Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security 9781350988392, 9781838609245

Table of contents :
Cover
Author Biography
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
List of Illustrations
Abbreviations
Foreword
Introduction
1. The Background to Militancy in Pakistan before 2001
The Genesis
2. Four Phases of Extremism and Terrorism
First Phase
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI)
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)/Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
LeT’s Involvement in the Mumbai Incident
United Nations Ban on Jamaat-ud-Dawa/LeT
Transformation
3. The Second Phase
The Third Phase
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)
4. The Rise of Militancy in Pakistan After 2001
The Fourth Phase
The Four Factors
The Main Concern
5. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Structure and System of TTP
TTP in Swat
TTP Punjab Chapter
TTP’s Tactics and Targets
6. Lal Masjid Operation, Escalation in Terrorist Activities and Expansion Across the Country
The Use of Media and the Internet by Militants
Claiming Responsibility
Terrorism Financing
Public Support and Sympathy for TTP and Al Qaeda
7. The State Response
Counter-Insurgency (COIN)
Is a Military Method the Right Solution?
The Use of Lashkars to Counter Insurgents
Peace Deal Politics
Strength, Tenacity, Objectives and Previous Pacts (STOP)
The Shakai Agreement
The Sararogha Agreement (February 2005)
The Swat Agreement (May 2008)
Nizam-e-Adl Peace Deal in Swat (2009)
Laws to Tackle Insurgents and Terrorists
Countering Terrorism
Need for a Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Proposed Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Role of Security and Intelligence Agencies
Insipid Investigation and Placid Prosecution
8. Irritants and Impediments
Pashtun Nature
The Drone Effects
Drone Attacks in Pakistan: 2005 – 15
Myths, Conspiracy Theories and Facts
9. The Existential Threat
Religious Extremism and Sectarianism
Economic Downturn
Social, Cultural and Psychological Fallouts
10. Future of TTP and Terrorism
Splintering of TTP: The Beginning of TTP’s End?
Would TTP Die after the US Departure from Afghanistan?
Conclusion
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

N. Elahi is Honorary Director of the Centre for Peace and Security Studies at the University of the Punjab. He holds a PhD from the University of the Punjab and an MA in Intelligence and International Security from King’s College London.

TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security

N. ELAHI

Published in 2019 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2019 N. Elahi The right N. Elahi to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of Twentieth Century History 127 ISBN (HB): 978 1 78453 999 3 ISBN (PB): 978 1 83860 376 2 eISBN: 978 1 78672 266 9 ePDF: 978 1 78673 266 8 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound in Great Britain

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Abbreviations Foreword Introduction

viii x xii 1

1. The Background to Militancy in Pakistan before 2001 The Genesis

10 10

2. Four Phases of Extremism and Terrorism First Phase Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)/Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) LeT’s Involvement in the Mumbai Incident United Nations Ban on Jamaat-ud-Dawa/LeT Transformation

22 23 24 31 33 34 36

3. The Second Phase The Third Phase Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)

43 46 47 48 55

4. The Rise of Militancy in Pakistan After 2001 The Fourth Phase

57 57

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The Four Factors The Main Concern 5. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Structure and System of TTP TTP in Swat TTP Punjab Chapter TTP’s Tactics and Targets

58 67 75 77 78 84 86

6. Lal Masjid Operation, Escalation in Terrorist Activities and Expansion Across the Country The Use of Media and the Internet by Militants Claiming Responsibility Terrorism Financing Public Support and Sympathy for TTP and Al Qaeda

95 101 107 111 116

7. The State Response Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Is a Military Method the Right Solution? The Use of Lashkars to Counter Insurgents Peace Deal Politics Strength, Tenacity, Objectives and Previous Pacts (STOP) The Shakai Agreement The Sararogha Agreement (February 2005) The Swat Agreement (May 2008) Nizam-e-Adl Peace Deal in Swat (2009) Laws to Tackle Insurgents and Terrorists Countering Terrorism Need for a Counter-Terrorism Strategy Proposed Counter-Terrorism Strategy Role of Security and Intelligence Agencies Insipid Investigation and Placid Prosecution

120 120 134 135 137 138 142 142 142 143 146 149 151 154 155 161

8. Irritants and Impediments Pashtun Nature The Drone Effects Drone Attacks in Pakistan: 2005– 15 Myths, Conspiracy Theories and Facts

164 164 165 167 174

CONTENTS

9. The Existential Threat Religious Extremism and Sectarianism Economic Downturn Social, Cultural and Psychological Fallouts

vii

183 184 187 189

10. Future of TTP and Terrorism Splintering of TTP: The Beginning of TTP’s End? Would TTP Die after the US Departure from Afghanistan?

203 203 208

Conclusion

212

Appendix Notes Bibliography Index

215 238 245 265

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map Map 4.1 Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan.

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Figures Figure 3.1 Trends of sectarian violence (2009–12).

47

Figure 8.1 An eight-arrow scenario.

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Figure 9.1 Situation, progression and impact.

185

Tables Table 5.1 Details of shrines/madaris bombed by terrorists in KP.

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Table 5.2 Details of the killing of Sunni Ulema linked with various shrines in KP.

92

Table 5.3 Suicide attacks, deaths and injuries from 2002 to 2017.

93

Table 6.1 Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan from 2003 to 2018.

100

Table 7.1 Military operations and peace deals.

121

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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Table 7.2 SWOT analysis of the situation.

154

Table 8.1 Drone attacks in Pakistan: 2005– 15.

166

Table 9.1 Estimated losses during 2001 –15.

189

ABBREVIATIONS

ANP CID CTD FATA FC FCR FIA GoP HuJI HuM IB IDPs IED ISI JeM JI JuD JUI KP LeJ LeT MI MMA MNA NATO

Awami National Party Criminal Investigation Department Counter Terrorism Department Federally Administered Tribal Areas Frontier Corps Frontier Crimes Regulation Federal Investigation Agency Government of Pakistan Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Intelligence Bureau Internally Displaced Persons Improvised Explosive Device Inter-Services Intelligence Jaish-e-Muhammad Jamaat-e-Islami Jamaat-ud-Dawa Jamiat Ulema-e Islam Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Military Intelligence Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Member of National Assembly North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ABBREVIATIONS

NCMC NGO NW NWFP PA PATA PML PML (N) PPP PT PTI SFs SWA TNSM TTP VBIED

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National Crisis Management Cell (works under Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior) Non-Governmental Organization North Waziristan North-West Frontier Province (now KP – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Political Agent Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Pakistan Muslim League Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (political party led by Nawaz Sharif) Pakistan Peoples Party Punjabi Taliban Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (political party headed by Imran Khan) Security Forces South Waziristan Agency Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

FOREWORD

It is my great pleasure to preface this book by N. Elahi, an old and valued friend, whose insights have helped me considerably to shape my perceptions of Pakistan. Mr Elahi has been closely observing Pakistan’s struggle against terrorism for the past 15 years, with profound insights into the conduct and structures of the counter-terrorism campaign. This book is therefore not only a work of analysis, but also an important historical document in its own right. Mr Elahi gives a vivid picture of the well-known struggle of Pakistan against terrorism. Furthermore, this book is highly objective and unbiased. Previously there has been both Pakistani and Western commentators engaging in hysterical denunciations and wild conspiracy theories. One of the valuable features of this book is that it is eminently sensible in its treatment of foreign involvement in the Tehreek-e-Taliban rebellion. It not only draws attention to the alleged role of the Afghan and Indian intelligence services in sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remnants who took refuge in Afghanistan and from there have continued their attacks on Pakistan, but also makes it clear that the origin, leadership and membership of the TTP have been – tragically – Pakistani. Mr Elahi rightly attributes the explosion of Pakistani militancy after 2001 to the side-effects of the US invasion of Afghanistan, as well as draws attention to the roots of the TTP rebellion in local traditions and resentments, and to the breakdown of the former indirect system of rule in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Mr Elahi is both clear-sighted and sympathetic (a rare combination) in his portrayal of why so many Pakistanis – including Pakistani

FOREWORD

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journalists – found this very difficult to accept, and the effects of this non-acceptance of reality had prevailed for several years, leading to the willingness of the Pakistani population to support a tough campaign against the militants. This also led to the repeated attempts by the military and politicians to make peace deals with the TTP, the futility of which is cleverly dissected in this book. As Mr Elahi writes, however, in early 2009, when the Pakistani security establishment recognised the TTP as a real threat to Pakistan’s interests and even its survival as a state (as opposed to the misguided products of legitimate anti-American feelings), they successfully launched a series of operations against the militants to rally public opinion in support of these campaigns over time. Consequently, the Pakistani state and military were greatly helped by the atrocities committed by the TTP against Pakistanis, culminating in the massacre of schoolchildren in Peshawar. Eventually, it simply became impossible not to attribute these crimes to the TTP and its leadership. This book brings out two more things that are important for both Pakistani and foreign observers to recognise. The first is that in the fight against the TTP insurgency, Pakistan had – for a while, and hopefully forever – won. This is despite what Mr Elahi says have been the often appalling failures of the Pakistani state and military response, especially regarding the development of a coherent, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy as well as steady, institutionalised cooperation between Pakistan’s disparate and often feuding security institutions. This failure meant that Pakistan has suffered many unnecessary losses in the struggle against militancy, and that it had to rely on massive military operations – inevitably causing much civilian suffering – which could have rendered the previously planned intelligence police operations unnecessary. The rebellion, which at one stage controlled a large majority of FATA and parts of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), has nonetheless been defeated, and the TTP forces killed, captured or dispersed. The reason for the existence of TTP leadership and most of the surviving rank and file in Afghanistan is that they have been driven out of Pakistan. As I wrote in my book, Pakistan: A Hard Country, which appeared in the middle of the struggle and predicted victory against the militants, Pakistan is tougher and more resilient than most observers – including many Pakistanis – have understood, and all those who wrote about

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Pakistan being on the brink of destruction should acknowledge their mistakes. Unlike in 2008, the TTP no longer poses a threat to conquering a large part of the country. However, as both Mr Elahi and I have written, Pakistanis also need to understand that victory against insurgency does not mean an end to terrorism, even if terrorism has been considerably reduced from its former heights. Tragically, and as we can see in Europe today, terrorist networks have become so widespread and simple terrorist weapons are so easy to procure that both Pakistan and the West will have to endure this menace for a very long time. Both Islamic and Western countries must develop long-term strategies that combine toughness and restraint and, whenever possible, prioritise effective police and intelligence tactics over military rules. It is also essential to shape a public opinion that will be resilient to terrorist attacks and resolute in its response. This book is an invaluable contribution to this effort by Pakistan. Professor Anatol Lieven Georgetown University, Qatar

INTRODUCTION

The rapid and relentless rise of post-2001 terrorism in Pakistan is largely attributed to the birth and evolution of home-grown Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups that sneaked into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan. The existing jihadi infrastructure in FATA and elsewhere harboured and supported them and very soon they started challenging the writ of the state. Nevertheless, it was not a sudden spike or unforeseen development. Things had been brewing for the last two decades, in FATA in particular and in Pakistan in general. The statesponsored jihadi activities to counter the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan had led to the rise of religious extremism and sectarianism in Pakistan. The jihadi parties formed to augment separatist activities in Indian-held Kashmir also added to the religious militancy mood. The soil was already fertile and became favourable for full-blown terrorist activities after 2001. Unfortunately, the intelligence agencies of Pakistan remained indifferent to the growing threat from the 1980s through to the 1990s until the situation snowballed into a grave threat to the country. From 2001 onwards, within a few years, Al Qaeda, TTP and its affiliates became too strong and well entrenched to be controlled by the security agencies of Pakistan. The state struggled to reduce this threat effectively, thereby challenging its stability and survival. This threat seriously undermined law and order in Pakistan, damaged social and political standing and, above all, undermined the country’s economic growth. The number of casualties and deaths was ever-growing, including civilians, and the members of civil and military forces

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introduced extreme violence in the society, which induced fear, uncertainty and enlarged risk perceptions, resulting in social upheaval, economic debility and international isolation. In fact, within less than a decade, terrorism engulfed Pakistan. Chapter 1 makes the case for an understanding of the genesis and background of extremism and militancy in Pakistan. It begins with an in-depth insight into the history of the role of religion in struggles for autonomy and freedom from oppression and foreign rules. In this chapter, the author states that Muslims are always religion-oriented during wars, conquests and tough times. The spirit of jihad almost always figured prominently in all their struggles. Jihad literally means struggle. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the struggles in the Caucasus, Algeria and India were led by Muslim personalities who transformed them into jihad. In India, Shah Waliullah, Syed Ismail and Syed Ahmed Barelvi waged armed jihad against Sikhs and British governments. In addition, other unarmed reformist movements were involved in such activities. After the so-called Indian War of Independence, that was, the 1857 mutiny against the British, the struggle initiated by Dadu Mian and Titumir in Bengal had tangible religious hues. The Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought, which resulted in the two most popular Muslim sects in the Indian sub-continent, also originated in the same era of foreign rule and oppression. The movement for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India was also mobilised on the same lines. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was a moderate, modern and pragmatic person who envisaged a separate homeland for the Muslims of India because he considered them to deserve a nation different from Hindus in order for their economic and political rights to be safeguarded from the Hindu-dominated India. He conceived Pakistan as a modern democratic Muslim state but not a theocratic state. Extremist religious leaders could not play important roles and acquire recognition throughout the struggle for Pakistan. Unsurprisingly religious slogans and the strong spirit of fighting for Islam remained the hall mark of the struggle. Muhammad Ali Jinnah died a year after the creation of Pakistan. However, his successors changed the idea of his vision of liberal Pakistan. Ruler after ruler, both civil and military, succumbed to the pressure of religious groups and made amendments to the constitution and formulated

INTRODUCTION

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policies, which resulted in religious intolerance and extremism. They did not take these steps out of sincerity to Islam but due to political exigencies, which could help them prolong their respective regimes. Kashmir became the first and foremost bone of contention between Pakistan and India. The first jihad was directed towards the liberation of Kashmir from India in 1948. Chapter 2 describes the history of religious extremism and terrorism in the following four phases in order to understand the origin of terrorism from religious extremism and flawed policies: (1) Afghan jihad formed jihadi parties and jihadi culture from 1979 onwards; (2) Indiansponsored terrorism and sabotage in the 1980s; (3) sectarian terrorism erupted in the late 1980s and (4) the rise of militancy after 2001, involving Al Qaeda, TTP and so on. This chapter deals with the first phase. The main parties involved in sectarianism and jihad have been discussed in detail. These parties were created to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets and to support freedom fighters in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). Pakistani religious groups sent thousands of jihadists to fight in Afghan jihad. Pakistanis were made to believe that it was their religious and moral duty to be sympathetic towards these jihadists. After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988, within four years, Pakistan started losing interest in affairs related to Afghanistan (Khan, 2011). It then increased its focus on Kashmir, and by the mid-1990s, the indigenous uprising, abetted by the militants and the jihadi parties from Pakistan, became quite violent. However, this focus was expected to end soon. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, Pakistan made a U-turn on Afghan and Kashmir policies. The IHK-centric Jihadi organisations were banned in the Musharraf regime. The Pakistanis who fought or supported those wars and conflicts with the approval of their own government were left in the lurch without any further guidance. Post-operation care was non-existent. Psychological and physical rehabilitation of trained and battle-hardened fighters, to reintroduce them in the society, was not considered necessary. It not only confused and agitated their ideological frame of mind, but also rendered them jobless. However, the regrouping of Al Qaeda, the resurgence of Afghan Taliban and the birth of local Taliban attracted a number of these elements from Pakistani religious jihadi organisations. Their training, temperament and experience made them very useful for Al Qaeda and TTP.

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Chapter 3 reviews the second and third phases, which include Indiansponsored terrorism in Pakistan and the spread of sectarianism and sectarian terrorism. On the one hand, India carried out bomb blasts in various cities of Pakistan in retaliation to the alleged involvement of Pakistani agencies in fomenting unrest in Indian-held Kashmir and East Punjab (Indian) where Sikh struggle for a separate homeland, Khalistan, had taken a serious turn. On the other hand, the sectarian violence also became too rampant and destructive. The Sunni sectarian party Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan (SSP – the Army of the Friends of the Prophet) and the Shi’a party Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP – the Army of the Prophet Muhammad) resorted to targeted killing of each other’s leaders and activists, as well as attacking the seminaries and mosques. In addition to these aspects of violence and militancy in Pakistan, this chapter discusses the diversionary sources of violence such as unrest in Balochistan, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)-related violence in Karachi and the spell of Indian-sponsored sabotage and terrorism, which were not directly linked with Islamist militancy, but exasperated the overall unruly situation. The main objective of this chapter is to provide an in-depth insight into the birth, growth and activities of terrorism in Pakistan, especially that of the TTP and its impact on the country. Chapter 4 addresses the rise of militancy after 2001. It narrates the factors that contributed to spurring the insurgency and terrorism in a new form. Furthermore, it discusses the role of Al Qaeda in Pakistan as well as the Afghan Taliban and the nature of both their activities and nexus. It can be seen that after the 2001 US attack on Al Qaeda’s hosts and hideouts in Afghanistan, its leaders and activists migrated to Pakistan, which gave birth to the TTP. Al Qaeda militants sneaked into Pakistan through the porous Pak-Afghan border and sheltered in its tribal areas (Khan, 2011). The US raised a call that FATA had become ‘a key centre for planning and preparing operations to attack the US as well as its allies and friends’ (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2008). The main leaders of Al Qaeda settled in the remote areas of Waziristan with the help of local groups. However, under the pressure of Pakistan Army operations, a large number of Al Qaeda leaders and activists relocated to the urban areas of Pakistan. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies soon tracked and arrested them in urban centres, and therefore they had to flee to the safe haven of Waziristan. In Waziristan, the relentless US drone attacks

INTRODUCTION

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killed several of its members and dispersed others. Initially, the main objective of the current US strategy to defeat Al Qaeda remained unfulfilled (The Nation, 2009). However, after the deaths of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 and many other leaders, Al Qaeda’s strength depleted to a great extent. It was substantially besmirched and dispersed; however, it was not totally decimated. Its affiliates and allies were well entrenched and continued to wage their insurgencies and carry out terrorism across Pakistan. It had succeeded in establishing contacts with sectarian extremists like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and jihadist parties like Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). Chapter 5 focuses on the origin and growth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and concentrates on its form and nature, groups, activities and various dimensions that made it a daunting threat to the security and stability of Pakistan. Rarely, an insurgency in any part of the world aroused so much international concern as by the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in the tribal areas of Pakistan and elsewhere (Butt & Elahi, 2010). There were primarily three reasons for this concern. First, the US and the West had a fear that the Al Qaeda elements based in the Pak-Afghan border, lurking behind the TTP, were planning another 9/11-like attack on their interest. Secondly, their activities were detrimental to the operations of the US, NATO and international forces in Afghanistan, where they had been battling with the Afghan Taliban since 2001. Thirdly, internally, their terrorist activities were considered an existential threat to Pakistan (Dawn, 2009). These reasons generated genuine international consternation over the presence and activities of TTP and Al Qaeda in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The TTP originated from its bases in Waziristan, FATA, and its insurgents carried out activities in those areas. After the TTP’s formal creation in December 2007, it extended its terrorist activities in the main cities of Pakistan, including Peshawar (capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), Rawalpindi (twin city of Islamabad), Lahore (capital of Punjab province), Karachi (capital of Sindh province), Islamabad (the Capital) and Quetta (capital of Balochistan province). Bombings, suicide bombings, and gun and grenade attacks wreaked havoc from 2008 onwards. As a result, more than 65,000 civilians and 7,500 soldiers and security men perished until 2017. The TTP became well organised and employed all methods and sources, ranging from

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kidnapping for ransom to foreign funding, to raise finances to run the organisation and to implement its plans. It used all tools of publicity and communication to spread its terror and to propagate its ideology. In the beginning, it had claimed that it came into being as a reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan, but ultimately took upon itself to impose Sharia (Islamic system) in not only FATA but also throughout Pakistan. The TTP’s Swat chapter led by Maulvi Fazlullah was more volatile than its parent organisation as it extended its sway across Swat and brazenly challenged the writ of the government. It ruthlessly bombed schools and beheaded people. Ultimately, the army quelled them and moved them out of their strongholds. However, they could not be eliminated completely. The TTP’s influence in the province of Punjab led to the phenomenon of Punjabi Taliban, who did not have command and control structure like in FATA and Swat but were equally determined and dangerous. They attacked armed forces and their offices and bases. In this chapter, I have also scrutinised the socio-economic implications of the security situation to see how these terrorists were biting at the roots of the country. The persistent streak of terrorism jolted the government and the people. In addition to the great loss of lives, the economy of the country suffered badly as the foreign investment dwindled and exports diminished. Moreover, the social and psychological impact on the people and the government had been enormous. Fear and mistrust became predominant in society. Lifestyles changed, especially in the urban areas. Barricades and gated residential areas became a common feature in big cities. People remained confused and perplexed about the real identity of perpetrators. It was hard for them to believe that Pakistanis could be involved in such dreadful terrorist acts in their own country. They sought foreign involvement for coaxing or luring them to indulge in terrorism, as was usually told by the government. Nevertheless, a few horrific incidents of terrorism and highhandedness of the terrorists enraged people, which enabled the army to take effective action against the Swati TTP. It took many years for the people to become aware of their identity and develop deep dislike for them. The government was held responsible for not exposing the terrorists in an unequivocal manner. The religious parties, especially belonging to the Deobandi sect, like Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e Islam, despite knowing the culprits hardly ever condemned them for their

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brutal acts. But rather they had sympathy for them, which was palpable in their denial to condemn them. Chapter 6 describes the important stage of TTP-led terrorism from 2007 onwards when the suicide bombing peaked in various cities of Pakistan. Gun and grenade attacks and bomb blasts became common. All sort of targets, soft and hard, faced an unprecedented onslaught from terrorists. Markets were bombed, military installations were attacked, schools were targeted and several public places faced suicide attacks. It resulted in the deaths of more than 56,000 people until 2015. Chapter 7 explores the state response to insurgency and terrorism. In 2002, the Pakistan Army resorted to counter insurgency against the terrorist groups in Waziristan and FATA; however, the focus was on Al Qaeda. The TTP had yet to be created. The first army operation against the TTP was launched against the Swati TTP in 2009. It was a success as the area was cleared of these elements. However, its main leaders including its chief Maulvi Fazlullah managed to escape. Shortly afterwards an operation was initiated against the TTP in South Waziristan. It continued until 2012 with mixed results. Many moved to North Waziristan and started operating from there. Despite the US pressure, the Pakistan Army was reluctant to open another front in a very treacherous terrain. As a result, the militants spread and carried out terrorism throughout Pakistan, which could not be controlled by the government. The disjointed, halfhearted and lackadaisical approach of Pakistan to counter these elements was evident from the fact that it could not control or annihilate the TTP although it was not great in number when compared to the Pakistan armed forces and security agencies. It was equipped with small arms and lived a medieval lifestyle in a remote corner of Pakistan, which is 1/20th of the size of the country, without access to air power or artillery. It lacked the numerical and military strength to defeat the Pakistani security forces in order to extend its writ to other areas of Pakistan outside their territories. Yet it operated persistently, engaging the army in an asymmetrical guerrilla war and became a real threat to the country. Unfortunately, Pakistan did not formulate a national counter terrorism strategy. All provinces and departments acted in a disjointed and erratic manner, which was ineffective to control the outrageous situation. The role of security and intelligence agencies remained much below the par. Laws and courts were not prepared to handle terrorism cases. Above all, political will seemed absent. The army monopolised the

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situation, whereas the civil government was marginalised, which found it convenient to acquiesce to it. The Pak– US relations in the fight against terrorism remained fraught with mistrust. This sad state of affairs resulted in the difference of approaches and strategies to counter the TTP and Al Qaeda. Doubtlessly, these groups posed real danger to Pakistan and the world at large, and they could not be neutralised due to the lack of proper planned and sustained strategies. It needs to be understood that the combination of TTP and Al Qaeda was lethal and attracted worldwide attention. If Al Qaeda was not involved, the TTP and its activities, howsoever devastating within Pakistan, would not have bothered the US and the West. Moreover, if it had not been for the TTP, Pakistan would not have considered Al Qaeda a threat to Pakistan, at least in a direct manner. Chapter 8 reviews the irritants and impediments that accelerated terrorism further. They undermined the strategies and policies against terrorism. The drone effects, the flared up Pashtun sentiments, myths and conspiracy theories – genuine, manufactured or invented – steadily increased. It helped the terrorists to spread their activities and gain ground. Chapter 9 explains that insurgency and terrorism were flourishing in widespread religious extremism, which had undermined the economy, serenity and stability of Pakistan. People were fearful and the world was viewing Pakistan with suspicion, resulting in international isolation of the country. Ironically, the state response to handle the situation was lackadaisical. This situation was a serious threat to the stability of Pakistan. These elements operating jointly could be termed an existential threat to Pakistan. This finding gave birth to the existential threat theory, which has been elaborated in this chapter. Chapter 10 explores the avenues and prospects of the early demise or dismemberment of the TTP. Some analysts thought that the TTP would miserably fail after the US forces withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others gloated prematurely over splintering of the TTP considering it the beginning of its end. Both scenarios seemed too imaginary and unrealistic. This approach of wishful reliance on the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and waiting for Allah to set things right for Pakistan might not suffice. It has been posited that the TTP and terrorism may not come to an end very soon due to several reasons. The resilience of terrorists and the lethargy of the state is an ideal recipe to perpetuate the palpable presence

INTRODUCTION

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and atrocious activities of terrorists in Pakistan. Moreover, all indicators confirm a constant upward trend in religious extremism and radicalisation. The state will have to tackle this menace with all its might, sincerity and seriousness. Otherwise, this menace will cause serious and irreparable damage to every sector of the country. Taliban- and Al Qaeda-related security concerns have led a lot of academics and experts to explore various avenues and aspects of the subject. Some of these studies have explained the genesis and metamorphism of Taliban from madrasah (religious seminary) students to a full-fledged force to reckon with in Afghanistan, while others have focused on Al Qaeda. The studies on Al Qaeda have delved into the mysteries and genesis of this global phenomenon and its metastasis into much localised cells in different countries, drawing identity from a single transnational ideology that made it a mercurial entity. However, researchers and academics have not conducted any serious and comprehensive work on terrorist outfits in Pakistan, especially the TTP, which is the most formidable of all. The impact of the TTP’s activities is not only countrywide, but also regionwide and even felt internationally. Despite this worrisome existence and growth of the TTP, there is a huge knowledge gap in understanding this phenomenon. The study of the Pakistani Taliban is a very fast-moving and contemporary subject with inconclusive published data, mainly relying on news items, articles and interviews. Nevertheless, the literature published in leading journals about terrorism and jihadists in Pakistan and other related issues was also extensively analysed. A number of interviews and surveys were conducted, which gave good insights into the phenomenon that posed critical threats to the stability of Pakistan. In recent years, ever since it had taken refuge in Afghanistan after its dislocation from Waziristan, the TTP became a graver danger for Pakistan as it organised terrorist attacks through its remnants and recruits in Pakistan with impunity. Its growing proximity with the so-called Islamic State terrorist group became a palpable threat to the region and beyond.

CHAPTER 1 THE BACKGROUND TO MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN BEFORE 2001

THE GENESIS Muslim struggles always adopt a religious hue. Evidently, in all wars and conquests, they display Islamic symbols, raise Islamic war slogans (Allah-o-Akbar, God is Great) and fight with religious zeal that emanated from the concept of Jihad and shahadat (martyrdom). Whether it be Tariq bin Ziad who conquered Spain (AD 711), Muhammad bin Qasim who defeated Raja Dahir to conquer Sindh (AD 712) or Mahmud Ghaznavi who launched 17 successful attacks on India (1001–26), their campaigns have shown palpable religious motivation or tint. In fact, whether for independence or an invasion either for the sake of invading or for their constitutional rights, every struggle of Muslims throughout the world has invariably taken a religious turn (Haqqani, 2005). In 1947– 8, Akbar Khan, the commander of the Pakistan Army involved in the Kashmir military operation, adopted the nom de guerre of Tariq after the Muslim conqueror of Spain, Tariq Bin Ziyad. It is no wonder that the tribesmen who aided this operation were full of the notion of jihad. Another historically proven peculiar phenomenon is that whenever Muslims are repressed, movements for Islamic revival take place. For the past 250 years, the Muslim world has been subjected to invasion and conquest by foreign powers, creating an inevitable anti-colonial

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backlash, some (albeit not all) of which has taken Islamist form. Religious elements have come to the fore with a force to find solutions within the teachings of Islam. This phenomenon has been witnessed in the Caucasus, Algeria and the Indian sub-continent. Russians conquered Chechnya in May 1859. Since then, Russia has tried to suppress Islam there. These attempts have always earned a strong backlash. In the nineteenth century, Dagestan and Chechnya were groaning under the Russian domination until Imam Shamil, a Muslim political, military and religious leader, unleashed a freedom struggle. He considered the endless feuds among the Caucasian clans that resulted from the tribal system and strived to replace it with Sharia or Muslim law. The peoples of both Dagestan and Chechnya revered him as their Imam (a divinely inspired religious leader). Many other Muslim figures, such as sheikhs, imams and qadis, led the national liberation movements in different parts of the region. The Sufi movement in north-eastern Caucasus, historically better known as Muridism, was the Russian Empire’s nemesis. Therefore, it was not surprising that after the war, Russian authorities set out to destroy the base of Sufi teachings in the region. Sheikhs were exiled under the Tsars, while under the Bolsheviks, they were shot. Sufism, which has become the way of life for the Chechens for the past 150 years, went underground under the pressure of the Bolsheviks’ militant atheism when they came to power. This made it possible for Sufis in Chechnya and Dagestan to preserve the practices they followed during the nineteenth-century Russian –Caucasian war. This included, for example, paying extreme veneration to the tombstones of sheikhs who were killed during the war and considered Shaheeds (martyrs) (Blank, 2012). In the Indian sub-continent, this trend started in the eighteenth century when call for jihad was made after the East India Company won the Battle of Plassey in 1757, and some quarters of Muslims strongly felt that the British were bent upon wresting the power from Muslim rulers (Aziz, 2011). Shah Waliullah (1703– 62), a Muslim reformist, advocated armed jihad to restore Muslim power in South Asia (Lieven, 2011). One important instance was that the family of Shah Waliullah, in association with other ulema, despatched 800 warriors from eastern India to the Pashtun belt to organise jihad, first against the Sikhs and later against the British who replaced the former as rulers in 1849 (Aziz, 2011).

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Actual jihad was unleashed by Syed Ahmed Shaheed Barelvi from Patna (India) in 1826. Syed Ahmed and Syed Ismail established their government in Charsadda (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and the number of their followers swelled to 100,000. However, ultimately, they had to face tough resistance from Sikhs and some local tribes and, ultimately, both died in a battle with Sikhs on 6 May 1831 (Qazi, 2011). It should be pointed out that Malakand and surrounding areas, which was the hub of Fazlullah-led terrorism in quest for the Islamic system in 2008– 9, were the same area where Syed Ahmed had carried out his Jihad. As Lieven (2011) writes, ‘He (Syed Ahmed Barelvi) is remembered by jihadi Islamists in the region as the greatest progenitor of their tradition.’ Although the British considered these repeated revolts as restricted to Pathan areas, without seriously fearing its spill over to other areas of the Indian empire (Lieven, 2011), they were wary of these experiences. Therefore, they believed that the Muslim leadership of India converted a sepoy mutiny into a war of independence in 1857 (Metcalf, 1965). Nevertheless, they treated the Muslims ruthlessly, especially the ruling elite (Singh, 2009). According to Mahmood (2000): As far back as 1842, Lord Ellenborough had written to the Duke of Wellington that the Muslims were fundamentally hostile towards the British and that their enmity towards the government was an established fact. But the collapse of the “war of Independence” in 1857, with its storm centres in the Muslim areas of Delhi and Oudh, further darkened the Muslims’ prospects. These circumstances led to the birth of Islamic reformist movements. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a Muslim thinker, writer, educationist and reformist, asserted that Muslims were a separate nation and started the struggle for their educational uplift. Although his tone was reconciliatory and reformist, which urged the Muslims to befriend the British, he laid emphasis on the separate identity of the Muslims of India. He was a religious but pragmatic visionary. Lieven (2011) describes him and his approach quite befittingly: Although himself a deeply religious man, Sir Syed advocated the need for Indian Muslims to collaborate with the British, and to learn the ways of Western modernity in order to develop as a

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people and compete successfully with the ascendant Hindus. Sir Syed founded what he intended to be ‘the Muslim Cambridge’, the Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College, at Aligarh- another of key Muslim institutions now left behind in India. In Bengal, Dadu Mian and Titumir launched the peasant struggle known as ‘Faraizi Movement’. The most religiously motivated movements were ‘Deobandi’ (1867) and ‘Barelvi’ (1883) schools of thought, which emerged for reviving the Islamic spirit in the defeated and dejected Muslims and are still the most popular sects of Indian and Pakistani Muslims. The comments of Lewis (2002) reinforce the theory of Muslims clinging to Islam for all struggles: Other Muslims in other parts of the world have their own local grievances, wherever the forces of Islam and unbelief meet and clash. Sometimes other issues, including ethnic, territorial, social and economic are involved, but religion is always a major, often the major element in defining the struggle. The best-known examples, going round the frontiers of Islam, are Bosnia and Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sinkiang, the southern Philippines, Timor, Palestine, Sudan, and a number of places in West Africa. Therefore, the history of Indian Muslims showed that howsoever moderate they were, they clung to their faith whenever they were pushed to the wall. In struggle and resistance, they gained strength from their religious beliefs. The religious scholars and leaders led the resistance movements. However, the fact remains that the followers of religious extremists were always in minority. Interestingly, a large majority of Muslims of India, despite being religious, never approved theocracy or mullahcracy. The confidence reposed in a modern leader like Muhammad Ali Jinnah rather than religious leaders spoke volumes of the mindset of the Muslims of India who strived for an independent homeland. Their aim was to eliminate Hindu hegemony that could hamper the growth and freedom of the Muslims of India. Although religious zeal was prominent during these testing times, the Muslims did not follow any Mullah or religious leader for this purpose. To date, religious parties have failed to woo a decent majority in their favour. In Pakistan, except for the stage-managed

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elections held under the dictatorial rule of General Pervez Musharraf in 2002, the religious parties never bagged more than 2– 3 per cent of the votes in general elections. It is a misconception that ‘Pakistan, created to safeguard the identity of a religion, is the realisation of a fundamentalist imagination’ (Siddiqui, 2009). The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader), who earlier advocated Muslim–Hindu unity, realised in the 1940s that Muslims could not survive politically and thrive economically in Hindu-dominated India after independence from the British rule. Therefore, it was the need envisioned by him and endorsed by the followers to safeguard the political and economic survival and well-being of the Muslims of India as a separate nation that necessitated the creation of Pakistan. It was not created because Islam was in danger of obliteration. ‘Jinnah did not want to create just another state; after all, even in his day there were many Muslim states. His dream was a grand one: what he wanted was nothing less than one of the greatest nations in the world’. The perception of ‘Islam in danger’ was popular among a large majority of Muslims, which was created due to historical reasons. As Lieven (2011) states: Underpinning intellectual and political responses by Muslim elites has been a diffuse but widespread sense among the Muslim masses of ‘Islam in danger’. This sense of endangered Islam has long been fuelled not only by local or even regional events but by developments in the wider Muslim world (for example, in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the face of attack from Christian powers). However, the leader was clear about the rationale of Pakistan’s creation (Haqqani, 2005). Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 clearly stated his ‘fundamental principle’ to run the state on the following basis: We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of the state. You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any

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religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense, as citizens of the State. However, it does not mean that Islam has no connection with the struggle for the creation of Pakistan. One has to understand the subtlety, explained above, that Islam and Muslims are so closely related that they are not two separate entities. If Muslims of an area face threat that could cause their defeat or annihilation, they derive succour from the strength of Islam, and if Islam faces a threat, Muslims rise to resist it tooth and nail. Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the philosopher poet, explained this phenomenon in the context of the Muslims of India in his letter written to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 28 May 1937 (Qureshi, 2011). The following is an excerpt from the letter: The Muslim has begun to believe that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League’s activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure that Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at last the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still

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believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. One can raise a question that Muhammad Ali Jinnah might not have agreed with the suggestions and views of Iqbal. In fact, Muhammad Ali Jinnah while paying tribute to Iqbal on his death stated that ‘If I am given a chance to choose between the work of Iqbal and a future Islamic state, I will choose Iqbal’s work.’ When the correspondence from Iqbal to Jinnah was published in book form in 1942, Jinnah wrote the foreword, in which he said: I think these letters are of very great historical importance, particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India. His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusion as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India and found expression in due course in the united will of the Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore resolution of the All India Muslim League, popularly known as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’ passed on March 23, 1940 (Dawn, 2011). Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a pragmatic leader who knew that Pakistan was going to be the homeland of millions of Muslims who would expect the introduction of Islamic rules to regulate their lives and systems. In fact, it happened as Pakistan became the first country created as a homeland for Muslims. Therefore, early in its campaign, Jinnah let the religious elements in the Muslim League make use of religious sentiments and emotions during the struggle for the creation of Pakistan (Riedel, 2013). The popular slogans chanted during the struggle, ‘Muslim hai to Muslim League mein aa’ (If you are a Muslim, join Muslim League) and ‘Pakistan ka Matlab Kya- La Ilaha Illallah’ (What is the meaning of Pakistan – There is no God but Allah), energised the majority of Muslims to favour Pakistan with religious fervour. The slogan ‘Pakistan ka matlab kya-La Ilaha Illallah’ was raised

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in the public gatherings of the Muslim League at Lucknow. It became popular although it was not the part of any party’s manifesto or any resolution (Qazi, 2009). His letter to Pir of Manki Sharif further confirmed Jinnah’s consonance with Iqbal’s views in November 1945 to allay his apprehensions with regard to the role of religion in Pakistan: It is needless to emphasize that the constituent assembly which would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the un-Islamic laws. However, it is clear that Jinnah did not want a theocratic state run by mullahs. In a broadcast to the people of the US recorded in February 1948, Jinnah made his point clear: In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many nonMuslims – Hindus, Christians and Parsees – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan. Conversely, the politics of religious identity was exploited by different quarters, with religious elements at the forefront, who started playing with the passions of faith (Ali, 2010). The spirit of ‘fundamental principle’ of Jinnah started petering out immediately after his death. Inclusion of ‘Objective resolution’ in the Constitution of Pakistan was considered the first major act in this direction. Although this resolution stopped short of advocating outright theocracy, it was not in consonance with Jinnah’s vision (Annexure of Objective Resolution). General Muhammad Ayub Khan, despite his modern outlook and anti-theocratic approach, could not keep the religious parties out of power for long, as some in his regime cooperated with the Islamists, particularly with the Jamaat-e-Islami, to get the support of the Arab countries over the Kashmir issue. He had deleted ‘Islamic’ from

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Pakistan’s official name in the initial version of the 1962 Constitution and had instead used ‘Republic of Pakistan’, but after pressure from the religious parties, the official name ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ was restored. Ayub Khan also used the religious parties when he contested the presidential election in 1965. The opposition parties had nominated Fatima Jinnah, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s sister, as their joint candidate to run against Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan launched a campaign against her, and religious elements were used to issue a fatwa (religious edict) that a woman was not allowed to rule in Islam. However, some religious scholars like Maududi were not part of this campaign (Haqqani, 2010: 44). Even a modern and so-called secular democratic leader like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could not maintain the spirit of Jinnah’s vision and succumbed to the pressure of religious coterie for political advantages. Nevertheless, it was he who first formally moved towards making Pakistan an Islamic state, although he did this for political reasons to appeal to the Islamists. He banned the sale and use of liquor, prohibited gambling and closed down nightclubs (Hussain, 2007). When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto parted ways with his mentor General Ayub Khan, president of Pakistan, he formed the Pakistan Peoples Party and started gaining popularity, thriving on socialist slogans. The antiBhutto forces adopted the strategy to relying on Islamic slogans and rhetoric to keep their existence and popularity intact. Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan, who was the information minister during General Yahya Khan’s martial law, coined the term ‘Nazria-e-Pakistan’ (ideology of Pakistan; Nizami, 2010), which became popular and is still considered as if it were coined before the creation of Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq, taking advantage of the hype created by the Islamists who were encouraged by the decisions taken by Bhutto, overthrew the democratic government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and relied on the religion and the religious parties to legitimise and perpetuate his rule. ‘There was a complete convergence of interests between the Islamists and the military leadership which had ousted the Bhutto government’ (Hussain, 2007). In return, these religious parties, seeking similar foothold in the society, propagated that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and it was an ideological state. In this process, the original history, concepts and visions were muddled and muted. An interesting episode of those days paints the situation quite

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aptly. The lounge suit worn by the Quaid in his portrait hanging in the National Assembly was painted into an ‘achkan’ (Pakistan’s National dress) to give it a nationalist look. As Z.A. Sulehri, the Editor of Pakistan Times and staunch nationalist, commented, ‘Paint the Quaid as he is’ (Nizami, 2010). Thus, this marriage of convenience between the political forces and the rhetoric of Islam as the basis of the creation of Pakistan laid the foundations for the beginning of Islamic extremism and radicalisation in Pakistan. The military dictator General Musharraf was the other ruler of Pakistan from 1999 to 2008, who posed a secular face but relied on religious elements and Islamic rhetoric to strengthen his rule. Islamic extremism and subsequently terrorism bloomed and transformed into full-fledged terrorism in the eras of military dictatorships of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977– 89) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008). Both grabbed the opportunities arising from the crises in Afghanistan and secured US support to rule with impunity and keep democracy at bay in return to help the US achieve its objectives to contain communism in 1979 and bridle Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001 in Afghanistan, respectively. The former created Mujahedeen with the money provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the latter fiddled with Taliban, Al Qaeda and home-grown Taliban until they became uncontrollable and an existential threat to Pakistan and a grave danger to the world. During General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, Pakistan’s headlong involvement in Afghanistan gave the Islamic extremists a rallying point and a training field. A large number of Muslim zealots from around the world were attracted to participate in the jihad against the infidel invader. According to a report, 35,000 holy warriors joined the Afghan war from 1979 to 1989 (Rashid, 1999). They could not remain restricted only to that border. Axiomatically, when jihad was at its peak in Afghanistan, Kashmir could not remain ignored. It has been the bone of contention and a powder keg since the partition of the sub-continent. Pakistan and India had already fought three wars mainly due to the Kashmir dispute. Both the countries claimed it. Pakistan considered Kashmir as its ‘jugular vein’, and India regarded it as its ‘inseparable part’. A brief background of this dispute can shed light on the seriousness of its genesis.

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The state of Jammu and Kashmir had more than 500 princely states in the sub-continent under British rule, inhabited by two distinct communities, Muslims and Hindus. The Muslims were the overwhelming majority (80 per cent), especially in the Vale of Kashmir. In 1846, the Hindu Dogra Gulab Singh purchased the Vale of Kashmir from the East India Company (Lamb, 1994). Although these two communities generally lived together in harmony, the ‘ethnocommunal divisions were present from a very early stage’. The dispute erupted in August 1947 at the time of partition of the sub-continent into two independent states, Pakistan and India. According to the partition plan, the princely states had to join either India or Pakistan on the basis of the religious majority and contiguity to one or the other country. However, the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, having profound emotional involvement with Kashmir which was his ancestral land, ‘was determined to block the application in any shape or form to his beloved Kashmir of those principles which had brought Pakistan into being’ (Malik, 2002). Before the decision of Kashmir’s accession could be made in accordance with the wishes of its people, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir arbitrarily signed the instrument for accession with India and the Indian forces forcibly accessed it to India on 27 October 1947 (Lamb, 1994). The people of Kashmir revolted against this arbitrary accession, calling for self-determination. This led to the Indo-Pakistan war to start in 1948. The UN secured a ceasefire and through a resolution called for plebiscite to determine the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Contrary to its commitment, India refused to abide by the UN resolutions (Khan, 2001), thereby resulting in a serious conflict. During 1989– 96, trained intruders were despatched from Pakistan to reinforce the indigenous struggle of Kashmiris against the Indian forces in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) (Naji, 2011). About a quarter argued that this intrusion was a disservice to the indigenous uprising as their guerrilla activities caused a new wave of violence in IHK. However, it experienced a brutal response from Indian forces. A chain reaction ensued. The militant jihadi organisations grew rapidly and established their training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir called Azad Kashmir (liberated Kashmir) by Pakistan. Jihad became a buzzword on this eastern side of Pakistan after raging hard for 10 years across its western borders in Afghanistan.

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In conclusion, it can be summarised that Pakistan was not created to be a violent and religiously bigoted country. The founder of Pakistan envisioned it to be a liberal Muslim country without religious or political bias. Some situations, mainly the CIA-sponsored Afghan war, made it into the quagmire of religious extremism. ‘Religion has been deployed cynically and instrumentally for political ends, not only by the politico-religious elements, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) or Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI), but also by liberal-secular rulers of both civil and military regimes’ (Bennett, 2009). Moreover, the policy of using proxies for Kashmir and Afghanistan initiated religious extremism, and military rulers were mainly responsible for this fiasco. This chapter gives a vivid picture of the constant religious extremism throughout Pakistan, both before and after independence. Except for the vision of Quaid-e-Azam, there has been an ever-increasing influence of religious elements on the policies, practices and laws of the country, which resulted in the subsequent phases of religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 2 FOUR PHASES OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

The current security situation in Pakistan is mainly attributed to its more than a decade-long support to anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and then to the Taliban regime. Pakistan provided not only CIA-backed financial support but also Pakistani manpower to Afghan Mujahedeen. Thousands of Pakistanis participated in the Afghan jihad. Many jihadi and religious parties and a large number of madrasahs grew rapidly as a result. It became a common culture and most Pakistanis believed that the militant struggle in Afghanistan was a legitimate activity and furthermore, they were made to believe that it was their religious and moral duty to support Afghan Mujahedeen or at least be sympathetic towards them. After the Soviet – Afghan War, Pakistanis returned home with the aim of bringing about a change in Pakistan too. An adverse aftermath was the spread of lethal illegal weapons like the Russian-made Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47) throughout Pakistan. It was termed the Kalashnikov culture, which facilitated organised crimes and armed groups to operate with might. The Pakistanis who fought or supported the war and conflicts at the behest of several states and their own government were left in the lurch and unguided and post-operation care was non-existent. Psychological and physical rehabilitation of trained and battle-hardened fighters to refit them in the society was considered needless. The sympathisers and facilitators

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of these fighters were spread all over Pakistan. Until 2000, they kept flourishing and remained relevant in one way or the other. Their situation completely changed when the government of Pakistan took an opposite stand on Afghan policy after the 9/11 attack on New York. The ideology of jihad, which was in vogue for more than two decades, was considered secondary. This abrupt change in policy not only stirred their ideological frame of mind but also rendered them jobless. However, the regrouping of Al Qaeda, the resurgence of Afghan Taliban and the birth of local Taliban attracted a number of these former fighters. Their training, temperament and experience made them useful for these organisations, thereby ushering in a new and more lethal phase of extremism and terrorism. Jihadi leaders were agitated over Musharraf’s signing of the Islamabad Agreement (with the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2004) to ‘fight together against terrorism’ because they viewed it as a perfidy on the part of the country’s military leadership. Top jihadi leaders did not like the reducing of the Kashmiri militants to mere spectators by the Pakistani establishment under the US pressure. Many estranged jihadists joined hands with the terrorists to attack the army and law enforcement agencies (Amir Rana). Religious extremism, sectarianism and terrorism in Pakistan can be roughly divided into four phases, culminating in the current situation: 1. 2. 3. 4.

formation of jihadi parties and jihad culture by Afghan jihad; Indian-sponsored terrorism and sabotage in the 1980s; eruption of sectarian terrorism in the early 1990s; the rise of militancy after 2001 (Al Qaeda, TTP, etc.).

FIRST PHASE The mother of all phases and faces of religious extremism and later on insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan can be attributed to the Afghan jihad that gave birth to jihadi parties and jihadi culture during and after the Afghan jihad. A number of religious and jihadi parties were formed, which recruited and despatched thousands of Pakistanis to Afghanistan. The rapid growth of jihadi, religious and sectarian parties gradually changed the sectarian and political landscape of Pakistan.

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These parties grew stronger day by day, opened their centres and madrasahs, exerted to propel their sectarian viewpoint, influenced the successive governments and even challenged the system and the constitution. There were only 30 religious parties in Pakistan that belonged to Deobandi (7), Barelvi (5), Ahl-e-Hadith (4) and Shi’a (3) parties in 1979, which increased to 237 in 2010. A few prominent jihadi organisations, many of whose members turned into militants and extremists supporting Taliban, TTP and Al Qaeda, were Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).

HARKAT-UL-JIHAD-AL-ISLAMI (HuJI) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, commonly known as HuJI, was a Pakistanbased militant organisation. In 1980, it was floated as Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen (the Party of the Friends of Afghan People). It was one of the first organisations created to fight the soviets in Afghanistan. Later, the group changed its name and turned its focus towards India in Kashmir after the Jihad with the Soviets was over in the late 1980s. The group expanded its operational area from the Kashmir theatre to regional states. It was also believed that HuJI operated in regional states like Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Sinkiang, China and even Bangladesh (Rana, 2009). After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent ousting of the Taliban, HuJI shifted its base from Afghanistan and many of its leaders sneaked into Pakistan and settled in the South Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Many of its activists also made their way to the north in the central Asian region to escape killing or capture by the US or Northern Alliance forces. However, a majority of the activists preferred to settle in FATA. Qari Saifullah Akhtar was one of the few Jihadi leaders from Pakistan who escaped with Taliban Ameer Mullah Omar from the forays of USled allied forces in October 2001. He first took shelter in South Waziristan, then moved to Peshawar and eventually fled to Saudi Arabia, from where he decided to move to the UAE (Mir, 2008). He was later arrested in the UAE and handed over to Pakistani authorities in 2004. He was detained by the security forces on the charges of anti-state activities inside and outside Pakistan. He was released in September 2007 but was again arrested in February 2008 after Benazir Bhutto,

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through her posthumous book Reconciliation, accused him of plotting an attack on her and her supporters in Karachi in October 2007 that killed more than 130 people. Akhtar was subsequently detained, but no formal charges were brought, and he was released after some months (Walsh, 2012). The investigating officer on the case, Nawaz Ranjha, reported to the court that no evidence had been found of the involvement of Qari Saifullah in any terrorist activity and therefore a charge sheet could not be filed against him. He was released on bail but was rearrested under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) and taken to a Karachi safe house. However, after five days, on 8 June 2008, Qari Saifullah was released by the Sindh Home Department, stating that the term for his detention had expired (Mir, 2008). Interestingly, he was also a student of Banuri Mosque in Karachi like Maulana Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). Qari Saifullah Akhtar was instrumental in the efforts of Mufti Shamzai to establish coordination between Taliban head Mullah Mohammad Omar and Osama bin Laden in their so-called Jihad. He, however, became famous after his involvement in a high-profile conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the government of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto (late) in 1995 by some army officers led by Major General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi, but all of them were arrested. He managed to secure his release by becoming state-witness. Then, he went to Afghanistan and became an important part of Taliban government. Soon, he became the advisor of Taliban Ameer Mullah Mohammad Omar. Interestingly, although he remained part of Taliban government’s administration, he continued to head his own organisation independent of Taliban and had the membership even from the Taliban ranks. However, the majority of fighters for his organisation were from Punjabi Taliban who were paid for their services, which was a unique characteristic of the organisation that made it different from other militant groups. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami had a very strong and cohesive organisational structure similar to that of other Jihadi organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen. However, as mentioned earlier, the presence of the group in certain other countries made the organisation wider and much larger. The group had its offices in Afghanistan, Kabul and Kandahar until the US attack that overthrew the Taliban government. Later on, the group shifted its offices to the tribal areas of Pakistan.

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HuJI had a separate branch for its operation in Indian-held Kashmir, which was semi-autonomous but ultimately came under the central management. Its other important departments were Dawat-o-Irshad (propagation), military and training camps, finance, organisation, broadcast/media and publication. When HuJI joined hands with Afghan Mujahedeen in the struggle against the Soviet forces, financial support was provided by sympathisers throughout Pakistan, including various affluent individuals, private sector entities, NGOs, Pakistan government and peer organisations. For example, the Pakistani Punjabi business community heavily funded HuJI missions primarily during its founding in 1980 (Centre for Defence Information, 2004). HuJI allegedly received funding from international Islamic NGOs and madrasahs operating in Pakistan (The Investigative Project on Terrorism, 2005). Later, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden also directly supported the organisation (The New York Times, 2011). The main goal of the group was to support the Kashmiri freedom fighters to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation. They were willing to use the military means to fulfill these objectives and to implement their ideology. According to various sources, HuJI had close relationships with Al Qaeda and both shared some training camps. This relationship developed due to HuJI’s closeness with Afghan Taliban and its long presence in Afghanistan. According to some reports, HuJI facilitated Al Qaeda as its support network inside Pakistan, specifically to convey messages, instructions and funds. Some evidence indicated that HuJI operatives might have helped in hiding or transporting bin Laden in Pakistan (The New York Times, 2011). Ilyas Kashmiri, the operational commander of HuJI, who was killed in the drone attack, also served as Al Qaeda’s military commander and was a senior leader in its external operations council (The Long War Journal, 2011). HuJI was declared a foreign terrorist organisation by the US Department of State in March 2008 (US State Department, 2008) which froze all of its financial assets and accounts (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2012). Since then, HuJI’s operations reduced in Pakistan when compared to the pre-2003 era. Its involvement in supporting the freedom fighters in Indian-held Kashmir also came to an end. The likely involvement of its

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activists inside Pakistan by supporting Al Qaeda and TTP was a major concern for the country. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) (the Army of Prophet Muhammad), a Sunni Deobandi jihadi organisation, was launched by Maulana Masood Azhar in February 2000. Its main objective was to support Kashmiris in their struggle against the Indian security forces in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). It was considered one of the most dangerous India-centric terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested in IHK in February 1994, but he was released from an Indian jail in exchange for hostages on board an Indian Airline plane, Flight IC 184, which was hijacked by five armed Kashmiri militants and taken to Kandahar (Afghanistan) in December 1999 (Mir, 2009). After a seven-day showdown on a Kandahar airfield, approximately 150 passengers were released when the Indian government finally agreed to release Masood Azhar and two other militants.1 In fact, it was Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM) that organised this hijacking for the release of Maulana Masood Azhar who was affiliated with it. However, soon after his release, Maulana Masood Azhar developed financial and ideological differences with HuM and split from it. One of the reasons for this split was the sectarian outlook of Masood Azhar which was not liked by the HuM chief Fazlur Rahaman Khalil. According to reports, JeM’s activists carried out a series of attacks in Indian-held Kashmir between 2000 and 2003. It was blamed for attacking the Parliament of India in 2001 in collusion with Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT). JeM was banned in 2002. It split into two organisations, namely Tehreek-e-Khuddam-ul-Islam (TKI) and Tehreek ul-Furqaan (TF), headed by Masood Azhar and Abdul Jabbar, respectively. The government of Pakistan in November 2003 also proscribed TKI and JUF. As General Musharraf was the President of Pakistan at that time, the JeM militants tried to assassinate Musharraf in December 2003 and again in January 2004. In January 2005, the police traced a network of 19 suspects involved in the 30 July 2004 suicide attack on the Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz in Fateh Jang, Attock, and arrested three brothers belonging to the proscribed JeM and Jamaat ul-Furqan outfits (Daily Times, 2004). After this ban, Maulana Masood Azhar started his operation under the name Al-Rahmat Trust (ART). ART was founded in 2001 and was once managed by Masood Azhar’s father, Allah Baksh Shabbir, as an educational

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and religious charity. It started publishing its magazines Al-Qalam and Muslim Ummah openly,2 which were available both online and on newsstands. These publications made appeals for donations for causes like building mosques or providing relief during natural calamities. ART claimed to have taken up the responsibility of monthly funding for approximately 850 homes of the martyrs and the comrades imprisoned in India and other countries. According to ART’s online magazine Al-Qalam, the group had built 13 mosques and 24 more were under construction until 2010. The group also called on people to donate for social services, support the households of martyrs and mujahedeen, sponsor Islamic preaching and struggle for the release of Muslim captives, among other causes. ART was sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury on 4 November 2010 as a front organisation for JeM, which was declared as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US Department of State in 2001 and 2008. Both JeM and ART maintained discreet relationships with Al Qaeda, by providing manpower to help Al Qaeda in urban centres.3 It also had links with Rashid Rauf (the transatlantic airline bomb plot) and Sheikh Ahmed Omar (the Daniel Pearl case). In 2009, five American youths who were trying to join either JeM or LeT were detained in the Sargodha district of Punjab Province (Dawn, 2009). Masood Azhar’s speeches and Friday sermons were often related to topics such as atrocities perpetrated against Muslims in the West and India. Known for giving fiery anti-Western and anti-Indian tirades in the style of Jama’at ud-Da’wah Amir Hafiz Saeed, Masood Azhar and his Al-Rahamat Trust worked hard to revive Pakistan’s madrasahs as places to recruit and indoctrinate a new generation of Islamic militants. JeM was one of several jihadi organisations that formed the Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC) in Pakistan in order to battle Indian troops in Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar was born in Bahawalpur, Punjab, in 1968 in a religious family. He joined a famous Madrasah Jamia Binoria in Karachi, where he studied from 1980 to 1989. He taught in the same institution for the next two years (Hussain, 2007). The madrasah was a well-known institution due to its historical role in the Deobandi Movement and produced radical Islamists who later became part of Afghan jihad against the soviet forces. Azhar became part of young fighters from his madrasah who were travelling to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces in

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the 1980s. He then became a member of Harkat-ul Mujahideen in Khost province of Afghanistan. He soon became a reckoning person in the ranks of the groups mainly because of his hardline approach and fierce speeches. It is believed that during his association with HuM, he came into contact with the Al Qaeda leadership, including its chief Osama bin Laden. The chiefs of three different schools of thought who supported the creation of JeM were Mufti Nizamuddin Shamizai of Majlis-e-Tawana-eIslami, Moulana Mufti Rasheem Ahmad of Darulifta-Wal-Irshad and Maulana Sher Ali of Sheikh ul Hadith Dar ul Haqqania. In a short period, JeM developed good relationships with other militant organisations operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan, including Al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Before the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and subsequent closure of its training camps in Afghanistan, it used to train its activists in camps inside Afghanistan under the patronage of Afghan Taliban (Hussain, 2007). During this period, these activists came into direct contact with Al Qaeda, resulting in some sort of relationship, although the nature of these relationships was not known. There was a well-established and publically known relationship between the JeM and the Taliban. In addition, the official newspaper of JeM called Zarb-eMomin was at the forefront of propaganda for Taliban in Afghanistan. Zarb-e-Momin was initially published by the Al-Rashid Trust, a social welfare organisation that works as a front for militant propaganda and then as a source of funding for the group. The funding from the trust was the chief source of funding for the militant group that helped it expand its activities even beyond the border into Afghanistan. The ban on the group did not affect the publishing of the newspaper. Furthermore, JeM had a strong relationship with another proscribed sectarian organisation called Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). This close relationship was mainly due to the close links between the heads of two groups, for instance, Maulana Masood Azhar and Maulana Azam Tariq from JeM and SSP, respectively (Rana, 2009). The intimate relationship was evident from a demonstration by JeM, in which Maulana Azam Tariq not only participated but also provided fighters to JeM in its holy war against India on 5 February 2000. Both the organisations had almost the same recruitment base; for instance, madrasahs spread across Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab province of

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Pakistan which belonged to the lower middle class. Officially, however, JeM denied its links and support from or to SSP. In addition to SSP, JeM had close ideological, sectarian and strategic relationships with another ultra-militant sectarian organisation known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). These links were based on the fact that both organisations had sectarian policies and recruited from the same type of people especially belonging to Deobandi madrasahs. This close relationship between SSP and JeM was also a factor in determining the intimate relationship between JeM and LeJ as the latter was considered a militant version of SSP (Mapping Militant Organisations, Jaish-e-Muhammad). The JeM became a rival group of HuM, the main group from which Maulana Masood Azhar splintered to form its own new group. The main reasons were internal divisions and rivalries in the group, particularly on ethnic lines between its Punjabi members and other communities. This rivalry, however, did not become a practical major clash, as both the groups co-existed even though rank and file of HuM continued to leave it to join JeM. There were reports of minor clashes between the two groups over issues of assets in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (Raman, 2001). Although they reached an agreement, this did not end the rivalry, and small clashes continued for some time until the government of Pakistan banned these organisations. JeM employed different methods and tools in its operations depending on the objectives and situations. According to reports, JeM primarily carried out suicide bombings, which was one of the first organisations to begin suicide missions in Kashmir. The group was also reported to have links with sectarian killings against the minority Shiite community and Christians. In addition, JeM carried out attacks on the Pakistani state and some of the western targets inside Pakistan. After the hijacking saga, Indian authorities declared JeM a terrorist organisation under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) on 25 October 2001. Later, in December 2001, the US Department of State also placed JeM in the list of foreign terrorist organisations. Due to international pressure to crackdown on militant organisations, Pakistan also declared JeM as a terrorist organisation and a number of its activists and leaders were detained or arrested (Kashmir Herald). JeM responded with attacks against the state of Pakistan, Christians and the minority Shiite community. Meanwhile, many of its activists joined hands with

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forces, particularly with Al Qaeda, that operated against the Pakistani state and the NATO forces in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2007). In 2016, it was blamed for its involvement in the terrorist attack on Pathankot Air Force Station in India. However, the investigations remained inconclusive as the Pakistani investigation team, led by a senior officer of the Pakistan Police Service, was not given full access and evidence in India.

JAMAAT-UD-DAWA (JuD)/LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LeT) Many stories have been told about the origin of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) ‘Army of the Pure’. The official story is that first of all, Markaz al-Dawawal-Irshad (Center for Preaching and Guidance, or MDI) was formed in 1984 in Afghanistan. Later, Maasker Tayyaba (military training camp) was formed at Kunar, Afghanistan. It was a training camp for the Mujahideen who wanted to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. According to some researchers, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi formed this small group of Ahl-e-Hadith4 Muslims from Pakistan to wage jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The official version denied it and clarified in an interview that MDI and Maasker were founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, a teacher at the University of Engineering and Technology (Lahore) in 1990.5 MDI was responsible for dawa (preaching) and LeT for jihad. It had several training camps in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Kunar and Paktia, both of which had a substantial number of Ahl-e-Hadith (Wahabi) Muslims, with the aim of participating in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Its leadership gained the trust of the Pakistani intelligence establishment. A year later, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, also a teacher at the University of Engineering and Technology (Lahore) Pakistan, formed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Organisation for Preaching, or JuD). In 1986, Lakhvi merged his outfit with JuD. In 1989, it turned its attention from Afghanistan and devoted itself to waging jihad in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). In December 2001, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) was launched. However, the US Department of State, which had actually designated the LeT a foreign terrorist organisation in 2002, described the JuD as the ‘front organisation’ of the Lashkar. JuD’s social organ was named Falah-eInsaniat Foundation (Harrison, 2009).

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JuD’s headquarters (200 acres) were located at Muridke, 30 km from Lahore, which was built with contributions and donations (SATP, 2009). The headquarters housed a madrasah (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for ‘scholars’ and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The LeT also reportedly operated 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminaries across Pakistan. However, in 2009, after the uproar over LeT’s alleged involvement in the Mumbai attack, the government of Punjab took control of all the set-ups of JuD and appointed an administrator to run schools and dispensaries. JuD collected donations from the Pakistani community in the Middle East and from Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. Its social organ Falah-e-Insaniat (betterment of mankind) collected charity and sacrificial hides from across Pakistan to generate funds. According to some sources, JuD also received some funding from the intelligence establishment. Funds also came from some sources in Saudi Arabia. JuD/LeT was not an underground organisation. It published its views and opinion through its Urdu monthly journal, Al-Dawa and an Urdu weekly, Ghazwa. It also published Voice of Islam (an English monthly), Al-Rabat (an Arabic monthly), Mujala-e-Tulba (an Urdu monthly for students) and Jihad Times (an Urdu weekly). These magazines not only published essays about the jihadi ideology and motivated the younger section to join jihad, but also published reports of the activities of ‘Mujahedeen’ inside IHK. It published the names and addresses of the Pakistani and Kashmiri Mujahedeen who lost their lives in operations inside IHK. Not only their names were mentioned in the magazines, but the funerals of many of the ‘martyred Mujahedeen’ were also held in their native towns and cities, which were attended by a large number of people who eulogised their sacrifice and congratulated their parents. Initially, LeT was focused on jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. After the Soviet forces moved out of Afghanistan, its primary objective remained the liberation of Kashmir. The recruits were sent for military training on ‘Daura-e-Aam’ (General visit) for 21 days and on ‘Daura-e-Sufa’ for religious training for 21 days (Jamestown Foundation, 2012). After the US attack on Iraq and later on Afghanistan, it turned its focus towards the US as well. However, according to the direction

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of Pakistani security, its focus of physical jihad remained IHK. It embraced a pan-Islamic rationale for military action. It did not support revolutionary jihad at home because the struggle in Pakistan ‘was not a struggle between Islam and disbelief’. According to the LeT tract Why We Do Jihad, ‘if we declare war against those who have professed Faith, we cannot do war with those who haven’t’. Instead, the group seeks gradual reform through dawa. The aim is to bring the people of Pakistan to LeT’s interpretation of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and, by doing so, to transform the society in which they live (Jamestown Foundation, 2012). Because of this, the Pakistani state rewarded JuD/ LeT with preferential treatment, which the group leveraged during that period and remained unfettered. Hafiz Saeed resigned as the Amir of LeT, assumed control of JuD and announced that all Lashkar activities and offices had been shifted to IHK. He responded to both international and internal pressures tactfully by disassociating itself from LeT. JuD/LeT despite being known for having links with Al Qaeda did not pose a threat to Pakistan. It was considered a dreaded force detrimental to the interests of India and later on to some extent to the US; however, within Pakistan, it had no record of anti-state activity. Even after the Mumbai attacks, it gradually receded and restricted itself to vitriolic rhetoric against India and angry outburst against the US and seemed to be desirous of becoming a political party.

LeT’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE MUMBAI INCIDENT LeT was held responsible for the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. Ajmal Kasab, the only attacker captured alive, was sentenced to death by Indian courts in May 2010 and hanged in 2013. The role of state and ISI in this incident was also questioned by India. The then Indian Prime Minister also blamed the ‘agencies’ in Pakistan. Pakistan strongly denied the allegations of India against it. Furthermore, it argued that if Kasab was a Pakistani citizen, it was not enough to blame the state and ISI for training, planning or execution of this attack. Pakistan arrested Hafiz Saeed but the court released him due to insufficient evidence. India termed it a subterfuge. The fact remained that the anti-terrorism courts were already hearing prosecution arguments against the seven men captured in November 2009 for their

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involvement in the said attacks. Of these men, the most important was Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, in charge of JuD’s northern areas, who remained in Adiala Jail, Rawalpindi from 2009 to 2015. India wanted Pakistan to pay more attention and give higher priority to LeT/JuD than Al Qaeda and TTP. However, Pakistan’s priority was obviously to suppress important groups like Al Qaeda and TTP. Naturally, they were seen as the threat requiring more immediate attention with regards to Pakistan’s security. Therefore, India’s unidimensional focus on LeT/JuD could not convince Pakistan to change its priority (Sajjad, Hafeez & Firdous, 2010). Moreover, Pakistan urged India to provide credible evidence against JuD and its chief, which could stand in a trial. The Indian dossier always fell short of meeting this requirement. Interestingly, Husain Haqqani, former ambassador of Pakistan to the US, who is almost blacklisted in Pakistan for allegedly facilitating the Americans against Pakistan’s interests and for adopting pro-India policy, tweeted in the beginning of 2018 that Pakistan and the intelligence community must discuss evidence against Hafiz Saeed. As with the Lockerbie case, there can be an international trial over the Mumbai attacks if India provides evidence against Hafiz Saeed. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi pointed out that the Pakistan Judiciary cannot give a verdict without evidence.

UNITED NATIONS BAN ON JAMAAT-UD-DAWA/LeT A UN Security Council declared that Jamaat-ud-Dawa was a front for the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba and subject to UN sanctions on terrorist organisations. It also approved the designation of four suspected plotters of the Mumbai attacks as terrorists subject to sanctions. The UN identified all four individuals as leaders of Lashkar, including Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Amir of JuD, northern areas of Pakistan and the alleged mastermind of the Mumbai siege. The others were Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the leader of JuD; Haji Muhammad Ashraf, JuD’s Chief of finance and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq, a Saudi financier of JuD. Among the sanctions imposed on the group and the four individuals by the Security Council, including Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee were an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on the individuals. Since 2005, the Sanctions Committee – a powerful tool of the UN’s powerhouse 15-nation

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Security Council – has considered Lashkar a terrorist organisation affiliated with Al Qaeda. The US and the European Union also approved of the group. By agreeing that Jamaat-ud-Dawa was essentially an alias for Lashkar, the UN panel has significantly added to India’s pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government to prove that it is cracking down on militant groups and pursuing extremists blamed for the Mumbai attack. Lakhvi was detained during a raid in Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir; the mountainous region claimed by both nations has been the focus of two of their three wars since 1947 (The Nation, 2008).6 The US announced a $10 million reward for information, leading to the capture of Hafiz Saeed. Strangely or strategically, it was announced in India. Wendy Sherman, then US Under Secretary of State for political affairs, announced the reward for Hafiz Saeed and also announced $2 million for information to capture Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, Hafiz Saeed’s brother-in-law. The announcement of these bounties by India had a negative impact on Pakistan. Most people considered it a US– India conspiracy to put Pakistan under pressure at the time when Pakistan had stopped the NATO supplies. Rather sympathy for Hafiz Saeed increased in many circles. This decision was considered ridiculous because Hafiz Saeed was neither underground nor was in hiding in remote areas of KP. He was based at Lahore, Punjab. He lived in a small 3 marla house in Johar Town with his family. During the announcement, he was very much present in Lahore and used to attend his party office at Al Qadisia mosque, the Lake Road Lahore, which was in the heart of the city. He regularly led the Friday prayers at Al Qadisia, which were attended by hundreds of followers. Immediately after the announcement of this reward on Hafiz Saeed, news surfaced that the US ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was being called back prematurely before the completion of his tenure of two years. A renowned columnist of Pakistan, Nazir Naji, whose column appeared in the leading Urdu newspaper, Jang, stated that Hafiz Saeed had met Munter and convinced him of his non-involvement in the Mumbai attack. Munter bought his idea and pleaded his case to the US authorities. However, in contrast to his report, the US announced a bounty on Hafiz Saeed and announced that too in India. Munter was upset and decided to quit before the completion of his tenure. Both JuD and the US Embassy in Pakistan rejected this report. The JuD Coordinator was ready to take legal action against Nazir Naji for

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misreporting. He clarified that, according to their policy, they met the foreign emissaries, especially from the UK or the US and Western countries, only after informing the government of Pakistan. This care was taken to avoid any allegation of having links with foreign powers, which was a common allegation hurled conveniently on anybody who met the foreign diplomats. Nazir Naji, however, insisted on the credibility of his source and authenticity of his information. It was surmised that the American move might have been motivated by Hafiz Saeed’s active presence in the Defense of Pakistan Council (DPC), a right-wing pressure group comprising jihadist militant groups, religious parties and conservative politicians, which had conducted major rallies in cities across Pakistan since January 2012. Its aim was to influence a major debate on Pakistan–US ties that was underway in parliament and, in particular, to prevent the reopening of NATO supply lines that had been closed since November 2011. DPC gathered a huge number of participants, and a tirade was set against India and the US, which alarmed Western diplomats and many Pakistanis. The media expressed suspicions that the DPC enjoyed tacit support from the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, possibly as a means of pressing Washington (Walsh, 2012). This speculation could be partially correct but was incorrect in that all components of DPC were being guided by the army or ISI. A JuD leader confided that the army was in favour of opening the NATO supplies, whereas the government of Pakistan wanted to take time to open it. This whispering campaign was spread by the sponsored members of DPC. One such person had the reputation of being paid by a source of various local and foreign intelligence agencies. In fact, this campaign within DPC was sponsored but at least revealed that DPC was not moving entirely at the behest of the army or ISI. However, their influence on various components of DPC could not be ruled out. As far as JuD is concerned, ‘it is claimed that its autonomy from the ISI has increased and it now requires only specific support – including safe havens, intelligence and campaign guidance rather than finances’ (Sajjad, Hafeez & Firdous, 2010).

TRANSFORMATION Transformation from LeT to JuD and in its stance and approach from known anti-India jihadi activities to a more political approach over the

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years enabled it to avoid crushing sanctions and a harsh state action. It disassociated itself from LeT based in IHK, although its moral and material support did not stop entirely. It stopped propagating its actions in Pakistan through its media. It adopted this strategy to avoid annihilation in the wake of immense local and foreign pressure after its alleged involvement in the Mumbai attacks. It seemed to have learnt lessons from Ikhwanul Muslimeen in Egypt and Hizbullah in Lebanon, which changed their course and approach to become mainstream political parties. During an interview with Khalid Bashir, Coordinator Public Relations, JuD, it was found that he did not express any disgust over the Mumbai attacks on the television. However, according to LeT/JuD magazines, LeT termed the television as the devil’s workshop, which polluted the minds of the youth. Its young members were encouraged to smash the TV sets at their homes. The stories of many young members who had smashed their television sets were published with great pride. Khalid Bashir stated that it was the policy of the past. He further added that JuD had given up its hatred towards TV after consulting the Muslim Ulema (religious scholars) and that the TV was no longer a taboo or ‘haram’ (religiously forbidden) now.7 Political aspirations and pragmatic reasons seemed to have overshadowed strict religious or ideological stance. Hafiz Saeed, who was media-shy initially (Mir, 2009), later started giving interviews to TV channels. And he was frequently photographed during his public meetings. Although this change might have gone unnoticed by many, in fact, it depicted a sea change in the approach of the Chief of LeT. Although Hafiz Saeed was suffering from flu and fever on the day of the meeting, he was perked up.8 The statement of the Indian Home Secretary that Indian Hindu extremists were responsible for a lot of terrorist acts in India refreshed him (Zee TV, 2009).9 He was feeling relieved and vindicated and somehow appreciated the Prime Minister of India for backing the revealing statement of the Home Minister. However, he talked less about India and more about the internal unrest and security situation in Pakistan. He lamented the deplorable security situation in Karachi and suggested that politicians should forget about the general elections (scheduled to be held in April/May 2013) for at least some time and focus on eradicating violence and terrorism in

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different parts of Pakistan. The man wanted by the US and India for terrorism seemed more of a politician than a terrorist. In July 2012, when the Defence of Pakistan Council (DPC), a group of more than 40 political and religious parties, launched a long march from Lahore to Islamabad to protest against the restoration of NATO supply, the Punjab government did not allow JuD to establish camps in front of the Punjab Assembly at the Charing Cross, the Mall Road, Lahore. However, this place was routinely used by all groups for all sorts of protests. The police pulled down the JuD camps, which they opposed initially, but dispersed after slogans were raised. Thus, the JuD strategy to move towards mildness and to be gradually more political than a militant was a positive development. However, it also had a negative fallout for the security of Pakistan. Some extremist elements within JuD that did not agree with its new approach detached themselves from it to operate within Pakistan. At least one such case gave credence to this apprehension when unknown armed terrorists attacked the army camp at Wazirabad (industrial town of Punjab), in which seven soldiers of the Pakistan Army were killed on 9 July 2012 (Express Tribune, 2012). Initial investigations confirmed that the attackers were from the splinter group of JuD. This group probably joined hands with TTP and started terrorist activities in Punjab. A JuD office bearer, Col (r) Nazeer, told that all members of JuD were under control and discipline of the party and those who were indulging in such activities were thrown out of the party.10 The parting of the ways by many dissidents of JuD, trained for jihad, joining hands with terrorists for striking inside Pakistan, could become a palpable security threat, especially in the province of Punjab. It did become a threat, but in a different way. It launched its political party ‘Milli Muslim League’ and fielded a candidate for the 2017 byelection of Constituency NA-120. He bagged the second highest number of votes (about 7,000 votes) after the PML (N). It was a remarkable achievement by a religio-political party in the stronghold of Nawaz Sharif-led PML (N). Currently, JuD is under tremendous pressure from abroad and within the country to change its stance and approach. Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) or the Party of Freedom Fighters, led by Yusuf Shah, alias Pir Syed Salahuddin, affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami, was considered the mother of militancy in the Indian-held Kashmir. According to Muhammad Ahsan Dar, the founder member of HM, who

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was released from jail in December 2012 after serving 11 years in different jails, stated that he formed HM on 15 February 1989 at Hajibugh Beerwa in Budgam district (Pakistan Observer, 2012). The name Hizbul Mujahideen was an amalgam of the names of Syed Ahmad Shaheed’s Tehreekul Mujahideen and Afghanistan’s Hizb-eIslami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HM was reportedly headquartered in Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. There were different opinions about the strength of the group. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal, the total strength of HM activists was about 1,500 (SATP, 2013). Some of its activists received arms training in Afghanistan camps. Nevertheless, its leadership never identified itself with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban. It was included in the ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ list by the US Department of State under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 on 1 May 2003. It was considered one of the most prominent militant groups in the region because of its effectiveness and high-tech tactics used against the Indian forces and the broad network of its organisational base. It was a well-organised and structured militant group as it formulated its own codified constitution that depicted its organisational structure, rules and regulations for the functioning of the group and its objectives. HM established a five-member Majlis-e-Shura to formulate the policy affairs of the group (Rana, 2009). It had considerable resources available, particularly in the 1990s in its fight against the Indian security forces. Some smaller groups operating in Indian-held Kashmir, such as Zia Tigers, Al Hamza, Maududi Squad and Ansar ul Islam which were linked with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), merged into the Hizbul Mujahideen, while other factions merged into it later. HM was blamed to be backed by Pakistan as it demanded the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control as opposed to the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which advocated for complete independence rather than accession to Pakistan (SATP). HM’s policy was based on two points. The first was related to their ideology, which clearly stated that HM would respect everyone who respected their concept of Jihad and would not tolerate opposition to this concept or subversion of their ideology. Secondly, it maintained that the group would use its weapons against its enemy only and none else.

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The four objectives of HM are: (1) to create an environment of Jihad among the Muslims of the land to help Muslim brothers in IHK; (2) to create a spirit of Jihad and martyrdom in the hearts of the youth and to help them achieve this by providing spiritual, physical and conceptual training; (3) to provide financial support to those involved in Jihad and the affected people and (4) to help those involved in Jihad to use their strengths in Islamic Renaissance. The command structure was as follows: The central command council comprises of seven members that include the Chief Commander. There are three to four battalions at the level of every district and a battalion Commander leads each. Each battalion has three companies led by a Platoon Commander each. Every platoon has three sections with separate Section Commanders. Each section has 11 Mujahideen, a platoon has 33 Mujahideen, a company has 99 and a battalion has 313 Mujahideen (Rana, 2009). During its heydays, HM was divided into the five divisions for administrative convenience and operational feasibility: the Central division for Srinagar; the southern division of Anantnag and Pulwama districts of Indian-controlled Kashmir; the Chenab division consisting of district Udhampur, the Pir Panjal division consisting of Rajouri and Poonch districts and finally the northern division of Kupwara, Baramulla and Bandipora regions (SATP). It had a substantial support base in the Kashmir Valley and in the Doda, Rajouri and Poonch districts and parts of Udhampur district in the Jammu region (SATP). Its media centre, Hizb Media Centre, ran its website illustrating its activities, Indian military’s actions in Kashmir, killings of Kashmiris and so on (Hibz Media Index, 2013). It had its own news agency, Kashmir Press International, and a women’s wing, Banat-ul-Islam. The head of the group was Syed Salahuddin (real name: Muhammad Yousaf Shah), who also headed Muttahida Jihad Council. Nasir ul Islam, who merged its group ‘Ansar ul Islam’ into the HM, developed differences with HM and formed his own faction of HM known as ‘Hizb ul Mujahideen Nasir Islam Group’ (Rana, 2003). It was later changed to Jamiat ul Mujahideen. Soon after this, another group within HM parted its ways from the group. This time it was the al Badr group, which along with other small groups had joined HM in its early period.

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After being part of HM for eight long years, al Badr decided to separate from the HM in 1998. This was the direct result of the significant differences between al Badr leadership and the leaders of HM. A more serious internal division emerged when in 2001 one of the senior commanders of HM, Majeed Dar, was replaced by another commander Saif ul Islam. The stated reason for this replacement was the poor health condition of Majeed Dar, but according to some writers and experts, the actual reason was the serious differences between him and the top leadership of JI. The experts saw these differences as a direct consequence of the decision of the Dar in announcing a unilateral ceasefire against India in Kashmir for a period of three months in July 2001. This decision was shock to Hizbul Mujahideen and the Jamaat Islami leadership, which got annoyed, and he was forced to step down from the Hizbul Mujahideen leadership. Although the JI top leadership had disassociated itself from this unilateral ceasefire announcement and warned of consequences of this negative decision, Hizbul Mujahideen did not do so. The top commander of HM, Syed Salahuddin, had said that he only differed on the length of ceasefire and that it will be for 15 days and not three months as had been announced by Dar earlier in a press conference. This led to differences between Syed Salahuddin and the top JI leadership, who wanted to fire him from the group, but did not do it because some HM commanders suggested that it would lead to a total division of HM. An interesting situation developed after the expiry of 15 days of ceasefire when Syed Salahuddin announced the end of ceasefire while Dar refused this decision and announced to continue it for three months. As a result of this conflict, Majeed Dar announced his resignation from HM, which was not accepted and he was asked to continue to hold office for one more year to complete his term. During this period, the leadership of HM and JI continued to diminish his and his associates’ role in important decisions of HM, particularly after reports of his meetings with the Indian spy agency RAW officials for participating in Kashmir elections. Finally, he was expelled from HM in May 2002 along with other commanders who supported him. Some of his associates were later recruited again into the ranks of HM. HM established ties with Al Qaeda. In August 2012, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami, spoke at the funeral of Engineer Ahsan Aziz, a commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen, who was

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killed in a US drone strike in the Shawal Valley in Pakistan’s Talibancontrolled tribal agency of North Waziristan (The Long War Journal, 19 November 2012). Like other militant groups operating in IHK, the activities of HM declined after 2002. Nevertheless, in June 2013, militants killed eight soldiers in Indianheld Kashmir in the deadliest such attack in five years, ahead of the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to this area. HM claimed responsibility for this attack (Dawn, 2013). After that, there was no credible report of HM’s activities inside IHK. At present, it has no existence in Pakistan. This milieu gave rise to the next three phases and different faces of terrorism, spanning over three decades, which posed a serious threat to the present security system. The following chapters will elaborate how the firm extension of earlier policies of the government threw the state into a complex situation aggravated by the participation in Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, backlash against such policies, weak writ of the government, sectarian terrorism and external factors. These phases solidified the foundations of the edifice of religious extremism and militancy in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 3 THE SECOND PHASE

In the 1980s and 1990s, several Indian-sponsored bomb blasts occurred in various areas of Pakistan, especially in the province of Punjab. Pakistan accused the Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for carrying out the blasts in Pakistan and supporting the secessionists in Balochistan. Earlier, RAW had a history of fomenting unrest in erstwhile East Pakistan and played an active role in its secession from Pakistan. On the contrary, India blamed the Pakistani intelligence agencies, especially ISI, for supporting the Khalistan movement of Sikhs of East Punjab and later, for supporting the uprising of Kashmiris in the Indian-administered Kashmir. On 29 January 1999, an Indian saboteur Subhash Chander was apprehended by the security agencies of Pakistan for carrying out bomb blasts in Sialkot. He confessed before a joint investigation team that he was trained by the Indian intelligence agencies and some others to carry out bomb blasts in Pakistan (The News International, 1999). The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif brought this Indian activity to the notice of the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, who was on a visit to Pakistan. Sialkot, being the border town, was worst hit by Indian terrorism, as from 1998 to 2000 it faced 25 Indian-sponsored bomb blasts, resulting in the deaths of many innocent civilians.1 Other major cities of Punjab also faced Indian-sponsored bomb blasts on trains and buses. Sarabjit Singh (an Indian national) detonated a suitcase bomb in a passenger train at Faisalabad, resulting in the death of two women and children. He was apprehended later while returning to Amritsar for illegally crossing the

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border. Interestingly, he told the investigators that he was not tracked and apprehended by Pakistani agencies, but rather he deliberately approached a security checkpost to get arrested. He gave the reason that he was extremely unhappy with his Indian handlers who had promised to pay Rs 50,000 per death in the bomb blasts carried out by him, but paid only Rs 15,000 in total. When he demanded his payment according to the agreement, they set him up in a fabricated police case and grilled him. Later, they facilitated his release and again asked him to carry out his activities in Pakistan. But being resentful of his treatment by his handlers, he decided to offer his services to Pakistan for carrying out similar activities in Indian Punjab. He had crossed over into Pakistan at least six times, carried out reconnaissance, exploded bombs and returned successfully. He was sentenced to capital punishment by the Lahore High Court.2 A Pakistani agent of Indian intelligence agencies named Ishaq, a resident of a village on the border near Lahore, carried out bomb blasts at Lahore Airport (6 dead; 12 injured) and on a bus that exploded between Lahore and Pattoki (45 dead; 20 injured). He was apprehended on the complaint of his neighbours who were suspicious of his fastchanging lifestyle. He was a poor person, but in a few days, he bought a bus to drive between his village and Lahore. He started wearing expensive clothes and did little to hide his ill-gotten money. During interrogation, he revealed that one of the local small-time smugglers, who used to smuggle liquor from India and cardamom from Pakistan, approached him to accompany him to India. These small-time smugglers operated in collaboration with the Indian Border Force and Pakistan Rangers. The Indian intelligence agency wanted an educated person from a village who could operate in cities. Ishaq was a young graduate looking for some regular decent income. Indian handlers treated him very well. Later, they asked him to carry out bomb blasts, for which he was rewarded adequately. Later, although the series of bomb blasts ended in 2004, India accelerated its support to the Baloch separatists to foment violence in Balochistan, a vital part of Pakistan. Although comprising 44 per cent of Pakistan’s land territory, Balochistan has a low population density. It has abundant natural resources and hundreds of miles of sea coast, which make it a key geopolitical area. It had been plagued with separatist movements involving senseless brutalities like the murder of Nawab

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Akbar Bugti by President General Pervez Musharraf. According to the government of Pakistan, India had taken advantage of the situation by constantly striking by aiding the rebels and carrying out clandestine subversive operations in Balochistan. Subsequent governments of Pakistan expressed their concern over Indian activities in Balochistan. In 2010, the Interior Minister of Pakistan, Rehman Malik, had categorically told the Senate (Upper House) of Pakistan that India was interfering in Balochistan and that Baloch dissidents were imparting military training in training camps in Afghanistan (under the supervision of Indian agencies) (The News International, 2010). However, the evidence of alleged Indian involvement was not made public. In September 2013, during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif told the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that terrorism was as much a concern of Pakistan as it was to India. Pakistan Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani told the media that the Pakistan prime minister had also raised the issue of ‘external interference in Balochistan’. Pakistan had been striving hard to collect palpable evidence of the involvement of RAW in Balochistan, which could be presented to the world to substantiate its accusations. In March 2016, the counter intelligence set-ups managed to get hold of a high-level RAW agent from Balochistan, who happened to be an Indian naval officer. He was based in Chabahar, Iran, but operated in Balochistan. His confessional statement was aired on TV channels. Some excerpts of his statement are reproduced verbatim as follows: I am Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav. Number 41558Z. I am a serving officer of the Indian Navy. I am from the engineering cadre of the Indian Navy and my cover name was Hussein Mubarak Patel, which I had taken for doing some intelligence gathering for the Indian government agencies. I was picked by RAW in 2013 end. Ever since I have been directing various activities in Balochistan and Karachi at the behest of RAW. I was basically the man for Mr Anil Kumar Gupta who is the joint secretary, RAW, and his contacts in Pakistan, especially in the Baloch student organisation.

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My purpose was to hold meeting with Baloch insurgents and carry out activities with their collaboration. These activities have been of criminal nature, these have been of anti-national, matlab terrorist, leading in to the killing and maiming of Pakistani citizens also. I realised during this process that RAW is involved in some activities related to the Baloch liberation movement within Pakistan and the region around it. There are finances which are fed into Baloch movement through various contacts or various ways and means into the Baloch liberation and the various activities of these Baloch liberation and the RAW handlers go towards activities which are criminal, which are anti-national, which can lead to maiming or killing of people within Pakistan and mostly these activities were centred around what I have knowledge of, the ports of Gwadar, Pasni, Jeevani and various other installations which are around the coast, damaging to the various other installations which are in Balochistan. So the activities seemed to be revolving around to create a criminal sort of a mindset within the Baloch liberation and lead to instability within Pakistan. Karachi, the economic hub of Pakistan, was another place where India surreptitiously but continuously stirred violence, terrorism and mayhem. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) (United Nationalist Movement), an ethnic political party, which has overwhelming support in Karachi, had been indulging in mass-scale violence, extortion and killings for three decades. Police and intelligence agencies have lots of evidence to prove that India financed MQM and also trained its yobs. Its chief Altaf Hussain went into self-exile in the UK in 1985 to avoid arrest for a number of murder cases against him in Pakistan.

THE THIRD PHASE The activities of the second phase continued during the third phase that started in the mid-1980s when sectarianism took the shape of sectarian terrorism. It was a multi-causal phenomenon, having deep social, political and geo-political roots. Most importantly, it was derivative of the extensive milieu of the birth and growth of religious and jihadi parties during the Afghan jihad era and onwards. The regional impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran was also a tangible factor in

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this regard. Some other factors like ‘unemployment, poverty, lack of education, social rejection, an unhappy family environment, etc. played a role in indoctrination of culturally dispossessed young men’. The indulgence of these elements in sectarian violence resulted in numerous clashes and killings over years. Data for three years can provide a fair glimpse of the consequences of sectarian violence during that period (Policy Brief; Figure 3.1). The following three organisations were responsible for this phase: (1) The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni Deobandi organisation; (2) Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) a Shiʿa organisation; and (3) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, an ultra-militant splinter group of SSP.

SIPAH-E-SAHABA PAKISTAN (SSP) This Sunni Deobandi militant sectarian organisation was formed in Jhang city in 1985 in retaliation to the Shiʿa sectarian surge after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Sunni elements felt that the Shiʿas of Jhang, who were in majority there, became more aggressive in practising that part of their sect, which affected them. That part was a blasphemous attitude towards the reverent Companions of Prophet Muhammad, known as Sahaba. The main targets of these sacrilegious attacks were usually Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman, who are known as Pious Caliphs (Khulfa-e-Rashdeen), and also Hazrat Ayesha, the wife of the Prophet. This practice irritated and instigated the Sunni Deobandis

Figure 3.1

Trends of sectarian violence (2009 –12).

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to the hilt. A small group of extremists among them started retaliating, and Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a young Sunni cleric of Jamia Mosque, Pipplian, Jhang, Punjab, formed Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) later renamed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) to counter the Shiʿa surge.3 In February 1990, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was allegedly gunned down by his Shiʿa rivals (The News International, 2009). SSP can be termed the pioneer of sectarian extremism and sectarian militancy in Pakistan. It resorted to killings of rival Shiʿa in Punjab and Karachi. SSP was proscribed on 15 January 2002. It renamed itself Millat-eIslamia Pakistan (MIP). Meanwhile, its firebrand leader Maulana Azam Tariq, who was elected Member of the National Assembly (MNA) in the general elections of 2002, was gunned down on 7 October 2003 in Islamabad. A few months before his death, Maulana Azam Tariq seemed to have become comparatively moderate and more inclined towards adopting constitutional approach to run its party. According to him, Lashkar-eJhangvi came into being because he had decided to step back from a violent approach. The hardliner elements detested this softening of his stance and formed LeJ to continue its violent activities.4 Later, SSP renamed itself Ahle Sunnat wal jamaat (ASWJ) headed by Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, who was more moderate in approach and political disposition than the late Maulana Azam Tariq.5

LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LeJ) LeJ was established in 1996 as a Sunni sectarian group in Jhang district in the Punjab province of Pakistan. It is an ultra-militant splinter group of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). SSP was formed in the late 1980s by Sunni extremists, most notably Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in response to the perceived ‘growing influence of Shiʿa and Iranian government’. Those who split from SSP gave the reason that the organisation no more has the ideals of its founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi after he was killed by his rival sectarian extremists in February 1990. After his death, some of its leaders, including the then central secretary for information of SSP, Riaz Basra, started leaving the organisation to continue their violent means of eliminating the Shiʿa from Pakistan. They believed that SSP was turning into a political platform only and had deviated from its original purpose. Initially, these people formed different organisations out of it, namely

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Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeemul Haq, Al-Farooq, Al-Badr Federation and Allah-O-Akbar. All of these organisations were based in different districts of Punjab except Al-Badr Federation, which was based in Karachi, Sindh (Mir, 2009). Later, when Riaz Basra announced the establishment of Lashkare-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996, all the above-mentioned groups started merging in this newly created organisation. Ideology and objectives: The basic objective of LeJ was to convert and transform the Pakistani state into a Sunni state, using any possible means, including violence. Its policies were mostly based on anti-Shiʿa activities, and it used different violent means to force the state to declare Shiites as non-Muslims. LeJ, however, belonged to the Deobandi sect of Islam, which is considered conservative in its ideology. Leadership and command structure: Akram Lahori (original name is Muhammad Ajmal) was considered to be the currently Saalar-i-Aala (Commander-in-Chief) of the LeJ. He was originally part of the parent organisation Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He joined SSP in 1990. Later, however, he became the founding member of LeJ alongside Malik Ishaque and Riaz Basra in 1996 and started terrorist activities against Shiites in Punjab. It was also alleged that he had established a training camp for the purpose in Afghanistan with active support of Taliban in Afghanistan. He succeeded another founding member of LeJ, Riaz Basra, one of its most radical leaders, but who was killed in a police encounter in Multan on 14 May 2002. Akram Lahori himself had been in the custody of police since his arrest in Karachi in June 2002. The governments of Sindh and Punjab each put a sum of Rs 5 million on his head. He was arrested while carrying live arms including Kalashnikovs and pistols. Akram Lahori was involved in many serious cases of sectarian killings, with some involving high-level cases like the killing of Ehtishamuddin Haider, brother of the former Federal Interior Minister Moheen uddin Haider and the Managing Director of Pakistan State Oil, Shoukat Raza Mirza. In addition to the sectarian target killings, he was involved in the massacre of Shiites at an Imambargah in Mahmoodabad and later in the killings of Iranian cadets in Rawalpindi. Lahori reportedly confessed during interrogation that he was involved in 30 cases of sectarian

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killings in Punjab, including those of 24 people who were attending a Majlis in Mominpura. He also revealed that his group had planned to kill Interior Minister Moinuddin Hiader, but due to tight security, murdered his brother instead. After the death of Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori became acting chief of LeJ. It is believed that he himself supervised and perpetrated the sectarian target killing in the city of Karachi – bastion for his outlawed organisation. Lahori’s predecessor Riaz Basra was involved in more than 300 terrorist incidents, including attacking Iranian missions, killing an Iranian diplomat Sadiq Ganji in December 1990 and targeting government officials. He was arrested and tried by a special court for Ganji’s killing (Iranian consulate); however, he escaped during the trial in 1994 from police custody while being produced in court. He was Chief of the Khalid bin Walid unit of the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan. According to media reports, Riaz Basra and three of his accomplices were killed in an encounter on 14 May 2002. Before the news of Riaz Basra’s killing spread, it was reported that he was arrested after a tip off from one of the activist of his groups, Ajmal alia Sheikh Jamshaid in Faisalabad. He helped the police in arresting another important member of LeJ, Liaqat Ali, and also gave information to the police to arrest Basra after carrying out several raids in different parts of the country, including Faisalabad, Jhang, Sargodha and Lahore. Riaz Basra was ranked high among the sectarian terrorists and had been considered a radical religious fanatic. He was a very active and motivated member of the parent organisation of LeJ, Sipah I Sahaba Pakistan. He also took part in political activities. As a member of Sipah-e-Sahaba, he also contested elections for provincial assembly in 1988. Under his leadership and influence, LeJ became one of the most deadly and most radical sectarian militant organisations. He even threatened the top political leadership of Pakistan, including the then Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who had even stopped attending open courts fearing the threat. The majority of the top and mid-level leadership of LeJ consists of militants who fought in Afghanistan or Kashmir. They became an important part of the LeJ cadre. The majority of its activists were from the Deobandi (Sunni) madrasahs spread all across Pakistan, although their major support bases were urban centres.

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According to the media reports and law enforcement investigation, LeJ consisted of small semi-autonomous and loosely coordinated units spread in various areas of Pakistan. This characteristic resembled that of the standard pattern by international terrorist organisations. However, its real stronghold was Punjab and its major urban centres. This loose and decentralised structure of the organisation made it more effective and helped in keeping the central structure intact. The small units were known as cells, each of which consisted of about five to eight cadres. Each cell was operationally independent of the other cells. Each cadre and cell was kept secret from other cells and cadres in order to save them from the police if the first cell or cadre was arrested. According to a news report in 2000, LeJ split into two different factions, headed by Riaz Basra and Qari Abdul Hai alia Talha, respectively. Here, it is pertinent to mention that the latter was the chief of the lashkar’s Majlis-i-Shoora (the Supreme Council that decided on all the major issues faced by the group). The report claimed that the major factor behind this division was the issue of whether or not to continue sectarian killings inside Pakistan. As was expected, Riaz Basra wanted to target Shiite important figures, thus forcing the government to accept the demands of the lashkar to act against the Shiites, whereas Qari Abdul Hai opposed this policy, as it would invoke strong response from the government. In addition, he believed that it would create national chaos, which should be avoided for the time being at least. The lashkar suffered heavy losses during the second term of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1998 who started the crackdown on the sectarian groups involved in the killings, with most of their leaders captured or killed in Punjab. Riaz Basra was on the US Department of State list of terrorists who ‘live in or have lived in, have trained in, are headquartered in or are financed by Afghanistan’. He escaped from the police custody and was wanted by Pakistani authorities in connection with sectarian terrorism. He was described in the US Department of State list as a ‘would be assassin’ of the deposed Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif. Basra was allegedly involved in a terrorist incident on 3 January 1999, in which a bridge on the Lahore – Raiwind road, close to Nawaz Sharif’s house, was blown up shortly before the then Prime Minister was due to pass by.

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Basra was also reportedly sighted at various places in Pakistan in the past five years, and Pakistani newspapers had often received messages purportedly sent by him claiming responsibility for certain sectarian terrorist attacks. Although police sources in Sargodha, on 5 April 1999, reported that he was killed in an encounter, his mother’s testimony and forensic tests have since disproved this. According to analysts and media reports, the strength of numbers in LeJ was in thousands as of 2014. Its activists were mainly recruited from the madrasahs spread throughout Pakistan. LeJ never fell short of activists as it had deep roots in the madrasah culture in Pakistan. The head of LeJ, Malik Ishaque, was arrested in 2015; however, he was granted interim bail twice from courts. The Supreme Court was criticised by the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party for granting him bail, as he was charged with killings in more than 100 cases across Pakistan, including some very high-profile cases. LeJ head Malik Ishaque was arrested in July 2015 along with his two sons. Later, Malik Ishaque, his two sons Usman and Haq Nawaz and 11 others were attacked in an alleged exchange of fire with police personnel in Muzaffargarh. They were taken to Muzaffargarh by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) to aid in the recovery of arms and explosives. While returning after the recovery, the police personnel were attacked by 12 – 15 gunmen, who succeeded in freeing Ishaq, his sons and the other accused and escaped. However, CTD police intercepted and killed them in an ensuing encounter. LeJ had two of its most significant training centres located in Muridke and Kabirwal, in the Khanewal districts of Punjab. It was alleged that the lashkar also had a training camp in Afghanistan previously operating under the patronage of Taliban in Afghanistan. The existence of the camp after the US invasion has since not been known. However, the operations of the group in Afghanistan were reported and the protest came from the top leader of Afghanistan who alleged that LeJ had been involved in some rare sectarian terrorist acts inside Afghanistan. In addition to Punjab, Sindh LeJ was reported to have been involved in sectarian killings within the Shiite Hazara community in Balochistan. The Federal government had clearly mentioned the involvement of the group in hundreds of such killings. Furthermore, the brutal killings of Shiites on the silk route were also blamed on LeJ terrorists. These brutal

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killings, particularly in Naran of Shiites, had shocked many in the high echelon of the security establishment. They used army uniforms to stop buses, entered them and after confirming their identities through National Identity Cards as Shiites, they shot the passengers dead. Eye witnesses and those who were not killed (Sunni people) stated that the militants were using satellite telephones to communicate with their higher ups. In the beginning, the chief of Sipah-e-Sahaba, Maulana Azam Tariq, had disassociated himself from the activities of LeJ on many occasions, but the security operatives and the media believed that they were closely linked and worked in coordination with each other in their operations. For instance, when LeJ terrorist Sheikh Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was due to be hanged in February 2001 for terrorist offences, Maulana Tariq, instead of dissociating himself from the terrorist, led a campaign for the remission of his sentence and also offered diyat (blood money) to Iran. Sheikh Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was 19-years-old when he murdered the Iranian diplomat in Lahore on 19 December 1990. Nawaz was hanged in the Mianwali Central Jail. And it took the courts and the authorities 11 years to give the judgment. During his trial, he was kept at different jails in Punjab. In addition to having links with SSP, LeJ had active relationships with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The members of LeJ had sided with the Taliban ranks in their war against the Northern Alliance. They were part of the Taliban force mainly due to its radical ideology and anti-Shiite stance. Many of its activists also took refuge in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule after killing minority Shiites in Pakistan. The relationship between the Pakistani government and the Taliban dissolved when the latter refused to hand over such elements to Pakistan. The main reason for not handing over them to Pakistan was the ideological synchronisation between the two as well the support LeJ leaders extended to the Taliban in the civil war in Afghanistan. LeJ was also allowed to operate a training camp in Afghanistan just outside Kabul. Although the Taliban refused to admit the claim that they were harbouring these criminals, the presence of the training camp just outside the capital and independent life in Afghanistan made the Pakistani authorities believe that they were backed by the Taliban. Former Pakistani Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider had visited Kabul and Kandahar in March 2001 and, among other things, discussed

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with the Taliban regime the extradition of Pakistani fugitives. The Taliban declined to sign an extradition treaty but promised to search and surrender them. At that time, topping the list of wanted persons was the then LeJ chief Riaz Basra, who, like the others on the list, carried an appreciable reward on his head. In fact, according to official sources, Basra had later visited Karachi and southern Punjab in 2001 for medical treatment. The authorities also added that Basra had narrowly escaped arrest in Punjab during his visit when he had stayed in Pakistan for almost six months. Besides, Basra, Zakiullah and present chief Lahori were the most wanted persons. Official sources told that LeJ terrorists frequently crossed over into Pakistan from Afghanistan using unfrequented routes and committed bank robberies and sectarian-related killings. LeJ was reported to have developed good operational links with the TTP and Al Qaeda in the FATA region. LeJ was at the core of the newly established and one of the most deadly groups, the Punjabi Taliban. It was believed that Punjabi Taliban was a congregation of sectarian groups in southern Punjab. As part of the Deobandi sect, LeJ enjoyed a favourable view from the radical elements in the Deobandi Movement and got their support on various issues. Being part of the broader Deobandi Movement, LeJ secured considerable assistance from other Deobandi outfits. It also had an effectual working relationship with other Deobandi political and terrorist outfits at a personal level, if not at the organisational level. It was also believed that LeJ had links with another Kashmirbased militant group Harkat-ul Mujahideen. It was alleged that HuM provided training to the militants of LeJ in its training camps in Azad Kashmir and in the tribal areas to carry out attacks inside Pakistan. Over the last three years, another group of LeJ, Lashkar-e-Jahngvi Al Alami (LeJ International), surfaced and carried out horrendous terrorist attacks in Balochistan. Initially, it collaborated with Al Qaeda and then with IS. Al-Alami spokesperson Ali bin Sufyan told Reuters that ‘wherever there are attacks taking place [in Pakistan] Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami is cooperating with [ISIS] either directly or indirectly’ (The Diplomat, November 2016). LeJ, TTP and IS have become natural allies due to their anti-Shiʿa stance, whereas Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban are not in favour of attacks on Shiʿas.

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SIPAH-E-MUHAMMAD PAKISTAN (SMP) SMP was the militant wing of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa Jafaria or the Movement for Enforcement of the Shiʿa System, the main-stream Shiʿa organisation of Pakistan headed by Allama Sajid Naqvi. Its origin is attributed much to the Iranian Islamic Revolution and Iranian financial support to all Shiʿa madrasahs of Pakistan. It was led by Ali Reza Naqvi, who was later arrested under charges of murder, kidnapping for ransom and robberies. He is incarcerated in Central Jail Lahore. After ferocious attacks by SSP and government crackdowns, SMP ceased to exist as all its active members were arrested and incarcerated. However, in 2011, intelligence reports indicated that it was again becoming active after the attacks on Shiʿa in Quetta (Balochistan). The release of LeJ’s dreaded leader Malik Muhammad Ishaq in 2011 and his whirlwind tour of Punjab to activate SSP activists, which coincided with attacks on Hazara Shi’a in Quetta, was also a cause of concern for Shiʿas. During this period, Pakistan had been facing violence, which was not Islamist or sectarian in nature. Rather it was political and was introduced in the port city of Karachi in the mid-1980s by the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), which emerged as the ethnic party of the muhajir, refugees from the Muslim-majority areas of British India in 1947. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, it resorted to extreme violence. The dead bodies of MQM opponents were frequently found in gunny bags on Karachi’s roadsides, and many of the MQM’s political rivals blamed these killings on the movement. Several law-enforcement operations also unearthed torture cells run by the MQM. Intelligence agencies claimed to have proof of its links with India and its design to create a separate state named ‘Jinnah Pur’. Altaf Hussain, the supreme leader of MQM, who went in self-exile in London, reportedly had the map of this plan also.6 It was quelled during the Benazir Bhutto’s regime through Operation ‘Clean-Up’ (July 1995–6) (The Pakistan Development Review, 1996). However, it kept erupting in some way. During Musharraf’s regime, their strength was restored, as they became part of the government. General Musharraf being an Urduspeaking Mohajir had ethnic proximity with MQM. He considered them useful political allies to extend his rule and therefore ignored all its evil characters and promoted it. The highlight was the induction of Ishratul Abaad as the Governor Sindh although he was accused in a police case for

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torturing and killing an army officer. General Musharraf gave them a clean chit. It can be concluded that religious extremism gave birth to sectarianism, sectarian terrorism and terrorism. The parties created for jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir became a threat for internal peace of Pakistan. They influenced the entire society and the region, and only little efforts were made to control and neutralise them. However, military and civil authorities had different views and approaches to handle these elements. The military mainly overshadowed the civil desire to bridle the religious extremists and jihadis. Indian retaliation in the form of bomb blasts created a further dent in the serenity of the country. The act of localised violence in Karachi and Balochistan further worsened the situation. The people of Pakistan were helpless in the situation, which changed into an irreversible scenario. These four factors, elaborated in Chapter 4, are the tools that facilitated the expansion of extremism and militancy in varying degrees at different stages. The linkages and collaboration of these four factors or tools strongly indicate an unabated crescendo in religious extremism due to the overpowering role of religious extremists, emboldened and empowered by weak writ and flawed policies of the state.

CHAPTER 4 THE RISE OF MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN AFTER 2001

THE FOURTH PHASE This phase started at the end of 2001 when a large number of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, pressed by the US Operations ‘Enduring Freedom’ and ‘Anaconda’, sneaked into Pakistan through the porous Pak-Afghan border. The American forces were not deployed around the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan because the US Air Force planes relentlessly dropped heavy bombs there to kill Osama bin Laden and his several hundred men. Then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Frank had taken this decision to avoid backlash from the locals over the presence of American forces in that area (Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2009). This excuse, however, did not seem plausible, rather Rumsfeld was probably afraid of US troop losses. On the contrary, the Pakistani militias and Frontier Constabulary were not well equipped to plug the rugged mountainous routes from Tora Bora inside Pakistan. Resultantly, about 1,000 Al Qaeda men entered Pakistan (Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2009). Small US Delta Force comprising 40 odd men could do little. Soon, FATA became a fertile base for the Al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and their local sympathisers, who were to become a formidable force titled Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These local militants rapidly gained enough strength to carry out operations in FATA, NWFP (KP) and across Pakistan, as

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well as alarming the US and other Western countries which saw a nexus between the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban that was considered a threat to them and to Pakistan’s existence. TTP claimed that they had come into existence due to the US invasion of Afghanistan. Lieutenant General (r) Rashid Aziz, a close cohort of General Pervez Musharraf, stated in a TV interview that Pakistan started massacre of Muslims at the behest of the US, due to which terrorism broke out in Pakistan (Dawn, 2013).

THE FOUR FACTORS In this outcry against Al Qaeda and its local allies, at least four aspects figured prominently as the basis of the new menace: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Sectarian/Jihadi parties; FATA; Madrasah; Afghanistan.

The perceptions and realities about these four factors are addressed below before discussing the actual threats, that is, Al Qaeda, Taliban and TTP.

Sectarian/jihadi parties The jihadi and sectarian parties that were instrumental in different phases of extremism, violence and terrorism in Pakistan have been discussed at length in the previous chapters. Many rudderless activists of proscribed organisations like LeJ, JeM, HM, SSP and LeJ joined the militants in FATA and Swat and indulged in militancy and terrorism. In fact, in character, they were flexible like Al Qaeda. In case of state pressures and bans, they adopted one form or the other to avoid annihilation and kept demonstrating their extremist tactics. FATA It was only after 2001 that FATA started earning the notoriety of a safe haven for all sorts of Islamist militants: local, regional and international. At the end of 2007, Director CIA Michael Hayden described Al Qaeda safe havens in FATA as a ‘clear and present danger’ to the US. The Director FBI also expressed similar sentiments. As surmised by Michael Mullen, Chairman of

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the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘if I were going to pick the next attack to hit the United States, it would come out of the FATA.’ Unfortunately, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies could not predict the effects of FATA on Pakistan. Al Qaeda and TPP had already started their activities but they were not considered a threat to Pakistan by these agencies. This delay in understanding the severity of the situation in FATA affected Pakistan significantly. Ultimately, after several limited military operations against the insurgents, in 2014, the largest-ever internal military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ had to be launched in North Waziristan Agency of FATA. FATA includes the tribal areas adjoining the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and the seven agencies, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.1 FATA is inhabited by seven main Pashtun tribes having a population of 3.2 million (Musharraf, 2006). The Pakistani courts and police have no jurisdiction in tribal areas. It is administered through the Political Agent (PA), the Maliks (tribal elders), Jirga (local elders’ groups) and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) (Khyber, 2009). Why and how FATA had acquired the reputation as the epicentre of terror is best explained by the following facts: The primary reason for the rise of militancy in FATA could be safely attributed to the continually violent activities happening in Afghanistan for the last 30 years (Brynjar & Katja, 2000). From the fleeing Afghan refugees to the retreating fighters of Taliban and Al Qaeda, all managed to take shelter in FATA. FATA was a convenient and natural sanctuary for the fleeing fighters from Afghanistan with a porous 2,500 km border with Afghanistan, called Durand Line, which could not be manned and monitored all along. It had been widely regarded as one of the most loosely maintained frontiers in the world, with tribesmen availing the historic right to cross it for centuries. Moreover, the related tribesmen and even the Afghan nomads known as pawandas or Kotchis had been the immigration-free travellers between Pakistan and Afghanistan for ages (Matinuddin, 1999). Pakistan tried to establish a biometric system in January 2007, but the Afghan tribesmen, backed by the Afghan government, opposed it tooth and nail so that the system was discarded within days (The News International, 2011). FATA, commonly known as ‘Ilaqa Ghair’ (the area of others or the area beyond), had always been a safe haven for criminals, outlaws and

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wanted persons from all over Pakistan, mainly due to the lack of police and courts jurisdiction in this area. The earliest jihadist in this area was Syed Ahmed Barelvi, who chose this area to wage jihad, because the absence of government provided what we would now call a ‘safe haven’. Therefore, it has a long history of serving as a safe haven, and only the actors and factors kept changing. The collateral damage caused by the US aerial bombing in Afghanistan in 2001 resulted in so much sympathy for the Taliban and Afghans in FATA and the rest of Pakistan that the Afghan refugees, Taliban or non-Taliban were welcomed for shelter. It was a new phase of the old norm practiced since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.2 Approximately 5,000 foreigners, Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs settled in FATA after the Afghan jihad. They contributed significantly in infecting FATA with extremist sentiments.3 There were also other foreign militant groups such as networks of Chechens, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Chinese Uighur militants from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. FATA had been the most underdeveloped area in Pakistan. It had the highest percentage of food-insecure population (67.7 per cent), with South Waziristan, Orakzai Agency, North Waziristan and Mohmand Agency being the worst food-insecure areas. The super flood hit South Waziristan, Orakzai and Mohmand Agency in 2010, which further deteriorated the situation (The News International, 2010). This deprivation and socio-economic problems were fully exploited by Al Qaeda and TTP to raise the local helpers.4 While Al Qaeda and Taliban were sneaking into this area, making permanent bases here and the local Taliban/militants were ganging up, the intelligence and security agencies of Pakistan remained a silent spectator and failed to perceive the threat these groups were going to pose to Pakistan and the Western world in the near future. The situation in FATA fast deteriorated as the ‘war on terror’ in that area made the poor even poorer. Neglect nettled the inhabitants of FATA and during military operations no relief was given to them. The members of parliament from FATA, instead of looking after their people, abandoned the area and moved to safe places far from their constituencies. They were neither consulted when the military operations were launched in FATA nor paid heed to during distribution of funds under the budget.

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The aid given by the US, European and other foreign governments for the development of FATA could not reach there. The younger generation was utterly frustrated due to insecurity, as well as lack of educational and recreational facilities (The Daily Times, 2010). For these reasons, historical and current, FATA became a hub of terrorists from all over the region. These elements mostly remained unchallenged by the state. Until 2014, they flourished in this ungoverned area. Several military operations failed to dislodge them. However, the military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was a serious effort that destroyed their command and control structures and flushed them out of FATA. Unfortunately, a large number of these elements sneaked into Afghanistan through the porous Pak–Afghan border and sheltered in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan.

Madrasahs After the 9/11 attack, the madaris (plural of madrasah – a religious seminary) in Pakistan were alleged to be protectors of terrorists in Pakistan. The Taliban (students) who had emerged from the madaris established themselves in Afghan refugee camps in tribal areas of Pakistan during the Afghan jihad and changed the Western perception about the 1,000-year-old institution of Islamic teaching (Fair, 2009). They were considered the breeding ground of the Jihadi culture – a term used for Islamic militancy in the English-language press of Pakistan. Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, KP, where Mullah Omar received education, was termed by Western journalists as the ‘University of Jihad’ (Ahmad, 2000). In addition to madrasahs, religious and jihadi parties were instrumental in creating the jihadi culture. The dauntingly long list of religious, sectarian and jihadi parties gave a clear but dismal picture that showed how easy and convenient it was to raise and run such organisations (Rana, 2009). Madrasah was a key educational institution of Islamic teachings, which had a long history in the Islamic world and in the Indo-Pak sub-continent. It offered different programmes ranging from learning Qur’an (Tajweed) to Hifz-e-Qur’an (Learning Qur’an by heart) and the Dars-e-Nizami degree for full-fledged religious scholars. The curriculum covered Islamic philosophy and logic, Qur’an, Hadith and fiqh and Arabic grammar. Students study for free and are awarded graduate qualifications after eight years. Funding to run this school comes from charity.

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Taliban, whether Afghani or Pakistani, all came from Pakistani madrasahs, whose strength increased from approximately 250 in 1947 to 11,000 registered persons at present. The unregistered madrasahs, at a conservative estimate, could number another 45,000 (Ahmed, 2009). However, it is wrong to interpret that Pakistani Taliban are from madrasahs. Pakistani Taliban or TTP were not particularly the madrasah students like Afghan students. Rather most of them were non-madrasahs. According to an ICG report, during the independence of Pakistan in 1947, there were barely 137 madrasahs. In April 2002, Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, stated that there were 10,000 with 1.7 million students. They belonged to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shiʿa. Pakistan is a predominantly Sunni country, so the number of Shiʿa were much less. Among the Sunnis, there are three subsects, namely Deobandis, Barelvis and the Ahl-e-Hadith (salafi). Besides, the revivalist Jamat-e-Islami also had its own madrasahs (Rehman, 2004). Yet another report stated that until 2011 there were approximately 24,000 madrasahs (Express Tribune, 2011)5 registered with six distinct madrasah networks, divided along the sectarian lines. There was no credible information on the unregistered madrasahs. However, the registered ones were controlled by their own central organisations or boards. They determined the syllabi and collected registration fees and examination fees. They used to send examination papers, in Urdu and Arabic, to pupils in the madrasahs and declare results. The names of the boards are as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Wafaq ul Madaris Deobandi Multan 1958; Tanzim ul Madaris Barelvi Lahore 1960; Wafaq ul Madaris (Shiʿa) Pakistan Shiʿa Lahore 1962; Rabta-tul-Madaris-al-Islamia Jamat-i-Islami Lahore 1986; Wafq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia Ahl-e-Hadith Faisalabad 1978.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule (1977– 88) proved to be a turning point for the madrasah system as the number of madrasahs increased rapidly. During the war by Islamic Afghan groups in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, the US was said to have supported the madrasahs by sending money, arms and ammunition through Pakistan. Later, presumably because religiously inspired and madrasah students infiltrated across the line of control to fight the Indian army in Kashmir,

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they were supported by the Pakistan Army (specifically the InterServices Intelligence agency). However, both the ISI and the madrasahs denied these links (see several issues of Wafaq ul Madaris), and therefore, it could not be ascertained as to how many madrasahs had increased by the financial aid provided by foreign donors or the Pakistan Army (Rehman, 2004). In the first years of Zia’s Islamisation (1979–82), only 151 new madrasahs were established, but in the next six years, another 1,000 were established. According to an official estimate in 1995, a total of 2,010 new madrasahs had been registered since 1979, the majority affiliated with the Deobandis, although Ahl-e-Hadith madrasahs also grew significantly. Reflecting rising sectarianism, Shiʿa madrasahs grew similarly, from 70 in 1979 to 116 in 1983– 4. Madrasahs were crucial for mobilising opinion and recruiting and training militants for the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. The JI’s Jamiat Talaba Arabia (JTA) madrasahs and the JUI’s Deobandi madrasahs were particularly fertile grounds. The two factions of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) constituted more than 65 per cent of all madrasahs, mainly in the Pashtun-majority KP and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, from which the majority of their party workers and leaders graduated. In Punjab, there were approximately 10,068 madaris in 2012. The break-up was as follows: Deobandi – 4,350; Barelvi – 4,843; Ahl-e-Hadith – 663 and Shiʿa – 212.6 The increase in the number of registered madrasahs was outstanding: from 2,002 in 1988 to 9,880 in 2002. The Deobandi madrasahs, the ones most closely allied to the Taliban, had increased in number from 1,779 to more than 7,000. P.W. Singer gave the estimate of 45,000 madrasahs but did not quote any source for this number (Rehman, 2004). According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report: The Haqqania madrasah graduated 3,000 students each year, who left with one central lesson: to carry out jihad in the name of Islam. Those from influential families often go into politics, while those with limited economic prospects were encouraged to join militant groups, teach at Deobandi madrasahs or open new madrasahs. To the best of my knowledge, there was hardly any evidence that these students were encouraged to join militant groups. It was

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quite skewed analysis to translate limited economic prospects into the reason to join militant groups. However, according to the theory of rapid modernisation, inequality theory, inequality under economic conditions tends to increase the potential for ideological terrorism.7 The International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report in 2002 stating that ‘about a third of all students in Pakistan were enrolled in madrasahs’; this estimation was grossly over-stated. According to the results of the survey conducted from 1991 to 2001, the students of madrasahs constituted less than 1 per cent of all students enrolled in Pakistan (Fair, 2009). Moreover, Fair (2009), through research, found ‘little evidence to support popular assertions that madrassahs are the cradle of militancy’. However, she added that ‘small numbers can have large consequences including sectarianism and connections to sectarian violence, the productions of suicide attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere’. Her assessment about the madrasah–sectarianism connection was correct because madrasahs were established on sectarian lines; however, the involvement of madrasah students in suicide bombings could not be ascertained or confirmed. The phenomenon of the rise of extremism from the madrasahs was closely linked to the issuance of Fatawa (religious edicts), which are legal opinions declaring whether a given act under Islam is obligatory, permitted or forbidden, which strengthened the extremist ideology. Bar (2008) examined how fatawa was served as an instrument for religious leaders to justify to believers to engage in acts of jihad. Islamist terrorists testified that fatawa, particularly originating in the Arab world, motivated them to act. After 2002, General Pervez Musharraf introduced donor-supported madrasah reform. English, geography and computer science subjects were introduced in the madrasah syllabus. The education ministry was provided more than $70 million in aid to modernise the curriculum in madrasahs. Most of the funds were not utilised due to non-cooperation from the seminaries (The Express Tribune, 2012). Attempts were made to register the madrasahs with the government, which was not complied with by most of them. Very few responded just for the sake of funds. These non-serious reforms produced few tangible changes, with Musharraf regime’s alliance with the Islamic parties.

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Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey looked at the backgrounds of 79 terrorists involved in five of the worst anti-West terrorist attacks and found ‘madrasah involvement to be rare and further noted that the masterminds of the attacks all had university degrees’ (Fair, 2009). The pattern was the same in Pakistan. Sheikh Omar, who was involved in the murder of Daniel Pearl, graduated from the London School of Economics (LSE) and Naeem Noor Khan alias Abu Talha, Communication Manager of Al Qaeda, received an IT degree from Karachi University.8 The religious quarters in Pakistan asserted that the West was wary of political Islam, which it thought stemmed from the Qur’an, masjid and madrasah. Hence, madrasahs were being targeted. Moreover, many Pakistanis suspected that the US sought to de-Islamise Pakistan’s educational system. Christine Fair met high-level officials in the US Department of State who confirmed that it was one of their goals (Fair, 2009). The recruitment patterns of TTP and Al Qaeda in Pakistan showed that their recruits did not come from madrasahs. One cogent reason is that unlike Afghan Taliban, TTP leadership was not madrasah graduate; therefore, it was difficult for them to woo madrasah students. Maybe they did not want to entice them into their ranks because madrasah students would have been more qualified in Islamic teachings, making them look more suitable for the leadership of the so-called Islamist group. Therefore, they might have been considered a threat to their leadership. Probably, Al Qaeda also adopted a similar recruitment policy. According to intelligence sources, among those who carried out suicide attacks in Pakistan, only a few were identified to be students of any madrasah. However, this aspect should not be considered less important as the madrasah students are most vulnerable to be influenced by prolonged militancy and extremism in Pakistan. Some research data indicated that madrasah students had a greater flair or zeal for jihad than the students in other educational streams. It further suggested that madrasah students were consistently more likely than students in private or public schools to support war with India and militants in Kashmir were less likely to support equal rights for minorities and women (Fair, 2009). By means of their education, madrasah students could be conveniently rallied around the slogan and mission of Amr Bil Maruf Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (correction of the morals and values of society through words and actions) and challenge the writ of government,

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a template that was adopted by the Afghan Taliban and also demonstrated by the Lal Masjid clerics. Above all, with the increase in militancy, ‘the militant labour demand may evolve toward greater reliance on madrasahs for recruits’ (Fair, 2009). The madrasahs and religious parties, which have been good factors for the spread of religious education and teachings of Islam, were misused by some with ulterior motives. They dabbled in sectarianism and the socalled jihad, which earned them an unfavourable image nationally and internationally. Religious extremism, sectarianism and militancy owed much to the Jihadi organisations, and a number of madrasahs involved in it. Unchecked propensity to issue fatawa was set a tone for the Islamist militancy as the militants derived legitimacy of their actions from these religious edicts.

Afghanistan Historically, Afghanistan had never been a state in the real sense. Despite the presence of a federal government in Kabul, the administration in most areas had been influenced or governed by ethnicities, militias and warlords. There had been a slack central control, whereas anarchy and banditry remained rampant. King Zahir Shah ruled for 40 years, but his writ and reforms were mostly confined to Kabul only. He was deposed in 1973 in a bloodless coup by his brother-in-law Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan who declared himself the President of Afghanistan. Later, he was killed in a coup by the army factions in 1978. After him, the successive Soviet backed governments of Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafeezullah Amin, Babrak Karmal and finally Najibullah further weakened the writ of state, and the existing schisms widened. In December 1979, the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and another bloody era ensued as the US and Pakistan backed Mujahideen fought a prolonged war against the Soviet forces. This process did not remain confined to Afghanistan only. Pakistan’s tribal areas, FATA and also the NWFP (now KP) got infested with the Afghan militants, Al Qaeda and their local supporters. Pakistan faced severe violence, Kalashnikov culture, heroine and hosted more than 3 million Afghan refugees from Afghanistan. The 2,500-kmlong porous Pak-Afghan border is a source of unhindered border crossing by all sorts of elements from both sides. Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban crossed this border in 2001 after the US attack on Afghanistan and

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sheltered in FATA. Afghan government and later on the US and British forces could not stop them from entering Pakistan from these areas. Border management had been non-existent as Afghanistan has always opposed Pakistan’s attempts to fence the border to stop unauthorised border crossing. However, the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan that was legally settled by the British rulers even before the creation of Pakistan, is secured, with which Afghanistan disagreed. The US and allied forces at least helped establish a democratic government in Kabul and kept the Taliban at bay to an extent. However, Taliban insurgency could not be quelled to the hilt. Rather it is still raging hard in Afghanistan. Pakistan is presently in a perplexing position. It had once recognised the Taliban government and extended them support too, as it had provided earlier on to millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet–Mujahideen War. Even the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai and present President Ashraf Ghani had enjoyed this hospitality for years. It was natural hospitality due to geographical contiguity and tribal affinity, from which stemmed the state policy too. Despite Afghanistan’s protest, it is as difficult for Pakistan to compel Taliban supporters to leave Pakistan as it is to Afghan refugees. Moreover, any stringent action against them can agitate their militarised groups like the Haqqani network that can create further violence in Pakistan. As the dreaded TTP was compelled to leave North Waziristan as a result of military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’, it shifted its command and control structures to Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, from where it kept launching terrorist attacks in urban centres of Pakistan. They were defeated by Pakistan military in North Waziristan as they have been provided strategic depth in Afghanistan. There is little hope that Afghanistan will become stable any time soon. The former British Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sir William Patey, had stated that Afghanistan will remain a fragile, unstable, corrupt state long after the British troops have departed (The Telegraph, August 2012).9 The spillover of violence and the inability of the Kabul government to control it would continue to affect Pakistan, especially its tribal areas.

THE MAIN CONCERN The following factors are of main concern: Al Qaeda, TTP and Afghan Taliban.

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Al Qaeda Did Al Qaeda really exist? Many Pakistanis were confused about it after 2001. Most Pakistanis did not believe that Osama bin Laden ever existed and if he was a reality, he had been killed in ‘Tora Bora’ (Afghanistan) by the US Daisy Cutters in 2002.10 These confusions and perceptions about the existence, strength, ideology and leadership of Al Qaeda were worldwide, even in the US (Byman, 2003).11 Despite this widespread ambiguity, most lower- and middle-class Pakistanis perceived Osama bin Laden as an ‘imagined hero’, whereas the educated upper middle class suspected that the CIA created him.12 These myths, confusions and ambiguities were mainly due to lack of trust in the US, mistrust against the military rule of General Musharraf, Al Qaeda’s elusive form and structure and partial coverage of events by Pakistani media. Arrests and deportation of approximately 700 Al Qaeda terrorists by Pakistan slightly contributed to removing this misconception (The Post, 2005). In fact, the US bombing on Afghanistan and the consistent news of collateral damage kept the people fixated on viewing the US as an aggressor. Thus, bin Laden’s popularity increased, which could be evidenced from one particular incident. At the end of December 2002, the funeral prayer of Aimal Kansi, who was put to death by the court orders for killing CIA officers outside the agency headquarters in Langley, in January 1993, was held at the Quetta stadium. It saw the fervour and anguish of thousands of participants, including army officers, police officers, civil bureaucrats, politicians and common people, which was so large that even the public meetings held by the political parties and General Musharraf could not attract such a crowd in their election campaigns at the same venue.13 In 2002, as a result of the US operation ‘Anaconda’ against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it was dispersed and forced to move towards the treacherous mountains of Hindu Kush along the Pak – Afghan border. Many of them sneaked into FATA. Since then it had been changing shelters from FATA to urban areas of KP, Punjab and Sindh and back to FATA to avoid annihilation by the US and the Pakistani security forces. It defied obliteration due to its mercurial form and structure. On intolerable pressure, it vanished from one area and appeared at the other.

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In the first phase, it grouped in FATA, where its old connections established during Afghan jihad sheltered its leaders. However, very soon the Pakistan security forces started an operation against them and the Taliban. Resultantly, the leaders started leaving FATA and moved towards the bigger cities of Pakistan, especially Punjab, where they operated clandestinely, far away from the area under scrutiny. In the second phase, Al Qaeda leaders found safe houses, logistic support and transport in these cities with the help of the activists of religious parties and jihadi organisations (Fair, 2009). Hamza Rabia, the operational chief of Al Qaeda, and his family lived in Lahore for 6 months in 2003–4.14 A number of Al Qaeda commanders were arrested in the cities from 2002 to 2005, including Abu Zubaydah (Faisalabad), Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Rawalpindi), Naeem Noor Khan, alias Abu Talha (Lahore), Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (Gujrat), Amjad Farooqi (killed in Nawabshah) and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (Mardan near Peshawar). After the arrests of Al Qaeda’s key leaders in Punjab, it returned to its original safe haven, for instance, FATA and started regrouping there (Musharraf, 2006). It was the beginning of the third phase. However, they were again under intense pressure from the Pakistani military operation and the US drone attacks. More than 50 Al Qaeda commanders had been killed by drone attacks in FATA until 2016. The documents recovered from the hideout of Hamza Rabia, the operational chief of Al Qaeda, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, in Gujrat (2004), revealed that the Al Qaeda leaders hiding in the Pak-Afghan border did not want to fight with the Pakistani army, but rather wanted to focus their attention on the US. Most of the army encounters therefore took place with the Uzbek desperadoes. The origin of the TTP could be explained by this logic and the policy of Al Qaeda to avoid direct skirmishes with the Pakistan Army and let the locals perform this job (Musharraf, 2006). Al Qaeda was thought to have 5,000– 12,000 members (Abuza, 2003). Different intelligence agencies had provided different data about the strength of Al Qaeda at various times. Abuza (2003) admitted that the number of people trained at the camps Bin Laden established in Afghanistan is unknown; German police estimated it to be approximately 70,000. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimation was between 15,000 and 20,000. Most became foot soldiers in an international brigade, also called the Arab brigade that

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fought alongside the Afghan Taliban. There were approximately 6,000 members in this brigade. The international brigade comprised up to one-third of the Taliban forces. Al Qaeda used the basic military training at the camps to select promising individuals for advanced training in establishing cells and combat. After 2001, the strength of Al Qaeda was estimated to have been depleted from 3,000– 4,000 to a few hundred people (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2008). In Pakistan, top Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, had been neutralised, leaving only less than 100 core group members of Al Qaeda in FATA.15 Al Qaeda struggled to replenish its strength from within Pakistan, as it did not have a system and structure to recruit Pakistanis. It relied on groups based in Pakistan to recruit helpers and facilitators to continue their activities within Pakistan (Fair, 2009). However, its asymmetrical system to run a loose federation worked well as other similar groups helped increase its strength (Rodrigues & Stichting, 2010). The spokesperson of Al Qaeda in Pakistan was an American, Adam Yahiye Gadahn, alias Adam Pearlman, from a well-known family in California. Besides Uzbeks, Chechens, Turks, Afghanis and so on, TTP was the largest and fiercest group raised by it in FATA and Swat.

Al Qaeda – TTP nexus, activities and concerns The fundamental reason for the origin of Al Qaeda was disenchantment of its leaders with the systems of their Arab homelands, for instance, mostly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Later, America became its focus due to its influence on the leaders and systems of these homelands. Initially, Pakistan was not a target of Al Qaeda. In 2002, the army operations against them in FATA made them turn against General Musharraf. However, Pakistan, as a country, was still not the target, but there seemed to be no love lost for Pakistan as was evident from its policies and actions aimed against its interests. However, Al Qaeda wanted to avail the FATA safe haven to carry on its agenda unhindered and, of course, without clashing with the Pakistan Army and security agencies. For this purpose, another ‘force’ was needed that could engage the Pakistan government and army so that Al Qaeda could focus on the US and the rest on its list. Axiomatically, the scattered tribesmen, mostly with jihadi background, who were already hosting them, were the most suitable to fit in this policy. Thus, the TTP emerged as the leading group of

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Al Qaeda, which the Pakistani Taliban had proven with their activities in FATA, Swat and the rest of Pakistan. The US concern was about the Al Qaeda in FATA. Initially, it viewed TTP as the insurgents focused on Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan failed to perceive the presence of Al Qaeda in FATA, as it was not targeting Pakistan. But soon both Pakistan and the US realised the nexus between the two and the lethality of the combination that had expanded its nature and scope of operation. The then US President Obama stated loud and clear that ‘Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that Al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the US homeland from its safe heavens in Pakistan’. He added that ‘The single greatest threat to their (US & Pakistan) interests comes from al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. That is why we must stand together’. He then warned that Pakistan would be held responsible for its potential failure to act against terrorism on its soil (The Nation, 2009). He further asserted that ‘The situation is increasingly perilous. The world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos or al-Qaeda operates unchecked’ (The Nation, 2009). These statements mirrored four US concerns, which have become one big concern for Pakistan: first, Al Qaeda is planning a big attack on the US from the Pakistani soil; secondly, its local allies are a threat to the US and Pakistan and that the latter could become a failed state; thirdly, Pakistan would be held responsible if these two (TTP and Al Qaeda) would carry out such attacks on the US and fourthly, these elements in FATA were adversely affecting US efforts in Afghanistan. Owing to its elusive nature, Al Qaeda was not visible, and as of the writing of this paper, no spectacular attack, as feared by the US, has taken place. The fact remained that Al Qaeda had no specific permanent base or particular country where it belonged. It had cells almost in 40 countries of the world (Ken & Dunne, 2002). Its rules of engagement were also exceptional, as it never engaged in a direct-armed conflict, battle or guerrilla war. It struck surreptitiously and snaked away, leaving behind trails, enough to reveal its imprints but too less to discern its operational plans and preparations. This strategy prevented disruption of its manpower and command and control structure. Its structure was fragmented and layered in sub-groups, often formed on the basis of nationalities, headed by the respective nationals. It was mercurial in

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nature as, ‘If you bring your fist down on it, it bursts into dozens of other tiny blobs of mercury’ (Ball, 2002). Al Qaeda suffered a continuous blow from 2004 onwards until the death of Osama bin Laden by US Seals at Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011. Although Osama bin Laden had informally handed over the reins of Al Qaeda to Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2006, his death in 2011 resulted in demoralisation among the ranks of Al Qaeda. Thus, drones and military actions dispersed Al Qaeda in Pakistan, but destroying it completely might take a long time. Several fighters of Al Qaeda had reportedly escaped from FATA and relocated to cities in Pakistan and as far as Somalia and Indonesia (Dawn, 2009). TTP’s nexus with Al Qaeda was also based on the latter’s policy to appropriate local struggles and fuse them into one broad ‘global jihad’ (The Guardian, 2012). The TTP despite having regional aspirations conformed to the global vision of Al Qaeda, as it was the most vibrant and violent group operating in the area where Al Qaeda’s leadership was based. This proximity was based on pragmatic needs as well. However, in fact, ideological closeness was equally important in the longer run. There were some reports of increasing mistrust between TTP and Al Qaeda after successful drone attacks on the AQ leaders in 2012. According to a report, ‘Al-Qaeda top ranks believed that it was the TTP and its commanders or people close to them who were revealing their whereabouts in Waziristan’ (The News International, 2012). This assessment seemed quite far-fetched and weak especially when compared with developments like the formation of shura and killing of TTP militants along with Al Qaeda or separately. Moreover, the number of TTP leaders killed by drone attacks was more than that of Al Qaeda. The founder chief of TTP Baitullah Mehsud died in a drone attack. The reigning TTP Chief Hakimullah Mehsud was injured in a drone attack in 2011 and faced another drone attack in January 2012. Suspicions and doubts were natural because when stakes were high and killings were continual, one looked for the spies and informers. Many spies were killed by TTP for informing the Pakistani security apparatus or the Americans.

Taliban The Taliban established a government in Afghanistan in 1996. After just five years, they were evicted from Kabul by US forces in November

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2001. The US was concerned that many Taliban had entered across the porous Pak-Afghan border to regroup in Pakistan. There were also instances of the Taliban fighters crossing over from the mostly unmanned Durand Line for rest and respite and returning to Afghanistan to fight again with the US-led forces. It was thought that they were regaining strength with the help of Pakistan’s ISI. However, in fact, unlike Al Qaeda, the Taliban was not based in FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan. They mostly remained in Afghanistan because more than 45 per cent of the Afghan population is Pashtun, which made it more convenient for them to assimilate in their own tribes. Thus, they regrouped in Afghanistan and initiated their guerrilla struggle within two months of their fall. Within five years, they again gained control over much of the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan established hundreds of pickets on the border to check Taliban infiltration. Afghanistan, on the other hand, had less than half of these pickets and had not agreed to Pakistan’s suggestion to barricade the entire border. Surprisingly, the Afghan Taliban survived for a further eight years entirely on hit-and-run operations from FATA and with Pakistan’s alleged secret help. It also believed former British Foreign Minister David Miliband’s misplaced optimism that the Taliban were ‘deeply unpopular’ and only 8 per cent of Afghans want the Taliban back. Conversely, the facts showed that Taliban were surviving on local strength and with the support from within, therefore the conflict could continue for a long time. And its intensity had already soared (The Daily Times, 2009). Consequently, Pakistan expressed apprehension of possible Taliban entry into Pakistan, especially after the initiation of Operation ‘Panther’s Claw’ by the British forces and later on the US operation against the Taliban in Helmand in July 2009 (The Daily Times, 2009). The US ‘assured to take all steps to stop infiltration of fleeing militants into Pakistan’ (The Daily Times, 2009). Holbrooke also saw little evidence that Taliban fighters had escaped from Helmand into Pakistan. However, he had to discover how the Taliban had melted away within Afghanistan (The Nation, 2009). However, the CIA soon alleged that Mullah Omar was in Pakistan and was harboured by ISI. However, a spokesperson for Foreign Office denied the report as baseless. The Washington Post reported that two senior US intelligence officials and one former senior CIA officer told

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Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan.

its scribe that Mullah Omar travelled to Karachi in September 2009 and inaugurated a new senior leadership council there. The officials alleged that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, ISI, helped the Taliban leaders move from Quetta, where they were exposed to attacks by unmanned US drones. Bruce Riedel, CIA veteran and analyst on Al Qaeda and the Taliban, confirmed that Mullah Omar had been spotted in Karachi (The News International, 2009). Interestingly, the Taliban chief Mullah Omar never approved of TTP’s activities in Pakistan. He rather asked them to come to Afghanistan for jihad. Conversely, Baitullah Mehsud although considered to be part of Mullah Omar, hardly paid heed to his instructions and concentrated on insurgency in FATA and terrorism in the cities of Pakistan. This dichotomy rebuffed the assertions that the TTP had provided an ‘essential rear base for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan’ (The New York Times, 2009). After Baitullah’s death, the new TTP Chief Hakimullah continued his policies and could not find favour with the Afghan Taliban (see Map 4.1).

CHAPTER 5 TEHREEK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)

Since 2002, some groups of tribesmen in FATA had been supporting the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda elements that escaped the US onslaught in Afghanistan (Yusuf & Adkin, 2007). These tribesmen, mostly Sunni Muslims of Deobandi sect, joined hands and formed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Religious Students’ Movement of Pakistan) on 14 December 2007. It was led by Baitullah Mehsud, who became a prominent figure after the death of famous militant tribal leaders Nek Muhammad Wazir and Abdullah Mehsud (Defence against Terrorism Review, 2008). Thus, the TTP rose from the rank of foot soldiers of Al Qaeda to an independent force, definitely backed by Al Qaeda, to implement its agenda. The reasons for the birth of TTP are historical, local and global. Unlike Afghan Taliban, TTP activists were not students of madrasahs. However, they adopted this name to take advantage of the branded name to get quick recognition and support of the Pashtuns of the tribal areas in particular and the people of Pakistan in general. The objectives of TTP were resistance against the Pakistani security forces, enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan and supporting Afghan Taliban against NATO forces in Afghanistan (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). In one interview, Baitullah Mehsud declared that his ultimate aim was to carry out attacks in New York and Washington: ‘Our main aim is to finish Britain and the United States and to crush the pride of the non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London’ (The News International, 2009).

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Ideological rhetoric aside, initially, financial benefits were a big support for the TTP. According to intelligence reports, the TTP was financially supported by Al Qaeda for keeping the security forces of Pakistan engaged so that they could operate around the Pak-Afghan border unchallenged (Hussain, 2011). However, the TTP eventually adopted the enforcement of Sharia as its main objective. It was a tactical move to give legitimacy and permanence to its existence. Anti-America stance and rhetoric always remained its stance to cash in the antiAmerican sentiments in the region. Within five years, the TTP became the largest organisation of Pakistani militants. It became active in most of the 24 districts, seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions in the North-West Frontier Province. Its strongholds were in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and Darra Adam Khel tribal regions and in the settled districts of Swat, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, Charsadda and Kohat (Terrorism Monitor, 2009). South Waziristan, home of Hakimullah, the second chief of TTP, and its HQ, has a very rugged mountainous terrain, an extension of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, making it quite inaccessible, ideal for prolonged guerrilla warfare (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2008). The TTP’s strength in FATA was estimated to be 10,000– 35,000 (Council on Foreign Relation, 2009) in 2009. In addition to the TTP, a number of militant groups grew rapidly, mostly to receive foreign funds and to establish their own writ in their respective areas. In 2013, the number of groups directly or indirectly affiliated with the TTP was about 43 and the combined strength of their fighters was approximately 11,000 (Dawn, 2013).1 These included Datta Khel-based Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group, non-Taliban Islamist militant groups in Khyber Agency, mostly in the Bara area like Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islam, late Haji Namdar’s Amr Bil Maruf Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) and Ustad Mahbub-ul-Haq’s Ansar ul Islam (Terrorism Monitor, 2009). They were closely associated with 12 foreign militant groups, including Al Qaeda. The group of politico-religious parties called Muttahida Majlis-eAmal (MMA), which had won the elections in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) with the connivance of General Pervez Musharraf (Outlook India, 2003) and ruled the province from 2002 to 2008, had a soft corner

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for the TTP. Moreover, the federal government of Pakistan remained ambivalent in tackling it. The security forces of Pakistan carried out operations against the local militants in 2002 to prevent them from providing protection to Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda in North and South Waziristan. However, it started relying on negotiations a bit too early. Hence, the TTP gained strength and became a menace for Pakistan. On 25 August 2008, the government of Pakistan imposed a ban on TTP, froze its bank accounts and assets and barred it from media appearances. The government also announced bounties on its prominent leaders (The News International, 2008). However, such bans and bars had little effect on the terrorist organisations like TTP, which have no offices and bank accounts as well as do not make public appearances. It only created awareness among the public and gave authority to announce head money on their wanted militants. The TTP continued to operate and flourish. It intensified its insurgency in FATA and Swat and conducted horrendous terrorism across Pakistan continuously.

STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM OF TTP Most TTP fighters were not intransigent ideological extremists, but belonged to different segments with different reasons for joining the TTP: 1. A large number of unemployed youth in FATA, who were recruited on payment of Rs 15,000– 20,000 per month (sterling 100– 120); 2. Criminals, who were lured by incentives, gun and legitimacy to operate; 3. Hardcore extremists of proscribed sectarian and jihadi organisations such as SSP, LJ and JeM; 4. Angry and aggrieved relatives of those who were killed in military operations and drone attacks (Times, 2009). There was a general opinion that the TTP was combined of bedraggled illiterate tribesmen living in remote areas who had little knowledge about modern life and warfare; however, that was an incorrect impression. The TTP had developed itself into a well-organised force, which had

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systems and procedures in place to run the organisation and its activities. It had a shura (consultative body), a seniority list of its leaders, a promotion policy, system of election of its Amir (Chief), media policy, code of discipline, well-thought-out policies and strategies to carry out insurgency and terrorism. It was reported that the TTP maintained a list of at least 15 seniormost leaders or commanders who were assigned important posts. The seniority was established on the basis of not only the length of time spent in the organisation but also the performance. Qari Walayat Mehsud was considered for the vacant slot of the chief of TTP after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, although he stood eleventh on the seniority list. However, his performance was outstanding. He had reportedly masterminded the horrendous suicide attack on the Kohati Church in Peshawar in September 2013. The closeness and kinship with the core group of TTP leadership also played a role in giving seniority and assigning important posts. Qari Walayat Mehsud was first cousin of Hakimullah Mehsud. However, he lost to Maulvi Fazlullah of Swat because he was considered a better choice by the TTP Majlis-e-Amla. The TTP’s Majlis-e-Amla, comprising 15 members, voted for the election of the Amir (The Nation, 2013).

TTP IN SWAT The militants operating in the Swat area of KP (formerly NWFP) were as destructive and brutal, if not more, as the main Waziristani TTP. They were headed by Maulvi Fazlullah, who was known as Maulvi FM for running unauthorised FM radio to propagate his militant views of ‘imagined Islam’ (Dawn, 2009). Their strength was estimated to be 3,000 (Democracy News Analysis, 2009) to 5,000 (The News International, 2009). They had been resorting to bombing, destroying schools or seizing them as their bases, beheading opponents and capturing security personnel (The News International, 2009). Swat, a formerly princely state, is a picturesque valley in the northwest of Pakistan. It falls in the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province but is a settled area and is not part of FATA. Unlike Waziristan, it shares no border with Afghanistan. Its population is approximately three million. It is only 160 km (80 miles) away from

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Islamabad, a geographical proximity to the capital of Pakistan that is often considered a matter of concern. The roots of this militant group of Swat could be traced back to the late 1980s when Maulvi Fazlullah’s father-in-law Sufi Muhammad formed an organisation Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) or the Movement for the Establishment of the Law of Prophet Muhammad, a Wahabi group, in Swat to strive to enforce his brand of Sharia in the area. In a bid to achieve this objective, TNSM posed several threats in the 1990s, including taking over the local airport and blocking the highway connecting Pakistan and China (The Nation, 2009). Its motto was shariat ya shahadat (Islamic laws or martyrdom). As Sufi states: ‘Those opposing the imposition of sharia in Pakistan are wajibulqatl (worth being killed).’ TNSM denounced democracy as unIslamic (The News International, 2009). In 2001, Sufi raised a lashkar (militia) of ill-equipped and untrained Mujahideen to support in the fight of Afghan Taliban against the US invasion. The lashkar was annihilated by the US air attacks and the brutal Northern Alliance forces. Sufi retreated but was arrested by the government of Pakistan and imprisoned (The Nation, 2009). He was released only in 2008 at the initiative of the Awami National Party government in NWFP to broker a peace deal between the government and Maulvi Fazlullah’s militant group. He was again imprisoned on 30 July 2009 when a Swat police station had accused him of hate speech against the government, in which he had termed the Constitution of Pakistan ‘unIslamic’ and demanded enforcement of the Sharia. He was released nine years later on the orders of the Peshawar High Court on 14 January 2018. During imprisonment, in 2015, Sufi Muhammad issued an informal decree against his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah-led Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), declaring that its members lacked the traits essential for a Muslim. ‘They [TTP] do not come up to the definition of Momin and Muslim set by the Holy Prophet (PBUH),’ he stated in a written ‘will’. After his release from the jail, he again accused Maulana Fazlullah of bringing bad name to the TNSM, killing a number of its leaders and inflicting colossal loss on seminaries (DAWN, 15 January 2018). The loosely organised TNSM and its offshoots were still strong in the Matta tehsil of Swat and in villages on the banks of the Swat River.

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Sufi Muhammad led the campaign for enforcement of Sharia in 1994, and later his 32-year-old son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah took command. He had been operating in a more brutal and aggressive manner. His group of militants had been trying to implement its uncouth brand of Sharia. Swat was a serene and safe place where justice was neither delayed nor did it require a lot of money. The political system provided an effective justice system based on Sharia (Islamic way of life) and Rewaj (traditions/ customs). Nevertheless, it should not be taken, as is commonly believed, that Shariat was the Supreme Law and that all the people were bound to follow and decide their cases accordingly in the Qazi courts. The Qazi courts were subservient to the administrative cum judicial officers and Islamic laws to the regional ‘Codes of Conduct’, and both were subordinate to the orders of the rulers. There were fines for all kinds of offences, for instance, murders, thefts and adultery. Strict Islamic rules and laws were seldom followed. Swat had a fairly developed socio-political and administrative set-up at the time of independence. Its cultural values were entrenched in Islamic traditions coupled with a unique sense of individual existence. After merger of Swat with West Pakistan in 1969, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was enforced in the Malakand division comprising the former princely states of Swat, Dir, Chitral and the Malakand Protected Area. Later, the PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Area) regulations were introduced in 1975, and at the same time, certain laws of the settled areas were extended. It may be noted that the status of PATA was in accordance with that of these areas by virtue of Article 246 (b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Similarly, Article 247(3) (4) and (5) of the Constitution of Pakistan provides for special procedures for extension of laws to FATA/PATA. The PATA Regulation I and II of 1975 and the Regulation IV of 1976 created a parallel judicial system. In this way, certain matters were decided by Sessions & Civil courts, while others remained in the jurisdiction of Jirgas. The judicial system was divided into two parts under the PATA regulations. The offences falling under Part I were exclusively dealt with by tribal Jirga to be constituted by the then Deputy Commissioner. These Jirgas were given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all offences except offences against the state, relating to the armed forces, elections and so on. The Jirga could adjudicate on all disputes of criminal nature. A Naib

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Tehsildar could preside over the Jirga hearing. The penalty for murder was life imprisonment, and there was no death penalty. The regular legal system resulted in judicial delays. Swat, usually known for its speedy justice, now had cases pending for decades. The ideological underpinnings of the old system were also lost, and a religious void was created. The people were slowly disillusioned and sought reforms based on the traditional Islamic practices. Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and his sonin-law Fazlullah of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Swat Chapter, exploited the situation and resorted to insurgency. The government entered into agreement with Sufi Muhammad to introduce Nizam-e-Adl in Swat. The insurgents, however, continued their activities and violated the agreement. Thus, an army operation was launched and the insurgents were subdued (Ali & Khan, 2010). The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 was retroactively effective from 15 March 2009. The system has three tiers, namely ilaqa (local area) court, the zila (district) court and the Darul qaza, which acts as a supreme court (Shoaib, 2009). According to this Regulation, the criminal and civil cases were to be disposed of in the stipulated times of four and six months, respectively. However, it could not become fully functional due to the dearth of Qazis, trained lawyers, apathy of the government and so on. It became a rueful replica of jaded judicial system prevalent in the rest of Pakistan. Its repercussions could be disastrous. The World Development Report 2011 stated that ‘In places like Swat, formal systems for the provision of justice were weak or broken down’. It also warned that ‘At the local level, this breakdown opens gaps not only in the core criminal justice system, but also in the regulation of land and family disputes’: Such gaps have led to popular frustration and have opened opportunities to violent opposition movements such as the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have in some areas of the country established a shadow presence offering an alternative local dispute resolution system (Dawn, 2011). The Swati Taliban were closely linked with Waziristani TTP. At a higher level, they were a component of the Hakimullah Mehsud-led TTP (The News International, 2008).

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Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ was a success. However, Fazlullah and his main commanders escaped unhurt, which remained a matter of concern for the people of Swat. Many businessmen and traders were reluctant to return to their homes in Swat to reopen their small businesses. Although Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ was acclaimed within the country and abroad and cited as an example of the success of the military over militancy, those who wanted to see the top leadership of the TTP Swat chapter either captured or killed remained sceptical about its final success. Fazlullah and some of his commanders, such as Ibne Amin of Matta, Mohammad Alam, alias commander Khalil of Fatehpur, and the most vocal Shah Dauran, who threatened people via FM radio, remained untraceable (The News International, 2009). But soon it became clear as Maulana Fazlullah claimed that he had safely crossed over to Afghanistan. According to the BBC Urdu Service, the Maulana informed its Peshawar reporter that he was in Afghanistan and that his fighters would soon start guerrilla attacks against security forces in Swat. According to the report, Fazlullah read a written statement while speaking from a mobile phone having an Afghanistan code (The News International, 2009). Fazlullah threatened that Information Minister NWFP (now KP) Mian Iftikhar Hussain, who was in the forefront in condemning the Taliban, would meet the same fate as late Afghan president Najibullah. It may be recalled that Najibullah was shot dead and then hanged, along with his younger brother Ahmadzai, in Aryana Square, Kabul, by the Afghan Taliban on 27 September 1996, the day they captured the city. Brig. (retd) Mahmood Shah, former FATA secretary chief, stated that the escape of Fazlullah to Afghanistan was the failure of security forces. He said, ‘It would be a great embarrassment for Pakistani and Afghan security forces if Fazlullah has crossed over’ (The News International, 2009). Despite this lapse, for which the army and people had to pay dearly afterwards, the successful offensive against the Taliban of Swat restored the credibility of the Pakistan military and hope in the people of Swat who were utterly dismayed before Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’, wondering that the state would ever come to their rescue. The militants were also in high spirits. Many of their foot soldiers were heard boasting about their writ in Swat, and that the Pakistan government had ceased to exist in Swat (The News International, 2009). However, they were proven wrong.

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Their command and control structures were dismantled. The only flaw was that Fazlullah and his diehard companions escaped to Afghanistan. According to confirmed information, he had moved to Kunar province of Afghanistan and carried out cross-border incursions on Pakistani check posts. On 27 August 2011, approximately 200– 300 militants launched an attack from Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan on seven border posts in Chitral, Pakistan. According to a statement of ISPR, ‘At least 25 security forces personnel, 16 Frontier Scouts, four policemen and five levies were killed in this terrorist attack from across the border.’ The military sources informed that such attacks are planned and carried out by Fazlullah of Swat and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur. Since their expulsion from their native areas, these terrorists have organised themselves with the support of local Afghan authorities in the two Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan (Dawn, 2011). Afghan intelligence officials in the province of Nuristan also accused the Afghan central government and NATO forces, in particular, of ignoring insurgents there and in other strategically important areas close to the Pakistani border, for instance, the provinces of Laghman, Kunar and Nangarhar, which pose a significant security threat. As stated by one senior police official in the Nuristan province, ‘Nuristan is now Al Qaeda and Taliban central.’ ‘They attack in hundreds, they have blocked key roads. We need to retake these areas from them’ (BBC News, 2011). On the Eid day of 31 August 2011, the TTP based in Kunar kidnapped 30 young boys of the Mohmand tribe from Bajaur and whisked them away to Kunar. A substantial number of US troops based in Kunar failed to trace TTP activities. The Mohmand tribe had sided with the Pakistan Army in operation against militants in Bajaur, as earlier the TTP had kidnapped its children to make a deal for swapping them with their detainees (Mir, 2011). People and the government became extremely suspicious of the surreptitious backing to these attacks. The Fazlullah-led TTP elements based in Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan liberally carried out militant activities in the Pakistani areas of Chitral, Dir and Bajaur, but the Afghan government and US/NATO forces did not take any action against them. Some termed it a payback for Pakistan as it was supporting the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. It might also be a pressure tactic to browbeat Pakistan for allegedly harbouring Afghan

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Taliban in Quetta and elsewhere. Regardless of the agenda, this policy of harbouring TTP and letting them attack Pakistanis severely undermined the US-Pakistan ally status, weakened the efforts to bring peace in the region and further increased the mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As long Fazlullah and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad were not subdued in Afghanistan, complete peace could not be guaranteed in Swat and other areas adjacent to Kunar and Nuristan provinces. They remained a significant threat not only to the stability of the north-western borders of Pakistan but also to peace and tranquillity in KP and other provinces of Pakistan. According to a report of the International Crisis Group: Since July 2009, the military and many in the media have hailed the Swat operation as Pakistan’s most successful counter-insurgency operation ever. Yet more than three years later, pledges that the TNSM, Pakistani Taliban and other militant leaders would be brought to justice are unfulfilled. The military has used the pace of IDP returns as the main gauge of success. Most have indeed returned, but their lives have fundamentally changed for the worse, with the conflict and continued militancy radically transforming the region’s economic, social and political complexion. Even as the military suggests that the civilian leadership’s unwillingness to assume responsibility over Malakand has undermined the ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy, it shows no signs of wanting to extricate itself from the region. But the longer PATA’s militarisation continues, and the deeper it goes, the greater the costs of the conflict (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2013).

TTP PUNJAB CHAPTER The TTP Punjab chapter was founded in July/August 2009. They were called Punjabi Taliban. According to intelligence reports, the TTP Commander Hussain Mehsud presided at a meeting at Imran Hotel Noor Din Market (weapons market), Miramshah, North Waziristan, and formed this chapter. He addressed about ten participants and stated that it was essential to carry out terrorist activities in Punjab in order to divert the attention from counter-insurgency in FATA to counter

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terrorism in Punjab as the TTP was facing pressure due to army operations. Qari Abdul Majeed, alias Qari Zafar, alias Qari Abu Kahafa was appointed the Ameer of Punjab Chapter.2 They decided to attack the offices of security forces, intelligence agencies, police, police stations, tombs of Sufis, imambargahs and processions of Shiʿa. The TTP formed sub-groups for terrorist activities in Punjab, some of which are as follows: 1. Ghazi Force: It was tasked to avenge the attack on Lal Masjid, Islamabad by carrying out terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan, especially in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Commander Hilal r/o Orakzai Agency was nominated as in-charge. 2. Basra Force: It was named after the dreaded leader of Lashkar-eJhangvi, Riaz Basra, who was killed in an encounter in 2002. Its aim was to avenge the death of Riaz Basra by carrying out terrorist activities in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Commander Haroon was appointed as the commander in charge of this group. 3. Junood-e-Hafsa Force: It was formed to avenge the death of female students killed in the Lal Masjid operation. Qari Asmatullah Muavia, alias Saad r/o Khanewal was appointed the Amir of this force. 4. Siraiki Karwan: It was formed to carry out terrorist activities in southern Punjab. Muhammad Hanif Gabol, alias Muavia was appointed the commander of this force. He was linked with Sipahe-Sahaba. In 2009–10, Punjab faced the worst terrorist attacks. All those mentioned in the meeting of Qari Hussain Mehsud were targeted. In 2010 alone, Lahore faced seven major suicide and gun and grenade attacks, leading to more than 200 deaths and approximately 700 injuries. In the same year, about 12 low-intensity bomb blasts took place in Lahore, resulting in two deaths and 40 injuries. The army’s general headquarters (GHQ) situated in Rawalpindi (Punjab) was attacked by Punjabi Taliban. In 2011– 2, their activities against armed forces became more pronounced. For instance, they attacked twice and killed army men in Gujrat. They also attacked Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra, and damaged a SAAB reconnaissance aeroplane. All nine attackers, four from Punjab, were killed in the gun battle. More worrying was the

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fact that the TTP’s plan to attack the nuclear site in Dera Ghazi Khan (Punjab-bordering Balochistan province) came to light, which alarmed the security forces. The target could be a key military and civilian fuel cycle site located about 40 km from DG Khan (Express Tribune, 2012). Asmatullah Muavia was the head of TTP Punjab, who conducted a series of terrorist activities in KP and Punjab for a number of years. However, after the military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was launched in North Waziristan in 2014, he announced to call off armed struggle in Pakistan (Dawn, 2014). He gave mixed statements that they would only indulge in Tabligh (preaching) in Pakistan but their activities inside Afghanistan would continue. It was not known on what terms and conditions the military pardoned him for the terrorist activities Punjabi Taliban had carried out under his command. When the newly elected government of Nawaz Sharif initiated its efforts to negotiate with the TTP, the Punjabi Taliban became increasingly open to peace talks with the government, which was the reason the main leadership parted ways with them.

TTP’S TACTICS AND TARGETS The TTP had been carrying out insurgency in its strongholds of Waziristan and Swat and terrorism in urban centres of Pakistan. Its twopronged strategy aimed at establishing its writ in the insurgency hit areas and to keep the government demoralised through suicide attacks in the cities.

Insurgency There is an appreciable overlap between many of the insurgent movements and terrorist organisations. Taliban would be considered as both an insurgent and terrorist organisation. Insurgency is generally the origin of terrorist attacks in areas and population centres that fall out of the domain of insurgents. It is done to either draw attention to the cause or reaction to counter-insurgency measures or both. The TTP falls in the same category of an insurgent and terrorist organisation. In line with the definition of insurgency, ‘the organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of

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a region’, the TTP effectively challenged the writ of the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) and the federal government of Pakistan in FATA and in Malakand agency, especially Swat Valley through subversion and militancy. In FATA, the TTP undermined the administration and tried to run a parallel government. The Political Agent, a powerful institution representing the federal government, was confined to his office only.3 The ancient system of handling the tribes through Maliks was shattered as more than 200 Maliks were killed in FATA within three years. TTP extremists frequently resorted to beheadings, killing for petty reasons, inhuman treatment of opponents, occupying girls’ schools and destruction of government and private property with a view to establishing their writ in the area and creating fear (The News International, 2009). In 2011, a majority of people in KP celebrated Eid on 7 November as announced by the government, but in parts of TTP-dominated Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency and Orakzai Agency and some tribal areas, it was celebrated on 6 November. Lashkar-e-Islami announced via FM radio the residents of Seepah, Malikdin Khel, Akkakhel, Shalobar and Qamarkhel Bara to celebrate Eid on 6 November. The Shura (Central Committee) of Amr Bil Maruf was Nahi Anil Munkar (Haji Namdar Group), which also made the similar announcement (Dawn, 2011). The militants were even active in flood relief when worst floods hit KP and other areas of Pakistan. They continued their struggle against the state despite the flood disaster. An attack launched by insurgents from the Khyber tribal region on a police post killed two civilians in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who had been active with a militia set-up against the militants. Attacks in other places continued in an organised and indefatigable manner as in the past. The militants remained highly organised and capable of striking at any time. While Interior Minister Rehman Malik announced that the militants would not be allowed to take advantage of the flood situation by carrying out relief activities, in reality, they were already creating a space for themselves among people and taking advantage of government failings to strengthen their own position. The set-up of training as fighters made them capable of doing so. The continued attacks were only to demoralise security forces and the population as a whole. Their successes were limited by the credibility of the government and the Interior Minister (The News International, 2010).

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Hundreds of schools, especially girls’ schools were destroyed by bombing by TTP miscreants in all areas under their control. Even in December 2011, when there was a lot of news about negotiations with the TTP, they continued destroying the schools. For example, on 28 December, they destroyed a government girls’ primary school with explosives in the Somnat area of Shabqadar in Charsadda district, KP. The school building was completely destroyed in the blast. Similarly, the terrorists blew up two schools in Chilas area of Diamer (The Daily Times, 2011). In Swat, Maulana Fazlullah had been trying to enforce its writ by similar tactics, including closing down barbershops, CDs and music shops and girls’ schools. His militants had been destroying or occupying government buildings and blowing up bridges. The basic health units and hotels, electricity and gas installations had been bombed and road blockades and checkpoints were set up. Beheadings of personnel of security forces and police and political rivals were common. Bodies of people slain overnight were dumped in the morning by the roadside everywhere in Swat (The News International, 2009). The TTP stifled dissent with an iron hand as its henchmen assassinated about 146 moderate clerics for opposing suicide bombing and violence carried out by the TTP (CNBC, 2012). In 2010, the battle lines were drawn and were firmly in place. TTP militants carried out suicide attacks and bomb blasts in South Waziristan, targeting the opponents to make it clear that in the tribal belt they could not tolerate even the slightest divergence from their rigid views. They started targeting people who were not entirely sympathetic to the Taliban cause. On 24 August 2010, a teenager carried out a suicide attack inside a mosque in Wana during Ramadan. At least 25 people were killed, but the primary target appeared to have been Maulana Noor Mohammad, a former MNA, who was elected on a JUI-F ticket. The JUI-F was not unsympathetic to the Taliban command, and Maulana Noor Mohammad had in the past personally brokered ‘peace deals’ between militants and the state. Obviously, Maulana was not opposed outright to the Taliban frame of mind. But he was killed simply because he looked askance in the presence of Uzbek militias. The message from the militants, like the warning issued by George Bush in 2001, was clear: you are either with us or against us. Not even a note of dissent was acceptable to the insurgents and there was no room for ‘moderates’ (Dawn, 2010).

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Similarly, Maulana Hassan Jan was killed at Swat for preaching moderation. Maulana Sarfraz Naeemi of Jamia Naeemia Lahore was killed in a suicide attack on his Madrasah at Garhi Shahu, Lahore, for issuing ‘fatwa’ against suicide attacks. The other prominent clerics who were eliminated include Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, Maulana Habibullah, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, Mufti Abdus Sami, Mufti Atiqur Rehman, Mufti Jamil Khan, Maulana Noor Muhammad, Maulana Aslam Sheikhupuri (Karachi) and Maulana Syed Mohsin Shah (Darra Pezu, KP). Rahimullah Yusufzai, resident editor of daily The News, was of the view that most of the cases remained unresolved due to ‘political compulsions or due to the government’s incompetence’. Tahir-ul-Qadri, a religious scholar (Barelvi) having a large following in Punjab, wrote a book to oppose suicide bombing, which earned him the wrath of TTP that he had to escape from Pakistan. He returned to Pakistan in June 2014.

Terrorism The TTP started expanding its area of influence and activities out of the region of Pashtun ethnicity and the precincts of FATA and KP (formerly NWFP) by employing ‘the unlawful use of force or violence to intimidate the government and the civilian population, in furtherance of its objectives’. This strategy was twofold: first, to develop sympathisers and supporters in new groups and areas; second, to carry out terrorist activities in these areas. A number of devastating suicide attacks, such as those on FIA Building Lahore; Naval War College, Lahore; Islamabad Marriot Hotel; Wah Ordnance Factory (2008); Sri Lankan cricket team, Lahore; Manawan Police Training School, Lahore, GHQ, Rawalpindi; Elite Police Training School and bomb blasts in Peshawar (2009), revealed the intent and intensity of its designs. A ban on TTP in 2008 did little to deter its militants as they carried out 12 suicide attacks in Punjab in the same year. These attacks showed the group’s growing network of allies among the local criminal and extremist groups, particularly in the Seraiki belt of southern Punjab. A better picture of the terror sans frontiers was revealed during the investigation of the September 2008 bombing of the Islamabad Marriot Hotel. Of the more than 250 suspects arrested from southern Punjab, a large number of them belonged to LJ, JeM, LeT, SSP, TJP and SMP. It was clear then that the Taliban were no longer a purely Pashtun movement. The members of terrorist and sectarian organisations from

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Punjab had started collaborating with them to carry out activities within Pakistan (Rediff News, 2009). It struck repeatedly in Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar. The shrines of revered Sufi saints were targeted in Peshawar, Swat and as far as in Lahore, Punjab and Karachi. The twin suicide attack on the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh, known as Data Darbar (the court of the giver) resulted in 40 deaths and 175 injuries in 2010. In the same year, lowintensity bomb blasts were detonated at the shrines of Peer Khaki Shah at Bagrial Chowk, Green Town, and on 3 June 2010, two low-intensity bomb explosions occurred at Duri Buri Darbarat Lahore (Shah, 2015). In Karachi, nine people, including two children, were killed and more than 65 others sustained injuries when two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in the Clifton area, Karachi, in October 2010. These incidents at the places greatly revered by followers of all schools of thought horrified people all over the country (The News International, 2010). After two days, the shrine of Mian Karim Baba at Swabi (KP) was blown up by detonating an IED planted close to it. Some of the details related to the incidents of bombing the shrines and madaris in KP are provided in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These activities demonstrated the terrorists’ strong sectarian animosity and intolerance towards other sects like Barelvis and Shiʿas. It gave a new dimension to the terrorist strategy, which helped them diversify their activities resulting in confusing the government and attracting different religious extremist groups in their fold or at least developed sympathy for them. Most of the terrorist attacks carried out by the TTP in urban centres, especially in Punjab are sectarian in nature. This cunning move not only attracted the ultra-violent activists of LeJ towards the TTP, but has also created an ever-widening wedge between Barelvis and Deobandis and between Shiʿas and Sunnis, causing widespread unrest and mistrust in the society.

Suicide terrorism When a suicide bomber attacked the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad in 1996, most people in Pakistan concluded that the perpetrator was not a Muslim as suicide is forbidden in Islam. However, there are some sects of Islam which believe that self-sacrifice, may be in the form of suicide attacks,

Sheikh Gull Sahibzadgan Sahiban Painda Muhammad Faqeer Muhammad Muhammad Ibrahim Syed Hussain Shah Baba Maulana Humayun Al-Rasheed Maulana Alam Zaib Maulana Siraj-ud-Din Maulana Muhammad Hussain Maulana Peer Syed Maulana Muhammad Raza Khan Maulana Mumtaz Ahmad Shah Maulana Ghulam Rehmani Maulana Syed Bashir Maulana Peer Painda Muhammad Peer Ghulam Muhammad Peer Ghulam Muhammad Maulana HabibUllah Khan Maulana Rozi Rehman

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

Names of Ulma Karam Khanqa Peeru Khail Shareef Khanqa Khanqa Khanqa Khanqa Jamia Masjid Madrasah Syed Alia Markazi Jamia Masjid/Madrasah Maaraj Al-Aloom Arbi Masjid/ Madrasah Zia Al-Aloom Behrin Swat Madrasah Qadria Ghaforia Madrasah Akhtar Al- Aloom Barkatia Daral Aloom Daral Mustafa Jamia Masjid Jamia Masjid Faizan Madina Daral Aloom Ghousia Tabian Al-Qur’an Khanqa Daral Aloom Muhammdia Qadria Daral Aloom Qadria Rizwia Jamia Masjid Syed Abad

Shrine/madaris/masjid

Details of shrines/madaris bombed by terrorists in KP.

S.no.

Table 5.1

Bagh Kundi Shareef District Dir Gul Abad Chakdrah District Dir Asbanar (District Dir) Asbanar (District Dir)

Tanrod Rug Swat Kanjoo Swat Kabal District Swat Shamzoi District Swat Madian Swat Thana Mala Kand Agency

Landi Kotal Khyber Agency Thana Mala Kand Agency Batkhela Mala Kand Agency (Abuha) Swat Peer Baba (R.A.) Dist. Bonir Peer Baba (R.A.) Dist. Bonir Peer Baba (R.A.) Dist. Bonir Behrin Swat

Territory

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Table 5.2 Details of the killing of Sunni Ulema linked with various shrines in KP.5 S.no. Names 1

Madrasah/masjid

4 5

Sheikh Al-Hadith Jamia Junedia Alama Ghaforia Noor-ud-Din Sheikh Al-Hadith Allama Jamia Junedia Ghaforia Muhammad Humayun Nazim-e-Ala Jamia Junedia Haji Abdul Ghaforia Azeem Bacha Sahib – Hafiq Rafi Ullah –

6

Sami Ullah

7

22 Followers and 40 common persons Maulana Sami Ullah Maulana Bahadur Khan Sharif Ullah

2

3

8 9 10

11

Brother of Maulana Kaleem Ullah

Shrine

Peeru Khail Landi Kotal Khyber Agency Peeru Khail Landi Kotal Khyber Agency Peeru Khail Landi Kotal Khyber Agency – Area of Noshehra Peshawar – Area of Mata Dist. Swat – Area of Muta Dist. Swat Masjid Qabal Area District Swat Masjid Madian District Swat – Khanqa Torwal Sharif Bahrain – Thana Mala Kand Agency

can win God’s favour and redemption from one’s sins (Hafez, 2009). Such a sect is hardly known in Pakistan, where Hanafi School of thought is largely followed, which strictly prohibits suicide. Ironically, the quick conclusion of most Pakistanis was proven wrong when it was revealed that an Egyptian Muslim had carried out the attack on the Egyptian embassy. When Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the tribal areas of Pakistan became active after 2002, suicide bombing shocked the people of Pakistan. From 2002 to 2006, about 25 suicide attacks took place. It increased to 57 in 2007 and 61 in 2008 and reached the maximum of 90 in 2009. The year 2010 remained equally bad with more focus on Punjab, especially

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Lahore. Rather it was the bloodiest year. There was a respite in 2011 as 44 suicide bombings were recorded that year, while 16 suicide bombings took place in 2012 until June. According to the details given in one estimate, 2009 saw the most suicide bombings, with 1,090 people killed and 3,462 injured. The highest number of people killed was 1,153 in 2010, with 58 suicide bombings. According to another analysis and estimate: 1,224 people were killed and more than 2,100 wounded in suicide bombings during the year 2010, slightly up from the previous year which was itself a record since Pakistan signed up for the war on terrorism. The number of suicide attacks, by itself, fell by as much as 35 per cent, which means the attacks that took place had a greater strike rate (Mir, 2010). In 2011, approximately 625 people were killed, while 1,386 got injured. In the first three months of that year, the suicide bombers carried out Table 5.3

Suicide attacks, deaths and injuries from 2002 to 2017.

Year

No. of suicide attacks

Killed

Injured

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total*

1 2 7 4 7 54 59 76 49 41 39 43 25 19 5 11 442

15 69 89 84 161 765 893 949 1,167 628 365 751 336 161 44 211 6,688

34 103 321 219 352 1,677 1,846 2,356 2,199 1,183 607 1,411 601 360 109 552 13,930

*Data until 30 December 2017.

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11 attacks killing 155 people and leaving more than 340 others wounded (January – March 2011). Of them, 85 people were killed and 179 others injured in 6 different suicide attacks in March 2011 (CMC report, 2011). In 2012, 119 had been killed and 254 injured until June. According to an estimate, suicide bombings in the country resulted in a total number of 6,477 deaths and 13,378 injuries. The data of suicide attacks, deaths and injuries from 2002 to 2016 are given in Table 5.3.4 The targets of these suicide attacks were security and intelligence personnel and offices as well as civilian population. Many attacks targeted Shiʿa, Ahmadis and the Barelvis, shrines and moderate mullahs. Most of the suicide bombers hailed from KP and tribal areas, mostly ranging between 14 and 25 years of age. In 2017, however, most of the suicide attacks took place in Balochistan province. Although the overall frequency of suicide attacks declined in Pakistan, it remained high in Balochistan.

CHAPTER 6 LAL MASJID OPERATION, ESCALATION IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND EXPANSION ACROSS THE COUNTRY

Shortly before the formal launching of TTP in December 2007, there was a manifold escalation in terrorist activities that terrified the people of Pakistan. In 2005, only four terrorist activities were recorded, in which 84 people were killed; in 2006, the number increased marginally as seven such activities were recorded killing 163 people. However, in 2007, there was a meteoric rise in terrorism as 54 terrorist activities were recorded killing 760 people. This situation became severe as the subsequent years witnessed a further escalation in terrorism. The main reason behind this surge in terrorism and violence, which was also considered by some as the reason for the formal birth of TTP, was the army operation on ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque) situated in the heart of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad.1 The Pakistan Army’s 111 Brigade and Special Services Group commandoes launched an operation, codenamed Operation ‘Sunrise’ against the clerics and students of Lal Masjid, Islamabad, on 16 July 2007. The Lal Masjid and the adjacent Madrasah Hafsa were besieged from 3 July to 11 July 2007, while negotiations were attempted between the militants and the cabinet ministers Ch. Shujaat Hussain and Ijaz-ul-Haq. Once negotiations failed, the complex was stormed and captured by the Pakistan Army’s Special Service Group. The conflict ended with

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154 deaths, and 50 militants were captured. The assault resulted in proTaliban rebels along the Pak–Afghan border, breaching a ten-month-old peace agreement with the Pakistani government. This event triggered the Third Waziristan War, which marked another surge in militancy and violence in Pakistan, resulting in more than 3,000 casualties. Many analysts viewed that the situation could have been tackled by the local administration at initial stages without the assistance of the army; however, it was allowed to settle for six months, by which time it reached a level where the army operation would seem the only viable option. However, even at that time, many of them preferred the Elite Police Force to take effective control of the situation. When the situation worsened, the politicians tried to find a negotiated settlement. However, the ruling party leaders, Ch. Shujaat Hussain and Ijaz-ul-Haq, had to cut a sorry figure when military operation was launched while they were engaged in talks with the holed up cleric leader Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi (The Daily Times, 2009). General Musharraf’s strategy was to create a situation that could be resolved through the army. He wanted the international community, especially the US, to believe that only he could tackle these militants. The army was his constituency on which he could survive and thrive. Secondly, he tried to emulate Zia-ul-Haq’s Afghan policy to get the US aid and support for countering terrorism through army action. He even boasted of earning millions of dollars by arresting 657 Al Qaeda activists (Musharraf, 2006). The 304-page report of the Lal Masjid Commission, although criticised for not providing the complete data, blamed former president Pervez Musharraf, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the members of his cabinet for being indirectly responsible for the Lal Masjid tragic incident. However, the former Prime Minister Ch. Shujaat Hussain, the former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Tariq Azeem and cabinet members held the former President Pervez Musharraf accountable for the Lal Masjid operation. According to the ex-prime ministers and cabinet members, the Lal Masjid operation could have been avoided by adopting some other option. TV talk show host and journalist Hamid Mir, who had been part of the negotiation process between the Lal Masjid clerics and the government, stated in his article that Musharraf wanted to stage a big drama in Islamabad, whereas the politicians in his government did not want him to

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do this. He further added that repeated efforts of Ch. Shujaat Hussain, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Ijaz-ul-Haq, the then Minister for Religious Affairs, and Fazlur Rehman Khalil to resolve the matter amicably were undermined by Musharraf as he needed dead bodies to show to the Americans to protect and prolong his rule (Mir, 2012). Consequently, suicide bombings escalated in the big cities. As stated by Hamid Mir in the same article, ‘Musharraf got the desired dead bodies and we are picking the bodies till today.’ Besides suicide bombing, the terrorists employed all methods, including gun and grenade attacks, IEDs with remote controls and timers, to create terror. Even before TTP came into being in a formal manner in 2007, its components were fully involved in militant and terrorist activities. It was especially after General Musharraf’s Operation ‘Silence’ on Lal Masjid in July 2007 that TTP accelerated its actions in FATA, Swat, KP (formerly NWFP) and the rest of Pakistan. The extremists came down hard on the state and the military operation in the tribal areas of Waziristan and Swat only escalated it (Pakistan Insider, 2011). Only 13 days after its formal formation (14 December 2007), one of the boldest and most heinous terrorist acts attributed to the TTP was the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud had threatened her before her return from self-exile. The modus operandi was suicide attack and firing. The emboldened militants attacked the army’s general headquarters (GHQ) on 10 October 2009. The attack was carefully planned and considered the boldest yet against the military. Ten Taliban fighters shot their way into GHQ to take hold of senior military officers as hostages in order to demand the release of more than 100 high-profile prisoners held by the security forces. The militants failed to achieve their primary objectives, as army commandos stormed into the building, killing nine and capturing the injured leader of the group. However, the militants gained the psychological edge as they reached inside the HQ of the Pakistan Army (The Nation, 2009). Apart from direct methods of terrorism, TTP at least threatened to use unconventional methods of killing. It threatened the Rawalpindi Cantonment Board and the Chaklala Cantonment Board, through a letter, of contaminating water sources and reservoirs with poisonous material to pressurise the army to stop its military operation in

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Waziristan. It was also written in the letter that the TTP had procured 200 litres of poisonous material that would be used to contaminate water sources and reservoirs in the wards falling under the RCB and CCB limits. It alarmed the authorities. The tube-well operators and valve men were issued special instructions to keep the doors of their offices closed where tube well was installed and other water equipment was placed (The News International, 2009). They also started attacking NATO supply trucks, terminals and police check posts in Chaman (The Nation, 2009). The security was beefed up at bordering areas with Afghanistan, particularly at Chaman, Nushki and Chagai districts to stop Afghan Taliban entering Pakistan territory (The Nation, 2009). There was a new fear when the interior minister of Pakistan declared that South Punjab could be the next Swat (The Daily Times, 2009). He gave two reasons for it: first, jihadi militias like LeJ and JeM hailed from South Punjab; secondly, perhaps all those terrorists who fled from Waziristan or Swat might have taken refuge in South Punjab. Three aspects were often ignored when predicting the emergence of Swat like the situation in South Punjab: (1) The presence of Punjabis in the ranks of TTP should not come as a surprise because Punjabis had always been a major part of Mujahideen from the Afghan jihad period, Sufi Muhammad’s lashkar to fight on Taliban side in Afghanistan in 2001 and later the TTP in FATA. (2) Proscribed organisations like SSP, LeJ and JeM lost their militant command and structure. Therefore, they were not part of TTP as organisations. However, some of its extremist members joined with the TTP. (3) Unlike FATA and Swat, Punjab’s terrain was not suitable for guerrilla warfare (The Daily Times, 2009). These mitigating aspects, however, did not diminish the danger. The scattered members of proscribed organisations have become the ‘sleeper agents’, facilitators and also active members who provided shelters to TTP fighters, offered hideouts for training and planning and joined the active cadres of fighters and suicide bombers. The blast carried out using stored suicide jackets and rocket launchers, in the house of a militant in Mian Channu, which killed 22 persons, including seven children in the adjacent madrasah, confirmed this fear (The Nation, 2009). Some other factors (The Daily Times, 2009) that added to the apprehension that South Punjab, comprising 13 districts, having a

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population of 27 million, might become another area of militancy were: (1) It had the largest number of Deobandi madaris. (2) Dera Ghazi Khan district bordered with KP, Balochistan and Sindh therefore the nearest route of escape for fleeing fighters of TTP. (3). A considerable number of Lal masjid students and even the Ghazi brothers (one dead and other surviving) belonged to D.G. Khan. (4) Writ of government was weak as policing was placid in these areas. (5) Intelligence set-ups were inefficient; therefore, ‘there was no proper surveillance over these elements’. Since 2010, TTP and groups affiliated with it had been braving the army operation. Despite setbacks in Malakand and some tribal areas, they were still flourishing in the vast north-west regions of the country. They were carrying out terrorist acts with full vigour. On 24 August 2010, they carried out a suicide attack inside a mosque in Wana during Ramadan. A teenage boy blew himself up as he approached the seminary leader. At least 25 people were killed in this incident (Dawn, 2010). After two years, in 2012, the month of Ramadan (fasting) started with separate attacks launched by militants across the country, in which at least 20 people, including six children, were killed (see https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorist_incidents_in_Pakistan_in_2012). The security situation in insurgency-hit Balochistan became bad to worse as the fleeing TTP fighters regrouped there to carry out their terrorists activities. When stakes were high and going was tough, opposing forces at times joined hands against common adversary. In this case, both Baloch separatists and TTP militants were fighting against the state. The fallouts of the undesirable army action by General Musharraf against Nawab Bugti and other Balochi dissidents, the alleged Indian support to Balochi insurgents and Western claims of the presence of Mullah Omar and Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta had made Balochistan a region of unrest and uncertainty. Even terrorists challenging the Iranian government set up bases in Balochistan (Dawn, 2008). The metropolis Karachi, the home of the terrorist ethnic party, MQM, had been a troubled spot as various armed groups keep resorting to violence. During the first six months of 2009, approximately 100 persons, belonging to different groups, were killed in various incidents (The Nation, 2009). TTP had been taking advantage of these situations and committed robberies and kidnappings to raise funds for the resistance. The CID held financiers of TTP from Mauripur and youngsters from Karachi, belonging to proscribed militant organisations

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Table 6.1

Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan from 2003 to 2018.

Year

Civilians

Security force personnel

Terrorists/ insurgents

Total

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

140 435 430 608 1,522 2,155 2,324 1,796 2,738 3,007 3,001 1,781 940 612 540 9 22,200

24 184 81 325 597 654 991 469 765 732 676 533 339 293 208 17 6904

25 244 137 538 1,479 3,906 8,389 5,170 2,800 2,472 1,702 3,182 2,403 898 512 19 33,920

189 863 648 1,471 3,598 6,715 11,704 7,435 6,303 6,211 5,379 5,496 3,682 1,803 1,260 45 63,024

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP).

hired by it to raise funds (The News International, 2008). Initially, TTP had refrained from resorting to violence in Karachi because they wanted to use it for fund raising, recruitment and refuge (Dawn, 2009). But once challenged by the CID, they carried out a number of terrorist attacks in Karachi, including horrendous suicide attacks on the CID office and the residence of its most active officer in 2010 and 2011. The TTP therefore continued its terrorist activities in different forms, faces and functions in many cities across Pakistan. Thus, TTP demonstrated its intention and ability to kill at will throughout Pakistan right from its inception. It callously made all endeavours to inflict as many casualties on all sorts of targets as possible, including coreligionists, Pakistanis and civilians. Similarly, TTP killed non-believers and sectarian minorities without compunction. The objective had been to create fear through spectacular terrorist attacks. They did not care for a backlash that could severely damage the organisation, and maintained the appearance of an Islamic group

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fighting for supremacy of Islam and against the US, the Pakistan government that supported the US and its allies. Generally, by limiting terrorist attacks, terrorist groups reduce the risk of undermining external political and economic support. The groups that comprise a ‘wing’ of an insurgency, or are affiliated with aboveground (sometimes legitimate) political organisations, often operate under these constraints. The tensions caused by balancing these considerations are often a prime factor in the development of splinter groups and internal factions within these organisations (Terrorism Research; Goals and Motivations). When SSP adopted a milder approach, the hardliners were disgruntled and they formed LeJ, which became part of TTP.

THE USE OF MEDIA AND THE INTERNET BY MILITANTS Al Qaeda had been well aware of the power and significance of media for furthering its cause. In July 2005, the Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of Al Qaeda operations in Iraq, ‘We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.’2 Osama bin Laden was personally interested in influencing the people of Pakistan through his media messages. On 20 September 2007, he issued a 23minute-long video tape titled ‘Join the jihad: a speech for the Pakistani people from Osama bin Laden, Ramadan 1428, and September 2007’. The picture on the screen showed bin Laden surrounded by four Islamic leaders, among them Abdul al-Rashid Ghazi, the chief cleric of ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque), Islamabad, who was killed in a Pakistan Army attack on the Red Mosque. In addition to Arabic and English, the tape was issued in Urdu and Pashtu. Osama castigated the then President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf calling for his defeat and the defeat of his supporters through jihad. He described the attack on the Red Mosque as ‘a tragic event. . .with critical implications’. He added, ‘Twenty years after the soil of Pakistan soaked up the blood of one of the greatest jihad fighters, the Imam Abdallah Azzam, today Pakistan is witness to the death of another great Muslim, Imam Abdul al-Rashid Ghazi.’ Osama called upon Musharraf’s soldiers to desert and rid them of his polytheism (Imm, 2007).

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In 2009, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote a treatise on the Constitution of Pakistan titled, The Morning and the Lamp (Terrorism Monitor, 2010),3 which was originally in Arabic (Al Sabah wal Qandeel) but was translated into English and Urdu. The Urdu version (Spaida Sahar aur Timtamata Chiragh) was printed and circulated in Pakistan in 2010. Luckily, the Special Branch of Punjab Police noted this circulation and the Home Department Punjab banned it upon its information.4 Al Qaeda’s brochures and booklets containing Osama bin Laden’s messages and criticism of the Pakistan Army and government were also found in circulation in Lahore, Gujranwala, Karachi and many other cities of Pakistan. Ironically, none of the agencies succeeded in locating the elements involved in its printing and circulation. Similarly, the funding and financing of this campaign remained unknown. It could be safely said that none of the agencies made serious efforts to find these facts to control the campaign. Al Qaeda’s propaganda media organ Al-Sahab released a video in Urdu language for Pakistani audience. It contained malicious propaganda against the government of Pakistan, its leaders, police, intelligence agencies and army. It showed the terrorists who carried out attacks on the ISI office in Lahore. It aimed to influence the people of Pakistan, to create hatred against the government and the US and to inculcate sympathy for Al Qaeda and its ideology.5 Al Qaeda issued its monthly magazine Al-Hitteen as hard copies. It was available online and also had email addresses idaraa.hitteen@ yahoo.com and [email protected] (Hitteen, 2012). Hitteen was named after the battle where Saladin Ayubi defeated the Crusaders in 1187 (The Express Tribune, 2012). On the title page of the magazine was written, ‘harbinger of global jehad’. Al-Malahem Media Foundation published it. The basic publication on the internet was in Arabic. It also had English and Urdu versions. Al-Malahem published other magazines also, namely Al-Fajr and Inspire (Hitteen, 2011). The hard copy of Hitteen distributed in Pakistan was in Urdu. It is a perfect propaganda document that could incite people against the government of Pakistan, its army and the US. In Issue V, its first article declared the Pakistan Army as the stooge of the ‘infidels’, which was still being run on British pattern and involved in the massacre of Muslims in FATA and elsewhere. It gave permission to murder Muslims in specific circumstances (Hitteen, 2012). The circulation of Hitteen by post was not wide and

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was restricted to like-minded people and those who could be influenced. It was available on the internet, but full text could be accessed through membership recommended by another member. Extensive use of the internet was an essential part of Al Qaeda’s propaganda strategy. A report of Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) commented, ‘Bin Laden’s intensive use of the Internet to spread his doctrines is productive and influences young Muslims, who adopt them and enlist in the global jihad in the various arenas in which it is taking place’ (Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center, 2008). Moreover, it used the internet to create fear and give messages to various quarters, including the US authorities. On 7 May 2012, it released a video of the US citizen Warren Weinstein who was kidnapped from Lahore on 13 August 2011. According to the US monitoring service SITE, the 2-minute, 40-second video was posted on jihadist forums by al-Sahab. Through him, Al Qaeda demanded the release of ‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdel-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef and El Sayyid Nosair, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, from US custody and the release of the family of Osama bin Laden (Dawn, 2012). Pakistan experienced a media revolution in the mid-2000s. The introduction of private TV channels changed the trends of politics and terrorism. The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) – Jamia Hafsa episode was telecasted live on TV channels, which unleashed a new era of extremism, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan. Media seemed sympathetic towards girls and young students holed up in the masjid and madrasah. It was also due to distrust and animosity against the then President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. The chief cleric Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who later died in the exchange of fire with the security forces, had been interacting with the media via mobile phone during the military operation. This stirred the sensibilities of the audience and gave impetus to the suicide bombing in the coming months. Conversely, another episode that changed the situation overnight against the militants of Swat was the video of a woman being flogged in Swat released to the media. It showed a girl made to lie upside down while two men held her hands and legs tightly and the third flogged her in front of a crowd. The girl cried and cringed with pain and shame. Viewers were deeply touched with these horrific scenes. It created an uproar and sparked hatred against the TTP in Swat, which

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paved the way for the launching of military operation Rah-e-Nijat against the militants in Swat. In the case of TTP, it is true that ‘the media is the terrorist’s best friend’, or ‘publicity is the oxygen all terrorists need’. It thrives on the fear created by the media coverage to its terrorist acts. Maulvi Fazlullah, Chief of TTP Swat chapter, used an FM radio station to propagate his views to threaten people and the government. He used it so persistently and effectively that he was nicknamed Maulvi FM. However, after military operation Rah-e-Nijat, these elements spread and their FM radio broadcasts came to a halt. There had been indications that after a lull of three years, the Swati Taliban had again started their radio broadcasts. ‘After relative peace since 2009, the Taliban are back in Swat Valley – at least on the air waves’ (The Express Tribune, 2012). Richard Holbrooke, who was America’s envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated in 2009 that ‘Fazlullah is going round every night broadcasting the names of people they are going to behead or have beheaded. Any of you who have a recent sense of history will know that that’s exactly what happened with Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda’. Radio Mille Collines (Thousand Hills Radio) seemed to be directing the massacres in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It not only poisoned the general atmosphere, but also urged on the killers, with phrases like ‘cutting the tall trees’ and ‘killing the cockroaches’ (The Economist, 2009). Holbrooke emphasised that broadcasting was one area where lessons learned in one war zone must be transferred to others. Hezbollah had also used radio and television to broadcast its point of view and to ‘bolster terrorism’. PKK also ran a satellite television, which ‘proved to be one of the most important consciousness-raising instruments at the disposal of PKK’. As far as use of FM radios or portable transmitters by Pakistani insurgents is concerned, a local analyst was of the view that the only antidote to hate radio was rival FM transmissions, run by locals who could speak familiar dialects and catered to local interests, from farming to music (The Economist, 2009). It meant a counter-propaganda campaign was essential. But in addition to it, continuous campaign to jam the transmissions of ever-popping transmitters was equally important. The TTP interacted with the media like a political party. Its spokespersons were actively engaged with the media and issued statements, usually to accept the responsibility of any terrorist attack. At times, they gave policy statements as well. Ehsanullah Ehsan had

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been the main spokesperson of the TTP, who usually gave statements to the media from ‘unknown destination’. Similarly, the spokesperson of the TTP Swat chapter was also quite active before the military operation. The TTP released a video in 2011 showing the planning of a suicide bombing that devastated the building of the Criminal Investigation Department in Karachi in 2010. It showed three suicide attackers receiving training, filming their target and recording their motives for carrying out the attack (Dawn Editorial, 2011). It also released videos of beheading and killing of kidnapped army and FC personnel by the TTP militants. The grisly footage showing the execution of 15 captured Pakistani policemen by a firing squad was released by the TTP and is available on YouTube. These videos were released by ‘Umar Video’. All videos were quite sophisticated as if they were made and edited in proper modern studios. These videos were uploaded on YouTube aimed at creating fear among the public. TTP also released the video of the daredevil daylight Bannu (KP) jailbreak, in which the armed-to-the-teeth militants secured the release of 384 prisoners on 15 April 2012. Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP Chief and his deputy Waliur Rehman were seen in the video briefing 150 TTP militants about the plan to attack the jail. It also showed the footage of militants attacking the jail. They went straight to the cell in the jail, where Adnan Rashid, the former air force official who was involved in plotting the attempt on the life of General Pervez Musharraf, was being held, and secured his release. Adnan Rashid’s interview was also included in this video. The 34minute footage was openly available and for sale in both North and South Waziristan (The News International, 2012). It would have lifted the morale of the militants and their sympathisers, resulting in more dare devil terrorist attacks. TTP published an Urdu monthly magazine, Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad (Voice of Afghan Jihad), which covered the activities of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The March 2012 issue had 68 pages containing articles on the importance of jihad, Aafia Siddiqui, who was imprisoned in the US, the case of missing persons in the custody of Pakistan’s security agencies, the details of Afghan Taliban’s activities/successes in Afghanistan, drone attacks and so on. The editorial was quite venomous and provocative. It reproduced a segment of the statement issued by Imaraat-e-Islamia Afghanistan (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan),

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thereby meaning the Taliban, on the burning of the Holy Qur’an at Bagram Air Base: The reaction over the desecration of Holy Qur’an should not be restricted to slogans and public protests only. The centers of occupying forces should be attacked, their convoys should be attacked and their soldiers should be killed. They should be taught a befitting lesson for desecration of the Holy Qur’an. It also expressed disappointment over the placid reaction of Pakistanis over this incident. In the article ‘Those Eleven Prisoners, Abdul Saboor Shaheed and Missing Persons’, the Pakistani intelligence agencies especially ISI and MI had been lambasted for unlawfully apprehending many suspects, torturing them and keeping them in illegal confinement for long periods. Pamphleteering was also an effective tool of communication employed by the terrorists, especially in Waziristan. On the first death anniversary of Osama bin Laden, the militants in North Waziristan distributed pamphlets in Miramshah to pledge to continue jihad. It stated that: Let us pledge today that we will continue our jihad and sacrifice our lives and property in the way of Allah like Sheikh Osama did. Today, a year since Sheikh Osama bin Laden embraced martyrdom the enemy America is repenting. It is facing defeat and Pakistan’ future is also bleak. It was in Pashto and Urdu. It was distributed by armed men openly in the streets of Miramshah. Only two days before this distribution, there was a bloody skirmish between the militants and the troops, which resulted in the death of 19 soldiers and civilians (Roggio, 2012). TTP and Al Qaeda used media and the internet quite deftly and persistently to propel their interests and exert influence across Pakistan. The aim was to influence a large segment of people and to prepare them for the transformation of society through brute force and the barrel of the gun as envisioned by them. The emphasis was on creating mistrust against the government and its armed forces. Their strategy of liberally using (misusing) Qur’anic verses and Prophet Muhammad’s sayings to

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strengthen their arguments and propaganda could influence the sensibilities of many religious-minded people. Many might have already succumbed to their trap. Sadly, little seemed to have been done by the government to control and counter this silent but lethal onslaught. Rather there was a complete disregard for the dire repercussions of this media war that had been enabling the militants and terrorists to gain a stronger foothold and make deeper inroads in society.

CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY TTP followed a mechanism and strategy to accept or deny the responsibility of a terrorist act committed by it. The terrorist attacks on police, intelligence, army and law enforcement agencies were followed by the statements of TTP spokesperson who claimed the responsibility. However, it did not claim responsibility of the attacks on nongovernment targets such as shrines, markets and educational institutions in order to avoid public animosity. During the emergence of ‘modern terrorism’, approximately 200 years ago, terrorists endorsed a doctrine of terrorism as ‘propaganda of the deed’. For these terrorists, claiming responsibility for their violence and the havoc it created was the most significant difference between their acts and those of criminal organisations. But during the last 50 years there had been a change in the approach of terrorist organisations. The number of claims decreased significantly. ‘From the late 1990s until 2004, the percentage of claimed acts of terror plummeted to 14.5 per cent, of which only half could be confirmed as valid claims of responsibility’ (Wright, 2009). Therefore, claiming and disclaiming responsibility is a universally employed tactic of terrorists. The TTP had been pursuing a carefully crafted policy of claiming and disclaiming the responsibility. Its spokesperson who owned the responsibility would contact a few selected journalists who knew him (sometimes by email). He would not mind telling his name but kept his location undisclosed. Many people doubted the authenticity of the socalled spokesperson and his claims. However, one could not resist believing the claim when it was initiated by reputable news agencies and published in prestigious and credible dailies like DAWN, Daily Jang, The News International and The Nation.

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Interviews were conducted with a number of leading journalists and reporters who dealt with security issues, to ascertain if any TTP spokesman had ever talked to them directly or if they knew any journalist who had ever come in contact with any TTP spokesman.6 None of them admitted to have direct contact. It was learnt from them that the TTP spokesperson preferred to talk to Pashtun journalists. Reportedly, the well-known journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, Resident Editor, The News International, KP, used to get calls from the TTP spokesperson and TTP militant leaders too. Amir Mir, the author of Talibanization of Pakistan, confirmed that TTP’s genuine spokesperson called the journalists of their choice and trust. Those journalists also knew the spokesperson’s identity but of course not their location. He added that the TTP spokesperson preferred to call the journalists affiliated with Reuters, BBC and Associated Press in order to get coverage in all newspapers and TV channels. He was of the opinion that Ashfaq Yusufzai, award-winning journalist working with The News International, and Munir Ahmed were usually contacted by the TTP spokesperson and militants. TTP also sent emails to media organisations, which were often followed by the confirmation by telephone calls from the TTP spokesperson. Ehsanullah Ehsan, the TTP spokesperson, sent an email to The News to give the TTP reaction over the killing of Muslims in Myanmar (The News International, 2012). Saleem Safi, a columnist and Geo TV anchor, and a Pashtun by race, also received an email from TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan to react on his comments in a popular Geo TV talk show ‘Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath’ (with Kamran Khan Today). “It is included in our demands, but our first and last demand is implementation of the Sharia law in Pakistan, instead of secular and democratic laws. After implementation of Sharia, relations with America will end as well, as Islam prohibits us from making kuffar (non-believers) our friends and the Qur’an clearly guides us about this. Hopefully you have understood our stance and next time you will keep it in consideration while making statement about the TTP” (Safi, 2012). Mr Saleem Safi, while commenting in the talk show ‘Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath’ on 9-7-2012 made a statement that if Pakistan had tried to commence talks with the TTP during the time of the closure of supplies, it could have resulted in a better situation as it was a major

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demand of the Taliban that Pakistan should stop cooperating with America. Saleem Safi’s later columns showed that the TTP message had due effect on him and advised the media to give appropriate coverage to the TTP point of view, which according to him was ignored by the Pakistani media. In 2008– 2009, Muslim Khan was the active spokesperson of Maulvi Fazlullah, the then chief of the TTP Swat chapter. He was arrested during an army operation and was incarcerated. Later, Sirajuddin Ahmad appeared as the spokesperson of the Swat Taliban, who had been expelled from Swat and made the TTP base in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces. He claimed the responsibility of attack on the Swat girl Malala, known for her courageous stance against the Swat Taliban, who had shut down her school. He said that ‘We had no intentions to kill her but were forced when she would not stop (speaking against us)’ (Jibran, 2012). On the Malala issue, Ehsanullah Ehsan also wrote a seven-page email to columnist and anchor Hamid Mir to threaten him and to put forward their views about Malala. Hamid Mir wrote in his column that he had been interacting with militants and terrorists throughout his 25-year career. He had even interviewed Osama bin Laden. However, it was his first time to come across someone who would use such a filthy and derogatory language as was used by Ehsanullah Ehsan against Malala in his letter addressed to him. Ehsanullah had termed her a US spy and a woman of easy virtue who was worth slaying. Hamid Mir termed these allegations as horrible. He added that once during a meeting with Osama bin Laden, his companion Abu Hifz Almisri used some harsh words about the then US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright. Osama interrupted him, apologised to Hamid and said that he did not like objectionable utterances about women (Mir, 2012). Probably, Hamid Mir narrated this incident to highlight the fact that the TTP, unlike its mentor, believed in a no-holds-barred approach. The TTP spokesperson did not always operate from a remote unidentified place located deep inside the tribal area nor was he very cautious about disclosure of his identity. He gave an interview to CNN in Peshawar. He was in contact with a few officials of government agencies in Islamabad (Mir, 2012). Ehsanullah Ehsan appeared in a video with Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman, which showed

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the boldness of daredevil militants and ineptness of intelligence agencies and weak will of the government to pursue and neutralise these elements. On 25 June 2013, Ehsanullah Ehasan was removed from his position of the spokesperson of TTP due to his statement that Afghan Taliban and the TTP were two different entities and movements. Ehsan had told a local newspaper that the US–Taliban peace talks in Doha would have no effect on the TTP. His dismissal was announced through the distribution of a pamphlet by militants in North Waziristan, which said that ‘He has made comments that raised the danger of divisions between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban’. ‘The Taliban are our foundation and (Afghan Taliban leader) Mullah Omar is our supreme leader. That is why, from today, Ehsanullah Ehsan is no longer our spokesman.’ Ehsan’s dismissal was considered one of the growing signs of divisions within the militant groups operating in the country’s tribal regions and was seen as a move meant to appease the Afghan Taliban, who were referred to as their ideological bulwark by the Pakistani Taliban (The Express Tribune, 2013). Ehsanullah was replaced by Shahidullah Shahid as the new spokesperson of TTP. According to sources, Ehsanullah Ehsan and Shahidullah Shahid were not their real names. Their real identity was concealed, though Ehsanullah appeared in videos too. On rare occasions, the TTP chief personally met media people. One such occasion was when Hakimullah Mehsud gave an interview to the BBC to explain his stance on the much-hyped negotiations with the government of Pakistan on 9 October 2013 (BBC Urdu, 2013). For this interview, the TTP activists escorted Reuters to the remote area in Waziristan and ordered them not to disclose the exact location of the interview (The News International, 2013). In rare cases, the TTP spokesperson talked to the government officers too to threaten them or to convince them to desist from anti-TTP activities. Shahidullah Shahid had a 20-minute talk with SSP Chaudhry Aslam, who was later killed by the TTP in a bomb blast in Karachi. Ch. Aslam was known for his risky actions against the TTP in Karachi that resulted in the arrests and killings of many TTP militants and facilitators. ‘I had almost 20 minute conversation with Ch. Aslam in which I had conveyed to him our (TTP) message that we would avenge the killing of almost 60 fellows who were killed extra-judicially,’ said

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Shahidullah Shahid while talking to The News correspondent from an undisclosed location (The News International, 2014). It was worth noting that usually none of the groups under the TTP umbrella had a separate spokesperson who made announcements or interacted with the journalists. Only the spokesperson of the main TTP, led by Baitullah, Hakimullah and later on by Fazlullah, employed this tactic.

TERRORISM FINANCING Like conventional armies, insurgents need a sustained supply of money to survive and thrive. TTP raised funds from various sources, but unlike Al Qaeda, it had a substantial source of domestic financial support. The primary known sources of the Taliban’s wealth were financial support by Al Qaeda, looting of supplies from NATO convoys, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, drug money, bank robberies, donations from its sympathisers and alleged financial help by India. The Pakistan Army estimated that a sum of $200 million was pumped into the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) coffers from the Afghan drug trade, although there is no real way to ascertain the exact number because of the widespread use of the ‘hawala’ system. According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2012, up to ‘$30 billion worth of narcotics are smuggled from Afghanistan, via Pakistan, to other parts of the world annually’ (Kasuri, 2013). According to some senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, 20 per cent of TTP funding came from crimes (including kidnappings and bank robberies); 50 per cent came from donations and extortions and the remaining 30 per cent was drug money. TTP operated through a network of affiliates such as the Harkat-ul Mujahideen and Al-Badr Mujahideen in its areas of influence and through a countrywide underground network of sleeper cells, financiers, facilitators, sympathisers and affiliates that helped the organisation achieve its intended objectives through vital financing (Kasuri, 2013). According to an intelligence officer, 50 kidnappings daily became routine in KP at one point. Even a close relative of Inspector General Islamabad Kaleem Imam was ransomed for Rs 5 million ($59,571) after being kidnapped from Peshawar. The same thing happened to the ViceChancellor of Kohat University (Kasuri, 2013).

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The militants linked with the Hakimullah Mehsud-led TTP had been kidnapping for ransom from Waziristan. An important member of TTP from Orakzai Agency, Muhammad Rafiq, whose son had carried out a suicide attack on the Naval Complex Islamabad on 2 December 2009, revealed during interrogation that they had kidnapped at least seven people from the Orakzai Agency and received Rs 10 –15 million each.7 The Hakimullah-led TTP also demanded huge money from the telecommunication companies and threatened to blow up their communication towers if they did not comply. His spokesperson made these demands by a phone call to the Lahore offices of cellular companies like Mobilink, Warid and Ufone.8 Confirmed reports indicated that Taliban were involved in bank robberies in major Pakistani cities such as Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi (Pakistan Nationalist Association, 2011). In 2008 – 9, the Karachi police detected an increase in Taliban-orchestrated bank robberies and kidnappings. According to the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, ‘Of the dozen bank robberies that occurred in Karachi in 2009, 80 per cent could be traced back to individuals based in the tribal areas who are believed to be working for the TTP’. In 2008, officials tracked a heist of Rs 150 million ($1.79 million) from a money exchange company in Karachi to nowdeceased TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud. On finding clues, the owners of the money exchange company approached the TTP leadership in Waziristan and asked Mehsud to return the money. Later reports confirmed that Mehsud gave some of the money back. In a daylight bank robbery, six TTP militants looted Rs 3.5 million from a branch of Habib Bank Limited (HBL) located near Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital & Research Centre in Johar Town on 25 January 2012. According to initial police investigations, the six bandits were Pashtun militants linked with the TTP. The same militants had looted a bank in Lahore in September 2011 (The Nation, 2012). In October 2008, abductors held film producer Satish Anand for six months near Matta, Swat. Jameel Yusuf, a security consultant and former chief of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee, who negotiated Anand’s release, said that the Taliban received Rs 1.68 million ($20,016) ransom for this kidnapping. He said that ‘The ransom payment was made in Islamabad’. Meanwhile, kidnappers seized two other businessmen. As stated by Yusuf, ‘One returned after payment of ransom, while the

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(other), Shaukat Afridi, who ran a fleet of NATO tanker trucks, was killed in a bombing during an abortive rescue attempt.’ A Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) CID Karachi, Ch. Aslam, who was credited with busting several TTP cells in Pakistan’s financial hub and was later killed in a suicide attack, said, ‘In most of the cases payment of ransom is traced to different parts of the FATA.’ He added that the money helped the TTP carry out its militant acts and fund organisational management. According to the customs officials, a number of customs officials including a superintendent were kidnapped for ransom by the Taliban in 2009. These incidents of kidnapping increased after two officials reportedly paid substantial amounts of money for their release in Peshawar. The released officials were too scared to share with their superiors how they suffered during their incarceration (The News International, 2009). A known ISI operative Col. Tarrar, alias Col. Imam, along with another former ISI official, Squadron Leader (retd) Khawaja Khalid and BBC journalist Asad Qureshi, were apprehended by TTP while travelling in North Waziristan on 26 March 2010. Qureshi was released in September after paying a ransom of Rs 20 million, while Khawaja Khalid and Col. Imam were executed by their captors after the negotiations for ransom and other demands for release of TTP prisoners failed (Butt, 2012). As the fundings dwindled from other sources in 2011, an increase in high-profile kidnappings for ransom was seen. Three high-profile kidnappings were carried out by TTP elements in Lahore in 2011, which included Amir Malik, son-in-law of Lt. General Tariq Majid; Chairman Joint Chiefs staff committee of the Pakistan Army; Warren Wienstein, a US national working for an NGO and Shahbaz Taseer, son of Salman Taseer, the slain governor of Punjab. The terrorists had been demanding a huge ransom for their release.9 Amir Malik was released after a year, probably as a result of a deal, which was kept secret. Warren Weinstein was killed in a US drone attack in April 2015. Shahbaz Taseer was released in 2016, the reason for which is still unknown. According to a report, he was released after ransom was paid to his kidnappers; however, it is also said that the captors were on the run due to an attack on them and therefore they abandoned the abductee. An Afghan Taliban activist dropped him near Quetta, from where he called his mother in Lahore.

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The law enforcement agencies reached the spot, took him in custody and delivered him safely at his home in Lahore. Another significant high-profile kidnapping for ransom was of Ali Haider Gillani, son of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousuf Raza Gillani, who was kidnapped during an election campaign event in Multan on 9 May 2013, just two days before the general elections on 11 May 2013. Gillani’s personal secretary, Muhammad Mohiuddin, was killed in the attack while one of his personal security guards was wounded. A terrorist group calling itself the Al-Mansooreen Brigade, an affiliate of TTP, claimed responsibility for his abduction. Abu Yazeed, a spokesperson for the Al-Mansooreen Brigade, said, ‘Ali Haider Gillani is in our custody and is safe and sound.’ Calling from an Afghan phone number, the spokesperson added, ‘We will release the video of Mr Gillani shortly after Eid and will apprise about our demands’ (Islam, 2013). Reportedly, they demanded Rs 3 billion for his release, but he was released in a counter-terror raid by the US Special Operations Forces and Afghan commandos in eastern Afghanistan in May 2016. These high-profile kidnappings for ransom were not only aimed at replenishing the depleting coffers of the TTP, but also had a psychological impact of the TTP prowess on the entire populace and especially the government, which further faced the pressure rather than retaliating with a might to establish its writ. Rana Jawad, Islamabad Bureau Chief of Geo TV, told Central Asia Online that ‘The TTP also receive their share from the drugs that cross into Pakistan’s North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces’. Abu Rehman Malik, the former Interior Minister of Pakistan, endorsed these views and the findings of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and said that illegal money earned through drugs and arms trafficking were being used by terrorists (The Nation, 2012). He added that poppy cultivated in Afghanistan directly fuelled terrorism in this region and across the globe as it was widely used for funding weapons supply, trainings and other needs for terrorism by the terrorist organisations. He claimed that the government of Pakistan had also lodged complaints to NATO, but it could do little in this regard probably ‘due to its limited mandate’ (The Nation, 2012). Senator Haji Adeel also backed these views. He said that:

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militant outfits receive money from Afghanistan and that allied forces must take actions due to their presence in Afghanistan. He added that Pakistan was dragged into war against Terrorism, and as long as this war continues, the illegal economy will also continue to progress (The Nation, 2012). Indian contribution in funding the TTP had been surreptitious but tangible. In August 2008, three arrested terrorists belonging to TTP’s Qari Hussain, known as ‘Ustad-e-Fedayeen’ (mentor of suicide bombers) (Dawn, 2009), revealed that he received Rs 680 million from ‘an enemy country’ (India).10 The then Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah and Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik had been persistently vocal about Indian involvement in funding and abetting terrorists in Pakistan. The most credible statement came from the most known TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan, who, after his surrender in 2017, claimed that they (TTP) received huge funds from Indian quarters. The National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) of Ministry of Interior, Pakistan, headed by Rehman Malik, claimed in a report that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was funding Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan’s (TTP) Punjabi chapter, Asmatullah Muavia, Ghulam Rabbani and Qari Kamran factions through Afghanistan’s Riyast-i-Amoor-o-Amanat-i-Milliyah (RAAM) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) (The Express Tribune, 2012). There was no subsequent confirmation or denial by the Ministry of Interior about the veracity of this report. However, later incidents and developments confirmed this claim. Ehsanullah Ehsan, the former spokesperson of TTP, and key commander of TTP’s breakaway faction, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), who surrendered to the Pakistan Army in April 2017, divulged that India was providing financial and logistical support to the TTP (The Express Tribune, April 17, 2017). The then Pakistan Army spokesperson Major General Athar Abbas, in an interview to a Chinese newspaper, said that there were several hostile intelligence agencies that were supporting and funding terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said that ‘The drug money, smuggling and other multiple sources of income are helping the terrorists to conduct terrorist activities not only in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan’ (The Nation, 2012).

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Although the sources of TTP financing were not very hard to identify, the intelligence reporting in this regard had been mostly insufficient and inaccurate, especially Al Qaeda’s funding to TTP which could not be detected and blocked. The evolution of TTP, from scattered groups of tribesmen, that harboured and sheltered Al Qaeda runaways from Afghanistan, to its final form in December 2007, was much due to Al Qaeda’s financial support. According to some reports, TTP started facing funds shortage in 2011. According to military sources, it was mainly due to stringent controls the Pakistan Army had put in place. Another reason stated for the dearth of TTP funds was the blows the Arab Al Qaeda had faced in the region due to a concerted campaign against them by the US forces stationed in Afghanistan and the drone attacks that shattered its command and control in the tribal areas of Pakistan. As an intelligence official disclosed, ‘AlQaeda is on the run now. . .most of the private Arab money to the TTP used to come through them. That has evaporated now.’ Moreover, the drug money from Afghanistan also soaked away to a large extent after tight controls by the US-led forces on the border, following their operations against the Afghan Taliban in Helmand and Kandahar (Khan, 2011).

PUBLIC SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR TTP AND AL QAEDA The majority of Pakistani Muslims, irrespective of their sectarian affiliations, do not want mullahs or religious extremists to dictate their lives according to their strict version of Islam or to rule them. They had been expressing their desire for moderate rulers in polls throughout Pakistan’s history. In the 2008 general election, in areas like Swat, where TNSM and later on the TTP had much influence, seven out of the total eight national assembly seats were won by the Awami National Party (ANP), a secular political party (The Nation, 2009). The religious parties got 2 per cent votes across Pakistan. JI abstained from the 2008 general elections, had it participated, the votes for religious parties would not have crossed 4 per cent, as the history showed. As the people of Pakistan have deep affection for the Muslim countries and express their deep concern on issues like Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir, the TTP elements from FATA and Swat exploited the favourable sentiments

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of the people of Pakistan. Their strategy worked for quite some time and they enjoyed public sympathy. However, the suicide attack on Islamabad Marriot Hotel on 25 September 2008 triggered public anger against them as Baitullah Mehsud claimed the responsibility of this action. It was the turning point when people started condemning them (Christain Science Monitor, 2008). As mentioned, these anti-TTP sentiments were reinforced by the footage of flogging of a teenage girl, Chand Bibi, by the Swat TTP, shown in Pakistani TV channels on 2 April 2009. Interestingly, the majority of Pakistanis, who were ambivalent about TTP’s role even after the devastating suicide attacks, reacted unanimously in denouncing the perpetrators of flogging. This unanimity enabled the army to carry out the successful operation Rah-e-Rast against the Swati TTP in 2009. A few months before, a questionnaire conducted on the educated people of Lahore during February 2009 revealed interesting trends: 97 per cent considered TTP and Al Qaeda in FATA a threat to Pakistan; 97 per cent thought their activities could spread in other areas; 97 per cent considered TTP’s claim to impose Islamic laws as illegal and in violation of the Constitution of Pakistan and 96 per cent would not like to vote for the religious-political parties of Pakistan. Interaction with people from the lower strata of society in Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and other cities showed that they also do not support terrorists and their activities. They abhorred the terrorists because they were a threat to the safety of their families and children. People did not show sympathy for terrorists. Only their confusion about the identity of terrorists, created due to confused policies of the government, made them ambivalent. They were puzzled by the official statements whether TTP carried out the terrorist attacks or Indian or foreign forces were behind these activities as was stated by the Interior Minister and even by the Punjab Law Minister after every terrorist attack. People took time to start distinguishing between the TTP and Afghan Taliban. Especially after major terrorist incidents, the majority developed a disliking for the former, at least outside KP. However, the sentiments for the latter were not bitter, as they were not considered a threat to Pakistan. Their fight within Afghanistan, against the Afghan government backed by the US and International forces, was considered

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their indigenous struggle against the invaders and usurpers in their homeland. In 2009, the politico-religious elements apparently started distancing themselves from the TTP, especially after the murder of Maulana Sarfraz Naeemi, a Lahore-based Barelvi cleric, who was killed in a suicide attack in Lahore for condemning the suicide attacks (Samaa TV, 2009). But surely they had not turned against TTP. They did not openly condemn their activities. Rather some religious elements, mostly belonging to Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith sects, had been persistently expressing or demonstrating sympathy for TTP. In 2009, the general public also demonstrated a better understanding of TTP and the terrorist activities carried out by it. Even independent analysts have admitted that the Pakistan Army seemed to be winning the battle for Swat this time around. The reason stated has been simple: the 2009 military operation against the forces of fanaticism and extremism was whole heartedly supported by the masses (Mir, 2009). Generally, letters to editors published in national dailies reflect the sentiments of the urban educated class in society. A brief look at the letters to editors published in The News International, given at Annexure F, mirror grave concerns of the public against the terrorists and their activities. People strongly believed that the terrorists had undermined their peaceful lifestyle and were causing a serious threat to their lives and properties. Another poll result in 2009 showed that 81 per cent of Pakistanis believed the activities of the Taliban and other Muslim extremists a ‘critical threat’ to the country, up from the 34 per cent polled on the same question in September 2007. And 82 per cent said Al Qaeda was also a critical threat, exactly twice as many who thought so two years ago (The Huffington Post, 2009). Similarly, the International Republican Institute’s poll showed that the number of people who did not approve of the US’s ‘war on terror’ was reduced by 19 per cent from 89 per cent in January 2009 to 70 per cent in June 2009 (Christain Science Monitor, 2008). However, it was a short-lived reduction in sentiment against the US policies. The anti-US sentiments soon started to swell again and reached an unprecedented height following the Raymond Davis issue,

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the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and the attack of NATO forces on the Salala checkpost. However, the sentiments against the terrorists belonging to TTP and Al Qaeda did not show any sign of a letup. On the contrary, the people became weary of terrorism with every passing month and year. Eventually, some opposition leaders like Imran Khan of PTI showed sympathy for the Waziristan-based terrorists in 2011 and 2012. They talked about negotiations and end to war, which was not Pakistan’s war but America’s war. In fact, this stance and approach influenced many people. The confusing statements of the Interior Minister of Pakistan and Punjab law minister of seeing Indian and foreign influences in every terrorist attack instead of directly accusing TTP caused great confusion among the public to identify the real culprit. Obviously, such rhetoric divided public sentiments and provided a lifeline to the terrorists. It hindered the security forces to fight the terrorists in North Waziristan and elsewhere. Compared to urbanites, the people of suburban and rural areas were less concerned about terrorism mainly because terrorists targeted major urban centres and terrorist activities hardly took place in villages or small towns. Usman Pannu, president of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Ferozewala, Punjab, said, ‘People of villages are more concerned about price hike in diesel rather than terrorism. Increase in price of diesel affects them badly because their tube wells and tractors are run by it.’11 Pakistan’s resilience to survive despite acute terrorism is much due to its large rural population, which had remained safe from terrorist activities. However, they could not escape from radicalisation and sectarianism.

CHAPTER 7 THE STATE RESPONSE

COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) Insurgency is violence with political motives. Therefore, it cannot be defeated with either a merely military solution or a purely political solution. A successful counter-insurgency strategy encompasses a carrot and stick policy: a melange of aggressive offensive to eradicate insurgency coupled with talks and socio-economic development. Negotiations are also undertaken to alienate population and to address the demands with the local leadership (Gurmeet, 2008). Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy was designed by the Pakistan Army with little or no civilian input. Pakistan military conducted about 24 major operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan as a part of counter-terrorism strategy from 2002 to 2017. The military operations in the last 13 years had been usually interlaced with intermittent peace deals with different groups of Taliban operating in the tribal areas. Table 7.1 presents the chronology of military operations and peace deals. The most important campaigns since 2001 include support for the US-led Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ (2001– 2); Operation ‘Al-Mizan’ (2002– 6); Operation ‘Zalzala’ (2008); Operations ‘Sherdil’, ‘Rah-e-Haq’ and ‘Rah-e-Rast’ (2007– 9) and Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’. Operation Rah-e-Nijat was started in 2009 against the TTP and its affiliated groups in South Waziristan. Pakistan employed the army, the Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Police in these operations (Fair & Jones, 2009). In July 2002, Pakistani troops entered the Khyber Agency for the first time since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

Mir Ali

7 Battle of Mir Ali

6 Al-Mizan

Kalosha, Wana, NW Shakai, Wana

5 Kalosha II

4 Battle of Wana

7 – 10 October 2007

11– 13 June 2004

12– 26 March 2004

16– 23 March 2004

June 2002

3 Kazha Punga

Kazha Punga, NW Wana, SW

March 2002

2 Anaconda

Date

September 2001– 2

Location

Military operations and peace deals.

1 Enduring Freedom

Name of the military operation

Table 7.1

–

–

Sararogha Peace Deal North Waziristan Accord Peace deal with Gul Bahadur September 2006

February 2005 5 September 2006

April 2004

–

–

Shakai Accord

Date

Peace deal

–

–

Ceasefire and military stalemate

Operation Silence in Lal Masjid in 2007 ended the two peace deals

Indecisive victory of Pakistan forces

Pakistan participated in the US operation Pakistan was part of the US operation

Peace deal brokered on Result/remarks

Location

Swat

Swat

Swat

Bajaur, Tang Khata, KP

Khyber

8 Rah-e-Haq-I

9 Rah-e-Haq-II

10 Rah-e-Haq-III

11 Sherdil

12 Sirat-iMustaqeem

Continued

Name of the military operation

Table 7.1

28 February 2009 28 June 2008 to July 2008

7 August to 26 September 2008

January 2009

25 October to 8 December 2007 July 2008

Date

Date

Unwritten agreement with Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber/Bara peace deal

11 July 2008

Covert peace deal August 2008 with Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur

Swat Agreement 21 May 2008

Peace deal

Launched against Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) led by Mangal Bagh

Launched in Shangla Hills and Swat Valley against TNSM Second phase of the operation launched to take Shangla Hills FC helped four army infantry brigades to secure main supply lines and consolidate Swat District Jointly launched with FC in Bajaur Agency. Widely considered an operational success but ended with a peace deal with Faqir Muhammad

Peace deal brokered on Result/remarks

In Khurram: September 2009 to 3 June 2010

Orakzai Agency and Kurram Agency

Khyber Pass, KP Mohmand Agency

17 Kawakh Ba De Sham (I’ll teach you a lesson)

18 Khyber Pass offensive 19 Brekhna (Thunder)

Orakzai Agency, March 2010 to 1 June 2010 1 September 2009 to 30 November 2009 3 November 2009

19 June 2009 to 12 December 2009

May 2009 to July 2009

January 2008 to May 2008 April 2009 to June 2009

SW, FATA

24 20 26 Buner, Lower Dir, Swat, 14 Shangla District Swat, KP 16 15

Spinkai, SW

16 Rah-e-Nijat

15 Rah-e-Rast

14 Black Thunderstorm

13 Zalzala Dir, Shangla District from Taliban

Victory of Pakistan Army, NATO routes secured Ground Offensive in Mohmand Agency

Commonly known as the Swat operation to regain Buner, some 100 km from Islamabad from Taliban’s control. Fazlullah escaped to Afghanistan but senior commanders were killed Launched in SW in the bastion of Mehsud tribe from which TTP leadership was derived at that time

The main objective was to kill or capture Qari Hussain The aim was to retake Buner, Lower

Khyber Agency, FATA Bara and Tirah Valley/NW

22 Khyber-1

22 February 2017

March 2015

October 2014 to present

2012 June 2014 ongoing

Date

Peace deal

Date

Operation against local and foreign militants in NW Mainly against LI, Jamaat-ulAhrar and TTP Sequel of Khyber-1 against Daesh/ IS, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, LI and other TTP remnants. Units from the elite Special Services Group also took part The aim was to eliminate the residual/latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders

Peace deal brokered on Result/remarks

Source: Dawn, News International, New York Times, Jamestown Foundation, Express Tribune and Wikipedia.

24 Radd-ul-Fasaad

Across Pakistan

NW NW

20 Tight Screw 21 Zarb-e-Azb

23 Khyber-2

Location

Continued

Name of the military operation

Table 7.1

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It intensified operations against the militants after two attacks on General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003. In 2004, the Pakistan Army sustained heavy casualties (New York Times, 2006). In early 2005, it resorted to negotiations and peace deals with militants to avoid Pashtun backlash from the local populace and within the army cadres. Although the operations continued all along, all-out assault was avoided due to the following three reasons: (1) to avoid the dangers of battling multiple groups in multiple theatres in most rugged terrain; (2) a lack of consensus within the state and (3) a dearth of support from the Pakistani public (The Nation, 2009). However, the turning point came when despite the peace deal with TTP in Swat and acceptance of their demand of imposition of Nizam-e-Adl (the justice system), the subversive and terrorist activities of Baitullah and Fazlullah continued unabated. In addition to immense US pressure, the public and the state realised the gravity of situation. Thus, the Pakistan Army started Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ (the virtuous path) against the Swat TTP on 26 April 2009 (The Nation, 2009). All the military operations did not achieve a clear-cut victory because the insurgents’ safe havens and supply lines were not neutralised. Pakistan employed a motley of forces in its military operations against militants, including the army, the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Police (Fair & Seth, 2010). TTP compelled the Pakistan Army to fight a three-front war in the tribal areas: against TTP and IMU in South Waziristan; against antiShiʿa Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Darra Adam Khel-Kohat areas of KP and the Kurram Agency of FATA and against the TNSM and TTP Swat Chapter headed by Fazlullah and JeM in Swat Valley (Gurmeet, 2008).

Operation Kazha Punga (2002) The Pakistan Army undertook its first military adventure on 25 June 2002 to kill Commander Nek Muhammad and his local and foreign militants in South Waziristan. They had taken refuge in the area after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. The objectives of the operation could not be achieved and the security forces faced tough resistance. Half of the top-tier leadership of the Pakistani Taliban fled to Afghanistan to escape the military operations. Another objective that

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could not be achieved through the operations was the neutralisation of safe havens and supply lines (Ihasanullah, 2011).

Operation Kalosha II (2004) In early 2004, the Pakistani intelligence community gathered reports of increased Al Qaeda activities in Wana. Later, in March, the army launched a 13-day cordon and search operation Kalosha when the Frontier Corps (FC) personnel were ambushed in Wana. The Pakistani forces faced stiff resistance, and the operation that started with 700 troops fortified later with a total of 7,000 army and FC soldiers. The operation succeeded in eliminating local and foreign militants and unearthing a network of tunnels containing sophisticated electronic equipment and supplies. Al Qaeda command and control centre was also dismantled (Fair & Seth, 2010). The Shakai agreement brokered after operation Kalosha in March 2004. Operation Al-Mizan (11 – 13 June 2004) A strong force of 10,000 army troops, US-trained Special Operations Task Force and FC attacked more than 200 Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs with hundreds of local supporters in Shakai at a distance of 25 km from Wana. Mounting casualties convinced the military into striking the Sargodha peace deal with militants in February 2005 (Fair & Seth, 2010). Operation Tri-Star (January 2008) The Pakistan Army launched a three-part operation in January 2008 in FATA against the Pakistani Taliban. Operation ‘Tri-Star’ was launched to contain the threat from Baitullah Mehsud after attacks on military forts in SWA in January 2008. Operation Zalzala was the part of the operation Tri-Star. The operation proved successful in regaining strategic areas of Laddah, Makin, Spinkai Raghzai, Kotkai and Tiarza (Gunaratna & Bukhari, 2008). Operation Al-Mizan (2002– 6) Operation ‘Al-Mizan’ comprised several smaller military operations, including Operation ‘Kalosha II’, which was carried out in South Waziristan. Pakistan forces employing local informants identified more than 70 Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen who were harbouring and supporting foreign fighters. The main success of the operation was

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that it resulted in the capture or killing of several senior Al Qaeda leaders. The operation failed to clear North and South Waziristan of militants. Another small operation as a part of Operation ‘Al-Mizan’ took place in June 2004 in Shakai, some 25 km north of Wana.

Operation Zalzala (2008) Operation ‘Zalzala’ was the component of the operation Tri-Star. The aim of this operation was to gain control of the areas under Mehsud’s loyalists sway. The goal was to capture key member/leaders of Mehsud who are against Pakistan and its security forces. It did not aim to target the groups that are fighting inside Afghanistan using the tribal areas as a launching pad. Over the following months, the army cleared most of the village Spinkai, which was under the control of Mehsud. The operation temporarily cleared many parts of South Waziristan. The army seized weapons, computers and propaganda material and finally withdrew in May 2008, claiming victory. Success was short-lived and militants re-infiltrated the areas as soon as the army withdrew (Gunaratna & Bukhari, 2008). The failure of Operation ‘Zalzala’ enabled the TTP under the tutelage of Baitullah Mehsud to increase terrorist attacks from their base in SW. There were 2,148 attacks in 2008 in Pakistan (Zahid, 2009). Operation Sherdil (September 2008) Operation ‘Sherdil’ was launched on 9 September 2008 when a security convoy was ambushed by the local militants in Loe Sam. Already in Bajaur 72 checkposts had been destroyed by the militants. The prime objective of Operation ‘Sherdil’ was to clear and hold Bajaur population centres and communication lines. The result of the operation was mixed. The operation resorted to heavy force including aerial bombing, bulldozers and tanks (Fair & Seth, 2010). The main objective of the operation was to target all militant groups that threatened the security of Pakistan (Zahid, 2008). Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007– 9) This operation was conducted in three phases. Malakand accord with TNSM was concluded after Operation ‘Rah-e-Haq’ in 2009. During the operation, a ‘shoot on sight’ curfew was imposed in Swat. Operation Rahe-Rast was launched after the third phase of Operation ‘Rah-e-Haq’ (ibid).

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Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009) Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ was launched after Sufi Muhammad severed the peace deal unilaterally, after 53 days, brokered with the government on 16 February 2009 to end the Taliban-driven insurgency in Swat. Sufi wanted to nominate Qazi/judges of his own choice and rejected government nominations. The Tehreek-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and the Taliban chapter of TTP jointly launched brutal offensives against innocent people, police and government and security officials in Malakand Division. Swat had already fallen in February 2009. The government finally launched military operation Rah-e-Rast in early May 2009. During Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’, the army ruthlessly eliminated Taliban who put up a stiff resistance. Learning from the defeat in the operation, the battle-hardened Taliban embraced a classic guerrilla tactic of ‘retreat and advance’ to evade extinction and elimination. By 30 June 2009, the security forces swept the area clean of Taliban and militants by killing 1,635 terrorists; eliminated their camps and hideouts and recovered huge caches of American-, Russian- and Indian-made weapons that were smuggled in from Afghanistan. The operation was successful in dismantling the terrorists in 60 days. Maulvi Fazlullah escaped to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the military operation. Maulvi Fazlullah’s escape to Afghanistan and failure to eliminate other members of his leadership was the major low point of the operation as these were the declared priority of the operation. The biggest success of the operation was that it dismantled the militants’ network in the Malakand Division within 60 days (Rashid, 2009). Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009) Operation ‘Rah-e-Nijat’, an air and ground offensive, was commenced on 17 October 2009 to take control of the areas in South Waziristan under the sway of Baitullah Mehsud (BBC News, 17 October 2009). Command and control system of TTP was disrupted in the key Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. By January 2010, Pakistan forces had almost cleared several villages in South Waziristan and seized heavy weapons from the Taliban. No important Taliban leaders were killed or arrested in the offensive. Some assistance was sought from CIA and the US military. The main objective was to disrupt and destroy the strongholds of TTP in Ladha, Makin, Sararogha (Ali, 2009).

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Operation Black Thunderstorm (26 April 2009) This operation was undertaken to regain control of Buner and Shangla districts, Lower Dir district and Swat district from the Taliban after the military took control of them since early 2009. Within the first ten days of the operation, the militants were on the run. The army rapidly cleared town after town and made quick progress. The ferocious Swat TTP was defeated in the fire and fury of the army. Air power was also used to destroy their hideouts and underground tunnels in the mountains. More than 1,700 militants were killed, as claimed by the ISPR (The Nation, 2009). At least 260 soldiers were killed. Approximately 3 million people, almost as many Afghan refugees who had come to Pakistan during the Soviet– Afghan War, were internally displaced. The US Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen acknowledged that Pakistan made an ‘awful lot of progresses’ in its fight against the Taliban insurgency in Swat (The Nation, 2009). The operation was therefore declared to have entered the wrapping up stage on 8 July 2009. However, the later developments showed that much more needed to be done to annihilate the insurgents in different agencies of FATA, especially in North Waziristan. Apart from small operations, an all-out military campaign seemed necessary to dismantle the command and control structures of the well-entrenched TTP insurgents and their affiliates. Therefore, Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was launched in 2014. Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was started on 15 June 2014 with a serious intent to annihilate the TTP and its affiliates, which held large swathes of FATA. US drone campaign was already taking care of Al Qaeda and its foreign associates in the same area. It was the twenty-third mentionable military operation against the insurgents and terrorists in FATA. The newly elected government of Pakistan made serious efforts to negotiate with TTP to reach an agreement for peace. However, these attempts failed miserably and the insurgents and terrorists continued their activities, rather adopting a more brutal and lethal approach of destruction. Following a terrorist attack on Karachi airport, the government’s peace talks with TTP came to an end and Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was launched. The government and political forces gave a unanimous go ahead to the military to end the menace of terrorism. Military went in with full might and fury, employing all the tools at its disposal, like artillery and air force. The COAS General Raheel Sharif

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led the fight from the front with a clear mind and clean heart. The stated aim of Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was to strike at all terrorists without any distinction of good or bad Taliban. As expected, very soon, the terrorists started crumbling under the army’s relentless onslaught. According to ISPR, at least 2,763 militants, including some known commanders, had been killed in ground operations and air strikes by June 2015. It added that 837 hideouts have been destroyed and 253 tons of explosives have been recovered. In the process, 347 military personnel have also lost their lives during the operation. The positives of Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ were obvious. The command and control structure of TTP and many networks of terrorists were destroyed. By 2015, about 90 per cent of the FATA area had been purged of the terrorists, as claimed by Defence Minister of Pakistan Khawaja Muhammad Asif. The Prime Minister of Pakistan had stated, ‘The operation Zarb-e-Azb has successfully destroyed terrorists’ hideouts and networks’. Above all, according to a report by the US Department of State, Pakistan topped the list of countries with decreasing number of terrorist attacks. Thus, the short-term plan has been achieved. The major flaw of this operation was that at the very inception the vital element of surprise was lost, which enabled the terrorists to take pre-emptive measures. The top leadership of TTP fled away to safe havens of the Pak-Afghan border or inside Afghanistan in Nuristan and Kunar provinces. Replicating the strategy of Afghan Taliban, most of them were defeated by initial military onslaught but managed to fight back after sometime. They kept launching dreadful terrorist attacks from their bases in Afghanistan. Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ ended in 2016. However, as the insurgents continued their terrorist operations from across the border, Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad was started in February 2017. This operation aimed at annihilating the terrorists and their facilitators from the cities, with the support of the civil agencies, according to directions given in the National Action Plan. Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was primarily a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. It is a fight against asymmetrical warfare, which the militants fight under an ideology and motive to bring so-called political and social change. Terrorism is one tool of insurgency. The US COIN model suggests that establishing security is not a precursor to economic and governance activity: rather security, economic and governance activity

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must be developed in parallel. In Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’, the main thrust was on the security aspect, whereas the other two aspects were ignored. The pace to build the war-ravaged areas was too slow and Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) were facing severe hardships in camps and temporary abodes. In the long-term, this gap might boomerang as the local population potentially get fed up and many might start siding with the insurgents. There has been a large exodus of almost 1 million TDPs who are still languishing in camps or have taken shelter at different places. These TDPs were facing endless miseries and were at the mercy of vagaries of extreme weathers and inhospitable conditions. Social fabric of North Waziristan and FATA was severely shattered. How long would it take to bring it back to normalcy? Or will it ever? Moreover, it was a point of concern that the information of successes, failures, deaths and arrests of the operation was only provided by the military source. There was no independent source to authenticate it. It also highlighted the absence of civil oversight over the military offensives in FATA. COIN is a complex and difficult campaign, which can become controversial politically. People of the area can stop distinguishing between the operational forces and the militants. Therefore, it required continuous monitoring, evaluation and assessment by the civil government. Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ did achieve successes by dismantling the command and control structures of the insurgents. There was a tangible reduction in terrorist attacks in urban areas. However, counterinsurgency campaigns took longer to achieve ultimate success. The insurgents dispersed, melted away and then reassembled to fight back. It was quite difficult to totally eliminate insurgent activity. So much more was required. It would have been considered a successful operation if TTP’s leadership was neutralised, marginalised or separated from the population. Furthermore, its success would also be measured by TTP’s demobilisation or reintegration into the political, economic and social structures of the country. As suggested above, the economic and governance activity must start immediately without waiting for the end of the military operation stage. Everything, including the military operations, ought to be done under civil oversight. When most of the area of FATA had been reclaimed, there should have been strategic change in the operation and more

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emphasis should have been on intelligence-led operations to strike at the top tier of the insurgents. Military claimed to have carried out intelligence-led operations, but the leadership of TTP remained intact. A counter-insurgency force should have been raised to replace armed forces gradually to avoid protracted engagement of military within the country. This engagement might continue for years. However, three aspects were perplexing. First, the military strategists chose to ignore the element of surprise; an effective ‘means to gain superiority’ on the battlefield (Clause Witz, 1976). The publicity of these operations was early and loud enough to be noticed and anticipated by the enemy that took precautionary measures. The army probably wanted to avoid collateral damage; therefore, it warned all beforehand so that civilians could leave in good time. Secondly, mainly due to the above reason, most of the top leadership of Swat TTP, including Maulvi Fazlullah, could be neither arrested nor killed. The news of Maulvi Fazlullah being seriously wounded was also denied by TTP sources (The Nation, 2009). Rather the TTP spokesperson, Muslim Khan, in an audio message sent to a TV channel threatened the people of Swat of dire consequences for siding with the army. He claimed that Fazlullah and other top Taliban leaders were alive and would continue their struggle (The Daily Times, 2009). It turned out to be true to some extent. Thirdly, melting away of TTP forces created a scare. Afghan Taliban had also melted away within 35 days of the US attack on Afghanistan, but within two months, they started the guerrilla war and after 16 years, they were still fighting with the international forces. The fear turned true as Fazlullah and his followers found sanctuaries in Nuristan and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan. All the militants should have been accounted for: how many were killed; how many were arrested; how many had slipped away and more importantly where? At least it became clear from subsequent activities of these elements that they took refuge in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, which were closer to Pakistan border. While this operation was being wrapped up, the operation ‘Rah-eNijat’ (the salvation path) was launched against the TTP in South Waziristan. It was the largest and most ambitious COIN campaign in the country’s history, involving 60,000 troops, of which 45,000 were deployed in a combat role and 15,000 in a support one (Lodhi, 2010).

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Lot of deliberation was done before launching the South Waziristan operation. TTP’s Mehsud stronghold was encircled to stop the militants’ supply lines and separate the Waziri chapter of the Taliban from the Mehsud affiliate. Earlier, three times, the army had gone into South Waziristan, but could not achieve the desired results. However, the army seemed determined to win this time. It was going to be a war that was both guerrilla in nature – the militants knew the terrain and had local support – and conventional in its goals. ‘For the military, the goal is limited: to degrade and destroy these elements and not let them use South Waziristan as a sanctuary from which to spread terrorism in the rest of Pakistan,’ said Rifaat Hussain, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. ‘But for the TTP, it is a battle for survival. If they lose, the whole movement is finished.’ Most civilians fled the area of fighting in South Waziristan, enabling the army to use extensive air power against militants without fear of collateral damage. Pakistan Air Force fighter jets pounded the hideouts and compounds of TTP militants. ISPR reported that hundreds had been killed, injured and arrested. Rest were on the run looking for shelter (The Nation, 2009). However, this operation proved tougher than the one against the Swat TTP because the terrain is harsh and closer to the Afghan border and their numerical strength is more than the Swat TTP. However, one big consolation was that Pakistan’s most wanted man, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed, though in a US drone attack (Lodhi, 2010). Nevertheless, this loss did not throw TTP in disarray, and Hakimullah Mehsud stepped in to lead it. Meanwhile, the army entered into truce tactics with non-Mehsud militants. Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur entered into nonaggression pacts with the army and were promised money and reconstruction projects in exchange for their neutrality. The Haqqani network, led by former Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani – one of the most-wanted militants by the US, whose network had concentrated its efforts on attacking NATO forces in Afghanistan – was also expected to remain passive throughout the operation, military officials told TIME. Although this policy was criticised by many, the Pakistan Army spokesperson, Athar Abbas, defended these agreements. He asked, ‘If you have to defeat the main serpent, would you like to isolate that from the others or deal with them all at once?’ Prof. Rifaat Hussain, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, thought the tactic

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made sense in the short term but worried that in time, the groups that were neutral now may just become a new threat. Baitullah Mehsud, he pointed out, was once an ally of the Pakistani military (Daily Times, 2009). The strategic difference between Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ and Operation ‘Rah-e-Nijat’ was that while 20,000 troops were used in Swat operation, more reliance was on air power to destroy the TTP hideouts in the mountainous region of Waziristan (Daily Times, 2009). Analysts did not consider it an appropriate approach to annihilate the hardened militants who were fighting a guerrilla war in harsh terrains (Daily Times, 2009). The result was that the operation against the TTP in South Waziristan could not be concluded. Moreover, the Swati TTP kept threatening from across the border.

IS A MILITARY METHOD THE RIGHT SOLUTION? Military operations should be the last resort to tackle an insurgency. Ikram Sehgal, defence and political analyst, said: The army increasingly has had to deal with internal strife instead of securing the borders. Other than drawing crucial reserves away from countering the aggressive defence postures of the Indians, they are compelled to devote time and effort to burgeoning internal problems of different dimensions. Fighting against one’s own population can put stress on any army in the world, raising adverse perceptions among the populace, extremely dangerous for a country that thrives on glorifying its armed forces (Sehgal, 2011). Ideally, instead of armed forces, paramilitary forces or a special counterinsurgency force should have been used for this purpose. The army could then have supported as the occasional back-up force for swift and shortlived operations. When the Pakistan Army had achieved initial success against dismantling the command and control structure of the militants, especially in Swat, the emphasis should have been on intelligence-based dedicated operations to pursue the higher echelon as well as disperse command structure and most importantly their sources of funding. When the army started its operation against the militants in FATA in 2002, there were fears of mutiny and disobedience.

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The army’s prolonged involvement in FATA and Swat created fears that Pashtun ethnic sentiment and religious sensibilities might affect the armed forces, as they are made up of 20 per cent Pashtun soldiers and officers. However, these apprehensions were unfounded and little credible evidence became known to suggest that the military was plagued with these problems (Foreign Affairs, 2009). There were no reported cases of insubordination or disobedience on these bases during the military operations in FATA and earlier in Swat. The Pakistan Army is considered a disciplined and professional organisation. The question whether a military method to quell insurgency and militancy is correct or not has already been discussed elsewhere. The army is a professionally sound organisation that despite its multi-ethnic composition takes pride in its discipline. Anatol Lieven portrayed its nature in befitting words, ‘It is the only Pakistani institution which works according to modern Weberian rules, as a more or less orderly, meritocratic and bureaucratic force with an esprit de corps and a capacity for self-discipline’ (Lieven, 2007). Nevertheless, the army’s prolonged engagement in Waziristan, which resulted in collateral damage and inconvenience to the public, created bitter sentiments over the tough military methods. If the situation continued, the struggle against insurgents and terrorists might start losing its legitimacy and efficacy. Moreover, after the trans-border attacks by the Maulvi Fazlullah-led TTP terrorists from their hideouts in Afghanistan into Pakistan, it became all the more important for the army to focus on borders and let the trained para-military forces, especially trained for counter-insurgency in the FATA terrain handle the internal situation.

THE USE OF LASHKARS TO COUNTER INSURGENTS Even the use of ‘lashkars’ (tribal militias) against Taliban in FATA and Swat, encouraged by the army, required extra caution as it was likely to trigger inter-tribal strife and thus more violence (Asia Times, 16 July 2009). This was exactly what happened. The lashkars fizzled out in some areas; in others, they proved only partially effective (Daily Times, 2010). They also created confusion as it became difficult to differentiate between lashkars and terrorists. The confusion increased when the heads of the Taliban commanders claimed close terms with security forces.

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The Taliban commander Taasil Khan based in Shakai, South Waziristan was shifted to Pindi CMH by a military helicopter after becoming the target of bomb blast planted by unknown miscreants (Wazir, 2012). This incident witnessed by many residents of South Waziristan left masses unable to identify their real enemy. The people who were affected by the terrorist activities were encouraged by the state to form a group to fight against the terrorists in their areas. They were supported and armed by the army for this purpose. They were also given awards and honours. Some were also provided with material and logistic support. However, these civilians had to face the wrath of terrorists, especially when the lashkars became strong or the army withdrew its support to them. A total of 25 militia men were brutally killed by the Taliban in Upper Dir District. The government did not provide security to these militia men and left them vulnerable. Once they were armed, they were safe, but they had to be disarmed after the expiry of their temporary employment as security personnel (Wazir, 2012). Sadly, the government of Pakistan never compensated these affected people. Saadullah and Raza Khan and many others like them purchased their own wheelchairs. ‘The government just used us and left us in the lurch’, Saadullah said. The media covered the story of 25 people who were slain by militants but the aftermath of the event was overlooked. The families of temporary soldiers were not compensated. One of the cousins of Raza Khan left the permanent military employment after one of his relatives was disregarded by Pakistan (Wazir, 2012). There are instances when local people, especially in Bajaur Agency and Mohmand Agency, were compelled to fight against the militants in their area. In the vicinity of Mandal in Bajaur, security forces compelled ten locals to provide for the security of each specified area. They were forced to patrol at nights. In one of their activities, Taliban abducted ten patrolling tribesmen including Abdullah, a schoolteacher, at midnight. Taliban chopped off Abdullah’s ear while threatening the other tribesmen to refrain from patrolling the area. However, the civilians could not give up patrolling under the pressure of the security forces. After a few days, Abdullah was killed brutally by the militants. The security forces did not compensate the family of the slain tribesman. These are a few instances among thousands of such cases in FATA and north of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where civilians became the victims in

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this counter-insurgency strategy. This picture serves as a sobering reminder for anyone who believed that arming the most accommodating militias came without grave risks. The case of 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai was no different; winner of the Nobel Peace Prize Malala Yousafzai was shot because she was used by the state as an anti-Taliban national hero. The government awarded her with a huge sum of money along with other titles, but she was left among the people who had already threatened her and other girls in Swat. The attack on Malala Yousafzai depicted the story of negligence on the part of the security forces that failed to protect her. In one way or the other, Malala was part of counter-insurgency; hence, she became the target of militants. She wrote a diary against Taliban activities in the region even at the time when the writ of Taliban was strong in Swat. She not only continued her education, but also encouraged other girls to do so even when Taliban banned girls’ education in Swat. She had been projected by the state as an education icon. The government must compensate the victims and protect the civilians in the areas (FATA and KP) where the war has been imposed. The best way of protecting civilians from militants was to keep them away from counter-insurgency strategy. Their involvement in it could jeopardise their lives. Although the local intrepid tribesmen could fight effectively against their enemy, in the case of the Taliban or other militants, they were quite ambivalent. They did not know whether the government was sincere in curbing the militant elements from society or wanted to keep them for some hidden state-strategic purpose. The government should have cleared this confusion to enable them to identify friends or enemies so that they could fight against their enemies, with clear goals and objectives. It would have been better if the government had utilised the potential of communities in sustaining peace by deploying them in the areas cleared by the security forces. Pitting the civilians against the militants would be dangerous in a tribal society (FRC, 2012).

PEACE DEAL POLITICS Roogha (reconciliation or compromise) and Soolah (truce) were two integral aspects of Pashtunwali (the Pashtun code) (Globalpolitician. com). India Office Library, London, contains the oldest peace agreement

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signed between the British government and the unruly Zakka Khel Afridis in 1857 (Spain, 1962). In light of these traditions and practices, the government of Pakistan had negotiated and concluded at least 13 prominent peace deals, some tacit and unwritten (from 2004 to 2009), all of which had been breached very quickly as both the parties blamed each other for the violations (Terrorism Monitor, 2006). What is the track record of talks and truces? From 2004 to 2014, eight main agreements took place between the government of Pakistan and the militants, but all ended in fiasco. (The details of the agreements are given below.) These repeated failures of talks and agreements show the importance of following a formula (STOP formula) to initiate and pursue talks or enter into a truce.

STRENGTH, TENACITY, OBJECTIVES AND PREVIOUS PACTS (STOP) Initiating negotiations from a position of weakness can be counterproductive. Pre-mature approach could give the terrorists and insurgents a feeling of legitimacy and supremacy. Consequently, they talked with confidence and authority and the government ended up giving concessions to them. Decisions on whether to initiate peace negotiations or not should be made on the basis of STOP formula (strength, tenacity, objective and previous pacts). It is imperative to look into detail at the four aspects to have a fair estimate of the chances of success or failure of talks.1 – Strength: Are the terrorists operating from a position of weakness or of strength? This is one of the fundamental questions to be addressed to make a decision whether to initiate the talks with the militants or not. As far as TTP was concerned, until 2012, all indications were that TTP and allied groups had not succumbed to pressure created by the army operations and counter-terrorism operations in cities. On 23 February 2012, when the terrorists carried out VBIED attack at Kohat Bus Stand killing 12 persons and injuring 35 others, the Awami National Party (ANP) leaders Haji Adeel and Zahid Khan lambasted the terrorists and said that it was an eye-opener for those who were talking about initiating talks with the terrorists. They said that these terrorists were a plague who wanted to negotiate on their

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own terms that was not acceptable (Dunya TV News bulletin, 2012). On the other hand, TTP scoffed at repeated government offers of truce or surrender, which showed their arrogance, will to fight and confidence in their strength. In November 2012, after the terrorist acts of sectarian violence in Karachi, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Dera, Ismail Khan, the interior minister of Pakistan, during the first seven days of the Islamic month of Muharram, offered a truce to TTP. The TTP rejected it and vowed to continue fighting until the ousting of the country’s ‘secular rulers’ (The News International, 2012). These strategic flaws were repeated time and again. Tenacity: The second cardinal element of STOP formula was to assess the determination of the insurgents/terrorists to utilise their strength, pursue their objectives and fight back resiliently. All indicators pointed that TTP had shown enough tenacity to fight back despite substantial damage to its command and control structure in South Waziristan. They kept bouncing back not only in the Waziristan area, but also carried out terrorist acts in urban centres of Pakistan. Earlier on, Maulvi Fazlullah and Maulvi Faqir were ousted from their areas of jurisdiction and their command and control structures were completely destroyed, but after some time, they started retaliating. They used ‘strategic depth’ and fought back from their hideouts in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan. They carried out organised attacks inside Pakistan. Objectives: In response to the repeated government offers of negotiations and amnesty to the TTP, they had been making several demands, including the release of fighters from prisons. Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, TTP’s deputy commander and commander in Bajaur Agency, said that ‘The TTP welcomes the prime minister’s offer’ and set two preconditions for the dialogue: to reconsider the government’s relationship with the US and to enforce Islamic Sharia in the country. ‘We never wanted to fight to begin with,’ said the senior Taliban commander. ‘Our aim was to rid Afghanistan of foreign forces. But the Pakistani government, by supporting America, left us no choice but to fight.’ Maulvi Faqir and other senior TTP cadres were believed to be hiding in the eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Islamabad blamed militants led by Maulvi Faqir for the cross-border attacks on its security forces.

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– But ironically until the beginning of 2012 when there were a lot of speculations and counter-clarifications regarding peace talks with the terrorists, the TTP continued its heinous and cruel activities. It executed 15 paramilitary Frontier Corps on 4 January 2012 who were captured from a check post. Their naked bodies were found in the town of Shiwa in the Miramshah area. They were captured on 22 December after a Taliban force assaulted a fort in the settled district of Tank, which borders South Waziristan. One soldier was killed during the assault. The next day, seven Frontier Corps troopers were killed in a suicide attack in the settled district of Bannu (Roggio, 2012). Peshawar faced a new wave of terrorism in February 2012. A total of 13 people died in a suicide attack at Kohat Bus Stand on 23 February 2012. On the next day, three suicide bombers targeted a police station in Peshawar, in which four police personnel died. On the same day, a militant was injured while planting an IED near the road (Dawn TV, 2012). – The TTP spokesperson, Ehsanullah Ehsan, said that these 15 soldiers were executed in retaliation to a Pakistani military operation in the Khyber tribal agency on 1 January that killed 12 Taliban. Amongst those killed in Khyber was Qari Kamran, a senior commander in Nowshera who was responsible for the murders of scores of Pakistani soldiers, policemen and civilians in the north-west. He further added that the 22 and 23 December attacks were carried out to avenge the death of Taj Gul Mehsud, a senior deputy to Hakimullah Mehsud, TTP Chief. Taj Gul was killed along with 12 other fighters in a US airstrike in South Waziristan on 26 October (Dawn TV, 2012). – Previous Pacts: It was essential to review the fate of previous pacts and truces and to find the reasons for their failure. Almost all truces had ended in smoke, resulting in renewed hostilities and skirmishes. The violations were done on one excuse or other. It was enough to predict the likely fate of any new truce. On the basis of this formula, the peace talks always seemed premature as the terrorists were exerting hard demands and making their presence felt in a strong and brutal manner. Even if talks were held, the government would have to give more than it could take. Even the Prime Minister expressed his apprehensions and cautions when he said that the approach

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being tried (in October 2011) was similar to that which was tried in Swat, where the government offered a peace deal to the militants in 2009, but launched a military operation after the Taliban refused to honour their end of the bargain. All the peace deals were negotiated by the Pakistan military, except the Swat Agreement, which was negotiated by the civil government. A review of these peace deals makes one commonality clearly evident that all the agreements were signed to placate adversary from a position of weakness. This appeasement was accentuated in the demands put forward by the government or military in agreements. Resultantly, all the major peace deals collapsed renewing the cycle of violence. The Pakistan Army entered FATA for the first time on the night of 25 June 2002 on its maiden military adventure in the tribal belt called Operation ‘Kazha Punga’, named after a remote village in South Waziristan, to hunt weapon caches and kill the Commander Nek Muhammad Wazir-led small group of both local and foreign militants at the behest of Washington. After many Pakistani commandoes were killed, the troops encircled a compound in Kazha Punga after getting intelligence about the presence of Al Qaeda operatives. The ambush was an eye-opener for the Pakistan Army as the 35 Al Qaeda operatives escaped the compound killing ten commandoes. The incident showed that the foreign fighters had entrenched themselves in FATA and enjoyed considerable local support (Hussain, 2010). In March 2004, the Pakistan Army moved into SW to counter the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militants, causing a revolt of tribesmen under the tutelage of local mullahs. The military incursion resulted in widespread destruction and fierce fighting, killing hundreds of people including women and children. In some cases, army units refused to fight. As a result, many officers were reportedly dismissed from the army. The sharply deteriorating circumstances forced the government to submit to the first of the several peace agreements with tribal militants. It was struck with Nek Muhammad Wazir-led militants. The deal stipulated the militants to stop targeting Pakistani forces and to cease cross-border attacks in Afghanistan in lieu of amnesty, expulsion of foreign militants and withdrawal of troops. ‘Operation Kaloosha’ led to the Shakai Agreement with Nek Muhammad in April 2004.

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THE SHAKAI AGREEMENT The Shakai deal was a result of the military operation aimed at forcing Nek Muhammad to expel foreign militants or get them registered. The operation was unsuccessful and the army faced stiff resistance and heavy casualties. As a part of the Shakai agreement, the government agreed to release Taliban prisoners, pay compensations and give money to Taliban to help them pay their debts to Al Qaeda. In exchange, Nek agreed to get foreign militants registered and stop cross-border attacks and incursions in Afghanistan. The Pakistani security forces were pinning their hopes on the full fruition of the peace deal, but Nek Muhammad reneged on all the clauses of the deal and ended setting up training camps for Al Qaeda and declared war against Pakistan (Behuria, 2007). Soon after signing the deal, Nek started mass massacre of the Maliks only to be stopped by a drone strike.

THE SARAROGHA AGREEMENT (FEBRUARY 2005) In a hope to halt the spread of Taliban from Ahmad Wazirs areas to Mehsud areas, the military authorities reached an agreement with Baitullah Mehsud in the Sararogha areas of South Waziristan. The main conditions included that the Taliban would be compensated for the damages incurred during military operations and the Baitullah and his coterie of militants would not be targeted by the security forces. In return, Baitullah was not required to lay down weapons or surrender foreign militants in his ranks. The agreement only required Baitullah to cease attacking Pakistani security forces and targets and bring an end to giving shelter to foreign fighters. The peace agreement did not stop skirmishes between militants and security forces, and Talibanisation proliferated unchecked. Baitullah too was killed in a drone attack in August 2009 (Khattak, 2012).

THE SWAT AGREEMENT (MAY 2008) After the Lal Masjid operation in 2007, Fazlullah attempted to install his brand of Sharia in Swat Valley and took a more violent turn until the civil government came to power after the March 2008 elections, which offered peace talks to Fazlullah and his supporters. After a flurry of peace

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overtures, the government and the Fazlullah-led militants reached a 16point agreement on 21 May 2008 to end violence and restore peace in Swat. Within days of signing the agreement, the militants reneged on the terms of peace deal by demanding more concessions from the government like withdrawing troops from Swat first and release of Taliban prisoners. Within a month, the militants started targeting government officials and installations. Finally, Operation ‘Rah-e-Haq’ was launched (Dawn, 2008). More violence followed in the aftermath of the operation as schools were torched, police station and army convoys were attacked and civilians were kidnapped and beheaded. The violence ended after the implementation of Sharia-based Nizam-e-Adl regulation in Swat on 15 February 2009. This forced Fazlullah in declaring a ceasefire (Khattak, 2009).

NIZAM-E-ADL PEACE DEAL IN SWAT (2009) The latest peace deal between the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) government led by the secular ANP and TNSM in Swat was signed on 16 February 2009. However, it was also breached due to the following two main reasons: first, the government had failed to learn from the previous peace deals experience that the nature of dispute and the form of the militants was quite different from the traditional tribal disputes between clans, tribes or individuals or even an invading force that could be resolved through Roogha and Soolah. Secondly, ironically, Sufi Muhammad, a party to the issue, posed to be the mediator between the NWFP (KP) government and the TTP leader Maulvi Fazlullah and signed the deal. Many, within Pakistan and especially in the West, considered it a surrender of Swat Valley to the militants after a bloody two-year battle (The Nation, 2009). In pursuance of the peace deal, the Nizam-e-Adl (the justice system) Regulation 2009 was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan by unanimous resolution, after a debate of less than 30 minutes, on 14 April 2009. Only the MQM abstained. On the next day, the governor NWFP (KP) promulgated the regulation. It sparked criticism at home and abroad (The Nation, 2009). Even after the signing of the peace deal and imposition of Nizame-Adl, devastating suicide attacks were carried out in Dera Ismail Khan, Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Jamrud, Charsadda and so on

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(Dawn, 2009). The heavily armed militants of TTP moved from Swat to Buner. The Western media raised an alarm that Islamabad was now only 80 miles away. It created a scare, though absurdly imaginative, that the militants might ultimately capture the capital and then, maybe the nuclear weapons (The Nation, 2009). Once again the situation had worsened enough to be resolved through military might. It generated mass public support for the military operation. Thus, the army moved ahead to launch Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ that paid dividends. This agreement that followed failed too, resulting in a renewed cycle of violence that saw Fazlullah and his militants taking over Mingora in May 2009. Emboldened by their victories, the militants entered contiguous Buner and Shangla districts, only 60 miles away from Islamabad (Constable, 2009). This led the government to launch a decisive military operation to contain the threat. Within two months of Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’, Fazlullah escaped to Afghanistan and many of his militants were either killed or arrested (Khattak, 2012). The government carried out a couple of covert and tacit deals/ understandings with different militant groups to stop them from targeting Pakistani security forces or targets inside Pakistan. One such deal was concluded with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his militants. In exchange for not targeting Pakistani interests, the security forces would not target him and his militants in North Waziristan. A similar non-aggression pact was reached with Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur after the conclusion of the military operation ‘Sherdil’ in 2008. After the conclusion of military operation Sirat-i-Mustaqeem in June 2008, authorities made an unwritten agreement with Lashkar-e-Islam militants in Khyber Agency, which was breached later (Khattak, 2012). All the peace deals were usually negotiated after the military operations failed to get the desired results in a classic battle pitched between guerrilla force and a conventional army. After reviewing the entire peace deals, we can conclude that the peace agreements gave sizeable concessions to the opponents and were not negotiated from the position of strength. None of the deals exacted any conditions for the Taliban like surrendering weapons, or disbanding foreign militants. The authorities gave a huge amount of money as compensation for damages incurred during military operations that were siphoned off to fuel and fund Taliban-led militancy. All the peace deals were struck after the conclusion of a major military operation that failed to achieve its aims.

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The peace deals greatly increased the stature of militants and brought them at par with the military authorities and enervated the centuries-old jirga and tribal Malik systems. None of the peace deals lasted for more than a few months and gave way to a renewed cycle of violence. The Taliban repeatedly used the same deadly tactics that proved effective in bringing the government to the negotiating table. They used the tactics whenever they needed breathing space from a military operation to regroup and rejuvenate their ranks and supplies. Peace deals also redirect the attention of Taliban towards Afghanistan increasing cross-border attacks and activities. The let up in military action in Pakistan helped Taliban to focus on Afghanistan. In October 2011, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani said that the government was ready to start talks with all factions of the Taliban, including the Haqqani network. A TTP commander admitted that preliminary talks were in progress and initially peace in South Waziristan was under discussion. However, it was not easy to initiate talk with a number of groups operating across FATA. A tribal mediator described the talks as ‘very difficult’ (The Express Tribune, 2011). Secondly, the main military operation was being carried out in South Waziristan and therefore talking about peace in this area meant to succumb to the TTP tactic to get pressure off them and start negotiations on their terms. Thirdly, the US, the source of billions of dollars of aid vital for Pakistan’s military and feeble economy, may not look kindly on peace talks with the TTP, which it labelled a terrorist group. ‘The US won’t be happy,’ said Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani expert on the Taliban. ‘If there is less pressure from Pakistan on the militants then they (the Pakistani Taliban) will turn their attention to Afghanistan’ (The Express Tribune, 2011). When there was a two-month lull in drone attacks at the end of 2011 after the NATO attack on the Salala check post, the TTP, Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda started reuniting and rejuvenating their strength. It was evident that past peace pacts with the TTP always backfired and merely gave the group time and space to consolidate, launch fresh attacks and impose their austere version of Islam on segments of the population. There was a massive mistrust between the parties, and both blamed each other for the violations of pacts. Despite repeated failures of peace deals, some quarters insisted on negotiated settlement. Some strategists believed that talks should remain an integral part of the COIN strategy to bring lulls and breathing spaces, which could

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ultimately help achieve lasting peace. However, all suggestions were not followed by any workable plan to initiate and conclude fruitful and meaningful dialogue for lasting peace. When Mian Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in May 2013, militancy was at its peak in Waziristan and other areas of Pakistan. Depleting economy and rising terrorism were the major problems he was facing. The clarion call was to go after the militants to improve the law and order situation so that the economy could be revived. He surely was determined to improve the economy of the country, but he was reluctant to hit the militants hard through military means. His political rival, Imran Khan, whose party had managed to form government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), was also in favour of talks with terrorists. Most of the politicians except the ANP supported the option of talks. Nawaz Sharif decided to give talks a chance. An All Parties Conference (APC) was held to take all political leaders on board. A unanimous decision was made to talk with the terrorists yet once again. However, it was most likely to fail and it did fail miserably. The timing and approach of negotiations was skewed and untimely. The strategy to talk was based on goodwill only. Real strategy was not chalked out. Plan B was not formulated. There is no doubt that negotiations are an inalienable part of any COIN and CT strategy. However, timing of talks, treaty and truce with terrorists and insurgents are of immense importance. The following yardstick could help decide the timing and approach of talks with terrorists.

LAWS TO TACKLE INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS The federal government issued two regulations on 12 July 2011, which provided legal cover to the armed forces for unlawful acts committed during the military operations in both Federally and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas. The two regulations, which are almost identical, were effective from 1 February 2008 to provide legal framework to the military operations conducted in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) since that date. Under these regulations ‘security forces operating in FATA and PATA were given virtually unbridled powers to act as judge, jury and executioner for anyone held on charges of terrorism in the tribal areas’ (The Express Tribune). They provided a wide range of powers to authorised

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officers and armed forces besides empowering an interning authority to intern a suspect until the continuation of action in aid of the civil power by the armed forces. The armed forces have also been empowered to occupy any property with the approval of the federal or the provincial government. Contrary to the provisions of Qanun-i-Shahadat (Evidence Act), these regulations provide that a statement or deposition by any member of the armed forces, or any officer authorised on his behalf, shall be sufficient for convicting an accused. Similarly, all evidences, information and material collected, received and prepared by the interning authority or its officials shall be admissible in evidence and shall be deemed sufficient to prove the facts in issue. Furthermore, the regulations gave a set of offences, which were punishable with the death penalty or imprisonment for life or up to ten years along with fine and forfeiture of property. Most of these offences have already been covered in the AntiTerrorism Act, 1997. These laws define ‘action in aid of civil power’ as a series of measures that involve the mobilisation of armed forces, in aid of civil power or their requisition by the federal government, including measures such as armed action, mobilisation and stationing, until they are withdrawn by the written order of the government. Furthermore, ‘defined area’ refers to the area notified by the federal government (in the case of FATA) and the provincial government (in the case of PATA), in which action in aid of civil power is being conducted to secure the territory or to ensure peace in any place where armed forces have been requisitioned. The regulations authorised the federal and provincial governments or any person authorised by it to act as interning authority having the powers to intern a person. The interning authority is empowered to intern any person, even if he is not in the defined area, who may obstruct actions in aid of civil power in any manner whatsoever; or if not restrained or incapacitated through interment shall strengthen the miscreant’s ability to resist the armed forces or any law enforcement agency; or by any action or attempt may cause a threat to the solidarity, integrity or security of Pakistan; or has committed or is likely to commit any offence under the regulation so that the said person shall not be able to commit or plan to commit any offence during the actions in aid of civil power.

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Section 14 of these regulations provided setting up of an oversight board comprising two civilians and two military officers to review cases of each person interned within a period of time not exceeding 120 days from the issuance of the order of internment. The laws also empower the authority to set up notified internment centres. Furthermore, the misuse of force during actions in aid of civil power had been prohibited. According to Section 5 (1) of the regulations: ‘If any abuse or misuse of the use of force during action in aid of civil power is alleged or attributed to any member of the armed forces, the same shall be investigated within the hierarchy of the armed forces.’ The lawyers of Peshawar High Court termed the regulations repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and the Constitution of 1973 (Dawn, 2011). There had been voices urging to repeal or withdraw these ordinances (Wazir, 2013). However, as long as the insurgents and terrorists would be active, the government and the army might not like to withdraw these ordinances. The laws termed to be draconian definitely earned popular resentment. In Northern Ireland, the civil rights movement of the late 1960s rallied against the Special Powers Act of 1922 that had given quite draconian powers to the civil authorities of the Stormont government. The internment policy of the British government and the techniques employed to interrogate prisoners was considered a violation of human rights. ‘By 1975 the British government had dropped the policy, however, in the face of its manifest failure and replaced it with what were known as the Diplock Courts, which replace trial by jury with trial by a single judge for terrorist offenses’ (Koch, 2007). Conversely, neither new anti-terrorism law was introduced nor was the old Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, amended in Pakistan until 2013. This disequilibrium was not understandable. It showed that insurgency was getting all attention, which was being handled by the army, but terrorism was let loose to wreak havoc across Pakistan. No strategy and no laws were formulated to handle it. Public pressure on the successive governments to do something to bridle terrorism failed to lead to the introduction of antiterrorism legislation. Nevertheless, in 2014, amendments were brought about in ATA, 1997, and a new law, Protection of Pakistan, 2014, was enacted, followed by National Action Plan, which showed determination of the new government of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, elected in 2013, to tackle the terrorists with all available tools, including negotiations, laws and military operations.

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In the wake of the terrorist attack on the Army Public School on 16 December 2014, in which 145 students and teachers were killed, the government lifted a six-year moratorium on executions (The New York Times, 22 December 2014). As a result, more than 300 prisoners were hanged in 2015 and 2016 under a new military judicial system.

COUNTERING TERRORISM The state response to terrorism in urban centres mostly remained weak and disjointed. The lack of counter-terrorism strategy confirmed the absence of the will of the government to tackle the terrorists in a firm, coordinated and effective manner. Lack of political will had a trickle-down effect on the government departments responsible to counter-terrorism. The police and their intelligence set-ups were deficient in temperament, training, experience, paraphernalia and, at times, will to tackle this sort of terrorism. Immediately after the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009, the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, stated that countering terrorism was not a police job. As the suicide attacks generally emanated from FATA and Swat, outside the respective provinces and areas, it became difficult for the provincial set-ups to pre-empt and prevent them. It required relentless coordination of the provincial police/intelligence set-ups with the federal intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and ISI to have advance information originating from FATA and elsewhere. This coordination was patchy and inconsistent. Generally, the police took the forewarnings, with indicators and insinuations provided by the federal agencies, lightly. They resented the paucity of information provided to them and failed to convince them to take action on it. Unfortunately, at times, these information reports turned true. The police investigations into suicide attacks were most often found to be too insipid and incomplete. Consequently, the courts exonerated a number of perpetrators and they re-joined their militant groups to continue with future actions. The dispersal and destruction of the militants in Swat resulted in a lull in suicide terrorism. Nipping the perpetrators in their areas was a good counter-terrorism strategy. However, it was not done properly. The death of Baitullah and the operation against TTP in Waziristan

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triggered a renewed spate of terrorism. Baitullah Mehsud had claimed that he had more than 200 suicide bombers who would strike the cities of Pakistan. Thus, even after his death, they retaliated with more force and ferocity. The fact that Pakistan did not form a national counter-terrorism strategy is beyond comprehension. It resulted in misdirected and episodic efforts to counter terrorists who kept persistently striking at their targets quite conveniently. Is it because the government wanted to be selective in striking at the terrorists of its choice? Some observers had also accused Pakistan of selective approach to cracking down on various organisations. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir, which was not involved in carrying out terrorist activities, had been banned, whereas some other organisations, known for their involvement in violence and militancy, kept operating with new names under the federal and provincial governments. The then Interior Minister of Pakistan, Mr Abdul Rehman Malik, while addressing a UK-based think tank reportedly alleged that all terrorists arrested in Pakistan had visited the Tablighi Jamaat centre at Raiwind, near Lahore. In fact, Tablighi Jamaat was a missionary organisation, which had no record of involvement in violence or terrorism. Political opponents criticised him for using it as a political ploy because Raiwind is in Punjab, ruled by the opposing political party PML (N) at that time. Earlier he had blamed ‘Punjabi Taliban’, based in southern Punjab, for militancy and suggested military operation against them. However, he quickly retracted his statement. Therefore, political rivalry between the PPP, ruling at the Centre, and the PML (N), ruling in the Punjab, remained a cogent reason for their inactivity against the terrorists, militants and religious extremists. Rather they used the terrorism card to pip the opponents. Had there been a CT strategy, they would have not been able to ‘divert attention to speculative statements with dubious implications’ (Dawn, 2011). Bryan Hunt had stated in one of his cables to the US Department of State that the local officials criticised the PML (N)-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their ‘failure to act’ against ‘extremist madrasahs, or known prominent leaders, such as Jaish-e-Muhammad’s leader Masood Azhar’. The Bahawalpur district Nazim at that time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received ‘no support’ in dealing with the issue

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unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The Nazim, who at the time was with the PML (Q), ‘blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties. . .neither the Pakistan Muslim League– Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously’ (Dawn, 2011).

NEED FOR A COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY A number of countries that faced terrorism formulated counter-terrorism strategies and successfully controlled, annihilated and eliminated the terrorist groups and their activities. A few that can be cited in this regard are: Britain-IRA, France-GIA, Venezuela-The FALN-FLN, ColumbiaFARC, Turkey-PKK, Russia-Chechnya, India-Khalistan, Sri LankaLTTE, Japan-Aum Shinrikyo and Italy-Red Brigades (Koch, 2007). Pakistan could learn lesson from these countries. The most relevant case study could be the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, which aimed at reducing the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism.2 It was formulated in 2003 and was revised in 2009, named as CONTEST II. It was organised in four work streams: pursue, prevent, protect and prepare.3 It clearly demarcated the responsibilities of various government and non-government departments, which included police, MI-6, MI-5, Health Protection Agency, UK Border Agency, Regional and Local Government, Airport Operators, Shopping Centre Management, Private Security Companies, Community and Sector Interest Groups and so on. As compared to it, Pakistan has no officially articulated CT strategy. At one point in time, a three Ds slogan, Development, Dialogue and Deterrence, was presented, pretended and portrayed as a strategy.4 In fact, it was a strategy outline for counter-insurgency, which was being pursued by the army in Waziristan and Swat areas. It had nothing to do with countering terrorism in urban centres. Even this slogan had never been debated in the parliament and the government did not bother to officially formulate and formally articulate a strategy. Political analyst Prof. As Moonis Ahmar stated, ‘There is no coherent policy to counter terrorism’ (Dawn, 2011). A number of senior officers of police, IB and ISI were interviewed, who had a consensus that there was no written, approved and comprehensive CT strategy of Pakistan. However, a plan

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was formulated in 2014, known as National Action Plan (NAP), which was misconstrued as the strategy. There were several reasons for the absence of a CT strategy. There was a lack of unity of approach among the political leaders on the ways to tackle the terrorists. The divided mindset of the leadership and sympathy for Islamic hardline groups at a societal level not only gave the militants enough space to sustain themselves and flourish but also had been a big hurdle in reaching a consensus to tackle them. Terrorism in Pakistan was a complex issue as it emanated from the insurgency in FATA. The policymakers failed to differentiate between the two and to understand that countering insurgency is far different from countering terrorism. From the very beginning, the army had been in charge of the realm of counter-terrorism. This trend had set in from the era of General Musharraf and continued after it too. Civilian leadership did not wrest control of national security affairs and felt contented with the army handling the situation. The absence of political resolve and interest reflected in the civil institutions established for fighting against terrorism. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was established to devise a counterterrorism strategy for Pakistan in 2008. It failed to start due to turf war between the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister’s office. It would not be an overstatement that it remained dormant ever since its formation. It was a litmus test of political non-seriousness to devise a counter-terrorism strategy (Sehgal, 2010). Until 2018, NACTA was observed to be performing in a slipshod manner. ‘The most important weapon in any campaign against terrorism is intelligence’ (Koch, 2007). However, ISI, Intelligence Bureau (IB), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Special Branches of Police and others lacked sustained coordination to counter terrorism. They looked towards the political leadership for seriousness of purpose, which was not evident, and they probably wanted to guard their turfs as well. CT strategy did not suit them, which could compel them to act in unison. Despite the lack of a National Counter-Terrorism strategy, Pakistan had been somehow tackling terrorism by any means. Main reliance was on target hardening of sensitive buildings and areas. The government and all others tried to save themselves by beefing up security of vulnerable places and buildings. Whether it was a hotel or a police office,

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it was turned into a mini fortress, defended by barriers, sniffer dogs, armed gunmen, body searches and so on. After every incident, LEAs reacted by enhancing police nakas (barricades) on roads and outside important buildings, which gave just an illusion of security. Until 2013, political rivalry between the federal and provincial governments was worse; therefore, whenever Peshawar or Lahore was attacked, the federal government would term it a provincial issue. The Punjab government rebounded with the allegations of lack of strategy and policy at the Centre. This trend changed after 2013 when the PML (N) governments were formed at the Centre and in the Punjab. The government had almost always found an alleged foreign involvement in a terrorist act. This approach misled people about the actual culprits. The interior ministers and provincial home ministers invariably blamed India after every terrorist attack. It seemed quite ludicrous when the TTP spokesperson claimed responsibility of the same incident. Although there was evidence of Indian support to TTP, it would have been better to clarify to people about the actual perpetrators instead of government supporters. The government’s policy to tackle banned organisations was ambivalent. SSP, LeJ, JeM and others kept operating with new names. However, in 2016, the Punjab government took strict action against LeJ as its dreaded leader Malik Ishaq, his 2 sons and 11 others were killed in a police encounter. The Punjab government had made CID responsible for tackling terrorism and renamed it Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and revamped it. For an initial few years, CTD’s performance was quite poor due to lack of directions and strategy (Sehgal, 2010). However, after the formulation of the National Action Plan, CTD Punjab carried out a number of operations and killed many terrorists belonging to LeJ, Al Qaeda, TTP and IS in police encounters. Although the human rights organisations accused it of indulging in fake encounters, the chances of penalising them through courts was near to impossible. Records showed that terrorists were rarely convicted due to insipid investigation and placid prosecution (Hussain, 2010). It could be safely concluded that unabated terrorist acts exposed the lack of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The government acted like a ‘fire brigade dousing flames and doing damage control’.

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The uncoordinated ‘bits and pieces’ effort affected security service delivery across a broad spectrum of likely targets, and the government’s apathy persisted. SWOT analysis of the situation can help understand the security situation and the need for CT strategy (see Table 7.2). In light of the above, it was strongly recommended that the federal government should have devised a coherent, comprehensive and robust counter-terrorism strategy. National Assembly was the arena where the outline of the much needed CT strategy could be discussed and devised.

PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY Pakistan had its peculiar circumstances; therefore, innovation and initiative were required to devise a counter-terrorism strategy.5 This strategy could be associated with the following four main activities: Table 7.2

SWOT analysis of the situation.

Strengths

Weaknesses

† Army operations against the insurgents in Swat and Waziristan were quite successful † Trained law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies had the potential to face the terrorists † People became wary of terrorists and wanted peace † World wanted Pakistan to overcome terrorism

† † † † † † †

Opportunities

Threats

† † † †

† † † † † †

International support Indigenous support Learn lessons from others Opportune time to strike

Fluctuation in political will Lack of understanding Lack of bureaucratic will Army leading the fight Disjointed intelligence role No national CT strategy No provincial CT strategy

Terrorism might not end soon Foreign investments will remain low Economy will suffer more Social split will become wider Political instability will increase Existential threat

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Trace: to find/identify the targets, for instance terrorists, supporters, sympathisers, sleeper-agents, financers; Trail: to keep a persistent and focused eye on their activities, hideouts, modus operandi; Tackle: arrest, prosecute, punish, negotiate (from position of strength), rehabilitate; Transform: mullah–masjid–madrasah, hearts and minds policy.

ROLE OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES The armed forces of Pakistan have been at the forefront of countering insurgency and terrorism. Its role has been discussed at length elsewhere. The role of various intelligence and law enforcement organisations is briefly discussed below.

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) The ISI was the most well-equipped and resourceful intelligence agency of Pakistan. It played a significant role in countering terrorism in urban centres of the country. It faced the brunt of the TTP and Al Qaeda terrorists as its offices were attacked at Lahore and Multan, killing a number of officers. From 2006, the US had been increasingly critical of ISI’s role in war against terror as it labelled ISI to be running with hare and hunting with hounds. According to some analysts, behaviour and policies of the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence were the biggest problems for the US in achieving its objectives in South Asia. ‘The complex relationship that the army had with terrorist groups was a difficult and critical challenge to our interest’ (Admiral Mullen interjected that this was the ‘heart of the matter’). Who would know better than the Americans that ISI was at the forefront in handling and guiding the Mujahideen against the Soviet forces. It had a long and deep relationship with the Mujahideen and the religious elements that supported them. It was a very difficult task to extricate itself from this relationship and start taking action against their factions. However, it employed all sorts of tactics to contain these elements. ISI’s intelligence support to the military enabled it to carry out successful intelligence-based operations in North Waziristan during Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’. It operated in urban centres with admirable

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success. However, its relationship with civil intelligence agencies was not close and productive.

Intelligence Bureau Similar to the relationship between the UK’s MI5 and MI6 or the US’ FBI and CIA, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the national civil intelligence agency of Pakistan, faced a turf war with a powerful internal rival, the ISI. In the realm of counter-terrorism, it was held back to play a secondary role, much below its capacity and capability. Nevertheless, the IB’s potential and prowess to play an effective role in countering terrorism could be gauged from the fact that the IB delivered whenever the government tasked it to tackle insurgency or terrorism. One of its mentionable achievements was the successful operation to counter the urban terrorism of MQM in Karachi in 1993– 5. It accepted the challenge when the army had failed to tackle this situation. Violence in Karachi was at its peak at that time. A total of 30 – 45 bullet-ridden mutilated bodies were found in gunny bags daily. People of Karachi were terrified. It seemed that the situation was irreversible. However, Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, while speaking at a public gathering at the border city of Kasur, Punjab, announced to control the situation. She tasked the Interior Minister Major General Naseerullah Babar and the IB chief Masood Sharif Khan Khattak to tackle the situation in Karachi. All of them went out and an ideal coordination of the IB and dedicated force of police resulted in bridling the situation within three to six months. Similarly, in 2004– 5, the IB played an effective role against Al Qaeda in urban areas of Punjab. It captured wanted Al Qaeda leaders like Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Naeem Noor Khan and foiled a number of terror plans. In KP, it operated against the TTP and linked militants and, at times, carried out excellent operations in 2006–7. The IB could perform during this period because it had a strong IB chief, Brig(r) Ijaz Shah, who was close to General Pervez Musharraf and therefore it managed to ward off the pressure and opposition of military agencies to some extent. From 2013, during the regime of Nawaz Sharif, ample resources were provided to the IB to reorganise itself and to step up its counterterrorism efforts. It managed to improve its performance and pulled off successes in the realm of counter-terrorism.

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The IB operates directly under the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Like ISI, it has an effective network of offices down to Tehsil level (the lowest unit of administration). After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the IB was dominated by police officers. However, its complexion started changing after the 1970s when direct officers were inducted to form its own cadre. The IB could be an ideal federal intelligence agency to tackle terrorism provided it is used for this purpose with full authority and resources at its disposal. The International Crisis Group’s recommendations to counter religious extremism and terrorism gave due emphasis to the role of the IB (International Crisis Group, 2009). (a) Vest significantly greater authority in civilian law enforcement agencies, including access to mobile phone records and other data, without having to obtain approval from the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). (b) Establish through an act of parliament a clear hierarchy of civilian intelligence agencies, including the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the provincial criminal investigation departments and the IB, with the IB as the primary authority in anti-terrorism investigations.

Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Assigning a counter-terrorism role to FIA was too challenging as it lacked the strength, spirit and set-ups to handle it. FIA is basically an investigation agency that has very few offices across Pakistan, manned with ill-trained staff, plagued with corruption and headed by police officers on deputation who do not have much interest in it. Somebody floated the ridiculous idea of equating it with the American FBI and got fixated with it. In addition to the 12 sections dealing with different sorts of federal crimes, (FIA website), Special Investigation Group (SIG) was set up with American assistance after the 9/11 attack to help investigate terrorism-related cases (Siddiqui, 2012). SIG could hardly deliver due to the above reasons (Geo News, 2009). FIA personnel were more interested in lucrative postings in immigration than in SIG. Its morale and effectiveness further dwindled when a massive suicide and gun and grenade attack on FIA’s regional office in Lahore resulted in the deaths of five persons including FIA officers and injuries to 38 others and total destruction of the office building on 16 October 2009.

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Criminal Investigation Department (CID)/ Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) Provincial police intelligence agencies like Special Branch were neither trained nor willing to counter this sort of terrorism. The Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab, had played a substantial role in quelling the sectarian terrorism in the 1990s. In order to dedicate it for counter-terrorism, it was renamed as Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) on 21 July 2010, but it could not repeat the performance. Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) was created by the vision and desire of the Chief Minister of Punjab to have a dedicated counterterrorism department. It had previous experience, expertise, personnel and paraphernalia as it had been dealing with sectarian terrorism since 1995. Unfortunately, its renaming and revamping in 2010 had little effect on its performance. The non-performance of CTD was mainly due to its leadership’s timidity to take on the terrorists head on and the lack of a clear vision. Some reasons are enumerated as follows: i. CTD restricted its role to interrogate only arrested terrorists by other departments. It mostly borrowed arrested and jailed terrorists to interrogate. Pro-active actions were very few. ii. As a result of the above reason, the emphasis had been on lowpriority activities such as reporting of loudspeaker violation at mosques. The police and special branch were already doing this job more effectively. iii. More emphasis was on event reporting instead of intelligence reporting. Approximately 98 per cent of reports were based on the coverage of events. iv. Majority of officers and staff of CTD had no training, temperament and taste for intelligence, whereas counter-terrorism is 85 per cent intelligence and 15 per cent law enforcement. v. Fear of terrorists’ backlash prevented the officers from indulging in taking direct action and carrying out real counter-terrorism. Conceptually, CTD emerged as the most suitable organisation to counter terrorism as it had the intelligence set-up and the strike force as well. Moreover, it had the powers to register cases against the culprits and interrogate them. It was headed by an Additional Inspector General of

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Police; at the HQ, there was a Deputy Inspector General (DIC) and five Senior Superintendents of Police (SSP) who dealt with operations, analysis, technical, administration and investigation. One good thing done by CTD Punjab was the initiation of a deradicalisation project where about 200 terrorists were given vocational training to enable them to start their life afresh. They were trained with the help of TEVTA. However, it soon paled into inactivity and became dormant. From 2015, at times, the CTD Punjab acted proactively and took the terrorists head on. Especially after the killing of Home Minister Punjab, Colw Shuja Khanzada, at his residence by a suicide bomber, CTD chased and neutralised terrorists and their facilitators belonging to LeJ, Al Qaeda and IS (Daesh). Conversely, the CID Karachi showed courage and seriousness to take action against TTP. It arrested a number of TTP terrorists and recovered arms and ammunition from them. Its officers faced the retaliatory attacks of TTP, but they remained undeterred. Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Chaudhry Aslam’s residence was targeted with VBIED. His house was totally destroyed; however, he and his family remained unhurt. But later on, he was ambushed and killed by the terrorists.

Police Police entered the arena of countering terrorism rather reluctantly, although it is the first agency that comes into contact with the terrorists. It not only felt that countering terrorism was not its job, but also it was ill-equipped and poorly trained to face well-armed and determined terrorists. It was trained to fight against crime, control riots, investigate and deal with other law and order situations, but not terrorists. However, the approach changed over a period of time because it had to face the terrorists in urban centres. The arrival of die-hard, ready-to-die terrorists and suicide bombers was a new and strange phenomenon for the police. They were neither trained nor equipped for this job. Talat Masood, a military analyst, said that the government had been slow to train and equip the police for a wave of attacks (Daily Times, 10 July 2009). Even the Punjab Police performed poorly during the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore (Dawn, 2009). In 2011 and 2012, several efforts were made for capacity building of

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police in all provinces of Pakistan, especially Punjab and KP. Turkish police arranged a number of courses in Pakistan and in Turkey for capacity building of police. Police, however, has the potential to perform better subject to commander’s will and courage to lead from the front. Elite Police Punjab is a highly trained force that can face any sort of terrorist situation. Police, being the most visible force, was worst hit by terrorists. Many policemen were killed in suicide bombing and gun and grenade attacks at the barricades, during raids and in their offices. For example, on 3 March 2009, six policemen were killed when terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore; on 4 August 2010, Commandant Frontier Constabulary Safwat Ghayur was killed by a targeted suicide bomb blast at the Frontier Constabulary Chowk in Peshawar, when he was driving away from his office; on 9 January 2014, a Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Mohammed Aslam Khan, was killed in a bomb attack hours after his team shot dead three suspected militants in an encounter; on 23 October 2016, heavily armed militants wearing suicide vests stormed a police academy in Quetta, killing at least 61 policemen and wounding at least 117; on 13 February 2017, six policemen, including a Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police, Captw Ahmad Mubin and Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Zahid Gondal, were killed in a suicide attack in Lahore and on 18 October 2017, seven policemen were killed and 22 others were injured in a suicide blast in Quetta. In November 2017, DIG Hamid Shakeel and three police officials were killed in a suicide attack on Quetta airport road. A week later, SP Investigations Muhammad Ilyas, his wife, son and a brother were killed when terrorists riding motorcycles ambushed their vehicle in the Nawan Killi area of Quetta; in November 2017, Additional Inspector General (AIG) Headquarters Ashraf Noor was killed in a suicide blast targeting a police vehicle in Peshawar. As Prof. Anatol Lieven observed, ‘The Pakistani State, with its overstretched, demoralised and desperately underfunded police, just does not have the resources to defend against a threat on this scale’. Doubtlessly, efforts were made to revamp the police and enhance its capacity in all provinces. It had its impact but the result was much below the desired level. The efforts made in this regard in Punjab province were much better than in other provinces. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police also showed notable improvement in its capacity to fight against terrorism.

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INSIPID INVESTIGATION AND PLACID PROSECUTION Most of the terrorists, supporters and facilitators, apprehended by police, managed to get exonerated from the courts. In fact, insipid investigation and placid prosecution made it difficult for judges to convict the culprits. The Islamabad courts could not convict a single person in any of the country’s biggest terrorist attacks of the past three years, a symptom of a dysfunctional legal system hurting the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda at a critical time. Former Chief Justice of Lahore High Court Khawaja Muhammad Sharif stated that the legal system’s failure to attack terrorism was critical because it robbed Pakistan of a chance to enforce a sense of law and order, which terrorists had set out to destroy. It has caused a sense of terror and insecurity amongst the members of society. The legal failures also called into question the government’s ability to fight against terrorism in any way except by using the army in military offensives or – as human rights groups alleged – through targeted extra-judicial killings. An associated press review found no convictions in the 20 largest and most high-profile terror attacks from 2007 to 2012. Many of the court cases linked with those attacks – which killed approximately 1,100 people – were dragged on for years or had yet to make it even past the investigation stage and into the courts. The handful of cases that had been provided judgment had all resulted in acquittals – although many of these defendants remained in custody while they were investigated in other cases.6 According to lawyers and law enforcement officials, weak investigations conducted by poorly trained and under resourced police officers made it very difficult for prosecutors and judges to convict. Police without basic investigative skills, such as the ability to lift fingerprints, and prosecutors, who lacked training to try terrorism cases, were some of the main reasons for this poor performance. ‘I thank the man who really plays the most critical role is neither the judge nor the prosecutor, but is in charge of the case who sits in the police station,’ said Ahmer Bilal Soofi, a legal commentator. Another tangible reason was the lack of proper safety to the judges and witnesses who were often subjected to intimidation that affected their ability to convict. ‘Prosecutors not only faced similar threats, they

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lacked the training needed to take on terror cases, are poorly paid and did not have the resources to carry out their jobs successfully,’ said Muhammad Jahangir, the chief prosecutor in Punjab. The state had been unable to properly prosecute the terrorists. Resultantly, most of them were exonerated and they rejoined the terrorist groups to restart the activities with renewed vigour. In the first seven months of 2011, the three anti-terrorism courts (ATC) of Rawalpindi acquitted 56 suspects involved in 96 terrorism cases. The large number of acquittals was mainly due to insipid investigation. Proper evidence was not presented in the court. As far as prosecutors were concerned, they worked in fear without adequate security. As one prosecutor put it, ‘terrorists threaten us. They are influential and well-informed’ (Dawn Editorial, 2011). Similarly, witnesses were also deeply scared of terrorists’ backlash. Only the Sindh government had introduced a Witness Protection System in Pakistan. The Punjab government was following the suit but a draft was pending in the files due to bureaucratic red-tapism. There were laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, which had provisions to control and suspend activities of proscribed and subversive organisations. However, they lacked depth and strength to take the concept to its logical conclusion. The law did not automatically produce any serious penal consequences for an organisation that is declared subversive or proscribed. The state was not obliged to identify the members of such an organisation, prevent them from reorganising themselves under a new banner, prohibit them from purchasing property, renting houses and vehicles and so on. The acts such as the Protection of Pakistan Act, POPA 2014 and amendments in Section 21 EEEE of the Anti-Terrorist Act were passed to assist the law enforcement agencies. Besides, the 21st Amendment to the Constitution was passed, which constitutionalised the creation of military courts parallel to the regular courts. Although such legislative measures were flouting fundamental rights, they were needed at the time as Pakistan was facing extraordinary circumstances. However, the POPA was not in force and the 21st Amendment was supposed to expire after the lapse of two years due to the sunset clause. No serious and longlasting efforts were made in reforming the judicial system until the end of 2017, as was decided while passing the 21st Amendment.

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The deficient legal framework thus made the exercise of declaring an organisation proscribed or subversive largely meaningless. Finally, there were laws that existed on statute books, but were just not being enforced. The Explosives Act 1884 was one such law that mandated that the manufacture, possession, use, sale, transport and importation would be subject to government licence. If this law was being properly implemented, terrorists would not get such large amounts of explosive material at will. In order to control the menace of terror wreaking havoc across Pakistan, it would be imperative to overhaul traditional law enforcement mechanisms, by bringing all its components within the realm of law to ensure that the criminal justice system remained functional. Without acquiring the ability to exercise effective control over men, material and money within Pakistan, our fire-fighting operations would only have limited utility. Moreover, unless the terrorists were convicted and sentenced, it would be largely impossible to curb militancy in Pakistan. But for this to happen, a strong legal structure was required while the element of fear must be eliminated in order to allow prosecutors, police, judges and witnesses to carry out their duties. It can be concluded that counter-insurgency military operations mostly could not neutralise the insurgents in FATA. Coupled with army operations were the peace deals and negotiations that mostly failed to sustain due to violations from either side that provided lifelines to the insurgents/terrorists. The army’s prolonged engagement in COIN had a downside as the local population was annoyed by collateral damage caused by the use of military force. It ignited the Pashtun nature of ‘badal’ (revenge), resulting in more space and manpower for the terrorists. The strategy to use ‘lashkars’ (militias of tribal fighters) against the terrorists paid little dividends and created more problems. The power of laws was underestimated. Continuous absence of officially articulated CT strategy was criminal negligence on the part of the state to tackle the menace of terrorism with the seriousness that was required. Consequently, the intelligence and LEAs performed disjointedly and painted a bleak picture of the state response to insurgency and terrorism in a lackadaisical manner.

CHAPTER 8 IRRITANTS AND IMPEDIMENTS

These strategies and policies at times worked but overall did not perform consistently. The drone effects, the flared up Pashtun sentiments, myths and conspiracy theories – genuine or manufactured – increased gradually. Resultantly, the desired results could not be achieved.

PASHTUN NATURE History is full of lessons to be learnt about Pashtuns’ religious and tribal sensibilities, that can get triggered quite quickly. Badal (revenge) is the first and greatest commandment of ‘Pukhtunwali’, ‘the way of the Pathan’ or ‘the Pathan (Pashtun) code’ (Spain, 1962). Secondly, Pashtuns are devout Muslims who revere, practice and preserve Islam according to their martial nature. The American diplomat James Spain, who served in Pakistan in the 1950s, commented that ‘The warrior-bishop of the Middle Ages frequently finds his counterpart among the hill pathans’. Many of the ferocious revolts against the British were led by mullahs preaching Jihad against the government of unbelievers. The notorious Fakir of Ipi, for 30 years, defied first the British and then the Pakistani governments from his cliffside headquarters in Waziristan (Spain, 1962). TTP, mainly dominated by Pashtuns, although comprising a fraction of the entire Pashtun population, had been exploiting the Pashtun nature of revenge and religiosity. They thrived on the themes of fight against the foreign power (US) and later included the army and the government of Pakistan. The challenge before them was the imposition

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of Sharia. They managed to exploit and mislead many people of FATA, KP and even Punjab that they were fighting for imposition of Sharia and to avenge the deaths of fellow tribesmen. In Swat, Maulvi Fazlullah had promoted propaganda for the imposition of Sharia, which according to him would provide justice to the people of Swat. This was difficult for the government to tackle. Fight against cultures and perceptions is tougher and much more difficult than the actual battle on the ground. It took a long time to overcome these irritants and impediments, although not completely.

THE DRONE EFFECTS The US drone campaign in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where the insurgents and terrorists were operating, is a mixed bag of relief and grief. It killed dreaded terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda, its affiliates like IMU and to top all TTP, which is indeed a matter of relief for Pakistan. Drone attacks killed two TTP chiefs, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. The most wanted mastermind of the horrendous attack on the Army Public School Peshawar on 16 December 2014 was also killed in a drone attack on 12 July 2016. On the other hand, the collateral damage caused by drone attacks is a matter of concern and grief. Over years, it has attracted huge public resentment against this campaign. The CIA-operated unmanned intelligence aircrafts, namely the Predator and the Reaper, had been firing drone attacks on Al Qaeda members in FATA since 2006. Later, TTP militants also became the target of drone attacks. According to some estimates, at least 20 highprofile Al Qaeda commanders and 40 TTP militants were killed until April 2012. This campaign destroyed many of Al Qaeda and TTP bases and safe houses (Spain, 1962). There was resentment among the Pashtuns in particular and the Pakistanis in general over this invisible invasion and innocent civilian casualties. This sentiment had flared up when the first drone on a seminary in Damadola, Bajaur, in 2006 resulted in the deaths of locals including young students. This one incident played a vital role in the unpopularity of General Musharraf and the subsequent rout of his king’s

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party PML (Q) in the 2008 general elections.1 The escalation of this campaign seemed to be creating more enemies than it eliminated. Baitullah Mehsud, the founder and the TTP Chief, had claimed that each drone brought him three or four suicide bombers who were usually from the families of the drone’s victims (Time, 2009). The Badla (Revenge) nature of Pashtuns was being capitalised by the TTP in terms of more support and more volunteers. Ironically, Baitullah was killed in a drone attack. His successor, Hakimullah, was also targeted by drones in January 2011 and in January 2012. It is said, he managed to escape although rumour has it that he died in those attacks. Most Pakistanis preferred Obama to Bush as the new President of the US at the time of the 2009 general election. Conversely, the frequency of drone strikes on Al Qaeda and other terrorists that lurked in FATA had risen under Barack Obama to one every four days, compared with one every 40 during George Bush’s presidency.2 Gradually, the increase in drone attacks angered the people of Pakistan. They considered it an attack on the sovereignty of Pakistan by the US: While drones were seen as a triumph of American technology in the United States, they provoked intense public anger in Pakistan. Exaggerated Taliban claims Table 8.1

Drone attacks in Pakistan: 2005 – 15.

Year

Incidents

Killed

Injured

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total*

1 0 1 19 46 90 59 46 24 19 5 3 5 318

1 0 20 156 536 831 548 344 158 122 31 9 22 2,778

0 0 15 17 75 85 þ 52 37 29 26 7 05 0 355 þ

*Data until 31 December 2017. Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).

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of civilian deaths were widely believed by Pakistanis, who saw the strikes as a flagrant violation of Washington’s purported support for human rights.

DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN: 2005 –15 According to another estimate made by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the cumulative statistics about the US drone strikes (as of 17 September 2017) are as follows: . . . . . . . . .

Total strikes: 429 Total killed: 2,514– 4,023 Civilians killed: 424– 969 Children killed: 172– 207 Injured: 1,162– 1,749 Strikes under the Bush Administration: 51 Strikes under the Obama Administration: 373 Strikes under the Trump Administration: 5 84 of the 2,379 deaths have been identified as members of Al Qaeda

Was the drone campaign a good strategy? Despite the public outcry and politicians’ weak protests following suit, many considered drone attacks a good strategy that not only shattered Al Qaeda’s command and control in FATA but also struck effectively at the hierarchy of TTP. The number of TTP leaders killed by drones was higher than that of Al Qaeda. However, the drone campaign was always considered a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, it killed wanted AQ and TTP militants with precision and accuracy and effectively created a dent in their command and control structure. On the other hand, it generated acute hatred and feelings of vengeance among the people of Pakistan in general and in the people of KP, FATA in particular. It gave rise to more militants and suicide bombers. TTP proved to be the sort of terrorist organisation that did not crumble due to death of its leaders. Therefore, killing of terrorists through drones at the cost of producing three times more militants needed to be particularly considered. A strategy that produced more militants than killed needed serious review because the basic rule of effective COIN strategy urges to isolate the militants from the people in ‘which they swim’:

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Successful guerrilla operations involve the people. It is the quality of their resistance to the enemy and support for the guerrillas which in the end will be the decisive factor . . . In fact, a guerrilla force will be unable to operate in an area where the people are hostile to its aims (Bermsan, 2011). If drone attacks were garnering public sympathy for the insurgents or generating public hatred against the counter-insurgents, it could not be declared an effective tool to counter militants and terrorists. Unlike the antagonists of the drone campaign, some were of the view that drones at least killed the terrorists, including Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, Qari Hussain and Umar Naray, who could not be handled by the Pakistan security forces. The US diplomats in Pakistan also picked up this line to defend the drone campaign in public encounters. The US Consul General at Lahore while addressing a gathering of government officers replied to a question that not all people were against drone attacks as these attacks were targeting the terrorists who were attacking the security forces of Pakistan and the public as well. Some in Pakistan viewed this from a different angle. Shahi Syed, a leader of the ANP, stated in a TV talk show that if drone attacks were violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, so were the foreign fighters like Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs based at FATA (Waqt News TV 2012). The negative reaction from the public was not entirely due to killing of militants. The general perception of the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and the collateral damage were the main reasons that caused negative reactions. Why could these causes not be addressed? Pakistan’s denial of granting permission to the US to carry out drone attacks and issuance of condemnatory statements after every drone killing made this campaign look like an attack on Pakistan and its sovereignty. The US drone campaign briefly stopped after Pakistan reacted sharply to the NATO attack on two Pakistani checkposts at Salala on 26 November 2011, in which 26 soldiers were killed. In reaction, Pakistan stopped supplies to NATO and asked the US to vacate the Shamsi Airfield (Jacobabad). The Pak-US relations dipped to the lowest, and Pakistan needed an apology by the US. CIA halted the drone campaign for a while probably because it wanted to avoid further deterioration in the relationship.

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The frequency of drone attacks in Pakistan had dropped to 64 in 2011 compared to 117 in 2010.3 According to some analysts, this dip in the drone campaign was due to the decreasing number of Al Qaeda leaders and a pause in strikes in 2010 after the arrest of Raymond Davis, a CIA security contractor who killed two Pakistanis in Lahore, the US marines’ attack on Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden and finally the US/NATO air strike on Pakistani checkposts in November 2011 (Dawn, 2012). But after two months of lull in the drone attacks, it was observed that the Al Qaeda, TTP militants and other militant groups started regrouping and intensified their attacks. According to a report by New York Times, the US and Pakistani officials confirmed that the two-month break in drone strikes in Pakistan helped embolden Al Qaeda and several Pakistani militant factions to regroup, increase attacks on Pakistani security forces and threaten intensified strikes against allied forces in Afghanistan (Dawn, 9 January 2012). On realising this, the US started the drone campaign again on 10 January 2012 after a lull of 55 days. The previous strike had taken place on 16 November 2011. This pause was the longest since the programme was ramped up at the end of July 2008. In this strike, two missiles were fired at a vehicle in the village of Dogga near Miramshah, North Waziristan, resulting in the death of six alleged militants, including foreigners, purportedly Al Qaeda militants (Roggio, 2012). US officials told The Long War Journal on Dec. 12, 2011 that the program was put ‘on hold’ due to tensions over the Mohmand incident, but that they would strike again if a high value terrorist target that could not be ignored was spotted (Roggio, 2012). Some argued that it had not stopped because of strained Pak-US relations. Rather it was a logistic problem as the US had to dismantle its system from Shamsi Airfield, therefore it took time to reinstall it at Bagram and restart the drone attacks. Once back in the saddle, more drone attacks were launched on 12, 15, 19 and 23 January 2012, in which about 15 persons, including Arab fighters, were killed. Al Qaeda’s external operational commander, Aslam Awan, was killed on 19 January. It was rumoured that Hakimullah Mehsud, TTP Chief, was reportedly killed on 15 January 2012, but

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credible sources did not confirm it. A few days later, Pakistani and US sources said that Mehsud was not targeted in the drone strike, and one Pakistani source said, ‘He is alive. Hakimullah is alive’ (The Express Tribune, 2012). The government of Pakistan had been under a greater public pressure after the Salala checkpost incident because the restarting of drone attacks during sour Pak –US relations was being construed as outright aggression by the US. This state of mind of the people of Pakistan suited the TTP and Al Qaeda as it gave them a hope to get rid of the menace of drone attacks. The widening gap between the Pak –US relations was another matter of satisfaction for them.

Was it done with Pakistan’s consent? In fact, the ever-increasing internal public pressure made the government of Pakistan to take a defensive position and constantly deny to have allowed the US to carry out the drone missile attacks inside Pakistan. The former Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, while addressing the students of the National Defence University, Islamabad, in May 2011, said that no agreement existed between Pakistan and the US regarding drone attacks nor such agreement had been executed during the previous (Musharraf) regime. Drone attacks were against the national integrity, he added (The Nation, 2011). Abdul Basit, the spokesperson of the Foreign Office of Pakistan, also said on 31 January 2012 that the drone attacks were unlawful, counterproductive and hence unacceptable. These remarks from the foreign ministry came as President Barack Obama confirmed for the first time that drone aircraft had targeted militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas on the Pak-Afghan border.4 Apart from these verbal denials for public consumption, a close scrutiny of the whole affair indicated complicity of Pakistan. The success of drone attack was largely dependent on humint. Unless the target was identified and located by the moles and planted with a chip or mobile phone sim, a drone missile could not locate or track the target. Who were the moles who performed this job and who handled them? There had been different views about it. The government of Pakistan denied its involvement in the drone campaign. Similarly, the Pakistan Army also claimed that it had no role in it. There was a strong evidence that the CIA had direct access in the area, especially in the urban areas through

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the local moles. But some locals strongly believed that as far as human intelligence for drone attacks was concerned, it was provided by the Pakistan intelligence and the drone campaign was continuing successfully due to this collaboration. This view carried weight. In 2004, three years before the formation of TTP, known Al Qaeda supporter Nek Mohammad and four other tribal militants were killed in a missile attack on a village in Wana, South Waziristan Agency. Witnesses stated that a spy drone was seen flying overheard minutes before the missile attack. There were also reports that Nek Mohammad was speaking on a satellite phone when the missile struck, fuelling speculation that he might have been hit by a guided missile. The precision with which the missile landed right in the middle of the courtyard where Nek Mohammad and his colleagues were sitting lent credence to the theory (Dawn, 2004). However, as the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Major General Shaukat Sultan commented: We have various means and a full array of weapons at our disposal. We have artillery that can fire with precision and we have helicopters with night vision capability which can fire guided missiles. But I am not going to give out operational secrets on how he was killed.5 This statement indicated that if at all it was the US drone missile that killed Nek Muhammad, it was fired with the consent of the Pakistan Army or it was at least in its knowledge. The reaction of the government of Pakistan on the drone campaign had been unsteady. It only reacted with anger (mock probably) over it whenever the public pressure was too high. It tried to douse it with condemnation of this campaign. It never seriously threatened to cut off diplomatic relations or mulled over any other serious steps of the same nature to pressurise the US to stop it as it did after the NATO attack on the Salala checkposts. No official rebuttal came after Bob Woodward’s story that former CIA Director Mike Hayden visited Zardari in the InterContinental New York Barclay Hotel, where Zardari and Ambassador Husain Haqqani waited for him. Zardari said, ‘Kill the seniors.’ ‘Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me.’ Reporting this startling

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statement, Woodward said, ‘Zardari had just given the CIA an important green light’. As the Wall Street Journal reports: About once a month, the Central Intelligence Agency sends a fax to a general at Pakistan’s intelligence service outlining broad areas where the US intends to conduct strikes with drone aircraft, according to US officials. The Pakistanis, who in public oppose the program, don’t respond. On this basis, plus the fact that Pakistan continues to clear airspace in the targeted areas, the US government concludes it has tacit consent to conduct strikes within the borders of a sovereign nation. Opposition political parties and the public had been quite critical of drone attacks. The PML (N) Chief Nawaz Sharif insinuated in an interview in June 2012 that drone attacks were being carried out with the connivance of the Pakistan government, which condemned the attacks but looked the other way when they took place. Imran Khan, cricketer turned politician, chief of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), claimed in a public gathering at Swabi, KP, that if he came into power, he would order to shoot down drones and if he failed to do so, he would resign. A poll conducted by The Express Tribune in February 2012 showed that 79 per cent were in favour of shooting down the US drones entering Pakistan airspace, whereas the remaining 21 per cent voted against it (The Express Tribune, 2012). Probably this popular sentiment encouraged Imran Khan, chairman of PTI, to announce during his election campaign that if he came to power he would order to shoot down the drones.

Solution to drone campaign controversy The drone campaign was a complex affair. It had generated a lot of controversies in Pakistan, which overshadowed its achievements. There were four parties to the drone campaign, for instance, the US, militants/ terrorists, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and the people of Pakistan. Two parties are directly engaged in this tussle, for instance, the US and the Al Qaeda/TTP militants. The other two, the government of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan, were dragged into it as unavoidable

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participants. The US started carrying out drone attacks to neutralise Al Qaeda members in Waziristan who desire to attack US interests. As the drone attacks had been targeting the militants on Pakistan’s soil, collateral damage of non-militant Pakistanis was obvious. The collateral damage caused by these drone attacks made the people of Pakistan party to it. The resentment and reaction of the Pakistani public pulled the government of Pakistan as well and they kept denying its approval of the drone campaign. It further complicated affairs and resentment against the US and even the government of Pakistan increased in the public. The drone campaign represented by an eight-arrow graph explains this situation (see Figure 8.1). It would become simpler if arrows are reduced. The policy should be to appease these parties. One simple and straight solution was to allow Pakistan control of the drone campaign. It would put an end to violation in Pakistan (one arrow gone). Moreover, it would give some semblance of morality, legality and legitimacy to this campaign, which was considered unlawful and arbitrary by many quarters within the US as well as operated far from the battlefield and violated the right to due process. The New York Times revealed that President Obama was making the final decision on ‘the biggest killing and drone strikes’. He relied on his counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan (Editorial, International Herald Tribune, 2012).

Figure 8.1

An eight-arrow scenario.

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If control was given to Pakistan, the collateral damage wouldn’t have been prevented but it would not be caused by the foreign attacks perceived to be carried out by the arbitrary and controversial decisions taken by a foreign ruler and his aide only (second arrow gone). The bombing and strafing by the Pakistan air force and army in the operations in Waziristan had caused collateral damage, but it was a battlefield for the Pakistan Army. Drone attack would be just a change in modus operandi (third arrow gone). The workable solution would be to form a committee comprising representatives of ISI, IB, CIA and the High Court, which would identify the targets and decide to launch the drone attack (fourth arrow gone). Every strike should be well considered. After a successful attack, the death of the actual target should be declared officially with the list of his crimes or accusations. In case of collateral damage, all bodies should be identified and handed over to their relatives for proper burial. The relatives of innocent victims should be compensated similar to the victims of other terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The situation would thus be reduced to four arrows, which would be the US and Pakistan against the militants and the militants against the US and Pakistan. In fact, it would be a two-against-one situation, which would mean US and Pakistan against militants.

MYTHS, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND FACTS In the whirlpool of accusations, myths and conspiracy theories taking place in Pakistan, two countries figured prominently: the US and India.

The US factor The then US President Obama unveiled his security strategy on 27 March 2009, with an obvious shift in attention away from Iraq to Afghanistan, but lumped Afghanistan and Pakistan together, thus giving it an acronym ‘Af-Pak Policy’. His arguments to take a unified approach to policy and strategy for these two countries were (1) the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks were in Pakistan and Afghanistan and (2) the future of Afghanistan was inextricably linked to the future of its neighbour, Pakistan. He specified that Al Qaeda was actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.

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In light of the above, he gave a clear and focused goal: ‘to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.’ In addition to the military action, the Af-Pak Policy ensured massive injections of cash, projects and experts for economic and social development in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Common Ground News, 2009). Pakistan had two concerns over the policy: (1) Pakistan objected to comparing it with Afghanistan. The Prime Minister said, ‘Pakistan is a nuclear state with strong institutions. There is a free media and judiciary in Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan should not be viewed on the same lines as Afghanistan’ (The Daily Times, 2009). (2) Pakistan wanted the Af-Pak authors to take the Pak-India rivalry into consideration, which was essential to enable Pakistan to switch its concentration from the Eastern border with India to FATA, Swat and the Western border with Afghanistan (The Daily Times, 2009). Despite these severe reservations, the Pakistan Army and the government of Pakistan managed to resolve it and responded positively. It carried out unprecedented military operation against the local Taliban in Swat and later on in Waziristan. However, the image of the US remained overwhelmingly negative in Pakistan, according to the 2010 Global Attitudes Project report released by the PEW Research Centre. About six in ten Pakistanis – 59 per cent – viewed the US as Pakistan’s enemy, decreasing only slightly from the 64 per cent reported in 2009 (The Daily Times, 2010). However, in the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US marines at Abbottabad and subsequent strong rumours that the US was bent upon taking out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the anti-US sentiments touched new heights in Pakistan. The US-Pak relations nosedived further. In May 2011, Mr Husain Haqqani, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US was startled to learn during a lecture at the National Defence University, Islamabad, that the majority of the audience, who were mostly highly educated and wellplaced people, perceived the US as the ‘Enemy number One of Pakistan’. Surprisingly, the US managed to clinch this negative topslot from India, which is otherwise considered the erstwhile enemy of Pakistan (The Nation 2011). Three reasons seemed to have spurred anti-US sentiments and also given birth to conspiracy theories galore. The first reason was that most

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Pakistanis see the US through its role in Iraq and Afghanistan, which they consider an attack on Muslims resulting in mass-scale killings of innocent people. The reports that the US and the UK concocted evidence of WMDs in Iraq further nourished these views. The second reason was more localised; drone attacks resulting in killing of innocent people in FATA. The third reason was the ever-increasing US tilt towards India reflected by its deal on a nuclear programme and billions of dollars worth of weapons contracts during Hillary Clinton’s visit to India (The Nation, 2009). In fact, Pakistan and the US had a long history of profound mistrust. Historically speaking, many Pakistanis considered the US as unfriendly and unreliable because of three complaints by them: (1) Washington’s refusal to help Pakistan during the 1965 war with India; (2) the US’s discarding of Pakistan ‘like a Kleenex’ when it was no longer needed after the Afghan War and (3) the indiscriminatory nature of the US nuclear sanctions, which – until the May 1998 nuclear tests – hit only Pakistan and did not affect India (Kux, 2001). A myth was linked to this feeling that the US wanted to take out Pakistan’s nuclear bombs. This indication was enough to stir the adverse sensibilities of most Pakistanis who considered the nuclear programme as their pride and strength to be equal to and be secure from arch rival India. They found an Indo-Israel nexus behind this conspiracy. Mike Muller said, ‘We actually sanctioned Pakistan from about 1990 to 2002. And so they’re wary of what is going to be our sustained position’ (The Nation, 2009). Adding to this wariness was the allegation that the US was funding the late TTP founder leader Baitullah Mehsud to destabilise Pakistan (Asian Tribune, 2009). A new dip in Pak-US relations came after the killing of Osama at Abbottabad. Prior to that, the issue of Raymond Davis, the security contractor based at the US Consulate General Lahore, who gunned down by two Pakistanis in broad day light in Lahore, caused bitterness in the relations. Raymond Davis claimed that he had fired at the youngsters because they could mug him at gun point. However, the circumstantial evidence did not support his claim. He had fired at them repeatedly from inside his car. The bullets pierced through the screen of the car and hit the motorcycle riders at vital points. Both died on the spot. Both were armed with pistols, but they neither took out the pistols nor fired any shot. The rescue team that rushed from the US Consulate General to

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respond to Raymond’s SOS call overran a motorcyclist who died on his way to hospital. The US government claimed that Raymond Davis was a diplomat. The government of Pakistan did not confirm it and maintained that he was a contractor working for the US Consulate General Lahore. Later, the matter went to the court. A back-channel effort worked, and the relatives of the boys killed by Raymond Davis agreed to forgive him in lieu of blood money. It was perfectly legal as Pakistan’s law has the provision of blood money known as ‘dyat’. Such issues and public perceptions, at times arising out of half-truths, are problematic for the governments of Pakistan and the US in implementing continuous and uninterrupted coordination against terrorism. Another irritant between Pak-US relations had been the Haqqani network or group that operated from the Pak-Afghan border for Al Qaeda and with the help of TTP. The US strongly believed that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies backed the group. This simmering irritant flared up after a Taliban attack on the US Embassy and NATO HQ in Kabul on 12 September 2011. The US authorities blamed the Haqqani group for organising this attack and lashed out at Pakistan for its support to the group. In a scathing and unprecedented public condemnation of Pakistan, Admiral Mike Mullen said that the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was actively supporting Haqqani network extremists who, he said, have targeted US forces in Afghanistan. Mullen told the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘The Haqqani Network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency’. The US threatened to attack North Waziristan, from where the Haqqani group was suspected to be operating and the US Senate Committee voted to make economic and security aid to Pakistan conditional on its cooperation in fighting militants such as Haqqani. Pakistan rejected these allegations, and the Interior Minister said, ‘the Pakistan nation will not allow the boots on our ground, never. Our government is already cooperating with the US but they also must respect our sovereignty’ (Asian Tribune, 2009). In fact, Pakistan forces were already busy as it had been constantly fighting with TTP militants in FATA. Opening up another front in North Waziristan would mean inviting more trouble. Prof Anatol Lieven had been indicating this scenario for quite some time fearing US incursion of US forces into Pakistan.

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This mistrust was not one-sided. In general, the US had been praising Pakistan for its cooperation in the war on terrorism. On eve of the tenth anniversary of 9/11 (11 September 2011), President Obama’s press secretary Jay Carney said, ‘It (US– Pakistan) is an important relationship and it is complicated as I have said numerous times from the podium, but America and Americans are safer because of the cooperation we have been able to achieve with Pakistan.’ On the contrary, a few higher officials of the US government criticised Pakistan for deficient cooperation. The US Vice President Joe Biden called Pakistan an ‘unreliable ally’ in the campaign. While talking to the CNN on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, he alleged that Pakistan failed ‘on the occasion’ when forced to choose between the US and Al Qaeda, which caused loss of life of American soldiers in Afghanistan. Hillary Clinton had been urging Pakistan to do more. While in Kabul on 20 October 2011, she threatened that it was a time for Islamabad to decide whether it would help or hinder the US-led war against militants. On the next day, she reached Islamabad, accompanied with top US military and Intelligence officials, and reiterated the above stance. In return, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani, during his meeting with Hillary Clinton, called upon the US to give peace a chance as envisaged in the resolution adopted by the All Parties Conference held in Pakistan after the row over the Haqqani network issue (The Nation, 2011). This blame-game caused an ever-widening gulf of mistrust and distrust. Emphasising on ‘winning back the trust of allies’, a report in The Economist suggested to the US, ‘The trick in the next ten years would be to win back the trust of allies (especially Pakistan)’ (Economist, 2011). Conversely, the trust of allies was badly bruised when the Pak-US relations took a further nosedive after the NATO gunship helicopters intruded into the Pakistan territory and attacked a checkpost (Salala) in Bajaur Agency, KP, resulting in the death of 26 soldiers including a major and a captain. Pakistan reacted by stopping the NATO supply route and demanded an apology from the US over killing of its soldiers. The tussle prolonged as the US refused to apologise and Pakistan did not open the supply route. The increase in the bitterness in the Pak-US relations could be judged from the fact that in September 2010, the US had apologised on a similar incident and Pakistan opened the route. However, it resulted in the destruction of almost 100 oil tankers and

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more than a week of suspended supplies before US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson apologised for a September 30 NATO helicopter incursion that killed three Pakistani soldiers. A US Embassy statement clarified that a joint investigation showed that American pilots had mistaken the soldiers for Afghan insurgents they had been pursuing. Acrimony between hawks in Islamabad and Washington, where a new White House assessment sharply criticised Pakistan for being ‘unwilling to take action against Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists’, had been growing for months. As an Obama administration official told The Wall Street Journal in October 2010, ‘there are real challenges we have with Pakistan’ (The Daily Times, 2010). Despite apology even at that time, the US-Pakistan relationship seemed to be reaching the breaking point. Although the US was well aware that Pakistan remained a crucial link in the US strategy in Afghanistan, it was fed up with Pakistan’s slackness to take effective action against the terrorists. In this fury, the US failed to remember that progress in Afghanistan would not be sustainable if it came at the cost of creating more enemies for Pakistan’s weak and unpopular government in the border regions. It seemed that US impatience stemmed not only from the ongoing tussles but also from its apprehensions about the future ominous scenario that could emerge due to lost state control. It had deep worries about various factors like corruption, mismanagement, population explosion, water and food scarcity that could give impetus to extremism and militancy in Pakistan in future. A study conducted by the Congressional Research Service for the US law makers warned that Pakistan’s ecological problems would likely to get worse due to climate change. Pakistan faced critical risks to food security in the coming decades due to a number of reasons including water scarcity, population growth and mismanagement. ‘The combination of these factors could contribute to Pakistan’s decline as a fully functioning state, creating new, or expanding existing new, or expanding existing, largely ungoverned areas.’ The US was worried that the growth of lawless areas of the type seen now in Pakistan’s tribal north-west was ‘not in the US’ strategic interest, given the recent history of such areas being used by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The report further warned of future disasters as climate change leads to a melting of Himalayan glaciers, the source of most of the water in the Indus River. However, Pakistan’s environmental

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decision making was hindered by corruption and rivalry between civilian and military leaders (The News International, 2010). President Trump’s South Asia Policy further widened the gulf between the two nations in 2017 –18, especially due to divergent views on Afghanistan. The desire and plan should be to regain trust and stay closer but the interests and approaches seemed so dissimilar that strengthening ties might be incredibly difficult unless a radical shift is brought about by both countries in their approach and thinking.

The Indian factor The US wanted Pakistan to concentrate on Al Qaeda and religious militants in Pakistan and stop worrying about India (Press Trust of India, 2009). However, very few people in Pakistan would believe that India was not a threat to Pakistan. They had the following reasons for it. The very creation of Pakistan was detested by the Congress leaders of India who dreamt of ruling Akhand Bharat (Undivided India). Kashmir, the eternal bone of contention between the two, three wars, the dismemberment of East Pakistan, the Siachen issue and so on speak volumes of the history of hostility and enmity between the two countries. About 80 per cent of the Pakistan Army had always been focused on countering the threat from India. Similarly, 7 out of 13 corps of the Indian army kept ‘pointing their guns at Pakistan’ (The News International, 2009). It would not be an overstatement that Pakistani nationalism was also rooted in the resentment of India with which it had experienced some serious grievances ranging from carnage at the time of independence in 1947 to the dismemberment of East Pakistan. These grievances had been consistently reinforced by politicians and the media. The Pakistan Army’s policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan also stemmed from this threat and apprehension. The cases of secret stabbing are many. Three days after the 9/11 catastrophe, the Indian intelligence agency RAW informed the CIA that Pakistani Jihadi organisations were planning an ‘imminent attack’ on the White House. President Bush refused to believe without exact information. Obviously, no such information could be presented as ‘it was an effort on the part of India to push the US Administration to include Pakistan on the hit list’ (Abbas, 2005).6 Christine Fair’s observations regarding India’s covert operations against Pakistan were worth noticing:

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(a) ‘Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity. (b) India had run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and it was likely doing so from the other consulates it had reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. (c) Indian officials had told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan. (d) Kabul had encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organisation to build sensitive parts of the Ring Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security. (e) It was also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar – across from Bajaur’ (Foreign Affairs, 2009). People readily accept any accusation of hostility against India. It was a common myth, although unconfirmed, that Indians and Gorkhas were found among the dead fighting on the Taliban side in Swat against the Pakistani security forces. It was revealed when they were found uncircumcised (Times Online, 2009). These sorts of unfounded stories worked in favour of the militants who actually deserved to be exposed before the public. Blaming India had always been a good excuse to get away with unresolved violent incidents. However, it is a fact that in August 2008, three arrested terrorists belonging to TTP’s Qari Hussain, known as ‘Ustad-e-Fedayeen’ (Mentor of suicide bombers) (Dawn, 2009), revealed that he received Rs 680 million from ‘an enemy country’ (India).7 The Prime Minister of Pakistan Yousuf Reza Gillani handed over a dossier containing proofs of India’s involvement in subversive activities in Pakistan to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt in July 2009 (Dawn, 2009). The contents of the dossier were not disclosed. Interior Minister Rehman Malik also stated that the security forces recovered a heavy amount of Indian-made weaponry from Bara area (KP). He claimed that India was involved in terror incidents in Pakistan and the evidence of Indian involvement in destabilising Pakistan had been handed over to the Foreign Office in Islamabad. He added that confiscation of Indian-made arms from Khyber Agency was one of the evidences of Indian involvement in Pakistan (The News International, 2009).

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These reasons were enough for the people and the government of Pakistan to keep India on top of its security priorities even if the fires of internal terrorism became too hot to burn Pakistan internally. According to the 2010 Global Attitudes Project report released by PEW Research Centre, the people of Pakistan saw India as a greater threat to their country than the Taliban or Al Qaeda, with 74 per cent viewing India as a serious threat, 54 per cent considering the Taliban and 38 per cent Al Qaeda. Interestingly in 2010, as opposed to soaring antiUS sentiments, Pakistanis became somewhat less concerned about the threat posed by India than they were in 2009, when 83 per cent considered India a serious threat. A large proportion, 72 per cent, in fact, supported improved relations with their neighbour and also favoured greater economic and political ties between the two countries (The Daily Times, 2010). These sentiments remained unchanged in subsequent years. However, the arrest of an Indian Naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016, who was operating at the behest of Indian intelligence agency RAW from Balochistan ignited the situation again. It was tangible evidence of India’s interference in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 9 THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT

The TTP’s ever-increasing influence and activities were a massive internal security threat and challenge to Pakistan. This phenomenon mutated into a vicious circle beginning from undermining the morale of the security forces and general public to the resultant severe setback to the economy, social fabric and all sectors of Pakistan, ‘further fuelling extremism’ (Lieven, 2008). Pakistan suffered more terrorist attacks and a greater death toll and destruction than any other country in the world. The presence of Al Qaeda in Pakistan territory and the rising tide of domestic extremism and militancy pose an existential threat both within and abroad (Pakistan Observer, 2009). The US/NATO foray in Afghanistan had direct bearing on an increase in extremism in Pakistan, especially on the Pashtun population living in the contiguous tribal belt. Drone attacks inside Pakistan, widely feared to be the prologue of a US ground invasion, further fuelled the fire. The Pashtun population was the worst affected, which was living not only in FATA but also in the whole KP province with large chunks living all over Pakistan. The extremism, violence and TTP influence had spread in these areas. The fear came true that this ethnic animosity combined with religious zest might not be restricted to the Pashtuns only. Many areas of the Punjab, the most populated province of Pakistan, having thousands of religious seminaries and trained jihadis, were affected by this spread.

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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND SECTARIANISM Religious extremism, sectarianism and Talibanisation did not emerge in days or months. It was the outcome of flawed policies introduced over the years. Mir (2009) delved into the past and present of jihadi culture and reached a conclusion that Talibanisation was in fact a result of the Islamisation process initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq from the 1970s to the 1980s. The fallouts of this process were not only disastrous for Pakistan but had adversely affected India, Afghanistan, the US and the UK. Jihadi organisations formed to fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and later turned towards Kashmir liberation and became too well entrenched in the society to be controlled by the civil governments. After 2001, the religious extremists became a force to be reckoned with, especially in the FATA and KP areas. The Pakistan Army managed to disperse the Taliban in Swat and FATA, but could not defeat them. Similarly, they could not prevent the spread of terror to the country’s major urban centres such as Peshawar, Quetta, Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and its capital, Islamabad. Growth of religious extremism and sectarianism had been neglected by the authorities, which ultimately resulted in full-blown terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan. Khan (2011) stated that the most serious and lethal challenge for Pakistan could be militant extremism and terrorism in the country, which had badly affected the society and threatened the internal as well external security of Pakistan. Not only the flawed policies led to birth of extremism and sectarianism in Pakistan, but also the criminal neglect to check the rise of these tendencies made the situation bad to worse. Only a holistic appraisal of TTP as insurgents operating in FATA, as terrorists carrying out their acts across Pakistan, backed by Al Qaeda, operating in the vastness of deep religious and sectarian extremism, clinging stubbornly to the divine mission of imposing Sharia in Pakistan and battering the economy (loss of $100 billion), stability, societal serenity and international image of Pakistan for more than a decade could portray it as an existential threat to Pakistan. The US’s reaction in the form of drone attacks and military operations, like the one at Salala, in which 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, further worsened the situation. Absence of any one of the above factors could make TTP look less formidable, resulting in incorrect assessment about

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its strength and the damage it would cause. Imran Khan, the chief of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), stated that 30,000– 40,000 insurgents could not fight and win against half a million men in the Pakistan Army. He conveniently missed all other aspects stated above. It is a relevant lesson to be learnt from contemporary history that protracted over indulgence of the soviet forces in Afghanistan became its bleeding wound and a catalyst of the disintegration of the superpower, the Soviet Union in 1990 (Hussain, 2013).

Situation (see the three main circles in Figure 9.1) i. Insurgency, backed by Al Qaeda, erupted in FATA area. ii. Same elements and their affiliates started carrying out terrorist activities in urban centres of Pakistan. iii. Religious extremism and intolerance seeped into the society after the Soviet–Afghan War and increased after the second Afghan war.

Figure 9.1

Situation, progression and impact.

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Progression 1. Despite persistent decade-long military operations, insurgency has not ended. 2. Terrorist activities have become more lethal. Places such as Army HQ in Rawalpindi and Naval bases had been targeted. There were international apprehensions about terrorist intentions and increasing prowess to lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. 3. Umpteen jihadi, religious and sectarian parties radicalised a large part of the society who do not look at the insurgents and terrorists unfavourably, who claim to be striving for the enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan.

Impact 1. Pakistan lost billions of dollars due to terrorism. Foreign investors were scared away. Even local big investors feel unsafe due to killings and kidnappings. ‘It was documented that cumulatively terrorism had cost Pakistan around 33.02 per cent of its real national income, for instance, terrorism costs Pakistan around 1 per cent of real GDP per capita growth every year’ (Mehmood, 2013). 2. Many Western countries considered FATA as the metropolis of militants where locals, Middle Easterners, Chechens, Uzbeks and even some Westerners got training and designed plans to carry out attacks. Many Western airlines stopped operating to Pakistan. They issued travel advisories to their nationals. International media highlighted the news of militants and terrorists linked with Al Qaeda and TTP, which created a negative image of Pakistan. 3. Law and order situation had hit the bottom due to frequent bomb blasts, suicide attacks and gun and grenade attacks in cities on markets, offices, schools, military and civil forces in big cities for the last ten years. Kidnappings and extortions added to the insecurity of the people. Well-off people living in big cities preferred to live in gated colonies. 4. Dissensions and differences cropped up in the society. There were differences between the liberals and religious extremists; Sunnis and

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Shiʿas; Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith, intolerant elements and minorities. How these components of existential threat theory have hit Pakistan is elaborated below.

ECONOMIC DOWNTURN The economy suffered the most as the losses of foreign direct investment and tourism were indeed substantial. Until 2009, according to then Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan had suffered a monetary loss amounting to $34.5 billion dollars since 2001. The losses of $5 billion had been estimated in foreign direct investment, more than $5 billion in exports and $5.5 billion in privatisation (Cheema, 2009). ‘It was documented that cumulatively terrorism had cost Pakistan around 33.02 per cent of its real national income for instance terrorism costs Pakistan around 1 per cent of real GDP per capita growth every year’ (Mehmood, 2013). Pakistan continued to pay a heavy price in economic and security terms. A large portion of its resources, both men and material, was consumed by this war over a decade. The economy was subjected to enormous direct and indirect costs, which continued to rise from $2.669 billion in 2001–2 to $13.6 billion by 2009– 10 and to $17.8 billion in the financial year 2010–1. Western countries, including the US, continued to impose travel ban for their citizens (investor, importers, etc.) to visit Pakistan. This adversely affected Pakistan’s exports, diminished the inflows of foreign investment, disturbed the pace of privatisation programme, slackened the overall economic activity, reduced import demand, reduced tax collection, increased expenditure on additional security spending and affected domestic tourism industry. Besides the destruction of physical infrastructure (military and civil), terrorism caused great losses. In general, a massive surge in security-related spending was a strain on dwindling economy. The direct and indirect costs to the economy continued to rise further. Pakistan’s investment-to-GDP ratio nosedived from 22.5 per cent in 2006–7 to 13.4 per cent in 2010–1 with serious consequences on the jobcreating ability of the economy (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2010–11).

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The foreign buyers from the US and the European Union, destination of more than 50 per cent of Pakistan’s exports, were reluctant to visit Pakistan due to travel advice. Many reputable international buying houses shifted to Singapore, Hong Kong and India (Hashmi, 2008). After the meteoric rise in suicide bombings since mid-2007, there had been further decline in business activity and travelling to Pakistan. British Airways suspended its flights to Pakistan after the Marriot Hotel bombing (Times Online, 2008). After the initiation of operations against the militants in Swat and FATA, more airlines like Qatar Airlines, Gulf Air and Etihad Airways suspended their flights to Peshawar (The Nation, 2009). In 2009, following the military operations in Swat, there were more than three million internally displaced people (IDP). The expenditure on their support and rehabilitation was a substantial strain on the fragile economy. The annual cost of relief efforts was estimated at about Rs 50 billion for the IDP population, but the cost of resettlement and reconstruction would be many times higher (Aziz, 2009). Moreover, the Pakistani population, 33 per cent of which was living below poverty line, was facing the fallout of ‘the surge in the international price of oil and the surge in international food prices’. The relentless electricity outages adversely affected the businesspeople and public alike (International Herald Tribune, 2008). In 2011, Pakistan’s economy fell to a 40-year low and economic growth slowed to an average of less than 3 per cent per annum over the last four years. Slower economic growth meant that fewer Pakistanis were getting jobs and climbing out of poverty. It might not be the result of terrorism alone. It had fallen to this fragility due to fiscal indiscipline, imprudent fiscal policy, political instability and mismanagement of the power sector (The News International, 2011). However, deterioration in security environment was one big cause of the economic downfall. Terrorism stifled the economic growth and created a bad investment climate. There had been a steady increase of both capital and manpower from the country, weakening the economy further. ‘The failing economy destroys jobs and incomes, creates more poverty and destabilises society leading to fuel riots, electricity riots, water riots, food riots, etc. This creates favourable conditions for criminals and terrorists, further impacting negatively on the overall security’ (Sehgal, 2011).

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From 2001 to 2015, Pakistan had incurred $106.98 billion (Rs 8.7 trillion) in direct and indirect costs owing to terrorism. The cost was worked out by an inter-ministerial committee, having representation of Ministries of Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs and a Joint Ministerial Group (see Table 9.1). According to the fresh fact sheet launched by the government of Pakistan in January 2018, terrorism killed more than 74,000 people over the last 14 years and resulted in economic losses of $123 billion (Dawn, Jan 9, 2018).

SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLOUTS According to a doctor from KP, every second person in Waziristan suffered from depression. Stress emerged as a new sociological phenomenon in insurgency-hit areas.1 Studies showed that bombings caused the severest Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) compared to other traumas.2 Psychiatrist Mian Iftikhar Hussain at the Sarhad Hospital for Psychiatric Table 9.1 Years 2001–2 2002–3 2003–4 2004–5 2005–6 2006–7 2007–8 2008–9 2009–10 2010–1 2011–2 2012–3 2013–4 2014–5* Total

Estimated losses during 2001– 15. $ Billion

Rs Billion

Per cent change

2.67 2.75 2.93 3.41 3.99 4.67 6.94 9.18 13.56 23.77 11.98 9.97 6.63 4.53 106.98

163.90 160.80 168.80 202.40 238.60 283.20 434.10 720.60 1,136.40 2,037.33 1,052.77 964.24 681.68 457.93 8,702.75

3.0 6.7 16.3 16.9 17.2 48.6 32.3 47.7 75.3 2 49.6 2 16.8 2 33.5 2 31.7

*Estimated on the basis of nine-month actual data. Source: MoF, M/o Interior, M/o Foreign Affairs Joint Ministerial Group.

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Diseases (SHPD) attributed psychiatric problems in militancy-wrecked areas to fear, stress, coping with the murders of family and friends and seeing mutilated bodies after terrorist attacks. In 2009, SHPD recorded about 97,000 psychiatric cases from FATA, Swat, Tank, Hangu, Darra Adam Khel and other areas hit by violence. In 2010, the number was about 22,000, including women and children who suffered from severe PTSD. According to a report released by the global health agency, ‘most of the IDP suffered from various forms of mental distress’. Mentally disabled children, who lack specialised care that could prevent problems from becoming major health concerns, were most vulnerable. Nevertheless, women and children in general were a concern, the report found. According to WHO, about 4 per cent of the population suffer from severe psychiatric disorders, but ‘a much larger portion of the population suffers from transient mental health problems linked to the stress of living under conditions of conflict and violence’. The WHO had recommended management of urgent psychiatric conditions at the primary health care level, including referral to psychiatric hospitals and continued treatment of chronic psychiatric patients. Victims of severe mental traumas due to the conflict and subsequent displacement should receive psychological support, it suggested. Disabled persons and victims of violence remained disadvantaged during distribution of humanitarian assistance, especially food, and were more susceptible to mental health problems, Professor Mohammad Shafiq, a senior psychiatrist in Mardan, told Central Asia Online. As stated by Gul Jamal, a farmer from Swat at Shafiq’s clinic, ‘I had several orchards destroyed by militants. During the army operation, we stayed in Mardan district as IDPs, where we queued for food and other essential items.’ He said that the Taliban turned him from an aid contributor into an aid recipient. As Shafiq stated, ‘The farmer needed psychological support to restore his confidence.’ The provincial health department in its post-conflict rapid assessment in Swat revealed that 27 of the valley’s 228 health facilities were destroyed, while 54 suffered partial damage that would cost an estimated Rs 1.2 billion ($14 million) to fix. As stated in the assessment, ‘This has put the population in a precarious situation because it needed urgent treatment . . . particularly for mental ailments.’

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According to Just Peace International (JPI), an NGO that ran a project with the financial assistance of the Greek-based charity European Union Perspective, about 85 per cent of the displaced population living with host communities had experienced problems, because they lost their social identities when they had to leave their homes. ‘The people of the conflict areas are exposed to high levels of violence,’ said Imdad Bashir, a consulting psychiatrist with JPI. ‘We have so far seen 255 patients, including 177 women.’ Anxiety and mistrust were common among conflict-zone residents, Bashir said. Every third person in South and North Waziristan, Bajaur and Swat suffered from depression, and many women and children complained of recurring nightmares of blood-splattered bodies and homeless families living in destitution, he said. As Ali stated, ‘The problem is most of the patients face relapses.’ Victims of violence needed regular psychological services, counselling and treatment to help them overcome the trauma. The doctors could not reach everyone, though, and part of that is society’s fault. ‘People do not consider (mental) trauma a health concern,’ said Ali. Also, patients had shunned the JPI clinic in Batkhela out of fear of militants, Bashir said, explaining that JPI was planning to establish free psychiatric clinics in other conflict zones. As he stated, ‘But we plan to have workshops in the violence-prone areas when law and order improves.’ ‘Now, people aren’t consulting psychiatrists because of the social stigma. In nutshell, better public awareness is needed.’ Children were the worst hit due to persistent episodes of terrorism and mayhem and they evinced a broad range of symptoms of mental illness. Children are most likely to take serious impact on their little minds and hearts. According to a survey, the children in New York City showed a broad range of mental health symptoms six months after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (Lamberg, 2003). However, there was no survey carried out by the researches to see which symptoms persisted in the children in KP and other parts of Pakistan. But various cases depicted a vivid picture about it. A 12-yearold girl brought to the psychiatry ward was suffering from anxiety and fear, Jawad Ali, a psychiatrist at the Khyber Teaching Hospital, Peshawar, said. She had witnessed a suicide bomb blast.

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Sadly, the already dismal literacy rate in FATA further dwindled. According to a report prepared by the Society for the Protection of Rights of Child (SPARC), the literacy rate in FATA dropped sharply from 29 per cent to 17.42 per cent because of massive militancy in the area. The overall dropout rate from pre-school to fifth grade in primary schools over the last six years (2004– 10) was 69 per cent, which included 63 per cent boys and 77 per cent girls. The overall dropout rate from class 6 to 10 over the last five years (2005– 10) remained 54 per cent, with boys accounting for 53 per cent and girls 58 per cent (Dawn, 2011). Approximately 600,000 school-going children of KP reportedly missed one or more years of education due to ongoing militancy (Dawn, 2012). TTP emulated Afghan Taliban to show their harsh side for Western education by destroying schools in KP. A total of 710 schools were destroyed or damaged by the militants. Swati TTP destroyed 640 schools in Malakand. More emphasis was on destroying girls’ schools. It was in more than one way tragic that education for girls, in a part of Pakistan where literacy rate was already dismally low, was being hit in this way (Dawn, 2012). Female teachers were harassed and attacked to prevent them from teaching. In 2009, in a tragic incident, two female teachers were shot dead in Bajaur Agency, after masked militants dragged them out of their vehicles and opened fire. Many schoolteachers quit their jobs for fear of being targeted. Across northern areas, one could see the burnt-out buildings of schools that had been attacked. However, when the Swati Taliban were flushed out by the army, the process of rebuilding almost 200 such structures was started (The Nation, 2009). However, this was not the end of TTP’s activities in Swat. As mentioned, Malala Yousafzai, a 14-year-old Swat girl, who stood up to protect the rights of the girls’ education,3 was attacked by militants on 9 October 2012. She was shot in her neck and head. TTP claimed responsibility and vowed to attack her again if she survived. It earned a sharp reaction from the people across Pakistan. All condemned the act in unison except the religious elements and parties. Political parties, lawyers, students and others took to rallies to protest against the attack on Malala. However, not even a single religius-political party made such a move. It further exposed the growing divide between the liberal and religious elements of the society.

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KP being worst hit by bomb blasts, meant most of the provincial ministers in the KP (NWFP) deserted their offices at the Civil Secretariat following the string of bomb blasts in the city in 2009. They restricted themselves to their houses or did official work from the MPAs Hostel in Peshawar. Provincial Minister for Prisons Mian Nisar Gul Kakakhel shifted his office from the ministerial block to the fortified building near the Home Department, where Minister for Higher Education Qazi Muhammad Asad and Minister for Schools and Literacy Sardar Hussain Babak had their offices. These precautions further widened the gulf between the ministers and the people of their areas. Provincial ministers Rahim-dad Khan, Wajid Ali Khan, Ayub Khan Ashari, Sher Azam Wazir, Muhammad Humayun Khan, Arshad Abdullah and Mian Iftikhar Hussain shifted their offices in the same premises, where common people could not enter (The News International, 2009). The socio-economic upheaval in the insurgency-hit area of Waziristan was evident from the harsh fact that a number of people from these areas migrated to settled areas of KP, where many remained jobless and started begging in the streets, mostly belonging to the Mehsud tribe.4 Insecurity and fear spread throughout Pakistan. It compelled the citizens, especially in cities, to adopt security measures in and around their residences. Gated housing colonies grew rapidly as people preferred to reside in a secure environment.5 The trend of gated communities emerged after 2002, and the demand for housing there went up by an estimated 30 per cent from 2010 to 2012 due to an increasing need for secure housing communities.6 Private security business also boomed. Registration of private security agencies increased manifold. It created an industry, with total worth of about $60 million a year. Similarly, the residents of cities suffered from the effects of terrorism and psychological war. The terrorist threats to educational institutions, especially to co-ed private schools in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore and a suicide attack on International Islamic University, Islamabad, resulting in the deaths of five female students added to the deep sense of insecurity among the teachers, students and parents (Dawn, 2009). Simultaneously, the like-minded religious bigots took advantage to harass women on the streets by telling them to observe the so-called Islamic dress code. This trend was observed in Lahore. However, it petered out as soon as the government reacted and showed some will to handle the terrorists sternly.

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The beard, a symbol of religiousness and piety in this society, started becoming a symbol of extremism and was seen with fear and suspicion. Conversely, the moderate bearded Muslims considered themselves odd men out in their own society. Anxiety and mistrust seeped into society. Hafiz Khalid of Jamia Ashrafia, Lahore, who wore a long beard, told that he got membership of a posh club in Lahore so that he could take his children there for swimming. He said: I felt myself odd man out as families seemed uncomfortable in my presence. Probably they feared that I might object on their dress or activities. Many students of my madrasah narrate not dissimilar experiences as many a times they had ill-feeling that they were being looked at suspiciously or were considered different from others. A tangible increase took place in the intolerance of religious extremists and their tendency to thrust upon themselves the responsibility to control perceived un-Islamic activities of people. The Valentine day of 2012 faced sharp and violent reaction from different religious organisations and groups. In Lahore, some activists of Tahaffuz-Namoos-e-Risalat Mahaz (The Front for Protection of Prophet’s Honour) staged a demonstration against the celebration of Valentine day; college students belonging to a religious organisation threatened and thrashed the management of a restaurant in the Gulberg area, Lahore, for arranging celebrations of Valentine’s day; activists of Shabab-e-Milli (Youth organisation of Jamaate-Islami) went out to rally against Valentine’s day and so on.7

International isolation Ever since 2001, Pakistan had been badly stigmatised as the epicentre of terrorism. Many countries of the world looked to it as a centre of such activities where bombings and killings were rampant. Doubtless, terrorism was rife in the country but not all areas were affected all the time. The media, however, showed an amplified account to the outer world, making them see the country and its people in an adverse light. Many Hollywood movies and books portrayed Pakistan in a bad light, linking it with nothing but terrorism. Hollywood movies such as Iron Man, Zero Dark Thirty and The Reluctant Fundamentalist were highly

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negative about Pakistan. The serial Homeland also had unpleasant contents pertaining to Pakistan. The battered image created problems for Pakistanis at home and abroad. Job opportunities for Pakistanis in the Middle East were being increasingly curtailed. It badly affected the economy of the country, as remittances from overseas Pakistanis amounting to about $14 billion were a substantial support to Pakistan’s economy. Usually Pakistanis faced tough treatment at foreign airports. It seemed that the green passport was devalued and visas were not issued easily. Obtaining a visa to not only Western countries but also the Middle Eastern Muslim countries became a tough task. For example, Pakistanis were completely banned in Kuwait, and even the families and newborns of those employed in Kuwait were denied a visa. A Pakistani based in Kuwait narrated an incident: ‘I remember once my sister got stuck at the immigration in Kuwait airport, they were not letting her out. I spoke to one of the security personnel to help. It was humiliating as he informed me for Pakistanis we cannot help.’ Western and other airlines stopped operating in Pakistan. Leading airlines, including British Airways, Singapore Airlines, Lufthansa and Malaysia Airlines had scaled back their operations since 2008 in part due to concerns related to security of their employees. ‘This is as bad as it can get for us,’ said a senior official of Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) responsible for encouraging foreign carriers to come and use Pakistan as a stopover destination. ‘When it comes to poor law and order, all our efforts fail.’ The attacks on Peshawar and Karachi airports in 2012 and 2014, respectively, compelled Emirates and Etihad Airways to suspend their flights. Only 19 foreign carriers came to Pakistan. Other than the airlines originating from Gulf countries, the only notable carrier was Cathay Pacific. The aviation industry had also been hit by a stagnant growth in passenger traffic of around 16 million domestic and international travellers as deteriorating security undermined all prospects of the allied tourism and hospitality industry. The number of tourists declined due to the law and order situation. After the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009, cricket teams from other countries stopped visiting Pakistan over security concerns, depriving Pakistanis of enjoying international matches of their most favourite sport in Pakistan.

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In seven years, from 2009 to 2016, only the national cricket team of Zimbabwe visited Pakistan to play one-day international matches. Pakistanis rejoiced at playing the matches thoroughly and felt thankful to them. Other countries remained too security-aware, rather apathetically, to play with the Pakistani cricket team, which had won world cups in both one-day and T-20 formats, in Pakistan. Home series were played in Dubai, UAE. Other sports also suffered because of the reluctance of foreign teams and players to visit Pakistan. Pakistan had not been able to host a Davis Cup tie since 2005, before the ITF deemed the country too dangerous, a view still shared by almost every sporting authority in the world. At this crucial time, Pakistan needed support from the international community to discourage terrorists, but unfortunately it did not happen.

Terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear programme With an acceleration in terrorist activities, apprehensions about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal became the centre of debates and discussions. It had been a continued and constant fear of the West that the terrorists might get hold of Pakistan’s nukes. This fear became more pronounced after July 2004 when the Intelligence Bureau’s successful anti-terrorist operation in Gujrat not only resulted in the capture of important Al Qaeda members like Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian national, who carried a $25 million bounty for exploding explosives in the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but also the material seized from his hideout contained a ‘treasure trove’ of information on Al Qaeda (Musharraf, 2007). Among other materials, it included a book titled Gas-Limo Project that presented methods of terrorist attacks such as a plan to attack the subway stations and underground car parks in London or New York with limos filled with compressed gas cylinders that would explode. Time magazine had reported that this 39-page document was believed to have been written by Issa al-Hindi, an Al Qaeda operative captured in Britain in 2004 (Zagorin, 2005). This book also contained a crude plan for preparing a dirty bomb, which strongly indicated that Al Qaeda had a serious desire to prepare something similar to use against the US or later the UK. Although the prospect of terrorist procurement of weapons has haunted the world since at least the late 1960s, when international

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terrorism gained prominence, the surreptitious but palpable presence of Al Qaeda in a nuclear state with a desire to have a nuclear weapon further triggered the fear. However, instead of seriously deliberating over how and from where it could get hold of a nuclear bomb or the enriched uranium, the flurry of statements, issued by different quarters, stemming from crescendoing terrorist activity, created further hype. Seymour Hersh wrote that the principal fear was that extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets or even divert a warhead. He added that although Pakistan ensured strict safeguards as the warheads and their triggers were stored separately from each other, and from their delivery devices, it enhanced the vulnerability during shipment and reassembly. This apprehension was based on contradictory logic as the strict safeguards were termed vulnerable, without actually going through the SOPs. Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Unit at the University of Bradford, UK, also stated, ‘A frontal assault on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event.’ Shaun probably had lesser knowledge than Hersh about the storage system of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The Daily Telegraph of London reported that Pakistani Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy had stated that there was evidence that the Pakistan Army had been infiltrated by ‘extremist elements’. As he stated, ‘We have reason to worry because the most secure installations, bases, and headquarters of the military have been successfully attacked by Islamic militants who have sympathisers within the military.’ A retired Major General of the Pakistan Army termed it a wild guess.8 He emphasised that the Pakistan Army was not ‘so penetrated by extremists’ that any of its officers would think of stealing the bomb. Doubtlessly, there must be some sympathisers of religious extremists, but the discipline in the Pakistan Army was par excellence. He remarked that there was not a single known precedent that any serving soldier defected and joined hands with the terrorists. Similarly, there was no report that even a gun was stolen from the Pakistan Army to be used by the insurgents or ever recovered from them. Secondly, the nuclear arsenal was so well guarded that it could not fall in the hands of a couple of or even a batch of determined thieves. The notion of influence of radical Islamist ideology on Pakistan Army officers

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is refuted by the findings of Professor Anatol Lieven: ‘The military (Pakistani) is tied to Pakistan, not the universal Muslim Ummah of the radical Islamists’ dreams.’ Conversely, an independent observer who taught strategy to Pakistan’s civil servants at Staff College, Lahore, was of the opinion that this threat was not an outright implausibility anymore. He argued that an attack on the General Headquarters of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi and a successful attack on the well-fortified Mehran naval base had shattered the myth of impregnability into the armed forces’ set-ups. Nevertheless, he admitted that safety measures of the nuclear arsenal and programme were many notches up and could not be compared with that of the GHQ and naval base. The probability is quite low. But Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator for CIA and the US Department of Energy, explained that the low probability had to be weighed against the awfulness of the consequences. He was of the view that ‘the odds are stacked against’ terrorists acquiring a nuclear bomb. However, he added that in today’s unpredictable world, ‘a probability-based approach to managing risk’ made less sense than one ‘focused on mitigating threats in descending order of their possible consequences’. The probability factor is not Pakistan-specific. Every nuclear state falls in this category. Nevertheless, three aspects must be taken into consideration to ascertain the seriousness of the threat probability of Pakistani nukes falling to the hands of the terrorists: (1) to identify who are desirous of laying their hands on Pakistani nukes; (2) to assess their strength and penetration that may enable them to accomplish this mission, by which all main terrorist organisations should be subjected to scrutiny and (3) to take stock of the security measures taken by Pakistan to protect its nukes. Before discussing these aspects, it is important to understand that the nuclear programme has a special place in the heart of Pakistanis: There remains a mythical belief in the invincibility of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national survivability. Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971– 77) the country had resolved ‘never again’ to suffer the humiliation as it did in the 1971 war with India.9 It became a symbol of nationalism.

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With this level of attachment of Pakistanis to the nuclear programme, any inkling of threat to the nuclear programme irks and upsets them to the hilt. An apprehension was rampant among the public that a superpower might try to snatch or neutralise Pakistan’s nukes. This perception overshadowed the threat of terrorists trying to steal these nukes. The Pakistan Army did not endorse this public perception openly, but it had always been very conscious about the protection of the nuclear programme from any foreign attack from its very inception. Previously, there had been strong apprehensions of Israeli plans to attack Pakistan’s nuclear plant. This worry had cropped up after Israeli jets attacked the Iraqi nuclear facility. Strangely, the threat from India came later as the army and public had a perception that India lacked the courage and the capability to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facility. However, the apprehension kept lurking in the minds of the public and the army that India might try to get it done with the help of Israel. These threats, perceived and actual, had been a blessing to sensitise Pakistan to ensure foolproof security measures for the protection of its nuclear programme and arsenal. It adopted a multilayered security system for the protection of nukes. Pakistani nuclear doctrine called for the warheads (containing an enriched radioactive core) and their triggers (sophisticated devices containing highly explosive lenses, detonators and krytrons) to be stored separately from each other and from their delivery devices (missiles or aircraft). The goal was to ensure that no one could launch a warhead – in the heat of a showdown with India, for example – without pausing to put it together. Final authority to order a nuclear strike required consensus within Pakistan’s tenmember National Command Authority, with the Chairman – by statute, President of Pakistan – casting the deciding vote. National Command Authority (NCA) was established in 2000 for the command and control of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces and for developing a nuclear policy (Khan, 2011). Hersh (2009) quoted General Musharraf that Pakistan had constructed a nuclear attack-proof huge tunnel system for the transport and storage of nuclear weaponry. Pakistan’s former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid in a statement called Hersh’s statement ‘absurd and plain mischievous’. ‘We have operationalised a very effective nuclear security regime which incorporates very stringent custodial and access controls.’ ‘As overall

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custodian of the development of our strategic programme, I reiterate in very unambiguous terms that there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets.’ According to The New Yorker, the then CIA Director Leon Panetta had once said that the US does not know the location of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, then how could terrorists reach them (The Daily Mail News, 2010). All six nuclear sites in Pakistan were protected by air defence, military, air force, ISI nuclear security division and other supporting civil agencies. ISI and IB conducted complete vetting of all employees working at these sites and in ancillary offices. Especially after the A.Q. Khan’s proliferation fiasco, more elaborate and deeper security clearance and investigation process for all individuals working in sensitive positions or in nuclear facilities became mandatory (Holt & Gray, 2011). Theoretically speaking, two terrorist organisations in Pakistan could be earmarked as threats to Pakistan’s nukes or interested in dirty bombs, that is, Al Qaeda and TTP. But how intense and effective were their desire, plans and potential to achieve this goal needed to be scrutinised thoroughly. As far as TTP was concerned, it had neither shown any desire to gain access to Pakistan nukes nor had any plan come to notice of intelligence agencies to use a nuke or a dirty bomb. TTP was engaged in a tough tussle with the Pakistan Army in Waziristan and had earlier been smashed in Swat. It fought bloody battles with the armed forces and frequently killed/brutally beheaded the soldiers. It had no ideological following as well. Its cruel terrorist activities in urban centres of Pakistan, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and much destruction, made it a symbol of hate. Its penetration into army or other forces was highly unlikely. No doubt, it had potential to be destructive as it demonstrated with attacks on GHQ, Rawalpindi, Mehran naval base, Karachi and Kamra Airbase (16 August 2012). But in all these cases, the attacks were repulsed and assailants could not take away anything or anybody and were neutralised, arrested or killed. Therefore, odds are against TTP’s potential to reach the nukes or the material. The threat further diminished in the absence of any record of its plans to acquire nukes or make a dirty bomb. Al Qaeda had its presence felt in Pakistan. It had a desire and plans to have some sort of dirty bomb or even a nuke. But it had been under

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constant pressure in Pakistan due to army action in tribal areas, intelligence operations in urban centres and the US drone campaign in Waziristan. Resultantly, its command and control structure was severely bruised, especially after the military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ was launched. Earlier, Osama bin Laden’s death had already undermined its effectiveness. Despite the confidence of the US and Pakistan in effective control over Pakistan’s nukes ‘some observers feared a radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathisers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a break-down of controls’ (Kerr & Nikitin, 2011). But it was more of concern in 2007–8 when hugely unpopular General Musharraf’s rule was at fag end and the democratic era was setting in. Transition seemed troublesome. Terrorism was also at its peak. The US Chief of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated on 22 September 2008: To the best of my ability to understand it – and that is with some ability – the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons have not changed. That said, they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I’ve spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that (Kerr & Nikitin, 2011). However, much later on, all significant US quarters, including President Obama, showed confidence in the safety of Pakistan’s nukes. President Obama said he felt ‘confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands’. The then US Department of State spokesperson Mark Toner stated on 9 November 2011 that the US ‘continue[s] to have confidence in the government of Pakistan that they both understand the threat to their nuclear arsenal, the varied threats to their nuclear arsenal, that they’re taking appropriate steps to safeguard them’ (Kerr & Nikitin, 2011).

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Pakistan could handle the security of its nukes but not the perception about the vulnerability of its nuclear arsenal. Media was the arena, which propelled this perception to the level of paranoia. In 2009, when the Swati Taliban fraudulently forged their way into Buner, in Swat, the BBC gave breaking news that Islamabad was only 80 miles away, giving an impression that terrorists could comfortably cruise towards the capital of Pakistan and capture it. It was an entirely unrealistic presentation. In fact, Taliban did not have the capacity and even a plan to fight with the army to make advancement towards Islamabad. It is very clear that the insurgents and terrorists cannot defeat the army to take over Pakistan in a regular war. They are fighting an asymmetrical war. Their objective is to strike at the roots of the country so that it might crumble due to a dilapidated economy, immense social and psychological distress, international isolation and threat to strategic assets. It was a disastrous situation especially when the state response was weak and religious extremism and sectarianism were on the rise. Since 2013, Pakistan has been addressing these aspects very seriously and the civil-military leadership was in agreement to bring a turnaround in the situation. Nuclear safeguards were as stringent and effective as possible; therefore, apprehensions of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists were highly misplaced.

CHAPTER 10 FUTURE OF TTP AND TERRORISM

SPLINTERING OF TTP: THE BEGINNING OF TTP’S END? In 2009– 12, the government of Pakistan and some analysts repeatedly predicted the decline and ultimate death of TTP. The first wave of this misplaced optimism came after Baitullah Mehsud’s death in 2009. It was generally felt that the death of charismatic Baitullah would result in the downfall of TTP. It amounted to underestimating TTP’s resilience and capacity to continue destruction. Conversely, it bounced back with an increasingly violent campaign of attacks across Pakistan in 2009 and 2010. After Baitullah’s death, there was a brief tiff over the issue of leadership. However, Hakimullah Mehsud prevailed and took over the command of the organisation. Initially, he ran TTP effectively and resorted to more brutal and effective actions in FATA and in urban centres as far as Punjab. This effectiveness did not last long. Two drone attacks on Hakimullah injured him and forced him to go underground. It weakened his position, and his grip over the organisation slackened. Consequently, power struggles ensued within it. It caused the splintering of TTP. Some militant sources were of the view that power struggles between rival militant commanders, both for overall control of the TTP and regional leadership, fractured the coordinated command structure created by the charismatic TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud. By 2011, the TTP had not remained a monolithic organisation. It had

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been split in at least two dozen factions operating under the TTP banner, which did not strictly follow Hakimullah Mehsud’s commands (The Nation, 2011). However, these groups followed the TTP ideology based on antiAmericanism, abhorrence for the US ‘war on terror’ (which they construe as a war on Islam) and of course the longing for enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. But each component group within the TTP also had its own specific objectives, priorities and approaches depending on its geographical placement and sectarian ideology. Punjabi TTP, Swati TTP, Waziristani TTP and others operated accordingly. There had been clashes between different groups, primarily to take control of respective areas. Aman (Peace) Lashkars formed with the backing of the army often faced attacks from various TTP groups. For example, Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency, close to Duran Line, remained a place of skirmishes between Aman Lashkar and Lashkar-eIslam (LI) backed by TTP in 2012. Ansar ul Islam (AI), another armed group in the area, sided with Aman Lashkar. LI captured checkposts in Angori Morcha, Bucha, Kala Wuch, Dri Addi, Haidar Kandau and Adam Khel areas. Approximately 23 AI fighters and Aman Lashkar volunteers who were deployed in these posts were killed in these skirmishes. LI lost 45 militants. However, according to official statements, 22 posts were recaptured the very next day (Aziz, 2013). The TTP leader in Kurram, Fazal Saeed, formed his own group named Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami (TTI). He stated that he had differences with the TTP leadership as he wanted them to stop suicide attacks against mosques, markets and other civilian targets (AFP, 2011).1 This reason to quit TTP seemed flawed as he had taken responsibility for the bombing of a Shiʿa neighbourhood in Parachinar that killed 43 civilians (Jamestown, 2012). The plausible reason could be his ambition to form a group of his own, enjoy power and control operational activities. Financial gains and control could be another important reason. Other factions sprung up for similar reasons. Some insiders also thought that TTP had been fragmented and therefore its strength and effectiveness was considerably depleted.2 However, they also admitted that due to army operations in South Waziristan, most of the TTP activists had scattered and relocated to other hideouts in North Waziristan and as far as Chaman, Balochistan.

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Had they learnt lessons from the history of other insurgent and terrorist groups and devised their strategies accordingly to avoid annihilation? There was every possibility of this angle because circumstantial evidence showed that TTP and Al Qaeda ideologues carried out research and engaged into discussions with various well-informed quarters to devise their strategies and tactics. Some splintering could be a strategic move emulating Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) ‘Plan Rebirth’, which it devised in 2008 after realising that it could not succeed in direct confrontations with Colombian security forces. According to this plan, the group retreated to its traditional strongholds, decentralised its leadership and formed into smaller units. It also changed tactics accordingly, relying more on hit-and-run ambushes, improvised explosive devices and small, mobile sniper teams that allowed the guerrillas to strike government forces without engaging them directly in conventional combat (Colby, 2012). In a similar fashion, the Swati TTP had escaped from Swat in the wake of Operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ and started fighting back from across the border. Afghan Taliban had made a strategic retreat from Kabul and other cities after the US attack on Afghanistan and started fighting back, which has continued for years. Strategising under pressure has a cost. TTP’s fragmentation might be its strategy to confuse the army. But the general impression was that it created a dent in its organisational setup and command structure. This impression led many to believe that it was the beginning of the end of TTP and that terrorism might come to an end in a couple of years or so. It is highly unlikely. Rather the scenario seemed the opposite. The year 2012 started with renewed contact and relationships between Al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and TTP. The TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan told the Associated Press that in November and December 2011, meetings were held between the leaders of the trio, in which the senior Al Qaeda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi asked the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud to end their in-fights and give manpower to the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to put up resistance against the American and international forces (The Daily Times, 2012). A pamphlet was distributed in North Waziristan stating that a fivemember committee known as Shura-e-Muraqaba was established in consultation with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It called on

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Pakistani militants to coordinate with each other and ‘avoid unwarranted killings and kidnappings for ransom’. Al-Libi asked the Pakistani militants to provide additional fighters to the Afghan Taliban in March, when the spring fighting season begins. TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan said that the militants agreed, but that did not mean the group would end its fight against the Pakistani government (Roggio, 2012). In its wake, an escalation was witnessed in the terrorist activities, especially in KP areas. A total of 15 soldiers of FC, who were kidnapped, were killed on 4 January 2012. In another incident, 20 people were killed and 30 were injured in a vehicle-based IED (VBIED) attack in the main bazaar of Jamrud, Khyber Agency, on 10 January. 2012.3 On 23 February 2012, a VBIED, packed with about 45 kg high-explosive, went off at Kohat Bus Stand, resulting in 12 deaths and 32 injuries.4 The death of Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the second most important commander of dreaded Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, in a drone attack on 29 May 2013 was one of the hardest blows to TTP after the death of the founder Chief of TTP Baitullah Mehsud.5 It was the prized scalp. The missile fired by the drone had targeted a house in the Chashma Pul area near Miramshah, South Waziristan, which resulted in the death of Waliur Rehman along with five other accomplices including two Uzbek nationals. They had returned from a meeting of the central committee (Majlis-e-Shura) of TTP. Waliur Rehman Mehsud was an astute planner who reportedly masterminded attacks on the Islamabad Marriot Hotel and on CIA setups in Khost, Afghanistan. Logically, the society should have been much relieved about the death of an unrepentant terrorist having a long blood-spattered record of destruction and mayhem. Sadly, there was hardly a whimper of satisfaction by the media and the official quarters. Conversely, a deafening uproar was unleashed on the violation of our territorial sovereignty. This confounding situation remained the deepest dilemma of Pakistan, which has perpetually persisted since 2002. Terrorists had killed about 50,000 citizens, soldiers, policemen, intelligence personnel and paramilitary forces; damaged the economy and shattered the social fabric, but the people have persistently ignored them and stubbornly refused to pin point the enemy. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher and strategist, had emphasised, ‘Know thy enemy’ if you have to win the war. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s policymakers didn’t care a

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fig about this advice. The terrorists were emboldened and energised by the lackadaisical approach of the government. They did not bother to be faceless any more. Their spokespersons addressed the media and claimed responsibilities of militant and terrorist acts. However, the government hesitated to name them and tackle them. Ironically, on the other hand, people reacted in unison against the US drone campaign, which was many decibels higher than that against the terrorist attacks by TTP. TTP threatened to avenge the death of Waliur Rehman. This reaction was obviously on the cards. What else could one expect from a terrorist group whose stalwart had been killed? But it could be a blessing in disguise. The newly elected parties who were to form governments in the Centre and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were stirred to come out of the fanciful world of achieving peace by negotiating with the terrorists. TTP in any case ignored its offer to hold talks for peace, making it easier for the governments to take the other way. America haters were feverishly propelling the conspiracy theory that a US drone killed Waliur Rehman to derail the chances of negotiations with TTP. They argued that Waliur Rehman was pro-negotiations. His death had undermined the chances of talks with TTP. Waliur Rehman’s position and record belied the tiniest chance of this noble gesture from him. He carried a bounty of Rs 50 million on his head announced by the government of Pakistan and also a $5 million reward from the US, which had listed him as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’. He was closely associated with the Haqqani network that operated in Afghanistan. It had been a source of rift between Pakistan and the US in 2011, due to its devastating attacks on the US and NATO forces. His death created further schisms in an already splintered TTP as there were unconfirmed reports of suspicion on Hakimullah Mehsud’s men to have leaked intelligence to facilitate the attack on Waliur Rehman. Some quarters were of the view that Hakimullah Mehsud was not pleased with his proximity with the Haqqani group, which gave him greater influence on Afghan Taliban and granted him more respect in all the groups (The News International, 2013). In 2013, the death of Hakimullah Mehsud was again viewed as a threat to the control and command of TTP. Rather they not only overcame the empty space created by Hakimullah’s death but also chose an equally fierce Amir, namely Maulvi Fazlullah from Swat. It was a

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masterstroke by TTP to have chosen an Amir who had the contacts and experience to use the strategic depth of Afghanistan to fall back in safety and fight back at will. Nevertheless, in subsequent years, the military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ created a substantial dent in the TTP rank and file. It seemed to be meeting the benchmark of weakening the terrorist group, as pointed out by Schmid (2011), that once ‘terrorist groups fail to increase the number of civilian and security personnel fatalities in their attacks, or realise a decline in their ability to raise funds, inability to secure a safe haven for their headquarters or a corresponding increase in terrorist fatalities (including defections among leaders and members and the arrest, death or loss of a group’s charismatic leader) weakening is detectable’.

WOULD TTP DIE AFTER THE US DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN? The causes and processes of birth or inception are always distinctly different from those of death or end, whether of a man, an organisation or a nation. Some optimists thought that the TTP activities in Pakistan and its tribal areas would come to a halt after the US and NATO forces left Afghanistan. Their argument was that the TTP rose in reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan and later on to protect the Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in FATA against the Pakistan forces. Therefore, it would evaporate once the situation changed. It was a grossly overstated hope. TTP emulates Afghan Taliban in strategy and approach. As the morale of Afghan Taliban soared after the departure of a major chunk of the US and allied forces from Afghanistan, TTP’s morale also swelled as it took cue from Afghan Taliban’s strategy and approaches. TTP and the terrorist groups operating under its banner seem determined to continue to enjoy power and writ over their jurisdiction. They would keep their arms up and exert harder for their writ. Their focus has shifted to the demand for enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. Waliur Rehman, Deputy Commander of TTP, Mehsud Group, had stated that the main objective of their jihad was imposition of ‘Sharia’ in Pakistan and they would keep fighting until the Islamic Caliphate was established.6 Later, the former TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan said, ‘Our fight with the Pakistani government would continue till the

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implementation of Shariah.’ Similarly, Maulvi Fazlullah of Swat, Chief of TTP, made it clear that he would extend his writ across Pakistan. It is a matter of grave concern that religio-political parties of Pakistan have the same objective, that is, to strive for imposition of Sharia in Pakistan. Axiomatically, both have sympathy for each other and in many ways they support each other. TTP’s terrorist activities decreased in urban areas after Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’, but did not come to a halt, rather the lethality increased. There is strong apprehension that their surreptitious ingress in these areas might increase through their ever-increasing sympathisers, supporters and sleeper agents. They would acquire the capability to strike as and when required. Whenever the government would slacken the control in FATA, TTP would enhance its ingress, especially in North and South Waziristan. After stabilising themselves in their home ground, they would expand their activities to the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The impact would be felt across Pakistan, where the likeminded and the linked religious extremists, many of them members and activists of religio-political parties, would take a cue and press harder for their share in the government and to compel to adopt their style of Islam in Pakistan. The Pakistan government, its agencies and public have a tendency to play down the seriousness of threats as soon the frequency of terrorist acts diminishes. They should learn the lesson from the tenacity of the US, which kept its guard up and showed no slackness in protective measures; therefore, hardly any notable terrorist incident took place after the 9/11 attack. Furthermore, it continued to make the security procedures and processes more stringent and effective. For example, although the Obama administration claimed to be close to defeating Al Qaeda, the size of the government’s secret list of suspected terrorists banned from flying to or within the US more than doubled in 2011. The no-fly list jumped from about 10,000 known or suspected terrorists in 2010 to about 21,000 by the end of 2011 (Sullivan, 2012). Pakistan needed to follow this hardline and systematic approach to counter terrorism. Usually, counter-terrorism (CT) measures targeted specifically the leadership, including arrests, assassinations as well as efforts to disrupt communications and to force the leaders into long-term inactivity and bear important influence on the terrorist organisation (Gutfraind, 2009).

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The efforts in this direction were dismally erratic and ineffective in Pakistan’s strategy. Despite successful military operation in Swat, the dreaded Maulvi Fazlullah could not be captured or killed and resultantly he became a menace operating from across the border. Similarly, Baitullah Mehsud, the founder and TTP Chief was not killed by the Pakistani forces, and ultimately, the US drone attack eliminated him. Further, the US drone twice hit Hakimullah Mehsud, the next TTP Chief in 2012, but he escaped and kept controlling the organisation for almost 2 years until he was eliminated in a drone attack in November 2013. The absence of CT strategy and persistent lack of coordinated and coherent counter-terrorism measures had been enabling the terrorists. This was a grave threat to Pakistan, where not only valuable lives were perishing cheaply at the hands of terrorists, but social and economic fabrics were disrupted and destroyed by them with the help of their supporters and sympathisers operating in urban centres across Pakistan. While Pakistan was still grappling with this scourge, another group started spreading in many parts of the country. Footprints of the dreaded Islamic State (IS), also known by the acronym Daish, became visible, which attracted the religious extremists and some groups of TTP who joined it. Hafiz Saeed, TTP leader in Orakzai Agency of FATA, became the head of IS in Pakistan. In October 2014, six top commanders of TTP, including its now defunct spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid, announced their allegiance to IS’s caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al Qureshi AlHussaini. The Taliban spokesperson said that he, along with TTP chief for Orakzai Agency Saeed Khan, TTP chief for Kurram Agency Daulat Khan, TTP’s Khyber Agency chief Fateh Gul Zaman, TTP’s Peshawar chief Mufti Hassan and TTP’s Hangu chief Khalid Mansoor, announced their allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (Dawn, 2014). In October 2014, the provincial government of Balochistan had conveyed a confidential report to the federal government and law enforcement agencies warning of increased footprints of IS in Pakistan. According to this report, IS claimed to have recruited a huge 10 – 12,000 followers from the Hangu and Kurram Agency tribal areas. It was a highly exaggerated number. The presence of IS was also evident in cities through wall chalkings and the distribution of literature. Locally published Urdu literature of IS was distributed in a number of cities including Lahore, Karachi, Khanewal and Peshawar (Dawn, 2014).

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In subsequent years, Pakistan’s security agencies killed IS activists in Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Karachi and so on. Security experts were of the opinion that the threat from IS could mature into a reality if they succeeded in aligning themselves with the splinter groups of mainstream militants, including the TTP. This process was already taking place. The terrorist attack on Civil Hospital, Quetta, in August 2016, in which more than 70 people died and more than 100 people were injured, was believed to be the handiwork of IS and TTP. The state was taking time to respond to this new challenge as it was in a state of denial as usual. If the Pakistan security and intelligence forces did not respond to the emerging menace, it could be another major threat not only to Pakistan but also to the region. The killing of TTP chiefs and its splintering could not be construed as the demise of TTP. Rather splintering suited to its survival as it became confusing for the intelligence agencies and LEAs to tackle more than 40 groups, all operating under the umbrella of TTP. Although the public reaction after the terrorist attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, spurred the armed forces to annihilate the terrorists completely, the hydra could not be decimated to its final end. It did create a palpable dent in the command and control structure of the insurgents. But its leadership went into hiding along with a large number of fighters, using the strategic depth of Afghanistan, with the aim to fight back at the right time. They emulated the Afghan Taliban strategy against the US and Allied forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, the rollback of US forces from Afghanistan did not have diminishing effect on TTP’s activities. Rather it got a better shelter in Afghanistan. All the facts and factors indicate that the demise of TTP and the end of terrorism might not happen any time soon.

CONCLUSION

The basic objective of this study was to explore whether terrorism in Pakistan, especially carried out by TTP, was a grave threat to the stability of Pakistan or not. After the catastrophic incident of 9/11, the US was not ready to take any chances with Al Qaeda that regrouped in FATA and kept planning further attacks on it. Its indigenous helper TTP caused immense damage to Pakistan’s serenity, stability, economy, foreign relations and social fabric. The Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces were successful in dismantling the control and command structure of the terrorists in Swat in 2009 and in FATA as late as 2014. But this success could be considered partial as the higher echelon of TTP Swat fled away from the area and regrouped across the border. It carried out several attacks inside Pakistan. The terrorists in FATA had been showing tough resistance. Their terrorist activities continued for almost a decade. The damage done to Pakistan was colossal. More than 65,000 people were killed until 2017. It caused a considerable dent to the economy and social fabric of the country. Religious extremism and sectarianism remained rampant across the country, which created a conducive atmosphere for the terrorists to flourish and expand their activities. The government could not counter them due to various reasons, including lack of political will and lack of ability. The military actions in FATA had been insipid, and a national counter-terrorism strategy was not formulated. The campaign against TTP and Al Qaeda faced several glitches because the inception and the COIN campaign needed much more than military action. However, substantial focus of the Pakistan government and the army on curbing the militants paid dividends whenever it was

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done with sincerity and strength. There was a visible decrease in the insurgency in Swat after the successful military operation in Swat in 2009. However, most of the TTP leadership could not be neutralised and annihilated. They had not given up the resolve to strike back. The follow-up stage was therefore crucial. The insurgents had the capacity and history to regroup and resume their activities afresh. Operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’, the longest and most serious military operation against TTP and affiliates in North Waziristan, caused considerable damage to insurgents, but their terrorist activities in urban centres did not come to a halt, although the frequency decreased substantially. To achieve sustainable success, the government of Pakistan should have devised a comprehensive and transparent counter-terrorism policy to bring about coherence among the intelligence agencies and LEAs. It could have given a direction to concerted efforts of all agencies and quarters. The civilian agencies and police could not get a clue due to directionlessness. The National Action Plan 2014 filled this gap of directionlessness to some extent. But its 20 points were a tall order, which needed to be prioritised and strategised in order to handle the same with the capacity of the agencies and departments for achieving the desired results. Additionally, a mechanism should be evolved to evaluate and monitor progress on the National Action Plan. The public was fed up of terrorism and violence and wanted the government to take action against the terrorists and extremists. Furthermore, there was an urgent need to ensure amelioration under the socio-economic conditions of FATA as part of overall policy of emphasis on education, health and employment. FATA reforms and its merger in the KP province are necessary to bring the populace of this area to the mainstream so that they could enjoy the benefits available to other people of Pakistan. The majority of the people migrated from FATA to bigger cities such as Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. The measures taken after the harrowing terrorist attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, on 16 December 2014 mitigated the severity of the situation, but total resolution remained a far cry. The terrorists were resilient, resourceful and quick to change their form and position to survive. The main leadership of TTP started operating from the border areas of Afghanistan. Their demands and form kept changing maliciously in order to keep their writ intact and to gradually expand it across the country. Moreover, the security situation and instability in

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Afghanistan had direct bearing on the security situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Brynjar & Katja, 2000). There was a palpable apprehension that the TTP could gain strength after the withdrawal of international and US forces from Afghanistan in 2014. As Al Qaeda had been neutralised to a large extent, mainly through the US drone campaign, the US interest in supporting Pakistan to tackle TTP and its affiliates started petering out. It adversely affected Pakistan’s capacity to fight against the insurgents and terrorists for a long time. In a nutshell, TTP and its affiliates, operating in an environment of widespread militancy, religious extremism and sectarianism throughout the country, especially in FATA, and their leadership and a large number of militants hiding safely in Afghanistan, would remain a grave threat to the stability of Pakistan. Pakistan will have to go all out in a sustained and strong manner to remove extremism and terrorism without any latitude to any such group for any purpose. More importantly, to strangulate popular support to them, the religious elements dabbling in politics should be encouraged to join the mainstream national political parties instead of forming religio-political parties. The process of fencing the Pak– Afghan border must be completed as early as possible so that TTP militants could not sneak into Pakistan to spread terrorism. This fence will also save Pakistan from the spillover of violence and instability in Afghanistan, which might continue for decades.

APPENDIX DIRECTORY OF TTP LEADERS/ PROMINENT MEMBERS

The military operations in the last 13 years have often been interlaced with intermittent peace deals with different groups of Taliban operating in the tribal areas. Military offensives and peace deals are part of counterinsurgency campaigns in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The following table shows the chronology of military operations and peace deals.

Baitullah Mehsud

Hakimullah Mehsud

1.

2.

Founder and Chief of TTP. Killed in drone attack in August 2009. Hakimullah Mehsud (34 at the time of his death) was the Amir, or leader, of TTP from August 2009 to November 2013. He was appointed Amir after his predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a US airstrike in August 2009. He hailed from Dehra village of Kotkal, South Waziristan. He belonged to the Ishangi, a sub-tribe of Mehsuds. Prior to leading the TTP, Hakimullah was TTP regional commander, controlling the Orakzai Agency in 2007 and later operating in Lower Kurram Valley. Hakimullah Mehsud was also the cousin of Qari Hussein, the top suicide-bomb facilitator for the TTP. He was killed in a US drone attack at Danda Darpa Khel near Miramshah on 1 November 2013. He was the most wanted militant in Pakistan with a $5 million US bounty on his head.

Status

TTP Leaders/Prominent Members

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Hakimullah is close to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, as well as to the constellation of Pakistani jihadist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammed. He [had] close links with the banned anti-Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its militant wing Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Affiliation Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai Agency. Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai Agencies.

Whereabouts

He was considered an able, tough and ruthless militant commander. He was responsible for the series of raids against US military supply convoys moving through Peshawar in 2007 and 2008. It was in Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai that he played an independent role and used the power of the media to get himself recognised as the new top leader of the Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP). It was Hakimullah who disrupted the NATO fuel supply lines in Khyber and Peshawar and took responsibility for destroying more than 600 NATO vehicles and containers (The News [Islamabad], September 1 [2009]). Hakimullah Mehsud [was] believed to be behind all the major suicide attacks in Pakistan and also blamed for killing Shia Muslims in Orakzai and Kurram Agencies. He was targeted by drone missiles in 2011 and January 2012

Further details

5.

4.

3.

Qari Hussain Mehsud was Hakimullah Mehsud’s deputy. He was considered the master trainer of suicide bombers and an expert bomb maker. He was killed in a drone attack. He ran suicide training camps for children in Spinkai, South Waziristan. Azam Tariq Azam Tariq was the top spokesperson for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. He was appointed as Hakimullah’s spokesperson in August 2009 after Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a US airstrike in South Waziristan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur Hafiz Gul Bahadur is the senior Taliban leader in North Waziristan and one of the most prominent commanders in Pakistan.

Qari Hussain Mehsud

Tariq appeared on a Taliban tape in May 2010 threatening further attacks on the US.

He is not aligned with TTP, but does maintain close ties to the group. He is a direct descendant of Mirza Ali Khan. Bahadar is considered by the Pakistani establishment a ‘pro-government Taliban’ leader. Al Qaeda and allied Pakistani and Central Asian jihadi groups shelter in Bahadar’s tribal areas and run training camps and safe houses in the region.

Spinkai, South Waziristan.

South Waziristan.

North Waziristan.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Bahadar chairs the North Waziristan Shura, or executive council.

but escaped. However, he was seriously injured. He was considered a candidate to take over the Pakistani Taliban in the event of Hakimullah’s death.

Siraj Haqqani

Sadiq Noor

Waliur Rehman Mehsud

6.

7.

8.

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued

Waliur Rehman Mehsud rose to the rank of Deputy Chief of TTP after 2009. He was killed by a US drone attack on 29 May 2013.

Sadiq Noor is a top Taliban commander in the Mir Ali region.

North Waziristan.

Whereabouts

Further details

Siraj is a member of Al Qaeda’s Shura Majlis, or top council, and he also leads the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Regional Military Shura, one of four military commands for Afghanistan. He works carefully to shield his influence from the media, however, and portrays himself as a regional commander in the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda Abu Kasha al-Iraqi, and the North Waziristan Mir Noor is not a member of the Ali region. Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Uzbek factions (the Islamic Jihad Noor is closely allied with Al Qaeda, Union and the Islamic Movement of particularly Abu Kasha al-Iraqi, and Uzbekistan). the Uzbek factions (the Islamic Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). South Waziristan. The missile fired by the drone had targeted a house in Chashma Pul area near Miramshah, South Waziristan, which resulted in the death of Waliur Rehman along with five other accomplices including two Uzbek nationals. They had returned from a

Affiliation

Haqqani Network Al Qaeda’s Shura Siraj Haqqani is the military commander of the Haqqani Network, Majlis Afghan Taliban’s Quetta a powerful and deadly faction of the Regional Military Shura. Afghan Taliban. Siraj is essentially the top Taliban leader in all of Pakistan.

Status

meeting of central committee (Majlise-Shura) of TTP. Waliur Rehman Mehsud was responsible for brutal deaths of hundreds of innocent Pakistanis and scores of soldiers. According to sources, he was responsible for fund collections for TTP through bank robberies and kidnappings. He was an astute planner who reportedly masterminded attacks on Islamabad Marriot Hotel and on CIA setups in Khost, Afghanistan. He was considered a possible successor to Hakimullah. He appeared in a video with Hakimullah and Ehsanullah Ehsan in December 2012. He carried a bounty of Rs 50 million on his head announced by the government of Pakistan as well as $5 million reward from the US, which had enlisted him as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’. He was closely associated with the Haqqani network that operates in Afghanistan.

Khan Said, alias Sajna

10. Mullah Nazir

9.

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued Affiliation

Mullah Nazir was a Taliban leader in TTP. He was closely allied to the Waziri areas of South Waziristan. Mullah Bahadar. He led Taliban militants belonging to the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe inhabiting Wana, Shakai, Azam Warsak and Angoor Adda areas. He was killed

He became deputy chief of TTP after TTP. He was close aide of the death of Waliur Rehman in 2013. Waliur Rehman. However, he was removed by Hakimullah Mehsud arbitrarily after a few months. He was appointed TTP Chief after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in a drone attack on 1 November 2013. Sajna was killed by a US drone attack on 8 February 2018.

Status

Further details

He was resident of Shobikhel area of South Waziristan.

After Waliur Rehman’s death on 29 May 2013, he was appointed Deputy Amir of TTP and commander of the South Waziristan Chapter, which was being held by Waliur Rehman. Sajna had no basic education, conventional or religious, but he was battle-hardened and was considered to be a pragmatic operative. He had been involved in fighting against the US-led Allied Forces in Afghanistan. However, in September 2013, he was replaced by Hakimullah Mehsud over differences over the issues of talks with the Pakistan government and mismanagement of TTP funds. Waziri areas of South Nazir was not a member of the TTP. Waziristan. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services considered Nazir and his followers ‘good Taliban’ as they did not openly seek the overthrow of the Pakistani state. He had signed a peace

Whereabouts

11. Bahawal Khan, alias Salahuddin Ayubi

He was appointed head of Maulvi Nazir Group after his death in drone attack on 2 January 2012. He too belongs to Kakakhel tribe of Ahmadzai tribe. Belongs to Speen village, located 20 km east of Wana.

along with his five sub-commanders in a drone attack in Sra Kanda village in South Waziristan on 2 January 2012. He was 38 years old. He belonged to the Kakakhel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe. His namaz-ejanaza (funeral prayer) was held at Azam Warsak, 12 km west of Wana and was buried in Zari Noor village graveyard.

TTP. Maulvi Nazir Group.

accord with the government in 2007 and pledged not to fight against Pakistani forces. But he did not like to be termed as a pro-government Taliban commander. Nazir openly supported Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden and waged jihad in Afghanistan. More senior Al Qaeda leaders had been killed in Nazir’s tribal areas during the US air campaign than in those of any other Taliban leader in Pakistan. He was quite close to Maulvi Nazir and had been involved in ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan for a long period. All companions of Maulvi Nazir agreed to nominate him as the successor of Maulvi Nazir instead of Qari Zia ur Rehman. Salahuddin initially refused to become the Commander but agreed when all elders and militant commanders insisted that he should become the commander. He declared that he would continue the mission of his late friend, Maulvi Nazir. He is known to be a hardline commander.

12. Omar Khalid

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued Affiliation

Omar Khalid is the Amir of TTP in TTP Mohmand Agency. He is senior deputy of Hakimullah Mehsud and is considered one of the most effective and powerful leaders in the tribal areas. He is also allied with Commander Ziaur Rehman, a TTP and Al Qaeda leader who operates in tribal agencies of Mohmand and Bajaur as well as in Afghanistan’s provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.

Status

Mohmand Agency.

Whereabouts

He is brave and well trained but harsh and inflexible. He is even against playing cricket and football and listening to music. He considers these activities against Shariah. He wants all males to wear caps in public. In 2007, he had supported Maulvi Nazir in flushing out Uzbeks from Wana and Shakai. Khalid gained prominence in Mohmand during the summer of 2007 after taking over a famous shrine and renaming it the Red Mosque, after the radical mosque in Islamabad. In July 2008, Khalid became the dominant Taliban commander in Mohmand after defeating the Shah Sahib group, a rival pro-Taliban terror group with ties to the Lashkar-e-Taiba. He allegedly carried out attack on Qazi Hussain Ahmed, former Amir of JI in Mohmand tribal agency on 19 November 2012.

Further details

Bajaur Agency.

Faqir Muhammad is the leader of TTP TTP in Bajaur and serves as Hakimullah’s second in command.

Qari Zia Rahman is deputy of Maulvi TTP. Maulvi Nazir group. Al Qaeda. Nazir. Operates in Pakistan’s Mohmand and Bajaur tribal agencies as well as in Afghanistan’s Nuristan and Kunar provinces.

14. Faqir Mohammad

15. Qari Zia Rahman

His forces successfully faced the Pakistan Army in Bajaur in two offensives in 2008 and fought the military to a stalemate in 2009 and 2010. He is a close ally to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bajaur serves as an Al Qaeda command and control centre for operations in northeastern Afghanistan. The mainstream TTP is led by Maulana Faqir Muhammad, a former leader of the banned Islamic group Tehreek Nifaz Shariat-iMohammadi (TNSM). He is closely allied with Faqir Pakistan’s Bajaur tribal agency as well Muhammad and Osama bin Laden. Rahman’s fighters are from Chechnya, as in Afghanistan’s Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Nuristan and Kunar provinces. Afghanistan and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in Al Qaeda’s paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar-e-Zil (LeZ), which was previously led by Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, who was killed in a US drone attack in July 2011.

Mohmand Agency.

TTP Qari Shakeel is a top lieutenant to Omar Khalid in the Mohmand tribal agency.

13. Qari Shakeel

Waliur Rahman is a deputy military commander to Faqir Muhammad.

Status

17. Maulana Maulana Mohammad Jamal is a Mohammad Jamal powerful commander who reportedly replaced Faqir as the leader of the Bajaur Taliban.

16. Waliur Rahman

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued

Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan Jaish-e-Islami Pakistan.

Affiliation

He leads a Taliban sub-group called the Jaish-e-Islami Pakistan, or the Army of Islam in Pakistan. He has led negotiations between the Taliban and the tribes. The Jaish-e-Islami, which parted ways with the TTP in 2008 but now appears to have mended its ties with the TTP in a desperate bid to resist the Pakistan Army’s military operation. Led by Waliur Rahman (alias Raihan), the group consists of militants hailing from the Bajaur village of Damadola. Damadola enjoys special status with the Islamist movement in Bajaur. Another important figure in the group, which used to have several hundred fighters before the military operation in August 2008, is Maulana Ismail. Maulana Mohammad Jamal is a powerful commander who reportedly replaced Faqir as the leader of the Bajaur Taliban after Faqir did not oppose a military advance into Bajaur.

Bajaur Agency.

Bajaur Agency.

Further details

Whereabouts

Maulvi Noor Jamal is the leader of the Movement of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan. in Kurram.

21. Mufti Ilyas

Mufti Ilyas commands Taliban forces TTP in Darra Adam Khel and is a deputy to Hakimullah Mehsud.

Movement of the 19. Fazal Saeed Utezai Fazal Saeed Utezai is a deputy to Hakimullah and leads Taliban fighters Taliban in Pakistan. in the Kurram tribal agency. TTP 20. Akhunzad a Aslam Akhunzada Aslam Farooqui is the Farooqui leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in the Arakzai tribal agency.

18. Maulvi Noor Jamal

Jamal was said to have been chosen by the Bajaur Taliban shura, and a commander known as Burhanuddin was chosen as his deputy. The report is unconfirmed, however, and all indications are that Faqir still leads the Bajaur Taliban. Kurram Agency. Jamal, who is also known as Maulvi Toofan, is considered a ruthless and bloodthirsty commander. He is at the forefront of the sectarian war against the Shia population in Kurram. Kurram Agency. His forces have been behind some of the worst sectarian violence against the Shia tribes. Arakzai tribal agency. Farooqui took control of the Taliban after Hakimullah Mehsud was promoted to lead the entire Taliban movement in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in the north-west. Farooqui was described as the ‘patron-in-chief’ of the Taliban in Arakzai and a ‘close friend of Mullah Mohammad Omar’ back in 2001. Arakzai Darra Adam He formed a group that is assigned to Khel. assassinate Shia leaders.

Status

Affiliation

TTP 22. Commander Tariq Commander Tariq Afridi was the Afridi leader of TTP in Khyber, as well as in regions of Peshawar, Kohat and Hangu. Afridi was also the leader of the Commander Tariq Afridi Group.

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued

Khyber, as well as in regions of Peshawar, Kohat and Hangu.

Whereabouts

Afridi was named the terror group’s commander of Khyber in November 2009. Commander Tariq Afridi Group is considered the most powerful terror group in Arakzai, and is based in Darra Adam Khel. The Tariq Afridi Group also conducts attacks on Pakistani security forces in Arakzai, Kohat and Hangu. His fighters were responsible for closing down the Kohat Tunnel twice in 2008. In early 2009, the Commander Tariq Afridi Group claimed the murder and beheading of Polish geologist Piotr Stanczak. In early 2010, operating under the guise of an outfit named the ‘Asian Tigers’, the group was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of former ISI officer and jihadist sympathiser Khalid Khawaja.

Further details

Swat.

Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

24. Ibin Amin

Ibin Amin is Fazlullah’s military commander.

Swat.

23. Maulana Fazlullah Maulana Fazlullah is the leader of the TTP Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in Swat.

Fazlullah led the Taliban takeover of Swat in 2007 and fought the Pakistani army to a standstill in 2007, 2008 and 2009, when he forced the government into a humiliating peace agreement that essentially ceded much of northwestern Pakistan to the Taliban. His father-in-law is Sufi Muhammad, the leader of the radical TNSM, or the Movement for the Enforcement of Mohammed’s Law. Fazlullah overreached in early 2009 when his forces advanced into the district of Buner, just 60 miles from Islamabad, and threatened neighbouring districts. The military launched a major offensive and ousted Fazlullah’s forces, but the Taliban have since returned and waged a low-level insurgency. Ibin Amin is Fazlullah’s military commander and the leader of the Tora Bora Brigade, a unit in Al Qaeda’s paramilitary Shadow Army. He led the invasion of Buner.

26. Kamran Mustafa Hijrat, (alias Muhamm ad Yahya Hijrat)

25. Moman Khan

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued Affiliation

He was the top TTP commander in the Khyber Agency. Hijrat was a deputy to Hakimullah Mehsud.

Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Movement of the Moman Khan is the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan. in Mansehra.

Status

Khyber Agency.

Manshera.

Whereabouts

Khan previously claimed to have been commander of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, an anti-Shia terror group that has been co-opted by Al Qaeda and has conducted numerous attacks inside Pakistan, but he has since said he no longer works with the group. Khan is said to have been behind recent threats and attacks against non-governmental organisations in neighbouring Abbottabad. During the spring of 2009, the Taliban entered Mansehra in force, establishing a base and a training camp there in April of that year. The move took place while the Pakistani military was launching an offensive in Swat Valley to depose the Taliban led by Maulana Fazlullah. Hijrat was a deputy to Hakimullah Mehsud and was reportedly responsible for attacks on trucks carrying supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Hijrat is an Afghan by

Further details

27. Ehsanullah Ehsan

Spokesperson of TTP.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Khyber Agency.

birth and was a small-time Afghan Taliban commander before making it big as a member of the Pakistani TTP. His deputy, Rahmanullah, also an Afghan national, took over as acting commander of TTP for Khyber Agency after Hijrat was arrested in Peshawar’s Hayatabad town in late 2008 and is now in the custody of Pakistan’s security services (The News International, 10 December 2008). He usually claimed responsibility of attacks by TTP and interacted with selected media through phone from unidentified place or emails. In December 2012, he appeared in a video with Hakimullah Mehsud and Walliur Rehman. Details of his modus operandi are given in Chapter 4 sub-heading ‘Claiming Responsibility’.He was fired from his post in June 2013 and was replaced by Shahidullah Shahid.

Bajaur.

Before the army’s campaign in Bajaur, Karwan-e-Niamatullah Tehreeke-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). the Karwan-e-Niamatullah was considered one of the most powerful groups in Bajaur, led by Haji Niamatullah of the Salarzai area.

29. Haji Niamatullah

Whereabouts Bajaur.

Affiliation

Ismail (who is not a qualified doctor) Teheeik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). is another powerful commander in Bajaur. He was affiliated earlier with Pakistan’s biggest religious-political party, the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam- Fazl (JUI-F) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who had recently declared that the government has no writ in any part of the NWFP (The Daily Times, 20 February).

Status

28. Ismail

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued

Ismail once employed the services of a few hundred fighters until the military struck in Bajaur and pushed his group out of their strongholds. Two young sons of Ismail were killed in Afghanistan. The TTP considers him and his supporters as part of the organisation, but Ismail is against the TTP’s policy of fighting against Pakistan’s armed forces. Instead, he wants the Pakistani Taliban and other militants to concentrate on fighting the US-led coalition forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. The group stuck with the TTP despite having some differences with its policies. At its height, the group had several thousand fighters. It suffered losses when tribesmen from the Salarzai area formed a tribal lashkar (an armed force usually raised with a specific objective), with support from the government and under the leadership of their tribal chiefs.

Further details

30. Mangal Bagh

Lashkar-e-Islam. Head of Taliban- styled Lashkar-eIslam (LI) militant outfit. He belongs to Sipah sub-tribe of Afridi tribe. He enjoys his support base with Sipah and Shalobar tribes. He was reportedly killed in a suicide attack on a mosque in Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency on 2 March 2012. TTP Khyber Agency claimed the responsibility of this attack.

Khyber Agency.

The lashkar started chasing out the militants, who retaliated with suicide bombings, one of which killed scores of their armed rivals, including some tribal elders (Newsline [Karachi], October 2008). The Karwan-iNiamatullah established its own Shari’a court in Pashat, the main town of the Salarzai area, but the group has since been uprooted from there. The LI styles itself as a puritanical militant group, which vows to remove vices from Khyber Agency, such as dens of criminals, drugs and smuggling of weapons. It was established in the Bara area of the Agency, which is inhabited by the Sipah sub-tribe, which is the smallest of the Afridi sub-tribes. Bagh regularly runs an FM radio channel in Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency, through which he delivers regular sermons to local Afridi tribesmen. The LI spokesperson, Muhammad Hussain, issued a denial on 9 March 2012, saying Mangal Bagh was not present on the site, and therefore was alive and well.

32. Asmatullah Muavia

31. Maulvi Abu Bakr

S. Name of the no. leader

Table A.1 Continued Affiliation

A TTP spokesperson announced death TTP of Maulvi Dadullah by a US drone attack and accension of Maulvi Abu Bakr as acting head of TTP-Bajaur in August 2012 (Source: The Express Tribune). Chief of the TTP Punjab Chapter. TTP

Status

DG Khan. Based in Afghanistan. Relocated in FATA after 2014.

Bajaur Agency.

Whereabouts

He started his jihadi career from the platform of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). He then joined the ranks of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and later launched Junood-e-Hafsa before becoming the Amir of the Punjabi Taliban. Muavia had launched Junood-e-Hafsa (the union of the Jamia Hafsa) to avenge the killing of Maulana Abdur Rasheed Ghazi and

Interestingly, Inspector General of Police of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province announced in a media briefing on 19 March 2012 that Mangal Bagh was killed in a skirmish with Pakistani security forces. LI’s spokesperson was quick to reject the claim, saying Mangal Bagh was alive.

Further details

Spokesperson of Ansar-ul Islam.

Source: The Long War Journal (2009).2

33. Saadat

Khyber Agency.

his followers in the July 2007 military operation against the fanatical clerics of the Lal Masjid in the heart of Islamabad. He developed differences and estrangementwith TTP central over unilaterally welcoming the talk offer of the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in August 2013. TTP central announced to evict him from their ranks for commenting without the approval of the high command, i.e. Hakimullah Mehsud. Mouavia retorted that he was not under their command. On 28 August 2013, TTP militants raided the Markaz (Centre) residence and some other hideouts of Asmatullah, but he had already gone underground due to expected reprisal of TTP.1 In 2014, in the wake of military operation Zarb-e-Azb, Asmatullah announced to call off armed struggle in Pakistan (DAWN, 13 September 2014).

1 Enduring Freedom Against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 2 Anaconda Against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 3 Kazha Punga Kazha Punga, NW 4 Battle of Wana, SW Wana 5 Kalosha II Kalosha, Wana, NW 6 Al-Mizan Shakai, Wana

Location

Military operations

Military operation name

Table A.2

June 2002 16 –23 March 2004 12 –26 March 2004 11 –13 June 2004

1– 18 March 2002

September 2001 –2

Date

April 2004 February 2005 5 September 2006 September 2006

Sararogha Peace Deal North Waziristan Accord Peace deal with Gul Bahadur

_

–

Shakai Accord

–

Peace deal

Date when peace deal brokered on

Operation Silence in Lal Masjid in 2007 ended the two peace deals

Pakistan forces indecisive victory

Pakistan was part of the US operation

Pakistan participated in the US operation

Result/remarks

Swat

Swat

Bajaur, Tang Khata, KP

9 Rah-e-Haq-II

10 Rah-e-Haq-III

11 Operation Sherdil

12 Sirat-i-Mustaqeem Khyber

Swat

Mir Ali

7 Battle of Mir Ali 8 Rah-e-Haq-I

Covert peace deal with Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur

28 June 2008 to Unwritten July 2008 agreement with Lashkar-eIslam in Khyber/ Bara peace deal

7 August 2008 to 26 September 2008. 28 February 2009

January 2009

7–10 October 2007 25 October 2007 to 8 December 2007 July 2008 Swat Agreement

11 July 2008

August 2008

21 May 2008

Ceasefire and military stalemate Launched in Shangla Hills and Swat Valley against TNSM Second phase of the operation launched to take Shangla Hills FC helped four army infantry brigades to secure main supply lines and consolidate Swat District Jointly launched with FC in Bajaur Agency. Widely considered an operational success but ended with a peace deal with Faqir Muhammad Launched against Lashkar-eIslam (LI) led by Mangal Bagh

Buner, Lower Dir, Swat, Shangla Districts Swat, KP

SW, FATA

Orakzai Agency and Kurram Agency

14 Black Thunderstorm

16 Rah-e-Nijat

17 Kawakh Ba De Sham (I’ll teach you a lesson)

15 Rah-e-Rast

Spinkai, SW

Location

13 Operation Zalzala

Military operation name

Table A.2 Continued

In Kurram: Sept 2009 to 3 June 2010

19 June 2009 to 12 December 2009

16 May 2009 to 15 July 2009

24 January 2008 to 20 May 2008 26 April 2009 to 14 June 2009

Date

Peace deal

Date when peace deal brokered on

Main objective was to kill or capture Qari Hussain Aimed to retake Buner, Lower Dir, Shangla District from Taliban Commonly known as the Swat operation to regain Buner, some 100 km from Islamabad from Taliban’s control. Fazlullah fled to Afghanistan, but senior commanders were killed Launched in SW in the bastion of Mehsud tribe from which TTP leadership was derived at that time

Result/remarks

Source: Dawn, News International, New York Times, Jamestown Foundation, Express Tribune and Wikipedia.

Orakzai Agency, March 2010 to 1 June 2010 18 Khyber Pass Khyber Pass, 1 September offensive KP 2009 to 30 November 2009 19 Operation Brekhna Mohmand Agency 3 November (Thunder) 2009 20 Operation NW 2012 Tight Screw 21 Operation NW June 2014 to Zarb-e-Azb present 22 Operation Khyber Agency, October 2014 to Khyber-1 FATA present 23 Operation Bara and Tirah March 2015 to Khyber-2 Valley/NW present Operation against local and foreign militants in NW Mainly against LI, Jamaat-ulAhrar and TTP generally Sequel of Khyber-1 against Daesh/IS, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, LI and other TTP remnants. Units from the elite Special Services Group are also taking part

Ground Offensive in Mohmand Agency

Pakistan Army won a victory. NATO routes were secured

NOTES

Chapter 2

Four Phases of Extremism and Terrorism

1. ‘Jaish-e-Muhammad’s charity wing revitalizes banned group in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor 9/41 (Jamestown Foundation, 11 November 2011). 2. Maulana Masood Azhar wrote in alqalam with the pen name Saadi. Available at http://www.alqalamonline.com (accessed 20 July 2011). 3. Intelligence Sources. 4. The Ahl-e-Hadith are Salafist in orientation, meaning they believe Muslims must return to a pure form of Islam and advocate emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in all areas of life. 5. Interview with Khalid Waleed, Political coordinator of Jamaat-ud-Dawa on 6 June 2012. He is son-in-law of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Amir JuD. 6. Jamat-ud-Dawah, Hafiz Saeed, Zaki-ur-Rehman and Haji Ashraf were added to UN terror list. 7. I interviewed Khalid Bashir, Coordinator Public Relations JuD, many times in Lahore in 2012 and 2013. He was killed on 17 May 2013 in mysterious circumstances. I was shocked to learn about his murder when I read about it in the newspaper. I was doubtful whether he was the same Khalid Bashir or not. I tried to call on his mobile number but it was switched off. The JuD office confirmed his death. I had met him just a week before his death. 8. I met Hafiz Saeed at the Madrassa across from his residence in Johar Town, Lahore, on 22 January 2013. We offered Maghrab (sunset time) prayer in the adjacent mosque under the security of agile gun-totting guards. Late Khalid Bashir, Coordinator PR JuD, remained present in the meeting. The meeting continued for half an hour due to the bad health of Hafiz Saeed. However, he was candid and relaxed. 9. Indian Home Minister Shinde openly conceded (20 January 2013) that Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS) run terrorist training camps and its targets are the Muslims in India. Addressing the

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239

three-day brainstorming conclave of the Congress party at Jaipur, he said it was the BJP-trained terrorists who carried out blasts aboard the Pakistan-bound Samjhota Express and bombed the mosques in Hyderabad and Malegaon. 10. Interview with Col (R) Nazeer, office bearer JuD, along with Khalid Bashir, Coordinator JuD, on 13 July 2012.

Chapter 3 The Second Phase 1. Pakistan Intelligence source. 2. Punjab Police sources. 3. Interview with Maulana Mujibur Rahman Inqalabi, former Information Secretary, Defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) on 26 June 2010. 4. My repeated conversations with Maulana Azam Tariq in 2003. 5. Interview with Maulana Mujibur Rahman Inqalabi, former Information Secretary, Defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) on 26 June 2010. 6. Masood Sharif Khan Khattak, former Director General Intelligence Bureau, Pakistan, was one of the most important persons involved in the Karachi Operation with the direct supervision of PM Benazir Bhutto and Interior Minister Major General Naseerullah Babar. Years after his retirement, during a conversation at his Islamabad residence, he told me that he was convinced about MQM’s Jinnah Pur design. Prior to that, during the Karachi Operation, I met him at his Karachi office and he was convinced about it then also.

Chapter 4 The Rise of Militancy in Pakistan After 2001 1. The Constitution of Pakistan 1973. 2. Interview with Bashir Khan r/o Miran Shah, FATA, Islamabad, 2012. Gunaratna and Nelson (2008) depend on the ‘Theory of norm dynamics’ to argue that ‘most of the Al Qaeda affiliated groups shared a similar experience during the Afghan– Soviet war or training in Afghanistan camps’. This experience and network, coupled with a sense of belonging to the same Pashtun tribe, gave rise to the norm of ‘Talibanisation’ in FATA. 3. Pakistan Intelligence source. 4. The Theory of Relative Deprivation helps us understand that the perception of relative deprivation, when the gap between expectations and satisfaction is growing rapidly, is the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence and terrorism. 5. In fact, there are several unregistered madrasahs. Ironically, there are at least 83 illegally constructed madrasahs and mosques in the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad, alone. The government is hesitant to demolish these illegal setups for fear of a Lal Masjid-like backlash. 6. CTD Punjab Estimate. 7. Due to rapid modernisation, inequality theory and rapid economic modernisation measured as GDP growth makes societies more exposed to

240

8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

NOTES

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ideological terrorism. Social inequality measured in income inequality tends to increase the potential for ideological terrorism. Pakistan Intelligence source. The Telegraph, 31 August 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9512140/Afghanistan-will-remain-fragile-unstableand-corrupt-long-after-troops-leave-says-outgoing-Ambassador.html (accessed 9 August 2016). Interviews with Pakistanis in Lahore (March 2009). Many Americans also questioned, ‘Who was Osama bin Laden, and what did he want? How could his bedraggled fighters carry out so devastating an attack? Why was America the target of the killers’ rage? Is the enemy a small band of killers, a larger group of radicals, or even the entire Islamic world itself? Is this a war to the death, threatening everything the United States (or civilisation) holds dear? And, most importantly, what can be done to counter these deadly foes? These questions provoked a heated debate. Experts disputed both the size and the appeal of Al Qaeda, making it unclear whether it is a small fringe movement or a cohesive network.’ Interviews with Pakistanis in Islamabad (2 July 2009). Interview with Shahid Durrani (25 June 2009). Pakistan Intelligence source. Ibid.

Chapter 5

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

1. The government officials put the total number of local militant groups operating in North Waziristan, including the Haqqani network, at 43. Hafiz Gul Bahadur has 15 groups affiliated with him, 10 groups are independent and 6 are affiliated with TTP. Punjabi Taliban has 4 groups. There are 12 foreign militant groups. 2. Interrogation Report of arrested TTP activists. 3. Department of State, United States of America. Available at www.state.gov/t/ pm/ppa/pmppt (accessed 2 January 2012). 4. Each tribal agency of FATA is administered by a political agent, assisted by a number of assistant political agents, tehsildars (administrative head of a tehsil) and naib tehsildars (deputy tehsildar), as well as members from various local police (khassadars) and security forces (levies, scouts). As part of his administrative functions, the political agent oversees the working of line departments and service providers. He is responsible for handling inter-tribal disputes over boundaries or the use of natural resources and for regulating the trade in natural resources with other agencies of the settled areas. The political agent plays a supervisory role for development projects and chairs an agency development sub-committee, comprising various government officials, to recommend proposals and approve development projects. He also serves as project coordinator for rural development schemes. Available at

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http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option¼ com_content&view ¼ article&id ¼ 50& Itemid ¼ 84 (accessed 11 January 2012). 5. Details prepared by Sunni Tehreek.

Chapter 6 Lal Masjid Operation, Escalation in Terrorist Activities and Expansion Across the Country 1. The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) is situated in the centre of Islamabad. It was run by two brothers, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi who were sons of the late Maulana Abdullah who had been Imam of this mosque for many years. From the beginning of 2006, Lal Masjid and the adjacent Jamia Hafsa madrasah had been operated by Islamic militants led by TTP. This organisation supported the imposition of Sharia (Islamic religious law) in Pakistan and openly called for the overthrow of the Pakistani government, led by its President Pervez Musharraf. Lal Masjid was in constant conflict with authorities in Islamabad for 18 months prior to the military operation. They engaged in violent demonstrations, destruction of property, kidnapping, arson and armed clashes with authorities. After Lal Masjid militants set fire to the Ministry of Environment building and attacked the Army Rangers who guarded it, the military responded, and the siege of the Lal Masjid complex began. 2. A copy of the letter was released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 11 October 2005. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm. 3. This document does not merely call for radical reform of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan along the principles traditionally espoused by Al Qaeda and its local allies; it calls for the destruction of the state itself. In making this call, Zawahiri is going beyond the name-calling and the declaration that Pakistan is an apostate government, to providing reasoned legal arguments to support his assertion that apostasy is rooted in the state’s foundational document. 4. Home Department source. 5. ‘Maghrib Ka Tareek Mustaqbil’ (Bleak future of the West). CD. In a crisp and correct Urdu, the commentator convinces that the US is on verge of destruction as its economy is in doldrums; the Pakistan Army is a continuation of Royal Indian Army of British era and the government of Pakistan is a puppet in the hands of the US government. The number of Pakistan Army soldiers killed in action in FATA is greater than those killed in wars with India in 1948, 1965 and 1971. 6. Interviews with Sattar Khan (The News), Mazhar Tufail (The News), Amir Mir, (The News), Maqsood Butt (Chief Reporter, Jang, Lahore) and Sohail Chaudhry (Editor, Daily Pakistan, Islamabad). 7. Interrogation by Special Branch, Punjab and Islamabad Police. 8. Threat Alert initiated by the Home Department Punjab.

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9. Lahore CIA Police and Special Branch, Punjab reports. 10. Pakistan Intelligence source. 11. Interview with Usman Pannu (5 July 2012). His father had been an MNA thrice from Ferozewala and Narang Mandi areas of Sheikhupura district in Punjab.

Chapter 7 The State Response 1. I have coined STOP formula in Pakistan’s terrorism context. But it can be applicable in similar situations in other countries as well. 2. Home Office, Government of the UK. Available at http://security.homeoffice. gov.uk/news-. 3. British Intelligence, p. 9. 4. Ministry of Finance. Government of Pakistan. Available at www.mofa.gov/fm (accessed February 2010). 5. The success of a terrorist organisation in threatening and carrying out attacks depends critically on the resources it accumulates to support its cause: a network of supporters; financial capital; weapons, explosives and materiel; destructive know-how; a communications network; the tacit approval or even active encouragement of a state or states; trained personnel and a sufficient number of recruits willing to risk prison or death. These aspects must be kept in mind to formulate a strong CT strategy. 6. Interview with Tariq Zulqarnain, former Civil Judge/Lawyer, based at Lahore, on 29 June 2012.

Chapter 8 Irritants and Impediments 1. 2. 3. 4.

Interview with Saeed Elahi MPA, Punjab Assembly. Ibid. The Long War Journal. Available at http://pk.msn.com/news/localnews/jg/2012/january/12464880/ drone-attacks-unlawful-unacceptable-pakistan.aspx?region¼pk.&featuredpk. 5. Ibid. 6. Abbas (2005, pp. 220– 1). 7. Pakistan Intelligence source.

Chapter 9

The Existential Threat

1. IPS 24 December 2007. 2. According to a research, 34 per cent of PTSD among the survivors of Oklahoma City Bombing 1995 was the highest of all the disasters. Rates of PTSD in other studies were 2 per cent following a tornado, 28 per cent after a mass shooting episode and 29 per cent after a plane crash into a hotel. ‘Psychiatric disorder

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4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

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among survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing’, Journal of the American Medical Association 282/8 (25 August 1999), p. 761. Malala Yousafzai raised her voice and championed the cause for the people of Swat against the sufferings and the cruel act of TTP. She lived in Mingora Swat, which was under control of Maulvi Fazlullah and his militants. They were destroying schools and beheading people. At that time, Malala started writing a diary for the BBC with the pseudonym Gul Makai, in which she exposed the brutalities of TTP. She was nominated for the International Children Peace Award. The government of Pakistan conferred on her ‘Sitara-eJurat’ (Star of gallantry). Interview with a former TTP militant. Gated colonies are residential areas that are enclosed within a boundary wall. In areas such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Lahore, these localities are located near the city centre. In Karachi, they are located mostly on the outskirts of the city. The value of property in gated communities is approximately 12 – 15 per cent more than the value of the property in nearby areas. Information provided by Citi Associates Karachi, Shah Estate Agency Lahore and Tariq Khan and Sons, Islamabad, to DAWN, 9 September 2012. Jamil Chaudhry of Jamil Brothers Contractors, Lahore, was also interviewed on 6 September 2012. Ibid. Special Branch Punjab, Daily Situation Report (Lahore: Government of the Punjab, 15 February 2012). Maj. General A – Served in ISI – commented on condition of anonymity. Interviewed on 12 March 2012. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, is famously quoted to have said, ‘We will eat grass but we will make the nuclear bomb.’ It was a vow to achieve the goal of going nuke despite debilitated economic conditions in the country. Similarly, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif retaliated to the Indian nuclear tests by carrying out nuclear tests at Chagai in Balochistan in May 1998, he anticipated US economic sanctions and urged the masses to brave the adverse conditions for the sake of nuclear capability. People responded positively and enthusiastically.

Chapter 10 Future of TTP and Terrorism 1. AFP, 28 June 2011. 2. Former TTP Activist Khaliq Dad, linked with Maulvi Nazir Group. Interview on 17 November 2011. 3. Dunya TV News bulletin at 11.30 pm, 10 January 2012. 4. Ibid., 23 February 2012. 5. Rahimullah Yusufzai, analyst and editor of The News, commented in a talk show on Dunya TV, 30 May 2013. 6. Nawai Afghan Jehad (2012, pp. 31 – 2).

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Appendix Directory of TTP Leaders/Prominent Members 1. My interview with Asad Kharl, Chief Reporter, The Express Tribune on 2 September 2013, whose report was published on this subject on the same day. 2. The Long War Journal (March 2009). Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘A who’s who of the insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part two – FATA excluding North and South Waziristan’, Terrorism Monitor 7/4 (2009). Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/the_pakistani_taliba_1. php#ixzz1WPaaRgTF. Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘Global terrorism analysis’, The News (30 May 2013).

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INDEX

Abbottabad, 5, 72, 119, 169, 175, 176, 228 Abdul Rashid Ghazi, 103, 241 Abu Faraj al-Libbi, 69 affiliates, 1, 5, 92, 111, 129, 165, 185, 213, 214 Afghan Taliban, 3, 4, 5, 26, 29, 54, 57, 65, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 82, 98, 99, 105, 110, 114, 116, 118, 130, 132, 141, 145, 192, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 216, 218, 229 Afghanistan, 7, 8, 12, 13, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 98, 104, 105, 109, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 125, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 135, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 228, 230, 232, 234, 236, 239, 240, 248, 251, 255, 256, 257, 259, 262

Af-Pak Policy, 174, 175 Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, 69, 156, 196 Al Qaeda, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 39, 42, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 92, 96, 101, 102, 103, 106, 111, 116, 117, 118, 119, 126, 127, 129, 141, 142, 145, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 196, 197, 200, 205, 208, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 221, 222, 223, 227, 228, 234, 239, 240, 241, 253, 259, 260, 261 Allah, 8, 10, 16, 27, 49, 106, 245, 257 America, 70, 76, 104, 106, 108, 119, 139, 178, 207, 240, 245, 250, 251, 255, 257, 261, 263 American, 8, 28, 31, 36, 57, 70, 76, 128, 157, 164, 166, 178, 179, 205, 243, 251, 258 Arab, 17, 64, 69, 70, 116, 169, 223 Awami National Party, 79, 116, 138 Baitullah Mehsud, 72, 74, 75, 97, 112, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 142,

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150, 165, 166, 168, 176, 203, 206, 210, 216, 217 Bajaur, 59, 76, 83, 122, 127, 136, 139, 144, 165, 178, 181, 191, 192, 222, 223, 224, 225, 230, 232, 235 Balochistan, 4, 5, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 56, 63, 86, 94, 99, 114, 182, 204, 210, 243, 246 Barelvi, 2, 12, 13, 24, 60, 62, 63, 89, 118 Bin Laden, Osama, 25, 26, 57, 68, 69, 72, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 119, 169, 175, 201, 221, 223, 240 bomb attack, 160 bomb blasts, 4, 7, 43, 44, 56, 85, 88, 89, 90, 110, 117, 136, 160, 186, 191, 193 border, 4, 5, 19, 29, 43, 44, 57, 59, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 76, 78, 83, 96, 116, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 139, 141, 142, 145, 156, 170, 175, 177, 179, 181, 205, 210, 212, 213, 214, 249 British, 2, 11, 12, 14, 20, 55, 67, 73, 102, 138, 148, 164, 188, 195, 241, 242, 262 Central Intelligence Agency, 69, 172 Chechens, 11, 60, 70, 126, 168, 186 Chechnya, 11, 13, 24, 151, 223, 260 China, 24, 79, 259 Chinese, 60, 115, 206, 249 CIA, 19, 21, 22, 58, 68, 69, 73, 74, 128, 156, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 180, 198, 200, 206, 219, 242, 251 civil government, 8, 131, 142 civilians, 1, 5, 43, 87, 100, 106, 132, 133, 136, 137, 140, 143, 148, 204 commandoes, 95, 141 Constitution of Pakistan, 17, 79, 80, 117, 239 Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), 52, 153, 158, 159, 239

IN

PAKISTAN

counter-insurgency, 84, 86, 120, 130, 132, 135, 137, 151, 163 counter-terrorism strategy, 120, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 212 criminal, 46, 80, 81, 89, 107, 157, 163, 184 Daesh, 124, 159, 237 Darul Uloom Haqqania, 61 Deobandi, 2, 6, 13, 24, 27, 28, 30, 47, 49, 50, 54, 62, 63, 75, 99, 118 Deobandi Movement, 28, 54 drone, 4, 8, 26, 42, 69, 72, 77, 105, 113, 116, 129, 133, 142, 145, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 184, 201, 203, 206, 207, 210, 214, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 232, 242, 262 drone attacks, 9, 165, 166, 170, 183 Durand Line, 59, 67, 73 East Turkestan Islamic Movement, 60 economy, 6, 8, 115, 145, 146, 183, 184, 187, 188, 195, 202, 206, 212, 241, 251, 255 Ehsanullah Ehsan, 104, 108, 109, 110, 115, 140, 206, 208, 219, 229 extremism, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 19, 21, 23, 42, 48, 56, 58, 64, 65, 66, 103, 118, 157, 179, 183, 184, 185, 194, 202, 212, 214, 251 Faqir Muhammad, 84, 144, 223, 224 FATA, 12, 13, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 24, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 87, 89, 97, 98, 102, 113, 117, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 141, 145, 146, 147, 149, 152, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 183, 184, 185, 186,

INDEX 188, 190, 192, 203, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 232, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 244, 247, 255, 263 fatalities, 208 Fazlullah, 6, 7, 12, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 104, 109, 111, 123, 125, 128, 132, 135, 139, 142, 143, 144, 165, 207, 209, 210, 227, 228, 236, 243, 247 FC, 105, 122, 126, 206, 235 FCR, 59, 80 Federal Investigation Agency, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 31, 33, 37, 47, 55, 67, 74, 77, 93, 101, 107, 111, 123, 135, 137, 143, 154, 155, 157, 161, 163, 167, 185, 187, 189, 216, 217, 221, 223, 225, 229, 232, 237, 243, 247, 248, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 265 financing, 111 foreign funding, 6 foreign intelligence agencies, 36 Frontier Corps, 120, 125, 126, 140 Frontier Crimes Regulation, 59 General Pervez Musharraf, 14, 45, 58, 64, 76, 101, 103, 105, 156 General Zia-ul-Haq, 18, 19, 62, 184 GHQ, 85, 89, 97, 198, 200 Government of Pakistan, 23, 27, 36, 45, 77, 79, 87, 102, 110, 114, 129, 136, 138, 164, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 189, 201, 203, 207, 213, 219, 241, 243 grenade, 5, 7, 85, 97, 157, 160, 186 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 39 Hafiz Saeed, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 210, 238 Hakimullah, 72, 74, 76, 78, 81, 105, 110, 111, 112, 133, 140, 165,

267 166, 168, 169, 170, 203, 204, 205, 207, 210, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 228, 229, 233, 247

Interior Ministry, 112 International forces, 118 ISI, 33, 34, 36, 37, 43, 63, 73, 74, 102, 106, 113, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 174, 177, 200, 226, 243, 246, 248, 250 Islamic, 14, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 28, 32, 33, 40, 46, 47, 55, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 79, 80, 81, 100, 101, 105, 117, 139, 152, 193, 194, 197, 205, 208, 210, 218, 223, 240, 241, 251, 253, 259 Islamist, 4, 11, 55, 58, 64, 65, 66, 76, 197, 224, 252, 253, 259, 263 Jaish-e-Muhammad, 24, 25, 27, 30, 150, 232, 238, 259 Jamaat-e-Islami, 6, 17, 21, 39, 42, 257 Jamaat-ud-Dawa, 5, 24, 31, 32, 34, 35, 238 Jamia Naeemia, 89 Jihad, 5, 2, 10, 12, 20, 24, 25, 28, 32, 33, 40, 41, 61, 105, 164, 218, 250, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260 Jihadist parties, 5 JUI, 21, 63, 88, 230 Kabul, 25, 53, 66, 67, 72, 82, 177, 178, 181, 205 Karachi, 4, 5, 25, 28, 38, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 65, 74, 89, 90, 99, 100, 102, 105, 110, 112, 113, 117, 129, 139, 156, 159, 184, 193, 195, 200, 210, 211, 213, 231, 239, 243, 249, 255, 260

268

TERRORISM

Khyber Agency, 87, 91, 92, 120, 124, 144, 181, 204, 206, 210, 228, 229, 231, 233, 237 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 12, 87, 136, 143, 146, 160, 207, 232 KP, 8, 11, 35, 58, 61, 63, 66, 68, 78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 97, 99, 105, 108, 111, 118, 122, 123, 125, 137, 143, 146, 156, 160, 165, 167, 172, 178, 181, 183, 184, 189, 191, 192, 193, 206, 213, 235, 236, 237 Kunar, 31, 61, 67, 83, 84, 109, 130, 132, 139, 181, 222, 223 Kurram Agency, 123, 125, 210, 225 Lahore, 5, 16, 31, 32, 35, 38, 44, 50, 51, 53, 55, 62, 69, 85, 89, 90, 93, 102, 103, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 143, 149, 150, 153, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 168, 169, 176, 177, 184, 193, 194, 195, 198, 210, 211, 213, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 251, 252, 253, 255, 257, 259, 260 Lal Masjid, 6, 66, 85, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103, 121, 142, 233, 239, 241, 258 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, 5, 29, 30, 47, 54, 125, 216, 228, 232 Lashkar-e-Taiba, 5, 24, 25, 29, 31, 34, 216, 222, 261 Madaris, 8, 61, 63, 90, 91, 99 Madrasah, 9, 28, 32, 52, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 98, 103, 194, 241 Madrasah Hafsa, 95 Maliks, 59, 87, 142 martyrdom, 10, 40, 79, 106 Mehsud, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 85, 105, 110, 112, 117, 123, 127, 128, 133, 140, 142, 165, 168, 169, 170, 193, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 216, 217, 218,

IN

PAKISTAN

219, 220, 222, 225, 228, 229, 233, 236, 262 militancy, 12, 13, 1, 2, 3, 4, 23, 39, 42, 48, 56, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 82, 84, 87, 96, 99, 103, 135, 144, 146, 150, 163, 179, 183, 190, 192, 214, 251, 254, 256 military, 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 31, 33, 36, 40, 45, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 77, 82, 83, 84, 86, 96, 97, 103, 104, 105, 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 175, 178, 180, 184, 186, 187, 188, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 208, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 223, 224, 227, 228, 230, 233, 235, 241, 247, 256, 260, 261 military forces, 1, 135 military operation, 10, 59, 61, 67, 69, 86, 96, 97, 104, 105, 118, 121, 128, 129, 131, 141, 142, 144, 145, 150, 175, 208, 210, 213, 224, 233, 241 military rule, 2, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 53, 55, 62, 68, 97, 116, 167, 201 Miramshah, 84, 106, 140, 169, 206, 216, 218 Mohmand, 59, 60, 76, 83, 123, 136, 169, 222, 223, 237 MQM, 4, 46, 55, 99, 143, 156, 239, 262 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 Mujahideen, 25, 27, 29, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 54, 66, 67, 79, 98, 111, 155, 261 Mullah Omar, 24, 61, 73, 74, 99, 110, 221 Mumbai attacks, 33, 34, 37, 262

INDEX National Action Plan, 130, 148, 152, 153, 213 Nawaz Sharif, 11, 39, 43, 45, 50, 51, 86, 146, 148, 156, 172, 233, 243 Nek Muhammad, 75, 125, 141, 142, 171 NGO, 11, 113, 191 Nizam-e-Adl regulation, 143 North Waziristan, 7, 42, 59, 60, 67, 76, 83, 84, 86, 106, 110, 113, 129, 144, 155, 177, 191, 204, 205, 213, 217, 218, 234, 240 North-West Frontier Province, 11, 13, 78, 244 Nuristan, 61, 67, 83, 84, 109, 130, 132, 139, 222, 223 Operation Kaloosha, 141 Operation Rah-e-Rast, 82, 125, 128, 134, 144, 253 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 120, 129, 130, 131, 155, 209, 213, 237 Orakzai Agency, 60, 87, 112, 123, 210, 216, 236, 237 Pakistan Army, 4, 7, 10, 38, 63, 69, 70, 83, 95, 97, 101, 102, 111, 113, 115, 116, 120, 123, 125, 126, 134, 135, 141, 155, 170, 174, 175, 180, 184, 185, 197, 198, 199, 200, 212, 223, 224, 237, 241 Pakistan Muslim League, 11, 151 Pakistan Peoples Party, 11, 18, 52, 119, 151 Pakistan-administered Kashmir, 20, 39 Pashtun, 6, 8, 11, 59, 63, 73, 89, 108, 112, 125, 135, 137, 163, 164, 183, 239 peace deal, 79, 122, 125, 126, 128, 141, 142, 143, 234, 235, 236, 258 Pearl, Daniel, 28, 31, 65 Peshawar, 5, 24, 59, 69, 76, 78, 79, 82, 89, 90, 92, 109, 112, 113, 139, 140, 143, 148, 153, 160, 165, 184, 188, 191, 193, 195, 210,

269

211, 213, 216, 226, 229, 243, 257, 263 political agent, 11, 59, 87 Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), 11, 146 public opinion, 14 Punjabi Taliban, 11, 6, 25, 54, 84, 85, 86, 150, 232, 240 Quetta, 5, 55, 68, 74, 84, 99, 114, 160, 184, 211, 218, 258 Qur’an, 61, 65, 91, 106, 108, 257 Radd-ul-Fasaad, 124, 130 Radicalisation, 9, 19, 119 Raymond Davis, 176, 177 religious edicts, 64, 66 Reuters, 54, 108, 110, 254 revolution, 46, 103 Russia, 11, 151 Russian, 11, 22, 128 Sararogha Agreement, 6 Saudi Arabia, 24, 70, 253, 255 sectarianism, 7 security forces, 11 seminaries, 4, 9, 32, 61, 64, 79, 99, 183, 165, 247 separatist, 1, 44 Shakai agreement, 126, 142 Sharia, 6, 11, 76, 79, 80, 142, 143, 165, 186, 204, 208, 209, 241 Sheikh Ahmed Omar, 31 Shiʿa, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 62, 63, 85, 94, 125, 204 Shiite, 30, 51, 52, 53 shrine, 90, 222 Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, 4, 47 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, 5, 29, 47, 48, 49, 216, 239 South Asia, 11, 39, 155, 166, 180, 253, 255, 256, 259 South Waziristan, 11, 7, 24, 60, 76, 77, 88, 105, 120, 125, 126, 127, 128,

270

TERRORISM

133, 134, 136, 139, 140, 142, 145, 206, 209, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 244, 248, 263 Soviet invasion, 1, 60 Special Service Group, 95 splinter group, 38, 47, 48 strongholds, 6, 76, 86, 128, 205, 230 suicide attack, 27, 78, 88, 89, 90, 97, 99, 112, 113, 117, 118, 140, 160, 193, 231, 259 Sunni, 8, 4, 27, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 62, 75, 92, 241, 251 surveillance, 99 Swat, 6, 58, 70, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 109, 112, 116, 117, 118, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 142, 143, 144, 149, 151, 154, 165, 175, 181, 184, 188, 190, 191, 192, 200, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 227, 228, 235, 236, 243, 246, 247, 248, 262 Swati Taliban, 81, 104, 192 Tehreek-e-Insaf, 11, 172 Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 11, 79 Tehreek-e-Taliban, 3, 6, 11, 12, 1, 5, 29, 57, 75, 79, 81, 111, 117, 204, 206, 216, 217, 218, 229, 240 training camp, 31, 52, 53, 228 tribal area, 80 tribesmen, 10, 59, 70, 75, 77, 116, 126, 136, 137, 141, 165, 230, 231 troops, 28, 67, 83, 106, 120, 126, 132, 134, 141, 143, 240, 255 TTP, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 23, 24, 27, 29, 34, 38, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81,

IN

PAKISTAN

82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 149, 153, 155, 156, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 181, 183, 184, 186, 192, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 253, 257 TTP spokesperson, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 140, 205, 206, 208, 232 Turks, 70 Uighur militants, 60 Ulema, 8, 6, 21, 37, 63, 92, 230 United Nations, the, 5, 114 US Consulate General, 176, 177 US Department of State, the, 28, 30, 32, 39, 51, 130 Uzbeks, 60, 70, 126, 168, 186, 222 VBIED, 11, 138, 159, 206 Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device, 11 violence, 8, 2, 4, 20, 38, 44, 46, 47, 49, 55, 56, 58, 64, 66, 67, 86, 88, 89, 95, 96, 99, 100, 107, 120, 135, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 150, 183, 190, 191, 213, 214, 225, 239, 253, 254, 256 Warrior, 164 Western diplomats, 36 Zarqawi, Al, 101 Zawahiri, Ayman Al, 72, 101, 102, 223, 241, 246, 249, 259, 260