Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications 2020049749, 2020049750, 9780367358952, 9780367761530, 9780429342523

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of illustrations
List of contributors
Acknowledgments
List of acronyms
Part I Introduction
Chapter 1 Contextualizing terrorism, security, and development in South Asia
Part II Country cases of terrorism, insurgencies, and development
Chapter 2 Non-state acts of terrorism and counterterrorism in Bangladesh: A critical review
Chapter 3 Terrorism, security, and development in Sri Lanka: In the national, regional, and global context
Chapter 4 Tenuous security in the Himalayas: A focus on Nepal
Chapter 5 Naxal insurgency in India: Genesis, ideological precepts, and security challenges
Chapter 6 Normalcy restored? The lingering drivers of insurgency in Northeast India
Chapter 7 The improbable rise and inglorious fall of the Khalistan insurgency in India’s Punjab
Chapter 8 Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan
Chapter 9 The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan: An analysis of domestic and regional factors
Part III Issues of radicalization, extremism, and the state
Chapter 10 Hindu radicalization and implications for India
Chapter 11 The proliferation of extremism and security issues in the Maldives
Part IV Issues of regional security and global implications
Chapter 12 Terrorism, security, and development and the “never-ending” conflict over Jammu and Kashmir
Chapter 13 Women and militancy in South Asia: Straddling the agent–victim binary
Chapter 14 Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
Chapter 15 The impact of terrorism in South Asia: Implications and prospects
Part V Conclusion
Chapter 16 Some rumination on the impact of terrorism, insurgencies, and (in)security in South Asia in the age of globalization
Index

Citation preview

New Regionalisms Series

TERRORISM, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS Edited by M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat

Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia

This book provides a rich analysis of the actors and organizations to reflect on the antecedents and trajectories of terrorism and insurgency in South Asia, and the different countermeasures adopted by the countries to deal with the security and developmental challenges. South Asia is a complex geography that has been both a victim and a playing field for indigenous insurgencies, and domestic and transnational terrorist movements. The contributors to this volume explore how this situation has posed serious challenges to the sovereignty of the states, to national and human security, to the socioeconomic fabric of the communities, and to the ethnic and religious cohesion. The book provides detailed studies of country cases on terrorism, security, and insurgencies, and it underlines the national, regional, and global implications of the threats that emanate from this region. Presenting an opportunity to diversify away from a Western-centric focus on terrorism and security, this book will be valuable to researchers in political science, criminology, defense and security studies, and to policy makers and think tanks. M. Raymond Izarali is a philosopher and Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada. Dalbir Ahlawat is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Australia.

New Regionalisms Series Series Editor: Timothy M. Shaw

The New Regionalisms series presents innovative analyses of a range of novel regional relations and institutions. Going beyond formal, interstate organisations, this interdisciplinary series builds on over two decades of the pioneering International Political Economy of New Regionalisms series, also edited by Professor Timothy M. Shaw. New Regionalisms is creative and cosmopolitan, reflecting enquiries from and about the global South and North. It reinforces ongoing networks of analysts in both academia and think-tanks as well as international institutions concerned with micro-, meso- and macrolevel regionalisms in the third decade of the 21st century and beyond. For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/NewRegionalisms-Series/book-series/ASHSER1146 Expanding Perspectives on Human Rights in Africa Edited by M. Raymond Izarali, Oliver Masakure and Bonny Ibhawoh The International Political Economy of the BRICS Edited by Li Xing Structural Change in Africa Misperceptions, New Narratives and Development in the 21st Century Carlos Lopes and George Kararach Multipolarization, South-South Cooperation, and the Rise of Post-Hegemonic Governance Efe Can Gürcan Inclusive Trade in Africa The African Continental Free Trade Area in Comparative Perspective Edited by David Luke and Jamie MacLeod The Political Economy of New Regionalisms in the Pacific Rim Edited by José Briceño Ruiz and Philippe De Lombaerde Governing Complexity in the Arctic Region Mathieu Landriault, Andrew Chater, Elana Wilson Rowe and P. Whitney Lackenbauer Social Standards in EU and US Trade Agreements Evgeny Postnikov Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia National, Regional and Global Implications Edited by M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat

Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia

National, Regional and Global Implications

Edited by M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat; individual chapters, the contributors The right of M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Izarali, M. Raymond, editor. | Ahlawat, Dalbir, editor. Title: Terrorism, security and development in South Asia: national, regional and global implications / edited by M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2021. | Series: New regionalisms | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020049749 (print) | LCCN 2020049750 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367358952 (hardback) | ISBN: 9780367761530 (pbk) | ISBN 9780429342523 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Terrorism--South Asia. | Terrorism--Religious aspects--Islam. | Terrorism--Religious aspects--Hinduism. | Terrorism--Prevention--Government policy--South Asia. | Ethnic conflict--South Asia. | Internal security--South Asia. | National security--South Asia. Classification: LCC HV6433.S64 T475 2021 (print) | LCC HV6433.S64 (ebook) | DDC 363.3250954--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020049749 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020049750 ISBN: 9780367358952 (hbk) ISBN: 9780367761530 (pbk) ISBN: 9780429342523 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Acknowledgments List of acronyms PART I

Introduction 1 Contextualizing terrorism, security, and development in South Asia

viii ix xii xiii

1 3

M. RAYMOND IZARALI AND DALBIR AHLAWAT

PART II

Country cases of terrorism, insurgencies, and development 2 Non-state acts of terrorism and counterterrorism in Bangladesh: A critical review

21 23

MOKERROM HOSSAIN AND RAWSHAN SADIA AFROZE

3 Terrorism, security, and development in Sri Lanka: In the national, regional, and global context

42

STANLEY W. SAMARASINGHE

4 Tenuous security in the Himalayas: A focus on Nepal

62

THOMAS A. MARKS

5 Naxal insurgency in India: Genesis, ideological precepts, and security challenges DALBIR AHLAWAT

80

vi

Contents

6 Normalcy restored? The lingering drivers of insurgency in Northeast India

99

ALEX WATERMAN

7 The improbable rise and inglorious fall of the Khalistan insurgency in India’s Punjab

121

PHILIP HULTQUIST

8 Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan

140

WILLIAM MALEY

9 The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan: An analysis of domestic and regional factors

157

ABDUL BASIT AND ZAHID SHAHAB AHMED

PART III

Issues of radicalization, extremism, and the state

175

10 Hindu radicalization and implications for India

177

BIDISHA BISWAS

11 The proliferation of extremism and security issues in the Maldives

193

KIRKLIN J. BATEMAN

PART IV

Issues of regional security and global implications

213

12 Terrorism, security, and development and the “never-ending” conflict over Jammu and Kashmir

215

EAMON MURPHY

13 Women and militancy in South Asia: Straddling the agent–victim binary

233

TANYA NAROZHNA

14 Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean

251

G.V.C. NAIDU

15 The impact of terrorism in South Asia: Implications and prospects IHEKWOABA D. ONWUDIWE AND EDIDIONG MENDIE

267

Contents PART V

vii

Conclusion

285

16 Some rumination on the impact of terrorism, insurgencies, and (in)security in South Asia in the age of globalization

287

M. RAYMOND IZARALI

Index

305

Illustrations

Table 7.1

Population percentages by religion

123

Figure 9.1

Terrorist incidents and casualties in Pakistan (2015–2019)

167

Contributors

Editors M. Raymond Izarali is a philosopher and Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada. Dr. Izarali’s research interests include globalization, global terrorism and security, human rights theory, Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia. He has published three co-edited books: The Contemporary Caribbean: Issues and Challenges (2013), Security, Education and Development in Contemporary Africa (2017), and Expanding Perspective on Human Rights in Africa (2019). He has also published a sole edited book, Crime, Violence and Security in the Caribbean (2018). Dalbir Ahlawat is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Australia. Dr. Ahlawat has published four books and thirty research papers in journals and edited books. His latest co-edited books include Indo-Pacific: Emerging Powers, Evolving Regions and Challenges to Global Governance (2016); and India-Australia Relations: Evolving Polycentric World Order (2017). Dr. Ahlawat's research interests include security and strategic affairs in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region with specific focus on India.

Contributors Rawshan Sadia Afroze, Superintendent of Bangladesh Police, is a Ph.D. candidate and sessional academic in criminology at the School of Social Science, University of Queensland, Australia. She graduated with a Master’s degree from Macquarie University, Australia in policing, intelligence and counter terrorism with international security studies. Zahid Shahab Ahmed is Research Fellow at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University, Australia. Dr. Ahmed studies peace and security in South Asia and has published extensively. He is the author of Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).

x

Contributors

Abdul Basit is Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Kirklin J. Bateman holds a Ph.D. and is Chief Academic Officer at the Expeditionary Warfare School of the U.S. Marine Corps University. Previously, Dr. Bateman was Associate Professor of War and Conflict Studies at the College of International Security Affairs in Washington, D.C. He has taught, researched, and published on a variety of irregular warfare topics. Bidisha Biswas is Professor of Political Science at Western Washington University. Dr. Biswas previously served as a policy adviser to the United States Department of State. Her research areas are international security, conflict, immigration, and refugee governance. In addition to writing two books, she has published several academic articles. Mokerrom Hossain is Professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Virginia State University, Petersburg, Virginia. Dr. Hossain has a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California and a Master’s in sociology from Dhaka University, Bangladesh. His research interests include nonstate violence in reference to history and social structure, and the role of ethics teaching among criminal justice professionals. Philip Hultquist is Associate Professor of Political Science in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Command and General Staff College, Army University. Dr. Hultquist holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of New Mexico. His research interests include internal security problems, defense, and development politics with a regional emphasis on India. William Maley is Emeritus Professor at The Australian National University. Dr. Maley is the author of Rescuing Afghanistan (2006), What is a Refugee? (2016), Transition in Afghanistan: Hope, Despair and the Limits of Statebuilding (2018), The Afghanistan Wars (3rd edition, 2021), and Diplomacy, Communication and Peace: Selected Essays (2021). Thomas A. Marks is Distinguished Professor and MG Edward G. Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy at the College of International Security Studies of the National Defense University. A former U.S. government officer, Dr. Marks previously served as the Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University (Quantico) and as a longtime adjunct professor at both the Air Force Special Operations School and the intelligence community’s Sherman Kent School. Edidiong Mendie is an adjunct instructor of criminal justice and a doctoral candidate of administration of justice at Texas Southern University in the U.S. She is an attorney licensed to practice law in Nigeria with a Master of Laws degree in energy, environment, and natural resources law from the University of Houston Law Center. Her research areas include green criminology, whitecollar crime, and terrorism.

Contributors

xi

Eamon Murphy is Adjunct Professor in the School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry at Curtin University, Western Australia. Dr. Murphy’s main research interests are terrorism, sectarian violence, and security in the South Asian region. His recent book publication is Islam and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: The Terror Within (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). G.V.C. Naidu is former founding chairperson and Professor of the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr. Naidu specializes in Indo-Pacific affairs, particularly issues related to maritime security and India’s engagement with this region. Dr. Naidu has numerous publications on a variety of topics concerning the Indo-Pacific. Tanya Narozhna is Associate Professor of Global Politics at the University of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. Dr. Narozhna holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Alberta. Her key research areas include critical security studies, gender, and terrorism. Dr. Narozhna’s major research over the last few years has focused on female suicide bombings. Declan Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe is Professor of Administration of Justice at Texas Southern University (TSU). Dr. Onwudiwe received his Ph.D. from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University. His research has focused primarily on community policing, terrorism, and homeland security. Stanley W. Samarasinghe holds a Ph.D. in economics from Cambridge University. He was Takemi Fellow at the Harvard School of Public Health and Cornell Visiting Professor at Swarthmore College. He is Adjunct Professor, Tulane University (New Orleans, Louisiana), and previously served as Research Professor and Director of the Development Studies Program at Tulane University. His research areas of interest include economics and international development, and global ethnic conflict. Alex Waterman is Research Fellow in Security, Terrorism and Insurgency at the University of Leeds, UK, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute, U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Waterman’s research interests include counterinsurgency, ceasefires, complex political orders, and comparative security studies more broadly.

Acknowledgments

Any book production comes with considerable demands and exhaustive work, let alone carrying out such an undertaking during a global health pandemic across continents and time zones. This one is no different. We extend deep appreciation to the contributing authors for their efforts, forbearance, and resilience in producing their respective chapter despite the constraints imposed by Covid19 around the world. This book focuses on South Asia, but its conception and coordination were from Canada and Australia. In Canada, we acknowledge with appreciation the kind assistance of Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, for funding research assistants through the Laurier Work Study Program (LWSP), the Office of the Dean of the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, and through the Office of Research for providing a book grant for indexing. In Australia, we also acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided by Macquarie University in Sydney for awarding Dalbir Ahlawat an Outside Studies Program to work on this book and the related research publications, and a travel grant to visit Canada. Gratitude is extended to Professor Ben Schreer, Head, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, and Professor Bates Gill at Macquarie University for their support and valuable advice. The works featured in this volume benefited significantly from the external referees’ anonymous reviews of the chapters. We thank them immensely for their professionalism, collegiality, and kindness in making time amidst the era of Covid-19 to share expert feedback so that the quality of the volume is optimized. We would be remiss if we did not convey our appreciation for the kindness and support provided by Rob Sorsby at Routledge and the New Regionalisms Series Editor, Professor Timothy Shaw.

Acronyms

AGP AGSA AISSF ANA ANNISU-R APC APF AQ AQIS ASR AuT BAL BGB BJP BJS BLA BNP BTFK CAA CC CCOMPOSA CMC COIN CPEC CPI CPIM CPIML CPN-M, CPN(M) CRPF CSCAP CT

Asom Gana Parishad Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Edara All-India Sikh Students Federation Afghan National Army All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union (Revolutionary) All Parties’ Conference Armed Police Force Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent Anandpur Sahib Resolution Ansar-ut-Tawheed Bangladesh Awami League Bangladesh Border Guards Bharatiya Janata Party Bharatiya Jan Sangh Baloch Liberation Army Bangladesh Nationalist Party Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan Citizenship Amendment Act Central Committee Coordination Committee of Maoists Parties and Organisations of South Asia Central Military Commission Counter Insurgency China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Central Reserve Police Force Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Counterterrorism

xiv Acronyms CTTCU CVE CWC BGB DGDI DGHC EP EPRLF EROS FARC FATA FATF FDI FNR FP GAM GCERF GDP GJM GNLF GoI HUJI ICC IDP IED IM IORA IPKF IS ISAF ISF ISGA ISI ISKP J&K JEI JeM JKLF JMB JMJB JNU JVP KCF KCP KhAD

Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit Countering Violent Extremism Ceylon Workers Congress Border Guards Bangladesh Directorate General of Defense Intelligence Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Eastern Province Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front Eelam Revolutionary Organization Students Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Federally Administered Tribal Areas Financial Action Task Force Foreign Direct Investment Forum for Naga Reconciliation Federal Party Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund Gross Domestic Product Global Jihadist Movement Gorkhaland National Liberation Front Government of India Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam International Criminal Court Internally Displaced Persons Improvised Explosive Device Indian Mujahideen Indian Ocean Rim Association Indian Peace Keeping Forces Islamic State International Security Assistance Force Indian Security Forces Interim Self-Governing Authority Inter-Services Intelligence Islamic State of Khorasan Province Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islam Jaish-e-Mohammed Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front Jamayat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh Jawaharlal Nehru University Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Khalistan Commando Force Kangleipak Communist Party Khedamat-e Atalaat-e Dawlat

Acronyms KLF KLO KYKL LDC LeJ LeT LTTE TELO MALSINDO MDA MHA MLPO MNDF MNLF MPS MQM MULTA NA NACTA NAP NC NCA NCP NCTC NDFB-P NDFB-RD NDFB-S NGO NIA NPP NPR NRC NSCN NSCN-IM NSCN-K NSLA OIC PB PC PDPA PLA PLGA PLO PLOTE POK

Khalistan Liberation Force Kamtapur Liberation Organisation Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup Least Developed Countries Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization Malaysia, Singapore and India Maritime Domain Awareness Ministry of Home Affairs Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance Maldives National Defence Force Moro National Liberation Front Maldives Police Service Muttahida Qaumi Movement Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam Nepal Army National Counter Terrorism Authority National Action Plan Nepali Congress (Party) Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Nepal Communist Party National Counter Terrorism Centre National Democratic Front of Bodoland–Progressive National Democratic Front of Bodoland–Ranjan Daimary National Democratic Front of Bodoland–Songbijit Non-Governmental Organization National Investigation Agency National People’s Party Nepalese Rupee National Register of Citizens National Socialist Council of Nagaland National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isak Muivah National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang National Santhal Liberation Army Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Politburo Provincial Council People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army Palestinian Liberation Organization People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

xv

xvi Acronyms POTA PRC PREPAK PULO RAB RGN RSF RSS RVE SAARC SGPC SIMI SLMM SLN SLPP SLT STIR SULFA TTA TTP U.S. UCPN-M ULFA ULFA-I ULFA-PTF UML UN UNDP UNF UNHRC UNLFWESEA UP USAID USSR VHP WBIED WMD WTO YCL ZUF

Prevention of Terrorism Act People’s Republic of China People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak Pattani United Liberation Organisation Rapid Action Battalion Revolutionary Government of Nagaland Reporters Without Borders Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh Radical Violent Extremism South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee Students Islamic Movement of India Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Sri Lankan Navy Sri Lanka People’s Front Sri Lanka Tamils Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution Surrendered United Liberation Front of Asom Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan United States Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist United Liberation Front of Asom United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent United Liberation Front of Asom–Pro-Talks Faction Unified Marxist-Leninists (of Nepal Communist Party) United Nations United Nations Development Program United National Front United Nations Human Rights Commission United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia Uttar Pradesh United States Agency for International Development Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vishwa Hindu Parishad Water-borne Improvised Explosive Devices Weapons of Mass Destruction Word Trade Organization Young Communist League Zeliangrong United Front

Part I

Introduction

1

Contextualizing terrorism, security, and development in South Asia M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat

Terrorism and security: Background Terrorism seems to be quite commonplace in the present time and especially following the 9/11 tragedy. At the level of optics, this may in part be because of the ubiquitous media coverage it gets in the West, especially on 24-hour news networks. In other respects, this may in part also be because those who live in the West seem to see or learn of incidents closer to home, especially incidents driven and inspired by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) networks (Ganguly & Al-Istrabadi, 2018, p. 14). From the stark, vivid horror of 9/11 in New York and Washington, to the London bombing, the Madrid bombing, and terrorism incidents across Europe and against Europeans and Westerners in general in global settings, the phenomenon seems both haunting and infectious (Izarali, 2018). Nevertheless, some seem to also think of it as somewhat new to the 21st century. Terrorism, as a number of scholars have noted, is far from a new phenomenon (Nassar, 2005; Izarali, 2018; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2018; Schmid, 2004; Onwudiwe, 2007). While the concept itself is said to have had its genesis in Edmund Burke’s observation and revulsion of the bloody French Revolution and the barbaric manner in which the government’s so-called liberation of the masses from the French monarchy came to literally consume the civilian public, it would be a mistake to conflate the phenomenon itself with the birth of the lexicon (White, 2017). Arguably, there are other aspects to terrorism too whose lexicons are yet to be coined and debated – for example, aspects of violent colonial conquests and disenfranchisement of societies and peoples (Onwudiwe, 2007; Jalata, 2011). As it stands, there is no concrete definition of the concept (Izarali, 2018; Schmid, 2004; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2018), owing to a variety of factors including the claim that what one person calls terrorism another might call liberation. The latter especially seems to be characteristic of the Israeli–Palestinian context, as some scholars note. However, in the contemporary context it is also characteristic of what has been dubbed as revolutionary terrorism when formerly colonized societies engaged in violence in seeking independence from European colonial empires during the mid-20th century. The case of the Mau Mau in Kenya is but one example. It must be recalled that the apartheid regime in South Africa

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M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat

that oppressed black South Africans gave rise to bitter protests and violence and the criminalization of Nelson Mandela as a terrorist. After all, it is worth bearing in mind that Gandhi’s nonviolence approach in seeking independence from Great Britain was not the trend or the bar at the time among other European or British colonies. Thus, some thinkers are of the view that labeling and the accompanying criminalization are a matter of position of power, which states or dominant groups could exploit. Definition affects classification but, as Alex Schmid (2004) notes, there is no uniformity of classifications among the databases of national agencies. Indeed, he has shown instances of duplication of events as well as misguided classifications because of the absence of clear criteria (Schmid, 2004; Izarali, 2018). Thus, both definitions and statistical accounts of terrorism can be marred. The impact of labeling and media recognition or media coverage should not be understated. So often there are many, even major, incidents of terrorism elsewhere in the world such as in Africa and Asia that go unreported and unnoticed in Western globalized media. Indian news media frequently feature reports of incidents of terrorism on Indian soil, for example, yet they are often not made news in much of the Western world except in instances where the victims happen to be from the West. The Mumbai bombing of 2008 is a notable example that was widely featured in the major press in the West, which was thus circulated globally through networks like CNN and the BBC. As Spindlove and Simonsen (2018, p.7) put it: It is seldom that one hears much about the barbarous acts committed in Third World countries, such as Rwanda, Congo, Zimbabwe, Burma, and Sudan, on the evening news in other than a quick sound bite. But let a few armed attackers take over a commercial airliner from a developed country, with 150–300 or so paying passengers, and the media flocks to stand by and listen to the demands of the terrorists and broadcast them around the globe. Consequently, exclusion or non-inclusion from view could lead Western publics into thinking that terrorism of the current times is largely something that happens to Westerners and is less an issue elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, it could also give rise to the idea that the reportage of terrorism in the Western media and literature depends on race and ethnicity, and the part of the world one lives. In such a situation, sympathy to, or empathy with, victims of terrorism would likewise depend on color, ethnicity, and geographical coordinates – even religion. Perhaps a near equivalent in conveying the point is the scope in which philosophy is taught in a great many of the universities in the West. We portend to be teaching philosophy of the world but generally do so by only teaching Western philosophy. Suffice it to say, terrorism remains a formidable issue that confronts us, and attention to it and the security issues it raises need to be equitable through the media and the literature, as opposed to a fixation of focus on the victimhood of Westerners or incidents in the West. Failing to broaden the scope of focus on the multiplicity of victims and perpetrators alike could potentially yield signals of

Contextualizing terrorism

5

neglect or lack of concern to distant strangers or transnational families and thus, in the same vein, foster vulnerability to radicalization and deepened waves of terrorism. Our proposed focus specifically on South Asia is a conscious recognition of the opportunity that prevails to diversify away from a Western-centric focus on terrorism and security. Especially since Talibanization, radicalization, and al Qaeda coordination have played out abundantly in Pakistan because of its proximity to Afghanistan, and have had catastrophic implications on global security, the focus on South Asia allows us the opportunity to more robustly examine some of the deep roots of terrorism that trigger global insecurity in the current times (Maley, 2003).

Terrorism and security issues in South Asia: Country contexts South Asia is comprised of eight countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It is, by any account, far from a simple region. The region is characterized by a variety of religions, ethnicities, languages, customs, histories, cultures, and a vast range of other elements characteristic of diversity. In the larger historical context, it has gone through various colonial conquests and controls, which mark different epochs in the evolution of its constitutive countries and with remnants of those epochs still very much notable. From the various kingdoms that ancestral India once was to the Mongols (or Mughals), the French, the Portuguese, and the English, much of the influence and impact from language to landmarks still remain. India itself up to the current times, from which later emerged Pakistan and Bangladesh, may be considered a world of its own. Its ability to preserve its ancient customs and religions exhibits vibrant practices of Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Islam, and Sikhism in addition to Christianity. These religious dimensions and cultural components have also been richly maintained in India’s vast diasporic transnational settings, especially Hinduism and Islam in global contexts, and Sikhism in England, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. Yet, in some important respects, these religious dimensions have also been sources of varying levels of tensions that have given rise to violent extremism and terrorism. Hindu and Sikh militancy were notable in the contemporary experience – for example, in the Ayodhya violence of the 1990s over the al-Babri Masjid (Maley, 2003), and the Khalistan movement for a separate Sikh homeland that gave rise to the Air India bombing in 1985. In the case of the latter, there was also a linkage of Sikh extremism to Canada, and there were many innocent victims of that tragedy who were Canadian. In the same vein, some scholars are of the view that there was relative unity in India among the various religions before the British arrival (Murphy & Malik, 2009). The splintering of Pakistan and the continued tension over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) carry strain and levels of political animosity between India and Pakistan (Kapur, 2008; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012; Moghaddam, 2018). Muhammed Ali Jinnah (father of the Pakistani state) splintered Pakistan away from India, arguably because he thought the Congress Party in India at the

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time did not show much priority toward its Muslim constituency, and, according to some scholars, he sought an open, hospitable society of the new country of Pakistan where people of all faiths would be respected. However, there have evolved some mutations of his vision in that society (Murphy & Malik, 2009). As Murphy and Malik (2009, p. 22) said of Jinnah: “He rejected religious communalism and advocated Hindu–Muslim unity until he became disillusioned with what he saw as the growing influence of Hindu thought among the leading members of the All-Indian National Congress.” A significant spread of the more entrenched Islamization in Pakistan on the public level is said to be attributed to General Zia ul Haq, who took over the government by coup and polarized the society away from the inclusive vision of Jinnah (Murphy & Malik, 2009). The repercussions to Pakistan, the region and in some sense to the global society of the present time may not be obvious. It hardly needs to be said, of course, that in Pakistan’s evolution in the 1970s and 1980s, the nesting and usurpation of the mujahideens to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan in order to stave off communist proliferation in the region were done by using Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to conduct training with funding encouraged by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (Qadir, 2001; Murphy & Malik, 2009; White, 2017; Syed, Saeed & Martin, 2015). The simple point is that the climate fomented especially by General Zia ul Haq was strategically used by others for Cold War interests that subsequently also resulted in the birth of al Qaeda upon conclusion of the Afghan–Soviet war. The influences of the Taliban on certain constituencies in Pakistan as especially nurtured by its proximity to neighboring Afghanistan (Maley, 2003), the network developed by rogue elements that coordinated between the geographies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and elements nurtured by the Pakistani ISI to carry out undertakings on its behalf have resulted in colossal destruction to lives and property much beyond the region through acts of terrorism. This situation, of course, has also affected innocent Pakistani civilians who continue to bear strains in other societies through labeling and stigma because of rogue hardline elements that operate(d) in their country of origin. As with the labeling and stigma Muslims face in global settings because of the carnage carried out by fanatic criminal zealots who present themselves as the vanguard of Islam, Pakistanis like people of Middle East ancestry endure a similar perception of prosecution and suspicion by virtue of their national identity or place of heritage. Thus, there are also more subtle but deeply affecting outcomes to people’s lives and liberties in a global context from terrorism and rogue groups in Pakistan (Maley, 2003). The exploitation of young minds and children in the hundreds of religious seminaries (also called madrassas) especially in the North Western Frontier and Baluchistan (Qadir, 2001; Basit, 2015) that function under extremists curricula of rogue administrators and the ISI has perpetuated the problem, and naturally provides a more expansive arsenal for militancy that could be channeled for the propagation of extremism and terrorism. In the Sri Lankan context, tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils saw decades of discontent with the rise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for an independent Tamil homeland. Various levels of terrorism on the part of

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both the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan state ensued, victimizing and displacing especially the civilian Tamil population. Here, too, the negative impact on human security was colossal. State targeting, on the one hand, and suicide bombings and other forms of destruction on the other hand carried out by the LTTE made for both a situation of carnage and vulnerability. Many Tamils in Canada and elsewhere who have fled the war and the calamities associated with it continue to be affected by the deep psychological scars from their experience. Such conditions present serious problems for human and social development, and for human security and public safety (Athukorala, 2016). While some good scholarly works have addressed these issues, there remains significant paucity of deep examination of them. In the Maldives, the situation is delicate – both in the religiopolitical sense and the economic hardship endured by Maldivians. The struggle to meet basic human needs make for a dismal outlook of life, leaving many to find inspiration in the propagandistic lure of ISIS for what is construed to be a better life (de Quetteville, 2018). Islam is the only legally permitted religion in the Maldives. Thus, religious fervor, the political structures that enforce it, and the difficulty to live a life of dignity in a sense orchestrate vulnerability among the people, which is exploited by ISIS recruiters and the like (Niyaz, 2010). Bangladesh also faces serious issues including the emergence of militant groups, which apparently draw some adrenaline from rival religious parties (Tripathi, 2015; Lorch, 2019; Fair & Oldmixon, 2015). The evolution of mutated religious seminaries that harbor extremism and exploit the vulnerability of the young is also a major issue for the country, which may similarly have been spawned by poverty, corruption, and distrust in the state institutions (Tripathi, 2015; Hossain, 2012). Rogue groups likewise exploit the social miseries and political instability to push for an Islamic State (IS) and orthodoxy of society. Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that the Bangladeshi Muslim society is driven by the whims and motives of Islamic militants in the country, as the majority of the country’s Muslims do not share such views (Hossain, 2012). Such consideration notwithstanding, the country does face problems by rogue elements that exist on the periphery (Hossain, 2012). As Khan (2017, pp. 191–192) notes, “Despite its impressive economic growth and social development, Bangladesh has become a target of Islamist militancy over the past two decades. The intensity of militancy became bolstered with the attacks on Holey Artisan Cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 1 July 2016.” As well, Bangladesh has to amicably address the issue of the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, who are eschewed in both Myanmar and Bangladesh and whose plight leaves them in very vulnerable conditions of subsistence and destitution (Fair, 2018). Bhutan, a Buddhist country located in the foothills of the Himalayas, is quite a peaceful society that seems immune from internal strife and safe from the threat of the “Macedonian syndrome” of externally instigated domestic ethnic upheavals as in the case of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In the late 1990s, four separatist movements in India – the United Liberation Front of Assam, National Democratic Front of Bodoland, Bodo Liberation Tigers Force, and Kamtapur

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Liberation Organisation (KLO) – set camps in the border areas of Bhutan. The KLO had allegedly established links between Nepalese Maoists and the Bhutan Tiger Force, a Bhutanese militant organization. Considering the threat to its internal harmony and pressure from India for allowing militant activities from its soil, the Bhutanese government launched Operation All Clear and got rid of rebels/ terrorists from its territory (Chhetri, 1997). Therefore, Bhutan, the only South Asian country that is not having any serious security and terrorism challenges, is exempted from devoting a full chapter to it in this compendium.

Terrorism, insurgencies, and security in South Asia After independence, South Asian states faced several challenges – among them, demarcation of borders without much consideration for demographics, religious orientations, and their historical antecedents that continue to persist. Weak states characterized by underdevelopment, varying ideologies, historical grievances, weak institutions, and the tensions of the Cold War had set the “perfect storm” for civil wars in the region. In the process, South Asia became home to insurgencies and terrorist activities that ranged from ethno-religious, leftist-communist, indigenous-independence struggles to religiopolitical movements. This culminated in South Asian states becoming origins, transits, and destinations of terrorism. For the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. indicted al Qaeda, which had operated its training camps in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban regime. The U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan and its installation of the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul in 2002 were considered to have lacked legitimacy. This attracted armed resistance from several tribal leaders, the majority of whom were Pashtuns. In response, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bolstered its counterinsurgency operations. After the ISAF’s partial withdrawal in 2014, the Afghan National Army (ANA) assumed control of the counterinsurgency operations. Notwithstanding rigorous training, advanced weapons, and continued logistical support provided by the remaining ISAF forces, the insurgents continued to pose a serious challenge to the ANA, and repeatedly captured governmentcontrolled territories. For example, at Kunduz, around 500 Taliban insurgents defeated around 7,000 ANA troops and seized the city (New York Times, 2015). The insurgency in Afghanistan remains untamed mainly because the U.S. is construed as having imposed its forces as well as that of the government without being cognizant of the complex tribal and ethnic alliances. Externally, Pakistan appears to play a twin role, namely, supporting the U.S. to fight international terrorism and at the same time providing safe haven to the Afghan Taliban (ICG International Crisis Group, 2014). Instead of assuaging the grievances by touching the hearts and minds of the aggrieved people, the Afghan government continues a military approach of “kill and capture” that led to the marginalization of different sections of the society (Schmeidl, 2016). The current government led by Ashraf Ghani continues to be vulnerable and reliant on foreign aid for its sustenance (Tan, 2018, p.158). This predicament is likely to conflagrate post-U.S. forces withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

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Pakistan also finds itself in a quagmire by insurgent and terrorist activities that appear to undermine development in the country on many levels (Fair, Littman, & Nugent, 2018). After 9/11, Pakistan joined the U.S. forces to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, and also arrested some high-profile al Qaeda leaders (the Mujahideens that the Pakistani military itself trained to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan). This action laid bare the twin roles adopted by the Pakistani military and gave rise to armed militias. In a sense, that pushed the country to the brink of a civil war. In response, Pakistan launched several counterinsurgency operations specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, banned some terrorist groups (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), and chased out some political parties and their leaders (Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and its leader Altaf Hussain). Among the major terrorist attacks, a ghastly attack in 2014 on an army school in Peshawar (where military personnel children study) led to the deaths of 141 students and staff (BBC, 2014; Sahill, 2018; Biberman & Zahid, 2019). In response, the military promulgated a new counterterrorism National Action Plan (NAP) with a provision to establish special courts to execute convicted terrorists (Zahid, 2016). Thus, the military used the war model to quell terrorism and insurgency. However, there is lack of a consistent and coherent policy, as the military and political leadership distinguish between “bad” jihadi groups (TTP, MQM), such as those that target Pakistan’s interests, and “good” jihadi groups, those that support Pakistan’s strategic interests in India and Afghanistan (Tankel, 2018). Indeed there is skepticism of Pakistan’s terror discourse and actual reality (Sahill, 2018; Tankel, 2018). On the one hand, as Rashid (2017) notes, “Pakistan blames its neighbours for terrorism instead of co-operating with them in fighting it, and uses militants as an appendage to foreign policy.” On the other hand, the U.S. accuses Pakistan for its role and has forced it to take “decisive action to shut down alleged terrorist sanctuaries on its territory, pertaining to the Afghan Taliban as well as the deadly Haqqani network, both of which have been responsible for insurgent attacks in Afghanistan” (Tan, 2018, p. 161). Not getting a satisfactory response, President Donald Trump tweeted on January 1, 2018: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” (Trump, 2018). Following this tweet, the U.S. suspended its security assistance so as to pressure Islamabad into initiating punitive actions against the militants. Such situations in Pakistan naturally strained the country from experiencing economic, social, and political progress in ways that could foster amicable development and betterment for its people. India also faces several terrorist and insurgency challenges (Siyech, 2018). According to Vice-Air Marshal Arjun Subramaniam, India faces four different types of threats: transnational terror networks (al Qaeda and Taliban), organized crime syndicates (which obtain sanctuary in Pakistan and finance attacks in India), proxy groups (Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami that receives funds from Pakistan’s intelligence agency), and indigenous outfits (local terrorist/insurgent groups including left-wing

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extremists) (Subramaniam, 2012, p. 397). Left-wing political parties exist in India since 1920. Although they actively fought for national independence, they became extremist with the peasant rebellion in Naxalbari in 1967 in West Bengal. Currently, threat emanates from the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which established a “Red Corridor” in almost one-third of India with support from the marginalized indigenous people. However, the adoption of several counterinsurgency strategies and the implementation of effective rehabilitation programs have resulted in almost containing the movement (Ahlawat, 2018). In a similar vein, the Maoist insurgency received rampant support in Nepal and forced the monarchy to step down. For the time being, the Maoists have mellowed, and they participate in democratic elections and the government. However, some insurgent remnants still remain active. Northeast states in India – Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura – also face separatist movements for autonomy or independence. However, by adopting hard and soft power approaches, India has neutralized most of these movements. It encourages them toward political solutions, to contest elections, form government and then change the legislation to meet their requirements but within the purview of the Indian constitution. Of particular concern was the Sikh movement in Punjab that initiated terrorist and insurgent activities for separation from India, but the Indian government responded through Operation Blue Star, a military-led operation, to neutralize the militants. Currently, several terrorist groups operate in J&K with their agenda ranging from autonomy to independence. This has been an ongoing problem since the partition of India in 1947. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan started sending the battle-hardened mujahideens across the border to fight for the cause of the Kashmiris (Ahlawat & Malik, 2019; Ahlawat & Izarali, 2020, pp. 663–664). However, that marginalized the local people and in the process, people became victims of the Indian military and the cross-border terrorism. Considering the U.S. withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan and possible flow of jihadis from across the border, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government took the opportunity to revoke the special status of J&K in August 2019 and divided it into two union territories (Ahlawat & Izarali, 2020). To deter cross-border terrorism, of late, New Delhi changed its strategy from defensive to retaliatory. Thus, it started to conduct military strikes across the border to neutralize the launching pads and militant training camps against what New Delhi saw as Islamabad’s role in sponsoring terrorism from its soil (Hall, 2019a). In feeling the brunt of cross-border terrorism, Afghanistan, India, and the U.S. through their collective efforts managed to have Pakistan placed on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Grey List (APG, 2019). In sum, there continue to be major issues of terrorism, insurgency, and security in South Asia that have consequences for development in the region. They demand deep scholarly attention. This book is a response to that.

Recent developments From a security standpoint, South Asia has been undergoing some major developments in the present times, as all the eyes were set on the outcome of the peace

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talks in Doha, Qatar between the U.S. government and the Taliban. The outcome may be such that Afghanistan is primed for a tug of war for dominance among rival groups like the Taliban, al Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State, and others, and may continue for a few years because of the vested interests of Pakistan, India, China, the U.S., and others. After becoming war fatigued from 19 years of fighting and having a deep interest in exiting Afghanistan, the U.S. signed an Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan with Taliban in February 2020. The agreement assured that Afghanistan “will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” (U.S. Department of State, 2020). It further added that the Taliban would not grant visas or passports, handle asylum seekers in Afghanistan according to international migration law and said agreement so that no threat is posed to the U.S., and would “prevent them from recruiting, training and fundraising” those who pose a threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies (U.S. Department of State, 2020). However, there are no provisions in the U.S.–Taliban agreement for the Taliban to cut ties with al Qaeda and other militant groups who have international exposure and battle-hardened cadres that may threaten the security of the South Asian region and leave the option for the Taliban to operate freely in South Asia. This was evidenced when shortly after the declaration of the agreement with the U.S., the Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada urged his people to “strengthen and organize your ranks to achieve the establishment of an Islamic government” and to follow “Islamic values” (Saif, 2020). Certainly, Pakistan has played a vital role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table with the U.S. This reflects Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban. In the post-U.S. withdrawal in 2021, there is a strong likelihood that the Pakistani military may repeat its previous strategy (as it did after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989) to push the Taliban cadres or other mujahideens (religious fighters) into J&K (a Muslim-dominated state in India, which is claimed both by India and Pakistan). Comparatively, this time it will be more compelling, as India revoked the special status granted to J&K and split it into two union territories in August 2019 (Hall, 2019b). Thus, India is likely to feel an enhanced impact of cross-border religious extremism. However, at the same time, Pakistan too may feel the pressure as a total control of the Taliban in Afghanistan will not only reduce its influence but also put pressure on Islamabad to resolve the border dispute. This may prove disadvantageous for Pakistan as the Pashtuns reside on both sides of the disputed Durand Line. The Taliban recently replaced the pro-Pakistan elements in the leadership with more neutral leaders like Mullah Yaqoob and Mullah Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai “to emerge from Pakistan’s shadow and to bolster its political legitimacy, particularly since the signing of the US–Taliban deal in February … to remove the label of being Pakistan’s proxy” (cited in Basit, 2020). Looked at from this perspective, the emergence of militancy in the border areas may turn out to be a real concern. India has traditionally had cordial relations with Afghanistan, except between 1996 and 2002 when the Pakistan-supported Taliban formed the government in

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Kabul and imposed Sharia law on its multiethnic society. Over the last 20 years, during the war in Afghanistan, India has contributed over three billion dollars in developmental aid that led to the construction of the national parliament, hospitals, roads, dams and bridges, which have been well received by the common Afghanis and their governments since 2002. However, India is not favorable about a Pakistan-supported Taliban that intends to follow Sharia law in its conservative form and marginalize other ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Such a situation, in India’s view, may also become the epicenter of anti-India terrorist activities. Thus, New Delhi is apprehensive about the formation of a government by the Taliban, which seems most likely to happen. China has its own deep concerns about the formation of a government by the Taliban. China shares a border with Afghanistan with its restive Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and thus fears cross-border incursions by the Taliban for support to Uygur Muslims. The Uygur are seen as suppressed by China and not allowed to follow their religious practices. In this case, China considers that its best bet would be to operate through Pakistan. Russia has its own inhibitions about the Taliban and a possible civil war situation in Afghanistan; as such, a scenario may impinge on Russia’s southern borders and attract Islamist militant groups on its soil as well as radicalize disgruntled Muslim youths in Russia. To assuage these concerns, after signing the agreement with the U.S., Sirajuddin Haqqani, deputy leader of the Taliban, assured that: “We acknowledge the importance of maintaining friendly relations with all countries and take their concerns seriously. Afghanistan cannot afford to live in isolation. The new Afghanistan will be a responsible member of the international community” (Haqqani, 2020). Notwithstanding pacifying the concerns, the competing priorities mainly among the Taliban, al Qaeda, the IS, and the current Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan may turn the country into a civil war and could pose a direct challenge to the Afghan National Security Forces. On June 22, 2020, Afghanistan’s National Security Council lamented that the Taliban had carried out 422 attacks in 32 provinces that killed 291 members of the Afghan security forces in a week (Tanzeem, 2020). The civil war–like situation may not remain confined to Afghanistan; it may also have spillover effects on Pakistan as the cadres of TTP (who waged war against the state of Pakistan from 2007 onward) were hounded out of Pakistan by the Pakistani army. Most of them joined the IS in Afghanistan. Facing challenge from the Taliban and al Qaeda, the IS cadres are likely to return to Pakistan for recruitment of new cadres and the expansion of their base in Pakistan. The IS plans to establish a wilayah in Pakistan. Islamabad may be more vulnerable with the IS reaching out to the young generation with religious intonations, especially in light of the country’s sagging economic situation. India too has been on the IS agenda since June 2014. In the 13th issue of its mouthpiece magazine, Dabiq, the IS claimed that “it will not be long before Kashmir is run by the organization” (Dabiq, 2014). Although the IS made several attempts to establish its modules in India, mainly in Kashmir, through Indian

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Mujahideen (IM) and Ansar-ut-Tawheed (AuT), the Indian security forces (ISF) were quick to neutralize the pro-IS elements. Finding the situation vulnerable in Kashmir, the IS declared its intent in May 2019 to establish Wilayah Hind (caliphate) in India (Fayaz & Alasdair, 2019). Notwithstanding such proclamations, the IS has failed to establish a foothold in India, mainly because of the aversion of Indian Muslims to jihad and also the intelligence-led operations by the ISF (Jadoon, 2018); however, the threat remains, as the excessive use of social media by the IS might prove instrumental in luring the youth in India. Al Qaeda has maintained strong relations with several jihadist and sectarian elements that operate from Pakistan, namely, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and TTP (The Soufan Centre, 2019). In September 2014, AQ announced its expansion with the inauguration of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). However, over the last five years, it has maintained a low profile. It remains to be seen how al Qaeda will deal with Pakistan, as Pakistan had provided land and air space to the American forces to fight against fellow Muslims. In June 2017, AQIS released its first comprehensive strategic plan in which Kashmir appeared prominently. Subsequently, in July 2017, AQIS formed Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind. In December 2017, AQIS released a video and encouraged its militants to target Indian security forces (Joscelyn, 2017). Like the IS modules, the ISF killed the AQIS leader Zakir Musa in mid-2019 and his successor Hameed Lelhari in October 2019. This situation created a leadership vacuum to steer the AQIS strategy. For its part, India declared that Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind has been “wiped out” in J&K, but the challenge remains (IANS, 2019). If the three major South Asian countries (Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan) get mired by militant organizations, the other states will likely also have a domino effect, as Sri Lanka faced a series of major terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday in 2019 and Bangladesh faced attacks from 2016 onward. Both Nepal (a Hindu country) and the Maldives (a Muslim country) could become epicenters of regional instability. Thus, from a pragmatic standpoint, there are significant regional issues of terrorism and security concerns in South Asia for the global public and the major world powers, and especially as the U.S. prepares to exit Afghanistan. It need hardly be said, too, that terrorism has been quite the phenomenon to contend with and, importantly, a good bit is deeply rooted in South Asia. This volume aims to enlighten readers by drawing attention to a multitude of terrorism and security issues in South Asia.

Organization of this volume This book brings to light the historical issues, current contexts of threats and challenges, and efforts made to address the situations. It features theoretical frameworks that shed light on scholarly perspectives on terrorism, with emphasis on their evolution in the South Asian contexts. Such accounts will help explain the challenges and trends connected to historicity, territoriality, ethnic conflicts and

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culturality, and the current waves of radicalization by groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda and their various inspired subsidiaries, and incidents across South Asia. The book is organized in five parts. Part I consists of this chapter, the introduction. Part II addresses country cases of terrorism, insurgencies, and development. Part III addresses issues of radicalization, extremism, and the state. Part IV addresses issues of regional security and global implications. Part V consists of the concluding chapter. Chapter 1, this chapter, provides a contextualization to the issues and the book. In Chapter 2, Mokerrrom Hossain and Rawshan Sadia Afroze claim that while Bangladesh has experienced many types of violence since independence in 1971, the views on such issues had a major shift after the 2016 Holey Artisan café attack. They argue that the non-state radical violent extremism needs to be contained, followed by the implementation of prevention and deradicalization programs alongside its counterterrorism strategies. In Chapter 3, Stanley Samarasinghe provides a deep analysis of the genesis of the ethnic tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the demographic history and make-up of the country, and the long civil war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state that ended in 2009. He addresses the use of terrorism as a tool, gives a lucid account of the role played by the state and the LTTE, and situates the issues within the development context of Sri Lanka. He addresses the need for an inclusive approach to governance and an equitable and principled way of dealing with the issues faced by the country. In Chapter 4, Thomas Marks claims that whereas the Nepali Maoists tend to be touted as having been reintegrated into Nepal’s political mainstream, their aim was actually to utilize a different route to carry on the power struggle. He argues that the mainstream Maoists’ reorientation of their strategy to lead with strong political organizational capacity with the aid of paramilitary action made them successful in getting to the brink of absolute power by way of united action which led to them joining the communists (not Maoists) of the United Marxist–Leninists (UML) to establish a singular Nepal Communist Party (NCP). According to him, the NCM now has, at all levels, complete political power. In Chapter 5, Dalbir Ahlawat gives an outline of the genesis of Naxal insurgency in India and the different phases of the movement’s development and growth. He claims that it predates the independence era. According to him, despite the welfare measures of different government administrations and in the wake of India’s economic liberalization, the Naxal insurgency became invigorated in 2004 and posed the most significant internal security threat for India by turning nearly a third of India into a “Red Corridor.” However, countermeasures taken by the BJP administration appear to have curbed the insurgency. In Chapter 6, Alex Waterman asserts that violence related to insurgencies in northeast India has dropped considerably since 2010, and there have been a number of peace agreements. He argues that the responses by the Indian government to conflict drivers in places like Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam served to suppress patterns of violence that are especially of interest to New Delhi, but the responses have not, however, suppressed the underlying violence altogether. Thus, there

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are still lingering patterns of violence and grievances, all of which challenge any claim of a return to “normalcy” in India’s northeast. In Chapter 7, Philip Hultquist focuses on the Khalistan secessionist movement in India. Hultquist asserts that a major crisis was created in Punjab by the insurgency for a Sikh state – Khalistan. According to him, the Khalistan case was puzzling for a number of reasons -- among them, the unusual circumstances such as the support from the relatively wealthy farmers in Punjab, a large local population of the state and a well-established diaspora. Furthermore, the situation was exploited by political entrepreneurs, which led to an ethnic outbidding process in the Sikh political system that started to favor extremism and eventually armed insurgency. However, the momentum became regressed into factionalism, fratricide, and criminalization. In Chapter 8, William Maley reminds us that Afghanistan has already gone through turbulence for 40 years. Moreover, Afghanistan also has had to deal with the implantation of terrorist groups on its soil that were rooted elsewhere in the world, especially al Qaeda and the Islamic State. He argues that the Taliban pose the main terrorist threat to ordinary Afghans, and Pakistan is where the Taliban has found a safe haven from which to operate. Maley utilizes the theoretical literature on terrorism to give an account as to why the Taliban can be properly labeled a terrorist group. In Chapter 9, Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed assert that Pakistan has come a considerable distance in the fight against terrorism, but despite this, extremism and terrorism remain prevalent because the scope of the counterterrorism framework remains limited. According to them, the structural factors of terrorism are yet to be addressed. They argue that the geopolitical context and the absence of non-kinetic counterterrorism measures in the internal security framework of the country will be the sources of terrorism continuing to be a low-intensity threat in Pakistan. Part II of the book, as already noted, is focused on addressing issues of extremism and the state. In Chapter 10, Bidisha Biswas asserts that the robust civil society, competitive elections, and vibrant media space in India have long been known as hallmarks of the country; however, in recent years the identity of the country as a pluralistic and secular democracy has been challenged by the Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, of the BJP ruling majoritarian party under Narendra Modi. According to Biswas, the direction shift has implications for domestic cohesion in India and for the country’s international reputation. In Chapter 11, Kirklin J. Bateman asserts that the stability and security of the Maldives are challenged by the emergence of religious extremism and endemic political corruption and criminal activity. He claims that the nature of the archipelago in being geographically dispersed and the role played by religion in both the society and the government make it difficult to achieve true democracy and reform. He explores the challenges faced by the government of the Maldives and the efforts to address them in seeking to protect Maldivians and the almost two million annual tourists to the country.

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Part III addresses issues of regional and global implications. In Chapter 12, Eamon Murphy claims that there are huge regional and global implications for the perpetual conflict over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which has resulted in three wars. The situation has also played a significant role in fomenting terrorism and extremism in South Asia and much further afield. Murphy analyzes the historical origins of this dispute between the two countries, discusses the implications for security in the region, and offers some suggestions on ways in which a resolution may be achieved. In Chapter 13, Tanya Narozhna undertakes to identify intraregional trends where women engage in terrorist activities across the region over the past two decades and to situate such trends in sociopolitical and historical contexts. Narozhna contends that a number of interrelated factors have given rise to female involvement in terrorist activities – among them, individual women’s agency, contextual factors, operational factors, and the gender-inclusive ideologies and recruitment approach taken by terrorist organizations. In Chapter 14, G.V.C. Naidu provides a succinct account of how the Indian Ocean is emerging as the epicenter of the India–Pakistan rivalry and the uneasiness among India and some of its neighbors in one respect; and of terrorism, transnational crimes, and drug smuggling in another respect. The amalgam of these situations is such that it exacerbates vulnerabilities in the region of South Asia. Naidu examines some salient elements that impact on transnational and maritime security vulnerabilities in the region by analyzing traditional and nontraditional security threats. In Chapter 15, Declan Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe and Edidiong Mendie assert that the informal recruitment of followers, very poor economic conditions in the region, and shared solidarity among insurgent groups are what account for the success of terrorist groups in South Asia as a core for terrorist movements and recruitment. Instead of discussing terrorism from an international and religious perspective, they focus on activities of homegrown violent extremism and global security implications therefrom, utilizing the concepts of habitus and deterrence in an effort to elucidate the security issues. Chapter 16 by M. Raymond Izarali concludes the volume by weaving together the larger picture, providing an historical outline of some major tensions, situating South Asia in the globalization context, and outlining some impact from terrorism, security, and insurgencies in the region. He provides some suggestions on the way forward in the interest of regional cooperation and development. As can be delineated from the chapter outlines provided, the volume presents a wide account of terrorism, security, insurgencies, and related developmental issues in South Asia. While it is by no means an exhausted or complete compendium of the issues and challenges in the region, it is hoped that the accounts provided will help to nourish students, researchers, and analysts alike with a more wholesome understanding of the varied complexities in South Asia and likewise foster wholesome response approaches. It is also hoped that the volume will give rise to further research by others on these and other related issues in the region, providing an even richer and better account as time evolves.

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References Ahlawat, D., & Izarali, M.R. (2020). India’s revocation of Article 370: Security dilemmas and options for Pakistan. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 109(6): pp. 663–683. Ahlawat, D. (2018). Maoist insurgency in India: Grievances, security threats and counter strategies. The Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2): pp. 252–266. Ahlawat, D., & Malik, S. (2019). Kashmir imbroglio: Geostrategic and religious imperatives. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2(2): pp. 59–82. APG. (2019). Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures—Pakistan, Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report, APG, Sydney. Retrieved from http://www.apgm l.org/includes/handlers/get-document.ashx?d=389ff465-24a1-41cf-9ab9-27edc2e4c836. Athukorala, P. (2016). Sri Lanka’s post-civil war development challenge: Learning from the past. Contemporary South Asia, 24(1): pp. 19–35. Basit, A. (2015). Countering violent extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s counterradicalization and de-radicalization initiatives. IPRI Journal, XV(2): pp. 44–68. Basit, A. (2020, September 25). Intra-Afghan talks and future of Pakistan-Taliban relations. The Interpreter. Retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/intra-afg han-talks-and-future-pakistan-taliban-relations. BBC News. (2014, December 16). Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435. Biberman, Y., & Zahid, F. (2019). Why terrorists target children: Outbidding, desperation, and extremism in the Peshawar and Beslan school massacres. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31(2): pp. 169–184. Chhetri, R. (1997). National security: A Bhutanese perspective. Retrieved from http:// www.nepalresearch.com/publications/rakesh_1997.htm. Dabiq. (2014). Interview with: The Wal of Khurasan, issue 13. Retrieved from https://cl arionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf. de Quetteville, H. (2018, October 19). Terrorists in paradise: Why did the Maldives become one of the world’s biggest exporters of Isil foot soldiers?. The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/19/terrorists-paradisewhy-did-mald ives-become-one-worlds-biggest/. Fair, C. C. (2018). Rohingya: Victims of a great game east. The Washington Quarterly, 41(3): pp. 63–85. Fair, C. C., & Oldmixon, S. (2015). Think again: Islamism and militancy in Bangladesh. The National Interest, 13 August. Retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/thi nk-again-islamism-militancy-bangladesh-13567. Fair, C. C., Littman, R., & Nugent, E. R. (2018). Conceptions of Sharia and support for militancy and democratic values: Evidence from Pakistan. Political Science Research and Methods, 6(3): pp. 429–448. Fayaz, B., & Alasdair, P. (2019, May 11). Islamic State claims ‘province’ in India for first time after clash in Kashmir. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-india-kashmir-islamic-state-idUSKCN1SH08J. Ganguly, S., & Al-Istrabadi, F. (2018). The future of ISIS: Regional and international implications. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hall, I. (2019a). The Pulwama terrorist attack: Modi under pressure. The Interpreter, 21 February. Retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pulwama-t errorist-attack-modi-under-pressure.

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Hall, I. (2019b). Why did the Modi government take the risk of revoking Kashmir’s special status? Transforming Society, 16 August. Retrieved from http://www.transformingso ciety.co.uk/2019/08/16/why-did-the-modi-government-take-the-risk-of-revoking-kas hmirs-special-status/. Haqqani, S. (2020, February 20). What we, the Taliban, want. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-wa r-haqqani.html. Hossain, A. A. (2012). Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh’s culture and politics: Origins, dynamics and implications. Journal of Islamic Studies, 23(2): pp. 165–198. IANS. (2019, October 27). “Here’s why IS failed to find ground in Jammu and Kashmir.” IndiaTV. Retrieved from https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/here-why-is-failedto-find-ground-in-jammu-and-kashmir-559401. ICG (International Crisis Group). (2014, May 12). Afghanistan’s insurgency after the transition (Asia Report No. 256). Retrieved from https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.n et/afghanistan-sinsurgency-after-the-transition.pdf. Izarali, M. R. (2018). The Caribbean in current global security affairs: The issue of terrorism. In M. R. Izarali (Ed.), Crime, violence and security in the Caribbean. New York: Routledge. pp. 240–269. Jadoon, A. (2018, February 9). An idea or a threat? Islamic state Jammu & Kashmir. CTC (West Point). Retrieved from http://ctc.usma.edu/idea-threat-islamic-state-jammu-kas hmir/. Jalata, A. (2011). Terrorism from above and below in the age of globalization. Sociology Mind, 1(1): pp. 1–15. Joscelyn, T. (2017, June 26). AQIS emphasizes allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, Taliban in new ‘code of conduct’. FDD′s Long War Journal. Retrieved from https://www.lon gwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/aqis-emphasizes-allegiance-to-ayman-al-zawahiritaliban-in-new-code-of-conduct.php. Kapur, S. P. (2008). Ten years of instability in a nuclear South Asia. International Security, 33(2): pp. 71–94. Kapur, S. P., & Ganguly, S. (2012). The jihad paradox. Pakistan and Islamist militancy in South Asia. International Security, 37(1): pp. 111–141. Khan, S. E. (2017). Bangladesh: The changing dynamics of violent extremism and the response of the state. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28(1): pp. 191–217. Lorch, J. (2019). Islamization by secular ruling parties: The case of Bangladesh. Politics and Religion, 12: pp. 257–282. Murphy, E., & Malik, A. R. (2009). Pakistan jihad: The making of religious terrorism. IPRI Journal, 9(2): pp. 17–31. Maley, W. (2003). The ‘war against terrorism’ in South Asia. Contemporary South Asia, 12(2): pp. 203–217. Moghaddam, F. M. (2018). Mutual radicalization: How groups and nations drive each other to extremes. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. New York Times. (2015, September 28). Taliban fighters capture Kunduz city as Afghan forces retreat. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/world/asia/talibanfighters-enter-city-ofkunduz-in-northern-afghanistan.html. Nassar, J. (2005). Globalisation and terrorism: The migration of dreams and nightmares. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Niyaz, A. (2010, October). Terrorism and extremism: A threat to Maldives tourism industry. UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 24.

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Onwudiwe, I. D. (2007). The place of criminology in the study of terrorism: Implications for homeland security. African Journal of Criminology & Justice Studies, 3(1): pp. 50–77. Qadir, S. (2001). The concept of international terrorism. An interim study of South Asia. The Round Table, 360: pp. 333–343. Rashid, A. (2017, February 24). Militant groups forge ties as Pakistan havens remain. FT.com. Retrieved from http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2017/02/24/militant-groupsforge-ties-as-pakistan-failsto-tackle-their-havens/. Sahil, P. H. (2018). The terror speaks: Inside Pakistan’s terrorism discourse and National Action Plan. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41(4): pp. 319–337. Saif, S. K. (2020, February 29). US, Afghan Taliban ink historic peace deal. AA. Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/us-afghan-taliban-ink-historic-peace-deal/ 1750028. Schmid, A. P. (2004). Statistics on terrorism: The challenge of measuring trends in global terrorism. Forum on Crime and Society, 4(1 & 2): pp. 49–69. Schmeidl, S. (2016, February 26). ISIS is the least of Afghanistan’s problems. The Interpreter, Lowy Institute. Siyech, M. S. (2018). A typology of insurgent, terrorist and extremist threats in India. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 13(2): pp. 231–251. Spindlove, J. R., & Simonsen, C. E. (2018). Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future, 6th edition. New York: Pearson. Subramaniam, A. (2012). Challenges of protecting India from terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(3): pp. 396–414. Syed, S. H., Saeed, L., & Martin, R. P. (2015). Causes and incentives for terrorism in Pakistan. Journal of Applied Security Research, 10(2): pp. 181–206. Tan, T. H. T. (2018). Evaluating counter-terrorism strategies in Asia. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2): pp. 155–169. Tankel, S. (2018). Beyond the double game: Lessons from Pakistan’s approach to Islamist militancy. Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(4): pp. 545–575. Tanzeem, A. (2020, June 22). Afghan security forces suffer bloodiest week in 19 years. VOA. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/usa/afghan-security-forces-suffer-bl oodiest-week-19-years. The Soufan Centre. (2019). Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent: Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia. New York: The Soufan Centre. Retrieved from https://thesoufancenter.org/ research/al-qaeda-in-the-indian-subcontinent-aqis-the-nucleus-of-jihad-in-south-asia/. Tripathi, A. (2015). Profiling non-state armed militant groups of Bangladesh. Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 19(1&2): pp. 119–134. Trump, D. J. (2018, January 1). Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/ 947802588174577664?lang=en. U.S. Department of State. (2020, February 29). Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/agreement-for-bringing-peace-to-a fghanistan/. White, J. R. (2017). Terrorism and homeland security, 9th edition. California: Wadsworth. Zahid, F. (2016, July 19). Counter terrorism policy measures: A critical analysis of Pakistan’s national action plan. The Mackenzie Institute. Retrieved from http://mac kenzieinstitute.com/counterterrorism-policy-measures-a-critical-analysis-of-pakistansnational-action-plan/.

Part II

Country cases of terrorism, insurgencies, and development

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Non-state acts of terrorism and counterterrorism in Bangladesh A critical review Mokerrom Hossain and Rawshan Sadia Afroze

Introduction Terrorism, a non-state act of violence or radicalization into violent extremism (RVE), has taken hold across the world after the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil and is a highly vexed contemporary global security issue requiring extraordinary measures to counter it. Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority country with a population of 160 million, has experienced repeated non-state violent attacks in recent years. In 1971, the people of erstwhile East Pakistan fought an armed struggle against the army of West Pakistan to establish an independent secular Bangladesh. On December 16, 1971, the country won its independence. In 1974, the war-ravaged Bangladesh became a full member of the United Nations (UN), getting a stigma from the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kiesinger, as a “bottomless basket.” After a troublous period of political instability along with economic uncertainties, Bangladesh gradually started turning away from economic hurdles to economic development. In 2015, Bangladesh earned the status of a lower-middle-income country. In 2018, it had fulfilled all three eligibility criteria to leave the UN’s least developed countries (LDC) list for the first time and was expecting to earn the status of a developed economy in 21 years (The United Nations News, March 13, 2018). Though sporadic political violence has been with the country since its inception after 9/11, when terrorism and the non-state violent attacks have become a recurrent phenomenon of many countries of Asia and Africa, Bangladesh has earned praise as a “moderate” Muslim country because of its stand against terrorism. However, the country’s leaders have failed to put a clamp on sporadic political violence that sometimes merged with the non-state violent extremism. To achieve the status of “developed country (DC)” by 2041, the country needs to recognize today’s terrorism and non-state radical violent extremism as a significant problem and handle it carefully. The global “War on Terror” began immediately after 9/11, but after 19 years of employing a hard approach, the world could not declare a victory. Today’s terrorism, as it appears, is a new kind of non-state violence that requires a special type of counterterrorism strategy combining both hard and soft powers. This chapter addresses the contemporary non-state radical violent extremism Bangladesh is facing from historical and social structural perspectives. This

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chapter contains a description of an existing dispute over the meaning of the word terrorism, a brief history of terrorism in Bangladesh since the colonial period to the end of Pakistan period, a proposal of a linear-path framework to study RVE, an examination of counterterrorism measures adopted by the government of Bangladesh, and effects of terrorism on the economic development of the country.

Terrorism: A highly disputed word As early as 1995, Victor T. Levine (1995) has pointed out the “logomachy” of terrorism – disputes about the meaning of the word. No word has sparked more disagreement in recent years than terrorism (Schanzer, 2019). The word terrorism originated from the word terror, which came from Latin terrere, which means “frighten” or “tremble,” and adding a French suffix -isme referring to “practice.” The word terror is 2,100 years old. Still, the word terrorism for “causing the frightening” became a part of the Western vocabulary following the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror (1793–1794) imposed by the Jacobian regime (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010). Vera Zasulich proclaimed she was “a terrorist not a criminal” in 1878 which gave terrorism a controversial meaning (Rapport, 2002; Sakharkar, 2005; Wieviorka, 2007). Since then, this phenomenon has visited different parts of Western colonies, as well as mainland Europe (Primoratz, 2013; Rapport, 1984, 2002). The logomachy of terrorism increased when Chaliand and Blin (2007) documented the assassination of Nizam al-Mulk, the Persian grand vizier of the Turkish Seljuq sultan, as a significant terrorist attack in human history. After 1878, the dispute over the meaning of the word increased as political violence and freedom fights have become synonymous with terrorism. In the early 1980s, Schmid and Jongman have attempted to reduce logomachy by providing an acceptable definition of terrorism (1988). In 1994, Jeffrey Simon (1994) identified about 212 definitions of terrorism. In 2011, about 100 terrorism experts from 20 countries had failed to develop an acceptable definition (Schmid, 2011). The logomachy exists because of its contradiction – “[O]ne person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Marsella, 2004, p. 15). The logomachy of terrorism continues due to the historical changes of its purposes, and the differences that exist between political, academic, and legal perspectives (Badey, 2016; Merari, 1993; Miller, 2001; Schmid, 2011). Nevertheless, the staircase model of Moghaddam (2005) and the NYPD jihadism model (2007) helped mitigate the dispute over the meaning of the word terrorism. Randy Borum’s (2011a,b) summary of dozens of explanatory theories of terrorism brought a new paradigm in explaining terrorism as radical violent extremism.

History and background: Non-state violent terrorism in Bangladesh The British Colonial Period To comprehend today’s non-state violent acts of terrorism in Bangladesh, an historical overview is essential. Bangladesh, being a part of colonial India, did

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experience the anti-colonial wave of terrorism (Chatterjee, 2004; Heehs, 1993). India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh witnessed many faces of political violence, including what scholars branded as terrorism. From today’s perspective, one can quite easily characterize the whole British colonial period as a period of statesponsored terrorism. The freedom-loving Indians routinely organized themselves in small groups and developed resistance to colonial rules. It began with the armed revolt by Indian soldiers against the East India Company in 1857, which was branded by the British as the Sepoy Mutiny. Still, local people called it the first freedom fight. After that, groups adopted violent means to unshackle the country from foreign rulers. The colonial authority suppressed them ruthlessly and carried out preemptive measures (Wolpert, 1984). During colonial rule, many individuals who were considered early martyrs of independence were hanged as terrorists (Ghosh, 2017; Silverstri, 2019). In Bengal, two individuals, Khudiram Bose (1896–1913) and Surya Sen (1898– 1935), who were hanged by the British rulers for terrorist attacks, were inspirational characters for many freedom fighters of Bangladesh (Bakshi, 1988). The British response to freedom movements frequently turned into a “reign of terror,” and the reaction of the natives became part of the mainstream political culture of greater India. But what has happened in Bangladesh in recent years is different from the colonial period. The neo-colonial Pakistan period For East Pakistanis, 25 years of the united-Pakistan period had been a continuous struggle for the establishment of a democratic system of governance based on the principle of one man, one vote. All political demand had routinely been thwarted by the military-bureaucrat ruling authority of West Pakistan (Anderson, 1974; Feldman, 1967). Following the colonial tradition, all political movements to restore democracy in East Pakistan had been brutally suppressed by the autocratic rulers of West Pakistan. The “reign of terror” of the military-bureaucratic ruling class began immediately after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first governor-general of the united-Pakistan, wanted to impose the Urdu language, only spoken by 7% of the total population, as the national language of Pakistan (Umar, 2004). The Bengalis of East Pakistan, the majority population of united-Pakistan, opposed the idea. The West Pakistani power elite did not seek a political solution, but instead reacted violently. As a result, a couple of demonstrating Bengali students died (McGrath, 1998). A conflicting relationship began between the two wings of Pakistan. The majority of the Muslims and Hindus of East Bengal supported the Lahore Resolution and endorsed the creation of Pakistan, not for religious reasons, but only to end colonial rule and upper-caste Hindu domination. The West Pakistani leadership, from the beginning, routinely used the Islam card to fan emotion rather than upholding democratic principles (Callard, 1957; Feldman, 1967; McGrath, 1998). Finally, the West Pakistani ruling class decided to ignore the 1970s election results and hand over power to the Awami League, the duly elected political

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party. Instead, the military rulers hatched a military assault called “Operation Searchlight,” and genocide began in East Pakistan on the night of March 25, 1971. The Bengalis took up arms to protect themselves and established an independent Muslim majority secular country (Afzal, 2001; Anderson, 1974; Blood, 2002; Hossain, 2010). On December 16, 1971, the war ended, and Bangladesh earned its independence from West Pakistan.

The political violence vis-à-vis non-state violence We are examining the historical antecedents of political violence to understand the non-state radical violent extremism of Bangladesh because both are structurally intertwined. Bangladesh earned its independence through violent arm struggle in 1971, and still it is facing political violence. Within four years of independence on August 15, 1975, its first prime minister – the Founding Father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – faced a violent death, and the country entered into an arena of violent extremism (Islam, 1984). Within six years of the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Ziaur Rahman, an army general turned politician, became the president of the country and was also assassinated in another military coup. Since independence, the process of democracy and secularism have been thwarted by violent military coups and countercoups, before a clear “victor” emerged (Fair, Hamza, & Heller, 2016). Religion was brought in the sphere of the public domain of the country through the legitimation of many anti-Bangladeshis and members of the Islamist political party the Jamat-e-Islam (Lorch, 2019; Riaz & Naser, 2011; Siddiqi, 2006). Today’s non-state radical violent extremism is the upshot of the political maneuvering that began with the removal of secular principles from the constitution in 1977 by President Ziaur Rahman and the declaration of Islam in 1988 as the state religion by President Muhammad Ershad. These two army generals brought structural changes by floating two political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Jatiya Party (JP), and by establishing religion into public and cultural spheres (Riaz & Naser, 2011). The political environment has remained highly contentious because the major political parties – the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islam (JEI) – have had a history of using their members of student wings as party storm troopers to protect their respective sphere of influence (Deo, 2016). The country has been swinging between the two domains of the secularists and the Islamists at least since 1947, first in East Pakistan, then in Bangladesh. The secularists want to maintain a distance from religion, but the Islamists rely on the “ideologization” of the Islamic faith (Islam, 2015). Since the late 1970s, Bangladesh has been polarized between the right-of-center BNP and the left-of-center BAL (Hasan, 2012). To secure the country’s remittance earnings, the party in power has always maintained a supportive foreign policy toward the Saudi government (Riaz, 2008; The Soufan Center, 2019). In a country with minimum democratic values of individual freedom and a highly centralized colonial bureaucratic administration, the head of government plays

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a significant role in bringing significant changes in its institutions. President Zia (1977–1981) and President Ershad (1983–1990) both ruled Bangladesh for about 15 years at its early formative stage and their preference for the Saudi-style Wahhabi Islamic culture set the course of Islamization on firm footing through the statecontrolled media (Riaz, 2008; The Soufan Center, 2019). This trend of Islamization continued during Khaleda Zia’s (wife of President Zia) two-term tenure of a total of 10 years (1991–1996 and 2001–2006). The repatriate Middle Eastern workers also played a significant role in interjecting Wahhabi values to culture (Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, 2017; International Crisis Groups, 2018). Wahhabism does not support Sufi-style Islam, which was introduced to Bengal by the early Muslim missionaries of Persia and Baghdad (Eaton, 1993). The various attacks on the Mazars (shrines) of Pirs in 2003 and 2004 were the manifestation of Wahhabism (Ross & Hossain, 2004; Sells, 2016) – an anti-Mazars and anti-Pir culture – and due to the political culture, these violent acts were treated differently. Bangladesh shares borders with the provincial states of northern India and Myanmar, both of which have problems of extremism. This border-sharing reality stands to impact the national security of Bangladesh. The states of the north of India are facing left-wing extremism (LWE) and separatist movements. In 2010, Bangladesh arrested and handed over one top leader of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) to Indian authorities, and in 2015 it handed over to Indian authorities Anup Chetia, another senior leader of the same separatist organization who was arrested 18 years earlier (The Hindu, November 11, 2015). The border with Myanmar has created a massive refugee problem for Bangladesh by way of handling the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks on Myanmar’s security forces in 2016 and 2017. Internal sectarian violence has forced over 750,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh, dramatically changing the security issues of the South Asian region. These refugees in Bangladesh might be the target of jihadi recruiters and can be radicalized (Seleth, 2018). Put simply, the internal political violence of one country, Myanmar, could be a stable source of non-state radical violent extremism of a whole region (Allchin, 2017). The attack on Holey Artisan Bakery on July 1, 2016, finally changed Bangladesh’s perception of political violence and brought to its realization that the wave of religious radical violent extremism had reached the country (Siddiqa, 2018). This realization was officially demonstrated when the country’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, attended the three-day Munich Security Conference in 2017 and met the chancellor of Germany and reaffirmed their commitments to fight terrorism (The Daily Star, February 19, 2017). This was critical for two reasons: firstly, it helped everyone to move to a different level of understanding to reconsider many previously branded political violence as non-state radical violent extremism, and secondly, counterterrorism strategies have become more targeted.

Radical violent extremism and the Bangladesh context Political violence, whether by police or by members of a rival political party, has been a recurring phenomenon of the political history of Bangladesh. Still,

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the Afghan war and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have brought newer dimensions in the examination of any acts of violence (Khan, 2017). Due to the radicalization process, some Bangladeshis have turned into violent extremists and have inflicted injuries and death on innocent citizens. Early leftist radical violent extremism There had been some left extremists who were mostly radicalized by Marxist philosophy, which often turned violent. During the British colonial and early Pakistan periods, these leftist radical extremists were followers of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)–sponsored Communism ideology (Franda, 1970). Due to the rift between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1962, the followers of Communism across the Indian subcontinent were divided into two groups: pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese groups (Gupta, 1972; Smith, 2014). These followers later broke into many local fractions with their interpretations of Marxism. Immediately after independence, Siraj Sikdar came to prominence because of his Sarobohara Party, which was based on the ideology of Charu Majumder of West Bengal. Different fractions of leftist violent radical extremists have succeeded in establishing their control over the western and southwestern districts of the country and were responsible for many killings during the last decades (Islam, 2011). From the inception of Bangladesh, the leftist radicals were violent, and they were clear about that, like today’s jihadi violent radical extremists. Leftists called for “an armed struggle” for economic salvation, and the jihadist wants to establish “Sharia” rule. Islamist jihadi violent extremism Since the late 1990s, Bangladesh has witnessed an increasing number of violent terrorist acts across the country that were nothing but actions of violent radical extremists. In October 1999, a mosque of Ahmadiyya, a tiny Muslim minority sect, was bombed, killing 9 and injuring 35 individuals (The Associated Press, October 10, 1999). In 2001 there was a grenade attack on a Communist Party rally in Dhaka, killing 7 and wounding 50 others. A bomb was thrown at the Mymensingh Cinema hall on December 7, 2002, in which 19 individuals were killed and over 100 injured. There were numerous attacks on various Sufi shrines in 2003. In 2004 Islamist radical violent extremism drew attention due to Bangla Bhai, also known as Siddique ul-Islam and Aziz ur-Rahman, who was the military commander of the al-Qaeda affiliated extreme Islamist organization Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB). The Dhaka grenade attack took place at an Awami League rally on August 21, 2004. The attack left 24 dead and more than 300 injured, including Awami League President Sheikh Hasina (The Daily Star, August 21, 2018). On August 17, 2005, some 400 small bombs exploded almost simultaneously in 63 of the 64 districts in the country, killing at least 2 and injuring more than 150 innocent people. Isolated incidents of violent extremism turned

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into an organized outbreak when Hefazet-e-Islam, an Islamist front formed in 2010 by ten religious parties, on May 5, 2013, paralyzed the capital Dhaka by bringing 500,000 people on the streets. They demanded the implementation of 13 measures, including an insertion in the wording of the constitution to include “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah.” Target killings began in the same year with the murder of Ahmed Rajib Haider, a secularist blogger, and by May 2016, the total number of target killings crossed two dozen (Hodges, 2018). The July 1, 2016, attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery changed the understanding of political violence. A research organization has classified the four-decades (1979–2019) history of non-state violent extremism into five different overlapping phases based on the characteristics of the actors. It named each phase as a “generation,” thus “the first-generation extremists were those who have joined the Soviet-Afghan war during 1979–1992” (Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, 2017, p. 3). The members of the first-generation created Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HUJI) in Bangladesh. In 1996, the second generation emerged with the advent of the organization “Qital Fi-Sabilillah.” This organization turned into “Jamayatul-Mujahidin Bangladesh” (JMB) in 1998, which was connected with HUJI. The rise of Hizbut Tahir in 2001 brought the third generation. The process of Islamist radicalization increased, and the fourth generation of extremists commenced in 2007 through the group known as Jamatul Muslemin, which later began to function as “Ansarulah Bangla Team.” The groups were influenced by ideologue Anwar Awlaki and claimed to represent al-Qaeda in Bangladesh under the name of Ansar Al-Islam. The emergence of ISIS signaled the rise of the fifth-generation extremists. In 2015, the JMB divided into two broad groups, one was the older JMB and the new one, which left the JMB for ideological reasons, has come to be known as Neo-JMB. This new group claims that it represents the Bangladesh chapter of Islamic State (IS). All extremist groups tend to be homegrown, but they may have connections with international terrorist groups. The fifth generation of extremists was responsible for the Holey Artisan Bakery attack carried out by a group of five young Western-educated Bangladeshis in 2016, killing 29 people, including 20 hostages,18 foreigners, and 2 locals (Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, 2017).

A linear-path framework to examine RVE of Bangladesh Bangladesh needs to contain radical violent extremism to stay on the path of economic development. However, until now, law enforcement counterterrorism strategies, which seem inadequate, remain the dominant methods to fight RVE in the country. Along with criminal justice strategies to counter violent extremism, there have been limited efforts to increase public awareness against RVE through Community Support Mechanisms, street parades, and town hall meetings. Over the decades there developed different theories, like psychological (Kegley, 1990; Rasch, 1979), psycho-social (Pearce, 1977; Post, 1998), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Webber, 2007), rational choice (Crenshaw, 1992, 2000;

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Sandler et al., 1983), and religious (Pope, 2003; Rapport, 1984), to explain terrorism. These theories, instead of reducing, have increased the existing logomachy of the term terrorism. Randy Borum conceptualized a four-stage heuristic model (trial and error) “to aid investigators and intelligence analysts in assessing the behaviors, experiences, and activities of a group or individual associated with extremist ideas” (2003, p. 7). Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism model came in 2005, followed by Silber and Bhatt’s model of jihadization in 2007. These model construction efforts opened a new vista of possibilities by bringing a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) in terrorism studies. Borum’s formulation of RVE in 2011 (2011a, 2011b) has provided a theoretical foundation that was lacking in model-building efforts. A new field of radicalization studies began to grow (Smith, 2018). A processual meta-analysis has identified 28 such models currently floating in the radicalization field (De Coensel, 2018). Though these process models have failed to address the multifactorial and contextual reality of radicalization into violent extremism, there developed an RVE approach by shifting the attention from an actor to a dynamic process that eventually leads to an act of violence. This paradigm shift allows researchers to include diverse independent variables in the equation that have played roles in radicalizing some individuals to act violently (dependent variable). Thus, researchers could shift focus from the nonstate actors of radical violence to the processes that have loosened social bonds and have helped develop an attachment to a radical violent ideology. This process begins with the exposure to radical ideology and, depending on the character of the individual, a host of factors influences him/her to internalize the messages and perform a violent act. For an organized group it works as a liner path, but for an individual it is a cyclical process; it begins with a contact to a radical ideology and ends with a violent act. In view of this metatheory, a research framework has been proposed here to study the radical violent extremism of Bangladesh. This framework will allow researchers to add as many determining factors (independent variables) as they might identify for the rise of RVE in the country by interviewing a sample of the population already being considered as extremists – individuals either arrested or convicted for taking active roles in an act of terrorism under the current counterterrorism acts (Rabbi & Alam, 2019). Additional information related to socio-politico-economic antecedents for choosing a violent path could be collected through focus group meetings of the members of law enforcement agencies and other professionals involved in counterterrorism strategies. One can look at the ethnic background, like Rohingyas, to validate the concerns many have about their involvement in the country’s terrorism. More relevant information about the progression of violent radicalism could be generated by interviewing the friends and acquaintances of the same sample. A snowball method will help develop a reasonable pool of friends and acquaintances. The estimated size of this population will be of a few thousand (Rabbi & Alam, 2019; Report OSAC Analysis, 2020). With cooperation from state authorities, a research strategy can be designed for empirical data collection that will assist in developing independent variables that have forced these individuals to

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act violently. Depending on the findings, the researchers will prioritize the independent variables that have shaped the linear path taken by the identified radical violent extremists of Bangladesh. Then it is time to conduct multiple studies and collect empirical data to construct a host of multiple middle-range linear-path framework analyses for the rise of RVE in Bangladesh. From these multiple linear-path frameworks, other researchers could construct a grand framework, targeted intervention, and deradicalization programs.

Counterterrorism strategies in Bangladesh The counterterrorism strategy is like a continuum where the law enforcement approach occupies one end and the war-fighting approach takes the other end; and the democratic elements (e.g., civil liberties, citizen’s rights to safeguards and privacy) occupy the center of this continuum. The war-fighting strategy includes the use of military or quasi-military tools to destroy the terrorists’ capacity to attack. According to the war-fighting approach, the victory means “the complete cessation of all hostile activity through the destruction of the enemy’s capacity to engage in hostile acts” (Morag, 2011, p. 64). The law enforcement approach considers terrorism as a crime and focuses on the reduction of crime at an acceptable level and views the enemies as individuals required to be prosecuted for committing a crime (Morag, 2011). For this approach, -success means, at a minimum, effective maintenance of law and order and, at a maximum, the successful prosecution and imprisonment of all terrorists to reach the complete cessation of terrorist activities (Morag, 2011). Before 9/11, Bangladesh did not have any specific legislation that directly addressed terrorism as mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution. Since independence, Bangladesh became the signatory of several international antiterrorism conventions, including 14 UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime, and the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy signed in 2006 (Fabe, 2017; Khan, 2007). In the post-9/11 era, the Bangladesh government, to tackle militancy, has taken the following measures (Bashir, 2016; Rapid Action Battalion Bangladesh, 2019a; Riaz, 2016) (Ali Ashraf, 2014): 1. Institutional development a. Formation of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in 2004 as a specialized force, comprised of members of all security forces of the Bangladesh police, army, navy, air force, border guard, ansar and coastguard b. Formation of the Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC) in 2016 with specific power to address terrorism and violent extremism c. Formation of the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) in 2019 to counter violent extremism and address the deradicalization process 2. Apprehension and execution of top leaders of eminent militant groups in 2007

32 3. 4. 5. 6.

Mokerrom Hossain and Rawshan Sadia Afroze Banning of several suspected terrorist organizations Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2009, amended in 2013 Intelligence reform International and regional cooperation

Anti-terrorism legislation and its effectiveness Since 2002, the government has taken several significant intelligence reform initiatives that focused on financial crime, border intelligence, and interagency coordination (Ali-Ashraf, 2014; Khan, 2007). It also took a legislative initiative to comply with UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178 (Khan, 2007). The government promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009, which was twice amended, in 2012 and 2013, to address money laundering and terror financing. The Bangladesh government has also enacted the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO), as a supplementary to the Anti-Terrorism Act (Fabe, 2017). These legislations do have some limitations, including not having a clear definition of terrorism and not having the provision of arresting foreign actors (Leonard, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004; U.S. Department of State, 2018). However, these changes have given the prime minister the absolute authority over the intelligence agencies of the country (Ali-Ashraf, 2014). Regional and International Collaboration and Use of Soft Power Bangladesh joined the South Asian Anti-Terrorism Taskforce with India and the U.S. (Fabe, 2017; Khan, 2017). The U.S. supports Bangladesh in improving the country’s airport security system (Fabe, 2017). Additionally, the U.S. and Australia are involved in providing training to counterterrorism (CT) personnel as a part of capacity building initiatives. Regional organizations, like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), lack the power to initiate collaborative counterterrorism mechanisms and cross-border joint investigations (Fink, 2010). With financial support from the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience (GCERF), a soft approach known as the Community Support Mechanism was introduced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015 to counter violent extremism at the grassroots level (Khan, 2017). The GCERF supports awareness development programs for local imams and religious scholars against extremism. The ministries of Information and Culture, Education and Home Affairs, and Religious Affairs are all mandated to use different soft approaches to address issues of violent extremism by providing messages to confront the extremist narratives. Apart from that, Bangladesh Police has adopted community-based counterterrorism initiative in the fight against terrorism. The community-based counterterrorism is an initiative in which police and communities work jointly to prevent radicalization/violent extremism and that has become central to the counterterrorism efforts across the world (Cherney, 2018). The community-led

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counterterrorism initiatives that have been adopted in Bangladesh include conducting various awareness raising programs for the community stakeholders to mobilize public opinion against terrorism, releasing a prescribed format for the Khutba (religious sermons) in the Jumma prayer to be delivered by the Imams and issuing ‘Fatwas’ (religious edicts) given by a group of Muslim clerics to affirm terrorism as forbidden in Islam (Khan, 2017; Bashar, 2017). These police-community partnership works are run by two specialized units - Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) and Counter Terrorism & Transnational Crime Unit (CTTCU). The ATU covers the whole country, while the CTTCU primarily acts within the jurisdiction of Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) but can operate outside DMP as per the command and requirement of the government. Additionally, the police stations are likely to work upon community policing to curb violent extremism. Counterterrorism in Bangladesh: Successes and failures The Bangladesh government’s response to fight terrorism was initially mostly reactive rather than proactive, which made its counterterrorism policy controversial and challenging. In practice, this approach has extended primacy to the army, which in reality is more inclined to the warfighting approach in the CT continuum. The country’s first approach in response to terrorism was the formation of an elite force – the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in 2004. This CT strategy employed a mixed approach. On the one hand, it used law enforcement measures, e.g., apprehension and prosecution of several terrorist suspects; on the other hand, it also employed hard measures such as military operations or gunfights to combat terrorism. The remarkable achievements of RAB’s hard approach against terrorism include the capture of several JMB leaders in 2006 by the military commando operations named Operation Surja Dighol Bari (notable arrest of JMB Chief Shaikh Abdur Rahman) and Operation Mymensing Muktagacha (significant arrest of JMB leader Siddikur Rahman, alias Bangla Bhai). Six of these apprehended terrorists, including both JMB leaders, were executed in 2007. RAB also achieved success in 2010 by arresting the leaders and members of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), an India-based militant organization (Fabe, 2017; Rapid Action Battalion Bangladesh, 2019b). In the case of the Dhaka Holey Artisan Bakery siege in 2016, the initial law enforcement response was not a success, but the army’s “Operation Thunder Bolt” succeeded in clearing the premise by killing all five terrorists involved in the attack. Immediately after clearing the Holey Artisan siege, the CTTCU carried out a few targeted operations where a leader of neo-JMB and the mastermind of the Holey Artisan attack and nine militants were killed (Manik, 2016). It appears that although intelligence was used in these CT operations to thwart the extremists’ plots, the country leans more heavily to the warfighting approach than that of the law enforcement approach in countering terrorism. Although the counterterrorism initiatives are accredited for their significant achievements, e.g., destroying the leadership of terrorist organizations and

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dismantling the terror networks, these initiatives have been criticized for alleged involvement in extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture in custody (Fink, 2010). In the name of national security, the country’s law enforcement agencies and security forces – particularly the Detective Branch of the Police, the Bangladesh Border Guards (BGB), the Directorate General of Defense Intelligence (DGFI), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) – are accused of committing severe, widespread violations of human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Non-state violent extremism and far-reaching consequences Since the late 1990s, Bangladesh has been witnessing terrorism, which should hurt its socioeconomic structures. The national security and the criminal justice system will reflect the immediate results; however, the effects on other institutions might not be evident but yet critical for the community where the attacks take place. The economic consequences of the continuing non-state violent attacks have been assessed in relation to Bangladesh’s goal to become a developed country (DC) by 2041. Though the economic indicators are not showing much stress, staying on course depends on how the country succeeds in intervening in the radicalization process. But Bangladesh is facing and managing the Rohingya refugee population in such a manner that jihadi recruiters cannot make this population a supply source. Economic consequences: Bangladesh context The non-state violent extremism of Bangladesh has been a concern of many observers since the late 1990s when violent terrorist activities have started surfacing (Fair, 2018; Fair & Abdullah, 2017; Fair, Hamza, & Heller, 2016; Iyengar, 2016; Kumar & Iyengar, 2016). However, despite being in the middle of an uncertain environment of political violence, Bangladesh’s economic progress continues. The two major economic indicators, the gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment (FDI), have shown some dents, but a steadily upward movement in them continues. To determine the impact of terrorism on the country’s economy, scholars have tried to correlate the number of casualties of terrorist acts with the GDP and FDI (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). To have an overview of the development process of Bangladesh, we reviewed the GDP from 1996, the year the South Asia Terrorism Portal began compiling major incidents of terrorist-related killings in Bangladesh, to 2018. The GDP of 1996 was 4.523 and showed steady growth until 2018 when the GDP was 7.864. The year 2016 was critical for Bangladesh due to the Holey Artisan Bakery attack; the total number of terrorism-related deaths was 54 when many observers expressed their concerns about the future growth rate. However, the GDP rate continued to rise. We also looked into the FDI data from 2010 to 2018. Except for some fluctuation, the flow of FDI remained encouraging. FDI in Bangladesh increased by 67.94% in 2018, according to the World Bank (2019a). Bangladesh registered a record

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level of FDI inflow in 2018, topping the list in South Asia. In 2018, Bangladesh reached the highest ever level in the country’s history at $3.61 billion, according to the World Investment Report 2019 by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2019). Along with economic indicators like GDP and FDI, the country’s military budget has not shown much increase over the last nine years (2010–2018); however, allocations for law enforcement increased manifold (The World Bank, 2019b; Dhaka Tribune, 2020). For the year 2019–2020, the allocation in the education sector increased by 17%, and the allocation for health services was larger than the previous year. However, the country’s expenditures in health and education (as a percentage of GDP) are the lowest in South Asia (Islam, 2019). Moreover, currently 29.6 million Bangladeshis are aged between 15 and 24, and 40% of them, which means 11.8 million Bangladeshi youths, are unemployed (Ovi, 2020). Whether the benefits of economic success will trickle down to the 11.8 million unemployed Bangladeshi youths due to prevailing corruption is yet to be seen. According to a Transparency International (TI) 2020 report, Bangladesh is the 14th most corrupt nation of the world (Foyez, 2020). Moreover, the number of internet users in Bangladesh is on the rise. More young people are connecting online and likely to be connected with jihadi groups (Hasan, 2012). A unique structural reality is persisting in Bangladesh, which only opens the door to bring more young people under the spell of incorrect Islam for which a broad supporting base has already been established for conversion to radical violent extremism. With its structural reality, the country has faced a massive challenge of the Rohingya refugee problem, which might be a constant recruiting source of radical violent extremism due to their grievances to take revenge.

Conclusion After decades of logomachy, there is a consensus: terrorism is a process of radicalization to violent extremism (RVE). In Bangladesh, a group of people is using Islam to enhance their narrow political goal by radicalizing some young adults to violent extremism. They are using cheap, simplistic, wrong, and highly emotionally charged narratives by making a small grievance into an earth-shattering issue to instill seeds of discontentment. Once that takes place, it becomes easy to have an ongoing conversation by using different platforms of social media. The counterterrorism strategies of Bangladesh are hard approaches and, consequently, less effective. Destroying leadership networks of terrorist organizations, dismantling the terror networks, and prosecution and execution of some apprehended terrorist operatives have so far failed to hamper the overall radicalization process. Instead, its hard approaches, which are criticized for their significant abuse of power and illegitimate use of violence, suppress the individual rights of citizens and undermine the rule of law. The counterterrorism strategies have eventually made progress by adjusting to the needs of the times; still, there is a long way to go. But there are other hard realities to face, like a many educated but unemployed youth in the middle of great

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economic progress and a massive Rohingya refugee population that could be the target of jihadi recruiters. Similarly, the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act has several definitional and procedural problems. Simultaneously, it does not emphasize the current problems of the judicial system in Bangladesh. These issues concerning measures to deal with terrorism need to be addressed to deal with contemporary radical violent extremism. Regional and international collaboration should be widened and made more comprehensive to get effective results. The introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Unit and the use of some soft and proactive approaches to address violent extremism are undoubtedly impressive. However, these remain at a premature level and need more research to get a structured format by constructing a linear-path framework suggested earlier to comprehend RVE. This framework will help establish correlations between factors that have motivated individuals to follow radical violent extremism. Defeating today’s non-state radical violent extremism needs multipronged steps. Here are five aspects that can be added to the overall counterterrorism strategies of the country: (1) treat these actors as radicalized operatives, (2) design prevention programs to prevent further recruiting, (3) develop necessary steps to dry up the financial support of recruiters, (4) destabilize hidden support bases, (5) develop academic courses on non-state radical violent extremism, and (6) deradicalize the current radicals who are in custody.

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Riaz, A., & Naser, A. (2011). Islamist politics and popular culture. In A. Rian [Riaz??] & C. C. Fair (Eds.). Political Islam and governance in Bangladesh. London: Routledge. 136–152. Ross, T., & Hossain, F. (2004). British high commissioner survives bomb attack at shrine in Bangladesh. Independent. Retrieved October 12, 2019, from htps://www.indepe ndent.co.uk/news/world/asia/british-high-commissioner-survives-bomb-attack-at-sh rine-in-bangladesh-564287.html Sakharkar, M. (2005). What is terrorism. Retrieved November 2, 2019, from https://www.aca demia.edu/4820699/What_Is_Terrorism_TERRORISM_ORIGIN_OF_THE_WORD Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J. T., & Cauley, J. (1983). A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. American Political Science Review, 77, 36–54. Schanzer, J. (2019). Terrorism. Israel Studies, Sum, 24(2), 52–62. Schmid, A. P. (2011). The Routledge handbook of terrorism research. New York: Routledge. Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, database, theories and literature. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company. Seleth, A. (2018). The Rohingya: A new terrorist threat? The Interpreter, Lowy Institute. Retrieved December 23, 2009, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rohi ngyas-new-terrorist-threat Sells, M. (2016). Wahhabist ideology: What it is and why it’s a problem. Huffpost. Retrieved December 20, 2020, from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wahhabist-ideo logy-what-it-is-and-why-its-a-problem_b_585991fce4b014e7c72ed86e Siddiqa, A. (2018). South Asia counterterrorism yearbook. London: South Asia Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies. Siddiqi, D. M. (2006). In the name of Islam? Gender, politics and women’s rights in Bangladesh. Harvard Asia Quarterly, 10(1), 4–14. Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat. New York Police Department. Retrieved December 20, 2019, from https://seths.blog/wp-con tent/uploads/2007/09/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf Silverstri, M. (2019). Policing ‘Bengal Terrorism’ in India and the World. London: Palgrave Macmilan. Simon, J. (1994). The terrorist trap. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Smith, A. G. (2018). Hos radicalization to terrorism occurs in the United States: What research sponsored by the National Institute of justice tells us. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Smith, S. (2014). The Oxford handbook of the history of communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Associated Press. (1999). Bangladesh army disarms mosque bomb. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/19991010/aponlin e090848_000.htm The Daily Star. (2018). August 21 Grenade attack: What happened on that day? Retrieved October 8, 2019, from https://www.thedailystar.net/august-21-carnage/21-august-gre nade-attack-what-happened-on-that-day-1644268 The Daily Star. (2017, February 19). PM joins Munich Security Conference. Retrieved October 17, 2019, from https://www.thedailystar.net/country/pm-reaches-munich-atten d-security-conference-1362673 The Hindu. (2015, November 11). Dhaka hands over top ULFA leader to India. Retrieved October 29, 2019, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ulfa-leader-anupchetia-handed-over-to-india-by-bangladesh/article7865894.ece

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The Soufan Center. (2019). Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS): The nucleus of Jihad in South Asia. Retrieved January 11, 2020, from https://thesoufancenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Al-Qaeda-in-the-Indian-Subcontinent-AQIS.pdf The United Nations News. (2018, March 13). Leaving the LDCs category: Booming Bangladesh prepares to graduate. Retrieved October 25, 2019, from https://www.un.org/ development/desa/en/news/policy/leaving-the-ldcs-category-booming-bangladeshprepares-to-graduate.html The U.S. Department of State. (2018). Country reports on terrorism 2017. Bureau of Counter-Terrorism. Retrieved November 15, 2018, from https://www.state.gov/doc uments/organization/283100.pdf The World Bank. (2019a, October 10). Bangladesh economy continues robust growth with rising exports and remittances. Press Release. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from https:// www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/10/10/world-bank-bangladesh-econ omy-continues-robust-growth-with-rising-exports-and-remittances The World Bank. (2019b, November 15). Bangladesh: Reducing poverty and sharing prosperity. Results Brief. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from https://www.worldbank. org/en/results/2018/11/15/bangladesh-reducing-poverty-and-sharing-prosperity Umar, B. (2004). The emergence of Bangladesh: Class struggles in East Pakistan (1947– 1958). London: Oxford University Press. UNCTAD. (2019). World investment report, 2019 special economic zones. Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved January 12, 2020, from https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ wir2019_overview:en.pdf Webber, Craig (2007). Revaluating relative deprivation theory. Theoretical Criminology, 11(1), 97–120. Wieviorka, M. (2007). From classical terrorism to ‘Global’ terrorism. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1(2), 92–104. Wolpert, S. (1984). Jinnah of Pakistan. New York: Oxford University Press.

3

Terrorism, security, and development in Sri Lanka In the national, regional, and global context Stanley W. Samarasinghe

Introduction In 2009, Sri Lanka emerged from over thirty years of terrorism, insurgency, and civil war driven by ethnic nationalism and related socioeconomic and security issues. For the past decade it has been struggling to cope with its aftermath and chart a fresh course toward peace and prosperity. The events in Sri Lanka did not occur in isolation. The regional power of South Asia, India, played an active role in the Sri Lankan saga. Other foreign entities, most notably, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Norway, China, the European Union (EU), and the U.S., also played prominent and varying roles. As explained later, the profound changes that the global system underwent in the past four decades not only provided a context for the events in Sri Lanka but also had an impact. Moreover, in some respects, the Sri Lankan experience was not unique. It mirrored similar problems and processes that many countries have faced. For that reason this case study has broader applicability to better understand issues of terrorism, security, and development. This chapter is presented in six parts. Part 1 provides the global, regional, and conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the Sri Lankan case study. Part 2 addresses the principal features of the Sri Lankan conflict including the demographic context, historical roots, causes, conflict resolution, and transition from peaceful political discourse to terrorism and then to insurgency and finally to civil war. Part 3 deals with three major questions associated with the conflict: terrorism, the issue of “Failed State,” and peace initiatives. Part 4 reviews the end of the war and its aftermath. Part 5 deals with what Sri Lanka can realistically look forward to in the next several years. Part 6 presents some key conclusions drawn from the study.

Part 1: Context Global Sri Lanka’s experience with terrorism, security, and development should be understood in its global and regional context. Between the mid-1970s and 2020 the world has radically changed. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet

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Union, leaving the U.S. as the sole superpower. In the political facet of globalization, liberal democracy that had spread rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s appeared to be the winner. Globalization accelerated the rapid growth of international trade, investment, and technology transfer. A substantial reduction in global poverty was in motion. Francis Fukuyama (1989) interpreted these changes as the triumph of the West, coining the memorable phrase the “end of history.” In retrospect, the post-Cold War political changes were the beginning of a new and more complicated history. Freedom House (2020), which tracks the health of democracy in 195 countries, reported this year that for the 14th successive year, on balance, globally democracy has been in decline. The Chinese one-party authoritarian state is posing itself as an alternative to the democratic liberal model. Non-state actors have emerged to challenge states both individually and collectively with acts of terrorism and in some cases insurgency. The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. placed this problem in the center stage of politics and diplomacy. Economic globalization has been much steadier. There is no serious challenge to the market economy model that almost every country has adopted. The state–private sector balance and the regulatory role of the state vary depending on the country. The globalized economy has faced its own set of challenges. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 was the first. The Great Recession of 2008 that hit major Western economies followed. These crises cast doubt on the viability of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)–led structural adjustment liberalization model that underpinned economic globalization. China is challenging the U.S. economic and military hegemony. The Covid-19 crisis has introduced a new uncertainty globally to almost all aspects of life. The emerging situation calls into question the old paradigms that we use to understand individual and collective security. Regional Sri Lanka’s immediate neighbor to the north, India, is the most important part of the regional context to understand Sri Lanka’s experience with terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and its aftermath. India and Sri Lanka have much in common. Both are former British colonies. India won its independence in August 1947 and Sri Lanka in February 1948. Both countries have managed to preserve parliamentary democracy and a system of public administration that they inherited from the British. India is one of the most diverse countries in the world in language, ethnicity, and religion. It also has caste divisions. But it remains a secular state. Notwithstanding its share of terrorism, insurgencies, and separatist movements, the country has managed to preserve its territorial integrity. Sri Lanka has almost all the features of India described earlier but on a much smaller scale. For that reason alone Delhi is not keen to see Sri Lanka set an example by being split into two countries along ethnic lines because it can set an example to Indian separatist movements. At the same time Delhi has to be sensitive to the concerns of the 68 million Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu who

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have been supportive of the Sri Lankan Tamils. In the 1960s India cooperated with Sri Lanka to find a solution to the problem of stateless Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. They immigrated to the island between the 1830s and 1930s to work on coffee and tea plantations. India agreed to take back about half of the stateless people and Sri Lanka gave citizenship to the other half. Both countries had been prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the height of the Cold War. Delhi was generally seen as an ally of Moscow during the Cold War. Delhi was particularly comfortable with left-of-center governments in Colombo (1956–1964, 1970–1977) that were also friendlier to Moscow (Nissanka, 2010, pp. 217–257). Conceptual and theoretical framework Some scholars assert that the state-centric world still remains notwithstanding globalization (see, for example, Ayoob, 2005). But most believe that the world has become part state-centric and part multicentric as a result of globalization (see, for example, Booth, 2005). Terrorism is a key component of the multicentric world. There is broad acceptance that terrorism has substantially changed both individual and collective security. It has also forced us to reexamine the old paradigm of security (Paul, 2005). Some see it in terms of physical insecurity that terrorism brings and the military or “hard” response to it. Some define security more broadly to include socioeconomic well-being or the lack thereof. The lack of development and the persistence of global poverty are also seen as security failures. The Covid-19 pandemic has been interpreted as one of the greatest security threats in living memory. This broader view of security does not necessarily preclude a military response to terrorism. But depending on the situation, a “soft” solution, usually political reform such as power sharing, may be more appropriate or even essential. In the real world we find a mixture of the two with the balance depending on the particular country (Aydilini, 2005). This chapter will use the broader paradigm of security when analyzing the case of Sri Lanka. Globalization notwithstanding, nationalism, defined here as the belief that the interests of one’s own country or people come first, remains a powerful driver of politics, economics, and related matters. Nationalism provides a theoretical basis for this analysis. Brexit, the problems that the Word Trade Organization (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are facing, and the lack of support from major countries such as the U.S. and China for international organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague are evidence of this situation. Analysis leads to policy. Policy needs to be based on a philosophy of governance. The philosophy of governance that underpins multiethnic societies in the 21st century must have as its core value the principles of equity and freedom that respect diversity. These should be nonnegotiable. Equity and freedom provide a morally and ethically acceptable framework for an ethnically plural society emerging from a protracted civil war to create a roadmap for transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation, reconstruction, and nation-building to

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have lasting security. The policy perspective presented in this chapter is based on the above.

Part 2: Principal features of the Sri Lankan conflict Demography Demographic diversity per se does not cause conflict. But as happened in Sri Lanka, such diversity provides a basis for conflict. The Sinhalese, whose mother tongue is Sinhala, account for 16.1 million (75%) of the island’s total population of 21.4 million as of September 2020. About 93% of the Sinhalese are Buddhist and the rest mostly Catholic. The Sri Lanka Tamils (SLT), whose mother tongue is Tamil, are about 2.4 million (11.2%) of the population. About 81% of the SLT are Hindu and the rest are Christians of various denominations. There is a second group of Tamils known as “Indian” Tamils numbering about 900,000 (4.1%) who migrated to the country between the 1830s and 1930s mainly to work as plantation laborers. They also speak Tamil, and about 90% are Hindu and the rest Christian. Muslims total about 2.0 million (9.3%). The majority of them speak Tamil, but those who live in predominantly Sinhalese areas speak Sinhala. The regional distribution of the population is also highly relevant to understand the conflict. Tamils account for 93.1% of the population of the Northern Province (NP) and 39.2% in the Eastern Province (EP) (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015). About 70.4% of the Tamils (hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, the term Tamil refers to Sri Lanka Tamils) live in the NP and EP (NEP) and they account for 61.0% the population of the region. About 97% of the Sinhalese live outside the NEP, that is, in the “South.” The Sinhalese account for 83.7% of the total population in the South. In the Nuwara Eliya District in the central highland tea country, Indian Tamils are about 53% of the population. The 2.0 million Muslims are more dispersed, mostly in cities and towns. The only significant Muslim concentration is in the EP where about one-third of the country’s Muslims live. They account for about one-third of the EP population and 43.5% of the EP’s Ampara district population. This population distribution is the demographic basis for the claim of the Tamils to a Tamil Eelam (homeland) in NEP, and the case that Muslims make that they are entitled to have their own regional government centered in the Ampara district under any scheme of devolution of power in the EP. Historical roots A strong sense of ethnic history, common to both the Sinhalese and Tamils, drives the conflict. The Sinhalese see precolonial Sri Lanka from about 250 BC to about 1600 as one where Sinhalese kings ruled and Buddhism received royal patronage and functioned as the state religion (De Silva, 1981, p. 573). Tamils cite the fact that from 1478 to 1620, for about 150 years Jaffna had its own Tamil king. In 1948, Sri Lanka became an independent country after about 150 years of British rule. The roots of Sri Lanka’s postindependence ethnic conflict between

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the Sinhalese and Tamils can be traced back to the colonial period (De Silva, 1986, pp. 27–158). It began as a political conflict over ethnic balance of representation in the legislature. Later it became multidimensional extending to the question of citizenship, official language policy, jobs, admission to state universities, devolution of power, and so on. Causes of conflict Scholars have identified multiple and interrelated causal factors, mostly connected to public policy, for Sri Lanka’s terrorism, insurgency, and civil war (Richardson, 2005, pp. 39–41). After World War I ended in 1918, the Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders were reasonably united in their negotiations with the British for Sri Lanka’s independence (Wilson, 1974; De Silva, 1973). In 1931, the British colonial government granted universal franchise to Sri Lanka. Tamil leaders opposed the move on the grounds that it would lead to majoritarian rule. The Tamil leaders wanted a legislature that split the membership with 50% going to the Sinhalese and 50% to the minorities (De Silva, 1973, p. 530). London rejected that too and created a parliament in 1947 that elects MPs under a territorial system that continues to date. The government passed legislation in 1948 making the Indian Tamils “stateless” and disenfranchising them (De Silva, 1981, p. 493). In the 1947 parliament, out of the 95 members elected, 8 were from the Indian Tamil community. In the 1952 parliament, there was none (Samarasinghe, 1988, p. 164). Tamils felt that their fear of Sinhalese majoritarian rule was being confirmed. They formed a new political party, Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchchi (Federal Party, FP), whose declared aim was to have a federal state in some form. It was a part of a governing coalition only for a brief period of three years from 1965 to 1968. Otherwise it has remained in the opposition for the past 72 years while supporting legislation that they felt were not harmful to Tamil interests. For example, FP vehemently opposed making Sinhala the only official language. It was seen as a move to make Tamils second-class citizens and also to shut them out from government employment (Manor, 1989, p. 269; Richardson, 2005, p. 197; Samarasinghe, 1984). Until the 1990s, Sri Lanka did not permit private universities. It had only state-funded universities that did not charge tuition. In the early 1970s Sinhalese protested that they were “relatively deprived” (Gurr, 1970, pp. 211–223) because the share of places that Tamils secured in state universities was significantly higher than their 15% share in the population. The government responded by introducing a quota system that helped reduce the Tamil share and increased the Sinhalese share. This probably was a major cause that alienated Tamil youth and drove them toward militancy. Starting from the 1930s the state settled farmers, mostly Sinhalese, on unused state land, officially known as colonization, especially in the Eastern Province and North Central Province, for agricultural development (Farmer, 1957; De Silva, 1986, p. 242). The Tamils objected to the settlement of Sinhalese farmers on state land in the Eastern Province that they considered as a part of the Tamil homeland. New Sinhalese settlements changed the demographic

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composition of the province from Sinhalese 4.7%, Tamil 53.4%, and Muslim 39.4% in 1921 (Government of Ceylon, 1923–1926) to 25.0%, 42.1%, and 32.4%, respectively, in 1981 (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015). Conflict resolution The traditional Tamil political leadership expressed their opposition to policies such as the “Sinhala Only” official language policy and denying citizenship to Indian Tamils (De Silva, 1986, pp. 181–182) within democratic norms of the country. The most “militant” act that the traditional Tamil leadership resorted to was nonviolent resistance (Satyagraha) in the Gandhian tradition (Little, 1994, p. 4). The Federal Party leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam resigned his seat in parliament in 1972 and recontested the seat to show that Tamils supported the FP strategy. In a turnout of 87%, he won polling 72.5% of the vote. Successive Sinhalese leaders in power generally tried to negotiate with the Tamil leadership with mixed results. One major constraint they faced was opposition from Sinhala nationalists (De Silva, 1986, p. 212). An attempt made initially in 1957 to resolve the official language question failed. But it was resolved later with new legislation in 1958, the 13th amendment (1987), and the 16th amendment (1988) to the Second Republican Constitution, that made Tamil a “national” language (De Silva, 1993). In 1964, Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike (1960–1964) reached an agreement with her Indian counterpart Lal Bahadur Shastri that granted about half a million Indian Tamils Sri Lankan citizenship and India accepted the balance for resettlement in that country (De Silva, 1981, p. 528). This led to the reintegration of the Indian Tamils to mainstream politics. The main political party that represented the Indian Tamils, Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), has been a part of the governing coalition without a break from 1978 onward. It helped create state policies to improve their living conditions (Samarasinghe, 1988). This probably also incentivized Indian Tamils not to join Tamil militant groups in the north (De Silva, 1986, pp. 320–321). A quota system for admission to state universities that gave some preference to students from “backward districts” (De Silva, 1984) and the establishment of a state university in Jaffna in 1974 followed by one in Batticaloa in 1986 assuaged Tamil concerns on the university admissions issue. District Development Councils were established in 1981 to decentralize the administration and give more power to the districts and regions, especially in NEP. But these solutions were too little and too late. Tamil youth were radicalized by then and were prepared to operate outside the conventional political rules. Transition to terrorism The dispute between the Sinhalese and Tamils evolved into violence gradually and in stages. Between 1956 and 1983, there were five notable but short-lived episodes of ethnic violence, some of which were “state sanctioned” (Kearney, 1985; Richardson, 2005, pp. 73–89, 197–205) where Tamils were the main victims. In

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the mid-1970s, the conflict gave rise to acts of terrorism, defined here to mean any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act” (UN, 2005). In June 1981, Tamil militants killed four Sinhalese police officers on duty in Jaffna for the District Council Election. In response, Sinhalese police officers went on a rampage setting fire to the Jaffna Municipal Library that the Tamils considered an important cultural treasure (De Silva, 1986, p. 332). In July 1983, Tamil militants killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna. This sparked off the worst ethnic violence Sri Lanka had ever witnessed. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 (Tambiah, 2011; Wickramasinghe, 2009, p. 1046) mostly Tamils living in the Sinhalese majority areas were killed and Tamil-owned property destroyed. Over 100,000 Tamils went to India as refugees and tens of thousands more, mostly from the middle class, got asylum in Western countries, especially in Canada, the UK, and Australia (Velamati, 2009). Sri Lanka’s economy suffered, and its image abroad was severely tarnished. The government introduced the sixth amendment to the constitution that banned political parties advocating separatism. President Jayewardene justified the amendment by stating that it was designed to “appease the natural desire and request of the Sinhala people” (Wilson, 1988, p. 211). The two aforementioned tragic events demonstrated, as Michael Roberts (2020) has pointed out, the role that psychosocial and emotional factors play in violent conflicts and the backlash and urge for retribution such events produce. Both the Sinhalese and Tamils resorted to collective retribution against the “other.” Similar situations have been seen in other South Asian countries. A contemporary example was the violent reaction of Hindus toward Sikhs in October 1984 immediately following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards. Following the July 1983 ethnic violence against the Tamils, Tamil opposition turned into an insurgency, which Alex P. Schmid (2000, p. 50) defines as an “uprising against the holders of state power; more serious than a revolt but short of a civil war.” Initially there were five Tamil militant groups – Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS; founded 1975), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE; 1976), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO; 1979), People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE; 1980), and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF; 1980) – that had taken up arms against the government. All received some form of training and arms from India with the backing of the Indira Gandhi government. Some also got assistance from Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Richardson, 2005, p. 352). By 1986 these groups had a combined total of about 15,000 fighters, compared to about 22,000 in the Sri Lankan military. In 1987 Velupillai Prabhakaran, who founded the LTTE in 1976, returned from India after four years in exile and took command of the organization, virtually destroyed the other Tamil militant groups, and brought Jaffna under LTTE rule (Richardson, 2005, p. 531). During this time the TULF got increasingly marginalized (Richardson, 2005, pp. 483–487). Between June 1983 and

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December 1988 more than 5,000 violent incidents involving the Tamil militants were reported (Richardson, 2005, pp. 527–529). In 1981 there were about 36,000 Sinhalese in NP. Almost all left after 1983. But the Tamil-speaking Muslim population that numbered about 50,000 remained. In 1990, the LTTE expelled them from the province, giving the LTTE an ethnically cleansed and homogenous territory to protect in the civil war. Military buildup The LTTE initially relied on arms captured or stolen from the military, a practice common to non-state militant groups almost everywhere. Later they established a modest capacity locally to build light mortars and mortar shells. Over the years, they purchased arms mainly from Southeast Asian suppliers on the informal global arms market (John Arquilla, 2009, p. 71) and smuggled them into the country using cargo ships they owned. Funding came mainly from Tamil diaspora groups (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2010) who also lobbied for them in Western capitals. By the early 2000s, the LTTE had an estimated 15,000 to 16,000 armed fighters plus about 5,000 child soldiers. The government built up its own security forces to meet the LTTE challenge. The military budget rose from $35 million (1.3% of GDP) in 1978 to $1,600 million (3.9%) in 2008. In 1985 the military had about 22,000 personnel. Between then and the end of the war in 2009, the military rose in two stages – 1990, 110,000; 1995, 236,000 – and remained at 223,000 in 2009. In 2009 the country had 1,099 active duty military personnel for every 100,000 people; the comparable ratio for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal was 227, 543, 136, and 293 respectively, making Sri Lanka the most militarized country in South Asia (World Bank). China and Pakistan were the principal suppliers of arms and ammunition to the government. The U.S., India, and Israel supplied naval craft and advanced surveillance equipment. China, Israel, and Ukraine supplied combat aircraft. The EU refused to supply any military equipment to the Sri Lankan government for reasons of human rights and also because it believed that the conflict should be settled peacefully (Wezemen, Bromley, & Wezemen, 2009, pp. 316–319). After July 1983 the insurgency quickly evolved into a civil war, defined as a “large-scale armed conflict within the country” (Schmid, 2000, p. 8), between government security forces and Tamil militants. Detailed accounts of the civil war and how it came to an end in May 2009 are available from a variety of sources from different perspectives (see De Silva, 1986; Swamy, 2003; Dixit, 2002; Richardson, 2005; Peiris, 2009; Roberts, 2014; Large, 2016). This study will not replicate them, although there will be some overlap. Instead, in the remainder of this chapter, we will attempt to analyze the Sri Lankan experience from a terrorism, security, and development perspective in both the regional and global context by taking up several key issues for review – notably among them, terror as a tool of war; “state failure”; peace initiatives; the aftermath of the war; and future prospects. Then the chapter concludes with lessons learned.

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Part 3: Terror, state failure, and peace initiatives Terror as a tool of war The Sri Lanka civil war can fairly be described as a war of terror. The LTTE used terror tactics whenever it had the opportunity to do so causing death and destruction. The Sri Lankan security forces did not go to those lengths to terrorize its enemies. But the government has been accused of using terror tactics such as kidnappings and making people disappear to subdue its enemies. The LTTE set up a small elite squad known as “Black Tigers” to carry out assassinations and suicide attacks (Swamy, 2003, p. 233). Suicide attacks were used for several purposes. One was to get rid of its Tamil rivals, especially mainstream Tamil politicians such as the TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam who was assassinated in 1989. The second main goal of resorting to terrorism was to provoke a Sinhalese backlash similar to the one that occurred in July 1983 that politically destabilized the south, caused enormous damage to the economy, tarnished the international image of the country, and helped mobilize external support for Tamil militants. Some of the terror attacks in the south were on mass targets that caused random death and destruction. Others were on more specific targets, mostly political leaders. In the decade of the 1990s, the LTTE launched at least 16 terrorist attacks on civilian targets in the south, resulting in about 1,000 casualties. In addition, on June 11, 1990, the LTTE killed an estimated 600 to 700 police personnel serving in the Eastern Province that had surrendered to it on the orders of the government. The LTTE also assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, attempted to assassinate President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1999, and succeeded in killing a large number of other political leaders in the south across party lines. Most important, none of the attacks provoked a widespread communal backlash that the LTTE may have wished for because both the government and the public learnt an important lesson in July 1983 not to react with mass hysteria and acts of retribution against Tamils. But they disrupted day-to-day life, harmed the economy, and compelled the government to deploy security personnel in the south who otherwise would have been fighting the war in the north. In 2005 and 2006 the government issued an emergency regulation to criminalize offences related to terrorism “ --- in the interests of public security and the preservation of public order --- ” (UN, 2011, p. 97). Such responses undermined the government’s liberal credentials and helped the Tamil diaspora and the LTTE to lobby Western governments and raise funds abroad (Manoharan, 2006). The suicide attacks had some negative consequences for the LTTE as well. Thirty-two countries including India (1992), the U.S. (1997), the UK (1991), the EU, and Canada (2006) proscribed it as a terrorist organization. The government used the argument of terrorism as a defense when it was accused of human rights violations (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005). The ban also helped Sri Lanka to secure more military and civilian aid (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).

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“Failed state”? One of the most notable features of the war was Sri Lanka’s success in avoiding being a failed state while experiencing nearly 30 years of terror and war. The area where the country suffered the most was in human rights. The quadrennial UNHRC “Universal Periodic Review” of Sri Lanka issued in 2008 reported serious lapses in human rights for which it held the government responsible (UN, 2011, p. 12). Major lapses in the protection of human rights attracted international criticism and sanction. The EU suspended GSP+ trade concessions to Sri Lanka. The Millennium Challenge Corporation of the U.S. withheld funding to the country. Sri Lanka’s great success was in avoiding a serious crisis in broader democratic governance and economic and human development. Between 1983 and 2009 four presidential elections and five parliamentary elections, nine in all, were held and in four there was a peaceful transfer of power (Election Commission of Sri Lanka, 2019). Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew over sevenfold from $335 to $2,397 during the same 25-year period (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2019). The country moved from low-income status to lower-middle-income status in 1997 (World Bank, 1998/99, p. 189). Between 1990 and 2008, Sri Lanka’s Human Development Index improved from 0.629 in 1990 to 0.754 in 2010, a rise of 20% (UNDP, 2020). These numbers could have been better if military spending had not risen from 3.4% of the total government budget to 1978 to 17.5% in 2008, and if the economy in the north and east had functioned normally. There are two main reasons for Sri Lanka’s success. First, two-thirds of the country in terms of land area and 87% of the country’s population lived outside the war zone, the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Second, the country’s governance outside the north and east was quite normal. Elections were held, and key institutions such as the judiciary, public service, and the media functioned normally. Peace initiatives Between 1983 and 2009 there were two local peace initiatives and two foreign-led peace initiatives. The local initiatives were during the presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989–1993) and the other under President Chandrika Kumaratunga (1994–2005). Both failed. The Premadasa initiative in 1990 was perfunctory (Jayaram, 1989). Neither side took it very seriously, and Eelam War II commenced in June 1990 when the LTTE attacked some police stations soon after the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) withdrew. The second local initiative was a more serious effort. In late 1994 the newly elected president Kumaratunga, with the backing of Indian prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, started talks with the LTTE. The talks failed mainly because what the government found politically feasible to offer was not acceptable to the LTTE. Eelam War III commenced in April 1995 with the LTTE blowing up two Sri Lankan naval vessels.

52 Stanley W. Samarasinghe The first foreign initiative to settle the conflict peacefully occurred in July 1987. India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stepped in to save the LTTE from a significant military defeat and to simultaneously compel the Sri Lanka government to establish provincial councils (PCs) to devolve power to satisfy the aspiration of Tamils (Ganguly & Pardesi, 2009, pp. 8–9). The Indian prime minister visited Sri Lanka in July 1987 and signed the Indo-Lanka Accord with President J.R. Jayewardene (Kodikara, 1995). Under the accord, the IPKF was inducted and Sri Lanka enacted legislation to create PCs (Manogaran, 1988). A single PC amalgamating the Northern and Eastern Provinces was established. The Indian plan did not work as expected. India had unwittingly stepped into a very complex ground situation with multiple stakeholders that it could not fully control (Samarasinghe & Liyanage, 1993). The LTTE refused to accept PCs as a solution. The IPKF could not play the role of a conventional impartial peacekeeping force (Bullion, 1994). It soon got into a losing battle with the LTTE (Hancock, 1999; Ouellet, 2011). Sri Lanka President R. Premadasa who took office in January 1989 disliked the accord and the PC system. He supplied weapons to the LTTE to fight the IPKF. Delhi withdrew the IPKF in early 1990 and the war resumed in June of the same year. The second major foreign initiative for a peaceful settlement began when President Kumaratunga invited Norway in May 1999 to facilitate a fresh peace process. India as well as Western powers backed the initiative (Bullion, 2001). The United National Front (UNF) that won the December 2001 general election controlled the parliament. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and cabinet also belonged to the same party. They also welcomed the Norwegian initiative and signed a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in Oslo in 2002. A Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) consisting of members from five Nordic countries was created to monitor the ceasefire. With Norwegian assistance, six rounds of peace talks between the government and LTTE were held in the period September 2002 to March 2003. In July 2003, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe offered an unelected “Provisional Administrative Council (PAC)” for NEP where the LTTE would have a majority (Edrisingha et al., 2008, pp. 650–675). In late October, the LTTE came up with a counterproposal called the “Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA),” the first-ever written peace proposal that the LTTE had presented since the beginning of the civil war. The LTTE rejected the PAC as being inadequate to meet its aspirations. The government rejected the ISGA that had proposed a virtually independent state in the north and east that no government could have sold to the voters in the south. There were multiple reasons that doomed the Norwegian effort. Politically powerful Buddhist monks and Sinhalese nationalists argued that Norway was biased toward the LTTE (Hoglund & Svensson, 2009; Shastri, 2009). President Kumaratunga who was sidelined by the UNF government also began to criticize the peace process. The LTTE, for its part, violated the ceasefire far more frequently than the government forces (SLMM, 2010; Sorbo, Goodhand, Klem, Nissen, & Selbervik, 2011). The UNF lost the 2004 general election and lost

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power. Mahinda Rajapaksa who was elected president in November 2005 replacing Kumaratunga sided with the Sinhala nationalists. Around the same time, top leadership of the LTTE split with the dissidents that controlled the Eastern Province leaving the organization to join the government side. They formed a militia with the help of the military to fight the LTTE (Peiris, 2009, pp. 151–177). President Rajapaksa saw this as an opportunity to take on the LTTE militarily. In January 2008, the government formally declared that the 2002 ceasefire agreement was void and officially resumed the war. Both the Indian intervention as well as the Norwegian intervention demonstrate that no matter how good the intentions of the intermediaries may be, the solution offered has to be acceptable to the public of the country. Both initiatives failed that crucial test. The intransigent “all or nothing” attitude of the LTTE combined with its commitment to achieving its goals through violence made a fairly compelling case that a democratically elected government also had no alternative but to give a military response to the LTTE challenge. That is what happened between 2007 and 2009.

Part 4: End of the war and its aftermath In January 2009 government forces captured the LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi and pushed the LTTE to a piece of land in northeast Sri Lanka that shrunk steadily. The war ended on May 19 with the LTTE leader Prabhakaran and another 17 or so in the top leadership of the LTTE being killed and its forces decimated. The events that occurred in the war zone during the last four months are mired in controversy (Roberts, 2014; UN, 2015a). The government’s version is that the security forces tried their utmost to protect civilians, declaring three “no fire zones” to protect them. A UN Security Council Report (UN, 2011) states that the no-fire zone that first held about 300,000 people shrunk from 35.5 sq km on January 21 to 14 sq km by February 12. In early May when the war was about to end, the zone still had about 100,000 people in a few square kilometers. The government asserts that some LTTE fighters were wearing civilian clothes and fighting and that the LTTE also used civilians as shields. The government first asserted that there were zero civilian casualties. Later it conceded that about 9,000 civilians died in the last phase of fighting. Some independent observers have placed the number between 10,000 and 15,000 (Roberts, 2014, p. 159). Others believe it is higher. The UN estimates that the figure could be as high as 40,000 (UN, 2011; UN, 2015a). An independent investigation that has unimpeded access to information is necessary to resolve the issue. Critics of the government demand accountability and an investigation of possible war crimes committed. The new Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration in Colombo totally rejects the criticism. For the foreseeable future the issue will remain unresolved. There were an estimated 296,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in mid2009 with about one-third of them under 18 years of age (Roberts, 2014, p. 159). The government established 41 IDP camps, and one large camp took in as many as 250,000. The movement of IDPs was initially restricted. They were not permitted to return to their homes until the government was confident that the areas were

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free of landmines. Starting in August 2009, IDPs were allowed to return home or to a host family home as demining cleared the areas. By the end of June 2011, only about 12,000 remained in the camps.

Part 5: Future prospects In addressing the nation on May 19, 2009 President Rajapaksa celebrated the defeat of “terrorism” and promised that a compromise would be reached to address Tamil grievances. The end of the war created an opportunity for Sri Lanka to chart a fresh course for transitional justice, accountability, national reconciliation, and reconstruction (Samarasinghe, 2010). Over ten years have lapsed since the war ended. The Tamils believe that many of their concerns that led to the war in the first instance yet remain to be addressed. The voting pattern in the NEP and elsewhere with a significant minority vote generally support that position. The UNHRC at a special session on May 27, 2009, addressed the “Human Rights Situation in Sri Lanka” and passed a resolution that condemned “all attacks that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched on the civilian population and its practice of using civilians as human shields,” and urged the government to protect human rights (UN, 2009a). The Sri Lanka government welcomed the critique of the LTTE but was displeased with the suggestion that the government had to do more on human rights (UN, 2009b). In 2010, Mahinda Rajapaksa and his party won a fresh mandate from the people with overwhelming support from Sinhalese voters. The minorities voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. The 2010–2014 Rajapaksa administration largely concentrated on rebuilding the economy, especially with heavy investment in major infrastructure projects such as superhighways, ports, airports, and so forth, mainly with Chinese funding. Some of these projects were in NEP. Before Eelam War IV started, Rajapaksa spoke of a 13th Amendment plus solution that was a reference to enhance the powers of the provincial councils. That may have helped move toward political reconciliation. But nothing was done to make it happen. In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the provincial councils could not control state land. The government also does not permit the PCs to handle the police that is allowed under the 13th amendment. Between 2010 and 2014, the UNHRC found Sri Lanka wanting in its postwar transitional justice, accountability, and IDP rehabilitation program (UN, 20l1b, p. ii; UN, 20l1b, p. v). The Mahinda Rajapaksa administration rejected all such criticism. Good governance In 2015, the opposition won both the presidency and parliament with a promise to bring good governance. About 80% of the minority voters and about 40% of the Sinhalese voters supported the UNF government under President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The new administration enacted the 19th amendment to the constitution that reduced the powers of the

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executive presidency and the Right to Information Act of 2015 that improved democratic governance. The government also supported the UNHRC resolution 30/1 at the 30th Session of UNHRC in 2015, making a commitment to resolve all outstanding humanitarian and human rights issues in accordance with international norms and law (UN, 2015b). The Tamils welcomed the move. But a significant segment of the Sinhala–Buddhist nationalists strongly opposed the UNHRC resolution and its implications claiming it to be a “conspiracy” against the country (Daily News, 2020). This constrained what the government could actually do (Padma, 2018). The government failed to scale back corruption and the economy was anemic. The GDP growth rate averaged 3.9% in the five year period 2015-2019. ISISinspired suicide bomb attacks on three churches and three luxury tourist hotels on Easter Sunday in April 2019 that claimed 267 lives and injured many more made the government even more unpopular. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, contested on the Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP) ticket and won the presidency in November 2019. He started his career as a military officer. He was secretary of defense in the Eelam War Phase IV and was more or less the de facto defense minister. In August 2020, the SLPP also won the parliamentary election with a two-thirds majority that empowers the government to change the constitution. The most vocal supporters of the SLPP were Sinhalese–Buddhist nationalists. In both elections only about 15% of the minority voters supported the SLPP. This is a strong indication that the country continues to remain deeply divided along ethnic lines. Authoritarian trend The new government has abandoned any pretense of addressing the concerns of the Tamils for devolution of power. Using its two-thirds majority in parliament it enacted the 20th amendment to the constitution in October 2020. The main opposition party Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) opposed it. It replaced the 19th Amendment enacted in April 2015 by the previous government with 215 members out of 225 in parliament voting for it. The 19th amendment reduced the powers of the executive president and increased the powers of the prime minister and cabinet. The president was not allowed to dissolve parliament until a minimum of 4.5 years of the five-year term of parliament was completed. It created a new Constituitonal Council that appointed members to various state commissions such as the Human Rights Commission, Police Commission, Elections Commission, and the Public Service Commission to ensure that such bodies would be less partisan and function more independently. The 20th amendment allows the president to dissolve parliament after it completes one year. The powers of the prime minster and cabinet have been scaled back. The president is only required to seek the advice of parliament and not approval for the high-level appointments including judicial appointments that the president makes. Now the legislative branch of government is virtually subordinate to the executive branch.

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The president started showing his authoritarian tendencies even before the 20th amendment was passed. Earlier in the year 2020, the president refused to recall the dissolved parliament to fix a fresh date for the parliamentary election that was postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic (International Crisis Group, 2020). He has developed a practice of ordering officials to take action on matters that violate laws, rules, regulations, and norms of the government. In June he named a presidential taskforce consisting exclusively of men from the security forces to “build a Secure Country, Disciplined, Virtuous and Lawful Society.” In August he created another presidential taskforce for “Economic Revival and Poverty Eradication” and directed all ministries to carry out development activities under the direction of the taskforce. Another of president’s brothers, Basil, chairs the taskforce. The new administration has taken several steps to appease its Sinhalese– Buddhist base. It has dismissed any suggestion that the Sri Lankan troops should be held accountable for “war crimes” related to the deaths of civilians (the number is controversial) in the last few weeks of the war (Roberts, 2020). It withdrew Sri Lanka’s support for UNHRC resolution 30/1 of 2015 and refused to cosponsor Council resolution 40/1 of 2020 that reaffirmed Sri Lanka’s commitment to transitional justice, promote reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka. The president granted a pardon to an army sergeant who had been convicted by the courts for murdering eight Tamil IDPs including three children (Amnesty International, 2020). He prohibited the singing of the national anthem in Tamil at the February 4, 2020, official Independence Day celebrations. The president with his military background has appointed a significant number of military officers to very senior positions in the public administration usually held by civilians. This is a form of militarization of the public sector. The civil society group, Friday Forum, has described the president’s action as the “first step to the creation of a military dictatorship in this country” (Friday Forum, 2020). Underpinning this new authoritarian trend is a new governing coalition that is emerging in Sri Lanka. In 1956 the then Sinhalese–nationalist prime minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, had put together a new informal “coalition” popularly called Sangha, Veda, Guru, Govi, Kamkaru (Buddhist monks, Native [Ayurveda] Physicians, Sinhala-speaking Teachers, Famers, and Laborers) as his power base. That coalition continued in one form or the other until the late 1990s. The 2019 presidential election and the 2020 parliamentary election saw the emergence of a new coalition under the umbrella of Viyath Maga (VM; Learned Way) that supported Rajapaksa’s SLPP. VM is an organization that largely consists of professionals and businesspeople in the upper echelons of society. The Sangha continues to play a major role in the new coalition. But the rest of the coalition is largely new and represents new political forces that have emerged in the past six decades. Western medical doctors have replaced the Ayurveda physicians; university professors, lawyers, and other professionals have replaced the Sinhala teachers; and business executives and entrepreneurs have replaced the farmers and laborers. The 1956 coalition and the new 2020 coalition share one important feature, that is, with a few exceptions, the members are largely Sinhalese and

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Buddhists. This is the Sri Lankan version of what Goldfischer (2005) calls the “Capitalist Security Community.” This lobby strongly opposed accepting a grant of $480 million from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). One part of the grant was meant to improve the country’s land data base and make the land market more efficient. The other part was to improve urban and inter-city transportation. Opponents of the grant claimed that the activities funded under the grant would undermine Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Reacting to the adverse publicity, MCC withdrew the grant offer in December 2020. The war played an important role in producing these aforementioned emerging trends. But the changes are the results of a more complex set of socioeconomic, political, and cultural changes that have taken place in the country. It is difficult to predict how Sri Lanka’s liberal democracy would fair in the coming five to ten years. It weathered a difficult war for three decades and survived. Democratic political culture is deeply embedded in society. A voter turnout of 75% to 80% is normal in national elections. Debates in parliament are robust. Sections of the private media challenge the government in power. Some critics of the government have large followings on social media. Domestic factors will be decisive in determining the future, but in a globalized world, international forces will matter as well.

Part 6: Conclusion Sri Lanka’s experience is evidence that even an economically relatively poor country can survive a war of terror that lasts about 30 years if the institutional structure is strong and there is a commitment to democratic culture. It also shows that ethnic nationalism is a strongly embedded motivating force in society that cannot be wished away. There is tension between ethnic nationalism and liberal democracy that has now come into the open since the war ended. Sri Lanka has had considerable success in making economic progress and social equity. But the Sri Lankan model of democracy has so far failed to create a more inclusive society based on the principles of equity and freedom for all ethnic and social groups. The hope that the 2015 change of government created to overcome tribalism and usher in good governance did not fully materialize. Five years later, a majority of the people, mainly Sinhalese, voted to return to the old model. Such swings are not unique to Sri Lanka. Even some mature Western democracies are facing similar situations with a rise in racial tribalism, exposing the fragility and vulnerability of democratic governance. In Sri Lanka that tension is further complicated by the need to make economic progress in a very competitive globalized system. The newly elected Gotabaya Rajapaksa government is exploiting that tension to move toward a more authoritarian form of government with a growing role for the military in administration and the economy. Whether there is a midpoint between liberal democracy and autocracy is a debatable point. In the Sri Lankan case some even speculate whether the emerging trend is the manifestation of an urge to return to some version of the precolonial state where the president rules like a king but not with a feudal aristocratic base

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but with a nationalist capitalist security community base that is the new aristocracy of the country.

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Sorbo, G., Goodhand, J., Klem, B., Nissen, E., & Selbervik, H. (2011). Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka 1997–2000. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/countries/ srilanka/49035074.pdf Swamy, M. R. N. (2003). Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran—The First Profile of the World’s Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications. Tambiah, S. J. (2011). The Colombo Riots of 1983. In Holt, John Clifford (Ed.), The Sri Lanka Reader: History, Culture Politics (pp. 641–647). Durham: Duke University Press. UN. (2005). Secretary General Kofi Annan Launches Global Strategy against Terrorism in Madrid. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sg2095.doc.htm UN, Security Council Report. (2009a). S-11/1 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. A/HRC/RES/S/11-1. Retrieved from http://www.securityc ouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ A_HRC_RES_S_11_1.pdf UN. (2009b). Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Eleventh Special Session, Geneva. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sri%20Lanka%20A-HRCS-11-2-Advance.pdf UN. (2011). Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9 B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20Rep%20on%20Account%20in %20Sri%20Lanka.pdf UN. (2015a). Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL). UNHRC Geneva. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Sessio n30/Pages/ListReports.aspx; https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regular Sessions/Session30/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A.HRC.30.CRP.2_E.docx&action=default &DefaultItemOpen=1 UN. (2015b). Resolution 30/1, Human Rights Council on 1 October 2015, Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka. UNHRC, Geneva. Retrieved from https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/236/38/PDF/ G1523638.pdf?OpenElement UNDP.(2020). Human Development Report. Retrieved from http://www.hdr.undp.org/ Velamati, M. (2009). Sri Lankan Tamil migration and settlement: time for reconsideration. India Quarterly, 65(3), 271–294. Wezemen, S. T., Bromley, M., & Wezemen, P. D. (2009). International arms transfers. In SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (pp. 299–320). Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB0907.pdf Wickramasinghe, N. (2009, November). After the war: new patriotism in Sri Lanka. The Journal of Asian Studies, 68(4), 1045–1054. Wilson, A. J. (1974). Politics in Sri Lanka 1947–1973. London: Macmillan. Wilson, A. J. (1988). The Break-Up of Sri Lanka. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. World Bank. (1998/99). World Development Report: Knowledge for Development. Washington: World Bank. World Bank. World Development Indicators. Retrieved from http://wdi.worldbank.org/ table

4

Tenuous security in the Himalayas A focus on Nepal Thomas A. Marks

Introduction Continued political violence in Nepal should not come as a surprise. Behind the national self-congratulation concerning termination of the decade-long insurgency in November 2006, turning a blind eye to local violence has been a hallmark of the new order (Dixit, 2011; Marks, 2017; Sharma, 2019). While the actions of the radical Chand (aka Biplav) faction stand out, in reality the Maoists generally have ignored the continued use of terrorism by their local operatives, both to ensure the outcome of polls and to amass the funds needed for political action (Marks, 2019a). There is thus considerable irony that events have progressed to the point that radical Maoist insurgent actions against a communist government that includes the mainstream Maoists stand as the most immediate security threat in Nepal today (Marks, 2019; “Expert speaks on Nepal,” 2019). Compounded by the challenges of the coronavirus lockdown and its attendant socioeconomic damage, the result is a fraught security situation. Several issues are at play, but only one – terrorism – will be considered in this chapter. Use of the term is consistent with most of academia, the various departments of the U.S. government, and both U.S. and international law: violence by non-state actors directed against the innocent for political purposes, often associated with conveying symbolic meaning. Such violence may be either method, used by insurgents, or logic, wherein the violence serves as an end unto itself, frequently having propagandistic value as used by what once were called “pure terrorists.” The distinction is crucial, since, as noted by Wieviorka, terrorism is always a method but at times assumes such salience that it swallows the political project at hand and becomes logic (Wieviorka, 1975, 2004). Despite the hackneyed observation that there is no accepted definition of terrorism, there is in reality considerable agreement with the formulation just provided, particularly among the member states of the United Nations (Young, 2006; Marks, 2019b). Related, but not to be covered specifically, are what one source has accurately termed the “challenges of security provision in rapidly urbanizing contexts” (Gupte & Bogati, 2014). Criminal activity in fact continues to grow for reasons that are not unlike those exploited by the Maoists in their 1996–2006 insurgent mobilization effort: a growing, youthful population (at least 46% of the 28-plus million

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 63 total are ≤19) finds itself increasingly frustrated by a rigid political opportunity structure unable to facilitate adequate employment, social mobility, or meaningful representation. The situation is complicated by the increasingly authoritarian impulses of a communist supermajority in parliament that is representative of electoral distortion (e.g., first past the post) rather than the actual popular vote or forces, which are more narrowly separated.

Historical and political context Overt Maoist insurgency in Nepal, February 1996 to November 2006, was a savage period that involved political violence ranging from terrorism to guerrilla warfare to actual military attacks by insurgent units armed and equipped in the manner of the government forces (Ogura 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Marks, 2008; Whelpton, 2013). The insurgents’ objective was to seize political power in order to institute a communist regime. The government and its armed local representatives, the police, had in many areas barely been able to survive the onslaught, which included widespread assassinations (with body mutilation common, such as cutting off heads) and attacks upon individuals perceived as rivals in organizing and mobilizing society, as well as extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and targeted bombings. Even Kathmandu was by 2002–2003 in a state of siege, and Maoist activity within the city was extensive. By the conclusion of this phase of the conflict, an estimated 70–80% of the populace lived in insurgent-dominated areas. A formal peace agreement notwithstanding, the complicated postinsurgency period has been characterized by a significant level of terrorism, both to eliminate political rivals and to raise the funds necessary to engage in their political effort (Marks, 2017). Central to the discussion here is the reality that the insurgency period featured an overt effort by the Maoists to capture the state using violence, with terrorism as a central feature, while the postinsurgency period was not an end to the first but its continuation through a covert approach. Debates about how to implement this alternative approach led to the splintering of the Maoist movement. The continuation of assault targeted those identified by the Maoists as their principal foes: members of the noncommunist political parties that have worked to implement a viable democratic order. This order, in turn, had come into existence only in 1990 with the end of absolute monarchy (Ogura, 2001; Debnicki, 1992). The leading democratic force in this effort was the Nepali Congress (NC), the country’s oldest and historically most dominant party. Throughout most of the period leading to the present, the communists – with the Maoists comprising their most radical element – were in the parliamentary opposition. The Unified Marxist–Leninists (UML) was the majority faction within the communist movement.1 Impatient at the slow pace of societal change, the Maoists broke away from the communist mainstream and declared people’s war in 1996 (Marks, 2007).2 Post-2006 Maoist actions have thus involved many of the same organizations and methodologies as in the 1996–2006 decade. The original and still largest Maoist group – referred to herein as “the mainstream” and headed throughout by Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda

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(“Renowned,” though “Fierce One” was most common in Western media) – has remained dominant within the extreme left wing of Nepali communism and continues to use terrorism opportunistically despite having opted to emphasize political action within the context of Nepal’s flawed democracy. Known for much of its history as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN(M), it changed its name to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) after the end of the overt conflict. Postinsurgency splintering saw at one point as many as ten Maoist parties in existence. When perhaps half of them returned to the fold, the mainstream altered its name yet again, becoming the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). Subsequently, on May 17, 2018, it was announced that the party’s electoral alliance with the communists (but not Maoists) of the UML, led by Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, had resulted in their amalgamation into a single, restored Nepal Communist Party (NCP). This body now has complete political power at all levels of governance to include control of the security forces (police and military). Dahal and Oli divide NCP leadership, with Oli the prime minister and Dahal endeavoring to lead party activities, which arguably are more important in a party state wherein all major government decisions are first decided upon in party deliberations. Nevertheless, the relationship has become increasingly strained and during December 2020 reached a point of crisis, with NCP degenerating into hostile groups. Such splintering is consistent with the past. Within the original Maoist party, a faction, headed by one of the senior figures of the movement, Mohan Baidya aka Kiran (“Ray of Light”), became increasingly alienated from the mainstream over issues of strategy – primarily the faction’s demand that violence be used systematically in the postwar environment rather than opportunistically – and finally broke away formally in late June 2012 under the original party name, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, but using CPN-M as its acronym. It took with it perhaps one-third of the entire party.3 It included at that time an even more radical faction led by firebrand Netra Bikram Chand aka Biplav (also rendered as Biplab; “Revolt” or “Rebel”). Dissatisfied with the ineffective strategy of Baidya during the events of the November 2013 elections, when violence failed to thwart the elections, it bolted in November 2014 to form its own party, which designated itself as the CPN(M), using the original acronym of the Maoist movement. Most of the Baidya manpower departed with Biplav. The group subsequently recruited actively and grew substantially. It is now second in (Maoist) strength only to the mainstream now within the NCP. It is this group that presently carries out the most sensational terroristic acts (e.g., bombings), which included attempting to stop the local and national elections of 2017. Ultimately, terroristic acts by all Maoist factions played an important role in stymying the non-communist opposition and resulted in the current communistruled state. As an integral component of the communist government, the Maoists control a number of positions and ministries, to include the most important as concerns internal security, the Home Ministry. This ministry has charge of both the police (in a national system) and elements of the intelligence apparatus (which is focused internally), with obvious implications for those who have been

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 65 identified as Maoist enemies. Most tellingly, continued Maoist terrorism must be reported to a state force that is controlled by those ordering or condoning the attacks. The mainstream Maoists retain a paramilitary capability and use it to execute violence, relying especially upon various front organizations such as the Young Communist League (YCL) and the All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union (Revolutionary) (ANNISU-R).4 As is the case with the Maoist mainstream, these front organizations have also splintered and execute the programs of various Maoist factions, a reality that has the consequence of making the situation much more dangerous for Maoist targets, both because it is seldom completely clear which Maoists are targeting the victim and because targeting lists migrate with individuals who switch loyalties to different factions and groups. None of these organizations are proscribed or monitored in any meaningful way by the police. Their activities are not interfered with except when circumstances cause public outrage to demand intervention. Such official response is normally cosmetic, and it is rare that individuals identified to the police as assailants have been detained and prosecuted.

Revolution in the revolution The ongoing violence is thus not a battle between a committed government and a rebellion but rather a dispute between factions of the larger Nepali communist movement over just how violence against opponents is to unfold: aggressively and provocatively, regardless of accompanying negative publicity and consequences (the Biplav line); or cautiously and low key, avoiding publicity and its invariable negative consequences for a country that still depends heavily upon foreign sources for aid and remains perilously exposed to possible anti-communist Indian intervention (the Dahal line). An ideological concept lacking specificity, the “two line struggle” essentially holds – just as a communist party is required to lead the masses to an understanding of their true interests, because the party has the best grasp of societal realities and necessary Marxist–Leninist redress – so within the party itself there will constantly be struggles over how to proceed strategically. These contending lines are a necessary dialectical clash that will result in a correct “mass line” or way forward. Reality, of course, has proved considerably less obvious, with regular (often violent) purges in the Chinese and other cases. At one point in Nepali Maoism, during the war years, the losing side in strategic debate was imprisoned and eventually released only because of intervening variables. In the case under discussion, contending lines have come to a head. Though the two sides agree in their assessment of Nepal’s flawed societal realities and the nature of the enemy (embodied most prominently in the non-communist political parties and various “imperialist forces,” especially the U.S.), tactical debate culminated on March 12, 2019, when the inner circle of the Cabinet banned the Biplav group for its violent criminal actions. The decision-making was chaired by Prime Minister Oli and conducted as primarily a party rather than governmental

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matter. The ban applied provisions dealing with organized crime to a political body and thus is challenged.5 Perhaps more telling for the assessment here, the action followed nearly a decade-and-a-half of Maoist-sponsored paramilitary terrorism and came just several months after a government panel, appointed by the Maoist-led Home Ministry, had announced that “no more conflict exists in the country” – by which it meant armed political conflict – precisely what is occurring. Nor does the concern appear to be one of public safety. Most elements of the security forces are not involved in countering the Biplav group; there are no programs or efforts in place to protect the population (e.g., local forces or watcher groups); and actions taken to date by the police have been overwhelmingly against radical activists – i.e., publicly active radical Maoists and their perceived supporters – who are invariably claimed to be clandestine cadre. This is seldom accurate. Behind the publicity, the reality is that nearly all those initially detained (numbers provided vary with the period used in the counting) have been released, being overwhelmingly just sympathizers rather than subversives much less combatants. The disparity between public arrest figures and weapons captured (less than two dozen) is glaring, even as victims of terroristic action often report that their assailants were armed. Regardless of identity, the numbers fail to impress. According to the most recent reliable figures, as of October 6, 2019, police sources put the total number of arrests of Biplav personnel over the previous two years at 849, of whom 794 had been initially detained following the “ban.” Of those 794, there were 55 who were released immediately (6.5%), 606 posted bail (71.4%), 125 refused to post bail (14.7%), and 63 (7.4%) were still being held for investigation at the time the figures were provided (i.e., further investigation was required in order to even charge them). No trials have been publicly noted. Further, all officially provided arrest figures are inflated by multiple arrests of many of the same individuals, who are rearrested the moment they post bail. One alleged, openly active district head, for example, has been arrested at least twelve times in eight months.6 Numbers aside, only several figures of any organizational stature have been apprehended. This confirms reporting that has highlighted the “low hanging fruit” nature of those arrested: political activists as opposed to insurgents much less terrorists. The Biplav organization remains intact and continues to grow. It holds the strategic initiative, choosing when and where to strike, as well as the form of its attacks. Charges filed against those arrested normally are for collateral actions. As the 2016 annual State Department, issued in 2017, report correctly notes: “Nepal lacks a law specifically criminalizing terrorism or the provision of material support to terrorist networks. If an act of terrorism were to take place, Nepali courts would likely prosecute the perpetrators on the basis of laws pertaining to its constituent crimes, e.g. murder, arson, etc. Most Nepali officials view Nepal as at low-risk for an international terrorist incident. Accordingly, there is little impetus to introduce new laws” (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As the threat under discussion is obviously not international, the government, all political parties, and Nepali society remain divided as to how to proceed. That the populace is not interested in a renewal of conflict is clear enough, even as

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 67 thousands have continued to be victims of coercion, violence, and illicit fundraising. The ruling NCP has moved from lackadaisical ignorance to embarrassing bravado. Prime Minister Oli at one point was quoted as boasting in early 2019 that “the government will control the criminal and destructive activities [of the Biplav outfit] within 15 days. … We will make them join the political mainstream by April 13. The group will be brought to mainstream politics, if possible politically, if not by even putting ‘the pseudo comrades’ behind bars” (Giri, 2019). Foolish on its merits, the passage does not explain the government’s own role, both tangibly and ideologically, in the spiral of violence. Beyond all else, there is the hollow ring to the label “pseudo comrades” adopted by the NCP. It has not escaped notice in Nepal and elsewhere that the Biplav faction is doing nothing more than carrying Maoist rhetoric and strategy to a logical end. It is the government and the NCP, claims the Biplav faction, who are not authentic communists; hence, revolt is the only option. When considered within the closed loop of Marxist–Leninist logic, such a stance is not far off. In reality, there is little difference between what is unfolding and what preceded it save the mainstream Maoist claim “now everything is different.” True to a point, this assessment is normally followed with another: that Biplav should follow the mainstream example and embrace nonviolence as has the mainstream. The claim that violence has been renounced, though, is inaccurate.

What is to be done? The police are now being used as a weapon in this communist intramural struggle, even as hitherto they have not aggressively pursued perpetrators of terrorism. Ironically, the Biplav group is challenging the communist government that includes the mainstream Maoists, with the home minister, Ram Bahadur Thapa aka Badal (“Cloud”), not only a former Biplav Maoist but also close friends with Biplav himself (Bibhas, 2018). Though he is home minister, Thapa is of questionable commitment either to the democratic process or popular security. The estrangement of the erstwhile comrades, as noted earlier, stems from disagreement concerning the Maoist plan to continue their struggle covertly using subversion and terrorism while placing guerrilla and military action on hold. A strategy session was held in September 2005 in Chunwang, Rukum, at which the course of action was outlined and agreed upon. As understood by all participants at the meeting, the embrace of parliamentary democracy was to be a tactic that would enable Maoist organizing in government strongholds (essentially, district capitals and Kathmandu) for ultimate seizure of power through violent mass action linked to then-existing rural domination. The subsequent splits resulted from radical claims of the plan’s betrayal by the mainstream. All Maoist factions after November 2006 supported the continued use of terrorism. Dahal’s presentation to the Chunwang meeting states as its first military goal of five (translation from Nepali):7 “To extensively militarize the party, authority, party members, and people and seek to configure, specialize, and train the People’s Liberation Army to take necessary action in the cities, center, region,

68 Thomas A. Marks districts, and capital” (i.e., to prepare forces for urban insurrection). The final way forward was agreed upon by the 11 individuals of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Maoist inner circle. A summary document was then discussed and passed by the larger membership of the Politburo and Central Committee.8 Significantly, my research has found no disagreement between sources, regardless of faction – to include individuals who were among the 11 – as to what was decided. Rather, intense agreement broke out concerning implementation, especially what was claimed by radicals to be the unilateral decision-making by Dahal in consultation with Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, then the Maoists’ chief ideologue and “Number Two.” The debate was not one of violence versus nonviolence but over just how aggressively to proceed. Violence thus has continued, with the Biplav group differing in methodology but not in essence. Details provided by victims of all factions are consistent in revealing typical Maoist targeting protocol.9 A mapping (whether done formally or informally) of socio-economic-political power identifies those who must be neutralized in order to clear the way for Maoist (and now communist) domination or to provide material assistance (especially funding) to the movement. The two elements are not mutually exclusive and are directed universally at noncommunist targets. During the 1996–2006 period, the level of violence was extreme. Today, opponents have been so decimated in many localities that heads need no longer be cut off or victims murdered while hanging on poles (both common occurrences during the conflict period). Rather, attacks that analysts often pass off as “just South Asian politics” are considered sufficient (though, in the case of women, often accompanied by threat of or actual rape). Terroristic menace and violence are particularly important now in the illicit raising of funds by the Maoist splinters. The mainstream Maoists rely principally upon the opportunities for pressure and corruption attendant to their participation in the political system. Regardless of orientation, individuals in the various Maoist groups interact and move fluidly between memberships in any particular faction. Thus, the identity and particulars of a targeted individual are accessed by all groups. The absence of effective police response is neither surprising nor unusual. Nepal’s centralized police force is spread thinly throughout the country and has throughout its history been characterized by lackluster performance and brutality. It is a service that remains of decidedly uneven quality. Except in extreme circumstances, many if not most citizens will go to considerable lengths to avoid officially interacting with them at all. A recent study by the well-regarded human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Advocacy Forum found that even now nearly a fourth (22.8%) of those detained by the police reported being tortured, with the figure still higher for juveniles (23.5%) and residents of the tarai, the lowlands in southern Nepal (30.4%) (Advocacy Forum, 2019). These figures were substantially larger during the decade of insurgency, when police indiscipline was a major factor in generating support for the Maoists, and police presence was eliminated completely in many parts of the country. Subsequently, police posts were slowly but incompletely restored to their prewar basing posture. This posture is based upon small stations of 6–20 personnel, minimally capable of responding to terroristic episodes.

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 69 Further, police nationwide have in the postwar years been directed not to become involved in cases that could be categorized as “political.” If some police still struggle to respond to episodes of assault and illicit fundraising, the reality gradually has become – even where response is at least a theoretical and physical option – staying clear of the normal violent assaults that are all but routine in localized political interactions. It is only the Maoists who actually benefit from this approach, because only the Maoists (and various allies) ideologically and structurally link their political action to terroristic violence. Today, biased or indifferent police performance of duties extends throughout the country. Cases of the police responding to requirements of individual citizen security or protection from extortion are unusual if not nonexistent. Exacerbating the situation, under the present communist government, the chain of command has become increasingly politicized, engaging in acts of questionable legality upon the political orders of the home minister or other communist functionaries. Suspects, for instance, as noted earlier, are often immediately rearrested without warrants after posting bail, a practice which has become routine when applied to alleged Biplav Maoists in the communist intramural contest. Officers are regularly implicated in corruption and sensational episodes of incompetence and dereliction of duty. In actions against the Biplav group, the police stand accused of falling back upon extrajudicial killings (i.e., death squad activity), an abuse in which they have routinely engaged in the past (“Encounter or shoot out,” 2019; Rai, 2019, May 26). A recent State Department annual document, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, issued March 13, 2019, while dutifully noting positive formal figures and training for the security forces (to include police), is scathing in the overall picture it paints in its introduction to the Nepal section (U.S. State Department, 2019). Unstated in the report is the reality that to force state action, particularly in recent instances of corruption and inadequate criminal investigation, the chosen tactic of desperate citizens has been the “fast until death.” As to capabilities for providing security, a 2016 assessment remains accurate: “While Nepal has specialized units to investigate and respond to terrorist incidents (Nepal Police Special Bureau), law enforcement units have limited capacity to effectively detect, deter, or identify terrorist suspects. An open border with India and relatively weak airport security present vulnerabilities” (U.S. State Department, 2017). Such activity does not in any manner improve the security of individual citizens. The communist government has pardoned previously convicted Maoist figures, creating an atmosphere (and reality) of impunity, and they now occupy prominent governmental positions. Only when actual murder (or rape) is prominently committed (e.g., in public spaces of Kathmandu) have the police gone through the motions of responding. It was just such a series of terroristic actions in late February and early March 2019, with casualties in the heart of Kathmandu, that forced the announced move against the Biplav group. Yet the verbiage, as previously noted, has not been matched by systematic response. Actions by the Biplav group, such as organizing in local space, are widespread, as illustrated by a large Biplav agitprop session held January 24, 2020, in Kalikot district. Another

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demonstration appeared simultaneously in Surkhet while the mainstream Maoist home minister was in the district conducting a security meeting (Neupane, 2020; Thapa, 2020).10 Such mobilization remains widespread and is often ignored by local authorities. As was the case during the open conflict, the Biplav clandestine party structure embraces the entire country, though now functioning in a more truncated form through 17 bureaus (which command district organizations) under three regional commands. As popular mobilization goes on, a portion of the recruits is trained, armed, and becomes the muscle that eliminates opposition to the Maoist political effort and engages in illicit fundraising (which is nationwide and all but unhindered by the ban). Considerable speculation has attended the emergence of this military capability, which is attempting to recreate capabilities now exercised by the mainstream Maoists through their front organizations. Absent access to the forces of the state, such as the police, the Biplav group desires its own armed capacity. Evidence indicates that it has reconstituted four companies (a hypothetical strength of 600) as a budding combatant force.11 Weaponry is mixed. Details hitherto known to analysts but not made public have now appeared in Nepali language outlets and correctly highlight that in the demobilization commencing November 2006, a large number of the known military-grade weapons in the Maoist inventory were not surrendered (2,603 of 6,078, or 43%). Unknown is the extent to which these remain divided amongst the various Maoist factions. In the current struggle, military-grade weapons and material have been captured by the police, but public displays have been unimpressive. A March 16, 2019, cache taken in a captured Biplav combatant camp, for example, consisted of but two Sterling submachineguns and a 9 mm pistol. In contrast, the government’s claims of hundreds of weapons seized have in reality stemmed from an early 2019 order that all “illegal arms and weapons be turned in within 35 days.” This produced an immediate surrender of hundreds of traditional, locally produced rifles used principally by citizens for hunting game as opposed to the modern weaponry known to exist (“429 Firearms Surrendered,” 2019; “Dhading District Police Office,” 2019; Khanal, 2019).12 This profile has not changed. Efforts not only to obtain but to manufacture weapons and IEDs are in place nationwide. Particularly impressive were the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) captured by the police in two Chand aka Biplav “bomb factories” in Kathmandu on June 14, 2020 (“Bomb Factory of Biplav Group,” 2020).13 More than 200 partially fabricated units using an older British model (the Mills grenade), after being primed with explosives, were apparently being further packed with shrapnel – a casualty-producing device. Most recent operations, though, have not involved deaths, because specific Biplav instructions have emphasized minimizing human casualties. Most attacks have been dedicated to messaging by engaging in spectacular property destruction. Particularly notable was the coordinated action, in late July and early August 2019, that sabotaged as many as 50 cell phone transmission towers nationwide in a matter of days (Lokendra, 2019). It can be safely argued that none of the aforementioned activities would matter to the NCP had the Biplav group continued to focus upon noncommunist targets.

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 71 The larger communist movement uses violence with near impunity. In the brutal attack upon civil society activist Gyanendra Shahi on September 28, 2019, in Bharatpur, Chitwan district, for example, the police arrived only afterward. In the attack the next day upon Nepali Congress politician Minendra Rijal in Tanahun district, the police simply stood by – this despite the ongoing communist seizure of all eight ward offices of the Rishing rural municipality, which were those Rijal was attempting to reach. Those wards had all elected NC representatives, which goes far to explain police inaction. That is, the ward office seizures, like the violent attacks detailed earlier, were labeled “political.” The escalation and intensity of such recent episodes, which have continued and have invariably involved armed communist cadre, has prompted something of a popular backlash, but this has done little for the victims (Poudel, 2019; “Bid to Attack Minendra Rijal of NC,” 2019; “Editorial: Stop Attacks,” 2019; “The Government and the Ruling Party,” 2019). It was not the use of terrorism per se that led to government response against the Biplav group. Rather, it was the perceived expansion of the group’s targeting, because such overt, public violence was seen as jeopardizing consolidation of the communist position. If the radicals returned to the communist fold, all would likely be forgiven, and Biplav would receive a ministerial portfolio. This is how the home minister was wooed back into the mainstream.

Citizenry in search of security As matters now stand, Biplav combatants operate in the guerrilla mode as dictated by early stage people’s war doctrine. Initial assaults on isolated police positions have thus been attempted to capture weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The first engagement in which there were casualties on both sides (one each) occurred on July 10, 2019, in Bhojpur district, when an undercover police unit encountered a Maoist cell under ambiguous circumstances (“Armed Chand Cadres,” 2019; “Police Constable, Chand Cadres Killed,” 2019; “One Moment It’s ‘We Are Rai Brother,’” 2019). That the situation has reached this point highlights the reality that the communist government has done little systematic planning to deal with the threat. Internal security (i.e., the police) is controlled by the mainstream Maoists, who have been oblivious to the needs of popular security even as their own front organizations engage in terroristic actions not unlike those of the breakaway radical groups, with the obvious exception of bombings, which remain a Biplav group monopoly. Regardless of faction, the Maoists continue to target individuals whom they have identified as enemies, desirable recruits, or possible sources of material support (especially money). Fleeing or moving elsewhere within the country does not alter the Maoist efforts, with their attendant terroristic threats and actions. Beyond Nepal, it may be observed that during the 1996–2006 period, large numbers of individuals fled to India, particularly young people fearful of being drafted into insurgent forces. These individuals, however, were effectively refugees as opposed to targeted

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individuals. For targets, India is not a viable option unless one can stay hidden, particularly by giving up normal political life. In fact, the Nepali community in India is penetrated by Maoist operatives, while New Delhi itself continues to battle a large Naxalite movement that follows Maoist ideology, which maintains links with radical Nepali Maoists even as the mainstream Maoists maintain front organizations within Indian centers of Nepali settlement. More generally, there are increasingly serious issues for Nepalis seeking refuge. Though the terms of a 1950 treaty state that Nepalis may stay with only their own national documentation, this is often not what actually occurs. Numerous Indian state exceptions exist that effectively negate the national treaty provision of free access. Language, cultural authenticity, land ownership, and law and order (i.e., security in general), for instance, are state matters – and the cause of widespread discrimination against even Nepalis who are Indian citizens (Middleton & Shneiderman, 2018). This has in the past led to actual Nepali insurgency (Bagchi, 2012). More recently, June–September 2017, violent civil rights protests, accompanied by a general strike, crippled the main center of Indian Nepali settlement, Darjeeling (in West Bengal), on Nepal’s eastern border. Paramilitary forces were deployed, and unrest continues. West Bengal state authorities have claimed that the upheaval was a result of mainstream Nepali Maoist and Chinese efforts. In reality, longstanding discrimination, particularly with respect to language, is at the heart of the matter. This becomes of central importance as the major states containing Nepali populations are presently involved in a massive government-directed campaign to expel “foreigners,” with Assam alone having claimed at one point some 4 million individuals not to be citizens, despite many family histories in the area going back multiple generations. Though the number affected has been reduced to 1.9 million, this has included an estimated 100,000 Nepalis (Choudhury, 2019). With India a poor option, fleeing abroad makes the most sense, but this normally does not end the Maoist targeting effort. Available evidence points to a concerted effort to continue the targeting protocol, especially by pressuring families to summon the return of the targeted individual. In such situations, there is nowhere to turn, because the police are either unwilling or ineffective in their response (see earlier discussion). This reality leaves the victim in a hopeless situation. A permeable membrane divides mainstream Maoists and their radical splinters. The contending factions, whatever their differences, and now the “ban” pronounced against the Biplav group, continue to interact, particularly at the local level. The mainstream Maoists, as stated earlier, have not renounced terrorism. Rather, they feel that in its present form, it has achieved and sustains their objectives. Notwithstanding their estranged comrades’ critique, the mainstream Maoists point out that they are in a position of power. To this end, they have been willing to tolerate more aggressive radical terrorist actions as long as they do not target the mainstream Maoists themselves and are not seen to be endangering their position in the open political spectrum. This unstated agreement is under pressure at the top but continues at lower levels. Hence victims remain almost exclusively members of noncommunist parties, especially the Nepali Congress. Widespread terrorism against individuals continues, both to

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 73 achieve local domination and to produce funds through extortion. Documentary evidence obtained when Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma, a member of the Biplav group Politburo, was detained revealed NPR 77 million (approximately USD 663,829) raised in the 28 months before mid-July 2018. (“Chand-led CPN Collects Rs. 77 Million,” 2018). In a mid-August 2018 interview, a member of the detained fundraiser’s legal team denied to me that such revolutionary taxation took place, but my own information supports the NPR 77 million as a minimum figure. This would seem to be more than confirmed by the latest reporting. Simultaneously, symbolic terrorist attacks have continued, with many of the numerous actual and attempted bombings having the potential to produce a mass casualty event. The precise nature of Maoist terrorist acts has varied considerably, ranging from seeking past enemies for appropriate punishment – with kidnapping, torture (to include rape), and assault (to include murder) being common – to widespread use of bombs by radicals to terrorize the general populace and eliminate specific targets. Use of criminality to raise funds is ubiquitous. Explanations provided by senior radical figures in interviews lead to the conclusion that the present Biplav group protocol for bombings is similar to the Vietnam-era American radical group, the Weather Underground. Symbolic violence at present has priority over mass casualty events. Unlike the Weather Underground, however, the Biplav group extensively targets individuals. This is a methodology it shares with all Maoist factions. As concerns funding through criminality, each insurgent group has its own profile driven by the context at hand. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for instance, while initially emphasizing the same funding activities as the Nepali Maoists (kidnap for ransom, extortion, bank robbery), was increasingly able to exploit the lucrative opportunities that came with participation in the drug trade (Marks, 2018). In Nepal, there are no such windfall sources. The Nepali Maoists hence have relied overwhelmingly upon extortion, with the mainstream now also able to profit from the widespread corruption that is integral to Nepali governance. The result is an astonishingly difficult environment within which to provide protection for individuals and organizations. To secure such a dispersed population in an area the size of Virginia (if the Himalayas are excluded) was beyond Nepal’s capability during the period of overt insurgency (1996–2006), when all forces were committed; it is beyond Nepal’s capability now. As an illustration, during the 2017 local elections, when terroristic assaults on individuals and property were widespread, the authorities were tasked with guarding 6,642 polling centers nationally, in addition to normal security duties. Simply assigning 12–18 policemen to each center (a normal distribution) created manpower demands greater than the strength of the entire police force (67,416). Though available elements of the Nepal Army (NA; 95,000) and paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF; a constabulary tasked with border security, approximately 40,000) were also deployed, the resulting distribution provided no security for the general populace. This is always the dilemma for the state, even where there is will.14 It is will that is decidedly absent today in Nepal, and there remains little inclination, much less strategy, to provide such protection. The other armed government

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forces, NA and APF, play no significant role in internal security (though specialist units have been committed, e.g., army bomb squads). The former is primarily devoted to United Nations Peacekeeping, the latter primarily to border control. Further, individual and situational cases aside, the performance protocol previously noted, whereby the police have been directed not to become involved in political matters, is nearly universally interpreted by even the most professional officers to dictate nonintervention in any violent activity carried out by a political party or its organs, which in practice refers to the Maoists. This has not changed despite the banning of the Biplav group. The practical effect is that nonintervention or simply refusal of mediation is the norm in cases where personal security is requested by targeted individuals. Thus, terrorism effectively has been relegated to a position as background noise and allowed to continue. Such actions, with their fusion of terroristic verbal and physical acts, go on nationwide.

Conclusion Nepali Maoism throughout its existence has been noteworthy for the deep consideration the would-be revolutionaries put into examining theory and practice, particularly into what had caused groups that seemed on the verge of success, such as Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru, to fail. This thinking was the essence of politics, whether violent or otherwise: how to shape the world to address the challenges that society faces. Most impressive is the keen understanding that violence is but a way to get to the objective, which is political power to carry out societal transformation. The fierce debates that have gone on throughout not only the Maoist movement, but the larger Nepali communist movement, all revolve around this point. The debate has not concluded, as illustrated by the Biplav phenomenon. Ironically, Biplav has made a reasonably astute assessment of the present ills of Nepali society, whether incompetence or corruption or desire to sell out the country to the highest bidder (presently China). Where he comes up short is in failing to offer a viable way forward. Ironically, this is precisely the critique the Biplav group advanced for splitting with the Baidya faction. This, of course, serves to highlight the roots of tenuous security in Nepal. As a consequence of a particular national trajectory still rooted in a sense of society as a zero-sum contest, the concept and vocabulary of social justice have been adroitly conflated with those of Marxism by Nepali communists. What emerges from numerous interviews with Nepali Marxist–Leninists is more akin to what one finds in European social democracy than hard-core communism. Voters thus opt for the organization that best conveys a message of equality and justice even as they are mobilized by solid organizational mechanisms. Therein lies the danger. Leaders are not followers; politicians are not voters. And too many of the communist leaders are currently enthralled to the notion that “authentic” national communism can deliver on the promises of Marx and Lenin. As those promises were false, the results can only be muddled if not tragic (Marks, 1998, 1978). This is on display in the reality that nearly a decade-and-a-half after the formal end of a brutal civil war, much that made that period awful continues in the shadows.

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 75 Disclosure statement: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government.

Notes 1 An excellent comparison between the two parties is Hachhethu (2002). 2 People’s war, as an insurgent approach, builds an alternative to the existing state – that is, it builds a counter-state – which ultimately is capable of fielding armed power sufficient to topple the old order or ancien régime. It begins by using terrorism and guerrilla warfare to establish local domination in areas where the state is weak or not present, mobilizing manpower and resources, ultimately to field actual military units. The foremost theorist of the approach was Mao Tse-tung in China, with various Vietnamese figures also prominent; but the case of particular interest to the Nepali Maoists was that of the Peruvian Maoists headed by Abimael Guzman. 3 If one uses postwar vote tallies as a rough guide, total adult strength of the Maoists was perhaps 1.5 million. The movement, though, actively recruited and incorporated youths and children, which would increase the figure substantially. Nepal’s population for the 1996–2006 period was estimated at 24 million; it is presently estimated at 28–30 million. As early as 2002, close to half the population was 19 years of age or less. This clouds efforts to estimate precise Maoist strength, since the party has consistently appealed directly to underage youth. 4 Front organizations are ostensibly independent, but in reality serve to support the party and its strategy. They conceal their subordinate role. Nepali terminology uses “sister organizations” to describe the relationship, but this does not adequately clarify the reality that these organizations take orders from the parent. Neither does their ostensibly political nature do justice to the frequency with which they resort to violence. In addition to those named, there are a large number of legacy organizations which, though independent, have various degrees of relationship with the Maoists stemming from front arrangements entered into during the insurgency. 5 The ban was declared to lack legal basis in the Supreme Court Nepal ruling 075-WH0182, Dabal Bahadur Shah vs. Home Ministry, habeas corpus, Jestha 1 2076 [June 16, 2019]; reviewed July 28, 2019 in translation with lawyer accredited to the Supreme Court. Still, since the government has a two-thirds majority, it simply ignores such rulings. 6 Individual arrest count at August 2020. Overall arrest figures obtained from personal source, October 7, 2019. They are the most recent available and are in accord with publicly available data. For details of the organization and categories of manpower in an insurgency such as that under discussion, see Marks, Winter 2000. 7 Original document examined during March 2017 fieldwork in Nepal. 8 In the current Nepali Communist Party (NCP) structure, the Standing Committee consists of 45 members, of whom 26 are from the former UML and 19 from the mainstream Maoists. The ruling hand, the General Secretariat (included in the 45 total), is divided 6–3 in favor of the UML. In an organizational word game of sorts, the nominally senior Politburo is now a directly subordinate body of 135. The nominally supreme body, the Central Committee, is a very large 441 (with 241 being former UML). These inflated figures reflect the difficulties in bringing diverse factions under one umbrella, thus the need to allocate prestige and resources as necessary to secure support for the actual leadership. A more normal Marxist–Leninist arrangement would be that of FARC in Colombia, which throughout its four decades of conflict had a 7-man Secretariat and a 25-person General Staff (or Central Committee). Complete unification thus remains a work in progress.

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9 Targeting protocol is the manner in which a target, either human or material, is acquired, surveilled, tracked (as necessary), and assaulted. Threats are frequently verbal but often levied in written form. The latter will normally make demands of the victim, such as instructing him to cease his political work and pay a fine (invariably called a “donation”). To my knowledge, there is no study that has been made of this methodology as it occurs in Nepal, but there exists a body of scholarship on the subject deriving from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The term “night letters” has become widely used in both academic and popular literature to describe the impossible threats and demands levied on the population by insurgents during civil war. Assault may take different forms, depending upon intent. Extensive older material remains available from people’s war conflicts analogous to that of Nepal, such as Vietnam. Most recent literature deals with state targeting of non-state adversaries. 10 For scope of such activity, see especially photo accompanying Neupane, 2020 (in Nepali). This is not an unusual gathering. For treatment of the specifics of the agitprop protocol, refer to Mottin (2010). The protocol has shown continuity across time and space (my assessment). 11 In the camp discussed, a captured banner in Nepali read (four lines, from top): “Hail to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; People’s Liberation Army, Nepal; Basic Recruit Training Camp; No. 2 Company.” 12 For identification of rifle types surrendered, see photographs accompanying cited works. 13 See especially photographs in cited work. 14 The classic work that mathematically displays the conundrum faced by state forces is Chapter 33 of T.E. Lawrence, 1926 (pp. 188–196).

Bibliography Advocacy Forum. (2019). Rise of Torture in 2018. Kathmandu: Advocacy Forum. http:// www.advocacyforum.org/publications/torture.php Armed Chand Cadres Went to Sankhuwasabha After Staying at Evacuated Police Post. (2019, June 3). Setopati. https://setopati.net/political/147563 Bagchi, R. (2012). Gorkhaland: Crisis of Statehood. New Delhi: Sage. Bibhas, N. (2018, May 3). Comrades at War. The Record. https://www.recordnepal.com/ wire/comrades-at-war/ Bid to Attack Minendra Rijal of NC. (2019, September 30). Republica. https://thehima layantimes.com/nepal/bid-to-attack-minendra-rijal-of-nepali-congress/ Bomb Factory of Biplav Group at Two Places in the Valley, Large Quantity of Explosives Recovered. (2020, June 14). Nepal Khabar. (In Nepali): https://nepalkhabar.com/societ y/29573-2020-06-14-05-46-15?fbclid=IwAR12BCPIo07qTdYohVaTiPtnIlV_Ny9bf PZy_4b5xDQBuPHy-TnPMqCSkWc (accessed 4 July 2020). Chand-Led CPN Collects Rs 77 Million in Donations. (2018, September 2). The Himalayan Times. https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/chand-led-cpn-collects-rs-77-million-indonations/ Choudhury, R. (2019, September 8). ‘Assam is Home’: Over 1 Lakh [100,000] from Gorkha Community [Nepalis] Not in Citizens’ List. Ndtv.com. https://www.ndtv.com/india-new s/assam-is-home-over-1-lakh-from-gorkha-community-not-in-citizens-list-2097506 Debnicki, K. (1992). Royalists and Populists: Evolution of the Political System of Nepal 1950–1980. Limited edition of Orientalia Varsoviensia 5. Warsaw University Press. Dhading District Police Office Displays Arms Collected From Locals. (2019, April 17). The Himalayan Times. https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/dhading-district-policeoffice-displays-arms-collected-from-locals/

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 77 Dixit, K. M. (2011). Peace Politics of Nepal: An Opinion from Within. Kathmandu: Himal Books. Editorial: Stop Attacks. (2019, October 1). The Himalayan Times. https://thehimalayan times.com/opinion/editorial-stop-attacks/ Encounter or Shoot Out? (26 June 2019). People’s Review. https://www.peoplesreview. com.np/2019/06/26/encounter-or-shoot-out/ Expert Speaks on Nepal: Interaction with Thomas A. Marks. (2019, September 2). Mantraya. Interaction #02. http://mantraya.org/expertspeakonnepal/; for Nepali language version, Naya Patrika Daily. (2019, September 14). https://jhannaya.nayapatr ikadaily.com/news-details/495/2019-09-14 429 Firearms Surrendered. (2019, April 21). The Himalayan Times. https://thehimalayan times.com/kathmandu/429-firearms-surrendered/ Giri, A. (2019, March 26). Ruling and Opposition Parties at Odds over Handling the Chand Outfit. The Kathmandu Post. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-03-26/ ruling-and-opposition-parties-at-odds-over-handling-of-the-chand-outfit.html Gupte, J., & Bogati, S. (2014, May). Key Challenges of Security Provision in Rapidly Urbanising Contexts: Evidence from Kathmandu Valley and Terai Regions of Nepal. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/ key-challenges-of-security-provision-in-rapidly-urbanising-contexts-evidence-fromkathmandu-valley-and-terai-regions-of-nepal/ Hachhethu, K. (2002). Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and People—A Comparative Study of the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. Khanal, L. (2019, April 22). People of Conflict-Affected Rukum Villages Submit Illegal Arms to Govt. Republica. https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/people-of-c onflict-affected-rukum-villages-submit-illegal-arms-to-govt/ Lawrence, T. E. (1926). Chapter XXXIII of Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. http://gut enberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100111h.html#intro Lokendra [sic]. (2019, August 1). Home Ministry Instructed the Police Not to Talk about Biplav, Fire Attacks in 47 Towers of NCELL. Deshsanchar. (In Nepali): https://de shsanchar.com/2019/08/01/230853/?fbclid=IwAR3inW5cAvEhoIOY7NKNTNG 3gBMSek-V7pobqX2a4A7aQzA4ogrCdZzwnEM Marks, T. A. (2019a). Back to the Future: Nepali People’s War as ‘New War’. In S. D’Souza (Ed.). Countering Insurgencies and Violent Extremism in South and South East Asia (pp. 109–152) London: Routledge. Marks, T. A. (2019b). Combating ‘Terrorism’: A Strategic Warfighting Perspective. In Ajai Sahni (Ed). Essays in Honour of K.P.S. Gill (pp. 99–128). New Delhi: Kautilya. Marks, T. A. (1998). Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang. London: Frank Cass. Marks, T. A. (2017, January 28). Enduring Dilemmas: Nepali Insurgency Redux. Mantraya, [Occasional Paper #02]. http://mantraya.org/enduring-dilemmas-nepaliinsurgency-redux/ Marks, T. A. (Winter 2000). Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11(3), 21–46. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0 9592310008423288 Marks, T. A. (2018). FARC, 1982–2002: Criminal Foundation for Insurgent Defeat. In T. A. Marks and P. B. Rich. (Eds.). People’s War: Variants and Responses (pp. 80–115). London: Routledge. Marks, T. A. (2007). Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

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Marks, T. A. (2019, August). Red on Red: Security Situation in Nepal. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 25(1), 28–35. Marks, T. A. (2017). Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28(1), 81–118. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 09592318.2016.1265820?journalCode=fswi20 Marks, T. A. (1978, May). ‘The History of Our Sewage Disposal System’: Solzhenitsyn’s Conception of Stalinism as a Necessary Product of Lenin’s Thinking. Issues & Studies, 14(5), 65–89. Marks, T. A. (2008, July). The Maoists in Nepal: Strategies of Subversion and Subterfuge. Faultlines, 19, 33–55. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume19/ Article%202.pdf Middleton, T., & Shneiderman, S. (2018). (Eds). Darjeeling Reconsidered: Histories, Politics, Environments. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mottin, M. (2010). Catchy Melodies and Clenched Fists: Performance as Politics in Maoist Cultural Programs. In M. Lawoti and A. K. Pahari, (Eds.), The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 52–72). London: Routledge. Neupane, B. P. (2020, January 25). Demonstration of Biplav Group in the Village of Prakanda. Annapurna Post. (In Nepali): http://annapurnapost.com/news/146460 Ogura, K. (2001). Kathmandu Spring: The People’s Movement of 1990. Kathmandu: Himal Books. Ogura, K. (2004). Realities and Images of Nepal’s Maoists after the Attack on Beni. European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 27, 67–125. https://www.semanticscholar .org/paper/Realities-and-Images-of-Nepal's-Maoists-after-the-1-Ogura/ae4f122abfcf 3927634b846b7c141643f69a00c9 Ogura, K. (2008a). Maoist People’s Governments, 2001–05: The Power in Wartime. In D. Gellner and K. Hachhethu (Eds.). Local Democracy in South Asia: Microprocesses of Democratization in Nepal and Its Neighbours (pp. 175–231). New Delhi: Sage. Ogura, K. (2008b). Seeking State Power: The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Berlin: Berghoff. https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Pa pers/Transitions_Series/transitions_cpnm.pdf One Moment It’s ‘We Are Rai Brothers’ While Shaking Hands and Drinking Tea Together, Then Gunshots. (2019, July 11). Nepal Khabar. (In Nepali): https://nepalkhabar.com/ newspaper/2720-2019-07-11-02-37-30?fbclid=IwAR2SCrgHHyfo81xnEdOmkx FEG3YQunZQvHuXPwAlTRZUIoZhAxmtR9FHRSo Police Constable, Chand Cadre Killed in Gunfight in Bhojpur. (2019, July 10). Setopati. https://setopati.net/political/149324 Poudel, R. K. (2019, September 29). Anti-Corruption Campaigner Gyanendra Shahi Attacked in Chitwan. The Kathmandu Post. https://kathmandupost.com/2/2019/09/29/ anti-corruption-campaigner-gyanendra-shahi-attacked-in-chitwan Rai, D. (2019, June 5). How the Maoist Strife has Reignited in Nepal, Explained. The Record. https://www.recordnepal.com/category-explainers/category-explainers-howthe-maoist-strife-has-reignited-in-nepal-explained/ Rai, D. (2019, May 26). Youth’s Death in Police Shooting Reminiscent of the Maoist Insurgency. The Record. https://www.recordnepal.com/wire/youth-killed-in-policeshooting-reminiscent-of-the-maoist-insurgency/ Sharma, S. (2019). The Nepal Nexus: An Insider Account of the Maoists, the Durbar and New Delhi. New Delhi: Penguin. Thapa, S. (2020, January 25). Lokaantra. http://lokaantar.com/story/98856/2020/1/25/bi plab

Tenuous security in the Himalayas 79 The Government and the Ruling Party Must Dial Down on the Authoritarian Behaviour. (2019, October 1). The Kathmandu Post. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2019/10/0 1/the-government-and-the-ruling-party-must-dial-down-on-the-authoritarian-behaviour U.S. State Department. (2019). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2018. https:// www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nepal/ U.S. State Department. (2017). Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. https://www.state.go v/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2016/ Whelpton, J. (2013). Political Violence in Nepal from Unification to Janandolan I: The Background to ‘People’s War’. In M. Lecomte-Tilouine (Ed.). Revolution in Nepal: An Anthropological and Historical Approach to the People’s War (pp. 27–74). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wieviorka, M. (1975). Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research. In M. Crenshaw (Ed.). Terrorism in Context (pp. 597–606). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Wieviorka, M. (2004). The Making of Terrorism. New preface ed. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Young, R. (2006, December 1). Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 29(1), 23–84. http://law digitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=iclr

5

Naxal insurgency in India Genesis, ideological precepts, and security challenges Dalbir Ahlawat

Introduction The genesis of the Naxal insurgency can be traced to the colonial period, specifically with the passage of the Indian Forest Act of 1878 by the British. The land and forests, traditionally owned and managed by the indigenous people (adivasis), were placed in reserve, and revenue collection rights for these resources were transferred to the feudal lords (zamindars). The adivasis not only lost control over their lands but also lost employment opportunities as they were replaced with the labor from neighboring states. On top of this, they were forced to pay taxes even for minor forest products (Mhaiske, Patil, & Narkhede, 2016, p. 6). These excruciating circumstances deprived the adivasis of their traditional rights over the land and forests and impinged on their existing socioeconomic setup. In retaliation, they attempted hundreds of insurgent attacks against the British, and thus began the insurgency. After India’s independence in 1947, the adivasis expected a better dispensation from the government, but the “forest resource management changed little: [the] exclusionary processes accelerated … to consolidate state authority over forest resources” (Haeuber, 1993, pp. 49–50). To redress their grievances, the adivasis formed several representative organizations, but these organizations and their leaders were castigated “as ‘Maoist’ conspiracy … though not a single one of the resistances … have been led by the Maoists or even assisted by their guerrilla forces” (Sanhati, 2010). Thus in the absence of effective leadership, proper organizational framework, and ideological clarity, the grievances of the adivasis continued to be unaddressed. In light of these circumstances, the adivasi legitimacy gap soared with the government and began to sinew toward the Communist Party of India (CPI), which had vociferously fought for India’s independence against the British. In the postindependence period, while following the Marxist ideology, the CPI split into two factions in 1964 following the ideological rift between China and the Soviet Union. One of the factions, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) supported the Chinese model, i.e., to achieve its goals through violent revolution. One of its leaders named Charu Mazumdar supported the adivasis’ cause and mobilized them for a revolution on the pattern of the Chinese model that was steered by Mao Zedong (Suchitra, 2017).

Naxal insurgency in India 81 This chapter traces the antecedents of the Naxal movement, the blending of grievances into Maoist ideology, the nature of security challenges posed, and the government response to contain the insurgency. It also delineates a theoretical framework as well as international links that aided the insurgency. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes the efficacy of the government’s policies, the changing tactics of the Naxals, and the evolving trends in the Naxal insurgency.

Theoretical imperatives of the Naxal insurgency There is no single theory that does justice to insurgency, mainly because of a lack of consensus on the definition of insurgency and the differing circumstances of its genesis, methods, and objectives. As discussed in the succeeding sections, the Naxal insurgency had its genesis in the colonial period that specifically started after the enactment of the Indian Forest Act of 1878 by the British. This act deprived the adivasis of their unfettered control and rights over the forests and lands. It can be safely stated that it started with a grievance, i.e., losing control over the lands and forests. After independence, the government faced a moral dilemma: whether to implement a uniform national developmental model or give space to the indigenous people to retain their culture, lifestyle, and value system. Considering the limited resources at its disposal, the government opted for the latter option. This generated disequilibrium between the mainstream society and the adivasis. According to Johnson (1982, p. 18) sustained “disequilibrium” between various sectors of society can lead to dissatisfaction with the regime. Moreover, the subsiding of the core issue of land and forest rights led to “relative deprivation” of the adivasis (Walker & Smith, 2001, p. 14). According to Gurr (2000), when there is a gap between expectation and achievement this leads to sustained discontent among individuals or groups. This discontentment was demonstrated by the adivasis in 1971, but in the absence of a strong organizational framework and effective leadership, the adivasis failed to resolve their grievances. It was only in 2004 that the Naxals, along with other radical Maoist groups, formed the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPIM). The CPIM provided an ideological blend to the adivasis’ grievances as “internal colonialism” (Dey, 2019, p. 250). This means the national bourgeoisie did not recognize the rights of the minority communities and treated them merely as colonies. The CPIM framed its discourse on grievance narratives, as “narratives are necessarily selective, reflecting choices about what is relevant and irrelevant … with a disturbance or conflict which needs to be resolved through some course of action” (Kundnani, 2012, p. 8). Thus, the CPIM framed a cautiously crafted narrative that was ingrained in historical injustice, economic exploitation, deprivation of rights, and institutional discrimination. These narratives were blended to garner support and legitimacy, and to condition the people to think from a specific perspective. This even legitimized the killing of people in the security forces and informers, and destroying the government-built “exploitative” infrastructure. In sum, a grievance narrative was used as a means to shape the thinking and behavior of the larger community to bridge the legitimacy gap. As per Snow and Benford (2006, p. 3), to recruit

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cadres, three approaches get prominence: (1) “diagnostic framing” to sensitize about the grievances; (2) “prognostic framing” to apprise about the strategies, tactics, and targets; and (3) “motivational framing” to convince for active participation. As an enabler, a narrative of victimhood is promoted to justify the violent attacks, and if someone died while perpetrating an attack, a narrative of martyr (balidaan) is used to legitimize the loss as sacrifice for the adivasis, thus project the loss as a strength to glue the community. To take the different ethnic communities in their fold, the Naxals promoted their narrative through mythical tales, role-plays, audio-visual medium, and favorable publications in the media. This proved instrumental in enhancing significance at the individual, family, and community levels. This prompted the adivasis to restore their lost significance and empower themselves to come out of the perception of discrimination, powerlessness, and marginalization (Tran, 2016, pp. 197–198). Thus, the CPIM projected its Maoist ideological framework as harbinger of their rights over the lands and forests, and the government’s development and welfare projects as exploitative. Based on the preceding analysis, the Naxal insurgency in India can be understood from different theoretical perspectives such as disequilibrium, relative deprivation, and grievance narrative. These perspectives were channeled through ideological moorings to achieve collective goals and collective identity. This inculcated the spirit to sacrifice self for the collective (Rule, 2018, p. 34). In addition, collaboration with leftist organizations within and outside South Asia held the insurgents’ morale high, as it facilitated regular supply of weapons. Because of these inherent strengths, the Naxal insurgency survives despite the government’s several counterinsurgency and economic development measures.

Naxal insurgency The Naxal insurgency started during the colonial period and was ignored during the post-independence formative years, but became a formidable force that spread to almost one-third of India during its peak in 2009–2010. The evolution trajectory of the insurgency took place in three phases. Formative phase The adivasi grievances, ongoing from the colonial and post-independence period, got sparked in 1967 with the killing of a landless peasant by zamindars in the Naxalbari village in West Bengal, hence termed as “Naxal.” This incident united the peasants against the zamindars, and on May 1, 1967, the Naxals formed the CPI Marxist–Leninist (CPIML) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar. Mazumdar incited the adivasis by reproaching the Indian constitution as a shield for a semi-colonial and semi-feudal system that should be overthrown by peasants through a rebellion on the pattern of the Chinese revolution. Mazumdar’s intellectual moorings and ideological precepts found popular support among the landless peasants, the lower castes, and the dispossessed adivasis. According to him, India

Naxal insurgency in India 83 was a crying case for a revolution against the oppressive social and the political system. Following Mao’s strategy to “encircle the cities from the villages,” Mazumdar emphasized launching the revolution by the rural peasants. Existing class hatred required small combatant groups, not mass organizations, to target the zamindars and moneylenders (Gupta, 2007, p. 168). From 1967 to 1971 the Naxalite movement expanded at such an unprecedented rate that it emboldened the suppressed people to embrace the Naxal ideology to overthrow the government by force. These underlying currents – meteoric rise of the Naxal movement, increasing support for insurgency from China, and expansion of communism in neighboring countries – triggered the Indian government to take tangible measures to contain the insurgency. The government neutralized the Naxal movement within 45 days (Behera, 2017, p. 545). Police detained Mazumdar, who later died in police custody in July 1972. Thereafter, the CPIML splintered to the extent of the cadres killing each other, and soon the Naxal movement dissipated. Especially lacking during this period was an organizational framework and an indigenous ideology to reflect the Indian circumstances. Merger and expansion phase This phase is characterized by India’s liberalization of the economy in the 1990s, and subsequent increase in demand for raw material, mining, and forest products. These demands placed immense pressure on the adivasis for displacement and to compromise on whatever rights they were left with over the forests and mines. To meet these pressing challenges, the People’s War Group, the CPIML, and the Maoist Communist Centre of India merged in September 2004 to form the CPIM. The CPIM adapted elements of Mao’s philosophy and released a strategic document, Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR), as a blueprint for its political, organizational, and military actions. The STIR emphasized “seizure of political power through protracted armed struggle … by taking into account the specific characteristics, the special features, and the peculiarities of the Indian situation” (Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, 2004). To rectify the pre-1971 failures, the CPIM emphasized building a strong organization. The organizational structure included a Central Committee (CC). Additionally, it was constituted of a Politburo (PB) and Central Military Commission (CMC) to provide support and guidance to the CC. While the PB acted as a think tank to formulate strategy, the CMC executed plans of attack, cadre recruitment, and fundraising through the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). To overthrow the government and capture power, it delineated a three-stage strategy: Strategic Defensive, Strategic Stalemate, and Strategic Offensive (Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, 2004). To initiate Strategic Defensive and gain legitimacy among the local people, the PLGA started to attack the zamindars and government-built infrastructure. The intensity of these attacks amplified to the extent that in 2006 then Prime Minister

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Manmohan Singh had to label the Naxal insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced” by India (Government of India Press Information Bureau, 2006). The Naxals expanded in 194 districts in 18 states and posed stiff challenges to the security forces. In a sense, they established a parallel administrative setup. Their strong ideological orientation, organizational framework, and absence of government administrative machinery fostered a conducive environment to establish legitimacy with the local people. Moreover, by communicating in local languages and following the local social and cultural norms, the Naxals integrated very fast with the local populace. To address the local issues and keep the government agencies at bay, the Naxals simultaneously worked on many fronts. They, for example, helped the local people financially, enforced minimum wage standards, redistributed land, and provided justice through kangaroo courts. To minimize the government presence, the Naxals damaged the government-laid infrastructure such as bridges, roads, schools, and hospitals; and targeted the government officials and security forces through guerrilla warfare. These measures not only facilitated in strengthening legitimacy and solidarity with the locals, but also proved instrumental in fulfilling the adivasis’ aspiration for autonomy in the region (Sood, 2011, pp. 161–162). During this period, the Naxals adopted a multipronged strategy, which included exploiting the government’s weaknesses and failures, projecting the government machinery as exploitative, and presenting themselves as the saviors (Massiha) of the adivasis and other marginalized people. Based on these measures, their stronghold expanded to one-third of India, with a 40,000-strong militia and over a million sympathizers (Parashar, 2019, p. 346). Diversification and disintegration phase In taking cognizance of the liberal economic model and the deepening privatization at an unprecedented rate, the Naxals shifted their ideological fight from the zamindars to private business establishments, and from agriculture to the mineralrich mining sector. This shift was advantageous in adapting to the changing circumstances and in framing the grievances to expose the new form of exploitation. This shift also proved beneficial in revenue generation through extortion, taxes, blackmailing, and kidnapping. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (2018) estimated that between 2005 and April 2018, the Naxals generated around US$20 million revenue annually. This shift reflected less of an ideological commitment and more of an inclination toward revenue generation. According to Metz (1993, p. 13) the commercial insurgencies pose “security threats without seeking the outright seizure of state power.” Notwithstanding the peak of the Naxal insurgency in 2009–2010, it remained in its first stage of Strategic Defensive. When it demonstrated signals of Strategic Stalemate, the government countered it by wooing the adivasis through favorable constitutional and legislative dispensation, and neutralizing the CPIM by declaring it as a terrorist organization. The government declared an all-out operation, which forced the Naxals to either surrender or disappear in deep forests.

Naxal insurgency in India 85 Therefore, in being unable to implement the STIR in its true spirit, the Naxals launched a New Democratic Revolution that had its agenda against liberalization and globalization processes (Das, 2010, pp. 492–495). This new agenda, no doubt, reflected the evolving circumstances in India but diverged from the original and genuine grievances: land and forest rights of the adivasis. Thus, “It created a huge dichotomy between the professed Naxalite ideology and their ground level practices” (Rawat, 2019, p. 17). The adivasis began to reap fruits under the new circumstances, thanks to constitutional amendments, employment opportunities, and other development and welfare policies. To retain their dominance, the Naxals continued to target the government-built infrastructures. However, in the absence of a strong ideological commitment, the Naxal cadres began to splinter and start their own revenuegenerating avenues. Some of the glaring examples include the Tritiya Prastuti Committee, the Odisha Maovadi Party, the People’s Liberation Front of India, and the Jharkhand Jana Mukti Parishad. This led to gang wars, kidnappings, and demands for ransom (Noronha, 2017). Moreover, the Naxals’ support of illegal mining and forest exploitation to generate revenue was regarded by the adivasis as an assault on their land and forest rights. Consequently, in the current circumstances, the adivasis realized that the Naxal’s strategy to keep them away from the mainstream hampers their socioeconomic interests. Thus, the insurgency is losing its appeal and legitimacy, and appears to be heading in the direction of criminal activities and money laundering. Lea-Henry (2018, p. 31) correctly portrays the Naxals as having “become the same embodiment of intolerance, corruption, and uncaring authoritarianism, against which they once claimed to be fighting; an unscrupulous and predatory movement.” Current statistics indicate that the legitimacy gap between the Naxals and the adivasis is widening; specifically the younger generation, disenchanted with violence, intends to reap the rewards of the liberalization process by working in industries and infrastructure development projects (ANI, 2018). If this trend is any indication, the Naxals are certainly on a struggling path for their survival.

Government’s counterinsurgency approaches Law and order to military approach The constitution of independent India, promulgated on January 26, 1950, classified the people living in forests as Scheduled Tribes. It offered them reservations in employment and educational institutions. However, the government failed to “assuage the adivasis’ grievances, such as issues of land and forest rights” (Ahlawat & Ahlawat, 2019, p. 105). The government also failed to understand the aspirations of the people whose marginalization started with the British and continued in independent India. By the 1960s the people’s hopes faded and the Naxalbari incident became a channel to vent their frustration and dilute the government legitimacy. Then Home Minister YB Chavan, oblivious to ground realities, narrated the Naxalbari incident in the parliament as simply an issue of “lawlessness” (Banergee, 2002, p. 2115).

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By 1971, in being cognizant of the grave situation confronting it, the government launched “Operation Steeplechase,” which was a coordinated move by the Indian Army, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the state police against the Naxalites (Menon, 2007). Within 45 days, the Naxal movement was neutralized, and to assuage the adivasis’ grievances the government initiated some rural development and land reform schemes. People-centric to kinetic approach With the initiation of economic liberalization in the 1990s, the government emphasized a “people-centric” approach with the hope of fostering a conducive environment for investment. In order to touch the hearts and minds of the adivasis, the government restrained itself to knee-jerk reactions against the Naxal attacks. In addition, to counter the Naxal’s propaganda about an exploitative capitalist economy, the government launched several developmental and welfare schemes specifically in the insurgency-affected areas. These schemes, however, fell short of their promises, mainly because of rampant corruption, multiple overlapping projects, and the lack of accountability (Routray, 2017, p. 58). A further weakness of this period was that the government remained confined mainly to welfare schemes, as opposed to investing in people-oriented infrastructure development programs to show tangible effects of the liberalization process. In real terms, the granting of leases and licenses to private firms for mining, construction, and infrastructure development adversely affected the adivasis’ interests, as the employment was given to skilled labor from neighboring states rather than the unskilled adivasis. Moreover, pressure increased on the adivasis to displace their holdings to give space to exploitation of mineral and forest products. If the adivasis opposed, they were castigated as Naxal supporters (Malreddy, 2014, p. 598). In those uncertain circumstances, the adivasis leaned more toward the Naxals and supported their violent actions against the security forces and public infrastructure. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in being concerned about the increasing support, influence, and violent activities, declared the Naxals in 2006 as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country” (Government of India Press Information Bureau, 2006). To counter the increasing influence of the Naxals, some state governments (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Jharkhand) formed local organizations with the adivasis who had either split or withdrawn their support from the Naxals. One such organization, Salwa Judum (People’s Resistance Movement), was constituted in 2006 by the adivasi youths, which proved quite effective in countering the Naxals and drawing their supporters (Miklian, 2009, p. 442). However, this organization got involved in violent and criminal activities against the adivasis and was soon discredited as a front organization for the security forces. Even the Supreme Court of India criticized the government in its decision: “It is a question of law and order. You cannot give arms to somebody (a civilian) and allow him to kill. You will be an abettor of the offence” (cited in Chakma, 2009, p. 403). Subsequently, the government banned such local militia groups. An

Naxal insurgency in India 87 alternative approach of recruiting young adivasis as Special Police Officers who had knowledge of the terrain, the tactics, and the operational know-how of the Naxals proved effective in gaining support of the local people. This strategy also proved successful in providing employment to local youth, instilling discipline in them, and inculcating nationalist feelings (Khanna & Zimmermann, 2014, p. 45). Thus, the year 2006 proved crucial in the sense that the government heavily supported the disinvestment of the public sector and launched several new mega projects. Private investors heavily invested in these projects, but instead of hiring the unskilled adivasis, they hired skilled labor from other states. Local organizations like the Salwa Judum proved counterproductive, and the forceful displacement of the adivasis generated an acrimonious environment. In this imbroglio, the adivasis got marginalized instead of becoming partners on a path to progress, mainly because they were offered lower wages and the private sector exploited the forests and mining areas by flouting the rules and regulations. Thus, the adivasis found themselves as hapless spectators in their own homeland. Taking heed of the critical situation before it, the government for the first time made a sincere effort to address the root cause of the insurgency by enacting the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 2006. This act granted legal recognition to the rights of traditional forest-dwelling communities (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2006, p. 10). This was quite an historic step, in about seven decades, to recognize the rights of the adivasis. No doubt, the act was well intentioned; however, it was left to the adivasis to prove their claims over the land. They owned the land for many generations, but not having documentary evidence in the form of some kind of legal title proved problematic. In this regard, acknowledging the operational fault lines, then Home Secretary GK Pillai (2010, p. 2) humbly admitted in 2009 that “the government and its policies were largely to blame for the rise of Naxalism.” Several factors can be attributed to this precarious situation, notably, that law and order is a state issue and that the central government has a limited role to play (see Shapiro, Eynde, Ingram, & Agawu, 2017). The fact is that different political parties governing the states translated to a lack of well-coordinated, comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies. Some states even supported the Naxal movement, as they “did not want to alienate the vote banks” (Lynch III, 2016, p.19). For example, in the 2009 Jharkhand state election, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha won the election by a landslide with the support of the Naxals. Even the Congress Party leader Ajit Jogi “often fiddled with Maoists for electoral gains and other benefits” (Sahoo, 2019). To gain votes in West Bengal, Mamta Banerjee “built a tacit understanding with underground Maoists” in 2011, similarly in Orissa, Biju Patnaik claimed in 1995 that “he himself was a Naxalite” (Sahoo, 2019). The Naxals’ expansion in one-third of India and the use of enhanced terror activities to subdue the adivasis and pose a challenge to the security forces had alarmed the government. To contain this expansion, the government declared the CPIM and all its formations as terrorist organizations in June 2009 (National Investigation Agency, 2016). The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA), under Section 3, defines a terrorist act as “intended” to “threaten the unity,

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integrity, security and sovereignty of India” or “strike terror in the people or any section of the people” (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2002). With having this act to stand on, the government adopted an “enemy-centric” approach instead of the previous “people-centric” approach. This meant applying the force necessary to subdue the Naxals and then, from a position of strength, offer a political solution. With the backup of POTA, the government initiated several targeted operations, such as Operation Green Hunt in November 2009, aimed at an “all-out offensive” with over 50,000 troops (Sethi, 2013). In addition, the army’s assistance was also taken to advise and train the security forces. For the first time, the security forces made inroads in the Naxal-operated no-go zones and successfully tapped their confidential operational and logistical networks. Feeling under significant pressure, the Naxals went into hibernation for a few months but retaliated by killing 76 security personnel in April 2010 (Chopra, 2010). In taking note of losses on this scale, Prime Minister Singh reiterated that the Naxals posed the “biggest internal security challenge” India has ever faced (The Hindu, 2010). The Naxals intensified their attacks on the security forces, and among others killed ten police personnel in May 2011. In consequence, a “kinetic approach” was initiated with the aim to knock out the core of the Naxals through different operations. In June 2011, Operation Anaconda was launched to oust the Naxals from the impregnable Saranda forest, and Operation Monsoon in July 2011 to attack and close training camps (Srivastava, 2015, p. 321). A major breakthrough for the Operation Green Hunt ongoing since 2009 was to kill Koteswara Rao, second-in-command and a Politburo member in November 2011. By the end of 2012, several other senior leaders were either captured or killed; in facing pressure from the security forces, 440 cadres surrendered and 1,800 affiliates were arrested (Lynch III, 2016, p. 16). The government became overconfident of its achievements. While witnessing the receding in the Naxal tide, the government started to allocate mining leases to private businesses in the Naxal-dominated areas (Gawande, Kapur, & Satyanath, 2017, pp. 141–142). Despite the core of the Naxal insurgency being fractured, the privatization spree conflagrated the situation, as the Naxals and the adivasis opposed such a move in unison and contributed to revitalizing the Naxals. To use adversity to their advantage, the Naxals demonstrated their new vitality by killing 24 Congress Party leaders. Taking it as a challenge, the CRPF and the police force launched joint offensive counterinsurgency operations in December 2013. A quick and prized achievement in this was the discovery of a weapons-making factory in Munger, Bihar. Facing a lack of weapons supply, being on a constant chase by the security forces, and feeling insecure and stressed, several senior leaders, including at least three regional area commanders, surrendered (Pradhan, 2014). These counterinsurgency operations proved a big blow to the Naxal movement. Integrated and holistic approach Soon after forming the government in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party took the Naxal insurgency seriously and to contain it declared an “integrated and

Naxal insurgency in India 89 holistic approach … by simultaneously addressing the areas of security, development and good governance” (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2018–2019, p. 9). To achieve this, the government launched a National Policy and Action Plan that emphasized a multipronged strategy. The government pursued a “kinetic approach,” i.e., more proactive and aggressive in its operations. To begin with, the government fortified hundreds of sensitive and vulnerable police stations and installed thousands of mobile towers to keep tabs on Naxal communication and mobility. The government approved the use of advance technology such as drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, and helicopters for operational requirements, supplies, and reinforcement (Ahlawat, 2018, p. 259). The use of technology facilitated identification of the precise location of the Naxal command and control, trace mobility, tap communication, and financial and weapons supply. The government also initiated measures to take people into confidence and establish legitimacy by mainstreaming the local cultures, social values, and traditions in the national media. Moreover, to create dissonance between the Naxals and the local people, the government named the new infrastructure projects after the local elders. Thus, local people would not allow the Naxals to dismantle these projects. While strengthening legitimacy, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) played a vital role in controlling the flow of finance and money laundering. Further, the demonetization of Rupees 500 and 1000 currency notes by the government in 2016 proved vital in starving the Naxals of cash funding (Chauhan, 2016). Furthermore, the new guidelines for the Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Scheme proved quite attractive for the insurgency-fatigued Naxals. This scheme offered a financial grant of US$3000–$5000, depending on the rank and profile of the insurgent. This amount was deposited in insurgents’ bank accounts after surrender and was released after three years of responsible behavior. After surrender, provisions were made for vocational training for three years with a monthly stipend of US$75 and an open jail facility while living with family. These provisions proved so attractive that in comparison to 2013, there was a 411% increase in surrenders in 2016–2017 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016–2017, p. 4). Another major innovation the government introduced in August 2014 was to amend the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006. This amendment was “to recognize and vest the forest rights and occupation of forest land in forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who have been residing in such forests for generations, but whose rights could not be recorded” (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2014). Thus, the adivasis were allowed to claim rights over their traditional forest and agricultural land, which the Naxals had cashed in on for so long. Despite earnest intentions to introduce this amendment, fault lines cropped up in its implementation that, in real terms, were the major root causes of the Naxal insurgency. Even the minister of tribal affairs himself acknowledged the fault lines (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017–18, p. 14). This issue still persists, as the burden to prove ownership is left to the advasis. Once again, the government’s claim of containing insurgency proved short-lived when the Naxals killed 11 paramilitary commandos and 25 CRPF

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personnel in early 2017. Treating these attacks as a challenge, then Home Minister Rajnath Singh announced a new nationwide single security doctrine, SAMADHAN: smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation and training, actionable intelligence, dashboard-based key performance indicators and key result areas, harnessing technology, action plan for each theatre, and no access to financing (Ministry of Home Affairs, n.d., p. 8). This doctrine stressed the use of drones and helicopters for operational purposes; use of trackers for weapons, biometrics activation technology for smart guns, and unique identification numbers for gelatin sticks and explosives; joint task forces for operations along interstate borders; and enhanced interstate coordination and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, even Prime Minister Narendra Modi also emphasized the choking of financial funding, tapping the mobility and communication of the Naxals, and fast tracking infrastructure development and railroad communication connectivity. This doctrine proved quite successful and demonstrated positive results in launching intelligence-based coordinated operations in April 2018 that killed 37 Naxals. Since then no major-scale Naxal attack has occurred. The Minister of State for Home, GK Reddy, apprised the parliament that in comparison to 2008– 2013 period, the Naxal insurgency was reduced by 43% during 2014–2019 and from 195 districts in 2009 to 10 districts in 2019 (Jain, 2019). Notwithstanding the major claim by the minister, it appears that the Naxals have been shifting their operations from central to southern India, specifically at the trijunction of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka (TNN, 2019). If the government is unable to judiciously contain this expansion, there may be serious repercussions.

Naxal’s transnational links It is quite enigmatic that the killing of a landless peasant in 1967 gave rise to Naxal insurgency with wide-ranging implications. To understand this perplexity, it is imperative to discuss the Naxal’s transnational links. As the Naxalbari incident took place in 1967, Mazumdar assumed leadership and provided strategic direction based on Mao’s dictum: “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Chinese media openly supported the Naxal rebellion: A peal of spring thunder has crashed over the land of India. Revolutionary peasants … have risen in rebellion under the leadership of a revolutionary group of the Indian Communist Party. … The revolutionary group … have done the absolutely correct thing and they have done well. (People’s Daily, 1967) This was not a one-off publication, rather China continuously supported the overthrow of the Indian government through its other media like Radio Peking. Radio Peking urged for a “‘relentless armed struggle’ to overthrow the Indian government” (Ram, 1971, p. 57; AJ, 2011). Naxal leaders openly admitted their allegiance to Mao and his revolutionary ideology to capture political power using force. Mazumdar left no doubt in stating: “China’s chairman (Mao) is our

Naxal insurgency in India 91 chairman” (Mazumdar, 1969). Yet another Naxal leader, Kanu Sanyal, along with four other members visited China in 1968 to undertake a two-and-a-half-months long guerilla warfare training (Sahoo, 2017). It appears during the heat of the Cold War India’s adoption of the nonalignment stance did not augur well in China’s strategic calculations, thus Beijing not finding New Delhi on its side started to promote secessionist movements to destabilize India (Jawaid, 1979, p. 31). It is believed that after Mao’s death in 1976, Beijing toned down its support of the Naxal insurgency. However, some remnants of direct or indirect support continued. Home Secretary GK Pillai confirmed this in November 2009: “Chinese are big smugglers and suppliers of small arms. I am sure that the Maoists also get them” (cited in Kanwal, 2013). In addition, repeated capture of made-in-China arms, radio sets, etc. from the Naxals further reinforced “substantial exposition of Maoist–China linkages” (PTI, 2009). Even one of China’s influential think tanks, the Institute for International Strategic Studies, went to the extent of claiming that “if China takes a little action … Indian Federation can be broken up into 30 pieces” (Long, 2015, p. 329). In response, Rajan, an Indian expert on China, warned that ignoring such threats “will prove to be costly for India” (AJ, 2011; Rajan, 2009). Several other sources have highlighted the supply of weapons from China, but there are differences as to whether these weapons were supplied directly, through smuggling, or through the black market. In this regard, Sudip Chongdar (alias Kanchan), CPIM Bengal secretary, divulged to the security forces that the Naxals received weapons from China through international smuggling routes through insurgent groups that operate in northeast India. He also confirmed that some of the CPIM leaders visited China through the Myanmar route (AJ, 2011). According to Rajan (2010), even Chinese websites like www.maoflag.net and www.gjgy.org, though not supported by the government directly, openly supported the Naxal attacks on the security forces, specifically the ambushing of 76 security personnel in April 2010 got particular mention. In addition to China, with the formation of CPIM in 2004, Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI) approached CPIM and offered to supply light weapons and logistical support through its proxy organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The ISI’s involvement was confirmed in 2005 when the ammunition used by the Naxals was detected with the “markings of a Pakistani ordnance factory” (Nayak, 2014). The ISI’s involvement was further established through forensic evidence when the Naxal ammunition matched with the “ISI-sponsored attack on the [Indian] Parliament” in December 2001 (Nayak, 2014). Reports also indicate that ISI tried to collaborate with the Naxals through its proxy organizations like LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). A major breakthrough occurred with the arrest of LeT operative Mohammed Omar Madani in 2009, as he divulged that his main purpose to visit India was to “initiate the ISI’s support to the Maoist insurgency” with the ultimate aim to disintegrate India through the Naxal insurgency (Sharan, 2009). For the first time, Director General of Police Naparajit Mukherjee publicly revealed the ISI’s close links with the CPIM in 2012. He claimed that the ISI

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operated through the banned SIMI to incite people against the government. This link was further reinforced by the Stratfor’s “Global Intelligence” files that became public through WikiLeaks in March 2012 (see Ohri, 2013). Syed Abdul Karim Tunda, a highly experienced bomb-maker and perpetrator of several terrorist attacks in India, corroborated further insights on Pakistan’s involvement after his arrest in August 2013. He confessed that there were strong links between the ISI-backed LeT and the Naxals (Nayak, 2014; Behera, 2014). Another evidence of nexus between the Naxals and the ISI was established when a Naxal senior operative paid about $90,000 to procure weapons in 2013 (see Ohri, 2013). This established that the funds were transferred illegally to the Naxals from overseas. The ISI’s objective to destabilize India and the Naxals objective to overthrow the Indian government imply a commonality of purpose. The Naxals’ fight for survival in India appears to be desperate, and they can go to any extent to seek operational help from LeT and strategic guidance from the ISI to further their cause. Over the years, more evidence has come to light, and therefore to neutralize this nexus it is essential “to choke the supply of arms and funds being pumped into the Maoist insurgency by the ISI” (Nayak, 2014). There could also be a counternarrative regarding the Naxals’ interaction with LeT. Koteswar Rao, in an interview in 2009, stated: “If the Taliban attack India, we will stand with the people and rally against the attack” (for details, see Parashar, 2019, p. 347). Similarly, a year after, he supported Kashmiri’s aspirations for selfdetermination but with the caveat that it should also include a Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a stance close to that of the Indian government (Parashar, 2019, p. 347). The Islamic State (IS) has been trying to establish its hold in India since June 2014, and there has even been some speculation that the ISI may have facilitated coordination between the Naxals and the IS (Dabiq, 2014). However, Minister of State for Home Affairs HP Chaudhary denied in parliament any nexus between the two, as “no terror attack by ISIS has been reported in the country” (PTI, 2016). This argument was further negated by Uddipan Mukherjee, deputy director, Ministry of Defence, when he noted that it is unlikely the Naxals would establish links with the IS or Al-Qaeda. Because this would “tarnish their credibility as secular, communist revolutionaries,” this way the Naxals would “lose the ideological support of intellectuals,” as they consider religion as a “poor man’s opium” (Mukherjee, 2016). In addition to China and Pakistan, the Naxals established close links with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M). Facing pressure from the security forces, the Naxals took an initiative in collaboration with CPN-M to unite all the radical communist parties at the regional level. For this, a Coordination Committee of Maoists Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was launched in July 2001, which was believed to have the direct blessings of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Ramana, 2010). The CCOMPOSA’s major objective was to bring all the Maoist movements in South Asia under a single umbrella. This undertaking was further strengthened with the formation of the CPIM in 2004, which shared men, matériel, and training facilities with CPN-M (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2004–2005, p. 44). The fourth congress of CCOMPOSA held in August 2006, to brace for the changing circumstances, emphasized deepening and

Naxal insurgency in India 93 advancing “new democratic revolutions” in South Asia. For this, it urged to “burn to ashes imperialism … Indian expansionism” (Nanda, 2007, pp. 1–2). As per the Jane’s intelligence and Indian Ministry of Home Affairs annual reports, the relations between the CPIM and the CPN-M diluted after the latter compromised on armed struggle in favor of participation in the political process in 2007 (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2011). The government of India continued to assert until 2011 that close cooperation existed between the two organizations, but the CPN-M denied having any links. The CCOMPOSA held its fifth and last congress in 2011 and made some lofty declarations, but subsequently became inoperative (Press Release of CCOMPOSA, 2011). With the fading of the CCOMPOSA, the CPIM established networks in Myanmar and Bangladesh, but mainly for the supply of weapons. Even in the past, Naxals developed close links with the LTTE of Sri Lanka to procure small arms. In addition to the South Asian ambit, the Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju revealed in 2018 that “the CPI(Maoist) has close links with foreign Maoist organisations in Philippines, Turkey etc.” (PTI, 2018). In addition to close links, CPIM also drew “support from several Maoist fringe organisations located in Germany, France, Turkey, Italy etc.” (PTI, 2018). This implies the CPIM’s strategic insight to establish international links to add cost to the government’s counterinsurgency measures. Notwithstanding establishing a complex network of external relations, the CPIM’s links remained weak and casual in nature. Currently, the Naxals appear to be down but not out. With their internal and external links they still have the potential to pose serious security threats. This can be gauged from the statement made by India’s Army Chief General Bipin Rawat: “Indian Army is fully ready for a two and a half front war” (EOM, 2017). This statement suggests that along with China and Pakistan, the Naxals are considered an equally serious threat to India’s national security.

Conclusion The land and forest rights of the adivasis that were infringed during the colonial period led to popular resentment that continued in independent India but got a spark in 1967 at Naxalbari to turn into insurgency. The Naxal insurgency turned into a vociferous force that posed the biggest internal security challenge. The Naxals got their legitimacy from the aggrieved people, ideological support from Mao’s doctrine, and logistical support from regional networks. The government initially considered it simply a law and order situation, but after realizing the real threat, it undertook several counterinsurgency measures that ranged from peoplecentric to enemy-centric, kinetic force, integrated, and holistic approaches to woo the common people. To counter the Naxal influence, it initiated several welfare and developmental schemes, promoted surrender and rehabilitation, and took hard approach against the insurgents. In their efforts to remain relevant, the Naxals shifted their focus from semi-feudal and semi-colonial India, to anti-zamindar and anti-government.

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Furthermore, their path mutated from focus on the adivasis’ rights over forests to criminal activities such as money laundering, extortion, and charging protection money from big business. Thus, over the period, the Naxals have turned into ideology-less selfish and financial criminals. They also appear to have lost support from the South Asian region as well as the other Maoist and communist entities. Thus, the gap between their ideological rhetoric and practice has widened, and hence has bulged to legitimacy-deficit. A major contribution of the Naxals is that, over the decades, they have successfully united and sensitized the adivasis and other poorer sections of the society about their rights and means to fight for their rights. Now the onus is on the government to harness the grievances of the people in earnest, bring them in the mainstream, and make them partners in India’s progress. If the government has learned any lesson from its past misjudgments, it is time to empower the people with modern education, and technical and professional skills, and offer them equal opportunities. Although the government has largely contained the Naxal insurgency, the undercurrents remain. Under pressure from the security forces, the Naxals have been shifting their operations toward the southern states of India. If pre-emptive action is not taken, the Naxals may cross into the neighboring countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal where they already have some connections, and this may become a regionwide challenge. So, the holistic approach initiated by the BJP government needs to be broader in scope to include the neighboring countries within its ambit to arrest the expansion of the Naxal movement in its immediate region. At the same time, the government should use the soft power to expose the Naxal ideology based on violence and annihilation, and mobilize the public opinion in favor of electoral democracy that offers a legitimate, stable, and sustainable forum for grievance redressal.

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6

Normalcy restored? The lingering drivers of insurgency in Northeast India Alex Waterman

Introduction On January 27, 2020, the Indian central government and the Assam state government signed a peace agreement with the representatives of four armed groups and civil society organizations from the ethnic Bodo community of Western Assam. The country’s home minister, Amit Shah, hailed the development as marking the end of the decades-long Bodo conflict, which had until February 2020 claimed over 4,000 lives since violence began in the late 1980s (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2020). Although the third such agreement to be signed with Bodo armed groups, India’s responses to the Bodo conflict have been remarkably diverse. In 1993 and 2003, New Delhi had signed accords with the most prominent armed groups in a bid to resolve the conflict. Since then, it adopted a strategy of holding long, drawn-out negotiations with the main pro-talks factions, National Democratic Front of Bodoland’s Progressive (NDFB-P) and Ranjan Daimary (NDFB-RD) factions. After the main anti-talks faction, NDFB Songbijit (NDFB-S),1 killed 68 adivasis during ethnic violence in December 2014 (“Assam: Killing Fields,” 2015), sustained counterinsurgency operations, combined with pressure from Myanmar, broke the backbone of the group before its remnants were eventually incorporated into the peace process in January 2020. Since 2010, Indian politicians and policymakers have repeatedly proclaimed that insurgency is witnessing a long-term and permanent decline in the region; indeed, according to Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data in 2019, insurgencyrelated fatalities had declined from 333 in 2012 to 71 in 2018 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019, p. 21). This chapter argues that while violence has declined substantially since 2010, an analysis of the driving forces that sustain insurgency suggests that this triumphalist narrative should not be overstated. The region has witnessed ebbs and flows in violence since independence, yet as former civil servant Nari Rustomji writes, “at the point of each depression [in a chart mapping violence levels] will be recorded an explanatory footnote that the situation has been brought fully under control and that permanent peace is at last ‘round the corner’” (Rustomji, 1983, p. 49). The chapter contends that “normalcy” in the eyes of Delhi’s policymakers usually marks one of these periodic ebbs in violence levels, which are reflective of the

100 Alex Waterman central government’s long-term approach to containing violence against the state “within tolerable limits” rather than pursuing comprehensive resolution (Pillai, 2012). This, while effective, means that the long-term conditions driving insurgencies continue to linger even as violence drops in the region. The chapter begins by firstly introducing three of the region’s most protracted insurgent conflicts – in the Naga-inhabited areas,2 Assam, and Manipur. It then proceeds to analyze the core drivers of continuing insurgency in the region: the cross-border networks that sustain insurgent logistics and identity politics (and its intimate relationship with state policies of coercion and accommodation). It then assesses lingering patterns of low-level violence that continue to permeate the region, concluding that Indian responses to each of these drivers, while effective in reducing patterns of violence that policymakers in the capital are most concerned about, have been unable to address underlying structural drivers that perpetuate low-level conflict and insecurity.

Insurgency in Northeast India India faced insurgencies in the Northeast almost immediately after independence. Beginning with a small insurgency in Tripura in the late 1940s, a much larger insurgency then broke out in the Naga Hills from the early 1950s, the Mizo Hills from 1966, in Manipur from the 1960s, Tripura and Assam from the 1970s, and Meghalaya from the 1990s. Alongside minor domestic insurgent activities, Arunachal Pradesh has also faced significant spillover from the Naga and Assam insurgencies since the 1990s. Of these, only the Mizo insurgency ended in comprehensive resolution with the signature of the Mizo Accord and a secret agreement to appoint the insurgency’s leader, Laldenga, as chief minister of Mizoram State (Government of India & Mizo National Front, 1986). The Mizoram case study has widely been held up as a model of India’s approaches to conflict resolution, and stands unique in the Northeast owing to a combination of both the political maturity of the Indian government, but crucially Laldenga’s ability to forge internal consensus and draw on civil society organizations as brokers during the talks (Panwar, 2017a; Satapathy, 2004). Few of the remaining insurgencies in the region have witnessed such a comprehensive resolution; however, the capability and threat of most of these have been eroded over time through a process of sustained attrition and fragmentation. To allow for a focus on the ongoing low-level drivers of insurgency, this chapter draws primarily from the Assam and the Naga conflicts, which are analyzed because of their regional, historical, and political significance. It also draws on evidence from the multitude of cross-cutting conflicts that permeate Manipur, which remains the starkest example of continued instability in the region to date. Naga insurgency The Naga insurgency to this day remains India’s longest-running conflict, while its geographic location adjacent to the India–Myanmar border, and its role in

Insurgency in Northeast India 101 financing and training regional armed groups has earned it the title of the “mother of all insurgencies” in the region. The conflict essentially owes its origins to the relatively late British colonial expansion into the Naga Hills from the 1840s onward, essentially using the area as a buffer to prevent raids into the more economically lucrative tea gardens of Assam. Naga national consciousness developed through a combination of exposure to Europe and European political thought by the Naga Labour Corps during World War I, the growth of Christianity in the region and the growing likelihood that Britain would relinquish control of India in the coming decades. As independence loomed, the prospect of the region’s integration with the rest of India provoked alarm amongst Nagas, who feared that this would lead to the erosion of Naga culture and the exploitation of local resources, leading the Naga Club to petition to the Simon Commission in 1929 to demand that the region be excluded from any independent India (Naga Club, 1929). The 1947 Hydari Agreement affirmed the right of the Nagas to “develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes,” suggesting that after ten years the Naga Council would be asked to review the Naga Hills’ status (The Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord, 26–28.06.1947, 2001). Divergent interpretations of the accord led to a sense of betrayal that an opportunity for possible independence was to be denied, ultimately leading to a breakdown in relations, the conduct of a unilateral plebiscite in 1951, and the creation of an extensive guerrilla army and parallel government in the subsequent three years (Nibedon, 1978). Violence then escalated until the military’s induction in 1956. Attempts at accommodation were made, including the creation of Nagaland State and an abortive peace process during 1964–1968, however the conflict continued into the 1970s. The 1975 Shillong Accord, far from resolving the conflict, splintered the movement and led to the creation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980, a group which further fragmented into the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) in 1988. After almost two decades of hostilities, the NSCN-IM and NSCN-K were brought under separate ceasefire arrangements in 1997 and 2001, respectively. However, low-level violence has continued throughout the ceasefire as rival insurgent actors, who have continued to recruit cadres, set up parallel governance structures and clashed with rival insurgents and, at times, state actors. This has, in turn, led to further armed group fragmentation,3 and continued to present challenges for civilian populations living under multiple overlapping rebel governance territories. The signing of the “Framework Agreement” between Delhi and the NSCN-IM in 2015, and a reported follow-up “agreement” in October 2019 allowed both parties to claim that they at last had secured peace. However, the deadlock over key negotiating issues continued to generate tensions between them in an environment that, as of spring 2020, remained highly militarized; Naga insurgents remained highly active, whilst Indian government forces, although restrained compared to the pre-1997 period, continued to operate in critical areas such as eastern Nagaland, eastern Arunachal Pradesh, and the hills of Manipur.

102 Alex Waterman Insurgencies in Assam Insurgencies in Assam, home to the majority of the region’s population and arguably its economic hub, offer a very different challenge to the hills-based insurgencies such as those in the Naga-inhabited areas of the region. The first major insurgency in the state, waged by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), had its origins in the Assamese movement for cultural and linguistic recognition in the face of a perceived threat to Assamese identity from “foreigners.” Although this originally dated back to the colonial period, when British authorities drew on Bengali labor in Assam and used Bengali as the official language, a series of postIndependence language movements and campaigns against the exploitation of the region’s oil resources compounded perceptions of “stepmotherly” treatment from Delhi. This came to a head during the 1979–1985 Assam Movement, when students and linguistic and cultural organizations campaigned against the inclusion of illegal migrants on the state’s electoral rolls. The 1985 Assam Accord included clauses guaranteeing the protection of Assam’s unique identity, language, and culture, while key agitators formed the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) political party and won the state assembly elections of 1985. Despite this, perceptions of continued central indifference and the AGP’s inability to deliver emboldened the ULFA and led to the beginning of its armed campaign against opponents of the agitation. From 1990, large-scale counterinsurgency along with negotiations with individual ULFA militants, the group itself, and with neighboring states that offer sanctuary, gradually isolated the hardliners within ULFA. A split within ULFA in 2009 saw the emergence of a pro-talks constituency and left the anti-talks faction known as ULFA–Independent (ULFA–I). As of 2020, the ULFA-I largely remains in exile in Myanmar, reliant on alliances with other Indian anti-talks groups, and continues to warn that negotiations will only take place if the Indian government considers the issue of Assam’s sovereignty. At the same time, the Assam Accord was met with anxiety by the non-Assamese communities of Assam such as the Bodos, Karbis, and Dimasas, leading to a proliferation of low-intensity insurgencies as armed groups sought to extract concessions from the government to convey to their constituents that they had secured the interests of their communities. A combination of counterinsurgency operations and concessions have fragmented the groups purporting to represent these communities, a dynamic that has undermined the peace accords struck between individual factions and the Indian state. Indeed, as of 2020, New Delhi had struck three separate peace accords with different elements of the Bodo insurgency (Waterman, 2020a, 2020b). Ethnic violence, employed by Bodo and other armed groups to consolidate claims to ethnic homelands, has furthermore led to the proliferation of insurgent groups from the targeted communities, such as the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and National Santhal Liberation Army (NSLA). Insurgencies in Manipur The insurgency environment in Manipur consists of a dense array of crosscutting conflicts. Insurgency initially emerged with the formation of the United

Insurgency in Northeast India 103 National Liberation Front (UNLF) in 1964, following growing discontent among Manipur’s plains-based Meitei elites over the legality of Manipur’s merger with India in 1949. Differences within the UNLF later led to the emergence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978, while other factions such as the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) were founded in 1977, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) in 1980, and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) formed from splinters of the UNLF, PREPAK, and KCP in 1994 (Meitei, 2018, pp. 147–148). From 2003 in particular, groups such as the UNLF and PLA created significant challenges for Indian security forces, creating and holding onto key base areas and limiting the success of Indian security forces operations (Bhaumik, 2009, pp. 112–113), which in turn led to notorious cases of security forces abuse that have alienated swathes of the civilian population from the state (Hazarika, 2018, pp. 1–45). Many of the smaller groups, which primarily consist of Manipur’s ethnic Meitei population based predominantly in Manipur’s plains region, have split into dozens of small fragments that continue to tax, bomb, and threaten civilians to extract business revenues in and around the Imphal Valley. Manipur’s politics has been permeated by tensions between the plains and the tribal populations residing in the surrounding hills, particularly as the central government’s attempts to placate Manipur’s Nagas with “Scheduled Tribe” status subsequently alienated the Meitei population (Chadha, 2005, pp. 312–313). Groups such as the UNLF have clashed with Kuki tribal outfits in areas such as Churachandpur. During the 1990s, Naga and Kuki outfits clashed over ancestral lands and access to the border town of Moreh, a lucrative site of revenue, while since 2011 the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), a breakaway Naga faction, has clashed with the NSCN-IM and security forces. Both Manipur’s plains and hill areas remain characterized by high levels of insecurity and account for the highest levels of violence across the Northeast with security forces continuing to face the daunting task of navigating these overlapping conflicts.

Key drivers Any analysis of the state’s attempts to establish normalcy in the region must be placed in the context of the social, political, and economic drivers that have sustained insurgency in the region. The most pertinent of these are the politics of identity; their impact on competitive mobilization within and between communities; and their intersection with state responses to insurgency, the porosity of borders, and the salience of external dynamics in the region; and the entrenched political economy of low-level insurgency, which continues to permeate daily life in the region. Porosity of borders and access to regional/international networks The region’s strategic vulnerabilities have long played a critical role in facilitating insurgent arms procurement, finance, training, and logistics. Indeed, a mere 16 km in width corridor popularly known as the “Chicken’s Neck” connects Northeast

104 Alex Waterman India to the mainland. Ninety-nine percent of the Northeast’s borders are international, and huge swathes of these are highly porous and often home to communities straddling both sides of the border, underlining the extent of the strategic vulnerability with which New Delhi has had to contend (Das, 2002). In the early years after independence, the region bordered two major hostile powers – East Pakistan and China – providing ample opportunities for insurgents to obtain material support. East Pakistan for example granted sanctuary and support to Naga National Council (NNC) guerrillas; by the time of its collapse in 1971, it had trained 2,500 militants and had established a network of training camps (Cline, 2006, p. 130; Rammohan, 2012), while several groups of NNC militants made the arduous trip to China during the 1960s. Although commentators even today report active attempts by Chinese and Pakistani intelligence agencies to sustain groups such as the ULFA (Kashyap, 2017), East Pakistan’s collapse in 1971 and the opening of the Chinese economy from the late 1970s have reduced the scale of active foreign sponsorship of insurgencies in the region. However, access to the peripheral areas of states such as Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, lacking at varying points either in the political will or capacity to crack down on Indian insurgents, has allowed groups to sustain themselves even whilst under pressure from counterinsurgency operations in India. In particular, this has empowered Naga armed groups. With access to Naga communities on either side of the India–Myanmar border, this has allowed them to tap into illicit markets and training camps that have, in turn, allowed the NSCN and its factions to arm, train, and offer sanctuary to insurgent groups from across the Northeast. The extent of these sanctuaries has gradually dwindled over time, compelling insurgent adaptation in order to ensure armed group survival. The ULFA, for example, had initially established a number of camps in Bhutan for quick access into Assam,4 however joint operations between the Royal Bhutanese Army and the Indian Army deprived it of its Bhutanese sanctuary in 2004 (Banerjee & Laishram, 2004). This forced a growing dependence on Bangladeshi sanctuaries, allowing the group to play a key role in international arms markets on the one hand, but compelling it to carefully straddle the balance between maintaining the anti-immigration stance upon which its support was based without antagonizing Bangladesh (Mahanta, 2013, pp. 69–70, 102, 237–241). The election of the pro-India Awami League of 2008, however, led to a series of key arrests that undermined the group’s sanctuary in Bangladesh and, by applying pressure to the pro-talks faction within the ULFA through key arrests (Rahman, 2011, pp. 138–139), contributed to the 2009 split between the ULFA’s Pro-Talks Faction (ULFA-PTF) and the ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I). Following the loss of sanctuaries in Bangladesh, anti-talks factions such as ULFA-I increasingly relied on the network of camps established by the NSCN-K, in particular in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region. Thus, when the NSCN-K abrogated its 14-year ceasefire in 2015, the group formed the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWESEA) to facilitate the coordination of joint strike operations into India (Bhattacharyya, 2015). The positioning of roughly 50 NSCN-K–maintained camps and their access corridors into

Insurgency in Northeast India 105 India led to increased insurgent activity in the tri-junction between northeastern Assam, eastern Nagaland, and eastern Arunachal Pradesh since 2015 (Kashyap, 2017; Waterman, 2018a, pp. 256–257; 2019, p. 242; forthcoming), demonstrating how access to sanctuaries has shaped insurgent operational dynamics (Waterman, 2017b). Myanmar’s historically ambivalent attitude toward the presence of these groups, as well as its requirement to commit forces to more pressing threats elsewhere has meant that it has only sporadically engaged Indian insurgents on its side of the border and has fluctuated in its willingness to do so. This has limited India’s ability to permanently weaken insurgents’ exploitation of the border regions. However, security cooperation between the two states has improved considerably since 2015 (Basit, 2018, pp. 78–79), presenting opportunities to disrupt insurgent sanctuaries in Myanmar. In 2015, Indian special forces launched “Operation Hot Pursuit” in response to an NSCN-K ambush in Chandel, Manipur, which killed 18 soldiers, crossing into Myanmar and striking a number of insurgent camps (Katoch, 2019). However, this operation, although widely publicized, primarily served as a deterrent function and did not fundamentally undermine the cross-border networks run by the NSCN-K. During 2018 and 2019, however, actions by the Myanmar government against the NSCN-K, despite its status as a ceasefire signatory in Myanmar, significantly disrupted insurgent sanctuaries in the Sagaing Region. In the summer of 2018, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) blockaded the NSCN-K headquarters in Taga, and in doing so exacerbated the group’s fragmentation into two separate Indian (NSCN-K/Khango Konyak) and Burmese (NSCN-K/Yung Aung) Naga factions favoring talks with their respective countries. With little ground made in pulling the pro-talks faction into its Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the Tatmadaw launched a series of operations against Indian insurgent camps in its territory, in conjunction with Indian operations on the Indian side of the border, during the first six months of 2019, reportedly “scattering” Indian rebels (Inside Northeast, 252019). Reports suggested that at least 70–80 militants had been arrested, including several major NSCN-K/YA and NDFB-S leaders, seven to eight camps destroyed, and two militants killed during the operation. Further reports indicated that the ULFA-I commander, Paresh Barua, had lost contact altogether with significant portions of the group’s Myanmar-based cadres (Northeast Now, 2019), suggesting that the attacks had led to further structural and operational fragmentation within the UNLFWESEA movement. Indeed, although the NSCN-K/YA and the ULFA-I conducted numerous attacks, they were responsible for just three security forces fatalities during 2019. Government sources noted an uptick in insurgents entering India from Myanmar to surrender throughout the year (Naqvi, 2019), while on March 19 media reports suggested that anti-talks armed groups were facing financial pressures as a result of the Tatmadaw operations (Choudhury, 2019). This situation indicated that the anti-talks groups camped in Myanmar were prioritizing organizational survival in the wake of the Tatmadaw operations.

106 Alex Waterman Indeed, this disruption, combined with over five years of intense counterinsurgency operations within India, appeared to directly contribute to the surrender of most of the remaining anti-talks Bodo insurgents in the NDFB-S in January 2020 when 50 of the group’s rebels, including its leader Saoraigwra Basumatary, had crossed into India (Mazumdar, 2020), paving the way for a hastily signed peace accord by the end of the month. In a first, furthermore, on May 15, 2020, the Myanmar government acting on India’s request handed over 22 Northeast insurgents. Among those deported by Myanmar included some senior and long-wanted insurgent leaders such as NDFB-S self-styled home secretary Rajen Daimary, Capt. Sanatomba Ningthoujam of UNLF, and Lt. Pashuram Laishram of PREPAK-Pro. Twelve of the 22 insurgents belonged to four insurgent groups in Manipur: the UNLF, the PREPAK-Pro, the KYKL, and the PLA. The remaining 10 were linked to groups based in Assam such as the NDFB-S and the KLO. It remains to be seen whether these blows to insurgent camps in the region will yield long-term results; on June 13, 2019, intelligence sources told media sources that NSCN-K militants were already planning to reestablish their headquarters at Taga, Sagaing Region (India Today, 2019), whilst in July 2019 intelligence sources were quoted as saying that up to 100 ULFA-I militants had relocated to new camps within 35 km of the international border (Deka, 2019a). This suggests that unless the Tatmadaw maintains a permanent presence in the region, this structural driver of insurgency is unlikely to be fully addressed, particularly since the political grievances and identity politics driving armed mobilization and insurgent recruitment continue to linger in the region. Identity politics: Intimately linked to state response H. Srikanth and Thinaglalmuan Ngaihte posit that identities based on ethnic, religious, tribal, and linguistic affiliation form the “pivot around which much of the politics of North-East India revolves” (Srikanth & Ngaihte, 2011, p. 1). While primordialist explanations have largely been discredited, local elite rivalries and their intersection with both accommodative and repressive state policies have made identity politics a central long-term driver of insurgency in the region (Chima, 2015). Naga national consciousness evolved, as a result of the combined influences of Christian missionary penetration and the exposure of Nagas to European political thought during World War One. However, as John Thomas notes, the presence of the Indian Army during the 1950s provided a common enemy and allowed the NNC to leverage the church in its propagation of Naga nationalism infused with Christianity (Thomas, 2015). As a result, while roughly 52.9% of Naga society had been converted to Christianity in 1951, by 1981 this figure was 80.2%, and by 2001 was almost 95%. The controversial Indian Army tactic of relocating and regrouping villages in strategically defensible locations employed during the late 1950s and early 1960s intersected with growing Christian revivalism in Nagaland, bringing once-separate villages together and coinciding with a dramatic rise in the NNC’s popularity (Longkumer, 2018, pp. 1106–1107). This

Insurgency in Northeast India 107 highlights the complex relationship between religion, national identity, and state counterinsurgency in driving recruitment and mobilization. Furthermore, the growing influence of Christianity throughout the 20th century influenced the social structures of Naga society, which have, in turn, laid the social foundations for insurgent mobilization and internal politics. Naga society was traditionally made up of shifting relations between independent village republics. The advent of Christian missionaries, however, through language and religious education, accelerated shifts toward a greater emphasis on tribal structures spanning multiple villages (Nshoga, 2009; von Stockhausen, 2008, p. 58). The geographically uneven spread of missionary activity, combined with colonial policies of classification nonetheless led to the emergence of perceptions of certain tribes as “backward” and others as more “advanced” (Mills, 1937; Mills & Hutton, 1922, 1926), establishing the precedent for future competition over access to resources according to tribal membership. Yet the very term “Naga” and the boundaries of the tribal subunits within Naga society are unfixed and have been susceptible to shifts over time. For example, analyses of the Naga–Kuki conflict between the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and Kuki ethnic militias during the 1990s frequently overlook the common history of the two communities; several Kuki tribes had in fact been represented in the Naga Club petition to the Simon Commission, while the Tangkhul tribes – the NSCN-IM’s core constituency in Manipur – were not (Kumar, 2016, p. 44). The creation of Nagaland State in 1963 granted special provisions and benefits to those contained within its borders under Article 371(A) of the Constitution, but excluded those Naga tribes beyond the boundaries of the state, creating incentives for many Nagaland-based Nagas to resist any extension of these rights to Nagas from beyond Nagaland. During 2008, agitations in Dimapur against the presence of the Tangkhul tribe (which originally hailed from Ukhrul, Manipur) were linked to fears that a unified Nagalim (as demanded by the Tangkhul-dominated NSCN-IM) would deprive the dominant Nagaland Naga tribes of access to jobs (Manchanda & Bose, 2015, p. 103). This demonstrates the complex interplay between Naga identity, state policy, and the competition over access to coveted resources (Waterman, 2017a, pp. 450–451). Naga insurgent organizational structures typically depended on the village and chieftainship networks from which commanders originated, meaning tribal dynamics and tensions, rather than being static and fixed, were subjected to the push and pulls of intraorganizational leadership disputes. The Sema (or Sumi) tribe, which has been heavily involved in the insurgency since the 1950s to the present day, serves as a case in point. The Sema tribe is frequently portrayed as a unitary bloc that has resented and resisted the dominance of, firstly, the Angami tribe during the peak of the NNC’s power and later the Tangkhul tribe when the NSCN-IM became ascendant. Prominent Sema leaders within the insurgent organizations have, however, been divided in their support for various political and armed groupings. The first major defections from the NNC began when Sema leaders with strong ties to their communities such as Kaito, Kughato Sema, and Scato Swu perceived that the Angami-dominated NNC leadership had excluded

108 Alex Waterman the Semas from major operations such as the expeditions to China during the 1960s. This led to a power struggle, the expulsion of Sema leaders, retaliatory killings from the NNC, and the formation of the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN) in 1968 (Panwar, 2017b, p. 242; Vashum, 2000, p. 91). Although often presented as such,5 the defection did not constitute a clean break between a pro-insurgency Angami tribe and a pro-negotiations Sema tribe. The Sema tribe’s position within the NNC insurgency had clearly been destabilized, but significant portions of the community remained; indeed, when the NSCN was formed out of the NNC in 1980, the group enjoyed significant support from the Sema tribes, with one of the NSCN leaders, Isak Swu (who would later go on to lead the NSCN-IM along with Thuingaleng Muivah) being a Sema highly respected amongst his community. The NSCN-IM’s first major split occurred in 2007 when a Dimapur-based faction within the group, led by a Sema Naga, defected to form NSCN-Unification after citing the dominance of the Tangkhul tribe in the NSCN-IM’s leadership cadre (Goswami, 2014), leading to a spurt in factional clashes during 2007–2008. Since then, however, the NSCN-IM has “gone out of its way to keep mid-level Sumi military commanders in its ranks happy” (Indian Express, 2016), while its involvement in the 2008 Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) marks a similar attempt to shore up its internal unity by coopting civil society bodies (Panwar, 2017b, pp. 248–249). Therefore, tribal loyalties are incredibly powerful and can play a significant role in driving factional violence. However, it is unhelpful to conceptualize factionalism solely through the lens of intertribal animosities without placing them into the context of intraand interorganizational politics. The requirement to carefully balance and negotiate the loyalties of a fragmented and divided population also partially explains the demands the NSCN-IM has made in its thus far inconclusive peace talks with New Delhi. Demands such as holding talks at the highest political level and the creation of “Greater Nagalim,” an envisioned territorial body incorporating Naga-inhabited areas beyond Nagaland in Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh, allow the group to claim its status as a legitimate sovereign representative for all Nagas. However, the “Greater Nagalim” demand has historically provoked unrest amongst non-Naga communities living in these areas; in 2001, an attempt to extend the government’s ceasefire with the NSCN-IM beyond Nagaland State to other Naga-inhabited areas was revoked following massive protests in Manipur. The 2015 “Framework Agreement” signed with New Delhi contained provisions that appeared to navigate this challenge, suggesting that a final peace deal would include “special arrangements” and special status to Nagas living beyond Nagaland without violating the territorial integrity of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh (V. Singh, 2018). Although government spokespersons indicated that only symbolic issues remained as of 2018, during 2019 several of these “symbolic issues,” so central to the NSCN-IM’s negotiation of Naga identity politics, created significant tensions in the peace process. For example, the appointment of the government’s interlocutor for peace talks, R.N. Ravi, as Nagaland governor in July 2018 led to NSCN-IM concerns that the talks had been reduced

Insurgency in Northeast India 109 to the “governor’s” level. The Indian negotiating team then declared that it could not meet the NSCN-IM’s demand of a separate Naga flag and constitution and set a deadline of October 31, 2019, leading to tensions across the Naga-inhabited areas throughout October and rumors that both sides were mobilizing forces to prepare for a collapse in the talks. On November 1, both sides appeared to commit to signing a peace accord and to continue to work to resolve their differences, seemingly diffusing the crisis. The key areas of contention nonetheless remained the same; on February 28, 2020, R.N. Ravi accused the NSCN–IM of “trying to imagine things which are not in the Framework Agreement and misleading the people” (Sumi, 2020). Although vocally supporting lockdown measures during the Covid-19 outbreak (“NSCN-IM Statement on COVID-19,” 2020), on May 16 NSCN–IM clashed with army personnel in Longding, Arunachal Pradesh, leading to the death of one civilian (“Arunachal Firing between Army and NSCN (IM),” 2020). This implied that the November 1 agreement had simply allowed the parties to save face, work around the October 31 deadline, and return to the tense status quo between the two parties. Just as the direct and indirect activities of the colonial and then postcolonial state influenced the evolution of the Naga tribal social order, armed group proliferation in Assam emerged out of competitive dynamics generated by the state’s direct and indirect interventions into identity politics. This essentially began with the state-sponsored migration of Bengalis from mainland India during the colonial period, who formed the majority of professional and salaried personnel in the region. Dependent on largely external labor, Assam’s coal and tea industries therefore did not effectively integrate with the indigenous Assamese communities (Ghosal, 2003, p. 56), leading to the displacement of the Assamese language in favor of Bengali (Srikanth, 2000, pp. 4118–4119). The postindependence period was characterized by attempts by the Assamese middle class to assert its socioeconomic, cultural, and linguistic rights in the face of the perceived threat of Bengali communities, leading to a series of agitations for Assamese language rights, a movement against the processing of local oil outside the state, and the Assam Movement (1979-1985) protests against the presence of illegal migrants on the state’s electoral rolls. Combined with perceptions of Congress and central indifference, this led to a widespread sense of hostility that spawned fringes of the Assam Movement to form ULFA in 1979. New Delhi’s attempts to alleviate the Assamese concerns through the 1985 Assam Accord nonetheless reproduced the structural incentives driving mobilization, both within the Assamese community and other communities in Assam, that contributed to the proliferation of insurgency in the region. The Assam Movement’s leaders were elected into power as the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), with a mandate to implement the accord. However, the AGP lacked political experience and was hindered by laws fettering the detection and expulsion of illegal migrants. Consequently, the AGP came to be perceived as either powerless or incompetent in its attempts to deliver the accord (Baruah, 2007, p. 153; 2009, p. 962). This situation, combined with the AGP’s unwillingness

110 Alex Waterman to act, fueled hardline sentiments, thus creating “fertile ground for the political growth of ULFA” during the late 1980s (Baruah, 2007, p. 168). Political fragility in Delhi ultimately allowed the insurgency and popular support for it to develop unchecked until Operation Bajrang was launched in 1990. By that point, massive military operations were required to dislodge the ULFA that the massive disruption caused to everyday life across Assam fostered further opportunities for the group to galvanize its support base. Although the ULFA’s Independent (anti-talks) faction is now scattered and isolated following decades of sustained counterinsurgency operations, the identity-based grievances that drove the Assam Movement and the rise of the ULFA during the 1980s continue to provide the foundations for unrest and the ULFA’s possible resurgence. Sustained counterinsurgency against the ULFA’s hardliners and negotiations with its pro-talks faction since 2009 have failed to alleviate the underlying perception of a threat to Assamese identity. Indeed, as of 2020, committees continued to deliberate the process of implementing the Assam Accord (Singh, 2020). The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) efforts to introduce the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) throughout 2019, which grants illegal migrants from religious minorities in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan with a pathway to obtain Indian citizenship, fueled the perception that the central government was once again sponsoring a form of illegal migration that would consolidate the vote bank of the party in power in New Delhi. Although the bill was initially shelved in February 2019, the BJP’s electoral consolidation during the general election allowed it to push the bill through in December 2019, weathering the subsequent riots in Assam during which five people were killed between December 11 and 13 (Pandey, 2019; Waterman, 2020a, 2020b). The ULFA’s pro-talks faction (ULFAPTF) had, for example, warned on January 12, 2019, that it would withdraw from peace talks if the bill was passed, while Assam’s state police intelligence services have consistently warned that the citizenship bill presents an ample opportunity for ULFA-I to regroup and consolidate its recruitment. Indeed, during October and November 2018, when the possibility of the CAA was being floated, ULFA-I conducted two of its most significant attacks in recent years, killing five civilians in Sadiya Saikhowaghat and carrying out its first bombing in Guwahati after several years, part of what the group termed an “explosive statement” to express its opposition to the bill (Waterman, 2019, pp. 248–249). During the riots against the act in December 2019, the group issued a warning to police that violence toward the protestors would be met with a response (Deka, 2019b), demonstrating that this underlying driver continues to be exploited by insurgents. In addition to driving identity-based radicalization and the conditions for insurgency within the Assamese movement, the longer-term implications of the accord also fueled insurgency in the state’s non-Assamese communities. Clause Six of the 1985 Assam Accord in particular, which included measures to protect the social, linguistic, and cultural identity of the Assamese people, was perceived as a threat by smaller communities such as the Bodos and Tiwas, who had hitherto actively participated in the Assam Movement (1979–1985). That prompted

Insurgency in Northeast India 111 them to withdraw support for the movement and launch their own agitations to secure recognition and constitutional provisions for their communities. The central government sought to accommodate these communities by granting autonomy, usually through district councils mandated under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The spatially contingent nature of these autonomous councils has fueled internal conflicts within the communities, prompting hardline factions to demand the incorporation of more villages within these councils. This was the case following the 1993 Bodo Accord, which specified that villages were to be included on the basis that they contained a Bodo population of 50% or more (Government of India, Government of Assam, All Bodo Students Union, & Bodo People’s Action Committee, 1993). This clause ultimately sparked further ethnic violence perpetrated by hardline groups such as the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) and NDFB against villages with less than this ratio in a bid to reshape the demographic balance in favor of the Bodos (Waterman, 2020, p. 2). The 2003 accord co-opted the BLTF and expanded the boundaries of the Bodo Territorial Council, but excluded the NDFB, thus leading to continued violence against both state forces and local minority ethnic communities. Each round of violence and countermobilization within the movement led targeted minority communities to mobilize their own self-defense outfits. The 150-strong Birsa Commando Force was, for example, formed in 1997 in response to attacks by Bodo militants, engaging in factional clashes with both Bodo insurgents and security forces until the group signed a ceasefire in 2004 (Bhattacharyya, 2013, p. 24). These “discordant accords” have accelerated fragmentary dynamics within insurgent movements. In each case, an armed group’s signature on a peace accord with the Indian state (Chadha, 2005, p. 426), or indeed even an agreement to enter into peace talks, has led splinter factions to break away and seek to “outbid” their now-moderate counterparts. Perhaps it was because of this dynamic that the Indian state has, since the 1990s, largely shifted toward creating and sustaining a multilayered ceasefire architecture (Sinha, 2017), holding groups in a “traffic jam” of prolonged peace talks without granting concessions, thereby allowing a degree of conflict fatigue to set in (Mahanta, 2013, p. 253; Waterman, 2018b). The January 2020 Bodo Accord indicates that some lessons have been learned. New Delhi had prolonged its talks with Bodo factions such as the NDFBProgressive and the NDFB-Ranjan Daimary while launching sustained counterinsurgency operations against the NDFB-S. In doing so, it effectively waited until the NDFB-S had been significantly weakened by operations both within India and Myanmar before incorporating all of the factions into one overarching peace accord. However, beyond the composition of the involved parties, the mechanics of this accord were unchanged compared with the previous accords, granting further powers to the newly rebranded Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) and exploring the possibility of including more villages with a 50% Bodo population into the autonomous region. Considerable uncertainty, therefore, remains about the extent to which the accord will again incentivize the proliferation of

112 Alex Waterman factionalism within the Bodo movement,6 as well as amongst rival communities threatened by the expansion of Bodo power in the region. The politics of identity and the fear of the “other,” whether that is the Indian “mainland” or a neighboring community, have clearly played significant roles in shaping the grievances giving rise to insurgent mobilization and factional violence. However, its role as an underlying driver cannot be understood without locating it in the context of an intimate relationship with state policy, beginning with colonial-sponsored migration and missionary activity and culminating most recently in the BJP’s attempts to reorder identity politics in the region, which have collided with longstanding anti-migrant sentiments and a distrust of New Delhi. This situation may imply that the longer-term political drivers of insurgency have not abated, and that the claims that the region is on the brink of permanent peace are somewhat optimistic.

Political economy of low-level violence The disruption to insurgent networks and the slowdown in the type of largescale concessions that provoked armed group proliferation and countermobilization have clearly contributed to the reduction of insurgent violence since 2010. However, they have also entrenched low-level patterns of insurgent violence, persisting militarization, and pervasive human insecurity even as fatalities decrease. Rather than seeking to completely eradicate insurgents and their networks, counterinsurgency operations have sought to contain anti-state violence within tolerable limits (Pillai, 2012; Staniland, 2014). Following the slowdown in concessions granted to separatist and pro-autonomy movements, there has been the emergence of protracted ceasefire arrangements with little tangible progress made toward a political solution. The conclusion of ceasefires with the NSCN-IM in 1997 and NSCN-K in 2001 reflected a desire to reduce overt violence against the Indian state. Other patterns of insurgent activity, such as recruitment, interfactional violence, violence against civilians and extortion, have received far less attention from the Indian state. This unevenness of attention has allowed Naga armed groups to vie for influence and run competing governance structures across Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh, contributing to a rise in factional clashes during the post-ceasefire period as factions contend for turf in towns such as Nagaland’s commercial capital of Dimapur (Sashinungla, 2003; SATP, 2017a, 2017b). Using a combination of a coercive approach and tapping into ideological sympathies, Naga militants have developed extensive taxation systems that penetrate deep into the Nagaland state government (Suykens, 2017). In consequence of ties that fuse patronage relationships between insurgents, politicians, and contractors throughout the region, development aid largely intended as a tool to pacify the region has fed into these networks of coercion and collusion (Ramesh, 2005; Sahni & George, 2001, p. 303). Although these patterns of extortion, factionalism, and corruption were present as early as the 1980s, when insurgents became deprived of external support and were forced to increasingly turn to alternative sources for financial assistance, the conditions of ceasefire and

Insurgency in Northeast India 113 demobilization reduced the pressure from the security forces; this situation had the effect of intensifying the competition for access to the state’s development largesse as the previously difficult-to-access cities presented new opportunities for insurgents.7 In Assam, for example, generous surrender schemes offered to ULFA cadres during the 1990s – under the direct patronage of local politicians – led to the emergence of several mafia-like factions known as the Surrendered ULFA (SULFA), which have utilized these schemes and their capacities for violence to carve out lucrative stakes in industry in towns such as Dibrugarh (Barbora, 2017). These injections of central capital, while reducing overt violence against security forces have, therefore, exacerbated the drivers of low-level militancy and violence. These persistent patterns of low-level militancy have had major and continuing implications for the conduct of political, social, and economic life in the region. In May 2019, for example, during campaigning for the state assembly elections in Arunachal Pradesh, the NSCN-IM militants attacked a political convoy of the National People’s Party (NPP) workers, killing 11 including a member of the state’s legislative assembly (Sentinel Assam, 2019), after killing another NPP worker on March 29 and kidnapping another in April. The extent of this continuing human security challenge is particularly apparent in Manipur. Indeed, during 2019, Manipur accounted for 49 of the 81 violent incidents recorded across the Assam, Naga, and Manipur conflicts, and 11 of the 42 total fatalities (Waterman, 2020). The widespread but predominantly nonlethal nature of the violence in Manipur reflects the enduring political economy of violence, particularly in the Imphal Municipal area. In this situation, small breakaway factions of groups such as the KCP issued “tax” demand letters; planted grenades outside the residences of businessmen, contractors, and officials; or, if the demand has not been met, detonated grenades outside business premises. These widespread patterns of extortion represent attempts by armed groups to carry out governance activities, and are usually accompanied with official receipts and invoices. Groups such as the UNLF have regularly killed suspected sexual offenders in a bid to present themselves as dispensers of justice to the local population (Sitlhou, 2019). Beyond the Imphal Valley, the NSCN-IM has historically controlled the main all-season motorway connecting the state to the rest of India via the Naga-inhabited hills, manning up to 26 tax collection points to extort goods vehicles that enter and exit the state (Dash, 2008), and kidnappings of contractors and laborers working on construction projects are not uncommon in the hill areas. Evidently, while violence has reduced significantly, violence and insecurity overall continue to be driven by a thriving political economy of insurgency. Furthermore, the persistence of the drivers of insurgent activity and the need for state forces to curb and police them have led to the continuation of low-level forms of state-insurgent insurgency within the boundaries of ceasefire. This has contained rather than eliminated state-insurgent violence, while allowing state security forces and insurgents to continue to test one another and attempt to gain local leverage. For example, as frustrations grew with the peace process, and

114 Alex Waterman the number of standoffs between security forces and ceasefire signatory insurgent groups (mainly the NSCN-IM and NSCN-Reformation) increased substantially from just 1 incident in 2017 to 9 in 2018 and 16 in 2019 (Waterman, 2020).8 Although a number of face-saving statements were eventually released to claim that an agreement had been reached, the tensions had generated considerable panic throughout the Naga-inhabited areas (Saikia, 2019). Thus, it illustrates how civilians remain caught in the enduring cat-and-mouse scenario between security forces and insurgents even as politicians proclaim that peace is imminent.

Conclusion Although violence has significantly reduced since the 1990s, insurgency and the drivers that sustain it continue to preserve significant challenges of low-level violence, militarization, and threats to human security. While these challenges are generally acceptable to policymakers in New Delhi, they continue to present significant challenges for civilians and state actors in the region. Insurgents in Assam, Manipur, and the Naga-inhabited areas have long sustained themselves by tapping into international networks and exploiting the region’s porous borders to access arms, training, and sanctuary. The disruption of these sanctuaries since the turn of the millennium has increasingly disrupted armed groups’ ability to sustain themselves. It has also contributed to continued patterns of extortion and kidnapping as groups adapt and attempt to financially sustain themselves. Military operations in the last remaining major insurgent sanctuary of Myanmar during 2019 had direct impact, like the NDFB-S surrender and the signing of the third Bodo Accord in January 2020. However, reports that other anti-talks armed groups had relocated their bases within Myanmar, and concerns surrounding the durability of the Tatmadaw’s presence in Sagaing Region, suggest that anti-talks groups are likely to continue to exploit the porous border regions to evade Indian security forces. The dynamics of insurgency in the Northeast have been fueled by the interaction between historic and contemporary state policies, and the politics of identity. It was colonial-sponsored missionaries, for example, that laid the societal foundations for the development of Naga nationalism, before this was consolidated during the intense early years of Indian counterinsurgency operations in the 1950s. Tools within India’s constitutional setup that are designed to accommodate underdeveloped communities have been deployed in a bid to manage insurgency, but have accelerated dynamics of countermobilizations and more violence. Concessions such as the creation of the state of Nagaland, for example, shaped the politics of “who is a Naga” in new ways. Contemporary Naga insurgent groups have had to grapple with these tensions between tribe, nation, and India’s federal setup, compelling “symbolic” demands in today’s peace processes that have created significant roadblocks for Indian negotiators. The unresolved status of the Assam Accord continues to provoke unrest and the conditions for the ULFA-I recruitment, as was demonstrated during the process of introducing and then

Insurgency in Northeast India 115 passing the Citizenship Amendment Bill throughout 2018–2019. It also led to the mobilization of armed groups from smaller communities across Assam. Certainly, slowing down concessions to armed groups has slowed the pace of insurgent mobilization, fragmentation, and countermobilization. But the mechanisms of counterinsurgency and ceasefires that were designed to contain and manage violence – reflecting Delhi’s priority of reducing the patterns of violence it deems most important – have left open the space for continued, if limited, forms of armed competition and conflict between states and insurgents. Civilians ultimately continue to be caught between competing insurgent governance structures in Nagaland and Manipur. These underlying patterns of insecurity require greater attention from policy communities, even as politicians once again laud a return to “normalcy.”

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

7

8

Later renamed NDFB-Saoraigwra. Includes the state of Nagaland and parts of Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh. For a comprehensive breakdown of the Naga armed factions, see Waterman (2020). At the time of writing in 2000, Sanjoy Hazarika notes that ULFA based up to 500 militants across 17 camps in Bhutan (Hazarika, 2000, p. 85). B.G. Verghese, for example, states that “the stranglehold of the underground Angamis on the movement was weakening and the Semas seemed to be more assertive in seeking peace” (2004, p. 93). It remains, for example, to be seen whether the demand for a separate Bodoland State will be formally dropped following the accord. On February 28, 2020, former MP SK Bwiswmuthiary said that the accord had been signed hastily and would not allay demands for a separate Bodoland (Sentinel Assam, 2020). Wouters, for example, describes a number of anecdotes from Phugwumi village in Nagaland, including an example in which NSCN-IM and NNC militants obtained information about the disbursement of a payment from the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and competed to demand their share of the funds (2018, pp. 82–86). Standoffs defined as raids on militant camp facilities, military operations against insurgent groups, and armed clashes.

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118 Alex Waterman Pandey, M. C. (2019, December 16). Assam CAA Protest: 4 Dead in Police Firing, 175 Arrested, More Than 1400 Detained. India Today. Retrieved from https://www.ind iatoday.in/india/story/assam-caa-protest-4-dead-in-police-firing-175-arrested-more-th an-1400-detained-1628545-2019-12-16 Panwar, N. (2017a). Explaining Cohesion in an Insurgent Organization: The Case of the Mizo National Front. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28(6), 973–995. https://doi.org/10.1 080/09592318.2017.1374602 Panwar, N. (2017b). From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28(1), 233–258. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016. 1233642 Pillai, G. K. (2012). Manipur: The Way Out. Internal Security Lecture Series. Presented at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Retrieved from https://ww w.youtube.com/watch?v=KCt87g_AFX4 Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2020, January 27). Bodo Agreement – Another Success of PM’s Vision of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas’: Shri Amit Shah. Retrieved from https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR_2020BodoSettl ementEng_27012020.pdf Rahman, M. Z. (2011). Northeast India: Protracted Conflicts and Protracted Peace Processes. In D. Suba Chandran & P. R. Chari (Eds.), Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence (pp. 123–151). New Delhi: Routledge. Ramesh, J. (2005). Northeast India in a New Asia. India Seminar, 500. Retrieved from http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550/550%20jairam%20ramesh.htm Rammohan, E. N. (2012). The Weapons Trail in India’s Northeast. United Services Institution of India Journal, CXLI(587). Retrieved from http://usiofindia.org/Article/ Print/?pub=Journal&pubno=587&ano=892 Rustomji, N. (1983). Imperilled Frontiers: India’s North-Eastern Borderlands. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Sahni, A., & George, G. (2001). Security and Development in India’s Northeast: An Alternative Perspective. In K. P. S. Gill & A. Sahni (Eds.), Terror and Containment Perspectives of India’s Internal Security (pp. 295–319). New Delhi: Gyan. Saikia, A. (2019, October 26). Panic and Prayers in Nagaland as Peace Talks Reach a Deadlock. Scroll.in. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/article/941689/panic-and-prayersin-nagaland-as-peace-talks-reach-a-deadlock Sashinungla. (2003, December 18). The Dynamics of Extortion. Outlook India. Retrieved from http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-dynamics-of-extortion/222387 Satapathy, R. K. (2004). Mediating Peace The Role of Insider-Partials in Conflict Resolution in Mizoram. Faultlines, 15. Retrieved from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ publication/faultlines/volume15/Article3.htm SATP. (2017a, June 11). Internecine Clashes between Naga Militant Outfits Beyond Nagaland. Retrieved from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/Inter necine_beyondNagaland.htm SATP. (2017b, July 2). Internecine Clashes in Nagaland. Retrieved from http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/data_sheets/internecine.htm Sentinel Assam. (2019, October 9). NSCN-IM Militant Nabbed for Killing Arunachal MLA Tirong Aboh. Retrieved from https://www.sentinelassam.com/north-east-india-news/ arunachal-news/nscn-im-militant-nabbed-for-killing-arunachal-mla-tirong-aboh/ Sentinel Assam. (2020, February 28). BTR Accord Signed in Haste, has Compromised on Demand for Bodoland: Bwiswmuthiary. Retrieved from https://www.sentinelassam.

Insurgency in Northeast India 119 com/north-east-india-news/assam-news/btr-accord-signed-in-haste-has-compromisedon-demand-for-bodoland-bwiswmuthiary/ Singh, B. (2020, March 3). Make Clause 6 of Assam Accord Report Public: A Member Requests Others. Economic Times. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.co m/news/politics-and-nation/make-clause-6-of-assam-accord-report-public-a-memberrequests-others/articleshow/74451023.cms?from=mdr Singh, V. (2018, July 19). Details of 2015 Naga Agreement Emerge. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/details-of-2015-naga-ag reement-emerge/article24464239.ece Sinha, S. (2017). The Strategic Use of Peace: Non-State Armed Groups and Subnational Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Northeastern India. Democracy and Security, 13(4), 273–303. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1353421 Sitlhou, M. (2019). Why Insurgent Groups in Manipur Kill the Rape Accused. Retrieved from https://zubaanprojects.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SPF-2018-Grant-P apers_Makepeace-Sitlhou_Why-Insurgent-Groups-in-Manipur-Kill-Rape-Accused-2 .pdf Srikanth, H. (2000). Militancy and Identity Politics in Assam. Economic and Political Weekly, 35(47), 4117–4124. Srikanth, H., & Ngaihte, T. (2011). Ethnicity and Ethnic Identities in Northeast India. Man and Society: A Journal of North-East Studies, 8, 125–133. Staniland, P. (2014). Counterinsurgency and Violence Management. In C. W. Gventer, D. M. Jones, & M. L. R. Smith (Eds.), The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective (pp. 144–156). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sumi, T. (2020, February 28). GoI cannot wait indefinitely for NSCN (I-M): Ravi. Nagaland Post. Retrieved from https://www.nagalandpost.com/goi-cannot-wait-indef initely-for-nscn-i-m--ravi/212143.html Suykens, B. (2017). Comparing Rebel Rule Through Revolution and Naturalization: Ideologies of Governance in Naxalite and Naga India. In A. Arjona, N. Kasfir, & Z. C. Mampilly (Eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (pp. 138–158). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord, 26–28.06.1947. (2001). Retrieved from http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/documents/papers/nagaland_9point.htm Thomas, J. (2015). Evangelising the Nation: Religion and the Formation of Naga Political Identity. New Delhi: Routledge. Vashum, R. (2000). Nagas’ Rights to Self Determination: An Anthropological-Historical Perspective. New Delhi: Mittal. Verghese, B. G. (2004). India’s Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development. Delhi: Konark. von Stockhausen, A. (2008). Creating Naga: Identity Between Colonial Construction, Political Calculation, and Religious Instrumentalisation. In M. Oppitz, T. Kaiser, A. von Stockhausen, & M. Wettstein (Eds.), Naga Identities: Changing Local Cultures in the Northeast of India (pp. 57–80). Zurich: Zurich University. Waterman, A. (2017a). Compressing Politics in Counterinsurgency (COIN): Implications for COIN Theory from India’s Northeast. Strategic Analysis, 41(5), 447–463. https://do i.org/10.1080/09700161.2017.1343236 Waterman, A. (2017b, August 10). Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the IndoMyanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge. Retrieved December 7, 2017, from IDSA Comment website: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/marriages-of-insurgent-convenie nce-along-the-indo-myanmar-border_awaterman_100817

120 Alex Waterman Waterman, A. (2018a). South Asia: Northeast India. In IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2018. London: IISS. Waterman, A. (2018b, October 30). India’s Counterinsurgency in the Northeast Challenges the Relationship Between Time and Insurgent Success. Eleventh Column. Retrieved from http://eleventhcolumn.com/2018/10/30/indias-counterinsurgency-northeast-cha llenges-relationship-time-insurgent-success/ Waterman, A. (2019). South Asia: Northeast India. In IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2019. London: IISS. Waterman, A. (2020a). South Asia: Northeast India. In IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2020 (pp. 241–251). Retrieved from 10.1080/23740973.2019.1603978 Waterman, A. (2020b). Third Bodo Accord and Insurgency in Western Assam. Retrieved from Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website: https://idsa.in/system/files/i ssuebrief/3rd-bodo-accord-waterman-190220.pdf Wouters, J. J. P. (2018). In the Shadows of the Naga Insurgency: Tribes, State and Violence in Northeast India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

7

The improbable rise and inglorious fall of the Khalistan insurgency in India’s Punjab Philip Hultquist1

Introduction Few would have predicted in 1977 that within a decade and a half, one of India’s most prosperous states would nearly secede from the union. Yet by early 1992, the movement for a separate Sikh nation-state to be named Khalistan – the land of the pure – appeared to be a real possibility. The rebels who supported Khalistan enforced strict religious social control over several areas of Punjab, including dictating coverage to local newspapers, forbidding music, enforcing a strict dress code, and banning alcohol and tobacco. Rebel threats paralyzed the civil administration and the courts. In the face of an attempt to negotiate with the government, a high-ranking rebel leader declared the only thing to negotiate is the borders of Khalistan. Yet within 15 months, the authorities would declare the rebels defeated. The ability to enforce strict social control through fear masked a movement that was internally incoherent, fractured, and much weaker than the body count might suggest. Despite enjoying substantial support from the people of Punjab (at least initially), a mobilized diaspora, and an external state sponsor in Pakistan, the Khalistani rebels failed to unify to mount a conventional challenge to the Indian state. The militia-based violence of the early 1980s, while minor in comparison with later years, escalated as the militias sought refuge in the religiously significant Golden Temple. When the government of India (GoI) attacked this temple during Operation Bluestar in 1984, it added religious indignity and state repression to the economic grievances and created an upsurge in popular support for anti-India Sikh extremists, both locally and in the diaspora. Over the next several years, many violent groups emerged to speak for the Sikh grievances, leading to a sustained insurgency. Despite numerous attempts at negotiations, however, the rebels failed to achieve a single concession from the government. They were unable to unify and endured frequent splits. Eventually, the violence of the early stages that targeted rival sects and attempted to force the migration of Hindus out of Punjab gave way to fratricidal violence and an increase in targeting the very Sikh people for whom they claimed to speak.

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The Khalistan insurgency presents several puzzles. Why did an insurgency arise from a social base of comparatively wealthy farmers – Jat Sikhs – in one of the most affluent regions in India? Why were rebels that enjoyed substantial popular support and a state sponsor unable to unify? Why did the rebels increasingly target each other and local Sikh populations rather than focus their challenge on the Indian state? The answers lie in the interaction of structure and agency. The social structure of Punjab and the changes associated with the end of the Green Revolution provided the baseline grievances that led to a process of competitive ethnic outbidding within Sikh elite politics, eventually leading to violent groups emerging to challenge the traditional leadership. Structural factors also played a role in shaping the parochial nature of the Khalistani rebel organizations, making it difficult to unite. Security forces, while initially encouraging cooperation through the indiscriminate violence of Operations Bluestar and Woodrose, eventually shifted to infiltrate rebel networks and target rebel leadership. The latter type of campaign can exacerbate the fragmentation of parochial rebel organizations with weak horizontal ties between elites in the movement (Staniland, 2014). As the rebel movement continued to split amid distrust, exacerbated by state repression, they increasingly fought each other and turned to target the very people that they claimed to represent. This chapter details this argument in three sections addressing the origins of the movement, the character of the violence, and the reasons behind the fragmentation of the movement that led to fratricide and co-ethnic violence.

Improbable origins Horowitz’s (1985) ethnic group typology is useful in explaining the type of political consciousness among the Sikh farming community and religious devotees. In Horowitz’s terms, the Sikhs of Punjab are an advanced group in an advanced region. Punjab is a relatively well-off agricultural state, where the farming community is predominantly Sikh from the Jat caste group.2 Advanced groups in advanced regions rarely provide the social bases for insurgencies, but when they do, they share similar characteristics. These demands typically include nondiscrimination in government jobs (i.e., meritocratic mobility), that wealth stays in the region rather than subsidize poorer areas, and that regional in-migration be limited to reduce the influx of lesser-skilled workers (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 249–254). In Punjab, these economic demands were coupled with demands for political decentralization – a common demand of rural land-owning classes – and increased recognition of Sikh religious symbols. Reflecting Horowitz’s framework, the demands included nondiscrimination in army recruitment (where Sikhs are overrepresented) and a greater share of water resources for irrigation to remain in Punjab. The Shiromani Akali Dal, the leading regional political party claiming to represent Sikh interests, codified these grievances in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) in 1973 and mobilized a protest movement to negotiate for them.

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Why did a rebellion arise from a social base of comparatively wealthy farmers – Jat Sikhs – in one of the most prosperous regions in India? This feature makes the Khalistan movement that sought an independent Sikh nation-state (~1981– 1993) unique to the other cases in South Asia and one of only a few worldwide. The vast majority of regional secessionist movements occur in the name of economically disadvantaged groups in less developed regions, such as the Naga and Mizo rebellions in Northeast India. Thus, a full explanation of the improbable origins of secessionism must go beyond structural factors to examine the interaction between multiple factors. This chapter highlights the interplay between several, notably the fear associated with minority status, rapid changes to the social structure (e.g., relative economic decline after the Green Revolution), ethnic outbidding in the Sikh political system, the influence of the Sikh diaspora, and political maneuvering by the ruling Indian National Congress party (Congress hereafter). In short, several factors created a confluence of interests where multiple groups sought redress of grievances against the GoI. While these grievances first manifested through regular party politics, they escalated to irregular but peaceful mechanisms (i.e., protests and agitations), wherein the dynamics of intra-Sikh politics encouraged ethnic outbidding that resulted in greater extremism and then turned to violence. The fear associated with minority status is hard to overstate, even though Sikhs were comparatively better off than many in the Hindu majority. Given the overwhelming numerical disparity, Sikhs and other minorities can take only little comfort in the fact that India is a constitutionally secular democracy. While democracy is associated with a peaceful order in the industrialized world, in multiethnic postcolonial countries, it can cement ethnic divisions if parties organize on identity lines. Indeed, this fear was central to Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s demand for a separate Pakistan. Sikhs faced a similar problem and Sikh representatives proposed a separate state at independence if India was to be partitioned, but they were not taken seriously (K. Singh, 1966, pp. 258–259). Sikhs were among those facing ethnic cleansing in the tragedy of partition that accompanied independence. Since that time, the Akali Dal sought to establish a Sikh-majority state in India. They were denied a separate state during the State Re-Organization Act (1956) because only linguistic, not ethnic or communal, claims were considered. They eventually won the Punjabi Suba (1966), which truncated the Indian Punjab into a portion that was majority Sikh (see Table 7.1). Table 7.1 Population percentages by religion

1961 (Pre-Punjabi Suba) 1971 (Post-Punjabi Suba)

% Sikhs in Punjab (India)

% Hindus in Punjab (India)

33.3 (1.8) 60.2 (1.9)

63.6 (83.5) 37.5 (82.7)

Source: Census of India (1961a, p. 326; 1961b, p. 482; 1971, p. 2; 1972, p. iii).

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Nonetheless, the Akali Dal could not dominate Punjabi politics, despite being a Sikh-majority state. It is important to note that Sikhs in Punjab are a heterogeneous group (Takhar, 2005). Despite a relatively greater sense of “peoplehood,” the Sikh social and political group has “cross-cutting cleavages, including caste, class, and partisan affiliation” in addition to degrees of religiosity (Chima, 2010, p. 23). The Sikh vote was split between the Akali Dal, with rural Jat Sikhs as its principal constituency, and the Indian National Congress in Punjab, which had a more mixed constituency made up of Hindus and urban Sikhs. The years after the implementation of the Punjabi Suba to the beginning of conflict went well for Punjab economically. Punjab was the heart of India’s Green Revolution in wheat during the 1960s and 1970s and is known as the breadbasket of India (along with Haryana). “One [statistical] highlight is that Punjab in 1980–81, occupying 1.6% of the area of the country and with 16.7 million people (1981 census), provided 73% of the India-wide procurement of wheat, and 48% of rice” (Wallace, 1986, p. 367). Pettigrew (1995) argues that the origins of the conflict lie in the agrarian policies of the GoI toward riparian Punjab’s water rights. Jat Sikh farmers produce mostly wheat on small, owner-occupier farms using irrigation from the state’s rivers (Pettigrew, 1995, p. 5). The GoI mandated that 75% of Punjab’s water be allocated to non-riparian states, meaning there would be less irrigation for Punjabi farmers (Pettigrew, 1995, p. 5). This event contributed to a general sense that the GoI would not allow Punjab to keep its resources or the wealth generated within. Complementary to the issue of water rights, farmers in Punjab experienced a significant rise in the cost of production (due to diesel and power shortages) accompanied by a low price for wheat. Despite impressive gains in agricultural productivity during the 1960s, the Green Revolution brought rising indebtedness and increasing economic grievances based on the fact that Punjabi farmers could not control their destiny. The indebtedness might not have been a significant problem if the benefits of the Green Revolution had continued. The output during the Green Revolution, however, could not keep up with rising expectations, which follows a classic Davies’s J-curve theory of grievance leading to violence (Davies, 1962). As Punjab’s agricultural success stagnated, it highlighted the fact that Punjab is “industrially backward,” which was blamed on the GoI for its lack of industrial investment in Punjab (Wallace, 1986, pp. 371–372). While some Punjab-level grievances seem rooted in the lack of modernization, the modernization that had taken place threatened the orthodox Sikhs and, with it, the socioreligious base of the Akali Dal. So why did the Sikhs become so disenchanted with life that they felt they had to take on the Indian government? The short answer is that most Sikhs did not. But there was an important section of the Sikh community, identified with the Akali Dal, which saw the modernism that came with prosperity as a menace to their faith, a threat to their identity. Terry-cotton shirts, jeans, motorcycles, and whiskey do not go with the observance of the five

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‘k’s. Modern life is too fast for cumbersome processes like tying turbans and washing waist-length hair. So to many Sikhs the safety razor became the symbol of modernity, and this alarmed the orthodox. (Tully & Jacob, 1985, p. 37) The social structure explanations are insufficient alone. Indeed, most advantaged groups in advantaged regions do not mobilize for violent secession (Horowitz, 1985). It is also crucial to understand how the dynamics of intra-Sikh politics came to incentivize outbidding, whereby each faction benefited from taking positions further and further to the extreme. The effect of outbidding continued the fractionalization of Sikh politics and supported more extreme elements willing to use violence and take hardline stances against concessions. The undisputed leader of religious extremism came to be Sant (or Saint) Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a radical but charismatic Sikh preacher. Bhindranwale was not part of the Akali leadership, but he became the face of the demands by outflanking the Akalis. That is, he took over as the champion of the ASR by refusing any concessions except the full implementation of the ASR, when the more moderate Akalis saw the ASR as a starting point in negotiations (Chima, 2010, pp. 40–46). In April 1978, clashes between Sikhs and Nirankaris (a “Hindu-Sikh” sect considered heretical by orthodox Sikhs) occurred in Amritsar, Punjab, resulting in the killings of 13 Sikhs, 4 of whom were members of Bhindranwale’s seminary (Chima, 2010, p. 42). This clash inflamed communal tensions, especially within the Sikh community. The Nirankari–Sikh clash also provided the Congress Party an opportunity to undermine the moderate Akalis and improve their electoral prospects. In 1978, Congress was out of power for the first time since independence at the national level, but also in Punjab. To destabilize the Punjab coalition government, to which the Akalis were a partner, Congress supported Sikh religious radicals, including Bhindranwale, to “out-radical” the Akalis. The goal of such a political move was to force the Akali Dal to the right, which would alienate the moderate supporters of the Akali Dal and split the Sikh vote with Congress in Punjab. To enact this policy, Congress reportedly supported the emergence of two radical groups in addition to supporting Bhindranwale. The most important of these was the Dal Khalsa, which was one of the first groups to call explicitly for a separate, sovereign Sikh nation-state (and still does so within Punjab and internationally). The extent of Congress’s support for the radicals is not clear. It appears that Congress operatives provided financial support, political support in the form of campaigning resources, and perhaps some cover from prosecution or arrest for their violent activities (Chima, 2010, p. 47; Nayar & Singh, 1984, pp. 30–34; Tully & Jacob, 1985, pp. 57–61). Other relevant radical (and later militant) groups emerged after that Nirankari– Sikh clash of 1978 that Congress did not assist. The Babbar Khalsa initially organized to enforce the edict against the Nirankaris and avenge the death of the martyred (Chima, 2010, pp. 47–48). The All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) had been the student wing of the Akali Dal for decades but radicalized after the clash when Bhindranwale’s close friend, Bhai Amrik Singh, became the

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president and began organizing an independent base of support (Chima, 2010, pp. 47–48). Although not every organization was explicitly loyal to Bhindranwale, he had undoubtedly emerged as a noteworthy radical to counter the moderates in the Akali Dal. He cemented his notoriety as the religious radical with two prominent assassinations. The first was the 1980 assassination of the Nirankari guru, for which Bhindranwale publicly called, and the second was the 1981 assassination of Lala Jagat Narain, a famous Hindu leader and former member of Parliament (Khandekar, 1981). By early 1984, the situation was escalating precariously, though violence was relatively low by insurgency standards. The outbidding process continued to radicalize the community, while moderates in the Akali Dal failed to secure concessions from the GoI, which frequently reneged on agreements to implement parts of the ASR. At each turn, radicals called for nothing short of full implementation of the ASR and pushed the Akalis to the right. Bhindranwale’s and other militias increased their violence and retreated into the Golden Temple with impunity. The Punjab Police, the default force for countermeasures, was not built to manage this type of violence and was ineffective in countering it. In the face of targeted assassinations, many in the police force refused to act or pursue. Those that did engage often overreacted with counterproductive measures like burning protesters’ busses and religious writings, and targeting amritdhari (baptized) Sikhs (Chima, 2010, pp. 63, 68–69). To make matters worse, many in the GoI believed the majority-Sikh police to be sympathetic to the militants’ cause. This situation set the stage for Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose, which set off a chain reaction that included the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and a wave of anti-Sikh violence in Delhi and beyond. Given the rise in violence and domestic political pressure, the GoI decided to act more forcefully. In June 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent the Indian Army to flush out the militants from the Golden Temple Complex, code named Operation Bluestar. The siege was expected to be short but took several days due to fierce fighting encountered from the militants. Ultimately, Bhindranwale was killed along with most of the militant leadership, but the siege was also responsible for the deaths of a large number of Sikh civilians—including religious pilgrims and assembled protesters waiting to begin the next protest (Tully & Jacob, 1985). The Indian Army destroyed much of the Golden Temple Complex, including the deeply significant Akal Takht. The Indian Army followed up Operation Bluestar with Operation Woodrose, which sent the army through the rural areas and gurdwaras (temples) to mop up remaining extremists through the summer of 1984. The army did not have intelligence on who was an actual militant, however, so it relied on the common – but dangerous – shorthand of targeting based on ethnicity, religiosity, and geography, notably the border region of Majha. Nineteen eighty-four was a watershed year for the whole of India, but especially for the crisis in Punjab. The militancy was a small part of the manifestations of Jat Sikh grievances in comparison to the protest movement in the years before, albeit growing more alarming. The destruction of religious sites, and Sikh

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targeting of Operation Bluestar, coupled with the explicitly collective violence of Operation Woodrose had the predictable effect of increasing the popular demand for rebellion while simultaneously providing the rebel recruitment pool (young Sikh men) few choices but fleeing or joining the rebellion. The popular demand for redress of Sikh grievances grew ever louder after the anti-Sikh riots that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi. The assassination itself was carried out by her Sikh bodyguards in retribution for Operation Bluestar. In reaction, as anti-Sikh communal violence raged in Delhi and beyond, it is not surprising that many Sikhs in Punjab and in the diaspora no longer felt that India could be a long-term home for Sikhs. The rise in demand was made explicit during a March 1985 Akali Dal conference, which added more demands to the long list of the ASR, such as the removal of military presence from Punjab, the return of deserted Sikh army soldiers to their units, and an independent investigation of the anti-Sikh riots. Beyond these relatively moderate formal demands, the mood displayed at the conference was more radical. “[T]he huge gathering listened to poets and dhadis (ballad singers) extolling the heroic deeds of Sant Bhindranwale and Mrs Gandhi’s assassins” (Chima, 2010, pp. 110–111). The tragic events of 1984 were the catalyst that set in motion nearly another decade of escalating violence. The shape of that violence, nonetheless, was not predetermined by this catalyst. Instead, it was the result of several interacting factors, which are explored in the following sections.

The character of the rebellion There are several striking features of the Khalistani rebellion. First, what began as religious militia-based violence targeting rival sects started to show signs of larger political goals associated with an insurgency and eventually turned into demands for secession. The insurgent violence was predominantly terrorism that targeted civilians, but had a significant portion of guerrilla warfare, challenging conventional characterizations. Second, although civilians remained the primary targets, the rebels’ use of violence shifted significantly over time. Notably, the groups devolved into a cycle of distrust and fragmentation that disintegrated any chance of unifying to challenge the state more seriously. The rebel groups became increasingly fratricidal, targeting rival groups out of paranoia, competition, and a quest for dominance. While violence against Hindus remained significant as rebels attempted to get Hindus to flee the state, rebels increasingly shifted violence toward Sikhs. As civilian targeting increased dramatically in 1986, so did the share of Sikh casualties. Sikh casualties bypassed the percentage of Hindus killed around 1988 and stayed greater for the remainder of the conflict, with the gap around 1,000 in 1990 and 1991 (Wallace, 2007).3 The remaining sections leverage case-specific evidence and broader comparative research to explain why this character emerged and through what processes it changed. In short, Operation Bluestar created a power vacuum in the budding rebel organizations while it and the other tragedies of 1984 – Operation Woodrose and the anti-Sikh riots – ignited a spike in popular grievances against the state,

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both locally and abroad. The many groups that emerged to speak for these grievances never unified, despite multiple attempts, and eventually entered a vicious cycle of competition over the spoils of the conflict, which manifested itself in fratricidal and co-ethnic violence. First, allow me to describe and explain the character in more detail. The events of 1984 created an upsurge in demand for redress of grievance beyond the initial social base of the upper Jat Sikh farming community that characterized the early stage. As the protest movement and militia-based violence turned to an insurgency, the class and caste dynamics shifted. The primary social bases of the insurgents were Jat Sikhs of the small and middle peasantry (Gayer, 2009). The landless and large landowners did not participate in high numbers for expected reasons, too poor or too connected to the status quo (Pettigrew, 1995, p. 57). Puri, Judge, and Sekhon (1999) surveyed border districts and found similar patterns of largely lower-class Jat Sikhs who took up arms. Notably, rather than ideological or religious zealots, the most common reason they cited for taking up arms was adventure. The geography of the rebellion appears to follow the class breakdown. The areas of greatest resistance began in the northwestern border region of Majha and then spread slowly to the southern region of Malwa. Pettigrew (1995, pp. 65–68) describes the slow spread from Majha to Malwa due to the higher status of the farming community in Malwa, which preferred political rather than armed opposition. The Khalistan movement was an insurgency that employed both terror and guerrilla tactics. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are specific types of violence and are not mutually exclusive within the same conflict or by the same group. The distinction between these tactics is most fruitfully determined by the targets of the violence. Whereas guerrilla warfare targets the state and its apparatus, terrorism targets civilians (Ganor, 2002). Both can, and frequently do, occur inside the concept of insurgency, which is an organized armed movement that uses violence to challenge the state for a broader political end, typically revolution or secession (Merari, 1993). The Khalistan movement exemplifies multiple types of warfare employed during an insurgency. Of the Khalistani rebel attacks between 1981 and 1995, roughly 70% were terrorism against civilian targets, and 26% can be considered guerrilla warfare.4 Regarding the latter, 85% of guerrilla attacks targeted the police, who were the primary counterinsurgents. The most common types of attacks were assassination (40.4%), armed assault (28.9%), and bombing (21.6%), as well as a few high-profile airline hijackings. The literature on civilian victimization during civil wars is useful to understand why the Khalistani rebels primarily targeted civilians. Rebel groups choose terrorism as a mode of insurgent violence under several circumstances, notably when they are weak. Weak rebels are expected to be more likely to target civilians in large numbers because they lack the capacity to hit harder targets, like military targets associated with guerrilla warfare, let alone build an army to confront the state military conventionally (Butler & Gates, 2009). Weak rebels will not have the capacity to take and hold territory; thus, they must attack

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within the state’s area of control, which is not only more challenging to operate in but precludes the level of intelligence necessary to target more selectively (Kalyvas, 2006). Second, rebels tend to target civilians when pressured by the state. Rebels increase civilian victimization as part of their attempts to enforce collective action in support of the insurgents and increase their resources via plunder following battlefield losses (Hultman, 2007; Wood, 2014a). In theory, rebels who increase their strength should avoid civilian targeting, but Wood (2014b) finds that this depends on their level of, or dependence on, popular support. Without that dependence, stronger groups have more capability to inflict damages on civilians in their attempt to enforce collective action and intimidate collaborators. This literature is helpful in the case of Khalistani violence. The Khalistani groups were undoubtedly weak in the sense that they never formed conventional armies to take and hold territory. Their weakness, however, is mostly the result of their fragmentation and inability to unify. The rebels enjoyed several factors that should have improved their strength. Most important, popular support for the cause of the Khalistanis, or at least grievances against India, was significant in the immediate aftermath of 1984. Masses gathered in support of proclamations for a Sikh homeland, wherein Indira Gandhi’s assassins were treated as heroes (Chima, 2010, pp. 110–111). Popular support should facilitate collective action, including improving recruitment, financial aid, intelligence gathering for the rebels, and denial of intelligence for the government. Next, the Khalistan movement also enjoyed the support of a mobilized diaspora in North America and Europe. Some of the first demands for a separate nation-state began in the diaspora in the 1970s and escalated in the early 1980s, but the ideological, political, and material support marshaled for Khalistan began in earnest in 1984 (Fair, 2005a; Tatla, 1999). Several organizations emerged in the diaspora to unify the movement and to provide material and organizational support, though support for Khalistan was not unanimous within the diaspora (Fair, 2005a, p. 133). Tatla (1999, pp. 117, 139) lists 16 Sikh organizations that emerged in 1984 or shortly thereafter in North America and the United Kingdom, with only the Babbar Khalsa International emerging earlier. Several of these organizations were connected across communities in North America and Europe, and some were allied with Khalistani political and armed wings in Punjab (Tatla, 1999). The support included informational support via numerous Sikh newspapers spreading their narrative, and political support, which internationalized the conflict through lobbying host governments. Some in the diaspora joined the rebels in Punjab (Tatla, 1999, p. 129). There were even attacks initiated in host countries, including two airline bombings originating in Canada in 1985. The Air India Flight 182 bombing killed 329 people, mostly Canadians of Indian origin (Bolan, 2017). Last, Pakistani support, while muted at first, eventually increased substantially to upgrade the weaponry available to the rebels. Nonetheless, these advantages did not unify the movement into a coherent fighting force that could carry out more sophisticated guerrilla warfare against harder targets, let alone build a conventional army to challenge the government for control of territory

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directly. Instead, the increase in weaponry coincided with the alienation of the local population, which incentivized more violence against civilians to enforce collective action. Both the character of this violence and its changes over time are best explained by the fragmentation of the rebel movement, the failed efforts at unification, and the vicious cycle of fear and competition that led to its disintegration. The question that remains is: Why was this movement so difficult to unify, and what led to its continual fragmentation?

Fragmentation of the Khalistan movement The fragmentation of the movement is explained well by theories of elite politics and rebel networks. Sikh political elites must jockey for position on multiple fronts, including rival political parties outside the Sikh political system (e.g., Congress), rival factions inside the Sikh political system (various Akali Dal parties), and militant factions. These dynamics fed the ethnic outbidding discussed earlier. Rebel groups themselves reflect preexisting social networks, with strengths and weaknesses, which provide the pathways for unifying or fragmenting the movement. This section combines these approaches by building primarily off Chima’s (2010) patterns of political leadership argument and Staniland’s (2014) network theory of rebel cohesion and collapse. In short, the initial organization of the rebel movement reflected the structural features of Sikh Punjabi society. It increasingly fragmented at both the political and armed-group levels until it disintegrated in the face of a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in 1992–1993. This was not, however, a linear process of fragmentation, weakening, and disintegration. Both the political and armed wings attempted to unite frequently, and the factionalized militant movement grew stronger (in the aggregate) even as it fragmented. By early 1992, the armed wings were as factionalized as ever, but their ideological dominance over the Sikh political system, their social control on the ground, and their likelihood of victory was at its peak. The rebel movement for Khalistan is an example of a parochial organization in Staniland’s (2014, pp. 5–6) typology. In this typology, rebel groups vary in their cohesion based on the strength of their horizontal and vertical relationships, which refer to the ties between elites/commanders and from commanders to local rank-and-file, respectively. Parochial groups have strong command and control from elites to rank-and-file insurgents, but elite ties are weak; thus, they have a distinct set of strengths and weaknesses. This organization reflects the density of ties each group has with the local population; therefore, each group tends to be very strong in its local area, which helps recruitment, civilian support, and the collection of intelligence of state actions and collaborators. However, they have difficulty building cohesive movements beyond their local area, given how the lack of elite ties generates distrust among leaders and commanders, hurting cooperation, like coordination and pooling resources (Staniland, 2014, pp. 7–8).

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In Punjab, the organization of armed wings was parochial from the beginning, which reflected the social structure of Jat Sikhs in Punjab. Gurharpal Singh sums this up well: Jat Sikh society – apart from its religious institutions – has developed few associations of horizontal nature, and is characterized essentially by vertical linkages that in times of crisis can easily become porous and do not serve as structures of resistance, opposition, and mobilization. (G. Singh, 1996, pp. 415–416) The institutions of the Sikh political system reflect this lack of horizontal associational ties, which encourage political competition over the management of Sikh religious institutions. The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) is the primary such institution, which is an elected body from a Sikh-only electorate that governs Sikh religious and gurdwara policies. These elections reflect the divisive elite politics of the Sikh community, but also exacerbate that factionalism, since some but not all elites compete in both the Sikh and the secular political system. The parochial characteristics were reflected early on in Akali politics, resulting in a split within the traditional Akali leaders in 1984 when Jagdev Singh Talwandi broke away from the main Akali Dal party (led by Harchand Singh Longowal) to create Akali Dal (Talwandi). The outbidding process that pushed the conflict toward extremist rhetoric and gave space for ethno-religious violence is an outgrowth of this factionalism. The tendency toward factionalism was exploited by the Congress Party (G. Singh, 1996, p. 416), with the most salient example coming from the sponsorship of Bhindranwale and potentially other early violent actors, such as the Dal Khalsa (Gayer, 2009, pp. 238–241). The early violent actors reflected this parochial structure as well in their militia system, which used religious symbolism and protection of supporters in rural areas (Gayer, 2009, p. 240). That many bands of rebels that became active later had different strongholds similarly reflects this parochial structure. For instance, Pettigrew (1995, p. 65) notes that Babbar Khalsa was strongest in the district of Patiala; the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) in Faridkot, Bathinda, and Ludhiana; and the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) in Amritsar. Cooperation among disparate groups was highest in the face of indiscriminate state violence, but this was still relatively low by insurgent standards. While many of the leaders of these militias were killed in Operation Bluestar, like Bhindranwale, others escaped the Golden Temple ahead of it and fled to Pakistan (Gayer, 2009, p. 243). Coming from different backgrounds and associated with different militias, such as Bhindranwale’s or the Babbar Khalsa, they found common cause in seeking Pakistan’s support for their budding insurgent movement. Others fled to Pakistan during the summer “mopping up” mission, Operation Woodrose, which specifically targeted amritdhari Sikhs. Although amritdhari Sikhs are easily discernible by their turbans and unshorn beards, it is not an indicator that one is a rebel. Gayer (2009, p. 245) suggests the number of

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Sikh militants in Pakistan was around 500 at the end of 1984. Pakistan was originally reluctant to support the would-be insurgents and kept a close watch on them, preventing their return until a united political organization arose to speak for the movement. Likewise, the more extreme, but not separatist, political factions of the Akali Dal were generally united after Operation Bluestar, but this unity would not last long. It began to break down as early as fall 1985 over a dispute regarding who would fund a convention of the AISSF (Chima, 2010, p. 120). Through the course of the conflict, different factions of the opposition attempted to unite to move beyond their parochial tendencies. At the political level, these attempts were frequently initiated by someone who, temporarily, had broad support across the spectrum – thus was difficult to refuse – and sought an opportunity to unite the factions under their leadership. Most of these were short-lived and broke down when confronted with circumstances that incentivized division. For instance, Baba Joginder Singh, who was Bhindranwale’s father and thus was difficult to refuse given Bhindranwale’s status as a martyr, attempted to unite the Akali factions in 1985. He did so by announcing the dissolution of the existing camps (the traditional AD-Longowal and AD-Talwandi) and the creation of the Akali Dal (United) to replace them. Both factions agreed initially before splitting soon after that. Extremist elements sought to unify the movement under their leadership while isolating the moderates. They called for a Sarbat Khalsa – a meeting of the Sikh community to decide significant issues – in January 1986. The (first) Panthic Committee was created following this meeting to unite the armed militiasturned-insurgents and coordinate action. They fused existing militias and created the KCF as the armed wing. This umbrella organization provided the coordinating wing of the movement that Pakistan had been waiting for, leading to increased support and the reintroduction of militants hiding in Pakistan. This Panthic Committee (prematurely) declared independence within a few months, in part to please patrons in Pakistan and supporters in a mobilized diaspora (Chima, 2010, pp. 133–134). All these attempts at unification, which continued but will not be detailed here for space, were short-lived, and the movement kept fragmenting. At the political level, efforts by the government to negotiate frequently led to fragmentation, due to spoiling from the militants, as did the announcement of elections, which incentivized each political faction to field separate candidates. The government’s attempts to negotiate followed a consistent logic: offer talks with the most moderate group that had previously not been discredited. In the protest and militia violence years before Operation Bluestar, the GoI frequently negotiated with the traditional, and more moderate, Akali Dal led by Sant Longowal. Each time Longowal would receive some concessions, Bhindranwale and others proclaimed them traitors for settling for less than the full ASR, and this outbidding process would push everyone to the right. After 1984, Longowal achieved the Punjab Accord with the Rajiv Gandhi government, which granted significant concessions on nearly all demands of the ASR. Nonetheless, militants assassinated Sant Longowal for selling out the Sikh community, and the GoI never implemented the Punjab Accord.5 After this failure, the GoI approached

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for negotiations increasingly more extreme factions, though short of those seeking full secession as a precondition, including the AISSF in 1986, Darshan Singh Ragi in 1987, and Jasbir Singh Rode in 1988. Each of these resulted in increased violence – KCF targeting Hindus on buses in response to the first two – and discrediting those who negotiated. In 1991, the Akali factions merged to negotiate with Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar’s National Front coalition government, who was promising talks without preconditions. Again, this unity was short-lived when the Parkash Singh Badal and Longowal factions reconstituted themselves ahead of the 1991 elections, which the government later called off. At the armed-group level, fragmentation reflected the distrust among elites and commanders. Before the Panthic Committee was even one year old, it removed a member, Aroor Singh, for initiating contact with the GoI. Aroor Singh then created the KLF, which “integrate[d] several smaller gangs” (Chima, 2010, p. 138). In 1988, a new, more educated class sought to lead the movement and formed a second Panthic Committee under Dr. Sohan Singh. Pakistan preferred dealing with this faction, which was more fundamentalist, independent in its source of revenue (e.g., extortion, robbery), and willing to share its spoils with its patrons (Gayer, 2009, p. 246). In 1990, Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, the leader of the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK), split to form a third Panthic Committee. There were three rival umbrella organizations to coordinate the armed struggle, each with multiple armed groups operating with various degrees of autonomy and coordination, and some independent groups, like the Babbar Khalsa, who split from the second Panthic Committee in 1991. Counterinsurgent actions also influenced this fragmentation through local disembedding and leadership decapitation, which fits well with Staniland’s (2014) theory. Given the importance of Punjab to India, the GoI took repressing the insurgency seriously, eventually deploying 120,000 Indian Army troops in later stages to bolster a 160,000 strong paramilitary and police force (Joshi, 1993, p. 12).6 Before that, however, the Punjab Police became the primary counterinsurgents once the army was discredited following Operations Bluestar and Woodrose. Over time, the police built the capacity to disembed the insurgents from their local strongholds, which fomented distrust and created individualized intelligence. They used this intelligence to target insurgents in large numbers in a sustained decapitation campaign. The Punjab Police built on its co-ethnicity advantages to disembed the local counterinsurgents through a variety of mechanisms. First, having local Jat Sikh counterinsurgents provided a limited counterweight to the effectiveness of the extremist anti-state rhetoric. They, along with flipped insurgents and criminals, were also able to infiltrate rebel networks, which provided intelligence on the underground operations and individual insurgents, but also fomented distrust and paranoia in insurgent ranks. They used locally recruited Sikh police officers in plain clothes and flipped insurgents to identify insurgents that were well known by name, but not by face. Locally recruited Sikh forces, coupled with more hardened CRPF forces from around the country, used these advantages to carry out a sustained decapitation campaign.7 It intentionally sought the extrajudicial killing

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of suspected high-ranking militants through brutal methods, though the degree to which the targeting was limited to the highest levels to include non-militants is contested (Silva, Marwaha, & Klinger, 2009; G. Singh, 1996). The local disembedding and decapitation campaign furthered the fragmentation through increasingly effective targeting and deterrence, but it also encouraged fragmentation by escalating rebel distrust and competition. The paranoia led to fratricide as rebels had incentives to strike first against rival gangs and root out informers in their ranks. The violence was notable following organizational splits. After the creation of the second Panthic Committee in 1988, the associated armed groups targeted each other. Coupled with a change in Pakistan’s preference for the groups of the second Panthic Committee and increased weaponry, including AK rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (Joshi, 1993, p. 2), 1988 saw a marked spike in violence. Another wave of fratricidal violence was notable in 1990 after the creation of the third Panthic Committee and a realignment of the BTFK. “These splits increased tension between the ‘militants’ aligned with the First, Second, and Third Panthic Committees, respectively, and resulted in the deaths of about twothirds of the known militants in the Majha region in the first half of 1990 due to fratricidal warfare” (Chima, 2010, p. 190). Last, as the Punjab Police succeeded in eliminating several high-profile Khalistani leaders in the summer of 1992, fratricide escalated as they sought to root out informers (Chima, 2010, p. 224). This vicious cycle of paranoia and competition is likely behind the targeting of Sikhs as well, as rival armed groups attacked each other’s social bases.8 In 1988, the same year of the creation of the second Panthic Committee, militants killed more Sikhs than Hindus, though the latter number remained significant. This gap increased throughout the rest of the conflict as fratricidal violence became more common. Competition is likely not the only reason for intra-ethnic targeting. Rebels are more likely to attack civilians thought to be their social base when they have outside actors, criminal activities, or resource looting for their financing (Wood, 2014b; Weinstein, 2007). These explanations also fit the Khalistani case reasonably well, given that the share of Sikh victims rose after outside support from Pakistan began in earnest, the second Panthic Committee started self-financing operations through criminal activities, and the implementation of religiously strict social control alienated them from the population (Gayer, 2009, pp. 245–247). To summarize, the Khalistani movement was a parochial movement from the structure of society, which would have made it difficult to unify under most circumstances. This vulnerability to fragmentation and disintegration eventually manifested itself in several ways, including failed mergers, frequent splits, and fratricidal and co-ethnic violence. After initially helping rebels solve these problems through the collective repression of Operations Bluestar and Woodrose, the GoI later encouraged the fragmentation and disintegration of the movement through disembedding their ties to the community and a decapitation campaign that exacerbated the distrust that already existed. When the militants boycotted and enforced a meager turnout in the 1992 legislative assembly elections, they brought a Congress government to power that pursued a relentless anti-terrorist

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campaign through a joint offensive. This joint offensive, which had the Indian Army and the Border Security Force seal most of the border (ending the haven in Pakistan), the Indian Army control the countryside, and the Punjab Police mount a ruthless decapitation campaign, escalated the inter-rebel competition that led to the disintegration of the movement. Decapitation counterinsurgency is not always effective. When rebel organizations build resilient bureaucratic succession mechanisms (Jordan, 2014) or the group emerges as a cohesive, integrated group from robust social networks (Staniland, 2014), they can withstand decapitation campaigns. In the case of Punjab, however, decapitation escalated a process of fragmentation and disintegration to which the Khalistan movement was already prone.9

Conclusion While the rebels were declared defeated in 1993, this was not a sharp end to the movement, nor is it impossible for the movement to return. When the Punjab Police declared the end of the militancy with the killing of the BTFK leader Manochahal, several other leaders were still at large, believed to be in Pakistan or hiding elsewhere. Lower-level violence continued in Punjab for several years, which included high-profile violence such as the assassination of Congress Chief Minister of Punjab Beant Singh in 1995. Because the Indian state oversaw the disintegration of the rebels without implementing any concessions, the underlying grievances of the Sikhs remain. There has also not been a systematic attempt at closure to address the violence that occurred from all sides and to heal social wounds (Wallace, 2015). The fractious elite politics of the Akali Dal, a contributing factor to the outbidding that provided the opportunity for militia violence early on, remains contentious (Chima, 2015; J. Singh, 2006). As a generation of Sikh youth is stoked with pro-Khalistani messages from within and abroad, the chances of a return to high levels of violence must be taken seriously. Indeed, some signs exist of a revival, including renewed violence, recovered weaponry, and improved recruitment.10 The case of the Khalistan movement in the Indian Punjab is rare in many ways. The movement grew out of an unlikely social group, in that Jat Sikhs were relatively well off from a prosperous part of India. Most insurgencies in South Asia and elsewhere emerge from social bases much more economically marginalized, such as the Nagas or Mizos in India’s Northeast, or on behalf of such marginalized groups like the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency claiming to organize on behalf of indigenous groups. The linkages to Pakistan’s support have parallels with other insurgents or cross-border terror groups. The fact that the Khalistanis did enjoy local popular support, however, make them more like the short-lived Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) than the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other more radical groups associated with the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (Staniland, 2014). Fragmentation, to some degree, is relatively common across insurgencies, but the degree of fragmentation that occurred within the Khalistani rebels was extreme. Last, the Khalistani movement is also

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rare in that it was defeated outright, where many such insurgencies linger for decades. Despite these rarities, the Punjab case can be explained using a combination of existing theories. The wave of application of more rigorous qualitative and quantitative social science research methods to security studies is bearing fruit. Sikh ethno-religious nationalism is explained through a combination of anthropological structural approaches (Pettigrew, 1995) with the elite politics approach from political science (Chima, 2010). The character of violence used by the Khalistanis fits well within the literature on civilian victimization (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012; Hultman, 2007; Wood, 2010). The fragmentation of the Khalistani groups fits well within the literature on rebel fragmentation, whether it emphasizes the social origins of those groups (Staniland, 2014) or it places fragmentation within a bargaining framework (Bakke, Cunningham, & Seymour, 2012; Cunningham, 2013; Seymour, Bakke, & Cunningham, 2016). The way forward to understand insurgent movements is to continue the competitive division of labor in the social sciences that address interesting social questions from a variety of viewpoints, using a diverse set of methods. Rather than stake out dogmatic claims regarding the superiority of a single discipline, method, or approach, a pluralistic view serves the enterprise best. Each method or approach is insufficient, but through triangulation among a variety of scholars in different fields, and continual dialogue between general explanations and particular cases, knowledge advances.

Notes 1 The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent the School of Advanced Military Studies, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The author thanks the editors and two anonymous reviewers for thoughtful feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript. 2 The caste and class dynamics of the case are more complicated as they shifted in the post-1984 stage of the insurgency (discussed later). 3 Data collected by the Ministry of Home Affairs, published in Times of India, February 9, 1992, and presented in Wallace (2007, p. 433). 4 Author’s calculation using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). To be specific, using terms from the GTD, I aggregate terrorism from target types that include private persons and property, business, education, aircraft, journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious figures, tourists, government personnel, and public transportation (when occupied by people, otherwise it is coded as an attack on infrastructure). Targets coded as guerrilla warfare include military, police, diplomatic, government buildings, intelligence, and infrastructure. The remaining 4% that is difficult to categorize is labeled other or unknown. Data should be read with caution since the GTD privileges, noncombatant targets in its inclusion criteria. 5 For more on the difficulty of achieving a negotiated solution, see Hultquist (2015). 6 In India, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Border Security Force (BSF) are called paramilitaries. Village defense committees, which were used in Punjab, are not included in this figure. 7 These processes were corroborated by personal interviews with KPS Gill and two anonymous Punjab Police officers active during the insurgency. For more detail on

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how the police carried out the intelligence gathering and targeting operations, see Fair (2005b), Gill (1999), Mahadevan (2012), and Wallace (2007). 8 That rebel competition leads to targeting civilians is consistent with a body of crossnational research (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012; Hultman, 2007; Seymour, Bakke, & Cunningham, 2016; Wood & Kathman, 2015). 9 This is consistent with a cross-case evaluation of decapitation strategies in counterinsurgency campaigns (Johnston, 2012). 10 See, for instance, Jolly (2017).

References Bakke, K. M., Cunningham, K. G., & Seymour, L. J. M. (2012). A plague of initials: Fragmentation, cohesion, and infighting in civil wars. Perspectives on Politics, 10(2), 265–283. Bolan, K. (2017, March 31). Air India Flight 182 Bombing. The Canadian Encyclopedia. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/air-india-flight-182bombing Butler, C., & Gates, S. (2009). Asymmetry, parity, and (civil) war: Can international theories of power help us understand civil war? International Interactions, 35(3), 330–340. Census of India. (1961a). Punjab Census Atlas, Volume XIII, Part IX. Retrieved from http://censusindia.gov.in/ Census of India. (1961b). Social and Cultural Tables, Volume I, Part II-C(1). Retrieved from http://censusindia.gov.in/ Census of India. (1971). Distribution of Population by Religion and Scheduled Castes. Series 17-Punjab, Part II-C(i) and Part V-A. Retrieved from http://censusindia.gov.in/ Census of India. (1972). Religion. Series 1, India. Retrieved from http://censusindia.gov.in/ Chima, J. S. (2010). The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements. London: Sage Publications. Chima, J. S. (2015). The Shiromani Akali Dal and emerging ideological cleavages in contemporary Sikh politics in Punjab: Integrative regionalism versus exclusivist ethnonationalism. Journal of Punjab Studies, 22(1), 143–174. Cunningham, K. G. (2013). Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: How internal divisions generate civil conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), 659–672. Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 5–19. Fair, C. C. (2005a). Diaspora involvement in insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam movements. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11, 125–156. Fair, C. C. (2005b). Urban Battlefields in South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Fjelde, H., & Nilsson, D. (2012). Rebels against rebels: Explaining violence between rebel groups. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(4), 604–628. Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter? Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 287–304. Gayer, L. (2009). The Khalistan militias: Servants and users of the state. In Gayer, L. and C. Jaffrelot (Eds.), Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 237–257. Gill, K. P. S. (1999). Endgame in Punjab, 1988–1993. Faultlines, 1(1), 1–30.

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Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hultman, L. (2007). Battle losses and rebel violence: Raising the costs for fighting. Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(2), 205–222. Hultquist, P. (2015). Countering Khalistan: Understanding India’s counter-rebellion strategies during the Punjab crisis. Journal of Punjab Studies, 22(1), 93–121. Johnston, P. (2012). Does decapitation work? Assessing the effectiveness of leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns. International Security, 36(4): 47–79. Jolly, A. (2017, June 19). How Punjab is threatened by revival of Khalistan movement, considered defeated in 1990s. India Today. Jordan, J. (2014). Attacking the leader, missing the mark: Why terrorist groups survive decapitation strikes. International Security, 38(4), 7–38. Joshi, M. (1993). Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis. London, UK: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Kalyvas, S. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khandekar, S. (1981, October 15). Bhindranwale’s arrest in connection with Lala Jagat Narain murder case hit headlines. India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday. in/magazine/indiascope/story/19811015-bhindranwales-arrest-in-connection-withlala-jagat-narain-murder-case-hit-headlines-773307-2013-10-30 Mahadevan, P. (2012). The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia. London: I.B.Tauris & Company Ltd. Merari, A. (1993). Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. Terrorism and Political Violence, 5(4), 213–251. Nayar, K., & Singh, K. (1984). The Tragedy of Punjab. New Delhi: Vision Books. Pettigrew, J. (1995). The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence. London: Zed Books. Puri, H., Judge, P., & Sekhon, J. S. (1999). Terrorism in Punjab: Understanding Grassroots Reality. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. Seymour, L. J., Bakke, K. M., & Cunningham, K. G. (2016). E pluribus unum, ex uno plures: Competition, violence, and fragmentation in ethnopolitical movements. Journal of Peace Research, 53(1), 3–18. Silva, R., Marwaha, J., & Klinger, J. (2009). Violent deaths and enforced disappearances during the counterinsurgency in Punjab, India: A preliminary quantitative analysis. A Joint Report by Benetech’s Human Rights Data Analysis Group & Ensaaf, Inc. Singh, G. (1996). Punjab since 1984: Disorder, order, and legitimacy. Asian Survey, 36(4): 410–421. Singh, J. (2006). Akali politics since Amritsar declaration: A synoptic view. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 67(1), 153–164. Singh, K. (1966). A History of the Sikhs, Volume 2: 1839–1974. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Staniland, P. (2014). Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Takhar, O. K. (2005). Sikh Identity: An Exploration of Groups among Sikhs. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. Tatla, D. S. (1999). The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood. New York, NY: Routledge. Tully, M., & Jacob, S. (1985). Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle. London: J Cape. Wallace, P. (1986). The Sikhs as a ‘minority’ in a Sikh majority state in India. Asian Survey, 26(3): 363–377.

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Wallace, P. (2007). Countering terrorist movements in India. In R. Art and L. Richardson (Eds.), Democracy and Counterterrorism. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 425-482. Wallace, P. (2015). Terrorism in Punjab & closure in a comparative context: It ‘ain’t’ over’ till it’s over. Journal of Punjab Studies, 22(1), 5–24. Weinstein, J. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, R. M. (2010). Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians. Journal of Peace Research, 47(5), 601–614. Wood, R. M. (2014a). From loss to looting? Battlefield costs and rebel incentives for violence. International Organization, 68(4), 979–999. Wood, R. M. (2014b). Opportunities to kill or incentives for restraint? Rebel capabilities, the origins of support, and civilian victimization in civil war. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5), 461–480. Wood, R. M., & Kathman, J. D. (2015). Competing for the crown: Inter-rebel competition and civilian targeting in civil war. Political Research Quarterly, 68(1), 167–179.

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Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan William Maley

Introduction On August 17, 2019, family and friends of a young Afghan couple, Mirwais Alani, 25, and Raihana, 18, gathered at a wedding hall in Kabul to celebrate their marriage. The invitations had proposed a celebration “with a world of hope and desire.” It was not to be. At around 11:40 p.m., a suicide bomber named Abu Asim al-Pakistani detonated his explosive charge in the midst of the guests (Mashal, Faizi, & Abed, 2019), killing 80 and wounding more than 100 of those present. A terrorist group, known variously as “Islamic State-Khorasan Province” (ISKP) or “Daesh,” claimed responsibility, on the basis of its fanatical, obsessive hatred of Shiite Muslims. Mirwais poignantly captured the horror of what had happened: “They devastated my life within seconds … We had done nothing wrong to anyone, but our lives were devastated” (Ibrahimi & Maley, 2020, p. v). On May 12, 2020, five gunmen stormed into a hospital in the Kabul suburb of Dasht-e Barchi. They headed straight for the maternity ward, where they systematically slaughtered young mothers, children, and medical staff. By the time the Afghan security forces had killed the attackers, some 18 newborn babies were left motherless. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, and while the U.S. hastened to pin the blame on Daesh, a great deal of Afghan anger was directed at the extremist Taliban movement (Mashal, 2020), which had signed a “peace agreement” with the US on February 29, 2020 but almost immediately resumed violent attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. Afghans such as Mirwais and Raihana have been living with the effects of terror and terrorism for more than 40 years. The newborns who lost their mothers in the attack on May 12 face futures forever blighted by terrorism. For such innocents, the concept of terrorism is neither an abstract academic term nor a loose item of political rhetoric cynically deployed to win votes in relatively safe and secure countries. It is a concrete attribute of their day-to-day reality and deserves to be taken very seriously. The aim of this chapter is to explore the history and the contemporary dimensions of the problem of terrorism in Afghanistan. It opens with a discussion of definitional issues. While claims such as the assertion that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” are frequently put forward to suggest that

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 141 terrorism is a term that defies definition, I argue that this misses a crucial distinction between lexical definition, which can indeed run into difficulties, and stipulative definition, which is much more defensible as a tool for clarifying a discussion. In the second section, I discuss the use made of extreme violence at the end of the 19th century to terrorize restive social groups into submission and show how this “state terror” created fissures in Afghan society that have contributed to some contemporary uses of terror. In the third, I document how the state again resorted to the use of terror after the communist coup of April 1978, but note that the effects of its campaign proved counterproductive, actually spurring further resistance that it proved unable to control. The fourth section examines acts of terror that took place after the collapse of the communist regime in 1992, and the fifth discusses the Taliban movement, arguing that it should be regarded as a terrorist group on the basis of the actions it has undertaken, even though the US was prepared to negotiate with Taliban “representatives.” The sixth section offers some reflections on the emergence and activities of ISKP in Afghanistan, and the final section offers some brief conclusions.

Defining terror, terrorism, and terrorists Definition is a more complex exercise than is often recognized (Robinson, 1950). Since ancient times, when Aristotle put forward the notion of definition per genus et differentiam – locating a phenomenon within some broader category and then showing what made it distinctive – analysts have reflected on how the meaning of terms should best be explicated. One of the most common forms of definition is what has been called “lexical” definition – essentially the approach that one finds in dictionaries that seek to give an account of the ways in which words are used in a particular language. Several problems, however, are associated with lexical definition. One problem relates to the accuracy of a definition. Since a lexical definition purports to summarize the way in which a word is actually used, it is open to critics to question whether a summary properly captures the complexity of a particular usage. Another problem relates to circularity, where a term being defined actually figures as part of the definition. Yet another problem, of a practical rather than logical variety, can arise from the apparent similarity of words in different languages that may nonetheless on closer scrutiny prove to differ subtly from each other: for example, the French word terreur and the Russian word Террор may not have quite the same meanings as their ostensible English equivalent (see Wierzbicka, 1997, 2014). An alternative and more rewarding approach, therefore, may be found in what is called “stipulative” definition, where the user of the term stipulates what the term is taken to mean. A stipulative definition cannot be “wrong” in the sense of departing from an established pattern of usage, but it can be more or less useful, depending upon whether it delineates a phenomenon that is fruitful to study or discuss. In stipulating a meaning for terrorism, my point of departure is the definition offered by Richards, who argues that “terrorism is a method that entails the use of violence or force or the threat of violence or force with the primary

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purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive” (2015, p. 146). To this, I would add one further requirement: the targets should be non-combatants; this allows us to distinguish terrorism from attacks on armed forces of a kind that may be sanctioned under international humanitarian law. In adding this requirement, I do not go so far as those who argue that the victims of terrorism must be randomly chosen (Meisels, 2008, pp. 20–29), since this would exclude targeted assassination as a terrorist tool and exculpate the terrorism of 19th century anarchists who justified assassination as “propaganda of the deed” (Joll, 1979, pp. 99–129). Rather, the focus on non-combatant victims brings this stipulative definition relatively close to the usage that a lexical definition might summarize, although that is not a requirement of the exercise. In this definition, there is no requirement that the practitioners of terrorism be non-state actors. The reason for this is simple: historically, states have been amongst the most virulent practitioners of violence against their own peoples (Bushnell, Shlapentokh, Vanderpool, & Sundram, 1991; Rummel, 1994), and as we shall see, Afghanistan is no exception to this rule. Indeed, on occasion the word “terror” has been employed to describe either a period in a country’s history (“la terreur” during the French Revolution) or a bout of state-driven bloodletting, such as the “Red Terror” in Bolshevik Russia (Mel’gunov, 1924). It flows easily from the definition offered earlier that “terror” is the use against non-combatants “of violence or force or the threat of violence or force with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive” (Richards, 2015, p. 146). Defining a “terrorist” or “terrorist group” is a somewhat more complex undertaking. Here, the issue arises of whether an individual or group must actually have undertaken a terrorist act in order to be categorized as a terrorist or terrorist group, or whether it is sufficient for such an individual or group to signal a willingness or disposition to engage in a terrorist act even if no overt action has been taken. From the point of view of policing and counterterrorism, it is perfectly understandable that agencies committed to protecting the public will want to move before some outrage occurs that establishes beyond all doubt that a particular individual or group can be considered terrorist. At the same time, the mere use of florid language by a political group (“death to the USA”) does not necessarily amount to a credible indication that in fact it is going to engage in the kind of violence captured by the stipulative definition of terrorism. Nor, despite Karl Popper’s (1968, pp. 355–363) attempt to draw a direct link between utopia and violence, should one accept that utopian groups such as Hezb-ul Tahrir are necessarily terrorist: here, Nozick’s distinction between imperialistic utopianism, which is indeed dangerous, and missionary and existential utopianisms, which are much more benign, is salutary (Nozick, 1974, pp. 319–320). In Afghanistan’s case, however, the issue is somewhat academic: there is no shortage of groups whose superheated rhetoric has been fully matched by a disposition to use violence of a terrorist variety to achieve their outcomes. And this has applied, both historically and contemporaneously, to state and non-state actors.

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Violence and the state in the 19th century More than anyone else, Charles Tilly has reminded us that state formation has historically not been a gentle process of social contracting, but rather a violent process by which power has been concentrated and deployed to eliminate competitors. “War,” he famously wrote, “makes states … Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making all belong on the same continuum” (Tilly, 1985, p. 170). Olson (2000) drew on the metaphor of the “stationary bandit” to give a sense of the forces at play (p. 11). It is salutary to note the role that violence played in the consolidation of the Afghan state, a process commonly located in the last two decades of the 19th century, and specifically during the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880–1901). With support from the British, he was able to shift to a system of taxation in cash rather than in kind, and began to regularize the operation of armed groups at the service of the state (see Kakar, 1979). This was, however, also a period of extreme violence. A British observer at the time, Sir Lepel Griffin, put it bluntly. The amir, he argued “is always exposed to the risk of assassination from his numerous enemies and rivals, and from men who have a blood feud with him on account of his unjust slaughter of their relations” (Griffin, 1888, p. 269; see also Kadrie, 2020). The historian Jonathan Lee concluded that the reign of Abdul Rahman “was an unmitigated disaster for the ordinary citizen of his country,” and documented the Amir’s “Reign of Terror” in searing detail, with perhaps 5,000 executions a year taking place on average during his 20 years on the throne (Lee, 1996, pp. 543–562). Prisoners were bayonetted, blown from cannons, hanged, crucified, disemboweled, sawn in two, strangled, and dragged behind horses (Lee, 1996, pp. 543–562). And as Lee later put it, “Fear reigned in every household and no one dared utter the slightest criticism of the Amir lest they were betrayed by members of their own family and ended up in prison, or were handed over to the Amir’s torturers and executioners” (2018, p. 384). Abdul Rahman Khan’s actions can be accommodated quite comfortably within the stipulative definition of terrorism outlined earlier in this chapter. Abdul Rahman Khan was also a vigorous practitioner of what would now be called ethnic cleansing (Tapper, 1983; Lee, 2018, pp. 387–390). While the Amir was perfectly capable of persecuting members of his own Pushtun ethnic group, many of whom suffered terribly during his time on the throne, perhaps the most egregious acts of state terror during his reign occurred during the socalled Hazara Wars of 1891–1893 (Ibrahimi, 2017, pp. 72–82). As Lee (2018) puts it, “On the back of each victory, the Amir unleashed an even more fearful reign of terror, which many Hazaras claim was tantamount to genocide” (p. 399). These events cast a very low shadow, and to this day, Hazaras in Afghanistan are haunted by accounts of the events of the late 19th century, which highlight hatreds and hostilities that seem to be chillingly present in the contemporary rhetoric of groups such as ISKP, as well as attacks on Hazaras mounted by the Taliban.

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State organized terror after the 1978 coup When Abdul Rahman Khan died in 1901, his son and successor, Habibullah, inaugurated a milder phase of rule in which far less use was made of violence to protect the position of the ruling elite, and on the whole this continued for the decade following Habibullah’s assassination in 1919 and the advent to power of his son Amanullah. Although Amanullah was overthrown in 1929 by Habibullah Kalakani, who was himself overthrown and executed before the end of the year, these events were not marked by the widespread use of terror as a tool for regime maintenance, although the new Musahiban dynasty, which ruled from 1929 until 1973 under Nadir Shah (1929–1933) and Zahir Shah (1933–1973), proved to be somewhat repressive and intolerant during the prime ministership of Nadir Shah’s brother Mohammad Hashim (1929–1946). Even the overthrow of Zahir Shah in 1973 by his cousin Mohammad Daoud proved a relatively tame affair, especially when compared to the bloodletting of the late 19th century. But all this changed in April 1978, when President Daoud was overthrown in a bloody coup by elements of the military associated with factions of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The new rulers, lacking significant legitimacy in the eyes of the population, increasingly resorted to extreme violence as a device for attempting to consolidate their rule, deployed on a scale which Afghanistan had not experienced since the late 19th century. The consequences were disastrous, and in a real sense Afghanistan has not yet come close to recovering from the damage that was inflicted on its politics and society by these reckless revolutionaries (Maley, 2021). Several factors accounted for their failures, which culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and ferocious conflict through much of the country in the decade that followed. First, there was not in 1978 any significant demand for mass revolutionary change in Afghanistan; rather, there were serious divisions within the political elite in Kabul, which created the conditions for the 1978 coup but did nothing to ensure that the revolutionaries’ radical policies would prove palatable to the bulk of the population. Second, the ideology of the PDPA – essentially a crude form of atheistic Marxism–Leninism – was dramatically at odds with the belief systems of very large numbers of ordinary Afghans, for whom the values preached by the new rulers were alien and unattractive. Third, the PDPA “leadership” was itself bitterly divided, at one level between the orientations of the Khalq (“Masses”) and Parcham (“Banner”) factions, but also on the strength of deep-rooted personal antagonisms between figures such as Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal (see Arnold, 1983, pp. 52–56; Bradsher, 1999, pp. 20–23). Within weeks of the April 1978 coup, these antagonisms began to surface, and recently declassified documents from the Czech Republic show how Karmal, who had been exiled to Czechoslovakia as Afghan ambassador, was subsequently targeted by assassins dispatched by his factional enemies (Bezhan & Kubalek, 2019). The regime saw itself as beset by enemies, and responded by resorting to terror and coercion. Ironically, this proved totally counterproductive. Given the strength of Afghan

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 145 society, the regime’s resort to terror led to an intensification rather than a collapse of popular resistance (Maley, 1991). The years immediately following the communist coup were some of the most distressing in Afghanistan’s modern history and have been poignantly memorialized by the Afghanistan Centre for Memory and Dialogue (Zucchino & Faizi, 2019a). People were simply snatched from the street or their workplaces and never seen again (see Gille & Heslot, 1989; Gauhari, 1996). Taraki, the first communist president, made the sinister observation that “those who plot against us in the dark will vanish in the dark” (Asiaweek, 1978, p. 40). This mindset was widespread within the Khalq faction, which had emerged dominant in the intraregime factional wars, and it came back to haunt Taraki, who was displaced and then murdered at the hands of his deputy Hafizullah Amin in a messy series of events in September–October 1979 (Braithwaite, 2011, pp. 58–73). However, one did not have to be a plotter (of any kind) to fall victim to the regime’s reign of terror. The Khalqi commandant of Pul-e Charkhi prison near Kabul candidly stated that “a million Afghans are all that should remain alive. We need a million Khalqis. The others we don’t need, we will get rid of them” (Barry, 1980, p. 183). Former prime ministers Nur Ahmad Etemadi and Musa Shafiq were murdered, but this represented only the tip of a very large iceberg. Indeed, so intent were the new rulers on the obliteration of the past that to this day, it is quite difficult in Afghanistan to find photographs of many prominent political figures who served before the 1978 coup. The regime’s secret police AGSA (in Pushto, Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Edara, or “Afghan Interests Protection Service”), headed by Asadullah Sarwari, engaged in the ruthless torture and murder of perceived opponents, for which Sarwari was eventually imprisoned (Qaane & Kouvo, 2017). The American anthropologist Louis Dupree, detained in November 1978, provided a chilling portrait of Sarwari and the organization he directed (Dupree, 1980a, 1980b); Dupree’s reports should be required reading for anyone inclined to write a positive report card for the PDPA and its methods. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan inaugurated a period in which vast numbers of Afghans would lose their lives. A careful demographic study concluded that in the period between 1978 and 1987, some 876,825 “unnatural deaths” occurred in the country, which on average amounted to more than 240 per day for 10 years straight (Khalidi, 1991, p. 107). These deaths of course have left Afghanistan with a devastating legacy of dislocation and trauma, but not all of them could be classified as the result of terror in the sense in which the term is used in this chapter. Some were simply the by-product of military tactics that pitted relatively sophisticated Soviet weapons systems against vulnerable Afghan targets. On many occasions, however, Soviet forces engaged in atrocities for which there could be no military justification. For example, in a village named Mata, there were two brothers aged 95 and 90, both of them blind. According to a resident of the village, “they stayed behind while the rest of the villagers fled during the spring offensive. ‘The Russians came, tied dynamite to their backs, and blew them up’” (Laber & Rubin, 1988, p. xi).

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Two particular tactics fell readily within the definition of terror. One was the precipitation of casualties with a view to setting whole communities into flight as refugees, a tactic aimed at depriving members of the Afghan resistance of accessible networks to which they could look for support. To the extent that attacks on villagers were designed to have the wider psychological effect of prompting other villagers to flee, such attacks met one of the essential criteria for terror. The other tactic used by the regime was a fairly straightforward continuation of the hugely repressive brutality that had been used by AGSA. The principal instrument was the “State Information Service” (Khedamat-e Etalaat-e Dawlati), known colloquially by its acronym KhAD. It was headed from 1980 to 1985 by Dr. Najibullah, and then in January 1986 it became the Ministry of State Security (Wizarat-e Amniat-e Dawlati), under Ghulam Farouq Yaqubi. It used diverse approaches to try to achieve its objectives. The eminent Afghan historian Hasan Kakar, imprisoned by the regime from 1982 to 1987, testified upon his release that political prisoners were “subjected to inhuman and untold physical tortures in jails in Afghanistan” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/0050/C/4, January 16, 1988). Another approach was psychological, as described in the testimony of a high school teacher, Fahima Nassery, who was arrested in May 1981: “I was taken to a room where I witnessed the most horrible sight of my detention. Cut fingers, noses, ears, legs, hands, breasts and hair of women were piled there. In one corner, a decayed corpse was lying. The smell of blood and the decayed corpse were intolerable. I remained in that chamber of horrors until the following morning” (Rahimi, 1986, p. 108). The 1980s for many Afghans were years of horror indeed.

Terror in and around Kabul after 1992 In November 1986, a relatively new Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev took the decision in principle to withdraw from Afghanistan, and this was finally given effect pursuant to the Geneva Accords of April 1988, following which the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its combat forces by February 1989 (Maley, 1989). Nonetheless, substantial aid to the regime continued and it was not until the cessation of Soviet aid at the end of 1991 that the position of the regime truly became critical, leading to its collapse in April 1992. The collapse of the regime also exposed the reality of substantial state disintegration in Afghanistan; long hidden by Soviet aid, this became all too palpable. This led to a quite perverse situation on the ground. On the one hand, levels of mortality in much of Afghanistan went down. Indeed, in a June 1995 briefing, the United Nations (UN) argued that “ninety per cent of Afghanistan is now peaceful” (United Nations, 1995, p. 1). On the other hand, the story in the vicinity of Kabul was very different. With no functioning state to control, contenders for power attached all the more significance to control of the capital as the principal symbol of state power. In this, there was nothing particularly surprising; the overrunning of a capital city is often a crucial marker of victory in combat, as one saw with the fall of Berlin in 1945. The consequences for Kabul were, however, fairly catastrophic. The

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 147 struggle for the city took two different forms. On the one hand, different parts of the city fell under the control of different resistance groups or militias, which then struggled to expand their influence or protect their territories from the predations of other forces. This was not an irrational struggle, although it was sometimes depicted as such. Rather, as a French scholar put it, “everything that has happened since 1992 has been the result of a rigorous political logic. The Afghan civil war is not ‘primitive’ or ‘tribal,’ but strongly political” (Dorronsoro, 1995, p. 37; see also Christia, 2012, pp. 57–100). On the other hand, one particular group, the radical Islamist Hezb-e Islami (“Party of Islam”) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, engaged in classic “total spoiler” behaviour (Stedman, 1997, pp. 10–11). Strongly backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, but lacking much support in Afghanistan, this party proved incapable of seizing and holding significant territory. Its approach therefore defaulted to one of blocking efforts by anyone else to establish meaningful authority. It declined to participate in agreements between other resistance parties to establish new political arrangements (see Maley, 1993), and ruthlessly bombarded large tracts of Kabul in order to prevent the establishment of a workable political order. In August 1992, the Hezb-e Islami launched a rocket attack on Kabul in which over 1,000 civilians were killed. The then president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, labeled Hekmatyar a “dangerous terrorist who should be expelled from Afghanistan” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/1461/B/1, August 17, 1992). The Hezb’s victims were exposed to actual violence, were predominantly non-combatants, and came under attack for avowedly political reasons. Whether the objective was to create a disproportionate psychological effect is more debatable, but there is no doubt that the Hezb’s attacks came very close to constituting terror even if to some degree they occupied a gray area. One particular event in the vicinity of Kabul stood out as an act of terror: the massacre of Shiite Hazaras in Afshar in February 1993, largely carried out by members of the Ittihad-e Islami militia loyal to the Sunni Islamist Abdul Rab al-Rasoul Sayyaf (United Nations, 1993, para. 58). Surveying in detail what had happened, Human Rights Watch concluded that the “Ittihad troops apparently wanted to leave some evidence of their crimes – to terrorize the local population” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 89). Sexual violence was one of the most horrifying tools deployed. As a careful study put it (Afghanistan Justice Project, 2005, p. 87): During the Afshar operation, Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami forces used rape and other assaults on civilians to drive the civilian population from the area. The Afghanistan Justice Project interviewed many witnesses who described incidents of rape by Ittihad forces during the Afshar operation. Witness M. … was injured in the hand and leg when Ittihad soldiers shot her son. She stated: ‘While I was still bleeding they raped me.’ She stated that three soldiers held her down while the fourth raped her in the basement of her own house. Several other women had also taken shelter in M.’s house: a neighbor, Z., and her two daughters, and another woman, R. The Ittihad troops raped Z.’s two daughters, ages 14 and 16, and the woman, R. The soldiers took them by turn

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William Maley down to the basement to carry out the rape. One of Z.’s daughters was injured by a bayonet when she attempted to resist.

Hazaras, of course, were by no means the only members of Afghanistan’s population to suffer terribly during these dark times, but nonetheless, cases such as the Afshar massacre point to a disturbing thread in Afghan history, namely that Hazaras are all too easily targeted by those forces looking for an enemy to hit. Physically distinctive by virtue of an East Asian phenotype and known to be predominantly members of the Shiite Muslim minority rather than Sunni Muslim majority in Afghanistan, they experience vulnerability on multiple levels. This was manifest at the end of the 19th century, and fully on display after 1992 in Kabul. Rarely has the Afghan state been on hand to assist Hazaras in their moments of need (see Ibrahimi, 2017). Tragically, Hazaras remain easy targets for terror to this day and have continued to be attacked by both the Taliban and the group known as Daesh.

The Taliban as a terrorist group, with ISI backing In 1994, a new armed group known as the Taliban surfaced in Afghanistan, and succeeded in taking over the cities of Kandahar in 1994, Herat in 1995, and finally the capital Kabul in 1996. It rapidly became clear that Pakistan’s ISI had played a crucial role in the creation of this armed force, drawing on religious students in madrassas (colleges) in Pakistan as a crucial source of manpower (Davis, 1998; see also Rashid, 2000; Nojumi, 2002; Griffin, 2004; Coll, 2005; Gutman, 2013). The Taliban were not manifestations of classic peasant insurgency (Desai & Eckstein, 1990) arising from within traditional social structures, although there were echoes of village values in some of their postures (Gopal & Strick van Linschoten, 2017); they were very much pathogenic insurgents, externally instrumentalized. A certain mythology developed that the Taliban’s takeover had been widely welcomed in Afghanistan. It seems clear that they were welcomed in the province of Kandahar, but elsewhere, they functioned very much as another militia, exploiting the exhaustion of existing forces in Afghanistan to establish their writ. They never succeeded in establishing control over the whole country, which was one reason why they failed to secure control of Afghanistan’s seat in the United Nations. Indeed, throughout the life of their regime from 1996 to 2001, they managed to secure diplomatic recognition only from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In seeking to expand their power, they proved to be not the least bit squeamish about using terror as a tool. In August 1998, the Taliban carried out a massacre in Mazar-e Sharif that the writer Ahmed Rashid described as “genocidal in its ferocity” (2000, p. 73). A graphic account of what occurred was supplied by a UN official (Colville, 1999): Some were shot on the streets. Many were executed in their own homes, after areas of the town known to be inhabited by their ethnic group had been systematically sealed off and searched. Some were boiled or asphyxiated to

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 149 death after being left crammed inside sealed metal containers under a hot August sun. In at least one hospital, as many as 30 patients were shot as they lay helplessly in their beds. The bodies of many of the victims were left on the streets or in their houses as a stark warning to the city’s remaining inhabitants. Horrified witnesses saw dogs tearing at the corpses, but were instructed over loudspeakers and by radio announcements not to remove or bury them. A Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, used a loudspeaker system to denounce the victims as heretics and personally supervised the choice of victims for imprisonment in containers (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Niazi remained a prominent Taliban figure, albeit in a restive faction (Shah, Nordland, & Sukhanyar, 2017). After the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the U.S. and its allies in 2001 (see Maley, 2021), the movement was initially in huge disarray (Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012, pp. 219–260). But reconstituted with Pakistani support, the Taliban resumed attacks on civilian targets in Afghanistan, well before any sign of waning confidence at the mass level in Afghanistan’s transition. These began with the killing of a Red Cross worker on March 27, 2003 (Maley, 2003, p. 214), and many other attacks followed. From 2007 to 2019, according to UN reporting, some 25,751 civilian deaths occurred at the hands of anti-government elements (see Ibrahimi & Maley, 2020, p. 75; Maley, 2021, p. 274). In September 2015, Kunduz fell to the Taliban for a gruesome fortnight and witnessed multiple episodes of terror (Amnesty International, 2015). And the Taliban openly claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on the Kabul office of Counterpart International, a civilian aid agency funded in part by USAID, on May 8, 2019 (Zucchino & Faizi, 2019b). By this stage, the Taliban had developed into a more complex phenomenon – a “network of networks,” as Ruttig (2012) has put it. This was partly because of the development of various Taliban shuras (councils); partly because of internal tensions over leadership succession following the death of its founding leader, Mullah Omar, in April 2013 (Ibrahimi & Maley, 2020, p. 74); partly through being joined by terrorist groups such as the so-called Haqqani Network (Brown & Rassler, 2013); and partly through its ongoing relationship with groups such as Al-Qaida and Daesh. A 2020 UN report on Al-Qaida noted that “relations with the Taliban continue to be close and mutually beneficial, with Al-Qaida supplying resources and training in exchange for protection” (United Nations, 2020, para. 55). Some writers, and also the U.S., have been disposed to downplay any links between the Taliban and Daesh, but a careful and sophisticated analysis has depicted the Taliban and Daesh as “parts of a broader ‘jihadist movement industry’ that is simultaneously united and divided by the logic of their embeddedness in the movement industry” (Ibrahimi & Akbarzadeh, 2019, p. 2). Yet despite the Taliban’s use of actual violence against non-combatants for political purposes with a view to creating a disproportionate psychological effect, Western governments proved on the whole unusually coy about using the term “terrorist” to describe them. This was doubtless because of a desire to cut some kind of deal with the Taliban as a way of exiting the Afghan theatre of

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operations, of the kind that was finally signed by the US and the Taliban in Doha on February 29, 2020. Quite predictably (see Maley, 2018, pp. 222–239; Maley, 2019; Ibrahimi & Maley, 2020, pp. 162–164; Maley, 2021, pp. 286–288), the deal soon ran into trouble, not least because the US, in a move of almost unbelievable foolishness, booby-trapped its own agreement by committing the Afghan government (which was not a signatory) to release large numbers of Taliban prisoners. One key reason why this was a ludicrous commitment was that few ordinary Afghans harbored any illusions about what the return of the Taliban would mean: a December 2019 survey report published by The Asia Foundation found that 85% of respondents had “no sympathy at all” for the Taliban (Asia Foundation, 2019, p. 315). And this depth of antipathy also shows why the desperate US attempt to exculpate the Taliban following the May 12, 2020, maternity ward atrocity was poorly received by many Afghans.

ISKP in Afghanistan Unlike the Taliban, who were of Southwest Asian provenance, Islamic StateKhorasan Province (ISKP), or Daesh, emerged as a predominantly Sunni Arab group with its main theatres of operation being Iraq and Syria, where its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, claimed the title of caliph. This title did not imply operational control over Afghanistan; the caliphate as an institution in the Muslim world decayed over a long period of time and was finally abolished in 1924 following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (Arnold, 1924). Instead, it highlighted the symbolic dimension of Daesh’s activities, using the idea of restored unity amongst Muslims, in a global umma (Piscatori & Saikal, 2019) under a shared leadership as a device for recruitment. This “imperialistic utopianism” is at best a small part of the story of how Daesh came to appear in Afghanistan. Two other factors played a greater role: the fragmentation of the Afghan Taliban and the driving into Afghanistan by the Pakistan Army of elements of the Pakistani Taliban. Fissures within the Afghan Taliban burst forth in 2015 with the revelation that the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar had died in April 2013 (Mashal, 2015). Up to this point, there had been little basis for anticipating any linking between members of the Afghan Taliban and Daesh. While the Taliban had a similar totalitarian mindset to Daesh, their antecedents were Deobandi rather than Wahabbi, and more significantly, they claimed for their leader another title of symbolic resonance, namely Amir al-Momineen (“Commander of the Faithful” or “Lord of the Believers”). It was therefore unlikely that they would show any particular respect for a self-declared caliph from the Arab world. But the naming of Mullah Akhtar Mansour – subsequently slain in a US drone strike (Gall & Khapalwak, 2017) – as Taliban leader provoked strong opposition from Mullah Omar’s family, especially his son Mullah Yaqub, and beneath the level of this elite, there were of course lesser players facing the challenge of how to position themselves. For some, the option of rebranding themselves with some other label was potentially attractive, even if only as a short-term signal, and this seems to have accounted in part for the emergence in Nangarhar of “Daesh” cells. This had

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 151 significant flow-on effects. President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, understandably keen to slow the withdrawal of foreign troops, highlighted to good effect the emergence of Daesh; but one consequence was mounting apprehension in Afghanistan itself. The 2015 Asian Foundation survey of Afghan opinion saw 54% of respondents answer yes to the question “In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?” (Asia Foundation, 2015, p. 187). That said, Daesh in Afghanistan appears to include significantly more Pakistanis than Afghans. This is hardly surprising. In December 2014, the Pakistan Taliban’s brutal attack on a school near Peshawar, which killed over 140 pupils and staff (Walsh, 2014), prompted a decision in Pakistan to strike at them hard. The consequence – whether intended or unintended – was that a substantial number of Pakistani radicals crossed the nearby frontier into Afghanistan. This placed them squarely in the environment in which Daesh was seeking to recruit. In January 2015, Daesh proclaimed a Wilayat of Khorasan, incorporating Pakistan and Afghanistan, and naming Hafiz Saeed Khan, formerly of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, as its leader. A 2016 report suggested that 7,000–8,500 Daesh “members” could be located in Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2016), the bulk of them in all probability being Pakistani. Thus far, Daesh has not proved that it is remotely capable of mounting an existential challenge to the Afghan state. Its extremism lacks a natural constituency in Afghanistan, and its most brutal attacks, directed against Afghan Shia, are most likely intended to strike fear in people’s hearts rather than achieve any specific political objective beyond replacing the Taliban as the major challenge to the government. This was undoubtedly the case with its most spectacular attack, the bombing of a peaceful Hazara demonstration in Kabul on July 23, 2016, an attack which killed 86 and injured 413 (Mashal & Nader, 2016). This was followed by a range of attacks that were just as gruesome. On October 11, 2016, gunmen opened fire at the Kart-e Sakhi shrine in Kabul and threw grenades into the crowd, killing at least 14 over a three-hour period (Nader & Mashal, 2016). On November 21, 2016, a bomber struck at the Baqir-al-Ulum mosque in western Kabul, killing 30 worshippers and wounding at least 40 more (Mashal & Abed, 2016). On July 24, 2017, a bomber struck a district in Kabul where many Shia live, killing at least 24 people (Mashal, 2017a). On August 25, 2017, a coordinated attack on the Imam Zaman Shiite mosque in northern Kabul killed at least 40 worshippers taking part in Friday prayers (Mashal, 2017b). On September 29, 2017, the Hussainiya Shiite mosque came under attack in the 7th street of Qala-e Fathullah (Mashal & Abed, 2017). On December 28, 2017, a large number of civil society activists who had gathered at the Tebyan cultural center in Babah Sharbat street in Kabul for a seminar fell victim to an ISIS attack. At least 41 attendees were killed, and many more injured (Abed, Faizi, & Mashal, 2017). On March 9, 2018, a Shiite mosque complex in Kabul was attacked by a suicide bomber (Kramer, 2018). On August 15, 2018, an educational institution, the Mawoud Academy, was struck, with reportedly 40 killed and 67 injured (Mashal & Faizi, 2018). And on September 5, 2018, a sporting hall was attacked, with at least 20 people killed (Abed & Faizi, 2018). But even if Daesh is not currently an existential threat to the state, groups that “start small” in Afghanistan on occasion find ways of growing bigger,

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often feeding off preexisting rivalries over things such as land or tribal identity. Giustozzi (2018) has argued that ISKP was significantly supported by the central leadership of Daesh and is more than a local franchise. How this will be affected by the decline of Daesh’s territorial writ in the Arab world, and by the US attack that killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 (Callimachi & Hassan, 2019), remains to be seen; the circumstances in which decapitating strikes are effective in weakening the effectiveness of terrorist groups are complex rather than straightforward (see Price, 2012; Jordan, 2014, 2019). Many Afghans have also come to suspect that the Taliban movement has become a feeder for Daesh – either because of individual members of more extreme disposition breaking away from the Taliban movement and finding a new home with Daesh; or because of a willingness by the Taliban to use Daesh as a kind of “subsidiary” that can undertake savage attacks that the Taliban would rather not claim (since that would embarrass their American friends), but which serve the Taliban’s objective of symbolically delegitimating the Afghan state by showing that it cannot even protect young mothers and newborn babies.

Conclusion Much of the misery that Afghanistan has experienced over the last four decades has been a product of armed conflict that does not fall within the definition of terrorism as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. It is entirely unsurprising that ordinary people in Afghanistan have a profound desire for peace, which many of them have never really known. But one of the sobering lessons of the cases discussed in this chapter is that the landscape continues to be richly populated with groups that have proved indifferent to the laws of armed conflict (Schmeidl, 2020), that have not the slightest qualms about attacking civilians as a mechanism for realizing their political objectives, and that are unlikely to modify their behaviors in any significant way because they have become so accustomed to using violence as the primary tool for achieving what they want. In some circumstances, it may be possible to strike lasting bargains with groups that have engaged at some point in the use of terror; and even if those bargains do not deliver everything for which people may have hoped, they may succeed in diverting groups from the patterns of violent behavior that have most blighted the lives of innocent people. Unfortunately, this will not always be the case. Some conflicts, for example, those which are grounded in ethno-nationalism, may lend themselves to distributive or boundary solutions that either buy off warring groups or keep them apart. But where groups are animated by intense, religiously based value systems that define exclusivist conceptions of the nature of a good society, the prospects for easy solution tend to shrink dramatically (see Pettersson, Högbladh, & Öberg, 2019). Under such circumstances, the best approach to dealing with the problem posed by groups of this kind is probably not to seek to accommodate them, but rather to pressure such outside patrons as may be backing them to discontinue their meddling. This may require the use of a diverse range of tools in a complex diplomatic space, but if one’s objective is to secure stability

Terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 153 in the long run for a state such as Afghanistan, it cannot be achieved by measures that are grounded in a large amount of self-delusion.

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9

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan An analysis of domestic and regional factors Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed

Introduction Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent US intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan has suffered tremendously in the war on terrorism. In about 20 years, Pakistan has lost as many as 75,000 human lives and incurred economic damages worth US$126.79 billion (Mustafa, 2018). The relocation of Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Taliban remnants to the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (ex-FATA) region, now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, tore apart Pakistan’s social fabric and destroyed the tolerant religious ethos (Abbasi, 2013, p. 47). Subsequently, the Talibanization of Pakistan’s peripheral regions facilitated the formation of several terrorist groups to the detriment of the country’s domestic security that has serious implications for regional peace and stability in South Asia (Wang, 2018, p. 78). In February 2015, following the Peshawar Army Public School (APS) attack – termed as Pakistan’s 9/11 – the country turned a new page in its fight against terrorism (Gishkori, 2015; BBC, 2014). The formulation and implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP), a 20-point counterterrorism roadmap, played a key role in bringing down terrorist incidents and casualties, and in the normalization of the country through, for example, the return of international cricket and tourism (Chughtai, 2017). Similarly, the US$62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is another visible sign of improvement in the security situation in Pakistan (Kugelman, 2019). Yet, the twin threats of extremism and terrorism continue to persist in Pakistan. For instance, the lynching of Abdul Wali Khan University student Mashal Khan on a false blasphemy accusation and the online recruitment of Liaqut Medical College student Naureen Laghari in 2017 by the Islamic State (IS) suggest that extremism and terrorism continue to affect Pakistan (BBC, 2017; Gabol, 2017). Pakistan’s existing counterterrorism framework is mostly reliant on kinetic approaches such as military operations; but it lacks equally effective non-kinetic components like preventing and countering extremist narratives, and carrying out reforms in various sectors, such as education (ICG, 2015).

158 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed Ahead of the expected US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s fight against terrorism is at a crossroads. Any potential outcome from the Afghan peace process will directly impact Pakistan’s terrorist landscape. On the one hand, if the US troops leave gradually in a calculated manner, then that will ensure a stable political transition through a negotiated intra-Afghan settlement, which in turn will facilitate the counterterrorism measures initiated by the Pakistani army (Basit, 2020). On the other hand, if the US pulls out its troops without sustainable peace in Afghanistan, then it is likely to have far-reaching negative impacts on Pakistan’s national security, which in turn will undermine counterterrorism measures initiated by the Pakistan army (Basit, 2020). Already, the scale down of US troops in Afghanistan and talks of ultimate withdrawal are creating a triumphant jihadist narrative that another superpower after the Soviet Union has been defeated in Afghanistan (Mashal, 2020b). This narrative is emboldening various jihadist groups in Pakistan who had previously shifted their militant activities from Pakistan to assist the Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) against the US in Afghanistan. With the accomplishment of their objective in Afghanistan, these terrorist groups may once again turn their guns and attention toward Pakistan (Zahid, 2020). Based on the assessment of the aforementioned factors, we argue that terrorism in Pakistan is likely to persist as a long-term low-intensity threat despite dismantling of major terrorist networks, terrorist sanctuaries, and infrastructure. Arguably, eliminating terrorism and terrorist groups are qualitatively two different things. Furthermore, the low frequency of terrorist incidents is a weak indicator of counterterrorism success. Given that the underlying socioeconomic conditions and structural factors of violence are still present in Pakistan, its counterterrorism gains are fragile and reversible. Hence, the persistence of terrorism in Pakistan is not surprising, but the absence of terrorism despite the aforementioned structural factors of violence constitutes an anomaly. In this chapter, we employ an analytical–descriptive approach to examine the future of terrorism in Pakistan. Using existing primary and secondary sources, we first discuss the nature and makeup of Pakistan’s terrorist landscape. Thereafter, the structural factors, i.e., geopolitical factors and socioeconomic conditions, that sustain violent extremism are examined. The third section critically analyzes the NAP to highlight policy gaps that have created a false sense of security and indirectly contribute to the persistence of terrorism in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s ever-evolving terrorist landscape Since its inception, Pakistan has failed to create a nation based on the common Islamic identity. The ethnic differences soon emerged as to whether Urdu or Bengali should be the national language. The Bengali grievances grew in East Pakistan and ultimately led to the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971. Thereafter, ethno-nationalism and ethnic fissures continued to hamper the domestic stability of Pakistan. Despite this situation, various governments have used Islam and Islamization for their political and electoral gains. In 1974, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 159 government excommunicated the heterodox minority Ahmadiyya community as non-Muslim to appease the religious right. Bhutto also propped up student leaders of different Afghan Islamist parties such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmed Shah Masoud, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, among others, to counter then Afghan prime minister Sardar Muhammad Daoud’s support to the irredentist Pashtunistan movement, which paved the way for using Islamist militant proxies to secure regional interests in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Afghanistan. Subsequently, the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq who, in search of legitimacy, formed alliances with right-wing religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and externally joined the US and its allies for jihad against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan as a frontline state played a key role in recruiting and training mujahideen; this led to some significant changes in terms of radicalization of the society through various state policies, especially change in the curricula of public schools and madrassas (Ahmed, 2012). Following the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the late 1980s, proxy militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, among others, were activated in J&K. The fateful 9/11 attack and the US intervention in Afghanistan turned the Pakistani policy of using jihadist militant proxies in J&K and Afghanistan on its head, as some dissidents from within these groups started attacking Pakistani security forces for joining the US-led global war against terrorism as a frontline ally. Pakistan has one of the largest concentrations of terrorist groups in the world (Basit, 2019). South Asia is the birthplace or the operating base of some of the world’s most notorious jihadist groups, such as AQ, TTA, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Haqqani Network, and the Tehreek Pakistan (TTP) (Rana, 2005). According to the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Pakistan’s central counterterrorism body, as many as 73 terrorist groups of various sizes and influence operate in and out of Pakistan (NACTA, 2020). Over the years, these militant groups have cooperated, competed, splintered, merged, resplintered, and remerged with each other. This pattern renders Pakistan’s terrorist landscape highly competitive, volatile, divisive, and ever evolving. The ongoing conflicts in J&K and Afghanistan, the Sunni–Shi’a conflict, and the use of jihadist proxies against archfoe India have created a conducive environment for the incubation of terrorism in Pakistan (Khan, 2005). Likewise, the Pakistani deep state’s repressive policies against subnationalist groups in Balochistan, Sindh, have stoked the flames of ethno-separatist insurgencies in these areas (Bansal, 2008, p. 190). Historically, AQ dominated Pakistan’s jihadist landscape, which is also its place of origin. Almost all the major jihadist groups in Pakistan are signatories to the Osama bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2001, p. 777). In the mid-1990s, most of the militant groups were trained in AQ-operated training camps in Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010), therefore, AQ is considered the vanguard of global jihadist movements by these groups. This monopoly was, however, challenged in 2014 with the split of the global jihadist movement between AQ and its former Iraqi affiliate IS. Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS revolted against

160 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed AQ and declared a self-styled caliphate in Mosul, Iraq, in 2014 (BBC, 2014). Subsequently, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) emerged as IS’s wilayat (province) in Afghanistan and Pakistan in January 2015, challenging AQ’s ideological preponderance of the Pakistani jihadist landscape (Jadoon, 2018, p. 22). This forced AQ to declare its official South Asian branch, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), in September 2014 (Siyech, 2019). Though AQ still has an ideological upper hand, ISKP has benefited tremendously from the former’s operational weakness due to the decapitation of the top leadership in the drone attacks, de-emphasis on violence, and localization of its jihadist approach (Jadoon, 2018, p. 31). ISKP through its audacious attacks against the religious minorities and slick social media propaganda tailored to target the vulnerable segments of educated youth outsmarted AQ in its own backyard (Roul, 2020). Resultantly, the current jihadist landscape in Pakistan is AQ-dominated but IS-inspired. Against AQ’s Ghazwa-e-Hind narrative, IS has employed the caliphate narrative to attract potential recruits and funding (Rajkumar, 2016). The new generation of educated jihadists in Pakistan is drawn to IS’s caliphate narrative (Yusuf, 2016, p. 7). The global jihadist groups use Pakistan as a base for recruitment and radicalization to achieve their long-term goals of creating the self-style global Muslim caliphate or the Islamic rule. In the global jihadists’ eschatological narratives, Pakistan holds a unique importance as part of the prophetic prophecy related to Ghazwa-e-Hind (the great battle of India closer to the end-of-times that would lead to revival of the Islamic renaissance), land of Khorasan, and the Black Flags of Khorasan (Haqqani, 2015). Since a plethora of terrorist groups operate in close proximity in Pakistan’s jihadist landscape aiming to recruit and mobilize funds from the same social pool, it renders Pakistan’s terrorist landscape highly competitive (ICG, 2009). In this competitive environment, outbidding, and inter- and intragroup rivalries are commonplace. Furthermore, this competitive nature of the Pakistani threat landscape compels terrorist groups to innovate and adapt to survive and stay relevant. Phillips (2014, p. 338; 2015, p. 64) has argued that in a competitive threat environment, intergroup cooperation and rivalry enhances the longevity of terrorist groups. In Pakistan’s multiactor jihadist landscape, cooperation and competition are positively linked to the endurance of terrorist groups. Cooperative relations assist terrorist groups in mitigating mobilization challenges, assist in attacks through collaboration and resource aggregation, all of which boost their survivability (Phillips, 2014, p. 338). The greater the number of alliance and cooperative relations of a terrorist group, the larger is its lifespan and lethality. A case in point is that of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), an anti-Shia terrorist group in Pakistan. During the last two decades, LeJ has successfully enhanced its endurance by collaborating with different terrorist groups. After 9/11, LeJ acted as the operational arm of AQ in Pakistan (Hindustan Times, 2007). Then, it collaborated with TTP for targeting the Shi’a community (The Nation, 2015). Since 2015, LeJ has stayed relevant by pledging allegiance and merging with ISKP (Jadoon, 2018, p. 50). Likewise, ISKP endured existential threats from AQ and TTP as well as counterterrorist operations of the US, Afghan, and Pakistani security

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 161 forces through multiple alliances with like-minded anti-Shi’a terrorist groups and Central Asian jihadists. These alliances assisted ISKP to stay afloat and brave these threats (Jadoon, 2018, p. 34). Similar to cooperation, interorganizational rivalries and competitions also enhance the endurance of terrorist groups (Phillips, 2015, p. 64). Interorganizational rivalries force terrorist groups to learn from rival organizations, adopt new operational tactics as well as acquire innovative methods of attacks and propaganda techniques (Blomger, Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2011, p. 442). Notable is the case of ISKP, which has showed tremendous resilience through adaptability and organizational learning in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISKP has been innovative in carving out a space for its Jihadist–Salafist brand by appealing to educated youth of urban middle and upper-middle classes (Osman, 2020). Another innovation of ISKP that gave it a qualitative edge over its rival terrorist groups in Pakistan was its use of social media for propaganda dissemination, recruitment and communication. Similarly, ISKP has been adaptive in the face of three-way rivalry with TTA; AQ; and counterterrorism operation by Afghan, US, and Pakistani security forces. ISKP continuously adapted by devolving its organizational structure into cell structures and luring dissident elements of rival terrorist organizations in its fold (Jadoon, 2018, p. 34).

Anatomy of terrorism in Pakistan Generally, three types of jihadist groups operate in Pakistan: local, regional, and global. This classification is based on declared ideological narratives, political goals, target selection, and attack tactics of these terrorist groups. However, these categorizations are not as simple as they appear on paper (Rana, 2004). Rather, the lines separating these groups are more blurred, so much so that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish (Basit, 2020). In any case, local jihadist groups operating in Pakistan are of three types: (1) anti-Pakistan terrorist groups; (2) anti-Shi’a extremist organizations; and (3) ethno-separatist groups from Balochistan, and Sindh provinces. TTP spearheads the anti-Pakistan militant classification and is a conglomerate of several militant factions that have formed a union in December 2007 in the aftermath of the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad (Siddique, 2010). Despite splintering, defections, leadership disputes, and internecine rivalries, TTP is still the most potent anti-Pakistan terrorist group that accounts for the greatest number of annual terrorist attacks in the country. Other prominent groups in this categorization include Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Khan, 2017) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (Shahid, 2017). While TTP and its affiliated groups wish to transform Pakistan into a Taliban-style theocracy by overthrowing the current democratic system, the anti-Shia sectarian militants, now absorbed into ISKP, aim to purge the country of its Shia population and subsume it in IS’s ideological vision of the global Sunni caliphate. The prominent anti-Shia militant groups such as LeJ, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Almi, and Jandullah have pledged allegiance to ISKP and operate on both sides of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border (Jadoon, 2018, p. 50). Within the

162 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed ethno-separatist spectrum, four prominent Baloch insurgent groups operating in and out of Afghanistan and Iran are the Baloch Republican Army, the Baloch Liberation Front, the Baloch Liberation Army, and the Baloch Republican Guard. Recently, these four organizations have formed a new alliance called Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (Zahid, 2019). Among the Sindhi separatist groups, the most active are the Sindhudesh Liberation Army and Sindhu Desh Revolutionary Army. All the separatist groups in Pakistan cannot be classified as terrorists, as they are insurgents who use terrorism as a tactic to highlight their demands and grievances related to participatory development, greater ownership of their resources, increase in development funds, and political autonomy. Some of their demands can be addressed through negotiations. The second category of militant groups operating in and out of Pakistan are regional. This typology includes three types of groups: (1) Afghanistan focused, (2) Kashmir centric, and (3) regional affiliates of the global jihadist groups. Both the Afghanistan- and Kashmir-focused groups are propped up by Pakistan’s military establishment to achieve strategic interests in these two regions, i.e., to neutralize India’s influence and occupation, respectively (Rana, 2004). The main Afghan militant groups – TTA and the Haqqani Network – are headquartered in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. Among the prominent Kashmiri jihadist groups are LeT, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The third category within the broader regional classification is of regional affiliates of AQ and IS, i.e., AQIS and ISKP, correspondingly. The AQ and IS, transnational militant groups, fall in the third category, and presently both entities are locked in ideological rivalry and operational outbidding. A detailed discussion of their rivalry was covered in the preceding passages.

Structural causes of terrorism There is no shortage of scholarship on structural violence as the theory has been widely used in peace and conflict studies. Johan Galtung expanded the existing understanding of violence by differentiating between direct, structural, and cultural violence. He then used the term “structural violence” to define a system that limits the full utilization of human capabilities through economic, social, and political structures (Galtung, 1969). Based on this concept, one can delve deeper into factors that have influenced terrorism in Pakistan. Since its independence, Pakistan’s domestic stability has been influenced by ethnic cleavages that the state has not managed to address because of ever growing socioeconomic disparities in the country. Socioeconomic disparities While structural factors contributed to the grievances of the people of the East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) against the state of Pakistan and led to mutiny and ultimately the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, the country still faces this dilemma that fuels ethno-nationalism. This dynamic can be understood by looking

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 163 at the poverty data, which shows a huge gap in terms of the haves and the havenots in the country. According to a report that shows poverty data for all regions of the country, including ex-FATA, the percentage of poor was the highest in exFATA at 73% followed by 71% in Balochistan (UNDP, 2016). We now expand on this discussion to better understand the deeper causes of terrorism in ex-FATA and Balochistan. After the start of the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s tribal areas – bordering Afghanistan – came under the international spotlight. Ex-FATA then also became a target of US drone strikes to attack terrorist hideouts and also the center of Pakistan’s security operations. Until recently, the tribal areas were not mainstreamed in Pakistan and that was a major cause of socioeconomic and political disparities. The government has realized the importance of socioeconomic and political development in ex-FATA by merging it with KP through the 25th constitutional amendment in 2018. Up until this time, the state practiced the British Empire’s governance mechanism in the tribal areas through the notorious Frontier Crimes Regulation. This was also a reason that the region was neglected in terms of developmental projects. For example, the developmental needs of exFATA were ignored in the 2017–2018 budget. Out of the 95 projects, only 1 was for FATA (construction of Bajaur/Khar, Jandola, Zob link road) (Anwar, 2017). Similarly, out of the total PKR35 billion for higher education, FATA received only PKR250 million for FATA University and PKR300 million under higher education opportunities for FATA and Balochsitan (Anwar, 2017). Zeb and Ahmed argue that a “combination of factors, such as the disputed Durand Line, the strategic use of FATA by the state and its allies, Islamization from the 1980s onwards, and structural violence, have played a role in allowing the Taliban to establish bases in the tribal areas” (2019, p. 5). Pakistan’s long-lasting friend, China, has realized the importance of development in regions that are crucial to its BRI. China, for example, announced that it will build 50 schools in ex-FATA (The News, 2017). More such efforts are however needed to address the structural causes of violence in these tribal regions. Similar to the case of ex-FATA, militancy and terrorism in Balochistan are also viewed as products of the local people’s grievances against the state. There are, however, a variety of groups – e.g. ethnic, ideological, and nationalist – and different actors have diverse objectives for engaging in terrorism. Greed and grievances are regarded as the most important causes of civil war (Keen, 2012), and both have played a role in terms of structural factors responsible for the state of violence in Balochistan. Since the merger of Balochistan with Pakistan in 1948, the state has indirectly governed its biggest province in terms of land size – Balochistan – through local tribal chiefs. The local insurgents have used the socioeconomic marginalization of Balochistan as a tool to recruit and support their causes. Despite the fact that the province is the largest source of natural wealth for Pakistan, such as gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminum, uranium, and hydrocarbon reserves, Balochistan remains one of the least developed areas of the country. For instance, female primary school enrollment in Balochistan is not more than 20% and only 39% of households have access to clean drinking

164 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed water within a two-kilometer distance from their homes (Khetran, 2011, p. 30). In addition, only in five (out of 30) districts is sanitation available to 51% of the population (Khetran, 2011, p. 30). Compared to the two biggest provinces in terms of population in Pakistan, i.e., Punjab and Sindh, the literacy rate is low in other provinces. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2018–19 reported 55.5% literacy rate for Balochistan, 55.3% for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 62.2% for Sindh, and 64.7% for Punjab (GOP, 2019, p. 162). Geopolitics Pakistan inherited a security dilemma vis-à-vis India at the time of its independence in 1947. This situation was partly because of the territorial disputes between the new states but also because of the fact that India dismembered the eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) through a military intervention. Being a weaker and much smaller state compared to India’s military strength and size, Pakistan formed alliances with the West to gain both economic and security benefits. This reliance on external support has continued since then in various forms. Here it is important and relevant to highlight how the US and its allies, especially Saudi Arabia, promoted the concept of jihad (holy war) across the Muslim world for the recruitment of jihadists to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s (Ahmed, 2012). This also led to a sudden growth of madrassas in Pakistan. The growth of madrassas is also partly due to the financial support from Saudi Arabia and Iran (Grare, 2007). Besides the madrassa boom, the Cold War era also witnessed changes in the religious curriculum of madrassas. Simultaneously, the country witnessed a sociopolitical transformation through Islamization under General Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule (Sheikh & Ahmed, 2020). As many as 1,000 madrassas were established during the Zia era alone to supply thousands of combatants for the war in Afghanistan (Iqbal & Raza, 2015, p. 28). All these factors played a key role in the proliferation of extremist ideologies through madrassas, the cost of which Pakistan continues to pay in the form of incidents of violent extremism. While there has been a spillover of the Afghan jihad on Pakistan, there have also been impacts on regional security. This can be particularly witnessed in the case of militancy in J&K. After the end of the war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, several jihadist groups shifted their attention to support the cause of Muslims in J&K (Blank, 2014). This led to a sudden increase in violence in J&K and heightened India–Pakistan tensions. This might again happen once there is a peace settlement in Afghanistan that would allow some terrorist groups to look for new opportunities. Pakistan’s relationship has also been fractious with Afghanistan due to the trust deficit and territorial disputes such as the Durand Line demarcation, the Pak–Afghan border, which the former is presently fencing. Islamabad has therefore been trying to have a friendly regime in Kabul and this was a reason behind Pakistan’s support for the TTA regime (1996–2001). The post-9/11 Afghanistan has brought new challenges for Pakistan; for instance, its archrival New Delhi has

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 165 forged close relations with Kabul. This creates insecurities for Pakistan, and on several occasions, Islamabad has blamed India for using Afghanistan to support terrorism in Pakistan (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2007). Pakistan also blames India for using its influence in Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan by supporting the Baloch insurgency (Fair, 2011). The Indian presence in Afghanistan is a reason that Pakistan has been supporting a peace deal with the Taliban as that offers Islamabad with perhaps the only opportunity to ensure a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul. Through its BRI, China has increased its economic and political influence in South Asia. Most of the South Asia states, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, have become China’s BRI partners. Through CPEC, China aims to have trade access to the Central Asian Republics, and therefore peace and stability of Afghanistan are very important. China has been closely working with Pakistan to facilitate the intra-Afghan peace process. While it looks very likely that the Taliban would return in some kind of a government in Kabul, the BRI has created new challenges for the regional security in South Asia. A visible impact of that can been seen in Pakistan where various terrorist groups, such as the BLA, have attacked CPEC projects and Chinese citizens to harm the BRI. BLA and other Baloch separatist groups frame China as an aggressor, a colonizer who is robbing the Baloch people of their resources through the CPEC. China and Pakistan are aware of these security challenges and therefore Pakistan has created two security divisions to safeguard CPEC projects. In any case, there are occasional attacks on the CPEC. For example, terrorists have targeted Chinese citizens. In 2019, Pakistan’s Baloch insurgents attacked the Pearl Continent Hotel near the centerpiece of the CPEC (the Gwadar Port) to show an intent to harm Chinse interests in the country (Aamir, 2019). As Baloch insurgents have grievances against the state that can be exploited by Pakistan’s enemies – for example, India has objections to the CPEC going through the disputed territory of J&K – it is highly likely that such sporadic CPEC-related attacks will continue. Militarized counterterrorism framework As such, Pakistan’s NAP has a disproportionate focus on terrorist actors and ignores the phenomenon of terrorism, i.e., the ideological threat. Following the APS attack that killed 144 people, including 132 school students and teachers, the then Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz government was under tremendous public pressure to act against the perpetrators (Haider, 2014). The army also saw it as a direct attack on it, as most of the students at APS Peshawar were from army families. Consequently, in an All Parties Conference (APC), the NAP was hurriedly put together to bring the perpetrators of the APS attack to justice (Salahuddin, 2015). Pakistan aims to promote nationalism through the NAP’s implementation, i.e., Pakistaniat, as a counterweight to terrorists’ goals of transforming Pakistan into a theocracy or subsume it into broader global jihadist vision of a Sunni caliphate or breakaway to create separate homelands in Sindh and Balochistan. The singular

166 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed focus on nationalism only added to the moral bankruptcy of the Pakistani state to reverse engineer its flirtations with jihadism in the 1980s. The NAP focuses on anti-Pakistan groups. The NAP and subsequent supplementary counter-narrative efforts and policy frameworks such as Paigham-e-Pakistan1 have portrayed Pakistan as a Muslim state where Islamic laws are enacted, allowing people to live their lives according to Islamic values, hence there was no room for violent campaigns and armed struggle in the garb of “jihad.” The fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s counter-narrative messaging is the theory– practice gap (implementation). Conceptually, a narrative has three components: (1) the messenger, (2) an audience, and (3) the message. A narrative is as good as the credibility of the messenger. As a framework for countering violent extremism (CVE), the NAP should have been based on democratic values and the rule of law to resurrect peace rather than aiming at only improving the internal security (that also at the operational level). Unfortunately, the NAP’s overmilitarized approach has added to an existing array of internal security problems confronting Pakistan, low incidence of violence notwithstanding. Though the NAP was quite comprehensive and has covered almost all important aspects of counterterrorism and counterextremism in Pakistan, it lacked an effective operational strategy and did not define clear benchmarks to realistically map its success (Rumi, 2015, p. 5). Though a review mechanism was put in place in the form of apex committees, the main thrust of the NAP’s implementation was on hard measures. Soon, the attention of the apex committees turned into an obsession with the numbers, such as the decline in the violent incidents (see Figure 9.1), arrest of the terrorists, and the cases registered against hate speech, among others. Ideally, the apex committees should have reviewed NAP’s progress in the face of evolving terrorist threat. The two fundamental issues in NAP’s implementation are (1) its overreliance on hard counterterrorism measures and (2) its rigid structure, which eventually rendered it less relevant in the face of a rapidly evolving political environment and security landscape. Ideally, an incremental approach with clearly defined objectives and rigorous review process was needed to gradually expand the scope of both counterterrorism and counterextremism measures (Sahill, 2017, p. 336). Phillips (2015) maintains that heavy-handed counterterrorism policies help the terrorist groups reinforce internal cohesiveness. This is like jujitsu politics where counterterrorism measures inspire more support for the terrorist groups from their support base: “out-group threat produces in-group solidarity and mobilization” (Phillips, 2015, p. 64). The third R of Richardson’s 3R argument (revenge, renown, and reaction) maintains that terrorist groups – through their acts of violence – provoke the states to (over)react to generate sympathy for their ideological propaganda, political grievances, and demands (Richardson, 2006, p. 23). Following the formulation of the NAP, Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sword of the Prophet) was launched in North Waziristan in June 2014 and was expanded to Balochistan and Karachi as well (Manan and Zafar, 2015). It focused on eliminating terrorist sanctuaries across the country. However, the excessive use of force consolidated TTP’s core constituency. Given the NAP’s actor-centric nature, it

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Figure 9.1 Terrorist incidents and casualties in Pakistan (2015–2019). Source: Pak Institute for Peace Studies’ Annual Security Reports (PIPS, 2015, p. 8; 2016, p. 13; 2017, p. 18; 2018, p. 18; 2019, p. 18).

became redundant sooner than expected (Dogar, 2017). Pakistan’s present security environment is significantly different from January 2015 when the NAP was formulated and implemented. For instance, in 2015 most of the terrorist threats to Pakistan’s internal security had emanated from the ex-FATA region, particularly North Waziristan. Also, TTP spearheaded the anti-Pakistan militancy (Iqbal & Silva, 2013, p. 80). However, in the current situation, TTP’s splintering, the emergence of ISKP, and the relocation of most of these groups in Afghanistan have changed Pakistan’s internal security environment. Moreover, in the preNAP environment, the use of social media by extremist and terrorist groups for recruitment and propaganda dissemination was limited. In the current environment, following in ISKP’s footsteps, all militant groups in Pakistan maintain a robust social media presence (Rani, 2020). In recent years, the Pakistani government has implemented a range of measures to curb online hate speech. In 2010, there was a two-week ban placed on Facebook for blasphemous contents (Walsh, 2010). In 2015, a man was sentenced to 13 years in jail for posting hate material on Facebook (Daily Mail, 2015). Then in 2017 the government the government banned several social media sites, including YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In 2018, Pakistani authorities reported to the Twitter headquarters more than 3,000 Twitter accounts on charges of spreading hate material and inciting violence (National Courier, 2018). Overall, the government has been somewhat successful in the reporting of online hate speech.

168 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed For example, there is an app called Chukas (meaning “alert”) where people can report hate speech. Such reactionary measures were ineffective as people could still access the blocked sites but also because, as one author writes, “the best antidote to hate speech is more speech,” and therefore, there is a need to sensitize social media users (Dawn, 2012). While the government has been proactive in removing online hate material, for instance through the reporting and blocking of the social media contents, it recognizes the fact that this is not a sustainable solution because extremist groups can form new social media groups. An official from the NACTA of Pakistan said: “I believe we need to come up with a strategy that could counter extremists’ narrative [because] blocking the internet is less effective than providing alternative narratives for our youth” (Gandhara, 2018). The loophole so far in Pakistan’s CVE strategy has been the neglect of using social media to counter the extremists’ narrative that is influencing millions of social media users, especially the youth, in Pakistan. Studies done on both social media and CVE have emphasized the importance of using social media for promoting religious tolerance in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2017). Due to the relocation of Pakistan-centric jihadist groups and the Baloch separatists to Afghanistan and Iran, respectively, Pakistan cannot eliminate terrorism without addressing these external dimensions (Dawn, 2020). For this, some tactical changes in the existing counterterrorism doctrine are necessary but not sufficient. A paradigm shift and a reconceptualization of the security framework are needed. In addition to improving internal security mechanisms of counterterrorism, Pakistan will have to forge bilateral counterterrorism frameworks to neutralize sanctuaries of the Taliban-affiliated factions and that of the Baloch separatists both in Afghanistan and Iran (Dawn, 2020). Unfortunately, with the change of the government after the 2018 general election, the implementation of the NAP has been half-hearted (Malik, 2019). The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf government has shown less enthusiasm in updating the NAP by removing the redundancies, inserting new points consistent with existing security requirements and challenges, as well as phasing out those points that have been achieved such as reforming FATA, and the creation of the Counter Terrorism Departments and Karachi operation (Kamran, 2019).

Conclusion Terrorism in Pakistan has a strong link with geopolitics, the state’s efforts to construct Islamic nationalism, heavy-handed policies toward peripheral ethnic groups, and structural violence. These polices have spawned centrifugal and fissiparous militant movements, some of which can be characterized as terrorist campaigns. Conceptual frameworks of terrorism related to socioeconomic factors, global jihadism, geographies of terrorism such as poorly governed areas and safe havens, state sponsorship of proxy militants, and religiously inspired terrorism are relevant to understanding the complex and diverse terrorist landscape in Pakistan. This chapter has studied terrorism using the longevity of terrorism theory of interorganizational cooperation and competition.

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 169 Undoubtedly, terrorism in Pakistan is multidimensional in terms of the focus of terrorist groups and also the contributing factors. Since the Afghan–Soviet War, the country has been a breeding ground of numerous terrorist groups that have diverse goals fluctuating between domestic and external targets. There are some that target Afghanistan and J&K, and others that target Shi’as at home and also the state. While there are structural factors, including domestic socioeconomic disparities, there are also geopolitical factors that make it difficult for the state to handle terrorism on its own. In terms of the geopolitical factors, China’s ambitious BRI has added complexity to regional security in South Asia because of India’s reservations on China’s increasing influence in its region. Despite the fact that Pakistan has succeeded on many fronts against terrorism, we argue that it is far from being terrorism-free. While the state has taken a step in a right direction by merging FATA with KP, there are numerous other structural factors that need attention. Based on our assessment, we also propose that the state needs to address the root causes of terrorism, such as radicalization and violent extremism, through more investment in counter-narratives that should be disseminated through the media and educational institutions.

Note 1 Paigham-e-Pakistan is a counter-narrative in the shape of a book endorsed by 1,850 religious scholars that delegitimizes the use of violence in Pakistan in the name of Islam.

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172 Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed Osman, B. (20022020). Bourgeois Jihad: Why young, middle-class Afghans join the Islamic State. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publicati ons/2020/06/bourgeois-jihad-why-young-middle-class-afghans-join-islamic-state Pak Institute for Peace Studies. (2019). Pakistan security report. Pak Institute of Peace Studies. Retrieved from https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ sr2019.pdf Phillips, B. J. (2014). Terrorist group cooperation and longevity. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 336–347. Phillips, B. J. (2015). Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and terrorist group longevity. Journal of Peace Research, 52(1), 62–75. PIPS. (2015). Pakistan security report. Pak Institute of Peace Studies. Retrieved from http://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/sr2015.pdf PIPS. (2016). Pakistan security report. Pak Institute of Peace Studies. Retrieved from https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/sr2017.pdf PIPS. (2017). Pakistan security report. Pak Institute of Peace Studies. Retrieved from http://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/sr2016.pdf PIPS. (2018). Pakistan security report. Pak Institute of Peace Studies. Retrieved from https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/sr2018.pdf Rajkuamr, V. (2016). AQIS-IS rivalry: Battle for supremacy in India. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 8(7), 9–14. Rana, M. A. (2004). A to Z Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan. Lahore: Mashal. Rana, M. A. (2005). Seeds of Terrorism. New Delhi: Minerva Press. Rani, M. (2020, 22 January). How the internet has enabled Pakistani militants to explore new avenues for foreign Jihad. Vox-Pol. Retrieved from https://www.voxpol.eu/howthe-internet-has-enabled-pakistani-militants-to-explore-new-avenues-for-foreign-jihad/ Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat. London: Murray. Roul, A. (2020). Islamic State-Khorasan remains potent force in Afghan Jihad. Terrorism Monitor, 18(11), 6–8. Rumi, R. (2015). Charting Pakistan’s internal security policy. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR368-Charting-Paki stans-Internal-Security-Policy.pdf Sahill, P. H. (2017). The terror speaks: Inside Pakistan’s terrorism discourse and national action plan. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 41(4), 319–337. Salahuddin, Z. (2015, 29 June). 20 points to Pakistan? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/29/20-points-to-pakistan/ Shahid, S. (2017, 13 November). Hizbul Ahrar takes birth as internal rifts tear Jamaatul Ahrar apart. Pakistan Today. Retrieved from https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/ 11/13/hizbul-ahrar-takes-birth-as-internal-rifts-tear-jamaatul-ahrar-apart/ Sheikh, M. Z. H., & Ahmed, Z. S. (2020). Military, authoritarianism and Islam: A comparative analysis of Bangladesh and Pakistan. Politics and Religion, 13(2), 333–360. Siddique, Q. (2010). Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s North-West. Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/ import/extra/rp2010-12-tehrik-e-taliban_web_1.pdf Siyech, M. S. (2019). Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent: Comparing the movement in India and Bangladesh. Journal of Policing Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15(1), 64–82.

The persistence of terrorism in Pakistan 173 The Nation. (2015). LeJ forms nexus with TTP: Ministry. Retrieved from https://nation. com.pk/26-Feb-2015/lej-forms-nexus-with-ttp-ministry The News. (2017, 4 September). China to build 50 schools in FATA. Retrieved from https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/227726-China-to-build-50-schools-in-FATA UNDP. (2016). Pakistan’s new poverty index reveals that 4 out of 10 Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty. Retrieved from https://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/ en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/06/20/pakistan-s-new-poverty-index-revealsthat-4-out-of-10-pakistanis-live-in-multidimensional-poverty.html Walsh, D. (2010, 1 June). Pakistan lifts Facebook ban but blasphemou’ pages stay hidden. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/ pakistan-lifts-facebook-ban#:~:text=Pakistan%20lifts%20Facebook%20ban%20but %20’blasphemous’%20pages%20stay%20hidden,-This%20article%20is&text=Pakis tan%20lifted%20a%20two%2Dweek,pages%20containing%20%22blasphemous %22%20content.&text=In%20recent%20weeks%20Pakistan%20extended,sites%2C %20including%20YouTube%20and%20Wikipedia Wang, L. (2018). Talibanization in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 4(1), 74–100. Yusuf, H. (2016). University radicalization: Pakistan’s next counterterrorism challenge. CTC Sentinel, 9(2), 4–8. Zahid, F. (2019). Baluch Raji Ajohi Sangar: Emergence of a New Baluch separatist alliance. Terrorism Monitor, 17(18), 7–8. Zahid, F. (2020). Jihadism in South Asia: A militant landscape in flux. Middle East Institute. Retrieved from https://www.mei.edu/publications/jihadism-south-asia-mi litant-landscape-flux. Zaidi, S. M. A. (2010). Geographic trajectories of Al-Qaida and Taliban terrorist groups in Pakistan. Journal of Strategic Security, 3(1), 1–18. Zeb, K., & Ahmed, Z. S. (2019). Structural violence and terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Civil Wars, 21(1), 1–24.

Part III

Issues of radicalization, extremism, and the state

10 Hindu radicalization and implications for India Bidisha Biswas

Introduction India has long been viewed as an unusual, even exceptional, democracy. After the country gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, it was founded as a democratic, federal republic. At the time, such an institutional framework went against prevalent beliefs that diversity and low levels of economic development are insurmountable barriers to establishing a pluralistic, liberal state.1 Even more remarkably, India modeled itself as a secular democracy. This meant that adherents of Hinduism, which comprise 80% of the population, would coexist, on equal footing, with those who follow other faiths – and even those who follow none at all. For several decades, the country was seen as an inspirational, even if deeply imperfect, model. The country was well known for its robust civil society, competitive elections resulting in frequent alterations of power, and a vibrant media space (Plattner & Diamond, 2007). In recent years, India’s identity as a pluralistic, secular democracy has been aggressively challenged by the growing political and social might of Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism. This process had been in motion for decades and has accelerated since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attained a parliamentary majority in 2014. In the 2019 elections, under the leadership of popular Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the party cemented that majority, leading many to ask if India had finally become a Hindu state (Verghese, 2019). During this period, India’s political journey turned markedly in the direction of an ethnic, illiberal democracy. How did the country get to this place? And, what are the long-term domestic, regional, and international implications of this shift? This chapter will provide some answers to these complex questions.

The beginnings The question of religious accommodation was at the heart of early debates about independent India’s identity and political system. This is because India’s independence was accompanied by the partition of British India into Hindumajority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, a bloody exercise that displaced 15 million people and left 1–2 million dead, victims of fierce sectarian violence

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(Dalrymple, 2015). The partition was the product of a complex set of circumstances, not least of which was the British government’s sustained efforts to divide Hindus and Muslims.2 In the run-up to independence, and in the framing of India’s Constitution, one of the central questions confronting the country’s leaders was: should India be a Hindu state? Prominent leaders such as Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru (India’s first prime minister) and B. R. Ambedkar (Dalit leader and the architect of the Indian Constitution)3 were all committed to crafting India into a pluralistic, inclusive country. They believed that the nation should protect religious freedom and provide equal cultural, political, and civil rights to people of all faiths. Yet, this inclusive view of India was not without its discontents. The roots of Hindutva go back to the early 20th century. A Hindu nationalist vision of India was first codified in the 1920s by V. D. Savarkar in Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? Savarkar argued that Hindutva was a national identity, in that Hindus constitute a nation connected by culture, geography, and history. Hindus are the true products of Indian soil; others, such as Christians and, in particular, Muslims, are the products of foreign invasions. Non-Hindus must therefore accept Hindu culture as the dominant and rightful identity of India. Savarkar intended to combine a Hindu religious identity with the political idea of the nation, akin to European nation-states (Iwanek, 2019; Jaffrelot, 2019). Interestingly, Savarkar himself was an atheist. For him, the Hindu religion was only one aspect of Hindu identity, with race, territory, and language (Hindi) being the other markers of the nation. This also means that Hindutva as a political ideology is distinct from Hinduism as a faith, as the latter contains within it in several different spiritual and doctrinal strands. Over time, a network of organizations was developed to propagate the Hindu nationalist viewpoint. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) or National Volunteer Organization was formed in the 1920s as a social organization that advocated adherence to military discipline and Hindu scriptures. The RSS modeled itself on fascist organizations in Europe (Casolari, 2000). The group’s branches continue to reach out to Hindus throughout the country and overseas. The Hindu Mahasabha was a political party established in 1951. In 1951, this party morphed into the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), which then became the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980. Today the RSS and the BJP, along with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or World Hindu Council (VHP), constitute the core of the powerful Sangh parivar or family. This network of organizations, which also includes groups focused on students, farmers, factory workers, and tribal communities, provide a wide breadth of ideological and organizational support to Hindu nationalism throughout India and beyond.4

Hindutva’s journey to political ascendance Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Sangh parivar did not get much traction in the Indian political landscape. The fact that Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse, was associated with the RSS, discredited the Hindu nationalist

Hindu radicalization 179 movement in the eyes of many.5 Prime Minister Nehru and his allies determinedly resisted communal polarization in Indian politics. During these decades, India’s bold secular experiment seemed to be working. Sectarian discourse and violence were rare in the country’s political landscape. This was a remarkable achievement, given the bloodshed that had accompanied the partition. Indian secularism began, however, to face considerable challenges from the 1980s onward. Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, first became the prime minister of India in 1966. She lost that position in 1977, but came back to power in 1980.6 The perennially insecure Indira Gandhi encouraged communal divisions for her own political ends. The cynical use of religion continued under her son, Rajiv Gandhi. Both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi played multiple sides against each other in their brand of communal politics. Hindu nationalists were able to use some of these actions to persuasively label the Congress party as “pandering” to fundamentalist voices in minority communities. In the 1980s, the discourse of Hindutva coalesced around a single, mobilizing issue. There had been a longstanding dispute over the Babri Masjid (mosque) in the city of Ayodhya, located in the northern Indian province of Uttar Pradesh (UP). Some Hindus have argued that the mosque stands on the birthplace of the revered Hindu god, Lord Ram. The Sangh parivar launched a campaign that demanded a temple be built on that exact site in place of the mosque. The campaign, which framed its goal as a necessary correction to centuries of humiliation faced by Hindus, galvanized public opinion. This was particularly the case in northern India, where Lord Ram is widely worshipped. In the ensuing polarized climate, the BJP won the 1991 state elections in UP, which is India’s most populous state. Soon after, in 1992, Hindu extremists demolished the Babri Masjid (Chatterji, Hansen, & Jaffrelot, 2020) , an event that led to riots in various parts of the country. In 1995, Hindu nationalist politics received a boost when the Indian Supreme Court ruled that Hindutva represented a secular concern. This enabled Hindu nationalist discourses to be used more openly in electoral campaigning (Jaffrelot, 2017). The BJP was rewarded for its belligerence by parliamentary victories in 1998 and 1999. It remained at the helm of the central government of India until the elections of 2004. In its first stint leading the country, the BJP formed a parliamentary majority as the head of a coalition of political parties. In order to placate its partners, it found itself having to dilute its core Hindu nationalist agenda. The same was not true, however, of the party’s actions in the states that it controlled. The starkest example of a virulent strand of Hindu nationalism occurred in the western state of Gujarat. In 2002, more than 2000 Muslims were killed in pogroms that occurred under the watch of then chief minister Narendra Modi. Although Indian courts never found him guilty of complicity, several human rights organizations and independent observers have accused Modi of having enabled the rioters.7 Between 2005 and 2014, the government of the U.S. banned Mr. Modi from entering the U.S. because of his poor human rights record (Ayyub, 2016; Biswas, 2010). In 2004, the BJP was ousted from power, largely due to public dissatisfaction with its economic record. However, between 2004 and 2014, the Sangh parivar

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remained busy. The RSS branches continued to build a grassroots network of committed volunteers. The BJP and, in particular, the ascendant Narendra Modi, aggressively promoted itself as the vanguard of a muscular, religio-nationalist identity, which would avenge Hindu humiliation. As the ruling Congress Party found itself mired in a number of corruption scandals, Narendra Modi built a powerful counter-narrative of being an incorruptible leader, dedicated to vikas (development). In 2014, a wave of anti-corruption and pro-growth sentiment catapulted the BJP to power in Delhi, with Modi as the prime minister. This time, the party was able to garner a majority on its own, which gave the party more leeway to pursue its agenda without having to compromise with other political parties. In its first term under Prime Minister Modi, the BJP refrained from formally instituting legislation that reflected its Hindu nationalist platform. However, in several parts of the country, religious polarization and the persecution of Muslims reached unprecedented levels. Hindu vigilante groups gained particular strength, as they came to be seen as unofficial arms of the state. Such groups have had three main planks with which to target Muslims, along with Christians, Dalits, and women. “Love jihad” is the accusation that Muslim men are waging war against Hindus by seducing and/or raping Hindu woman. “Ghar wapsi” (return home) is based on the premise that Muslims and Christians were originally Hindus, who were deceived or forced into converting.8 Such “converts” are therefore exhorted, often coercively, to “come home” by reconverting. And, finally, there is the argument that cows, which are considered sacred by many Hindus, must be protected at all costs. Cow protection vigilante groups have led vicious public attacks and the lynching of Muslims and Dalits, who are the two groups usually associated with the meat and leather industries. Human Right Watch (2019) reports that between May 2015 and December 2018 at least 44 people, of whom 36 were Muslim, were killed by cow vigilantes. It recorded about 100 different incidents of such violence, which had spread across 20 of India’s 29 states, leading to about 280 people being injured. In many cases, local police forces either took no action against those accused or actively enabled them. At the societal level, the Hindu nationalist project was furthered by an increasingly pliant media and the rewriting of history textbooks in a number of states. India also witnessed increasing repression of, and attacks on, journalists, student activists, and civil society leaders. In many cases, those who dissented with the government were accused of being anti-national, seditious, and in cahoots with left-wing extremists, Pakistan, or both (Ganguly, 2020). In 2019, largely propelled by the personal popularity of Prime Minister Modi, the BJP won the national elections and increased its parliamentary majority. This was an electoral feat not seen in several decades. The resounding victory, which occurred in spite of economic missteps by the Modi government and a stagnant Indian economy, was widely seen as an endorsement of a Hindu nationalist agenda (Gettleman, Schultz, Venkataraman, & Yasir, 2019). The newly empowered BJP wasted no time in implementing its Hindutva vision, signaling an even sharper, rightward turn for the country.

Hindu radicalization 181 In August 2019, the BJP announced that it would abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which accorded special, semiautonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state.9 This measure was not a surprise: revocation of Article 370 was a long-standing campaign promise of the party. The BJP, however, went further than simply revoking the controversial law. It unilaterally revoked statehood for the province, dividing it into two territories that would be governed directly by the central government. These steps were accompanied by harsh measures, including a ramped up military presence, arrests of most prominent state leaders, and a communications blackout. The clampdown on the state has continued for well over a year.10 Next, in November 2019, the Supreme Court handed Hindu nationalists a victory in the long-running Babri Masjid dispute. While recognizing that the destruction of the mosque was illegal, the justices ruled that the destroyed mosque’s 2.77 acre site must be turned over to the government, which could then form a trust to build a Hindu temple there (Ganguly, 2020). This was one signal, among many, that India’s judiciary was becoming more and more closely aligned with Hindutva. Then, in December 2019, the BJP government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which introduced, for the first time, religious criteria to acquiring Indian citizenship. This act provided opportunities for an expedited citizenship process for refugees from the three Muslim-majority countries in South Asia – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – but only to those from six identified religions, that is, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian. It explicitly excluded Muslims from this fast track. Critics noted as well that the large number of Hindu Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka were not included in the CAA provisions (Chandran, 2019; Ramachandran, 2019). Many feared that the CAA, combined with a proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC), and the changes to the citizenship process will reduce Muslims in India to second-class status, and perhaps even lead to their disenfranchisement and/or eventual expulsion.11 Between December 2019 and March 2020, there were widespread protests in India against the CAA, and the protests included large numbers of youth from all faiths. These demonstrations were mostly peaceful; however, they were met with intense police brutality. Modi, his home minister Amit Shah, and many other BJP leaders adopted a belligerent position, with some even openly calling for violence against the demonstrators. While the protests themselves stopped after the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, the government’s crackdown on dissent continued. Several students and civil society leaders who had protested the CAA were arrested or charged with incitement to violence and/or sedition (Pandey, 2020a). In early 2020, Delhi witnessed two major incidents of mob violence, both of which indicated state complicity. In January, one of the country’s premier liberal arts institutions, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), was the site of an attack staged by a group of masked men and women. Several students and at least one faculty member were beaten with rods. Several eyewitness accounts reported that the attacks occurred in the presence of Delhi Police. To date, even though some of the attackers were filmed on security cameras, no arrests have been made. This

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attack added to a long list of incidents where university students and scholars around the country have been intimidated by members and supporters of the BJP. In February 2020, while US President Trump was visiting India, Delhi saw its worst sectarian Hindu–Muslim violence in decades, leaving more than 50 people dead and causing extensive property damage. While both communities suffered in the violence, Muslims bore the brunt of it. The riots occurred after Kapil Mishra, a politician from the ruling BJP, made an incendiary speech against anti-CAA protestors. As in the JNU attack, Delhi Police seemed to have been either passive witnesses or, per eyewitness reports, participants in anti-Muslim violence (Schultz & Raj, 2020).12 Over the last few years, India has also witnessed increasing levels of repression of Dalit (lower caste) activists. In April 2020, following orders from the Supreme Court, the police arrested Anand Teltumbde, who has been accused of inciting violence and participating in a plot to assassinate the prime minister. Teltumbde is one of the most prominent and respected Dalit scholars in India. Many critics allege that he was arrested on trumped up charges, for his criticism of Hindu nationalist politics. His arrest, and that of another prominent Dalit-rights scholar, Hany Babu, added to an already lengthy list of activists who have been jailed on charges of “sedition,” even though the evidence against them has been flimsy at best (Dasgupta, 2020; Mani, 2020; Pandey, 2020b; Teltumbde, 2020).

From a democratic state-nation to an illiberal ethnic state? India’s bold experiment in being a pluralistic, liberal democracy has thus arrived at an inflection point. While we cannot predict how long Modi and the BJP will remain in power, it is clear that the ascendant Hindutva has changed Indian’s polity, society, and identity in ways that will be difficult to reverse. It has already been noted that when India started its journey as a democracy, the odds seemed to be stacked against its success. But against the expectations of many Western analysts, Indian institutions and civil society, for all their imperfections, proved to be resilient. This resilience had its roots in the design of independent India’s institutional framework. India, like Belgium and Canada, is a multinational state. This means that the country contains within it groups that have strong ethnic, religious, or linguistic identities, and that at least some of these identities have political salience. National leaders may find it challenging to build legitimacy with such groups. One way to get the buy-in of different groups into the state-making project is to craft a political system that combines national political integration with recognizing and protecting subnational identities. This was the approach that was taken by India’s early leaders, who envisioned India as a state-nation; that is, a state with multiple nations existing within it (Stepan, Linz, & Yadav, 2011). This helps explain why India was constituted as a federal polity, with power devolved to the states (Stepan et al., 2011).13 On the matter of religion, it explains why the Republic of India was envisioned as a secular state. Although India’s Constitution was amended in 1976 in order to include the word “secular” in the

Hindu radicalization 183 preamble, several portions of the original text, adopted in 1949, already embodied secularism in principle. Article 15 bans religion-based discrimination, and Article 25 permits all Indians the right to freely practice their religion. Articles 26 and 30 recognize the right of religious groups to establish charitable and educational institutions, and to receive state aid. Indian secularism is distinct from that of Western democracies such as the U.S. or France. In the Indian context, secularism has meant that the state has kept a “principled distance” from religious matters, while treating people of different religions equally. At the same time, the Indian state has intervened in religious affairs in different cases, for example, by banning animal sacrifices, reforming civil law pertaining to specific religions, and subsidizing religious pilgrimages (Nandy, 1998; Madan, 1998; Bhargava, 2002; Jaffrelot, 2017, 2019). The early leaders of independent India believed that it was desirable, even necessary, for the Indian state to build political integration without imposing cultural homogeneity. Others, however, have long believed something different – notably, that India should be defined as a Hindu nation and state. Hindu nationalists contend that, to the extent that subnational groups continue to live in India, they must pay allegiance to the majority community (Jaffrelot, 2007; Vaishnav, 2019). India should not be a state-nation that accommodates distinct identities. Rather, it should be a nation-state, where the cultural dominance of Hinduism should extend into the country’s political and social framework. This alternate vision of India has been unabashedly steeped in the Hindu religion’s caste hierarchy, and, until recently, had a distinct regional bias. The BJP’s electoral success was concentrated in states in northern and western India, such as Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. In recent years, the BJP has made considerable ground in other parts of the country, including the southern state of Karnataka and the eastern states of Assam and West Bengal. Today, with the widespread popularity of its leader and its strong control over many of India’s institutions, the Hindutva vision of India seems to be near fruition. By seeing the country as a nation-state dominated by a Hindu ideology, this vision is fundamentally at odds with the ideal of a pluralistic India. Some have argued that India is now well on its way to being an ethnic democracy, along the lines of Israel (Chatterji et al., 2020). In an ethnic democracy, a particular community claims ownership of the state’s territory and practices. While nonmembers of that community can be residents or even citizens, they do not belong to the dominant nation and are therefore lesser citizens. For example, in Israel,14 Jewish citizens are the dominant group, and Arab Israelis do not enjoy equal status. The concept of an ethnic democracy contains within it a fundamental incompatibility with the concept of liberal democracy. The latter requires equal protection for all, whereas an ethno-national structure privileges a certain group and is therefore explicitly unequal. Smooha (2002) has argued that despite the lack of equality, an ethnic democracy can claim to be democratic if all its citizens, including minorities, have political and civil rights, are allowed to participate in politics, and are not systematically repressed by the state. Others have argued that the inherent incomparability of this conceptualization means that ethnic

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democracies are unstable, and will, in many cases, move toward exclusionary majoritarianism, which does not in fact protect the political and civil rights of its citizens (Peled, 2011, 2014). In the case of India, the march toward Hindu ethnic domination has been partnered with an unmistakable move away from many, if not most, democratic traits. The emphasis on silencing and punishing dissent, even from members of the dominant Hindu community, indicates that democratic conditions are sharply deteriorating. While the country continues to hold regular elections and has a competitive multiparty system, the extent of authoritarian nationalism means that the democratic feature of the country is being threatened (Repucci, 2020). If it continues on this trajectory, India cannot be a considered an ethnic democracy along the lines identified by Smooha (2002). Rather, it will morph into a majoritarian, repressive, illiberal polity.15

What is new and what is not Indian democracy has long had its shortcomings. It is, therefore, reasonable to ask: To what extent is the repression that has characterized the Modi years a new development? Is the repression merely the continuation of features that have long plagued the Indian political system? The answers to these questions are, in fact, quite complex. In some ways, the authoritarian impulses of the Sangh parivar builds on long-standing flaws in the country’s legal, social, and political frameworks. At the same time, the Indian sociopolitical landscape that Hindutva has shaped is a markedly different India than that of earlier decades. Let us consider the issue of mob and extrajudicial violence. Since 2014, the country has witnessed the public lynching of Muslims and other minorities, often under the pretext of gau raksha (cow protection). It is important to remember, however, that violence by private individuals and groups, often under the pretext of “providing order,” has long been a feature of Indian society. The right to punish, govern, and even kill have historically been distributed among different actors, including the police, mobs, the underworld, and particular social groups, such as upper-caste men “disciplining” rebellious Dalits. Police brutality has been an endemic feature of the Indian state; and Muslims, along with other marginalized groups, have long borne the brunt of it. Facilitated by corrupt and ineffective law enforcement agencies, such extrajudicial violence has often been condoned, and empowered, by local, state, and national authorities (Hansen, 2005, 2020). What, then, is new about the kinds of mob and police violence we see in BJP’s India? The difference is that the state has now gone further than ever before in condoning, and even rewarding, violent acts. As long as violence is undertaken in the defense of the Hindu nation, it is justified as a public good. Previously mob violence or police brutality was tolerated; on occasion, political leaders even called such actions.16 But, now, attacks on minorities are celebrated. For example, individuals accused of leading the lynching of Muslims accused of killing cattle have been openly protected by state authorities and celebrated by their communities (Ali, 2020). Political leaders who have incited, and even participated in, violence

Hindu radicalization 185 against Muslims have been rewarded with plum political posts. Such individuals include Yogi Adityanath, the powerful chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, and Pragya Thakur, a member of Parliament from the state of Madhya Pradesh. The marginalization of specific communities, particularly Muslims, appears to enjoy broad societal acceptance. Noted scholar on India Christophe Jaffrelot chillingly calls this the banalization of Hindutva, where practices that implicitly or explicitly target Muslims become an everyday norm (Anderson & Jaffrelot, 2018). In addition, the BJP’s approach toward the judiciary reflects authoritarian tendencies. The judicial system in India has long been deeply flawed, mired in delays, inequities, politicization, and corruption. Under Prime Minister Modi, however, judicial institutions, including the Supreme Court, have come to play a crucial role in legitimizing, enabling, and emboldening the Hindu nationalist project (Dev, 2019; Ghosh, 2018; Sen, 2020). Since 2014, there have been numerous occasions where the justices of the court have shown signs of being closely allied to the ruling party. The decision on the Babri Masjid dispute was one such decision, but not the only one. In March 2020, the Supreme Court rejected the bail petition of Teltumbde, who has been accused of inciting violence and participating in a plot to assassinate the prime minister. It is widely believed that Teltumbde was targeted by the government, and arrested on trumped up charges, for his criticism of the BJP and of Modi. Earlier in 2020, a controversial former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Ranjan Gogoi, was appointed for a seat in the Indian Parliament. Few would deny that this position was given to him because of the ways in which his court had favored the Modi government’s agenda (Ayyub, 2020; Kapur, 2020). In comparison to previous governments, the Modi era has seen a more aggressive, political effort to control the judiciary. India has long had issues with press freedom and with safe spaces for civil society to do its work. But, today, the extent to which such freedoms have been stifled is unprecedented. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) notes a consistent decline in press freedom in the country since 2015, much of it because of the media clampdown in Kashmir.17 In several parts of the country, journalists and media outlets that criticize the Modi government are subject to legal and social harassment, economic pressure, and even violence (Scroll.in, 2020). The same holds true of nongovernmental organizations and civil society leaders. In sum, Hindu nationalists have come to exert control on almost every major institution of India, including the press and judiciary. An anemic opposition and a beleaguered civil society seem unable to withstand such a sustained assault on Indian democracy. The impact of these changes will likely outlive Hindutva. Even if Mr. Modi and his party were to lose electoral power, in the muddy landscape of Indian politics, rebuilding these fragile safeguards to Indian democracy will be an arduous task

Can the Indian democracy survive majoritarianism? For proponents of Hindutva, although Muslims are the central threat to the Hindu Rashtra (nation), they are by no means the only one. In the Sangh parivar’s vision,

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India’s tribal communities (adivasis), Dalits, left-wing intellectuals, moderates, students, journalists, outspoken women – indeed anyone who dares to question the Hindutva project – are considered a threat to the nation. Repression in India has reached such unprecedented levels that the country has tumbled in various democracy indices, including the Economist Intelligence Unit, V-Dem, and Freedom House. Of course, previous Indian administrations had also displayed authoritarian tendencies. There is, however, a crucial difference. Other governments have turned to repression when it was situationally convenient, for example, around elections, in confronting public discontent, or while manipulating political coalitions (Ganguly, 2020). Judging by the routineness with which the BJP stifles all forms of dissent, repression appears to be a core part of its ideology and agenda. Hindu majoritarianism, as manifested in the Sangh parivar’s actions, is fundamentally opposed to a pluralistic, democratic India. Paradoxically, India’s electoral landscape still remains robust, with energetic campaigning by a multitude of regional parties. The Sangh parivar is internally divided over its economic vision. As a result, the BJP’s economic policies have been both inconsistent and wholly inadequate in dealing with the multitude of problems bedeviling the Indian economy. Opinion polls have repeatedly shown that the BJP’s success in parliamentary elections is driven by the personal popularity of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Like many other countries, Indian citizens have been showing a marked preference for a strong leader who centralized political power in themselves (Sircar, 2020). The reliance on a single individual has, of course, in-built vulnerabilities. Moreover, the BJP has a spotty record in state-level elections, which raises questions about how long the party can continue to repeat its electoral success (Aiyar & Sircar, 2020). All of these factors point to weaknesses in the hegemony of Hindutva. It may be asked: If Mr. Modi were to fall from his pedestal and lose popular support, how will that affect the BJP? Will Indian voters turn against the party because of its numerous policy missteps with regard to the economy? Can regional parties act as an effective bulwark to the Hindu nationalist agenda? Only time can answer these questions. Yet, the changes seen in India are not just about the BJP’s electoral success. The Sangh parivar has an exhaustive list of actors whom it thinks that ‘good’ Indians should fear, including Muslims, women, Dalits, “pseudo-secularists,” and left-wing extremists (Anderson & Jaffrelot, 2018). Indian politicians, whether or not they are ideologically aligned with Hindutva, have seen how successful the politics of fear and discourses of humiliation can be. Furthermore, the BJP’s control over the media, the judiciary, and other institutions cannot be easily undone, especially given the absence of strong, alternate narratives and leaders (Sircar, 2020; Ziegfield, 2020). Hindutva nationalism has changed the parameters of Indian political and social behavior. These changes will likely outlast the staying power of the BJP.

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Geopolitical and security impact Notwithstanding the muscular nationalism that has accompanied Hindutva, the BJP’s foreign policy position has been largely consistent with that of previous governments. It has pushed for closer ties with the U.S. and with the buoyant economies of East Asia. Its relationship with Pakistan continues to be fraught, as are its relations with China. The promotion of a Hindu nationalist image overseas has more to do with domestic political calculations rather than international ambitions (Biswas & Goel, 2020; Hall, 2019). Hindu nationalism in India has, however, had an adverse impact on prospects for regional cooperation. As long as proponents of Hindutva base their domestic politics on demonizing others, especially Muslims, the Indian government will have few domestic incentives to seek even a partial rapprochement with Pakistan. This, in turn, could impact the complicated, triangulated relationship between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. China has taken note of India’s actions in Jammu and Kashmir, and has responded with aggressive steps along its disputed border areas with India. Furthermore, India’s citizenship laws could strain its relations with Bangladesh (Biswas & Bhattacharya, 2020). At the international level, India continues to be an important economic and military player. Other countries, including the U.S., will continue to pursue close economic and defense ties with the country. However, a continuation of the BJP’s exclusionary policies will likely impact both domestic security and India’s reputation overseas. If India continues on its Hindu nationalist march, it would be reasonable to inquire as to what will happen to those who do not fall under this umbrella. Non-Hindus make up almost 20% of India’s population. If they are to be reduced to second-class citizens, or worse, the “country will almost certainly careen into a state of perpetual instability and communal discontent” (Biswas & Goel, 2020). Moreover, Hinduism itself is a very broad umbrella faith, containing multiple diversities and inequities. What place will a Hindu nation have for those Hindu Indians who do not align themselves with the Sangh Parivar? The policies of exclusion that the BJP is pursuing may well create multiple cycles of marginalization and radicalization (Biswas, 2014; Goel, 2020). This could impact the stability of the country and, by extension, the willingness of international actors to see India as a reliable partner. India does not have to look far beyond its boundaries to see the consequences of majoritarian politics. In the mid-20th century, because of its relatively strong performance on a variety of human development indicators, Sri Lanka was expected to be the success story of Asia. Yet, a focus on majoritarian Sinhala Buddhist nationalist politics marginalized the country’s minority Tamil population and plunged the country into a brutal civil war. Even though the war ended with a decisive battlefield victory for the government of Sri Lanka in 2009, the country continues to suffer the effects of those polarizations (Vaishnav, 2019). To the east, Myanmar is a country politically, socially, economically, and morally devastated by the exclusionary policies of the government toward the Rohingya and other

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minority populations (Biswas & Bhattacharya, 2020). The lesson for India, from both these countries, is that the pursuit of hardline repressive and discriminatory policies often comes at the cost of domestic cohesion and international reputation.

Conclusion India, like every other state, is an imagined community, that must be sustained through contestations about ideas, institutions, and political practices (Stepan et al., 2011). The Hindutva project imagines a community that is fundamentally at odds with the secular, pluralistic vision of the early years of the Indian republic. It emphasizes the othering of those who do not agree with it and pursues a strong grip on instruments of state power (Chatterji et al., 2020). By repudiating debate and dissent, even while winning power through electoral processes, Hindu nationalism challenges democratic principles. In fact, given the binary identity (Hindu vs. Other) that the Hindutva seeks to create in the country, Hindu nationalism cannot thrive without undermining Indian democracy. In sum, the rise of Hindu nationalism in India has been accompanied by increasing authoritarianism in the country. Notwithstanding the robustness of its elections, India seems well on its way to becoming a majoritarian, illiberal democracy. These are not, however, irreversible trends. The BJP’s ascendance has coincided with a worldwide shift toward authoritarian, populist leaders. As with many other countries, Indians have shown a marked decline in their preferences for democratic processes, a trend that has been both noted and encouraged by the BJP. Globally, as populist leaders fail to deliver on their promises, these winds will turn. When they do, it is quite possible that India, too, will question the merits of the authoritarian path it has pursued. Such a pushback against Hindu nationalism has already been seen in the 2019– 2020 protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Numerous civil society leaders and journalists continue to question Hindu majoritarianism, often at great personal and professional cost to themselves. Challenging Hindu nationalism, and recommitting to an inclusive vision of India, is still possible. It will, however, require a herculean effort on the part of citizens – efforts that will have to match the Sangh parivar’s multidecade endeavor to remake India into an ethnic state.

Notes 1 Social scientists have, however, long pointed to the variable relationship between economic growth and political regime type. See, for example, Lipset (1959) and Przeowrski and Limongi (1993). 2 There is a vast body of literature that discusses the causes behind the Partition of India and its aftermath. See, for example, Khan (2008) and Hajari (2016). 3 Dalit is a term to describe individuals who are in the lowest category of the Hindu caste hierarchy. 4 Overseas branches of the Sangh parivar mainly aim to build support among the Indian diaspora.

Hindu radicalization 189 5 Nathuram Godse shot Gandhi, at point-blank range, on January 30, 1948. Godse was arrested, tried, and subsequently hanged to death in 1949. He had joined the RSS in his youth but was not an active member of the organisation at the time of the assassination. 6 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. 7 See, for example, a comprehensive report by Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw. org/reports/2002/india/ 8 Religious conversions have a long and complex history in India. Undoubtedly, coercive conversions did occur under periods of Muslim invasions, as well as under pressure from Christian missionaries during the colonial era. It is also the case that lower caste Hindus have sought to convert to other religions in order to escape the inequities of the Hindu caste system. A prominent convert was Dr. B. R. Amdekar, who was himself a Dalit. He famously renounced Hinduism, declaring “I was born a Hindu, but I will not die one,” and became a Buddhist. See Ambedkar et al. (2018). 9 Since 1947, Jammu and Kashmir has been a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought several wars over control of the province. See Biswas (2014) for more information. 10 More information on the revocation of Article 370 is available here: https://thedipl omat.com/2019/10/state-no-more-india-formally-ends-statehood-for-jammu-andkashmir/ 11 For an explanation of these concerns, see Kakkar (2020). 12 It should be noted that the Delhi Police is under the direct command of the central government, which is controlled by the BJP. In other states, the police is controlled by the state government. 13 Most states in India have been formed on the basis of linguistic factors. 14 The authors who discuss this argument clarify that they are referring only to Israel, as defined by its pre-1967 borders. Their conceptualization does not include the West Bank or Gaza. 15 Many would argue that contemporary Israel is also an increasingly problematic representation of democracy. For a fuller discussion of ethnic democracy as it applies to Israel, see Peled (2011, 2014). 16 The most egregious example of this was the complicity of some Congress leaders in anti-Sikh violence in Delhi in 1984. See Jeffrey and Hall (2020). 17 https://rsf.org/en/india

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Hindu radicalization 191 Hansen, T. B. (2020). Democracy against the law: Reflections on India’s illiberal democracy. In A. P. Chatterji, T. B. Hansen, & C. Jaffrelot (Eds.), Majoritarian state: How Hindu nationalism is changing India, pp. 19–39. London: Hurst & Company. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190078171.003.0002 Human Rights Watch. (2019). Violent cow protection in India: Vigilante groups attacks minorities. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/02/18/violent-cow-protection-india/vig ilante-groups-attack-minorities# Iwanek, K. (13 October 2019). Savarkar had many faces—But Hindutva has only one. Scroll. in. https://scroll.in/article/939737/savarkar-had-many-faces-but-hindutva-has-only-one Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.). (2007). Hindu nationalism: A reader. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jaffrelot, C. (2017). Towards a Hindu state? Journal of Democracy, 28(3), 52–63. Jaffrelot, C. (2019). The fate of secularism in India. In M. Vaishnav (Ed.), The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalisms. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/bjp-in-power-indian-demo cracy-and-religious-nationalism-pub-78677 Jeffery, R., & Hall, I. (2020.) Post-conflict justice in divided democracies: The 1984 antiSikh riots in India. Third World Quarterly, 41(6), 994–1011. Kapur, R. (2020). Belief in the rule of law and the Hindu nation and the rule of law. In A. P. Chatterji, T. B. Hansen, & C. Jaffrelot (Eds.), Majoritarian state: How Hindu nationalism is changing India (pp. 353–371). London: Hurst & Company. doi:10.1093/ oso/9780190078171.003.0020 Khan, Y. (2008). The great partition: The making of India and Pakistan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Madan, T. N. (1998). Secularism in its place. In R. Bhargava (Ed.), Secularism and Its Critics (pp. 297–320). Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mani, G. (29 July 2020). DU professors slam arrest of Hany Babu, hail him as activist. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/delhi/2020/jul/29/ du-professors-slam-arrest-of-hany-babu-hail-him-as-activist-2176266.html Nandy, A. (1998). The politics of secularism and the recovery of religious toleration. In R. Bhargava (Ed.), Secularism and its critics (pp. 321–334). Delhi: Oxford University Press. Pandey, G. (25 May 2020a). India activists held over citizenship law protest. BBC. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-52794967 Pandey, G. (14 July 2020b). Anand Teltumbde: Cards and letters for jailed India scholar as he turns 70. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53400138 Peled, Y. (2011). The viability of ethnic democracy: Jewish citizens in inter-war Poland and Palestinian citizens in Israel. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(1), 83–102. Peled, Y. (2014). The challenge of ethnic democracy: The state and minority groups in Israel, Poland and Northern Ireland. London: Routledge. Plattner, M. F., & Diamond, L. J. (2007). India’s unlikely democracy. Journal of Democracy, 18(2), 29–29. Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51–69. Ramachandran, S. (16 December 2019). The unbearable nothingness of being Sri Lankan Hindu. Outlook. https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/opinion-the-unbearablenothingness-of-being-sri-lankan-hindu/344208

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Repucci, S. (2020). A leaderless struggle for democracy. Freedom House. https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracyhttps://freed omhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy Schultz, K., & Suhasini Raj. (10 January 2020). Behind campus attack in India, some see a far-right agenda. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/ asia/india-jawaharlal-nehru-university-attack.html Scroll Staff. (23 June 2020). PUCL, PEN international condemn FIR against Scroll.in’s Supriya Sharma. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/latest/965459/pucl-pen-international-conde mn-fir-against-scroll-ins-supriya-sharma Sen, S. (2020). Indian judiciary imprisoned: An integrated AHP–TOPSIS approach to judicial productivity. Global Business Review, 21(2), 586–603. doi:10.1177/0972150918765319 Sircar, N. (2020). The politics of Vishwas: Political mobilization in the 2019 national election. Contemporary South Asia. doi:10.1080/09584935.2020.1765988 Smooha, S. (2002). The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic State. Nations and Nationalism, 8(4), 475–503. Stepan, A. C., Yadav, Y., & Linz, J. J. (2011). Crafting state-nations India and other multinational democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Teltumbde, A. (14 April 2020). Elgar Parishad case: Teltumbde pens open letter ahead of surrender. The Quint. https://www.thequint.com/voices/elgar-parishad-case-anand-te ltumbde-pens-open-letter-ahead-of-surrender Vaishnav, M. (18 December 2019). From nation-state to state-nation. The Hindustan Times. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/18/from-nation-state-to-state-nationpub-80642 Verghese, A. (5 June 2019). Is India becoming a ‘Hindu state’? The Washington Post. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/05/is-india-becoming-hindu-state/ Ziegfeld, A. (2020). A new dominant party in India? Putting the 2019 BJP victory into comparative and historical perspective. India Review, 19(2), 36–152. doi:10.1080/147 36489.2020.1744995

11 The proliferation of extremism and security issues in the Maldives Kirklin J. Bateman

Introduction Situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean south of India and southwest of Sri Lanka, the Maldives is one of the most idyllic tourist destinations in the world. Its one-island, one-resort concept allows for beautiful romantic getaways on secluded beaches in the archipelago. A 100% Muslim country, the Maldives has struggled to overcome the dichotomy of its tourist industry and all its attendant practices that are seemingly at odds with Islam. Indeed, the Maldives one sees on the Internet and at the various tourist resorts is only one version of the country. There is also Malé, the capital city and one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Political instability and the rise in protests that range from harassing political rivals to targeting Westerners have in recent times marred what was arguably a tranquil and peaceful place. Indeed, former president Abdullah Yameen’s administration arrested and imprisoned a former president and the sitting minister of defense on terrorism-related charges. Over the course of Yameen’s five-year term, these and other numerous abuses of the rule of law led to a series of protests and a national emergency in 2018. This dichotomy extends into the economic sphere as well. The Maldives is the wealthiest country in South Asia with a per capita GDP on par with Mexico or Argentina (World Bank, 2020). Despite this relative wealth across the population, education, employment, and housing opportunities remain relatively few and are only available to those with the right connections. “At the heart of this is corruption: the government is the main employer but obtaining a civil service job requires connections. According to the young people everything from housing to getting a degree depends on a willingness either to pay or to use connections. A deep unfairness at the heart of the system is both inefficient and corrosive to community spirit” (Templer, 2019, p. 8). The challenges the Maldives faces are deep and extend well beyond the political turmoil that has existed for decades. Indeed, long-standing neglect on the part of the government in key areas like education, housing, employment, and justice have led to extensive disillusionment – especially among young people – and in many cases an unraveling of the social fabric. This has led to a rise in crime and drug use as the educational system is insufficient for the job market and housing is both extremely limited and often priced far out of reach of most people. Criminal

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and drug activity have in turn led to an ever-increasing gang problem across the islands and in particular Malé, the capital and largest city, and Addu City, the second largest city located in the southern atoll. Gang activity is a significant problem and young people believe that the government is more interested in closing the political and cultural space available to them than enhancing their opportunities for education, employment, and housing (Templer, 2019, p. 8). This contentious political environment and deep-seated corruption have caused numerous grievances among young people, both real and perceived. One of the driving factors behind this political and social instability is the very tourist industry that has enabled the Maldives to become the richest country in South Asia. Indeed, the rapid transformation of the country from an isolated and underdeveloped archipelago to a world-class, exotic tourist destination in less than 50 years with foreign-born workers accounting for 25% of the population has placed significant stress on the political and social fabric of the country. The shift in the political system to a multiparty democracy as the tourist resorts began appearing caused further strain and polarization in the country and among families (Templer, 2019, p. 8). The Maldives has struggled with terrorism and violent extremism since the Sultan Park bombing in 2007. After the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014, over 60 radicalized men left the Maldives, many with families in tow, to join the insurgent group in Syria. When family members are added to the count, approximately 200 Maldivians found their way to Syria, making the Maldives the country with the greatest number per capita of individuals that went to fight alongside Islamic State and Jabhat Al-Nusra militants. As the only Muslim country in South Asia, the Maldives continues to struggle with a radicalized version of Islam seeking access to the ideological spaces of the nation. With an increasing number of young people who are unable to find work and face an ever-growing problem of overcrowding and lack of affordable housing, many find themselves drawn to join criminal gangs and engage in illicit drug activity. The nation’s youth are increasingly vulnerable to radicalization from a variety of pathways. While a number of the Maldivians who went to Syria died fighting, the return of battle-hardened and experienced fighters poses serious security issues to the country and its neighbors. Indeed, since 2014, the emergence of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has provided an avenue of recruitment for these returnees. Similarly, the Islamic State has called on its adherents to target Western citizens and interests. Thus, the lure and recruitment of these two groups polarizes many in society in the face of a rise in extremism. The current situation in the Maldives therefore raises serious security concerns on many levels and has the potential to harm the Maldives’s vital tourism economy and its fragile political system. Seen from this perspective, this chapter will examine the proliferation of religious extremism in the Maldives and the security implications for the country. Key to understanding why the Maldives has suffered from this increase in religious extremism is the context in which individual Maldivians live across the archipelago and how these contextual factors impact them in their daily lives. Social Movement Theory holds that when the political

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opportunity structure in a given society is closed to a group and it attempts to find redress for grievances, social movements emerge as alternate means for the people in the group to find pathways for reform (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015, pp. 8–9).

Legacy of corruption and bad governance Since its independence from Great Britain in 1965 and subsequent transition to a republic in 1968, the Maldives has struggled with governance and rule of law shortfalls that a legacy and pattern of corruption have worsened. Until the inauguration of the current president, Ibrahim Solih in November 2018, the Maldives had only experienced a true democratic form of government for four years during Mahomed Nasheed’s presidency from 2008 to 2012. Unfortunately, Nasheed’s presidency ended in a bloodless coup when he stepped down in 2012. Between Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and his half-brother Abdulla Yameen, the Maldives was ruled under a virtual dictatorship for 35 of its 52 years since becoming a republic. Even the first president, Ibrahim Nasir, did not fully embrace the transition from monarchy to democracy. And while the current president is seeking true democratic reform, the Maldives with its legacy of corruption has struggled to fully implement the promises of democratic governance. Thus, the Maldives and its pathway toward democracy are uneven – the resulting lack of redress within the existing political opportunity structure creates an environment that other contextual factors further exacerbate. A recent U.S. State Department (2019, p. 2) report on the Maldives notes that there are significant challenges to Maldives’ newfound openness. Some of the most pressing that President Solih must address include religious extremism, systemic corruption and significant debt, limited opportunities for citizens, civil society, and media, as well as income and development inequality. If President Solih fails to address these challenges, his efforts to bolster democratic governance, rule of law, fiscal management, combat corruption and empower civil society will falter. Unfortunately, the legacy of corruption in the Maldives runs deep. The 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International ranked the Maldives 130 out of 180 behind Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2019, p. 3). The Maldives’s score in 2018 was 124 out of 180 countries (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). Thus, despite President Solih’s agenda focused on democratic reform, development, and human rights, the country’s position on the Corruption Perceptions Index has fallen. It is this intersection of corruption and bad governance that continues to sow fear and frustration among various elements of the country, the youth in particular. Although the Maldives’s gross domestic product (GDP) of $10,000 per capita is the highest in South Asia, the benefits of this wealth that result from tourism is concentrated into the hands of a few individuals who misuse it for personal gain, while public institutions continue to struggle, and many Maldivians

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lack access to the tools and services required to improve their lives (Templer, 2019, p. 4). It is this fear and frustration among the nation’s youth that causes many of them to disengage from society or feel excluded and then become easy prey for criminals and extremists to exploit. Indeed, the 2019 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, Youth Vulnerability in the Maldives, states: Many under 35 have found few legitimate ways to express their frustration. They have come of age in a period of political turmoil and polarization, even seeing their families wrenched apart by partisan divisions. Widening mismatches between education and jobs mean a quarter of them are out of work. Those on outer islands have seen opportunities ever more concentrated in Malé and out of reach to all but a few. It is no surprise to find that many of them are deeply disillusioned, frustrated by corruption, and bitter about politicians who pay them little heed. (Templer, 2019, p. 4) The report also notes that 80% of young Maldivians the UNDP interviewed said they were optimistic about their future, likely owing to President Solih’s democratic reform-minded agenda (Templer, 2019, p. 4). Despite this encouraging outlook, there is still a sizeable portion of the youth who are at risk for seeking redress for their grievances in illegal and dangerous activities.

Contextual factors Geography and religion play significant roles in why the Maldives has struggled with violent extremism since the 2007 Sultan Park Bombing in Malé. The archipelago of over 1,200 islands stretches across the Indian Ocean for nearly 800 km and sits across three major shipping lanes connecting Asia to the Persian Gulf and East Africa. Indeed, the maritime environment of the Maldives creates extremely porous borders that the country’s lack of maritime domain awareness exacerbates. In a striking illustration of capability shortfalls, as of December 2018, the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) Coast Guard has a single office near Malé responsible for coordinating the coast guard activities across the entire territory of the country (Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, MNDF Coast Guard, interview, December 21, 2018). There are no fixed wing aircraft in the MNDF Coast Guard, and it only has about 30 vessels. This creates significant gaps which make the Maldives extremely “vulnerable to a variety of security threats, including narcotics trafficking and smuggling. Proceeds derived from such criminal activity fund terrorism and gang activity” (U.S. State Department, 2019, p. 2). Most of the 1,200 islands are deserted with the remaining inhabited islands consisting of the capital Malé comprising about 40% of the population, Addu City in the southern most atoll with about 10% of the population, and the remaining 50% of the populace spread across some 200 home islands. In addition to the inhabited islands and major population centers, there are also 132 resort islands under the one island – one resort concept. With half of the population living in

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such dispersed and remote islands – accessible only by speedboat or sea plane – it is nearly impossible for the government to provide adequate services like healthcare, education, and affordable housing. There are also ample opportunities for extremist individuals to preach radicalized versions of Islam like Salafi Jihadism in the various home islands far from the oversight of government officials in Malé. The Maldives Government relies on the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, headquartered in Malé, like all government ministries, to ensure the country’s 700plus mosques adhere to the laws and regulations regarding Islamic preaching that prohibit extremist ideology and radicalization activities. The ministry relies on city and island councils to enforce requirements for individual imams from each mosque to submit daily reports on what theology and sermons he preached. Nevertheless, with no requirement to submit physical reports to the ministry, imams are ultimately accountable to the city and island councils. While it is commendable for the Maldives’s government to allow local governments to shape and oversee local religious leaders, this becomes problematic when isolated communities are beholden to conservative and sometimes radicalized preaching. The ministry also conducts inspections of each mosque and engages with the imam, but with few staff members and such a large number of mosques spread across the home islands, it is difficult to measure the efficacy of this accountability system. The ministry could not provide information on how often it conducted inspections, and despite the aforementioned geographic challenges, as of December 2018, it did not have a single speedboat to conduct ministry business and had to rely on other government assets or commercial interisland transport to visit mosques and imams across the country (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, interview, December 20, 2018). The geographically dispersed nature of the islands creates challenges for the ministry in helping island communities understand the differences in the various ideological branches of Islam. This produces seams and gaps that allow those with nefarious purposes in the religious domain to exploit. Dr. Ahmed Zahir, the minister of Islamic Affairs, believes the root problem of violent extremism in the Maldives stems from the people’s lack of understanding and education in Islam. Indeed, the ministry identified a significant level of misinformation among Maldivians as to what constitutes radical Islam. There is also the perception that many Maldivians are unsure of what comprises the different schools of thought within Islam. This promotes confusion about what is the “right path” of Islam, which further allows extremist narratives to find relevance among elements of society (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, interview, December 20, 2018). There is also a substantial problem of radicalization that occurs in the prisons. While foreign fighters from other countries either self-radicalized through the Internet and social media platforms, or a recruiter groomed and recruited them in a virtual environment, the ministry’s assessment is that much of the radicalizing activity in the Maldives occurs in the prisons. The prison system is overwhelmed and there are simply not enough resources available to ensure that extremist individuals who are incarcerated are segregated from vulnerable individuals in the

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prisons who are at risk for radicalization (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, interview, December 20, 2018; Storey, 2019). The resulting friction within communities as people do not always know the difference between various ideologies is cause for concern within the ministry as it seeks to promote religious harmony across the archipelago. While it has established procedures and national law requires imams and other Islamic speakers to produce an education certificate before speaking or delivering religious messages to people, the number of mosques in the country and the geographically dispersed nature of the archipelago make these requirements difficult to enforce. Ultimately, the ministry requires an integrated strategy on promoting religious peace and tolerance across the archipelago (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, interview, December 20, 2018). President Yameen and the previous administration placed heavy restrictions on information about violent extremism in the Maldives. While he may have sought to control the narrative, he actually ceded the space in the information domain to radicalized individuals and groups. Consequently, the Maldives is only now fully coming to understand the scope of the problem it faces. Zahir views the lack of general education about Islam as the most significant factor that contributes to radicalization and thus is planning several prevention and counter violent extremism programs to counter radical Islam and radicalized ideology across the Maldives. The ministry has focused much of these programs on Maldivian youth, both boys and girls, to address the vulnerability of young people to radical ideas and influence from extremist individuals. One example of these programs is the Mosque Program designed to bring boys and girls to the mosques after school for additional Islamic instruction. The goal of the program is to further promote Islam as a religion of peace and to counter radical narratives that children may encounter. The ministry has also engaged in other outreach and education activities designed to reach the broader civil society and has coordinated numerous lectures from world-renowned Islamic scholars that preach peace and tolerance along with carefully vetted local scholars for public lectures and workshops. The focus of these activities has been to promote unity and tolerance among all Maldivians. Ultimately, the ministry is seeking to conduct research to help it understand why religion has become such a source of contention in the Maldives and how it can develop a strategic plan to address this disparity and the lack of understanding about Islam as one of the primary causes of religious tension in the country (Ministry of Islamic Affairs, interview, December 20, 2018). Despite these initiatives and efforts, the Maldives Constitution and legal framework in the country make true religious freedom problematic. The 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Maldives from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom makes clear that the Maldivian government has enabled religious intolerance under the guise of democracy. Indeed, the Maldives Constitution designates Islam as the state religion of the Maldives, requires citizens to be Muslim, and mandates that public office holders be followers of Islam (U.S. State Department, 2018). This has the chilling effect of

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producing an environment where any criticism of Islam is viewed as blasphemy and the “propagation of any religion other than Islam is a criminal offense” (U.S. State Department, 2018). This narrative is continually in contention with the Maldives as a world-class tourist destination and its motto, “The Sunny Side of Life.” This conflict creates space for radicalized individuals to engage in lawfare and find avenues to conduct radicalized and extremist activities. There are also government employees and members of the general public who desire stricter adherence to conservative Islamic tenets and engage in activities that produce alienation among other Maldivians that view their religious practice as a private matter. Thus, while the Maldives relies heavily on revenue from its tourist industry for its GDP, it must also contend with fairly draconian laws with respect to religious freedom. Under national law, it is both illegal to criticize Islam and promote unlawful religious ideologies (Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008). The Maldives Constitution and its associated legal system are filled with contradictions that place democracy, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought at severe risk and effectively make it illegal to be non-Muslim as a Maldivian. Indeed, while the constitution does not mention freedom of religion or belief and prohibits any kind of discrimination, it does not list religion as a basis for discrimination. Further, the constitution states that individuals have the right to freedom of thought and expression but cannot engage in activities that are contrary to the tenets of Islam (Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008; U.S. State Department, 2018). This creates space for individuals to declare as an apostate any Muslim who does not adhere to the tenets of Sunni Islam. This form of lawfare provides opportunities for those with radical agendas to use the Maldives’s laws as means to justify their own. Civil liberties abuses have emerged that both the government and civil society perpetuate. There are numerous accounts of religious discrimination across government agencies. One example is the family court within the Ministry of Justice that routinely refuses to issue birth certificates for children born with one non-Muslim parent. Despite the absence of a legal prohibition for Maldivian citizens to marry a non-Muslim, the court repeatedly held that citizens could neither marry non-Muslims or have children with them. There are also several instances of individuals within the broader society of shaming or harassing women who do not wear a hijab even though there is no government or religious requirement to wear one (U.S. State Department, 2018). Some instances have been so severe that women have had to relocate to other island communities or Malé. Other examples include parents demanding that island schools remove lessons from the curriculum on Roman gods and the solar system because they believe it promotes polytheistic views (U.S. State Department, 2018). Ultimately, this has created an environment where the government and civil society are seemingly at odds with each other and themselves. Although many of these instances may seem isolated or trivial, the small national population and close-knit nature of home island communities make for circumstances that produce feelings of alienation and in some cases mobilization to violence. This

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conflict within the government and civil society is particularly difficult on the youth. With 25% of youth unemployed and coupled with severe overcrowding in Malé and Addu City, young people often feel adrift and isolated without familial and community safeguards to help them navigate society. Indeed, young people view corruption and employment as their top two concerns (Templer, 2019, p. 14). With many young people relocating to Malé to pursue greater education and employment opportunities, feelings of isolation are exacerbated, and young people become easy prey for criminal gangs and radicalized individuals to recruit (Villijoali NGO, interview, December 15, 2018; Transparency Maldives, interview, December 17, 2018).

Religious extremism in the Maldives Religious extremism and the mobilization to violence were relatively isolated in the Maldives before and after the Sultan Park bombing in 2007. It was the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 that created the environment where the Maldives became the country with the highest number per capita of citizens going to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside Islamic State fighters (U.S. State Department, 2019, p. 2). Counter and anti-terrorism duties are split between the Maldives Police Service (MPS) and the Maldives National Defence Force’s (MNDF) National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). While some sources indicate that up to 200 Maldivians went to fight along Islamic State fighters, officials from the MPS and MNDF/NCTC place the count of Maldivian foreign fighters at 61 as of December 2018. Both organizations agree that when family members (wives and children) are added the total number may be closer to 200 but insist that actual fighters are well below that number (NCTC officials, interview, December 17, 2018; MPS officials, interview, December 17, 2018). More recent updates place the number at 69, as Defence Minister Mariya Didi confirmed a MNDF report in an interview with The Hindu following the deadly terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday in 2019 (Moorthy, 2019). While the rise of the Islamic State and radicalization of Maldivians seeking to leave the country for Syria is the latest extremist group the country has had to contend with, the phenomenon first emerged after the Sultan Park bombing in 2007. In the wake of that attack, foreign terrorist groups emerged across the Middle East and South Asia at a time of political turmoil in the Maldives. Indeed, “Political divisions that came with democracy created challenges for communities at a time when social media and other forces were creating an environment supporting extremism” (Templer, 2019, p. 8). Thus, political shocks – especially the bloodless coup in 2012 – combined with globalized religion and social media, as well as the use of religion as a political tool, contributed to the rise of religious radicalization and extremism in the Maldives (Templer, 2019, p. 8). Further exacerbating this was the lack of prosecutions in the aftermath of the bombing that emboldened extremist behavior in the archipelago. As early as 2011, security professionals believe there was a concerted effort to recruit senior members from Maldivian criminal gangs for extremist activity. Many of these individuals joined

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or attempted to join terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and Al Qaeda. One of the common denominators among those that left the country to join extremist groups was a record of criminal activity. This terror-crime nexus is one of the most significant challenges the Maldives faces in addressing religious extremism. Indeed, Maldivian security professionals assess that as much as 50% of the Maldivian foreign fighters that went to join Al Qaeda had extensive criminal records (NCTC officials, interview, December 17, 2018; MPS officials, interview, December 17, 2018). As seen with other foreign fighters going to Iraq and Syria, fighting with the Islamic State and other extremist groups is inherently dangerous. The Maldives Police Service estimates about 50% of the 61 foreign fighters that comprise the official account died while fighting in Syria. Beyond the family members that accompanied Maldivian men when they left for Syria, there are now reports that some of the Maldivian older girls and young women have become wives of other foreign fighters in Syria. These young women most likely will never return to the Maldives. This is especially difficult for family members who remain in the Maldives given the close-knit nature of island communities. Exact numbers are unknown, but of the widows and families left behind in Syria, many want to come back but are unable to because of legal and immigration issues. Many have young children born in Syria and thus lack Maldivian passports and do not have access to Maldivian embassies or consular services to obtain them. There are also those whose husbands died in the fighting that do not want to return and have confounded efforts to repatriate them (NCTC officials, interview, December 17, 2018; MPS officials, interview, December 17, 2018). Official accounts also indicate approximately 75 additional Maldivians have tried to emigrate to Syria since 2014, but authorities either intercepted them before leaving or officials in other countries they were traveling through were able to interdict them. According to officials in the MPS and NCTC, the previous administration under President Yameen made it nearly impossible to prosecute these individuals under the Anti-Terrorism Law and Criminal Procedure Act. Nevertheless, officials are hopeful that the new administration will enable prosecution of these cases. One of the biggest challenges that officials in the MPS and NCTC face is a lack of awareness among political leaders about the scope of the problem as well as the limitations of the Criminal Procedure Act on bringing these cases to trial (NCTC officials, interview, December 17, 2018; MPS officials, interview, December 17, 2018). Whether the number of foreign fighters is 200 or 69, the Maldives faces challenges in bringing charges against those suspected of violating the country’s terrorism laws and prosecuting those cases as well as dealing with returnees and their families. This same situation occurred in the aftermath of the Sultan Park bombing. Additionally, the reporting of these numbers and a more conservative religious view across the archipelago have produced anxiety among the youth that further exacerbates grievances and the search for redress from a system that increasingly shuts them out. Thus, while the intersection of various economic, social, and political disparities is driving a wedge among the people,

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there are fewer and fewer legitimate avenues for young people to find their place in society.

Corruption, rule of law, and humanitarian rights One of the factors contributing to these inequities – both real and perceived – is the judicial system. Long-standing corruption within the Ministry of Justice at its highest levels has frustrated prosecutors, counterterrorism analysts, and security professionals in the Maldives. Indeed, there are links between politicians, criminal gangs, and judges that make it extremely difficult for the Maldives’s judicial system to effectively address not only terrorism but the associated criminal behavior that enables it (U.S. State Department, 2019, p. 2). In discussions with members of the Prosecutor General’s Office, there are a number of factors that make it difficult to pursue criminal prosecution of individuals the government knows are involved in various illegal activities covered by the Maldives’ anti-terrorism legislation. These vary from family members and friends of the accused unwilling to testify once a Maldivian foreign fighter has returned home to various judges in the judiciary unwilling to hear terrorism cases. Even investigators from the MPS are prohibited from being in court during the prosecution of these cases (Prosecutor General’s Office, interview, December 20, 2018). This environment creates a destabilizing effect across the entire country, but especially in Malé. With the breakdown of the judicial system, the prisons have become de facto holding cells and breeding grounds for extremism. Indeed, the confluence of criminal activity involving both drugs and gangs, and decades of corrupt governance and confrontational politics have disillusioned many young men in the country. They become easy targets for recruiters from both criminal gangs and radical Islamic preachers – some of them from other Islamic countries. Whether these preachers are recruiting young men for extremist activities or to propagate conservative Islam is unknown. Nevertheless, the overall effect on communities is disrupting. The Maldives has taken a hard stance on gang activity and drug use, which in turn has filled the country’s prisons to overflowing. Indeed, the Maldives imprisons people at 15 times the rate of India with little impact on the rate of gang and drug-related crime (Templer, 2019, p. 15). This emphasis on incarceration in lieu of rehabilitation coupled with the high level of youth unemployment is creating a crippling cycle of dependency for young people who use or deal in illegal substances. Indeed, most of those who are incarcerated have committed nonviolent offenses. For those imprisoned, instead of rehabilitation, they often fall victim to radicalization and recidivism. Unfortunately, drug treatment reaches too few individuals and those that do receive treatment often receive no continuing care after they leave treatment programs (“Audit reveals existence of corruption,” 2019). Maldivian youth often point to drugs as the most serious problem in their communities along with gang activity and other crimes that are associated with drug use and trafficking. The net effect of this is that youth across the archipelago – the home islands as well as Malé and Addu City – view “drugs and associated crimes, imprisonment,

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and corruption as eroding faith in government and undermining communities” (Templer, 2019, p. 5). Beyond the severe inequity that exists in the prison system and lack of rehabilitation programs is the endemic corruption that exists across government ministries. As the Maldives shifted from authoritarian to democratic politics, the country experienced deep divisions that continue to this day. This has produced a patronage system within government and civil society that many young people – the age demographic most vulnerable to radicalization – believe is deeply unfair. Indeed, young people surveyed for the 2019 UNDP Report consider corruption as the number one concern they had for their own future employment and the future of the country (Templer, 2019, p. 14). Youth and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during in-country interviews echoed this sentiment believing that the system does not allow for freedom or opportunity. The head of the Villijoali NGO assesses corruption as one of the most important issues impacting the security and stability of the country. Of particular concern is his belief that many of the politicians that were involved in the scandals and corruption of 2013 following the ouster of President Nasheed in February 2012 are now involved directly or indirectly with the government. Indeed, President Solih, inaugurated in 2018, meets weekly with former president Gayoom who ruled the Maldives in an authoritarian government for over 30 years (Villijoali NGO, interview, December 15, 2018; Bhatia, 2018). The NGO Transparency Maldives, established in 2007 specifically for fighting against corruption and promoting democracy, has performed a great deal of outreach and has made attempts to engage with individuals politically. It also advocates for accountability among government officials. Unfortunately, the NGO has faced an uphill battle in accomplishing this work since its founding. Much of the Maldives’s political history enabled a system that facilitated corruption and the violation of civil liberties as well as humanitarian rights. This system is still in place and is evident within the judiciary in particular, as detailed earlier in this chapter. Consequently, the rife corruption has created serious trust deficits in public institutions. President Yameen’s administration from 2013 to 2018 made it extremely difficult for Transparency Maldives to do its work, and the NGO was often prohibited from bringing visitors to the country for collaboration, investigations, and research, as government officials would frequently prohibit NGO visitors from entering the country. Those working at the NGO received threats of violence from various sources and face continual harassment. This atmosphere, coupled with the murder of popular blogger and human rights defender Yameen Rasheed, has created a culture of fear and intimidation (Transparency Maldives, interview, December 17, 2018; Transparency International, 2013). Despite Transparency Maldives providing free legal aid, and promoting civic education, tolerance, and positive citizenship, the organization continues to receive threats and accusations of being un-Islamic. These actions place a cloud of suspicion over the NGO and prevent it from serving the very members of civil society it is trying to protect. This often happens in the Maldives with organizations that promote civil liberties and humanitarian rights. Much of these issues

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result from inherent weaknesses with the society in general and some government institutions in particular. Indeed, Transparency Maldives assesses that civil society in the Maldives is weak and as a whole is a rather intolerant society. This intolerance begins early in children’s education and the creation of national identity. Unfortunately, there is no real civic education within the public education system and thus young people are ignorant of how government ministries are supposed to promote good governance and the rule of law. This then creates a constant tension between organizations like NGOs and the press that are critical of the government and people in the general society. This tension coupled with the relative homogeneity of the population that government and religious leaders promote creates the potential for radicalization and extremism (Transparency Maldives, interview, December 17, 2018). Like Transparency Maldives, the Villijoali NGO also assesses issues in civil society identity that have led to weaknesses radicalized individuals are able to exploit. The country’s relative isolation until about 50 years ago and its continued homogeneity in ethnicity and religion have contributed to a very tribal atmosphere among the people that persists to this day. Indeed, there is still a desire among many Maldivians for a “cult”-like leader the country had for over 30 years under President Gayoom. In many ways, this reflects a longing for the nation’s past when a series of sultans and sultanas ruled the archipelago. This societal attitude also enables religious extremism. While both Transparency Maldives and Villijoali NGO do not assess radical Islam as significant across the country, the relative intolerance in society as well as fear of extremist groups and individuals allow those who espouse religious extremism to promote their ideology. Ultimately, greater emphasis on and access to educational services are required to create more tolerance in society, promote democratic reforms, and reduce the space available to radicalized individuals and extremist organizations to operate (Villijoali NGO, interview, December 15, 2018; Transparency Maldives, interview, December 17, 2018).

Educational challenges After corruption, young people in the Maldives view education as the greatest hinderance to their own and the country’s development and success. While students in Malé have considerable agency in educational programs, young people spread across the home islands are far less empowered in pursuing even basic education. Most schools outside of the capital only provide education through age 16 and those that want to further their studies must go to Malé. Unfortunately, this requires significant resources that are often unavailable to the majority of young people. Even those education facilities that are available lack the required infrastructure, teaching materials, and guidance counselors to assist students in preparing themselves for potential careers and adulthood (Templer, 2019, p. 16). In an interview with members of the Ministry of Education, officials discussed a range of challenges that the Maldives must address in order to ensure universal education access, facilities that have adequate resources, and curriculum

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designed to prepare Maldivians for success beyond the classroom. One of the challenges the ministry is addressing is reversing the centralized control of education and curriculum across the country that occurred under the Yameen administration. Because of this consolidated control, numerous principals left their posts, which left schools without leadership. Furthermore, the curriculum is focused on testing for the Cambridge Assessment International Education program. While this is a very effective college preparatory program of study, it does little to prepare graduates for the demands of the workforce in the Maldives. This gap in education also causes frustration among the nation’s youth that the lack of human resources in education across the archipelago further exacerbates. With 213 schools nationwide spread across such a large geographic maritime area, it is often difficult to provide qualified teachers to the smaller home islands. Further, many of these schools have limited physical resources for infrastructure; lack curricula in science, technology, engineering, and math; and are unable to pay competitive salaries for teachers and staff (Ministry of Education, interview, December 18, 2018). Despite these challenges, the Ministry of Education is seeking to make substantive changes and reform long-standing inadequacies in public education. One such initiative is establishing atoll superintendent positions that will have responsibility and authority within the atolls to manage education and schooling. The ministry is also seeking to ensure that in addition to physical libraries in each school, digital libraries accessible via cellular and wireless networks are also available. Given the frustration with the emphasis on teaching the Cambridge test over more useful life skills, the ministry is also undertaking efforts to revise curricula to focus on the needs of every student to prepare them for life. Part of this is an emphasis on health and physical education and programs for teachers to use to spark interest in their students to engage in healthy and active lifestyles. The ministry is also creating an advocacy program for creative arts, music, dance, and other aesthetic arts. Nevertheless, there are numerous challenges as some island communities do not allow music in the schools and there are constant pressures from parents in the more conservative communities to focus solely on Islamic education (Ministry of Education, interview, December 18, 2018). In an effort to promote awareness and to introduce progressive ideas in education, the Ministry of Education has conducted education seminars with members of the NCTC. The focus of these seminars is promoting critical and creative thinking as a way to prevent and counter radicalization and violent extremism. One area in particular that has hindered these efforts is the lack of formally trained counselors in the schools. As detailed earlier, the Yameen administration centralized much of the educational decisions in the country, isolated schools, and prevented principals from allowing outside entities into the schools. Consequently, there is a real dearth of certified professional staff that has hampered efforts at reform. The ministry requires assistance from other ministries in the government for resources and programs in physical and mental health, youth sports, Islamic education, gender, and the environment. Ultimately, the goal of these partnerships is to ensure the Ministry of Education has the resources it needs to promote peace

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and tolerance and protect society – all of which must start as early as possible in the schools (Ministry of Education, interview, December 18, 2018).

The National Counter Terrorism Centre The Maldives established the National Counter Terrorism Centre in February 2016. It falls under the Minister of Defence and National Security and has largely focused its efforts on prevention and countering violent extremism through partnerships across the entirety of the Maldives’s government and civil society. In a few short years, NCTC has developed an extensive network of partners across all the ministries and various civil society actors and is focused on creating approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism that involve local island councils, all government ministries, and elements of civil society. Extensive interviews and discussions with members of the NCTC revealed that the organization is committed to working by, with, and through a number of government ministries and civil society actors. It does this through traditional intelligence work, but more important, through numerous working groups, conferences, and workshops. All of these are designed for education and collaboration in the identification of the various push and pull factors that create pathways to radicalization and extremism, and developing strategies to counter them (NCTC, interview, December 17, 2018). Such transformational approaches are uncommon in the Maldives and significant credit goes to NCTC for fostering trust and confidence among so many ministries and civil society actors. Indeed, while many NGOs and other civil society members are hesitant and fearful of interacting with government officials as a result of the Yameen administration’s targeted harassment, they view NCTC officials as trusted agents to advance prevention and counter violent extremism programs. Numerous ministries interviewed recounted various NCTC conferences and workshops that ministerial personnel had attended. Common themes in these workshops are that there are a variety of contextual factors that lead individuals to radicalization. While there is no single factor that enables this process, there is often a confluence of identity crises coupled with limited or nonexistent opportunities for education and employment. Thus, NCTC is seeking to empower ministries and civil society actors with education and awareness to develop approaches within each ministry and civil organization to counter feelings among the people – particularly the youth – of alienation and mobilization to violence. In this way, NCTC is seeking to create resiliency in the Maldives that will enable communities at all levels to focus on preventing radicalization and extremism, which is far more cost effective and successful than countering these challenges after the fact (NCTC, interview, December 17, 2018). Ultimately, the Maldives should consider reorganizing NCTC so that it is no longer within the MNDF, but rather make it a separate ministry-level organization that reports directly to the president. This would establish NCTC as a cabinet-level ministry and decouple the military from what are largely intelligence and social reform efforts.

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Conclusion The Maldives is now at one of its most critical points since President Solih began his administration in November 2018. Having secured an absolute legislative majority in the parliament during the April 2019 elections, the Maldivian Democratic Party under President Solih’s leadership is busy enacting his progressive agenda. In interviews and conversations across various government ministries, the country is actively seeking to chart a course away from the authoritarian and intolerant regime of President Yameen. Nevertheless, there are significant challenges that the government must address. Long-standing corruption across numerous ministries and particularly in the Ministry of Justice threaten to unravel the progress President Solih and his administration have made. True prison reform that offers pathways toward rehabilitation and redemption as well as medical and mental health care for drug users rather than incarceration are also required. The public education system also needs improvement to prepare the nation’s youth for the job market of the 21st century. Creating fair and equitable opportunities for young people will do much to stem the flow of radicalized and extremist behavior and the active recruiting that takes place to target the vulnerable among the population. The Maldives must also invest resources to properly plan, coordinate, and execute demobilization, deradicalization, and reintegration programs suitable to address returning foreign fighters and their family members to help them become productive members of society while eschewing the lure of radicalization. The recently opened national De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Center is an important first step in this process. President Solih announced the opening at his annual address in early 2020 at the inauguration of the parliament for the new year, emphasizing the importance of rehabilitating and reintegrating “Maldivian citizens who return after involvement in terrorism abroad” (Hussain, 2020). Indeed, public trust and confidence in the administration is relatively high and Solih now has a clear mandate to pursue his democratic-minded agenda (Moorthy, 2019). Time will reveal whether Maldivian society is ready to embrace the progressive agenda that will enable the country to realize all the potential that comes with being the richest nation per capita in South Asia. With China constantly seeking access to the maritime and economic spaces of the archipelago as part of its One Belt, One Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia along with other Muslim countries seeking access to the ideological spaces of the country, the Maldives needs active partnerships with other democratic countries. Unfortunately, the Maldives is saddled with ever-increasing debt from China as that country continues to expand its influence across the South Asian region. At the end of 2019, the Maldives owed $3.5 billion to China in loans when government-to-government loans were combined with private loans and sovereign guarantees. The Maldives paid China over $700 million in interest and principal payments for 2019, nearly one fifth of its GDP (Dixit, 2019). While these loans have enabled significant development projects in Malé and other parts of the archipelago, they are often a double-edged sword. Chinese construction firms do not employ local labor and do not source building materials, supplies, or construction equipment from the

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Maldives. This eliminates significant job and market opportunities for Maldivians and further exacerbates youth grievances (Villijoali NGO, interview, December 15, 2018; Immigration official, interview, December 20, 2018). The Maldives is also contending with increased efforts on the part of Saudi Arabia to partner with Islamic institutions in the country. It was the 2004 tsunami that enabled an influx of Islamic NGOs, many with extensive Saudi funding, that began to shift how Maldivians viewed Islam. While the impact of the Soviet– Afghan War raised the consciousness among Maldivians about jihad and the rise of Al Qaeda in the post-Soviet space increased this, it was the role of some Islamic NGOs with radicalized agendas that had the greatest impact. The Maldives is still grappling with the second and third order effects of this more than 15 years after the tsunami. It was this Saudi influence and funding that allowed Wahhabism and other radicalized versions of Islam to take root in the Maldives and flourish in some parts of the home islands (Storey, 2019). Addressing this phenomenon in a way that does not alienate and further exacerbate existing grievances but rather sets those radicalized individuals on a pathway away from extremist behavior is one of the more significant challenges for the government and civil society (NCTC, interview, December 17, 2018; MPS, interview, December 16, 2018). Given the limited resources of the Maldives and its expansive maritime domain, it requires strategic partnerships to ensure its security and stability. India and Sri Lanka have long-standing ties to the Maldives that offer some buffer and in recent years both countries have increased their cooperation with the Maldives. While the Yameen administration had forged closer relationships with China, Solih is committed to fortifying the Maldives’ relationship with its closest neighbors. Indeed, in September 2019, the Maldives and India signed a treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters that is intended to enhance the effectiveness of both countries in criminal investigations and prosecutions “through cooperation and mutual assistance in criminal matters” (“India, Maldives sign treaty,” 2019). Likewise, Sri Lanka – the Maldives’s closest neighbor – has also increased its cooperation in security and anti-terrorism following the devastating terrorist attack in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday in 2019 as both countries seek to enhance their operational capabilities (Moorthy, 2019). This comes in addition to the two countries’ cooperation, along with India, in a formal agreement on maritime cooperation in 2012, updated in 2016. The trilateral agreement allowed for shared resources and data in the region to better control territorial waters of the three countries and detect suspicious movements (Radhakrishan, 2016). Future research should further explore the impact of these cooperative agreements on the security of the region. Despite this increased cooperation with India and Sri Lanka, the Maldives requires additional help from the West to prevent it from further negative influence. Unfortunately, the U.S. administration under President Trump approached foreign relations from a purely transactional approach. With no U.S. embassy in the Maldives, diplomatic and foreign policy duties fall to the U.S. embassy in Colombo, Sri Lanka. This is hardly adequate. There is hope for greater partnerships in the future, however, as a number of highly placed members of the Maldives National Defence Force are graduates of U.S. Department of Defense education

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programs. Many of these programs are focused on whole of government approaches to countering violent extremism, and Maldivian graduates of these programs are focused on ensuring the rule of law, and protecting civil liberties and humanitarian rights, while preventing and countering violent extremism across the archipelago.

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Templer, R. J. (2019, February). Youth vulnerability in the Maldives. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/hom e/librarypage/democratic-governance/youth-vulnerability-in-the-maldives.html Transparency International. (2018). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from https:// www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2018/results/mdv ———. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index 2019. Retrieved form https://images.trans parencycdn.org/images/2019_CPI_Report_EN_200331_141425.pdf ———. (2013, October 7). Transparency International calls for the protection of staff working with Transparency Maldives. Thompson Reuters Foundation News. Retrieved from https://news.trust.org/item/20131007112826-l40nq/ U.S. State Department. (2019). Country reports on terrorism 2019: Maldives. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/maldives/ ———. (2019, April 2). Integrated country strategy for the Maldives. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICS-Maldives_UNCLASS-508 .pdf ———. (2018). Report on international religious freedom: Maldives. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/mal dives/ The World Bank. (2020, April 10). The World Bank in the Maldives. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/maldives/overview Zahir, A. (2016, April 25). Politics of radicalization: how the Maldives is failing to stem violent extremism. Maldives Independent. Retrieved from https://maldivesindependent. com/feature-comment/politics-of-radicalisation-how-the-maldives-is-failing-to-stemviolent-extremism-123782

Part IV

Issues of regional security and global implications

12 Terrorism, security, and development and the “never-ending” conflict over Jammu and Kashmir Eamon Murphy Introduction Arguably, the greatest tragedy of modern South Asian history is the long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan over the beautiful valley of Kashmir. Cradled by the mighty Himalayas and the Pir Panjal mountain range, the Kashmir Valley, with its stunning scenery, lush vegetation, crisp cool mountain air, and lakes, and traversed by the mighty rapid flowing rivers Indus and Sutlej and their tributaries has been described by the famous Sufi mystic Amir Khusrow Dehlavi, with some poetic license, as a “paradise on earth” (The Sufi, 2015). Endemic poverty, violence, and oppression, however, have meant that for many inhabitants Kashmir has become a “hell on earth,” especially since the 1980s when the bitter conflict between the inhabitants of the valley and the central government greatly escalated, leading to curfews, economic chaos, and civil disturbances. The civil unrest in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been further inflamed by anger over the ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Kashmir police, Central Reserve Police, and the military. The Kashmir crisis has poisoned relations between India and Pakistan ever since 1947, leading to two major wars as well as ongoing border skirmishes, which, at times, have threatened to bring about the horrors of nuclear war (Ahlawat & Malik, 2019). The tragic human and economic costs of the conflict have been enormous, as have been the national, regional, and global security implications.

Kashmir and Kashmiriyat J&K is one of the most strategically important regions of South Asia being bounded by India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. Historically J&K (commonly referred to as Kashmir) has been a pivotal geopolitical region at the crossroads of the world’s greatest civilizations: India, China, and central Asia. Throughout its history, Kashmir has been ruled by either local independent rulers or by powerful empires and states based in the north Indian Gangetic plain, Afghanistan, or central Asia. The region, while connected politically and geographically to south, central, and western Asia, has its own distinct secular and religiously inclusive

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ethno-nationalism and cultural identity as Kashmiriyat, which Kashmiris are determined to protect (Tak, 2013). One of the misconceptions of the Kashmir conflict is that it has been an ideological struggle between the Hindu majority of India and the Kashmiris, most of whom are Muslim. Islam in Kashmir, however, has for the most part been tolerant, nondoctrinal, and syncretic. Of great importance to the spread of Islam in Kashmir were the mystical teachings of Sufi saints who migrated from central Asia and Persia (now Iran). The shrines of Sufi saints have attracted Hindus and Buddhists as well as Muslims. Likewise, the shrines of Hindu saints or rishes, the Hindu counterparts to Sufi mystics, were respected by all religions (Ahmad, 1979). From the syncretism of mystical Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and other Kashmiri religious traditions has emerged the concept of Kashmiriyat, an expression of the solidarity, tolerance, and distinctive secular nonsectarian identity of the Kashmiri people (Tak, 2013). Most Kashmiris have not strongly identified either with Hindu India or Muslim Pakistan but rather have a robust sense of independence.

Origins of the Kashmir conflict In August 1947, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two independent nations: the Hindu majority Republic of India and the Muslim majority Pakistan. Accompanied by the largest migration of peoples in history and horrific communal violence, the partition of the subcontinent on religious grounds went ahead generally as planned with Hindu majority areas being incorporated into India and Muslim into Pakistan. The most notable exception was Kashmir, which was unique in that its population was predominantly Muslim and the territory was contiguous to Pakistan as well as India, but its ruler Maharajah Hari Singh, after much hesitation, reluctantly decided that his kingdom would accede to India (Schofield, 2010, p. xi). The circumstances surrounding the origins of the Kashmir conflict are clouded in controversy and have resulted in fiercely acrimonious, often bitter and emotional, debate among scholars, journalists, and politicians, particularly from India and Pakistan. Briefly, the Indian argument is that legally all of Kashmir belongs to India and that the Pakistanis are invaders illegally occupying the western area known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The Pakistani counterargument is that in addition to Azad (Free) Kashmir (India calls it POK), as a Muslimmajority area, the whole of Kashmir rightfully belongs to Pakistan. Islamabad claims that India has consistently refused to hold a promised referendum among the Kashmiris to determine their own future (Kishwar, 2003). India says it will not hold a referendum until Pakistan has withdrawn its troops from the region, which is a key precondition for the holding of a referendum as laid down by the United Nations Security Council in 1948 (Ahlawat & Malik, 2019, pp. 61–62). The stalemate continues, but the political reality is that neither Pakistan nor India would agree to an independent Kashmir even in the highly unlikely event of Pakistan withdrawing its forces, thus enabling a referendum being held.

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Hari Singh was an ineffectual, authoritarian, and unpopular ruler with the vast majority of his subjects, especially Muslims who suffered brutal oppression (Copland, 1981, pp. 233–235). In Kashmir, the resistance to the maharajah’s highly unpopular rule was led by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference under the leadership of the charismatic and highly popular Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah. According to a recent biographer, Abdullah “was, without question, the dominant figure in Kashmir from the 1930s until his death in 1982” (Para, 2019, p. 279). Sheikh Abdullah had become a warm friend and political ally of Jawaharlal Nehru, the secularist and socialist leader of the Indian Nationalist Congress Party, which played a major role in gaining independence from Britain. Abdullah considered that land and other long-overdue reforms in Kashmir would have a much better chance of succeeding with Nehru and the Congress rather than the All-India Pakistan Muslim League, which had led the movement for a separate Muslim majority nation. Abdullah was convinced that the Muslim League had become dominated by reactionary landlords (Ganguly, 2002, pp. 174–194). Moreover, Islam in Pakistan is much more influenced by the more rigid orthodox Islam, called Deobandi, Wahhabi, or Salafi, than the Islam in Kashmir, which adheres to the far more tolerant and syncretic Sufism. While in his private life Abdullah was deeply religious, he was, like Nehru, strongly secularist and socialist and believed that religion should be kept out of politics. Abdullah’s party, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, won all 75 seats for J&K in the 1951 constituent assembly elections, which was regarded as an unofficial plebiscite on the decision to accede to India (Ahlawat & Malik, 2019, p. 62).

The first Indo-Pakistan War and the partition of Kashmir In May 1948, tensions between the two new states over the uncertain future of Kashmir resulted in an undeclared hard-fought war which ended on January 1, 1949, when the United Nations brokered a peace agreement partitioning Kashmir. India lost about 1,500 of its soldiers, while the Pakistani casualties were much higher, around 6,000 (“Indian military hysteria since 1947,” 2019). The settlement left about two-thirds of the former princely state of J&K controlled by India with Pakistan controlling the other third. Pakistan controlled the western area of the Kashmir Valley, known in Pakistan as Azad (free) Kashmir, as well as the northern mountainous regions of Gilgit, Baltistan, Hunza, and Nagar. The southern and southeastern parts of Kashmir constituted the former Indian state of J&K, an artificial administrative construct made up of three regions that have their own cultural identity and historical traditions: the larger Muslim majority Valley of Kashmir situated at a height of 1,600 meters; the lower-lying Jammu, with a Hindu majority, lies to the southwest; and the high, remote, sparsely Buddhist-populated, elevated plateau of Ladakh lies to the northeast (Guruswamy, 2016). The crisis in Kashmir has been largely confined to the Indian-administered Kashmir Valley. Whatever the merits of the conflicting arguments over the origins, the conflict over Kashmir has had disastrous consequences for all concerned: India and more

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so Pakistan, and most of all for the unfortunate Kashmiris who have long been subjected to intimidation, violence, rape, and extrajudicial killings from both the Indian security forces and from Pakistani and foreign fanatical religious extremists supported by the Pakistan military. The conflict has been a continuously suppurating sore in the relationship between India and Pakistan and the major cause of the long-standing and persistent hostility between the two countries. It has led to the often-paranoid fear that India has been intent on destroying the Pakistani state. As Professor C. Christine Fair (2014) has cogently argued, Pakistan’s military, which has dominated the state, especially its foreign policy, since its foundation in 1947 has locked the country into an enduring hostility with India with the major goal of gaining control of Kashmir. The anger and frustration over Pakistan sponsoring terrorist groups in Kashmir has recently led to ill-advised calls from some sections of the Indian media calling for a much tougher line against Pakistan including “the complete destruction of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan” (Singh, 2019).

Kashmir and the second Indo-Pakistan war Simmering tensions between India and Pakistan over the unresolved Kashmir issue led to the second Indo-Pakistan war which began on August 5, 1965. The war was initiated by Pakistan on the naive assumption that the Indian military was weak because of its highly embarrassing defeat by the Chinese army in 1962 that had annexed the remote Aksai Chin region of Ladakh, which, at that time, was part of J&K. The second incorrect assumption was that the Kashmiri people would rebel and support the invasion. The fighting, which was mostly contained within Kashmir, involved infantry, armored vehicles, and air forces. While there was no decisive victory on either side, India’s superior forces and resources and the threat to Pakistan border towns eventually led Pakistan accepting a United Nations–brokered ceasefire on September 22, 1965 (Murphy, 2013, pp. 68–69). In effect, the outcome of the war was another defeat for the Pakistan military.

Ethnic nationalism, state repression, and rebellion in Kashmir Unfortunately for the peace and security of Kashmir, the warm friendship and trust between Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, and Sheikh Abdullah, the prime minster (after 1964 chief minister) of Kashmir and Jammu, soon evaporated. The main issue that created a rift between Abdullah and the Congress leadership was the unique status of J&K under Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, a provision that granted special autonomous status to J&K, India’s only state with a Muslim majority. According to Articles 370 and 35A, ethnic Kashmiris of the Kashmir Valley would have a degree of independence and be permitted to live under a separate set of laws that apply to citizenship, ownership of property, and fundamental human rights. In other words, except for a few reserved exceptions such as defense, communications, finance, and foreign affairs, Kashmir’s state parliament, not India’s National Parliament in Delhi, had

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the right to make laws. In particular, the Indian parliament could not, in theory if not in practice, declare an emergency because of internal disturbances or unless the state government agreed (“What is Article 370?,” 2018). Article 370 was drafted in 1947 by Sheikh Abdullah, whom Nehru had appointed Prime Minister of J&K. Abdullah argued that as J&K was the only Muslim-majority state its autonomy should be permanent in order to protect its unique Kashmiriyat identity and its indigenous Kashmiri majority, but this was rejected by Delhi. By 1953, the relationship between Nehru and Abdullah had totally broken down. Under pressure from powerful colleagues within Congress, Nehru began to have second thoughts about the degree of independence that can be given to Kashmir and feared that Abdullah was planning to establish a fully independent Kashmir. Consequently, Nehru was complicit in the dismissal of Abdullah as prime minister in 1958 and the installation of a puppet state government (Narain, 2016, p. 16). The sacking and jailing of Abdullah and the cavalier dismissal of Kashmiri concerns about their future in a Hindu-dominated state was the first of many blunders that the Indian state has made in Kashmir. Indian governments, including both the former ruling Congress Party and the current Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or India’s People’s Party, has consistently been whittling away the internal autonomy of Kashmir, which has been fiercely resented and, at times, violently resisted by the majority of Kashmiris (“What is Article 370?” 2018). Articles 370 and 35A have recently been controversially rescinded by the Hindu nationalist BJP government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Rebellion, terrorism, and state violence in Kashmir Despite the ever-growing interference of the federal government in Jammu and Kashmir affairs leading to disillusionment by growing numbers of Kashmiris, Kashmir had been relatively peaceful between 1965 and the early 1980s. However, frustration with the denial of their basic political rights and anger at the abuse of human rights by the Indian security services culminated in a violent rebellion that broke out in 1989, organized by the most important Kashmiri separatist group, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, which advocates that J&K should become an independent state rather than be integrated into either India or Pakistan (Widmalm, 1997, p. 1007). The final straw for the Kashmiris was the blatant corruption and rigging of the March 1987 election in Kashmir by Rajiv Gandhi’s government. The widely discredited 1987 election was seen as a failure of democracy and a cynical reneging of earlier promises made to the people of Kashmir (Narain, 2016, p. 16). Disgust, frustration, and anger over the treatment by Delhi and Kashmir’s opportunistic politicians, and the failure of democracy led to strikes, protests, attacks on government officials and buildings, and the murder of police informers and intelligence officers, all contributing to the paralysis of government in the valley. For the Kashmiri nationalists this was a struggle for self-determination but was considered to be treason by the Indian state. The Kashmiris regarded

220 Eamon Murphy the activists as brave freedom fighters, while the Indian state, media, and public opinion dismissed them as terrorists. As the insurgency gained momentum and the violence increased, the frustrated Indian security forces reacted with excessive violence in order to crush the unrest. Kashmir is one of the most militarized zones in the world, and under the draconic Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 and the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978, the security forces have immunity from prosecution for alleged flagrant human rights violations including the use of lethal force against unarmed protesters, torture of suspected terrorists, and random beatings of innocent civilians. The excessive force used by the security forces can in part be explained by the difficulty of trying to prevent cross-border terrorists crossing the porous Line of Control. It also demonstrates the danger and limitation of using physical force rather than meaningful negotiations to resolve what is fundamentally a political problem. Between mid-July 2016 and the end of March 2018, 145 civilians were killed by security forces (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018, p. 17). One of the most dangerous weapons used against protesters is a 12-gauge shotgun that fires metal pellets that can both kill and blind peaceful demonstrators and innocent bystanders (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018, p. 22). The security forces have also been accused of torture, extrajudicial killings, random violence, and sexual assaults (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018, pp. 27–35). Human rights workers, journalists, and political leaders can be detained, sometimes for years, without trial. Children as young as 14 years of age have been arrested, imprisoned, and allegedly tortured by the security forces (Wallen, 2019). Despite the damning evidence from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the India-based Human Rights Commission, members of the security forces have seldom been charged for these horrific offenses. One of the rare cases of the military having been held accountable occurred in 2014 when the Indian army sentenced seven soldiers to life imprisonment for the murder of three young men, a decision warmly welcomed by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah (“Kashmir soldiers sentenced to life for killings,” 2014).

Proxy war, religious extremism, and terrorism in Kashmir Until the 1980s, the conflict in Kashmir revolved around the fundamental problem between Kashmiris who wanted a degree of independence and the Indian state’s attempts to fully integrate J&K into the Indian union. Religious differences between the largely Muslim Kashmiris and the Hindu-majority Indian state played little part in the conflict. Rather, it was a secular struggle led by political dissidents pitted against the might of the Indian state (Widmalm, 1997, p. 1008). Pakistan’s use of fundamentalist zealots to wage a proxy war in Kashmir, however, introduced a religious element into the conflict. The rebellion in Kashmir came at a highly serendipitous time for Pakistan, especially the military, which has controlled foreign policy especially in Kashmir.

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From 1979 to 1989, Pakistan and its main allies, the United States and Saudi Arabia, waged a successful war of attrition against the Soviet forces that had invaded Afghanistan. The Afghan jihad greatly increased the power of the controversial shadowy Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency both within the military and the Pakistan state. The huge financial backing from the United States and Saudi Arabia to help the mujahideen, Islamic warriors engaged in jihad or holy war, was administered and distributed by the ISI to the militias that were ideologically and politically aligned to Pakistan’s interests (Murphy, 2013, pp. 110–111). One of the factors that greatly assisted the militants was the abundant supply of weapons that was left over from the war in Afghanistan. Besides the easy availability of Kalashnikov assault rifles, the militants had ready access to grenades, rocket launchers, machine guns, and other military hardware, which were easily smuggled across the porous border between Pakistan and India-administered Kashmir (Murphy, 2013, pp. 112–115). The outbreak of rebellion in Kashmir in 1989 and the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, therefore, gave Pakistan a golden opportunity to wage a proxy war against India in Kashmir. By supporting dissident organizations within Kashmir and by organizing, training, and arming jihadi groups from Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harkat ul-Mujahideen, the Pakistani military through the ISI aimed to tie up the more powerful Indian war machine in Kashmir, in a similar fashion to the way that the Soviet military had previously been tied up in Afghanistan. Military-sponsored mujahideen fighters battle hardened in the Afghan jihad were joined by jihadists from other parts of the Islamic world to wage jihad against the Hindu “infidels” in Kashmir. While we will never probably know the full story of the involvement of the Pakistani military, particularly the ISI, in the Kashmir conflict, a very compelling case can be made that although the ISI took advantage of the uprising caused by the breakdown of law and order, the uprising was fundamentally spontaneous (Widmalm, 1997, pp. 1025–1026). The involvement of extremist Sunni jihadi groups, mainly from Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas, trained, armed, and encouraged by the Pakistani military through the ISI along with militant jihadis from Afghanistan and other Islamic countries inflamed and complicated the conflict by adding a new religious dimension to the struggle (Ganguly, 2002, pp. 179–194). The battle-hardened jihadis from Pakistan and other Muslim countries were ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different from the Kashmiris. Their extremist, exclusivist, fundamentalist Islam alienated them from the Kashmiris, who regarded them as arrogant, foreign, and religious extremist bullies. The danger now, however, is that the longer the Kashmiri conflict continues, the greater is the risk of the conflict developing into one between two bitter and uncompromising religious ideologies: Islam and Hinduism. By the late 1990s, Kashmiris, however, had become increasingly cynical of Pakistan’s motives for supporting their movement and had grown weary of the violence. Most were now hostile toward the militants from outside Kashmir, because of their violence, religious bigotry, and open involvement in criminal

222 Eamon Murphy activities. Kashmiri hatred and distrust of the outsiders enabled the Indian government, through bribery and persuasion, to persuade Kashmiri dissidents to assist the security forces in tracking down and killing foreign intruders (Tremblay, 2009, p. 937).

Warfare in the clouds: The Kargil crisis While much of the conflict over Kashmir has been waged between the Kashmiri people and the Indian security forces, in addition, undeclared warfare, mainly border skirmishes, has also been going on between the military of India and Pakistan in Kashmir. One of the most serious causes of the ongoing conflict between the two countries has been the continual tension along the over 3,000 kilometers long Line of Control, particularly through the high barren mountainous terrain separating much of Indian-administered Kashmir from Pakistani-administered Kashmir. The cost of this conflict, both in respect to human lives lost in fierce combat and the economic cost of waging war in such an inhospitable area, has been astronomical. The conflict has also been the major factor hampering efforts to negotiate a peace between the two countries. Because of the porous nature and length of the Line of Control, Indian forces have found it extremely difficult to prevent cross-border incursions from the Pakistani side. In early 1998, after both India and Pakistan had successfully tested nuclear weapons, a limited war was fought between May and July when the Pakistani military launched a surprise military operation across the Line of Control that cuts through the mountainous Kargil heights. Kargil town and the adjoining district have been a fiercely disputed region ever since the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947. The military operation involved between 1,000 and 2,000 men of mainly the Pakistani military with a few token Kashmiri volunteers who secretly crossed the unguarded border and moved about 10 kilometers into Indian territory. They seized the high strategic positions that had been temporarily abandoned by India during the long and harsh Kashmiri winter (BennettJones, 2009, p. 110). The Pakistani military’s decision to occupy the Kargil heights turned out to be an unmitigated military and diplomatic disaster. After initially being taken by surprise, the Indian military subjected the Pakistani forces to sustained airstrikes and gun barrages, which were followed up by fierce infantry attacks. Both armies fought with great skill and courage, as they were contending not only with the determined enemy but with the rugged, inhospitable treacherous mountain terrain and the crippling cold. The Pakistani forces were severely handicapped by limited supplies and ammunition, and eventually Pakistan had to yet again sue for peace (Murphy, 2013, p. 126). Once again, Pakistan’s military had suffered a humiliating defeat. The decision to occupy the Kargil heights was secretly undertaken by the army high command and clearly demonstrates how little control the civilian government had over foreign policy. The plan was enthusiastically supported by the new chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf. The prime minister, Nawaz

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Sharif, was only informed of the decision after the operation was well underway. Pakistan was isolated diplomatically and Sharif was forced to make a humiliating rushed visit to Washington in order to ask the United States to help resolve the crisis. The retreat was highly embarrassing for both Sharif and the military, and each blamed the other for the disastrous invasion (Lavoy, 2019, p. 8). The episode severely damaged Islamabad’s political credibility, both in the region and internationally. Pakistan was now viewed internationally as the aggressor, while the withdrawal of Pakistani forces was celebrated by the Indian media as a great military and moral victory. Except for the Kashmiris living in the Kargil area, the Pakistan intrusion had little impact on Kashmiris and there was not widespread support for the Pakistani offensive. The military’s obsession with Kashmir resulting in the reckless invasion of Indian territory was also responsible for aborting promising attempts to negotiate a meaningful settlement to the crisis. The tragedy was that the Kargil incident ended attempts by the prime minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, encouraged by President Clinton, to sign a meaningful lasting peace agreement between the two countries (Goldenberg, 1999). According to one prominent analyst, whenever peace negotiations seem to be progressing favorably, the hawkish Pakistan military initiates attacks on India in order to disrupt the negotiations (Fair, 2014).

The resurgence of civil unrest and militancy in Kashmir Post 9/11, however, the conflict temporarily eased in the Kashmir Valley. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies, supported reluctantly by Pakistani President Musharraf, led to a clampdown of militants, many of whom had turned on the Pakistani military and government. India also conducted three reasonably free elections in Kashmir, which gave the locals hope that the conflict would be resolved peacefully. Since 2012, however, many Kashmiris, especially young men, have become increasingly alienated, resentful, and have again turned to violence because of Delhi’s use of brute force in an attempt to stifle legitimate grievances. Data released by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs demonstrated that between 2014 and 2018 there was nearly a 200% rise in the number of terrorist attacks, over 1,700 incidents (Rawat, 2019). The spark for the recent outbreak of violence in Kashmir was the death in July 2016 of Burhan Wani, a 22-year-old Kashmir-based Hizbul Mujahideen commander, who was killed in a shootout with Indian soldiers. Wani was a highly charismatic figure who was revered by the youth of Kashmir. Part of the reason for Wani’s popularity was his skillful use of social media, posting videos on WhatsApp and Facebook with his bearded comrades wearing military clothing and brandishing weapons. Through the videos, he railed against injustice and called for young people to take a stand against Indian oppression. His funeral was attended by thousands of his supporters and the clashes with security forces throughout Kashmir following his funeral resulted in the death of over 30 civilians. Since then the violence has escalated with hundreds of civilians, members of the

224 Eamon Murphy security forces, and militants killed in 2018 (Rawat, 2019). While India dismissed him as yet another terrorist, for many Kashmiris, especially the young, he was a fearless spokesperson for the anger and frustration particularly of the younger generation. On February 14, 2019, tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir escalated even more dramatically when around 40 paramilitary troops of the Central Reserve Police Force died when a suicide bomber rammed his SUV, carrying an estimated 300 kilos of explosives, into a bus that was part of a large convoy travelling through Pulwama district on the main Srinagar-Jammu Highway. The attack was the deadliest assault of the rebellion in Kashmir. Jaish-e-Mohammad (the Army of Mohammad), a militant organization based in Pakistan, claimed responsibility. Jaish-e-Mohammad released a video of the suicide bomber, a local young man, Adil Ahmad Dar, calmly brandishing his weapons and standing in front of a Jaish-e-Mohammad banner (“Pulwama terror attack,” 2019a, 2019b). According to Dar’s parents, the motivation for their young son becoming a terrorist was having being beaten up by security forces along with his friends on the way home from school in 2016 (“Pulwama bomber Adil Ahmad Khan became terrorist,” 2019). The story of Dar’s radicalization is almost identical to that of Burhan Wani and many other Kashmiri youth. Attempts by the Indian government and media to stereotype dissidents like Wani and Dar as just terrorists “sweeps under the rug the complexities of Kashmir’s decades-long turmoil” (as quoted in Menon, 2016). According to one source, the vast majority of Kashmiris are now opposed to Indian rule, whereas previously they were more likely to have been either accepting of Indian rule or had been politically apathetic (Lalwani & Tallo, 2019b). Predictably, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi labelled the Pulwama attack “despicable” and “dastardly” and ominously warned that the “sacrifices of our brave security personnel shall not go in vain” (as quoted in “Pulwama terror attack,” 2019b). On 26 February the conflict dangerously escalated when India launched airstrikes into Pakistani territory targeting the Jaish-e-Mohammad training camp. The next day Pakistan shot down one Indian air force jet after claiming it had strayed into Pakistani territory (Lalwani & Tallo, 2019b). Tensions were inflamed by the war-mongering sections of the media in both India and Pakistan. For a time, the conflict threatened to break out into an all-out war, but fortunately things cooled down, at least temporarily, due in part to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s efforts to defuse the crisis.

The security implications of the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A The Pulwama crisis was a major factor in the sweeping victory of the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 2019 national general election that rode on a crest of militaristic nationalism fueled by the fear of Islamic terrorism launched from Pakistan. The sweeping victory gave Modi’s government a popular mandate to aggressively push a Hindu nationalism agenda that

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included integrating Kashmir fully into the Indian state. Much to the dismay of human rights workers, peace activists, and Kashmiris, Modi’s government on August 5, 2019, revoked Articles 370 and 35A (“India revokes Kashmir’s special status,” 2019). Human rights activists have condemned the decision, arguing that it is part of a broader strategy to erode the basic rights of Kashmiris and flood the region with non-Kashmiris. It seems inevitable that extensive conflict will erupt between Kashmiris and the new settlers. The fears of Kashmiris that their Kashmiriyat identity will be lost has been accentuated by provocative claims by some Hindu nationalists urging Hindus to buy land and marry Kashmiri women with property and turn the valley into a Hindu-dominated region (“India’s ‘patriotic pop’ songs urge Hindu to claim Kashmir,” 2019). In addition, Kashmiris greatly resent the fact that the status of J&K was reduced from that of a state with a degree of independence to that of a union territory ruled directly from New Delhi. One of India’s most respected constitutional lawyers, A.G. Noorani, has condemned the government’s decision as utterly unconstitutional and deceitful (Deshmane, 2019). The revocation of Articles 370 and 35A has greatly heightened tensions with Pakistan and has probably effectively ended any hopes of a peaceful political solution to the Kashmir crisis in the foreseeable future (“India revokes Kashmir’s special status,” 2019). In the lead up to the move to revoke Articles 370 and 35A India sent thousands of extra troops to Kashmir, imposed a crippling curfew, and shut down all communications and the Internet. Hundreds of politicians, human rights activists, and trade unionists have been arrested and detained without trial. Prominent analyst Christophe Jaffrelot argues that the populist ill-advised decision was made to divert attention from India’s economic problems (“With Kashmir erased, has India’s democracy ‘died in silence’,” 2019). Many scholars and human rights activists fear that the revocation of Kashmir’s special status will strengthen moves toward creating a Hindu majoritarian state in which the rights and perhaps the safety of minorities, especially Muslims, who comprise about 140 million of India’s population, will be denied (Chatterji, Hansen, & Jaffrelot, 2019, pp. 3–4). Such a development could greatly heighten security concerns in India and the region if disillusioned Muslims were to turn to extremist organizations and perpetrated violence in large numbers. The threat of Hindu–Muslim violence is further enhanced with the growth of Islamophobia, mob attacks on Muslim young men dating Hindu women, and beating and killing of Muslims for allegedly butchering cows. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is feared and reviled by many Indian Muslims because as chief minister of the state of Gujarat he failed to prevent, or perhaps was complicit in, the deadly pogrom against Muslims in 2002 during which between approximately 1,000 and 2,000 innocent men, women, and children were murdered (Murphy, 2010, p. 90). So long as there is no political solution to the Kashmir crisis and the more extreme Hindu nationalists continue to scapegoat Kashmiri and other Indian Muslims as potential traitors, the risk of widespread civil disturbances will continue. India’s Muslim majority neighbors, Pakistan

226 Eamon Murphy and Bangladesh, would then come under increasing pressure to support their co-religionists.

Kashmir and the security threat of ISIS and al-Qaeda Security concerns over the Kashmir conflict are further complicated by recent attempts by the extremist global terrorist organizations, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, to take advantage of the crisis. ISIS and al-Qaeda are both competing for leadership of the global jihadist movement (Mueller & Stewart, 2016, p. 30). Their leaders regard South Asia as an area to expand their influence and are attempting to use the Kashmiri conflict as a means to tap into Muslim anger in other parts of India and the subcontinent (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), 2019, p. 23). Both al-Qaeda and ISIS are contemptuous of both the leaders of Kashmiri political parties and of the Pakistan military, especially the ISI, because they are motivated by secular nationalist goals rather than Islam (Siyech, 2018, pp. 11–12). To date, neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda has made a significant impact in Kashmir or in other parts of South Asia in part because the conflict is a political dispute and not one based on religious ideology (Siyech, 2018, p. 11). The danger, however, is that the longer the conflict continues and a political solution is not found, frustrated Kashmiris may turn to extremist Islamic organizations, either those sponsored by the Pakistan military or al-Qaeda and ISIS (Siyech, 2018, p. 11). In Kashmir, some young men are already calling for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Kashmir rather than independence (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), 2019, p. 27). One of the most worrying security concerns in Kashmir, India, and other parts of South Asia has been drift away from the traditional more moderate form of South Asian Sufi-Islam to that of the more puritanical and intolerant Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi madaris and mosques, funded by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, have encouraged jihadis, which has alarmed moderate Muslims concerned about the spread of violent extremism in their own societies (Nasr, 2000, p. 142). One sect, Ahle Hadith, similar to Wahhabism, runs over 700 madaris (Islamic religious schools) and mosques in Kashmir (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), 2019, p. 29). This development, which has increased the distrust and potential violence between South Asian Hindus and Muslims, has, in part been fueled by anger over the treatment of Muslims in Kashmir.

The regional security implications of the Kashmir conflict It is no exaggeration to state that the 72-year-long conflict between India and Pakistan has regional implications that have been far-reaching and highly dangerous. The obvious, most serious threat is the ever-present risk of a war between the two nuclear-armed states. According to one analyst, a former senior police officer, the risk is “perhaps one of the most unappreciated threats to international peace and security” (Shapoo, 2016). As a conventional war would be disastrous enough,

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one shudders to think of the carnage that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has warned the United Nations of the danger of a nuclear war (Borger, 2019). The risk is omnipresent while the current tensions over Kashmir persist. The second consequence of the Kashmir crisis has been to strengthen the forces of religious extremists in both countries: Hindu nationalists in India and extremist Muslims in Pakistan. The BJP’s overwhelming victory in the 2019 elections was in large part due to the party’s ability to use the Kashmir crisis to project the view that its leader Narendra Modi was the only politician capable of making India secure from terrorist attacks from Pakistan (Varshney, 2019, pp. 67–68). More extreme Hindu nationalist supporters and politicians have labeled all Muslims in India as potential traitors and fifth columnists working on behalf of the Pakistani state (Bal, 2019). Marginalizing and alienating Muslims, who comprise about 14% of the population, poses a grave threat to security and democracy in India. In Pakistan, on the other hand, Prime Minister Imran Khan, who has attempted to initiate peace talks with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi and has stated that he intends to clamp down on religious extremists (Heanue, 2019), and is facing constant pressure from a bellicose military and extremist Islamists who see the struggle over Kashmir as an ongoing ideological war between Islam and Hinduism. The Kashmir dispute has also distracted Pakistani security forces from combating anti-state religious terrorists. The majority of the Pakistani military have had to be deployed to meet the perceived threat from the eastern border with India and thus diverting resources needed to combat the ongoing powerful terrorist groups threatening the Pakistani state as well as its sectarian and religious minorities (Murphy, 2019). Another unfortunate consequence has been the targeting of innocent men, women, and children – mainly Kashmiri Brahmins, Sikhs, and other religious minorities. The terrorist activities against minorities by Pakistansupported religious extremists, such as brutal killings, kidnappings, and threats of violence, were part of a policy of deliberate ethnic cleansing, which has led to the mass exodus of Hindus and other religious minorities from the Kashmir Valley since 1990. The plight of the Kashmiri Brahmin refugees in particular is a highly emotive issue that has been exploited by supporters of the BJP as yet another example of Muslim oppression of Hindus.

The international security implications of the Kashmir conflict The international community has been gravely concerned about the worsening security problem in Kashmir. For various reasons, the major foreign powers involved in the conflict – the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia – are all keen to establish a long-lasting peace between India and Pakistan. Conflicting ideological and strategic rivalries among the foreign powers, however, have complicated and weakened their attempts to play a constructive role in helping to resolve the crisis. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, appealed to the United Nations, China, the United States, and Russia for support in his opposition to the revocation

228 Eamon Murphy of Articles 370 and 35A but received little or no support. Most countries backed the Indian move to integrate Kashmir more closely with the rest of the country including, somewhat surprisingly, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s major ally, China. As one commentator noted, the members of the OIC “values India more for economic engagement and strategic partnership than to pay heed to Pakistan’s knee-jerk reaction to an internal matter of India” (Dutta, 2019). It is not surprising that members of the OIC and other nations are not willing to be seen to favor Pakistan given that India has emerged as one of the world’s most powerful and fastest growing economies whose gross domestic product is around 10 times greater than Pakistan (“Comparing India and Pakistan by Economy,” 2019). The United States was a staunch ally of Pakistan during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, but the relationship soured when the United States bullied Pakistan into supporting the war against terrorism after 9/11, which culminated in the disastrous and highly unpopular invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies. Currently, the United States faces the dilemma that it needs to work closely with Pakistan in order to somehow negotiate a satisfactory solution to the Afghanistan problem, and to find a way to exit the country without losing face or influence. If the United States attempts to put too much pressure on Pakistan to take more aggressive action against terrorists, especially in Kashmir, Pakistan can sabotage attempts to find a peaceful solution to an orderly and peaceful withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. On the one hand, the United States also faces the possibility of a nuclear response from Pakistan if it feels sufficiently threatened by the far more powerful Indian military machine. On the other hand, under the highly unpredictable Trump administration, the United States has been moving ever closer to India partly in order to become a major defense and trading partner to counter Chinese growing power in the region (Lalwani & Tallo, 2019a). The recent decision to establish Ladakh as a separate union territory administered directly from Delhi is strongly opposed by China which is seriously concerned about the current situation in Kashmir (“Article 370: China says opposed to Ladakh as Union Territory,” 2019). There is a strong anti-Chinese sentiment in India among the more hawkish elements among the Indian defense establishment with fears that China intends to undermine the unity of India by supporting insurgent groups within Kashmir and other parts of India (Merrington, 2010). Indian military strategists are aware that China, which is economically and militarily far more powerful than India, potentially poses a far greater military threat than Pakistan (Merrington, 2010). One nightmare scenario for Indian military strategists is having to wage a war simultaneously on two fronts against Pakistan and China. Memories of the shattering defeat by China in the 1962 Indo-Chinese war are still strong (Merrington, 2010). On the other hand, China does not want to have to take sides in the conflict over Kashmir. While it needs to be seen to be still supporting Pakistan, China, like the United States, is also very keen to build up its diplomatic, trading and economic ties with India with a rapidly growing middle-class and potentially a major market

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for Chinese goods. China is very concerned about its trade war with the United States and fears that the current Kashmir crisis may move India even closer to the United States (Wescott & Jiang, 2019).

Conclusion Resolving the Kashmir crisis and a lasting peace would enable the diversion of military spending into use that is more productive. It would go a long way toward bringing peace, stability, and economic progress to India and Pakistan as well as the entire south Asian region. Whether Pakistan, whose security is under threat from a fundamentalist Islam, or India, whose current ruling party, the BJP, with its antiMuslim bias and aggressive foreign policy, can resolve the old age dispute is uncertain. What is certain is that until the ongoing Kashmir crisis is somehow resolved, the threat to security in both countries and throughout the Indian subcontinent will continue and be of great concern for the major powers with a stake in the region.

Bibliography Ahlawat, D., & Malik, S. (2019). Kashmir imbroglio: Geostrategic and religious imperatives. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2(2), 59–82. Ahmad, A. (1979). Conversions to Islam in the valley of Kashmir. Central Asian Journal, 23(1–2), 3–18. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS): The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia. (2019, January). The Soufan Center. Retrieved from https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/u ploads/2019/01/Al-Qaeda-in-the-Indian-Subcontinent-AQIS.pdf Article 370: China says opposed to Ladakh as Union Territory. (2019). India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-reaction-jammu-kashmirarticle-370-1577915-2019-08-06 Bal, H. S. (2019, April 17). Modi’s Campaign of fear and prejudice. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/modi-india-elec tion.html Bennett-Jones, O. (2009). Pakistan: Eye of the storm (3rd ed.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Borger, J. (2019, September 26). Imran Kahn warns UN of potential war in Kashmir. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/26/imran-kha n-warns-un-of-potential-nuclear-war-in-kashmir Chatterji, A. P., Hansen, T. B., & Jaffrelot, C. (Eds). (2019). Majoritarian state: how Hindu Nationalism is changing India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Comparing India and Pakistan by Economy. (2019, August 30). World Bank. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved form http://statisticstimes.com/economy/india-vs-pakistaneconomy.php Copland, I. (1981, Summer). Islam and political mobilization in Kashmir, 1931–34. Pacific Affairs, 54(2), 228–259. Deshmane, A. (2019). Kashmir: Scrapping Article 370 “Unconstitutional”, “Deceitful” says legal expert A.G. Noorani. Huffpost. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpos t.in/entry/kashmir-article-370-scrapping-constitutional-expert-reacts-noorani_in_5d47 e58de4b0aca341206135

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Dutta, P. K. (2019, August 12). Kashmir: Pakistan tries to isolate India over Article 370, gets a reality check. India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/ story/kashmir-pakistan-tries-to-isolate-india-over-article-370-gets-a-reality-check1579988-2019-08-12 Fair, C.C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan army’s way of war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ganguly, S. (2002). The Islamic dimensions of the Kashmir insurgency. In C. Jaffrelot, (Ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation, pp. 174–194. New Delhi: Manohar. Goldenberg, S. (1999, February 23). PMs sign Indo-Pakistani pact on nuclear war risks. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/22/kash mir.india Guruswamy, M. F. (2016, August 19). For azadi for all, it is time to break the fiction of Jammu and Kashmir. Scroll.in. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/article/814274/for-aza di-for-all-it-ishttp-cms-scroll-team-time-to-break-the-fiction-of-jammu-and-kashmir Heanue, S. (2019, April 10). Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan says greater chance of peace with India if Modi elected. ABC News. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net. au/news/2019-04-10/pakistans-imran-khan-says-peace-talks-more-likely-with-modi/1 0987258 India revokes Kashmir’s special status (2019, September 4). Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/india-revokes-kashmir-special-status-1909 04143838166.html Indian military hysteria since 1947. (2019, May 9). The International News. Retrieved from https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/640946-indian-military-hysteria-since-1947 India’s ‘patriotism pop’ songs urge Hindus to claim Kashmir. (2019, August 22). Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/india-patriotismpop-songs-urge-hindus-claim-kashmir-190822090343584.html Kashmir soldiers sentenced to life for killings. (2014, November 13). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30032883 Kishwar, M. (2003, September 6–12). Why fear people’s choice? Calling Pakistan’s Bluff on Plebiscite in J and K. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(36), 3773–3777 Lalwani, S., & Tallo, E. D. (2019a, February 20). Decisions, dilemmas: Understanding the Kashmir crisis and its implications. War on the Rocks. Retrieved from https://waronth erocks.com/2019/02/drivers-decisions-dilemmas-understanding-the-kashmir-crisis-a nd-its-implications/ Lalwani, S., & Tallo, E. (2019b, April 17). Did India shoot down a Pakistani F-16 in February? This just became a big deal. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://ww w.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/17/did-india-shoot-down-pakistani-f-back-f ebruary-this-just-became-big-deal/ Lavoy, P. R. (Ed.). (2019). Asymmetric warfare in South Asia: The causes and consequences of the Kargil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Menon, R. (2016, October 3). How to stop Kashmir from spiraling into all-out War. The National Interest. Retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-stop-kashmirspiraling-all-out-war-17913 Merrington, L. (2010, August 19). Uneasy neighbours. Inside Story. Retrieved from https:// insidestory.org.au/uneasy-neighbours/ Murphy, E. (2010). “We have no orders to save you”: State terrorism, politics and communal violence in the Indian state of Gujarat, 2002. In Jackson, R., Murphy, E and Poynting, S. (Eds.), Contemporary State Terrorism, pp. 86–103. Oxford and New York: Routledge.

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Murphy, E. (2013). The making of terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and social roots of extremism. London & New York: Routledge. Murphy, E. (2019). Islam and sectarian violence in Pakistan: The terror within. Abington: Routledge. Mueller, J., & Stewart, M. G. (2016). Misoverestimating ISIS: Comparisons with Al-Qaeda. Perspectives on Terrorism, 10(4), 30–39. Narain, A. (2016, July). Revival of violence in Kashmir: The threat to India’s Security. Trends and Analysis, 8(7), 15–20. Nasr, S. V. R. (2000). The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: The changing role of Islamism and the Ulema in society and politics, Modern Asian Studies, 34(1), 139–180. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2018, June 14). Report on the situation of human rights in Kashmir: developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and general human rights concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, 1–49. Retrieved from https://reliefw eb.int/report/india/report-situation-human-rights-kashmir-developments-indian-state-j ammu-and-kashmir-june Para, A. H. (2019). The making of modern Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah and the politics of the state. Abington: Routledge. Pulwama bomber Adil Ahmad Khan became terrorist after he was beaten by troops, say parents. (2019, February 16). India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/indi a/story/pulwama-bomber-adil-ahmad-dar-became-terrorist-after-he-was-beaten-bytroops-say-parents-1457317-2019-02-15 Pulwama terror attack: Jaish-e-Mohammed claims responsibility with video of suicide bomber Adil Dar. (2019a, February 16). India Today. Retrieved from https://www.ind iatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-terror-attack-kashmir-jaish-e-mohammad-adil-ahmaddar-1456169-2019-02-14 Pulwama terror attack: Suicide bomber drives SUV packed with 300 kg explosives into CRPF bus, 44 men martyred. (2019b, February 16). India Today. Retrieved from https:// www.indiatoday.in/india/story/twelve-crpf-jawans-injured-in-ied-blast-in-j-k-145 6037-2019-02-14 Rawat, M. (2019, May 18). Pulwama terror attack: In last 5 years, J&K saw 93% rise in death of security personal in terror attacks. India Today. Retrieved from https://www. indiatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-terror-attack-jammu-kashmir-terrorism-data-last5-years-soldiers-killed-1456427-2019-02-14 Schofield, V. (2010). Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending War. London: I.B. Taurus. Shapoo, S.F. (2016, November). How non-state actors could cause war in South Asia: Pakistan based non-state actors have an alarming ability to dictate the tenors of IndiaPakistan relations. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/ how-non-state-actors-could-cause-war-in-south-asia/ Singh, H. (2019, February). Pakistan must be destroyed. The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/cogito-ergo-sum/pakistan-must-be-destroyed/ Siyech, M. S. (2018, May). Why has the Islamic state failed to grow in Kashmir. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 10(5), 11–15. Tak, T. (2013, April 20). The term ‘Kashmiriyat’: Kashmiri nationalism of the 1970s, Economic and Political Weekly, 48(1), 28–32. The Sufi. (2015, August 13). Kashmir: Paradise on earth—poem by Amir Khusrow. TheSufi.com. Retrieved from https://www.thesufi.com/kashmir-paradise-on-earthpoem-by-amir-khusrow/

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Tremblay, R. C. (2009). Kashmir’s secessionist movement resurfaces: Ethnic identity, community competition and the state. Asian Survey, 49(6), 924–950. Varshney, A. (2019, October). Modi consolidates power: Electoral vibrancy, mounting liberal deficits. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 63–67. Wallen, J. (2019, September 25). Young boys detained and tortured in Kashmir clampdown as new figures show 1,300 teenagers arrested. The Telegraph. Retrieved from https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/25/young-boys-tortured-kashmir-clampdown-n ew-figures-show-13000/ Westcott, B., and Jiang, S. (2019, March 1). Why China doesn’t want to get caught in the middle of a Indo-Pakistan conflict. CNN News. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/ 2019/02/28/asia/pakistan-india-china-crisis-intl/index.html What is Article 370? Three key points. (2018, 20 June). The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/What-is-Article-370Article-370/article show/35678708.cms Widmalm, S. (1997, November). The rise and fall of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. Asian Survey, 37(11), 1005–1030. With Kashmir erased, has India’s democracy ‘died in silence’. (2019, August 6). Democracy Digest. Retrieved from https://www.demdigest.org/with-kashmir-erasedhas-indias-democracy-died-in-silence/

13 Women and militancy in South Asia Straddling the agent–victim binary Tanya Narozhna

Introduction Women, gender, and militancy1 intersect in contemporary conflicts in South Asia in complex ways. Conflicts simultaneously loosen and reinforce socially accepted gender roles, producing both empowering and disempowering effects on women (Parashar, 2009; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2004; Alison, 2003). With respect to militant organizations, conflicts generate and sustain antithetical attitudes among women. As mothers, sisters, and wives, women can influence the decision of their male relatives to join militant groups. They can provide valuable support to such groups in keeping the armed struggle alive. Sometimes, women can join the ranks of militant organizations as frontline combatants, including suicide bombers. At the same time, amidst deteriorating social, economic, and security conditions in conflict-ridden societies, women experience displacement, destitution, abandonment and routine violations of rights (Ladbury, 2015; Parashar, 2011; Aslam, 2010; Kandiyoti, 2005). Many of them bear the brunt of conflicts, enduring increased threats, intimidation, and violence, including gender-based violence, at the hands of militant groups. Such experiences generated oft-repeated characterization of South Asian women as passive victims of local patriarchies, with limited ability to make choices or take action. This misleading characterization has detracted critical attention from multiple expressions of female agency in and around militant activities in the region. While South Asian women’s experiences with militant groups have proven to be conflicting, ranging from active participation to victimization, it is important to note that militant organizations across South Asia have been equally ambivalent in their attitudes toward women. Many groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT; now Jamaat-ud-Dawa), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, developed women’s wings and outreach programs to actively engage women as facilitators, fundraisers, recruiters, and attackers. Other groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, have kept women out of their militant activities. Importantly, whether the strategy of particular organizations has been to include or exclude women, these strategies have always been instigated by

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men. Ultimately, imposing strictures on women’s bodies and identities has been crucial to reasserting patriarchal control. This chapter seeks to identify intraregional trends in women’s engagement in militant activities across South Asia over the last few decades and to situate these trends within their respective sociohistorical contexts. It contends that female involvement in militant activities resulted from several interrelated factors, including women’s agency, contextual factors (i.e., state repression, conflict intensity, deprivation, etc.), and operational factors (i.e., recruitment pool, publicity, level of support, competition with other groups). The chapter demonstrates that while militant groups in South Asia have increasingly embraced women, both the organizations and their female members have been forced to navigate a highly complex gender terrain in which women’s involvement entailed at one and the same time exploitation, defiance, and reinforcement of gender norms. As a result, female militants in various South Asian societies occupy a liminal position, straddling the agent–victim binary. Examining how women’s agency has been enabled or constrained by the activities of militant groups in the region allows us to move beyond the misleadingly caricatured image of women as always already victims and to reveal women’s resilience in the circumstances when their access to positions of power has been denied or drastically limited. Given the complex and shifting nature of women’s relationship to militancy across South Asia, the principal objective of this chapter is twofold: (1) to examine women’s experiences with militant organizations so as to unearth multiple manifestations of women’s agency; and (2) to tease out some of the key ways in which women’s bodies and identities, through gendered dynamics of conflict across South Asia, have become the site of manifold political contestations. Having recognized a gamut of female agentic capacities in and around militancy, there is little reason to celebrate the expansion of female agency through militancy. A sober look at the issue reveals that women’s agency is increasingly appropriated by militant organizations across South Asia, producing at best temporary empowerment and illusory emancipation. The analytical framework employed in this chapter is based on two conceptual pillars, namely, agency and gender. Agency refers to conscious, purposeful action in pursuit of certain goals. Feminist scholarship generally treats agency as the tool for achieving political ends. Alongside agency, gender - or socially constructed norms that attribute certain features to men and women, and prescribe how men and women should behave – serves as a useful analytical tool for examining the fluid character of women’s relationship to militancy across South Asia. Importantly, gender is not merely a descriptor of identity: since the relationship between masculinity and femininity is based on hierarchy, gender itself is a power relationship (Shepherd, 2013). Treating gender as a power relationship means that any serious discussion of the gendered dynamics of militancy necessarily entails exposing multiple power relations at work in contemporary conflicts in South Asia. This task requires careful analytical attention to contextual factors.

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Gender and militancy Militancy is a fundamentally gendered phenomenon deeply entrenched in the ideal of normative masculinity and the politics of militarization. Feminist researchers have unearthed stable linkages between men, masculinity, and militancy demonstrating that men are typically constructed as “naturally those who wield violence, whether that violence is organized by the state or by non- or anti-state actors” (Enloe, 2006, p. viii). Not only does militancy serve as a way of manifesting masculine traits, it also, importantly, provides opportunities to reclaim masculinity and agency where they have been taken away (Noonan, 2018). Foreign occupation, political dependency, and the memory of colonial subordination disempower communities and emasculate men, creating conditions for male radicalization and extremism. In such circumstances, militancy becomes a restorative activity that “aims to reconstruct masculinity” (Noonan, 2018, p. 21). Strong association between masculinity and militancy makes the latter highly discriminatory toward women. In our cognitive frames, militant is always “a subject gendered male by definition” (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 69). Women, as allegedly peaceful and nurturing by nature, are not generally perceived as belonging in militancy, especially in combat roles. They may be present in such activities but only as victims, spectators, or prize (D’Amico, 1996). Masculine underpinnings of militancy facilitate male access to violence, position male militants in a superior position vis-à-vis their female counterparts, and impose strict taboos on women’s involvement in combat. Women and femininity, although seemingly misfits in the masculine domain of militancy, are nonetheless absolutely necessary to it. Not only do militant activities rely on women’s support, i.e., cooking, nursing, intelligence gathering, etc., but also normative femininity is essential to sustaining gendered notions of male protector/agent and female victim/non-agent. Conventional wisdom ascribes sex-specific motivations and roles to men and women in militancy. It holds that women join militant groups for personal reasons, i.e., personal loss, social stigma, or following male family members. Recent studies, however, have demonstrated that women’s motivations differ little from those of men. Women’s decisions are often driven by their clan, ethnic, and/or religious identities demonstrating women’s political awareness and commitment to the cause (Ladbury, 2015). Research also reveals that female involvement in militant activities across the world has increased exponentially in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Interrelated factors, such as long-term domestic and international counterterror campaigns, conflict intensity, state repression, poor socioeconomic conditions, social dislocation and marginalization, as well as operational imperatives (i.e., recruitment pool, level of support, legitimacy) prompted male leadership to strategize toward “actor innovation” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 172). Combined with women’s varied motivations to join militancy, these factors produced a “mutually reinforcing process driving terrorist [and militant] organizations to recruit women” at the same time as women pushed for greater participation in militant activities (Cunningham, 2003, p. 172).

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Women’s participation in popular insurgencies across South Asia Even though women’s participation in militant activities contradicts cultural strictures across South Asia, women have been involved in militant movements in the region, including as frontline combatants. Militant organizations are highly adaptive rational actors, capable of learning with respect to their techniques, targets, and perpetrators (Crenshaw, 1998). When faced with contextual and operational pressures, a group’s ability to learn and adapt is essential to its ongoing existence. Many militant groups in the region have gone to great lengths to mobilize women as enablers and executors of violence, or as influencers who can persuade others to join their ranks. While nationalist movements have been more likely to attract women, Islamist fundamentalist groups have also had some success in mobilizing women’s support.

Afghanistan Afghanistan has a long history of female militancy. In 1880, a Pashtun woman named Malalai is known to have led the Afghans against the British in the Battle of Maiwand. About a century later, many Afghan women actively resisted the Soviet occupation by participating in protest marches and by supporting mujahidins. Some women also served as members or commanders of the anti-Soviet Revolutionary Defense Groups. For example, a Tajik female warlord, Bibi Ayesha, also known as “the Pigeon,” commanded a group of 150 men in Northern Afghanistan (Dearing, 2010, p. 1087). Afghan women’s relationship to militancy over the last few decades developed within a complex social context marked by deep tensions between traditional tribal culture, religion, and modernity. Each of these influential forces focused on gender roles and relations “as a critical area for the expression of contending political visions” (Kandiyoti, 2005, p. 2). Indeed, tribal structures and codes hold a powerful sway over the everyday lives of individuals and communities in the predominantly rural Afghan society, shaping gender-based roles and social practices. Customary tribal codes, administered by the tribal council (jirga), strongly promote the notion of honor and the norm of male responsibility for the protection of women. These codes often clash with Islam, which operates through Shari’a laws and courts. Important disagreements between contending normative-regulatory systems concern, among other things, property rights for women, adjudication of extramarital affairs, issues of dowry, honor, vengeance, land allocation, and the like (Dearing, 2010, p. 1089). Despite ostensible lack of agreement in many areas, tribal codes, particularly Pashtunwali, and Islam find themselves in unison when it comes to the issue of women’s participation in conflict. Tribal and religious scriptures concur that women, as symbols of family honor and Islamic purity, have little role outside of the domestic sphere. Being quintessentially peaceful and maternal, women are expected to care for their husbands and children, uphold the honor of their families,

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and support the mujahidins. Effectively, tribal and religious codes sustain social practices that preserve strict segregation of gender roles, control women’s behavior, and restrict their participation in society, including societal struggles. Persistence of conservative codes in Afghanistan produces disempowering effects on women, creating an image of an Afghan woman as a voiceless victim. This image, however, is grossly misleading. On the one hand, as Dearing (2010) notes, “[i]n many ways, [Afghan] women derive power from their ability to retain or take away a man’s honor. … [A] woman can easily manipulate this fragile status symbol through her own actions” (p. 1088). On the other hand, in the course of the 20th century, Afghanistan’s central government undertook two progressive initiatives geared toward the expansion of women’s rights: one, during the reign of King Amanullah (1919–1928) and the other under the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime (1978–1979). Both campaigns resulted in violent conservative reactions and curtailment of women’s rights (Kandiyoti, 2005; Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2004). Nonetheless, gradual expansion of centralized state control, especially in urban centers, generated a new social strata disconnected from tribal culture that supported the cause of women’s advancement (Kandiyoti, 2005). It is in the context of these antithetical influences emanating from tribal culture, religion, and modernity that we should understand the relationship between women and militancy in Afghanistan. Violent conflict that engulfed the country after the Soviet withdrawal marked the ascendance of jihad as a mobilizing factor. A fragile balance between contending tribal, religious, and modern forces has been tilted toward Islamist actors, such as the Taliban, eroding the political authority of the state and producing alliances between religious and tribal structures (Chishti, 2010). The coalescence of religious and tribal politics often occurred around the idea of protecting “authentic” Afghan traditions and cultural values, especially male honor and female chastity, from corrupt influences of the Afghan government and its foreign supporters (Dearing, 2010, p. 1090). Such politics produced draconian restrictions on the rights, attire, and mobility of Afghan women (Fair & Hamza, 2018). A product of Pashtun refugees indoctrinated in religious schools (madrassas) that inculcated their students in the conservative Deobandi tradition, the Taliban is a prime example of emasculated, radicalized men taking up arms to restore masculine power and patriarchal control through the imposition of the harsh variant of Islamic law (Noonan, 2018; Rubin, 1997). Since the Taliban, backed by Pakistan, came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, its brutal abuse of, and institutionalized violence against, women were in plain sight through the actions of the Office for the Enforcement of Islamic Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. As Kandiyoti (2005, p. 7) observed where previously 70 per cent of teachers, almost half of civil servants and 40 per cent of doctors had been women, they were altogether banned from paid employment, including trade, and prohibited from leaving their homes without a mahram (an immediate male relative). For war widows who had

238 Tanya Narozhna become the sole breadwinners of their families, this meant levels of destitution that reduced many to begging or prostitution. By the late 1990s, the plight of Afghan women under the Taliban rule came to be widely recognized in the West as the cause for humanitarian intervention. In the war on terror, launched by the U.S. in 2001, Western and local militarized masculinities employed ideologically driven gendered constructions that used Afghan women to justify the moral superiority of their actions. Western states and the Afghan government hailed the return of Afghan women into the public sphere. They viewed “newly liberated” Afghan women as active nation-builders and channeled foreign aid in support of reforms for the advancement of women in Afghan society. In contrast, the Taliban, whose ethos frames women as guardians of honor and faith, interpreted female public activism as the sign of national betrayal, subjecting women and girls to violent reprisals. Effectively, competing militarized masculinities locked Afghan women into a rigid dichotomy between nation-building and nation-betrayal, with each political vision failing to address women’s primary concerns, such as health, food, and physical security (Chishti, 2010, p. 254). The Afghan Taliban and associated groups, like the Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, have proven consistent in excluding women from the insurgency. Despite the long tradition of female militancy in Afghan history, researchers have noted the complete absence of women in Taliban insurgency (Fair & Hamza, 2018; Dearing, 2010). Exploiting gender stereotypes, the Taliban dispatched male attackers disguised as women, often dressing them in burqas, but it did not employ women in the execution of violence. Such absence of women was a stark departure from the practices of anti-Soviet resistance, when mujahidins included women in both their narratives and combat. It is also at odds with the practices of jihadist groups in Pakistan. A permissive security environment in Afghanistan, conditioned by challenging geographic terrain and freedom of movement along the Pakistan border, as well as extensive social support, played a key role in minimizing the Taliban’s need for female participation in its activities (Dearing, 2010). The Taliban’s relatively high capacity for resistance, coupled with conservative culture, hindered women’s active participation in the insurgency. Female association with the organization has been mostly by way of familial links with male Taliban members or wider tribal ties to the organization (Fair & Hamza, 2018). Widespread corruption and failures in government accountability, systematic abuses by government and Western militaries, and women’s awareness or first-hand experiences of gender-based insecurity sustain deep skepticism on the local level about the government’s ability to address sociopolitical and economic issues. Women interviewed in Southern Afghanistan spoke “bitterly about practices under Pashtunwali (a cultural code of honour amongst men). They complained about the practice of baad (using girls as blood money), lack of inheritance rights, and the lack of institutions to appeal to in cases of honour killings and violent abuse” (Ladbury, 2015, p. 17, footnote 16). Nonetheless, women often

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support Shari’a law, and the jihadi groups promoting it, because they promise a form of governance that national and local government have proven unable to deliver (Ladbury, 2015, p. 17). In highly illiterate rural areas, women’s approval of Shari’a law and the jihadi organizations is often channeled into mobilizing broader support for the Taliban’s cause through storytelling, poetry, and songs. Afghan women use landay, a form of folklore poetry, to motivate men to join the struggle by stressing male responsibility to protect family honor against aggressors. Importantly, whether the promise of gender justice and responsive governance materializes under Shari’a law is contingent on its implementation by male political and religious leaders. As Ladbury (2015) noted, “Women’s expectations have frequently been dashed by the patriarchal way in which Shari’a is interpreted and the fact that customary practices – the result of centuries of male decision making – are often deliberately maintained in order to ensure women’s dependence” (p. 17).

Pakistan As in the Afghan case, Pakistani women’s conflicting relationship with militancy needs to be understood in the context of overlapping modern, tribal, and religious influences. In some areas of Pakistan, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which in 2018 merged with the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, tribal leaders traditionally provided security and administered resources on which livelihoods depend. Communal affiliation thus provided powerful motivation for tribal members, both male and female, to join militant groups that were supported by community leaders (Ladbury, 2015, p. 13). The emergence of the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM) offered a unifying ideological platform to local militant groups, while calibrating Islamist ideology to local circumstances made it effective in mobilizing women’s support or recruiting them for various roles in militant organizations (Aslam, 2010, p. 428). In Pakistan, women’s participation in militant activities ebbed and flowed across a series of waves, influenced by the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, the Kashmiri jihad after 1989, and more recently by the formation of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with links to Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic State (IS) (Mahmood, n.d., p. 14). The radicalization of Pakistani women began during the first two waves when they followed gender-specific “female jihad” providing logistics and support as mothers and wives for male militants. At the time, militant organizations in Pakistan used women’s support without enlisting females as active combatants (Noor & Hussain, 2009, p. 3). Over the last decade, however, Pakistan witnessed growing involvement of women in transnational jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State. Pakistani women have been active facilitators, fundraisers, and “domestic radicalizers” (Mahmood, 2017a). Their growing support for Islamist terrorism was on full display in 2007 during the siege of the Red Mosque complex in Islamabad. Multiple factors, including displacement,

240 Tanya Narozhna poverty, lack of education, and social marginalization, have been behind women’s militancy (Noor & Hussain, 2009, p. 1). Militant groups offer improved economic and social conditions by making payments to women for various support or combat activities, or by offering them educational opportunities in the madrassas (Ladbury, 2015, p. 21). For nearly four decades, the Red Mosque and its women’s wing, Jami’a Hafsa, functioned as a conservative religious seminary. After 2005, most seminarians came from the northern tribal and Kashmir geographical areas that were disproportionately affected by violence (Aslam, 2010). In the months leading to the siege, radicalized female students of Jami’a Hafsa channeled their agency toward political activism declaring “jihad” against the Pakistani state and launching a campaign to enforce Shari’a law (Aslam, 2010, p. 421). As their vigilantism intensified, the state military laid siege to the Red Mosque and later stormed the seminary, killing about 300 women. While the confrontational stance of Jami’a women seems to be indicative of their agency, these women were “pawns in a larger game” (Aslam, 2010, p. 418), in which women’s agency was co-opted by the militant Islamism (Mahmood, 2017a). Ultimately, they acted “within and not outside of patriarchy” (Aslam, 2010, p. 426). After the formation of the TTP in 2007, Pakistani women’s roles in militancy expanded. Not only did they prepare improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for men and acted as informants, they also embarked on violent missions as suicide bombers. The first case of female suicide bombing took place in 2007 in the FATA. After 2015, there has been an observable trend toward increased involvement of Pakistani women in transnational jihadist groups, like AQIS and IS. Some of the key developments include the formation of AQIS’s Shaheen Women’s wing that is allegedly training more than 500 female suicide bombers, the Al Zikra academy network for upper middle-class women in Karachi responsible for fundraising and matchmaking for IS, and the case of three women who left for Syria with their 12 children in 2015 (Mahmood, 2017b). In their effort to recruit women, some organizations have established women’s wings and outreach programs. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formerly known as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, was one of the first groups to develop an active women’s branch. It has issued a series of publications designated for women and has held an annual convention that attracted women from all over the country (Fair & Hamza, 2018; Parashar, 2011). The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has employed female propagandists, including Umm-e-Hammad, who has written several books intended to recruit women (Fair & Hamza, 2018, p. 968). The group’s leadership also “places a premium upon mothers offering their blessing to their sons before they are deployed upon a mission [to the Indian-occupied part of Kashmir]” (Fair & Hamza, 2018, p. 968). The grieving mothers of the martyrs who celebrate their sons’ martyrdoms in public have become a powerful mobilization and recruiting tool of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Other groups, like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), have recruited and deployed women as suicide bombers in Pakistan (Iqbal, 2015). More recently, the rivalry among Pakistani militant groups intensified when AQIS and IS began to pursue the recruitment of urban-, middle-, and upper-class women (Mahmood, 2017b). In August 2017 the TTP issued an English-language

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magazine, Sunnat-e-Khaula, named after a female Muslim fighter (Jadoon & Mahmood, 2017). In striking resemblance to the IS propaganda, Sunnat-e-Khaula sought to mobilize educated urban women as members of the global ummah to wage jihad under the TTP auspices. It skillfully intermeshed local grievances with the global ones, blaming the U.S. and national governments for betraying Muslims. Mirroring the IS’s strategy, the TTP highlighted the significance of women’s traditional roles in supporting jihad as mothers and wives, while urging them to move to more active roles. The TTP’s move demonstrated the group’s capacity for adaptive learning. Intensified state counterterror operations generated increased combat losses for the TTP. Escalating rivalry with the IS along with internal tensions weakened the TTP’s operational capabilities and general support for the group in Pakistan. Under these circumstances, the mobilization of women for violent jihad was tactically advantageous: it expanded the recruitment pool, while enabling the group to successfully evade state security forces. Direct appeal to Pakistani women to engage in violent jihad has also signified the group’s willingness to use female perpetrators against the Pakistani state (Haq, 2007).

India In India, women have been active in the Kashmiri insurgency, the Maoist conflict in tribal and rural areas of the central and eastern parts of the country, and the Hindutva militancy. Since 1989, women have been integral to the militant movement in Indian Kashmir, which has been supported by neighboring Pakistan and featured active involvement of several militant groups based in Pakistan. While the political objectives of the movement have changed over time – ranging from demands for an independent Kashmir, to the unification with Pakistan, to more autonomy for Kashmir within India – the movement has evolved through two distinct stages. The first, more popular and secular stage, led by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), began in 1987 as an indigenous movement for Kashmir liberation (Biswas, 2014, p. 46). Increasing Pakistan’s support for Islamist groups was a significant factor in the changing nature of the Kashmir movement.2 The second stage, from the mid-1990s and on, was marked by the growing influence of Islamist groups, such as the Hizbul-e-Mujahideen, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (now the Jamaat-ud-Dawa), shifting the movement’s objectives from Kashmiri liberation to eradicating un-Islamic influences in Kashmiri society and creating the Muslim ummah. During the first stage, the movement enjoyed widespread involvement of Kashmiri women who saw their support as an extension of their roles as mothers, sisters, and wives. Their political activism was grounded as much in everyday concerns related to the security and livelihoods of their families as it was in their dedication for the cause of Azaadi (freedom). Indeed, Kashmiri women took pride in being related to mujahidins and lending support to the jihad. They used traditional Kashmiri folklore, wanuwan, to express their support for Azaadi, condemn India and the “Hindustani” forces, and motivate Kashmiri men

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to join the movement (Sobhrajani, 2008). Women also mobilized in large numbers to lead massive public protests. Women of the now largely defunct Muslim Khawateen Marqaz (Muslim Women’s Center), the women’s wing of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, served as couriers, transported arms and explosives, provided shelter and medical assistance to the militants, transferred funds, etc. One female member, Anjum Zamruda Habib, became famous after she saved the chief of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, Hamid Sheikh (Sobhrajani, 2008; Parashar, 2011). In the second half of the 1990s, increased Islamization of the movement and the influx of foreign fighters contributed to women’s growing disillusionment with, and declining support for, militancy. While some Kashmiri women spoke openly against widespread human rights violations and gender-based insecurities, there were no organized women’s groups working for gender justice. In fact, fundamentalist women’s groups rose to prominence. They embraced conservative Islamist politics and engaged in moral policing, targeting other women in the Kashmir Valley who did not share their beliefs. Women’s groups, like the Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of Faith), promoted the enforcement of the burqa and relegation of women into the private realm. Its radical leader, Asiya Andrabi, believed that a Kashmir merger with Pakistan should be the first step toward the creation of a Muslim ummah (Parashar, 2011, p. 103). In 2001, the group publicly supported a campaign of violence unleashed by the Lashkar-e-Jabber against women who refused to wear burqas in public (Sobhrajani, 2008). Generally, suicide bombings are not accepted in Kashmir as a legitimate form of resistance. These attacks are primarily carried out by Pakistani operatives of the Lashkare-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. While the Dukhtaran-e-Millat encouraged women’s involvement in militancy in support roles, the group deemed it inappropriate for women to engage in more active roles. In 2005, however, Yasmeena Akhter, a 22-year-old female operative of Banaat-e-Ayesha (Daughters of Ayesha), the women’s wing of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, blew herself up near the Srinagar-Jammu highway that connects the Kashmir Valley to the rest of India. Her act triggered a debate about the role of women in the armed militancy in Kashmir. While media reports maintained that the explosives went off accidentally, Andrabi argued that “it is against the dignity of a Muslim woman that the parts of her body be strewn in a public place” (Sobhrajani, 2008; Parashar, 2011, p. 109). Despite reports of female militants, Kashmiri society has not accepted them. Kashmiri women’s identity in the ongoing struggle is generally perceived as that of a victim. Reducing women’s active engagement in conflict to the passive role of a victim is the result of unequal gender relations. As Parashar (2011, p. 113) observed: Although they [women] are part of the larger project of subversion, they have had to conform to the rigid demands of a patriarchal society and polity, which are gradually adopting conservative religious values. … Women like Asiya Andrabi (and her group) have even willingly upheld the ‘silencing’ of other

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women and have colluded with patriarchal strictures to push women out of public spaces. The Kashmiri insurgency is not the only theater of violence in India that drew large numbers of women. The contemporary Maoist militant movement has also featured an active involvement of women as combatants, supporters, activists, and recruiters. The movement has deep historic roots claiming continuity with the Naxalite movement in West Bengal (1967–1975) sharing similarities in matters of ideology, strategy, objectives, and support base (Ahlawat, 2018, pp. 253–254). Both movements were fueled by the Maoist ideology and accepted terrorist tactics as the means to creating a more just democratic state that would meet the socioeconomic needs of India’s marginalized rural population. Both drew support primarily from the lower castes, even though the leaders have been males from upper- and middle-caste backgrounds. Finally, both represented the reactions against the failures of the Indian state to address ongoing vulnerabilities and disempowerment experienced by the marginalized rural communities, especially the Dalits (untouchable castes) and the Adivasis (indigenous tribal people). Indeed, both movements emphasized the complicity of the Indian state in perpetuating colonial-style structural violence against its marginalized subjects (Parashar & Shah, 2016, p. 448). The Dalit and Adivasi women, who are particularly vulnerable under overlapping class and caste patriarchies, have been actively involved in the Naxalite movement. Importantly, even though gender justice was not the movement’s goal back in the 1960s–1970s, women joined the class struggle to bring about social change, primarily as lower ranks members charged with supporting roles (Parashar & Shah, 2016, p. 448). The auxiliary roles performed by women made their militancy and agency invisible (Roy, 2012). The Naxalbari insurgency was brutally quelled by state security forces. However, while the state prevailed over the rebellion, it did not address the fundamental inequalities that plagued many parts of rural India, sustaining mistrust toward the state (Parashar, 2019, pp. 344–345). Indeed, in the early 1990s India abandoned socialist economic policies and embraced economic neoliberalism, which generated major challenges for the dispossessed, fueling the rise of revolutionary leftist groups. The merger of these groups in 2004 led to the emergence of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which served as the umbrella organization providing a relatively coherent strategy and organizational structure to smaller groups. Its armed wing, People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), has an estimated membership of 40,000 and over a million supporters, most of whom hail from the Dalits and the Adivasis (Parashar, 2019, p. 345). Unlike the Naxalite leadership, contemporary Maoists have openly promoted a gender-equal, classless society, emphasizing that no revolution could ever succeed without the dismantling of the patriarchal order. In practical terms, this commitment translated into the inclusion of women into the movement’s ranks, expansion of women’s roles within the movement, and execution of vigilante justice against the perpetrators of sexual violence. Many squads within PLGA

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are led by female commanders (Navlakha, 2010). The organization’s leadership has also commemorated fallen female combatants and used their martyrdom as a way to glorify women’s contribution while publicizing its agenda of gender equality and facilitating the recruitment of female fighters (Parashar & Shah, 2016, p. 450). The presence of women within the movement legitimized its tactics among the locals sustaining community support and the recruitment pool. While forced recruitment does occur, existing studies suggest that most members, male and female alike, join the movement primarily out of conviction (Parashar & Shah, 2016). The Indian state responded to Maoist insurgency by demarcating the regions supportive of the insurgency as the “Red Corridor” and by forming armed vigilante groups, like the Salwa Judum, which unleashed indiscriminate violence against local populations (Malreddy, 2014). In 2009, the mercenary campaign was replaced by a government-led military offensive called “Operation Greenhunt.” Both state-backed vigilante groups and government militaries have been implicated in major human rights abuses, including gender-based violence against women. In the context of widespread lawlessness, insecurity, and displacement, many women have joined the Maoist movement “as a survival strategy or coping [and protection] mechanism” (Parashar & Shah, 2016, p. 449). While the Maoists have been known for the commitment to gender equality in their propaganda and for carrying out summary justice against the members of state security involved in sexual violence, their claims about the absence of such violence within their own ranks do not withstand scrutiny. As Parashar and Shah (2016, p. 455) observed, “the violence within the movement remains hidden” and sexual violence against women persists within the party and its armed wing. Equally questionable is the Maoist leadership’s professed commitment to gender equality, as women are missing from the higher echelons of military and political power, and have been excluded from the decision-making, negotiations with the state, and peace talks. Last but not least, women in India have also participated extensively in the right-wing Hindu Nationalist Movement, or Hindutva, which has been active in India since the beginning of the 20th century. The movement is rooted in an expressly religious form of nationalism that foregrounds Hinduism as the criterion for membership in a Hindu rashtra (nation), effectively excluding non-Hindus from its “imagined community” and full-fledged citizenship. Although women have participated in different phases of Hindutva, a decidedly masculinist character of the movement, i.e., its ideology, leadership, membership, symbols, and action, confined most women to the roles of supporters and victims.3 Despite this gender bias, nationalist Hindu women have carved a niche within the movement. The Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is the most influential organization within the movement, with up to 37,000 local branches and a membership of several million. It is estimated that its women’s wing, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (the Samiti), has a membership of over a million women (Sehgal, 2007, p. 166). The RSS supported the creation of the Samiti for fear of losing women’s support to its opponents. Unlike Islamist organizations across South Asia, which draw mainly

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lower-class women, the Samiti members have elite urban, upper-caste, middleclass backgrounds (Bacchetta, 1996). The Samiti has been actively engaged in organizing festivals, conferences, neighborhood meetings, and marches in support of Hindu nationalist campaigns. They have run primary schools, libraries, hostels for young girls and single working women, and employment services for poor women (Sehgal, 2007, p. 166). The organization has spread its version of Hindu nationalist ideology, which draws on the range of Hindu goddesses and feminine principles, and differs in terms of gendered meanings from the RSS’s ideology. For example, the RSS refers to the Hindu people in masculine terms as “the sons of the soil,” while the Samiti sees the Hindu people as Hindu men and “the daughters of Bharatmata” (Bacchetta, 1999, p. 129). Female activism within the organizational milieu of the Samiti provided women with the opportunity to exercise their agency while retaining the respect of their families and communities. The Samiti members present their activities as a positive contribution to women’s empowerment. For example, each state branch of the Samiti organizes an annual paramilitary camp, which trains women in self-defense and combat, while instructing them to adhere to traditional roles as mothers and wives. Camp instructors depict male Muslims as rapists and female Hindus as victims by emphasizing women’s fear of male violence, especially sexual violence, within a Hindu nationalist ideology. Accordingly, camp instructors teach self-defense skills to protect Hindu women against sexual attacks by Muslim men without mentioning that these skills can also be used in the context of domestic violence (Sehgal, 2007, pp. 176–177). Equally important, the Samiti ideology is silent on the range of issues that are of crucial importance to its members, including dowry and abortion (Bacchetta, 1999, p. 131). Instead, the Samiti cultivates a vision of female militancy geared toward defending female honor and that of the Hindu rashtra. Despite claims to women’s empowerment, the Samiti mobilizes Hindu women in defense of their nation against the Muslim enemy, while perpetuating gender inequality and women’s inferior position within a masculinized Hindu nationalist project (Nayak, 2003; Banerjee, 2012).

Sri Lanka For nearly three decades, Sri Lanka has experienced a protracted violent conflict between the state armed forces and the Tamil minority in the north and east of the country. Several groups sought/purported to represent the Tamils’ interest, notably among them the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and directed their struggle against sociopolitical and economic oppression by the Sinhala majority in Sri Lanka. Their ultimate goal was to achieve national independence for Tamil Eelam. The conflict had deep colonial roots dating back centuries, but it was triggered by the violent anti-Tamil riots that spread throughout Sri Lanka in 1983 (Stack-O’Connor, 2007, p. 44). Since the Tamil nationalist parties have failed to ensure security and fight discrimination, many Tamils began to enlist in militant

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groups to fight the Sri Lankan state. Initially, women have been active in various Tamil groups, all of which declared commitment to women’s liberation as part of the Tamil nationalist project (Alison, 2003, p. 44). By the mid-1980s, however, the LTTE eradicated its competitors, ending a period of intra-Tamil violence and becoming a self-proclaimed representative of all Tamils in Sri Lanka (Parashar, 2009). In the early years of conflict, women engaged in a range of logistical activities, i.e., spreading propaganda, providing medical care, collecting information, fundraising, and recruitment. Even though traditional Tamil culture does not support active roles for women in conflict, by the mid-1980s the LTTE founded the Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers, with its own leadership structure, and created an all-female combat unit, the Freedom Birds. In the 1990s, the number of LTTE female fighters grew exponentially. Prior to its military defeat in 2009, the LTTE was known as the largest Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka with an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 armed members. Women comprised up to 20% of the LTTE cadres, including 30–35% of Black Tigers, an elite suicide bombers squad (Alison, 2003, pp. 38–39). A few overlapping factors drove the expansion of Tamil women’s roles into combat, i.e., women’s ability to evade security, decline in male recruits, increased legitimacy, and women’s demand for more active involvement (Stack-O’Connor, 2007, pp. 43–48). While the LTTE used forced conscription, many female recruits joined voluntarily. Women’s reasons for joining the militants were often the same as those of male combatants, notably, nationalism, communal experiences of oppression and injustice, etc., but some were also gender-specific to women (Alison, 2003, pp. 39–43). Joining the LTTE provided the female with protection against sexual violence by the Sri Lankan military and offered “a militarized space within which women’s personal grievances found a politicized home” (Gowrinathan, 2017, p. 335). Ultimately, it was “‘the political’ as much as the ‘personal’ that propel[ed] these women to become perpetrators and patrons of violence” (Parashar, 2009, p. 239). Women’s entry into operational and leadership roles within the LTTE provoked conflicting reactions among the Tamils, many of whom saw female combatants as a violation of Tamil culture. This prompted the LTTE leadership to search for culturally acceptable justifications of female involvement. The organization introduced a series of measures – such as separation of sexes, strict policies on sexual conduct, etc. – that replicated the gender norms of conservative Tamil society, while skillfully exploiting gendered notions of female victimization, especially by government forces, to its advantage (Stack-O’Connor, 2007, p. 49). The LTTE often presented its female combatants as the symbol of women’s liberation (Alison, 2003, pp. 44–46). While the agency of Tamil women expanded through participation in the militant movement, enabling many women to become active in the public sphere, there is little evidence that they played a key role in the policy- or decision-making. They were “cogs in the wheel” (Coomaraswamy, 1997, p. 9) in a masculine nationalist project that subordinated the issue of gender equality to that of national liberation (Brun, 2008). Ironically, it is precisely at the

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time of expanded opportunities that Tamil women also endured “dual militarization” of the state and rebel forces, which made them extremely vulnerable and insecure (Gowrinathan, 2017, p. 335).

Conclusion Militancy creates new spaces for women’s agency. The expanded repertoire of roles available to women in times of conflict enables them to become active in the public domain. At first glance, women acting as supporters and perpetrators of violence may appear as a sign of agency. However, the evidence that women’s active involvement in militant activities results in the disruption of patriarchy is yet to be discovered.4 Parashar (2009) once observed that “gender may not have a strategy, but the strategy of militancy is a ‘gendered’ one” (p. 237). Although they appear only as trespassers in the masculine domain of militancy, women are essential to bolstering militant activities either by playing traditional support roles or by taking up the social roles that have been traditionally ascribed to men. Yet masculine bias in militancy makes female perpetrators “the most resilient taboo” (Mann, 2015, p. 27), obscuring the presence and multiple roles of women in militancy, especially as supporters and perpetrators of violence. The masculine center of gravity in militancy sustains and reproduces patriarchal cultural norms. Even in the situations when militant groups actively seek women’s participation, they pressure their female members to live up to the culturally accepted norms of “proper” femininity. This demonstrates to the broader community that the patriarchal foundation of militancy, and indeed of the community itself, remains unscathed even if women transgress socially accepted norms. Ultimately, militant groups “advocate the retraditionalization of women’s role at the same time that they actively mobilize women in the public arena” (Haq, 2007, p. 1024). Women may experience “momentary emancipation” (Shekhawat, 2015, p. 6). They may seek to act like men to attain a degree of empowerment, freedom of choice, and gender equality. But, this empowerment is both temporary and illusory, “a semblance of parity and power” (Shekhawat, 2015, p. 14). In a sense, the question of whether South Asian women are agents or victims of militancy is a misguided one since a simple agent–victim binary fails to capture the complexity of their experiences in and around militancy. Caught between competing masculinities of the state and militant groups, women across South Asia occupy a liminal space between agents and victims. With their bodies and identities as the stakes in the political projects of competing masculinities, women at best can experience “ambivalent empowerment” (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001, p. 102). Their participation in militancy perpetuates rather than challenges gender inequality, reproducing women’s subjugation inside militant groups and within the broader society. Once the guns are down, women militants are pushed back home where they often face increased stigmatization and discrimination. Having transgressed socially accepted gender roles, they are seen as the outcasts by their communities and families. The wartime empowerment “recedes with advancing peace” (Shekhawat, 2015, p. 14).

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Notes 1 While definitional issues are beyond the scope of this chapter, I prefer to use a broader term “militancy” instead of terrorism since several groups discussed in the chapter have operated in the gray area between terrorism and militancy. 2 While not the catalyst of Kashmiri militancy, Pakistan took advantage of it first by supporting JKLF and later by building up the main rival of JKLF, a pro-Pakistani Hizbule-Mujahideen (Biswas, 2014, pp. 46–48). 3 In January 2020, at least one woman was identified partaking in the vicious attack by the right-wing Hindu nationalist group Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad on the students and faculty at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (The Wire, 2020). 4 Some directions for future research include in-depth examination of the post-conflict gender relations across South Asia.

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Parashar, S. (2019). Colonial legacies, armed revolts and state violence: the Maoist movement in India. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 337–354. Parashar, S., & Shah, J. A. (2016). (En)Gendering the Maoist insurgency in India: between rhetoric and reality. Postcolonial Studies, 19(4), 445–462. Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (2001). Ambivalent empowerment: the tragedy of Tamil women in Conflict. In R. Manchanda (Ed.), Women, war and peace in South Asia: Beyond victimhood to agency (pp. 102–130). New Delhi: Sage. Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (2004). Between reality and representation: women’s agency in war and post-conflict Sri Lanka. Cultural Dynamics, 16(2/3), 141–168. Roy, M. S. (2012). Open space: rethinking female militancy in post-colonial Bengal. Feminist Review, 101, 124–131. Rubin, B. (1997). Women and pipelines: Afghanistan’s proxy wars. International Affairs, 73(2), 283–296. Sehgal, M. (2007). Manufacturing a feminized siege mentality: Hindu nationalist paramilitary camps for women in India. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 36(2), 165–183. Shekhawat, S. (2015). Introduction: women in conflict and peace-making. In S. Shekhawat (Ed.), Female combatants in conflict and peace: challenging gender in violence and post-conflict reintegration (pp. 1–19). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shepherd, L. (Ed.). (2013). Critical approaches to security: an introduction to theories and methods. London: Routledge. Sjoberg, L. (2009). Feminist interrogations of terrorism/terrorist studies. International Relations, 23(1), 69–74. Sobhrajani, M. (2008). Jammu and Kashmir: women’s role in the post-1989 insurgency. Faultlines 19. South Asia Terrorism Portal. Retrieved from https://www.satp.org/satp orgtp/publication/faultlines/volume19/Article3.htm Stack-O’Connor, A. (2007). Lions, tigers, and freedom birds: how and why the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam employs women. Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(1), 43–63. The Wire. (2020, January 15). JNU attack: Delhi police confirm masked woman is ABVP Member Komal Sharma. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/government/jnu-maskedwoman-komal-sharma-abvp-delhi-police-confirm

14 Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean G.V.C. Naidu

Introduction The Indian Ocean is the only ocean that is named after a country, where historically India has played a vital role. Naturally, the “India” to which reference is made here is not today’s India but the Indian Subcontinent, which, notwithstanding its vast cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, is, for most purposes, a single civilizational entity. In other words, the Indian Subcontinent is today’s South Asia. This region is currently characterized by a demographic bulge with proportionally limited resources. Hence, underdevelopment, underemployment, illiteracy, etc. have been contributing to the diversion of attention of the younger generation toward crime and terrorism in some of the countries. In addition, the India–Pakistan rivalry and uneasy relationships between India and some of its neighbors, on the one hand, and terrorism, transnational crimes, and drug smuggling, on the other, exacerbate the vulnerabilities in South Asia. All of the South Asian countries directly or indirectly rely on the Indian Ocean for trade and resources. The ocean offers opportunities and also acts as a medium of seaborne threats by both state and non-state actors. That, in short, impinges on the security of the littoral states. The superpower competition of the Cold War era is being replaced by the growing competition between the two rising powers – India and China. This competition is not limited to the Indian Ocean; it is also expanding to South Asia and the larger Indo-Pacific, an entirely new geostrategic construct. Consequently, the Indian Ocean security vulnerabilities are inexorably getting enmeshed to an extent with the developments in South Asia and vice versa. This chapter aims to examine some key elements that impinge on the transnational and maritime security vulnerabilities in South Asia. Some of these vulnerabilities that arise from the Indian Ocean region remain relatively understudied. This chapter is, therefore, an effort to address that deficit by focusing on traditional and nontraditional security challenges and future security challenges that emanate from the Indo-Pacific region, with specific focus on the Indian Ocean.

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Nontraditional security issues and South Asia One set of security vulnerabilities common to South Asia and the Indian Ocean relate broadly to the nontraditional domain. Given their unconventional nature, these are becoming far more challenging. South Asia is one of the most affected regions faced with problems such as terrorism, drugs, and irregular wars. These issues compel military planners and policymakers to devote more time and energy to devise appropriate strategies to tackle them. It is not that some of these issues did not exist earlier in one form or another, but there are newer ones that are more challenging. Indeed, parts of the Indian Ocean have had certain security threats even in ancient times. The menace of piracy and armed robberies in the East Indian Ocean have waxed and waned but persist even today. For instance, 41% of the world’s pirate attacks between 1995 and 2003 occurred in Southeast Asia (Lim, 2018). Collective efforts through the Malacca Strait Coordinated Patrol (MALSINDO) have played a key role in curbing the threat but not eliminating it. The fact that five attacks took place in four days in December 2019 in the Singapore Strait demonstrates the seriousness of the issue (Koh, 2019). It may be germane at this point to illustrate that situation by noting the hijacking of the Japanese freight ship Alondra Rainbow in October 1999, which was carrying aluminum ingots, by Indonesian pirates off the Singapore coast. The pirates put the crew of the ship on a life raft and left them to the mercy of high seas, and painted the ship black to veil its identity. In a swift and closely coordinated operation between the Indian Coast Guard and the Indian Navy, the ship was eventually recaptured some 800 km off the Indian coast. The pirate crew was prosecuted in February 2003. That incident highlighted for the first time the role that India can play in countering piracy in the Indian Ocean, given its sea power and capacity to quickly reach most parts of the ocean.1 Piracy in its virulent form in the western Indian Ocean region is of more recent origin. It became so dangerous and threatening to both the local and global peace that in 2008 the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing international naval forces to carry out anti-piracy measures off Somalia’s coast. That authorization witnessed concerted efforts at the global level to tackle the piracy threat by bringing together several major powers, including the U.S., the European Union, India, Japan, China, Russia, and others to undertake joint operations. Even smaller countries such as South Korea and Malaysia sent naval ships to patrol and secure the region. Interestingly, in one of those rare instances, the Indian and Chinese navies worked in tandem with each other in these operations, something that is otherwise unthinkable. It would not have been possible was it not for the fact that their stakes in securing the Indian Ocean sea-lanes of communication have become so vital. Given its proximity to the region, the Indian Navy played a crucial role in curbing Somali piracy. Indeed, it was the first to dispatch naval ships to the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast in November 2008 when it rescued a Saudi tanker carrying US$100 million worth of crude oil. Since that time, the Indian Navy has been continuously deployed in the region. According to the chief of the naval

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 253 staff, the Indian Navy “escorted over 3000 merchant marine during this patrol. Not a single ship under the escort of the Indian Navy since 2008 has been hijacked by the pirates” (“No hijacking of any ship,” 2018). Somali piracy has since been brought largely under control but that does not, however, imply a complete cessation of piracy. According to the Oceans Beyond Piracy Program, piracy attacks off Somalia’s coast increased from 16 in 2015 to 27 in 2016 and 54 in 2017, even though those numbers have dropped radically from the 160 incidents reported in 2011 (Pigeon, Sadic, Duncan, Ridgway, & Soeth, 2018). Recent events have raised questions over the long-term sustenance of counter-piracy operations, especially due to the potential nexus between pirates and maritime terrorists. Despite collective efforts, both East and West Indian Ocean regions continue to be vulnerable to piracy and armed robberies. A second issue that has emerged as a pronounced security threat in the Indian Ocean is maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism has a strong South Asian connection since it is an extension of land-based terrorism. In South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular have been the locus of terrorism for a long time. Terrorist organizations that are located in South Asia have spread to and established links with most other countries in the region. According to the Global Terror Database, “over the last 15 years, South Asia experienced the most terrorist activity” and “between 2002 and 2017, South Asia suffered 31,959 terror attacks which claimed 59,229 lives,” the second-highest in the world after the Middle East and North Africa, underscoring its vulnerability to terrorism and extremism. Even though terrorism has been around for centuries, it took an entirely new form after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and several other subsequent high-profile incidents. It is no longer an occasional car bomb attack or indiscriminate firing at innocent people but has evolved into a phenomenon that is underpinned by ideology, justified by religion, and assisted with modern technology. Terrorism as a phenomenon has succeeded to the extent that insurgent and political forces swear by it and legitimize and use terror attacks as a tool to achieve their goals. Unlike in the past, when one saw occasional extremist groups or others motivated by political factors indulging in terrorist activities, the situation is different today. Given the relative ease with which the young and gullible may be radicalized and motivated by political and religious ideologies and persuaded to undertake terrorist activities, terrorists and their groups seek avenues to meet and induct those young people into their groups and movements. Some of the most well-known terrorist organizations are Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS), and the Taliban, but there are numerous others in several countries with or without links to these outfits such as Boko Haram in Nigeria; Jemaah Islamiya mainly in Indonesia and Malaysia; the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines; Al-Shabaab in Somalia; and Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and several other groups in Pakistan. The rise of individuals and small groups undertaking terrorist attacks on their own without necessarily having formal links and/or securing ideological or material support and training from larger ones are more ominous. The terrorist threats are not limited to the use of conventional weapons; the available evidence suggests that some extremist groups seek to acquire

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weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Osama bin Laden even declared that acquiring WMD for the defense of Muslims is a “religious duty” (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). According to the Global Terrorism Index 2019, there has been a steady decline in the number of deaths from terrorism since peaking in 2014. This is attributable mainly to the military successes against the IS and Boko Haram. However, due to Al-Qaeda’s intensified activities the number of deaths are increasing in Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks occur for several reasons, but religion-based extremism thrives in an atmosphere of instability, as seen in South Asia, the Middle East, and Northern Africa, and also with the direct or indirect support of certain states. The fact that the perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008 remain free is a telling example of how terrorism thrives with state patronage. Notwithstanding the best efforts to eradicate terror attacks, the April 2019 attacks in Sri Lanka presented a grim reminder that terrorism is still alive in South Asia and will remain a top security concern. Maritime terrorism Maritime terrorism is of relatively recent origin but proving to be deadlier and that much more difficult to counter. All terrorist actions appear similar in terms of motivation, expectations, and outcomes, but maritime terrorism presents a qualitatively different kind of threat and is more challenging to address. Maritime terrorist incidents are very small – less than 2% of the total number – but some of them are deadly and very high profile. Either due to poor media coverage or limited knowledge of the maritime domain to undertake successful attacks, or due to the complexities involved in executing successful attacks, terrorism at sea is still limited. There is, however, a growing realization by the international community that maritime terrorism will remain a significant dimension of terrorism and that no effort should be spared to tackle it, since terrorist tactics are by nature unpredictable and depend on innovation and surprise. It is certainly not easy to develop countermeasures given the fact that most countries have vast coastlines and guarding them is a difficult task (Yadav, 2018). Second, there are innumerable ports of all possible sizes where providing a high level of security is virtually impossible. Third, as global trade constantly expands and the world becomes economically and logistically interdependent, it becomes impossible to scan every container or cargo ship for potential terror-related men and/or material being transported. In recent times, human smuggling has become rampant, especially from those countries affected by religious extremism. Even the U.S.-led Container Security Initiative examines only about 80% of containers that reach American ports. Since there is no commonly agreed upon definition of what constitutes maritime terrorism, it has been subject to various interpretations. According to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988, p. 225) maritime terrorism is “any attempt or threat to seize control of a ship by force; to damage or destroy a ship or its cargo; to injure or kill a person on board a ship; or to endanger in any way the safe navigation of a ship

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 255 that moves from the territorial waters.” The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered an expansive definition for the types of events that comprise maritime terrorism: “The undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities” (Greenberg, Chalk, Willis, Khilko, & Ortiz, 2006, p. 9). Most maritime terrorist activities can be broadly included in one of four categories. First, the use of the sea for land-based attacks as in the case of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Second, the use of ships for capacity building, such as the transport of persons and material for terrorist activities on land, as in the case of 1993 Mumbai serial bombings. Third, the hijacking of ships for political ransom, such as the 1985 hijacking incident of the Italian cruiser Achille Lauro in Yemen. Fourth, attacking high-value targets such as the American Navy’s USS Cole and the bombing of the Filippina Princess and Superferry 15 during peak hours (Kyriakidis, 2017). The WMD dimension has also been discussed by analysts, but given the complexity of building those weapons and the dangers involved in transporting and using them effectively on land, though impossible to rule out, appears to be a rather remote possibility. Nature of maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean Today, terrorism is a global phenomenon even though it is more rampant in the Middle East, parts of Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Maritime terrorism, however, is most prevalent in the Indian Ocean for a number of reasons. First, the Indian Ocean rim region is the epicenter of terrorism, as most terrorist organizations have originated and are located here with a substantial base. Many of them that were born in response to certain local issues gradually garnered considerable support and followers by exploiting religious sentiments and the feeling of victimhood. The earliest of them can be traced to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which staged violent attacks in the 1960s. In Southeast Asia the prominent ones were in southern Thailand, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) founded in 1968; and in the southern Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) created in 1972. Two events can be cited that gave a major fillip to the formation of transnational groups: the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 in support of a communist regime leading to the creation of Muslim insurgents, called mujahedeen, to wage jihad (holy war) against the Soviets. The Al-Qaeda group, with an extremely radical religious ideology and with a larger global agenda, evolved from this insurgency with Osama bin Laden as its head. Subsequently, another fundamentalist organization of religious students, the Taliban, was born of the mujahedeen. The Taliban took power and ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Almost all the terrorist groups that evolved more recently have drawn inspiration and ideological guidance (and have pledged their affiliation) to these groups.

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The second aspect is state sponsorship of terrorist groups. Both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were created for political reasons and it is well-known that the U.S. and its allies, such as Pakistan, extended strong political and military backing. The generous funds made available to these organizations, especially by rich patrons in Saudi Arabia and others in the Middle East, further aided their rapid expansion. Without this support, it would have been very difficult for Al-Qaeda and later the Taliban to sustain such a prolonged armed fight. It was done for short-term gains but the implications are long-term. The third dimension is the provision of safe havens and ideological justification for the actions of terrorists by certain countries that helped them to sustain their activities with impunity. It is no secret that but for Pakistan’s active participation, neither Al-Qaeda nor the Taliban would have been that much successful. Indeed, some of those who had participated in the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. had undergone training, both ideological indoctrination and in handling sophisticated weapons in Pakistan. In the aftermath of these attacks, it was revealing that Pakistan was hosting the largest number of terrorist organizations according to the UN. The most recent updates from the UN Security Council (UNSC) indicate that Pakistan has the most citizens and entities after Iraq and Afghanistan in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee list. The UNSC has designated Jaish-e-Mohammad’s chief, Masood Azhar, as a global terrorist and the number of Pakistani citizens in the UNSC’s proscribed list has gone up to 146 (after Afghanistan and Iraq) (Tripathi, 2019). Ironically, Pakistan itself is a major victim of terrorism although it supports terrorist organizations for its own political ends. Some of these outfits had their role in undertaking maritime terrorist actions in India. The fourth factor that allows terrorism to flourish is the political instability that characterizes failed and/or failing states. As James Piazza (2008) statistically shows, weak states produce the conditions that permit transnational terrorist groups to thrive. Most fragile states in the world are either located on the Indian Ocean rim or in its extended region, including Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Fund for Peace, 2019). Maritime terrorism acquires greater attention in the Indian Ocean because of the following reasons. First, the largest and most high profile maritime terrorist attacks have occurred in this region. Much before terrorism gained prominence consequent to the 9/11 events, there was one major attack that wreaked havoc in the bustling financial capital of India back in 1993 wherein all the explosive materials, triggers, etc., were transported by the sea. The attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, while it was refueling in Yemen’s Aden harbor brought the issue of maritime terrorism under the spotlight. The planning for the attack was carried out during Al-Qaeda’s Kuala Lumpur summit that was held in a hotel room convened by a former captain of the Malaysian Army and a businessman. A small fiberglass boat laden with explosives and a couple of suicide bombers caused massive damage to a warship, killed 17 sailors, and seriously injured scores of others. It was one of the most sophisticated Aegis-equipped guided-missile destroyers that was supposed to be fully capable of defending itself against all

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 257 possible contingencies. Since it is well known that several major American naval ships are nuclear-powered and some of them are equipped with atomic weapons, one can well imagine the consequences if any of them came under attack with more powerful explosives. The second prominent incident was the deadly Bali bombing exactly two years after the Cole incident, resulting in more than 200 deaths and several hundreds more suffering serious injuries. As Bali is a small island teeming with tourists throughout the year, it is difficult to expect that so much explosive material and detonators would have been made locally and thus quite possibly brought in using a sea route. While Al-Qaeda took the responsibility, it was the Indonesia-based militant group Jemaah Islamiya that carried out the attack purportedly in response to the U.S. post 9/11 counterterrorism actions against Afghanistan. The third one is the infamous Mumbai attack, also referred to as 26/11. The four days of mayhem and shooting and bombing of prime locations in south Mumbai between November 26 and 29, 2008, left 166 people dead and several hundreds injured. Ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based in Pakistan, carried out 12 coordinated attacks. Despite initial denials, Pakistan eventually accepted that the lone terrorist who was caught alive was its citizen. The modus operandi was relatively simple. After undergoing thorough training, including in some basic marine warfare at a remote camp in Pakistan, the chosen group used an Indian fishing trawler and then an inflatable rubber dinghy to arrive on land in Mumbai. Throughout their operation, they were in touch with each other with the mobile telephones of their victims and a satellite phone to communicate with their handlers in Pakistan. Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, the mastermind of the Mumbai attacks, still lives freely in Pakistan where he has been openly collecting funds for his organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, that is designated by the UN as a terrorist group. He is an international operative and has directed terrorist operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, and Southeast Asia. The officers from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, who were directly involved in working with the attackers, were never charged, despite the evidence presented. Additionally, there have been innumerable minor as well as failed and/or thwarted attacks, including the well-known case of Al-Qaeda’s attempt to attack the USS The Sullivans in 2000, where the boat that Al-Qaeda used was so overloaded with explosives that it sank before it reached its target. Almost all major terrorist organizations have attempted to build a maritime dimension but did not show much interest for a number of reasons. Nevertheless, mention needs to be made about two militant outfits that built maritime wings. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or simply GAM) that was active in the Indonesian province of Aceh between 1976 and 2005 was the first. Aceh, especially Banda Aceh, the capital of the province, was so badly hit by the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that the movement could hardly recover. GAM was surrounded on three sides by water (and the fourth by a hostile government), so it developed a maritime capability. Throughout the insurgency,

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Since GAM controlled nearly 80% of the villages of Aceh province, it helped in securing these boat rides as well as undertaking attacks on nearby ships for ransom. The second group was the Tamil Tigers (also known as the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam [LTTE]) who, at its peak, administered the territory under its control like a regular government and even built what many observers consider to be the twentieth century’s most effective non-state navy, designed to protect the land-based insurgency’s seaward flank and the supply routes upon which the insurgency depended. It did this by conducting traditional sea control and sea denial operations, and by mounting amphibious assaults on government positions. It also conducted water-borne suicide missions using domestically-manufactured ‘stealth’ craft, launched bomb attacks against Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) recruits and other personnel, in a campaign that came close to breaking the navy’s morale, and deployed a range of effective home-produced naval mines and water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017; Rawat, 2019) Moreover, it had “sea battle regiments, underwater demolition teams, the notorious Sea Tiger strike groups, marine engineering and boat-building unit, radar and telecommunication unit, marine weapons armoury, logistics unit, reconnaissance team and intelligence section, even a Naval Academy/Maritime school” (Kyriakidis, 2017). Before its demise, the LTTE began building a rudimentary midget submarine, a technologically highly demanding task, of its own (Venkataramanan, 2009). The LTTE was defeated, and its leadership and several of its followers were eliminated in 2009 before the submarine could be built, however. Due to geographical constraints, both these organizations had to develop maritime wings to ensure their logistical chains could sustain their activities. Both are nonexistent today, but the means and tactics they developed can be emulated and improvised by others to undertake maritime terrorist attacks. Some of them are already being used. The LTTE in many ways was a trendsetter. It was the first to use suicide bombers, to recruit and use child soldiers for military actions, and to attack high-profile individuals. It had also sought to evolve from guerrilla-style attacks to the use of regular warfare means in fighting the Sri Lankan military. On the one hand, suicide bombings and the use of children for terrorist activities have become seminal and have been extensively used by the IS, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. On the other hand, the GAM successfully used small boats for supplies and also to extract ransom by capturing

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 259 ships and their crews, a strategy that the Abu Sayyaf group used very effectively in the Philippines. Tackling maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean While countries must be prepared to face unforeseen contingencies, certain measures can be taken to pre-empt most, if not all, terror acts. State sponsorship, directly or indirectly, and funding are the two main aspects that support terrorism and thus maritime terrorism. Examples of the former are the many individuals and terrorist organizations that have been sponsored by Pakistan, where the army calls the shots on most issues, especially on foreign and security policies, even when an elected government is in place. Interestingly, Osama bin Laden hid in a heavily fortified bungalow that was located less than half a mile from Pakistan’s premier military training academy, the Kakul Military Academy, in Abbottabad. It is hardly conceivable that Osama could have continued his operations from this hideout without the knowledge of the Pakistani government. There are several other countries in the Indian Ocean region that have directly or otherwise helped terrorist groups to sustain themselves, depending on the interests that those groups serve. It is the funding that the terrorists generate through licit and illicit means that is very critical to their activities. Small donations constitute a significant source, but some rich individual sympathizers are known to have contributed generously, especially to Osama bin Laden. Money laundering, drug peddling, arms smuggling, and links to organized crime are other known sources of income. There is no way this can be curbed unless the international community brings to bear enormous pressure, and punitive measures if needed, on those countries that harbor terrorists and sustain them through financial support. Second, states need to promote maritime domain awareness (MDA), an idea that has recently become popular. The International Maritime Organization defines MDA as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment” (2010, p. 4). The process of achieving MDA includes: “(1) collection of information, (2) fusion of information from different sources, (3) analysis through the evaluation and interpretation of information, and (4) dissemination of information to decision makers. The goal is to identify risks and threats in a timely manner and provide actionable intelligence” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014). Thus, MDA has two main elements: surveillance of activities at sea, and intelligence gathering in the background to the movements and presences identified (Murphy, 2007, p. 74). MDA has become a key dimension in recognizing that any illegal activity at sea can carry security risks. In a vast region like the Indian Ocean, which has a high volume of maritime traffic, it is crucial to pool all relevant data on illicit activities, then process and disseminate it to interested parties. Increasingly, MDA has been encouraged and used as an effective tool to identify and tackle illegal activities, including potential terrorist actions. Third, it is vital to undertake collective actions. It is obvious that none of the security threats in the nontraditional domain can be dealt with by any one nation

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since most of the threats tend to be transnational and transregional. As the Somali anti-piracy operations have shown, only a collective action brought the piracy under control. The same is true with respect to maritime terrorism, where the critical component is intelligence gathering and sharing. Except for a few bilateral agreements and ad hoc arrangements, at present there are no mechanisms either for collective actions or intelligence sharing in the Indian Ocean. Finally, a major shortcoming in the Indian Ocean is the lack of effective regional multilateral mechanisms. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has been around since 1997, but it has not been able to make a mark either in promoting economic cooperation or in tackling nontraditional security threats. A weak institutional structure, a lack of a tangible agenda, and poor political backing by member states, especially the big four – India, Indonesia, Australia, and South Africa – have hobbled the IORA’s progression. Even though maritime safety and security have been brought under the ambit of the IORA, it has so far remained confined to the conference halls than in crafting concrete initiatives (Naidu, 2019, p. 110). With 21 rim countries as its members and all major powers as its Dialogue Partners,2 none is better placed to initiate and coordinate activities on nontraditional security issues than the IORA, especially due to the fact that there is no Indian Ocean regionwide multilateral mechanism that exists at present. The Somali counter-piracy operation was an excellent missed opportunity where the IORA could have played a key role as the nodal coordinator of the coalition activities.

Traditional security issues and South Asia The South Asia and Indian Ocean regions confront several traditional security challenges that can be broadly cataloged under intensifying great power competition and a comparable militarization witnessed during the Cold War, which invariably spills from one region to the other. Unlike in the West Pacific Ocean, where there are several mechanisms of various types – bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral, and regular high-level interactions to deal with security-related issues – there are hardly any such arrangements in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Both the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the IORA have somehow failed to live up to expectations; their roles in the security arena have always been minimal or non-existent. Some of the security issues confronting the region are briefly addressed next. That the Indian Ocean is gradually becoming the cockpit for great power competition in maritime space is no doubt concomitant with its rising geo-strategic stature. After being dominated by the British during the colonial era, it was contested by the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. That contest had a profound impact on South Asian security as the two major regional powers, India and Pakistan, aligned themselves with the two superpowers. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. retained its presence in the Indian Ocean and thus has remained the predominant military power. Diego Garcia has always been a crucial link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans for American

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 261 military operations, as was seen during its operations both in the Middle East and later in Afghanistan. Its geostrategic salience was enormously enhanced after the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines in 1992. It is little wonder that Washington has emerged the most enthusiastic supporter of the Indo-Pacific idea of covering the space between Diego Garcia and Honolulu, the headquarters of its Pacific Command (renamed as the Indo-Pacific Command) with forward deployments in Guam, South Korea, and Japan, and smaller presences in Australia and Singapore. The U.S. continues to maintain a strong military presence as part of its strategy of hub and spokes. After the tardy progress of the “rebalancing” strategy of the Obama administration, Donald Trump has advanced a grand Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, even though it remains somewhat vague and undefined. It has been variously interpreted but primarily aimed at establishing a maritime order that is based on international rules, on the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes, the application of international regimes, unimpeded access to the maritime commons, and the security of international sea-lanes and airspace, all of which ensure that the dominant status of the U.S. is not undermined. Despite being a regional power, India did not have the political will, the military wherewithal, or even a long-term strategy to even pretend to be an Indian Ocean power of consequence, both during and immediately after the Cold War. Notwithstanding some power projection capabilities, the Indian Navy had been primarily a brown-water navy for all practical purposes. It was virtually incapable of embarking on any out-of-area operations given the very limited sea-lift capability it possessed. It has, however, undergone a transformation since the early 2000s. Besides the rapprochement and a robust strategic partnership with Washington, New Delhi has started charting a new course for its navy with fundamental changes in its force structure with the addition of more ocean-going rather than coastal ships and, importantly, has articulated forcefully its maritime interests, maritime doctrines, and strategies. It certainly seems to be on a course that would make it blue-water capable if the ambitious plans it has set were to be realized. Three aircraft carriers; several nuclear submarines complemented by advanced conventional submarines; and a large number of ocean-going ships, greater strategic sealift capabilities, and dedicated satellites along with network-centric operations will make India a formidable force in the Indian Ocean. According to a former naval chief, by 2027 the Indian Navy will wear a brand-new look with some 150 principal combatant ships and a 500-odd aircraft fleet. It is expected that nearly 49 new warships and submarines, which are on order, are likely to be inducted in the next few years (Verma, 2012). Along with a new force structure, an entirely new maritime strategy is also taking shape. The earlier defensive posture that had basically centered on coastal protection is being replaced by a strategy under which the navy would be able to undertake what is called “out-of-area operations.” With continental threats becoming less severe and an Indian Ocean environment that is generally favorable, there has been a greater appreciation of the unique role the navy can perform in advancing diplomatic and strategic interests, and to deal with a variety of maritime security challenges.

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The evolving strategic contestation in the Indian Ocean in many ways is linked not only to the rise of India but also to the rise of East Asia, especially China. Hence, no discourse on Indian Ocean security can be complete without reference to China. For instance, more than 80% of the East Asian hydrocarbon requirements, prominently of the global economic powerhouses like China, Japan, and South Korea (and India), are met with imports from the Middle East and Africa. Estimates suggest that more than 60% of China’s two-way trade passes through the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean covering much of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. It is natural that Beijing would be concerned if these trade routes came under threat. Thus, its forays into the Indian Ocean have been steadily increasing and has even secured a military foothold at Djibouti. More worryingly for New Delhi, under the Maritime Road Initiative, Beijing has undertaken to develop several ports especially in countries around India, which are viewed to be potentially of dual use. Japan has also become active in the Indian Ocean region. It began with Japan extending logistical support to the American war against terrorism in Afghanistan in the 2000s but later on actively participating in peacekeeping and other activities in the region. Significantly, Japan has also set up a small military facility in strategically located Djibouti. The enhanced Japanese security cooperation with a number of countries in the Indian Ocean Rim, prominently with Australia, Indonesia, and India, is of significance. In a major move, “Japan is working on a plan to send about 270 seamen to the Middle East to guard ships supplying Japan under a law that allows military deployments for research and intelligence gathering” (“Japan plans to send 270 sailors to Middle East,” 2019). Tokyo has taken these steps in view of the vulnerability and challenges in the Indian Ocean despite being a close alliance partner with Washington. Tokyo has also announced a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy and active engagement across the region through infrastructure building. Along with increasing its forays into the Indian Ocean, Japan’s defense links with India have witnessed a remarkable shift in the past decade from holding bilateral coast guard exercises to forging a variety of relations (Naidu & Yasuyuki, 2019). Certainly Washington and Beijing have been on a collision course on a range of issues, with the former openly articulating that the latter is a threat in many ways. Concomitantly, a rising China is expanding its political influence, backed by its mammoth economic and military might, by challenging the status quo, which is leading to a conflict of interests and tensions with other great powers. That tension, which was limited to East Asia until recently, is now extending to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The lack of reliable balance of power appears to be the cause of instability and the unease that is manifesting in many ways. Whereas great power military presence and competition in the maritime domain can pose certain kinds of challenges, major security issues are likely to emanate from politically unstable areas, where great powers tend to get involved one way or another. For instance, the South China Sea is an extension of the Indian Ocean, and developments there will have implications, besides the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are Indian Ocean countries that are parties to the South

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 263 China Sea dispute. For China, the South China Sea is a critical means of egress to access its Indian Ocean trade routes. China’s attempts to exert control over the Spratly and Paracel Islands are challenged by the U.S. (which conducts Freedom of Navigation Exercises) and India and Japan too, since they also hold periodic naval exercises there. Any prospect of Beijing’s enhanced military presence in the Indian Ocean region will most likely draw reactions from Washington as well as New Delhi. Besides, the expanding U.S. presence at Diego Garcia and enhanced strategic contestation would further strengthen security cooperation with India and several other countries in the region. Similarly, in South Asia the simmering tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has drawn China into the picture, as recent events have demonstrated (“Article 370: China says opposed to Ladakh as union territory,” 2019). Moreover, China is also involved in building a massive China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) comprising several infrastructure projects as part of its Belt and Road Initiative connecting the strategically located Gwadar Port overlooking the Gulf of Oman to China’s Xinjiang province at an estimated cost ranging from US$45 billion to US$60 billion. New Delhi has objected to this project as it transits through parts of Pakistan-administered Kashmir that India claims. Moreover, if Gwadar becomes a Chinese military base as was claimed by a leading American think tank, it would further aggravate tensions both between India and Pakistan and between India and China (Kanwal, 2018). It would certainly prompt India to establish naval bases/facilities beyond its borders and maritime boundaries, which it had refrained from, but that is already changing with the acquisition of a few facilities and arrangements with some Indian Ocean island states. A military showdown between India and China is most unlikely; however, their growing competition will be a source of tension that could undermine the Indian Ocean security. If Beijing is developing the Gwadar Port in a big way in Pakistan, India is involved in building the Chabahar Port in southeast Iran, both located close to the Persian Gulf. Similarly, both are engaged in wooing the strategically located island states such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, etc. Thus, the Great Power contest is visible with close nexus between South Asia and the Indian Ocean. A rising China is engendering power shifts and that is undermining the preeminent status of the U.S. and posing challenges to India. As its strategic interests grow, China is cementing its relationship with Pakistan. If Delhi and Washington have evolved a common approach to the Indian Ocean security with high-level Malabar and other military exercises and through other means, Beijing and Islamabad too are crafting their common policy with Gwadar as the lynchpin. Further, there is no denying that the China–India contest has been intensifying in the rest of South Asia too. China is sparing no effort to cultivate and expand relations with all the countries in the region (including Bhutan) and India is trying its best to counter China’s growing influence. Consequently, the close nexus between the South Asian security and the Indian Ocean is undeniable.

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Conclusion There is an innate link between South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Undoubtedly, developments in South Asia have influenced the Indian Ocean in many ways. There is no denying that today both of these regions are faced with numerous traditional and nontraditional security threats, each posing different kinds of challenges. The former is becoming particularly difficult to deal with, especially because many countries both in South Asia and the rest of the Indian Ocean Rim region are very volatile and economically weak and politically unstable, and thus are a major source of these threats. The latter is in the form of great power competition, which invariably leads to greater militarization. Maritime piracy and maritime terrorism have emerged as major threats in the region. Even though they seemingly have contradictory objectives, their potential nexus cannot be ruled out; that, however, becomes much more difficult to counter. Maritime terrorism is not easy to undertake due to a variety of reasons and hence their overall numbers are very few. Some of them are, however, very deadly and take a heavy toll in lives; hence it will remain a significant dimension of terrorism. Moreover, several on-land terror acts have a strong maritime dimension as supplies are routed through the sea. Thanks to modern communications and the Internet, groups that used to operate at the local level are establishing contacts with their counterparts and also with larger organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the IS, which provide ideological guidance, planning, and training in terror activities. This was particularly visible in the case of a series of seaborne attacks in India. Compared to any other region, South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions are also very vulnerable to many other sources of threat such as transnational crimes, drug peddling (sandwiched as such between the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent), gun running (from the Andaman Sea, which was the biggest conduit for Maoists in Nepal and India, to the LTTE in Sri Lanka), maritime piracy, and maritime terrorism. As anti-piracy efforts along Africa’s east coast have amply demonstrated, these threats can only be tackled through collective efforts. It would have been unthinkable, for instance, that so many countries would take part in counter-piracy operations along the east coast of Africa to bring it under control. The same holds true with regard to maritime terrorism where a key aspect is intelligence gathering and sharing. Although there are bilateral informal arrangements, a lack of institutional mechanisms wherein intelligence inputs are vetted and passed on to the concerned is notable. The April 2019 massive terrorist attacks on churches and luxury hotels resulting in 259 deaths could have been avoided had the Sri Lankan government acted on several intelligence inputs that India provided. Indeed, many have been thwarted due to timely, credible intelligence sharing. As intelligence gathering and sharing intensifies, terrorists will find it much more difficult to undertake large-scale activities except in politically vulnerable countries, which, in turn, might drive them to the maritime domain both to target high-profile, high-value ships and to stage attacks on land such as the Mumbai

Security vulnerabilities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 265 attacks. In no other region are the dangers of terrorism and maritime terrorism so clear and present than in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Thus, the need to address them has become that much urgent.

Notes 1 The Indian Navy was also the first to reach Banda Aceh after it was struck by the December 2004 devastating tsunami and to provide relief when super cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in May 2008. 2 China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States are IORA’s Dialogue Partners.

References Article 370: China says opposed to Ladakh as union territory. (2019, August 6). India Today [Press Trust of India]. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-reaction-ja mmu-kashmir-article-370-1577915-2019-08-06 Asal, V., & Hastings, J. V. (2015). When terrorism goes to sea: terrorist organizations and the move to maritime targets. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(4), 722–740. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. (1988). https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv8-english.pdf Fund for Peace. (2019). Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019. https://fundforpeace. org/2019/04/10/fragile-states-index-2019/ Greenberg, M., Chalk, P., Willis, H. H., Khilko, I., & Ortiz, D. S. (2006). Maritime terrorism: risk and liability. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ra nd/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf Institute for Economics & Peace. (2017). Global terrorism index 2017: measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/ 11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf International Maritime Organization. (2010, May 24). Amendments to the international aeronautical and maritime search and rescue (Iamsar) manual. http://www.imo.org/b last/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29093&filename=1367.pdf Japan plans to send 270 sailors to Middle East to guard ships—Nikkei. (2019, December 5). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-japan/japan-plans-to-send270-sailors-to-middle-east-to-guard-ships-nikkei-idUSKBN1Y904V Kanwal, G. (2018, April 2). Pakistan’s Gwadar port: a new naval base in China’s string of pearls in the Indo-Pacific. Policy Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-stringpearls-indo-pacific Koh, F. (2019, December 23). Five attacks in just four days. The Straits Times. https://ww w.straitstimes.com/singapore/two-piracy-attempts-in-singapore-strait-on-dec-23-five-a ttacks-in-just-four-days Kyriakidis, K. (2017, October/November). Maritime terrorism history, typology and contemporary threats. ASPIS. https://www.aspis-superyachts.com/maritime-security/ maritime-terrorism-history-typology-and-contemporary-threats.html Lim, T. W. (2018, March 15). Fighting piracy on the ASEAN seas. Asia Global Online. https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/fighting-piracy-asean-seas-southeast-asia/

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Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2010, January). Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: Hype or reality. Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/l egacy/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf Murphy, M. N. (2007). Maritime piracy and contemporary maritime terrorism: The threat to international security. London: Routledge. Naidu, G. V. C. (2019). Envisioning IORA’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies, 2(2), 102–110. Naidu, G. V. C., & Yasuyuki, I. (2019). India-Japan defence links. Strategic Analysis, 43(1), 13–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2019.1573556 No hijacking of any ship for last two years on anti-piracy watch: Indian navy. (2018, July 14). The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/no-hi jacking-of-any-ship-for-last-two-years-on-anti-piracy-watch-indian-navy/articleshow/ 50013756.cms?from=mdr Piazza, J. A. (2008). Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism? International Studies Quarterly, 52(3), 469–488. Pigeon, M., Sadic, E., Duncan, S., Ridgway, C., & Soeth, K. (2018). The State of Maritime Piracy 2017: Assessing the Economic and Human Cost. One Earth Future. http://oce ansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/one_earth_future_state_of_piracy_report_ 2017.pdf Rawat, M. (2019, April 22). How South Asia emerged as hotbed for terror attacks since 1971. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/terror-attacks-sri-lanka-in dia-pakistan-south-asia-middle-east-1507353-2019-04-22 Tripathi, R. (2019, May 3). Pakistan has third highest number in UN proscribed list. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-has-th ird-highest-number-in-un-proscribed-list/articleshow/69155248.cms?from=mdr U.S. Government Printing Office. (2014). How to improve the efficiency, safety, and security of maritime transportation: better use and integration of maritime domain awareness data. [Report 113–33]. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, 1st Session, July 31, 2013. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did= 755687 Venkataramanan, K. (2009, January 30). Forces find ‘submarines’ in abandoned LTTE base. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Forces-findsubmarines-in-abandoned-LTTE-base/articleshow/4048344.cms Verma, N. (2012, August 7). Indian navy’s recent milestones [Statement at his farewell press conference.]. India Strategic. http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1698_Indian _Navy_recent_milestones.htm Yadav, Y. (2018, November 26). More than a decade after the Mumbai attacks, India’s coastal security is riddled with loopholes. First Post. https://www.firstpost.com/india/tenyears-of-november-26-2008-mumbai-terror-attacks-high-seas-still-remain-securitynightmare-as-india-does-little-to-plug-loopholes-5615691.html

15 The impact of terrorism in South Asia Implications and prospects Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe and Edidiong Mendie

Introduction The terrorism threat is receding throughout the world except for the South Asian region. This region is in a state of quagmire characterized by uncertainty in Afghanistan and the emergence of three major groups – Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda, and Taliban. Similarly, Pakistan also faces threats from Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Other countries such as India with challenges from LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-e-Mujahideen (HeM); Sri Lanka from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and National Thowheeth Jama’at; Bangladesh from Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, Islamic Front, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; and Nepal from the Maoists. Some significant factors for the prevalence of terrorist organizations are the availability of human resources, interstate conflicts, ethnic and religious clashes, and disputed territories and borders. Facing a threat from these terrorist groups, some of whom transcend national borders, the national security interest of a nation becomes of paramount importance as it impacts foreign policy and trade relations. For security purposes, governments are more likely to engage in trade relations with countries that are less prone to terrorism. Suffice it to say, security plays a crucial role in determining the frequency at which countries deal with one another economically. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas (2018) assert that for some regions in South Asia, the uncertainty of a safe environment may be a result of hostile trade relations that have become a problem, as terrorism hurts trade. That is, it slows the free flow of resources from major port authorities and investors, and pressures locals to spend more on security apparatus than on economic needs. Countries are concerned about safety when looking for investment opportunities, and an unstable environment due to terrorist activities, or vulnerability, poses a considerable risk to such trade avenues. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) discussed the rise of global security and its impact on global capital. Like other regions of the world, South Asia is not left out of the debate on global security because of the decline in trade relations. This work addresses homegrown violent extremism and insecurity across South Asia concerning trade and security. Violent extremism, an antecedent of terrorism, involves an ideology that takes a radical view, especially

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in political matters, and is prejudicial to opposing beliefs (Martin, 2011). Hence, in this chapter, violent extremism and terrorism are applied interchangeably. Given the lack of a universal definition of what constitutes terrorism (see Onwudiwe, 2001; Schmid, 2004; White, 2017), this chapter adopts the definition of terrorism deduced by the United Nations (UN) (2018, para 3): Acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. By this definition, an act of terrorism targeting a group or nation satisfies the standard of terrorism. Since the definition of terrorism is pejorative, the UN’s effort in defining terrorism may be designed to fulfill its member nations’ understanding of the phenomenon. This definition gap is addressed in the latter part of this chapter. This chapter will place specific emphasis on strategies that focus on cutting the access and flow of resources to primary actors of terrorist groups. The principal actors of terrorism are those individuals and groups who are actively or passively engaged in perpetrating acts of terrorism, while secondary actors are those with the power and funds responsible for directing the affairs of terrorism (usually the leaders). Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three segments. Part one addresses the origin of terrorism and insecurity in South Asia. Part two addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and insecurity, and the relevant criminological and theoretical frameworks that may best explain the phenomenon. Part three discusses practical solutions and efforts that may be employed in mitigating and eradicating terrorism. Over the years, South Asia has experienced the uprising of different insurgencies and terrorist attacks that have threatened the peace, security, economic, and political climate of the region. Although terrorist activities are primarily concentrated in the Middle East, many operating zones for rebels are in South Asia, Europe, and Africa (Van Dijk, 2008). The insurgencies occurring in the world have made South Asia the global hub of terrorism, as Pakistan and Afghanistan have sheltered Al-Qaeda. The Taliban is still a force that employs violent means to destabilize the Afghan government. Consequently, identifying the societal impact of terrorism in South Asia is the first step to combating it. It also requires an understanding of its historical context and the demographics of the region. South Asia is comprised of the following countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 2019, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, respectively, ranked as the second, fifth, and eighth most populous countries in the world (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019; United States Census Bureau, 2019). This chapter primarily focuses on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan because of the heightened tension and acts of terrorism experienced over the past decades. In 2017, India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan ranked among the top ten countries impacted by terrorism, based on the number of deaths in the region (Institute for

The impact of terrorism in South Asia 269 Economics & Peace, 2018, p. 18); hence, the focus of this chapter is on these countries. As per the 2019 Global Terrorism Index, South Asia remains the region most impacted by terrorism. The economic impact of terrorism is equal to $5.9 billion in South Asia. Between 2002 and 2018, 34,648 attacks and 67,503 deaths were reported to occur in South Asia.

Part 1: How We Got Here The origin and problem Many issues of terrorism in the world stem from religious, political, economic, and cultural differences among nations, tribes, and groups; and relationships between the core, peripheral, and semiperipheral regions. Arguably, in South Asia, the problem relates primarily to cultural and ideological beliefs, religion, and colonialism. Scholars have advocated that understanding historical issues like colonialism is fundamental in giving insight to the actions of terrorists and in formulating counterterrorism measures (Onwudiwe, 2007; Onwudiwe, Tsado, Ejiogu, McGee-Cobbs, & Okoye, 2016). Onwudiwe (2001) used the world systems theory in clarifying the inequalities experienced by different nations as a result of colonialism. Rodney (1972) strongly asserted that Europe, due to its imperialist agenda, underdeveloped Africa. The same analytic frame could be applied to South Asia, as it was equally colonized and exploited by the same colonizers. An inequitable economic system benefits some constituents and marginalizes others. This has been the case in South Asia, where some parts feel exploited historically. Indeed, India was partitioned into two independent nations, India and Pakistan, by the British. Based on their colonial past, the two countries still contest sovereignty over some geographical regions and continuously remain in war mode over the disputed border. Specifically, due to their geopolitical context and colonial experience, different forms of sporadic violence are advocated by various geographical constituencies for their cause. Accordingly, colonialism has contributed to disunity in South Asia, as exemplified in transnational border disputes among India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. That is, it left a vacuum for a power struggle in different parts of the region where each claims the disputed border territory. Each is addressed next. India India is a significant country in South Asia. India came under British rule in 1858 (Hagerty, 2005). The centralization of power during the British rule, albeit its restriction, ensured uniformity of power as long as power remained under one administration. Despite the overwhelming colonial control, India gained its independence from Great Britain on August 15, 1947. The end of British rule brought a divide to the political administration in the nation. The effect of postcolonialism paved the way for different ethnic groups seeking self-rule. On one hand, the pan-Indian nationalists sought a unified nation, and on the other, there were the secessionists who wanted autonomy (Thongkholal,

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2012). Despite the government’s plan to integrate all the regions into the Indian mainstream, the independent ethnic areas persisted with their demands for secession (Thongkholal, 2012). This disagreement led to the creation of separate states by the government in a bid to accommodate these demands (Thongkholal, 2012), while accepting some aspects of British governance in some jurisdictions. The Maoists and other radical groups commenced with the intent to overthrow the Indian government, and have fought continuously against private organizations trying to exploit their lands and sources of livelihood. Their purpose in the fight for autonomy is strictly political. They tend to recruit people who are victims and have been affected by the government’s mining activities. They have also recruited people who were displaced through the loss of lands and mines. Several insurgencies have also arisen in different parts of South Asia. Groups such as the Maoist rebels in Nepal (on the border of India) have emerged, wreaking various forms of havoc in the region. The Maoist insurgency started to establish a people’s democracy in the area (Marks, 2017). Though it was a postcolonial movement, it was not devoid of the colonial experience, which can be attributed to the root cause of insurgencies in India. Afghanistan The playing field of terrorism in Afghanistan has been a significant cause of concern for South Asia for decades. Assuredly, the Taliban emerged in this region as a revolutionary group of Mujahideen and Pashtun tribesmen fighting against the invasion of their lands (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). The fight for the independence of their regions was rooted in ideological grumbles and objections. In 2017, the Taliban was responsible for 3,571 deaths and 699 terrorist attacks (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018), and before 2017 had harbored and provided a haven to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, thereby using the Afghan land to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. Furthermore, Osama Bin Laden founded Al-Qaeda, which has a stronghold in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda started to gain prominence following the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. The 9/11 attacks in the United States (U.S.) involving Al-Qaeda placed it in the spotlight of global terrorism. Al-Qaeda became a topic of universal concern, and its presence in Afghanistan and the conduct of activities in the early 2000s by Osama Bin Laden became a major catastrophe for the region. While the former Soviet Union and the United States are not colonial states in the real sense of Great Britain and other European countries that partitioned nations, both countries were/are regarded as imperialist, hegemonic nations by the Taliban and other insurgent groups in South Asia. The Soviets occupied Afghanistan in 1979, and currently, the U.S. has a military presence there. Pakistan The Indo-Pakistan wars (1947–1948, 1965, and 1999) were primarily over the Kashmir territory (Hagerty, 2005, p. 6). A significant cause of the Indo-Pakistan wars was the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) territorial conflicts.

The impact of terrorism in South Asia 271 After the British left India, Kashmir, a small region (predominantly occupied by Muslims), wanted to become independent. However, Pakistan invaded Kashmir. The Kashmir kingdom lacked the human resources to deter Pakistan. However, due to the Muslim population’s financial constraints and resentment against the Hindu king, Kashmir was unable to prevail against Pakistan. The king of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, therefore, requested India’s intervention to stop Pakistan from taking over its territory. India’s condition of this arms provision was a treaty that Kashmir would become a part of India, for which India intervened and prevailed. The Indo-Pakistan wars over the J&K territory depicted many unpleasant memories across both sides of the border. To date, some Pakistani citizens consider the Indo-Pakistan wars a betrayal by India over Kashmir and still hold grudges leading to different forms of attacks. India, for its part, also claims J&K as an integral part of its territory (Ahlawat & Malik, 2019, pp. 68–69). Additionally, the extension of the Taliban terrorist group in this region is demonstrated through its affiliate Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). The TTP was responsible for 233 deaths and 56 attacks in Pakistan as of 2017. The emergence of various groups in the postcolonial period led support to different ideologies in South Asia, and each group sought dominance over the other groups. These secession attempts marked the origin of different conflicts and current acts of terrorism in South Asia. The British divide and rule policies remain a critical cause of terrorism, conflicts, and disunity (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). Like in Africa, Britain favored some groups against other groups. A good example is that Muslims and Hindus were played against each other by the British. Indeed, the conflict between India and Pakistan today is directly related to the British colonization. Both the United States and even the Soviet Union have suffered the consequences of British conquests in South Asia through the seeds of terrorism sown in the region and acts of terrorism carried out on foreign soil.

Part 2: Where we are Theoretical framework Though not prominently recognized in the criminology and terrorism literature, Pierre Bourdieu was a chief proponent of the concepts of habitus and field (1977, 1990), where he explained how a set of governing rules binds certain societies. Bourdieu’s idea of habitus can be applied to the conflict that is currently being experienced by the independent nations of South Asia. In this regard, it has been stated that society consists of different spaces termed fields, which involve specific spaces controlled by select individuals, institutions, or groups (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). The nexus between habitus and fields rests in the fact that select individuals control the fields in that particular society. Anyone who does not obey its rules is in default. Bourdieu (1999) states that the fields, which are dominated and controlled by “Doxa” (unwritten rules) from the select few, are usually explained from the perspective of the dominant group. Similarly, Bourdieu’s analysis applies to South Asia in that certain terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, exert power over

272 Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe and Edidiong Mendie the general population. When resisted by other groups, the control exhibited by insurgents in South Asia leads to the perpetuation of violence by the rebels. We must also underscore that Pierre Bourdieu’s Doxa remains a secret weapon that allowed the colonizer to be operational and successful in colonial administration and hegemonic survival tactics. Often, as in South Asia, mainly India, Hindus, and Muslims were made to dislike each other. Britain favored Hindus over Muslims. The same principle had occurred in Nigeria, where the Muslims in the north were also supported by Britain to rule and govern Nigeria. The implication of such colonial policy is rooted in Doxa, where individual members of society are made to believe that they have an unfettered right over other members of society. The British strategy allowed fellow citizens to think that they are born to rule or be in control. Indeed, such an endorsed ethnocentric view creates division, conflict, disunity, and hardships in society. It can lead to genocide, exploitation, and terrorism. This form of unwritten colonial rule is still the root cause of terrorism in South Asia. Causes of terrorism and insecurity A major cause of terrorism in South Asia is a lack of inclusivity among diverse cultures. As previously addressed, the end of colonialism in India brought about uncertainty in the region and gave rise to the creation of different sectarian groups. With such diverse groups came the need for the nations to be independent. That is, every kingdom or group wants to be heard and be recognized. The groups striving for their independence include the J&K groups and autonomous groups such as the Taliban. The Maoist groups, for their part, have not been seeking independence but rather an end to what they view as a system of exploitation. The need that each sees to strive for independence or to make demands from the state for their respective areas may lead to securitization problems resulting in terrorism and violence. Ghatak (2016) claims that minority discrimination by the governments of South Asia has made insurgent groups lack faith in state institutions, leading to a breeding space for terrorist activities to thrive. According to this rationale, minority ethnic groups have become estranged from mainstream systems (Ghatak, 2016). Marginalized minority groups in South Asia are likely to be radicalized due to hardships and are acquiescent to the views of the terrorist organizations. Indeed, oppressed and depressed populations tend to accept financial help offered by terrorist organizations. Another issue that encourages terrorist activities to prevail in South Asia is the unstable political systems. The creation of independent nations such as establishing the country of Pakistan with a mostly Muslim population and India with a Hindu majority introduced colossal instability in the region due to the ensuing differences in political and religious systems that guided the partition of India. The uncharted boundaries created by Britain to achieve its colonial objectives have allowed the extremist groups to form and thrive. Political instability is notable in areas where weak democratic governments and values are in place, which is

The impact of terrorism in South Asia 273 prominent in Third World countries or developing countries. The existence of the creation of separate independent states with different religions as a mark of division has led to unstable political structures that allowed extremist groups to use their religious beliefs as a means of promoting their insurgent ideologies. In such a poor political climate, with India as an exception, the citizens do not have the true freedom to express themselves which is characteristic of a real democracy. Instead, pseudo-democracy is practiced in the region (a form of partial democracy where citizens cannot fully exercise their rights). Pseudo-democracy leads to the establishment of terrorist cells and ideologies in some areas of the South Asian hemisphere that eventually matures and threatens regional and global security. As these cells grow, they separate themselves from the general public and become highly intolerant of people who do not share their perspectives and values. Anyone exhibiting different beliefs from the radicals is seen as an infidel and subdued through violence and fear. Fear is the main caprice of terrorists because one of the essential goals of terrorism is inculcating fear into the spirit of the opponents. Thus, terrorism is seen as the “psychology of fear” (Bongar, 2007, p. 3). Religion is another cause of terrorism in South Asia. For example, the inspiration behind the actions of the Taliban, the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir, and Pakistan emanate from the dispositions of religious organizations (Crenshaw, 2008). Interpretation of religion can be extreme, which creates a dogma of superiority of a person’s religion over nonbelievers. For example, the belief that dying for one’s faith while conducting jihad in Islam makes that person a martyr constitutes the crux of many extremist behaviors, which is evident in most terrorist groups in South Asia. Impact of terrorism and insecurity Underdevelopment is a significant factor that contributes to terrorism and insecurity in South Asia in different ways. That is, the lack of proper social and economic structures in most parts of South Asia enables terrorists’ activities to thrive in the region. For example, Pakistan’s weak internal structures made the efforts of terrorists flourish within its territory (Maley, 2003), resulting in inequality experienced by Pakistan following the end of British rule and the scramble of South Asian states. Thus, while Pakistan experienced various insurgencies and military reigns in its regions (Srinagar and Baluchistan), these instabilities weakened the country (Amstutz et al., 2019). Maley (2003) advocated this position by stating that India was able to advance its legislative and judicial institutions after colonialism, whereas Pakistan struggled with setting up a political structure while undergoing various military rules. The challenges in the ability of different regions in South Asia to handle insurgency vary. For example, regions like India are better equipped with the resources and strategies in counterinsurgency, despite experiencing different uprisings. Pakistan, on the other hand, faced more dilemmas in countering insurgencies (Tan, 2018). Unlike India, Pakistan became “prey” for the Taliban terrorists, lacking the appropriate political and internal structures

274 Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe and Edidiong Mendie to secure its borders. Undergoing insurgency in its Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan (Maley, 2001, p. 68), this grappling fear heightened tension in Pakistan, especially in its fight for ethnic and religious recognition, and further weakened any efforts for autonomy. Fear was not the only challenge Pakistan faced because the insurrection forced it to make a choice: forge a new partnership with Taliban terrorists or become a shell state whereby it loses its political sovereignty. This distress goes without saying that Pakistan became a sanctuary and breeding ground for infiltration by Taliban terrorists. Pakistan is one of the countries that have a security infrastructure deficit in South Asia. South Asia lacks adequate defense mechanisms to find and fight terrorists, so these radicals thrive in such societies. The Mumbai attacks that claimed so many human lives illustrate this point. For example, the local police were not adequately equipped in terms of weaponry, technology, or training to fight the Mumbai attacks (Asthana, 2010). Although this was remedied by strengthening the country’s various schemes to intensify security, it shows the vulnerability of some nations in South Asia when faced with such acts of terrorism. Rapid immigration may also arise as a result of the unrest caused by acts of terrorism in South Asia. That is, citizens of South Asia migrate to other countries when things are not working in their countries. Brown (2006) reported that about nine million people migrated to other countries from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in the 1960s. Reports have also established that Asian immigrants (comprising of descendants from East, Southeast Asia, and India) overtook Hispanic immigrants in the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2013). These statistics show that Asian immigrants made up 5.8% of the total U.S. population, amounting to 18.2 million between 2000 and 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2013). Of this number, 61% possessed a bachelor’s degree (Pew Research Center, 2013). This establishes that the workforce population and most skilled people in South Asia form a majority of those leaving the region. That is, the talents and skills of migrant Asians are being utilized more in the U.S. than in their home country. While terrorism might not be a direct cause of migration, terrorism, however, reduces economic activity. In this context, citizens in South Asia tend to pursue settlement in other stable and developed nations. Terrorism impacts the social psychology of the general population. People lose hope about life generally because of the failure of their government to protect them. When citizens lose hope in social justice and the justice system’s ability to work correctly, some may place their faith in terrorism with the belief that the extrajudicial measures engaged by terrorists will protect them. By way of comparison, as with the Taliban activities in Afghanistan with the support of some segments of the Afghan citizens against what they treated as the domination of their soil, the Niger Delta of Nigeria also with similar experiences had more trust and hope in militancy. The citizens of the region had faith in the leader of the Niger Delta Militants group (Asari Dokubo) to protect them and fight for them more than they trusted the Nigerian government. Terrorists and extremist groups project their ideas to supporters with a promise to realize the social and psychological desires of their members (Southers, 2013). This is not different from the

The impact of terrorism in South Asia 275 Maoist groups in South Asia, which recruited victims of land displacement as their members to fight against the government and private organizations. Terrorism also negatively impacts society by creating unemployment. Business owners shut down in times of insurgency and terrorists prey on this unemployment deficiency by recruiting and exploiting talents. For example, they pay members monetary value to become radicalized and stay committed to their ideologies. No wonder it has been stated that the radicalization pathway is not a fixed course, but one cloaked with the mindset of the appropriate environment to thrive (Southers, 2013). In the South Asian case, trade, industry, and business have not wholly closed off. This situation, though, may apply to the context of Boko Haram or Al Shabab in Africa. The resulting fear and harm inflicted by terrorists remain a security concern that affects South Asia’s international community. That is, it places humanitarian organizations and aid workers at risk. Scholars have reported different instances of incessant violent attacks and killings in Afghanistan. These include the willful target of a United Nations vehicle and killing of a United Nations staff member in Kabul, Afghanistan (Mashal, 2019); the killing of seven aid workers in Swabi District, Pakistan (Burke, 2013); and the killing of Red Cross delegates by Afghanistan shooters in 2003 (Maley, 2003). Terrorist killings and targeting aid workers deny the vulnerable population in South Asia access to adequate health care. It also dissuades humanitarian organizations and aid workers from coming to render help in times of crisis. International aid is particularly relevant because the Afghanistan economy is heavily dependent on humanitarian aid (Tan, 2018), and insurgency actions place foreign aid workers in danger and have the effect of crippling the Afghan economy. What drives terrorism in South Asia may not be dramatically different from everywhere else. Indeed, loss of faith in the system of government, poverty, hopelessness, economic marginalization, political oppression, and religious irredentism may all contribute to a lack of citizenship. The same underlining problems also push people to radicalize from one country to another. The cause might differ, but the intention remains to create fear or employ violence to achieve their goals, leading to some legal parameters in combating terrorism.

Part 3: The way forward Commentary on legal frameworks for fighting terrorism The war against terrorism remains an arduous task. No one nation or institution such as the United Nations has the sole answer to ending terrorism or the specific method in place for this action. Global and collective efforts must be continuously made to curtail and subsequently ensure that the menace of terrorism is eradicated from society. Terrorism transcends national boundaries, making it a transnational issue. Similarly, most acts of terrorism fall under the purview of criminal actions. Therefore, criminologists are to be actively involved in understanding criminal concepts and crime trends to properly formulate criminological theories to address

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such issues (Van Dijk, 2008). This chapter proposes the following strategies in combating terrorism and enforcing security measures in South Asia. 1. To effectively combat terrorism, the international community needs to more clearly define what terrorism is, so the expectations are known in society. There is no one definition of terrorism in the world, which makes it challenging to decipher which acts constitute terrorism. No doubt, it has been stated that defining terrorism is not an easy undertaking (Onwudiwe, 2001). Delegates of the United Nations General Assembly Press Release (2005) first emphasized the importance of having a standardized definition of terrorism. To curb terrorism, nations need to agree on what constitutes terrorism because terrorism has no boundaries (Adams, 2002, p. 5; Southers, 2013, p. 2). A violent act may not necessarily qualify as an act of terrorism. For example, there is no simple method of classifying someone as a terrorist because radicals and criminals such as Timothy McVeigh and Yahweh Ben Yahweh exist, but do not ordinarily qualify as terrorists before their fog of terror (Ronczkowski, 2018). The issue of what acts are considered as terrorism is a concern not just in South Asia, but in the international community as well. A universal agreement on the definition of terrorism ensures the emergence of a multidisciplinary approach that helps to identify research gaps to produce more anti-terrorism strategies. Some scholars have argued that emphasis must be on studying terrorists instead of defining them (Sageman, 2008), that is, using a micro analysis theory (identifying differences between a terrorist and regular citizen) and macro analysis theory (understanding factors that influence adherents to subscribe) to properly study terrorist activities (Sageman, 2008). However, to understand how terrorists operate, society must be transparent on what actions constitute terrorism. As Beccaria ([1764] 1963) stated, crime should be well-defined as well as its punishment. 2. The terrorist landscape must be isolated to derail its social and economic presence. It is crucial to get to the root of the terrorists’ supply of funds to deactivate the influence of terrorists in South Asia. The governments in South Asian countries must unite to critically check and disengage all forms of illegal channels explored in bringing arms and supplies for terrorists in their regions. For example, governments should monitor the importation, sale of weapons, and ammunitions in secondary markets. Prudent policy agility against arms into the hands of rogue governments and groups, indeed, can cripple terrorist cells and their safe havens and weaken their operations when they have no legitimate funding. Thus, access to terrorists’ resources in South Asia must be stifled at every opportunity. This can be done by the U.S., a superpower nation, with interests in ending terrorist havens in Afghanistan to design an effective policy that will stop the opium business. Without interrupting or halting the opium supply to the world, the Taliban will continue to sustain its lifeblood of financing terrorism and insurgencies. In other respects, it must be acknowledged that this recommendation has gray areas for its materialization, notably the tension between Pakistan and India

The impact of terrorism in South Asia 277 over Kashmir and the role played by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in supporting militant groups. Unless the activities on both sides are circumspect and the diplomacy is transparent and in good faith, the struggle will continue in combating terrorism and neutralizing radicalization that has a bearing on the Kashmir issue. The situation has been made a bit more uncertain, as India has revoked Article 370 and incorporated J&K into India. Article 370 had previously been in place to recognize the disputed contexts over J&K. Put simply, a coordinated effort to adequately address terrorism and counter violent extremist radicalization when “good faith” cooperation is absent between the two major countries in South Asia who have carried the most protracted dispute in the region over J&K is easier said than done and certainly has prerequisites. 3. The local police force and the military in South Asia must be adequately armed to fight terrorism. A functional working police system would greatly help local lifestyle improvement that can help fight international terrorism (Van Dijk, 2008). Funding local security forces is a capital-intensive requirement and exceeds the confines of the countries of South Asia. Noting that security is capital intensive, we advocate for the diversification of defense in South Asia to international financial institutions and private security firms. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund can assist in this regard for interested countries’ participants. For example, countries in South Asia can partner with these international financial institutions to receive loans to help combat acts of terrorism. As a way of ensuring accountability, the global financial institutions should ensure that such funds are appropriately accounted for and audited to adequately manage the fight against the fog of terror. This is an opportunity for the governments in South Asia to expand economic opportunities to private security firms and businesses. Private security is an ever-growing establishment, and its administration should not be left exclusively for the states (Bradley, 2016; White, 2011, p. 86). Thus, there is an investment opportunity for private investors to look into South Asian security outfits. For example, Pakistan’s ISI, regarded as the premier intelligence apparatus of the country, is considered one of the most professional security agencies by some and also one that is linked to rogue militant groups can be integrated with the fight against terrorism. Although the ISI modus operandi may differ from the U.S. anti-terrorism initiatives in South Asia, a carefully planned cooperation between the ISI and the U.S. may yield stable conditions for eradicating insurgency and terrorism in South Asia. 4. The punishment for acts of terrorism must be proscribed so that people would appreciate the penalty. It will cause people to refrain from such activities when there are efficient deterrence measures. Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1963) strongly advocated for deterrence as punishment in a way that the punishment outweighs the urge or reward to commit a crime. Terrorists in South Asia alike must be made aware of the punishments associated with such acts to deter others from being involved.

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5. A robust accountability system is required in South Asia to bring acts of terrorism to book. A useful way of ensuring the application of accountability is having extradition treaties so that guilty parties can be prosecuted both locally and internationally. The lack of extradition treaties in countries makes prosecution and accountability for the actions of terrorists challenging to enforce. Currently, India and Pakistan do not have an extradition treaty (Asthana, 2010). Thus, acts of terrorism committed in one of these regions may evade prosecution if the culprits leave the confines of the committing area to the other location. Of course, the decades-long tension between India and Pakistan and the role of the ISI in abetting militants are major intransigences to such efforts. For the sake of active foreign policy, the governments must work collaboratively to put aside differences and ensure that the nations’ greater good takes precedence. Thus, it is critical to recommend strategies that enhance extradition treaties. 6. Given the complex nature of terrorism in society, nations require an innovative and interdisciplinary approach to effectively tackle its occurrence. Terrorist groups are technology savvy in using contemporary technological inventions for their activities. Technological devices may help terrorists quickly disseminate information to their cells and potential terrorist foot soldiers sympathetic to a particular terrorist group’s ideology (Chellaney, 2001). Also, “Al-Qaeda was one of the first terrorist groups to use the Internet to expand their influence” (Operation 250, 2018). Technological advancement has aided the undertakings of terrorist groups to thrive in communicating efficiently and getting recruits. South Asian countries should ensure they scientifically explore mechanisms (use of technology as well) that may be used in identifying terrorist activities. For example, research should be done to determine how forensic science and forensic techniques may help identify weapons that have been used to perpetrate violence and identify terrorists promptly before they have successfully recruited new members. Tracing the digital footprints of terrorist activities and equipping the appropriate security agencies in South Asia with state-of-the-art facilities in combating terrorism is vital. All of these will ensure that as terrorists evolve in technological advancement, the governments in South Asia are also well-equipped to oppose and fight terrorists’ plans with the matching and appropriate resources. 7. The efforts of the intelligence community in gathering information to stop terrorism must be encouraged. Currently, India has different intelligence agencies equipped with gathering information to help fight cross-border terrorism (Asthana, 2010). These efforts of intelligence agencies ought to be encouraged on a global scale. Nations should be engaged in sharing information and ideas on terrorists’ actions to weaken their operations. Such information sharing between agencies would boost efficiency in ensuring that countries are one step ahead of terrorist groups to curtail their activities. 8. One of the guiding principles that will eradicate terrorism rests on collaboration, not finger-pointing. Past attempts in South Asia have focused on apportioning liability where due. For example, in one report, India held Pakistan

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9.

10.

11.

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responsible for providing aid to Kashmiri militants (Kronstadt & Vaughn, 2004). Understanding the root cause of terrorism is essential, but plans should focus on nations’ collective efforts to eradicate the menace of terrorism and not just apportioning blame. These countries can collaborate in intelligence and regional uniform laws against terrorism for the benefit of their societies regardless of existing conflicts among them. Collaboration between the two nations is critical even if the historical tension between India and Pakistan would pose a challenge to such an endeavor. Terrorism may or may not wholly be eradicated, but different risk management policies must be utilized. That is, the governments in South Asia must enforce risk management policies in high target areas of terrorism. It can be accomplished by identifying potential risk sites based on previous history and establishing prevention plans in these regions to avoid future attacks. This action will help create a safer South Asia, which will attract investors to the area by instilling a better sense of security for these stakeholders. Grassroots activism through relationship building with religious leaders, community leaders, and inhabitants must be encouraged. This is because adherents of radicalism are mainly people estranged from their community (Southers, 2013, p. 57). Thus, terrorists capitalize on this and appeal to their socioeconomic needs. The efforts of religious actors in combating terrorism will therefore serve as an essential consideration in societies (Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009). An extension of these grassroots actions is building active community policing. Implementing a community-policing policy on terrorism will be helpful through shared information and knowledge, relationship building, and identifying people with likely violent tendencies (Onwudiwe et al., 2016; Southers, 2013). This collaboration will help reduce crimes and acts of violence in society. Studies have shown that law and order can be achieved when police work with the community and not by themselves (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014). Additionally, crime goes down when families share suspicious activities of their households with the police. For community police initiatives to work, the government must genuinely embrace the merits of “policing from below” (Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2008). Funding support and a belief in this philosophy of policing are necessary for success in some areas in South Asia where the practice has failed in the past. Deradicalization programs must be explored to divert the minds of people from being recruited by terrorists. Terrorist groups have certain ideologies and tactics used in getting recruits. Thus, it is crucial to educate the public against the ills of such ideas through better inclusion and education about terrorism in school curriculums in South Asia. More empowerment courses and programs on counterterrorism measures are essential to creating awareness that will help get citizens exposed to the evil associated with terrorism. The state of Pakistan has experimented with deradicalization programs since 2015 after the bombing in Peshawar that killed 132 children in 2014. Pakistan was not alone with its program failures. The U.S. had also experimented and

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failed after the September 2001 fog of terror. The Pakistani program, among other strategies, placed more emphasis on economic mobility. We suggest that future deradicalization efforts in South Asia, noting its vast Muslim populations, should focus primarily on the proper teachings of Islamic moral principles. As a peaceful religion, the youths ought to be exposed to those enshrined principles in the Koran that emphasize humanity and respect for human lives. Young people must be taught by their respective Islamic teachers to avoid radicalization and bogus promises of heavenly glories. Of course, it is significant to note that there are other religions whose values are mutated by rogue elements to radicalize people as well (notably, Hindu extremism, Sikh extremism, and Christian extremism, among others), and there are nonreligious ideologies (e.g., Maoism) that are utilized in radicalizing or perpetrating terrorism, as discussed in this chapter. 13. Hospitality security must be given extra consideration in combating terrorism. That is, increasing safety in hospitality places, which are soft target areas prone to violence (Onwudiwe, 2017). Security must meet standards in these key and vulnerable industries (hospitality places) such as airports, theaters, and shopping malls. These are vulnerable places that everyday citizens tour and therefore suffice as a high-risk target. Mumbai, for example, was regarded as the economic epicenter of India and suffered 12 simultaneous bombing attacks in 1993 that claimed 257 lives and maimed 717 people. Hotels such as Hotel Sea Rock and Hotel Airport Centaur were among the worst hit by the terrorists. The 2008 Mumbai attacks are also notable. It is recommended that intelligence sharing and cooperation among the states in South Asia and nations like the United States will help stop the source of such evil attacks.

Conclusion Terrorism and insecurity have been a growing concern in South Asia. The growth of more terrorist organizations in this region impacts both national and global security. That is, the uncertainty of security in South Asia harms not only its citizens but also investors desiring to establish entrepreneurship in the region. Insecurity places a burden on the governments in South Asia to resolve the chaos. In 2018, India ranked fourth among the top five states with the highest military expenditure on strategic security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019). Therefore, counterterrorism measures and heightened forms of security must focus on these regions. Adequate protection in South Asia entails the availability of lots of human resources. This work, through research, contributes to that fight for a safer South Asia.

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Part V

Conclusion

16 Some rumination on the impact of terrorism, insurgencies, and (in)security in South Asia in the age of globalization M. Raymond Izarali Introduction South Asia embodies a complex history, both ancient and contemporary, and is characterized by a wide heterogeneity of features, even on the level of security. Ancient India, which makes up the geographical landscape of contemporary South Asia, was a place that produced much in the canons of knowledge, crafts, agriculture, art, exotic garments, spices, and myriad other things. The evidence of the intellectual industry of the ancient era that has survived the centuries despite the vicissitudes of conquests over time show a people who were deeply caught up in understanding the cosmos, mathematical properties of the natural world, the art of governance and warfare, philosophy, and deep metaphysical spirituality. Yet it was never a place without major conflicts and security challenges, on many levels. As Amartya Sen writes of Emperor Ashoka: In many ways, the most interesting articulation of the need for tolerance on an egalitarian basis can be found in the writings of Emperor Ashoka, who in the third century B.C. commanded a larger Indian empire than any other Indian king in history (including the Moghuls, and even the Raj, if we leave out the native states that the British let be). He turned his attention in a big way to public ethics and enlightened politics after being horrified by the carnage he saw in his own victorious battle against the king of Kalinga (now Orissa). (Sen, 1997, p. 19) Ashoka was deeply disturbed by the carnage from a battle he had just won, where the bodies of men and animals were in excess of 150,000. This suggests the presence of conflict and tension on a grand scale (Sen, 1997). The landscape of historical India is today a divided set of boundaries that make up the countries of South Asia, some of which have been borne out of similarly vexatious elements of ancient conflicts. In the most recent, the splitting away of Pakistan from India was borne out of colonial input, religious discontent on the political level, and perhaps other factors at a time India was to become a sovereign country from imperial England. Yet the partitioning of Pakistan from India in the making of a new country has shown throughout the decades to have

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given rise to more insecurity between the two over Jammu and Kashmir and, indeed, the rise yet of another sovereign country, Bangladesh, with the split of East and West Pakistan during a genocidal war in 1971 (see Kapur & Ganguly, 2012; Moghaddam, 2018; Khan, 2017; Fair, 2018). If religion was the core raison d’être for the splitting away of Pakistan from India, the same could not be said of the formation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan, since both countries are overwhelmingly of the same faith. In the same vein, if a Hindu majoritarian religion in India was wholly the source of comfort for people of that faith, the large global diaspora communities of Indians that especially emerged from the British system of indentured labor who are overwhelmingly Hindus could not be explained by that logic, as many left yearning for a life free of social indignation, and class and caste bondage in social settings and cultural life. Studies on security and terrorism in South Asia do not so deeply revisit these historical repertoires of various local facets of human insecurity that have been spawned from myriad elements – ethnocentrism, political factionalism, religion, conquests, territoriality, colonialism – to grapple with the heterogeneity of security issues and challenges at various developmental and social levels of the contemporary era. Nor may it be said, at the same time, that all the problems of the present can find historical expressions in the distant past. Arguably, however, setting aside matters of political ego and aggrandizement that are characteristic of power politics, the absence of a wholesome sense of social cohesion especially in culturally pluralistic or heterogeneous societies may give rise to vulnerabilities of a range of security and political issues, all of which impact on the social and political stability of the society (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016). Afghanistan stands starkly as a failed state and is characterized by a range of discontents and turmoil across its various ethnic constituents, despite being a country for which the population is overwhelmingly largely Muslim. India is a major emerging power but was saddled for a while with various factions such as the Naxalites, insurgent groups in the northeast, Sikh militancy, religious tensions between Hindus and Muslims over the al-Babri Masjid, and a range of others, all as one country. The chapters by Dalbir Ahlawat, Alex Waterman, Philip Hultquist, and Bidisha Bishwas, respectively, in this volume have highlighted the complex dynamics for India in dealing with these issues. Nepal is a wholly Hindu society but is problematized by Maoist factions, as Thomas Marks has shown in Chapter 4. Sri Lanka had climaxed into a drawn out civil war owing to long-standing polarity between ethnic Tamils and the majoritarian Sinhalese (Bishku, 2020; Deane, 2016), as Stanley Samarasinghe has addressed in Chapter 3. Pakistan straddles with various political factions and ethnic groups internally and the long-standing issue with India over Jammu and Kashmir (U.S. Department of State, 2020), as Abdul Basit and Zahid Ahmed point out in Chapter 9. Suffice it to say, new challenges emerge, some that may be spurred by doctrinaire ideological embrace such as Marxism, and some by doctrinaire and distorted religious “messaging” through propaganda aimed at terrorist luring, as we have seen successfully carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to mobilize foreign fighters across the world through social media (Greenberg, 2016).

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While such success in terrorist luring may perhaps relate to a sense of unbelonging of the subject persons in society or a sense of alienation owing to discontent of some kind or to some other issue (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010), it is also a clarion illustration of polluted narratives articulating a dystopic social world through the largely unfettered Internet space in this age of globalization. In this dystopia that is imbued, religion is used to convey purism of community, nobility in serving a distorted version of the divine, victimhood emanating from non-adherents, concepts of the pure and the enemy, and oppression. That such “messaging” can take place from anywhere in the world to anywhere else in the world in a largely uncontrolled medium is a testament of the struggles faced by states to navigate through, and respond to, the multitude of non-traditional threats of the globalized times in which we live and the rapid access to, and dissemination of, information by anyone. This volume has sought to bring to light the multitude of issues and challenges faced in South Asia at the level of terrorism, security, and insurgency, and any relations to development conditions as states traverse this era of globalization.

Conceptual issues: Globalization, terrorism, and radicalization Globalization is said to be the liberalization of the trade markets in world settings through free trade mechanisms and in consequence it was expected to lift the life context of the world’s people so that everyone’s lot is ameliorated. While scholars continue to debate the origins or manifestations of globalization, others focus on gaps between its premise and reality in critiquing the human security and development challenges it has implied or imposed. At the same time, it seems to mean different things to different people who are trained across different disciplines (Izarali, 2019; Singer, 2004; Kakar, Khilji, & Khan, 2011; WrightNeville & Smith, 2009; Beall, 2002). For some, globalization has not done well for a better global society (Ezeonu, 2008, 2018; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2015; Jalata, 2011; Singer, 2004), whereas others see the issue of globalization as complex and with both pros and cons that will have to be ironed out in equitable ways over time (Singer, 2004; Howard-Hassman, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008; Izarali, 2019; Srinivasan, 2013). Yet while the political and other social science literature talk about globalization as an economic phenomenon, one cannot lose sight of other dimensions of it. Economic globalization may well characterize the primary discussion and manifestation of globalization of the times, but other dimensions such as technology and education across boundaries are noticeably prevalent (Izarali, 2019). Smart phones, social media and the Internet highlight varied dimensions of technology and sociocultural globalization in transcending borders with communication across physical boundaries, preserving social and family bonds, political ties, and liaising with the world in real-time in digital space. In these ways, the globalization in which we live is characterized by simultaneity and aroundthe-clock activity (Izarali, 2019). Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic and the global coordination and dialogue in relation to it have shown many facets of globalization, including the technology that enables remote working and global intercourse

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through such software programs as Zoom, Teams, and others. The Covid-19 pandemic also raises issues of human security as well – on the national, regional, and global levels. It need hardly be said, at the same time, that security issues and challenges relating to terrorism and online radicalization have found convenience in these dimensions of globalization and in the discontented aspects too. As with families, businesses and governments being able to communicate and stay in touch through social media and other venues, so too are terrorists, terrorist organizations, and transnational organized criminal entities/entrepreneurs (Izarali, 2017; Zimmermann, 2011; Greenberg, 2016). Terrorist groups are able to maintain local, regional, and transnational networks in planning, recruiting, plotting, and carrying out atrocities on civilian publics and national governments. Social media usage has been especially exploited by groups like al Qaeda and ISIS in spreading infectious propaganda of hate, pursuing radicalization initiatives, and carrying out recruitment campaigns (Greenberg, 2016). The reality of the thousands of foreign fighters from across the world, including the developed countries, who have never known in any direct way what life and reality were like in the territories that had been occupied by ISIS, for example, is indicative of the specialized propaganda approach taken by the group and the success in luring people through technology globalization. South Asian countries have not been exempted from this problem, as over 400 individuals have been infected with the lure and have joined ISIS as foreign fighters by 2018 – notably, from the Maldives, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (Marone, 2018). Moreover, the digital space afforded by technology globalization also paved the way for leaderless jihadism as noted by Mark Sageman and others, thus giving rise to the continuity of terrorism through lone wolves or groups who have no formal connection to official terrorist groups like ISIS (McCoy & Knight, 2014). If globalization is said to have spurred on human security and development challenges through displacement of industries and economic oppression of people and society, then so too it may be said that some of the people in the South Asian context who have enjoined terrorism owing to despair or through online radicalization propaganda have come from contexts of community-level social disorganization and human insecurity. Of course, the impact of terrorism on development is likewise notable (Hyder, Akram, & Padda, 2015; Tujan, Gaughran, & Mollet, 2004). Tujan, Gaughran, and Mollet (2004, p. 54) claim that “terrorism can only be effectively combated within a framework of peace and development that upholds social justice and human rights, promotes inclusion and empowerment and enhances international understanding.” In other words, to be effective in neutralizing terrorism, an overwhelmingly militaristic approach will yield limited results and perhaps countervailing situations if the social conditions of human insecurity remain unaddressed. Indeed, Tujan et al. argue (2004) that “the war on terror has resulted in the militarisation of globalisation, according to which the integration of markets remains the main economic imperative, but is pursued within the framework of the global security agenda” (p. 55). Implied in all of this is that while there may not be a necessary determinism between poverty and

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terrorism, for example, the absence of human rights, inclusiveness and development foster, or can exacerbate, conditions of insecurity (Kivimaki, 2007). Terrorism itself, like the concepts of globalization and radicalization, has no concrete definition in global settings (Jalata, 2011; Schmid, 2004; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2018; Maskaliunaite, 2015). This fact has been a recurring point throughout this volume. While notions of violence with political objectives of instilling fear on civilian populations and states tend to characterize a good bit of conceptualization of terrorism in the Western world, there are scholars who address what they regard as the narrow conspectus and strictures of such conceptualization and the failure to take into consideration similar elements in previous waves of globalization through colonization and the political violence and carnage carried out in the interest of territorial usurpation and domination of colonialized peoples (see Onwudiwe, 2007; Jalata, 2011). In other words, colonial states have carried out acts of terrorism as well in their expansionary quests. Jalata (2011, p. 3), for example, states: “Most liberal and leftist scholars have failed to identify and explain the role of state-sponsored or state terrorism that colonial officials, European companies, and expeditionary forces used during the expansion of the racialized capitalist world system to transfer the economic resources of the indigenous peoples to European forces or settlers and their collaborators.” According to him, “We cannot clearly understand the essence and meaning of global terrorism without comprehending the essence and characteristics of state terrorism since states were born and consolidated through violence” (Jalata, p. 3). Put another way, conceptualizations of terrorism in Western settings do not encompass the fuller dimensions of the players and history involved in terrorism within the criterion of political violence. The study of terrorism itself in the pre-9/11 period has not been given significant attention by criminologists; prior to this, it was largely the focus of political science, psychology, and economics (Freilich & LaFree, 2015, p. 5; Onwudiwe, 2007). Thus, arguably, it was conceived and theorized on for a significant period of time through a particular disciplinary ethos that may not have encompassed wider elements to it (Onwudiwe, 2007). As LaFree and Miller (2008) note, criminologists tended to focus on conventional crime perhaps because acts of terrorism are not typically frequent. Freilich and LaFree (2015) suggest that scarcity of data and the lack of a uniform, concrete definition may be among the reason. They write: Part of the difficulty is differing definitions of terrorism across countries and even between different agencies in the same country. Moreover, terrorist acts often cut across several more common types of criminal categories. Thus, an assassination might be included in police data as a homicide but not as terrorism while destruction of a building might be included in a police report as arson but not as terrorism. (Freilich & LaFree, 2015, p. 5) Over time, distinctions have evolved that differentiate between orthodox and critical terrorism studies, to demarcate between earlier studies and more recent ones that seek to address a broader consideration of elements that may attend or give

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rise to terrorism (Franks, 2009; Barnett & Nelson, 2019). Similarly, radicalization studies have evolved a number of conceptualizations to try to make sense of why and how it is that people get drawn into violent extremism. As such, there are a number of radicalization pathways and other frameworks that have emerged, as noted by Mokerrom Hossain and Rawshan Sadia Afroze in Chapter 2. As we consider the various dimensions and the pro and con elements of globalization, the ambiguity of the concepts of terrorism and radicalization in the face of the pre- and post-9/11 approaches to the study of terrorism and radicalization, a major element that stands out is the need to take a broad inter-/multidisciplinary approach. As Jalata (2011) notes, people partake in terrorism in various parts of the world not always for the same reason. As it stands, there is no concrete profile of a terrorist (White, 2017). Terrorism is not a necessary domain of the poor or the uneducated, as it is carried out by people of different economic and educational status, and has been around for a long time (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2018; White, 2017; Piazza, 2009; Fair, Littman, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 2018). Certainly, poor people may have disdain for militants, seeing them as causing more hardship to their lives (Fair et al., 2018). It is significant that the pilots of the planes that dive-bombed into the World Trade Center in the 9/11 tragedy in New York could not have been illiterate or undereducated, and that the perpetrators of the 2007 attack on the Glasgow International Airport, Scotland, were medical doctors (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2018). The perpetrators of the Mumbai 2008 attacks may not have been middle class or very educated and may have been extracted from social conditions of vulnerability by preying rogue organizations or persons. The terrorism emanating from the civil war in Sri Lanka was strongly linked to the ethnic problems between the Sinhalese and the Tamil populations that gave rise to insurgency in the 1970s, as aptly highlighted by Stanley Samarasinghe in Chapter 3 and by Tanya Narozhna in Chapter 13. The insecurity from the various insurgents in northeast India are not spawned by the same factors as those of groups in Bangladesh or those of Pakistan that are focused on India. There may be different underlying impetus and so a one-size approach to countering terrorism will have different levels of effectiveness in different situations (Basit, 2015). Underlying all of these considerations is the fact that the problems in the South Asian region are incoherent, deeply impactful, and countervailing to national and regional development. The impact also extends well beyond the region, as many acts of international terrorism have links to South Asia. The Air India bombing of 1985 in which hundreds of Canadian citizens died and the related overseas extremism, the Taliban and al Qaeda matrix in relation to the 9/11 tragedies in the U.S. and the subsequent U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan over the past two decades, the Tamil Tigers’s insurgency and terrorism in the Sri Lankan civil war and the group’s overseas fundraising and security-tax intimidation of ethnic Tamils in the diaspora in Canada and elsewhere, are all significant in this regard but by no means exhaustive. The impact on overseas countries from within South Asia through soft-target attacks on tourists as in the Mumbai attacks of 2008 by Laskhar-e-Taiba; the Holey Artisan cafe attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2016; and the Easter Sunday attacks at three churches and three luxury hotels in Sri Lanka

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in 2019 are notable. While there are many elements of security threats and challenges to South Asia, a major problem in the region is that its security problems are largely intraregional, as especially notable in the long-standing India–Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir since the birth of the two countries.

Rumination on impacts of terrorism and insecurity in South Asia Although it is reasonable to say that no society finds comfort in having to deal with acts of terrorism and major security issues, the reality is that incidents of these nature can also be exploited by states and political actors to leverage public perceptions of a strong government administration (Seoighe, 2016). Certainly, criticisms of this kind from time to time have been leveled at governments and politicians of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere in the world. But, aside from the issue of possible political leverage or capital that may be gained from an aggressive response to acts of terrorism and security breaches, there is no comfort when a society is faced with incidents of terrorism. Acts of terrorism impact at various levels – physical, psychological, economic, infrastructural, societal, and political. Foremost among these is the devastation caused to persons killed and injured as immediate victims. A number of scholars have already pointed out that acts of terrorism are especially harder on developing societies in comparison to developed ones (Hyder, Akram, & Padda, 2015). This asymmetry in part has to do with the available resources to allocate in response to such phenomenon and to keep the economy stable. There are some studies as well that highlight that acts of terrorism impact the confidence and transactions in stock market trading and returns, and on economic growth in South Asia (Nazir, Khan, Akram, & Ahmed, 2018; Saleem, Sida, Rauf, & Siddique, 2020). It perhaps need hardly be said that the ability to rebuild public infrastructure that have been damaged or destroyed from terrorism and insurgency would be strained in countries that have scarcity of income and, as such, destruction of roads, water supply, buildings, airports, hospitals, schools, public transportation and related facilities, and others would place a society with such victimhood in a considerably dire situation in the long run. As Akhmat, Zaman, Shukui, and Sajjad (2014, p. 3066) note: “Terrorism is about psychological maiming as it is about physical destruction.” Similarly, dire situations could prevail from aggressive military counterterrorism and counterinsurgency undertakings. Businesses, banking institutions, and markets that are destroyed or made unworkable can impose hardship on economic flow at the level of currency circulation and income generation, can pose hardship to food supply and people’s ability to access the necessary means of life and growth including medicines, and can even make some people destitute or displaced (Ahmed, 2016; Akhmat et al., 2014). Afghanistan is perhaps a classic case of this scenario where there appears to be a lack of coherent coordination especially in the post-9/11 context. Pakistan, too, endures hardship as a country that is already in dire economic straits. As Saleem et al. (2020, p. 186) note: “Pakistan is confronting a serious trouble of

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terrorism which affects the international tourism, FDI, human capital, formation and investment.” The account provided by Basit and Ahmed in Chapter 9 offers much elucidation on the problem and impact of terrorism in Pakistan and for the region. There is no escaping that terrorism has serious consequences for South Asian countries, and the most affected are Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Ashraf, 2019). India has a robust economy and appears to be better able among South Asian countries to coordinate itself and stay resilient in difficult times, as it is the economic giant in South Asia and contends with China as a major player in Asia. Thus, on the one hand, in the face of various attacks perpetrated on Indian soil by Pakistan-based militants and by Maoist and Khalistani insurgents, it has remained focused and stable. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been apportioning a considerable proportion of its budget to military spending and related debt servicing particularly in relation to the dispute with India over Jammu and Kashmir. But, Pakistan has also been eschewed by many in the international community for its “deep state” (i.e., the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]) and for sponsoring terrorism against India through various militant groups over time (U.S. Department of State, 2020). The lack of a national education coordination system in Pakistan as well leaves children and the youth vulnerable to psychological manipulation through training that emphasizes intolerance and unmediated religious education in madrassas controlled by rogue elements in the society (Abbasi, 2014; Basit, 2015). According to Abassi (2014, p. 21): “The worst fallout of lack of education or improper education in the case of Pakistan is the spread of extremism and sectarianism in the society. Since the state can neither provide sufficient opportunities to the youth for education nor employment, they are vulnerable to radical tendencies.” Syed, Saeed, and Martin (2015, p. 200) concur, noting that biases and hatred of sects and minorities are perpetuated through state-mandated educational curriculums. In their view, it is not merely education or more education that is required but proper education. The impact of terrorism has been heavy on human lives, and women and children have been especially affected, particularly in environments of economic hardships and structural disadvantages (Ahmed, 2016; Slone & Mann, 2016; Biberman & Zahid, 2019). Of course, women have also been used in various roles by terrorist groups (Bhattacharya, 2019; Fair & Hamza, 2018), as Tanya Narozhna discussed in Chapter 13. Aside from the quantum of deaths of men, women, and children alike resulting from acts of terrorism, so often in the societies where men have been the principal income providers of the family, death or serious injuries to them from such attacks leave families in destitute conditions. In such contexts, mothers are left to provide for the young in difficult conditions of subsistence or the young in turn may be forced to help provide for the household and forego schooling, thus hindering their childhood development and future (Duncan & Cardozo, 2017). Children and families may also be displaced in conflict settings, thus severing important bonds to families and communities and inscribing scars of trauma in their psyche. In yet other situations, females become a focus in archaic values, as ill-conceived notions of the role of females in social

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and domestic life and of their educational pursuit for knowledge and independence of personhood are targeted as contrary to orthodox pseudo-religious values. The values projected by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the near-fatal impact on the young Malala Yousafzai who was shot by the Taliban in Pakistan on October 9, 2012 for advocating education for girls certainly bear testimony to both a warped understanding of the role of females, the girl-child and the victimhood impact that can bear out. Terrorism, wars, and social contexts of rampant violence coupled with political instability and weak social institutions have serious impacts on the social psychology and the development of a society. The impact on the children and the youth, both psychologically and physically, ought to be given serious attention since the long-term effects may be especially countervailing to the individual and the public good. The populations of the countries of South Asia are made up of large proportions of young people, and this is cause for attention on many levels, especially as they may be vulnerable to radicalization by rogue elements in conditions of social despair, marginalization, and economic deficits. For example, according to Encyclopedia Britannica (2020), the proportion of the population that is age 15 or less is 47.7% for Afghanistan, 32.5% for Pakistan, 30.2% for Nepal, 27% for India, and 25.2% for Sri Lanka. Thus, fostering a proper social climate that features proper education and opportunities is vital in taking measures to steer them away from negatively impactful behaviors or undertakings. In this age of globalization characterized by expansive transnational trade, where the Internet and technology have revolutionized communication and social spaces through social media and instantaneous around-the-clock global networking, acts of terrorism can take on varying platforms and levels of plotting (Izarali, 2017). They can also have deep deleterious impacts on local life and, as notable from contexts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, major implications on security in global settings. There can be consequences that affect preserving a social context where people can have a life of liberty and security of persons, where trade and employment can flourish, and where children can grow in peaceful environments conducive to reaching their potential and enjoying their youth and natural life. In terrorism and security analyses these issues are not given sufficient depth of focus, and thus the impacts on the social psychology and the constraints imposed on social life from elements (rogue groups, states, lone actors, etc.) and environments of terrorism and gross insecurity are not brought to light. As discussed in the preceding chapters of this volume, the evolution of terrorism and insurgency in South Asia are rooted in a multitude of factors, which, as Patra (2019, p. 180) points out, include “perpetration by tyrannical and aggressive regimes and rebel groups, social injustice, ideological contradictions, religious beliefs, and foreign interference.” The costs in terms of human lives lost to terrorist and insurgency movements in South Asia are enormous. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (2020), from January 2018 to December 2020, there were up to 6,274 incidents in which there were the deaths of 4,362 civilians, 4,383 security forces, 29,567 terrorists/insurgents and 237 unspecified deaths; thus, this aggregates to total deaths of 38,549 people in the region in just 36 months.

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According to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index (2019), South Asia has had the highest impact from terrorism since 2002. Currently, of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism, three – Afghanistan (ranked 1), Pakistan (ranked 5) and India (ranked 7) – are located in South Asia. In economic terms, the impact of terrorism in South Asia translated to $5.87 billion in 2018, a significant amount as it constitutes 18% of the total global impact. Aside from fatalities, terrorism and insurgency have led to a collapse of the institutional frameworks and a paralysis of governments in some settings. For example, during the last 25 years, Afghanistan witnessed the Taliban government from 1996 to 2002 that was formed with the intervention of Pakistan and the later governments with the intervention of the U.S. The governments were seen as lacking legitimacy and as ruled through rogue elements or by adopting a military approach. Thus, intervention by external actors and a perceived lack of local legitimacy brought Afghanistan to the brink of a civil war. In the case of Pakistan, the military has formed the government as many times as the elected governments. A major downside is that religious organizations that have associations with terrorist and insurgent elements play a major role in the formation as well as the ousting of the governments. This has brought Pakistan on the verge of financial collapse. The country has been placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Grey List for sponsoring and funding terrorism. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) not only acquired naval power but also had plans to utilize airpower against the Sri Lankan military. This situation gave rise to authoritarian leadership at the state level to combat the LTTE. In Nepal, the monarchy was ousted under the Maoist guerrillas and the constitution was amended in a way that compromised the democratic fabric of the society. While India has shown itself to be resilient, it had to at times deploy considerable security forces to counter insurgency and cross-border terrorism, which impinged excessively on the national exchequer and arms acquisition. The cross-border issues between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir have been addressed by Eamon Murphy in Chapter 12. Similarly, Bangladesh and the Maldives also struggle to safeguard the integrity of their institutions and of the functioning of their governments. Mokerrom Hossain and Rawshan Sadia Afroze gave a rich account on Bangladesh in Chapter 2. Kirklin Bateman provided a likewise rich account on the Maldives in Chapter 11. The vulnerabilities arising from such situations in each country have deeply impacted interstate relations. For example, whereas mutual benefit and progress could be had by joint initiatives among the countries of the region in dealing with insurgency and terrorism, there is instead a lack of trust among them, as pointed out by Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe and Edidiong Mendie in Chapter 15. This can be exemplified in Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorists in India to liberate Kashmir, the links between Indian and Nepali Maoists, the ingression of terrorists from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in India, and Pakistan’s providing of protection to the Taliban and al Qaeda that destabilize Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing unity and integrated counterterrorism actions, the insecurity from cross-border infiltration of terrorists and insurgents has led to the erection of walls between Afghanistan

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and Pakistan, and barbed wire between India and Pakistan and between India and Bangladesh. Such trust deficits among the countries of the region have impacts at the country level because of their strained ability to neutralize or respond to these challenges on their own with the paltry resources that they have. Thus, a sober, committed, and resolute approach to regional cooperation of the states could be of significant value and of benefit to the human security condition of local populations. Looked at from this perspective, it should not be surprising that these factors have deeply impacted the societies on many levels and have posed serious challenges in the form of spawning outgoing migration and straining the inflow of foreign investment and tourists. Able-bodied persons, professionals and technocrats with sound economic backgrounds migrate overseas for their safety and to avail themselves to opportunities that are commensurate with their qualifications and skills. This migration creates a brain-drain and has long-term effects in the form of undermining the creation of a generation of new technocrats and professionals. In an insecure environment, except for the supply of weapons, foreign investors would not put their capital and investment in jeopardy. Thus, South Asian countries are impacted by underdevelopment and by the outflow of qualified human capital, despite India appearing to be a globalization and liberalization trailblazer. In the aggregate, these factors can have a domino effect, as one gives rise to another as a result and each state struggles on its own in the absence of a South Asian level system of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, policy frameworks, and institutional structures. It may seem illusory on the one hand to think this could or may change, but it is worth noting that, in the digital age, much can happen in rapid time frames when the young and the progressive collectively insist from their political leaders that they want better social conditions for a life of flourishing in the modern age.

Looking back and looking ahead: Some considerations for improvement As we conclude this volume, it is worth highlighting some salient elements to come to grips with the security issues in the region. First, the genesis of the border disputes in South Asia can be traced back to colonial times. The cartographic borders and boundaries were drawn to serve the purpose and the political and administrative convenience of the British. Their approach to govern their “jewel in the crown” effectively did not serve well in the post-India partition and independence years. The countries in the post-independence period inherited border dispute issues that still continue in the present time and impede relations between the continental South Asian countries – for example, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, India and Pakistan, India and Nepal, India and China, and India and Bangladesh. For this, the countries have fought multiple wars and even used non-state actors. What may be of value is a borders commission that is constituted by eminent jurists from South Asia to resolve, or at least reach some broad understanding, on these issues so as to avoid the draining

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of the blood and treasure of these countries on matters of border disputes. The human resources and the capital wasted in border disputes and protection can be allocated toward social development and, as such, serve to ameliorate the standards and conditions of the millions and millions of people living in abject poverty in the region. But this also requires political will, vision, and resoluteness among the political leaders. Second, as variously noted in the preceding chapters, the genesis of insurgency in South Asia can also be traced back to colonial times. The current Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan was left autonomous, as the British could not govern this region. As a result, they drew the Durand Line. It is also more or less similarly the case of the northeastern territory in India. The Naxal insurgency evolved because the British placed what was privately owned indigenous forests in “reserve” to harness the forests’ products for export to the United Kingdom. If the people resisted, the whole community or the particular ethnic group of that area was collectively declared as criminals, including the children and women, and were tried under criminal laws. Thus, the fight for autonomy or independence that started during the British rule continues in the post-independence period. The respective countries should consider reconciliation with the people who were marginalized for so long, treat them as equal citizens, and help to bring them into the mainstream rather than be left to environments or undertakings of insurgency. But here, too, trust building and sincerity on the part of the state are paramount. Third, as is well known, South Asia is home to three major religions – Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Bhutan (74% Buddhist, 25% Hindu), the Maldives (98.5% Muslim), and Nepal (81.3% Hindu, 9% Buddhist) predominantly follow Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism, respectively. India (79.8% Hindu, 14.2% Muslim), Pakistan (96.4% Muslims), Afghanistan (99% Muslims), Sri Lanka (70% Buddhist, 12.6% Hindu, 9.7% Muslim), and Bangladesh (89% Muslim, 10% Hindu) each has a majoritarian religion. It may be said that the minority religions are overshadowed or imposed upon by such contexts, thus creating alienation, marginalization, violation of minority rights, and limited representation in the decision-making institutions and share in the government (Piazza, 2009; Danzell, Yeh, & Pfannenstiel, 2019). Bidisha Biswas took up related concerns in the case of India in Chapter 10, as did Eamon Murphy in Chapter 12. This can lead to radicalization of the minority for redressing grievances and high handedness by the majority and state actors. Inclusiveness and participation in the process of democracy have value in helping to curb conflicts and terrorism (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016). The minority religious communities have been living in these countries for a significant period of time, and in the case of India, for centuries. It may be useful for countries in the region to foster effective protection, due representation in government institutions, and equitable treatment. As Syed, Saeed, and Martin (2015, p. 201) note of Pakistan, it is vitally useful for the governmentmandated curriculum to be revised in such a way as to eschew violence as a means to settling conflicts and instead promote interethnic and interreligious respect; this is an approach that can be extended across the region.

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Fourth, each South Asian country has a bulge of the population that is 29 years of age and under. Specifically, the proportion of people who are age 29 or less is 48.4% in Sri Lanka, 57.3% in Maldives, 55.7% in Bangladesh, 67.7% in Afghanistan, 60.7% in Pakistan, 53% in India, 67% in Nepal, and 56.8% in Bhutan (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020). With limited resources for proper education, employment, and other opportunities, the youth can get distracted toward nonstate actors who show them incentives in gun power, drugs smuggling, fighting on religious grounds, and perpetrating terrorist and criminal activities. The youth may not only pose challenge to their own country in such context, but also to the neighboring countries. It is no trivial matter that the circulation of small arms in South Asia works as a fodder for many uneducated and unemployed youth. The circulation of large amounts of weapons can destabilize the countries. Here, too, the young population may be vulnerable. The countries in the region therefore need to treat their age-demographic bulge not as an idle crowd but rather prepare them as human resources to take on the challenges of the 21st century in order to harness opportunities and overcome the existing challenges in their respective societies. Thus, more efforts on the part of the state need to be directed toward youth development and creating proper and solid education and career pathways for their futures in the digital age instead of being absorbed in a war economy in budget allocations (Bowden & Binns, 2016). India has taken on various paths in the information technology (IT) revolution where its youth population is provided employment opportunities in working in the IT industry for companies located in Western societies (Pattnaik, 2013). This requires investments in education and research and in employment futures; it, too, is something that can be emulated across the region. Fifth, the lack of strong institutional frameworks, the power play of majoritarianism, the role of the military, ethnic and religious divisions, underdevelopment in the rural areas, limited resources, and debt crises all require the respective governments to take thoughtful measures to counteract. There is a strong need to build national dialogue by including all stakeholders and developing both long- and short-term national development strategies that should have continuation irrespective of whichever political party is in power. It is vital that all constituents experience economic growth and a sense of inclusiveness in the society, especially as economic growth across the constituents in polarized societies may contribute to reducing domestic terrorism and insurgency (Danzell, Yeh, & Pfannenstiel, 2019). Sixth, weak regional institutional frameworks in South Asia, such as the ineffective South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), along with border disputes and disputes over transnational water flows, lead to deep distrust and skepticism that can overshadow and undermine constructive initiatives. Some such initiatives include India’s launching of a satellite for South Asia for education, health, weather, and other purposes; opening of a South Asian University in New Delhi; and, of late, creating a SAARC Covid-19 Emergency Fund. Trust deficits among the South Asian countries, however, can make such matters subject to parochial interpretations and thus intransigent to regional development,

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confidence building, and stability in South Asia. What is required is the strengthening of the regional institutional frameworks, with membership of eminent personalities who transcend the narrow nationalistic interests and conspectus. This may not be a light undertaking, of course, but it would certainly be significantly purposeful for regional development.

Conclusion The chapters in this volume provide very robust analyses of issues of terrorism, insurgencies, and security relating to the countries that comprise South Asia, by leading experts in the field. The book has addressed religious, ideological, and separatist issues, among others, that have spawned major events and concerns for security and development. Critical attention was given to country contexts, radicalization, ethnic conflicts, gender dynamics, and implications that extend to global security. A mixed record in combating terrorism and insurgency demonstrates that India mostly uses a soft power approach while focusing on its overall development; Pakistan got itself engulfed in a quagmire of terrorism and came to be placed on the FATF Grey List; Bhutan remains comparatively stable and peaceful; Nepal introduced constitutional changes but remains far away from a solution; Sri Lanka has dealt with the LTTE, but the situation is still volatile; and the Maldives remains vulnerable. Each country has its unique security challenges and requires specific solutions. The authors of the chapters in the volume have taken pains to flesh out the security challenges that are unique to each country’s context, and some that have more regional extensions, notably Pakistan and Afghanistan. The editors have tried in earnest to produce a wholesome volume, but there are still more topics that can yet be addressed – among them, a fuller examination of diaspora-related issues of terrorism and security, comparing theories of terrorism of the West and conceptual approaches taken in South Asia, and terrorism and insurgency financing. Whatever imperfections may be perceived of the volume, we hope it has also served as a useful source of knowledge on the issues, and one that impels the reader to carry the research further in producing an even better account of the situations in South Asia so that the lives of the peoples of the region may be much more enhanced. The current global pandemic, despite the toll it has been having on human society, may also inspire further insight on security affairs and the need for regional and global cooperation.

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Index

**Page numbers in bold reference tables. 9/11 292 1947 Hydari Agreement 101 1975 Shillong Accord 101 1985 Assam Accord 102 1993 Bodo Accord 111 2008 Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) 108 2015 Framework Agreement 108 2020 Bodo Accord 111 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad 217–219 Abrahamsen, R. 267 accountability systems 278 Adityanath, Yogi 185 Adivasis 243 adivasis, India 80–85 Afghan National Army (ANA) 8 Afghan Taliban 8, 9 Afghanistan 6, 140–141, 270; Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan 11; female militancy 236–239; insurgency 8; ISKP (Islamic StateKhorasan Province) 150–152; Kabul after 1992 146–148; relations with India 11–12; sexual violence 147–148; state organized terror after 1978 coup 144–146; Taliban 11–12, 148–150, 255; U.S. withdrawal from 158; violence and the state (19th century) 143 agency, definition 234 AGP (Asom Gana Parishad) 102, 109 Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan 11 AGSA 145–146 Ahle Hadith 226 Ahmed, Z. S. 163 Air India bombing (1985) 5, 292

AISSF (All-India Sikh Students Federation) 125 Akali Dal 123–127, 131, 132 Akhmat, G. 293 Akhter, Yasmeena 242 Akhundzada, Hibatullah 11 Al Qaeda 6, 8, 13, 149, 255, 256, 270; Maldives 201; Pakistan 159–160; threat to Kashmir 226 Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) 13, 160 Al Zikra academy network 240 All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference 217 All Nepal National Independent Student’s Union (Revolutionary)(ANNISU-R) 65 All Parties Conference (APC), Pakistan 165 All-India Pakistan Muslim League 217 All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) 125 Alondra Rainbow 252 Amanullah 144 Amin, Hafizullah 145 amritdhari Sikhs 131 ANA (Afghan National Army) 8 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) 122 Andrabi, Asiya 242 ANNISU-R (All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union (Revolutionary) 65 Ansarulah Bangla Team 29 anti-Pakistan terrorist groups 161, 166 anti-Shia militant groups, Pakistan 161–162 Anti-Terrorism Act (2009), Bangladesh 32 anti-terrorism legislation, Bangladesh 32

306

Index

Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), Bangladesh 31 APC (All Parties Conference), Pakistan 165 APF (Armed Police Force), Nepal 73–74 AQIS (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) 13, 160; Shaheen Women’s wing 240 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks, Myanmar 27 Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 220 Armed Police Force (APF), Nepal 73–74 ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacks, Myanmar 27 Articles 370 and 35A, Kashmir 224–226 Ashoka, Emperor 287 Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) 102, 109 ASR (Anandpur Sahib Resolution) 122, 125 Assam, identity politics 109–110 Assam insurgencies 102 Assam Movement (1979-1985) 102, 109–110 attack on army school in Peshawar (2014) 9 ATU (Anti-Terrorism Unit), Bangladesh 31 authoritarianism, Sri Lanka 55–57 Awami League 25 Ayesha, Bibi (the Pigeon) 236 Ayodhya violence 5 Azad (Free) Kashmir 216, 217 Babbar Khalsa 125, 131 Babri Masjid 21, 179, 181, 185 Babu, Hany 182 al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr 159 Baidya, Mohan (Kiran) 64 BAL (Bangladesh Awami League) 26 Bali bombing 257 Baloch insurgent groups 162 Baloch separatists 168 Balochistan 163 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D. 56 Bandyopadhyay, S. 267 Bangladesh 7, 13; counterterrorism strategies 31–34; Islam 26; non-state violent terrorism 24–26, 34–35; political violence 26–27; radical violent extremism 27–29; RVE (radicalization into violent extremism) 29–31; Wahhabism 27

Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) 26 Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 26 Bangladeshi Muslim society 7 Basumatary, Saoraigwra 106 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 157 Benford, R. D. 81 Bhai, Bangla 28 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India 10, 88, 177–181, 186, 224; Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 110; Kashmir 219 Bhattarai, Baburam 68 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh 125–126 Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK) 133–134 Bhutan 7; Operation All Clear 8 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 158–159 Bin Laden, Osama 259, 270 Biplav group, Nepal 65–66, 69–71, 73–74 BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), India 10, 88, 177–181, 186, 224; Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 110; Kashmir 219 Black Tigers: LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 50; Sri Lanka 246 Blin, A. 24 BLTF (Bodo Liberation Tiger Force) 111 BNP (Bangladesh National Party) 26 Bodo, identity politics 111–112 Bodo conflict, India 99 Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) 7, 111 Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) 111 border disputes 297–298 Borum, Randy 24, 30 Bose, Khudiram 25 Bourdieu, Pierre 271–272 BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) 157, 165 Britain, colonialism 4, 177, 195, 217, 269–271 British colonial period, Bangladesh 24–25 Brown, J. M. 274 BTFK (Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan) 133–134 BTR (Bodoland Territorial Region) 111 Buddhism, Bhutan 7–8 CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 110, 181 Cambridge Assessment International Education program 205 Canada, Sikh extremism 5 causes of terrorism 272–273

Index CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoists Parties and Organisations of South Asia) 92–93 Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) 47 Chaliand, G. 24 Chand, Netra Bikram (Biplav) 64 Chaudhary, HP 92 Chavan, YB 85 Chetia, Anup 27 children, impact of terrorism 294–295 China 104; BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) 157, 165; Indian Ocean 262–263; Ladakh 228; Naxal rebellion 90–91; Taliban 12 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 157, 263 Chongdar, Sudip 91 Christianity, Naga, India 106–107 Chukas 168 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), India 110, 181 civil war: definition 49; Sri Lanka 50 collaboration 278–279 colonialism 269–270 Communism, in Bangladesh 28 Communist Party of India (CPI) 80 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPIM) 81–82 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) 64, 92 Community Support Mechanism, Bangladesh 32–33 Congress Party, Punjab, India 131 Coordination Committee of Maoists Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) 92–93 corruption, Maldives 195–196, 202–203 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group 255 counterinsurgency approaches: India 85–90; northeast India 112–114 Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTCU), Bangladesh 31, 33 counterterrorism strategies: Bangladesh 31–34; Pakistan 165–168 Covid-19 pandemic 289–290 cow protection vigilante groups 180 CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) 157, 165, 263 CPI (Communist Party of India) 80 CPI Marxist-Leninist (CPIML) 82–83 CPIM (Communist Party of India-Maoist) 81–83, 91

307

CPN-M (Communist Party of NepalMaoist) 64, 92 cross-border terrorism, India 10 CTTCU (Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit), Bangladesh 31, 33 CWC (Ceylon Workers Congress) 47 Daesh see ISKP (Islamic State-Khorasan Province) Dahal, Pushpa Kamal 63–64, 67–68 Dal Khalsa 125 Dalits 186, 243 Daoud, Mohammad 144, 159 Dar, Adil Ahmad 224 Dearing, M. 237 deaths, due to terrorism 295–296 demographic diversity, Sri Lanka 45 deradicalization programs 279–280 Dhaka grenade attack (2004) 28 diagnostic framing, grievance narratives 82 Didi, Mariya 200 Diego Garcia 260–261 disequilibrium 81 Doxa (unwritten rules) 271 drivers of insurgency in northeast India 103–112 drugs, Maldives 202–203 Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of Faith) 242 Dupree, Louis 145 East Pakistan 25–26, 104 Easter Sunda 2019 attacks, Sri Lanka 13 economic consequences, non-state violent terrorism, Bangladesh 34–35 economic globalization 43 education 299; Maldives 204–206; Pakistan 294 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) 48 Eelam Revolutionary Organization Students (EROS) 48 employment opportunities 299 Ershad, Muhammad 26, 27 ethnic democracy, India 183–184 ethnic nationalism, Kashmir 218–219 ex-FATA, Pakistan 163 extremism: left-wing extremism (LWE) 27; radicalization into violent extremism (RVE) 13, 27–29; religious extremism 200–202, 220–222; Sikh extremism 5, 121; violent extremism 267–268

308

Index

Facebook 167 failed states, Sri Lanka 51 Fair, C. C. 218 families, impact of terrorism 294–295 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 73 FATF (Financial Action Task Force) 296 fear 273–274 Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) 9; Pakistan 239–241 female activism, India 245 female jihad 239–240 female militancy: Afghanistan 236–239; India 241–245; Pakistan 239–241; Sri Lanka 245–247 femininity 235 fields 271 fighting terrorism, legal frameworks for 275–280 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 296 Framework Agreement, NSCN-IM (NSCN-Isak-Muivah) 101 Free Aceh Movement 257–258 Freilich, J. D. 291 Frontier Crimes Regulation 163 Fukuyama, Francis 43 Galtung, Johan 162 GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) 257–258 Gandhi, Indira 127, 129, 179 Gandhi, Rajiv 52, 132, 179 gau raksha (cow protection) 184 Gaughran, A. 290 Gayoom, Maumoon Abdul 195 GCERF (Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience) 32–33 gender 234; militancy and 235 geopolitics: Hindutva (India) 187–188; Pakistan 164–165 Ghani, Ashraf 8, 151 Ghar wapsi 180 Ghatak, S. 272 Ghazwa-e-Hind 160 Ghazwat-ul-Hind, Ansar 13 Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience (GCERF) 32–33 Global Jidhadist Movement (GJM) 239 global terrorism 291 globalization 43, 289 Gogoi, Ranjan 185 Golden Temple 121, 126 Gorbachev, Mikhail 146 grassroots activism 279

Greater Nagalim 108 Green Revolution (India) 124 grievance narratives, CPIM (Communist Party of India-Maoist) 81–82 Griffin, Lepel 143 guerrilla warfare, Khalistan movement 128 Gurr, T. R. 81 Gwadar Port 263 Habib, Anjum Zamruda 242 Habibullah Kalakani 144 habitus 271 Haider, Ahmed Rajib 29 Haq, Zia ul 6 Haqqani, Sirajuddin 12 Haqqani network 9 Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HUJI) 29 Hashim, Mohammad 144 Hasina, Sheikh 27, 28 Hazaras 147–148 Hefazet-e-Islam 29 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 147 Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) 147 hijackings, Indian Ocean 252, 255 Hindu 5, 6 Hindu Mahasabha 178 Hinduism 187 Hindu-Muslim violence, Kashmir 225 Hindus 288; Punjab, India 127 Hindutva (India) 177–178; geopolitics 187–188; majoritarianism 185–186; political ascendance 178–182; women 244–245 Hizubt Tahir 29 Holey Artisan Bakery attack (2016) 27, 29, 33 Horowitz, D. L. 122 hospitality security 280 HUJI (Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam) 29 human rights abuses, J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 220 humanitarian organizations, impact of terrorism 275 identity politics, northeast India 106–112 IDP (internally displaced persons), Sri Lanka 53–54 immigration 274 impact of terrorism 273–275, 293–297 India 43, 80, 177; adivasis 80–85; Ancient India 287; Assam insurgencies 102; beginnings of 177–178; Bodo conflict 99; CAA (Citizenship Amendment

Index Act) 181; colonialism 269–270; counterinsurgency approaches 85–90, 112–114; drivers of insurgency in northeast India 103–112; female militancy 241–245; Hindu nationalism see Hindutva (India); IS (Islamic State) 12–13, 92; J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 11; Khalistan movement 121–122; Manipur insurgencies 102–103; Mizo insurgency 100; mob violence 184; Naga insurgency 100–101; Naxal insurgency 80–85; Operation Blue Star 10; police 184; press freedom 185; Punjab, India see Punjab, India; Red Corridor 10; relations with Afghanistan 11–12; religions 5; secularism 179, 182–184; separatist movements 10; threats to 9–10 Indian Forest Act (1878) 80, 81 Indian Navy 252–253, 261 Indian Ocean 251, 260; maritime terrorism 255–260; nontraditional security issues 252–254 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 260 Indo-Pacific Command 261 Indo-Pakistan wars 217–218, 270–271 insecurity: causes of terrorism 272–273; impact of terrorism 273–275 insurgency 298; Assam insurgencies 102; definition 48; drivers of insurgency in northeast India 103–112; J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 219–220; Khalistan movement 127–130; Manipur insurgencies (India) 102–103; Maoists, Nepal 63–65; Mizo insurgency (India) 100; Naga insurgency (India) 100–101; Naxal insurgency (India) 80–85 Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 52 internal colonialism 81 internally displaced persons (IDP), Sri Lanka 53–54 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 8 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan 6 IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) 260 IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Forces) 52 IS (Islamic State), India 12–13, 92 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 8

309

ISGA (Interim Self-Governing Authority), LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 52 Ishaqzai, Abdul Hakim 11 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), Pakistan 6, 91–92, 147, 160, 221, 277; Taliban 148–150 ISIL (Da’esh) 256 ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) 29, 288; recruitment campaigns 290; threat to Kashmir 226 Islam: Bangladesh 26; Kashmir 216; Maldives 7, 198–199; Pakistan 217 Islamabad 10; Kashmir conflict 216 Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) 140; Afghanistan 150–152; Pakistan 160–161 Islamist jihadi violent extremism, Bangladesh 28–29 Islamization, Bangladesh 27 Israel 183 Ittihad-e Islami 147 J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 5, 10, 11, 159, 215, 270–271; CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) 165; ethnic nationalism 218–219; Kargil crisis 222–223; Kashmir conflict 216–217; partition of Kashmir 217–218; proxy wars 220–222; rebellion 219–220; religious extremism 220–222; see also Kashmir Jaffrelot, Christophe 185 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) 28 Jaish-e-Mohammad 224 Jalata, A. 291, 292 Jamaat-e-Islam (JEI) 26 Jamaat-ud-Dawa 240 Jamatul Muslemin 29 Jamayat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) 29 Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 5, 10, 11, 159, 215, 270–271; CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) 165; ethnic nationalism 218–219; Kargil crisis 222–223; Kashmir conflict 216–217; partition of Kashmir 217–218; proxy wars 220–222; rebellion 219–220; religious extremism 220–222; see also Kashmir Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 217

310

Index

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front 219; women 242 Japan 262 Jat Sikhs 123–124, 128, 131 Jatiya Party (JP) 26 JEI (Jamaat-e-Islam) 26 Jihadi groups, Pakistan 9 Jinnah, Muhammed Ali 5–6, 25 JMB (Jamayat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh) 29 JMJB (Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh) 28 Jogi, Ajit 87 Johnson, C. A. 81 Jongman, A. J. 24 JP (Jatiay Party) 26 judicial system, Maldives 202–203 Kabul, Afghanistan, terror after 1992 146–148 Kakar, Hasan 146 Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) 7–8 Kandiyoti, D. 237–238 Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) 103 Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 103 Kargil crisis 222–223 Karmal, Babrak 144 Kashmir: civil unrest 223–224; ethnic nationalism 218–219; female militancy 241–242; Indo-Pakistan war 217–218; IS 12–13; ISIS and al-Qaeda 226; partition of 217–218; revocation of Articles 370 and 35A 224–226; see also Jammu and Kasmir (J&K) Kashmir conflict 216–217; security implications 226–229 Kashmir Public Safety Act (1978) 220 Kashmiri Brahmin refugees 227 Kashmiris 10, 225 Kashmiriyat 216 KCP (Kangleipak Communist Party) 103 KhAD (State Information Service) 146 Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) 131 Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) 131 Khalistan movement 5, 127–135 Khalq 144 Khalqis 145 Khan, Amir Abdul Rahman 143 Khan, Hafiz Saeed 151 Khan, Imran 227 Kiesinger, Henry 13 KLF (Khalistan Liberation Force) 131

KLO (Kamtapur Liberation Organisation) 7–8 Kumaratunga, Chandrika 50, 52 KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup) 103 Ladbury, S. 239 LaFree, G. 291 Laishram, Pashuram 106 Lakhvi, Zaki-ur Rehman 257 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 160 Lashkar-e-Taiba 240, 257 Lea-Henry, J. 85 Lee, Jonathan 143 leftist radical violent extremism, Bangladesh 28 left-wing extremism (LWE) 27 legal frameworks for fighting terrorism 275–280 LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) 160 Lelhari, Hameed 13 lesical definition 141 Levine, Victor T. 24 liberation 3 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 48–52, 54, 296; maritime terrorism 258; Sri Lanka 6–7, 53–54; women 245–247 Line of Control, J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 222–223 local jihadist groups, Pakistan 161–162 logomachy of terrorism 24 Longowal, Sant 132 Lord Ram 179 Love jihad 180 LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 48–52, 54, 296; maritime terrorism 258; Sri Lanka 6–7, 53–54; women 245–247 LWE (left-wing extremism) 27 Madani, Mohammed Omar 91 madrassas, Pakistan 164 majoritarianism, Hindutva (India) 185–186 Malacca Strait Coordinated Patrol 252 Malalai 236 Maldives 7, 13, 193–195; corruption 195–196, 202–203; education 204–206; geography 196–197; Islam 198–199; judicial system 202–203; NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre) 206; radicalization 197–200; religions 197–200; religious extremism 200–202 Maldives Police Service (MPS) 200 Maley, W. 273 Malik, S. 6

Index Manipur insurgencies, India 102–103 Manochahal, Gurbachan Singh 133 Mansour, Akhtar 150 Mao Zedong 90 Maoist insurgency, women 244 Maoists 272; Nepal 10, 62–63, 73–74 maritime domain awareness (MDA) 259 maritime terrorism 253–260 Martin, R.P. 294 masculinity 235 Mazumdar, Charu 80, 82–83, 90 MDA (maritime domain awareness) 259 Metz, S. 84 militancy: gender and 235; Kashmir 223–224; women see female militancy 233–234 militarized counterterrorism framework, Pakistan 165–168 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 51, 57 Miller, E. 291 Mishra, Kapil 182 Mizo insurgency (India) 100 MLPO (Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance), Bangladesh 32 MNDF (Maldives National Defence Force) Coast Guard 196; National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 200 MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) 255 mob violence, India 184 modernization, Sikhs of Punjab 124–125 Modi, Narendra 90, 177, 179–180, 185, 186, 224 Mollet, H. 290 Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO), Bangladesh 32 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 255 Mosque Program, Maldives 198 motivational framing, grievance narratives 82 MPS (Maldives Police Service) 200 mujahedeens 10, 255 Mukherjee, Naparajit 91 Mukherjee, Uddipan 92 al-Mulk, Nizam 24 Mumbai attack (26/11) 257, 274 Murphy, E. 6 Musa, Zakir 13 Musharraf, Pervez 222 Muslim Khawateen Marqaz (Muslim Women’s Center) 242

311

Muslims: Bangladesh 7; India 184–185; Nigeria 272; Sri Lanka 45; see also Islam Myanmar 7; ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacks 27; NSCN-K (NSCN-Khaplang) 105–106 Naga insurgency, India 100–101 Naga national consciousness 106–109 Naga National Council (NNC) 104 Nagalim 107 NAP (National Action Plan), Pakistan 9, 157, 165–166 Narain, Lala Jagat 126 Nasheed, Mahomed 195 Nasir, Ibrahim 195 Nassery, Fahima 146 National Action Plan (NAP), Pakistan 9, 157, 165–166 National Democratic Front of Bodoland 7 National Democratic Front of Bodoland’s Progressive (NDFB-P) 99 National Democratic Front of Bodoland’s Ranjan Daimary (NDFB-RD) 99 National Investigation Agency (NIA), India 89 National People’s Party (NPP) 113 National Register of Citizens (NRC), India 181 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) 101 National Volunteer Organization, India 178 nationalism, definition 44 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 105 NATO, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 8 Naxal insurgency: China 90–91; counterinsurgency approaches to 85–90; India 80–85; Nepal 92; Pakistan 91–92; women 243 NC (Nepali Congress) 63 NCA (Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement) 105 NCP (Nepal Communist Party) 64 NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre), Maldives 200, 206 NDFB-P (National Democratic Front of Bodoland’s Progressive) 99, 111 NDFB-Ranjan Daimary 111 NDFB-RD (National Democratic Front of Bodoland’s Ranjan Daimary) 99

312

Index

NDFB-S 106, 111 Nehru, Jawaharlal 217–219 neo-colonial Pakistan period, Bangladesh 25–26 Neo-JMB 29 Nepal 13, 62–65; Maoists 10; Naxal insurgency 92; police 67–71; revolution 65–67; security for citizens 71–74 Nepal Communist Party (NCP) 64 Nepali Congress (NC) 63 Ngaihte, Thinaglalmuan 106 NGO Transparency Maldives 203–204 NIA (National Investigation Agency), India 89 Niazi, Abdul Manan 148–149 Nigeria 272, 274 Nirankari-Sikh clash, Punjab, India 125 NNC (Naga National Council) 104 non-state violent terrorism, Bangladesh 24–26, 34–35 nontraditional security issues, South Asia 252–254 NPP (National People’s Party) 113 NRC (National Register of Citizens (NRC) 181 NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) 101 NSCN-Isak-Nuivah (NSCN-IM) 101, 108–109, 113 NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) 101, 104–105 Oceans Beyond Piracy Program 253 OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) 228 Oli, Khadga Prasad Sharma 64, 65 Olson, M. 143 Omar, Mohammad 150 online radicalization 290 Onwudiwe, I. D. 269 Operation All Clear, Bhutan 8 Operation Anaconda, India 88 Operation Blue Star 10, 121–122, 126–127, 131 Operation Green Hunt 88, 244 Operation Searchlight, Pakistan 26 Operation Steeplechase, India 86 Operation Woodrose 122, 126–127, 131 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan 166 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 228

PAC (Provisional Administrative Council), Sri Lanka 52 Pacific Command 261 Pakistan 5–6, 9, 157, 270–271; Al Qaeda 13, 159–160; attack on army school in Peshawar (2014) 9; education 294; evolving terrorist landscape 158–161; female militancy 239–241; impact on Afghanistan 8; ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) 6, 91–92, 147–150, 221, 277; ISKP (Islamic State-Khorasan Province) 160–161; Khalistan movement 129–130; local jihadist groups 161; mujahideens 10; National Action Plan (NAP) 9; partitioning of 287–288; regional militant groups 162; relations with US 228; Sikh militants 131–132; state sponsorship of terrorist groups 256–257; structural causes of terrorism 162–168; Taliban 11–12, 157; underdevelopment 273 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) 216 al-Pakistani, Abu Asim 140 Pakistaniat 165 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 255 Panthic Committee, Khalistan movement 132–134 Parashar 242–243 Parcham 144 parochial groups, Khalistan movement 130 partition of Kashmir 217–218 Pashtuns 11 Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) 255 PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) 144 peace initiatives, Sri Lanka 51–53 people-centric approach, counterinsurgency, India 86 People’’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 144 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 103 People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) 83–84; women 243 People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 48 People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) 103 Peshawar Army Public School attack 279 Pettigrew, J. 124, 128, 131 Phillips, B. J. 160, 166 Piazza, J. 256

Index Pillai, GK 91 piracy, Indian Ocean 252–253 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 103 PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army) 83–84; women 243 PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) 255 PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) 48 POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) 216 police, Nepal 67–71 police brutality, India 184 political instability 256, 272–273 political violence, Bangladesh 26–27 POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) (2002), India 87 Premadasa, Ranasinghe 50, 52 PREPAK (People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak) 103 PREPAK-Pro 106 press freedom, India 185 Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002) (POTA), India 87 prognostic framing, grievance narratives 82 Provisional Administrative Council (PAC), Sri Lanka 52 proxy wars, J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 220–222 pseudo-democracy 273 PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organisation) 255 Pulwama attack 224 punishment for acts of terrorism 277 Punjab, India: Khalistan movement 121–122, 127–130, 130–135; Nirankari-Sikh clash 125; Sikhs 122–124; water 124 Punjab Accord 132 Punjab Police 133 Punjabi Suba (1966) 123 Qital Fi-Sabilillah 29 RAB (Rapid Action Battalion), Bangladesh 31, 33 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 147 radicalization 290–293; Maldives 197–200 radicalization into violent extremism (RVE) 13; Bangladesh 27–29 Radio Peking 90 Ragi, Darshan Singh 133 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 26

313

Rahman, Ziaur 26 Rajan, D. S. 91 Rajapaksa, Gotabaya 53–55, 57 Rajapaksa, Mahinda 53 Rao, Koteswara 88, 92 rape, Afghanistan 147–148 Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Bangladesh 31, 33 Rashid, Ahmed 9, 148–149 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), India 178; women 244–245 al-Rasoul Sayyaf, Abdul Rab 147 Ravi, R.N. 108–109 Rawat, Bipin 93 rebels, Khalistan movement 128–129 Red Corridor 10, 244 Red Mosque 239–240 Reddy, GK 90 regional militant groups, Pakistan 162 religions 5, 298; Bangladesh 26; Buddhism 7–8; cause of terrorism 273; Hindu 6; Islam see Islam; Punjab, India 123; Sikh 5 religious extremism: J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 220–222; Maldives 200–202 revocation of Articles 370 and 35A, Kashmir 224–226 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 73 Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN) 108 revolutionary terrorism 3–4 Richards, A. 141 Right to Information Act (2015), Sri Lanka 55 Rijal, Minendra 71 Roberts, Michael 48 Rode, Jasbir Singh 133 Rodney, W. 269 RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), India 178; women 244–245 Russia, Taliban 12 Rustomji, Nari 99 Ruttig, T. 149 RVE (radicalization into violent extremism) 23; Bangladesh 27–31 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 32–33, 260, 299 Saeed, L. 294 Sajjad, F. 293 Salafi Jihadism 197 Saleem, Q. 293

314

Index

Salwa Judum (People’s Resistance Movement), India 86 SAMADHAN, India 90 Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), Sri Lanka 55 Samati 244–245 Sandler, T. 267 Sangha, Sri 56 Sanyal, Kanu 91 Sarbat Khalsa 132 Sarwari, Asadullah 145 Savarkar, V. D. 178 Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (2006), India 87, 89 Schmid, Alex 4, 24, 48 secularism, India 182–184 security 260–263; Hindutva (India) 187–188; Kashmir conflict 226–229; Nepal 71–74; nontraditional security issues 252–254 Sema tribe, Naga insurgency 107–108 Sen, Amartya 287 Sen, Surya 25 separatist groups, Pakistan 162 separatist movements, India 10 sexual violence, Afghanistan 147–148 SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee) 131 Shah, Amit 99 Shah, Nadir 144 Shah, Zahir 144 Shaheen Women’s wing, AQIS (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent) 240 Shahi, Gyanendra 71 Sharia law, Taliban 12 Sharif, Nawaz 222–223 Sheikh, Hamid 242 Shekhar, Chandra 133 Shiite Hazaras 147 Shiromani Akali Dal 122 Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) 131 Shukui, T. 293 Sikdar, Siraj 28 Sikh 5 Sikh extremism 5, 121; amritdhari Sikhs 131; India 10 Sikhs of Punjab 122–125 SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India) 91–92 Simon, Jeffrey 24 Simonsen, C. E. 4

Singh, Bhai Amrik 125 Singh, Gurharpal 131 Singh, Maharajah Hari 216–217, 271 Singh, Manmohan 84, 88 Singh, Rajnath 90 Singh, Sohan 133 Sinhalese, Sri Lanka 6–7, 45–49 Sirisena, Maithripala 54 SJB (Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), Sri Lanka 55 SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) 52 SLPP (Sri Lanka People’s Front) 55 Smooha, S. 183 Snow, D. A. 81 social media 290 social psychology, impact of terrorism 274 socioeconomic disparities, Pakistan 162–164 soft power, Bangladesh 32–33 Solih, Ibrahim 195, 203 Somali piracy 252–253 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Naxals 84 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 32–33, 260, 299 South China Sea 262–263 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 145; withdrawal from 146 Spindlove, J. R. 4 Sri Lanka 6–7, 42–45; demographic diversity 45; Easter Sunday 2019 attacks 13; end of war 53–54; failed states 51; features of conflict 45–49; female militancy 245–247; future of 54–57; peace initiatives 51–53; Tamils 43–49; terrorism 50 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 52 Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP) 55 Srikanth, H. 106 Staniland, P. 130 State Information Service (KhAD) 146 state organized terror, Afghanistan 144–146 State Re-Organization Act (1956), Punjab, India 123 state sponsorship of terrorist groups 256 state terrorism 291 state violence, J&K (Jammu and Kashmir) 219–220 stipulative definition 141–142 Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution (STIR) 83 strong institutional frameworks, lack of 299

Index structural violence 162 Subramaniam, Arjun 9 suicide attacks, LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 50 SULFA (Surrendered ULFA) 113 Sunnat-e-Khaula 241 Sunni jihadi groups 221 Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Scheme, India 89 Surrendered ULFA (SULFA) 113 Swu, Isak 108 Syed, S. H. 294 Taliban 8, 140, 150, 255; Afghanistan 148–150, 237, 270; Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan 11; Pakistan 11, 157 Taliban in Afghanistan 233 Talwandi, Jagdev Singh 131 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) 48 Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Sri Lanka 55 Tamil Tigers 258 Tamils, Sri Lanka 6–7, 45–49 Taraki, Nur Mohammed 145 targeting protocol, Nepal 76n9 Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) 158 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 161, 167, 241, 271 TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) 48 Teltumbde, Anand 182, 185 terrorism 3–5; definition 62, 141–142, 268; logomachy of 24; revolutionary terrorism 3–4 Thapa, Ram Bahadur (Badal) 67 Tilly, Charles 143 TNA (Tamil National Alliance), Sri Lanka 55 trade, impact of terrorism 267 Transparency Maldives 203–204 Trump, Donald 9, 261 TTA (Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan) 158 TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) 161, 167, 241, 271 Tujan, A. 290 Tunda, Syed Abdul Karim 92 UCPN-M (Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist) 64 ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) 27, 102, 104

315

ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I) 102, 104, 106, 110 UML (Unified Marxist-Leninists) 63 Umm-e-Hammad 240 underdevelopment, impact of terrorism 273 unemployment, impact of terrorism 275 UNF (United National Front), Sri Lanka 52 UNHRC, Sri Lanka 54–55 Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) 64 Unified Marxists-Leninists (UML) 63 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 27, 102, 104 United Liberation Front of Assam 7 United National Front (UNF), Sri Lanka 52 United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 102–103 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 256 unstable political systems 272–273 U.S.: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan 11; impact on Afghanistan 8; Indian Ocean 261; relations with Pakistan 228; South China Sea 263; withdrawal from Afghanistan 158 USS Cole (2000) 256–257 USS The Sullivans 257 Uygur Muslims 12 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 223 Villijoali NGO 204 violent extremism 267–268 Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 178 Viyath Maga (VM), Sri Lanka 56 Wahhabism 27, 226 Wani, Burhan 223 War on Terror 13 water, Punjab, India 124 weak regional institutional frameworks 299 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 254 West Pakistan 25–26 Wickremesinghe, Ranil 52, 54 Wilayah Hind 13 Williams, M. C. 267 women 233–234; impact of terrorism 294–295; militancy see female militancy; treatment by the Taliban 237–238

316

Index

Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers, Sri Lanka 246 Wood, R. M. 129 World Hindu Council (VHP) 178 Yameen, Abdullah 193, 195, 198 Yaqoob, Mullah 11 Yaqub, Mullah 150 Yaqubi, Ghulam Farouq 146

Younas, J. 267 Young Communist League (YCL) 65 Yousafzai, Malala 295 Zaman, K. 293 zamindars, India 82–84 Zeb, K. 163 Zia, Khaleda 27 ZUF (Zeliangrong United Front) 103