzbekistan and is still practiced nowadays. The exit visa is issued within two weeks109 at the “Local Departments of Exit, Entry, Citizenship” (OVIR) in form of a sticker in the Uzbek citizen’s passport which has to be paid for. It is valid for two years and is limited to the validity of a citizen’s passport. Travel to the CIS countries does not require the issue of an exit visa (Pak 2014: 2). Half of Uzbek students out of 86 persons, who participated in the online survey, indicated that they needed to wait 2-3 weeks for the issuing of the ‘exit

108 Currently Uzbekistan counts to one of the few countries in the world (along with North Korea), which keep the exit visa system. Although there have been some official statements about it’s abolishment during the upcoming period between July and September 2017, it is still unclear when respective policy will be implemented. In: Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty (2017): Uzbekistan moves to abolish exit visas. Available online: http://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-moves-to-abolish-exit-visas/28251171.html 109 According to the latest information, the duration of the exit visa issue is extended up to 3 weeks.

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visa.’ One-third of them had to wait four-six weeks until the permission for travel to particularly Germany was issued. To the question whether Uzbek students had to use informal practices (e.g. bribe) for the issuing of the ‘exit visa’, the vast majority of them (69 percent) answered “No.” Almost one-third (29 percent) of Uzbek respondents, in contrast, bribed local authorities in order to get the exit visa issued. According to the respective answers of Uzbek respondents, received from in-depth interviews, if an applicant had limited time and could not wait for a couple of weeks until the ‘exit visa’ was issued, it was then possible to speed up the procedure through bribes. Generally it was easier to receive the ‘exit visa’ as a student than an employee, as one female respondent A. mentioned. According to regulations, if one travels abroad (excluding the CIS space) for employment, he or she has to register with the Ministry of Labour of Uzbekistan and fill out different forms, pay taxes and so on. Further, there is a special regulation for unmarried and/or divorced women in Uzbekistan, who are under 35 years old and who want to travel abroad for private purposes. According to some (informal) rules from the recent years, they must get a ‘travel allowance’ from their parents in order to be able to apply for the travel permission. The allowance of parents must be given in a written form and it ensures Uzbek authorities that the respective female applicant will not get involved in particularly prostitution or human trafficking in foreign countries. Additionally, the above-mentioned category of women, who want to travel for private purposes, must conduct an interview with a relevant authority in order to be able to finally get the exit visa. A warranty from the local self-administration organ (Mahalla) is also required by respective Uzbek authorities for the issuing of exit visas for the above-mentioned female applicants. The permission from parents in the form of their signature can be replaced by the signature of an employer, if the purpose of female applicants’ travel is business (Potrebiteli. UZ 2015). This regulation can be escaped, if one has “useful connections”, as one female applicant explained, who falls under the category of women under 35 years old and was issued the exit visa as a tourist. Another Uzbek female respondent U., who previously applied for the ‘exit visa’, when the special regulation for unmarried women was not yet practiced, did not have any particular troubles. She was only upset by the fact that she needed to wait for several weeks (longer that two weeks) until her ‘exit visa’ was ready. One male respondent E. from Uzbekistan speculated about the selective nature of the exit visa. Its application depends on the travel purpose of an applicant. In particular, if someone leaves Uzbekistan as a guest-worker for Russia

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then he or she does not need the ‘exit visa’ at all, according to the CIS agreements. The respondent argued that Uzbek government did that deliberately because the out-migration of large numbers of Uzbeks, who are mainly low skilled and unemployed in their country, is profitable for the Uzbek authorities. Since short-term economic and long-term social problems are solved thereby. The respondent himself has never experienced any unusual issues applying for the ‘exit visa’. He admitted that it was a time-consuming and annoying procedure but it was not perceived by him as something ‘extraordinary’. Moreover, he emphasized that if one has useful connections a lot of problems can be solved in Uzbekistan meaning thereby his personal experience in solving numerous bureaucratic issues through such connections (including shortening of the ‘exit visa’ procedure). In the words of another male respondent H. from Uzbekistan he faced some trouble with the ‘exit visa’ due to the incompetent work of the military enlistment office (in Russian: Voyenkomat). The latter refused to provide the respondent with a document, which would testify the accomplishment of his obligation for compulsory military service while studying at a HEI in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, being aware the incompetence of the respective authorities in Voyenkomat, the respondent stayed strong and refused to bribe anyone in order to solve his problem. Indeed, after some time, the problem was solved by itself and the ‘exit visa’ was issued even without the document from the military enlistment office. Furthermore, the respondent advised a free-access online platform, where people can read laws and other legal documents and stay informed about their rights. An additional pressure on students is the regulation, introduced in 2005 based on the former President’s decree from 2nd of June of the same year: This decree prescribed that Uzbek graduates (all study areas, B.A. and M.A.), who during their studies at local HEIs received state scholarships, must work for at least three years at an assigned place (educational institutions, factories, organizations) in Uzbekistan. Those graduates, who will not meet this requirement, will not receive their qualification document (e.g. diploma) meaning that the original qualification document will be provided three years after completion of the studies (Norma 2012). As the respondents of the qualitative part indicated the interrogation of students, who studied abroad for one or more years, is practiced. In particular, the respondent I. was posed questions by the employees of National Security Service of Uzbekistan (in Russian: Slujba Nazional’noy Bezopasnosti) regarding what he did in Germany exactly, whether he had contacts to compatriots, if yes to whom and why etc. Moreover, the general question on possible problems from the home authorities before the departure to Germany for study purposes, was posed to all three

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republics’ respondents. The answers demonstrated that Uzbek students experienced much more trouble with their home authorities than the students from other two republics. So, with over 17 percent of responses Uzbek students became the leading group for choosing the options “problematic” and “very problematic.” In contrast, only 7 percent of Kazakh students and 6 percent of Kyrgyz students chose these options. Subsequently, in contrast to Kazakh students (46 percent) and Kyrgyz students (36 percent), only few people from Uzbekistan (20 percent) answered that the process was “not problematic at all”. The positive experience of Kazakh and Kyrgyz students with their home authorities regarding travel abroad was confirmed by the in-depth interviews. In particular, none of the interviewed Kazakh students had any problems, which would explicitly have hindered them from traveling to Germany for study purposes. Moreover, they did not have the feeling that there were mechanisms at a state level, which would prevent Kazakh citizens from travelling abroad. Kyrgyz citizens, too, did not have to undergo any bureaucratic barriers on the side of Kyrgyz authorities in order to be able to travel for study purposes to Germany. The reasons behind the specifically restrictive policies of the Uzbek government can be explained by drawing on a theory of rational choice institutionalism, where “actors are assumed to be self-interested and goal oriented” (Héritier 2007: 10). Since Uzbek authorities restrict the outflow of tertiary students to especially Western countries, the reasoning behind this might be the prevention of the formation of a “political stratum” which would threaten the status-quo in the country of origin, as Dahl (2005: 91), would put it. Keeping low the numbers of local citizens, who get acquainted with liberal principles and political rights in Western societies, thus maintaining the status-quo, could be a plausible explanation for that. This explanation could also be a cause for the lack of attractive, or indeed any, measures on the part of Uzbek government to encourage the return of Uzbek graduates from Germany. 5.2.2

Policies of Sending CA States Accounting for the Period During the Tertiary Studies of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Temporary Return (Brain Circulation), Transfer of Social Remittances and Diaspora Issues

This section, which is the meso-level of the analysis, deals with the issues of the promotion of brain circulation, transfer of social remittances during the stay in Germany and the process of diaspora building among the CA students and graduates.

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It must be stressed here that due to the temporary character of student migration (at least according to visa type), the probability for a circular (temporary) migration is much higher than it would be for those groups, who from the start leave for abroad as permanent migrants e.g. contingent migrants. The meso-level of analysis was introduced by Faist as a binding element for macro and micro levels of analysis and, according to him it takes place “between individuals and larger structures such as the nation-state.” The meso-level consists of units of analysis such as “households and families, groups of kinship, the reference community, but also friends and acquaintances in the workplace, and groupings such as ethnic, religious and political associations.” Faist’s theoretical endeavor was to understand “what exactly happens in networks and collectives that induce people to stay, move and return” (Faist 1997: 204, 199). As with every movement of people, the documentation of the scale of circular migration is a challenging act too. There is not any standardised definition of circular migration, but there is a consensus among researchers that circular migration implies transnational mobility, which should be fostered. As it was mentioned in the chapter two circular migration “involves migrants sharing work, family, and other aspects of their lives between two or more locations.” It differs from return migration, where latter is seen as an act of return after “an extended absence”. The main advantage of circular migration is that it reduces negative consequences from the brain-drain i.e. through temporary returns to their home countries, migrants can explore their valuable potential. In this connection, circular migration is also beneficial for migrants themselves because through their experience sharing they will simultaneously gather new experience, skills and if possible, income (Graeme 2013: 2, 6). In other words, circular migration does not let migrants break their ties with their home countries and in the best case, through appropriate policy measures the circular migration will bring full benefits for the development of source countries. As the empirical results of this study (chapter 4) testified, the transfers of financial and political remittances are in the case of these student migrants from CA, rather weak. It was determined by asking respondents whether they remit to their home countries while studying in Germany. The limited potential of political remittances became evident through identifying respondents’ low political activeness in their home countries and especially in Germany. The analysis of the transfer of social remittances requires a wider scope, which can be approached using the following indicators, which were elaborated based on the OS and interview results: a) Temporary return: frequency of visits to and doing an internship in the home

country during the study time in Germany. b) Level of connectivity of CA students’ to diplomatic representations of their

home countries in Germany.

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c) Level of connectivity to compatriots living in Germany and the methods of

building diaspora. The third indicator also covers some aspects of diaspora in order to see whether there are ways of diaspora formation within the phenomenon of student migration from three CA republics in Germany. If yes, whether that creates potential regarding the transfer of social remittances. Perhaps the most prominent study on social remittances was conducted by Levitt (2001) in her manuscript “Transnational villagers”, where she defined social remittances as “ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from host to sending-country communities.” Thereby she differentiated between positive and negative social remittances: “When Javier told us that he wouldn’t stand being tricked by politicians anymore or having to wait on long lines at city hall because they are so unorganized there, these were good things that he taught us about his life in the United States. But when people come back saying that they care more about themselves than about our community or that you can make a lot of money by selling drugs and that is okay, then we would rather not learn what the U.S. has to offer” (Levitt 2001).

Social remittances bear “the personalized character” and have explicit transmission directions (from host to source countries). They can be transmitted through various ways: “when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin; when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country; or through exchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, e-mails, and telephone calls” (Ibid). This makes clear that the transfer of social remittances takes place during the temporary modes of stay and return migration (permanent). Adversely it can be assumed that if migrants are reluctant to visit (e.g. during the study abroad) or return to their home countries afterwards or they escape to stay connected to their countries of origins through alternative ways, then the effectiveness of the social remittances’ transfer is constrained. Further, as Faist (1997: 203) emphasized the transfer of social remittances is “quite time- and energy-consuming” in terms of constructing or joining “new networks in the receiving country, especially in those cases where it is not the whole family that is moving. [...] Costs are especially high for pioneer migrants who cannot rely on established networks of movers to guide and facilitate their migration.” These arguments hold true for student migrants because when they arrive in Germany, mostly alone, they apparently have no visible, strong diaspora there. As it was mentioned in the second chapter, the dissertation at hand uses the new or contemporary concept of diaspora that encompasses “populations living abroad who, in many cases, are neither active agents of colonization nor passive victims of persecution. Notwithstanding, they do maintain strong collective iden-

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tities” (Sadovskaya 2013: 26-27). Thereby the focus is laid on individual countries’ diasporas and not on regional/ “complex or segmented” diasporas (Werbner 2010: 75-76). Although, even if considered individually, the diaspora issues, due to cultural, linguistic, political and religious diversity of CA republics can be regarded as complex. Diaspora has a huge potential (financial, social and similar) to invest in the countries, where they themselves or their ancestors originally come from and to which they want to keep ties. However, diaspora may not always bring positive effects. To take the example of Kurdish diaspora in Denmark, it was revealed that different groups within the diaspora exist: while one group that valued “the transfer of financial remittances, invests in the hometown” and clearly acted as agents of development, another group held “a more hands-off position” and was interested in its own narrow aims. Therefore, it is assumed that diaspora “can hardly be a homogeneous entity” (Faist/Fauser/Reisenauer 2013: 86-87). a)

Temporary return: frequency of visits to, and doing an internship in the home - country during the study time in Germany

Due to the potential to transfer social remittances and knowledge to their home countries, which students gather in the receiving countries and may transfer during the studies in Germany, the issue of temporary return plays an important role. According to the OS results, the students from Kazakhstan travel most frequently (once in a year) to their home country during their studies at German HEIs. In contrast, Uzbek students do the same most seldom (half of Uzbeks students travel once in 2-3 years or more seldom). Kyrgyz students took an inbetween position in this regard. This picture may illustrate the better financial opportunities of Kazakh students and the numerous bureaucratic hurdles in Uzbekistan, which obviously demotivate many students to travel to their home country more frequently. Doing an internship in the home country during the study years in Germany can be seen as an effective option for the transferring of social remittances. The OS results demonstrated that the vast majority of respondents from three republics did not do an internship in their home countries during the study years in Germany. However, Kyrgyz students led the group of those, who had experience with doing an internship in their home country during the study years in Germany. This serves as a clear indicator for more intensive contacts with their home country. Moreover, the vast majority of these respondents completed their internship at an international organization based in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the availability of numerous international organizations in Kyrgyzstan, and obviously the personal willingness of Kyrgyz students to do an internship in their home country, together with the question of possible additional payment, are all factors

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which add up to make Kyrgyz students the most likely to return home to do internships. According to the statements of the three countries’ respondents from the indepth interviews, among the reasons for why students rarely (on average once in 1-2 years) visited their home countries or did not do an internship there during the study years in Germany, the respondents mentioned scarcity of financial resources and lack of time due to the many responsibilities relating to the study process in Germany. This fleshes out the afore-mentioned assumption regarding the travel frequency of Kazakh students. Another circumstance revealed a general unwillingness of CA respondents, especially among Kazakh students, to get engaged in an explicitly remunerated activity in their home countries during the study years in Germany. So, to the question concerning a hypothetical opportunity for doing a paid internship throughout the tertiary study in Germany, the OS respondents from three republics demonstrated their huge interest for doing it either in Germany or any other EU country, but not in the home country. One explanation for this may be described by a female respondent O. from Kazakhstan who believed that her home country did not need her experiences and competencies; even if there were sectors which need development (this is also applied in her opinion regarding her permanent return intentions). The respondent emphasized that the attitude among people in Kazakhstan was somewhat ‘we know ourselves what to do’. Moreover, the high share of Kazakh students, the national scholarship-holders, who due to the return obligation must anyway return home after the graduation in Germany, shaped the low percentage of Kazakh students’ answers regarding the willingness to do a paid internship at home during the study years in Germany. These results provide the following evidence: on the one hand, financial difficulties and on the other hand general reluctance can be seen as the reasons for their rather rare visits or resistance to doing an internship in the home country. This may suggest that financial motivation and the improvement of the image of local institutions may contribute to raising the willingness of students to stay connected with the home country during the study years in Germany through e.g. doing a paid internship there. b)

Level of connectivity of CA students’ to diplomatic representations of their home countries in Germany

The level of connectivity to their home countries may also be characterized by the level of CA students’ engagement with home countries associations or diplomatic representations based in Germany. In particular, embassies and consulates, in line with their competencies, may play a consolidating, facilitating and coordinating role in exploring the potential of their compatriots.

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Although Kazakh OS respondents belong to the largest non-registered people at their diplomatic representations 110 accredited in Germany; regulations exist for an obligatory registration. According to the information concerning the consular register at the Kazakh embassy or consulates that can be found at the website of the embassy, citizens of Kazakhstan who possess a “residence permit” for Germany must register themselves. Thereby the bearers of residence permits for Germany are called “permanent residents” by the respective Kazakh embassy’s source. Since the residence permit that is issued by German authorities for particularly Kazakh students has a temporary character, it does not fit the permanent residents, for whom, in turn, a settlement permit is issued by German authorities. Therefore, based on the information provided by the Kazakh embassy concerning the consular register, it is not clear whether students from Kazakhstan, who are non-permanent residents (temporary residents) in Germany and possess a residence permit, must register with the embassy (BotschaftKaz.de (2013c). The low registration rates of Kazakh students with their diplomatic representations were also confirmed in qualitative interviews. So, all respondent Kazakh interviewees turned out to have no registration. Some of them stated that they actually individually decide whether to get registered or not because there is no such obligation. Many of the respondents did not want to get registered because they did not think that it was a necessary step i.e. there was not any practical advantage from the registration. Moreover, some respondents think that the employees of specifically the Kazakh embassy are not interested in establishing contacts to their compatriots studying in Germany. Further, a non-serious attitude of those employees was stressed, explained by inadequate professional qualifications of some of the staff. The reasons behind this are that the diplomatic carrier in Kazakhstan is a matter of connections (kinship) that may enable, also non-qualified people, to get employment at an embassy. Interestingly, according to the OS results, although the majority of Kazakh students are not registered either at the Kazakh embassy or consulate/s located in Germany, half of them stay either regularly or irregularly informed by these diplomatic representations of Kazakhstan in Germany. It is possible, if one takes into account the statement of a Kazakh respondent from the in-depth interview, who assumed that the flow of information about different events on Kazakhstan mostly takes place not on the part of the Kazakh embassy or consulates but 110 These are: Embassy of Kazakhstan in Germany and its branch office in Bonn; Consulate General of Kazakhstan in Frankfurt/Main; Honorary Consulate in Hannover; Consulate of Kazakhstan in Munich; Honorary Consulates in Stuttgart, Hamburg, Bremen and Dresden. In: Botschaft-Kaz.de (2013c): Predstavitel’stva Posol’stva v FRG. Available online: http:// www.botschaft-kasachstan.de/ru/

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rather on the part of different initiatives of the members of Kazakh diaspora in Germany e.g. Russian-speaking community members from Kazakhstan. Indeed, as it will be shown below, the Kazakh diaspora in Germany is the biggest, not necessarily the most active, compared to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyz respondents, who participated in the OS, demonstrated the highest percentage of those, who are registered at the diplomatic representations of their home country based in Germany as well as they are the best informed about different events etc. by the Kyrgyz embassy or consulate in Germany.111 According to respective regulations, citizens of Kyrgyzstan, who leave the country for more than three months, are obliged to register within 15 days at an embassy or consulate/s of Kyrgyzstan accredited in the receiving country. The “consular register” as the registration is officially called on the homepage of the embassy of Kyrgyzstan in Germany enables a registered person to realize all official procedures e.g. change of passport or legalization of documents and to seek protection in case of trouble in Germany. Moreover, the registration is marked in the passport and enables unhindered travel to Kyrgyzstan and other CIS countries with which Kyrgyzstan has signed a visa free regime. The obligation to get registered applies for those categories of people, who live in Germany temporarily (students, au-pair etc.). It falls out if someone lives in Germany permanently (e.g. marriage, work). Kyrgyz students can issue their registration without payment.112 Female respondent P. from Kyrgyzstan states that she received regular notifications in the form of invitations from the embassy of Kyrgyzstan before the presidential and parliamentary elections there. Further, annually, since 2010, the embassy organizes a football game for an ambassador’s cup among Kyrgyz people dispersed throughout Germany. This event is then ends with a cultural program. It has become a sort of tradition. Among the critical points that this respondent mentioned is the embassy’s services which require the payment of high fees for e.g. document legalization. Thus, there is parity in the Kyrgyz case between those, who are registered at diplomatic representations of Kyrgyzstan based in Germany as well as those respondents, who are informed about different events etc. by the Kyrgyz embassy or consulate/s in Germany. Both aspects are best represented in the online survey, in contrast to the tendencies that became visible regarding these aspects in Kazakh and Uzbek students’ responses. The parity emanates obviously from 111 There are the following diplomatic representatives of Kyrgyzstan in Germany: Embassy of Kyrgyzstan located in Berlin, branch office of the Kyrgyz embassy located in Bonn and the consulate located in Frankfurt/Main. Source (the page is temporarily unavailable). 112 In Russian: Konsul’skiy uchyot. Postanovka na konsul’skiy uchyot. Available online (in Russian): Source (the page is temporarily unavailable).

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the active work of Kyrgyz diplomatic representations in developing and keeping contacts with their citizens living in Germany. Half of the Uzbek OS respondents are registered persons in the diplomatic representations of Uzbekistan in Germany. Similarly to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz cases, the registration is obligatory for Uzbek citizens too. According to the regulations that can be found at the homepage of Embassy of Uzbekistan in Germany, Uzbek students must run the process of temporary fee-free registration, which is different to the permanent registration for persons leaving Uzbekistan permanently.113 The medical student H. registered at the Uzbek embassy when he went there for the re-issuing of his passport. There he immediately received the registration form and had to register as Uzbek citizen, otherwise the embassy would have denied its services: “I am registered at the Uzbek embassy. When I applied for a new passport I received an application form for the registration and filled it out with pleasure. If something happens, we should be able to approach you immediately; this is what they say at the embassy as an argument for getting registered there. It does not bother me. I filled it out and handed it in there. About two years ago.”

It turned out that Uzbek students, as compared to Kazakh und especially Kyrgyz students, have the lowest percentage of those, who are regularly informed about different events by Uzbek embassy or consulate in Germany. This aspect is paradoxical if one takes into account a comparatively high percentage of Uzbek students, who are registered at the embassy or consulate of Uzbekistan in Germany. This circumstance suggests that the communication channels between the embassy of Uzbekistan in Berlin or Uzbek consulate in Frankfurt/Main and Uzbek students are weakly developed. Although signs of interest to develop regular communication with Uzbek diplomatic representations were shown by some of Uzbek respondents, they could not get access to communication because the criteria for getting informed was for them unclear and indeed selective. So, by filling out the registration form, the afore-mentioned respondent H. hoped to be included into a sort of mailing list by the Uzbek embassy in order to stay informed about different kinds of events. He actually knew some people, who were regularly informed by the embassy. However, he himself did not receive any information from the embassy on a regular basis. He explained this condition as follows: 113 In Russian: Uzbekistan. de (a) n.d.): Registraziya. Available online: http://www. uzbekistan.de/ru/konsularabteilungRU/Регистрация. Notably, since recently (apparently with the newly elected President Mirziyoyev) the webpage of the embassy of Uzbekistan became ‚vital’ with full of updated information concerning economic, political and cultural areas in Uzbekistan.

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“I would like to keep contact with the embassy in terms of getting information per mailing list. I heard about it this practice. Some of my friends regularly receive invitations for different kinds of events. I hoped for this too, when I filled out the registration form. I would like to be invited for e.g. the Day of Constitution, but I still have not received any invitation. It is a pity. I would get to know new people; I am interested in what they study, what they do. For example, when I would return home and open my own clinic or similar there, I could receive a consultation from some of them. I think it is important. …. I did not try to find out at the embassy what I should do in order to get informed from their side. If they do not invite me I do not insist …. But I have an interest for that to stay informed by the Uzbek embassy.”

Another respondent U. stressed that although she was a member in some social networks and also registered at the Uzbek embassy, except for once, she has not received invitations from the latter. She also mentioned that she knew about different events (saw pictures) that took place there in the meantime and only people (including students) who have ‘personal’ contacts to the embassy could get an invitation. Based on these quotations of the respondents from Uzbekistan it can be assumed that the employees of Uzbek embassy in Berlin discriminate in how they keep contact with, particularly, students from Uzbekistan. c)

Level of connectivity to compatriots living in Germany and ways of building diaspora

In terms of initiating of or being a member in a social network uniting the compatriots, only 1/3 of Kazakh students, participating in OS, showed their approval. This means that the vast majority of Kazakh students studying in Germany are rather passive when it comes to keeping contact with their countrymen living in Germany. And this is albeit the fact that almost half of OS respondents answered that they are aware of an organization based either in Germany or in Kazakhstan, which deals with issues of the Kazakh diaspora in Germany. Indeed there is a relatively well-established Kazakh diaspora in Germany, which is in fact heterogeneous and consists of considerable numbers of ethnic Germans ((Spät-) Aussiedler), who in mass emigrated from Kazakhstan to Germany in 1980s-90s (Federal Foreign Office (2017b), rather few ethnic Kazakhs, who immigrated to Germany from Turkey and other people, who more or less identify themselves with and (or) maintain the relationship to Kazakhstan. Ethnic Kazakhs from Turkey arrived in Germany as guest workers in the mid 1960s, many of whom in the meantime have become German citizens. Their ancestors moved to Turkey in the early 1950s due to forced collectivization, famine and the despotic rule of the Soviets in the CA region.

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According to the official sources, the number of Kazakhs from Turkey in Germany is relatively small and accounts for around 1000 people: 500 people in Cologne, ca. 400 people in Munich and more than 100 people in Berlin. In some of these cities, Kazakh Cultural Centres were formed and in 2003 the Kazakh Society in Berlin was created. During 2009 the “Year of Kazakhstan in Germany” events such as “Intercultural dialogue in Kazakhstan- Progress through diversity” and “Issues on identity and integration of young people of the Kazakh diaspora in German-speaking countries” were organized (Botschaft-Kaz.de 2013a). In the same year the Federation of European Kazakh Associations (FEKA) that consolidates Kazakhs from 10 European countries, was officially established in Munich (FEKA n.d.). This show evidence that the members of Kazakh diaspora originating from Turkey are united and can be considered as the most active representatives of the Kazakh diaspora in Germany, despite their low numbers. Perhaps it is the reason that almost all Kazakh respondents of in-depth interviews and Kazakh officials associate the Kazakh diaspora with mainly Kazakhs from Turkey (Kazakh Turks). The unity of Kazakh Turks is widely recognized by officials of Kazakhstan, represented by the embassy and consulate staff in Germany, who try to make use of this visible network of Kazakhs living in Germany. In particular, through close cooperation with Kazakh Turks, regular meetings of Kazakhs living in Europe (qurultai) are organized and all representatives of the Kazakh diaspora are invited. Such qurultais so far took place in Berlin, Munich, Cologne and other cities of Germany (Botschaft-Kaz.de 2013). This initiative represents a viable opportunity to unite the multicultural Kazakh diaspora. However, despite the efforts of the Kazakh government to integrate students from Kazakhstan living in Germany into the activities of the Kazakh diaspora i.e. Kazakh Turks, the in-depth interviews with some Kazakh students made clear their non-affiliation with the former. As they feel alienated towards them because of the different identity and mind-set of Kazakh Turks, or in the word of respondents, the “Kazakh diaspora”. For some of Russian-speaking respondents from Kazakhstan, who do not possess Kazakh and German languages proficiency, along with the reason of different identity and mind-set, the non-mastery of Kazakh language was seen as another significant hindrance to communication. The respondent L. rather kept contacts to Russian speaking people from Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet countries: “I had a friend from Kazakhstan in the city, where I lived and she found a diaspora, but I did not have any connection to them. It was especially a Kazakh diaspora. Because I felt at that moment, that those were Kazakhs from Turkey, for example, well, they have never been to Kazakhstan, in other words they speak only Kazakh [together with German or other languages, not Russian]. Because I do not speak Ka-

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zakh language [or German], in short, no I did not [have contacts to them]. I kept contacts to Russian-speakers.”

Another respondent O. emphasized the special role of Russian-speaking people from Kazakhstan in Germany: “I think the Kazakhstani diaspora is quite strong here. Well, I would say, RussianKazakhstani. There are many German-Kazakhstani organizations. Something always takes place. One or two times monthly I definitely receive an invitation for some event.”

Another respondent J. from Kazakhstan, who indeed possesses the Kazakh language at the mother tongue level, also could not establish contacts to Kazakh Turks: “I know there is a diaspora [Kazakh] there, but I do not know who is responsible for that. Those Kazakhs with whom I kept contact in Germany were people from Kazakhstan. In our circle were also some people from the [Kazakh] diaspora. But I did not communicate with them closely. Well, they were in our circle, but I personally was not associated with them. They spoke only fluently in Kazakh and in German, not Russian. Well, I do not have problems with the Kazakh language, but it [keeping contacts] did not work out with them.”

From the above-mentioned it becomes clear that there is a relatively well-established Kazakh diaspora in Germany, mainly Kazakh Turks, which is supported by the officials of Kazakhstan based in Germany. This support can be considered as part of a larger politics by the government of Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet period that is aimed at making the Kazakh diaspora abroad more visible. In particular, the Kazakh government launched a special program for “Oralman” (repatriates) for promoting their return to the ‘historical homeland’ Kazakhstan. Ethnic Kazakhs, who for different reasons at different life stages emigrated from Kazakhstan and became citizens of other countries and are ready to return to Kazakhstan, can become oralman. In line with the report of the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 2012, “860,400 Kazakh individuals, or 221,300 households, immigrated to Kazakhstan from 1991 until October 1, 2011. Of these 127,700 households (57.7% of the total) were provided assistance under the quota.” The assistance included granting Kazakh citizenship, “financial benefits such as compensation for travel costs, financial assistance for obtaining housing, and one-time cash assistance” (Natsuko 2013: 1, 5). Whether the representatives of the Kazakh diaspora are ready to become Oralman and return to their ‘historical homeland’ and contribute to the development of Kazakhstan is a separate issue and beyond the scope of the study at hand.

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What is clear is that respondents of in-depth interviews from Kazakhstan, albeit the above-mentioned efforts of particularly the Kazakh embassy in Germany, due to mainly cultural (and linguistic) differences, showed their reluctance towards integration into the relatively well established Kazakh diaspora whose active members stem originally from Turkey. The respondents assigned themselves instead to the Russian-speaking community114 in Germany meaning that they are more active in this direction. Therefore, this disunity inside the Kazakh diaspora must be taken into account and a diversified approach towards the term Kazakh diaspora is recommended. Instead of associating Kazakh diaspora with mainly Kazakh Turks, the understanding of this term must be widened to also recognize other groups e.g. Russian-speaking as active members of the Kazakh diaspora. It means concretely that the varied needs and concerns of people must be considered and met. This makes possible, among other things, to fuse different groups of the Kazakh diaspora into a unified entity. In addition to being most likely to do a paid internship at home, Kyrgyz respondents are most likely to register at and be informed through diplomatic representations (embassy or consulate/s), according to the OS. Kyrgyz students are also distinguished by the level of awareness regarding the existence of organizations based either in Germany or in their home country, which deal with issues of the Kyrgyz diaspora in Germany. Also, regarding the issue of staying connected to their compatriots in Germany in different ways, Kyrgyz students scored best, as compared to Kazakh and especially Uzbek students. In line with the statements of respondents of in-depth interviews, Kyrgyz students had numerously experience in attending events, festivities organized by the Kyrgyz embassy in Germany. All of the interview participants were registered in the Kyrgyz embassy. Similar to Kazakh students from the in-depth interviews, Kyrgyz participants also emphasized the role of social networks and other informal channels in staying connected with each other as more important than through official channels; particularly the Kyrgyz embassy or consulate/s. Hence, except for travel frequency to the home country during the study years, 114 To the Russian speaking community in Germany belong mostly the following groups: There are about 2.3 Mil of German ethnic minorities ((Spät-) Aussiedler), who have emigrated to Germany from the ex-Soviet Republics since 1987. Around 215.00 people of Jewish origin („Kontingentflüchtlinge“) found shelter in Germany. Further, there are people, who came to Germany with labour-, student-, family reunification and other types of visas. For more details see: BPB (2017): Postsowjetische Migranten in Deutschland. Perspektiven auf eine heterogene „Diaspora“. Available online: http://www.bpb.de/apuz/ 243862/postsowjetische-migranten-in-deutschland-perspektiven-auf-eine-heterogenediaspora?p=all#footnode1-1

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Kyrgyz students scored highest, than Kazakh and Uzbek students, in all aforementioned aspects and can be assumed as best connected and contributing more intensively to their home country Kyrgyzstan. Apart from the ethnic Germans, who used to live in Kyrgyzstan (about 100,000 people) and almost all of them out-migrated to Germany, there is not yet such a visible (established) Kyrgyz diaspora in Germany, alike to Kazakh diaspora. About 8,000 Germans still live in Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Federal Foreign Office 2017a). The Kyrgyz diaspora is rather in its formation process, also due to the fact there are many settled Kyrgyz citizens who have become German citizens. One of the most well-known organizations that consolidate people from Kyrgyzstan in Germany is the German-Kyrgyz Cultural Society (GKCS), which was officially established in 2010. Amongst the activists, who contributed to the foundation of this association belong a woman from Kyrgyzstan, who is married with a German citizen. The latter is the chairman of this cultural association. This particular example may indicate the correlation between the level of integration and the willingness to become socially active. The German-Kyrgyz Cultural Society aims to deepening cultural relations between Germany and Kyrgyzstan through the organization of cultural events and projects, which make Germans aware of Kyrgyzstan and its culture on the one hand, and on the other hand, help Kyrgyz citizens explore the cultural richness of Germany. This organization cooperates closely with the embassy of Kyrgyzstan e.g. to organize Nooruz (spring festival).115 According to the statement of the respondent P. from Kyrgyzstan, in the initial phases the activities of the GKCS were very interesting for Kyrgyz citizens. However, with time, this interest decreased and its main audience in the meantime is the local people (Germans). The decrease of interest accounted for the weakened ties between the organisers and the Kyrgyz audience for making their cooperation tangible. Another initiative is called Kyrgyz Club and was realized in 2005 in New York. It has become in the meantime an “international organization with branches in Canada, Japan, Russia, UK, Italy, Germany, UAE and Malaysia. Kyrgyz Club is now one of the major Kyrgyz organizations abroad that unites Kyrgyz people around the globe.” The main aim of this organization is “promoting Kyrgyz culture and giving to charity” (Kyrgyz Club (n.d.). As some of the Kyrgyz respondents of qualitative interviews added this organization is especially active in Hamburg and Frankfurt/Main because its leaders are based in these cities. In practice, the Kyrgyz Club organized the New 115 The statue of the German-Kyrgyz Cultural Association can be found here (in German): DKK (n.d.): Über uns. Available online: http://www.dkk-verein.com/?page_id=45

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Year celebrations, showed Kyrgyz movies in different German cities organised the “Day of the Kyrgyzstanis Abroad” in Hamburg (Kyrgyz Club n.d.). As it was briefly mentioned above, the information, in particular about the activities of these organizations and other activities of Kyrgyz people in Germany, may be received through membership in a social network e.g. “Kyrgyz in Berlin” or “Kyrgyz in Hamburg” and similar. Based on the results of the online survey, it is evident that either in terms of initiating or being a member in a social network, or staying informed through diplomatic representations of Uzbekistan accredited in Germany (Embassy of Uzbekistan in Berlin and Consulate General in Frankfurt/Main) (Uzbekistan.de n.d.), Uzbek students proved to be most passive in this regard. Moreover, the students from Uzbekistan are also only dimly aware of organizations located either in Germany or in Uzbekistan, which deal with the issues of Uzbek diaspora in Germany. Concerning the civic initiatives of Uzbeks living in Germany, there are a couple of organizations founded by different groups of people from Uzbekistan living in Germany. The oldest one is the German-Uzbek Society that was initiated and established in 1994, primarily, by the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Germany located at that time in Bonn. The headquarters of this organization are likewise located in Bonn. The aim of the German-Uzbek Society is to deepen German-Uzbek relations in the cultural, academic and economic areas. It promotes contacts between individuals, organizations of two states and supports exchange programs (Deutsch-Usbekische Gesellschaft e.V. 1994). According to one of the Uzbek respondents from the in-depth interviews, the German-Uzbek Society plays a more significant role in the economic area being thus more suitable for businessmen rather than for students: “The German-Uzbek Society that exists in Germany since 1994 fits better to business people, not to students, not to young people, but to entrepreneurs. ….”

Among other organizations are Chiroq e.V. that was founded in 2012 and Nihol e.V. emerged in 2015. Except for some sport events like annual football games, these associations are not distinguished by their activities, which would contribute in terms of transfer of social remittances to Uzbekistan.

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Policies of Sending CA States, Accounting for the Period After Graduation of CA Students in Germany: Promoting Permanent Return Migration

As Lowell put it, restriction and return migration directly affect the movement of people. The return migration is the best way to transfer human capital to the source country (Lowell 2001: 3). Given all the possible kinds of remittances of students and graduates, which were discussed earlier, it is meaningful to encourage them to do both: to return temporarily and permanently to the home countries. This section focuses on the promotion of permanent return mechanisms (at least one year in the country of origin) of CA graduates from German HEIs, who want to return shortly after graduation or after some time or even those who have already settled down in Germany. The promotion of the (physical) presence of CA graduates in their home countries is considered as the best way to transfer social remittances and knowledge. It has to be differentiated between compulsory and voluntary return methods. The compulsory return of student migrants is probably the most effective tool to return graduates from abroad. However, its functionality relates primarily to the technical side of the return process. The effectiveness i.e. durability and sustainability of return migration are not guaranteed though, because some repatriates return only because they have to do it meaning that after some time they leave the country again. The compulsory measures to return CA graduates from German HEIs are used currently only by Kazakhstan i.e. the Bolashak scholarship-holders. This is due to the fact that there is not any similar state program, at least of the same scope as Bolashak, in either Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. This is also testified by the OS results where only students from Kazakhstan are national scholarship-holders, who composed 16 percent of total scholarshipholders’ from three countries (44 percent). At the same time this makes up 35 percent of all scholarship-holders from Kazakhstan (63 percent). 100 percent of all national scholarship-holders, Bolashak scholarship-holder applied for their scholarship while still in Kazakhstan. Almost all of them indicated that their scholarship regulates their return and they must definitely return to Kazakhstan after graduation from a German HEI. The scholarship program “Bolashak” was established in 1993 and is financed by the government of Kazakhstan with the aim to send talented youth to pursue tertiary education abroad. Initially the tertiary studies were financed in only four countries – Germany, the UK, France and the US. In the period between19942004 “780 scholarships were awarded to study in 13 countries.” If in the begin-

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ning predominantly graduates “holding degrees in economics related fields and humanities” were eligible for Bolashak scholarship, since 2000 graduates holding “technical and engineering” fields were also admitted for the scholarship application. Since 2005 the number of Bolashak scholarship-holders, as compared to the previous years, increased enormously. This is due to the fact that “President N. Nazarbayev in his annual State-of-the-Nation-Address announced the importance of sending 3,000 young talented Kazakhstanis abroad annually to study at the leading higher education institutions of the world.” In the same year, amongst other things, for a better coordination and implementation of the Bolashak scholarship-program the “Centre for International Programs” was established. Thus, potential scholarship-holders gained an opportunity to pursue tertiary study in one of 33 countries of the world (including China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea as well as some post-soviet countries). With 2.574 scholarships awarded in 2005 “Bolashak” reached its record (History of the program 2016)116. This became evident also from the quotes of some Kazakh respondents, who had to deal with Bolashak scholarship directly. They explained that a huge amount of scholarships in 2005 were awarded apparently due to the President’s election in Kazakhstan. However, such a generous scholarship-award policy had its negative sides. As both respondents explained, the selection criteria that year were rather low so that many unqualified people were admitted to the ranks of the Bolashak scholarship-holders. This became a factor, contributing to why some could not manage their studies in Germany and finally graduate from a German HEI. A deficiency in the qualifications of many Bolashak stipendiaries came to the surface later on. Nevertheless, the selection criteria are not simple and cover “superior academic performance, Kazakh and foreign language proficiency, and psychological well-being” (Perna/Orosz/Jumakulov 2014). Since 2014 they have even been increased: “the minimum level of foreign language (from IELTS 3.0 to IELTS 4.0) and Kazakh language (from 75 to 85 points)” (History of the program 2016). These high selection criteria might be indeed be difficult to apply towards the applicants from e.g. rural areas, where quality of education is not equal to those from urban areas. On the other hand, as one respondent form Kazakhstan noticed there was a growing tendency for awarding Bolashak scholarships to especially applicants from the rural areas of Kazakhstan due to their higher level of Kazakh language proficiency and stronger nationalistic views. Moreover, according to a Kazakh TV program, rural students were depicted as more responsible than 116 Since its establishment in 1994, 11.126 young people from Kazakhstan have been awarded “Bolashak” scholarship to pursue their tertiary studies at “200 best universities of 33 countries.” Bolashak (a) n.d.): History of the program. Available online: https:// bolashak.gov.kz/en/o-stipendii/istoriya-razvitiya.html

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urban students in terms of successful graduation of their studies abroad. This might be true, in line with the respondent, because rural students were traditional and it would be very shameful and disgraceful for them to return home with failed study results. All in all, they were seen as more inclined to fulfil their obligation to return to Kazakhstan after graduation. The “Bolashak” program is in constant motion: throughout its realization the program underwent significant changes. One of those changes was that the funding of undergraduate studies was quit in 2011 i.e. it is not foreseen for study-seekers of bachelor degrees (History of the program 2016). This reform was perceived positively in practice. As one of the Kazakh respondents explained, who herself was a Bolashak scholarship-holder, the finance of bachelor studies was less productive. Financing of master students instead was meaningful because they are more conscientious about their studies and they need less time to get a foreign degree, and thus, less money is needed for investment on the funding side. Moreover, the applicants for B.A. degree are generally young and are not as focused as they are during the application for master degrees meaning that making right decision of what to study is characteristic for later stages. Also the return obligation was modified. Initially it prescribed that “applicants must demonstrate collateral (typically real estate owned by the family of the applicant) equal in financial value to the scholarship to be received” that would serve as a return guarantee. If scholarship holders do not “return and work in Kazakhstan for five years upon program completion, they have to repay the government the full amount of scholarship received. In case of non-return and non-repayment, the government will seize the recipient’s collateral or hold the guarantors liable for repayment.” According to the new rules from 2012, “Bolashak” applicants “must be employed when they apply for the scholarship and then must work for the same employer for five years upon their return to Kazakhstan” (Perna/Orosz/Jumakulov 2014)117. Before this rule was introduced the recipients of the “Bolashak” scholarship, who participated in this study’s interviews formally and informally, articulated their discontent with the lack of appropriate employment opportunities tailored for “Bolashak” graduates after returning to Kazakhstan. It became particularly evident that many “Bolashak” returners felt themselves underestimated and indeed their expectations did not coincide with the reality in Kazakhstan.118 117 For detailed information see also (in Russian): Bolashak (2008): Pravila otbora pretendentov dlya prisujdeniya mejdunarodnoy stipendii „Bolashak“. Available online: https:// www.bolashak.gov.kz/ru/pretendentu/pravila.html 118 For example, only one job offer was received by the Bolashak returner from the career center and it was also non-attractive. No further measures were undertaken to ease the adaptation, according to my interviewee. See chapter 4 for further details.

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In this context, Perna et al. (2015) pointed out that according to the “2011–2015 Strategy of Development for the Bolashak program” many graduates could not be employed efficiently after their return to Kazakhstan due to their “unrealistically high expectations, time required to re-adapt to local conditions, and lack of practical skills and work experience.” For example, the “unrealistically high expectations” were explained by some of the returned graduates, with whom Perna and her team conducted interviews, as follows: “They have high expectations like 5000 [U.S. dollars] a month, but the jobs have only 500 [U.S. dollars] a month.” The introduction of the new employment regulations from 2012, which insist that potential Bolashak applicants be in employment and return to that position after their studies for three or five years, may reduce employment concerns. However, this regulation makes the whole return issue even more complicated and may discourage potential applicants to apply for the Bolashak scholarship even more than before. In particular, the currents study’s results i.e. qualitative interviews testify119 that many talented individuals reject the Bolashak scholarship due to the return obligation. Later, Perna et al. (2015) also showed that the “return-and-work requirement” increases potential applicants’ self-selection out of the programme. Moreover, the authors assumed that among other drawbacks of this double requirement is that it may reduce “labour market efficiency” and cause “skills mismatch and subsequent skills decay.” Further it was pointed out that this employment obligation may constrain Kazakh employers “since they are mandated to employ an individual for five years regardless of the current need for the Bolashak recipient’s expertise or skills.” The obligatory employment requirement may be profitable in some ways, but it restricts the free choice of graduates. A three or even five year employment obligation is somewhat long, the term might be cut down to two years, for example. Such a short-term obligation would give individuals without work experience a chance to gather it and be free again after a couple of years. Another efficient method would be to provide returners with a free choice of work through offering them attractive employment opportunities that provide the feeling of being valued by the employers and the home country in general. As this study showed, the returners need, first of all, job places where they can realize themselves (match of qualifications) and apply their know-how transferred from abroad. After all, the OS results show, almost half of Kazakh respondents felt themselves as not needed by their home country. All in all, obligatory return and employment regulations seem to be limitedly effective, restricting instead different kinds of freedoms of returners and the conditions for their future success. Therefore it is not surprising that many 119 See chapter 4, where relevant interview passages are cited.

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returners may try to use loopholes in those tough regulations to escape, or shorten them and in the worst case, they leave the country as soon as possible again. As mentioned above, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan do not have national scholarship-programs currently, not at least of a similar scope as Bolashak. Kyrgyzstan used to have, for this country’s settings, the largest national program to support bright students fro studying abroad. It was launched by the Presidential Decree in 1995 “Kadry XXI veka” (Cadres of the 21st Century)” (Minjust 2013). This program, however, was financed by a range of sources including foreign ones (Mikosz 2004: 119). This program, amongst others, used to support bright and talented youth from Kyrgyzstan to study abroad and promoted young specialists in their professional carriers. However its budget was much lower than that of Kazakhstan’s Bolashak and also of Uzbekistan’s Umid foundations, which will be discussed below. In the period between 1998 and 2011 Kadry XXI veka supported around 94 students. However, the exact numbers are not accessible. In 2011 the head of DAAD in Kyrgyzstan spoke about the functional crisis of this foundation and advised to re-launch it and introduce return mechanisms in order to control who returns and who does not. Moreover, a need for a more transparent work in the selection committee was indicated (Kutueva 2011). According to the official homepage of the Ministry of Justice of Kyrgyzstan from 2013, where the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan from 2013 is cited, the Decree of Kyrgyz President from 1995 about the “Presidential educational program Kadry XXI veka” lost effect. This basically means that the program does not officially function since 2013. There were also smaller-scale scholarship programs like “Jetkinchek” and “Umut”, but they also do not exist, according to this decree (Minjust 2013). In 1997 the former Uzbek President initiated the scholarship program “Umid” (“Hope”). The scope of the Umid foundation is smaller than that of Bolashak, but it remains the largest and is unique in the history of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Umid had the aim to support bright undergraduate and graduate students from Uzbekistan to pursue higher education in overseas countries (e.g. US, Germany, UK, France, and Japan). This foundation, similarly to Bolashak, obliged graduates to return and work at state organs in Uzbekistan for five years. The exact numbers of scholarship holders are not released publicly, it is estimated that in the period 1997-2000 around 900 Uzbek students were bearers of the national scholarship Umid. Already in the initial phases of its functioning, the administration of Umid had to struggle with the problem of low return rates (e.g. prolongation of studies, marriage abroad) (Mikosz 2004: 117-118). After five years, this program, due to high rates of non-returners and other problems, was gradually quit. In 2003 in lieu of “Umid” and another foundation

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“Ustoz” (Teacher) with limited scope, the foundation “Istedod” (Talent) was created. The latter was established with an aim to enhance “the professional skills of perspective young teachers and scientists” (The “Istedod” n.d.). After the negative experience with the foundation “Umid”, the state-funded “Istedod” does not practically support the undergraduate and graduate studies abroad leaving a gap in this area in Uzbekistan. In this connection it can be assumed, as the examples below show, the governmental (and private sector) return incentives, which include, among other things, attractive salary and housing packages, may bring much more tangible and long-term results. The attractiveness of return policies is especially important for individuals, who may be categorized as voluntary returners. They represent in practice the majority and are funded either by themselves through a side job, or by their families. They make the return decision autonomously meaning that they have no contractual bindings. Their return, is therefore, highly bound to incentives (mostly financial) (Ziguras and Gribble 2015). The examples of South Korean (Yoon 1992) and Singaporean (Ziguras and Gribble 2015) return policies may serve as an exemplar of successful return policies (compulsory and voluntarily). As the most suitable reference case, one can look at South Korea’s return policy in the second half of the 20th century. During that period South Korean socio-economic and political situations under President Park were in certain respects similar to those of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. For example, similarly to South Korea in the past, the three CA republics are authoritarian countries with a strong consolidation of power in the hands of a national leader. As the case of South Korea demonstrates, strong political support and the “personal guardianship” of the president became decisive in successfully conducting “reverse brain drain” (RBD) policies and empowering returners. He took the issue of the RBD under his personal patronage making the whole endeavour very well organized and managed. Park did it because he needed “to accomplish his national industrialization plan” and enhance “political legitimacy in domestic politics.” In other words, President Park acknowledged that Korean repatriates, mainly engineers and scientists, would play a decisive role for the research and development (R&D) of South Korea. The recruitment back home started with cooperative work on the part of the newly created Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). The appeal to the national and patriotic feelings of potential repatriates was the initial step of the RBD policy. Thereby it has to be mentioned, that the return policies were, at least in the initial phases, highly selective. So, the KIST tried to attract candidates with doctoral degrees and five years’ work-experience. This indicates that the policy measures started with small steps, if one takes into

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account the high numbers of stayers abroad120, avoiding thus simplified selection processes that may negatively influence the quality of returners (Yoon 1992). Moreover, successful returners, who were employed in KIST, were given the feeling of being in a “power elite”. They were provided with research autonomy, necessary facilities and supporting staff. Their fringe benefits included “relocation expenses (i.e. airfares for the repatriates and immediate family members, door-to-door moving expenses), free housing, overseas travel, subsidized education costs for children, and subsidies for local transportation (i.e., free transportation, free or low-cost automobile maintenance)” and also “new Western-style housing on the KIST campus.” The salary question is important: what Korean returners were offered in their home country was by no means comparable with their salaries abroad, but it was “exceptionally high by Korean standards.” This example demonstrates that the “bureaucratic-authoritarian nature” of South Korean political system and a “full-fledged policy support” of returners (attractive funding, administrative support, employment and other policy measures) contributed a lot to the successful implementation of the RBD (Yoon 1992). Another example relates to compulsory return and employment in the source country afterward the studies. It is called the “Pre-Employment Grant” and is provided by Singaporean public health system to bright medical and dental students at local HEIs for spending one or two-years at well-known medical HEIs abroad. Scholarship-holders are obliged, on their return to Singapore, to work in the public health system for some years. This example again shows the small scope and selective character of the program (Ziguras and Gribble 2015). This strategy is obviously effective because it, first of all, follows the principle of supply and demand of the local market preventing thus, superfluous numbers of graduates and brain waste. Moreover, it relieves the persons in charge from the pressure of coping with many thousands of applicants and arranging their compulsory return, as Bolashak may testify. On the other hand, the smaller sample of applicants and returners through high-standard selection would ensure the qualification qualities of candidates. It is meaningful to mention here the statement regarding the superfluity of the labour market with Bolashak graduates. Many of them had to take jobs which had no or little relation to their qualifications. Moreover, the labour market in particularly big cities in Kazakhstan was overfilled with not only Bolashak graduates but also graduates of local (state and private) 120 For example, in 1965 “those who had a doctoral degree at home in all fields totalled 79 whereas Korean scientists and engineers in the United States alone (although not all of them had Ph.D.s) numbered approximately 869”. In: Yoon, Bang-Song (1992): Reverse brain drain in South Korea: State-led model. In: Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.27, No.1, p.17

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HEIs, who were jobless. This is, or was at least a couple of years ago, the reality with the employment of graduates in Kazakhstan, which indicates mismanagement and brain waste. As the results of qualitative interviews with respondents from Kazakhstan demonstrated (chapter 4), the voluntarily repatriates (non-scholarship holders) had to organize everything on the spot by themselves. There was not any interest shown on the part of Kazakh authorities in supporting them. Some of them instead, created serious barriers in diploma recognition questions (nostrification). According to a female respondent from Kazakhstan J., who did her PhD in Germany and was supported financially by the German side, there was a problem in Kazakhstan with the approval of her postgraduate degree from a German HEI. Local authorities did not recognize her German PhD because she was required to translate the whole dissertation into Kazakh or Russian and submit it to the dissertation committee. She was of the opinion that difficult bureaucratic hurdles had to be overcome before the recognition took place. The respondent would have done it, if she had not had to face these bureaucratic barriers for the second time. Her first PhD, which she got from a private HEI in Kazakhstan was also not recognized officially i.e. by the Higher Attestation Committee (VAK, Visshaya Attestazionnaya Komissiya). The problem emerged because this qualification was issued by a private university as an academic qualification (equivalent to PhD) but not as the scientific qualification that is officially issued by the VAK. This meant in practice that the respondent could not move forward in her academic carrier because both of her PhDs did not run the nostrification procedure and were not recognized in Kazakhstan. Therefore she was planning at the time of interview, in order to escape several years of bureaucratic problems, to move back to Germany and work there with her German PhD. Also in the case of voluntary returners, the statements of Uzbek respondents proved that officials did not support their return or reintegration (employment and similar) in Uzbekistan. Moreover some of them had to struggle with the nostrification procedure. In particular, similarly to the example of a Kazakh respondent J., a former doctoral candidate from Uzbekistan I. who completed his Ph.D. study in Germany faced the problem of the recognition of his doctoral degree after the return to Uzbekistan.. “In Germany they do not have a special organization as our VAK. We have here a centralized system, everything is ‘protected’, and so VAK issues and recognizes HEI diplomas. In Germany this lies in the competence of the universities. I was told that the nostrification will be done only of diplomas that were issued by VAK i.e. by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states, not others. I even asked the DAAD to support me in this issue, but they said if Uzbek legislation does not allow the recognition of German diplomas we cannot change it.”

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This respondent, at the time of interview, was looking for a job outside of Uzbekistan and was thinking to move to an Asian country because he believed, as mentioned above, in Europe or US there is a problem with temporary employment contracts: “I have a friend in the US, he is assistant professor there. He told me that it was harsh to find an appropriate job there. The job contracts were limited for 3 years or so. [...].”

Two Uzbek respondents, who acquired their diploma from German HEIs, got employed at international representations in Uzbekistan based on their German qualifications and did not need to run the nostrification procedure. Thereby, one of the respondents stressed that the nostrification must take place anyway if one wants the recognition from the Uzbek authorities for those years, which were spent in Germany. This is important in terms of getting e.g. pension later.

5.3

Germany as a Receiving Country for International Student Migrants

5.3.1

International Student Migration and Germany’s Interest in it

There are two main paths for attracting the highly skilled to Germany, one for German nationals and another for foreign nationals. The programs for German nationals include: (1) supporting academic exchange through scholarships to provide individuals with international experience, (2) encouraging the return of German academics based abroad and maintaining contact and developing cooperation with those German academics living overseas permanently e.g. with those in the US, thus enabling the sharing of valuable experience.121 The promotion of international student migration can be seen as one of Germany’s main policies to attract the highly skilled from abroad. It can be described as a “two-tiered procedure”, involving significant efforts to internationalize the higher education landscape and promote a “welcome culture” to allow Germany to attract students from abroad while making efforts to retain international students from German HEIs after they graduate. These measures, combined with the improvement of legal frameworks, seek to integrate foreign graduates as highly-qualified persons into Germany’s labour market (Mayer et al. 2012: 12). 121 For more information see: EURAXESS – Researchers in Motion (n.d.): About EURAXESS. Available online: https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/useful-information/about-euraxess

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As has been explained in the second chapter, there are a number of advantages for host countries in promoting international student migration and keeping highly qualified individuals in the country. Student migrants are singled out as a promising group for successful integration and are considered by politicians as “productive human capital”. However, the approach of the German government towards the recruitment of foreign students and graduates has only recently been substantially widened and improved. This favourable climate dates back to the period when the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) won the federal election in 1998 and entered into coalition with the Greens. The SPD’s win opened up new opportunities to finally reform citizenship and immigration laws. In 1999 the citizenship law was revised so that “children granted German citizenship under the principle of jus soli would maintain their parents’ nationality until they reached the age of majority (eighteen), at which time they would have until their twenty-third birthday to choose between the two” (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 151). The new citizenship law came into effect on January 1st, 2000 and is considered innovative for its so-called “option model (Optionsmodell) and dual citizenship” (Howards 2008: 53). The 2000 citizenship law underwent further revisions (2005 and 2007) (BPB 2007) and according to the latest amendments from December 2014, all jus soli Germans (children who were born in Germany to foreign parents) who grew up in Germany or have EU or Swiss citizenship are now excluded from the “option model” (“Optionspflicht”).122 The next step was reformation of the immigration law, something that had been vigorously pushed by the Green Party. Changes allowing immigration of highly qualified personnel were actively demanded by business leaders while Germany’s broader demographic problems like the shrinking population (low total fertility rate and an ageing population) were highlighted (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 153). As a result, in August 2000 the “Green Card” for IT specialists was introduced (BPB 2005). At almost the same time, on September 12th, 2000, the Interior Minister Otto Schilly established an “Independent Commission on Migration to Germany” called “Structuring Migration-Fostering Integration.” This commis-

122 German version: “Während bisher grundsätzlich alle Ius-soli-Deutschen optionspflichtig waren, sind mit der Neuregelung durch das Zweite Gesetz zur Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes (BGBl. I S. 1714) in Zukunft alle Ius-soli-Deutschen von der Optionspflicht befreit, die in Deutschland aufgewachsen sind oder als ausländische Staatsangehörigkeit nur die eines EU-Staates oder der Schweiz besitzen.” BMI 2014: Optionspflicht. Available online: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Migration-Integration/Options pflicht/optionspflicht_node.html

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sion, chaired by Rita Süssmuth123, sought to prepare detailed recommendations for Germany’s immigration policy. In nine months the Independent Commission released the following statement: “Germany needs immigrants. An overall plan defining clear goals is needed to structure immigration to Germany as well as integration: in order to meet its humanitarian responsibilities, to contribute to the safeguarding of economic prosperity, to improve the co-existence of Germans and immigrants in Germany as well as to foster integration” (Triadafilopoulos 2012: 154). Nevertheless, these progressive proposals did not become a law until 2005 after much wrangling between the red-green government and the conservative opposition. Although the new immigration law did not, at the demand of the opposition, include an “innovative point system for selecting immigrants” (Özkan 2004), it made a number of notable changes in German immigration politics. Thus, the first Immigration Act of Germany, officially known as the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) (Auswärtiges Amt 2015) came into force on January 1st, 2005 and replaced the Aliens Act from 1990. The Residence Act gave strong preference to highly qualified immigrants, regardless of their origin. According to this law, Green Card holders who previously had to leave Germany after five years were allowed to stay on in Germany permanently. Furthermore German language courses for newcomers received state funding. For the first time, foreign students were considered as potentially skilled workers that could be used in the German economy (DW 2005). For international students the reforms opened up new opportunities such as being able to stay on in Germany after graduation from German HEIs. International graduates looking to pursue work in Germany were given a one-year residency to look for a job after graduating. Moreover, job-seekers got the right to take part-time jobs, as is the case with international students. Additionally in 2007, following the authorization regulation for HEI graduates, the Federal Employment Agency’s priority check for the employment of international graduates of German HEIs was dropped. Nevertheless, the law stipulated that the jobs must be appropriate to the qualifications held by the foreign applicant. These changes show how the position of foreign graduates of German HEIs has been made more favourable than that of other third country nationals seeking to stay on in Germany. A year later, the Labour Migration Control Act also reduced the income limit for an immediate settlement permit for highly qualified persons (SVR 2011). 123 Rita Süssmuth (CDU) was appointed in 1985 as the Minister for Youth, Family and Health thus becoming the first female Minister at the federal level. In: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Rita Süssmuth. Available online: http://www.rita-suessmuth.de/biografie/

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Before 2005, the situation was different: “After the completion of their studies, students from (mainly developing) foreign countries had to return to their country of origin (Refworld 1991)124 With this regulation, Germany aimed at providing assistance to developing countries to get back a part of their human capital. Instead, the new Residence Act opened a long-term perspective for foreign students, who have successfully completed their studies [...]” (Naujoks 2017).

As a result of the new regulations that have been introduced since 2005, the growth in student migration to Germany has become more visible. Whereas in 2005 only 30 percent of migrants had an academic background, in 2010 44 percent of migrants in Germany possessed a higher education qualification (Meier-Braun/Weber 2013: 15). In August 2012 more generous regulations towards international student migration came into effect. “In particular, the employment opportunities for foreign students during the course of their studies in Germany were extended from 90 full or 180 half days to 120 full or 240 half days annually. Foreign graduates of German HEIs are now permitted to stay on in Germany and seek employment for 18 months, a notable increase from the 12 months that was previously allowed. Notably, during this job-seeking period, foreign graduates are allowed to work without any restrictions” (Abdullaeva 2014a: 98). Along with these regulations, foreign graduates of German HEIs gained the right to apply for a settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis) in Germany. The requirements for this include secured livelihood, German language proficiency, possession of a residence title for two years according to certain paragraphs, employment that is appropriate to the applicant’s qualification and proof of paid “compulsory or voluntary contributions to the statutory health insurance scheme for at least 24 months” (DAAD 2012). Additionally, within the framework of the EU Blue Card scheme German authorities undertook efforts to attract highly qualified people from third countries to Germany to work. Third country nationals may apply for the EU Blue Card if: “a) he or she has a German or an accredited foreign or a university degree that is comparable to a German one; b) he or she has a working contract with a gross annual compensation of at least €48,400 (€4,034 per month), a contract in the so-called shortage occupation (scientists, mathematics, engineers, doctors and IT-skilled workers) with the amount of €37.752 (€3.146 per month)” (Blue-Card EU n.d.). 124 §28 of the Aliens Act, which is the predecessor of the 2005 Residence Act , regulated this area. For more information see: Refworld (1991): Germany: Act Concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Federal Republic (Aliens Act). Available online: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b55a0.html

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As has been shown above, the immigration regulations in place since 2005 have sought to retain highly qualified individuals, both those already resident in Germany as foreign-graduates of German HEIs and those who are attracted from abroad to pursue tertiary studies and seek employment in Germany. All this is evidence of the significant steps Germany has made towards establishing liberal125 immigration policies that seek to attract and retain highly qualified foreign nationals. This, in sum, provides clear evidence of Germany recognising itself as a country of immigration (Abdullaeva 2014: 11). According to the results of the online survey, more than half of total respondents from the focus CA countries believe that German immigration policy seeks to retain international graduates of German HEIs in the country. Furthermore, according to the OS results, more than half of respondents from three CA republics reported satisfaction with Germany’s immigration policy in attracting highly qualified foreign workers. 5.3.2

Germany’s Development Policy

The previous section demonstrated how Germany has carried out significant reforms in pursuit of its economic interests. However, this is only one side of the coin. The other deals with Germany’s development policy and may challenge economic interests if the balance between the two is not found. The German development policy has several approaches, aimed in a broad sense at harnessing the benefits from migration for all sides: migrants, and their home and host countries. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) these approaches include: bilateral cooperation between Germany and partner countries that provide instruments (1) “to harness the potential offered by migration more effectively” while (2) the policy advice for source countries is to share all relevant information regarding the migration flows with Germany, including who is leaving the country, their destination and purpose (the migrants’ profiles) along with any other detailed statistical data which may be useful for policy recommendations (BMZ n.d.). There are also a number of development approaches tailored for communities settled in Germany who may be established as diaspora. These may come in consideration for CA graduates who have been living in Germany long-term yet keep close ties with their countries of origin. These approaches include: 1) facilitation of money transfers that foster “legal, safe and affordable remittance arrangements.” 2) Supporting “migrants’ organizations” seeks to promote various aid projects in migrants’ countries of origin. And the last approach 3) covers the 125 In terms of improvements to make the legal system more permissive.

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strengthening of the “private-sector activity” Diaspora communities, whose members want to invest in their birth countries, may profit from the latter. Support from Germany or BMZ might comprise “valuable know-how on markets, quality standards and trading regulations. Advisory services tailored to the specific needs of migrants are available on all aspects of starting and running a business.” Another approach is called “expanding development education”, which focuses on local people and authorities in Germany, in addition to the migrants themselves. Its aim is to raise awareness among Germans of Germany’s role as a global player and the certain responsibilities this entails and motivate them to be responsible through having an active position in local community. In particular, this approach promotes close collaboration between Germans and migrants in order to “overcome prejudices and foster mutual understanding” between them (BMZ n.d.). The last development policy approach in the area of migration delivers assistance to “skilled returnees” (Ibid) and can be considered the most effective way to mitigate negative effects of the brain drain. This is due to the fact that international graduates are still not bound to their host countries and are more likely to return to their home countries. Return migration is promoted on behalf of the BMZ within the framework of the “Returning Experts Programme” (REI) and is “implemented by the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM). CIM is a joint operation of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the International Placement Services (ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA)” (CIM n.d.). In addition to advisory and placement services, the REI provides graduates of German HEIs and people with at least two-years practical experience with financial support, including travel subsidies, subsidies for workplace facilities and salary subsidies (Abdullaeva 2014: 12). Thus “placing professionals in areas of particular relevance to development policy” plays an important role (CIM n.d.). The CIM regularly advertises REM at information evenings and help desks which are regularly organized in Germany. Unfortunately, the REI has not yet been widely implemented into development cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The development cooperation areas between Germany and Uzbekistan focus on “sustainable economic development and health. Germany's development activities also promote regional collaboration in areas such as regional economic cooperation, reform of the legal and justice systems, and sustainable use of natural resources.” Given the “sensitive political situation” in Uzbekistan, development collaboration is carried out beyond “government circles” (BMZ a) n.d.). This implies that development cooperation activities between the two countries are restricted, with Germany carefully selecting areas for cooperation

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with Uzbekistan. Given this, the promotion of return migration is likely hindered too. Germany’s development cooperation with Kyrgyzstan concentrates on the reduction of poverty as its overarching goal and implements projects to achieve “sustainable economic cooperation” and efficient and qualitative health system. “Bilateral cooperation is supplemented by regional projects concerned with economic cooperation, law and justice, health, education, natural resource conservation and disaster risk management” (BMZ b)n.d.) Due to the fact that Kazakhstan is not considered by Germany as an aidrecipient country, it is not included in the German development cooperation by the BMZ. Recently, Kazakhstan, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established KazAID thus turning the country into a donor.126 According to a ranking of the richest and poorest countries in the world prepared by Global Finance Magazine, with a per capita GDP of 25,367.27 USD Kazakhstan became the richest among the CIS countries in 2015 and ranked 50th in the world, ahead of Russia. With 5,963.77 USD per capita Uzbekistan ranks 127th worldwide while Kyrgyzstan is 142th with a per capita GDP of 3,581.33 USD. These values are based on countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) (Global Finance 2017). To recall, the evidence from the online survey shows that there is little awareness of the REI/CIM among the students from the three republics. Only 16 percent (35 people) of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek students who responded were aware of any German program promoting the return of foreign graduates (and the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) specifically) to their home countries. Among the 35 people who gave positive answers (16 percent of the total respondents), only four (two from Kyrgyzstan and one from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan respectively) had made use of those programs. Of the 16 percent who responded, the majority of respondents from Kazakhstan and from Kyrgyzstan felt that Germany’s return promoting programs were less effecttive. In contrast, the majority of Uzbek students considered them to be effective in promoting return migration. According to the results of the qualitative in-depth interviews, none of the students from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had heard about any German program promoting return. A comparatively high number of Uzbek respondents, in contrast, were aware of a German program promoting return such as the CIM. How126 The implementation of KazAID marked a significant transition from an aid-recipient to donor country. In: UNDP (2014): Start of KazAID marks significant transition in Kazakhstan from aid-recipient to donor. Available online: http://www.eurasia.undp.org/ content/rbec/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/11/3/start-kazaid-significant-transitionkazakhstan.html

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ever, none of these respondents were able to make use of CIM or a similar program for a range of reasons. My request sent to the BMZ asking why there are not any effective measures as part of CIM activities to promote return migration to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was met with the following response: given the comparatively few numbers of students from these countries studying in Germany and limited personal and financial capacities of CIM, the latter is not active in either country. In the words of another CIM employer, the CA countries are not considered priorities for developing cooperation. Indirectly mentioned was that good governance is the main factor determining development cooperation in some countries. The arguments around numbers of students do not seem to be convincing since the share of students from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan studying in Germany is no less, and indeed is sometimes greater, than the share of students from Mongolia, which in a broad sense also belongs to Central Asia. The CIM has extensive operations in Mongolia in various private and public sectors. The good governance argument sounds more realistic, and one can assume that since the Mongolian government is open to new innovation it would be in favour of the development of cooperation with CIM too. This might not be the case in the two CA republics, which are marked by instability in the case of Kyrgyzstan and rather closed policies in the case of Uzbekistan.127 Similarly, hardly any of numerous widely recognized German foundations, which promote overseas professional study and research in Germany, prescribe their return home after the graduation from German HEIs. To remind, this is also reflected in the OS results: of the total share of scholarship-holders from the three republics in Germany (44 percent) almost all of Kyrgyz and Uzbek students (88 and 89 percent respectively) and half of Kazakh students (53 percent) are financed by the German side. On the question of whether there was a return obligation, 70 percent of all German scholarship holders from three republics answered that they were not obliged to return home because their scholarship did not prescribe the return of students after the graduation in Germany. Another 24 percent of scholarship holders from three republics answered that their scholarship envisaged return. However, that regulation did not have any legal implication, so the students could actually decide autonomously whether to return home or not after graduation in Germany. Only a minority of students were obliged to return home after their studies as part of the conditions of their scholarship. This shows how almost all of the German scholarship holders from the three republics could in fact decide autonomously whether to return home after their graduation in Germany. 127 For detailed information see Chapter 3.

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This is also the case for one of the largest scholarship donor organizations worldwide, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), which does not prescribe an obligatory return.128 The DAAD is also actively engaged in the CA region: it is the only visible academic organization in the CA republics that can afford to finance larger numbers of local applicants to pursue higher education in Germany. Therefore it can be assumed that the majority, if not all, of the abovementioned respondents of the OS survey were DAAD scholarship-holders. Considering the empirical information that was gathered from the in-depth interviews, it is clear that DAAD’s activity is oriented towards development goals. The DAAD expects its scholarship holders to return to their home countries after graduation in Germany and serve as multipliers. This was evident in instances where DAAD members of the selection committee regularly posed questions about the post-graduation plans of applicants, including whether they intended to return to their home countries. But in practice there are no DAAD mechanisms, which would oblige the scholarship holders to return to their origin countries after graduation in Germany. The voluntary nature of decisions by scholarship-holders to return is important for DAAD, one of the organization’s experts explained. In his opinion, the scholarships are awarded on the basis of the academic strength of the applicant, and not on their willingness to return, pointing out that the academic performance of the applicants is given priority. The DAAD expert stressed once again that it is important to provide DAAD applicants with the freedom to make voluntary decisions and to freely plan their lives after graduation in Germany. In 2014 the DAAD (2014) released a position paper in which it officially explained its role as a promoter of global academic mobility. It specifically stressed that globalization fosters academic mobility worldwide, allowing students to take advantage of overseas study and research opportunities more easily. It mentioned that liberal regulations towards highly qualified graduates in Germany make foreign students were willing to stay on in the country after graduation. “Almost half of foreign academics that engage in a qualified employment in Germany possess a qualification from a German HEI. This implies that the study of foreigners contributes to the security of highly qualified in Germany.” This, in turn, brings diversity and creativity to Germany, driving innovation in research and technology.

128 With some exceptions, the contracts with scholarship holders may contain paragraphs which clearly state that the scholarship recipient must return home after graduation in Germany. This is the case for the DAAD graduate students’ joint program from the Open Society Institute (OSI). However, in practice this stipulation does not have any negative legal implication for those staying on in Germany regardless.

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At the same time, the position paper underlined that the graduation of foreign students from German HEIs and their stay on in Germany may have positive outcomes for their home countries too. The positive outcomes can occur in form of new cooperation, remittances, investments and the physical return of experienced graduates at some point in their lives to their source countries. As it was suggested in the paper an appraisal of academic migration as “brain drain” or “brain gain” is thus one-sided, though with some exceptions (e.g. massive emigration of medical specialists). The position paper was premised and finalized on the idea that Germany welcomes both international students who want to stay on in Germany and those who want to return to their home countries. The DAAD accentuated its role as a bridge between Germany and the source countries of scholarship holders, putting it as follows: “We respect the decisions of responsible individuals about their professional paths and the life paths. We inform foreign graduates of German HEIs about many ways they have at their disposal in Germany, in their home countries and in third countries. Our promotional programs do not pursue the qualified migration to one or other direction. We tailor our programs in that way so that the connections to source countries stay possible and strong. We support the networking between Germany and other countries in different directions. The responsibility for making work places and life conditions attractive lies primarily at hand of certain societies and governments in developing countries, but we can and want to shape general frameworks for that (DAAD 2014).” 129

The latter makes clear that the responsibility to prevent the emigration of the ‘bright and best’ lies according to the DAAD with source countries, though the DAAD can support the latter on this issue. In this context and in view of the extremely low return tendencies among the CA respondents, the key question to be posed is how the DAAD and other foundations which in effect contribute to the emigration of CA graduates by awarding scholarships can alleviate or even reverse the outflow of highly skilled graduates from the CA republics. Therefore, in the case of CA students who were surveyed and interviewed in the study at hand, the brain-drain approach is meaningful and not “one-sided” and may involve negative consequences for the countries of origin. So far, there have been made some steps towards the promotion of return migration on the part of the DAAD. Specifically, the DAAD launched a project 129 Tanslation from German. For more information see: Akademische Mobilität und Fachkräfte-Migration. Die Position des DAAD (2014). Available online: https://imperia.daad. com/medien/der-daad/unsere-mission/standpunkte/final_standpunkt_fachkr%C3%A4ftemigration.pdf

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entitled “Getting prepared” in cooperation with the World University Services (WUS). “Getting prepared” encompasses seminars which take place across various German cities, and aims to make graduates from developing countries aware of challenges that may await them in their home countries once they decide to return (WUS n.d.). There are other positive examples like an initiative from the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FES) which offers its scholarship-holders an annual three-day seminar in German called “Study in Germany and what comes next? As the seminar organizers stress, this event is tailored for international students who are in the latter phases of their studies. The content of this seminar covers areas like the legal rights of students in Germany after their graduation there, tips for job applications, information about return promotion programs and other useful information which raises the awareness of potential graduates of their opportunities in Germany and their home countries. Having said this, it must be noted that there are indeed CA graduates who would return home given favourable conditions, such as those proposed by the CIM. However, as the in-depth interviews with CA respondents and the analysis of the CIM work in CA have shown, the CIM is barely active in this region. Against the background of a necessity for the main source countries to take the responsibility for the prevention of brain drain, the German side could make significant contributions to promote brain circulation as a first step. The implementation of return promotion measures would also reconcile the existing conflict between Germany’s economic interests and development policy goals. The CA republics must be recognized as partner countries on this issue and close bilateral cooperation must be developed with them to find common solutions. In absence of this, goals such as “sustainable economic development” which Germany wants to achieve with its development policy will remain on paper, in particularly on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan If needed, pressure must be put on respective authorities in CA countries in order that they be able to make progress. The DAAD should as a matter of course integrate information about the CIM and return opportunities in its regular meetings with scholarship holders. Furthermore, the DAAD could introduce regulations supporting at least the temporary return of scholarship recipients (degree students) to their home countries during their study years e.g. by offering internships there. The launch of joint degree programs or opening of joint HEIs (similar to the German-Kazakh University in Almaty) in Uzbekistan especially would contribute to an increase in

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the quality of higher education in the country. Such measures would also support parts of the DAAD’s development cooperation130 which are currently practiced.

5.4

Summary

Looking back at the policy options of three CA republics towards student migration from these countries to Germany, one can generally see a similar picture when it comes to attractive measures to promote brain circulation and permanent return. However, there are significant differences in the methods involved in these policies and to a lesser extent their outcomes. Taking the retention policies of the CA republics individually, including mechanisms in developing higher quality education and labour market opportunities, one can see that Kazakhstan has a leading position in terms of the scale of undertaken reforms. However, they have been mostly done in a hasty and inconsistent manner, and so Kazakhstan still has a long way to go in order to make its local higher education landscape competitive with those of Western European countries, for example. Despite this, Kazakhstan and especially Kyrgyzstan managed to be regional hubs of higher education for predominantly students from the wider CA region (including e.g. Afghanistan, Mongolia). In this regard, Uzbekistan is in the worst position: the Uzbek higher education system is extremely uncompetitive, with only a few semi-private HEIs. Moreover, as with the other two CA republics Uzbekistan’s higher education system features numerous problems that have persisted since the Soviet times: widespread corruption; centralization by the state apparatus; inadequate financing for teaching staff and their training; and a lack of facilities, particularly at state-funded HEIs. The lack of labour market opportunities is even more critical, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where there is clearly a strong need for highly skilled workers while paradoxically huge numbers of local HEI graduates remain unemployed. There are no mechanisms at the state level that would create incentives for CA graduates from abroad to return to these republics and successfully integrate into local job markets. Only exceptionally does voluntary return take place in such conditions. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan do not even have any policy mechanisms promoting compulsory return, in contrast to Kazakhstan with its Bolashak program. Although this program contributed to the return of graduates with foreign qualifications to Kazakhstan, it has faced many problems with reintegrating graduates, due to skills mismatches and similar issues. Therefore, 130 For detailed information see: Our activities in development cooperation. Available online: https://www.daad.de/der-daad/unsere-aufgaben/entwicklungszusammenarbeit/aufgaben/ en/37671-our-activities-in-development-cooperation/

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as the analysis has shown it is more efficient to promote voluntary return and leave the graduates the free choice of where to work and for how long. The restrictive measures assigning graduates to a certain workplace and making them work for three or five years can have detrimental consequences, as seen in situations where people subsequently left Kazakhstan following experiences with bribes or similar incidents. Moreover, as respondents who voluntarily returned to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan testified, they had to struggle with serious problems of diploma recognition and in many respondents’ cases this remained unresolved, negatively influencing issues such as pensions in the latter stages of their life. This indicates that the transfer of social remittances and knowledge through the promotion of voluntary return in particular is very limited because the three CA republics are missing the necessary mechanisms for it. As OS results and the in-depth interviews demonstrated, the majority of returners did it for family reasons, in part because they had to. With the partial exception of Kyrgyzstan, the potential of transferring social remittances during students’ time studying is generally ignored. No mechanisms exist here either that would make this attractive e.g. opportunities for students to do an internship or get involved in voluntary social activities in their home country. Additionally, in the case of Uzbek respondents, it became evident that there is distrust among the Uzbek compatriots living in Germany, which may prevent them from developing the social capital that is a part of the social remittance process. Given this background it can be concluded that transnationalization and circular migration does not function effectively among the CA respondents who took part in this study. For student migration from CA to Germany, taking this small sample it can be argued that the second phase of the MDN is more characteristic in cases where underdevelopment was seen as the main reason for the out-migration of the highly qualified. The majority of respondents are neither inclined to regularly visit their home countries, nor to return there after graduation. Germany’ s immigration policy contributes to the brain- drain, with DAAD serving as the main tool for students to leave for Germany. In addition to Germany’s policies to promote circular and return migration for its own nationals, there are focused efforts by this EU member state to promote international student migration. Through internationalization of the higher education system, promotion of a ‘welcome culture’ and liberal improvements to the legal system, Germany attracts thousands of students from abroad (‘newcomers’) and encourages those already resident after graduating in Germany to remain. Such policies only became possible in recent decades and started in 1998 when the SPD and Greens opened up opportunities for the reformation of citizenship and immigration laws. As a result, in 2000 the new citizenship law came

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into effect and included amendments innovative for that time such as the ‘option model’ and dual citizenship. According to the latest amendments from 2014, jus soli Germans (children who were born in Germany to foreign parents) may keep dual citizenship if they were resident in Germany up until the age of 21 (for at least six years). After long discussions, the first Immigration or Residence Act first came into force in 2005, having replaced the Aliens Act from 1990. The Residence Act liberalized immigration regulations significantly. Foreign graduates from German HEIs who were previously obliged to return home after qualifying in Germany acquired, amongst other things, the right to stay on in Germany for jobseeking purposes. This was only the beginning, however, and in 2012 the immigration regulations for foreign graduates from German HEIs were again liberalized and opened up, setting out the right to apply for a settlement permit after two years’ regular employment in Germany. In pursuit of its demographic and economic interests, Germany made significant reforms to its citizenship and immigration laws, turning it into a country of immigration. Germany’s efforts may however endanger development policy goals if the balance between the latter and the above-mentioned economic strategies is not found. Through “development friendly” (Graeme 2013: 7) policies it is, in particular, important to promote circular and return migration in order to work towards the effective transfer of social remittances and reversing the brain drain that indeed takes place in many developing countries. It might seem natural and understandable that Germany would seek to solve its short-, and long-term problems through lenient immigration policies. But the one-sided influx which appears to be taking place among students from the three CA republics (with partial exception of Kazakhstan) coming to Germany does not presage positive implications for CA republics i.e. their growth and development. Moreover, such negative implications can be considered as cases for many other developing countries whose students pursue tertiary studies in Germany. In fact, if foreign graduates from German HEIs get the chance to return to their countries to pursue their goals, they will be able to at least try to use their knowledge, know-how and other competencies acquired in Germany, in their home countries. The cooperation between both origin and recipient countries is thus of outmost importance. Germany can take the initiative however, especially if CA origin countries are reluctant to cooperate and promote different policy options for the temporary return of CA graduates as an initial step.

6 Conclusion

The main objective (meta-level) of this doctoral thesis was to understand student migration from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Germany in order to classify it within a certain phase of migration-development nexus (from migration to development, from underdevelopment to migration or migration as a circular process). In pursuing this objective, the following aspects were questioned: CA students’ and graduates individual characteristics, their life courses before and during their studies in Germany, students’ return/non-return intentions after graduation in Germany and the motivations behind these intentions (microlevel), the aspects of circular migration and social remittances’ transfer (meso level) and also the policy mechanisms on the part of sending CA and receiving German governments (macro level).

6.1

Theoretical Contributions

The comparative case study, which explored in detail student migration paths from three CA republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, addressed significant challenges in the conceptualisation and research of international student migration. Being a complex phenomenon with a variety of nuances, tertiary student migration has been conceptualized in most of the sources as a quasihighly skilled migration, being, thus, situated within blurred boundaries. In order to overcome this uncertainty, the dissertation deployed the definition of highly skilled individuals proposed by Guerrero and Bolay. According to the online survey (OS) results (83 percent of all CA respondents proved to possess at least a bachelor degree prior to starting studies in Germany) it concluded therefore that the majority of OS tertiary student migrants are highly qualified. So, the clearcut handling of student migrants from CA to Germany as highly skilled personnel is one of the main advantages of the doctoral thesis, which not only fills a gap in the conceptualisation of student migration regarding its uncertain nature but also touches upon the sensitive issue, that students leaving the country are expected to be highly qualified after their graduation in host countries. This may indicate that student migration from CA is used by highly qualified people in the CA region as one of the easiest ways to immigrate to Germany because other © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7_6

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channels, as explained in previous chapters, are rather complicated. This assumption was strengthened by the OS results, which showed that almost all CA respondents, participants of the online survey, were planning not to return to their home countries after graduation in Germany (the exceptions in this regard were Kazakh students with a national scholarship Bolashak). This finding became a contributory element to the theoretical debates concerning the issue of timeframe: when the brain drain starts i.e. with the move itself or after the non-return of the respective persons to the source country. Having joined the researchers who approached the issue regarding the timeframe of the start of brain-drain with clarity, the dissertation took the low non-return intentions of CA tertiary students (almost 90 percent) to their home countries after graduation in Germany as an indicator for brain-drain. This strategy also fills the statistical gap, meaning the general shortfalls in the official data on the numbers of students returning after graduation in Germany. Moreover, the dissertation at hand, while being guided by various theories due to the multi-faceted nature of student migration, integrates into the analysis the aspect of transnationalization covering, thus, all three phases of the MDN and focusing on aspects such as temporary (circular migration) and permanent return, transfer of social remittances and knowledge. The dissertation also scrutinized the policies of the receiving country Germany and of the sending CA republics as entities, which possess tools to enhance the potentials (social remittances and knowledge) of circular migration and return. Thus, the thesis combined three levels of analysis: micro-level (students’ intentions and motivations behind), meso-level (circular migration (temporary return), reverse brain drain (permanent return) and the macro-level of analysis (policy mechanisms of host and sending states). This implies that the inquiry, unlike many existing studies, sets up linkage between three levels of analysis and looks both at sending and receiving countries policies. Thus, this inquiry makes a significant theoretical contribution to the existing works on international student migration from developing to developed countries.

6.2

Methodological Contributions

Apart from the combination of different levels of analysis, which can be also considered as theoretical contributions, the methodological contributions of the Ph.D. thesis include the use of both methods: quantitative (descriptive statistics) and qualitative. The quantitative and qualitative methods, used in this research, underwent multiple levels of analysis. On the one hand, the detailed OS was conducted. The average time taken to complete it was 30 minutes. The questionnaire for the OS

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was developed by means of focus group discussions (rather informal), face-toface informal and formal interviews, theoretical considerations, and was shaped by my own background and experiences. The latter i.e. the possession of the same language and mentality as respondents, contributed significantly to the authenticity and plausibility of the data. Before the OS was activated, multiple pre-tests were done by a couple of CA students, to whom I had personal contacts. These contacts provided me with valuable feedback and concrete proposals to improve the OS questionnaire before the OS was started. The most significant contribution of the survey method is that it provided information regarding the return intentions of student respondents from CA, thus filling a gap in return statistics. Although the results of the online survey do not constitute statistical representivity and cannot be thus generalizable, due to a comparatively high turnover and the uniqueness of this study, they fulfil the requirements of “authentic representation” (Kruse 2011). On the other hand, in order to complement and explain the data gathered by means of the OS, the qualitative method was used. The use of Mayring’s “consolidation model” (“Vertiefungsmodell”) made it possible to better interpret the OS data by discovering the correlations within it. The in-depth face-to-face interviews were long and informative and covered a lot of important aspects, which unfortunately cannot all be included in this research, but can be used for separate research at a later stage. To overcome the bias in data interpretation, the interviewees were classified in different groups in order to see the variations in their statements regarding, in particular, their return intentions. Based on Faist’ classification of migrants, I differentiated student migrants between stayers, returners and graduates in transition. Such classifications may serve as a useful tool for future research on student migration, especially for a longitudinal study. Further, the interview data was supplemented by the results from expert interviews and information from secondary sources. This methodological strategy was also deployed in the fifth chapter indicating that the research uses a highly differentiated approach. Bearing in mind that migration outcomes, to a different extent, are shaped by the policies of the respective countries, the micro level was supplemented by the macro level (policy analysis). This contributes to the comprehensiveness of the study and raises an awareness of the necessity to scrutinize student migration policies within the nexus of migration and development.

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Empirical Contributions

The research of the case of student migration from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Germany is innovative because there has not been similar in-depth research done on the three republics separately or the CA region in general so far. Being apparently the first attempt to analyse the student migration phenomenon from CA, the research has important implications for the discussion of student migration from the perspective of highly skilled migration and its relationship to development issues. Among the main findings of the micro-level were aspects showing that the phenomenon of student migration from the three CA republics to Germany provides concrete evidence that it serves as a realistic channel for the out-migration of highly qualified people. The findings of the meso- and macro levels revealed a deficit of brain circulation among the CA students and insufficient policy measures on the part of the three CA countries and Germany to prevent brain-drain and promote brain circulation. It is assumed that the higher qualified persons are prone, the better their chances, to migrate to a developed Western country. The case of the CA states confirm this argument: The vast majority of student migrants from CA (83 percent in total), who participated in the OS, possess at least a bachelor’s degree earned in their home countries before they came to Germany to pursue higher education studies. From year to year thousands of CA students leave their countries of origin in search of better opportunities in education and other life spheres in wealthy Western countries. In view of the internationalization of higher education systems, easy access to knowledge, and relative ease of travel, this is per se a normal condition in these times of globalization. However, extremely low rates of intention to return to their home countries after graduation in Germany among the CA respondents (almost 90 percent in total) may indicate the problem of brain drain. The majority of these ‘best of the best’, once they have finished their studies abroad, do not intend to return home, which is strongly evident in the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent, in the case of Kazakhstan (due to existing compulsory return mechanisms in this country). Moreover, the indicators for the brain drain problematic were reinforced by the answers of respondents to the OS question concerning return tendencies among compatriots. Around 2/3 of Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents and half of Kazakh students believed that the majority of their compatriots would be inclined to stay on in Germany after graduation. Deficient brain circulation is another indicator for the brain drain problematic. This became evident through the answers of CA countries’ respondents (with the exception of Kyrgyz students), which demonstrated infrequent visits to their home countries during the studies

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in Germany, weak social contacts with their compatriots (mistrust, different mindsets, unsatisfactory work of students’ national diplomatic representations i.e. embassies and consulates in Germany) living and working in Germany and the insignificant role of their national diasporas in Germany. The latter can be in fact regarded as an explanation for the weak social contacts of respondents. If the case of Kazakh respondents, the available Kazakh diaspora had a dispersed character and can be characterized as not united, the case of Uzbek students showed that their national diaspora has still a long way before it becomes established. Although, concrete evidence of the actions of the Kyrgyz diaspora could not be listed, the OS respondents’ answers from Kyrgyzstan, demonstrated however that the preconditions for its formation are already there. All these aspects do not contribute or contribute only minimally to the transfer of social remittances and knowledge to the sending countries. As the qualitative and quantitative findings revealed, economic reasons, foremost, affected the decision-making of specifically Kyrgyz and Uzbek students not to return home after the graduation in Germany. For Kazakh students there were primarily social factors in play. Political factors seemed to play an insignificant role in all three countries, both in the quantitative and qualitative parts (one respondent from Kazakhstan is an exception in this regard). In particular, according to the results of the OS and the in-depth interviews, the staying on in Germany for a while after graduation was explained in the case of Kyrgyz students by the more attractive economic conditions in Germany and professional reasons i.e. the willingness of respondents to find work in Germany. In the case of Kazakh students social factors in Germany were mentioned, while the majority of Uzbek students mentioned both social factors (OS survey) and economic factors (in-depth interviews) as reasons to stay in Germany. Notably for all three cases, political factors in Germany did not have any significant influence for the decision to stay on. With the exception of Kazakhstan, the majority of respondents from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were intending to “first stay and then return”. Their decision to settle down in Germany after graduation was explained in the OS by their eagerness to be employed in Germany. In-depth interviews in the Kyrgyz cases demonstrated that personal factors are the most likely to induce someone to settle down in Germany. This is principally in line with the OS results, where Kyrgyz students mentioned personal (and social) factors as the second most important for settling down in Germany. Uzbek respondents from the qualitative interview confirmed the results of the OS showing economic factors as having the strongest influence. For Kazakh students personal factors were most common. This was confirmed by the in-depth interviews using the example of the compulsory return of Bolashak students in particular. Unfavorable political factors in

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Kazakhstan also lead some Kazakh graduates to desire to settle down in Germany. The OS option “to immediately return home” was checked by only a small percentage of respondents from the three republics (11 percent or 23 people). Of those 23 willing to return home immediately after graduation in Germany, 17 were Kazakh students and five were Uzbek, alongside 1 respondent from Kyrgyzstan. A majority of the cohort from each of the countries and a majority of the whole group studied would also “work” in their home-countries after returning there. However, in deciding “to immediately return home” after graduation in Germany, respondents reported “personal factors” as being important. The macro-level considerations showed that effective policy strategies on the part of sending CA countries to prevent and reverse brain-drain together with mechanisms to promote brain circulation are missing. This became evident through the analysis of the following policy options: prevention of the out-migration of highly qualified students, promotion of brain circulation among the CA students while they stay in Germany and the promotion of return (voluntary and compulsory). Prevention or retain policies demonstrated in general that neither higher education quality, with the exception of private HEIs that however are not widely accessible due to high study fees, nor labour market opportunities (including social protection aspects) in the source CA republics offer attractive conditions to retain local students in the countries. The promotion of brain circulation is widely ignored. This became evident from the unsatisfactory work of the national embassies and consulates of particularly Kazakh and Uzbek respondents, which should play the role of coordinating and consolidating for its compatriots abroad. Moreover, no mechanisms are envisaged by the national governments of the students to promote their temporary return. In return, the restrictive policies in Uzbekistan like the ‘exit-visa’ and interrogation practices when the students leave or return (temporary and permanent) to their home countries and many other problems’ on the part of homeauthorities indicates that Uzbek students in general are highly reluctant to return to Uzbekistan. Once having left the country, they will perhaps go there again only because of their relatives or other personal issues but not for in particular e.g. doing an internship there because attractive opportunities for the latter are simply missing. The promotion of voluntarily return after students graduate from German HEIs is also not envisaged by all three countries governments. There are no attractive policies to reverse brain drain. There are no mechanisms at all in this regard. Although Kazakhstan, by using methods of compulsion, can force graduates to return from abroad, the obligatory return and tough re-employment regulations

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seem to be limitedly effective, restricting instead the freedoms of returners and the conditions for their future success. Therefore it is not surprising that many returners try to use loopholes in those regulations to escape, or shorten them. In the worst case, they leave the country again to get away. All in all, it can be assumed that the issue of tertiary student migration as a channel for the out-migration of the highly qualified has not become an issue of political relevance, for especially Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities. Even if they are aware of the mass migration of young people overseas and their stay on there, counter (attractive) measures have not been undertaken yet. On the other hand, Germany as a receiving country, owing to its socio-economic needs, pursues active immigration policies to retain highly qualified foreign graduates. Those few existing programs on promoting return (temporary and permanent) of foreign graduates are unfortunately invisible so that CA graduates rarely hear about them or, can not take advantage of them. This condition can be considered as a contributory factor for brain-drain. In fact, by attracting and retaining foreign students and graduates Germany’s socio-economic interests are indeed in conflict with its development policy goals. Therefore, it is important that Germany’s migration policies become more “development friendly.” These findings evoke the following policy recommendations: Retention policies must be improved, first of all, in higher education and the labour market sectors. The effective functioning of these sectors will enable study-seekers and graduates either to pursue/continue study at the home country’s HEI or/and make it easy for graduates to enter the local labour market. Thereby the students and graduates must feel socially protected. The practice to restrict free movement of citizens outside the country (“exit visa”), as in the case of Uzbekistan, must be abolished, for, at least, highlyqualified people. Recommendations to three CA republics to improve higher education qualities: Improvements in the higher education sector must be fostered through the increased investments in local higher education, “research and development/ science and technology.” Thereby the rational distribution of financial means is crucial. Consistent strategies to eliminate bribery and corrupt practices at local HEIs should be undertaken. This step will not be possible if the wages of teaching personnel and research staff are not increased. Therefore it is crucial to guarantee adequate salaries for HEI’s professional staff, which will also contribute to the augmentation of their role and authority.

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The still existing Soviet-style teaching and learning methods should be effectively replaced and adequate curricula at local HEIs adapted. In this regard the independent work of students, especially of doctoral candidates must be encouraged. The problem indicating the deficit of literature in national languages should be solved so that students with other languages of instruction (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, or Uzbek) at the three CA republics have equal chances for access to literature. To ensure the quality of education the conditions for regular training (including overseas) of local professional staff (teachers/researchers) should be created. Moreover, the conditions at HEIs for more practical work e.g. for philologists during the study years should be facilitated. For an effective organization of every-day life at local HEIs and the transmission of knowledge, access to essential facilities (e.g. video projectors, internet access) at three republics’ HEIs should be guaranteed. This can be done through revenues emanating from the high tuition fees paid by students. In principal high tuition fees need to be proportionally distributed to achieve attractive cost-benefit ratio (between quality and costs) for local students. In the long run, a sophisticated cost-benefit ratio will also attract international students to study in the country. On the other hand, the increasing tendency of making the higher education system widely dependent on student fees, which for local conditions are getting enormously high from year to year, should be counteracted e.g. through the involvement of industry in the higher education system. This measure would enable financially deprived study-seekers to get more access to higher education. The efforts to internationalize the higher education system should bear a homogenious and complementary character. Effective policies for internationalization and modernization of higher education systems will not only prevent the brain-drain of local study-seekers and attract the foreign ones but will also satisfy the growing needs of the local labour market for highly qualified personnel. In this regard, the close cooperetion of HEIs with industry and the private sector are important. To the government of Kazakhstan: To a certain extent, Kazakhstan has already gained an attractive image as a higher education destination among the regional students in recent years. However, there is a long way to go in order to make it attractive for overseas students and make it competitive at the international level. The allocation of considerable resources to higher education should bring tangible results through effective implementation of reforms. Frequent system and organizational transformations should be avoided in this regard. The reforms must be done from the bottom up to ensure a stable fundamental basis and provide the expected outcomes.

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The reforms, which have been done so far, did not efficiently penetrate the existing higher education system, which was established by the Soviet system. The leftovers of the latter, such as assigning methods in study and research, people’s mentality, outdated educational and scientific support and the inadequate professionalism of teaching staff are indicators for existing problems in higher education system of Kazakhstan. The implementation of the Bologna process must be quantitatively and qualitatively improved so that the process of internationalization can make significant progress. The reforms in this direction must go hand in hand with the realities in Kazakhstan. For this reason teaching, research and administrative (e.g. heads of HEIs) staff must be adequately trained, in particular the aquisition of foreign languages, an understanding of the credit system and its transferring mechanisms as well as academic mobility should be intensified. Successful internationalization also requires an overall understanding of the importance of this policy by HEI administrations; sufficient funding, standardised curricula for the HEIs, affordable housing, developed international cooperation and information channels and functioning inbound and outbound academic mobility are also vital. The numbers of German HEIs in Kazakhstan, which were very positively rated by Kazakh respondents, should be increased. The existing German-Kazakh University enjoys a well respected and trusted image. The ‘high-calibre’ and well-resourced HEIs in Kazakhstan such as KIMEP and Nazarbayev University should be more inclusive also for the financially deprived population. Their best practices should be shared in a systematic way with other HEIs in Kazakhstan, especially with state (“less well resourced”) HEIs. To the government of Kyrgyzstan: Similarly to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan counts as the second hub for higher education for regional students. Many well-known HEIs are avaliable, but that does not however provide the financially deprivied population with equal chances for admission as for those children, who are from wealthy families. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan should keep and increase its image as regional higher educational hub. It is important in this regard to guarantee children in rural (mountainous) areas more access to pre-HEI education that may enable them later to enter a HEI. Moreover, there is a strong need in Kyrgystan to increase the quality of secondary education significantly as became evident from PISA results. The HEI graduation qualifications should be eased and standardised otherwise the existence of Soviet-style diplomas and post-independency qualifications confuse the whole HEI system. Efficient reforms in the higher education system in order to align it closely with the Bologna Accords should be made. Furthermore, measures helping Kyr-

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gyzstan to become a formal member of the Bologna Accords should be continiuosly undertaken. There is a lack of quality control over higher education institutions especially of state HEIs. They, particularly, suffer under deeply rooted corruption and low quality. This is to be done through elaboration of appropriate criteria that would close down a number of HEIs, which do not comply with those criteria. To the government of Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan allocates, to a certain extent, considerable means for the education system. However, its higher education system is extremely underfinanced. Therefore there is a strong need to increase investment in the higher education system that will also ensure quality. Indeed, the quality of HEIs in Uzbekistan, which are mostly state-funded, is low too so that there are no attractive factors to encourage Uzbek study-seekers to pursue higher education at home. The problem of drop of tertiary enrolment rates in general and of female candidates specifically should be addressed and counter-measures undertaken. A very strict state accreditation and certification process of potential HEIs should be eased in, in order to increase chances for the establishment of private HEIs. The increase of the number of private HEIs, partnerships with foreign HEIs as well as branch campuses of foreign HEIs will contribute to competition in the higher education landscape within the country and increase higher education quality. The strictly centralised higher education system should be opened out and diversified through giving more autonomy to HEI administration in curricula and study fee questions. As shown, there is a need for curricula to increase the range of minor subjects on offer and get rid of “ideological” major subjects. The latter would provide students with more space to concentrate on their field of study. Teaching and research staff as well students should be free from any (cleaning) work, which does not have any direct relation to the study process. As part of the struggle against the corruption, the existing blackmailing practices at HEIs of Uzbekistan such as pressuring a HEI employee if he or she refuses to grade a ‘special’ student, who even did not attend a course at all, should be eliminated. More efforts should be made to align the higher education standards with the Bologna model. As the next step the formal membership in Bologna Accords must be set as a target.

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Recommendations to all three CA republics for the improvement of labour market opportunities: The first and foremost issue is the struggle against poverty and corruption, and useless bureaucracy should be abolished. The increase of wage levels for the population especially of those employed in the public sector will contribute to the solution of this problem. Due to high unemployment rates, new job places, should be created particularly through industrialization efforts; especially in Kazakhstan, in view of increasing population numbers and the thousands of Bolashak returners in this country. The number of employed women in especially Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan should be increased. Jobs in the state sector should be made more attractive in terms of the improvement of working conditions and especially payment. Industry and the private sector should set up active cooperation with higher education and research, which will foster innovation and increase employment opportunities for local HEI graduates. The already established system of vocational training should be strengthened and operational training especially in small and medium sized local companies fostered. The participants in vocational training should have better opportunities to effectively apply their theoretical knowledge. This will raise the quality of trained personnel. The qualification of the labour force should be diversified and carrier perspectives widened. This will increase the productivity of the economic sector in general. Skill mismatches (brain waste) in the domestic labour market should be stopped through matching fields of study and job market needs. In this connection it is important to regularly monitor the local labour market to ensure the balance between supply and demand. The role and effective work of statistical agencies is important in this issue An attractive investment climate (currency conversion, labour tax etc.) especially in Uzbekistan should be created. In view of a substantial shortage of highly qualified people for economic development in key areas, Uzbekistan has immediately to tailor attractive policies to retain HEI graduates with the appropriate qualifications. To the government of Uzbekistan: abolishment of restrictive travel policies The restrictive, so called ‘exit policy’ should be abolished. Otherwise it impedes brain circulation significantly. Moreover it contributes to the flourishing of corruption. The practice of ‘exit visa’ should stop the discrimination of young women under 35 years old through additional controls for issuing this travel permission. Moreover, the discriminatory character of the ‘exit visa’ is demonstra-

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ted by millions of Uzbek citizens working at construction sites or similar in Russia. The ‘gastarbeiter’ or seasonal workers are released from applying for the ‘exit visa.’ Such selectivity indicates that when it is about the finding solution for millions of unemployed Uzbeks, then the ‘exist visa’ is not needed but for those, who travel outside the CIS countries the ‘exit visa’ is necessary. The regulation for Uzbek graduates, who during their studies at local HEIs, received state scholarships and who must work these off for at least three years at an assigned place (educational institutions, factories, organizations) in Uzbekistan in order to receive a fairly-earned qualification, should be abolished. This inhibits their personal and academic/carrier mobility. Policies to reverse brain drain and promote return migration Taking into account that the three CA republics under consideration belong, to a certain extent, to different development stages, the opportunities to promote return migration are differing too. The recommendations, which are given below, provide specific measures that depend on the availability of financial resources, and the political willingness of each country. These measures are partially adapted from successful policy responses of South Korea (Yoon 1992); implemented in order to reverse brain drain in the second half of 20th century. The reasons for choosing this inquiry were explained in detail in the fifth chapter. Recommendations to the three CA republics: Policy-makers must recognize officially (set it on the political agenda) that student migration may represent a serious problem of brain drain and undertake immediate measures to turn the brain drain into brain gain. As a first step, reliable statistical data should be set up to get a clear overview on how many leave and how many return. Return migration will gain momentum if economic and employment opportunities in CA republics are boosted. This can be done in particular through promotion of industrial technology and industrial productivity. For the return of graduates from Germany and other developed countries special departments should be established in all three CA republics. They need to closely coordinate their work with ministries and other respective institutions. The government must remain the key coordinator, contact and a guarantor for successful reforms. A sort of paternalism on the part of state leaders is required to be able to break “the bureaucratic control and anti-professionalism” of some authorities involved in the process. In order to gain access to the potential of future returners, professional associations of CA students and scientists in Germany should be invoked. They may play an important role as a “brain pool”, serve as “important outposts for inter-

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national networking in personnel” and contribute to the “exchange of scientific and technological information”. These associations can be subsidized by the CA government through the organization of respective events such as workshops, conferences, also in cooperation with e.g. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The contacts with young professionals should be intensively developed by first of all, diplomatic representations (embassy, consulates) of CA republics in Germany. Suitable programmes should be tailored separately for temporary returners, for permanent returners and foreign scholars and specialists, who can be regularly invited to the CA republics. The infrastructure for research and development should be created. This implies that researchers should be provided with “optimum research autonomy and given independent research laboratory facilities with supporting staff.” In general terms, academic freedom for academia employees should be guaranteed. Research establishments, where returners will be employed, should be insured with “financial stability” i.e., financed from government endowment funds, construction, operation, the granting of government-owned land. It is important this comes with no strings attached regarding managerial control, government audit, a priori government approval for operating programs, or interference in research. The improvement of HEIs capacities will give an incentive for returners to either study or work there. Regular overseas training programs and professional meetings should be offered. A “package of fringe benefits” should be provided to returners, which may include relocation and moving expenses such as airfares for the repatriates and immediate family members. Additionally free housing and transportation, overseas travel, and subsidized quality education for the returners’ children could be included. All sectors involved must guarantee a top salary for returners (in accordance with local standards), depending on their qualifications e.g. M.A.s or Ph.Ds. Thereby the offered salary must not necessarily be comparable with what the respective returners would have earned in Germany but should be substantially higher than the average local salary in a similar position. The returners, in short, must have the feeling of being somewhat exceptional and respected. A generous handling of returners indicates “recognition of the value of professionalism and scientific knowledge as a new resource of power on the part of government” (Yoon 1992). The above-mentioned attractive incentives should be directed equally for all returners: for national scholarship holders (e.g. Bolashak- and non-Bolashak scholarship-holders), German and other foundations’ scholarship-holders and non-scholarship holders.

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Particularly, the Bolashak scholarship program, through incorporation of the above-mentioned measures, should reconsider its return policies thereby making them more effective. The compulsory return alone is not a long-term solution especially if attractive conditions in the home country are missing, which most probably will lead to the brain waste problematic. Any corrupt practices inside the national scholarship programs of the CA republics should be eliminated and the regulations of such programs should be fairly followed by all. The nostrification (recognition) of foreign diplomas must take place barrierfree and efficiently. Alumni networks should be fostered and work effectively to help to consolidate the know-how of returned personnel. In the case of those returners, who through a long-term stay in Germany have had weak ties to their home countries, the patriotic feelings should be woken. A feeling of recognition of their capabilities should be transferred towards them. Policies to promote brain circulation and the “resourcing expatriates” (diaspora options, Lowell (2001)): Kazakh and especially Uzbek students mistrust their compatriots residing in Germany. The strategy of distancing himself or herself from compatriots, or not taking part in events organized by them, hampers the diaspora building as in case of Uzbekistan, or joining the existing network, as in case of Kazakhstan. Therefore, in the first line, measures for confidence building should be taken in order that the Diasporas of Kazakhs and Uzbeks become visible and strong. Kyrgyz students have a better relationship with their official and non-official compatriots. But more measures are needed to explore and consolidate their valuable potential. Recommendations to the Kazakh government: The embassy of Kazakhstan should raise its profile in order to improve its image among the students. Some of them distrust this institution and believe that the employees there are incompetent. Moreover, the embassy of Kazakhstan must clearly formulate whether students from Kazakhstan should be registered at the embassy or not. This would overcome many misunderstandings among students regarding the registration. The partially hostile attitude between Bolashak scholarship-holders and the scholarship-holders of other foundations as well as non-scholarship holders coming from Kazakhstan should be improved. The embassy should create measures which directly address the interests of Kazakh scholarship-holders

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other than Bolashak and non-scholarship holders e.g. through setting up different events for wakening their interest to return home after graduation in Germany. This would contribute to the efforts of the Kazakh government to strive to establish a bridge between different groups of the still weak Kazakh diaspora in Germany (Turkish-, Kazakh-, and Russian speaking). Even if they have different mentalities it is possible to use their potential through making it united and visible. A strong Kazakh diaspora can bring valuable changes for the development of Kazakhstan. Recommendations to the Kyrgyz government: The Kyrgyz embassy should keep good relations with Kyrgyz students and graduates in Germany. The young Kyrgyz diaspora, in contrast to the relatively mature Kazakh diaspora, is becoming visible and it will contribute to the development of Kyrgyzstan if appropriate measures are undertaken on the part of Kyrgyz government and its embassies in Germany. The Kyrgyz diaspora in Germany, which emerged mostly thanks to students and graduates from Kyrgyzstan, has acted through different initiatives so far. However it should undertake more actions so that Kyrgyz Republic would benefit from its valuable potential. Recommendations to the Uzbek government: The Uzbek government and its embassy and consulates in Germany must significantly contribute to building confidence between Uzbek students and graduates. The latter have a deep mistrust towards both the diplomatic representations of Uzbekistan in Germany and their student fellows from Uzbekistan. This mistrust must be overcome for diaspora formation to begin. Uzbek students should be intensively involved in social events organized by the diplomatic representations of Uzbekistan in Germany without discrimination. Many students do not know what they need to do in order to be involved in the activities of the Uzbek embassy. The embassy has the potential to bring benefits for the development of Uzbekistan through the use of the potential of students and graduates living in Germany. The embassy and consulates should open themselves up towards the Uzbek expatriates. This can be done through for example organising conferences and workshops aimed e.g. at attracting young professionals to return to Uzbekistan. Those few existing organizations of young Uzbeks in Germany should become more active in terms of making development contributions to Uzbekistan. Apart from sport events other activities, which would bring tangible results should be organised.

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Recommendations to the receiving country Germany Improvements in teaching and learning processes (TLP): Germany enjoys a good reputation as a study destination among CA students. This is due to the fee–free or low-fee study opportunities in Germany, together with the internationalized higher education landscape which provides the opportunity to undertake tertiary studies in English, make Germany an attractive country for pursuing tertiary studies. The top quality of tertiary education in Germany and the overall safety and the openness of this country serve in favour of starting tertiary education there. However, according to respondents, some (minor) aspects in the TLP of the higher education system in Germany should be improved. These concern overcrowded lecture halls which should be avoided because they contribute insignificantly or not at all to learning process of especially foreign students. More attention should be paid to international students, who may have little experience with autonomous work at their home HEI. Otherwise, such students get the impression that course organizers at German HEIs are unmotivated and unenthusiastic, and that the lectures are poorly organized. The constant rotation of different teaching personnel, especially in the medical studies should be avoided. Promotion of brain circulation and return migration: It is necessary that Germany finds a balance between its economic interests and development policy goals; otherwise the promotion of circular migration will fail. For this reason already existing development policies such as “assisting skilled returnees” should become more visible if they are to be made use of by CA students. In particular, the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) should make its work visible in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. German foundations should introduce the issues of how to promote circular and permanent returns of foreign scholarship-holders. In particular, more intensive discussions about e.g. permanent return to the home country as a valuable option, must be introduced. The permanent return, in particular, could be promoted through the combination of job search, visa easements and the financial security of a concrete job placement there. Close cooperation with source CA republics in tailoring brain circulation (temporary return) and reverse brain-drain (permanent return) promoting programmes is vital.

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Limitations and future research perspectives: One of the key aims of the PhD thesis was to raise an awareness of student migration as the phenomenon of the outmigration of the ‘best of the best’. Consequently, to push politicians to undertake appropriate measures for the return of thousands of stayers from focus CA republics in developed countries, in particular from Germany, to their home destinations. Due to the method of sampling, the results of this research are not representative but they give a hint to the afore-mentioned aims. In this regard, a largescale research on student migration with representative results would be very promising and extremely important especially in view of the missing statistical data. Such an endeavour would be costly, but it could open up for a researcher or research team the chance to apply for bigger project funds. Through interviewing different groups of students (stayers, returners, and graduates in transition) I tried to find certain dynamics in students’ decisionmaking and compare them within the three focus countries. However, heterogeneity of participants in numbers and characteristics challenged me a lot and hindered me from reaching this goal as I wished. In this connection, although I had strong personal familiarity with the researched topic, one of the biggest challenges of my study was the large amount of data, which was generated by both: online survey and in-depth interviews with three countries’ respondents. The gathered data exceeded the scope of the inquiry at hand. Therefore some aspects had to be skipped or discussed briefly. There is much space for interpretation regarding the three countries’ results. Potential new research questions considering the roles of international students as immigrants or as actors in diaspora formation in overseas countries arise. It has to be stressed that a comparative endeavour makes sense if the topic is well researched. However, if there is not enough or any information on a certain topic, it is quite challenging to make a comparative research initially because of the overwhelming scope of the work. In this regard, the advice for future research is to focus on social processes taking place in one country e.g. student migration from Uzbekistan and discuss it in detail through pursuing in particular a longitudinal research about the changing experiences, intentions and behaviour of Uzbek students.

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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7

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Appendix

List of illustrations Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (1999-2016)131

Source: Data are compiled from Corruption Perceptions Index at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/ 131 CPI reflects “the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public”. In: Background information. Available online: https://www.transparency. org/research/cpi/cpi_1999/0/#background. Until 2011 the CPI scale ranged between “10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).” In 2012 the CPI’s methodology was updated and countries scored on a scale from 100 (very clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). “A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries/territories included in the index. Ranks can change merely if the number of countries included in the index changes.” For more information see: FAQs. Available online: http://files.transparency.org/content/download/ 1951/12816/file/2015_CPI_FAQsZIP.zip © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020 N. Abdullaeva, Tertiary Student Migration from Central Asia to Germany, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29020-7

242

Source: Freedom House

Appendix

List of illustrations

243

OS respondents and their citizenship

Citizenship

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan

68 64 86

31.19 29.36 39.45

31.19 60.55 100.00

Total

218

100.00

OS respondents and their working languages

Language

Citizenship Kazakhsta Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

English

4 16.67 5.88

8 33.33 12.50

12 50.00 13.95

24 100.00 11.01

Russian

43 50.00 63.24

17 19.77 26.56

26 30.23 30.23

86 100.00 39.45

German

21 19.44 30.88

39 36.11 60.94

48 44.44 55.81

108 100.00 49.54

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

244

Appendix

OS respondents and their age distribution Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Age

Kazakhsta

Total

under 20 Y/O

6 8.82

1 1.56

0 0.00

7 3.21

20-25 Y/O

37 54.41

24 37.50

32 37.21

93 42.66

25 - 35 Y/O

24 35.29

33 51.56

52 60.47

109 50.00

35 Y/O and older

1 1.47

6 9.38

2 2.33

9 4.13

Total

68 100.00

64 100.00

86 100.00

218 100.00

List of illustrations

245

OS respondents and their ethnic distribution Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Ethnicity

Kazakhsta

Total

Kazakh

49 96.08 72.06

1 1.96 1.56

1 1.96 1.16

51 100.00 23.39

Kyrgyz

0 0.00 0.00

58 98.31 90.63

1 1.69 1.16

59 100.00 27.06

Russian

17 58.62 25.00

4 13.79 6.25

8 27.59 9.30

29 100.00 13.30

Tajik

0 0.00 0.00

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 1.16

1 100.00 0.46

Turkmen

0 0.00 0.00

0 0.00 0.00

2 100.00 2.33

2 100.00 0.92

Uzbek

0 0.00 0.00

1 1.47 1.56

67 98.53 77.91

68 100.00 31.19

Other

2 25.00 2.94

0 0.00 0.00

6 75.00 6.98

8 100.00 3.67

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

246

Appendix

OS respondents and academic degree from their home-countries Academic degree from home-country

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Bachelor

33 29.20 70.21

25 22.12 43.86

55 48.67 70.51

113 100.00 62.09

Master

4 19.05 8.51

6 28.57 10.53

11 52.38 14.10

21 100.00 11.54

PhD

0 0.00 0.00

2 66.67 3.51

1 33.33 1.28

3 100.00 1.65

BA and MA

4 23.53 8.51

5 29.41 8.77

8 47.06 10.26

17 100.00 9.34

BA, MA and PhD

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 1.75

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 0.55

Other

6 22.22 12.77

18 66.67 31.58

3 11.11 3.85

27 100.00 14.84

Total

47 25.82 100.00

57 31.32 100.00

78 42.86 100.00

182 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

247

OS respondents and their marital status Marital status

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Single

58 36.02 85.29

42 26.09 65.63

61 37.89 70.93

161 100.00 73.85

Married

7 14.00 10.29

20 40.00 31.25

23 46.00 26.74

50 100.00 22.94

Other

3 42.86 4.41

2 28.57 3.13

2 28.57 2.33

7 100.00 3.21

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Spouse’ citizenship of married OS respondents Spouse' citizenship

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

The same as mine

2 6.25 28.57

11 34.38 55.00

19 59.38 82.61

32 100.00 64.00

German

2 16.67 28.57

7 58.33 35.00

3 25.00 13.04

12 100.00 24.00

Other

3 50.00 42.86

2 33.33 10.00

1 16.67 4.35

6 100.00 12.00

Total

7 14.00 100.00

20 40.00 100.00

23 46.00 100.00

50 100.00 100.00

248

Appendix

Gender distribution of OS respondents Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Gender

Kazakhsta

Total

Feminine

41 32.80 60.29

44 35.20 68.75

40 32.00 46.51

125 100.00 57.34

Masculine

27 29.03 39.71

20 21.51 31.25

46 49.46 53.49

93 100.00 42.66

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Parents’ education of the OS respondents Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Parents' education

Kazakhsta

Total

Both with higher educ

39 28.26 57.35

47 34.06 73.44

52 37.68 60.47

138 100.00 63.30

One with higher educa

16 31.37 23.53

12 23.53 18.75

23 45.10 26.74

51 100.00 23.39

Both without higher e

13 44.83 19.12

5 17.24 7.81

11 37.93 12.79

29 100.00 13.30

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

249

Parents’ financial situation of the OS respondents Parents' financial situation

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Rich

1 14.29 1.47

1 14.29 1.56

5 71.43 5.81

7 100.00 3.21

Upper middle income

10 27.03 14.71

13 35.14 20.31

14 37.84 16.28

37 100.00 16.97

Middle income

48 34.78 70.59

37 26.81 57.81

53 38.41 61.63

138 100.00 63.30

Lower middle income

6 25.00 8.82

6 25.00 9.38

12 50.00 13.95

24 100.00 11.01

Low income

3 25.00 4.41

7 58.33 10.94

2 16.67 2.33

12 100.00 5.50

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

250

Appendix

OS respondents and the financial support from parents Financial support from parents

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes, to 100 percent

9 60.00 13.24

2 13.33 3.13

4 26.67 4.65

15 100.00 6.88

Yes, less than to 100

7 35.00 10.29

3 15.00 4.69

10 50.00 11.63

20 100.00 9.17

Yes, less than to 50

15 38.46 22.06

11 28.21 17.19

13 33.33 15.12

39 100.00 17.89

Not at all

37 25.69 54.41

48 33.33 75.00

59 40.97 68.60

144 100.00 66.06

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

OS respondents and the possession of higher education degree from home-country’s HEI Higher education in a home-count ry

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes

47 25.82 69.12

57 31.32 89.06

78 42.86 90.70

182 100.00 83.49

No

21 58.33 30.88

7 19.44 10.94

8 22.22 9.30

36 100.00 16.51

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

251

OS respondents and types of their studies at German HEIs Type of study in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Bachelor

20 28.17 29.41

27 38.03 42.19

24 33.80 27.91

71 100.00 32.57

Master

34 37.36 50.00

17 18.68 26.56

40 43.96 46.51

91 100.00 41.74

PhD

7 25.00 10.29

9 32.14 14.06

12 42.86 13.95

28 100.00 12.84

One of old degree pro

4 20.00 5.88

8 40.00 12.50

8 40.00 9.30

20 100.00 9.17

Other

3 37.50 4.41

3 37.50 4.69

2 25.00 2.33

8 100.00 3.67

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

252

Appendix

German language proficiency of the OS respondents German language proficiency

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

A1-A2 (Basic user)

13 44.83 19.12

3 10.34 4.69

13 44.83 15.12

29 100.00 13.30

B1-B2 (Independent us

14 35.00 20.59

13 32.50 20.31

13 32.50 15.12

40 100.00 18.35

C1-C2 (Proficient use

41 27.52 60.29

48 32.21 75.00

60 40.27 69.77

149 100.00 68.35

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Place of learning German language Place of learning German language

Kazakhsta

While living in my ho

46 30.07 67.65

47 30.72 73.44

60 39.22 69.77

153 100.00 70.18

While living in Germa

21 33.33 30.88

17 26.98 26.56

25 39.68 29.07

63 100.00 28.90

While living in a thi

1 50.00 1.47

0 0.00 0.00

1 50.00 1.16

2 100.00 0.92

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

253

OS respondents and language of instruction at German HEIs Language of instruction at German HEI

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

German

34 32.69 50.00

33 31.73 51.56

37 35.58 43.02

104 100.00 47.71

English

19 33.33 27.94

14 24.56 21.88

24 42.11 27.91

57 100.00 26.15

German and English

15 26.79 22.06

16 28.57 25.00

25 44.64 29.07

56 100.00 25.69

Other (French)

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 1.56

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 0.46

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

254

Appendix

Assessment of the TLP at German HEIs Teaching and learning process (TLP) in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Very good

19 26.76 27.94

20 28.17 31.25

32 45.07 37.21

71 100.00 32.57

Good

41 33.61 60.29

35 28.69 54.69

46 37.70 53.49

122 100.00 55.96

Satisfying

7 29.17 10.29

9 37.50 14.06

8 33.33 9.30

24 100.00 11.01

Bad

1 100.00 1.47

0 0.00 0.00

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 0.46

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

255

OS respondents and financing of study in Germany through scholarship Finance of current study in Germany through scholarship

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes

43 45.26 63.24

25 26.32 39.06

27 28.42 31.40

95 100.00 43.58

No

25 20.33 36.76

39 31.71 60.94

59 47.97 68.60

123 100.00 56.42

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Type of scholarship Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Type of scholarship

Kazakhsta

Total

Financed by German si

23 33.33 53.49

22 31.88 88.00

24 34.78 88.89

69 100.00 72.63

Financed by home-coun

15 100.00 34.88

0 0.00 0.00

0 0.00 0.00

15 100.00 15.79

Other

5 45.45 11.63

3 27.27 12.00

3 27.27 11.11

11 100.00 11.58

Total

43 45.26 100.00

25 26.32 100.00

27 28.42 100.00

95 100.00 100.00

256

Appendix

Social engagement in the home-country Social engagement at home

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes,I was very active

13 38.24 19.12

11 32.35 17.19

10 29.41 11.63

34 100.00 15.60

Yes, I was active

10 19.61 14.71

20 39.22 31.25

21 41.18 24.42

51 100.00 23.39

Yes, but not often

21 35.59 30.88

15 25.42 23.44

23 38.98 26.74

59 100.00 27.06

Almost not

9 28.13 13.24

9 28.13 14.06

14 43.75 16.28

32 100.00 14.68

Never

15 35.71 22.06

9 21.43 14.06

18 42.86 20.93

42 100.00 19.27

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

257

Social engagement in Germany Social engagement in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes,I am very active

2 16.67 2.94

6 50.00 9.38

4 33.33 4.65

12 100.00 5.50

Yes, I am active

13 41.94 19.12

8 25.81 12.50

10 32.26 11.63

31 100.00 14.22

Yes, but not often

13 25.49 19.12

15 29.41 23.44

23 45.10 26.74

51 100.00 23.39

Almost not

13 25.49 19.12

16 31.37 25.00

22 43.14 25.58

51 100.00 23.39

Never

27 36.99 39.71

19 26.03 29.69

27 36.99 31.40

73 100.00 33.49

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

258

Appendix

Political engagement in home-country Political engagement at home

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes,I was very active

2 40.00 2.94

3 60.00 4.69

0 0.00 0.00

5 100.00 2.29

Yes, I was active

3 33.33 4.41

4 44.44 6.25

2 22.22 2.33

9 100.00 4.13

Yes, but not often

19 47.50 27.94

12 30.00 18.75

9 22.50 10.47

40 100.00 18.35

Almost not

11 26.19 16.18

13 30.95 20.31

18 42.86 20.93

42 100.00 19.27

Never

33 27.05 48.53

32 26.23 50.00

57 46.72 66.28

122 100.00 55.96

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Political engagement in Germany Political engagement in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes,I am very active

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 1.56

0 0.00 0.00

1 100.00 0.46

Yes, I am active

6 54.55 8.82

3 27.27 4.69

2 18.18 2.33

11 100.00 5.05

Yes, but not often

5 35.71 7.35

4 28.57 6.25

5 35.71 5.81

14 100.00 6.42

Almost not

10 33.33 14.71

8 26.67 12.50

12 40.00 13.95

30 100.00 13.76

Never

47 29.01 69.12

48 29.63 75.00

67 41.36 77.91

162 100.00 74.31

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

259

Plans of the OS respondents after graduation from a German HEI Plans after graduation of the current study

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Immediatly return hom

17 73.91 25.00

1 4.35 1.56

5 21.74 5.81

23 100.00 10.55

First stay in Germany

25 24.27 36.76

35 33.98 54.69

43 41.75 50.00

103 100.00 47.25

To settle down in Ger

10 22.73 14.71

19 43.18 29.69

15 34.09 17.44

44 100.00 20.18

Move to a thrid count

8 30.77 11.76

4 15.38 6.25

14 53.85 16.28

26 100.00 11.93

Other

8 36.36 11.76

5 22.73 7.81

9 40.91 10.47

22 100.00 10.09

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Experience of doing an internship in the home-country while studying in Germany Internship in home country while studying in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes

9 26.47 13.24

13 38.24 20.31

12 35.29 13.95

34 100.00 15.60

No

59 32.07 86.76

51 27.72 79.69

74 40.22 86.05

184 100.00 84.40

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

260

Appendix

OS respondents and their membership in or initiative of any social network in Germany Member or initiator of any social network in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes

24 27.27 35.29

34 38.64 53.13

30 34.09 34.88

88 100.00 40.37

No

44 33.85 64.71

30 23.08 46.88

56 43.08 65.12

130 100.00 59.63

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

Awareness of diaspora organization/s in Germany Awareness of any diaspora organization in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes

27 39.71 39.71

31 45.59 48.44

10 14.71 11.63

68 100.00 31.19

No

41 27.33 60.29

33 22.00 51.56

76 50.67 88.37

150 100.00 68.81

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

List of illustrations

261

Staying informed by home country's embassy based in Germany Staying informed by home country's embassy based in Germany

Kazakhsta

Citizenship Kyrgyzsta Uzbekista

Total

Yes. Regularly

15 35.71 22.06

19 45.24 29.69

8 19.05 9.30

42 100.00 19.27

Yes. Irregualrly

19 30.16 27.94

22 34.92 34.38

22 34.92 25.58

63 100.00 28.90

No. Not at all

34 30.09 50.00

23 20.35 35.94

56 49.56 65.12

113 100.00 51.83

Total

68 31.19 100.00

64 29.36 100.00

86 39.45 100.00

218 100.00 100.00

262

Appendix

List of study participants First-time stayers: Current CA students of German HEIs or employees/ employers who may have already graduated from a German HEI previously and have stayed on in this country (without legal interruption) Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation at that time

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. Kazakhstan

Female O. (previously M.A in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Doctoral candidate

2012/ Germany

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 50min

2. Kazakhstan

Male K. (previously P.hD. degree in Germany, Bolashak scholarship)

Anonymous

2013– 2015

Numerous informal interviews

3. Kazakhstan

Male S. previously P.hD. degree in Germany, Bolashak scholarship

Anonymous

2008– 2015

Numerous informal interviews

1. Kyrgyzstan

Female P. (no previous degree in Germany, FES scholarship)

Doctoral candidate

2012– 2014

Numerous informal interviews

2. Kyrgyzstan

Female B. (previously B.A. in Germany, self-financed)

M.A. student

2013/ Germany

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 03min

3. Kyrgyzstan

Male R. (previously Lawyer L.LM and study of law with Staatsexamen, DAAD scholarship and self-financed )

2014/ Germany

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 22min

1. Uzbekistan

Male H. (no previous degree in Germany)

Medical student

2012

In-depth semistructured interview/2h 09min

2. Uzbekistan

Female U. (no previous degree in Germany)

M.A. student

2012

In-depth semistructured interview/2h 01min

List of study participants

263

Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation at that time

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

3. Uzbekistan

Male E. (no previous degree in Germany)

Doctoral student

2012

In-depth semistructured interview/2h 23min

4. Uzbekistan

Female A. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Economist

2013

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 25min

Return-stayers (with legal interruption): current students or employees/ employers who used to study in Germany at a HEI and then returned home before coming back to Germany after a period of time Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. Uzbekistan

Male K. (Magister (‘old’-degree) in Germany, national scholarship)

Economist

2013/2014

Numerous informal interviews

Graduates in transition: graduates of German HEIs who at the time of interviewing were looking for another place to study or an employment opportunity Country of origin

Interviewee

Date and Place

Form of participation

1. Kazakhstan

Female A. (M.A. in Germany, FES scholarship)

2011/Germany

Questionnaire

1. Kyrgyzstan

Female B. (M.A. in Germany, self-financed)

2013/Germany

Questionnaire

264

Appendix

Returners: graduates who after their graduation in Germany returned back home and who lived and worked during the interview there. Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. Kazakhstan

Female C. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Economist

2013/ Kazakhstan

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 21min

2. Kazakhstan

Female J. (doctoral study in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Researcher

2013/ Kazakhstan

In-depth semistructured interview/1:22 min

3. Kazakhstan

Female L. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Psychologist

2013/ Kazakhstan

In-depth semistructured interview/0:49 min

4. Kazakhstan

Female R. (B.A. in Germany, Bolashak scholarship)

Technical specialist

2013/ Kazakhstan

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 09 min

5. Kazakhstan

Female M. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

IT Specialist

2013/ Kazakhstan

In-depth semistructured interview/0:48 min

6. Kazakhstan

Male P. (interrupted study in Germany, Bolashak scholarship)

Unknown

2013/ Kazakhstan

Informal interview

7. Kazakhstan

Female F. (M.A. in Germany, Bolashak scholarship)

Engineer

2013/ Kazakhstan

Numerous informal interviews

List of study participants

265

Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. Uzbekistan

Female D. (M.A. in Germany, selffinanced)

Specialist in development sector

2013/ Uzbekistan

In-depth semistructured interview/0:46 min

2. Uzbekistan

Male Q. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

HR specialist

2013/ Uzbekistan

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 39 min

3. Uzbekistan

Male I. (Doctoral degree in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Researcher

2013/ Uzbekistan

In-depth semistructured interview/1h 09 min

4. Uzbekistan

Female H. (M.A. in Germany, DAAD scholarship)

Specialist in development sector

2013/ Uzbekistan

Informal interview/not recorded

Non-movers: people living in target countries, who have graduated from a local HEI and had the potential (educational basis, language skills) for starting studies in Germany but have not done it yet. Country of origin

Interviewee

Occupation

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. Kazakhstan

Female E., married, children

Lawyer

2013/ Kazakhstan

Informal interview

1. Uzbekistan

Female M., married, children

Entrepreneur

2005-2013

Numerous informal interviews

2. Uzbekistan

Female M., married, children

Specialist in construction sector

2004-2013

Numerous informal interviews

266

Appendix

Expert interviews: Interviewee

Date and Place of interview

Form of participation

1. DAAD employee

2012/Germany

Interview by phone

2. WUS employee

2012/Germany

Questionnaire and phone interview

3. CIM Employee

2013/Germany

Face-to-face interview/not recorded

4. CIM Expert

2013/Germany

Face-to-face interview/1h

1. DAAD employee

2013/Kazakhstan

Face-to-face interview/0h 32 min

2. Executive at German-Kazakh University

2013/Kazakhstan

Face-to-face interview/not recorded

3. Head of Department at AlFarabi Kazakh National University

2013/Kazakhstan

Face-to-face interview/1h 52min

1. Researcher at Academy of Sciences

2013/Uzbekistan

Face-to-face interview/1h 02min

2. DAAD employee

2013/Uzbekistan

Face-to-face interview/1h 31min

3. CIM Expert

2013/Uzbekistan

Face-to-face interview/40 min

4. Representative of DAAD-Alumni network

2013/Uzbekistan

Face-to-face interview/1h 19 min