Terrorism in Contemporary France: A Vicious Circle of Violence 3031235509, 9783031235504

Table of contents :
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction of the Book
1.1 Presentation of the Chapters of This Book
1.2 Four Big French Presidents
1.3 Omnipresent Fear From Terrorist Attacks
References
Chapter 2: Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodology
2.1 The Concept of the Vicious Circle
2.2 Theory: Why and How the Text Will Use the Theoretical Heritage of Pierre Bourdieu
2.3 Pierre Bourdieu and His Key Concepts
2.4 Three Key Actors in Contemporary France
2.5 The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks
2.6 Methodology
2.7 Research Questions
References
Chapter 3: What Preceded the Attacks Against France: From 9/11 to the European Front of the Global Terror (2001-2005)
3.1 The Attacks from 9/11 as the Beginning of the Era of the Global Terror
3.2 The US Doctrinal Documents for the GWOT
3.3 Jihadist Doctrinal Answer as the Mirror of the Bush Doctrine
3.4 Global Clash of Doctrinal Violence
3.5 US Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq
3.6 The European Front of the Global Terror
3.6.1 Madrid 2004
3.6.2 The London Attacks in July 2005
3.6.3 Common Features of the Attacks in Madrid and London
References
Chapter 4: The Vicious Circle Starts: The French Military Interventions in the Countries of the MENAP
4.1 General Framework of French Military Operations
4.2 Harmattan 2011: A Wind Which Blew Out a Dangerous Dictator, but Opened a Pandora´s Box
4.3 Operational Serval as Intervention Against Gangster Jihadism in Mali
4.4 Operation Sangaris as a Direct Military Involvement in a Clash of Civilizations
4.5 Chammal as the Most Controversial French Military Intervention
4.6 Operation Barkhane and Its Consequences
4.7 The Hollande Doctrine
4.8 The Takuba Task Force
4.9 Conclusion of the Chapter
References
Chapter 5: The Vicious Circle Escalates: The Terrorist Attacks Against France After 2015
5.1 Charlie Hebdo as the First French Example of Militarized Terrorism
5.2 The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks as the First War-Generated Punishment of France
5.3 The Mass Murder in Nice in 2016 and Its Devastating Political and Psychological Consequences
5.4 The Shocking Terrorist Bestiality in Normandy
5.5 The Assassination of Samuel Paty: The Terrorist Attack in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, 16 October 2020
5.6 The Macron Doctrine as a Political Answer to the Growing Brutality of Jihadist Terrorism
5.6.1 The Factors of Continuity
5.6.2 New Approaches and New Priorities
5.7 The Terrorist Attack in Strasbourg as the First Manifest Punishment of the New French President
5.8 Conclusion of the Chapter
References
Chapter 6: The Revolt of French Soldiers Against the Failing Immigration Policy
6.1 The Role of the French President and Its Prerogatives
6.2 What Is at Stake?
6.3 The General Context of the Revolt
6.4 The Main Acts of the Revolt of French Soldiers
6.5 General Pierre de Villiers in Light of the Theory of Pierre Bourdieu
6.6 Two Works of Constitution
6.7 New Political Context in 2022
6.8 Conclusion of the Chapter
References
Documents
Books and Articles
Chapter 7: Conclusion of the Book
Reference

Citation preview

Contributions to Political Science

Jan Eichler

Terrorism in Contemporary France A Vicious Circle of Violence

Contributions to Political Science

The series Contributions to Political Science contains publications in all areas of political science, such as public policy and administration, political economy, comparative politics, European politics and European integration, electoral systems and voting behavior, international relations and others. Publications are primarily monographs and multiple author works containing new research results, but conference and congress reports are also considered. The series covers both theoretical and empirical aspects and is addressed to researchers and policy makers. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. This book series is indexed in Scopus.

Jan Eichler

Terrorism in Contemporary France A Vicious Circle of Violence

Jan Eichler Institute of International Relations Praha 1, Czech Republic

ISSN 2198-7289 ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic) Contributions to Political Science ISBN 978-3-031-23550-4 ISBN 978-3-031-23551-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1

Introduction of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Presentation of the Chapters of This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Four Big French Presidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Omnipresent Fear From Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 4 8 10

2

Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Concept of the Vicious Circle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Theory: Why and How the Text Will Use the Theoretical Heritage of Pierre Bourdieu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Pierre Bourdieu and His Key Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Three Key Actors in Contemporary France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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What Preceded the Attacks Against France: From 9/11 to the European Front of the Global Terror (2001–2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Attacks from 9/11 as the Beginning of the Era of the Global Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The US Doctrinal Documents for the GWOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Jihadist Doctrinal Answer as the Mirror of the Bush Doctrine . . . . 3.4 Global Clash of Doctrinal Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 US Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 The European Front of the Global Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 Madrid 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2 The London Attacks in July 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.3 Common Features of the Attacks in Madrid and London . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 17 21 25 31 34 35 39 39 41 43 44 46 48 48 50 52 53

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Contents

The Vicious Circle Starts: The French Military Interventions in the Countries of the MENAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 General Framework of French Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Harmattan 2011: A Wind Which Blew Out a Dangerous Dictator, but Opened a Pandora’s Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Operational Serval as Intervention Against Gangster Jihadism in Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Operation Sangaris as a Direct Military Involvement in a Clash of Civilizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Chammal as the Most Controversial French Military Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Operation Barkhane and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 The Hollande Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 The Takuba Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Vicious Circle Escalates: The Terrorist Attacks Against France After 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Charlie Hebdo as the First French Example of Militarized Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks as the First War-Generated Punishment of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Mass Murder in Nice in 2016 and Its Devastating Political and Psychological Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Shocking Terrorist Bestiality in Normandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The Assassination of Samuel Paty: The Terrorist Attack in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, 16 October 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 The Macron Doctrine as a Political Answer to the Growing Brutality of Jihadist Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 The Factors of Continuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2 New Approaches and New Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 The Terrorist Attack in Strasbourg as the First Manifest Punishment of the New French President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Revolt of French Soldiers Against the Failing Immigration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Role of the French President and Its Prerogatives . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 What Is at Stake? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The General Context of the Revolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Main Acts of the Revolt of French Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 General Pierre de Villiers in Light of the Theory of Pierre Bourdieu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 57 60 63 66 69 72 74 75 79 82 87 89 93 101 105 108 112 112 113 113 117 120 123 123 124 125 132 141

Contents

6.6 Two Works of Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 New Political Context in 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books and Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

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146 149 151 156 156 156

Conclusion of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Chapter 1

Introduction of the Book

As the main title as well as the subtitle indicate, contemporary France, one of the most important and influential countries of Europe, is witnessing a strongly dangerous period of its history. For a decade, it has suffered an endless series of brutal terrorist attacks perpetrated by the fanatical Islamic jihadists born and grown in Islamic countries or even in France. The last decade saw the efforts of the political élites of this attacked hexagonal country to deter the jihadists by special military operations in the Islamic countries, namely, in Sahel. These operations were or continue to be waged with the aim of destroying the so-called safe havens of the jihadist organizations that had been used for the preparation of terrorist attacks against France. Unfortunately, these operations are followed by new terrorist attacks perpetrated in the territory of France or by terrorist attacks against French soldiers engaged abroad. As a result, France is moving within a typical vicious circle of violence with all its negative consequences. During the last decade, some very interesting books about terror in France have been published. This is especially the case for the book of Gilles Kepel (2017) and Olivier Roy (2016a, 2016b). It is generally known that between these two widely respected authors, there are theoretical and sociological opposites that separate them. Boily, Frédéric: Le débat entre Gilles Kepel et Olivier Roy.1 In addition, French military interventions in Islamic countries have been analysed by some important authors. This is especially the case for the French military historian Michel Goya (2020, 2022). Another very interesting book has been written by a respected commander Raphaël Bernard (2021) or by Pérouse de Montclos (2020), a successful French researcher and writer. Finally, some important authors (namely, French authors) described the security strategy of the French political élites. The most important between them is the contemporary President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron.2 However, until

1 2

Anatomie d’un désaccord. Available at: https://www.erudit.org › revues › 2... Macron (2002).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_1

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Introduction of the Book

today, no text has been written with the ambition of synthesizing all the abovementioned phenomena that deteriorate the security situation of France. It is a blind spot in the research of violence in contemporary France. In this light, the aim of this book is to present an interplay between terrorist attacks, special military operations, and political strategy in the field of security. In other words, this text offers a first contribution to a complex analysis of the security situation in contemporary France. Moreover, this subject is interesting not only for France, but also for all Western countries with numerous Muslim communities which are more and more radicalized by a targeted and concentrated indoctrination orchestrated by hateful jihadist imams. This indoctrination is based on the Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC), a doctrinal document written with the aim to destabilize and to destroy the Western societies. This doctrine represents a threat for the way of life of Western European societies. It is a soft threat, nevertheless, it can be underestimated because it is more and more acute and imminent.

1.1

Presentation of the Chapters of This Book

This book is divided into seven parts: introduction, five chapters, and conclusion. The first chapter presents the key theoretical concepts and methodology of all the book. It starts by the explication of the concept of the vicious circle and of its three pillars: actors, dynamics, and effects. The following part of this chapter explains why and how this book will use the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu. It presents the key concepts of this important French author whose theoretical heritage continues to be very inspirational. This is the case for the following pivotal concepts: field, social wars in the political fields, capital, and habitus. At the same time, much attention is given to the concepts of symbolic violence as an important part of habitus and to the concept of the moral harassment of actors in the political field because these concepts have great potential for the study of the political fights in contemporary France. At the same time, this subchapter presents the potential of the concept of the depository of collective memory (DCM), which was introduced by Stefano Guzzini, an important German-Italian constructivist scholar and theorist of power in the field of international relations. This concept will be used in the analysis of the three key actors of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France: the jihadi terrorists, political élites led by the President Emmanuel Macron, and the revolting soldiers. Their respective DCM will be analysed in detail in the last chapter. The following section presents the most important theoretical approaches to terrorist attacks. It concretely explains key ideas of Lawrence Freedman (namely, his emphasis on geopolitics and history), Bruce Hoffman (his concept of counterterrorism policy), David Rappoport (his coherent theory of holy terrorism), Alex Schmid (his enormously valuable concept of the strategy of communication of terrorist organizations), and Martha Crenshaw (her concept of provocative terrorism). All the above-mentioned concepts have great potential for the study and

1.1

Presentation of the Chapters of This Book

3

interpretation of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. Last, this section explains the importance of two basic forms of violence, doctrinal and instrumental, which are typical for all three actors in contemporary France. The methodological part of the first chapter explains that this book will be written as a combination of theory testing and policy evaluative work (Van Evera, 1997). The chapter graduates by the presentation of four research questions of the book. The second chapter presents the development of global terrorism between the attacks of the 9/11 and the opening of the European front of the Global Terror in Spain and Great Britain (2001–2005). The main attention is given to the analysis of the US doctrinal documents for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), to the following US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and their international consequences and to the attacks perpetrated in Madrid 11. 03. 2004 and in London 7. 7. 2005. The fourth chapter analyses the escalation of the vicious circle of violence. Its key attention is given to the terrorist attacks against France perpetrated after 2015. Its first subchapter analyses the attack against Charlie Hebdo as the first example of militarized terrorism in France. The following subchapter explains the context and consequences of the attacks against the night club Bataclan and against the Paris restaurant perpetrated on Friday 13 November 2015. It presents them as the first war-generated terrorism in France. The third subchapter analyses the mass murder perpetrated on 14 July 2016 (the French national holiday) in Nice and its devastating psychological and political consequences. The following subchapter examines the bestial terrorist attack in Normandy that shocked all of France in 2016. At the same time, much attention is given to the assassination of professor Samuel Paty, which was perpetrated in October 2020, and to its psychological and political consequences, which have been clearly articulated by President Macron. The sixth subchapter presents an original concept of the Macron doctrine. This innovative term is based on a detailed analysis of the political reactions of the eight French presidents and of his approaches to the growing brutality of jihadist terrorism in his country. The following subchapter analyses the terrorist attack in Strasbourg during Christmas 2018 as the first manifest punishment of President Macron. Finally, the attack in Nice 2020 is described. All the above-mentioned attacks are examined considering the five basic criteria. The first of them is the political context and consequences of each attack. Second, much attention is given to the modus operandi, in other words, to the concrete forms of attacks. Third, the manifestations of punitive religious terrorism will be clearly traced. Fourth, the attacks will be analysed considering the theory of terrorism. Finally, the greatest focus will be on the communication strategy of each terrorist attack. The last chapter of this book is divided into seven subchapters. The first explains the general context of the revolt of French soldiers. It pays particular attention to the historical context of the revolt, namely, to the hard legacy of the Algerian war, and to the political aspects and consequences. At the same time, the geopolitical and military context of the revolt are analysed with the aim of showing that the political mentality of French soldiers is strongly shaped and influenced by the drastic experiences and lessons learned during the missions in the Islamic countries as

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Introduction of the Book

well as during the Sentinelle operation in France, where they are confronted with a growing aggressiveness of anti-French rioters who are manipulated by jihadist leaders. The main part of the chapter analyses the most important acts of the revolt of French soldiers. It starts with the clash between the Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls and General Bertrand Soubelet, which occurred in 2013. It continues by the conflict between Alain Juppé (Prime Minister of France between 1995 and 1997 and presidential candidate in 2017) and General Vincent Desportes in 2016, and it graduates by the direct clash between two top-level symbolic authorities: the eighth President Emmanuel Macron and the Chief of the General Staff, General Pierre de Villiers. This conflict becomes an important political event. The attitudes and key ideas of the above-mentioned General are deeply analysed in the light of the theory of Pierre Bourdieu. The theoretical heritage of this big thinker is applied in the concluding part of the chapter, which presents a comparison of two works of constitution. The first of them is based on the decisions of highly symbolic political authorities, and the second results from the attitudes of the revolting soldiers. The last pages of this chapter are consecrated to the presentation of the new political context after the presidential and legislative elections in spring 2022, which changed the political map of contemporary France. A necessary attention is given to the analysis of the new approach of the French political élites to the soldiers.

1.2

Four Big French Presidents

In this introduction of the book, it is necessary to mention the fact that France is a republic with a particularly strong role of the president. This typical feature of contemporary France dates from 1958, when the so-called semi-presidential regime was introduced. It was a substantial negation of the regime of the IV. Republic (1946–1958), which had been based on the Parliament and resulted in a long range of instability, repeating resignations of governmental coalitions and political crises. This regime was characterized by a chronic governmental instability, partisan combinations, the impotence of Parliament, and the inability of public authorities. A key role was played by the incapability to resolve a long-term Algerian war, a true nightmare of French policy in the 1950s (Fauvet, 1959). The descending tendency of the IV. Republic reached its peak on April 15, 1958, with the fall of the government of Prime Minister Félix Gaillard. Just after, Charles de Gaulle, an extraordinary charismatic politician with the aureole of the liberator of France in 1944, was solicited by the French political élites to assume his historical role in the salvation of France. All leaders of the declining IV. Republic and of its political praxis accepted his basic condition of Charles de Gaulle: a new constitution that will give the most important competitions to the President of the Republic (de La Gorce, 1979). The concentration of the key competencies and decisions in the field of the FFP in the hands of the President of the Republic (PR) is so large that some experts describe

1.2

Four Big French Presidents

5

the French constitution and the political praxis as a power without counter powers (Badie & Vidal, 2021) or as an example of a Republican Monarchy. According to the constitution, President of the Republic is the commander-inchief of French armed forces. It gives him large competencies in the field of national security. However, at the same time, this important prerogative is balanced by a large responsibility and by the duty to study the strategic thinking (Pensée stratégique) of his country (Reysset et al., 1997). Within this strict framework, primordial attention must be paid to the questions of nuclear deterrents (de Montbrial & Klein, 2006). During the more than six decades long history of the V. Republic, the function of the president was assumed by eight directly elected president with very strong competencies, especially in the field of foreign and defence policy. Four of them have been elected only one time: Georges Pompidou in 1969, Valéry Giscard d’ Estaing in 1974, Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, and Francois Hollande in 2012. On the other hand, four other French presidents managed to be re-elected and, as a result, they are called Big Presidents. This is the case for Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970, in the function between 1958 and 1969), Francois Mitterrand (1916–1996, in the function between 1981 and 1995), Jacques Chirac (1932–2019, in the function between 1995 and 2002), and Emmanuel Macron (born in 1977, elected in 2017, and re-elected in 2022). Each of the three first mentioned presidents came with a new doctrinal vision of the foreign and security policy of France and imposed significant changes in the security strategy of his country. The first and, at the same time, most respected of the above-mentioned presidents was Charles de Gaulle, the founder of the V. Republic. In 1961, only 3 years after his election, Charles de Gaulle presented in Strasbourg the metropole of East France3 in the presence of 80 generals and admirals and 2800 officers an important speech in which he defined three main axes of his completely new ad revolutionary military doctrine. The first axe of this doctrine has been based on an innovative approach to the “Atlantic” alliance. The NATO was presented as a necessary alliance, France being one of its founding states. Nevertheless, the first president of the V. French republic articulated a critical approach towards the policy of the NATO during the first decade of its history. He did not hesitate to say that “the system which has been called integration, and which was inaugurated and even, to a certain extent, practiced after the great trials which we had gone through, when one could believe that the free world was placed before an imminent threat and unlimited and that we had not yet recovered our national personality, this system has had its day”. In other words, Charles de Gaulle stressed the deeply rooted conviction that France must keep its will, its figure, and its army to itself. However, at the same time, and it was the second axis of his innovative approach, the general added the following declaration: “it goes without saying that our defense,

3

Strasbourg is one of these places, by virtue of two reasons which are Alsace and the Rhine. This is why the destiny of the city, torn in 1871, recovered in 1918, lost in 1940, symbolized the fate of the fatherland. In 1944, it was therefore of vital national interest that the city be liberated as soon as possible and under the best possible conditions.

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Introduction of the Book

the setting up of our means, the conception of the conduct of the war, must be for us combined with what is in other countries. Our strategy must be combined with the strategy of others. On the battlefield, it is infinitely likely that we will find ourselves side by side with allies. However, that each will have his own part”. There is no doubt that this important declaration was pronounced with the aim of calming all the NATO, namely, the president of the USA (Planchais, 1959). The third axis of the Gaullist military doctrine was based on the decision to provide France with strategic and tactical nuclear projectiles and the devices to launch them to create the so-called force de frappe. In explaining his long-term vision, Charles de Gaulle stated that France had the need to assume, on land, at sea and in the air, immediate defence (de Gaulle, 1970). This determination was fully shared and in detail elaborated by the most appreciated symbolic authorities of the French generality, including the chief of the general staff between 1962 and 1968 (Ailleret, 1968). In all the above-mentioned axes, the first president of the V. French republic presented and imposed profound changes of historical and even revolutionary importance. In his speech in Strasbourg, Charles de Gaulle articulated a substantial change in the paradigm of the military doctrine of France (Lecoq, 2022). Nevertheless, this speech provoked no protests of the French generals and officers. In contrast, they fully shared and supported all basic pillars of the new doctrine (Lacouture, 1986). This positive behaviour of French soldiers resulted from two key facts. First, the new doctrine was based on good arguments prepared by highly appreciated generals, such as Charles Ailleret and the CEMA, between 1962 and 1968. The Gaullist doctrine underlined the big ambitions of France in the field of international security. Second, President de Gaulle had no need to declare that he was their commander-in-chief and that he would respect no critics. He based his approach on his big respect and appreciation of the liberator of the country in 1944 and of the inspiration of its new political culture anchored in the constitution of the V. Republic. Today, we know that the ideas of Charles de Gaulle have stood the test of time, hats off to him! The second “Big president of France”4 was Francois Mitterrand. He entered the modern history of his country by two important interventions of doctrinal character. The first of them came in 1983 when he presented his principle “Neither Pershing, nor SS 20”, in other words, no new nuclear missiles of middle range (Mitterrand, 1986). Only 4 years later, this principle was materialized in the famous INF Treaty signed in Washington by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev (Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, INF Treaty). The spring of 1988 saw the second big moment of Francois Mitterrand. He did not hesitate to clearly articulate his doctrinal preferences and convictions during an open debate with his Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The latter supported, during the

4 This notion is used for three French presidents who manage to be re-elected and to spend in the function 10 or more years.

1.2

Four Big French Presidents

7

dynamic period called “crisis of the Euromissiles”5 the tendencies of the generals of the French Army to accept some principles of the US doctrine of the so-called flexible reaction, which reserved to the generals the possibility to decide the question of the use of the tactical nuclear weapons, the so-called weapons on the theatre, in the scenario of a direct military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe (Eichler, 1990). In this crucial moment, Francois Mitterrand clearly declared that the Gaullist doctrine reserved this competency only to the President of the Republic. He articulated two categorical arguments. The first of them was articulated in his famous declaration: the deterrent, it is me! (La dissuasion, c’est moi),6 which provoked a large and important discussion between French experts and journalists (Isnard, 1995). Second, Francois Mitterrand (Mitterrand, 2012) managed to clearly explain the substance of this crucial doctrinal question to all citizens in an Open letter called Letter to all French people (Mitterrand, 1988). Today, we know that the ideas of Francois Mitterrand have stood the test of time, hats off to him! The third “Big president of France” was Jacques Chirac. Just at the beginning of his first mandate, he had two important speeches. In each of them, he presented key pillars of his new doctrine. In the first speech, he articulated a new vision of the French policy of nuclear deterrent, especially a significant reduction in the French nuclear forces, with the closure of the Albion site, the dismantling of the Hades missiles,7 which was a decision of strategic and historic importance (Guisnel, 1995). At the same time, Jacques Chirac announced another important decision (Chirac 1996): the limitation to four of the number of our new-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. These important measures illustrated the desire of Jacques Chirac to actively contribute to the fight against proliferation and to the reduction of nuclear weapons (Merchet, 1996). It was a speech of great strategic and political importance that clearly explained the strategic continuity as well as new approaches in the French nuclear doctrine (Arteaga, 2006). The second important speech of Jacques Chirac was consecrated to the fool professionalization of the French armed forces, which was an end of a taboo. Nevertheless, the fifth president of France managed to explain this decision to “his” generals as well as to the French people. After the above-mentioned speech, Jacques Chirac continued to carry out a considerable update of French military nuclear policy: resumption and end of tests, abandonment of capabilities, modernization of systems, diversification of means, Copernican revolution imposed on a deterrence that would no longer be “Russian-centric”, complete rupture in the way France designs and manufactures its weapons (Guisnel & Tertrais, 2016: 130–144).

5

Face à la crise des Euromissiles: la politique de dissuasion française. François Mitterrand et la dissuasion nucléaire. Available at https://www.mitterrand.org › franco... 22. 2. 2012. 7 Hadès was a short-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile developed by France to replace its Pluton missile. It was capable of delivering a high explosive or nuclear payload. This system had Warhead HE or 80 kT Nuclear and with a range of 480 km. 6

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Introduction of the Book

Today, we know that the ideas of Jacques Chirac have stood the test of time, hats off to him! The reminder of the key doctrinal ideas of the three Big French presidents shows us that each of them paid a big importance to the questions of military doctrine and of the security strategy. Each articulated new ideas and made important decisions. Charles de Gaulle inspired and imposed a completely new doctrine, a revolutionary doctrine. Francois Mitterrand articulated his own approach to the most important international crisis during the 1980s and presented remarkable political courage when he defended the heritage of the Gaullist nuclear doctrine. Jacques Chirac made some important decisions regarding which urgency was imposed by the end of the Cold War. Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac based their important decisions and speeches on a profound understanding of three important pillars: the doctrinal heritage of Charles de Gaulle, the changes of the international context, and the vital interests and ambitions of their country. Their doctrinal behaviour was based on concrete arguments that had been consulted with the most important symbolic authorities and the more respected thinkers in the ranges of French generality. Today, we know that Emmanuel Macron is the fourth French president who managed to be elected. The results of the election in 20228 opened his way into the prestigious group of the so-called big presidents. During his second mandate he will face a lot of important and imminent challenges (Attali, 2021). As he is just at the beginning of his second mandate, it is too soon to make his final balance. This is the reason why the following pages of this chapter will pay the main attention to his conflict with the French generals that happened in the first weeks of his first mandate and that shaped his relations with French armed forces during the entire period between 2017 and 2022. This conflict did not arise from the substance of the military doctrine and security strategy. In contrast, it resulted from the formal questions, from the differences in the interpretation of the competitions of the political vs. military symbolic authorities in the field of the security policy of the French republic.

1.3

Omnipresent Fear From Terrorist Attacks

Today, it is widely known that contemporary France is suffering a long series of terrorist attacks. These attacks will be analysed in Chap. 5 of this book. During the last decade, no other European country has been as affected by terrorism as France. However, despite this fact, some French authors relativize the imminence of the security threat of contemporary global terrorism. They argue by the statistics published on the pages of the prestigious revue Lancet, which says that 40 million

In the second tour, he obtained 18,768,639 voices (58.55%). Rappel des Résultats au 1 er tour – Election présidentielle 2022. Available at: https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr › ..., 24. 4. 2022.

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Omnipresent Fear From Terrorist Attacks

9

people die every year because of cardiovascular accidents, cancer, breathing difficulties, Alzheimer’s disease, and kidney failure,9 which is much more than the numbers of people killed during terrorist attacks. Other authors add that within the category of violent deaths, the numbers of people killed by terrorists are far behind the numbers of victims of traffic accidents. They conclude by criticizing the disparity between the investments into the fight against terrorism at the detriment of the modernization of traffic security (Pérouse de Montclos, 2020: 121). The direct military engagement of the French armed forces in the war against terrorism in Sahel is increasingly criticized because of the following five negative political consequences. First, at the international level, the critics spoke about a crisis area between Somalia and Mauritania. They often use the neologism Sahelistan or Africanistan, which reflects deeply rooted doubts and fears resulting from long-term political or military engagements in counties that are perceived as having long-term asymmetric wars and terrorist organizations. Second, France has its long-term negative experiences learned during the civil war in Algeria between 1990 and 2002. France has suffered a long range of terrorist attacks perpetrated on its territory as a punishment for its political involvement in this enormously cruel war was waged by the Algerian jihadists against the government in Alger and against large masses of innocent civilians (Balencie & de La Grange, 2005). The jihadists were represented by the political organization called Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and by its military organization called Armed Islamic Group (GIA). It was an enormously cruel war, and the number of the victims of the so-called black decade was evaluated to be between 100,000 (Daum, 2017) and 200,000 people (Hagelstein, 2008). The political engagement of the France war, although it was an indirect and prudent involvement, was presented, namely, by the GIA, as a French imperialism (Buisson-Fenet, 1997: 36–38), which is harmful for the Islamic world (Pérouse de Montclos, 2020: 149), although French military engagement is not comparable with the military presence of the USA in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Third, since the end of the Cold War and the brusque evaporation of the so-called red peril, the emphasis on anti-terrorism has become a real cash flow for corrupt regimes of the part of the word. Moreover, these regimes become indispensable allies of France as a leading force in the long-term fight against the threat of terrorism. As a result, the budgets of security of these countries exploded at the detriment of the health or education budgets (Pérouse de Montclos, 2020: 131). Fourth, some French authors share the conviction that the focus on the fight against terrorism has negative international consequences, especially the thwarting of the United Nations’ efforts to promote peace (Charbonneau, 2017). Other authors warn that the French military presence in the Sahel is systematically abused by some

9 Available at: https://www.thelancet.com › Global Burden of Disease 2019. GBD cause and risk summaries, Oct 17, 2020.

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Introduction of the Book

groups that take advantage of the French intervention to form their own militias. In addition, these groups apply a strongly perverse strategy: they claim military support and benefit from the so-called DDR procedures (Geel & Rabecq, 2018). Last, as France beat in Mali the longevity record of the Red Army in Afghanistan, the consequences of French military operations in the Islamic world have been criticized even by military experts. One of them, General Vincent Desportes (his attitudes and arguments will be analysed in the last chapter of this book), concludes that a war waged at a large distance is a decoy: it produces a military effect but without producing a political effect. He warns that such a war destroys without mastering the reconstruction and concludes that there is a real illusion of aerial efficiency (Desportes, 2018). Despite all the above-mentioned critical or negative attitudes of French experts, this book will analyse and present terrorism and terrorist attacks as important and imminent threats to the security of contemporary France. This attitude is based on an important document on the UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004), which underlined that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security. The text of this Resolution will be analysed in Chap. 3 of this book. Summary Contemporary France is moving within a typical vicious circle of violence with all its negative consequences. It suffers an endless serial of brutal terrorist attacks perpetrated by the fanatical Islamic jihadists, born and grown in Islamic countries or even in France. Its political élites try to deter the jihadists by special military operations in the Islamic countries, namely, in Sahel. Unfortunately, these operations are followed by new terrorist attacks perpetrated in the territory of France or by terrorist attacks against French soldiers engaged abroad. This book examines an interplay between terrorist attacks, special military operations, and the security strategy in the field of French governing élites. It offers a first contribution to a complex analysis of the security situation in contemporary France.

References Ailleret, C. (1968). L’aventure atomique française – Comment naquit la force de frappe. éd. Grasset. Paris. Arteaga, F. (2006). French nuclear deterrence according to president Chirac: Reform, clean break or reminder? Retrieved January 24, 2006, from https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org Attali, J. (2021). Faire réussir la France: 30 réformes majeures et 250 actions urgentes. Fayard. Balencie, J.-M., & de La Grange, A. (2005). Les nouveaux mondes rebelles. Michalon. Bernard, R. (2021). Au coeur de Barkhane – Face aux terroristes. Éditions Jpo Altipresse. Bertrand Badie et Dominique Vidal. (2021). La France, une puissance contrariée : l'etat du monde 2022. La Découverte. Boily, F. Le débat entre Gilles Kepel et Olivier Roy. Anatomie d’un désaccord. Retrieved from https://www.erudit.org › revues › 2... Buisson-Fenet, E. (1997). Une nouvelle “guerre sans nom”? Vacarme, 1997/2 (n° 2).

References

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Charbonneau, B. (2017). Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 35(4). Whose ‘West Africa’? The regional dynamics of peace and Security. Chirac, J. (1996). Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la réorganisation et la professionnalisation de l’armée, la modernisation de l’industrie de défense et le projet de suppression du service national, Paris le 23 février 1996 . . . Elysee.fr. Retrieved from https://www.elysee.fr Daum, P. (2017). Vingt ans après les massacres de la guerre civile Mémoire interdite en Algérie. Le Monde Diplomatique. de Gaulle, C. (1970). Mémoires d’espoir tome 1 sur 2. PLON. de La Gorce, P.-M. (1979). Naissance de la France moderne. In Apogée et mort de la IVe République, 1952–1958 (Vol. 2). Bernard Grasset. De Montbrial, T., & Klein, J. (2006). Dictionnaire de stratégie. Presses universitaires de France, DL. Desportes, V. (2018). Leçons des guerres d’aujourd’hui pour les guerres de demain. Retrieved September 6, 2018, from https://www.geostrategia.fr › lecons. Eichler, J. (1990). Francouzská armáda od de Gaulla k Mitterrandovi [The French armed forces from de Gaulle to Mitterrand]. Naše vojsko. Fauvet, J. (1959). La IVe République. Librairie Arthème Fayard, coll. «Les grandes études contemporaines». Geel, F., & Rabecq, A. (2018). Dans le centre du Mali, les populations prises au piège du terrorisme et du contreterrorisme. Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org › IMG › pdf › fidh_centre_. . . Novembre 2018/N° 727. Goya, M. (2020). Une révolution militaire africaine : Lutter contre les organisations armées en Afrique subsaharienne. Amazon. Goya, M. (2022). Le temps des guépards: La guerre mondiale de la France de 1961 à nos jours. Tallandier. Guisnel, J. (1995, July 4). Plateau d’Albion: des missiles en sursis. Chirac est partisan de l’abandon de la troisième composante de la dissuasion. Libération. Guisnel, J., & Tertrais, B. (2016). Le Président et la Bombe. Odile Jacob. Hagelstein, R. (2008). Explaining the violence pattern of the Algerian civil war. Households in Conflict Network, HiCN Working Paper 43 March 2008. Isnard, J. (1995, May 11). La dissuasion, c’est moi. Le Monde. Kepel, G. (2017). Terror in France: The rise of jihad in France. Princeton University Press. Lacouture, J. (1986). Charles de Gaulle – Le souverain 1959–1970, t. III. éd. du Seuil. Lecoq, T. (2022). De Gaulle et la défense nationale. Un modèle de gouvernement. Revue Défense Nationale, 2022/3(848), 69–75. Macron, E. (2002). Terrorisme au Sahel. Retrieved from https://www.vie-publique.fr › 2838. . . Merchet, J.-D. (1996, February 23). Le président de la république a présenté hier son projet de réforme des armées qui verront leurs effectifs réduits à 350.000 hommes en 2001. Chirac dissout un régiment sur trois et laisse le service national en débat Libération. Mitterrand, F. (1986). Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Fayard. Mitterrand, F. (1988). Lettre à tous les Français. Institut François Mitterrand. https://www. mitterrand.org › lettre-. . .Publié le 7 avril 1988. Mitterrand, F. (2012). François Mitterrand et la dissuasion nucléaire. Retrieved February 22, 2012, from https://www.mitterrand.org › franco. . . . Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2020). Une guerre perdue. La France au Sahel. LC Lattes. Planchais, J. (1959). La France doit avoir sa force de frappe. Retrieved 1959/11/06, from https:// www.lemonde.fr

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Reysset, P., Widemann, T., Angoulvent, P., & Angoulvent-Michel, A.-L. (1997). La pensée stratégique. Presses universitaires de France. Roy, O. (2016a). Le Djihad et la Mort. Le Seuil, coll. «Débats». Roy, O. (2016b). Peut-on comprendre les motivations des djihadistes? Pouvoirs, 2016/3(158), 15–24. Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University.

Chapter 2

Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodology

Abstract This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first of them examines the concept of the vicious circle, the concept that anchors the title of this entire book. The second section presents the central theoretical heritage of the whole text: the heritage of Pierre Bourdieu, an important and internationally respected French sociologist. The following third section explains the key concepts of Pierre Bourdieu: the field, capital, and habitus. The fourth section presents the three key actors in the field of the French Republic during the terms in office of the last two presidents. The fifth section specifies the most important theoretical approaches to terrorist attacks, which are largely applied in the Chapter about terrorism in contemporary France. The sixth section focuses on the methodology and the specification of the key criteria. The last section defines the research questions of the entire book.

2.1

The Concept of the Vicious Circle

In light of the title of this book, it is necessary to start with the concept of a vicious circle. This concept has many meanings, but only the most important and relevant of them will be mentioned in the book. First, a vicious circle or vicious cycle is defined as a situation in which an attempt to resolve one problem creates new problems that lead back to the original situation (Collins English Dictionary). Second, a vicious circle or vicious cycle is defined as a situation in which the solution of one problem gives rise to another, but the solution of this second problem, or of other problems arising from it, brings back the first, often with greater involvement. In the medical sciences, a vicious circle is defined as a mutually augmenting action of two independent diseases or phenomena or of a primary and a secondary affection. It is described as a chain of events in which the response to one difficulty creates a new problem that aggravates the original difficulty. Last, it is conceived as a situation in which the apparent solution of one problem in a chain of circumstances creates a new problem and increases the difficulty of solving the original problem.1

1

Available from: https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_2

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One concrete example from the medical field: anxiety produces physical symptoms, the physical symptoms worsen anxiety, and the two feed each other in a vicious cycle. In the economic sciences, one type of vicious circle is defined by a link between natural disasters and poverty: poor people suffer more drastically during such disasters and have less resilience that would enable them to re-establish themselves after a disaster strikes. Another type of vicious circle in economics is that each time salaries are raised, prices go up as well. However, another type is a vicious circle in which structuration increases complexity, which in turn increases uncertainty, which in turn calls for rational solutions that invite restructuralization. Last, there is also a vicious circle between population growth, resource depletion, and the problem of poverty (Sachs, 2006). Moreover, this question has an important political dimension (Obama & Biden, 2008). In the social sciences, we know that there exists a vicious circle between “coercion” and “voluntary will”. Another type of vicious circle in this field is that of women’s work, which is perceived as low status and poorly rewarded and therefore regarded as unimportant. Last, there is also a very important vicious circle of hunger and conflict.2 From all these examples, we can tell that a vicious circle is a problem or difficult situation that has the effect of creating new problems, which then causes the original problem or situation to occur again. In the case of the growing violence in contemporary France, we are witnessing a vicious circle between the military operations waged by this country and the terrorist attacks inflicted against it by jihadist organizations. Since the beginning of the 1990s, all French presidents have waged military operations. One of them, Francois Hollande (2002–2007), is even called a “war president”. The aims of French military operations in recent decades were to stop the rise of jihadists in the Islamic countries of the MENA, to eradicate extremism there and to prevent the transformation of these countries into safe havens for terrorists who carry out attacks in Western Europe, especially in France. The book will show that the French interventions and the following occupations have had incontestable counterproductive consequences. They have been followed by new punitive terrorist attacks with a high degree of atrocity. In other words, French politicians, despite their initial intentions, create new problems, and the related dangerous situations occur repeatedly. Military solutions to this problem provoke a chain of circumstances that creates new problems and increases the difficulty of solving the original problems. The concrete actors and the dynamics of this vicious circle in the contemporary France are presented in Table 2.1.

2

Breaking the vicious circle of hunger and conflict. The United Nations. Available from: https:// www.un.org/en/food-systems-summit/news/breaking-vicious-circle-hunger-and-conflict

2.2

Theory: Why and How the Text Will Use the Theoretical Heritage of. . .

15

Table 2.1 The three pillars of the concept of a vicious circle: actors, dynamics, and effects Actors of the vicious circle The dynamics of the vicious circle The effects of the vicious circle

2.2

Two or more independent subjects who take the measures and decisions with the aim to react to the original problems A chain of circumstances which creates a new problem and increases the difficulty of solving the original problem The creation of new problems which then cause the original problem or situation to occur again

Theory: Why and How the Text Will Use the Theoretical Heritage of Pierre Bourdieu

The book will be based on the theoretical heritage of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, namely, on his concepts of field, social war, capital, and habitus and their basic pillars. In addition to the texts of Pierre Bourdieu, the text will also work with various books and articles by authors who are widely respected as major experts in the field of security studies, including the security of contemporary France. At the same time, the text will work with the innovative concept of the depository of collective memory (DCM), which was invented and defined by Stefano Guzzini, an important German-Italian constructivist scholar and theorist of power in the field of international relations. This respected theorist presented his construct of the depository of collective memory (DCM) of every political actor (Guzzini, 2013: 86). The DCM is created by deeply rooted modes of behaviour of actors in the social, political, cultural, and military fields created by generations of political and military élites. In the field of security, the DMC includes the approaches to the threats and the methods for eliminating them. The concept of DCM contains some criteria that are shared by the concepts of security culture and strategic culture. The first of them explains a general framework of analysis that promises to be useful for explaining the security policies of states (Duffield, 1988). At the same time, the concept of security culture provides a framework for the analysis of threat perception and other aspects of the changing security agenda (Kirchner & Sperling, 1988). The concept of strategic culture is defined as a complex of shared ideas, approaches, traditions, and behaviours that are anchored in the institutions of every state (Gray, 2018). Another important author concludes that the decision-makers of each state adapt and adjust to the strategic approaches and procedures in their approach the armed forces (Johnson, 2006). Although Bourdieu formulated his theory during the 1970s and the 1980s, his heritage is not dead; in contrast, it is still very inspirational for academic thinkers. Moreover, his key concepts have a strong potential for being beneficial to the study of contemporary politics at all levels. They continue to maintain their fully respected universal relevance (Lemieux, 2011: 75–100) and can be applied to a wide range of political events and systems. The above-mentioned revolt of the French soldiers and their clash with the governing élites in the entourage of Emmanuel Macron is one of those events to which Bourdieu’s concepts can be applied.

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Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodology

To date, Pierre Bourdieu has been appreciated as one of the most cited and respected sociologists of the world. Moreover, he is an unavoidable reference for all authors of the critical illiberal school of thought, not only in France but also in other parts of the world. In this book, most of the attention to his work is aimed at his concepts of field, habitus, corpus, symbolic violence, social classes, and social space. The text of this book works particularly with the first four of these concepts. These concepts can serve as excellent instruments for the analysis of the growing tensions and clashes between the three main actors examined in this book. The first consists of the governing élites led by President Emmanuel Macron, who is determined to carry out important reforms of the French public finance system, even if they would be to the detriment of the modernization of the French armed forces and the financing of their missions. The second actor is the revolting soldiers who protest against these budgetary cuts and are led by several strongly respected generals (though today, all of them are retired). Last, the third actor is the young terrorists who are increasingly hateful towards contemporary France and perpetrated many merciless attacks against civilian targets. In a much more modest measure, the heritage of the leading British historian and theoretician Edward Carr (1961) will be used as well. This author underlined the necessity to differentiate between rational causes and historical accidents. The former can be generalized, but the latter cannot. In this light, this text will focus on the most important military operations waged by French soldiers and the most lethal and symbolic attacks that were perpetrated by the jihadists in the territory of France. In light of the heritage of Edward Carr, the growing social tension in contemporary France has the following three rational causes. The first of them is French military interventions in the Islamic world, which are motivated by French determination to destroy the so-called safe havens of contemporary jihadism. The second cause is the growing hostility of young men of Islamic origin who are frustrated by their precarious situation, which leads them into the ranks of the terrorist organizations and to attack against civilian targets. The last cause is the bitterness of French soldiers, who do not hide their disappointment with the approach of their governing elite to the problems posed by the failing immigration policy. On the other hand, concrete military operations of French armed forces in the Islamic world, concrete forms of terrorist attacks perpetrated on the territory of this country, and concrete clashes between the French political elites and the revolting soldiers will be analysed as the so-called historical accidents, as concrete episodes of the above-mentioned long-term process of the growing social tension in contemporary France.

2.3

2.3

Pierre Bourdieu and His Key Concepts

17

Pierre Bourdieu and His Key Concepts

As previously mentioned, the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu covers some concepts that are internationally known and cited with much respect. More specifically, Bourdieu introduced the concepts of field, capital, and habitus. Field According to Pierre Bourdieu, the field is something metaphysical; it covers a set of objective power relations imposed on all those who enter it and who act there. At the same time, the field is defined as a constellation of objective relations between different positions that are characterized by their situations (situs) within the framework of different forms of power whose possession opens access to specific profits (Lemoine, 2020: 54). The field integrates many phenomena that are not reducible to the intentions of individual agents (Bourdieu, 1991). A field is constituted when a group of agents struggle in a structured way over a specific kind of scarce resource (Pouliot & Mérand, 2013: 32) and encompasses a variety of dimensions: it can be global, international, national, and regional. It can cover many activities, such as economics, politics, security, science, culture, and sports (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). All actors in the field are disposed to defend their ideas and norms (Bourdieu, 1988). In the case of France, the national field will be analysed, and here, the key attention will be aimed towards activities in the field of national security. Bourdieu explained his concept of the field as a vector of power and as a space of power as well as of struggles between different actors who apply their own modi operandi (de Fornel & Ogien, 2011). The concept of field is characterized by practical solidarities or rivalries because all actors wage permanent fights for their relative positions in their interactions. As a result, every field has a structure that covers some binary oppositions, such as dominant–dominated, orthodox–heterodox, and sacred–profane (Lemieux, 2011). This binary framework is the source of incessant and permanent combat and battles waged between key actors, with these fights playing the role of constitutive elements of every field (Bourdieu, 1984: 136). Each actor has his own ideas and aims and his own beliefs (doxa) in his games in the field. He is convinced that the game is worth playing and that the game is worth the candle. At the same time, every actor in the field has his own illusions and rules and tries to apply them. All these illusions and rules shape the basic structure of the field, which can lead the actors towards cooperation or confrontation. All actors accept their positions and roles in the field. On the other hand, each of them has an obsessive determination to defend or even strengthen his influence and power in the field (Lemoine, 2020: 5). As a result, every field witnessed endless competition between actors, their clashes and mutual conflicts, and even their fights, which have a large quantity of forms and methods. The main stake of these fights is to obtain some profits. The ambitious actors combat each other for necessary means and instruments with the aim of acquiring or conserving the status of a dominant actor, which would give them the possibility to control the dominated actors and tame their possible

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Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodology

resistance (Lemieux, 2011). On the other hand, the dominated actors fight to reinforce their positions in the field. As a result, every field has its own production and reproduction of mutual combative relations between actors (Bourdieu, 1992: 337–338). In contemporary France, the combative relations during the last decade concern three types of actors: terrorist organizations, the governing élites, and, last but not least, the revolting soldiers, who are critical not only towards the terrorists but also towards the current president and his ministers. Social Wars in the Political Fields The field is always structured by the strategies of actors. According to Bourdieu, strategy is not limited to military means, aims, and methods. Its key stake is not a military victory but social dominance as a result of a social war (Bourdieu, 1994a: 3–12) in which all actors try to shape the power structure and satisfy their subjective expectations (Bourdieu, 2000). The concept of social war still inspires fear when these two words are pronounced and even more when they are applied as an instrument for a concrete analysis. No wonder that until today, no author had the courage (or the folly?) to work with this fear driving concept and to apply it in the analysis of political fights in a concrete West European country. This text has the ambition to break this taboo and to present a concrete application of the concept of the social war. Social war is a concept with some basic negative definitions. It is a war without tanks, cannons, planes, or bombings, without military operations or barricades, and without victims in military battlefields. For its positive meaning, a social war is waged in the social and political fields; it is waged by political manoeuvres, campaigns, and other means. The aim of such a war is not to kill the enemy but to reduce his power and influence and discourage and marginalize him. Social wars are waged by position takers (Merand & Forget, 2012: 102) who are obsessed with the fight for their positions in the field and whose obsessions predetermine their own strategic moves, strategic culture, and trajectory in the field. With these words, Bourdieu proposed a relational approach (Bigo, 2013: 102) to the concept of social war. This concept is grounded on an analysis of practices of distinction between the actors within the framework of their mutual interactions, which begin in the moment when the actors take their decisions and measures in reaction to each other. Capital The concept of capital is conceived as a value accumulated by actors with the aim of being permanently used in the field. It is not limited only to financial resources; it includes an ensemble of material and symbolic resources (Bourdieu, 1988: 33). According to Bourdieu, the state is a particularly important actor; it is the holder of a “meta capital” due to its central and privileged position in the field of power (Pouliot & Mérand, 2013: 36). This meta capital gives states a large portfolio for a wide range of their financial, juridical, political, and other interventions, which can be made with the aim of imposing their strategic ambitions, obtaining necessary results, satisfying national preferences, or avoiding losing face. Bourdieu underlined the central role of the heads of state, who have the right as well as the duty to aggregate the interests of

2.3

Pierre Bourdieu and His Key Concepts

19

their nations at the national as well as international fields of power (Moravcsik, 1997: 513–53). An important role is played by cultural capital, which is based on the state’s soft power, its power of attraction, and its possibilities and abilities to influence or shape the preferences of others. This capital is directly connected with the governing élites’ abilities to offer their so-called good services to their own states (in the field of domestic politics), other states, or a large international community (in the field of foreign policy). All this represents important characteristics of the concept of capital (Adler-Nissen, 2013). Habitus Habitus, as the third concept, is defined as a bridge between objective and personal structures. It includes three schemes of social and political behaviour: the perception of different actors, the reflexion of all social events, and of their reasons and consequences, and last, important decisions of the key actors and their implementations in the political field. Within this concept, the key roles are played by the symbolic authorities who fix the strategic aims and the paradigms of behaviour and define the rules of the game and the acceptable as well as unacceptable forms of conduct in the field. These authorities are accepted as symbols of social groups. Moreover, every state is a symbolic capital holder par excellence. The state possesses the habitus for the definition of the criteria in the field of both domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, it possesses the authority to naturalize or universalize arbitrary constructions. States have at their disposal two habitus: that of structure and that of an important actor. Symbolic Violence as an Important Part of Habitus The concept of habitus covers an important tendency to use the so-called symbolic violence. This type or concept of violence is not based on physical means and instruments. In terms of its substance, symbolic violence differs from open violence, which is based on police brutality or brutality carried out by other authorities. Two examples of open violence are the violence in Germany in the 1930s (Adolf Hitler, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps) and that in the USSR (J. V. Stalin, the KGB, and the Gulags). Such forms of violence aim to create an atmosphere of fear and prevent any resistance of the governed, oppressed masses. Symbolic violence has been defined by Pierre Bourdieu as the so-called inert violence, which is “forgotten” because it is codified in the established order of things (Bourdieu, 2015). This violence is invisible, nonphysical, and no instrumental; we can even say that it is metaphysical violence. According to Bourdieu, the force of this violence resides in its invisibility, which means that it does not appear as violence. Thanks to its invisibility, this violence is not recognized as such and, as a result, is even more effective. As Bourdieu underlined, this symbolic violence can be found even in discourses and narratives of important dominant actors (Bourdieu, 1982). Finally, Bourdieu concluded that symbolic violence, as an important part of the habitus, can have the form of manipulation of the so-called laws of acceptability.

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This concretely means that dominant actors often have the tendency to give in to the temptation to arbitrarily decide what can be acceptable and what is without this framework. This approach very often tends to lead to a systematic discrediting and disqualification of political opponents and even to their systematic elimination (Bourdieu, 1982). The tendency towards manipulation is very often intertwined with a deeply rooted temptation to very subjectively interpret the so-called laws of acceptability. This approach leads to largely arbitrary classifications that are typical for the dominant and dominated actors and that play a very important role within the framework of symbolic violence. Pierre Bourdieu stated that these actors have a strong tendency to make their own subjective classifications. The above-mentioned subjective approaches have the form of distinctions made between the tasty and the tasteless, between the beautiful and the ugly, between the chic and the classy, and between the distinguished and the vulgar—and where one betrays their position in the objective rankings. In the political field, this approach very often tends towards arbitrary distinctions between correct and incorrect behaviour, which represent another way to disqualify political opponents. The Moral Harassment of Actors in the Political Field The above-mentioned symbolic violence has a clearly negative motivation—it is very often used with the aim of devaluing the competitor and weakening his position to destabilize him as much as possible. Simon Lemoine, a major and highly respected French expert, explains that in the political field, this symbolic violence is used with the aim of enriching the habitus of those who dominate a concrete society with the instruments of the so-called moral harassment (harcelement moral) of those who are dominated (Lemoine, 2020: 47). The concept of moral harassment is based on violence that is not visible but is not legitimate despite its invisibility. This concept explains situations in which dominated actors accept their subordinate position without protesting against it as an injustice. This type of subordination results in a state of things in which the dominated actors recognize the superiority of the dominant actor without any protest against this state of things. In some situations of this sort, the dominated actors can even be fully resigned and passive. This type of harassment opens the way to an atmosphere in which the aims, arguments, and methods of the dominated can be presented as egoistic, destructive, and unacceptable. It can even be misused for a moral disqualification of the dominated, especially in situations in which they protest. At the same time, nobody can deprive the dominated of their right to protest—of course, only under the condition that their protests are not violent and respect the basic rules of democracy and loyalty towards their states. Last but not least, Bourdieu underlined the importance of another aspect of his concept of habitus. It is the “work of constitution” (travail de constitution), which means that different groups construct their identities (their habitus) on the basis of their mutual relations in the field (Bourdieu, 1984: 3–14). This mechanism is explained as a “mutual exteriority” within which the competing groups of actors

2.4

Three Key Actors in Contemporary France

21

designate their positions based on the principle of “us versus them”. These groups continue by mobilizing their respective capitals (Lenoir, 2004: 385–396), and this process culminates with their mutual competitions, which can result in clashes between them. If the stakes are very high, the competition can even lead to a situation called a social war (Lemoine, 2020: 187–193). Almost 10 years ago, that is, 10 years after the death of Pierre Bourdieu, the concept of habitus was particularly enriched by Stefano Guzzini, an important German-Italian constructivist scholar and theorist of power in the field of international relations. This respected theorist presented his construct of the depository of collective memory (DCM) of every political actor (Guzzini, 2013: 86). Thanks to the concept of the DCM, the understanding of the word habitus covers and explains deeply rooted tendencies to use violence repeatedly, no matter if it is an open, manifest violence or a symbolic one. Of course, symbolic violence, in contrast to open violence, must be based on the unconscious adjustment of subjective structures to objective structures (Guzzini, 2013: 82). With these words, Guzzini deepened the meaning of Bourdieu’s term “obedience”, since Guzzini saw it as a process that works all the better if the agents are not aware of it (Bourdieu, 1994b: 188). This subtle mechanism is called the “third dimension” of power (Lukes, 1974) and plays an enormously important role.

2.4

Three Key Actors in Contemporary France

In light of the heritage of Pierre Bourdieu and his followers, the revolt of the French generals will be analysed as a struggle in the national field, where the economic and security interests of France, as an important Western European country, are at stake. This struggle will be studied as a concrete manifestation of a permanently growing tension between three important groups. The first group is composed of jihadi terrorists, with a large majority of them being recruited and radicalized in the suburbs controlled by the sons or even grandsons of immigrants from Muslim countries. These desperados wage their own war—they perpetrate perfidious criminal acts with the aim of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoking a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons, intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing a certain act.3 The French jihadists reject all the important values and customs of France. Despite the fact that they were born in this country, they hate it and wage a longterm war against it. They attack the symbols of its history, culture (especially cathedrals as symbols of hated Catholicism), and way of life (national holidays, festivals, etc.). They represent a determined, negative, anti-state force whose aim is

3

Resolution 1566 (2004).

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to maintain a state of terror in contemporary France, intimidate its population, and compel its government to make important political concessions. The second group is represented by Emmanuel Macron and his large political entourage. This group includes the young Ministers of Finance, Economy, Interior, and Defence, and it is supported by various influential deputies and senators. Moreover, Macron, as their respected leader, can rely on the unconditional support of a strong majority in the National Assembly.4 This group possesses a clear dominance in the political field, where the most important decisions are made. It has a political monopoly, including on the fiscal strategy and the allocations of finances within the framework of military budgets. Its leaders assume the role of symbolic authorities in the French political field, and they are convinced that they can reduce the budgets of the Ministry of Defence regardless of the attitudes of the French soldiers. The theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu opens the way for the study of the political behaviour of this group even in light of the symbolic violence that is used and applied to their political opponents, including the soldiers who protest against the budgetary cuts. Of course, it is a nonphysical, non-instrumental violence, a violence without the use of police brutality. Nevertheless, its aim is to impose the aims of the dominant actors on the dominated actors, and its additional aim is to break up the protests against such a strategy. In some situations, the dominated actors can be fully resigned and passive towards such an imposition. Thanks to the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu, we have an excellent instrument for the study of the reactions of the third group—the French soldiers who are directly touched by the above-mentioned approach of the French political elites. At the same time, Bourdieu shows us how we can analyse the habitus of the French political elites and of the revolting soldiers in light of the manipulation of the so-called laws of acceptability. In this light, we can study why the French soldiers refused to resign themselves to the policies of the governing elites of their country. The third group is represented by a group of French retired generals and their supporters and sympathizers within the armed forces. They present themselves as the “Generation of Fire”, which has two referential objects. The first is a long range of battles during the French military missions in the Islamic world, concretely those in Syria, Mali, Libya, the CAR, and Afghanistan. The second is the long-term Operation Sentinelle, which is being waged in the territory of France. This long-term operation confronts French soldiers with the everyday violence perpetrated in the suburbs by the sons of immigrants from the Islamic world. French soldiers perceive this permanent violence as a form of a long-term war of attrition. The greatest attention will be given to their leading symbolic authorities represented by the generals who had the courage to protest against some arbitrary decisions made by the second group. As a result, French soldiers are increasingly critical towards the growing aggressiveness of French jihadists as well as towards the policy of Macron’s group

4

Macron’s party La République en marche has 308 deputies from the total of 577 deputies.

2.4

Three Key Actors in Contemporary France

23

(namely, the continuing budgetary cuts and the alleged underestimation of the threat of jihadism). The open protests of the French generals will be analysed as the activities of people who assume the role of symbolic authorities of frustrated soldiers who share the conviction that in this situation, they cannot be passive and have a duty to act. These authorities will be studied as the holders of an oppositional strategy whose aim is to stop the strategy of the budgetary cuts and the alleged underestimation of the threat of radical jihadism. The Role of Cultural Capital At the same time, much of the attention of this text will be paid to the role of the cultural capital of the three above-mentioned groups of actors in contemporary France. First, the cultural capital of the young jihadists is based on the doctrinal document called “The Global Islamic Resistance Call” (GIRC),5 which was referred to as the “Jihadist Mein Kampf” (Ignatius, 2014). It describes the West as a principal enemy and an existential threat to the Islamic world and condemns it for its alleged impiousness, weakness, corruption, cowardice, and hypocrisy (Nash, 2006). Second, the young politicians in the Macron entourage profit from three main resources. The first of them is their political educations, which they acquired at the most prestigious universities, especially at the famous ENA. The second resource is their political careers, especially their positions in the French Parliament and various Ministries. Finally, the constitutional practice of the Fifth French Republic, as the third source, plays an enormously important role. It grants a large portfolio of competences to the chief of state and the members of its government. These young politicians know each other and have no problems communicating with each other. Emmanuel Macron, as their fully respected leader, delivered some important speeches and made some crucial decisions in the fight against the threat of terrorism. This is why the key ideas of the eighth French president will be presented here as the Macron doctrine. It is a term introduced by the author of this book, although no one can rule out that other authors will contest it. Nevertheless, the cultural capital of these young politicians includes no direct contact or experience with jihadists, either in France or in Islamic countries. When they visit these countries, they are received by the heads of state and the general quarters of French military units, where they receive short briefings with some basic information. In addition, in the territory of France, they are received and briefed by the mayors of cities or the prefects of regions, but they have no direct contact with the violence and its perpetrators in the peripheries of the French cities. On the other hand, French soldiers know each other from their studies at various military schools and from missions in dangerous areas of the contemporary world. Their cultural capital is based on their permanent direct contacts and long-term experiences with jihadists, not only in the Islamic countries but also in France (in Operation Sentinelle). They are confronted with omnipresent menaces and the losses of their subordinate soldiers and comrades, they have the duty to organize

5

Al-Suri (2010).

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Table 2.2 Key pillars of the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu Field Social war

Capital

Habitus

Depository of collective memory (DCM)

The field is something metaphysical; it is a set of objective power relations imposed on all these who enter it Its key stake is not a military victory, but social dominance as a result of a social war The aim of a social war is not to kill the enemy, but to reduce his power and influence, and discourage and marginalize him, if necessary A value accumulated by actors with the aim to permanently use it in the field and influence it Cultural capital plays an important role because it is based on soft power, on the power of attraction A bridge between objective and personal structures It includes the perceptions of different actors, the reflexion of all social events, and important decisions of the key actors Within this concept, the key roles are played by the symbolic authorities Moreover, the concept of habitus includes two negative practices: manipulation of the so-called laws of acceptability and moral harassment A complex of deeply rooted modes of behaviour of actors in the social, political, cultural, and military fields created by generations of political and military élites. In the field of security, the DMC includes, namely, the approaches to the threats and the methods how to eliminate them In the concrete case of the contemporary France, the concept of the DCM includes a long tradition of the relations between governing élites and soldiers

their burials, and they have to calm the passions and support the morale of the other soldiers. Last, the roles of habitus and DCM merit further study. The key attention in this regard will be paid to the so-called le sens pratique, which includes a complex system of shared values, norms, and arguments of the symbolic authorities of the opposing groups of actors. These norms and arguments result in important decisions and shape the forms of behaviour of the rival groups as well as their approaches to the role of obedience, which represents the so-called third dimension of power. The text will search for the answer to the question of why the above-mentioned groups in contemporary France act so differently and why their different strategies became increasingly confrontational. The substance of all the above-mentioned five pillars of the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu—Field, Social War, Capital, Habitus, and the DCM—is briefly presented in Table 2.2.

2.5

2.5

The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks

25

The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks

As terrorism is defined as an important threat to international peace and security, it represents a long-term challenge for the theory of international security. Before the analysis of the concrete terrorist attacks in France, it is necessary to present the key ideas of the most important authors in this field, who will be used here as a key important inspiration—namely, Lawrence Freedman, Bruce Hoffman, David Rappoport, Alex Schmid, and Martha Crenshaw. Lawrence Freedman and His Emphasis on the Role of Geopolitics and History Lawrence Freedman, the “dean of British strategic studies”, presented an analysis of the threat posed by terrorism. In this analysis, he concludes that this phenomenon has been particularly successful when the targeted government was a colonial or occupying power (Freedman, 1986: 61). This conclusion provides a clear framework for a detailed study of the post-2001 terrorism that is now present almost everywhere in the contemporary world. It represents a highly important inspiration for the study of terrorist attacks in contemporary France. Two points should be noted here. First, France is a former colonial power. The so-called second French colonial empire was one of the largest empires in history, with colonies, protectorates, and mandates outside of Europe covering a land area of 12,106,000 km2 with a population of 110 million people in 1936 (Montagnon, 2010). The colonial empire played an important role in all the politics of France (Manceron, 2005). Second, during the last two decades, France waged many military operations in the Islamic world (they will be presented and deeply analysed on the pages of the following chapters), which means that its presence in the Islamic countries, particularly in the Sahel and Syria, can be, without any problems, presented as an occupation of an important part of the Muslim world and as a strategy that tries to impose its political interests and values on Muslims despite the related resolutions of the UN SC. Bruce Hoffman and His Emphasis on Counterterrorism Policy Bruce Hoffman merits a particular appreciation, particularly for his sophisticated conclusion that terrorism represents “a new face of war in the 21st century” (Hoffman, 1998: 200). This conclusion is based on an enormously detailed analysis of the structures of contemporary terrorist groups, their strategies and tactics, their aims and the modi operandi of their attacks. At the same time, this important author paid much attention to the role of the so-called home-grown terrorists (Hoffman, 2006). In this light, the work of Bruce Hoffman is enormously inspirational for France because this country has approximately six million inhabitants of North African origin. As they live in areas with a low security status, these areas represent an ideal milieu for the recruitment of young members of extremist and terrorist organizations. The most frustrated, radical, and hateful individuals among them hate the country in which they were born and have grown up in, and they perpetrate merciless attacks

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against their fellow citizens. They also convert to a fanatical version of jihadism. Last, Hoffman wrote the newspaper article “Terror’s Aftermath: A Counterterrorism Policy for Yesterday’s Threat”, which is an important text as it presents a framework for a long-term sophisticated “counterterrorism policy” (Hoffman, 2001: M5). David Rappoport and His Concept of Holy Terrorism It should first be mentioned that this important author enriched the studies in this field with his concept of “assassination policy” (Rappoport, 2008: 13), which explains the religious and strategic culture of the fanatical jihadist killers. An important source of inspiration is articulated in his rigorous distinction between two basic forms of killing—discriminated and non-discriminated killing. In the case of discriminated killing,6 it is possible to speak about an alternative to war. However, in the case of no discriminated killing of innocent people, it is a war waged against the whole of the targeted country. This important distinction has been sometime later enriched by Thomas H. Johnson and James A. Russell, two American authors who speak about the jihadist long-term war of attrition waged against the West (Johnson & Russell, 2008: 342). Second, David Rappoport paid much attention to the concept of martyrdom. The word martyrdom is very dubious and enormously morally relative, but it can be used when speaking about jihadists who do not hesitate to sacrifice their own lives in the name of their faith and convictions. However, the perpetrators of attacks against innocent and defenceless civilians, who refuse to risk their own lives in these attacks, have nothing in common with the concept of martyrdom. Their acts of killing demonstrate their avoidant behaviour; these acts are cowardly, dirty, and fully contemptible, and they thus merit a categorical condemnation. This cowardice is symbolized by the jihadists retargeting their attacks towards defenceless people who have less and less value as symbols and are considered to have less and less responsibility for the policies of the governing élites, which are abused as pretexts for terrorist attacks (Rappoport, 2008: 25). Alex Schmid and His Concept of the Strategy of Communication The attacks perpetrated in the territory of France will be studied as typical examples of the so-called insurgent terrorism. This concept was introduced by Alex Schmid (2011) and is explained by him as a “propaganda by death” whose aim is to impose radical and profound changes in the internal as well as external politics of the attacked country. Schmid concludes that contemporary terrorists almost always target mainly civilians and non-combatants. Those unfortunate people have the tragic and fatal misfortune of being at the wrong place at the wrong time. As a result, they are in the passive role of direct targets of terrorists’ merciless violence. In this light, Schmid defines terrorism as a “peacetime equivalent of war crimes” (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). A fault he finds with terrorists is the fact that they

6

Acts of discriminated killing are attacks which are aimed at important persons and decision-makers who can be labelled as guilty and as responsible for a policy which is hostile to the attackers (in this case, Muslims), and which causes their presumed suffering.

2.5

The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks

27

have elevated criminal practices that are perceived as excesses in war to the level of routine tactics. He categorically condemns them for their attacks on undefended people because these attacks are not unsought side effects but part of a deliberate and premeditated strategy. As a result, Schmid strongly disapproved of contemporary terrorists for their disregard for principles of chivalry and humanity contained in The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions (Schmid, 2008: 7). Moreover, civilians and non-combatants are not the main targets of terrorist attacks. In the framework of the terrorists’ perfidious strategy, the role of the main targets is reserved for the governments of the attacked countries. In addition, it is another important domain of the heritage of Schmid, which contains his analysis of the strategy of communication of contemporary terrorist organizations. This analysis examines the terrorists’ motives, their modus operandi and the political as well as psychological consequences of their attacks against civilians (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). As a result of this analysis, Schmid rightly concludes that terrorists use in their communication with governments the so-called language of blood, which is built on the following five messages. In a book published in cooperation with his colleague Bradley McAllister, Schmid presented a framework of five basic messages of terrorist organizations (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). The first of them, and the most categorical, is the message to the constituency of the adversary. This message is articulated in two main sentences. The first sentence insinuates to the people of attacked countries that their governments are failing because they are not able to protect their populations. In addition, this psychological pressure is escalated by the second sentence, which says that the civilian population will be targeted again if it does not put pressure on its government to change its policies, internal as well as external. The second message is addressed to the victims and their families. It says that the terrorists have warned them and reproaches them for not listening to the warning. Their blackmail communication concludes with the statement that the victims and their families had to pay the price. This tactic continues with the third message, which is for those who identify with the victims. It tells them that the threatened people should see what the terrorists are able to do and that they had better change their ways or that they will be the next. The fourth message is addressed to the sympathizers of the terrorist organizations. It argues that the terrorists represent the wave of the future and that they offer the remedy for the rotten and corrupted Western societies, which represent the past but not the future. This message concludes with the idea that the sympathizers had better support them. The strategy of communication is crowned by the last message, which is sent to the media in the attacked countries. It tells them that they should report fully and accurately about the terrorist organizations, their aims and actions, and the results and consequences of their attacks. It offers them bilateral cooperation with the given organization in which they will receive scoops as a reward. In the event that the media refuse this offer and if they continue to hold a critical approach towards the jihadists, they run the risk of paying for this attitude with their lives. Today, the whole world knows that this approach was very cynically applied in France in 2015

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in the attacks against the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo. However, this attack will be profoundly analysed in Chap. 4. First, all five of the above-mentioned messages confirm that the strategy of communication of contemporary terrorism represents an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated and premeditated violent action. Second, during terrorist attacks, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. Last, the above-mentioned attacks serve as message generators (Schmid, 2011). Their aim is to generate an omnipresent fear that creates an excellent field for coercive political violence and for a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints. The concept of the strategy of communication formulated by Alex Schmid will be used as the main framework for the analysis of all the terrorist attacks perpetrated in France after 2015. The main attention will be given to their psychological and political effects on the audience in contemporary France. Martha Crenshaw and Her Concept of Provocative Terrorism At the same time, the proposed text will develop the ideas of other authors, especially those of Martha Crenshaw, who speaks about provocative terrorism (Crenshaw, 2008: 26–47), which is perpetrated by individuals who do not hesitate to assume a high personal risk because they are fully identified with the thing for which they perpetrate their attacks (ibid.: 39). The strategic aim of this kind of terrorism is to provoke the attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it, namely, to punitive military interventions that would be immediately misinterpreted as an aggressive humiliation of the whole Islamic world. These provocations generate newer and newer security dilemmas and vicious cycles of violence between terrorist networks and the attacked Western states. At the same time, the terrorist attacks perpetrated in France will be analysed in light of the theory of religious terrorism. It is a concept developed by Audrey Cronin (2011), who underlines that the perpetrators of these sorts of attacks are profoundly convinced that they are engaged in a Manichean struggle of good against evil, which gives them the justification for their attacks against civilian targets. They also believe that they are satisfying the commands of a deity. Their determination and assumed moral superiority are based on the fact that they consider themselves to be unconstrained by secular values or laws, while they live in a state of complete alienation from the existing social system of their country. The importance of this aspect has been growing since 11/9/2001. Since this date, global terrorists have had an incontestable psychological superiority, which has been openly confirmed by Usama bin Laden, the “Pope of religious terrorism”, who clearly declared that terror is the most dreaded weapon in the modern age and that it is used with the aim of adding fear and feelings of helplessness to the psyche of the people of Europe and the USA.7 7

Usama bin Laden Says the Al-Qaidah Group Had Nothing to Do with the 11 September Attacks, Ummat, Karachi, Sept. 28, 2001. Available from http://www.robert-fisk.com/usama:interview_ ummat.xhtml

2.5

The Theoretical Approaches to Terrorist Attacks

29

All the above-mentioned authors offer an excellent framework for the study of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. First, in light of the theoretical heritage of Lawrence Freedman, the following chapters will manifest that France is attacked due to being a country with a long colonial tradition that contains a long range of military expeditions, violent actions, and victims. At the same time, the following pages will show that the jihadists present France as an occupying power because it sent its armed forces to some Islamic countries and its soldiers are stationed there on a rotation basis. Through the ideas of Lawrence Freedman, we will better understand why the above-mentioned jihadist narrative is successful although the French soldiers are in those countries in the context of a mandate of the UN Security Council with the aim of fighting against militant jihadist organizations. Second, based on the ideas of Bruce Hoffman, the following pages will look for the answer to the question of why and to what extent contemporary France is becoming the theatre of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. Of course, it is a war declared and provoked by the jihadists with the aim of transferring the violence, bloodshed, and immense human suffering in the Islamic countries to the territory of France. Third, the work of David Rappoport will be used as a source of inspiration for a detailed study of a new assassination policy that is being applied in the jihadist war that is being waged by the young jihadist fanatics against contemporary France. At the same time, particular attention will be given to the cowardice of the abovementioned young jihadists, which represents a clear contrast to the heroism of soldiers who fight for the defence of their countries. France’s government as well as its citizens face newer and newer merciless messages (Schmid) of jihadists engaging in provocative terrorism (Crenshaw), whose aim is to generate new spirals of deadly violence. Table 2.3. presents all the five above-mentioned authors, their respective fields of research as well as their key ideas. Since 2001, the relations between radical jihadists and the Western world have been moving in a vicious circle of deadly violence with growing numbers of victims and strong psychological and political impacts. This violence has two key dimensions: instrumental and doctrinal. The former includes lethal violence such as that of the military operations against terrorist attacks, and the latter is articulated in the doctrinal documents that rationalize the use of armed violence. For both, the principle of reciprocity is a typical form of the related mutual interactions. Within this framework, it is necessary to pay a big attention to the arguments and discourses of the contemporary terrorist organizations (Ditrych, 2014). The Vicious Circle of Violence The word “vicious circle” is defined as a continuing unpleasant situation created when one problem causes another problem that then makes the first problem worse.8 8 Definition of “vicious circle” from the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus, Cambridge University Press.

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Table 2.3 The most important authors in terrorism studies and their inspiring ideas for the study of contemporary terrorism Author Lawrence Freedman Bruce Hoffman David Rappoport

Field of research Terrorism and strategy Inside terrorism terror’s aftermath Global terrorism

Alex Schmid

Violence as communication

Martha Crenshaw

The causes of terrorism

Key ideas The territory of a colonial and/or occupying power as an ideal environment for terrorism Terrorism as a new face of war in the twenty-first century Counterterrorism policy Assassination policy Discriminated vs. non discriminated killing Martyrdom vs. cowardice Insurgent or peacetime terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes Strategy of communication between the terrorists and governments as a “language of blood” based on the messages to five key actors: the message to the adversary the message to the victims and their families the message to those who identify with the victims the message to the sympathizers of the terrorist organization the message to the media Provocative terrorism, whose aim is to provoke the attacked country to a violent reaction which will discredit it

Table 2.4 The vicious circle of violence between France and jihadists Forms of violence Doctrinal Instrumental

Jihadists Jihad by pen = Fatwas and the GIRC of 2004 Jihad by the sword = terrorist attacks against both civilians in France and soldiers in different missions

France The Hollande doctrine and the Macron doctrine French military interventions + regime saving operations in the Islamic world during the last decade

This concept is very suitable for research of the interactions between Western military interventions in the Islamic world and the punitive terrorist attacks perpetrated by jihadists with the aim of transferring the conflict to the territory of Western countries. The following table indicates that the key attention of the book will be aimed at the analysis of two basic subjects. The first of them is represented by the most important documents of a doctrinal character that justify the use of violent instruments (military interventions of the French armed forces vs. punitive terrorist attacks). The second of them aims the basic attention to the above-mentioned forms of violence (Table 2.4). Another key focus of this text will be the attacks that occurred after French military interventions in the Islamic world. The proposed text will be written as a theory-proposing text (Van Evera, 1997) for the research of contemporary global terror. It does not present a completely new theory. Its ambition is much more

2.6

Methodology

31

modest: it will propose a modest contribution to the long-term theoretical research of two intertwined phenomena: (a) The principle of reciprocity in the security culture and behaviour of the three compared antagonistic actors of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. (b) The dynamic relationship between the instrumental and doctrinal violence used by them.

2.6

Methodology

In terms of methodology, this book will be written as a combination of theory testing and policy evaluative work (Van Evera, 1997). This means that the following chapters will test the potential of the theory of the above-mentioned and very often cited French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. His concepts of the field, capital, and habitus will be used to produce a detailed analysis of the key events and actors of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. The term “policy evaluative” means that this text will analyse the political programs, approaches, decisions, and concrete acts of the three key groups of actors in contemporary France. At the same time, this text will examine the results and consequences of these politics. In light of the recommendations of Umberto Eco (1977), the text will be based on the study of primary resources, namely, doctrines, speeches of presidents, and statements of prime ministers and ministers. At the same time, a wide range of secondary resources will be cited, especially the monographs, essays, and articles of the most influential relevant actors. These resources enlarge the spectrum of knowledge and circumstances of the studied phenomena. The Equilibrium Between Holism and Individualism Within the framework of the methodology, Margaret Hermann represents an important inspiration. This teacher from the Ohio State University published a long series of books and articles about the foreign policy of the USA, the role of political leaders, and the methodology of research in this important field (Hermann, 1980). She managed to very clearly define the main differences between the two basic approaches. The first of them is called the holistic approach, and it is aimed at the study of social structures and their role in politics. The second is called individualism, and it analyses the roles of concrete individual actors (Hermann, 2012). Even if on the pages of following chapters, the first approach will predominate, the second approach will not be underestimated. In contrast, a large space will be reserved for the analysis of the most influential individuals from all three studied social groups. All of them will be presented, and necessary attention will be given to the analysis of all the factors that create their capitals and habitus. This concretely means that their narratives, arguments, motivations, decisions, actions, and political behaviour and its consequences for the political field of contemporary France will be analysed.

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Objective vs. Subjective Approaches In the book, the objective approach will be preferred over the subjective approach, and the “outside scoop” will be used rather than the “inside scoop”. However, this preponderance will not be absolute; it will be only relative. This specifically means that the author will not proceed as a political psychologist who is oriented towards the study of subjectivities and their preferences. In other words, the author of this text will try to work as an investigative reporter who tries to piece together the story of the profound changes in the circle of violence in contemporary France. The vicious circle of violence in contemporary France will be studied through two lenses. The first of them, the institutional lens, gives us the possibility to focus our key attention on the institutions/procedures that have been used by the three studied groups: the networks of the terrorist organizations, the governmental institutions and mechanisms, and the institutions/procedures used by the French soldiers. The word “focus” is understood here as the description of the research interest and of the main or central point of the research attention and interest.9 The second lens, the people’s lens, is focused on the roles of individuals. In the case of French jihadists, the main research attention and interest will be aimed at the perpetrators of the most brutal terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2022. In the case of the political élites, the key attention will be focused on the decisions of the Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Ministers. Last, in the study of the third group, the decisions and declarations of the generals as the most respected moral authorities will be at the centre of the research focus. At the same time, the people lens is oriented towards the study of the capital and habitus of concrete particular actors. It examines their positions and attitudes and the roles that they assume in the field of contemporary France. The capital of these people results from the fact that they identify and interpret problems in the political situation in contemporary France. As a result, the habitus of these people results from the fact that they influence all political decisions and political behaviour of the contemporary French institutions. Idealism vs. Materialism In this book, idealism prevails over materialism. However, as in the case of the preceding criteria, this preponderance will be only relative. This concretely means that within the framework of the capital as well as in the habitus of all the compared actors, the basic values, motives, narratives, and arguments prevail over the material factors. In the group of French jihadists, the key attention will be given to the analysis of their motives and the authoritative resources of their main capital (namely, their hate towards the West and France as well as their determination to transfer the war from the Islamic world to the territory of France). The book will continue by providing an analysis of the critical attitudes of the French soldiers towards the weakness and lack of an approach of the governing élites towards the problems caused by the failing immigration policy and by the terrorist 9

Focus|meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary. Available from: http://dictionary.cambridge. org › dictionary › focus.

2.6

Methodology

33

attacks. At the same time, the book will carefully analyse their habitus, which is based on three pillars. The first is the basic values articulated by their leading symbolic authorities. The second is the experiences and lessons they learned during their missions in the Islamic world as well as in the territory of France, which play an important role. The third is the two open letters from 2021 addressed to the governing élites of France, which will be analysed. Last, the book will study the capital of the French governing élites, which is based on their key ideas, their narratives and arguments, and their approaches and attitudes towards the two other groups, especially towards the revolting French soldiers. The book will show that in their approach towards the jihadists, the habitus of the governing élites is made up of ideal instruments, especially the eloquent and bathetically formulated and presented speeches of the contemporary President of the Republic. However, in their approach towards the revolting soldiers, their habitus is made up of restrictive and punitive measures. However, on the other hand, the book will pay much attention to the analysis of an important material factor that is represented by the consequences of the cuts to the defence budgets. In light of the theory of Pierre Bourdieu, the military budget represents the main material capital of the military forces of each important and influential state. Moreover, it is a basic pillar of the role of every country in international relations and of its international prestige (Leroy, 2021). This fact explains why the discussions about this capital are so controversial and why the protests of the French soldiers are so determined. Processes and Outcomes One ambition of this book is to offer an equilibrium between processes and outcomes (Hermann, 2012). It will search for an answer to the question of what happened in contemporary France as well as the question of why it happened. The first question implies the following questions: what are the key features of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France, who are its key actors, and what are their strategic aims and tactical measures and instruments? The second question continues with the following sub-questions: why did the above-mentioned vicious circle happen, why do its key actors continue to fight among themselves, and why are they not able to take off their warrior habitus? Last, why is it so difficult to reach a generally acceptable outcome of the contemporary vicious circle of violence? Last, the text will be written as a narrative that explains the mutual interactions between the actors (Van Evera, 1997) and the importance of time and history in politics (Karlas, 2007). Like every narrative, this text is based on a detailed analysis of various elements (in this case, particularly the key actors and their respective security cultures) and offers an original story about mutually intertwined causes and effects (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018). In light of the recommendations of the important Italian author Umberto Eco (1977), the text will be based on primary resources: the relevant doctrines, the speeches of Presidents, the statements of various Prime Ministers and Ministers, analyses of military operations and terrorist attacks, etc. At the same time, some

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Table 2.5 Research questions RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 RQ 4

What are the key reasons, actors, and features of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France? What kinds of behaviour are prevailing in the strategies and tactics of the analysed groups of actors? What are the roles of the capital, habitus, and DCMs of the three key actors of the social war in contemporary France? What are the reasons, actors, and possible consequences of the revolt of French soldiers?

secondary resources will be used as well, namely, monographs, essays, articles, reviews, reports, and interviews. This text will be written as an analytic narrative whose aim is to present all the key actors, their respective strategies, and their mutual interactions (Bates et al., 1998). It will fully respect the principle of “path dependence”, particularly in the field of political combat (Pierson, 2004). The strategy of France and that of the terrorist organizations will be studied and analysed in light of historical factors with the aim of detecting the most important events in the long-term clash of violence between these two actors. Each chapter will be written as a case study that will help us to understand what is at stake in contemporary France (Gerring, 2007).

2.7

Research Questions

This chapter is crowned by a presentation of four research questions (RQs). They are formulated as statements that identify the phenomenon that this book wants to study, particularly the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. The answers to the above-mentioned RQs will show that it is a phenomenon that is highly interesting and important, but until today, it has not been satisfactorily addressed, while satisfactory questions about it have not been asked or answered. The RQs are formulated with the aim of addressing a fundamental and interesting issue and contributing to the understanding of the explosive situation in contemporary France. This book is based on four RQs which are clearly articulated in Table 2.5. The above-presented RQs are not oriented to an ideal world, and they do not have a normative character. This concretely means that the aim of this book is not to say how the vicious circle in contemporary France should be resolved or how this important country should be governed. In contrast, they are formulated as positive questions. They open the way towards a better understanding of the existing world. All the RQs of this text are oriented to the research of the relationships and associations between three important groups in the field of contemporary France. They are formulated with the aim of satisfying the criteria of relevancy and of availability of the types of knowledge that are necessary for the research. Last, they reflect the ambition to open the way towards findings that could be generalizable outside of the study of France during the last 10 years.

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All four RQs have been formulated with the aim of satisfying the criteria of qualitative research (Burnham, 2008). They are oriented towards non-numerical, in-depth directed research and the corresponding data collection. They are not aimed at a large quantity of cases, and their scope is reduced to the most important cases connected with the studied topic. Last, they are oriented towards increasing the understanding of the context of the studied subject. Summary In contemporary France, we are witnessing a vicious circle between the military operations waged by this country and the terrorist attacks inflicted against it by jihadist organizations. This vicious circle has three key actors: the jihadi terrorists, political élites, and soldiers. Its analysis is based on the theoretical heritage of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, namely, on his concepts of field, social war, capital, habitus, and moral harassment in the political field. This text is written as a combination of theory testing and policy evaluative work. Its aim is to offer an equilibrium between holism and individualism, between idealism vs. materialism, and between processes and outcomes. All the analyses are framed by four research questions formulated with the aim of satisfying the criteria of qualitative research.

References Adler-Nissen, R. (2013). Sovereignty. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Routledge. Al-Suri, A. M. (2010, July 23). The global Islamic resistance call. Archive.org. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/TheGlobalIslamicResistanceCall Bates, R., Greif, N., Levi, M., & Laurent, J. (1998). Analytic narratives. Princeton University Press. Bigo, D. (2013). Security. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Routledge. Bourdieu, P. (1982). Ce que parler veut dire. Lʼéconomie des échanges linguistiques. Fayard. Bourdieu, P. (1984). Questions de sociologie. Minuit. Bourdieu, P. (1988). Practical reasons. Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language of symbolic power. Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1992). Les règles de l’art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire. Seuil. Bourdieu, P. (1994a). Stratégies de reproduction et modes de domination. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1994/5(105). Bourdieu, P. (1994b). Raisons pratiques: sur la théorie de l’action. Seuil. Bourdieu, P. (2000). Pascalian meditations. Polity Press. Bourdieu, P. (2015). Sociologie générale vol. 1. Cours au Collège de France 1981–1983. Vol. 1. Média Diffusion. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). The purpose of reflexive sociology. Polity Press. Bueger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2018). International practice theory. Palgrave MacMillan. Burnham, P. (2008). Research methods in politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Cambridge Advanced Learnerʼs Dictionary & Thesaurus. Cambridge English dictionary. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://dictionary.cambridge.org › dictionary › focus. Carr, E. (1961). What is history? Macmillan. Crenshaw, M. (2008). The causes of terrorism. In B. J. Lutz & J. Lutz (Eds.), Global terrorism (Vol. I). Sage.

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Cronin, A. K. (2011). How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. Princeton University Press. de Fornel, M., & Ogien, A. (Eds.). (2011). Bourdieu Théoricien de la pratique (Vol. 21). Editions de lʼEHESS, Raisons Pratiques. Ditrych, O. (2014). Tracing the discourses of terrorism: Genealogy, identity and state. Palgrave Macmillan. Duffield, J. (1988). World power forsaken. Stanford University Press. Eco, U. (1977). Come si fa una tesi di laurea. Bompiani. Freedman, L. (1986). Terrorism and strategy. In L. Freedman et al. (Eds.), Terrorism and international order. Routledge. Gerring, J. (2007). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University. Gray, C. S. (2018). Theory of strategy. Oxford University Press. Guzzini, S. (2013). Power. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Routledge. Hermann, M. (1980). Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 7–46. Hermann, M. (2012). The study of American FP. In S. W. Hook & C. M. Jones (Eds.), Routledge handbook of American foreign policy. Routledge. Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside terrorism. St. Andrewʼs. Hoffman, B. (2001, September 16). Terror’s aftermath: A counterterrorism policy for yesterday’s threat. Los Angeles Times, p. M5. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. Columbia University Press. Ignatius, D. (2014, September 25). The “Mein Kampf’ of Jihadˮ. The Washington Post. Johnson, J. L. (2006). Strategic culture: Refining the theoretical construct. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. Johnson, T. H., & Russell, J. A. (2008). A hard day’s night? The United States and the global war on terrorism. In B. J. Lutz & J. Lutz (Eds.), Global terrorism (Vol. IV). Sage. Karlas, J. (2007). Paul Pierson: Politics in time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Mezinárodní vztahy, 42(2). Kirchner, E., & Sperling, J. (1988). Global security governance: Competing perceptions of security in the twenty-first century. Routledge. Lemieux, C. (2011). Le crépuscule des Champs. Limites dʼun concept ou disparition d’une réalité historique? Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales. Lemoine, S. (2020). Découvrir Bourdieu. Les éditions sociales. Lenoir, R. (2004). Espace social et classes sociales chez Pierre Bourdieu. Sociétés & Représentations, 2004/1 (17). Leroy, A. (2021). L’armée dans la politique étrangère. In B. Badie & D. Vidal (Eds.), La France, une puissance contrariée. Éditions La Découverte. Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical view. Macmillan. Manceron, G. (2005). Marianne et les colonies. Une introduction à l’histoire coloniale de la France. Éditions La Découverte. McAllister, B., & Schmid, A. (2011). Terrorism as communication. Routledge. Merand, F., & Forget, A. (2012). Strategy. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Routledge. Montagnon, P. (2010). Dictionnaire de la colonisation française. Édition Pygmalion. Moravcsik, A. (1997, Autumn). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organisation, 51(4). Nash, E. (2006, November 7). Madrid bombers “were inspired by Bin Laden address”. The Independent. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20080706184144/http:/news.indepen dent.co.uk/europe/article1961431.ece Obama, B., & Biden, J. (2008). Barack Obama and Joe Biden’s plan to combat poverty. ObamaBiden website. Fall 2008. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions and social analysis. Princeton University.

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Pouliot, V., & Mérand, F. (2013). Bourdieu’s concepts. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Routledge. Rappoport, D. (2008). Global terrorism. In B. J. Lutz & J. Lutz (Eds.), Global terrorism (Vol. I). Sage. Resolution 1566. (2004). Adopted by the security council at its 5053rd meeting on 8 October 2004. Sachs, J. D. (2006). The end of poverty. Penguin Books. Schmid, A. P. (2008). The response problem as a definition problem. In B. J. Lutz & J. Lutz (Eds.), Global terrorism (Vol. I). Sage. Schmid, A. (2011). Violence as communication: Propaganda by the deed, violence and coercion. In A. Schmid (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of terrorism research. Routledge. Schmid, A. P., & de Graaf, J. (1982). Violence as communication: Insurgent terrorism and the western news media. Sage. Usama bin Laden says the Al-Qaida group had nothing to do with the 11 September attacks, Ummat, Karachi, Sept. 28, 2001. Retrieved from http://www.robert-fisk.com/usama:interview_ ummat.xhtml Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University.

Chapter 3

What Preceded the Attacks Against France: From 9/11 to the European Front of the Global Terror (2001–2005)

Abstract This chapter is divided into six sections that will analyze 9/11, the following US doctrinal documents, the two US wars waged in the Islamic world and the opening of the European front of the Global Terror. They will be analyzed in light of the principle of reciprocity (Goldstein and Pevehouse, International relations, Longman, 2007: 4–9), which solves the collective goods problem by rewarding behaviour that contributes to the group and punishing behaviour that pursues self-interest at the expense of the group. The behaviour of human beings as well as that of states is very often influenced by the principle of mirrors: one group’s behaviour reflects the acts and messages recently received from another group of people or states. Unfortunately, this principle can lead to a dangerous spiral of mutual punishments and to an escalation of mutual hostility and violence between them. In the following pages, we will study this spiral’s development during three periods of the relations between the West and jihadi terrorists.

3.1

The Attacks from 9/11 as the Beginning of the Era of the Global Terror

The 11.9.2001, ale the world was shocked by the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the twin towers of the WTO in New York. Today, it is generally recognized that these attacks opened the era of Global Terror (GT). In this era, these attacks are perpetrated as the premeditated killing of a defenseless civilian population with the following key credo: “a lot of people watching, and a lot of people killed” (Brian, 2006: 117–130). They have been planned by Osama bin Laden (ObL); the leader of the terrorist network called al-Qaida. These attacks started a cycle of decivilization (Beck, 2003). In the justification of the above-mentioned attacks, he mentioned two referential objects. The first of them was the long-term USA’s unilateral support of the State of Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians. The second referential object of ObL was the American military presence in Saudi Arabia, the native country of ObL, after Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991. These two referential objects of ObL © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_3

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represent the key pillars of jihadist doctrinal violence (JDV) for the 1990s (Rogers, 2008: 179). Moreover, he was the first terrorist leader who managed to territorialize a terrorist organization and to transform a whole state (Afghanistan) into a large base for the preparation of new terrorist attacks with a global impact and global consequences (Simes, 2003: 91–102). Today, we know that the decision of ObL resulted from his hateful reflection of the acts and messages that he had received from the ruling élites of his country who had been perceived as the so-called near enemy, while the USA and its soldiers in Saudi Arabia had been perceived as the far enemy (Rogers, 2008: 179). In this light, the 9/11 attacks represented the culmination of his hate and of his obsession with violent revenge. On the following pages of this book, the analysis of each important terrorist attack, not only the 9/11 attacks but also all attacks perpetrated in France, will pay a big attention to the strategy of communication, which includes five actors: transmitter, target, addressee, message, and feed-back (Henderson, 2001: 18). The strategy of communication is a concept that gives us the possibility to understand the psychological and political motivations as well as the consequences of every examined terrorist attack. In this light, the attacks from 9/11 have had three messages. First, the USA must reduce its political and military support of Saudi Arabia and its other client Islamic states, which are seen as discredited apostate and tyrannical states.1 Second, this superpower must revisit its approach to the Middle East, which had been perceived as an unfair foreign policy (Walt, 2005: 105–120). In other words, ObL sent the message that even the USA must take into consideration the limits of its power and influence (Walt, 2006). Last, the attacks from 9/11 send the message about the determination of the jihadi terrorist who does not hesitate to make absolute sacrifice. A leading French author Farhad Khosrokhavar (EHESS Paris) underlines the role of the altruistic suicides perpetrated in the name of the humiliated Muslims (Khosrokhavar, 2009). Moreover, the emphasis on this justification of the attacks 9/11 confirms the strong role played by authoritative resources (Eichler, 2017). The above-mentioned message was very clearly explained by the g words of Ulrich Beck, a worldwide respected German sociologist. He underlined the importance of the determination to use one’s life as a weapon that completely devalues the tools of state power in the face of terrorists, and they thus gain infinite dominance and, as a result, an enormous power (Beck, 2005). In this context, we can better understand the fact that poorly armed individuals challenged, surprised, and wounded the world’s dominant superpower (Hoffman, 2002: 112).

1

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004. Washington: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquistion, Technology, and Logistics, 2004.

3.2

3.2

The US Doctrinal Documents for the GWOT

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The US Doctrinal Documents for the GWOT

Generally, the concept of doctrine2 has been introduced and used as an instrument that justifies and conceptualizes the use of violence against a presumed or declared enemy (NATO Standardization Office, 2018). Concretely speaking, the doctrinal reaction of G.W. Bush to the attacks of 9/11 has been determined by two factors of basic importance. First, it was his nature of a selfish, self-confident decision-maker prone to snap judgments (Weisberg, 2006). In addition, second, the 43. The president of the USA acted under the decisive influence of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Karl Rove, Condoleezza Rice, and other influential leaders of the neoconservative political thinking in the USA at the beginning of twenty-first century. This coincidence resulted in a military answer of historical dimension and global impact (Ullman, 2017: 24). The Bush doctrine opened the way towards military intervention and following long-term asymmetric war. Moreover, this war represents the longest military engagement in the entire history of the USA. Last, the NSS 2002 has been written as a doctrine of a direct strategy based on the use of state violence. It puts the key emphasis on state-to-state military violence, military invasions, regime changes, and the following occupations (Berenskoetter, 2005: 71–92). It makes up a coherent framework for the combat of the USA and its allies against Islamic states that are presented as security threats for them. This orientation is presented as a method of the punishment of the Islamic states (particularly for 9/11) as well as to preempt their possible preparations of other terrorist attacks. The Bush Doctrine (see Table 3.2) signified an overall cavalier approach on the part of the USA towards international rules and norms, treaties, and security partnerships (Ikenberry, 2001: 19–34). In other words, this doctrine constructed a therapeutic security paradigm (Humphrey, 2009), which presented the war as a central feature of the US administration and transformed G. W. Bush into a war president (Andréani, 2004: 31–50). His strategical approach to the security threat has been strongly influenced by intellectuals in favour of the war (Heilbrunn, 2008: 91–96). His doctrine (Table 3.1) became the symbol of Western Doctrinal Violence and opened the way for Western Military Violence. The doctrinal reactions of the USA have been articulated in the military dimension (Jervis, 2003) of the NSS 2002,3 which emphasized its pre-emptive wars against rogue states and the following regime changes and occupations in such states (Berenskoetter, 2005: 71–92). It was an overall cavalier approach (Ikenberry, 2004: 19–34) that resulted from the so-called therapeutic security paradigm (Humphrey, 2009) of G. W. Bush as a war president (Andréani, 2004: 31–50) who started and waged his big war under the code—name OIF 2003. As a result, the 43rd President of the USA entered modern history, particularly through his emphasis on 2

NATO Standardization Office (NSO), AAP-6(V) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018. 3 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), September 2002. Washington: US Department of State. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

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Table 3.1 The key pillars of the Bush Doctrine Key slogans GWOT

Regime Change Unilateralism Militarism

Geopolitical meanings Determination to start a war against important Islamic states, beginning with Iraq (Berenskoetter, 2005) Determination to topple every regime which harbours terrorist organizations (Korb & Wadhams, 2006) Military interventions in the Islamic world Preference for military approaches and instruments (Desch, 2007: 97–108)

Doctrinal meanings Preference of pre-emptive military operations over long-term prevention Determination to use military supremacy (Eichler, 2011) Determination to wage wars regardless of the international law Unlimited use of force imposed by politicians (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007)

Table 3.2 Binary vision of the GIRC Condemnation of the West The inferior actor Impiousness, weakness, corruption, hypocrisy The third crusade, the pillage of the wealth of the Islamic world, direct and indirect occupations of the Islamic world

Adoration of the Islamic world The superior actor Islam is presented as a therapeutic cure for the protracted disease symbolized by the West. Face-to-face resistance to Western expansion and its destructive behaviour

pre-emptive wars,4 which resulted in a militarization of US foreign policy5 with many counterproductive results (Scowcroft & Berger, 2005). The NSS 2002 and the following doctrinal documents articulated the determination of the administration of the 43rd President of the USA to wage the wars of choice against politicians and even against states suspicious from the active role in the preparation of attacks 9/11 and from the support of global terrorist organizations. Today, we know that this doctrinal thinking resulted in two large wars waged in the Islamic world: in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). These wars have had a long range of controversial and counterproductive consequences in the entire world, including the USA. These consequences have been very clearly formulated by Philip H. Gordon, an important and very influential American diplomat and foreign policy expert. From 2013 to 2015, Gordon served in the White House as a Special Assistant to the President and the White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region. He categorically condemned the 43rd President of the USA for his flawed diagnosis. Gordon reproached to G.W. Bush his misuse of force and 4

President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point United States Military Academy. West Point, New York, 1. 6. 2002. Available at: georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 5 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (2005), November 2005. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 2005.

3.3

Jihadist Doctrinal Answer as the Mirror of the Bush Doctrine

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invited him to wage another war, a war against the causes, not against the symptoms, of the tensions between the USA and the Islamic world (Gordon, 2008). At the same time, G.W. Bush was criticized because he gave the terrorists the war they wanted (Schroeder, 2001/2202) offered them the role of martyrs and nourished their aggressive campaign (Roberts, 2005: 101–130). As an answer to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Bush Doctrine entered contemporary history by its specific form of strategic and security culture (SSC). Generally, SSC is understood as a collection of ideas, conditional emotional responses, and established behaviours that national strategic communities have acquired through study or imitation (Snyder, 1977). In addition, in the concrete case of the 43rd President of the USA, it was a mixture of Jacksonian and Hamiltonian traditions (Mead, 1999–2000). In light of the basic criteria of SSC, this doctrine was based on unilateralist approaches (Krauthammer, 2001) and on the exaggeration of security threats (Ikenberry, 2001: 19–34). It was a strong activist (Krauthammer, 2001) and formative approach to terrorism as an imminent security threat (Freedman, 2004). Today, we know that it has a long range of unintended consequences. Finally, its framework has been problematic (Andréani, 2004). Table 3.1 presents key slogans, geopolitical meanings, and doctrinal meanings of the doctrine of the 43rd President of the USA.

3.3

Jihadist Doctrinal Answer as the Mirror of the Bush Doctrine

The Islamists’ doctrinal mirror answer to the Bush doctrine was articulated in the document titled Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC) (Al-Suri, 2010). It is no wonder that this doctrinal document received an unflattering sobriquet the “Jihadist Mein Kampf” (Ignatius, 2014). It described the West as “impious, weak, corrupted, cowardly, and hypocritical”. The Islamic world, in contrast, is adored in the document as the superior actor, even as a therapeutic cure for the protracted disease of the West. Most importantly, two variants of terrorist attacks are recommended. The first is punitive attacks as acts of revenge for the preceding Western interventions and occupations. The second is pre-emptive attacks as a cruel method of blackmail and intimidation and, at the same time, as a form of deterrence against the Western temptation to intervene in the Islamic world. The Islamists’ doctrinal thinking is anchored in the document called the Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC) of 2004 (Al-Suri, 2010), whose diction is so hateful and aggressive towards the West that it received a nickname—the “Jihadist Mein Kampf” (Masoud, 2013). It describes the West as a principal enemy of and an existential threat to the Islamic world and condemns it for its alleged impiousness, weakness, corruption, cowardice, and hypocrisy. Within its binary vision, the Islamic world is adored as the superior actor, even as a therapeutic cure for the protracted disease of the West. The West is also condemned for its third crusade, its

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systematic pillages of the wealth of the Islamic world and its military operations in this part of the world. Constructed and articulated as a doctrinal mirror of the NSS 2002, the GIRC places emphasis on punitive as well as pre-emptive terrorist attacks. The punitive attacks are perceived as acts of revenge for the preceding Western interventions and occupations. Pre-emptive terrorist attacks are conceived as a cruel method of extortion and intimidation and as a form of deterrence. The binary Vision of the GIRC (Condemnation of the contemporary West vs. adoration of the Islam) is presented in Table 3.2.

3.4

Global Clash of Doctrinal Violence

On the one hand, the above-mentioned Jihadist doctrine symbolizes the so-called Jihad by pen. Moreover, it becomes the basis for the following attitudes and fatwas that motivate young Muslims desperate and fanatic to perpetrate mass killings of civilians in Western countries as well as of their soldiers engaged in military operations waged in Islamic countries. The jihadist fully ignores the fact that these operations have a clear mandate of the UN Security Council, and their aim is the elimination of jihadists who are determined to seize large territories in Northern Africa and to transform them into their safe havens. The more dangerous jihadist doctrinal documents and attitudes justify the barbarous killings of innocent people and openly encourage and provoke violent attacks and mass murders perpetrated on civilians. On the other hand, the Bush doctrine represents a complex of ideas and methods for how to prepare and wage wars in the Islamic world with the aim of destroying jihadi terrorist organizations, destroying their safe havens, and, if necessary, imposing a regime change in these countries of the Islamic world. As we know today, this doctrinal approach has been applied in wars of historical importance: Afghanistan in 2001 (OEF) and Iraq in 2003 (OIF). The Western and Jihadist doctrinal documents from the first decade of the twentyfirst century played an enormously important role in international security relations. As a result, we are witnessing a highly dangerous process of the escalation of mutual hate, hostility, violence, and revenge. As a result, we are witnessing a global clash of doctrinal violence between the West and jihadists. From the beginning until today, this clash escapes the political control of both actors. Bush Doctrine Versus the GIRC in Light of Reciprocity The Bush Doctrine demonizes the jihadist interpretation of Islam, while the GIRC demonizes the West. The punitive attacks of the West have the form of military interventions and following occupations and they are presented as an answer to the terrorist attacks of Jihadists. The Islamists’ punitive terrorist attacks in Western cities are interpreted as an answer to Western military interventions. If the pre-emptive Western attacks are rationalized by the slogans of the necessity to interdict the

3.4

Global Clash of Doctrinal Violence

45

creation of new safe havens for terrorists and the preparation of new terrorist attacks, the pre-emptive attacks of the Jihadists are rationalized by the necessity to discourage and even deter the Western countries from conducting new interventions in the Islamic world. There is only one basic difference: the West relies on direct, statebased violence, while the Jihadists rely on indirect, nonstate-based violence. The West has the possibility to overthrow the pro-Jihadist governments, while the Jihadists can “only” provoke destabilizations of Western governments. Patron Against Broker, Broker Against Patron In his role as patron, Mr. W. Bush had almost limitless first-order allocation resources. The USA was the richest country in the world, with a GDP of more than $11 trillion, almost forty times the GDP of Saudi Arabia.6 As a commander-inchief, G. W. Bush had a total of 1.4 million professional soldiers plus 1.2 million trained and well-prepared reserves. However, at the same time, G. W. Bush partially acted, especially in the years 2002–2003, as a broker and as a trader with confidence. First, 43rd President of the USA presented an exemplary social construction of the security threat, expressed in his speeches delivered in Cincinnati in October 2002. In this speech, George W. Bush declared that when it stood face to face with the imminent and obvious threat of Iraq, the USA could not wait for a final proof, for a smoking gun, because that smoking gun could take on the form of a mushroom cloud (Bush, 2002). This line of arguments was crowned by the then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld when he added his famous declaration that the absence of evidence7 (of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq) is not the same as evidence of their absence. Nevertheless, the approach of D. Rumsfeld to the question of the WMD in Iraq provoked a discussion.8 Second, the Bush Administration exerted extraordinarily strong and intense pressure on intelligence services and gave them a clear political challenge. It required the evidence for the argument that Saddam Hussein was behind the strikes of September 11, 2001, and that he was in the train to finish his nuclear program (Freedman, 2004: 8). Last, in preparation for the OIF 2003, Mr. G. W. Bush and his administration applied a bipolar approach. They praised the countries that supported their action while not concealing “contempt for all countries that did not support their political decisions” (Fukuyama, 2006: 64). On the other hand, ObL acted as a broker because, compared to G. W. Bush, he had very limited first-order resources and no regular army. In contrast, he profited from an infinite wealth of second-order resources. It was his emphasis on the idea that the Islamic world must free itself from the pernicious influence of the West. This gave him the opportunity to act for a long time as a businessman with the confidence of the Islamic world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. He used the feelings

6

The World Almanac and book of facts 2005, p. 112. “Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense (defense.gov)”, February 12, 2002. 8 Rumsfeld (2011). 7

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of hundreds of millions of Muslims of humiliation and helplessness as an endless base for the mobilization of social capital. Simultaneously, ObL acted in part as a patron. First, he used his financial resources accumulated in his previous business, and his extended family had a long list of significant deals with the Bush family. Second, he relied on his bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan. On this basis, he made the decision to lead the terrorist attacks primarily through ideological messages (Porter, 2009: 296). In this situation, ObL profited from the fact that the social network of the Islamic world at the beginning of the twenty-first century is very extensive. It represents almost one-sixth of all humanity, a billion people who are in a large measure affected by feelings of injustice and helplessness in the face of a growing presence and, in particular, Western influence. He made the decision to benefit from the fact that “those who are both poor and uprooted may see the possibility of revenge and selfesteem in terrorism” (Hoffman, 2002: 112). In reaction to the above-mentioned context, Robert Pape presented an interesting neorealist point of view: according to him, al-Qaeda functioned as a “transnational military alliance working together to fight for national liberation from what is considered an imperial threat” (Pape, 2005: 104).

3.5

US Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq

The first months after 9/11 saw the publication of a series of doctrinal documents of the USA, namely, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002) and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002),9 which articulated the determination of the Administration of the 43rd President of the USA to overthrow hostile governments in two Islamic countries. They were followed by two large military interventions and two successful regime changes. However, on the other hand, they resulted in the long-term military occupations of these countries. At the same time, they provoked strong negative feelings not only towards the USA but also towards the Western European countries that participated in the controversial Operation Iraqi Freedom. OEF 2001 as the First Application of the Bush Doctrine The first military intervention occurred in Afghanistan in 2001, and it was crowned by a successful “regime change policy” carried out by the 43rd US President— George W. Bush. The Taliban regime was toppled, and the new government led by President Hamid Karzai was enthroned. This operation was professed to be an Afghan model of a quick and inexpensive war based on an overwhelming predominance in terms of modern technology (Biddle, 2006: 161–176). However, since 2003, the first serious problems have arisen (Eichler, 2007: 167–173), and they 9 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002). Washington: U. S. Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs.

3.5

US Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq

47

continued to grow over time until the departure of the coalition soldiers in 2021. The OEF 2001 represented a major challenge as well as a difficult test for all member states of NATO, including France (Hynek & Eichler, 2010: 405–430). Military Characteristics and Results of the OIF 200310 The OIF began at 5.34 am Baghdad time on March 20, 2003, without any official declaration of war. This operation was led by the US Army General Tommy Franks, who had under his command 248,000 US soldiers, 45,000 British soldiers, 2000 Australian soldiers, and 194 Polish soldiers; the US troops included the 1st and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 3rd Commando Brigade, the 3rd Infantry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. The UK forces were represented by the 1st Armored Division. All these forces proceeded very professionally; they properly predicted that the Iraqi equipment and tactics would be out of date, and they correctly anticipated the Iraqi troops’ reluctance to fight on the side of the profoundly discredited and hated Iraqi dictatorship. During the air phase of the OIF 2003, Western forces swiftly eliminated the most fundamental weapon systems of the Iraqi army. They opted for quick encirclements of the core epicentres of the more-or-less symbolic resistance of Iraqi army groups. Thanks to this fact and to a clever application of their Network Centric Warfare (NCW), they managed to quickly encircle the important cities and advanced 560 km within the first 3 days. As a result, the US troops managed to destroy the Iraqi armed forces as well as capture their strategic sites within a few days, and they reached the city of Baghdad sooner than originally foreseen. After the overthrow of the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the role of the USA and the UK in Iraq was officially confirmed by the UN SC Resolution 1483/2003— the two countries sent a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under a unified command (the “Authority”). Today, it is generally known that the OIF 2003 resulted in a clear military victory of the USA, which was based on the US technological superiority gained thanks to the accomplishments of the RMA. Nevertheless, the human price of this operation was enormously high: 600,000 civilians dead (Burnham et al., 2006: 1421–1428) and between 2.7 and 3 million Iraqi internally displaced persons (Sassoon, 2009: 29). Additionally, it started the second wave of Jihadist Doctrinal Violence. It is no wonder that the US occupation of Iraq is seen as a historic error (Rogers, 2008: 181). Despite uncontestable military success, the enemy collapsed; nevertheless, the following months and years showed that it was not completely destroyed. The rebels and terrorists managed to pass into “illegality” and commenced their guerrilla warfare, which demanded an increase in the numbers of their troops, a lengthening of their stays, and higher expenses for situation stabilization and reconstruction (Scowcroft & Berger, 2005). This unintended outcome becomes a sore point for 10

In this part of the text, the author reproduces key ideas which he has published in 2017. Eichler (2017).

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the American army. Their ability to apply qualitative and discriminative violence receded and was gradually replaced by a quantitative and indiscriminative use of violence. Francis Fukuyama, a leading US political scientist, paid a big attention to the analysis of the counterproductive consequences and concluded that G. W. Bush brought about exactly what he wanted to avoid: a rise in the activities of jihadist terrorist organizations (Fukuyama, 2004). An important US doctrinal document from 2004 concluded that the USA’s direct intervention in the Muslim world has had a paradoxical effect: it reinforced the radical Islamists and dramatically reduced the support for the USA (Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 2004).

3.6

The European Front of the Global Terror

Unfortunately, the war in Iraq did not put an end to terrorism, but quite the opposite—it opened the way leading to its rise not only in Iraq but over the entire Western Hemisphere. It even launched a total combat against the West (Smolar, 2005). In 2004 and 2005, Spain and the UK were directly punished with terrorist attacks prepared and perpetrated as bloody punishment for their active participation at the OIF 2003 and at the following occupation of Iraq. As a mirror of two military interventions of the USA and its allies in the Islamic world (the OEF 2001 and especially of the OIF 2003), two cruel punitive attacks occurred. The first of them was perpetrated in Spain, exactly 30 months after 9/11, during the Spanish elections (Nash, 2006). In the pages and chapters that follow, this text will argue that these two attacks have had enormously large and important geopolitical consequences. They opened the European Front of Global Terror, which continued in other Western European countries, especially in France. These attacks accelerated the dynamics of the vicious cycle of violence between war and terrorism and between jihadists and the West. During this horrible cycle, large towns with a high concentration of civilians will be attacked and killed.

3.6.1

Madrid 2004

First, the attacks against Spain had a remarkable chronological circumstance: they were perpetrated on March 11, 2004, exactly 30 months after 9/11. It is a remarkable example of premeditation as a basic feature of every spectacular terrorist attack. Second, their modus operandi was enormously cynical: a perfidious installation of explosive materials on a train caused the deaths of 194 students. Last, and most importantly, these attacks were intentionally perpetrated during the Spanish elections with the aim of influencing their results (Nash, 2006). This cynical calculation

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The European Front of the Global Terror

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Table 3.3 The vicious circle of violence between Western countries and jihadists Form of violence Instrumental Doctrinal

Western countries Military interventions + regime change, or regime saving The Bush Doctrine (the NSS 2002 + other documents) in the USA The Hollande doctrine in France

Jihadists Terrorist attacks (jihad by the sword) Jihad by pen (Particularly the Fatwas of Osama bin Laden and the GIRC of 2004)

was rewarded by the profound discrediting of Prime Minister J.-M. Aznar, who imputed these attacks to the ETA as a transmitter. This colossal lie was motivated by the Prime Minister’s aim to hide the attacks’ true message: that they were an act of revenge for his participation in OIF 2003 (Gordon, 2004). The perpetrators of these attacks were recruited from the ranks of the outlaws living in difficult conditions in the peripheries of large cities who represented ideal potential members for the groups of the so-called home-grown terrorists of the second generation.11 The targets of these attacks were chosen with the aim of killing a large number of people. The intentions of these attacks were very clear: to cause a profound shock to the large public not only in the Span but also in a global dimension. The message of this premeditated killing was noticeably clear: the Spanish political élites were punished for their support of the American military intervention and the following occupation of Iraq. The perpetrators of these attacks wanted to discourage Western European political élites from actively participating in American military interventions in the Islamic world. In this context, the Madrid attack represented a specific form of Jihadist deterrence towards Western Europe. This Madrid attack was crowned by two shocking successes. First, the Prime Minister lost the following elections, and second, his successor retired the Spanish soldiers from Iraq. Only a year later, the British capital witnessed another awful act of revenge for Iraq (Bennetto & Herbert, 2005). In the case of Madrid, the Jihadist calculation was enormously horrible and even infernal. This cynical calculation with psychological and political consequences of two hundreds of killed people has been crowned by a shocking success. Aznar’s colossal lie opened the way for the victory of the PSOE led by José Zapatero, who decided to withdraw the Spanish soldiers from Iraq. Considering the strategy of communication, not only Spain but also all the world witnessed a perfect success of the Jihadist logic of punitive terrorist attacks. The vicious circle of violence played perfectly into their hands. Table 3.3 presents the comparison of two basic forms of violence of the Western countries resp. Jihadists. The above-mentioned context shows us that the Spanish terrorists achieved clear success. They managed to punish Prime Minister Aznar and all his political party for their fervent support of the US intervention and the following occupation of Iraq.

11 This generation was born in Europe to parents who came there as immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century.

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The massacres at Spanish train stations opened the way for the victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) in the general elections, which opened the way to the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from Iraq. Last, but not least, the terrorists yet again drew enormous media attention and proved the existence of the global dimension of their actions. Therefore, we can conclude that the attacks in Madrid were a remarkable circle of terrorist successes.

3.6.2

The London Attacks in July 2005

Only a year after Madrid, the British capital witnessed another awful act of revenge from Iraq—a series of metro and bus bombings. Even if its perpetrators never had any direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership,12 they succeeded in drawing global attention. First, there was a horrible balance of these attacks: the bombs planted by the terrorists in the metro and in the buses killed 52 and injured several hundred people. Second, similar to the Spanish train bombings, the main goal of these attacks was to punish Prime Minister Blair for the fervour with which he supported G. W. Bush (as his nickname during the preparations for OIF was “Bush’s Foreign Affairs Minister” and to discipline the UK for its participation in the Iraq occupation. Third, the terrorists in London manifested their diabolic intelligence, as in the case of Madrid. They profoundly wounded Great Britain on a very important day. It was the day when Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a G8 summit and was delighted by the decision of the International Olympic Committee that the 2012 Olympic Games would take place in London.13 However, just after the announcement of this happy news, he was shocked by the announcement that London witnessed brutal terrorist attacks. For the moral of T. Blair, it was, to some degree of exaggeration, a fall from the heavenly heights of success on the global scene into the abyss of a cruelly and perfidiously attacked country. Fourth, a high degree of cynicism was typical for these attacks. Their perpetrators were never in any direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership (Bennetto & Herbert, 2005); nevertheless, they still succeeded in drawing global attention. They chose for their attack the day when Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a G8 summit; additionally, the International Olympic Committee had ruled that the 2015 Olympic Games would take place in London on that day. By this choice, they manifested a high degree of infernal and merciless intelligence. All the above-mentioned circumstances increased the emotionality of the reactions of the British public to these attacks. As a result of the military interventions and the subsequent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, which were perceived as acts of revenge for 9/11, a new dynamics of war developed—one where the resistance of local regimes against

12 13

Bennetto and Herbert (2005). 2012 Host City Election—Olympics https://olympics.com › ioc › 2012-...

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political and social changes intensified while jihadists gained more supporters from Arab majorities and more direct and no direct support from the Islamists than the majority of the local governments (Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 2004). In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US soldiers faced traps and ambushes, bombs detonated from afar, and, most importantly, they even faced suicide bombers. It was because of these developments that the international presence began to be understood as an occupation and therefore categorically disclaimed. In light of the strategy of communication, there was a large difference between Aznar and Blair. The first of them lied about the transmitter and especially about the message of the attacks against his country. His motivation was very clear: not to admit that it was a punishment for Iraq. However, his British colleague openly admitted who was the transmitter and what has been his message. It gave him the possibility to save his face by the declaration that Great Britain would not accept the blackmail of terrorists and that it would not retire its soldiers from Iraq. And crowned his declaration by an excellent definition of terrorism and the reactions of his country. He articulates it in the following words: “When they try to intimidate us, we will not be intimidated. When they seek to change our country or our way of life by these methods, we will not be changed. The purpose of terrorism is just that. It is to terrorize people, and we will not be terrorized. This is a very sad day for the British people, but we will hold true to the British way of life” (Smith, 2015). Basically, Tony Blair was right. Nevertheless, this declaration, let it be formulated in the best possible way, could not reverse the situation. Stephen Benedict Dyson, a much-respected British author, remembers that the British choice in Iraq has been interpreted as “Tony Blair’s War” and that many people believe that the personality and leadership style of Tony Blair played a crucial part in determining British participation. Dyson argues that Blair had a high belief in his ability to control events, a low conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. He concludes that Blair’s personality and leadership style did indeed shape both the process and outcome of British foreign policy towards Iraq (Dyson, 2006). Another strongly critical attitude was published 10 years later by Ken Livingstone, the London mayor, in 2005. He did not hesitate to say that Tony Blair was told by the security services: “If you go into Iraq, we will be a target for terrorism”. And he ignored that advice and it killed 52 Londoners (Watt, 2015). In this light, this important politician directly blamed Tony Blair for his attitudes and political behaviour. This means that Blair played an active role in the vicious circle of violence between the West and jihadists after the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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3.6.3

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What Preceded the Attacks Against France: From 9/11 to the European. . .

Common Features of the Attacks in Madrid and London

First, in the two above-mentioned cases, the perpetrators were recruited from the social network of the so-called home-grown terrorists of the second generation of immigrants from the Islamic world. They were inspired by the jihadist doctrine (Benjamin et al., 2006), and they managed to punish the Prime Ministers of two leading Western European countries. Second, it is necessary to remember another important fact: during the first years after the OIF 2003, the fanatical revengeful logic of the GIRC was not applied against France. In full conformity with the principle of reciprocity, this country was spared thanks to its negative political14 as well as diplomatic attitudes towards OIF 2003 (de Villepin, 2014). Last but not least, these attacks have had important international consequences. Following these attacks, the UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) underlined that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that its aim is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to commit or abstain from committing an act. In this concrete case, the aim was more than clear: to coerce the Spanish government to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Political Consequences of the Punitive Terrorist Attacks in Spain and Great Britain Two Prime Ministers have been punished for their decisions to engage their soldiers in an extremely controversial war in the Islamic world. They were punished by two small groups of typical self-starter and initiative-taker terrorists who shared a feeling of humiliation and whose central inspiration was the Al-Qaeda ideology (Benjamin et al., 2006). These violent Jihadists also shared feelings of injustice and hopelessness (Khosrokhavar, 2005) and were obsessed with getting revenge on the West. In this light, they presented conflict-generated terrorism (Stepanova, 2008). As a result, Spain and Great Britain saw a remarkable decrease in the willingness of their political leaders to engage their soldiers in military operations in the Islamic world (Shada Islam, 2004). From the geopolitical point of view, these attacks accentuated the spiral of violence related to the vicious cycle between Western wars and Jihadist terrorism. Finally, the withdrawal of Spanish soldiers from Iraq negatively influenced the relations between the Bush administration and the Spanish government and, as a result, weakened (for a certain period) all transatlantic

Musée du Quai Branly: “Quand Chirac refuse la guerre en Irak, c’est aussi un acte culturel”. Europe 1, June 21, 2016. Available at: https://www.europe1.fr/politique/musee-du-quai-branly quand-chirac-refuse-la-guerre-en-irak-cest-aussi-unacte-culturel-2778172 14

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relations.15 Two important Western European countries have been confronted by the violent strategy of a war machine of Global Terror (Ditrych et al., 2022). Summary The attacks of 11.9.2001 opened the era of Global Terror. The USA reacted by the Bush Doctrine (doctrinal violence) and by two large military operations OEF 2001 and OIF 2003 (instrumental violence). The jihadist mirror of the Bush Doctrine articulated the Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC). The attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) opened the European front of Global Terror. Their analysis is enormously interesting in light of the theory of communication and of the psychological and political consequences. Following these attacks, UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) articulated an excellent definition that underlined that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security.

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Roberts, A. (2005). The ‘war on terror’ in historical perspective. Survival, 47(2), 101–130. Rogers, P. (2008). Terrorism. In: Security studies: An introduction. Routledge. Rumsfeld, D. (2011). Known and unknown: A Memoir. Penguin Group. Sassoon, J. (2009). The Iraqi refugees: The new crisis in the middle east (p. 29). Palgrave Macmillan. Schroeder, P. W. (2001/2002). The risks of victory: An historian’s provocation. The National Interest, 66, Winter 2001/02. Scowcroft, B., & Berger, S. (2005). Getting serious about nation-building. The National Interest, Fall 2005, Iss. 81. Simes, D. K. (2003). America’s imperial dilemma. Foreign Affairs, 82(6), 91–102. Smith, H. (2015). 7/7 bombings: From Tony Blair to Prince William, what key figures said about the attacks at the time. 7/7 bombings: From Tony Blair to Prince William, what key figures ... www.independent.co.uk › UK › Home News. Smolar, P. (2005). L’Irak a relancé la logique du combat total contre l’Occident. Le Monde, 12(7), 2005. Snyder, J. (1977). The soviet strategic culture: Implications for limited nuclear operations. RAND Santa Monica. Stepanova, E. (2008). Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict. SIPRI Research Report No. 23. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (September 2002). Retrieved from https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ Ullman, H. (2017). Anatomy of failure—Why America loses every war it starts (p. 24). Walt, S. (2005). Taming American power. Foreign Affairs, 84(5). Walt, S. (2006, January 23). Nous découvrons ce que la puissance américaine peut et ne peut pas faire. Le Monde. Watt, N. (2015, November 27). Livingstone blames Blair for 7/7 deaths. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/27/livingstone-blames-blair-for-77deaths Weisberg, J. (2006). The bush tragedy: The unmaking of a president. Bloomsbury.

Chapter 4

The Vicious Circle Starts: The French Military Interventions in the Countries of the MENAP

Abstract This chapter will analyse six important French military interventions in the Islamic states after the end of the Cold War. The key attention will be given to the intervention that has been decided and led by two presidents: Francois Hollande and Emmanuel Macron. Even though there are some differences between these interventions, they have had two common aims: to fight against jihadi terrorism and to implement the framework articulated by the doctrine of the seventh president of France. This chapter is divided into nine parts. The first of them presents the general framework of French military operations waged in the Islamic world. The following six parts present and analyse the most important operations: Harmattan 2011, Serval 2012, Sangaris 2013, Barkhane 2014, Chammal 2014, and Takuba 2020. These operations are studied in light of the following points of view: their international and military context, the criteria of international law (legality and legitimacy of each operation), doctrinal context, military and political consequences. The last part of the chapter presents the common features of all analysed operations.

4.1

General Framework of French Military Operations

France is one of the most ambitious countries of the contemporary world. It is a permanent member of the UNSC with the right of veto, it plays an important role in the EU and in NATO (Attali, 2021). Moreover, its current president, Emmanuel Macron, fights for increased European defence-industrial cooperation with the aim of strengthening its role as a strategic actor in the contemporary world. These factors of military force and prestige can be enough to deter classic military threats, but they are not enough when France is faced with terrorist attacks aimed at its civilian population. During the last decade, this hexagonal country has been suffering a long series of terrorist attacks with hundreds of victims and hard political and psychological consequences. These attacks have been perpetrated as acts of revenge and punishment for French military interventions in Islamic countries during the last two decades what is a perfect manifestation of a vicious circle of violence.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_4

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Since the end of the Cold War, French operations in the Islamic world have represented one of the most important instruments of the foreign policy of this country. The term “presidentialization of the political power” is often used to describe the fact that big competencies are reserved to the President of the Republic as the commander-in-chief of all French armed forces. He has to his disposal three important military organs: the General of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Special presidential Staff, and the Commandment of the Special operations (COS). The General of Staff of the French Armed Forces, État-Major des armées (EMA in French), is the most important military institution, his chief (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Chef de l’État-Major des armées—CEMA—in French) occupies the highest position in the French armed forces; he commands all military operations under the authority of the President of the Republic, subject to specific provisions relating to nuclear deterrence. He assists the Minister of the Armed Forces in its capacity attributions to make use of the various required forces and their general organization. He is regularly consulted in the planning and programming work and may be charged by the Minister with any study concerning the armed forces. Moreover, he is responsible for the coordination of the requirements of the forces in support of joint services and for the use of forces and commandment of all military operations. The CEMA is responsible for the conduct of operations, which includes the plans of use, general articulation of forces, and distribution of operational means between theatre commanders who are subordinated under his full authority. The CEMA articulates the needs in material of human resources of the armed forces and the definition of the ensemble format of the armed forces. He is responsible for the planning and programming of military capacities, which concerns the military and defence budgets. Last, the CEMA is responsible for French foreign military operations in foreign theatres, and he represents France at the various military committees of international organizations. The second place in the French military hierarchy is held by the Special presidential Staff (Etat—Major Particulier du Président, EMP) which is subordinate to the authority of a general of the army, of the air force or admiral, who has the title of Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic (CEMP). He has the status of the second highest-ranking soldier in the French armed forces, just after the CEMA and he has the status of the main military collaborator of the President of the Republic, which gives him the possibility to influence the decisions of the PR in the field of foreign policy. He ensures the operational permanence of the nuclear forces, which gives him a particular responsibility in the field of defence strategy. The third important institution is called Commandment of the Special operations (COS), which was created by the decree of June 24, 1992 of the Minister of Defence Pierre Joxe. 1 This Commandment is responsible for planning, preparing, coordinating, and conducting the special operations, which are conceived and waged as military operations carried out outside the framework of classic actions, aimed at

1

Order of June 24, 1992 creating the special operations command.

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achieving objectives of strategic interest, particularly in the opening of a theatre of operations, in-depth intervention on high-value objectives, or in the fight against terrorist organizations.2 The COS plays a particularly important role in the contemporary world, which is characterized by the return of strategic and economic rivalries, an aggressive competition of powers, which fight for the accomplishment of their “hidden intentions” and which wage their new “invisible wars” (Gomart, 2021). The COS gives the PR an important asset that reinforces its role and importance in the field of foreign and security policy (Goya, 2019). At the international level, the importance of the COS was manifested at the beginning of this century, when President Jacques Chirac refused to send French soldiers in Iraq, but he compensated for this courageous attitude by the expenditure of the 200 soldiers from the COS in Afghanistan. By this decision, he manifested the continued strategic partnership as well as solidarity of his country with the USA. The COS is often directly consulted by the PR (Lequesne, 2020). As a result, this Commandment is very often called the 4th Pillar of the FAF, together with the other three being the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (Leroy, 2021: 120). Moreover, the COS is implied in the preparations and direction of the French Special Military Operations (SMOs) in Islamic countries, which play a crucial role in French foreign policy (FFP). On the following pages, the six most important French interventions will be analysed in terms of military aspects, namely, their military aims, engaged units, military manoeuvres, and consequences. The aim of this part of chapter is not to present a complete or detailed analysis of all operations. The aim is much modest: this text will remember the most important features of these operations and show their role in the escalation of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France. In this light, the text will remember the following operations: Harmattan (March– October 2011), Serval (January 2013–July 2014), Sangaris (May 2013–October 2016), Chammal (September 2014), Barkhane, and Takuba (March 2020–July 2022). Each of them will be analysed in light of the following criteria: international context, doctrinal context (presentation of the security threat, formation of concrete military units, and the forms of military actions), legality and legitimacy (Evans, 2004), military context, and military and political consequences in the Islamic countries as well as in France. The criteria of legality and legitimacy have been clearly defined by an internationally respected expert, Gareth Evans.

2

Order of January 5, 2017 relating to the command of special operations [archive].

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Harmattan 2011: A Wind Which Blew Out a Dangerous Dictator, but Opened a Pandora’s Box

The first of the analysed SMO came in 2011, when the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) initiated, in cooperation with the British Prime Minister David Cameron (2010–2016), a large military attack against Libya with the aim of stopping the immense human suffering caused by the civil war there and by the atrocities of the brutal dictator M. Qaddafi. This operation was codenamed Operation Harmattan. The Operation in the Light of the International Law The outbreak of the civil war in Libya generated an imminent security threat not only for the civil population of this country but also for the neighbouring countries. This threat was symbolized by gross and systematic violations of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, by the acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities, and by systematic attacks against the civilian population. 3 The resolution of the UNSC decided the enforcement of the arms embargo and a strict ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to help protect civilians and confirmed the decision of the preceding UNSC resolution (1970/2011), which authorized all Member States to immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related material of all types. 4 Thanks to the mentioned resolutions, the following military operations of France and its allies satisfied the criteria of legality. The suffering of the civilian population in Libya caused by the dictator Kaddafi and his supporters confirmed the legitimacy of the use of the force. Operation Unified Protector was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 defined its legal mandate. In line with UNSCR 1973, NATO had no intention for any occupying force anywhere in Libya. 5 The official names for the interventions by the coalition members are Opération Harmattan by France; Operation Ellamy by the United Kingdom; Operation Mobile for Canadian participation, and Operation Odyssey Dawn for the United States. Political Context Since the beginning, this operation has been marked by a clash between two important French ministries. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued in favour of a long-term diplomatic and political strategy in regard to the situation in the Sahara and the Sahel. On the other hand, the Ministry of Defence preferred military actions waged with the aim of destroying all the jihadist safe havens in the 3

Resolution 1973 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011. Resolution 1970 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011. 5 “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR” (PDF). NATO.int. 4

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area of the G5 once and forever. The French generals argued by pointing to the necessity to overthrow the Libyan dictator Qaddafi, and they underlined the need to destroy his regime, which supported the jihadists in the area of the G5. The ideas of the French generals provided a chance for the fulfilment of the political and personal demands and ambitions of the sixth president of the République Francaise. For Nicolas Sarkozy, the military solution to the problem of the Libyan dictator represented an irresistible opportunity to present himself as a no hesitant and determined statesman who is able to assume the role of a war president via Operation Harmattan.6 The temptation to enter history with the status of a war president was irresistible, and Nicolas Sarkozy succumbed it. Doctrinal Context This military operation was conceived and prepared by the Admiral Édouard Guillaud, the Chief of the French General Staff, as a French contribution to the military campaign of NATO in Libya (Gros-Verheyde, 2011). It was waged with the aim of obtaining a regime change in this important North African country.7 Its codename is very symbolic: the Harmattan is a season in West Africa that occurs between the end of November and the middle of March; in other words, it is almost the same as the Western winter season. However, this operation was waged between 19 March 2011 and 31 October 2011, during three seasons, including summer. This was the first contradiction of this operation. The operation Harmattan has been conceived as a part of an intervention of international coalition which consisted of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the USA. The operation was based on three elements: an arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and actions to protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack. The NATO-led arms embargo covered the maritime approaches to Libya, and the other elements covered the whole territory of Libya. The French Opération Harmattan started 19. 3. 2011 and was stopped the 31. 10. 2011, a few days after the death of the Libyan dictator Kaddafi. It entered into the modern history of France as a manifestation of the high level and preparedness of French armed forces. France mobilized and engaged the most modern arms systems of its Air force and Navy. All French politicians and generals fully respected the general principle of the US President Barack Obama articulated by the words “no boots on the ground” (Gerathy, 2011). This principle excluded the invasion of the Army and the subsequent military occupation, as these activities became a nightmare after Afghanistan and Iraq (Lert, 2012). The French Air Force was represented, namely, by a dozen of planes Rafale, by the same quantity of planes Mirage 2000 and by a six of the C135 aerial refuelling planes. Moreover, the French Air Force engaged its helicopters Aérospatiale 6

Libye: début des opérations aériennes françaises [archive]. Ministère français de la Défense, 19 March 2011. Available at: www.defense.gouv.fr 7 Libye: point de situation opération Harmattan no 11 [archive], 28 March 2011. Available at: www. defense.gouv.fr

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Gazelle, Eurocopter Tiger, and Eurocopter Puma. The French Navy sent to the borders of Libya its Task Force 473 with the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as the central system, which was used as the platform of 10 Rafale M fighters, 6 SuperEtendard strike aircraft, from Flottille 17F, 2E-2C airborne early warning aircraft and 2 Dauphin multipurpose helicopters. 8 Military consequences of this operation are clear: destruction of the armed forces of the Qaddafi regime and a clear victory of the allied forces. The French helicopters won the air supremacy, they eliminated the Libyan air defence systems (Merchet, 2011), and they destroyed many pickups of the Libyan soldiers. The success of the French armed forces was highly appreciated by President Nicolas Sarkozy, who did not hesitate to declare that the helicopters won this operation (Sarkozy, 2012). At the same time, the work of French helicopters and their pilots was appreciated by the General Charles Bouchard (Canada), the NATO commander of the operations Unified Protector in Libya.9 This former pilot of helicopter recognized an outstanding and significant French contribution to the Operation Unified Protector, which has played a critical role in improving the Western ability to protect the civilian population of Libya by reducing the military potential of pro-Gaddafi forces (Tanguy, 2012: 110–111). Political Consequences Like in the case of Iraq, the overthrow of the dictator was a positive act, but this fundamental change opened the way to a general instability, if not a disarray, in the entire affected area. If the operations OEF 2001 and OIF 2003 opened a way to the entanglement of the USA (as well as its allies) in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Operation Harmattan opened the same prospect for France in the Sahel, with strongly negative consequences for all the following French military operations in this area. Finally, all the above-mentioned operations (OEF 2001, OIF 2003, and Harmattan 2011) put the wind in the sails of anti-Western jihadists, giving them arguments in favour of future punitive terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Western intervention resulted into the division of Libya into two states; in 2015, their territory became the main departure point of hundreds of thousands of migrants fleeing their countries from wars and poverty.10 Ten years later, it is clear that this operation confirmed that every Foreign Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) is very problematic because it opens the way to instability and chaos.11 In light of the theoretical heritage of Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1996), the Operation Harmattan 2011 was a direct military intervention of Western countries in the Islamic world that has been crowned by a regime change. The following chapter will show that controversial consequences of this operation had 8

Libye: appareillage du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle. French Ministry of Defense, 20 March 2011. 9 NATOʼs Libya mission to be led by Canadian [archive], sur CBCNews, 25 mars 2011. 10 Libya coast guard rescues 290 migrants off eastern ... Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters. com › article › l...23. 5. 2019. 11 Stejskalová (2018b).

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strong long-term negative political impacts and consequences that have lasted until today.

4.3

Operational Serval as Intervention Against Gangster Jihadism in Mali

International Context Mali is a large African state (1,240,000 km2) with more than 20 million inhabitants. It is an important part of the Sahel (Mehdi, 2010), which is represented by the following countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. Until 1920, it had the name French Soudan. This country is completely francophone; but, on the other hand, it has strong anti-colonialist feelings, which represent an important instrument for contemporary jihadists. Moreover, Mali is a divided county: its Northern Sahel part is the homeland of the nomadic Tuaregs (Moors), who profess a radical conception of Islam, including Sharia law. The Saharan part of this country is inhabited by a settled Negro-African population, which lives mainly on agriculture, and their relationship with Islam is much more reserved (Chauprade & Thual, 1999: 265–266). Doctrinal Context The Tuaregs were perceived as a main security threat in 2011 after the fall of the Libyan dictator Gaddafi, who paid during his long reign hundreds of Tuaregs as mercenaries, as an easily manipulated ethnicity. However, when Gaddafi’s regime fell, the Tuaregs retreated to northern Mali with weapons and started the transformation of this large territory into their “safe havens”. It was a serious security threat not only for Mali but also for the entire West. In this situation, it was necessary to prevent the creation of a global terrorism free zone right in the heart of Africa. The exactions and violence of Tuaregs posed an imminent security threat not only for Mali but also for all areas of Sahel. The Tuaregs returned from Libya with weapons and cars back to northern Mali, mainly with personal weapons, pistols, Italian-made automatic rifles and Russian- and Chinese-made submachine guns. Furthermore, they had also machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and the off-road vehicles to move pick-up cars with 23 mm cannons, with a range of 1 km and along with that as well as several infantry fighting vehicles which they seized in Libya. The Tuaregs returned with their anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles seized from the mercenary operation in Libya shots, especially shots fired from the shooter’s shoulder. It is a category of weapons called MANPADS,12 and it is possible to attack with these weapons even airplanes, especially when landing or taking off what was a serious security threat to all troops moving into Mali by air.

12

Man Portable Air Defense System.

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The Tuaregs massacred dozens of Malian soldiers looted several warehouses of ammunition or fuel, thereby further strengthening their weaponry. They have become a very dangerous and aggressive force, a great and acute threat for an increasing number of villages and towns in northern Mali. There panic began to spread, and the result was an increase in refugee waves, which at the end of February 2012 meant overall 130,000 refugees who fled mainly to Niger, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. The subsequent connection of the MNLA (MNLA Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad/Azawad National Liberation Movement) with the AQMI (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)13 resulted in additional enormously brutal violence (Balencie & de la Grange, 2005). Operation Serval in Light of International Law The legality of military operation in Mali was clearly articulated in Resolution 2100 (2013), which was adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting on 25 April 2013. This important document strongly condemned the offensive launched on 10 January 2013 by terrorist, extremist, and armed groups towards the south of Mali and qualified them as acts of terrorism. At the same time, it condemned all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence, forced amputations, killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, forced displacements, and destruction of cultural and historical heritage, committed in Mali by any group or individuals. Just after the condemnation of the violence and exactions perpetrated by Tuaregs, the UNCS decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the following articulation of its mandate: stabilization of key population centres and support for the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process, protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, promotion and protection of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance, support for cultural preservation, and support for national and international justice. Moreover, France was solicited by the president of Mali to intervene there, and it acted against the transformation of this state into a base of jihadist terrorism.14 Political Decision The French political élites condemned the above-mentioned violence as a “gangster jihadism”,15 particularly after the MNLA’s enormously violent jihadi punishment of the town of Timbuktu for its “impiety”.16 The French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves

13

Chatelot (2013). Sallon (2013). 15 Plagnol and Loncle (2012). 16 Kepel (2013). 14

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Le Drian decided to actively fight against the threat of “Sahelistan”, 17 namely, the building of a sanctuary for jihadist terrorists in the Sahel (Laurent, 2013: 51–88). The seriousness of the security situation was evaluated by a narrow staff member in composition, President Francois Hollande, Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, and Chiefs staff of all three types of armed forces. After their many negotiations, the president made the decision that France would actively intervene. The engagement of French soldiers in Mali was unavoidable even from the military point of view because it was impossible to rely on the Malian armed forces in this respect.18 President Hollande (2013) underlined the determination of France to fight against the brutality and atrocities of the local fanatical terrorists in Mali.19 This declaration was followed by the opening of the operation in January 2013 and was carried out as part of the military intervention in Mali. The Military Dimension of the Operation Serval The military aims of this intervention were defined by the French President, François Hollande, on 15 January 2013, as follows: to stop the advance towards Bamako of jihadist forces, to secure the capital of Mali, and allow the country to recover its territorial integrity. During this operation, France engaged its Army, especially some units of its Légion étrangère, namely, the units from the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment, plus the companies of the 3rd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, and 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment. The Air Force engaged its units based at N’Djamena International Airport on alert as part of the Épervier system and decided to reinforce them. This force included aircraft (three Mirage 2000D, two Mirage F1 CR, six Mirage 2000D, trois C-135FR, un C-130 Hercules et un C-160 Transall, six planes Rafale à N’Djaména, two drones MALE Harfang), support personnel, in particular, their mechanics, as well as special forces, in particular, Air Paratrooper Commando No. 10 and Air Paratrooper Commando No. 2022. The French Navy was represented by Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft from naval aviation, which have been used for observation and intelligence missions. Moreover, Le Dixmude (L9015) is an amphibious helicopter carrier (PHA, formerly projection and command building) of the French Navy of the Mistral class. Its NATO designation is Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD). The Operation Serval has been crowned by a long range of military victories (Galy, 2013) against the principal enemy called Jama’at Nusratul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the country’s largest jihadist grouping. French soldiers managed to, namely, the air strikes against the bases of the JNIM, the control of the Diabaly Konna line, they secured the Niger loop, Capture of Gao (25 January 2013), Capture of Timbuktu (27 January 2013), Capture of Kidal (30 January 2013), Capture of Tessalit (8 February 2013). In summer 2014, this operation was transformed into a

17

Bejot (2013). Plagnol and Loncle (2012), op. cit. 66–67. 19 Hollande (2013). 18

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large international operation, Barkhane. This new operation will be analysed in Sect. 4.5.

4.4

Operation Sangaris as a Direct Military Involvement in a Clash of Civilizations

Since March 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR) witnessed a new typical “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996), namely, a clash between the Muslim and African civilizations.20 After the overthrow of the Christian President Francois Bozize, the Muslim fighters of Séléka rebel groups massacred civilians, including women, children, and old people. Soldiers from Chad protected the Muslims of the CAR, while soldiers from the Congo defended the Christians.21 For the latter, simplistic emotional reasoning was typical: e.g., a member of Séléka = a Muslim = a man from Chad = a killer.22 Political Decision of the French President In this situation, President Hollande declared his determination to stop the mutual murders23 and immense human suffering24 and to fight against the creation of new safe havens in Africa.25 Becoming a war president,26 he added a strong military dimension to the strategy called «Françafrique», 27 which had been based on longterm French political interference. Thus, the French armed forces intervened in the CAR in the context of Operation Sangaris. As a result, the anti-French feelings28 were reinforced by the fact that it was the fiftieth French military intervention in Africa since the end of WW II.29 All these interventions had a common denominator: very often, France acted in support of dictatorships, or it directly imposed new governments, the so-called démocratures.30 In full conformity with this long-term tradition, in December 2013, President Hollande sent 1600 men to help the African Union soldiers keep the growing chaos at bay.31 Even if his aim was to stop the

20

Ourdan (2013). Amselle (2013). 22 Bensimon and Guibert (2013). 23 Guibert (2013). 24 Bensimon (2013). 25 Hollande (2016b). 26 Haski (2013). 27 Verschave (1998). 28 Galy (2016). 29 de Saint Victor (2013). 30 Durocher (2018), op. Cit. 31 de Saint Victor (2013), op. cit. 21

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genocidal violence in the CAR,32 nearly a million people were internally displaced in the country as a result. Operation Sangaris in Light of International Law The operation of Sangaris fully satisfied all the criteria of legitimacy. All the reasons were fully confirmed, and none of them were challenged. This legitimacy has been argued in Resolution No. 2127 of 5 December 2013, which is exceptionally extensive, with a total of 62 articles on 12 pages. Its opening preamble emphasized that the dramatic situation poses a threat to peace and security in the CAR. Specifically, this article mentioned above all the growing dynamics of mutual violence and slaughter. As with other threats, it cited the uncontrollability of the situation, which resulted in a long series of crimes against humanity. At the same time, the operation of Sangaris was completely legal. Article No. 28 of the above-mentioned resolution stipulated that the term “necessary measures” means the following summary of activities: protection of the civilian population and restoration of security and public order, the overall stabilization of the country and the restoration of the state’s authority over the entire territory of the SAR, the creation of conditions for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the population that needs it, the decisive support for the process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and repopulation of the country affected by the civil war (DDRRR), and the ensuring of national and international efforts in the reform and restructuring of the defence and security sectors. Military Characteristics of the Sangaris Operation In 2013, the military strength of AQMI as the military threat in this area was estimated at 2000–5000 men in arms. These militants were known by their longterm strategy of which substance is to avoid direct confrontations with troops of the French army and by their determination to conduct a typical asymmetric war. These terrorist and criminals recorded for them the terrain and, in addition, the armament, which mainly consisted of AK-47 assault rifles, both light and heavy machine guns (calibre 7.62 mm vs. 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm), pick-up cars with cannons 23 mm and with additional armament. All this made them a dangerous opponent of the French soldiers in the case of direct military fights. Moreover, these violent groups represented an imminent threat to the everyday security of the civilian population of this important country. During the first phase of Operation Sangaris, the command and landing vessel Dixmude was used.33 This system represents a great pride of the entire French armed forces; it is a landing craft of the Mistral class, which was put into operational use at the beginning of 2013. Although it is part of the military navy, it is also a new platform for transporting land troops in overseas operations. Dixmude is one of three vessels that was built so that it could perform tasks both within the air-sea

32 33

Guibert (2013). Record d’emport pour leDixmude, lemamouth.blogspot.fr, janvier 2013.

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components of the French armed forces and within the alliance forces of rapid reaction (NATO Response Force). The Dixmude vessel has an important striking power because it is a platform for modern battle helicopters (called Landing Helicopter Dock, LHD in Atlantic terminology, the porte-hélicoptères amphibie PHA in French), which can be used as attack helicopters, such as Puma, Gazelle, and Tigre systems (Groizeleau, 2013). These helicopters represent one of the great priorities of the French armed forces, mainly because they are an irreplaceable weapon system for the needs of peace operations and interventions in Africa, concretely Mali and CAR. The Dixmude vessel was used to transport deployed troops and all their combat equipment from the Toulon garrison in southern France to the Gulf of Guinea. From there, the helicopters flew across the territory of Cameroon to their destination in the SAR. The troops with their equipment were transported along the same route. At the same time, the French Air Force engaged six Dassault Rafale from the French Air Force, two Eurocopter AS550 Fennec helicopters, two Gazelle helicopters from French Army Light Aviation, and four Aérospatiale SA330Ba Puma helicopters from French Army Light Aviation. The French Army engaged 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, 21st Marine Infantry Regiment, 3rd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, 6th Marine Infantry Battalion, 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment, and 1st Parachute Chasseur Regiment. Political Context of the Operation Sangaris Just in December 2013, French General Vincent Desportes, 34 a highly appreciated expert on strategic affairs, was the first French general who defended this operation. In an interview to the Radio France Internationale, he articulated the following argument: This is a much more complicated mission than in Mali, where the French armed forces had a simple mission, or at least a clear one, destroying a perfectly identified and identifiable enemy. Here, we are talking of interposition between factions. Hence, we have nothing to destroy, no adversaries. The only adversary is disorder and massacres (Desportes, 2013). At the same time, the former MFA and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin articulated an important argument for the defence of the above-mentioned operation. In his allocution, he spoked about the international framework of this operation. He concretely underlined the thesis that France has a duty to act, but the interdiction to act alone. How can we break the dilemma? My mobilization. We have been told as nauseam that if France does not intervene, nobody will do anything. The opposite is true. If France intervenes, nobody will move. The great powers (America, China, Russia, and Europe) as much as for regional powers will obtain their comfort (de Villepin, 2013). Third, the ambassador of France in this country, Charles Malinas, defended the importance of French operation for the citizens of the RCA. He especially underlined its positive outcome, the restoration of normal life and the fact that “everything is 34 This general and his attitudes will be largely analysed in the last chapter of this book which will present the revolt of French soldiers against the failing immigration policy of France.

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restarting in Bangui”. He concluded that violence was “more and more limited and circumscribed to a few areas” (Malinas, 2013). Not only French officials defended the importance and positive balance of the operation of Sangaris. Volker Türk, Director of International Protection at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC), recently back from the CAR, stated in Boda that without Sangaris, it would be a massacre. Without Sangaris, the Muslim community would no longer exist (Turk, 2014). Last, the French SMO in Mali set a critical mirror to the current policy of France in this large and complicated country. In 2013, after the liberation of Timbuktu, the inhabitants of this city cheered French President Francois Hollande with blue, white, and red flags. However, some years later, anti-French graffiti multiplied as did demonstrations in front of the French Embassy. A liberation army can very quickly turn into an occupying force (Perouse de Montclos, 2020: 264).

4.5

Chammal as the Most Controversial French Military Intervention

Operation Chammal is the name given from 20 September 2014, to the participation of the French armed forces, within the coalition led by the USA and Great Britain against the Islamic State, in the wars waged in Iraq and Syria. This operation has been started after the request of the Iraqi government. The French armed forces were mobilized in Iraq with the aim of providing air support to the local armed forces in their fight against the terrorist group Islamic State. From September 2015, the operation was extended to Syrian territory to neutralize Islamic State training camps in this area. International Context The US armed forces waged their Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) as the international military intervention against ISIL, 35 including both a campaign in Iraq and a campaign in Syria, with a closely related campaign in Libya. According to the Pentagon, by March 2019, the day of the territorial defeat in Syria of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), CJTF-OIR and its partner forces had liberated nearly 110,000 km2 of land and 7.7 million people from ISIL, the vast majority of the self-proclaimed caliphate’s territory and subjects. 36 By October 2017, around the time of ISIL’s territorial defeat in Iraq, CJTF-OIR claimed that approximately 80,000 ISIL militants had been killed by it and its allies. 37 By the end of August 2019, it had

“Pentagon Briefing on Operation Inherent Resolve against Daesh”. Archived 3 January 2020. “CJTFOIR Strike Releases March 26 2019” (PDF). 37 Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve Monthly Civilian Casualty Report. Operation Inherent Resolve, 26 September 2019. 35 36

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conducted 34,573 strikes. Opération Chammal was the name for similar French operations against the same enemy in his area. Doctrinal Context Before this operation, the security threat was clearly defined. French President Francois Hollande organized in Paris an important international conference about peace and security in Iraq.38 During this conference, the then President of Iraq, Fouad Massoum, clearly identified the security threat with the massacres, ethnic and religious cleansing, and many crimes of genocidal character perpetrated by the IS.39 At the same time, he clearly articulated his desire that France together with other Western democratic states make interventions against ISIL.40 This means that the Operation Chammal was a typical example of military engagement by invitation, if not by solicitation.41 Just after him, Francois Hollande very clearly defined the attitude of his country. First, he declared that there is no time to lose against the threat of Daesh (ISIL) jihadists who controlled large parts of Iraqi and Syrian territories, committing more and more extortions.42 Second, he argued that France had to take its responsibilities and gave its support for aerial operations. Last, the French President excluded other support, which was called: no troops on the ground.43 This doctrinal approach was fully shared and supported by MFA Laurent Fabius44 as well as by the Minister of Defence Jean—Yves Le Drian, who even declared that the pseudo-Islamic State 45 represented a security threat not only for Syria and Iraq but also for France. Hollande’s decision resulted from his conviction that Daesh represented an imminent threat not only for the local civil population but also for international security.46 His MFA condemned the cutthroats of Daesh and underlined the

38

La conférence de Paris s’engage à soutenir l’Irak, «par tous les moyens». Available at: https:// www.lepoint.fr › monde › la... le 15 septembre. 39 N° 2884—Proposition de résolution de M. Jean-Jacques. Available at: https://www.assembleenationale.fr › ... 40 Washington wins diplomatic support for campaign in Iraq. Available at: https://www.reuters.com › article, 14. 9. 2014—Iraqi President Fouad Massoum told Monday’s conference he hoped the Paris meeting would bring a “quick response”. 41 Opération Chammal: nouvelles missions d’appui aérien en Irak. Ministère de la Défense, September 24, 2014. Available at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/chammal/actualites/ operation-chammal-nouvelles-missions-d-appui-aerien-en-irak. 42 Mimaut, Cécile: «Daech ou Etat islamique? Questions sur un vocable». franceinfo.fr (in French), 15 September 2014. 43 «Irak: la France n’enverra pas de troupes au sol, annonce François Hollande» (there will be no French troops on the Iraqi ground, says Hollande). RTL.fr, 18 September 2014. 44 « Déclarations officielles de politique étrangère du 10 septembre 2014» (in French). France diplomatie, 10 September 2014. 45 « Opérations: Irak » [archive], sur Ministère français de la défense, 2014 (consulté le 20 septembre 2014). 46 Arefi (2014).

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necessity to stop their exactions.47 This Operation was presented as a pre-emptive strike against an enemy who wanted to strike France and as a war whose aim was to destroy this imminent security threat (Hollande, 2016a) Chammal in the Light of International Law The legality of this operation has been clearly articulated in resolution 2170 (2014) adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting on 15 August 2014. This document expressed the gravest concern that territory in parts of Iraq and Syria was under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Nusrah Front (ANF) and that their violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights in Iraq and Syria must be held accountable. This resolution strongly condemned incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals, groups, the indiscriminate killing and deliberate targeting of civilians, numerous atrocities, mass executions, and extrajudicial killings. At the same time, this resolution called upon all States to take all measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts perpetrated by individuals or entities associated with ISIL, ANF Al-Qaida. Military Context France engaged all its most modern, prestigious, and lethal arms systems. The most important and impressive between them was the Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle; this platform came to the Persian Gulf 23. February 2015 48 accompanied by 1 attack nuclear submarine, 2 frigate of the Navy, 1 frigate of the Air Defense, 12 planes Rafale, 9 Super-Étendard, and 4 helicopters. The Air Force engaged 20 Dassault Rafale Fighters 49 6 Mirage, 2000D Fighter-bombers, 9 Super-Étendard Strike fighters, 1 E3F AWACS, 4 CAESAR self-propelled howitzer, and 3200 troops (special forces operators included). 50 In total, it was a very strong and respectful military dispositive. The main attacks of the French Air force were concentrated in the areas of Faloujah, Kirkouk, and Mossoul. The airstrikes were aimed at ISIL depots in Mosul, mainly by dropping 4 GBU-12 bombs, French planes destroyed the training camps, shooting stances, and logistics of the units of ISIL, factories of the production of explosive materials. In total, French pilots made more than 1000 missions, and

47

Rollins (2014). Ministère de la Défense: Rencontre des CEMA français et américain sur le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle [archive]. 49 « Etat islamique : la France «renforce son dispositif militaire» en Irak » [archive], sur leparisien.fr, 1er octobre 2014. 50 « Etat islamique : la France “renforce son dispositif militaireˮ en Irak ». Le Parisien, 28. 7. 2016. 48

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they managed to make the “neutralization” of 1500 objectives of the ISIL.51 During their missions, more than 1000 jihadists were killed. 52

4.6

Operation Barkhane and Its Consequences

This operation was started by the French armed forces in August 2014 as the continuation of the operations Serval and Épervier with the aim of stopping the military activities of the jihadist armed groups in the Sahel and the Sahara. Since that year, it has represented the most important French military action in the Islamic world. Its aim was defined as the support of Malian troops seeking to repel an offensive by Islamist armed groups that have taken control of Azawad, the northern part of the country. The Geopolitical Context This operation is framed (Guisnel, 2014) by the partnership between France and the so-called zone sahélo-saharienne (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad). 53 The basic sense of this partnership was articulated in a treaty signed on 16 July 2014 by the Malian Minister of Defence Bah N’Daw, which underlined the importance of defence cooperation, exchange of information, consultations, preparation for combat and armament. 54 In comparison with the Serval, this operation was conceived as an international operation that included not only France but also Estonia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic, plus the support of Great Britain (three FAF Chinook helicopters). This operation was prepared and waged as the French pillar of counterterrorism in the Sahel region. 55 The main security threat was clearly articulated by the then MOD Jean—Yves Le Drian: he spoked about the strategic aim of the jihadists to create their safe havens in the area from the Horn of Africa to Guinea—Bissau.56 The main target of this operation was identified with the Islamist extremists in Mali, Chad, and Niger with a mandate to operate even across borders. The Military Context of Operation Barkhane At the beginning of the Operation Barkhane in 2014, France engaged 3000 soldiers, 200 logistic vehicles, 200 armoured vehicles, 4 drones, 6 combat planes, a dozen

51

« Chammal : point de situation au 7 janvier 2016 » [archive]. Available at: sur www.defense. gouv.fr 52 22,000 jihadistes tués par la coalition anti-État islamique, depuis 2014, selon Le Drian [archive], France tv info avec AFP, 21 janvier 2016. 53 Fin de Serval au Mali, lancement de l’opération “Barkhaneˮ au Sahel. France 24, 14 July 2014. 54 Reuters: Nouvel accord de coopération militaire franco-malien [archive]. 55 François Hollandeʼs African adventures: The French are reorganizing security in an increasingly troubled region. Economist, 21 July 2014. 56 Les forces spéciales françaises ont tué et enterré le chef d’AQMI dans le désert du nord du Mali. Le Monde.fr. 11 June 2020.

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transport planes, and approximately 20 helicopters.57 However, 4 years later, the number of French soldiers was heightened to 4500,58 and in February 2020, it increased to 5100 soldiers.59 The French soldiers are organized in independent units that use the French military bases in every state of the G5. The most important battles of this operation have been concentrated in the “area of three frontiers” between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In February 2020, the new French Defence Minister Florence Parly took the decision to send an additional 600 troops to the Sahel region, which bolstered the force of the Operation Barkhane to 5100 troops. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2018, the Chief of the French General Staff, General François Lecointre, did not hesitate to declare that solving the problem of Mali would take at least 10 years. In addition, he also did not hesitate to say that France is in a situation of entrapment in regard to Mali.60 His argumentation was supported by Michel Goya, a military historian, who underlined that this operation faced chaos that strongly limited its possibilities of changing the situation in Mali.61 In this light, France is currently witnessing a rise of doubts about the preference for military approaches to Mali to the detriment of political solutions,62 particularly in connection with the clear incapability of the Malian political elites.63 Protests Against the French Military Presence The first manifestation against France’s military presence in Mali took place in November 2013 in Bamako,64 and it continued in other towns,65 being organized by the «Groupe des patriotes du Mali» (GPM).66 France’s action in the G5 was presented as a continuation of its colonial history and particularly of the discredited politics of « Françafrique ». In this light, Operation Barkhane has been (mis)interpreted as a camouflage of the long-term aims of France in North Africa. Moreover, France continues to be criticized for its active role in the military deposition of Colonel Qaddafi, the subsequent destabilization of the Sahel,67 and its policy.68 All these criticisms played into the hands of the revengeful radical jihadists.

57

Lagneau (2014). Barluet (2018). 59 Communiqué de Florence Parly, ministre des Armées [archive]. Ministère des Armées, 2 February 2020. 60 Sombres perspectives militaires pour la France au Sahel [archive]. AFP, 2 July 2018. 61 Sugy (2019). 62 Gouëset (2017). 63 Carayol (2019). 64 Roxo (2013). 65 Lorgerie (2020). 66 Macé (2010). 67 Belsoeur and Tagnan (2017). 68 Macé (2010), op. cit. 58

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Table 4.1 Key pillars of the Hollande anti-terrorist doctrine Key slogans The necessity to stop the immense human suffering, murders, brutality, and atrocities The necessity to actively fight against the threat of the creation of “Sahelistan” The determination to fight the local fanatical terrorists if necessary French military operations are necessary when France is faced with an enemy who wants to strike it

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Geopolitical meanings France looks good when waging military operations against terrorist organizations The determination to not allow the creation of dangerous safe havens for terrorists near France Francophone Africa represents the key area of French military engagement in the foreseeable future The long-term French strategy called «Françafrique» receives a strong military dimension

Doctrinal meanings The key emphasis is put on the human suffering, which opens the way for a pre-emptive use of force The key emphasis is put on prevention; nevertheless, it can open the way for a pre-emptive use of force The key emphasis is put on prevention and on a military deterrent against the terrorist organizations The key emphasis is put on pre-emptive operations

The Hollande Doctrine

During 2013–2016, French politicians presented arguments in favour of a permanent use of military forces against the terrorist organizations in Islamic countries that were previously under a French long-term historical influence. As these arguments were articulated in some important speeches of President Francois Hollande, we label them with the term “the Hollande doctrine” (see Table 4.1). The term Hollande doctrine is neither an official expression used by French politicians, nor a term used by French security experts. It is an invention of the author of this text, and this term is used with the aim of covering the key approaches of the 7th French President to the imminent security threat of contemporary jihadism. This threat has two basic dimensions. The first of them is presented by the expansion of jihadist organizations in the large area of Sahel where they build the so-called safe havens, the camps for the formations of terrorists, and for the planning of future attacks. The second dimension has the form of an endless series of terrorist attacks perpetrated against civilian targets in the territory of France. In light of the above-mentioned facts, we can conclude that the concept of Hollande doctrine reflects and summarizes the security fears and psychological traumas provoked by the cruel terrorist attacks perpetrated during the period between 2013 and 2016. The analysis of the above-mentioned discourses showed four important political features. First, the 7th French President and other leading politicians shared the same perception of the security situation of their country; they had the same mentality. They were particularly shocked by the human suffering, murders, brutality, and atrocities caused by the terrorist attacks that had been planned and perpetrated with the aim of killing or injuring as much of the French people as possible and provoking a state of fear.

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Second, Francois Hollande and his ministers largely shared the geopolitical aspects of the wage of terrorist attacks. They shared intense security fears that resulted from the possibility of the creation of a so-called Sahelistan, a new safe haven of global terrorists situated in a traditional sphere of influence of their country. As this area is located very near France, the word Sahelistan was identified with the most important security fears of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Third, Francois Hollande refused the passivity and made a move towards an active approach towards a determined fight against the imminent security threat. It was his specific form of pre-emptive strategy of the war against the Global Terror. Last, from the doctrinal point of view, this strategy resulted in military operations that were waged in the large area of Sahelistan. From the military point of view, these operations were conceived as a specific form of deterrent applied against the anti-French jihadism. Table 4.1 presents key slogans, geopolitical meanings, and doctrinal meanings of the anti-terrorist doctrine of Francois Hollande, the 7th President of the French V. République.

4.8

The Takuba Task Force

The international context of this operation resulted from a rapid and large deterioration of the international situation in the region of Sahel at the beginning of 2020. As an international reaction, this task force was established in response to the request of the governments of Niger and Mali, two countries of this region that were menaced by a rapid increase in the violence and aggressiveness of the jihadist forces. The name of the Task Force was deduced from the Tacuba that is used across the western Sahel. This military task force was established with the aim of advising, assisting, and accompanying Malian Armed Forces in coordination with G5-Sahel partners and other international actors on the ground. Since the beginning, it has been placed under French command. Since the beginning, Takuba has been a symbol of European defence dear to French President Emmanuel Macron, who has managed to bring together a dozen European countries and up to 900 elite soldiers (Macron, 2020). This Coalition for the Sahel was announced at the Pau Summit on 13 January 2020 by the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, France, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the European Council, the European Union High Representative, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the Secretary General of La Francophonie. The creation of this Coalition, which had long been called for by the G5 Sahel, is a strong sign of solidarity with the Sahel States.69 This TF had the following five aims: fighting armed terrorist

69 The International Coalition for the Sahel. Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr › th... March 2020.

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groups, building the capacities of the armed forces in the region, supporting the return of the State and administrations in the territory, improving access to basic services, and assisting development. Announced in late 2019, Takuba at its peak brought together nearly 900 elite troops from nine of France’s allies: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. These soldiers were responsible for helping the Malian forces gain autonomy and allowing them to regain a foothold in the territories abandoned by the state in the face of jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) group.70 The doctrinal context of this Task Force resulted from presentation of the bloody insurgencies linked to al Qaeda or the Islamic State group as a main security threat from this part of the world and, as a result, for all the Europe. This threat was symbolized, namely, by the abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence, forced amputations, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, forced displacements, and destruction of cultural and historical heritage committed in Mali by any group or individuals, noting, especially, widespread abuses of human rights by terrorist, extremist, and armed groups in northern Mali. Operation Takuba in Light of International Law The legality of the military engagement in Mali has its bases in Resolution 2100 (2013) adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting on 25 April 2013. Face to face to the above-mentioned exactions and crimes, the UNSC decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This long-term engagement of the international society received a large and clearly structured mandate that covered the following activities: stabilization of key population centres and support for the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process, protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, promotion and protection of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance, support for cultural preservation, and support for national and international justice. Four years later, Resolution 2374 (2017), adopted by the Security Council at its 8040th meeting on 5 September 2017, underlined serious concerns about the volatile security situation, especially the expansion of terrorist and other criminal activities into Central and Southern Mali as well as the intensification of criminal activities such as drug trafficking and trafficking in persons in Mali. At the same time, it condemned the activities in Mali and in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including the MUJAO, AQIM, and Islamic State in Greater Sahara, which continued to operate in Mali and constituted a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond. On this basis, the UNSC concluded that Member States should take the 70 France announces the end of Takuba in Mali. Atalayar. Available at: https://atalayar.com › content › fran...1. 7. 2022.

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necessary measures in an active fight against terrorists, namely, in the fields of the travel ban, asset freeze, and the designation criteria. Military Context of the Takuba Task Force The military context of the Takuba Task Force reflected a strong international dimension. Since the beginning, the soldiers of this force operated from Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) bases located in Gao, Ansogo, Menaka, and N’Djamena in Chad.71 The soldiers of all participating countries were integrated into the command of French operation Barkhane, which aimed to tackle the terrorist groups in the Liptako region, a historic region falling in eastern Burkina Faso, southwestern Niger and a small portion of southeast central Mali. At its beginning, the Task Force was based on two task groups: the TG1, a Franco-Estonian unit, and the Franco-Czech TG2. These groups were supported by the Swedish Rapid-Response Force, named TG3. Each of the task groups supported an ULRI (Unité Légère de Reconnaissance et d’Intervention), a type of light unit from the Malian forces operating with rifles such as the AK-47 and the AK-74M. These units used motorbikes and Toyotas as their primary vehicles. At the military level, the Takuba TF was closely coordinated with the Operation Barkhane and with the combat activities of the local forces of the G5-Sahel. On the 15th of July 2020, the Task Force declared its IOC, subsequently followed by its FOC on the 2nd of April 2021. The TF Takuba become the part of the “Opération Solstice”, based on a close coordination between French and Nigerien forces, in their determined fight against the rebels of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The European forces operated without the Malian ULRI they usually fight with. The aim of this approach was to reinforce cooperation with Niger. The operation was successful, taking 13 motorcycles, more than 30 light infantry weapons, 50 communication devices and material used in the construction of improvised explosives devices (IED). At the end of 2022, we know that Takuba witnessed two coups d’état in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021 and, more dramatic, a brutal deterioration of FrancoMalian relations. This deterioration of the situation culminated after the declarations of the Malian Prime Minister Choguel Maïga, who gave the soldiers of the Takuba TF a highly pejorative name “mercenaries”.72 By breaking with Paris, the Bamako junta also broke with all its allies, which was reflected in the declaration of General Pascal Ianni, the spokesperson of the French CEMA.73 Moreover, the Malian junta provoked suspicions to have called on the private Russian mercenary company Wagner, accused of multiple human rights violations and other trafficking in the Middle East and Africa. This decision became the symbol of a major geopolitical reorientation of Mali, which intensified French “Task Force Takuba: European Special Forces in the Sahel”, November 25, 2021. Morgane Le Cam: Mali: le premier ministre s’en prend aux soldats de l’opération « Barkhane », qualifiés de « mercenaires ». Le Monde, 8. 2. 2022. 73 EUʼs Takuba force quits junta-controlled Mali. France 24. Available at: https://www.france24. com › africa, 1. 7. 2022. 71 72

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downgrading in the region and raised questions and doubts about the future of the commitment of Europeans in the anti-jihadist fight in the Sahel. Military consequences in the theatre of operations were perfectly explained by the General Hervé Pierre,74 who supervised the partnerships between French and western armies from Niamey. He clearly stated that the French transformation towards a partnership model was embodied in Mali by Takuba. Nevertheless, he added that the spirit of Takuba will endure in the combat partnership with the Nigeriens in an even more balanced relationship. Today, we know that all the above-mentioned operations turned into drastic asymmetrical wars in which the West was the losing actor (Chaliand, 2016). It is no wonder that SMOs are currently perceived as a major problem for contemporary France and its Armed Forces (Général Christophe Gomart 2020). Political consequences were clearly articulated by two important French ministers. First, at the end of January 2022, Mali’s junta government called on Denmark to withdraw its 100 troops, which were deployed in the south of this African country as part of the European special task force75 Takuba, to withdraw “immediately” from the country’s Sahel region.76 Following this important event, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian clearly condemned the “irresponsible measures” of an “illegitimate” junta in power in Bamako.77 He imputed to this junta a full responsibility for the withdrawal of Danish forces and is further isolating itself from its international partners.78 Second, the Minister of Defence, Mme Florence Parly, reproached the junta in Bamako its political provocations and declared, at the end of January 2022 (Parly, 2022) that her country would discuss the best path forward with other European allies that are also present in the country to combat terrorism by Islamic militants. She declared that France had made a big work at the demand of a sovereign state to combat terrorism that victimizes Mali’s population. Her critical tone graduated from the declaration that France could not remain in Mali regardless of the price and that France and its allies needed to determine the new conditions on their mission in Mali, which all are united in wanting to maintain. Last, the TF Takuba resulted in another manifestation of the clash of civilizations between France, on the one hand, and the large area of Northern Africa and Sahel, on the other hand.79

74 Mali: la France officialise la fin de la force européenne. Available at: https://www.sudouest.fr › France, 1. 7. 2022. 75 Mali: le Danemark va rapatrier ses soldats face. Le Monde. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr › ... › Mali, 27. 1. 2022. 76 Mali orders Denmark to withdraw troops ʻimmediatelyʼ from... Available at: https://www. euronews.com › mali-o...25. 1. 2022. 77 France condemns Maliʼs ʻirresponsibleʼ expulsion of Danish. Available at: https://www.rfi.fr › africa › 202201... 27. 1. 2022. 78 Après le retrait danois du Mali, Paris et Bamako au bord de la rupture. Le Monde, 29. 1. 2022. 79 Dos au mur, la France et ses alliés confirment un «retrait coordonné» du Mali. Available at: https://www.letemps.ch › monde, 16. 2. 2022.

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4.9

Conclusion of the Chapter

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Conclusion of the Chapter

In Syria, like in Libya, France engaged its aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (the pride of this country), its Navy forces from Toulon, 12 Rafale aircraft, 9 Super-Etendard aircraft, combat helicopters, and the modern bombs AASM and GBU.80 These arms systems represented the second force within the international Arabic-Western coalition intervening in Syria, just after that of the USA. The French attacks with the use of these arms systems were aimed against terrorist camps, bases, hangars, and pickups, and the terrorist organizations’ units which were preparing attacks against civilians. None of the attacks of the French forces in Islamic countries were aimed against civilian targets on the territory controlled by Daesh. Except for Libya, all these French military interventions have been waged by Francois Hollande, which makes him the most warrior-like president of the V République. 81 Moreover, he was the first president to be punished for his military campaigns by a series of cruel terrorist attacks. All the above-analysed operations had many consequences, which strongly reminds us of one of the US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The long-term Operation Barkhane resulted in an entrapment of France, which confirms that the solutions of the related problems cannot be reduced to military operations. The contradictory consequences of these operations opened the way for the activities of the hateful jihadists and their so-called punitive attacks against France. The French experiences gained during the military operations waged in Islamic countries during the last decade have a large international overlap in the field of the fight against contemporary jihadist terrorism. This overlap is manifested in the seven following dimensions. First, these military operations have been waged against the Islamic state as a common enemy of all Western nations (McCants, 2015: 102). The ISIL was an enormously obstinate and dangerous enemy determined to destroy the so-called Romans. In all battlefields, the ISIL was obsessed by three strategic aims: creation of the so-called save havens, systematic deadly attacks against all Western soldiers in the Islamic countries, and the preparations of the terrorist attacks against the civilian targets in the Western countries (Byman, 2016: 78). Second, the French SMO waged in the Islamic world has been conceived as a negation of two basic features of operations from the first decade of the twenty-first century. These SMOs have been conceived as a clear negation of the large military operations that have been waged without a clear mandate of the UNSC: OAF 1999, OEF 2001, and OIF 2003, which have had only the first resolution (a concrete organization or event represents the threat to international peace and security); Chammal: fin de mandat pour la 6e BLB à la TF Monsabert. Ministère de la Défense, October 25, 2016, accessed April 17, 2019. Available at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/ actualites2/chammal-fin-demandat-pour-la-6e-blb-a-la-tf-monsabert 81 Bastié (2017). 80

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nevertheless, they have been started without the second resolution (the authorization to use all necessary measures). All French operations had the second resolution of the UNSC. The second basic difference results from the fact that the French SMO has not been conceived as the Regime change (like OEF 2001 or OIF 2003) but as the Regime Save. They have been prepared and waged as the support of existing secular and tolerant regimes against the aggressiveness of radical jihadists and against their determination to impose a radical Islamization of all the areas of Sahel. Third, participation in the SMO provoked an incontestable disillusion and disenchantment of French soldiers. At the political level, the SMO showed them that since the end of the Cold War and the evaporation of the red peril, anti-terrorism has become a veritable financial and diplomatic asset for corrupt regimes in the area. The region’s security apparatuses have seen their budgets explode to the detriment of spending on access to health or education. At the same time, the fight against terrorism relieves the national armies of their mission of defending the territory and allows them to do business, a much more lucrative and less dangerous occupation than going to war (Perouse de Montclos, 2020: 131–132). At the military level, it is a cascade of lessons. First, the Afghanistan and Iraq decade of the twenty-first century showed to all Western countries that large military operations are not omnipotent and that they have a long range of counterproductive consequences. This was the case for interventions based on the massive use of strategic bombers, the mass killings (Ikenberry, 2001: 26–27), which accompanied an aggressive expansion of democracy (Simes, 2003). Second, during the following decade of twenty-first century, we have witnessed a move towards drones and targeted killings motivated by the determination to reduce the numbers of the co called collateral damages (Stejskalová, 2018a: 129–150). Last, the French SMO in Islamic countries showed the insufficiencies and pitfalls of the preference for the so-called warfare at a distance. A respected French strategist concludes that it is a decoy: it produces a military effect but no political effect. It destroys without mastering the reconstruction and creates chaos. There is a real illusion of aerial efficiency (Desportes, 2018). Third, at the global level, the synthesis of new forms of military operations of Western countries in the Islamic world was articulated in an important doctrinal document of the 44. President of the USA called Complex Strategy of the Fight against the IS from 10. 09. 2014 (Obama, 2014; Jan & Kristýna, 2017). At the same time, the French experience confirmed the warning of Jean-Yves Le Drian, the former French MOD and MFA that the terrorist groups in Sahel represent a security threat of a global dimension (Châtaigner, 2019: 123–136). Thanks to this dramatic experience, it is generally known that the so-called Sahelistan (Laurent, 2013) or Africanistan represents a security threat not only for France but also for the entire Western world (Michailof, 2015). Fourth, in all these operations, all participants are faced with an intra-alliance security dilemma between two fundamental positions that represent two sides of the same coin: entrapment and abandonment. The first of them means that alliance or coalition member “A” has no particular interest in supporting the hegemon or other members of the coalition, but he is conscious of his obligations towards them.

4.9

Conclusion of the Chapter

81

However, at the same time, he must take into consideration the risk of abandonment because in this case, he cannot necessarily count on the other member states’ support against a nonalliance state or other adversaries (Massala, 2010: 387). In this light, the failure of the Barkhane mission in Mali was enormously bitter not only for French soldiers but also for all its partners within the framework of the EUTM mission (Bernard, 2021). In the case of this mission, the bitterness of all participants has been reinforced by the above-mentioned inculpation of the military junta of Mali in summer 2022. Fifth, all the above-analysed French military operations fully satisfied the criteria of the legality defined by the Charter of the United Nations and by the definitions of its Security Council (Malone, 2007: 117–133), despite the doubts of some influential thinkers who prefer the rapidity of an eventual military action before the obligation to respect international law and to lose the advantage of time (Glennon, 2003: 16–35). Nevertheless, France has been confronted with a surprising hostility of governing élites. Moreover, its departure from Mali was fully comparable with the end of the Western military presence in Afghanistan in 2021. Like the Americans in Afghanistan, the French soldiers have been frustrated by a forced removal or “désengagement forcé” in their terminology. It is a big disenchantment not only for France but also for all the West. It is a serious contestation of a nice idealistic idea that in the case of respect for the basic pillars of international law, it is possible to intervene without the risk of a subsequent merciless asymmetric war. Last, the French military interventions in Muslim countries and their interplay with repressive terrorist attacks in France fully confirmed the logic of a vicious circle. French military interventions in the Islamic countries, and especially in Sahel, provoke new problems and difficult situations that create new problems, which then causes the original problem or situation to occur again. The brusque failure of the operation Takuba has shown that this type of intervention is, despite all good intentions, enormously vulnerable by unpredictable caprices of self-proclaimed juntas,82 which represent a traditional form of political governance in African Muslim countries. Francois Hollande, the 7th French President, was so active and dynamic in the field of military operations that he received the sobriquet of “War president”. Nevertheless, after 5 years of his reign, his country was not more secure. In contrast, the logic of the vicious circle in contemporary France has been reinforced. In the battlefield in Sahel, French soldiers were confronted with growing hostility, and the national territory became the theatre of the rise of punitive terrorist attacks. This highly negative tendency is the main subject of the following chapter. After a decade of endless fights in Sahel, the contemporary president openly articulated the disillusion provoked by SMO in the so-called Black continent. During his speech delivered to the ambassadors of his country, he said that Africa is the laboratory for attacks against France (Macron, 2022). Moreover, all the

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Le Cam and Vincent (2022).

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above-mentioned operations turned into drastic asymmetrical wars in which the West was the losing actor (Chaliand, 2016). It is no wonder that SMOs are currently perceived as a major problem for contemporary France and its armed forces (Général Christophe Gomart 2020). Summary During the 2010s, France waged many important special military operations (SMOs) in important Islamic countries: Syria, Libya, and Sahel. All of them have been aimed against the Islamic state as a common enemy of the contemporary West. Despite the emphasis on the legality and legitimacy of its interventions, France is confronted with the logic of the vicious circle. All its SMOs turned into drastic asymmetrical wars in which France is the losing actor. According to contemporary research, Africa is the laboratory for attacks against France. Moreover, these asymmetric wars are accompanied by terrorist attacks in France. The SMO is currently a major problem for contemporary France and its armed forces.

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Chaliand, G. (2016). Pourquoi perd on la guerre? Odile Jacob, Paris. Châtaigner, J.-M. (2019). Sahel et France, enjeux d’une relation particulière. Hérodote, 2019/ 1(172). Chatelot, C. (2013, February 3–4). Les Trois plaies du Mali. Le Monde, pp. 4–5. Chauprade, A., & Thual, F. (1999). Dictionnaire de géopolitique (2nd ed.). Ellipses. de Saint Victor, F. (2013). 45 ans d’opérations militaires françaises en République Centrafricaine. Lettre du retex – Opérations (8). Centre de doctrine d’emploi des forces. De Villepin, D. (2013, December 4). Paris ne doit pas agir seul, mais mobilizer le Conseil de sécurité et l’Europe. Le Monde. Desportes, V. (2013, December 26). Mission Sangaris: pour le général Desportes, «il faut agir vite» en Centrafrique. RFI. Desportes, V. (2018). Leçons des guerres d’aujourd’hui pour les guerres de demain. Retrieved September 6, 2018, from https://www.geostrategia.fr › leçons. . . . Durocher, G. (2018, July 6). Démocrature: Nazi Concept Welcomed into French Language. North American New Right. Retrieved from https://www.countercurrents.com/2018/07/democraturenazi-concept-welcomed-into-french-language/ Evans, G. (2004). When is it right to fight? Survival, 46(3). Galy, M. (2013, juin). La guerre au Mali: Comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara. Enjeux et zones d’ombre, Éditions La Découverte. Galy, M. (2016, October 31). L’Aventure Ambiguë de Valls en Afrique. Retrieved from https:// www.facebook.com/1545419919028842/posts/1822310214673143/ Gerathy, J. (2011). Obama: No U.S. forces on the ground in Libya. . . except for those guys. Retrieved March 23, 2011, from https://www.nationalreview.com › o. . . . Glennon, M. J. (2003). Why the security council failed. Foreign Affairs, 82(3). Retrieved from https://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MAC404A.html Gomart, T. (2020). Soldat de l’ombre. Au cœur des forces spéciales. Tallandier. Gomart, T. (2021). Guerres invisibles – Nos prochains défis géopolitiques. Éditions Tallandier. Gouëset, C. (2017, May 19). Au Mali, “la France prête trop d’attention au militaire, pas assez au terreau du djihadismeˮ [archive]. L’Express. Goya, M. (2019). S’adapter pour vaincre. Comment les armées évoluent. Perrin. Groizeleau, V. (2013, avril 30). La France fait une croix sur son quatrième BPC. Mer et Marine. Gros-Verheyde, N. (2011, November 22). L’atout français: sa chaîne de commandement, rapide. . . [archive]. Bruxelles 2. Guibert, N. (2013, December 7). Les coulisses des guerres au Mali et en Centrafrique. Le Monde. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/12/07/les-coulisses-desguerres-au-mali-et-en-centrafrique_3527296_3210.html Guisnel, J. (2014, July 16). Le Drian et Hollande installent l’opération Barkhane. Le Point. Haski, P. (2013, November 26). Pourquoi François Hollande envoie des troupes en Centrafrique. L’Obs. Retrieved https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-afrique/20131126.RUE0476/ pourquoi-francois-hollande-envoie-des-troupes-en-centrafrique.html Hollande, F. (2013, January 12). Mali: l’intégralité du discours de François Hollande. Le Soir. Retrieved from https://www.lesoir.be/art/159960/article/actualite/france/2013-01-12/mali-l% E2%80%99int%C3%A9gralit%C3%A9-du-discours-fran%C3%A7ois-hollande Hollande, F. (2016a, November 25). Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur les forces armées, Paris. Retrieved from http://discours.vie-publique.fr/ notices/167003473.html Hollande, F. (2016b, May 13). Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la situation en République centrafricaine et l’opération militaire française Sangaris, Bangui. Retrieved from discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/167001453.html Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon & Schuster. Ikenberry, J. (2001). American grand strategy in the age of terror. Survival Global Politics and Strategy, 43(4).

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Chapter 5

The Vicious Circle Escalates: The Terrorist Attacks Against France After 2015

Abstract Since the beginning of the second half of the 2010s, France has suffered a long series of violent and even barbaric terrorist attacks perpetrated by the jihadists of the Maghreb origin. As a result, terrorism is perceived as an imminent security threat for all the territories of this nice country with a long history. The numbers of terrorist attacks perpetrated in France during the last decade are so high that it is impossible to analyze all of them. During these attacks, three hundred French people or visitors of this attractive country were killed (2015–2020: cinq ans d’attentats islamistes meurtriers en France, Sud-Ouest, 29 octobre 2020). This is the reason why the scope of this chapter will be limited only to the most important and most spectacular attacks. The choice of the analyzed attacks is based on two basic criteria. First, the key attention will be given to the attacks that have been perpetrated as acts of revenge for the French military interventions waged in the Islamic world after 2011. Second, the same attention will be given to the most spectacular attacks with the largest numbers of victims and with strong political, psychological, and international impacts. All these attacks will be analyzed in light of the strategy of communication, the principle of reciprocity, and the theory of terrorism.

The Situation After the Election of Francois Hollande After 5 years of the reign of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), the people living in the “banlieus”, large cities with a high concentration of immigrants and their families. These peripheries of large French towns are often called “quartiers difficiles”, difficult districts because of a high degree of the unemployment, or “no-go zones” because of a high degree of criminality. They are located in the neighbourhood of large metropoles, and the largest of them is at the Nord of Paris (600 thousand inhabitants). Their citizens placed their hopes on Francois Hollande, the socialist candidate in the 2012 presidential election who promised to pay particular attention to the situation of these areas. One of the most important promises has been declared in Marseille, where Francois Hollande solemnly announced his determination to “bring back the French

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_5

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republic” and its values to these disadvantaged areas.1 In the concretization of this important promise, he spoked about the “tolerance zero” for the undignified flats and conditions of life in these areas. At the same time, he condemned the fact that the people living in these areas have no possibility of obtaining a financial loan. During his visit to an area in the region of Paris, he spoked about investments in the infrastructure of the so-called banlieus. He promised many profound transformations, substantial changes, and anti- discriminatory measures. In this situation, the victory of F. Hollande was celebrated as a beginning of a new era, symbolized, namely, by new jobs for these areas and by the improvements of the conditions for everyday life. However, the first 2 years of his presidency showed that the majority of his promises were unkept. This fact provoked a deep disappointment and even a profound mistrust to all French policy elites and to the French political system as a whole. Negative Consequences of the Gaza War Disenchantment from the internal policy of the newly elected French president was reinforced by his reactions to important international challenges. Only 2 years after his victory, he had to articulate the French attitude to the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2014, also known as Operation Protective Edge. It was a military operation launched by Israel on 8 July 2014, in the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian territory that has been governed by Hamas since 2007 (The Military Balance, 2012). Just after the beginning of this war, President Hollande assured M. Netanyahu, the PM of the State of Israel, of the support of his country regarding the rockets launched from Gaza. He strongly condemned the rocket attacks of Hamas aimed at the territory of the State of Israel, qualifying them as an act of aggression.2 The Muslims in France perceived those attitudes as a blessing, especially after the repressive Israeli offensive in Gaza. They condemned them as a betrayal of the longterm balanced French approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was articulated by Charles de Gaulle at the beginning of the V. République (1958). As a result, the above-mentioned profound disappointments of the internal and external policies of F. Hollande have fateful implications for the relation between France and its growing Islamic community. These controversial events created the framework favourable for the so-called alternative solutions, which are often proposed if not imposed by the extremist and even terrorist organizations operating in the marginalized areas inhabited by the Muslim population.

Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la . . . https://www.vie-publique.fr › 1880. . .4. 6. 2013. 2 “France, Germany ʻStrongly Condemnʼ Rockets on Israel”. Israel National News. 9 July 2014. 1

5.1

5.1

Charlie Hebdo as the First French Example of Militarized Terrorism

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Charlie Hebdo as the First French Example of Militarized Terrorism

Just at the beginning of 2015, January 7, all of France was shocked by spectacular terrorist attacks perpetrated against the redaction of the magazine Charlie Hebdo.3 These attacks have been prepared as the punishment of the satiric cartoons published on the pages of the above-mentioned magazine. These attacks have had an enormously strong political and psychological impact—not only in France but also all over the world. They provoked a strong sensibilization of public opinion. Political Context of the Attack At the beginning of this analysis, it is necessary to remember that these cartoons have been published even despite the preceding serious warnings of President Jacques Chirac. This charismatic president invited the cartoonists into his office and argued by a disturbing political radicalization of the Muslim community in France and especially in the suburbs of Paris. Moreover, he argued for their sensitization during the war in Iraq in 2003 and warned before their unpredictable hate.4 In 2012, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius criticized the magazine’s decision, saying that “In France, there is a principle of freedom of expression, which should not be undermined. In the present context, given this absurd video that has been aired, strong emotions have been awakened in many Muslim countries. Is it truly sensible or intelligent to pour oil on the fire?”5 Unfortunately, the urgent warnings of President Chirac as well as the declarations of Minister Fabius were not heeded, and they were ignored. The cartoons were published, which provoked strong emotions in the entire Islamic world and accelerated the radicalization of the Muslim community in France. They have been perceived as extremely anti-Islamic, provocative, highly offensive, and injuring.6 This was especially the case for a cartoon with Muhammad with an over-dimensional erected penis and with the provocative text: I am the sixth pillar of the Quran. This cartoon has been perceived as an act of blaspheme,7 as a public humiliation of all Islamic faith and religion, and as a blow into its heart. Modus Operandi Today, we know that the publication of the above-mentioned cartoons has been punished by a foolish shooting in the Charlie Hebdo offices. This mass assassination occurred on 7 January 2015, when two Islamist gunmen8 forced their way into the Paris headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, where they opened fire. They killed

3

What is Charlie Hebdo and why was it a target?. The Globe and Mail. AFP (2006). 5 Clark (2012). 6 Duggan (2015). 7 The Charlie Hebdo affair: Laughing at blasphemy. The New Yorker. 8 French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. The Times. London, UK. 4

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12 members of the redaction: five prominent and highly appreciated staff cartoonists: Charb (cartoonist, columnist, and director of publication), Cabu (cartoonist), Honoré (cartoonist), Tignous (cartoonist), and Wolinski (cartoonist).9 Together with them, seven other people were killed. It was the economist of the redaction, three of its editors. They were Elsa Cayat, psychoanalyst and columnist; Philippe Honoré, cartoonist; and Bernard Maris, economist, editor, and columnist. Last, a guest, a maintenance worker, and two police officers were brutally killed.10 The fanatic killers were identified as Saïd Kouachi and Chérif Kouachi, French Muslim brothers of Algerian origin born in 1980 and 1982 in Paris. They accompanied their barbaric murders by the exclamations “Allahu akbar” (“God is great” in Arabic) and “the Prophet is avenged”.11 These exclamations confirmed that France has been directly attacked by an extreme form of religious terrorism. An excellent explication of the general framework of these attacks has been presented by Michael Morell, former deputy director of the CIA. According to him, the motive of the attackers was “absolutely clear: trying to shut down a media organization that lampooned the Prophet Muhammad”.12 Military execution has been chosen as a parallel with absolute punishment during war when hostility and mutual hate are at the highest level. Last, the brutality served as the factor of multiplication of a dissuasive message for all the “impious and profane mans” who could succumb to the tendency to ironize Islam and its prophet. This message said that no religious outrage of this style would be tolerated and that it would be punished by a merciless execution. As for its modus operandi, it was a targeted killing, an execution a la militaire carried out after the condemnation of the magazine made within a small circle of the jihadists of the Parisian region. Its perpetrators assumed the role of self-proclaimed avengers and transmitters of the message that any other cartoons or other representations that are offensive to Islam would be punished by a similar form of execution. As a result, the above-mentioned attacks will be analyzed as the beginning of the so-called Annus Horribilis of France. In this year, France became a victim of its own home-grown terrorists. These attacks were enormously shocking13 and revealed the high vulnerability of French and Western European society when it was faced with a merciless and brutal enemy.

9

Attentat contre « Charlie Hebdo » : Charb, Cabu, Wolinski et les autres, assassinés dans leur rédaction. Le Monde (in French), 7 January 2015. 10 Les dessinateurs Charb et Cabu seraient morts. L’Essentiel (in French), 7 January 2015. 11 EN DIRECT. Massacre chez « Charlie Hebdo »: 12 morts, dont Charb et Cabu. Le Point.fr (in French), 7 January 2015. 12 Bilefsky, Dan: “Terrorists Strike Charlie Hebdo Newspaper in Paris, Leaving 12 Dead”. The New York Times, 7 January 2015. 13 Attentat à Charlie Hebdo: la France sous le choc [archive]. Le Parisien, January 7, 2015. Available at: http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/en-direct-paris-fusillade-au-siege-decharliehebdo-07-01-2015-4425881.php

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Punitive Religious Terrorism All the above-mentioned facts confirm that the attacks against Charlie Hebdo have been prepared and perpetrated as an extremely violent and brutal punition for blasphemy at two levels. First, it was, according to the French jihadists, the blasphemy against holy personages. Second, the cartoons were misinterpreted as the blasphemy against beliefs and customs of all Muslims, including those who are born and living in France. From the psychological and political point of view, the military execution of the redaction of Charlie Hebdo was more choking that it had been perpetrated in a country in which the blasphemy law had ceased to exist in the first half of nineteenth century. In addition, since the beginning of the twentieth century the separation of church and state has been accomplished.14 Moreover, this formal separation was anchored in the Fourth Constitution of this country from 1945. This means that, together with a long range of other important aspects, all French authors, humorists, cartoonists, and individuals have the right to satirize people, public actors, and even religions. This right to ironies is balanced by defamation laws. Of course, the articulation of this law in 1945 concerned Christianism as the dominant religion. The immigration of millions of Muslims from North Africa has profoundly changed the situation (Boniface, 2005). From the formal point of view, the images of Muhammad are not explicitly banned by the Quran itself.15 On the other hand, prominent Islamic views underlie for a long time their categorical opposition to all human images, especially in the case of prophets. Unfortunately, for Western civilization, and especially for contemporary France, these approaches prevailed among militant Islamic groups.16 Accordingly, some Muslims share the conviction that the satire of Islam, of religious representatives, and above all of Islamic prophets is blasphemy in Islam punishable by death.17 This sentimental approach was most famously symbolized by the assassination of the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. According to the BBC, France has seen “the apparent desire of some younger, often disaffected children or grandchildren of immigrant families not to conform to Western, liberal lifestyles—including traditions of religious tolerance and free speech”.18 War-Generated Terrorism In light of the above-mentioned historical and cultural facts, the assassination of the 12 members of the redaction Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 was an ultraviolent clash between two approaches towards religion in contemporary France. The right to ironies, deeply anchored in the cultural and political tradition of France, was brutally 14

Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat. Version consolidée au 0 8 avril 2015. 15 The Koran Does Not Forbid Images of the Prophet, Newsweek, 9 January 2015. 16 The issue of depicting the Prophet Muhammad. BBC, 14 January 2015. 17 FOCUS – Praying for a pardon: Christian sentenced to death for blaspheming against Islam. France 24, 2 December 2010. 18 Paris attack highlights Europe’s struggle with Islamism. BBC News, 7 January 2015.

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denied by a hateful violence perpetrated by fanatical jihadists who came to France from Algeria. As these fanatical criminals were born in France and spent their childhood over there, they belong to the category of home-grown or domestic terrorists who are extremely hateful, determined, and dangerous. Domestic terrorism is defined as “homegrown in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the same country” (Enders et al., 2011: 319–337). The term “homegrown terrorism” is used as a label for the terrorism perpetrated by jihadist against Westerners. It is defined as “autonomously organized radicalized Westerners with little direct assistance from transnational networks, usually organized within the home or host country, and targets fellow nationals” (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010: 33–51). Even if the punition for blasphemy in Islam in the cartoons was the dominant motivation of the attacks perpetrated on 7 January 2015, the wars waged by Western countries in the Islamic world played an important role. This important aspect was confirmed in an interview between Chérif Kouachi and Igor Sahiri, one of France’s BFM TV journalists. Chérif used the following arguments: “We are not killers. We are defenders of the prophet; we do not kill women. We kill no one. We defend the prophet. If someone offends the prophet, then there is no problem; we can kill him. We do not kill women. We are not like you. You are the ones killing women and children in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This is not us. We have an honor code in Islam”.19 The attack against the redaction of Charlie Hebdo provoked huge and profound emotions, and it was condemned by the French president,20 particularly for its cruelty.21 As a result, jihadist terrorism has become the most imminent security threat in France. In light of the modus operandi, the attacks from January 2015 represented something new and specific in the era of religious terrorism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Two fanatical brothers made an original combination of three key features: punitive attacks, military attacks, and a brutal execution of cartoonists presented as guilty men who perpetrated mortal sins. Their punishment has been conceived as an act that demonstrated the so-called tolerance zero towards the acts of this genre, the act that is perceived and misinterpreted as an intolerable outrage of the Islamic religion. Charlie Hebdo in Light of the Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, the attacks perpetrated in January 2015 confirmed that France entered the age of terrorism, which represents a new face of war in the twenty-first century. According to the theory of David Rappoport, the behaviour of brothers Kouachi satisfied the criteria of cowardice (Rappoport, 2008). Armed criminals brutally killed a dozen defenceless 19

Saliba (2015). Asquin and Wibaux (2015). 21 Hollande dénonce un ‘acte d’une exceptionnelle barbarie’. BFMTV, January 7, 2015. Available at: https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/charlie-hebdo-hollande-denonce-unacte-d-uneexceptionnelle-barbarie-856207.html 20

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The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks as the First War-Generated. . .

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cartoonists and their collaborators. These jihadist gangsters demonstrated a concrete face of the assassination policy and a brutal discriminate killing aimed against concrete French journalists. In light of the theory of Alex Schmid (Schmid, 2011), the militarized killing perpetrated in January 2015 represents a peacetime equivalent of war crimes. It was a lethal communication with the French government and with French society based on the language of blood. Last, in light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, these peacetime war crimes represent a concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism perpetrated with the aim of provoking France as an attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it in the eyes of all Muslims. From the point of view of the strategy of communication, the brothers Kouachi send the following messages. First, it was the message that they would tolerate neither ridiculing nor mockery at the detriment of the Muslim religion. Second, an important message was sent to the families of the victims. In a blackmail communication, the killers told them that in that situation of bilateral hate, they had to pay the price. Third, in the message to their sympathizers, the brothers Kouachi presented themselves as the wave of the future, as the fighters who offered the remedy for the rotten and corrupted French society manifested its unacceptable solidarity with cartoonists. Last, these fanatical jihadists send a clear message to the French media saying then that they have to report fully and accurately about us, about our aims, actions, and results and about the consequences of our determination.

5.2

The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks as the First War-Generated Punishment of France

The second largest terrorist attack occurred on Friday, 13 November 2015, at three different places in Paris. The first of them was the Stade de France, and the second wave of attacks was aimed against the restaurants in 10th and 11th arrondissements in Paris. The last attack, and the deadliest of them, touched the Bataclan theatre on the boulevard Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement. The Stade de France The first of the above-mentioned attacks took place in the northern suburb called Saint-Denis, an important area. At 21:15, during an international friendly football match between France and Germany, three suicide bombers struck near the Stade de France. Fortunately, they failed to gain entry to the stadium, and this incident passed without victims. The choice of this match had three strong political motivations. First, it was a match between two neighbour states that represent the so-called motor of the West European integration. Second, French President Hollande was present in the tribune. Finally, Stade de France has been chosen because of its historical and symbolic importance. In 1988, this Stade witnessed, in the presence

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of President Jacques Chirac, the first victory of the team of France in the championship in football. In 2024, it will host the Olympia Games. Attacks Against Restaurants and Cafés At the same time, the second group of attackers then opened fire on crowded cafés and restaurants in the 10th arrondissement in Paris, with one of them also detonating an explosive, killing himself in the process. A total of 13 people were killed at these locations, and 10 others were critically injured.22 Just after, the terrorists attacked Le Carillon,23 a café and bar, the restaurant Le Petit Cambodge,24 Café Bonne Bière.25 The following attack was aimed at the Italian restaurant La Casa Nostra. During this attack, five people were killed, and eight others were injured.26 The most lethal was the attack perpetrated against the restaurant La Belle Équipe in the 11th arrondissement: the result is that 21 people were killed, and seven others were left in critical condition. The Shooting in Bataclan Theatre A third group carried out another mass shooting and took hostages at a rock concert attended by 1500 people in the Bataclan theatre during the concerts of an American rock band Eagles of Death Metal before the audience of approximately 1500 people. Mass killing started at 21:50 at the moment when the band had started performing the song “Kiss the Devil”. The attackers shot randomly into the crowd 27 and they killed about 90 fans.28 Political Context of the Attacks The November 2015 attacks happened 10 years after the publication of the jihadist doctrine GIRC (Global Islamic Resistance Call) articulated by Abu Moussab al-Souri. This document exhorted all the Muslims in Western countries, especially the immigrant Muslims, to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe with the aim of “triggering the final dislocation of the West, prior to the global triumph of Islamism”.29 His philosophy is based on the conviction that repeated attacks would generate strong Islamophobia in the attacked states, which would push the Muslims of France to join the ranks of jihadists. However, in the first years after the courageous decision of the fifth French President Jacques Chirac to refuse the support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003,

22 « Attaques à Paris: le point sur l’enquête et le déroulé des attaques ». Le Monde, 20 November 2015. 23 Le Monde (2015). 24 Attaques à Paris: le point sur l’enquête et le déroulé des attaques. Le Monde, 15 November 2015. 25 Attentats de Paris: le point sur l’enquête 24 heures après les faits. Le Figaro, 14 November 2015. 26 Rawlinson (2015). 27 Harding and Willsher (2015). 28 Attaques à Paris: la situation au lendemain des fusillades meurtrières qui ont fait au moins 12 9 morts. Le Huffington Post, November 14, 2015. 29 Henri Tincq, «Depuis 2005, la fulgurante percée du « djihadisme de proximité » français», sur slate.fr, 15 janvier 2016.

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France was not a target of jihadists from the Middle East. Nevertheless, the atmosphere gradually changed to the detriment of France in the period between 2004 and 2010. The first date is connected with the adoption of the law on religious symbols in French schools, and the second entered into the contemporary history of France thanks to the ban on wearing the full veil in 2010.30 During this period, France saw some important events that accelerated the radicalization of its Muslims. This disturbing process was started by the riots in November 2005, the so-called French riots. It was a 3-week-long period of riots in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities that occurred between 28 October 2005 and 16 November 2005.31 These violent and highly negativist protests involved youth in attacks and the burning of cars and public buildings.32 These riots affected 274 French towns; 8973 vehicles were burned, 233 public houses and 74 private houses were destroyed, and 18 religious localities were torched.33 Total damages are estimated at 200–250 million euros.34 During these riots, Nicolas Sarkozy, interior minister at the time, played an important role. He declared a “zero tolerance” policy towards urban violence after the fourth night of riots and made the decision to station 17 companies of riot police (CRS) and seven mobile police squadrons (escadrons de gendarmerie mobile) in contentious Paris neighbourhoods. At the same time, he used an enormously controversial word: “he labelled the protesting French youth as thugs” (racaille), a term considered by some to bear implicit racial and ethnic resonances.35 This explosive sentence accelerated the radicalization of young French Muslims. Last, the riots have had an important political consequence: face to face of this violence and brutality, President Jacques Chirac announced a national state of emergency on 8 November. Moreover, on 20 November 2005, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin announced the tightening of controls on immigration, and Chirac’s government started the process aimed at limiting the fraudulent marriages that some immigrants used with the aim of acquiring residency in France. At the same time, a stricter screening process for foreign students was launched. Only some months later, Charlie Hebdo, as mentioned above, republished the cartoons of Muhammad. Just after, President Jacques Chirac hardened the tone. During the Council of Ministers, held on 8 February 2006, he firmly condemned the clear provocations likely to dangerously stir up passions. Since the start of this crisis, Jacques Chirac has decided to calm the atmosphere and has tried to balance two

30

Christophe Ayad et Soren Seelow, «2003–2008 : de l’Irak aux caricatures de Mahomet, la laïcité française dans le viseur d’Al-Qaida», lemonde.fr, 31 août 2021. 31 Cesari (2005). 32 Canet et al. (2008). 33 Conseil national des villes, Avis du Conseil national des villes sur « les émeutes urbaines de novembre 2005 », novembre 2006. 34 Enquêtes sur les violences urbaines : comprendre les émeutes de novembre 2005. Documentation française, 2007, p. 71 35 « La boîte de Pandore de Sarkozy » . L’Humanité, 3 November 2005.

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important values: freedom of expression and respect for religions. His strategy was based on two basic facts. First, Islam has become the second religion in France, and second, since the end of WW II, France has cultivated its ties with the Arab world. During the crisis of satirical cartoons, Jacques Chirac received the rector of the Paris Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, at the Elysee Palace and clearly told him that freedom of expression is one of the foundations of the Republic. However, at the same time, he spoked about a greater spirit of responsibility, of respect and of moderation and about the necessity to avoid anything that could offend other people’s beliefs.36 Dalil Boubakeur immediately appreciated the calming words of Jacques Chirac and his respect for Muslims. Despite the highly prudent and intelligent behaviour of the French President, the tension continued to graduate. In reaction to the cartoons, the chief theologian of Al-Qaeda Abou Yahya al-Libi urged, on 11 May 2006, to punish three European countries where these caricatures were republished, including France. Another step of the anti-French feelings was reached in 2007 when Nicolas Sarkozy, elected President of the Republic, made the decision to bring France back into NATO’s integrated military command and to reinforce the French contingent in Afghanistan. On 22 February 2009, the Egyptian capital Cairo witnessed a bomb attack against a group of young French tourists with 15 injured and a dead victim aged 17. After this attack, the Egyptian authorities presented the warning that France was targeted by plans for an attack37 at Bataclan.38 This threat was linked to another important fact: the Jewish owners of the theatre had planned, in January 2009, to organize a gala in support of the Israeli army, as in 200739 and 2008. It is no wonder that associations supporting Palestine had demonstrated against these events. Punitive Religious Terrorism The religious motives were openly and clearly articulated in the statement of the IS. This statement underlined the following three arguments: first, during the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Bataclan hosted galas organized with the aim of raising funds for the social works of the Israeli forces. Second, on 13.11.2015, Bataclan hosted hundreds of idolaters of perversity.40 Third, in the past, the Bataclan was owned by Jewish entrepreneurs.41 The last argument confirms that the mass murder in Bataclan had a deeply rooted anti-Semite and

Philippe Guillaud: Cartoons: Chirac denounces the ʻprovocations’ 9. 2. 2006. Nathalie Guibert et Véronique Montaigne, « Le Bataclan, un haut lieu de la culture ciblé de longue date par les islamistes », Le Monde, 14 novembre 2015. 38 Terrorisme : les attentats de 13 novembre et celui du Caire en 2009 sont-ils liés ?», France Info, 22 février 2016. 39 Julien Heyligen, « Le gala pour la police israélienne contesté », Le Parisien, 22 janvier 2007. 40 Véronique Mortaigne et Nathalie Guibert, «Le Bataclan, un haut lieu de la culture ciblé de longue date par les islamistes», Le Monde, 15 November 2015. 41 Le point 14 novembre 2015. 36 37

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The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks as the First War-Generated. . .

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antizionist motivation.42 It has been prepared with the aim of punishing the State of Israel for its approach to the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The attacks of 13 November 2015 confirmed, once again, that the terrorist attacks in France are prepared and perpetrated as an exemplary premeditated political violence and of a diabolic intelligence of the contemporary French jihadists. Even if the name of this band is very controversial, as well as its repertoire, the shooting during its concert can be justified under no pretext. These attacks are, as the UN Security council 1566 (2004) stipulates, under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature. We can condemn terrorists, but we cannot underestimate their hate, determination, and capability to injure Western societies. The Bataclan and Paris restaurant attacks manifested four important phenomena. First, they showed the hate of the terrorists towards France, which was caused by their irritation in reaction to the Western military interventions and the wars waged in the Islamic world. Second, they manifested the determination of the French jihadists to fight against the “decadent West”. Third, these attacks revealed the enormous cruelty of the terrorists, and President Hollande condemned them as acts of war. 43 Last, these attacks confirmed the fact that contemporary jihadists are extremely hateful and merciless, but nevertheless, they have a diabolic intelligence. By killing the guests of a so-called café trotoir, they attacked an important pillar of the French way of life, which is symbolized by dozens of thousands of people dining in restaurants and cafés on a Friday evening. Modus Operandi In the first case, the jihadists tried, according to the security sources, to perpetrate three explosions as typical suicide bombings. This commando is made up of three men. The first of them was Ammar Ramadan Mansour Mohamad al-Sabaawi (originally from Mosul and aged approximately 20).44 The second terrorist was identified as Mohammad al-Mahmod, his Iraqi brother. They passed through Greece in October 2015.45 The third was Bilal Hadfi, who is a Frenchman from Neder-OverHeembeek in Belgium.46 Near the stadium, after the start of the match, when the places are relatively uncrowded, the first of the three men activated his explosive belt killing Manuel

42 «Paris attacks: Eagles of Death Metal defied pro-Palestine boycott movement and Roger Waters to play Israel», sur International Business Times, 20 November 2015. 43 Paris Attacks: Hollande Blames Islamic State for “Act of War”. BBC News, November 14, 2015. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34820016 44 Meyze, Christian: «Un des deux terroristes encore inconnus du Stade de France identifié», sur france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr, 18 janvier 2017. 45 Adenor, Jean-Loup: «13-Novembre. Morts, en prison ou en fuite. . . Que sont devenus les auteurs des attentats et leurs complices ?», sur ouest-france.fr, 13 novembre 2018. 46 Fournier, Catherine: «Attentats de Paris : Bilal Hadfi, le jeune djihadiste du Stade de France, amateur de jeux vidéo et de taekwondo», sur FranceTv Info, 21 décembre 2015.

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Dias,47 followed a few minutes later by the second terrorist, both avenue JulesRimet. The third explosion, rue de la Cokerie, occurred half an hour later. The three explosions caused a total of one death and a dozen serious injuries, in addition to terrorists. The three men intended to enter the stadium to perpetrate their acts but failed four times.48 Given the armament at their disposal, they could have caused far more casualties.49 In the case of attacks perpetrated on the host of Parisian restaurants and cafés, France has witnessed a typical militarized terrorism. During the first attack, the foolish shooting, gunmen shouted “Allahu Akbar”,50 and they killed 13 people51 at these locations, and 10 others were critically injured.52 Their behaviour was enormously cynical. It was fast the modus operandi, as in the case of Charlie Hebdo: a combination of three key features: punitive attacks, military attacks, and a brutal execution of the people presented as guilty men who perpetrated mortal sins. However, in the case of restaurants and especially of the Theatre Bataclan, the attackers perpetrated massive non-discrimination killing. This modus operandi resulted from their obsession to kill as many people as possible. War-Generated Terrorism In 2014, the Middle East witnessed merciless civil wars in Syria and Iraq, during which the Islamic State took control of large territories in these two countries. In August 2014, the jihadists started a large offensive in Iraqi Kurdistan, which provoked military intervention in Western countries. A coalition forms and launches a campaign of airstrikes against ISIS; in Iraq from 8 August 2014, then in Syria on 22 September 2014. France, for its part, intervenes within this coalition by conducting Operation Chammal, first in Iraq53 on 19 September 2014, then in Syria on 27 September 2015.54 After the beginning of the airstrikes of the international coalition, the Islamic State made an important change in its strategy. The logic called “regional jihad”, which focused on the fight against the states of the region, has been replaced by the

47 AFP, «Le destin tragique de Manuel Dias, victime des attentats au Stade de France : « Tu auras une place privilégiée pour voir le match »», sur La Libre, 9 juillet 2016. 48 Attentats à Paris: Bilal Hadfi a essayé de rentrer à quatre reprises au Stade de France», sur 20 Minutes, 28 décembre 2015. 49 Bonnefoy, Geoffrey: «Attentats de Paris : au Stade de France, « ils se sont loupés »», sur L’Express, 17 novembre 2015. 50 Paris shootings: Casualties in city center and explosion at the Stade de France. BBC News. 13 November 2015. 51 « Un an après, la France rend hommage aux victimes des attentats du 13 novembre 2015 ». Le Figaro.fr. 52 « Rue Bichat: On pensait que c’étaient des pétards. C’étaient des scènes de guerre ». Le Monde. Archived from the original on 14 November 2015. 53 Irak: l’opération française s’appelle Chammal», Le Figaro, 20 septembre 2014. 54 France – Syrie : les premières frappes françaises ont visé un camp djihadiste « occupé et actif »», France 24, 28 septembre 2015.

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logic of “global jihad”.55 The IS declared itself in struggle against the rest of the world and in particular against the West, including France. This strategic move clearly articulated in the message of Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, spokesman for the Islamic State, published on 22 September 2014. This determined jihadist called for the murder of citizens of the countries of the Coalition, in particular the “dirty French people”. 56 On 13 November, a few hours before the attacks, France reinstated random checks at its metropolitan borders as part of the security measures planned for the Paris Climate Conference (COP 21), which was open on 30 November and organized at the Paris-Le Bourget exhibition centre.57 Five days after the terrorist attacks, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle left its home port of Toulon heading for the eastern Mediterranean Sea58 to support the bombardment operations carried out by the international coalition. This decision had been made before the November attacks but was accelerated by these events. These planes are operational from Monday, 23 November 2015,59and come into action on sites in Syria and Iraq.60 Discussions Between French Experts The attacks of 13 November 2015 had a catalytic defect on the discussions between the leading French experts. They accelerated and deepened the quarrel between Olivier Roy (Olivier, 2019) and Gilles Kepel. The first of them, Research director at L’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), a prestigious French Research Center, is a globally respected specialist in the field of the studies of the Islamic world, the relations between the Western and Islamic civilizations, and the radicalization of Islamic youth in Western countries, especially in France. He is the author of a long range of monographs and often cited articles, in which he states that the Western jihadists are first of all nihilists. In addition, he continues by the argument that Western jihadists never represent a tradition that would revolt against Westernization. According to Olivier Roy, they are westernized; they speak French better than their parents. The argumentation of Olivier Roy continues with the thesis that all the future terrorists shared the “young” culture of their generation; they drank alcohol, smoked weed, and flirted with girls in nightclubs. Many of them have spent time in prison. In addition, then one fine morning, they (re)converted, choosing Salafist Islam, that is

55 Hélène Sallon, « Le but premier de l’Etat islamique est de cibler des Français, pas un mode de vie », sur Le Monde, 17 novembre 2015. 56 Comment l’Etat islamique menace la France après les frappes françaises en Irak», sur FranceTv Info, 22 septembre 2014. 57 COP21: la France rétablit ses contrôles aux frontières pour une durée d’un mois», sur France 24 , 13 novembre 2015. 58 Le porte-avions « Charles-de-Gaulle » a appareillé en direction de la Méditerranée orientale», Le Monde, 18 novembre 2015. 59 Le porte-avions français Charles de Gaulle est entré en action en Syrie et en Irak», sur Le Figaro, 23 novembre 2015. 60 Le Charles-de-Gaulle lance ses premières frappes en Syrie», sur La Tribune, 23 novembre 2015.

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to say an Islam that rejects the concept of culture, an Islam of the norm that allows them to rebuild themselves. Because they want neither the culture of their parents nor a “Western” culture, which have become symbols of their self-hatred. As a result, the violence these radicalized young people adhere to modern violence. They use the same modus operandi of mass killing as the killers in America or Breivik in Norway: they kill coldly and quietly. Roy concludes by stating that nihilism and pride are deeply linked here.61 On the other hand, his opponent Gilles Kepel, professor of the Political Science at the prestigious French Institute Science Po, at the London School of Economics (2009–2010), is a member of the direction of the l’Institut du monde arabe, a consultant of the French president Emmanuel Macron. Gilles Kepel (Kepel, 2005) has been, for a long time, in deep disagreement with political scientist Olivier Roy on the analysis of the causes of Islamist terrorism in France.62 The substance of their disaccords concerns the radicalization of Islamic youth in France.63 Gilles Kepel categorically refuses the basic thesis of Olivier Roy that France is only experiencing an Islamization of radicalization and that the jihadists have nothing to do with Salafism. Gilles Kepel continues by a frontal critic of the conviction of Olivier Roy that the West needs to internationalize the conflict all the less since Daesh has above all a local strategy, which it is trying to extend to the entire Middle East, but his goal is neither New York nor Paris. While the mass is said, the rantings cut off from reality continue to circulate. Olivier Roy’s ideas are similar to modern fallacies, which is why they are popular. This justifies the widespread intellectual laziness on this complex issue. Everyone seems to understand without having worked on it. However, no one travels to Syria only through the Internet. This requires a network of peers, the progression of Salafism as a model of value, and cultural rupture. The porosity between Salafism and jihadism remains great, even if the Salafists claim not to be violent.64 The Bataclan and Paris Restaurant Attacks in Light of the Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, these attacks confirmed, once again, that France entered the age of terrorism, which represents a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, the behaviour of these bestial killers was an upgrade of cowardice. Armed criminals brutally killed some dozen defenceless young visitors of concerts and the Paris bon vivants (good livers) savouring the atmosphere of the Friday evening. These jihadist gangsters

61

Olivier Roy, «Olivier Roy : « Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste »», sur Le Monde, 23 novembre 2015. 62 Olivier Roy et Gilles Kepel : le Prophète et le Mandarin [archive], Pierre de Gasquet, Les Échos, 31 mars 2017. 63 Frédéric Boily, « Le débat entre Gilles Kepel et Olivier Roy. Anatomie d’un désaccord », Frontières, vol. 31, no 1, 2019. 64 «Gilles Kepel « L’émergence du salafisme est un signe des failles de notre société »», sur L’Humanité, 26 février 2016.

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demonstrated a lethal face of the assassination policy and a brutal indiscriminate killing aimed against a typical manifestation of the French way of life. In light of the theory of Alex Schmid, the militarized killing perpetrated in November 2015 represents a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and with French society based on the language of blood. Last, in light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, these peacetime war crimes represent another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism perpetrated with the aim of provoking France as an attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it in the eyes of all Muslims. The Strategy of Communication In light of the strategy of communication, the killers from November 2015 send the following messages. First, it was the message that they would punish French youth for their way of life. Second, an important message was sent to the families of the victims. In a blackmail communication, the killers told them that in that atmosphere of bilateral hate, they had to pay the price. In the message to their sympathizers, the killers presented themselves, like the brother Kouachi, as the wave of the future, as the fighters who offer the remedy for the rotten and corrupted French society. Last, they send a clear message to the French media saying then that they have to report fully and accurately about their determination, about their aims, actions, and about the consequences of their strategy (Rouart, 2021: 148–150).

5.3

The Mass Murder in Nice in 2016 and Its Devastating Political and Psychological Consequences

Political Context The second attack carried out by jihadist terrorists as a punishment for the wars waged in the Islamic world happened in Nice, a splendid and world-famous Mediterranean city. From the psychological point of view, the choice of the date was very symbolic and cynical: it was July 14, a national holiday, and the most important day for France, when the French people forgot all their everyday obligations and worries and their differences, frustrations, and animosities. During the largely shared celebration, they shake hands saying, “Bonne fete” (Good holiday). This unique allied atmosphere was perfidiously abused for a brutal and insidious mass attack in which a camion drove into the crowds of the celebrating people.65 The perpetrator of this attack chose a very emblematic place with a large concentration of people and, as a result, with a certitude of an enormously strong psychological and political impact. He chose not only the date of the national holiday but also that of the Prom Party (party on the Promenade des Anglais), one of the largest projects of the town hall of Nice in recent years, with the backing of national

65

Vantighem and Aballain (2016).

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and international advertising campaigns, especially in airline magazines. Moreover, many victims were foreign visitors of this splendid town—this fact underlined a large international dimension and impact of this attack. Modus Operandi In the preparation of his attack, the terrorist rented a truck, a 19-tonne white heavy goods vehicle (a Renault Midlum3 delivery truck), with the aim to use it at the moment when fireworks display will take place from 10 p.m. to 10:20 p.m., in the presence of nearly 30,000 people. Therefore, it was a premeditated violence perpetrated with the aim of killing as many people as possible. This horrible killing started shortly after the end of the fireworks, at approximately 10:30 p.m. The truck came from the Magnan district in the direction of the Promenade des Anglais (the most splendid avenue of this town) and was free of traffic.66 During this attack, the truck is filmed, making several swerves from right to left, hitting the crowd massed on the south sidewalk (sea side) and the three lanes of the south roadway of the promenade.67 He tries to stay as much as possible on the sidewalk in order to cause the maximum number of victims there before being confronted with obstacles and then returning to the roadway.68 The race of the vehicle is slowed down in front of Hotel Negresco. The driver of the truck fired several times with a 7.65 mm pistol at National Police officers who responded with Sig-Sauer 9 mm5, chased him and tried to neutralize him.69 The truck drove another 300 m to stop at 10:50 p.m. opposite the Palais de la Méditerranée (the flat tires and the windscreen riddled with bullets), where two police officers from the Specialized Field Brigade shot the driver.70 The killing took place over a distance of 1.7 km, between numbers 11 and 147, causing the death of 86 people and causing a major movement of panic.71 According to Frédéric Gallois, former boss of the GIGN (Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale—National Gendarmerie Intervention unit),72 is convinced that the police were confronted with an “operating mode extremely difficult

66

Comment le camion a-t-il pu circuler sur la promenade des Anglais pourtant fermée à la circulation ?» [archive], sur francetvinfo.fr, 15 juillet 2016. 67 Ce que l’on sait de l’attentat commis à Nice» [archive], sur lemonde.fr, 15 juillet 2016. 68 Alain Auffray, Arnaud Vaulerin, Pierre Alonso, Stéphanie Harounyan, Laure Bretton, Mathilde Frénois et Amélie Quentel, «Nice, la nuit de l’apocalypse» [archive], sur liberation.fr, 15 juillet 2016. 69 «Attentat de Nice : ce que l’on sait du chauffeur du camion» [archive], sur tempsreel.nouvelobs. com, 15 juillet 2016. 70 Roland Gauron, Loïc Besson et Edouard de Mareschal, «En direct – Attentat de Nice : le bilan grimpe à 84 morts» [archive], Le Figaro, 14 juillet 2016. 71 Attentat à Nice : «un mode opératoire extrêmement difficile à contrer», juge l’ancien patron du GIGN» [archive], sur Europe 1, 15 juillet 2016. 72 It is specialized in crisis management and dangerous missions requiring specific know-how, particularly in the intervention: counterterrorism, release of hostages, retrenchment of madmen and high-risk arrests in the fight against organized crime.

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to counter which corresponds to the instructions of the Islamic State”.73 Frédéric Gallois is right, even though this modus operandi (the use of a vehicle as an arm of mass killing) has already been used in the past, in France, and in several other countries, with various circumstances and motives.74 The balance sheet is comparable with the Bataclan attack of 13 November 2015. However, in Bataclan, there were three terrorists, while in Nice, it was only one terrorist. According to the Ministry of Health, 188 patients were treated, and on July 15 in the afternoon, approximately 15 people were still between life and death.75 Some hours later, the public prosecutor of Paris, François Molins, announced during his first press conference a provisional toll of 84 dead (including 13 children and adolescents) and 202 injured from 8 to 10 different nationalities, including 52 in a state of absolute emergency.76 War-Generated Terrorism This mass killing was perpetrated by Mohamed Salmène Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian born in M’saken on 3 January 1985.77 According to his father, he suffered from depression between 2000 and 2004, before leaving Tunisia in 2005 for France, where he married a Franco-Tunisian girl from Nice. Regularizing his situation, he has a resident’s card. Two days after the attack, the Ministre of Interior Bernard Cazeneuve presented the hypothesis of a very rapid radicalization of this killer. The perpetrator of this attack, an outlaw misanthrope of Tunisian origin, acted as a self-proclaimed transmitter and avenger. The key message was clear: the attack was a punishment and a revenge for French interventions in the Islamic world. The use of a truck as the modus operandi was not a new method,78 but its combination with the national holiday represented a new form of cynical killing with an enormously strong psychological impact.79 As in the preceding cases, this terrorist attack with 86 dead and 458 injured80 was almost immediately taken credit for by the Islamic State.81

73

Attentat à Nice: «un mode opératoire extrêmement difficile à contrer», juge l’ancien patron du GIGN» [archive], sur Europe 1, 15 juillet 2016. 74 Valentin Pasquier et Mohamed Berkani, «Les précédentes attaques au véhicule-bélier à travers le monde» [archive], sur Francetvinfo, 15 juillet 2016. 75 Le groupe Etat islamique revendique l’attentat de Nice via son agence» [archive], sur lexpress.fr. 76 Ce qu’il faut retenir de la conférence de presse de François Molins» [archive], sur rtl.fr. 77 Qui est Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, l’auteur de l’attentat de Nice?» [archive], sur challenges.fr, 16 juillet 2016. 78 It was inspired by the attacks against the American and French soldiers in Lebanon during the 1980s. 79 L’attentat de Nice sur la promenade des Anglais le 14 juillet 2016. L’Express, July 14, 2016. Available at: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/camion-fou-a-nice-unacte-criminel-fait-desdizaines-demorts_1812646.html 80 Le Hars (2017). 81 Cornevin (2016).

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Political Consequences On the psychological level, the consequences were very hard: the state of emergency was prolonged over the whole territory of France,82 which became a symbol of the prolongation of the fear, incertitude, and hopelessness that the whole country felt when it was faced with a cruel and invisible enemy. On the political level, because of the attack, Prime Minister Manuel Valls was booed and whistled at by crowds of furious and highly dissatisfied citizens of the city of Nice during the minute of silence after his discourse.83 This whistling started the brutal end of the political career of a politician who cherished presidential ambitions for 2017.84 Last, this brutal attack accelerated and reinforced the profound crisis of the French Socialist Party, one of the gravest crises in all its history. This party with a long85 and rich history started to be confronted with the threat of marginalization. Its political weight and influence started to go swiftly down. In light of the strategy of communication, the political result of this attack is highly comparable with the political destiny of Tony Blair in Great Britain: in both cases, the reaction of the Prime Minister to the given terrorist attack resulted in his total discrediting and thus a brutal decline of a brilliant young politician with an enormously promising political career. Additionally, as in London, in Nice, the psychological and political consequences of the attack exceeded the expectations of the terrorists. Nice 2016 in Light of the Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, these attacks were prepared and perpetrated as a new step in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, the behaviour of this bestial killer represented a new form of cowardice—the perpetrator was hidden in the cabin of his truck, while his victims had no chance to defend themselves. This jihadist desperately demonstrated a lethal face of the assassination policy and a brutal indiscriminate killing aimed against a typical manifestation of the French way of live during the national holiday. In light of the theory of Alex Schmid, the mass killing perpetrated in July 2016 satisfies the criteria of a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and communication with French society based on the language of blood. Last, in light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw,

82

L’attentat de Nice sur la promenade des Anglais le 14 juillet 2016, op. cit. VIDEOS. Attentat de Nice: Valls déplore ‘les sifflets d’une minorité chauffée à blanc’. Le Parisien, July 18, 2016. Available at: http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/videos-attentat-denicevalls-deplore-les-sifflets-d-une-minorite-chauffee-a-blanc-18-07-2016-5977447.php 84 Manuel Valls assume ses ambitions présidentielles. Valeurs actuelles, July 17, 2016. Available at: https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/manuel-valls-assume-ses-ambitions-presidentielles-62 825 85 It was created in 1905. During the Fifth Republic, two Presidents (Mitterrand and Hollande) and many of the Prime Ministers (Mauroy, Fabius, Rocard, Cresson, Bérégovoy, Jospin, Ayrault, Valls, and Cazeneuve) were from this party. 83

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these peacetime war crimes represent another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism perpetrated with the aim of provoking France as an attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it in the eyes of all Muslims. The Strategy of Communication In light of the strategy of communication, the killer from Nice 2016 sent the following messages. First, it was the message that French citizens may be punished even in the most important holiday of their country. Second, an important message was sent to the families of victims. In a blackmail communication, the killer told them that in that atmosphere of bilateral hate, they had to pay the price. In the message to his sympathizers, the killer from Nice presented himself as the member of the wave of the future, as fighters who offer the remedy for the rotten and corrupted French society. Last, they send a clear message to the French media saying them that they have to report fully and accurately about the determination of jihadists, about their aims, actions, and results and about the consequences of their strategy.

5.4

The Shocking Terrorist Bestiality in Normandy

In July 2016, not only France but also all the civilized world was chocked by an enormously brutal Islamist terrorist attack perpetrated in a small town in SaintÉtienne-du-Rouvray in the French region called Normandy. This quiet and profoundly peaceful town witnessed a bestial slaughter of an 86-year-old Catholic priest in his Church before his collaborates. Political Context of the Attack The attack on the Saint-Étienne church was an attack committed on Tuesday, 26 July 2016. It was perpetrated only 2 years after the beginning of an important military operation the French armed forces waged against the Islamic state. This operation received the codename Chammal, which is Arabic the name for a north wind in Iraq. The French soldiers truly come from the north, and the operations, started on 20 September 2014, within the framework of a large international coalition fighting against the Islamic State in the territory of Iraq and Syria,86 were as rapid and quick as wind. Unfortunately, this operation was punished by a terrorist attack. Modus Operandi Two radical Islamists, Adel Kermiche (in the moment of the attack he was, under judicial control and was equipped with an electronic bracelet) and Abdel Malik Nabil-Petitjean, come suddenly into the church, and just after, they attacked Father Jacques Hamel, a priest of the Saint-Étienne church in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray.87 86

Irak: l’opération française s’appelle Chammal» [archive], sur Le Figaro, 20 septembre 2014. « Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray: les deux assaillants fichés S » [archive], sur lepoint.fr, 26 juillet 2016. 87

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They assassinate him by an enormously brutal and humiliating mode—by slitting his throat and stabbing him. The attackers then hold three other worshipers hostage, but after some minutes, they were shot by the police. Not surprisingly, this repugnant act is claimed the same day by the terrorist organization Islamic State. War-Generated Terrorism The aspect of WGT has been clearly articulated during a short discussion between one of the perpetrators and three nuns of the Sisters of Saint Vincent de Paul: Hélène Decaux (83 years old), Danièle Delafosse (72 years old), and Huguette Péron (79 years old). During the conversation with the oldest of them, questions about life after death and the divinity of Jesus and the Koran were discussed. This brave and intelligent nun (she has read the sacred book of Muslims) insists on the passages on peace in the book, which makes one of the young people react: “Peace? We also want peace! When you are on television, you will tell the authorities that as long as there are bombings in Syria, there will be attacks in France. Every day”.88 In these words, the fanatic killer clearly articulated two basic ideas. First, this bestial assassination has been prepared and perpetrated as a premeditated foolish revenge of the young French jihadists for the active role of France during the war against the Syrian regime. Second, it was a classic example of the determination to transfer the war from Syria to the territory of France. The aim of this transfer was to punish France for the engagement of its Air Forces against two important Islamic countries. Punitive Religious Terrorism Abominable killing in Normandy has had a strong religious dimension. First, the slitting of the throat was perpetrated on an 86-year-old Catholic parish priest.89 He was a great man,90 and he was enormously appreciated in the society not only as a priest but also as a huge altruist and an excellent psychologist.91 During his long service, he managed to convince a long range of couples to forget the idea to divorce and to continue their conjugal life. It is no wonder that in the following days and weeks, he was celebrated as a victim of jihad92 not only by the French people but also by Pope Francis,93 who initiated the process of the celebration.94 Second, like in Nice, this attack was perpetrated by self-proclaimed transmitters and avengers of Maghreb origin, although they were rather two perfidious criminals 88

Jan De Volder, Martyr. Vie et mort du père Jacques Hamel, Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 2016. De Volder (2016). 90 Nossiter and Olivennes (2015). 91 Prêtre tué à Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray: ce que l’on sait. Le Monde, July 27, 2016. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/07/26/unmort-apres-une-prise-d-otages-dans-uneeglise-pres-derouen_4974794_3224.html 92 De Montclos et al. (2016). 93 Izoard (2016). 94 Le pape François d’accord pour accélérer la béatification du père Jacques Hamel. Huffington Post, October 2, 2016. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/10/02/pere-jacques-hamelpape-francois-beatification-saint-etienne-du-rouvray_n_12298240.html 89

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and desperados. They committed this horrible murder on the day of Saint Anne, the grandmother of Jesus Christ. The aim was very clear: to punish all French Christians. Third, the aim of the attack was to hurt the minds and hearts of all of Christian France and deliver a premeditated insult to the whole of France. 95 The Attack in Light of the Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, this attack was a new and highly barbaric episode in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, two killers in Normandy acted as typical cowards—armed by his knives, they assassinated a defenceless and very old man. They demonstrated an infernal face of the assassination policy and a brutal attack on the important symbol of French Christianism. This fact largely confirms the value of the theory of Alex Schmid; it was a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and with all French society, a communication based on the language of blood. Last, in light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, the little village in Normandy witnessed a peacetime war crime perpetrated as a concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism. Strategy of Communication The message of this horrible attack was directly formulated by the murderers who cried “as long as there are bombs on Syria, we will continue our attacks”.96 In other words, it was a punishment of France for its military operations in the Islamic world. This murder represents a premeditated97 punitive and enormously cruel violence, and it became one of the most visible demonstrations of the principle of reciprocity, as it was conceived as a punishment that resulted from religious hate and an obsession with revenge.98 Moreover, this danger for France can even rise in the months after the return of the former fighters in Syria.99

Attentat Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray: “Tuer un prêtre, c’est profaner la République, déclare Hollande. France24, July 26, 2016. Available at: https://www.france24.com/fr/20160726-directlive-attaque-eglise-saint-etienne-rouvray-otage-normandie-pretre-assassine-mort 96 France Church Attackers “Smiledˮ and Talked of Peace, Nun Says. The Guardian, July 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/30/france-church-attackers-smiled-andtalked-of-peace-nun-says. 97 Prêtre égorgé: les tueurs se sont rencontrés sur Telegram. Le Figaro, July 31, 2016. Available at: http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/07/31/97001-20160731FILWWW00014-pretre-egorge-lestueurs-se-sont-rencontres-sur-telegram.php 98 Cazeneuve (2019). 99 Thomson (2016). 95

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The Assassination of Samuel Paty: The Terrorist Attack in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, 16 October 2020

Four years after the bestial slaughter in Normandy, another shocking terrorist attack occurred in the Paris region. It was the assassination and post-mortem decapitation of Samuel Paty, a 47-year-old professor of history and geography. He had been in the post for 3 years at the Collège du Bois-d’Aulne in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine.100 As in January 2015, the cartoons were the pretext of this attack. The Danish cartoons of 2006 were also republished by the same newspaper on 1 September 2020,101 which prompted calls for reprisals from Pakistan.102 Political Context Moreover, this attack comes shortly after the speech of Emmanuel Macron about the fight against separatism, delivered on 2 October 2020, in Les Mureaux (Macron, 2020). In this important speech of the doctrinal character, the French president openly said that Islamist separatism presented a serious problem for his country. In addition, he defined as a theorized, politico-religious project that materializes in repeated deviations from the values of the Republic, which often results in the constitution of a counter society and whose manifestations are the deschooling of children. This phenomenon means that the immigrants refuse to send their children to French schools, and their education has been replaced by the imams who teach only in Arabic and only the Quran. Emmanuel Macron clearly refused the above-mentioned indoctrination, which led to the negation of French principles, namely, equality between women and men and human dignity. He underlined that the problem is this ideology, which asserts that its own laws are superior to those of the Republic. In this important allocution, the French president underlined the duty of all French citizens to respect the principles of the Republic.103 At the same time, he presented important measures to strengthen secularism and denounced “the radicalization of certain Islamic practices”.104 Modus Operandi The critical moment came on 6 October 26, when Samuel Paty presented to his students a course in moral and civic education (EMC) about freedom of expression, a

100 Professeur décapité à Conflans-Sainte-Honorine: ce que l’on sait de l’attaque terroriste survenue près d’un collège» [archive], sur L’Indépendant, 17 octobre 2020. 101 L’intolérance vient de franchir un nouveau seuil": Charlie Hebdo réagit après l’attentat à Conflans-Sainte-Honorine» [archive], sur Le HuffPost, 16 octobre 2020. 102 « Charlie Hebdo » republie les caricatures du prophète Mahomet qui avaient fait du journal la cible des djihadistes », Le Monde, 1er septembre 2020. 103 Pauline Théveniau, «Enseignant décapité à Conflans: «Ils ne passeront pas», promet Macron» [archive], sur Le Parisien, 16 octobre 2020. 104 « Ce qu’il faut retenir du discours d’Emmanuel Macron sur la laïcité et les « séparatismes » », Le Monde, 2 octobre 2020.

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theme incorporated into the official National Education program.105 Articulating his argument, he presents two cartoons of Muhammad from the newspaper Charlie Hebdo,106 which are related to the murderous attack against this newspaper in 2015. According to former students, he presented it every year,107 without provoking negative reactions from students or parents.108 Just before the presentation of cartoons, Samuel Paty proposed to students who wish the possibility to look away or leave the classroom for a few seconds in the presence of a school life assistant.109 Despite his prudence and tactfulness, the presentation of cartoons provoked, even if it happened 5 years after the Charlie Hebdo, a wave of emotions and subsequent confrontation based on religious beliefs and pride. On the day of the attack, Abdoullakh Anzorov travelled between Évreux, his city of residence, and Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, where Bois-d’Aulne College is located. After his arrival, three college students join him and nominate Samuel Paty. Some minutes later, Anzorov tweeted a photo of the victim’s head, which he did not immediately name,110 and accompanied it with a message of demand.111 Only 3 min later, he hastily sends, via Instagram, a 28-s voice message to two contacts based in Idleb, Syria. Punitive Religious Terrorism Since the beginning, this attack has had a clear religious dimension. One of the students immediately spoke about the presentation of cartoons to her parents and her father, Brahim Chnina, a worker of Moroccan origin, strongly misinterpreted the behaviour of the teacher as an unacceptable affront of the Islamic belief. He accused the teacher of asking “the whole class for Muslim students to raise their hands”, including his daughter, and then “telling them to get out of the class”.112 His feverish activities continued on the internet, where he started a virulent campaign against the teacher.113 105

Ce que l’on sait de l’attaque terroriste contre un professeur, décapité à Conflans-SainteHonorine» [archive], sur France Info, 16 octobre 2020. 106 « Assassinat de Samuel Paty: un parent d’élève au cœur d’un engrenage islamiste ? » [archive], sur LCI, 18 octobre 2020. 107 Professeur d’histoire décapité: qui était Samuel Paty, quadragénaire "à fond dans son métier"? » [archive], sur parismatch.com, 17 octobre 2020. 108 Le père qui avait diffusé la vidéo hostile au professeur d’histoire en garde à vue », Le Point.fr, 17 octobre 2020. 109 Conflans: une note du renseignement retrace la chronologie des jours précédant l’attaque» [archive], sur Libération.fr, 17 octobre 2020. 110 Enseignant décapité à Conflans: l’assaillant n’était pas sur le radar de l’antiterrorisme» [archive], sur leparisien.fr, 16 octobre 2020. 111 Boris Thiolay, «Assassinat de Samuel Paty: sur les traces du djihad numérique d’Abdoullakh Anzorov» [archive du 13 avril 2021], Le Journal du dimanche, 13 avril 2021. 112 « L’homme qui a mis le feu aux poudres » [archive], sur La Presse+, 1er novembre 2020 113 Le père qui avait diffusé la vidéo hostile au professeur d’histoire en garde à vue », Le Point.fr, 17 octobre 2020.

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He accused him of having presented the students with “the photo” of a naked man and of having indicated: “It is the Prophet”. In addition, on Facebook, he urges his “brothers and sisters” to complain to the CCIF (Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France is an organization for combatting Islamophobia) and to the administration.114 His video has even been shared and distributed by the mosque of the village Pantin115 and on WhatsApp.116 In the WhatsApp web, the first contacts were established between Brahim Chnina and Abdoullakh Anzorov, an 18-year-old Russian Muslim refugee of Chechen ethnicity, a radical jihadist whose family moved from the village of Shalazhi in Chechnya 6 years ago. Until 2020, Abdoullakh was not noticed by security agencies. However, today, we know that in the spring of 2020, he was obsessed by the determination to leave France and to join Taliban in Afghanistan.117 He admired their emphasis on the strict application of the sharia.118 At the same time, Abdoullakh Anzorov has been in contact with two jihadists in Syria,119 concretely in the area of Idleb.120 Just after his criminal and abominable act, Abdoullakh Anzorov sends a clear religious message that underlines, in Russian and Arabic, his obsession with revenge and punishment. He formulated it by the following words: “My brothers, peace be upon you, as well as the mercy of Allah and his blessings. I avenged the Prophet Muhammad; may Allah’s blessings be upon him and peace. It was this teacher who showed the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah’s blessings be upon him and peace. He showed it offensively”.121 It was around this time that the decapitated body of Samuel Paty was discovered near the Bois-d’Aulne College by municipal police officers122 who immediately alerted the National Police.

114 Après l’attentat de Conflans, Gérald Darmanin veut dissoudre le Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France », Le Monde.fr, 19 octobre 2020. 115 Bernadette Sauvaget, «Attentat de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine: la mosquée de Pantin reconnaît avoir diffusé la vidéo du père de famille» [archive], sur Libération.fr, 18 octobre 2020. 116 «Attentat de Conflans: comment un « incident mineur » dans une classe est devenu « hors de contrôle »» [archive], sur lemonde.fr, 18 octobre 2020. 117 Denis Sokolov, « Russian Islamic Religious Authorities and Their Activities at the Regional, National, and International Levels », CAP paper, Central Asia Program, no 220 « Russiaʼs Islamic Diplomacy », 1er juin 2019, p. 38–42, article no 6. 118 Boris Thiolay, «Assassinat de Samuel Paty: sur les traces du djihad numérique d’Abdoullakh Anzorov» [archive du 13 avril 2021], Le Journal du dimanche, 13 avril 2021. 119 Attentat de Conflans: le terroriste était en contact avec au moins deux présumés djihadistes en Syrie [archive], Le Monde. 120 Agence-France-Presse, «Professeur décapité: le meurtrier était en contact avec un djihadiste russophone en Syrie» [archive], sur lefigaro.fr, 22 octobre 2020. 121 Arthur Carpentier, « Samuel Paty: enquête sur le terroriste et la rumeur » [archive], sur youtube. com, Le Monde, 16 novembre 2020. 122 Arthur Carpentier, « Samuel Paty: enquête sur le terroriste et la rumeur » [archive], sur youtube. com, Le Monde, 16 novembre 2020.

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The religious motive was confirmed even during the confrontation of Abdoullakh Anzorov with the members of the anti-crime brigade (BAC).123 Despite the warnings (the police asked him several times to drop his weapon and get on the ground), this fanatic killer refused to drop his weapon and ran towards them, shouting “Allahu akbar” and firing an air pistol five times.124 The religious motivation of the decapitation of Samuel Paty has been very clearly articulated by the following words of President Emmanuel Macron: Our compatriot was the victim of a characterized Islamist terrorist attack (. . .) It is no coincidence that this evening it is a teacher that this terrorist killed because he wanted to bring down the Republic in its values.125 At the same time, he articulated a clear psychological conclusion. He underlined that the Enlightenment, the possibility of making our children, wherever they come from, whether they believe or do not believe, whatever their religion, to make them free citizens. “This battle is ours and it is existential”. In addition, he concluded: “all of us, we will unite. They will not pass. Obscurantism and the violence that accompanies it will not win. They will not divide us. This is what they seek, and we must all stand together”.126 In other words, he clearly said that the perpetrators of this crime would not receive the desired feedback, and the French republic would not demission its basic values. The Decapitation of Samuel Paty in Light of the Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, this attack was a new episode in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, the jihadist Abdoullakh Anzorov acted as a typical coward— armed by his knives (35 cm), he assassinated an innocent and defenceless man. He demonstrated a lethal face of the assassination policy and a brutal attack against one of the most important symbols of French culture, against a professor of history and geography. This fact fully corresponds to the theory of Alex Schmid, which was a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and communication with all French society. This communication is based on the language of blood. Last, in light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, this peacetime war crime represents another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism perpetrated with the aim of provoking France as an attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it in the eyes of all Muslims.

123

Willy Le Devin, «Terrorisme: des interpellations après la décapitation de l’enseignant» [archive], sur Libération.fr, 16 octobre 2020. 124 Attentat de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine: ce que révèle l’enquête» [archive], sur lejdd.fr, 18 octobre 2020 125 Déclaration du Président Emmanuel Macron suite à l’attentat de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine.» [archive], sur elysee.fr, 16 octobre 2020. 126 Rioux (2020).

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Strategy of Communication In light of the strategy of communication, Abdoullakh Anzorov sends the following messages. First, it was the message addressed to all French teachers: if you will present the cartoons that ironize our prophet and our religion, you run the risk of capital punishment. In this light, the bestial decapitation of Professor Samuel Paty was a specific form of jihadist deterrent. Second, in a blackmail communication with the families of victims, the killer told them that in that atmosphere of bilateral hate, they had to pay the price. Third, in the message to his sympathizers, Abdoullakh Anzorov presented himself as the member of the wave of the future, as the fighter who offers the remedy for impious French society. Fourth, he said to the French media that they have to report fully and accurately about the determination of jihadists to revenge every act of the ridicule of Muhammad. Last, it was the message that the beliefs of Muslims are more important than the values of French society, including the liberty of expression.

5.6

The Macron Doctrine as a Political Answer to the Growing Brutality of Jihadist Terrorism

Since May 2017, France has been represented and led by the new president Emmanuel Macron, who is young and particularly dynamic. He inherited the tradition of wars waged in North Africa as well as the challenge of brutal terrorist attacks. This part of the chapter will analyze the factors of continuity in his antiterrorist strategy as well as his new approaches and priorities in this field. The following text will explain the basic claims of the doctrinal thinking of Emmanuel Macron, the contemporary president of France. Attention will be given to the factors of continuity as well as to his new approaches, priorities, and accents.

5.6.1

The Factors of Continuity

In his important speeches, Emmanuel Macron used some important slogans. The first of them was the necessity to stop the immense human suffering, murders, brutality, and atrocities perpetrated by the jihadists in North Africa as well as in the territory of France. Second, he very often spoked about the necessity to actively fight against the threat of the creation of “Sahelistan” to fight the local fanatical terrorists if necessary and wage military operations if necessary.

5.7

The Terrorist Attack in Strasbourg as the First Manifest Punishment of. . .

5.6.2

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New Approaches and New Priorities

Emmanuel Macron enriched the anti-terrorist strategy of his country by three new doctrinal slogans. The first of them is militarized Islamic terrorism (MIT), whose aim is to attack France and deter it, to discourage her before new military interventions in the Islamic world. From the point of view of geopolitics, this threat is symbolized by two mutually intertwined actors: military gangs in the Sahel and Syria and radical jihadists in France.127 Together, these two dangerous actors prepare low-cost terrorist attacks with the aim of paralyzing France. The new approach to this threat is explained as follows: the long-term fight against this threat must be based on a clear political strategy and political solutions that are primordial and play a dominant role. Second, Macron introduced the word vigilant society. This means that the whole country has the obligation to prevent and detect jihadist radicalization and to act against it and against its consequences. This means that the fight against the terrorist threat represents a long-term task of all French societies. The third new word is “surgical military interventions (SMI)”. These SMI will be waged mainly in the area of the Sahel and, with the cooperation of other allies, also in Syria and other areas. From the military point of view, these SMIs must be based on professional secret services, modern IT, and agile special forces.

5.7

The Terrorist Attack in Strasbourg as the First Manifest Punishment of the New French President

The first spectacular terrorist attack during the reign of Emmanuel Macron was perpetrated in the Strasbourg Christmas market on 11 December 2018. His author was Chérif Chekatt, born in Strasbourg in February 1989, into a family with Moroccan roots who has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Chekatt opened fire and killed 5 people and 11 others. Before this horrible attack, he was known to justice multiple common law offenses (27 convictions in France, Switzerland, and Germany).128 Political Context This terrorist chooses the famous Christkindelsmärik in Strasbourg, the oldest Christmas market in France. This market has been held every year during the Advent season in the European capital, which has also called itself the “Christmas capital” since 1570 (Leser, 2018: 34–35). It has enjoyed increasing success since the 1990s.129As in the preceding cases, the perpetrator of the Strasbourg attack was an

127

They concentrate mainly in the so-called French Molenbeecks. Attentat à Strasbourg: qui est Chérit Chekatt, le suspect de la fusillade?» [archive], Le Monde, 12 décembre 2018. 129 Strasbourg, capitale de Noël, programme, Ed. Ville de Strasbourg, novembre 2018 128

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outlaw of Maghreb origin suffering from a hatred towards France and, particularly, its military interventions in the MENAP.130 This 29-year-old multi-recidivist131 was obsessed with getting revenge,132 which for him was more important than his French citizenship. 133 The modus operandi of this self-proclaimed transmitter and avenger 134 was largely inspired by the assassinations in several Paris restaurants on 13 November 2015. He attacked civilians with a gun and a knife, crying “Allahu Akbar!”135 It is no surprise that this furious act was approved, like all precedent attacks, by the IS.136 Modus Operandi On 11 December 2018, early in the morning, the gendarmes came to the home of Chérif Chekatt with the aim of arresting him in a case of extortion and attempting homicide. He was absent,137 but the search of his home reveals a loaded Long Rifle pistol, a defensive grenade, several ammunition and four knives, including two hunting knives. This fact confirms that the following attack was perpetrated after a long premeditation: The attack started at 7:50 p.m., when several shots were heard near the Christmas market.138 The shooter was equipped with an ordinance revolver of 1892, caliber 8 mm,139 and he shot several times at passers-by and wounded others with a knife. When he came very close to the chalets built in the Christmas market sector located in front of the cathedral, he continued towards small streets of the medieval quarter of Strasbourg and reached the picturesque rue des Orfèvres, where tourists like to stroll and in front of a jewellery store killed the first victim. In addition, in the Rue du Saumon, he killed a man leaving a restaurant, while in the Rue du Savon, he seriously injured musicians who discussed in front of the bar. His foolish criminal

130

Jacquard et al. (2018). Valdiguié (2018). 132 Fusillade à Strasbourg: deux morts et plusieurs blessés, la piste terroriste évoquée. L’Orient-Le Jour, December 11, 2018. Available at: https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1147886/fusillade-astrasbourg-deux-mort-et-onze-blesses-la-piste-terroriste-evoquee.html 133 Chichizola and Philippot (2018). 134 Attentat à Strasbourg: qui est Chérit Chekatt, le suspect de la fusillade? Le Monde, December 12, 2018. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2018/12/12/toujours-en-fuitele-tireur-destrasbourg-est-unradicalize-au-lourd-passe-judiciaire_5396463_1653578.html 135 Attaque à Strasbourg: des témoins ont entendu l’assaillant crier “Allah Akbarˮ. Europe 1, December 12, 2018. Available at: https://www.europe1.fr/societe/attaque-a-strasbourg-destemoins-ont-entendu-lassaillant-crier-allah-akbar-3819410 136 Strasbourg: Daech revendique l’attentat. Le Huffington Post, December 13, 2018. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2018/12/13/strasbourg-daech-revendique-lattentat_a_23617590/ 137 Fusillade: le tireur venait d’échapper à une arrestation» [archive], sur lexpress.fr, 12 décembre 2018. 138 Fusillade à Strasbourg: deux morts et plusieurs blessés, la piste terroriste évoquée» [archive], sur L’Orient-Le Jour, 11 décembre 2018. 139 Fusillade de Strasbourg: le tireur est un homme, fiché S, âgé de 29 ans» [archive], sur franceinter.fr, 12 décembre 2018. 131

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The Terrorist Attack in Strasbourg as the First Manifest Punishment of. . .

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behaviour continued in the sector called “Petite-France”, where he killed a Thai tourist. As Chérif Chekatt used his revolver to kill innocent people in Strasbourg, his attack was another form of militarized terrorism. During his terrorist action, he was purchased by French soldiers who had been engaged within the framework of the Sentinelle operation.140 In the end, he was shot by the Gendarmerie Nationale. Religious Terrorism During his attack, Chekatt cried “Allahu akbar”. Moreover, for a long part of this horrible night, dozens of scared and frightened people were confined to public places,141 especially the National Theater of Strasbourg, the National University Library, buildings bordering the Place de la République. By choosing as his victims the numerous crowds of Alsatians as well as tourists at the Christmas market in a highly Catholic big city, Chekatt sent a cruel message to France: you will be attacked even during the holidays, which are identified with peace, calm, tolerance, and generosity. This attack confirmed, once again, the danger of the deeply rooted Western European jihadism142 and its pathological inclination to violent acts of revenge perpetrated by home-grown hateful fanatics. Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, this attack represents a new episode in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, the jihadist Chérif Chekatt acted as a typical coward—armed by a revolver, caliber 8 mm and a knife he assassinated five defenceless people. Alex Schmid’s theory was a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and communication with all French society. In light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, this peacetime war crime represents another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism. Strategy of Communication In light of the strategy of communication, Chérif Chekatt sends the following four messages. His first message was addressed to all French citizens and even to the visitors of this attractive country: you can be killed or injured even during the Christmas holiday, which is appreciated by you. Second, in a blackmail communication with the families of victims, the killer said that they had to pay the price. Third, in the message to his sympathizers, Chérif Chekatt presented himself as the member of the wave of the future, as the fighter who offers the remedy for the impious French society. Last, he said to the French media that they have to report fully and accurately about the determination of jihadists to punish French society.

140

Corinne Laurent, «À Strasbourg, les soldats Sentinelle en première ligne» [archive], la-croix. com, 12 décembre 2018. 141 Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace, 13 décembre 2018, p. 9–10. 142 Micheron et al. (2018).

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The murders perpetrated by Chérif Chekatt touched the minds and hearts of all of France, particularly in the period of Christmas. They provoked strong emotions in the entire region of Alsace,143 and even President Emmanuel Macron came to Strasbourg144 to honour the memory of the brutally killed innocent civilians.145 In contrast with the Nice attack in 2016, this attack did not provoke any protests against the ruling elites or any political discrediting, and thus, one can say that the reaction to it was not as strong. Theory of Terrorism In light of the theoretical heritage of Bruce Hoffman, this attack represents a new episode in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, the jihadist Chérif Chekatt acted as a typical coward—armed by a revolver, caliber 8 mm and a knife he assassinated five defenceless people. Alex Schmid’s theory was a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with the French government and communication with all French society. In light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, this peacetime war crime represents another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism. Nice 2020 In the fall of 2020, 29 October 2020, the town of Nice once again became the target of a terrorist attack. This attack was perpetrated only 2 weeks after the bestial murder of professor Samuel Paty. His author was Brahim Aouissaoui, a Tunisian of 21 years who radicalized in the course of 2018.146 During his travel to France, he was picked up by an Italian rescue boat and supported by the Italian Red Cross in Lampedusa.147 Religious Terrorism This attack was perpetrated at the beginning of a very important period in the Christian calendar: only 2 days before All Saints Day.148 This day is celebrated in honour of all the saints of the church, regardless of whether they are known or unknown.149 Moreover, this day is followed by All Souls Day (2. 11), in France, this period is called La Toussaint. The following day, 2 November (All Souls Day) is called Le jour des morts, the Day of the Dead. During these days, people visit the cemeteries to remember their parents, grandparents, and other predecessors and pray in the churches. They place the flowers (especially in Chrysanthemums) or wreaths 143

Munhoz-Boillot (2018). Attentat à Strasbourg: Macron à la rencontre des victimes et des policiers. Le Point, December 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/attentat-a-strasbourg-macron-a-la-rencontredes-victimes-et-des-policiers-14-12-2018-2279365_23.php 145 Munsch (2018). 146 Le Figaro, article du 30 octobre 2020 [archive]. 147 Marie Lemonnier, « L’assaillant de Nice est un Tunisien de 21 ans arrivé clandestinement en France » [archive], nouvelobs.com, 29 octobre 2020. 148 All Saintsʼ Day | Definition, History, & Facts. Encyclopedia Britannica. 149 Smith (1967). 144

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called couronnes de toussaints at each tomb or grave. It is a very important day, a day of public holiday. Modus Operandi On 27 October 2020, he arrived in Nice illegally, and he had not applied for asylum before going to French territory or once in France.150 On 29 October 2020, on a fateful day, Brahim Aouissaoui came in the morning into the basilique Notre-Damede-l’Assomption, he entered the interior of the building at 8:29 a.m. and remained here a little less than 30 min to perpetrate his brutal attacks against three victims. He started his massacre by the slaughter of Vincent Loquès, sacristan of the basilica, a 60-year-old father of two children. He continued by an attack against another woman, and he injured her. This unhappy woman managed to escape from the left side of the basilica; unfortunately, she succumbed to her injuries. The same fate befell the third victim, a 44-year-old Franco-Brazilian woman who had been deadly injured during this attack and who took refuge in a bar near the basilica, where she died. Strategy of Communication In light of the strategy of communication, Brahim Aouissaoui sends the following messages. First, like his jihadist predecessor, he addressed the message to all French citizens saying them that they can be killed even during an important Christmas holiday. Second, in a blackmail communication with the families of victims, he said that they had to pay the price. Third, in the message to his sympathizers, he presented himself as the fighter who offers the remedy for the impious French society. Last, he said to the French media that they have to report fully about the determination of jihadists to punish French society. Theory of Terrorism In light of the theory of Bruce Hoffman, the town of Nice witnessed a new episode in the escalation of a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In light of the theory of David Rappoport, Brahim Aouissaoui acted as a typical coward—armed by his knife, he assassinated three defenceless people. Alex Schmid’s theory was a peacetime equivalent of war crimes and a new phase in lethal communication with all French society. In light of the theory of Martha Crenshaw, this peacetime war crime represents another concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism.

5.8

Conclusion of the Chapter

This chapter covered the period of the last two French presidents—Francois Holland and Emmanuel Macron. It was an enormously dynamic decade full of dramatic events. The first of the above-mentioned politicians started his presidential carrier by 150

Attaque à Nice: l’assaillant est un Tunisien de 21 ans arrivé par Lampedusa» [archive], sur lefigaro.fr, 29 octobre 2020.

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large promises given to the million people of immigrants and of their children and grandchildren who live in the so-called no-go zones. However, the first 2 years showed that the fulfilment of these promises was beyond his power, and this fact provoked disenchantment and a growing radicalization. As a result, France is confronted with growing protests of young desperados from the immigrant’s milieu and, unfortunately, by terrorist attacks perpetrated by them. Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated During the Presidency of Francois Holland (2012–2017) The terrorist attack perpetrated in January 2015 against the redaction of the magazine Charlie Hebdo entered into the current history as the first act of spectacular militarized terrorism sui generis. The motives of this attack were deeply rooted in the religious feelings of the French Muslims. This attack was prepared as a demonstrative execution of a mortal enemy during the war. The attack against the Bataclan theatre perpetrated in the fall of the same year as the second spectacular terrorist attack has three basic dimensions. First, it was a militarized terrorism perpetrated with the aim of killing a large number of young people. Second, this attack was generated by war, in this concrete case by the war waged by the State of Israel against the Palestinians. In other words, it was the first spectacular war-generated punishment of France. Last, this attack had a strong religious and civilizational motivation: to punish the fans of a decadent culture. In Nice in July 2016, France witnessed not militarized, but mass terrorism generated by wars waged by France in the Islamic world. Moreover, this mass murder had an important added value: strong devastating political and psychological consequences. A few days later, in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray 2016, during the assassination of Professor Samuel Paty, and in Nice 2020, all the world was shocked by an enormously barbaric religious terrorism generated by wars. The last two mentioned attacks were more brutal than they were perpetrated by the knives. The most abominable of the above-mentioned attacks was the bestial undercutting of the Catholic priest Father Jacques Hamel. At the same time, it was a rare example of a discriminatory and precisely targeted murder with only one victim. However, on the other hand, it was an unprecedented example of bestiality; it was a terrorist variant of the attacks of the category “shock and awe”. Terrorist Attacks After 2017 The terrorist attack perpetrated in Strasbourg during the Christmas market in December 2018 as well as the execution of Professor Paty confirmed that despite the changes of its presidents, France is confronted with an imminent threat of deeply rooted fanatical jihadism,151 which has a pathological inclination to violent acts of revenge. As a result, the terrorist managed to transfer the wars from the Islamic world to the territory of France.

Hugo Micheron, Bernard Rougier, and Gilles Kepel, “Les dénégationnistes du jihad”. Libération, December 21, 2018, https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/12/21/les-denegationnistes-dujihad_1698799 151

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All the terrorist attacks perpetrated after 2015 confirmed the value of the theoretical approaches of the most respected authors who have been presented in the first chapter of this book. First, in light of the heritage of Lawrence Freedman, France has been attacked many times as a typical country with a long history of colonialist politics and with numerous communities from the Islamic world. Second, Bruce Hoffman is right when he says that contemporary terrorism represents a new face of war in the twenty-first century. In 2015, France became an important front of this specific and long war. Third, the behaviour of French terrorists fully confirmed the value of the theory of David Rappoport. They acted in a profound contradiction with the principles of chivalry, which are based on face-to-face fights, with balanced chances between the actors of frontal combat. The terrorists acted as typical cowards; they attacked the defenceless people, and they gave no chance to their victims. During their attacks, they run no risk of being killed or injured by the attacked people. If they were killed, it happened only after their actions, and they were killed by soldiers or by policemen. Fourth, all attacks of the French jihadi terrorist satisfied the criteria of a peacetime equivalent of war crimes articulated by Alex Schmid. At the same time, they opened a new phase in lethal communication with the French government, a communication that is based on the language of blood. Last, these peacetime war crimes have been perpetrated as a concrete manifestation of a provocative terrorism with the aim of provoking France as an attacked country to a violent reaction that would discredit it in the eyes of all Muslims, as Martha Crenshaw says. Vicious Circle of Violence in Contemporary France Since 2015, France has been moving in a vicious circle of violence, both doctrinal and instrumental. The related French military operations are prepared, waged, and presented as actions of necessity, with the aim of preventing the creation of safe havens for the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations. However, this narrative is categorically refused by jihadists in these areas as well as in France. They misinterpret the French interventions and condemn them as an unacceptable interference in the Islamic world. They react with new punitive terrorist attacks, which aim to transfer the war from the Islamic world to the territory of France and to create a long-term atmosphere of fear there. As a result, France is truly in a state of war; even French President Macron152 and his Minister of Interior officially declared it.153 The former emphasizes the external dimension of this war; the latter underlines the importance of the internal front. The substance of this war as well its stakes have been clearly explained by Général Pierre de Villiers, former Chief of the General Staff of French Armed Forces (CEMA), who said that his country is at war against radical Islamism and that jihadists will not stop in their activities and atrocities (De Villiers, 2020). After the decapitation of 152

La guerre contre les djihadistes au Sahel est à « un tournant » selon Emmanuel Macron. www. ouest-france.fr › politique › l. . .22.12.2019. 153 Terrorisme: «Nous sommes en guerre» contre «l’idéologie islamiste», affirme Gérald Darmanin. Le Figaro, 30. 10. 2020.

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Professor Samuel Paty and the attacks in the basilica in Nice, he openly declared that two basic institutions of France were targeted. First, it was national education; second, the Catholic Church, with the bestial murder of innocent people, came to pray. The basic ideas of this general will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter of this book. As a result, contemporary France is penetrated by a “culture of fear”,154 which strengthens negative attitudes towards immigrants based on the so-called amalgam. Within this framework, immigrants from the MENA are identified with jihadi terrorism.155 This negative culture has negative political consequences: democracy in France is weakened because every attack is followed by anti-terrorist laws and by so-called post attentat lobbyism. Unfortunately, it leads contemporary France to the abandonment of some principles of the democratic way of life. France is living within a binary logic: we against them, which represents a mortal threat to the republican cohesion. Summary After 2015, France was a victim of a long series of terrorist attacks, which started with the militarized mass execution in Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, and continued with the Bataclan and Paris restaurant attacks (the first war-generated punishment of France) in November 2015, with the mass murder in Nice in 2016 (National holiday), the shocking terrorist bestiality in Normandy in the same year, and the execution of professor Samuel Paty and culminated with the attack in Strasbourg (Christmas 2018). All these attacks satisfied the criteria of religious terrorism and provocative terrorism. Their modus operandi resulted from the jihadist doctrine GIRC, namely, from the determination to kill as many people as possible and to provoke an atmosphere of fear with big psychological and political consequences.

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Chichizola, J., & Philippot, D. (2018, December 13). Chérif Chekatt, un délinquant tombé dans l’islam radical. Le Figaro. Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/201 8/12/12/01016-20181212ARTFIG00276-cherif-c-undelinquant-tombe-dans-l-islamradical.php Clark, N. (2012, September 19). French magazine publishes cartoons mocking Muhammad. The New York Times. Cornevin, C. (2016, July 16). L’État islamique revendique l’attentat de Nice. Le Figaro. Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/07/16/97001-20160716FILWWW00041-l-etatislamique-revendique-l-attentat-denice.php De Montclos, V., Beuve, J.-P., Bordet, M., Cordelier, J., DuPont, L., Pérou, O., Pétreault, C., & Zemouri, A. (2016, July 27). Le père Jacques Hamel victime martyre du djihad ordinaire. Le Point. Retrieved from https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/le-pere-jacques-hamel-victime-martyredu-djihad-ordinaire-27-07-2016-2057434_23.php De Villiers, P. (2020). L’équilibre est un courage, Réparer la France. Fayard. De Volder, J. (2016). Martyr. Vie et mort du père Jacques Hamel. Éditions du Cerf. Duggan, O. (2015, January 7). The history of Charlie Hebdo, Bastion of French Satire. Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11330322/Thehistory-of-Charlie-Hebdo-Frances-most-satirical-magazine.html Enders, W., Sandler, T., & Gaibulloev, K. (2011). Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics. Journal of Peace Research (3 ed.), 48(3). Harding, L., & Willsher, K. (2015, November 14). From dinner in Paris to a ʻwar on happinessʼ in 15 minutes. The Observer. Izoard, A.-M. (2016, July 27). Assassinat du Père Hamel: «Le monde est en guerre, car il a perdu la paix», déplore le pape. Famille Chrétienne. Retrieved from https://www.famillechretienne.fr/ filinfo/assassinat-du-pere-hamel-le-monde-est-en-guerre-car-il-a-perdu-la-paix-deplore-lepape-200086 Jacquard, N., Décugis, J.-M., Pelletier, E., Pham-Lê, J., Delseny, D., & Loisy, F. (2018, December 13). Attentat de Strasbourg: la bascule terroriste de Chérif Chekatt. Le Parisien. Retrieved from http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentat-destrasbourg-la-bascule-terroriste-decherifchekatt-delinquant-endurci-13-12-2018-7967322.php Kepel, G. (2005, August 22). Fin du Londonistan, fin du communautarisme? Le Monde. Le Hars, A. (2017, January 12). Attentat de Nice: six mois après, trois personnes toujours hospitalisées. Francetvinfo.fr. Retrieved from https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provencealpes-cote-d-azur/attentat-nice-six-mois-apres-trois-personnes-toujours-hospitalizees-1173181. html Le Monde, (Eds.). (2015, November 14). Rue Bichat: «On pensait que c’étaient des pétards. C’étaient des scènes de guerre». Le Monde. Leser, G. (2018). Noël en Alsace. Rites, coutumes et croyances (pp. 34–35). Ed. Degorce. Macron, E. (2020). La République en actes: discours du Président de la République sur le thème de la lutte contre les séparatismes. Micheron, H., Rougier, B., & Kepel, G. (2018, December 21). Les dénégationnistes du jihad. Libération. Retrieved from https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/12/21/les-denegationnistesdu-jihad_1698799 Moïsi, D. (2007, January/February). The clash of emotions. Foreign Affairs. Munhoz-Boillot, W. (2018, December 16). Hommage aux victimes de l’attentat de Strasbourg: l’émotion citoyenne place Kléber. France Bleu. Retrieved from https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/ faits-divers-justice/direct-rassemblement-citoyen-place-kleber-en-hommage-aux-victimes-delattentat-destrasbourg-1544953359 Munsch, C. (2018, December 14). Attentat de Strasbourg: Emmanuel Macron rend hommage aux victims. Francetvinfo. Retrieved from https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/grand-est/bas-rhin/ strasbourg-0/attentat-strasbourg-emmanuel-macron-rend-hommage-aux-victimes-1592709. html

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Nossiter, A., & Olivennes, H. (2015, July 27). Jacques Hamel, 85, a Beloved French Priest, Killed in His Church. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/ world/europe/jacques-hamel-85-a-beloved-french-priest-killed-in-his-church.html Olivier, R. (2019). L’Europe est-elle chrétienne? Le Seuil. Rappoport, D. (2008). Global terrorism. In B. J. Lutz & J. Lutz (Eds.), Global terrorism (Vol. I). Sage. Rawlinson, K. (2015, November 13). Fatal shootings and explosion reported in Paris—live. The Guardian. Rioux, P. (2020, octobre 16). «Emmanuel Macron: «Ils ne passeront pas. Nous ferons bloc»» [archive], sur La Dépêche. Rouart, V. (2021). Luc-Antoine Lenoir: Comment pourrais-je pardonner? Editions de l’ Observatoire. Saliba, E. (2015, January 9). Paris Killer Cherif Kouachi Gave Interview to TV Channel Before He Died. NBC News. Schmid, A. (2011). Violence as communication: Propaganda by the deed, violence and coercion. In A. Schmid (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of terrorism research. Routledge. Smith, C. (1967). The new catholic encyclopedia, s.v. Feast of All Saints, p. 318. The Military Balance. (2012, March 7). In J. Hackett (Ed.), International institute For strategic studies. Routledge. Thomson, D. (2016): Les revenants: Ils étaient partis faire le jihad. Ils sont de retour en France. Le Seuil, coll. «Les Jours». Valdiguié, L. (2018, December 12). Multirécidiviste, fiché sur plusieurs registres: le profil de Chérif Chekatt, le suspect de Strasbourg. Marianne. Retrieved from https://www.marianne.net/societe/ attentat-strasbourg-cherif-chekatt-fiche-s Vantighem, V., & Aballain, O. (2016, July 15). Attentat de Nice: Comment un camion de location est devenu une arme meurtrière. 20 Minutes. Retrieved from https://www.20minutes.fr/ societe/1890947-20160715-attentat-nice-comment-camion-location-devenu-arme-meurtriere Wilner, A. S., & Dubouloz, C.-J. (2010). Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. Global Change, Peace and Security, 22(1), 33–51.

Chapter 6

The Revolt of French Soldiers Against the Failing Immigration Policy

Abstract Contemporary France is witnessing an exceptional process: a determined political revolt of French soldiers, represented mainly by retired generals, who manifest their profound dissatisfaction with the approach of the governing élites to the problems generated by the disaster of the French immigration policy. This revolt represents a concentrated reaction to two important forms of behaviour of the current president (It is Emmanuel Macron, the eighth and the youngest president in all the history of France) and his ministers.

6.1

The Role of the French President and Its Prerogatives

First, since 1958, thanks to Charles de Gaulle, the Président de la République has played a central role in the French political system. He is directly elected and has the prerogative to nominate the Prime Minister, but he is also the President of the Council of Ministers. During his sessions, he makes the key political decisions, and the Prime Minister and his ministers are charged with their execution. In light of the central theme of this chapter, it is necessary to underline the fact that the President has a large portfolio of competences in the field of foreign affairs and especially in the area of security strategy and defence. This portfolio is called the reserved domain (domain réservé) of the President. He is the supreme commander of the French armed forces, and most importantly, the Vth Constitution reserves for him the prerogative to make a decision to use nuclear arms in case the vital interests of his country are at stake. The questions connected with nuclear arms and the nuclear deterrent played an important role during the presidential elections in 1981 when a move towards the heritage of the founder of the Vth Republic helped Francois Mitterrand (1986) win against the presidential candidate Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1976), who was very reluctant in his approach to nuclear arms and did not hesitate to say some time later that he would never have made a decision that would have led to the destruction of his country. The questions of the nuclear deterrent have been discussed even in the campaigns for the presidential elections in 2022 (Mélenchon, 2021).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_6

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Like an excellent expert on French security policy underlines, the Vth Constitution reserves for the President the so-called patriotic function (Buffotot, 2022: 63). This function includes, among other things, making the decisions to engage French military forces in exterior operations (including Opex), which implies his regular contacts and discussions with the generals who are responsible for the execution of his decisions.

6.2

What Is at Stake?

The decisive moment came in July 2017, when the French President Emmanuel Macron made the decision to make a long range of important budgetary cuts in all ministries, including the Ministry of Defence. These cuts led to two important changes. The first of them was many postponements of programs for the modernization of all three main armed forces: Army, Air Forces, and Marine. Second, it was necessary to make important reductions of their missions in the dangerous areas of the world. In reaction to these cuts, the French soldiers are increasingly critical vis a vis the approach of French political élites to the growing violence perpetrated by the sons or even the grandsons of immigrants from the Islamic countries. Their anger is stronger than the above-mentioned violence, and their violent acts even include terrorist attacks with dozens and dozens of victims, which have strong psychological and political consequences (Cazeneuve, 2019). This dangerous phenomenon is well explained by one influent French General in his book called “Before it is Too Late—The Manifesto of the General of the Suburbs”. He analyses the attacks perpetrated by the teenagers from the immigrant families who refuse the integration into French society and who created their own counter society that develops, and which is based on a parallel economy with its laws, its rites, and its workforce (de Richoufftz, 2022a). The open protests of French soldiers started at the beginning of the last decade. Since the summer of 2017, President Macron and his entourage have reacted to them with various types of punishments for the revolting soldiers. Nevertheless, the soldiers do not retreat, and they continue to hold their critical attitudes and openly articulate them. Their revolt culminated in spring 2021 in two open letters that warned of the threat of a civil war and underlined the determination of French soldiers to act in the name of the Republic and its basic principles and values, if necessary. This behaviour satisfies the criteria of what makes an act a revolt, a concept that requires a profound analysis.

6.3

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The General Context of the Revolt

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The General Context of the Revolt

The basic definition of the term “revolt” in the military sense says that a revolt is a collective manifestation of disobedience by at least four soldiers.1 This chapter will show that in the case of contemporary France, this criterion of what makes something a revolt is fully satisfied because the given rebellion includes many more than four soldiers. On the following pages, some open conflicts between the two large and influential groups involved will be analysed. The first group included the French generals led by the Chief of the General Staff (CEMA) who served in this position from February 2017 to July 2017 as their top-level symbolic authority. The second group was made up of the governing élites led by the President of the Republic, who has also assumed, since his election in 2017, the role of the commander-in-chief of the French armed forces as the top-level symbolic authority in this case. In this light, the key attention of this chapter will be to analyse the most important reasons, motives, and consequences of the clash between French soldiers and top-level politicians. As France is the main subject, the text is based on the theoretical heritage of the internationally respected and cited French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, particularly on his concepts of the field, capital, and habitus. Within this framework, his concept of the social war will be mentioned. The above-mentioned clash will be analysed on the five following levels: history, geopolitics, politics, the military, and security. The Historical Context of the Revolt Three turning points in the French post-war history Pascal Boniface, the Director of the IRIS in Paris, speaks about three turning points that are deeply rooted in the mentality of all generations of Arabs, including the children of Arab immigrants who were already born in the countries to which their parents moved, including France (Boniface, 2019: 201–206). The first of these events of historical importance came right after the end of the First World War, when France and Great Britain did not respect their promise that the Arab countries would receive their independence as a reward for their active and heroic fight against the Ottoman Empire. The Arab states immediately called it a betrayal. The second turning point came right after the end of World War II, when the State of Israel, which gained 51% of Palestinian territory, was created. It is still seen as a betrayal of the West and as a decision that was made to the detriment of the suffering people of Palestine and the whole Arab world. Finally, Boniface argues that the West, with the exception of France, has unilaterally and largely supported the State of Israel since the end of the 1940s. This long-term support includes continuing financial aid and providing military materials. A very important role in this regard is played by the diplomatic support for Israel, namely, by a long series of vetoes of resolutions of the UNSC that were articulated by critics of Israeli behaviour in the occupied territories.

1

Dictionnaire de français Larousse. Available from : https://www.larousse.fr

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All the above-mentioned realities are perceived by all Arabs as instances of a great hypocrisy of the West and as serious injustices. Moreover, they are very often misused by radicals not only in the Islamic world but also in Western countries. The aim of the jihadist radicals is clear: they are determined to provoke and reinforce feelings of hatred towards the countries in which they were born among young Muslims. As a result, the sons and even the grandsons of immigrants from Islamic countries are more nihilistic than utopian, they have only a very superficial knowledge of the Qur’an, and their program is only revenge. The final aim of the jihadist activists is very clear: to impose their demands, which would lead to profound changes in the Western way of life. From this point of view, France has been the number one target for more than a decade. The hard legacy of the Algerian war This war was waged in 1954–1962 between the French armed forces and the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Liberation Army (ALN) over the independence of Algeria. It was a typical merciless asymmetric war with many casualties (250,000 Algerians vs. 26,000 French) and enormously high numbers of war crimes and crimes against humanity. France sent not only professional soldiers into this war but also recruits, as it gradually extended their obligatory service so that they would fight in it. During this horrible war, more than 1.5 million French troops passed through the Algerian battlefield, and in 1959, there were as many as 800,000 there. It was the largest army ever to operate in a colonial territory. A total of 60 generals, almost a thousand colonels and lieutenants, and 1500 majors commanded the French forces. They were overwhelmingly convinced that they were fighting for the French Republic and its basic values in Algeria. As part of the ruthless fighting, many of them also resorted to the torture and execution of ALN soldiers. Such acts were committed by French soldiers or even Algerian civilians. They even included placing explosive traps, which was an element of terrorist tactics. Participation in the Algerian war was a steppingstone for French soldiers that helped them to advance in their careers in France. As a result, the term “generation of commanders of the Algerian war” was used as a common denominator for these soldiers. They identified themselves with republican values and with the concept of strict discipline, including drills and the sense of duty. At the same time, they shared strongly critical attitudes towards immigrants from Algeria. General Christian Piquemal, one of the active actors of the contemporary revolt, served in Algeria, namely, in the 2nd Airborne Regiment of the Foreign Legion. Immediately after leaving civilian life, he became a very active fighter against immigration. The Algerian war and its political solutions opened the way for an important process: the mass migration of Algerians to France. Nevertheless, it is known that Algerians and immigrants from other North African Islamic countries are not interested in becoming integrated or assimilated in France. In contrast, they associate with each other in their closed areas, which are called “sensitive neighbourhoods”, where they live as they would in the Islamic world (Wihtol, 2019: 64–65). This fact leads to an important dividing line: the vast majority (94%) of the native French people believe that those who come to their country should adapt to the French way

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of life, but the immigrants do not respect it and insist on living according to their own values, religion, and way of life. The Political Context of the Revolt Last but not least, the Algerian war had a major impact on France’s domestic policy. It accelerated the crisis of the IVth Republic (1945–1958), which was a typical parliamentary democracy and was characterized by frequent changes of governments and a high degree of instability and uncertainty. This development resulted in the situation in which General Charles de Gaulle was called to return to French politics. His answer was clearly positive, but it was under the condition of a basic change: the approval of a new constitution that would introduce a presidential regime in the country. As a result, the Vth Republic dates from that time. In this respect, the collaborators of Charles de Gaulle took their basic inspiration from the political system of the USA, which is called a presidential system. However, the French President is assisted by the Prime Minister, whose task is to implement decisions that have been made at meetings of the Council of Ministers, which are chaired by the President of the Republic. As a result, since the end of the 1950s, the key competencies and decisions in the field of the FFP have been reserved for the President of the Republic (PR). In connection with this, some experts speak about a power without counter powers2 or about a Republican Monarchy.3 In 2004, Jacques Chirac, the fifth French President, very clearly articulated the practical application of the competencies through the following words: “I make the decisions, he is responsible for their execution” (“Je décide, il exécute”, in French).4 This style of governance plays an important role even during the mandate of the 8th French President Emmanuel Macron. This young politician (born in 1977) is often presented as a president who strongly assumes the position of a young Jupiter.5 His critics reproach him by saying that he presents himself as a saviour on a mission to change his country. Since the end of WWII, all French politicians (presidents, ministers, senators, etc.), including Emmanuel Macron, underline the importance of the universal dimension of French values and of its culture of influence.6 They share the axiom that French foreign policy (FFP) is based on the particular responsibility of this country in world affairs,7 especially after the end of the Cold War.8

2 Badie, Bertrand and Dominique Vidal: Qui gouverne le monde? l’état du monde 2017. La Découverte 2018. 3 Frank (2015). 4 Jacques Chirac à Sarkozy:
“Je décide, il exécuteˮ. LʼObs. Available from: https://www. nouvelobs.com › Politique, 15. 7. 2004. 5 Backmann, René: La diplomatie d’Emmanuel Macron : un pouvoir sans contre-pouvoirs. In : La France, une puissance contrariée (2021), pp. 106–108. 6 Frank (2021, pp. 23–33). 7 Badie and Vidal (1921, pp. 9–20). 8 Buffotot (2022, p. 63).

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The Geopolitical Context of the Revolt Thierry de Montbrial, a leading French expert, states that geopolitics is an approach that reflects “ideologies relating to a particular territory” (De Montbrial, 2017: 113–114). This means that in the concrete case of the revolt of French soldiers, it is necessary to respect the importance of the territory of the Sahel. This part of Africa has become a large base of terrorist organizations preparing terrorist attacks not only on this continent but also in Western European countries, including France. The first geopolitical argument of the revolting soldiers underlines that the large area of the Sahel represents the first line of a long-term war between their country and the contemporary violent jihadists. This conviction is based on their dramatic experiences from this part of the world, experiences which include a long range of merciless battles, perfidious stratagems, ambushes, and traps organized by the jihadist fighters. At the same time, the mentality of the French soldiers is strongly influenced by hundreds of their comrades being killed or injured during the merciless asymmetric wars waged in the large area of the Sahel. The argumentation of the French soldiers continues with the statement that the territory of their country has become the second line of the above-mentioned fight and that this fight results in a growing deterioration of the security situation, particularly in Paris and other large French cities. In this regard, they concretely speak about the so-called pockets, which have gotten outside of the control of the French state. Their numbers as well as their areas continue to expand. Within these pockets, important political changes happen: the laws of the republic have been replaced by the laws of the immigrants, the so-called identity discourses based primarily on religious beliefs are gaining ground in these pockets, and the French language is replaced by the Arab language. The attitudes of the French soldiers are strongly influenced by the growing radicalization among immigrants from the Islamic world who are concentrated in the so-called no-law zones (“zones de no droit” in French) throughout the whole territory of France. This negative and highly dangerous process is strongly inspired by a jihadist doctrine called the Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC), which invites young Muslims in Europe to inflict terrorist attacks in European countries and thus transfer the war to their territory this way (Masoud, 2013: Article 4). In the so-called no-law zones, a growing Islamization is a dominant and increasingly dangerous trend (Caldwell, 2010: 343). In this field, France is witnessing the construction of an increasing number of new mosques and an increasing submission of ruling élites to the political, ideological, and even theological requests of immigrants and their sons (Houellebecq, 2015). As a result, contemporary France is witnessing a rise in the number of so-called detached imams who teach young children born in the families of immigrants from the Islamic world. These children officially have French nationality, but their education is limited to the Quran. It is no wonder that the social and political consequences of this phenomenon have been criticized even by President Macron, who speaks about an unacceptable

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descolarization9 and openly declares the need to stop the process of “consular Islam”10 and assure respect for the rules of the French Republic. This critical approach is fully shared by some other politicians, especially an influential Senator named Jacqueline Eustache-Brinio. This courageous woman speaks about the so-called political Islam,11 defining it as a frontal invasion in all spheres of French public life.12 The following pages will show that in contemporary France, radicalization is reciprocal. This concretely means that the radicalization of political Islam leads to the radicalization of its opponents, particularly those in the ranks of French soldiers who articulate their attitudes in their manifestos. The Military Context of the Revolt Just after the end of the WW I, France had its “big Armed Forces”, which were the largest in all of the post-WW I world. Today, the FAF are, in terms of numbers of soldiers, far behind those of the USA, China, and some other countries. However, at the same time, France is a member of the prestigious club of eight countries with nuclear weapons. Moreover, this country has a modern doctrine of nuclear deterrent as well as modern conventional forces. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, French Special Military Operations (SMOs) in Islamic countries have played a very important role in the FFP, and war-making is an important condition of state-making. For the management of SMOs, France has a triad of institutions. The first of them is the Etat–Major Particulier (EMP) or the Special Staff, which prepares decisions for the PR. The second is the Chief of the General Staff (CEMA), who is responsible for the military and operational aspects. Last, the third is the COS (Commandement des Operations spéciales, or the Special Operations Command), which is a very influential institution that is often directly consulted by the PR.13 It is no wonder that the COS is called the 4th Pillar of the FAF (with the other three being the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy).14 The French soldiers use the argument that they were involved in high numbers of long-term missions or even military operations during which they were in the first line of the clash between the West and radical jihadist Islam. In their narratives, they put these missions in a strong contrast with the short visits of French politicians to Islamic countries and their very superficial knowledge of the contemporary Islamic world. They conclude that the levels of knowledge of these issues of the governing élites are very superficial.

9

Macron entame à Mulhouse une séquence dédiée à la lutte contre le communautarisme. LEXPRESS.fr avec AFP, 18. 2. 2020. 10 Lemarié (2020). 11 Eustache-Brinio (2020a). 12 Eustache-Brinio (2020b). 13 Lequesne, Christian: Ethnographie du Quai d’Orsay: les pratiques des diplomates français. CNRS éditions, 2020. 14 Leroy (2021b).

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The operations of the French armed forces are prepared and managed by a special staff called the Command of the Special Operations (COS). It is a very influential and respected organ; it is even referred to as the IVth Armed Force (with the other three being the Army, the Air Force, and the Marines). Its chief has the prerogative of direct access to the President of the Republic. He, together with the CEMA and the Chief of the Military Cabinet of the President of the Republic, can present the President with his arguments, analyses, and recommendations concerning all operations. These big military chiefs work as a closed and very authoritative circle, and they do so without parliamentary control (Leroy, 2021a: 118–124). Concretely speaking, the failure of the ISAF mission played an important role at three levels. First, it showed the alarming shortcomings of the Afghan security forces. Second, it provoked a large disenchantment in the ranks of French soldiers (Gomart, 2020: 228–229). Last, their disillusionment has been reinforced by the avoidant military behaviour of some of their allies during the long-term ISAF mission (Chaliand, 2016: 138–139). The French officers are very disturbed by the growing enlargement of the so-called pockets or sensitive qua (Wihtol, 2019: 64–65) in the territory of their country, as in these areas, the values and laws of the French Republic are not respected and are replaced by Islamic values and the law of Sharia. These pockets generate the so-called identity-based discourses (De Montbrial, 2017: 155–156), which are accompanied by growing instability and violence, including direct attacks against the Gendarmerie Nationale. To give a major example of such violence, in October 2020, the whole country was shocked and disgusted by the decapitation of a French professor.15 French soldiers very often refer to the knowledge they gained during military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and/or Afghanistan. The longest of them, ISAF, took place in Afghanistan and had a clear UN Security Council mandate. The Air Force, National Gendarmerie units, Special Forces, paratroopers and members of the intelligence service were deployed within its framework. A total of 89 French soldiers were killed in this country (most in 2011, when a total of 26 French soldiers were killed there). The financial cost of French participation was approximately half a billion euros each year. During their deployment, the French troops watched with growing concern as the situation worsened, especially after 2007, when several of their comrades were killed in suicide attacks, which are maximally effective at a minimum cost. A very depressing aspect for them was the deplorable state of the Afghan National Army, as well as the laxity of the troops of some Allied countries. Two such cases were particularly critical. The first was in the province of Uruzgan, where the Italians paid the Taliban for not fighting them and where the Dutch remained locked up in their fortified bases and did not act to maintain their area of responsibility (Chaliand, 2016: 138–139). NATOʼs rapid withdrawal from

15 Professeur décapité: “l’obscurantisme ne gagnera pas”, dit Emmanuel Macron, 16. 10. 2020. Available from: https://www.vosgesmatin.fr

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the country in 2021 caused great disappointment throughout France.16 A former commander of the French special forces writes in his book that in Afghanistan, French soldiers almost daily encountered the perverted cruelty of jihadist terrorists, who killed members of the civilian population of their own country and whose motto was “the more dead, the greater the satisfaction”. They also saw the fact that the local soldiers were insufficiently armed, trained, and motivated (Gomart, 2020: 123). The second case was Operation Sangaris in 2013. It was launched in the Central African Republic (SAR) and focused on protecting the civilian population and restoring security and public order. In the same year, Operation Serval (which was reformatted to become Operation Barkhane in 2014) was launched in Mali. In this operation, French troops intervened against AQMI (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). Michel Rocard, a former Prime Minister of France, explained that this decision had been made because there were fears that this important African country could be “Afghanized”.17 The stay in this country showed the French soldiers that in such poverty, the local population has only three options: to become a businessman, a smuggler, or a jihadist terrorist. They insistently learned that if they did not find the right time to leave, they would be perceived as occupiers in the country (Gomart, 2020: 228–229). Moreover, in the middle of the last decade, a major turning point occurred as a result of French military interventions in three important Islamic countries: Mali, the Central African Republic, and especially Syria. These interventions were followed by acts of revenge in the category called conflict-generated terror. It was a drastic end to the conditions of the first decade of the twenty-first century, as at that time, France, unlike Spain and Great Britain, was spared from major terrorist attacks perpetrated by the sons of immigrants. At the same time, the attacks caused disillusionment for President Francois Hollande (2012–2017), as they contradicted his optimistic conviction that democracy and Islam could complement each other. Growing Aggressiveness of Anti-French Rioters The most disturbing factor of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France results from riots in the suburbs of large towns in all territories of France, which have beak out since 2005. During the last 5 years, they have been openly aggressive and lethal, and they have been perpetrated with the aim of killing as many gendarmes and policeman as possible. The above-mentioned General Emmanuel Richoufftz speaks about a very “military” method of confrontation that prevailed at the beginning of the 2020s. This method has a cruel modus operandi that starts with anonymous phone calls announcing an incident. It continues by the arrival of security forces on the scene and culminates in the ambush prepared by gangs bringing together several dozen hooded participants and having multiple blunt objects, direct shots—with the will to kill—on the state officials, with mortars, Molotov cocktails and bottles

16 17

Dalle (2021). Rocard, Michel: Le Monde, 5. 2. 2013.

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incendiaries, then immediate dispersal of the aggressors with the firing of urban equipment and private cars to cover their stall (de Richoufftz, 2022b). The above explained that the “military” method of confrontation has many catastrophic lethal consequences for French police officers. According to General Richoufftz, there are nearly 7000 wounded individuals in their ranks each year, as well as approximately 15 deaths. The most often cited are two spectacular attentat. The first of them was the murder of a policewoman brutally slaughtered at the Rambouillet police station in April 2021.18 This lethal attack has been preceded by other attacks against French gendarmes.19 Second, in May 2021, ale France was shocked when a policeman was executed by a handgun in Avignon20 during an antidrogue operation.21 The above-mentioned lethal attacks reinforced the dissatisfaction and bitterness of French gendarmes, policeman, and soldiers. It is no wonder that they are very critically reflected by the revolting soldiers.

6.4

The Main Acts of the Revolt of French Soldiers

The above-mentioned events and their context indicate that the revolt of the French soldiers was not accidental. In contrast, it had its main causes, which were discussed in detail in the context of the three levels mentioned above (the historical, geopolitical, and security-political levels). This means that this revolt did not result from the so-called random causes, which cannot be generalized. In contrast, this revolt has its deeply rooted causes, which resulted from the decisions of the most influential actors, who are in the positions of the symbolic authorities of the three social groups in contemporary France. These important decisions and the answers and countermeasures of the opposing actors will be analysed in the following pages. The key attention will be given to specific clashes between the governing élites led by the eighth president and the soldiers led by the most influential generals. The reactions of the French generals will be presented as a revolt that has three main acts. Act No. 1: Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls vs. General Bertrand Soubelet in 2013 The revolt of the French soldiers has had some symbolic authority since its beginning. The first of them is General Bertrand Soubelet, who started the first clash between the politicians and the generals with his critical analysis of the serious

France reviews terror threat after policewoman fatally stabbed. . .https://www.france24.com ›france, 24. 4. 2021. 19 Avant Rambouillet, ces attentats qui ont visé les forces de l. . .https://www.lexpress.fr ›Société, 24. 4. 2021 20 French police officer shot dead in Avignon during drug raid . . .https://www.france24.com ›france 5. 5. 2021. 21 Un policier tué lors d’une opération antidrogue à Avignon, le. . .https://www.france24.com ›france, 5. 5. 2021. 18

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problems with immigrants in France. Born in 1959, he is a graduate of the famous military school in Saint-Cyr and was originally an artilleryman. In the last years of the Cold War, he even served in the 2nd Army Corps in Germany, which at that time was preparing to fight against the then 4th Army of the Czechoslovak Army. After the end of the Cold War, the young Major Soubelet joined the French Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale). He gradually went on to command various units and areas throughout France but also overseas. He thus got to know his country very well and encountered a deteriorating security situation in the immigrant milieu daily, particularly in the areas where French law ceased to apply. He was in daily contact with the prefects, mayors, deputies, and ministers and was confronted with their hypocritical and evasive approach to the problems posed by the country’s unmanaged immigration policy. He received the highest state award for his exemplary service: he is a knight of the National Order of Merit and an officer of the Legion of Honour. He reached the rank of corps general (four stars in France) and was responsible for the operational deployment of all soldiers of the Gendarmerie Nationale. In December 2013, he was invited to attend a session of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the French Republic. He vowed to “speak the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth”,22 and immediately afterward said that the fight against everyday crime had been incoherent in France for many years and that it did not match the gravity of the situation (Soubelet, 2016). During his presentation to the members of the Parliamentary Commission for Security, he openly criticized some controversial decisions of the French government. The first of them, and the most disturbing, was the decision to cancel 6000 contracts for the members of the National Gendarmerie, which led to a weakening of everyday security in France. He continued by criticizing the complex bureaucratic procedures and the helplessness of organs of justice when the perpetrators of crimes have greater protection rights than the victims. He did not hesitate to openly say that the gendarmerie is increasingly powerless in direct confrontations with the hordes of young criminals in the areas controlled by immigrants. In addition, General Soubelet openly spoke about the direct attacks perpetrated by teenage gangsters from an immigrant background against French gendarmes and police officers.23 Moreover, General Bertrand Soubelet presented a critical account of the political aspect of the above-mentioned problems. He did not hesitate to directly protest against the behaviour of the governing élites. He reproached them for three main deficiencies in their long-term behaviour. First, he pointed to their politicking when faced with the violent excesses of the activists in the “pockets” governed by radical jihadists. Second, he spoke about the deficit of necessary political courage in the approach to the everyday violence attacks against the French way of life and against the most important symbols of the Republic.

22 23

Malafaye (2016). Hofstein (2016).

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Last, he spoke about the failure to respect the principle that the greater the solving of problems is delayed, the more urgent they become.24 Of course, he could not avoid commenting on the reactions of the political élites to his presentation in the French Parliament. He articulated his credo with the following words: “On December 18, 2013, my life changed. I, Bertrand Soubelet, General of the Army, Director of Operations and Employment of the Gendarmerie, was dismissed for having told the truth: security in our country is not guaranteed as it should be. What happened? At the Palais-Bourbon, in front of the deputies, that day, I explained, in all frankness, the difficulties encountered by the gendarmerie: 6000 jobs cut, an overly complex procedure, justice without means, delinquents running wild despite the commitment of the gendarmes and magistrates; the culprits are shown more consideration and are better protected than the victims”. With those words, General Soubelet managed to clearly explain the main stake of the beginning of the revolt of the French soldiers. In addition, in the presentation of his book, he further defined his credo: “My diagnosis is simple: safety is everyone’s business. It is time to react, high time. It’s urgent. Our society is in danger. Never has the danger been so threatening. I do not make controversy; I do not lobby for a political party. Simply put, I alert. Because I love my country”. He clearly defined the referential object of the entire revolt: the devotion to his country, to its basic values, and to its safety and security (Soubelet, 2016). General Soubelet entered recent history as the first French general who had the courage to publicly question the rule of the French political system, which says that soldiers should not comment on politics at all. If they do not follow this unwritten rule, they run the risk of being disciplined, or they may even be released and deprived of all benefits. This courageous act of General Soubelet was followed by a series of particularly harsh and aggressive attacks of the then Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls, who was a relatively young (he was 50 at the time) but extremely ambitious and assertive politician and a member of the Socialist Party (PS). In 2012–2014, he was a powerful Minister of the Interior, and for the next 2 years (2014–2016), he even held the position of Prime Minister and was preparing to run for President of the Republic in 2017. Under his pressure, the Council of Ministers decided on 30 July 2014 that General Soubelet would be removed from his position and transferred to the overseas gendarmerie headquarters. However, the Minister Valls campaign against General Soubelet was of great political importance, as it created a basic “arrangement” on the political chessboard. On the one hand, there are self-confident, very ambitious, mostly young, and straightforward politicians. On the other hand, there are generals who emphasize traditional values—the Republic and the service to the homeland. In the name of these values, they refuse to remain silent and increasingly show their dissatisfaction and even bitterness. Immediately after his clash with political power, General

24 Général Soubelet: « Ceux qui agressent les policiers n’ont aucune circonstance atténuante ». FigaroVox/Tribune, 29. 4. 2020.

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Soubelet became a hero25 and an icon in the eyes of all French gendarmes and soldiers and was nicknamed General Courage.26 His prestige was enormously high. His prestige was reinforced sometime later, when he did not hesitate to say that the official statistics of the French government did not correspond to reality.27 As an overseas gendarmerie commander, he published another book that he titled There Is No Freedom without Authority (Soubelet, 2017). This book was immediately evaluated as a programmatic essay warning political leaders of possible fatal concessions and mistakes in the field of immigration policy. In his book, General Soubelet explained the importance of past large-scale military operations during which French soldiers were deployed against the forces of global terrorism and jihadism directly in the places of their origin.28 He underlined the fact that these places generate a systematic attack against France, its basic values, and its way of life and pointed to the everyday attacks of young jihadist hooligans against the town halls of important French towns. At the same time, General Soubelet strongly recalled the large-scale military operations during which the French were engaged against the forces of global terrorism. He concluded his book with a categorical refusal of a long range of (in his view) negative consequences of the failed immigration policy, particularly the promotion of Islamic holidays in the whole territory of France, the distribution of different meals for Muslims in school and military canteens, and the adaptation of working hours to Islamic holidays. It is no wonder that the key ideas of this book were followed by a major political decision: “General Courage” was removed from his overseas office, and he had to leave the Armed Forces and look for a job in civilian life.29 His long-term service in the French armed forces and especially his political story from the first half of the 2010s became important milestones in the process of the growing tension between the symbolic authorities of the French politicians and the soldiers. Despite the decisions of the French political élites, he repeated his statement that it was necessary to defend the freedom of speech of soldiers, who, in his view, were reduced to a state of “sub citizenship”.30 General Christian Piquemal As the Most Radical of All the Rebels In the same year as that in which the protests of General Soubelet began, another general, Christian Piquemal, began to publicly protest against the failed immigration policy. He is the oldest of all the revolting soldiers, as he was born in 1940. Since the beginning of his career, he served in the Foreign Legion, and there he held various

25

Cornevin (2016). Le «général courage» Bertrand Soubelet avait. Le Figaro, 12. 8. 2021. Available from: https://m. facebook.com/lefigaro/posts/10152243114891339/?refsrc=deprecated&_rdr 27 Cottin (2021). 28 Marechal, Édouard de: « Laïcité, immigration, sécurité : les vérités dérangeantes du Général Soubelet ». Le Figaro, 4. 4. 2017. 29 Le général Soubelet, numéro 3 de la gendarmerie, perd son poste après un livre très critique. Le Monde avec AFP, 24. 4. 2016. 30 Cornevin (2016), op. cit. 26

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positions, including platoon commander, the chief of the legionnaires training, battalion commander and, in later years, the chief of a regiment (in Guyana). From 1989 to 1992, he served in Paris as a Deputy Head of the Military Office of three consecutive Prime Ministers for the PS (Michel Rocard, Édith Cresson, and Pierre Bérégovoy). Here, he was responsible for the ground forces, and he daily encountered the style of work of his country’s political elites. He ended his military career in the highly appreciated position of commander of the Foreign Legion in the rank of corps general. He is also the holder of the National Order of Merit and the Order of the Legion of Honour. Immediately after retiring, he became severely radicalized. He became a chairman of the Association of Citizen-Patriots, whose main goal is to “protect and restore the values on which France’s greatness and its role in the world are based”.31 He has fully converted to the views of the French far right, in particular to the thesis that France is threatened with being replaced by immigrant nations and must therefore fight to preserve its national identity.32 He immediately took the lead in the fight against the “Islamization of his homeland” and, thanks to his position as chairman of the French Paratroopers Association,33 which he held for many years, he became an iconic figure.34 He began performing at events co-organized by the well-known antiimmigration organization Pegida. At the beginning of February 2016, he also took part in a protest event held in the northern French city of Calais, where there was an immigration camp called Jungle.35 The then Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian,36 pushed for General Piquemal to be removed from the so-called second section of the reserve soldiers and succeeded in this. His removal means, among other things, that he must never appear in public in uniform again.37 Act No. 2: Alain Juppé vs. General Vincent Desportes in 2016 The second clash between the symbolic authorities of the political leaders and the soldiers was provoked by Alain Juppé, the long-time mayor of Bordeaux (2006–2019), who, during his extremely rich political career, also held the positions of Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993–1995 and 2011–2012), Minister of Defence (2010–2011), and Prime Minister (in 1995, he was chosen for this position by the incoming President Jacques Chirac and remained in it until 1997). He is one of the

31 «À propos de Calais», sur cercle-citoyens-patriotes.fr. Blog du Cercle des “citoyens-patriotes”, February 2016. 32 « Qui est le général Piquemal, nouvel étendard de l’extrême droite ? » [archive]. Europe1.fr, 8. 2. 2016. 33 « Historique de l’UNP ». unp74.org. Union nationale des parachutistes, section Robert-Duret, Haute-Savoie. 34 «Avec le général Piquemal, l’extrême droite s’est trouvé une icône quatre étoiles» [archive]. francetvinfo.fr, 9. 2. 2016. 35 A. Del., O. P. et T. B. (2016). 36 In 2017, the then newly elected president Emmanuel Macron nominated him for the function of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 37 «Le Drian demande la mise à la retraite du général Piquemal» [archive]. bfmtv.com, 7. 3. 2016.

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politicians who are called “heavyweights” in France. Therefore, in 2016, he announced his candidacy for the 2017 presidential election. In April 2016, during one of his debates with students, he presented his commentary concerning General Soubelet and his book and openly articulated his critical attitudes towards him. In the heat of battle, he said, “[a] soldier has the same thing as a minister: he either respects the rule of silence or packs up and leaves”. Some days later, he openly announced his regret; nevertheless, his words could no longer be taken back.38 As a result, another direct and sharp clash between politicians and generals broke out. Its key stake was, once again, the status of soldiers and the question of whether they have the right to openly criticize the decisions of the political élites of their country. The declarations of Alain Juppé were so explosive that just a few days later, another French general intervened in the clash of symbolic authorities. It was Vincent Desportes, born in 1953, who, during his career, held the positions of commander of a tank regiment and commander of the Center for the Preparation of Military Doctrines, and at the end of his career, he had the honour of holding the function of the commander of the famous War School in Paris (founded in 1750 by the King Louis XV under the name École de Guerre; in 1993, it was reformed and renamed the Collège interarmées de défense [CID]). Moreover, during his career, he spent 5 years in the USA, becoming a highly regarded expert on the country’s military and doctrines. He is also the author of several books and treatises on strategy. In the most successful of his books, Entrer en stratégie, Desportes presented his definition of strategic thinking (Desportes, 2019). He underlined that strategic thought must be based on the negation of closeness in standardized processes and on the anticipation of the adversary’s key aims and actions. His most important idea is that there is a large difference between political and military strategies. In the first case, the horizon is limited to the next election because the stakes are reduced to the posts in the Parliament and the government. However, in the second case, the position of France in the world is at stake, which means that it is necessary to prepare medium- and even long-term plans in this regard (Desportes & Moinet, 2019: 115–119). Earlier, in April 2008, in an interview with Le Monde, a prestigious French newspaper, Desportes confirmed his obsession with strategy. He clearly articulated his doubts about the way in which the USA was waging war in Afghanistan.39 In return, at the instigation of the then Minister of Defence, Hervé Morin, he was reprimanded, and then he was obliged to leave the army and retire (Sapir, 2010). This incident happened even though Desportes did not comment on the military

38

Quinault-Maupoil (2016). Défense devrait, d’ici à la mi-juin, rendre ses conclusions. Mais le pays est-il conscient des enjeux? Aujourd’hui, la sécurité se construit loin du territoire national. Propos recueillis par Laurent Zecchini, 26. 4. 2008.

39

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strategy of his own country and did not criticize the war in Afghanistan as such but only the ambiguity of the Allied forces’ leadership and its counterproductive effects. This incident between the former Minister of Defence and the four-star general as two important and highly respected symbolic authorities was immediately commented on by the French anti-immigration right. One of its main ideologues, the economist Jacques Sapir, wrote that the dramatic departure of General Desportes confirmed that the French generals had only two options: either they were pro-American, or they had to leave (Sapir, 2010). In response to Juppéʼs attack on the soldiers, General Desportes, then already a retired soldier, wrote an open letter entitled “You are wrong, Mr. Juppé” (Desportes, 2016). From a formal point of view, he basically used the term address “Mr. Juppé”, and never once addressed him as “Mr. Prime Minister”, which is otherwise a common term of address for a current or former Prime Minister in France. General Desportes wrote that Alain Juppé was wrong about the very essence of this conflict: the minister moves in a very changeable political environment and is accountable to the President of the Republic, while a soldier (especially a general) is accountable to his country, his nation, and his interests and values. He deduced from this that a soldier must speak whenever it is necessary to prove his fidelity to the abovementioned values. General Desportes also accused Juppé of disrespecting those who have dedicated their entire lives to the service of their homeland and thus have not only the right but also the duty to tell the nation what they know, especially regarding security threats and military missions abroad. Finally, General Desportes warned Juppé that the military’s budget resources were still dwindling. He then also immediately criticized him for making only a very marginal mention of the army in his program book The Strong State as My Goal (Juppé, 2016). The controversial polemic between the presidential candidate Alain Juppé and General Desportes has shown that French generals were already refusing to be what they used to be during the Cold War: the so-called the Great Dumb. Today, these symbolic authorities refuse to remain silent, and they are determined to comment on what is happening around them, the nature and urgency of security threats, the main issues of a doctrinal nature, and the financing and modernization of the army. Act No. 3: The Direct Clash Between Two Top-Level Symbolic Authorities The third and most serious act of the revolt of French soldiers began in early July 2017, when President Emmanuel Macron, who had then only been in office for 2 months, began to implement his strategy of cutting government spending with a determination to impose such cuts on the French armed forces. His then Minister of Finance Gérald Darmanin (born in 1982, and currently the Minister of the Interior) decided to cut the budget of the armed forces by EUR 850 million. Since the beginning, it was clear that this decision would result in the cancelling of some already agreed purchases of weapons systems as well as of some planned operations. It is no wonder that this unilateral and arbitrary decision provoked the protest of Pierre de Villiers, the then Chief of the General Staff (CEMA in French) and a fivestar General. He is a commandant with an excellent career: he is a former battalion

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and brigade commander who has been on missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo and has served as the head of the military office of several prime ministers. After taking over the highest military position in 2014, he led the deployment of troops in Syria, the Sahel, and the Central African Republic. At the time of Macron’s inauguration, he was in office for 4 years. After the election of Emmanuel Macron to the post of the President of the French Republic, the French generals reacted to the doctrinal document called la Loi de programmation militaire, which stipulated that the French armed forces would receive 198 billion euros for the period 2019–2023 and 295 billion euros for the period 2019–2025 (Le dossier de la Loi de programmation militaire, 2019–2025). These budgetary resources were perceived as insufficient. Moreover, the depository of collective memory (DCM) of the French soldiers has been “enriched” by other disturbing facts. First, 54,000 jobs in the armed forces were cancelled between 2008 and 2015, which represented an alarming quantity. Second, the soldiers continued to operate on a constant budget and behaved like a disciplined student, which was in great contrast to other state bodies that continued to carry out strikes and make threats each time they faced new cuts. Third, it is generally known that over the course of 5 years, inflation reduced the budget of defence by 4 billion euros if not more. As a result, France has witnessed a real killing game for military capabilities and the defence industry (De De Durand, 2013). The above-mentioned budgetary context explains the following reactions of General Pierre de Villiers. During a meeting of the National Assembly’s military committee, he recalled how many projects had been cancelled during that time, how many soldiers had to go into civilian life, and how much these negative measures have weakened the French armed forces. He concluded by declaring that it was unacceptable for him and that he would not be swept away like this. Although the meeting was not public, the walls had ears, and the prestigious daily Le Monde reported on the announcement.40 Then, the revenge of the new governing élites followed. It took place on the eve of a national holiday (14 July) in the garden of the Ministry of Defence during a ceremonial meeting of the new president, the prime minister, and the defence minister with the highest military officials and generals, representatives of the Allied armies who were invited to the ceremony and the parents of soldiers who fell during missions in various parts of the world. President Macron at first pathetically stated that he was the superior of all French generals and their commander-in-chief, and he concluded by saying that he would not tolerate those strategic decisions be discussed in public and would consistently insist on the restraint of all general French armed forces (Macron, 2017a, 2017b). This sharp proclamation was perceived by all the French generals as an attempt to humiliate them made by a very young politician who, without proper training (for example, he was never a mayor or deputy), reached the very top of the power

40

de Royer and Johannès (2020).

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pyramid. Since then, they have called him “Jupiter”, which has two meanings in this case. First, it is the official title of the command post under the seat of the President of the Republic. Second, it is a designation for a narcissist who acts as if he descended from heavenly heights with a saving mission for his country. After the clash with President Macron, a top symbolic political authority, General de Villiers made the decision to resign and retire. Immediately after his resignation, he became a new hero and a great icon of French soldiers. He became the third French general to refuse to remain silent indefinitely and spoke publicly at a time when he considered the actions of the country’s highest constitutional official unacceptable. His open dispute with the President of the Republic brought tensions between the symbolic authorities of the two groups to the highest possible level. After retiring, General Pierre de Villiers published a book called Service to the Fatherland (de Villiers, 2017). On its pages, he clearly articulated his basic values and his credo of a devoted soldier who had served in the military for over 40 years. In the first place, he underlined the importance of military service for his native country. It is based on sharing altruistic and collective values that are common to all members of the French military forces. This value is followed by the priority of collective values and interests over the individual, which means that the personal interests of soldiers are secondary to the interests of the country, the military corps, and especially the protection of the homeland, which should always prevail over all else. The General underlines that this approach is deeply rooted in the DNA of each soldier. All French soldiers know and fully respect the basic fact that they have to work hard during their military training and that they must fully respect the high military discipline as well as accept frequent separations from their families. The abnegations of French soldiers are reinforced by the fact that the armed forces offer them salaries that are not very high. However, French soldiers appreciate that during their military service, they obtain some invaluable value. They obtain new skills, self-esteem, military camaraderie, and especially the fact that during missions abroad, it is the comrade-in-arms who can save a soldier’s life. The General emphasizes that a regiment is a large community of friends, often one large family, while the uniform acts as a balancing element and opens the way for professional and social advancement. The third great value is the high responsibility of every commander for the lives of his subordinates. This means that each commander has to consider the risks in every situation and that he cannot be indecisive. The fourth value is explained as the devotion to France, to its size, strategic autonomy, and independence. Last but not least, the General emphasizes the duty of every military commander to speak out whenever the political authorities decide that there will be an unacceptable discrepancy between operational requirements and French armed forces requirements and a permanent reduction of defence budgets followed by a closure of military bases and cancellations of acquisition programs and sometimes even missions. The General’s book became a big bestseller; it was bought not only by active soldiers but also by thousands of Frenchmen who spent a year in basic military service (Service national). It is no wonder that it had several reprints. At the same time, the publication of this book became an important political event because it has

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been perceived as a credo of an excellent soldier devoted to the service of the French Republic. Many French even saw in it in the year of its publication (2017) the program of a future candidate for the presidency. 41 As a result, this book was highly appreciated as a document of a political nature.

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General Pierre de Villiers in Light of the Theory of Pierre Bourdieu

The spectacular story of General Pierre de Villiers represents an excellent subject for testing the theory of Pierre Bourdieu. Here, such a test will be carried out in three main directions: identification of the basic values of all French soldiers, enrichment of their depository of collective memory, and their exemplary resistance against the moral harassment and symbolic violence perpetrated by the political elites. First, by his behaviour, his crucial decisions, and his book, particularly by his clear identification and explication of the basic values of all French soldiers, the former CEMA has created an extraordinary work of constitution (travail de constitution). He enriched the construction of the identity (of the habitus) of the large social group of French soldiers. He clearly defined their “mutual exteriority” (Bourdieu, 1984: 3–14) in the field of contemporary France. This exteriority has been defined particularly against the group of young politicians and their values, aims, and behaviour. In a more modest measure, it has been defined in the field of a clear opposition towards jihadist immigrants who do not respect the French Republic or its basic values, symbols, and way of life. As a result, France has witnessed a clearly defined clash of identities. On the one hand, we saw a unilateral decision about budgetary cuts with fatal consequences in the field of defence and security policy, which has been made without consultations with the CEMA and other chiefs of the armed forces. Moreover, this decision has been imposed regardless of the protests of soldiers, which were based on correct arguments and fully legitimate. Last, the budgetary cuts have been followed by godlike declarations of the President of the Republic. On the other hand, General de Villiers presented basic values that are respected by all French soldiers. By his clear definition of those values, he made an excellent designation of the soldiers’ positions based on the principle of “us versus them”. Concretely speaking, it was a clash between two actors. The political elites were determined to impose a short-term decision in the form of budgetary cuts. The CEMA, as the symbolic authority of the French soldiers, argued by pointing to the long-term obligations in the field of defence and security policy. At the same time, he did not forget to clearly express his opposition to the values and behaviour of the contemporary French jihadists as the third social group in contemporary France, a group whose tactics are enormously hostile and aggressive. 41

Sapin (2020).

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Second, in light of the theory of Stefano Guzzini (2013: 86), General de Villiers enriched the depository of collective memory of the entire group of French soldiers. He clearly defined the so-called le sens pratique (Bourdieu, 1980), which is constituted by a complex system of shared values, norms, and arguments of the symbolic authorities that form their habitus. The norms articulated by Pierre de Villiers and his clearly presented arguments accompanied by his important decisions shaped the forms of behaviour of the entire group of French soldiers. At the same time, they shaped their approaches to the role of obedience, which represents the so-called third dimension of power. By his behaviour and legacy, de Villiers strongly influenced the common sense (Bourdieu, 1980) of the French soldiers. Last, after the direct clash with the top symbolic authority of the group of young politicians, in which he did not hesitate to sacrifice his highly appreciated function, General de Villiers came out as a hero and as a highly respected symbolic authority. He made it in the field of resistance against moral harassment and against the symbolic violence of the political elites, a violence that worked and continues to work although it is not recognized as such. In the concrete case of France, this harassment has been symbolized by three top-level politicians. Manuel Valls, as the first of them, started the confrontation in 2013 with his arrogant and counterproductive critical declarations aimed at the highly respected General Soubelet. The Minister of Finance Gérald Darmanin gradually increased the confrontation in 2017 with his unilaterally declared budgetary cuts, and Emmanuel Macron crowned the clash in July 2017 with his public declarations with strong features of an attempted humiliation addressed to General Pierre de Villiers (CEMA) as the top symbolic authority of all French soldiers. Two Manifestos of French Soldiers Published in 2021 and Their Consequences In the spring of 2021, the depository of collective memory (DCM) of French soldiers was enriched by the publication of two manifestoes on the pages of the weekly Valeurs Actuelles, which serves as a tribune of the anti-immigration far right. Both of them have been accepted as major political events. The first has the title “We call for the return of the honour of those who rule over us”.42 It was signed by 20 generals and is addressed to the President of the Republic and all French ministers, deputies, senators, and generals. The second was published a month later. The main ideas of the first manifesto were articulated in five sections. The first of them presents the military careers of the signatories. All of them have studied at prestigious military schools and served in units throughout France and overseas. They participated in difficult military operations in the Islamic world (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Mali, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Syria), during which they saw the deaths of many of their brothers in arms. It is no wonder that the authors and signatories of both manifestos call themselves a generation that has gone through the fire of war. 42

Valeursactuelles.com, 22. 4. 2021. Available from: https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/ pour-unretour-delhonneur-denos-gouvernants-20-generaux-appellent-macron-a-defendre-lepatriotisme/

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At the same time, the signatories of these letters have direct experiences of war that they gained during the long-term Operation Sentinelle (Patrol). Thanks to their experiences, they have an excellent overview of the situation in their country. They are in everyday contact with the violence perpetrated by young hooligans in the suburbs of French towns and cities. They witness the attacks against the town halls, the statues of great heroes of French history, and other symbols of their country. They are particularly offended by the descriptions of the “three beautiful colours” (white, red, and blue) on the national flag. In connection with this, they refer to the inscription “Honour and Homeland” on the battle flags of all French military units. The second section of the manifesto presents, without mincing words, the main negative phenomena of contemporary France. It especially condemns the so-called salami tactics, by which they mean the tactics that lead to new territories being cut off from their country every day. In these territories, the laws of the republic are no longer respected and are being replaced by the Sharia. Young hooligans manifest their open contempt for France and its history and values. The soldiers condemn the practice of tearing down statues of great figures, as this causes France to be deprived of its history and self-esteem. The actors of the anti-French violence are described as members of “hordes of immigrants” who hate everything French, weaken the country’s cohesion, and seek to destroy the entire French system. The third section expresses very strong reservations about the country’s political elites, as it reproaches them for their alleged hypocrisy, laxity, indifference, perversion of values and cowardice in the face of the consequences of the long-term neglect of the problems associated with immigrants and their real causes. By the abovementioned hypocrisy, the authors mean that the political élites take very harsh action against yellow vests, but on the other hand, they remain very dormant in their attitude towards immigrants and their violence. The soldiers accuse them of making ever-increasing concessions to Islamism in the French territory. In the fourth section, the authors use highly dramatic words. They declare that if the country’s political elites will continue to underestimate the problems resulting from the failing immigration policy, a civil war will break out in France. They continue by stating that in such a situation, the French armed forces will not hesitate to directly intervene with the aim of ending the chaos and restoring respect for the basic values of the French Republic. It was the first time after six decades that French soldiers openly spoke about the threat of a civil war in their country and their determination to act. The last section of the first letter has a strongly personal dimension. It declares that all French soldiers have one big hero and symbolic authority: General Pierre de Villiers. The soldiers openly declare that they want him as a candidate for the presidential election of 2022. It shows us that President Macron, with his godlike approach to military budgets, the needs of the French armed forces and their symbolic authorities, has generated this possible challenger. Even if de Villiers did not hear the wishes of his former subordinate soldiers, his position of a symbolic authority of all French soldiers has not been challenged. This extraordinary soldier entered the recent history of France as a highly respected symbol of courage (Clément, 2020).

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In comparison with the book of General de Villiers, the second manifesto is much more critical towards French jihadists. Its key critical approach is based on word disintegration, which it explains by looking at in the context of three domains.43 First, the manifesto condemns the process of rampant disintegration, which is conceived and pushed for a single purpose: to create on the territory of France a malaise or even a hatred between the communities. The text continues by criticizing the concepts of racialism, indigenization, and decolonialization theories and warns that through these terms, it is a race war that the hateful and bigoted supporters of these concepts want. According to the French soldiers, these hateful people want to despise France and its traditions and culture and want to see it dissolve by tearing away its past and history. Thus, they attack past military and civil glories by analysing remarks that are several centuries old and tearing down statues.44 Second, the French generals speak about a disintegration that is based on Islamism and manifested by the violent activities of the hordes of the suburbs. As a result, it leads to a detachment of multiple parcels of the nation so that they would be transformed into territories subject to dogmas contrary to the French Constitution. The manifesto underlines that every Frenchman, whatever his belief or non-belief, has the right to feel at home everywhere in France and argues that there can and should be no city or district where the laws of the Republic do not apply. Third, the French generals speak about a disintegration that is manifested by an extraordinary repression that prevails over fraternity during demonstrations where the power uses the police as auxiliary agents and scapegoats in the face of French people in yellow vests who legitimately express their despair. They reproach the French political élites by arguing that they give the police and the gendarmes contradictory directives, which is in strong contrast with the concessions made to immigrants who do not respect basic French rules and hate the French way of life. Fourth, the text increases in force with a strong criticism of the ruling élites. It reproaches them for their laxity, which can lead, according to the authors of the second manifesto, to an explosion and an unavoidable intervention of France’s active soldiers (who are comrades of the authors) in a perilous mission whose aims would be the protection of the French civilizational values and safeguarding of their compatriots on the national territory. Last, the manifesto clearly defines the main threat to contemporary France: it identifies it with the civil war, which will put an end to this growing chaos caused by the continuing procrastination of the ruling élites, and which can lead to thousands of victims. The manifesto attributes all the responsibility for such a tragic unravelling to the current governing élites. 43

Valeursactuelles.com, 22. 4. 2021. Available from: https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/ pour-unretour-delhonneur-denos-gouvernants-20-generaux-appellent-macron-a-defendre-lepatriotisme/. 44 Nouvelle tribune de militaires: 20 Minutes, 10. 5. 2021. Available from: https://www.20minutes. fr/societe/3038631-20210510-tribune-valeurs-actuelles-hebdomadaire-publie-nouveau-texte-ecritmilitaires-activite

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The second letter has been published in the beginning of May 2021.45 This text had been signed by 2000 soldiers and was addressed to President Macron. It developed and deepened the argumentation of the book of General de Villiers and the first manifesto. It put the main emphasis on the big difference between the short time aims of politicians and the long-term aims of soldiers. The letter underlines that the former aims are motivated by mandates gained in the elections, while the latter aims are devoted to the survival of their country and its defence and security.46 The letter starts by repeating the tragic lesson learned in the operations in the Islamic world and continues by pointing to the particular importance of the experiences gained during Operation Sentinelle in France. The soldiers directly reproach President Macron for the fact that he, together with his government, abandoned large territories of France and left them to the mercy of jihadists who have no respect for France and its basic values.47 The manifestos of the French Soldiers have provoked a strong polarization throughout France. They were gladly supported by Marine Le Pen, who profited from this situation; she went on to invite the soldiers to join her association, especially in the context of the 2022 presidential election, when France faced a great battle for its own future.48 At the same time, the connection between the signatories of the letter and the protest movement of the yellow vests is very important. The leading managers of the yellow vests were the first who came with the idea that General Pierre de Villiers should become a candidate in the 2022 presidential election and thus challenge Emmanuel Macron, a politician strongly hated by them.49 On the other hand, some critical remarks were made. They were formulated by political authorities. These included the remarks by Prime Minister Jean Castex, who condemned the first manifesto of the French soldiers as an initiative that is contrary to all the principles of the French Republic, as well as to the principles of military honour and basic duties.50 And after the publication of the second text, he added that it was a call for an insurrection of French soldiers against the political system of this democratic country. He especially condemned the fact that the text of the soldiers mentioned the possibility of acting against the French government.51 Following the categorical declarations of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Defence Florence Parly sharply condemned the signatories, referring to them as 45

«Valeurs actuelles» publie un nouveau texte présenté comme une deuxième tribune de militaires. Le Monde, 10. 5. 2021. 46 Available from: https://valeursactuelles.com/exclusif-signez-la-nouvelle-tribune-des. . . 47 Lair (2021). 48 Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/04/26/marine-le-pen-applauditla-tribune-des-anciens-militaires-publiee-dans-valeurs-actuelles_6078123_823448.html 49 Sapin (2020). 50 Tribune de militaires: « Une récupération politique inacceptable », juge Jean Castex. Le Monde, 28. 4. 2021. 51 La rédaction de France Bleu: Tribune d’anciens militaires: Jean Castex condamne “une initiative contraire aux principes républicains, 28. 4. 2021.

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rioters and conspirators who carried out political machinations. At the same time, she invited them to fully respect the principle of political neutrality and loyalty to the Republic.52 Moreover, she did not hesitate to speak about possible sanctions of the protesting soldiers, which could even include an exclusion of the active soldiers and a denial of all benefits to the retired officers.53 At the same time, it was announced that the active soldiers would be judged by a military council.54 The government’s critical attitudes towards the revolting soldiers were confirmed even by the five-star General François Lecointre, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who, in an interview, declared that the 18 active soldiers who signed the controversial letters would “each stand before a military council”. 55 The letters of the French soldiers have been criticized even by the leader of the French left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. He and all the deputies of the party called La France Insoumise were so critical and even outraged that they asked the Paris prosecutor “to initiate proceedings” against the authors and publishers of the letters. 56

In the two above-mentioned cases, French political authorities repeated some highly appreciated words of major importance, especially democracy, republic, and shared values. Unfortunately, they failed to present concrete arguments and direct answers to the concrete criticism and reproaches of the French soldiers, even if some critical theses of the second open letter were exaggerated, too critical, and pathetically formulated. As a result, the above-mentioned declarations of French political leaders cannot be appreciated as a concrete enrichment of the depository of collective memory of contemporary France.

6.6

Two Works of Constitution

In light of the theory of Pierre Bourdieu, we can make a comparison of the book of General Pierre de Villiers and the two manifestos of French soldiers. On the pages of the book of the former CEMA, the main emphasis is placed on positive values that are shared by all French soldiers. In other words, the positive approach clearly prevails. At the same time, his criticism aimed at the other two competing groups— the French jihadists and the ruling élites—is only implicit. The former CEMA managed to articulate his criticism so cleverly that an attentive reader who

52

Barotte (2021). Le Parisien, 28. 4. 2021. 54 Laspière, Victor Tribot: Tribune des militaires: les signataires en activité passeront devant un conseil militaire. France Bleu, 28. 4. 2021. 55 Available from: https://French army chief tells soldiers to quit over civil-war letter – BBC https:// www.bbc.com › news › worl. . .11. 5. 2021 56 Lair (2021), op. cit. 53

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understands the situation in contemporary France can deduce his own conclusion, which may be critical, from his text. On the other hand, the two manifestos are predominantly aimed at the negative tendencies in contemporary France. They are openly and explicitly critical, with their criticism being aimed at the French jihadists as well as the ruling élites. The first group is labelled with the very critical phrase “hordes from the peripheries”. The soldiers reproach them for their disdain of France and its basic values, their hate, their acts of bestiality (especially the decapitation of the professor), and their determination to provoke a racial war in France. At the same time, the French soldiers were explicitly negative toward the French political élites. First, they did not hesitate to condemn them for their laxity and to articulate the following conclusion: when caution is everywhere, courage is nowhere. Second, they had the courage to explicitly reproach the French political élites for their cowardice and their responsibility for a thousand dead in the event that they would not be able to act against the threat of a civil war. Their explicit negativism culminated in their declaration of their determination to fight in case a civil war breaks out. Last, General de Villiers produced an excellent work of constitution in two fields. The first of them is the field of an explicit identification of positive values of French soldiers, while the second is the field of implicit criticism of French jihadist and political élites. The two manifestos amounted to a remarkable work of constitution in the field of very explicit criticism of the latter two groups. With their respective works, Pierre de Villiers and the authors of the two manifestos enriched the depository of collective memory of French soldiers at the beginning of the 2020s. Their works of constitution are fully complementary, and they represent an important enrichment of DCM. Table 6.1 presents the professional background of the French soldiers, the Key ideas of their open letters, their political attitudes as well as ambitions, and their symbolic authorities. The revolting French soldiers have been reproached for the fact that their main arguments were in full accordance with the theses of Éric Zemmour, a very influential French journalist, essayist, and writer who was also a candidate in the 2022 presidential election. In 2014, this far right politician published a very scandalous monograph called French Suicide (Eric Zemmour: Le Suicide français), which became such a bestseller that it sold 15,000 copies a day and went through several reprints.57 On its pages, Zemmour wrote that his country was completely unsuccessful in managing immigration, that it was sacrificing its national sovereignty and that it tolerates the so-called halalization. This controversial author also wrote in his book that the French governing élites opened their country to a huge number of people who “have nothing to do with the anthropological structure of the French nation”. He also stated that contemporary

57

Zemmour bat tous les records de vente! Le Point, 21. 10. 2014.

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Table 6.1 The revolt of French soldiers against the governing elites The professional background of the French soldiers

Key ideas of their open letters

Political attitudes of the French soldiers Political ambition of the French soldiers Personal symbol of the hopes of the French soldiers

Military operations in the Islamic word (Afghanistan, Mali, the CAR, Syria) with high numbers of killed and injured soldiers Direct drastic experiences from Operation Sentinelle (It is a long-term operation during which French soldiers patrol the peripheries which are occupied by immigrants from the Islamic world. At the same time, they also patrol the areas in front of big monuments (the Champs-Elysées, the Louvre, Notre Dame, the Eiffel Tower, Lourdes, etc.), airports, railway stations, etc.) A long-term cutting of the basic French values in the territories controlled by the “hordes” of hateful immigrants obsessed with jihadism The decline of the French society and of its cohesion The threat of a collapse of France as a modern state The threat of a civil war in France The soldiers’ determination to defend the French Republic and its basic values They condemn the French political élites for their hypocrisy, laxness, indifference, perversion, and cowardice In case of a civil war, they are determined to restore the order and save the Republic General Pierre de Villiers (The Chief of the General Staff between 2014 and 2017, who submitted his resignation in protest against the budgetary cuts of the newly elected president Emmanuel Macron. This general has become a living symbol of the deeply rooted conservative values and traditions of France.)

France is witnessing the process of a large halalization, as the term “halalization” was derived from the term “halal” from the Arabic cuisine and way of life. The criticism of Zemmour gains in force with his condemnation of the fact that wherever Muslims came, they imposed their language, their religion, their god, and their way of life. He concludes by stating that the spread of Islam in France is ensured by Qur’anic schools, which are paid for by individuals and groups in Saudi Arabia. Finally, Zemmour warns that Islam is completely incompatible with the basic principles of the French Republic and then draws a clear dilemma: either France will submit to Islam, or the immigrants will have to choose between France and Islam. An important event came in May 2021 when Eric Zemmour signed the second manifesto of French soldiers and commented on it with the following words: “I signed the military forum and I invite you all to do the same”.58 Of course, this declaration, like the commentaries of Marine Le Pen, has a counterproductive aspect,

58 Éric Zemmour a signé la tribune des militaires. Available from: https://www.valeursactuelles. com, 12. 5. 2021.

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New Political Context in 2022

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as it can be used against the protesting soldiers. However, from an impartial point of view, the parallels between Zemmour and protesting soldiers are reduced at critical attitudes towards the failing immigration policy.

6.7

New Political Context in 2022

The parliamentary elections in June 2022 resulted in a new situation; it is even possible to say that their results redrawn the political map of the French republic. They created three major parliamentary groups that represent three dominant pols. The most numerous between them is the party of the newly elected president whose name is Ensemble! (Together!) It has got 245 deputies from 577,59 in the comparison with the elections 2017, this party lost 63 deputies and, more importantly, the absolute majority from the preceding period 2017–2022 which gave Emmanuel Macron the possibility to impose his decisions despite the protests of the opposition. Politically speaking, the parliamentary elections 2022 represented a serious disappointment as well as an important lesson for Macron. The French electors disobeyed him when he called on them to come to the polls in as many numbers as possible. A record absenteeism60 was their reaction to the promises of a future without oil, without gas and without coal, promises of a new social and health policy and of a new system of education. In other words, despite a long range of promises, Emmanuel Macron did not manage to win the necessary political support for his political party. Like French people use to say, it is not good to promise castles in Spain. As a result, the people who refused to go to the ballot boxes represent 46, 23%, in other words, the first political party in France.61 Macron’s political party RM (Republic en Marche) will no longer have the required majority. In addition, some key figures lost the election: House Speaker Richard Ferrand, former Home Secretary and Deputy Club Chairman Christophe Castaner, and others. Last but not least, Emmanuel Macron was punished for the fact that he chose a completely unknown and, above all, inexperienced woman Elisabeth Borne to the position of Prime minister.62 The second group of the French parliament is represented by the block called NUPES (Nouvelle union populaire écologique et sociale—New popular ecological and social Union) with 131 deputies. This block includes the party La France Insoumise, which is led by Jean Luc Mélenchon (JLM), French socialists, the French Législatives 2022: résultats définitifs et composition de l . . .https://www.vie-publique.fr › en-bref, 20. 6. 2022. 60 Législatives 2022: en raison de la forte abstention . . . – Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr › . . . › Élections législatives 2022, 20. 6. 2022. 61 Législatives 2022: l’abstention reste le premier « parti https://www.lemonde.fr › 2022/06/20. 62 This 60-year-old woman, a specialist in the field of the construction of bridges, is a very loyal supporter of Emmanuel Macron. During his first presidency, she was several time minister (Minister of Transport, of Ecology, and of Employment policy). 59

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Communist party, and the Ecological left. Even JLM is disappointed because the result was far behind his hopes about the most numerous parliamentary groups and of the post of Prime Minister. The third large group of French National Assembly has the name Rassemblement National (National Rally). Since January 2011, this party has been led, with a very firm hand, by Marine Le Pen, an enormously dynamic, combative, rigorous, and authoritative women. She is a very experienced politician. In the past, she has been a member of the European Parliament (2009–2017) and a member of the National Assembly (since 2017). It is no wonder that Marine Le Pen is considered one of the main winners of the parliamentary elections in June 2022.63 The number of 89 deputies strongly contrasts with only 8 deputies in 2017.64 This result strongly reinforced the self-esteem of this party and especially of its leader. Nevertheless, despite the above-mentioned profound changes, contemporary France is not witnessing the end of its democracy. This historical country is confronted with the end of a specific form of governing that was possible between 2017 and 2022, when EM had an absolute majority that gave him the possibility to decide all strategic questions in his Palais when the details were delegated to the chief of the club of his party in the French Parliament. However, after the parliamentary elections 2022, he has the obligation to negotiate directly with all the chiefs of political parties what candidate within the framework of the coalition RM, it means the MoDem and Horizons, led by Francois Bayrou and Edouard Philippe. At the same time, the newly elected presidents will have the obligation to negotiate directly and honestly with the leaders of the party called Republicans (the traditional party of the French republican right), which was underestimated by him, maltreated, and dealt with upset during the period 2017–2022. This new situation has once again shown that French voters can put their chosen policies to the test. Thus, the results of this year’s parliamentary elections do not mark the end of French democracy but open a new stage for it. New Approach Towards the Soldiers Just in the first days of his new mandate, EM made an important gestation towards the French soldiers. He visited their unit engaged as part of the international mission “Eagle”, for which France was designated as an executive nation under NATO command with the mission to strengthen the eastern flank of Europe in the face of the Russian threat. Many of these troops are based at the NATO base of MihailKogalniceanu, near the Romanian port of Constanta, on the shores of the Black Sea.65 Another part is building the foundations for a second base in Cincu, Transylvania, for training further inland with Romanian forces. During this visit, the French President declared that it is a pride of the France to be there on this Romanian soil at the eastern outposts of Europe at a time when the war Législatives 2022: à Hénin-Beaumont, Marine Le Pen. . .https://www.lemonde.fr ›2022/06/20. Élections législatives 2017 – Ministère de l’Intérieur https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr › El. . . 65 Lucas Da Silva: In Romania, Emmanuel Macron salutes French soldiers and “Europe of defence”. Le Monde, 15. 6. 2022. 63 64

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is returning to the continent. He did not hesitate to highly appreciate the importance of the work of French soldiers and to qualify as an unprecedented mission because the Europe of defence is built here in this partnership and intimacy.66 At the same time, he clearly explained the international context of the mission of French soldiers in the Black Sea. He openly spoked about the necessity to stop the Russian war effort, to help the Ukrainians and their army and continue negotiations. Moreover, he clearly defined this mission as a sustainable way, which aims to protect France and its interests, to deter the enemy and to be present in this area with a large strategic importance. In addition, he concluded by an important compliment when he said that in this regard, they have been pioneers in these deployments. The visit of President Macron was highly appreciated by the French soldiers, namely, by the Colonel Minguet, head of the French contingent, who underlined that one of the lessons that can be learned from the war in Ukraine is that ground fighting remains important with old-generation tanks but also with ultramodern weapons, that is to say the rustic and high technology. At the same time, he explained the geopolitical context of French engagement on this part of the old continent, saying that the retreat of the Russian army to the eastern regions of Ukraine reduced the tension on Romania border, but the threat was never far away. In addition, he concluded that in such situations, it is difficult to know in which direction the war will go.

6.8

Conclusion of the Chapter

The above-analysed revolt of French soldiers is an important social phenomenon that confirms that the theoretical heritage of Pierre Bourdieu is not dead (Lemoine, Simon: 55). This complex event showed that the political field in contemporary France is characterized by long struggles between three main actors: the terrorist organizations, the governing élites, and the soldiers, who do not hesitate to manifest their discontent with the existing situation, namely, with the failing immigration policy. The Field of Contemporary France In light of the theory of Pierre Bourdieu, it is possible to conclude that the field of contemporary France is witnessing a specific production and reproduction of mutual combative relations between the three above-mentioned actors (Bourdieu, 1992: 337–338). All these actors take their decisions and measures in reaction to each other. The last decade has shown that their strategic aims, tactical means, and modi operandi are mutually intertwined. They wage endless fights for their positions in the field, and their obsessions predetermine their own strategic moves, strategic culture, and trajectory in the field. As a result, contemporary France is witnessing a specific 66 Isabelle Mandraud: Emmanuel Macron aux soldats français en Roumanie: «L’Europe de la défense se construit ici». Le Monde, 15. 6. 2022.

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form of social war that is waged by the three actors, who are in the role of highly determined position takers (Bigo, 2013: 102). The Capital of the Three Key Actors All the fighting actors use their respective capitals. Each of them mobilizes its own instruments, measures, and methods with the aim of reinforcing its own position in the field of power (Pouliot & Mérand, 2013: 36). The capital of French jihadists is purely violent—their terrorist attacks are perpetrated with the aim of killing, injuring, harming, and provoking a state of fear. This means that these attacks can never be justified. At the same time, the capital of the French jihadists is highly negative; it has been used with the aim of imposing profound changes in French society and politics and with the aim of profoundly changing the way of life in this important country. The capital of the French governing élites results from their position as the dominant actor who is determined to take and reinforce its positions. These élites mobilize and use a large portfolio of repressive measures and instruments, which can be used with the aim of suppressing any revolt and deterring or even punishing its leading actors. They largely profit from their position as dominant actors and impose important reductions of the military budgets, which lead to annulments of modernization programs of the French armed forces and improvisations in the missions in Islamic countries. At the same time, the French governing élites openly attack and punish the revolting generals, including their symbolic authorities and their supporters. The capital used by the French governing élites towards the revolting soldiers satisfies the criteria of moral harassment. This negative tendency was visible in the moment when the ministers spoke about the parallels between the two manifestos and the theses of Éric Zémmour. This specific capital has been used with the aim to discredit the revolting soldiers, qualify them as extremists, and create an appropriate framework for their discrediting, disqualifications, and eliminations from the field. The French soldiers, as the third actor, use their capital based on the experiences they gained during their long-term missions in the Islamic world as well as in France. During such missions, they are or were directly confronted daily with contemporary jihadists in the Islamic countries as well as in France. They have knowledge of the cruelty and violence used by the jihadists. Last, the analysis of the revolt confirmed the importance of the habitus and of the perceptions, reflexions, and decisions that represent the most important schemes of social and political behaviour. The revolting soldiers put the main emphasis on the basic values of the French Republic and the necessity to defend them. They do not hesitate to resist the will of the politicians (Lemieux, 2011: 75–100) and show that the position of the dominated actor cannot be identified with an absolute silence and submission. Their behaviour satisfies all the basic criteria of a revolt. The Habitus of the Three Key Actors Each of the three above-mentioned actors wears its own habitus, which confirms its identity.

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The habitus of the French terrorist organizations is woven from a brutal and direct violence perpetrated on innocent civilian people. This habitus is symbolized by their openly declared determination to wage a direct war in the territory of France with the aim of imposing profound changes in the field of French policy and the French way of life. The habitus of the French jihadists manifests their arrogance and superciliousness and the pride of a sect of activists who believe that they represent the necessary therapy for France as a decadent country that is in profound decline. French jihadists have the habitus of fanatics who are convinced that they represent the future of France, a country that is depicted by them as rotten and corrupt. The habitus of the governing élites has been studied in the context of two basic levels. The first was the level of their discourses, particularly the speeches of Emmanuel Macron, the youngest President of the Vth Republic. These speeches had an incontestably high rhetorical quality, but nevertheless, their results were very doubtful at all fronts (Wurtz, 2021: 204). The second level is made up of their reactions to the above-mentioned terrorist attacks. It is symbolized particularly by their eloquent discourses and their large quantity of poetic if not bombastic words. In their communication with the revolting soldiers, they prefer an inert violence that is “forgotten” because it is codified in the established order of things (Bourdieu, 2015). The fibre of the habitus of the French governing élites contains elements of an invisible, nonphysical, and non-instrumental violence. This habitus is codified in their discourses and narratives, which are formulated and articulated with the aim to discredit the revolting soldiers or even to eliminate them (Bourdieu, 1982). The habitus of the French soldiers is woven from two basic fibres. The first of them reflects the most important republican values, which have been presented and explained in the book of General Pierre de Villiers. The second fibre has been cultivated during a long range of difficult missions in the Islamic world, where the soldiers have been confronted daily with the hate towards their country, strong antiFrench attitudes, slogans such as “away from France”, and perfidious and violent attacks (Pigeaud, 2021: 189–195). Metamorphoses of Works of Constitution As the last decade (2013–2023) in France has been full of clashes between the three competing actors, it has confirmed the relevancy and importance of another important concept defined by Pierre Bourdieu: the concept of the “work of constitution” (Bourdieu, 1984: 3–14) as an integral part of the habitus. The group of jihadi terrorists continued to wear the same habitus, which is based on the repeated modus operandi of their terrorist attacks perpetrated with the aim of killing and injuring French citizens as much as possible. The French Republic witnessed no profound changes in their work of constitution. It has been confronted with combinations of different modi operandi of terrorist attacks. The same conclusion is typical for the governing élites: they repeated the same discourses with the aim of condemning the revolting soldiers without substantial corrections of their work of constitution. Their work of constitution has been based on two pillars. The first of them has been articulated in discourses full of condemnations of terrorist attacks. The second pillar has been manifested in their negative

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attitudes towards the capital and habitus of the revolting soldiers, who have been depicted as insupportable troublemakers. However, the revolting soldiers have made an important work of constitution—it has been articulated at two levels. First, their symbolic authorities published some books and articles in which they clearly explained the basic values and reasons for their revolt. The arguments of the French generals, especially those that have been articulated by General de Villiers, represent a remarkable positive work of constitution (based on positive values). Second, other officers (including some active officers) presented two manifestos that provoked enormously exasperated reactions of all the symbolic authorities of the French governing élites. The manifestos from 2021 represented a predominantly negative work of constitution (based on their negative attitudes towards the violence of the French jihadists as well as towards the incoherence of the behaviour of the governing élites). Rational Causes and Historical Accidents In light of the theory of Edward Carr (the second theoretical inspiration of this text), the revolt of the French soldiers started in 2013 with the open and aggressive attack of Manuel Valls against General Bertrand Soubelet. Today, we know that this attack was strongly counterproductive because it started a series of subsequent clashes between the symbolic authorities of two important groups in contemporary France. The first of them is led by young assertive politicians, and the second is represented by four- and five-star generals at the highest posts of the French military hierarchy. In full conformity with the legacy of Edward Carr, all the clashes between the governing élites and the revolting soldiers have been analysed here as historical accidents. The analysis of these accidents showed that the revolt has its deeply rooted causes and reasons. The analysed revolt of French soldiers has three main contexts. The historical context results from the three above-mentioned turning points in French post-war history and the legacy of the Algerian war. The geopolitical context is symbolized by the French military operations in the Sahel, Operation Sentinelle in France, and the dramatic consequences of the failing immigration policy. Last, the military context is created by the experiences of French soldiers that they gained during the missions ISAF and Operation Sangaris. These three contexts have been identified as the main rational causes of the revolt. Of course, the most important rational cause of the revolt, which occurred in the decade between 2013 and 2021, resulted from unilateral decisions in the field of restrictions of the defence budgets. At the same time, the concrete specific clashes between soldiers and politicians represent historical accidents. The above-analysed concrete clashes resulted in a clear identification and explication of the basic values of the contemporary generation of French soldiers. These clashes enormously enriched their depository of collective memory and reinforced the positions and influence of their highly respected symbolic authorities, particularly the prestige of the former CEMA General Pierre de Villiers. Last, the revolt accelerated the process of a clash of identities between the soldiers and the French governing élites.

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The rational causes of the revolt of the French soldiers have been generalized in the following five directions. First, one reason was the failed immigration policy, which represents a serious and urgent security threat not only to France but also to any Western country with a strong immigrant community that does not respect the rules and way of life of the host country. Second, even though immigration is perceived as a so-called soft threat, it has been accompanied by many long-term negative consequences for the life of every Western society. The French case has shown that soldiers can be very disturbed by this kind of security threat. Third, thanks to a long range of missions in Islamic countries (each of them takes 6 months), French soldiers have a rich DCM based on their direct experiences that they gained during harsh first-line combat. It is no wonder that they refuse to speak in general phrases regarding this topic and that they prefer concrete actions against imminent threats to the security of their country (Gomart, 2020: 226). Fourth, the experience of French politicians, in contrast with that of French soldiers and their dramatic DCM, is based only on their short-term visits to the Islamic world. As a result, all clashes (as historical accidents) between the politicians and soldiers are only a matter of time. We never know when new clashes will break out and how serious their consequences will be. Finally, the revolt reached its highest level at the moment when the former CEMA came into a direct conflict with the President and the Prime Minister. At this moment, France witnessed a clash between two high-level moral authorities. The revolt of the French soldiers has had its initiating event—the clash between General Soubelet and Minister Manuel Valls, which happened in 2013. This conflict opened the way to further clashes, even at the highest levels. All the acts of the clash between the highest political and military figures in France have three common denominators. First, French soldiers refused to remain silent at the moments when the decisions of the political élites crossed the limits of their tolerance. Second, the decisions to make very sensible reductions in defence budgets provoked open protests of the French generals. Last, the above-studied social groups, as key actors in the social war in contemporary France, have different referential objects. The referential object of the French jihadists as the first group is the basic ideas of the doctrine called the Global Islamic Resistance Call and the ambition to impose profound changes on French politics and the French way of life. The referential object of the French political élites is framed by short-term timeframes related to elections and by ideas that open the way towards electoral victories. However, the referential object of the revolting soldiers is based on the long-term values of France and the determination to defend them against all threats and despite all possible troubles. Today, we can hope that the Macron’s visit of the French soldiers in Romania represents a very important step towards the reduction of bilateral tensions and towards a new modus vivendi in the relation between the highest symbolic authorities of the political class and soldiers. It is a move from the mutual suspiciousness and confrontation that has been so typical for the period between 2015 and 2022 towards confidence and cooperation.

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Summary Since 2013, France has witnessed a series of clashes between the ministers and generality that culminated in July 2017 by a direct conflict at the top level: President of the Republic vs. the Chief of the General Staff. These clashes have not been provoked by the discussions about the doctrinal questions but by the disaccords in the field of competencies of two groups of actors. They have their rational causes as well as historical accidents. They resulted in an extraordinary intensification of the work of constitution: the political symbolic authorities articulated their attitudes, and the military symbolic authorities published some remarkable books that clearly explained the credo of the contemporary French soldiers who have been confronted by jihadist violence for two decades every day.

References Documents Le dossier de la Loi de programmation militaire 2019–2025. Loi de programmation militaire 2019–2025. Ministère des Armées. Retrieved from https://www. defense.gouv.fr › ministere › loi-programmatio. . . Opération Barkhane. Ministère des Armées. Retrieved from: https://www.defense.gouv.fr › operation-barkhane. . .

Books and Articles A. Del., O. P. et T. B. (2016, February 6). «Calais : une vingtaine d’interpellés, dont le général Piquemal, au cours du rassemblement anti-migrants de PEGIDA» [archive]. lavoixdunord.fr. Badie, B., & Vidal, D. (1921). La France, une puissance contrariée. L’état du monde 2022. Éditions La Découverte. Barotte, N. (2021, May 10). Nouvelle tribune de militaires: Florence Parly dénonce une «grossière machination politique». Le Figaro. Bigo, D. (2013). Security. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.). Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. Boniface, P. (2019). Comprendre le monde: les relations internationales expliquées à tous. Malakoff, Armand Colin. Bourdieu, P. (1980). Le Sens pratique. Les Éditions de Minuit, coll. «Le sens commun». Bourdieu, P. (1982). Ce que parler veut dire. Lʼéconomie des échanges linguistiques. Fayard. Bourdieu, P. (1984). Espace social et genèse des “classes”. Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, (52–53). Bourdieu, P. (1992). Les règles de l’art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire. Seuil. Bourdieu, P. (2015). Sociologie générale. Vol. 1: Cours au Collège de France 1981–1983. Vol. 1. Média Diffusion. Buffotot, P. (2022). Les élections présidentielles et les questions de défense sous le V. République. Révue Défense Nationale, 848, 63–68. Caldwell, C. (2010). Une révolution sous nos yeux. Édition du Toucan, Collection Adultes.

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Macron, E. (2017a). Discours d’Emmanuel Macron à lʼhôtel de Brienne. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from https://www.elysee.fr › emmanuel-macron. Macron, E. (2017b). Discours du Président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, à la Pnyx, Athènes le jeudi 7 septembre 2017. Retrieved September 7, 2017, from https://www.elysee.fr, emmanuel-macron. Malafaye, A. (2016, April 26). Éviction du Général Soubelet: comment éviter la répétition dʼun tel gâchis? FigaroVox. Masoud, M. W. Z. (2013). An analysis of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “call to global Islamic resistance”. Journal of Strategic Security, 6(1), Article 4. Spring 2013. Mélenchon, J.-L. (2021). L’Avenir en commun. Seuil. Mitterrand, F. (1986). Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Fayard. Pigeaud, F. (2021). L’Afrique et le sentiment. In B. Badie & D. Vidal (Eds.). La France, une puissance contrariée. L’état du monde 2022. La Découverte. Pouliot, V., & Mérand, F. (2013). Bourdieu’s concepts. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.). Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR (p. 36). Quinault-Maupoil, T. (2016, May 12). Juppé «regrette» d’avoir demandé aux militaires de «fermer leur gueule». Le Figaro. Sapin, C. (2020, November 20). Présidentielle 2022: 20% des Français prêts à voter pour le général de Villiers. Le Figaro. Sapir, J. (2010). «Sois pro-américain ou tais toi !» Ambassade de France aux États-Unis d’Amérique Morin sanctionne Desportes. Marianne.net, 6.7.2010. Retrieved from https:// www.marianne.net/Morin-sanctionne-Desportes-Sois-pro-americain-ou-tais-toi-_a194919.html Soubelet, B. (2016). Tout ce qu’il ne faut pas dire. Plon. Soubelet, B. (2017). Sans autorité, quelle liberté? Les Éditions de l’Observatoire. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2019). Géopolitique des migrations: 40 fiches illustrées pour comprende le monde. Eyrolles. Wurtz, F. (2021). La politique européenne de la France depuis 2005. In B. Badie & D. Vidal (Eds.). La France, une puissance contrariée. L’état du monde 2022. Éditions La Découverte.

Chapter 7

Conclusion of the Book

Today, we know that the attacks of 11. 9. 2001 opened the era of the Global Terror. The USA reacted by the Bush Doctrine (doctrinal violence) and by two large military operations OEF 2001 and OIF 2003 (instrumental violence). The jihadist mirror of the Bush Doctrine articulated the Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC). The attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) opened the European front of the Global Terror. Their analysis was enormously interesting for the understanding of the theory and strategy of communication and of the psychological and political consequences. Following these attacks, UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) articulated an excellent definition that underlined that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security. In the second decade of this century, France became a theatre of a long series of terrorist attacks of high brutality and lethality. This important country is moving within a vicious circle between the military operations waged by this country and the terrorist attacks inflicted against it by jihadist organizations. This vicious circle has three key actors: the jihadi terrorists, political élites, and soldiers. Chapter 2 of this book explained why the analysis of terror in France has been based on the theoretical heritage of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, namely, on his concepts of field, social war, capital, habitus, and moral harassment in the political field. At the same time, the heritage of other authors has been used, namely, Stefano Guzzini and his concept of the depository of collective memory (DCM), which was enormously helpful for a deep analysis and synthesis of the behaviour of all three above-mentioned actors of the vicious circle in contemporary France. The methodology of this text has been based on the heritage of Stephen Van Evera, Margaret Hermann, Akan Malici, and other important authors. Thanks to their inspirational ideas, this book was written as a combination of theory testing and policy evaluative work. It tested the potential of the most known and respected theoreticians in the field of the terror studies. At the same time, the book made an evaluation of the political strategy of three actors of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Eichler, Terrorism in Contemporary France, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23551-1_7

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As a result, the book offered an equilibrium between holism and individualism, between the general context, on the one hand, and the strategy and tactics of the three above-mentioned actors, on the other hand. At the same time, this book offers an equilibrium between idealism and materialism. Its big attention was given to a detailed study of the main ideas and programs of concrete actors which have been articulated in jihadist doctrines as well as in doctrines of two last French Presidents (Hollande and Macron). Together with the ideas and programs, the means used by three key actors were analysed and explained, the main attention being paid to terrorist attacks, military operations, and published texts. Last, this book offers an equilibrium between processes of the vicious circle and its outcomes (the worsening of everyday security in France). All the analyses were framed by four research questions formulated with the aim of satisfying the basic criteria of qualitative research. Since 2015, jihadists have chosen France as a new front of global terrorism. This front has, in comparison with other Western countries, the highest numbers of perpetrated attacks as well as of victims. This front started with the militarized mass execution in the Charlie Hebdo in January 2015; it continued with the Bataclan and Paris restaurant attacks (the first war-generated punishment of France) in November 2015, with the mass murder in Nice in 2016 (National holiday), the shocking terrorist bestiality in Normandy in the same year, and the execution of Professor Samuel Paty and culminated with the attack in Strasbourg (Christmas 2018). The vicious circle of violence in contemporary France is largely intertwined with the international context, namely, with a long-term war that was opened by the terrorist attacks of radical jihadists against the USA in September 2021. Some years later, the West European front of the Global terror was opened by the attacks in Madrid (2003) and London (2005). During this long-term war, violence plays the most important role and has two basic forms: instrumental and doctrinal. At the doctrinal level, global terrorists apply the principles of the jihad by the pen based on the hate towards the West and its policy in the Islamic world. The Western states reacted strategically and formulated the key principles of the war against the Global Terror. At the instrumental level, the jihadist perpetrated the terrorist attacks, while the Western countries waged the military operations, resulting in regime changes and following occupations. Chapter 3 of this book shows that the same behaviour was typical even for France. The last two presidents formulated some doctrinal principles for the fight against jihadi terrorists, and they waged some important military operations in the area of Sahel. As in the case of the USA, these operations had many counterproductive consequences. From a theoretical point of view, all the above-mentioned attacks confirmed the theses of Lawrence Freedman that colonial and/or occupying power represent an ideal environment for contemporary terrorism. France is one of them and is witnessing many iconoclastic attacks against the symbols of its colonial passé. These attacks are aimed not only against the statues of former French presidents and ministers but also against the statues of French philosophes, writers, and scientists. Second, the study of the Terror in France confirmed the great potential

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of the theory of the strategy of communication of global terrorism, which has been brilliantly formulated by Alex Schmid. This theory served as the basis for a detailed analysis of three important phenomena: the aims of all important terrorist attacks, the intentions of their perpetrators and their consequences for the very day live of France. Third, all the terrorist attacks perpetrated in France satisfied the criteria of religious terrorism and provocative terrorism articulated by Martha Crenshaw. Their modus operandi resulted from the jihadist doctrine GIRC, namely, from the determination to kill as many people as possible and to provoke an atmosphere of fear with big psychological and political consequences. They have been prepared with two basic aims. The first of them is to manifest long-term negative feelings of French Muslims who are dissatisfied with their lives in France. The second aim is to provoke the French state to repressive countermeasures that can be misused for the exacerbation of feelings of frustration of French Muslims and for the escalation of their radicalization. Fourth, the terrorist attacks which happened in France during last decade confirmed the value of the theory of David Rappoport, who clearly defined the danger of a highly brutal assassination policy and no discriminated killing of the innocent civilian population. Last, all the above-mentioned attacks perpetrated in France confirmed the statement of Bruce Hoffman that contemporary terrorism represents a new face of war in the twenty-first century. The last decade shown us that the contemporary France is truly suffering a new face of war. The Results of This Book Are in Light of the Four Research Questions All the research on the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France was based on four research questions. These questions have been formulated with the aim of making a convenient design and presenting original text about the studied phenomenon. RQ 1

What are the key reasons, actors, and features of the vicious circle of violence in contemporary France?

The vicious circle of violence in contemporary France results from long struggles between three main actors: the terrorist organizations, the governing élites, and the soldiers, who do not hesitate to manifest their discontent with the existing situation, namely, with the failing immigration policy. France is witnessing a specific production and reproduction of mutual combative relations between these three actors who wage endless fights for their positions in the field. Unfortunately, this country is witnessing a specific form of a social war (Bourdieu, 1994: 3–12) with all its negative consequences. In contrast to Charles de Gaulle, Francois Mitterrand, and Jacques Chirac, the doctrinal contribution of the contemporary President Emmanuel Macron is relatively modest. It is limited to the speeches which articulated the determination to resist the terrorist attacks and not to cede before the violence and barbarism. These speeches are excellent, namely from the grammatical point of view, and highly pathetic,

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nevertheless, their doctrinal contribution is behind these of three above-mentioned big presidents. The direct conflict of the contemporary president with the Chief of the General Staff and other symbolic authorities of French soldiers did not result from the questions of doctrinal character. At the contrary, it resulted from the disaccords in the field of their respective competencies. The rational cause of this direct clash resulted from the decision of the governing élites to cut the military budgets of France what lead to the annulations of programs of acquisition of new arms systems which are, from the point of view of soldiers, necessary for the accomplishment of missions abroad as well as in the national territory. RQ 2

What kinds of behaviour are prevailing in the strategies and tactics of the analysed groups of actors?

The behaviour of the first group, fanatical Islamic jihadists, is symbolized by brutal terrorist attacks perpetrated with the aim of destabilizing France, although the majority of them are born in this country. Moreover, it is the native country of all their parents. The enormously violent behaviour of these criminals resulted from their determination to manifest their hate to France, to harm this country as strongly as possible, and to impose their political and religious requests. The behaviour of the political élites as the second group results from the determination to deter the jihadists, and it has two main forms. First, the special military operations in the Islamic countries, namely, in a large area of Sahel, have been waged with the aim of not allowing the creation of the save havens of the jihadists. Unfortunately, these operations have been followed by punitive terrorist attacks perpetrated in the territory of France or by terrorist attacks against French soldiers engaged abroad. This fact resulted in large reductions of these operations. Second, in the territory of France, the anti-terrorist long-term operation Sentinelle is waged with the aim of protecting the so-called soft targets, which means the civilian population, cultural monuments, and critical infrastructure. The violence of the jihadists created in France an atmosphere of fear and even a “culture of fear”, which reinforced negative attitudes towards immigrants from the MENA who are increasingly identified with jihadi terrorism. This negative culture has negative political consequences: every terrorist attack is followed by antiterrorist laws and by the so-called post attentat lobbyism. As a result, democracy in France is weakened by the abandonment of some principles of the democratic way of life. France is living within a binary logic: we against them, which represents a mortal threat to the republican cohesion. RQ 3

What are the roles of the capital, habitus, and DCMs of the three key actors of the social war in contemporary France?

The capital of French jihadists as the first actor is purely violent—their terrorist attacks are perpetrated with the aim of killing, injuring, harming, and provoking a state of fear. It is evident that these attacks can never be justified. Their habitus is

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woven from a brutal and direct violence perpetrated on innocent civilian people. Their referential object is based on the doctrine called the Global Islamic Resistance Call; their ambition is to impose profound changes on French politics and the French way of life. The capital of French governing élites as the second actor results from their position as the dominant actor who is determined to take and reinforce its positions. Their habitus is symbolized, namely, by their discourses, which are full of condemnation of all terrorist attacks and of the determination to punish their perpetrators. Their referential object is framed by the relatively short-term timeframes related to elections and by ideas that open the way towards electoral victories. The French soldiers, as the third actor, use their capital based on the experiences they gained during their long-term missions in the Islamic world as well as in France. Their habitus is woven from the most important republican values and from their conviction that it is necessary to defend them. They have a rich DCM based on the following pillars: Gaullist heritage, Missions in abroad and Sentinelle, attitudes of their symbolic authorities formulated on the pages of their books. Their behaviour is strongly influenced by their direct experiences that they gained during harsh first-line combat. It is no wonder that they refuse to speak in general phrases regarding this topic and that they prefer concrete actions against imminent threats to the security of their country. Their referential object of the revolting soldiers is based on the longterm values of France and the determination to defend them against all threats and despite all possible troubles. RQ 4

What are the consequences of the revolt of French soldiers?

Since fast a decade, France has witnessed a series of clashes between the ministers and generality that culminated in July 2017 by a direct conflict at the top level: President of the Republic vs. the Chief of the General Staff. These clashes have not been provoked by the discussions about the doctrinal questions but by the disaccords in the field of competencies of two groups of actors. They have their rational causes as well as historical accidents. They resulted in an extraordinary intensification of the work of constitution: the political symbolic authorities articulated their attitudes, and the military symbolic authorities published some remarkable books that clearly explained the credo of the contemporary French soldiers who have been confronted by jihadist violence for two decades every day. In contemporary France, we are witnessing a vicious circle between the military operations waged by this country and the terrorist attacks inflicted against it by jihadist organizations. This vicious circle has three key actors: the jihadi terrorists, political élites, and soldiers. Its analysis is based on the theoretical heritage of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, namely, on his concepts of field, social war, capital, habitus, and moral harassment in the political field. This text is written as a combination of theory testing and policy evaluative work. Its aim is to offer an equilibrium between holism and individualism, between idealism vs. materialism, and between processes and outcomes. All the analyses are framed by four research questions formulated with the aim of satisfying the criteria of qualitative research.

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As a result, jihadism is perceived as the most imminent threat to the security of France as a threat to its way of life. However, as the last chapter of this book shows, since 2013, France has witnessed a unique phenomenon. The basic differences in the approach to the jihadist extremism and terrorism resulted in a series of clashes between the ministers and generality who are convinced that the approaches of the governing élites towards this threat are insufficient. Something like this exists in no other country of NATO. The above-mentioned differences culminated in July 2017 by a direct conflict at the top level: it was the conflict between the President of the Republic and the Chief of the General Staff. These clashes have not been provoked by the discussions about the doctrinal questions but by the disaccords in the field of competencies of two groups of actors. They have their rational causes as well as historical accidents. They resulted in an extraordinary intensification of the work of constitution: the political symbolic authorities articulated their attitudes, and the military symbolic authorities published some remarkable books that clearly explained the credo of the contemporary French soldiers who have been confronted by jihadist violence for two decades every day. Thanks to systematic research framed by four research questions, this book offered a first contribution to a complex analysis of the interplay between terrorist attacks, special military operations, and the security strategy applied by the French governing élites. It offers a contribution to a complex analysis of the security situation in contemporary France. Moreover, the last chapter of this book offered a first non-French large analysis of the clash between the symbolic authorities of political and military élites in France. Summary Since 2015, France has become a new front of global terrorism, with the largest numbers of perpetrated attacks as well as victims. The vicious circle of violence in this country results from long struggles between three main actors: the terrorist organizations, the governing élites, and the soldiers, who do not hesitate to openly criticize the failing immigration policy and the policy of governing élites. The DCM of French soldiers is based on the following pillars: Gaullist heritage, missions abroad as well as Sentinelle, and on the attitudes of their symbolic authorities. This book offered a first contribution to a complex analysis of an interplay between terrorist attacks, special military operations, and the security strategy applied by the French governing élites.

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